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## PLATO

### V

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PLATO  
THE REPUBLIC  
BOOKS I-V

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY  
PAUL SHOREY



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## INTRODUCTION

ANALYSES of the *Republic* abound.<sup>a</sup> The object of this sketch is not to follow all the windings of its ideas, but to indicate sufficiently their literary framework and setting. Socrates speaks in the first person, as in the *Charmides* and the *Lysis*. He relates to Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and an unnamed fourth person, as we learn from the introduction of the *Timaeus*, a conversation which took place "yesterday" at the Peiraeus. The narrative falls on the day of the Lesser Panathenaea, and its scene, like that of the *Timaeus*, Proclus affirms to be the city or the Acropolis, a more suitable place, he thinks, for the quieter theme and the fit audience but few than the noisy seaport, apt symbol of Socrates' contention with the sophists.<sup>b</sup>

The *Timaeus*, composed some time later than the *Republic*, is by an afterthought represented as its

<sup>a</sup> Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*, vol. iii. pp. xvi-clvii; Grote's *Plato*, vol. iv. pp. 1-94; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. pp. 54-105; William Boyd, *An Introduction to the Republic of Plato*, London, 1904, pp. 196 ff.; Richard Lewis Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, London, 1904; Ueberweg-Praechter, *Geschichte der Philosophie, Altertum*, pp. 231-234 and 269-279; Wilamowitz, *Platon*<sup>2</sup>, i. pp. 393-449; etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Proclus, *In Rem P.* vol. i. p. 17. 3 Kroll. Cf. also *Laws*, 705 A.

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sequel. And the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and unfinished *Critias* constitute the first of the "trilogies" in which Aristophanes of Byzantium arranged the Platonic dialogues.<sup>a</sup> The *Timaeus* accordingly opens with a brief recapitulation of the main political and social features of the *Republic*. But nothing can be inferred from the variations of this slight summary.<sup>b</sup>

The dramatic date of the dialogue is plausibly assigned by Boeckh<sup>c</sup> to the year 411 or 410.<sup>d</sup> Proof is impossible because Plato admits anachronisms in his dramas.<sup>e</sup>

Socrates tells how he went down to the Peiraeus to attend the new festival of the Thracian Artemis, Bendis,<sup>f</sup> and, turning homewards, was detained by

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, and Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*<sup>4</sup>, vol. ii. pt. i. pp. 494 f., n. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Proclus tries to show that the points selected for emphasis are those which prefigure the constitution and government of the universe by the Creator (*In Tim.* 17 E-F). His reasoning is differently presented but hardly more fantastic than that of modern critics who endeavour to determine by this means the original design or order of publication of the parts of the *Republic*. Cf. further Taylor, *Plato*, p. 264, n. 2.

<sup>c</sup> *Kleine Schriften*, iv. pp. 437 ff., especially 448.

<sup>d</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 263, n. 1, argues that this is the worst of all possible dates.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Jowett and Campbell, vol. iii. pp. 2-3; Zeller, vol. ii. pt. i. p. 489. Arguments are based on the circumstances of the family of Lysias, the presumable age of Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus and Thrasymachus, and the extreme old age of Sophocles.

<sup>f</sup> The religion of Bendis may have been known at Athens as early as Cratinus's *Thraittai* (443 B.C.), Kock, *Fragmenta*, i. 34. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen*, p. 490, cites inscriptions to prove its establishment in Attica as early as 429-428 B.C. But he thinks Plato's "inasmuch as this was the first celebration" may refer to special ceremonies first instituted circa 411 B.C.

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a group of friends who took him to the house of Polemarchus, brother of the orator Lysias.<sup>a</sup> A goodly company was assembled there, Lysias and a younger brother Euthydemus—yea, and Thrasymachus of Chalcedon,<sup>b</sup> Charmantides of the deme Paiania,<sup>c</sup> Cleitophon,<sup>d</sup> and conspicuous among them the venerable Cephalus, crowned from a recent sacrifice and a prefiguring type of the happy old age of the just man.<sup>e</sup> A conversation springs up which Socrates guides to an inquiry into the definition and nature of justice (330 D, 331 C, 332 B) and to the conclusion that the conventional Greek formula, "Help your friends and harm your enemies," cannot be right (335 E-336 A), since it is not the function (ἔργον, 335 D) of the good man to do evil to any. The sophist

<sup>a</sup> See Lysias in any classical dictionary. He returned to Athens from Thurii *circa* 412 B.C. Polemarchus was the elder brother. He was a student of philosophy (*Phaedr.* 257 B). Whether he lived with Cephalus or Cephalus with him cannot be inferred with certainty. Lysias perhaps had a separate house at the Peiraeus (*cf. Phaedr.* 227 B). The family owned three houses in 404 B.C. (Lysias, *Or.* 12. 18), and Blass (*Attische Beredsamkeit*, i. p. 347) infers from Lysias, 12. 16 that Polemarchus resided at Athens. Lysias takes no part in the conversation. He was no philosopher (*Phaedr.* 257 B).

<sup>b</sup> A noted sophist and rhetorician. *Cf. Phaedr.* 266 C, Zeller<sup>6</sup>, i. pp. 1321 ff.; Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*<sup>2</sup>, i. pp. 244-258; Sidgwick, *Journ. of Phil.* (English), v. pp. 78-79, who denies that Thrasymachus was, properly speaking, a sophist; Diels, *Fragmente*<sup>3</sup>, ii. pp. 276-282.

<sup>c</sup> Blass, *op. cit.* ii. p. 19.

<sup>d</sup> Apparently a partisan of Thrasymachus. His name is given to a short, probably spurious, dialogue, of which the main thought is that Socrates, though excellent in exhortation or protreptic, is totally lacking in a positive and coherent philosophy. Grote and others have conjectured it to be a discarded introduction to the *Republic*.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf.* 329 D, 331 A with 613 B-C.



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Thrasymachus, intervening brutally (336 B), affirms the immoralist thesis that justice is only the advantage of the (politically) stronger, and with humorous dramatic touches of character-portrayal is finally silenced (350 c-d), much as Calicles is refuted in the *Gorgias*. The conclusion, in the manner of the minor dialogues, is that Socrates knows nothing (354 c). For since he does not know what justice is, he cannot *a fortiori* determine the larger question raised by Thrasymachus's later contention (352 D), whether the just life or the unjust life is the happier.

Either the first half or the whole of this book detached would be a plausible companion to such dialogues as the *Charmides* and *Laches*, which deal in similar manner with two other cardinal virtues, temperance and bravery. It is an easy but idle and unverifiable conjecture that it was in Plato's original intention composed as a separate work, perhaps a discarded sketch for the *Gorgias*, and only by an afterthought became an introduction for the *Republic*.<sup>a</sup> It is now an excellent introduction and not, in view of the extent of the *Republic*, disproportionate in length. That is all we know or can know.

The second book opens with what Mill describes as a "monument of the essential fairness of Plato's mind"<sup>b</sup>—a powerful restatement of the theory of Thrasymachus by the brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus. They are not content with the dialectic that reduced Thrasymachus to silence (358 B). They demand a demonstration which will convince the youth hesitating at the cross-roads of virtue and

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. xxv, note b.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Dissertations and Discussions*, vol. iv. p. 311.

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vice (365 A-B)<sup>a</sup> that it is really and intrinsically better to be than to seem just.<sup>b</sup>

It is Plato's method always to restate a satirized and controverted doctrine in its most plausible form before proceeding to a definitive refutation.<sup>c</sup> As he himself says in the *Phaedrus* (272 c), "it is right to give the wolf too a hearing."

It is also characteristic of Plato that he prefers to put the strongest statement of the sophistic, immoralist, Machiavellian, Hobbesian, Nietzschean political ethics in the mouths of speakers who are themselves on the side of the angels.<sup>d</sup> There is this historical justification of the procedure, that there exists not a shred of evidence that any contemporary or predecessor of Plato could state any of their theories which he assailed as well, as fully, as coherently, as systematically, as he has done it for them.

In response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates proposes to study the nature of justice and injustice writ large in the larger organism of the state, and to test the conceptions so won by their application to the individual also (368.E, 369 A). Plato, though he freely employs

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25, n. 164.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 362 A with 367 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 8: ". . . the elaborate refutations which Plato thinks fit to give of the crudest form of hostile theories sometimes produce an impression of unfairness upon modern critics. They forget two things: First, that he always goes on to restate the theory and refute its fair meaning; second, that in the case of many doctrines combated by Plato there is no evidence that they were ever formulated with the proper logical qualifications except by himself."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 368 A-B.

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metaphor, symbolism, and myth, never bases his argument on them.<sup>a</sup> The figurative language here, as elsewhere, serves as a transition to, a framework for, an illustration of, the argument. Man is a social and political animal, and nothing but abstract dialectics can come of the attempt to isolate his psychology and ethics from the political and social environment that shapes them.<sup>b</sup> The question whether the main subject of the *Republic* is justice or the state is, as Proclus already in effect said, a logomachy.<sup>c</sup> The construction of an ideal state was a necessary part of Plato's design, and actually occupies the larger part of the *Republic*. But it is, as he repeatedly tells us, logically subordinated to the proof that the just is the happy life.<sup>d</sup>

It is idle to object that it is not true and cannot be proved that righteousness is verifiably happiness. The question still interests humanity, and Plato's discussion of it, whether it does or does not amount to a demonstration, still remains the most instructive and suggestive treatment of the theme in all literature.

There is little profit also in scrutinizing too curiously the unity or lack of unity of design in the *Republic*, the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my review of Barker, "Greek Political Theory," in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxix., 1920, p. 86: "To say (on p. 119) that 'by considering the temper of the watchdog Plato arrives at the principle,' etc., is to make no allowance for Plato's literary art and his humour. Plato never really deduces his conclusions from the figurative analogies which he uses to illustrate them."

<sup>b</sup> Cf., e.g., *Rep.* 544 D-E, and *infra*, p. xxvi.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the long discussion of Stallbaum in his Introduction to the *Republic*, pp. vii-lxv. For Proclus cf. *On Rep.* p. 349 (ed. of Kroll, p. 5 and p. 11).

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 352 D, 367 E, 369 A, 427 D, 445 A-B, 576 C, and especially 472 B with 588 B and 612 B.

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scale and proportion of the various topics introduced, the justification and relevance of what may seem to some modern readers disproportionate digressions. The rigid, undeviating logic which Poe postulates for the short story or poem has no application to the large-scale masterpieces of literature as we actually find them. And it is the height of naïveté for philological critics who have never themselves composed any work of literary art to schoolmaster such creations by their own *a priori* canons of the logic and architectonic unity of composition. Such speculations have made wild work of Homeric criticism. They have been applied to Demosthenes *On the Crown* and Virgil's *Aeneid*. Their employment either in criticism of the *Republic* or in support of unverifiable hypotheses about the order of composition of its different books is sufficiently disposed of by the common sense of the passages which I have quoted below.<sup>a</sup> For the reader who intelligently follows the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my review of Diesendruck's "Struktur und Charakter des Platonischen Phaidros," *Class. Phil.* vol. xxiii., 1928, pp. 79 f. : "In the Introduction to the *Republic*, Jowett writes, 'Nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose.' Goethe in conversation with Eckermann said on May 6, 1827, 'Da kommen sie und fragen, welche Idee ich in meinem Faust zu verkörpern gesucht. Als ob ich das selber wüsste und aussprechen könnte.' Or with more special application to the *Phaedrus* I may quote Bourguet's review of Raeder, 'Cet ensemble, on pensera sans doute que M. Raeder a eu tort de le juger mal construit. Au lieu d'une imperfection d'assemblage, c'est le plan même que le sujet indiquait. Et peut-être est-il permis d'ajouter qu'on arrive ainsi à une autre idée de la composition, plus large et plus profonde, que celle qui est d'ordinaire acceptée, trop asservie à des canons d'école.' "

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main argument of the *Republic*, minor disproportions and irrelevancies disappear in the total impression of the unity and designed convergence of all its parts in a predetermined conclusion. If it pleases Plato to dwell a little longer than interests the modern reader on the expurgation of Homer (379 D-394), the regulation of warfare between Greek states (469-471 c), the postulates of elementary logic (438-439), the programme of the higher education (521 ff.) and its psychological presuppositions (522-524), and the justification of the banishment of the poets (595-608 c), criticism has only to note and accept the fact.

Socrates constructs the indispensable minimum (369 D-E) of a state or city from the necessities of human life, food, shelter, clothing, the inability of the isolated individual to provide for these needs and the principle of the division of labour.<sup>a</sup> Plato is aware that the historic origin of society is to be looked for in the family and the clan. But he reserves this aspect of the subject for the *Laws*.<sup>b</sup> The hypothetical, simple primitive state, which Glaucon stigmatizes as a city of pigs (372 D), is developed into a normal modern society or city by the demand for customary luxuries, and by Herbert Spencer's principle of "the multiplication of effects," one thing leading to another (373-374). The luxurious and inflamed city (372 E) is then purged and purified by the reform of ordinary Greek education,<sup>c</sup> in which the expurgation of Homer and Homeric mythology holds a place that may weary the modern reader but is not

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 369 B-372 c and my paper on "The Idea of Justice in Plato's *Republic*," *The Ethical Record*, January 1890.

<sup>b</sup> 677 ff., 680 A-B ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. my paper, "Some Ideals of Education in Plato's *Republic*," *The Educational Bi-Monthly*, February 1908.

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disproportionate to the importance of the matter for Plato's generation and for the Christian Fathers who quote it almost entire. Luxury makes war unavoidable (373 E). The principle of division of labour (374 B-E) is applied to the military class, who receive a special education, and who, to secure the disinterested use of their power,<sup>a</sup> are subjected to a Spartan discipline and not permitted to touch gold or to own property (416-417).

In such a state the four cardinal virtues, the definitions of which were vainly sought in the minor dialogues, are easily seen to be realizations on a higher plane of the principle of the division of labour.<sup>b</sup> It is further provisionally assumed that the four cardinal virtues constitute and in some sort define goodness.<sup>c</sup> The wisdom of such a state resides predominantly in the rulers (428); its bravery in the soldiers (429), who acquire from their education a fixed and settled right opinion as to what things are really to be feared. Its sobriety, moderation, and temperance (*sophrosyne*) are the willingness of all classes to accept this division of function (431 E). Its justice is the fulfilment of its own function by every class (433). A provisional psychology (435 c-d) discovers in the human soul faculties corresponding to the three social classes (435 E ff.).<sup>d</sup> And the social and political definitions of these virtues are then seen to

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my article, "Plato and His Lessons for To-day," in the *Independent*, vol. lx., 1906, pp. 253-256.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 433, 443 c and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 427 E with 449 A, and *Gorgias*, 507 c.

<sup>d</sup> There is no real evidence that this is derived from a Pythagorean doctrine of the three lives. There is a considerable recent literature that affirms it. It is enough here to refer to Mr. A. E. Taylor's *Plato*, p. 281, and Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*<sup>3</sup>, p. 296, n. 2.

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fit the individual. Sobriety and temperance are the acceptance by every faculty of this higher division of labour (441-442). Justice is the performance by every faculty of its proper task (433 A-B with 441 D). These definitions will stand the test of vulgar instances. The man whose own soul is inherently just in this ideal sense of the word will also be just in the ordinary relations of life. He will not pick and steal and cheat and break his promises (442 E-443 A). Justice in man and state is health. It is as absurd to maintain that the unjust man can be happier than the just as it would be to argue that the unhealthy man is happier than the healthy (445 A).<sup>a</sup> Our problem is apparently solved.

It has been argued that this conclusion marks the end of a first edition of the *Republic* to which there are vague references in antiquity. There can be no proof for such an hypothesis.<sup>b</sup> Plato's plan from the first presumably contemplated an ideal state governed by philosophers (347 D), and there is distinct reference in the first four books to the necessity of securing the perpetuity of the reformed state by the superior intelligence of its rulers.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my paper on "The Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. i. p. 194: "Utilitarian ethics differs from the evolutionist, says Leslie Stephen . . . in that 'the one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the other the health of the society. . . .' Mr. Stephen adds, 'the two are not really divergent,' and this is the thesis which Plato strains every nerve to prove throughout the *Republic* and *Laws*."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. xxv, note b.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 412 A with 429 A, 497 c-D, 502 D. Cf. also the "longer way," 435 D with 504 B-C, and further, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 650, and the article "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," *Classical Philology*, October 1914.

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The transition at the beginning of the fifth book is quite in Plato's manner and recalls the transition in the *Phaedo* (84 c) to a renewal of the discussion of immortality. Here Glaucon and Adeimantus, as there Simmias and Cebes, are conversing in low tones and are challenged by Socrates to speak their mind openly (449 b). They desire a fuller explanation and justification of the paradox, too lightly let fall by Socrates, that the guardians will have all things in common, including wives and children (449 c, *cf.* 424 a). Socrates, after some demur, undertakes to expound this topic and in general the pre-conditions of the realization of the ideal state under the continued metaphor of three waves of paradox. They are (1) the exercise of the same functions by men and women (457 a, 453 to 457); (2) the community of wives (457 c); (3) (which is the condition of the realization of all these ideals) the postulate that either philosophers must become kings or kings philosophers.

The discussion of these topics and the digressions which they suggest give to this transitional book an appearance of confusion which attention to the clue of the three waves of paradox and the distinction between the desirability and the possibility of the Utopia contemplated will remove.<sup>a</sup> The last few pages of the book deprecate prevailing prejudice against the philosophers and prepare the way for the theory and description of the higher education in Books VI and VII by distinguishing from the many pretenders the true philosophers who are those who are lovers of ideas, capable of appreciating them, and able to reason in abstractions.<sup>b</sup> Whatever the meta-

<sup>a</sup> *Cf.* 452 e, 457 c, 457 d-e, 458 a-b, 461 e, 466 d, 471 c, 472 d, 473 c-d.      <sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 474 b, 475 d-e, 477-480, 479 a-b.



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physical implications of this passage<sup>a</sup> its practical significance for the higher education and the main argument of the *Republic* is that stated here.

The sixth book continues this topic with an enumeration of the qualities of the perfect student, the natural endowments that are the prerequisites of the higher education (485 ff.) and the reasons why so few (496 A) of those thus fortunately endowed are saved (494 A) for philosophy from the corrupting influences of the crowd and the crowd-compelling sophists.<sup>b</sup>

In an ideal state these sports of nature (as Huxley styles them) will be systematically selected (499 B ff.), tested through all the stages of ordinary education and finally conducted by the longer way (504 B with 435 D) of the higher education in the abstract sciences and mathematics and dialectics to the apprehension of the idea of good, which will be their guide in the conduct of the state. This simple thought is expressed in a series of symbols—the sun (506 E ff.), the divided line (509 D), the cave (514 ff.)—which has obscured its plain meaning for the majority of readers.<sup>c</sup> For the purposes of the *Republic* and apart from disputable metaphysical implications it means simply that ethics and politics ought to be something more than mere empiricism. Their principles and practice must be consistently related to a clearly conceived final standard and ideal of human welfare and good. To conceive such a standard and apply it systematically

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 490 E, 492 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. my paper on "The Idea of Good," *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 16 ff. and 74, and my article "Summum Bonum" in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

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to the complications of institutions, law, and education is possible only for first-class minds who have undergone a severe discipline in abstract thought, supplemented by a long experience in affairs (484 A, 539 E). But it is even more impossible that the multitude should be critics than that they should be philosophers (494 A). And so this which is Plato's plain meaning has been lost in the literature of mystic and fanciful interpretation of the imagery in which he clothes it.

From these heights the seventh book descends to a sober account of the higher education in the mathematical sciences and dialectic (521 c ff.). The passage is an interesting document for Plato's conception of education and perhaps for the practice in his Academy. It also is the chief text for the controverted question of Plato's attitude towards science and the place of Platonism in the history of science, but it need not further detain us here.<sup>a</sup> This book, in a sense, completes the description of the ideal state.

The eighth book, one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato, is a rapid survey of the divergence, the progressive degeneracy from the ideal state in the four types to which Plato thinks the tiresome infinity of the forms of government that minute research enumerates among Greeks and barbarians may be conveniently reduced (544 c-d). These are the timocracy, whose principle is honour (545 c ff.), the oligarchy, which regards wealth (550 c ff., 551 c), the democracy, whose slogan is

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my paper, "Platonism and the History of Science," *American Philosophical Society's Proceedings*, vol. lxvi., 1927, pp. 171 ff.

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liberty, or "doing as one likes" (557 B-E), the tyranny, enslaved to appetite. In this review history, satire, political philosophy, and the special literary motives of the *Republic* are blended in a mixture hopelessly disconcerting to all literal-minded critics from Aristotle down.

In the first two types Plato is evidently thinking of the better (544 c) and the worse aspects (548 A) of Sparta. In his portrayal of the democratic state he lets himself go in satire of fourth-century Athens (557 B ff.), intoxicated with too heady draughts of liberty (562 D) and dying of the triumph of the liberal party. His picture of the tyrant is in part a powerful restatement of Greek commonplace (565 A-576) and in part a preparation for the return to the main argument of the *Republic* (577 ff.) by direct application of the analogy between the individual and the state with which he began.

In the ninth book all the lines converge on the original problem. After adding the final touches to the picture of the terrors and inner discords (576-580) of the tyrant's soul, Plato finally decides the issue between the just and the unjust life by three arguments. The just life is proved the happier (1) by the analogy with the contrasted happiness of the royal (ideal) and the unhappiness of the tyrannized state (577 c ff.), (2) by reason of an argument which Plato never repeats but which John Stuart Mill seriously accepts (582-583): The man who lives mainly for the higher spiritual satisfactions has necessarily had experience of the pleasures of sense and ambition also. He only can compare and judge. The devotees of sense and ambition know little or nothing of the higher happiness of the intellect and the soul.

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(3) The third and perhaps the most weighty proof is the principle on which the Platonic philosophy or science of ethics rests, the fact that the pleasures of sense are essentially negative, not to say worthless, because they are preconditioned by equivalent wants which are pains.<sup>a</sup> This principle is clearly suggested in the *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Phaedrus*, and *Phaedo*, and is elaborately explained in the psychology of the *Philebus*. It is in fact the basis of the Platonic ethics, which the majority of critics persist in deducing from their notion of Plato's metaphysics. These three arguments, however, are not the last word. For final conviction Plato falls back on the old analogy of health and disease, with which the fourth book provisionally concluded the argument, and which as we there saw is all that the scientific ethics of Leslie Stephen can urge in the last resort.<sup>b</sup> The immoral soul is diseased and cannot enjoy true happiness. This thought is expressed in the image of the many-headed beast (588 c ff.) and confirmed in a final passage of moral eloquence which forms a climax and the apparent conclusion of the whole (591-592).

The tenth book may be regarded either as an appendix and after-piece or as the second and higher climax prepared by an intervening level tract separating it from the eloquent conclusion of the ninth book. The discussion in the first half of the book of the deeper psychological justification of the banishment of imitative poets is interesting in itself. It is something that Plato had to say and that could be

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 583 B ff. and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 23 f. and 26 f., and "The Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," pp. 192 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. xvi, note a.

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said here with the least interruption of the general design. But its chief service is that it rests the emotions between two culminating points and so allows each its full force. Whether by accident or design, this method of composition is found in the *Iliad*, where the games of the twenty-third book relieve the emotional tension of the death of Hector in the twenty-second and prepare us for the final climax of the ransom of his body and his burial in the twenty-fourth. It is also found in the oration *On the Crown*, which has two almost equally eloquent perorations separated by a tame level tract. In Plato's case there is no improbability in the assumption of conscious design. The intrinsic preferability of justice has been proved and eloquently summed up. The impression of that moral eloquence would have been weakened if Plato had immediately proceeded to the myth that sets forth the rewards that await the just man in the life to come. And the myth itself is much more effective after an interval of sober argument and discussion. Then that natural human desire for variation and relief of monotony for which the modulations of Plato's art everywhere provide makes us welcome the tale of Er the son of Arminius (614 B), the "angel" from over there (614 D). And we listen entranced to the myth that was saved and will save us if we believe it—believe that the soul is immortal, capable of infinite issues of good and evil, of weal or woe. So shall we hold ever to the upward way and follow righteousness and sobriety with clear-eyed reason that we may be dear to ourselves and to God, both in the time of our sojourn and trial here below and also when, like victors in the games, we receive the final crown and

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prize, that thus both here and in all the millennial pilgrim's progress of the soul of which we fable we shall fare well (621 c-d).

This summary presents only the bare framework of the ideas of the *Republic*. But we may fittingly add here a partial list of the many brilliant passages of description, character-painting, satire, imagery, and moral eloquence dispersed through the work.

They include the dramatic introduction (327-331) with the picture of the old age of the just man, prefiguring the conclusion of the whole work; the angry intervention of Thrasymachus (336 B ff.); the altercation between Thrasymachus and Cleitophon (340); Thrasymachus perspiring under Socrates' questions because it was a hot day (350 D); the magnificent restatement of the case for injustice by Glaucon and Adeimantus (357-367); the Wordsworthian idea of the influence of a beautiful environment on the young soul (401); the satiric description of the valetudinarian and *malade imaginaire* (406-407); the eloquent forecast of the fate of a society in which the guardians exploit their charges and the watchdogs become grey wolves (416-417); the satire on the lazy workman's or socialist paradise (420 D-E); the completion of the dream and the first of three noble statements of what Emerson calls the sovereignty of ethics, the moral ideal, the anticipated Stoic principle that nothing really matters but the good will (443-444; cf. 591 E, 618 c); the soul that contemplates all time and all existence (486 A); the allegory of the disorderly ship and the riotous crew (488-489); the power of popular assemblies to

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corrupt the youthful soul and all souls that have not a footing somewhere in eternity (492); the great beast that symbolizes the public (493 A-B)—not to be confused, as often happens, with the composite beast that is an allegory of the mixed nature of man; the little bald tinker who marries his master's daughter, an allegory of the unworthy wooers of divine philosophy (495 E); the true philosophers whose contemplation of the heavens and of eternal things leaves them no leisure for petty bickerings and jealousies (500 c-d); the sun as symbol of the idea of good (507-509); the divided line illustrating the faculties of mind and the distinction between the sciences and pure philosophy or dialectics (510-511); the prisoners in the fire-lit cave, an allegory of the unphilosophic, unreleased mind (514-518); the entire eighth book, which Macaulay so greatly admired; and especially its satire on democracy doing as it likes, the inspiration of Matthew Arnold (562-563); Plato's evening prayer, as it has been called, anticipating all that is true and significant in the Freudian psychology (571); the description of the tortured tyrant's soul, applied by Tacitus to the Roman emperors (578-579); the comparison of the shadows we are and the shadows we pursue with the Greeks and Trojans who fought for a phantom Helen (586 B-C); the likening of the human soul to a many-headed beast (588 c); the city of which the pattern is laid up in heaven (592 A-B); the spell of Homer (607 c-d); the crowning myth of immortality (614-621).

The *Republic* is the central and most comprehensive work of Plato's maturity. It may have been com-

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posed between the years 380 and 370 B.C. in the fifth or sixth decade of Plato's life.<sup>a</sup>

The tradition that the earlier books were published earlier can neither be proved nor disproved.<sup>b</sup>

The invention of printing has given to the idea of "publication" a precision of meaning which it could not bear in the Athens of the fourth century B.C. Long before its formal completion the plan and the main ideas of Plato's masterpiece were doubtless familiar, not only to the students of the Academy but to the rival school of Isocrates and the literary gossips of Athens.

Unlike the presumably earlier *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, the *Republic* is a positive, not to say à dogmatic, exposition of Plato's thought, and not, except in the introductory first book, an idealizing dra-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 78, n. 606; Zeller, *Plato*<sup>4</sup>, p. 551, discusses the evidence and anticipates without accepting Taylor's argument (*Plato*, p. 20) that the quotation of the sentence about philosophers being kings (*Rep.* 473 c-d, 499 b-c) by the author of the seventh *Epistle* proves that the *Republic* was already written in the year 388/7.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, xiv. 3. 3 and other passages cited by Henri Alline, *Histoire du texte de Platon*, p. 14, and Hirmer, "Entstehung und Komp. d. Plat. *Rep.*," *Jahrbücher für Phil.*, Suppl., N.F., vol. xxiii. p. 654; Wilamowitz, i. pp. 209 ff. on the "Thrasymachus"; Hans Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, pp. 187 ff.; Ueberweg-Praechter (*Alttertum*), p. 217. Cf. Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen*, etc., p. 322: "Vor allem aber bestimmt mich der Gesamtscharakter des ersten Buches, welches zu keinem anderen Zwecke geschrieben sein kann, als demjenigen, den es in dem jetzigen Zusammenhange erfüllt, nämlich, als Einleitung in ein grösseres Ganzes zu dienen. Es kann nie dazu bestimmt gewesen sein, eine Sonderexistenz zu führen, wie etwa der *Charmides*."



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matization of Socrates' talks with Athenian youths and sophists.

Aristotle cites the *Republic* as the *Politeia*,<sup>a</sup> and this was the name given to it by Plato. In 527 c it is playfully called the *Kallipolis*. The secondary title ἡ περὶ δικαίου is not found in the best manuscripts, and, as the peculiar use of ἡ indicates, was probably added later.

But, as already said, we cannot infer from this that the ethical interest is subordinated to the political.<sup>b</sup> The two are inseparable. The distinction between ethics and politics tends to vanish in early as in recent philosophy. Even Aristotle, who first perhaps wrote separate treatises on ethics and politics, combines them as ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία. He speaks of ethics as a kind of politics. And though he regards the family and the individual as historically preceding the state, in the order of nature and the idea the state is prior. The modern sociologist who insists that the psychological and moral life of the individual apart from the social organism is an unreal abstraction is merely returning to the standpoint of the Greek who could not conceive man as a moral being outside of the *polis*.<sup>c</sup> In the consciously figurative language of Plato,<sup>d</sup> the idea of justice is reflected both in the individual and the state, the latter merely exhibits it on a larger scale. Or, to put it more simply, the true and only aim of the political art is to make the citizens happier by making them better.<sup>e</sup> And though good men

<sup>a</sup> *Politics*, 1264 b 24. The plural also occurs, *ibid.* 1293 b 1.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. supra*, p. xii, note c.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf. supra*, p. xii.

<sup>d</sup> 368 D-369 A. It is uncritical to press the metaphysical suggestions of this passage.

<sup>e</sup> *Euthydemus* 291 c ff., *Gorgias* 521 D, *Euthyphro* 2 D.

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arise sporadically,<sup>a</sup> and are preserved by the grace of God in corrupt states,<sup>b</sup> the only hope for mankind is in a state governed by philosophical wisdom (473 D), and the ideal man can attain to his full stature and live a complete life only in the ideal city.<sup>c</sup>

The larger part of the *Republic* is in fact occupied with the ideal state, with problems of education and social control, but, as already said, we are repeatedly reminded (*supra*, p. xii) that all these discussions are in Plato's intention subordinated to the main ethical proof that the just life is happier than the unjust. Ethics takes precedence in that the final appeal is to the individual will and the individual thirst for happiness. Plato is to that extent an individualist and a utilitarian. Politics is primary in so far as man's moral life cannot exist outside of the state.

There are hints of the notion of an ideal state before Plato.<sup>d</sup> And the literary motif of Utopia has a long history.<sup>e</sup> But it was the success of the *Republic* and *Laws* that made the portrayal of the best state the chief problem, not to say the sole theme, of Greek political science. In Plato this was due to an idealistic temper and a conviction of the irremediable corruption of Greek social and political life. The place

<sup>a</sup> *Rep.* 520 B, *Protag.* 320 A, *Meno* 92 D-E, *Laws* 642 C, 951 B.

<sup>b</sup> *Meno* 99 E, *Rep.* 493 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 497 A; Spencer, *Ethics*, vol. i. p. 280.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 85 ff.

<sup>e</sup> Of the immense literature of the subject it is enough to refer to Alfred Dorens' "Wünschräume und Wunschzeiten" in *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1924-1925, Berlin, 1927; Fr. Kleinwächter, *Die Staats Romane*, Vienna, 1891; Edgar Salin, *Platon und die griechische Utopie*, Leipzig, 1921. An incomplete list collected from these essays includes more than fifty examples.

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assigned to the ideal state in Aristotle's *Politics* is sometimes deplored by the admirers of the matter-of-fact and inductive methods of the first and fifth books. And in our own day the value of this motif for the serious science of society is still debated by sociologists.

The eternal fascination of the literary motif is indisputable, and we may enjoy without cavil the form which the artist Plato preferred for the exposition of his thought, while careful to distinguish the thoughts themselves from their sometimes fantastic embodiment. But we must first note one or two of the fundamental differences between the presuppositions of Plato's speculations and our own. (1) Plato's state is a Greek city, not a Persian empire, a European nation, or a conglomerate America. To Greek feeling complete and rational life was impossible for the inhabitant of a village or the subject of a satrap. It was attainable only through the varied social and political activities of the Greek *polis*, equipped with agora, gymnasium, assembly, theatre, and temple-crowned acropolis. It resulted from the action and interaction upon themselves and the world of intelligent and equal freemen conscious of kinship and not too numerous for self-knowledge or too few for self-defence. From this point of view Babylon, Alexandria, Rome, London, and New York would not be cities but chaotic aggregations of men. And in the absence of steam, telegraphy, and representative government the empires of Darius, Alexander, and Augustus would not be states but loose associations of cities, tribes, and provinces. Much of Plato's sociology is therefore inapplicable to modern conditions. But though we recognize, we must not

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exaggerate the difference. The Stoic and Christian city of God, the world citizenship into which the subjects of Rome were progressively adopted, the mediaeval papacy and empire, the twentieth-century democratic nation are the expressions of larger and perhaps more generous ideals. But in respect of the achievement of a complete life for all their members, they still remain failures or experiments. The city-state, on the other hand, has once and again at Athens and Florence so nearly solved its lesser problem as to make the ideal city appear not altogether a dream. And, accordingly, modern idealists are returning to the conception of smaller cantonal communities, interconnected, it is true, by all the agencies of modern science and industrialism, but in their social tissue and structure not altogether incomparable to the small city-state which Plato contemplated as the only practical vehicle of the higher life.

(2) The developments of science and industry have made the idea of progress an essential part of every modern Utopia. The subjugation of nature by man predicted in Bacon's *New Atlantis* has come more and more to dominate all modern dreams of social reform. It is this which is to lay the spectre of Malthusianism. It is this which is to give us the four-hour day and will furnish the workman's dwelling with all the labour-saving conveniences of electricity, supply his table with all the delicacies of all the seasons, entertain his cultivated leisure with automatic reproductions of all the arts, and place flying machines and automobiles at his disposal when he would take the air.

This is not the place to estimate the part of illusion in these fancies. It is enough to observe that in dwelling too complacently upon them modern utop-

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ians are apt to forget the moral and spiritual preconditions of any fundamental betterment of human life. Whereas Plato, conceiving the external condition of man's existence to be essentially fixed, has more to tell us of the discipline of character and the elevation of intelligence. In Xavier Demaistre's *Voyage autour de ma chambre*, Plato, revisiting the glimpses of the moon, is made to say, "In spite of your glorious gains in physical science, my opinion of human nature is unchanged—but I presume that your progress in psychology, history, and the scientific control of human nature, has by this time made possible that ideal Republic which in the conditions of my own age I regarded as an impracticable dream." Demaistre was sorely embarrassed for a reply. Have we one ready?

Living in a milder climate and before the birth of the modern industrial proletariat, Plato is less haunted than we by the problem of pauperism.<sup>a</sup> And his austerity of temper would have left him indifferent, if not hostile, to the ideal of universal luxury and ease. It was not the life he appointed for his guardians, and the demand of the workers for it he has satirized in advance (420 D-E). If we add to the two points here considered some shades of ethical and religious feeling, associated with Christianity, we shall have nearly exhausted the list of fundamental differences between Plato's political and social thought and our own. The *Republic*, if we look beneath the vesture of paradox to the body of its substantive thought, might

<sup>a</sup> Cf., however, Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt*, who, however, in the opinion of some of his critics, exaggerates the industrialism and industrial problems of Athens.

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seem a book of yesterday or to-morrow. The conception of society as an organism, with the dependence of laws and institutions upon national temperament and customs, the omnipotence of public opinion, the division of labour and the reasons for it, the necessity of specialization, the formation of a trained standing army, the limitation of the right of private property, the industrial and political equality of women, the reform of the letter of the creeds in order to save the spirit, the proscription of unwholesome art and literature, the reorganization of education, eugenics, the kindergarten method, the distinction between higher and secondary education, the endowment of research, the application of the higher mathematics to astronomy and physics—all this and much more may be read in it by him who runs.

A critical interpretation would first remove some obstacles to a true appreciation interposed by captious cavils or over-ingenious scholarship, and then proceed to study Plato's ideas (1) as embedded in the artistic structure of the *Republic*, (2) as the outgrowth of Plato's thought and experience as a whole, and of the suggestions that came to him from his predecessors and contemporaries. The *Republic* is, in Huxley's words, a "noble, philosophical romance"—it is a discussion of ethics, politics, sociology, religion and education cast in the form of a *Utopia* or an *Émile*. The criticism of Plato's serious meanings is one thing. The observation of the way in which they are coloured and heightened by the exigencies of this special literary form is another. Plato himself has told us that the *Republic* is a fairy-tale or fable about justice. And he has warned us that every such finished composition must contain a large measure of what in contrast to

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the severity of pure dialectic he calls jest or play.<sup>a</sup> Within the work itself the artistic illusion had to be preserved. But even there Plato makes it plain that his chief purpose is to embody certain ideas in an ideal, not to formulate a working constitution or body of legislation for an actual state. An ideal retains its value even though it may never be precisely realized in experience. It is a pattern laid up in heaven for those who can see and understand. Plato will not even assert that the education which he prescribes is the best. He is certain only that the best education, whatever it may be, is a pre-condition of the ideal state (416 B-C). Somewhere in the infinite past or future—it may be in the barbarian world beyond our ken—the true city may be visioned whenever and wherever political power and philosophic wisdom are wedded and not as now divorced. He affirms no more.

It is a waste of ink to refute the paradoxes or harp upon the omissions of the *Republic* in disregard of these considerations. The paradoxes are softened and explained, the omissions supplied in the *Politicus* and the *Laws*, which express fundamentally identical ethical and political convictions from a slightly different point of view and a perhaps somewhat sobered mood.<sup>b</sup> To assume that differences which are easily explained by the moulding of the ideas in their literary framework are caused by revolutions in Plato's beliefs is to violate all canons of sound criticism and all the established presumptions of the unity of Plato's thought.

The right way to read the *Republic* is fairly indicated

<sup>a</sup> *Phaedr.* 278 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. my paper, "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," *Class. Phil.* vol. ix., 1914, pp. 345-369.

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by casual utterances of such critics as Renan, Pater, Emerson, and Émile Faguet. The captious attitude of mind is illustrated by the set criticism of Aristotle, the Christian Fathers, Zeller, De Quincey, Landor, Spencer, and too large a proportion of professional philologists and commentators. "As the poet too," says Emerson, "he (Plato) is only contemplative. He did not, like Pythagoras, break himself with an institution. All his painting in the *Republic* must be esteemed mythical with the intent to bring out, sometimes in violent colours, his thought."

This disposes at once of all criticism, hostile or friendly, aesthetic or philological, that scrutinizes the *Republic* as if it were a bill at its second reading in Parliament, or a draft of a constitution presented to an American state convention. The greater the ingenuity and industry applied to such interpretations the further we are led astray. Even in the *Laws* Plato warns us that we are not yet, but are only becoming, legislators.

In the *Republic* it suits Plato's design to build up the state from individual units and their economic needs. But his critics, from Aristotle to Sir Henry Maine, derive their conception of the patriarchal theory of society from his exposition of it in the *Laws*.

He embodies his criticism of existing Greek institutions in a scheme for the training of his soldiers, supplemented by the higher education of the guardians. But we cannot infer, as hasty critics have done, from 421 A that he would not educate the masses at all. The banishment of Homer is a vivid expression of Plato's demand that theology be purified and art moralized. But Milton wisely declined to treat it as a serious argument against the liberty of unlicensed



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printing in England. And nothing can be more preposterous than the statement still current in books of supposed authority that the severity of dialectics had suppressed in Plato the capacity for emotion and the appreciation of beauty. The abolition of private property among the ruling classes is partly the expression of a religious, a Pythagorean, not to say a Christian, ideal, which Plato reluctantly renounces in the *Laws*.<sup>a</sup> But it is mainly a desperate attempt to square the circle of politics and justify the rule of the intelligent few by an enforced disinterestedness and the annihilation of all possible "sinister interests."<sup>b</sup> All criticism that ignores this vital point is worthless.<sup>c</sup>

The same may be said of the community of wives, which is further, as Schopenhauer remarks, merely a drastic expression of the thought that the breeding of men ought to be as carefully managed as that of animals. It is abandoned in the *Laws*. The detailed refutations of Aristotle are beside the mark, and the denunciations of the Christian Fathers and De Quincey and Landor are sufficiently met by Lucian's remark that those who find in the *Republic* an apology for licentiousness little apprehend in what sense the divine philosopher meant his doctrine of communistic marriage.

It is the height of naïveté to demonstrate by the statistics of a Parisian crèche that the children of the guardians would die in infancy, or to inquire too curiously into the risks they would run in accompanying their parents on horseback to war (466 F, 467 F).

<sup>a</sup> *Rep.* 416, 462-463, 465 B, *Timaëus* 18 B, *Laws* 739 B-D.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. supra*, p. xv and *infra*, p. xlii.

<sup>c</sup> Even Newman, for example, seems to accept the Aristotelian objection that such a military caste will tyrannize. See Newman's *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 326 f.

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The comparison of the individual to the state is a suggestive analogy for sociology and at the same time a literary motif that is worth precisely what the writer's tact and skill can make of it. Plato's use of the idea is most effective. By subtle artifices of style the cumulative effect of which can be felt only in the original, the reader is brought to conceive of the social organism as one monster man or leviathan, whose sensuous appetites are the unruly mechanic mob, whose disciplined emotions are the trained force that checks rebellion within and guards against invasion from without, and whose reason is the philosophic statesmanship that directs each and all for the good of the whole. And conversely the individual man is pictured as a biological colony of passions and appetites which "swarm like worms within our living clay"—a curious compound of beast and man which can attain real unity and personality only by the conscious domination of the monarchical reason. The origination of this idea apparently belongs to Plato. But he can hardly be held responsible for the abuse of it by modern sociologists, or for Herbert Spencer's ponderous demonstration that with the aid of Huxley and Carpenter he can discover analogies between the body politic and the physiological body in comparison with which those of Plato are mere child's-play.

It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations of such matter-of-fact and misconceived criticism. Enough has been said perhaps to prepare the way for the broad literary common-sense appreciation of the *Republic*, which an intelligent reader, even of a translation, will arrive at for himself if he reads without prejudice and without checking at every little apparent oddity in the reasoning or the expression.

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The proper historical background for such a broad understanding of Plato's political and social philosophy is Thucydides' account of the thirty years' Peloponnesian war, which Hobbes translated in order to exhibit to England and Europe the evils of unbridled democracy. Thucydides' history is the ultimate source of all the hard-headed cynical political philosophy of Realpolitik and the Superman, from Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Hobbes to Nietzsche and Bernardi. And in recent years the speeches which he attributes to the Athenian ambassadors proposing to violate the neutrality of Melos have been repeatedly rediscovered and quoted. They are merely the most drastic expression of a philosophy of life and politics which pervades the entire history and which I studied many years ago in a paper on the "Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides,"<sup>a</sup> some of the ideas of which are reproduced apparently by accident in Mr. Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus*. The moral disintegration of a prolonged world war is the predestined medium for the culture of this poisonous germ. And the Peloponnesian war was a world war for the smaller international system of the Greek states. It was for Greece that suicide which our civil war may prove to have been for the old American New England and Virginia, and which we pray the World War may not prove to have been for Europe. The analogy, which we need not verify in detail, is startling, though the scale in Greece was infinitely smaller. In both cases we see an inner ring or focus of intense higher civilization encompassed by a vast

<sup>a</sup> *Transactions of Amer. Philol. Assoc.* vol. xxiv. pp. 66 ff. *The Dial*, Chicago, 1907, xliii. p. 202.

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outer semi-civilized or barbarian world of colonization, places in the sun, trade monopolies, and spheres of influence. In both the inner ring is subdivided into jealous states whose unstable equilibrium depends on the maintenance of the balance of power between two great systems, one commercial, democratic, and naval, the other authoritative, disciplined, military. The speeches of Pericles and King Archidamus in Thucydides analyse, contrast, and develop the conflicting ideals and weigh sea power against land power, as the speeches of rival prime ministers have done in our day. I merely suggest the parallel. What concerns us here is that to understand Plato we must compare, I do not say identify, him with Renan writing about *la réforme intellectuelle et morale* of France after the *année terrible*, or, *absit omen*, an English philosopher of 1950 speculating on the decline and fall of the British Empire, or an American philosopher of 1980 meditating on the failure of American democracy. The background of the comparatively optimistic Socrates was the triumphant progressive imperialistic democracy of the age of Pericles, and the choric odes of the poets and prophets of the imaginative reason, Aeschylus and Sophocles. The background of Plato, the experience that ground to devilish colours all his dreams and permanently darkened his vision of life, was the world war that made shipwreck of the Periclean ideal and lowered the level of Hellenic civilization in preparation for its final overthrow. The philosophy which he strove to overcome in himself and others was the philosophy of the political speeches in Thucydides and of those bitter disillusionized later plays of Euripides. His

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middle age fell and his *Republic* was conceived in an Athens stagnating under the hateful oppression of the Spartan Junker dominating Greece in alliance with the unspeakable Persian. The environment of his old age and its masterpiece, the *Laws*, was the soft, relaxed, sensuous, cynical, pococurante, *fin de siècle* Athens of the New Comedy, drifting helplessly to the catastrophe of Chaeronea—the Athens which Isocrates expected to save by treaties of peace with all mankind and shutting up the wine-shops, and which Demosthenes vainly admonished to build up its fleet and drill its armies against the Macedonian peril. When Plato is characterized as an unpatriotic, undemocratic, conservative reactionary, false to the splendid Periclean tradition, we must remember that Pericles' funeral oration had become for all but the fourth of July orators of Plato's generation as intolerable and ironic a mockery as Lowell's *Commemoration Ode* and Lincoln's Gettysburg address will seem to America if democracy fails to unify us into a real people. His philosophy was "reactionary" in the sense that it was his own inevitable psychological and moral reaction against the sophistical ethics<sup>a</sup> of the Superman on one side and on the other against the cult of inefficiency and indiscipline which he had come to regard as wholly inseparable from unlimited democracy. This reactionary aspect of Plato's political and social philosophy has been vividly depicted, though perhaps with some strained allusions to the democracy of contemporary France, in Faguet's five chapters on the hatreds of Plato.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my paper on the " Interpretation of the *Timaeus*," *A.J.P.* vol. ix. pp. 395 ff.

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The equivocal labels radical and conservative mean little in their application to minds of the calibre of a Plato or even of a Burke. What really matters is the kind of conservative, the kind of radical that you are. As Mill says, there is a distinction ignored in all political classification, and more important than any political classification, the difference between superior and inferior minds.

As a thinker for all time, Plato in logical grasp and coherency of consecutive and subtle thought, stands apart from and above a Renan, a Burke, an Arnold, or a Ruskin. But as a man, his mood, inevitably determined by his historical environment, was that of Matthew Arnold in the 'sixties, endeavouring to prick with satire the hide of the British Philistine, or of Ruskin in the 'seventies embittered by the horrors of the Franco-Prussian War and seeking consolation in the political economy of the future. We may denominate him a conservative and a reactionary, in view of this personal mood and temper, and his despair of the democracy of *fin de siècle* Athens. But his *Utopian Republic* advocated not only higher education and votes, but offices for women, and a eugenic legislation that would stagger Oklahoma. And so if you turn to Professor Murray's delightful *Euripides and his Age*, you will read that Euripides is the child of a strong and splendid tradition and is, together with Plato, the first of all rebels against it. Suppose Professor Murray had written, Bernard Shaw is the child of a strong and splendid tradition and, together with Matthew Arnold, the first of all rebels against it. I think we should demur, and feel that something was wrong. We should decline to bracket Arnold

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and Shaw as rebels to English tradition, despite the fact that both endeavoured to stir up the British Philistine with satire and wit. As a matter of fact, Plato detested Euripides and all his works, and generally alludes to him with Aristophanic irony.

If we pass by the terrible arraignment in the *Gorgias* of the democracy that was guilty of the judicial murder of Socrates, the political philosophy of the minor dialogues is mainly a Socratic canvassing of definitions, and an apparently vain but illuminating quest for the supreme art of life, the art that will make us happy, the political or royal art, which guides and controls all else, including music, literature, and education. This conception is represented in the *Republic* by the poetic allegory of the Idea of Good and the description of the higher education of the true statesman which alone lends it real content. The matter is quite simple, and has been confused only by the refusal to accept Plato's own plain statements about it and the persistent tendency to translate Plato's good poetry into bad metaphysics.<sup>a</sup>

The metaphysics of the Idea of Good will be treated in the introduction to the second volume. Here it is enough to quote Mr. Chesterton, who, whether by accident or design, in a lively passage of his *Heretics*, expresses the essential meaning of the doctrine in the political, ethical, and educational philosophy of the *Republic* quite sufficiently for practical purposes.

“Every one of the popular modern phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is good. We are fond of talking about ‘liberty’; that, as we talk of it, is a dodge to avoid discussing

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my article “Summum Bonum” in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

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what is good. We are fond of talking about 'progress'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about 'education'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. The modern man says, 'Let us leave all these arbitrary standards and embrace liberty.' That is, logically rendered, 'Let us not decide what is good, but let it be considered good not to decide it.' He says, 'Away with your old moral formulae; I am for progress.' This, logically stated, means, 'Let us not settle what is good; but let us settle whether we are getting more of it.' He says, 'Neither in religion nor morality, my friend, lie the hopes of the race, but in education.' This, clearly expressed, means, 'We cannot decide what is good, but let us give it to our children.' " So far Mr. Chesterton.

Plato's Idea of Good, then, means that the education of his philosophic statesmen must lift them to a region of thought which transcends the intellectual confusion in which these dodges and evasions alike of the ward boss and the gushing settlement-worker dwell. He does not tell us in a quotable formula what the good is, because it remains an inexhaustible ideal. But he portrays with entire lucidity his own imaginative conception of Greek social good in his *Republic* and *Laws*.

The doctrine of the Idea of Good is simply the postulate that social well-being must be organized not by rule-of-thumb, hand-to-mouth opportunist politicians, but by highly trained statesmen systematically keeping in view large and consciously apprehended ends. The only way to compass this, Plato affirms, is first to prepare and test your rulers by the severest education physical and mental, theoretical and



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practical that the world has yet seen, and secondly to insure their freedom from what Bentham calls "sinister interests" by taking away from them their safe-deposit vaults and their investments in corporation stock and requiring them to live on a moderate salary and a reasonable pension.

This, or so much of it as may be translated into modern terms, is the essence of Plato's social and political philosophy.

But Plato's *Republic*, whatever its contributions to political theory or its suggestiveness to the practical politician or social reformer, is not a treatise on political science or a text-book of civics. It is the City of God in which Plato's soul sought refuge from the abasement of Athenian politics which he felt himself impotent to reform. The philosopher, he says (496 D) with unmistakable reference to Socrates (*Apology* 31 E) and apology for himself, knows that no politician is honest nor is there any champion of justice at whose side he may fight and be saved. He resembles a man fallen among wild beasts. He is unwilling to share and impotent singly to oppose their rapine. He is like one who in a driving storm of dust and sleet stands aside under shelter of a wall and seeing others filled full with all iniquity, must be content to live his own life, keep his soul unspotted from the world, and depart at last with peace and good will and gracious hopes. This is something. But how much more could he accomplish for himself and others, Plato wistfully adds, in a society in harmony with his true nature. And so he plays (it is his own word) with the construction of such a state. But when the dream is finished, his epilogue is: We have built a city in words, since it exists nowhere on earth, though there may be a

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pattern of it laid up in heaven. But whether it exists or not, the true philosopher will concern himself with the politics of this city only, of this city only will he constitute himself a citizen. As Emerson puts it, he was born to other politics. The witty and cynical Lucian mocks at this city in the clouds where Socrates lives all alone by himself, governed by his own laws. And I have no time to answer him now, even by enumeration of the great spirits who have taken refuge in the Platonic City of God. It was there that St. Augustine found consolation and hope in the crash and downfall of the Roman Empire. And fifteen hundred years later an unwonted glow suffuses the arid style of Kant when he speaks of the man who is conscious of an inward call to constitute himself by his conduct in this world the citizen of a better.

But to those political and social philosophers who disdain a fugitive and cloistered virtue and ask for some more helpful practical lesson than this, Plato's *Republic* offers two main suggestions.

The first is the way of St. Francis : the acceptance of the simple life, which by a startling coincidence Glaucon, in reply to Socrates, and the Pope, in remonstrance with St. Francis, designate as a city of pigs.<sup>a</sup> But if we insist on a sophisticated civilization, a fevered city as Plato styles it, we shall find no remedy for the ills to which human nature is heir so long as our guiding principle is the equality of unequals (558 c) and the liberty of every one to do as he pleases. The only way of political and social salvation for such a state is self-sacrificing discipline, specialized efficiency, and government administered by men whom we have

<sup>a</sup> Matthew Paris *apud* Sabatier, *Life of St. Francis*, p. 97 "vade frater et quaere porcus (*sic*)," etc.

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educated for the function and whom we compel to be unselfish.

We shall not wrong them by this suppression of their lower selves. For they will find in it their highest happiness and so apprehend the full meaning of old Hesiod's saying that the half is more than the whole.<sup>a</sup> All this, though often confounded with the gospel of the strong man, is in Plato's intentions its diametrical opposite. Plato's strong man is not, and is not permitted to be, strong for himself. And finding his own happiness in duty fulfilled he will procure through just and wise government as much happiness as government and education can bestow upon men. Plato never loses faith in the leadership of the right leaders nor in the government of scholars and idealists, provided always that the scholarship is really the highest and severest that the age can furnish, the idealism tempered by long apprenticeship to practical administration, and the mortal nature which cannot endure the temptations of irresponsible power held in check by self-denying ordinances of enforced disinterestedness.

Such scholars in politics and such idealists, and they only, can do for us what the practical politician and the opportunist who never even in dreams have seen the things that are more excellent, can never achieve. Think you (*Rep.* 500) that such a man, if called to the conduct of human affairs and given the opportunity not merely to mould his own soul but to realize and embody his vision in the institutions and characters of men, will be a contemptible artizan of sobriety and righteousness and all social and human virtue? Will he not like an artist glance frequently back and forth

<sup>a</sup> *Cf. Rep.* 419, 420 B, C, 466 B-C.

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from his model, the city in the clouds, home of the absolute good, the true and the beautiful, to the mortal copy which he fashions so far as may be in its image? And so mixing and mingling the pigments on his palette he will reproduce the true measure and likeness of man which even old Homer hints is or ought to be the likeness of God.

### THE TEXT

Convention requires that something should be said about the text. How little need be said appears from the fact that the translation was originally made from two or three texts taken at random. The text of this edition was for convenience set up from the Teubner text, and the adjustments in either case have presented no difficulty. I have tried to indicate all really significant divergences and my reasons. That is all that the student of Plato's philosophy or literary art needs.

The tradition of the text of the *Republic* is excellent.<sup>a</sup> The chief manuscripts have been repeatedly collated, and the *Republic* has been printed in many critical editions that record variations significant and insignificant. The text criticism of Plato to-day is a game that is played for its own sake, and not for any important results for the text itself or the interpretation. The validity of a new text to-day depends far more on acquaintance with Platonic Greek and Platonic thought than on any rigour of the text-critical and palaeographic game. Nothing whatever results from the hundred and six pages of

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the work of Alline referred to *supra*, p. xxv, note b.

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“Textkritik” in the Appendix to Professor Wilamowitz’s *Platon*. Adam repeatedly changed his mind about the readings of his preliminary text edition when he came to write his commentary, and with a candour rare in the *irritabile genus* of text critics withdrew an emendation which I showed to be superfluous by a reference to the *Sophist*.

The Jowett and Campbell edition devotes about a hundred pages of costly print to what are for the most part unessential and uncertain variations. As I said in reviewing it (*A.J.P.* xvi. pp. 229 ff.): “There is something disheartening in the exiguity of the outcome of all this toil, and one is tempted to repeat Professor Jowett’s heretical dictum, that ‘such inquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer detain us from more important subjects.’ There is really not much to be done with the text of Plato. The game must be played strictly according to the rules, but when it is played out we feel that it was hardly worth the midnight oil. The text of this edition must have cost Professor Campbell a considerable portion of the leisure hours of two or three years. Yet, as he himself says at the close of his interesting, if discursive, essay: ‘Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the *Republic* as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato’s philosophy would remain uninjured.’

“Of the twelve passages which Professor Campbell regards as still open to suspicion (vol. ii. p. 115), only two affect the sense even slightly. 387 c φρίπτειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς οἴεται, for which our editors read

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ὡς οἶόν τε (which they refer to *q*, and the correction of Par. A by *q*, not to Par. A, as hitherto), rejecting Hermann's more vigorous ὅσ' ἔτη and not venturing to insert in the text L. C.'s suggestion, ὡς ἑτεά. In ix. 581 E, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, there is no real difficulty if we accept, with nearly all editors, Graser's τί οἰώμεθα and place interrogation points after μανθάνοντα and πόρρω. Professor Jowett would retain ποιώμεθα and take the words τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω as ironical; I do not care to try to convert anyone whose perceptions of Greek style do not tell him that this is impossible. Professor Campbell's suggestion, τῆς ἀληθινῆς, of which he thinks ἡδονῆς a substituted gloss, does not affect the meaning and supplies a plausible remedy for the seemingly objectionable repetition of ἡδονῆς. But it is, I think, unnecessary. The Platonic philosopher thinks that sensual pleasures are no pleasures. Cf. *Philebus* 44 C ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοῆτευμα οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι. The difficulties in 388 E, 359 C, 567 E, 590 D, 603 C, 615 C are too trifling for further debate. 439 E ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ is certainly awkward. L. C.'s suggestion, οὐ πιστεύω τούτῳ, with changed reference of τούτῳ, equally so. 533 E ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνεῖα ὃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ is impossible, and the ingenuity is wasted that is spent upon it in the commentary to this result: 'An expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition that of which it speaks as existing in the mind.' All we want is the thought of *Charmides* 163 D δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοῦνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς, and that is given by the only tolerable text yet proposed, that of Hermann: ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξω

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σαφήνειαν ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ (ἀρκέσει), which is ignored by our editors and which is indeed too remote from the mss. to be susceptible of proof. In 562 B the unwarranted ὑπέρπλουτος, which B. J. defends *more suo*, may be emended by deleting ὑπερ or by L. C.'s plausible suggestion, που πλούτος. In 568 D L. C.'s suggestion, πωλουμένων, is as easy a way as any of securing the required meaning which grammar forbids us to extract from ἀποδομένων.

“ Of the 29 passages in which the present text relies on conjectures by various hands, none affects the sense except possibly the obvious παισὶν for πᾶσιν (494 B and 431 C), Schneider's palmary καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα for καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα, 554 B, Graser's τί οἴόμεθα, 581 D, Vermehren's χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων, which restores concinnity in 401 E, and L. C.'s διὰ τοῦ bis, 440 C, for διὰ τὸ, an emendation which was pencilled on the margin of my Teubner text some years ago. The others restore a paragogic ν or a dropped ἄν or an iota subscript, or smooth out an anacoluthon. Professor Campbell himself suggests some fifteen emendations in addition to the one admitted to the text (vol. ii. p. 123); three or four of these have already been considered. Of the others the most important are the (in the context) cacophonous ἀξίως, 496 A, for ἄξιον which is better omitted altogether, with Hermann; ἐγγύς τι τείνων τῶν τοῦ σώματος for εἶναι, 518 D, which is clever and would commend itself but for a lingering doubt whether the phrase had not a half-humorous suggestion in Plato's usage; and ἢ οὐκ (*sic q*) . . . ἀλλοίαν τε [Stallb. for τοι] φήσεις, 500 A. It is unnecessary to follow Professor Campbell in his recension of the superfluous emendations of Cobet,

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Madvig and others not admitted into the text. The man who prints an emendation that is not required but is merely possible Greek in the context is a thief of our time and should be suppressed by a conspiracy of silence. I could wish, however, that our editors had followed Hermann in admitting Nägelsbach's ἔτι ἀδυναμία, supported by a quotation from Iamblichus, for ἐπ' ἀδυναμία in 532 B-C. ἐπ' ἀδυναμία βλέπειν 'to look powerlessly,' *i.e.* 'to be without the power to see,' as our editors construe, after Schneider, makes large demands on our faith in the flexibility of Greek idiom, and Stallbaum's 'bei dem Unvermögen zu sehen' is not much better. Moreover, the ἔτι adds a touch that is needed; *cf.* 516 A πρῶτον μὲν, etc. For the rest, all this matter, with much besides, is conscientiously repeated in the commentary, though exhaustiveness is after all not attained, and many useful readings recorded in Stallbaum or Hermann are ignored. I have noted the following points, which might (without much profit) be indefinitely added to. In 332 E no notice is taken of the plausible προπολεμῆν approved by Ast and Stephanus. In 365 B εἰ μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, which has sufficient ms. authority, is better than εἰ καὶ μὴ δοκῶ. The thought is: 'I shall profit nothing from being just (even) if I seem the opposite.' What our editors mean by saying that εἰ καὶ μὴ δοκῶ is more idiomatic I cannot guess. In 365 D, καὶ (οὐδ' Jowett and Campbell) ἡμῶν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν, I think the consensus of the mss. *could* be defended, despite the necessity for a negative that nearly all editors have felt here. The argument of the entire passage would run: There exist (1) political clubs ἐπὶ τὸ λανθάνειν, and (2) teachers of persuasion



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who will enable us to evade punishment if detected. But, you will say, we cannot (1) elude or (2) constrain the gods. The answer is (transferring the question to the higher sphere), as for gods, perhaps (1) they do not exist or are careless of mankind, or (2) can be persuaded or bought off by prayers and ceremonies. Accordingly, we must either (1) try to escape detection, as on the previous supposition, before the gods were introduced into the argument, or (2) invoke priests and hierophants as in the former case teachers of the art of persuasion. The logic of *καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν* is loose, but it is quite as good as that of *εἰ μὴ εἰσὶν* as an answer to *θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν δυνατόν*, and it is not absolutely necessary to read *οὐδ', οὔκουν τί* or *ἀμελητέον*. The *καὶ* of *καὶ ἡμῖν* indicates an illogical but perfectly natural antithesis between 'us' on the present supposition and the members of the political clubs above. In 378 D our editors follow Baiter in punctuating after *γραυσί*. The antithesis thus secured between *παιδία εὐθὺς* and *πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις* (an *γενομένοις*?) favours this. The awkwardness of the four times repeated ambiguous *καὶ*, and the difficulty of the dative with *λογοποιεῖν* and the emphasis thus lost of the triplet *καὶ γέρονσι καὶ γραυσὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις*, are against it. 397 A, L. C. accepts Madvig's (Schneider's?) *μιμήσεται* for *διηγῆσεται*, *adversante* B. J., but *διηγῆσεται* seems to be favoured by the balance of the sentence: *πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγῆσεται καὶ . . . οἰήσεται ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμείσθαι*. 442 C *σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει τῷ ὃ ἦρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελθεν ἔχον αὐτὸ κ' κείνο*, etc. Our editors seem to feel no difficulty in the *τῷ ὃ*, etc., nor do they note the omission of

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τῶ by Par. K and Mon. A simple remedy would be to omit the τῶ before ὁ and insert it after παρήγγελλεν, reading τῶ ἔχειν. In 451 A-B, in reading ὥστε εἶ (for οὐ) με παραμυθεῖ, our editors, here as elsewhere, over-estimate the possibilities of Socratic irony. 500 A. In arguing against the repetition of ἀλλοίαν in a different sense, 499 E-500 A, our editors should not have ignored the reading of M, ἀλλ' οἶαν (recorded, it is true, in the footnotes to the text), which, with the pointing and interrogation marks of Hermann, yields a much more vivacious and idiomatic text than that adopted here. Moreover, ἀλλὰ ἀποκρινεῖσθαι fits the defiant οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ above much better if taken in the sense 'contradict us' than in the sense 'change their reply.' In 521 c Hermann's οὔσα ἐπάνοδος (after Iamblichus) is the only readable idiomatic text here. Only desperate ingenuity can construe the others. In 606 c the text or footnotes should indicate Hermann's δῆ (for δὲ), which the commentary rightly prefers."

These observations are not intended as a renewal of Jowett's attack on text criticism or an illiberal disparagement of an indispensable technique. They merely explain why it was not thought necessary to waste the limited space of this edition by reprinting information which would interest a half dozen specialists at the most and which they know where to find in more detail than could possibly be given here.

The *Republic* has been endlessly edited, commented, summarized, and paraphrased (*cf. supra*, p. vii). The chief editions are enumerated in Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, 12th ed., Berlin (1926), pp. 190 ff. Schneidewin's edition is curt, critical, and

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sagacious. Stallbaum's Latin commentary is still useful for idioms and parallel passages. The two most helpful editions are English. The great three-volume work of Jowett and Campbell was critically reviewed by me in *A.J.P.* vol. xvi. pp. 223 ff., and from another point of view in the *New York Nation*, vol. lxi. (1895) pp. 82-84. Adam's painstaking and faithful commentary does not supersede, but indispensably supplements, Jowett and Campbell's. Apelt's German translation is, with a few exceptions, substantially correct, and the appended notes supply most of the information which the ordinary reader needs.

The history of the Platonic text is most amply set forth in the excellent and readable book of Alline (*Histoire du texte de Platon*, par Henri Alline, Paris, 1915). Other general discussions of the text and its history are: H. Usener, *Unser Platontext* (*Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. pp. 104-162); M. Schanz, *Studien zur Geschichte des platonischen Textes*, Würzburg, 1874; Wohlrab, "Die Platon-Handschriften und ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen," *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie*, Suppl. 15 (1887), pp. 641-728. Cf. further Ueberweg-Praechter, vol. i., appendix pp. 67 ff. The manuscripts of Plato are enumerated and described by Jowett and Campbell, vol. ii. pp. 67-131, Essay II. "On the Text of this Edition of Plato's *Republic*"; less fully by Adam, who did not live to write a proposed introductory volume supplementing his commentary (*The Republic of Plato*, vol. i. pp. xiii-xvi); and, sufficiently for the ordinary student, by Maurice Croiset in the *Budé Plato*, vol. i. pp. 14-18.

The best manuscript is thought to be Parisinus graecus 1807 (ninth century), generally designated

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A ; then come, in more or less disputed order of merit, Venetus 185, Bekker's Π, Burnet's D (12th century); Malatestianus, plut. xxviii. 4, Burnet's M; Vindobonensis 55 (14th century), Burnet's F; Venetus 184, usually designated E, but Burnet indicates its readings by scr. Ven. 184 (15th century); Monacensis 237, Bekker's and Adam's q, but Burnet indicates its readings by scr. Mon.

## THE TRANSLATION

There are several excellent translations of the *Republic* in print. I have not hoped or tried to produce a better piece of English composition than some of these. My chief endeavour has been, while usually following the text closely, to use a justifiable apparent freedom in order to bring out the precise meaning of passages which long experience as a teacher and a reviewer has taught me are liable to misapprehension. I have tried to make such passages as intelligible as possible to an attentive and educated English reader. Other readers will continue to make as wild work of the *Republic* as they will of the Bible. My aim requires the employment sometimes of two apparent synonyms for one word, and the rendering of the same word differently in different contexts or even when repeated within a few lines. The thing cannot be done in any other way, and it can be safely attempted only by a translator who understands the shades of Plato's thought as well as something of the niceties of the Greek language.

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LIST OF PLATO'S WORKS showing their division  
into volumes in this edition and their place in the  
edition of H. Stephanus (vols. I-III, Paris, 1578).

VOLUME		PAGES
I.	Euthyphro . . . . .	I. 2A-16
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	Crito . . . . .	I. 43A-54E
	Phaedo . . . . .	I. 57A-118
	Phaedrus . . . . .	III. 227A-279C
II.	Laches . . . . .	II. 178A-201C
	Protagoras . . . . .	I. 309A-362
	Meno . . . . .	II. 70A-100B
	Euthydemus . . . . .	I. 271A-307C
III.	Lysis . . . . .	II. 203A-223B
	Symposium . . . . .	III. 172A-223D
	Gorgias . . . . .	I. 447A-527E
IV.	Cratylus . . . . .	I. 383A-440E
	Parmenides . . . . .	III. 126A-166C
	Greater Hippias . . . . .	III. 281A-304E
	Lesser Hippias . . . . .	I. 363A-376C
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VII. Theaetetus . . . . .	I. 142A-210D
Sophist . . . . .	I. 216A-268B
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Philebus . . . . .	II. 11A-67B
Ion . . . . .	I. 530A-542B
IX. Timaeus . . . . .	III. 17A-92C
Critias . . . . .	III. 106A-121C
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Epistles . . . . .	III. 309A-363C
X. The Laws I: Books I-VI . . . . .	II. 624A-785B
XI. The Laws II: Books VII- XII . . . . .	II. 788A-969D
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PLATO  
THE REPUBLIC  
BOOKS I—V



# ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ,  
ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ

St. T.  
II. p.  
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I. Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν, ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θρᾶκες ἔπεμπον.

B Προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῆμεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέ-

<sup>a</sup> For the title and the personages *cf.* *Introd.* pp. ix and vii.

<sup>b</sup> Socrates narrates in the first person, as in the *Charmides* and *Lysis*; see *Introd.* p. vii, Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. p. 84. Demetrius, *On Style*, 205, cites this sentence as an example of "trimeter members." Editors give references for the anecdote that it was found in Plato's tablets with many variations. For Plato's description of such painstaking *cf.* *Phaedr.* 278 D. Cic. *De sen.* 5. 13 "scribens est mortuus."

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* 439 E; about a five-mile walk.

<sup>d</sup> Plato and Xenophon represent Socrates as worshipping the gods, νόμφ πόλεως. Athanasius, *Contra gentes*, 9, censures

# THE REPUBLIC

[OR ON JUSTICE : POLITICAL]

## CHARACTERS •

SOCRATES, GLAUCON, POLEMARCHUS, THRASYMACHUS,  
ADEIMANTUS, CEPHALUS

I. SOCRATES. I<sup>b</sup> went down yesterday to the Peiraeus<sup>o</sup> with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions<sup>d</sup> to the Goddess,<sup>e</sup> and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.<sup>f</sup> I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show made by the marching of the Thracian contingent.

After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward<sup>g</sup>

Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the fathers and mediaeval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato's regrettable concessions to polytheism—"persuasio civilis" as Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* xiii. 13. 66.

<sup>e</sup> Presumably Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is ἡ θεός for an Athenian. For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, *History of Greece*, iii. p. 189.

<sup>f</sup> See Introd. p. viii.

<sup>g</sup> "Headed homeward" is more exact and perhaps better.

λευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἔ κελεύσαι.  
καί μου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου,  
Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. καὶ  
ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη.  
Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περι-  
μένετε. Ἄλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.  
C καὶ ὀλίγω ὕστερον ὃ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ  
Ἄδειμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικ-  
ήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς.  
ὁ οὖν Πολεμαρχος ἔφη ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι  
πρὸς ἄστν ὠρμηῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες. Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς  
δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι  
ἐσμέν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἡ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη,  
κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένεν' αὐτοῦ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται<sup>1</sup> τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρῆ  
ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι; Ἡ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πείσαι  
μὴ ἀκούοντας; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. Ὡς  
τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. καὶ ὁ  
328 Ἄδειμαντος, Ἄρά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι  
λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῶ;  
Ἄφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμ-

<sup>1</sup> A<sup>1</sup>H: ἐν λείπεται Ξq.

<sup>a</sup> A Greek gentleman would always be so attended. Cf. *Charm.* 155 A, *Meno* 82 B, *Protag.* 310 c, *Demosth.* xlvii. 36.

<sup>b</sup> The "bounder" in Theophrastus, *Char.* xi. (xvii.), if he sees persons in a hurry will ask them to wait.

<sup>c</sup> *Charm.* 153 B, *Parmen.* 126 A, *infra* 449 B.

<sup>d</sup> "Ipse," cf. *Protag.* 314 D; "ipse dixit;" "Now you are not 'ipse,' for I am he."—Shakes.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. the playful threat in *Phileb.* 16 A, *Phaedr.* 236 c, *Horace, Sat.* i. 4. 142.

<sup>f</sup> For the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in *Diog. Laert.* vii. 24.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

and ordered his boy <sup>a</sup> run and bid us to wait <sup>b</sup> for him, and the boy caught hold <sup>c</sup> of my himation from behind and said, "Polemarchus wants you to wait." And I turned around and asked where his master <sup>d</sup> was. "There he is," he said, "behind you, coming this way. Wait for him." "So we will," said Glaucon, and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said, "Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us." "Not a bad guess," said I. "But you see how many we are?" he said. "Surely." "You must either then prove yourselves the better men <sup>e</sup> or stay here." "Why, is there not left," said I, "the alternative of our persuading <sup>f</sup> you that you ought to let us go?" "But *could* you persuade us," said he, "if we refused to listen?" "Nohow," said Glaucon. "Well, we won't listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it." "Do you mean to say," interposed Adeimantus, "that you haven't heard that there is to be a torch-light race <sup>g</sup> this evening on horseback in honour of the Goddess?" "On horseback?" said I. "That

<sup>g</sup> See Sterrett in *A.J.P.* xxii. p. 393. "The torch was passed down the lines which competed as wholes. Cf. Swinburne, *Hymn of Man* :

Where the runners outwear each other, but running with  
lampsless hands,  
No man takes light from his brother, till blind at the goal  
he stands."

For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, *Laws*, 776 B, Lucretius ii. 79.

πάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολεμάρχος· καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἣν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι. ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ  
 Β μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

II. Ἦμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Χαλκηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιαιεῖα καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου· ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατήρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος.

Καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι· διὰ  
 C χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη αὐτόν. καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγγανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ. εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν τοῦ ραδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σε ἔδει δεῦρο ἰέναι,

<sup>a</sup> Rise from table. This is forgotten.

<sup>b</sup> In "American," the colloquial Greek means "be a sport."

<sup>c</sup> The particles single out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in *Tim.* 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the *dramatis personae*.

<sup>d</sup> A companion picture to the fair vision of the youthful Lysis (*Lysis*, 207 A). The wreath was worn at the sacrifice.

## THE REPUBLIC. BOOK I

is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean?" "That's the way of it," said Polemarchus, "and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up<sup>a</sup> and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask."<sup>b</sup> "It looks as if we should have to stay," said Glaucon. "Well," said I, "if it so be, so be it."

II. So we went with them to Polemarchus's house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and<sup>c</sup> Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home.

And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of chair with cushions and he had a chaplet<sup>d</sup> on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.<sup>e</sup> As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said, "You are not a very frequent<sup>f</sup> visitor, Socrates. You don't often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your

<sup>e</sup> For the seats compare *Protag.* 317 D-E, *Cic. Laelius* 1. 2 "in hemicyclo sedentem."

<sup>f</sup> The language recalls the Homeric formula, *πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίξεις*, *Il.* xviii. 386, *Od.* v. 88, Jebb on *O.C.* 672; Tennyson's, "When I was frequent with him in my youth." Cephalus's friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of *Laches* 181 c.

Δ ἄλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σέ ἤμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρή πυ-  
 κνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε, ὅσον  
 αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον  
 αὖξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ  
 ἡδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς  
 νεανίαις ξύνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς  
 παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μήν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος τοῖς  
 Ε σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρήναι παρ'  
 αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυ-  
 θότων, ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία  
 τίς ἐστι, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπορος·  
 καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, ὃ τί σοι  
 φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας,  
 ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ φασὶν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί,  
 πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξ-  
 αγγέλλεις.

III. Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώ-  
 329 κρατες, οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συν-  
 ερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταῦτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν  
 ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ

<sup>a</sup> Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. *Phaedr.* 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking "of" the body, but "in" or "relating to" it. See my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 45.

<sup>b</sup> Much of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied by Cicero, *De sen.* 3 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Horace, *Epist.* i. 11 "Quid tibi visa Chios?" The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence.

<sup>d</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy.

<sup>e</sup> This, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,<sup>a</sup> in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don't refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates." "Why, yes, Cephalus," said I, "and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers<sup>b</sup> who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—what<sup>c</sup> it is like—is it rough<sup>d</sup> and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call 'the threshold<sup>e</sup> of old age.' Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?"

III. "Yes, indeed, Socrates," he said, "I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify<sup>f</sup> the old saw of like to like. At

like our "One foot in the grave." Cf. Leaf on *Il.* xxii. 60, xxiv. 487; Hypercides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose.

<sup>f</sup> Lit. "preserving." For the reverse cf. *Symp.* 174 B. Cicero renders, "similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur." The proverb is ἡλιξ ἡλικα τέρπει *Phaedr.* 240 c, or, as in *Lysis* 214 A, *Protag.* 337 D, *Symp.* 195 B, the reference may be to Homer's ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, *Od.* xvii. 218. Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, x., "The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself."



οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται ξυνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε τὰ φροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες· ἔνιοι  
 Β δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γήρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσι αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη ἔνεκά γε γήρως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμενῳ ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινος  
 C Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια; ἔτι οἴός τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμεναίτατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντα τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. παντάπασιν γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρα πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται

<sup>a</sup> The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simon. fr. 71, Soph. *Antig.* 1165, Antiphanes, in Stob. 63. 12. For the application to old age cf. *Anth. Pal.* ix. 127, Horace, *Epist.* ii. 2. 55, and the ψόγος γήρως in Stobaeus, 116.

<sup>b</sup> For such a litany cf. Soph. *O.C.* 1235, and Matthew Arnold's poem, "Growing Old."

<sup>c</sup> This suggests Aristotle's fallacy of the false cause, *Soph. El.* 167 b 21. Cf. *Phileb.* 28 A and Isoc. xv. 230.

<sup>d</sup> For Sophocles' sentiment cf. Tennyson, *By an Evolutionist*—

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK 1

these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.<sup>a</sup> And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany<sup>b</sup> of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.<sup>c</sup> For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, 'How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated?' And he replied, 'Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.'<sup>d</sup> I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed

But I hear no yelp of the beast, and the Man is quiet at last  
As he stands on the heights of his life with a glimpse of a  
height that is higher.

Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, *Progymn.* ii. 66 (Spengel), turns the anecdote into an edifying *χρεία*. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, *cf.* Cic. *Cato M.* 14, Plutarch, *De cupid. divit.* 5, *An seni* p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 1. 13.

καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὴν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ  
 D Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται· δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἔστι καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκολοὶ ᾧσι, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ γῆρας, ὧ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

IV. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον ὦ  
 E Κέφαλε, οἶμαί σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἠγεῖσθαί σε ῥαδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτηῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τί, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λαιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι  
 330 οὐ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὗτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σεριφίος ὢν ὀνομαστός ἐγένετο οὗτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 86 c, 94 c, *Phileb.* 47 A, *Laws* 645 B, 644 E σπῶσι.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Eurip. *I.A.* 547 μαινομένων οἴστρων.

<sup>c</sup> For Sophocles as εὐκολος cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 82, and on this quality, *Laws* 791 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cephalus prefigures the old age of the righteous, *infra* 612-613. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Teles. (Hense, pp. 9-10), Philemon in Plut. p. 358,

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

release. When the fierce tensions<sup>a</sup> of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad<sup>b</sup> masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful<sup>c</sup> even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions.”

IV. And I was filled with admiration<sup>d</sup> for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, “ I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. ‘ For the rich,’ they say, ‘ have many consolations.’ ”<sup>e</sup> “ You are right,” he said. “ They don’t accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus<sup>f</sup> grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard ;

Musonius, Stob. 117. 8. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stob. *Florileg.* 68. 1 is almost a paraphrase of this passage. Thucyd. ii. 44 says that honour, not money, is the consolation of old age.

<sup>f</sup> Lit. *the* Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cic. *Cato M.* 8 “ Seriphio cuidam.”

ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάνυ τι  
 ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι, οὐθ' ὁ μὴ  
 ἐπιεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο.  
 Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησαι  
 τὰ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποῖ' ἐπεκτη-  
 Β σάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρη-  
 ματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν  
 γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι  
 ὄσσην ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλά-  
 κισ τοσαύτην ἐποίησε, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι  
 ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὐσῆς· ἐγὼ δὲ  
 ἀγαπῶ, εἰ μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τουτοισί, ἀλλὰ  
 βραχεῖ γέ τιμι πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον. Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα  
 ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα  
 C ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιούσιν ὡς τὸ  
 πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι  
 διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ  
 ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς  
 παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισά-  
 μενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον  
 ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, ἥπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.  
 χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες  
 ἐπαιεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.  
 D V. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ μοι ἔτι  
 τοσόνδε εἶπέ· τί μέγιστον οἶει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυ-  
 κέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτήσθαι; "Ο, ἦ δ' ὅς,

<sup>a</sup> Matthew Arnold's "Sweetly reasonable," but here a loose synonym of good, and not in the Aristotelian sense, "equitable."

<sup>b</sup> Cephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle makes a similar observation, *Eth. Nic.* iv. 1. 20, *Rhet.* i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For *nouveaux riches*, *γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου*, see Starkie on Aristoph. *Wasps*, 1309.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

for neither would the reasonable<sup>a</sup> man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper." "May I ask, Cephalus," said I, "whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself?" "Acquired, quotha?" he said. "As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake<sup>b</sup> inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance." "The reason I asked," I said, "is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.<sup>c</sup> But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,<sup>d</sup> so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth."

V. "You are right," he replied. "I assuredly am," said I. "But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property?" "Something,"

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 160 E, *Symp.* 209 c, *Phaedr.* 274 E, with Epaminondas' saying, that Leuctra and Mantinea were his children.

ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσῃ, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήει. οἳ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι ἔτι τῶν ἐπιπέσειν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὡσι· καὶ αὐτὸς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά. ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῆ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Walter Scott's "Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here." Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar's *Second Olympian*. See Rohde's *Psyche* and Adam in *Cambridge Praelections*. The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato's appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 c-d, 386 b, 613 e ff., also 496 e, 498 d, 608 d.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 498 c and Pind. *Ol.* ii. 64. But 500 d, "there" is the realm of Platonic ideas.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Gorgias* 523 a, 527 a.

<sup>d</sup> The conclusion logically expected, "is more credulous," shifts to the alternative preferred by Plato. ὥσπερ marks the figurative sense of "nearer." καθορᾶ is not "takes a more careful view of it" (Goodwin) but wins a glimpse, catches sight of those obscure things, as a sailor descries land. So often in Plato. Cf. *Epin.* 985 c. Sir Thomas Browne, *Christ. Morals*, iii. 22 "And having been long tossed in the Ocean of this world, he will by that time feel the indraught of another." Waller on the *Divine Poems*—

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

he said, "which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.<sup>a</sup> For let me tell you, Socrates," he said, "that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,<sup>b</sup> though he may have laughed them down<sup>c</sup> hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself<sup>d</sup> either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone. Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up<sup>e</sup> even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is

The Soul's Dark Cottage, batter'd and decay'd,  
Lets in new light through chinks that time has made. . . .  
Leaving the old, both worlds at once they view  
That stand upon the threshold of the new.

Rabelais, iii. 21 "Aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons demons (selon la doctrine des Platoniques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme de port très sceur et salulaire—les saluent les consolent, parlent avec eux et ja commencent leur communiquer art de divination."

<sup>e</sup> Polyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 127 A, *Job* iv. 13-14. Tennyson, *Vastness* ix.—

Pain, that has crawl'd from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm  
which writhes all day, and at night  
Stirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him  
back to the curse of the light.



## PLATO

331 δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἠδεῖα ἐλπίς αἰεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὅς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγη,

γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συν-  
 αορεῖ  
 ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν  
 πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν  
 B πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὐ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρεῖας πολλάς· ἀλλὰ γε ἔν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι. Παγκάλως, ἦν δ'  
 C ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἂν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιόνδε

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<sup>a</sup> The better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connexion with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isoc. i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pind. *Nem.* xi. *in fine*, Soph. *Antig.* 615, Thucyd. ii. 62, iii. 45.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope<sup>a</sup> ever attends and a goodly, to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar<sup>b</sup> too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety 'sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanieth Hope, who chiefly ruleth the changeful mind of mortals.' That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god<sup>c</sup> for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth." "An admirable sentiment, Cephalus," said I. "But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification<sup>d</sup> that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean,

<sup>b</sup> Pindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the famous, "We owe a cock to Aesculapius," *Phaedo* 118 A. Cf. further, Browne, *Christian Morals*, i. 26 "Well content if they be but rich enough to be honest, and to give every man his due."

<sup>d</sup> It is Platonic Doctrine that no act is *per se* good or bad. *Symp.* 181 A. This opens the door to casuistry, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 12, *Cic. De offic.* iii. 25. For the argument cf. *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 18, *Cic. De offic.* iii. 25. For the proverb, "a knife to a child" or a madman cf. *Athen.* v. 52, *Iambl. Protrep.* 18 K., *Jebb's Bentley*, p. 69, where *Jebb* misses *Bentley's* allusion to it.

λέγω· πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἄνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανεῖς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἄν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα  
 D πάντα ἐθέλων τάληθῆ λέγειν. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἂ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς γελάσας· καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

E VI. Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὃ τί ποτε λέγει,

<sup>a</sup> The argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. *Phileb.* 12 A, *Charm.* 162 E, *Protag.* 331 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cic. *Ad Att.* iv. 16 "Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinisset," Bagehot, *Hartley Coleridge*, "It (meta-physical debate) attracts the scorn of middle-aged men, who depart πρὸς τὰ ἱερά," etc.

<sup>c</sup> The definition is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists' "Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens." For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles "Righteousness" and "Theognis" in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state.” “You are right,” he replied. “Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received.” “Nay, but it is, Socrates,” said Polemarchus breaking in, “if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides.” “Very well,” said Cephalus, “indeed I make over the whole argument<sup>a</sup> to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices.” “Well,” said I, “is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?” “Certainly,” said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.<sup>b</sup>

VI. “Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice.” “That it is just,” he replied, “to render to each his due.<sup>c</sup> In saying this I think he speaks well.” “I must admit,” said I, “that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.<sup>d</sup> But just what he

<sup>a</sup> The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. *Apol.* 22 A-B, *Ion* 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of “wise” men must be true. *Theaetet.* 152 B, *Phaedr.* 260 A, *Laws* 888 E, *Euthydem.* 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. *Protag.* 347 E, *Meno* 71 D, *Lysis* 214-215, *Hipp. Minor* 365 D.

σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γινώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὄτωϋν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι· καίτοι γε  
 332 ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὄπωστιοῦν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 Ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.  
 Ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν, ὅς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἢ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἢ λήψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὃ ἀποδιδούς· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνυ μὲν οὔν. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον, ὃ τι ἂν τύχη ὀφειλόμενον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὔν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς· ὀφείλεται δέ,<sup>1</sup> οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

VII. Ἡνίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ

<sup>1</sup> δέ Ξ is frequently used to repeat and define: δέ γε AIIq.

<sup>a</sup> Owing to the rarity of banks "reddere depositum" was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juv. Sat. 13. 15, Herod. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, *De spec. leg.* 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἀ παραλαμβάνει: Diog. Laert. viii. 35. Earth is "iustissima tellus" because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates' distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: "ut si iuste depositum

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit<sup>a</sup> to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?" "Yes." "But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being in his right mind." "True," said he. "It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due." "Something else in very deed," he replied, "for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil." "I see," said I; "you mean that<sup>b</sup> he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn't that what you say Simonides means?" "Quite so." "But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?" "By all means," he said, "what is due<sup>c</sup> and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil."

VII. "It was a riddling<sup>d</sup> definition of justice, then, reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere," Cic. *De fin.* iii. 18.

<sup>b</sup> Adam insists that the meaning of *μανθάνω ὅτι* here and everywhere is "it is because."

<sup>c</sup> In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Lysis* 214 D, *Charm.* 162 A, *Theaetet.* 152 c, 194 c, *Alc. II.* 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is "inspired," but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, *Tim.* 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.

Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὁ εἶη. διανοεῖτο  
 C μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ  
 προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν  
 ὀφειλόμενον. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. Ὡ πρὸς Διός,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· ὦ Σιμωνίδη,  
 ἦ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ  
 προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν  
 αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἢ σώμασι  
 φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσι τί  
 ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγει-  
 D ρικὴ καλεῖται; Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. Εἶεν·  
 ἢ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη  
 ἂν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἢ τοῖς  
 φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελείας τε καὶ βλάβας  
 ἀποδιδούσα. Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ  
 τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι.  
 Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν  
 καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν; Ἰατρός.  
 E Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον;  
 Κυβερνήτης. Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ  
 πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, *Gorg.* 451 B, *Hipp. M.* 287 B ff., Thompson on *Meno* 72 B.

<sup>b</sup> Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. *Gorg.* 451 A, *Protag.* 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly's *Pickwick* examination: "Who little thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom with how many what and all how big?"

<sup>c</sup> Similarly *Protag.* 312 A.

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that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due.' "What else do you suppose?" said he. "In heaven's name!" said I, "suppose<sup>a</sup> someone had questioned him thus: 'Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine?'"<sup>b</sup> What do you take it would have been his answer?" "Obviously," he said, "the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks." "And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?" "Seasoning to meats." "Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice." "If we are to follow the previous examples,<sup>c</sup> Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies." "To do good to friends and evil to enemies,<sup>d</sup> then, is justice in his meaning?" "I think so." "Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?" "The physician." "And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?" "The pilot." "Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent

<sup>a</sup> Simonides' definition is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the *Rep. infra*, 335 D-336 A, but in the *Crito* 49 B C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (*Mem.* ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocr. (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik*, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 85, Aeschyl. *Choeph.* 123, Jebb, introd. to Soph. *Ajax*, p. xxxix, Thümser, *Staats-Altertümer*, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on *Meno* 71 E.



ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ  
 ξυμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε  
 μὴν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος.  
 Ἄληθῆ. Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. Ναί.  
 Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;  
 Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν  
 333 εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία·  
 ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτηῶν; Ναί. Καὶ  
 μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική; Ναί. Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων  
 ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίης κτηῶν. Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ δὴ;  
 τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτηῶν ἐν  
 εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμ-  
 βόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοι-  
 νωνήματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; Κοινωνήματα δῆτα. Ἄρ'  
 Β οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς  
 πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός; Ὁ πεττευτικός.  
 Ἄλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρη-  
 σιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδο-  
 μικοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ  
 δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ  
 ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων; Εἰς  
 ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμα-  
 ρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυ-  
 ρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ,  
 ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ  
 μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης.

<sup>a</sup> Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the *Republic*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 14.

<sup>b</sup> Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with

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to benefit friends and harm enemies ? ” “ In making war and as an ally, I should say. ” “ Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. ” “ True. ” “ And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. ” “ Yes. ” “ Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless ? ” “ By no means. ” “ There is a use then even in peace for justice ? ” “ Yes, it is useful. ” “ But so is agriculture, isn't it ? ” “ Yes. ” “ Namely, for the getting of a harvest ? ” “ Yes. ” “ But likewise the cobbler's art ? ” “ Yes. ” “ Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes. ” “ Certainly. ” “ Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace ? ” “ In engagements and dealings, Socrates. ” “ And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else ? ” “ Associations, of course. ” “ Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player ? ” “ The player. ” “ And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder ? ” “ By no means. ” “ Then what is the association <sup>a</sup> in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords ? ” “ For money-dealings, <sup>b</sup> I think. ” “ Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn't it so ? ” “ Apparently. ” “ And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot. ” “ It money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.



Ἔοικεν. Ὄταν οὖν τί δέη ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων; Ὄταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δέη αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὄταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ  
 D δικαιοσύνη; Κινδυνεύει. Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέη φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδία· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελουργική; Φαίνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέη φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος; Κινδυνεύει.  
 E VIII. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὃν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας<sup>1</sup>; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἄλλῃ  
 334 μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ

<sup>1</sup> Schneider: ἐμποιῆσαι ΑΙΓ.

<sup>a</sup> Interest is ignored. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.

<sup>b</sup> A virtue is presumably a good. A definition that makes justice useless is *ipso facto* refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in *Hipp. Minor* 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between

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would seem so." "What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?" "When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates." "You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle<sup>a</sup>?" "Quite so." "Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?" "It looks that way." "And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser's art is useful?" "Apparently." "And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music." "Necessarily." "And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?" "It looks that way."

VIII. "Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth<sup>b</sup> if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against<sup>c</sup> a blow?" "Assuredly." "Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?" "I think so." "But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march<sup>d</sup> habit and faculty (ἐξίς and δύναμις). Cf. *Topics*, vi. 12. 6, *Eth. Nic.* v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, *Met.* 1046 b, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 38.

<sup>c</sup> The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.

<sup>d</sup> The play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare's "If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company," *Much Ado* III. iii.

καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. "Οτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δεινός. "Εοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται· καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως  
**B** πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκω τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σέ καὶ καθ' Ὀμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὃ τι ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.  
**C** Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι. καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὓς ἂν τις ἠγῆται χρηστούς, φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν

<sup>a</sup> The qualified assent here marks the speaker's perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. *Theaetetus*. 152 E.

<sup>c</sup> "A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles" (*Winter's Tale*, iv. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (*Od.* xix. 395). The naïveté of Homer's "amoral" standpoint (cf. *Od.* xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato's sense of humour, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule "help friends and harm enemies" is on the same ethical plane. So in the

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upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally." "Certainly." "Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?" "It seems so." "If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it." "The argument certainly points that way."<sup>a</sup> "A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.<sup>b</sup> For he regards with complacency Autolycus,<sup>c</sup> the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury. So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that what you meant?" "No, by Zeus," he replied. "I no longer know what I did mean.<sup>d</sup> Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies." "May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem<sup>e</sup> to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies?" "It is likely," he said, "that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad."

*Euthyphro*, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of *καπηλεία* or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. *Or.* xi. 315 R., and modern laments over "The Decay of Lying."

<sup>a</sup> For humorous bewilderment of Socrates' interlocutors cf. *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 19, *Lysis* 216 c, *Alc. I.* 127 D, *Meno* 80, *Euthyphro* 11 B, *Symp.* 201 B, *Theaetet.* 149 A, 169 c.

<sup>e</sup> The antithesis of "seeming" and "being" is a common category of early Greek and Platonic thought. Cf. 361 A-B, 365 c, Aeschyl. *Ag.* 788, and the fragments of Parmenides. This discussion of the true *φίλος* recalls the manner of the *Lysis*; cf. Aristot. *Topics* i. 8. 5.

πονηρούς, μισεῖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ  
 ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς  
 μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναν-  
 τίον; Ἄμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ  
 ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλ' ὅμως  
 δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν,  
 D τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν; Φαίνεται. Ἄλλὰ μὴν  
 οἷ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθῆ.  
 Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας  
 δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς  
 ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ  
 δικαίους ὠφελεῖν; Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαί-  
 νεται. Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, συμβήσεται,  
 ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι  
 E τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν· πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ·  
 τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν· ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως  
 ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τούναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν  
 λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω συμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ  
 μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν  
 φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέ-  
 μαρχε; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι.  
 Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντά  
 τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον· τὸν δὲ  
 335 δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι  
 φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις.  
 Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς  
 ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός. Ναί. Κελεύεις δὴ  
 ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον  
 ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ  
 ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὠδε

<sup>a</sup> Or, "that is an immoral conclusion."

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“Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse?” “They do.” “For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends?” “Certainly.” “But all the same it is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good?” “It would seem so.” “But again the good are just and incapable of injustice.” “True.” “On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice.” “Nay, nay, Socrates,” he said, “the reasoning can’t be right.”<sup>a</sup> “Then,” said I, “it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just.” “That seems a better conclusion than the other.” “It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean.” “Most certainly,” he said, “it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy.” “What notion, Polemarchus?” “That the man who seems to us good is the friend.” “And to what shall we change it now?” said I. “That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.” “Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.” “Yes.” “So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we



λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Β Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ΙΧ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη, τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίνονται; Χείρους. Ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετὴν; C Ἀνάγκη. Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίνεσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή; Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίνεσθαι. Ἔοικεν. Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύνανται ποιεῖν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ D οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς; Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. Οὐ γὰρ θερ-

<sup>a</sup> After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.

<sup>b</sup> For Socratic comparisons of animals and men cf. *Apol.* 30 c, *Euthyphro* 13 b-c, and *infra* on 451 c.

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are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?" "By all means," he said, "that, I think, would be the right way to put it."

IX. "Is it then," said I, "the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?"<sup>a</sup> "Certainly it is," he replied; "a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies." "When horses<sup>b</sup> are harmed does it make them better or worse?" "Worse." "In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses?" "Of horses." "And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue?" "Necessarily." "And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse?" "Assuredly." "And is not justice the specific virtue of man?"<sup>c</sup> "That too must be granted." "Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust." "It seems so." "Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music?" "Impossible." "Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses?" "No." "By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad?" "Nay, it is impossible." "It is not, I take it, the

<sup>a</sup> The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf. *Apol.* 41 D, *Crito* 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used *infra* 353 and 609 B-D.

μότῃτος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Ναί. Οὐδὲ ξηρότῃτος ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Πάνυ γε. Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς Εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησί τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφέλειαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών· οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὄν βλάπτειν. Συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῆ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέειν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Ἔγωγ' οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωεῖν 336 τῆς μάχης. Ἄλλ' οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ρῆμα τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἔφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός. Ἄλη-

<sup>a</sup> The special "work" (Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See *infra* 351 D, 352 E, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 7. 10, *Idea of Good* p. 210, Diog. Laert. vii. 103, Porphyry. *De abstin.* ii. 41, Courtney, *Studies in Philosophy* p. 125, Spencer, *Data of Ethics* § 12.

<sup>b</sup> Xenophon approves the doctrine (*Mem.* ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (*Hiero* 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.

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function<sup>a</sup> of heat to chill but of its opposite." "Yes."  
"Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite."  
"Assuredly." "Nor yet of the good to harm but of  
its opposite." "So it appears." "But the just man is  
good?" "Certainly." "It is not then the function  
of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend  
or anyone else, but of his opposite, the unjust."  
"I think you are altogether right, Socrates." "If,  
then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each  
his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is  
what is due to his enemies from the just man<sup>b</sup> and  
benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who  
said it. For what he meant was not true. For it  
has been made clear to us that in no case is it just  
to harm anyone." "I concede it," he said. "We  
will take up arms against him, then," said I, "you  
and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides  
or Bias<sup>c</sup> or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed  
said such a thing." "I, for my part," he said, "am  
ready to join in the battle with you." "Do you  
know," said I, "to whom I think the saying belongs  
—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and  
harm enemies?" "To whom?" he said. "I  
think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas  
or Xerxes or Ismenias<sup>d</sup> the Theban or some other  
rich man who had great power in his own conceit."<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning *must* have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, *Protag.* 345 D, Simplic. on Aristot. *Phys.* 107. 30.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Thompson, *Meno* xl.

<sup>e</sup> It is a Socratic paradox that "doing as one likes" is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. *Gorg.* 467 A, *infra* 577 D.

θέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

- B X. Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακουῖσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ
- C μέσον φθεγξάμενος Τίς, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἶπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ἐστί, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναί
- D καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστί μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὃ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, εἰ ἢ ἄλλους τοιούτους λέγῃς. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καί μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ, ἄφωνος

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Introd.* pp. ix-x.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Introd.* p. x.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 483 a, *Aristot. Soph. El.* 183 b 7. "Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know." For similar complaints cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, *Theaet.* 150 c, *Clitophon passim.*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

"That is most true," he replied. "Very well," said I, "since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?"<sup>a</sup>

X. Now Thrasymachus,<sup>b</sup> even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn't any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst, "What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don't merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,<sup>c</sup> but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don't you be telling me<sup>d</sup> that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won't take from you any such drivel as that!" And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should

<sup>a</sup> Thrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (*cf. Clitophon* 409 c). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books.

ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἤνικα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο  
**Ε** ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε  
 αὐτῷ οἶός τ' ἐγενόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον  
 ὑποτρέμων ὦ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι·  
 εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει  
 ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὄδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν.  
 μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν  
 ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις  
 ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ,  
 δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων  
 τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπέικειν ἀλ-  
 λήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι  
 αὐτό. οἴου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνά-  
 μεθα· ἐλεείσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἐστὶ  
**337** πού ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

**XI.** Καὶ ὡς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα  
 σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη  
 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταύτ'  
 ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀπο-  
 κρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσεις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ  
 πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἰ τίς τί σε  
 ἐρωτᾷ. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε·  
 εὖ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι, εἰ τινα ἔροιο ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὰ  
**Β** δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ· ὅπως μοι,  
 ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ

<sup>a</sup> For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virg. *Ecl.* 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, *N.H.* viii. 34, Milton, *Epitaphium Damonis* 27 "nisi me lupus ante videbit."

<sup>b</sup> For similar irony cf. *Gorg.* 461 c-d, 489 d.

<sup>c</sup> For this type of a *fortiori* or *ex contrario* argument cf.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

have lost my voice.<sup>a</sup> But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a slight tremor: "Thrasymachus, don't be harsh<sup>b</sup> with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while<sup>c</sup> if our quest were for gold<sup>d</sup> we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered. You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity."

XI. And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, "Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony<sup>e</sup> of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you." "That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don't you be telling me, fellow, that twelve

589 E, 600 C-D, *Crito* 46 D, *Laws* 647 c, 931 c, *Protag.* 325 B-C, *Phaedo* 68 A, Thompson on *Meno* 91 E.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Heraclit. fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, *King's Treasuries*  
"The physical type of wisdom, gold," *Psalms* xix. 10.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 216 E, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* iii. p. 277.



μηδ' ὅτι τρίς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῆς· δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτω πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἴ σοι εἶπεν· ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω τι τοῦ  
 C ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα; Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἡττόν τι αὐτὸν οἶει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐὰν τε μή; "Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν. Τί  
 D οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίῳ τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν. Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται, εἶπον. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων·

\* In "American," "nerve." Socrates' statement that the παθεῖν "due him" is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the *Apology* that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: "In addition to the *recovery* of your wits, you must pay a *fine*." Plato constantly harps on the taking

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean?' What would have been your answer to him?" "Humph!" said he, "how very like the two cases are!" "There is nothing to prevent," said I; "yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't?" "Is that, then," said he, "what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers?" "I shouldn't be surprised," I said, "if on reflection that would be my view." "What then," he said, "if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve?" "Why, what else," said I, "than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer." "I like your simplicity,"<sup>a</sup> said he; "but in addition to 'learning' you must pay a fine of money." "Well, I will when I have got it," I said. "It is there," said Glaucon: "if money is all that

of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.

ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνυ γε, οἶμαι, Ε ἢ δ' ὅς, ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τίς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναί, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὦν ἠγεῖται, ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; 338 ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μάλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναί καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλ' ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα ὃ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν· καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἠγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλῃν· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησε, Β καῖπειτα Αὐτῆ δὴ, ἔφην, ἢ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιόντα μαθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. "Ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μαθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει. ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω· ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, εἴαν τίς μοι δοκῆ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν C ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γὰρ σε εὖ ἐρεῖν. "Ἀκουε δὴ, ἢ

\* "Grudging." Cf. *Laches* 200 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 391 B.

\* Socrates' poverty (*Apol.* 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates." "Oh yes, of course," said he, "so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies." "Why, how," I said, "my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don't be obstinate, but do me the favour to reply and don't be chary<sup>a</sup> of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us."

XII. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, "Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks<sup>b</sup> therefor." "That I learn from others," I said, "you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.<sup>c</sup> But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well." "Hearken

δ' ὅς. φημί γάρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἔπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐδεκήσεις. Ἐὖν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστῆς καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρεται τὰ βόεια κρέα  
**D** πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. Βδε-  
 λυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπο-  
 λαμβάνεις, ἢ ἂν κακουργήσῃς μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἶπέ, τί λέγεις. Εἶπ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν

<sup>a</sup> For this dogmatic formulation of a definition cf. *Theaetetus*. 151 E.

<sup>b</sup> To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, *Laws* 714 A; "her seat is the bosom of God" (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and "law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior." "Whatever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force," *Theaetetus*. 177 D. The formula "justice is the advantage of the superior" means, as explained in *Laws* 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates' affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, *Pensées* iv. 4, "la commodité du souverain." Leibniz approves Thrasymachus's definition: "justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!").

<sup>c</sup> The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato's alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

and hear then," said he. "I affirm that the just is nothing else than <sup>a</sup> the advantage of the stronger.<sup>b</sup> Well, why don't you applaud? Nay, you'll do anything but that." "Provided only I first understand your meaning," said I; "for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves <sup>c</sup> is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just." "You are a buffoon,<sup>d</sup> Socrates, and take my statement <sup>e</sup> in the most detrimental sense." "Not at all, my dear fellow," said I; "I only want you to make your meaning plainer."<sup>f</sup> "Don't you know then," said he, "that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?"<sup>g</sup> "Assuredly." "And is not this the thing that is

<sup>a</sup> The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 465, Theophrast. *Char.* xvii. (Jebb).

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 392 c, 394 b, 424 c, *Meno* 78 c, *Euthydem.* 295 c, *Gorg.* 451 a *δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις*, "you take my meaning fairly." For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 d, *Charm.* 166 c, *Meno* 80 a, *Theaetet.* 167 e, *Gorg.* 461 b-c, 482 e.

<sup>f</sup> This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in *Gorg.* 451 e, 453 b, 489 d, 490 c, *Laws* 714 c. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.

<sup>g</sup> These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 86, Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 6. See 445 d, Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 62.

τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; Πάνυ γε.  
 Ε Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ  
 αὐτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς,  
 τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω· θέμεναι  
 δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι,  
 τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα  
 339 ταῖς πόλεσι ταῦτόν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστη-  
 κυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε  
 συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι  
 τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.  
 Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ  
 μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ  
 Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι  
 ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην·  
 Β πρόσσεστι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Σμι-  
 κρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη. Οὕπω δῆλον οὐδ'  
 εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ  
 λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι

<sup>a</sup> κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. *Menex.* 238 D, *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, *Meno* 77 B, *Lysis* 215 B, where L. & S. miss the point.

<sup>b</sup> On this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (*Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 12; cf. *Gorg.* 504 D). This is the doctrine of the "Old Oligarch," [*Xen.*] *Rep. Ath.* 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (*Laws* 713 ff.) and Aristotle (*Pol.* iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*,

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

strong and has the mastery<sup>a</sup> in each—the ruling party? ” “ Certainly. ” “ And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviates<sup>b</sup> from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states—the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,<sup>c</sup> the advantage of the stronger. ” “ Now, ” said I, “ I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger. ” “ A trifling addition<sup>d</sup> perhaps you think it, ” he said. “ It is not yet clear<sup>e</sup> whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.<sup>f</sup> For since I too admit that the just

chap. ii.: “ We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government ” etc.

<sup>c</sup> Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (*Hipp. Maj.* 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 c-d) at first, understands the nature of a definition.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Laches* 182 c.

<sup>e</sup> For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, *Lysis* 203 B, *Soph. O.T.* 327.



καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δὴ. Σκόπει, ἔφη.

XIII. Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς  
 C εἶναι; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναί τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ τινὰς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως. Ἄ δ' ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς  
 D γὰρ οὐ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸναντίον τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη. Ἄ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὁμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις

<sup>a</sup> For Plato's so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 b, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham's statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, *English Utilitarianism*, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.

<sup>b</sup> This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.

<sup>c</sup> The argument turns on the opposition between the real (*i.e.* ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 c.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

is something that is of advantage<sup>a</sup>—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don't profess to know,<sup>b</sup> we must pursue the inquiry. "Inquire away," he said.

XIII. "I will do so," said I. "Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?" "I do." "May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible<sup>c</sup> or capable sometimes of error?" "Surely," he said, "they are liable to err." "Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not?" "So I suppose." "And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not?" "That." "But whatever they enact<sup>d</sup> must be performed by their subjects and is justice?" "Of course." "Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage." "What's that you're saying?<sup>e</sup>" he replied. "What you yourself are saying,<sup>f</sup> I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin it is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 338 E and *Theaetetus*. 177 D.

<sup>b</sup> *Τὶ λέγεις σὺ*; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 1174. The suspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasy-machus rude again. But cf. *Euthydemus*. 290 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Berkeley, *Divine Visual Language*, 13: "The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions." See on 334 D, *Alc. I.* 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (*Data of Ethics*, § 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.

ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὠμολόγηται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.  
 Ε Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν  
 τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὠμο-  
 λογῆσθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ  
 αὐτοῖς προστάττωσι, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς  
 ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ ἐκείνοι προσέταξαν· ἄρα τότε, ὦ  
 σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν  
 αὐτὸ οὕτως δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τούναντίον ἢ ὃ  
 σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήπου  
 340 προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσι ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὰ Δί',  
 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε.  
 Ἐὰν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν  
 ὑπολαβών. Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς  
 γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας  
 ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχο-  
 μένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ  
 κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόν-  
 των δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ  
 τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, ξυμφέρον δίκαιον  
 Β εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφοτέρα θέμενος ὠμολό-  
 γησεν αὐτὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀξύμφορα  
 κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν.  
 ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ  
 κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ  
 ξυμφέρον. Ἄλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείτ-  
 τονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ

<sup>a</sup> Socrates is himself a little rude.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorgias* 495 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laches* 215 E, *Phaedo* 62 E.

<sup>d</sup> It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. *Gorg.* 472 A-B.

<sup>e</sup> τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

admitted?" "I think it was," he replied. "Then you will have to think,<sup>a</sup> I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient<sup>b</sup> Thrasy-machus, that it is just to do the very opposite<sup>c</sup> of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform." "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates," said Polemarchus, "nothing could be more conclusive." "Of course," said Cleitophon, breaking in, "if you are his witness."<sup>d</sup> "What need is there of a witness?" Polemarchus said. "Thrasy-machus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this." "That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasy-machus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders<sup>e</sup> of the rulers." "Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary." "O well," said Cleitophon, "by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form "it is just to do what rulers bid." Polemarchus retorts: "And (I was right,) for he (also) . . ."

ξυμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. Ἄλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς  
 C ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει  
 Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

XIV. Καί μοι εἶπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν ὁ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμ-  
 φέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, εἴαν τε ξυμφέρῃ  
 εἴαν τε μή; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; "Ἡκιστα γ',  
 ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἶε καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτά-  
 νοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ; "Ἐγωγε, εἶπον, ὦμην  
 σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὠμολόγεις οὐκ  
 D ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν.  
 Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς  
 λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρ-  
 τάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ  
 ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὅς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ  
 ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν  
 ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως,  
 ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτε  
 καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων,  
 E καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν,  
 οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον,  
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν

<sup>a</sup> Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. *Gorg.* 491 b, 499 b, *Protag.* 349 c, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 18.

<sup>b</sup> Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician's miscalculations but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler *qua* ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler *qua* ruler, the artist *qua* artist has no "sinister" or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to

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for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position." "That isn't what he said," replied Polemarchus. "Never mind, Polemarchus," said I, "but if that is Thrasymachus's present meaning, let us take it from him<sup>a</sup> in that sense.

"XIV. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning?" "Not in the least," he said;<sup>b</sup> "do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs?" "I certainly did suppose that you meant that," I replied, "when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes." "That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician<sup>c</sup> erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,<sup>d</sup> no crafts-

substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the "economic man."

<sup>c</sup> For the idea cf. Rousseau's *Émile*, i.: "On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médecine en elle-même est infaillible. A la bonne heure; mais qu'elle vienne donc sans le médecin." Lucian, *De Parasito* 54, parodies this reasoning.

<sup>d</sup> For the invidious associations of ἀκρεβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristot. *Met.* 995 a 11, *Cratyl.* 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosth. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diog. Laert. ii. 19.

ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργός ἢ σοφός ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾗ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρός ἤμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἤμαρτε. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν  
 341 ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

XV. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶει γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλήs ἐν τοῖs λόγοιs κακουργοῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡs ἠρόμην; Εὐ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις  
 B κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡs ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃν<sup>1</sup> νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα.  
 C πρὸs ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι· οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἶός τ'

<sup>1</sup> ὃν probable conjecture of Benedictus: mss. ὁ.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 365 D.

<sup>b</sup> i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι 340 D.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

man errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred. It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.”

XV. “So then, Thrasymachus,” said I, “my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging?” “It does,” he said. “You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question?” “I don’t think it, I know it,” he said, “and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and, failing stealth, you are not of the force<sup>a</sup> to beat me in debate.” “Bless your soul,” said I, “I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler<sup>b</sup> or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act?” “I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word,” he said. “Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable.”



ἤσ. Οἶει γὰρ ἄν με, εἶπον, οὕτω μανῆναι, ὥστε  
 ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύ-  
 μαχον; Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὦν  
 καὶ ταῦτα. Ἐδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ'  
 εἰπέ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι  
 ἔλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστίν ἢ τῶν καμνόν-  
 των θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν  
 ὄντα. Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής. Τί δὲ  
 κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν ἄρχων  
 D ἐστίν ἢ ναύτης; Ναυτῶν ἄρχων. Οὐδὲν, οἶμαι,  
 τοῦτο ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηϊ, οὐδ' ἐστὶ  
 κλητέος ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης  
 καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν  
 ναυτῶν ἀρχήν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστω  
 τούτων ἐστὶ τι ξυμφέρον; Πάνυ γε. Οὐ καὶ ἡ  
 τέχνη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ  
 ξυμφέρον ἐκάστω ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; Ἐπὶ  
 τούτῳ, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν  
 ἐστὶ τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὃ τι μάλιστα τελέαν  
 E εἶναι; Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶς; Ὡσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ,

<sup>a</sup> A rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. *ad loc.* and Aristides, *Orat. Plat.* ii. p. 143.

<sup>b</sup> καὶ ταῦτα = *idque*, normally precedes (cf. 404 c, 419 e, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristoph. *Wasps* 1184, *Frogs* 704, and *Acharn.* 168 allow this position. See my note in *A.J.P.* vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: "though you failed in that too."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *infra* 541 b, *Euthyphro* 11 e, *Charm.* 153 d.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedents can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 c τοῦτο, 373 c, 396 b, 598 c τεχνῶν, *Protag.* 327 c.

<sup>e</sup> Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, p. 242, fancifully cites this for "art for art's sake." See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

“Why, do you suppose,” I said, “that I am so mad as to try to beard a lion<sup>a</sup> and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus?” “You did try it just now,” he said, “paltry fellow though you be.”<sup>b</sup> “Something too much<sup>c</sup> of this sort of thing,” said I. “But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such.” “A healer of the sick,” he replied. “And what of the pilot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?” “A ruler of sailors.” “We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors.” “True,” he said. “Then for each of them<sup>d</sup> is there not a something that is for his advantage?” “Quite so.” “And is it not also true,” said I, “that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?” “Yes, for this.” “Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be as perfect as possible<sup>e</sup>?” “What do you mean by

does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (=the artist *qua* artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herod. i. 32, *Lysis* 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on *ad infinitum*. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist *qua* artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.

εἴ με ἔροιο, εἰ ἔξαρκεῖ σώματι εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖται τινος, εἶποίμ' ἂν ὅτι παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρημένη, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἡ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, 342 ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ; Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Τί δὲ δῆ; αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶ πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὃ τι προσδεῖται τινος ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὠτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινὸς τέχνης τῆς τὸ συμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα<sup>1</sup> σκευομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριούσης<sup>2</sup>; ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνὶ τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνη ἄλλης τέχνης, ἣτις αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπομένη ἐτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον; ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἀμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνη ἄλλῳ τὸ συμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθὴ οὐσα, ἔωσπερ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὅλη ἤπερ ἐστί; καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει; Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' C ἐγώ, ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι. Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ ἵππικὴ ἵππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὐδέ

<sup>1</sup> A. M. Burnet improbably reads *αὐτὰ ταῦτα* with FD.

<sup>2</sup> The future (q) is better than the present (AIIΞ).

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

that question ? ” “ Just as if,” I said, “ you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, ‘ By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised.’ Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not ? ” “ Correct,” he said. “ But how about this ? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on *ad infinitum*, or will the art look out for its own advantage ? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency ? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that ‘ precise ’ way of speaking. Is it so or not ? ” “ It appears to be so,” he said. “ Then medicine,” said I, “ does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body ? ” “ Yes.” “ Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out

γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως. Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου, οὐπὲρ εἰσι τέχναι. Συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγισ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ

D ἥττονός τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς. Ἐνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, "Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρός οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἰατρός σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὐχ ὠμολόγηται; Ἐυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι

E ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης; ὠμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ συμφέρον σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. Ἐυνέφησε μόγισ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συμφέρον καὶ πρέπον, καὶ λέγει ἅ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἅ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

343 XVI. Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ

<sup>a</sup> The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἀρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art.” “So it seems,” he replied. “But surely,<sup>a</sup> Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts.” He conceded this but it went very hard. “Then no art considers or enjoins<sup>b</sup> the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it.” This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—“Can we deny, then,” said I, “that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, ‘precisely’ speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a money-maker. Did we agree on that?” He assented. “And so the ‘precise’ pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?” That was admitted. “Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is.” He assented reluctantly. “Then,” said I, “Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.”

XVI. When we had come to this point in the dis-

for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. “Ruler” is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* 244, *Laws* 875 c.

<sup>b</sup> It is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. *Politicus* 260 A, c.

πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς  
 τοῦναντίον περιειστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ  
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη  
 σοι ἔστιν; Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι  
 χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν; "Ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη,  
 κορυζῶντα περιορᾶ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον,  
 ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις.  
 "Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ "Ὅτι οἶει τοὺς  
 Β ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ  
 τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς  
 καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν  
 δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς  
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν,  
 ἄλλως πως ἠγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους  
 ἢ ὥσπερ ἂν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο  
 τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο  
 C ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περί

<sup>a</sup> Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (*Protag.* 334), when pressed by Socrates' dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he may shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the *Gorgias*. Justice is another's good which only the naive and "innocent" pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the *Republic* is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.

<sup>b</sup> κορυζῶντα L. & S., also s.v. κόρυζα. Lucian, *Lexiphanes* 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms

## THE REPUBLIC BOOK, I

cussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,<sup>a</sup> said, "Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?" "What do you mean?" said I. "Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question?" "Because," he said, "she lets her little 'snotty' run about drivelling<sup>b</sup> and doesn't wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to know<sup>c</sup> the difference between the shepherd and the sheep." "And what, pray, makes you think that?" said I. "Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,<sup>d</sup> differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude towards his sheep<sup>e</sup> or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you

(1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, *Sat.* i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ' αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι.

<sup>c</sup> Literally, "if you don't know for her." For the ethical dative cf. Shakes. *Taming of the Shrew*, i. ii. 8 "Knock *me* here soundly." Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. "Shepherd of the people," like "survival of the fittest," may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 431, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 2. 1, Sueton. *Vit. Tib.* 32; and my note in *Class. Phil.* vol. i. p. 298.

<sup>d</sup> Thrasymachus's real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates' true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 1203 πρόβατ' ἄλλως, Herrick, "Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep."



τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθόμενου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἢ δὲ ἀδικία τούναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχόμενοι ποιούσι τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκείνον

**D** ποιούσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὀπωσιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὕτωςι χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὖροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον· ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ᾧσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν

**E** τε λήψῃς, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος, τῷ μὲν

<sup>a</sup> This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, "so far advanced," better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.

<sup>b</sup> τῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, *Laches* 187 B, *Phileb.* 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, *Archil.* fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in *Aristoph. Birds* 507 τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐκείν' ἦν τοῦπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. *Anth. Pal.* v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, "simple," which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning "of good character." Cf. 348 C,

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are so far out<sup>a</sup> concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice and the just are literally<sup>b</sup> the other fellow's good<sup>c</sup>—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy by serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just

400 E, *Laws* 679 c, Thucyd. iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of "silly" with *selig*, and in Italian, Leopardi's bitter comment on *dabbenaggine* (*Pensieri* xxvi.).

<sup>c</sup> Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another's good. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, "but one's own harm," for which see 392 B, Eurip. *Heracleid.* 1-5, and Isocrates' protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diog. Laert. iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as "the other fellow's good"; which recalls Woodrow Wilson's favourite limerick, and the definition of business as "l'argent des autres."

δικαίῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τὰ γε οἰκεῖα δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλη αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τὰναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὄνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, 344 τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον συμφέρεῖ ἰδία αὐτῷ ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾶστα μαθήσει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τ' ἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερά καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, B ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην· ὧν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιοῦται τε καὶ ὀνειδῆ ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὴν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων

<sup>a</sup> For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating "graft" cf. the story of Deïoces in Herod. i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, *Laches* 180 B, Isoc. xii. 145, Aristot. *Pol.* v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. *Meno* 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, *Praecept.*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

man must count on his own affairs <sup>a</sup> falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice he makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue. I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.<sup>b</sup> For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the appellations of those who commit these several forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious

*reipub. ger.* 13) cited by Godwin (*Political Justice*) in the form: "God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies." Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.

<sup>b</sup> The order of words dramatically expresses Thrasy-machus's excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.

εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ  
 C τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν  
 πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἡδίκηκότα· οὐ  
 γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμε-  
 νοι ὄνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὄνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτε-  
 ρον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν  
 ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν  
 τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν,  
 τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον.

D XVII. Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῶ εἶχεν  
 ἀπιέναι, ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ  
 τῶν ὄτων ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον. οὐ μὴν  
 εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν  
 ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον·  
 καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον  
 ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν  
 νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν  
 εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει; ἢ σμικρὸν οἶε ἐπι-  
 E χειρεῖν πράγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγὴν,  
 ἢ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην  
 ζωὴν ζῶη; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος,  
 τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἐοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥτοι  
 ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε

<sup>a</sup> The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides' *Bellerophon* (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world.

<sup>b</sup> Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense.

<sup>c</sup> The main issue of the *Republic*. Cf. 360 D, 358 E and *Gorg.* 469 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, *Life in* 70

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

names they are pronounced happy and blessed<sup>a</sup> not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.<sup>b</sup> For it is not the fear of doing<sup>c</sup> but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits a man's self and is for his advantage."

XVII. After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman<sup>d</sup> he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, "I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling<sup>e</sup> such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter<sup>f</sup> that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while?" "Well, do I deny it?<sup>g</sup>" said Thrasymachus. "You seem to," said I, "or else<sup>h</sup> to care nothing for us and so feel no

*Ancient Athens*, p. 134. For the metaphor *cf.* 536 B, *Lysis* 204 D, Aristoph. *Wasps* 483. "Sudden," lit. "all at once."

<sup>a</sup> *Cf.* Eurip. *Alcestis* 680 οὐ βαλῶν οὕτως ἄπει.

<sup>f</sup> Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, *Gorg.* 492 c, 500 c, *Laches* 185 A. *Cf. infra* 377 B, 578 c, 608 B.

<sup>g</sup> Plainly a protesting question, "Why, do I think otherwise?" *Cf. supra* 339 D.

<sup>h</sup> For the impossibility of J. and C.'s "or rather" see my note in *A.J.P.* vol. xiii. p. 234.

χειρόν εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ  
 φῆς εἶδέναι. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν  
 345 ἐνδείξασθαι· οὗτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται, ὅ τι ἂν  
 ἡμᾶς τοσοῦσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσης. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ  
 σοι λέγω τό γ' ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι  
 ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐὰν  
 ἔᾱ τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται.  
 ἀλλ', ὦ ἄγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ  
 ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως  
 ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδα-  
 Β λεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν  
 πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πείσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε,  
 ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιο-  
 σύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ πῶς,  
 ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέ-  
 πεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων  
 ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε·  
 ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις. ἢ  
 ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερώς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ  
 C ἔξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὕρᾶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ  
 τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς  
 ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ῥοιζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποι-

<sup>a</sup> κείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, *Rudens* 939 "bonis quod bene fit, haud perit."

<sup>b</sup> Isocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato's idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the *Hipparchus* that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν.

<sup>c</sup> Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. *infra* 438 A, 577 D, and *Gorg.* 467 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 365 D.

<sup>e</sup> Thrasy-machus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson

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concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know. Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment<sup>a</sup> for you—any benefit that you bestow on such a company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable<sup>b</sup> than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.<sup>c</sup> But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,<sup>d</sup> all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.” “And how am I to persuade you?”<sup>e</sup> he said. “If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram<sup>f</sup> it into your head?” “Heaven forbid!” I said, “don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,<sup>g</sup> or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not he cannot supply brains to understand it. *Cf. Gorg.* 489 c, 499 b. *Meno* 75 d.

<sup>f</sup> The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristoph. *Eccl.* 716, is rude. *Cf.* Shakespeare, “He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense.”

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, *Gorg.* 499 b-c, but *cf. supra* 334 e, 340 b-c.



μένα οὐκέτι ᾧου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ ποιμαίνειν<sup>1</sup> οἷει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς  
**D** τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὡσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ· ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς, ὡστ' εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γ' ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω δὲ ᾧμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θερα-  
**E** πευομένῳ, ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἷει ἄρχειν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

XVIII. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκῶν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσι οὐφέλειαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχο-  
 346 μένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἶπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φασὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι,

<sup>1</sup> ποιμαίνειν (π γρ in marg. A<sup>2</sup>)] πιαίνειν (A) might seem to fit δαιτυμόνα better but does not accord so well with καθ' ὅσον, etc. For the thought cf. Dio Chrys. Or. i. 48 R., who virtually quotes, adding ὡς ἔφη τις.

• The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. *Crito* 48 A.

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think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd<sup>a</sup> surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule<sup>b</sup> in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers<sup>c</sup>—willingly hold office and rule?" "I don't think," he said, "I know right well they do."

XVIII. "But what of other forms of rule, Thrasy-machus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others

<sup>b</sup> Aristotle's despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 245). But that too should be for the good of the slave; *infra* 590 D.

<sup>c</sup> See on 343 B, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, *l.c.* pp. 244-245, *Dio Cass.* xxxvi. 27. 1.

τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Ἄλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίαιαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλείν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς Β ἢ δύναμις· ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἕανπερ βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἕαν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιᾶς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλείν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἕαν ὑγιαίνει τις μισθαρνῶν. Οὐ C δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, ἕαν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ; Οὐκ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφέλειαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρῶμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνημένους ὠφελείσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ἐυνέφη μόγισ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the "argument" may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 83 D, Campbell on *Soph.* 246 D.

<sup>b</sup> As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>c</sup> Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot

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because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don't answer counter to your real belief.<sup>a</sup>”

“Well, yes,” he said, “that is what renders it different.” “And does not each art also yield us benefit<sup>b</sup> that is peculiar to itself and not general,<sup>c</sup> as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly?” “Assuredly.”

“And does not the wage-earner's art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot's art? Or if you please to discriminate ‘precisely’ as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?” “Of course not,” he said. “Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health.” “Surely not.” “But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages?” “No,” he said. “And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it?” “So be it,” he said. “Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing.” “It seems so,” he said. “And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art.” He assented reluctantly.

be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art *μισθωτική*. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus's original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It has also this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on *χρηματιστική*, *Pol.* i. 3 (1253 b 14).

Δ αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστω αὕτη ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν, ἢ  
 τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι,  
 ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ  
 μισθόν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἢ δὲ μισθαρ-  
 νητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι  
 οὕτω· τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ  
 ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. εἰ δὲ μὴ μισθὸς  
 αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουρ-  
 γὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. Ἄρ'  
 Ε οὖν οὐδ' ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζεται;  
 Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη  
 δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτῇ  
 ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγο-  
 μεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ  
 ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκεῖνου συμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος  
 σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ  
 ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον  
 μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια  
 κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν  
 347 αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέ-  
 ποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει  
 κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ·  
 ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς  
 μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμὴν,  
 ἢ ζημίαν, εἰ μὴ ἄρχῃ.

XIX. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ  
 Γλαῦκων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γινώσκω·  
 τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἤντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει  
 εἶρηκας, οὐ ξυνῆκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα

<sup>a</sup> κακά = troubles, misères, 517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 8, Herod. i. 97.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 345 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1134 b 6.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

“ Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it ‘ precisely ’ medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft ? ” “ Apparently not,” he said. “ Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing ? ” “ I’ll say he does.” “ Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage of the stronger ? That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people’s troubles<sup>a</sup> in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay<sup>b</sup> must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in the form of money or honour or a penalty if they refuse.”

XIX. “ What do you mean by that, Socrates ? ” said Glaucon. “ The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don’t understand.<sup>c</sup> ” “ Then,” said I, “ you don’t

<sup>c</sup> Plato habitually explains metaphors, abstractions, and complicated definitions in this dramatic fashion. Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B.

Β μισθόν, ἔφην, οὐ ξυνιεῖς, δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεταιί τε καὶ ἔστιν; "Εγωγε, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερώς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλήσθαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται· οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα·

Γ οὐ γάρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν· ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλη ἄρχειν· ἦν δείσαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίοσιν

Δ ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις. ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει, πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ'

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1318 b 36. In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. Cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.* ii. 9 "male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare"; Democ. *fr.* 49 D.: "It is hard to be ruled by a worse man;" Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, § 77.

<sup>b</sup> The good and the necessary is a favourite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the *condicio sine qua non* of the good. Cf. 358 c, 493 c, 540 b, *Laws* 628 c-d, 858 a. Aristotle took over the idea, *Met.* 1072 b 12.

<sup>c</sup> This suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than *Meno* 100 a, 89 b.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honour and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?" "I do," he said. "Well, then," said I, "that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honour. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honour, for they are not covetous of honour. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse<sup>a</sup> if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,<sup>b</sup> but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men<sup>c</sup> only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,<sup>d</sup> and there it

<sup>a</sup> The paradox suggests Spencer's altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall's Upsidonia. Cf. *infra* 521 A, 586 c, Isoc. vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, *On Representative Government*, p. 56: "The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as consenting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils;" *ibid.* p. 200: "Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it."



ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς  
 ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι,  
 ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιννώσκων  
 τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον  
 ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε  
 Ε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι  
 τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ  
 καὶ εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μείζον  
 εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου  
 βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ  
 οὖν πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἰρεῖ καὶ  
 ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρας δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν  
 τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε, ἔφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον  
 348 εἶναι. "Ἦκουσας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύ-  
 μαχος ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; "Ἦκουσα,  
 ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πεί-  
 θωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πη ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ  
 λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς. "Ἄν μὲν  
 τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν  
 αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ  
 δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς,  
 ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τὰγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν, ὅσα ἑκάτεροι  
 Β ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν  
 διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομο-  
 λογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοῖ

<sup>a</sup> εἰσαῦθις lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 c. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus's definition is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main theme of the *Republic* raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just.

<sup>b</sup> This is done in 358 d ff. It is the favourite Greek

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would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled ; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.<sup>a</sup> A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus's present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon ? ” said I, “ and which seems to you to be the truer statement ? ” “ That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say,” he replied. “ Did you hear,” said I, “ all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man ? ” “ I heard,” he said, “ but I am not convinced.” “ Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true ? ” “ Of course I wish it,” he said. “ If then we oppose<sup>b</sup> him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and

method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and anti-thetic enumerations. Cf. Herod. viii. 83, the *διαλέξεις* (Diels, *Vorsokratiker* ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. *Protag.* 329 A, 334-335, *Gorg.* 461-462, also *Gorg.* 471 E, *Cratyl.* 437 D, *Theaetet.* 171 A.

τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει; Οὕτως, ἔφη.

XX. "Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀποκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι; C Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἶρηκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν; Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἡδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ. Ἄλλὰ τί μήν; Τούναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν D καλεῖς; Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη. Ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; Οἷ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἰοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶει με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια E λόγου, ἀλλ' ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀγνωῶ ὅ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα,

<sup>a</sup> Thrasymachus's "Umwertung aller Werte" reverses the normal application of the words, as Callicles does in *Gorg.* 491 E.

<sup>b</sup> Thrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates' inference from the etymology of εὐήθεια (cf. 343 c) is repudiated. Injustice is not turpitude (bad character) but —discretion. εὐβουλία in a higher sense is what Protagoras teaches (*Protag.* 318 E) and in the highest sense is the wisdom of Plato's guardians (*infra* 428 B).

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

pleaders." "Quite so," he said. "Which method do you like best?" said I. "This one," he said.

XX. "Come then, Thrasymachus," I said, "go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete." "I affirm it," he said, "and have told you my reasons." "Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?" "Of course." "Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?" "It is likely,<sup>a</sup> you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn't pay." "But what then, pray?" "The opposite," he replied. "What! justice vice?" "No, but a most noble simplicity<sup>b</sup> or goodness of heart." "Then do you call injustice badness of heart?" "No, but goodness of judgement." "Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good?" "Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice," he said, "and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing," he said, "if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described." "I am not unaware of your meaning in that," I said; "but this is what surprised me,<sup>c</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 c) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. *Introd.* p. x.

εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Ἄλλὰ πάνν οὕτω τίθημι. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ράδιον ἔχειν ὃ τί τις εἶπη. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰλλα αὐτῷ πάντα  
 349 προσθήσεις, ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Ἄλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον  
 Β ἐλέγχεις; Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τότε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἄν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν;

<sup>a</sup> ἤδη marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a "stiffer proposition," i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn.

<sup>b</sup> e.g. Polus in *Gorg.* 474 ff., 482 D-E. Cf. Isoc. *De Pace* 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the κακὸν and the αἰσχρὸν and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. *Laws* 627 D, *Polit.* 306 A, *Laws* 662 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* on 346 A.

<sup>d</sup> περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on *Theaet.* 161 c, and Aristot. *Met. passim.*

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that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class." "Well, I do so class them," he said. "That," said I, "is a stiffer proposition,<sup>a</sup> my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer. For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other<sup>b</sup> disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honourable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don't shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom." "You are a most veritable prophet," he replied. "Well," said I, "I mustn't flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.<sup>c</sup> For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not 'mocking' us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.<sup>d</sup>" "What difference does it make to you," he said, "whether I believe it or not? Why don't you test the argument?" "No difference," said I, "but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach<sup>e</sup> or exceed another just

<sup>e</sup> In pursuance of the analogy between the virtues and the arts the moral idea *πλεονεξία* (overreaching, getting more than your share; see on 359 c) is generalized to include doing more than or differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett's Shakespearian quotation (*King John* iv. ii. 28),

When workmen strive to do better than well,  
They do confound their skill in covetousness,  
though apt, only illustrates the thought in part.

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστείος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. Τί δέ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον; Ἡγοῖτ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, C ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσῃ καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

XXI. Ὡδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος D τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας. Ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερος. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὦν καὶ εἰκέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰκέναι; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν. Ἄλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη. Εἶεν, ὦ Θρασύ-

° The assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus's ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in "Substitution of Similar": "Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like." But practical logic requires the qualification "in respect of their likeness." Socrates,

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man?" "By no means," he said; "otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is." "And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?" "Not that either," he replied. "But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not?" "He would," he said, "but he wouldn't be able to." "That is not my question," I said, "but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim or wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust?" "That is the case," he replied. "How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?" "Of course," he said, "since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything." "Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavour will be to get the most in everything for himself." "That is so."

XXI. "Let us put it in this way," I said; "the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both." "Admirably put," he said. "But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither." "That, too, is right," he said. "Is it not also true," I said, "that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?" "Of course," he said, "being such he will be like to such and the other not." "Excellent. Then each is such<sup>a</sup> as that to which he is like." "What else do you suppose?"

however, argues that since the just man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy.



μαχε· μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον·  
 Ἔγωγε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα;  
 Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον  
 ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ  
 δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν; Ναί. Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; οὐχ  
 οὕτως; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἀριστε,  
 μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσι-  
 κοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν  
 πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιούν πλεόν ἔχειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.  
 Τί δέ; ἀμούσου; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ἰατρι-  
 350 κός; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ἰατρικοῦ  
 πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος; Οὐ δῆτα.  
 Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ; Ναί. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὄρα  
 ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, εἴ τίς σοι  
 δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὅστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖ-  
 σθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν,  
 καὶ οὐ ταῦτά τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν  
 πράξιν. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὕτως  
 ἔχειν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν  
 Β ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτήσειεν ἂν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπι-  
 στήμονος; Ἴσως. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; Φη-  
 μί. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημί. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός  
 τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεον-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 608 E, *Gorg.* 463 E, *Protag.* 332 A, 358 D, *Phaedo* 103 C, *Soph.* 226 B, *Phileb.* 34 E, *Meno* 75 D, 88 A, *Alc. I.* 128 B, *Cratyl.* 385 B. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, ἔγωγε, but in *δήπου* there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all.

<sup>b</sup> Familiar Socratic doctrine. Cf. *Laches* 194 D, *Ilysis* 210 D, *Gorg.* 504 D.

<sup>c</sup> πλεονεκτεῖν is here a virtual synonym of πλεόν ἔχειν. The  
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he said. "Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musician<sup>a</sup> and another unmusical?" "I do." "Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent?" "The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent." "And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent<sup>b</sup> and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent?" "Yes." "And the same of the physician?" "The same." "Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach<sup>c</sup> another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him?" "I do not." "But would he the unmusical man?" "Of necessity," he said. "And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?" "Surely not." "But he would the un-medical man?" "Yes." "Consider then with regard to all<sup>d</sup> forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action." "Why, perhaps it must be so," he said, "in such cases." "But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant?" "It may be." "But the one who knows is wise?" "I'll say so." "And the wise is good?" "I'll say so." "Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach

two terms help the double meaning. Cf. *Laws* 691 Α πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων.

<sup>a</sup> Generalizing from the inductive instances.

εκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. "Ἐοικεν, ἔφη. Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθής τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; "Ἐγωγε, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῆσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; Ναί. "Ἐοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεί. Κινδυνεύει. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὠμολογοῦμεν, ὦ γε ὅμοιος ἐκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι. Ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ. Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

XXII. Ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγισ, μετὰ ἰδρώτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὐπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἄ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἂν με φαίης· ἢ οὖν ἔα με

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 334 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 333 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the blush of the sophist in *Euthydem.* 297 A.

<sup>d</sup> The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets *ισχυρόν*, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses

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his like but his unlike and opposite." "It seems so," he said. "But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?" "So it appears." "And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?" "I did," he replied. "But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?" "Yes." "Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus." "It seems likely." "But furthermore we agreed that each is such as that to which he is like." "Yes, we did." "Then the just man has turned out<sup>a</sup> on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant."

XXII. Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance<sup>b</sup> and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.<sup>c</sup> But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, "Good," said I, "let this be taken as established.<sup>d</sup> But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?" "I remember," he said; "but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.<sup>e</sup> Either then allow me to speak at such

to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in *Gorg.* 510 A.

<sup>e</sup> This is really a reminiscence of such passages as *Theaetet.* 162 D, *Protag.* 336 B, *Gorg.* 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B.

εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, εἶεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. Ὡστε σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔα<sup>s</sup> λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδέν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα δὴ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώ-  
 351 μεθα τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὄν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἶη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· οὐν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία. οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν, ἀλλ' οὔτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὧ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδέ πη σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἀδικὸν εἶναι καὶ  
 Β ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτό γε ἢ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελειώτατα οὔσα ἀδικός. Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆ μετὰ  
 C δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες

<sup>a</sup> So Polus in *Gorg.* 461 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 527 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 331 C, 386 B. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., than injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not

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length as I desire,<sup>a</sup> or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives<sup>b</sup> telling their tales, will say 'Very good' and will nod assent and dissent." "No, no," said I, "not counter to your own belief." "Yes, to please you," he said, "since you don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?" "Nothing, indeed," said I; "but if this is what you propose to do, do it, and I will ask the questions." "Ask on, then." "This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now," I said, "if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple<sup>c</sup> as that. I wish, Thrasy-machus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection." "Certainly," he said; "and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete." "I understand," I said, "that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this: whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice." "If,<sup>d</sup>" he replied, "what you were just now because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice.

<sup>d</sup> Thrasy-machus can foresee the implications of either theory.

ἔχει, ἢ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας. Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς. Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

XXIII. Εὐ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ ληστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πράξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ  
 D ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; Οὐ δῆτα, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνυ γε. Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἢ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἢ γάρ; "Ἐστω, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἄλλ' εὐ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους  
 E εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσι καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; "Ἐσονται, ἔφη. Ἐὰν δὲ δῆ, ὦ

\* For the thought cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, § 144: "Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society;" Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, Chap. VIII. § 31: "It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a kind of spurious or class morality," etc.; Carlyle: "Neither James Boswell's good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof." Proclus, *In Rempub.*

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saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice ; if it is as I said, with injustice." " Admirable, Thrasymachus," I said ; " you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers." " I am trying to please you," he replied.

XXIII. " Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this : do you think that a city,<sup>a</sup> an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another ? " " Certainly not," said he. " But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to ? " " Assuredly." " For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so ? " " So be it," he replied, " not to differ from you." " That is good of you, my friend ; but tell me this : if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common ? " " By all means." " Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just ? " " They will," he said. " And then will you tell me that if

Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante (*Convivio* i. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke (*Human Understanding* i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: "They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities," etc. Cf. further Isoc. xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato, *Protag.* 322 B, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους.



θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μὴ ἀπολεῖ  
 τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔξει; Μηδὲν  
 ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται  
 ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἶαν, ὧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε  
 πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ  
 352 ὄτωσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν  
 μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι,  
 ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ  
 παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ γε.  
 Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δὴ, οἶμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσει,  
 ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον  
 αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ  
 ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ  
 καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Δίκαιοι δέ γ'  
 Β εἰσὶν, ὧ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί; "Ἐστωσαν, ἔφη. Καὶ  
 θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἀδικος, ὧ Θρασύμαχε,  
 ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη,  
 θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα  
 μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. "Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ  
 τὰ λοιπά μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀπο-  
 κρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ

<sup>a</sup> The specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the *Republic*. Cf. 369 A, 434 D, 441 C. For the argument many, few or two, one, cf. *Laws* 626 C.

<sup>b</sup> Plato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. *Introd.* p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, *Laws* 626 E, 693 B, *Epist.* vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556. 45 Diels ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, *Stoic. Repug.* xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd.

<sup>c</sup> This is the conventional climax of the plea for any

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

injustice arises in one<sup>a</sup> it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? ” “ Have it that it keeps it,” he said. “ And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else, it first renders the thing incapable of co-operation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself<sup>b</sup> and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so? ” “ By all means. ” “ Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so? ” “ Yes. ” “ But, my friend, the gods too<sup>c</sup> are just. ” “ Have it that they are,” he said. “ So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear. ” “ Revel in your discourse,” he said, “ without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here. ” “ Fill up the measure of my feast,<sup>d</sup> then, and complete it for me,” I said, “ by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that

moral ideal. So Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1179 a 24, proves that the σοφός being likest God is θεοφιλέστατος. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. μόννοι θεοφιλέες ὅσοις ἐχθρόν τὸ ἀδικεῖν; *infra* 382 E, 612 E, *Phileb.* 39 E, *Laws* 716 D. The “enlightened” Thrasy-machus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. *Theaetet.* 162 D θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες. He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544. 40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use.

<sup>d</sup> ἐστιάσεως keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 354 A-B, *Lysis* 211 c, *Gorg.* 522 A, *Phaedr.* 227 B, and *Tim.* 17 A, from which perhaps it became a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages.

σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν  
 C μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὓς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτε τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πράξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθές λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἤεσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν ἅ ἔπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικία ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἷ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ  
 D τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προῦθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καί μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί  
 E σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; "Ἐμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο

<sup>a</sup> For the idea cf. the argument in *Protag.* 327 c-d, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all.

<sup>b</sup> The main ethical question of the *Republic*, suggested in 347 e, now recurs.

<sup>c</sup> Similarly 578 c. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 a-b). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἔργον or specific function.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 344 d, *supra*, pp. 71 f.

<sup>e</sup> See on 335 d, and Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted<sup>a</sup> by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also true<sup>b</sup> that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.<sup>c</sup> For it is no ordinary<sup>d</sup> matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life.” “Proceed with your inquiry,” he said. “I proceed,” said I. “Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work<sup>e</sup> or function?” “I would.” “Would you be willing its specific function. See Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 301, Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (*cf.* 445 B and *Cratyl.* 399 D) and on the ambiguity of *εὖ πράττειν*, “fare well” and “do well.” The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, adverts on the fallacy. For *ἔργον cf.* further Epictet. *Dis.* i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. *Dis.* ii. 4, Musonius, *apud* Stob. 117. 8, Thompson on *Meno* 90 E, Plato, *Laws* 896 D, *Phaedr.* 246 B.

ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ὦδε· ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὡσίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν ἔργα εἶναι; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; 353 μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλου κληῖμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἄλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἂν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐργασθέντι. Ἀληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν; Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

XXIV. Νῦν δὴ, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων πυνθανόμενος, εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἐκάστου εἶη ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζεται. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καί μοι Β δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὥπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; Ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν. ὀφθαλμῶν, φαμέν, ἔστιν ἔργον; Ἔστιν. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δέ; ὧτων ἦν τι ἔργον; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; Οὕτω. Ἔχε δὴ· ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον C καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. Ἦτις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἢ ἀρετὴ· οὐ γάρ πω

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?" "I don't understand," he replied. "Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes?" "Certainly not." "Again, could you hear with anything but ears?" "By no means." "Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)?" "By all means." "Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments." "Certainly." "But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose." "That is true." "Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?" "We must."

XXIV. "You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform." "Well," he said, "I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that." "Very good," said I. "Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function?" "They have." "Is there also a virtue of the eyes?" "There is." "And was there not a function of the ears?" "Yes." "And so also a virtue?" "Also a virtue." "And what of all other things? Is the case not the same?" "The same." "Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?" "How could they?" he said; "for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision." "Whatever," said I, "the excellence may be. For

τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς. Ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι; Οὐδενὶ ἄλλω. Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; Μάλιστα γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; Φαμέν. Ἄρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν; Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ. Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

354 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὃ δὲ μὴ τάναντία. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὃ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Ἔστωσαν,

<sup>a</sup> Platonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose.

<sup>b</sup> For the equivocation cf. *Charm.* 172 A, *Gorg.* 507 c, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 9. 14, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1098 b 21, Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 401, Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*

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I have not yet come <sup>a</sup> to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect." "That much," he said, "you may safely affirm to be true." "Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?" "Assuredly." "And do we then apply the same principle to all things?" "I think so." "Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?" "Nothing else." "And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul?" "Most certainly," he said. "And do we not also say that there is an excellence or virtue of the soul?" "We do." "Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?" "It is impossible." "Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.<sup>b</sup>" "Of necessity." "And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?" "Yes, we did." "The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill?" "So it appears," he said, "by your reasoning." "But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary." "Of course." "Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable." "So be (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that *κακῶς ἀρχειν*, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness.



ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐδέποτ' ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδαίοις. Ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε  
 Β εἰστίαμαι, δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφόμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμηῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐτῷ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἢ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι  
 C νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἐστὶ, σχολῆ εἶσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὔσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

\* For similar irony cf. *Gorg.* 489 D, *Euthydem.* 304 C.

<sup>b</sup> Similarly Holmes (*Poet at the Breakfast Table*, p. 108) of the poet: "He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied," etc. Cf. Lucian, *Demosth. Encom.* 18, Julian, *Orat.* ii. p. 69 C, Polyb. iii. 57. 7.

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it," he said. "But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy." "Of course not." "Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice." "Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis." "A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus," I said, "now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.<sup>a</sup> I have not dined well, however—by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttons<sup>b</sup> snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion<sup>c</sup> is that I know nothing.<sup>d</sup> For if I don't know what the just is,<sup>e</sup> I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy."

<sup>c</sup> Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that *διαλόγου* here means "inquiry" (*Erörterung*), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus.

<sup>d</sup> For the profession of ignorance at the close of a Socratic dialogue cf. *Charm.* 175 A-B, *Lysis* 222 D-E, *Protag.* 361 A-B, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 39. Cf. also *Introd.* p. x.

<sup>e</sup> Knowledge of the essence, or definition, must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf. *Meno* 71 B, 86 D-E, *Laches* 190 B, *Gorg.* 448 E.

## B

357 I. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων αἰεὶ τε ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέειν B ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι, ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὁ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἄρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἰ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

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• So in *Philebus* 11 c, Philebus cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument.

• Aristotle borrows this classification from Plato (*Topics* 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to “preferables” (Diog. Laert. vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body,

## BOOK II

I. When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid, enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus's abandonment<sup>a</sup> of his case, but said, "Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?" "Really," I said, "if the choice rested with me." "Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of good<sup>b</sup> which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures as are harmless<sup>c</sup> and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment." "I

and of possessions (*Laws* 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things.

<sup>c</sup> Plato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. *Tim.* 59 D ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονήν, Milton's

Mirth that after no repenting draws.

But the *Republic* (583 D) like the *Gorgias* (493 E-494 C) knows the more technical distinction of the *Philebus* (42 C ff., 53 C ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain.

C Ἐμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δέ; ὃ αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων; οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζόμεθα. Ναί, εἶπον. Τρίτον δέ ὄρας τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν

D ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δή; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην  
358 τίθης; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους, ὃ μισθῶν θ' ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὄν χαλεπόν.

II. Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται<sup>1</sup>. ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. Ἴθι  
B δή, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ. Θρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ

<sup>1</sup> ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται A omits.

<sup>a</sup> Isoc. i. 47 has this distinction, as well as Aristotle.

<sup>b</sup> Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diog. Laert. x. 1. 138), said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the opening sentences of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* treat all forms of knowledge as goods in themselves.

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recognize that kind," said I. "And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences,<sup>a</sup> such as understanding,<sup>b</sup> sight, and health?<sup>c</sup> For these I presume we welcome for both reasons." "Yes," I said. "And can you discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them." "Why yes," I said, "I must admit this third class also. But what of it?" "In which of these classes do you place justice?" he said. "In my opinion, I said, "it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results." "Yet the multitude," he said, "do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction."

II. "I am aware," said I, "that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn." "Come now," he said, "hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpent<sup>d</sup> that you had charmed, but I am not yet satis-

<sup>a</sup> Plutarch (1040 c) says that Chrysippus censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato explicitly says that even health is to be disregarded when the true interests of the soul require it.

<sup>d</sup> For Plato's fondness for the idea of *κηλεῖν* cf. *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 500.

οὐπω κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονε περὶ ἐκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι, τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἑᾶσαι χαίρειν. οὕτωςι οὖν ποιήσω, εἴαν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπ-  
 C ανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγενῆσθαι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν· τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐτι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν  
 D δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἀμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι. μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι· διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδικὸν βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι, ὃν τρόπον αὐτὸ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ἦν  
 E δ' ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 366 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 317 C-D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 66 E. Plato affirms that the immoralism of Thrasymachus and Callicles was widespread in Greece. Cf.

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fied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul,<sup>a</sup> but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary<sup>b</sup> and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others.<sup>c</sup> But the case for justice, to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you." "Nothing could please me more," said I; "for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear discourse again and again?" "That is excellent," he said; "and now listen to what I said would be the first topic

Introd. x-xi, and *Gorg.* 511 B, *Protag.* 333 c, *Euthydem.* 279 B, and my paper on the interpretation of the *Timaeus*, *A.J.P.* vol. ix. pp. 403-404.



ἄκουε, οἷόν τέ τι<sup>1</sup> καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν  
 359 τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτ' ἀδικεῖν μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, εἰὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, εἰὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὄν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι  
 Β οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἂν ἐνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἂν. ἢ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὧ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

III. Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ·

<sup>1</sup> τί οἷόν τε D.

<sup>a</sup> Glaucon employs the antithesis between nature and law and the theory of an original social contract to expound the doctrine of Thrasymachus and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. His statement is more systematic than theirs, but the principle is the same; for, though Callicles does not explicitly speak of a

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—the nature and origin of justice. By nature,<sup>a</sup> they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory.

III. "But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as

social contract, he implies that conventional justice is an agreement of the weak devised to hold the strong in awe (*Gorg.* 492 c), and Glaucon here affirms that no really strong man would enter into any such agreement. The social contract without the immoral application is also suggested in *Protag.* 322 B. Cf. also *Crito* 50 c, f.

- C** δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρω ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσασιν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτόν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἷαν
- D** ποτέ φασι δύναμιν τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἧ ἔνεμεν· ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν,<sup>1</sup> περὶ δὲ τῆ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἴν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα<sup>1</sup> τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ

<sup>1</sup> ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν A; the translation tries to preserve the idiomatic ambiguity of the text: ἔχειν οὐδέν of Π would explicitly affirm the nakedness of the corpse.

<sup>a</sup> The antithesis of φύσις and νόμος, nature and law, custom or convention, is a commonplace of both Greek rhetoric and Greek ethics. Cf. the Chicago Dissertation of John Walter Beardslee, *The Use of φύσις in Fifth Century Greek Literature*, ch. x. p. 68. Cf. Herod. iii. 38, Pindar, quoted by Plato, *Gorg.* 484 B, *Laws* 690 B. 715 A; Euripides or Critias, *Frag. of Sisyphus*, Aristoph. *Birds* 755 ff., Plato, *Protag.* 337 D, *Gorg.* 483 E, *Laws* 889 C and 890 D. It was misused by ancient as it is by modern radicals. Cf. my interpretation of the *Timaeus*, *A.J.P.* vol. ix. p. 405. The ingenuity of

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this in thought : if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law <sup>a</sup> it is forcibly diverted to paying honour to 'equality.'<sup>b</sup> The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian.<sup>c</sup> They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing ; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm ; and the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the

modern philologists has tried to classify the Greek sophists as distinctly partisans of νόμος or φύσις. It cannot be done. Cf. my unsigned review of Alfred Benn in the *New York Nation*, July 20, 1899, p. 57.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 508 A.

<sup>c</sup> So manuscripts and Proclus. There are many emendations which the curious will find in Adam's first appendix to this book. Herod. i. 8-13 tells a similar but not identical story of Gyges himself, in which the magic ring and many other points of Plato's tale are lacking. On the whole legend cf. the study of Kirby Flower Smith, *A.J.P.* vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer's *Paus.* iii. p. 417.

ποιμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκείνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τῆς χειρός· τούτου δὲ γενομένου  
 360 ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερόν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἶσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλω γίνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλω. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθύς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα· ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, ἔξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτω βούλοιο, καὶ ἀποκτινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὕστινας βούλοιο, καὶ τᾶλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιῶι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν

<sup>a</sup> Mr. H. G. Wells' *The Invisible Man* rests on a similar fancy. Cf. also the lawless fancies of Aristoph. *Birds* 785 ff.

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flocks, he also attended wearing the ring. So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisible<sup>a</sup> to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent; and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the collet outwards and so became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, and when outwards visible; and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamant<sup>b</sup> temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the marketplace, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.<sup>c</sup> And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet

<sup>b</sup> The word is used of the firmness of moral faith in *Gorg.* 509 A and *Rep.* 618 E.

<sup>c</sup> *ισόθεος*. The word is a *leit-motif* anticipating Plato's rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of the tyrant. Cf. *infra* 568 A-B. It does not, as Adam suggests, foreshadow Plato's attack on the popular theology.

φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδία ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν.

Δ λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἶεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδία τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἄψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως.

Ε IV. Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ ὧν λέγομεν, εἴαν διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω· οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ, ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πη σφαλῆ, ἰκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασι λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι· τὸν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 344 A, *Gorg.* 492 B.

<sup>b</sup> αἰσθανομένοις suggests men of discernment who are not taken in by phrases, "the knowing ones." Cf. *Protag.* 317 A, and *Aristoph. Clouds* 1241 τοῖς εἰδόσιν.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 483 B, 492 A, *Protag.* 327 B, *Aristot. Rhet.* ii. 23.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *infra* 580 B-C, *Phileb.* 27 C.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a licence within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiable <sup>a</sup> and a great fool by all who took note of it, <sup>b</sup> though they would praise him <sup>c</sup> before one another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point.

IV. "But to come now to the decision <sup>d</sup> between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to be made? Thus: we must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct. In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do: a first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities <sup>e</sup> and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Quint. iv. 5. 17 "recte enim Graeci praecipiant non tentanda quae effici omnino non possint."



άλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς Β δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐὰν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διὰ τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος C εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν, εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἔνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ἢ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων· ἀλλ' ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, D δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὣν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵν' ἀμφοτέροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν

\* Cf. Emerson, *Eloquence*: "Yet any swindlers we have known are novices and bunglers. . . . A greater power of face would accomplish anything and with the rest of the takings take away the bad name."

† Cf. Cic. *De offic.* i. 13.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

caught as a bungler.<sup>a</sup> For the height of injustice <sup>b</sup> is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if he does happen to trip,<sup>c</sup> we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigour and his provision of friends and money; and when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming.<sup>d</sup> For if he is going to be thought just he will have honours and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice' sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honours. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.<sup>e</sup> Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Thucyd. viii. 24 on the miscalculation of the shrewd Chians.

<sup>d</sup> As Aristotle sententiously says, ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν ὁ λαυθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιτο (*Rhet.* 1365 b 1, *Topics* iii. 3. 14).

<sup>e</sup> For the thought cf. Eurip. *Hel.* 270-271.

δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνονται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

V. Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν. 'Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντων δὲ τοιούτων, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγώ-μαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον  
 Ε βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικότερως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται,  
 362 ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἀδικόν, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἀδικόν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

Β βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον, ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμῆν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 540 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *infra* 613 ε, *Gorg.* 486 c, 509 α, *Apol.* 32 d. The Greeks were sensitive to rude or boastful speech.

<sup>c</sup> Or strictly "impaled." Cf. Cic. *De Rep.* iii. 27. Writers on Plato and Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato's just man with the Crucifixion.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier."

V. "Bless me, my dear Glaucon," said I, "how strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue!<sup>a</sup>" "To the best of my ability," he replied, "and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each. We must tell it, then; and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal,<sup>b</sup> you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice. What they will say is this: that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified,<sup>c</sup> and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of Aeschylus<sup>d</sup> was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust,

Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit  
From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd,

first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with whom he will, and in all these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so

<sup>d</sup> *Septem* 592-594.

ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία περι-  
 γίνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεον-  
 εκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ  
 ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας  
 καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν  
 τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου  
 πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς  
 ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι  
 μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον.  
 οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ'  
 ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον  
 ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

VI. Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν  
 ἐν νῶ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς  
 αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί που οἶει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἀλλὰ  
 τί μήν; εἶπον. Αὐτό, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὁ  
 μάλιστα ἔδει ρηθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ  
 λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη· ὥστε καὶ σύ,  
 εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ  
 καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ρηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ  
 ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη. καὶ ὅς,  
 Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε· δεῖ  
 γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν  
 ὅδε εἶπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν  
 δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἴν' ἢ σαφέστερον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ βούλε-  
 σθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται  
 πατέρες τε υἱέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* on 343 D, 349 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 332 D.

<sup>c</sup> μεγαλοπρεπῶς. Usually a word of ironical connotation in Plato.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Euthyphro* 12 E ff. and *supra* 331 B, θεῶ θυσίας, where

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they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better,<sup>a</sup> is rich and benefits his friends and harms his enemies<sup>b</sup>; and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently,<sup>c</sup> and he serves and pays court<sup>d</sup> to men whom he favours and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favour of heaven<sup>e</sup> also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just.”

VI. When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus said, “ You surely don’t suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete? ” “ Why, what else? ” I said. “ The very most essential point,” said he, “ has not been mentioned. ” “ Then,” said I, “ as the proverb has it, ‘ Let a brother help a man ’<sup>f</sup>—and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice. ” “ Nonsense,” he said, “ but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon’s meaning is to be made more clear. Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all

the respectable morality of the good Cephalus is virtually identical with this commercial view of religion.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 352 B and 613 A-B.

<sup>f</sup> ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη. The rhythm perhaps indicates a proverb of which the scholiast found the source in *Odyssey* xvi. 97.

## PLATO

363 ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίω εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ ἀδίκῳ.<sup>1</sup> ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσι· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὀμη-  
B ρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν

ἄκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας  
εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄϊες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι,

καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα· παρα-  
πλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥστε τευ γάρ φησιν

ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅστε θεουδῆς  
εὐδικίας ἀνέχησι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα  
C πυροῦς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθησι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,  
τίκτηη δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τὰγαθὰ καὶ ὁ

<sup>1</sup> ἀδίκῳ recent mss.; cf. 362 B: the δικαίω of A and II can be defended.

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• Who, in Quaker language, have a concern for, who have charge of souls. Cf. the admonitions of the father of Horace, *Sat.* i. 4. 105 ff., *Protag.* 325 D, *Xen. Cyr.* i. 5. 9, *Isoc.* iii. 2, Terence, *Adelphi* 414 f., Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 187, and the letters of Lord Chesterfield *passim*, as well as Plato himself, *Laws* 662 E.

<sup>b</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* 232 f., Homer, *Od.* xix. 109 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, iv. p. 83. The son is possibly Eumolpus.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

those who have others in their charge,<sup>a</sup> urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer<sup>b</sup> declare, the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just :

Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their  
mid-trunks,

and he tells how the

Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted  
with soft wool,

and of many other blessings akin to these ; and  
similarly the other poet :

Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the  
high gods,

Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him  
her foison,

Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted  
with fair fruits,

Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with  
fishes.

And Musaeus and his son<sup>c</sup> have<sup>d</sup> a more excellent

<sup>d</sup> For the thought of the following *cf.* Emerson, *Compensation*: "He (the preacher) assumed that judgement is not executed in this world ; that the wicked are successful ; that the good are miserable ; and then urged from reason and scripture a compensation to be made to both parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the congregation at this doctrine."



υἱὸς αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασι τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς  
 "Αἴδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες  
 καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἔστε-  
 D φανωμένους ποιούσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν  
 μεθύοντας, ἠγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν  
 μέθην αἰώνιον· οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους  
 ἀποτείνουσι<sup>1</sup> μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ  
 παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ  
 ὀσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα  
 ἐγκωμιάζουσι δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὐ  
 καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν  
 "Αἴδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἔτι  
 E τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ Γλαύκων  
 περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διήλθε  
 τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν,  
 ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ  
 ψόγος οὗτος ἑκατέρων.

VII. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο  
 αὐ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας  
 364 ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ  
 ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἢ σωφρο-  
 σύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ  
 ἐπίπονον· ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἠδὲ μὲν καὶ  
 εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰ-  
 σχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα

<sup>1</sup> ἀποτείνουσιν AΠΞ: ἀποτίνουσιν q.

<sup>a</sup> νεανικώτερα is in Plato often humorous and depreciative.  
 Cf. *infra* 563 E νεανική.

<sup>b</sup> συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων. Jowett's notion that this is a jingle  
 is due to the English pronunciation of Greek.

<sup>c</sup> Kern, *ibid.*, quotes Servius *ad Virgil, Aen. iii. 98* "et nati

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

song<sup>a</sup> than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints,<sup>b</sup> where, reclined on couches and crowned with wreaths, they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children's children<sup>c</sup> of the pious and oath-keeping man and his race thereafter never fail. Such and such-like are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mud<sup>d</sup> in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve,<sup>e</sup> and, while they still live, they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say.<sup>f</sup> Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust.

VII. "Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honourable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, natorum" and opines that Homer took *Il.* xx. 308 from Orpheus.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* i. pp. 56-57, *infra* 533 D, *Phaedo* 69 c, commentators on Aristoph. *Frogs* 146.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 11. 22, and, with an allegorical application, *Gorg.* 493 B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato elsewhere teaches that the real punishment of sin is to be cut off from communion with the good. *Theaetet.* 176 D-E, *Laws* 728 B, *infra* 367 A.

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσι δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς B δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πη ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἐνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπωδαῖς, εἴτε C τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψειν, ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶ καὶ καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεούς, ὡς φασι, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες, ὡς

τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι  
 D ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·  
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν  
 καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν

<sup>a</sup> The gnostic poets complain that bad men prosper for a time, but they have faith in the late punishment of the wicked and the final triumph of justice.

<sup>b</sup> There is a striking analogy between Plato's language here and the description by Protestant historians of the sale of indulgences by Tetzels in Germany. Rich men's doors is proverbial. Cf. 489 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Mill, "Utility of Religion," *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 90: "All positive religions aid this self-delusion. Bad religions teach that divine vengeance may be bought off by

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for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power and to do them honour in public and private, and to dishonour and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods <sup>a</sup> and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests <sup>b</sup> and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods <sup>c</sup> that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantments <sup>d</sup> that constrain the gods to serve their end. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting :

Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking ;  
Smooth is the way and it lies near at hand and is easy  
to enter ;  
But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from  
the first step,<sup>e</sup>

and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite offerings or personal abasement." Plato, *Laws* 885 D, anticipates Mill. With the whole passage compare the scenes at the founding of Cloudecuckootown, Aristoph. *Birds* 960-990, and more seriously the mediaeval doctrine of the "treasure of the church" and the Hindu *tapas*.

<sup>a</sup> In *Laws* 933 D both are used of the victim with ἐπιφθαις, which primarily applies to the god. Cf. Lucan, *Phars.* vi. 492 and 527.

<sup>e</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* 287-289.

θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρ-  
τύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπε

λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,  
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν  
E λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρῶσ' ἄνθρωποι  
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆῃ καὶ ἀμάρτη.

βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρ-  
φέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασι,  
καθ' ἃς θηηπολοῦσι, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας  
ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ  
ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ  
365 μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ  
τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἶ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν  
ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

VIII. Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες,  
τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ  
κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι  
τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν,  
ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα  
ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν,  
B ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῆ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς  
ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων  
πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ

<sup>a</sup> *Iliad*, ix. 497 ff. adapted.

<sup>b</sup> ὄμαδον, lit. noise, hubbub, babel, here contemptuous. There is no need of the emendation ὄμαθόν. Cf. *infra* 387 A, and Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, p. 82; cf. John Morley, *Lit. Studies*, p. 184, "A bushel of books."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 819 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25: "His (Plato's) imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young

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Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said :

The gods themselves are moved by prayers,  
And men by sacrifice and soothing vows,  
And incense and libation turn their wills  
Praying, whene'er they have sinned and made trans-  
gression.<sup>a</sup>

And they produce a bushel<sup>b</sup> of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport<sup>c</sup> for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.

VIII. "What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth<sup>d</sup> would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, 'Is it by

Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether his best chance of happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy." Cf. *Intro.* x-xi; also "The Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," p. 214.

πότερον δίκαια τείχος ὕψιον  
ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις

ἀναβὰς καὶ ἑμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιώ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικάϊω μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ,<sup>1</sup> ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκω δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασαμένω θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν,  
C ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτόν ὄλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἑμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραφτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἐλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ράδιον αἰεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές,  
D φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν, εἰσὶ τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀν-

<sup>1</sup> ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ] cf. Introd. xlix. ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ would, unless we assume careless displacement of the καί, mean "if I also seem not to be (just)."

<sup>a</sup> φανερά ζημία is familiar and slightly humorous. Cf. Starkie on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 737.

<sup>b</sup> Simonides, *Fr.* 76 Bergk, and Eurip. *Orest.* 236.

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justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security?' The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets,<sup>a</sup> they say, but liabilities, labour and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then since it is 'the seeming,' as the wise men<sup>b</sup> show me, that 'masters the reality' and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. For a front and a show<sup>c</sup> I must draw about myself a shadow-outline of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of the most sage Archilochus,<sup>d</sup> shifty and bent on gain. Nay, 'tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer always to lie hid.<sup>e</sup> Neither is any other big thing facile, we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs,<sup>f</sup> and there are teachers of cajolery<sup>g</sup> who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room. So that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they

<sup>c</sup> A Pindaric mixture of metaphors beginning with a portico and garb, continuing with the illusory perspective of scene-painting, and concluding with the crafty fox trailed behind.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Fr.* 86-89 Bergk, and Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 55. 285 R. *κερδαλέαν* is a standing epithet of Reynard. Cf. Gildersleeve on Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 78.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. my review of Jebb's "Bacchylides," *Class. Phil.*, 1907, vol. ii. p. 235.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. George Miller Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, University of Chicago Dissertation, 1911.

<sup>g</sup> Lit. persuasion. Cf. the definition of rhetoric, *Gorg.* 453 A.



Ε θρωπίνων μέλει, οὐδ' <sup>1</sup> ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσὶν οἱοὶ θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῆσι καὶ ἀναθήμασι παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον 366 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἀδικοὶ δὲ κερδανούμεν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλ' ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἰ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται <sup>2</sup> καὶ οἱ Β λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἰ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸς μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἂν; ἢν ἔαν μετ' εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν

<sup>1</sup> οὐδ' q: καὶ A. This is the simplest and most plausible text. For a possible defence of καὶ cf. *Introd.* p. xlix.

<sup>2</sup> αὖ μέγα δύνανται: A omits.

• For the thought compare Tennyson, "Lucretius":

But he that holds  
The Gods are careless, wherefore need he care  
Greatly for them?

Cf. also Eurip. *I.A.* 1034-1035, *Anth. Pal.* x. 34.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Verres' distribution of his three years' spoliation of

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do not concern themselves with the doings of men, neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation.<sup>a</sup> If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by 'sacrifice and soothing vows' and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from the fruits of our wrong-doing.<sup>b</sup> For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children's children. 'Nay, my dear sir,' our calculating friend<sup>c</sup> will say, 'here again the rites for the dead<sup>d</sup> have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets<sup>e</sup> of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth.'

IX. "On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart's desire, with gods and men, in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest Sicily, Cic. *In C. Verrem actio prima* 14 (40), and Plato, *Laws* 906 c-d, *Lysias* xxvii. 6.

<sup>c</sup> His morality is the hedonistic calculus of the *Protagoras* or the commercial religion of "other-worldliness."

<sup>d</sup> For these τελευταί cf. 365 A. <sup>e</sup> Or rather "mouthpieces."

τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιο-  
**C** σύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ὦ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἶ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἅ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκους, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι πλὴν εἶ τις θεία φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ,  
**D** τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρωσ ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἴός τ' ᾗ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθεν περ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὤρμησε καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, ὦ θαυμάσιε,  
**E** πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον τῆ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῆ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ λαυθάνον θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίῳ λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχῇ ἐν αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δ' ἔστι  
**367** μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς

<sup>a</sup> Aristoph. *Clouds* 1241.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 492 A.

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authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honour justice and not rather laugh<sup>a</sup> when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness<sup>b</sup> that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such an one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honours, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good. For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up

ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπέιθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾗ. ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἅν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, φορτικῶς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τὰναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστι· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἄξια κεκτηῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄραν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δὴ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστί, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 363 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 343 c.

• Adam's note on γόνιμα: i.q. γνήσια is, I think, wrong.

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had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils.<sup>a</sup> This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I—for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is the other man's good,<sup>b</sup> the advantage of the stronger, and that injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productive<sup>c</sup> by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which

ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει· μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαιεῖν. ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαιούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι

**Ε** πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιούσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν, εἴαν τε λανθάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν ἐστιν.

**Χ.** Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ

368 οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἤσθην καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών·

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός.

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἀμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

**Β** δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 506 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* 1917, vol. xii. p. 436. It does not refer to Thrasymachus facetiously as Adam fancies, but is an honorific expression borrowed from the Pythagoreans.

<sup>c</sup> Possibly Critias,

<sup>d</sup> Probably the battle of 409 B.C., reported in *Diodor. Sic.* xiii. 65. Cf. *Introd.* p. viii.

<sup>e</sup> The implied pun on the name is made explicit in 580 c-d.

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injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honours that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire life<sup>a</sup> in the consideration of this very matter. Do not, then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil.”

X. While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said: “It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know,<sup>b</sup> in the beginning of the elegy which the admirer<sup>c</sup> of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara<sup>d</sup>—

Sons of Ariston,<sup>e</sup> whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.

This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion. And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general char-

Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they were his brothers. Cf. *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and *Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1873, Hist.-Phil. Kl. pp. 86 ff.



ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίσταν ἄν  
 ὑμῖν· ὅσω δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον  
 ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω·  
 δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι· σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι  
 ἂ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς  
 ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου·  
 οὔτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ  
 C οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορου-  
 μένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα  
 καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως  
 ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ· ὁ τε οὖν Γλαύκων  
 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ  
 μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ  
 ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελείας αὐτοῖν  
 τάληθές ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν,  
 D ὅτι Τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ'  
 D ὄξυ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν  
 ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην  
 ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ  
 τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ  
 πάνυ ὄξυ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ  
 αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ  
 ἐν μείζονι, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκεῖνα  
 πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω,  
 εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ  
 E Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐν  
 τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσῃ καθορᾶς; Ἐγώ σοι,  
 ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς  
 ἐνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἦ  
 δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν μείζον πόλις ἐνός ἀνδρός; Μείζον,

\* So Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 2. 8 (1094 b 10).

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acter, since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability for the reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be faint-hearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can." Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought: "The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and then examine the smaller, if they are the same." "Quite so," said Adeimantus; "but what analogy to this do you detect in the inquiry about justice?" "I will tell you," I said: "there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city?" "Assuredly," said he. "Is not the city larger than the man?" "It is larger," he said. "Then, per-

ἔφη. "Ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ  
 μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν  
 369 βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν  
 ποῖόν τί ἐστίν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ  
 ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ  
 τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες. Ἀλλά μοι  
 δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν  
 δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν  
 ἀδικίαν; Τάχ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένου  
 αὐτοῦ ἐλπίς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὁ ζητοῦμεν;  
 Β Πολύ γε. Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν;  
 οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι·  
 σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος·  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

XI. Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς  
 ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ  
 αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν  
 ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; Οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὕτω  
 C δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου,  
 τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς  
 εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνοὺς τε καὶ  
 βοηθοὺς, ταύτῃ τῇ ξυνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα.  
 ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος  
 ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος  
 αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι. Πάνυ γε. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν. ποιήσει

<sup>a</sup> Lit., coming into being. Cf. *Introd.* p. xiv. So *Aristot. Pol.* i. 1, but iv. 4 he criticizes Plato.

<sup>b</sup> "C'est tout réfléchi."

<sup>c</sup> Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 10: "Forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish

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haps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less." "I think that is a good suggestion," he said. "If, then," said I, "our argument should observe the origin<sup>a</sup> of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it?" "It may be," said he. "And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking?" "Much more." "Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then." "We have reflected,<sup>b</sup>" said Adeimantus; "proceed and don't refuse."

XI. "The origin of the city, then," said I, "in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs,<sup>c</sup> but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state?" "No other," said he. "As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not?" "By all means." "And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself." "Certainly." "Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our ourselves with a competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire . . . therefore to supply these defects . . . we are naturally inclined to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in civil societies."

δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡμετέρα χρεία. Πῶς δ'  
 D οὐ; Ἄλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρεῶν  
 ἢ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν  
 ἔνεκα. Παντάσασί γε. Δευτέρα δὲ οἰκίσεως,  
 τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα.  
 Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἢ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ  
 τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς,  
 ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ  
 σκυτοτόμον αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον  
 τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν; Πάνυ γε. Εἴη  
 δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ  
 E πέντε ἀνδρῶν. Φαίνεται. Τί δὴ οὖν; ἓνα ἕκα-  
 στον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἅπασιν κοινὸν  
 κατατιθέσθαι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἓνα ὄντα παρα-  
 σκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσι καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον  
 τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ, καὶ  
 ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν; ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον  
 370 τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ  
 μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς  
 οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ  
 δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα  
 πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ  
 πράττειν; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἄλλ' ἴσως,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾶον ἢ κείνως. Οὐδέν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δί' ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς  
 εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ  
 B πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν,  
 ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle says that the city comes into being for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life, which, of course, is also Plato's view of the true *raison d'être* of the State. Cf. *Laws* 828 D and *Crito* 48 B.

<sup>b</sup> It is characteristic of Plato's drama of ideas to give this

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theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs." "Obviously." "Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life."<sup>a</sup> "Assuredly." "The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing." "That is so." "Tell me, then," said I, "how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of the body?" "Certainly." "The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men." "Apparently." "What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?"<sup>b</sup> And Adeimantus said, "But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier." "It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange," said I; "for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for

kind of rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the division of labour as set forth in Adam Smith, with the characteristic exception of its stimulus to new inventions. Cf. *Introd.* xv.

Ἐμοιγε. Τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἂν τις εἷς ὢν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἷς; Ὅταν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἷς μίαν. Ἄλλα μὴν, οἶμαι, καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, εἴαν τις τινος παρῆ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται. Δῆλον γάρ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα C τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει. Ἀνάγκη. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Πλειόνων δὴ, ὦ Ἄδειμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν· ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει D καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύην οὐδὲ τᾶλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν· οὐδ' αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ· ὡσαύτως δ' ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος. Ἀληθῆ. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολυχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, οὐδ'<sup>1</sup> εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τοὺς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθεῖμεν, E ἵνα οἳ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασί τε καὶ ἐρίοις. Οὐδέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα. Ἄλλα μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὗ ἐπεισαγωγίμων μὴ δεήσεται,

<sup>1</sup> οὐδ' add. Hermann; it is better but not indispensable.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

another. Don't you think so?" "I do." "Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one?" "One at one," he said. "And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favourable moment in any task, the work is spoiled." "Obvious." "That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work." "He must indeed." "The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations." "By all means." "Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler." "True." "Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably." "Certainly." "Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing,<sup>a</sup> and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use." "It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had all these." "But further," said I, "it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not

<sup>a</sup> Butcher's meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 c. We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian.



σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον. Ἀδύνατον γάρ. Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἳ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομίσουσιν ὧν δεῖται. Δεήσει. Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴη ὁ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται, 371 παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζονται ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεῖα, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἦ γάρ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνοις ὧν ἂν δέωνται. Δεῖ γάρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει. Πλειόνων γάρ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων ἕκαστα· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ ἂν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἢ ἐμπορία γίγνηται, Β συχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας. Συχνῶν μέντοι.

XII. Τί δὲ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει; πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζονται; ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ὠκίσασμεν. Δῆλον δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι. Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ζύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. C Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν τι ὧν ποιεῖ, ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἦκη τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἳ τοῦτο ὀρώντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάπτουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέ-

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle adds that the medium of exchange must of itself have value (*Pol.* 1257 a 36).

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

need imports.” “ It is.” “ There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires.” “ There will.” “ And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not ? ” “ I think so.” “ Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need.” “ It must.” So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen.” “ Yes, more.” “ And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not ? ” “ Yes.” “ We shall also need traders, then.” “ Assuredly.” “ And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business.” “ Quite a number.”

XII. “ But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labour ? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state.” “ Obviously,” he said, “ by buying and selling.” “ A market-place, then, and money as a token<sup>a</sup> for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this.” “ By all means.” “ If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work ? ” “ By no means,” he said, “ but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest<sup>b</sup> in body

<sup>b</sup> Similarly *Laws* 918-920.

στατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον  
 πράττειν. αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περι  
 D τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς  
 τι δεομένοις ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτῶν ἀργυρίου  
 διαλλάττειν, ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι. Αὕτη  
 ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν  
 ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς  
 πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πράσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους  
 ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις  
 ἐμπόρους; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὴ τινες, ὡς  
 ἐγῶμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἀντὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς  
 E διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ὄντες, τὴν δὲ  
 τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἰκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἔχουσιν·  
 οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρείαν, τὴν  
 τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς  
 ἐγῶμαι, μισθωτοί· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πλή-  
 ρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί.  
 Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν  
 ἠϋξῆται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα; Ἴσως. Πού  
 οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ  
 ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὦν ἐσκέμμεθα;  
 372 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ  
 που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.  
 Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον  
 γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα,  
 τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἳ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι.  
 ἄλλο τι ἢ σίτον τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια  
 καὶ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας,  
 θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοί τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι  
 ἐργάσσονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle (*Pol.* 1254 b 18) says that those, the use of whose bodies is the best thing they have to offer, are by nature

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy." "This need, then," said I, "creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants?" "Certainly." "And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not?" "Certainly." "Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state." "I think so." "Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete?" "Perhaps." "Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?" "I cannot conceive, Socrates," he said, "unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another." "Perhaps that is a good suggestion," said I; "we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed slaves. Cf. *Jesus of Sirach* xxxviii. 36 *ἀνευ αὐτῶν οὐκ οἰκισθήσεται πόλις*. So Carlyle, and Shakespeare on Caliban: "We cannot miss him" (*Tempest*, i. ii.)

Β ὑποδεδεμένοι ἰκανῶς; θρέφονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρὰ, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον;

XIII. Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ὑπολαβὼν, "Ανευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐστιωμένους. Ἄληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἔξουσιν· ἄλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν· καὶ βολβούς καὶ λάχανα, οἷα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται· καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κνάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγούς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν. καὶ ὅς, Εἰ δὲ ὑῶν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκευάζες, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες; Ἄλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων; Ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπὶ τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι, οἶμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν καὶ ὄψα ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. Εἶεν, ἦν δ'

<sup>a</sup> ὄψον is anything eaten with bread, usually meat or fish, as Glauccon means; but Socrates gives it a different sense.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Introd. p. xiv. By the mouth of the fine gentleman.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

and shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war?"

XIII. Here Glaucon broke in: "No relishes<sup>a</sup> apparently," he said, "for the men you describe as feasting." "True," said I; "I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese; and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans, and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations; and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring." And he said, "If you were founding a city of pigs,<sup>b</sup> Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide?" "Why, what would you have, Glaucon?" said I. "What is customary," he replied; "they must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now

Glaucon, Plato expresses with humorous exaggeration his own recognition of the inadequacy for ethical and social philosophy of his idyllic ideal. Cf. Mandeville, Preface to *Fable of the Bees*:

A golden age must be as free  
For acorns as for honesty.

ἐγώ, μανθάνω· οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν  
 μόνον ὅπως γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν.  
 ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει· σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ  
 τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην  
 καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπη ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἢ  
 μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν δι-  
 εληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε  
 καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀπο-  
 373 κωλύει. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξ-  
 ἀρκέσει, οὐδ' αὕτη ἢ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσ-  
 ἔσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τᾶλλα σκεύη, καὶ ὄψα δὴ  
 καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα,  
 ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἅ τὸ  
 πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον,  
 οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε  
 ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν<sup>1</sup> καὶ χρυσὸν  
 καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἢ γάρ;  
 Β Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ  
 ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἢ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλ'  
 ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἅ οὐκέτι τοῦ  
 ἀναγκαίου ἔνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἳ τε  
 θηρευταὶ πάντες, οἳ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ  
 τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν Π: A omits.

<sup>a</sup> On flute-girls as the accompaniment of a banquet *cf.* *Symp.* 176 ε, Aristoph. *Ach.* 1090-1092, Catullus 13. 4. But apart from this, the sudden mention of an incongruous item in a list is a device of Aristophanic humour which even the philosophic Emerson did not disdain: "The love of little maids and berries."

<sup>b</sup> τὰ ἀναγκαῖα predicatively, "in the measure prescribed by

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in use." "Good," said I, "I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder. For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life; but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls<sup>a</sup> and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities,<sup>b</sup> but we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?" "Yes," he said. "Then shall we not have to enlarge the city again? For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators,<sup>c</sup> many of them occupied with figures and colours and many with music—the

necessity." Cf. 369 D "the indispensable minimum of a city." The historical order is: (1) arts of necessity, (2) arts of pleasure and luxury, (3) disinterested science. Cf. *Critias* 110 A, Aristot. *Met.* 981 b 20.

<sup>a</sup> *θηρευται* and *μιμηται* are generalized Platonic categories, including much not ordinarily signified by the words. For a list of such Platonic generalizations cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 500.



μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε  
**C** παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὄψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν· ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει, δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται.  
**D** ἢ γάρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον; Πολύ γε.

XIV. Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἰκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἰκανῆς ἔσται· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰκανὴν ἔξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἄροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, εἴαν καὶ ἐκείνοι ἀφῶσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν  
**E** ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Πολεμήσομεν

<sup>a</sup> Contractors generally, and especially theatrical managers.

<sup>b</sup> The mothers of the idyllic state nursed their own children, but in the ideal state the wives of the guardians are relieved of this burden by special provision. Cf. *infra* 460 D.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors<sup>a</sup>—and the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wet<sup>b</sup> and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbers<sup>c</sup> and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creatures<sup>d</sup> in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need; and we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten, shall we not?" "Yes." "Doctors, too, are something whose services<sup>e</sup> we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before?" "Much."

XIV. "And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not?" "It is." "Then we shall have to cut out a cantle<sup>f</sup> of our neighbour's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited<sup>g</sup> acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants." "Inevitably, Socrates." "We

<sup>c</sup> The rhetoricians of the empire liked to repeat that no barber was known at Rome in the first 200 or 300 years of the city.

<sup>d</sup> Illogical idiom referring to the swine. Cf. *infra* 598 c.

<sup>e</sup> *χρείαις*: Greek idiom could use either singular or plural. Cf. 410 A; *Phaedo* 87 c; *Laws* 630 E. The plural here avoids hiatus.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Isocrates iii. 34.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 591 D. Natural desires are limited. Luxury and unnatural forms of wealth are limitless, as the Greek moralists repeat from Solon down. Cf. Aristot. *Politics* 1257 b 23.

τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαῦκων; ἢ πῶς ἔσται; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Καὶ μηδὲν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὐτὸ γένεσιν εὐρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ<sup>1</sup> κακὰ γίνονται, ὅταν γίνηται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὴ, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πό-  
 374 λεως δεῖ οὗτι σμικρῶ, ἀλλ' ὄλω στρατοπέδῳ, ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί; Οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὠμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἠνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὠμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἓνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἦν  
 B δ' ἐγώ· ἢ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ Π.

<sup>a</sup> The unnecessary desires are the ultimate cause of wars. *Phaedo* 66 c. The simple life once abandoned, war is inevitable. "My lord," said St. Francis to the Bishop of Assisi, "if we possessed property we should have need of arms for its defence" (Sabatier, p. 81). Similarly that very dissimilar thinker, Mandeville. Cf. *supra* on 372 c. Plato recognizes the struggle for existence (Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, § 6), and the "bellum omnium contra omnes," *Laws* 625 E. Cf. Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, i. 2: "The Republic of Plato seems in many respects sufficiently divergent from the reality. And yet he contemplates war as a permanent, unalterable fact to be provided for in the ideal state." Spencer on the contrary contemplates a completely

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shall go to war<sup>a</sup> as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen?” “What you say,” he said. “And we are not yet to speak,” said I, “of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further<sup>b</sup> discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from which<sup>c</sup> the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come.” “Certainly.” “Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described.” “How so?” he said; “are the citizens themselves<sup>d</sup> not sufficient for that?” “Not if you,” said I, “and we all were right in the admission we made when we were moulding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well.” “True,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “don’t you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession?” “It is indeed,” he said. “Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler’s art than for the art of war?” “By no means.” “Can we suppose,<sup>e</sup> then, that while we were evolved society in which the ethics of militarism will disappear.

<sup>b</sup> *i.e.* as well as the genesis of society. 369 B.

<sup>c</sup> ἐξ ὧν: *i.e.* ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν, namely the appetites and the love of money.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 567 E τί δέ; ἀντόθεν. In the fourth century “it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade” (Butcher, *Demosth.* p. 17). Plato arrives at the same result by his principle “one man one task” (370 A-B). He is not here “making citizens synonymous with soldiers” nor “laconizing” as Adam says.

<sup>e</sup> For the thought of this *a fortiori* or *ex contrario* argument cf. 421 A.

γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον,<sup>1</sup> ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστω ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων  
 C σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεῖς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥάδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἠντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργω χρώμενος; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν  
 D λαβὼν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὄπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὀπλιτικῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ; Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

XV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσω μέγιστον τὸ τῶν  
 E φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτω σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ'

<sup>1</sup> ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον Π: not indispensable, and A omits.

• ἵνα δὴ ironical.

• Cf. 370 B-C.

• The ironical argument *ex contrario* is continued with fresh illustrations to the end of the chapter.

• Cf. on 467 A.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that<sup>a</sup> we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure<sup>b</sup> from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy<sup>c</sup> that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood<sup>d</sup> but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armour or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science<sup>e</sup> of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use?" "Great indeed," he said, "would be the value of tools in that case!"

XV. "Then," said I, "in the same degree that the task of our guardians<sup>g</sup> is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training." "I think so," said he.

<sup>e</sup> For the three requisites, science, practice, and natural ability *cf.* *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 596, and my paper on *Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη*, *Tr. A. Ph. A.* vol. xl, 1910.

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* Thucyd. ii. 40.

<sup>g</sup> First mention. *Cf.* 428 D note, 414 B.

οὐν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδεΐας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτή-  
 δευμα; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἶη,  
 ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἰοί τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες  
 τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδεια εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν.  
 Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα  
 φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδει-  
 375 λιατέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν,  
 ἔφη. Οἶει οὐν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν  
 γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐ-  
 γενοῦς; Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; Οἶον ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ  
 αὐτοῖν ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν  
 πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ,  
 εἰ δέη ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ οὐν, ἔφη,  
 πάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖόν γε, εἴπερ εὖ  
 μαχεῖται. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα  
 ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ  
 Β ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ζῶον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἄμαχόν  
 τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα  
 πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος; Ἐν-  
 νενόηκα. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶον δεῖ τὸν  
 φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς  
 ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Πῶς οὐν,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις τε  
 ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι  
 τὰς φύσεις; Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥαδίως. Ἀλλὰ  
 C μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾶους αὐτοὺς

<sup>a</sup> αἰσθανόμενον: present. There is no pause between perception and pursuit.

<sup>b</sup> In common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no brute is brave. *Laches* 196 D, *infra* 430 B.

<sup>c</sup> Anger (or the heart's desire?) buys its will at the price of life, as Heraclitus says (*Fr.* 105 Bywater). Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

“ Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit ? ” “ Of course. ” “ It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state. ” “ Yes, ours. ” “ Upon my word, ” said I, “ it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows. ” “ No, we mustn’t. ” “ Do you think, ” said I, “ that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog’s work and that of a well-born lad ? ” “ What point have you in mind ? ” “ I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,<sup>a</sup> and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive. ” “ Why, yes, ” said he, “ there is need of all these qualities. ” “ And it must, further, be brave <sup>b</sup> if it is to fight well. ” “ Of course. ” “ And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else ? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,<sup>c</sup> the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable ? ” “ I have. ” “ The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious. ” “ Yes. ” “ And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit. ” “ Yes, this too. ” “ How then, Glaucon, ” said I, “ will they escape being savage to one another <sup>d</sup> and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature ? ” “ Not easily, by Zeus, ” said he. “ And yet we must have them gentle to their friends

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Spencer, *Psychology* § 511: “ Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies. ” For what follows cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* i. 44 R., Julian, *Or.* ii. 86 D.



εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ περιμενουῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθήσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὐρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πραεῖα φύσις. Φαίνεται. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε, καὶ οὕτω

**D** δὴ ξυμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἥς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνας ἀπελείφθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνοήσαμεν, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις, οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ὠήθημεν, ἔχουσαι τὰναντία ταῦτα. Ποῦ δὴ; Ἴδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μέντ' ἂν ἦκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς

**E** παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον. Οἶδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

XVI. Ἄρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δὴ<sup>1</sup>; ἔφη· οὐ

<sup>1</sup> δὴ q: others δέ or γε.

\* The contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperaments is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 59, 70, 481.

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and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about." "True," he said. "What, then, are we to do?" said I. "Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition<sup>a</sup> between the spirited type and the gentle nature." "There does." "But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible." "It seems likely," he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, "We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves."<sup>b</sup> "What do you mean?" "We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities." "Where?" "It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know." "I am aware of that." "The thing is possible, then," said I, "and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian." "It seems not."

XVI. "And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?" "Howso?" he said; "I don't

<sup>b</sup> Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it.

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376 γὰρ ἐννοῶ. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶ κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου. Τὸ ποῖον; Ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδη ἀγνώτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν προπεπονθώς<sup>1</sup>. ὅν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾶ ταῦτα, δῆλον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψόν γε φαίνεται τὸ

**B** πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον. Πῆ δῆ; Ἐπι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλω φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι· καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη, συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοία ὀριζόμενον τό τε οἰκείον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὔ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταυτόν; Ταυτόν γάρ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει

**C** πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶός τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. Φιλόσοφος δῆ καὶ θυμοειδῆς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως; Παντάπασι μὲν οὔν, ἔφη. Οὗτος μὲν δῆ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι· θρέψονται δὲ δῆ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευ-

<sup>1</sup> προπεπονθώς Π.

\* φιλόσοφον: etymologically here, as ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates. "Your dog now is your only philosopher," says Plato, not more seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): "Mais vistes vous oncques chien rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c'est comme dit Platon, lib. ii. de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe." Cf. Huxley, *Hume*, p. 104: "The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a 'general idea' of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion?" Dümmler

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

apprehend your meaning." "This too," said I, "is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature." "What?" "That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that?" "I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious." "But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.<sup>a</sup>" "In what respect, pray?" "In respect," said I, "that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you,<sup>b</sup> can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?" "It certainly cannot," he said. "But you will admit," said I, "that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same?" "The same," he said. "Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning?" "Let us so assume," he replied. "The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state." "By all means," he said. "Such, then," I said, "would be the basis<sup>c</sup> of his character. But the rearing of and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics, but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.?"

<sup>b</sup> *καίτοι πῶς*: humorous oratorical appeal. Cf. 360 *σ* *καίτοι*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 343 *ε*. *ὑπάρχοι* marks the basis of nature as opposed to teaching.

θήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προὔργου ἡμῖν  
 D ἔστιν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὔπερ ἔνεκα  
 πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα  
 τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐῷμεν ἰκανὸν  
 λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξίωμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος  
 ἀδελφὸς Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ  
 προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ  
 Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα  
 ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα. Οὐ  
 γὰρ οὖν. Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές  
 E τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς  
 ἄνδρας. Ἀλλὰ χρή.

XVII. Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν  
 βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης;  
 ἔστι δέ που ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἢ δ'  
 ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. Ἔστι γάρ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μουσι-  
 κῇ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;  
 Πῶς δ' οὐ; Μουσικῆς δ' εἰπῶν<sup>1</sup> τίθης λόγους, ἢ  
 οὐ; Ἔγωγε. Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν  
 ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον; Ναί. Παιδευτέον δ'  
 377 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ  
 μαθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μαθάνεις, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν,  
 τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐνὶ δὲ καὶ

<sup>1</sup> εἰπῶν ΑΠ: εἶπον ν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Introd.* pp. xxi-xxii, and *Phaedr.* 276 ε.

<sup>b</sup> Plato likes to contrast the leisure of philosophy with the hurry of business and law. Cf. *Theaet.* 172 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> For the abrupt question cf. 360 ε. Plato here prescribes for all the guardians, or military class, the normal Greek education in music and gymnastics, purged of what he considers its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected few for the office of guardians *par excellence*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length?” And Glaucon’s brother replied, “Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end.” “Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus,” said I, “we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long.” “No, we must not.” “Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables<sup>a</sup> and had ample leisure,<sup>b</sup> let us educate these men in our discourse.” “So we must.”

XVII. “What, then, is our education?<sup>c</sup> Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered?<sup>d</sup> Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body<sup>e</sup> and for the soul music.” “It is.” “And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics?” “Of course.” “And under music you include tales, do you not?” “I do.” “And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false?” “Yes.” “And education must make use of both, but first of the false<sup>f</sup>?” “I don’t understand your meaning.” “Don’t you understand,” I said, “that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a  
or rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher education was not in Plato’s mind when he described the lower. Cf. 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, *Unity of Plato’s Thought*, n. 650.

<sup>a</sup> For this conservative argument cf. *Politicus* 300 B, *Laws* 844 A.

<sup>e</sup> Qualified in 410 C. *μουσική* is playing the lyre, music, poetry, letters, culture, philosophy, according to the context.

<sup>f</sup> A slight paradox to surprise attention.

ἀληθῆ; πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδιά ἢ  
 γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα. "Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τοῦτο δὴ  
 ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτόεν ἢ γυμνα-  
 στικῆς. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἴσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ  
 παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέω καὶ  
 Β ἀπαλῶ ὄτρωον; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται  
 καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημή-  
 νασθαι ἐκάστῳ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως  
 οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπι-  
 τυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας  
 καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ  
 ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἅς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν,  
 ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν  
 παρήσομεν. Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπι-  
 C στατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλοῖ  
 ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον.  
 τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ  
 μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς  
 αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς  
 χερσίν, ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.  
 Ποίους δὴ; ἔφη. Ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτὸν δύνασθαι τοὺς τε  
 D μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἶει; "Ἐγωγ',

• Cf. *Laws* 753 E, 765 E, Antiphon, fr. 134 Blass.

• Cf. *Laws* 664 B, and Shelley's

"Specious names

Learned in soft childhood's unsuspecting hour,"

perhaps derived from the educational philosophy of Rousseau.

° The image became a commonplace. Cf. *Theaetetus*. 191 D, Horace, *Ep.* ii. 2. 8, the Stoic *τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ*, and Byron's "Wax to receive and marble to retain."

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics." "That is so." "That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics." "You were right," he said. "Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing,<sup>a</sup> especially for any creature that is young and tender<sup>b</sup>? For it is then that it is best moulded and takes the impression<sup>c</sup> that one wishes to stamp upon it." "Quite so." "Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer<sup>d</sup> our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up?" "By no manner of means will we allow it." "We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our story-makers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject." "What sort of stories?" he said. "The example of the greater stories," I said, "will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same and the greater and the less must have a like tendency. Don't you think so?" "I do," he said; "but I

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the censorship proposed in *Laws* 656 c. Plato's criticism of the mythology is anticipated in part by Euripides, Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and Pythagoras. Cf. Décharme, *Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas*, translated by James Loeb, chap. ii. Many of the Christian Fathers repeated his criticism almost verbatim.



ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. Οὓς Ἡσίοδος τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγον τε καὶ λέγουσιν. Ποίους δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις; Ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδῃται. Τί τοῦτο; Ὅταν εἰκάζη τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἰοί εἶσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν εἰκότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῆ γράψαι. Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὃ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἃ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν· τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νιέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὥμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγαῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον, ἀλλὰ τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὃ τι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκούσαι. Καὶ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί. Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα πόλει, οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέω ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν

<sup>a</sup> *Theogony* 154-181.

<sup>b</sup> Conservative feeling or caution prevents Plato from proscribing absolutely what may be a necessary part of traditional or mystical religion.

<sup>c</sup> The ordinary sacrifice at the Eleusinian mysteries. Cf.

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don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either." "Those," I said, "that Hesiod<sup>a</sup> and Homer and the other poets related to us. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind." "Of what sort?" he said; "and with what in them do you find fault?" "With that," I said, "which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one." "What is that?" "When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models." "It is certainly right to condemn things like that," he said; "but just what do we mean and what particular things?" "There is, first of all," I said, "the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity<sup>b</sup> for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig,<sup>c</sup> but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales." "Why, yes," said he, "such stories are hard sayings." "Yes, and they are not to be told, Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man, that in doing

Aristoph. *Acharn.* 747, *Peace* 374-375; Walter Pater, *Demeter and the Pig.*

ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα  
 κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρώη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ  
 πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς,  
 οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν. Οὐδέ  
 γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν, ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολε-  
 μοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· οὐδέ  
 C γὰρ ἀληθῆ· εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν  
 πόλιν φυλάξειν αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ραδίως ἀλλή-  
 λους ἀπεχθάνεσθαι· πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε  
 μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας  
 ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων  
 πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἴ  
 πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης  
 ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὄσιον,  
 D τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδιά εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι  
 καὶ γραυσί, καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις, καὶ τοὺς  
 ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν.  
 Ἦρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νιέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ρίψει  
 ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένη ἀμυ-  
 νεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ

<sup>a</sup> Plato does not sympathize with the Samuel Butlers of his day. Cf. *Euthyphro* 4 B, *Crito* 51 B.

<sup>b</sup> The argument, whether used in jest or earnest, was a commonplace. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. 137, *Laws* 941 B, Aeschyl. *Eumen.* 640-641, Terence, *Eunuchus* 590 "At quem deum! . . . ego homuncio hoc non facerem." The Neoplatonists met the criticism of Plato and the Christian Fathers by allegorizing or refining away the immoral parts of the mythology, but St. Augustine cleverly retorts (*De Civ. Dei*, ii. 7): "Omnes enim . . . cultores talium deorum . . . magis intuentur quid Iupiter fecerit quam quid docuerit Plato."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the protest in the *Euthyphro* 6 B, beautifully translated by Ruskin, *Aratra Pentelici* § 107: "And think you that there is verily war with each other among the gods?"

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father's<sup>a</sup> wrongdoings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.<sup>b</sup>" "No, by heaven," said he, "I do not myself think that they are fit to be told." "Neither must we admit at all," said I, "that gods war with gods<sup>c</sup> and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either—if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another; still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries,<sup>d</sup> and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled with his fellow-citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera's fetterings<sup>e</sup> by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods<sup>f</sup> in Homer's verse are things

And dreadful enmities and battles, such as the poets have told, and such as our painters set forth in graven sculpture to adorn all our sacred rites and holy places. Yes, and in the great Panathenaia themselves the Peplus, full of such wild picturing, is carried up into the Acropolis—shall we say that these things are true, oh Euthyphron, right-minded friend?"

<sup>a</sup> On the Panathenaic πέπλος of Athena.

<sup>e</sup> The title of a play by Epicharmus. The hurling of Hephaestus, *Il.* i. 586-594.

<sup>f</sup> *Il.* xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513.

παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶός τε κρίνειν ὃ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ἂν τηλικούτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι. ὢν δὴ ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον, ἂν πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν, ὃ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.

XVIII. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῶη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ  
 379 παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναί, ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους. Ὅρθως, ἔφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; Τοιοῖδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὢν, αἰεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν τίς αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσιν<sup>1</sup> ἐὰν τε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε θεὸς τῷ  
 Β ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτως; Τί μὴν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν. ἦ γάρ; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ μὴ βλαβερόν, βλάπτει; Οὐδα-

<sup>1</sup> ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσιν Π: om. A.

<sup>a</sup> ὑπόνοια: the older word for allegory; Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* 19 E. For the allegorical interpretation of Homer in Plato's time cf. Jebb, *Homer*, p. 89, and Mrs. Anne Bates Hersman's Chicago Dissertation: *Studies in Greek Allegorical Interpretation*.

<sup>b</sup> The poet, like the rhetorician (*Politicus* 304 D), is a ministerial agent of the royal or political art. So virtually Aristotle, *Politics* 1336 b.

<sup>c</sup> The γε implies that God is good *ex vi termini*.

<sup>d</sup> It is characteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and

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that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory<sup>a</sup> or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove indelible and unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears."

XVIII. "Yes, that is reasonable," he said; "but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?" And I replied, "Adeimantus, we are not poets,<sup>b</sup> you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables." "Right," he said; "but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be?" "Something like this," I said. "The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse." "We must." "And is not God of course<sup>c</sup> good in reality and always to be spoken of<sup>d</sup> as such?" "Certainly." "But further, no good thing is harmful, is it?" "I think not." "Can what is not harmful

the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the minute links which tempt to parody.

Below τὸ ἀγαθόν, followed by οὐδ' ἄρα . . . ὁ θεός, is in itself a refutation of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier's hymn, "The Eternal Goodness."

μῶς. "Ο δὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακὸν τι ποιεῖ; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. "Ο δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἄν τινος εἶη κακοῦ αἴτιον; Πῶς γάρ; Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ναί. Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὐ ἔχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. Παν-  
 C τελῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἄν εἶη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε  
 D Ὅμηρου οὔτ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἀμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει  
 κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν·  
 καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἄν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων,  
 ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῶ ὃ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ'  
 ἐσθλῶ,  
 ᾧ δ' ἄν μή, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα,

<sup>a</sup> Anticipates the proclamation of the prophet in the final myth, 617 E: αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. The idea, elaborated in Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, may be traced back to the speech of the Homeric Zeus in *Od.* i. 33 ἐξ ἡμεῶν γὰρ φασὶ κάκ' ἔμμεναι. St. Thomas distinguishes: 'Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa.'

<sup>b</sup> A pessimistic commonplace more emphasized in the

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harm?" "By no means." "Can that which does not harm do any evil?" "Not that either." "But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either?" "How could it?" "Once more, is the good beneficent?" "Yes." "It is the cause, then, of welfare?" "Yes." "Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it is the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless." "Entirely so," he said. "Neither, then, could God," said I, "since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause.<sup>a</sup> For good things are far fewer<sup>b</sup> with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God." "What you say seems to me most true," he replied. "Then," said I, "we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says<sup>c</sup>—

Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and  
are filled with  
Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts  
that are evil,

and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled—

Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his  
portion,

but the man for whom he does not blend the lots,  
but to whom he gives unmixed evil—

*Laws* than in the *Republic*. Cf. *Laws* 896 E, where the Manichean hypothesis of an evil world-soul is suggested.

<sup>c</sup> *Il.* xxiv. 527-532. Plato, perhaps quoting from memory, abbreviates and adapts the Homeric quotation. This does not justify inferences about the Homeric text.



τὸν δὲ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διὰν ἐλαύνει·  
 Ε οὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς

ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.

XIX. Τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσις,  
 ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, εἴαν τις φῆ δι' Ἀθηναίης τε  
 καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα· οὐδὲ θεῶν  
 380 ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός· οὐδ' αὖ,  
 ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους, ὅτι

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,  
 ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλη.

ἀλλ' εἴαν τις ποιῆ, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι,  
 τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωικὰ  
 ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον  
 αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὄν  
 νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν  
 Β θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο  
 κολαζόμενοι. ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες,  
 ἣν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν  
 ποιητήν· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως  
 λέγοιεν, ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην  
 ὠφελούντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον

<sup>a</sup> The line is not found in Homer, nor does Plato explicitly say that it is. Zeus is dispenser of war in *Il.* iv. 84.

<sup>b</sup> *Il.* iv. 69 ff.

<sup>c</sup> ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν is used in *Menex.* 237 c of the contest of the gods for Attica. Here it is generally taken of the theomachy, *Il.* xx. 1-74, which begins with the summons of the gods to a council by Themis at the command of Zeus. It has also been understood, rather improbably, of the judgement of Paris.

<sup>d</sup> For the idea, "quem deus vult perdere dementat prius,"

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Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world,

nor will we tolerate the saying that

Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals.<sup>a</sup>

XIX. "But as to the violation of the oaths<sup>b</sup> and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention<sup>c</sup> of the gods was the doing of Themis and Zeus; nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says—

A god implants the guilty cause in men  
When he would utterly destroy a house,<sup>d</sup>

but if any poets compose a 'Sorrows of Niobe,' the poem that contains these iambs, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good, and they were benefited<sup>e</sup> by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say; if on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good,

*cf.* Theognis 405, Schmidt, *Ethik d. Griechen*, i. pp. 235 and 247, and Jebb on Soph. *Antig.* 620-624.

<sup>a</sup> Plato's doctrine that punishment is remedial must apply to punishments inflicted by the gods. *Cf.* *Protag.* 324 B, *Gorg.* 478 E, 480 A, 505 B, 525 B, *infra* 590 A-B. Yet there are some incurables. *Cf. infra* 615 E.

φάναι θεόν τινι γίνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, δια-  
μαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν  
τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ  
C ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτ' ἐν  
μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε  
ὄσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν  
οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. Σύμφηφός σοί εἰμι,  
ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι ἀρέσκει. Οὗτος  
μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἂν εἶη τῶν περὶ θεοὺς  
νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας  
λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον  
τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπό-  
D χρη. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὄδε; ἄρα γόητα τὸν  
θεὸν οἶει εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι  
ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνό-  
μενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς  
μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ  
αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων  
ἡκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη,  
νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν. Τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη,  
εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταται τῆς αὐτοῦ ἰδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ'  
E ἑαυτοῦ μεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκ-  
οῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἡκιστα  
ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων

<sup>a</sup> Minucius Felix says of Plato's theology, *Octav.* chap. xix: "Platoni apertior de deo et rebus ipsis et nominibus oratio est et quae tota esset caelestis nisi persuasionis civilis nonnunquam admixtione sordesceret."

<sup>b</sup> The two methods, (1) self-transformation, and (2) production of illusions in our minds, answer broadly to the two methods of deception distinguished in the *Sophist* 236 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 50 B, *Cratyl.* 439 E. Aristotle, *H. A.* i. 1. 32,

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becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in metre or without metre; for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves." "I cast my vote with yours for this law," he said, "and am well pleased with it." "This, then," said I, "will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods<sup>a</sup> to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good." "And an entirely satisfactory one," he said. "And what of this, the second. Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one time<sup>b</sup> himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him; or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form?" "I cannot say offhand," he replied. "But what of this: If anything went out from<sup>c</sup> its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself or by something else?" "Necessarily." "Is it not true that to be altered and moved<sup>d</sup> by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition, as, for example, a body by food

applies it to biology: τὸ γενναῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. Plato's proof from the idea of perfection that God is changeless has little in common with the Eleatic argument that pure being cannot change.

<sup>a</sup> The *Theaetetus* explicitly distinguishes two kinds of motion, qualitative change and motion proper (181 c-d), but the distinction is in Plato's mind here and in *Cratyl.* 439 ε.

τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεών τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἤκιστα  
 381 ἀλλοιοῦται; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἤκιστ' ἂν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταραξείε τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειεν; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τὰ γε ξύνθετα πάντα σκευή τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα<sup>1</sup> κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται. Ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα. Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ  
 Β τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται. Ἔοικεν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἤκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἰσχοί ὁ θεός. Ἦκιστα δὴτα.

XX. Ἄλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ; Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχίον ἑαυτοῦ;  
 C Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὀρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις· καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρω ποιεῖν ὄπῃ οὖν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστος

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἀμφιέσματα Π : om. A.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 765 E.

<sup>b</sup> ταραξείε suggests the ἀταραξία of the sage in the later schools.

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and drink and toil, and plants<sup>a</sup> by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered?”

“Certainly.” “And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent, that would be least disturbed<sup>b</sup> and altered by any external affection?” “Yes.”

“And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences.” “That is so.” “It is universally<sup>c</sup> true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or art or both admits least alteration by something else.” “So it seems.” “But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God is in every way in the best possible state.” “Of course.”

“From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God.” “Least indeed.”

XX. “But would he transform and alter himself?” “Obviously,” he said, “if he is altered.” “Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worse<sup>d</sup> and to something uglier than himself?” “It must necessarily,” said he, “be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence.” “Most rightly spoken,” said I. “And if that were his condition, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way?” “Impossible,” he replied. “It is impossible then,” said I, “even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them being

<sup>c</sup> πᾶν δὴ generalizes from the preceding exhaustive enumeration of cases. Cf. 382 E, *Parmen.* 139 A.

<sup>d</sup> So Aristot. *Met.* 1074 b 26.

αὐτῶν μένει αἰὲ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ.  
 Ἄπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεὶς ἄρα,  
 D ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν εὐκότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι  
 παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας·

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδεὶς,  
 μηδ' ἐν τραγωδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν  
 εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἡλλοιωμένην ὡς ἰέρειαν ἀγεί-  
 ρουσαν

Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις·

E καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν· μηδ'  
 αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἰ μητέρες τὰ παιδιά  
 ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς  
 ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις  
 καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς  
 θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργά-  
 ζωνται δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσὶν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν  
 ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι  
 ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Τί  
 382 δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ  
 ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος,  
 εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄν-  
 θρωποι μισοῦσιν; Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 42 E ἔμενεν, which suggested the Neoplatonic and Miltonic paradox that the divine abides even when it goes forth.

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the fairest and best possible abides <sup>a</sup> for ever simply in his own form." "An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking." "No poet then," I said, "my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that

The gods, in the likeness of strangers,  
Many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals.<sup>b</sup>  
Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about Proteus<sup>c</sup>  
and Thetis, nor in any tragedy or in other poems  
bring in Hera disguised as a priestess collecting alms  
'for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive  
stream.'<sup>d</sup> And many similar falsehoods they must  
not tell. Nor again must mothers under the influence  
of such poets terrify their children<sup>e</sup> with harmful  
tales, how that there are certain gods whose apparitions  
haunt the night in the likeness of many strangers  
from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil  
of the gods they at the same time make cowards of  
the children." "They must not," he said. "But,"  
said I, "may we suppose that while the gods themselves  
are incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they  
appear in many shapes deceiving and practising magic  
upon us?" "Perhaps," said he. "Consider," said I;  
"would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting  
in either word or action what is only appearance?"  
"I don't know," said he. "Don't you know," said I,  
"that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible,  
is a thing that all gods and men abhor?" "What do you  
mean?" he said. "This," said I, "that falsehood in the most

<sup>b</sup> *Od.* xvii. 485-486, quoted again in *Sophist* 216 B-C. Cf. *Tim.* 41 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Od.* iv. 456-8. Thetis transformed herself to avoid the wooing of Peleus. Cf. Pindar, *Nem.* iv.

<sup>d</sup> From the *Ξαντρίαι* of Aeschylus.

<sup>e</sup> Rousseau also deprecates this.



καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἢ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. Οἷε γάρ τί με, Β ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἠκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Πολύ γε, ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἂν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ C ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἶδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XXI. Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα ἄνοιαν κακὸν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἔνεκα ὡς D φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίνεταί; καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναί, ὅπη τ' ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὃ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον;

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *De Interp.* i. 12 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. Cf. also *Cratyl.* 428 D, *infra* 535 E, *Laws* 730 c, Bacon, *Of Truth*: "But it is not the lie that passes through the mind but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 245 A μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone fears it." "I don't understand yet either." "That is because you suspect me of some grand meaning," I said; "but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood there, is what all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they loathe it most of all." "Quite so," he said. "But surely it would be most wholly right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—ignorance namely in the *soul* of the man deceived. For the falsehood in *words* is a copy<sup>a</sup> of the affection in the soul, an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that so?" "By all means."

XXI. "Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men." "I agree." "But what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil—as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying.<sup>b</sup>" "We most certainly do," he said. "Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God.

*ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει*, Isoc. xii. 149 and Livy's Preface. For *χρήσιμον* cf. *Politicus* 274 E. We must not infer that Plato is trying to sophisticate away the moral virtue of truth-telling.

πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιωῶν ἂν  
 ψεύδοιτο; Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἶη, ἔφη. Ποιητῆς  
 μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔστι. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.  
 Ε' Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε  
 δεῖ. Ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείων ἀνοιαν ἢ μανίαν; Ἀλλ'  
 οὐδεὶς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς.  
 Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὐδ' ἔνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο. Οὐκ  
 ἔστιν. Πάντη ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ  
 τὸ θεῖον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Κομιδῆ ἄρα  
 ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ,  
 καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ,  
 οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ  
 383 σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ. Οὕτως, ἔφη,  
 ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος. Συγχωρεῖς  
 ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι· ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ  
 θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας  
 ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι  
 παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ; Συγχωρῶ. Πολλὰ  
 ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπ-  
 αινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς  
 τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῆ ἢ Θέτις  
 Β τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα

ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς εὐπαιδίας,  
 νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους.  
 ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας  
 παιᾶν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.  
 καγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα  
 ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῆ βρύον τέχνη.

<sup>a</sup> Generalizing after the exhaustive classification that precedes.

<sup>b</sup> *Il.* ii. 1-34. This apparent attribution of falsehood to Zeus was an "Homeric problem" which some solved by a

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Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it?" "An absurd supposition, that," he said. "Then there is no lying poet in God." "I think not." "Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie?" "Far from it." "Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends?" "Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God." "Then there is no motive for God to deceive." "None." "So from every point of view<sup>a</sup> the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood." "By all means." "Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams." "I myself think so," he said, "when I hear you say it." "You concur then," I said, "in this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods,—that they are neither wizards in shape-shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed?" "I concur." "Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by Zeus<sup>b</sup> to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his Thetis<sup>c</sup> avers that Apollo, singing at her wedding, 'foretold the happy fortunes of her issue'—

Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free,  
And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings,  
Raised the proud paeon, making glad my heart.  
And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine,  
Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie.

change of accent from *δίδομεν* to *διδόμεν*. Cf. Aristot. *Poetics* 1461 a 22.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aeschyl. *Frag.* 350. Possibly from the "Ὀπλων κρῖσις.

ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὕμνων, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίῃ παρών,  
αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπών, αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ κτανών  
τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν.

Ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε  
καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους  
ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλ-  
λουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι  
γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλείστον οἶόν  
τε. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τού-  
τους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώμην.

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But he himself, the singer, himself who sat  
At meat with us, himself who promised all,  
Is now himself the slayer of my son.

When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus, neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and god-like in so far as that is possible for humanity.” “By all means,” he said, “I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws.”

## Γ

386 I. Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεούς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεοῦς τε τιμήσουσι καὶ γονέας τήν τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένοις. Καὶ οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι. Τί δὲ δὴ; εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτά τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι  
 B ἤκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδιέναι; ἢ ἡγεί τινά ποτ' ἂν γενέσθαι ἀνδρεῖον, ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δεῖμα; Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε. Τί δέ; τὰν "Αἰδου ἡγούμενον εἶναί τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἷε τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Οὐδαμῶς. Δεῖ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἀπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν "Αἰδου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
 C ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς οὐτ' ἀληθῆ λέγοντας οὐτ' ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη.

<sup>a</sup> We may, if we choose, see here a reference to the virtue of piety, which some critics fancifully suppose was eliminated by the *Euthyphro*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 58.

<sup>b</sup> For the idea that death is no evil cf. *Apology*, in *fine*, 200

### III

I. "Concerning the gods then," said I, "this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honour the gods<sup>a</sup> and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem." "That was our view and I believe it right." "What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart?" "No indeed, I do not," he replied. "And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors,<sup>b</sup> do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery?" "By no means." "Then it seems we must exercise supervision<sup>c</sup> also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this indiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors." "Yes, we must," he said. "Then,"

*Laws* 727 D, 828 D, and 881 A, where, however, the fear of hell is approved as a deterrent.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* 377 B.



Ἐξαλείψομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ  
ἔπους ἀρξάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,

βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλω  
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ . . .

ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν·

καὶ τὸ

D οἰκία δὲ θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι φανείη  
σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ·

καὶ

ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι  
ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνὶ πάμπαν·

καὶ τὸ

οἶω πεπνῦσθαι, ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἴσσουσι·

<sup>a</sup> Spoken by Achilles when Odysseus sought to console him for his death, *Od.* xi. 489-491. Lucian, *Dialog. Mort.* 18, develops the idea. Proclus comments on it for a page. Cf. Matthew Arnold's imitation in "Balder Dead":

Hermod the nimble, gild me not my death!  
Better to live a serf, a captured man,  
Who scatters rushes in a master's hall  
Than be a crown'd king here, and rule the dead;

Lowell, "After the Burial":

But not all the preaching since Adam  
Has made death other than death;

Heine, *Das Buch Le Grand*, chap. iii.; *Education of Henry Adams*: "After sixty or seventy years of growing astonishment the mind wakes to find itself looking blankly into the void of death . . . that it should actually be satisfied would prove . . . idiocy." *Per contra*, cf. Landor:

Death stands beside me whispering low  
I know not what into my ear.  
Of his strange language all I know  
Is, there is not a word of fear;

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

said I, "beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind :

Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another  
Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty sub-  
sistence,  
Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have  
perished,<sup>a</sup>

and this :

Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be  
uncovered  
Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhor-  
rence,<sup>b</sup>

and :

Ah me ! so it is true that e'en in the dwellings of Hades  
Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no under-  
standing,<sup>c</sup>

and this :

Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy  
phantoms,<sup>d</sup>

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and the passage of the *Cratylus* 403 D, exquisitely rendered by Ruskin, *Time and Tide* xxiv. : "And none of those who dwell there desire to depart thence—no, not even the sirens; but even they the seducers are there themselves beguiled, and they who lulled all men, themselves laid to rest—they and all others—such sweet songs doth death know how to sing to them."

<sup>b</sup> *Il.* xx. 64. *δέσας μὴ* precedes.

<sup>c</sup> *Il.* xxiii. 103. The exclamation and inference (*ῥά*) of Achilles when the shade of Patroclus eludes his embrace in the dream. The text is endlessly quoted by writers on religious origins and dream and ghost theories of the origin of the belief in the soul.

<sup>d</sup> *Od.* x. 495. Said of the prophet Teiresias. The preceding line is,

Unto him even in death was it granted by Persephoneia.

The line is quoted also in *Meno* 100 A.

καὶ

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη "Αἰδόσδε βεβήκει,  
ὄν πότμον γοόωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτήτα καὶ ἦβην·

387 καὶ τὸ

ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἡὔτε καπνός,  
ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα·

καὶ

ὡς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῶ ἀντροῦ θεσπεσίοιο  
τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν  
ὄρμαθου ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλησιν ἔχονται,  
ὡς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἄμ' ἦεσαν.

Β ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα  
"Ομηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαί-  
νειν ἂν διαγράψωμεν, οὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ  
ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ὅσω ποιητικώτερα,  
τοσοῦτω ἦττον ἀκουστέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν, οὓς  
δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον  
πεφοβημένους. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Π. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα  
πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, κωκυ-  
C τούς τε καὶ στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Said of the death of Patroclus, *Il.* xvi. 856, and Hector, xxii. 382; imitated in the last line of the *Aeneid* "Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras," which is in turn expanded by Masefield in "August 1914." Cf. Matthew Arnold in "Sohrab and Rustum":

Till now all strength was ebb'd and from his limbs  
Unwillingly the spirit fled away,  
Regretting the warm mansion which it left,  
And youth, and bloom, and this delightful world;

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

and :

Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades,  
Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its  
manhood,<sup>a</sup>

and :

Under the earth like a vapour vanished the gibbering soul,<sup>b</sup>

and :

Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto  
Fly with a flittermouse shriek when one of them falls from  
the cluster  
Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to  
the other,  
Flitted their gibbering ghosts.<sup>c</sup>

We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing<sup>d</sup> to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of slavery than of death." "By all means."

II. "Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, Cocytus<sup>e</sup> named of lamentation loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of

Bacchyl. v. 153-4:

*πύματον δὲ πνέων δάκρυσα τλάμων  
ἀγλαὰν ἤβαν προλείπων.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Il.* xxiii. 100.

<sup>c</sup> *Od.* xxiv. 6-10. Said of the souls of the suitors slain by Odysseus. Cf. Tennyson, "Oenone":

Thin as the bat-like shrillings of the dead.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 177 c οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν.

<sup>e</sup> Milton's words, which I have borrowed, are the best expression of Plato's thought.

ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὅσα ἔτη<sup>1</sup> πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα. Ἐφαιρετέα ἄρα; Ναί. Τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τύπον τούτοις λεκτέον τε καὶ ποιητέον; Δῆλα δὴ. Καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμούς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα. Σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὐ. φάμεν δὲ δὴ, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικῆς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὐπὲρ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστι, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἠγήσεται. Φάμεν γάρ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γ' ἐκείνου ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ' ἄν. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτῆς ἀρκῆς πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἠκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Ἐκιστ' ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι υἱέος ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ

<sup>1</sup> ὅσα ἔτη is a plausible emendation of Hermann, referring to annual recitations of rhapsodists and performances of tragedy. The best mss. read ὡς οἶεται, some others ὡς οἶόν τε. Perhaps the words are best omitted.

<sup>a</sup> φρίττειν and φρίκη are often used of the thrill or terror of tragedy. Cf. Soph. *El.* 1402, *O.T.* 1306, Aeschyl. *Prom.* 540.

<sup>b</sup> Some say, to frighten the wicked, but more probably for their aesthetic effect. Cf. 390 A εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, *Laws* 886 c εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει.

<sup>c</sup> θερμότεροι contains a playful suggestion of the fever

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

the charnel-house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names send a shudder<sup>a</sup> through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes,<sup>b</sup> but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitive<sup>c</sup> and soft than we would have them." "And we are right in so fearing." "We must remove those things then?" "Yes." "And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse?" "Obviously." "And shall we also do away with the wailings and lamentations of men of repute?" "That necessarily follows," he said, "from the other." "Consider," said I, "whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man<sup>d</sup> will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing." "Yes, we say that." "Then it would not be for his friend's<sup>e</sup> sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament." "Certainly not." "But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself<sup>f</sup> for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else." "True," he replied. "Least of all then to him is

following the chill; *cf.* *Phaedr.* 251 A. With *μαλακώτεροι* the image passes into that of softened metal; *cf.* 411 B, *Laws* 666 B-C, 671 B.

<sup>a</sup> That only the good can be truly friends was a favourite doctrine of the ancient moralists. *Cf.* *Lysis* 214 c, *Xen. Mem.* ii. 6. 9, 20.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* *Phaedo* 117 c "I wept for myself, for surely not for him."

<sup>f</sup> *αὐτάρκης* is the equivalent of *ικανὸς αὐτῷ* in *Lysis* 215 A. For the idea *cf.* *Menex.* 247 E. Self-sufficiency is the mark of the good man, of God, of the universe (*Tim.* 33 D), of happiness in Aristotle, and of the Stoic sage.

χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔκιστα  
 μέντοι. Ἔκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεται, φέρει<sup>1</sup> δὲ ὡς  
 πραότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη ξυμφορὰ κατα-  
 λάβῃ. Πολύ γε. Ὅρθως ἄρ' ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς  
 θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀπο-  
 388 διδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις, καὶ ὅσοι  
 κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια  
 τούτοις ποιεῖν οὐς δὴ φάμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας  
 τρέφειν. Ὅρθως, ἔφη. Πάλιν δὴ Ὅμηρου τε  
 δεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν  
 Ἀχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα

ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε  
 ὑπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνηῖ,

τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα

πλωΐζοντ' ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ θῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,

Β μηδὲ ἀμφοτέρησι χερσὶν ἐλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλό-  
 εσσαν χευάμενον κακ κεφαλῆς, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαί-  
 οντά τε καὶ ὀδυρόμενον, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἐκεῖνος  
 ἐποίησε· μηδὲ Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα  
 λιτανεύοντά τε καὶ κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,

ἐξονομακλήδην ὀνομάζοντ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

<sup>1</sup> ὀδύρεται, φέρει] this conjecture of Stallbaum reads more  
 smoothly: the mss. have ὀδύρεσθαι φέρειν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the anecdotes of Pericles and Xenophon and the  
 comment of Pater on Marcus Aurelius in *Marius the  
 Epicurean*. Plato qualifies the Stoic extreme in 603 E. The  
 Platonic ideal is μετριοπάθεια, the Stoic ἀπάθεια,

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 398 E.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

it a terrible thing to lose son <sup>a</sup> or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort." "Least of all." "Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him." "Certainly." "Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women,<sup>b</sup> and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in order that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these." "We should be right," said he. "Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as,

Lying now on his side, and then again on his back,  
And again on his face,<sup>c</sup>

and then rising up and

Drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested  
ocean,<sup>d</sup>

nor as clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head,<sup>e</sup> nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam,<sup>f</sup> near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung,

Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing.

<sup>c</sup> The description of Achilles mourning for Patroclus, *Il.* xxiv. 10-12. Cf. Juvenal iii. 279-280:

Noctem patitur lugentis amicum  
Pelidae, cubat in faciem mox deinde supinus.

<sup>d</sup> *Il.* xxiv. 12. Our text of Homer reads *δινεύεσκ' ἀλύων παρὰ θιν' ἀλός, οὐδέ μιν ἠώς*. Plato's text may be intentional burlesque or it may be corrupt.

<sup>e</sup> *Il.* xviii. 23-24. When he heard of Patroclus's death.

<sup>f</sup> *Il.* xxii. 414-415.



πολὺ δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα μήτοι θεοὺς  
γε ποιεῖν ὄδυρομένους καὶ λέγοντας

C ὦμοι ἐγὼ δειλή, ὦμοι δυσαριστοτόκεια·

εἰ δ' οὖν θεοὺς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν  
τολμῆσαι οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι, ὥστε· ὦ  
πόποι, φάναι,

ἢ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ ἄστῃ  
ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρῶμαι, ἐμὸν δ' ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ·  
καὶ

αἰ αἰ ἐγών, ὅτε μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν  
D μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενoitιάδαο δαμῆναι.

III. Εἰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν  
οἱ νέοι σπουδῇ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῶεν ὡς  
ἀναξίως λεγομένων, σχολῇ ἂν ἑαυτὸν γέ τις ἄν-  
θρωπον ὄντα ἀνάξιον ἠγήσαιο τούτων καὶ ἐπι-  
πλήξοιεν, εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ  
ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσχυρόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν πολ-  
λοὺς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι παθήμασι θρήνους ἂν ἄδοι καὶ  
E ὄδυρμούς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Δεῖ δέ γε  
οὔχ, ὡς ἄρτι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαιεν· ὦ πειστέον,  
ἕως ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλίονι πείσῃ. Οὐ γὰρ  
οὖν δεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ

<sup>a</sup> Thetis in *Il.* xviii. 54.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 377 E.

<sup>c</sup> *Il.* xxii. 168. Zeus of Hector.

<sup>d</sup> *Il.* xvi. 433-434. Cf. Virgil's imitation, *Aen.* x. 465 ff., Cicero, *De Div.* ii. ch. 10, and the imitation of the whole passage in Matthew Arnold's "Balder Dead."

<sup>e</sup> I have imitated the suggestion of rhythm in the original which with its Ionic dative is perhaps a latent quotation from tragedy. Cf. Chairemon, οὐδεὶς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι λυπεῖται σοφός, N.<sup>2</sup> fr. 37.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying,

Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest,<sup>a</sup>

and if they will so picture the gods at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likeness<sup>b</sup> of the supreme god as to make him say :

Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy-town

I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me,<sup>c</sup>

and :

Ah, woe is me ! of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest, Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius' offspring.<sup>d</sup>

III. "For if, dear Adeimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less likely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant<sup>e</sup> and many a lament."

"You say most truly," he replied. "But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces us with a better reason." "No, it must not be." "Again, they must not be prone to laughter.<sup>f</sup> For

<sup>f</sup> The ancients generally thought violent laughter undignified. Cf. Isoc. *Demon.* 15, Plato, *Laws* 732 c, 935 b, Epictet. *Encheirid.* xxxiii. 4, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 33. 703 R. Diog. Laert. iii. 26, reports that Plato never laughed excessively in his youth. Aristotle's great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter (*Eth.* iv. 8, *Rhet.* 1389 b 10), as Lord Chesterfield advises his son to do.

εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφίῃ ἰσχυρῶ γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Οὐτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου  
 389 κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἂν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, εἰάν θεούς. Πολὺ μέντοι, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκ οὖν Ὀμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα [ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν],

ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλωσ μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,  
 ὡς ἴδον Ἡφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα,

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. Εἰ σύ, ἔφη, βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον. Ἄλλα μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει, δῆλον, ὅτι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὴ τῆς πόλεως εἶπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῆς πόλεως· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ  
 C ἀπτέον τοῦ τοιοῦτου, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γε δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄρχοντας ἰδιώτη ψευσασθαι ταῦτόν καὶ μείζον ἀμάρτημα φήσομεν ἢ κάμνοντι πρὸς ἰατρὸν ἢ ἀσκοῦντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην περὶ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ

<sup>a</sup> In 563 E Plato generalizes this psychological principle.

<sup>b</sup> This laughter of the Homeric gods has been endlessly commented upon. Hegel allegorizes it. Mrs. Browning ("Aurora Leigh") says:

And all true poets laugh unquenchably  
 Like Shakespeare and the gods.

Proclus, *In Rempub.* i. 127 Kroll, says that it is an expression of the abundance of the divine energy. It is a commonplace repeated by George Eliot that the primitive sense of humour

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.<sup>a</sup>” “I think so,” he said. “Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must not accept it, much less if gods.” “Much indeed,” he replied. “Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods :

Quenchless then was the laughter<sup>b</sup> that rose from the  
blessed immortals

When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and  
panting.

—we must not accept it on your view.<sup>c</sup>” “If it pleases you to call it mine,” he said ; “at any rate we must not accept it.” “But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine,<sup>d</sup> it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians, and laymen should have nothing to do with it.” “Obviously,” he replied. “The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit<sup>e</sup> of the state ; no others may have anything to do with it, but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell his physician or an athlete his trainer the truth of the Homeric gods laughs at the personal deformity of Hephaestus, but they really laugh at his officiousness and the contrast he presents to Hebe. Cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 334 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 382 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 334 B, 459 D. A cynic might compare Cleon's plea in Aristoph. *Knights* 1226 ἐγὼ δ' ἔκλεπτον ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ γε τῆ πόλει. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6. 37, Bolingbroke, *Letters to Pope*, p. 172.

σώματος παθημάτων μὴ τάληθῆ λέγειν, ἢ πρὸς κυβερνήτην περὶ τῆς νεώς τε καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν μὴ. τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι, ὅπως ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τις τῶν ξυ- ναυτῶν πράξεως ἔχει. Ἐπιεικῆτατα, ἔφη. Ἄν D ἄρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαμβάνη ψευδόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ἔασι,

μάντιν ἢ ἰητήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, κολάσει ὡς ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὥσπερ νεὼς ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον. Ἐάν γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελεῖται. Τί δέ; σωφρο- σύνης ἄρα οὐ δεήσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίαις; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ E ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδὰς ἡδονῶν; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Τὰ δὲ τοιάδε φήσομεν, οἶμαι, καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷα καὶ Ὀμήρω Διομήδης λέγει,

τέττα, σιωπῆ ἦσο, ἐμῶ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ,  
καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, τὰ

[ἴσαν μένεα πνεύοντες Ἀχαιοί]  
σιγῆ δειδιότες σημάντορας,

390 καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Καλῶς. Τί δέ; τὰ τοιάδε

<sup>a</sup> *Od.* xvii. 383-384. Jebb, *Homer*, p. 69.

<sup>b</sup> The word is chosen to fit both ship and state. Cf. 424 E, 442 B; and *Alcaeus apud Aristoph. Wasps* 1235, *Eurip. Phoen.* 888, *Aeschines* iii. 158, *Epictet.* iii. 7. 20.

<sup>c</sup> That is, probably, if our Utopia is realized. Cf. 452 A εἰ πράξεται ἢ λέγεται. Cf. the imitation in *Epistles* 357 A εἴπερ ἔργα ἐπὶ νῶ ἐγίγνωτο.

<sup>d</sup> For the mass of men, as distinguished from the higher

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare." "Most true," he replied. "If then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen

Whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers,<sup>a</sup>

he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive<sup>b</sup> and destructive of a state as it is of a ship." "He will," he said, "if deed follows upon word."<sup>c</sup> "Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?" "Of course." "And for the multitude<sup>d</sup> are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers<sup>e</sup> over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?" "I think so." "Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer's Diomedes :

Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding,<sup>f</sup>

and what follows :

Breathing high spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains,<sup>g</sup>

and all similar passages." "Yes, well said." "But what of this sort of thing ?

philosophical virtue. Often misunderstood. For the meanings of *σωφροσύνη* cf. my review of Jowett's *Plato, A.J.P.* vol. xiii. (1892) p. 361. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 15 and n. 77.

<sup>a</sup> In *Gorg.* 491 D-E, Callicles does not understand what Socrates means by a similar expression.

<sup>f</sup> *Il.* iv. 412. Diomedes to Sthenelos.

<sup>g</sup> In our Homer this is *Il.* iii. 8, and *σιγή κτλ.* iv. 431. See Howes in *Harvard Studies*, vi. pp. 153-237.

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐξῆς ἄρα καλῶς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τις ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἴρηκε νεανιεύματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας; Οὐ καλῶς. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἰς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν· εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν· ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται; Οὕτως, ἔφη.

IV. Τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα, ὡς δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν παραπλείαι ὡσι τράπεζαι

B σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων οἰνοχόος φορέησι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι,

δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἀκούειν νέω; ἢ τὸ

λιμῶ δ' οἴκτιστον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

ἢ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο, C τούτων πάντων ῥαδίως ἐπιλανθανόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἰδόντα τὴν Ἥραν, ὥστε μηδ' εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἐθέλειν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ βουλόμενον χαμαὶ ξυγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ λέγοντα ὡς οὕτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται, ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους

<sup>a</sup> *Il. i. 225.* Achilles to the commander-in-chief, Agamemnon. Several lines of insult follow.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. Philebus 42 c.*

<sup>c</sup> *Cf. Gorgias 482 c.*

<sup>d</sup> Odysseus in *Od. ix. 8-10.* For παραπλείαι the Homeric text has *παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι.* Plato's treatment of the quotation

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Heavy with wine with the eyes of a dog and the heart of  
a fleet deer,<sup>a</sup>

and the lines that follow,<sup>b</sup> are these well—and other impertinences<sup>c</sup> in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers? ” “ They are not well.” “ They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised; or what is your view of it? ” “ This,” he said.

IV. “ Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world,

When the bounteous tables are standing  
Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles  
the sweet wine  
Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the  
beakers.<sup>d</sup>

—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? or this :

Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer.<sup>e</sup>  
Or to hear how Zeus<sup>f</sup> lightly forgot all the designs which he devised, awake while the other gods and men slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another,

is hardly fair to Homer. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1338 a 28, cites it more fairly to illustrate the use of music for entertainment (*διαγωγή*). The passage, however, was liable to abuse. See the use made of it by Lucian, *Parasite* 10.

<sup>a</sup> *Od.* xii. 342.

<sup>f</sup> *Il.* xiv. 294-341.



φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας;

οὐδὲ Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαιστού  
δεσμὸν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς,  
D οὐ μοι φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον. Ἄλλ' εἴ πού τινες,  
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καρτερίαι πρὸς ἅπαντα καὶ λέγονται  
καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, θεατέον τε  
καὶ ἀκουστέον, οἶον καὶ τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·  
τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐ μὲν δὴ δωροδόκους  
γε ἐατέον εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρας οὐδὲ φιλοχρημάτους.  
E Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδ' ἀστέον αὐτοῖς ὅτι

δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας·

οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοίνικα  
ἐπαινετέον, ὡς μετρίως ἔλεγε συμβουλεύων αὐτῷ  
δῶρα μὲν λαβόντι ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ  
δώρων μὴ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιος. οὐδ' αὐτὸν  
τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἀξιόσομεν οὐδ' ὁμολογήσομεν οὕτω  
φιλοχρήματον εἶναι, ὥστε παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος  
δῶρα λαβεῖν, καὶ τιμὴν αὐτῷ λαβόντα νεκροῦ ἀπο-  
391 λύειν, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ θέλειν. Οὐκ οὖν δίκαιόν γε,  
ἔφη, ἐπαινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ὁκνῶ δέ γε, ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, δι' Ὅμηρον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδ' ὅσιον ταῦτά γε  
κατὰ Ἀχιλλέως φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πεί-  
θεσθαι, καὶ αὐτῷ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλω εἶπεν

<sup>a</sup> *Od.* viii. 266 ff.

<sup>b</sup> May include on Platonic principles the temptations of pleasure. Cf. *Laws* 633 D, *Laches* 191 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> *Od.* xx. 17-18. Quoted also in *Phaedo* 94 D-E.

<sup>d</sup> *Suidas s.v. δῶρα* says that some attributed the line to

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Deceiving their dear parents.

Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus's fettering of Ares and Aphrodite<sup>a</sup> for a like motive." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I don't think it will." "But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds<sup>b</sup> attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as :

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart,  
'Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured.'<sup>c</sup>"

"By all means," he said. "It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain." "By no means." "Then they must not chant :

Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings.<sup>d</sup>

Nor should we approve Achilles' attendant Phoenix<sup>e</sup> as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath ; nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles<sup>f</sup> himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment<sup>g</sup> but otherwise to refuse." "It is not right," he said, "to commend such conduct." "But, for Homer's sake," said I, "I hesitate to say that it is positively impious<sup>h</sup> to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others ; or again to believe that he said to Apollo

Hesiod. Cf. Eurip. *Medea* 964, Ovid, *Ars Am.* iii. 653, Otto, *Sprichw. d. Röm.* 233.

<sup>e</sup> See his speech, *Il.* ix. 515 ff.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Il.* xix. 278 ff. But Achilles in Homer is indifferent to the gifts.

<sup>g</sup> *Il.* xxiv. 502, 555, 594. But in 560 he does not explicitly mention the ransom.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 368 B.

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἐκάεργε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων·  
ἢ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύνამίς γε παρείη·

**B** καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, θεὸν ὄντα, ἀπειθῶς εἶχε  
καὶ μάχεσθαι ἔτοιμος ἦν· καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς τοῦ ἑτέρου  
ποταμοῦ Σπερχειοῦ ἱεράς τρίχας

Πατρόκλω ἦρωϊ, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι,  
νεκρῶ ὄντι, καὶ ὡς ἔδρασε τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον.  
τάς τε αὐτὸς Ἔκτορος ἔλξεις περὶ τὸ σῆμα τὸ Πα-  
τρόκλου καὶ τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν  
πυράν, ξύμπαντα ταῦτα οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθῆ εἰρή-  
**C** σθαι, οὐδ' ἐάσομεν πείθεσθαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὡς  
'Αχιλλεύς, θεᾶς ὦν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστά-  
του τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ  
Χείρωνι τεθραμμένος, τοσαύτης ἦν ταραχῆς πλέως,  
ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματα δύο ἐναντίῳ ἀλλήλοις,  
ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπερ-  
ηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη,  
λέγεις.

**V.** Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα  
μηδ' ἐῷμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεὺς Ποσειδῶνος υἱὸς  
**D** Πειρίθους τε Διὸς ὄρμησεν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς  
ἄρπαγὰς, μηδέ τιν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παιδᾶ τε καὶ ἦρω

<sup>a</sup> *Il.* xxii. 15. Professor Wilamowitz uses ὀλοώτατε to prove that Apollo was a god of destruction. But Menelaus says the same of Zeus in *Il.* iii. 365. Cf. *Class. Phil.* vol. iv (1909) p. 329.

<sup>b</sup> Scamander. *Il.* xxi. 130-132.

<sup>c</sup> *Il.* xxiii. 151. Cf. Proclus, p. 146 Kroll. Plato exaggerates to make his case. The locks were vowed to Spercheius on the condition of Achilles' return. In their context the words are innocent enough.

<sup>d</sup> *Il.* xxiv. 14 ff.

<sup>e</sup> *Il.* xxiii. 175-176.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Me thou hast baulked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of  
all gods,  
Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the  
power.<sup>a</sup>

And how he was disobedient to the river,<sup>b</sup> who was  
a god, and was ready to fight with him, and again  
that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to  
the other river Spercheius :

This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero,  
Patroclus,<sup>c</sup>

who was a dead body, and that he did so we must  
not believe. And again the trailings<sup>d</sup> of Hector's  
body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter<sup>e</sup>  
of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we  
will affirm to be lies, nor will we suffer our youth to  
believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of  
Peleus the most chaste<sup>f</sup> of men, grandson<sup>g</sup> of Zeus,  
and himself bred under the care of the most sage  
Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected  
with two contradictory maladies, the greed that  
becomes no free man and at the same time over-  
weening arrogance towards gods and men." "You  
are right," he said.

V. "Neither, then," said I, "must we believe this  
or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of  
Poseidon, and Peirithoüs, the son of Zeus, attempted  
such dreadful rapes,<sup>h</sup> nor that any other child of a

<sup>f</sup> Proverbially. Cf. Pind. *Nem.* iv. 56, v. 26, Aristoph. *Clouds* 1063, and my note on Horace iii. 7. 17.

<sup>g</sup> Zeus, Aeacus, Peleus. For the education of Achilles by Cheiron cf. *Il.* xi. 832, Pindar, *Nem.* iii., Eurip. *I.A.* 926-927, Plato, *Hipp. Minor* 371 D.

<sup>h</sup> Theseus was assisted by Peirithoüs in the rape of Helen and joined Peirithoüs in the attempt to abduct Persephone. Theseus was the theme of epics and of lost plays by Sophocles and Euripides.

τολμῆσαι ἂν δεινὰ καὶ ἀσεβῆ ἔργασασθαι, οἷα νῦν καταφεύδονται αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ προσαναγκάζωμεν τοὺς ποιητὰς ἢ μὴ τούτων αὐτὰ ἔργα φάναι ἢ τούτους μὴ εἶναι θεῶν παῖδας, ἀμφότερα δὲ μὴ λέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσι, καὶ ἥρωες ἀνθρώπων  
**Ε** οὐδὲν βελτίους. ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὐτ' ἀληθῆ· ἐπεδείξαμεν γάρ που, ὅτι ἐκ θεῶν κακὰ γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἔξει κακῶ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ

οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι

Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον  
 Διὸς πατρώου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,  
 καὶ οὐ πῶ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἶμα δαιμόνων.

ὧν ἕνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν  
 392 πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίας. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπὸν εἶδος λόγων περὶ ὀριζομένοις οἷους τε λεκτέον καὶ μῆ; περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἴη ἂν; Δῆλα δῆ. Ἀδύνατον δῆ, ὦ φίλε, ἡμῖν τοῦτό γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι τάξαι. Πῶς; Ὅτι οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ  
**Β** καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσι περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ

<sup>a</sup> Plato was probably thinking of this passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the *Critias*.

<sup>b</sup> From Aeschylus's *Niobe*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* vol. xii. (1910) p. 308.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men. For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility." "Certainly." "And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of

The near-sown seed of gods,  
Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top  
Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven,  
Nor in their life-blood fails<sup>a</sup> the fire divine.<sup>b</sup>

For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed in our youth great laxity<sup>c</sup> in turpitude." "Most assuredly." "What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions? We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world?" "We have." "Speech, then, about men would be the remainder." "Obviously." "It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.<sup>d</sup>" "Why?" "Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying

<sup>a</sup> Or possibly "determine this at present." The prohibition which it would beg the question to place here is made explicit in *Laws* 660 E. Cf. *Laws* 899 D, and *supra* 364 B.

μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπερεῖν λέγειν, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προστάζειν ἄδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Εὐ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶδα. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὁμολογῆς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε ὁμολογηκέναι ἃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν;

C Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, ὑπέλαβες. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους λέγεσθαι, τότε δι-  
ομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὖρωμεν, οἷόν ἐστι δικαιο-  
σύνη, καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐὰν τε  
δοκῆ ἐὰν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

VI. Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων περί ἐχέτω τέλος, τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.

καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅ  
D τι λέγεις. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖ γε. ἴσως  
οὖν τῆδε μᾶλλον εἴσει. ἄρ' οὐ πάντα, ὅσα ὑπὸ  
μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται, διήγησις οὔσα  
τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων; Τί  
γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο; Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀπλήρῃ διηγήσει ἢ  
διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένη ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαι-  
νουσιν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον  
μαθεῖν. Γελοῖός, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικα διδάσκαλος

<sup>a</sup> λόγων here practically means the matter, and λέξεως, which became a technical term for diction, the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to understand.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Poet.* 1449 b 27.

<sup>c</sup> All art is essentially imitation for Plato and Aristotle. But imitation means for them not only the portrayal or description of visible and tangible things, but more especially the communication of a mood or feeling, hence the (to a modern) paradox that music is the most imitative of the arts.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don't you think so?" "Nay, I well know it," he said. "Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?" "Rightly apprehended," he said. "Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just." "Most true," he replied.

VI. "So this concludes the topic of tales.<sup>a</sup> That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech." And Adeimantus said, "I don't understand what you mean by this." "Well," said I, "we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things?" "What else could it be?" he said. "Do not they proceed<sup>b</sup> either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation,<sup>c</sup> or by both?" "This too," he said, "I still need to have made plainer." "I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure

But Plato here complicates the matter further by sometimes using imitation in the narrower sense of dramatic dialogue as opposed to narration. An attentive reader will easily observe these distinctions. Aristotle's *Poetics* makes much use of the ideas and the terminology of the following pages.



εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφής. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν,  
 Ε οὐ κατὰ ὅλον ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαι  
 σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι. καί μοι εἶπέ·  
 ἐπίστασαι τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητής  
 φησι τὸν μὲν Χρῦσιν δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος  
 ἀπολῦσαι τὴν θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαίνειν, τὸν  
 393 δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐτύγχανε, κατεύχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν  
 πρὸς τὸν θεόν; Ἔγωγε. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν  
 τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν

καὶ ἐλίσσεται πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς,  
 Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν

λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής καὶ οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν  
 τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων  
 Β ἢ αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ  
 Χρῦσις λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα  
 ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα  
 ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα· καὶ τὴν ἄλλην  
 δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποιήται διήγησιν περί  
 τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλη  
 Ὀδυσσεΐα παθημάτων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκ-  
 οὖν διήγησις μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκά-  
 στοτε λέγῃ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων;  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν  
 C ὡς τις ἄλλος ὢν, ἄρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν  
 φήσομεν ὅ τι μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξιν ἐκάστῳ,

<sup>a</sup> Socratic urbanity professes that the speaker, not the hearer, is at fault. Cf. *Protag.* 340 ε, *Phileb.* 23 δ.

<sup>b</sup> Plato and Aristotle often contrast the universal and the particular as whole and part. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 52. Though a good style is concrete, it is a mark of linguistic helplessness not to be able to state an idea in

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

teacher,<sup>a</sup>” I said; “so like men who are unable to express themselves I won’t try to speak in wholes<sup>b</sup> and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning. Tell me. Do you know the first lines of the *Iliad* in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses, failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god?” “I do.” “You know then that as far as these verses,

And prayed unto all the Achaeans,  
Chiefly to Atreus’ sons, twin leaders who marshalled the  
people,<sup>c</sup>

the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried on nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilium, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire *Odyssey*.” “Quite so,” he said. “Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches?” “Of course.” “But when he delivers a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction as far as possible to that of the person whom he speaks in general terms. Cf. Locke, *Human Understanding*, iii. 10. 27: “This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them.”

<sup>c</sup> *Il.* i. 15 f.

ὄν ἂν προείπη ὡς ἐροῦντα; Φήσομεν· τί γάρ; Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλω ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμείσθαι ἔστιν ἐκείνον ὧ ἂν τις ὁμοιοῖ; Τί μὴν; Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἢ ποιήσεις τε καὶ διήγησις  
**D** γεγονυῖα εἶη. ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ μαθή-  
 νεις, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἐγὼ φράσω. εἰ γάρ  
 Ὀμηρος εἰπὼν, ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ Χρῦσης τῆς τε θυγα-  
 τρὸς λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἰκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα  
 δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὡς Χρῦσης γενό-  
 μενος ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι ὡς Ὀμηρος, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ  
 ἂν μίμησις ἦν ἀλλ' ἀπλή διήγησις. εἶχε δ' ἂν  
 ὠδέ πως· φράσω δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· οὐ γάρ εἰμι  
**E** ποιητικός· ἐλθὼν ὁ ἱερεὺς ἠὔχετο ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς  
 θεοὺς δοῦναι ἐλόντας τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοὺς σωθῆναι,  
 τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λῦσαι δεξαμένους ἄποινα καὶ  
 τὸν θεὸν αἰδεσθέντας. ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ  
 μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνήνουν, ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων  
 ἠγρίασεν ἐντελλόμενος νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὖθις μὴ  
 ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τό τε σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ  
 στέμματα οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι· πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ  
 τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἀργεῖ ἔφη γηράσειν μετὰ οὗ·  
 ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε καὶ μὴ ἐρεθίζειν, ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε  
**394** ἔλθοι. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἀκούσας ἔδειςέ τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> In the narrower sense.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Hazlitt, *Antony and Cleopatra*: "Shakespeare does not stand reasoning on what his characters would do or say, but at once becomes them and speaks and acts for them."

<sup>c</sup> From here to 394 B, Plato gives a prose paraphrase of  
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announces as about to speak?" "We shall obviously." "And is not likening one's self to another in speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one's self?" "Surely." "In such case then, it appears, he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation." "Certainly." "But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.<sup>a</sup> And lest you may say again that you don't understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses<sup>b</sup> but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without metre for I am not a poet:<sup>c</sup> the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god; and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the sceptre and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, he said, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe. And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having

*Il. i. 12-42.* Roger Ascham in his *Schoolmaster* quotes it as a perfect example of the best form of exercise for learning a language.

ἀπῆει σιγῇ, ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πολλὰ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ἠΰχετο, τὰς τε ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ ἀπαιτῶν, εἴ τι πώποτε ἢ ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν ἢ ἐν ἱερῶν θυσίαις κεχαρισμένον δωρήσαιο. ὦν δὴ χάριν κατηύχετο τῖσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὰ ἄ δάκρυα τοῖς ἐκείνου βέλεσιν. οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, B ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἀπλῆ διήγησις γίγνεται. Μανθάνω, ἔφη.

VII. Μάνθανε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπη. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, μανθάνω, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγωδίας τοιοῦτον. Ὅρθότατα, ἔφην, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ οἶμαί σοι ἤδη δηλοῦν ὃ ἔμπροσθεν οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦν, ὅτι τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἢ μὲν διὰ C μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμωδία, ἢ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ· εὖροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις· ἢ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, εἴ μοι μανθάνεις. Ἀλλὰ ξυνίημι, ἔφη, ὃ τότε ἐβούλου λέγειν. Καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου δὴ ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι ἔφαμεν, ἃ μὲν λεκτέον, ἢδη εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς δὲ λεκτέον, ἔτι σκεπτέον εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι. D Τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἦν ὃ ἔλεγον, ὅτι χρεῖη δι-ομολογήσασθαι, πότερον ἐάσομεν τοὺς ποιητὰς μιμουμένους ἡμῖν τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν μιμουμένους, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ ὅποια ἐκάτερα, ἢ

<sup>a</sup> The dithyramb was technically a poem in honour of Bacchus. For its more or less conjectural history cf. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*.

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## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favour whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god's shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow," I said, "that without imitation simple narration results." "I understand," he said.

VII. "Understand then," said I, "that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches." "This too I understand," he said, "—it is what happens in tragedy." "You have conceived me most rightly," I said, "and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation, as you remarked, tragedy and comedy; and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyramb<sup>a</sup>; and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me." "I understand now," he said, "what you then meant." "Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the 'what' of speech and still had to consider the 'how.'" "I remember." "What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in

Here, however, it is used broadly to designate the type of elaborate Greek lyric which like the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides narrates a myth or legend with little if any dialogue.

οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι. Μαντεύομαι, ἔφη, σκοπεῖσθαί σε, εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγωδίαν τε καὶ κωμωδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὐ. Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη  
 Εἰτέον. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικούς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὐ; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔπεται, ὅτι εἰς ἕκαστος ἐν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν, ὥστ' εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι εὖ ὥσπερ ἐν οὐ δυνατός; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σχολῆ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει  
 395 γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεὶ που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα<sup>1</sup> δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτῳ ἐκάλεις; Ἐγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί. Οὐδὲ μὴν ραψωδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα. Ἀληθῆ. Ἀλλ'

<sup>1</sup> μιμήματα is more euphonious: some mss. and editors read μιμήματα.

<sup>a</sup> Again in the special limited sense.

<sup>b</sup> This seems to imply that Plato already had in mind the extension of the discussion in the tenth book to the whole question of the moral effect of poetry and art.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaetetus*. 172 d. But it is very naïve to suppose that the sequence of Plato's argument is not carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 5.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

each case, or not allow them to imitate<sup>a</sup> at all.” “I divine,” he said, “that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not.” “Perhaps,” said I, “and perhaps even more than that.<sup>b</sup> For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows,<sup>c</sup> there lies our course.” “Well said,” he replied. “This then, Adeimantus, is the point we must keep in view, do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practise well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of distinction in all?” “Of course it is.” “And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one?” “No, he is not.” “Still less, then, will he be able to combine the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic; since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practise well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedy<sup>d</sup>? Did you not just now call these two imitations?” “I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both, nor yet to be at once good rhapsodists<sup>e</sup> and actors.” “True. But neither can the same men

<sup>a</sup> At the close of the *Symposium* Socrates constrains Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that one who has the science (*τέχνη*) of writing tragedy will also be able to write comedy. There is for Plato no contradiction, since poetry is for him not a science or art, but an inspiration.

<sup>e</sup> The rhapsode Ion is a Homeric specialist who cannot interpret other poets. Cf. *Ion* 533 c.



Β οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὐ; Μιμήματα. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστ' ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμῆσθαι, ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν, ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

VIII. Εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρῶτον λόγον διασώσομεν, τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουργοῦσι  
 C γιῶν ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάννυ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὅ τι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμῆσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμῆσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὀσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως  
 D τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθνη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέφομεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧν φαμέν κήδεσθαι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Classical Review*, vol. xiv. (1900), pp. 201 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 846E, Montaigne, "Nostre suffisance est détaillée à menues pièces," Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 60:

One science only will one genius fit,  
 So vast is art, so narrow human wit.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the fine passage in *Laws* 817 B ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταί, [Pindar] *apud* Plut. 807 C δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

be actors for tragedies and comedies <sup>a</sup>—and all these are imitations, are they not? ” “ Yes, imitations.” “ And to still smaller coinage <sup>b</sup> than this, in my opinion, Adeimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses.” “ Most true,” he replied.

VIII. “ If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our guardians, released from all other crafts, are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty, <sup>c</sup> and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they should from childhood up <sup>d</sup> imitate what is appropriate to them <sup>e</sup>—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality. <sup>f</sup> Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature <sup>g</sup> in the body, the speech, and the thought? ” “ Yes, indeed,” said he. “ We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 386 A.

<sup>e</sup> i.e., δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *infra* 606 B, *Laws* 656 B, 669 B-C, and Burke, *Sublime and Beautiful* iv. 4, anticipating James, *Psychology* ii. pp. 449, 451, and anticipated by Shakespeare's (*Cor.* III. ii. 123)

By my body's action teach my mind  
A most inherent baseness.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. my paper on Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη, *T.A.P.A.* vol. xl. (1910) pp. 185 ff.

καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα  
 μιμῆσθαι ἄνδρας ὄντας, ἢ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν, ἢ  
 ἀνδρὶ λαιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσάν τε καὶ  
 μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἰομένην εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἢ ἐν  
 Ε ξυμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην·  
 κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρώσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν πολλοῦ καὶ  
 δεήσομεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐδέ γε  
 δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὅσα δούλων.  
 Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακοὺς, ὡς ἔοικε,  
 δειλοὺς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττοντας ὧν νῦν δὴ  
 εἶπομεν, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμωδοῦντας  
 ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἢ καὶ  
 396 νήφοντας, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐν  
 λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε  
 καὶ εἰς ἄλλους· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μαινομένοις ἐθιστέον  
 ἀφομοιοῦν αὐτοὺς ἐν λόγοις οὐδ' ἐν ἔργοις. γνω-  
 στέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς  
 ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων  
 οὐδὲ μιμητέον. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δ'; ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ· χαλκεύοντας ἢ τι ἄλλο δημιουργοῦντας, ἢ  
 ἐλαύνοντας τριήρεις ἢ κελεύοντας τούτοις, ἢ τι  
 Β ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταῦτα μιμητέον; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη,  
 οἷς γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενὶ  
 ἐξέσται; Τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύ-  
 ρους μυκωμένους καὶ ποταμοὺς ψοφοῦντας καὶ  
 θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα ἢ μιμήσονται; Ἀλλ' ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς,

\* Cf. *Laws* 816 D-E.

<sup>b</sup> For this rejection of violent realism cf. *Laws* 669 C-D. Plato describes precisely what Verhaeren's admirers approve: "often in his rhythm can be heard the beat of hammers, the hard, edged, regular whizzing of wheels, the whirring of

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labour.”

“Most certainly not,” he replied. “Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves.” “No, not that either.” “Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must have<sup>a</sup> both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind.” “Most true,” he said. “What of this?”

I said, “—are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of triremes and those who call the time to them or other things connected therewith?” “How could they,” he said, “since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things?” “Well, then, neighing horses<sup>b</sup> and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these?” “Nay,

looms, the hissing of locomotives; often the wild, restless tumult of streets, the humming and rumbling of dense masses of the people” (Stefan Zweig). So another modern critic celebrates “the cry of the baby in a Strauss symphony, the sneers and snarls of the critics in his *Helden Leben*, the contortions of the Dragon in Wagner’s *Siegfried*.”

ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαινομένοις ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. Εἰ ἄρ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἂ σὺ λέγεις, ἔστι τι εἶδος λέξεώς τε καὶ διηγήσεως, ἐν ᾧ ἂν  
**C** διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὅποτε τι δέοι αὐτὸν λέγειν· καὶ ἕτερον αὖ ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἶδος, οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο αἰεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο ὁ ἐναντίως ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς. Ποῖα δὴ, ἔφη, ταῦτα; Ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν  
**D** ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης ξυμφορᾶς· ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατὰ τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμῆσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναί εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων  
**E** τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὃ τι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν. Εἰκός, ἔφη.

IX. Οὐκοῦν διηγήσει χρήσεται οἷα ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων,

<sup>a</sup> Chaucer drew from a misapplication of *Tim.* 29 B or Boethius the opposite moral:

Who so shall telle a tale after a man,  
 He most reherse, as neighe as ever he can,  
 Everich word, if it be in his charge,  
 All speke he never so rudely and so large;

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

they have been forbidden," he said, "to be mad or liken themselves to madmen." "If, then, I understand your meaning," said I, "there is a form of diction and narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and in which he would tell his story." "What are these forms?" he said. "A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior,<sup>a</sup> except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from moulding and fitting himself to the types of baser things. His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.<sup>b</sup>" "Naturally," he said.

IX. "Then the narrative that he will employ will be of the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes

. . . . .  
Eke Plato sayeth, who so can him rede,  
The wordes most ben cosin to the dede.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, like Howells and some other modern novelists, would have thought somewhat gross comedy less harmful than the tragedy or romance that insidiously instils false ideals.

μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς<sup>1</sup> διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως· ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οἷόν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιούτου ῥήτορος. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 397 ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον μιμήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων καὶ τροχιλίων καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπασα διὰ Β μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρὸν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔλεγον τὰ δύο εἶδη τῆς λέξεως. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ εἴαν τις ἀποδιδῶ πρόπουσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ—σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μετα- C βολαί—καὶ δὴ ἐν ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησιῶ τινί; Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει. Τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν ἀρμονιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκείως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως

<sup>1</sup> ἀπλῆς Adam plausibly: the mss. ἄλλης idiomatically, "as well."

<sup>a</sup> The respondent plays on the double meaning of οὐδὲν λέγεις and replies, "Yes indeed, you do say something, namely the type and pattern," etc.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say?” “Yes, indeed,<sup>a</sup>” he said, “that *is* the type and pattern of such a speaker.” “Then,” said I, “the other kind of speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many,<sup>b</sup> to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and so his style will depend wholly on imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration.” “That too follows of necessity,” he said. “These, then,” said I, “were the two types of diction of which I was speaking.” “There are those two,” he replied. “Now does not one of the two involve slight variations,<sup>c</sup> and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight—and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind?” “Quite so.” “But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation?” “Emphat-

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 487 B, *Euthydem.* 305 B, *Protag.* 323 B.

<sup>c</sup> Besides its suggestion of change and reaction the word is technical in music for the transition from one harmony to another.



ἔχει. Ἄρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἳ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνουσι τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ξυγκεραν-  
 D νύντες; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παραδεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἕτερον ἢ τὸν κεκραμένον; Ἐὰν ἡ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἀκρατον. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἡδιστος παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὗ σὺ αἰρεῖ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. Ἡδιστος γάρ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρμόττειν φαίης  
 E τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πολιτείᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἐν πράττει. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἀρμόττει. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τόν τε σκυτοτόμον σκυτοτόμον εὐρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ σκυτοτομίᾳ, καὶ τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργὸν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ γεωργίᾳ, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτω; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Ἄνδρα δὴ, ὡς  
 398 ἔοικε, δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ μιμῆσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκνυοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν, εἴπομεν δ' ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέμπομέν τε εἰς ἄλλην

<sup>a</sup> The reverse of the Periclean ideal. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 41.

<sup>b</sup> The famous banishment of Homer, regarded as the prototype of the tragedian. Cf. 568 A-C, 595 B, 605 C, 607 D, *Laws* 656 c, 817 B.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

ically so." "And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both?" "They must," he said. "What, then," said I, "are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of the unmixed types, or the mixed type?" "If my vote prevails," he said, "the unmixed imitator of the good." "Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adeimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice." "Most pleasing it is." "But perhaps," said I, "you would affirm it to be ill-suited to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold man<sup>a</sup> among us, since every man does one thing." "It is not suited." "And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest?" "True," he said. "<sup>b</sup> If a man, then, it seems, who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself<sup>c</sup> the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another

<sup>a</sup> Greek idiom achieves an effect impossible to English here, by the shift from the co-ordination of ποιήματα with αὐτός to the treatment of it as the object of ἐπιδειξασθαι and the possible double use of the latter as middle with αὐτός and transitive with ποιήματα. Cf. for a less striking example 427 D, *Phaedr.* 250 B-C.

πόλιν μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέφαντες, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ  
 B ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελείας ἔνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις, οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖμεν, εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶη. Νῦν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι· ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον, εἴρηται. Καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

C X. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ὠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν; Δῆλα δὴ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὔροι, ἃ ἡμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, εἴπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφωνήσειν; καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἐπιγελάσας, Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι· οὐκ οὐκ ἰκανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι ξυμβαλέσθαι, ποῖ' ἄττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, ὑποπτεύω μέντοι. Πάντως δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν

D τόδε ἰκανῶς ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶ συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ. Ναί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δήπου διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. from a different point of view Arnold's *The Austerity of Poetry*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 379 A ff.

<sup>c</sup> He laughs at his own mild joke, which Professor Wilamowitz (*Platon* ii. p. 192) does not understand. Cf. *Laws*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue to employ the more austere<sup>a</sup> and less delightful poet and tale-teller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,<sup>b</sup> when we set out to educate our soldiers." "We certainly should do that if it rested with us." "And now, my friend," said I, "we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said." "I think so too," he replied.

X. "After this, then," said I, "comes the manner of song and tunes?" "Obviously." "And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said?" "I am afraid that 'everybody' does not include me," laughed Glaucon<sup>c</sup>; "I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion." "You certainly, I presume," said I, "have a sufficient understanding of this—that the song<sup>d</sup> is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm?" "Yes," said he, "that much." "And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of

859 E, *Hipp. Major* 293 A ἢ οὐχ εἰς τῶν ἀπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν; and in a recent novel, "I am afraid everybody does not include me," she smiled."

<sup>d</sup> The complete song includes words, rhythm, and "harmony," that is, a pitch system of high and low notes. Harmony is also used technically of the peculiar Greek system of scales or modes. Cf. *Monro, Modes of Ancient Greek Music*.

τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ ὡσ-  
 αύτως; Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν τὴν γε ἄρμονίαν  
 καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;  
 Ἄλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν  
 λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν  
 Ε θρηνώδεις ἄρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός.  
 Μιξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστί καὶ τοι-  
 αὔταιί τινες. Οὐκοῦν αὐται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι·  
 ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν ἄς δεῖ ἐπιεικέις εἶναι,  
 μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε  
 φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία.  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμπο-  
 τικαὶ τῶν ἄρμονιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί,  
 399 αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται. Ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε,  
 ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ' ὅ τι χρήσει; Οὐδα-  
 μῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστί λείπεσθαι  
 καὶ φρυγιστί. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἄρμονίας,  
 ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἄρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε

<sup>a</sup> The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words. When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals.

<sup>b</sup> The modes of Greek music are known to the English reader only from Milton's allusions, his "Lap me in soft Lydian airs" and, *P.L.* i. 549 f., his

Anon they move  
 In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood  
 Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised  
 To highth of noblest temper heroes old.

The adaptation of particular modes, harmonies or scales to the expression of particular feelings is something that we are obliged to accept on faith. Plato's statements here were challenged by some later critics, but the majority believed that there was a real connexion between modes of music

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed?" "True," he said. "And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech.<sup>a</sup>" "Of course." "But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words." "We do not." "What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician." "The mixed Lydian,<sup>b</sup>" he said, "and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes." "These, then," said I, "we must do away with. For they are useless even to women<sup>c</sup> who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men." "Assuredly." "But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbecoming guardians, and so is softness and sloth." "Yes." "What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?" "There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax." "Will you make any use of them for warriors?" "None at all," he said; "but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian." "I don't know<sup>d</sup> the musical modes," I said, "but leave us that mode<sup>e</sup> that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the

and modes of feeling, as Ruskin and many others have in our day. The hard-headed Epicureans and sceptics denied it, as well as the moral significance of music generally.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 387 E.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, like a lawyer or popular essayist, affects ignorance of the technical details; or perhaps rather he wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists' controversy about particular modes of music and their names.

<sup>c</sup> ἐκεῖνην may mean, but does not say, Dorian, which the *Laches* (188 D) pronounces the only true Greek harmony.

This long anacoluthic sentence sums up the whole matter with impressive repetition and explicit enumeration of all types of conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato's doctrine of the two fundamental temperaments, the swift and the slow, the energetic and the mild. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 59, 70, 481.

πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσαιο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος, ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἰς τινα ἄλλην ξυμφορὰν  
 Β πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκουσίῳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινὰ τι πείθοντός τε καὶ δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσῃ ἀνθρωπον, ἢ τοῦναντίον ἄλλῳ δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα,<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας  
 C δύο ἁρμονίας, βίαιον, ἐκούσιον, δυστυχοῦντων, εὐτυχοῦντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων [ἁρμονίας] αἵτινες φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λείπε. Ἄλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπειν, ἢ ἄς νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολυχорδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ὠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν. Οὐ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται. Τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων,  
 D ὅσα πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν. Οὐ φαινόμεθα. Τί δέ; αὐλοποιούς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχорδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; Δῆλα δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς. Λύρα δὴ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ

<sup>1</sup> ἐπέχοντα has most ms. authority, but ὑπέχοντα or παρέχοντα is more normal Greek for the idea.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 814 E.

<sup>b</sup> Metaphorically. The "many-toned instrumentation of

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary,<sup>a</sup> either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who is petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the enforced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these.” “Well,” said he, “you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of.” “Then,” said I, “we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies.” “Not in my opinion,” said he. “Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other many-stringed and poly-harmonic<sup>b</sup> instruments.” “Apparently not.” “Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most ‘many-stringed’ of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics<sup>c</sup> themselves imitate it?” “Clearly,” he said. “You have left,” said I, “the lyre and the

the flutes,” as Pindar calls it, *Ol.* vii. 12, can vie with the most complex and many-stringed lyre of musical innovation.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 404 D, the only other occurrence of the word in Plato.



πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σύριγξ ἄν τις εἴη. Ὡς γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν Ε σημαίνει. Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καινὸν ποιούμεν, ὦ φίλε, κρίνοντας τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαρσίου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὀργάνων. Μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαινόμεθα. Καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν. Σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XI. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν. ἐπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ἄν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμούς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν· οὓς ἰδόντα  
400 τὸν πόδα τῷ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἔπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ μέλει. οἷτινες δ' ἄν εἶεν οὗτοι οἱ ῥυθμοί, σὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰς ἀρμονίας, φράσαι. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί' ἄττα ἐστὶν εἶδη, ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἀρμονίαι, τεθεαμένος ἄν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my note on *Tim.* 47 c, in *A.J.P.* vol. x. p. 61.

<sup>b</sup> Ancient critics noted this sentence as an example of adaptation of sound to sense. Cf. *Demetr.* *Περὶ ἔρμ.* 185. The sigmas and iotas may be fancied to suggest the whistling notes of the syrinx. So *Lucretius* v. 1385 "tibia quas fundit digitis pulsata canentum." Cf. on *Catull.* 61. 13 "voce carmina tinnula."

<sup>c</sup> The so-called Rhadamanthine oath to avoid taking the names of the gods in vain. Cf. 592 A, *Apol.* 21 E, *Blaydes* on *Aristoph.* *Wasps* 83.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 372 E. *Dümmeler, Proleg.* p. 62, strangely affirms that this is an express retractation of the ἀληθινὴ πόλις. This is to misapprehend Plato's method. He starts with the indispensable minimum of a simple society, develops it by

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

cither. These are useful<sup>a</sup> in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on.<sup>b</sup>”

“So our argument indicates,” he said. “We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments.”

‘No, by heaven!’ he said, “I think not.” “And by the dog,<sup>c</sup>” said I, “we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was luxurious.<sup>d</sup>”

“In that we show our good sense,” he said.

XI. “Come then, let us complete the purification. For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms : we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements,<sup>e</sup> but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man’s speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes.” “Nay, in faith,” he said, “I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms<sup>f</sup> from which the feet are combined, just as there are four<sup>g</sup> in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could

Herbert Spencer’s multiplication of effects into an ordinary Greek city, then reforms it by a reform of education and finally transforms it into his ideal state by the rule of the philosopher kings. Cf. *Introd.* p. xiv.

<sup>e</sup> Practically the feet.

<sup>f</sup> According to the ancient musicians these are the equal as *e.g.* in dactyls (— ∪ ∪), spondees (— —) and anapaests (∪ ∪ —), where the foot divides into two equal quantities; the  $\frac{3}{2}$  ratio, as in the so-called cretic (— ∪ —); the  $\frac{2}{1}$  as in the iamb (∪ —) and trochee (— ∪). Cf. *Aristid. Quint.* i. pp. 34-35.

<sup>g</sup> Possibly the four notes of the tetrachord, but there is no agreement among experts. Cf. *Monro, Modes of Ancient Greek Music.*

εἶποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ  
 Β ἔχω. Ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ  
 Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ  
 ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι  
 βάσεις, καὶ τίνες τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς.  
 οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα  
 ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ ξύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ  
 ἠρῶν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον  
 ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν  
 γιγνόμενον, καὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἴαμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλον  
 C τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσ-  
 ἦπτε· καὶ τούτων τισὶν οἶμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ  
 ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἦττον ψέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ  
 τοὺς ῥυθμούς αὐτούς, ἦτοι ξυναμφοτέρων τι· οὐ  
 γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς  
 Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ μικροῦ  
 λόγου· ἢ σὺ οἶει; Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλα  
 τόδε γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημο-  
 σύνης τῶ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρύθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ,  
 δύνασαι διελέσθαι; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἄλλα μὴν τὸ

<sup>a</sup> Modern psychologists are still debating the question.

<sup>b</sup> The Platonic Socrates frequently refers to Damon as his musical expert. Cf. *Laches* 200 b, *infra* 424 c, *Alc. I.* 118 c.

<sup>c</sup> There is a hint of satire in this disclaimer of expert knowledge. Cf. 399 a. There is no agreement among modern experts with regard to the precise form of the so-called enoplios. Cf. my review of Herkenrath's "Der Enoplios," *Class. Phil.* vol. iii. p. 360, Goodell, *Chapters on Greek Metric*, pp. 185 and 189, Blaydes on *Aristoph. Nubes* 651.

<sup>d</sup> Possibly foot, possibly rhythm. δάκτυλον seems to mean the foot, while ἠρῶς is the measure based on dactyls but admitting spondees.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.<sup>a</sup>” “Well,” said I, “on this point we will take counsel with Damon,<sup>b</sup> too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking<sup>c</sup> of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroic<sup>d</sup> foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and down<sup>e</sup> in the interchange of long and short,<sup>f</sup> and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I can’t say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon’s consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise?” “No, by heaven, I do not.” “But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad.” “Of course.” “And, further,<sup>g</sup> that good rhythm and

<sup>a</sup> ἄνω καὶ κάτω is an untranslatable gibe meaning literally and technically the upper and lower half of the foot, the arsis and thesis, but idiomatically meaning topsy-turvy. There is a similar play on the idiom in *Phileb.* 43 A and 43 B.

<sup>f</sup> Literally “becoming” or “issuing in long and short,” long, that is, when a spondee is used, short when a dactyl.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, as often, employs the forms of an argument proceeding by minute links to accumulate synonyms in illustration of a moral or aesthetic analogy. He is working up to the Wordsworthian thought that order, harmony, and beauty in nature and art are akin to these qualities in the soul.

Δ εὐρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ  
 λέξει ἔπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντία, καὶ τὸ  
 εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως εἶπερ ρυ-  
 θμός γε καὶ ἀρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο,  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἣ δ' ὅς,  
 ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. Τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς  
 λέξεως, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς  
 ἦθει ἔπεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τῇ δὲ λέξει τᾶλλα;  
 Ναί. Εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχη-  
 Ε μοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν  
 ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐ-  
 ήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐ<sup>α</sup> τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ  
 ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν. Παντάπασι μὲν  
 οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα  
 τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν; Διω-  
 κτέα μὲν οὖν. Ἔστι δὲ γέ που πλήρης μὲν  
 401 γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἣ τοιαύτη δημιουργία,  
 πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία  
 καὶ πᾶσα αὐ<sup>α</sup> ἣ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ  
 ἣ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἣ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν.  
 ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχη-  
 μοσύνη. καὶ ἣ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἄρρυθμία καὶ  
 ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά,  
 τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σῶφρονός τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Plato recurs to the etymological meaning of εὐήθεια. Cf. on 343 c.

<sup>b</sup> The Ruskinian and Wordsworthian generalization is extended from music to all the fine arts, including, by the way,

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these." "They certainly must follow the speech," he said. "And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech?" said I. "Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?" "Of course." "And all the rest to the diction?" "Yes." "Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon a good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.<sup>a</sup>" "By all means," he said. "And must not our youth pursue these everywhere<sup>b</sup> if they are to do what it is truly theirs to do<sup>c</sup>?" "They must indeed." "And there is surely much of these qualities in painting and in all similar craftsmanship<sup>d</sup>—weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper, but the opposites are the symbols and the

architecture (*οικοδομία*), which Butcher (*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*, p. 138) says is ignored by Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>c</sup> Their special task is to cultivate the true *εὐήθεια* in their souls. For τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν here cf. 443 c-d.

<sup>d</sup> The following page is Plato's most eloquent statement of Wordsworth's, Ruskin's, and Tennyson's gospel of beauty for the education of the young. He repeats it in *Laws* 668 b. Cf. my paper on "Some Ideals of Education in Plato's *Republic*," *Educational Bi-monthly*, vol. ii. (1907-1908) pp. 215 ff.

ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα. Παν-  
τελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

- B** XII. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπι-  
στατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ'  
ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπι-  
στατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόηθες τοῦτο καὶ  
ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄσχημον μήτε ἐν  
εἰκόσι ζώων μήτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ  
μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἷός τε  
ὦν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν  
κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες ὥσπερ  
**C** ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κατὰ  
σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοί τε καὶ νεμόμενοι,  
ἐν τι ξυνιστάντες λανθάνωσι κακὸν μέγα ἐν τῇ  
αὐτῶν ψυχῇ· ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ζητητέον τοὺς δημι-  
ουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ  
καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐν  
ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς  
ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν  
ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλη,  
ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν,  
**D** καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε  
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα;  
Πολὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὕτω τραφεῖεν. Ἄρ'  
οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριω-  
τάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition.”  
“Entirely so,” he said.

XII. “Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practise their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason.” “Yes,” he said, “that would be far the best education for them.” “And is it not for this reason, Glaucon,” said I, “that education in music is most sovereign,<sup>a</sup> because more than anything else

<sup>a</sup> Schopenhauer, following Plato, adds the further metaphysical reason that while the other arts imitate the external manifestations of the universal Will, music represents the Will itself.



εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἄρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς, φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, εἴαν τις ὀρθῶς

Ε τραφῆ, εἰ δὲ μή, τούναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὐτῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο

402 καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεὶς; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἔνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή. Ὡσπερ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανῶς εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν μικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐδέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προὔθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχοιμεν. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 362 B, 366 C, 388 A, 391 E, and Ruskin's paradox that taste is the only morality.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 653 B-C, where Plato defines education by this principle. Aristotle virtually accepts it (*Ethics* ii. 3. 2). The Stoics somewhat pedantically laid it down that reason entered into the youth at the age of fourteen.

<sup>c</sup> Plato often employs letters or elements (στοιχεῖα) to

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rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary? And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste<sup>a</sup> rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came<sup>b</sup> the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her.” “I certainly think,” he said, “that such is the cause of education in music.” “It is, then,” said I, “as it was when we learned our letters<sup>c</sup> and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them in small things or great<sup>d</sup> and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this.” “True.” “And is

illustrate the acquisition of knowledge (*Theaetet.* 206 A), the relation of elements to compounds, the principles of classification (*Phileb.* 18 C, *Cratyl.* 393 D), and the theory of ideas (*Polit.* 278 A. Cf. *Isoc.* xiii. 13, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 7, Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, ii. pp. 23 f., 348 f., *Cic. De or.* ii. 130).

<sup>a</sup> It is fundamental Platonic doctrine that truth is not concerned with size or seeming importance. (Cf. *Parmen.* 130 D-E, *Polit.* 266 D, *Laws* 793 C, 901-902, *Sophist* 227 B, *Hipp. Major* 288 D.

γραμμαμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνονται, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα,  
 C οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φάμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόητα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.  
 D Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόητα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα

<sup>a</sup> It is of course possible to contrast images with the things themselves, and to speak of forms or species without explicit allusion to the metaphysical doctrine of ideas. But on the other hand there is not the slightest reason to assume that the doctrine and its terminology were not familiar to Plato at the time when this part of the *Republic* was written. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 31 ff., 35. Statistics of the uses of *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* (Peiper's *Ontologica Platonica*, Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. pp. 249-253), whatever their philological interest, contribute nothing to the interpretation of Plato's thought. Cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 1, 30, and *Class. Phil.* vol. vi. pp. 363-364.

There is for common sense no contradiction or problem in the fact that Plato here says that we cannot be true "musicians" till we recognize both the forms and all copies of, or approximations to, them in art or nature, while in Book X. (601) he argues that the poet and artist copy not the idea but its copy in the material world.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

it not also true that if there are any likenesses<sup>a</sup> of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and discipline<sup>b</sup>?" "By all means." "Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either—neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality,<sup>c</sup> and high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline?" "The conclusion is inevitable," he said. "Then," said I, "when there is a coincidence<sup>d</sup> of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation<sup>e</sup>?"

<sup>b</sup> Plato, like all intellectuals, habitually assumes that knowledge of principles helps practice. Cf. *Phaedr.* 259 E, 262 B, and *infra* 484 D, 520 C, 540 A.

<sup>c</sup> Liberality and high-mindedness, or rather, perhaps, magnificence, are among the virtues defined in Aristotle's list (*Eth. Nic.* 1107 b 17), but are not among the four cardinal virtues which the *Republic* will use in Book IV. in the comparison of the individual with the state.

<sup>d</sup> *Symp.* 209 B τὸ συναμφοτέρον, 210 c, Wilamowitz, vol. ii. p. 192.

<sup>e</sup> Music and beauty lead to the philosophy of love, more fully set forth in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, and here dismissed in a page. Plato's practical conclusion here may be summed up in the Virgilian line (*Aen.* v. 344):

Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.

τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι; Πολύ γε. Καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασιμώτατον. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῶν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὁ γε μουσικὸς ἐρώη ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἀξύμφωνος εἶη, οὐκ ἄν ἐρώη. Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι· εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειεν ἄν ὥστ' ἐθέλειν  
 Ε ἀσπάζεσθαι. Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστι σοι ἢ γέγονε παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ συγχωρῶ· ἀλλὰ τότε μοι εἶπέ· σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούση ἔστι τις κοινωνία; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, ἢ γε ἔκφρονα ποιεῖ  
 403 οὐχ ἦττον ἢ λύπη; Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; ὕβρει τε καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ; Πάντων μάλιστα. Μείζω δέ τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν; Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδέ ξυγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι; Οὐ προσοιστέον. Οὐ προσοιστέον  
 Β ἄρα αὕτη ἢ ἡδονή, οὐδέ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρώσῃ τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις; Οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον. Οὕτω δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκιζομένῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι ὥσπερ υἱέος παιδικῶν ἐραστήν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν, ἐὰν πείθῃ· τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὀμιλεῖν πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάξοι, ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα τού-

<sup>a</sup> Extravagant pleasure is akin to madness. Cf. *Phileb.* 47 A-C, *Phaedo* 83 C-D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 468 B-C.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

“Far the fairest.” “And surely the fairest is the most lovable.” “Of course.” “The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this.” “No,” he said, “not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love.” “I understand,” I said, “that you have or have had favourites of this sort and I grant your distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure<sup>a</sup>?” “How could there be,” he said, “since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain?” “Or between it and virtue generally?” “By no means.” “But is there between pleasure and insolence and licence?” “Most assuredly.” “Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?” “I don’t,” he said, “nor yet of any more insane.” “But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful?” “It is indeed,” said he. “Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed to come nigh the right love?” “No.” “Then this kind of pleasure may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it?” “No, by heaven, Socrates,” he said, “it must not come nigh them.” “Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kiss<sup>b</sup> and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honourable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further,

Κ των ξυγγίγνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται τέλος ἡμῖν ἔχειν ὁ περὶ μουσικῆς λόγος· οἱ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτᾶν, τετελεύτηκε· δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά. Ξύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XIII. Μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικῇ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι. Τί μήν; Δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀκριβῶς  
 D τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παίδων διὰ βίου, ἔχει δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὧδε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ· ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστόν ἦ σῶμα, τοῦτο τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστον· σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτως. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἰκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβο-  
 E λογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοῖμεν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Μέθης μὲν δὴ εἶπομεν ὅτι ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς· παντὶ γάρ που μᾶλλον ἐγχωρεῖ ἢ φύλακι μεθυσθέντι μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπου γῆς ἐστίν. Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι. Τί δὲ δὴ σίτων πέρι; ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ

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<sup>a</sup> The dependence of body on soul, whether in a mystical, a moral, or a medical sense, is a favourite doctrine of Plato and Platonists. Cf. *Charm.* 156-157, Spenser, "An Hymn in Honour of Beauty":

For of the soul the body form doth take,  
 For soul is form, and doth the body make,

and Shelley, "The Sensitive Plant":

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture." "Even so," he said. "Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture is the love of the beautiful." "I concur," he said.

XIII. "After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics?" "Certainly." "In this too they must be carefully trained from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe; but consider it yourself too. For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible.<sup>a</sup> What is your opinion?" "I think so too." "Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body, and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should be acting rightly?" "By all means." "From intoxication<sup>b</sup> we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is." "Yes," he said, "it would be absurd that a guardian<sup>c</sup> should need a guard." "What next about their food? These men are

A lady, the wonder of her kind,  
Whose form was upborne by a lovely mind,  
Which dilating had moulded her mien and motion  
Like a sea-flower unfolded beneath the ocean.

*Cf.* also Democr. fr. B. 187 Diels<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 398 E. There is no contradiction between this and the half-serious proposal of the *Laws* to use supervised drinking-bouts as a safe test of character (*Laws* 641).

<sup>c</sup> γε emphasizes what follows from the very meaning of the word. *Cf.* 379 B, 389 B, 435 A.



οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος· ἢ οὐχί; Ναί.  
 Ἄρ' οὖν ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις προσήκουσ'  
 404 ἂν εἴη τούτοις; Ἴσως. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπνώδης  
 αὕτη γέ τις καὶ σφαλερὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν· ἢ οὐχ ὄρας  
 ὅτι καθεύδουσί τε τὸν βίον, καὶ εἰς σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσι  
 τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, μεγάλα καὶ σφόδρα  
 νοσοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀσκηταί; Ὅρω. Κομψοτέρας  
 δὴ τινος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς  
 ἀθληταῖς, οὓς γε ὥσπερ κύνας ἀγρύπνους τε  
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ὄξυ ὄραν καὶ  
 Β μεταβάλλοντας ὑδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων  
 καὶ εἰλήσεων καὶ χειμώνων μὴ ἀκροσφαλεῖς εἶναι  
 πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Φαίνεται μοι. Ἄρ' οὖν ἢ βελτίστη  
 γυμναστικὴ ἀδελφὴ τις ἂν εἴη τῆς μουσικῆς, ἦν  
 ὀλίγον πρότερον διῆμεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Ἀπλῆ που  
 καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικὴ, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῶν περὶ  
 τὸν πόλεμον. Πῆ δὴ; Καὶ παρ' Ὀμήρου, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, τά γε τοιαῦτα μάθοι ἂν τις. οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι  
 ἐπὶ στρατείας ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἡρώων ἐστιάσεσιν οὔτε  
 C ἰχθύσιν αὐτοὺς ἐστιᾶ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἐν  
 Ἐλλησπόντῳ ὄντας, οὔτε ἐφθοῖς κρέασιν ἀλλὰ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 543 B, 621 D, *Laches* 182 A, *Laws* 830 A, Demosth. xxv. 97 ἀθληταὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Ἐράσται 132 C καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον. Xenophanes, Euripides, Aristotle, and the medical writers, like Plato, protest against the exaggerated honour paid to athletes and the heavy sluggishness induced by overfeeding and overtraining.

<sup>c</sup> *Laws* 797 D. Cf. *supra* 380 E. Aristotle's comment on μεταβολή, *Eth. Nic.* 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato, including the phrase ἀπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς.

<sup>d</sup> Perhaps in the context "cold."

<sup>e</sup> Literally "equitable," if we translate ἐπιεικῆς by its later meaning, that is, not over-precise or rigid in conformity to

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

athletes in the greatest of contests,<sup>a</sup> are they not ? ”

“ Yes. ” “ Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such ? ” “ Perhaps. ”

“ Nay, ” said I, “ that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their lives,<sup>b</sup> and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases ? ” “ I do. ”

“ Then, ” said I, “ we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes<sup>c</sup> in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms,<sup>d</sup> without disturbance of their health. ” “ I think so. ” “ Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing ? ” “ What do you mean ? ”

“ It would be a simple and flexible<sup>e</sup> gymnastic, and especially so in the training for war. ” “ In what way ? ” “ One could learn that, ” said I, “ even from Homer.<sup>f</sup> For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not feast them on fish,<sup>g</sup> though they are at the sea-side on the Hellespont,<sup>h</sup> nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is

rule. Adam is mistaken in saying that *ἐπιεικής* is practically synonymous with *ἀγαθή*. It sometimes is, but not here. Cf. Plutarch, *De san.* 13 *ἀκριβής . . . καὶ δι' ὄνυχος*.

<sup>f</sup> So *Laws* 706 D. The *καὶ* is perhaps merely idiomatic in quotation.

<sup>g</sup> Homer's ignoring of fish diet, except in stress of starvation, has been much and idly discussed both in antiquity and by modern scholars. Modern pseudo-science has even inferred from this passage that Plato placed a “taboo” on fish.

<sup>h</sup> Which Homer calls “fish-teeming,” *Il.* ix. 360.

μόνον ὀπτοῖς, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη στρατιώταις  
 εὖπορα· πανταχοῦ γάρ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, αὐτῶ τῶ  
 πυρὶ χρῆσθαι εὖπορώτερον ἢ ἀγγεῖα ξυμπεριφέρειν.  
 Καὶ μάλα. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἡδυσμάτων, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,  
 Ὅμηρος πώποτε ἐμνήσθη· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι  
 ἀσκηταὶ ἴσασιν, ὅτι τῶ μέλλοντι σώματι εὖ ἔξειν  
 ἀφεκτέον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε,  
 D ἔφη, ἴσασί τε καὶ ἀπέχονται. Συρακοσίαν δέ, ὧ  
 φίλε, τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου, ὡς  
 εἰκας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς, εἶπερ σοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς  
 ἔχειν. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ. Ψέγεις ἄρα καὶ Κορινθίαν  
 κόρην φίλην εἶναι ἀνδράσι μέλλουσιν εὖ σώματος  
 ἔξειν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ἀττικῶν  
 περμάτων τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι εὐπαθείας; Ἀνάγκη.  
 Ὅλην γάρ, οἶμαι, τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ  
 δίαιταν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ὠδῇ τῇ ἐν τῶ παναρ-  
 E μονίῳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένη ἀπεικάζον-  
 τες ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεικάζοιμεν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν  
 ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἢ ποικιλίαν ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα  
 δὲ νόσον, ἢ δὲ ἀπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικὴν  
 ἐν ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικὴν  
 ἐν σώμασιν ὑγίειαν; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἀκολα-  
 405 σίας δὲ καὶ νόσων πληθυσσῶν ἐν πόλει ἄρ' οὐ  
 δικαστήριά τε καὶ ἰατρεία πολλὰ ἀνοίγεται, καὶ  
 δικανικὴ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ σεμνύνονται, ὅταν δὴ καὶ  
 ἐλεύθεροι πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδά-  
 ζωσιν; Τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Green, *History of English People*, Book II. chap. ii., an old description of the Scotch army: "They have therefore no occasion for pots or pans, for they dress the flesh of the cattle in their skins after they have flayed them," etc. But cf. Athenaeus, i. 8-9 (vol. i. p. 36 L.C.L.), Diog. Laert. viii. 13 ὥστε εὖπορίστους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς τροφάς.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pans<sup>a</sup> along.” “Indeed it is.” “Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweetmeats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether?” “They are right,” he said, “in that they know it and do abstain.” “Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan table<sup>b</sup> and Sicilian variety of made dishes.” “I think not.” “You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the *chère amie* of men who were to keep themselves fit?” “Most certainly.” “And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry?” “Inevitably.” “In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the pan-harmonic mode and in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison.” “Quite so.” “And there variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease? While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies.” “Most true,” he said. “And when licentiousness and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened, and the arts of chicane<sup>c</sup> and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously?” “How can they help it?” he said.

<sup>b</sup> Proverbial, like the “Corinthian maid” and the “Attic pastry.” Cf. Otto, *Sprichw. d. Röm.* p. 321, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 302. Cf. also *Phaedr.* 240 B.

<sup>c</sup> *δικανική*: more contemptuous than *δικαστική*.

XIV. Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχροῦ παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἄρα μή τι μείζον ἔξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον, ἢ τὸ δεῖσθαι ἰατρῶν καὶ δικαστῶν ἄκρων, μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους τε καὶ χειροτέχνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ σχήματι προσποιουμένους τεθράφθαι; ἢ Β οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας μέγα τεκμήριον τὸ ἐπακτῶ παρ' ἄλλων, ὡς δεσποτῶν τε καὶ κριτῶν, τῷ δικαίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἀπορία οἰκείων; Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, αἰσχιστον. Ἦ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτου αἰσχίον εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅταν τις μὴ μόνον τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου ἐν δικαστηρίοις φεύγων τε καὶ διώκων κατατρίβηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ ἀπειροκαλίας ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῆ καλλωπίζεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς ὢν περὶ τὸ C ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἱκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθὼν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος, ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην, καὶ ταῦτα σμικρῶν τε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἔνεκα, ἀγνοῶν ὅσω κάλλιον καὶ ἄμεινον τὸ παρασκευάζειν τὸν βίον αὐτῷ μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἰσχίον. Τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖσθαι, ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα ἢ τινῶν ἐπετείων νοσημάτων ἐπιπεσόντων, D ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίαν τε καὶ δίαιταν οἷαν διήλθομεν ρευμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὥσπερ λίμνας ἐμ-

<sup>a</sup> I have given the sense. The construction is debated accordingly as we read ἀπορία or ἀπορία. Cf. *Phaedr.* 239 D, of the use of cosmetics, χῆται οἰκείων. The καὶ with ἀπορία is awkward or expresses the carelessness of conversation.

<sup>b</sup> Plato likes to emphasize by pointing to a lower depth or a higher height beyond the superlative.

<sup>c</sup> There is no exact English equivalent for ἀπειροκαλία, the

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

XIV. "Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself<sup>a</sup>?" "The most shameful thing in the world." "Is it?" said I, "or is this still more shameful<sup>b</sup>—when a man not only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser, but from the lack of all true sense of values<sup>c</sup> is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice,<sup>d</sup> every evasion, and wriggle<sup>e</sup> out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no need<sup>f</sup> of a nodding juryman?" "That is," said he, "still more shameful than the other." "And to require medicine," said I, "not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies, but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one's body up with winds and humours like a insensitiveness to the *καλόν* of the banausic, the *nouveau riche* and the Philistine.

<sup>a</sup> The phrasing of this passage recalls passages of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and the description of the pettifogging lawyer and politician in the *Theaetetus* 172 E. Cf. *infra* 519, also *Euthydem.* 302 B, and Porphyry, *De abstinentia*, i. 34. The metaphors are partly from wrestling.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 263.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 507 D, Thucyd. iii. 82, Isoc. *Antid.* 238, Antiphanes, fr. 288 Kock *ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν οὐδενὸς δέεται νόμον.*

πιπλαμένους φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους νοσήμασιν ὀνόματα τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἄσκληπιάδας, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ὡς ἀληθῶς καινὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄτοπα νοσημάτων ὀνόματα. Οἶα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς οἶμαι, οὐκ ἦν ἐπ' Ἄσκληπιου· τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι αὐτοῦ οἱ υἱεῖς  
 Ε ἐν Τροίᾳ Εὐρυπύλῳ τετρωμένῳ ἐπ' οἶνον Πράμνειον ἄλφιστα πολλὰ ἐπιπασθέντα καὶ τυρὸν ἐπι-  
 406 ξυσθέντα, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ φλεγματώδη εἶναι, οὐκ ἐμέμψαντο τῇ δούσῃ πιεῖν, οὐδὲ Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἰωμένῳ ἐπετίμησαν. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ἄτοπόν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως ἔχοντι. Οὐκ, εἰ γ' ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν ἰατρικῇ πρὸ τοῦ Ἄσκληπιάδαι οὐκ ἐχρῶντο, ὡς φασι, πρὶν Ἡρόδικον γενέσθαι. Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μίξας  
 Β γυμναστικῇν ἰατρικῇ, ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλούς. Πῆ δὴ; ἔφη. Μακρόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ ποιήσας. παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι, οἶμαι, οἷός τ' ἦν ἑαυτόν, ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε πάντων ἰατρευόμενος διὰ βίου ἔζη ἀποκναιόμενος, εἴ τι τῆς εἰωθυίας διαίτης

<sup>a</sup> Plato ridicules the unsavoury metaphors required to describe the effects of auto-intoxication. There is a similar bit of somewhat heavier satire in Spencer's *Social Statics*, 1868, p. 32: "Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, foetid breaths, and plethoric bodies meet us at every turn; and our condolences are perpetually asked for headaches, flatulences, nightmare, heartburn, and endless other dyspeptic symptoms."

<sup>b</sup> Plato is probably quoting from memory. In our text, *Il.* xi. 624, Hecamede gives the draught to Machaon and Nestor as the *Ion* (538 B) correctly states.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don't you think that disgraceful? <sup>a</sup>” “Those surely are,” he said, “new-fangled and monstrous strange names of diseases.” “There was nothing of the kind, I fancy,” said I, “in the days of Aesculapius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded Eurypylus <sup>b</sup> to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese, inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case.” “It was indeed,” said he, “a strange potion for a man in that condition.” “Not so strange,” said I, “if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddling <sup>c</sup> medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus <sup>d</sup> was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors.” “How so?” he said. “By lingering out his death,” said I; “for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit

<sup>c</sup> This coddling treatment of disease, which Plato affects to reprobate here, he recommends from the point of view of science in the *Timaeus* (89 c): *διὸ παιδαγωγεῖν δεῖ διαίταις*, etc. Cf. Eurip. *Orestes* 883; and even in the *Republic* 459 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 316 E, *Phaedr.* 227 D. To be distinguished from his namesake, the brother of Gorgias in *Gorg.* 448 B. Cf. Cope on Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 5, Wilamowitz-Kiessling, *Phil. Unt.* xv. p. 220, Jüthner, *Philostratus über Gymnastik*, p. 10.



ἐκβαίη, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο. Καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, ἔφη, τῆς τέχνης  
 C ἠνέγκατο. Οἷον εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ὅτι Ἀσκληπιὸς οὐκ ἀγνοία οὐδὲ ἀπειρία τούτου τοῦ εἶδους τῆς ἰατρικῆς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις οὐ κατέδειξεν αὐτό, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομούμενοις ἔργον τι ἐκάστω ἐν τῇ πόλει προστέτακται, ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐδενὶ σχολή διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένω· ὃ ἡμεῖς γελοίως ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δημιουργῶν αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων δοκούντων εἶναι οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα. Πῶς; ἔφη.

D XV. Τέκτων μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κάμνων ἀξιοὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ φάρμακον πιῶν ἐξεμέσαι τὸ νόσημα ἢ κάτω καθαρθεῖς ἢ καύσει ἢ τομῇ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι· εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν δίαιταν προστάττη, πιλίδιά τε περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περιτιθεῖς καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα, ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολή κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν

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<sup>a</sup> Cf. Macaulay on Mitford's *History of Greece*: "It (oligarchical government) has a sort of valetudinarian longevity; it lives in the balance of Sanctorius; it takes no exercise; it exposes itself to no accident; it is seized with a hypochondriac alarm at every new sensation; it trembles at every breath; it lets blood for every inflammation; and thus, without ever enjoying a day of health or pleasure, drags out its existence to a dotting and debilitated old age." That Macaulay here is consciously paraphrasing Plato is apparent from his unfair use of the Platonic passage in his essay on Bacon. Cf. further Eurip. *Supp.* 1109-1113; Seneca on early medicine, *Epistles* xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoes both Spencer and Macaulay. Cf. Rousseau, *Emile*, Book I.: "Je ne sais point apprendre à vivre à qui ne songe qu'à

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.<sup>a</sup>” “A noble prize<sup>b</sup> indeed for his science,” he said. “The appropriate one,” said I, “for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick<sup>c</sup> and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don’t see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate.” “How so?” he said.

XV. “A carpenter,” said I, “when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging<sup>d</sup> or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathings<sup>e</sup> about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick, and that such a life of preoccupation with his

s’empêcher de mourir;” La Rochefoucauld (*Max.* 282): “C’est une ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grand régime.”

<sup>b</sup> The pun γήρας and γέρας is hardly translatable. Cf. Pherecydes *apud* Diog. Laert. i. 119 χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζῆς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ (vol. i. p. 124 L.C.L.). For the ironical use of καλόν cf. Eurip. *Cyclops* 551, Sappho, fr. 53 (58).

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De sanitate tuenda* 23, Sophocles, fr. 88. 11 (?), Lucian, *Nigrinus* 22, differently; Hotspur’s, “Zounds! how has he the leisure to be sick?”

<sup>d</sup> For ἡ κάτω cf. Chaucer, “Ne upward purgative ne downward laxative.”

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharnians* 439.

νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρειν εἰπὼν τῷ  
**E** τοιούτῳ ἰατρῷ, εἰς τὴν εἰωθυῖαν δίαιταν ἐμβάς, ὑγιῆς γενόμενος ζῆ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων· ἔαν δὲ μὴ ἰκανὸν ᾗ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκεῖν, τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγη. Καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ μὲν γ', ἔφη, δοκεῖ πρέπειν οὕτως ἰατρικῇ χρῆσθαι. Ἄρ', ἦν  
 407 δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν; Δῆλον, ἔφη. Ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὡς φαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον, οὐδ' ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον. Οὐκουν δὴ λέγεταιί γε. Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις, πῶς φησὶ δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἤδη βίος ᾗ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον. Μηδέν, εἶπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο  
**B** τῷ πλουσίῳ καὶ ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία τεκτονικῇ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακέλευμα οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει. Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σχεδόν γέ τι πάντων μάλιστα ἢ γε περαιτέρῳ γυμναστικῆς ἢ περιττῇ αὐτῇ ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἐδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχὰς δύσκολος. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς

<sup>a</sup> This alone marks the humour of the whole passage which Macaulay's *Essay on Bacon* seems to miss. Cf. Aristoph. *Acharnians* 757; *Apology* 41 D.

<sup>b</sup> The line of Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the thought. Bergk restores it *δίξησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ' ὅταν ᾗ βίος ἤδη*, which is Horace's (*Ep.* i. 1. 53 f.):

Quaerenda pecunia primum est;  
 Virtus post nummos!

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

illness and neglect of the work that lies before him isn't worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to the strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.<sup>a</sup>”

“For such a man,” he said, “that appears to be the right use of medicine.” “And is not the reason,” I said, “that he had a task and that life wasn't worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work?”

“Obviously,” he said. “But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable.” “I haven't heard of any.” “Why, haven't you heard that saying of Phocylides,<sup>b</sup> that after a man has 'made his pile' he ought to practise virtue?” “Before, too, I fancy,” he said. “Let us not quarrel with him on that point,” I said, “but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides' exhortation.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics<sup>c</sup> is about the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city.” “And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of

<sup>a</sup> In the *Gorgias* (464 B) *ιατρική* is recognized as co-ordinate in the care of the body with *γυμναστική*. Here, whatever goes beyond the training and care that will preserve the health of a normal body is austere rejected. Cf. 410 B.

μαθήσεις ἀστινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας  
 C πρὸς ἑαυτὸν χαλεπή, κεφαλῆς τινὰς αἰεὶ δια-  
 τάσεις<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἰλίγγους ὑποπτεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένη  
 ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὥστε, ὅπη ταύτη  
 ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, πάντῃ ἐμπόδιος·  
 κάμνειν γὰρ οἷεσθαι ποιεῖ αἰεὶ καὶ ὠδίνοντα μήποτε  
 λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν  
 ταῦτα γινώσκοντα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς  
 μὲν φύσει τε καὶ διαίτῃ ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας τὰ  
 D σώματα, νόσημα δέ τι ἀποκεκριμένον ἴσχοντας ἐν  
 αὐτοῖς, τούτοις μὲν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καταδείξαι  
 ἰατρικὴν, φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς τὰ νοσήματα  
 ἐκβάλλοντα αὐτῶν τὴν εἰωθυῖαν προστάττειν  
 διαίταν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βλάπτοι, τὰ δ' εἴσω  
 διὰ παντὸς νεοσηκότα σώματα οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν  
 διαίταις κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα  
 μακρὸν καὶ κακὸν βίον ἀνθρώπῳ ποιεῖν, καὶ  
 ἔκγονα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν,  
 E ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυῖα περιόδῳ  
 ζῆν μὴ οἷεσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὔτε αὐτῶ οὔτε  
 πόλει λυσιτελεῖ; Πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκλη-  
 πιόν. Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.<sup>2</sup> καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ,

<sup>1</sup> διατάσεις Galen: διαστάσεις mss., plainly wrong.

<sup>2</sup> δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ κτλ.] this, the ms. reading, will not construe smoothly, and many emendations have been proposed, none of which seriously affects the sense. I have translated Schneider's transposition of ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν after ἐγώ and before καί.

<sup>a</sup> As Macaulay, Essay on "Bacon," puts it: "That a valetudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the Queen of Navarre's tales should be treated as a *caput lupinum* because he could not read the *Timaeus* without a headache, was a notion which the humane spirit of the English schools of wisdom altogether rejected." For the thought cf. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 12. 6-7.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

instruction, thinking, or private meditation, forever imagining headaches<sup>a</sup> and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practised<sup>b</sup> and tested it is in every way a hindrance.<sup>c</sup> For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body." "Naturally," he said. "Then shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established round<sup>d</sup> and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state." "A most politic Asclepius you're telling us of,<sup>e</sup>" he said. "Obviously," said I,

<sup>b</sup> Literally "virtue is practised in this way." Cf. 503 D for a similar contrast between mental and other labours. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the Elizabethan: "Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds."

<sup>c</sup> There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in Plato's use of ἐμπόδιος and similar words. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 4. On the whole passage cf. again Macaulay's Essay on "Bacon," Maximus of Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward Carpenter's *Civilization, Its Cause and Cure*. <sup>d</sup> Cf. Thucyd. i. 130.

<sup>e</sup> There is a touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 Kock ταχὺν λέγεις μὲν.

ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ  
 408 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ ἰατρικῇ, ὡς  
 ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐχρῶντο; ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὅτι καὶ τῷ  
 Μενέλεω ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος οὐ ὁ Πάνδαρος ἔβαλεν

αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσαντ' ἐπὶ τ' ἤπια φάρμακ' ἔπασσον,  
 ὅ τι δ' ἐχρῆν μετὰ τοῦτο ἢ πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν  
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ Εὐρυπύλῳ προσέταττον, ὡς ἱκανῶν  
 ὄντων τῶν φαρμάκων ἰάσασθαι ἄνδρας πρὸ τῶν  
 τραυμάτων ὑγιεινοὺς τε καὶ κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ,  
 Β κἂν εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα κυκεῶνα πiónτες,  
 νοσώδη δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον οὔτε αὐτοῖς  
 οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾤοντο λυσιτελεῖν ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ  
 τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον  
 αὐτούς, οὐδ' εἰ Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν. Πάνυ  
 κομψούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας.

XVI. Πρέπει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντές  
 γε ἡμῖν οἱ τραγωδιοποιοί τε καὶ Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλ-  
 λωνος μὲν φασιν Ἀσκληπιὸν εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ  
 C πεισθῆναι πλούσιον ἄνδρα θανάσιμον ἤδη ὄντα  
 ἰάσασθαι, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν. ἡμεῖς  
 δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα οὐ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμ-  
 φότερα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν,  
 αἰσχροκερδής, εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ.  
 Ὅρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦδε  
 τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἄρ' οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ  
 ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἰατρούς; εἶεν δ' ἄν που

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the Homeric ἢ οὐ μέμνη;

<sup>b</sup> Plato is quoting loosely or adapting *Il.* iv. 218. αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ' ἄρ' ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς πάσσε is said of Machaon, not of Menelaus.

<sup>c</sup> Proverbial and suggests Tyrtaeus. Cf. *Laws* 660 E.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

“that was his character. And his sons too, don't you see that at Troy they approved themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don't you remember<sup>a</sup> that in the case of Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted

They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled?<sup>b</sup> But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset; but they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas.<sup>c</sup>” “Very ingenious fellows,” he said, “you make out these sons of Asclepius to be.”

XVI. “'Tis fitting,” said I; “and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and Pindar<sup>d</sup> affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principles<sup>e</sup> refuse to believe both statements, but if he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god.” “That much,” said he, “is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates, must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aeschyl. *Ag.* 1022 ff., Eurip. *Alcest.* 3-4, Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 53.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 379 ff., also 365 E.



μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι, ὅσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινούς,  
 D πλείστους δὲ νοσώδεις μετεχειρίσαντο, καὶ δικασ-  
 σταὶ αὖ ὡσαύτως οἱ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεσιν ὠμι-  
 ληκότες. Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω· ἀλλ'  
 οἴσθα οὐς ἠγοῦμαι τοιούτους; "Αν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.  
 Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ  
 ὅμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἦρου. Πῶς; ἔφη.  
 Ἰατροὶ μὲν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιοντο, εἰ ἐκ  
 παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην  
 ὡς πλείστοις τε καὶ πονηροτάτοις σώμασιν ὁμιλή-  
 E σαιαν καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσας νόσους κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν μὴ  
 πάνυ ὑγιενοὶ φύσει. οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, σώματι σῶμα  
 θεραπεύουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναι  
 ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἧ οὐκ  
 ἐγχωρεῖ κακὴν γενομένην τε καὶ οὔσαν εὖ τι  
 θεραπεύειν. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Δικαστῆς δέ γε, ὦ  
 409 φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ἧ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας  
 ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ ὠμιληκένας  
 καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἠδικηκυῖαν διεξελη-  
 λυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἀφ' αὐτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ  
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα, οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους·  
 ἀλλ' ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἠθῶν  
 νέαν οὔσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ καγαθὴ οὔσα  
 κρίνειν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι  
 ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ  
 B τῶν ἀδίκων, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγ-  
 ματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη,  
 σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν. Τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ'

<sup>a</sup> Slight colloquial jest. Cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 1158, *Pax* 1061.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 465 c-d.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men, and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men.”

“ Most assuredly I want them good,” I said ; “ but do you know whom I regard as such ? ” “ I’ll know if you tell,<sup>a</sup>” he said. “ Well, I will try,” said I. “ You, however, have put unlike cases in one question.” “ How so ? ” said he. “ Physicians, it is true,” I said, “ would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies, and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body.<sup>b</sup> If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well.”

“ Right,” he said. “ But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad.”

“ That is indeed their experience,” he said. “ There-

ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὀψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν· οὐκ οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνούσαν ἠσθημένον, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι, οἷον πέφυκε  
 C κακόν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρία οἰκεία κεχρημένον. Γενναιότατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής. Καὶ ἀγαθός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ σὺ ἠρώτας· ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποπτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἠδικηκῶς καὶ πανοῦργός τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίοις ὁμιλῆ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβούμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις ἤδη πλησιάσῃ,  
 D ἀβέλτερος αὖ φαίνεται, ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀγνοῶν ὑγιὲς ἦθος, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιοῦτου· πλεονάκεις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ.

XVII. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτον χρῆ τὸν δικαστὴν ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον. πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὔ ποτ' ἂν γνοίῃ, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης  
 E χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστή-

<sup>a</sup> ὀψιμαθῆ: here in a favourable sense, but usually an untranslatable Greek word for a type portrayed in a character of Theophrastus.

<sup>b</sup> For this type of character cf. Thucyd. iii. 83, and my comments in *T.A.P.A.* vol. xxiv. p. 79. Cf. Burke, *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*: "They who raise suspicions on the good on account of the behaviour of ill men, are of the party of the latter;" Stobaeus ii. p. 46 Βίαις ἔφη, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ εὐαπάτητοι, Menander, fr. 845 Κοκκ χρηστοῦ παρ' ἀνδρὸς μηδὲν ὑπονέει κακόν.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

fore it is," said I, " that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner<sup>a</sup> of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own." "That at any rate," he said, " appears to be the noblest kind of judge." " And what is more, a good one," I said, " which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil,<sup>b</sup> and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish." "That is quite true," he said.

XVII. "Well then," said I, " such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science of both itself and badness.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Cf. George Eliot, *Adam Bede*, chap. xiv.: "It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension by a good deal of hard experience."

μην λήψεται. σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται. Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, ξυνδοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρικὴν, οἷαν εἶπομεν, μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ  
 410 τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουσιν, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν; Τὸ γοῦν ἄριστον, ἔφη, αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς πάσχουσι καὶ τῇ πόλει οὕτω πέφανται. Οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι εὐλαβήσονται σοι δικαστικῆς εἰς χρεῖαν ἰέναι, τῇ ἀπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι, ἦν δὲ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν. Τί μὴν; ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα  
 Β ἔχνη ταῦτα ὁ μουσικὸς γυμναστικὴν διώκων, ἐὰν ἐθέλη, αἰρήσει, ὥστε μηδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ ἀνάγκη; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Αὐτὰ μὴν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων κακῆνο ἐγείρων πονήσει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀθληταὶ ῥώμης ἕνεκα σιτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειρίζονται. Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 176 D "It is far best not to concede to the unjust that they are *clever* knaves, for they glory in the taunt." Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 21.

<sup>b</sup> Only the incurable suffer a purely exemplary and deterrent punishment in this world or the next. Cf. *infra* 615 E, *Protag.* 325 A, *Gorg.* 525 C, *Phaedo* 113 E.

<sup>c</sup> *ultro*, as opposed to *ἑάσουσιν*.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 405 c. Plato always allows for the limitation of the ideal by necessity.

<sup>e</sup> The welfare of the soul is always the prime object for

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.<sup>a</sup>” “And I concur,” he said. “Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable<sup>b</sup> in soul they will themselves<sup>c</sup> put to death.” “This certainly,” he said, “has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state.” “And so your youths,” said I, “employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room.” “Yes,” he said. “And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable<sup>d</sup>?” “I think so.” “And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature<sup>e</sup> to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat<sup>f</sup> diet and exercise only as a means to muscle.” “Nothing could be truer,” he said. “Then may we not say, Glaucon,” said I,

Plato. (Cf. 591 c.) But he cannot always delay to correct ordinary speech in this sense. The correction of 376 ε here is of course not a change of opinion, and it is no more a criticism of Isocrates, *Antid.* 180-185, than it is of Gorgias 464 β, or *Soph.* 228 ε, or *Rep.* 521 ε.

<sup>f</sup> μεταχειρίζονται: this reading of Galen is more idiomatic than the ms. μεταχειριέται. Where English says “he is not covetous of honour as other men are,” Greek says “he (is) not as other men are covetous of honour.”

καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ  
 C παιδεύειν οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκά τινες οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν,  
 ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοντο, τῇ δὲ τὴν  
 ψυχὴν; Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; ἔφη. Κινδυνεύουσιν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφότερα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον  
 καθιστάναι. Πῶς δῆ; Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὡς  
 διατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ ἂν γυμναστικῇ  
 μὲν διὰ βίου ὀμιλήσωσι, μουσικῆς δὲ μὴ ἄψωνται;  
 ἢ ὅσοι ἂν τούναντίον διατεθῶσιν; Τίνος δέ, ἢ δ'  
 D ὅς, πέρι λέγεις; Ἄγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος,  
 καὶ αὐτὴ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.  
 Ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῇ ἀκράτῳ  
 χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν,  
 οἱ δὲ μουσικῇ μαλακώτεροι αὐτῷ γίνονται ἢ ὡς  
 κάλλιον αὐτοῖς. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον  
 τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς  
 μὲν τραφέν ἀνδρείον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν  
 τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνοιτ' ἂν,  
 ὡς τὸ εἶκός. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ ἡμερον  
 E οὐχ ἢ φιλόσοφος ἂν ἔχοι φύσις; καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν  
 ἀνεθéntος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος,  
 καλῶς δὲ τραφέντος ἡμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον; Ἔστι  
 ταῦτα. Δεῖν δέ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα  
 ἔχειν τούτω τῷ φύσει. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἡρμό-  
 σθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ  
 τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἢ

<sup>a</sup> Plato half seriously attributes his own purposes to the founders. Cf. 405-406 on medicine and *Phileb.* 16 c on dialectics.

<sup>b</sup> For the thought cf. Eurip. *Suppl.* 882 f. and Polybius's account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv. 20).

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* 375 a. With Plato's doctrine of the two

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

“ that those who established <sup>a</sup> an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other ? ”

“ But what ? ” he said. “ It seems likely,” I said, “ that they ordained both chiefly for the soul’s sake.”

“ How so ? ” “ Have you not observed,” said I, “ the effect on the disposition of the mind itself <sup>b</sup> of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music ? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit ? ” “ In what respect do you mean ? ” he said.

“ In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness ? ” “ I have observed,” he said, “ that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them.”

“ And surely,” said I, “ this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh.”

“ I think so,” he said. “ And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield ? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly ? ”

“ That is so.” “ But our requirement, we say, <sup>c</sup> is that the guardians should possess both natures.”

“ It is.” “ And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another ? ” “ Of course.” “ And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave ? ”

temperaments *cf.* the distinction of quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham’s *Schoolmaster*. Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says : “ Galen saith much music marreth men’s manners ; and Plato hath a notable place of the same thing in his book *De rep.*, well marked also and excellently translated by Tully himself.”



## PLATO

411 ψυχῆ; Πάνυ γε. Τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος; Καὶ μάλα.

XVIII. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρέχη καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὠτῶν ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἅς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ὠδῆς διατελῆ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ  
 B τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίη ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμη ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσει ἄθυμον λάβη, ταχὺ τοῦτο διεπράξατο· εἰ δὲ θυμοειδῆ, ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὀξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο,  
 C ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενον. ἀκράχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς γεγένηται, δυσκολίας ἔμπλεοι. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἂν αὖ γυμναστικῇ πολλὰ πονῇ καὶ εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα, μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἄπτηται, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εὖ ἴσχων τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός τε καὶ θυμοῦ ἐμπίπλεται καὶ ἀνδρειό-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 561 c.

<sup>b</sup> Demetrius, *Περὶ Ἑρμ.* 51, quotes this and the following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Thesm.* 18, Aeschyl. *Choeph.* 451, Shakespeare, *Cymbeline* III. ii. 59 "Love's counsellor should fill the pores of hearing."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 398 D-E, where the θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι are rejected altogether, while here they are used to illustrate the softening effect of music on a hard temperament. It is misspent ingenuity to harp on such "contradictions."

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

“Certainly.” “And that of the ill adjusted is cowardly and rude?” “It surely is.”

XVIII. “Now when a man abandons himself to music to play <sup>a</sup> upon him and pour <sup>b</sup> into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now <sup>c</sup> speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron <sup>d</sup> and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues <sup>e</sup> the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies <sup>f</sup> till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a ‘feeble warrior.’ <sup>g</sup>” “Assuredly,” he said. “And if,” said I, “he has to begin with a spiritless <sup>h</sup> nature he reaches this result quickly, but if a high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented.” “Precisely so.” “On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and

<sup>a</sup> For images drawn from the tempering of metals cf. Aeschyl. *Ag.* 612 and Jebb on Soph. *Ajax* 650.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 165 Ε ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείεις, and Blaydes on Aristoph. *Peace* 1121.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Tennyson’s “Molten down in mere uxoriousness” (“Geraint and Enid”).

<sup>g</sup> A familiar Homeric reminiscence (*Il.* xvii. 588) quoted also in *Symp.* 174 c. Cf. Froissart’s “un mol chevalier.”

<sup>h</sup> Etymologically ἀθυμος = “deficient in θυμός.”

τερος γίνεται αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ; Καὶ μάλα γε. Τί  
 δαί; ἐπειδὴν ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττη μηδὲ κοινωνῆ  
 D Μούσης μηδαμῆ, οὐκ εἶ τι καὶ ἐνῆν αὐτοῦ φιλο-  
 μαθὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἅτε οὔτε μαθήματος γευόμενον  
 οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζητήματος, οὔτε λόγου μετίσχον  
 οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς, ἀσθενὲς τε καὶ κωφὸν  
 καὶ τυφλὸν γίνεται, ἅτε οὐκ ἐγειρόμενον οὐδὲ  
 τρεφόμενον οὐδὲ διακαθαίρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων  
 αὐτοῦ; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Μισόλογος δὴ, οἶμαι, ὁ  
 τοιοῦτος γίνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοῖ μὲν διὰ  
 λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρεῖται, βία δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι  
 E ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται, καὶ ἐν  
 ἀμαθία καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ  
 ἀχαριστίας ζῆ. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.  
 Ἐπὶ δὴ δὺ' ὄντε τούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν  
 ἔγωγ' ἂν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,  
 μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ  
 τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, εἰ μὴ εἰ  
 πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ, ὅπως ἂν ἀλλήλοιν  
 412 ξυναρμοσθῆτον ἐπιτεινομένῳ καὶ ἀνιεμένῳ μέχρι  
 τοῦ προσήκοντος. Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Τὸν  
 κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῆ γυμναστικὴν κεραυνύντα καὶ  
 μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρθότατ'  
 ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐ-  
 αρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς  
 ἀλλήλαις ξυνιστάντα. Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-

<sup>a</sup> A hater of rational discussion, as explained in *Laches* 188 c, and the beautiful passage in the *Phaedo* 89 d ff. Cf. Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 14. 6 "Igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum laboremus." John Morley describes obscurantists as "sombre hierophants of misology."

<sup>b</sup> For virtue as "music" cf. *Phaedo* 61 a, *Laches* 188 d, and Iago's "There is a daily music in his life." The

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

become more brave and bold than he was ? ” “ He does indeed.” “ But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened ? ” “ That is so,” he said. “ And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist<sup>a</sup> and a stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness.” “ That is entirely true,” he said. “ For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each.” “ Yes, so it appears,” he said. “ Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.<sup>b</sup> ” “ That seems likely,

“perfect musician” is the professor of the royal art of *Politicus* 306-308 ff. which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but by eliminating extremes through judicious marriages.

κρατες. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δεήσει τοῦ τοιούτου τινὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει B ἡ πολιτεία σώζεσθαι; Δεήσει μέντοι ὡς οἶόν τέ γε μάλιστα.

XIX. Οἱ μὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν. χορείας γὰρ τί ἂν τις διεξίοι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ ἵππικούς; σχεδὸν γάρ τι δῆλα δὴ ὅτι τούτοις ἐπόμενα δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι χαλεπὰ εὐρεῖν. Ἴσως, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ χαλεπά. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τί ἂν ἡμῶν διαιρετέον εἴη; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τούτων οἷτινες C ἄρξουσὶ τε καὶ ἄρξονται; Τί μὴν; Ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; Δῆλον. Καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο. Οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἄρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίνονται; Ναί. Nῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς D καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Κήδοιτο δέ γ' ἂν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ὦ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῶ καὶ

<sup>a</sup> This "epistates" is not the director of education of *Laws* 765 D ff., though of course he or it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 c-d, and corresponds to the nocturnal council of *Laws* 950 B ff. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 86, note 650.

<sup>b</sup> γάρ explains τύποι, or outlines. Both in the *Republic* and the *Laws* Plato frequently states that many details must be left to subsequent legislation. Cf. *Rep.* 379 A, 400 B-C, 294

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Socrates," he said. "And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer<sup>a</sup> of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved?" "We most certainly shall."

XIX. "Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why<sup>b</sup> should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them." "There is, it may be, no difficulty," he said. "Very well," said I; "what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them<sup>c</sup> shall be the rulers and the ruled?" "Certainly." "That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious." "It is." "And that the rulers must be their best?" "This too." "And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers?" "Yes." "And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state?" "Yes." "They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore careful<sup>d</sup> of the interests of the state?" "That is so." "But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved." "Necessarily." "And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to

403 D-E, 425 A-E, *Laws* 770 B, 772 A-B, 785 A, 788 A-B, 807 E, 828 B, 846 C, 855 D, 876 D-E, 957 A, 968 C.

<sup>c</sup> αὐτῶν τούτων marks a class within a class. Cf. *Class. Phil.* vol. vii. (1912) p. 485. 535 A refers back to this passage.

<sup>d</sup> The argument proceeds by minute links. Cf. *supra* on 338 D.

[ὅταν μάλιστα]<sup>1</sup> ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἷοιτο  
 ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τούναν-  
 τίον. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων  
 φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡμῖν  
 μάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, ὃ μὲν  
 Ε ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται ξυμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμία  
 ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πράξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.  
 Ἐπιτήδειοι γάρ, ἔφη. Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τηρητέον  
 αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοὶ  
 εἰσι τούτου τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μήτε γοητευόμενοι  
 μήτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλανθανόμενοι  
 δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν, ἃ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα.  
 Τίνα, ἔφη, λέγεις, τὴν ἐκβολήν; Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη,  
 ἐρῶ. φαίνεται μοι δόξα ἐξιέναι ἐκ διανοίας ἢ  
 413 ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, ἐκουσίως μὲν ἢ ψευδῆς τοῦ  
 μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἢ ἀληθῆς.  
 Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκουσίου, ἔφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς  
 ἀκουσίου δέομαι μαθεῖν. Τί δαί; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ,  
 ἔφη ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι  
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκουσίως; ἢ οὐ  
 τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ  
 ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν  
 ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Ἄλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς  
 λέγεις, καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄκοντες ἀληθοῦς δόξης  
 στερίσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες  
 ἢ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχουσιν; Οὐδὲ νῦν, ἔφη,  
 μανθάνω. Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν.

<sup>1</sup> Bracketed by Hermann.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Crito* 46 B, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 12. 7.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 382 A and *Sophist.* 228 c, *Marcus Aurelius* vii. 63.

<sup>c</sup> The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown, obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 76 E, *Cratyl.* 418 D, *Aristoph. Frogs, passim*, *Wilamowitz, Platon*, ii. p. 146.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered he too would prosper and if not, the contrary." "So it is," he said. "Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite." "That would be a suitable choice," he said. "I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel<sup>a</sup> from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state." "What do you mean by the 'expelling'?" he said. "I will tell you, said I; "it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief." "The voluntary," he said, "I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary." "How now," said I, "don't you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth?" "Why, yes," said he, "you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.<sup>b</sup>" "And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force?" "I don't understand now either," he said. "I must be talking in high tragic style,<sup>c</sup>" I said; "by



**Β** κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει. νῦν γὰρ που μανθάνεις; **Ναί.** Τοὺς τοίνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὓς ἂν ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδῶν μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ. **Καὶ τοῦτ',** ἔφη, ἔμαθον, καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγεις. **Τοὺς**  
**С** μὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, κἂν σὺ φαίης εἶναι οἱ ἂν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες. Ἔοικε γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, γοητεύειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾶ.

**XX.** Ὁ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ζητητέον, τίνες ἄριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον, ὃ ἂν τῇ πόλει αἰεὶ δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν. τηρητέον δὴ εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων, προθεμένοις ἔργα, ἐν οἷς ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιλανθάνοιτο καὶ ἐξαπατῶτο, καὶ τὸν μὲν μνή-  
**Д** μονα καὶ δυσεξαπάτητον ἐγκριτέον, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον. ἦ γάρ; **Ναί.** Καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ταῦτα τηρητέον. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τρίτου εἴδους τούτοις γοητείας ἄμιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ θεατέον, ὥσπερ τοὺς πῶλους ἐπὶ τοὺς ψόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοποῦσιν εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέους ὄντας εἰς δείματ' ἄττα  
**Ε** κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί, εἰ δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήμεων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος, who went over from the Stoics to the Cyrenaics because of pain in his eyes, Diog. Laert. vii. 166.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 584 Δ γοητεία.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not?" "Yes." "Well then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels<sup>a</sup> to change their minds." "That too I understand and you are right." "And the victims of sorcery<sup>b</sup> I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear." "Yes," he said: "everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind."

XX. "Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose for them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so?" "Yes." "And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits." "Right," he said. "Then," said I, "must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his com-

φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἥς ἐμάν-  
 θανεν, εὐρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν  
 πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἂν ὧν καὶ ἑαυτῷ  
 καὶ πόλει χρησιμώτατος εἴη. καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἐν τε  
 παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασα-  
 414 νιζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον  
 ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον  
 καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, τάφων τε καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα· τὸν δὲ  
 μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον. τοιαύτη τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ,  
 δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ ἐκλογή εἶναι καὶ κατά-  
 στασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν  
 τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρήσθαι. Καὶ ἐμοί, ἡ  
 δ' ὅς, οὕτω πη φαίνεται. Ἄρ' οὖν ὡς ἀληθῶς  
 Β ὀρθότατον καλεῖν τούτους μὲν φύλακας παντελεῖς  
 τῶν τε ἔξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων,  
 ὅπως οἱ μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνήσονται  
 κακουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς νῦν δὴ φύλακας  
 ἐκαλοῦμεν, ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν  
 ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

XXI. Τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ  
 γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν  
 C δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, γενναῖόν τι ἐν ψευδομένους πείσαι  
 μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή,  
 τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν; Ποῖόν τι; ἔφη. Μηδὲν καινόν,

\* The concept μηχανή or ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play provi-  
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## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

posure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state. And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honours of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such," said I, "appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail." "I too," he said, "think much the same." "Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers?" "I think so," he replied.

XXI. "How, then," said I, "might we contrive<sup>a</sup> one of those opportune falsehoods<sup>b</sup> of which we were just now<sup>c</sup> speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city?" "What kind of a fiction do you mean?" said he. "Nothing unprecedented," said

dence with the vulgar holds a prominent place in Plato's physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers one of the dangerous features of his political and educational philosophy.

*Cf. infra* 415 c, *Laws* 664 A, 752 c, 769 E, 798 B, 640 B.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 389 B.

<sup>c</sup> 389 B f.

ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ Φοινικικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἤδη  
πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὡς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ  
πεπεύκασιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονός οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ  
γενόμενον ἄν, πείσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς. Ὡς  
ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὀκνοῦντι λέγειν. Δόξω δέ σοι, ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως ὀκνεῖν, ἐπειδὴν εἶπω.  
D Λέγ', ἔφη, καὶ μὴ φοβοῦ. Λέγω δὴ· καίτοι οὐκ  
οἶδα ὅποια τόλμη ἢ ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ·  
καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας  
πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν  
ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ' ἂ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομέν τε  
καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὀνειράτα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα  
πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς,  
ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς  
πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ  
E ὄπλα αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη,  
ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν, ὡς ἡ  
γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὔσα ἀνήκε, καὶ νῦν δεῖ ὡς

<sup>a</sup> As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the dragon's teeth, which the Greeks believed οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, *Laws* 663 E. Pater, who translates the passage (*Plato and Platonism*, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a "miners' story." Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes. The proverb ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν (Strabo 259 B) probably goes back to the Phoenician tales of the *Odyssey*.

<sup>b</sup> Plato never attempts a Voltairian polemic against the general faith in the supernatural, which he is willing to utilize for ethical ends, but he never himself affirms "le surnaturel particulier."

<sup>c</sup> καὶ μάλ' here as often adds a touch of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce.

<sup>d</sup> Perhaps "that so it is that" would be better. ὡς ἄρα as

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

I, "but a sort of Phoenician tale,<sup>a</sup> something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day<sup>b</sup> and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable." "You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought," he said. "You will think that I have right good reason<sup>c</sup> for shrinking when I have told," I said. "Say on," said he, "and don't be afraid." "Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth<sup>d</sup> all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being moulded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother<sup>e</sup> delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse

often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato's fancy of men reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton's *Utopia*, *The Coming Race*, as his use of the ring of Gyges (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells' *Invisible Man*.

<sup>a</sup> The symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato's patriotic application of it, *Menex.* 237 E-238 A. Cf. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. iii. pp. 153-154; *Tim.* 24 c-d, Aeschyl. *Septem* 17, Lucretius ii. 641 f., and Swinburne, "Erechtheus":

All races but one are as aliens engrafted or sown,  
Strange children and changelings, but we, O our mother,  
thine own.

περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφῶν τῆς χώρας ἐν ἧ εἰσὶ βου-  
 λεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, εἴαν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν  
 ἴη, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν  
 ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι. Οὐκ ἐτός, ἔφη,  
 πάλαι ἡσχύνου τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν. Πάνυ, ἦν δ'  
 415 ἐγώ, εἰκότως· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄκουε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ  
 μύθου. ἔστ' ἐμὲ γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει  
 ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς μυθολογοῦντες,  
 ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν,  
 χρυσοῦν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ξυνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμιώτα-  
 τοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον δὲ  
 καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
 δημιουργοῖς. ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ  
 μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῶτε, ἔστι  
 Β δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ  
 ἀργυροῦ χρυσοῦν ἕκγονον καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως  
 ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μά-  
 λιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω  
 φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται μηδ' οὕτω σφόδρα  
 φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὃ τι αὐτοῖς

<sup>a</sup> οὐκ ἐτός is comic. Cf. 568 A, and Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 411.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 468 E, 547 A, and "already" *Cratyl.* 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod's four metals, *Works and Days* 109-201, symbolize four successive ages. Plato's myth cannot of course be interpreted literally or made to express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on Administrative Nihilism says: "The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words."

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth." "It is not for nothing,<sup>a</sup>" he said, "that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie." "It was quite natural that I should be," I said; "but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation,<sup>b</sup> for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,<sup>c</sup> it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else<sup>d</sup> are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these

<sup>c</sup> The four classes are not castes, but are species which will generally breed true. Cf. *Cratyl.* 393 B, 394 A.

<sup>d</sup> The phrasing of this injunction recalls Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, *in fine*:

I'll fear no other thing  
So sore as keeping safe Nerissa's ring.

The securing of disinterested capacity in the rulers is the *pons asinorum* of political theory. Plato constructs his whole state for this end. Cf. *Introd.* p. xv; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1262 b 27, raises the obvious objection that the transference from class to class will not be an easy matter. But Plato here and in 423 D-E is merely stating emphatically the postulates of an ideal state. He admits that even if established it will some time break down, and that the causes of its failure will lie beyond human ken, and can only be expressed in symbol. See on 546-547.



τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται, καὶ εἴαν τε σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος γένηται, C μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελεήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ὥσουσιν εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωργοὺς, καὶ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐκ τούτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῆ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακὴν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν, ὡς χρησιμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς φυλάξῃ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν; D Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτοὶ οὗτοι· ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μαθάνω ὁ λέγεις. XXII. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἔξει ὅπη ἂν αὐτὸ ἢ φήμη ἀγάγη.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὀπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀρχόντων. ἐλθόντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλιστον E στρατοπεδεύσασθαι, ὅθεν τοὺς τε ἔνδον μάλιστ' ἂν κατέχοιεν, εἴ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἔξωθεν ἀπαμύνοιεν, εἰ πολέμιος ὥσπερ λύκος ἐπὶ ποιμνῆν τις ἴοι, στρατοπεδευ-

<sup>a</sup> The summary in *Tim.* 19 A varies somewhat from this. Plato does not stress the details. Cf. *Introd.* p. viii.

<sup>b</sup> Plato's oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men's answer to Psammetik (*Herod.* ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a literal physical interpretation, like the "lame reign" against which Sparta was warned. Cf. *Xen. Hellenica* iii. 3. 3.

<sup>c</sup> Plato repeats the thought that since the mass of men

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out<sup>a</sup> among the artizans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle<sup>b</sup> that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?" "No, not these themselves," he said, "but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after."<sup>c</sup> "Well," said I, "even that would have a good effect in making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as tradition<sup>d</sup> guides."

"But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment,<sup>e</sup> a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they

can be brought to believe anything by repetition, myths framed for edification are a useful instrument of education and government. Cf. *Laws* 663 E-664 A.

<sup>a</sup> *φήμη*, not any particular oracular utterance, but popular belief from mouth to mouth.

<sup>e</sup> The Platonic guardians, like the ruling class at Sparta, will live the life of a camp. Cf. *Laws* 666 E, Isoc. *Archdamus*.

σάμενοι δέ, θύσαντες οἷς χρή, εὐνάς ποιησά-  
 σθων· ἢ πῶς; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιαύτας,  
 οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι;  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; οἰκήσεις γάρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι  
 λέγειν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, στρατιωτικός γε, ἀλλ'  
 416 οὐ χρηματιστικός. Πῶς, ἔφη, αὐτοῦτο λέγεις  
 διαφέρειν ἐκείνου; Ἐγώ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρά-  
 σομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινότατον γάρ που πάντων καὶ  
 αἰσχιστον ποιμέσι τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν  
 κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὥστε ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας  
 ἢ λιμοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοὺς τοὺς  
 κύνας ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν καὶ  
 ἀντὶ κυνῶν λύκοις ὁμοιωθῆναι. Δεινόν, ἦ δ' ὅς·  
 Β πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν φυλακτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ, μὴ  
 τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν οἱ ἐπίκουροι ποιήσωσι πρὸς τοὺς  
 πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ  
 ξυμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις ἀφομοιω-  
 θῶσιν; Φυλακτέον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μεγίστην  
 τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι ἂν εἶεν, εἰ τῶ  
 ὄντι καλῶς πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν; Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰσί  
 γ', ἔφη. καὶ ἔγωγ'<sup>1</sup> εἶπον, Τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον  
 δισχυρίζεσθαι, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων· ὁ μέντοι ἄρτι  
 C ἐλέγομεν, ἄξιον, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς τῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν  
 παιδείας, ἣτις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγι-  
 στον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἡμεροὶ εἶναι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς

<sup>1</sup> Burnet and Adam read ἐγώ.

\* Partly from caution, partly from genuine religious feeling, Plato leaves all details of the cult to Delphi. Cf. 427 B. <sup>b</sup> For the limiting γε cf. 430 c.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle's objection (*Pol.* 1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from Plato's similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes that the enforced disinterestedness,  
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## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods<sup>a</sup> they must make their lairs, must they not?" "Yes," he said. "And these must be of a character to keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer?" "Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses." "Yes," said I, "the houses of soldiers<sup>b</sup> not of money-makers." "What distinction do you intend by that?" he said. "I will try to tell you," I said. "It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves<sup>c</sup> instead of dogs." "A terrible thing, indeed," he said. "Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters?" "We must," he said. "And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one?" "But it surely has," he said. "That," said I, "dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm,<sup>d</sup> but what we were just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle

the higher education, and other precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure away the danger to which Plato first calls attention.

<sup>d</sup> This is not so much a reservation in reference to the higher education as a characteristic refusal of Plato to dogmatize. Cf. *Meno* 86 B and my paper "Recent Platonism in England," *A.J.P.* vol. ix. pp. 7-8.

φυλαττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἢ δ' ὄς. Πρὸς τοίνυν τῇ παιδείᾳ ταύτῃ φαίη ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρασκευάσασθαι, ἥτις μήτε τοὺς φύλακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι παύσοι αὐτούς, κακουργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαροῖ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. Καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει. "Ορα δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, εἰ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐτοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιοῦτοι ἔσεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένον μηδεμίαν μηδένα ἰδίαν, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἔπειτα οἴκησιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, εἰς ὃ οὐ πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσεισι· τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σῶφρονές τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, Ε ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεῖν· φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς ξυσσίτια ὡσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν· χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτήσιν τῇ τοῦ θνητοῦ χρυσοῦ κτήσει ξυμμιγνύντας μιαίνειν, διότι πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ 417 τῶν πολλῶν νόμισμα γέγονεν, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει

<sup>a</sup> Plato's communism is primarily a device to secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf. *Introd.* p. xv note a.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 403 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 551 B, *Meno* 91 B, Thucyd. i. 108, *G.M.T.* 837.

<sup>d</sup> They are worthy of their hire. Cf. on 347 A. It is a strange misapprehension to speak of Plato as careless of

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to one another and to their charges." "That is right," he said. "In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens." "He will rightly affirm that." "Consider then," said I, "whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property <sup>a</sup> save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war <sup>b</sup> sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed <sup>c</sup> stipend <sup>d</sup> from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack.<sup>e</sup> And resorting to a common mess <sup>f</sup> like soldiers on campaign they will live together. Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the welfare of the masses. His aristocracy is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power.

<sup>e</sup> This is precisely Aristophanes' distinction between beggary and honourable poverty, *Plutus* 552-553.

<sup>f</sup> As at Sparta. Cf. 458 c, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 334.

μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιάψασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν σώζοιεν τ' ἂν καὶ σώζοιεν τὴν πόλιν· ὅποτε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπότες δ' ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται, μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιβουλεύομενοι διάξουσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἢ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. τούτων οὖν πάντων ἔνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω δεῖν κατεσκευάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκῆσεώς τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἢ μή; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

<sup>a</sup> As if the accursed and tainted metal were a polluted murderer or temple-robber. Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 2. 27 "sub isdem trabibus," Antiphon v. 11.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 621 B-C, and *Laws* 692 A.

<sup>c</sup> δεσπότες. Cf. *Menex.* 238 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Laws* 697 D in a passage of similar import, μισοῦντες μισοῦνται.

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the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof<sup>a</sup> with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city.<sup>b</sup> But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be householders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow-citizens to their enemies and masters,<sup>c</sup> and so in hating and being hated,<sup>d</sup> plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rather<sup>e</sup> the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course<sup>f</sup> of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons,” said I, “let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not?” “By all means,” said Glaucon.

<sup>e</sup> *more and rather*: so 396 D, 551 B.

<sup>f</sup> The image is that of a ship nearing the fatal reef. Cf. Aeschyl. *Eumen.* 562. The sentiment and the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recall the last page of the *Critias*, with Ruskin's translation and comment in *A Crown of Wild Olive*.



Δ

- 419 I. Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν, Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπολογήσῃ, εἴαν τις σε φῆ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοῦς, ὧν ἔστι μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἄλλοι ἀγροῦς τε κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομοῦμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, καὶ ταύταις πρέπουσαν κατασκευὴν κτώμενοι, καὶ θυσίας θεοῖς ἰδίας θύοντες καὶ ξενοδοκοῦντες, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι μακαρίους εἶναι; ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι
- 420 μισθωτοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά

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\* Adeimantus's criticism is made from the point of view of a Thrasymachus (343 a, 345 b) or a Callicles (*Gorgias* 492 b-c) or of Solon's critics (*cf.* my note on Solon's Trochaics to Phokos, *Class. Phil.* vol. vi. pp. 216 ff.). The captious objection is repeated by Aristotle, *Pol.* 1264 b 15 ff., though he later (1325 a 9-10) himself uses Plato's answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 69), and Zeller (*Aristotle*, ii. p. 224) who has the audacity to say that "Plato demanded the abolition of *all* private possession and the suppression of *all* individual interests *because it is only*

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## BOOK IV

I. AND Adeimantus broke in and said, "What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy,<sup>a</sup> and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favour of the gods by private sacrifices<sup>b</sup> and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy? But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city, exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard." "Yes," said I, "and what is

*in the Idea or Universal that he acknowledges any title to true reality.*" Leslie Stephen does not diverge so far from Plato when he says (*Science of Ethics*, p. 397): "The virtuous men may be the very salt of the earth, and yet the discharge of a function socially necessary may involve their own misery." By the happiness of the whole Plato obviously means not an abstraction but the concrete whole of which Leslie Stephen is thinking. But from a higher point of view Plato eloquently argues (465 B-C) that duty fulfilled will yield truer happiness to the guardians than seeking their own advantage in the lower sense of the word.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 362 c, and *Laws* 909 D ff. where they are forbidden.

γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημῆσαι βούλωνται ἰδία, ἐξέσται αὐτοῖς, οὐδ' ἑταίραις διδόναι οὐδ' ἀναλίσκειν ἂν ποι βούλωνται ἄλλοσε, οἷα δὴ οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἀναλίσκουσι. ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ τῆς κατηγορίας ἀπολείπεις. Ἄλλ', ἡ δ' ὅς, ἔστω καὶ  
 Β ταῦτα κατηγορημένα. Τί οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φῆς; Ναί. Τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορευόμενοι εὐρήσομεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἃ λεκτέα. ἐροῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν εἶη, εἰ καὶ οὗτοι οὕτως εὐδαιμονέστατοί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἐν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις. ὠήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ  
 C κάκιστα οἰκουμένην ἀδικίαν, κατιδόντες δὲ κρίναι ἂν, ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἴομεθα, τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτους τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντα γράφοντας προσελθὼν τις ἔψεγε λέγων, ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις τοῦ ζώου τὰ

<sup>a</sup> Other men, ordinary men. Cf. 543 B ὦν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, which disposes of other interpretations and misunderstandings.

<sup>b</sup> This is, for a different reason, one of the deprivations of the tyrant (579 B). The *Laws* strictly limits travel (949 E). Here Plato is speaking from the point of view of the ordinary citizen.

<sup>c</sup> The Platonic Socrates always states the adverse case strongly (Introd. p. xi), and observes the rule:

Would you adopt a strong logical attitude,  
 Always allow your opponent full latitude.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

more, they serve for board-wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do,<sup>a</sup> so that they will not even be able to take a journey<sup>b</sup> on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting.” “Well, said he, “assume these counts too.”<sup>c</sup> “What then will be our apology you ask?” “Yes.” “By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thought<sup>d</sup> that in a state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice in the worst governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgement on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mould the model of a happy state—we are not isolating<sup>e</sup> a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently.<sup>f</sup> It is as if we were colouring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 369 A.

<sup>e</sup> ἀπολαμβάντες, “separating off,” “abstracting,” may be used absolutely as in *Gorgias* 495 E, or with an object as *supra* 392 E.

<sup>f</sup> That is 449 A and books VIII. and IX. The degenerate types of state are four, but the extreme opposite of the good state, the tyranny, is one.

κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν· οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ  
 κάλλιστον ὄν οὐκ ὀστρεῖω ἐναληλιμμένοι εἶεν ἀλλὰ  
 D μέλανι· μετρίως ἂν ἔδοκοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπο-  
 λογεῖσθαι λέγοντες, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μὴ οἴου δεῖν ἡμᾶς  
 οὔτω καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὥστε μηδὲ  
 ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὖ τᾶλλα μέρη, ἀλλ'  
 ἄθρει εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ  
 ὄλον καλὸν ποιούμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε  
 ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσ-  
 ἄπτειν, ἢ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ  
 E φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς  
 ξυστίδας ἀμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς  
 ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς  
 κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπιδέξια πρὸς τὸ πῦρ δια-  
 πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχομένους, τὸν τροχὸν παρα-  
 θεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς  
 ἄλλους πάντας τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν,  
 ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ· ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μὴ οὔτω  
 421 νουθέτει· ὥς, ἂν σοι πειθῶμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς  
 γεωργὸς ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς οὔτε  
 ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων σχῆμα, ἐξ ὧν πόλις  
 γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος·  
 νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες

<sup>a</sup> So *Hippias Major* 290 B.

<sup>b</sup> For this principle of aesthetics cf. *Phaedrus* 264 c, *Aristot. Poetics* 1450 b 1-2.

<sup>c</sup> "We know how to." For the satire of the Socialistic millennium which follows cf. *Introd.* p. xxix, and Ruskin, *Fors Clavigera*. Plato may have been thinking of the scene on the shield of Achilles, *Il.* xviii. 541-560.

<sup>d</sup> *i.e.* so that the guest on the right hand occupied a lower place and the wine circulated in the same direction. Many write ἐπὶ δεξιᾶ, but A ἐπιδέξια. "Forever, 'tis a single word. Our rude forefathers thought it two."

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes,<sup>a</sup> which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black—we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, ‘Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts, but observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.’<sup>b</sup> And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians. For in like manner we could<sup>c</sup> clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to right<sup>d</sup> before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy. But urge us not to this, since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute a state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblers<sup>e</sup> who deteriorate and are

<sup>a</sup> Note the “ab urbe condita” construction. For the thought cf. 374 B. Zeller and many who follow him are not justified in inferring that Plato would not educate the masses. (Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s *Politics*, i. p. 160.) It might as well be argued that the high schools of the United States are not intended for the masses because some people sometimes emphasize their function of “fitting for college.” In the *Republic* Plato describes secondary education as a preparation for the higher training. The secondary education of the entire citizenry in the *Laws* marks no change of opinion (*Laws* 818 ff.). Cf. *Intro.* p. xxxiii.

καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν· φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὁρᾶς δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύασιν, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εὐ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν  
 Β φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιούμεν, ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκείνο λέγων γεωργούς τινας καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας, ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι. σκεπτέον οὖν, πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὁ τι πλείστη αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενήσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὄλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ ἐκείνη ἐγγίγνεται, τοὺς δ' ἐπικούρους τούτους καὶ τοὺς φύλακας  
 C ἐκείνο ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν καὶ πειστέον, ὅπως ὁ τι ἄριστοι δημιουργοὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἔργου ἔσονται, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὡσαύτως, καὶ οὕτω ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς οἰκιζομένης ἑατέον ὅπως ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

II. Ἄλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἀδελφὸν δόξω σοι μετρίως λέγειν; Τί μάλιστα; Τοὺς ἄλλους  
 D αὐτὸν δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε διαφθείρει, ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίνεσθαι. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα; Πλοῦτος, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία. Πῶς δὴ; Ὡδε· πλου-

<sup>a</sup> The expression is loose, but the meaning is plain. The principle "one man, one task" makes the guardians real guardians. The assumption that their happiness is the end is incompatible with the very idea of a state. Cf. *Introd.* pp. xxix f. ἐστιάτορας recalls μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι 345 c, but we are expected to think also of the farmers of 420 e.

<sup>b</sup> The guardians are δημιουργοὶ ἐλευθερίας (395 c).

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and on the other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and 'happy' feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mind<sup>a</sup> than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature comports."

II. "Well," he said, "I think you are right." "And will you then," I said, "also think me reasonable in another point akin to this?" "What pray?" "Consider whether these are the causes that corrupt other<sup>b</sup> craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them.<sup>c</sup>" "What causes?" "Wealth and poverty,"<sup>d</sup> said I.

<sup>c</sup> ὥστε καὶ κακοῦς, I think, means "so that they become actually bad," not "so that they also become bad." Cf. *Lysis* 217 B.

<sup>d</sup> For the dangers of wealth cf. 550, 553 D, 555 B, 556 A, 562, *Laws* 831 c, 919 B, and for the praises of poverty cf. Aristoph. *Plutus* 510-591, Lucian, *Nigrinus* 12, Eurip. *fr.* 55 N., Stobaeus, *Flor.* 94 (Meineke iii. 198), *Class. Phil.* vol. xxii. pp. 235-236.



τήσας χυτρεὺς δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι θελήσειν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Ἄργος δὲ καὶ ἀμελὴς γενήσεται μάλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ; Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὄργανά γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς τὴν

**E** τέχνην, τὰ τε ἔργα πονηρότερα ἐργάζεται καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὓς ἂν διδάσκη χεῖρους δημιουργοὺς διδάξεται. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἰπ' ἀμφοτέρων δὴ, πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χεῖρω μὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χεῖρους δὲ αὐτοί. Φαίνεται. Ἔτερα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξιν εὐρήκαμεν, ἃ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύντα. Ποῖα ταῦτα;

422 **B** Πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφὴν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιούντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τότε μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκόπει, πῶς ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις οἷα τ' ἔσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὴν χρήματα μὴ κεκτημένη ἦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς μεγάλην τε καὶ πλουσίαν ἀναγκασθῆ πολεμεῖν. Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρὸς μὲν μίαν

**B** χαλεπώτερον, πρὸς δὲ δύο τοιαύτας ῥᾶον. Πῶς εἶπες; ἦ δ' ὅς. Πρῶτον μὲν που, εἶπον, ἐὰν δέη μάχεσθαι, ἄρα οὐ πλουσίοις ἀνδράσι μαχοῦνται αὐτοὶ ὄντες πολέμου ἀθληταί; Ναὶ τοῦτό γε, ἔφη.

\* Apparent paradox to stimulate attention. Cf. 377 A, 334 A, 382 A, 414 B-C, 544 C, *Laws* 646 B. To fight against two was quasi-proverbial. Cf. *Laws* 919 B. For images from boxing cf. *Aristot. Met.* 985 a 14, and Demosthenes' statement (*Philip. i.* 40-41) that the Athenians fight Philip as the barbarians box. The Greeks felt that "lesser breeds

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

“How so?” “Thus! do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft?” “By no means,” said he. “But will he become more idle and negligent than he was?” “Far more.” “Then he becomes a worse potter?” “Far worse too.” “And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches.” “Of course.” “From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans?” “So it appears.” “Here, then, is a second group of things, it seems, that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge.” “What are they?” “Wealth and poverty,” said I, “since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation.” “Assuredly,” he said; “yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates, how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state.” “Obviously,” said I, “it would be rather difficult to fight one such, but easier to fight two.<sup>a</sup>” “What did you mean by that?” he said. “Tell me first,” I said, “whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of war<sup>b</sup> against men of wealth?” “Yes, that is true,” he said.

without the law” were inferior in this manly art of self-defence. Cf. the amusing description of the boxing of Orestes and Pylades by the ἀγγελος in Eurip. *I.T.* 1366 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 416 E, 403 E.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε; εἰς πύκτης ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευασμένος δυοῖν μὴ πύκταιν, πλουσίον δὲ καὶ πιόνιον, οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ῥαδίως μάχεσθαι; Οὐκ ἂν ἴσως, ἔφη, ἅμα γε. Οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπο-  
 C φεύγοντι τὸν πρότερον αἰεὶ προσφερόμενον ἀνα-  
 στρέφοντα κρούειν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῖ πολλάκις ἐν ἡλίῳ τε καὶ πνίγει; ἄρα γε οὐ καὶ πλείους χειρώσαιτ' ἂν τοιοῦτους ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶει πυκτικῆς πλέον μετέχειν τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἐμπειρία ἢ πολεμικῆς; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ῥαδίως ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται. Συγχωρήσο-  
 D μαί σοι, ἔφη. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Τί δ', ἂν πρεσβείαν πέμψαντες εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πόλιν τὰληθῆ εἴπωσιν, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσίῳ οὐδ' ἀργυρίῳ χρώμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν δέ·  
 E ξυμπολεμήσαντες οὖν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων· οἶει τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταῦτα αἰρήσεσθαι κυσὶ πολεμεῖν στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῖς μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτοις πίσσί τε καὶ ἀπαλοῖς; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἔφη, πόλιν ξυ-  
 αθροισθῆ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὅρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρη τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἶει ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἷαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν. Ἄλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη. Μειζόνως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ προσ-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Herod. iv. 111.

<sup>b</sup> Two elements of the triad φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *supra* 374 D.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

“ Answer me then, Adeimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it? ” “ Not at the same time perhaps,” said he. “ Not even,” said I, “ if he were allowed to retreat <sup>a</sup> and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents? ” “ Doubtless,” he said; “ it wouldn’t be surprising if he did.” “ Well, don’t you think that the rich have more of the skill and practice <sup>b</sup> of boxing than of the art of war? ” “ I do,” he said. “ It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number.” “ I shall have to concede the point,” he said, “ for I believe you are right.” “ Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact true <sup>c</sup>: ‘ We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy,’ <sup>d</sup>—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep? ” “ I think not. Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth.” “ What happy innocence,” said I, “ to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing.” “ Why, what should we say? ” he said. “ A greater predication,” said I,

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Herod. vii. 233 τὸν ἀληθέστατον τῶν λόγων, Catull. x. 9 “id quod erat.”

<sup>d</sup> The style is of intentional Spartan curtness.

αγορεύειν τὰς ἄλλας· ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. δύο μὲν, κὰν ὅτιοῦν ἦ, πολεμία ἀλλήλαις, ἡ μὲν 423 πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· τούτων δ' ἐν ἑκατέρα πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν μὲν ὡς μιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντὸς ἂν ἀμάρτοις, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδούς τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις χρήματά τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, ξυμμάχοις μὲν ἀεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσει, πολεμίοις δ' ὀλίγοις. καὶ ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῆ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται, οὐ τῶ εὐδοκιμεῖν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἢ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων· οὕτω γὰρ Β μεγάλην πόλιν μίαν οὐ ῥαδίως οὔτε ἐν Ἑλλησιν οὔτε ἐν βαρβάροις εὐρήσεις, δοκούσας δὲ πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας τῆς τηλικαύτης. ἢ ἄλλως οἶει; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη.

III. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἶη καὶ κάλλιστος ὄρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσῃν δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικὴ οὔσῃ ὅσῃν χώραν ἀφορισαμένους τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν ἐᾶν. Τίς, ἔφη, ὄρος; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὔ

<sup>a</sup> "As they say in the game" or "in the jest." The general meaning is plain. We do not know enough about the game called πόλεις (cf. scholiast, Suidas, Hesychius, and Photius) to be more specific. Cf. for conjectures and details Adam's note, and for the phrase Thompson on *Meno* 77 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1316 b 7 and 1264 a 25.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 1261 b 38, takes this as the actual number of the military class. Sparta, according to Xenophon, *Rep. Lac.* 1. 1, was τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων, yet one of the strongest. Cf. also Aristot. *Pol.* 1270 a 14 f. In the *Laws* 326

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“ must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game.<sup>a</sup> There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor,<sup>b</sup> and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousand<sup>c</sup> defenders. For a city of this size that is really one<sup>d</sup> you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise? ” “ No, indeed I don't,” said he.

III. “ Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more? ” “ What is the measure? ” “ I think,” said I, “ that

Plato proposes the number 5040 which Aristotle thinks too large, *Pol.* 1265 a 15.

<sup>a</sup> Commentators, I think, miss the subtlety of this sentence; *μίαν* means truly one as below in *ἄ*, and its antithesis is not so much *πολλάς* as *δοκούσας* which means primarily the appearance of unity, and only secondarily refers to *μεγάλην*. *καί* then is rather “and” than “even.” “So large a city that is really one you will not easily find, but the semblance (of one big city) you will find in cities many and many times the size of this.” Cf. also 462 A-B, and my paper “Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought,” *Class. Phil.* 1914, p. 358. For Aristotle's comment cf. *Pol.* 1261 a 15.

ἂν ἐθέλη αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὖξεν,  
 C πέρα δὲ μή. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ  
 τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο πρόσταγμα τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν,  
 φυλάττειν παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἢ  
 πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τις ἰκανὴ  
 καὶ μία. Καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη, ἴσως αὐτοῖς προσ-  
 τάξομεν. Καὶ τούτου γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι φαυλό-  
 τερον τόδε, οὗ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθημεν  
 λέγοντες, ὡς δέοι, εἴαν τε τῶν φυλάκων τις φαῦλος  
 ἔκγονος γένηται, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸν ἀπο-  
 D πέμπεσθαι, εἴαν τ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων σπουδαῖος, εἰς τοὺς  
 φύλακας. τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς  
 ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο  
 ἕνα πρὸς ἕν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν  
 ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ  
 εἰς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἢ πόλις μία  
 φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί. "Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο  
 ἐκείνου σμικρότερον. Οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄγαθὲ  
 Ἄδειμαντε, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν τις, ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ  
 E μεγάλα αὐτοῖς προστάττομεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα φαῦλα,  
 εἴαν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι, μᾶλλον δ'  
 ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἰκανόν. Τί τοῦτο; ἔφη. Τὴν παι-

<sup>a</sup> The Greek idea of government required that the citizens should know one another. They would not have called Babylon, London or Chicago cities. Cf. *Introd.* p. xxviii, Fowler, *Greek City State, passim*, Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* vol. i. *Introd.* pp. 314-315, and Isocrates' complaint that Athens was too large, *Antid.* 171-172.

<sup>b</sup> Ironical, of course.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 415 b.

<sup>d</sup> The special precept with regard to the guardians was significant of the universal principal, "one man, one task."

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they should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents<sup>a</sup> to remain a unity, but no further.” “Excellent,” he said. “Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one?” “That behest will perhaps be an easy<sup>b</sup> one for them,” he said. “And still easier,<sup>b</sup> haply,” I said, “is this that we mentioned before<sup>c</sup> when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes, and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians; and the purport of all this was<sup>d</sup> that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.<sup>e</sup>” “Why yes,” he said, “this is even more trifling than that.” “These are not, my good Adeimantus, as one might suppose, numerous and difficult injunctions that we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thing<sup>f</sup>—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.<sup>g</sup>” “What is that?” he said. “Their education and

*Cf.* 443 c, 370 B-C (note), 394 E, 374 A-D, *Laws* 846 D-847 B.

<sup>a</sup> It is a natural growth, not an artificial contrivance. For Aristotle's criticism *cf.* *Pol.* 1261 a.

<sup>f</sup> The proverbial one great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is: *πόλλ' οἷδ' ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ' ἐχίνος ἐν μέγα* (Suidas). *Cf.* Archil. fr. 61 *ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα*, *Polit.* 297 A *μέχρι περ ἂν ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι*.

<sup>g</sup> *μέγα* has the unfavourable associations of *ἔπος μέγα*, and *ἱκανόν*, “adequate,” is characteristically preferred by Plato.



δείαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφήν. ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παι-  
 δευόμενοι μέτριοι ἄνδρες γίνωνται, πάντα ταῦτα  
 ῥαδίως διόψονται καὶ ἄλλα γε, ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς  
 παραλείπομεν, τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτήσιν καὶ  
 424 γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας, ὅτι δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν  
 παροιμίαν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων  
 ποιεῖσθαι. Ὅρθότατα γάρ, ἔφη, γίγνοιτ' ἄν. Καὶ  
 μὴν, εἶπον, πολιτεία, ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ὀρμήσῃ εὖ,  
 ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη. τροφή γὰρ  
 καὶ παιδείεις χρηστὴ σωζομένη φύσεις ἀγαθὰς  
 ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ αὖ φύσεις χρησταὶ τοιαύτης παιδείας  
 ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ἔτι βελτίους τῶν προτέρων  
 Β φύονται εἰς τε τᾶλλα καὶ εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν, ὥσπερ καὶ  
 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Ὡς τοίνυν  
 διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, τούτου ἀνθεκτέον τοῖς ἐπι-  
 μεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς μὴ λάθῃ  
 διαφθαρέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ  
 μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικὴν τε καὶ μουσικὴν  
 παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα φυλάτ-  
 τειν φοβουμένους, ὅταν τις λέγῃ, ὡς τὴν ἀοιδὴν  
 μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσιν ἄνθρωποι,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 416 b. Plato of course has in mind both the education already described and the higher education of books VI. and VII.

<sup>b</sup> The indirect introduction of the proverb is characteristic of Plato's style. Cf. on 449 c, where the paradox thus lightly introduced is taken up for serious discussion. Quite fantastic is the hypothesis on which much ink has been wasted, that the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes was suggested by this sentence and is answered by the fifth book. Cf. Introd. pp. xxv and xxxiv. It ought not to be necessary to repeat that Plato's communism applies only to the guardians, and that its main purpose is to enforce their disinterested-

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nurture," I replied. "For if a right education<sup>a</sup> makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common.<sup>b</sup>" "Yes, that would be the best way," he said. "And, moreover," said I, "the state, if it once starts<sup>c</sup> well, proceeds as it were in a cycle<sup>d</sup> of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also.<sup>e</sup>" "It is probable," he said. "To put it briefly, then," said I, "it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that that song is most regarded among men

ness. Cf. *Introd.* pp. xv and note a, xxxiv, xlii, xliv, and "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," p. 358. Aristotle's criticism is that the possessions of friends ought to be common in use but not in ownership. Cf. *Pol.* 1263 a 30, and Eurip. *Androm.* 376-377.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 305 D τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν.

<sup>d</sup> No concrete metaphor of wheel, hook or circle seems to be intended, but only the cycle of cumulative effect of education on nature and nature on education, described in what follows. See the evidence collected in my note, *Class. Phil.* vol. v. pp. 505-507.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 459 A.

ἥτις ἀειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται,

C μὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητὴν τις οἶηται λέγειν οὐκ ἄσματα νέα, ἀλλὰ τρόπον ὠδῆς νέον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπαινῆ. δεῖ δ' οὐτ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔτε ὑπολαμβάνειν. εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον ὡς ἐν ὄλω κινδυνεύοντα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινεῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων, ὡς φησὶ τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. Καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, θές τῶν πεπεισμένων.

D IV. Τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθά που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῇ. Ἡ γοῦν παρανομία, ἔφη, ῥαδίως αὕτη λανθάνει παραδυομένη. Ναί, ἔφην, ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς γε μέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργαζομένη. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἦθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους

<sup>a</sup> *Od.* i. 351. Our text has ἐπικλείουσ' and ἀκούοντεσσι. For the variant cf. Howes in *Harvard Studies*, vi. p. 205. For the commonplace that new songs are best cf. Pindar, *Ol.* ix. 52.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Stallbaum on *Phaedr.* 238 D-E, Forman, *Plato Selections*, p. 457.

<sup>c</sup> The meaning of the similar phrase in Pindar, *Ol.* iii. 4 is different.

<sup>d</sup> μουσικῆς τρόποι need not be so technical as it is in later Greek writers on music, who, however, were greatly influenced by Plato. For the ethical and social power of music cf. *Introd.* p. xiv note c, and *supra* 401 D-404 A, also *Laws* 700 D-E, 701 A.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 316 A, Julian 150 B.

<sup>f</sup> The etymological force of the word makes the metaphor less harsh than the English translation "guard-house." Cf. *Laws* 962 c, where Bury renders "safeguard." Cf. Pindar's

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which hovers newest on the singer's lips,<sup>a</sup>

lest haply <sup>b</sup> it be supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of song <sup>c</sup> and is commending this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of music <sup>d</sup> are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms and as I am convinced.<sup>e</sup> "Set me too down in the number of the convinced," said Adeimantus.

IV. "It is here, then," I said, "in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guard-house <sup>f</sup> and post of watch." "It is certain," he said, "that this is the kind of lawlessness <sup>g</sup> that easily insinuates <sup>h</sup> itself unobserved." "Yes," said I, "because it is supposed to be only a form of play <sup>i</sup> and to work no harm." "Nor does it work any," he said, "except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows <sup>j</sup> upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business

*ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς*, the sharpening thing, that is, the whetstone, *Ol.* vi. 82.

<sup>a</sup> *παρὰνομία* besides its moral meaning (537 ε) suggests lawless innovation in music, from association with the musical sense of *νόμος*. Cf. *Chicago Studies in Class. Phil.* i. p. 22 n. 4.

<sup>b</sup> So Aristot. *Pol.* 1307 b 33.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the warning against innovation in children's games, *Laws* 797 A-B. But music is *παιδεία* as well as *παιδιά*. Cf. Aristotle's three uses of music, for play, education, and the entertainment of leisure (*Pol.* 1339 a 16).

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Demosth. xix. 228. The image is that of a stream overflowing and spreading. Cf. Eurip. *fr.* 499 N. and Cicero's use of "serpit," *Cat.* iv. 3, and *passim*.

ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ξυμ-  
 Ε βολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας σὺν  
 πολλῇ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀσελγείᾳ, ἕως ἂν τελευτῶσα  
 πάντα ἰδία καὶ δημοσία ἀνατρέψῃ. Εἶεν, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ· οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν  
 ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἡμετέροις παισὶν ἐν-  
 νομωτέρου εὐθὺς παιδιᾶς μεθεκτέον, ὡς παρανόμου  
 425 γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παίδων τοιούτων ἐννόμους τε  
 καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας αὐξάνεσθαι  
 ἀδύνατον ὄν; Πῶς δ' οὐχί; ἔφη. "Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα  
 καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παῖδες παίζειν εὐνομίαν διὰ τῆς  
 μουσικῆς εἰσδέξωνται, πάλιν τούναντίον ἢ 'κείνοις  
 εἰς πάντα ξυνέπεται τε καὶ αὔξει, ἐπανορθοῦσα εἴ-  
 τι καὶ πρότερον τῆς πόλεως ἔκειτο. 'Αληθῆ μέντοι,  
 ἔφη. Καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα, εἶπον, δοκοῦντα εἶναι  
 νόμιμα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὗτοι, ἃ οἱ πρότερον ἀπ-  
 ὄλλυσαν πάντα. Ποῖα; Τὰ τοιάδε· σιγᾶς τε  
 Β τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ἃς πρέπει, καὶ  
 κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις καὶ γονέων θερα-  
 πείας, καὶ κουράς γε καὶ ἀμπεχόνας καὶ ὑποδέσεις  
 καὶ ὄλον τὸν τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν καὶ τᾶλλα  
 ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἢ οὐκ οἶει; "Ἐγωγε. Νομοθετεῖν  
 δ' αὐτὰ οἶμαι εὐήθες· οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὗτ'  
 ἂν μείνειεν, λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασι νομοθετηθέντα.

• Cf. on 389 D.

ᵇ The reference is to the general tenour of what precedes.

ᶜ *πρότερον* is an unconscious lapse from the construction of an ideal state to the reformation of degenerate Athens. Cf. Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 41 ff., and *Laws* 876 B-C, 948 C-D.

ᵈ For these traits of old-fashioned decorum and modesty cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 961-1023, Blaydes on 991, Herod. ii. 80, Isoc. *Areopagit.* 48-49.

ᵉ Cf. Starkie on Aristoph. *Wasps* 1069.

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dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton licence, Socrates, till finally it overthrows<sup>a</sup> all things public and private." "Well," said I, "are these things so?" "I think so," he said. "Then, as we were saying<sup>b</sup> in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise, it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit." "Of course," he said. "And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other<sup>c</sup> type of state." "True, indeed," he said. "Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether." "Of what sort?" "Such things as the becoming silence<sup>d</sup> of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair<sup>e</sup> and the garments and the fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so?" "I do." "Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly.<sup>f</sup> For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 412 B, Isoc. *Areopagit.* 41, and *Laws* 788 B, where the further, still pertinent consideration is added that the multiplication of minor enactments tends to bring fundamental laws into contempt. Cf. "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," p. 353, n. 2.

Πῶς γάρ; Κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκ τῆς παιδείας, ὅποι ἄν τις ὀρμήσῃ, C  
 τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄν ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ; Τί μὴν; Καὶ τελευτῶν δῆ, οἶμαι, φαίμεν ἄν εἰς ἓν τι τέλος καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τούναντίον. Τί γὰρ οὐκ; ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἄν ἔτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήσαιμι νομοθετεῖν. Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη. Τί δέ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, τὰ ἀγοραῖα ξυμβολαίων τε D  
 περὶ κατ' ἀγορὰν ἕκαστοι ἅ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβάλλουσιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ χειροτεχνικῶν περὶ ξυμβολαίων καὶ λαιδοριῶν καὶ αἰκίας καὶ δικῶν λήξεις<sup>1</sup> καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεις, καὶ εἴ που τελῶν τινὲς ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἀναγκαῖοί εἰσιν ἢ κατ' ἀγορὰς ἢ λιμένας, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἅττα ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν; Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς καγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν· τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετή- E  
 εσασθαι, ῥαδίως που εὐρήσουσιν. Ναί, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, εἴαν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῶ σωτηρίαν τῶν

<sup>1</sup> λήξεως q: λήξεις others.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 401 c, Demosth. *Olynth.* iii. 33 τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα.

<sup>b</sup> τὰ τοιαῦτα is slightly contemptuous. Specific commercial, industrial and criminal legislation was not compatible with the plan of the *Republic*, and so Plato omits it here. Much of it is given in the *Laws*, but even there details are left to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. *supra* on 412 b.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 922 a, Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 b 21. All legal relations of contract, implied contract and tort.

<sup>d</sup> In *Laws* 920 d Plato allows a δίκη ἀτελοῦς ὁμολογίας against

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

paper.” “How could they?” “At any rate, Adeimantus,” I said, “the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like?” “Surely.” “And the final<sup>a</sup> outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse.” “Of course,” said he. “For my part, then,” I said, “for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.<sup>b</sup>” “With good reason,” said he. “But what, in heaven’s name,” said I, “about business matters, the deals<sup>c</sup> that men make with one another in the agora—and, if you please, contracts with workmen<sup>d</sup> and actions for foul language<sup>e</sup> and assault, the filing of declarations,<sup>f</sup> the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbours and in general market, police or harbour regulations and the like, can we bring<sup>g</sup> ourselves to legislate about these?” “Nay, ’twould not be fitting,” he said, “to dictate to good and honourable men.<sup>h</sup> For most of the enactments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover.” “Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have workmen or contractors who break or fail to complete contracts.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 935 c. There was no *λοιδορίας δίκη* under that name at Athens, but certain words were actionable, *ἀπόρρητα*, and there was a *δίκη κακηγορίας*.

<sup>f</sup> Plato shows his contempt for the subject by this confused enumeration, passing without warning from contracts and torts to procedure and then to taxes, market, harbour and police regulations.

<sup>g</sup> *τολμήσομεν* is both “venture” and “deign.”

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Isoc. Panegyri.* 78 *ὅτι τοῖς καλοῖς κάγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν δεήσει πολλῶν γραμμάτων.*



νόμων ὧν ἔμπροσθεν διήλθομεν. Εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιθέμενοι αἰεὶ καὶ ἐπανορθούμενοι τὸν βίον διατελέσουσιν, οἰόμενοι ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου. Λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἐκβῆναι πονηρᾶς διαίτης.

426 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ μὴν οὗτοί γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν. ἰατρευόμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσι, πλήν γε ποικιλώτερα καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, εἴαν τις φάρμακον συμβουλεύσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἔσεσθαι ὑγιεῖς. Πάνυ γάρ, ἔφη, τῶν οὕτω καμνόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, τὸ πάντων ἔχθιστον ἠγεῖσθαι τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιπλάμενος καὶ ἀφροδισιάζων καὶ ἀργῶν παύσῃται, οὔτε φάρμακα οὔτε καύσεις οὔτε τομαὶ οὐδ' αὖ ἐπωδαὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ περίαπτα οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὀνήσει; Οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν. Οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

\* Cf. Emerson, "Experience": "They wish to be saved from the mischiefs of their vices but not from their vices. Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, 'Come out of that' as the first condition of advice."

<sup>b</sup> Ironical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler's supposition (*Kleine Schriften*, i. p. 99) that this passage was meant as destructive criticism of Isocrates' *Panegyricus* and that *Antid.* 62 is a reply. Plato is obviously thinking of practical politicians rather than of Isocrates.

<sup>c</sup> πλήν γε etc., is loosely elliptical, but emendations are superfluous.

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already discussed.” “Failing that,” said he, “they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best.” “You mean,” said I, “that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon<sup>a</sup> their unwholesome regimen.” “By all means.” “And truly,” said I, “these latter go on in a most charming<sup>b</sup> fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. And<sup>c</sup> they are always hoping that some one will recommend a panacea that will restore their health.” “A perfect description,” he said, “of the state of such invalids.” “And isn’t this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching and idling, neither drugs<sup>d</sup> nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periapts<sup>e</sup> nor anything of that kind will be of any avail?” “Not altogether charming,” he said, “for there is no grace or charm in being angry<sup>f</sup> with him who speaks well.” “You do not seem to be an admirer<sup>g</sup> of such people,” said I. “No, by heaven, I am not.”

<sup>a</sup> For the list *cf.* Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 50-54. *οὐδ’ αὖ* emphasizes the transition to superstitious remedies in which Plato doesn’t really believe. *Cf.* his rationalizing interpretation of *ἐπωδαί*, *Charm.* 157 A, *Theaetet.* 149 c. *Laws* 933 A-B is to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden’s *Table Talk*: “The law against witches does not prove that there be any but it punishes the malice,” etc. [Demosthenes] xxv. 80 is sceptical.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* any lexicon, Shakes. *1 Henry VI.* v. iii. 2 “Now help, ye charming spells and periapts,” and Plutarch’s story of the women who hung them on Pericles’ neck on his death-bed.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* 480 A, 354 A.

<sup>d</sup> The noun is more forcible than the verb would be. *Cf.* *Protag.* 309 A *ἐπαιvēτης*.

V. Οὐδ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ἄρα, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὅλη τοιοῦτον ποιῆ, οὐκ ἐπαινέσει. ἢ οὐ φαίνονται σοι ταῦτόν ἐργάζεσθαι τούτοις τῶν πόλεων  
 C ὅσαι κακῶς πολιτευόμεναι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς πολίταις τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανουμένους, ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ· ὃς δ' ἂν σφᾶς οὕτω πολιτευομένους ἡδιστα θεραπεύῃ καὶ χαρίζηται ὑποτρέχων καὶ προγιγνώσκων τὰς σφετέρας βουλήσεις καὶ ταύτας δεινὸς ἢ ἀποπληροῦν, οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθός τε ἔσται ἀνὴρ καὶ σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τιμήσεται ὑπὸ σφῶν; Ταῦτόν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι δρᾶν, καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν  
 D ἐπαινῶ. Τί δ' αὖ τοὺς θέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ προθυμουμένους οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχερείας; "Ἐγωγ'", ἔφη, πλὴν γ' ὅσοι ἐξηπάτηνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἴονται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἐπαινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις,

<sup>a</sup> We return from the illustration to its application to the state.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 497 B, Aristot. *Pol.* 1301 b 11. Cf. the obvious imitation in the (probably spurious) *Epistle* vii. 330 E. For the thought, from the point of view of an enemy of democracy, cf. the statement in [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 3. 9, that the faults of Athens cannot be corrected while she remains a democracy. The Athenians naturally guarded their constitution and viewed with equal suspicion the idealistic reformer and the oligarchical reactionary.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 65 note d, and *Laws* 923 B. The phraseology here recalls *Gorg.* 517 B, Aristoph. *Knights* 46-63. Cf. "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," *Class. Phil.* vol. ix. (Oct. 1914) p. 363, n. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Almost technical. Cf. 538 B.

<sup>e</sup> Here "serve," not "flatter."

<sup>f</sup> This word εὐχέρεια is often misunderstood by lexicons and commentators. It is of course not "dexterity" (L. & S.) nor

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V. "Neither then, if an entire city,<sup>a</sup> as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don't you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddle<sup>b</sup> with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably serves<sup>c</sup> them governed as they are and who carries favour with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things,<sup>d</sup> the man they will delight to honour?" "Yes," he said, "I think their conduct is identical, and I don't approve it in the very least." "And what again of those who are willing and eager to serve<sup>e</sup> such states? Don't you admire their valiance and light-hearted irresponsibility<sup>f</sup>?" "I do," he said, "except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmen<sup>g</sup> because they are praised by the many." "What do you mean? Can't you make allowances<sup>h</sup>

yet probably "complaisance," nor yet "humanitas" or "Gutmütigkeit," as Adam and Schneider think. It expresses rather the lightheartedness with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread, which is akin to the lightness with which men plunge into crime. Cf. *Laws* 690 D τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥαδίως and 969 A ἀνδρείβρατος. Plato's political physician makes "come out of that" a precondition of his treatment. Cf. *Laws* 736-737, *Polit.* 299 A-B, *infra* 501 A, 540 E, *Epistle* vii. 330 C-D, and the story in Aelian, *V.H.* ii. 42, of Plato's refusal to legislate for the Arcadians because they would not accept an equalization of property.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Euthyphro* 2 C-D, *Gorg.* 513 B, *Polit.* 275 C and 292 D.

<sup>h</sup> Plato often condescendingly and half ironically pardons psychologically inevitable errors. Cf. 366 C, *Phaedr.* 269 B, *Euthydem.* 306 C.

- ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν; ἢ οἶει οἶόν τ' εἶναι ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν, ἐτέρων τοιούτων πολλῶν λεγόντων ὅτι τετράπηχὺς ἐστίν, αὐτὸν
- E** ταῦτα μὴ ἠγείσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ; Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε· καὶ γάρ πού εἰσι πάντων χαριέστατοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, νομοθετοῦντές τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντες αἰεὶ οἰόμενοί τι πέρας εὐρήσειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις κακουργήματα καὶ περὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὡσπερ Ὑδραν
- 427 τέμνουσιν. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἄλλο τί γε ποιοῦσιν. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας οὔτ' ἐν κακῶς οὔτ' ἐν εὖ πολιτευομένη πόλει ὥμην ἂν δεῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην πραγματεύεσθαι, ἐν τῇ μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῆ καὶ πλεον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τῇ, ὅτι τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κἂν ὄστισοῦν εὖροι, τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα ἔπεισιν ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.
- B** Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἂν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων. Τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ' ὅς.

\* For οὐκ αὖ cf. 393 D, 442 A, *Theaetet.* 161 A, *Class. Phil.* vol. xxiii. pp. 285-287. ἐγωγε above concurs with ἀγασαι, ignoring the irony. πλήν γε etc. marks dissent on one point. This dissent is challenged, and is withdrawn by οὐκ αὖ . . . τοῦτό γε (οἶμαι).

<sup>b</sup> τῷ ὄντι points the application of the proverbial ὕδραν τέμνειν, which appears in its now trite metaphorical use for the first time here and in *Euthydem.* 297 c. Cf. my note on Horace iv. 4. 61. For the thought cf. Isoc. vii. 40, Macrob. *Sat.* ii. 13 "leges bonae ex malis moribus procreantur," Arcesilaus *apud* Stob. *Flor.* xliii. 91 οὕτω δὴ καὶ θεοῦ νόμοι

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for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall not to suppose this to be the fact about himself?" "Why no,<sup>a</sup>" he said, "I don't think that." "Then don't be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can't see that they are in very truth<sup>b</sup> trying to cut off a Hydra's head." "Indeed," he said, "that is exactly what they are doing." "I, then," said I, "should not have supposed<sup>c</sup> that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind<sup>d</sup> in the laws and the constitution of either an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described."

"What part of legislation, then," he said, "is still left for us?" And I replied, "For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments." "What are they?" he said.

πλεῖστοι ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀδικίαν εἶναι μεγίστην, Theophrastus *apud* Stob. *Flor.* xxxvii. 21 ὀλίγων οἱ ἀγαθοὶ νόμων δέονται.

<sup>c</sup> Ironically, "I should not have supposed, but for the practice of our politicians."

<sup>d</sup> εἶδος νόμων περὶ is here a mere periphrasis, though the true classification of laws was a topic of the day. Cf. *Laws* 630 E, Aristot. *Pol.* 1267 b 37. Plato is not always careful to mark the distinction between the legislation which he rejects altogether and that which he leaves to the discretion of the citizens.

Ἱερῶν τε ἰδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων θεραπείαι. τελευτησάντων\* τε\* αὖ θῆκαι καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἐκεῖ δεῖ ὑπηρετοῦντας ἴλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα  
 C οὗτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, εἰάν νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ χρῆσόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ. οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ποιητέον οὕτω.

D VI. Ὀικισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη ἄν σοι εἴη, ὦ παῖ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς ποθὲν πορισάμενος ἱκανὸν αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει καὶ Πολέμαρχον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, εἰάν πως ἴδωμεν, ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία, καὶ τί

\* ἐκεῖ = in the other world. So often.

<sup>b</sup> For the exegete as a special religious functionary at Athens cf. L. & S. s.v. and *Laws* 759 c-d. Apollo in a higher sense is the interpreter of religion for all mankind. He is technically πατρῶος at Athens (*Euthydem.* 302 d) but he is πάτριος for all Greeks and all men. Plato does not, as Thümser says (p. 301), confuse the Dorian and the Ionian Apollo, but rises above the distinction.

<sup>c</sup> Plato prudently or piously leaves the details of ceremonial and institutional religion to Delphi. Cf. 540 b-c, *Laws* 759 c, 738 b-c, 828 a, 856 e, 865 b, 914 a, 947 d.

<sup>d</sup> This "navel" stone, supposed to mark the centre of the earth, has now been found. Cf. Poulsen's *Delphi*, pp. 19, 29, 157, and Frazer on Pausanias x. 16.

<sup>e</sup> Not the ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις of 369 e, nor the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις of 372 e, but the purified city of 399 e has now been established and described. The search for justice that follows formulates for the first time the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues and defines each provisionally and sufficiently for the

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“ The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes ; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond <sup>a</sup> to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter <sup>b</sup> than the God of our fathers. <sup>c</sup> For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel <sup>d</sup> of the earth delivers his interpretation.” “ Excellently said,” he replied ; “ and that is what we must do.”

VI. “ At last, then, son of Ariston,” said I, “ your city <sup>e</sup> may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, <sup>f</sup> and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice <sup>g</sup> should be in it, wherein

present purpose, and solves the problems dramatically presented in the minor dialogues, *Charmides*, *Laches*, etc. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 15-18, nn. 81-102, and the introduction to the second volume of this translation.

<sup>f</sup> αὐτός τε καί : cf. 398 A.

<sup>g</sup> See on 369 A. Matter-of-fact critics may object that there is no injustice in the perfectly good state. But we know the bad best by the canon of the good. Cf. on 409 A-B. The knowledge of opposites is the same.

Injustice can be defined only in relation to its opposite (444 A-B), and in the final argument the most unjust man and state are set up as the extreme antitypes of the ideal (571-580). By the perfect state Plato does not mean a state in which no individual retains any human imperfections.

It is idle then to speak of “ difficulties ” or “ contradictions ” or changes of plan in the composition of the *Republic*.



ἀλλήλοιν διαφέρετον, καὶ πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, εἴαν τε λανθάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ πάντα θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχου ζητήσῃν, E ὡς οὐχ ὀσιόν σοι ὄν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη εἰς δύναμιν παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὑπομιμνήσκεις, καὶ ποιητέον μὲν γε οὕτω, χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ξυλλαμβάνειν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ποιήσομεν οὕτω. Ἐλπίζω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐρήσειν αὐτὸ ὧδε. οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ὤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι σοφὴ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὐρημένον; 428 Τί μὴν; Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἔν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὄτωοῦν, ὅποτε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἰκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῶ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο

<sup>a</sup> For εἴαν τε . . . εἴαν τε cf. 367 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 331 E. Emphatic as in 449 D-450 A, *Phaedo* 95 A, and *Alcib. I.* 135 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 368 B-C.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 434 E, 449 A. This in a sense begs the original question in controversy with Thrasymachus, by the assumption that justice and the other moral virtues are goods. Cf. *Gorg.* 507 c. See *The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 205. For the cardinal virtues cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 304, Pearson, *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, pp. 173 f., and commentators on Pindar, *Nem.* iii. 74, which seems to refer to four periods of human life, and Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9. 1-5, and iv. 6. 1-12.

Plato recognizes other virtues even in the *Republic* (*supra* 402 c ἐλευθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. 536 A), and would have been as ready to admit that the number four was a

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they differ from one another and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alike <sup>a</sup> whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men.” “Nonsense,” said Glaucon, “you <sup>b</sup> promised that you would carry on the search yourself, admitting that it would be impious <sup>c</sup> for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power.” “A true reminder,” I said, “and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand.” “Well,” he said, “we will.” “I expect then,” said I, “that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is good in the full sense of the word.” <sup>d</sup> “Necessarily,” he said. “Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just.” “Clearly.” “Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder <sup>e</sup> will be that which we have not found?” “Surely.” “Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing

part of his literary machinery as Ruskin was to confess the arbitrariness of his *Seven Lamps of Architecture*.

<sup>e</sup> It is pedantry to identify this with Mill's method of residues and then comment on the primitive naïveté of such an application of Logic to ethics. One might as well speak of Andocides' employment of the method (*De myst.* 109) or of its use by Gorgias in the disjunctive dilemma of the Palamedes 11 and *passim*, or say that the dog of the anecdote employs it when he sniffs at one trail and immediately runs up the other. Plato obviously employs it merely as a literary device for the presentation of his material under the figure of a search. He, “in the infancy of philosophy,” is quite as well aware as his censors can be in the senility of criticism that he is not proving anything by this method, but merely setting forth what he has assumed for other reasons.

ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον; Δῆλα δῆ. Καὶ μὲν  
 B δὴ πρῶτόν γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι ἢ σοφία· καί τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτὴν φαίνεται. Τί; ἢ δ' ὅς. Σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἢ πόλις εἶναι ἦν διήλθομεν· εὐβουλος γάρ. οὐχί; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἢ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που ἀμαθία γε ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμη εὐβουλεύονται. Δῆλον. Πολλαὶ δέ γε καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἐπιστήμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 C Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην σοφὴ καὶ εὐβουλος ἢ πόλις προσρητέα; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, διὰ γε ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική. Οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, βουλευομένη,<sup>1</sup> ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις. Οὐ μέντοι. Τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἢ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων; Οὐδ' ἦντινοῦν, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς

<sup>1</sup> βουλευομένη codd.: βουλευομένην Heindorf.

\* σοφία is wisdom *par excellence*. Aristotle, *Met.* i., traces the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in Aristotle's mind with first philosophy or metaphysics. For Plato, the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for his political theory it is the "political or royal art" which the dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special sciences and arts. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17, n. 97, *Protag.* 319 A, *Euthyd.* 282 E, 291 C, *Gorg.* 501 A-B, etc.

In the unreformed Greek state its counterfeit counterpart is the art of the politician.

In the *Republic* its reality will be found in the selected guardians who are to receive the higher education, and who alone will apprehend the idea of good, which is not mentioned here simply because Plato, not Krohn, is writing the *Republic*.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

left for it to be but the remainder." "Right," he said. "And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way." "Clearly." "And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom,<sup>a</sup> and there is something odd about that, it appears." "What?" said he. "Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not?" "Yes." "And surely this very thing, good counsel,<sup>b</sup> is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well." "Obviously." "But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city." "Of course." "Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that a city is to be called wise and well advised?" "By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building." "Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations<sup>c</sup> of the science of wooden utensils for their best production?" "No, I grant you." "Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind?" "None whatsoever," he said. "Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that

<sup>b</sup> Protagoras, like Isocrates, professed to teach *εὐβουλία* (*Protag.* 318 E), which Socrates at once identifies with the political art. Plato would accept Protagoras's discrimination of this from the special arts (*ibid.* 318 E ff.), but he does not believe that such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very different thing from Protagoras's *εὐβουλία* and is apprehended by a very different education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," p. 348, n. 5, *Euthydem.* 291 B-C, *Charm.* 170 B, *Protag.* 319 A, *Gorg.* 501 A-B, 503 D, *Polit.* 289 C, 293 D, 309 C.

<sup>c</sup> *βουλευομένη*: Heindorf's *βουλευομένην* is perhaps supported by ἡ . . . *βουλεύεται* below, but in view of Plato's colloquial anacoluthic style is unnecessary.

γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείση παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἣ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν  
**D** ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλευέται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς ὅλης, ὄντιν<sup>1</sup> ἂν τρόπον αὐτὴ τε πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ; Ἔστι μέντοι. Τίς, ἔφη ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν; Αὕτη, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἡ φυλακικὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὓς νῦν δὴ τελέους φύλακας ὠνομάζομεν. Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις; Εὐβουλον, ἔφη, καὶ τῷ ὄντι σοφῆν. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
**E** ἐν τῇ πόλει οἷε ἡμῖν χαλκέας πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας τούτους; Πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὠνομάζονται τινες εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν ὀλίγιστοι; Πολύ γε. Τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλη σοφῆ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα πόλις· καὶ  
**429** τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, φύσει ὀλίγιστον γίγνεται γένος, ᾧ προσήκει ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν, ἦν μόνην δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεττάρων οὐκ οἶδα ὄντινα τρόπον εὐρήκαμεν αὐτό τε καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ἴδρυται. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἀποχρώντως εὐρήσθαι.

VII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ

<sup>1</sup> ὄντιν' ἂν Ast's conjecture: ὄντινα codd.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 416 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 311 **E** τί ἄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωτ-

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

is agricultural." "I think so." "Then," said I, "is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself<sup>a</sup> and other states?" "Why, yes, there is." "What is it," said I, "and in whom is it found?" "It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word." "And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge?" "Well advised," he said, "and truly wise." "Which class, then," said I, "do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians?" "The smiths, by far," he said. "And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations<sup>b</sup>?" "By far." "Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears these are by nature the fewest, the class to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom." "Most true," he said. "This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state." "I certainly think," said he, "that it has been discovered sufficiently."

VII. "But again there is no difficulty in seeing

*αγδρου ακουομεν; ὡσπερ περι Φειδίου ἀγαλαματοποιδν και περι Ὀμήρου ποιητήν.*

κείται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ τοιαύτη κλητέα ἢ πόλις, οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. Πῶς δῆ; Τίς ἄν, ἦν δ' **B** ἐγώ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δειλὴν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἶποι, ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς; Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη, εἰς ἄλλο τι. Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἷ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρείοι ὄντες κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν. Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστί, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν δύναμιν τοιαύτην, ἢ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν **C** περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτά τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ τε καὶ οἶα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγειλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔμαθον ὃ εἶπες, ἀλλ' αὐθις εἶπέ. Σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Ποίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν; Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονυίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν, ἃ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἶα. διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν<sup>1</sup> **D** αὐτὴν<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν. ᾧ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὴν codd.: Adam unnecessarily αὐτῆς.

<sup>a</sup> τοιαύτη = such, that is, brave. The courage of a state, qua such, also resides in a small class, the warriors.

<sup>b</sup> ἀνδρείοι ὄντες: the *ab urbe condita* construction. Cf. *supra* 421 A.

<sup>c</sup> τοίαν . . . ἢ τοίαν: cf. 437 E, *Phaedr.* 271 D, *Laws* 721 B.

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bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave.<sup>a</sup>” “How so?” “Who,” said I, “in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf?” “No one at all,” he said. “For the reason, I take it,” said I, “that the cowardice or the bravery<sup>b</sup> of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other.<sup>c</sup>” “It does not.” “Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver<sup>d</sup> inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery?” “I don’t altogether understand<sup>e</sup> what you said,” he replied; “but say it again.” “A kind of conservation,” I said, “is what I mean by bravery.” “What sort of a conservation<sup>f</sup>?” “The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase ‘under all conditions<sup>g</sup>’ I mean that the brave man preserves it both in pain and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expel<sup>h</sup> it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 442 c, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1129 b 19 προστάττει δ’ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* on 347 A.

<sup>f</sup> σωτηρίαν is the genus; *Phileb.* 34 A, *Def. Plat.* 412 A-B. Hence ποίαν as often in the minor dialogues sometimes with a play on its idiomatic, contemptuous meaning. Cf. *Laches* 194 D.

<sup>g</sup> In the *Laches* 191 D-E, and the *Laws* 633 D also, Plato generalizes courage to include resistance to the lure of pleasure.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *supra* 412 E.



εἶναι, ἐθέλω ἀπεικάσαι, εἰ βούλει. Ἄλλὰ βούλομαι. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὴν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἀλουργά, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκλέγονται ἐκ τοσοῦτων χρωμάτων μίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προπαρασκευάζουσιν οὐκ ὀλίγη παρασκευῇ θεραπεύσαντες, ὅπως δέξεται ὃ τι μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ βαφέν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὐτ' ἄνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ῥυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἂ δ' ἂν μή, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάν τε τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπεύσας. Οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα. Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ· μηδὲν οἷου ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι, ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὃ τι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφῆν, ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιτηδεῖαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν

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° The moral training of the guardians is likened to the dyeing of selected white wools with fast colours. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1105 a 2, Marc. Aurel. iii. 4. 3 *δικαιοσύνη βεβαμμένου εἰς βάθος*, Sir Thomas Browne, *Christian Morals*, i. 9 "Be what thou virtuously art, and let not the ocean wash away thy tincture." The idea that the underlying substance must be of neutral quality may have been suggested to Plato by Anaxagoras. It occurs in the *Timaeus* 50 D-E, whence it passed to Aristotle's psychology and Lucretius. Cf. my paper on "Plato, Epicurus and Lucretius," *Harvard Studies*, vol. xii. p. 204.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

similitude<sup>a</sup> if you please.” “I do.” “You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colours there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment,<sup>b</sup> then and then only, dip it in the dye. And things that are dyed by this process become fast-coloured<sup>c</sup> and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whether<sup>d</sup> anyone dips other colours or even these without the preparatory treatment.” “I know,” he said, “that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance. “By this analogy, then,” said I, “you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music<sup>e</sup> and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be<sup>f</sup> fast-coloured both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes

<sup>b</sup> For the technique cf. Blümner, *Technologie*, vol. i. pp. 227 ff. The *θεράπενσις* seems to be virtually identical with the *προπαρασκευή*, so that the aorist seems inappropriate, unless with Adam's earlier edition we transpose it immediately before *οὕτω δῆ*.

<sup>c</sup> For *δευσοποιοῖς* cf. L. & S., and Nauck, *Ἀδέσποτα* 441 *τοῖς δευσοποιοῖς φαρμάκοις ξανθίζεται*.

<sup>d</sup> The two points of precaution are (1) to select white wool, not *ἄλλα χρώματα*, (2) to prepare by treatment even this.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 522 A, *Phileb.* 17 B.

<sup>f</sup> *γίγνοιτο* is process; *ἐκπλύναι* (aorist) is a single event (*μῆ*).

βαφὴν τὰ ρύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν, ἢ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινότερα οὔσα  
 Β τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος. τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἢ δ' ὅς, λέγω. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγонуῖαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον<sup>1</sup> ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν  
 C καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει· αὐθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ βούλη, ἔτι κάλλιον δίμεν. νῦν γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἐζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην· πρὸς οὖν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἱκανῶς ἔχει. Ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.  
 D VIII. Δύο μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπά, ἃ δεῖ κατιδεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὐ δὴ

<sup>1</sup> νόμιμον codd.: μόνιμον Stob. Flor. xliii. 97.

<sup>a</sup> δεινά: it is not fanciful to feel the unity of Plato's imagination as well as of his thought in the recurrence of this word in the δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα . . . παθήματα of the mortal soul in *Tim.* 69 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 360 c-d, *Laws* 632 c, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1116 b 24. Strictly speaking, Plato would recognize four grades, (1) philosophic bravery, (2) the bravery of the ἐπίκουροι here defined, (3) casual civic bravery in ordinary states, (4) animal instinct, which hardly deserves the name. Cf. *Laches* 196 e, Mill, *Nature*, p. 47 "Consistent courage is always the effect of cultivation," etc., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 46 and 77.

<sup>c</sup> *Phaedo* 69 b.

<sup>d</sup> νόμιμον of the mss. yields quite as good a meaning as

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that have such dread<sup>a</sup> power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief<sup>b</sup> about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say." "No, nothing," said he; "for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave,<sup>c</sup> to have little or nothing to do with law<sup>d</sup> and that you would call it by another name than courage." "That is most true," said I. "Well then," he said, "I accept this as bravery." "Do so," said I, "and you will be right with the reservation<sup>e</sup> that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time,<sup>f</sup> if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough." "You are quite right," he said.

VIII. "Two things still remain," said I, "to make out in our city, soberness<sup>g</sup> and the object of the whole

Stobaeus's *μόνιμον*. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by law is more abiding than accidental virtue.

<sup>a</sup> γε marks a reservation as 415 Ε στρατιωτικός γε, *Polit.* 309 Ε, *Laws* 710 Α τὴν δημώδη γε. Plotinus, unlike some modern commentators, perceived this. Cf. *Enn.* i. 2. 3. In *Phaedo* 82 Α πολιτικὴν is used disparagingly of ordinary bourgeois virtue. In *Xen. Rep. Lac.* 10. 7 and *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* iii. 8. 1 (1116 a 17) there is no disparagement. The word is often used of citizen soldiery as opposed to professional mercenaries.

<sup>f</sup> This dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise of the *Laches*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 77 and 603.

<sup>g</sup> Matthew Arnold's word. But cf. on 389 D and 430 E—"sobriety," "temperance," "*Besonnenheit*."

ἔνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν δικαιοσύνη. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὔροιμεν, ἵνα μηκέτι πραγματευώμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης; Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὔτε οἶδα οὔτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φανῆναι, εἴπερ μηκέτι ἐπισκεψόμεθα σωφροσύνην· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔμοιγε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι, σκόπει πρότερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν Ε δ' ἐγώ, βούλομαί γε, εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη. Σκεπτέον, εἶπον· καὶ ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, συμφωνία τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονία προσέοικε μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον. Πῶς; Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασι, κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἅττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς φαίνεται· ἦ γάρ; Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν κρείττω αὐτοῦ γελοῖον; ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἥττων δήπου 431 ἂν αὐτοῦ εἶη καὶ ὁ ἥττων κρείττων· ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται. Τί δ' οὔ; Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαίνεται μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἔνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατὲς ᾖ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττω αὐτοῦ· ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν· ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ

<sup>a</sup> εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ is idiomatic, "I ought to." Cf. 608 D, 612, *Menex.* 236 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 506 E ff. σωφροσύνη and σωφρονεῖν sometimes mean etymologically of sound mind or level head, with or without ethical suggestion, according to the standpoint of the speaker. Cf. *Protag.* 333 B-C. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 D-E: subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised to higher

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

inquiry, justice." "Quite so." "If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness." "Well, I, for my part," he said, "neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that." "It would certainly be very wrong<sup>a</sup> of me not to desire it," said I. "Go on with the inquiry then," he said. "I must go on," I replied, "and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did." "How so?" "Soberness is a kind of beautiful order<sup>b</sup> and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase 'master of himself' I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so?" "Most certainly." "Now the phrase 'master of himself' is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions." "Of course." "But," said I, "the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But significance in Plato's definition. As in the case of bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the disciplined and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps there is. Cf. *Laws* 626 E ff., 863 D, *A.J.P.* vol. xiii. pp. 361 f., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 77 and 78.

τροφῆς κακῆς ἢ τινος ὀμιλίας κρατηθῆ ὑπὸ πλή-  
 θους τοῦ χείρονος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὄν, τοῦτο  
 B δὲ ὡς ἐν ὄνειδει ψέγειν τε καὶ καλεῖν ἥττω ἑαυτοῦ  
 καὶ ἀκόλαστον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον. Καὶ γὰρ  
 ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Ἀπόβλεπε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς  
 τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ εὐρήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ  
 ἕτερον τούτων ἐνόν· κρείττω γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς  
 δικαίως φήσεις προσαγορεύεσθαι εἴπερ οὗ τὸ  
 ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος ἄρχει σῶφρον κλητέον καὶ  
 κρείττον αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπω, ἔφη, καὶ ἀληθῆ  
 λέγεις. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντο-  
 C δαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ  
 μάλιστα ἄν τις εὖροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ  
 τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ  
 φαύλοις. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὰς δέ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ  
 μετρίας, αἱ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογι-  
 σμῶ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξει καὶ τοῖς  
 βέλτιστα μὲν φύσι, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν.  
 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρᾶς ἐνόητα σοι ἐν  
 τῇ πόλει, καὶ κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας  
 D τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν  
 ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν  
 τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

IX. Εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ πόλιν προσαγορεύειν κρείττω  
 ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ ταύ-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 442 A, *Laws* 689 A-B. The expression is intended to remind us of the parallelism between man and state. See *Introd.* p. xxxv.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 189 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 441 D, 443 B, 573 D.

<sup>e</sup> παντοδαπός is disparaging in Plato. Cf. 557 c.

<sup>f</sup> παισί: so Wolf, for ms. πᾶσι, a frequent error. Cf. 494 B.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

when, because of bad breeding or some association,<sup>a</sup> the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude<sup>b</sup> of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach,<sup>c</sup> and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious." "That seems likely," he said. "Turn your eyes now upon our new city," said I, "and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which<sup>d</sup> the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered." "I do turn my eyes upon it," he said, "and it is as you say." "And again, the mob of motley<sup>e</sup> appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children<sup>f</sup> and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.<sup>g</sup>" "By all means." "But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated." "True," he said. "And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better sort?" "I do," he said.

IX. "If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation."

Plato, like Shakespeare's Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who is passion's slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, *Sat.* v. 73 and 124, Epictet. *Diss.* iv. 1, Xen. *Mem.* iv. 5. 4, Xen. *Oecon.* 1. 22-23.



την προσηγέον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ σώφρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν εἶπερ αὖ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἢ αὐτῇ δόξα

Ε ἔνεστι τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οὔστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἂν εἶη τοῦτο ἐνόν· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Ἐν ποτέροις οὖν φήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἐνεῖναι, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; Ἐν ἀμφοτέροις που, ἔφη. Ὁρᾶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπικεικῶς ἐμαντευόμεθα ἄρτι, ὡς ἀρμονία τινὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη ὁμοίωται; Τί δή; Ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἢ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἢ σοφία ἐν μέρει

432 τινὶ ἑκατέρα ἐνοῦσα ἢ μὲν σοφὴν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὕτη, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται, διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη ξυνάδοντας τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὄτω οὖν τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε

<sup>a</sup> Plato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal links. Cf. *supra* 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. καὶ μὴν introduces a further verification of the definition.

<sup>b</sup> που marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as Aristotle and others have taken it, that σωφροσύνη is the distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for the lower sense of σωφροσύνη, but in the higher sense of the willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination to the whole, it is common to all classes.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of (faulty) definition by metaphor (*Topics* iv. 3. 5).

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

“ Most assuredly,” he said. “ And is it not also to be called sober <sup>a</sup> in all these respects ? ” “ Indeed it is,” he said. “ And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so ? ” “ I most emphatically do,” he said. “ In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition ? In the rulers or in the ruled ? ” “ In both, I suppose, <sup>b</sup> ” he said. “ Do you see then,” said I, “ that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony <sup>c</sup> ? ” “ Why so ? ” “ Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut <sup>d</sup> throughout, bringing about <sup>e</sup> the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please, <sup>f</sup> in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right

<sup>a</sup> δι’ ὅλης : sc. τῆς πόλεως, but as ἀτεχνῶς shows (cf. *supra* on 419 E) it already suggests the musical metaphor of the entire octave διὰ πασῶν.

<sup>e</sup> The word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. ταῦτόν, the object of συνάδοντας, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the *Laws* and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations.

<sup>f</sup> For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on *Meno* 71 E and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the *Laws*, ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, *Laws* 690 A ff. and *infra* 434 B.

ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαίμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοϊαν σωφρο-  
 σύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνωνος κατὰ φύσιν  
 Β ξυμφωνίαν, ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ  
 ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ. Πάνυ μοι, ἔφη, ξυνδοκεῖ. Εἶεν,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὰ μὲν τρία ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατῶπται,  
 ὡς γε οὕτως δόξαι· τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὃ  
 ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; δῆλον  
 γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Δῆλον. Οὐκ-  
 οὔν, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας  
 τινὰς θάμνον κύκλῳ περιίστασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν  
 νοῦν, μή πη διαφύγη ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀφανι-  
 C σθείσα ἀδηλος γένηται· φανερόν γάρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτη  
 πη ἐστίν· ὄρα οὔν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, ἐάν πως  
 πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἴδῃς καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσῃς. Εἰ γὰρ  
 ὄφελον, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ἐάν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρῆ  
 καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν, πάνυ μοι  
 μετρίως χρήσει. Ἔπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐξάμενος μετ'  
 ἐμοῦ. Ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡγοῦ.  
 Καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος

<sup>a</sup> The final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato's thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. *Def. Plat.* 413 E, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 15 f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether *σωφροσύνη* is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη*. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato's purpose in the imagery and analogies of the *Republic*. <sup>b</sup> Cf. on 351 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Dem.* xx. 18 and 430 E ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν. Plato's definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519.

<sup>d</sup> δι' ὃ: cf. my paper on the Origin of the Syllogism, *Class. Phil.* vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas "already" in the first four books. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35, n. 238, p. 38.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

in affirming this unanimity <sup>a</sup> to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.<sup>b</sup>” “I entirely concur,” he said. “Very well,” said I; “we have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.<sup>c</sup> What can be the remaining form that <sup>d</sup> would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice.” “Obvious.” “Now then,<sup>e</sup> Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen <sup>f</sup> to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me.” “Would that I could,” he said; “but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair <sup>g</sup> use of me.” “Pray <sup>h</sup> for success then,” said I, “and follow along with me.” “That I will do, only lead on,” he said. “And truly,” said I, “it appears to be an inaccessible

<sup>a</sup> *νῦν δὴ*: i.e. *νῦν ἤδη*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 235 B, *Euthydem.* 290 B-C, *Phaedo* 66 C, *Laws* 654 E, *Parmen.* 128 C, *Lysis* 218 C, Thompson on *Meno* 96 E, Huxley, *Hume*, p. 139 “There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy.” Cf. also Hardy’s “He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game.” The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of *δικαιοσύνη* and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.

<sup>c</sup> It is not necessary, though plausible, to emend *μετρίως* to *μετρίω*. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence’s “benigno me utetur patre.”

<sup>d</sup> Prayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. *Tim.* 27 C, *Laws* 712 B.

φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκικς· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ  
**D** δυσδιερεύνητος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον. Ἰτέον γάρ,  
 ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδῶν Ἰοῦ ἰού, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων·  
 κινδυνεύομέν τι ἔχειν ἴχνος, καί μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ  
 τι ἐκφευξείσθαι ἡμᾶς. Εὐ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δ' ὄς.  
 Ἡ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.  
 Τὸ ποῖον; Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ  
 ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶ-  
 μεν ἄρ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡμεν καταγελαστότατοι· ὥσ-  
**E** περ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες ζητοῦσιν ἐνίοτε ὃ  
 ἔχουσι, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν,  
 πόρρω δέ ποι ἀπεσκοποῦμεν, ἦ δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν  
 ἴσως ἡμᾶς. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὕτως, εἶπον, ὡς  
 δοκοῦμέν μοι καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες  
 πάλαι οὐ μανθάνειν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐλέγομεν  
 τρόπον τινὰ αὐτό. Μακρόν, ἔφη, τὸ προοίμιον τῷ  
 ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἀκοῦσαι.

433 X. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄκουε, εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω.  
 ὃ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός,  
 ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατωκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ  
 δοκεῖ, ἥτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἢ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα  
 δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὅτι  
 ἓνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν  
 πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα

<sup>a</sup> τὸ πάθος: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 201 A.

<sup>c</sup> A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes use.

<sup>d</sup> This sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. on 344 E. Justice is a species falling under the vague genus τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν, which Critias in the *Charmides* proposed as a definition of σωφροσύνη (*Charm.* 161 B),

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place, lying in deep shadows." "It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up." "But all the same on we must go." "Yes, on." And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, "Glaucou, I think we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get away from us." "I am glad to hear that," said he. "Truly," said I, "we were slackers<sup>a</sup> indeed." "How so?" "Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet<sup>b</sup> from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.<sup>c</sup> So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which was perhaps the reason it escaped us." "What do you mean?" he said. "This," I replied, "that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves<sup>d</sup> or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense." "That is a tedious prologue," he said, "for an eager listener."

X. "Listen then," said I, "and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or<sup>e</sup> some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, if you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature was best adapted." "Yes, we said that." "And

but failed to sustain owing to his inability to distinguish the various possible meanings of the phrase. In the *Republic* too we have hitherto failed to "learn from ourselves" its true meaning, till now when Socrates begins to perceive that if taken in the higher sense of spiritual division of labour in the soul and in the state, it is the long-sought justice. Cf. *infra* 433 B-C-D, 443 C-D.

εἶη. Ἐλέγομεν γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ  
 πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί,  
 B καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. Εἰρήκαμεν γάρ. Τοῦτο τοί-  
 νυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ  
 γιγνόμενον ἢ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράτ-  
 τειν. οἶσθα ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ λέγ',  
 ἔφη. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ  
 πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας  
 καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν  
 δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομέ-  
 νοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνῆ. καίτοι  
 C ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων,  
 εἰ τὰ τρία εὖροισιν. Καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.  
 Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρίναι, τί τὴν  
 πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται  
 ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἂν εἶη, πότερον ἢ ὁμοδοξία  
 τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἢ ἢ περὶ δεινῶν  
 τε καὶ μή, ἅττα ἐστί, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν  
 τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἢ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχουσι  
 D φρόνησις τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἢ τοῦτο μάλιστα  
 ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν  
 γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ  
 καὶ ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἰς  
 ὧν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει. Δύσκριτον,  
 ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς εἴκει, πρὸς

<sup>a</sup> This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 236. A Greek could at any time say that minding one's own business and not being a busybody is *σωφρον* or *δίκαιον* or both.

<sup>b</sup> *τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον*: as in the translation, not "justice

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

again that to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice, is a saying that we have heard from many and have very often repeated ourselves.<sup>a</sup>"

"We have." "This, then," I said, "my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,<sup>b</sup> this principle of doing one's own business. Do you know whence I infer this?" "No, but tell me," he said. "I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that<sup>c</sup> we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three." "That is an unavoidable conclusion," he said. "But moreover," said I, "if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody." "Hard to decide indeed," he said. "A thing, then, that in its contribution to

seems somehow to be proving to be this." *Cf.* 432 E, 516 C, *Lysis* 217 E, *Laws* 910 B, *infra* 495 A, 596 D, Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, 830. Yet, *cf.* *Polit.* 291 D.

<sup>c</sup> *καίτοι*: *cf.* on 360 C and 376 B. Here it points out the significance of *τὸ ὑπόλοιπον* if true, while *ἀλλὰ μέντοι* introduces the considerations that prove it true.



ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφρο-  
 σύνη καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ  
 αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Οὐκ-  
 οὔν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς  
 Ε ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης; Παντάπασι μὲν οὔν. Σκό-  
 πει δὴ καὶ τῇδε, εἰ οὕτω δόξει. ἄρα τοῖς ἄρ-  
 χουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζουν;  
 Τί μὴν; Ἡ ἄλλου οὔτινοσοῦν μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενοι  
 δικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστοι μὴτ' ἔχωσι  
 τὰλλότρια μῆτε τῶν αὐτῶν στέρωνται; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ  
 τούτου. Ὡς δικαίου ὄντος; Ναί. Καὶ ταύτη  
 ἄρα πῃ ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ  
 434 πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν ὁμολογοῖτο. Ἔστι ταῦτα.  
 Ἴδὲ δὴ, ἐὰν σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ξυνδοκῇ. τέκτων  
 σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν ἔργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ σκυτο-  
 τόμος τέκτονος, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες  
 τὰλλήλων ἢ τιμάς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφό-  
 τερα πράττειν, πάντα τὰλλα μεταλλαττόμενα ἄρα  
 σοὶ ἂν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν; Οὐ πάννυ, ἔφη.  
 Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε, οἶμαι, δημιουργὸς ὢν ἢ τις ἄλλος  
 Β χρηματιστῆς φύσει, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ  
 ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ  
 πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχειρῆ ἵέναι, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν  
 τις εἰς τὸ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος ἀνάξιος

<sup>a</sup> γε argues from the very meaning of ἐνάμιλλον. Cf. *supra* 379 B.

<sup>b</sup> So *Phaedo* 79 E ἄρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε. It introduces a further confirmation. The mere judicial and conventional conception of justice can be brought under the formula in a fashion (πῃ *infra*), for legal justice "est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens." Cf. *supra* 331 E and *Aristot. Rhet.* 1366 b 9 ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος.

<sup>c</sup> τὰλλότρια: the article is normal; Stallb. on *Phaedr.* 230 A. 370

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the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task." "It is indeed," he said. "And is not justice the name you would have to give <sup>a</sup> to the principle that rivals these as conducing to the virtue of state?" "By all means," "Consider it in this wise too <sup>b</sup> if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers?" "Of course." "Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others <sup>c</sup> or be deprived of his own?" "Nothing else but this." "On the assumption that this is just?" "Yes." "From this point of view too, then, the having <sup>d</sup> and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice." "That is so." "Consider now <sup>e</sup> whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another's tools or honours or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?" "Not much," he said. "But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these inter-

For the ambiguity of *τάλλοτρια* cf. 443 D. So *οικείου* is one's own in either the literal or in the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and *ἐαυτοῦ* is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on 443 D.

<sup>d</sup> *ἔξις* is still fluid in Plato and has not yet taken the technical Aristotelian meaning of habit or state.

<sup>e</sup> A further confirmation. For what follows cf. 421 A.

ῶν, καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων οὔτοι ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι καὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἢ ὅταν ὁ αὐτὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα ἐπιχειρῆ πράττειν, τότε οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὄλεθρον εἶναι τῇ πόλει. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἡ τριῶν ἄρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς  
 C ἄλληλα μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κακουργία. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσεις εἶναι; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἀδικία.

XI. Πάλιν δὲ ὧδε λέγωμεν· χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκειοπραγία, ἐκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, τούναντίον ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν  
 D παρέχοι. Οὐκ ἄλλη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔχειν ἢ ταύτη. Μηδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶ πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἓνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμο-

<sup>a</sup> μάλιστα with κακουργία.

<sup>b</sup> πάλιν, "again," here means conversely. Cf. 425 A. The definition is repeated in terms of the three citizen classes to prepare the way for testing it in relation to the individual soul, which, if the analogy is to hold, must possess three corresponding faculties or parts. The order of words in this and many Platonic sentences is justified by the psychological "investigation," which showed that when the question "which do you like best, apples, pears, or cherries?" was presented in the form "apples, pears, cherries, which do you like best?" the reaction time was appreciably shortened.

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change their tools and their honours or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state.” “By all means.” “The interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly <sup>a</sup> works it harm.” “Precisely so.” “And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice?” “Of course.” “This, then, is injustice.

XI. “Again,<sup>b</sup> let us put it in this way. The proper functioning <sup>c</sup> of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that <sup>d</sup> just described, would be justice and would render the city just.” “I think the case is thus and no otherwise,” said he. “Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,<sup>e</sup>” I said, “but if this form <sup>f</sup> when applied to the individual man, is

<sup>c</sup> *οικειπραγία*: this coinage is explained by the genitive absolute. Proclus (Kroll i. p. 207) substitutes *αὐτοπραγία*. So *Def. Plat.* 411 ε.

<sup>d</sup> *ἐκείνου*: cf. *ἐκείνοις*, 425 Δ.

<sup>e</sup> *παγίως*: cf. 479 c, Aristot. *Met.* 1062 b 15.

<sup>f</sup> The doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to Plato at this time. Cf. *supra* on 402 β, and *Unity of Plato’s Thought*, p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not invoke the theory of *παρουσία* here to account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or definition of justice. Cf. 538 δ, and the use of *ἐλθών* in Eurip. *Suppl.* 562 and of *ἴον* in *Phileb.* 52 ε. Plato, in short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says in the words *δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν*, *Eth. Nic.* 1107 a 28.

λογῆται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, ξυγχωρησόμεθα ἤδη· τί γὰρ καὶ ἐροῦμεν; εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἄλλο τι σκεψόμεθα· νῦν δ' ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, ἣν ὤηθημεν, εἰ ἐν μείζονί τινι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾶον ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κατιδεῖν οἶόν ἐστι, καὶ

Ε ἔδοξε δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο εἶναι πόλις, καὶ οὕτως ὠκίζομεν ὡς ἐδυνάμεθα ἀρίστην, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι ἐν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἂν εἴη. ὁ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἕνα, κἂν μὲν ὁμολογῆται, καλῶς ἔξει· ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐμφαίνεται, πάλιν

435 ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν, καὶ τάχ' ἂν παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φανεράν γενομένην βεβαιωσαίμεθ' ἂν αὐτὴν παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, καθ' ὁδόν τε λέγεις καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτως. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ γε

<sup>a</sup> In 368 E. For the loose internal accusative ἣν cf. 443 B, *Laws* 666 B, *Phaedr.* 249 D, *Sophist* 264 B, my paper on Illogical Idiom, *T.A.P.A.*, 1916, vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl's "This is the play that the reward is offered for the best name suggested for it."

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which<sup>a</sup> we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,<sup>b</sup> we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good<sup>c</sup> city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side<sup>d</sup> and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks<sup>e</sup> we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,<sup>f</sup> and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.” “Well,” he said, “that seems a sound method<sup>g</sup> and that is what we must do.” “Then,” said I, “if you

<sup>b</sup> ἐκεῖ though redundant need not offend in this intentionally anacoluthic and resumptive sentence. Some inferior mss. read ἐκεῖνο. Burnet's <ἤ> is impossible.

<sup>c</sup> ἐν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ: cf. on 427 E, and for the force of γε cf. 379 B, 403 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Sophist* 230 B τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, *Isoc. Areopagit.* 79, *Nic.* 17.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. L. & S. and Morgan, “De Ignis Eliciendi Modis,” *Harvard Studies*, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18) καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὡσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 484 B, *Epistle* vii. 344 B.

<sup>g</sup> Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.

ταῦτόν ἄν τις προσείποι μείζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀνόμοιον τυγχάνει ὃν ταύτη ἢ ταῦτόν προσ-  
 αγορεύεται, ἢ ὅμοιον; "Ὁμοιον, ἔφη. Καὶ δίκαιος  
 Β ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς  
 δικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ' ὅμοιος ἔσται.  
 "Ὁμοιος, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι  
 δικαία, ὅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τριπτὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόητα τὸ  
 αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἔπραττε· σώφρων δὲ αὖ καὶ  
 ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν  
 ἀλλ' ἅττα πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ  
 τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιώσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ  
 C ταῦτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ  
 πάθη ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθῶς ἀξιού-  
 σθαι τῇ πόλει. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰς φαῦλόν  
 γε αὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, σκέμμα ἐμπεπτώ-  
 καμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἶδη ταῦτα  
 ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μή. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, εἰς  
 φαῦλον. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον

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<sup>a</sup> ὃ γε ταῦτόν : there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato's ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the *Republic*. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf. *Introd.* p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

call a thing by the same<sup>a</sup> name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like?" "Like," he said. "Then a just man too will not differ<sup>b</sup> at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it." "Yes, like." "But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits<sup>c</sup> of these three kinds." "True," he said. "Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations." "Inevitable," he said. "Goodness gracious," said I, "here is another trifling<sup>d</sup> inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not." "It does not seem to me at all trifling," he said, "for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are

γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταύτον. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and *Polit.* 278 E; cf. also *Parmen.* 139 E.

The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 369 A and *Meno* 72 B. In *Phileb.* 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.

<sup>c</sup> ἔξεις is here almost the Aristotelian ἔξις. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1105 b 20, regards πάθη, ἔξεις and δυνάμεις as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For δυνάμεις cf. 477 c, Simplic. *De An.* Hayduck, p. 289 ἀλλὰ τὰ ὦν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωὴν, τὰ τρία μόνον παρεῖληφεν.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 423 C.



ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. Φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἔγω· καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη<sup>1</sup> γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα· ἴσως μέντοι τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκευασμένων ἀξίως. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη· ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι ἱκανῶς ἂν ἔχοι. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, ἔμοιγε καὶ πάνυ ἐξαρκέσει. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ σκόπει. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἔγω, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκάστω ἐνεστὶν ἡμῶν εἶδη τε καὶ ἦθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκείσε

<sup>1</sup> The inferior reading ἀλλὰ of several good mss. would not appreciably affect the meaning.

<sup>a</sup> A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.

<sup>b</sup> τοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the "longer way" as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a "new logic" hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato's thought and the composition of the *Republic* based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

difficult.<sup>a</sup>” “Apparently,” said I; “and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never apprehend this matter<sup>b</sup> accurately from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of our previous statements and inquiries.” “May we not acquiesce in that?” he said; “I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present.” “And I surely should be more than satisfied,” I replied. “Don’t you weary then,” he said, “but go on with the inquiry.” “Is it not, then,” said I, “impossible for us to avoid admitting<sup>c</sup> this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could

*Cf.* Introd. p. xvi, “Idea of Good,” p. 190, *Unity of Plato’s Thought*, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connexion of it all with the idea of good.

Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (*cf.* on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. *Cf. infra* 506 E, 533 A, *Phaedo* 85 c, *Tim.* 29 B-C, *Soph.* 254 c.

<sup>c</sup> Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. *Cf.* Mill, *Logic*, vi. 7. 1 “Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man”; Spencer, *Autobiog.* ii. p. 543 “Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units.”

Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partly anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle’s name, that they are determined by climate and environment. *Cf.* Newman, Introd. to Aristot. *Pol.* pp. 318–320.

ἀφίκται. γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἶη, εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ  
 θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν  
 ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν,  
 οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ  
 σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ  
 δὴ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο  
 436 τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας  
 εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ  
 ἦκιστα. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν γνῶναι. Οὐ δῆτα.

XII. Τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπὸν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτων<sup>1</sup>  
 ἕκαστα πράττομεν ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλω·  
 μανθάνομεν μὲν ἐτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλω τῶν ἐν  
 ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν δ' αὖ τρίτῳ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν  
 Β τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων  
 ἀδελφά, ἢ ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν  
 πράττομεν, ὅταν ὀρμήσωμεν· ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ χα-  
 λεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου. Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,  
 ἔφη. Ὡς τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτὰ ὀρίζεσθαι, εἴτε  
 τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἕτερα ἔστιν. Πῶς; Δῆλον

<sup>1</sup> Obviously better than the *τούτῳ* of the better mss. accepted by Burnet.

<sup>a</sup> *αἰτιάσαιτο*: this merely varies the idiom *αἰτίαν ἔχειν* above, "predicate of," "say of." Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Eurip. *Medea* 829–830, Isoc. vii. 74, Roberts, *The Ancient Boeotians*, pp. 59, 76.

<sup>b</sup> *φιλοχρήματον* is a virtual synonym of *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Cf. 580 E and *Phaedo* 68 c, 82 c.

<sup>c</sup> In *Laws* 747 c, Plato tells us that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them *πανουργία* rather than *σοφία*.

<sup>d</sup> The question debated by psychologists from Aristotle

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not get there from any other source. It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality, as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions ; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to<sup>a</sup> the region where we dwell, or the love of money<sup>b</sup> which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians<sup>c</sup> and the population of Egypt." "One certainly might," he replied. "This is the fact then," said I, "and there is no difficulty in recognizing it." "Certainly not."

XII. "But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul<sup>d</sup> that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly." "I think so too," he said. "Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way." "How?" "It is obvious that the same

(*Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the "faculties" of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold's "Lines on Butler's Sermons" and my remarks in *The Assault on Humanism*.

Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and *Phaedo* 68 c, 82 c, and *Rep.* x. 611-12. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 42-43.

ὅτι ταῦτόν τ'ἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταῦτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτόν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἐάν που εὐρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, C εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω. Εἶεν. Σκόπει δὴ ὁ λέγω. Λέγε, ἔφη. Ἐστάναι, εἶπον, καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησώμεθα, μή πη προϊόντες ἀμφισβητήσωμεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ἄνθρωπον ἑστηκότα, κινουῦντα δὲ τὰς χεῖράς τε καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἑστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται ἅμα, οὐκ ἂν, οἶμαι, ἀξιοῖμεν οὕτω λέγειν δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν τι D αὐτοῦ ἑστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον χαριεντίζοιτο ὁ ταῦτα λέγων κομψευόμενος, ὡς οἱ γε στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἐστᾶσί τε ἅμα καὶ κινουῦνται, ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πῆξαντες τὸ κέντρον περιφέρωνται, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι κύκλῳ περιὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔδρᾳ τοῦτο δρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν

<sup>a</sup> The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. *Phaedo* 102 E, *Theaet.* 188 A, *Soph.* 220 B, *infra* 602 E.

Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (*De interp.* 17 a 36-37). Cf. *Met.* 1005 b 22 πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας, and *Rhet.* ii. 24.

Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή (*Met.* 1005 b 18).

<sup>b</sup> κατὰ ταῦτόν = in the same part of or aspect of itself; πρὸς ταῦτόν = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. *Sophist* 230 B ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐναντίας.

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thing will never do or suffer opposites<sup>a</sup> in the same respect<sup>b</sup> in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find<sup>c</sup> these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was<sup>d</sup> not the same thing functioning but a plurality.” “Very well.” “Consider, then, what I am saying.” “Say on,” he replied. “Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest<sup>e</sup> and in motion?” “By no means.” “Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part<sup>f</sup> of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so?” “It is.” “Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate<sup>g</sup> stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot

<sup>c</sup> For this method of reasoning *cf.* 478 D, 609 B, *Laws* 896 C, *Charm.* 168 B-C, *Gorg.* 496 C, *Phileb.* 11 D-E.

<sup>d</sup> ἦν = “was all along and is.”

<sup>e</sup> The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. *Cf.* *Sophist* 249 C-D, *Parmen.* 156 D and *passim*.

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* *Theaetet.* 181 E.

<sup>g</sup> The argumentative γε is controversial. For the illustration of the top *cf.* Spencer, *First Principles*, § 170, who analyzes “certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word ‘wobbling’” and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the *equilibrium mobile*.

ἀποδεχοίμεθα, ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων, ἀλλὰ  
 Ε φαίμεν ἂν ἔχειν αὐτὰ εὐθύ τε καὶ περιφερὲς ἐν  
 αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐθὺ ἐστάναι, οὐδαμῇ γὰρ  
 ἀποκλίνειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ περιφερὲς κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι.  
 ὅταν δὲ τὴν εὐθυωρίαν ἢ εἰς δεξιὰν ἢ εἰς ἀριστεράν  
 ἢ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσθεν ἐγκλίνη ἅμα  
 περιφερόμενον, τότε οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν ἐστάναι. Καὶ  
 ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων  
 λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον τι πείσει, ὡς  
 ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ  
 437 αὐτὸ τάναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἶη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν.  
 Οὐκουν ἐμέ γε, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ὅμως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα  
 μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισ-  
 βητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες καὶ βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ  
 ἀληθεῖς οὔσας μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου  
 οὔτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προΐωμεν, ὁμο-  
 λογήσαντες, εἴαν ποτε ἄλλη φανῇ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτη,  
 πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου ξυμβαίνοντα λελυμένα  
 ἔσεσθαι. Ἄλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

<sup>a</sup> The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιούτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1022 a 23 ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἔστηκεν, etc.

<sup>c</sup> εἶη, the reading of most mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy ποιεῖν πάσχειν. So *Phaedo* 97 c ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν.

<sup>d</sup> ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristot. *supra*, ἐνοχλήσεις, and *Theaetet.* 158 σ τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν.

<sup>e</sup> It is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the

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—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases <sup>a</sup> were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still <sup>b</sup> since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest.” “And that would be right,” he said. “No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be, <sup>c</sup> or do opposites.” “They will not me, I am sure,” said he. “All the same,” said I, “that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions <sup>d</sup> and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis <sup>e</sup> that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated.” “That is what we must do,” he said.

dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 471, *Polit.* 284 D, *Phaedo* 77 A, 92 D, *Tim.* 51 D, *Parmen.* 149 A. It may be used to cut short discussion (*Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maxim of contradiction can be proved only controversially against an adversary who says something (cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 7-9, *Aristot. Met.* 1012 b 1-10); and so, having sufficiently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis of its truth. Cf. *Sophist* 247 E.



**B** XIII. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἂν<sup>1</sup> ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτη διοίσει. Ἄλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἶδη τὰ

**C** νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα; οἷον αἰεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιθυμῆ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληται οἷ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἷ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορευομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως; Ἔγωγε. Τί δαί; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ

**D** εἰς ἅπαντα τὰναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐπιθυμιῶν τι

<sup>1</sup> Baiter's ἂν is of course necessary.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 496 ε, and *supra* on 435 d.

<sup>b</sup> ἐθέλειν in Plato normally means to be willing, and βούλεσθαι to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47 and n. 339, *Phileb.* 60 d. προσάγεσθαι below relates to ἐπιθυμία and ἐπινεύειν to ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Aristot. De anima* 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion, δόξα, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will.

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XIII. "Will you not then," said I, "set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavour after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?"<sup>a</sup> "None," said he, "but they are opposites." "What then," said I, "of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting<sup>b</sup> and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,<sup>c</sup> striving towards its attainment?" "I would say so," he said. "But what of not-willing<sup>d</sup> and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul's rejection<sup>e</sup> and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former?" "Of course." "This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a

<sup>a</sup> ἀβουλεῖν recalls the French coinage "nolonté," and the Southern mule's "won't-power." Cf. *Epist.* vii. 347 A, Demosth. *Epist.* ii. 17.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Aristotle's ἀνθέλκειν, *De an.* 433 b 8. "All willing is either pushing or pulling," Jastrow, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, p. 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer's *First Principles* § 80, that the phrase "impelled by desires" is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato's generalization of the concepts "attraction" and "repulsion" brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, *History of Materialism, passim*), just as his rejection in the *Timaeus* of attraction and *actio in distans* allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists.

φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος, καὶ ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν  
 τούτων ἦν τε δίψαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἦν πείναν;  
 Φήσομεν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δ'  
 ἐδωδῆς; Ναί. Ἄρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστί,  
 πλέονος ἂν τινος ἢ οὐ<sup>1</sup> λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ  
 ψυχῇ εἶη; οἷον δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἀρά γε θερμοῦ  
 ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἐνὶ  
 λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινὸς πώματος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν τις  
 Ε θερμότης τῷ δίψει προσῆ, τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπι-  
 θυμίαν προσπαρέχοιτ' ἂν, ἐὰν δὲ ψυχρότης, τὴν  
 τοῦ θερμοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλή  
 ἢ δίψα ἦ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἐὰν δὲ ὀλίγη,  
 τὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μὴ ποτε  
 ἄλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὐπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ  
 πώματος, καὶ αὐτὸ πεινῆν βρώματος; Οὕτως,  
 ἔφη, αὐτὴ γε ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον  
 ἐκάστου οὐ πέφυκε, τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ  
 438 προσγιγνώμενα. Μήτοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους  
 ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ

<sup>1</sup> Several good mss. have the obviously wrong *που*, others  
 ἢ οὐ.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 349 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 412 B and *Class. Phil.* vii. (1912) pp. 485-486.

<sup>c</sup> The argument might proceed with 439 A τοῦ διψῶντος  
 ἀρα ἢ ψυχῆ. All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a  
 caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition  
 that thirst *qua* thirst is a desire for drink only and un-  
 qualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 A) against the  
 misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must  
 be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf.  
 the dramatic correction of a misconception, *Phaedo* 79 B,  
*infra* 529 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> In the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the "pre-  
 sence" of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

class<sup>a</sup> and that the most conspicuous members of that class<sup>b</sup> are what we call thirst and hunger?" "We shall," said he. "Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food?" "Yes." "Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?<sup>c</sup> I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat<sup>d</sup> is attached<sup>e</sup> to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,<sup>f</sup> and so hunger of food." "That is so," he said; "each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such."<sup>g</sup> "Let no one then,"<sup>h</sup> said I, "disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody

*Cf.* "The Origin of the Syllogism," *Class. Phil.* vol. xix. p. 10. But in the concrete instance heat causes the desire of cool and *vice versa*. *Cf. Phileb.* 35 A ἐπιθυμεί τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει.

If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (*cf. Lysis* 215 E τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ), there is no need of Hermann's transposition of ψυχροῦ and θερμοῦ, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with πλήθους παρουσίαν . . . τοῦ πολλοῦ below.

<sup>e</sup> προσῆ denotes that the "presence" is an addition. *Cf.* προσείη in *Parmen.* 149 E.

<sup>f</sup> *Phileb.* 35 A adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink.

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* 429 B. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).

<sup>h</sup> μήτοι τις = look you to it that no one, etc.

ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ  
 σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.  
 εἰ οὖν ἢ δίψα ἐπιθυμία ἐστί, χρηστοῦ ἂν εἴη εἴτε  
 πώματος εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ  
 ἄλλαι οὕτω. Ἴσως γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, δοκοῖ τὶ λέγειν ὁ  
 ταῦτα λέγων. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα γ'  
 Β ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιά ἅττα ποιοῦ  
 τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα  
 αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου μόνον. Οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἔφη. Οὐκ  
 ἔμαθες, ἔφην, ὅτι τὸ μείζον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον  
 τινός εἶναι μείζον; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάτ-  
 τονος; Ναί. Τὸ δέ γε πολὺ μείζον πολὺ ἐλάτ-  
 τονος. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ  
 μείζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μείζον  
 ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 C Καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλα-  
 σια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεια καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ  
 βαρύτερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάπτω πρὸς τὰ  
 βραδύτερα, καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ

<sup>a</sup> ἄρα marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf. *supra* 358 c, 364 e, 381 e, 499 c. Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.

<sup>b</sup> ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. ὅσα etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other also is taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (cf. *supra* on 347 b), represents the interlocutor as not understanding the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run <sup>a</sup>) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires." "Why," he said, "there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection." "But I need hardly remind you," said I, "that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.<sup>b</sup>" "I don't understand," he said. "Don't you understand," said I, "that the greater <sup>c</sup> is such as to be greater than something?" "Certainly." "Is it not than the less?" "Yes." "But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?" "Yes." "And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less?" "Surely." "And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind,<sup>d</sup> in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom.

<sup>c</sup> The notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. *Charm.* 167 E, *Theaetet.* 160 A, *Symp.* 199 D-E, *Parmen.* 133 c ff., *Sophist* 255 D, *Aristot. Topics* vi. 4, and *Cat.* v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the *Politicus* 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 61, 62, and *infra* 531 A.

<sup>d</sup> *καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ . . . καὶ ἔτι γέ* etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantities, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical properties.

πάντα τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιῶντινός καὶ τινός. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οὐκ, ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι; Τί μήν; Ἄρ' οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἷα ἑτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιῶντινός, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαι; Ἔστιν οὕτω.

XIV. Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φάθι με τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναί του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστίν, ἐ τῶν δὲ ποιῶντινῶν ποιά ἅττα. καὶ οὐ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἷων ἂν ἦ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινὴ καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ οὐπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιῶντινός, τοῦτο

<sup>a</sup> Plato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of ἐπιστήμη is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. *Parmen.* 134 A.

But the relativity of ἐπιστήμη (Aristot. *Top.* iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in *Charm.* 168 and to theological in *Parmen.* 134 c-e, which are waived by this phrase. Science in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. *Sophist* 257 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 37 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 393 B, *Phaedo* 81 D, and for the thought Aristot. *Met.* 1030 b 2 ff. The "added determinants" need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

does not the same hold?" "By all means." "But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever<sup>a</sup> we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture."

"Certainly." "Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind<sup>b</sup> such as no other of all the rest?"

"Yes." "And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences?" "That is so."

XIV. "This then," said I, "if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something, those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don't at all mean<sup>c</sup> that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing<sup>d</sup> of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In *Gorg.* 476 B this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in *Laws* 859-860.

<sup>a</sup> αὐτοῦ ὄπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν is here a mere periphrasis for μαθήματος, αὐτοῦ expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or *per se*, but ὄπερ or ἤπερ ἐστίν is often a synonym of αὐτός or αὐτή in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 71 B, *Sophist* 255 D τοῦτο ὄπερ ἐστίν εἶναι.



δ' ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιά δὴ τις ξυνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησε μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς προσγενομένου ἰατρικὴν. "Ἐμαθον, ἔφη, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δῖψος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ  
 439 τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν; ἔστι δὲ δῆπου δῖψος; "Ἐγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώματός γε. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦ μὲν τινος πώματος ποίον τι καὶ δῖψος, δῖψος δ' οὖν αὐτὸ οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ, οὐδ' ἐνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινός, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον αὐτὸ δῖψος πέφυκεν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἢ ψυχὴ, καθ' ὅσον διψῆ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ  
 Β τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὄρμα. Δῆλον δὴ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἶη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ, φαμέν,

<sup>a</sup> δὴ marks the application of this digression on relativity, for δῖψος is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink.

<sup>b</sup> τῶν τινὸς εἶναι: If the text is sound, εἶναι seems to be taken twice, (1) with τοῦτο etc., (2) τῶν τινὸς as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι in Aesch. *Ag.* 788. Cf. Tennyson's

How sweet are looks that ladies bend  
 On whom their favours fall,

and Pope's

And virgins smiled at what they blushed before.

Possibly θήσεις τῶν τινὸς is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and εἶναι τοῦτο etc. is a loose epexegetis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam's insertion of καὶ τινὸς between τινὸς and εἶναι, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. further *Sophist* 255 D, Aristot. *Met.* 1021 a 27, Aristot. *Cat.* v., *Top.* vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

namely, of health and disease, the result <sup>a</sup> was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science." "I understand," he said, "and agree that it is so." "To return to thirst, then," said I, "will you not class it with the things <sup>b</sup> that are of something and say that it is what it is <sup>c</sup> in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst?" "I will," said he, "—namely of drink." "Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only." "By all means." "The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this." "Obviously." "Then if anything draws it back <sup>d</sup> when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast <sup>e</sup> to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that

relative terms are those whose very being is the relation *καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι*.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 437 c, Aristot. *De an.* 433 b 8, *Laws* 644 ε, *infra* 604 β, *Phaedr.* 238 c. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different from the animal appetite which it overpowers. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1102 b 24, *Laws* 863 ε.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *infra* 589, *Epist.* 335 β. Cf. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, article xlvii: "En quoi consistent les combats qu'on a coutume d'imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l'âme." He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the "lower soul" is the body. Cf. *ibid.* lxxviii, where he rejects the "concupiscible" and the "irascible."

τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα  
 τὰναντία πράττει.<sup>1</sup> Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. "Ὡσπερ γε, οἶμαι,  
 τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα  
 αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται,  
 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα χεῖρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ  
 C προσαγομένη. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότερον  
 δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν  
 πιεῖν; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις.  
 Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ  
 ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεύον, ἐνεῖναι  
 δὲ τὸ κωλύον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὄν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύ-  
 οντος; "Ἐμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. "Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν  
 κωλύον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγίγνηται,<sup>2</sup> ἐκ  
 D λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἔλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων  
 τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται; Φαίνεται. Οὐ  
 δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε  
 καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται  
 λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ

<sup>1</sup> So Ast for ms. *πράττοι*—necessarily, unless we read with Campbell *ἅμ' ἂν*.

<sup>2</sup> So Schneider; cf. 373 E: *ἐγγένηται* codd.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 68: "Plato . . . delights to prick . . . the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion (*Symp.* 187 A) or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis."

For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler's lines:

He that will win his dame must do  
 As love does when he bends his bow,  
 With one hand thrust his lady from  
 And with the other pull her home.

<sup>b</sup> *ἐνεῖναι μὲν . . . ἐνεῖναι δέ*: the slight artificiality of the anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle *κελεύον . .*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing.” “We must admit that it does not.” “So I fancy it is not well said of the archer<sup>a</sup> that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to.” “By all means,” he said. “Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink?” “We are indeed,” he said, “many and often.” “What then,” said I, “should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is<sup>b</sup> a something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids?” “I think so.” “And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections<sup>c</sup> and diseases?” “Apparently.” “Not unreasonably,” said I, “shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational<sup>d</sup> and that with which it loves,

κωλύον. Cf. Iambl. *Protrept.* p. 41 Postelli ἔστι γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃ κελεύει καὶ κωλύει.

<sup>c</sup> The “pulls” are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. *νοσημάτων* suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 4 *perturbationes*, and *passim*, and *Phileb.* 45 c.

<sup>d</sup> *λογιστικόν* is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 c, 571 c, 587 d, 605 b. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. *Crito* 46 b (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the *λόγος*), *Theaetet.* 186 c *ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν*, and *Laws* 644 d. Aristot. *Eth.* 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.

ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταῖρον. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' Εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθ' ἂν οὕτως. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὠρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόητα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές; Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιῶν ἐκ Πειραιέως ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δ' αὖ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ

<sup>a</sup> ἐπτόηται: almost technical, as in Sappho's ode, for the flutter of desire. ἀλόγιστον, though applied here to the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 28.

<sup>b</sup> So the bad steed which symbolizes the ἐπιθυμητικόν in *Phaedr.* 253 E is ἀλαζονείας ἐταῖρος.

<sup>c</sup> We now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggests, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the *Timaeus* 69 D.

In *Laws* 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, *De ira*, i. 9, and *passim*. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, *Lord Brougham*: "Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter<sup>a</sup> and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion<sup>b</sup> of various repletions and pleasures.” “It would not be unreasonable but quite natural,” he said, “for us to think this.” “These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos<sup>c</sup> or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?” “Perhaps,” he said, “with one of these, the appetitive.” “But,” I said, “I once heard a story<sup>d</sup> which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,<sup>e</sup> becoming aware of dead bodies<sup>f</sup> that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he

The supine placidity of civilization is not favourable to animosity [Bacon’s word for θυμός].” Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: “The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions,” etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.

<sup>a</sup> Socrates has heard and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk’s guess identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 739.

<sup>e</sup> He was following the outer side of the north wall up to the city. Cf. *Lysis* 203 A, Frazer, *Paus.* ii. 40, Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, i. p. 190.

<sup>f</sup> The corpses were by, near, or with the executioner (ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι) whether he had thrown them into the pit (βάραθρον) or not.

## PLATO

440 τέως μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν, ἔφη, ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος. "Ἦκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός. Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλω. Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

XV. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι, λαιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, αἰροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν, ἀντιπράττειν, οἶμαί δε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτέ ἐν σαυτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι, οἶμαι δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

C Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν, οὐχ ὅσω ἂν γενναιότερος ἦ, τοσοῦτῳ ἦττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ'

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Antiph. fr. 18 Kock πληγείς, τέως μὲν ἐπεκράτει τῆς συμφορᾶς, etc., and

Maids who shrieked to see the heads  
Yet shrieking pressed more nigh.

<sup>b</sup> He apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo's, "Eyes, look your last."

<sup>c</sup> αὐτόν: we shift from the θυμός to the man and back again.

<sup>d</sup> ἀντιπράττειν: that is, oppose the reason. It may be construed with δεῖν or as the verb of αὐτόν. There are no real difficulties in the passage, though many have been found. The order of words and the anacoluthon are intentional and effective. Cf. *supra* on 434 c. οὐκ ἂν . . . ποτέ is to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is

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resisted<sup>a</sup> and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, 'There, ye wretches,<sup>b</sup> take your fill of the fine spectacle!' " "I too," he said, "have heard the story." "Yet, surely, this anecdote," I said, "signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien." "Yes, it does," he said.

XV. "And do we not," said I, "on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him; and that as it were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its<sup>c</sup> making common cause<sup>d</sup> with the desires against the reason when reason whispers low<sup>e</sup> 'Thou must not'—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either." "No, by heaven," he said. "Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong,<sup>f</sup> is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold<sup>g</sup> and what-

speaking of the normal action of uncorrupted *θυμός*. Plato would not accept the psychology of Euripides' *Medea* (1079-1080):

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,  
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

Cf. Dr. Loeb's translation of Decharme, p. 340.

<sup>a</sup> αἰροῦντος: cf. 604 c, and L. & S. s.v. A. II. 5.

<sup>b</sup> So Aristot. *Rhet.* 1380 B 17 οὐ γίνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, and *Eth. Nic.* 1135 b 28 ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ὀργὴ ἐστίν. This is true only with Plato's reservation γενναίωτερος. The baser type is angry when in the wrong.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Demosth. xv. 10 for the same general idea.



ἐκείνου, ὃν ἂν οἶηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν, καί, ὃ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; Ἐλεῖται, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγῆται, οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν  
**D** καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὡσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πρᾶνθῇ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ὧ λέγεις, καίτοι γ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὡσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως. Καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς  
**E** τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμεί; Τὸ ποῖον; Ὅτι τοῦναντίον ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ ὠόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν ἕτερον ὄν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἶδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ

<sup>a</sup> ὃ λέγω: idiomatic, "as I was saying."

<sup>b</sup> ἐν τούτῳ: possibly "in such an one," preferably "in such a case." θυμός is plainly the subject of ζεῖ. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristot. *De an.* 403 a 31 ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to λήγει. καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν . . . πάσχειν is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice.

<sup>c</sup> τῶν γενναίων: i.e. the θυμός of the noble, repeating ὅσῳ δὲ γενναίωτερος ἢ above. The interpretation "does not desist from his noble (acts)" destroys this symmetry and has no

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soever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say<sup>a</sup> his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one?" "True," he said. "But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that case<sup>b</sup> seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger, cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble souls<sup>c</sup> it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed." "Your similitude is perfect," he said, "and it confirms<sup>d</sup> our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city." "You apprehend my meaning excellently," said I. "But do you also take note of this?" "Of what?" "That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions<sup>e</sup> of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason." "By all means," he said. "Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul,

warrant in Plato's use of *γενναῖος*. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only argument against the view here taken is that "*θυμός* is not the subject of *λήγει*," which it plainly is. The shift from *θυμός* to the man in what follows is no difficulty and is required only by *τελευτήση*, which may well be a gloss. Cf. *A.J.P.* xvi. p. 237.

<sup>d</sup> *καίτοι γε* calls attention to the confirmation supplied by the image. Cf. *supra* on 376 B, and my article in *Class. Journ.* vol. iii. p. 29.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 440 B and *Phaedr.* 237 E.

ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυνείχεν  
 441 αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρη-  
 τικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό  
 ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὃν τῷ λογιστικῷ  
 φύσει, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῆ;  
 Ἄνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄν γε τοῦ  
 λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι φανῆ ὡσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ  
 ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὄν. Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι.  
 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι  
 θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστὰ ἐστι, λογισμοῦ  
 Β δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμ-  
 βάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις  
 ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ  
 ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἶπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου μαρτυ-  
 ρήσει, τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλήττον  
 C πεποίηκεν Ὀμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ  
 βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ.  
 Κομιδῆ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

XVI. Ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μόγις δια-  
 νευέκαμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιεικῶς ὁμολογεῖται, τὰ  
 αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῇ  
 ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν. Ἔστι

<sup>a</sup> It still remains to distinguish the λογιστικόν from θυμός, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess θυμός (cf. *Laws* 963 E, *Aristot. Pol.* 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in *Phaedo* 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the

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the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?" "We have to assume it as a third," he said. "Yes," said I, "provided<sup>a</sup> it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive." "That is not hard to be shown," he said; "for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late." "Yes, by heaven, excellently said," I replied; "and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.

For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing." "You are entirely right," he said.

XVI. "Through these waters, then," said I, "we have with difficulty made our way<sup>b</sup> and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us."

passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the *Timæus*. See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 42-43.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Parmen.* 137 A, Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 114 ἐκνεύσαι.

ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνό γε ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς πόλις ἦν σοφὴ καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι; Τί μὴν; Καὶ ᾧ δὴ ἀνδρείος  
**D** ἰδιώτης καὶ ὡς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὡσαύτως ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ δίκαιον δὴ, ᾧ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι, φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία. Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. Ἄλλ' οὐ πη μὴν τοῦτο ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικαία ἦν. Οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελήσθαι. Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂν τὰ αὐτοῦ  
**E** ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττη, οὗτος δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων. Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μνημονευτέον. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ ξυμμάχῳ τούτου; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις ξύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα  
**442** καὶ τρέφουσα λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιείσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἀρμονία τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ; Κομιδῆ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Καὶ τούτῳ δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προσταθήσετον<sup>1</sup> τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ

<sup>1</sup> Bekker's *προσταθήσετον* is better than the *ms.* *προστήσετον*.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 435 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Meno* 73 c, *Hipp. Major* 295 D. A virtual synonym for τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει, *Meno* 72 E.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

“That is so.” “Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby<sup>a</sup> the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise?” “Surely.” “And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way<sup>b</sup>?” “Necessarily.” “Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just.” “That too is quite inevitable.” “But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function.” “I don’t think we have forgotten,” he said. “We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom<sup>c</sup> the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.” “We must indeed remember,” he said. “Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally?” “Assuredly.” “Then is it not, as we said,<sup>d</sup> the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?” “Quite so,” said he. “And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,<sup>e</sup> will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass<sup>f</sup> of the soul in each of us and the

<sup>a</sup> *δτον*: cf. 431 B οὐ, and 573 D ὡν.      <sup>d</sup> Cf. 411 E, 412 A.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* on 433 B-E, *infra* 443 D, and *Charm.* 161 B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 431 A-B, *Laws* 689 A-B.

χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον· ὃ τηρήσεται, μὴ  
 τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων  
 ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὐ-  
 Β τοῦ πράττη, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν  
 ἐπιχειρήσει ὧν οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ξύμ-  
 παντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψει. Πάνυ μὲν  
 οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν  
 πολεμίους τούτῳ ἂν κάλλιστα φυλαττοίτην ὑπὲρ  
 ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν  
 βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἐπόμενον δὲ τῷ  
 ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα;  
 Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ  
 C μέρει καλοῦμεν ἓνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμο-  
 ειδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ  
 τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή. Ὅρθως  
 γ', ἔφη. Σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει,  
 τῷ ὃ ἦρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν,  
 ἔχον αὖ κακείνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμ-  
 φέροντος ἕκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν  
 D οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν  
 τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν  
 ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ;  
 Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ

<sup>a</sup> Strictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 330. καλουμένων implies the doctrine of the *Gorgias* 493 E, 494 C, *Phileb.* 42 C, *Phaedr.* 258 E, and *infra* 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 152. Cf. on λεγομένων 431 C.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 426 E, 606 B.

<sup>c</sup> προσήκον: sc. ἐστίν ἄρχειν. γένει, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads γενῶν.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body <sup>a</sup> and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to <sup>b</sup> its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting <sup>c</sup> that it should, and so overturn <sup>d</sup> the entire life of all." "By all means," he said. "Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without <sup>e</sup> also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,<sup>f</sup> the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?" "That is so." "Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures <sup>g</sup> the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared." "Right," he said. "But wise by that small part that <sup>h</sup> ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession <sup>i</sup> in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three." "By all means." "And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?" "The virtue of soberness certainly," said he, "is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 389 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* 415 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Isoc. xii. 138 αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ πάντων. <sup>g</sup> Cf. 429 C-D.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar*, § 1027.

<sup>i</sup> ἔχον: anacoluthic epexegetis, corresponding to ὅταν . . . διασώζη. αὐ probably merely marks the correspondence.



τοῦτο, πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ  
 δίκαιός γε, ὧ πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως  
 ἔσται. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ· μή  
 πη ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν  
 εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη,  
 Ε δοκεῖ. Ὡδε γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντάπασιν ἂν  
 βεβαιωσαίμεθα, εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφι-  
 σβητεῖ, τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες. Ποῖα δὴ;  
 Οἶον εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περὶ τε ἐκείνης  
 τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνη ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε  
 καὶ τετραμμένου ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν παρακατα-  
 θήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος  
 ἀποστερηῆσαι, τίν' ἂν οἶε οἰηθῆναι τοῦτο αὐτὸν  
 443 δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι; Οὐδέν' ἂν,  
 ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ  
 προδοσιῶν, ἢ ἰδία ἐταίρων ἢ δημοσία πόλεων,  
 ἐκτὸς ἂν οὗτος εἴη; Ἐκτός. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ'  
 ὄπωστιοῦν ἀπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὄρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς  
 ἄλλας ὁμολογίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν; Μοιχεῖαι μὴν  
 καὶ γονέων ἀμέλειαι καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευσίαι παντὶ  
 ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσήκουσιν. Παντὶ  
 Β μέντοι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον, ὅτι

<sup>a</sup> ὧ πολλάκις: that is, by the principle of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

<sup>b</sup> ἀπαμβλύνεται: is the edge or outline of the definition blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual?

<sup>c</sup> The transcendental or philosophical definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato's sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1178 b 16 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος . . . to say that the gods are σώφρονες. Similarly Plato feels that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap tests of prudential morality (cf. *Phaedo* 68 c-d) to intrinsic virtue. "Be this," is the highest expression of the moral

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

individual." "But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often<sup>a</sup> described." "That is altogether necessary." "Well then," said I, "has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge<sup>b</sup> of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?" "I think not," he said. "We might," I said, "completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar<sup>c</sup> tests to it." "What are these?" "For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit<sup>d</sup> of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act than men of a different kind?" "No one would," he said. "And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?" "He would." "And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements." "How could he?" "Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man." "To anyone indeed," he said. "And is not the cause

law. "Do this," inevitably follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, *Self-Reliance*: "But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself . . . If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day." The Xenophontic Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* on 332 A and Aristot. *Rhet.* 1383 b 21.

αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι; Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο. Ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

XVII. Τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτετέλεσται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, ὡς εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὧ Γλαύκων, δι' ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ, εἶδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτως. Φαίνεται. Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθὲς τοιοῦτο μὲν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πράξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἑάσαντα τὰλλότρια

<sup>a</sup> δ. *cf. supra* on 434 D.

<sup>b</sup> The contemplation of the εἶδωλον, image or symbol, leads us to the reality. The reality is always the Platonic Idea. The εἶδωλον, in the case of ordinary "things," is the material copy which men mistake for the reality (516 A). In the case of spiritual things and moral ideas, there is no visible image or symbol (*Polit.* 286 A), but imperfect analogies, popular definitions, suggestive phrases, as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, well-meant laws and institutions serve as the εἶδωλα in which the philosophic dialectician may find a reflection of the true idea. *Cf.* on 520 c, *Sophist* 234 c, *Theaetet.* 150 B.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf. Tim.* 86 D, *Laws* 731 E, *Apol.* 23 A. The reality of justice as distinguished from the εἶδωλον, which in this case is merely the economic division of labour. Adam errs in

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of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?" "Yes, that and nothing else." "Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?" "No, by heaven," he said, "I do not."

XVII. "Finished, then, is our dream and perfected—the surmise we spoke of,<sup>a</sup> that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice." "Most assuredly." "It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,<sup>b</sup> a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practise carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter<sup>c</sup> was, as it seems, that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and the things of one's self—it means that<sup>d</sup>

thinking that the real justice is justice in the soul, and the *εἰδωλον* is justice in the state. In the state too the division of labour may be taken in the lower or in the higher sense. Cf. *supra* on 370 A, *Introd.* p. xv.

<sup>a</sup> *μη̄ ε̄ασαντα . . . δόξαν* 444 A: cf. *Gorgias* 459 c, 462 a. A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the meaning of *την εντός* (*πρᾶξις*), and enumerate the conditions precedent (resumed in *οὕτω δὴ* 443 E; cf. *Protag.* 325 A) of all action which is to be called just if it tends to preserve this inner harmony of soul, and the reverse if it tends to dissolve it. The subject of *πράττειν* is anybody or Everyman. For the general type of sentence and the Stoic principle that nothing imports but virtue cf. 591 E and 618 a.

πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν  
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ  
 ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν  
 αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ  
 καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα ὡσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς  
 ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ  
 Ε μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα,  
 πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα  
 γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σῶφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον,  
 οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη, εἴαν τι πράττη ἢ περὶ  
 χρημάτων κτήσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ  
 πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πάσι  
 τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν  
 καὶ καλὴν πράξιν, ἢ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν σῶζῃ τε  
 καὶ ξυναπεργάζεται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν  
 444 ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ πράξιν,  
 ἢ ἂν αἰεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὖ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* on 433 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 491 D where Callicles does not understand.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 504.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *infra* 621 c and *supra* on 352 A.

<sup>e</sup> The harmony of the three parts of the soul is compared to that of the three fundamental notes or strings in the octave, including any intervening tones, and so by implication any faculties of the soul overlooked in the preceding classification. Cf. Plutarch, *Plat. Quest.* 9, Proclus, p. 230 Kroll. ὡσπερ introduces the images, the exact application of which is pointed by ἀτεχνῶς. Cf. on 343 c. The scholiast tries to make two octaves (δὶς διὰ πασῶν) of it. The technical musical details have at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the thought, which is that of Shakespeare's

For government, though high and low and lower,  
 Put into parts, doth keep in one concert,

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a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,<sup>a</sup> and having first attained to self-mastery<sup>b</sup> and beautiful order<sup>c</sup> within himself,<sup>d</sup> and having harmonized<sup>e</sup> these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,<sup>f</sup> one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tending of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming<sup>g</sup> the just and honourable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish

Congreeing in a full and natural close  
Like music. (Henry V. i. ii. 179.)

*Cf.* Cicero, *De Rep.* ii. 42, and Milton (*Reason of Church Government*), "Discipline . . . which with her musical chords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together."

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* *Epin.* 992 B. The idea was claimed for the Pythagoreans; *cf.* Zeller i. i. p. 463, Guyau, *Esquisse d'une Morale*, p. 109 "La moralité n'est autre chose que l'unité de l'être." "The key to effective life is unity of life," says another modern rationalist.

<sup>g</sup> *ὀνομάζοντα* betrays a consciousness that the ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. *Cf.* *Laws* 864 A-B and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1138 b 6) would regard all this as mere metaphor.

ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄν, εἰ φαῖμεν εὐρηκέσαι, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τι, οἶμαι, δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι. Μὰ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη. Φῶμεν ἄρα; Φῶμεν.

XVIII. "Ἐστω δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, οἶμαι, ἀδικίαν. Δῆλον ὅτι. Οὐκοῦν  
 Β στασίσι τινὰ αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασις μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει, οἷου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι<sup>1</sup>; τοιαῦτ' ἅττα, οἶμαι, φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τὴν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ ξυλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν. Ταῦτά μὲν  
 C οὖν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυγχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ἤδη σαφῶς, εἶπερ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη; Πῶς δὴ; Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσωδῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐν σώματι,

<sup>1</sup> πρέπειν . . . ὄντι is plainly the better reading. Burnet amends the additional τοῦ δ' αὐτῷ δουλεύειν of several mss. to τῷ δ' οὐ δουλεύειν, which might be justified by 358 Δ.

<sup>a</sup> ἐπιστήμην . . . δόξαν: a hint of a fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the *Republic*. Cf. *Meno* 97 B ff. and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage injustice. ἀμαθία is a very strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic sense: the ignorance that mistakes itself for knowledge. Cf. *Sophist* 229 c.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

ignorance, to be the opinion<sup>a</sup> that in turn presides<sup>b</sup> over this." "What you say is entirely true, Socrates." "Well," said I, "if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is<sup>c</sup> in them, I think we should not be much mistaken." "No indeed, we should not," he said. "Shall we affirm it, then?" "Let us so affirm."

XVIII. "So be it, then," said I; "next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice." "Obviously." "Must not this be a kind of civil war<sup>d</sup> of these three principles, their meddlesomeness<sup>e</sup> and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general,<sup>f</sup> all turpitude." "Precisely this," he replied. "Then," said I, "to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly—the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so." "How so?" "Because," said I, "these are in the soul what<sup>g</sup> the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body;

<sup>b</sup> ἐπιστατούσαν: Isocrates would have used a synonym instead of repeating the word.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 337 B.

<sup>d</sup> στάσιν: cf. 440 E. It is defined in *Sophist* 228 B. Aristotle would again regard this as mere metaphor.

<sup>e</sup> πολυπραγμοσύνην: *supra* 434 B and *Isoc.* viii. 59.

<sup>f</sup> ξυλλήβδην: summing up, as in *Phaedo* 69 B.

<sup>g</sup> ὡς ἐκείνα: a proportion is thus usually stated in anacoluthic apposition.



ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ. Πῆ; ἔφη. Τὰ μὲν που ὑγιεῖνα ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσώδη νόσον. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην  
**D** ἐμποιεῖ, τὸ δ' ἄδικα ἀδικίαν; Ἀνάγκη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου. Ἔστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου; Κομιδῆ, ἔφη. Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη  
**E** καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. Ἔστιν οὕτω. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἀρετῆς κτήσιν φέρει, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ εἰς κακίας; Ἀνάγκη.

XIX. Τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι, πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράτ-  
**445** τειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἔάν τε λανθάνῃ ἔάν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἔάνπερ μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

<sup>a</sup> The common-sense point of view, "fit fabricando faber." Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1103 a 32.

In *Gorg.* 460 B, Socrates argues the paradox that he who knows justice does it. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 11, n. 42.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the generalization of *ἔρως* to include medicine and music in *Symp.* 186-187, and *Tim.* 82 A, *Laws* 906 c, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 500.

<sup>c</sup> The identification of virtue with spiritual health really, as Plato says (445 A), answers the main question of the

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there is no difference." "In what respect?" he said. "Healthful things surely engender health<sup>a</sup> and diseaseful disease." "Yes." "Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice?" "Of necessity." "But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated<sup>b</sup> by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature." "Yes, that is so." "And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?" "Exactly so," he said. "Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health<sup>c</sup> and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease,<sup>d</sup> ugliness, and weakness." "It is so." "Then is it not also true that beautiful and honourable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice?" "Of necessity."

XIX. "And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practise honourable pursuits and be just, whether<sup>e</sup> one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.<sup>f</sup>" "Nay,

*Republic.* It is not explicitly used as one of the three final arguments in the ninth book, but is implied in 591 B. It is found "already" in *Crito* 47 D-E. Cf. *Gorg.* 479 B.

<sup>a</sup> *κακία . . . αἰσχος*: *Sophist* 228 E distinguishes two forms of *κακία*: νόσος or moral evil, and ignorance or αἰσχος. Cf. *Gorg.* 477 B.

<sup>e</sup> *ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε*: cf. *supra* 337 C, 367 E, 427 D, 429 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 512 A-B, and *supra* on 380 B.

γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἔάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουλευθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τούτου, ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῆσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν κτήσεται, ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνη γε ὄντα ἐκάτερα οἷα ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν. Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπέειπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἷόν τε σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν. Ἦκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, πάντων ἀποκμητέον. C Δεῦρο νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς, ὅσα καὶ εἶδη ἔχει ἢ κακία, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἃ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄξια θεάς. Ἔπομαι, ἔφη· μόνον λέγε. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 456 D. On the following *argumentum ex contrario* cf. *supra* on 336 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 353 D and Aristot. *De an.* 414 a 12 ff. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 41.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 577 D, *Gorg.* 466 E. If all men desire the good, he who does evil does not do what he really wishes.

<sup>d</sup> ὅσον . . . κατιδεῖν is generally taken as exexegetic of ἐνταῦθα. It is rather felt with οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Apol.* 25 c.

<sup>f</sup> ἃ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄξια θεάς: for καὶ cf. *Soph.* 223 A, 229 D, *Tim.* 83 c, *Polit.* 285 B, and *infra* 544 A, C-D. By the strict theory of ideas any distinction may mark a class, and so constitute an idea. (Cf. *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 22-25.) But Plato's logical practice recognizes that

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Socrates," he said, " I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity<sup>a</sup>—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live<sup>b</sup> is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases,<sup>c</sup> and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them." " Yes, it is absurd," said I; " but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavouring to discover<sup>d</sup> with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so." " That is the last thing in the world we must do," he said. " Come up here<sup>e</sup> then," said I, " that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.<sup>f</sup>" " I am with you," he said; " only do you say on." " And truly," said I, " now that we have come to this height<sup>g</sup> of argument I seem to see

only typical or relevant " Ideas " are worth naming or considering. The *Republic* does not raise the metaphysical question how a true idea is to be distinguished from a part or from a partial or casual concept. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 52-53, n. 381, *Polit.* 263 A-B.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 588 B, Emerson, *Nominalist and Realist*, ii. p. 256; " We like to come to a height of land and see the landscape, just as we value a general remark in conversation." Cf. Lowell, *Democracy*, Prose Works, vi. 8: " He who has mounted the tower of Plato to look abroad from it will never hope to climb another with so lofty a vantage of speculation." From this and 517 A-B, the *ἀνάβασις* became a technical or cant term in Neoplatonism.

ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἅττα ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. "Ὅσοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἶδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ  
**D** ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι. Πόσοι δὴ; Πέντε μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς. Λέγε, ἔφη, τίνες. Λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἰς μὲν οὗτος ὃν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἶη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθείη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῆ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν εἶδος λέγω·  
**E** οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὔτε εἰς ἐγγερόμενος κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῆ τε καὶ παιδεία χρησάμενος, ἢ διήλθομεν. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἔφη.

\* ἐν μὲν, etc. : perhaps a faint reminiscence of the line

ἔσθλοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί,

quoted by Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1106 b 35. It suggests Plato's principle of the unity of virtue, as ἄπειρα below suggests the logical doctrine of the *Phileb.* 16 and *Parmen.* 145 A, 158 B-C that the other of the definite idea is the indefinite and infinite.

<sup>b</sup> The true state is that in which knowledge governs. It may be named indifferently monarchy, or aristocracy, according as such knowledge happens to be found in one or more than one. It can never be the possession of many. Cf. *infra* 494 A. The inconsistencies which some critics have

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

as from a point of outlook that there is one form<sup>a</sup> of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of." "What do you mean?" he said. "As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, are the characters of soul." "How many, pray?" "There are five kinds of constitutions," said I, "and five kinds of soul." "Tell me what they are," he said. "I tell you," said I, "that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two.<sup>b</sup> If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy." "True," he said. "Well, then," I said, "this is one of the forms I have in mind. For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described." "It is not likely," he said.

found between this statement and other parts of the *Republic*, are imaginary. Hitherto the *Republic* has contemplated a plurality of rulers, and such is its scheme to the end. But we are explicitly warned in 540 D and 587 D that this is a matter of indifference. It is idle then to argue with Immisch, Krohn, and others that the passage marks a sudden, violent alteration of the original design.

## Ε

449 I. Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον· κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἴπερ αὕτη ὀρθή, περί τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν, ἐν τέτταρσι πονηρίας εἶδεσιν οὔσας. Ποίας δὴ ταύτας; ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὡς μοι ἐφαίνοντο ἕκασται  
 B ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν· ὁ δὲ Πολέμαρχος— σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου καθῆστο— ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὦμον ἐκείνόν τε προσηγάγετο καὶ προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἅττα προσκεκυφώς, ὦν ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τόδε δέ· Ἀφήσομεν οὖν, ἔφη, ἢ τί δράσομεν; Ἡκιστά γε, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἤδη λέγων. καὶ ἐγὼ, Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; Σέ,

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\* Cf. on 427 E, and Newman, *Introd. to Aristot. Pol.* p. 14; for ὀρθή, "normal," see p. 423.

† κατασκευήν: a highly general word not to be pressed in this periphrasis. Cf. *Gorg.* 455 E, 477 B.

‡ Cf. 562 c, *Theaetet.* 180 c, Stein on Herod. i. 5. For the transition here to the digression of books V., VI., and VII. cf. *Introd.* p. xvii, *Phaedo* 84 c. "Digression" need not imply that these books were not a part of the original design.

## BOOK V

I. "To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms good<sup>a</sup> and right—and to the corresponding kind of man; but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation<sup>b</sup> of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness." "What are these," he said. And I was going on<sup>c</sup> to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolution<sup>d</sup> from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distance<sup>e</sup> from Adeimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garment<sup>f</sup> from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothing<sup>g</sup> else save only this, "Shall we let him off,<sup>h</sup> then," he said, "or what shall we do?" "By no means," said Adeimantus, now raising his voice. "What, pray,"<sup>i</sup> said I, "is it that you are not letting off?" "You," said he. "And

<sup>a</sup> μεταβαίνειν: the word is half technical. Cf. 547 c, 550 d, *Laws* 676 a, 736 d-e, 894 a.

<sup>e</sup> ἀπωτέρω absolutely. Cf. Cratinus 229 Kock *δνοι κάθηνται τῆς λύρας ἀπωτέρω*.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 327 b.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 359 e.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. on 327 c.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. 337 d, 343 b, 421 c, 612 c, *Laches* 188 e, *Meno* 80 b. There is a play on the double meaning, "What, pray?" and "Why, pray?"



C ἢ δ' ὅς. Ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα; Ἀπορ-  
 ραθυμεῖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον οὐ τὸ  
 ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μὴ διέλθῃς,  
 καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὡς ἄρα  
 περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι  
 κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ὦ  
 Ἀδείμαντε; Ναί, ἢ δ' ὅς· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο,  
 ὥσπερ τᾶλλα, λόγου δεῖται, τίς ὁ· τρόπος τῆς  
 κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιοντο. μὴ οὖν παρῆς  
 D ὄντινα σὺ λέγεις. ὡς ἡμεῖς πάλαι περιμένομεν  
 οἰόμενοί σε που μνησθήσεσθαι παιδοποιίας τε πέρι,  
 πῶς παιδοποιήσονται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέ-  
 ψουσι, καὶ ὅλην ταύτην ἣν λέγεις κοινωνίαν  
 γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων· μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα  
 φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς  
 γιγνόμενον. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνει  
 πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἱκανῶς διελέσθαι, δέδοκται  
 450 ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ ἤκουσας, τὸ σε μὴ μεθιέναι,  
 πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὥσπερ τᾶλλα διέλθῃς. Καὶ  
 ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ὃ Γλαύκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου  
 ταύτης τίθετε. Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πᾶσι  
 ταῦτα δεδογμένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

II. Οἶον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοί

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Soph. *Trach.* 437.

<sup>b</sup> So Isoc. xv. 74 ὅλοις εἶδεσι.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 424 A, *Laws* 739 c. Aristotle says that the possessions of friends should be separate in ownership but common in use, as at Sparta. Cf. Newman, *Introd. to Aristot. Pol.* p. 201, Epicurus in Diog. Laert. x. 11, Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 a 30 ff., Eurip. *Androm.* 270.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 459 D, *Laws* 668 D, Aristot. *Pol.* 1269 b 13, Shakes. *Tro. and Cres.* i. i. 23 "But here's yet in the word *hereafter* the kneading, the making of the cake," etc.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 665 B 7.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1264 a 12.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

for what special reason, pray?" said I. "We think you are a slacker," he said, "and are trying to cheat<sup>a</sup> us out of a whole division,<sup>b</sup> and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to 'get away with it' by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common.<sup>c</sup>" "Well, isn't that right, Adeimantus?" I said. "Yes," said he, "but this word 'right,'<sup>d</sup> like other things, requires defining<sup>e</sup> as to the way<sup>f</sup> and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass over the one that you<sup>g</sup> have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing up,<sup>h</sup> and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world,<sup>i</sup> in the constitution of a state; so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest." "Set me down, too," said Glaucon, "as voting this ticket.<sup>j</sup>" "Surely," said Thrasymachus, "you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates."

II. "What a thing you have done," said I, "in thus

<sup>a</sup> Emphatic. Cf. 427 E.

<sup>b</sup> *γενομένους*: a noun is supplied from the preceding verb. Cf. on 598 c, and *supra* on 341 D.

<sup>c</sup> *μέγα . . . καὶ ὄλον*: cf. 469 c, 527 c, *Phaedo* 79 E, *Laws* 779 B, 944 c, *Symp.* 188 D, Demosth. ii. 22, Aeschyl. *Prom.* 961.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 330 c.

μου. ὅσον λόγον πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κινεῖτε  
περὶ τῆς πολιτείας! ἦν ὡς ἤδη διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε  
ἔχαιρον ἀγαπῶν, εἴ τις εἶσοι ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος  
**B** ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη· ἄ νῦν ὑμεῖς παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ  
ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγεύρετε· ὃν ὀρῶν ἐγὼ  
παρῆκα τότε, μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν ὄχλον. Τί δέ;  
ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἶει  
τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσο-  
μένους; Ναί, εἶπον, μετρίων γε. Μέτρον δέ γ',  
ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων  
ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν  
ἡμέτερον ἔα· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶμεν μηδαμῶς  
**C** ἀποκάμης ἢ σοι δοκεῖ διεξιῶν, τίς ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς  
φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται  
καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ  
χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, ἣ δὴ  
ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρῶ οὖν εἰπεῖν τίνα  
τρόπον δεῖ γίνεσθαι αὐτήν. Οὐ ράδιον, ὦ  
εὐδαιμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελθεῖν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας  
ἔχει ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὧν διήλθομεν. καὶ  
γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ εἰ ὅ τι  
**D** μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἄν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ  
ταύτη ἀπιστήσεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὄκνος τις αὐτῶν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 184 c, *Gorg.* 469 c.

<sup>b</sup> For the metaphor cf. *Eurip. Bacchae* 710 and *σμήνος*, *Rep.* 574 d, *Cratyl.* 401 c, *Meno* 72 a.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 36 d, *Theaetet.* 184 a, *Cratyl.* 411 a.

<sup>d</sup> Thrasymachus speaks here for the last time. He is mentioned in 357 a, 358 b-c, 498 c, 545 b, 590 d.

<sup>e</sup> Lit. "to smelt ore." The expression was proverbial and was explained by an obscure anecdote. Cf. *Leutsch, Paroemiographi*, ii. pp. 91, 727, and i. p. 464, and commentators on *Herod.* iii. 102.

<sup>f</sup> Plato often anticipates and repels the charge of tedious

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

challenging<sup>a</sup> me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted as I then set it forth! You don't realize what a swarm<sup>b</sup> of arguments you are stirring up<sup>c</sup> by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble." "Well," said Thrasymachus,<sup>d</sup> "do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold<sup>e</sup> and not to listen to discussions?" "Yes," I said, "in measure." "Nay, Socrates," said Glaucon, "the measure<sup>f</sup> of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don't consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary in explaining to us what we ask for, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval between<sup>g</sup> birth and formal schooling which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it." "It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow," said I, "for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possible<sup>h</sup> and, even conceding the possibility,<sup>i</sup> one might still be sceptical whether it is best. For which reason one, as it were, shrinks from touching

length (see *Polit.* 286 c, *Phileb.* 28 d, 36 d). Here the thought takes a different turn (as 504 c). The *δέ γε* implies a slight rebuke (cf. *Class. Phil.* xiv. pp. 165-174).

<sup>a</sup> So 498 A. Cf. on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 434, and *Laws* 792 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 456 c, Thucyd. vi. 98, *Introd.* xvii.

<sup>c</sup> *εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα*: a common formula for what a disputant can afford to concede. Cf. Lysias xiii. 52, xxii. 1, xxii. 10. It occurs six times in the *Charmides*.

ἄπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχή δοκῆ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὦ φίλε  
 ἑταῖρε. Μηδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅκνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώ-  
 μονες οὔτε ἄπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι.  
 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὦ ἄριστε, ἦ που βουλόμενός με  
 παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις; "Ἐγωγ', ἔφη. Πᾶν τοίνυν,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖς. πιστεύοντος μὲν γὰρ  
 ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναί ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν ἢ παρα-  
 Ε μυθία· ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ τῶν  
 μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τᾶληθῆ εἰδόμενα λέγειν  
 ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον· ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζη-  
 τοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ,  
 451 φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν·  
 παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτό γε· ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεῖς τῆς  
 ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους  
 ξυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ ἃ ἠκιστα δεῖ  
 σφάλλεσθαι. προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, ὦ Γλαύ-  
 κων, χάριν οὗ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν ἔλατ-  
 τον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ  
 ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων  
 νομίμων πέρι. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνευμα κινδυ-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Introd. xxxi-xxxii, *infra* 456 c, 499 c, 540 d, *Laws* 736 d, *Aristot. Pol.* 1260 b 29, 1265 a 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον.

<sup>b</sup> ἀγνώμονες = inconsiderate, unreasonable, as *Andoc.* ii. 6 shows.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 452 c-d, *Euthydem.* 3 c "To be laughed at is no matter," *Laws* 830 b τὸν τῶν ἀνοήτων γέλωτα, *Eurip.* fr. 495.

<sup>d</sup> Ἀδράστειαν: practically equivalent to Nemesis. Cf. our "knock on wood." Cf. Posnansky in *Breslauer Phil.* 430

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a 'wish-thought,'<sup>a</sup> my dear friend." "Do not shrink," he said, "for your hearers will not be inconsiderate<sup>b</sup> nor distrustful nor hostile." And I said, "My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me?" "It is," he said. "Well then," said I, "it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement. For there is both safety and boldness in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear. But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks, as I am doing, is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at,<sup>c</sup> for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis,<sup>d</sup> Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed,<sup>e</sup> I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honourable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies<sup>f</sup> than

*Abhandl.* v. 2, "Nemesis und Adrasteia": Herod. i. 35, Aeschyl. *Prom.* 936, Eurip. *Rhesus* 342, Demosth. xxv. 37 καὶ Ἀδράστειαν μὲν ἄνθρωπος ὧν ἐγὼ προσκυνῶ. For the moral earnestness of what follows cf. 336 ε, *Gorg.* 458 α, and Joubert *apud* Arnold, *Essays in Crit.* p. 29 "Ignorance . . . is in itself in intellectual matters a crime of the first order."

<sup>a</sup> γὰρ οὖν, "for in fact," but often with the suggestion that the fact has to be faced, as e.g. in *Tim.* 47 ε, where the point is often missed.

<sup>f</sup> Almost proverbial. Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 27. 21. Plato is speaking here from the point of view of the ordinary man, and not from that of his "Sermon on the Mount ethics." Cf. *Phileb.* 49 D and *Gorg.* 480 ε, where Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, ii. pp. 332 and 350, goes astray. Cf. *Class. Phil.* vol. i. p. 297.

Βνεύειν ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρεῖττον ἢ φίλοις, ὥστε οὐ<sup>1</sup> με παραμυθεῖ. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων γελάσας Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εἴαν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελές ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἀφίεμέν σε ὥσπερ φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν· ἀλλὰ θαρρήσας λέγε. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, καθαρὸς γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀφεθείς, ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει· εἰκὸς δέ γε, εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κἀνθάδε. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, τούτου γ' ἔνεκα. Λέγειν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χρὴ ἀνάπαλιν αὐτῷ νῦν, ἅ τότε ἴσως ἔδει  
 C ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρείου δράμα παντελῶς διαπερανθέν τὸ γυναικῆιον αὐτῷ περαίνειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σὺ οὕτω προκαλεῖ.

III. Ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φύσι καὶ παιδευθεῖσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη ὀρθὴ παίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτησίς τε καὶ χρεία ἢ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὀρμὴν ἰοῦσιν, ἣν περ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρμήσαμεν· ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δέ που ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ. Ναί.  
 D Ἀκολουθῶμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφήν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὐ. Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὡς. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ξυμφυλάττειν οἴομεθα δεῖν, ἄπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωσι, καὶ ξυνθηρεύειν καὶ τἄλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν

<sup>1</sup> οὐ Hermann: mss. οὐκ εὔ and εὔ, which would be ironical. Adam is mistaken in supposing that Glaucon laughs at the irony.

\* ὥσπερ marks the legal metaphor to which ἐκεῖ below refers. Cf. *Laws* 869 E, and Eurip. *Hippol.* 1433 and 1448-1450, with Hirzel, *Δίκη* etc. p. 191, n. 1, Demosth. xxxvii. 58-59. Plato transfers the idea to the other world in *Phaedo* 114 A-B, where the pardon of their victims is required for the release

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

with friends, so that your encouragement is none." And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, "Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as <sup>a</sup> in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence." "Well," said I, "he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too." "Speak on, then," he said, "for all this objection." "We must return then," said I, "and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there. But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,<sup>b</sup> especially since you are so urgent."

III. "For men, then, born and bred as we described, there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavour, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flock<sup>c</sup>?" "Yes." "Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not." "In what way?" he said. "In this. Do we expect the females of watch-dogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the of sinners. The passage is used by the older critics in the comparison of Plato with Christianity.

<sup>b</sup> Sophron's Mimes are said to have been so classified. For *δρᾶμα* cf. also *Theaetet.* 150 A.

<sup>c</sup> For the use of analogies drawn from animals cf. 375-376, 422 D, 466 D, 467 B, 491 D-E, 537 A, 546 A-B, 564 A. Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle's literal-minded criticism objects that animals have no "economy," *Pol.* 1264 b 4-6.



οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποίμνια; Κοινηῆ, **E** ἔφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις. Οἶόν τ' οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσθαι τινι ζώῳ, ἂν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδιδῶς; Οὐχ οἶόν τε. **E**ἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ ταῦτά χρησόμεθα καὶ **452** τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτά καὶ διδακτέον αὐτάς. Ναί. Μουσικὴ μὲν<sup>1</sup> ἐκείνοις τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἐδόθη. Ναί. Καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἄρα τούτῳ τὸ τέχνα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρηστέον κατὰ ταῦτά. Εἰκὸς ἐξ ὧν λέγεις, ἔφη. "Ἴσως δὴ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ἢ λέγεται. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὄρας; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν ταῖς **B** παλαιίστραις γυμναζομένας μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἠδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν, ὡς γε

<sup>1</sup> μὲν] Richards' conjecture μὴν is attractive.

<sup>a</sup> Reformers always denounce this source of wit while conservative satirists maintain that ridicule is a test of truth. Cf. e.g. Renan, *Avenir de la Science*, p. 439 "Le premier pas dans la carrière philosophique est de se cuirasser contre le ridicule," and Lucian, *Piscator* 14 "No harm can be done by a joke; that on the contrary, whatever is beautiful shines brighter . . . like gold cleansed," Harmon in Loeb translation, iii. 22. There was a literature for and against

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females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock? ” “ They have all things in common,” he replied, “ except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger.” “ Is it possible, then,” said I, “ to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education? ” “ It is not possible.” “ If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men, we must also teach them the same things.” “ Yes.” “ Now music together with gymnastic was the training we gave the men.” “ Yes.” “ Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way.” “ It would seem likely from what you say,” he replied. “ Perhaps, then,” said I, “ the contrast with present custom<sup>a</sup> would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words<sup>b</sup> are to be realized in fact.” “ Yes, indeed,” he said. “ What then,” said I, “ is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palestra together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums,<sup>c</sup> when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising? ” “ Yes, on my word,” he replied, “ it would seem ridiculous under present

custom (sometimes called *συνήθεια*) of which there are echoes in Cicero's use of *consuetudo*, *Acad.* ii. 75, *De off.* i. 148, *De nat. deor.* i. 83.

<sup>b</sup> ἢ λέγεται: cf. on 389 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaetet.* 162 B, and the *ὀψιμαθής* or late learner in Theophrastus' *Characters* xxvii. 14 Loeb. Eurip. *Androm.* 596 ff. denounces the light attire of Spartan women when exercising.

ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεὶπερ ὠρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ  
 C γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὀχήσεις. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶπερ λέγειν ἠρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, δεηθείσιν τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν, ὅτι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα, ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὺς ἀνδρας ὀρᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶ-  
 D τοι μὲν Κρήτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμωδεῖν· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ, οἶμαι, χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μνηυθέντος ἀρίστου, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὡς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ  
 E τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτὸ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

IV. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἢ οὔ, καὶ δοτέον ἀμφισβήτησιν, εἴτε τις φιλοπαίσιμον εἴτε σπουδαστικὸς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Propert. iv. 13 Müller.

<sup>b</sup> For a variation of this image cf. 568 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato plays on his own favourite phrase. The proper business of the wit is to raise a laugh. Cf. *Symp.* 189 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Thucyd. i. 6, Herod. i. 10. Sikes in *Anthropology*

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conditions.” “Then,” said I, “since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the jibes<sup>a</sup> with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses.” “You’re right,” he said. “But since we have begun we must go forward to the rough part of our law,<sup>b</sup> after begging these fellows not to mind their own business<sup>c</sup> but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbarians<sup>d</sup> do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don’t you think so?” “I do.” “But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyes<sup>e</sup> faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good.” “Most assuredly,” said he.

IV. “Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debate<sup>f</sup> to anyone who wishes either in jest or earnest to

*and the Classics* says this was borrowed from Thucydides, whom Wilamowitz says Plato never read. Cf. Dio Chrys. xiii. 226 M. For ἐξ οὗ cf. Demosth. iv. 3, Isoc. v. 47.

<sup>a</sup> Lit. “what (seemed) laughable to (in) the eyes.”

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 607 D δοῖμεν . . . λόγον.

## PLATO

453 ἐθέλει ἀμφισβητῆσαι, πότερον δυνατὴ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ θήλεια τῇ τοῦ ἄρρενος γένους κοινω-  
 νῆσαι εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα, ἢ οὐδ' εἰς ἓν, ἢ εἰς τὰ  
 μὲν οἷα τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ περὶ τὸν  
 πόλεμον ποτέρων ἐστίν; ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἂν κάλ-  
 λιστά τις ἀρχόμενος ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ κάλλιστα  
 τελευτήσειεν; Πολύ γε, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου  
 Β λόγου πολιορκῆται; Οὐδέν, ἔφη, κωλύει. Λέγω-  
 μεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι, “ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ  
 Γλαῦκων, οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν·  
 αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἦν ὠκίζετε  
 πόλιν, ὠμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν  
 τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.” Ὁμολογήσαμεν, οἶμαι· πῶς  
 γὰρ οὐ; Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει  
 γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δ' οὐ διαφέρει;  
 Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρω προσήκει προσ-  
 C τάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν; Τί μήν; Πῶς  
 οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνετε νῦν καὶ τὰναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς  
 λέγετε, φάσκοντες αὐ τοὺς ἀνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας  
 δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλείστον κεχωρισμένην  
 φύσιν ἔχοντας; ἔξεις τι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς ταῦτ'

<sup>a</sup> Plato as elsewhere asks whether it is true of all, some, or none. So of the commingling of ideas in *Sophist* 251 D. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1260 b 38) employs the same would-be exhaustive method.

<sup>b</sup> ἀρχόμενος . . . τελευτήσειεν: an overlooked reference to a proverb also overlooked by commentators on Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 35. Cf. Pindar, fr. 108 A Loeb, *Laws* 775 E, Sophocles, fr. 831 (Pearson), Antiphon the Sophist, fr. 60 (Diels).

<sup>c</sup> This pleading the opponent's case for him is common

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raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others,<sup>a</sup> and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end <sup>b</sup> ? ” “ Far the best,” he said. “ Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those others <sup>c</sup> so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenceless and go by default <sup>d</sup> ? ” “ Nothing hinders,” he said. “ Shall we say then in their behalf: ‘ There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreed <sup>e</sup> that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature ? ’ ‘ We did so agree, I think ; certainly ! ’ ‘ Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women ? ’ ‘ Surely there is. ’ ‘ Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed for each corresponding to this difference of nature ? ’ ‘ Certainly. ’ ‘ How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart ? ’ Can you surprise me with an answer to that ques-

in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in *Theaetetus*. 166-167.

<sup>a</sup> Apparently a mixture of military and legal phraseology. Cf. *ἐκπέρση* in *Protag.* 340 A, *Il.* v. 140 τὰ δ' ἐρήμα φοβεῖται, and the legal phrase *ἐρήμην καταδικαίτων* or *ὀφλεῖν*.

<sup>e</sup> ὠμολογεῖτε: cf. 369 E f. For *κατὰ φύσιν* cf. 370 c and 456 c. The apparent emphasis of *φύσις* in this book is of little significance. Cf. *Laws*, *passim*.

ἀπολογεῖσθαι; Ὡς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ  
 ῥάδιον· ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεήσομαί τε καὶ δέομαι καὶ τὸν  
 ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, ἐρμηνεῦσαι.  
 Ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ ἄλλα  
 D πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμην  
 τε καὶ ὤκνουν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν  
 τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτηῆσιν καὶ τροφήν.  
 Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν. Οὐ  
 γάρ, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ δὴ ὧδ' ἔχει· ἂν τέ τις εἰς κολυμ-  
 βήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἂν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον  
 πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον. Πάνυ  
 μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον  
 σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἥτοι δελφίνα τινα ἐλπί-  
 ζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον  
 E σωτηρίαν. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 εἰάν πη εὕρωμεν τὴν ἔξοδον. ὠμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ  
 ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ  
 καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ  
 αὐτὰ φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν  
 κατηγορεῖτε; Κομιδῆ γε. Ἡ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 454 ὦ Γλαύκων, ἢ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.  
 Τί δὴ; Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ  
 ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἶεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν,  
 ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη  
 διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ'

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the πέλαγος τῶν λόγων *Protag.* 338 A. Similarly Sidney Smith: "cut his cable, and spread his enormous canvas, and launch into the wide sea of reasoning eloquence."

<sup>b</sup> An allusion to the story of Arion and the dolphin in Herod. i. 24, as ὑπολαβεῖν perhaps proves. For ἄπορον cf. 378 A.

<sup>c</sup> γενναία: often as here ironical in Plato. Cf. *Sophist* 231 B, where interpreters misunderstand it. But the new L. & S. is correct.

<sup>d</sup> ἀντιλογικῆς: one of several designations for the eristic

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tion?" "Not easily on this sudden challenge," he replied: "but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be." "These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon," said I, "I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children." "It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven," he said, "no, by heaven." "No, it is not," said I; "but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving-pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same." "By all means." "Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea<sup>a</sup> of argument in the hope that either some dolphin<sup>b</sup> will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue." "So it seems," he said. "Come then, consider," said I, "if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing pursuits and that the nature of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment?" "It is." "What a grand<sup>c</sup> thing, Glaucon," said I, "is the power of the art of contradiction<sup>d</sup>!" "Why so?" "Because," said I, "many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under con- which Isocrates maliciously confounds with dialectic while Plato is careful to distinguish them. Cf. E. S. Thompson, *The Meno of Plato*, Excursus V., pp. 272 ff. and the introduction to E. H. Gifford's *Euthydemus*, p. 42. Among the marks of eristic are the pursuit of merely verbal oppositions as here and *Euthydem.* 278 A, 301 B, *Theaetet.* 164 c; the neglect to distinguish and divide, *Phileb.* 17 A, *Phaedr.* 265 E, 266 A, B; the failure to distinguish the hypothesis from its consequences, *Phaedo* 101 E, *Parmen.* 135-136.



αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίω-  
 σιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.  
 "Ἔστι γὰρ δὴ, ἔφη, περὶ πολλοὺς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος·  
 ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο τείνει ἐν τῷ  
 B παρόντι; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· κινδυ-  
 νεύομεν γοῦν ἄκοντες ἀντιλογίας ἄπτεσθαι. Πῶς;  
 Τὸ τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπι-  
 τηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ  
 ἐριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα  
 δὲ οὐδ' ὀπηοῦν, τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς  
 αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνον ὠριζόμεθα τότε,  
 ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ  
 αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπεδίδομεν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη,  
 C ἐπεσκεψάμεθα. Τοιγάρτοι, εἶπον, ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν,  
 ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνερωτᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰ ἢ αὐτὴ φύσις  
 φαλακρῶν καὶ κομητῶν καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἐναντία, καὶ  
 ἐπειδὴν ὁμολογῶμεν ἐναντίαν εἶναι, εἴαν φαλακροὶ  
 σκυτοτομῶσι, μὴ εἴαν κομήτας, εἴαν δ' αὖ κομήται,  
 μὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους. Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, ἔφη.  
 "Ἄρα κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἶπον ἐγώ, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε  
 οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν  
 ἐτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε  
 D καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ  
 τείνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἷον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ

<sup>a</sup> ἄκοντες is almost "unconscious." Cf. *Phileb.* 14 c.

<sup>b</sup> Greek style often couples thus two adverbs, the second defining more specifically the first, and, as here and often in Plato and Aristophanes, with humorous or paradoxical effect. Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 800 εὖ καὶ μιαρῶς. So Shakes. "well and chirurgonly."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Sophist* 256 A-B for the relativity of "same" and "other." *Polit.* 292 c describes in different language the correct method.

<sup>d</sup> For this humorously trivial illustration cf. Mill, *Rep. Gov.*

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sideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on one another.” “ Yes, this does happen to many,” he said ; “ but does this observation apply to us too at present ? ” “ Absolutely,” said I ; “ at any rate I am afraid that we are unawares<sup>a</sup> slipping into contentiousness.” “ In what way ? ” “ The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristically<sup>b</sup> in the literal and verbal sense ; but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identity<sup>c</sup> of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same.” “ No, we didn’t consider that,” he said. “ Wherefore, by the same token,” I said, “ we might ask ourselves whether the natures of bald<sup>d</sup> and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, the contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or *vice versa*.” “ That would be ridiculous,” he said. “ Would it be so,” said I, “ for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinent<sup>e</sup> to the pursuits themselves ? We meant, for example, that a man and

chap. viii. p. 190 : “ I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height, or in the colour of the hair ; ” and Mill’s disciple Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians*, i. 291 : “ We may at least grant that the burden of proof should be upon those who would disfranchise all red-haired men.”

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laches* 190 D εἰς ὃ τέλνειν δοκεῖ, *Protag.* 345 B.

ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Ἔγωγε. Ἰατρικὸν δὲ καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην; Πάντως που.

V. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, εἴαν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρον φαίνεται, τοῦτο δὲ φήσομεν ἑκατέρω δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι, εἴαν δ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ φαίνεται διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτειν, E τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀχεύειν, οὐδὲν τί πω φήσομεν μᾶλλον ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ὡς πρὸς ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἰησόμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα τοῦτο αὐτὸ  
455 διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην ἢ τί ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευὴν οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀλλὰ ἕτερα φύσις γυναικός τε καὶ ἀνδρός; Δίκαιον γοῦν. Τάχα τοίνυν ἄν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἴποι ἄν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ παρα-  
χρῆμα ἱκανῶς εἰπεῖν οὐ ράδιον, ἐπισκεψαμένῳ δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν. Εἴποι γὰρ ἄν. Βούλει οὖν δεώ-  
μεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθῆσαι  
B ἡμῖν, εἴαν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον γυναικὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως; Πάνυ γε. Ἴθι δὴ, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνου· ἄρα οὕτως ἔλεγες τὸν μὲν εὐφυῆ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ραδίως τι

<sup>a</sup> Adam makes difficulties, but cf. *Laws* 963 A νοῦν . . . κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικόν. The translation follows Hermann despite the objection that this reading forestalls the next sentence. Cf. Campbell *ad loc.* and Apelt, *Woch. für klass. Phil.*, 1903, p. 344.

<sup>b</sup> Plato anticipates the objection that the Socratic dialectic

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a woman who have a physician's<sup>a</sup> mind have the same nature. Don't you think so?" "I do." "But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures?" "Certainly, I suppose."

V. "Similarly, then," said I, "if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits." "And rightly," said he. "Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's?" "That would be at any rate fair." "Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden,<sup>b</sup> but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty." "He might say that." "Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman?" "By all means." "Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, surprises assent. Cf. more fully 487 B, and for a comic version *Hippias Major* 295 A "if I could go off for a little by myself in solitude I would tell you the answer more precisely than precision itself."

μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὐρετικὸς εἶη οὐδ' ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἂ ἔμαθε σώζοιτο, καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς  
 C ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο; ἀρ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυῆ πρὸς ἕκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὠρίζου; Οὐδεὶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει. Οἴσθ' ἂν οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν τήν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε  
 D καὶ ἐψημάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὐ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν ἐστι πάντων ἠττώμενον; Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους. γυναῖκες μὲν τοὶ πολλαὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζώοις, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνή ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων  
 E δὲ ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνή ἀνδρός. Πάνυ γε. Ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδέν; Καὶ πῶς; Ἄλλ' ἔστι γάρ,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 286 E, where this is said to be the object of teaching.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 326 B, *Rep.* 498 B, 410 C, *Isoc.* xv. 180, *Xen. Mem.* ii. 1. 28.

<sup>c</sup> On the alleged superiority of men even in women's occupations cf. the amusing diatribe of the old bachelor in George Eliot's *Adam Bede*, chap. xxi.: "I tell you there isn't a thing under the sun that needs to be done at all but what a man can do better than women, unless it's bearing children, and they do that in a poor makeshift way," and

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the other with difficulty; that the one with slight instruction could discover<sup>a</sup> much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned; and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately served<sup>b</sup> his mind, while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed?" "No one," said he, "will be able to name any others." "Do you know, then, of anything practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points?" "Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter?" "You are right," he said, "that the one sex<sup>d</sup> is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say." "Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—yet for all the woman is weaker than the man." "Assuredly." "Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women?" "How could we?" "We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the remarks on women as cooks of the bachelor Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 234. But Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9. 11 takes the ordinary view. On the character of women generally cf. *Laws* 781 and Aristotle in Zeller trans. ii. 215.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 392 c ὡς τὸ δλον εἰπεῖν γένος.

οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική, ἢ δ' οὐ, καὶ μουσική, ἢ δ' ἄμουσος φύσει. Τί μὴν; Γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὐ, οὐδὲ πολεμική, ἢ δὲ ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τί δέ; φιλόσοφος τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδής, ἢ δ' ἄθυμος; Ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα. Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἢ δ' οὐ. ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξάμεθα; Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν. Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἢ αὐτῆ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν. Φαίνεται.

**B** VI. Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι ξυνοικεῖν τε καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ περ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ ξυγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν. Πάνυ γε. Τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν; Τὰ αὐτά. Ἦκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναῖξί μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἀποδιδόναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ περ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἦν, εἰ δυνατά τε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγοιμεν; Ἦν γάρ. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολόγηται; Ναί. Ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ διομολογηθῆναι; Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ἡμῖν ἀνδρας

\* Cf. Gorg. 517 c.

ᵇ Cf. on 450 D.

ᵇ Cf. Introd. p. xvii.

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the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical?" "Surely." "Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics?" "I think not." "And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit?" "That also is true." "Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians?" "They were." "The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger." "Apparently."

VI. "Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature." "By all means." "And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits?" "The same." "We come round,<sup>a</sup> then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians." "By all means." "Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian,<sup>b</sup> since the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent to-day, proves, as it seems, unnatural." "Apparently." "The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirability<sup>c</sup> of what we were proposing?" "It was." "That it is possible has been admitted." "Yes." "The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way." "Obviously." "For the production of a female guardian, then, our educa-



- ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη δὲ γυναῖκας, ἄλλως τε καὶ  
 D τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραλαβοῦσα; Οὐκ ἄλλη. Πῶς  
 οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι; Τίνος δὴ; Τοῦ  
 ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῶ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνω ἄνδρα,  
 τὸν δὲ χείρω· ἢ πάντας ὁμοίους ἡγεῖ; Οὐδαμῶς.  
 Ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει, ἣν ὠκίζομεν, πότερον οἶει ἡμῖν  
 ἀμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξαιργάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας τυχόν-  
 τας ἢς διήλθομεν παιδείας, ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους  
 τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας; Γελοῖον, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾶς.  
 E Μανθάνω, ἔφην· τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ  
 οὔτοι ἄριστοι; Πολύ γε. Τί δέ; αἱ γυναῖκες  
 τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὐταὶ ἔσονται βέλτισται; Καὶ  
 τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ. Ἔστι δέ τι πόλει ἀμεινον ἢ  
 γυναικῆς τε καὶ ἄνδρας ὡς ἀρίστους ἐγγίγνεσθαι;  
 Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τοῦτο δὲ μουσικὴ τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ  
 457 παραγιγνώμεναι, ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, ἀπεργάζονται;  
 Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 ἄριστον πόλει νόμιμον ἐτίθεμεν. Οὕτως. Ἀπο-  
 δυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπεὶπερ  
 ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον  
 πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν  
 πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν  
 τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι δοτέον  
 B διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀσθένειαν· ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ  
 γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα γυμναζο-

<sup>a</sup> This is only a more complicated case of the point of style noted on 349 D. Cf. *Cratyl.* 386 A, *Sophist* 247 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 421 A. We should not press this incidental phrase to prove that Plato would not educate all the citizens, as he in fact does in the *Laws* and by implication in the *Politicus*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Morley, *Voltaire*, p. 103: "It has been rather the fashion to laugh at the Marquise de Châtelet, for no better reason than that she, being a woman, studied Newton. . . ."

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tion will not be one thing for men and another for women, especially since the nature which we hand over to it is the same." "There will be no difference." "How are you minded, now, in this matter?" "In what?" "In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse,<sup>a</sup> or do you think them all alike?" "By no means." "In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobbling<sup>b</sup>?" "An absurd question," he said. "I understand," said I; "and are not these the best of all the citizens?" "By far." "And will not these women be the best of all the women?" "They, too, by far." "Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible women<sup>c</sup> and men?" "There is not." "And this, music and gymnastics applied as we described will effect." "Surely." "Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state." "That is so." "The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment,<sup>d</sup> and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they

There is probably nothing which would lead to so rapid and marked an improvement in the world as a large increase of the number of women in it with the will and the capacity to master Newton as thoroughly as she did."

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Rousseau, *Lettre à d'Alembert*, "Couvertes de l'honnêteté publique."

μέναις, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου δρέπων καρπὸν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελαῖ οὐδ' ὅ τι πράττει· κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερόν αἰσχρόν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

VII. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ὧσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν, τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, C ὥστε μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι τιθέντας, ὡς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἀλλὰ πη τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι, ὡς δυνατὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα λέγει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὐ σμικρὸν κῦμα διαφεύγεις. Φήσεις γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὅταν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴδῃς. Λέγε δή, ἴδω, ἔφη. Τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὅδε. Τίς; Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Pindar, fr. 209 Schroeder, ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπ(ειν). Plato varies the quotation to suit his purpose.

<sup>b</sup> This is one of the chief texts for the alleged utilitarianism of Plato, a question too complicated to be settled by anything less than a comparative study of the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Republic* (IX) and *Laws*. ὠφέλιμον suggests "benefit" rather than "utility." Cf. *Introd.* to second volume of this translation, and *supra* on 339 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Aeschyl. *Septem*, *in fine*.

<sup>d</sup> For this form of exaggeration cf. *supra* on 414 c, 339 b.

<sup>e</sup> On the whole topic cf. *Introd.* p. xxxiv, Lucian, *Fugitivi* 18 οὐκ εἰδότες ὅπως ὁ ἱερός ἐκεῖνος ἠέλιου κοινὰς ἠγεῖσθαι τὰς γυναῖκας, Epictet. fr. 53, p. 21, Rousseau, *Emile*, v: "je ne parle point de cette prétendue communauté de femmes dont le reproche tant répété prouve que ceux qui le lui font ne l'ont jamais lu." But Rousseau dissents violently from what he calls "cette promiscuité civile qui confond partout les deux sexes dans les mêmes emplois." Cf. further the denunciations of the Christian fathers *passim*, who are outdone by De Quincey's "Otaheitian carnival of licentious

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should, "plucks the unripe<sup>a</sup> fruit" of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fair<sup>b</sup> and the harmful foul." "Assuredly."

VII. "In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite swept<sup>c</sup> away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial." "It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping." "You will not think it a great<sup>d</sup> one," I said, "when you have seen the one that follows." "Say on then and show me," said he. "This," said I, "and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law." "What?" "That these women shall all be common<sup>e</sup> to all these men, and appetite, connected with a contempt of human life which is excessive even for paganism."

Most of the obvious parallels between Plato and Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* follow as a matter of course from the very notion of communal marriage and supply no evidence for the dating of a supposed earlier edition of the whole or a part of the *Republic*. In any case the ideas of the *Republic* might have come to Aristophanes in conversation before publication; and the Greeks knew enough of the facts collected in such books as Westermarck's *Marriage*, not to be taken altogether by surprise by Plato's speculations. Cf. Herod. iv. 104, and Aristot. *Pol.* 1262 a 20. Cf. further Adam's exhaustive discussion in the appendix to this book, Grube, "The Marriage Laws in Plato's *Republic*," *Classical Quarterly*, 1927, pp. 95 ff., Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, i. p. 19 n., and the more recent literature collected in Praechter-Ueberweg, 12th ed. i. p. 207, Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der Sozialenfrage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt*, ii. p. 578, Pohlenz, *Aus Platon's Werdezeit*, pp. 225-228, C. Robert, *Hermes* lvii. pp. 351 ff.

Δ πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδία δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον εἰδέναί τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα. Πολύ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μείζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου. Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περί γε τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινούς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἴπερ οἶόν τε· ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ

Ε πλείστην ἀμφισβήτησιν ἄν γενέσθαι. Περὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὖ μάλα ἄν ἀμφισβητηθεῖη. Λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λόγων ξύστασιν· ἐγὼ δ' ὤμην ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποδράσεσθαι, εἴ σοι δόξειεν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι, λοιπὸν δὲ δή μοι ἔσεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀποδιδράσκων, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρων πέρι δίδου λόγον. Ὑφεκτέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκην. τοσόνδε μέντοι χάρισαί μοι·  
 458 ἔασόν με ἑορτάσαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀργοὶ τὴν διάνοιαν εἰώθασιν ἐστιᾶσθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, ὅταν μόνοι πορεύωνται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί που, πρὶν ἐξευρεῖν, τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τι ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῦτο παρέντες, ἵνα μὴ κάμνωσι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή, θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὁ βούλονται, ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διατάττουσι καὶ χαίρουσι διεξιόντες οἷα δράσουσι γενομένου, ἀργὸν καὶ ἄλλως ψυχὴν ἔτι ἀργοτέραν ποιοῦντες. ἤδη οὖν

\* A distinct suggestion of the topics of the "useful" and the "possible" in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Isoc. ii. 47, on "those who in solitude do not deliberate but imagine what they wish," and Chesterton's saying, "All feeble spirits live in the future, because it is a soft job"; cf. further on day-dreams, Schmidt, *Ethik der*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

that none shall cohabit with any privately ; and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent.” “ This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its utility.<sup>a</sup> ” “ I presume,” said I, “ that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the community of women and children would be the greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary would be the chief topic of contention.” “ Both,” he said, “ would be right sharply debated.” “ You mean,” said I, “ that I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I expected to escape from one of them, and that if you agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain for me to speak only of its feasibility.” “ You have not escaped detection,” he said, “ in your attempted flight, but you must render an account of both.” “ I must pay the penalty,” I said, “ yet do me this much grace : Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk alone.<sup>b</sup> Such persons, without waiting to discover how their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the labour of deliberating about possibilities and impossibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed to work out the details in imagination, and take pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is idle without that.<sup>c</sup> I too now succumb to this weak-

*Griechen*, ii. p. 71, and Lucian's *Πλοῖον ἢ εὐχαί*. Plato's description anticipates the most recent psychology in everything except the term “autistic thinking.”

<sup>a</sup> ἄλλως : *cf. infra* 495 B.

**Β** καὶ αὐτὸς μαλθακίζομαι, καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐπιθυμῶ ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἢ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς δυνατῶν ὄντων θεῖς σκέφομαι, ἂν μοι παρίης, πῶς διατάξουσιν αὐτὰ οἱ ἄρχοντες γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι πάντων συμφυρότατ' ἂν εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξι. ταῦτα πειράσομαί σοι πρότερα συνδιασκοπεῖσθαι, ὕστερα δ' ἐκεῖνα, εἶπερ παρίης. Ἄλλὰ παρίημι, ἔφη, καὶ σκόπει. Οἶμαι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶπερ ἔσονται

**Γ** οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄξιοι τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἳ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι κατὰ ταῦτά, τοὺς μὲν ἐθελήσειν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξειν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς πειθομένους τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμουμένους ὅσα ἂν ἐκείνοις ἐπιτρέψωμεν. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὡςπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δὲ ἅτε οἰκίας τε καὶ ξυσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδία δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον κεκτημένου,

**Δ** ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμιγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, οἶμαι, τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μίξιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικάις ἀνάγ-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 727.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Herod. ix. 8. He returns to the postponed topic in 466 d, but again digresses and does not take it up definitely till 471 c or rather 473 c-d. The reason is that the third wave of paradox is also the condition of the possibility of realisation. Cf. *Introd.* p. xvii.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* on 340 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> That is to say, they are to imitate or conform to our

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ness<sup>a</sup> and desire to postpone<sup>b</sup> and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it." "I do allow it," he said: "proceed with the inquiry." "I think, then," said I, "that the rulers, if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders,<sup>c</sup> and the other, to give them, in some things obeying our laws, and imitating<sup>d</sup> them in others which we leave to their discretion." "Presumably." "You, then, the lawgiver," I said, "have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature.<sup>e</sup> And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that kind, will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence?" "Not by the necessities of geometry," he said, "but by

principles in the details which we leave to them. So in the *Laws*, 770 B, 846 c, 876 E, and the secondary divinities in the *Timaeus*, 69 c. Cf. *Polit.* 301 A, and Aristot. *Pol.* 1261 b 2 μιμείται.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 456 B. Plato has already explained that he means "of like nature in respect to capacity for government." There is no contradiction of the doctrine of the *Politicus*, 310 A (cf. *Laws* 773 A-B) that the mating should blend opposite temperaments. Those elements are already mixed in the selection of the guardians. Cf. *supra* 375 B-C, 410 D-E and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 62, n. 481.



καις, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἔλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεῶν.

VIII. Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἀτάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν ποιεῖν οὔτε ὅσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὔτ' ἐάσουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες. Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἔφη. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροῦς εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα· εἴεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ  
459 ὠφελιμώτατοι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Πῶς οὖν δὴ ὠφελιμώτατοι ἔσονται; τόδε μοι λέγε, ὦ Γλαύκων· ὄρῳ γάρ σου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνας θηρευτικούς καὶ τῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συχνοῦς· ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, προσέσχηκας τι τοῖς τούτων γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιίαις; Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἄρ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ γίνονται ἄριστοι; Εἰσὶν. Πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἀπάντων ὁμοίως γεννᾶς, ἢ προθυμεῖ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων; Β' Ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων. Τί δ'; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἢ ἐκ τῶν γεραιτάτων ἢ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων ὅ τι μάλιστα; Ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων. Καὶ ἐὰν μὴ οὕτω γεννᾶται, πολὺ σοι ἡγεῖ χεῖρον ἔσεσθαι τό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος; "Εγώγ', ἔφη. Τί δὲ ἵππων οἶει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων; ἢ ἄλλη πη ἔχειν; "Ατοπον μέντ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἶη. Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὡς ἄρα σφόδρα

<sup>a</sup> The phrase is imitated by Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1122 D φυσικαῖς, οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἐλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 789 B-C.

<sup>c</sup> The riddling question to which the response is "what?" is a mannerism derived from tragedy, which becomes very

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those of love,<sup>a</sup> which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude."

VIII. "They are, indeed," I said; "but next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it." "It would not be right," he said. "Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial." "By all means." "How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting-dogs and a number of pedigree cocks.<sup>b</sup> Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations?" "What?"<sup>c</sup> he said. "In the first place," I said, "among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than the rest?" "They do." "Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the best<sup>d</sup>?" "From the best." "And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime?" "From those in their prime." "And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds' breed and hounds will greatly degenerate?" "I do," he said. "And what of horses and other animals?" I said; "is it otherwise with them?" "It would be strange if it were," said he. "Gracious," said I, "dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the frequent in the later style of the *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Philebus*.

<sup>a</sup> This commonplace of stirpiculture or eugenics, as it is now called, begins with Theognis 184, and has thus far got no further.

ἡμῖν δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

C Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ; "Ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι. ἰατρὸν δέ που μὴ δεομένοις μὲν σώμασι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίτη ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν, καὶ φαυλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἠγούμεθα εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ φαρμακεύειν δέη, ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειότερου δεῖ τοῦ ἰατροῦ. Ἀληθῆ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί λέγεις; Πρὸς τόδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· συχνῶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει

D ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἔφαμεν δέ που ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη. Ἐν τοῖς γάμοις τοίνυν καὶ παιδοποιίαις ἔοικε τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον. Πῶς δὴ; Δεῖ μὲν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις

E τοῦναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅ τι ἀκρότατον εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λαμβάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται. Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετητέαι [ἔσονται], ἐν αἷς ξυνάξομεν τὰς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις

460 ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν,

\* A recurrence to the metaphor of 389 B, as we are reminded below in D.

• Cf. 389 B, 414 C, and *Laws* 663 D ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι.

Cf. on 343 A-B and *Polit.* 267 B-C, 268 B. αὖ below merely

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind." "Well, it does," he said, "but what of it?" "This," said I, "that they will have to employ many of those drugs<sup>a</sup> of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required." "True; but what is the pertinency?" "This," said I: "it seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit<sup>b</sup> of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine." "And that was right," he said. "In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of 'right.'" "How so?" "It follows from our former admissions," I said, "that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock<sup>c</sup> is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension." "Most true," he said. "We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the dis-

marks the second consideration, harmony, the first being eugenics.

ἴν' ὡς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μήτε μεγάλη ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν μήτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται. Ὅρθως, ἔφη. Κληῆροι δὴ τινες, οἶμαι, ποιητέοι κομποί, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκείνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

B IX. Καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἄθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονεστέρα ἢ ἐξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ξυγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἅμα μετὰ προφάσεως ὡς πλείστοι τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπεύρωνται. Ὅρθως. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενα ἔκγονα παραλαμβάνουσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφεστηκυῖαι ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφότερα· κοινὰ μὲν γάρ που καὶ ἀρχαὶ γυναιξί τε καὶ C ἀνδράσιν. Ναί. Τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἴσουσι παρά τινος τροφούς, χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἐν τινι μέρει τῆς πόλεως· τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει. Εἴπερ μέλλει, ἔφη, καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἐπιμελήσονται, τὰς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες, ὅταν σπαργῶσι, πᾶσαν μηχανὴν D μηχανώμενοι, ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεται,

<sup>a</sup> Plato apparently forgets that this legislation applies only to the guardians. The statement that ancient civilization was free from the shadow of Malthusianism requires qualification by this and many other passages. Cf. 372 c and *Laws* 740 d-e. The ancients in fact took it for granted.

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cretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may be the same,<sup>a</sup> taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small." "Right," he said. "Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers." "Yes, indeed," he said.

IX. "And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honours and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible." "Right." "And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men." "Yes." "The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or crèche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret,<sup>b</sup> so that no one will know what has become of them." "That is the condition," he said, "of preserving the purity of the guardians' breed." "They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every device<sup>c</sup> to prevent any-

<sup>b</sup> Opinions differ whether this is euphemism for exposure. On the frequency or infrequency of this practice *cf.* Professor La Rue Van Hook's article in *T.A.P.A.* vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein, *Class. Phil.* vol. xvii. (1922) pp. 222-239.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf. supra* on 414 B and Aristot. *Pol.* 1262 a 14 ff.

καὶ ἄλλας γάλα ἐχούσας ἐκπορίζοντες, εἴαν μὴ αὐταὶ ἱκαναὶ ὦσι, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐπιμελήσονται, ὅπως μέτριον χρόνον θηλάσονται, ἀγρυπνίας δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίτθαις τε καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν; Πολλὴν ῥαστώνην, ἔφη, λέγεις τῆς παιδοποιίας ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν. Πρέπει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς διέλθωμεν ὃ προθυμούμεθα. ἔφαμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων δεῖν

**E** τὰ ἔκγονα γίνεσθαι. Ἄληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν σοι ξυνοκεῖ μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα; Τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν; ἔφη. Γυναικὶ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρξαμένη ἀπὸ εἴκοσι-έτιδος μέχρι τετταρακονταέτιδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει· ἀνδρὶ δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῆ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι πεντε-

461 καιπεντηκονταέτους. Ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως. Οὐκοῦν εἴαν τε πρεσβύτερος τούτων εἴαν τε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων ἄψηται, οὔτε ὄσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ὡς παῖδα φυτεύοντος τῇ πόλει, ὅς, ἂν λάθῃ, γεννήσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσιῶν οὐδ' ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φύς, ἀς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὔξονται καὶ ἱέρειαί καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὠφελίμων ὠφελι-

**B** μωτέρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐγγόνους γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκότου μετὰ δεινῆς ἀκρατείας γεγονώς. Ὅρθως,

<sup>a</sup> Another favourite idea and expression. Cf. *Gorg.* 459 c, *Laws* 648 c, 713 d, 720 c, 779 a, 903 e, *Isoc.* iv. 36, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 13. 5.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 458 c.

<sup>c</sup> Half humorous legal language. Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1335 b 28 λειτουργεῖν . . . πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν, and *Lucan's* "urbi pater est, urbiq̄ue maritus" (*Phars.* ii. 388). The dates for marriage are given a little differently in the *Laws*,

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one from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry." "You are making maternity a soft job<sup>a</sup> for the women of the guardians." "It ought to be," said I, "but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime." "True." "Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man?" "How do you reckon it?"<sup>b</sup> he said. "The women," I said, "beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state<sup>c</sup> to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five." "That is," he said, "the maturity and prime for both of body and mind." "Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good sires<sup>d</sup> and from fathers helpful to the state sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence."

785 B, 833 C-D, men 30-35, women 16-20. On the whole question and Aristotle's opinion *cf.* Newman, *Introd. to Aristot. Pol.* p. 183; *cf.* also Grube, *Class. Quarterly* 1927, pp. 95 ff., "The Marriage Laws in Plato's *Republic*."

<sup>a</sup> *Cf.* Horace, *Odes* iv. 4. 29.



ἔφη. Ὁ αὐτὸς δέ γ', εἶπον, νόμος, εἴαν τις τῶν ἔτι γεννώντων μὴ ξυνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος ἄπτηται τῶν ἐν ἡλικία γυναικῶν· νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγυον καὶ ἀνιέρον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναί. Ὁρθότατα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δὲ δῆ, οἶμαι, αἶτε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομέν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγί-  
 C γνεσθαι ὧ ἂν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν θυγατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παισὶ καὶ ταῖς ἄνω μητρός, καὶ γυναῖκας αὐτῶν πλὴν υἱεὶ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τούτων εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κῆμα μηδέ γ' ἔν, εἴαν γένηται, εἴαν δέ τι βιάσῃται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γ', ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεται· πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγα-  
 D τέρας καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες πῶς διαγνώσονται ἀλλήλων; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡμέρας τις αὐτῶν νυμφίος γένηται, μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δὴ ἃ ἂν γένηται ἔκγονα, ταῦτα πάντα προσερεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα υἱεῖς, τὰ δὲ θήλεα θυγατέρας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐκεῖνον πατέρα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ τούτων ἔκγονα παίδων παῖδας καὶ ἐκεῖνα αὐτῶν ἐκείνους πάππους τε καὶ τηθᾶς, τὰ δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν ᾧ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων, ἀδελφᾶς τε καὶ  
 E ἀδελφούς· ὥστε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλήλων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι· ἀδελφούς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος

\* Cf. *Laws* 838 A and 924 E.

† Cf. Newman, *op. cit.* p. 187.

‡ Cf. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 89: "A native of Hawaii, for example, calls by the name of father

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“Right,” he said. “And the same rule will apply,” I said, “if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child.” “Most rightly,” he said. “But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations with whomsoever they please, except <sup>a</sup> daughter and mother and their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to light <sup>b</sup> anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring.” “All that sounds reasonable,” he said; “but how are they to distinguish one another’s fathers and daughters, and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned?” “They won’t,” said I, “except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father.<sup>c</sup> And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildren<sup>d</sup> and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters. This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers

. . . every man of an age such that he could be his father.”  
*Cf.* Aristoph. *Eccles.* 636-637.

<sup>a</sup> *Cf.* 363 D and *Laws* 899 E, 927 B.

συνοικεῖν, εἰάν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη ξυμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ. Ὅρθότατα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

Χ. Ἡ μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, ὧ Γλαύκων, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων τοῖς φύλαξί σοι τῆς πόλεως· ὡς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτεία καὶ μακρῶ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώ-  
 462 σασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου· ἢ πῶς ποιῶμεν; Οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἦδε ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, ἐρέσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν, οὗ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ τί μέγιστον κακόν, εἶτα ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἄρα ἂ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀναρμοστεί; Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη. Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ  
 Β καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν ξυνδῆ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; Οὐκ ἔχομεν. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ξυνδεῖ, ὅταν ὃ τι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ιδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγείς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς  
 C αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει; Τί δ' οὐ; Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίνεσθαι, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, καὶ  
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and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves." "Quite right," said he.

X. "This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?" "It is, indeed," he said. "Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints<sup>a</sup> of the good and do not suit those of the evil?" "By all means," he said. "Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?" "We do not." "Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?" "By all means," he said. "But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?" "Of course." "And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as 'mine' and 'not mine,' and similarly with regard

<sup>a</sup> We may perhaps infer from the more explicit reference in *Theaetetus*. 193 c that Plato is thinking of the "recognition" by footprints in Aeschyl. *Choeph.* 205-210.

περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταῦτά; Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.  
 Ἐν ἧτινι δὴ πόλει πλείστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ  
 ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν.  
 αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται; Πολύ γε. Καὶ ἥτις δὴ  
 ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, οἷον ὅταν που ἡμῶν  
 δάκτυλός του πληγῆ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ  
 σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν  
 D τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἦσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα  
 ξυνηγήθησε μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ  
 λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ· καὶ  
 περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου οὖν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λό-  
 γος, περί τε λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ περὶ  
 ἡδονῆς ραΐζοντος. Ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο  
 ὃ ἐρωτᾶς, τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐγγύτατα ἢ ἄριστα πολι-  
 τευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ. Ἐνὸς δὴ, οἶμαι, πάσχοντος  
 τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι οὖν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοιαύτη  
 E πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσκει εἶναι τὸ πάσχον,  
 καὶ ἢ ξυνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ ξυλλυπήσεται.  
 Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τὴν γε εὖνομον.

XI. Ὡρα ἂν εἶη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν ἐπὶ  
 τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογή-  
 ματα σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτῇ μάλιστα ἔχει εἶτε

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 423 B, Aristot. *Pol.* 1261 b 16 ff., "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 358, *Laws* 664 A, 739 C-E, Julian (Teubner) ii. 459, Teichmüller, *Lit. Fehden*, vol. i. p. 19, Mill, *Utilitarianism*, iii. 345: "In an improving state of the human mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest, which, if perfect, would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included;" Spinoza, paraphrased by Höffding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.* i. p. 325: "It would be best, since they seek a common good, if all could be like one mind and one body." Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: "Si  
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to the word 'alien'?"<sup>a</sup> "Precisely so." "That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way." "Much the best." "And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man."<sup>b</sup> For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connexions stretching to the soul for 'integration'<sup>c</sup> with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labours in pain or is eased by pleasure." "The same," he said, "and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism." "That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole." "Inevitably," he said, "if it is well governed."

XI. "It is time," I said, "to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies

quelqu'un ou quelqu'une disoit 'beuvons,' tous beuvoient" etc. Aristotle's criticism, though using some of Plato's phrases, does not mention his name at this point but speaks of *τινες*, *Pol.* 1261 b 7.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 829 A.

<sup>c</sup> I so translate to bring out the analogy between Plato and e.g. Sherrington. For "to the soul" cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 328, *Laws* 673 A, *Tim.* 45 D, *infra* 584 C, *Phileb.* 33, 34, 43 B-C. Poschenrieder, *Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippocratischen Schriften*, p. 67, compares the *De locis in homine*, vi. p. 278 Littré.

καὶ ἄλλη τις μάλλον. Οὐκοῦν χρή, ἔφη. Τί οὖν;  
 463 ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές  
 τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ; Ἔστιν.  
 Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσ-  
 εροῦσιν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί  
 ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγο-  
 ρεῦει; Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς  
 δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.  
 Τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας  
 B τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι; Σωτηράς τε καὶ  
 ἐπικούρους, ἔφη. Τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον; Μισθο-  
 δότας τε καὶ τροφείας. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις  
 ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους; Δούλους, ἔφη. Τί δ' οἱ  
 ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους; Ξυνάρχοντας, ἔφη. Τί δ' οἱ  
 ἡμέτεροι; Ξυμφύλακας. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν  
 ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τίς τινα  
 ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν ξυναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς  
 οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον; Καὶ πολλούς γε.  
 Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ  
 C λέγει, τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ; Οὕτως.  
 Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν  
 ἔχοι ἂν τῶν ξυμφυλάκων νομίσει τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν  
 ὡς ἀλλότριον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· παντὶ γάρ, ὧ ἂν  
 ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς  
 πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεὶ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων  
 ἐκγόνοις ἢ προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν. Κάλ-  
 λιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τότε εἶπέ·  
 D πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετή-  
 σεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα

<sup>a</sup> For these further confirmations of an established thesis cf. on 442-443.

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the qualities agreed upon in our argument.<sup>a</sup> ” “ We must,” he said. “ Well, then, there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in it, are there not? ” “ There are.” “ Will not all these address one another as fellow-citizens? ” “ Of course.” “ But in addition to citizens, what does the people in other states call its rulers? ” “ In most cities, masters, in democratic cities, just this—rulers.” “ But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens, what do they call their rulers? ” “ Saviours and helpers,” he said. “ And what term do these apply to the people? ” “ Payers of their wage and supporters.” “ And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace? ” “ Slaves,” he said. “ And how do the rulers describe one another? ” “ Co-rulers,” he said. “ And ours? ” “ Co-guardians.” “ Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their co-rulers as ‘ belonging ’ and others as outsiders? ” “ Yes, many would.” “ And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that ‘ belongs ’ as his own, doesn’t he, and of the outsider as not his own? ” “ That is so.” “ But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of his co-guardian as an outsider? ” “ By no means,” he said; “ for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these.” “ Excellent,” said I; “ but tell me this further, will it be merely the names<sup>b</sup> of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the

<sup>b</sup> τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον may be thought to anticipate Aristotle’s objections.



πράττειν, περί τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἄν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἢ ταῦτα; αὐταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθὺς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὦτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὓς ἂν αὐτοῖς

**Ε** τις ἀποφήνη, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυγγενῶν; Αὐταί, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγονται. Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ξυμφωνήσουσιν ἐνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

464 Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος ἔφαμεν ξυνακολουθεῖν τὰς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῇ; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν. Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσι· τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἔξουσιν; Πολύ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν τούτων αἰτία πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἢ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξι; Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ἔφη.

**Β** XII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν, ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἔχει. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, ὠμολογή-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 554 D ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the reliance on a unanimous public opinion in the *Laws*, 838 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> περὶ . . . περί: for the preposition repeated in a different

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names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favour<sup>a</sup> of either gods or men, since any other behaviour would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching beset<sup>b</sup> the ears of your children from their birth, both concerning<sup>c</sup> what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers and to their other kin? ” “ These,” he said; “ for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds.” “ Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke: ‘ It is mine that does well; it is mine that does ill.’ ” “ That is most true,” he said. “ And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech<sup>d</sup> brings with it a community in pleasures and pains? ” “ And rightly, too.” “ Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common.” “ Quite so.” “ And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians? ” “ It will certainly be the chief cause,” he said.

XII. “ But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.” “ And we

sense *cf.* Isoc. iv. 34, ix. 3, and Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, III. i. “ As here by Caesar and by you cut off.”

<sup>a</sup> δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος: *cf.* *Sophist* 265 c, *Laws* 797 c.

σαμεν. Τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία  
 ἡμῖν πέφανται ἢ κοινωμία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε  
 παίδων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Καὶ  
 μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἔφαμεν  
 γάρ που, οὔτε οἰκίας τούτοις ἰδίας δεῖν εἶναι οὔτε  
 C γῆν οὔτε τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν  
 λαμβάνοντας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας  
 ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι.  
 Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τά τε  
 πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον  
 ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινούς φύλακας, καὶ ποιεῖ  
 μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ  
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ  
 οἰκίαν ἔλκοντα, ὃ τι ἂν δύνηται χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων  
 D κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑτέραν οὔσαν,  
 καὶ γυναικὰ τε καὶ παῖδας ἑτέρους, ἡδονὰς τε καὶ  
 ἀλγηδόνας ἐμποιοῦντας ἰδίων ὄντων ἰδίας, ἀλλ'  
 ἐνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἰκείου πέρι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τεί-  
 νοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε  
 καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι; Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δαί;  
 δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχή-  
 σεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον  
 ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν  
 E δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε  
 διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παίδων καὶ ξυγγενῶν κτήσιν  
 ἄνθρωποι στασιάζουσιν; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 416-417.

<sup>b</sup> For a similar list cf. *Laws* 842 d. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1263b20f.,

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were right in so agreeing." "Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause." "Quite so," he said. "And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said,<sup>a</sup> I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians." "Right," he said. "Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring 'mine' not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain." "By all means," he said. "Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish,<sup>b</sup> one may say,<sup>c</sup> from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common? So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin." "They will necessarily be quit objects that it is not lack of unity but wickedness that causes these evils.

<sup>a</sup> Softens the strong word *οιχθήσεται*.

ἀπηλλάχθαι. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίῳ γε οὐδ' αἰκίας  
 δίκαι δικάίως ἂν εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἤλιξι μὲν γὰρ  
 ἤλικας ἀμύνεσθαι καλὸν καὶ δίκαιόν που φήσομεν,  
 ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεία τιθέντες. Ὅρθως,  
 465 ἔφη. Καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν ἔχει, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος  
 ὁ νόμος· εἴ πού τις τῷ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ  
 πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἦττον ἐπὶ μείζους ἂν ἴοι στά-  
 σεις. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων  
 πάντων ἄρχειν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάξεται.  
 Δῆλον. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον,  
 ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες προστάττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιά-  
 ζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτὲ οὔτε τύπτειν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός·  
 οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἰκανὸν γὰρ τὸ  
 Β φύλακε κωλύοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν  
 ὡς γονέων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι εἴργουσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ  
 πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱεῖς,  
 τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας. Ξυμ-  
 βαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη. Πανταχῆ δὴ ἐκ τῶν  
 νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν;  
 Πολλήν γε. Τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασια-  
 ζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς  
 τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ. Οὐ γὰρ  
 C οὖν. Τὰ γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι'  
 ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν  
 εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες<sup>1</sup> ἀπορίας τε

<sup>1</sup> The text is probably corrupt. The genitive, singular or plural, is an easy emendation. But the harsh construction of *πένητες* as subject of *ἴσχυσι* yields the sense required.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *A.J.P.* vol. xiii. p. 364, Aeschines iii. 255, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 4. 5, *Laws* 880 a.

<sup>b</sup> One of the profoundest of Plato's many political

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of these," he said. "And again, there could not rightly arise among them any law-suit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellows<sup>a</sup> we shall say that self-defence is honourable and just, thereby compelling them to keep their bodies in condition." "Right," he said. "And there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes." "Assuredly." "As for an older man, he will always have the charge of ruling and chastising the younger." "Obviously." "Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably not do violence to an elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonour him in any other way. There being the two competent guardians to prevent that, fear and awe, awe restraining him from laying hands on one who may be his parent, and fear in that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers." "That is the way it works out," he said. "Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together." "Great peace." "And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there is no fear that<sup>b</sup> the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another." "No, there is not." "But I hesitate, so unseemly<sup>c</sup> are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings<sup>d</sup> of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the

aphorisms. Cf. on 545 D, *Laws* 683 E, and Aristot. *Pol.* 1305 a 39.

<sup>c</sup> *Alma sdegnosa.* Cf. 371 E, 396 B, 397 D, 525 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 b 22.

καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ὅσας ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφήν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναικᾶς τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἶα πάσχουσι, δῆλά τε δὴ καὶ  
 D ἀγεννή καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

XIII. Δῆλα γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῶ. Πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονίκαί ζῶσι, μακαριώτερον. Πῆ; Διὰ μικρόν που μέρος εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις ὑπάρχει. ἦ τε γὰρ τῶνδε νίκη καλλίων, ἦ τ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε γὰρ νικῶσι ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, τροφήν τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσων βίος δεῖται, αὐτοῖ τε καὶ παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται,  
 E καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καλά. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας  
 466 ποιούμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; ἡμεῖς δὲ που εἴπομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν, εἴ που παραπίπτοι, εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιούμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἰοί τ' εἶμεν εὐδαιμονεστάτην, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 416 D, 548 A, 550 D.

<sup>b</sup> Proverbial. Cf. *Sophist* 241 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 540 B-C, 621 D, *Laws* 715 C, 807 C, 840 A, 946-947, 964 C, *Cic. Pro Flacco* 31 "Olympionicen esse apud Graecos prope maius et gloriosius est quam Romae triumphasse." The motive is anticipated or parodied by Dracontion, *Athenaeus* 237 D, where the parasite boasts—

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bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband,<sup>a</sup> and all the indignities that they endure in such matters, which are obvious and ignoble and not deserving of mention." "Even a blind<sup>b</sup> man can see these," he said.

XIII. "From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia.<sup>c</sup>" "How so?" "The things for which those are felicitated are a small part of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete. For the prize of victory that they win is the salvation of the entire state, the fillet that binds their brows is the public support of themselves and their children—they receive honour from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial." "A fair guerdon, indeed," he said. "Do you recall," said I, "that in the preceding<sup>d</sup> argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modelling<sup>e</sup>

*γέρα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ταῦτα τοῖς τάλύμπια  
νικῶσι δέδοται χρηστότητος οὐνεκα.*

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 419 E-20.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 420 c. Omitting *τό*, translate "that we were not fixing our eyes on any one class, and portraying that as happy."



ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτο [τὸ] εὐδαιμον  
 πλάττοιμεν; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; νῦν ἡμῖν  
 ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιο-  
 νικῶν πολὺ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται, μή  
 Β πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον ἢ  
 τινων ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;  
 Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὃ γε καὶ ἐκεῖ  
 ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ οὕτως  
 ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαιμῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε  
 μηδὲ φύλαξ εἶναι, μηδ' ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βίος οὕτω  
 μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν ἄριστος,  
 ἀλλ' ἀνόητός τε καὶ μεираκιώδης δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα  
 εὐδαιμονίας πέρι ὀρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ  
 C τὸ ἅπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκειοῦσθαι, γνώσεται  
 τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων πλεόν  
 εἶναί πως ἡμισυ παντός. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἔφη, ξυμ-  
 βούλω χρώμενος μενεῖ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ. Συγ-  
 χωρεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινω-  
 νίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἦν διεληλύθαμεν παιδείας τε  
 πέρι καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν,  
 κατὰ τε πόλιν μενούσας εἰς πόλεμόν τε ἰούσας καὶ  
 ξυμφυλάττειν δεῖν καὶ ξυνηρεῦειν ὥσπερ κύνας  
 D καὶ πάντα πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ  
 ταῦτα πραττούσας τά τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ  
 παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἢ πεφύ-  
 κατον πρὸς ἀλλήλω κοινωνεῖν; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο λοιπὸν δι-  
 ελέσθαι, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνατόν ὥσπερ

<sup>a</sup> ἐπικούρων : the word here includes the rulers.

<sup>b</sup> κατὰ, "comparable to, on a level with." Cf. *Apol.*  
 17 B, *Gorg.* 512 B.

<sup>c</sup> μηδέ : cf. 420 D.

<sup>d</sup> *Works and Days* 40. So *Laws* 690 E.

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our ideal of happiness with reference to any one class? ” “ I do remember,” he said. “ Well then, since now the life of our helpers <sup>a</sup> has been shown to be far fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia, need we compare <sup>b</sup> it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers? ” “ I think not,” he said. “ But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake <sup>c</sup> him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is so moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod <sup>d</sup> was indeed wise, who said that the half was in some sort more than the whole.” “ If he accepts my counsel,” he said, “ he will abide in this way of life.” “ You accept, then, as we have described it, this partnership of the women with our men in the matter of education and children and the guardianship of the other citizens, and you admit that both within the city and when they go forth to war they ought to keep guard together and hunt together as it were like hounds, and have all things in every way, so far as possible, in common, and that so doing they will do what is for the best and nothing that is contrary to female human nature <sup>e</sup> in comparison with male or to their natural fellowship with one another.” “ I do admit it,” he said.

XIV. “ Then,” I said, “ is not the thing that it remains to determine this, whether, namely, it is possible

<sup>e</sup> τήν: this order is frequent and sometimes significant in the *Laws*. Cf. 690 c, 720 e, 814 e, 853 a, 857 d, 923 b.

ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ὅπη δυνατόν; Ἐφθης, ἔφη, εἰπὼν ἢ ἔμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι. Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ  
 Ε οἶμαι, ἔφη, δῆλον ὄν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν. Πῶς; ἢ δ' ὅς. Ὅτι κοινῇ στρατεύονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἀδρόι, ἴν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἃ τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν· πρὸς  
 467 δὲ τῇ θεᾷ διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι πρὶν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν; Καὶ μάλα. Ἦ οὖν ἐκείνοις ἐπιμελέστερον παιδευτέον ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία τε καὶ θεᾷ τῶν προσηκόντων; Καταγέλαστον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἶη. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται  
 Β γε πᾶν ζῶον διαφερόντως παρόντων ὧν ἂν τέκη. Ἔστιν οὕτω· κίνδυνος δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλεῖσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παῖδας ἀπολέσαντας ποιῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀδύνατον ἀναλαβεῖν. Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις·

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 451 D. The community in this case, of course, refers only to occupations.

<sup>b</sup> μὲν γάρ: forced transition to a delaying digression.

<sup>c</sup> So with modifications *Laws* 785 B, 794 C-D, 804 D-E, 806 A-B, 813-814, 829 E.

<sup>d</sup> For this practice of Greek artists see Klein, *Praxiteles*, Newman, *Introd. to Aristot. Pol.* p. 352, Pater, *The Renaissance* 104, *Protag.* 328 A, *Laws* 643 B-C, *Protagoras* frag. 3 (Diels), *Aristot. Pol.* 1336 b 36, *Iambl. Protrept.* x., *Polyb.* vi. 2. 16, iii. 71. 6 καὶ παιδομαθῆ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, *Aristides* x. 72 who quotes Plato; *Antidotus*, *Athenaeus*, 484

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for such a community to be brought about among men as it is in the other animals,<sup>a</sup> and in what way it is possible?" "You have anticipated," he said, "the point I was about to raise." "For<sup>b</sup> as for their wars," I said, "the manner in which they will conduct them is too obvious for discussion." "How so," said he. "It is obvious that they will march out together,<sup>c</sup> and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen,<sup>d</sup> they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity; and in addition to looking on they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay?" "They do," indeed. "Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business?" "That would be ridiculous," he said. "But, further, when it comes to fighting, every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring?" "That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover." "What you say is true," I replied; "but, in the

240 B, where the parasite boasts that he was a *παιδομαθής* in his art, and Sosipater, Athenaeus 377 F, where the cook makes the same boast, Phocyl. frag. 13 (Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* I., L.C.L.), Henry Arthur Jones, *Patriotism and popular Education*, Kipling, *From Sea to Sea*, p. 361. Greek language and satire contrasted such *παιδομαθείς* with the *ὀψιμαθείς* or late learners.

ἀλλὰ σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἡγεῖ παρασκευαστέον τὸ μη ποτε κινδυνεύσαι; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ'; εἴ που κινδυνευτέον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ βελτίους ἔσονται κατορθοῦντες;

C Δῆλον δὴ. Ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν οἶει διαφέρειν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου, θεωρεῖν ἢ μὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον παῖδας τοὺς ἄνδρας πολεμικοὺς ἔσομένους; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει πρὸς ὃ λέγεις. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωροὺς πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, προσμηχανᾶσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἔξει· ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν οἱ πατέρες ὅσα ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς

D ἔσονται ἀλλὰ γνωμονικοὶ τῶν στρατειῶν, ὅσαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπικίνδυνοι; Εἰκός, ἔφη. Εἰς μὲν ἄρα τὰς ἄξουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐλαβήσονται. Ὅρθῶς. Καὶ ἄρχοντάς γέ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρία τε καὶ ἡλικία ἱκανοὺς ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς εἶναι. Πρέπει γάρ. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο. Καὶ μάλα. Πρὸς τοίνυν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ᾧ φίλε, πτεροῦν χρή παιδία ὄντα εὐθύς, ἴν' ἂν τι δέη πετόμενοι ἀπο-

E φεύγωσιν. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναβιβαστέον ὡς νεωτάτους, καὶ διδασκόμενους ἵππεύειν ἐφ' ἵππων ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, μὴ θυμοειδῶν μηδὲ μαχητικῶν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποδωκεστάτων καὶ εὐηνωτάτων. οὕτω γὰρ κάλλιστα τε θεάσονται τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον, καὶ ἀσφαλέ-

<sup>a</sup> προσμηχανᾶσθαι: cf. *supra* on 414 B.

<sup>b</sup> παρὰ δόξαν: cf. Thucyd. i. 122 ἡκιστα ὁ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, ii. 11, iii. 30, iv. 102, vii. 61.

<sup>c</sup> πτεροῦν: metaphorical. In Aristoph. *Birds* 1436-1438 literal.

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first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger?" "By no means." "And, if they must incur danger, should it not be for something in which success will make them better?" "Clearly." "Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys?" "No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak." "Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive<sup>a</sup> security for them and all will be well, will it not?" "Yes." "To begin with, then," said I, "will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not?" "Presumably," he said. "They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others?" "Rightly." "And for officers, I presume," said I, "they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as caretakers of children." "Yes, that would be the proper way." "Still, we may object, it is the unexpected<sup>b</sup> that happens to many in many cases." "Yes, indeed." "To provide against such chances, then, we must wing<sup>c</sup> the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape." "What do you mean?" he said. "We must mount them when very young," said I, "and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if

στατα, ἂν τι δέη, σωθήσονται μετὰ πρεσβυτέρων  
 ἡγεμόνων ἐπόμενοι. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖς  
 468 λέγειν. Τί δαὶ δὴ, εἶπον, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον;  
 πῶς ἐκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας πρὸς αὐτούς τε  
 καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους; ἄρ' ὀρθῶς μοι καταφαίνεται  
 ἢ οὐ; Λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' ἂν. Αὐτῶν μὲν, εἶπον,  
 τὸν λιπόντα τάξιν ἢ ὄπλα ἀποβαλόντα ἢ τι τῶν  
 τοιούτων ποιήσαντα διὰ κάκην ἄρα οὐ δημιουργόν  
 τινα δεῖ καθιστάναι ἢ γεωργόν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
 Τὸν δὲ ζῶντα εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀλόντα ἄρ'  
 οὐ δωρεὰν διδόναι τοῖς ἐλουσι<sup>1</sup> χρῆσθαι τῇ ἄγρα  
 Β ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται; Κομιδῆ γε. Τὸν δὲ ἀριστεύ-  
 σαντά τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσαντα οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ  
 στρατείας ὑπὸ τῶν συστρατευομένων μεираκίων  
 τε καὶ παίδων ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ ἐκάστου δοκεῖ σοι  
 χρῆναι στεφανωθῆναι; ἢ οὐ; Ἐμοιγε. Τί δαί;  
 δεξιωθῆναι; Καὶ τοῦτο. Ἀλλὰ τόδ', οἶμαι, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ φιλησαί  
 τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκάστου. Πάντων, ἔφη,  
 μάλιστα· καὶ προστίθημί γε τῷ νόμῳ, ἕως ἂν  
 C ἐπὶ ταύτης ὡσι τῆς στρατείας, μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπ-  
 αρνηθῆναι, ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, εἴαν τις  
 του τύχη ἐρῶν ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας, προθυμότερος  
 ἢ πρὸς τὸ τὰριστεῖα φέρειν. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.  
 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῶ ὄντι γάμοι τε ἔτοιμοι πλείους

<sup>1</sup> van Leeuwen: mss. θέλουσι.

<sup>a</sup> The terms are technical. Cf. *Laws* 943 d ff., Lipsius, *Das attische Recht* (1908), ii. pp. 452 ff.

<sup>b</sup> εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους: technical. Cf. inscription in *Bulletin de corr. hellénique*, xii. p. 224, n. 1 τῶν ἀλόντων εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους.

<sup>c</sup> ἄγρα: the word is chosen to give a touch of Spartan, or, as we should say, Roman severity. Cf. *Sophist* 235 c,

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need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides." "I think you are right," he said. "But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not?" "Tell me what notions," he said. "Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons,<sup>a</sup> or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not?" "By all means." "And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy<sup>b</sup> we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch<sup>c</sup> as they please?" "Quite so." "And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valour and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn?" "I do." "And be greeted with the right hand?" "That, too." "But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this?" "What?" "That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone<sup>d</sup>?" "By all means," he said, "and I add to the law the provision that during that campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize." "Excellent," said I, "and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good

Aeschyl. *Eumen.* 148, Horace, *Odes*, iii. 5. 33 ff. Plutarch, *De aud. poet.* 30, says that in Homer no Greeks are taken prisoners, only Trojans.

<sup>a</sup> The deplorable facetiousness of the following recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon's guard-house conversations. It is almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot. Helvetius, otherwise anything but a Platonist, characteristically adopts it, Lange, *History of Materialism*, ii. p. 86.



ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων πολλάκις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔσονται, ἵν' ὃ τι πλείστοι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίνωνται, εἴρηται ἤδη. Εἵπομεν γάρ, ἔφη.

XV. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον τοῖς τοιοῖσδε  
 D δίκαιον τιμᾶν τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἀγαθοί. καὶ γὰρ  
 Ὅμηρος τὸν εὐδοκιμήσαντα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νώτοισιν  
 Αἴαντα ἔφη διηνεκέεσσι γεραίρεσθαι, ὡς ταύτην  
 οἰκείαν οὔσαν τιμὴν τῷ ἠβῶντί τε καὶ ἀνδρείῳ,  
 ἐξ ἧς ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐξήσει.  
 Ὅρθότατα, ἔφη. Πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 ταῦτά γε Ὅμηρῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐν τε θυσίαις  
 καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, καθ' ὅσον  
 ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ  
 E ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔδραις τε καὶ  
 κρέασιν ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσιν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶν  
 ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας.  
 Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Εἶεν· τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀπο-  
 θανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὅς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τε-  
 λευτήσῃ, ἂρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ  
 γένους εἶναι; Πάντων γε μάλιστα. Ἀλλ' οὐ πει-  
 σόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδάν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους  
 τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα

469 .οὐ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοὶ ἐπιχθονιοὶ τελέθουσιν,  
 ἐσθλοὶ, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων;  
 Πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν. Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ,  
 πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέσθαι καὶ  
 τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτη θήσομεν ἢ ἂν

<sup>a</sup> *Il.* vii. 321-322. Cf. also viii. 162, xii. 311.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 415 A.

<sup>c</sup> *Works and Days* 121 ff. Stewart, *Myths of Plato*, p. 437.

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man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock." "We have," he replied.

XV. "But, furthermore, we may cite Homer<sup>a</sup> too for the justice of honouring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honoured with the long chine, assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honour and strength will accrue to him." "Most rightly," he said. "We will then," said I, "take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with seats of honour and meat and full cups, so as to combine physical training with honour for the good, both men and women." "Nothing could be better," he said. "Very well; and of those who die on campaign, if anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race<sup>b</sup>?" "By all means." "And shall we not believe Hesiod<sup>c</sup> who tells us that when any one of this race dies, so it is that they become

Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil,  
Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking  
mortals?"

"We certainly shall believe him." "We will inquire of Apollo,<sup>d</sup> then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 427 B-C.

ἐξηγήται; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν; Καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν τε καὶ Β προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας· ταῦτά δὲ ταῦτα νομοῦμεν, ὅταν τις γήρα ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν; Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη. Τί δαί; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ στρατιῶται; Τὸ ποῖον δὴ; Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἑλληνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, ἢ μηδ' ἄλλη ἐπιτρέπειν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τοῦτο ἐθίζειν, τοῦ Ἑλλη- C νικοῦ γένους φεΐδεσθαι, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν; Ὀλω καὶ παντί, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ φεΐδεσθαι. Μηδὲ Ἑλληνα ἄρα δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι μήτε αὐτοὺς τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν οὕτω συμβουλεύειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γ' ἂν οὖν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο, ἑαυτῶν δ' ἀπέχοντο. Τί δαί; σκυλεύειν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλὴν ὄπλων, ἐπειδὴν νικήσωσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει; ἢ οὐ πρόφασιν μὲν τοῖς D δειλοῖς ἔχει μὴ πρὸς τὸν μαχόμενον ἰέναι, ὡς τι τῶν δεόντων δρῶντας, ὅταν περὶ τὸν τεθνεῶτα κυπτάζωσι, πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη στρατόπεδα διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρπαγὴν ἀπώλετο; Καὶ μάλα. Ἄνελεύθερον δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν συλᾶν, καὶ γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας τὸ πολέμιον νομίζειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἀποπτα-

<sup>a</sup> ἐξηγήται: cf. 427 c.

<sup>b</sup> τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον: cf. Pindar in *Meno* 81 c, *Phaedo* 81 a.

<sup>c</sup> For this Pan-Hellenic feeling cf. Xen. *Ages.* 7. 6, *Hellen.* i. 6. 14, Aeschines ii. 115, Isoc. *Panegyricus*.

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response.<sup>a</sup>” “How can we do otherwise?” “And ever after<sup>b</sup> we will bestow on their graves the tendance and worship paid to spirits divine. And we will practise the same observance when any who have been adjudged exceptionally good in the ordinary course of life die of old age or otherwise?” “That will surely be right,” he said. “But again, how will our soldiers conduct themselves toward enemies?” “In what respect?” “First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities<sup>c</sup> to slavery, or rather that, so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger<sup>d</sup> of enslavement by the barbarians?” “Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better,” said he. “They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to?” “By all means,” he said; “at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another.” “And how about stripping the dead after victory of anything except their weapons: is that well? Does it not furnish a pretext to cowards not to advance on the living foe, as if they were doing something needful when poking<sup>e</sup> about the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere now destroyed many an army?” “Yes, indeed.” “And don’t you think it illiberal and greedy to plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and petty<sup>f</sup> spirit to deem the body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown

<sup>a</sup> For the following *cf.* *Laws* 693 A, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. p. 275.

<sup>e</sup> *κυπτάζωσι*: *cf.* Blaydes on Aristoph. *Nubes* 509.

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* Juvenal, *Sat.* xiii. 189-191.

μένου τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, λελιοπότος δὲ ᾧ ἐπολέμει; ἢ  
 Ε οἶει τι διάφορον δρᾶν τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας τῶν  
 κυνῶν, αἷ τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι,  
 τοῦ βαλόντος<sup>1</sup> οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι; Οὐδὲ σμικρόν, ἔφη.  
 Ἐατέον ἄρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναιρέ-  
 σεων διακωλύσεις; Ἐατέον μέντοι, ἔφη, νῆ Δία.

XVI. Οὐδὲ μὴν που πρὸς τὰ ἱερά τὰ ὄπλα  
 οἴσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν  
 470 Ἑλλήνων, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν μέλη τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους  
 Ἑλληνας εὐνοίας· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ φοβησόμεθα, μῆ  
 τι μίασμα ἢ πρὸς ἱερόν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων  
 φέρειν, ἐὰν μῆ τι δὴ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλο λέγη. Ὁρθότατα,  
 ἔφη. Τί δαί; γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς  
 καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως ποῖόν τί σοι δράσουσιν  
 οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους; Σοῦ, ἔφη,  
 δόξαν ἀποφαινομένου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἐμοὶ  
 Β μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων μηδέτερα  
 ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· καὶ  
 ᾧ ἔνεκα, βούλει σοι λέγω; Πάνυ γε. Φαίνεται  
 μοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα,  
 πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα

<sup>1</sup> The mss. vary between βαλόντος and βάλλοντος, which Aristotle, who refers to the passage (*Rhet.* 1406 b 33), seems to have read. It might be important in the classroom to distinguish the continuous present from the matter-of-fact aorist.

<sup>a</sup> ἀποπταμένου: both Homer and Sappho so speak of the soul as flitting away.

<sup>b</sup> The body is only the instrument of the soul. Cf. Socrates' answer to the question, "How shall we bury you?" *Phaedo* 115 c ff. and the elaboration of the idea in *Alc. I.* 129 ε, whence it passed into European literature.

<sup>c</sup> Quoted by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1406 b. Epictetus iii. 19. 4 complains that nurses encourage children to strike the stone on which they stumble. Cf. also Lucan vi. 220-223. Otto, 494

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

away<sup>a</sup> and left behind only the instrument<sup>b</sup> with which he fought? Do you see any difference between such conduct and that of the dogs<sup>c</sup> who snarl at the stones that hit them but don't touch the thrower?" "Not the slightest." "We must abandon, then, the plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit their burial.<sup>d</sup>" "By heaven, we certainly must," he said.

XVI. "And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory<sup>e</sup> offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks, if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise.<sup>f</sup>" "Most rightly," he said. "And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies." "I would gladly hear your opinion of that." "In my view," said I, "they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why?" "Do." "In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished

*Sprichwörter der Römer*, p. 70, cites Pliny, *N.H.* xxix. 102, and Pacuv. v. 38, Ribb. *Trag.*<sup>2</sup> Cf. Montaigne i. 4, "Ainsin emporte les bestes leur rage à s'attaquer à la pierre et au fer qui les a blecées."

<sup>a</sup> Plato as a boy may have heard of the Thebans' refusal to allow the Athenians to bury their dead after Delium. Cf. Thucyd. iv. 97-101, and Eurip. *Supplices*.

<sup>e</sup> For the practice cf. Aeschyl. *Septem* 275-279 and *Ag.* 577-579. Italian cities and American states have restored to one another the flags so dedicated from old wars. Cf. Cic. *De invent.* ii. 70 "at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet."

<sup>f</sup> For similar caution cf. on 427 b-c.

ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκείον καὶ ξυγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρα στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις. "Ορα δὴ καὶ  
 C εἰ τόδε πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτῷ οἰκείον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον. Καλῶς γε, ἔφη. Ἕλληνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάροις καὶ βαρβάρους Ἕλλησι πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον. Ἕλληνας δὲ Ἕλλησιν, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτο δρῶσι, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα  
 D καὶ στασιάζειν, καὶ στάσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχθραν κλητέον. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ξυγχωρῶ οὕτω νομίζειν. Σκόπει δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένη στάσει, ὅπου ἂν τι τοιοῦτον γένηται καὶ διαστή πόλις, εἴαν ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέρων τέμνωσιν ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκίας ἐμπιπρῶσιν, ὡς ἀλιτηριώδης τε δοκεῖ ἢ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοπόλιδες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐτόλμων τὴν τροφὸν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν· ἀλλὰ μέτριον εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς

<sup>a</sup> I have so translated technically in order to imply that the Plato of the *Republic* is already acquainted with the terminology of the *Sophist*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, notes 375 and 377, followed by Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 504. But most editors take διαφορά here as dissension, and construe "applied to the disagreements of two things," which may be right. Cf. *Sophist* 228 A *στάσιν . . . τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἐκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν*.

<sup>b</sup> Plato shared the natural feelings of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and all patriotic Greeks. Cf. Isoc. *Panegy.* 157, 184, *Panath.* 163; *Menex.* 237 ff., *Laws* 692 c and 693 A.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

by two differentiae.<sup>a</sup> The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war." "What you say is in nothing beside the mark," he replied. "Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian." "Rightly," he said. "We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature,<sup>b</sup> and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity." "I will allow you that habit of speech," he said. "Then observe," said I, "that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother.<sup>c</sup> But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the van-

It is uncritical then with Newman (*op. cit.* p. 430) and many others to take as a recantation of this passage the purely logical observation in *Polit.* 262 D that Greek and barbarian is an unscientific dichotomy of mankind. Cf. on the whole question the dissertation of Friedrich Weber, *Platons Stellung zu den Barbaren.*

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* 414 E, *Menex.* 237 E, *Tim.* 40 B, *Laws* 740 A, Aeschyl. *Septem* 16.



Ε ἀφαιρείσθαι τοῖς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ  
 διανοεῖσθαι ὡς διαλλαγησομένων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ πο-  
 λεμησόντων. Πολὺ γάρ, ἔφη, ἡμερωτέρων αὕτη ἢ  
 διάνοια ἐκείνης. Τί δὲ δῆ; ἔφην· ἦν σὺ πόλιν  
 οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται; Δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἔφη.  
 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ ἡμεροὶ ἔσονται; Σφόδρα  
 γε. Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλέλληνες οὐδὲ οἰκείαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα  
 ἡγήσονται, οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσιν ὧν περ οἱ ἄλλοι  
 ἱερῶν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς  
 471 Ἕλληνας διαφορὰν ὡς οἰκείους στάσει ἡγήσονται  
 καὶ οὐδὲ ὀνομάσουσι πόλεμον; Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ ὡς  
 διαλλαγησόμενοι ἄρα διοίσονται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
 Εὐμενῶς δὴ σωφρονιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ  
 κολάζοντες οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες,  
 οὐ πολέμιοι. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα  
 Ἕλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἰκήσεις ἐμ-  
 πρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει  
 πάντας ἐχθροὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ  
 γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγους ἀεὶ ἐχθροὺς  
 Β τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφορᾶς· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα  
 οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἐβελήσουσι κείρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων  
 τῶν πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι  
 τούτου ποιήσονται τὴν διαφορὰν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ  
 αἴτιοι ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Epist.* 354 A, *Herod.* ii. 178, *Isoc. Phil.* 122, *Panegy.* 96, *Evag.* 40, *Panath.* 241. The word is still significant for international politics, and must be retained in the translation.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Newman, *op. cit.* p. 143.

<sup>c</sup> The same language was frequently used in the recent World War, but the practice was sometimes less civilized than that which Plato recommends. Hobhouse (*Mind in Evolution*, p. 384), writing earlier, said, "Plato's conclusions

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

quished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war." "That way of feeling," he said, "is far less savage than the other." "Well, then," said I, "is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city?" "It must be," he said. "Will they then not be good and gentle?" "Indeed they will." "And won't they be philhellenes,<sup>a</sup> lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks?" "Most certainly." "Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?" "Most certainly." "And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?" "By all means." "They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement<sup>b</sup> or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies." "They will," he said. "They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes,<sup>c</sup> those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the

(*Rep.* 469-471) show how narrow was the conception of humanitarian duties in the fourth century." It is, I think, only modern fancy that sees irony in the conclusion: "treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks."

δοῦναι δίκην. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὁμολογῶ οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Τιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον  
 C τὸν νόμον τοῖς φύλαξι, μήτε γῆν τέμνειν μήτε οἰκίας ἐμπιπράναι; Θῶμεν, ἔφη, καὶ ἔχειν γε καλῶς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν.

XVII. Ἀλλὰ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν τις σοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέπη λέγειν, οὐδέποτε μνησθήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἶρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατὴ· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ' ἂν εἶη ἀγαθὰ πόλει ἢ γένοιτο, καὶ ἂ σὺ παραλείπεις ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πο-  
 D λεμίοις ἄριστ' ἂν μάχονται τῷ ἡκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους, γιγνώσκοντές τε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα ἑαυτοῦς, ἀδελφούς, πατέρας, υἱεῖς, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύοιτο, εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὀπισθεν ἐπιτεταγμένον, φόβων τε ἔνεκα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ εἴ ποτε τις ἀνάγκη βοηθείας γένοιτο, οἶδ' ὅτι ταύτη πάντη ἄμαχοι ἂν εἶεν· καὶ οἴκοι γε ἂ παραλείπεται ἀγαθὰ, ὅσα ἂν εἶη αὐτοῖς, ὀρώ· ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοῦ  
 E ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἶη ἂν καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία, εἰ γένοιτο ἢ πολιτεία αὕτη, μηκέτι πλείω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἤδη πειρώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατόν καὶ ἢ  
 472 δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶμεν. Ἐξαίφνης γε

<sup>a</sup> It is a mistaken ingenuity that finds a juncture between two distinct versions here.

<sup>b</sup> πάντ' . . . ἀγαθὰ: idiomatically colloquial. Cf. *Polit.*

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suffering of the innocent." "I," he said, "agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks." "Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians, that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses?" "Let us so decree," he said, "and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right.

XVII. "But<sup>a</sup> I fear, Socrates, that, if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely<sup>b</sup> for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshalled behind to intimidate the enemy,<sup>c</sup> or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don't labour that point further; but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing everything else." "This is a

284 B, *Laws* 711 D, 757 D, 780 D, Aristoph. *Acharn.* 978, 982, *Frogs* 302.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 806 B.

σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ καταδρομὴν ἐποιήσω ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον μου, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις στραγγευομένῳ.<sup>1</sup> ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι μόγις μοι τῶ δύω κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὃ ἐπειδὴν ἴδης τε καὶ ἀκούσης, πάνυ συγγνώμην ἔξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα ὠκνοῦν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκεν οὕτω παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. Ὅσω ἄν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγης, ἦττον Β ἀφεθήσει ὑφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν, πῆ δυνατὴ γίνεσθαι αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία· ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ μὴ διάτριβε. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρή ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἤκομεν. Χρή· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτό γ'; ἔφη. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' εἴαν εὖρωμεν οἷόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιόσομεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, C ἀλλὰ πανταχῆ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν, εἴαν ὅ τι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἦ καὶ πλείστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχη; Οὕτως,

<sup>1</sup> στραγγευομένῳ, "loitering." A rare word. See Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 126. Most mss. read less aptly στρατευομένῳ, "my stratagem."

<sup>a</sup> ὥσπερ marks the figurative use as *τινα* in Aeschines, *Tim.* 135 *τινα καταδρομὴν.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Introd.* p. xvii. The third wave, sometimes the ninth, was proverbially the greatest. Cf. *Euthydem.* 293 A, Lucan v. 672 "decimus dictu mirabile fluctus," and Swinburne:

Who swims in sight of the great third wave  
That never a swimmer shall cross or climb.

<sup>c</sup> συγγνώμην: L. & S. wrongly with ὅτι, "to acknowledge that . . ."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Introd.* p. xii and note *d.* Plato seems to overlook the fact that the search was virtually completed in the fourth book.

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sudden assault,<sup>a</sup> indeed," said I, "that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the 'great third wave<sup>b</sup>' of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient,<sup>c</sup> recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion." "The more such excuses you offer," he said, "the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off." "The first thing to recall, then," I said, "is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass.<sup>d</sup>" "Yes; but what of it?" he said. "Oh, nothing,<sup>e</sup>" I replied, "only this: if we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect, but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others?"

\* οὐδέν: idiomatic, like the English of the translation. Cf. *Charm.* 164 A, *Gorg.* 498 A, 515 E. The emphatic statement that follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato's warning hint that he does not expect the literal realization of his Utopia, though it would be disillusionizing to say so too explicitly. Cf. *Intro.* pp. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato's *Laws*, *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) pp. 351 and 353. This is one of the chief ideas which Cicero derived from Plato. He applies it to his picture of the ideal orator, and the mistaken ingenuity of modern scholarship has deduced from this and attributed to the maleficent influence of Plato the post-Renaissance and eighteenth-century doctrine of fixed literary kinds. Cf. my note in the *New York Nation*, vol. ciii. p. 238, Sept. 7, 1916.

ἔφη· ἀγαπήσομεν. Παραδείγματος ἄρα ἔνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο καὶ οἷος ἂν εἶη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδικίαν αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες, οἷοι ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκαζώμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν  
 D ὁμολογεῖν, ὅς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅ τι ὁμοιότατος ἢ τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. Τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, ἀληθὲς λέγεις. Οἷοι ἂν οὖν ἡττόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι, ὅς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα, οἷον ἂν εἶη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανῶς ἀποδοῦς μὴ ἔχη ἀποδείξαι, ὡς καὶ δυνατόν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ  
 E ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως; Πάνυ γε. Ἡττόν τι οὖν οἷοι ἡμᾶς εὖ λέγειν τούτου ἔνεκα, εἰ μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδείξαι, ὡς δυνατόν οὕτω πόλιν οἰκῆσαι ὡς ἐλέγετο; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν ἀληθές, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν, ἀποδείξαι, πῆ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ' ἂν εἶη, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι. Τὰ ποῖα; Ἄρ'

<sup>a</sup> An ideal in the plastic arts is used to illustrate the thought. Cf. Aristot. *Poetics* 1461 b 14, *Politics* 1281 b 10, Cicero, *Orator* ii. 3, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 10, Finsler, *Platon u. d. aristotelische Poetik*, p. 56. Polyb. vi. 47. 7 gives a different turn to the comparison of the Republic to a statue. Plato is speaking from the point of view of ordinary opinion, and it is uncritical to find here and in 501 an admission that

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

“That will content us,” he said. “A pattern, then,” said I, “was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals.” “In that,” he said, “you speak truly.” “Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter,<sup>a</sup> who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist?” “Not I, by Zeus,” he said. “Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state?” “Certainly.” “Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words?” “Of course not,” he said. “That, then,” said I, “is the truth<sup>b</sup> of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point.<sup>c</sup>” “What?” “Is it possible for the artist copies the idea, which is denied in Book X. 597 E ff. Apelt, *Platonische Aufsätze*, p. 67.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 372 E.

<sup>c</sup> The point is so important that Plato repeats it more specifically.



## PLATO

473 οἶόν τέ τι πραχθῆναι ὡς λέγεται, ἢ φύσιν ἔχει  
 πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἦττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν  
 εἰ μή τω δοκεῖ; ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς  
 οὕτως ἢ οὐ; Ὁμολογῶ, ἔφη. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ  
 ἀνάγκαζέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, τοιαῦτα  
 παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν.  
 ἀλλ', εἰ οἰοί τε γενώμεθα εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἐγγύτατα  
 τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξ-  
 ευρηκένοι, ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, ἃ σὺ ἐπι-  
 B τάττεις. ἢ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων τυγχάνων; ἐγὼ  
 μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῶην. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἔφη.

XVIII. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, πει-  
 ρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύειν, τί ποτε νῦν  
 κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται, δι' ὃ οὐχ οὕτως  
 οἰκοῦνται, καὶ τίνας ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος  
 ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις,  
 μάλιστα μὲν ἑνός, εἰ δὲ μή, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὃ τι  
 ὀλιγίστων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ σμικροτάτων τὴν  
 C δύναμιν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἐνός μὲν  
 τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι  
 ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἂν, οὐ μόντοι σμικροῦ  
 γε οὐδὲ ραδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ. Τίνος; ἔφη. Ἐπ'  
 αὐτὸ<sup>1</sup> δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμι, ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προεικά-  
 ζομεν χύματι· εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέ-  
 λωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία  
 κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν. Λέγε,

<sup>1</sup> ἐπ' αὐτὸ] the translation nearly enough fits both this  
 and Burnet's reading ἐπ' αὐτῷ . . . εἰμί.

<sup>a</sup> Plato is contradicting the Greek commonplace which  
 contrasts the word with the deed. Cf. *Apol.* 32 A, *Sophist*  
 234 E, Eurip. frag. *Alcmena* λόγος γὰρ τοῦργον οὐ νικᾷ ποτε,  
 and perhaps Democritus's λόγος ἔργου σκικῆ. Cf. *A.J.P.* xiii.  
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anything to be realized in deed as it is spoken in word, or is it the nature of things that action should partake of exact truth less than speech, even if some deny it <sup>a</sup>? Do you admit it or not?" "I do," he said. "Then don't insist," said I, "that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of realization which you demanded. Will you not be content if you get this? I for my part would." "And I too," he said.

XVIII. "Next, it seems, we must try to discover and point out what it is that is now badly managed in our cities, and that prevents them from being so governed, and what is the smallest change that would bring a state to this manner of government, preferably a change in one thing, if not, then in two, and, failing that, the fewest possible in number and the slightest in potency." "By all means," he said. "There is one change, then," said I, "which I think that we can show would bring about the desired transformation. It is not a slight or an easy thing but it is possible." "What is that?" said he. "I am on the very verge," said I, "of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it <sup>b</sup> I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash <sup>c</sup> us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen." "I am all

p. 64. The word is the expression of the thought. It is more plastic (*infra* 588 D, *Laws* 736 B) and, as Goethe says "von einem Wort lässt sich kein Iota rauben."

<sup>b</sup> εἰρήσεται: so used by the orators to introduce a bold statement. Cf. Aeschines ii. 22, Demosth. xix. 224, xi. 17, xiv. 24, xxi. 198, etc.

<sup>c</sup> More literally "deluge or overwhelm with ridicule."

ἔφη. Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύ-  
 D σωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν ξυμπέσῃ, δύναμις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἰ πολλὰ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον  
 E φυῆ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὀρῶντι ὡς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ. καὶ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἡγοῦ ἐπὶ σὲ πάνυ πολλούς τε καὶ οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὕτως οἶον ῥίψαντας

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<sup>a</sup> This is perhaps the most famous sentence in Plato. Cf. for the idea 499 B, 540 D, *Laws* 711 D, 712 A, 713 E ff. It is paraphrased by the author of the seventh *Epistle* (324 B, 326 A-B, 328 A-B) who perhaps quotes Plato too frequently to be Plato himself. *Epistle* ii. 310 E, though sometimes quoted in this connexion, is not quite the same thought. It is implied in *Phaedrus* 252 E φιλόσοφος καὶ ἡγεμονικός, and *Polit.* 293 C, and only seems to be contradicted in *Euthydem.* 306 B. Aristotle is said to have contradicted it in a lost work (fr. 79, 1489 b 8 ff.). It is paraphrased or parodied by a score of writers from Polybius xii. 28 to Bacon, Hobbes, More, Erasmus, and Bernard Shaw. Boethius transmitted it to the Middle Ages (*Cons. Phil.* i. 4. 11). It was always on the lips of Marcus Aurelius. Cf. *Capitol*, Aurel. i. 1 and iv. 27. It was a standardized topic of compliment to princes in Themistius, Julian, the *Panegyrici Latini*, and many modern imitators. Among the rulers who have been

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attention," he said. "Unless," said I, "either philosophers become kings<sup>a</sup> in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy<sup>b</sup> to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life." Whereupon he, "Socrates," said he, "after hurling at us such an utterance and statement as that, you must expect to be attacked by a great multitude of our men of light and leading,<sup>c</sup> who forthwith will, so to speak, cast off

thus compared with Plato's philosophic king are Marcus Aurelius, Constantine, Arcadius, James I., Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. There is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko's Program, *Sententiae Platonicae de philosophis regnantibus fata quae fuerint*, Krakow, 1904, in the supplementary article of Karl Praechter, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xiv. (1905) pp. 479-491, and in the dissertation of Emil Wolff, *Francis Bacon's Verhältnis zu Platon*, Berlin, 1908, pp. 60 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Plato's condescension to the ordinary mind that cannot be expected to understand often finds expression in this form. Cf. *supra* 366 c, *infra* 489 c, *Theaetet.* 176 c, and *Rep.* 495 E ἀνάγκη.

<sup>c</sup> *Lit.* "many and not slight men."

## PLATO

474 τὰ ἱμάτια γυμνούς, λαβόντας ὃ τι ἐκάστω παρ-  
 ἔτυχεν ὄπλον, θεῖν διατεταμένους ὡς θαυμάσια  
 ἐργασομένους· οὓς εἰ μὴ ἀμυνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ  
 ἐκφεύξει, τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.  
 Οὐκοῦν σύ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος; Καλῶς  
 γ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ'  
 ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοία τε καὶ τῷ  
 παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέ-  
 Β στερὸν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχων τοιοῦτον  
 βοηθὸν πειρῶ τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι  
 ἔχει ἢ σὺ λέγεις. Πειρατέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ  
 καὶ σὺ οὕτω μεγάλην ξυμμαχίαν παρέχει. ἀναγ-  
 καῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομέν πη ἐκφεύξεσθαι  
 οὓς λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοὺς φιλο-  
 σόφους τίνες λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν,  
 ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων δύνηται τις ἀμύνεσθαι  
 ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἄπτε-  
 C σθαί τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πόλει, τοῖς  
 δ' ἄλλοις μήτε ἄπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγου-  
 μένῳ. Ὡρα ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ὀρίζεσθαι. Ἴθι δὴ,  
 ἀκολούθησόν μοι τῆδε, εἰάν αὐτὸ ἀμῆ γέ πη  
 ἱκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα. Ἄγε, ἔφη. Ἀναμιμνή-  
 σκειν οὖν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι  
 ὄν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, εἰάν  
 ὀρθῶς λέγηται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ  
 μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Hipponax, fr. 74 (58), Theophrast. *Char.* 27, Aristoph. *Wasps* 408.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Apol.* 35 A, *Theaet.* 151 A.

<sup>c</sup> τῷ ὄντι verifies the strong word τωθαζόμενος.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 162 A 7. The dialectician prefers a docile respondent. Cf. *Sophist* 217 c, *Parmen.* 137 B.

<sup>e</sup> τὸ δὲ μή: for the idiom cf. *Phileb.* 22 A, *Laws* 797 E.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

their garments<sup>a</sup> and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to do<sup>b</sup> dreadful deeds. And if you don't find words to defend yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and flouted will in very truth<sup>c</sup> be the penalty you will have to pay." "And isn't it you," said I, "that have brought this upon me and are to blame?" "And a good thing, too," said he; "but I won't let you down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more suitably<sup>d</sup> than another. So, with such an aid to back you, try to make it plain to the doubters that the truth is as you say." "I must try," I replied, "since you proffer so strong an alliance. I think it requisite, then, if we are to escape the assailants you speak of, that we should define for them whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers. When these are clearly discriminated it will be possible to defend ourselves by showing that to them by their very nature belong the study of philosophy and political leadership, while it befits the other sort to let philosophy alone and to follow their leader." "It is high time," he said, "to produce your definition." "Come, then, follow me on this line, if we may in some fashion or other explain our meaning." "Proceed," he said. "Must I remind you, then," said I, "or do you remember, that when we affirm that a man is a lover of something, it must be apparent that he is fond of all of it? It will not do to say that some of it he likes and some<sup>e</sup> does not."

923 c, Demodocus's epigram on the Chians, Aeschyl. *Persae* 802, Soph. *O.C.* 1671.

XIX. Ἀναμιμνήσκειν, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ· οὐ  
**D** γὰρ πάνυ γε ἐννοῶ. Ἄλλω, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ  
 Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἅ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῶ οὐ  
 πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν, ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν ὥρᾳ τὸν  
 φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἀμῆ γέ πη δάκνουσί τε  
 καὶ κινουῦσι, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τε  
 καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς  
 τοὺς καλοὺς; ὁ μὲν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς  
 ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βα-  
 σιλικόν φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ μέσου τούτων  
**E** ἐμμετρότατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν,  
 λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι· μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ  
 τοῦνομα οἶει τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἐραστοῦ  
 ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν  
 ὠχρότητα, εἴαν ἐπὶ ὥρᾳ ἦ; καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάσας  
 475 προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς  
 ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούτων  
 ἐν ὥρᾳ. Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν  
 ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιουῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου  
 χάριν. Τί δαί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς φιλοῖνους οὐ τὰ  
 αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιούοντας ὀρᾶς, πάντα οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης  
 προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους; Καὶ μάλα. Καὶ μὴν  
 φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, καθορᾶς, ὅτι, ἂν μὴ  
 στρατηγῆσαι δύνωνται, τριπτυαρχοῦσι, κἂν μὴ  
**B** ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ

<sup>a</sup> Another of the famous sentences that would be worth a monograph. Cf. Lucretius iv. 1160, Molière, *Misanthrope*, ii. 5, Horace, *Sat.* i. 338. F. Brunetière, *Les Époques du théâtre français*, p. 76, thinks that Molière took it from Scarron, not from Lucretius. Shakes. *Much Ado*, iii. i. reverses the conceit, Santayana, *Reason in Society*, p. 25, writes prettily about it.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth.* i. 8. 10 ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς δ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος. Cf. the old Latin hexameters—

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XIX. "I think you will have to remind me," he said, "for I don't apprehend at all." "That reply, Glaucon," said I, "befitted another rather than you. It does not become a lover to forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and desirable. Is not that your 'reaction' to the fair? One, because his nose is tip-tilted,<sup>a</sup> you will praise as piquant, the beak of another you pronounce right-royal, the intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean, the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the gods divinely fair, and as for honey-hued, do you suppose the very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth? And, in short, there is no pretext you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime." "If it is your pleasure," he said, "to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument." "Again," said I, "do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine?<sup>b</sup> They welcome every wine on any pretext." "They do, indeed." "And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honour,<sup>c</sup> if they can't get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company.<sup>d</sup> And if they can't be honoured by great men

Si bene quid memini causae sunt quinque bibendi:  
Hospitis adventus, praesens sitis atque futura,  
Aut vini bonitas, aut quaelibet altera causa.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 21 (Loeb) μικροφιλοτιμίας, petty pride.

<sup>d</sup> τριπταρχοῦσι, "command the soldiers of a trittys" or third of one of the ten tribes.



σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὄλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Τοῦτο δὴ φάθι ἢ μή· ἄρ' ὄν ἄν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ; Παντός, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

C Ἀληθῆ. Τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χοηστὸν καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῆ οὔτε πεινῆν φαμέν οὔτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν. Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον. ἢ γάρ; καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἔφη,

D Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσονταί σοι τοιοῦτοι· οἳ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἳ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὡς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἳ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην

<sup>a</sup> δυσχεραίνοντα, squeamish, particular, "choicy." Cf. *supra* 391 E, 426 D, and Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 288—

Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best,  
Which nauseate all, and nothing can digest.

<sup>b</sup> Plato as usual anticipates objections and misunderstandings. Cf. e.g. on 487 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the argument in the first sentence of Aristotle's

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

and dignitaries, are satisfied with honour from little men and nobodies. But honour they desire and must have." "Yes, indeed." "Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not?" "The whole," he said. "Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not." "Certainly." "The student, then, who is finical<sup>a</sup> about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder." "We shall rightly say so." "But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not?" To which Glaucon replied,<sup>b</sup> "You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles<sup>c</sup> are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing<sup>d</sup> are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn't induce them to attend a serious debate or

*Metaphysics* that men's pleasure in sense-perception is a form of their love of knowledge.

<sup>a</sup> *φιλήκοι*: the word, like *curiosity* in Ruskin's interpretation, may have a higher and a lower meaning. It is used half technically of intellectual interests generally. Cf. *Euthydem.* 304 B. The abstract *φιληκοία* became a virtual synonym of culture and reading.

διατριβὴν ἐκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὦτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν μαθητικούς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν; Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

XX. Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τοιόνδε. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρῶ, δύο αὐτῶ  
476 εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἓν ἐκάτερον; Καὶ τοῦτο. Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 498 A, and in *Parmenides* 126 E, Antiphon, who studied Eleatic dialectic in his youth, but now gives his time to horses. The word διατριβή has a long history in philosophy and literature, starting from such passages as *Charmides* 153 A and *Lysis* 204 A.

<sup>b</sup> In addition to the presentation of new plays at the city Dionysia, there were performances at the Peiraeus and in the demes.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaetetus*. 201 B 3, *Sophist* 240 B οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινὸν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκὸς μὲν.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth.* 1098 a 32 θεατῆς γὰρ τὰληθοῦς.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 449 c.

<sup>f</sup> Plato is merely restating the theory of Ideas to prepare for his practical distinction between minds that can and minds that cannot apprehend abstractions. He does not here

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

any such entertainment,<sup>a</sup> but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac festivals,<sup>b</sup> never missing one, either in the towns or in the country-villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers? "Not at all," I said; "but they do bear a certain likeness<sup>c</sup> to philosophers."

XX, "Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers?" "Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamoured,<sup>d</sup>" said I. "Right again,<sup>e</sup>" said he; "but in what sense do you mean it?" "It would be by no means easy to explain it to another," I said, "but I think that you will grant me this." "What?" "That since the fair and honourable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two." "Of course." "And since they are two, each is one.<sup>f</sup>" "That also." "And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of

enter into the metaphysics of the subject. But he does distinctly show that he is "already" aware of the difficulties raised in the *Parmenides*, 131 B ff., and of the misapprehension disposed of in the *Sophist* 252 ff. that the metaphysical isolation of the Ideas precludes their combination and intermingling in human thought and speech. For the many attempts to evade ἀλλήλων κοινωνία cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 244, and add now Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 567, who, completely missing the point, refers to 505 A, which is also misunderstood. He adds "mit den Problemen des *Sophistes* hat das gar nichts zu tun; sie waren ihm noch nicht aufgestossen," which begs the question.

φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ταύτη  
 τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὖς νῦν δὴ  
 ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ  
 Β πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὖς  
 μόνους ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους. Πῶς,  
 ἔφη, λέγεις; Οἱ μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ  
 φιλοθεάμονες τὰς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ  
 χροᾶς καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων  
 δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος  
 αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπᾶσθαι.  
 Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτως. Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ  
 τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰεῖν τε καὶ ὄραν καθ' αὐτὸ ἄρα  
 C οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν; Καὶ μάλα. Ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν  
 πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων  
 μήτε, ἂν τις ἠγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνά-  
 μενος ἔπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκόπει  
 δέ. τὸ ὄνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, εἴαν τε  
 ἐν ὕπνῳ τις εἴαν τε ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ  
 ὅμοιον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἠγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν; Ἐγὼ  
 γοῦν ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην ὄνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.  
 Τί δέ; ὁ τάναντία τούτων ἠγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ  
 D καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ  
 ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ  
 οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἠγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ  
 αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,  
 ὕπαρ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώ-  
 σκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαίμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ

<sup>a</sup> "Le petit nombre des élus" is a common topic in Plato. Cf. on 494 A.

<sup>b</sup> The dream state is a very different thing for Plato from what it is for some modern sentimental Platonists. Cf. 518

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

aspects." "Right," he said. "This, then," said I, "is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts, and men of action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom." "What do you mean?" he said. "The lovers of sounds and sights," I said, "delight in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself." "Why, yes," he said, "that is so." "And on the other hand, will not those be few<sup>a</sup> who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?" "They would, indeed." "He, then, who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a dream or a waking<sup>b</sup>? Just consider. Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking of resemblance for identity?" "I should certainly call that dreaming," he said. "Well, then, take the opposite case: the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state?" "He is very much awake," he replied. "Could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as knowing, know-

520 c-d, *Phaedr.* 277 d, *Tim.* 52 b, and 71 e, if rightly interpreted.

δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί οὖν, εἰ ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνει οὗτος, ὃν φάμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῆ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ἔξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἡρέμα ἐπικρυπτόμενοι, ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει; Δεῖ γέ τοι δῆ, ἔφη. "Ἴθι δῆ, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ βούλει ὧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρ' αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες, ὡς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδείς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλ' ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἰπέ τόδε· ὁ γινώσκων γινώσκει τί ἢ οὐδέν; σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου. Ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γινώσκει τί. Πότερον ὃν ἢ οὐκ ὄν; "Ον· πῶς 477 γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθεῖη; Ἰκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῆ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὃν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὃν δὲ μηδαμῆ πάντῃ ἀγνωστον; Ἰκανώτατα. Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δῆ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτῷ μηδαμῆ

<sup>a</sup> ἡρέμα : cf. *Symp.* 221 B. Plato's humorous use of this word is the source of Emerson's humorous use of "gently."

<sup>b</sup> For the humour of the sudden shift to the second person cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* i. "profer, Galla, caput."

<sup>c</sup> To understand what follows it is necessary (1) to assume that Plato is not talking nonsense; (2) to make allowance for the necessity that he is under of combating contemporary fallacies and sophisms which may seem trivial to us (cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 50 ff.); (3) to remember the greater richness of the Greek language in forms of the verb "to be"; and the misunderstandings introduced by the indiscriminate use of the abstract verbal noun "being" in English—a difficulty which I have tried to meet by varying the terms of the translation; (4) to recognize that apart from

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ledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion ? ”  
“ Assuredly. ” “ Suppose, now, he who we say  
opines but does not know should be angry and chal-  
lenge our statement as not true—can we find any  
way of soothing him and gently<sup>a</sup> winning him over,  
without telling him too plainly that he is not in his  
right mind ? ” “ We must try, ” he said. “ Come,  
then, consider what we are to say to him, or would  
you have us question him in this fashion—premis-  
ing that if he knows anything, nobody grudges it him, but  
we should be very glad to see him knowing something  
—but tell<sup>b</sup> us this : Does he who knows know some-  
thing or nothing ? Do you reply in his behalf. ” “ I  
will reply, ” he said, “ that he knows something. ”  
“ Is it something that is or is not<sup>c</sup> ? ” “ That is.  
How could that which is not be known ? ” “ We are  
sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should  
examine it from every point of view, that that which  
entirely<sup>d</sup> ‘ is ’ is entirely knowable, and that which in  
no way ‘ is ’ is in every way unknowable ? ” “ Most  
sufficiently. ” “ Good. If a thing, then, is so con-  
ditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie  
between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is

metaphysics Plato’s main purpose is to insist on the ability to think abstractly as a prerequisite of the higher education ; (5) to observe the qualifications and turns of phrase which indicate that Plato himself was not confused by the double meaning of “ is not, ” but was already aware of the distinctions explicitly explained in the *Sophist* (Cf. *Unity of Plato’s Thought*, pp. 53 ff. nn. 389 ff.)

<sup>a</sup> παντελῶς : cf. μηδαμῆ and 478 D πάντως. Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 B ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ εἶναι, which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was “ yet ” naïvely unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.



ὄντος; Μεταξύ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ<sup>1</sup> ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, Β ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξύ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὄν τοιούτον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν; Ἄλλην. Ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὐτῆς. Οὕτω. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι. Πῶς;

С XXI. Φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὃ τί περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος. Ἄλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἄκουσον δὴ, ὃ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν· δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χροῶν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρ' ἑμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν

<sup>1</sup> ἐπεὶ Hermann: Adam reads εἰ ἐπὶ, for which there is some ms. authority, Burnet ἐπὶ, which yields a harsh but possible construction.

<sup>a</sup> Apart from the metaphysical question of the relativity of all knowledge, the word ἐπιστήμη in Greek usage connotes certainty, and so Plato and Aristotle always take it. But more specifically that which (always) is, for Plato, is the "idea" which is not subject to change and therefore always is what it is, while a particular material thing subject to change and relativity both is and is not any and every predicate that can be applied to it. And since knowledge in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge of abstract and general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the word idea.

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and that which in no way is?" "Between." "Then since knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be." "By all means." "Is there a thing which we call opinion?" "Surely." "Is it a different faculty from science or the same?" "A different." "Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty." "That is so." "May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is,<sup>a</sup> to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions." "What ones?"

XXI. "Shall we say that faculties,<sup>b</sup> powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe." "I understand," he said. "Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any colour or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is uncritical to ignore Plato's terminology and purpose and to talk condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty in what follows.

<sup>b</sup> The history of the word *δύναμις* has been studied in recent monographs and its various meanings, from potentiality to active power, discriminated. Cf. J. Souilhé, *Étude sur le terme δύναμις dans les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris, 1919, pp. 96, 163 ff. But Plato makes his simple meaning here quite plain, and it would be irrelevant to bring in modern denunciations of the "old faculty psychology."

D ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα· δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτην ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δυνάμιν τινα φῆς

E εἶναι αὐτὴν ἢ εἰς τί γένος τίθης; Εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην. Τί δαί; δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν. Ἄλλα μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὠμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμαρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταυτόν ποτέ τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη; Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι  
478 ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν. Ἔτερον. Ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. Ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὄν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει; Ναί. Δόξα δέ, φασί, δοξάζειν<sup>1</sup>; Ναί. Ἡ ταυτόν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γινώσκει, καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστόν

<sup>1</sup> δοξάζειν] I translate Adam's *δοξάζει*, but it makes little difference.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my note on *Simplic. De An.* 146. 21, *Class. Phil.* xvii. p. 143.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Ion* 537 D οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην.

<sup>c</sup> ἐπί: cf. *Parmen.* 147 D-E ἑκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς;

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 352 B, *Aristot. Eth.* 1145 b 24.

<sup>e</sup> For the various meanings of *δόξα* cf. *Unity of Plato's*

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another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what its effects,<sup>a</sup> and it is in this way that I come to call <sup>b</sup> each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to <sup>c</sup> the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice? ” “ The same,” he said. “ To return, then, my friend,” said I, “ to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it? ” “ Into this,” he said, “ the most potent of all <sup>d</sup> faculties.” “ And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty.” “ By no means,” he said, “ for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.<sup>e</sup> ” “ But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical.” “ How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible? ” “ Excellent,” said I, “ and we are plainly agreed that opinion is a different <sup>f</sup> thing from scientific knowledge.” “ Yes, different.” “ Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object.” “ Of necessity.” “ Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is? ” “ Yes.” “ But opinion, we say, opines.” “ Yes.” “ Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the *Thought*, p. 47 “ the word δόξα may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavourably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favourably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts.”

<sup>f</sup> Plato reaffirms this strongly *Tim.* 51 ε, where, however, νοῦς is used, not ἐπιστήμη. Of course where distinctions are irrelevant Plato may use many of the terms that denote mental processes as virtual synonyms. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 47-49.

τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἄδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, εἶπερ ἐπ' ἄλλω ἄλλη δύναμις πέ-  
 B φυκε, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφοτέραί ἐστων, δόξα τε καὶ  
 ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὡς φαμέν· ἐκ τούτων  
 δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστόν καὶ δοξαστόν ταυτόν  
 εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν  
 δοξαστόν ἢ τὸ ὄν εἶη; Ἄλλο. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ  
 ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν;  
 ἐννόει δέ. οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν;  
 ἢ οἶόν τε αὐτὸς δοξάζει μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;  
 Ἄδύνατον. Ἄλλ' ἐν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων;  
 Naί. Ἄλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδέν  
 C ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο. Πάνυ γε. Μὴ ὄντι  
 μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν.  
 Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ὄν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει.  
 Οὐ γάρ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν  
 εἶη. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶν  
 ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γνῶσιν σαφηνεῖα ἢ ἄγνοιαν  
 ἀσαφεία; Οὐδέτερα. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 γνώσεως μὲν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον,  
 ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη. Ἐντὸς  
 D δ' ἀμφοῖν κεῖται; Naί. Μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἶη  
 τούτοις δόξα. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν  
 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανεῖα οἶον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 200 B, 201 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 477 c.

<sup>c</sup> Plato is, of course, aware that this is true only if *μὴ ὄν* be taken in the absolute sense. We cannot suppose that he himself is puzzled by a fallacy which he ironically attributes to the Sophists and to Protagoras (*Theaetetus* 167 A), and ridicules in the *Cratylus* 188 D and *Euthydemus* 286 c. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 53, 54. As Aristotle explicitly puts it, *De interpr.* 11. 11 τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ὅτι δοξαστόν οὐκ

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?" "Impossible by our admissions,<sup>a</sup>" he said. "If different faculties are naturally related to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable.<sup>b</sup>" "Then, if that which is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable." "Something else." "Does it opine that which is not,<sup>c</sup> or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing?" "That is impossible." "Then he who opines opines some one thing?" "Yes." "But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but most rightly as nothing at all." "Yes." "To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge." "Rightly," he said. "Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion." "It seems not." "Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge." "So it seems." "Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity?" "It is neither." "But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance?" "Much so," he said. "And does it lie within the boundaries of the two?" "Yes." "Then opinion would be between the two." "Most assuredly." "Were we not saying a little while ago<sup>d</sup> that if anything should

*ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τι δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, οὐχ ὅτι ἐστίν ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν.*

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 477 A.

μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν φανέν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης; Ὅρθως. Νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτων ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν. Πέφανται.

Ε XXII. Ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινές ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα ἐὰν φανῆ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι εἰ δίκη προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέ-  
 479 τω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός, ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἠγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλα νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῆ ἀνεχόμενος, ἂν τις ἐν τὸ καλὸν φῆ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται;

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turn up<sup>a</sup> such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science nor nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science." "Right." "And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion." "There has."

XXII. "It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so?" "It is." "This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good<sup>b</sup> fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or any<sup>c</sup> idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question: My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair-and-honourable things that will

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 477 A-B. This is almost a standardized method with Plato. Cf. *infra* 609 B, *Charmides* 168 B, *Gorgias* 496 c, *supra* 436 B, *Phileb.* 11 D, 66 E, *Laws* 896 c.

<sup>b</sup> Ironical. Cf. *Phaedr.* 266 E.

<sup>c</sup> τινὰ does not mean that the theory of Ideas is a novelty here or that the terminology is new and strange. It merely says that the type of mind that is absorbed in the concrete cannot apprehend any general aspect of things. αὐτό and κατὰ ταῦτά are the technical designation of the Idea here. Cf. my note on *Phileb.* 64 A, *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.



καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων,  
 ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά  
 Β πῶς αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα  
 ἐρωτᾶς. Τί δαί; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤττόν τι  
 ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα  
 δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον,  
 ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τὰναντία;  
 Οὐκ, ἀλλ' αἰεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται.  
 Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν  
 πολλῶν τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν τις φῆ αὐτὸ εἶναι; Τοῖς ἐν  
 ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικε, καὶ  
 C τῷ τῶν παιδῶν αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου  
 τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν  
 αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτε-  
 ρίζειν, καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν  
 δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε  
 οὐδέτερον. Ἐχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ τι  
 χρήσει, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξύ

<sup>a</sup> Plato consciously uses mere logic to lend the emphasis and dignity of absolute metaphysics to his distinction between the two types of mind, which is for all practical purposes his main point here. If you cannot correctly define the beautiful, all your imperfect definitions will be refuted by showing that they sometimes describe what is ugly. Cf. *Hippias Major* 289 c and note on *Rep.* i. 333 E. The many concrete objects are this and are not that, and so with conscious use of the ambiguity of the copula may be said to tumble about between being and not-being. That this is the consciously intended meaning may be inferred from the fact that in *Tim.* 37 E, where Plato must have had in mind the conclusions of the *Sophist*, he still avails himself of this ambiguity to suggest an absolute being behind phenomena. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 55, 56, 60, *De Platonis Idearum doctrina*, pp. 48, 49.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 524 A, B.

<sup>c</sup> The scholiast (Hermann vi. 34) quotes the riddle in two forms. It might run in English—

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

not sometimes appear ugly-and-base<sup>a</sup>? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious? "No, it is inevitable," he said, "that they would appear to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about." "And again, do the many double things<sup>b</sup> appear any the less halves than doubles?" "None the less." "And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites?" "No," he said, "each of them will always hold of, partake of, both." "Then *is* each of these multiples rather than it *is not* that which one affirms it to be?" "They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets," he replied, "and resemble the children's riddle<sup>c</sup> about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly<sup>d</sup> any one of them to be or not to be or both or neither." "Do you know what to do with them, then?" said I, "and can you find a better place to put them than that midway

A tale there is, a man yet not a man,  
Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a bird,  
Perching upon a bough and not a bough,  
And hit it—not, with a stone and not a stone.

The key words of the answer are eunuch, bat, reed, pumice-stone. Cf. also Athenaeus 448 E, 452 E, Gifford on *Euthydemus* 300 D. It was used in the Stoic schools of logic, and Epicurus is said to have used it to disprove Plato's statement that either the negative or the affirmative of a proposition must be true or false. Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 348.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaetetus*. 157 A.

οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι; οὔτε γάρ που σκοτω-  
δέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι φανή-  
**D** σεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι.  
'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. Εὐρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν,  
ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι  
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε  
μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. Εὐρήκαμεν.  
Πρωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη,  
δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἄλλ' οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ  
μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξύ πλανητὸν ἀλίσκόμενον.  
'Ωμολογήκαμεν. Τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεω-  
**E** μένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὀρώντας μηδ' ἄλλω  
ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἔπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ  
δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ, καὶ πάντα οὕτω,  
δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γινώσκειν δὲ ὧν  
δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν. 'Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς  
αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα  
ῶσαύτως ὄντα; ἄρ' οὐ γινώσκειν ἄλλ' οὐ  
δοξάζειν; 'Ανάγκη καὶ ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπα-  
ζεσθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Sophist* 254 A εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα.

<sup>b</sup> A further thought is developed here, suggested in 479 A, B. Just as the many particular horses, trees or tables shift and change, and are and are not in comparison with the unchanging idea of each, so the many opinions of the multitude about justice and the good and the beautiful and other moral conceptions change, and both are and are not in comparison with the unalterable ideas of justice and beauty, which the philosopher more nearly apprehends. Thus, for the purposes of this contrast, notions, opinions, and what English usage would call ideas, fall into the same class as material objects. Cf. *Euthyphro* 6 D, *Phaedo* 78 D, *Parmen.* 131 D, *Gorgias* 488 D τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα, *Laws* 715 B τὰ τούτων δίκαια, 860 C τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς etc., 962 D τὰ τῶν πόλεων (of states) νόμιμα. The

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between existence or essence and the not-to-be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being<sup>a</sup> that they should still more not be, nor a brighter than being that they should still more be." "Most true," he said. "We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions<sup>b</sup> of the many about the fair and honourable and other things are tumbled about in<sup>c</sup> the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense." "We have so found it." "But we agreed in advance that, if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between." "We did." "We shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another's guidance<sup>d</sup> to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine." "Of necessity." "And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine?" "That, too, necessarily follows." "Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things subject

practical truth of this distinction is unaffected by our metaphysics. Plato is speaking of what he elsewhere calls the εἶδωλα of justice, beauty and the like. Cf. 517 D, 532 D, *Theaetet.* 150 B, and "The Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, i. p. 238.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 275 E, *Phaedo* 81 C, 82 E. Isocrates uses καλινδέομαι in similar contemptuous connotation, v. 82, xiii. 20, xv. 30.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 989 a 33 τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν.

## PLATO

480 ἐφ' οἷς γνῶσίς ἐστιν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν, ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χροάς καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὡς τι ὄν; Μερνήμεθα. Μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους, καὶ ἄρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν; Οὐκ, ἂν γ' ἐμοὶ πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις. Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

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\* Plato coins a word which means "lovers of opinion."

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to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colours and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself?" "We do remember." "Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists<sup>a</sup> rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak?" "Not if they heed my counsel," he said, "for to be angry with truth is not lawful." "Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion<sup>b</sup> is the name we must give." "By all means."

<sup>b</sup> Isoc. xv. 271 is conceivably an answer to this.