THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

EDITED BY

T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D.

E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. W. D. H. ROUSE, LITT.D.

ARISTOTLE THE METAPHYSICS

II

BOOKS X-XIV

THE OECONOMICA THE MAGNA MORALIA

THE METAPHYSICS BOOKS X-XIV

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY HUGH TREDENNICK, M.A.

THE OECONOMICA AND THE MAGNA MORALIA

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY G. CYRIL ARMSTRONG, B.A.

LECTURER IN LAFIN AND HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ARTS IN THE MUNICIPAL COLLIGE, PORTSMOUTH



LONDON WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS MOMXXXV

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

							PAGL
THE METAPH	YSI	CS:					
Воок Х.		•	•				2
Βοοκ ΧΙ.	•	•		•			52
Воок XII,							122
Book XIII.		,					176
BOOK XIV.					•		256
Índex .					•		307
THE OECONO	міс	A :					
Introduction		•	•				323
Воок І.							326
Воок II.			•			•	344
Воок III.			•			•	400
Index	•	•	•	•			420
							v

I

1052 a Ι. Τὸ ἕν ὅτι μέν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἐν τοῖς περὶ 75 του ποσαχώς διηρημένοις είρηται πρότερον. πλεοναγώς δε λεγομένου οι συγκεφαλαιούμενοι τρόποι είσι τέτταρες των πρώτων και καθ' αύτα λενομένων ἕν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Τό τε γάρ 20 συνεχές η άπλως η μάλιστά γε το φύσει και μη άφη μηδε δεσμώ· και τούτων μαλλον εν και πρότερον οῦ ἀδιαιρετωτέρα ἡ κίνησις καὶ μᾶλλον Έτι τοιοῦτον καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ὅλον καὶ άπλη. έγον τινά μορφήν και είδος μάλιστα δ' εί τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βία, ὤσπερ ὅσα κόλλη ἢ γόμφω ἢ 25 συνδέσμω, άλλα έχει έν αύτω το αίτιον αύτω του συνεχές είναι. τοιοῦτον δε τῶ μίαν τὴν κίνησιν είναι και άδιαίρετον τόπω και χρόνω, ώστε φανερόν, εί τι φύσει κινήσεως άρχην έχει της πρώτης την πρώτην, οΐον λέγω φοράς κυκλοφορίαν, ότι τοῦτο πρώτον μέγεθος έν. Τὰ μέν δή ούτως έν ή 80 συνεχές η όλον, τὰ δὲ ῶν ἂν ὁ λόγος είς ή. τοιαῦτα

1 7 Christ: 7.

^b This description applies to the celestial spheres.

BOOK X

I. That "one" has several meanings has been BOOK X UNITY AND already stated a in our distinction of the various OTHER meanings of terms. But although it has a number GENTRAL ATTRIBUTES of senses, the things which are primarily and essenti- of SUBally called one, and not in an accidental sense, may STANCE. be summarized under four heads :

(i.) That which is continuous, either absolutely or "The one" means in particular that which is continuous by natural (1) the congrowth and not by contact or ligature; and of these tinuous, things those are more strictly and in a prior sense one whose motion is more simple and indivisible.

(ii.) Of this kind in a still higher degree is that 2 which is a whole and has a definite shape or form, (2) the particularly that which is such by nature and not by whole, constraint (like things which are joined by glue or nails or by being tied together), but which contains in itself the cause of its continuity. A thing is of 3 this kind if its motion is one and indivisible in respect of place and time; so that clearly if a thing has as its principle of motion the primary kind of motion (i.e. locomotion) in its primary form (i.e. circular locomotion), it is in the primary sense one spatial magnitude.^b

Some things, then, are one in this sense, qua continuous or whole; the other things which are one are those whose formula is one. Such are the 4

£

1052 a δε ών ή νόησις μία τοιαῦτα δε ών αδιαίρετος. άδιαίρετος δε τοῦ άδιαιρέτου είδει η άριθμώ. άριθμώ μέν ούν το καθ' έκαστον άδιαίρετον, είδει δέ το τῶ γνωστῶ καὶ τῆ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὥσθ' ἕν ἂν εἴη πρώτον το ταις ουσίαις αίτιον του ένός. λέγεται 36 μέν οῦν τὸ ἕν τοσαυταχῶς, τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ καθόλου. 1052 b πάντα δε ταῦτα εν τῷ άδιαίρετον είναι των μεν την κίνησιν των δέ την νόησιν η τόν λόγον. $\Delta \epsilon \hat{\imath} \delta \hat{\epsilon}$ κατανοείν ότι ούχ ώσαύτως ληπτέον λέγεσθαι ποίά τε εν λέγεται, και τί έστι το ένι είναι, και τις αύτοῦ λόγος. λέγεται μέν γάρ τὸ ἕν τοσαυταχῶς, καὶ s έκαστον έσται έν τούτων, ŵ äν ύπάρχη τις τούτων των τρόπων το δε ενι είναι ότε μεν τούτων τινί έσται, ότε δε άλλω, δ και μαλλον έγγυς τω ονόματί έστι, τη δυνάμει δ' έκεινα, ώσπερ και περί στοιχείου καί αίτίου εί δέοι λέγειν έπί τε τοῖς πράγμασι διορίζοντα καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ὄρον ἀποδιδόντα. 10 έστι μέν γάρ ώς στοιχείον το πύρ (έστι δ' ίσως καθ' αύτο και το απειρον ή τι άλλο τοιοῦτον), ἔστι δ' ώς ού · ου γάρ το αυτό πυρί και στοιχείω είναι, άλλ' ώς μέν πραγμά τι καὶ φύσις τὸ πῦρ στοιχείον, τό δε όνομα σημαίνει το τοδί συμβεβηκέναι αὐτώ, ότι έστί τι έκ τούτου ώς πρώτου ένυπάρχοντος. 15 ούτω και έπι αιτίου και ένος και των τοιούτων άπάντων.

^a The reference is doubtless to Anaximander. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. x.

things of which the concept is one, *i.e.* of which the concept is indivisible; and this is indivisible when the object is indivisible (iii.) in form or (iv.) in number. (B) the indi-Now in number the individual is indivisible, and in (4) the uniform that which is indivisible in comprehension and versal. knowledge; so that that which causes the unity of substances must be one in the primary sense. Such, 5 then, in number are the meanings of "one": the naturally continuous, the whole, the individual, and the universal. All these are one because they are indivisible; some in motion, and others in concept or formula.

But we must recognize that the questions, "What None of sort of things are called one ?" and "What is essential ticular unity, and what is the formula ?" must not be taken senses gives to be the same. " One " has these several meanings, 6 and each thing to which some one of these senses the connotaapplies will be one; but essential unity will have tion of unity. now one of these senses and now something else, which is still nearer to the term one, whereas they are nearer to its denotation. This is also true of "element" and "cause," supposing that one had to explain them both by exhibiting concrete examples and by giving a definition of the term. There is a 7 sense in which fire is an element (and no doubt so too is "the indeterminate" a or some other similar thing, of its own nature), and there is a sense in which it is not; because "to be fire" and "to be an element" are not the same. It is as a concrete thing and as a stuff that fire is an element; but the term "element" denotes that it has this attribute : that something is made of it as a primary constituent. The same is true of "cause" or "one" and all other 8 such terms.

1052 b

Διό και το ένι είναι το άδιαιρέτω έστιν είναι, οπερ τόδει όντι και ιδία χωριστώ² ή τόπω ή είδει ἢ διανοία, ἢ καὶ τὸ³ ὅλῷ καὶ ἀδιαιρἐτῷ, μάλιστα δέ το μέτρω⁴ είναι πρώτω⁵ έκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ 20 ἄλλα ἐλήλυθεν. μέτρον γάρ ἐστιν ῷ τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται· γιγνώσκεται δε η ενί η άριθμῷ τὸ ποσὸν η ποσόν, δ δε ἀριθμὸς ἅπας ενί, ὥστε παν τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται ή ποσὸν τῷ ἐνί, καὶ ῷ πρώτῳ ποσὰ γιγνώσκεται τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕν διὸ τὸ έν αριθμού αρχή ή αριθμός. έντεύθεν δε και έν 25 τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον τε ῷ ἕκαστον πρώτω⁶ γιγνώσκεται, και το μέτρον εκάστου εν έν μήκει, έν πλάτει, έν βάθει, έν βάρει, έν τάχει (το γαρ βάρος και τάχος κοινόν έν τοις έναντίοις διττόν γάρ έκάτερον αὐτῶν, οໂον βάρος τό τε ὁποσηνοῦν ἔχον ροπήν και το έχον υπεροχήν ροπής, και τάχος τό 30 τε δποσηνοῦν κίνησιν έχον και το ύπεροχην κινήσεως έστι γάρ τι τάχος και τοῦ βραδέος, και βάρος τοῦ κουφοτέρου). Έν πασι δη τούτοις μέτρον καί άρχη έν τι και άδιαίρετον, έπει και έν ταις γραμμαίς χρώνται ώς ατόμω τη ποδιαία. πανταχού γάρ το μέτρον έν τι ζητοῦσι και άδιαίρετον τοῦτο 85 δε το άπλοῦν ἢ τῷ ποιῷ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ. ὅπου μεν οῦν δοκεῖ μὴ είναι ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι, τοῦτο 1058 a ἀκριβès το μέτρον διο το τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀκριβέστατον την γαρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντη αδιαίρετον. έν δε τοις άλλοις μιμουνται το τοιουτον άπο γάρ 1 τώδε Ab. ² ίδία χωριστώ A^b Alexander (?): άχωρίστω ΕJΓ. 4 μέτρω Aldine : μέτρον. ⁸ τὸ Bonitz : τῷ. ⁵ πρώτω Christ : πρωτον. ⁶ τε . . πρώτω] ψ πρώτω τε ξκαστον ΕΙΓ. 6

Hence "to be one" means "to be indivisible" "The one is essentially (being essentially a particular thing, distinct and a measure. separate in place or form or thought), or "to be whole and indivisible"; but especially "to be the first measure of each kind," and above all of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other categories. Measure is that by which quantity 9 is known, and quantity qua quantity is known either by unity or by number, and all number is known by unity. Therefore all quantity qua quantity is known by unity, and that by which quantitics are primarily known is absolute unity. Thus unity is the starting- 10 point of number qua number. Hence in other cases too "measure" means that by which each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit-in length, breadth, depth, weight and speed. (The terms "weight" and "speed" are common to 11 both contraries, for each of them has a double meaning; e.g., "weight" applies to that which has the least amount of gravity and also to that which has an excess of it, and "speed" to that which has the least amount of motion and also to that which has excess of it; for even the slow has some speed, and the light some weight.)

In all these cases, then, the measure and starting-12 point is some indivisible unit (since even in the case of lines we treat the "one-foot line" as indivisible). For everywhere we require as our measure an indivisible unit; *i.e.*, that which is simple either in quality or in quantity. Now where it seems im-13 possible to take away or add, there the measure is exact. Hence the measure of number is most exact, for we posit the unit as in every way indivisible; and in all other cases we follow this

7

1058 a σταδίου και ταλάντου και άει του μείζονος λάθοι άν και προστεθέν τι και άφαιρεθέν μαλλον η άπό s έλάττονος. ώστε άφ' οῦ πρώτου κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν μή ένδέχεται, τοῦτο πάντες ποιοῦνται μέτρον και ύγρων και ξηρών και βάρους και μεγέθους. και τότ' οι ονται είδεναι το ποσον όταν είδωσι δια τούτου τοῦ μέτρου. καὶ δή καὶ κίνησιν τῆ ἁπλῆ κινήσει καί τη ταχίστη δλιγιστόν γάρ αύτη έχει 10 χρόνον. διό έν τη αστρολογία το τοιούτον έν αρχή και μέτρον την κίνησιν γαρ δμαλήν ύποτίθενται καί ταχίστην την τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρὸς ην κρίνουσι τάς άλλας. και έν μουσική δίεσις, ότι έλάχιστον, καί έν φωνή στοιχείον. και ταῦτα πάντα έν τι ούτως, ούχ ώς κοινόν τι τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὤσπερ εἴρηται. 15 ούκ ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἕν τὸ μέτρον, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε πλείω, οίον αι διέσεις δύο, αι μή κατά την ακοήν άλλ' έν τοις λόγοις, και αι φωναι πλείους αίς μετρούμεν, και ή διάμετρος δυσί μετρείται Γκαι ή πλευρά],¹ καί τὰ (τοιαῦτα)² μεγέθη πάντα. οὕτω δή πάντων μέτρον το έν, ότι γνωρίζομεν έξ ών έστιν 20 ή οὐσία διαιροῦντες η κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν η κατὰ τὸ είδος. διά³ τούτο το έν αδιαίρετον, ότι τό πρώτον έκάστων άδιαίρετον. ούχ όμοίως δε παν άδιαίρετον, 2 rotaûra addidi. ⁸ καί διά E².J. ¹ Goebel.

^a *i.e.*, the enharmonic (or quarter-tone proper) and the chromatic, which was $\frac{1}{2}$ of a tone (Aristoxenus *i.* 21). There was also the $\delta l \epsilon \sigma is \eta \mu i \partial l a$, which was $\frac{3}{2}$ of a tone (*id. ii.* 51).

^b The meaning seems to be that the diameter consists of two parts, one equal to the side, and the other representing its

example, for with the furlong or talent or in general with the greater measure an addition or subtraction would be less obvious than with a smaller one. Therefore the first thing from which, according to our 14 perception, nothing can be subtracted is used by all men as their measure of wet and dry, weight and magnitude; and they think that they know the quantity only when they know it in terms of this measure. And they know motion too by simple motion and the most rapid, for this takes least time. Hence in astronomy a unit of this kind is the starting- 15 point and measure; for they assume that the motion of the heavens is uniform and the most rapid, and by it they judge the others. In music the measure is the quarter-tone, because it is the smallest interval; and in language the letter. All these are examples of units in this sense-not in the sense that unity is something common to them all, but in the sense which we have described. The measure is not 16 always numerically one, but sometimes more than one; e.g., there are two quarter-tones, distinguished not by our hearing but by their theoretical ratios a; and the articulate sounds by which we measure speech are more than one; and the diagonal of a square is measured by two quantities,^b and so are all magnitudes of this kind. Thus unity is the measure of all things, because we learn of what the substance is composed by dividing it, in respect of either quantity or form. Hence unity is indivisible, 17 because that which is primary in each class of things is indivisible. But not every unit is indivisible in

excess over the side; the two parts being incommensurate are measured by different units (Ross). Kal $\dot{\eta} \pi \lambda \epsilon v \rho \dot{\alpha}$ must, I think, be a gloss.

1058 a οΐον πούς και μονάς, αλλά το μέν πάντη, το δ' είς άδιαίρετα πρός την αισθησιν θετέον, δυσπερ είρηται ήδη· ίσως γάρ παν συνεχές διαιρετόν. 'Ael Se 25 συννενές τό μέτρον μεγεθών μεν γάρ μέγεθος, καί καθ' ἕκαστον μήκους μηκος, πλάτους πλάτος, φωνῶν φωνή, βάρους βάρος, μονάδων μονάς. οὕτω γαρ δεί λαμβάνειν, άλλ' ούχ ότι αριθμών αριθμός. καίτοι έδει, ει όμοίως άλλ' ουχ όμοίως άξιοι, άλλ' 30 ώσπερ εί μονάδων μονάδας ἀξιώσειε μέτρον ἀλλὰ μὴ μονάδα όδ' αριθμός πληθος μονάδων. Και την έπιστήμην δε μέτρον των πραγμάτων λέγομεν και την αισθησιν διά το αυτό, ότι γνωρίζομέν τι αυταις, έπει μετρούνται μαλλον η μετρούσιν. άλλα συμβαίνει ήμεν ώσπερ αν ει άλλου ήμας μετρουντος 35 έγνωρίσαμεν πηλίκοι έσμεν τώ τον πήχυν επί τοσοῦτον ήμιν ἐπιβάλλειν. Πρωταγόρας δ' άνθρωπόν φησι πάντων είναι μέτρον, ώσπερ αν εί τον 1058 1 επιστήμονα είπων η τον αίσθανόμενον τούτους δ' ότι έχουσιν ό μεν αισθησιν ό δε επιστήμην, ά φαμεν είναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. οὐθέν δη λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεταί® τι λέγειν. ὅΟτι μὲν οῦν τὸ ένὶ εἶναι μάλιστά ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ἀφ-5 ορίζοντι μέτρον τι, καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ, εἶτα

1 θετέον Forster: έθέλει.

² avrois Bekker.

³ λέγων . . . φαίνεται Alexander et fecit E⁹: λέγοντες . . . φαίνονται.

⁴ έν A^b γρ. E Alexander.

^a What Protagoras really meant was (apparently) that appearances are true relatively to the percipient. *Cf.* IV. iv. 27, and see Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* (Part I. Thales to Plato), § 92. the same sense—e.g. the foot and the arithmetical unit; but the latter is absolutely indivisible, and the former must be classed as indivisible with respect to our power of perception, as we have already stated; since presumably everything which is continuous is divisible.

The measure is always akin to the thing measured. 18 The measure of magnitude is magnitude, and in particular the measure of length is a length; of breadth, a breadth; of sounds, a sound; of weight, a weight; of units, a unit; for this is the view that we must take, and not that the measure of numbers is a number. The latter, indeed, would necessarily be true, if the analogy held good; but the supposition is not analogous—it is as though one were to suppose that the measure of units is units, and not a unit; for number is a plurality of units.

We also speak of knowledge or sense-perception 19 as a measure of things for the same reason, because through them we come to know something ; whereas really they are measured themselves rather than measure other things. But our experience is as though someone else measured us, and we learned our height by noticing to what extent he applied his foot-rule to us. Protagoras says that "man is 20 the measure of all things," meaning, as it were, the scholar of the man of perception ; and these because they possess, the one knowledge, and the other perception, which we hold to be the measures of objects. Thus, while appearing to say something exceptional, he is really saying nothing.^a

Obviously, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we 21 make our definition in accordance with the meaning of the term, is a measure; particularly of quantity, 1058 b

τοῦ ποιοῦ, φανερόν. ἔσται δὲ τοιοῦτον τὸ μὲν ἂν ἡ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν· διόπερ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ἕν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἦ ἕν.

II. Κατά δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ψύσιν ζητητέον 10 ποτέρως ἔχει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν ἐπήλθομεν, τἰ τὸ ἔν ἐστι καὶ πῶς δεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν, πότερον ὡς οὐσίας τινὸς οὔσης αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός, καθάπερ οι τε Πυθαγόρειοι φασι πρότερον καὶ Πλάτων ὕστερον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑπόκειται τις φύαις, και πως¹ δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον 15 ὥσπερ οι περὶ φύσεως. ἐκείνων γὰρ ὅ μέν τις φιλίαν εἶναι φησι τὸ ἕν, ὅ δ' ἀέρα, ὅ δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον.

Εί δέ μηδèν τῶν καθόλου δυνατόν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὅντος εἴρηται λόγοις, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ) ἀλλ' ²⁰ ἢ κατηγόρημα μόνον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ ἕν· τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν καθόλου κατηγορεῖται μάλιστα πάντων. ὥστε οὖτε τὰ γένη φύσεις τινὲς καὶ οὐσίαι χωρισταὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν, οὖτε τὸ ἕν γένος ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς aἰτίας δι' ἄσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν. "Ετι δ' ὅμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων ²⁵ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν· λέγεται δ' ἰσαχῶς τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ἕν· ὥστ' ἐπείπερ ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς ἐστί τι το ἕν καί τις φύσις, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποσοῖς, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως ζητητέον τί τὸ ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ τί τὸ ὄν,

¹ $\pi\omega$ s Schwegler: $\pi\omega$ s codd.: seclusit Christ.

^a III. 17, 24-27. ^b Empedoeles. ^d Anaximander. ^e VII. xiii. ^f Cf. III. iii, 7.

and secondarily of quality. Some things will be of this kind if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if in quality. Therefore that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua one.

II. We must inquire, with regard to the sub-Unity is not stance and nature of unity, in which sense it exists. but a predi-This is the same question which we approached in cate covour discussion of difficulties a: what unity is, and what Being. view we are to take of it; whether that unity itself is a kind of substance-as first the Pythagoreans, and later Plato, both maintain-or whether rather some nature underlies it, and we should give a more intelligible account of it, and more after the manner of the physicists; for of them one b holds that " the One " is Love, another " Air, and another a the Indeterminate.

Now if no universal can be a substance (as we have 2 stated in our discussion e of substance and being), and being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of one thing existing alongside the many (since it is common to them), but only as a predicate, then clearly neither can unity be a substance ; because being and unity are the most universal of all predicates. Therefore (a) genera are not certain entities 3 and substances separate from other things; and (b)unity cannot be a genus, for the same reasons that being and substance cannot.¹

Further, the nature of unity must be the same for all categories. Now being and unity have the same 4 number of meanings; so that since in the category of qualities unity is something definite, i.e. some definite entity, and similarly in the category of quantity, clearly we must also inquire in general what unity is, just as in the case of being ; since it is

1058 b ώς ούχ ίκανον ότι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ή φύσις αὐτοῦ. άλλα μήν έν γε χρώμασίν έστι το έν χρώμα, οໂον 30 το λευκόν, εί^ι τὰ άλλα ἐκ τούτου καὶ τοῦ μέλανος φαίνεται γιγνόμενα, το δε μέλαν στέρησις λευκοῦ, ώσπερ και φωτός σκότος [τοῦτο δ' ἐστι στέρησις φωτός]²· ώστε εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἦν χρώματα, ἦν ἂν ἀριθμός τις τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τίνων; δηλον δή ὅτι χρωμάτων και το έν ην άν τι έν, οίον το λευκόν. 85 δμοίως δε καί εἰ μέλη τὰ ὄντα ήν, ἀριθμὸς ἂν ήν, διέσεων μέντοι, άλλ' ούκ άριθμος ή ούσία αυτών 1054 & καί τὸ έν ην άν τι οῦ ή οὐσία οὐ τὸ έν ἀλλὰ δίεσις. όμοίως δε και έπι των φθόγγων στοιχείων αν ήν τά όντα άριθμός, και τό έν στοιχείον φωνήεν. καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα, σχημάτων ἂν ἦν αριθμός, και το έν το τρίγωνον. ό δ' αυτός λόγος ι και έπι των άλλων γενών. ωστ' είπερ και έν τοις πάθεσι και έν τοις ποιοις και έν τοις ποσοις και έν κινήσει αριθμών όντων και ένός τινος έν απασιν, ο τε αριθμός τινών και τό εν τι εν, αλλ' ούχι τουτο αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνάγκη ὡσαύτως έχειν όμοίως γαρ έχει έπι πάντων. Οτι μέν ουν 10 το έν έν άπαντι γένει έστί τις φύσις, και ούδενος τοῦτό γ' αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις τὸ ἕν, φανερόν ἀλλ' ὦσπερ έν χρώμασι χρώμα έν ζητητέον αὐτὸ τὸ τ΄ν, οὕτω καί έν οὐσία οὐσίαν μίαν αὐτὸ⁴ τὸ ἕν· ὅτι δὲ - ταὐτὸ σημαίνει πως τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ὄν, δηλον τῶ τε παρακολουθείν ίσαχως ταις κατηγορίαις και μή 18 είναι έν μηδεμιά (οίον ούτ' έν τη τι έστιν ούτ' έν

1 el AbE : elta.	² Jaeger.
a martl EJ.	4 αὐτό τε Α ^b .

not enough to say that its nature is simply unity or being. But in the sphere of colours unity is a 5 colour, e.g. white ; that is if all the other colours are apparently derived from white and black, and black is a privation of white, as darkness is of light. Thus if all existing things were colours, all existing things would be a number; but of what? Clearly of 6 And unity would be some one colour, e.g. colours. white. Similarly if all existing things were tunes, there would be a number-of quarter-tones; but their substance would not be a number ; and unity would be something whose substance is not unity but a quarter-tone. Similarly in the case of sounds, existing things would be a number of letters, and unity would be a vowel; and if existing things were 7 right-lined figures, they would be a number of figures, and unity would be a triangle. And the same principle holds for all other genera. Therefore if in the categories of passivity and quality and quantity and motion there is in every category a number and a unity, and if the number is of particular things and the unity is a particular unity, and its substance is not unity, then the same must be true in the case of substances, because the same is true in all cases.

It is obvious, then, that in every genus "one" is 8 a definite entity, and that in no case is its nature merely unity; but as in the sphere of colours the One-itself which we have to seek is one colour, so too in the sphere of substance the One-itself is one substance. And that in a sense unity means the same 9as being is clear (a) from the fact that it has a meaning corresponding to each of the categories, and is contained in none of them—e.g., it is contained

1054 a

^{* α} τῆ ποιόν, ἀλλ' ὅμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν), καὶ τῷ μὴ προσκατηγορεῖσθαι ἔτερόν τι τὸ εἶς ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπος (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τό τι ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν) καὶ ⟨τῷ⟩¹ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι.

- 20 III. 'Αντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ῶν ἕνα τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢ διηρημένον ἢ διαιρετὸν πλῆθός τι λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ μὴ διηρημένον ἕν. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τετραχῶς, 25 καὶ τούτων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, ἐναντία
- 25 και τουτων κατά στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, εναντια αν είη, και ουτε ώς άντίφασις ουτε ώς τα πρός τι λεγόμενα. λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου και δηλοῦται τὸ ἕν, ἐκ τοῦ διαιρετοῦ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, διὰ τὸ μαλλον αἰσθητὸν τὸ πλῆθος είναι και τὸ διαιρετὸν η τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ὥστε τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον τὸ πλῆθος 80 τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. "Εστι δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἐνός, ὥσπερ και ἐν τῆ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων διαιρίσιαι τὸ τοῦ μεν ἐναρίσιου και ἐναντίων

διεγράψαμεν, τὸ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους τὸ ἔτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἀνισον. Λεγομένου δὲ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν

Πεγομενου δε του ταυτου πολλαχως, ενα μεν τρόπον κατ' άριθμον λέγομεν ένίοτε αυτό, τοῦτο δ'
 85 ἐἀν καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ῆ, οἶον σὺ σαυτῷ καὶ
 1054 » τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῆ ὕλη ἕν· ἕτι δ' ἐἀν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας εἶς ῆ, οἶον αἱ ἰσαι γραμμαὶ εὐθεῖαι αἱ αὐταί, καὶ τὰ ἴσα καὶ³ ἰσογώνια τετράγωνα, καίτοι πλείω· ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἑνότης.

¹ τŵ Christ: τŵ είναι Ross.

⁸ Kal Tà EJ.

^a Cf. IV. ii. 6-8. ^b Cf. IV. ii. 9. ^c Or "the same." Cf. V. ix. ^d Or "like." Cf. V. ix, δ.

neither in substance nor in quality, but is related to them exactly as being is; (b) from the fact that in "one man" nothing more is predicated than in "man"^{α} (just as Being too does not exist apart from some thing or quality or quantity); and (c) because "to be one" is "to be a particular thing."

III. "One" and "Many" are opposed in several Unity and ways. Unity and Plurality are opposed as being plurality indivisible and divisible; for that which is divided or divisible is called a plurality, and that which is indivisible or undivided is called one. Then since opposition is of four kinds, and one of the present pairs of opposites is used in a privative sense, they must be contraries, and neither contradictories nor relative terms. Unity is described and explained by 2 its contrary—the indivisible by the divisible—because plurality, *i.e.* the divisible, is more easily perceptible than the indivisible; and so in formula plurality is prior to the indivisible, on account of our powers of perception.

To Unity belong (as we showed by tabulation in our distinction of the contraries ^b) Identity, Similarity and Equality; and to Plurality belong Otherness, Dissimilarity and Inequality.

"Identity "^a has several meanings. (a) Some-3 times we speak of it in respect of number. (b) We Identity. call a thing the same if it is one both in formula and in number, *e.g.*, you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and again (c) if the formula of the primary substance is one, *e.g.*, equal straight lines are the same, and equal quadrilaterals with equal angles, and there are many more examples; but in these equality means unity.

Things are "similar" a (a) if, while not being the 4

1054 b ς την ουσίαν αδιάφορα την συγκειμένην, κατά τό είδος ταύτὰ ή, οίον τὸ μείζον τετράγωνον τῷ μικρῷ όμοιον, καί αί άνισοι εύθείαι αύται γαρ δμοιαι μέν, αί αυταί δε άπλως ου. τα δε εαν το αυτό είδος έχοντα, έν οίς τό μαλλον και ήττον έγγίγνεται, μήτε μαλλον ή μήτε ήττον. τα δε εαν ή το αυτό 10 πάθος και έν τω είδει, οίον το λευκόν, σφόδρα και ήττον, όμοιά φασιν είναι ότι έν τό είδος αὐτῶν. τὰ δὲ ἐὰν πλείω ἔχη ταὐτὰ ἢ ἕτερα, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τὰ πρόχειρα, οໂον καττίτερος ἀργύρω ή λευκόν, χρυσός δε πυρί ή ξανθόν και πυρρόν. ″Ωστε δήλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον πολλαχῶς 15 λέγεται. και το μέν άλλο αντικειμένως και το ταὐτό, διὸ ἄπαν πρὸς ἅπαν η ταὐτὸ η ἄλλο· τὸ δ' έαν μή και ή ύλη και ό λόγος είς, διό σύ και ό πλησίον έτερος. το δε τρίτον ώς τα έν τοις μαθηματικοίς. το μέν ούν έτερον η ταύτο διά τουτο παν πρός παν λέγεται, όσα λέγεται έν και όν. 20 ου3 γαρ αντίφασίς έστι του ταύτου. διό ου λέγεται έπι των μή όντων (το δε μή ταυτό λεγεται), επί δέ των ὄντων πάντων ἢ γὰρ ἕν ἢ οὐχ ἕν πέφυκε όσα⁴ ον καί έν. Το μέν ουν έτερον και ταυτόν ούτως αντίκειται, διαφορά δε και ετερότης άλλο.

1 ή λευκόν ex Alexandro Ross: η λευκόs Schwegler: ή your codd.

² άπαν A^b Alexander: πâν EJ. 8 ound Ab.

4 πέφικε δσα Apelt: πεφυχ' δσα Ross: πεφυκός Ab: πεφυκός Kal EJT Alexander.

^a Cf. V. 1x. 4. ^b sc. as opposed to "same" in sense (a); § 3 above.

same absolutely or indistinguishable in respect of similarity their concrete substance, they are identical in form; e g., the larger square is similar to the smaller, and unequal straight lines are similar. These are similar, but not absolutely the same. (b) If, having the same form, and being capable of difference in degree, they have no difference of degree. (c) If things have an \overline{b} attribute which is the same and one in form—e.g. white—in different degrees, we say that they are similar because their form is one. (d) If the respects in which they are the same are more than those in which they differ, either in general or as regards their more prominent qualities; e g., tin is similar to silver, as being white; and gold to fire, as being yellow or flame-coloured.

Thus it is obvious that " Other " a and " Unlike " 6 also have several meanings. (a) In one sense "other" Otherness is used in the sense opposite to "the same"; thus similarly everything in relation to every other thing is either "the same "or "other." (b) In another sense things are "other" unless both their matter and their formula are one; thus you are "other" than your neighbour. (c) The third sense is that which is found in mathematics.^b Therefore everything in relation to everything else is called either "other " or " the same "; that is, in the case of things of which unity and being are predicated; for "other" is not the 7 contradictory of "the same," and so it is not predicated of non-existent things (they are called " not the same "), but it is predicated of all things which exist ; for whatever is by nature existent and one is either one or not one with something else.

"Other" and "same," then, are opposed in this Difference. way; but "difference" a is distinct from "other-

1054 b τό μέν γάρ έτερον καί ού έτερον ούκ άνάγκη είναι 25 τινί έτερον παν γάρ η έτερον η ταυτό ό τι αν η όν. τό δε διάφορον τινός τινί διάφορον, ώστε ανάγκη ταὐτό τι είναι ῷ διαφέρουσιν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος η είδος παν γάρ το διαφέρον διαφέρει η γένει η είδει, γένει μέν ών μή έστι κοινη ή ύλη μηδε γένεσις είς άλληλα, οΐον όσων άλλο σχήμα 80 τής κατηγορίας, είδει δέ ών το αύτο γένος (λέγεται δε γένος ο άμφω το αὐτο λέγονται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ διάφορα). Τὰ δ' ἐναντία διάφορα. καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις διαφορά τις. ὅτι δὲ καλῶς τοῦτο ύποτιθέμεθα, δήλον έκ τής έπαγωγής πάντα γάρ διαφέρονται φαίνεται καὶ ταῦτα, οὐ μόνον ἕτερα 35 όντα, άλλά τα μέν το γένος έτερα, τα δ' έν τή 1055 & αὐτή συστοιχία τής κατηγορίας, ὥστ' ἐν ταὐτῶ γένει και ταυτά τῷ γένει.² διώρισται δ' έν άλλοις ποία τώ γένει ταὐτὰ η ἕτερα.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἕλαττον, ἔστι τις καὶ μεγίστη
διαφορά, καὶ ταύτην λέγω ἐναντίωσιν. ὅτι δ' ἡ μεγίστη ἐστὶ διαφορά, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένει διαφέροντα οὐκ ἔχει' δδὸν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀλλ' ἀπέχει πλέον καὶ ἀσύμβλητα· τοῖς δ'
εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσὶν ὡς ἐσχάτων. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐσχάτων διάστημα μέγιστον,

¹ διαφέροντά τε EJ: διαφέροντά τι Bonitz. ² εἴδει EJ.

" Cf. V. x.

^b V. xxviii. 4.

ness." For that which is "other" than something 8 else need not be other in a particular respect, since everything which is existent is either "other" or "the same." But that which is different from something is different in some particular respect, so that that in which they differ must be the same sort of thing; *i.e.* the same genus or species. For every-9 thing which is different differs either in genus or in species—in genus, such things as have not common matter and cannot be generated into or out of each other, *e.g.* things which belong to different categories ; and in species, such things as are of the same genus (genus meaning that which is predicated of both the different things alike in respect of their substance).

The contraries ^a are different, and contrariety is a 10 kind of difference. That this is rightly premissed is Contrarioty. made clear by induction; for the contrares are obviously all different, since they are not merely "other," but some are other in genus, and others are in the same line of predication, and so are in the same genus and the same in genus. We have distinguished elsewhere ^b what sort of things are the same or other in genus.

IV. Since things which differ can differ from one Contrariety another in a greater or less degree, there is a certain difference, maximum difference, and this I call contrariety. That it is the maximum difference is shown by induction. For whereas things which differ in genus have no means of passing into each other, and are more widely distant, and are not comparable, in the case of things which differ in species the contraries are the extremes from which generation takes place; and the greatest distance is that which is between 2 the extremes, and therefore also between the con-

^{1055 a} 10 ώστε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέγιστον έν έκάστω γένει τέλειον. μέγιστόν τε γάρ ού μή έστιν ύπερβολή, και τέλειον ου μή έστιν έξω λαβείν τι δυνατόν· τέλος γαρ έχει ή τελεία διαφορά, ώσπερ καὶ τάλλα τῷ τέλος ἔχειν λέγεται τέλεια. τοῦ δὲ 15 τέλους οὐθέν ἔξω· ἔσχατον γὰρ ἐν παντὶ καὶ περιέχει. διὸ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ τέλους, οὐδὲ προσδεῖται ούδενός το τέλειον. Οτι μέν ούν ή έναντιότης έστι διαφορά τέλειος, έκ τούτων δήλον· πολλαχώς δε λεγομένων των εναντίων, ακολουθήσει το τελείως ούτως ώς αν και το έναντίοις είναι ύπάρχη αὐτοίς. 20 Τούτων δε όντων φανερόν ότι ούκ ενδεχεται ενί πλείω έναντία είναι (ούτε γαρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώτερον είη αν τι, ούτε του ένος διαστήματος πλείω δυοίν έσχατα), όλως τε εί έστιν ή έναντιότης διαφορά, ή δε διαφορά δυοΐν, ώστε και ή τέλειος. 'Ανάγκη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄρους ἀληθεῖς εἶναι των έναντίων. και γαρ πλειστον διαφέρει ή τέλειος 25 διαφορά (τῶν τε γὰρ γένει διαφερόντων οὐκ ἔστιν έξωτέρω λαβείν και τῶν είδει δέδεικται γάρ ὅτι πρός τὰ έξω τοῦ γένους οὐκ ἔστι διαφορά, τούτων δ' αύτη μεγίστη), και τὰ έν τῶ αὐτῶ γένει πλεῖστον διαφέροντα έναντία (μεγίστη γαρ διαφορά τούτων 80 ή τέλειος), και τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ πλείστον διαφέροντα έναντία¹ (ή γαρ υλη ή αὐτή τοῖς έναν-

¹ τάναντία E¹J.

traries. But in every elass the greatest thing is complete. For (a) that is greatest which cannot be exceeded, and (b) that is complete outside which nothing proper to it can be found. For complete difference implies an end, just as all other things are called complete because they imply an end. And 3 there is nothing beyond the end : for in everything the end is the last thing, and forms the boundary, Thus there is nothing beyond the end, and that which is complete lacks nothing.

From this argument, then, it is clear that contrariety is maximum difference; and since we speak of contrarics in various senses, the sense of completeness will vary in accordance with the sense of contrariety which applies to the contrarics.

This being so, evidently one thing cannot have 4 more than one contrary (since there can be nothing out thing more extreme than the extreme, nor can there be gamot have more than two extremes of one interval); and in one congeneral this is evident, if contrariety is difference. trary. and difference (and therefore complete difference) is between two things.

The other definitions of contraries must also be 5 true, for (i.) complete difference is the maximum difference; since (a) we can find nothing beyond it, whether things differ in genus or in species (for we have shown that difference in relation to things outside the genus is impossible; this is the maximum difference between them); and (b) the things which differ most in the same genus are contraries; for complete difference is the maximum difference between these. (ii.) The things which differ most 6 in the same receptive material are contraries; for contraries have the same matter. (iii.) The most

1055 a τίοις), και τὰ ύπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν πλεῖστον διαφέροντα· καί γαρ ή έπιστήμη περί εν γένος ή μία, έν οίς ή τελεία διαφορά μεγίστη. Πρώτη δε εναντίωσις έξις και στέρησις εστιν. ου πάσα δε 30 στέρησις (πολλαχώς γάρ λέγεται ή στέρησις), άλλ' ήτις ἂν τελεία ή. τὰ δ' άλλα έναντία κατά ταῦτα λεχθήσεται, τὰ μέν τῷ ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν η ποιητικά είναι, τά δε τω λήψεις είναι και άποβολαί τούτων η άλλων έναντίων. εί δη αντίκειται 1055 b μέν αντίφασις και στέρησις και έναντιότης και τά πρός τι, τούτων δε πρώτον αντίφασις, αντιφάσεως δε μηδέν εστι μεταξύ, των δε εναντίων ενδεχεται. ότι μέν ού ταύτον άντίφασις και τάναντία δήλον. ή δε στέρησις αντίφασίς τίς εστιν. η γαρ το 5 ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἔχειν, ἢ ὅ ἂν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχη, έστέρηται η όλως η πώς αφορισθέν· πολλαχώς γάρ ήδη τούτο λέγομεν, ώσπερ διήρηται ήμιν έν άλλοις. ώστ' έστιν ή στέρησις αντίφασίς τις η άδυναμία διορισθείσα η συνειλημμένη τω δεκτικώ. διδ άντιφάσεως μέν ούκ έστι μεταξύ, στερήσεως δέ 10 τινός έστιν ίσον μέν γάρ η ούκ ίσον παν, ίσον δ' η άνισον ού παν, άλλ' είπερ, μόνον έν τω δεκτικώ τοῦ ἴσου. εἰ δὴ αί γενέσεις τῆ ὕλη ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, γίγνονται δέ η έκ τοῦ είδους και της του είδους έξεως η έκ στερήσεώς τινος τοῦ είδους και της

^a This is not a proper example of privation, Cf. V, xxii. ^b Ibid.

different things which come under the same faculty are contraries; for one science treats of one class of things, in which complete difference is the greatest.

"Positive state" and "privation" constitute 7 primary contrariety-not every form of privation Primary (for it has several senses), but any form which is contrariety. complete. All other contraries must be so called with respect to these; some because they possess these, others because they produce them or are productive of them, and others because they are acquisitions or losses of these or other contrarics. Now if the types of opposition are contradiction, 8 privation, contrariety and relation, and of these The forms of the primary type is contradiction, and an inter- opposition. mediate is impossible in contradiction but possible between contraries, obviously contradiction is not Privation. the same as contrariety; and privation is a form of contradiction : for it is either that which is totally a incapable of possessing some attribute,^a or that which would naturally possess some attribute but does not, that suffers privation-either absolutely or in some specified way. Here we already have several meanings, which we have distinguished elsewhere.^b Thus privation is a kind of contradiction or incapacity which is determinate or associated with the receptive material. This is why although there is no inter-10 mediate in contradiction, there is one in some kinds of privation. For everything is either equal or not equal, but not everything is either equal or unequal; if it is, it is only so in the case of a material which admits of equality. If, then, processes of material generation start from the contraries, and proceed either from the form and the possession of the form, or from some privation of the form or shape, clearly

25

1055 b

μορφής, δήλον ότι ή μέν έναντίωσις στέρησις άν 15 τις είη πάσα, ή δε στέρησις ίσως ου πάσα έναντιότης. αίτιον δ' ότι πολλαχώς ενδέχεται εστερήσθαι τὸ ἐστερημένον· ἐξ ῶν γὰρ αι μεταβολαί έσχάτων, έναντία ταῦτα. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. πάσα γὰρ ἐναντίωσις ἔχει στέρησιν θάτερον' των έναντίων, αλλ' ούχ όμοίως πάντα. 20 ανισότης μέν γαρ ισότητος, ανομοιότης δε δμοιότητος, κακία δε άρετής. διαφέρει δε ώσπερ είρηται. το μέν γαρ έαν μόνον ή έστερημένον, το δ' έαν ή ποτε η έν τινι, οίον αν έν ηλικία τινί η τω κυρίω, η πάντη. διο των μεν έστι μεταξύ, και έστιν ούτε άγαθός άνθρωπος ούτε κακός, των δε ούκ έστιν, 25 άλλ' ἀνάγκη είναι η περιττόν η άρτιον. ἕτι τὰ μὲν έχει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὡρισμένον, τὰ δ' οὕ. ὥστε φανερόν ότι αξί θάτερον των εναντίων λέγεται κατά στέρησιν απόχρη δε καν τα πρωτα και τα γένη των έναντίων, οίον το έν και τα πολλά. τα γάρ άλλα είς ταῦτα ἀνάνεται.

80 V. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕν ἐνί ἐναντίον, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πῶς ἀντίκειται τὸ ἕν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ μεγάλῷ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ³ πότερον ἀεὶ ἐν ἀντιθέσει λέγομεν, οἶον πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, καὶ πότερον λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκόν (πότερον δὲ ἄνθρω-85 πος ἢ λευκὸν οὐ λέγομεν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ ζητοῦντες, οἶον πότερον ἦλθε Κλέων ἢ Σωκράτης· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν οὐδενὶ γένει τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀντικείμενα μόνα

> ¹ θατέρου EJ. ² ένι έστιν EJ. ⁸ εί γάρ το A^b γρ. E Alexander (?): το γάρ EJ.

all contrariety must be a form of privation, although presumably not all privation is contrariety. This 11 is because that which suffers privation may suffer it in several senses; for it is only the extremes from which changes proceed that are contraries.

This can also be shown by induction. Every contrariety involves privation as one of its contraries, but not always in the same way : inequality involves the privation of equality, dissimilarity that of similarity, evil that of goodness. And the differences are 12 as we have stated : one ease is, if a thing is merely deprived ; another, if it is deprived at a certain time or in a certain part-e.g. at a certain age or in the important part-or entirely. Hence in some cases there is an intermediate (there are men who arc neither good nor bad), and in others there is not-a thing must be either odd or even. Again, some have 13 a determinate subject, and others have not. Thus it is evident that one of a pair of contraries always has a privative sense; but it is enough if this is true of the primary or generic contraries, e.g. unity and plurality; for the others can be reduced to them.

V. Since one thing has one contrary, it might be Problems asked in what sense unity is opposed to plurality, with opposi-and the equal to the great and to the small. For if tion. The we always use the word "whether" in an antithesis of "equal" --e.g., "whether it is white or black," or "whether to "greater" it is white or not " (but we do not ask " whether it "smaller." is a man or white," unless we are proceeding upon some assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who came or Socrates. This is not a 2 necessary disjunction in any class of things, but is derived from the use in the case of opposites-for it is only opposites that cannot be true at the same

27

1055 b ούκ ένδέχεται άμα ύπάρχειν. ὦ καὶ ένταῦθα χρηται 1058 α έν τώ πότερος ήλθεν. εί γαρ άμα ένεδέχετο, γελοΐον τὸ ἐρώτημα. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως, ὁμοίως ἐμπίπτει εἰς αντίθεσιν, είς το έν η πολλά, οίον πότερον αμφότεροι ήλθον η άτερος)-εί δη έν τοις αντικειμένοις άει τοῦ ποτέρου ή ζήτησις, λέγεται δὲ πότερον 5 μείζον η έλαττον, η ίσον, τίς έστιν ή άντίθεσις πρός ταῦτα τοῦ ἴσου; οὕτε γὰρ θατέρω μόνω ἐναντίον ούτ' αμφοίν· τί γαρ μαλλον τώ μείζονι η τώ ελάττονι ; έτι τώ ανίσω έναντίον το ίσον. ώστε πλείοσιν έσται η ένί. εί δε το άνισον σημαίνει το αυτό 10 άμα ἀμφοῖν, εἴη μεν ἂν ἀντικείμενον ἀμφοῖν· καὶ ή απορία βοηθεί τοις φάσκουσι το ανισον δυάδα είναι. άλλά συμβαίνει έν δυοίν έναντίον όπερ άδύνατον.

Έτι τὸ μέν ἴσον μεταξὺ φαίνεται μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, ἐναντίωσις δὲ μεταξὺ οὐδεμία¹ οὕτε φαίνεται οὕτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τελεία μεταξύ τινος οῦσα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
¹⁵ ἔχει ἀεὶ ἑαυτῆς τι μεταξύ. Λείπεται δὴ ἢ ὡς ἀπόφασιν ἀντικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς στέρησιν. θατέρου μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ μικροῦ; ἀμφοῖν ἄρα ἀπόφασις στερητική. διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὸ πότερον λέγεται, πρὸς δὲ θάτερον οὕ, οἶον πότερον μεῦζον ἢ ἴσον, ἢ πότερον ¹ om. EJ.

^a Held by the Platonists. Cf. XIV. i. 4, 5.

time-and we have this same use here in the question "which of the two came?" for if both alternatives were possible, the question would be absurd; but even so the question falls into an antithesis : that of "one" or "many "-i.e., "whether both came, or one ")-if, then, the question " whether " is always 3 concerned with opposites, and we can ask " whether it is greater or smaller, or equal," what is the nature of the antithesis between "equal" and "greater or, smaller "? It is contrary neither to one only, nor to both: for (a) it is no more contrary to the greater than to the smaller; (b) " equal" is contrary to "unequal," and thus it will be contrary to more than one thing; (c) if "unequal" means the same 4 as both "greater" and "smaller" at the same time, "equal" must still be opposed to them both. This difficulty supports the theory " that " the unequal " is a duality. But the result is that one thing is contrary to two; which is impossible.

Further, it is apparent that "equal" is inter-5 mediate between "great" and "small," but it is not apparent that any contraricty is intermediate, nor can it be, by definition; for it could not be complete if it were the intermediate of something, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and the other extreme.

It remains, then, that it is opposed either as negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so opposed to one of the two, for it is no more opposed to the great than to the small. Therefore it is a 6 privative negation of both. For this reason we say "whether" with reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., "whether it is greater or equal," or "whether it is equal or smaller"; there are

29

1056 a 20 ίσον η έλαττον άλλ' άει τρία. ου στέρησις δε εξ άνάγκης ου γάρ παν ίσον δ μή μείζον ή έλαττον, άλλ' έν οίς πέφυκεν έκεινα. Έστι δή το ίσον τὸ μήτε μέγα μήτε μικρόν, πεφυκὸς δὲ ἢ μέγα η μικρόν είναι· και αντίκειται αμφοιν ώς απόφασις στερητική, διὸ καὶ μεταξύ έστιν. καὶ τὸ μήτε 26 αναθόν μήτε κακόν αντίκειται αμφοΐν, αλλ' άνώνυμον· πολλαχώς γάρ λέγεται έκάτερον και οικ έστιν έν τό δεκτικόν, άλλά μαλλον το μήτε λευκόν μήτε μέλαν. έν δε ούδε τοῦτο λέγεται, ἀλλ' ώρισμένα πως τὰ χρώματα ἐφ' ῶν λέγεται στερητικῶς 80 ή ἀπόφασις αῦτη ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψαιὸν ἢ ὠχρὸν "Ωστε ούκ ορθώς είναι ή τοιοῦτόν τι άλλο. έπιτιμωσιν οι νομίζοντες όμοίως λέγεσθαι πάντα, ώστε έσεσθαι ύποδήματος καὶ χειρὸς μεταξὺ τὸ μήτε υπόδημα μήτε χείρα, επείπερ¹ και το μήτε άγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὡς 35 πάντων έσομένου τινός μεταξύ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δέ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. ή μέν γάρ ἀντικειμένων συναπόφασίς έστιν ων έστι μεταξύ τι και διάστημά τι 1058 b πέφυκεν είναι· των δ' ούκ έστι διαφορά· έν άλλω γάρ γένει ων αί συναποφάσεις, ώστ' ούχ έν το ύποκείμενον.

VI. Όμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶ ἐνὶ
 ὅπλῶς ἀντίκειται, συμβαίνει ἔνια ἀδύνατα. τὸ γὰρ
 ἕν ὀλίγον ἢ ὀλίγα ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ τοῖς

¹ είπερ Ε.

^a Cf. ini. 8.

always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything is equal which is not greater or smaller, but only things which would naturally have these attributes

The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor 7 small, but would naturally be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation, and therefore is intermediate between them. And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but it has no name (for each of these terms has several meanings, and there is no one maternal which is receptive of both); that which is neither white nor black is better entitled to a name, although even this 8 has no single name, but the colours of which this negation is privatively predicated are to a certain extent limited; for it must be either grey or buff or something similar.

Therefore those persons are wrong in their criticism θ who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between "shoe" and "hand," because that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though there must be an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily follow. For the one is a joint negation 10 of opposites where there is an intermediate and a natural interval; but in the other case there is no question of difference, since the joint negation applies to things which are in different genera, and therefore the substrate is not one.^a

VI. A similar question might be raised about The opposi-"one" and "many." For if "many" is absolutely "one" to opposed to "one," certain impossibilities result. "many" (1) One will be few; for "many" is also opposed to 1056 b όλίγοις αντίκειται. έτι τα δύο πολλά, είπερ το διπλάσιον πολλαπλάσιον, λέγεται δε κατά¹ τὰ δύο². ώστε τὸ ἕν ὀλίγον πρός τί γὰρ πολλά τὰ δύο εἰ μή πρός έν τε και το ολίγον; ούθεν γάρ εστιν 10 έλαττον. έτι εί³ ώς εν μήκει το μακρον καί βραχύ, ούτως έν πλήθει το πολύ και όλίγον, και δ αν ή πολύ και πολλά, και τὰ πολλὰ πολύ (εἰ μή τι ἄρα διαφέρει έν συνεχεί εὐορίστω), τὸ ὀλίγον πληθός τι έσται. ώστε το έν πληθός τι, είπερ και όλίγον. 15 τοῦτο δὲ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὰ δύο πολλά. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὰ πολλὰ λέγεται μέν πως καὶ [τὸ]⁴ πολύ, ἀλλ' ὡς διαφέρον, οΐον ὕδωρ πολύ, πολλα δ' οὕ. ἀλλ' ὄσα διαιρετά, έν τούτοις λέγεται, ένα μεν τρόπον έαν ή πλήθος έχον ύπεροχήν η άπλως η πρός τι (και το ολίγον ώσαύτως πληθος έχον έλλειψιν), το δέ 20 ώς αριθμός, δ και αντίκειται τῶ ένι μόνον. ουτως γαρ λέγομεν εν η πολλά, ώσπερ εί τις είποι εν καί ἕνα η λευκόν και λευκά, και τὰ μεμετρημένα πρός το μέτρον [και το μετρητόν]. ουτως και τα πολλαπλάσια λέγεται πολλά γαρ έκαστος ό αριθμός ότι ένα και ότι μετρητός ένι έκαστος, και ώς 25 τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐνί, οὐ τῷ ὀλίγω. οὕτως μὲν οῦν ἐστὶ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ δύο, ὡς δὲ πληθος ἔχον ὑπεροχήν ή πρός τι ή άπλως ούκ έστιν, άλλά πρωτον. όλίγα δ' άπλως τα δύο· πληθος γάρ έστιν έλλειψιν έχον πρώτον (διὸ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθώς ἀπέστη ἀΑνάξ-1 Kal Ab. ³ δύο διπλάσια Α^b. ⁸ om. A^bl⁻ Alexander. ⁴ τδ om. Alexander, secl. Bonitz. ⁵ Jaeger. ⁶ ¿ om. recc.

^a *i.e.*, a fluid, which cannot be described as "many."

"few." (2) Two will be many; since "twofold"2 is "manifold," and "twofold " is derived from two. Therefore one will be few; for in what relation can two be many if not in relation to one, which must therefore be few? for there can be nothing less. (3) If "much" and "little" are in plurality what "long" and "short" are in length, and if whatever is "much" is also "many," and "many" is "much" 3 (unless indeed there is a difference in the case of a plastic continuum^a), "few" will be a plurality. Therefore one will be a plurality, if it is few; and this necessarily follows if two is many. Presumably, however, although "many" in a sense means "much," there is a distinction ; e.g., water is called "much" but not "many." To all things, however, 4 which are divisible the term "many" is applicable : in one sense, if there is a plurality which involves excess either absolutely or relatively (and similarly "few" is a plurality involving defect); and in another in the sense of number, in which case it is opposed to "one" only. For we say "one or many" just as if we were to say "one and ones," or "white thing and white things," or were to compare the things measured with the measure. Multiples, too, are spoken of in this way; for every 5 number is "many," because it consists of "ones," and because every number is measurable by one; and also as being the opposite of one, and not of In this sense even two is many; but as few. a plurality involving excess either relatively or absolutely it is not many, but the first plurality. Two is, however, absolutely few; because it is the first plurality involving defect (hence Anaxagoras ^b 6

• Cf. I. iii. 9.

VOL. II

1056 b ανόρας είπων ότι όμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ην ἄπειρα 30 καὶ πλήθει καὶ μικρότητι· ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ "καὶ μικρότητι" "καὶ ὀλιγότητι" οὐ γὰρ άπειρα), έπει το όλίγον ου διά το έν, ώσπερ τινές φασιν, άλλα δια τα δύο. 'Αντίκειται δη το έν και τὰ πολλὰ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ὡς μέτρον μετρητῶ. ταῦτα δὲ ώς τὰ πρός τι, ὄσα μὴ καθ' αύτὰ τῶν 85 πρός τι. διήρηται δ' ήμιν έν άλλοις ὄτι διχώς λέγεται τὰ πρός τι, τὰ μέν ώς εναντία, τὰ δ' ώς 1057 • ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, τῶ λέγεσθαί τι ἄλλο πρὸς Τὸ δὲ ἕν ἔλαττον είναι τινός, οίον τοῖν αὐτό. δυοίν, ούδεν κωλύει ού γαρ εί έλαττον και όλίγον. το δε πλήθος οίον γένος έστι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ· ἔστι γαρ αριθμός πλήθος ένι μετρητόν. και αντίκειταί 5 πως το εν και αριθμός, ούχ ώς εναντίον, αλλ ώσπερ είρηται των πρός τι ένια. ή γάρ μέτρον, τό δε μετρητόν, ταύτη αντίκειται. διό ου παν δ αν ή έν αριθμός έστιν, οίον ει τι αδιαίρετόν έστιν. όμοίως δε λεγομένη ή επιστήμη πρός τό επιστητόν ούγ όμοίως αποδίδωσιν. δόξειε μέν γαρ αν μέτρον 10 ή έπιστήμη είναι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ μετρούμενον, συμβαίνει δε επιστήμην μεν πασαν επιστητόν είναι, το δε επιστητον μή παν επιστήμην, ότι τρόπον τινά ή έπιστήμη μετρείται τῷ ἐπιστητῷ. Τὸ δὲ πλήθος οὔτε τῷ ὀλίγω ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ τούτω

^a sc. "and then the absurdity of his view would have been apparent, for," etc. Aristotle assumes that Anaxagoras meant "smallness" ($\mu\kappa\rho\sigma\eta$ s) to be the opposite of "multitude" ($\pi\lambda\eta\theta\sigma$ s); but he meant just what he said that the particles of which things consist are infinitely many 34

was not right in leaving the subject by saying "all things were together, infinite both in multitude and in smallness"; instead of "in smallness" he should have said "in fewness," a for things cannot be infinite in fewness), since fewness is constituted not by one, as some hold, but by two.

In the sphere of numbers "one" is opposed to 7 "many" as the measure to the measurable, *i.e.*, as relative terms are opposed which are not of their own nature relative. We have distinguished elsewhere ^b that things are called "relative" in two senses—either as being contraries, or as knowledge is related to the knowable, A being related to B because B is described in relation to A.

There is no reason why one should not be fewer s than something, e.g. two; for if it is fewer it is not therefore few. Plurality is, as it were, a genus of number, since number is a plurality measurable by one. And in a sense one and number are opposed; not, however, as being contrary, but as we have said some relative terms to be; for it is qua measure and measurable that they are opposed. (Hence not 9 everything which is one is a number-e.g., a thing which is indivisible.) But although the relation between knowledge and the knowable is said to be similar to this, it turns out not to be similar. For it would seem that knowledge is a measure, and the knowable that which is measurable by it; but it happens that whereas all knowledge is knowable, the knowable is not always knowledge, because in a way knowledge is measured by the knowable.^c

Plurality is contrary neither to the few (whose 10 and infinitely small. See Bowman in Class. Review xxx. 42-44. ^b V. xv. 8, 9. ^c Cf. ch. i. 19.

1057 a

μέν τὸ πολὺ ὡς ὑπερέχον πλῆθος ὑπερεχομένω ¹⁶ πλήθει, οὕτε τῷ ἐνὶ πάντως· ἀλλὰ τὸ μεν ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι διαιρετὸν τὸ δ' ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ δ' ὡς πρός τι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητῷ, ἐὰν ἦ ἀριθμὸς τὸ δ' ἕν μέτρον.

VII. 'Επεί δε των εναντίων ενδέχεται είναι τι μεταξύ και ένίων έστιν, ανάγκη έκ των έναντίων 20 είναι τὰ μεταξύ πάντα γὰρ τὰ μεταξύ έν τῷ αὐτῶ γένει έστι και ών έστι μεταξύ. μεταξύ μέν γαρ ταῦτα λέγομεν εἰς ὄσα μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη πρότερον το μεταβάλλον. οίον από της υπάτης έπι την νήτην εί μεταβαίνοι τω όλιγίστω, ήξει πρότερον είς τούς μεταξύ φθόγγους· καί έν χρώμασιν 25 εἰ [ήξει]¹ ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ εἰς τὸ μέλαν, πρότερον ήξει είς το φοινικούν και φαιόν η είς το μέλαν όμοίως δέ και έπι των άλλων. μεταβάλλειν δ' έξ άλλου γένους είς άλλο γένος ούκ έστιν άλλ' η κατά συμβεβηκός, οΐον ἐκ χρώματος εἰς σχήμα. ἀνάγκη άρα τὰ μεταξύ και αύτοῖς και ῶν μεταξύ εἰσιν έν 30 τῶ αὐτῶ γένει είναι. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν πάντα γε τὰ μεταξύ έστιν άντικειμένων τινών έκ τούτων γάρ μόνων καθ' αύτὰ έστι μεταβάλλειν. διὸ ἀδύνατον είναι μεταξύ μή άντικειμένων είη γαρ αν μεταβολή και μή έξ αντικειμένων. των δ' αντικειμένων άντιφάσεως μέν οὐκ ἔστι μεταξύ (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν 36 αντίφασις, αντίθεσις ής ότωουν θάτερον μόριον πάρεστιν, οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐθὲν μεταξύ), τῶν δὲ λοιπών τὰ μέν πρός τι, τὰ δὲ στέρησις, τὰ δὲ ¹ Christ.

real contrary is the many, as an excessive plurality to an exceeded plurality) nor in *all* senses to one; but they are contrary in one sense (as has been said) as being the one divisible and the other indivisible; and in another as being relative (just as knowledge is relative to the knowable) if plurality is a number and one is the measure.

VII. Since there can be, and in some cases is, Interan intermediate between contraries, intermediates mediates. must be composed of contraries; for all intermediates are in the same genus as the things between which they are intermediate. By intermediates we mean 2 those things into which that which changes must first change. E.g., if we change from the highest string to the lowest by the smallest gradations we shall first come to the intermediate notes; and in the case of colours if we change from white to black we shall come to red and grey before we come to black; and similarly in other cases. But change 3 from one genus into another is impossible except accidentally; e.g., from colour to shape. Therefore intermediates must be in the same genus as one another and as the things between which they are intermediate.

But all intermediates are between cortain opposites, for it is only from these *per se* that change is possible. Hence there can be no intermediate between things 4 which are not opposites; for then there would be change also between things which are not opposites. Of things which are opposites, contradiction has no intermediate term (for contradiction means this: an antithesis one term of which must apply to any given thing, and which contains no intermediate term); of the remaining types of opposites some

1057 8 έναντία έστίν. των δέ πρός τι όσα μή έναντία ούκ έχει μεταξύ. αίτιον δ' ότι ούκ έν τώ αύτω ουκ εχει μεταζυ. αιτιον ο στι συκ εν τω αυτώ 1057 b γένει ἐστίν· τί γὰρ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητοῦ μεταξύ; ἀλλὰ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει τὰ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ δέδεικται, καὶ μεταξὺ ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἐναντίων. ἢ γὰρ ἔσται τι γένος b αὐτῶν, ἢ οὐθέν. καὶ εἰ μεν γένος ἔσται οὕτως ώστ' είναι πρότερόν τι των έναντίων, αί διαφοραί πρότεραι έναντίαι έσονται αι ποιήσασαι τα έναντία είδη ώς γένους έκ γάρ του γένους και τών διαφορών τὰ είδη, οίον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν έναντία, έστι δε το μεν διακριτικόν χρώμα το δε 10 συγκριτικόν χρώμα, αύται αί διαφοραί τό διακριτικόν και συγκριτικόν πρότεραι ωστε ταυτα έναντία άλλήλοις πρότερα. άλλά μην τά γε έναν-τίως διαφέροντα μαλλον έναντία, και τα λοιπά καί τὰ μεταξύ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἔσται καί τῶν διαφορών οίον όσα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανός 15 έστι μεταξύ, ταῦτα δεῖ ἐκ τοῦ γένους λέγεσθαι (έστι δέ γένος το χρώμα) και έκ διαφορών τινών. αύται δε ούκ έσονται τα πρώτα εναντία εί δε μή, έσται εκαστον η λευκόν η μέλαν. ετεραι άρα· μεταξύ άρα των πρώτων έναντίων αθται έσονται, αί πρώται δε διαφοραί το διακριτικόν και συγ-20 κριτικόν. ώστε ταθτα πρώτα ζητητέον όσα έναντία μή έν γένει, έκ τίνος τα μεταξύ αὐτῶν. άνάγκη γάρ τὰ έν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐκ τῶν ἀσυνθέτων

^a This is Plato's definition. Cf. Timaeus 67 D, E.

are relative, others privative, and others contrary. Those relative opposites which are not contrary 5 have no intermediate. The reason for this is that they are not in the same genus-for what is intermediate between knowledge and the knowable ?--but between great and small there is an intermediate. Now since intermediates are in the same genus, as has been shown, and are between contraries, they must be composed of those contraries. For the contrarics must either belong to a genus or not. And if there is a genus in such a way that it is some-6 thing prior to the contrarics, then the differentiae which constitute the contrary species (for species consist of genus and differentiae) will be contraries in a prior sense. E.g., if white and black arc con-7 traries, and the one is a penetrative a and the other a compressive colour, these differentiae, "penetrative "and "compressive," are prior, and so are opposed to each other in a prior sense. But it is the 8 species which have contrary differentiae that are more truly contraries; the other, *i.e.* intermediate, species will consist of genus and differentiae. E.g., all colours which are intermediate between white and black should be described by their genus (*i.e.* colour) and by certain differentiae. But these differentiae 9 will not be the primary contraries; otherwise everything will be either white or black. Therefore they will be different from the primary contraries. Therefore they will be intermediate between them, and the primary differentiae will be "the penetrative" and "the compressive." Thus we must first investigate the contraries which are not contained in a genus, and discover of what their intermediates are composed. For things which are in the same genus 10

1057 b τω γένει συγκείσθαι η ασύνθετα είναι. τα μέν ουν έναντία ασύνθετα έξ αλλήλων, ώστε αρχαί τα δε μεταξύ η πάντα η ούδεν. εκ δε των εναντίων 25 γίγνεταί τι, ώστ' έσται μεταβολή είς τοῦτο πρίν η είς αὐτά· ἐκατέρου γὰρ καὶ ήττον ἔσται καὶ μάλλον. μεταξύ άρα έσται και τοῦτο τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ τἆλλα ἄρα πάντα σύνθετα τὰ μεταξύ· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ μέν μαλλον τοῦ δ' ήττον σύνθετόν πως έξ έκείνων ών λέγεται είναι τοῦ μέν μαλλον τοῦ δ' . ήττον. έπει δ' ούκ έστιν έτερα πρότερα όμογενή 80 των έναντίων, απαντ' αν έκ των έναντίων είη τά μεταξύ. ωστε καὶ τὰ κάτω πάντα, καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐναντίων ἔσονται. ότι μέν ούν τὰ μεταξύ έν τε ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα καί μεταξύ έναντίων και σύγκειται έκ των έναντίων πάντα, δηλον.

VIII. Τὸ δ' ἔτερον τῷ εἴδει τινός τι ἔτερόν ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν· οῖον εἰ ζῷον ἔτερον τῷ εἴδει, ἄμφω ζῷα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον
 1058 a γένος καλῶ, ὅ° ἄμφω ἕν ταὐτὸ λέγεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχον διαφοράν, εἴθ' ὡς ὕλη ὄν εἴτ'
 ¹ ἀπαντα Α^b.

must either be composed of differentiac which are not compounded with the genus, or be incomposite. Contraries are not compounded with one another, and are therefore first principles; but intermediates are either all incomposite or none of them. Now from the contraries something is generated in such a way that change will reach it before reaching the contraries themselves (for there must be something which is less in degree than one contrary and greater than the other). Therefore this also will be intermediate between the contraries. Hence all the 11 other intermediates must be composite; for that which is greater in degree than one contrary and less than the other is in some sense a compound of the contraries of which it is said to be greater in degree than one and less than the other. And since there is nothing else homogeneous which is prior to the contraries, all intermediates must be composed of contrarics. Therefore all the lower 12 terms, both contraries and intermediates, must be composed of the primary contraries. Thus it is clear that intermediates are all in the same genus, and are between contraries. and are all composed of contraries.

VIII. That which is "other in species" than The meaning something else is "other" in respect of something; species." and that something must apply to both. E.g., if an animal is other in species than something else, they must both be animals. Hence things which are other in species must be in the same genus. The sort of thing I mean by "genus" is that in virtue of which two things are both called the same one thing; and which is not accidentally differentiated, whether regarded as matter or otherwise. For not 2

1058 a

άλλως. οὐ μόνον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν. οίον αμφω ζώα, αλλά και έτερον εκατέρω τοῦτο αύτο το ζώον, οίον το μεν ίππον το δε άνθρωπον. ⁶ διό¹ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν ἕτερον ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ τῷ είδει. έσται δή καθ' αύτά το μέν τοιονδί ζώον τό δε τοιονδί, οίον τό μεν ίππος τό δ' άνθρωπος. άνάγκη άρα την διαφοράν ταύτην έτερότητα τοῦ γένους είναι (λέγω γάρ γένους διαφοράν έτερότητα ή έτερον ποιεί τοῦτο αὐτό). ἐναντίωσις τοίνυν έσται αύτη. δήλον δε και έκ τής επαγωγής. 10 πάντα γαρ διαιρείται τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, καὶ ὅτι τάναντία έν ταύτω γένει, δέδεικται ή γάρ έναν-· τιότης ήν διαφορά τελεία. ή δε διαφορά ή είδει πασα τινός τι ώστε τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ γένος ἐπ άμφοῖν (διὸ καὶ ἐν τῆ αὐτῆ συστοιχία πάντα τὰ έναντία τής κατηγορίας, όσα είδει διάφορα και μή 15 γένει, ετερά τε άλλήλων μάλιστα τελεία γαρ ή διαφορά, καὶ ἄμα ἀλλήλοις οὐ γίγνεται) ἡ ἄρα διαφορά έναντίωσις έστιν. Τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ έτέροις είναι τω είδει, τὸ ἐν ταὐτω γένει ὄντα έναντίωσιν έχειν άτομα όντα (ταντά δέ τω είδει, όσα μή έχει έναντίωσιν άτομα όντα) έν γάρ τή 20 διαιρέσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ γίγνονται ἐναντιώσεις πρίν είς τὰ άτομα έλθειν. ωστε φανερόν ότι πρός

¹ διà recc.

^a Aristotle does not use induction to prove his point; indeed he does not prove it at all.

^v In ch. iv.

[•] Or "category." • *i.e.*, indivisible species and individuals.

only must the common quality belong to both, e.g., that they are both animals, but the very animality of each must be different; e.g., in one case it must be equinity and in the other humanity. Hence the common quality must for one be other in species than that which it is for the other. They must be, then, of their very nature, the one this kind of animal, and the other that; e.g., the one a horse and the other a man. Therefore this differ- 3 ence must be "otherness of genus" (I say "other-ness of genus" because by "difference of genus" I mean an "otherness" which makes the genus itself other); this, then, will be a form of contrariety. This is obvious by induction.^a For all differentiation is by opposites, and we have shown ^b that contraries are in the same genus, because contrariety was shown to be complete difference. But difference in species is always difference from something in respect of something; therefore this is the same thing, i.e. the genus, for both. (Hence too all contraries 4 which differ in species but not in genus are in the same line of predication, and are other than each other in the highest degree; for their difference is complete, and they cannot come into existence simultaneously.) Hence the difference is a form of contrariety.

To be $\mathbf{4}^{\mathbf{i}}$ other in species," then, means this: to be in the same genus and involve contrariety, while being indivisible (and "the same in species" 5 applies to all things which do not involve contrariety, while being indivisible); for it is in the course of differentiation and in the intermediate terms that contrariety appears, before we come to the indivisibles.^d Thus it is evident that in relation 6

1058 a

^{*} τὸ καλούμενον¹ γένος οὔτε ταὐτὸν οὔτε ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει οὐθέν ἐστι τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν (προσηκόντως^{*} ἡ γὰρ ῦλη ἀποφάσει δηλοῦται, τὸ δὲ γένος ῦλη οῦ λέγεται γένος, μὴ ὡς τὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν, 26 ἀλλ³ ὡς τὸ ἐν τῆ φύσει), οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, ἀλλὰ διοίσει τῷ γένει ἐκείνων, εἴδει δὲ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει. ἐναντίωσιν γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν οῦ διαφέρει εἴδει· αὕτη δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐν ταὐτῷ τῷ γένει οῦσι μόνοις.

ΙΧ. Απορήσειε δ' άν τις δια τί γυνή ανδρός ούκ 30 είδει διαφέρει, εναντίου του θήλεος και του άρρενος όντος, τής δε διαφοράς εναντιώσεως ούδε ζώον θήλυ και άρρεν έτερον τώ είδει, καίτοι καθ' αύτό του ζώου αύτη ή διαφορά και ούχ ώς λευκότης ή μελανία, άλλ' ή ζῶον καὶ τὸ θηλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ύπάρχει. έστι δ' ή άπορία αύτη σχεδόν ή αὐτή 36 και διά τί ή μεν ποιεί τω είδει έτερα εναντίωσις, ή δ' ού, οίον το πεζον και το πτερωτόν, λευκότης δέ καὶ μελανία οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν οἰκεῖα πάθη τοῦ 1058 b γένους, τὰ δ' ἦττον; καὶ ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δ' ὕλη, ὄσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες είδει ποιουσι διαφοράν, όσαι δ' έν τω συνειλημ. μένω τη ύλη ου ποιούσιν. διο ανθρώπου λευκότης ού ποιεί ούδε μελανία, ούδε του λευκού άνθρώπου s έστι διαφορά κατ' είδος πρός μέλανα άνθρωπον, ούδ' αν όνομα έν τεθή. ώς ύλη γαρ ό άνθρωπος,

> ¹ καλούμενον δν A^b: καθόλου δν uel κατηγορούμενον Bonitz. ⁸ προσηκόντων JΓ.

> > ^a Cf. V. xxviii. 1.

to what is called genus no species is either the same or other in species (and this is as it should be, for the matter is disclosed by negation, and the genus is the matter of that of which it is predicated as genus; not in the sense in which we speak of the genus or clan of the Heraclidae," but as we speak of a genus in nature); nor yet in relation to things which are not in the same genus. From the latter it will differ in genus, but in species from things which are in the same genus. For the difference of things which differ in species must be a contrariety; and this belongs only to things which are in the same genus.

IX. The question might be raised as to why What con-woman does not differ in species from man, seeing "otherness that female is contrary to male, and difference is in species"? contrariety; and why a female and a male annual are not other in species, although this difference belongs to "animal" per se, and not as whiteness or blackness does; "male" and "female" belong to it qua animal. This problem is practically the same 2 as "why does one kind of contrariety (e.g. "footed" and "winged") make things other in species, while another (e.g. whiteness and blackness) does not?" The answer may be that in the one case the attributes are peculiar to the genus, and in the other they are less so; and since one element is formula and the other matter, contrarieties in the formula produce difference in species, but contrarieties in the concrete whole do not. Hence the whiteness 3 or blackness of a man does not produce this, nor is there any specific difference between a white man and a black man; not even if one term is assigned to each. For we are now regarding "man" as

1058 b

οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν ή ὕλη· οὐδ¹ ἀνθρώπου γὰρ εἴδη εἰσὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τοῦτο, καίτοι ἕτεραι ai σάρκες καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐξ ῶν ὅδε καὶ ὅδε· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον ἕτερον μέν, εἴδει δ' οὐχ ἕτερον, ὅτι ἐν τῷ
10 λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίωσις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἄτομον. ὁ δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης· καὶ ὁ λευκὸς δὴ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι Καλλίας λευκός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οῦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λευκός. οὐδὲ χαλκοῦς δὴ κύκλος καὶ ξύλινος, οὐδὲ τρίγωνον χαλκοῦν καὶ κύκλος ξύλινος, οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην
18 εἴδει διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἕνεστιν ἐναντίωσις.

Πότερον δ' ή ὕλη οὐ ποιεῖ ἕτερα τῷ εἰδει, οῦσά πως ἑτέρα, ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ; διὰ τί γὰρ όδὶ ὁ ὅππος τουδὶ <τοῦ)^{\$} ἀνθρώπου ἔτερος τῷ εἴδει; καίτοι σὺν τῇ ὕλη οἱ λόγοι αὐτῶν. ἢ ὅτι ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῷ ἐναντίωσις; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μέλανος ὅππου. καὶ ἔστι γε 20 εἴδει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ῇ ὁ μὲν λευκὸς ὁ δὲ μέλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ ἄμφω λευκὰ ἦν, ὁμοίως ἂν ἦν εἴδει ἔτερα. Τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ τοῦ ζώου οἰκεῖα μὲν πάθη, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῆ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ σώματι. διὸ τὸ αὐτὸ σπέρμα θῆλυ ἢ ἄρρεν γίγνεται παθόν τι πάθος.

25 Τί μέν ούν ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἔτερον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μέν διαφέρει εἴδει τὰ δ' οὔ, εἴρηται.
 ¹ οὐδ' J: οὐδὲν A^b: οὐκ E.
 ² Ross.
 46

matter, and matter docs not produce difference; and for this reason, too, individual men are not species of "man," although the flesh and bones of which this and that man consist are different. The concrete whole is "other," but not "other in species," because there is no contrariety in the formula, and this is the ultimate indivisible species. But Callias is 4 definition and matter. Then so too is "white man," because it is the individual, Callias, who is white. Hence "man" is only white accidentally. Again, a bronze circle and a wooden one do not differ in species; and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle differ in species not because of their matter, but because there is contrariety in their formulae.

But does not matter, when it is "other" in a 5 particular way, make things "other in species"? Probably there is a sense in which it does. Otherwise why is this particular horse "other in species" than this particular man, although the definitions involve matter? Surely it is because there is contrariety in the definition, for so there also is in "white man" and "black horse"; and it is a contrariety in species, but not because one is white and the other black; for even if they had both been white, they would still be "other in species."

"Male" and "female" are attributes peculiar to 6 the animal, but not in virtue of its substance; they are material or physical. Hence the same semen may, as the result of some modification, become either female or male.

We have now stated what "to be other in species" means, and why some things differ in species and others do not.

1058 h

Χ. Ἐπειδή δέ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, τό δέ φθαρτόν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἐναντία (στέρησις γὰρ ἀδυναμία διωρισμένη), ἀνάγκη ἕτερον εἶναι τῷ γένει το φθαρτόν καί το άφθαρτον. νῦν μέν οὖν 80 έπ' αὐτῶν εἰρήκαμεν τῶν καθόλου ὀνομάτων, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὅτιοῦν ẳφθαρτον καὶ όθαρτον έτερα είναι τῷ είδει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λευκον καὶ μέλαν. το γὰρ αὐτο ἐνδέχεται είναι καὶ ἅμα, ἐὰν ἦ τῶν καθόλου, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν καὶ λευκός και μέλας, και τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· εἴη γὰρ 86 ἂν μή ἅμα ὁ αὐτὸς λευκὸς καὶ μέλας· καίτοι ἐναντίον τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μέν κατὰ συμβεβήκὸς ὑπάρχει ἐνίοις, οἶον καὶ 1059 a τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ών έστι και τό φθαρτόν και τό αφθαρτον. ούδεν γάρ έστι φθαρτόν κατά συμβεβηκός το μέν γάρ συμβεβηκός ένδέχεται μη ύπάρχειν, το δε φθαρτόν των έξ ανάγκης υπαρχόντων έστιν οις υπάρχει. η των έξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἐστίν οἰς ὑπαρχει· η ^b ἔσται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν φθαρτὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, εἰ ἐν-δέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ φθαρτόν. ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἢ ἐν τῆ οὐσία ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τὸ φθαρτὸν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φθαρτῶν. ὅ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου· τῶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἄμφω. ἦ ἄρα καὶ καθ᾽ ὅ πρῶτον τὸ ¹⁰ μὲν φθαρτὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτον, ἔχει ἀντίθεσιν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη γένει ἕτερα εἶναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται είναι είδη τοιαῦτα οἱα λέγουσί τινες: έσται γάρ και άνθρωπος ό μεν φθαρτός ό δ' ά-

^a It appears that in this chapter (apart from § 5, which may be a later addition) the terms etoos and yevos are used in a non-technical sense. Cf. Ross on 1058 b 28. 48

X. Since contraries are other in form,^a and " the Difference perishable " and " imperishable " are contraries (for between privation is a definite incapacity). " the perishable " perishable" perishable " perishable " perishable" But so far we have spoken only of the universal terms : things and so it might appear to be unnecessary that anything perishable and imperishable should be "other in form," just as in the case of white and black. For 2 the same thing may be both at the same tune. if it is a universal (c.g., "man" may be both white and black); and it may still be both if it is a particular. for the same person may be white and black, although not at the same time. Yet white is contrary to black. But although some contraries (e.g. those which we 3 have just mentioned, and many others) can belong to certain things accidentally, others cannot ; and this applies to "the perishable" and "the imperishable." Nothing is accidentally perishable; for that which is accidental may not be applicable; but perishability is an attribute which applies necessarily when it is applicable at all. Otherwise one and the same thing will be imperishable as well as perishable, if it is possible for perishability not to apply to it. Thus perishability must be either the 4 substance or in the substance of every perishable thing. The same argument also applies to the imperishable; for both perishability and imperishability are attributes which are necessarily applicable. Hence the characteristics in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable are opposed; and therefore they must be other in kind. Thus it is obvious 5 that there cannot be Forms such as some thinkers maintain; for then there would be both a perishable

VOL. II

1059 a

φθαρτος. καίτοι τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὰ λέγεται εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τοῖς τισὶ καἱ οὐχ ὁμώνυμα· τὰ δὲ γένει ἔτερα πλεῖον διέστηκεν ἢ τὰ εἴδει.

^a *i.e.*, the individual man is perishable and the Idea of man imperishable; and these must be other in kind $(\gamma \ell \nu \epsilon \iota \text{ non-technical})$. But the Platonists hold that the Idea is the same

METAPHYSICS, X. x. 5

and an imperishable "man."^a Yet the Forms are said to be the same in species as the particulars, and not merely to share a common predicate with them; but things which are other in genus differ more widely than things which are other in species.

in species as the particular. This is impossible if it is other in genus ($\gamma \epsilon \nu \epsilon \iota$ technical).

1059 a

I. "Οτι μέν ή σοφία περί ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς έστι. δήλον έκ των πρώτων έν οις διηπόρηται πρός 20 τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. άπορήσειε δ' άν τις πότερον μίαν ύπολαβειν είναι δεῖ τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ πολλάς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν, μία γ' έστιν αεί των έναντίων αι δ' αρχαί οὐκ ἐναντίαι. εὶ δὲ μὴ μία, ποίας δεῖ θεῖναι ταύτας; "Ετι τὰς ἀποδεικτικὰς ἀργὰς θεωρήσαι 26 μιας η πλειόνων; εἰ μέν γὰρ μιας, τί μαλλον ταύτης η όποιασουν; εί δε πλειόνων, ποίας δεί ταύτας θειναι: "Ετι πότερον πασῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν η ού; εί μέν γάρ μη πασών, ποίων χαλεπόν άποδούναι εί δε πασών μία, άδηλον πως ενδεχεται πλειόνων την αυτην επιστήμην είναι. "Ετι πότε-80 ρον περί τὰς οὐσίας μόνον η και τὰ συμβεβηκότα'; εί γαρ περί γε τα συμβεβηκότα απόδειξίς έστιν, περί τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα, τίς $\hat{\eta}^{*}$ $\mu \hat{\epsilon} \nu \hat{\gamma} \hat{a} \rho \hat{a} \pi \rho \cdot$ έκατέρα καὶ ποτέρα σοφία;

K

¹ $\sigma \nu \mu \beta \epsilon \beta \eta \kappa \delta \tau a \dot{a} \pi \delta \delta \epsilon i \xi ls \dot{\epsilon} \sigma \tau i \nu EJ Alexander: om. A^b.$ $² <math>\dot{\eta}$. . . $\dot{\eta}$ Luthe: $\dot{\eta}$. . . $\dot{\eta}$ codd.

^a I. iii.-x.

• Cf. III. i. 5, ii. 1-10.

 Cf. III. i. 5, ii. 10-15, where the problem takes a slightly different form.

^a Cf. III. i. 6, ii. 15-17.

Cf. III. i. 8-10, ii. 18-19.

BOOK XI

I. That Wisdom is a science of first principles is generation clear from our introductory remarks,^a in which we of Books raised objections to the statements of other thinkers III. IV. and VI cc. 1, U about the first principles. It might be asked, however, whether we should regard Wisdom as one science problems or as more than one.^b If as one, it may be objected physics. that the objects of one science are always contraries; but the first principles are not contraries. And if it is not one, what sort of sciences are we to suppose them to be?

of Meta-

Again, is it the province of one science, or of more 2 than one, to study the principles of demonstration ? ° If of one, why of it rather than of any other? And if of more than one, of what sort are we to suppose them to be?

Again, are we to suppose that Wisdom deals with all substances or not $?^{d}$ If not with all, it is hard to lay down with what kind it does deal; while if there is one science of them all, it is not clear how the same science can deal with more than one subject.

Again, is this science concerned only with sub-3 stances, or with attributes as well?" For if it is a demonstration of attributes, it is not concerned with substances; and if there is a separate science of each, what is each of these sciences, and which of them is Wisdom ? Qua demonstrative, the science of attri-

1059 a δεικτική σοφία ή περί τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ή¹ δὲ περί τὰ πρῶτα ή τῶν οὐσιῶν. ᾿Αλλ' οὐδὲ περί τὰς 35 έν τοις φυσικοις είρημένας αιτίας την επιζητουμένην[®] ἐπιστήμην θετέον· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οῦ ἕνεκεν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οῦσιν ἐν κινήσει καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον κινεί (τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ τέλος), τὸ δε πρωτον κινήσαν ούκ εστιν έν τοις ακινήτοις. δίως δ΄ ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερόν ποτε περὶ τὰς
 ^{1059 b} αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ οῦ, περὶ δέ τινας ἑτέρας. εἰ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλας,
 ἢ περὶ τὰ εἴδη εἴη ἂν ἢ περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. τὰ
 μὲν γὰρ εἴδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον· ὅμως δὲ ἀπορίαν έχει, καν είναι τις αύτα θη, δια τι ποτ' ούχ ⁵ ώσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ των άλλων ων έστιν είδη· λέγω δ' ότι τα μαθηματικά μέν μεταξύ τε τών είδων τιθέασι και τών αίσθητών οໂον τρίτα τινά παρά τὰ εἴδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο, τρίτος δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' ἴππος παρ' αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον· εἰ δ' αῦ μή 10 έστιν ώς λέγουσι, περί ποῖα θετέον πραγματεύεσθαι τον μαθηματικόν; ου γάρ δή περί τα δευρο τούτων γὰρ οὐθέν ἐστιν οἶον aί μαθηματικαὶ ζητοῦσι των γὰρ οὐθέν ἐστιν οἶον aί μαθηματικαὶ ζητοῦσι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, χωριστόν γὰρ αύτων ούθέν. άλλ' ούδε των αισθητων ούσιων. φθαρταί γάρ.

¹ $\tilde{\eta} \dots \tilde{\eta} \dots$ Luthe: $\dot{\eta} \dots \dot{\eta}$ codd. ² $\zeta\eta\tau\sigma\sigma\mu\mu$ EJ.

Physics II. iii.
 Cf. III. i. 7, ii. 20-30.
 This phrase has πo technical sense here; cf. I. ix. 4.

butes appears to be Wisdom; but qua concerned with that which is primary, the science of substances.

Nor must we suppose that the science which we are 4 seeking is concerned with the causes described in the *Physics.*^a It is not concerned with the final eause; for this is the Good, and this belongs to the sphere of action and to things which are in motion ; and it is this which first causes motion (for the end is of this nature); but there is no Prime Mover in the sphere of immovable things. And in general it is a difficult 5 question whether the science which we are now seeking is concerned with sensible substances, or not with sensible substances, but with some other kind bIf with another kind, it must be concerned either with the Forms or with mathematical objects. Now clearly the Forms do not exist. (But nevertheless, even if we posit them, it is a difficult question as to why the same rule does not apply to the other things of which there are Forms as applies to the objects of mathematics. I mean that they posit the objects of 6 mathematics as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the Forms and the things of our world; but there is no " third man "o or "horse " besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to suppose to be the concern of the mathematician? Not surely the things of our world; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical sciences investigate.) Nor indeed is the science which we are now seeking 7 concerned with the objects of mathematics ; for none of them can exist separately. But it does not deal with sensible substances either; for they are perishable.

1059 b

¹⁶ Όλως δ' ἀπορήσειέ τις ἂν ποίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὸ διαπορήσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλης. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ πᾶσαν εἶναι πραγματείαν, οὐδὲ μὴν τῆς σκοπούσης περὶ ἀποδείξεώς τε καὶ 20 ἐπιστήμης· περὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖται. λείπεται τοίνυν τὴν προκειμένην φιλοσοφίαν περὶ αὐτῶν τὴν σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι.

Διαπορήσει δ' αν τις εί δεῦ θεῦναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰ καλούμενα ὑπό τινων στοιχεῖα· ταῦτα δὲ πάντες ἐνυπάρχοντα τοῖς ²⁵ συνθέτοις τιθέασιν. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν δόξειε τῶν καθόλου δεῖν εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην· πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὥστ' εἶη ἂν οῦτω τῶν πρώτων γενῶν. ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἔν· ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὑποληφθείη περιέχειν τὰ ⁸⁰ ὅντα πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖς ἐοικέναι διὰ τὸ είναι πρῶτα τῆ φύσει· φθαρέντων γὰρ αὐτῶν συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ λοιπά· πῶν' γὰρ ὅν καὶ ἔν. ῆ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν εἰ θήσει τις αὐτὰ γένη, διαφορὰ δ' οὐδεμία τοῦ γένους μετέχει, ταύτῃ δ' οὐκ ἂν δόξειε δεῖν αὐτὰ τιθέναι ⁸⁵ γένη οὐδ' ἀρχάς. ἕτι δ' εἰ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ τὸ ἁπλούστερον τοῦ ἡττον τοιούτου, τὰ δ' ἔσχατα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἁπλούστερα τῶν γενῶν (ἄτομα

¹ πâν A^b Alexander (?): πάντα EJ.

^a i.e., intelligible matter (cf. VII, x. 18). This problem is not raised in Book III. ^b Cf. III. i. 10, iii. 56

In general the question might be raised, to what science it pertains to discuss the problems concerned with the matter a of mathematical objects. It is not 8 the province of physics, because the whole business of the physicist is with things which contain in themselves a principle of motion and rest; nor yet of the science which inquires into demonstration and scientific knowledge, for it is simply this sort of thing which forms the subject of its inquiry. It remains, therefore, that it is the science which we have set ourselves to find that treats of these subjects.

One might consider the question whether we should 9 regard the science which we are now seeking as dealing with the principles which by some are called elements.^b But everyone assumes that these are present in composite things; and it would scem rather that the science which we are seeking must be concerned with universals, since every formula and every science is of universals and not of ultimate species; so that in this case it must deal with the primary genera. These would be Being and Unity; 10 for these, if any, might best be supposed to embrace all existing things, and to be most of the nature of first principles, because they are by nature primary ; for if they are destroyed, everything else is destroyed with them, since everything exists and is one. But 11 inasmuch as, if Being and Unity are to be regarded as genera, they must be predicable of their differentiae, whereas no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae, from this point of view it would seem that they should be regarded neither as genera nor as principles. Further, since the more simple is more nearly a 12 principle than the less simple, and the ultimate subdivisions of the genus are more simple than the

1059 b γάρ), τὰ γένη δ' εἰς εἴδη πλείω καὶ διαφέροντα διαιρεῖται, μᾶλλον ἂν ἀρχή δόξειεν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν. ή δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ
1080 » εἴδη, τὰ γένη ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔοικε μᾶλλον' ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν. τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν ἕχοντα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἕτερα.

ΙΙ. "Ετι πότερον δεί τιθέναι τι παρά τὰ καθ' έκαστα η ού, άλλα τούτων ή ζητουμένη επιστήμη; s ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄπειρα. τά γε μὴν παρὰ τὰ καθ' έκαστα γένη η είδη έστίν, άλλ' ούδετέρου τούτων ή ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη. διότι γαρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο, εἴρηται. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερον δει τινά ύπολαβειν ούσίαν είναι χωριστήν παρά τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς δεῦρο, η ού, ἀλλὰ 10 ταῦτ' είναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν σοφίαν ύπάρχειν. ζητείν μεν γαρ εσίκαμεν άλλην τινά, και το προκείμενον τοῦτ' ἐστίν ήμῖν, λέγω δε το ίδεῖν εἴ τι χωριστόν καθ' αύτό καὶ μηδενὶ τῶν αίσθητών ύπάρχον, έτι δ' εί παρά τάς αίσθητάς ούσίας έστι τις έτέρα ούσία, παρά ποίας των 15 αίσθητών δεί τιθέναι ταύτην είναι; τί γάρ μάλλον παρά τούς άνθρώπους η τούς ίππους η των άλλων ζώων θήσει τις αυτήν η και των αψύχων όλως; τό γε μήν ίσας ταις αίσθηταις και φθαρταις ούσίαις

> ^{*a*} Cf. III. i. 11, iv. 1-8. ^{*b*} Ch. l. 11-13.

genera (because they are indivisible), and the genera are divided into a number of different species, it would seem that species are more nearly a principle than genera. On the other hand, inasmuch as 13 species are destroyed together with their genera, it seems more likely that the genera are principles; because that which involves the destruction of something else is a principle. These and other similar points are those which cause us perplexity.

II. Again, ought we to assume the existence of something else besides particular things, or are they the objects of the science which we are seeking ?^a It is true that they are infinite in number ; but then the things which exist besides particulars are genera or species, and neither of these is the object of the science which we are now seeking. We have explained ^b why this is impossible. Indeed, in general 2 it is a difficult question whether we should suppose that there is some substance which exists separately besides sensible substances (i.e. the substances of our world), or that the latter constitute reality, and that it is with them that Wisdom is concerned. It seems that we are looking for some other kind of substance, and that this is the object of our undertaking: I mean, to see whether there is anything which exists separately and independently, and does not appertain to any sensible thing. But again, if 3 there is another kind of substance besides sensible substances, to what kind of sensible things are we to suppose that it corresponds? Why should we suppose that it corresponds to men or horses rather than to other animals, or even to inanimate objects in general? And yet to manufacture a set of eternal substances equal in number to those which are

1060 a

αιδίους έτέρας κατασκευάζειν έκτος των ευλόγων Δίουος ετεμας καταυκευαζευ εκτος των ευτογών
 δόξειεν ἂν πίπτειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ χωριστὴ τῶν σω μάτων ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστιν ἀρχή, τίνα ἄν τις
 άλλην θείη μαλλον' τῆς ὕλης; αὕτη γε μὴν
 ἐνεργεία μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, δυνάμει δ' ἔστιν. μαλλόν
 τ' ἂν ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα ταύτης δόξειεν είναι τὸ είδος και ή μορφή τουτο δε φθαρτόν, ωσθ όλως ουκ έστιν ἀίδιος ουσία χωριστή καὶ καθ' αὐτήν. 25 ἀλλ' ἀτοπον· ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ ζητεῖται σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστάτων ὡς οῦσά τις ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐσία τοιαύτη πως γαρ έσται τάξις μή τινος όντος αιδίου και χωριστοῦ και μένοντος; "Ετι δ' εἶπερ ἔστι τις οὐσία και ἀρχή τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν οἶαν νῦν ζητοῦμεν, και αῦτη μία πάντων και ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀιδίων τε και φθαρτῶν, ἀπορίαν ἔχει διὰ τί 30 ποτε της αὐτης ἀρχής ουσης τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀίδια των ύπό την άρχήν, τα δ' ούκ αίδια τουτο γάρ άτοπον. εί δ' άλλη μέν έστιν άρχη των φθαρτών ἀλλη δὲ τῶν ἀιδίμων, εἰ μὲν ἀιδίος καὶ ἡ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ὁμοίως ἀπορήσομεν διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ
 ἀιδίου τῆς ἀρχῆς οὕσης καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἀδία; φθαρτῆς δ' οὕσης ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ γίγνεται ταύτης κακείνης ετέρα, και τουτ' είς άπειρον πρόεισιν.

Εἰ δ' αῦ τις τὰς δοκούσας μάλιστ' ἀρχὰς ἀκινήτους εἶναι, τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, θήσει, πρῶτον

1 θείη μάλλον] μάλλον θείη Ab.

^o Forms which are induced in matter are perishable, although not subject to the process of destruction ; they are at one time and are not at another (of. VII. xv. 1). The only pure form (*i.e.*, the only form which is independent of matter in any and every sense) is the prime mover (XII. vii.).

^b Cf. III. i. 12, iv. 11-23.

sensible and perishable would seem to fall outside the bounds of plausibility. Yet if the principle 4 which we are now seeking does not exist in separation from bodies, what can we suppose it to be if not matter? Yes, but matter does not exist actually, but only potentially. It might seem rather that a more appropriate principle would be form or shape; but this is perishable a; and so in general there is no eternal substance which exists separately and independently. But this is absurd, because it seems 5 natural that there should be a substance and principle of this kind, and it is sought for as existing by nearly all the most enlightened thinkers. For how can there be any order in the universe if there is not something eternal and separate and permanent?

Again, if there is a substance and principle of such 8 a nature as that which we are now seeking, and if it is one for all things, *i.e.* the same for both eternal and perishable things, it is a difficult question as to why, when the principle is the same, some of the things which come under that principle are eternal, and others not; for this is paradoxical.^b But if 7 there is one principle of perishable things, and another of eternal things, if the principle of perishable things is also eternal, we shall still have the same difficulty; because if the principle is eternal, why are not the things which come under that principle eternal? And if it is perishable, it must have another principle behind it, and that principle must have another behind it; and the process will go on to infinity.

On the other hand, if we posit the principles 8 which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity,^c

· Cf. III. i. 18, iv. 24-34.

1080 η μέν εί μή τόδε τι και ουσίαν εκάτερον αυτών σημαίνει, πως έσονται χωρισταὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς; τοιαύτας δε ζητοῦμεν τὰς ἀιδίους τε καὶ πρώτας άρχάς. ει γε μήν τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν δηλοΐ, πάντ' ἐστιν οὐσίαι τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ο πάντων γάρ το όν κατηγορείται, κατ' ένίων δέ καί τὸ ἕν. οὐσίαν δ' είναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ψεῦδος. έτι δε τοις την πρώτην άρχην το εν λέγουσι και τουτ' ούσίαν, έκ δε του ένδς και της ύλης τον άριθμόν γεννωσι πρώτον, και τοῦτον οὐσίαν φάσκουσιν είναι, πως ενδεχεται το λεγόμενον αληθές 10 είναι; την γαρ δυάδα και των λοιπων ἕκαστον άριθμών των συνθέτων πως έν δεί νοήσαι; περί τούτου γαρ ούτε λέγουσιν ούδεν ούτε ράδιον είπειν. Ει γε μήν γραμμάς ή τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (λέγω δὲ επιφανείας τας πρώτας) θήσει τις άρχάς, ταθτά γ' ούκ είσιν ούσίαι χωρισταί, τομαί δε και διαιρέσεις 15 αί μέν επιφανειών αί δε σωμάτων, αί δε στιγμαί γραμμών, έτι δε πέρατα τών αὐτῶν τούτων πάντα δε ταῦτα εν άλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ χωριστὸν οὐδέν έστιν, έτι πως ούσίαν ύπολαβειν είναι δει τοῦ ένδς καί στιγμής; ούσίας μέν γάρ πάσης γένεσις έστι, στιγμής δ' οὐκ ἔστιν διαίρεσις γὰρ ή στιγμή. 20 Παρέχει δ' απορίαν και το πάσαν μεν επιστήμην είναι τών καθόλου και του τοιουδί, την δ' ουσίαν μή των καθόλου είναι, μαλλον δε τόδε τι καί χωριστόν, ωστ' εί περί τας αρχάς έστιν έπιστήμη,

¹ $\gamma' \gamma \rho$. J, Bonitz : $\delta' EJ$: $\gamma d\rho A^{b}$.

^a *i.e.*, intelligible surfaces, etc.

^b Cf. III. i. 15, v.

" so. which is liable to generation or destruction.

(a) unless each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature. (b) If, 9however, each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of some things. But that all things are 10 substances is false. (c) As for those who maintain that Unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number from Unity and matter as their first product, and assert that it is a substance, how can their theory be true? How are we to conceive of 2 and cach of the other numbers thus composed, as one? On this point they give no explanation; nor is it easy to give one.

But if we posit lines or the things derived from 11 them (I mean surfaces in the primary sense a) as principles,^b these at least are not separately existing substances, but sections and divisions, the former of surfaces and the latter of bodies (and points are sections and divisions of lines); and further they are limits of these same things. All these things are integral parts of something else, and not one of them exists separately. Further, how are we to suppose 12 that there is a substance of unity or a point ? for in the case of every substance a there is a process of generation, but in the case of the point there is not; for the point is a division.

It is a perplexing fact also that whereas every science treats of universals and types, substance is not a universal thing, but rather a particular and separable thing; so that if there is a science that

1060 b

πως δεί την ἀρχήν ὑπολαβεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι; "Ετι πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον η οὕ; λέγω δὲ
25 την ὕλην καὶ τὸ μετὰ ταύτης. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή, τά γε ἐν ὕλη 'φθαρτὰ πάντα' εἰ δ' ἔστι τι, τὸ είδος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ μορφή. τοῦτ' οῦν ἐπὶ τίνων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οῦ, χαλεπὸν ἀφορίσαι· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ δηλον οὐκ ὂν χωριστὸν τὸ είδος, οἶον οἰκίας. "Ετι πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἴδει η ἀριθμῷ αἱ αὐταί;
30 εἰ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἕν, πάντ' ἔσται ταὐτά.

ÍIÍ. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὅντος ἢ ὅν καθόλου καὶ οὐ κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δ' ὅν πολλαχῶς καὶ οὐ καθ' ἔνα λέγεται τρόπον εἰ μὲν οῦν ὁμωνύμως κατὰ δὲ κοινὸν μηδέν, οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην (οὐ γὰρ ἕν γένος τῶν τοιούτων), εἰ δὲ κατά τι κοινόν, εἴη ἂν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην.

^{*}Εοικε δη τον εἰρημένον λέγεσθαι τρόπον καθάπερ τό τε ἰατρικόν καὶ ὑγιεινόν· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκά-1061 » τερον πολλαχῶς λέγομεν. λέγεται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον τῷ τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἱατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγεσθαί πως, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ δ' ἄλλως, πρὸς ταὐτὸ δ' ἕκαστον. ἰατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς δ ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτη χρήσιμον. όμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι σημαντικὸν ὑγιείας, τὸ δ' ὅτι ποιητικόν. ὅ δ' αὐτὸς τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τὸ

¹ έν om. EJΓ.

^a Cf. III. i. 14, vi. 7-9.

,

^d This chapter corresponds to IV. i., ii., with which it should be compared. 64

[•] This section belongs to the problem discussed in §§ 1-5 above.

[•] Cf. III. i. 12, iv. 8-10.

deals with first principles, how can we suppose that substance is a first principle ? "

Again, is there anything besides the concrete 13 whole (I mean the matter and the form in combination) or not? ^b If not, all things in the nature of matter are perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does not exist in separation.

Again, are the first principles formally or numerically the same? If they are numerically one, all things will be the same.

III. Since the science of the philosopher is con-The subject cerned with Being qua Being universally,^d and not Metawith some part of it, and since the term Being has physics, several meanings and is not used only in one sense, if it is merely equivocal and has no common significance it cannot fall under one science (for there is no one class in things of this kind); but if it has a common significance it must fall under one science.

Now it would seem that it is used in the sense 2 which we have described, like "medical" and " healthy," for we use each of these terms in several senses; and each is used in this way because it has a reference, one to the science of medicine, and another to health, and another to something elsc; but each refers always to the same concept. A diagnosis and a scalpel are both called medical, because the one proceeds from medical science and the other is useful to it. The same is true of 3 "healthy"; one thing is so called because it is indicative, and another because it is productive, of health; and the same applies to all other cases.

VOL. II

1081 a ον άπαν λέγεται τω γάρ τοῦ όντος ή ον πάθος η «ξις η διάθεσις η κίνησις η των άλλων τι των 10 τοιούτων είναι λέγεται έκαστον αὐτῶν ὄν. ἐπεί δὲ παντός του όντος πρός έν τι και κοινόν ή άναγωγή γίγνεται, και των έναντιώσεων έκάστη πρός τάς πρώτας διαφοράς και έναντιώσεις άναχθήσεται τοῦ όντος, είτε πλήθος και εν είθ' όμοιότης και άνομοιότης αί πρώται τοῦ ὄντος εἰσὶ διαφοραί, εἴτ 15 άλλαι τινές. έστωσαν γάρ αθται τεθεωρημέναι. διαφέρει δ' ούδεν την του όντος άναγωγην πρός τό ον η πρός τό έν γίγνεσθαι. και γάρ εί μη ταυτόν άλλο δ' έστίν, αντιστρέφει γε τό τε γάρ έν και όν πως, τό τε ον έν. Έπει δ' έστι τὰ ἐναντία πάντα τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ μιῶς ἐπιστήμης 20 θεωρήσαι, λέγεται δ' έκαστον αὐτῶν κατὰ στέρησιν (καίτοι γ' ένια απορήσειέ τις αν πως λέγεται κατά στέρησιν, ών έστιν άνα μέσον τι, καθάπερ άδίκου καί δικαίου), περί πάντα δή τὰ τοιαῦτα τήν στέρησιν δεί τιθέναι, μή του όλου λόγου, του τελευταίου δε είδους σίον ει εστιν ο δικαιος καθ' 25 έξιν τινά πειθαρχικός τοῖς νόμοις, οὐ πάντως ό άδικος έσται τοῦ ὅλου στερούμενος λόγου, περί δέ τό πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ἐκλείπων πη, καὶ ταύτη ή στέρησις ύπάρξει αύτω. τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και έπι τών άλλων. καθάπερ δ' ό μαθηματικός περί τὰ έξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται ³⁰ (περιελών γάρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἶον βάρος και κουφότητα και σκληρότητα και τούναν-

^a Cf. IV. ii. 9 n.

66

Now it is in this same way that everything which exists is said to be; each thing is said to be because it is a modification or permanent or temporary state or motion or some other such affection of Being qua Being. And since everything that is can be referred 4 to some one common concept, each of the contraricties too can be referred to the primary differentiae and contrarieties of Being-whether the primary differentiae of Being are plurality and unity, or similarity and dissimilarity, or something else; for we may take them as already discussed.^a It makes no 5 difference whether that which is is referred to Being or Unity; for even if they are not the same but different, they are in any case convertible, since that which is one also in a sense is, and that which is is one.

Now since the study of contraries pertains to one 6 and the same science, and each contrary is so called in virtue of privation (although indeed one might wonder in what sense they can be called contraries in virtue of privation when they admit of a middle term -e.g. "unjust" and "just"), in all such cases we must regard the privation as being not of the whole definition but of the ultimate species. E.g., if the just man is " one who is obedient to the laws in virtue of some volitional state," the unjust man will not be entirely deprived of the whole definition, but will be " one who is in some respect deficient in obedience to the laws "; and it is in this respect that the privation of justice will apply to him (and 'the same holds good in all other cases). And just as the mathematician 7 makes a study of abstractions (for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is sensible, such as weight and lightness, hardness and its con1061 a τίον, έτι δε και θερμότητα και ψυχρότητα και τάς άλλας' αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τό ποσόν καί συνεχές, των μέν έφ' έν των δ' έπι δύο των δ' επί τρία, και τα πάθη τα τούτων ή 85 ποσά έστι καὶ συνεχη, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἕτερόν τι θεωρεί, και τῶν μέν τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα θέσεις 1061 b σκοπεί και τα ταύταις ύπάρχοντα, των δέ τάς συμμετρίας και άσυμμετρίας, τῶν δὲ τοὺς λόγους, άλλ' όμως μίαν πάντων και την αυτήν τίθεμεν έπιστήμην την γεωμετρικήν), τον αυτόν δή τρόπον έχει και περί τὸ ὄν. τὰ γὰρ τούτω συμβεβηκότα s καθ' όσον έστιν όν, και τας έναντιώσεις αύτου ή όν, οὐκ ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ἢ φιλοσοφίας θεωρησαι. τή φυσική μέν γάρ ούχ ή όντα, μαλλον δ' ή κινήσεως μετέχει, την θεωρίαν τις απονείμειεν άν. ή γε μήν διαλεκτική και ή σοφιστική των συμβεβηκότων μέν είσι τοῖς οῦσιν, οὐχ ή δ' ὄντα, 10 ούδε περί το όν αυτό καθ' όσον όν εστιν. ώστε λείπεται τον φιλόσοφον, καθ' όσον όντ' έστίν, είναι περί τὰ λεχθέντα θεωρητικόν. ἐπεί δὲ τό τε ὄν άπαν καθ' έν τι και κοινόν λέγεται πολλαχώς λεγόμενον, και τάναντία τον αυτόν τρόπον (eis τας πρώτας γάρ έναντιώσεις και διαφοράς τοῦ ὄντος άν-15 άγεται), τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα δυνατὸν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην είναι, διαλύοιτ' αν ή κατ' άρχας άπορία λεχθείσα, λέγω δ' έν ή διηπορείτο πως έσται πολλών και διαφόρων ὄντων τῷ γένει μία τις ἐπιστήμη. ΙV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς χρῆται τοῖς

 Έπει δε και ο μαθηματικός χρήται τοῖς κοινοῖς ίδίως, και τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς ἂν εἶη
 ¹ άλλας Α^b: άλλας τὰs EJ Alexander (?).

^a *i.e.*, identity, otherness, etc. ^b Ch. 1. 1. ^o Also the problem stated in ch. i. 3.

1081 b

20 θεωρήσαι τής πρώτης φιλοσοφίας. ὄτι γάρ ἀπὸ των ίσων ίσων άφαιρεθέντων ίσα τα λειπόμενα, κοινόν μέν έστιν έπι πάντων των ποσών, ή μαθηματική δ' απολαβούσα περί τι μέρος της οικείας ύλης ποιείται την θεωρίαν, οΐον περί γραμμάς ή γωνίας η αριθμούς η των λοιπων τι ποσών, ούχ 25 ή δ' ὄντα ἀλλ' ή συνεχες αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἐφ' ἐν ή δύο η τρία· ή δε φιλοσοφία περί τῶν ἐν μέρει μέν, ή τούτων έκάστω τι' συμβέβηκεν, ου σκοπεί, περί τό ον δε ή όν των τοιούτων εκαστον θεωρεί. τον αὐτὸν δ' ἔχει τρόπον καὶ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην τη μαθηματική τὰ συμβεβηκότα γὰρ ή 10 φυσική και τας άρχας θεωρεί τας των όντων ή κινούμενα καί ούχ ή όντα. την δε πρώτην ειρήκαμεν επιστήμην τούτων είναι καθ' όσον όντα τα ύποκείμενά έστιν, άλλ' ούχ ή ἕτερόν τι. διό και ταύτην και την μαθηματικήν επιστήμην μέρη της σοφίας είναι θετέον.

 V. "Εστι δέ τις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρχή περὶ ἡν
 ⁸⁵ οὐκ ἔστι διεψεῦσθαι, τοὐναντίον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ ποιεῖν, λέγω δὲ ἀληθεύειν, οἶον ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 ¹⁰⁸² ⁸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθ ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἀντικείμενα τὸν τρόπου. καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐκ ἕστιν ἀπόδειξις, πρὸς τόνδε δ' ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, πρὸς τόνδε δ' ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκ πιστοτέρας ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ τούτου ποι ⁵ ήσασθαι συλλογισμόν,² δεῖ δέ γ', εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν λέγοντα τὰς
 ¹ τι Γ Bessarion Alexander: τι codd.

^a This chapter corresponds to IV. iii. 1-6, and answers the problem stated in ch. i. 2. 70

province of Primary Philosophy to study the principles of these as well." That when equals are taken 2 from equals the remainders are equal is an axiom metacommon to all quantities; but mathematics isolates physics. a particular part of its proper subject matter and studies it separately; e.g. lines or angles or numbers or some other kind of quantity, but not qua Being, but only in so far as each of them is continuous in one. two or three dimensions. But philosophy does not investigate particular things in so far as each of them has some definite attribute, but studies that which is, in so far as each particular thing is. The same 3 applies to the science of physics as to mathematics, for physics studies the attributes and first principles of things qua in motion, and not qua Being; but Primary Science, as we have said, deals with these things only in so far as the subjects which underlie them are existent, and not in respect of anything else. Hence we should regard both physics and mathematics as subdivisions of Wisdom.

V. There is a principle in existing things about Argument which we cannot make a mistake ^b; of which, on the of the Law contrary, we must always realize the truth—viz. that of Contractle same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, nor admit of any other similar pair of opposites. Of such axioms although there is a proof *ad hominem*, there is no absolute proof; because there 2 is no principle more convincing than the axiom itself on which to base an argument, whereas there must be such a principle if there is to be absolute proof.^c But he who wants to convince an opponent who 3

^b This chapter corresponds to IV. iii. 7-iv. 31. \$ 1 = IV. iii. 7-iv. 51. \$ 1 = IV.

° §§ 2-5=IV. iv. 2-19.

1062 a άντικειμένας φάσεις τω δεικνύντι διότι ψεύδος, ληπτέον τι τοιούτον ο ταύτο μέν έσται τω μή ένδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι καθ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αύτον χρόνον, μή δόξει δ' είναι ταυτόν ούτω γάρ 10 μόνως αν αποδειχθείη πρός τον φάσκοντα ένδέχεσθαι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις ἀληθεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. τοὺς δη μέλλοντας ἀλλήλοις λόγου κοινωνήσειν δεί τι συνιέναι αύτων1. μή γιγνομένου γάρ τούτου πως έσται κοινωνία τούτοις πρός άλλήλους λόγου; δεί τοίνυν των δνομάτων έκαστον 15 είναι γνώριμον και δηλούν τι, και μή πολλά, μόνον δε εν αν δε πλείω σημαίνη, φανερόν ποιείν εφ' δ φέρει τούνομα τούτων. δ δη λέγων είναι τουτο καί μή είναι, τοῦτο ὅ° φησιν οὕ φησιν, ῶσθ' ὅ σημαίνει τουνομα τουτ' ου φησι σημαίνειν. τουτο δ' αδύνατον. ώστ' είπερ σημαίνει τι το είναι τόδε, 20 την αντίφασιν άδύνατον άληθεύειν κατά τοῦ αὐτοῦ. "Ε΄τι δ' εί τι σημαίνει το υνομα και το υτ' άληθεύεται, δει τουτ' έξ ανάγκης είναι το δ' έξ ανάγκης ον ούκ ένδέχεταί ποτε μή είναι· τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἄρα οὐκ ένδέχεται φάσεις⁶ άληθεύειν κατά τοῦ αὐτοῦ. "Ετι δ' εί μηθεν μαλλον ή φάσις η ή ἀπόφασις ἀλη-25 θεύεται, ό λέγων ανθρωπον η ούκ ανθρωπον ούδεν μαλλον άληθεύσει. δόξειε δε καν ούχ ιππον είναι φάσκων τον ανθρωπον η μαλλον η ούχ ήττον άληθεύειν ή ούκ ανθρωπον, ώστε και ίππον φάσκων είναι τον αυτόν αληθεύσει τας γαρ αντικειμένας

¹ αύτῶν Alexander, Bessarion: αὐτῶν codd.
 ² πλείονα EJ.
 ³ δ ὅλως εἶναί EJ.
 ⁴ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ om. A^b.
 ⁵ φάσεις και ἀποφάσεις EJ.
 72

makes opposite statements that he is wrong must obtain from him an admission which shall be identical with the proposition that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, but shall seem not to be identical with it. This is the only method of proof which can be used against one who maintains that opposite statements can be truly made about the same subject. Now those who intend to join in dis- 4 cussion must understand one another to some extent ; for without this how can there be any common discussion between them ? Therefore each of the terms which they use must be intelligible and signify something; not several things, but one only; or if it signifies more than one thing, it must be made clear to which of these the term is applied. Now he who 5 says that A is and is not denies what he asserts, and therefore denies that the term signifies what it does signify. But this is impossible. Therefore if " to be so-and-so" has a definite meaning, the opposite statement about the same subject cannot be true.

Again, if the term has a definite significance and 6 this is truly stated, it must of necessity be so.^a But that which of necessity is can never not be. Hence opposite statements about the same subject cannot be true.

Again, if the assertion is no more true than the negation, it will be no more true to say "A is man" than to say "A is not man."^b But it would also be 7 admitted that it is more or at least not less true to say that a man is not a horse than to say that he is not a man; and therefore, since it was assumed that opposite statements are equally true, it will be true

§ 6=IV. iv. 14-16.
With this section of. IV. iv. 26-30.

1082 a όμοίως ήν άληθεύειν. συμβαίνει τοίνυν τον αὐτὸν 30 ἄνθρωπον είναι καὶ ἴππον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζώων.

'Απόδειξις μέν οΰν ούδεμία τούτων έστιν άπλῶς, πρός μέντοι τὸν ταῦτα τιθέμενον ἀπόδειξις. ταχέως άν τις καί αὐτὸν τὸν Ἡράκλειτον τοῦτον έρωτων' τον τρόπον ήνάγκασεν όμολογειν μηδέποτε τάς άντικειμένας φάσεις δυνατόν είναι κατά των 35 αύτων άληθεύεσθαι· νύν δ' ου συνιείς² έαυτου τί ποτε λέγει ταύτην έλαβε την δόξαν. όλως δ' εί το λεγόμενον ύπ' αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ἀληθές, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸ 1082 1 τούτο είη άληθές, λέγω δε το ενδέχεσθαι το αυτό καθ' ένα καί τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον είναι τε και μή είναι. καθάπερ γαρ και διηρημένων αὐτῶν οὐδὲν μαλλον ή κατάφασις ἢ ή ἀπόφασις ἀληθεύεται, τον δαὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου καὶ τοῦ συμπεπλεγμένου καθάπερ μιας τινος καταφάσεως ούσης ούθεν ηττον ή απόφασις η το όλον ώς. έν καταφάσει τιθέμενον άληθεύσεται. έτι δ' εί μηθέν έστιν άληθώς καταφήσαι, καν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψεῦδος «ἴη τὸ φάναι μηδεμίαν ἀληθῆ κατάφασιν 10 υπάρχειν. εί δ' έστι τι, λύοιτ' αν το λεγόμενον ύπο των τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνισταμένων καὶ παντελώς ἀναιρούντων το διαλέγεσθαι.

VI. Παραπλήσιον δε τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ λεχθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔφη πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων⁸ μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐδεν ¹⁵ ἔτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι

1 έρωτήσας EJ.

2 ouvels EJ.

β ήττον scripsi (μάλλον codd.), ci. Ross, sed mauult retento μάλλον ή ante ή transponere.

4 άληθεύσεται Λ^b: άληθεύεται Alexander: άληθές έσται EJ.

⁵ είναι χρημάτων] χρημάτων είναι Ab.

to say that the same person is also a horse. It follows therefore, that the same person is a man and a horse, or any other animal.

Thus, although there is no absolute proof of these 8 axioms, there is an *ad hominem* proof where one's opponent makes these assumptions.^a Perhaps even Heraclitus himself, if he had been questioned on these lines, would have been compelled to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects : as it is, he adopted this theory through ignorance of what his doctrine implied. In general,^b 9 if what he says is true, not even this statement itself (I mean "that the same thing can at one and the same time be and not be ") will be true ; because 10 just as, when they are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, so in the same way, if the complex statement is taken as a single affirmation, the negation will be just as true as the whole statement regarded as an affirmation. And further, 11 if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very statement-that there is no such thing as a true affirmation-will be false. But if there is such a thing, the contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly destroy rational discourse may be considered to be refuted.^o

VI. Very similar to the views which we have just Criticism of mentioned is the dietum of Protagoras^{*d*}; for he which deny said that man is the measure of all things, by which the Law of he meant simply that each individual's impressions diction.

^a § 8=IV. iii. 10.

^b §§ 9-11 = IV. iv. 31.

° Čf. IV. viii. 4, 5.

^a This chapter forms a summary of IV. v. -viii. §§ 1-3 = IV. v. 1-5.

1062 b

παγίως. τούτου δέ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καί είναι και μή είναι, και κακόν και άγαθόν είναι. καί τάλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λενόμενα φάσεις, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τοισδί μέν φαίνεσθαι τόδε έίναι καλόν τοισδί δέ τουναντίον, μέτρον δ' είναι τό 20 φαινόμενον εκάστω. λύοιτο δ' άν αύτη ή άπορία θεωρήσασι πόθεν ελήλυθεν' ή άρχη της ύπολήψεως ταύτης. έοικε γαρ ένίοις μεν έκ της των φυσιολόγων δόξης γεγενήσθαι, τοις δ' έκ του μή ταυτά περί των αυτών απαντας γιγνώσκειν, άλλά τοισδί μέν ήδύ τόδε φαίνεσθαι τοισδί δε τούναντίον. τό 25 γάρ μηδέν έκ μή όντος γίγνεσθαι, παν δ' έξ όντος, σχεδόν άπάντων έστι κοινόν δόγμα των περί φύσεως. έπει ούν ου λευκόν γίγνεται λευκού τελέως όντος και ούδαμή μη λευκού [νύν δε γεγενημένον μή λευκόν], γίγνοιτ' αν έκ μή όντος λευκού τὸ γιγνόμενον [μη]³ λευκόν· ὤστε ἐκ μη ὄντος 30 γίγνοιτ' ἀν κατ' ἐκείνους, εἰ μη ὑπηρχε λευκὸν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ λευκόν. οὐ χαλεπὸν δέ διαλύειν τὴν άπορίαν ταύτην. είρηται γάρ έν τοις φυσικοίς πως έκ του μή όντος γίγνεται τα γιγνόμενα και πως έξ ővros.

Τό γε μήν όμοίως προσέχειν ταῖς δόξαις καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαμφισβητούν-⁸⁵ των εὔηθες· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοὺς ἐτέρους αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη διεψεῦσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῶν 1088 & γιγνομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον,

ελήλυθεν om. A^b Alexander.
 ² Bonitz.

⁸ λευκόν . . . καl μή λευκόν A^b Alexander: μή λευκόν . . . καl λευκόν. are positively true. But if this is so, it follows that 2 the same thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that all the other implications of opposite statements are true; because often a given thing seems beautiful to one sct of people and ugly to another, and that which seems to each individual is the measure. This difficulty will be solved if we con-3 sider the origin of the assumption. It seems probable that it arose in some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that everyone does not form the same opinion about the same things, but to some a given thing seems sweet and to others the contrary. For that 4 nothing comes from what is not, but everything from what is, is a doctrine common to nearly all natural philosophers." Since, then, a thing does not become white which was before completely white and in no respect not-white, that which becomes white must come from what was not-white. Hence according to this theory there would be generation from what is not, unless the same thing were originally white and not-white. However, it is not hard 5 to solve this difficulty. We have explained in the Physics ^b in what sense things which are generated are generated from what is not, and in what sense from what is.

But to attach equal importance to the opimons and impressions of disputing parties is foolish, because clearly one side or the other must be wrong.⁶ This is evident from what happens in the sphere of 6sensation; for the same thing never seems to some people sweet and to others the contrary unless one

1063 a

μή διεφθαρμένων και λελωβημένων των έτέρων τό αίσθητήριον και κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμών. τούτου δ' όντος τοιούτου τους ετέρους μέν υπολη-5 πτέον μέτρον είναι, τους δ' άλλους¹ούχ ὑποληπτέον. όμοίως δέ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, και καλού και αισχρού, και των άλλων των τοιούτων. ούδεν γαρ διαφέρει τουτ' άξιουν η τά φαινόμενα τοις ύπο την όψιν υποβάλλουσι τον δάκτυλον και ποιούσιν έκ του ένδς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο δείν είναι διά το φαίνεσθαι τοσαύτα, και πάλιν έν. 10 τοις γαρ μή κινούσι την όψιν έν φαίνεται το έν. όλως δέ άτοπον έκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὰ δεῦρο μεταβάλλοντα και μηδέποτε διαμένοντα έν τοίς αυτοίς, έκ τούτου περί της άληθείας την κρίσιν ποιείσθαι. δεί γαρ έκ των αεί κατά ταυτά έχόντων καί 16 μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν ποιουμένων τάληθές θηρεύειν. τοιαθτα δ' έστί τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον· ταθτα γὰρ οὐχ ότε μεν τοιαδι πάλιν δ' άλλοια φαίνεται, ταυτά δ' άει και μεταβολής ούδεμιας κοινωνούντα. "Έτι δ' εί κίνησις έστι, και κινούμενόν τι, κινείται δέ παν έκ τινος και είς τι δεί άρα το κινούμενον 20 είναι έν έκείνω έξ οῦ κινήσεται καὶ οὐκ είναι έν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τοδὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι έν τούτω, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν μὴ συναληθεύεσθαι³ κατ' αὐτούς. καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συνεχώς τὰ δεῦρο ρέι και κινειται, καί τις τοῦτο θείη καίπερ ούκ άληθες όν, δια τί κατα το ποιόν ού 1 érépous EJ.

² δείν JΓ: δ' EA^b: τ' Bessarion, Bonitz: incl. Christ. ³ άληθεύεσθαι EJ.

^a *i.e.*, that the same thing has contrary qualities. ^b §§ 8, 9 (first half) = IV. v. 21, 22. of the parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavours injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be taken as the "measure," and the other not. And I hold 7 the same in the case of good and bad, and of beautiful and ugly, and of all other such qualities. For to maintain this view " is just the same as to maintain that what appears to us when we press the finger below the eye and make a thing seem two instead of one must be two because it appears to be so, and then afterwards that it must be one; because if we do not interfere with our sight that which is one appears to be one. And in general it is absurd to 8 form our opinion of the truth from the appearances of things in this world of ours which are subject to change and never remain in the same state^b; for it is by reference to those things which are always in the same state and undergo no change that we should prosecute our search for truth. Of this kind 9 are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now of one nature and subsequently of another, but are manifestly always the same and have no part in change of any kind.

Again, if there is motion there is also something which is moved; and everything is moved from something and into something. Therefore that which is moved must be in that from which it is to be moved, and must also not be in it; and must be moved into so-and-so and must also come to be in it; but the contradictory statements cannot be true at the same time, as our opponents allege. And if the things of our world are in a state of con-10 tinuous flux and motion in respect of quantity, and we assume this although it is not true, why should

1068 я μενεί¹; φαίνονται γάρ ούχ ήκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς 20 αντιφάσεις ταύτοῦ κατηγορείν έκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ύπειληφέναι μη μένειν έπι των σωμάτων, διο² καί είναι τετράπηχυ το αύτο και ούκ είναι. ή δ' ούσία κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ "Ετι διά τί προστάττοντος ποαόν τής ἀορίστου. τοῦ ἰατροῦ τοδὶ τὸ σιτίον προσενέγκασθαι προσ-30 φέρονται; τί γαρ μαλλον τοῦτο άρτος ἐστιν η οὐκ έστιν: ώστ' ούθεν αν διέχοι φαγείν η μη φαγείν. νῦν δ' ώς άληθεύοντες περί αὐτὸ καὶ ὅντος τοῦ προσταχθέντος σιτίου τούτου προσφέρονται τοῦτο. καίτοι ν' ούκ έδει μή διαμενούσης παγίως μηδεμιας φύσεως εν τοις αισθητοις, αλλ' αεί πασων 85 κινουμένων και ρέουσών. Έτι δ' ει μεν άλλοιούμεθα ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένομεν οἱ ἀὐτοί, τί καὶ θαυμαστόν εί μηδέποθ' ήμιν ταὐτὰ φαίνεται 1008 1 καθάπερ τοις κάμνουσιν; και γαρ τούτοις δια το μή δμοίως διακείσθαι την έξιν και όθ' ύγιαινον, ούχ όμοια φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, αὐτὰ μέν ούδεμιας διά γε τοῦτο μεταβολης κοινωνοῦντα τὰ αίσθητά, αίσθήματα δ' ἕτερα ποιοῦντα τοῖς κάμ-5 νουσι καὶ μὴ τὰ αὐτά. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχειν καὶ τῆς ἐἰρημένης μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης ἴσως ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν εἰ δὲ μὴ μεταβάλλομεν ἀλλ' οἱ αὐτοὶ διατελοῦμεν ὄντες, εἴη ἄν τι μένον. Πρὸς μέν οῦν τοὺς ἐκ λόγου τὰς εἰρημένας ἀπορίας

μενεί Richards, Alexander (?): μένει.
 ² διά τδ EJ.

^a Cf. IV. v. 20, 21.
^b Cf. IV. iv. 39-42.
^c With this section cf. IV. v. 7-14.
^d With this section cf. IV. v. 3, 4, vi. 1-3.

they not be constant in respect of quality i^a It appears that not the least reason why our opponents predicate opposite statements of the same thing is that they start with the assumption that quantity is not constant in the case of bodies; hence they say that the same thing is and is not six feet long. But 11 essence depends upon quality, and this is of a determinate, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate nature.

Again, when the doctor orders them to adopt some article of diet, why do they adopt $it i^{b}$ For on their view it is no more true that a thing is bread than that it is not; and therefore it would make no difference whether they ate it or not. But as it is, they adopt a particular food as though they knew the truth about it and it were the food prescribed; yet they ought not to do so if there were no fixed 12 and permanent nature in sensible things and everything were always in a state of motion and flux.

Again, if we are always changing and never remain the same, is it any wonder that to us, as to the diseased, things never appear the same ? For to 13 the diseased, since they are not in the same physical condition as when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same; although this does not mean that the sensible things themselves partake of any change, but that they cause different, and not the same, sensations in the diseased. Doubtless the same must be true if the change which we have referred to takes place in us. If, however, 14 we do not change but remain always the same, there must be something permanent.

As for those who raise the aforesaid difficulties on dialectical grounds,^d it is not easy to find a solution

VOL. II

1008 b έχοντας οὐ ῥάδιον διαλῦσαι μὴ τιθέντων τι καὶ 10 τούτου μηκέτι λόγον απαιτούντων ούτω γαο πας λόγος και πασα απόδειξις γίγνεται μηδέν γαρ τιθέντες αναιρούσι το διαλέγεσθαι και όλως λόγον. ώστε πρός μέν τούς τοιούτους ούκ έστι λόγος, πρός δέ τούς διαποροῦντας ἐκ τῶν παραδεδομένων ἀποριών ράδιον απανταν και διαλύειν τα ποιούντα την 15 απορίαν έν αυτοίς. δήλον δ' έκ των ειρημένων.

Ωστε φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰς άντικειμένας φάσεις περί ταὐτοῦ καθ' ἕνα χρόνον άληθεύειν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐναντια, διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι κατὰ στέρησιν πασαν έναντιότητα. δήλον δε τουτ' έπ' άρχην τούς λόγους άναλύουσι τους των έναντίων. Όμοίως δ' ούδε των ανά μέσον ούδεν οίόν τε 20 κατηγορείσθαι καθ' ένὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. λευκοῦ γαρ όντος του ύποκειμένου λέγοντες αὐτὸ είναι οὕτε λευκόν ούτε μέλαν ψευσόμεθα συμβαίνει γάρ είναι λευκόν αὐτό καὶ μἡ εἶναι θάτερον γὰρ τῶν συμ-πεπλεγμένων ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο δ' έστιν άντίφασις τοῦ λευκοῦ. Οὕτε δὴ καθ' Ἡρά-25 κλειτον ένδέχεται λέγοντας άληθεύειν, ούτε κατ' 'Αναξαγόραν. εί δε μή, συμβήσεται τάναντία τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατηγορείν ὅταν γὰρ ἐν παντὶ φῆ παντὸς είναι μοιραν, σύδεν μαλλον είναι φησι γλυκύ η πικρόν η των λοιπων δποιανούν έναντιώσεων, είπερ

1 λύγον μηκέτι Ab.

^a Cf. IV. vi. 10, 11.

^b Cf. IV. vii. where, however, the point which is proved is that there can be no intermediate between contradictories. • Cf. ch. v. 8.

d Cf. IV. vii. 8-viii. 5.

which will convince them unless they grant some assumption for which they no longer require an explanation; for every argument and proof is possible only in this way. If they grant no assumption, they destroy discussion and reasoning in general. Thus there is no arguing with people of this kind; 15 but in the case of those who are perplexed by the traditional difficulties it is easy to meet and refute the causes of their perplexity. This is evident from what has been already said.

Thus from these considerations it is obvious that 16 opposite statements cannot be true of the same thing at one time; nor can contrary statements, since every contrariety involves privation. This is clear if we reduce the formulae of contraries to their first principles.^a

Similarly no middle term can be predicated of one and the same thing of which one of the contraries is predicated.^b If, when the subject is white, we say 17 that it is neither white nor black, we shall be in error; for it follows that it is and is not white, because the first of the two terms in the complex statement will be true of the subject, and this is the contradictory of white.

Thus we cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus o or of Anaxagoras.^d If we could, it 18 would follow that contraries are predicable of the same subject; for when he o says that in everything there is a part of everything, he means that nothing is sweet any more than it is bitter, and similarly with any of the other pairs of contraries; that is,

^e Anaxagoras. What he really meant was that even the sweetest things contain some bitter particles. Cf. fr. 11 (Diels); Burnet, E.G.P. § 129.

1068 b
έν άπαντι παν ύπάρχει μή δυνάμει μόνον άλλ'
⁵⁰ ένεργεία και άποκεκριμένον. Όμοίως δε ούδε πάσας ψευδείς ούδ' άληθείς τὰς φάσεις δυνατόν είναι, δι' άλλά τε πολλά των συναχθέντων ἂν δυσχερῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν θέσιν, και διότι ψευδῶν μέν οὐσῶν πασῶν οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις φάσκων ἀληθεύσει,
³⁵ ἀληθῶν δε ψευδείς είναι πάσας λέγων οὐ ψεύσεται.

VII. Πασα δ' ἐπιστήμη ζητεῖ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὴν ἐπιστητῶν, 1064 2 οໂον ιατρική και γυμναστική και των λοιπων έκάστη τών ποιητικών και μαθηματικών. έκάστη γαρ τούτων περιγραψαμένη τι γένος αύτη περί τοῦτο πραγματεύεται ώς ύπάρχον καὶ ὄν, οὐχ ή δὲ ὄν, άλλ' έτέρα τις αύτη παρά ταύτας τας επιστήμας ⁵ ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη. τῶν δὲ λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν έκάστη λαβοῦσά πως τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστω γένει πειραται δεικνύναι τὰ λοιπὰ μαλακώτερον η άκριβέστερον. λαμβάνουσι δε τό τί εστιν αί μεν δι' αίσθήσεως αί δ' υποτιθέμεναι· διο και δήλον έκ της τοιαύτης έπαγωγης ότι της ούσίας καί του τί 10 έστιν ούκ έστιν απόδειξις. Έπει δ' έστι τις ή περί φύσεως επιστήμη, δήλον ότι και πρακτικής έτέρα καί ποιητικής έσται. ποιητικής μέν γάρ έν τώ ποιούντι και ου τώ ποιουμένω τής κινήσεως ή ἀρχή, και τοῦτ' ἐστίν εἴτε τέχνη τις εἴτ' ἄλλη τις δύναμις όμοίως δε και επί της πρακτικής 15 ούκ έν τῷ πρακτῷ, μαλλον δ' έν τοῖς πράττουσιν ή κίνησις, ή δε του φυσικού περί τα έχοντ' έν ¹ δι'] διά τής EJ.

^a This chapter corresponds to VI. i.; cf. also IV. iii. 1-6 and ch. iv. above. It also answers the problem stated in ch. i. 2.

if everything is present in everything not mercly potentially but actually and in differentiation.

Similarly all statements cannot be false, nor all 19 true. Among many other difficulties which might be adduced as involved by this supposition there is the objection that if all statements were false, not even this proposition itself would be true; while if they were all true it would not be false to say that they are all false.

VII. Every science inquires for certain principles Distinction which comes within its scope a; e.g., the sciences of insta-mathe medicine and physical culture do this, and so does matters, each of the other productive and mathematical sciences. Each one of these marks out for itself some class of objects, and concerns itself with this as with something existent and real, but not qua real: it is another science distinct from these which does this. Each of the said sciences arrives in some 2 way at the essence in a particular class of things, and then tries to prove the rest more or less exactly. Some arrive at the essence through sense-perception, and some by hypothesis; hence it is obvious from such a process of induction that there is no demonstration of the reality or essence.

Now since there is a science of nature, clearly it 3 must be different from both practical and productive science. In a productive science the source of motion is in the producer and not in the thing produced, and is either an art or some other kind of potency; and similarly in a practical science the motion is not in the thing acted upon but rather in the agent. But 4 the science of the natural philosopher is concerned with things which contain in themselves a source of

1064 a έαυτοίς κινήσεως άρχήν έστιν. ότι μέν τοίνυν ούτε πρακτικήν ούτε ποιητικήν άλλά θεωρητικήν άναγκαΐον είναι την φυσικήν έπιστήμην, δήλον έκ τούτων είς έν γάρ τι τούτων των γενών ανάγκη πίπτειν αὐτήν. ἐπεί δε το τί ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον 20 έκάστη πως των ἐπιστημών ειδέναι και τούτω χρήσθαι άρχή, δεί μή λανθάνειν πως όριστέον τώ φυσικώ και πως ό της ουσίας λόγος ληπτέος, πότερον ώς τὸ σιμόν, η μαλλον ώς τὸ κοιλον. τούτων γάρ ό μέν τοῦ σιμοῦ λόγος μετά τῆς ὕλης λέγεται τῆς τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κοίλου χωρὶς τῆς 25 ύλης· ή γάρ σιμότης ἐν ρινὶ γίγνεται, διό καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς μετὰ ταύτης θεωρεῖται· τὸ σιμὸν γάρ έστι ρίς κοίλη. φανερόν ουν ότι και σαρκός και όφθαλμοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν μορίων μετὰ τῆς ὕλης άει τον λόγον αποδοτέον. 'Επεί δ' έστι τις έπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ή ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, σκεπτέον 80 πότερόν ποτε τη φυσική την αυτήν θετέον ταύτην είναι η μαλλον έτέραν. η μεν ούν φυσικη περί τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντ' ἀρχὴν ἐν αύτοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ μαθηματική θεωρητική μέν και περι μένοντά τις αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστά. περὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἄρα ὃν και άκίνητον έτέρα τούτων αμφοτέρων των έπι-35 στημών έστί τις, είπερ υπάρχει τις ουσία τοιαύτη, λένω δε χωριστή και ακίνητος, όπερ πειρασόμεθα δεικνύναι. και είπερ έστι τις τοιαύτη φύσις έν τοις ούσιν, ένταυθ' αν είη που και το θειον, και 1084 b αύτη αν είη πρώτη και κυριωτάτη άρχή. δήλον τοίνυν ότι τρία γένη των θεωρητικών επιστημών

1 Kal to EJ.

^a XII. vi., vii.

From this it is clear that natural science motion. must be neither practical nor productive, but speculative : since it must fall under one of these classes. And since every science must have some knowledge 5 of the essence and must use it as a starting-point, we must be careful to observe how the natural philosopher should define, and how he should regard the formula of essence-whether in the same way as the term " snub," or rather as the term " concave." For 6 of these the formula of " snub " is stated in conjunction with the matter of the object, whereas that of " concave " is stated apart from the matter; since snubness is only found in the nose, which is therefore included in the formula, for "the snub "is a concave nose. Thus it is obvious that the formula of "flesh" and "eve" and the other parts of the body must always be stated in conjunction with their matter.

Since there is a science of Being qua Being and 7 separately existent, we must inquire whether this should be regarded as identical with natural science or rather as a distinct branch of knowledge. Physics deals with things which contain a source of motion in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is a science which deals with permanent things, but not with things which can exist separately. Hence there 8 is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with that which exists separately and is immovable ; that is, if there really is a substance of this kind-I mean separately existent and immovable-as we shall endeavour to prove." And if there is an entity of this kind in the world of reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be the first and most fundamental principle. Evidently, then, there are 9 three kinds of speculative science : physics, mathe1064 b

έστί, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική. βέλτιστον μέν οῦν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν $[επιστημῶν]^1$ γενος. τούτων δ' αυτών ή τελευταία λεχθείσα περί το 5 τιμιώτατον γάρ έστι των όντων, βελτίων δε καί χείρων έκάστη λέγεται κατά τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν.

Απορήσειε δ' αν τις, πότερόν ποτε την τοῦ ὄντος ή ον επιστήμην καθόλου δεί θείναι η ού. των μεν γαρ μαθηματικών έκάστη περί έν τι γένος άφωρισμένον έστίν, ή δε καθόλου κοινή περί πάντων. εί 10 μέν οῦν ai φυσικαί οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων εἰσί. κἂν ή φυσικὴ πρώτη των ἐπιστημων εἴη εἰ δ έστιν έτέρα φύσις και ουσία χωριστή και ακίνητος, έτέραν ανάγκη και την έπιστήμην αυτής είναι και προτέραν της φυσικής και καθόλου τω προτέραν.

¹⁵ VIII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὃν κατὰ πλείους λέγεται τρόπους, ών είς έστιν ό κατά συμβεβηκός είναι² λεγόμενος, σκεπτέον πρώτον περί τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος. ότι μέν ούν ούδεμία των παραδεδομένων έπιστημών πραγματεύεται περί το συμβεβηκός, δήλον. ούτε γάρ οίκοδομική σκοπεί το συμβησόμενον 20 τοις τη οικία χρησομένοις, οίον ει λυπηρώς η τουναντίον οικήσουσιν, ούθ' υφαντική ουτε σκυτοτομική ουτε όψοποιική, το δε καθ' αύτην ίδιον έκάστη τούτων σκοπεί των επιστημών μόνον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος. οὐδ' (έἰ τὸ)3 μουσικόν καί γραμματικόν, ούδε τόν όντα μουσικόν ότι γενόμενος γραμματικός άμα έσται τὰ άμ-

¹ $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\hat{\omega}\nu$ A^b: om. cet.

² elvai om. EJ.

³ εί τὸ Bullinger: εί Bonitz, τὸ Christ: ½ JΓ, ut uid. E¹: om. Ab.

^a Sections 1-9 of this chapter correspond to VI, ii.-iv.

matics, and theology. The highest class of science is the speculative, and of the speculative sciences themselves the highest is the last named, because it deals with the most important side of reality; and each science is reckoned higher or lower in accordance with the proper object of its study.

The question might be raised as to whether the science of Being qua Being should be regarded as universal or not. Each of the mathematical sciences 10 deals with some one class of things which is determinate, but universal mathematics is common to all alike. If, then, natural substances are the first of existing things, physics will be the first of the sciences; but if there is some other nature and substance which exists separately and is immovable, then the science which treats of it must be different from and prior to physics, and universal because of its priority.

VIII. Since the term Being in its unqualified sense Accidental is used with several meanings, of which one is acci-^{Being}. dental Being, we must first consider Being in this sense.^a Clearly none of the traditional sciences concerns itself with the accidental; the science of building does not consider what will happen to the occupants of the house, e.g. whether they will find it unpleasant or the contrary to live in; nor does the science of weaving or of shoemaking or of confectionery. Each of these sciences considers only what 2 is proper to it, *i.e.* its particular end. As for the lettered," or the quibble b that " the man who is cultured, when he has become lettered, will be both

^b This is a different form of the "quibble" in VI. ii. 4. Here the fallacy obviously consists in the wrong application of the word $\sharp\mu\alpha$ ("at once" or "at the same time").

1064 b

25 φότερα, 1 πρότερον οὐκ ῶν, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀεἰ ὄν ἐστιν, ἐγένετο τοῦτο, ῶσθ' ἅμα μουσικὸς ἐγένετο καὶ γραμματικός,—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία ζητεῖ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν, πλὴν ἡ σοφιστική· περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ αὕτη μόνη πραγματεύεται, διὸ Πλάτων οὐ κακῶς εἴρηκε φήσας τὸν σοφιστὴν 80 περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν διατρίβειν. ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν εἶναι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπιστήμην φανερὸν ἔσται πειραθεῖσιν ἰδεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός.

Παν δη φαμèν είναι το μèν ἀεἰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (ἀνάγκης δ' οὐ τῆς κατὰ το βίαιον λεγομένης, ἀλλ'
³⁵ ƒ χρώμεθα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις), τὸ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δ' οὕθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτ' ἀεἰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν· οἱον ἐπὶ κυνὶ γένοιτ' ἂν ψῦχος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὕθ' ὡς ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ
¹⁰⁸⁵ ἐνάγκης οὕθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται, συμβαίη δέ ποτ' ἄν. ἔστι δη τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὅ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὖδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὶ μὲν οῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, εἴρηται, διότι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τοιούτου, δῆλον·
⁵ ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πῶσα τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος η̈ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῷ τούτων ἐστίν.

[°]Οτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν aἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οໂαίπερ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντος, δηλον· ἔσται γὰρ ἄπαντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ γὰρ τόδε μὲν ἔστι τοῦδε ὄντος, τόδε δὲ τοῦδε, 10 τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ οῦ τοῦτ' ἦν αἴτιον ἕως τοῦ

¹ άμα έσται τὰ άμφότερα] τὰ άμφότερα άμα έσται Ab.

90

at once although he was not before; but that which is but was not always so must have come to be; therefore he must have become at the same time cultured and lettered "---none of the recognized sciences 3 considers this, except sophistry. This is the only science which concerns itself with the accidental, and hence Plato was not far wrong in saying ^a that the sophist spends his time in the study of unreality. But that it is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental will be apparent if we try to see what the accidental really is.

Of some things we say that they are so always and 4 of necessity (necessity having the sense not of compulsion, but that which we use in logical demonstration ^b), and of others that they are so usually, but of others that they are so neither usually nor always and of necessity, but fortuitously. *E.g.*, there might be a frost at midsummer, although this comes about neither always and of necessity nor usually; but it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is 5 that which comes about, but not always nor of necessity nor usually. Thus we have now stated what the accidental is; and it is obvious why there can be no science of such a thing, because every science has as its object that which is so always or usually, and the accidental falls under neither of these descriptions.

Clearly there can be no causes and principles of the 6 accidental such as there are of that which is *per se*; otherwise everything would be of necessity. For if A is when B is, and B is when C is, and C is not fortuitously but of necessity, then that of which C was the cause will also be of necessity, and so on

^a Sophist 254 A.

^b Cf. VI. ii. 6.

1065 a

^{**} τελευταίου λεγομένου αἰτιατοῦ (τοῦτο δ' ἦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός). ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντ' ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ὁποτέρως ἔτυχε καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ παντελῶς ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται.
 15 κἂν μὴ ὂν δὲ ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον τὸ αἴτιον ὑποτεθῆ, ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται. πῶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται. ἡ γὰρ αὔριον ἔκλειψις γενήσεται ἂν τόδε γένηται, τοῦτο δ' ἂν ἕτερόν τι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μέχρι αὔριον. ὥστ'
 20 ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἅπαντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο γενήσεται.

Τὸ δ' ὡς ἀληθὲς³ ὃν καὶ³ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέν έστιν έν συμπλοκή διανοίας⁴ και πάθος έν ταύτη. διό περί μέν τὸ ούτως ὃν οὐ ζητοῦνται αἱ ἀργαί. 25 περί δε το έξω ον και χωριστόν το δ' ούκ άναγκαΐον άλλ' άόριστον, λέγω δε το κατά συμβεβηκός. τοῦ τοιούτου δ' ἄτακτα καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια. Τò δε ένεκά του έν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις η ἀπὸ διανοίας έστίν τύχη δ' έστιν όταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός ωσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν έστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αύτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 30 ούτω και αίτιον. ή τύχη δ' αιτία κατά συμβεβηκός έν τοις κατά προαίρεσιν των ένεκά του γιγνομένοις. διο περί ταὐτο τύχη και διάνοια. προαίρεσις γάρ ου χωρίς διανοίας. τὰ δ' αίτια άόριστα άφ' ῶν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης. διὸ 1 ταῦτα Ε. ² άληθῶs EJ Alexander. ³ κal μη A^b γρ. E Alexander. 5 altion Ab. 4 τής διavolas EJ.

^a This section is taken from *Physics* II, v., vi.

down to the last causatum, as it is called. (But this 7 was assumed to be accidental.) Therefore everything will be of necessity, and the element of chance, *i* e, the possibility of a thing's either happening or not, is entirely banished from the world of events. Even if we suppose the cause not to exist already but to be coming to be, the result will be the same ; for everything will come to be of necessity. The celipse to-8 morrow will come about if A does, and A will if B does, and B if C does ; and in this way if we keep on subtracting time from the finite time between now and to-morrow, we shall at some point arrive at the present existing condition. Therefore since this exists, everything subsequent to it will happen of necessity, and so everything happens of necessity.

As for "what is " in the sense of what is *true* or 9 what is *accidental*, the former depends upon a com-Being as bination in thought, and is an affection of thought ^{truth} (hence we do not look for the principles of Being in this sense, but only for those of objective and separable Being): the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are indefinite and cannot be reduced to a system.

Teleology is found in events which come about in 10 the course of nature or as a result of thought.^a It is Chance. "chance" (or "luck") when one of these comes about by accident; for a thing may be a cause, just as it may exist, either *per se* or accidentally. Chance is an accidental cause of normally purposive teleological events. Hence chance and thought have the 11 same sphere of action, for there is no purpose without thought. Causes from which chance results may come about are indeterminate; hence chance is

^{1065 a} άδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμ⁸⁵ βεβηκός, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐδενός. ἀγαθὴ δὲ τύχη καὶ
^{1065 b} κακὴ ὅταν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἀποβῆ· εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία περὶ μέγεθος τούτων. Ἐπεὶ δ'
οὐθὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὐτό,
οὐδ' ἄρ' αἴτια. εἰ ἄρα τύχη ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρότερον νοῦς αἴτιος' καὶ φύσις.

IX. "Εστι δέ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργεία μόνον, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεία, τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν. οὐκ ἔστι δέ τιs² κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὅντος κατηγορίας. κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅ³ οὐδ' ἐν μιῷ κατηγορία.
 ἔκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν (οἶον τὸ τόδε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ τὸ δὲ στέρησις· καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ ἀτελές, καὶ κατὰ φορὰν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω, η κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ), ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς τοσαῦτ' εἴδη ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.

16 Διηρημένου δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν δυνάμει τοῦ δ' ἐντελεχεία, τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ή ¹ αίτιον J. ² τι JΓ: om. Λ^b. ³ om. A^b.

^a The argument is stated more fully and clearly in *Physics* II. vi. *ad fin.* Chance produces indirectly the effects produced directly by mind; and spontaneity is similarly related 94

inscrutable to human calculation, and is a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing It is "good" or "bad luck" when the 12 result is good or bad, and " good " or " bad fortune " when the result is on a large scale.

Since nothing accidental is prior to that which is per se, neither arc accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the cause of the universe. mind and nature are prior causes.^a

IX. A thing may exist only actually or potentially, Motion. or actually and potentially; it may be a substance or a quantity or one of the other categories. There is no motion b apart from things, for change is always in accordance with the categories of Being °; and there is nothing which is common to these and in no one category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways-e.g. substance, for this is sometimes the form of the thing and sometimes its privation; and as regards quality there is white and 2 black; and as regards quantity, complete and incomplete; and as regards spatial motion there is up and down or light and heavy-so that there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of Being.d

Now since every kind of thing is divided into the Motion is potential and the real, I call the actualization of the the actualto nature. But the indirect cause presupposes the direct. The argument is directed against the Atomists. Cf. Physics II. iv., 196 a 24, Simplicius 327. 24, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I. § 66 (" nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito "). The discussion of motion in this chapter consists of

extracts from Physics III. i.-iii.

^a *i.e.*, change is substantial (generation and destruction); quantitative (increase and dccrease); qualitative (alteration); spatial (locomotion). Cf. ch. xii. 1, 2.

" This is inaccurate ; see previous note.

1065 b

τοιουτόν έστιν ένέργειαν λέγω κίνησιν. ότι δ' άληθη λέγομεν, ένθένδε δηλον όταν γάρ το οίκοδομητόν, ή τοιούτον αύτο λέγομεν είναι, ένεργεία \tilde{n} , oikobou ϵ itai, kai $\check{\epsilon}$ oti to \hat{v} to oikobóunois. 20 δμοίως μάθησις, ιάτρευσις [και κύλισις], βάδισις, άλσις, γήρανσις, άδρυνσις. συμβαίνει δε κινείσθαι όταν ή⁴ έντελέχεια ή⁴ αὐτή, καὶ οὕτε πρότερον οὕθ' ὕστερον. ἡ δὴ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν ἐντελεχεία ου ενεργή, ούχ ή αυτό άλλ³⁵ ή κινητόν, κίνησίς εστιν. λέγω δε τό ή ώδε. εστι γαρ ό χαλκός δυνάμει άνδριάς άλλ όμως ούχ ή του 25 χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ἡ χαλκός, κίνησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γαρ ταὐτὸν χαλκῷ έἶναι καὶ δυνάμει τινί, ἐπεὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἦν ἂν ή τοῦ χαλκοῦ έντελέχεια κίνησίς τις. οὐκ ἕστι δὲ ταὐτό (δήλον δ' έπι των έναντίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ύγιαίνειν και δύνασθαι κάμνειν ου ταυτόν-και γαρ 30 αν το ύγιαίνειν και το κάμνειν ταυτον ήν-το δ' ύποκείμενον και ύγιαινον και νοσούν, ειθ' ύγρότης είθ' αίμα, ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν). ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ώσπερ ούδε χρώμα ταύτον και δρατόν, ή τοῦ δυνατοῦ ή δυνατὸν ἐντελέχεια κίνησίς ἐστιν. ὅτι μέν οῦν ἐστιν αυτη, και ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε κινει-

¹ η Ab.
³ η Bekker.
³ κal κύλισις A^b Physics: om. cet.
⁴ η . . . η E¹ Physics: uulgo η . . . η.
⁵ ούχ η aὐrð ἀλλ] η aὐrð η ἄλλο A^b Alexander Porphyrion.
⁶ οὖν A^b Physics: γàρ EJΓ.

^a What Aristotle means by this is explained more clearly in the following sections, which may be summarized thus. The material substrate, *e.g.* bricks, etc., which is potentially a house, may be regarded (a) as potential material; in this 96

potential as such,^a motion. That this is a true state- 3 ment will be clear from what follows. When the potential as " buildable " in the sense m which we call it such such exists actually, it is being built; and this is the process of building. The same is true of the processes of learning, healing, walking, jumping, ageing, maturing. Motion results when the complete reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor later. The complete reality, then, of that which exists 4 potentially, when it is completely real and actual, not qua itself but qua movable, is motion. By qua I mean this. The bronze is potentially a statue; but nevertheless the complete reality of the bronze qua bronze is not motion. To be bronze is not the same as to be a particular potentiality; since if it were absolutely the same by definition the complete reality of the bronze would be a kind of motion; but it is not the same. (This is obvious in the case 5 of contraries; for the potentiality for health and the potentiality for illness are not the same-for if they were, health and illness would be the same too -but the substrate which becomes healthy or ill, whether it is moisture or blood, is one and the same.) And since it is not the same, just as " colour " and "visible" are not the same, it is the complete reality of the potential qua potential that is motion. It is evident that it is this, and that motion results 6

sense it is actualized as bricks before building begins; (b) as potentially a house; in this sense when it is actualized it is no longer buildable but built, *i.e.*, it is no longer potential; (c) as potentially buildable into a house. In this sense its actualization is conterminous with the process of building, and is incomplete (§ 11), and should not be described as $e_{PT}e\lambda \xi_{xeta}$ or " complete reality." But Aristotle often uses this term as synonymous with the vaguer $l_{P}e_{P}e_{ta}$.

VOL. II

1065 b

³⁵⁵ σθαι ὅταν ή ἐντελέχεια ή αὐτή,¹ καὶ οὕτε πρότερον 1069 α οὕθ' ὕστερον, δηλον. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅτὲ μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὅτὲ δὲ μή, οἶον τὸ οἰκοδομητὸν ή οἰκοδομητόν, καὶ ή τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια ή οἰκοδομητὸν οἰκοδόμησίς ἐστιν. η γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ή οἰκοδόμησις, ή ἐνέργεια, η οἰκία· ἀλλ' ὅταν οἰκία 5, ή, οὐκέτι οἰκοδομητὸν ἔσται· οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν είναι, ή δ' οἰκοδόμησις κίνησίς τις· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων.

"Οτι δὲ καλῶς εἴρηται, δηλον ἐξ ῶν οἱ ἄλλοι λέγουσι περί αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι 10 διορίσαι άλλως αὐτήν. οὕτε γὰρ ἐν άλλω τις γένει δύναιτ' αν θείναι αυτήν. δήλον δ' έξ ών λέγουσιν. οί μέν γαρ² έτερότητα και ανισότητα και το μή όν, ών ουδέν ανάγκη κινεισθαι αλλ' ουδ' ή μεταβολή ούτ' είς ταῦτα οὕτ' ἐκ τούτων μάλλον ἢ ἐκ τῶν άντικειμένων. αίτιον δε τοῦ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι ὅτι 16 αδριστόν τι δοκεί είναι ή κίνησις, τής δ' έτέρας συστοιχίας αί άρχαι διὰ τὸ στερητικαι είναι ἀόριστοι· ούτε γάρ τόδε ούτε τοιόνδε ούδεμία αὐτῶν ούτε των λοιπών κατηγοριών. του δε δοκείν άόριστον είναι την κίνησιν αιτιον ότι ουτ' είς δύναμιν των όντων ουτ' είς ενέργειαν εστι θείναι αὐτήν οὕτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ποσὸν εἶναι κινεῖται έξ 20 ανάγκης, ούτε το ένεργεία ποσόν. ή τε κίνησις

¹ αὐτή Christ: αὐτη.

² γàρ om. EJ.

^a Pythagoreans and Platonists. Cf. I. v. 6, Plato, Sophist 256 p.

^b The criticism implied is : If motion is identified with otherness, inequality, etc., then these concepts must be either 98

when the complete reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor later. For everything may sometimes be actual, and sometimes not; e.g. the "buildable" qua "buildable"; and the actualization of the "buildable" qua "buildable" is the act of building. For the actualization is either this — the act of 7 building—or a house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; the buildable is that which is being built. Hence the actualization must be the act of building, and the act of building is a kind of motion. The same argument applies to the other kinds of motion.

That this account is correct is clear from what the 8 other authorities say about motion, and from the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise. For one thing, it could not be placed in any other class; this is clear from the fact that some people " identify it with otherness and inequality and not-being, none of which is necessarily moved; moreover change is 9 no more into these or out of them than into or out of their opposites.^b The reason for placing motion in this class is that it is considered to be indeterminate, and the principles in one of the columns of contraries are indeterminate, being privative; for none of them is a determinate thing or quality or any of the other categories. The reason for con-10 sidering motion to be indeterminate is that it cannot be associated either with the potentiality or with the actuality of things; for neither that which is potentially nor that which is actually of a certain size is necessarily moved. And motion is considered 11

(a) subjects of motion, which is absurd, or (b) termini of motion, in which case the same must be true of their contraries, since motion is between contraries.

1066 a ένέργεια μέν είναι δοκεί τις, άτελής δέ αιτιον δ' ότι άτελές το δυνατόν ου έστιν ένέργεια. Kai διά τοῦτο χαλεπόν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν ή γάρ είς στέρησιν ανάγκη θειναι η είς δύναμιν η είς ένέργειαν άπλην, τούτων δ' ούδεν φαίνεται ένδεχό-25 μενον. ώστε λείπεται το λεχθέν είναι και ένέργειαν καί [μή]¹ ένέργειαν την είρημένην, ίδειν μέν χαλεπήν ένδεχομένην δ' είναι. Και ότι έστιν ή κίνησις έν τῷ κινητῷ, δήλον έντελέχεια γάρ έστι τούτου ύπό του κινητικού, και ή του κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι 30 έντελέχειαν άμφοῖν· κινητικόν μέν γάρ έστι τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐνεργητικόν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ῶσθ' όμοίως μία ή² ἀμφοῖν ένέργεια ώσπερ το αύτο διάστημα έν πρός δύο καί δύο πρός έν, και τὸ άναντες και τὸ κάταντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ είναι οὐχ ἕν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καί κινουμένου.

85 Χ. Τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἢ τὸ ἀδύνατον διελθεῖν τῷ μὴ πεφυκέναι διιέναι, καθάπερ ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος, ἢ τὸ διέξοδον ἔχον ἀτελεύτητον, ἢ ὅ μόλις, ἢ ὅ 1066 b πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχει διέξοδον ἢ πέρας· ἔτι προσθέσει ἢ ἀφαιρέσει ἢ ἄμφω. Χωριστὸν μὲν δὴ αὐτό τι ὄν, αἰσθητὸν δ' (οῦ),³ οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι. ¹ Bonitz.

³ Bonitz. ³ ή om. A^b. ³ οδ ci. Ross: αἰσθητόν δ' om. E.

^a Cf. note on § 2 (end) above, and IX. vi. 7-10.

^b This chapter consists of extracts from *Physics* III. iv., v., vii.

to be a kind of actualization, but incomplete a; the reason of this is that the potential, of which it is the actualization, is incomplete.

Thus it is difficult to comprehend what motion is; for we must associate it either with privation or with potentiality or with absolute actuality; and apparently none of these is possible. There remains, 12 then, the account which we have given; that it is an actuality, and an actuality of the kind which we have described, which is hard to visualize but capable of existing.

That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be 13 a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar.

X.^b The infinite is either (a) that which cannot be The infinite traversed because it is not its nature to be traversed has several (just as sound is by nature invisible); or (b) that which admits of an endless traverse; or (c) scarcely admits of traverse; or (d) which, though it would naturally admit of traverse or limit, does not do so. Further, it may be infinite in respect of addition or of subtraction or of both.

That the infinite should be a separate independent it cannot be

1066 b εί γαρ μήτε μέγεθός έστι μήτε πλήθος, ούσία δ' αὐτόι τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ συμβεβηκός, ἀδιαίρετον ¹ έσται· τὸ γὰρ διαιρετὸν η μέγεθος η πληθος. εἰ δὲ άδιαίρετον, ούκ άπειρον, εί μη καθάπερ ή φωνη άόρατος άλλ' ούχ ούτω λέγουσιν ούδ' ήμεῖς ζητουμεν, αλλ' ώς άδιέξοδον. "Ετι πως ενδέχεται καθ' αύτὸ είναι ἄπειρον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ μένεθος, ών πάθος το απειρον; έτι εί κατά συμ-10 βεβηκός, οὐκ ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖον τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἄπειρον, ώσπερ ούδε το αόρατον της διαλέκτου, καίτοι ή φωνή αόρατος. και ότι ούκ έστιν ενεργεία είναι τὸ ẳπειρον, δηλον. ἔσται γὰρό τιοῦν αὐτοῦ άπειρον μέρος το λαμβανόμενον το γαρ απείρω είναι καί απειρον τό αὐτό, εἶπερ οὐσία τὸ απειρον καί μή καθ' ύποκειμένου. ώστε η άδιαίρετον, η 15 είς απειρα διαιρετόν, εί μεριστόν. πολλά δ' είναι τό αὐτό ἀδύνατον ἄπειρα· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀέρος ἀήρ μέρος, ούτως απειρον απείρου, εί έστιν ούσία καί άρχή. ἀμέριστον ἄρα καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον το έντελεχεία ον απειρον ποσόν γαρ είναι άνάγκη. κατά συμβεβηκός άρα υπάρχει. άλλ' εί 20 ούτως, είρηται ότι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται είναι ἀρχήν, ἀλλ' έκεινο δ συμβέβηκε, τον άέρα η το άρτιον. Αυτη μέν οῦν ή ζήτησις καθόλου, ὅτι δ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς

1 avros Ab.

^a The Pythagorean and Platonic view,

Aristotle has argued that they do not in I. ix. 16-25.
 According to Anaximenes; of Theophrastus, Phys. Opin. fr. 2 (Ritter and Preller 26).

^d According to the Pythagoreans. Cf. I. v. 5 n.

entity,^{*a*} and yet imperceptible, is impossible. For 2 if it is neither magnitude nor plurality, but infinity a separate itself is the essence of it, and not merely an accident, ^{entity} it must be indivisible; because that which is divisible is either magnitude or plurality. And if it is indivisible it cannot be infinite, except in the same way as sound is invisible. But this is not what people mean by infinite; and it is not the infinite in this sense that we are investigating, but the infinite in the sense of the untraversable.

Again, how can the infinite exist independently 3 unless number and magnitude, of which infinity is an attribute, also exist independently ? . And further, if the infinite is accidental, it cannot, qua infinite, be an element of things ; just as the invisible is not an element of speech, although sound is invisible. It is clear also that the infinite cannot exist actually. Otherwise any part of it which we might take would 4 be infinite; for infinity and the infinite are the same, if the infinite is substance and is not predicated of a subject. Therefore it is either indivisible, or if it is partible, the parts into which it is divisible are infinite. But the same thing cannot be many infinites; for just as a part of air is air, so a part of the infinite will be infinite, if the infinite is a substance and principle. Therefore it is impartible 5 and indivisible. But this is impossible of the actually infinite, because it must be some quantity. Therefore infinity is an accidental attribute. But if so, as we have said, it cannot be it that is a principle, but that of which it is an accident : air o or "the even." a

The foregoing inquiry is general; but what Provis that follows will show that the infinite does not exist in dors not

1088 b

ούκ έστιν, ένθένδε δήλον. εί γαρ σώματος λόγος το έπιπέδοις ώρισμένον, ούκ ειη αν άπειρον σώμα, 25 οὔτ' αἰσθητὸν οὔτε νοητόν, οὔτ' ἀριθμὸς ὡς κε-χωρισμένος καὶ ἄπειρος ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ή το έχον αριθμόν. φυσικώς δε εκ τώνδε δήλον. ούτε γαρ σύνθετον οξόν τε είναι, ούθ' άπλουν. σύνθετον μέν γάρ ούκ έσται σώμα, εί¹ πεπέρανται τώ πλήθει τα στοιχεία. δεί γαρ ισάζειν τάναντία 30 και μή είναι εν αυτών απειρον εί γαρ ότωουν λείπεται ή θατέρου σώματος δύναμις, φθαρήσεται ύπο του απείρου το πεπερασμένον. έκαστον δ' άπειρον είναι άδύνατον σώμα γάρ έστι το πάντη έχον διάστασιν, απειρον δε το απεράντως διεστηκός, ώστ' εί τὸ ἄπειρον σώμα, πάντη ἔσται ἄπειρον. ούδε εν δε και άπλουν ενδέχεται το άπειρον είναι 35 σώμα, ούθ' ώς λέγουσί τινες, παρά τα στοιχεία έξ οῦ γεννῶσι ταῦτα (οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ³ τοιοῦτο σῶμα παρά τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἄπαν γὰρ έξ ου έστι και δια-1087 = λύεται είς τοῦτο, °ου φαίνεται δε τοῦτο παρά' τά άπλα σώματα), οὐδὲ πῦρ οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν στοι-χείων οὐθέν· χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ ἄπειρον εἶναί τι αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον τὸ ἄπαν, κἂν ῇ πεπερασμένον, ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι έν τι αυτών, ώσπερ Ηράκλειτός φησιν s άπαντα γίγνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ έπι του ένός, δ ποιούσι παρά τα στοιχεία οί φυσικοί.

¹ ἐπείπερ A^b.
 ² ὑποσφοῦν Physics E, Simplicius (?): ὑπωσοῦν A^b Physics FI Philoponus.

⁸ γὰρ τὸ A^b. ⁴ ἄπαντα A^b. ⁵ ῶν A^b. ⁶ ταῦτα A^b. ⁷ περὶ ΕJ.

^a This is proved in *Physics* I. vi.

^b sc. and so no other body can exist beside it.

sensible things. If the definition of a body is " that 6 which is bounded by surfaces," then no body, whether exist in sensible or intelligible, can be infinite; nor can things there be any separate and infinite number, since number or that which involves number is numerable. This is clearly shown by the following concrete argument. The infinite can neither be composite nor simple. For (a) it cannot be a composite body if the elements are limited in number a: for the 7 contraries must be equal, and no one of them must be infinite; for if the potency of one of the two corporeal elements is in any way inferior, the finite element will be destroyed by the infinite. And every element cannot be infinite, because body is that which has extension in all directions, and the infinite is that which is extended without limit; so that if the infinite is corporeal it will be infinite in all directions.^b Nor (b) can the infinite be any simple 8 body; neither, as some ^o hold, something which is apart from the elements and from which they suppose the elements to be generated (for there is no such body apart from the elements; everything can be resolved into that of which it consists, but we do not see things resolved into anything apart from the simple bodies), nor fire nor any other element. Apart from the question of how any of them could 9 be infinite, the All, even if it is finite, cannot be or become any one of the elements, as Heraclitus says ^d all things at certain times become fire. The same argument applies as to the One which the physicists

^ο Anaximander. It seems, however, that by $d\pi\epsilon\epsilon\rho\rho\rho$ he meant "indeterminate" or "undifferentiated," although he no doubt regarded this principle as "infinite" as well. *Cf.* notes on I. vii. 3, XII. ii. 3.

^d Cf. frr. 20-22 (Bywater).

1067 a

πûν γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίου, οἶον ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν.

Έτι τὸ αἰσθητὸν σῶμα πού, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅλου καὶ μορίου, οἶον τῆς γῆς. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ὁμο-10 ειδές, ἀκίνητον ἔσται ἢ ἀεὶ οἰσθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ ὅπουοῦν; οἶον εἰ βῶλος εἴη, ποῦ αὕτη κινήσεται ἢ μενεῖ; ὁ γὰρ τόπος τοῦ συγγενοῦς αὐτῆ¹ σώματος ἄπειρος. καθέξει οῦν τὸν ὅλον τόπον; καὶ πῶς; τίς οῦν ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις; ἢ πανταχοῦ μενεῖ—οὐ
15 κινήσεται⁸ ἄρα—ἢ πανταχοῦ κινήσεται⁹—οἰκ ἄρα στήσεται. εἰ δ' ἀνόμοιον τὸ πῶν, ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ τόποι, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἰχ ἕν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, εἶτα ἢ πεπερασμένα ταῦτ' ἔσται ἢ ἄπειρα εἴδει. πεπερασμένα μὲν οὖν οἰχ οἶόν τε· ἔσται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἄπειρα τὰ δ' οῦ, εἰ τὸ

¹ τοῦ συγγενους αἰτῷ Physics: αὐτῆς τοῦ συγγενοῦς. ² κινηθήσεται EJ Physics.

⁸ κινήσεται Bekker: κινηθήσεται E Physics: om. AbJ.

^a The argument seems to be: Since all change is from contrary to contrary, and it is impossible that either (a) one of the elements should be contrary to the rest, or (b) one material principle should be contrary to all four elements, it follows that no one element, and similarly that no one material principle apart from the elements, can be the ultimate material principle of the universe.

^b *i.e.*, the region of the universe which is proper to a given element is proper also to any part of that element. The proper region of earth is the centre, of fire the circumference of the universe. *Cf. De Caelo I. i.*

Ross is evidently right in taking this to refer to the rest
 106

1067 a

τον τοις έναντίοις. εί δ' άπειρα και άπλα, και οί τόποι απειροι καί έσται απειρα τὰ στοιχεία· εί δέ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, καὶ οἱ τόποι πεπερασμένοι, καὶ τὸ παν ἀνάνκη πεπεράνθαι. Ολως δ' αδύνατον άπειρον είναι σώμα και τόπον τοῖς σώμασιν, εἰ πâν 25 σώμα αίσθητον η βάρος έχει η κουφότητα. η γαρ έπι το μέσον η άνω οισθήσεται, αδύνατον δε το ἄπειρον η παν ή τὸ ημισυ όποτερονοῦν πεπονθέναι· πως γὰρ διελεῖς ; η πως τοῦ ἀπείρου ἔσται τὸ μὲν κάτω το δ' άνω, η έσχατον και μέσον; έτι παν σώμα αἰσθητον έν τόπω, τόπου δε είδη έξ, αδύ-30 νατον δ' έν τω απείρω σώματι ταῦτ' είναι. ὅλως δ' εἰ ἀδύνατον τόπον ἄπειρον είναι, καὶ σώμα άδύνατον το γάρ έν τόπω πού, τοῦτο δὲ σημαίνει η άνω η κάτω η των λοιπων τι, τούτων δ' ἕκα-στον πέρας τι. Τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐν μεγέθει και κινήσει και χρόνω ώς μία τις φύσις, άλλα 85 το ύστερον λέγεται κατά το πρότερον, οໂον κίνησις κατά τό μέγεθος έφ' οῦ κινέιται η άλλοιοῦται η αῦξεται, χρόνος δὲ διὰ την κίνησιν.

ΧΙ. Μεταβάλλει δε το μεταβάλλον το μεν κατά 1067 b συμβεβηκός, ώς το μουσικον βαδίζει, το δε τώ τούτου τι μεταβάλλειν άπλως λέγεται μεταβάλλειν, οΐον όσα κατά μέρη ύγιάζεται γάρ το σώμα, ότι 5 δ όφθαλμός. ἕστι δέ τι δ καθ' αύτὸ πρώτον κινείται, και τοῦτ' ἐστι τὸ καθ' αύτὸ κινητόν. έστι δέ [τι]³ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος ὡσαύτως κινεῖ 1 Huiov A Ab. 2 Babliceuv E1J. ³ secl. Bonitz: on. Bessarion, Physics.

^a sc. in kind or number. ^b Cf. § 6 n.

° Cf. § 14 n.

" i.e., above and below, before and behind, right and left (Physics 205 b 31). Cf. V. xiii. 5. 108

contrarics. But if the parts are infinite and simple, the regions proper to them are infinite and the elements will be infinite. And since this is impossible.^b the regions are finite ^o and the whole must be finite.

In general, there cannot be an infinite body and 13 a place for bodies if every body which is sensible has either weight or lightness; for it will have to move either towards the centre or upwards, and the infinite -either the whole or the half-cannot do either; for how can you divide it? How can the infinite be part up and part down, or part extreme and part centre? Further, every sensible body is in some 14 place, and of place there are six kinds,^d but these cannot exist in an infinite body. In general, if an infinite place is impossible, so is an infinite body; because that which is in a place is somewhere, and this means either up or down or one of the other kinds of place, and each of these is a limit.

The infinite is not the same in the sense that it is 15 one nature whether it applies to magnitude or to motion or to time; the posterior is derived from the prior sense, e.g. motion is called infinite in virtue of the magnitude involved when a thing is moved or changed or increased, and time is so called on account of motion."

XI. That which changes either changes accident- Modes of ally, as when "the cultured " walks; or is said to change and motion. change in general because something in it changes, as in the case of things which change in their parts; the body becomes healthy because the eye does. But there is something which is moved directly per se, 2 *i.e.* the essentially movable. The same applies to that which moves, for it moves sometimes accident-

1067 b γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ δέι κατὰ μέρος τὸ δέ καθ' αύτό τστι δέ τι το κινοῦν πρώτον έστι δέ τι το κινούμενον έτι έν 🖓 χρόνω, και έξ οῦ, και 10 εἰς ὅ. τὰ δ' εἴδη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ὁ τόπος. εἰς â κινοῦνται τὰ κινούμενα, ἀκίνητά ἐστιν, οἶον ἐπι-στήμη καὶ θερμότης· ἔστι δ' οὐχ ἡ θερμότης κίνησις άλλ' ή θέρμανσις. Η δέ μή κατά συμβεβηκός μεταβολή οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' έν τοις έναντίοις και μεταξύ και έν άντιφάσει. 15 τούτου δε πίστις έκ της επαγωγής, μεταβάλλει δε το μεταβάλλον η εξ υποκειμένου είς υποκείμενον, η ούκ έξ ύποκειμένου είς ούχ ύποκείμενον. η έξ ύποκειμένου είς ούχ ύποκείμενον, η ούκ έξ ύποκειμένου είς ύποκείμενον. λέγω δε ύποκείμενον το καταφάσει δηλούμενον. ωστ' ανάγκη 20 τρεῖς είναι μεταβολάς. ή γὰρ ἐξ οὐχ ὑποκειμένου είς μη υποκείμενον ουκ έστι μεταβολή ούτε γαρ έναντία ούτε αντίφασίς έστιν, ότι ούκ αντίθεσις. ή μέν οῦν οὐκ έξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον κατ' αντίφασιν γένεσίς έστιν, ή μέν άπλως άπλη, ή δε τινός τίς ή δ' έξ ύποκειμένου είς μή ύποκείμενον φθορά, ή μεν άπλως άπλη, ή δε τινός 25 τίς. εἰ δή τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγεται πλεοναχως, καὶ μήτε τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι, μήτε το κατά δύναμιν το τῷ άπλῶς ὄντι ἀντικείμενον (τὸ γὰρ μὴ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ὅμως ἐνδέχεται κινείσθαι κατά συμβεβηκός είη γάρ αν 1 Lev EJ. ² έτι έν ω] έν τινι Ab,

^a The change from positive to positive is omitted here (but cf. § 7). Aristotle no doubt intended to use it as an example of non-substantial change, e.g. from "poor man" to "rich man"; but since this can be regarded as change from "poor man" to "not-poor man," or "not-rich man" 110 ally, sometimes partially, and sometimes per se. There is something that moves directly, and something that is moved; and also a time in which, and something from which, and something into which it is moved. But the forms and modifications and place into which moving things are moved are immovable; e.g. knowledge and warmth. It is not warmth that is motion, but the process of warming.

Non-accidental change is not found in all things, 3 but only between contraries and intermediates and contradictories. We can convince ourselves of this by means of induction. That which changes changes either from positive into positive, or from negative into negative, or from positive into negative, or from negative into positive. By "positive" I mean that 4 which is denoted by an affirmation. Thus there must be three forms of change; for that which is from negative into negative is not change, because they are neither contraries nor contradictories, since they entail no opposition. The change from the negative into its contradictory positive is generation -absolute change absolute generation, and qualified change qualified generation; and the change from the positive to the negative is destruction-absolute change absolute destruction, and qualified change qualified destruction." Now if "what is not" has 5 several meanings, and neither that which implies a combination or separation of terms,^b nor that which relates to potentiality and is opposed to unqualified Being, admits of motion ("not-white" or "notgood," however, admits of motion accidentally,

to "rich man," he includes it as a qualified type of substantial change.

^b i.e., falsity. Cf. IX. x. 1.

1067 b 30 ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευκόν· τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς μὴ τόδε οὐδαμῶς), ἀδύνατον τοι μὴ ὄν κινεῖσθαι εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν γένεσιν κίνησιν εἶναι· γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ότι ύπάρχει το μη δν κατά του γιγνομένου άπλως. 35 δμοίως δε και το ήρεμειν. ταθτά τε δή συμβαίνει δυσχερή, καὶ εἰ πῶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τόπω, τὸ δε μή ον ούκ έστιν εν τόπω. είη γαρ αν πού. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ φθορὰ κίνησις· ἐναντίον γὰρ κινήσει 1088 & κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία, φθορὰ δὲ γενέσει. ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα κίνησις μέταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ εἰρημέναι, τούτων δ' αἱ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὐ κινήσεις, αὖται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀντίφασιν, άνάγκη την έξ ύποκειμένου είς ύποκείμενον κίνησιν δ είναι μόνην. τὰ δ' ὑποκείμενα η ἐναντία η μεταξύ (και γαρ ή στέρησις κείσθω εναντίον), και δηλουται καταφάσει, οໂον τὸ γυμνὸν καὶ νωδὸν καὶ² μέλαν. ΧΙΙ. Εί οῦν αί κατηγορίαι διήρηνται οὐσία, ποιότητι, τόπω, τῷ ποιείν ἢ πάσχειν, τῷ πρός τι, 10 τῷ ποσῷ, ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶναι κινήσεις, ποιοῦ, ποσοῦ, τόπου· κατ' οὐσίαν δ' οὕ, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν

είναι ούσία έναντίον, ούδε τοῦ πρός τι έστι γάρ

¹ τό JT Themistius: γàρ τό EA^bl' Physics. ² κal τό EJ.

a § S.

^b Aristotle generally distinguishes eight categories (originally ten, but he seems to have abandoned κείσθαι " position" and $\xi_{\chi \in \nu}$ "state" at an early date); here he omits "time" as being relative to motion (it is that by which motion can be numerically estimated; cf. XII. vl. 2, Physics 219 b 1) and therefore neither the subject nor the terminus of motion. Cf. Ross ad loc.

because "not-white" may be a man; but that which is "not so-and-so" in an absolute sense does not admit of it at all), then " what is not " cannot be moved. If this is so, generation cannot be motion: for it is "what is not " that is generated. For even 6 if the generation is in the highest degree accidental, still it is true to say that not-being is predicable of that which is generated absolutely. And the argument applies similarly to rest. Thus not only do these difficult conclusions follow, but also that everything which is moved is in a place, whereas " what is not " is not in a place; for then it would be somewhere. Nor is destruction motion ; for the contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction is generation. And since every motion is a kind 7 of change, and the three kinds of change are those which we have described," and of these those which relate to generation and destruction are not motions, and these are the changes between contradictories, the change from positive to positive must alone be motion. The subjects are either contraries or intermediates (for privative terms may also be regarded as contraries) and are denoted by a positive term—e.g. "naked " or " toothless " or " black."

XII. Now since the categories are distinguished There are as substance, quality, place, activity or passivity, of motion or relation and quantity,^b there must be three kinds change-of of motion, in respect of quality, quantity and place. quantity There is no motion c in respect of substance, because and place. substance has no contrary; nor of the relative,

^o There is, however, change in respect of substance (generation and destruction), but this is between contradictories and is not motion in the strict sense. Cf. xi. 6, and § 4 below. The distinction between motion and change is not always maintained.

VOL. II

1068 a

βάλλει ὅτι ὦ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο μεταβάλλει, ὅτὲ μὲν είς ἐπιστήμην ότε δε είς άγνοιαν.¹ "Ετι είς άπειρον βαδιείται, εί έσται μεταβολής μεταβολή καί 35 γενέσεως γένεσις. ανάγκη δή και την προτέραν, 1068 b εί ή ύστέρα. οΐον εί ή άπλη γένεσις έγίγνετό ποτε, καί τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐγίγνετο²· ὥστε οὔπω ἦν τὸ γιγνόμενον άπλωs, άλλά τι γιγνόμενον [η] γιγνόμενου⁸ ήδη. καὶ τοῦτ ἐγίγνετό ποτε, ώστ οὐκ ἦν πω τότε γιγνόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ 5 έστι τι πρώτον, ούκ έσται το πρώτον, ώστ' ούδε τὸ ἐχόμενον. οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οῦν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οίόν τε ούτε μεταβάλλειν ούδέν. "Ετι τοῦ αὐτοῦ κίνησις ή έναντία και ήρέμησις, και γένεσις και φθορά ωστε το γιγνόμενον, όταν γένηται γιγνόμενον, τότε φθείρεται ούτε γάρ εύθύς γιγνόμενον 10 ούθ' ύστερον είναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον. $E_{\tau\iota}$ δεί ύλην ύπειναι τώ γιγνομένω και μεταβάλλοντι. τίς οῦν ἔσται;---ῶσπερ τὸ ἀλλοιωτὸν σῶμα ἢ ψυχή, ούτω τί τὸ γιγνόμενον κίνησις η γένεσις; καὶ ἔτι

¹ Smith: byleiav codd., Physics.

² άπλῶς έγίγνετο Ab.

8 τι γιγνόμενον γιγνόμενον Bonitz: τι γιγνόμενον ή γενόμενον Ε: τι γιγνόμενον απλώς ή γενόμενον J: τι γιγνόμενον καί γιγνόμενον Physics FI: γιγνόμενόν τι η γινόμενον Ab: γιγνόμενον τd Physics E.

4 ήδη Ab Physics : εl δη EJ.

^a sc. which is absurd.

^b That which comes to be must cease to be, and it can cease to be only when it exists. Therefore if that which comes to be comes to be coming to be, it must cease to be when it 116

ing to forgetting because the *subject* changes, now in the direction of knowledge and now in that of ignorance.

Further, we shall have an infinite series if there is 6 to be change of change and becoming of becoming, second because if the latter of two becomings comes to be proof. from the former, the former must come to be too. E.g., if simple becoming was once coming to be, that which comes to be something was also once coming to Therefore that which simply comes to be was be. not yet, but there was already something coming to be coming to be something. But this too was at one 7 time coming to be, and therefore it was not at that time coming to be something. But in infinite series there is no first term, and therefore in this series the first term cannot exist, nor can any subsequent term. Therefore nothing can be either generated or moved or changed.

Further, the same thing which admits of motion Third proof admits also of the contrary motion and of rest, and that which admits of generation admits also of destruction. Therefore that which comes to be, 8 when it has come to be coming to be, is then in course of perishing a; for it does not perish as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor afterwards, because that which is perishing must *exist.*^b

Further, there must be some matter underlying Fourth that which is coming to be or changing. What proof. then will it be? What is it that becomes motion or generation in the same way as it is body or soul that undergoes change? And moreover what is

is coming to be; before this it does not exist, but is only coming to be coming to be, and after this it is not "that which comes to be" but "that which has come to be."

1068 b τί είς δ κινοῦνται; δεί γάρ είναι την τοῦδε ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε κίνησιν η γένεσιν.¹ πῶς οὖν; οὐ 15 γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις τῆς μαθήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδέ γένεσις γενέσεως. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτ' οὐσίας οὕτε τοῦ πρός τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν και πάσχειν, λείπεται κατά τό ποιόν και ποσόν και τόπον κίνησιν είναι. τούτων γαρ έκάστω έναντίωσις έστιν. λέγω δε τό ποιόν οὐ τὸ ἐν τῆ οὐσία (καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ποιόν) 20 άλλα το παθητικόν καθ' δ λέγεται πάσχειν η άπαθές είναι. το δε ακίνητον τό τε όλως αδύνατον κινηθήναι και το μόλις έν χρόνω πολλώ η βραδέως άρχόμενον, καί τὸ πεφυκὸς μέν κινεῖσθαι, μὴ δυνάμενον² δε ότε πέφυκε και ού και ώς· δ καλώ ήρεμείν των άκινήτων μόνον έναντίον γαρ ήρεμία 25 κινήσει, ώστε στέρησις αν είη του δεκτικου.

20 "Αμα κατὰ τόπον ὅσα ἐν ἐνὶ τόπῳ πρώτῳ, καὶ 27 χωρὶς ὅσα ἐν ἄλλῳ. <ἐναντίον κατὰ τόπον τὸ 81 κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἀπέχον πλεῖστον.>³ ἄπτεσθαι δὲ ῶν 28 τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα. μεταξῦ δ' εἰς ὃ πέψυκε πρότερον

¹ ή γένεσιν Physics E²HI Alexander Simplicius: μή κίνησιν codd. γρ. Alexander: καί μή κίνησιν Physics E¹: μή κίνησιν ή γένεσιν Physics F: μή κίνησιν άπλῶs Lasson.

² μή δυνάμενον] και δυνάμενον, μή κινούμενον Physics.

³ ϵ ^μαντίον . . . πλεΐστον hic posui: habent codd. post μεταβάλλον l. 30.

^c I have transferred this sentence from the end of the section, where it is placed in the text, on the ground that it fits more naturally here. I suspect that it, like the displaced

^a Cf. V. xiv.

^b *i.e.*, when they occupy one place to the exclusion of anything else. *Cf. Physics* 209 a 33-b 1. ^c I have transferred this sentence from the end of the

that which is the terminus of the motion? For that which we are considering nust be a motion or generation of A from B into C. How then ean these con-9 ditions be fulfilled? There can be no learning of earning, and therefore there can be no generation of generation.

Since there is no motion of substance or of the Motion is in elative or of activity and passivity. it remains that respect of quality, there is motion in respect of quality, quantity and quantity place; for each of these admits of contrariety. By and place 'quality " I mean not that which is in the substance for indeed even the differentia is a quality), but the bassive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be aeted upon or to be immune from being acted 1 pon.^{*a*} The immovable is either that which is 10 vholly ineapable of being moved, or that which is careely moved in the course of a long time or is slow n starting, or that which would naturally be moved out cannot be moved at the time when and from the place whence and in the way in which it would naturally be moved. This last is the only kind of mmovable thing which I recognize as being at rest; or rest is contrary to motion, and so must be a privation of that which admits of motion.

Things are "together in place" which are in the 11 minary sense ^b in one place, and "separate" v_{ardous} which are in different places. "Contrary in place" definitions s that which is at a maximum distance in a straight ine.^a Things are said to be "in contact" whose extremes are together in place. An "intermediate" s that at which a changing thing which changes

portion of § 13, was originally a marginal note which was ater inserted in the body of the text, but in the wrong posiion.

1068 b 29 αφικνείσθαι το μεταβάλλον ή είς δ έσχατον μετα-30 βάλλει κατὰ φύσιν τὸ συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον. (ἐπεὶ (1089 1) 3 δέ πασα μεταβολή έν τοις άντικειμένοις, ταῦτα δέ 4 τά τ' έναντία και αντίφασις, αντιφάσεως δε ούδεν 5 ανα μέσον, δήλον ώς έν τοις εναντίοις το μεταξύ,)1 έξης δε ού μετά την άρχην όντος, θέσει η είδει η (1068 b) 32 άλλως πως αφορισθέντος, μηθέν μεταξύ έστι των BB ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει καὶ οῦ ἐφεξῆς ἐστίν, οໂον γραμμαὶ 84 γραμμής η μονάδες μονάδος η οικίας οικία άλλο 85 δ' ούθεν κωλύει μεταξύ είναι το γαρ έξης τινός 1069 α έφεξης και ύστερόν τι ου γάρ το έν έξης των 2 δύο, ούδ' ή νουμηνία της δευτέρας. έχόμενον δέ δ αν έξης ον απτηται. το δε συνεχες όπερ έχό-6 μενόν τι. λέγω² δε συνεχες όταν ταὐτό γένηται καί εν τὸ έκατέρου πέρας οἶς απτονται καί συνέχονται, ώστε δήλον ότι το συνεχές έν τούτοις έξ ών έν τι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κατά την σύναψιν. Kal 10 ότι πρώτον το έφεξης, δηλον το γαρ έφεξης ούχ άπτεται, τοῦτο δ' ἐφεξής· και εί συνεχές, άπτεται, εί δ' απτεται, ούπω συνεχές. εν οίς δε μή εστιν άφή, ούκ έστι σύμφυσις έν τούτοις. ωστ' ούκ έστι στιγμή μονάδι ταὐτόν ταῖς μέν γὰρ ὑπάρχει το άπτεσθαι, ταις δ' ού, αλλά το έφεξης. και των μέν μεταξύ τι, των δ' ου.

¹ ἐπεί δὲ . . . μεταξύ hic ponenda ci. Prantl.
 ⁸ λέγω] ή ἀπτόμενον. λέγεται Α^b.
 ³ ἐξῆs EJ.

^a I have followed Prantl's suggestion in transferring this sentence from the end of § 13.

^b i.e., the first day of the month.

continuously in accordance with its nature naturally arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing. Since all change takes place between (13) opposites, and these are either contraries or contradictories, and contradictories have no middle term, clearly it is to the sphere of contraries that the intermediate belongs." "Successive " is that which 12 comes after the beginning (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing of the same class between itself and that which it succeeds; e.g. lines in the case of a line, and units in that of a unit, and a house in the case of a house (but there is nothing to prevent something else from coming between). For that which is successive is a thing which is successive and posterior to some other thing. 1 is not successive to 2, nor is the new moon b to the second day of the month. "Contiguous" is that which is successive 13 and in contact. "The " continuous " is a species of the contiguous. I call two things continuous when 14 their respective boundaries, by which they are kept together in contact, become one and the same; hence clearly the continuous belongs to the sphere of things whose nature it is to become one by contiguity.

Clearly "successive" is the most ultimate term; for the successive need not be in contact, but contact implies succession; and if there is continuity there is contact, but if there is contact there is not necessarily continuity; and where there is no con-15 tact there is no coalescence. Therefore a point is not the same as a unit; for points admit of contact, whereas units do not, but only of succession; and between points there is something intermediate, but between units there is not. 1069 a

Ι. Περί της οὐσίας ή θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αί άρχαι και τα αίτια ζητούνται. και γάρ ει ώς 20 όλον τι τό παν, ή ούσία πρώτον μέρος και ει τώ έφεξής, καν ούτω πρωτον ή ούσία, είτα το ποιόν, είτα το ποσόν. αμα δ' οὐδ' ὄντα ώς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα, 1 ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, η 2 καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκόν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ· λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, οໂον " ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν." ἔτι οὐδέν τῶν 21 άλλων χωριστόν. μαρτυρούσι δε και οι άρχαιοι έρνω. της νάρ ούσίας έζήτουν άρχάς και στοιχεία καί αίτια. οί μέν ούν νύν τα καθόλου ούσίας μαλλον τιθέασιν τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἄ φασιν άρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητείν· οί δε πάλαι τα καθ' εκαστα, οίον πύρ και 30 γήν, άλλ' οὐ τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα. Οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μέν αισθητή-ής ή μέν αίδιος ή δε φθαρτή, ην πάντες όμολογοῦσιν, οἶον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ' άιδιος] -- ής άνάγκη τα στοιχεία λαβείν, είτε εν είτε πολλά αλλη δε ακίνητος, και ταύτην φασί τινες

τάλλα A^b γρ. E Themistius.
 ³ ξκαστον EJ.
 ⁴ om. Themistius, Alexander apud Averroem.

^a Cf. ch. x. 14, XIV. iii. 9.

^b Platonists. ^c *i.e.*, the celestial bodies.

Λ

BOOK XII

I. Our inquiry is concerned with substance; for BOOK XII it is the principles and causes of substances that we SUBSTANCE, ND ESPECIare investigating. Indeed if the universe is to be ALLY NONregarded as a whole, substance is its first part; and SUBSTINCE if it is to be regarded as a succession," even so sub-substance is stance is first, then quality, then quantity. More- the jalmary over, the latter hardly exist at all in the full sense, but are merely qualifications and affections of Being. Otherwise "not-white" and "not-straight" would also exist; at any rate we say that they too " are," e.g., "it is not white." Further, none of the other 2 eategories is separately existent. Even the ancients in effect testify to this, for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. Present-day thinkers b tend to regard universals as substance, because genera are universal, and they hold that these are more truly principles and substances because they approach the question theoretically; but the ancients identified substance with particular things, e.g. fire and earth, and not with body in general.

Now there are three kinds of substance. One is 3 sensible (and may be either eternal $^{\circ}$ or perishable; substance the latter, e.g. plants and animals, is universally may be recognized); of this we must apprchend the ele- and eternal, ments, whether they are one or many. Another is 4

1069 a

³⁵ είναι¹ χωριστήν, οί μέν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οί δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἰ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ 1069 ἡ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δ' ἐτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή. 'Η δ' αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ' ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμέ-5 νων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει.

II. "Ετι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον οἰχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ή
¹⁰ ὕλη. εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τὶ² ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ πού, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ τόδε, αὕξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μετα¹⁵ βάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἄμφω· ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πῶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεία λευκόν (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως)· ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὅντος γίγνεται πάντα,

¹ φασί τινςς είναι] τινές είναι φασι Ab. ² τι scripsi: rl.

^o These three views were held respectively by Plato, Xenocrates and Speusippus. *Cf.* VII. ii. S, 4; XIII. i. 4, and see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxiv.

^b Cf. X. vii.

^c i.e., contrary qualities. Cf. VIII. v. 1.

immutable, which certain thinkers hold to exist (b) sensible separately; some dividing it into two classes, able; (c) others combining the Forms and the objects of non-consult mathematics into a single class, and others recog-able. nizing only the objects of mathematics as of this nature.^a The first two kinds of substance come within the scope of physics, since they involve motion; the last belongs to some other science, if there is no principle common to all three.

Sensible substance is liable to change. Now if \tilde{o} change proceeds from opposites or intermediates—Sensible not however from all opposites (for speech is not habitation is white), but only from the contrary b—then there change, must be something underlying which changes into plasmatter, the opposite contrary; for the contraries do not change.

II. Further, something persists, whereas the con-The four trary does not persist. Therefore besides the con-thanks of change. traries there is some third thing, the matter. Now if change is of four kinds, in respect either of substance or of quality or of quantity or of place, and if change of substance is generation or destruction in the simple sense, and change of quantity is increase or decrease, and change of affection is alteration, and change of place is locomotion, then changes must be in each case into the corresponding contrary state. It must 2 be the matter, then, which admits of both contraries, that changes. And since " that which is " is twofold, everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually ; e.g. from potentially white to actually white. The same applies to increase and decrease. Hence not only may there be generation accidentally from that which is not, but also everything is generated from that which is, but is poten-

125

1069 b

- δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργεία.
 καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ 'Αναξαγόρου ἕν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ
 '' ὁμοῦ πάντα ''—καὶ 'Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῦγμα
 καὶ 'Αναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—'' ἦν
 ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργεία δ' οὕ ''· ὥστε τῆς
 ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι. πάντα δ' ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα
 ²⁴ μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν· καὶ τῶν ἀιδίων ὅσα μὴ
 γενητὰ' κινητὰ δὲ φορᾶ, ἀλλ' οὐ γενητήν,' ἀλλὰ
 ποθὲν ποί. 'Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ
 ὄντος ἡ γένεσις· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι
 δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ
 ετέρου. οὐδ' ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα·
 διαφέρει γὰρ τῆ ὕλη, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἶς, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη
 μία, ἐκεῶνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργεία οῦ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει.
 τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς aἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν
 ή ἐναντίωσις, ῆς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ είδος τὸ δὲ
- 85 III. Μετά ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὖτε ἡ ὕλη οὖτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πῶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει

1 γεννητά . . . γεννητήν Ab.

^a Fr. 1 (Diels).

^b In this passage I follow Ross's punctuation and interpretation, which seem to me to be certainly right. Anaxagoras's undifferentiated infinity of homoeomerous particles (although contrasted with the unifying principle of Mind, of. I. vili. 14) can be regarded as in a sense a unity. Again, $\mu^2\gamma\mu a$ (as Ross points out) in its Aristotehan sense of "complete fusion" is a fair description of Anaximander's "indeterminate." The general meaning of the passage is that in each of the systems referred to the material principle in its elemental state should have been described as existing only potentially.

[°] *Úf.* ch. i. 3, VIII. i. 7, 8. 126 tially and is not actually. And this is the "one" of \mathfrak{s} Anaxagoras; for his "all things were together," ^a and the " mixture " of Empedocles and Anaximander and the doctrine of Democritus would be better expressed as " all things were together potentially, but not actually." ^b Hence these thinkers must have 4 had some conception of matter. All things which Different change have matter, but different things have different things have kinds ; and of eternal things such as are not generable kinds of but are movable by locomotion have matter; matter, however, which admits not of generation, but of motion from one place to another.^c

One might raise the question from what sort of " not-being " generation takes place ; for not-being has three senses.^d If a thing exists through a potentiality, nevertheless it is not through a potentiality for any chance thing ; different things are derived from different things. Nor is it satisfactory to say 5 that "all things were together," for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did they become an infinity and not one? For Mind is one; so that if matter is also one, only that could have come to be in actuality whose matter existed potentially. The There are causes and principles, then, are three ; two being the three principles, pair of contraries, of which one is the formula or form form, pivaand the other the privation, and the third being the tion, matter. matter.e

III. We must next observe ' that neither matter Generation nor form (I mean in the proximate sense) is generated. of sub-

^d *i.e.*, (1) the negation of a category, (2) falsity, (3) unrealized potentiality. Cf. XIV. ii. 10.

" This classification is found in Physics I. vi., vii., but is foreign to the main treatise of the Metaphysics. See Vol. I. Introd. p xxviii.

¹ See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

127

1070 * τι καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ ϵις τι· ὑφ' οὖ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος ὅ δέ, ἡ ὕλη· ϵἰς ὅ δέ, τὸ ϵἶδος. ϵἰς ẳπϵιρον οὖν ϵἶσιν, ϵἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγ-νεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι. Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ⁵ ἑκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία¹· τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τἆλλα· ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν άλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἀνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννῷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων.

10 Οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οῦσα τῷ
11 φαίνεσθαι (ὄσα γάρ ἐστιν ἁφῆ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει,
20 ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον, (οἶον πῦρ, σάρξ, κεφαλή. ἄπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ' οὐσίας ἡ
21, 12 τελευταία)²), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ῆν³.
13 ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἶον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οῦν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι
14 οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθέτην οὐσίαν (οἶον οἰκίας τὸ

1 h ovola Ab.

² οδον . . . τελευταία hic ponenda uidit Alexander : habent codd, post τούτων 19 infra.

³ καl έξις τις είς ήν Bessarion, fort. Alexander · είς ήν καl έξις τις codd.

^a In natural reproduction the generative principle is obviously in the parent. But the offspring is in a sense a part of the parent, and so Aristotle identifies the two.

^b Cf. XI. viii. 12 n.

^o Aristotle is contrasting proximate with primary matter. Fire, the primary matter of a man, is a simple undifferentiated element which cannot be perceived as such, and has no individuality. The head, and the other parts of the body, 128 All change is of some subject by some agent into some object. The agent is the immediate mover; the Proximate subject is the matter; and the object is the form. matter and form are not Thus the process will go on to infinity if not only the generated bronze comes to be round, but also roundness or bronze comes to be; there must, then, be some stopping-point.

We must next observe that every substance is 2 generated from something which has the same name Modes of ("substances" including not only natural but all generation. other products). Things are generated either by art or by nature or by chance or spontaneously. Art is a generative principle in something else; nature is a generative principle in the subject itself a (for man begets man); the other causes are privations of these.b

There are three kinds of substance : (i.) matter, 3 which exists individually in virtue of being apparent o Three kinds (for everything which is characterized by contact and stance; not by coalescence is matter and substrate ; e.g. fire, (1) matter, flesh and head; these are all matter, and the last 18 (4.5) the matter of a substance in the strictest sense); (2) indi-(ii.) the "nature" d (existing individually)-i.e. a kind 3 of positive state which is the terminus of motion; vidual and (iii.) the particular combination of these, e.g. their parti-Socrates or Callias. In some cases the individuality cular comdoes not exist apart from the composite substance (e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of building; nor are these forms 4 liable to generation and destruction; there is a

considered merely as in contact and not as forming an organic unity, are the proximate matter of a man; they are perceptible and individual. Flesh (in general) represents the matter in an intermediate stage.

^d *i.e.*, form.

VOL. II

1070 a 16 τούτων, άλλ' άλλον τρόπον είσι και ούκ εισιν οικία 17 τε ή άνευ ύλης και ύγίεια και παν το κατά τέ-18 χνην), άλλ' είπερ, επί των φύσει· διό δή ου κακως 10 Πλάτων έφη ότι είδη έστιν δπόσα φύσει, είπερ 21 έστιν είδη άλλα τούτων. Τὰ μὲν οῦν κινοῦντα 2 αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ' ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ότε ναρ ύγιαίνει ό άνθρωπος, τότε και ή ύγίεια έστιν, καί τὸ σχήμα τής χαλκής σφαίρας άμα καὶ 25 ή χαλκή σφαίρα. εί δε και ύστερόν τι ύπομένει. σκεπτέον έπ' ένίων γαρ ούδεν κωλύει, οίον εί ή ψυχή τοιοῦτον (μή πάσα, άλλ' ό νοῦς πάσαν γάρ άδύνατον ίσως). φανερόν δή ότι οὐδεν δεί διά γε ταῦτ' είναι τὰς ἰδέας· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννα, ό καθ' εκαστον τον τινά. όμοίως δε καί 30 έπι των τεχνων. ή γαρ ιατρική τέχνη ό λόγος τής ύγιείας έστί.

IV. Τὰ δ' αιτια καὶ ai ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγη τις καὶ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ ai aὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ⁸⁵ οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἀτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ ἡ 1070 Ϸ οὐσία. τί οῦν τοῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τάλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν·

¹ ο Πλάτων Α^b.

^a *i.e.*, in the mind of the architect or doctor. ^b See Vol, I. Introd. p. xxi. ^c *i.e.*, such as to survive after death. distinct sense in which "house" and "health" and every artificial product, considered in the abstract, do or do not exist^a); if it does so at all, it does so in the case of natural objects. Hence Plato was not far wrong in saying^b that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural objects; that is if there are Forms distinct from the things of our world.

Moving causes are causes in the sense of pre-5 existent things, but formal causes coexist with their effects. For it is when the man becomes healthy that health exists, and the shape of the bronze sphere comes into being simultaneously with the bronze sphere. Whether any form remains also afterwards 6 is another question. In some cases there is nothing to prevent this, e.g. the soul may be of this nature⁶ (not all of it, but the intelligent part; for presumably all of it cannot be). Clearly then there is no need on these grounds for the Ideas to exist; for man begets man, the individual begetting the particular person. And the same is true of the arts, for the art of medicine is the formula of health.

IV. In one sense the causes and principles are Different different for different things; but in another, if one different speaks generally and analogically, they are the same causes, for all. For the question might be raised whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different; and similarly with respect to each of the other categories. But it is absurd that they should be the same for all; for then relations and substance would have the same constituents. What then can their common con-2 stituent be? For there is nothing common to and yet distinct from substance and the other predicable categories, yet the element is prior to that of which

1070 b

πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ῶνι στοιχεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδι ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάν-5 των είναι ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶόν τ' είναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ³ στοιχείων συγκειμένῷ τὸ αὐτό, οἶον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ δἡ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἶον τὸ ἕν ἢ τὸ ὄν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῷ καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἔσται αὐτῶν οὕτ' οὐσία οὕτε πρός τι· 10 ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἅρα πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα.

"Η ώσπερ λέγομεν, έστι μὲν ὥς, έστι δ' ὡς οῦ, οἶον ἰσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν είδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ' αὐτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ῶν
15 ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ γίγνεται ἕν, οίον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν. ἔτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων είναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οῦν ταὐτὰ στοι-χεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί, ἄλλων δ' ἄλλα· πάντων δὲ οῦπερ εἴ τις εἰποῖ ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ είδος καὶ ἡ ὅτέρησις καὶ ἡ ῦλη. ἀλλ ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερου
20 περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οίον ἐν χρώματι λευκόν, μέλαν, ἐπιφάνεια· φῶς, σκότος, ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα

1 ων έστι τό EJ.

² έκ τών EJ.

^a Unity and being are called intelligibles as being the most universal predicates and as contrasted with particulars, which are sensible.

^b This apparently refers to the elements; fire and air are hot matter, water and earth cold matter. 132 it is an element. Moreover substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of the latter an element of substance. Further, how can all the categories have the same elements? For no element 3 can be the same as that which is composed of elcments; e.g., neither B nor A can be the same as BA (nor indeed can any of the "mtelligibles," a e.g. Unity or Being, be an element; for these apply in every case, even to composite things); hence no element can be either substance or relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the categories have not all the same elements.

The truth is that, as we say, in one sense all things 4 have the same elements and in another they have not. but ana-logically the E.g., the elements of sensible bodies are, let us say, causes are (1) as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, the same for which is the corresponding privation ; as matter, that which directly and of its own nature is potentially hot or cold. And not only these are substances, but so are (2) the compounds b of which they are principles, and (3) any unity which is generated from hot and cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product of hot and cold must be distinct from them. These things, then, 5 have the same elements and principles, although specifically different things have specifically different elements; we cannot, however, say that all things have the same elements in this sense, but only by analogy; *i.e.*, one might say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of 6 these is different in respect of each class of things, e.g., in the case of colour they are white, black, surface : or again there is light, darkness and air, of which day and night are composed. And since not only things which are inherent in an object are its

133

1070 b

αίτια, άλλά και των έκτος οίον το κινουν, δήλον ότι έτερον άρχη και στοιχείον αίτια δ' άμφω. 25 καί εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ή ἀρχή, τὸ δ' ὡς κινοῦν η ίσταν αρχή τις και ούσία. ώστε στοινεία μέν κατ' ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες. άλλο δ' έν άλλω, και το πρώτον αίτιον ώς κινούν άλλο άλλω. ύγίεια, νόσος, σωμα· τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική. είδος, αταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθοι το κινοῦν οἰκοδομική. 30 [kai eis raûra Siaipeîrai $\dot{\eta}$ $dp_{\chi}\dot{\eta}$.]¹ $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\dot{i}$ $\dot{\delta}\dot{\epsilon}$ rò κινοῦν ἐν μέν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπω² ἄνθρωπος. έν δε τοις από διανοίας το είδος η το εναντίον. τρόπον τινά τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ώδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ύγιεία γάρ πως ή ἰατρική, και οἰκίας είδος ή οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννῶ· ἔτι 85 παρά ταῦτα τὸ ώς³ πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα. V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ' οὐ 1071 & χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αίτια ταὐτά, ότι των οὐσιών ανευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη και αί κινήσεις. ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχή ίσως καί σώμα, η νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σώμα. ἕτι δ' άλλον τρόπον τῶ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἶον ι ένέργεια και δύναμις· άλλα και ταῦτα ἄλλα τε άλλοις και άλλως. έν ένίοις μέν γάρ το αυτό ότε μέν ένεργεία έστιν ότε δε δυνάμει, οίον οίνος η ¹ καl . . . άρχή om. A^b Alexander.

³ ἀνθρώπω Zeller: ἀνθρώποιs E Alexander: om. A^bJ. ³ τὸ ὡs Bonitz: ὡs τὸ. 4 rairá Christ: rabra.

^a For the first time the ultimate efficient cause is distinguished from the proximate. Aristotle is leading up to the description of the Prime Mover which occupies the latter half of the book.

^b See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

causes, but also certain external things, e.g. the moving cause, clearly " principle " and " element " are not the same; but both are causes. Principles are divided into these two kinds, and that which moves a thing or brings it to rest is a kind of principle and substance. Thus analogically there are three 7 elements and four causes or principles ; but they are different in different cases, and the proximate moving cause is different in different cases. Health, discase, body; and the moving cause is the art of medicine. Form. a particular kind of disorder, bricks; and the moving cause is the art of building. And since in the 8 sphere of natural objects the moving cause of man is man, while in the sphere of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there are three causes and in another four. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man ; but besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things.ª

V. Now since some things can exist in separation and others cannot, it is the former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because without substance there can be no affections and motions. Next we shall see ^b that these causes are probably soul and body, or mind, appetite and body.^o Again, there is another sense Actuality in which by analogy the principles are the same, ality are viz. actuality and potentiality; but these are causes different for different things, and apply to them in all things. different ways. For in some cases the same thing 2 exists now actually and now potentially; e.g. wine

^o Aristotle is thinking of animals and human beings, which are substances in the truest sense.

1071 a

σάρξ η άνθρωπος (πίπτει δε καί ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αίτια· ἐνεργεία μέν γάρ τὸ είδος, ἐάν ή γωριστόν, και το έξ αμφοῖν, στέρησίς τε' οໂον 10 σκότος η κάμνον, δυνάμει δε ή ύλη τουτο γάρ εστι το δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι άμφω) άλλως δ' ένεργεία και δυνάμει διαφέρει, ών μή έστιν ή αυτή ύλη, ών (ενίων) ούκ έστι το αυτό είδος αλλ' έτερον, ώσπερ ανθρώπου αίτιον τά τε στοιχεία, πῦρ καὶ 15 γη ώς ύλη και το ίδιον είδος, και έτι³ τι άλλο έξω, οΐον ό πατήρ, και παρά ταῦτα ό ήλιος και ό λοξός κύκλος, ουτε ύλη όντα ουτ' είδος ουτε στέρησις ούτε όμοειδές, άλλά κινούντα. "Ετι δε όραν δεί ότι τά μέν καθόλου έστιν είπειν, τά δ' ού. πάντων δή πρώται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργεία πρῶτον τοδὶ* καὶ ἄλλό 20 δ δυνάμει. ἐκείνα μέν ούν καθόλου⁵ ούκ ἔστιν. άρχή γάρ το καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον άνθρωπος μέν γαρ ανθρώπου καθόλου, αλλ' ούκ έστιν ούδείς, αλλά Πηλεύς 'Αχιλλέως, σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καί τοδί το Β τουδί τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ άπλως ΒΑ. ἕπειτα εἰ δηθ τὰ των οὐσιων, ἄλλα 25 δε άλλων αίτια και στοιχεία, ώσπερ ελέχθη, τών

1 TE Ross: de.

² ῶν ἐνίων Ross: ῶν codd. Alexander: καὶ ῶν γρ. Ε, Themístius: ϯ ῶν Zeller.

³ εί EJ. ⁴ τῷ είδει A^b: τὸ είδει rece.

⁵ καθόλου A^b: τὰ καθόλου EJ Alexander.

 0 ei dù Rolfes: etan AbJ² Alexander: Hon EJ¹: tà etan Christ.

 a *i.e.*, of acquiring either of the contrary qualities distinguished by the form and the privation.

^b The sun, moving in the ecliptic, approaches nearer to the earth in summer, causing generation, and recedes farther 136

or flesh or man (actuality and potentiality also fall under the causes as already described ; for the form exists actually if it is separable, and so does the compound of form and matter, and the privation, e.g. darkness or disease; and the matter exists potentially, for it is this which has the potentiality of becoming both a); but the distinction in virtue 3 of actuality and potentiality applies in a different sense to cases where the matter of cause and effect is not the same, in some of which the form is not the same but different. E.g., the cause of a man is (i) his elements: fire and earth as matter, and the particular form; (ii) some external formal cause, viz. his father; and besides these (iii) the sun and the ecliptic,^b which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor identical in form with him, but cause motion.

Further, we must observe that some causes can be stated universally, but others cannot. The proxi-4 mate principles of all things are the proximate actual individual and another individual which exists potentially.⁶ Therefore the proximate principles are not universal. For it is the particular that is the principle of particulars; "man" in general is the principle of "man" in general, but there is no such person as "man," whereas Peleus is the principle of Achilles and your father of you, and this particular B of this particular BA; but B in general is the principle of BA regarded absolutely. Again, 5 even if the causes of substances are universal, still, as has been said,⁶ different things, *i.e.* things which from the earth in winter, causing destruction. *Cf.* ch. vi.

¹⁰ n., De Gen. et Corr. 336 a 32.

c *i.e.*, the proximate efficient cause and proximate matter. ^d Ch. iv. 6.

1071 a μή έν ταυτώ γένει, χρωμάτων, ψόφων, ουσιών, ποσότητος, πλήν τω ανάλογον· και των έν ταυτω είδει έτερα, ούκ είδει, αλλ' ότι των καθ' εκαστον άλλο, η τε σή ύλη και το είδος και το κινήσαν¹ καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῶ καθόλου δὲ λόνω ταὐτά. Tà 82 80 ζητείν τίνες άρχαι η στοιχεία των ουσιών και πρός τι καί ποιών, πότερον αί αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δήλον ότι πολλαχώς νε² λενομένων έστιν έκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δε ού ταύτα άλλ' έτερα, πλην ώδι και πάντων· ώδι μέν ταυτά ή τό³ ανάλογον, ότι ύλη. 35 είδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ώδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αίτια ώς αίτια πάντων, ότι άναιρείται άναιρουμένων έτι το πρώτον έντελεχεία ώδι δε έτερα πρώτα όσα τὰ έναντία ἅ μήτε ώς γένη λέγεται 1071 & μήτε πολλαχώς λέγεται και έτι αι ύλαι. Tives μέν οῦν αί ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πως αί αὐταὶ καὶ πως ἔτεραι, εἴρηται.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ήσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μέν αἰ φυσικαί, μία δὲ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον,

¹ και τὸ είδος και τὸ κινῆσαν] και τὸ κινῆσαν και τὸ είδος A^b,
 ² γε Christ: τε.
 ⁸ τὸ Ross: τῷ.

^a *i.e.*, the prime mover.

i.e., individual forms and privations of individual things.
 Ch. i. 3, 4.

are not in the same genus, as colours, sounds, substances and quantity, have different causes and elements, except in an analogical sense; and the causes of things which are in the same species are different, not in species, but because the causes of individuals are different : your matter and form and moving cause being different from nune, although in their universal formula they are the same.

As for the question what are the principles or 6 elements of substances and relations and qualities, whether they are the same or different, it is evident that when the terms "principle" and "element" are used with several meanings they are the same for everything; but when the meanings are distinguished, they are not the same but different ; except that in a certain sense they are the same for all. In a certain sense they are the same or analogous, because (a) everything has matter, form, privation and a moving cause; (b) the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things, since if substances are destroyed everything is destroyed; and further (c) that which is first in complete reality ^a is the cause of all things. In another sense, however, 7 proximate causes are different; there are as many proximate causes as there are contraries which are predicated neither as genera nor with a variety of meanings^b; and further the particular material causes are different.

Thus we have stated what the principles of sensible things are, and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.

VI. Since we have seen ^c that there are three There must kinds of substance, two of which are natural and minutable one immutable, we must now discuss the last named substance.

1071 b

5 ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀίδιον τινὰ¹ οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον, αἴ τε γαρ ούσίαι πρώται τών όντων, και εί πασαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά. άλλ' αδύνατον κίνησιν η γενέσθαι η φθαρήναι άει γαρ ήν ουδε χρόνον. ού γάρ οδόν τε τό πρότερον και ύστερον είναι μή όντος χρόνου. και ή κίνησις άρα ούτω συνεχής 10 ώσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος. κίνησις δ' οὐκ ἐστι συνεχής ἀλλ' ή ή κατὰ τόπον, και ταύτης ή κύκλω. 'Αλλά μην εί έσται² κινητικόν ή ποιητικόν, μή ένεργουν δέ τι, ούκ έσται³ κίνησις· ένδέχεται γάρ το δύναμιν έχον μή ένεργείν. ούθεν άρα όφελος ούδ' έαν ούσίας ποιή-15 σωμεν αιδίους, ωσπερ οι τα ειδη, ει μή τις δυναμένη ενέσται άρχη μεταβάλλειν. ού τοίνυν ούδ' αύτη ίκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη· εἰ γὰρ μή ενεργήσει, ούκ έσται κίνησις. ετι ούδ' εί ένεργήσει, ή δ' ούσία αύτης δύναμις· ού γάρ έσται κίνησις αΐδιος ένδέχεται γάρ το δυνάμει ον μή 20 είναι. δεί άρα είναι άρχην τοιαύτην ής ή ούσία ένέργεια. έτι τοίνυν ταύτας δει τὰς οὐσίας είναι άνευ ύλης αίδίους γάρ δεί, είπερ γε και άλλο τι αΐδιον. ενέργεια άρα. Καίτοι απορία·δοκεί 1 didiou tiva] tiva didiou Ab.

² έστι A^b Alexander. ³ έστι ΕΑ^b. ⁴ ένεργεία ΕΓ.

^b The argument seems to be: If we assume that time was generated, it follows that before that there was no time; but the very term "before" implies time. The same applies to the destruction of time.

° Cf. XI. xii. 1 n.

- ^d These statements are proved in *Physics* VIII. viii., ix.
- ^e As there is not, according to Aristotle ; of. I. vii. 4.
- f Aristotle is now thinking not only of the prime mover 40

^a Cf. Physics VIII. i.-iii.

and show that there must be some substance which is eternal and immutable. Substances are the primary reality, and if they are all perishable, everything is perishable. But motion cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed "; nor can time, because there can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time.^b Hence as time 2 is continuous, so too is motion : for time is either identical with motion or an affection of it.^c But there is no continuous motion except that which is spatial, and of spatial motion only that which is circular.d

But even if we are to suppose that there is some- The name thing which is kinetic and productive although it move anust does not actually move or produce, there will not and its necessarily be motion; for that which has a poten-must be tiality may not actualize it. Thus it will not help a matters if we posit eternal substances, as do the actuality. exponents of the Forms, unless there is in them some principle which can cause change. And even this is not enough, nor is it enough if there is another substance besides the Forms; for unless it actually functions there will not be motion. And it will 4 still not be enough even if it does function, if its essence is potentiality; for there will not be eternal motion, since that which exists potentially may not exist. Therefore there must be a principle of this kind whose essence is actuality. Furthermore these substances' must be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything is. Therefore they are actuality.

There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that 5

(God or Mind) but also of the movers of the celestial spheres. Cf. ch. viii. 14.

1071 b γάρ τό μέν ένεργοῦν πῶν δύνασθαι, τὸ δέ δυνάμενον ού παν ένεργείν, ωστε πρότερον είναι την δύναμιν. 25 άλλα μήν ει τούτο, ούθεν έσται των όντων ένδέχεται γαρ δύνασθαι μέν είναι μήπω δ' είναι. καίτοι εί ώς λέγουσιν οί θεολόγοι οί έκ νυκτός γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ '' ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά '' φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ 30 μη¹ έσται ένεργεία τι² αιτιον; ού γάρ ή γε ύλη κινήσει αὐτή έαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ έπιμήνια οὐδ' ή γη, άλλά τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ή γονή. διο ένιοι ποιούσιν άει ενέργειαν, οίον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διά τί και τίνα ου λέγουσιν, ούδ', (εί) ώδι η ώδί, 35 την αιτίαν. ουδέν γαρ ώς έτυχε κινείται, άλλα δεί τι ακί υπάρχειν, ώσπερ νυν φύσει μεν ώδι, βία δε η ύπο νου η άλλου ώδι. είτα ποια πρώτη; διαφέρει 1072 α γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὄσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οίόν τε λέγειν ην οίεται ενίοτε άρχην είναι, το αύτο έαυτὸ κινοῦν ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἄμα τῶ οὐρανῶ ή ψυχή, ώς φησίν. το μεν δή δύναμιν οίεσθαι ένεργείας πρότερον έστι μέν ώς καλώς, έστι δ' ώς ουν είρηται δε πως. ότι δ' ενεργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεί 'Αναξαγόρας (ό γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ

μή] μηθέν Α^b.
 ² τι om. A^b.
 ³ ούδ', εί ώδι ή ώδι Diels, Alexander (?): οὐδὲ ώδι οὐδὲ.
 ⁴ ἐνέργεια ΤΓ Alexander: ἐνεργεία ΕΛ^bJ.

^a Cf. Hesiod, Works and Days 17, Theogony 116 sqq.

^b Of. ch. ii. 3.

• Cf. I. iv. 12, De Caelo 300 b 8, and see Burnet, E.G.P. § 178.

^d Cf. Timasus 30 A, and § 8 below.

• Aristotle refers to Plato's rather inconsistent account in *Timaeus* 30-34.

everything which actually functions has a potentiality, It might whereas not everything which has a potentiality potentiality actually functions; so that potentiality is prior. Is puor to But if this is so, there need be no reality; for actuality; everything may be capable of existing, but not yet view the existent. Yet if we accept the statements of the 6 cosmologists who generate everything from Night, a universe or the doctrine of the physicists that " all things cannot be were together," b we have the same impossibility; for how can there be motion if there is no actual cause? Wood will not move itself-carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves-the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses. Hence 7 some, e.g. Leucippus and Plato,^d posit an eternal actuality, for they say that there is always motion; but why there is, and what it is, they do not say; nor, if it moves in this or that particular way, what the cause is. For nothing is moved at haphazard, but in every case there must be some reason present ; as in point of fact things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or mind or some other agent. And further, what kind of motion is primary? For this is an extremely important point. Again, 8 Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks to be the source of motion, *i.e.*, that which moves itself; for according to him the soul is postcrior to motion and coeval with the sensible universe.^e Now to suppose that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another wrong; we have explained ' the distinction. But that actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras 9 (since mind is actuality), and by Empedocles with

¹ The reference is probably to § 5 above, but cf. IX, viii. 143

1072 a Έμπεδοκλής φιλίαν και νεικος, και οι άει λέγοντες κίνησιν είναι, ώσπερ Λεύκιππος. "Ωστ' οὐκ ሕν απειρον χρόνον χάος η νύξ, αλλα ταυτα αεί ή περιόδω η άλλως, είπερ πρότερον ένέργεια δυνά-10 μεως. εί δη το αυτό άει περιόδω, δεί τι άει μένειν ώσαύτως ένεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις και φθορά είναι, άλλο δει είναι άει ένεργουν άλλως καί άλλως. ανάγκη άρα ώδι μέν καθ' αύτο ένεργείν, ώδι δε κατ' άλλο· ήτοι άρα καθ' έτερον η κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο πάλιν 15 γàρ ἐκεῖνο αὐτ $\hat{\omega}^1$ τε αἴτιον κἀκείνω, οὐκοῦν βέλτιον το πρώτον και γάρ αιτιον ήν έκεινο του άει ώσαύτως, τοῦ δ' ἄλλως ἕτερον· τοῦ δ' ἀει ἄλλως αμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν αί κινήσεις. τί οῦν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς;

VII. 'Επεί δ' ούτω τ' ένδέχεται, καὶ ἐἰ μἡ ούτως, ²⁰ ἐκ.νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὅμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μἡ ὄντος, λύοιτ' ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ' ἡ κύκλω· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγω μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργω δῆλον· ὥστε ἀἰδιος ἂν εἴη ὅ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὅ κινεῦ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ]³ μέσον, κινοῦν³

¹ $a\dot{v}r\hat{\varphi} \Gamma$ Alexander: $a\dot{v}r\hat{\varphi}$ codd.

² καl punctis notatum in A^b, om. Bessarion, Aldine.
³ κινοῦν ci. Ross: τοίνυν.

^a The sphere of the fixed stars, viii. 9; cf. De Gen. et Corr. 336 a 23 sqq.

^d Ch. ii. 2, 3.

^b The sun, which has its own yearly orbit in the ecliptic, and a daily rotation round the earth, which is explained most economically with reference to the rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars. *Cf.* ch. v. 3 n., *De Gen. et Corr. loo. cit.*

[°] Ch. vi. 6.

his theory of Love and Strife, and by those who hold that motion is eternal, e.g. Leucippus.

Therefore Chaos or Night did not endure for an The theory unlimited time, but the same things have always of eyclic existed, either passing through a cycle or in accord- all the facts ance with some other principle-that is, if actuality is prior to potentiality. Now if there is a regular 10 cycle, there must be something a which remains always active in the same way; but if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else ^b which is always active in two different ways. Therefore this must be active in one way independently, and in the other in virtue of something else, *i.e.* either of some third active principle or of the first. It must, then, be in virtue of the 11 first; for this is in turn the cause both of the third and of the second. Therefore the first is preferable, since it was the cause of perpetual regular motion, and something else was the cause of variety; and obviously both together make up the cause of perpetual variety. Now this is just what actually characterizes motions; therefore why need we seek any further principles ?

VII. Since (a) this is a possible explanation, and The eternal (b) if it is not true, we shall have to regard everything motion of the outer-as coming from "Night" and "all things together" most sphere and "not-being,"⁴ these difficulties may be con- an eternal sidered to be solved. There is something which prime is eternally moved with an unceasing motion, and that circular motion. This is evident not merely in theory, but in fact. Therefore the "ultimate heaven" must be eternal. Then there is also something which moves it. And since that which is 2 moved while it moves is intermediate, there is some-

mover.

VOL. II

1072 a 25 έστι τι δ ού κινούμενον κινεί, αίδιον, και ούσία και ενεργεια ούσα. Κινεί δε ώδε· το όρεκτον καί το νοητόν κινεί ού κινούμενα. τούτων τά πρώτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητόν μέν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητόν δε πρώτον το ον καλόν. όρεγόμεθα δε διότι δοκεί μαλλον η δοκεί διότι 30 ορεγόμεθα ἀρχή γὰρ¹ ή νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπό τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ' αύτήν και ταύτης ή ούσία πρώτη, και ταύτης ή άπλη και κατ' ένέργειαν (έστι δε το εν και το άπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό τὸ μέν γὰρ ἕν μέτρον σημαίνει, τό δε άπλοῦν πώς ἔχον αὐτό). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ 35 το καλόν και το δι' αύτο αίρετον έν τη αυτή 1072 & συστοιχία· και έστιν άριστον άει η ανάλογον το πρῶτον.

"Οτι δ' ἔστι τὸ οῦ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῦς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῦ· ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οῦ ἕνεκα (καὶ) τινός,^{*} ῶν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστι· κινεῦ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα[®] δὲ τᾶλλα κινεῦ. εἰ μὲν οῦν 5 τι κινεῦται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· ὥστ' εἰ [ή]⁴

1 γàρ: δέ Λ^b γρ. E.

² kal rurds Alexander apud Averroem, Christ: rurds A^b: om. cet.

³ Ross: κινουμένω A^{b1}EJ: κινούμενον A^{b2} et fort. Alexander.
⁴ Bonitz.

* Bound.

^a This shows that desire in general (of which appetite and will are the irrational and rational aspects) has as its object the good.

^b Aristotle himself recognizes two series, lists or columns of contrarics, similar to those of the Pythagoreans (I. v. 6). One, the positive, contains being, unity, substance, etc.; the 146

1072 b φορά πρώτη ή' ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ή κινεῖται ταύτη² γ³ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἕχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον όν, ένεργεία όν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν ουδαμώς. φορά γὰρ ή πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, 10 ταύτης δὲ ή κύκλω ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ άνάγκης άρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ ούτως άρχή. το γαρ άναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, το μέν βία ότι παρά την δρμήν, το δε ού ούκ άνευ το εῦ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. 'Ек τοιαύτης άρα ἀρχής ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύ-15 σις. διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἶα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ήμιν. ούτω γάρ ἀεὶ ἐκεινό ἐστιν (ἡμιν μέν γάρ άδύνατον), έπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ⁴ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διά τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, έλπίδες δε και μνήμαι δια ταῦτα). ή δε νόησις ή καθ' αύτὴν τοῦ κάθ' αύτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα 20 τοῦ μάλιστα. αύτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καί νοῶν, ὤστε ταὐτόν νοῦς καί νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ

¹ η ex Alexandro Ross: *kal* codd., incl. Bonitz.

² ταύτην A^b.
 ⁸ γ' ci. Bonitz: δ² codd., secl. Bonitz.
 ⁴ ήδον ή ή γρ. E Alexander Themistius Aldine: ή ήδον ή EA^bJ.

^a Proved in *Physics* VIII, vii.

^b Ibid. ch. 1x.

^c The argument is: X (the prime mover), since it imparts the primary motion, cannot be liable to motion (or change) of any kind. Therefore it exists of necessity, and must be good (cf, V. v. 6); and it is *qua* good, *i.e.*, the object of desire, that X is a first principle.

^d Cf. V. v.

• For the relation of pleasure to actuality or activity see *Eth. Nic.* X. iv.

of "the heaven" is primary locomotion, then in so far as "the heaven" is moved, in this respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise; i.e. in respect of place, even if not of substantiality. But since there is something-X-which moves while being itself unmoved, existing actually, X cannot be otherwise in any respect. For the primary kind of 6 change is locomotion,^a and of locomotion circular locomotion b; and this is the motion which X induces. Thus X is necessarily existent; and qua necessary it is good, and is in this sense a first principle.^o For the necessary has all these meanings : that which is by constraint because it is contrary to impulse; and that without which excellence is impossible ; and that which cannot be otherwise, but is absolutely necessary.d

Such, then, is the first principle upon which depend The divine the sensible universe and the world of nature. And 7 its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. If sof the It must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure.^c (And purce, for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best.^f And thought thinks itself through participation 8 in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object

¹ Since the prime mover is pure actuality, and has or rather is the highest form of life, Aristotle identifies it with the highest activity—pure thinking.

1072 b

δεκτικόν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων· ὥστε ἐκείνου μαλλον τοῦτο¹ ὅ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ
 ²⁵ ἄριστον. εἰ οῦν οὕτως εῦ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὅ
 θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώ τερον. ἔχει δὲ ῶδε.[°] καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ
 γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια. γαρ νου ενεργεια ζωη, εκεινος σε η ενεργεια ένεργεια δε ή καθ' αυτήν εκείνου ζωή αρίστη και αίδιος. φαμεν δη³ τον θεον είναι ζώον αίδιον 80 αριστον, ώστε ζωή και αιών συνεχής και άίδιος υπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. "Όσοι δε ύπολαμβάνουσιν, ώσπερ οι Πυθαγόρειοι και Σπεύσιππος, τό κάλλιστον και άριστον μη έν άρχη είναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν είναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ⁸⁵ ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ yàp σπέρμα έξ έτέρων έστι προτέρων τελείων, και τὸ 1078 Β πρώτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἶον πρότερου ανθρωπου αν φαίη τις είναι τοῦ σπέρ-ματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενου, ἀλλ' ἔτερου έξ οῦ τὸ σπέρμα. Ο Τι μὲν οῦν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀίδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθη-5 τῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ότι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ

1 έκείνου μάλλον τοῦτο ex Alexandro Ross: έκεῖνο μάλλον τούτου codd.

² ώδι Bekker: ώδι ώδε Ab.

⁸ δη Themistius, ci. Bonitz: δè codd.

^a In actualization the subject and object of thought (like those of perception, De Anima III. ii.) are identical. 150

of thought, i.e. essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it possesses this object." Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God always 9 enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is.

Those who suppose, as do the Pythagoreans and 10 Speusippus,^b that perfect beauty and goodness do not exist in the beginning (on the ground that whereas the first beginnings of plants and animals are causes, it is in the products of these that beauty and perfection are found) are mistaken in their views. For seed comes from prior creatures which are perfect, 11 and that which is first is not the seed but the perfect creature. E.g., one might say that prior to the seed is the man—not he who is produced from the seed, but another man from whom the seed comes.^c

Thus it is evident from the foregoing account that 12 there is some substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things; and it has also been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is impartible and indivisible (for it

^b The view is referred to again in ch. x. 6, XIV. iv. 2, 3, v. 1. ^c Of. IX. viii. 4, 5.

1078 a

γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ' ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ 10 τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ' ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πῶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οῦν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

VIII. Πότερον δε μίαν θετέον την τοιαύτην 15 ούσίαν η πλείους, και πόσας, δει μή λανθάνειν. άλλα μεμνησθαι και τας των άλλων αποφάσεις, ότι περί πλήθους ούθεν ειρήκασιν ο τι και σαφες είπειν. ή μέν γαρ περί τας ίδεας υπόληψις ούδεμίαν έχει σκέψιν ίδίαν αριθμούς γάρ λέγουσι τάς ίδέας οι λέγοντες ίδέας, περί δε των αριθμών 20 ότε μεν ώς περί απείρων λέγουσιν, ότε δε ώς μέχρι της δεκάδος ώρισμένων δι' ήν δ' alτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πληθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδης ἀποδεικτικης. ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων και διωρισμένων λεκτέον. Η μέν γαρ άρχη και το πρώτον των όντων ακίνητον και καθ 25 αύτό και κατά συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δέ τὴν πρώτην αίδιον και μίαν κίνησιν. επεί δε το κινούμενον άνάγκη ύπό τινος κινείσθαι, και το πρώτον κινούν άκίνητον είναι καθ' αύτό, και την άίδιον κίνησιν ύπο αιδίου κινείσθαι και την μίαν ύφ' ένος, δρώμεν δε παρά την του παντός την άπλην φοράν, ην

^a Cf. Physics 266 a 24-b 6.

^b Ibid. III. v.

^c Cf. XIII. viii. 17, 20. This was a Pythagorean survival, cf. Vol. I. Introd. xvi.

 $^{^{}a}$ i.e., the (apparent) diurnal revolution of the heavens. 152

eauses motion for infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite potentiality a; and therefore since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it eannot have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite 13 magnitude because there is no such thing at all b); and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable : for all the other kinds of motion are posterior to spatial motion. Thus it is clear why this substance has these attributes.

VIII. We must not disregard the question whether The number we should hold that there is one substance of this moving kind or more than one, and if more than one, how principles, many; we must review the pronouncements of other thinkers and show that with regard to the number of the substances they have said nothing that can be clearly stated. The theory of the Ideas contains 2 no peculiar treatment of the question; for the exponents of the theory call the Ideas numbers, and speak of the numbers now as though they were unlimited and now as though they were limited by the number 10°; but as for why there should be just so many numbers, there is no explanation given with demonstrative accuracy. We, however, must discuss 3 the question on the basis of the assumptions and distinctions which we have already made.

The first principle and primary reality is immovable. The motions both essentially and accidentally, but it excites the heavenly primary form of motion, which is one and eternal. bodies pre-Now since that which is moved must be moved by 4 something, and the prime mover must be essentially suppose a immovable, and eternal motion must be excited by unmoved something eternal, and one motion by some one movers. thing; and since we can see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universe d (which we hold to be

1073 a

80 κινεΐν φαμέν την πρώτην ούσίαν και ακίνητον, άλλας φοράς ούσας τας των πλανήτων αιδίους (ἀΐδιον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλω σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' έν τοΐς φυσικοΐς περί τούτων), ανάγκη και τούτων έκάστην των φορών ύπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινείσθαι καθ' αύτην και ἀϊδίου οὐσίας. ή τε γὰρ των ἄ-85 στρων φύσις αίδιος ούσία τις ούσα, και το κινούν αΐδιον και πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, και τὸ πρότερον ούσίας ούσίαν άναγκαῖον είναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ότι τοσαύτας ούσίας άναγκαῖον είναι τήν τε φύσιν ἀιδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αύτὰς καὶ άνευ 1078 ι μεγέθους, δια την είρημένην αιτίαν πρότερον. "Οτι μέν οῦν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις² πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν άστρων, φανερόν. τὸ δὲ πληθος ήδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφία³ τῶν μαθηματικῶν
 ἑπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας αὕτη γάρ περί ούσίας αίσθητής μέν ἀιδίου δέ ποιείται τήν θεωρίαν, αί δ' άλλαι περί ούδεμιας ούσίας, οΐον ή τε περί τούς άριθμούς και την γεωμετρίαν. ότι μέν οῦν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί, φανερόν τοῦς καὶ μετρίως ἡμμένοις πλείους γὰρ 10 έκαστον φέρεται μιας τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων. πόσαι δ' αῦται τυγχάνουσιν οῦσαι, νῦν μèν ἡμεῖς ά λέγουσι των μαθηματικών τινές έννοίας χάριν λένομεν, όπως ή τι τη διανοία πληθος ώρισμένον ¹ $a\dot{v}\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$ E Alexander: $a\dot{v}\tau\dot{\sigma}$ A^bJ $\gamma\rho$. Alexander, Simplicius.

² ris Alexander (?), Christ: ris codd.

² φιλοσοφία Alexander, Themistius, Bonitz : φιλοσοφίας codd.

^a Physics VIII. viii., ix., De Caelo I. ii., II. iii.-viii. ^b Ch. vii. 12, 13. excited by the primary immovable substance) there are other spatial motions-those of the planetswhich are eternal (because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest-this has been proved in our physical treatises a); then each of these spatial motions must also be excited by a substance which is essentially immovable and eternal. For 5 the nature of the heavenly bodies is eternal, being a kind of substance; and that which moves is eternal and prior to the moved; and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is therefore clear that there must be an equal number of substances, in nature eternal, essentially immovable, and without magnitude; for the reason already stated.^b

Thus it is clear that the movers are substances, 6 and that one of them is first and another second and The number so on in the same order as the spatial motions of the notions heavenly bodies. As regards the number of these 7 motions, we have now reached a question which must and of the be investigated by the aid of that branch of mathe- which excite matical science which is most akin to philosophy, be decided *i.e.* astronomy; for this has as its object a substance by astronomy. which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other mathematical sciences, e.g. arithmetic and geometry, do not deal with any substance. That there are more spatial motions than there are bodies which move in space is obvious to those who have even a moderate grasp of the subject, since each of the nonfixed stars has more than one spatial motion. As 8 to how many these spatial motions actually are we shall now, to give some idea of the subject, quote what some of the mathematicians say, in order that there may be some definite number for the mind to

1078 b ύπολαβείν· το δε λοιπόν τα μεν ζητούντας αύτούς δεί, τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων, 15 άν τι φαίνηται παρά τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δε τοις ακριβεστέροις. Εύδοξος μεν ουν ήλίου και σελήνης έκατέρου την φοράν έν τρισίν έτίθετ' είναι σφαίραις, ων την μέν πρώτην την των άπλανων άστρων είναι, την δέ δευτέραν κατά τόν 20 δια μέσων των ζωδίων, την δε τρίτην κατά τον λελοξωμένον έν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζωδίων· ἐν μείζονι δε πλάτει λελοξώσθαι καθ δν ή σελήνη φέρεται η καθ' όν ο ήλιος. των δε πλανωμένων άστρων έν τέτταρσιν ξκάστου σφαίραις, καί τούτων δε την 25 μεν πρώτην και δευτέραν την αυτην είναι εκείναις (τήν τε γαρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἑπάσας φέρουσαν έίναι, καί την ύπο ταύτη τεταγμένην και κατά τον δια μέσων των ζωδίων την φοραν έχουσαν κοινήν άπασων είναι), της δε τρίτης άπάντων τους πόλους έν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρ-30 της την φοράν κατά τον λελοξωμένον πρός τον μέσον ταύτης είναι δε της τρίτης σφαίρας τους πόλους των μέν άλλων ίδίους, τους δέ της 'Αφροδίτης και τοῦ Ερμοῦ τοὺς αὐτούς. Κάλλιππος δε την μεν θέσιν των σφαιρών την αυτην ετίθετο

1 rairny recc.

^o Of Cnidus (circa 408-355 B.C.). He was a pupil of Plato, and a distinguished mathematician.

^b For a full discussion of the theories of Eudoxus and Callippus see Dreyer, *Planetary Systems* 87-114; Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* 190-224.

[°] Not identical with that of the fixed stars, but having the same motion.

grasp; but for the rest we must partly investigate for ourselves and partly learn from other investigators. and if those who apply themselves to these matters come to some conclusion which clashes with what we have just stated, we must appreciate both views, but follow the more accurate.

Eudoxus ^a held that the motion of the sun and θ moon involves in either case three spheres, b of which The theory the outermost is that of the fixed stars,^c the second of homorevolves in the circle which bisects the zodiac,^a and spheres the third revolves in a circle which is inclined across (a) Eudoves the breadth of the zodiac ϵ : but the circle in which the moon moves is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun moves. And he held that the 10 motion of the planets involved in each case four spheres ; and that of these the first and second are the same ¹ as before (for the sphere of the fixed stars is that which carries round all the other spheres, and the sphere next in order, which has its motion in the circle which bisects the zodiac, is common to all the planets); the third sphere of all the planets has its poles in the circle which bisects the zodiac; and the fourth sphere moves in the eirele inclined to the equator of the third. In the case of the third sphere, while the other planets have their own peculiar poles, those of Venus and Mercury are the same.

Callippus g assumed the same arrangement of the 11

^d *i.e.*, revolves with its equator in the ecliptic.

• *i.e.*, has the plane of its equator inclined to the plane of the ecliptic. This sphere carries the sun (or moon) fixed to a point in its equator.

1 Not the same, but having the same motion.

" Of Cyzicus (fl. 830 n.c.). Simplicius says (193. 5-8) that he corrected and elaborated Eudoxus's theory with Aristotle's help while on a visit to him at Athens.

according to

157

1073 b Εὐδόξω, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν, τὸ 35 δε πλήθος τω μεν τοῦ Διὸς και τω τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνω ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ' ἡλίω καὶ τη σελήνη δύο ώετο έτι προσθετέας είναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινόμενα εί μέλλει τις αποδώσειν, τοις δε λοιποίς των πλανητών έκάστω μίαν. 'Αναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλ-1074 ε λουσι συντεθείσαι πάσαι τα φαινόμενα αποδώσειν, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μια έλάττονας είναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας και είς τὸ αὐτὸ άποκαθιστάσας τη θέσει την πρώτην σφαιραν άει 5 το**ῦ ὑ**ποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ένδέγεται την των πλανητών φοράν απαντα ποιείσθαι. έπει ούν έν αίς μεν αντά φέρεται σφαίραις αί μέν οκτώ αί δε πέντε και είκοσιν είσιν, τούτων δε μόνας ού δεί άνελιχθήναι έν αίς το κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αί μέν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο 10 ανελίττουσαι έξ έσονται, αί δε τας των ύστερον τεττάρων έκκαίδεκα, ό δε άπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσών και τών ανελιττουσών ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε καί πέντε. εί δε τη σελήνη τε και τω ήλίω μή προστιθείη τις ας είπομεν κινήσεις, αι πασαι σφαιραι έσονται έπτά⁸ τε και τεσσαράκοντα. Τò 15 μέν ούν πληθος των σφαιρών έστω τοσούτον, ώστε και τὰς οὐσίας και τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [και τάς αίσθητάς]³ τοσαύτας εύλογον ύπολαβειν το γαρ αναγκαίον αφείσθω τοις ίσχυροτέροις λέγειν. ήλloυ και τῷ σελήνης recc.
 ² έννέα c
 ² om. Alexander, seel. Goebel. 2 évvéa ci. Sosigenes.

^a Aristotle is trying to establish a mechanical relation between the spheres, which Eudoxus and Callippus did not attempt to do. ^b The moon. ^o In § 11.

^d Either Aristotle has made a slip in his calculations, or we should read $\epsilon\nu\nu\epsilon a$ (Sosigenes) for $\epsilon\pi\tau a$; this would give 158 spheres as did Eudoxus (that is, with respect to the (b) Callorder of their intervals), but as regards their number, ^{1PPRUS,} whereas he assigned to Jupiter and Saturn the same number of spheres as Eudoxus, he considered that two further spheres should be added both for the sun and for the moon, if the phenomena arc to be accounted for, and one for each of the other planets.

But if all the spheres in combination are to account 12 for the phenomena, there must be for each of the (c) Aristotle, other planets other spheres, one less in number than those already mentioned, which counteract these and restore to the same position the first sphere of the star which in each case is next in order below.^a In this way only can the combination of forces produce the motion of the planets. Therefore since the forces 13 by which the planets themselves are moved are 8 for Jupiter and Saturn, and 25 for the others, and since of these the only ones which do not need to be counteracted are those by which the lowest planet^b is moved, the counteracting spheres for the first two planets will be 6, and those of the remaining four will be 16; and the total number of spheres, both those which move the planets and those which counteract these, will be 55. If we do not invest the moon and 14 the sun with the additional motions which we have mentioned,^o there will be 47 (?) ^d spheres in all.

This, then, may be taken to be the number of the spheres; and thus it is reasonable to suppose that there are as many immovable substances and principles,^{*o*}—the statement of logical necessity may be left to more competent thinkers.

49, which appears to be the correct total. For alternative explanations of an error in calculation see Ross ad loo.

i.e., the movers of the spheres.

Εί δε μηδεμίαν οίόν τ' είναι φοράν μή συντείνουσαν πρός άστρου φοράν, έτι δε πάσαν φύσιν και πάσαν 20 οὐσίαν ἀπαθή καὶ καθ' αύτην τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυΐαν τέλος' είναι δει νομίζειν, ούδεμία αν είη παρά ταύτας έτέρα φύσις, άλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν άριθμον είναι των ούσιων. είτε γάρ είσιν έτεραι, κινοίεν ἃν ώς τέλος οῦσαι φορᾶς. ἀλλ' εἶναί γε ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο 25 δ' εύλογον έκ των φερομένων ύπολαβείν. εί γαρ παν το φέρον του φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε και φορά πάσα φερομένου τινός έστιν, ούδεμία φορά αύτης ἂν ἕνεκα είη οὐδ' ἄλλης φορας, ἀλλὰ τῶν άστρων ένεκα. εί γαρ έσται φορά φορας ένεκα, και έκείνην έτέρου δεήσει χάριν είναι ώστ' έπειδή 30 ούχ οίόν τε είς άπειρον, τέλος έσται πάσης φοράς τών φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατά τόν ουρανόν.

"Ότι δὲ εἶς οὐρανός, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ πλείους οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἴδει μία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε πολλαί. ἀλλ' ὄσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ
⁸⁶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν, οἶον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἶς).
τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον. ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἕν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα

¹ τέλος Γ γρ. E Alexander (?) Bonitz: τέλους codd.

^a See previous note.

^o The definition or form is one and universal; it is the combination of form with matter that constitutes an indi-160

1074 a

^b This paragraph seems to belong to an earlier period of Aristotle's thought. At any rate the argument that plurality involves matter is inconsistent with the view that there are 55 immaterial movers.

If there can be no spatial motion which is not 15 conducive to the motion of a star, and if moreover The unevery entity and every substance which is impassive moved and has in itself attained to the highest good should (apart from be regarded as an end, then there can be no other mover must entity besides these," and the number of the sub- he equal in number to stances must be as we have said. For if there are the spheres, other substances, they must move something, since they are the end of spatial motion. But there can be 16 no other spatial motions besides those already mentioned. This is a reasonable inference from a general consideration of spatial motion. For if everything which moves exists for the sake of that which is moved, and every motion for the sake of something which is moved, no motion ean exist for the sake of itself or of some other motion, but all motions must exist for the sake of the stars. For if we are to 17 suppose that one motion is for the sake of another, the latter too must be for the sake of something else; and since the series cannot be infinite, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies which are moved through the heavens.

It is evident that there is only one heaven.^b For There is if there is to be a plurality of heavens (as there is of "heaven" or men), the principle of each must be one in kind but universe. many in number. But all things which are many in 18 number have matter (for one and the same definition applies to many individuals, e.g. that of "man"; but Socrates is one e), but the primary essence has no matter, because it is complete reality. Therefore the prime mover, which is immovable, is one both in formula and in number ; and therefore so also is that

vidual. Thus a plurality of individuals is caused by the combination of the same form with different matter.

VOL. II

161

1074 a

- άεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς¹· εἶς ắρα οὐρανὸς μόνος. Hapa-1074 ο δέδοται δε παρά των άρχαίων και παμπαλαίων έν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοί τέ είσιν οῦτοι και περιέχει το θείον την όλην φύσιν. τά δέ λοιπά μυθικώς ήδη προσήκται πρός 5 την πειθώ των πολλών και πρός την είς τούς νόμους καί το συμφέρον χρήσιν άνθρωποειδείς τε γάρ τούτους και των άλλων ζώων όμοίους τισί λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοις είρημένοις ών εί τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τό πρώτον, ότι θεούς ώοντο τάς πρώτας 10 ούσίας είναι, θείως ἂν εἰρησθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εύρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων και ταύτας τας δόξας ἐκείνων οίον λείψανα περισεσωσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ή μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ ή παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ µóvov.
 - 15 ΙΧ. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν; ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ

1 συνεχώς έν μόνον E.J.

^a This statement is not literally true. The planets do not seem to have been associated with the gods of popular mythology until the fourth century n.c. (see Burnet, E.G.P. p. 23 n.). But Aristotle's general meaning seems to be that 162

which is eternally and continuously in motion. Therefore there is only one heaven

A tradition has been handed down by the ancient 19 thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to The divine posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that element in nature has these heavenly bodies are gods,^a and that the Divine been recogpervades the whole of nature. The rest of their 20 tradition has been added later in a mythological form mized since to influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and times. utilitarian expedient b; they say that these gods are human in shape or are like certain other animals,^o and make other statements consequent upon and similar to those which we have mentioned. Now if 21 we separate these statements and accept only the first, that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying; and reflect that whereas every art and philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge. To this extent only, then, are the views of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us.

IX. The subject of Mind involves certain diffi-Further diseulties. Mind is held to be of all phenomena the cussion of most supernatural; but the question of how we must Intelligence. regard it if it is to be of this nature involves certain must be selfdifficulties. If Mind thinks nothing, where is its thanking. dignity? It is in just the same state as a man who is asleep. If it thinks, but something else determines its thinking, then since that which is its essence is not the gods were identified with the primary natural forces; and this is substantially true.

^b Cf. II. iii. 1.

º e.g. the Egyptian deities. . Zoomorphism in Greek religion is a doubtful quantity.

1074 b 20 ούσία νόησις άλλα δύναμις, ούκ αν ή αρίστη ούσία είη δια γαρ του νοείν το τίμιον αυτώ ύπάρχει. έτι δε είτε νοῦς ή οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεί; η γάρ αυτός αυτόν η έτερόν τι. και εί έτερόν τι, η το αυτό αεί η άλλο. πότερον ούν διαφέρει τι η ούδεν το νοείν το καλόν η τό τυχόν; 25 η και άτοπον το διανοείσθαι περί ενίων; δηλον τοίνυν ότι το θειότατον και τιμιώτατον νοεί, και ου μεταβάλλει είς χείρον γαρ ή μεταβολή, καί κίνησίς τις ήδη τό τοιοῦτον. πρώτον μέν οῦν εί μή νόησίς έστιν άλλά δύναμις, εύλογον επίπονον είναι το συνεχές αύτω της νοήσεως έπειτα δηλον 80 ότι άλλο τι αν είη το τιμιώτερον η ό νους, το νοούμενον. και γάρ το νοείν και ή νόησις υπάρξει και τό χείριστον νοοῦντι. ὥστ' εἰ φευκτόν τοῦτο (καὶ γάρ μή δραν ένια κρείττον ή όραν), ούκ αν είη τό άριστον ή νόησις. αύτον άρα νοεί, είπερ έστι το 35 κράτιστον, και έστιν ή νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

Φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εῦ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι 1075 μνοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρâγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ

^a *i.e.*, if its thinking is determined by something else, Mind is only a potentialily, and not (as described in ch. vii. 1-9) the highest actuality.

^{b'} Cf. IX. viii. 18.

 If Mind is a potentiality, since a potentiality is of contraries, Mind may think that which is worst.

thinking but potentiality,^a it cannot be the best reality; because it derives its excellence from the act of thinking. Again, whether its essence is thought 2 or thinking, what does it think ? It must think either itself or something else; and if something else, then it must think either the same thing always, or different things at different times. Then does it make any difference, or not, whether it thinks that which is good or thinks at random? Surely it would be 3 absurd for it to think about some subjects Clearly. then, it thinks that which is most divine and estimable. and does not change; for the change would be for the worse, and anything of this kind would immediately imply some sort of motion. Therefore if Mind is not thinking but a potentiality, (a) it is reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is laborious b; (b) clearly there must be something else which is more excellent than Mind : *i.e.* the object of thought; for both thought and the act of thinking 4 will belong even to the thinker of the worst thoughts.^c Therefore if this is to be avoided (as it is, since it is better not to see some things than to see them), thinking cannot be the supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best ; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking,

Yet it seems that knowledge and perception and objections opinion and understanding are always of something to this view else, and only ineidentally of themselves. And 5 further, if to think is not the same as to be thought, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? for the act of thinking and the object of thought have not the same essence. The answer is that in some eases the knowledge is the objecty. In the productive sciences, if we disregard the matter, the sub-

1075 a

^{*} οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ῆν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὅ λόγος τὸ πρâγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οῦν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ₅ ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ¹ μία.

^{*}Έτι δη λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νουνμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. η ἀδιαίρετον πῶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην· ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, η ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνω (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εῦ ἐν τωδὶ ἢ ἐν τωδί, ἀλλ' 10 ἐν ὅλω τινὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ὅν ἀλλο τι), οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ή νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα.

Χ. Ἐπίσκέπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάζιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως, ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῆ 15 τάξει τὸ εῦ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οῦτος οὐ γὰρ οῦτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ ψυτά· καὶ οὐχ οῦτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρω πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἕν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκία τοῦς ἐλευθέροις 20 ἥκιστα ἔζεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ

1 τώ νοουμένω Alexander, Bonitz : τού νοουμένου.

^a *i.e.*, beings composed of matter as well as form. Such beings are contrasted with the divine Mind, which is pure form.

^b The meaning of this sentence is shown by the definition of Happiness in *Eth. Nic.* 1098 a 16-20. It takes the human mind a lifetime of 4^{the} highest intellectual activity of which it is capable to attain to happiness; but the divine Mind is always happy. *Cf.* ch. vii. 9.

stance, i.e. the essence, is the object; but in the speculative sciences the formula or the act of thinking is the object. Therefore since thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things which contain no matter, they will be the same, and the act of thinking will be one with the object of thought

There still remains the question whether the object 6 of thought is composite; for if so, thought would change in passing from one part of the whole to another. The answer is that everything which contains no matter is indivisible. Just as the human mind, or rather the mind of composite beings," is in a certain space of time b (for it does not possess the good at this or at that moment, but in the course of a certain whole period it attains to the supreme good, which is other than itself), so is absolute selfthought throughout all eternity.

X. We must also consider in which sense the nature The good of the universe contains the good or the supreme as a begarate good; whether as something separate and inde- substance and as the pendent, or as the orderly arrangement of its parts, order of the Probably in both senses, as an army does; for the 2 efficiency of an army consists partly in the order universe. and partly in the general; but chiefly in the latter, because he does not depend upon the order, but the order depends upon him. All things, both fishes and birds and plants, are ordered together in some way, but not in the same way; and the system is not such that there is no relation between one thing and another : there is a definite connexion. Every-3 thing is ordered together to one end; but the arrangement is like that in a household, where the free persons have the least liberty to act at random,

167

1075 а

τὰ πλείστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρόν τό είς τό κοινόν, τό δέ πολύ ό τι έτυχεν τοιαύτη γάρ έκάστου άρχη αυτών ή φύσις έστίν. λέγω δ' οίον είς γε το διακριθήναι άνάγκη απασιν έλθειν, και άλλα ούτως έστιν ών 25 κοινωνεί άπαντα είς το όλον. Οσα δε άδύνατα συμβαίνει η άτοπα τοις άλλως λέγουσι, και ποία οί χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, και έπι ποίων έλάχισται άπορίαι, δεί μή λανθάνειν. πάντες γάρ έξ έναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὕτε δε τὸ πάντα οὕτε τὸ έξ έναντίων όρθως, οὕτ' έν ὄσοις τὰ έναντία 80 ύπάρχει, πως έκ των έναντίων έσται, οὐ λέγουσιν άπαθή γὰρ τὰ έναντία ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ήμιν δέ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῶ τρίτον τι είναι. οἱ δὲ τό έτερον των έναντίων ύλην ποιούσιν, ώσπερ οί τὸ άνισον τῶ ἴσω ἢ τῶ ένὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καί τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ή γὰρ ὕλη ή μία 35 ούδενί έναντίον. έτι άπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει «ξω τοῦ ένός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων. οί δ' άλλοι οὐδ' ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀναθὸν άρχή. οί δε τοῦτο μεν ἀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλά

^a The free persons correspond to the heavenly bodies, whose movements are fixed by necessity; the servile class to human beings. Each class acts in accordance with its nature, a principle which " produces obedience to duty in the higher creatures, caprice in the lower " (Ross).

^b Because there is an eternal substance, which is not derived from contrarics (ch. vi. 1).

^e Things are derived from a substrate as well (ch. ii, 1). 168 and have all or most of their actions preordained for them, whereas the slaves and animals have little common responsibility and act for the most part at random; for the nature of each class is a principle such as we have described.^{*a*} I mean, for example, 4 that everything must at least come to dissolution; and similarly there are other respects in which everything contributes to the good of the whole.

We must not fail to observe how many impossi- Difficulties bilities and absurdities are involved by other theories, in other and what views the more enlightened thinkers hold, (a) Platonists and what views entail the fewest difficulties. All 5 thinkers maintain that all things come from con- and Pythtraries; but they are wrong both in saying "all agoreans, things "b and in saying that they come from contraries,° nor do they explain how things in which the contrarics really are present come from the contraries ; for the contraries cannot act upon each other. For us, however, this problem is satisfactorily solved by the fact that there is a third factor. Other thinkers make one of the two contraries matter; e.g., this is done by those d' who make the Unequal matter for the Equal, or the Many matter for the One. But this also is disposed of in 6 the same way ; for the one matter of two contrarics is contrary to nothing. Further, on their view everything except Unity itself will partake of evil; for "the Bad" e is itself one of the elements. The other school ' does not even regard the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the Good is in the truest sense a principle in all things. The former school is

⁴ See on XIV, 1. 4.

• The "Bad" was identified with the unequal; *cf.* I. vi. 10.

169

1075 b πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἡ ὡς εἶδος. ᾿Ατόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη (μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος)· εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ ⁵ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε καὶ ὡς ὕλη¹ ἀρχῆ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οῦν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.

³Αναξαγόρας δὲ ώς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, ¹⁰ πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ' οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις. καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεἰς λέγει πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν ¹⁸ αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὅντα οἱ δ' ἕνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἕν πάντα ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἕσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεἰς λέγει. Καὶ τοῖς τὰ ἕίδη [ὅτι³ ἄλλη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέρα³.

¹ και ώς ύλη Bessarion Alexander Bonitz: ώς ύλη και.

[#] δτι] čτι fort. Themistius, ci. Bonitz (uel έσται), Ross.

⁹ Christ.

^o Cf. I. iv. 3. ^b Fr. 17 (Diels), 18-20. ^o Cf. IX. ix. 3. ^d Motion presupposes a final cause, which was not what Anaxagoras meant by "Mind." Cf. I. vii. 5.

^e Aristotle identifies the efficient cause, in a sense, with the final eause. *Cf.* VII. ix. 3.

¹ In I. vi. 10 Aristotle describes Anaxagoras as recognizing contrary principles of good and evil. Moreover, on Aristotle's own showing, evil cannot be a principle (IX. ix. 3). 170 right in holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle—whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form.

Empedocles' theory is also absurd, for he identifies 7 the Good with Love.^a This is a principle both as (h) Empecausing motion (since it combines) and as matter doules, (since it is part of the mixture).^b Now even if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as eausing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence of evil.^o

Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing 8 motion; for Mind moves things, but moves them (r) Anaxfor some end, and therefore there must be some agona other Good d-unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health.^c It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for the Good, *i.e.* for Mind.^f But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the contraries, unless General we systematize their theories. And none of them 9 explains why some things are perishable and others of previous imperishable; for they make all existing things theorem. come from the same first principles.^g Again, some ^h make existing things come from not-being, while others,' to avoid this necessity, make all things one. Again, no one explains why there must always be generation, and what the cause of generation is.

Moreover, those who posit two principles must 10 admit another superior principle,' and so must the exponents of the Forms; for what made or makes

^{*v*} Cf. III. iv. 11-20. ^{*b*} Cf. ch. ii. 2, 3. ^{*i*} The Eleatics. Cf. I. v. 10-13. ^{*i*} *i.e.*, an efficient cause. 171

1075 b

- ²⁰ διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ μετέχει; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῆ σοφία καὶ τῆ τιμιωτάτη ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῦν δ' οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῷ οὐδέν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα¹ ἔστιν· ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῷ ἐναντίον οὐδέν.
- ²⁵ Εἴ τε⁸ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐρά-νια, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχῆ, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. εἰ δ' ἔσται τὰ εἶδη ἢ ⟨οί⟩⁸ ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια· εἰ δὲ μή, οὕτι κινήσεώς γε. ^{*}Ετι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει
 ³⁶ συνεχές, οὕτε ὡς κινοῦν οὕτε ὡς είδος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ' ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὅντα. ἀλλ' ἔστιν· ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ' εἴρηται πῶς.⁴ ^{*}Ετι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ
 ³⁶ ἕν ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ είδος καὶ τὸ πρâγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς· οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐαν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ.

¹ ταῦτα JI: ταὐτὰ EA^b Themistius. ² cĩ τε Chrisi: εἴτε. ³ ex Alexandro Bonitz. ⁴ πῶs Bonitz: ὥs.

^a If there is nothing but what is sensible or potential, there can be no prime mover (which is actuality) to excite motion in the universe, and no teleology in causation. For the cosmologists on causation see III. iii. 11-13.

^b By assuming an eternal actual mover (ch. vi. 4).

particulars participate in the Forms? And on all other views it follows necessarily that there must be something which is contrary to Wisdom or supreme knowledge, but on ours it does not. For there is no contrary to that which is primary, since all contraries 11 involve matter, and that which has matter exists potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to Wisdom would tend towards the contrary of the object of Wisdom; but that which is primary has no contrary.

Further, if there is to be nothing else besides sensible things, there will be no first principle, no order, no generation, and no celestral motions, but every principle will be based upon another,^{*a*} as in the accounts of all the cosmologists and physicists. And if the Forms or numbers are to exist, they will ¹² be causes of nothing; or if not of nothing, at least not of motion.

Further, how can extension, *i.e.* a continuum, be produced from that which is unextended ? Number cannot, either as a moving or as a formal cause, produce a continuum. Moreover, no contrary can be essentially productive and kinetic, for then it would be possible for it not to exist; and further, 13 the act of production would in any case be posterior to the potentiality. Therefore the world of reality is not eternal. But there are real objects which are eternal. Therefore one of these premisses must be rejected. We have described how this may be done.^b

Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or soul and body, or in general the form and the object, are one, no one attempts to explain; nor is it possible to do so except on our theory, that it is the moving

1075 b οί δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οῦτως ἀεἰ ἀλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ
1076 κ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῆ ἐτέρα, συμβάλλεται οῦσα ἢ μὴ οῦσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς.

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἶς κοίρανος ἔστω.

^a Cf. VIII. vi.

^b Speusippus and his followers ; cf. VII. ii. 4, XIV. iii. 8. ^o Homer, *Iliad* ii. 204.

METAPHYSICS, XII. x. 13-14

cause that makes them one.^a As for those ^b who main-14 tain that mathematical number is the primary reality, and so go on generating one substance after another and finding different principles for each one, they make the substance of the universe incoherent (for one substance in no way affects another by its existence or non-existence) and give us a great many governing principles. But the world must not be governed badly :

The rule of many is not good ; let one be the ruler."

1076 a

Ι. Περί μέν ούν της των αίσθητων ούσίας είρηται τίς έστιν, έν μεν τη μεθόδω τη των φυσικών 10 περί τής ύλης, ύστερον δε περί τής κατ' ενέργειαν. έπει δ' ή σκέψις έστι πότερόν έστι τις παρά τάς αίσθητας ούσίας ακίνητος και αίδιος η ούκ έστι. καί εί έστι τίς έστι, πρώτον τὰ παρά των ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέον, όπως είτε τι μή καλώς λέγουσι, μη τοΐς αυτοῖς ἔνοχοι ὦμεν, καὶ εἴ τι 15 δόγμα κοινὸν ἡμῖν κἀκείνοις, τοῦτ' ἰδία μη καθ' ήμων δυσχεραίνωμεν άγαπητόν γάρ εί τις τὰ μέν κάλλιον λέγοι, τὰ δὲ μὴ χεῖρον. Δύο δ' είσι δόξαι περί τούτων· τά τε γάρ μαθηματικά φασιν ούσίας είναι τινες, οίον άριθμούς και γραμμάς και τά συγγενή τούτοις, και πάλιν τας ίδεας. επεί δε οί 20 μέν δύο ταῦτα γένη ποιοῦσι, τάς τε ίδέας και τους μαθηματικούς αριθμούς, οι δε μίαν φύσιν αμφοτέρων, έτεροι δέ τινες τας μαθηματικάς μόνον ούσίας είναι φασι, σκεπτέον πρώτον μέν περί τών μαθηματικών, μηδεμίαν προστιθέντας φύσιν άλλην αύτοις, οίον πότερον ίδέαι τυγχάνουσιν ούσαι η ού,

M

^a The reference is presumably to *Physics* I. ^b In Books VII.-IX.

^c This was the orthodox Platonist view ; *ef.* I. vi. 4. ^d Xenocrates and his followers.

BOOK XIII

There are two views on this subject. Some say 3 that mathematical objects, *i.e.* numbers and lines, etc., are substances; and others again that the Ideas are substances. Now since some ^o recognize 4 these as two classes—the Ideas and the mathematical numbers—and others ^a regard both as having one nature, and yet others ^e hold that only the mathematical substances are substances, we must first consider the mathematical objects, without imputing to them any other characteristic—e.g. by asking whether they are really Ideas or not, or whether

* The Pythagoreans and Speusippus.

VOL. 11

1076 a 25 και πότερον άρχαι και οθσίαι των όντων η ου, άλλ ώς περί μαθηματικών μόνον είτ' είσιν είτε μή είσι, καί εί είσι πως είσιν επειτα μετά ταῦτα χωρίς περί των ίδεων αυτων άπλως και όσον νόμου χάριν τεθρύληται γάρ τὰ πολλά και ύπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικών λόγων. έτι δε πρός εκείνην δει την 30 σκέψιν απαντάν τον πλείω λόγον, όταν έπισκοπώμεν εί αί οὐσίαι καὶ αί ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων αριθμοί και ίδέαι είσιν μετά γάρ τας ίδέας αύτη λείπεται τρίτη σκέψις. 'Ανάγκη δ', είπερ έστι τὰ μαθηματικά, η έν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς είναι αὐτά, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ή κεχωρισμένα των alσθη-35 των (λέγουσι δε και ούτω τινές). ή εί μηδετέρως. η ούκ είσιν η άλλον τρόπον είσιν. ωσθ' ή άμφισβήτησις ήμεν έσται ου περί του είναι άλλα περί τοῦ τρόπου.

II. "Οτι μέν τοίνυν έν γε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀδύνατον είναι καὶ ἅμα πλασματίας ὁ λόγος, εἰρηται 1076 ν μέν καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν ὅτι δύο ἅμα στερεὰ είναι ἀδύνατον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις καὶ φύσεις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς είναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κεχωρισμένην—ταῦτα μέν οδυ εἰρηται πρότερον· ἀλλὰ πρός τούτοις φανερὸν ὅτι δ ἀδύνατον διαιρεθῆναι ὅτιοῦν σῶμα· κατ' ἐπίπεδον γὰρ διαιρεθήσεται, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ γραμμήν, καὶ αὕτη κατὰ στιγμήν, ὥστ' εἰ τὴν στιγμὴν διελεῖν

^a Cf. III. ii. 23-80.

they are principles and substances of existing things or not-and merely inquire whether as mathematical objects they exist or not, and if they do, in what sense; then after this we must separately consider the Ideas themselves, simply and in so far as the accepted procedure requires; for most of the arguments have been made familiar already by the criticisms of other thinkers. And further, the greater 5 part of our discussion must bear directly upon this second question-viz. when we are considering whether the substances and first principles of existing things are numbers and Ideas; for after we have dealt with the Ideas there remains this third question.

Now if the objects of mathematics exist, they 6 must be either in sensible things, as some hold; The object or separate from them (there are some also who of mathehold this view); or if they are neither the one nor the other, either they do not exist at all, or they exist in some other way. Thus the point which we shall have to discuss is concerned not with their existence, but with the mode of their existence.

II. That the objects of mathematics cannot be They at enot in sensible things, and that moreover the theory in sensible that they are is a fabrication, has been observed already in our discussion of difficulties a-the reasons being (a) that two solids cannot occupy the same space, and (b) that on this same theory all other potentialities and characteristics would exist in sensible things, and none of them would exist separately. This, then, has been already stated; but in addition to this it is clearly impossible on this 2 theory for any body to be divided. For it must be divided in a plane, and the plane in a line, and the line at a point; and therefore if the point is indi-

1076 b

τάλλα. τί οῦν διαφέρει ἢ ταύτας εἶναι τοιαύτας
 φύσεις, ἢ αὐτὰς μὲν μή, εἶναι δ' ἐν αὐταῖς τοιαύτας
 φύσεις; τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ συμβήσεται· διαιρουμένων
 γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαιρεθήσονται, ἢ οὐδὲ ai
 αἰσθηταί.

'Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κεχωρισμένας γ' εໂναι φύσεις τοιαύτας δυνατόν. εί γαρ έσται στερεά παρά τά αίσθητὰ κεχωρισμένα τούτων ἕτερα καὶ πρότερα των αἰσθητων, δήλον ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐπίπεδα 15 έτερα αναγκαίον είναι επίπεδα κεχωρισμένα, και στιγμάς και γραμμάς τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου. εì δέ ταῦτα, πάλιν παρὰ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ στιγμὰς ἕτερα κεχωρισμένα πρότερα γάρ των συγκειμένων έστὶ τὰ ἀσύνθετα· καὶ εἴπερ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρότερα 20 σώματα μή αἰσθητά, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγω καὶ τῶν έπιπέδων τών έν τοις ακινήτοις στερεοίς τα αύτα καθ' αύτά. ώστε έτερα ταῦτα ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμμαί των άμα τοις στερεοίς τοις κεχωρισμένοις. τά μέν γὰρ ἄμα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς στερεοῖς, τὰ δὲ 25 πρότερα τών μαθηματικών στερεών. πάλιν τοίνυν τούτων των επιπέδων εσονται γραμμαί, ών πρότερον δεήσει έτέρας γραμμάς και στιγμάς είναι διά τόν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τούτων (τῶν)¹ ἐν ταῖς προτέραις γραμμαῖς ἐτέρας προτέρας στιγμάς, ὧν οὐκέτι πρότεραι ἕτεραι. ἄτοπός τε δη γίγνεται ή σώρευσις· συμβαίνει γὰρ στερεὰ μὲν μοναχὰ 80 παρά τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐπίπεδα δὲ τριττὰ παρὰ τὰ αίσθητά, τά τε παρά τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς

visible, so is the line, and so on. For what difference 3 does it make whether entities of this kind are sensible objects, or while not being the objects themselves, are yet present in them? the consequence will be the same, for either they must be divided when the sensible objects are divided, or else not even the sensible objects can be divided.

Nor again can entities of this kind exist separately. For if besides sensible solids there are to be other 4 solids which are separate from them and prior to not can sensible solids, clearly besides sensible planes there they exist separately. must be other separate planes, and so too with Fust proof points and lines; for the same argument applies. And if these exist, again besides the planes, lines and points of the mathematical solid, there must be others which are separate; for the incomposite is 5 prior to the composite, and if prior to sensible bodies there are other non-sensible bodies, then by the same argument the planes which exist independently must be prior to those which are present in the immovable solids. Therefore there will be planes and lines distinct from those which coexist with the separately-existent solids; for the latter coexist with the mathematical solids, but the former are prior to the mathematical solids. Again, in these 6 planes there will be lines, and by the same argument there must be other lines prior to these; and prior to the points which are in the prior lines there must be other points, although there will be no other points prior to these. Now the accumulation be-7 comes absurd; because whereas we get only one class of solids besides sensible solids, we get three classes of planes besides sensible planes-those which exist separately from sensible planes, those

1076 h

 μαθηματικοῖς στερεοῖς καὶ (τὰ)¹ παρὰ τὰ ἐν τούτοις, γραμμαὶ δὲ τετραξαί, στιγμαὶ δὲ πενταξαί· ὥστε περὶ ποῖα αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἔσονται αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τούτων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ στερεῷ
 τῷ ἀκινήτῳ ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ στιγμάς· ἀεἰ γὰρ περὶ τὰ πρότερα ἡ ἐπιστήμη. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν· παρ' ἑκάστας γὰρ τὰς στιγμὰς ἔτεραι ἔσονται μονάδες, καὶ παρ' ἕκαστα τὰ ὄντα, (τὰ)² αἰσθητά, εἶτα τὰ νοητά, ὥστ' ἔσται γένη ἄπειρα τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἀριθμῶν.

- 1077 * "Ετι άπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν ἐπήλθομεν πῶς ἐνδέχεται λύειν; περὶ ἅ γὰρ ἡ ἀστρολογία ἐστίν, ὁμοίως ἔσται³ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ γεωμετρία· είναι δ' οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ πῶς δυνατόν, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἔχον κίνησιν; ὁμοίως
 - 5 δὲ καὶ τὰ ὀπτικὰ καὶ τὰ ἁρμονικά· ἔσται γὰρ φωνή τε καὶ ὅψις παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητά (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε;)· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ζῷα ἔσονται, εἴπερ καὶ αἰσθήσεις. "Ἐτι
 - 10 γράφεται ένια καθόλου ύπό τῶν μαθηματικῶν παρὰ ταύτας τὰς οὐσίας. ἐσται οὖν καὶ αὕτη τις ἄλλη οὐσία μεταξὺ κεχωρισμένη τῶν τ' ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν μεταξύ, ἢ οὕτε ἀριθμός ἐστιν οὕτε στιγμαὶ οὕτε μέγεθος οὕτε χρόνος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, δῆλον

	¹ Bessarion, Alexander,	
² Ross.	⁸ έσται Alexander (?) Bonitz : έστι.	

^a III. ii. 23-27.

which exist in the mathematical solids, and those which exist separately from those in the mathematical solids—four classes of lines, and five of points ; with which of these, then, will the mathematical 8 sciences deal? Not, surely, with the planes, lines and points in the immovable solid : for knowledge is always concerned with that which is prior. And the same argument applies to numbers ; for there will be other units besides each class of points, and besides each class of existing things, first the sensible and then the intelligible : so that there will be an infinite number of kinds of mathematical numbers.

Again, there are the problems which we enumer 9 ated in our discussion of difficulties ": how can they second be solved? For the objects of astronomy will phote similarly be distinct from sensible things, and so will those of geometry ; but how can a heaven and its parts (or anything else which has motion) exist apart from the sensible heaven? And similarly the objects of optics and of harmonics will be dustinct, for there will be sound and sight apart from the sensible and particular objects. Hence clearly 10 the other senses and objects of sense will exist separately ; for why should one class of objects do so rather than another? And if this is so, animals too will exist separately, inasmuch as the senses will.

Again, there are certain general mathematical Third proof theorems which are not restricted to these substances. Here, then, we shall have yet another 11 kind of substance intermediate between and distinct from the Ideas and the intermediates, which is neither number nor points nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is impossible, clearly it is

1077 a

ὄτι κἀκεῖνα ἀδύνατον εἶναι κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

Ολως δε τουναντίον συμβαίνει και του άληθους 15 και του είωθότος υπολαμβάνεσθαι, ει τις θήσει ούτως είναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ ώς κεχωρισμένας τινάς φύσεις. άνάγκη γάρ διά το μέν ούτως είναι αυτάς προτέρας είναι των αισθητών μεγεθών, κατά το άληθές δε ύστερας το γάρ άτελες μέγεθος γενέσει μέν πρότερόν έστι, τη ούσία δ' 20 ύστερον, οίον άψυχον έμψύχου. "Ετι τίνι καί ποτ' έσται εν τὰ μαθήματικὰ μεγέθη; τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ψυχῆ ἢ μέρει ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ εὐλόγως»· εί δε μή, πολλά, και διαλύεται· έκείνοις δε διαιρετοίς και ποσοίς ούσι τι αιτιον του έν είναι 25 καί συμμένειν; "Ετι αί γενέσεις δηλούσιν. πρώτον μέν γάρ έπι μήκος γίγνεται, είτα έπι πλάτος, τελευταίον δ' είς βάθος, και τέλος έσχεν. εί ούν τὸ τῆ γενέσει ὕστερον τῆ οὐσία πρότερον, τὸ σῶμα πρότερον αν είη επιπέδου και μήκους, και ταύτη και τέλειον και όλον μαλλον, ότι έμψυχον γίγνεται 30 γραμμή δε εμψυχος η επίπεδον πως αν είη; ύπερ γάρ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς ήμετέρας ἂν εἶη τὸ ἀξίωμα. "Ετι το μέν σωμα ούσία τις" ήδη γαρ έχει πως το τέλειον αί δε γραμμαί πως ούσίαι; ούτε γάρ ώς

καί ποτ' Bonitz: και πότ'.
 εὐλόγωs ci. Ross: εὐλογον Jaeger: εὐλόγω codd.
 τις Γ Bessarion Alexander: τίς.

^a i.e., in the natural order of development. Thus "generation" ($\gamma \epsilon \nu \epsilon \sigma \sigma s$) is used in two different senses in this argument, which therefore becomes invalid (Bonitz). 184

1077 a είδος και μορφή τις, οίον εί άρα ή ψυχή τοιούτον, ούτε ώς ή ύλη, οίον τό σωμα. ούθεν γαρ έκ γραμ-25 μων ούδ' έπιπέδων ούδε στιγμών φαίνεται συνίστασθαι δυνάμενον εί δ' ήν ουσία τις ύλική, τουτ' 1077 ι ἂν ἐφαίνετο δυνάμενα πάσχειν. Τῷ μέν οὖν λόγω έστω πρότερα· άλλ' οὐ πάντα ὄσα τῶ λόγω πρότερα καί τη ουσία πρότερα. τη μέν γαρ ουσία πρότερα όσα χωριζόμενα τῶ είναι ὑπερβάλλει, τῶ λόγω δε όσων οί λόγοι εκ τῶν λόγων ταῦτα δε 5 ούχ άμα ύπάρχει. εί γαρ μη έστι τα πάθη παρα τάς ούσίας, οίον κινούμενόν τι η λευκόν, του λευκού άνθρώπου τὸ λευκὸν πρότερον κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ού κατά την ούσίαν. ού γάρ ένδέχεται είναι κεχωρισμένον, αλλ' αεί αμα τω συνόλω εστίν σύνολον δε λέγω τον άνθρωπον τον λευκόν. ωστε φανερόν ότι 10 ούτε τό έξ άφαιρέσεως πρότερον ούτε τό έκ προσθέσεως ύστερον έκ προσθέσεως γάρ τῷ λευκῷ δ λευκός άνθρωπος λέγεται. "Ότι μέν ούν ούτε οὐσίαι μαλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσίν, οὕτε πρότερα τῷ είναι των αίσθητων, άλλα τω λόγω μόνον, ουτε κεχωρισμένα που είναι δυνατόν, είρηται ίκανως. 15 έπει δ' ούδ' έν τοις αισθητοις ένεδέχετο αύτα είναι, φανερόν ότι η όλως ούκ έστιν η τρόπον τινά έστι καί διά τοῦτο οὐχ άπλῶς ἔστιν πολλαχῶς γάρ τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν.

III. "Ωσπερ γάρ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς μαθή-

^a §§ 1-3 supra.

of form or shape, as perhaps the soul is, nor as being matter, like the body; for it does not appear that anything can be composed either of lines or of planes or of points, whereas if they were a kind of material ¹⁶ substance it would be apparent that things can be so composed.

Let it be granted that they are prior in formula; yet not everything which is prior in formula is also prior in substantiality. Things are prior in substantiality which when separated have a superior nower of existence; things are prior in formula from whose formulae the formulae of other things are compounded. And these characteristics are not indissociable. For if attributes, such as "moving" 17 or "white," do not exist apart from their substances, "white" will be prior in formula to "white man," but not in substantiality; for it eannot exist in separation, but always exists conjointly with the concrete whole-by which I mean "white man." Thus it is obvious that neither is the result 18 of abstraction prior, nor the result of adding a determinant posterior-for the expression " white man " is the result of adding a determinant to " white."

Thus we have sufficiently shown (a) that the objects Summary. of mathematics are not more substantial than corporeal objects; (b) that they are not prior in point of existence to sensible things, but only in formula; and (c) that they cannot in any way exist in separation. And since we have seen ^a that they cannot 19 exist in sensible things, it is clear that either they do not exist at all, or they exist only in a certain way, and therefore not absolutely; for "exist" has several senses.

III. The general propositions in mathematics are Mathe-

1077 h μασιν ού περί κεχωρισμένων έστι παρά τα μεγέθη και τους αριθμούς, αλλά περί τούτων μέν, ούχ ή 20 δε τοιαύτα οία έχειν μέγεθος η είναι διαιρετά. δήλον ότι ένδέγεται και περί των αισθητών μενεθών είναι και λόγους και αποδείξεις, μη ή δε αισθητά, άλλ' ή τοιαδί. ώσπερ γάρ και ή κινούμενα μόνον πολλοί λόγοι είσι, χωρίς του τί εκαστόν έστι τών 25 τοιούτων και τών συμβεβηκότων αυτοίς, και ούκ άνάγκη διά ταῦτα η κεχωρισμένον τι είναι κινούμενον των αίσθητων η έν τούτοις τινα φύσιν είναι άφωρισμένην, ούτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κινουμένων ἔσονται λόγοι και έπιστήμαι, ούχ ή κινούμενα δέ άλλ' ή σώματα μόνον, και πάλιν ή επίπεδα μόνον και ή 30 μήκη μόνον, καὶ ή διαιρετὰ καὶ ή ἀδιαίρετα ἔχοντα δε θέσιν, και ή άδιαίρετα μόνον. ωστ' έπει άπλως λέγειν άληθές μη μόνον τα χωριστα είναι άλλα καί τὰ μὴ χωριστά, οໂον κινούμενα είναι, καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά ότι έστιν άπλως άληθες είπειν, καί τοιαθτά γε οία λέγουσιν. και ωσπερ και τάς 25 άλλας έπιστήμας άπλως άληθές είπειν τούτου είναι, ούχι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οίον ὅτι λευκοῦ εἰ τό ύγιεινόν λευκόν, ή¹ δ' έστιν ύγιεινοῦ,² ἀλλ' 1078 a ἐκείνου οῦ ἐστιν ἑκάστη, εἰ $\langle \hat{\eta} \rangle^3$ ὑγιεινὸν ὑγιεινοῦ, εί δ' ή άνθρωπος άνθρώπου, ούτω και την γεωμετρίαν· οὐκ εἰ συμβέβηκεν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ῶν ἐστί,

¹ ή Bonitz: ή. ² ύγιεινοῦ γρ. Ε, Alexander: όγιεινόν. ³ Bonitz. 188

not concerned with objects which exist separately studies objects as apart from magnitudes and numbers ; they are con- having cerned with magnitudes and numbers, but not with quain character them as possessing magnitude or being divisible. It istics, is clearly possible that in the same way propositions and logical proofs may apply to sensible magnitudes; not qua sensible, but qua having certain characteristics. For just as there can be many 2 propositions about things merely qua movable, without any reference to the essential nature of each one or to their attributes, and it does not necessarily follow from this either that there is something movable which exists in separation from sensible things or that there is a distinct movable nature in sensible things; so too there will be propositions and sciences which apply to movable things, not qua movable but qua corporeal only; and again qua planes only and qua lines only, and qua divisible, and qua indivisible but having position, and qua indivisible only. Therefore since it is true to say in a 3 general sense not only that things which are separable but that things which are inseparable exist, e.g., that movable things exist, it is also true to say in a general sense that mathematical objects exist, and in such a form as mathematicians describe them. And just as it is true to say generally of the 4 other sciences that they deal with a particular subject-not with that which is accidental to it (e.g. not with "white" if "the healthy" is white, and the subject of the science is "the healthy"), but with that which is the subject of the particular science: with the healthy if it treats of things qua healthy, and with man if qua man-so this is also true of geometry. If the things of which it treats

1078 a μή έστι δε ή αίσθητά, ου των αίσθητων έσονται αί μαθηματικαί επιστήμαι, ού μέντοι ούδε παρά 5 ταῦτα ἄλλων κεχωρισμένων. Πολλά δὲ συμβέβηκε καθ' αύτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν ή ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει των τοιούτων, έπει και ή θήλυ το ζώον και ή άρρεν, ίδια πάθη έστιν, καίτοι ούκ έστι τι θήλυ ούδ άρρεν κεχωρισμένον των ζώων . ώστε και ή μήκη μόνον και ή επίπεδα, και όσω δη αν περί 10 προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἁπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μαλλον έχει το άκριβές (τοῦτο δὲ το άπλοῦν ἐστίν). ώστε άνευ τε μεγέθους μαλλον η μετα μεγέθους, καὶ μάλιστα άνευ κινήσεως· έὰν δὲ κίνησιν, μάλιστα την πρώτην άπλουστάτη γάρ, και ταύτης ή δμαλή. Ο δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἁρμονικῆς ¹⁶ καὶ ὀπτικῆs· οὐδετέρα γὰρ ἢ ὄψις ἢ ἡ ψωνὴ θεωρεῖ, άλλ' ή γραμμαί και άριθμοί οἰκεία μέντοι ταῦτα πάθη ἐκείνων· καὶ ἡ μηχανικὴ δὲ ὡσαύτως. "Ωστ' ει τις θέμενος κεχωρισμένα των συμβεβηκότων σκοπεί τι περί τούτων ή τοιαύτα, ούθεν διά τούτο ψεῦδος ψεύσεται, ώσπερ οὐδ' ὅταν ἐν τη γη γράφη 20 καὶ ποδιαίαν φῆ τὴν¹ μὴ ποδιαίαν· οὐ γὰρ έν ταῖς προτάσεσι το ψεύδος. άριστα δ' αν ούτω θεωρηθείη έκαστον, εί τις το μη κεχωρισμένον θείη χωρίσας, όπερ ό άριθμητικός ποιεί και ό γεω-

¹ ποδιαίαν $\phi \hat{\eta}$ την Bessarion Alexander Bonitz: την ποδιαίαν $\phi \hat{\eta}$.

^a Cf. XIV. ii. 9, 10.

^a XII. vii. 6.

^b Optics studies lines and harmonics numbers because these sciences are subordinate to geometry and arithmetic (An. Post. 75 b 15).

are accidentally sensible although it does not treat of them qua sensible, it does not follow that the mathematical sciences treat of sensible things-nor, on the other hand, that they treat of other things which exist independently apart from these,

Many attributes are essential properties of things 5 as possessing a particular characteristic; e.g., there are attributes peculiar to an animal qua female or qua male, although there is no such thing as female or male in separation from animals, Hence there are also attributes which are peculiar to things merely qua lines or planes. And in proportion as the 6 things which we are considering are prior in formula and simpler, they admit of greater exactness; for simplicity implies exactness. Hence we find greater exactness where there is no magnitude, and the greatest exactness where there is no motion; or if motion is involved, where it is primary, because this is the simplest kind; and the simplest kind of primary motion is uniform motion.^a

The same principle applies to both harmonies and 7 optics, for neither of these sciences studies objects qua sight or qua sound, but qua lines and numbers b; yet the latter are affections peculiar to the former. The same is also true of mechanics.

Thus if we regard objects independently of their 8 attributes and investigate any aspect of them as so It is quite regarded, we shall not be guilty of any error on this proper to account, any more than when we draw a diagram on potentially the ground and say that a line is a foot long when it that which is not; because the error is not in the premisses of anot actually. The best way to conduct an investigation in every separable. case is to take that which does not exist in separation and consider it separately; which is just what the

1078 a

μέτρης. Εν μεν γαρ και αδιαίρετον ό ανθρωπος ή άνθρωπος όδ' έθετο έν αδιαίρετον, είτ' εθεώρησεν 25 εί τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ή ἀδιαίρετος. ὁδὲ γεωμέτρης ούθ' ή άνθρωπος ούθ' ή άδιαίρετος, άλλ' ή στερεόν. ά γαρ καν εί μή που ήν άδιαίρετος ύπηρχεν αυτώ, δήλον ότι και άνευ τούτων ένδέχεται αὐτῶ ὑπάρχειν [τὸ δυνατόν]1. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσιν, καὶ περὶ ὄντων 80 διαλέγονται, καὶ ὄντα ἐστίν διττὸν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, τὸ μέν ἐντελεχεία τὸ δ' ὑλικῶς. 'Επεί δέ τό άναθόν καί το καλόν έτερον (το μέν γάρ άει έν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις), οί φάσκοντες ούδεν λέγειν τας μαθηματικάς έπιστήμας περί καλοῦ η ἀναθοῦ ψεύδονται· λένουσι 35 γάρ και δεικνύουσι μάλιστα ου γάρ ει μή ονομάζουσι, τὰ δ' ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ λέγουσι περί αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη 1078 & τάξις καί συμμετρία και τὸ ώρισμένον, ἁ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αί μαθηματικαί ἐπιστήμαι. καὶ ἐπεί νε πολλών αιτια φαίνεται ταῦτα (λέγω δ' οίον ή τάξις καί το ώρισμένον), δήλον ότι λέγοιεν αν καί 5 την τοιαύτην αιτίαν την ώς το καλόν αιτιον τρόπον τινά. μαλλον δε γνωρίμως εν άλλοις περί αὐτῶν έροῦμεν.

IV. Περί μέν ούν τών μαθηματικών, ότι τε όντα 1 om. F: habent codd.

^b Cf. III. ii. 4.

^a i.e., potentially. ^b Cf. III, ii. ^c ^c There is no obvious fulfilment of this promise.

arithmetician or the geometrician does For man, 9 qua man, is one indivisible thing; and the arithmetician assumes man to be one indivisible thing. and then considers whether there is any attribute of man qua indivisible. And the geometrician considers man neither qua man nor qua indivisible, but qua something solid. For clearly the attributes which would have belonged to "man" even if man were somehow not indivisible can belong to man irrespectively of his humanity or indivisibility. Hence for this reason the geometricians are right 10 in what they maintain, and treat of what really exists; *i.e.*, the objects of geometry really exist. For things can exist in two ways, either in complete reality or as matter.4

And since goodness is distinct from beauty (for it Mathema-tues does not is always in actions that goodness is present, whereas ignore the beauty is also in immovable things), they b are in $\frac{p_{\text{introduce of}}}{beauty}$. error who assert that the mathematical sciences tell us nothing about beauty or goodness: for they 11 describe and manifest these qualities in the highest degree, since it does not follow, because they manifest the effects and principles of beauty and goodness without naming them, that they do not treat of these The main species of beauty are orderly qualities. arrangement, proportion, and definiteness ; and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences. And inasmuch as it is evident that these 12 (I mean, e.g., orderly arrangement and definiteness) are causes of many things, obviously they must also to some extent treat of the cause in this sense, i.e. the cause in the sense of the Beautiful. But we shall deal with this subject more explicitly elsewhere.°

IV. As regards the objects of mathematics, then, The Ideal theory.

VOL. II

1078 b έστι και πως όντα, και πως πρότερα και πως ου πρότερα, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν 10 πρώτον αὐτὴν τὴν κατά τὴν ἰδέαν δόξαν ἐπισκεπτέον, μηθέν συνάπτοντας πρός την των αριθμών φύσιν, άλλ' ώς υπέλαβον έξ άρχης οι πρώτοι τάς ίδέας φήσαντες είναι. Συνέβη δ' ή περί των είδων δόξα τοις είπουσι διά το πεισθήναι περί τής άληθείας τοις 'Ηρακλειτείοις λόγοις ώς πάντων των 16 αλσθητών αεί δεόντων, ωστ' είπερ επιστήμη τινός έσται καί φρόνησις, ετέρας δείν τινάς φύσεις είναι παρά τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας οὐ γὰρ είναι τῶν δεόντων επιστήμην. Σωκράτους δε περί τὰς ήθικάς άρετάς πραγματευομένου και περί τούτων δρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρώτου (τῶν μέν γὰρ 20 φυσικών έπι μικρόν Δημόκριτος ήψατο μόνον και ώρίσατό πως τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι πρότερον περί τινων όλίγων, ών τούς λόγους είς τούς αριθμούς ανηπτον, οίον τί έστι καιρός η το δίκαιον η γάμος), εκείνος δ' ευλόγως έζήτει το τί έστι. συλλογίζεσθαι γαρ έζήτει, αρχή 25 δέ των συλλογισμών το τί έστιν διαλεκτική γάρ ίσχύς σύπω τότ' ήν ώστε δύνασθαι και χωρίς τοῦ τί έστι τάναντία έπισκοπείν, και των έναντίων εί

¹ δ' om. recc.

^a It seems quite obvious that Aristotle intends this vague phrase to refer to Plato. Cf. I. vi. 1-3, with which the following sections 2-5 should be compared. On the whole subject see Vol. I. Introd. pp. xx ff. 194

the foregoing account may be taken as sufficient to show that they exist, and in what sense they exist, and in what sense they are prior and in what they are not. But as regards the Ideas we must first consider the actual theory in relation to the Idea, without connecting it in any way with the nature of numbers. but approaching it in the form in which it was originally propounded by the first exponents a of the Ideas.

The theory of Forms occurred to those who enunci-2 ated it because they were convinced as to the true Ungin of nature of reality by the doctrine of Heraelitus, that the theory. all sensible things are always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be any knowledge or thought about anything, there must be certain other entities, besides sensible ones, which persist. For there can be no knowledge of that which is in flux. Now Socrates 8 devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was the first to seek a general definition of these (for of the Physicists Democritus gained only a superficial grasp of the subject^b and defined, after a fashion, the hot " and " the cold "; while the Pythagoreans ° at an earlier date had arrived at definitions of some few things-whose formulae they connected with numbers-e.g., what "opportunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he was trying 4 to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence. At that time there was as yet no such proficiency in Dialectic that men could study contraries independently of the essence, and consider whether both contraries come under the

^b Cf. Physics 194 a 20, De Part. Anim. 642 a 24. < Cf. I. v. 2, 16.

1078 b

ή αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ἑρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ 80 ἀρχήν ἐπιστήμης. ᾿Αλλ' ὁ μèν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς. οί δ' έχώρισαν, και τα τοιαθτα των όντων ίδέας προσηγόρευσαν. ώστε συνέβαινεν αυτοίς σχεδόν τω αύτω λόγω πάντων ίδέας είναι των καθόλου λεγομένων, και παραπλήσιον ώσπερ αν εί τις ⁸⁵ ἀριθμήσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μέν ὄντων οἴοιτο μή δύνασθαι, πλείω δε ποιήσας αριθμοίη πλείω 1079 ε γάρ έστι τών καθ' έκαστα αίσθητών ώς έιπειν τά είδη, περί ών ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐκεί προήλθον καθ' έκαστόν τε γαρ δμώνυμον έστι καί παρά τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε άλλων ἕν ἔστιν ἐπὶ πολλών, και έπι τοισδε και έπι τοις αιδίοις. καθ' οῦς τρόπους δείκνυται ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, κατ' ούθένα φαίνεται τούτων έξ ενίων μέν γάρ ούκ άνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, έξ ένίων δέ και ούχ ών ο οι ονται τούτων είδη γίγνεται. κατά τε γάρ τούς λόγους τούς έκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔσται είδη πάντων όσων έπιστημαι είσίν, και κατά τό έν έπι 10 πολλών και τών αποφάσεων, κατα δε το νοείν τι

^a This is perhaps too strong a word. What Aristotle - means is that Socrates was the first thinker who attached importance to general definitions and systematically used arguments from analogy in order to arrive at them. The Greeks as a whole were only too readily impressed by analogy; Socrates merely developed an already prevalent tendency. For an example of his method see the reference ^b Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxi. at V. xxix. 5.

" With §§ 6-13 cf. I. ix. 1-8, which are almost verbally the same. On the relation of Book XIII, to Book I, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

same science. There are two innovations a which 5 may fairly be ascribed to Socrates : inductive reasoning and general definition. Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific knowledge.

But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals Arguments nor definitions as existing in separation, the Idealists the Ideal gave them a separate existence, and to these uni-Theory. versals and definitions of existing things they gave assumption the name of Ideas.^b Hence on their view it followed 6 by virtually the same argument that there are Ideas of the Ideas of all terms which are predicated universally "; and doubles the the result was very nearly the same as if a man who things to be wishes to count a number of things were to suppose explained. that he could not do so when they are few, and yet were to try to count them when he has added to them. For it is hardly an exaggeration to say that there are more Forms than there are particular sensible things (in seeking for whose causes these thinkers were led on from particulars to Ideas); because corresponding to each thing there is a synonymous entity, apart from the substances (and in the case of non-substantial things there is a One over the Many) both in our everyday world and in the realm of eternal entities.

Again, not one of the ways in which it is attempted 7 to prove that the Forms exist demonstrates their (b) The point; from some of them no necessary conclusion arguments supposed to follows, and from others it follows that there are Forms support the of things of which they hold that there are no Forms. theory either For according to the arguments from the sciences 8 there will be Forms of all things of which there are nothing, or sciences; and according to the "One-over-Many" too much, or else they argument, of negations too; and according to the imply conseargument that "we have some conception of what inconsistent

1079 a φθαρέντος των φθαρτών φάντασμα γάρ τι τούτων έστιν. έτι δε οι ακριβέστατοι των λόγων οι μεν των πρός τι ποιούσιν ίδέας, ών ου φασιν είναι καθ' αύτο γένος, οί δε τον τρίτον άνθρωπον λέγουσιν. όλως τε αναιρούσιν οι περί των είδων λόγοι α 15 μάλλον βούλονται είναι οι λένοντες είδη του τάς ίδέας είναι συμβαίνει γάρ μή είναι πρώτον τήν δυάδα άλλά τον αριθμόν, και τούτου τό πρός τι και τοῦτο τοῦ καθ' αὐτό, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τινὲς ἀκολουθήσαντες ταις περί των είδων δόξαις ηναντιώθησαν ταῖς ἀργαῖς. Έτι κατά μέν την ύπόληψιν 20 καθ' ην φασιν είναι τὰς ιδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν έσονται είδη άλλά και άλλων πολλών (το γάρ νόημα έν ού μόνον περί τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ μή ούσιων έστι, και έπιστημαι ου μόνον της ούσιας έσονται· συμβαίνει δε και άλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα)· [25 κατά δέ το άναγκαῖον και τὰς δόξας τὰς περί αύτων, εί έστι μεθεκτά τά ειδη, των ούσιων άναγκαΐον ίδέας είναι μόνον ού γάρ κατά συμ-Βεβηκός μετέχονται, άλλα δεί ταύτη εκάστου μετέχειν ή μή καθ' ύποκειμένου λέγεται. λέγω δ' οίον εί τι αύτου διπλασίου μετέχει, τουτο και αιδίου 30 μετέχει, άλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τώ διπλασίω αιδίω είναι. ωστε έσται ούσία τὰ είδη. ταῦτα δ' ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν σημαίνει κἀκεῖ·

ἐστί] ἔσται Syrianus, fecit E, Bekker.
 ² και J, A (E Alexander): και αι EA^b Syrianus, A (A^b).
 198

has perished " there will be Forms of perishable with the things, because we have a mental picture of these the theory things. Further, of the most exact arguments some establish Ideas of relations, of which the Idealists deny that there is a separate genus, and others state the "Third Man." And in general the arguments 9 for the Forms do away with things which are more important to the exponents of the Forms than the existence of the Ideas; for they imply that it is not the Dyad that is primary, but Number ; and that the relative is prior to number, and therefore to the absolute ; and all the other conclusions in respect of which certain persons by following up the views held about the Forms have gone against the principles of the theory.

Again, according to the assumption by which they 10 hold that the Ideas exist, there will be Forms not only (r) It is a of substances but of many other things (since the impleation concept is one not only in the case of substances but of the in the case of non-substantial things as well; and theory that there can be sciences not only of substances but also Ideas of of other things; and there are a thousand other bigs gaisimilar consequences); but it follows necessarily from II the views generally held about them that if the Forms stances; but are participated in, there can only be Ideas of sub- this is stances, because they are not participated in acci- contrary to dentally; things can only participate in a Form in practice. so far as it is not predicated of a subject. I mean, 12 e.g., that if a thing participates in absolute doubleness, it participates also in something eternal, but only accidentally; because it is an accident of "doubleucss " to be eternal. Thus the Ideas will be substance. But the same terms denote substance in the

¹⁰⁷⁹ η τί έσται τὸ είναι φάναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα, τὸ ἕν έπι πολλών: και εί μέν ταυτό είδος των ίδεων και των μετεχόντων, έσται τι κοινόν τί γαρ μαλλον έπί 85 των φθαρτών δυάδων, και των δυάδων των πολλών 1079 μεν αιδίων δέ, το δυας εν και ταυτόν, η επί τ' αυτης και της τινός; εί δε μή το αυτό είδος, όμώνυμα αν είη, και όμοιον ώσπερ αν εί τις καλοί άνθρωπον τόν τε Καλλίαν και το ξύλον, μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν έπιβλέψας αὐτῶν. Εί δέ τὰ μέν ἄλλα τους κοινούς λόγους έφαρμόττειν θήσομεν τοις είδεσιν, οίον έπ' αὐτὸν τὸν κύκλον σχημα ἐπίπεδον καὶ τὰ λοιπά μέρη τοῦ λόγου, τὸ δ' οῦ ἐστὶ προστεθήσεται, σκοπείν δεί μή κενον ή τουτο παντελώς. τίνι τε γαρ προστεθήσεται; τω μέσω η τω έπιπέδω η πασιν; πάντα γάρ τα έν τη ουσία ίδέαι, οໂον τό ζώον καί τὸ δίπουν. ἔτι δήλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ 10 είναι τι, ωσπερ το επίπεδον φύσιν τινά ή πασιν ένυπάρξει τοις είδεσιν ώς γένος.

V. Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλονται τὰ εἴδη ἢ τοῖς ἀἰδίοις τῶν aἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ [τοῖς]² φθειρο-16 μένοις οὕτε γὰρ κινήσεώς ἐστιν οὕτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς αἴτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτε⁸ πρὸς τὴν

¹ έπι τ' Bonitz : έπ'.
 ² om. Syrianus, A (A^b Alexander).
 ³ Bonitz : οὐδὲ.

sc. in the definition or essence of "Ideal man."
 200

^a §§ 14, 15 have no counterpart in Book I.

^b The suggestion is that the definition of an Ideal circle is the same as that of a particular circle, except that it must have added to it the statement of what particular the Idea is an Idea.

sensible as in the Ideal world; otherwise what meaning will there be in saying that something exists besides the particulars, *i.e.* the unity comprising their multiplicity? If the form of the Ideas and of the 13 things which participate in them is the same, they will have something in common (for why should duality mean one and the same thing in the case of perishable 2's and the 2's which are many but eternal, and not in the case of absolute duality and a particular 2?). But if the form is not the same, they will simply be homonyms; just as though one were to eall both Callias and a piece of wood "man," without remarking any property commou to them.

^a And if we profess that in all other respects the 14 common definitions apply to the Forms, e.g. that (d) Inff-"plane figure" and the other parts of the definition $\frac{\operatorname{cully} of}{\operatorname{regarding}}$ apply to the Ideal circle, only that we must also state $\frac{\operatorname{Ideas}}{\operatorname{regarding}}$ of what the Form is a Form, we must beware lest this $\frac{\operatorname{Form} \operatorname{regarding}}{\operatorname{regarding}}$ is a quite meaningless statement." For to what 15 clement of the definition must the addition be made ? as related in to "eentre," or "plane" or all of them ? For all $\frac{\operatorname{definition}}{\operatorname{definition}}$. the elements in the essence of an Idea are Ideas; e.g. "animal" and "two-footed." Further, it is obvious that "being an Idea," just like "plane," must be a definite characteristic which belongs as genus to all its species.^a

V. ^eAbove all we might examine the question what (a) What do on earth the Ideas contribute to sensible things, contribute to sensible things, contribute to generation and decay; to sensible for they are not the cause of any motion or change They are in them. Moreover they are no help towards the 2

^d *i.e.*, "being an Idea" will be a characteristic common to all Ideas, and so must be itself an Idea.

^e This chapter corresponds almost verbally to I. m. 9-15. Cf. note on ch. w. 6.

1079 b έπιστήμην ούθεν βοηθεί την των άλλων (ούδε' γαρ ούσία έκεινα τούτων έν τούτοις γαρ αν ήν), ούτ είς το είναι, μή ένυπάρχοντά γε τοις μετέχουσιν. ούτω μέν γάρ ίσως αίτια δόξειεν άν είναι ώς τό 20 λευκόν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ. ἀλλ' ούτος μέν ό λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος, ὃν 'Αναξανόρας μέν πρότερος Εύδοξος δ' ὕστερος ἔλεγε διαπορῶν καὶ ἕτεροί τινες· ράδιον γάρ πολλά συναγαγείν και άδύνατα πρός τήν τοιαύτην δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν έστι τάλλα κατ' ούθένα τρόπου των είωθότων 25 λέγεσθαι. το δε λέγειν παραδείγματα είναι καί μετέχειν αὐτῶν τὰ ἄλλα κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφοράς λέγειν ποιητικάς. τί γάρ έστι το έργαζόμενον πρός τας ίδεας αποβλέπον; ενδεχεταί τε καί είναι και γίγνεσθαι ότιοῦν και μη εικαζόμενον, ώστε και όντος Σωκράτους και μη όντος γένοιτ' αν 80 olos⁸ Σωκράτης (όμοίως δε δήλον ότι καν εί ήν³ ό Σωκράτης ἀίδιος). έσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ώστε καὶ εἴδη, οἶον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζώον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ẵμα δὲ καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος. έτι ού μόνον των αίσθητων παραδείγματα τα είδη, άλλά και αυτών, οίον το γένος των ώς γένους 85 είδων ώστε το αὐτὸ έσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκών. έτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον χωρίς είναι την οὐσίαν καὶ 1080 a οῦ ή οὐσία. ὥστε πῶς ἂν αι ίδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων ούσαι χωρίς είεν; 'Εν δέ τῶ Φαίδωνι

Bonitz: οὄτε.
 otos A (A^b Alexander): οἰον codd,
 ⁸ εἰ ῆν Bessarion, A: εἰη codd.
 ⁴ αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν Bekker.

knowledge of other things (for they are not the sub- not causes, they do not stance of particulars, otherwise they would be in help our particulars) or to their existence (since they are not knowledge , they do not present in the things which participate in them. explain the If they were, they might perhaps seem to be causes, evistonce of things in the sense in which the admixture of white causes a thing to be white. But this theory, which was 3 stated first by Anaxagoras and later by Eudoxus in his discussion of difficulties, and by others also, is very readily refuted; for it is easy to adduce plenty of impossibilities against such a view). Again, other things are not in any accepted sense derived from the Forms. To say that the Forms are patterns, 4 and that other things participate in them, is to use To say empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is ideas are it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas ? "patterns" Besides, anything may both be and come to be help the without being imitated from something else; thus theory, a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not, and even if Socrates were eternal. 5 clearly the case would be the same. Also there will it only raises be several "patterns" (and therefore Forms) of difficulties. the same thing; e.g., "animal" and "two-footed" will be patterns of "man," and so too will the Idea of man. Further, the Forms will be patterns not 6 only of sensible things but of Ideas; e.g. the genus will be the pattern of its species; hence the same thing will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in separation; then how can the Ideas, if they are the substances of things, exist in separation from them ?

In the Phuedo a this statement is made : that the Plato

^a Plato, Phardo 100 D.

describes the Ideas as

1080 a

τοῦτον λέγεται τὸν τρόπον, ὡς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν. καίτοι τῶν εἰδῶν ὅντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται, ἂν μὴ ἦ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ 5 πολλὰ γίγνεται ἔτερα, οໂον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὡν οὕ φασιν εἶναι εἴδη. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται κἀκεῖνα ῶν φασιν ἰδέας εἶναι, καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἴας καὶ τὰ ἡηθέντα νῦν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ εἴδη. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν
 καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ λογικωτέρων καὶ ἀκριβεστέρων λόγων ἔστι πολλὰ συναγαγεῖν ὅμοια τοῖς τεθεωρημένοις.

VI. Έπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, καλῶς ἔχει πάλιν θεωρῆσαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς συμβαίνοντα τοῦς λέγουσιν οὐσίας αὐτοὺς ἐἰναι χωριστὰς
15 καὶ τῶν ὄντων αἰτίας πρώτας. ἀνάγκη δ', εἶπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς φύσις τις καὶ μὴ ἄλλη τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, ἤτοι εἶναι τὸ μὲν πρῶτόν τι αὐτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον ἔτερον ὄν τῷ εἴδει ἕκαστον—καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀσύμβλητος
20 ὅποιαοῦν μονὰς ὅποιαοῦν μονάδι, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐφεξῆς πῶσαι καὶ συμβληταὶ ὅποιαιοῦν ὅποιαισοῦν, οἶον λέγουσιν εἶναι τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμόν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ μαθηματικῷ οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὐδεμία μονὰς ἑτέρα ἑτέρας). ἢ τὰς μὲν συμβλητὰς τὰς δὲ μή (οἶον εἰ ἔστι μετὰ τὸ ἕν πρώτη ἡ δυάς, ἔπειτα ἡ τριὰς

^a This statement seems to bear two meanings, which Aristotle confuses : (i) There must be more than one numberseries, each series being different in kind from every other scries; (ii) All numbers are different in kind, and inaddible. Confusion (or textual inaccuracy) is further suggested by the fact that Aristotle offers no alternative statement of the nature of number in general, such as we should expect from 204 Forms are causes both of being and of generation, sausing Yet assuming that the Forms exist, still there is and generano generation unless there is something to impart tion, but motion; and many other things are generated betrue. (e.g. house and ring) of which the Idealists say that there are no Forms. Thus it is clearly possible that 7 those things of which they say that there are Ideas may also exist and be generated through the same kind of causes as those of the things which we have just mentioned, and not because of the Forms. Indeed, as regards the Ideas, we can collect against them plenty of evidence similar to that which we have now considered; not only by the foregoing methods, but by means of more abstract and exact reasoning.

VI. Now that we have dealt with the problems inforent concerning the Ideas, we had better re-investigate forms of the the problems connected with numbers that follow numbers are from the theory that numbers are separate sub-substances. stances and primary causes of existing things. Now if number is a kind of entity, and has nothing else as its substance, but only number itself, as some maintain; then either (a) there must be some one if there are part of number which is primary, and some other different part next in succession, and so on, each part being number, specifically different a-and this applies directly to 2 units, and any given unit is inaddible to any other other (a) all given unit; or (b) they ^b are all directly successive, units are maddlible, and any units can be added to any other units, as is or (h) all held of mathematical number; for in mathematical addible, number no one unit differs in any way from another. Or (c) some units must be addible and others not. 3 E.g., 2 is first after 1, and then 3, and so on with the or (c) some

his language. In any case the classification is arbitrary and ^b The units. incomplete.

they cannot

1080 a 25 και ούτω δη ό άλλος αριθμός, είσι δε συμβληται αί έν έκάστω ἀριθμῷ μονάδες, olov ai έν τη δυάδι τη πρώτη αύταις, και έν τη τριάδι τη πρώτη αύταις, και ούτω δη έπι των άλλων αριθμων αί δ έν τη δυάδι αυτή πρός τὰς έν τη τριάδι αυτή άσύμβλητοι, όμοίως δε και επι των άλλων των 80 ἐφεξής ἀριθμῶν. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμεῖται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἑνὶ άλλο έν, και τα τρία πρός τοις δυσι τούτοις άλλο έν. και ό λοιπός δε ώσαύτως ούτος δε μετά τό εν δύο έτερα άνευ τοῦ ένος τοῦ πρώτου, και ή τριάς 35 άνευ της δυάδος, όμοίως δέ και ό άλλος ἀριθμός). η τον μέν είναι των αριθμων οίον ό πρωτος ελέχθη. τόν δ' οΐον οί μαθηματικοί λέγουσι, τρίτον δέ τόν ρηθέντα τελευταΐον. "Ετι τούτους ή χωριστούς είναι 1080 10 τούς αριθμούς τών πραγμάτων, η ού χωριστούς άλλ' έν τοις αίσθητοις, ούχ ούτως δ' ώς το πρώτον έπεσκοπούμεν, άλλ' ώς έκ των άριθμων ένυπαρχόντων όντα τα αίσθητά η τον μέν αυτων είναι 5 τον δε μή, η πάντας είναι. οι μεν ούν τρόποι καθ' ούς ενδέχεται αύτους είναι ουτοί είσιν έξ ανάγκης μόνοι. αχεδόν δε και οι λέγοντες το εν άρχην είναι καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον πάντων, καὶ ἐκ τούτου και άλλου τινός είναι τον άριθμόν, έκαστος τούτων τινά των τρόπων είρηκε, πλήν του πάσας τάς μονάδας είναι άσυμβλήτους. και τοῦτο συμ-10 βέβηκεν ευλόγως ου γαρ ενδέχεται έτι άλλον τρόπον είναι παρά τους είρημένους, οί μεν ούν

^a *i.e.*, Ideal or natural.

^b In ch. ii. 1-3.

 ^o The Pythagorean number-atomist view; see Vol. I.
 Introd. p. xvii.
 206

other numbers; and the units in each number are units are addible, e.g. the units in the first a 2 are addible to addible one another, and those in the first 3 to one another, madilible, and so on in the case of the other numbers : but the units in the Ideal 2 are inaddible to those in the Ideal 3; and similarly in the case of the other 4 successive numbers. Hence whereas mathematical number is counted thus : after 1, 2 (which consists of another 1 added to the former) and 3 (which consists of another 1 added to these two) and the other numbers in the same way, Ideal number is counted hke this: after 1, a distinct 2 not including the original 1: and a 3 not including the 2, and the rest of the numbers similarly. Or (d) one kind of num-5 ber must be such as we first described, and another or to all such as the mathematicians maintain, and that which three alterwe have last described must be a third kind.

Again, these numbers must exist either in separa- each of a different tion from things, or not in separation, but in sensible numberthings (not, however, in the way which we first con-Numbers, as sidered,^b but in the sense that sensible things are substances, composed of numbers which are present in them ^c)- exist separeither some of them and not others, or all of them.d 6 These are of necessity the only ways in which the ately or as numbers can exist. Now of those who say that immanentin unity is the beginning and substance and element of all things, and that number is derived from it and something else, almost every one has described number in one of these ways (except that no one has maintained that all units are inaddible '); and this is 7 natural enough, because there can be no other way apart from those which we have mentioned. Some

^a *i.e.*, either all numbers are material elements of things, or some are and others are not. . Cf. § 2.

be held.

1080 b άμφοτέρους φασίν είναι τούς άριθμούς, τὸν μέν έχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικόν παρά τὰς ίδέας και τὰ αἰσθητά, και χωριστούς αμφοτέρους των αισθητών οι δε τόν 15 μαθηματικόν μόνον άριθμόν είναι τόν πρώτον τών όντων κεχωρισμένον των αίσθητων. Kal of Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ένα, τον μαθηματικόν, πλήν ου κεχωρισμένον άλλ' έκ τούτου τάς αίσθητάς ούσίας συνεστάναι φασίν τον γάρ όλον ουρανόν κατασκευάζουσιν έξ αριθμών, πλήν ου μοναδικών, άλλά 20 τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος. ὅπως δε το πρώτον εν συνέστη έχον μέγεθος, άπορειν "Αλλος δέ τις τὸν πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν ξοίκασιν. τόν των είδων ένα είναι, ένιοι δε και τόν μαθηματικόν τόν αύτόν τοῦτον είναι. Όμοίως δέ και περί τὰ μήκη καὶ περί τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ περί τὰ στερεά. 25 οι μέν γαρ έτερα τα μαθηματικά και τα μετά τας ίδέας. των δ' άλλως λεγόντων οι μέν τα μαθηματικά και μαθηματικώς λέγουσιν, όσοι μή ποιοῦσι τὰς ίδέας ἀριθμούς μηδὲ είναι φασιν ίδέας, οι δὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, ού μαθηματικώς δέ ού γαρ τέμνε-30 σθαι ούτε μέγεθος παν είς μεγέθη, ούθ' όποιασούν μονάδας δυάδα είναι. μοναδικούς δε τούς αριθμούς είναι πάντες τιθέασι, πλήν των Πυθαγορείων, όσοι

^a Cf. I. vi. 4. ^b Cf. XII. x. 14.

º Cf. ch. viii. 9, 10, XIV. iii. 15, v. 7, and see Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii. Plato.

^d Cf. § 10 ad fin., ch. 1. 4.

¹ i.e., the (semi-)Ideal lines, planes, etc. Cf. I. 1x. 30.

⁹ Speusippus ; cf. § 7 above.

hold that both kinds of number exist, that which Views actuinvolves priority and posteriority being identical (1) Plate. with the Ideas, and mathematical number being distinct from Ideas and sensible things, and both kinds being separable from sensible things "; others (2) Spenshold that mathematical number alone exists,^b being house the primary reality and separate from sensible things.

The Pythagoreans also believe in one kind of 8 number-the mathematical; only they maintain (3) Pyththat it is not separate, but that sensible substances "governes. are composed of it. For they construct the whole universe of numbers, but not of numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the units to be e_{λ} tended-but as for how the first extended unit was formed they appear to be at a loss.^o

/ Another thinker holds that primary or Ideal num- 9 ber alone exists; and some d identify this with (1) some mathematical number.

The same applies in the case of lines, planes and ciates. Some distinguish mathematical objects 10 solids. from those which "come after the Ideas" 1; and Similar of those who treat the subject in a different manner geometrical some g speak of the mathematical objects and in a objects. mathematical way-viz. those who do not regard the Ideas as numbers, nor indeed hold that the Ideas exist-and others ^h speak of the mathematical objects, but not in a mathematical way; for they deny that every spatial magnitude is divisible into extended magnitudes, or that any two given units make 2. But all who hold that Unity is an element 11 and principle of existing things regard numbers as

^h Xenocrates. For his belief in indivisible lines see Ritter and Preller 362. Aristotle ascribes the doctrine to Plato in L. ix. 25.

VOL. II

Р

Platonfat (5) Xeno-

1080 b

τὸ ἕν στοιχείον καὶ ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων· ἐκείνοι δ' ἔχοντα μέγεθος, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

Οσαχῶς μὲν οῦν ἐνδέχεται λεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν, 35 καὶ ὅτι πάντες εἰσὶν εἰρημένοι οἱ τρόποι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ἔστι δὲ πάντα μὲν ἀδύνατα, μαλλον δ' ἴσως βάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων.

VII. Πρώτον μέν ούν σκεπτέον εί συμβληταί 1081 & αί μονάδες η ασύμβλητοι, και εί ασύμβλητοι, ποτέρως ώσπερ διείλομεν. έστι μέν γάρ όποιανοῦν είναι όποιφοῦν μονάδα ἀσύμβλητον, ἔστι δέ τάς έν αὐτη τη δυάδι πρός τὰς έν αὐτη τη τριάδι, καὶ οὕτως δὴ ἀσυμβλήτους εἶναι τὰς ἐν ἑκάστω τῷ 5 πρώτω ἀριθμῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλας. Εί μέν ούν πάσαι συμβληταί και άδιάφοροι αί μονάδες, ό μαθηματικός γίγνεται άριθμός και είς μόνος, και τάς ίδέας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς. ποῖος γὰρ έσται ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ζῷον ἢ ἄλλο ότιοῦν τῶν είδῶν; ιδέα μεν γάρ μία έκάστου, οἶον 10 αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπου μία, καὶ αὐτοῦ ζώου ἄλλη μία· οἱ δ' δμοιοι και άδιάφοροι απειροι, ώστ' ούθέν μαλλον ήδε ή τριάς αὐτοάνθρωπος η όποιαοῦν. εἰ δὲ μή είσιν αριθμοί αι ίδέαι, ούδ' όλως οδόν τε αυτάς είναι. έκ τίνων γάρ έσονται άρχων αί ιδέαι; ό γάρ 15 αριθμός έστιν έκ τοῦ ένος και της δυάδος της αορίστου, και αι άρχαι και τα στοιχεία λέγονται τοῦ άριθμοῦ είναι, τάξαι τε οὔτε προτέρας ἐνδέχεται 210

consisting of abstract units, except the Pythagoreans; and they regard number as having spatial magnitude, as has been previously stated.4

It is clear from the foregoing account (i.) in how many ways it is possible to speak of numbers, and (ii.) that all the ways have been described. They are all impossible, but doubtless some b are more so than others.

VII. First, then, we must inquire whether the Plato's view units are addible or maddible; and if inaddible, in entraited which of the two ways which we have distinguished.^c For it is possible either (a) that any one unit is inaddible to any other, or (b) that the units in the Ideal 2 are inaddible to those in the Ideal 3, and thus that the units in each Ideal number are inaddible to those in the other Ideal numbers.

Now if all units are addible and do not differ in 2 kind, we get one type of number only, the mathe- if all units are addible, matical, and the Ideas eannot be the numbers thus the Ideas produced; for how can we regard the Idea of Man 3 or Animal, or any other Form, as a number? There exist. is one Idea of each kind of thing : e.g. one of Humanity and another one of Animality ; but the numbers which are similar and do not differ in kind are infinitely many, so that this 3 is no more the Idea of Man than any other 3 is. But if the Ideas are not numbers, they cannot exist at all; for from what 4 principles can the Ideas be derived? Number is derived from Unity and the indeterminate dyad, and the principles and elements are said to be the principles and elements of number, and the Ideas

a § 8. ^b so, the view of Xenocrates (cf. ch. vin. 8). ^e Ch. vi. 2, 3.

1081 a $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu \, d\rho_i \theta_\mu \hat{\omega} \nu \, a \dot{v} \tau \dot{a}_S \, o \ddot{v} \theta' \, \dot{v} \sigma \tau \dot{\epsilon} \rho a_S.$ Ei & $d\sigma \dot{v}_\mu$ βλητοι αί μονάδες, και ούτως ασύμβλητοι ώστε ήτισοῦν ήτινιοῦν, οὔτε τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐνδέχεται έλναι τοῦτον τὸν ἀριθμὸν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικὸς 20 έξ αδιαφόρων, καί τα δεικνύμενα κατ' αύτοῦ ώς έπι τοιούτου άρμόττει) ούτε τον των είδων ου γάρ έσται ή δυάς πρώτη έκ τοῦ ένὸς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, επειτα οι έξης αριθμοί, ώς λεγεται δυάς, τριάς, τετράς--άμα γαρ αί έν τη δυάδι τη πρώτη μονάδες γεννῶνται, εἴτε ὥσπερ ὁ πρῶτος 25 είπων έξ ανίσων (Ισασθέντων γαρ εγένοντο) είτε άλλως—, έπει εί έσται ή έτέρα μονάς της έτέρας προτέρα, και της δυάδος της έκ τούτων έσται προτέρα. ὅταν γὰρ ἡ τι τὸ μέν πρότερον τὸ δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων τοῦ μὲν ἔσται πρότερον τοῦ δ᾽ ὕστερον. Ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ἔστι πρωτον μὲν αὐτὸ 80 το έν, επείτα των άλλων εστι τι πρωτον έν, δεύ-

1 Ross: Eneira codd.

^a Since the only principles which Plato recognizes are Unity and the Dyad, which are numerical (Aristotle insists on regarding them as a kind of 1 and 2), and therefore clearly principles of number; and the Ideas can only be derived from these principles if they (the Ideas) are (a) numbers (which has been proved impossible) or (b) prior or posterior to numbers (*i.e.*, causes or effects of numbers, which they cannot be if they are composed of a different kind of units); then the Ideas are not derived from any principle at all, and therefore do not exist.

^b The Platonists.

^o This was the orthodox Platonic view of the generation of Ideal numbers; or at least Aristotle is intending to describe the orthodox view. Plato should not have regarded the Ideal numbers as composed of units at all, and there is no real reason to suppose that he did (see Vol. I. lutrod. pp. xxixxiii). But Aristotle infers from the fact that the Ideal 2 is 212 cannot be placed either as prior or as posterior to numbers.^a

But if the units are maddible in the sense that 5 any one unit is inaddible to any other, the number It all units so composed can be neither mathematical number are in-(since mathematical number consists of units which (1) the ideal do not differ, and the facts demonstrated of it fit first number in with this character) nor Ideal number. For on generated. this view 2 will not be the first number generated from Unity and the indeterminate dyad, and then the other numbers in succession, as they b say 2, 3, 4-because the units in the primary 2 are generated at the same time,^o whether, as the originator of the theory held, from unequals ^d (coming into being when these were equalized), or otherwise-since if we regard 6 the one unit as prior to the other," it will be prior also to the 2 which is composed of them ; because whenever one thing is prior and another posterior, their compound will be prior to the latter and posterior to the former.

Further, since the Ideal 1 is first, and then comes 7 a particular 1 which is first of the other 1's but second (2) The units

the first number generated (and then the other Ideal numbers in the natural order) that the units of the Ideal 2 are generated simultaneously, and then goes on to show that this is incompatible with the theory of inaddible units.

" i.e., the Great-and-Small, which Aristotle wrongly understands as two unequal things. It is practically certain that Plato used the term (as he did that of "Indeterminate Dyad ") to describe indeterminate quantity. See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxii.

This is a necessary implication of the theory of inadduble units (cf. ch. vi. 1, 2).

¹ So the order of generation will be : (1) Unity (ungenerated); (11) first unit in 2; (iii) second unit in 2; and the Ideal 2 will come between (ii) and (iii).

1081 n τερον δέ μετ' έκεινο και πάλιν τρίτον, το δεύτερον μέν μετά το δεύτερον, τρίτον δε μετά το πρώτον έν ώστε πρότεραι αν είεν αι μονάδες η οι αριθμοι έξ ών λέγονται¹· οໂον έν τη δυάδι τρίτη μονάς έσται 35 πρίν τα τρία είναι, και έν τη τριάδι τετάρτη και [ή] πέμπτη πρίν τους άριθμους τούτους. Ουδείς μέν ούν τόν τρόπον τούτον ειρηκεν αύτων τάς μονάδας ασυμβλήτους, έστι δε κατά μεν τας εκεί-1081 b νων άρχας εύλογον και ούτως, κατά μέντοι την άλήθειαν άδύνατον. τάς τε γάρ μονάδας προτέρας καί ύστέρας είναι εύλογον, είπερ και πρώτη τις έστι μονάς καί εν πρώτον, όμοίως δε καί δυάδας, είπερ και δυάς πρώτη έστιν μετά γάρ το πρώτον 5 εύλογον και άναγκαΐον δεύτερόν τι είναι, και εί δεύτερον, τρίτον, και ούτω δή τα άλλα έφεξης άμα δ' ἀμφότερα λέγειν, μονάδα τε μετά τὸ εν πρώτην είναι και δευτέραν, και δυάδα πρώτην, αδύνατον. οί δε ποιοῦσι μονάδα μεν καὶ εν πρωτον, δεύτερον 10 δε και τρίτον ουκέτι, και δυάδα πρώτην, δευτέραν δε και τρίτην ουκέτι. Φανερόν δε καί ότι ούκ ενδέχεται, εί ασύμβλητοι πάσαι αί μονάδες, δυάδα είναι αὐτὴν καὶ τριάδα καὶ οὕτω τοὺς άλλους άριθμούς. άν τε γάρ ωσιν άδιάφοροι αί μονάδες αν τε διαφέρουσαι εκάστη εκάστης, ανάγκη άριθμείσθαι τόν άριθμόν κατά πρόσθεσιν, οίον την 15 δυάδα πρός τω ένι άλλου ένος προστεθέντος, και την τριάδα άλλου ένος πρός τοις δυσί προστεθέντος, και την τετράδα ώσαύτως. τούτων δε όντων άδύνατον την γένεσιν είναι των αριθμων, ώς γεννωσιν

¹ πλέκονται A^bJ^aΓ Alexander. ² Jaeger. 214 after the Ideal I, and then a third 1 which is next will be prior after the second but third after the first 1, it follows to the numbers after that the units will be prior to the numbers after which they which they are called; e.g., there will be a third umt are called. in 2 before 3 exists, and a fourth and fifth in 3 before these numbers exist.^a

It is true that nobody has represented the units 8 of numbers as inaddible in this way; but according to the principles held by these thinkers even this view is quite reasonable, although in actual fact it is untenable. For assuming that there is a first unit 9 or first $1,^{b}$ it is reasonable that the units should be prior and posterior ; and similarly in the case of 2's, if there is a first 2. For it is reasonable and indeed necessary that after the first there should be a second ; and if a second, a third ; and so on with the rest in sequence. But the two statements, that there is 10 after 1 a first and a second unit, and that there is a first 2, are incompatible. These thinkers, however, recognize a first unit and first 1, but not a second and third; and they recognize a first 2, but not a second and third.

It is also evident that if all units are inaddible, (3) The numthere cannot be an Ideal 2 and 3, and similarly begenerated with the other numbers; for whether the units are 11 indistinguishable or each is different in kind from as the every other, numbers must be produced by addition; hold, for e.g. 2 by adding 1 to another 1, and 3 by adding they must another 1 to the 2, and 4 similarly.^a This being 12 so, numbers cannot be generated as these thinkers be generated

^a This is a corollary to the previous argument, and de-pends upon an identification of "ones" (including the Ideal One or Unity) with units.

• i.e., the Ideal One.

^e This is of course not true of the natural numbers.

1081 Ե

¹ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· μόριον γὰρ γίγνεται ἡ 20 δυὰς τῆς τριάδος καὶ αὕτη τῆς τετράδος· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχομένων. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πρώτης καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος ἐγίγνετο ἡ τετράς, δύο δυάδες παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν δυάδα· εἰ δὲ μή, μόριον ἔσται αὐτὴ¹ ἡ δυάς, ἑτέρα δὲ προσέσται μία δυάς, καὶ ἡ δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ 26 ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλου ἑνός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον στοιχεῖον δυάδα ἀόριστον· μονάδα γὰρ μίαν γεννậ, ἀλλ' οὐ δυάδα ὡρισμένην.

Έτι παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν τριάδα καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν δυάδα πῶς ἔσονται ǎλλαι τριάδες καὶ δυάδες; καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐκ προτέρων μονάδων καὶ ὑστέρων σύγκειν-30 ται; πάντα γὰρ ταῦτ' (ǎτοπά)[°] ἐστι καὶ πλασματώδη, καὶ ἀδύνατον είναι πρώτην δυάδα, είτ' αὐτὴν τριάδα. ἀνάγκη δ', ἐπείπερ ἔσται τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυὰς στοιχεῖα. εἰ δ' ἀδύνατα τὰ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς είναι ταύτας ἀδύνατον.

Εἰ μέν οῦν διάφοροι αἱ μονάδες ὅποιαιοῦν ὅποιαια-⁸⁵ οῦν, ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἔτερα συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ δ' aἱ μὲν ἐν ἄλλῷ διάφοροι, aἱ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιάφοροι ἀλλήλαις μόναι, καὶ οὕτως 1082 κ οὐθὲν ἐλάττω συμβαίνει τὰ δυσχερῆ. οἶον γὰρ ἐν τῆ δεκάδι αὐτῆ ἕνεισι δέκα μονάδες, σύγκειται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐκ δύο πεντάδων ἡ δεκάς.

¹ aὐτή] aὕτη EJ. ² Jaeger.

try to generate them, from Unity and the dyad; by succesbecause 2 becomes a part of 3, and 3 of 4, and sive addithe same applies to the following numbers. But 13 according to them 4 was generated from the first tions of 1. 2 and the indeterminate dyad, thus consisting of two 2's apart from the Ideal 2.^b Otherwise 4 will consist of the Ideal 2 and another 2 added to it, and the Ideal 2 will consist of the Ideal 1 and another 1; and if this is so the other element cannot be the indeterminate dyad, because it produces one unit and not a definite 2.º

Again, how can there be other 3's and 2's besides 14 the Ideal numbers 3 and 2, and in what way can they General be composed of prior and posterior units ? All these eriticism of the theory, theories are absurd and fictitious, and there can be no primary 2 and Ideal 3. Yet there must be, if we are to regard Unity and the indeterminate dyad as elements.^d But if the consequences are impossible, 15 the principles cannot be of this nature.

If, then, any one unit differs in kind from any other, these and other similar consequences necessarily follow. If, on the other hand, while the units if the units in different numbers are different, those which are in number are the same number are alone indistinguishable from units in one another, even so the consequences which follow different are no less difficult. For example, in the Ideal 16 number 10 there are ten units, and 10 is composed numbers are imuldible, both of these and of two 5's. Now since the Ideal the conse-

• i.e., 3 is produced by adding 1 to 2. ^b Cf. § 18.

" The general argument is: Numbers are produced by addition ; but this is incompatible with the belief in the Indeterminate Dyad as a generative principle, because, being duplicative, it cannot produce single units.

^a *i.e.*, if numbers are not generated by addition, there must be Ideal (or natural) numbers.

1082 a

έπει δ' ούχ ό τυχών αριθμός αυτή¹ ή δεκάς ούδέ σύγκειται έκ των τυχουσών πεντάδων, ώσπερ 5 ούδε μονάδων, ανάγκη διαφέρειν τας μονάδας τας έν τη δεκάδι ταύτη. αν γαρ μη διαφέρωσιν, ούδ' αί πεντάδες διοίσουσιν έξ ών έστιν ή δεκάς επεί δέ διαφέρουσι, και αί μονάδες διοίσουσιν. εί δέ διαφέρουσι, πότερον ούκ ένέσονται πεντάδες άλλαι άλλα μόνον αθται αί δύο, η έσονται; είτε δε μη 10 ένέσονται, άτοπον· είτ' ενέσονται, ποία έσται δεκάς έξ ἐκείνων; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑτέρα δεκὰς ἐν τῆ δεκάδι παρ' αὐτήν. 'Αλλά μην και ἀνάγκη γε μή έκ των τυχουσών δυάδων την τετράδα συγκείσθαι. ή γαρ αόριστος δυάς, ώς φασι, λαβούσα την ώρισμένην δυάδα δύο δυάδας έποίησεν τοῦ γὰρ λη-15 φθέντος ήν δυοποιός. "Ετι το είναι παρά τας δύο μονάδας την δυάδα φύσιν τινά, και την τριάδα παρά τάς τρείς μονάδας, πως ένδέχεται; ή γάρ μεθέξει θατέρου θατέρου, " ώσπερ λευκός άνθρωπος παρά λευκόν και άνθρωπον (μετέχει γάρ τούτων). η όταν η θατέρου θάτερον διαφορά τις, ώσπερ ό 20 άνθρωπος παρά ζώον καί δίπουν. "Ετι τὰ μέν άφη έστιν έν, τα δε μίζει, τα δε θέσει ών ούδεν ένδέχεται υπάρχειν ταις μονάσιν έξ ων ή δυας και ή τριάς αλλ' ώσπερ οι δύο άνθρωποι ούχ έν τι παρά άμφοτέρους, ούτως άνάγκη και τας μονάδας. και 25 ούχ ότι άδιαίρετοι, διοίσουσι διά τούτο· καί γάρ αί

1 αύτη E.

² θατέρου Christ: θάτερον.

^a I think Ross's interpretation of this passage must be right. The Ideal 10 is a unique number, and the numbers contained in it must be ideal and unique; therefore the 218

Again, it must also be true that 4 is not composed 18 of chance 2's. For according to them the indeterminate dyad, receiving the determinate dyad, made two dyads; for it was capable of duplicating that which it received.⁶

Again, how is it possible that 2 can be a definite 19 entity existing besides the two units, and 3 besides the three units? Either by participation of the one in the other, as "white man" exists besides "white" and "man," because it partakes of these concepts ; or when the one is a differentia of the other, as "man" exists besides "animal" and "two-footed."

Again, some things are one by contact, others by 20 mixture, and others by position; but none of these alternatives can possibly apply to the units of which 2 and 3 consist. Just as two men do not constitute any one thing distinct from both of them, so it must be with the units. The fact that the units are in- 21 divisible will make no difference; because points two 5's must be specifically different, and so must their units —which contradicts the view under discussion.

b i.e., it is only reasonable to suppose that other 5's might be made up out of different combinations of the units.

· Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xxii f.

1082 a στιγμαί άδιαίρετοι, άλλ' όμως παρά τας δύο ούθέν έτερον ή δυάς αυτών. 'Αλλά μήν ουδέ τουτο δεί λανθάνειν, ότι συμβαίνει προτέρας και ύστέρας είναι δυάδας, όμοίως δε και τους άλλους αριθμούς. αί μέν γάρ έν τη τετράδι δυάδες έστωσαν άλλήλαις 30 άμα· άλλ' αυται των έν τη οκτάδι πρότεραί είσι. καί εγέννησαν, ώσπερ ή δυάς ταύτας, αθται τάς τετράδας τὰς ἐν τῆ ὀκτάδι αὐτῆ. ὤστε εἰ καὶ ή πρώτη δυας ίδέα, και αυται ίδέαι τινές έσονται. ό δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων· αί γὰρ ἐν τη δυάδι τη πρώτη μονάδες γεννωσι τας τέτταρας 85 τὰς ἐν τῆ τετράδι, ὥστε πάσαι ai μονάδες ίδεαι γίγνονται και συγκείσεται ίδέα έξ ίδεων ωστε δήλον ότι κάκεινα, ών ίδεαι αθται τυγχάνουσιν 1082 & ούσαι, συγκείμενα έσται, οίον εί τὰ ζώα φαίη τις συγκείσθαι έκ ζώων, εί τούτων ίδέαι είσίν. "Ολως δέ τὸ ποιείν τὰς μονάδας διαφόρους όπωσοῦν άτοπον και πλασματώδες (λέγω δε πλασματώδες τό πρός ύπόθεσιν βεβιασμένον), ούτε γάρ κατά τό 5 ποσών ούτε κατά το ποιον δρωμεν διαφέρουσαν μονάδα μονάδος, ἀνάγκη τε η ἴσον η ἄνισον είναι άριθμόν, πάντα μέν άλλα μάλιστα τον μοναδικόν. ώστε εἰ μήτε πλείων μήτ' ελάττων, Ισος τὰ δὲ Ισα καὶ ὅλως ἀδιάφορα ταὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τοῖς αριθμοίς. εί δε μή, ουδ' αί εν αυτη¹ τη δεκάδι 10 δυάδες αδιάφοροι έσονται ίσαι ούσαι τίνα γαρ αιτίαν έξει λέγειν ό φάσκων άδιαφόρους είναι; "Ετι εί άπασα μονὰς καὶ μονὰς ἄλλη δύο, ή $[\delta]^2 \epsilon \kappa$

Alexander (?), Schwegler: ταύτη.
 om. Λ^b Alexander (?).

are indivisible also, but nevertheless a pair of points is not anything distinct from the two single points.

Moreover we must not fail to realize this: that on this theory it follows that 2's are prior and posterior, and the other numbers similarly. Let it 22 be granted that the 2's in 4 are contemporaneous; yet they are prior to those in 8, and just as the $\langle dc$ terminate \rangle 2 produced the 2's in 4, so ° they produced the 4's in 8. Hence if the original 2 is an Idea, these 2's will also be Ideas of a sort. And the same 23 argument applies to the units, because the nuits in the original 2 produce the four units in 4; and so all the units become Ideas, and an Idea will be composed of Ideas. Hence clearly those things also of which these thungs are Ideas will be composite; e.g., one might say that animals are composed of animals, if there are Ideas of animals.

In general, to regard units as different in any way 24 whatsoever is absurd and fictitious (by "fictitious" I mean "dragged in to support a hypothesis"). For we can see that one unit differs from another neither in quantity nor in quality; and a number must be either equal or unequal-this applies to all numbers, but especially to numbers consisting of abstract units. Thus if a number is neither more nor less, it is equal; 25 and things which are equal and entirely without difference we assume, in the sphere of number, to be identical. Otherwise even the 2's in the Ideal 10 will be different, although they are equal; for if anyone maintains that they are not different, what reason will he be able to allege ?

Again, if every unit plus another unit makes 2, a 26

^a In each case the other factor is the indeterminate dyad $(cf. \S 18)$.

1082 b της δυάδος αὐτης μονὰς καὶ ἡ ἐκ της τριάδος αὐτης δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ διαφερουσῶν τε, καὶ πότερον προτέρα της τριάδος ἢ ὑστέρα; μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔοικε 16 προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄμα τῃ τριάδι, ή δ' ἅμα τῃ δυάδι τῶν μονάδων. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅλως ἐν καὶ ἕν, καὶ ἐὰν ῃ ἴσα ἢ ἄνισα, δύο εἶναι, οἶον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον· οἱ δ' οὕτως λέγοντες οὐδὲ τὰς μονάδας.

- 20 Εἴτε δὲ μή ἐστι πλείων ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς ἢ ὁ τῆς δυάδος, θαυμαστόν· εἴτε ἐστὶ πλείων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἴσος ἐνεστι τῆ δυάδι, ὥστε οῦτος ἀδιάφορος αὐτῆ τῆ δυάδι. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, εἰ πρῶτός τις ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς καὶ δεύτερος· οὐδὲ ἔσονται αἱ ἰδέαι ἀριθμοί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ
- 26 όρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ διαφόρους τὰς μονάδας ἀξιοῦντες είναι, εἴπερ ἰδέαι ἐσονται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐν γὰρ τὸ είδος, aἱ δὲ μονάδες εἰ ἀδιάφοροι, καὶ aἱ δυάδες καὶ aἱ τριάδες ἔσονται ἀδιάφοροι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖσθαι οὕτως, ἐν δύο, μὴ προσλαμβανομένου πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς 80 λέγειν· οὕτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἔσται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, οὕτ' ἰδέαν ἐνδέχεται είναι· ἐνυπάρξει γὰρ ἑτέρα ἰδέα ἐν ἑτέρα, καὶ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἑνὸς μέρη. διὸ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, ὅλως δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀναιροῦσιν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γ'

⁸⁵ αὐτὸ ἔχειν τινὰ φήσουσιν ἀπορίαν, πότερον, ὅταν ἀριθμῶμεν καὶ εἶπωμεν ἕν δύο τρία, προσλαμβά-

^a Which conflicts with the view under discussion.

^b The implication seems to be, as Ross says, that the 222

1082 b

νοντες ἀριθμοῦμεν ἢ κατὰ μερίδας. ποιοῦμεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρως· διὸ γελοῖον ταύτην εἰς τηλικαύτην τῆς οὐσίας ἀνάγειν διαφοράν.

VIII. Πάντων δε πρώτον καλώς έχει διορίσα-1083 a σθαι τίς ἀριθμοῦ διαφορά, καὶ μονάδος, εἰ ἔστιν. άνάγκη δή ή κατά το ποσόν ή κατά το ποιόν διαφέρειν· τούτων δ' οὐδέτερον φαίνεται ἐνδέχεσθαι υ ύπάρχον. ἀλλ' ĝ ἀριθμός, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν. εἰ δὲ δή και αί μονάδες τῶ ποσῷ διέφερον, κἂν ἀριθμός άριθμοῦ διέφερεν δ ίσος τῷ πλήθει τῶν μονάδων. έτι πότερον αι πρώται μείζους η ελάττους, και αί ύστερον επιδιδόασιν η τουναντίον; πάντα γάρ ταῦτα ἄλογα. ἀλλὰ μην οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν δια-10 φέρειν ἐνδέχεται. οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν πάθος. ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς φασὶν ὑπάρ-χειν τὸ ποιὸν τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἔτι οὕτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦτ' αὐταῖς γένοιτο οὕτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς δυάδος· τὸ μέν γάρ οὐ ποιόν, ή δὲ ποσοποιόν¹. τοῦ γάρ πολλά τὰ ὄντα είναι αἰτία αὕτη² ή φύσις. εἰ δ' ἄρα ἔχει ¹⁵ πως ἄλλως, λεκτέον ἐν ἀρχῆ μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ διοριστέον περί μονάδος διαφοράς, μάλιστα μέν καί διότι άνάγκη ύπάρχειν εί δε μή, τίνα λέγουσιν.

Οτι μέν οῦν, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ αἱ ἰδέαι, οὕτε συμβλητὰς τὰς μονάδας ἁπάσας ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, 20 φανερόν, οὕτε ἀσυμβλήτους ἀλλήλαις οὐδέτερον τῶν

> ¹ ποσοποιόν E² Syrianus: ποσόν ποιόν. ² αύτῆs EJ.

^a This is Apelt's interpretation of $\kappa a \tau \dot{a} \mu \epsilon \rho t \dot{\delta} as$. For this sense of the word he quotes Plutarch, Moralia 644 c. The meaning then is: If you count by addition, you regard number as exhibited only in concrete instances; if you treat each number as a "distinct portion" (*i.e.*, generated 22.4 by addition or by enumerating distinct portions.^{*a*} But we do both ; and therefore it is ridiculous to refer this point to so great a difference in essence.

VIII. First of all it would be well to define the How can differentia of a number; and of a unit, if it has a units differ? differentia. Now units must differ either in quantity or in quality; and clearly neither of these alternatives can be true. "But units may differ, as number does, in quantity." But if units also differed in quantity, They cannot number would differ from number, although equal in differ in quantity, number of units. Again, are the first units greater 2 or smaller, and do the later units increase in size. or the opposite? All these suggestions are absurd. Nor can units differ in quality ; for no modification or in can ever be applicable to them, because these thinkers quality. hold that even in numbers quality is a later attribute than quantity.^b Further, the units cannot derive 3 quality either from unity or from the dyad; because unity has no quality, and the dyad produces quantity, because its nature causes things to be many. If, then, the units differ in some other way, they should most certainly state this at the outset, and explain, if possible, with regard to the differentia of the unit, why it must exist; or failing this, what differentia they mean.

Clearly, then, if the Ideas are numbers, the units 4 cannot all be addible, nor can they all be inaddible

separately), you admit another kind of number besides the mathematical. Aristotle says that number can be regarded in both ways.

^b Numbers have quality as being prime or composite, "plane" or "solid" (*i.e.*, products of two or three factors); but these qualities are clearly incidental to quantity, *('f.* V. xiv, 2. 1088 a τρόπων. αλλά μήν οὐδ' ώς ἕτεροί τινες λέγουσι περί των αριθμών λέγεται καλώς είσι δ' ουτοι όσοι ίδέας μέν ούκ οίονται είναι ούτε άπλως ούτε ώς ἀριθμούς τινας ούσας, τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ είναι καί τους αριθμούς πρώτους των ὄντων, και αρχήν 25 αὐτῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν. ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ἕν μέν είναι τι πρώτον τών ένών, ώσπερ έκεινοι φασι. δυάδα δε των δυάδων μή, μηδε τριάδα των τριάδων του γάρ αὐτου λόγου πάντα ἐστίν, εἰ μέν ουν ούτως έχει τα περί τον αριθμόν και θήσει τις είναι τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕν άρχή. άνάγκη γαρ διαφέρειν το έν το τοιούτο τών 30 άλλων μονάδων ει δε τοῦτο, και δυάδα τινà πρώτην τῶν δυάδων, δμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους άριθμούς τούς έφεξής. εί δέ έστι το έν άρχή, άνάγκη μαλλον ώσπερ Πλάτων έλεγεν έχειν τὰ περί τους αριθμούς, και είναι δυάδα¹ πρώτην και τριάδα, και ου συμβλητούς είναι τους αριθμούς υ πρός αλλήλους. αν δ' αθ πάλιν τις τιθή ταθτα, ειρηται ότι άδύνατα πολλά συμβαίνει. άλλά μήν άνάγκη γε η ούτως η έκείνως έχειν, ώστ' εί 1083 & μηδετέρως, ούκ αν ενδέχοιτο είναι τον αριθμον χωριστόν.

Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι χείριστα λέγεται ὁ τρίτος τρόπος, τὸ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικόν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἰς μίαν δόξαν συμβαίνειν δύο ἁμαρ τίας. οὔτε γὰρ μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἰδίας ὕποθέσεις ὑποθέμενον ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν. ὅσα τε τοῖς ὡς εἴδη

¹ δυάδα] τινα δυάδα Ε: την δυάδα J.

^a Cf. ch. i. 4.

226

in either sense. Nor again is the theory sound which Gratelsa of Spenappuls certain other thinkers a hold concerning numbers, new, These are they who do not believe in Ideas, either 5 absolutely or as being a kind of numbers, but believe that the objects of mathematics exist, and that the numbers are the first of existing things, and that their principle is Unity itself. For it is absurd that if, as they say, there is a 1 which is first of the 1's,^b there should not be a 2 first of the 2's, nor a 3 of the 3's; for the same principle applies to all cases. Now 6 if this is the truth with regard to number, and we posit only mathematical number as existing, Unity is not a principle. For the Unity which is of this nature must differ from the other units; and if so. then there must be some 2 which is first of the 2° s: and similarly with the other numbers in succession. But if Unity is a principle, then the truth about 7 numbers must rather be as Plato used to maintain : there must be a first 2 and first 3, and the numbers cannot be addible to each other. But then again, if we assume this, many impossibilities result, as has been already stated.º Moreover, the truth must lie one way or the other ; so that if neither view is sound, number cannot have a separate abstract existence.

From these considerations it is also clear that the 8 third alternative d-that Ideal number and mathe- Xenocrates' matical number are the same-is the worst ; for two worst. errors have to be combined to make one theory. (i.) Mathematical number cannot be of this nature, but the propounder of this view has to spin it out by making peculiar assumptions; (ii.) his theory must

^b i.e., Speusippus recognized unity or "the One" as a formal principle, but admitted no other ideal numbers. Aristotle argues that this is inconsistent. ^d Cf. ch. vi. 7.

^c Ch. vii, 1-viii, 3.

227

1083 h τον αριθμον λέγουσι συμβαίνει, και ταθτα άνανκαΐον λέγειν. Ο δε τών Πυθαγορείων τρόπος τή μέν έλάττους έχει δυσχερείας των πρότερον εί-10 ρημένων, τη δε ίδίας ετέρας. το μεν γάρ μή γωριστόν ποιείν τον αριθμόν αφαιρείται πολλά των άδυνάτων το δε τα σώματα εξ αριθμών είναι συγκείμενα, και τον αριθμόν τοῦτον είναι μαθηματικόν, αδύνατόν έστιν. ούτε γαρ ατομα μεγέθη λέγειν άληθές, ει θ' ότι μάλιστα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν 16 τρόπον, ούχ αι γε μονάδες μέγεθος έχουσιν. μέγεθος δ' έξ άδιαιρέτων συγκείσθαι πως δυνατόν; άλλά μήν ο γ' άριθμητικός άριθμός μοναδικός έστιν, έκεινοι δέ τον άριθμον τα όντα λέγουσιν. τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ώς έξ έκείνων όντων των αριθμών. Εί τοίνυν 20 ανάγκη μέν, ειπερ έστιν αριθμός των όντων τι καθ' αύτό, τούτων είναι τινα των ειρημένων τρόπων, ούθένα δε τούτων ενδέχεται, φανερόν ώς ούκ έστιν αριθμού τις τοιαύτη φύσις οίαν κατασκευάζουσιν οί χωριστόν ποιοῦντες αὐτόν. "Ετι πότερον έκάστη μονάς έκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ 25 ίσασθέντων έστίν, η ή μεν έκ τοῦ μικροῦ ή δ' έκ τοῦ μεγάλου; εἰ μέν δη ούτως, ούτε ἐκ πάντων τών στοιχείων έκαστον, ούτε άδιάφοροι αί μονάδες. έν τη μέν γάρ το μέγα έν τη δε το μικρον υπάρχει, έναντίον τη φύσει όν. έτι αί έν τη τριάδι αυτη πως; μία γάρ περιττή. άλλα διά τοῦτο ἴσως 30 αὐτό τό ἕν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιττῷ μέσον. εἰ δ'

^a See Vol. I, Introd. p. xvii.

^b This is proved in De Gen. et Corr. 315 b 24-317 a 17.

 $^{^{\}circ}$ Cf. ch. vii. 5 n. Aristotle is obviously referring to the two units in the Ideal 2.

admit all the difficulties which confront those who speak of Ideal number.

The Pythagorean view in one way contains fewer 9 difficulties than the view described above, but in Physical States and the second seco another way it contains further difficulties peculiar to Pythagorean itself. By not regarding number as separable, it disposes of many of the impossibilities; but that bodies should be composed of numbers, and that these numbers should be mathematical, is impossible." For (a) it is not true to speak of indivisible magni-10 tudes b'; (b) assuming that this view is perfectly true, still units at any rate have no magnitude ; and how can a magnitude be composed of indivisible parts? Moreover anthmetical number consists of abstract units. But the Pythagoreans identify number with existing things; at least they apply mathematical propositions to bodies as though they consisted of those numbers.^a

Thus if number, if it is a self-subsistent reality, 11 must be regarded in one of the ways described above, it follows and if it cannot be regarded in any of these ways, that number clearly number has no such nature as is invented for a solfit by those who treat it as separable. reality.

Again, does each unit come from the Great and 12 the Small, when they are equalized o; or does one General come from the Small and another from the Great? ^{objections.} If the latter, each thing is not composed of all the are such elements, nor are the units undifferentiated ; for one numbers contains the Great, and the other the Small, which is by nature contrary to the Great. Again, what of the 13 units in the Ideal 3? because there is one over. But no doubt it is for this reason that in an odd number they make the Ideal One the middle unit.^d If on

^d Cf. Diels, Vorsokratiker 270. 18.

subvistant

1083 b

έκατέρα των μονάδων έξ αμφοτέρων έστιν ισασθέντων, ή δυάς πως έσται μία τις ούσα φύσις έκ του μεγάλου και μικρού; η τί διοίσει τής μονάδος; έτι προτέρα ή μονάς της δυάδος άναιρουμένης γὰρ ἀναιρεῖται ή δυάς. ἰδέαν οῦν ἰδέας ἀναγκαῖον ι αὐτὴν είναι, προτέραν γ' οῦσαν ἰδέας, καὶ γεγονέναι προτέραν. ἐκ τίνος οῦν¹; ἡ γὰρ ἀόριστος δυὰς δυοποιός ήν. "Ετι άνάγκη ήτοι απειρον τόν άριθμόν είναι ή πεπερασμένον χωριστόν γάρ ποιούσι 1084 = τόν ἀριθμόν, ὥστε ούχ οἶόν τε μή οὐχὶ τούτων θάτερον υπάρχειν. ότι μεν τοίνυν απειρον ούκ ένδέχεται, δήλον ούτε γάρ περιττός ο άπειρός έστιν ούτε άρτιος, ή δε γένεσις των αριθμών η περιττοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἢ ἀρτίου ἀεί ἐστιν, ὡδὶ μέν τοῦ · ένος είς τον άρτιον πίπτοντος περιττός, ώδι δέ της μέν δυάδος εμπιπτούσης ό άφ' ένος διπλασιαζόμενος, ώδι δε των περιττων ό άλλος άρτιος. "Ετι εί παυα ίδέα τινός, οί δε αριθμοί ίδεαι, και δ άπειρος έσται ίδέα τινός, η των αίσθητων η άλλου τινός. καίτοι ούτε κατά την θέσιν ενδέχεται ούτε 10 κατά λόγον, τάττουσί γ³ ουτω τάς ιδέας. Εl δέ πεπερασμένος, μέχρι πόσου; τοῦτο γὰρ δεῖ λένεσθαι ου μόνον ότι, άλλά και διότι. άλλά μήν εί μέχρι της δεκάδος ό αριθμός, ωσπερ τινές φασιν,

> ¹ τίνος οὖν A^b Alexander Syrianus: τινος οὖν (τινοσοῦν) EJ. ² γ' Schwegler: δ'.

^a Ch. vii. 18.

^b The point seems to be that if number is self-subsistent it must be *actually* finite or infinite. Aristotle himself holds that number is infinite only potentially; *i.e.*, however high you count, you can always count higher.

^e *i.e.*, as implying an actual infinite.

the other hand each of the units comes from both Great and Small, when they are equalized, how can the Ideal 2 be a single entity composed of the Great and Small ? How will it differ from one of its units ? Again, the unit is prior to the 2; because when the unit disappears the 2 disappears. Therefore the unit 14 must be the Idea of an Idea, since it is prior to an Idea, and must have been generated before it. From what, then ? for the indeterminate dyad, as we have seen,^a causes duality.

Again, number must be either infinite or finite If number (for they make number separable, so that one of 18 solfthese alternatives must be true).^b Now it is obvious 15 that it cannot be infinite, because infinite number subsistent, is neither odd nor even, and numbers are always be infinited. generated either from odd or from even number. By one process, when 1 is added to an even number, we get an odd number; by another, when 1 is multiplied by 2, we get ascending powers of 2; and by another, when powers of 2 are multiplied by odd numbers, we get the remaining even numbers.

Again, if every Idea is an Idea of something, and 16 the numbers are Ideas, infinite number will also be an Idea of something, either sensible or otherwise. This, however, is impossible, both logically o and on their own assumption,^d since they regard the Ideas as they do.

If, on the other hand, number is finite, what is its (b) if it is limit ? In reply to this we must not only assert the finite, and fact, but give the reason. Now if number only goes 17 up to 10, as some hold," in the first place the Forms the limit is

^{*d*} *i.e.*, as inconsistent with the conception of an Idea as a hold, the

determining principle. • Cf. XII, vni. 2. 'The Platonists derived this view from the Pythagoreans; see Vol. I. Introd. p. xvi.

πρώτον μέν ταχύ έπιλεμβει τα είδη οίον εί έστιν ή τριάς αυτοάνθρωπος, τίς έσται άριθμος αυτό-15 ιππος; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀριθμὸς μέχρι δεκάδος. ανάγκη δη των έν τούτοις αριθμών τινα' είναιουσίαι γαρ και ιδέαι ούτοι-άλλ' όμως εκλεμμει. τα του ζώου γαρ είδη υπερέξει - άμα δε δηλον ότι εί ούτως ή τριας αυτοάνθρωπος, και αι άλλαι 20 τριάδες· ὄμοιαι γαρ αί έν τοις αὐτοις ἀριθμοις, ὥστ' άπειροι έσονται άνθρωποι, ει μεν ίδεα εκάστη τριάς, αὐτὸ ἕκαστος³ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ³ άνθρωποί γε. και ει μέρος δ ελάττων τοῦ μείζονος, ό έκ των συμβλητων μονάδων των έν τω αυτω άριθμώ, εί δη ή τετράς αυτή ίδεα τινός έστιν, οΐον ίππου η λευκού, ο άνθρωπος έσται μέρος 25 ίππου, εί δυας ό άνθρωπος. άτοπον δε και τό τής μέν δεκάδος είναι ίδέαν, ένδεκάδος δε μή, μηδέ των έχομένων άριθμων. "Ετι δέ και έστι και γίγνεται ένια καί ών είδη ούκ έστιν, ώστε διά τί ού κακείνων είδη έστιν; ούκ άρα αίτια τα είδη εστίν.

"Ετι ἄτοπον εἰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος μᾶλλόν τι ὃν καὶ εἶδος αὐτῆς τῆς δεκάδος, καίτοι τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις ὡς ἐνός, τῆς δ' ἔστιν. πειρῶνται δ' ὡς τοῦ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος τελείου ὅντος ἀριθμοῦ. γεννῶσι γοῦν τὰ ἑπόμενα, οἶον τὸ κενόν, ἀναλογίαν, τὸ περιττόν, τὰ ἄλλα τὰ

τινὰ Alexander, Bonitz: τινὰs.
 aἰτὸ ἔκαστος J Bessarion Alexander: αὐτοέκαστος.
 δὴ Bonitz: δ'.
 aἰτὴ T Bessarion Alexander: αὕτη.

1084 a

^a Robin is probably right in taking this to mean that the 3 which is in the ideal 4 is like the 3 which is in the 4 which 232

will soon run short. For example, if 3 is the Idea of conse-Man, what number will be the Idea of Horse? about Each number up to 10 is an Idea; the Idea of Horse, then, must be one of the numbers in this series, for they are substances or Ideas. But the fact remains 18 that they will run short, because the different types of animals will outnumber them. At the same time it is clear that if in this way the Ideal 3 is the Idea of Man, so will the other 3's be also (for the 3's in the same numbers " are similar), so that there will be an infinite number of men; and if each 3 is an Idea, each man will be an Idea of Man; or if not, they will still be men. And if the smaller number is 19 part of the greater, when it is composed of the addible units contained in the same number, then if the Ideal 4 is the Idea of something, c g. " horse " or "white," then "man" will be part of "horse," if "man" is 2. It is absurd also that there should be an Idea of 10 and not of 11, nor of the following numbers.

Again, some things exist and come into being of 20 which there are no Forms^b; why, then, are there not Forms of these too? It follows that the Forms are not the causes of things.

Again, it is absurd that number up to 10 should be more really existent, and a Form, than 10 itself; although the former is not generated as a unity, whereas the latter is. However, they try to make out that the series up to 10 is a complete number; at least they generate the derivatives. *e.g.* the void, 21 proportion, the odd, etc., from within the decad.

is in a higher ideal number, and so on (La Theorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote, p. 352). ^b Cf. ch. iv. 7, 8; I. ix. 2, 3. 1084 b άλλον, το μέν κατά λόγον το δέ κατά χρόνον. ποτέρως ούν το εν άρχή; ωσπερ γαρ είρηται, και ή όρθη της όξείας και αύτη έκείνης δοκεί προτέρα είναι, και έκατέρα μία. αμφοτέρως δη ποιούσι τό εν αρχήν. εστι δε αδύνατον το μεν γαρ ώς είδος 20 και ή ουσία, το δ' ώς μέρος και ώς ύλη. έστι γάρ πως εν εκάτερον, τη μεν αληθεία δυνάμει (εί γε δ ἀριθμὸς ἕν τι καὶ μἡ ὡς σωρός, ἀλλ' ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρων μονάδων, ὥσπερ φασίν), ἐντελεχεία δ' οὐκ έστι μονάς έκατέρα. αίτιον δε τής συμβαινούσης άμαρτίας ότι άμα έκ των μαθημάτων έθήρευον 23 και έκ των λόγων των καθόλου, ώστ' έξ έκεινων μέν ώς στιγμήν το έν και την άρχην έθηκαν ή γὰρ μονὰς στιγμὴ ἄθετός ἐστιν. καθάπερ οῦν καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τὰ ὄντα συνετίθεσαν και ούτοι. ωστε γίγνεται ή μουάς ύλη των αριθμών και άμα προτέρα της δυάδος, πάλιν δέ s» ύστέρα ώς őλου τινός και ένος και είδους της δυάδος ούσης. διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου ζητεῖν τὸ κατηγορούμενον έν και ούτως ώς μέρος έλεγον ταυτα δέ άμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ἕν αὐτὸ δεῖ τμόνον ἄθετοντ εἶναι (οὐθενὶ γὰρ διαφέρει

^a Aristotle takes the number 2 as an example, but the principle is of course universal. In a sense both number and unit are one; but if the number exists as an actual unity, the unit can only exist potentially.

^b Perhaps the Atomists ; but of. I. viii. 3, 4.

• If the text is sound (and no convincing emendation has been suggested), it seems best to understand $\mathcal{U}e_{\tau o\nu}$ in a rather wider sense than the semi-technical one put forward by Ross. "Without position" = not localized, *i.e.* abstract. Unity as a principle has no concrete instance, 236

¹ Eri recc.

² µόνον älerov] µόνον aσύνθετον Bywater, µοναδικόν Ross.

Yes, but they are prior in a different sense : the one in formula and the other in time. In which sense, then, is the One a first principle? for, as we have just said, both the right angle seems to be prior to the acute angle, and the latter prior to the former; and each of them is one. Accordingly the Platonists 26 make the One a first principle in both senses. But this is impossible; for in one sense it is the One aug form or essence, and in the other the One aug part or matter, that is primary. There is a sense in which both number and unit are one; they are so in truth potentially-that is, if a number is not an aggregate but a unity consisting of units distinct from those of other numbers, as the Platonists hold-but each of the two a units is not one in com- 27 plete reality. The cause of the error which befell the Platomists was that they were pursuing their inquiry from two points of view-that of mathematics and that of general definition-at the same time. Hence as a result of the former they conceived of the One or first principle as a point, for the unit is a point without position. (Thus they too, just like certain others, represented existing things as com-28 posed of that which is smallest.) "We get, then, that the unit is the material element of numbers, and at the same time is prior to the number 2; and again we get that it is posterior to 2 regarded as a whole or unity or form. On the other hand, through looking for the universal, they were led to speak of the unity predicated of a given number as a part in the formal sense also. But these two characteristics cannot belong simultaneously to the same thing.

And if Unity itself must only be without position e^{29} (for it differs only in that it is a principle) and 2 is

^{1084 b} η öτι ἀρχή), καὶ ή μέν δυὰς διαιρετή ή δὲ μονὰς ³⁵ οὕ, ὅμοιοτέρα ἂν εἴη τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ ή μονάς· εἰ δ' ή μονάς, κἀκεῖνο τῆ μονάδι ἢ τῆ δυάδι· ὥστε προτέρα ἂν εἴη ἐκατέρα ή μονὰς τῆς δυάδος. οὕ 1085 a φασι δέ· γεννῶσι γοῦν τὴν δυάδα πρῶτον. ^{*}Ετι εἰ ἔστιν ή δυὰς ἕν τι αὐτὴ καὶ ή τριὰς αὐτή, ἄμφω δυάς. ἐκ τίνος οῦν αὕτη ή δυάς;

IX. 'Απορήσειε δ' άν τις καὶ ἐπεὶ ἁφὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς, ὅσων μὴ ἔστι μεταξὺ μονάδων, οἶον τῶν ἐν τῆ δυάδι ἢ τῆ τριάδι, πότερον ἐφεξῆς τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ ἢ οὕ, καὶ πότερον ἡ δυὰς προτέρα τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῶν μονάδων ὁποτεραοῦν.¹

Ομοίως δε και περί τῶν ὕστερον γενῶν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ συμβαίνει τὰ δυσχερή, γραμμής τε καί έπιπέδου και σώματος. οι μέν γαρ έκ των 10 είδων τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ποιοῦσιν, οἶον ἐκ μακρού μέν και βραχέος τα μήκη, πλατέος δε και στενοῦ τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ βαθέος δὲ καὶ ταπεινοῦ τοὺς όγκους ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν είδη τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικρού. την δε κατά το εν άρχην αλλοι άλλως τιθέασι τών τοιούτων. και έν τούτοις δε μυρία 15 φαίνεται τά τε άδύνατα και τὰ πλασματώδη και τα ύπεναντία πασι τοις εύλόγοις. απολελυμένα τε γαρ αλλήλων συμβαίνει, εί μή συνακολουθοῦσι καί αί ἀρχαί, ὥστε είναι τὸ πλατὺ καὶ στενὸν καὶ μακρόν καί βραχύ· εί δε τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ ἐπίπεδον γραμμή και το στερεόν επίπεδον. έτι δε γωνίαι 20 καί σχήματα καί τὰ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἀποδοθήσεται;

¹ δποτερφούν Bessarion, Aldine, Bekker.

divisible whereas the unit is not, the unit will be more nearly akin to Unity itself; and if this is so. Unity itself will also be more nearly akin to the unit than to 2. Hence each of the units in 2 will be prior to 2. But this they deny; at least they make out that 2 is generated first."

Further, if 2 itself and 3 itself are each one thing. both together make 2. From what, then, does this 2 come ?

IX. Since there is no contact in numbers, but units which have nothing between them-e.g. those in 2 or 3-are successive, the question might be raised whether or not they are successive to Unity itself, and whether of the numbers which succeed it 2 or one of the units in 2 is prior.^b

We find similar difficulties in the case of the genera 2 posterior to number -the line, plane and solid. Dumentities Some derive these from the species of the Great and generation Small ; viz. lines from the Long and Short, planes of geometicfrom the Broad and Narrow, and solids from the some Deep and Shallow. These are species of the Great Platonists and Small. As for the geometrical first principle 3 which corresponds to the arithmetical One, different derive them Platonists propound different views.^d In these too from species we can see innumerable impossibilitics, fictions and and Small contradictions of all reasonable probability. For "sterial (a) we get that the geometrical forms are unconnected principle; with each other, unless their principles also are so clearly associated that the Broad and Narrow is also Long mogical and Short ; and if this is so, the plane will be a line and the solid a plane. Moreover, how can angles 4 and figures, etc., be explained? And (b) the same

^a Cf. ch. vii. 5. ^b Cf. ibid. 5-7. ^c Cf. ch. vi. 10. ^d Cf. III. iv. 34, XIV. iii. 9.

1085 a ταύτό τε συμβαίνει τοῖς περί τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα γαρ πάθη μεγέθους έστίν, αλλ' ούκ έκ τούτων το μέγεθος, ώσπερ οὐδ' ἐξ εὐθέος καὶ καμπύλου τὸ μήκος, οὐδ' ἐκ λείου καὶ τραχέος τὰ στερεά. Πάντων δε κοινόν τούτων όπερ επί των είδων των ώς 25 γένους συμβαίνει διαπορείν, όταν τις θή τὰ καθόλου, πότερον το ζώον αυτό έν τω ζώω η έτερον αὐτοῦ ζώου. τούτου γὰρ μὴ χωριστοῦ μέν ὄντος ούδεμίαν ποιήσει απορίαν χωριστού δ', ώσπερ οί ταῦτα λέγοντές φασι, τοῦ ένὸς καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὐ ράδιον λύσαι, εί μη ράδιον δεί λέγειν το άδύνατον. 30 όταν γάρ νοή τις έν τή δυάδι το έν και όλως έν άριθμώ, πότερον αὐτὸ νοεῖ τι ἢ ἔτερον; Οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ μεγέθη γεννωσιν έκ τοιαύτης ύλης, έτεροι δε έκ τής στιγμής (ή δε στιγμή αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐχ έν άλλ' οίον τὸ έν) καὶ ἄλλης ὕλης οίας τὸ πληθος, άλλ' ου πλήθους. περί ών ουδέν ήττον συμβαίνει τά 85 αὐτὰ ἀπορεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μία ἡ ὕλη, ταὐτὸ γραμμή καί επίπεδον και στερεόν (εκ γάρ των αὐτων τό 1085 b αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἔσται)· εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ῦλαι, καὶ έτέρα μέν γραμμής έτέρα δε τοῦ ἐπιπέδου καὶ άλλη του στερεου, ήτοι ακολουθουσιν αλλήλαις η ού, ωστε ταύτὰ συμβήσεται και ούτως. η γάρ ούχ ἕξει τὸ ἐπίπεδον γραμμὴν ἢ ἔσται γραμμή. $^{"}E\tau\iota$ s πως μέν ένδέχεται είναι έκ τοῦ ένὸς καὶ πλήθοὺς

^a The reference is probably to Speusippus; Plato and Xenocrates did not believe in points (I. ix. 25, ch. v. 10 n.). 240

result follows as in the case of number; for these concepts are modifications of magnitude, but magmtude is not generated from them, any more than a line is generated from the Straight and Crooked, or_solids from the Smooth and Rough.

Common to all these Platonic theories is the same 5 problem which presents itself in the case of species (Digression, of a genus when we posit universals—viz, whether mentalit is the Ideal animal that is present in the particular difficulty of animal, or some other "animal" distinct from the theory) Ideal animal. This question will cause no difficulty if the universal is not separable ; but if, as the Platonists say, Unity and the numbers exist separately, then it is not easy to solve (if we should apply the phrase "not easy" to what is impossible). For 6 when we think of the one in 2, or m number generally, are we thinking of an Idea or of something else i —

These thinkers, then, generate geometrical magi others nitudes from this sort of material principle, but generate geometrical others a generate them from the point (they regard objects from the point not as a unity but as similar to Unity) and "similar" another material principle which is not plurality but to unity and is similar to it; yet in the case of these principles The same none the less we get the same difficulties. For if 7 the matter is one, line, plane and solid will be the duhculties same; because the product of the same elements apply to this must be one and the same. If on the other hand there is more than one kind of matter-one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the solideither the kinds are associated with each other, or they are not. Thus the same result will follow in this case also; for either the plane will not contain a line, or it will be a line.

Further, no attempt is made to explain how num-8

VOL. 11

1085 b

τον αριθμον ούθεν επιχειρείται όπως δ' ούν λέγουσι ταύτά συμβαίνει δυσχερή απερ και τοις έκ τοῦ ένὸς καὶ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου. ὁ μέν γαρ έκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου γεννά τὸν αριθμόν και ου τινός πλήθους, ό δ' έκ τινος πλή-10 θους, του πρώτου δέ (την γαρ δυάδα πρωτόν τι είναι πληθος), ώστε διαφέρει ούθεν ώς είπειν, άλλ' αί απορίαι αι αυταί ακολουθήσουσι, μιξις η θέσις ή κράσις η γένεσις και όσα άλλα τοιαθτα. Μάλιστα δ' αν τις επιζητήσειεν, εἰ μία εκάστη μονάς, εκ
τίνος εστίν οι γὰρ δη αὐτό γε τὸ εν εκάστη.
ι: ἀνάγκη δη² ἐκ τοῦ ενὸς αὐτοῦ είναι καὶ πλήθους, η μορίου του πλήθους. το μέν ούν πληθός τι είναι φάναι την μονάδα άδύνατον, άδιαίρετον γ' ούσαν. τὸ δ' ἐκ μορίου ἄλλας ἔχει πολλὰς δυσχερείας. άδιαιρετόν τε γάρ εκαστον άναγκαΐον είναι τών μορίων, η πληθος είναι και την μονάδα διαιρετήν, 20 και μή στοιχείον είναι το έν και το πλήθος. ή γαρ μονας έκαστη ούκ έκ πλήθους και ένός. έτι ούθεν άλλο ποιεί ό τοῦτο λέγων ἀλλ' η ἀριθμον έτερον το γάρ πλήθος άδιαιρέτων έστιν άριθμός. Έτι ζητητέον και παρά τοῦ οὕτω λέγοντος³ πότερον απειρος ό αριθμός η πεπερασμένος. ύπηρχε

¹ al aύταl Γ Syrianus, fort. Alexander: αύται (ai sup. lin. addito) J: αύται EA^b.

² δ' ή A^bΓ Syrianus.

⁸ τού ούτω λέγοντος scripsi: τούς ούτω λέγοντας.

^a Aristotle again identifies the indeterminate dyad with the number 2.

* sc. of the elements of number.

• Which, being a principle, is $d\theta \epsilon \tau o\nu$ (viii, 29).

^d sc, but from an indivisible part of plucality—which is not a plurality but a unity. 242 ber can be generated from unity and plurality; Their genebut howsoever they account for this, they have to number is meet the same difficulties as those who generate equally unnumber from unity and the indeterminate dyad. Satisfactory The one school generates number not from a particular plurality but from that which is universally predicated; the other from a particular plurality, but the first; for they hold that the dyad is the first plurality.^a Thus there is practically no difference 9 between the two views; the same difficulties will be involved with regard to mixture, position, blending, generation and the other similar modes of combination.^b

We might very well ask the further question : if How can each unit is one, of what it is composed ; for clearly guerated each unit is not absolute unity.^c It must be generated ated from absolute unity and either plurality or a plurality τ part of plurality. Now we cannot hold that the unit 10 is a plurality, because the unit is indivisible ; but the view that it is derived from a part of plurality involves many further difficulties, because (a) each part must be indivisible ; otherwise it will be a plurality will not be its elements, because each unit will not be generated from plurality^d and unity. (b) The 11 exponent of this theory merely introduces another number ; because plurality is a number of indivisible parts.^e

Again, we must inquire from the exponent of this is the theory whether the number is infinite or finite. Unite or

' i.e., to say that number is derived from plurality is to say that number is derived from number -which explains no-thing.

f se, which plurality has been shown to be.

1085 b

25 γάρ, ώς έοικε, και πεπερασμένον πληθος, έξ οδ αί πεπερασμέναι μονάδες και τοῦ ένός ἔστι τε ἕτερον αὐτό πλήθος και πληθος ἄπειρον. ποῖον οῦν πληθος στοιχείόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἕν; ΄Ομοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ στιγμῆς ἄν τις ζητήσειε καὶ τοῦ στοιχείου ἐξ οῦ ποιοῦσι τὰ μεγέθη· οὐ γὰρ μία γε μόνον στιγμή 30 έστιν αύτη. των γουν άλλων στιγμων εκάστη έκ τίνος; ού γαρ δή έκ γε διαστήματός τινος καί αὐτῆς στιγμῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ μόρια ἀδιαίρετα ένδέχεται τοῦ διαστήματος είναι μόρια, ώσπερ τοῦ πλήθους έξ ών αί μονάδες ό μεν γαρ αριθμός έξ άδιαιρέτων σύγκειται, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη ού. Πάντα 35 δή ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα φανερόν ποιεῖ ὅτι ἀδύνατον είναι τον αριθμον καί τα μεγέθη χωριστά. 1088 a έτι δε το διαφωνείν τους πρώτους¹ περί των άριθμών σημεῖον ὅτι τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ³ οὐκ ὄντα άληθη παρέχει την ταραχήν αύτοις. οί μέν γάρ τά μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, δρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἴδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ⁶ ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν οἱ δὲ τὰ εἴδη βουλόμενοι άμα και ἀριθμούς ποιεῖν, οὐχ ὁρῶντες δέ, εἰ τὰς ἀρχάς τις ταύτας θήσεται, πῶς ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικός αριθμός παρά τον είδητικόν, τον αυτόν

> ¹ πρώτους A^b Alexander: τρόπους EJ γρ. Alexander. ² ταῦτα A^bJ Syrianus.

^a Alexander preferred the reading $\pi\rho\omega\tau_{ovs}$, interpreting it in this sense; and I do not see why he should not be followed. Ross objects that $\pi\rho\omega\tau_{os}$ is used in the chronological sense in § 16 *init*, but this is really no argument. For a much more serious (although different) inconsistency in the use of terms *cf.* X11, iii. 1.

^b Speusippus and his followers,
 244

There was, it appears, a finite plurality from which, 12 in combination with unity, the finite units were $\inf (i)$ generated; and absolute plurality is different from finite plurality. What sort of plurality is it, then, that is, in combination with unity, an element of number >

We might ask a similar question with regard to flow are the point, *i.e.* the element out of which they create points spatial magnitudes. This is surely not the one and 13 only point. At least we may ask from what each generated? of the other points comes; it is not, certainly, from some interval and the Ideal point. Moreover, the parts of the interval cannot be indivisible parts, any more than the parts of the plurality of which the units are composed; because although number is composed of indivisible parts, spatial magnitudes are not.

All these and other similar considerations make 14 it clear that number and spatial magnitudes cannot summary exist separately. Further, the fact that the leading of the anthorities a disagree about numbers indicates that already it is the misrepresentation of the facts themselves stated. that produces this confusion in their views. Those b 15 who recognize only the objects of mathematics as existing besides sensible things, abandoned Ideal number and posited mathematical number because they perceived the difficulty and artificiality of the Ideal theory. Others, wishing to maintain both Forms and numbers, but not seeing how, if one posits these d as first principles, mathematical number can exist besides Ideal number, identified Ideal with mathe-

^o Xenocrates and his followers.

^a Unity and the indeterminate dyad; for the difficulty see ch. vii. 3, 4.

1086 a

είδητικόν καὶ μαθηματικόν ἐποίησαν ἀριθμόν-10 τω λόγω, έπει έργω γε άνήρηται ό μαθηματικός. ίδίας γάρ και ου μαθηματικάς υποθέσεις λέγουσιν. ό δε πρώτος θέμενος τα' είδη είναι και αριθμούς τὰ είδη και τὰ μαθηματικὰ είναι εὐλόγως έχώρισεν. ώστε πάντας συμβαίνει κατά μέν τι λέγειν όρθως, όλως δ' ούκ όρθώς. και αύτοι δε όμολογούσιν ου το ταύτα λέγοντες άλλα τα έναντία. αίτιον δ' ότι αί ύποθέσεις και αί άρχαι ψευδείς. χαλεπόν δ' έκ μή καλώς έχόντων λέγειν καλώς, κατ' Ἐπίχαρμον· άρτίως τε γάρ λέλεκται, και εύθέως φαίνεται ου καλώς έχον. 'Λλλά περί μέν των αριθμων ίκανά τά διηπορημένα και διωρισμένα· μάλλον γάρ έκ 20 πλειόνων αν έτι πεισθείη τις πεπεισμένος, πρός δέ τό πεισθηναι μή πεπεισμένος ούθεν μαλλον περί δέ των πρώτων άρχων και των πρώτων αιτίων και στοιχείων όσα μεν λέγουσιν οί περί μόνης της αίσθητής ούσίας διορίζοντες, τα μέν έν τοις περί φύσεως είρηται, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι τῆς μεθόδου τῆς 25 νῦν όσα δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες είναι παρά τὰς αἰσθητὰς έτέρας ούσίας, έχόμενόν έστι θεωρήσαι των είρημένων.

' Ἐπεὶ οὖν λέγουσί τινες τοιαύτας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ τὰ τούτων στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχάς, σκεπτέον περὶ τούτων τί λέγουσι καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν 80 ἀριθμοὺς ποιοῦντες μόνον καὶ τούτους μαθηματι-

1 rà: rá re recc. Syrianus.

^a Cf. ch. vi. 10. ^b Plato. ^c Fr. 14, Diels. ^c Physics I. iv.-vi. ^c The Pythagoreans and Speusippus.

246

matical number,—but only in theory, since actually mathematical number is done away with, because the hypotheses which they state are peculiar to them and not mathematical." And he " who first assumed 16 that there are Ideas, and that the Ideas are numbers, and that the objects of mathematics exist, naturally separated them. Thus it happens that all are right in some respect, but not altogether right ; even they themselves admit as much by not agreeing but contradicting each other. The reason of this is that there assumptions and first principles are wrong ; and it is difficult to propound a correct theory from 17 faulty premisses : as Epicharmus says, " no sooner is it said than it is seen to be wrong." "

We have now examined and analyzed the questions concerning numbers to a sufficient extent; for although one who is already convinced might be still more convinced by a fuller treatment, he who is not convinced would be brought no nearcr to conviction. As for the first principles and causes and 18 elements, the views expressed by those who discuss only sensible substance either have been described in the *Physics*⁴ or have no place in our present inquiry; but the views of those who assert that there are other substances besides sensible ones call for investigation next after those which we have just discussed.

Since, then, some thinkers hold that the Ideas and 19 numbers are such substances, and that their elements are the elements and principles of reality, we must inquire what it is that they hold, and in what sense they hold it.

Those " who posit only numbers, and mathematical 20

1086 a

κούς υστερον επισκεπτέοι. των δε τάς ίδεας λεγόντων άμα τόν τε τρόπου θεάσαιτ' άν τις και την άπορίαν την περί αυτών. άμα γάρ καθόλου τε ώς ούσίας' ποιούσι τώς ίδέας και πάλιν ώς χωριστώς καί των καθ' έκαστον. ταθτα δ' ότι οι κ ένδεχεται 83 διηπόρηται πρότερον. αίτιον δε τοῦ συνάψαι ταῦτα είς ταύτον τοις λέγουσι τάς ούσίας² καθόλου, ότι τοις αἰσθητοις οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς [οὐσίας]³ ἐποίουν. τὰ 1089 & μέν ούν έν τοις αίσθητοις καθ έκαστα δειν ενόμιζον καί μένειν ούθεν αύτων, τό δε καθόλου παρά ταῦτα είναι τε και ετερόν τι είναι. τοῦτο δ', ώσπερ έν τοις έμπροσθεν έλέγομεν, εκίνησε μέν Σωκράτης διά τούς όρισμούς, ού μην έχώρισε γε των καθ' » ἕκαστον καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας. δηλοί δε έκ των έργων άνευ μεν γάρ τοῦ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβείν, τὸ δε χωρίζειν αἴτιον των συμβαινόντων δυσχερών περί τὰς ίδέας ἐστίν. οί δ' ώς άναγκαίον, είπερ έσονται τινες ούσιαι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς καὶ ῥεούσας, χωριστὰς εἶι·αι, 10 ἄλλας μὲν οὐκ εἶχον, ταύτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγομένας έξέθεσαν, ώστε συμβαίνειν σχεδόν τας αύτας φύσεις είναι τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον. αύτη μέν ούν αυτή καθ' αυτήν είη τις αν δυσχέρεια τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Ό δὲ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας ἔχει τινὰ 16 ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς μὴ λέγουσιν, καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν

¹ ŵs ovolas secl. Jaeger.
 ² ovolas Jaeger: lôtas.
 ³ Jaeger.

^a XIV. ii. 21, ii. 2-8, 15, 16. ^b III. vi. 7-9. ^c The Platonists,

248

numbers at that, may be considered later "; but as Criterism of for those who speak of the Ideas, we can observe at theory the same time their way of thinking and the difficulties which befall them. For they not only treat the Ideas as universal substances, but also as separable and particular. (That this is impossible has been 21 already shown h by a consideration of the difficulties involved.) The reason why those who hold substances to be universal combined these two views was that they did not identify substances with sensible things. They considered that the particulars in the sensible world are in a state of flux, and that none of them persists, but that the universal exists besides them and is something distinct from them. This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage," 22 was initiated by Socrates as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them. This is evident from the facts : for without the universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of the universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal theory. Others,^d regarding it as neces-23 sary, if there are to be any substances besides those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence to those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that universals and particulars are practically the same kind of thing. This in itself would be one difficulty in the view which we have just described."

X. Let us now mention a point which presents some How are difficulty both to those who hold the Ideal theory and Collecting to those who do not. It has been stated already, at regarded (

^{*} See Vol. I. Introd. pp. xxi f.

1086 b

τοίς διαπορήμασιν έλέχθη πρότερον, λέγωμεν νύν. εί μέν γάρ τις μή θήσει τάς ούσίας είναι κεχωρισμένας, και τον τρόπον τουτον ώς λέγεται τα καθ' έκαστα των όντων, αναιρήσει την ουσίαν ώς βουλόμεθα λέγειν αν δέ τις θη τας ούσίας χωριστάς. πως θήσει τὰ στοιχεία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτων; εἰ μέν γάρ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ καθόλου, τοσαῦτα έσται τὰ όντα όσαπερ τὰ στοιχεία, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητά τά στοιχεία. έστωσαν γάρ αί μέν έν τη φωνή συλλαβαί ούσίαι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεία αὐτῶν στοιχεία των ούσιων ανάγκη δή το ΒΛ έν είναι 25 καὶ ἐκάστην τῶν συλλαβῶν μίαν, εἶπερ μὴ καθόλου καὶ τῶ εἴδει αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλὰ μία ἐκάστη τῶ ἀριθμῶ και τόδε τι και μη όμώνυμον. έτι δ' αυτό δ έστιν έν ἕκαστον τιθέασιν· εί δ' αί συλλαβαί, ούτω καί εξ ών είσιν· οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα πλείω ἄλφα ένός, οὐδέ των άλλων στοιχείων οδθέν κατά τον αυτόν λόγον 30 όνπερ οὐδὲ τῶν [άλλων] συλλαβῶν ή αὐτή ἄλλη και άλλη. άλλα μην εί τουτο, ούκ έσται παρά τα στοιχεία έτερα όντα, άλλα μόνον τα στοιχεία.

"Έτι δὲ οὐδ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ καθόλου, ή δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. δηλον δ' ἐκ^a τῶν ἀποδείζεων καὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγ ⁸⁵ νεται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, εἰ μη πῶν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί,³ οὐδ' ὅτι όδὶ ὁ

¹ άλλων seclusi.

³ δρθαîs J.

250

3 EK TE E.

the beginning of our treatise, among the problems.^a If we do not suppose substances to be separate, that is in the way in which particular things are said to be separate, we shall do away with substance in the sense in which we wish to maintain it; but if we suppose substances to be separable, how are we to regard their elements and principles ? If they are particular 2 and not universal, there will be as many real things if they are as there are elements, and the elements will not be periodiar, knowable. For let us suppose that the syllables in things will speech are substances, and that their letters are the in mumber elements of substances. Then there must be only than their one BA, and only one of each of the other syllables; that is, if they are not universal and identical in form, but each is numerically one and an individual, and not a member of a class bearing a common name. (Moreover, the Platonists assume that each Ideal 3 entity is unique.) Now if this is true of the syllables, it is also true of their letters. Hence there will not be more than one A, nor more than one of any of the other letters,^b on the same argument by which in the ease of the syllable there cannot be more than one instance of the same syllable. But if this is so, there will be no other things besides the letters, but only the letters.

Nor again will the elements be knowable; for they 4 will not be universal, and knowledge is of the universal. and these liements This can be seen by reference to proofs and defini- will be untions; for there is no logical conclusion that a given knowable. triangle has its angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles equal to two right

^a Cf. III. iv. 8-10, vi, 7-9.

^b This is, as a matter of fact, the assumption upon which the whole argument rests ; Aristotle is arguing in a circle.

251

1086 b άνθρωπος ζώον, εἰ μὴ πâς άνθρωπος ζώον. 'Λλλà 1087 a μήν είγε καθόλου αι άρχαι ή και αι έκ τούτων ούσίαι καθόλου <η)* έσται μη ούσία πρότερον ουσιαι καυολου (η) ευται μη συστα προτερου ουσίας· το μέν γάρ καθόλου ουκ ουσία, το δέ στοιχείον και ή άρχη καθόλου· πρότερον δέ το στοιχείον και ή άρχη ών άρχη και στοιχείόν έστιν. 5 ταῦτά τε δη πάντα συμβαίνει ευλόγως, ὅταν ἐκ στοιχείων τε ποιώσι τὰς ίδέας και παρά τὰς τό αυτό είδος έχούσας ουσίας και ίδέας έν τι άξιωσιν είναι κεχωρισμένον. Εί δε μηθεν κωλύει ώσπερ έπι των της φωνης στοιχείων πολλά είναι τα άλφα καί τὰ βητά και μηθέν είναι παρά τὰ πολλά 10 αὐτὸ ἄλφα καὶ αὐτὸ βῆτα, ἔσονται ἔνεκά νε τούτου απειροι αί δμοιαι συλλαβαί. Το δε την επιστήμην είναι καθόλου πάσαν, ώστε άναγκαίον είναι καί τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς καθόλου είναι καὶ μὴ οὐσίας κεχωρισμένας, έχει μὲν μάλιστ' ἀπορίαν των λεχθέντων, ου μην άλλ' ἔστι μεν ώς άληθες 15 το λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ώς ουκ άληθές. ή γάρ επιστήμη, ώσπερ και το επίστασθαι, διττόν, ών τό μέν δυνάμει, το δε ένεργεία. ή μέν ουν δύναμις ώς ύλη [τοῦ]³ καθόλου οῦσα και ἀόριστος τοῦ καθόλου και ἀορίστου ἐστίν, ή δ' ἐνέργεια ώρισμένη και ώρισμένου τόδε τι ούσα τοῦδέ τινος. άλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ή ὄψις τὸ καθόλου χρῶμα
 ∞ ὅρῷ, ὅτι τόδε τὸ χρῶμα ὅ ὅρῷ χρῶμά ἐστιν, καὶ
 ὅ θεωρεῖ ὁ γραμματικός, τόδε τὸ ἄλφα ἄλφα. έπει εί ανάγκη τας αρχάς καθόλου είναι, ανάγκη

¹ al om. EJ Syrianus.

β Ross, Syrianus (?): habet ante καθόλου Τ.
 Bonitz.

angles, or that a given man is an animal unless every man is an animal.

On the other hand, if the first principles are uni-5 versal, either the substances composed of them will if the last be universal too, or there will be a non-substance prior plinciples to substance; because the universal is not substance, sal, the con and the element or first principle is universal; and at equally the element or first principle is prior to that of which dufficult. it is an element or first principle. All this naturally 6 follows when they compose the Ideas of clements and assert that besides the substances which have the same form there are also Ideas each of which is a separate entity.

But if, as in the case of the phonetic elements, there Solution is no reason why there should not be many A's and problem. B's, and no "A itself" or "B itself" apart from these many, then on this basis there may be any number of similar syllables.

The doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal, 7 and hence that the principles of existing things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents the greatest difficulty of all that we have discussed; there is, however, a sense in which this statement is true, although there is another in which it is not true. Knowledge, like the verb " to know," has two senses, 8 of which one is potential and the other actual. The potentiality being, as matter, universal and indefinite, has a universal and indefinite object; but the actuality is definite and has a definite object, because it is particular and deals with the particular. It is only accidentally that sight sees universal colour, () because the particular colour which it sees is colour ; and the particular A which the grammarian studies is an A. For if the first principles must be universal,

1087 a

και τὰ ἐκ τούτων καθόλου, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων· cỉ δὲ τοῦτο, οἰκ ἔσται χωριστὸν οὐθὲν οὐδ' οὐσία. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἡ¹ ἐπι-٤ στήμη καθόλου, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὕ.

""Because $d\pi \delta \delta a \xi s$ " (logical or syllogistic proof) "must be in the first figure (*An. Post.* I, xiv.), and in that

METAPHYSICS, XIII. x. 9

that which is derived from them must also be universal, as in the case of logical proofs a; and if this is so, there will be nothing which has a separate existence; *i.e.* no substance. But it is clear that although in one sense knowledge is universal, in 'another it is not.

figure universal premises always give a universal conclusion." (Ross.)

1087 a

Ι. Περί μέν οῦν της οὐσίας ταύτης εἰρήσθω 80 τοσαθτα, πάντες δε ποιοθσι τάς άρχας εναντίας, ώσπερ έν τοις φυσικοίς, και περί τας ακινήτους ούσίας όμοίως. εί δε της των άπάντων άρχης μή ένδέχεται πρότερόν τι είναι, άδύνατον αν είη την άρχην ετερόν τι ούσαν είναι άρχην, οίον εί τις λέγοι το λευκόν άρχην είναι ούχ ή ετερον άλλ' ή 35 λευκόν, είναι μέντοι καθ' ύποκειμένου, και έπερόν τι ὃν λευκόν είναι· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ πρότερον ἔσται. άλλά μήν γίγνεται πάντα έξ έναντίων ώς ύποκειμένου τινός άνάγκη άρα μάλιστα έν τοις έναντίοις 1087 ο τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν, ἀεὶ ἄρα πάντα τὰ ἐναντία καθ' ύποκειμένου, και ούθεν χωριστόν άλλ' ώσπερ και φαίνεται ούθεν ούσία εναντίον, και ό λόγος μαρτυρεί. οὐθέν ἄρα τῶν ἐναντίων κυρίως ἀρχή πάντων άλλ' έτέρα. Οί δε τὸ ετερον τῶν ἐναντίων

Ν

^a *i.e.*, the Platonic Ideas or numbers, which they regarded as unchangeable substances. There is, however, no definite transition to a fresh subject at this point. The criticisms of the Ideas or numbers as substances, and of the Platonic first principles, have not been grouped systematically in Books 256

BOOK XIV

I. With regard to this kind of substance,^a then, let BOOK XIV the foregoing account suffice. All thinkers make the FORTHER CRITICISM first principles contraries; as in the realm of natural of the objects, so too in respect of the unchangeable sub- THEORIF. OF stances. Now if nothing can be prior to the first 2 principle of all things, that first principle cannot be a NUMBERS. first principle if it is an attribute of something else. All innheis This would be as absurd as to say that " white " is the trary first first principle, not qua anything clse but qua white, principles and yet that it is predicable of a subject, and is white because it is an attribute of something else; because the latter will be prior to it. Moreover, all things are 3 generated from contraries as from a substrate, and therefore contraries must most certainly have a substrate. Therefore all contraries are predicated of a subject, and none of them exists separately. But But no conthere is no contrary to substance; not only is this be a first apparent, but it is borne out by reasoned considera- principle. tion.^b Thus none of the contraries is strictly a first principle ; the first principle is something different.

But the Platonists treat one of the contraries as 4

XIII. and XIV. Indeed there is so little distinction in subject matter between the two books that in some MSS. XIV. was made to begin at XIII. ix. 18 (Syrianus ad loc.). Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

^b Cf. Categories 3 b 24-27.

VOL. II

257

1087 b

⁴ ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μέν τῷ ἐνὶ [τῷ ἴσῳ]¹ τὸ ἀνισον, ὡς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οῦσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ πλῆθος· γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας 10 ἀμφοῖν· καὶ γὰρ ὅ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ ἕν λέγων τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὸ δ' ἀνισον ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ δυάδα, ὡς ἕν ὄντα τὸ ἀνισον καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ διορίζει ὅτι λόγῷ ἀριθμῷ δ' οὕ.

Αλλά μήν καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὡς στοιχεῖα καλοῦσιν, οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόασιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ 15 μικρὸν λέγοντες μετὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς τρία ταῦτα στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν δύο ὕλην, τὸ δ' ἐν τὴν μορφήν, οἱ δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον, ὅτι τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μεγέθους οἰκειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοὐτων τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς μόνον δυσχερείας, ὡς ἀποδείξεις. πλὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε λόγου ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ ὅ ἀπερεχόμενον εἶναι ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρότερον τῆς δυάδος ἐκ

¹ Jaeger.

2 kal tò rece.

[•] Plato ; cf. XIII. vii. 5.

^b Probably Speusippus.

^o This shows clearly that by the Great-and-Small Plato meant a single principle, *i.e.*, indeterminate quantity. Aristotle admits this here because he is contrasting the Great-and-Small with the One; but elsewhere he prefers to regard the 258

matter, some opposing "the unequal" to Unity (on The the ground that the former is of the nature of plurality) Platonists and others plurality. For according to some, a^{5} numbers are generated from the unequal dyad of employ conthe Great and Small; and according to another, $b_{plinclples}$ from plurality; but in both cases they are generated by the essence of unity. For he who speaks of "the unequal" and Unity as elements, and describes the nucqual as a dyad composed of Great and Small, speaks of the unequal, *i.e.* the Great and Small, as being one; and does not draw the distinction that they are one in formula but not in number.^a

Again, they state the first principles, which they 8 call elements, badly; some say that the Great and and state the Small, together with Unity (making 3" in all), them hadly. are the elements of numbers; the two former as matter, and Unity as form. Others speak of the Many and Few, because the Great and the Small are in their nature more suited to be the principles of magnitude; and others use the more general term which covers these-" the exceeding " and "the exceeded." But none of these variations 7 makes any appreciable difference with respect to some of the consequences of the theory ; they only affect the abstract difficulties, which these thinkers escape because the proofs which they themselves employ are abstract. There is, however, this ex-8 ception : if "the exceeding" and "the exceeded" are the first principles, and not the Great and the Small, on the same principle number should be derived from the elements before 2 is derived; for as "the exceeding and the exceeded" is more

Platonic material principle as a duality. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xxii f. *Cf.* previous note. 1087 h 25 τῶν στοιχείων· καθόλου γὰρ ἀμφότερα μαλλόν ἐστιν. νῦν δὲ τό μὲν λέγουσι τό δ' οὐ λέγουσιν. Οί δε το ετερον και το άλλο πρός το εν άντιτιθέασιν, οί δε πλήθος και τό έν. εί δ' εστίν, ώσπερ βούλονται, τὰ ὄντα έξ έναντίων, τω δὲ ένὶ η οὐθέν έναντίον, η είπερ άρα μέλλει, το πληθος, το δ' 80 άνισον τω ίσω καὶ τὸ ἔτερον τω ταὐτω καὶ τὸ άλλο αὐτῶ, μάλιστα μέν οἱ τὸ ἕν τῶ πλήθει ἀντιτιθέντες έχονταί τινος δόξης, ου μήν ουδ' ούτοι ίκανως· έσται γάρ τό έν όλίγον· πλήθος μέν γάρ όλιγότητι, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τῷ όλίγω ἀντίκειται. Tò δ' έν ότι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερόν. και έν παντί 85 έστί τι έτερον ύποκείμενον, οໂον έν άρμονία δίεσις. έν δε μεγέθει δάκτυλος η πούς ή τι τοιοῦτον, έν δε δυθμοις βάσις η συλλαβή δμοίως δε και εν βάρει σταθμός τις ώρισμένος έστίν και κατά πάν-1088 a των δέ τον αυτόν τρόπον, έν μέν τοις ποιοίς ποιόν τι. έν δε τοις ποσοίς ποσόν τι (και αδιαίρετον το μέτρον, τό μέν κατά τό είδος το δέ πρός την αισθησιν), ώς ούκ όντος τινός του ένος καθ' αύτό ούσίας. και τοῦτο κατὰ λόγον σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ 5 εν ότι μέτρον πλήθους τινός, και ό αριθμός ότι πλήθος μεμετρημένον και πλήθος μέτρων (διο και εθλόγως οθκ έστι το εν αριθμός ουδε γαρ το μέτρον μέτρα, αλλ' άρχη και το μέτρον και το έν). δεί δε άει το αυτό τι υπάρχειν πασι το μέτρον, οίον εί ίπποι, το μέτρον ίππος, και εί άνθρωποι. 1 ταὐτώ Bekker.

^o Cf. V. vi. 17, 18, X. i. 8, 21.

universal than the Great and Small, so number is more universal than 2. But in point of fact they assert the one and not the other.

Others oppose "the different" or "other" to Unity; and others contrast Plurality and Unity. Now if, as they maintain, existing things are derived 9 from contraries, and if there is either no contrary to unity, or if there is to be any contrary it is plurality; and if the unequal is contrary to the equal, and the different to the same, and the other to the thing itself, then those who oppose unity to plurality have the best claim to credibility-but even their theory is inadequate, because then unity will be few. For plurality is opposed to pancity, and many to few.

That " unity " denotes a measure a is obvious. And 10 in every case there is something else which underlies unity or in every case there is something case which under the 0me it; e.g., in the scale there is the quarter-tone; in $\frac{1}{16}$ amenur spatial magnitude the inch or foot or some similar which have thing ; and in rhythms the foot or syllable. Similarly strate. It in the case of gravity there is some definite weight, has no Unity is predicated of all things in the same way; substantia of qualities as a quality, and of quantities as a quantity. (The measure is indivisible, in the former case in 11 kind, and in the latter to our senses.) This shows that unity is not any independent substance. And this is reasonable ; because unity denotes a measure of some plurality, and number denotes a measured plurality and a plurality of measures. (Hence too it stands to reason that unity is not a number; for the measure is not measures, but the measure and unity are starting-points.) The measure must 12 always be something which applies to all alike ; e.g., if the things are horses, the measure is a horse; if

1088 a

- ¹⁰ άνθρωπος.¹ εἰ δ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ ὅππος καὶ θεός, ζῷον ἴσως, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἔσται ζῷα. εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸν καὶ βαδίζον, ὅκιστα μὲν ἀριθμὸς τούτων διὰ τὸ ταὐτῷ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνὶ κατὰ² ἀριθμόν, ὅμως δὲ γενῶν ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τούτων, ὅ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης προσηγορίας.
- 15 Οί δè τὸ ἄνισον ώς ἕν τι, τὴν δυάδα δè άδριστον ποιούντες μεγάλου και μικρού, πόρρω λίαν των δοκούντων και δυνατων λέγουσιν πάθη τε γάρ ταῦτα καὶ συμβεβηκότα μάλλον η ὑποκείμενα τοις αριθμοις και τοις μεγέθεσιν έστι, τό πολύ και όλίγον άριθμοῦ, και μέγα και μικρόν 20 μεγέθους, ώσπερ άρτιον και περιττόν, και λείον καί τραχύ, και εύθυ και καμπύλον. έτι δε πρός ταύτη τη άμαρτία και πρός τι ανάγκη είναι το μέγα και το μικρόν και όσα τοιαθτα το δέ πρός τι πάντων ήκιστα φύσις τις η ούσία των κατηγοριών έστί, και ύστέρα του ποιού και ποσού. 25 καί πάθος τι τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ πρός τι, ώσπερ ἐλέχθη, άλλ' ούχ ύλη, εί τι έτερον καί τω όλως κοινώ πρός τι, και τοις μέρεσιν αυτού και είδεσιν. ουθέν γάρ έστιν ούτε μέγα ούτε μικρόν, ούτε πολύ ούτε όλίγον, ούτε όλως πρός τι, δ ούχ ετερόν τι δν πολύ η όλίγον η μέγα η μικρόν η πρός τι έστίν. 30 σημείον δ' ότι ήκιστα ούσία τις και όν τι το πρός

² ката тди recc.

⁶ Cf. § 5.

^b Čf. XI. xii. 1. There Aristotle refers to seven categories, 262

they are men, the measure is a man; and if they are man, horse and god, the measure will presumably be an animate being, and the number of them animate beings. If the things are "man," "white" and 13 " walking," there will scarcely be a number of them, because they all belong to a subject which is one and the same in number; however, their number will he a number of "genera," or some other such appellation.

Those " who regard the unequal as a unity, and 14 the dyad as an indeterminate compound of great similarly. and small, hold theories which are very far from "the unbeing probable or possible. For these terms repre- "great-andsent affections and attributes, rather than substrates, another bates of numbers and magnitudes-" many " and " few " and not a applying to number, and "great" and "small" to "ubstance magnitude-just as odd and even, smooth and rough, straight and crooked, are attributes. Further, in 15 addition to this error, "great" and "small" and all other such terms must be relative. And the relative is of all the categories in the least degree a definite entity or substance; it is posterior to quality and quantity. The relative is an affection of quantity, as we have said, and not its matter; since there is something else distinct which is the matter both of the relative in general and of its parts and kinds. There is nothing great or small, many 16 or few, or in general relative, which is many or few, great or small, or relative to something else without having a distinct nature of its own. That the relative is in the lowest degree a substance and a real thing is shown by the fact that of it alone b there is neither

but here he omits "activity" and "passivity" as being virtually identical with motion.

1088 a τι το μόνου¹ μή είναι γένεσιν αύτοῦ μηδε φθοράν μηδέ κίνησιν, ώσπερ κατά το ποσόν αύξησις καί φθίσις, κατά τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλοίωσις, κατά τόπον φορά, κατά την ουσίαν ή απλη γένεσις και φθορά. άλλ' ού κατά το πρός τι άνευ γάρ τοῦ κινηθήναι 35 ότε μεν μείζον ότε δε έλαττον η ίσον έσται θατέρου 1088 εκινηθέντος κατά τὸ ποσόν. ἀνάγκη τε ἑκάστου ύλην είναι το δυνάμει τοιούτον, ώστε και ούσίας. το δε πρός τι ούτε δυνάμει ούσία ούτε ένεργεία. "Ατοπον ούν, μαλλον δε αδύνατον, το ούσίας μή ούσίαν ποιείν στοιχείον και πρότερον ύστερον γάρ ¹ πάσαι αί κατηγορίαι. ἔτι δὲ τὰ στοιχεία οὐ κατηγορείται καθ' ών στοιχεία, το δε πολύ και όλίγον καί χωρίς και άμα κατηγορείται άριθμοῦ, και τὸ μακρὸν καὶ τὸ βραχὺ γραμμῆς, καὶ ἐπίπεδόν έστι και πλατύ και στενόν. εί δε δή και έστι τι πλήθος ού το μέν άει (το)² ολίγον, οίον ή δυάς 10 (εἰ γὰρ πολύ, τὸ ἕν ἂν ὀλίγον εἴη), κἂν πολὺ άπλως είη, οίον ή δεκάς πολύ, [καί]³ εί ταύτης μή έστι πλείον, η τα μύρια. πως ούν έσται ούτως έξ όλίγου και πολλοῦ ὁ ἀριθμός; ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω έδει κατηγορείσθαι ή μηδέτερον νῦν δὲ τὸ ἔτερον μόνον κατηγορείται.

II. 'Απλώς δὲ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἀρα δυνατὸν τὰ ἀΐδια ¹⁵ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκεῖσθαι· ὕλην γὰρ ἕξει· σύνθετον γὰρ πῶν τὸ ἐκ στοιχείων. εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἐξ οῦ

> ¹ μόνου E Syrianus: μόνουν J¹: μόνου J²Λ^bl. ² τό Alexander (?) Ross. ³ Bonitz.

A (16 V	1.0	ъ	CLE WITT	
° Cf. X. vi.	1-3,		Cf. XIII, viii, :	17.
OF A.				

generation nor destruction nor change in the sense that in respect of quantity there is increase and decrease, in respect of quality, alteration, in respect of place, locomotion, and in respect of substance, absolute generation and destruction. There is no 17 real change in respect of the relative; for without any change in itself, one term will be now greater, now smaller or equal, as the other term undergoes quantitative change. Moreover, the matter of every thing, and therefore of substance, nust be that which is potentially of that nature; but the relative is neither potentially substance nor actually.

It is absurd, then, or rather impossible, to represent 18 non-substance as an element of substance and prior to it : for all the other categories are posterior to substance. And further, the elements are not predicated of those things of which they are elements; vet "many" and "few" are predicated, both separately and together, of number; and "long" and "short" are predicated of the line, and the plane is both broad and narrow. If, then, there is a 19 plurality of which one term, viz. "few," is always predicable, e.g. 2 (for if 2 is many, 1 will be few a), then there will be an absolute "many"; e.g., 10 will be many (if there is nothing more than 10^{b}), or 10,000. How, then, in this light, can number be derived from Few and Many? Either both ought to be predicated of it, or neither : but according to this view only one or the other is predicated.

II. But we must inquire in general whether eternal Bround things can be composed of elements. If so, they not be comwill have matter; for everything which consists of posed of elements is composite. Assuming, then, that that 2 which consists of anything, whether it has always elements.

1088 h έστίν, εί και άςι έστι καν εί έγένετο, έκ τούτου γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται δε παν έκ τοῦ δυνάμει όντος τούτο δ γίγνεται (ού γαρ αν ενένετο' εκ του άδυνάτου ούδε πν), τό δε δυνατόν ενδεχεται και ενερ-20 γείν και μή, ει και ότι μάλιστα αεί έστιν ο αριθμός η ότιουν άλλο ύλην έχον, ενδέχοιτ' αν μη είναι. ώσπερ και το μίαν ήμέραν έχον και το όποσαοῦν έτη· εί δ' ούτω, και τό τοσούτον χρόνον ού μή έστι πέρας. οὐκ ἂν τοίνυν εἴη ἀίδια, εἴπερ μη ἀίδιον τὸ ένδεχόμενον μή είναι, καθάπερ έν άλλοις λόγοις 20 συνέβη πραγματευθήναι. εί δ' έστι το λεγόμενον νῦν ἀληθές καθόλου, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστίν ἀίδιος οὐσία έαν μή ή ένέργεια,³ τα δε στοιχεία ύλη τής ούσίας, ούδεμιας αν είη αιδίου ούσίας στοιχεία έξ ών έστιν ένυπαρχόντων. Είσι δέ τινες οι δυάδα μέν ἀόριστον ποιοῦσι τὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς στοιγείον. 30 τό δ' άνισον δυσχεραίνουσιν εύλόγως διά τά συμβαίνοντα άδύνατα. οίς τοσαῦτα μόνον ἀφήρηται τῶν δυσχερών, όσα διά τό ποιείν τό άνισον και τό πρός τι στοιχείον άναγκαία συμβαίνει τοις λέγουσιν. όσα δέ χωρίς ταύτης της δόξης, ταῦτα κἀκείνοις ὑπάρχειν άναγκαΐον, έάν τε τον είδητικον άριθμον έξ αυτών 85 ποιωσιν, έάν τε τον μαθηματικόν. Πολλά μέν 1089 1 ούν τὰ αίτια της έπι ταύτας τὰς αιτίας έκτροπής.

έγίνετο Ε: έγίγνετο Bekker.
 ³ ένεργεία recc. Γ.

^a IX. viii. 15-17, De Caelo I. xii. ^b Cf, ch. i. 14-17.

existed or it eame into being, must come into being (if at all) out of that of which it consists; and that everything comes to be that which it comes to be out of that which is it potentially (for it could not have come to be out of that which was not potentially such, nor could it have consisted of it); and that the potential can either be actualized or not; then however everlasting number or anything else which has matter may be, it would be possible for it not to exist. just as that which is any number of years old is as capable of not existing as that which is one day old. And if this is so, that which has existed for so long a time that there is no limit to it may also not exist. Therefore things which contain matter cannot be 3 cternal, that is, if that which is capable of not existing is not eternal, as we have had occasion to say elsewhere ^a Now if what we have just been sayingthat no substance is eternal unless it is actualityis true universally, and the elements are the matter of substance, an eternal substance can have no elements of which, as inherent in it, it consists.

There are some who, while making the element 4 which acts conjointly with unity the indeterminate However dyad, object to "the unequal," quite reasonably, the maternal on the score of the difficulties which it involves. But conceived. they are rid only of those difficultics b which neces- this objection still sarily attend the theory of those who make the applies. unequal, i.e. the relative, an element; all the difficulties which are independent of this view must apply to their theories also, whether it is Ideal or mathematical number that they construct out of these elements.

There are many causes for their resorting to these 5 explanations, the chief being that they visualized

1089 a

μάλιστα δέ τὸ ἀπορήσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς, ἔδοξε γὰρ αύτοις πάντ' έσεσθαι έν τα όντα, αύτο το όν, εί μή τις λύσει και όμόσε βαδιείται τω Παρμενίδου λόγω

ού γάρ μήποτε τούτο δαμή, είναι μη εόντα,

³ ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὂν δείξαι ὅτι ἔστιν· οὕτω γάρ, ἐκ τοῦ ὅντος καὶ ἄλλου τινός, τὰ ὄντα έσεσθαι, εί πολλά έστιν. Καίτοι πρώτον μέν. εί τό öν πολλαχώς (τό μέν γάρ [ότι]² ούσίαν σημαίνει. τό δ' ότι ποιόν, το δ' ότι ποσόν, και τας άλλας δή 10 κατηγορίας), ποΐον ούν τὰ όντα πάντα έν, εί μη το μή δν έσται; πότερον αί οὐσίαι, η τὰ πάθη (και τά άλλα δή όμοίως), ή πάντα, και έσται έν τό τόδε και το τοιόνδε και το τοσόνδε και τάλλα όσα όν τι σημαίνει; άλλ' άτοπον, μαλλον δε άδύνατον, τό μίαν φύσιν τινά γενομένην αίτίαν είναι του τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μέν τόδε είναι, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὸ δὲ 15 τοσόνδε, τό δέ πού. "Επειτα έκ ποίου μή όντος καί ὄντος τὰ ὄντα; πολλαχῶς γὰρ και τό μη ὄν, έπειδή και το όν και το μεν μή άνθρωπον⁵ σημαίνει το μή είναι τοδί, το δε μή εύθυ το μή είναι τοιονδί, τό δε μη τρίπηχυ το μη είναι τοσονδί. έκ ποίου οῦν ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα: 20 βούλεται μέν δή το ψεύδος και ταύτην την φύσιν

¹ τοῦτο δαμή EJ Simplicius: τοῦτ' οὐδαμή Abl' Syrianus, Plato: robro dans recc.

^g Maier.

³ η πάντα JΓ: απαντα EAb: πάντα Alexander, Syrianus. 4 δν Bonitz : έν.

⁶ ανθρωπον είναι Jaeger.

^a Fr. 7 (Diels).

^b Cf. Plato, Sophist 237 A, 241 D, 256 E.

the problem in an archaic form. They supposed that The fundaall existing things would be one, absolute Being, mental error unless they encountered and refuted Parmenides' Platonsts; dictum :

'Twill ne'er be proved that things which are not, are,"

i.e., that they must show that that which is not, is; $\frac{1}{100}$ (must for only so—of that which is, and of something else—being." could existing things be composed, if they are more than one.^b

However, (i) in the first place, if "being" has 6 several meanings (for sometimes it means substance, But sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and so on "being" with the other categories), what sort of unity will being "have all the things that are constitute, if not-being is not "weind to be? Will it be the substances that are one, or the What sort affections (and similarly with the other categories), did Plato or all the categories together ? in which case the expect to "this" and the "such" and the "so great," and all "word?" the other categories which denote some sense of Being, will be one. But it is absurd, or rather im-7 possible, that the introduction of one thing should account for the fact that "what is" sometimes means "so-and-so," sometimes "such-and-such," sometimes "of such-and-such a size," sometimes "in such-and-such a place."

(ii) Of what sort of not-being and Being do real 8 things consist? Not-being, too, has several senses, inasmuch as Being has; and "not-man" means "not so-and-so," whereas "not straight" means "not such-and-such," and "not five feet long" means "not of such-and-such a size." What sort of Being and not-being, then, make existing things a plurality? This thinker means by the not-being 9 960

mental error of the Platomsts; they thought that the principles must be "being" and "notbeing," 1089 a λέγειν το ούκ όν, έξ ού και του όντος πολλά τά όντα· διο καί ελέγετο ότι δεί ψεῦδός τι ύπυθέσθαι. ώσπερ και οι γεωμέτραι το ποδιαίαν είναι την μή ποδιαίαν αδύνατον δέ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν οὕτε γὰρ 25 οί γεωμέτραι ψεύδος ούθεν υποτίθενται (ου γάρ έν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ή πρότασις), οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ οὕτω μὴ όντος τὰ όντα γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται. ἀλλ' έπειδή το μέν κατά τάς πτώσεις μή ον ίσαχως ταις κατηγορίαις λέγεται, παρά τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ώς ψεύδος λέγεται τό μή όν και τό κατά δύναμιν, έκ τούτου ή γένεσίς έστιν, έκ τοῦ μή ἀνθρώπου 80 δυνάμει δε άνθρώπου άνθρωπος, και έκ τοῦ μή λευκοῦ δυνάμει δὲ λευκοῦ λευκόν, ὁμοίως ἐάν τε ἕν τι γίγνηται έάν τε πολλά. Φαίνεται δε ή ζήτησις πως πολλά το ον το κατά τάς ούσίας λεγόμενον. άριθμοί γάρ και μήκη και σώματα τα γεννώμενά έστιν. άτοπον δή το όπως μέν πολλά το ον το τί 85 έστι ζητήσαι, πως δε η ποιά η ποσά, μή. ου γάρ δή ή δυάς ή άόριστος αίτία ούδε το μέγα και το 1089 η μικρόν τοῦ δύο λευκά ή πολλά είναι χρώματα ή χυμούς η σχήματα αριθμοί γαρ αν καί ταῦτα ήσαν καί μονάδες. άλλα μην εί γε ταῦτ' ἐπηλθον, έίδον αν τό αίτιον και τό έν έκείνοις τό γάρ αὐτό καί τὸ ἀνάλογον αἴτιον. Αὕτη γὰρ ἡ παρέκβασις 5 αίτία καί του το άντικείμενον ζητουντας τω όντι και τω ένι, έξ ου και τούτων το όντα, το πρός τι

^a Sophist. 237 A, 240; but Aristotle's statement assumes too much.

^b Presumably by some Platonist.

^e *i.e.*, the validity of a geometrical proof does not depend upon the accuracy of the figure.

¹^d Matter, according to Aristotle; and there is matter, or something analogous to it, in every category. *Cf.* XII. v. 270 which together with Being makes existing things a By not-plurality, falsity and everything of this nature a; p_{table} meant and for this reason also it was said b that we must have assume something which is false, just as geometricians assume that a line is a foot long when it is not. But 10 this cannot be so; for (a) the geometricians do not assume anything that is false (since the proposition is not part of the logical inference c), and (b) existing things are not generated from or resolved into notbeing in this sense. But not only has "not-being" in its various cases as many meanings as there are categories, but moreover the false and the potential are called "not-being"; and it is from the latter that generation takes place-man comes to be from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white from that which is not white but is potentially white; no matter whether one thing is generated or many.

Clearly the point at issue is how "being" in the 11 sense of the substances is many; for the things that The are generated are numbers and lines and bodies. Went wrong It is absurd to inquire how Being as substance is the ange they conmany, and not how qualities or quantities are many. Surely the indeterminate dyad or the Great and 12 Small is no reason why there should be two whites fined their or many colours or flavours or shapes ; for then these "heing" in too would be numbers and units. But if the Platon- the sense of ists had pursued this inquiry, they would have perceived the cause of plurality in substances as well; for the cause d is the same, or analogous.

This deviation of theirs was the reason why in 13 seeking the opposite of Being and unity, from which in combination with Being and unity existing things are derived, they posited the relative (i.e. the un-

1089 b
καὶ τὸ ἄνισον ὑποθεῖναι, ὃ οὔτ' ἐναντίον οὕτ' ἀπόφασις ἐκείνων, μία τε φύσις τῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τὶ καὶ τὸ ποιόν. καὶ ζητεῖν ἔδει καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς πολλὰ τὰ πρός τι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν. νῦν δὲ πῶς μὲν
10 πολλαὶ μονάδες παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἕν ζητεῖται, πῶς δὲ πολλὰ ἄνισα παρὰ τὸ ἄνισον οὐκέτι. καίτοι χρῶνται καὶ λέγουσι μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὀλίγον, ἐξ ῶν τὸ ἐπίπεδον, βαθὺ ταπεινόν, ἐξ ῶν τὸ ἐπίπεδον, βαθὺ ταπεινόν, ἐξ ῶν το ἰ ὅγκοι· καὶ ἔτι δὴ πλείω εἶδη λέγουσι τοῦ

'Ανάγκη μέν οῦν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ὑποθεῖναι τὸ δυνάμει ὄν ἐκάστω. τοῦτο δὲ προσαπεφήνατο ὅ ταῦτα λέγων, τί τὸ δυνάμει τόδε καὶ οὐσία,¹ μὴ ὄν δὲ καθ' αὑτό, ὅτι τὸ πρός τι, ὥσπερ εἰ εἴπε τὸ ποιόν, ὅ οὕτε δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ ἕν ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὕτε ²⁰ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ τοῦ ὅντος, ἀλλ' ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων· πολύ τε μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, εἰ ἐζήτει³ πῶς πολλὰ τὰ ὅντα, μὴ τὰ ἐν τῃ αὐτῃ κατηγορία ζητεῖν, πῶς πολλαὶ οὐσίαι ἢ πολλὰ ποιά, ἀλλὰ πῶς πολλὰ τὰ ὅντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ πρός τι. ἐπὶ μὲν οῦν τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν 26 ἔχει τινὰ καὶ ἄλλην ἐπίστασιν πῶς πολλά· διὰ γὰρ

¹ ούσία E² Bekker. ² έζητεῖτο E Syrianus⁸.

^a Cf. ch. i. 6, 18, I. ix. 23.

Plato.

• § 11.

equal), which is neither the contrary nor the negation of Being and unity, but is a single characteristic of existing things, just like substance or quality. They should have investigated this question also: how it is that relations are many, and not one. As 14 it is, they inquire how it is that there are many units besides the primary unity, but not how there are many unequal things besides the Unequal. Yet they employ in their arguments and speak of Great and Small, Many and Few (of which numbers are composed), Long and Short (of which the line is composed), Broad and Narrow (of which the plane is composed), Deep and Shallow (of which solids are composed); and they mention still further kinds of relation.^a Now what is the cause of plurality in these relations?

We must, then, as I say, presuppose in the case 15 of each thing that which is it potentially. The it is "not author b of this theory further explained what it is the sense that is potentially a particular thing or substance, of the notential but is not per se existent-that it is the relative that is the (he might as well have said "quality"); which is material neither potentially unity or Being, nor a negation of unity or Being, but just a particular kind of Being. And it was still more necessary, as we have said,⁶ 16 that, if he was inquiring how it is that things are many, he should not confine his inquiry to things in the same category, and ask how it is that substances or qualities are many, but that he should ask how it is that things in general are many; for some things are substances, some affections, and some relations. Now in the ease of the other 17 eategories there is an additional difficulty in diseovering how they are many. For it may be said

being 'm

VOL. II

ARISTÔTLE

1089 b τό μή χωριστά είναι τώ το ύποκείμενον πολλά γίγνεσθαι και είναι ποιά τε πολλά είναι και ποσά. καίτοι δεί γε τινα είναι ύλην εκάστω γένει, πλήν χωριστήν αδύνατον των ούσιων αλλ' έπι των τόδε 30 τι έχει τινά λόγον, πώς πολλά το τόδε τι, εί μή τι έσται και τόδε τι και φύσις τις τοιαύτη, αύτη δέ έστιν ἐκείθεν μάλλον ή ἀπορία, πῶς πολλαί ἐνεργεία οὐσίαι ἀλλ' οὐ μία. 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ μὴ ταυτόν έστι το τόδε και το ποσόν, ου λέγεται πώς καὶ διὰ τί πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πῶς ποσὰ πολλά. 35 δ γαρ αριθμός πας ποσόν τι σημαίνει· και ή μονάς, εί μη μέτρον, ότι το κατά το ποσον άδιαίρετον. εί μέν οῦν ἕτερον το ποσον και το τί έστιν. ού 1090 & λέγεται το τί έστιν έκ τίνος ούδε πως πολλά εί δε ταύτό, πολλάς ύπομένει ό λέγων έναντιώσεις.

Έπιστήσειε δ' άν τις τὴν σκέψιν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πόθεν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὡς εἰσίν. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἰδέας τιθεμένῷ παρέχονται τιν' αἰτίαν 5 τοῦς οῦσιν, εἴπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέα τις, ἡ δ' ἰδέα τοῦς ἄλλοις αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ὑν δή ποτε τρόπου. ἔστω γὰρ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς τοῦτο. τῷ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον οὐκ οἰομένῷ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐνούσας δυσχερείας ὁρῶν περὶ τὰς ἰδέας (ὥστε διά γε ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν ἀριθμούς), ποιοῦντι δὲ ἀριθμὸν 10 τὸν μαθηματικόν, πόθεν τε χρὴ πιστεῦσαι ὡς ἔστι

1 Sri] kal ex comm. Ross.

^a This, according to Aristotle, is how the Platonists regard the Ideas. See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxii.

^b Plato and his orthodox followers.

[•] Speusippus.

that since they are not separable, it is because the substrate becomes or is many that qualities and quantities are many; yet there must be some matter for each class of entities, only it cannot be separable from substances. In the case of particular 18 substances, however, it is explicable how the particular thing can be many, if we do not regard a thing both as a particular substance and as a certain characteristic.^a The real difficulty which arises from these considerations is how substances are actually many and not one.

Again, even if a particular thing and a quantity are not the same, it is not explained how and why existing things are many, but only how quantilies are many; for all number denotes quantity, and the 10 unit, if it does not mean a measure, means that which is quantitatively indivisible. If, then, quantity and substance are different, it is not explained whence or how substance is many; but if they are the same, he who holds this has to face many logical contradictions.

One might fasten also upon the question with Criterium or respect to numbers, whence we should derive the framework belief that they exist, i For one ^b who posits Ideas, 20 numbers supply a kindl of cause for existing things; Why should that is if each of the numbers is a kind of Idea, and numbers the Idea is, in some way or other, the cause of separate existence for other things; for let us grant them this "existence" assumption. But as for him ^e who does not hold 21 this belief, because he can see the difficulties inherent in the Ideal theory (and so has not this reason for positing numbers), and yet posits mathematical number, what grounds have we for believing his statement that there is a number of this kind, and

τοιούτος αριθμός, και τί τοίς άλλοις χρήσιμος; ούθενός γάρ ούτε φησίν ό λέγων αυτόν είναι, άλλ' ώς αὐτήν τινα λέγει καθ' αῦτὴν φύσιν οῦσαν, οὕτε φαίνεται ών αιτιος τα γαρ θεωρήματα τών αρι-15 θμητικών πάντα και κατά των αισθητών υπάρξει.

III. Οί μέν οῦν τιθέμενοι τὰς ἰδέας είναι καὶ ἀριθμούς αὐτὰς ϵἶναι, (τῶ) κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν έκάστου² παρά τὰ πολλὰ λαμβάνειν [τό]³ ἕν τι έκαστον πειρώνται νε λέγειν πως' διά τι έστιν. ου μήν αλλ' έπει ουτε άναγκαία ουτε δυνατά 20 ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν διά γε ταῦτα εἶναι λεκτέον οι δε Πυθαγόρειοι διὰ τὸ ὁρâν πολλὰ τῶν άριθμών πάθη ύπάρχοντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς σώμασιν, είναι μεν αριθμούς εποίησαν τα όντα, ου χωριστούς δέ, αλλ' έξ αριθμών τα όντα. δια τί δέ; ότι τα πάθη τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν ἁρμονία ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐν 25 τω οὐρανῶ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις. Τοῖς δὲ τόν μαθηματικόν μόνον λέγουσιν είναι αριθμόν ούθεν τοιοῦτον ἐνδέχεται λέγειν κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, άλλ' ότι ούκ έσονται αύτων αί έπιστημαι έλέγετο. ήμεις δε φαμέν είναι, καθάπερ είπομεν πρότερον. καί δήλον ότι ου κεχώρισται τὰ μαθηματικά. 80 ού γάρ αν κεχωρισμένων τὰ πάθη ὑπῆρχεν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν. οἱ μέν οῦν Πυθαγόρειοι κατὰ μέν

> ¹ $\tau \hat{\omega}$ ex Bessarion Ross, Joachim. ³ Maier.

² EKAGTON Joachim.

⁴ πως Alexander, Bullinger: πῶς EAbJ: πῶς και rece.

¹⁰⁹⁰ a

καθάπερ ἐλέχθη.

^a XIII. nii. 1.

^b I have followed Ross's text and interpretation of this sentence. For the meaning cf. ii. 20.

^o See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvil. ^d Cf. vi. 5. ^o Cf. ii. 21. 276

what good is this number to other things? He who maintains its existence does not claim that it is the cause of anything, but regards it as an independent entity; nor can we observe it to be the cause of anything; for the theorems of the arithmeticians will all apply equally well to sensible things, as we have said.^a

III. Those, then, who posit the Ideas and identify them with numbers, by their assumption (in accordance with their method of abstracting each general term from its several concrete examples) that every general term is a unity, make some attempt to explain why number exists.^b Since, however, their arguments are neither necessarily true nor indeed possible, there is no justification on this ground for maintaining the existence of number. The Pyth-2 agoreans, on the other hand, observing that many attributes of numbers apply to sensible bodies, assumed that real things are numbers; not that numbers exist separately, but that real things are composed of numbers.º But why? Because the attributes of numbers are to be found in a musical scale, in the heavens, and in many other connexions.^d

As for those who hold that mathematical number 3 alone exists, e they cannot allege anything of this kind f consistently with their hypotheses; what they did say was that the sciences could not have sensible things as their objects. But we maintain that they can; as we have said before.⁴ And clearly the objects of mathematics do not exist in separation; for if they did their attributes would not be present in corporeal things. Thus in this respect the Pyth-4

> ^{*f*} *i.e.*, that things are composed of numbers. ^{*g*} Cf. note on il, 21 ad fin.

1090 a

το τοιοῦτον οὐθενὶ ἔνοχοί εἰσιν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ ποιεῖι· ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων βάρος μηδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος, ἐοίκασι περὶ ἄλλου οὐρανοῦ λέγειν καὶ ¾, σωμάτωι· ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν άξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίι·ει τὴν 1090 b ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι· όμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.

Δήλον οῦν ὅτι καὶ ὅ ἐναντιούμενος λόγος τἀναντία ἐρεῖ, καὶ ὅ ἄρτι ἡπορήθη λυτέον τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσι, διὰ τί οὐδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπαρχόντων τὰ ι πάθη ὑπάρχει αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οῦ ἐκ τοῦ πέρατα εἶναι καὶ ἔσχατα τὴν στιγμὴν μὲν γραμμῆς, ταύτην δ' ἐπιπέδου, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, οἴονται εἶναι ἀνάγκην τοιαύτας φύσεις εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ὁρâν τὀν λόγον, μὴ λίαν ἡ μαλακός. οὕτε γὰρ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ τὰ ιο ἔσχατα ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πάντα ταῦτα πέρατα (ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς βαδίσεως καὶ ὅλως κινήσεώς ἐστί τι πέρας· τοῦτ' οῦν ἔσται τόδε καὶ οὐσία τις· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ εἰσί, τῶνδε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται πάντα· ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ ὁ λόγος εἴρηκεν· διὰ τί οῦν χωριστὰ ἔσται; ἕτι δὲ ἐπιζητήσειεν ἄν τις μὴ λίαν εὐχερὴς ῶν περὶ

^a See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

^o The Pythagorean theory, which maintains that numbers not only are present in sensible things but actually compose them, is in itself an argument against the Speusippean view, 278

^b The statements of mathematics appeal so strongly to our intelligence that they must be true; therefore if they are not true of sensible things, there must be some class of objects of which they are true.

agoreans are immune from criticism : but in so far as they construct natural bodies, which have lightness' and weight, out of numbers which have no weight or lightness, they appear to be treating of another universe and other bodies, not of sensible ones,^a But those who treat number as separable assume that it exists and is separable because the axioms will not apply to sensible objects ; whereas the statements of mathematics are true and appeal to the soul.^b The same applies to mathematical extended magnitudes.

It is clear, then, both that the contrary theory ^c can make out a case for the contrary view, and that those who hold this theory must find a solution for the difficulty which was recently raised d---why it is that while numbers are in no way present in sensible things, their attributes are present in sensible things.

There are some ' who think that, because the point Points, is the limit and extreme of the line, and the line of places the plane, and the plane of the solid, there must be cannot be entities of this kind. We must, then, examine this 7 argument also, and see whether it is not exceptionally independent weak. For (i.) extremes are not substances; rather all such things are merely limits. Even walking, and motion in general, has some limit; so on the view which we are criticizing this will be an individual thing, and a kind of substance. But this is absurd. And moreover (ii.) even if they are substances, they will all be substances of particular sensible things, since it was to these that the argument applied. Why, then, should they be separable ?

Again, we may, if we are not unduly acquiescent, 8 which in separating numbers from sensible things has to face the question why sensible things exhibit numerical 4 5 3. attributes.

* Probably Pythagoreans, Cf. VII. n. 2, III. v. 3.

substances

1090 b

, 15 μέν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ παντὸς καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ μηθέν συμβάλλεσθαι άλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοις ύστερον· μή όντος γάρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθέν ήττον τὰ μεγέθη έσται τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον είναι φαμένοις, και τούτων μη όντων ή ψυχη και τα σώματα τὰ αἰσθητά· οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισ-20 οδιώδης οῦσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία. τοις δε τας ίδεας τιθεμένοις τουτο μέν έκφεύγει ποιούσι γάρ τὰ μεγέθη έκ της ύλης καί άριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ' ίσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ η και έξ άλλων αριθμών διαφέρει γαρ ουθέν. άλλα 25 ταῦτά γε πότερον ίδέαι έσονται, η τίς ο τρόπος αὐτῶν, καὶ τί συμβάλλονται τοῖς οὖσιν; οὐθέν γάρ, ώσπερ ούδε τὰ μαθηματικά, ούδε ταῦτα συμβάλλεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπάρχει γε κατ' αὐτῶν ούθὲν θεώρημα, ἐὰν μή τις βούληται κινεῖν τὰ μαθηματικά και ποιείν ίδίας τινάς δόξας. έστι δ' 80 ού χαλεπόν όποιασούν ύποθέσεις λαμβάνοντας μακροποιείν και συνείρειν. Ούτοι μέν ούν ταύτη προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν. οί δε πρώτοι δύο τούς αριθμούς ποιήσαντες, τόν τε των είδων και τον μαθηματικόν άλλον, ούδαμώς ούτ' ειρήκασιν ουτ' έχοιεν αν 85 εἰπεῖν πῶς καὶ ἐκ τίνος ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικός. ποιούσι γάρ αὐτὸν μεταξῦ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ,

^a That the criticism is directed against Speusippus is clear from VII. ii. 4. Cf. XII. x. 14.

^b Xenocrates (that the reference is not to Plato is clear from \S 11).

e.g. that of " indivisible lines."280

further object with regard to all number and mathe- Spensippus' matical objects that they contribute nothing to each no coherent other, the prior to the posterior. For if number does account of not exist, none the less spatial magnitudes will exist mality, for those who maintain that only the objects of mathematics exist; and if the latter do not exist. the soul and sensible bodies will exist.⁴ But it does 9 not appear, to judge from the observed facts, that the natural system lacks cohesion, like a poorly constructed drama. Those b who posit the Ideas escape and that of this difficulty, because they construct spatial magni- Vencentes tudes out of matter and a number--2 in the case of explanation hnes, and 3, presumably, in that of planes, and 4 in sensible that of solids : or out of other numbers, for it makes universe no difference. But are we to regard these magni-10 tudes as Ideas, or what is their mode of existence? and what contribution do they make to reality? They contribute nothing; just as the objects of mathematics contribute nothing. Moreover, no mathematical theorem applies to them, unless one chooses to interfere with the principles of mathematics and invent peculiar theories c of one's own. But it is not difficult to take any chance hypotheses and enlarge upon them and draw out a long string of conclusions.

These thinkers, then, are quite wrong in thus 11 striving to connect the objects of mathematics with Plato canthe Ideas. But those who first recognized two kinds not account of number, the Ideal and the mathematical as well, separate neither have explained nor can explain in any way mathematihow mathematical number will exist and of what it cal number. will be composed; for they make it intermediate between Ideal and sensible number. For if it is 12 composed of the Great and Small, it will be the same

1090 b ό αὐτὸς ἐκείνῷ ἔσται τῷ τῶν ἰδεῶν (ἐξ ἄλλου δὲ 1081 ¤ τίνος¹ μικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου; τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη ποιεῖ)· εἰ δ' ἕτερόν τι ἐρεῖ, πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐρεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἕν τι ἑκατέρου ἡ ἀρχή, κοινόν τι ἐπὶ τούτων ἔσται τὸ ἕν, ζητητέον τς πῶς καὶ ταῦτα πολλὰ τὸ 5 ἕν, καὶ ἅμα τὸν ἀριθμὸν γενέσθαι ἄλλως ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ δυάδος ἀορίστου ἀδύνατον κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

Πάντα δή ταῦτα ἄλογα, καὶ μάχεται καὶ αὐτὰ έαυτοις και τοις εύλόγοις, και έοικεν έν αύτοις είναι δ Σιμωνίδου μακρός λόγος γίγνεται γάρ δ μακρός λόγος ώσπερ δ τών δούλων όταν μηθέν 10 ύγιὲς λέγωσιν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα το μένα και το μικρον βοαν ώς έλκόμενα ου δύναται γάρ ούδαμώς γεννήσαι τον άριθμον άλλ' η τὸν ἀφ' ἑνὸς διπλασιαζόμενον. "Ατοπον δὲ καὶ γένεσιν ποιείν ἀιδίων ὄντων, μαλλον δ' έν τι τών άδυνάτων. οί μέν οῦν Πυθαγόρειοι πότερον οὐ ποιούσιν η ποιούσι γένεσιν ούδεν δεί διστάζειν. 15 φανερώς γάρ λέγουσιν ώς τοῦ ένὸς συσταθέντος. είτ' έξ επιπέδων είτ' έκ χροιας είτ' έκ σπέρματος είτ' έξ ων απορούσιν είπειν, εύθύς το έγγιστα τοῦ ἀπείρου ὅτι εἴλκετο καὶ ἐπεραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ

1 TIVOS ei. Ross: TIVOS.

^a This interpretation (Ross's second alternative, reading $\tau i \nu os$ for $\tau i \nu os$) seems to be the most satisfactory. For the objection of. III. iv. 34.

^b The argument may be summarized thus. If mathematical number cannot be derived from the Great-and-Small or a species of the Great-and-Small, either it has a different material principle (which is not economical) or its formal principle is in some sense distinct from that of the Ideal numbers. But this implies that unity is a kind of plurality, 282 as the former, *i.e.* Ideal, number. But of what other Great and Small can it be composed ? for Plato makes spatial magnitudes out of a Great and Small.⁴ And if he speaks of some other component, he will be maintaining too many elements; while if some one thing is the first principle of each kind of number. unity will be something common to these several kinds. We must inquire how it is that unity is these 13 many things, when at the same time number, according to him, cannot be derived otherwise than from unity and an indeterminate dyad.^b

All these views are irrational; they conflict both with one another and with sound logic, and it seems that in them we have a case of Simonides' "long story ""; for men have recourse to the "long story," such as slaves tell, when they have nothing satisfactory to say. The very elements too, the Great 14 and Small, seem to protest at being dragged in ; for they cannot possibly generate numbers except rising powers of 2,d

It is absurd also, or rather it is one of the impossi- if numbers bilities of this theory, to introduce generation of an eternal, things which are eternal. There is no reason to 15 doubt whether the Pythagoreans do or do not intro- it is abound duce it; for they clearly state that when the One should be had been constituted-whether out of planes or generated. superficies or seed or out of something that they cannot explain-immediately the nearest part of the Infinite began to be drawn in and limited by the

and number or plurality can only be referred to the dyad or maternal principle.

• The exact reference is uncertain, but Aristotle probably means Simonides of Ceos. *Uf.* fr. 189 (Bergk).

⁴ Assuming that the Great-and-Small, or indeterminate dyad, is duplicative (XIII. vii. 18).

1091 a

 πέρατος. ἀλλ' ἐπειδή κοσμοποιοῦσι καὶ ψυσικῶς βούλονται λέγειν, δίκαιον αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζειν τι περὶ
 φύσεως, ἐκ δὲ τῆς νῦν ἀφεῖναι μεθόδου· τὰς γὰρ
 ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ζητοῦμεν ἀρχάς, ὥστε καὶ τῶν
 ἀριθμῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν γένεσιν.

ΙΥ. Τοῦ μέν οῦν περιττοῦ γένεσιν οὐ φασιν, ώς δήλον ότι τοῦ ἀρτίου οὕσης γενέσεως τον δ' 25 άρτιον πρώτον έξ ανίσων τινές κατασκευάζουσι του μεγάλου και μικρού ισασθέντων. ανάγκη ούν πρότερον ύπάρχειν την άνισότητα αύτοις του ίσασθήναι· εί δ' άει ήσαν ίσασμένα, ούκ αν ήσαν άνισα πρότερον του γάρ αεί ούκ έστι πρότερον ούθέν ώστε φανερόν ότι ου του θεωρήσαι ένεκεν ποιουσι 30 την γένεσιν των αριθμων. "Έχει δ' απορίαν και εύπορήσαντι επιτίμησιν, πως έχει πρός το άγαθον καί τό καλόν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ai ἀρχαί, ἀπορίαν μέν ταύτην, πότερόν έστί τι έκείνων οໂον Βουλόμεθα λέγειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ ού, άλλ' ύστερογενή. παρά μέν γάρ των θεολόγων 35 ζοικεν δμολογείσθαι των νύν τισίν, οι ου φασιν, άλλα προελθούσης της των όντων φύσεως και το άναθον και το καλον εμφαίνεσθαι τοῦτο δε ποιοῦσιν εύλαβούμενοι άληθινην δυσχέρειαν ή συμβαίνει

1091 1 τοις λέγουσιν, ωσπερ ένιοι, τό έν αρχήν έστι δ

^a Cf. Physics III. iv., IV. vi. ad fin., and Burnet, E.G.P. § 53.

^b The Platonists.

^o This statement was probably symbolical. "They described the odd numbers as ungenerated because they likened them to the One, the principle of pure form " (Ross *ad loc.*).

^d Cf. XIII. vii. 5.

· Aristotle speaks as a Platonist. See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

' The Pythagoreans and Speusippus; cf. XII. vii. 10.

Limit.^a However, since they are here explaining 16 the construction of the universe and meaning to speak in terms of physics, although we may somewhat criticize their physical theories, it is only fair to exempt them from the present inquiry; for it is the first principles in unchangeable things that we are investigating, and therefore we have to consider the generation of this kind of numbers.

IV. They ^b say that there is no generation of odd numbers,^c which clearly implies that there is generation of even ones; and some hold that the even is constructed first out of unequals—the Great and Small—when they are equalized.^d Therefore the inequality must apply to them before they are equalized. If they had always been equalized they would not have been unequal before; for there is nothing prior to that which has always been. Hence 2 evidently it is not for the sake of a logical theory that they introduce the generation of numbers.

A difficulty, and a discredit to those who make Relation of light of the difficulty, arises out of the question how the first principles to the elements and first principles are related to the two good. Good and the Beautiful. The difficulty is this: whether any of the elements is such as we mean when we' speak of the Good or the Supreme Good, or whether on the contrary these are later in generation than the elements. It would seem that there is an 3 agreement between the mythologists and some some hold present-day thinkers, who deny that there is such that good ness only an element, and say that it was only after some appeared in evolution in the natural order of things that both the the course of evolution. Good and the Bcautiful appeared. They do this to avoid a real difficulty which confronts those who hold, as some do, that unity is a first principle. This 4 285

1091 b ή δυσχέρεια οὐ διὰ τὸ τῃ ἀρχῃ τὸ εῦ ἀποδιδόναι ώς υπάρχον, αλλά διά το το έν αρχήν και αργήν ώς στοιχείον και τον αριθμον έκ του ένός. οί δέ ποιηταί οι άρχαιοι ταύτη όμοίως, ή βασιλεύειν · καί άρχειν φασίν ου τους πρώτους οໂον νύκτα καί ουρανών η χάος η ώκεανών, άλλα των Δία, ου μήν άλλά τούτοις μέν διά το μεταβάλλειν τούς άργοντας των όντων συμβαίνει τοιαύτα λέγειν, έπει οί γε μεμιγμένοι αὐτῶν [καί]¹ τῷ μή μυθικῶς 10 πάντα² λέγειν, οίον Φερεκύδης κοι έτεροί τινες, το γεννήσαν πρώτον άριστον τιθέασι, και οι Μάγοι, και των ύστέρων δε σοφών, οίων 'Εμπεδοκλής τε καί 'Αναξανόρας, ό μέν την φιλίαν στοιχείον, ό δέ τόν νοῦν ἀρχήν ποιήσας. τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους ούσίας είναι λεγόντων οι μέν φασιν αυτό το έν το 15 άναθον αύτο είναι. ούσίαν μέντοι το έν αύτου ὤοντο είναι μάλιστα. 'Η μέν οῦν ἀπορία αὕτη, ποτέρως δει λέγειν. θαυμαστόν δ' εί τῷ πρώτῳ και ἀιδίω καλ αυταρκεστάτω τουτ' αυτό πρωτον ουχ ώς άγαθον ύπάρχει το αυταρκες και ή σωτηρία. άλλα μήν ου δι' άλλο τι άφθαρτον ή διότι ευ έχει, 20 ούδ' αύταρκες, ώστε το μέν φάναι την άρχην τοιαύτην είναι εύλογον άληθές είναι το μέντοι ταύτην είναι τὸ έν, η εἰ μη τοῦτο, στοιχείόν γε³ καί στοιχείον αριθμών, αδύνατον συμβαίνει γαρ ¹ Bonitz. ³ γε J Syrianus : τε. ² а́лаута гесс.

^a Of Syros (circa 600-525 B.c.). He made Zeus one of the three primary beings (Diels, Vorsokratiker 201, 202).

^b The Zoroastrian priestly caste.

difficulty arises not from ascribing goodness to the first principle as an attribute, but from treating unity as a principle, and a principle in the sense of an element, and then deriving number from unity. The early poets agree with this view in so far as they assert that it was not the original forces-such as Night, Heaven, Chaos or Occan-but Zeus who was king and ruler. It was, however, on the ground 5 of the changing of the rulers of the world that the poets were led to state these theories; because those others of them who compromise by not describing every- make goodthing in mythological language-e.g. Pherceydes a principle. and certain others-make the primary generator the Supreme Good; and so do the Magi,^b and some of the later philosophers such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras: the one making Love an element,^e and the other making Mind a first principle.^d And 6 of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some a identify absolute unity with absolute goodness: but they considered that the essence of goodness was primarily unity.

This, then, is the problem : which of these two rue latter views we should hold. Now it is remarkable if that 7 which is primary and eternal and supremely self-are probably sufficient does not possess this very quality, viz. selfsufficiency and inimunity, in a primary degree and as something good. Moreover, it is imperishable and self-sufficient for no other reason than because it is good. Hence it is probably true to say that the first principle is of this nature. But to say that this 8 principle is unity, or if not that, that it is an element, But to and an element of numbers, is impossible; for this dentity

º Of. III. i. 13. ^d Cf. L in, 16. " Plato ; cf. I. vi. 10.

1091 b πολλή δυσχέρεια, ήν ένιοι φεύγοντες απειρήκασιν, οί το έν μέν όμολογοῦντες ἀρχήν είναι πρώτην 25 καί στοιχέιον, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ. άπασαι γαρ αί μονάδες γίγνονται όπερ άγαθόν τι, και πολλή τις ευπορία άγαθων. Ετι εί τα είδη άριθμοί, τὰ εἴδη πάντα ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι· ἀλλὰ μην ότου βούλεται τιθέτω τις είναι ίδέας ει μεν γάρ των άγαθων μόνον, ούκ έσονται ούσίαι αι ιδέαι, 30 εί δε και των ούσιων, πάντα τα ζωα και τα φυτά άγαθὰ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα. Ταῦτά τε δή συμβαίνει άτοπα, και το έναντίον στοιχείον, είτε πλήθος ον είτε τὸ άνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αυτό διόπερ ό μεν έφευγε το άγαθον προσάπτειν τω ένι ώς άναγκαιον όν, επειδή εξ εναντίων ή 35 γένεσις, το κακόν την του πλήθους φύσιν είναι, οί δε λέγουσι το άνισον τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν συμβαίνει δή πάντα τὰ όντα μετέχειν τοῦ κακοῦ ἔξω ένὸς αύτοῦ τοῦ ένός, καὶ μαλλον ἀκράτου μετέχειν τοὺς 1092 a αριθμούς η τα μεγέθη, και τό κακόν του αγαθού χώραν είναι, και μετέχειν και ορέγεσθαι τοῦ φθαρτικοῦ φθαρτικόν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναν-τίον. καὶ εἰ ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμει ἕκαστον, οἶον πυρὸς τοῦ ἐνεργεία τὸ 5 δυνάμει πῦρ, τὸ κακὸν ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ δυνάμει άγαθόν.

^a Speusippus and his followers ; cf. § 3.

- ^d Because the Ideas are goods.
- Speusippus.
- / Plato and Xenocrates.

^b If unity is goodness, and every unit is a kind of unity, every unit must be a kind of goodness—which is absurd.

^c Because they are Ideas not of substances but of qualities.

involves a serious difficulty, to avoid which some with unity, thinkers " have abandoned the theory (viz. those of to make it a principle who agree that unity is a first principle and element, at numbers, but of mathematical number). For on this view all "sabsuidunits become identical with some good, and we get a great abundance of goods.^b Further, if the Forms 9 are numbers, all Forms become identical with some good. Again, let us assume that there are ideas of anything that we choose. If there are Ideas only of goods, the Ideas will not be substances (; and if there are Ideas of substances also, all animals and plants, and all things that participate in the Ideas, will be goods.⁴

Not only do these absurdities follow, but it also 10 follows that the contrary element, whether it is monows plurality or the unequal, i.e. the Great and Small, that the under all is absolute badness. Hence one thinker avoided paneline associating the Good with unity, on the ground that is had since generation proceeds from contrarics, the nature of plurality would then necessarily be bad. Others 11 hold that inequality is the nature of the bad. _ I+ follows, then, that all things partake of the Bad except one-absolute unity; and that numbers partake of it in a more unmitigated form than do spatial magnitudes o; and that the Bad is the province for the activity of the Good, and partakes of and tends towards that which is destructive of the Good; for a contrary is destructive of its contrary. And if, 12 as we said,^h the matter of each thing is that which is it potentially-e.g., the matter of actual fire is that which is potentially fire-then the Bad will be simply the potentially Good.

⁹ As being more directly derived from the first principles. A Ch. 1. 17. Cf. I. ix. 23 n.

VOL. II

1092 a

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα συμβαίνει, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀρχὴν πᾶσαν στοιχεῖον ποιοῦσι, τὸ δ' ὅτι τἀναντία ἀρχάς, τὸ δ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἀρχήν, τὸ δ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας καὶ χωριστὰ^ι καὶ εἴδη.

V. Εί οῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ τιθέναι τὸ ἀναθὸν ἐν ταῖς 10 άρχαις και το τιθέναι ούτως άδύνατον, δήλον ότι αί άρχαι ούκ όρθως άποδίδονται ούδε αι πρώται ούσίαι. ούκ όρθως δ' ύπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῆ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτών, ότι έξ αορίστων ατελών τε² αεί τα τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πριώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν. 15 ώστε μηδέ όν τι είναι το έν αὐτό. εἰσὶ γάρ καὶ ένταθθα τέλειαι αί άρχαι έξ ών ταθτα άνθρωπος γαρ ανθρωπον γεννά, και ούκ έστι το σπέρμα πρώτον. άτοπον δέ και το τόπον άμα τοις στερεοίς τοίς³ μαθηματικοίς ποιήσαι (ό μέν γάρ τόπος των καθ' έκαστον ίδιος, διο χωριστα τόπω, τα δέ 20 μαθηματικά οὐ πού), και τὸ εἰπεῖν μέν ὅτι ποὺ έσται, τί δέ έστιν ό τόπος μή. "Εδει δὲ τοὺς λένοντας έκ στοιχείων είναι τα όντα και των όντων τα πρώτα τούς αριθμούς, διελομένους πως άλλο έξ άλλου έστίν, ούτω λέγειν τίνα τρόπον ό άριθμός έστιν έκ των άρχων. πότερον μίζει; άλλ

¹ χωριστàs A^b.
 ² Ravaisson: δέ.
 ³ καί τοῖs E.

^a Evidently Speusippus; cf. ch. iv. 3.

^b Spensippus argued that since all things are originally imperfect, unity, which is the first principle, must be imperfect, and therefore distinct from the good. Aristotle objects that the imperfect does not really exist, and so Speusippus deprives his first principle of reality. 200

Thus all these objections follow because (i.) they The faut make every principle an element; (ii.) they make enormal fundamental contraries principles; (iii.) they make unity a prin-Platonic ciple; and (iv.) they make numbers the primary substances, and separable, and Forms

V. If, then, it is impossible both not to include the Good among the first principles, and to include it in this way, it is clear that the first principles are not being rightly represented, nor are the primary substances. Nor is a certain thinker" right in his objections assumption when he likens the principles of the spension universe to that of animals and plants, on the ground views that the more perfect forms are always produced from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that this is true also of the ultimate principles; so that not even unity itself is a real thing.^b He is wrong; for even in the 2 natural world the principles from which these things are derived are perfect and complete-for it is man that begets man; the seed does not come first." It is absurd also to generate space simultaneously with the mathematical solids (for space is peculiar to particular things, which is why they are separable in space, whereas the objects of mathematics have no position) and to say that they must be somewhere, and yet not explain what their spatial position is.

Those who assert that reality is derived from ele- 3 ments, and that numbers are the primary realities, How is ought to have first distinguished the senses in number dewhich one thing is derived from another, and then the first explained in what way number is derived from the principles? first principles. Is it by mixture? But (a) not

1092 a 25 οὔτε παν μικτόν, τό τε γιγνόμενον ἔτερον, οὐκ ἔσται τε χωριστόν τό έν ούδ' έτέρα φύσις οι δε βούλονται. αλλα συνθέσει, ώσπερ συλλαβήν¹; αλλα θέσιν τε ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν, καὶ χωρὶς ὁ νοιῦν νοήσει τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτ οῦν ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμός, μονάς και πληθος, η το έν και άνισον. Και έπει 30 το έκ τινών είναι έστι μέν ώς ένυπαρχόντων έστι δε ώς ου, ποτέρως ό αριθμός; ούτως γαρ ώς ενυπαρχόντων ουκ εστιν αλλ' η ών γένεσις έστιν. ἀλλ' ώς ἀπὸ σπέρματος; ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου τι ἀπελθείν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου μη ύπομένοντος; άλλ' όσα ούτως έστι, καί 35 έξ άλλου τινός έστιν ύπομένοντος. έπει τοίνυν το 1092 b έν ό μέν τω πλήθει ώς έναντίον τίθησιν, ό δε τω άνίσω, ώς ίσω τῶ ένὶ χρώμενος, ώς ἐξ ἐναντίων είη αν ό αριθμός. έστιν άρα τι έτερον έξ ου ύπομένοντος καί θατέρου έστιν η γέγονεν. "Ετι τί δή ποτε τὰ μεν άλλ' όσα εξ εναντίων η ois εστιν 5 ἐναντία φθείρεται, κἂν ἐκ παντὸς ή, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ού; περί τούτου γάρ ούθεν λέγεται. καίτοι καί ένυπάρχον και μή ένυπάρχον φθείρει το έναντίον,

¹ συλλαβή E Alexander.

^a e.g. to admit of mixture a thing must first have a separate existence, and the Great-and-Small, which is an affection or quality of number (ch. i. 14) cannot exist separately.

^b sc. when it has once been mixed. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 327 b 21-26.

^o And numbers are supposed to be eternal. Cf. ch. ii. 1-3.

d i.e., unity, being indivisible, cannot contribute the formal principle of generation in the way that the male parent contributes it.

• Speusippus : Plato. Of. ch. i. 5.

¹ The objection is directed against the Platonist treatment of the principles as contraries (cf. iv. 12), and may be illus-292

everything admits of mixture a; (b) the result of mixture is something different; and unity will not be separable,^b nor will it be a distinct entity, as they intend it to be. Is it by composition, as we hold 4 of the syllable? But (a) this necessarily implies position; (b) in thinking of unity and plurality we shall think of them separately. This, then, is what number will be---a unit plus plurality, or unity plus the Unequal.

And since a thing is derived from elements either as inherent or as not inherent in it, in which way is number so derived? Derivation from inherent elements is only possible for things which admit of generation.⁶ Is it derived as from seed? But no-5 thing can be emitted from that which is indivisible.⁴ Is it derived from a contrary which does not persist? But all things which derive their being in this way derive it also from something else which does persist. Since, therefore, one thinker $^{\circ}$ regards unity as contrary to plurality, and another $^{\circ}$ (treating it as the Equal) as contrary to the Unequal, number must be derived as from contraries. Hence there is some 6 thing else which persists from which, together with one contrary, number is or has been derived.⁷

Further, why on earth is it that whereas all other things which are derived from contraries or have contraries perish, even if the contrary is exhausted in producing them,^{σ} number does not perish? Of this no explanation is given; yet whether it is inherent or not, a contrary is destructive; e.g.. Strife

trated by XII. i. 5-ii. 2. Plurality, as the contrary of unity, is privation, not matter; the Platonists should have derived numbers from unity and some other principle which is truly material.

⁹ Because it may be regarded as still potentially present.

1092 b

οίον το νεικος το μίγμα καίτοι γε1 ούκ έδει ού γαρ ἐκείνω³ γε ἐναντίον. Οὐθεν δε διώρισται ούδε όποτερως οι αριθμοι αίτιοι των ουσιών και 10 του είναι, πότερον ώς όροι (οίον αί στιγμαί των μεγεθών, και ώς Εύρυτος έταττε τίς αριθμός τίνος, οίον όδι μέν ανθρώπου όδι δέ ιππου, ώσπερ οί τους αριθμούς άγοντες είς τα σχήματα τρίγωνον καί τετράγωνον, ούτως αφομοιών ταις ψήφοις τας μορφάς των φυτών), η ότι [ό]' λόγος ή' συμφωνία ι άριθμών, όμοίως δε και άνθρωπος και των άλλων ἕκαστον; τὰ δὲ δὴ πάθη πῶς ἀριθμοί, τὸ λευκὸν και γλυκύ και το θερμόν; ότι δε ούχ οι άριθμοι ούσία ούδε της μορφής αίτιοι, δήλον δ γαρ λόγος ή ούσία, ό δ' άριθμος ύλη. οίον σαρκός ή όστου άριθμός ή ούσία ούτω, τρία πυρός, γής δε δύο. 20 καὶ ἀεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅς ἂν ἢ τινῶν ἐστίν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γήϊνος ἢ μοναδικός, ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσία τὸ τοσόνδ' είναι πρός τοσόνδε κατά την μιξιν τοῦτο δ' οὐκέτι άριθμός άλλά λόγος μίξεως άριθμων σωματικών $\ddot{\eta}$ όποιωνοῦν. οὕτε οῦν τῷ ποιησαι αἴτιος ὁ ἀριθμός, ούτε όλως ό αριθμός ούτε ό μοναδικός. ούτε 25 ύλη ούτε λόγος και είδος των πραγμάτων, άλλα μην ούδ' ώς το ού ένεκα.

¹ ye om. recc.	² CAEÎVO E.
⁸ Bonitz.	
⁴ η E Alexander: η .	⁶ oùolai 1ecc.

^a According to Empedocles, fr. 17 (Diels).

⁹ The theories criticized from this point onwards to ch. vi. 11 are primarily Pythagorean. See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

 o e.g. the line by 2 points, the triangle (the simplest plane figure) by 3, the tetrahedron (the simplest solid figure) by 4.

^d Disciple of Philolaus; he "flourished" in the early fourth century s.c. 294 destroys the mixture." It should not, however, do this; because the mixture is not its contrary.

Nor is it in any way defined in which sense numbers 7 are the causes of substances and of Being ; whether Bowen as bounds, b e.g. as points are the bounds of spatial multiple states of magnitudes,^e and as Enrytus^d determined which things number belongs to which thing-e.g this number to man, and this to horse-by using pebbles to copy the shape of natural objects, like those who arrange numbers in the form of geometrical figures, the triangle and the square.^e Or is it because harmony s is a ratio of numbers, and so too is man and everything else? But in what sense are attributes --white, and sweet, and hot---numbers? And clearly numbers are not the essence of things, nor are they causes of the form; for the ratio " is the essence, and number h is matter. E.g. the essence of flesh 9 or bone is number only in the sense that it is three parts of fire and two of earth.³ And the number, whatever it is, is always a number of something; of particles of fire or carth, or of units. But the essence is the proportion of one quantity to another in the mixture; *i.e.* no longer a number, but a ratio of the mixture of numbers, either of corporeal particles or of any other kind. Thus number is not an efficient cause-neither number in general, nor that which consists of abstract units-nor is it the matter, nor the formula or form of things. Nor again is it a final cause.

^a Cf. Burnet, E.G.P. § 47,

¹ This is an objection to the view that numbers are causes as bounds.

- Or "formula."
- ^h In the sense of a number of material particles.
- Uf, Empedocles fr. 96 (Diels).

1092 b

VI. 'Απορήσειε δ' αν τις και τί τὸ εῦ ἐστι τὸ άπό των αριθμών τῷ¹ ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι τὴν μιξιν, ή έν ευλογίστω ή έν περιττώ. νυνί γάρ ούθεν ύγιεινότερον τρίς τρία αν ή το μελίκρατον κεκρα-30 μένον, αλλα μαλλον ωφελήσειεν αν έν ουδενι λόγω ον ύδαρές δε η έν άριθμω άκρατον όν. έτι οί λόνοι έν προσθέσει αριθμών εἰσὶν οἱ τῶν μίζεων, ούκ έν αριθμοῖς, οίον τρία πρός δύο, αλλ' ού τρὶς δύο. το γαρ αὐτο δεῖ γένος εἶναι ἐν ταῖς πολλαπλασιώσεσιν, ώστε δεί μετρείσθαι τω τε Α τό 35 στοιχείον έφ' ού ABΓ και τώ Δ τον ΔΕΖ· ώστε τώ αὐτώ πάντα. οὔκουν² ἔσται πυρὸς ΒΕΓΖ, Εί δ' ἀνάγκη 1093 & καί ύδατος άριθμός δίς τρία. πάντα ἀριθμοῦ κοινωνεῖν, ἀνάγκη πολλά συμβαίνειν τα αυτά, και αριθμόν τον αυτόν τώδε και άλλω. άρ' ούν τουτ' αιτιον και δια τουτό έστι τό πραγμα, η άδηλον; οίον έστι τις των του ήλίου 5 φορών aριθμός, και πάλιν των της σελήνης, και τών ζώων γε έκάστου τοῦ βίου και ήλικίας· τί οῦν κωλύει ένίους μέν τούτων τετραγώνους είναι ένίους δε κύβους, και ισους, τους δε διπλασίους; ούθεν γαρ κωλύει, άλλ' ανάγκη έν τούτοις στρέφε-

τφ Alexander: τδ ΕΛ^b.
 ² ούκουν Bonitz: οὐκοῦν.

^a *i.e.*, a sumple ratio.

^b It is hard to see exactly what this means. If the terms of a ratio are rational, one of them must be odd. Alexander says a ratio like 1:3 is meant. Oddness was associated with goodness (cf. I. v. 6).

^o Apparently the Pythagoreans meant by this "three parts of water to three of honey." Aristotle goes on to criticize this way of expressing ratios.

^d Cf. previous note.

VI. The question might also be raised as to what Things the good is which things derive from numbers because derive no their mixture can be expressed by a number, either number one which is easily calculable,^a or an odd number.^b For in point of fact honey-water is no more wholesome if it is mixed in the proportion " three times three " "; it would be more beneficial mixed in no particular proportion, provided that it be diluted, than mixed in an arithmetical proportion, but strong. Again, 2 the ratios of mixtures are expressed by the relation of numbers, and not simply by numbers; e.g., it is 3:2, not 3×2^{d} ; for in products of multiplication the units must belong to the same genus. Thus the product of $1 \times 2 \times 3$ must be measurable by 1, and the product of $4 \times 5 \times 7$ by 4. Therefore all products which contain the same factor must be measurable by that factor. Hence the number of fire cannot be $2 \times 5 \times 3 \times 7$ if the number of water is $2 \times 3.^{6}$

If all things must share in number, it must follow 3 that many things are the same; i.e., that the same Numerical number belongs both to this thing and to something coincielse. Is number, then, a cause ; i.e., is it because of number that the object exists? Or is this not conclusive? E.g., there is a certain number of the sun's motions, and again of the moon's,¹ and indeed of the life and maturity of every animate thing. What reason, then, is there why some of these numbers should not be squares and others cubes, some equal and others double? There is no reason; 4 all things must fall within this range of numbers if,

• so, because if so, a particle of fire would simply equal 35 particles of water.

¹ 5 in each case, according to Aristotle; cf. XII. vii. 9, 11. 297

ARISTOTLE

1098 a σθαι, εἰ ἀριθμοῦ πάντα ἐκοινώνει, ἐνεδέχετό τε 10 τα διαφέροντα ύπο τον αυτόν αριθμόν πίπτειν. ώστ' εί τισιν ό αυτός αριθμός συνεβεβήκει, ταυτά άν ήν άλλήλοις έκεινα το αύτο είδος άριθμου έχοντα, οໂον ήλιος και σελήνη τα αυτά. αλλά διά τί αίτια ταῦτα; έπτὰ μέν φωνήεντα, έπτὰ δέ χορδαί ή άρμονία, επτά δε αί πλειάδες, εν επτά 15 δε οδόντας βάλλει (ένιά γε, ένια δ' ου), έπτα δε οί έπι Θήβας. αρ' οῦν ὅτι τοιοσδι ὁ ἀριθμος πέφυκεν, διὰ τοῦτο η ἐκείνοι ἐγένοντο ἑπτὰ η ή πλειὰς έπτα αστέρων έστίν; η οί μεν διά τας πύλας η άλλην τινα αιτίαν, την δε ήμεις ουτως αριθμούμεν, 20 την δε άρκτον γε δώδεκα, οι δε πλείους έπει και τό Ξ Ψ Ζ συμφωνίας φασίν είναι, και ότι έκειναι τρείς, και ταῦτά τρία· ὅτι δὲ μυρία ἂν εἴη τοιαῦτα, οὐθὲν μέλει (τῶ² γὰρ Γ καὶ \dot{P} έἴη ἂν ἕν σημεῖον). εί δ' ὅτι διπλάσιον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ἄλλο δ' ού, αίτιον δ' ότι τριών όντων τόπων εν έφ' έκά-26 στου ἐπιφέρεται τῷ σίγμα, διὰ τοῦτο τρία μόνον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι αἱ συμφωνίαι τρεῖς, ἐπεὶ πλείους νε αί συμφωνίαι, ένταῦθα δ' οὐκέτι δύναται.

Ομοιοι δὴ καὶ οῦτοι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ὑμηρικοῖς, οῦ μικρὰς ὁμοιότητας ὁρῶσι μεγάλας δὲ παρορῶσιν.

1 ή άρμονία Ε Alexandri lemma: ή άρμονίαι. 3 το Alexander, Syrianus.

^a Cf. previous note. ^b In the Greek alphabet.

• In the old heptachord ; cf. note on V. xi. 4.

^d Of. Hist. An. 576 a 6.

• According to Alexander ζ was connected with the fourth, ξ with the fifth, and ψ with the octave.

¹ θ , ϕ , and χ are aspirated, not double, consonants.

⁹ Palate, lips, and teeth.

as was assumed, all things share in number, and different things may fall under the same number. Hence if certain things happened to have the same number, on the Pythagorcan view they would be the same as one another, because they would have the same form of number ; e.g., sun and moon would be the same.^a But why are these numbers causes ? 5 There are seven vowels,^b seven strings to the scale,^c seven Pleiads; most animals (though not all d) lose their teeth in the seventh year; and there were seven heroes who attacked Thebes. Is it. then, because the number 7 is such as it is that there were seven heroes, or that the Pleiads consist of seven stars? Surely there were seven heroes because of the seven gates, or for some other reason, and the Pleiads are seven because we count them so: just as we count the Bear as 12, whereas others count more stars in both. Indeed, they assert also 6 that Ξ , Ψ , and Z are concords,^o and that because there are three concords, there are three double consonants. They ignore the fact that there might be thousands of double consonants-because there might be one symbol for TP. But if they say that each of these letters is double any of the others, whereas no other is ! and that the reason is that there are three regions g of the mouth, and that one consonant is combined with σ in each region, it is for this reason that there are only three double consonants, and not because there are three concordsbecause there are really more than three; but there cannot be more than three double consonants.

Thus these thinkers are like the ancient Homeric 7 scholars, who see minor similarities but overlook important ones.

ARISTOTLE

Λένουσι δέ τινες ότι πολλά τοιαῦτα, οἶον αι 80 τε μέσαι ή μεν εννέα ή δε όκτώ, και το έπος 1093 ο δεκαεπτά, ίσαριθμον τούτοις, βαίνεται δ' έν μεν τῶ δεξιῶ ἐννέα συλλαβαῖς ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀριστερῷ όκτώ, και ότι ίσον το διάστημα έν τε τοις γράμμασιν από τοῦ Λ πρός τὸ Ω καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βόμβυκος έπι την όξυτάτην [νεάτην]¹ έν αύλοις, ής ό άριθμος 5 ίσος τη ούλομελεία του ουρανου. όραν δε δεί μη τοιαῦτα οὐθείς ἂν ἀπορήσειεν οὔτε λέγειν οὔθ εύρίσκειν έν τοις αιδίοις, έπει και έν τοις φθαρτοις. Αλλ' αί έν τοις αριθμοις φύσεις αι επαινόυμεναι και τὰ τούτοις εναντία και όλως τὰ εν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ώς μεν λέγουσί τινες και αίτια ποιοῦσι τής 10 φύσεως, έοικεν ούτωσί γε σκοπουμένοις διαφεύγειν κατ' οὐθένα γὰρ τρόπον τῶν διωρισμένων περί τὰς ἀρχὰς οὐθέν αὐτῶν αἴτιον. ἔστιν ὡς² μέντοι ποιοῦσι φανερόν ὅτι τὸ εῦ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῆς συστοιχίας έστι της του καλού το περιττόν, το εύθύ, το ισάκις ισον, αί δυνάμεις ενίων αριθμών. 15 άμα γὰρ ῶραι καὶ ἀριθμὸς τοιοσδί· καὶ τάλλα δὴ όσα συνάνουσιν έκ των μαθηματικών θεωρημάτων

¹ Diels.

² ús Ab Alexander: éκείνο JI Syrianus: om. E. ⁸ ίσάκις ίσον: Ισάριθμον Ε: ίσον Ab.

• *i.e.*, the $\mu \epsilon \sigma \eta$ (fourth) and $\pi a \rho a \mu \epsilon \sigma \eta$ (fifth), whose ratios can be expressed as 8:6,9:6.

^b *i.e.*, a dactylic hexameter whose sixth foot is always a spondee or trochee has nine syllables in the first three feet and eight in the last three. For rd degion meaning "the first part" of a metrical system see Bassett, Journal of Classical Philology xi, 458-460.

^o Alexander suggests that the number 24 may have been made up of the 12 signs of the zodiac, the 8 spheres (fixed stars, five planets, sun and moon) and 4 elements. 300

1098 a

Some say that there are many correspondences of this kind; e.g., the middle notes a of the octave arc respectively 8 and 9, and the epic hexameter has scventeen syllables, which equals the sum of these two: and the line scans in the first half with nine syllables, and in the second with eight.^b And they 8 point out that the interval from a to ω in the alphabet is equal to that from the lowest note of a flute to the highest, whose number is equal to that of the whole system of the universe.^c We must realize that no one would find any difficulty either in discovering or in stating such correspondences as these in the realm of eternal things, since they occur even among perishable things.

As for the celebrated characteristics of number, 9 and their contraries, and in general the mathematical There is a properties, in the sense that some describe them and certain analogy make them out to be causes of the natural world, between numbers it would seem that if we examine them along these and things: lines, they disappear; for not one of them is a cause but the in any of the senses which we distinguished with not causal. respect to the first principles.^d There is a sense, 10 however, in which these thinkers make it clear that goodness is predicable of numbers, and that the odd. the straight, the equal-by-equal, and the powers f of certain numbers, belong to the series of the Beautiful.^g For the seasons are connected with a certain kind of number h; and the other examples which they adduce from mathematical theorems all have

· i.e., square.

¹ Probably their " power " of being represented as regular figures; e.g. the triangularity of 3 .. or 6

⁹ Cf. I. v. 6. h i.e., 4.

^d Cf. I. iii. 1, V. i., ii.

ARISTOTLE

1098 b πάντα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. διὸ καὶ ἔοικε συμπτώμασιν ἔστι γὰρ συμβεβηκότα μέν, ἀλλ οἰκεῖα ἀλλήλοις πάντα, ἕν δὲ τῷ¹ ἀνάλογον ἐν ἑκάστη γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον,
20 ὡς εὐθὺ ἐν μήκει οὕτως ἐν πλάτει τὸ ὁμαλόν, ἴσως ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ περιττόν, ἐν δὲ χροία² τὸ λευκόν. "Ετι οὐχ οἱ ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀριθμοἱ αἴτιοι τῶν ἁρμονικῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων (διαφέρουσι γὰρ ἐκείνοι ἀλλήλων οἱ ἴσοι εἴδει·καὶ γὰρ αἱ μονάδες). ὥστε διά γε ταῦτα εἴδη οὐ ποιητέον. Τὰ μὲν οῦν
25 συμβαίνοντα ταῦτά τε κἂν ἔτι πλείω συναχθείη. ἔοικε δὲ τεκμήριον είναι τὸ πολλὰ κακοπαθεῖν περὶ την γένεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδένα τρόπον δύνασθαι συνεῖραι τοῦ μὴ χωριστὰ είναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἕνιοι λέγουσι, μηδὲ ταύτας είναι τὰ ἀρχάς.

1 τω] τδ Ab.

² χρόφ Ε.

^a Aristotle has argued (XIII. vi,-viii.) that if the Ideal numbers differ in kind, their units must differ in kind. Hence even equal numbers, being composed of different

the same force. Hence they would seem to be mere 11 coincidences, for they are accidental; but all the examples are appropriate to each other, and they arc one by analogy. For there is analogy between all the categories of Being-as "straight" is in length, so is "level" in breadth, perhaps "odd" in number, and " while " in colour.

Again, it is not the Ideal numbers that are the 12 causes of harmonic relations, etc. (for Ideal numbers, Ideal numeven when they are equal, differ in kind, since their even express units also differ in kind) "; so on this ground at least relations. we need not posit Forms.

Such, then, are the consequences of the theory, 13 and even more might be adduced. But the mere lience the fact that the Platonists find so much trouble with are clearly regard to the generation of Ideal numbers, and can mistaken with respect in no way build up a system, would seem to be a to the first proof that the objects of mathematics are not separ- principlus. able from sensible things, as some maintain, and that the first principles are not those which these thinkers assume.

units, must be different in kind. In point of fact, since each Ideal number is unique, no two of them could be equal.

INDEX TO ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

BOOKS I--XIV

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

- Arcident, accidental (συμβιβηκός), defined, v. xvx., unplies preducation, iv v. 23; accident.i Being, v. vi. 1, vii 1, vi. 1, xI. viu; causes, v. ii. 11, vi ii., identity, v. ix 1; preducations, vi. vi. 3; quantity, v. xui. 2; relations, v. xv. 11, unity, v. vi. 1. See Attribute
- Activity, relative, v. xv. 6; and actuality, IX, viii, 11; of heavenly bodies, 10 18
- Actuality (*irigopend*) = form or formula, VIII. ii. 1, ML V. 2, C. VII. XII. 1; () Concete substance, VII. XII. 1; () Concete substance, VII. XII. 1; and complete reality and motion, IX. iii. 8; X potentiality, IX. VI; X motion, IX. VI. 1; prior to potentiality, IX. VII., XII VI. 6, C. XII. VI. 11; resides in subject of object of action, IX. VII. 18; imperielable tilinge actual, ib. 17, Cf XII. VI. 4; good actuality better than good potentiality, IX. X; is a common cause, XII. V. 1; and pleasure, XII. VI. 7
- Aflection (πάθος), defined, v. xxi Alemaeon, 1 v. 7
- All, defined, v. xxvi. 3
- Alteration, = change of affection or quality, xn. ii 1, xiv. i, 16, impossible on Empedocles' view, I. vni. 9
- Always X usually, vr. ii. 6, 11
- Analytics, quoted, vii. xii. 1
- Ana agoras, theory of particles, 1. m. 9, vn. 2, x. vi. 6; of Mind, 1. iii, 17, iv. 5, vi. 10, viii, 10, xrr. vi. 9, x. 8, xrv. iv. 5; of Mixture, 1. vii. 11, ix. 11, iv. iv. 28, v. 5, xr. vi. 17, xrr. ii. 3,

NII. v. 3; of subjective reality, IV v. 13, vii. 3

- Anaximander, vit. ii. 3, cf. x 3 7, ii. 1
- ABAXimones, I 311, 8, cf. 111, i, 18, X. ii, 1
- Anticithon or counter-cartin, 1. v. 3
- Autisthenes, v. XXIX. 4, VIII. iii. 7
- Appearances, theory of truth in, iv. v , vi. See Impression
- Appetite, xn. v. 1, vii. 2
- Archytas, viii. n. 9
- Aristippus, III ii, 4
- Arithmetic, 1. ii. 5; cf IV ni. 8, xIV. ii. 21
- Art, and science and experience, I. i. 8 fl.; = iorm, VII. IX. 3, XII. iii. 3; arts called "beginnings," v i. 2; all arts potencies, IX. ii. 1, 4, v. 1
- Astronomy, I. viii. 17, 111, 11. 23, 26, vi. 1. 11, x. i. 15, x11, viii. 7, x111, 11, 9
- Atlas, v. xxin. 3
- Attributes ($\sigma \nu \mu \beta e \beta \eta \kappa \delta \tau a$), whether studied by the science of substance, nt 1. 8, it. 13, iv. 1, 1, xt, iti. 8, per se or peculiar, vii. v. 2, xiit. it. 5; how are they numbers? xiv. v. 8
- Axioms, ni. ii. 11, IV. iii. 1, 12, x1. iv.
- Bad, and Groat-and-Small, unequal, plurality, xiv. iv. 10. See Good, Evil
- Bats, 11. 1. 3
- Beautiful, and Good, v. i. 8, x11. vii. 10, x1v. iv. 2, vi. 10; X Good, x111. iii. 10
- Beee, I. i. 8
- Beginning, defined, v. i.; a kind of

hmit, v. vvil. 2 See Principie, Starting-Point

- Being, defined, v. vn , various senses, iv n. 8, v. 6, v. x. 4, xi. 7, vi. h. 1, vir. 1, iv. 4, vir. ii. 8, ix. 1, 2, x. 1, xi. iii. 1, xiii ni 10, xiv n 6; Belng qua Being the subject of metaphysics, 1v. 1., 11 0, vr. i. 1, x1 ul. 1, modifications of, IV. il. 18; and unity, 111. iff. 4, 6, 1v. 24, 1v ii 6, 21, vit. xvi 3, vitt. vi. 6, x. ti. 4; as substance, 111. i. 18, iv 21, vir. i , XI il 8; all sonses refer to substance, iv II. 1, IX. 1. 1; not substance, 111, 1v. 29, 111 xvi. 8; most universal term, III. iv. 27, x. ii. 2, xr. r. 10; not a universal, IN ii. 24; as genus, m, m 4; not a genus, m, til. 7. xr. i. 11; not an element, xrr. iv 3, not a final cause, I vil. 6; potential) (actual, v. vli. 6, 1x. 1, 2; accidental, v. vn. 1, vi il, m, xt vlli.; as truth, v. vli. 5, vi, iv., ix. x., xi, vin 9 ; Eleatic. I v. 13; Eleatle and Platonic. XIV II 5
- Body, and soui and mind, XII. v 1; (geometrical) deflued, v. vi. 19, XI X. 6; derivation (Platonic), I, iv. 28, as substance, III v., VII. II. 2. See Solid
- Calllas (name used without personal reference), 1. 1. 6, V. NVIII, 5, VII. V 2, etc.
- Callippus, x11. vhi, 11
- Capable, 1x, 1x, 1. See Potency
- Capacity, 1x, i. 8. See Potency
- Ortegories, enumerated, v. vil. 4; meanings vary in different, v. x. 4, xrvnil. 4, vi. n. 1, vii 1, 1, nature of unity the same in all, x. n. 18; motoon or change m, xi. k. 1, xii. 1; pluralify in, xiv. i, 16; elonents of different, vii. iv. 6; elonents of different, xii. v. 1; no category except enbstance can exist separately, vii. 1. 5; form not generated m any, vii. 1x. 6
- Cause, defined, v. ll; = that in virtue of which, v. will, 2;

Wisdom the knowledge of minary causes, 1.1. 17, c/ 11. 1 6, 111. 1. 5, ii., vi. i. l, viif. i 1, four causes, 1. in. 1, x. 1, VIII. iv. 4, cf. XII. iv., no infinite series or number of causes, 11, ji., js there any cause inesides matter? III. 1 11; not all present in all things, III 11.2. no definite cause of the accidental, v. XXX. 3, XI. VIII, 6; accldental causes, v. ii 10, vi iii., xr. viii, 10; potential and actual causes, v. 11, 12; proximate causes, xII. iv. 7, v. 4, only two causes in Platonisni, i vi. 9, iv 27. See End, Essence, Final Cause, Formal Cause, Matter, Moving Cause, Principle

- Chance, x1, viii, 10
- Ohange, modes of, iv. v. 20, viii, 1, 7, vi. 1x. 1, xi. y. 1i, 1; reclprocai, viii. v. 4, between contrarres or intermediatee, iv. vii 2, xi. v. 9, xii. 1, 5, incelantsmi of, xii. iii. 1, cf. 1, iii. 11 problems connected with, iv v 17; source of (i.e. efficient cause), v. ii. 2, 8; not explained by Ideal Theory, n. iv. 26 See Mohan
- Chaos, a cosmological principle, 1. 1V I, XII VI. 9, XIV. iv. 4
- Cholen, v xiv. 5, 1x v. 3
- Cleon (name used without personal reference), vii xv 10, x. v. 1
- Cogitation, vii, vii 7
- Completeness, iv, ii, 24, x, iv, 2 See Perfect
- Concrete object of whole $(\sigma i \nu o \lambda o \nu)$, III. i. 11, iv. 2, 6, VII iii. 2, x. 13, xi. 15, xI. ii. 13, XIII. ii. 17, of. v. xxlv. 2, VII. iv. 6, x. 4, XII. ii. 8, ix. 6
- Contact (äπτεσθαι, ἀψή), v. iv. 1, vi. 7, xi. xii 11, xiii. vii. 20, iv. 1, minimediate apprehension, ix. v. 5, xii. vii. 8
- Contiguity (execobai), XI. vii. 18
- Continuity (συνεχές), defined, xI. xi. 13, and unity, v. v. 6, xxvi. 2, vII. xvI. 2; and quantity, XI. iii. 7

Continuum, XII. X. 12. See Body

- Contraduction, a kind of opposition,
- v. x. 1, x. iv. 8; Law of, iv.

in. vi., XI. v., vi., no intermediate in, iv. vi., X. iv. S, XI XII. 13, and tiuth and faisity, vi. iv. 1

- Contrary, defined, v. s. 2, (in place) xt, xh, 11, and dillerence, opposition, privation, iv. ii, 14, 21, v x, 1, ix. ii. 8, x iii 1, 10, iv. 7, x 1, xi, iii, 6, ix, 9, 6, xii, vil 8, attribute of substance, III, 1 9, one thing has one, iv. n. 16, X. iv. 4: contraries fall under one science, 111. fl. 1, x1. iii. 6, x111. iv. 1; reducible to Being and unity and their privations, iv, n, 9, 21, xt hi 4; and subject, substrate, matter, I, VIII 0, VIII. v. 2, 1X, 1X, 1, X1, Vi, 18, X11, 1, 5, x, 11, xIV. I. 8, V 5, cf. VI. ul. 3 contrailes have the same form, vii, vii, 5, cf. v. ii 5; mutually destructive, xiv. iv 11, c/ vi. in 3, generation of, iv. v. 4, vill v. 1; change between, xt. x. 9, xi 3, x11 i. 5, intermediates composed of, x. vii ; as principles, IV. 11 21, XII. II. 5, X. 5, XIV. 1. 1, Pythagorean, I. V. 6
- Corisous (name used without personal reference), v. vi. 1, vi. ii 4, vii, xi 12
- Orntylus, 1. vi. 2, IV. v 18
- Definition, relation of parts to whole, vii. x.; parts must be familiar, 1. 1x 33, unity of, vii. xi, 14, xil., vin. vi , cf. v. vi. 18, refers to universal, vir. xi.; belongs primarily to substance, vii, lv, 16, v. 5; of matter, form and their compound, vill. 11, 8; no definition of coupled torms, vir. v. 1, or of individual sensiblo substances, vii. xv. 2, cf. vi. 1.7, viii, ni 7, has more than one senso, vii. iv. 12, and essence, i. x. 2, vii. iv. 9, v. 7, viii. i, 4; genera first principles of, III. ili 3, starting-point for demonstration, iv. vii. 7, cf. lv. 5; false of everything but its proper subject, v. xxix. 3, how not per se true of its subject, vii. iv. 7, by division, 10 xli. 4; and number, vIII, iii, 9, vi. 1, and Idoal theory,

- XIII, IV. 14, of VII, VV. 5; Platome, Pythagorean, Sociatic, 1, V. 16, VI. 2, XIII, IV. 3, See Formula
- Democritus, 1. iv. 9, iv. v. 5, 9, vii. xiii. 9, viii. ii. 1, xii. ii. 8, xiii. iv. 3
- Desire, n principle, i. iv. 1; as exciting activity, ix. v. 3, xii. vii. 2
- Destruction. See Generation
- Dialectic, 1. vi. 7, 19 11. 19, X1, 111. 8, X117 19 4
- Dialecticians, ix, vill, 20
- Difference, different, defined, v. iv. 4, primary, vi. iu. 9, 0, contrary, opposite, other, iv. ii. 12, x. iii. 7, 10, 4, viu. 3, 1x.; = constitutivo form, vin. a. 2, atomic, i. iv. 10, vin. u. 1
- Differential, of substance, i. iv 28; of genus and species, ii.i. ii. 7; iv. ii. 11; v. v. ii. 12; v. ii. 8; x. vii 6; viii. 1; ix.; ef. v. x. 2; x iii. 8; of osconce; v. xiv. 1; of motions, ib. 4; of numbers and annts; viii. viii. q vi.; vii
- Diogenes, 1, ili. 8
- Dionysm, v. xviv. 5
- Disposition, defined, v. vix, See State
- Dissimilarity, Iv. II, 12
- Dyad, indeteiminate, I. ix J. X117, 17, 9, vil., vin, 14, 1x, 8, X17, 1, 4, 12, 11, 18; cf. 1, vil. 6, 7, 10, See Great-and-Small, One, Unity

Echptic, ns cause, XII, v. 8

Effects, classified like causes, v.

Egypt, 1. 1 16

Elément (στοιχεΐον), defined, v. in., q. vii, xvu. 12, x. i. 6; ematetial principle, i. lh. 3; X principle, xii. iv. 6; problems connected with elementa, i. 1x. 81, 11, vi. 6, x111. x., only elements of substances, i. 1x. 31; elements of composite individuals determined by form, vii. xvu. 8; ef. vii. u. 3; elements of different categories, xii. 1v. 2, v. 6, no elements of eternal things, xiv. ii, 1; and influty, xi. x, 6; monistic view of, I. vih. 1, = lotter of the alphabet, III. II 1, iv. 10, vi. 2, v. id. 1, cj vii. xvii. 8, in geometry, III id 1, v. iu. 3

- Europedocles, hus four elements, i. nt 8, lv. 8, vn. 2, vin 7, x. 3, nt, fil, 2; en Love, Sinife, Mixture, i n, 3, nt, 1, 13, iv. 15, 20, xii 1, 8, vi, 9, x, 7, xiv, iv 5; on ratios, i x 2, c, xiv, v 0, on thought and physical alteration, iv. v. 10, on "nature," v. yr, 6
- End, = final cange, i. vii 5, ii. u. 9, v. ii. 2, 8, xvi, 4, vvii. 2, ix. viii. 9, xr. i 4, xri. vii 17, and ilmit, ii. ii. 10, v. xvii. 2; and death, perfection, shape, v. xvi. 4, xxiv. 2; and actuality, ix. viii. 9
- Epicharmus, 1v. v. 17, XIII. 15, 17
- Equal, defined, V V. 5, relative, ib. 11, X unequal, x. iv. 10;) (greater and smaller, x v., Platonic principle, xii, v. 5, xiv. v. 5
- Escence $(ri \, \beta_V \, elax, ri \, errs, some$ times obv(a), discussed, vir. iv.vi ; studied by Metaphysics, vi.i, 6; = substance, v. viii, 4, vii,ii, 1, iv 8, xvii 7, viii, 4, vii,v. viii, 1; = formal cause, definition, formula, ratio, r. iii, 1, viii,2, x, 2, tii, ii, 7, v ii, 7, viii, 4,XIII, iv. 8, XIV, v. 8, cf. vii 4,XIII, iv. 8, XIV, v. 8, cf. vii 4,XIII, iv. 8, XIV, v. 7, primaryessence = Mind or God, XII, vii,18; Platonic and Pythagoreanviews of, 1, v 16, vi 5
- Eternal, X sensible things, 1 vi. 4, v. v. 6, vii. 8, ix. viii. 15, ix. 8, xii. 1. 8, ii. 4; eternal substance=Prime Mover, xii. vi. eternal things incomposite and ungenerated, xiv. ii, in. 14
- Eudoxus, 1. ix. 11, x11. vill. 9, x111. v. 3
- Enrytus, xIV. v. 7
- Even, Pythsgorean, I. v. 5, IV. II. 22; cf. xI. x. 5
- Evenus, v. v 2
- Evil, only in perishable things, ix.

ix 3; and Strife, i. iv 3; Platonic principle, xii, x 6, cf. xiv. iv. 10. See Bad, Good

- Excess and detect, I. ix 28, IV. II. 18, VHI. ii. 2, 4, x. i. 11, Vi. 10, XIV. 1. 6
- Experience, I. i. 8-18, 17
- Extremes, and opposition, v. x.1
- Falsity, defined, iv. vif 1, v xxiv., and not-being, vi. ii. 1, iv. 1, ix. x; χ impossibility, ix. iv. 2; Platonic, xiv. if 9
- Few,)(many, x vi.
- Figures (σχήματα), are they substances ? 111. i. 15. See Plane
- Final cause (of i_{vecko}), no infinite chain of f.c.'s., it. ii. 2; = beglonding, end, innotion, good, in. ii. 6, v. i. 3, ii. 2, 8, viii. iv. 5, xi. i. 4, Xii. vii 4; and Formal, Efficient causes, viii iv. 5, xi. i 4, number not a final cause, xiv., 9
- Flux, Horachtean, I. vi 2, XIII. IV. 2; of. VI. vi. 10, XIII. ix. 21
- 2; of x1. vi. 10, x111. ix. 21 Form, and definition or formula, III. 11 0, v. vi 15, vII. v. 4 ff., xi 1, v111. il. 8, x11. il. 5, x111. vili. 24, of IV. v. 21, VIII, 1. 0; and essence, vir vil. 4, vin. 8, x. 16; and nature, v. iv. 6; and whole, v. vi. 16; = actuality, in vni. 14; - art, vii (x. 8, xii m. 3, of. vii vii. 4, = that in virtue of which, v. vin. 1, cf. vir vvil. 7, as substance, v vin. 4, vII. 11. 7, vii 4, x, 4, xvii. 7, 1x, viii. 8, 14, viu, viii. 24; as substrate, vii. ili 2;)(matter and concrete object, 111, 1v. 6, v1. i. 6, v11, vlii., x. 4-xi., 1x. viii. 10, x1, ii. 18, x11. iii. 1, x11. viii. 24;)(privation, v11. v. 2, x11 v. 5; not gener-ated, v1. viii. 1, 1x. 6, v11. iii. 5, v. 1, x11. iii. 1, 4, cf v111. 1, 6, perishable, xt li. 4. See Species
- Formal cause, XII. v. 3; = escence or formula, v. ii. 1, vIII. iv. 5, cf. I. III. 1; and final cause, VIII. iv. 5; no infinite chain of imal causes, II. 3, 10, final causes coexist with their effects, XII. ii. 5

- Forms (Platonic), theory of described, i. vi ; criticized, i. iv., vii, vi 6, slv., x. v 5, slit, iv., v.; as causes, i. vii, 4, vii vii, 7, xii, vi 8, v10, slit, vii, 20; as substances, ii, i, 7, ii, 20, vii ii 8, xvi, 5, viii, i. 2, xii, i 4, as per se terms, vii, vi, 8, of natural objects, sti iii, 4, and intermediates or mathematical objects, iii, 5, xii i i; ad numbers, xiii, vii, 20, siv. iv. 9, vi, 12, See Ideas
- Formula (Adyos), or Account, and definition, in. hi. 5, iv iv. 8, vit. 1. 6, VIII 11.9, 111.7,)(definition, vii. iv 11, parts of, vii. x., xi.. - actuality, essence, form, vii. vv. 1, viii. 7, = formal cause, VIII. iv 7, XII in 5, and matter, vii vii. 9;) inatter, concrete object, vii. xv 1, viii. 1, 6, x 1x. 4, x1. vii. 5, x11 vin 18; and potency, 1x. il. 2, priority in, v. xi, ö, vii, xui 5, ix, viii, 2, x, iii, 2, XIII. 11, 16, 11, 6, VIII, 24, cf. vii. 1. 6; applies to universals, xr. i. 0, analysis of, xr vi. 16, See Definition
- Fortuitous, vi. il. 11, ili. 4, xi. vin 4
- Full (Atomism), i. iv. 9. See Pienum
- Generation or Becoming (yéveris, γίγνεσθαι), conditions of, itt. iv. 4. iv. v. 20, vir. vil. 1, 9, vill. 1, viil. v. 1, 1x viii, 6, 9, by something of the same form or name, vil ix, 8, 1x vil 5, x11. iii, 2; not of matter or form but of the concrete thing, vii. vui., ix. 6, vv 1, vin i. 6, v. 1; xii. ii. 1, 4, from not being, the potential, II. h 6, 1x viii, 5, x1, vi. 4, x11, n, 2, x1v. li. 2, from matter, privation, substrate, v11. vii. 2, 9, x. iv. 10; from contraries, x. iv. 10, xiv. iv. 10, absolute and qualified, VIII, i. 8, x1 x1. 4, X11. 11. 1, XIV. i. 16, cf. 1. 111. 3; natural, artificial, spontaneous, vii. vii., iv., XII. ili. 2,)(production, vii. vii. B; a mode of change, x1, xi, 4, and motion,

M vil., of points, lines and planes, H. v. S; no generation of the accidentai, vi ii 5, cf lu. 1

- Genus, defined, v. xxvin, viii, i. g, x in. 9; studied by metaphysics, iv. n. 25; highest, lowest, phinary, proximate, ultimate, ph. 1, 0, ph. 5, fv: 2, v. xxiv, 1, vii, viii, S, xii, 5, Xi, 1, 9, 6, v. ii, 0, ph. v. 1, 0, xii, 2, v. xxiv, 1, vii, viii, S, xii, 5, Xi, 1, 9, 6, v. ii, 0, ph. v. 1, 0, xii, 1, 0, pi, 2, 3, substance, vii, iii, 1, xiii, viiii, 1, 3, v. 1, 3; and definition, differentia, individuat, intermediates, species, nii, v. n. 0, vi, 11, 21, viii, 1, xvi, 2, vii, xii, 5, 11, amit, and being as genera, fiii, iii, 1, 7, of viii, vii, 7; connexion with universal and Idens, viii, 1, 8
- Geometry, 1. 11. 16, 18. 25, 111, 11. 25, 27, 18. 11 24, 14 3, 81, 1, 11, 1X 1X 4, XI. 111 7, X111, 31, 9, X19, 11, 9
- God, not jedoas, I. h. 12; a principle, ib. 11, cf. I. v. 12, X. vil. 8, the and activity of XII. vil. 0, 12; gods in human form, 11. il. 22, XII vil. 20; heavenly lodies as gods, XII. vill. 20. Sue Mind, Mover
- Good, goodness, a kind of perfection, v xiv 3, cf xii, vii, 10, x. 6, = end, 6nal cause, i. i. 7, iii, 1, iv, 3, vii, 5, 11, 11, 2, v. ii 3, cf xii, vii, 4; in mathemiatics, numbers, 11, if 3, xiii, 11, 10, xiv, vi, 10; how contained in the universe, xii, x; relation to elements, xiv iv, 2; ne a quality, v, xiv, 3; and beauty, v i, 3, xiv, iv, 2; (beauty, xiii, iii, 10, cansation of (Platonic), 1 vi 10, cf xiii vii, 21
- Great-and-Small, Pinto's material principle, 1 vi. 6, 10, vi. 2, ix. 23, 28, xiv. i, 5, ii 12, un. 12; a duality, pair of unequais, 1 vi. 6, 10, xiii, viii. 12, xiv. i, 5, iv. 10, relative, xiv. 1, 6, ii. 14; 8e a genus, 11i. ii. 4; species of, 1. iv. 23, xiii, x. 2, cf, xiv. ii. 14, See Dyad, Plurality, Unequal

- Habit, having (c(is), defined, v xx. See State
- Harmonics, 111, n 24, X111, ii, 9, 111 7, X1V, VI 12
- Have or possess, defined, V Xun.
- Heating, necessary for learning, I.
- Heaven, motion of, xH. vn 1, 5, only one, tb. vni. 17, a cosmological principle, xiv. lv. 4
- Heetor, 1v. v. 14
- Heilen, v. vxviii 1
- Heraclitus, I. nl. 8, vl. 2, IV iii 10, V. 18, vn. 8, vnl. 2, M v. 8, vl. 17, X. 9, XIII. iv. 2
- Hermes, "In thestone" or "wood," III. v. 6, v. vil. 8, IX. vi. 2. See Pauson
- Hermotimus, 1. m. 17
- Hestod, I. IV. I. viii 6, III. IV 12
- Hippasus, I. Ill 8
- Hippias Minor quoted, v. XXX. 5
- Hupo, r u. 7
- Homei, IV. v. 14
- Homocomerans, 1, 10, 9, vit. 2
- Ideas (Platonic), theory described, i. vi. 8 ff., xrii. vi., as per setterms, vii. vi 4; as substances, vii. vi. 8, vii., i 5, xiii 1x 19, as causes, xii. vi. 6, Xii. iii 6, as potentialities, ix. vii. 20, and definition, vii. x. 6, viii. vi. 2, and genus and universal, viii. i. 8, xiii. ix. 5, and numbers, xii. vii. 2, xiit 1. 3, i. 11, vi.-viii, xiv. h 20, ni. 0, iv 0 See Forms
- ldentity, iv. ii. 14, 24, v. iii 2. See Same
- Ignorance,)(falsity, 1x x 5, 7
- Illust, a unity by connection, vii. iv 17, viii. vi. 2, cf. vii. iv. 10
- Imitation (Pythagorean), I. vi. 8, of V 2
- Imperishable. See Perishable
- Impossible, defined, v. xii. 9; X false, ix, iv 2
- Impotence, defined, v. xit. S
- impression(s), of sense-perception vary, iv. v. 9;)(perception, ib. 28
- Indeterminate, exists only potentialiy, 1v. iv. 28, v. 16, Anaxi-

mander's (') principle, X. 1 7, II. 1 See Infinite

- Individual (καθ ἕκαστον, ἄτομον, τόδε τι), and unity, III, IV. Ο, Υ. I. 4; and genus, III. I IO, iII. 9 fl.; and substance, VII. I. J. and essence, VII. IV. 9; and matter, XII iII. 8, does anything exist apart from the individual 7 III. IV; are first principles hullvidual? III. IV. 8, cf XII. V. 4. See Particular
- Indivisible $(\tilde{a}_{70\mu}o_5)$, lines, magnitudes, i. ix. 25, MH vin 10, 22; form, species, vii vili, 0, x. vili 4; in genus, v. x. 5; ($d\tilde{a}_{4d}$ peros, indistinguishalub), and unity, 11, m 0, v. vi 10, XIII vili, 25; m form, kind, 11 ili, 9, v iu 1, vi. 10
- Induction, I. iv. 33, IX. vi. 3, Socratic, XIII. iv. 5
- Inequality, a species of plurality, iv il. 12; Platonic principle, HI iv 84, xiv. iv. 11 See Unequal
- Infinite, defined and discussed, XI, X., II II 917, III IV I, in what sorve it exists potentially, IX. vi. 5, of XI, X. 8; infinite series impossible, II, II, III, IV, 22, IV IV, 2, vii. 5, vii. 6, V, XX. 1, vII, V, 3, V, 12, Vii. 6, V, XX. 1, vII, V, 3, V, 12, Vii. 7, NO INFINITE magnitude or number, XII, VII, 13, XIII viii. 17; no minite magnitude or number, XII, VII, 3, XII viii. 14; Anaxagoras's infinity of homoeomeries, III 9, VII, 2, See Indeterminate, Unlimited
- Intelligible, learning proceeds from the less to the more mtelligible, vir. iv. 2, intelligible ercles, vir. x. 17; matter, *ib* 18, vir. vi. 6; numbers, i. vii. 24; objects, ini iv 3, substances, vir. m 5, "intelligibles," z.e. Being, Unity, etc., xu. iv. 3, of, vi. 3. See Sensible
- Internediate terms of a series not causes, ii 18.3; intermediates between contraries, iv. vii. 2, x iv. 8, v. 5, vii., cf. xi. xi. 7; not between contradictories, iv. vii. 2, x, iv. 8, xi. xih. 13; Platonic

1. vi. 4, 6, 1x. 20, 30, 111, ii. 20 ft , vi 1, xt i. 0. See Mathematics

lon, v. xxvin 1

Isthman games, 11 n. 5

- itahans, i.e. Pythagoreans, i. v. 15, vi. 1, vi. 2
- Judgements, all men form some unqualified, IV. iv. 42
- Knowledge, universally desired, I. 1. 1. characteristics of, 1 L. H. 111, ii. 7, theoretical and practical. 11. 1. 5; concerned with what is primary, iv. il 5; consists m knowing the essence, vit vI 6. of CRUSES, 1, 11 6, 11 1, 11, 1, 6, 16, 18, 111 n. 7; of alements, 1 15. 31 fl., of mehvidnals, 11. 1 11, of universals, 1 II 1, III. lv. 8, x111. iz, 22, x. 7,) gness-work, opinion, sense-perception, 11 iv. 8, IV. IV. 43, VII AV. 3: priority m, v. xi 5, vir 1.5; a kind of measure, x i. 9, cf. vi 9, has two senses, XIII Y. 8; of like by like (Empedocies), in. iv 17. Bee Science
- Learning, how acquired, 1 ix. 33, vii, iv. 2
- Lectures, their effect upon the listener, II. in
- Leucippus, 1 IV. 9, MI vi 7, 9
- Like X unlike, attribute of substance, 111 1 °, defined, v. 1X 5, vv. 5, knowledge of like by like, 11, 1v. 17 See Similar
- Lamit, defined, v. xvl); Pythagorean, I. v 6, 15, xul. 20, xiv. ui 15; Platome (?), IV. 4. 22, See Unlimited
- Lune, defined, v. vi. 19, not composed of points, HL iv. 39, are lines substances? III. i. 16, h. 18, vii. 11, 2, XI n. 11, XIII. u., XIV. ii 6, goueration and destruction of, UL v. 8, essential to plane, v. viil. 8, indivisible hnes, r. 1x, 25, Ideal linee, how dorived, i. ix, 23, 80, XII K. 2, secondary to Ideas and numbers, vii. ii. 4. See Point, Plane, Solid

Lovo, a first principle, 1. iv. 1, vu. 3, 5; (Empedorles) 1. iv. 2, 6, 11; 1; 13, 1v. 18, 23, 1v. 11, 22, x. H. 1, x1; 1. 0, x. 7, x1v. 1v 5, Prinne Mover an object of love, >11. vu.

Lycophron, viti. vi. 8

Magi, xiv. iv 5

- Magnitude, defined, v. xm 1; how composed of indivisible pn14s⁷ 10. (v. 33, no minito or indivisible magnitude, xm vu 13, xm, vm, 10, how are mathematical magnitudes one⁷ xm, i 19
- Many X one, v. vi, 28, x. nl 1, vi, X few, much, https, x. vi, xiv, i 6, 18, n. 14, Platonic principle, vii, x 5, xiv, i, 6, See Plinality

Material cause. See Matter

- Mathematics, originated in Egypt, 1 t. 16; developed by Pythagoreans, i. v. 1; over-stressed in Phitonium, i. u. 27; relation to the Good, itt. II, 3, Xitt in 10, a specific science, vi, 1, 8; N, vii, 7, procedure of, vi, 11; vi, iv, 1, of Alit, lu,; mathematical necuracy impossible in the sensible world, 12, ni, 3; mathematical objects, i vii, 17; vi, 4, 0, itt. 10, (Platonic), i, vi, 4, 0, itt. 10, vii, 6, Xitt. 4, 0, Xitt. i-u., vi, 10, Xiv, ni, 8; vi, 13. Sice Intermediate, Line, Plane, Fount, etc.
- Matter, dollned, vir. iil. 5; dia. cumsol, vii. iv., v., as substaines, vii. ui, viii. 1, r, ix. vii. 7, xir. ii. 9, xiii. 1, 10; = cubstrate, i. iii. 1, vi. 10; ix. 18, 28, v. xviii. 1, xviii. 8, viii. 1, 8, 28, v. xviii. 1, xviii. 8, viii. 1, 8, 28, v. xviii. 1, xviii. 8, 28, v. xri. iii. 3; (loctuality, dofinition, form, formula, vi. 1, 6, vii. 11, y, x., xi., xiii. 1, xvii. 7, 11, viii. 0, vi. 4, ix. vii. 10, x. ix. 2, 4, xii. 10, 1, v. 2, vi. 4, vii. 18, xiii. 1, v. 2, vi. 4, vii. 18, xiii. 1, ix. vii. 10, x. x. i. 4, xii. 1, x. vii. 4, viii. 10, xi. ii. 4, xii. 1, z, vii. 4, viii. 10, xi. ii. 4, xii. 1, z, vii. 4, viii. 10,

XIV. I 17, IV 12. and continuits, vitt, v. 2, xii. i. 5, x. 11, indeterminate, vii xi, 16, ix, vii 7. Secondary vii M. 16, IN. VII 7, necessary for generation and change, vii vii 2, 9, viii 1 7, v., xii, 1 5; and motion, vi 1. 7 ± 6 feature descent 7; 🛥 female element, v xxviii. 2, of vin. iv 5, primary, provimate, mitimate, v. 11. 3, 7, 11. 28, vit x. 15, viti, iv. 1, vi 10, 1X. vii, 5, cf. XII, iji, 3, sensible X intelligible, vir x. 18, xi. 11, VIII VI. 6, cf. XI 1 7; generable, mobile, viti 1 7, iv 6, xii. ii 1, genus as matten, v. XXVIII 8, vii xii 7, matter cause of the accidental, vi. ii 11, of. vii. vu 2, of plurality, vii. viii 18, is there any first minciple apart from matter ? III. 1 11; materini cause, i. ili. I, v ni. 1, 1, 7, IX. 1. 7; carly views of, 1 m. 8, v. 5, 14, vii 2, Platonic, 1. vi. 5, 10. vii. 2. ix. 28. no infinite chain of material causes, n. li, I. 5 ft.

- Megano school, ix in. 1
- Melissus, I. v. 12, 18
- Memory, 1. i. 2
- Mind, in uature (Anaxagoras), I. in. 16, 17, 5, vii. 3, 5, viii. 13, x11 ih. 5; as cause, vi. i, 5, x1 viii. 12, relation to body, soul, x11, v. 1, cf. iii. 6; = actuality, x11, v. 1, cf. iii. 6; = actuality, x11, vi θ , = God, x11 ix., x17. (v. 5. See Thought
- Modifications, not substance, 111. v. 1. See Affection, Attribute, Quality
- Monists, criticized, I. vul. I ff.
- Motion, defined, XI. ix. 2; other views of, 4b 8; and activity, actuality, complete reality, function, v. XIV. 6, XVII. 2, XX. 1, XXIII. 8; IX. ifI. 9, VIII. 7, XII. 1X. 2, XII. VI. 6; X action, IX. VI 7, X actualization, 4b. 8; relation to matter, sensible objects, I.

viii, 17, vi 1, 7, vi 1, 8, 9, cf, 1x li 10, vi 4x, 1, to time, v, xui, 5, xi, x, 15, to change, xi, vi, xii, tonthunous, element, simple, x, 1 13, vii, 10, 7, 11, viii, 1, motions of heavenly bodies, x, 1, 15, xii, vi, 10, vii, 1, viii, 1, priminy motion or change locomotion, x = 3, xii vii, 6, 18, xiii, 11, 6, locomotion defined, xii, 11, 4, 2 primary locomotion chendre, xii, vi, 2, vi, 6, simple locomotion, xii, vii, 4

- Motion, source of, i e, moving or efficient cause, i, m. i, m. i, fil, n 6, 9, v, a 2 ft., vit, xvn, 6, viti iv 3, vi f 1, m natural objects called "unture," v. iv. i, S, of vit, ix. J, 6; early views of, i, in (i, v. 1), vii, 3; ignored by momster, t viii 1; treatment by Empedacies, ib. 8, Platonic, 1, ix. 29, xii, vi, S, See Moving Cause
- Mover(s), eternal, x11. vni, ; First or Prime, 1v. vill. 8, x1 i 4, x11. iv 8, v. 6, vn, viii. 4, 18
- Moving cause, XII. iii 5; proximate, XII. iv 7, v. 6, uo influte cluin of moving causes, 11. ii. See Motion, Source of
- Mutilated, defined, v. xxvii.
- Nature, defined, v. iv.; a genus of Being, iv. iii. 4, a cause, xi. vili, 12, = mather, v. iv. 8, v.xvi. 4, = form, actuality, vii vii 8, vili, iii. 11, xii. iii. 8, as subistance, viii. til. 6, contains its own motive principle, v. iv. 1, vi. 1, 4, iv. vii. 1, xii. iii. 2,)(art, vii. vii. 1, xii. iii. 2,)(force, v. 6, x. i. 2, xii. vii. 7, prior in., i. viii. 7, natural generation, vii. vii. 7, natural generation, vii. vii. 7, nature, iii. 8, vii. 8, vii. See Physics
- Necessary, necessary, iv. iv. 15, v 28, v. v., vi. ii. 6, ii., xi. v. 6, vii. 4, xii. vii d, necessariy χ usually, v. xx. I, vi. ii. 6, necessary truths, vi. vv. 3
- Negation, and privation, iv. n. 11, x. y. 5, 8; and contranety, iv. vii,

5, superfluous in the answer to a simple question, iv iv. 17, Ideas of, i. iv. 2, vin. iv. 8

- Night, a cosmological principle, x11. v1. 6, 9, x1v iv. 4
- Not-being, its three senses, xii, ii, 4, ae ialsity, vi. iv. 1, xiv. n. 9; as potentiality, xiv. ii, 10, a principle in Platonism, 40 5. See Being
- Number, defined, v. víii. 2, x. vi. 8; arithmetical, mathematical, I. iv. 20, XIII. i. 4, VI 2 ff., VIII. 8 ff., E., 15, xIV. ii. 21, iii. 11, IV. 8. modifications of, iv n. 18; how qualitative, v. viv. 2, in relations, v xv. 2, 6, succession of, xm. IV. 1, and units, III. IV. 28, VII. xiii 10, x 111. vi. 8, 11, vii. 24, viii. 10, and unity, v vi. 17, v. i. 9, vi. 8; and definition, viii. in. 9, vi. 1, intelligible, sensible, 1 vill, 24, xiv. 111, 11, addible, inaddible, viit vi.-vii , na anb-stances, 111. 1. 15, 19 30, v., v. viil, 8, viii, ni, 9, xi, b. 10, XII, v. 18, XIII, il. 8, vl., ix. 19, XIV. it 19; as causes, principles, 1. v. 6, vi 6, viii, 22, xii. x. 12, xiii. i. 5, NIV. V. 7, vi., Pythagorean view of, I. V., vl. 6, vin. 22, vii xi. 5, xiv. iti., v. 7-vi. ; in Platomenn, r. vi. 6, vili. 24, 1x 4, 8, xIII. VI.-IX., xiv. u. 10-v., vi. 12; relation to ldens, r. iv. 16, vir. ii. 4, xii x. 12, xIII, i. 4, vi. 7, vii. 2, viii. 8, iv, 15, xiv. ii, 19, generation of, 1, vi. 7, 111. 1v. 84, XIII. vli. 4, vin., ix. 6, x1v. iv., v.

Oceanne, I. ni. 6, XIV. iv. 4

- Odd, Pythagorean principle, I. v. 5, vill. 20, 1v. il. 22; q. xiv. iv. 1; = unity (Platome), xiii, vill. 22 Odeum, iv. v. 26
- Olympic games, II. ii. 5
- One, defined, v. vi, x. i. 1; vnrious senses, iv ii. 13, 23, vii. iv. 17; starting-point of number, v. xv. 5, x. 1, 10; a measure, x, i, 8, xii. vii. 8, xiv. i. 10; X number, x. vi. 8, (many, x iii. 1, vi; = Mind (Anavagoraa), I. vui. 14, xr. ii. 3, of. xi, x, 9, Pythagoraan, xiv.

ii. 16; Pintonle, 1, vl. 5, vn. 4,
iv. 22, xi ii 10, xn. x, b, vn. 4,
viii. 34 ff, Spensippus's, vii. n.
4. See Unity

- One-over-many, 1. ix. 1, VII. XVI. 5, XIII. iv. 6, cf x n 2
- Opposition, defined, v. v., typee of, x m I, iv S, vin, 4, xi, vin 4, species of plurality, 1v ii. 12, problems connected with, x. v., vi, vi, 4; opposites studied by one celemce, iv, u. 11; all change between opposites, iv vil S, v. vil 3, vi, xil, 4, xii, 1, 5, potentiality for opposites, ix, vin, 15, 19
- Otherness, defined, v, m. 4, meanings, x, m. 6; species of plurahty, iv. n. 12, 24,) (difference, x, m 7; m species, v x 4, x, vin, r., x, 5; m form, klnd, x, x.; of genus, x vm, 3
- Parmenides, I. Hi. 18, IV. 1, V. 12, 18, III IV. 80, IV. V. 12, VIV. II. 5
- Part, defined, v. x.v.; meanings, vii. x.8; studied by metaphysics, iv. ii. 25, relation to whole, v. xi. 8, in definitions, vii. x., viii, i. 4; of form, concrete object, vii. vi., and mutilation, v. xvii, 8
- Patticipation, vii. iv. 11, xii. 3; Platonic, r. vi. 3, 5, lv. 5 fl., vii. vi. 8, xv. 8, viii. vi. 8, 8, xiii. iv. 11, v. 2
- Particular (xel⁹ isacrov), object of expenence, action, 1. i. 8; prior in perception, v. al. 6, cause, principie, HL, iv, 7, v. ii, 14, xii, v. 4; its there anything besides particulare? xii d.; are substancee particular? xiii. X. See Individual, Universal
- Passivity, v. vv. 6. See Activity Pauson, IX. vili, 11
- Perception) (impression, rv. v. 23 Perfect, defined, v. xvi.
- Perishable)(imperishable things, II, iv, II, x x, principle, substance of psushable things, III. iv, 11, vIII. iii, 6; perishable substances, xII 1. 3; perishables X Forms or intermediates, I. iv, 30

Phaedo quoted, J. 1x. 14, XIII v. 6

Pheneoydes, XIV IV. 5

- Philosophy, origin and development, r. n. 9; mathematical trend, ib ix 27, knowledge of truth, ir, i, 5; divisions of, iv, n. 9, vr, i, 10, X (inlectic, sophistry, iv, ti, 10, X (inlectic, sophistry, iv, ti, 10, X (inlectic, sophistry, g, iri, i, 5, ii, ; Primary philosophy, vi, i, 11, cf, xi, ii, 8, iv 1, See Wiedom
- Physicists (i.e., pre-Socratics), I v 11, vin 17, ix. 28, 11, iv. 26, iv. iii. 3, iv. 1, ix. vni, 18, x, ii. 1, xI, x, 9, xII, vi. 6, x 11, xIII, v. 3
- Physics, subject matter of, vi. 1. 7 ft, vii. vi. 13, xi. 1 8, ni. 8, iv. 8, vii., xii. 14, Seo Natural Science
- Physics quoted, r. hi 2, 1v. 4, v. 13, vn. 1, x 1, v11. 1 8, x1. 1 4, v1 5, x11. vn. 4, x11. 1, 1, 1x. 18
- Place, kinds of, Xi X. 14, change of, viii, 17, Xii, ii 1, see Motion, contrary in, together in, XI. Xii. 11. See Space
- Plane, t. iv. 23, 80, 11, 11, 18, v, v, vi. 10, vill. 3, vir. il. 4, vir. it., ix. 2, xiv in 6. See Surface Planets, motions of, vil. vil. 4
- Theory in the second s
- Platonists, referred to, 111, 1, 7, 11, 21, 28, 101, 4, 1 $^{\circ}$, 26, $^{\circ}$, 4, $^{\circ}$, 1, $^{\circ}$, 11, 11, 8, $^{\circ}$, 14, $^{\circ}$, 11, 7, $^{\circ}$, 31, $^{\circ}$, 10, $^{\circ}$, 11, 11, 2, 12, $^{\circ}$, 11, 12, $^{\circ}$, 2, $^{\circ}$, 4, $^{\circ}$, 5, 5, 11, 10, 11, 10, 211, 1, 2, 4, $^{\circ}$, 13, $^{\circ}$, 14, 5, $^{\circ}$, 16, 2, $^{\circ}$, 5, 10, 13, 211, and 219, 9a×8m
- Pleiads, xIV. vi. 5
- Piurality, defined, v. viii. 1;)(unity, 1v. ii. 11, x. iii. 1, vi.; Pythagorean, I. v. 6; Platonic, x111. ix. 8, x1v. i. 4, lv. 10. See Many
- Point, defined, v. vi. 10;)(nmit, unity, xr. xii. 15, x111, ix. 6, as substances, 111, 15, v, v11, ii. 2, x1. 11, 2, x111, ii., x1v. iii, 6; generation of, 111, v. 8 fl. Platonne, 1, ix, 26, x111, ix. 12, of. 40, 6

Polus, 1, i. 5

- Polychtus, v. li. 11
- Position, an atomic "difference," 1. 17. 11, viri il. 1, of points, inits, v vi i9, xiii, m 2, viii, 27, 29, and disposition, v. xix
- Possible, its meanings, v xn 10, 1x, i 4, the possible may happen, 1x, iv.
- Posteriority See Priority
- Potency, defined, v. vi., IX. 1.4, the superior in potency prior, v vi. 8, rational (invational potencies, IX. 11.1, v. 2; Megaric view of, ib. 11.1; how acquired and actualized, ib v. See Capacity, Polentiality
- Potent, v. vil, 5
- Potentiality, v. xu., prior, postellor to actuality, 111. vi 6, 1X. vili., ix 5, not always actualized, III. vi. 6, x11. v1 2,)(actuality, v11. xih 8, VIII, 11, 8, VI 0, 1X, 1, 2, ix. 5, xt. ix. 1, xit. ii. 2, v. 2, 4, potential and actual in a sense one, vin. vi. 10, potentiality and matter, VIII. 1. 6, 11. 1, 8, 1X. viii 10, xt. it. 4, XII it 2, 1v. 4 v. 2, XIV. 1. 17, 11. 15, 1V. 12, cf. VII. XV. 2; for opposite results, 1x. h. 2, v. 2, vill, 19, XII. v. 2; how one thing is potentially another, 1x vii., cf. XII. II., do elements evist potentially? III. 1 14, vi. 5, the indeterminate exists potentially, iv. iv. 28, nothing eternal potential, iv. 20, vin. 15; no motion potentini, ibid.; potential causes, being, priority, relations, v. n. 12, vii. 6, x1. 7, xv. 6, most so-called substances potentialities, VII. xvi. 1. See Capacity, Polency
- Power (geometrical), v. xii 11, 1x. i. 4
- Predication, figures of, v. vn. 4. See Categories

a principle, r n 14, cf. m. lv. 12, principles conceived as contraries, 1. v. 6, 8, IV. ii. 22, XII. x, 5, XIV. 1 1, of Being, substance, 11, 1., VI. 1., XI. 1.; of demonstration, 111, 1, 5, 11, 10, 1v. 11. 6 ft., xr. v. 1; ale genera principles? un, i, i0, m, xi, i. 9, cf. viii. i. 3, 4; one in kind or in number? III i 12, iv. 8, XI in 13, ef. xir, iv., v., xin, x.; of perishable and imperishable things, 11, 1, 12, 19 11, XI n. 6; potential or actual? nr. i. 14. vi 5, muversal or individual? 111. i. 14, vi 5, xi. ii. 12, xii i 2, v 3, xiii. x. ,)(element, vii. vvn 12 , x11. iv. 6, most certain principle the Law of Contradiction, IV. ni. 9, x1, v. 1; unity as a principle, XIII. VIU. 24: relation to Good. x1v. iv. 2, v 1, cf vii. ii. 4; views of Anaragoras, Pyth-agoreans, I. ill. 9, v. 6. See Beginning, Cause, Starting point

- Priority, defined, v. xi.; attribute of substance, 111. . 0; studied by metaphysics, 1v. 1. 25; in formula, generation, nature, substantiality, thuse, it. vil. 7, vii. xul. 6; in causation, v. it. 10, of farts or whole in definitions, vii. x. 2, xiii, vii. 23, actuality prior to potentiality, ix. vii.; accidental not pror to per se, xi. vii. 12, q?, vii. xiii. 5; no priority of melvicuals, iii. 11, 11; of spaces, numbers, iii. ii), xiii, vi, 7, viii. 22
- Privation, defined, v. xvii, r.x. 1, 9; and constrained, v. xvii, r.x. 1, 9; and constrained, r.v. 11, v. 11, r.x. 11, 8, x. iv. 10, 13, xr, 11, 6, vi, 16, and contradiction, x. Iv. 8; and negation, rv. 11, 11, x. v. 5; a form of opposition, v. x. 1, x. iv. 8; a kind of state, v. xn. 6; y positive state, v. vii. v. 2, x. fv. 7, cf. x11, iv. 4; a definite mceeda from, vit. vii. 10, x. v. 10
- Production, a kind of generation, vii. vii. 3; natural production, *vb.* viii. 8. See Generation

- Proof, not always possible, iv. iv. 2, of. xi. v. 1; by refutation, iv. iv. 3, xi. v. 2. See Demonstration
- Piolagoras, III fl. 27, 1v 1v. 27, v. 1, IN, fl. 4, X. 1, 20, XI, VI, 1
- Phipuse, = Good or final cause (q, v), i in 1
- Pyirha, v. xxvii, 2
- Pythagoras, I. v. 7
- Pythagoneans, r v., vl. 3, vhi 17, nt. 1, 13, lv. 25, vn. vl. 7, v hi 1, xn vh. 10, vtr. vt. 8, 11, vm. 9, vtv m. 2, 4, 15, vt. 4. Sen italians
- Qualify, defined, v. viv., x1. x1. 9, X substance, v1. 1 9,)(quantity, x1. v1. 11, x11, v11 1; change of, x11, 1, 1
- Quantity, defined, v. vin., known by a measure, x_i . ϑ ; χ quality, x_i . v_i , 11, x_{i1} , v_{i3} , 1, e_{i3} , θ x_{11} , i_1 , j_2 , x_1 , x_1 , ϑ
- Quarter-tone, a unit, v. vi. 18, x. 1, 15, 11 6, MIV. 1, 10

Rarity, atomic, 1, iv 10, 14 28

- Ratio $(\lambda \delta \gamma o_{5})_{i} = \text{definition or}$ $\bullet sequec, i, x 2, xiv. v. 8, not$ $substance; iii, v. 1, <math>c_{i}^{2}$ xi, i_{i}^{1} , 7; how explessed; xiv. vi. 2; Enpedocloum, i x 2; Pythagorean, i. v. 2; iv. 17, c_{j}^{2} xiv. vi. 1
- Reulity, complete (εντελέχεια), IX. ih. 9, vul. 11, x1, 12, 2, x11, V. 6, vul. 16, x111, nl. 10. Sec Actuality Reasoning, 1, 1, 3. Sec Muud
- Relation, relative, defined, v. vv., x. vi. 7, xvv. 15; and opposibion, v. x. 1, x. iv S, vi 7 ff.; no motion of, xI, vi. 1, xiv. 1, 15; Ideas of, I. ix S, xiii. iv. 8; Great-and-Small islative, xiv. i, 15, ii. 14 fl., of. I. iv. 4
- Same, defined, v. ix, xv. 5, cf. x. H. 2; Xother, rt. 1. 9, rv. 1. 8 lu species, v x. 5, x. viii, b, of. IX. viii, 3, 5; accidentally, vr. xi. 18. See Identity
- Science, scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), χ experience, art, 1. 1. 4-17, speculative, productive, prectleal, 1. i. 17, 11. 1. 5,

vi. i. 4, ix. n. 1; superior, subыdiary, 1, 11. 8, 7, 111. 11 7; exact, independent, divine, 1, 11 5, 11, 14; contraries studied by one science, 111. ii. 1, XI. in. 6, XIII. iv. 4, one science of one genus, IV. ii. 4, X. IV 6, knowledge of species, III. ill. 4, of essence, vir, vi, 6; of universals, XI, i, 9, ii, 12, sciences of other things than substances, I. ix 5; every intellectual science treats of causes, vi 1. 1; particular sciences do not study the essence, XI VR. 1, no science of the accidental or sensible, 1. vi. 2, vi ii. 2, 12, xi. vih. 1, 5, xm, ni. 4; natural or physical science, vi 1. 4, xi, vii. 3. See Physics

- Sense-perception, natural to animatis, 1, 2, ant) concerned with facts, 40, 13, X (Widom, 1 m 2; X knowledge, 111, 1v. 3; produces varous impressions, 1v. v. 0, XI. vi, 13, and thought, physical alteration, 1v. v. 10; objects proper or foreign to a given sense, id, 20; perception presupposes an object, id, 23
- Sen \tilde{s} ble, \tilde{y} (I deal, intelligible, mathematical, i. vini. 17, 21, 24, 111. 1. 21 ff., iv. 3, vit. x. 17, viti, vit. 6, xiv, in. 11; no knowledge of the sensible, I. vi, 3 ff., 111, iv. 3, xitt. iv. 2, cf. iv. v. 16 ff., vit. xv. 2 ff., sensible, non sensible substance, 111. 17, ii. 20, vit. 1 ff., vit. ii. 3; change, motion of sensible things, i. vi. 2, vini. 17, vit. xi. 9, xitt. iv. 2; sensible contrarieties, xi, ni. 7;
- Sight, 1. i. 1
- Similar, v. xv. 11, x. iii. 4. See Like
- Simonules, i. ii. 12, xiv. id. 13
- Snub, vi. i. 8, vii. x. 4, xi. 16, xi. vii. 5. See Concrete object
- Socrates, I. vi. 2, XIII. iv. 5, 5, ix. 22; the younger, vi. xi 9; mane used without personal reference, I. I. 6, ill. 8, ix. 12, etc.
- Solid, whether substance, III. ii. 18, XIII. ii., XIV. iii. 6, contains all

shapes, 111. v 6; Ideal solids, 1. iv. 28 fl., x111. 1x, 2. See Body

- Sophistry, sophists, iv. ii. 19, vi. n. 3, vii. vi. 13, ix. viii. 7, xi. ii. 8, viii. 3
- Sophocies quoted, v. v. 8
- Soil, studied by physics, vi. 1, 7, substance of hving creature, vii. x. 18, xi. 12, viii. iii. 1, ci.xii. v. 1, = essence of soul, vii. x, 16, viii. m. 3; rational, intelligent hart of v. ii. 1, xir. ill. 6, sui vival of, thid.; a mifying principle, xiii, ii. 13; and motion (Plato), xii vi. 8. See Mind
- Space, xiv. v. 2. See Place
- Species, scientific knowledge of, in, in, 4; relation to gonus, bid., v. xxv. 2 f., vit. xii. 7, slv. 1, x vii. 6, viii. x; same in, other in, v. x, 4, 5, x. viii, iv., cf in. 8, See Form, Genus
- Speusippus, vir ii. 4, xir. vii. 10; cf. xiri. vi. 7, vii. 5, ix. 15, xiv. ii. 21, ii. 3, v. 1
- Spheres, theory of homocentric, XII. viii. 0
- Spontaneity, 1. ni. 15. Sec Generation, Motion
- Square, a Pythagorean principle, I. v. 6, diagonal of square incommensurable, I. 11. 15, 1V. VII. I, V. VII. 6, XXIX I, IX. IV. I, X. 4, X. I. 16
- Starting-point $(\lambda_{\rho\chi\eta})$, of the fortuitous, vi. in 4; one the starting point of number, v vi. 17, x. i. 10. See Beginning, Principle
- State (ič:s), opposite, v. x 1; privation a kind of state, v. xii. 6; X privation, x. iv. 7 fl.; positive state and privation as primary contrariety, x iv. 7; = form, viii v.2, c/ xii, ill. 3; and potentiality, ix. i. 5. See Habit, Have Strife, Empedecies' principle, i.
- Strife, Empedocles' principle, 1. iv. 2 ff., 11. 11, 11, 11, 10, 15, x11, x. 7, x1v. v. 6. See Love
- Styx, I. in 6
- Substance, its meanings, v. vili., viz. iii., XII. 1., 11. 3, cf. vi. 1, = body, matter, subject, sub-

strate, r. iv 10, ix. 28, iii. v. 2, v. vm 1, xi. 7, vir. ii 1, ni. 8, x, 4, xui. 3, vini, 1, 2, 3, 6 fl., n. 1, iv. 1, ix vn. 7, xii, iv 4, xiii, ii, 16, = actuality, essence, form, 1. vi. 5, 1v. 1v 19, v. vni. 4, vii. iii 1, 7, iv.-ví., vii 4, x. 4, 18, xi 10, xii. 3, xvil, vin n.m., ix. voi 14, xi ix. 1, XII IV. 4, VII. 2, and genus, universal, m vi. 7, vii. il. 1, x. 15, xili., xvi 3, x ii. 2, xi, ii. 12, xii i, 2, xiii x. 5, sensible, non sensible int, 5 7, it 20, 1. (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (1, 2), (1, 2), (1, 2), (1, 2), (1, 2), (1, 3), (tion, 1v, 1v 22, vii xui, 5, XII, v, 1, and concrete thing, vit x. 4, 14, xi. 16, viii, ii, 8, iii, (f. XII. IV. 1; primary, prior, v. Xi, 7, VII. 1 5; one in a primary sense, v. vi. 15, = primary being, vir. i. 1, xii. i. 1; s principle of cause, vir xvii, I, 12, vill, 11, 5, are Forms, mathematical objects, numbers substances? 111 1. 15, 19, 30, V., v vii. 3, viii. 1, 2, hi. 9, xi. 1, 10, xii. 1, 4, x 13, xiii. 1, ii., vi., ix, 19, xiv 11, 19, are Being and Unity substances? 111, 1, 18, iv. 24 ff., vII xvi. 8, X. II., natural substances, vi, i, 12, viii i 2, iv. 6, xii, lii, 2, incomposite, vii, xin, II; most so called substances potentiailties, vii. xvi. 1, oternal, vii. xvi, 7, xII, 1 3, vi.-viii ; not ali things substances, xt ii. 16; no motion of substance, xr xll. 1; cause of plurality in substances, xIV. 11, See Essence

Substrate, subject (unoreinevor). its meanings, vir fli. 1, xiii. 1, IX. VII 6; = matter, I. m. I, ix. 28, v. n 7, xviii. 1, vir. ni 2, . VIII, 1, 6, cf. XII, m 3;) matter, viii, lv. 7; as substance, vii. ni. 1, viii. i 3, 6, see Substance; substance not predleated of a subject, v. viii 1, substrate prior, v. xi. 7; unmediate, provimate, ultimate, v. vi. 10, viil. i, AAVIIL 4

- Successive, xr. xii, 12
- Surface, vii, n. 2, xi h 11, x. 6 See Phane
- Syllable, composition doubtful, 1. ix 35, principles of syllables determinate in number, m. vi 2, avilable not morely the sum olits letters, vit. xvn, 8 See Letter, Elemenia
- Teleology, Mr. vul. 10
- Telhys, 1 m. 6
- Thales, r. m. 5, 7
- Thurgoila, v. XXIV. 5
- Theology, vi 1 10, x1 vi 9 See Plutosophy, Wisdom "Thrd Man," 1 18 3, vii, xii 7,
- viii. iv. 8
- Thought (vonois, vois), truth and falsity in thought, not in things, vi, iv. 2, cf. xi, vill, 9, has the same sphere of action as chance. xr vill 11, of the Divine Mind, XII, vil., IX, See Cogitation, Mind
- Time, relation to motion, v. xin 5, XI. X. 15; ungenerated, XII. vi 1
- Tunothens, 11 1 4
- Unequal; the (Platonic principle), x. v 4, xiv. i, 1, it 1, 13, 1v, 10, cf. 11. iv, 84. See Great-and-Šmall
- Umt, defined, v. vi 19, xiv. h. 19, and one, unity, 111. iv 28, x111. vin. 29, indivisible, v vi. 18, x. 1. 12; undivisible in different senses, ib. 17; a measure and starting-point, ib. 12, differs m different classes, v. vi. 17,) point, x1. x1. 15, cf. x111 vill. 27; whether substance, VII II. 2, number is muts, mi. iv. 28, vii. viii. 10, relation of units m Ideal numbers, I. IX. 19, XIII vi ; addibie, haddible units, xiii. vi, vu., how can units dilter? ib. thi. : how are they composed? ib. Ix. 9; units as goods, xiv iv. 8. See Number

Unity, Its senses, vii. xvii. 8, X.

ii ; not a final cause, I. vil. 6; whether substance, in. 1, 13, iv. 24, vii. vi. 8, x. ii., xi. ii. 10, whether a genus or universal, nr m. 4, 7, iv n 24, x n. 8, indivisible, iii. iv 31, x i 17, association with Being, iv ii 6, vii, xvi 3, xi, ifi 5, species of unity, Iv. if. S. X. iii, 2; unity of definition, number, substance, vill. hi 10, vi.; the same in all categories, x n. 3;) plurality, x in 1; a measure, x, 1 21, xiv. i. 10, not an element, xri. iv. 3, and units, xIII vin 20, and Good, xIV iv. 6, Pythagorean, I. v 5; Eleatic, I. v. 11; Platonic, VII, x. 6, XIII, VII 4, vili. 22. XIV. 1. 4, 1V. 3, V. 5. See One

Universal, defined, v xxvi 2, vir. vih. 2, hard to grasp, I. d. 4, (Class, genny, I. rx 30, vir. m 1; are first principles indiversal? III. f. 14, int. 6, vir. 7, xr. 6, 9, h. 12, xr. i 2, xrii. x, Being and Unity most mulversal terms, III. vi? 27; prior in formula, v. vir. 5; relation to particulati, v. xxvi, 2; whicher substance, vir. ifi. 1, x, 15, vid, virt. f. 3, xr. n. (H, xx, 15, vid, virt. f. 3, xr. n. (H, xx, 15, vid, virt. 5, xr. 6, subsistent, virt. xvi, 5, xr. 6, xint, ix, 20; connexion wild genus and Ideas, virt. 1, 3; a unity, x, i, 5; all definition and knowledge of universals, III. vi. 9, vii. xi. 1, xi. 1 9, ii. 12, xiii x 4, 7, *cf.* 1, i. 8; universal predications, v. ix. 2

- Unlike, x. fil 6. See Like
- Unlimited (Pythagorean), r. v. 6, 15, vi. 6, vi. 2, rv. u. 22 See Infinite
- Usnal(iy),)(always, VI 11 6, X1, viil, 4
- Virtue of itself, in, v. xvin 3, cf. xxx 4
- Virtue of which, that in, v. Xvm
- Void, IX. vi. 5 , (in Atomisin) i. iv. 9, iv. v. 5
- Whole, defined, v. xvvi., studied by Metaphysics, iv n 25; some things only one if whole, v vi 10, cf. x. 1. 2; relation to part, v xi. 8
- Will, v. xi, 8, xir, vli. 2
- Wisdom, i.e. Motaphysics, its characteristics, scope, i. j. n., xi. i.-hu, i. Knowledge of casaes, i. i. 17, if 2, ix. 26, fff. il. 6, xi. i. 1, Divine Wisdom has no contrary, xit. x. 10. Sue Philosophy, Science, Theology

Xenociales referred to, XIII. vi. 9, viil 8, lx. 15, XIV. 11. 9 Xenophanes, t. v. 12, IV. v. 17

Zeno, 111, 19/21 Zena, XIV, iv. 4 Zodiac, XII, viu/9

THE OECONOMICA

INTRODUCTION a

Two Books entitled "Oeconomica" — "Housecraft" or "The Ordering of Households"—are current in Greek under Aristotle's name; a third exists in two Latin versions.

The first Book is largely derived from the $Oi\kappa ovo\mu \kappa \delta s$ of Xenophon and the $\Pi o\lambda vr \kappa \delta \delta d$ Aristotle.^b A treatise of the Epicurean Philodemus (a contemporary of Cicero) discovered at Herculaneum attributes it to Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as head of the Peripatetie school in 322 B.C. According to Susemihl, although it differs in certain points from the teaching of Aristotle, it is unmistakably the work of an early Peripatetic, uncoloured as yet by any tincture of Stoicism.

The second Book, in the main a collection of anecdotes telling of the means, fair or foul, by which various rulers and governments filled their treasuries, was shown by Niebuhr in 1813 ° to be an independent work. It is certainly unworthy of the great moralist; and the $oi\kappa ovo\mu \iota \kappa \eta$ which it illustrates is something very different from that so carefully defined and distinguished from $\pi o\lambda \iota \tau \iota \kappa \eta$ in Book I. The intro-

^a For this I am chiefly indebted to the edition of Franz Susemihl (Teubner, Leipzig, 1887).

^b Susemihl (pp. v and vi) gives a list of parallel passages.

• His essay was reprinted in a collection of his shorter works published at Bonn in 1828.

ARISTOTLE

ductory chapter applies the term $olkoro\mu la$, as we apply its Anglicized form Economy, to the ordering of states as well as to that of private households; and in the succeeding anecdotes, the latter is ignored. Of the rulers whose deeds are herein recorded, Cleomenes and Philoxenus survived Aristotle (d. 322), while Ophellas was living in 308. Susemihl would assign the book to the latter half of the third century B.C.

The chief interest of these "footnotes to history" is the opportunity they afford for comparing ancient and modern treatment of such matters as currency, taxation, and insurance. August Boeckh makes considerable use of this Book in his treatise on the Public Economy of Athens (*Staatshaushaltung der Athener*), which may with advantage be consulted. It is available in an English translation.

The Greek text followed is in the main that of Susemihl (Leipzig 1887), which is reprinted by kind permission of Messrs. Teubner. Where I have diverged from it, I have given the reading preferred in a footnote. The pages, columns, and lines of Bekker's Greek Text of Books A and B are given in the margin for convenience of reference.

The third Book, of which no Greek exemplar is known, appears in a Latin translation made by Guillaume Durand^a (who also translated the first Book) in 1295. One of the MSS. of this translation adds in the margin portions of a different version; whether this was ever more than fragmentary, we do not know. Another Latin translation is also extant containing Book II. as well as Books I. and III.

^a Bishop of Mende in Languedoc, a distinguished statesman and jurist; died at Rome in 1296. 324 Its age and authorship are uncertain. Susemihl thinks the first Book of this latter version is translated from a Greek original differing from that used by Durand; and suspects the third Book to be a compound of Durand's version and the now fragmentary one mentioned above.

These three Latin versions I have distinguished by the letters a (Durand), b (fragmentary) and c. In Book III, the version of Durand, as edited by Susemihl, is printed (by kind permission of Messrs. Teubner) on the left-hand pages; and where the English translation noticeably diverges from it, the reading followed is added in a note. The pages of Rose's edition (Aristotelian Fragments, No. 184) are given in the margin.

In substance this so-called third Book is a graceful homily on married life, worthy of Aristotle himself. Indeed the chaste and tender spirit which it breathes is almost Christian. As a favourable example of enlightened Greek thought about marriage and the family, it is well worth presenting in an English dress. It should be compared with the discourse of Ischomachus in the $Oi\kappa ovo\mu \kappa \delta s$ of Xenophon—a work probably well-known to its author.

In a list of works attributed to Aristotle which is preserved by Hesychius of Miletus (VIth Century) a treatise is mentioned under the title $v \delta \mu o i dv \delta \rho \delta s$ $\kappa a i \gamma a \mu \epsilon \tau \eta s$ —" Rules for married life." It is conjectured by Rose that this is the work translated by Durand, and now only known in his and the other Latin versions.

In the translation, words inserted to complete the sense are placed between angular brackets $\langle \rangle$.

[ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ] ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ

А

- 1848 I. 'Η οἰκονομικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἰκία καὶ πόλις (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς ἐστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων ἐστίν, ἡ οἰκονομικὴ δὲ μοναρχία.
 - ⁵ "Ενιαι μέν οῦν τῶν τεχνῶν διήρηνται, καὶ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι ποιῆσαι καὶ χρήσασθαι τῷ ποιηθέντι, ὥσπερ λύρα καὶ αὐλοῖς· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἐστι καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστήσασθαι καὶ ὑπαρχούσῃ χρήσασθαι καλῶς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ κτήσασθαι οἶκον καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ.
 - 10 Πόλις μέν οὖν οἰκιῶν πληθός ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ 2 κτημάτων αὖταρκες πρὸς τὸ εῦ ζῆν. φανερὸν δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ δυνατοὶ ῶσι τούτου τυγχάνειν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. ἔτι δὲ ἔνεκα τούτου συν-326

[ARISTOTLE'S] THE OECONOMICA

BOOK I

I. Between Housecraft (the art of governing a Household or Home) and Statecraft (the art of governing a Nation) there are differences corresponding to those between the two kinds of community over which they severally preside. There is, however, this further difference: that whereas the government of a nation is in many hands, a household has but a single ruler.

Now some arts are divided into two separate branches, one concerned with the making of an object —for example a lyre or a flute—and the other with its use when made. Statecraft on the other hand shows us how to build up a nation from its beginning, as well as how to order rightly a nation that already exists; from which we infer that Housecraft also tells us first how to acquire a household and then how to conduct its affairs.

By a Nation we mean an assemblage of houses, 2, lands, and property sufficient to enable the inhabitants to lead a civilized life. This is proved by the fact that when such a life is no longer possible for them, the tie itself which unites them is dissolved. Moreover,

ARISTOTLE

1843 a

έρχονται· οῦ δὲ ἕνεκα ἕκαστον ἕστι καὶ γέγονε, καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει αὕτη οῦσα.

¹⁵ "Ωστε δήλον ὅτι πρότερον γενέσει ἡ οἰκονομικὴ πολιτικής ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον. μόριον γὰρ οἰκία πόλεώς ἐστιν.

Σκεπτέον ούν περί της οίκονομικής, και τί τό έργον αυτής.

 II. Μέρη δε οἰκίας ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ κτῆσις εστίν. ἐπεὶ δε πρῶτον ἐν τοῦς ἐλαχίστοις ἡ φύσις
 20 ἐκάστου θεωρεῖται, καὶ περὶ οἰκίας ἂν ὁμοίως ἔχοι· ὥστε καθ' Ἡσίοδον δέοι ἂν ὑπάρχειν

οໂκον μέν πρώτιστα γυναϊκά τε [βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα].

τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὰ περὶ τὴν τῆς γυναικὸς ὁμιλίαν οἰκονομήσασθαι καλῶς· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ 25 ποίαν² τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην εἶναι παρασκευάσαι.

Κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν 2 κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἶον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη. ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὅτι δικαία· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὔθ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ ∞ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρνικαί, οὕτ' ἀκόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί. ἕτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· φύσει

' $\beta o \delta v \tau'$ aportipa: apparently these words were not in the copy read by Philodemus (see Introduction).

² Reading όποιαν (Schoemann) for MS. τό ποιαν. 328 it is with such a life in view that the association is originally formed; and the object for which a thing exists and has come into being is in fact the very essence of that particular thing.

From this definition of a Nation, it is evident that the art of Housecraft is older than that of Statecraft, since the Household, which it creates, is older; being a component part of the Nation created by Statecraft.

Accordingly we must consider the nature of Housecraft, and what the Household, which it creates, actually is.

II. The component parts of a household are (1) human beings, and (2) goods and chattels. And as households are no exception to the rule that the nature of a thing is first studied in its barest and simplest form, we will follow Hesiod and begin by postulating

Homestead first, and a woman ; a plough-ox hardy to furrow.

For the steading takes precedence among our physical necessities, and the woman among our frcc associates. It is, therefore, one of the tasks of Homecraft to set in order the relation between man and woman; in other words, to see that it is what it ought to be.

Of occupations attendant on our goods and chattels, 2 those come first which are natural. Among these precedence is given to the one which cultivates the land; those like mining, which extract wealth from it, take the second place. Agriculture is the most honest of all such occupations; seeing that the wealth it brings is not derived from other men. Herein it is distinguished from trade and the wageearning employments, which acquire wealth from others by their consent; and from war, which wrings it from them perforce. It is also a natural occupa-329 1348 b

γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἡ τροφὴ πᾶσίν ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς.

Πρός δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρός ἀνδρίαν συμβάλλεται μεγάλα· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ αἱ βάναυσοι τὰ σώματα ἀχρεῖα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενα θυραυλεῖν καὶ 5 πονεῖν, ἔτι δὲ δυνάμενα κινδυνεύειν πρός τοὺς πολεμίους· μόνων γὰρ τούτων τὰ κτήματα ἔξω τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἐστίν.

III. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ περὶ γυναῖκα πρώτη ἐπιμιέλεια· κοινωνία γὰρ φύσει τῷ θήλει καὶ τῷ ἀρρενι μάλιστά ἐστιν. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν
¹⁰ ἄλλοις ὅτι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἡ φύσις ἐφίεται ἀπεργάζεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ζῷων ἕκαστον· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἢ τὸ ἄρρεν ἄνευ τοῦ θήλεος ἀποτελεῖν τοῦτο, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῶν ἡ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν.

Έν μέν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἀλόγως τοῦτο 2 ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως, ἐπὶ
15 τοσοῦτον, καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήρθρωται μᾶλλον (φαίνονται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοήθειαι γινόμεναι καὶ εὖνοιαι καὶ συνεργίαι ἀλλήλοις), ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ :: μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ
20 εἶναι συνεργὰ ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστί. καὶ ἡ τῶν τέκνων κτῆσις οὐ λειτουργίας ἕνεκεν

^a Cf. Politics I. i.

tion; since by Nature's appointment all creatures receive sustenance from their mother, and mankind like the rest from their common mother the earth.

And besides all this, agriculture contributes notably 3 to the making of a manly character; because, unlike the mechanical arts, it does not cripple and weaken the bodies of those engaged in it, but inures them to exposure and toil and invigorates them to face the perils of war. For the farmer's possessions, unlike those of other men, lie outside the eity's defences.

III. When we turn our attention to the human part of the household, it is the woman who makes the first claim upon it; \langle for the natural eomes first, as we have said, \rangle and nothing is more natural than the tie between female and male. For we have clsowhere laid down the premiss⁴ that Nature is intent on multiplying severally her types; and this is true of every animal in particular. Neither the female, however, can effect this without the male, nor the male without the female; whence the union of the sexes has of necessity arisen.

Now among the lower animals, this union is irra-2 tional in character; it exists merely for the purpose of procreation, and lasts only so long as the parents are occupied in producing their brood. In tame animals, on the other hand, and those which possess a greater share of intelligence, it has assumed a more complex form; for in their case we see more examples of mutual help, goodwill, and co-operation. It is, 3 however, in the human species that this complexity is most marked; since the co-operation between woman and man aims not merely at existence, but at a happy existence. Nor do mankind beget children merely to pay the service they owe to Nature,

1348 b

τῆ φύσει μόνον οὖσα τυγχάνει ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελείας· ἅ γὰρ ἂν δυνάμενοι εἰς ἀδυνάτους πονήσωσι, πάλιν κομίζονται παρὰ δυναμένων ἀδυνατοῦντες ἐν τῷ γήρα.

' ^{''}Åμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτη τῆ περιόδω 4 25 τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ είδος. οὕτω προωκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου έκατέρου ή φύσις, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρός την κοινωνίαν. διείληπται γάρ τω μή έπι ταυτά πάντα χρήσιμον έχειν την δύναμιν, άλλ' ένια μεν επί τάναντία, είς ταὐτὸν δε συντεί-30 νοντα· τό μέν γάρ ισχυρότερον τό δ' άσθενέστερον 1344 α έποίησεν, ίνα το μέν φυλακτικώτερον ή δια τον φόβον, τὸ δ' ἀμυντικώτερον διὰ την ἀνδρίαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν πορίζη τὰ ἔξωθεν, τὸ δὲ σώζη τὰ ἔνδον καὶ πρός την έργασίαν το μέν δυνάμενον έδραιον είναι, 5 πρός δέ τὰς ἔξωθεν θυραυλίας ἀσθενές, τὸ δὲ πρός μέν τὰς ήσυχίας χεῖρον, πρός δὲ τὰς κινήσεις ύγιεινόν και περί τέκνων την μέν γένεσιν κοινήν, την δε ωφέλειαν ίδιον1. των μεν γαρ το θρέψαι, των δε το παιδεύσαί έστιν.

 IV. Πρώτον μέν οὖν νόμοι πρός γυναῖκα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀδικοῖτο·
 τοῦθ' ὑφηγεῖται δὲ [δ] καὶ ὁ κοινὸς νόμος, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ἰκέτιν καὶ ἀφ'

¹ Other MSS. read $\tau h \mu \mu e \gamma \epsilon \nu \epsilon \sigma \nu i \delta i \sigma \nu$, $\tau h \nu \delta e d \phi \epsilon \delta i \epsilon a \nu \kappa \sigma \nu r \mu$, "to the production of children each makes a different contribution, but in their upbringing both share alike." (The concluding sentence, distinguishing between the parts of the parents in upbringing, points clearly to the first reading.)

^a Cf. De Gener. _ Ini., ii. 1, p. 731 b.

but also that they may themselves receive a benefit; for the toil they undergo while they are strong and their offspring is still weak is repaid by that offspring when it in turn is grown strong and the parents by reason of age are weak.

At the same time Nature, by this cycle of changes, 4 fulfils her purpose of perpetuating existence; preserving the type when she is unable to preserve the individual^a And so with this purpose in view Divine Providence has fashioned the nature of man and of woman for their partnership. For they are distinguished from each other by the possession of faculties not adapted in every case to the same tasks, but in some cases for opposite ones, though contributing to the same end. For Providence made man stronger and woman weaker, so that he in virtue of his manly prowess may be more ready to defend the home, and she, by reason of her timid nature, more ready to keep watch over it; and while he brings in fresh supplies from without, she may keep safe what lies within. In handicrafts again, woman was given a sedentary patience, though denied stamina for endurance of exposure; while man, though inferior to her in quiet employments, is endowed with vigour for every active occupation. In the production of children both share alike; but each makes a different contribution to their upbringing. It is the mother who nurtures, and the father who educates.

IV. We begin then with the rules that should govern a man's treatment of his wife. And the first of these forbids him to do her wrong; for if he observes this, he is not likely himself to suffer wrong at her hands. As the Pythagoreans declare, even the common rule or eustom of mankind thus ordains,

¹³⁴⁴ α έστίας ήγμένην ώς ήκιστα δείν [δοκείν] άδικείν άδικία δὲ ἀνδρός αἱ θύραζε συνουσίαι γιγνόμεναι. Περὶ δὲ ὁμιλίας μήθ' ὥστε δεῖσθαι ⟨μηθὲν⟩² μήθ' ὡς ἀπόντων ἀδυνατεῖν ήσυχάζειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ¹⁶ ἐθίζειν ὥστε ἱκανῶς ἔχειν παρόντος καὶ μὴ παρόντος. εῦ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου

Παρθενικήν δε γαμείν, ίνα ήθεα κεδνά διδάξης.

αί γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν ἠθῶν ἥκιστα φιλικόν.

Περὶ δὲ κοσμήσεως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ἤθη δεῖ 3 ²⁰ ἀλαζονευομένους ἀλλήλοις πλησιάζειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ σώματα· ἡ δὲ διὰ τῆς κοσμήσεως οὐδὲν διαφέρουσά ἐστι τῆς τῶν τραγῳδῶν ἐν τῆ σκευῆ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλία.

V. Των δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ οἰκονομικώτατον²⁵ τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἄνθρωπος. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον δούλους παρασκευάζεσθαι σπουδαίους. δούλων δὲ εἴδη δύο, ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐργάτης. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι αἰ παιδεῖαι ποιούς τινας ποιοῦσι τοὺς νέους, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ παρασκευασάμενον τρέφειν οῖς τὰ ἐλευθέρια τῶν ἔργων προστακτέον.

Ομιλία δὲ πρὸς δούλους ὡς μήτε ὑβρίζειν ἐâν 2 30 μήτε ἀνιâν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐλευθεριωτέροις τιμῆς 334 forbidding all wrong to a wife as stringently as though she were a suppliant whom one has raised from the hearthstone. And a man does wrong to his wife when he associates with other women.

As regards the intercourse of marriage, wives 2 should neither importune their husbands, nor be restless in their absence; but a man should accustom his wife to be content whether he is at home or away. Good also is the advice of Hesiod:

Take thee a maiden to wife, and teach her ways of discretion.

For differences of ways and habits are little conducive to affection.

As regards adornment: it is not well that souls 3 should approach one another in borrowed plumes, nor is it well in the ease of bodies. Intercourse which depends (for its charm) upon outward adornment differs in no respect from that of figures on the stage in their conventional attire.

 \overline{V} . Of property, the first and most indispensable kind is that which is also best and most amenable to Housecraft; and this is the human chattel. Our first step therefore must be to procure good slaves. Of slaves there are two kinds; those in positions of trust, and the labourers. And since it is matter of experience that the character of the young can be moulded by training, when we require to charge slaves with tasks befitting the free, we have not only to procure the slaves, but to bring them up (for the trust).

In our intercourse with slaves we must neither 2 suffer them to be insolent nor treat them with cruelty. A share of honour should be given to those who are

1344 μεταδιδόναι, τοῖς δ' ἐργάταις τροφῆς πλῆθος. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ ἔθνη ἀπέχεται καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, οἶον Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, φανερὸν ὅτι τούτου ἢ μηδὲν ἢ ὀλιγάκις μεταδοτέον.

³⁵ "Οντων δέ τριών, ἔργου καὶ κολάσεως καὶ τροφῆς, 3 τὸ μὲν μήτε κολάζεσθαι, μήτ' ἐργάζεσθαι, τροφὴν ¹⁸⁴⁴ δ' ἔχειν, ὕβριν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἔργα μὲν ἔχειν καὶ κολάσεις, τροφὴν δὲ μή, βίαιον, καὶ ἀδυναμίαν ποιεῖ. λείπεται δὴ ἔργα παρέχειν καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανήν· ἀμίσθων γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄρχειν, δούλῳ δὲ μισθὸς τροφή.

⁵ "Ωσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίγνηται τοῖς βελτίοσι βέλτιον μηδὲ ἇθλα ἢ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, γίγνονται χείρους, οὕτω καὶ περὶ οἰκέτας. διόπερ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι σκέψιν, καὶ διανέμειν τε ι καὶ ἀνιέναι κατ' ἀξίαν ἕκαστα, καὶ τροφὴν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ κολάσεις, λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ
 10 μιμουμένους τὴν τῶν ἰατρῶν δύναμιν ἐν φαρμάκου λόγῳ, προσθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές.

Γένη δὲ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὰ ἔργα βέλτιστα μήτε δειλὰ ⁵ μήτε ἀνδρεῖα ἄγαν. ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄγαν δειλοὶ οὐχ ὑπομένουσι καὶ οἱ θυμοειδεῖς οὐκ εὔαρχοι. 336

1344 b

 Χρή δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ 6 καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον· βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ άθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὡρισμένος. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξομηρεύειν ταῖς τεκνοποιίαις· καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλούς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀπο-20 λαύσεις μᾶλλον τῶν δούλων ἕνεκα ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. πλείονα γὰρ ἔχουσιν οὕτοι οῦπερ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνομίσθη.

VI. Είδη δὲ τοῦ οἰκονόμου τέτταρα, ἅ δεῖ ἔχειν περὶ τὰ χρήματα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ κτᾶσθαι δυνατὸν χρὴ εἶναι καὶ φυλάττειν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν ὄφελος
25 τοῦ κτᾶσθαι· τῷ γὰρ ἠθμῷ ἀντλεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ λεγόμενος τετρημένος πίθος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἶναι κοσμητικόν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ χρηστικόν· τούτων γὰρ ἕνεκα κἀκείνων δεόμεθα.

Διηρήσθαι δὲ δεῖ τῶν κτημάτων ἕκαστον, καὶ 2 πλείω τὰ κάρπιμα εἶναι τῶν ἀκάρπων, καὶ τὰς 80 ἐργασίας οὕτω νενεμήσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ἄμα κινδυνεύσωσιν ἅπασιν. πρὸς δὲ φυλακὴν τοῖς τε Περσικοῖς συμφέρει χρήσθαι καὶ τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς. καὶ ἡ ᾿Αττικὴ δὲ οἰκονομία χρήσιμος· ἀποδιδόμενοι γὰρ ἀνοῦνται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ταμιείου θέσις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς μικροτέραις οἰκονομίαις.

85 Περσικά δὲ ήν τὸ πάντα τετάχθαι, καὶ πάντ' 3 338 Every slave should have before his eyes a definite 6 goal or term of his labour. To set the prize of freedom before him is both just and expedient; since having a prize to work for, and a time defined for its attainment, he will put his heart into his labours. We should, moreover, take hostages (for our slaves' fidelity) by allowing them to beget children; and avoid the practice of purchasing many slaves of the same nationality, as men avoid doing in towns. We should also keep festivals and give treats, more on the slaves' account than on that of the freemen; since the free have a fuller share in those enjoyments for the sake of which these institutions exist.

VI. There arc four qualities which the head of a household must possess in dealing with his property. Firstly, he must have the faculty of acquiring, and secondly that of preserving what he has acquired; otherwise there is no more benefit in acquiring than in baling with a colander, or in the proverbial winejar with a hole in the bottom. Thirdly and fourthly, he must know how to improve his property, and how to make use of it; since these are the ends for which the powers of acquisition and of preservation are sought.

Everything we possess should be duly classified; 2 and the amount of our productive property exceed that of the unproductive. Produce should be so employed that we do not risk all our possessions at once. For the safe keeping of our property, we shall do well to adopt the Persian and Laconian systems. Athenian housecraft has, however, some advantages. The Athenian buys immediately with the produce of his sales, and the smaller households keep no idle deposits in store.

Under the Persian system, the master himself 3

1844 b έφορᾶν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅ ἔλεγε Δίων περὶ Διονυσίου· οὐδεἰς γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖται ὅμοίως τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ 1845 h τῶν οἰκείων, ὥστε ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, δι' ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι χρὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πέρσου καὶ τὸ τοῦ Λίβυος ἀπόφθεγμα εῦ ἂν ἔχοι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐρωτηθεἰς τί μάλιστα ὕππον πιαίνει, '' ὁ τοῦ δεσπότου ὀθθαλμὸς '' ἔφη· ὁ δὲ Λίβυς ἐρωτηθεἰς b ποία κόπρος ἀρίστη, '' τὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἔχνη '' ἔψη.

Έπισκεπτέον οῦν τὰ μὲν αὐτόν τὰ δὲ τὴν 4 γυναῖκα, ὡς ἐκατέροις διαιρεῖται τὰ ἔργα τῆς οἰκονομίας. καὶ τοῦτο ποιητέον ἐν μικραῖς οἰκονομίαις ὀλιγάκις, ἐν δ' ἐπιτροπευομέναις πολλάκις. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε μὴ καλῶς ὑποδεικνύντος καλῶς 10 μιμεῖσθαι, οὕτ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτ' ἐν ἐπιτροπεία. ὡς ἀδύνατον μὴ ἐπιμελῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιμελεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ καλὰ πρòς ἀρετὴν καὶ ὅ ὡφέλιμα πρòς οἰκονομίαν, ἐγείρεσθαι χρη πρότερον δεσπότας οἰκετῶν καὶ καθεύδειν ὕστερον, καὶ
16 μηδέποτε ἀφύλακτον οἰκίαν εἶναι, ὥσπερ πόλιν, ὅσα τε δεῖ ποιεῖν μήτε νυκτὸς μήτε ἡμέρας παριέναι.
τό τε διανίστασθαι νύκτωρ· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρòς ὑγίειαν καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν χρήσιμον.

Έν μέν οὗν ταῖς μικραῖς κτήσεσιν ὁ ἀΑττικός 6 τρόπος τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἐπικαρπιῶν χρήσιμος[.] 20 ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις διαμερισθέντων καὶ τῶν πρός

^a Cf. Xenophon, Oeconomicus 12 (end).

undertook the entire disposition and supervision of the household, following the practice which Dion used to remark in Dionysius. No one, indeed, takes the same care of another's property as of his own; so that, as far as is possible, each man ought to attend to his affairs in person. We may commend also a pair of sayings, one attributed to a Persian and the other to a Libyan. The former on being asked what best conditions a horse, replied "His master's eye."^a The Libyan, when asked what kind of manure is best, answered "The master's footprints."

The master and mistress should, therefore, give per-4 sonal supervision, each to his or her special department of the household work. In small households, an occasional inspection will suffice; in estates managed through stewards, inspections must be frequent. For in stewardship as in other matters there can be no good copy without a good example; and if the master and mistress do not attend diligently to their estate, their deputies will certainly not do so.

Moreover, as such habits are both commendable 5 for moral reasons and also conducive to good management, the master and mistress will do well to rise earlier than their servants and to retire later; to treat their home as a city, and never leave it unguarded; nor ever, by night or by day, to postpone a task which ought to be done. Rising before daylight is also to be commended; it is a healthy habit, and gives more time for the management of the household as well as for liberal studies.

We have remarked that on small holdings the 6Athenian method of disposing of the produce is advantageous. On large estates, after the amount for the year's or the month's outlay has been set

- 1845 a ένιαυτόν καὶ τῶν κατὰ μῆνα δαπανωμένων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ σκευῶν χρήσεως τῶν καθ ἡμέραν καὶ τῶν ὀλιγάκις, ταῦτα παραδοτέον τοῖς ἐφεστῶσιν. ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν αὐτῶν διά τινος χρόνου ποιητέον, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ τὸ σϣζόμενον καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.
 - 25 Οἰκίαν δὲ πρός τε τὰ κτήματα ἀποβλέποντα 7 κατασκευαστέον καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐημερίαν αὐτῶν· λέγω δὲ κτήματα μέν, οໂον καρποῖς καὶ ἐσθῆτι ποία συμφέρει, καὶ τῶν καρπῶν ποία -ξηροῖς καὶ ποία ὑγροῖς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ποία ἐμψύχοις καὶ ποία ἀψύχοις καὶ δούλοις καὶ
 - ⁸⁰ ἐλευθέροις καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ ξένοις καὶ ἀστοῖς. καὶ πρὸς εὐημερίαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν δεῖ εἶναι,¹ εὕπνουν μὲν τοῦ θέρους, εὐήλιον δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος.

Εἰη δ' ἂν ή τοιαύτη κατάβορρος οῦσα καὶ μὴ 8 ἰσοπλατής. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις οἰκο ⁸⁵ νομίαις χρήσιμος είναι θυρωρός, ὃς ἂν ή ἄχρηστος τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων, πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῶν εἰσ 1845 b φερομένων καὶ ἐκφερομένων. πρὸς εὐχρηστίαν δὲ σκευῶν τὸ Λακωνικόν χρὴ γὰρ ἕν ἕκαστον ἐν τῆ αῦτοῦ χώρα κεῖσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕτοιμον ὂν οὐ ζητοῖτο.

¹ I omit the comma in translating.

apart, it should be handed to the overseers; and so also with implements, whether for daily or for occasional use. In addition, an inspection of implements and stores should be made periodically, so that remainders and deficiencies may alike be noted.

In constructing a homestead, we have to provide 7 for the stock which it is to shelter, and for its health and well-being. Providing for the stock involves questions such as these: What type of building is best for the storage of crops and of clothing? How are we to store the dry crops, and how the moist ones? Of the other stock, how is the living to be housed, and how the dead? and what accommodation are we to make for slaves and free, for women and men, for foreigners and fellow-citizens? For well-being and health, again, the homestead should be airy in summer, and sunny in winter.

A homestead possessing these qualities would be 8 longer than it is deep; and its main front would face the south. On large estates, moreover, it seems worth while to instal as porter a man incapable of other work, to keep his eye on what passes in and out. That implements may be ready for use, the Laconian practice should be followed. Each should be kept in its own place; thus it will always be to hand, and not require seeking. 1345 b

I. Τὸν οἰκονομεῖν μέλλοντά τι κατὰ τρόπον τῶν τε τόπων, περὶ οῦς ἂν πραγματεύηται, μὴ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, καὶ τῷ φύσει εὐφυῆ εἶναι καὶ τῷ προαιρέσει 10 φιλόπονόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ἀπῷ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, πολλὰ διαμαρτήσεται περὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἣν μεταχειρίζεται.

Οἰκονομίαι δέ εἰσι τέσσαβες, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιπτούσας εὐρήσομεν), βασιλική σατραπική πολιτική ἰδιωτική.

- ¹⁵ Τούτών δὲ μεγίστη μὲν καὶ ἁπλουστάτη ή 2 βασιλική, . .,¹ ποικιλωτάτη δὲ καὶ ῥάστη ή πολιτική, ἐλαχίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη ἡ ἰδιωτική. ἐπικοινωνεῖν μὲν τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκαῖον ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ μάλιστα δι' αὐτῶν ἑκάστῃ συμβαίνει, ταῦτα ἐπισκεπτέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν.
- Πρώτον μέν τοίνυν την βασιλικην ίδωμεν. έστι 20 δε αύτη δυναμένη μεν το καθόλου, είδη δε έχουσα τέσσαρα, περί νόμισμα, περί τὰ εξαγώγιμα, περί τὰ είσαγώγιμα, περί τὰ ἀναλώματα.

Τούτων δε ἕκαστον [μεν] περί . . . το νόμισμα 3

¹ Reading, after βασιλική, ζμεγίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη ή σατραπική> (Susemihl, following Goettling).

^a Or, "the localities wherein we work."

BOOK II

I. Right administration of a household demands in the first place familiarity with the sphere of one's action a; in the second place, good natural endowments; and in the third, an upright and industrious way of life. For the lack of any one of these qualifications will involve many a failure in the task one takes in hand.

Of such administrations there are four main types, under which all others may be classified. We have the administration of a king; of the governors under him; of a free state; and of a private citizen.

Of these, that of a king is the most extensive, yet 2 at the same time the simplest. A governor's office is also very extensive, but divided into a great variety of departments. The administration of a free state is again very varied, but it is the easiest to conduct ; while that of a private individual presents the like variety, but within limits which are narrowest of all. For the most part, all four will of necessity cover the same ground; we will, however, take them in turn, and see what is especially characteristic of each.

Taking first the royal administration, we see that while theoretically its power is unlimited, it is in practice concerned with four departments, namely currency, exports, imports, and expenditure.

Taking these severally, I assign to that of currency 3

1345 b

λένωι ποΐον και πότε τίμιον η εύωνον ποιητέον, περί δε τὰ εξαγώγιμα και είσαγώγιμα πότε και 25 τίνα παρά τῶν σατραπῶν ἐν τῆ ταγῆ ἐκλαβόντι αὐτῶ λυσιτελήσει διατίθεσθαι, περί δέ τὰ ἀναλώματα τίνα περιαιρετέον και πότε, και πότερον δοτέον νόμισμα εἰς τὰς δαπάνας, ἢ ἃ τῶ νομίσματι ผ้านส

Δεύτερον δέ την σατραπικήν. έστι δέ ταύτης 4 είδη εξ των προσόδων, άπο γης, άπο των έν τη ⁸⁰ χώρα ίδίων γινομένων, από έμπορίων,² από τελων, άπο βοσκημάτων, άπο των άλλων.

Αὐτῶν δἐ τούτῶν πρώτη μèν καὶ κρατίστη ή ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἢν οἱ μèν ἐκφόριον οἱ δὲ δεκάτην προσαγορεύουσιν), δευτέρα ή άπο των ίδίων γινομένη, ου μέν χρυσίον, ου δε άργύριον, 86 ου δε χαλκός, ου δε όπόσα δύναται γίνεσθαι, τρίτη 1846 = δε ή από των εμπορίων, τετάρτη δε ή από των κατά γην τε και άγοραίων τελών γινομένη, πέμπτη δε ή από τῶν βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία τε καὶ δεκάτη καλουμένη, ἕκτη δε ή ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων,
 δ ἐπικεφάλαιόν τε καὶ χειρωνάξιον προσαγορευομένη. Τρίτον δε την πολιτικήν. ταύτης δε κρατίστη 5 μέν πρόσοδος ή άπο των ίδίων έν τη χώρα γινομένων, είτα ή από των έμπορίων³ και διαγωγων, είτα ή άπο των ενκυκλίων.

1 Reading τούτων δέ έκαστον, περί μέν το νόμισμα λέγω (Susemihl, after Bekker).

² Or (after Schneider and Bonitz) έμποριών, "merchandise " (Mss. έμπόρων, " traders ").

 ³ Or έμποριών, "merchandlse" (several Mss.).
 ⁴ διαγωγών 18 Boeckh's conjecture for Ms. δι' άγώνων. (Boeckh however takes the word to signify "tolls" or wavleaves": as in Polybius iv. 52 διαγώγιον.

346

the seasonable regulation of prices; to imports and exports, the profitable disposition, at any given time, of the dues received from provincial governors; and to expenditure, the reduction of outgoings as occasion may serve, and the question of meeting expenses by currency or by commodities.

The second kind of administration, that of the 4 governor, is concerned with six different classes of revenue; those, namely, arising from agriculture, from the special products of the country, from markets, from taxes, from cattle, and from other sources.

Taking these in turn, the first and most important of them is revenue from agriculture, which some call tithe and some produce-tax.^a The second is that from special products; in one place gold, in another silver, in another copper, and so on. Third in importance is revenue from markets, and fourth that which arises from taxes on land and on sales. In the fifth place we have revenue from cattle, called tithe or first-fruits ; and in the sixth, revenue from other sources, which we term poll-tax, or tax on industry.

Of our third kind of administration, that of a free 5 state, the most important revenue is that arising from the special products of the country. Next follows revenue from markets and occupations; and finally that from every-day transactions.^b

 ^a Boeckh translates ἐκφόριον "Grundsteuer." But how then does it differ from τῶν κατὰ γῆν τελῶν below?
 ^b Or (understanding λειτουργιῶν) "regular public services."

1846 a

²⁴ Τέταρτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τὴν ἰδιωτικήν. aὕ-6 τη δέ ἐστιν ἀνώμαλος μὲν διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὴ πρὸς ἕνα 10 σκοπὸν οἰκονομεῖν, ἐλαχίστη δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα βραχέα γίνεσθαι. αὐτῆς δὲ ταύτης κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένη, δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγκλημάτων,¹ τρίτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ ἀργυρίου. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὅ πάσαις μὲν ἐπικοινωνεῖται ταῖς οἰκονομίαις, 15 καὶ προσήκει σκοπεῖν αὐτὸ μὴ παρέργως, μάλιστα δὲ ταύτη, τὸ τἀναλώματα μὴ μείζω τῶν προσόδων γίνεσθαι.

' Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰς διαιρέσεις εἰρήκαμεν, μετὰ Τ τοῦτο πάλιν νοητέον ἡμῦν, ἡ σατραπεία, περὶ ἡν ἂν πραγματευώμεθα, ἡ πόλις, πότερον ἃ πάντα 20 ἄρτι διειλόμεθα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα τούτων εἰ δυνατὴ φέρειν ἐστί, . . ³ τούτοις χρηστέον· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ποῖαι τῶν προσόδων ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἰσί, δυναταὶ δ' εἰσὶ γενέσθαι, ἡ μικραὶ νῦν οῦσαι μείζους οἶαί τινες κατασκευασθῆναι, ἢ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων τῶν νῦν ἀναλουμένων, τίνα τε καὶ πόσα περιαιρεθέντα (τὰ)³ ὅλα μηθὲν βλάψει.

²⁵ Τὰ μὲν οῦν περὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας τε καὶ τὰ μέρη 8 τὰ τούτων εἰρήκαμεν ὅσα δέ τινες τῶν πρότερον πεπράγασιν εἰς πόρον χρημάτων ἢ τεχνικῶς τι διώκησαν, ἅ ὑπελαμβάνομεν ἀξιόλογα αὐτῶν εἶναι, συναγηόχαμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀ-

¹ Reading έγκυκλημάτων (3rd Basle edition) for MS. έγκλημάτων, έγκλιμάτων, έγ... μάτων.

² If rourous $\chi \rho \eta \sigma \tau \epsilon \sigma \nu$ be read, some addition must be made to complete the sense. The words are, however, omitted by several Mss. If they are left untranslated the sentence ends at "them." Susemill suggests a lacuna before $\tau o t \tau \sigma s$.

⁸ <*r*à> inserted by Keil.

348

Fourthly and lastly, we must consider the adminis- 6 tration of a private citizen. It is difficult to reduce this to rules owing to the necessary variety of its aims; yet it is the most limited of the four, because both revenues and expenses are (comparatively) small. Taking its revenues in turn, the chief are those from agriculture; next in importance, those from other every-day occupations; while third comes interest on money. Apart from all these, there is a matter common to all kinds of administration which is best eonsidered at this particular point, and deserves more than cursory attention. This is the importance of keeping expenditure within the limits of revenue.

Having thus enumerated the divisions of our sub-7 ject, we must next consider whether the province or the free state with which we are concerned is able to produce all the forms of revenue we have just detailed or at least the chief of them ; (and this being known) must make the best use of what we have. Next we must inquire what kinds of revenue, at present wholly lacking, are yet potentially existent ; what kinds, though now small, may with care be increased ; and how far certain items of present expenditure may without prejudice to the commonwealth bediminished.

Having spoken thus of administrations and their g various departments, we have further proceeded to collect such instances as we deemed noteworthy of the means adopted by certain statesmen in times past for the replenishment of the treasury, and also of their skill in administration. These anecdotes (which

1346 a

χρείον ὑπελαμβάνομεν είναι. ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτων ἐφαρμόσει τοῖς οία ἂν αὐτὸς πραγματεύηται.¹

 II. Κύψελος ό Κορίνθιος εὐξάμενος τῷ Διί, ἐὰν κύριος γένηται τῆς πόλεως, τὰ ὅντα Κορινθίοις
 1846 h πάντα ἀναθήσειν, ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς ἀπογράψασθαι, ἀπογραψαμένων δὲ τούτων τὸ δέκατον μέρος παρ' ἐκάστου ἕλαβε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐκέλευσεν ἐργάζεσθαι. περιελθόντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν, ὥστε συνέβαινεν ἐν δέκα ἔτεσι ◊ κεῖνόν τε ἅπαντα ἔχειν, ἅπερ ἀνιέρωσεν, τούς τε Κορινθίους ἕτερα κεκτῆσθαι.

 Αύγδαμις Νάξιος ἐκβαλών φυγάδας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ 2 κτήματα αὐτῶν οὐθεὶς ἠθέλησεν ἀλλ' ἢ βραχέος ἀγοράζειν, αὐτοῖς τοῖς φυγάσιν ἀπέδοτο. τά τε
 10 ἀναθήματα, ὅσα ἦν αὐτῶν ἐν τισιν ἐργαστηρίοις ἡμίεργα ἀνακείμενα, ἐπώλει τοῖς τε φυγάσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ βουλομένῷ ὥστ' ἐπιγραφῆναι τὸ τοῦ πριαμένου ὅνομα.

Βυζάντιοι δὲ δεηθέντες χρημάτων τὰ τεμένη τὰ 3 δημόσια ἀπέδοντο, τὰ μὲν κάρπιμα χρόνον τινά, 18 τὰ δὲ ἄκαρπα ἀεννάως, τά τε θιασωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πατριωτικὰ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὅσα ἐν χωρίοις ἰδιωτικοῖς ἦν. ὡνοῦντο γὰρ πολλοῦ ὡν ἦν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο κτῆμα. τοῖς δὲ θιασώταις ἕτερα χωρία³ τὰ δημόσια, ὅσα ἦν περὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον ἢ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἢ

¹ Reading τ_i after roirw and τ_i s ofs for rois of a (see Susemihl's note).

² A verb is omitted in the Greek.

^a See the seventh Speech of the Athenian orator Lysias. 350

follow), seemed to us by no means lacking in utility; being capable from time to time of application by others to the business they themselves have in hand.

II. Cypselus of Corinth had made a vow that if he became master of the city, he would offer to Zeus the entire property of the Corinthians. Accordingly he commanded them to make a return of their possessions; which done, he took from each a tenth part, and told them to employ the remainder in trading. A year later, he repeated the process. And so in ten years' time it came to pass that Cypselus received the entire amount which he had dedicated; while the Corinthians on their part had replaced all that they had paid him

Lygdamis of Naxos, after driving into exile a party 2 of the inhabitants, found that no one would give him a fair price for their property. He therefore sold it to the exiled owners. The exiles had left behind them a number of works of art destined for temple offerings, which lay in certain workshops in an unfinished condition. These Lygdamis proceeded to sell to the exiles and whose else would buy them; allowing each purchaser to have his name engraved on the offering.

The people of Byzantium, being in need of funds, 3 sold such dedicated lands as belonged to the State; those under crops, for a term of years, and those uncultivated, in perpetuity. In like manner they sold lands appropriated to religious celebrations or ancestral cults, not excepting those that were on private estates a; for the owners of the surrounding land were ready to give a high price for them. To the dispossessed celebrants (they assigned) such other public lands surrounding the gymnasium, the

1346 b

20 τον λιμένα,¹ τούς τε τόπους τοὺς ἀγοραίους, ἐν οἶς ἐπώλει τίς τι· καὶ τῆς θαλάττης τὴν ἁλιείαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἁλῶν ἁλ[ατ]οπωλίαν, τῶν τ' ἐργαζομένων θαυματοποιῶν καὶ μάντεων καὶ φαρμακοπωλῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων . . .³· τὸ τρίτον δὲ μέρος τοῦ ἐργαζομένου ἀποτελεῖν ἔταξαν. τῶν τε νομισμάτων τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἀπέδοντο μιậ 25 τραπέζη· ἑτέρῷ δὲ οὐκ ῆν οὐθενὶ οὕτε ἀποδόσθαι ἑτέρῷ οὕτε πρίασθαι παρ' ἑτέρου· εἰ δὲ μή, στέρησις ἦν.

"Οντος δε νόμου αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι πολίτην ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἢ, χρημάτων δεηθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν ἐξ ένὸς ὅντα ἀστοῦ³ καταβαλόντα μνᾶς τριάκοντα εἶναι πολίτην.

⁸⁰ Ἐν σιτοδεία δὲ γενόμενοι καὶ ἀποροῦντες χρημάτων κατήγαγον τὰ πλοῖα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου· χρόνου δὲ γενομένου, τῶν ἐμπόρων ἀγανακτούντων ἐτέλουν αὐτοῖς τόκους ἐπιδεκάτους· τοῖς δ' ἀνουμένοις τι ἔταξαν χωρὶς τῆς τιμῆς διδόναι τὸ ἐπιδέκατον.

1847 a

Μετοίκων δέ τινων ἐπιδεδανεικότων ἐπὶ κτήμα-^{*} σιν, οὐκ οὕσης αὐτοῖς ἐγκτήσεως⁴ ἐψηφίσαντο τὸ τρίτον μέρος εἰσφέροντα τοῦ δανείου τὸν βουλόμενον κυρίως ἔχειν τὸ κτῆμα.

'Ιππίας [δ] 'Αθηναΐος τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τῶν ὑπε-4

¹ I transpose this comma and the colon in the next line.

² Reading την έργασίαν έδήμευσαν, (?) after τοιουτοτρόπων.

⁸ ἀστοῦ (for ἀὐτοῦ MSS.) is restored by Sylburg from the Latin version σ.

⁴ έγκτήσεως is Schneider's correction of MS, έκτίσεως, έκτήσεως, οτ έκκτήσεως.

352

agora, or the harbour, as belonged to the Statc. Moreover they claimed as public property all open spaces where anything was sold, together with the sea-fisheries, the traffic m salt, and the trade of professional conjurors, soothsayers, charm-sellers, and the like; exacting from all these one-third of their gains. The right of changing money they sold to a single bank, whose proprietor was given a monopoly of the sale and purchase of coin, protected under penalty of confiscation.

And whereas previously the rights of citizenship were by law confined to those whose parents were both citizens, lack of funds induced them to offer citizenship to him who had one citizen parent on payment of the sum of thirty *minae.^a*

On another occasion, when food and funds were both scarce, they called home all vessels that were trading in the Pontus. On the merchants protesting, they were at length allowed to trade on payment of a tithe of their profits. This tax of 10 per cent was also extended to purchases of every kind.

It happened that certain aliens residing in the city had lent money on the security of citizens' property. As these aliens did not possess the right of holding such property, the people offered to recognize the title of anyonc who chose to pay into the treasury one third of the amount secured.

Hippias of Athens offered for sale upper stories that 4

• A mina of silver (1lb. 5 oz. avoirdupois) was coined into 100 drachmae, each being an artisan's ordinary daily wage.

VOL. II

1847 a

⁵ ρώων εἰς τὰς δημοσίας όδοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀναβαθμοὺς καὶ τὰ προφράγματα καὶ τὰς θύρας τὰς ἀνοιγομένας ἔξω ἐπώλησεν· ἀνοῦντο οῦν ῶν ἦν τὰ κτήματα, καὶ συνελέγη χρήματα οὕτω συχνά.

Τό τε νόμισμα το ον 'Αθηναίοις άδόκιμον ἐποίησε, τάξας δὲ τιμήν ἐκέλευσε προς αύτον ἀνακομίζειν 10 συνελθόντων δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ κόψαι ἕτερον χαρακτήρα, ἐξέδωκε τὸ αὐτὸ ἀργύριον.

"Όσοι τε τριηραρχέδυ ἢ φυλαρχεΐν ἢ χορηγεΐν ἤ τινα εἰς ἐτέραν λειτουργίαν τοιαύτην ἤμελλον δαπαναν, τίμημα τάξας μέτριον ἐκέλευσε τον βουλόμενον ἀποτίσαντα τοῦτο ἐγγράφεσθαι εἰς τοὺς λελειτουργηκότας.

¹⁵ Τη τε ίερεία τη της 'Αθηνας της έν ακροπόλει ύπερ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος φέρειν χοίνικα κριθῶν καὶ πυρῶν ἐτέραν καὶ ὀβολόν, καὶ ὅτῷ ἂν παιδάριον γένηται, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

³ Αθηναίοι δὲ οἱ ἐν Ποτιδαία οἰκοῦντες δεόμενοι ὅ χρημάτων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπογράψασθαι ἄπασι ²⁰ συνέταξαν τὰς οὐσίας, μὴ ἀθρόας εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ δῆμον ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κτῆμα ἐν ῷ τόπῳ ἕκαστον εἴη, ἵνα οἱ πένητες δύνωνται ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὅτῷ δὲ μὴ ἦν κτῆμα μηθέν, τὸ σῶμα διμναῖον τιμήυασθαι. ἀπὸ τούτων οῦν εἰσέφερον τὸ ἐπιγραφὲν ἕκαστος σῷον τῆ πόλει.

The poet's father, wishing to rebuild his house without 854

^a Cf. Goethe, Wahrheit und Diohtung, Book I. "In Frankfurt, as in several ancient cities, those who had erected wooden buildings had sought to obtain more room by allowing the first and higher floors to overhang the street. . . . At last a law was carried that in all entirely new houses the first floor alone should project; above that, the wall should be perpendicular."

projected over the public streets.^a together with flights of steps, railings, and doors that opened outwards. The owners of the buildings bought them, and in this way a large sum of money was collected.

He also called in b the existing currency, promising to pay the holders at a fixed rate. But when they came to receive the new mintage, he reissued the old coins.

Those who were expecting to equip a war-vessel or preside over a tribe or train a chorus or undertake the expense of some other public service of the kund, he allowed, if they chose, to commute the service for a moderate sum, and to be enrolled on the list of those who had performed it.

Moreover, whenever a citizen died, the priestess of the temple of Athena on the Acropolis^c was to receive one quart measure of barley, one of wheat, and a silver obolus.^d And when a child was born, the father paid the same dues.

The Athenian colonists at Potidaea, being in need 5 of funds for the war, agreed that all should make a return of their property for assessment of tax. But instead of each returning the entire amount to his own parish, properties were to be assessed separately, each in its own locality, so that the poor might propose a reduced assessment; while those without any $\langle landed \rangle$ property were assessed at two *munae* a head. On these assessments each man paid the State the full amount of the war-tax.

sacrifice of floor-space, underpinned the upper stories and renewed the building piecemecal from below. Cf. also § 14.

b Lit. " rendered invalid."

• This was the public treasury, like the Temple of Saturnus at Rome.

^d 1 of the draohma. See § 3 above.

1847 в

 25 (Σωσίπολις)' 'Αντισσαίος [δέ], δεηθείσης τῆς 8 πόλεως χρημάτων, εἰθισμένων [δέ] αὐτῶν λαμπρῶς ἄγειν Διονύσια, ἐν οἶς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἀνήλισκον ἐξ ἐνιαυτοῦ παρασκευάζοντες, καὶ ἱερεία πολυτελῆ, ὑπογύου δὲ οὕσης ταύτης τῆς ἑορτῆς, ἔπεισεν αὐτοὺς τῷ μὲν Διονύσω εὕξασθαι ἐς νέωτα ἀποδώ 80 σειν διπλάσια, ταῦτα δὲ συναγαγόντας ἀποδόσθαι. συνελέγη οὖν αὐτοῖς χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

Λαμψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίμων οὐσῶν τριήρων η πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅντος μεδίμνου τῶν ἀλφίτων τετραδράχμου, προσέταξαν τοῖς ἀγοραίοις πωλεῖν

- 85 έξάδραχμον, καί τοῦ ἐλαίου τὸν χοῦ ὅντα δραχμῶν <τριῶν),⁸ τεττάρων καὶ τριωβόλου, τοῦ τε οἴνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. τὴν μὲν οῦν ἀρχαίαν 1847 ι τιμὴν ἐλάμβανεν ὁ ἰδιώτης, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἡ πόλις,
 - καὶ εὐπόρησε χρημάτων.

Ηρακλεώται πέμποντες ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα ἐπὶ 8 τοὺς ἐν Βοσπόρω τυράννους, οὐκ εὐπορούμενοι ε χρημάτων παρὰ τῶν ἐμπόρων συνηγόρασαν τόν τε σίτον πάντα καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον καὶ τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγορὰν χρόνου διισταμένου ἐν ῷ ἔμελλον ἀποδώσειν τὴν τιμήν. τοῖς τε δὴ ἐμπόροις καλῶς εἶχε μὴ κοτυλίζειν, ἀλλ ἀθρόα τὰ φορτία πεπρασθαι, ἐκεῖνοί τε διδόντες δι' ἄλλην οὐ⁸ μισθὸν παρ-10 ῆγον [ἀλλὰ] τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐν ὅλκάσι, <καὶ⟩ ἄνδρα</p>

ταμίαν ἐπέστησαν ἐφ' ἑκάστη τῶν νεῶν. ἀφ-

¹ The name, omitted in the Greek MSS., is supplied from the Latin version c.

* $\langle r\rho\iota\hat{\omega}\nu\rangle$ is inserted by Boeckh.

* Reading διμήνου (Kirchhoff) for MS. δι' άλλην ού.

" Or " All through the year."

The city of Autissa had been accustomed to cele-6 brate the festival of Dionysus with great magnificence. Year by year ^a great provision was made for the occasion, and costly sacrifices were prepared. Now one year the city found itself in need of funds; and shortly before the festival, on the proposal of a citizen named Sosipolis, the people after vowing that they would next year offer to Dionysus a double amount, collected all that had been provided and sold it. In this way they realized a large sum of money to meet their necessity.

On one occasion the people of Lampsacus were 7 expecting to be attacked by a large fleet of triremes.^b The price of barley meal being then four drachmae for a bushel and a half, they instructed the retailers to sell it at six drachmae. Oil, which was at three drachmae for six pints, was to be sold at four drachmae and a half, and wine and other commodities at a proportionate increase. In this way the retailer got the original price, while the State took the addition and filled its treasury.

The people of Heraclea, being about to dispatch a 8 fleet of forty ships against the lords of Bosporus, were at a loss for the necessary funds. They therefore bought up all the merchants' stock of corn and oil and wine and other marketable commodities, agreeing to pay at a future date. The merchants' were well satisfied that they had disposed of their cargoes withont breaking bulk ; and the people, advancing two months' pay to their armament, sent along with it a fleet of merchant-vessels laden with the commodities, every ship being in charge of a public official. When

^b War-ships, each propelled by some 174 rowers ranked in three tiers.

1847 b ικομένων δ' εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν αὐτῶν ἠγόραζον οἱ στρατιῶται παρὰ τούτων απαντα. πρότερον (οῦν) συνελέγη ἀργύριον ἢ' ἐδίδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάλιν τὸν μισθόν, ὥστε συνέβαινε ταὐτὸ [τὸ][®] ἀργύριον 15 δίδοσθαι ἕως εἰς οἶκον ἀπῆλθον.

Λακεδαιμόνιοι Σαμίων δεηθέντων χρήματα αὐτοῖς 9 εἰς τὴν κάθοδον δοῦναι, ἐψηφίσαντο μίαν ἡμέραν καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια νηστεῦσαι, ὅσον δὲ ἐδαπάνα ἕκαστος, τοσοῦτον δοῦναι τοῖς Σαμίοις.

20 Χαλκηδόνιοι δέ, ξένων ἐν τῆ πόλει συχνῶν παρ' 10 αὐτοῖς γινομένων, ὀφείλοντες αὐτοῖς μισθὸν οὐκ ἠδύναντο διαλῦσαι. ἀνήγγειλαν οὖν, εἴ τις τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ μετοίκων σῦλον ἔχει κατὰ πόλεως ἢ ἰδιώτου καὶ βούλεται λαβεῖν, ἀπογράψασθαι. ἀπο-25 γραψαμένων δὲ συχνῶν, τὰ πλοῖα τὰ πλέοντα εἰς τὸν Πόντον ἐσύλων μετὰ προφάσεως εὐλόγου. ἔταξαν δὲ χρόνον ἐν ῷ λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔφασαν ποιήσασθαι. συλλεγέντων δὲ χρημάτων συχνῶν

τούς μέν στρατιώτας ἀπήλλαξαν, ὑπέρ δὲ τῶν σύλων διεδικάσαντο. τοῖς δὲ μὴ δικαίως συλη-80 θεῖσιν ἡ πόλις ἀπὸ τῶν προσόδων ἀπεδίδου.

Κυζικηνοί δέ στασιάσαντες πρός ἀλλήλους, 11 ἐπικρατήσαντος τοῦ δήμου, τῶν δὲ πλουσίων αυνειλημμένων, ὀφείλοντες χρήματα στρατιώταις

¹ Reading πρότερον οῦν συνελέγη τἀργύριον ή (Schneider's correction of πρότερον συνελέγη ή ἀργύριον, the reading of most MSS.).

² $\tau \delta$ bracketed by Schneider.

358

the expedition reached its goal, the men purchased from these officials all they needed. In this way, the money was collected before the leaders again paid their men; so that the same payment sufficed until the expedition returned home.

When the Samians entreated the Lacedaemonians 9 for money to enable them to return to their country, the Lacedaemonians passed a resolution that they and their servants and their beasts of burden should go without food for one day; and that the expense each one thus saved should be given to the Samians.

The people of Chalcedon had a large number of 10 mercenary troops in their city, to whom they could not pay the wages they owed. Accordingly they made proclamation that anyone, either citizen or alien, who had right of reprisal against any city or individual, and wished to exercise it, should have his name entered on a list. A large number of names was enrolled, and the people thus obtained a specious pretext for exercising reprisal upon ships that were passing on their way to the Pontus. They accordingly arrested the ships and fixed a period within which they would consider any claims that might be made in respect of them. Having now a large fund in hand, they paid off the mercenaries, and set up a tribunal to decide the claims; and those whose goods had been unjustly seized were compensated out of the revenues of the state.

At Cyzicus, civil strife broke out between the 11 democratic and oligarchic partics. The former proved victorious, and the rich cilizens were placed under arrest. But as the city owed money to its troops, a

1347 b

ểψηφίσαντο μὴ θανατῶσαι τοὺς συνειλημμένους, ἀλλὰ χρήματα πραξαμένους φυγαδεῦσαι.

- ³⁵ Χίοι δέ, νόμου όντος αυτοίς απογράφεσθαι τὰ 12 χρέα εἰς τὸ δημόσιον, δεηθέντες χρημάτων ἐψηφί-1848 κ σαντο τοὺς ὀφείλοντας μὲν ἀποδοῦναι τῆ πόλει τὰ δάνεια, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν προσόδων τοὺς τόκους τοῖς δεδανεικόσι καταφέρειν, ἕως ἂν κατὰ¹ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εὐπορήσωσιν.
 - Μαύσωλος ό Καρίας τύραννος, πέμποντος βασι- 13
 λέως πρός αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς φόρους δοῦναι, συναγαγῶν τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους ἐν τῆ χώρα ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁ βασιλεὺς αἰτεῖ τοὺς φόρους, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ εὐπορεῖται. κατασκευαστοὶ δ' ἄνδρες αὐτῷ εὐθέως ἐπηγγέλλοντο, ὅσον εἰσοίσει ἕκαστος. τούτων δὲ τοῦτο πραξάντων, οἱ εὐπορώτεροι τὰ μὲν αἰσχυνό μενοι τὰ δὲ φοβούμενοι πολλῷ τούτων ⟨πλείω⟩² ἐπηγγέλλοντο καὶ εἰσέφερον.

Πάλιν δεηθείς χρημάτων έξεκκλησιάσας τοις Μυλασσεύσιν έλεγεν ότι μητρόπολις ούσα ή πόλις αύτοῦ αὕτη ἀτείχιστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' αὐτὸν στρατεύει. ἐκέλευσεν οῦν τοὺς Μυλασσεῖς
15 φέρειν ἕκαστον ὅτι πλεῖστα χρήματα, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τοις νῦν εἰσενεχθείσι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σώζειν. εἰσενεχθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τὰ μὲν χρήματα εἶχε, τὸ δὲ τεῖχος οὐκ ἕφη τὸν θεὸν ⟨ἐᾶν)⁸ ἐν τῷ παρόντι οἰκοδομεῖν.

Κόνδαλος Μαυσώλου υπαρχος, δπότε διαπορευο- 14 μένω αυτῷ διὰ τῆς χώρας προσενέγκοι τις πρόβατον

¹ Or, reading kal (Camerarius) for karà, "until it was able to repay the principal as well."

² $\langle \pi \lambda \epsilon l \omega \rangle$ added by the Aldine edition.

³ $\langle \hat{\epsilon} \hat{a} \nu \rangle$ inserted by Scaliger.

resolution was passed that the lives of those under arrest should be spared, and that they should be allowed to depart into exile on paying a sum of money to the state.

At Chios there was a law that all debts should be 12 entered on a public register. Being in need of funds, the people resolved that debtors should pay their debts into the treasury, and that the state should meet the creditors' interest out of its revenues until its former prosperity returned.

Mausolus lord of Caria received from the King of 13Persia ^a a demand for tribute. Therefore he summoned the wealthnest men in his dominion, and told them that the King was asking for the tribute, and he had not the means of paying it. Men whom he had previously suborned at once came forward and declared what each was ready to contribute. With this example before them, they who were wealthier than these, partly in shame and partly in alarm, promised and paid much larger sums than the others.

Being again in lack of funds, Mausolus summoned a public meeting of the people of Mylassa and told them that the King of Persia was preparing to attack him; and that Mylassa his capital city was unfortified. He therefore bade the citizens contribute cach as liberally as he could, saying that what they now paid in would afford security to the rest of their possessions. By these means he obtained large contributions. But though he kept the money, he declared that heaven, for the present, forbade the building of the walls.

Condalus, who was a lieutenant-governor under 14 Mausolus, whenever on his progress through the country he was presented with a sheep, a pig, or a

^a Probably Artaxerxes II. who reigned 405-359 B.C.

361

^{1348 a} ²⁰ η υν η μόσχον, ἀπογραψάμενος τὸν δόντα καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ἀπαγαγόντα εἰς οἶκον ἐκέλευε τρέφειν ἕως ἂν ἐπανέλθοι· ὁπότε δὲ δοκοίη χρόνος ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτό τε τὸ τραφὲν καὶ τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν λογισάμενος ἀπήτει. τῶν τε δένδρων τὰ ὑπερέχοντα η πίπτοντα 25 εἰς τὰς ὅδοὺς τὰς βασιλικὰς ἐπώλει ὡς ἐπικαρπίας.¹

Των δε στρατιωτών εί τις τελευτήσειε, διαπύλιον επώλει δραχμήν τοῦ σώματος άμα τε οὖν ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀργύριον ἐλάμβανεν, ἅμα τε οἱ ἡγεμόνες οὐ παρεκρούοντο αὐτόν, πότε τετελεύτηκεν ὁ στρατιώτης.

Τούς τε Λυκίους όρῶν ἀγαπῶντας τὸ τρίχωμα φορεῖν, ἔφησε γράμματα ἥκειν παρὰ βασιλέως, κόμας ἀποστεῖλαι εἰς προκόμια, προστετάχθαι οὖν αῦτῷ ὑπὸ Μαυσώλου ἀποκεῖραι αὐτούς. ἔφησεν οὖν, εἰ βούλονται ἐπικεφάλαιον τακτὸν αὐτῷ δοῦναι, μεταπέμψασθαι ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κόμην, οἱ δὲ ἀσμένως ἕδοσαν ὅ ἤτει, καὶ συνελέγη χρήματα πολλὰ ἀπὸ ὅχλου πολλοῦ.

36 'Αριστοτέλης 'Ρόδιος άρχων Φωκαίας, ἀπορῶν 15 χρημάτων, δρῶν στάσεις οὕσας δύο τῶν Φωκαίων 1848 b λόγους ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τὴν ἐτέραν στάσιν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, φάσκων αῦτῷ διδόναι χρήματα τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐφ' ῷ αὐτοῖς τὰ πράγματα ἐγκλῖναι, αὐτὸς δὲ μᾶλλον βούλεσθαι παρὰ τούτων λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ 5 τὴν πόλιν τούτοις διοικεῖν παραδοῦναι. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα εὐθέως τὰ χρήματα οἱ παρόντες πορίσαντες ὅσα ἐκέλευσεν ἔδωκαν. ὅ δὲ τοῖς ἑτέροις πάλιν ἔδειξεν ἅ εἰληφώς εἴη παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων· οἱ 1 ὡς ἐπικαρπίας is Goettling's emendation for τὰς ἐ. (MSS,).

^a Mentioned by Proclus in his commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato. A coin of Phocaea is extant bearing the name. 362

calf, had a record made of the donor's name and of the date. He then bade the man take the beast home and keep it until he should again pass that way. After what he considered a sufficient interval, he would demand the beast together with such profits as he reckoned it had produced. All trees, too, which projected over the king's highway, or fell thereon, he sold as profits accruing to the State.

When one of his soldiers died, he charged a drachma for the right of passing the body through the gates. This was not only a source of revenue, but a check on the commanders, who were thus prevented from falsifying the date of the man's death.

Noticing that the Lycians were fond of wearing their hair long, Condalus proclaimed that a dispatch had arrived from the King ordering him to send hair to make forclocks for his horses; and that Mausolus had therefore instructed him to shave their heads. However, if they would pay him a fixed sum per head, he would send to Greece for hair. They were glad to comply with his demand, and a large sum was collected, the number of those taxed being great.

Aristoteles of Rhodes,^a when governor of Phocaea, 15 found himself in need of funds. Noticing that there were at Phocaea two opposing parties, he held a secret conference with one of them, at which he declared that the other party.was offering him money if he would favour their pretensions; that he, however, preferred to receive from those now before him, and to entrust to them the administration of the city. On hearing this, they immediately contributed the money he asked, and gave it him. Thereupon he told the other party what he had received from them;

1318 b

δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν οὐκ ἐλάττω δώσειν. λαβὼν δὲ παρ' ἀμφοτέρων κατήλλαξεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

10 Τοῖς τε πολίταις κατιδών ούσας δίκας πολλάς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἀδικίας τούτοις διὰ πολέμου, δικαστήριον καθίσας προεῖπεν, ὅσοι ἂν μὴ δικάσωνται χρόνω ὅν¹ ἔθηκε, μηκέτι εἶναι ὑπὲρ τῶν προτέρων ἐγκλημάτων κρίσεις. τότε δὴ παραβόλιον³ πολλῶν δικῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλήτους³ μετ³ 15 ἐπιτιμίων ἐφ' αὐτὸν ποιούμενος καὶ παρ' ἑκατέρων ἀργύριον δι' ἐτέρων⁴ λαμβάνων, συνήγαγεν οὐκ ὀλίγα χρήματα.

Κλαζομένιοι δ' έν σιτοδεία ὄντες χρημάτων τε 16 ἀποροῦντες ἐψηφίσαντο, παρ' οἶς ἔλαιών ἐστι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, δανεῖσαι τῆ πόλει ἐπὶ τόκῳ· γίνεται δὲ 20 πολὺς οῦτος ὁ καρπός ἐν τῆ χώρα αὐτῶν. δανεισάντων δὲ μισθωσάμενοι πλοῖα ἀπέστειλαν εἰς τὰ ἐμπόρια, ὅθεν αὐτοῖς ῆκε σῖτος, ὑποθήκης γενομένης τῆς τοῦ ἐλαίου τιμῆς.

'Οφείλοντες στρατιώταις μισθον είκοσι τάλαντα καί οὐ (δοῦναι)' δυνάμενοι τόκον ἔφερον τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τέτταρα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ· ἐπεὶ δὲ 25 τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου ἀπέκοπτον οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ μάτην ἐδαπάνων, νόμισμα ἔκοψαν σιδηροῦν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον εἶκοσι ταλάντων, εἶτα διδόντες τοῖς εὐπορω-

¹ χρόν φ δν is Susemihl's emendation. The MSS. have χρόνον, καl χρόνον, or καl χρόνων.

² παραβόλιον is Susemihl's emendation. The MSS. have παραβολόν, παραβόλου, παραβολήν, or παραβολή. Perhaps παρακαταβολήν should be restored.

^δ ἐκκλήτουs is Schneider's emendation for M8. ἐγκλήτουs. Perhaps $\langle \tau \dot{\alpha} s \rangle$ should be inserted before μετ' ἐπιτιμίων.

⁴ Perhaps $\delta i' \epsilon r \epsilon \rho \omega \nu$ should be omitted. Walford renders: 364 and they in turn promised him at least an equal amount. Having thus taken the money of both factions, he effected a reconciliation between them.

He also observed that there were many law-suits pending between the citizens. and that they had grave and long-standing plaints against one another which had arisen in course of war. He therefore appointed a tribunal, and made proclamation that all who failed to appear before it within a stated period should lose the right to a legal decision of their outstanding claims. Then, by taking into his own hands the court-fees for a number of suits, and also those appeal-cases which involved penalties, and receiving [through others] money from both sides, he obtained altogether a very considerable sum.

The people of Clazomenae, suffering from dearth 16 of grain and scarcity of funds, passed a resolution that any private citizens who had stores of oil should lend it to the State at interest; this being a produce which their land bears in abundance. The loan arranged, they hired vessels and sent them to the depots whence they obtained their grain, (and bought a consignment) on security of the value of the oil.

The same people, owing their mercenarics twenty talents of pay and being unable to find it, were giving the leaders of the troop four talents of interest each year. But failing to reduce the capital debt, and committed to this fruitless dram on their revenue, they struck an iron coinage of twenty talents, bearing the face-value of the silver. This they distributed

[&]quot;and by taking bribes from each party through the instrumentality of the other."

⁶ <δοῦναι> is added by Spengel and Susemihl. Schneider suggests <διαλῦσαι> or <διδόσαι> after δυνάμενοι.

^{1348 b} τάτοις ἐν τῆ πόλει κατὰ λόγον ἐκάστῷ ἀργύριον παρ' ἐκείνων ἔλαβον ἴσον. οἶ τε οὖν ἰδιῶται είχον εἰς τὰς καθ' ἡμέραν χρείας ἀναλίσκειν, καὶ ἡ πόλις ³⁰ τοῦ χρέους ἀπηλλάγη. δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσόδων ἐκείνοις τόν τε τόκον κατέφερον ⟨καὶ⟩ aἰεὶ διαιροῦντες ἑκάστῷ πρὸς μέρος διεδίδοσαν, τοὺς δὲ σιδηροῦς ἐκομίζοντο.

Σηλυβριανοὶ δὲ δεηθέντες χρημάτων, νόμου ὄντος 17 αὐτοῖς σῖτον μὴ ἐξάγειν . . . ἐν λιμῷ γενομένοις, 85 ἐκείνοις δὲ ὑπάρχοντος σίτου παλαιοῦ, ἐψηφίσαντο τῆ πόλει παραδοῦναι τοὺς ἰδιώτας τὸν σῖτον τῆς 1349 κ τεταγμένης τιμῆς, ὑπολειπόμενον ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτοῦ τροφήν· εἶτα ἐξαγωγὴν ἕδωκαν τῷ βουλομένῳ, τάξαντες τιμὴν ἦν ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῖς.

³ Αβυδηνοί δέ, διὰ στασιασμὸν τῆς χώρας ἀργοῦ 18 γενομένης, καὶ τῶν μετοίκων οὐ προϊεμένων αὐτοῖς ⁵ οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ καὶ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν βουλόμενον τοῖς γεωργοῖς δανείζειν, ὡς ἐργάσωνται, ὡς πρώτοις αὐτοῖς ἐσομένης τῆς κομιδῆς ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἐκ τῶν λειπομένων.

² Ἐφέσιοι δεηθέντες χρημάτων νόμον ἔθεντο μὴ 19 10 φορεῖν χρυσόν τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅσον δὲ νῦν ἔχουσι, δανεῖσαι τῇ πόλει.

¹ Keil and Susemihl suspect a lacuna before $i\nu \lambda \iota \mu \hat{\omega}$. The former suggests $\langle \tau o \hat{i} \cdot \delta \lambda \rangle o i \cdot \delta \rangle$, "... a law which forbade the export of grain $\langle to \ other \ peoples \rangle$ suffering from famine." The latter conjectures $\tau \partial \nu \mu \dot{e} \nu \delta \lambda \partial \omega \dot{e} \nu \lambda \iota \mu \partial \gamma e \nu \partial \mu \dot{e} \nu \omega \nu$, "... a law which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as $\langle others \ were suffering from famine while \rangle$ they possessed ..." 366

proportionately among the wealthiest citizens, and received from them silver to the same amount. Through this expedient, the private citizens possessed a currency which was good for their daily needs, and the state was relieved of its debt. Next, they proeceded to pay interest out of revenue to those who had advanced the silver; and little by little distributed repayment among them, recalling at the same time the currency of iron.^a

The people of Selybria had a law, passed in time 17 of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that eitizens should deliver up their corn to the state at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.

At Abydos civil strife had caused the land to re-18 main uncultivated; while the resident alicns, to 2 whom the city was already indebted, refused to make any further advances. A resolution was accordingly passed that anyone who would might lend money to enable the farmers to cultivate their land, on the understanding that the lender had the first elaim on its produce; others taking from what was then left.

· The people of Ephesus, being in need of funds, 19 passed a law forbidding their women to wear gold, and ordering them to lend the State what gold they had in their possession.

^a Plutarch (*Life of Lycurgus*) speaks of an iron currency at Sparta, and Seneca (*De beneficiis*) of a leathern one. These, not being exchangeable abroad, threw the nation upon its own resources and prevented the import of luxuries. 1349 a

Τών τε κιόνων (τισί)¹ τών ἐν τῷ νεῷ τάξαντες ἀργύριον ὅ δεῖ καταβαλεῖν εἴων ἐπιγράφεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ δόντος τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς ἀνατεθεικότος.

- Διονύσιος Συρακούσιος βουλόμενος χρήματα 20 15 συναγαγείν, ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσας ἔφησεν ἑωρακέναι τὴν Δήμητραν, καὶ κελεύειν τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν κόσμον εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν ἀποκομίζειν. αὐτὸς μὲν οῦν τῶν παρ' αὑτῷ γυναικῶν τὸν κόσμον τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι· ήξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, μή τι μήνιμα παρὰ τῆς θεοῦ γένηται· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσαντα 20 ἔνοχον ἔφησεν ἱεροσυλίας ἔσεσθαι. ἀνενεγκάντων δὲ πάντων ἅ είχον διά τε τὴν θεὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον, θύσας τῆ θεῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπηνέγκατο ὡς παρὰ τῆς θεοῦ δεδανεισμένος. προελθόντος δὲ χρόνου καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν πάλιν φορουσῶν, ἐκέλευσε τὴν βουλομένην χρυσοφορεῖν τάγμα τι ἀνατιθέναι ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ.
- 25 Τριήρεις τε ναυπηγείσθαι μέλλων ήδει ότι δεήσοιτο χρημάτων. ἐκκλησίαν οῦν συναγαγών ἕφη πόλιν αὐτῷ τινα προδίδοσθαι, εἰς ἡν δεῖσθαι χρημάτων, ήξίου τε αὐτῷ τοὺς πολίτας εἰσενέγκαι δύο στατῆρας ἕκαστον οἱ δ' εἰσήνεγκαν. διαλιπών δὲ δύο ἡ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, ὡς διημαρτηκὼς τῆς πράξεως, 80 ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστω ὅ εἰσήνεγκαν.

¹ $\langle \tau \sigma t \rangle$ inserted by Keil; otherwise, "They also assessed each pillar in their temple at a certain price, and offered to any citizen who was willing to pay it, the right of having his name inscribed thereon as the donor."

^a This temple, dedicated to Artemis, was restored with great magnificence after its destruction by fire in 356 B.c. 368

They also offered to any crtizen who was willing to pay a fixed sum the right of having his name inscribed on a certain pillar of their temple a as the donor thereof.

Dionysius of Syracuse, being desirous of collecting 20 funds, called a public assembly, and declared that Demeter had appeared to him, and bade him convey all the women's ornaments into her temple. That he himself had done so with the ornaments of his own household; and the others must now follow his example, and thereby avoid any visitation of the goddess's anger. Anyone who failed to comply would, he declared, be guilty of sacrilege. Through fear of the goddess as well as of the despot, all the citizens brought in whatever they had. Then Dionysius, after sacrificing to the goddess, removed the ornaments to his own treasury as a loan which he had borrowed from her. As time went on, the women again appeared with precious ornaments. Dionysius thereupon issued a decree that any woman who desired to wear gold should make an offering of a fixed amount in the temple.

Intending to build a fleet of triremes, Dionysius knew that he should require funds for the purpose. He therefore ealled an assembly and declared that a certain city was offered to him by traitors, and he needed money to pay them. The citizens therefore must contribute two staters apiece.^b The money was paid; but after two or three days, Dionysius, pretending that the plot had failed, thanked the citizens and returned to each his contribution. In

For its fame see Acts xix. Portions of the sculptured pillars are to be seen in the British Museum.

^b The stater was a Persian gold coin worth 20 drachmae. (See § 3.)

VOL. II

^{1349 a} ποιήσας δέ τοῦτο ἀνεκτήσατο τοὺς πολίτας. εἶτα πάλιν . . ¹ οἰόμενοι ἀπολήψεσθαι εἰσήνεγκαν· ὅ δὲ λαβών εἶχεν εἰς τὴν ναυπηγίαν.

Οὐκ εὐπορῶν δὲ ἀργυρίου νόμισμα ἔκοψε καττιτέρου, καὶ συναγαγών ἐκκλησίαν πολλὰ τοῦ 35 κεκομμένου νομίσματος ὑπερεῖπεν, οἱ δὲ ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι ἕκαστος ὃ ἂν εἴλετο ἔχειν ὡς ἀργυροῦν ἀλλὰ μὴ καττιτέρινον.

1849 b Πάλιν τε δεηθείς χρημάτων ήξίου τους πολίτας είσενεγκείν αύτῷ· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔφασαν ἔχειν. ἐξενέγκας οῦν τὰ σκεύη τὰ παρ' αύτοῦ ἐπώλει, ὡς δὴ δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦτο ποιῶν· ἀγοραζόντων δὲ Συρακουσίων ἀπεγράφετο τί ἕκαστος ἀγοράσειεν· ἐπεὶ δ δὲ τὴν τιμὴν κατέβαλον, ἐκέλευσε τὸ σκεῦος ἀναφέρειν ἕκαστον ὅ ἠγόρασεν.

Τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν διὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς οὐ τρεφόντων βοσκήματα εἶπεν ὅτι ἱκανὰ ῆν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοσοῦτον· τοὺς οῦν νῦν τι κτησαμένους ἀτελεῖς ἔσεσθαι. πολλῶν δὲ ταχὺ κτησαμένων πολλὰ βοσκήματα,
10 ὡς ἀτελῆ ἐξόντων, ἐπεὶ καιρὸν ὥετο εἶναι, τιμήσασθαι κελεύσας ἐπέβαλε τέλος. οἱ οῦν πολῖται ἀγανακτήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξηπατῆσθαι, σφάζοντες ἐπώλουν. ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔταξε σφάζεσθαι ὄσα δεῖ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἱ δὲ πάλιν ἱερόθυτα ἐποίουν· ὁ δὲ ἀπεῖπε θῆλυ μὴ θύειν.

15 Πάλιν τε δεηθείς χρημάτων ἐκέλευσεν ἀπο-

¹ Understanding or inserting $\langle \dot{a}\xi\iota o \hat{v} \tau \sigma s \rangle$ (Susemihl) or the like. 370

۰.

this way he won the confidence of the eitizens; so that when he again asked for money, they contributed in the expectation that they would receive it back. But this time he kept it for building the flect.

On another occasion being in straits for silver he minted a coinage of tin, and summoning a public assembly, spoke at length m its favour. The citizens perforce voted that everyone should regard as silver, and not as tin, whatever he received.

Again being in need of funds, he requested the eitizens to contribute. On their declaring that they had not the wherewithal, he brought out the furnishings of his palace and offered them for sale, pretending to be compelled through lack of money. At the sale, he had a list made of the articles and their purchasers; and when they had all paid, he commanded every one to bring back the article he had bought.

Finding that because of his imposts the citizens were ceasing to rear sheep and cattle, he made proclamation that he needed no more money until a certain (date); so that those who now became possessed of any stock would not be liable to taxation. A large number of citizens lost no time in acquiring a quantity of sheep and cattle, on the understanding that they would be free of impost. But Dionysius, when he thought the fitting time was come, had them all valued and imposed a tax. The eitizens were angry at being thus deceived, and proceeded to kill and sell their beasts. On Dionysius's making a decree that only such beasts should be slain as were needed each day, the owners retorted by offering their animals as sacrifices; whereupon the despot forbade the sacrifice of female beasts.

Once more funds were lacking, and Dionysius

1349 b

γράψασθαι [χρήματα]¹ πρός αύτὸν ὅσοι οἶκοί εἰσιν όρφανικοί· ἀπογραψαμένων δὲ ἄλλων⁸ τὰ τούτων χρήματα ἀπεχρᾶτο, ἕως ἕκαστος εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. 'Ρήγιόν τε καταλαβών, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγών εἶπε διότι δικαίως μὲν ἂν ἐξανδραποδισθεῖεν ὑφ'
20 αύτοῦ, νῦν μέντοι τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηλωμένα χρήματα κομισάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου σώματος τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀφήσειν αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ 'Ρηγῖνοι ὅσα ποτ' ἡν αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῆ ἐποίουν, καὶ οἱ ἄποροι παρὰ τῶν εὐπορωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ξένων δανειζόμενοι ἐπόρισαν â ἐκέλευσε χρήματα.
25 λαβών δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τά τε σώματα πάντα οὐδὲν ἡττον ἀπέδοτο, τά τε σκεύη, ἃ τότε ἡν ἀποκεκρυμμένα, ἐμφανῆ ἕπαντα ἕλαβε.

Δανεισάμενός τε παρά των πολιτων χρήματα έπ' αποδόσει, ώς απήτουν αυτόν, εκέλευσεν αναφέρειν ³⁰ όσον έχει τις αργύριον πρός αυτόν εί δε μή, θάνατον εταξε το επιτίμιον ανενεχθέντος δε τοῦ αργυρίου, επικόψας χαρακτήρα εξέδωκε την δραχμην δύο δυναμένην δραχμάς, και τό τε όφειλόμενον πρότερον . .³ ανήνεγκαν πρός αυτόν.

Εἰς Τυρρηνίαν τε πλεύσας ναυσὶν ἐκατὸν ἐλαβεν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Λευκοθέας ἱεροῦ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἀργύριον ⁸⁵ πολὺ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον οὐκ ὀλίγον. εἰδὼς δὲ ὅτι καὶ οἱ ναῦται πολλὰ ἔχουσι, κήρυγμα ἐποιήσατο, 1850 - τὰ ἡμίσεα ὦν ἔχει ἕκαστος ἀναφέρειν πρὸς αὐτόν, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἕχειν τὸν λαβόντα· τῷ δὲ μὴ ἀνενέγ-

καντι θάνατον έταξε το επιτίμιον. υπολαβόντες δε ' Or, if χρήματα be kept, "a return of property to be made

him by all houses whose heirs were orphan."

² Reading πάντων (Sylburg) for Ms. άλλων.

⁸ Reading τό τε όφειλόμενον ζάπέδωκε και δ νῦν> ἀνήνεγκαν (after Susemihl).

372

ordered a list to be made for him of all houses whose heirs were orphan. Having obtained a complete list, he made use of the orphans' property until each should come of age.

After the capture of Rhegium, he summoned a meeting of the citizens, and told them why he had a good right to sell them as slaves. If, however, they would pay him the expenses of the war and three minae a a head besides, he would release them. The people of Rhegium brought forth all their hoards; the poor borrowed from the wealthier and from the foreigners resident in the city; and so the amount demanded was paid. But though he received this money from them, none the less he sold them all for slaves, having succeeded $\langle by$ his trick in bringing to light the hoarded goods which they had previously concealed.

On another occasion he had borrowed money from the citizens, promising to repay it. On their demanding its return, he bade each bring him, under pain of death, whatever silver he possessed. This silver when brought he coined into drachmae each bearing the face value of two : with these he repaid the $\langle \text{previous} \rangle$ debt and also what had just been brought in.

Hc also made a raid on Tyrrhenia with a hundred ships, and rifled the temple of Leucothea of a large amount of gold and silver, besides a quantity of works of art. But being aware that his sailors too had taken much plunder, he made proclamation that each should bring him, under pain of death, one-half of what he had; the remainder of their takings they might keep. On the understanding that if they 1850 a

οί ναῦται ἀνενεγκόντες τὰ ἡμίσεα τὰ κατάλοιπα 5 ἔχειν ἀδεῶς, ἀνήνεγκαν ὁ δ' ἐπείπερ ἐκεῖνα ἔλαβεν, ἐκέλευσε πάλιν τὰ ἡμίσεα ἀναφέρειν.

Μενδαΐοι δὲ τὰ μέν ἀπὸ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 21 τελῶν αὐτοῖς προσπορευόμενα ἐχρῶντο εἰς διοίκησιν τῆς πόλεως, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν τέλη οὐκ ἔπραττον, ἀλλ' ἀνέγραφον τοὺς ἔχοντας· ὁπόταν 10 δὲ δεηθεῖεν χρημάτων, ἀπεδίδοσαν <οἱς ὀφείλοντες. ἐκέρδαινον οῦν τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον ἀτόκοις τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποκεχρημένοι.

Πολεμοῦντές (τε) πρός Ολυνθίους καὶ δεόμενοι χρημάτων, ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἀνδραπόδων, ἐψηφίσαντο καταλειπομένων ἐνὶ ἐκάστω θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος τὰ ἄλλα ἀποδόσθαι τῆ πόλει, ὡς ἐκδανεῖσαι τοὺς 16 ἰδιώτας χρήματα.

Καλλίστρατος ἐν Μακεδονία πωλουμένου τοῦ 22 ἐλλιμενίου ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ εἴκοσι ταλάντων ἐποίησεν εὑρεῖν τὸ διπλάσιον· κατιδών γὰρ ἀνουμένους τοὺς εὑπορωτέρους ἀεἰ διὰ τὸ δεῖν ταλαντιαίους 20 καθεστάναι τοὺς ἐγγύους τῶν εἴκοσι ταλάντων, προεκήρυξεν ἀνεῖσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον, καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύους καθεστάναι τοῦ τρίτου μέρους καὶ καθ' ὅπόσον ἑκάστους δύνηται πείθειν.

Τιμόθεος 'Αθηναίος πολεμών πρός 'Ολυνθίους 23 καὶ ἀπορούμενος ἀργυρίου, κόψας χαλκὸν διεδίδου 25 τοῖς στρατιώταις. ἀγανακτούντων δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔφη αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἐμπόρους τε καὶ ἀγοραίους ἀπαντας ὡσαύτως πωλήσειν. τοῖς δ' ἐμπόροις προεῖπεν, δν ἀν τις λάβη χαλκόν, τούτου πάλιν

^a Or: "that citizens should sell to the state what slaves they possessed . . . as the equivalent of a loan from private persons to the city <of the slaves' value>." 374

1**3**50 a

ἀγοράζειν τά τ' ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὤνια καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν
 λειῶν ἀγόμενα· ὃς δ' ἂν περιλειφθῆ αὐτοῖς χαλκός,
 πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέροντας ἀργύριον λαμβάνειν.

Περὶ Κέρκυραν δὲ πολεμῶν καὶ ἀπόρως διακείμενος καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν αἰτούντων τοὺς μισθοὺς καὶ ἀπειθούντων αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους φασκόντων ἀποπορεύεσθαι, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγῶν ἔφησεν οὐ δύνασθαι διὰ τοὺς χειμῶνας παραγενέ-³⁵ σθαι αὑτῷ ἀργύριον, ἐπεὶ τοσαύτην εἶναι περὶ αὑτὸν εὐπορίαν, ὥστε τὴν προδεδομένην τριμήνου σιταρ-

1850 b χίαν δωρεάν αὐτοῖς διδόναι οἱ δὲ ὑπολάβόντες οὐκ άν ποτε προέσθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα τὸν Τιμόθεον αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τῆ ἀληθεία προσδόκιμα ἦν τὰ χρήματα πρὸς αὐτόν, ἡσυχίαν εἶχον ὑπὲρ τῶν μισθῶν, ἔως ἐκεῖνος διῷκήσατο ἅ ἐβούλετο.

Σάμον δὲ πολιορκῶν τοὺς καρποὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἀπεδίδοτο αὐτοῖς τοῖς Σαμίοις, ὥστε εὐπόρησε χρημάτων εἰς μισθοὺς τοῖς στρατιώταις. τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων ἐπεὶ σπάνις ῆν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδω διὰ τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους, ἀπηγόρευσε μὴ πωλεῖν σῖτον ἀληλεσμένον, μηδὲ μέτρον ἕλασσον ῆ 10 μέδιμνον, μηδὲ τῶν ὑγρῶν μηθὲν ἕλαττον ἢ μετρητήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ταξίαρχοί τε καὶ λοχαγοὶ ἀγοράζοντες ἀθρόα διεδίδοσαν τοῖς στρατιώταις, οἱ δὲ εἰσαφικνούμενοι ἦγον αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ὅπότε δὲ ἀπαλλάττοιντο, εἴ τι περίλοιπον εἴη αὐτοῖς, ἐπώλουν. ὥστε συνέβαινεν εὐπορεῖσθαι τοὺς στρατιώ-15 τας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.

Διδάλης Πέρσης ἕχων στρατιώτας τὰ μὲν καθ 24 ήμέραν πορίζειν ἐδύνατο ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας αὐτοῖς, νόμισμα δὲ οὐκ ἕχων διδόναι, ἀπαιτούμενος δέ, ecived such produce of the land as was for sale, as well as any booty brought to them; such copper as remained on their hands he would exchange for silver.

During the campaign of Corcyra^{*a*} this same Timotheus was reduced to sore straits. His men demanded their pay ; refused to obey his orders ; and declared they would desert to the enemy. Accordingly he summoned a meeting and told them that the stormy weather was delaying the arrival of the silver he expected ; meanwhile, as he had on hand such abundance of provisions, he would eharge them nothing for the three months' ration of grain already advanced. The men, unable to believe that Timotheus would have sacrificed so large a sum to them unless he was in truth expecting the money, made no further elaim for pay until he had completed his dispositions.

At the siege of Samos,^b Timotheus sold the erops and other country property to the besieged Samians themselves, and thus obtained plenty of money to pay his men. But finding the eamp was short of provisions owing to the arrival of reinforcements, he forbade the sale of milled corn, or of any measure less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ bushels of eorn or $8\frac{1}{2}$ gallons of wine or oil. Accordingly the officers bought supplies wholesale and issued them to their men; the reinforcements thenceforth brought their own provisions, and sold any surplus on their departure. In this way the needs of the soldiers were satisfactorily met.

Didales the Persian was able to provide for the 24 daily needs of his mercenaries from the enemy's country; but had no coined money to give them.

^a Apparently in 375 s.c. See the end of Xenophon's fifth Book of *Hellenica*. ^b In 366 s.c.

ARISTOTLE

1350 b χρόνου γενομένου οδ ὤφειλε, τεχνάζει τοιόνδε. 20 ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγών ἔφη οὐκ ἀπορεῖσθαι χρημάτων, άλλ' είναι αύτω έν χωρίω τινί, λέγων έν ώ είη. και αναζεύξας εβάδιζεν επ' αυτό είτα ώς έγγὺς τοῦ χωρίου έγένετο, προελθών εἰς αὐτὸ έλαβεν έκ των ένόντων ίερων όσος ένην κοίλος άργυρος· είτ' ἐπισκευάσας τὰς ἡμιόνους ὡς ἀγούσας 25 άργύριον παραφαινούσας τε ταῦτα ἐβάδιζεν. ἰδόντες δε οί στρατιώται καὶ νομίσαντες απαντα είναι άργυρον τὰ ἀγόμενα, ἐθάρρησαν ὡς κομιούμενοι τόν μισθόν. ό δε έφη δείν είς 'Αμισόν ελθόντα επισημήνασθαι· ήν δ' είς την 'Αμισόν όδός πολλών τε ήμερών και χειμέριος τον δή χρόνον τοῦτον 80 απεχράτο τω στρατοπέδω τὰ ἐπιτήδεια μόνον διδούς.

Τούς (τε) τεχνίτας τοὺς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδψ αὐτὸς εἶχε καὶ τοὺς καπήλους τοὺς μεταβαλλομένους τι· ἄλλψ δὲ οὐκ ἦν οὐθενὶ οὐθὲν τούτων ποιεῖν.

Χαβρίας 'Αθηναΐος Ταψ των Αἰγυπτίων βασιλεῖ 25 ἐκστρατεύοντι καὶ δεομένω χρημάτων συνεβούλευε 35 τῶν τε ἱερῶν τινα καὶ τῶν ἱερέων¹ τὸ πλῆθος φάναι πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς δεῖν παραλυθῆναι διὰ τὴν δαπάνην.

1351 a ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ ἱερεῖς καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι βουλόμενοι εἶναι, καὶ ἴδια³ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἱερεῖς

¹ leρέων, "priests," is Sylburg's emendation for MS. leρείων, "sacrifices."

² Perhaps <καί κοινà> has dropped out after αὐτοῖs. Sylburg suggests ίδία ἕκαστος καί κοινŷ. See § 33, last sentence. 378

When their pay became due, and they demanded it, he had recourse to the following trick. He called a meeting, and told the men that he had plenty of money, but that it was stored in a certain fortress, which he named. He then broke up his encampment and marched in that direction. On reaching the neighbourhood of the fortress, he himself went on ahead, and entering the place seized all the silver vessels in the temples. He then loaded his mules in such a way that this plate was exposed, thus suggesting that silver formed the entire load ; and so continued his march. The soldiers, beholding the plate and supposing that they convoyed a full load of silver, were checred by the expectation of their pay. They were informed however by Didales that they would have to take it to Amisus to be coined-a journey of many days, and in the winter season. And during all this time, he continued to employ the army without giving it more than its necessary rations.

Moreover, all the craftsmen in the army, and the hucksters who traded with the soldiers by barter, were under his personal control, and enjoyed a complete monopoly.

When Taos,^a king of Egypt, needed funds for an 25 expedition he was making, Chabrias of Athens advised him to inform the priests that to save expense it was necessary to suppress some of the temples together with the majority of the attendant priests. On hearing this, each priesthood, being anxious to retain their own temple, offered him money from

^a Called Tachos $(Ta\chi\omega_5)$ by Xenophon and Plutarch. Perhaps that form should be restored here. (Bonitz and Susemihl.) The name recurs in § 37. ^{1351 a} έδίδοσαν χρήματα. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντων εἰλήφει, προστάζαι αὐτοῖς ἐκέλευσεν εἰς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν¹ τῆς δαπάνης ῆς πρότερον ἐποιοῦντο τὸ 5 δέκατον μέρος ποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ αὐτῷ δανεῖσαι, ἕως ὁ πύλεμος ὁ πρὸς βασιλέα διαλυθῆ.

Άπ' οἰκίας δὲ ἑκάστης κελεῦσαι ἄπαντας εἰσενέγκαι τάξαντα ὃ δεῖ, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ώσαύτως· τοῦ σίτου τε πωλουμένου χωρὶς τῆς τιμῆς διδόναι τὸν πωλοῦντα καὶ ἀνούμενον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρτά-10 βης τὸν ὀβολόν· ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων τε καὶ ἐργαστηρίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐργασίαν ἐχόντων τῆς ἐργασίας μέρος τὸ δέκατον κελεῦσαι ἀποτελεῖν. Ἐκστρατεύειν δ' αὐτῷ μέλλοντι ἐκ τῆς χώρας,

Έκστρατεύειν δ' αὐτῷ μέλλοντι ἐκ τῆς χώρας, εἴ τις ἔχοι ἀσημον ἀργύριον ἢ χρυσίον, κελεῦσαι 15 ἐνέγκαι προς αὐτόν ἐνεγκάντων δὲ τῶν πλείστων, ἐκέλευσε τούτῷ μὲν ἐκεῖνον χρῆσθαι, τοὺς δὲ δανείσαντας συστῆσαι τοῖς νομάρχαις, ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν φόρων αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι.

³ Ιφικράτης 'Αθηναΐος, Κότυος συναγαγόντος 28 στρατιώτας, ἐπόρισεν αὐτῷ χρήματα τρόπον τοιοῦ-20 τον. ἐκέλευσε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ῶν ῆρχε προστάξαι κατασπεῖραι αὐτῷ γῆν τριῶν μεδίμνων· τούτου δὲ πραχθέντος συνελέγη σίτου πολὺ πλῆθος. καταγαγὼν οῦν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐμπόρια ἀπέδοτο, καὶ εὐπόρησε χρημάτων.

Κότυς Θράξ παρά Πειρινθίων έδανείζετο χρήματα 27 25 εἰς τὸ τοὺς στρατιώτας συναγαγεῖν· οἱ δὲ Πειρίνθιοι οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν αὐτῷ, ἡξίωσεν οῦν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας γε τῶν πολιτῶν φρουροὺς δοῦναι εἰς χωρία τινά,

¹ Reading εls abrods for M8. εls abrodν (Aldine edition εls abrodν).

their private possessions (as well as from the temple funds). When the king had thus received money from them all, Chabrias bade him tell the priests to spend on the temple-service and on their own maintenance one-tenth of what they formerly spent, and lend him the remainder until he had made peace with the King (of Persia).

Moreover, each inhabitant was to contribute a stated proportion of his household and personal possessions; and when grain was sold, buyer and seller were each to contribute, apart from the price, one obol per *artabe*^a; while a tax of one tenth was to be imposed on profits arising from slups and workshops and other sources of gain.

Again, when Taos was on the point of setting out from Egypt, Chabrias advised him to make requisition of all uncoined gold and silver in the possession of the inhabitants; and when most of them complied, he bade the king make use of the bullion, and refer the lenders to the governors of his provinces for compensation out of the taxes.

Iphicrates of Athens provided Cotys with money 26 for a force which he had collected in the following manner. He bade him order (each) of his subjects to sow for him a piece of land bearing $4\frac{1}{2}$ bushels. A large quantity of grain was thus gathered, from the price of which, when brought to the depots on the coast, the king obtained as much money as he wanted.

Cotys of Thrace asked the people of Peirinthus for 27 a loan to enable him to raise an army. On their refusing, he begged them at any rate to let him have some of their eitizens to garrison certain fortresses,

^a The artable was a Persian measure containing nearly 50 quarts. The obol was $\frac{1}{4}$ of a drachma of silver.

1351 a

^{*} ἕνα τοῦς ἐκεῖ στρατιώταις νῦν φρουροῦσι σχῆ ἀποχρήσασθαι. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο ταχέως ἐποίησαν, οἰό-³⁰ μενοι τῶν χωρίων κύριοι ἔσεσθαι. ὁ δὲ Κότυς τοὺς ἀποσταλέντας εἰς φυλακὴν ποιήσας τὰ χρήματα αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευσεν ἀποστείλαντας, ἃ ἐδανείζετο παρ' αὐτῶν, κομίσασθαι.

Μέντωρ΄ 'Ρόδιος' Έρμείαν συλλαβών και τὰ 28 χωρία αὐτοῦ κατασχών τοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς εἴασε κατὰ ³⁵ χώραν τοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ 'Έρμείου καθεστηκότας. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐθάρρησάν τε ἅπαντες, και εἴ τί ποτ' ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἢ ὑπεκκείμενον, μεθ' αὐτῶν εἶχον, συλλαβών αὐτοὺς πάντα παρείλετο ἁ εἶχον.

- 1351 b Μέμνων Ρόδιος κυριεύσας Λαμψάκου δεηθείς 29 χρημάτων ἐπέγραψε τοῖς πλουσιωτάτοις αὐτῶν πληθός τι ἀργυρίου, τούτοις δὲ τὴν κομιδὴν ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἔφησεν ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι
 - 5 πολίται εἰσήνεγκαν, ἐκέλευσε καὶ ταῦτα αύτῷ δανείσαι ἐν χρόνῷ⁸ διειπάμενος ἐν ῷ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσει.

Πάλιν τε δεηθεὶς χρημάτων ἡξίωσεν αὐτοὺς εἰσενέγκαι, κομίσασθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσόδων· οἱ δ' εἰσήνεγκαν, ὡς διὰ ταχέων αὐτοῦς ἐσομένης τῆς κομιδῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ καταβολαὶ τῶν προσόδων ¹⁰ παρῆσαν, ἔφησεν ἐπ' αὐτῷ³ χρείαν εἶναι καὶ τούτων, ἐκείνοις δὲ ὕστερον ἀποδώσειν σὺν τόκῳ.

Τών τε στρατευομένων παρ' αὐτῷ παρητεῖτο τàs σιταρχίας καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς ἕξ ἡμερῶν τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, φάσκων ταύταις ταῖς ἡμέραις οὐτε φυλακὴν αὐτοὺς

1 'Póõlos Camerarius for MS. vlos.

^a Perhaps $\chi p \phi \nu o \nu$ (Kirchhoff) should be read for MS. $\epsilon \nu \chi \rho \delta \nu \varphi$.

³ ⁸ Reading έτι αύτφ (Scaliger) or έαυτφ (Sylburg) for έπ' αύτφ (most Mss.).

382

and release for active service the men who were there on duty. They readily complied, thinking thus to obtain control of the fortresses. But Cotys placed in custody the men they sent, and told the ertizens that they might have them back when they had sent him the amount of the loan he desired.

Mentor of Rhodes, after taking Hermias prisoner 28 and seizing his fortresses, left in their various districts the officials appointed by him. By this means he restored their confidence, so that they all took again to themselves the property they had hidden or had sent secretly out of the country. Then Mentor arrested them and stripped them of all they had.

Memnon of Rhodes, on making himself master of 29 Lampsacus, found he was in need of funds. He therefore assessed upon the wealthiest inhabitants a quantity of silver, telling them that they should recover it from the other citizens. But when the other citizens made their contributions, Memnon said they must lend him this money also, fixing a certain date for its repayment.

Again being in need of funds, he asked for a contribution, to be recovered, as he said, from the eity revenues. The citizens complied, thinking that they would speedily reimburse themselves. But when the revenue payments came in, he declared that he must have these also, and would repay the lenders subsequently with interest.

His mercenary troops he requested to forgo six days' pay and rations each year, on the plea that on those days they were neither on garrison duty nor on the march nor did they incur any expense. 1351 b

οὐδεμίαν οὔτε πορείαν οὔτε δαπάνην ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς 15 ἐξαιρεσίμους λέγων.

Τόν τε πρό τοῦ χρόνον διδοὺς τοῖς στρατιώταις τῆ δευτέρα τῆς νουμηνίας τὴν σιταρχίαν, τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ μηνὶ παρέβη τρεῖς ἡμέρας, τῷ δ' ἐχομένῳ πέντε· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον προῆγεν, ἕως εἰς τὴν τριακάδα ἦλθεν.

Χαρίδημος 'Ωρείτης ἔχων τῆς Αἰολίδος τινὰ 30 20 χωρία, ἐπιστρατεύοντος ἐπ' αὐτὸν 'Αρταβάζου χρημάτων ἐδεῖτο εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰσέφερον αὐτῷ, εἶτα οὐκέτι ἔφασαν ἔχειν ὁ δὲ Χαρίδημος, ὅ ῷετο χωρίον εὐπορώτατον εἶναι, ἐκέλευσεν, [καὶ] εἴ τι νόμισμα ἔχουσιν ἤ τι ἄλλο σκεῦος ἀξιόλογον, εἰς ἕτερον χωρίον ἀποστέλλειν, 25 παραπομπὴν δὲ δώσειν ἅμα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο ποιῶν φανερὸς ἦν. πεισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, προαγαγῶν αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως μικρὸν καὶ ἐρευνήσας ἅ εἶχον, ἔλαβεν ὅσων ἐδεῖτο, ἐκείνους δὲ πάλιν εἰς τὸ χωρίον ἀπῆγεν.

Κήρυγμά τε ποιησάμενος έν ταις πόλεσιν, ών 80 ήρχε, μηδένα μηδέν ὅπλον κεκτήσθαι ἐν τῆ οἰκία, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποτίσειν ἀργύριον ὅ ἐπεκήρυξεν, ἡμέλει καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐποιειτο. τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἰομένων τὸ κήρυγμα μάτην αὐτὸν πεποιῆσθαι, είχον ἅ ἔτυχον ἕκαστοι κεκτημένοι κατὰ χώραν. δ δἰ ἔρευναν ἐξαίφνης ποιησάμενος τῶν οἰκιῶν, παρ' 86 οἶς εῦρεν ὅπλον τι, ἐπράττετο τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.

^a As the moon's cycle is completed in 29½ days, it was customary to alternate "hollow "months of 29 days with the "full" months of 30 days. Memnon paid his men by the month, but deducted a day's pay every "hollow" month. 384

(He referred to the days omitted from alternate months.^a)

Moreover, being accustomed previously to issue his men's rations of corn on the second day of the month, in the first month he postponed the distribution for three days, and in the second month for five; proceeding in this fashion until at length it took place on the last day of the month.

Charidemus of Orens, being in occupation of certain 30 fortress-towns in Acohs, and threatened with an attack by Aitabazus,^b was in need of money to pay his troops. After their first contributions, the inhabitants declared they had no more to give. Charidemus then issued a proclamation to the town he deemed wealthiest, bidding the inhabitants send away to another fortress all the coin and valuables they possessed, under convoy which he would provide. He himself openly set the example with his own goods, and prevailed on them to comply. But when he had conducted them a little way out of the town, he made an inventory of their goods, took all he wanted, and led them home again.

He had also issued a proclamation in the cities he governed forbidding anyone to keep arms in his house, under pain of a stated fine. At first, however, he took no eare to enforce it, nor did he make any inquisition; so that the people treated his proclamation as nugatory, and made no attempt to get rid of what arms each possessed. Then Charidemus unexpectedly ordered a search to be made from house to house, and exacted the penalty from those who were found in possession of arms.

^b For the circumstances, and a (hostile) account of this commander's adventures, see Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates.

ARISTOTLE

1351 b

 Φιλόξενός τις Μακεδών Καρίας σατραπεύων 31 δεηθεὶς χρημάτων Διονύσια ἔφασκε μέλλειν ἄγειν,
 1852 καὶ χοραγοὺς προέγραψε τῶν Καρῶν τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους, καὶ προσέταττεν αὐτοῖς ἃ δεῖ παρασκευάζειν. ὅρῶν δ' αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας, ὑποπέμπων τινὰς ἡρώτα, τί βούλονται δόντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς
 5 λειτουργίας. οἱ δὲ πολλῷ πλέον ἢ ὅσον ὤοντο ἀναλώσειν ἔφασαν δώσειν τοῦ μὴ ὀχλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπεῖναι. ὅ δὲ παρὰ τούτων λαβὼν ὅ ἐδίδοσαν ἑτέρους κατέγραψεν, ἕως ἕλαβε παρὰ τούτων ἃ ἐβούλετο καὶ προσῆν παρ' ἑκάστοις.¹

Ειδαίσης Σύρος Αἰγύπτου σατραπεύων, ἀφίστα- 32 10 σθαι μελλόντων τῶν νομαρχῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ αἰσθόμενος, καλέσας αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ βασίλεια ἐκρέμα ἄπαντας πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους ἐκέλευσε λέγειν ὅτι ἐν φυλακῆ εἰσιν. ἕκαστος³ οῦν τῶν οἰκείων ἔπραττον ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου, καὶ χρημάτων ἐξεωνοῦντο τοὺς συνειλημμένους. ὁ δὲ διομολογησάμενος ὑπὲρ ¹⁵ ἑκάστου καὶ λαβῶν τὰ ὁμολογηθέντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστοις τὸν νεκρόν.

Κλεομένης 'Αλεξανδρεύς Αἰγύπτου σατραπεύων, 33 λιμοῦ γενομένου ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τόποις σφόδρα, ἐν Αἰγύπτω δὲ μετρίως, ἀπέκλεισε τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τοῦ σίτου. τῶν δὲ νομαρχῶν φασκόντων οὐ δυ-20 νήσεσθαι τοὺς φόρους ἀποδοῦναι τῷ μὴ ἐξάγεσθαι τὸν σῖτον, ἐξαγωγὴν μὲν ἐποίησε, τέλος δὲ πολὺ τῷ

¹ Reading έως <και> (Keil) έλαβε παρὰ τούτων, και à εβούλετο (Keil) προσήν παρ' έκάστων (Sylburg). The ms. readings are corrupt.

² Perhaps ξκαστοι should be read : "cach family on behalf of their kinsman."

[&]quot; Cf. Demosthenes, Against Dionysodorus: " Cleomenes 386

A Macedonian named Philoxenus, who was gover-31 nor of Caria, being in need of funds proclaumed that he intended to celebrate the festival of Dionysus. The wealthiest inhabitants were selected to provide the choruses, and were informed what they were expected to furnish. Noticing their disinclination, Philoxenus sent to them privately and asked what they would give to be reheved of the duty. They told him they were prepared to pay a much larger sum than they expected to spend (on the choruses) in order to avoid the trouble and the interruption of their business. Philoxenus accepted ther offers, and proceeded to enrol a second levy. These also paid ; and at last he received what he desired from each company.

Euaises the Syrian, when governor of Egypt, re-32 ceived information that the local governors were meditating rebellion. He therefore summoned them to the palace and proceeded to hang them all, sending word to their relations that they were in prison. These accordingly made offers, each on behalf of his own kinsman, seeking by payment to secure their release. Enaises agreed to accept a certain sum for each, and when it had been paid returned to the relations the dead body.

While Cleomenes of Alexandria was governor of 33 Egypt,^a at a time when there was some scarcity in the land, but elsewhere a grievous famine, he forbade the export of grain. On the local governors representing that if there were no export of grain they would be unable to pay in their taxes, he allowed the export, . . . from the time that he received the government, has done immense mischief to your state, and still more to the rest of Greece, by buying up corn for result and keeping it at his own price "(Kennedy's translation).

¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸ σίτψ ἐπέβαλεν, ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ¹ . . ., ἐξαγομένου ὀλίγου πολὺ τέλος λαμβάνειν, αὐτούς τε τοὺς νομάρχας πεπαῦσθαι τῆς προφάσεως.

Διαπλέοντος δ' αὐτοῦ τὸν νομόν, οῦ ἐστι θεὸς ὁ κροκόδειλος, ἡρπάσθη τις τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ 26 καλέσας οῦν τοὺς ἱερεῖς ἔφη πρότερος ἀδικηθεὶς ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς κροκοδείλους, καὶ προσέταξε θηρεύειν αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς, ἵνα μὴ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῶν καταφρονηθῆ, συναγαγόντες ὅσον ἡδύναντο χρυσίον ἔδοσαν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπαύσατο.

³ Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντειλαμένου αὐτῷ ³⁰ οἰκίσαι πόλιν πρὸς τῷ Φάρῳ καὶ τὸ ἐμπόριον τὸ πρότερον ὃν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κανώβου ἐνταῦθα ποιῆσαι, καταπλεύσας εἰς τὸν Κάνωβον πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ τοὺς κτήματα ἔχοντας ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τούτῷ ἤκειν ἔφη ὥστε μετοικίσαι αὐτούς. οἱ (δὲ) ἱερεῖς καὶ οἱ κάτοικοι εἰσενέγκαντες χρήματα ἔδωκαν, ἵν ³⁵ ἐậ κατὰ χώραν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐμπόριον. ὅ δὲ λαβών τότε μὲν ἀπηλλάγη, εἶτα δὲ καταπλεύσας, ἐπεὶ ἦν ^{1852 b} εὐτρεπῆ αὐτῷ τὰ πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν, ἤτει αὐτοὺς χρήματα ὑπερβαλών τῷ πλήθει· τοῦτο γὰρ αύτῷ τὸ διάφορον εἶναι, τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐμπόριον καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖ. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔφασαν δύνασθαι δοῦναι, μετῷκισεν αὐτούς.

'Αποστείλας τέ τινα ἐπ' ἀγόρασμά τι καὶ αἰσθό-⁵ μενος ὅτι εὐώνων ἐπιτετύχηκεν, αὐτῷ δὲ μέλλει ἐκτετιμημένα λογίζεσθαι, πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις τοῦ ἀγοραστοῦ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀκηκοὼς εἶη τὰ ἀγοράσματα αὐτὸν ὑπερτίμια ἠγορακέναι· αὐτὸς οῦν οὐ προσ-

¹ $\epsilon l \mu \eta$, omitted in several MSS., I have left untranslated. Susemihl suspects a lacuna after the words. but laid a heavy duty on the corn. By this means he obtained a large amount of duty from a small amount of export, and at the same time deprived the officials of their excuse.

When Cleomenes was making a progress by water through the province where the crocodile is worshipped, one of his servants was carried off. Accordingly, summoning the priests, he told them that he intended to retaliate on the crocodiles for this unprovoked aggression; and gave orders for a battue. The priests, to save the credit of their god, collected all the gold they could, and succeeded in putting an end to the pursuit.

King Alexander had given Cleomenes command to establish a town near the island of Pharus, and to transfer thither the market bitherto held at Canopus. Sailing therefore to Canopus he informed the priests and the men of property there that he was come to remove them. The priests and residents thereupon contributed money to induce him to leave their market where it was. He took what they offered, and departed; but afterwards returned, when all was ready to build the town, and proceeded to demand an excessive sum; which represented, he said, the difference the change of site would make to him. They however declared themselves unable to pay it, and were accordingly removed.

On another occasion he sent an agent to make a certain purchase for him. Learning that the agent had made a good bargain, but intended to charge him a high price, he proceeded to inform the man's associates that he had been told he had purchased the goods at an excessive price, and that therefore he did not intend to recognize the transaction; denouncing

ARISTOTLE

1252 b

Τοῦ τε σίτου πωλουμένου ἐν τῆ χώρα δεκα-¹⁶ δράχμου, καλέσας τοὺς ἐργαζομένους ἡρώτα, πόσου¹ βούλονται αὑτῷ ἐργάζεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν ἐλάσσονος ἢ ὅσου τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐπώλουν. ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνον² μὲν ἐκέλευσεν αὑτῷ παραδιδόναι ὅσουπερ ἐπώλουν τοῖς ἄλλοις· αὐτὸς δὲ τάξας τριάκοντα καὶ ²⁰ δύο δραχμὰς τοῦ σίτου τὴν τιμὴν οὕτως ἐπώλει.

Τούς τε ίερεῖς καλέσας ἔφήσε πολὺ τὸ ἀνώμαλον ἀνάλωμα³ ἐν τῆ χώρα γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ ἱερά· δεῖν οῦν καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τινα καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τὸ πλῆθος καταλυθῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς καὶ ἰδία ἕκαστος καὶ κοινῆ τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα ἐδίδοσαν, οἰόμενοί τε αὐτὸν τῆ ἀληθεία μέλλειν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστος ²⁶ βουλόμενος τό τε ἱερὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι κατὰ χώραν καὐτὸς ἱερεύς.

'Αντιμένης 'Ρόδιος ήμιόδιος' γενόμενος 'Αλεξ-34 ' πόσον Camerarius for πŵs (MSS.).

² Reading excivous with Bekker and the 3rd Basle edition.

³ Or, omitting (with some MSS.) $\dot{a}r\dot{\omega}\mu a\lambda or$ before $\dot{a}r\dot{a}\lambda\omega\mu a$, "complained of the large amount expended on the temples of the country; declaring that some of these . . ."

⁴ Reading eπιόδιος (επί όδων Keil) for MS. ημιόδιος. Perhaps προσόδιος or eπi προσόδων, "revenue officer," would be better.

^a If the measure intended is the Attic *medimnos*, it is $1\frac{1}{2}$ bushels. The Persian *artabs* may however be meant, 390

at the same time with feigned anger the fellow's stupidity. They on hearing this asked him not to believe what was said against the agent until he humself arrived and rendered his account. On the man's arrival, his associates told him what Cleomenes had said. He, desirous of winning their approval as well as that of Cleomenes, debuted the latter with the actual price he had given

At a time when the price of grain in Egypt was ten drachmae (ameasure),"Cleomenessent for the growers and asked them at what price they would contract to supply him with their produce. On their quoting a price lower than what they were charging the merchants, he offered them the full price they were accustomed to receive from others; and taking over the entire supply, sold it at a fixed rate of thirty-two drachmae (for the same measure).

He also sent for the priests, and told them that the expenditure on the temples was very unevenly distributed in the country; and that some of these, together with the majority of the attendant priests, must accordingly be suppressed. The priests, supposing him to be in earnest, and wishing each to secure the continuance of his own temple and office, gave him money individually from their private possessions as well as collectively from the temple funds.^b

Antimenes of Rhodes, who was appointed by 34 which was equal to 1 medimnos and $\frac{1}{10}$ th. In either case the price is very high compared with 5 drachmae per medimnos, the price at Athens in 390 n.c. Yet Polybius (ix 44) says that at Rome during the war with Hannibal (210) corn was sold for fifteen drachmae per medimnos. As a contrast cf. what the same author says of the fertility of Galha Cisalpina, where in time of peace this same measure of wheat was sold for four obols, and of barley for two. See note on § 25.

Cf. § 25.

^{1352 b} άνδρου περὶ Βαβυλῶνα ἐπόρισε χρήματα ῶδε. νόμου ὄντος ἐν Βαβυλωνία παλαιοῦ δεκάτην είναι τῶν εἰσαγομένων, χρωμένου δὲ αὐτῷ οὐθενός, 30 τηρήσας τούς τε σατράπας ἄπαντας προσδοκίμους ὄντας καὶ στρατιώτας, οὐκ ὀλίγους τε πρέσβεις καὶ τεχνίτας κλητοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἄγοντας καὶ ἰδία ἀποδημοῦντας, καὶ δῶρα πολλὰ ἀναγόμενα, τὴν δεκάτην ἔπρασσε κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν κείμενον.

Πάλιν τέ πορίζων τάνδράποδα τὰ ἐπἱ στρατοπέδω ὄντα ἐκέλευσε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀπογράφεσθαι ⁸⁵ ὁπόσου θέλοι, μέλλειν δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὀκτώ δραχμὰς ἀποτῖσαι, ἂν δὲ ἀποδρậ τὸ ἀνδράποδον, κομί-1858 Δ ζεσθαι τὴν τιμὴν ἢν ἀνεγράψατο. ἀπογραφέντων οῦν πολλῶν ἀνδραπόδων οὐκ ὀλίγον συντελεῖ³ ἀργύριον. εἰ δέ τι ἀποδρώη ἀνδράποδον, ἐκέλευε τὸν σατράπην τῆς ...³ ἐν ἡ ἐστι τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἀνασψζειν ⟨ἢ⟩ τὴν τιμὴν τῷ κυρίω ἀποδοῦναι.

⁵ 'Οφέλας' 'Ολύνθιος καταστήσας ἐπιμελητήν ἐπὶ 35 τὸν νομὸν τὸν 'Αθριβίτην,⁵ ἐπεὶ προσελθόντες αὐτῷ οἱ νομάρχαι οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τόπου τούτου ἔφασαν βούλεσθαι πλείω αὐτοὶ πολὺ φέρειν, τὸν δ' ἐπιμελητήν τὸν νῦν καθεστηκότα ἀπαλλάξαι αὐτὸν ἠξίουν, ἐπερωτήσας αὐτοὺς εἰ δυνήσονται συντελεῖν ἅπερ 10 ἐπαγγέλλονται, φησάντων αὐτῶν τὸν μὲν ἐπιμελητήν κατὰ χώραν εἴα, τοὺς δὲ φόρους πράσ-

¹ Reading τούς άλλους άγοντας (Bekker) for άλλους τούς άγοντας (Mss.), and έπιδημοῦντας, Schneider's correction of Ms. άποδημοῦντας.

⁸ Reading $\sigma u\nu \epsilon \tau \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \tilde{\tau} \tau \sigma$ (Sylburg, after Camerarius), or $\sigma u\nu \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \gamma \eta$ (marginal note in one MS.), for MS. $\sigma u\nu \tau \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \tilde{\iota}$.

³ Perhaps χώρας has fallen out (Schneider).

⁴ The spelling 'Οφέλλαs is restored by Keil for MS. 'Οφέλαs.

⁵ 'Αθριβίτην restored by Sylburg for Ms. ἀρθριδήτων, αlθριδίτην, or ἀρθριδίτην.

392

Alexander superintendent of highways in the province of Babylon, adopted the following means of raising funds. An ancient law of the country imposed a tax of one-tenth on all imports; but this had fallen into total abeyance. Antimenes kept a watch for all governors and soldiers whose arrival was expected, and upon the many ambassadors and craftsmen who were invited to the city, but brought with them others who dwelt there unofficially; and also upon the multitude of presents that were brought (to these persons), on which he exacted the legal tax of a tenth.

Another expedient was this. He invited the owners of any slaves in the camp to register them at whatever value they desired, undertaking at the same time to pay him eight drachmae a year. If the slave ran away, the owner was to recover the registered value. Many slaves were thus registered, and a large sum of money was paid (in premiums). And when a slave ran away, Antimenes instructed the governor of the (province) where the camp lay either to recover the man or to pay his master his value.

Ophellas of Olynthus appointed an officer to super-35 intend the revenues of the provuce of Athribis. The local governors came to him and told him they were willing to pay a much larger amount in taxes; but asked him to remove the present superintendent. Ophellas inquired if they were really able to pay what they promised; and on their assuring him that they were, left the superintendent in office and instructed him to demand from them the amount of tax which 393 1353 a

σεσθαι ἐκέλευεν ὄσους αὐτοὶ ὑπετιμήσαντο. οὔτε οὖν ὃν κατέστησεν ἀτιμάσαι ἐδόκει οὔτ' ἐκείνοις πλείους φόρους ἐπιβαλεῖν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἔταξαν, χρήματα δὲ πολλαπλάσια αὐτὸς ἐλάμβανεν.

15 Πυθοκλής 'Αθηναίος 'Αθηναίοις συνεβούλευσε 36 τον μόλιβδον τον έκ των Λαυρίων¹ παραλαμβάνειν παρά των ίδιωτων την πόλιν, ωσπερ ἐπώλουν, δίδραχμον, είτα τάξαντας αὐτοὺς τιμην ἑξαδράχμου οὕτω πωλείν.

Χαβρίας πληρωμάτων τε κατειλεγμένων εἰς 37 20 έκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς, τῷ δὲ Ταῷ ἐξήκοντα μόνον οὔσης χρείας, προσέταξε τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἐξήκοντα νεῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὑπομενουσῶν τοὺς πλέοντας εἰς δίμηνον σιτηρεσιάσαι, ἢ αὐτοὺς πλέειν. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων μεῖναι⁹ ἔδωκαν ἅ προσἐταξεν.

'Αντιμένης τούς τε θησαυρούς τοὺς παρὰ τὰς 38 25 όδοὺς τὰς βασιλικὰς ἀναπληροῦν ἐκέλευε τοὺς σατράπας κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν τῆς χώρας ὅπότε δὲ διαπορεύοιτο στρατόπεδου³ ἢ ἔτερος ὄχλος ἄνευ τοῦ βασιλέως, πέμψας τινὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ⁴ ἐπώλει τὰ ἐκ τῶν θησαυρῶν.

1852 b Κλεομένης προσπορευομένης τε της νουμηνίας 39 και δέον τοις στρατιώταις σιταρχίαν δοῦναι κατέπλευσεν ἐζεπίτηδες, προσπορευομένου⁶ δε τοῦ

¹ Λαυρίων is Sylburg's correction of Ms. Tupίων,

² Keil, for MS. elval.

⁸ διαπορεύοιτο στρατόπεδον Sylburg for MS. διαπορούν τό (or διαπορούντο) στρατόπεδον. The Aldine edition and Bekker read διαποροίη το στρατόπεδον, "the army was in need of provisions."

⁴ παρ' αύτοῦ Susemihl for Ms. παρ' αὐτοῦ: παρ' αὐτὸν, "to them," Bekker.

⁶ Reading προπορευομένου (Sylburg) for προσπορευομένου MSS. 394 they themselves had assessed. And so, without being chargeable either with discountenancing the officer he had appointed, or with taxing the governors beyond their own estimate, he obtained from the latter many times his previous revenue.

Pythocles the Atheman recommended his fellow- 36 countrymen that the State should take over from private citizens the lead obtained from the mines of Laurum^a at the price of two drachmae (per talent [?]) which they were asking, and should itself sell it at the fixed price of six drachmae.

Chabrias had levied crews for a hundred and twenty 37 ships to serve King Taos.^b Finding that Taos needed only sixty ships, he gave the crews of the superfluous sixty their choice between providing those who were to serve with two months' rations, and themselves taking their place. Desiring to remain at their business, they gave what he demanded.

Antimenes bade the governors of the provinces 38 replenish, in accordance with the law of the country, the magazines along the royal highways. Whenever an army passed through the country or any other body of men unaccompanied by the king, he sent an officer to sell them the contents of the magazines.

Cleomenes, as the beginning of the month ap-39 proached when his soldiers' allowance became due, dehberately sailed away down the river; and not till

^a These silver mines were state property; but mining rights therein were let to private citizens. Lead and silver were found in the same ore and had to be separated. The weight of the lead is not specified : it may have been a talent of 80 lbs. See Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*; and Xenophon, *De vectigalibus*.

^b Sce § 25.

 μηνός ἀναπλεύσας διέδωκε τὴν σιταρχίαν, εἶτα τοῦ εἰσιόντος μηνός διέλιπεν ἕως τῆς νουμηνίας.
 οἱ μὲι οὖν στρατιῶται διὰ τὸ νεωστὶ εἰληφέναι τὴν σιταρχίαν ἡσυχίαν εἶχον, ἐκεῖνος δὲ παραλλάξας ἕνα μῆνα παρὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀφήρει μισθὸν ἀεὶ μηνός.

Σταβέλβιος δ Μυσών . . . στρατιώταις μισθόν 40 συγκαλέσας . . ³ έφησεν αύτῷ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν ¹⁰ οὐδεμίαν χρείαν εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων, ὅταν (δὲ) δέηται στρατιωτῶν, ἐκείνων ἑκάστῷ δοὺς ἀργύριον ἀποστέλλειν³ ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν, τούς τε μισθοὺς οῦς δεῖ κείνοις δοῦναι, τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἂν ἤδιον διδόναι· ἐκέλευεν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἀποστέλλειν ἕκαστον τοὺς αὐτῶν καταλόγους ἐκ τῆς χώρας. τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων ¹⁵ ὑπολαβόντων χρηματισμὸν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, ἀπἐστειλαν τοὺς στρατιώτας, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος προσἐταξε. διαλιπὼν δὲ ὀλίγον χρόνον καὶ συναγαγὼν αὐτοὺς οὖτε αὐλητὴν ἄνευ χοροῦ οὖτε ἡγεμόνας ἄνευ ἰδιωτῶν οὐδὲν ἔφη χρησίμους εἶναι· ἐκέλευεν οὖν

αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

Διονύσιος τὰ ἱερὰ περιπορευόμενος, εἰ μὲν 41 τράπεζαν ιδοι παρακειμένην χρυσῆν ἢ ἀργυρῶν, ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος κελεύσας ἐγχέαι ἐκέλευεν ἀφαιρεῦν, ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φιάλην εἶχε προτετακότα, είπας ἂν ὅτι δέχομαι, ἐξαιρεῖν ἐκέλευε.

¹ Reading Σταβέλβιος δ Μυσών ζβασιλεύς (Raphael Volaterranus) ούκ έχων τοΐς> στρατιώταις μισθόν, συγκαλέσας (τούς ήγέμονας> (Camerarius).

² Reading $d\pi o \sigma \tau \epsilon \lambda \epsilon i \nu$ for MS. $d\pi \sigma \sigma \tau \epsilon \lambda \lambda \epsilon \iota \nu$, "it was his custom to entrust . . . and send . . ." 396

¹⁸⁵⁸ b

the month was advanced did he return and distribute the allowance. For the coming month, he omitted the distribution altogether until the following month began. Thus the men were quicted by the recent distribution, and Cleomenes, passing over a month each year, docked his troops of a month's pay.^a

Stabelbius, king of the Mysians, lacking pay to 40 give his troops, summoned a meeting of the officers, and declared that he no longer needed the private soldiers, but only the officers. When he required troops, he would entrust a sum of money to each officer and send him to collect mercenaries; but that meanwhile he preferred to give the officers the pay he would otherwise have to give the men. Accordingly he bade each dismiss the men who were on his own muster-roll. The officers, scenting a source of gain for themselves, dismissed their men, as they were bidden. Shortly afterwards, Stabelbius called them together and informed them that a conductor without his chorus and an officer without his men were alike useless ; wherefore let them depart from his country.

When Dionysius was making a tour of the temples, 41 wherever he saw a gold or silver table set, he bade them fill a cup " in honour of the good spirit," ^b and then had the table carried away. Wherever, again, he saw a precious bowl set before one of the images, he would order its removal, with the words " I accept

^a $\sigma_{i\tau ap\chi la}$ (corn allowance) and $\mu_{i\sigma}\theta\delta_{\delta}$ (pay) here seem to be identified; possibly because in a land where grain was readily purchasable the former was given in money. *Cf.* §§ 23, 29.

^b Čf. Čicero, De natura deorum, iii. 3. 4, and Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, xv. 693.

ARISTOTLE

^{1358 b} τά θ' ἱμάτια τά τε χρυσά καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους (τοὺς) 25 . . ¹ περιήρει τῶν ἀγαλμάτων, φάσκων αὐτὸς καὶ κουφότερα καὶ εὐωδέστερα δοῦναι· εἶτα ἱμάτια μὲν λευκά, στεφάνους δὲ λευκοίνους³ περιετίθει.

¹ $\langle \tau \sigma v i s \rangle \rightarrow *$ inserted by Susemihl, as there is a lacuna in some of the MSS. Perhaps it would be better to insert $\langle hai \tau a \rho \gamma u \rho a \rangle$ after $\tau a \tau \epsilon \chi \rho v \sigma a$, "gold and silver raiment."

OECONOMICA, II. 11. 41

it." He also stripped the images of their golden raiment and garlands, and declaring he would give them lighter and more fragrant wear, arrayed them in robes of white (linen) and garlands of white stocks.

² LEUKOLVOUS Camerarius for MS. LEUKLVOUS, " of poplar."

Rose (Arist. fr. 184). p. 140

Г

I. Bonam mulierem eorum quae sunt intus dominari oportet curam habentem omnium secundum scriptas leges, non permittentem ingredi nullum, si non vir perceperit,¹ timentem praecipue verba forensium 10 mulierum ad corruptionem animae. Et quae intus sibi contingunt ut sola sciat, et si quid sinistri ab ingredientibus fiat, vir habet causam. Dominam existentem expensarum et sumptuum ad festivitates, quas quidem vir permiserit, expensis et vestimento ac apparatu minori utentem quam etiam leges civitatis 15 praecipiunt, considerantem quoniam nec quaestus vestimentorum differens forma² nec auri multitudo tanta est ad mulieris virtutem quanta modestia in quolibet opere et desiderium honestae atque compositae vitae. Etenim quilibet talis ornatus et elatio

animi est^a et multo certius ad senectutem iustas laudes sibi filiisque tribuendo.

Talium quidem igitur ipsa se inanimet mulier com-20 posite dominari (indecens enim viro videtur scire quae intus fiunt): in ceteris autem omnibus viro p. 141 parere intendat nec quicquam civilium audiens nec

¹ o reads praceperit, "authority." ² Reading scientem quod nec vestium quaestus differt pulchritudine (c) (είδυΐαν αθτε κτήσιν Ιματίων διαφέρουσαν κάλλει . . .).

³ Reading etenim invidiosus (ζηλωτός) omnis animae huiusmodi ornatus est. . . . (c). 4.00

BOOK III

I. A good wife should be the mistress of her home, having under her care all that is within it, according to the rules we have laid down. She should allow none to enter without her husband's knowledge. dreading above all things the gossip of gadding women, which tends to poison the soul. She alone should have knowledge of what happens within, whilst if any harm is wrought by those from without, her husband will bear the blame. She must exercise control of the money spent on such festivities as her husband has approved, keeping, moreover, within the limit set by law upon expenditure, dress, and ornament; and remembering that beauty depends not on costliness of raiment, nor does abundance of gold so conduce to the praise of a woman as selfcontrol in all that she does, and her inclination towards an honourable and well-ordered life.^a For such adornment of the soul as this is in truth ever a thing to be envied, and a far surer warrant for the payment, to the woman herself in her old age and to her children after her, of the due meed of praise.

This, then, is the province over which a woman should be minded to bear an orderly rule; for it seems not fitting that a man should know all that passes within the house. But in all other matters, let it be her aim to obey her husband; giving no heed

^a Cf. 1 Peter iii. 3, 4.

VOL, II

ARISTOTLE

p. 141 aliquid de hiss quae ad nuptias spectare videntur velit peragere. Sed cum tempus exigit proprios filios filiasve foras tradere aut recipere, tune autem pareat quoque viro in omnibus et simul deliberet et oboediat, s si ille praeceperit, arbitrans non ita viro esse turpe eorum quae domi sunt quicquam peragere sicut mulieri quae foris sunt perquirere. Sed arbitrari decet vere compositam mulierem viri mores vitae suae legem imponi, a deo sibi impositos, cum nuptiis et fortuna comunctos, quos equidem si patienter et 10 humiliter ferat, facile reget domum, si vero non, difficilius. Propter quae decct non solum cum contingit virum ad rerum esse prosperitatem et ad aliam gloriam, unanimem esse¹ ac iuxta velle servire, verum etiam in adversitatibus. Si quid autem in rebus deerit vel ad corporis acgritudinem aut ad igno-16 rantiam animae esse manifestam, dicat quoque semper optima et in decentibus obsequatur, praeterquam turpe quidem agere aut sibi non dignum, vel memorem esse, si quid vir animae passione ad ipsam peccaverit, de niliilo conqueratur quasi illo hoc peragente, 20 sed haec omnia aegritudinis ac ignorantiae ponere et accidentium poccatorum. Quantum enim in hiis quis diligentius obsequetur, tanto maiorem gratiam habebit qui curatus extiterit, cum ab aegritudine fuerit liberatus : et si quid ei iubenti non bene habentium non paruerit mulier, multo magis sentiet a morbo 25 curatus. Propter quae decet timere huiusmodi, in

¹ Reading, with c, prudentia simul intellegere= $\sigma \omega \phi \rho \delta \nu \omega s$ $\delta \mu \sigma \nu \sigma c \delta \nu$ (?).

^a Or (if manifestam esse represents $\delta\eta\lambda_{0}\nu\delta\tau_{1}$) "then plainly it is her part to encourage . . . and to yield . . ."

to public affairs, nor desiring any part in arranging the marriages of her children. Rather, when the time shall come to give or receive in marriage sons or daughters, let her even then hearken to her husband in all respects, and agreeing with him obey his behest; considering that it is less unseemly for him to deal with a matter within the house than it is for her to pry into those outside its walls. Nav. it is fitting that a woman of well-ordered life should consider that her husband's uses are as laws appointed for her own life by divine will, along with the marriage state and the fortune she shares. If she endure them with patience and gentleness, she will rule her home with ease; otherwise, not so easily. Wherefore not only when her husband is in prosperity and good report does it beseem her to be in modest agreement with him, and to render him the service he wills, but also in times of adversity. If, through sickness or fault of judgement, his good fortune fails, then must she show her quality,^a eneouraging him ever with words of cheer and yielding him obedience in all fitting ways; only let her do nothing base or unworthy of herself, or remember any wrong her husband may have done her through distress of mind. Let her refrain from all complaint, nor charge him with the wrong, but rather attribute everything of this kind to sickness or ignorance or accidental errors. For the more sedulous her service herein, the fuller will be his gratitude when he is restored, and freed from his trouble; and if she has failed to obey him when he commanded aught that is amiss, the deeper will be his recognition (of her loyalty) when health Wherefore, whilst careful to avoid such returns. (misplaced obedience), in other respects she will

D. 141 aliis autem multo diligentius obsequi, quani si empta venisset ad domum : magno enim pretio cmpta fuit, societate namque vitae et procreatione liberorum quibus nil maius nec sanctius fierct. Adhuc insuper si quidem cum felici viro vixisset, non quoque similiter p. 142 fieret divulgata.¹ Et quidem non modicum est uti bene prosperitate et non humiliter, verum etiam adversitateni bene sufferre multo magis merito honoratur : nam in multis iniuriis et doloribus esse et nihil 5 turpe peragere fortis animi est. Orare quidem igitur decet in adversitateni virum non pervenure, si vero quicquam mali sibi contingat, arbitrari huic² optimam laudem esse sobriae mulieris, existimantem quoniam nec Alcestis tantam acquireret sibi gloriam nec Penelope tot et tantas laudes meruisset, si cum felicibus 10 viris vixissent : nunc autem Admeti et Ulixis adversitates paraverunt eis memoriam immortalem. Factae enim in malis fideles et iustae viris, a diis nec immerito sunt honoratae. Prosperitatis quidem enim faeile invenire participantes, adversitati vero nolunt com-

municare non optimae mulierum. Propter quae 15 omnia decet multo magis honorare virum et in vereeundia non habere, si sacra pudicitia³ et opes animositatis⁴ filius secundum Herculem⁵ non sequantur.

II. Mulierem quidem ergo in quodam tali typo

¹ c reads manifesta for divulgata (of. esse manifestam above).

² Reading hic with c.

³ c reads mentis sanitas for the pudicitia of a and b. Both translate apparently σωφροσύνη.

 ⁴ animositatis the Mss. of b give the Greek word, εύθυμοσύνης, in corrupt forms, which Rose emends to euthymosynae.
 ⁵ Reading Orpheum with b and c for Herculem a.

^a For Orpheus see Index.

serve him more assiduously than if she had been a bondwoman bought and taken home. For he has indeed bought her with a great price-with partnership in his life and in the procreation of children ; than which things nought could be greater or more divine. And besides all this, the wife who had only lived in company with a fortunate husband would not have had the like opportunity to show her true quality. For though there be no small merit in a right and noble use of prosperity, still the right endurance of adversity justly receives an honom greater by far. For only a great soul can live in the midst of trouble and wrong without itself committing any base act. And so, while praying that her husband may be spared adversity, if trouble should come it beseems the wife to consider that here a good woman wins her highest praise. Let her bethink herself how Alcostis would never have attained such renown nor Penelope have deserved all the high praises bestowed on her had not their husbands known adversity; whereas the troubles of Admetus and Ulysses have obtained for their wives a reputation that shall never die. For because in time of distress they proved themselves faithful and dutiful to their husbands, the gods have bestowed on them the honour they deserved. To find partners in prosperity is easy enough; but only the best women are ready to share in adversity. For all these reasons it is fitting that a woman should (in time of adversity) pay her husband an honour greater by far, nor feel shame on his account even when, as Orpheus a says, Holy health of soul, and wealth, the child of a brave spirit, companion him no more.

II. Such then is the pattern of the rules and ways

p. 142

^{**} legum et morum oportet se custodire: vir autem 20 leges a similibus adinveniat uxoris in usum, quoniam tamquam socia filiorum et vitae ad domum viri¹ devenit, relinquens filios genitorum viri et sui nomina

p. 148 habituros. Quibus quid sanctius³ fieret aut circa quae magis vir sanae mentis studebit quam ex optima et pretiosissima muliere liberos procreare senectutis pastores quasi optimos et pudicos³ patris ac matris 5 custodes ac totius domus conservatores : quoniam educati quippe recte a patre et matre sancte atque iuste ipsis utentium⁴ quasi merito boni fient, hoc autem non obtinentes patientur defectum. Exemplum enim vitae filiis nisi parentes dederint, puram et excusabilem causam adinvicem haberc poterunt.
10 Timor(que) ne contempti a filiis, cum non bene

viverent, ad interitum ipsis erunt.

Propter quae enim nihil decet omittere ad uxoris doctrinam, ut iuxta posse quasi ex optimis liberos valeant procreare. Etenim agricola nihil omittit studendo, ut ad optimam terram⁵ et maxime bene cultam semen consumere, expectans ita optimum sibi 15 fructum fieri, et vult pro ea, ut devastari non possit, si sic contigerit, mori cum inimicis pugnando : et huiusmodi mors maxime honoratur. Ubi autem tantum studium fit pro corporis esca, ad quam animae semen consumitur, quid si pro suis liberis matre atque

¹ Reading, with c_i quoniam promissa socia vitae et filiorum sicut ab extraneitate deprecator ad domum viri . . . (cf. Bk. I., c. iv. 1).

² Reading divinius c. Otherwise, "more sacred."

⁸ Reading prudentissimos c: pudicos is apparently a misunderstanding of o úpporas.

⁴ utentibus c. a apparently keeps the genitive of the Greek.

⁵ ut ad optimam terram = els $\gamma \hat{\eta} \nu$ is delo $\tau \eta \nu$ (?). 406 of living which a good wife will observe. And the rules which a good husband will follow in treatment of his wife will be similar; sceing that she has entered his home like a suppliant from without, and is pledged to be the partner of his life and parenthood; and that the offspring she leaves behind her will bear the names of their parents, her name as well as his. And what could be more divine than this, or more desired by a man of sound mind, than to beget by a noble and honoured wife children who shall be the most loyal supporters and discreet guardians of their parents in old age, and the preservers of the whole house? Rightly reared by father and mother, children will grow up virtuous, as those who have treated them piously and righteously deserve that they should ; but (parents) who observe not these precepts will be losers thereby. For unless parents have given their children an example how to live, the children in their turn will be able to offer a fair and specious excuse (for undutifulness). Such parents will risk being rejected by their offspring for their evil lives, and thus bringing destruction upon their own heads.

Wherefore his wife's training should be the object of a man's unstinting care; that so far as is possible their children may spring from the noblest of stock. For the tiller of the soil spares no pains to sow his seed in the most fertile and best cultivated land, looking thus to obtain the fairest fruits; and to save it from devastation is ready, if such be his lot, to fall in conflict with his focs; a death which men crown with the highest of praise. Seeing, then, that such care is lavished on the body's food, surely every care should be taken on behalf of our own children's p. 148

¹⁷⁰₂₀ nutrice¹ nonne omne studium est faciendum? Hoe enim solo omne mortale semper factum immortalitatis participat, et omnes petitiones ac orationes divum permanent paternorum. Unde qui conteninit hoc, et deos videtur neglegere. Propter deos itaque, coram quibus sacra mactavit et uxoren duxit, et ²⁰ multo magis se post parentes uxori tradidit ad honorem.

Maximus autem honor sobriae mulieri, si videt virum suum observantem sibi eastitatem et de nulla alia muliere curam magis habentem, sed prae ceteris omnibus propriam et amicam et fideleni [sibi] existip. 144 manteni. Tanto etiam magis studebit se talem esse mulier: si cognoverit fideliter atque iuste ad se virum amabilem esse, et ipsa circa virum iuste fidelis erit. Ergo prudentem² ignorare non decet nec paren-5 tum qui sui honores sunt nec qui uxori et filiis proprii et decentes, ut tribuens unicuique quae sua sunt iustus et sanctus fiat. Multo enim maxime graviter quisque fert honore suo privatus, nec etiam si aliorum quis multa dederit propria auferendo, libenter acceperit. Nihil quoque maius nec propius est uxori ad 10 virum quant societas honorabilis et fidelis. Propter quae non decet hominem sanae mentis³ ut ubicunque contingit ponere semen suum, nec ad qualemcunque accesscrit, proprium immittere semen, ut non degeneribus et iniquis similia liberis legitimis

¹ Reading, with one us. of b, pro suorum filiorum matre atque nutrice. Probably a has misunderstood $\pi \epsilon \rho l \pi a (\delta \omega r \mu \eta \tau \rho \delta s \kappa a l \tau \rho \delta \phi o v.$ ad quam animae semen consumitur, misplaced in a, follows nutrice in b and c.

² prudentem $= \tau \delta v$ or $\phi \phi \rho o va$? o has gui sanae mentis est. Cf. the next note.

³ hominem sanae mentis here o has recte sapientem.

mother and nurse, in whom is implanted the seed from which there springs a living soul. For it is only by this means that each mortal, successively produced, participates in immortality; and that petitions and prayers continue to be offered to ancestral gods. So that he who thinks lightly of this ^a would seem also to be slighting the gods. For their sake then, in whose presence he offered sacrifice and led his wife home, promising to honour her far above all others saving his parents, (a man must have care for wife and children).

Now a virtuous wife is best honoured when she sees that her husband is faithful to her, and has no preference for another woman; but before all others loves and trusts her and holds her as his own. And so much the more will the woman seek to be what he accounts her. If she perceives that her husband's affection for her is faithful and righteous, she too will be faithful and righteous towards him. Wherefore a man of sound mind ought not to forget what honours are proper to his parents or what fittingly belong to his wife and children ; so that rendering to each and all their own, he may obey the law of men and of gods. For the deprivation we feel most of all is that of the special honour which is our due; nor will abundant gifts of what belongs to others be welcome to him who is dispossessed of his own. Now to a wife nothing is of more value, nothing more rightfully her own, than honoured and faithful partnership with her husband. Wherefore it befits not a man of sound mind to bestow his person promiscuously, or have random intercourse with women; for otherwise the base-born will share in the

^a *i.e.*, the procreation of children.

p. 144

fiant,1 et quidem uxor honore suo privetur, filiis 15 vero opprobrium adiungatur.

III. De hiis ergo omnibus reverentia viro debetur² : appropinguare vero dccet eius uxori cum honestate et cum multa modestia et timore. dando verba coniunctionis eius, qui bene habet, ac liciti operis et honesti, multa modestia^a et fide utendo, parva quidem et 20 spontanea4 remittendo peccata: ct si quid autem per ignorantiam deliquerit, moneat nec metum incutiat sine verecundia et pudore. Nec etiam sit neglegens nec severus.⁵ Talis quidem enim passio meretricis (ad) adulterum est, cum verecundia autem et pudore acqualiter diligere et timere liberae mulieris 25 ad proprium virum est. Duplex enim timoris species est : alia quidem fit cum verecundia et pudore, qua utuntur ad patres filii sobrii et honesti et cives comp. 145 positi ad benignos rectores, alia vero cum inimicitia et odio, sicut servi ad dominos et cives ad tyrannos iniuriosos et iniquos.

Ex hiis guoque omnibus eligens meliora, uxorem sibi concordem et fidelem et propriam facere decet, ut praesente viro et non, utatur semper non minus 5 ac si praesens adesset, ut tamquam rerum com-

¹ Or reading, with c, ut non de illegitimis et villbus generi-bus similes his, qui legitime procreati sunt, "for otherwise the unlawfully and basely born will be undistinguished from his children of lawful birth."

² Reading, with c, attendendum est viro.

^a c reads mansuetudine, "gentleness."
^a Reading quae non sponte c for spontanea a.

⁵ Or reading, with c, nec solutam saevitiam nec voluptatem, "anger and pleasure must alike be kept in control."

rights of his lawful children, and his wife will be robbed of her honour due, and shame be attached to his sons.

III. To all these matters, therefore, a man should give heed. And it is fitting that he should approach his wife in honourable wise, full of self-restraint and awe ; and in his conversation with her, should use only the words of a right-minded man, suggesting only such acts as are themselves lawful and honourable; treating her with much self-restraint and trust,^a and passing over any trivial or unintentional errors she has committed. And if through ignorance she has done wrong, he should advise her of it without threatening, in a courteous and modest manner. Indifference (toher faults) and harsh reproof (of them), he must alike avoid. Between a courtesan and her lover, such tempers are allowed their course; between a free woman and her lawful spouse there should be a reverent and modest mingling of love and fear. For of fear there are two kinds. The fear which virtuous and honourable sons feel towards their fathers, and loyal citizens towards rightminded rulers, has for its companions reverence and modesty; but the other kind, felt by slaves for masters and by subjects for despots who treat them with injustice and wrong, is associated with hostility and hatred.

By choosing the better of all these alternatives a husband should secure the agreement, loyalty, and devotion of his wife, so that whether he himself is present or not, there may be no difference in her attitude towards him, since she realizes that they are

• Or "loyalty."

p. 145 munium curatores,1 et quando vir abest ut sentiat uxor, quod nullus sibi melior nec modestior nec magis proprius viro suo. Et ostendet hoc in principio² ad commune bonum semper respiciens, quamvis novitia sit in talibus. Et si ipse sibi maxime dominetur, 10 optimus totius vitae rector existet et uxorem talibus uti docebit. Nam nec amicitiam nec timorem absque pudore neguaquam honoravit Homerus,³ sed ubique amare praecepit cum modestia et pudore, timere autem sicut Helena ait dicens Priamum : " metuendus et reverendus es mihi et terribilis, amatissime 15 socer," nil aliud dicens quam cum timore ipsum diligere ac pudore. Et rursus Ulixes ad Nausicaam digit hoc : "te, mulier, valde miror et timeo," Arbitratur enim Homerus sic ad invicem virum et uxorem habere putans ambos bene fieri taliter se habentes. 20 Nemo enim diligit nec miratur unquam peiorem nec timet etiam cum pudore, sed huiusmodi passiones contingunt ad invicem melioribus et natura benignis, minoribus tamen scientia ad se meliores. Hunc habitum Ulixes ad Penelopen habens in absentia nil deliquit, Agamemnon autem propter Chryseidem ad

¹ Or reading, with c, ut presente viro et non, utatur nihilo minus, ac si quando parentes sibi adsint, ut communibus curet rebus, "so that whether he himself is present or not, she may treat him as she would her parents, and act as guardian of the common interests." (Perhaps the translator has confused the Greek word maphyros with the Latin word parentes.)

² o reads ostendet quidem vir hoc in principio. Perhaps vir is an error for uxor.

³ Or reading, with c, sicut et Homerus at decet habere virum. Non enim . . . , "and so too would the poet Homer have a husband to be. For he . . ."

a Iliad iii. 172:

αίδοϊός τέ μοί έσσι, φίλε έκυρέ, δεινός τε

- p. 145
 - ²⁵ eius uxorem peccavit, in ecclesia dicens mulierem captivam et non bonam, immo ut dicam barbaram, in nullo deficere in virtutibus Clytaemnestrae, non bene
- p. 146 quidem, ex se liberos habente,¹ neque iuste cohabitare usus est. Qualiter enim iuste, qui antequam sciret, illam, qualis fieret erga se, nuper per violentiam duxit ? Ulixes autem rogante ipsum Atlantis filia sibi cohabitare et promittente semper facere im-
 - ⁵ mortalem,² ncc ut fieret immortalis prodere praesumpsit uxoris affectum et dilectionem et fidem, maximam arbitrans poenam suam fieri, si malus existens immortalitatem mereatur habere. Nam cum Circe iacere noluit nisi propter amicorum salutem, immo respondit ei, quod nihil dulcius eius patria
 ¹⁰ posset videri quamvis aspera existente, et oravit magis mortalem uxorem filiumque videre quam
 - vivere : sic firmiter in uxorem fidem suam servabat. Pro quibus recipiebat acqualiter ab uxore.

IV. Patet etiam et actor³ in oratione Ulixis ad Nausicaam honorare maxime viri et uxoris cum 16 nuptiis pudicam societatem. Oravit enim deos sibi⁴

¹ This points to K $\lambda vraµwhorpas$... $\xi \xi$ eaver \hat{v} raidas $\xi \chi$ ovors. c has deesse a Clytemnestra... non bene 1gitur, liberos habens ex ea, nec inste puella muliere usus est.

² Reading, with c, et promittente immortalem facere et beatim omni tempore.

⁸ Reading auctor with one MS. c reads poeta.

⁴ Durand seems to have mistaken αυτή for αυτή. This would account for his writing ipsa in the next sentence.

^a *Riad* i. 113:

και γάρ βα Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα, κουριδίης αλόχου, έπει ου έθέν έστι χερείων, ου δέμας ουδέ φυήν, οῦτ ἀρ φρένας οῦτε τι ἕργα. ⁵ Calypso. See Odyssey v. 136, 203 foll.

- ^o Cf. Plato, Gargias 472 foll.
- ⁴ Cf. Odyssey ix. 26 foll.

declaring in open assembly that a base captive woman, and of alien race besides, was in no wise inferior to Clytemnestra in womanly excellence.^a This was ill spoken of the mother of his children; nor was his connexion with the other a righteous one. How could it be, when he had but recently compelled her to be his concubine, and before he had any experience of her behaviour to him ? Ulysses on the other hand, when the daughter of Atlas b besought him to share her bed and board, and promised him immortality and everlasting happiness, could not bring himself even for the sake of immortality to betray the kindness and love and loyalty of his wife, deeming immortality purchased by unrighteousness to be the worst of all punishments.º For it was only to save his comrades that he yielded his person to Circe; and in answer to her he even declared that in his eves nothing could be more lovely than his native isle, rugged though it were; and praved that he might die, if only he might look upon his mortal wife and son.^d So firmly did he keep troth with his wife; and received in return from her the like loyalty."

IV. Once again, in the words addressed by Ulysses to Nausicaa^f the poet makes clear the great honour in which he holds the virtuous companionship of man and wife in marriage. There he prays the gods to

• With this chapter of, the poem of Simon Dach (1648) translated by Longfellow as "Anne of Tharaw."

' Odyssey vi. 180 foll.:

σοί δέ θεοί τόσα δοΐεν Κσα φρεσί σησι μενοινώς, ανδρα τε καί οίκον καί ομοφροσύνην όπάσειαν έσθλήν ού μέν γάρ τοῦ γε κρείσσον καί άρειον, ή δθ' όμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οίκον ἔχητον ἀνὴρ ήδὲ γυνή πόλλ' άλγεα δυσμενέεσσιν, χάρματα δ' εύμενέτησι μάλιστα δέ τ' ἕκλυον αὐτοί. p. 146

^o dare virum et domum et unanimitatem optatam ad virum, non quamcunque, sed bonam. Nihil cnim maius bonum ipsa in hominibus ait esse,¹ quam cum concordes vir et uxor in voluntatibus domum regunt. Hine patet rursus, quod non laudat unanimitatem

20 ad invicem, quae circa prava servitia fit, sed eam quae animo et prudentia iuste coniuncta est : nam voluntatibus domum regere² id significat. Et iterum dicens quia cum huiusmodi dilectio fit, multae quidem tristitiae inimicis fiunt, in ipsis amicis vero gaudia

²⁵ multa,³ et maxime audiunt ipsum sicut vera dicentem. Nam viro et uxore circa optima concorditer existentibus necesse et utriusque amicos sibi ad invicem concordare, deinde fortes existentes esse terribiles inimicis, suis autem utiles : hiis vero discordantibus p. 147 different et amici, deinde vero infirmos esse maxime

ipsos huiusmodi sentire.4

In istis autem manifeste praecipit actor⁵ ea quidem quae prava et impudica, invicem inhibere, ea vero quae iuxta posse⁶ et pudica et iusta sunt, indifferenter⁷ ⁵ sibimet ipsis servire : studentes primo quidem curam

parentum habere, vir quidem eorum qui sunt uxoris

¹ Reading, with c, nihil enim hoc mains bonum inquit esse in hominibus. (But c has sibi above.)

² c omits domum regunt (above) and domum regere (here).

³ Or reading, with c, necesso et amicos utriusque lactari, "of necessity the friends of each will also rejoice."

⁴ Reading, with c, oportet et amicos discordes esse, deinde autem debiles esse, maxime autem sentire huiusmodi cos. The last five words seem to represent aυτούς δὲ μάλιστα τοιοῦτό τι πάσχειν, echoing μάλιστα δέ τ' ἕκλυον αὐτοί.

⁵ Reading auctor with several uss. c has poeta, as above.

⁶ iuxta posse=κατά δύναμιν or κατά τὸ δυνατών. Perhaps the words are misplaced in the Latin, as they appear to qualify obsequi.

^γ indifferenter = aδιaφόρωs (?): c has cum sollicitudine, "sedulously."

416

grant her a husband and a home ; and between herself and her husband, precious unity of mind; provided that such unity be for righteous ends. For, says he, there is no greater blessing on earth than when husband and wife rule their home in harmony of mind and will. Moreover it is evident from this that the unity which the poet commends is no mutual subservience in each other's vices, but one that is rightfully allied with wisdom and understanding; for this is the meaning of the words " rule the house in (harmony of) mind." And he goes on to say that wherever such a love is found between man and wife, it is a cause of sore distress to those who hate them and of delight to those that love them; while the truth of his words is most of all acknowledged by the happy pair.^a For when wife and husband are agreed about the best things in life, of necessity the friends of each will also be mutually agreed; and the strength which the pair gain from their unity will make them formidable to their enemies and helpful to their own. But when discord reigns between them, their friends too will disagree and become in consequence enfeebled, while the pair themselves will suffer most of all.

In all these precepts it is clear that the poet is teaching husband and wife to dissuade one another from whatever is evil and dishonourable, while unselfishly furthering to the best of their power one another's honourable and righteous aims. In the first place they will strive to perform all duty towards their parents, the husband towards those of his wife

μάλιστα δέ τ' ἕκλυον αὐτοί,

" and themselves best know their own case."

VOL, II

^a The Greek, as cited above, is

p. 147

non minus quam suorum, uxor vero eorum qui sunt viri. Deinde filiorum et amicorum et rerum et totius domus tamquam communis curam habeant, colluctantes ad

- 10 invicem, ut plurium bonorum ad commune uterque causa fiat et melior atque iustior, dimittens quidem superbiam, regens autom rocte et habens humilem modum et mansuetum,¹ ut cum ad sonectutem venerint, liberati a beneficio multaque cura et concupiscentiarum et voluptatum, quae interdum fiunt in
- ¹⁵ iuventute, habeant invicem et filiis respondere, uter eorum ad domum plurium bonorum rector factus est, et statim scire aut per fortunam malum aut per virtutem bonum. In quibus qui vicerit, maximum meritum a düs consequitur, ut Pindarus ait : dulce enim sibi cor et spes mortalium multiplicem volun-²⁰ tatem gubernat, secundum autem a filiis, feliciter ad senectutem depasci. Propter quae proprie et communiter decet iuste considerantes ad onnes deos et homines eum qui vitam habet² et multum ad suam uxorem et filios et parentes.

¹ c has manual set domesticos mores, "in a kindly spirit which befits a home."

² Reading, with c, vivere instead of Durand's eum qui vitam habet. Perhaps the translator confused διαβιοῦν (infin.) and διαβιῶν (partic.).

^a Or "which of their parents."

^b A mistranslation of the following words, cited by Plato in Republic i. 331 $_{\text{A}}$:

γλυκείά ol καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεί έλπίς, & μάλιστα θνατών πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνά,

" the old age (of a righteous man) is sustained by a pleasant

OECONOMICA, III. 1v.

no less than towards his own, and she in her turn towards his. Their next duties are towards their children, their friends, their estate, and their entire household which they will treat as a common possession; each vying with the other in the effort to contribute most to the common welfare, and to excel in virtue and righteousness; laying aside arrogance, and ruling with justice in a kindly and unassuming spirit. And so at length, when they reach old age, and are freed from the duty of providing for others and from preoccupation with the pleasures and desires of youth, they will be able to give answer also to their children, if question arise whether child or parent^a has contributed more good things to the common household store : and will be well assured that whatsoever of evil has befallen them is due to fortune, and whatsoever of good, to their own virtue. One who comes victorious through such question wins from heaven, as Pindar says,^b his chiefest reward; for " hope, and a soul filled with fair thoughts are supreme in the manifold mind of mortals"; and next, from his children the good fortune of being sustained by them in his old age. And therefore it behoves us to preserve throughout our lives a righteous attitude towards all gods and mortal men, to each individually, and to all in common °; and not least towards our own wives and children and parents.

companion that cherishes his heart; even by Hope, who more than aught else guides the wayward mind of mortals."

• Or "both as individuals and as members of a community."

INDEX TO THE OECONOMICA

(PERSONS AND PLACES)

N.B -In Books 1 and M1, Arabio numbers refer to the Chapters In Book 11 they refer to the Sections of the second Chapter

- Abydos, ii. 18 A colony of Miletus, on the Asiabic shore of the Helicspont Famous for the legend of Leander, and in Byron's poem
- Admötus, ih 1. A legendary knig of Pherae in Northern Greece
- Aeolis, ii. 80 A district on the coast of Mysia (q v.)
- Agamennön, ill. 3. According to legend, king of Mycenao in Greece, and with his brother Meneläus leader of the Greeks in the Trojan War
- Alorstie, iii. 1. Wife of Admetus, who according to the legend gave her fre instead of her hneband's. She is the heroine of a famous play by Euripides
- Alexander the Great, il. 33, 84. King of Macedonia 336-323 B.C.
- Alexandria, il. 33. A city at the western end of the Nile Delta, founded by Alexander the Great
- Amīsus, ii. 24. A city on the south coast of the Black Sea, now Samsun
- Antimenës, ii. 84, 38. An officer of Alexander the Great
- Antlesa, H. 6. A town in the isle of Lesbos off the N.W. const of Asia Minor
- Aristotelëe, ii. 16. (See note there) Artabazus, ii. 80. Pensian governor of Weetern Asia under Artaverkes III. and Darlus III.

- Athēnā, il. 4. The patron goddess of Athens
- Athens, Athenans, Attic, 1. 6; ii 4, 5, 28, 25, 26, 30 Athribis, n. 85. The chief city of a
- Athribis, n. 85. The chief city of a province of Lower Egypt
- Athäs, iii, d, A personification of the North African mountain, ligured as a glant holding heaven and earth asunder The goddess Calypso, who entertained Odyssaus (Ulysess) on her island, was one of his daughters
- Babylön, il, 34 A great city on the Euphrates; seat of the Chaldean empire from 612 n.c. Cyues the Persian took it in 539, and Alexander the Great died there in 223
- Bosporus ("Ox-passage"), i. 8. Ancent name of (1) the Strats of Constantunople, (2) the Strats of Yenkaleh, E. of the Orimas. The Crimea was colonized by Greeks from Milötus about 600 B.C., and from this colony afterwards arose the Kingdom of Bosporus, to which this soction probably refers
- Byzantluin, H. S. A colony of the Greek city of Megara, situated where Constantinople was afterwards built

Callistratus, 11, 22. An Athenian

stateman, who was condemned by the Athenians in 301 and wont into exile in Macedonia, where he is said to have ionnede tho eity after wards called Philippi

- Canopus (Greek Kanobos), ii, 33. A city of Egypt on the coast about 14 miles east of Alexandria
- Calia, Carlans, u. 18, 81. A southwestern district of Asia Minor, watered by the river Macander
- Gartinge (tifeck Kanchedon, in the Phoenician, Cartha Hadath - New Town), Cartingtunans, i 5. A. Phoenician colony near Tunns on the N. coast of Arica, said to have been founded in the ninti century p. c. It grew nich not only by overseas trade, but by the care and skill of its spileulture. Its nee of merceasry soldiers rendered specially necessary the precaution mentioned in the text
- Chabrias, ii. 25, 87. An Athenian commander, sent to the aid of King Tachas (q v.) in 861
- Chalewidon, 11. 10. A Greek colony on the Bospons, founded from Megara in 685 u.c. Being opposite the far more eligible site afterwards occupied by Byzantium, it was termed "The City of the Blind."
- Charidēmus, ii. 30 A captain of mercenary troops, who served under Athens as well as under Cotys (q v.), whose son-in-law he became
- Chios, H. 12. An island off the W. coast of Asia Minor, colonized by Greeke
- Chrysers ("Daughtor of Chryser"), il. 8. Amaiden named Astynome, whom, according to legend, the Greeks captured in the Trojan War and gave to King Agamsmnon
- Circë (Greek Kukë), 111. 3. An enchantress in the *idayscy*, whom Odysseus (Ulyssee) overcame by the help of the gods
- Clazomenae, II. 16. A Greek olty on the coast of Asia Minor, not far from Smyrna.

- Cleomenës, n. 38, 89 A native of the Greek colony of Naneratis m Lowor Egypt; Receiver of the Egyptant tributounder Alexander the Great
- Clytemnëstra (Gloek Klytaimnëstra), n. 3. Wife of Agameunnon (q.v.). Her nurden of hum on his relarm from Thoy 14 the subject of a famous drama by Ac-obylus
- Condains, n 14. A governor under Mausolus (q.v.) ruler of Caria
- Corcyra (Greek Kerkyra, Italian Corfu), il 23. It was coloured by the Corinthians about 700 B.C.
- Corinth (Greek Korinthos), Corinthians, ii 1. A city on the Isthmus joining North and South Groeco, Francous for its commerce and its luvury
- Colys, il. 26, 27 King of Thraco, 882-858 s c.
- Cypselus, il. 1 Ruler of Corintli, 655-625 B.C. His romantic story is toid by Herodotus (v. 92)
- Cysicus, ii. 11. A Greek city on an Island in the Propontis (Sea of Marmura), said to have been colonized from Miletns, New Bai Kiz
- Démétér, il. 20 "Earth-Mother," the Greek corn-goddess
- Didalës, i. 24. A Porsian officer: perhaps the same as Datames who rebeiled against Artaverxes II, and was shan in 862
- Diön, i. G. An emineut citizen of Syracuse, and a disciple of Plato. He expelled the despot Dionysius H. in 856, but was assessinated three years later
- Dionýshis, 1. 6; n. 20, 41 Two despots of this name, father and son, ruled at Syracuse during the fourth century n.o. 1 the probably the elder, who relend from 405 to 867, whose deeds are recorded in Book II.
- Dionysus, II. 31. The Greek god of wine, also called Bacohus His fostivals were colebrated by dramatic performances. To train

and equip the choruses for these was a duty and privilego of wealthy citizens

- Egypt, Egyptians (Greek Aigyptos, from Hei-ku-Pluh, an ancient name for the aity of Meniphis on the Nile), ii. 25, 32, 33
- Ephesus, Ephesians, II. 19. One of the chief Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor; suid to have been colonized from Athens in the eleventh contury a c
- Euclises, il. 82. Governor of Egypt, probably under the Persian king
- Greece (Greek Hellas), il 14 The name was given to all districts and cities where the Groek language and civilization prevailed
- Helen (Latin Helena, Greek Helenë), ili, 3. The wife of Menelaus, whose abduction by Paris, son of Priam, brought about the Trojan War
- Difractica, if. S. A Greek colony on the south coast of the Euxine (Black) Sea, founded about 550 B.O.; now Eregli
- Hermits, ii. 25. A Greek who held a small principality near the Hellsspont in the middle of the fourth century no. He was the friend and father-m-haw of the phillosopher Aristotik. In 344 he was taken prisoner by Mentor (q, v) and put to death by the Persians
- HERIOD (Greek Histodos), i. 2, 4. A Greek post of uncertain date, possibly in the eighth century s.c. He was born at Ascra in Northern Greece, and wrote a descriptive poem on farming entitled Works and Days
- Hippias, il. 4 Son of Pensistratus, whem he succeeded as ruler of Athens in 527 B.C. He was deposed in 510, and died in exile
- Hemer (Greek Homeros), in. 8. A Greek poet of uncertain date, to whom was attributed the com-

position of the Iliai and Odyssey Possibly of Smyrna in Asia Miner

- **I**phicrates, i. 26 An Athevian commander in the inst half of the fourth century B.c. Lake Charidömus, he entered the service of King Cotys (q, v) and married one of his daughters
- Lacedacomonians or Laconians, i 6, il. 4. The mhabitants of Laconia in Southern Greece. Their chief city was Lacedaconon or Sparta. They were tanous for the strictness of their military training, the simplicity of their life ("Spartan fare"), and the tewness of their words ("Laconic specif.")
- Lampsach4, n 7, 29. A Greek city on the Asiatic shore of the Helles. pent
- Laurunn, ii 36 (if the conjecture of Sylburg is right). A mountain in Attica, containing a mine of lead and sliver, the property e the Athenian people
- the Athenian people Leucothea ("White Goddess"), II. 20 According to Greek legand, she was Inö the daughter et Cadmus; her husband Athannas, solzad with madness, sought to elay her, whereen she leapt into the eea and was transformed into a goddess
- Labya, Libyan, i. 6. The Greek name for Africa
- Lycla, Lyclans, ii. 14. A district on the western end of the S. coast of Asia Minor
- Lygdamis, H. 2 An ally ef Pelsistratus of Athens, by whose aid he became despet of Naxos, about 540 B c
- Macedonia, Macedonians, il. 22, 31. The mative land of Alexander the Great, to the north of the Aegaean Sea
- Mansolus, il 18, 14 Ruler of Carla from 377-365 B.c.; at first under the Perslans, against whem he afterwards rebelled. Parts of the

splendid monument (Mausoleum) erected in his memory by his wife Artemisia are to be seen in the British Museum

- Memnön, H. 29 A Rhodlan In the service of Darius III He succeeded his brother Mentor as governor of W Asia Minor, and distinguished binself by his vigorous resistance to the invasion of Alexander the Great in 384 and 388 b.c.
- Monde, 11 21. A Greek colony on the coast of Macedonia
- Mentor, il. 28 A. Rhodian in the Persian service, who eventually became governor of W. Asia Minor
- Mylassa, it 13. A city in Carla, a soat of the government of Mausõlus (q.v.). Now Melasso
- Mysia, Mysians, li. 40. A district of N W. Asia Minor, between the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and the Asgassan Sea
- Nausicaā, in. 4. Daughter of Aldhous, king of the Pikefeana, whose reception of Ulyssöz (Odysseus) when cast ashore on her father's kingdom is related in Odyssey vi.
- Naxos, ii. 2. An Island half-way between Groece and Asia Minor, famous in the legend of Bacchus and Ariadnö
- Olynthus ("Winter fig"), Olynthuans, it. 21, 23, 85. A Greek city on the coast of Macedonia Now Alo Manus
- Opheliäs, il. 85. An officer of Alexander the Great, and atterwards of Ptolemaeus I., king of Egypt _ 328-285 B.C.
- Öreus, fl. 80. A town in Euboca (Negropont), colonized by the Athenians in 445 B C.
- Orpheus, ill. 1. A poet and musician famous in Greek legend. Most of the poems attributed to him are late forgerles; but a few fragments are as early as 500 BC.

- Peirinthus or Përinthus, n. 27. A Greek colony on the N. shore of the Proportis (Sze of Marmara), founded from the Island of Samos about 659 a.c. Now Eski Eregit
- Penelope, ili. 1. The faithful wife of Ulysnes (q. v)
- Perala, Perslans, 1. 6; 11. 24, 25
- Phärus, il. 23 An island of the coast of Egypt, opposite to which Alexander founded the city of Alexandra. It was afterwards tamous for its lighthouse tower
- Philozenus, Il. 31. An officer of Alexander the Great
- Phöcaea (?"Seal-town"), li 15, A Greek colony on line W coast of Asia Mutor, N of Smyrna, famous for murtum enterplise, The mother-city of Marseilles
- Pindar (Greek Findaros), HI, 4. A famous lyric poet of Thebes in Boolitu. His Odes in honour of the victors in the Greek athlotic cootests havo here preserved. For a skillni initiation of their structure use the (ides of Thomas Gray
- Pontus, n. 8, 10. Now the Black Sen. The original Greek name was apparently "Pontos Assinos" "The inhospitable Sea." This was afterwards, for the sake of omen, changed to "Eussinos," "Hospitable"
- Potldaea, il. 5. A city on the coast of Macedonia, colonized from Athens in 429 k.C. It was destroyed 73 years later by Phillip, father of Alexander the Great
- Priam (Greek Priumes), ill. 8. King of Troy at the time of the Trojan war; inther of Paris
- Pythagoreans, i. 4 The followers of Pythagoria, a Greek philosopher from the filend of Samos (a.u.), who founded a sect of brotherhood in S. Italy in the latter part of the sixth century 0.0.
- Pýthocles, il. 36. Possibly an adherent of Phöciön, put to death along with him in 317 B.C.

- Rhégium (Greek Rhégion, Italian Reggno), n. 20. A Greek eity in the extreme S. of Italy, on the Straits of Mossma, colonized in the ciglith and seventh centuries n.c. 16 was captured by Donwins I. of Svracuas in 285
- Bhodes' (Greek, Rhödos), Rhodians, in, 15, 23, 29, 34 An island off the S-W. coast of Asla Minor, early coloidzed by Dorlan Greeks. Its capital city, also called Rhodos, which asserted and maintained its independence after the denth of Alexander the Great, was huilt in 408 n.o
- Samos, Samians, h. 9, 23 An island off the W coast of Asia Muor, occupied by Greeks from voly early times. Between 405 and 319 n.o. th passed alternately under the control of Lacedaemonians, Athenians, Persuns, and Muccedonians, The eviles whose restoration is montioned in the text were probably supporters of Lacedaemonian suzerainty who had been expelled by the Athennan party
- Selybria, il. 17 A Grock city, founded like Byzantium by Megara, but still earlier, and about 50 miles farthor west. Now Seliertz

Sösipolis, if. 6. (The name, lacking in the Greek, is supplied from the Latin version, c) Stabolbius. In 40*

- Syracuse (Greek Sğrähüsan), Syra cusans, n. 20. The chief Greek colony in Sicily, founded from Corinth in 734 n.c. Syrian, n. 82
- Ta55 (or T.telh6: Egyptian Telehra), n. 25, 87 An Egyptian Ing of the XXXLi Lynasky, who was helped to manifain his throne against Person a titacks by the Athenian Chabrias and the Lacodiminian king Agésiläus (about 961 B c.)
- Thrace (Greek Thräki, Latm Thräcad), Thracian, it. 27. A region between Macedoma and the Black Sea
- Timothéns, n. 23. An Athonan commander, who served in many campaigns in the first half of the fourth century B.0
- Tyrrhiena, it 25. The district in italy now called Joscana The inhalifants, called by the Greeks Pyrhienoi or Tyrsinai, by the Latus Tusci or Eurosci, and by themselves RaSena, were thought to have immigrated from Asia Minor
- Ulysses (Greek Odysseus), iii. 1, 3, 4, The hero of the Odyssey' a type of steadfastness and resource
- Zens (other wise Dens or Zan), is. 1. The Greek god of the sky, corresponding to the Roman Despiter or Imppiter (=Iovispater)

* The author of capparently read TridBios for TraBédBios.

THE MAGNA MORALIA

INTRODUCTION

THE Peripatetic ^a School, founded at Athens by Aristotle in the second half of the fourth century B.C., has left us four treatises on Ethics, or the Science and Art of Human Conduct. They are known as the Ethics of Nicomachus; the Ethics of Eudemus; the Great Ethics ^b; and the Tract on Virtues and Vices.

Nicomachus was the son of Aristotle, and the treatise which bears his name bore it as far back as the days of Cicero.^c That he did no more than edit his father's work was then the opinion of the learned; an opinion confirmed by the studies of modern times.

Eudemus of Rhodes was one of Aristotle's most eminent pupils, the author of several works on Mathematics and Natural Science. The earliest testimony to his authorship of the treatise on Ethics which bears his name is that of Aspasius, a commentator of the first century A.D.; quoted by Susemihl in his Introduction, p. xxix.^d

While it is generally agreed that both the above

^a So called from the Promenade ($\pi \epsilon \rho (\pi a \tau \sigma s)$ where the philosopher lectured.

^b τὰ μεγάλα 'Ηθικά: in Latin, Magna Moralia.

• See De Finibus v. 5.

^d Aspasius on Nicomachus, Bk. VIII. c. viii. : λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὐδημος καὶ Θεόφραστος ὅτι καὶ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γίνονται ἢ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ το χρήσιμον ἢ δι' ἀρετήν. The reference is to Euclemus VII. x. 10.

426

treatises present us with the substance of Aristotle's own lectures on Ethics, the relation between the two has been very differently conceived. Grant (Essay I. pp. 23 foll.), in agreement with Leonhard Spengel, regards the latter as a rewriting of the former. By several German scholars (Jäger, Walzer, Brink) the converse has recently been maintained, and the edition of Eudemus held to be an early sketch which Aristotle afterwards elaborated in the longer work.

Three Books (Nicomachus V., VI., VII.: Eudemus IV., V., VI.) are common to both editions; and the question of their authorship has been much discussed. Among British scholars, Munro, Jackson, Grant, and Stock attribute them to Eudemus; while Burnet and Rackham think they belonged originally to the work of Nicomachus. This is also the opinion of the German editors Spengel and Susemihl,⁹ though they except the treatise on Pleasure which forms the second part of Eud. VI. (Nic. VII.). For a full discussion, the reader may be referred to the editions of Grant and Burnet.

Students of the Great Ethics, with rare exceptions,^b take them to be a post-Aristotelean epitome. Susemihl (Introduction to Magna Moralia, p. xii) says they are extracted chiefly from Eudemus; whilst Brink points out that in their general structure they follow Nicomachus. The origin of the title (which cannot be traced higher than the time of Marcus Aurelius) is uncertain. As the two $\beta_i\beta\lambda_i$ or rolls into which the work was divided cover the ground of the eight rolls of Eudemus, which nevertheless con-

^a Introduction to Eudemi Ethica, pp. ix foll.

^b Notable among these are Schleiermacher and Prof. Hans von Arnim of Vienna.

ground as the first four of *Nicomachus* : namely, the definition and analysis of Moral Virtue.

Book IV. (=Nic. V.) treats of Justice, (1) as an End IV. (Nic. V.) abstract principle. (2) as a Virtue-a State or Habit of the Soul. The principle is a species of equality, which assigns to men their deserved proportions of good and ill. Two main types of it are distinguished, the Distributive and the Corrective : as an instrument of both, Currency is devised, to be a token and a measure of our needs; which we can keep till the need arises, and then exchange for the needed goods. Justice as a *Virtue* must be voluntary; its proper sphere is the intercourse of fellow-citizens. No one voluntarily commits injustice against himself or suffers it from another, though he may commit or suffer something contrary to the principle or rule. Finally, Equity (enterneut) is explained as a Virtue which intervenes in cases where strict Justice is inapplicable,

End, v. Description of the Moral Virtues $(i\partial \theta \iota \kappa u i d \rho \epsilon \tau u i)$ (Nue, VI) being thus concluded, the question arises, what is the rational Rule or Standard in accordance with which the virtuous man's passions are balanced between excess and defect?

Determination of this Rule is a task for the Intellect; but for its calculative or deliberative side $(\tau \partial \ \lambda o \gamma \iota \sigma \tau \iota \kappa \delta \nu)$ which deals with changeable things, not for the speculative part $(\tau \partial \ \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu o \nu \iota \kappa \delta \nu)$ which embraces pure knowledge. Now just as the Moral Virtues are excellences of the irrational or passionate nature, so in our rational or intellectual nature there are certain outstanding powers or excellences of thought. Chief among these are the Artistic, Scientific, Practical, Philosophical, and Intuitive

430

powers ($\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta$, $\epsilon \pi i \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta$, $\phi \rho \delta \nu \eta \sigma \kappa$, $a \sigma \phi \delta \sigma$, $\nu \sigma \hat{\nu} s$). Of these, Practical Thought or Prudence is found to be the seat of that Right Rule which controls Moral Virtue.

After distinguishing the applications of "Prudence" to the life of the State, the Family, and the Individual, the author touches upon certain cognate powers such as Good Counsel, Shrewdness, Considerateness. He then returns to Intuitive Thought (rois). and traces its relation to Prudence. Finally he contrasts Philosophic Thought and Prudence as representative excellences of the two sides of the Intellect. Prudence, however, needs Monal Virtue, or it degenerates into Cleverness ; even as apart from Prudence, Moral Virtue becomes a blind and fallible instinct.

After reviewing certain states of soul which tran- Rud, vi. seend ordinary Virtue or Vice, the author proceeds (Nie, VII). to consider Self-Control (eykpúreu) and its opposite Self-Indulgence (disparia). Like the Virtue of Temperance (roopporting) and the Vice of Profligacy $(\dot{a}\kappa_0\lambda_a\sigma_{i\sigma})$ they are concerned with bodily pleasure and pain; but whereas the profligate, misguided by a false Rule, purposes wrongly, the self-indulgent, though he knows the true " major premiss " or rule of conduct, and also the "minor premiss" which applies it to his own case, fails to act upon the latter through the influence of Desire ; which resembles

^a Dr. W. Juger, who believes the Eudemian Ethics to represent an earlier stage of Aristotle's own thought, points out (as Greenwood in his edition of Nic. VI. had already done) that in Eud. I., VII., VIII. pownous is the highest form of Thought, corresponding rather to god/a here. He therefore ranges the present Book with the later (Nicomachean) version. (Aristotle, English trans. c. ix., with concluding note, Oxford, 1934.)

that of slumber, madness, or intovication. His case is more hopeful than that of the profligate, because the rational Rule in him is as yet uncorrupted.

The remainder of the Book treats, like Nic. X, of the relation of Pleasure to Happiness. Here, however, the view is taken that Happiness and the noblest kinds of Pleasure are identical. And though the palm is given to the pleasure of Contemplation, it is recognized that those who are capable of it need a certain measure of material welfare, or their happiness will be meomplete.^a

Evid VII The seventh Book, treating of Friendship, corre-Eud VIII, sponds to Nic. VIII, and IX. The eighth Book is fragmentary. It comprises discussions on the possibility of mis-using Virtue; on Good Fortune; and on $\kappa a \lambda o \kappa d \gamma o \theta i a$ —a state of perfect Virtue which, possessing a true criterion of worth, is unharmed by any accession of external advantages. This Book has no counterpart in the treatise of Nieomaehus.

Analysis of the Great Ethics ("Magna Moralia")

- M. M. 1 1.1 The First Book, after discovering in Ethies---the Science of Moral Conduct---a branch of Sociology, the Science of Civilized Life, passes in review the opinions on Moral Excellence held respectively by Pythagoras,
 - 1.0. Socrates, and Plato. The author then lays down his own, or rather his school's, definition of the object of
 - 1. 10. Ethical inquiry : which is the Highest Good of Man in his Social Life.

^a Cf. Nic. I. v., vni. The opposite view, that a man may be happy in torment, was maintained by the Cynics and Stoics (Grant). 432 Hereupon, like Endemus and Nicomachus, he^{1, 12,26,} introduces a criticism of Plato's Ideal Good. This he finally sets aside as alien to the limited and relative Good with which his science deals; and concludes his ^{1, 26, 27,} first Chapter ^a with a further criticism of the view of Socrates that Virtue is simply and solely Knowledge of the Truth.

In the following Chapters the conception of the ^{ii, iii,} Highest Human Good (or Chief End for Man) is analysed, and it is identified with Happiness. This is a compound of greater and lesser Goods; and may be defined briefly as " Living well and Acting well." In the main, such a life consists in the Activity of a 11.1. virtuous soul; to the completeness whereof certain external Goods are ancillary. Having thus defined 19, 10 Happiness, the author proceeds to analyse that Moral Virtue or Excellence which enters into his definition. It is distinguished psychologically from Intellectual v. Virtue as being a state of the Irrational part of the soul, whose passions it orders and regulates. Con-vi-ix 6 eerned closely with Pleasure and Pain, it may be regarded as a mean between excess and defect of the various kinds of Feeling Moral Virtue being thus 15.7 aviit. 2. defined, the question is asked whether it can be taught; and several ehapters are devoted to a discussion of Moral Freedom. It is shown that the human Will is a άρχή κυρία-a Cause of Action ; and as there is something inealculable in human conduct, and the same person acts differently under the same circumstances, so the Will which causes our actions must be free. This leads to a search for the Motive Force of Voluntary Action ; which is eventually found in $\pi poniperts$ or well. Purposive Choice; a compound of Impulse or Ap-

^a Possibly this portion has become misplaced. See note. VOL. 11 2 F 438

petence and Intelligence ($\delta \rho \epsilon \xi is \beta \delta \nu \lambda \epsilon \nu \tau i \kappa \eta$ $\mu \epsilon \tau \dot{\alpha}$ xviii $\delta i a roi a s$). Through this we choose the means towards our end; but our choice is deflected by Pleasure or Pain. Hence the possibility of error; we may overshoot the mark, or we may fall short of it.

The End or Aim of Virtue is next discussed. Just
xix as προαίρωσιs aims at Virtue (cf. xvii. 2), so Virtue herself aims at το καλών—Moral Beauty or Nobility. The author now considers in detail the several Virtues : those states of soul which maintain a perfect balance between the excess of some feeling and xx, its defect. First he analyses Courage, the mean state xxi, between excess and defect of Fear ; then Temperance, which is intermediate between Profligacy and xxiv. Insensibility to Pleasure ; and so on with Gentleness, xvv. txvii. Circatness of Soul, Magnificence, Righteous Indignation and Modesty lack the steadfastness of full Moral Virtues,

but as they are "intermediate states of feeling " they are included here.^a

xxxIII. The thirty-third Chapter deals with the primary social Virtue of Justice or Righteousness, corresponding to the treatment of it in Nic. V. (=Eud. IV.) of which I have already given a summary (p. 430
 xxxIII. L above). The principle of Justice (τὸ δίκαιον) is two-

xxxxxx. 1. above). The principle of Justiee (τὸ δίκαιον) is twofold, consisting either in obedience to human laws,

of Justice which corresponds to this latter kind is a middle state of soul which claims for itself neither too

axis. 8. much nor too little. There is just equality between

^a Dignity, Urbanity, Fuendship, and Truthfulness are regarded as virtues by Nicomachus, but not by Eudemus. See note on xxvm. 1. 484 two men when each is rewarded proportionately to his desert. The division between Distributive and Corrective Justice in Nic. V. ii. 12 is here ignored; but the criticism of reprisal or requital (Nic. V. v.), vixini, 13, which is only just if proportioned to the states and culpability of the parties, duly appears. Domestic variation Justice, which operates between unequal members of a household, is next distinguished from the civic or political Justice which binds together the equal members of a commonwealth; and Natural Right from xxxm 19 what is just by convention. Injustice is also dif- varua 22. ferentiated from wrongdoing, as in Nic. V. vii.; and its voluntary character is emphasized. Following axia 27 Nic. V. ix., xi., the writer then discusses the question whether a man can wrong himself, and decides that he cannot. The chapter concludes with the case with 35. of Injustice arising from error-either on our part or on that of our neighbour."

In the thirty-fourth Chapter, which for the most xxiv, 1. part corresponds to Nic. VI. (= Eud. V.), the formula $\pi \rho \dot{\alpha} \tau \tau \epsilon \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \dot{\alpha} \tau \dot{\sigma} \nu \sigma \dot{\rho} \theta \dot{\sigma} \nu \lambda \dot{\sigma} \gamma \sigma r$ is introduced as a description of morally virtuous action; and leads to the question, what is this $\dot{\sigma} \rho \theta \dot{\sigma} s \lambda \dot{\sigma} \gamma \sigma s$, this Right xxiv. 2 Standard or Principle, by which, as by a touchstone, the virtuous man will test his actions?

As its name implies, it is something rational; a XXXIV 3. rule of which a reasoned account can be given. It is therefore to be sought not in the irrational part of the soul which is the seat of the Moral Virtues, but in the rational part which is the seat of the Intellectual Virtues. In this part we again distinguish the organ of Science or Knowledge, and the organ of Delibera-

^a The consideration of Equity (ἐπιείκεια, Nic. V. x.) 15 omitted here, but appears below in π. i.

tion and Purpose; which latter deals with the world that is perceptible through our senses and susceptible to the action of our wills.

^{XXXIV} 7. From this piece of psychological analysis, the author proceeds to an enumeration of five intellectual faculties by which we attain Truth ; the list is that of *Nic.* VI. iii. 1, with the substitution of $i\pi\delta\lambda\eta\psi_{US}$ for $\tau\dot{\epsilon}\chi\nu\eta$.^a

Name is shown to be a Virtue of the deliberative part of the soul, chabling us to purpose and to act aright; and is distinguished on the one hand from $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta$ (Art) and on the other from $\epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta$ (Scientific Thought or Know-

xxviv 11 ledge). This latter faculty, which attains Truth by deduction, becomes through union with vois (Intuition of First Principles) the intellectual Virtue of

- xxxiv. 16, 17. σοφία or Wisdom, which is an excellence of the scientific part of the soul as Prudence is of the deh-
- NMV. 18-20. berative. σ inverses (Sagacity) and $\delta \epsilon \nu \delta \tau \gamma_{3}$ s (Cleverness) are next analysed, and shown to be auxiliary to
- xxxiv. 23 26. Prudence. This relationship suggests the similar one between natural tendencies towards Courage, Justice, etc., and the fully formed Virtues, which arise from Habit and Purpose, and possess a rational Rule or Standard ($\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$).
- avviv. 27-29. In the concluding sections, the status of Prudence as a Virtue, and its practicality, are again emphasized,

XXIV. 30-32 and its relation to Wisdom defined as that of Steward to Householder. (It is to be noticed that the author omits direct answer to the question raised in § 2 "What is the Right Rule or Standard of Conduct?"

> ^a See p. 430 above. indeprint of truth, is dismissed in two lines (§ 15).436

but leaves us to infer the answer given in Nie. VI. xiii. 4, which places it in Prudence or Practical Thought.)

The Second Book commences with a brief account of M.M. 11.4. Equity or Considerateness- -a moral quality corrective of strict Justice. This chapter, which corresponds to Nic. V. X., would find a more fitting place at the end of I. XXXII, above. It seems to be placed here as introductory to the mention of Discrimination, which II. (as in Nic, VI, Xi 1) is an intellectual quality whereby we determine what is equitable. Good Counsel II 1. $(e^{i\beta}or\lambda ia)$ which, like Sagacity and Cleverness, is auxiliary to Prudence, is next briefly treated ; with Discrimination, it would be more naturally considered after I. XXXIV, 17. (Cf. Nic, VI, ix.)

Five problems are now stated and solved which do not appear in the longer Treatise. According to the conjecture of Susemihl, they once stood therein as a kind of appendix, either at the end of Nic. VI. (*Eud.* V.) or at the beginning of the following Book. (See his Introduction to M. M. p. xiii). They are as follows:

Will the Just treat all mon alike ?
 (2) Can the Unjust be said to possess Prudence ?
 44.

(3) Can one commit Injustice against a bad man ? ill. 8.

(4) Is conflict possible between the Virtues?

(5) Can we have too much Virtue?

iii. 12. 18. 14.

All these questions are answered in the negative.

The next three Chapters correspond with the $_{1.7,vi.}$ greater part of Nic. VII. They commence with a distinction between three evil states of soul, namely (1) Self-Indulgence ($d\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma(a)$, which being opposed, not guided, by the sinner's rational Standard ($\lambda\delta\gamma\sigma_{0}$), falls short of full viciousness; (2) the true Vice of Profligacy, which is in agreement with a rational

Standard, but with a perverted one (cf. vi. 41); and

- (cf vi 33) (3) Bestiality, which exceeds the normal measure of human Vice. (Contrast Nic. VII. v. 6, where this state is attributed to the absence of a rational Standard, whether good or bad.)
 - There follows the consideration of four problems touching Self-Control and Self-Indulgence. These are (1) In what sense can the Self-Controlled be said to possess Knowledge or Opinion ? (2) Can we predicate Self-Control of the Temperate $(\sigma \omega \phi \rho \omega \nu)$? (3) Is Self-Control always praiseworthy ? (4) In what vi, u sphere of action is Self-Control shown ? The answer
 - to (1) is that the mere possession of Knowledge must
 - vi. 15. be distinguished from its active use; or again that we may know the "major premiss" or general rule, and yet be ignorant of the "minor premiss" which applies it to our own particular case. (For (2) see
- vi. 18, 19 below.) (3) Self-Indulgence that ignores a perverted Standard ($\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$) and thus wins praise, and Self-Control that abides by such a Standard and thus wins blame, are not really what we call them. True Self-Indulgence and Self-Control only exist in relation to a *right* Standard, and are therefore always deserving, the one of eensure, and the other of praise.
- vi. 21-26. (4) Those who are self-indulgent in bodily pleasures are properly so-called; but we use the term in a qualified sense of those who are self-indulgent in temper, or in the pursuit of honour. Indulgence in temper is culpable; but less so than the sensual kind.

 vi. 27, 28 Self-Control is next distinguished from Endurance, and Self-Indulgence from Feebleness or Softness
 vi. 20. in face of hardships. Finally, the vital distinction between Self-Indulgence and Profligacy, that the former acts against a right Principle, and the latter in accordance with a wrong one, does not preclude vi. 37. an affirmative answer to the question propounded above (§ 6), whether the temperate man ($\sigma \phi \phi \rho \sigma v$) is also self-controlled. Such Self-Control is however only potential; the Temperate man, so long as he is temperate, does not need to exercise it. (*Cf.* Nic, VII, ix, 6.) In the course of the discussion, it is vi. 35, 86. pointed out that the sudden failure of a passionate nature is less eulpable than the weak surrender of a colder one; and the question is raised, whether the vi 30 profigate is in worse case than the self-indulgent. At first he would seem in better case : but finally vi 40-42. the reverse is seen to be true, because the profligate's lack of Principle is a natural deficiency, and therefore harder to cure.

The Chapter concludes by showing that Prudence is vi. 43, 44, incompatible with Self-Indulgence ; though Cleverness is not.

The next Chapter contains an account of Pleasure vo. corresponding in the main to that of Nic. VII. (Eud. VI.) xi.-xiii., on which see above, p. 432. Six vo. 3. arguments are eited by which the goodness of Pleasure is impugned: (1) that it is a Process, and not a completed State of soul; (2) that there are evil Pleasures; (3) that Pleasure is enjoyed by good and bad alike; (4) (that there is no Science of Pleasure^a); (5) that it is not the best of all things; (6) that it impedes noble Action.

Against (1) the author shows that "no Pleasure vii. 4-10. is a Process"; against (2) that Pleasure accompanies vii. 11 18. every activity of Good, and that Pleasures moreover differ in kind; against (3) that all creatures naturally vii. 19-20.

 $^{\alpha}$ This objection seems to have dropped out of the list. It is cited and answered afterwards.

- vil 21-25, seek what is good ; against (6) that the Pleasure arising from an Action furthers instead of hindering
 - in 26, that Action; against (4) that Pleasure is an in-
 - vn 27 separable accompaniment of Science; against (5) that Courage and other virtues are good, yet not " best of all."
- vii 28-30. The author now reverts to a subject treated already in I xxxiv, and II. vi. : the respective parts played by Principle and Passion in determining a virtuous Action. Such Action can only take place when both elements are in a right condition, and in harmony with each other : of the two, the unreasoning impulse of a healthy passion for what is noble is the more fundamental.
 - The next three chapters deal in turn with three subjects treated in the fragmentary eighth Book of Eudemus, namely Good Fortune: Moral Nobility $(\kappa \sigma \lambda \sigma \kappa d \gamma a \theta i a)$: and the Standard of Conduct.
- vin. 1-5. Good Fortune is an element in Happiness whose origin is obscure. It is difficult to attribute anything so uncertain to Nature; or again to Intuition, or a rational Rule of Conduct; while its frequent undeservedness forbids us to see in it the hand of God. We are driven to regard it as a kind of natural gift (cf. Eud. VIII. ii. 7-9). It is beyond our control, and thus differs from the Moral Virtues. A man may be vint. 6, 7. called "lucky" to be well-born; but the term is
- more properly used when we achieve something
- vul. 8, 9. which reason would not expect. Such Good Fortune may be defined as a Natural Instinct which irration-
- viu. 10, 11. ally impels us towards our advantage. Apart from such impulse, we speak of Good Fortune as a Cause of unexpected success. This is a different kind from the other, and is due apparently to vicissitudes of

circumstance. But it is the instinctive kind which best deserves the name.

Noble Goodness (καλοκάγαθία) is the Goodness of is one who is complete in virtue, and cannot be harmed by those things which, in themselves good, may to an inferior soul prove mjurious

Conduct conforms to the Right Rational Standard (cf. I. xxxiv. 1, 25, 26) when the passions are so controlled by the latter that they offer no hindrance to the activity of the Reasoning faculties. To judge of this condition is a task for common sense. The Chapter ends with a warning that neither Ethics nor any other science can impart the power to use the knowledge it conveys.

The next five Chapters present in abbreviated $_{MeXM}$ form the discussion of Friendship (as anxiliary to Happiness) contained in *Eud.* VII., and in *Nic.* VIII.-IX. Four questions are first proposed about $_{MeXM}$ Friendship. (1) Is it based on Likeness or Unlikeness? (2) Is it easy to attain? (3) Can the Good he friend to the Bad, (4) or the Bad to the Bad?

To answer these, we must analyse our concept of xi. 6, 7. Friendship. Friendship in the proper sense implies mutual affection or love. Now what is intrinsically xi. 8. good is lovable; but the individual is drawn to love what is good for himself. Truly good men love one xi. 11; 20. another for and because of their intrinsic goodness; but this goodness includes the kind which attracts even those who are not good : the power, namely, of conferring Profit or Pleasure. In the exchange of xi. 1247; 20. these two inferior goods an imperfect type of Friendship can subsist between the Good and the Bad; or even between Bad and Bad if their interests agree. The Friendship of the Good being based on Virtue $\frac{1}{21}, \frac{19}{22}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{19}{21}, \frac{10}{21}, \frac{10}{2$

and not on Profit or Pleasure, is the firmest and most successful and most successful and most ships through misconception of their basis.

- xi, 26, 27
- Of virtuous Friendship, Pleasure, though not the basis, is yet the necessary accompaniment.
- N 28 31 Friendship may subsist between those who are unequal as well as between equals.^a The Friendship of Virtue is between the Like; that of Profit between the Unlike, who supply one another's deficiencies.
- xi 82, 83 Differences arise between friends when service is not equal on both sides. We may compensate for deficiency of Pleasure or Profit by surplus of affection.
- x1 34-39 The wealthy or ambitious expect this compensation from their poorer or humbler friends; yet to love
- xi 40, 11. Is really better than to be loved. There are also partial or imperfect Friendships, which are knit by sympathy, without presenting the other characteristies of Friendship.
- xi 42-44 The question whether Friendship for oneself is
- xi 47-50. possible is next discussed. It can only exist in the good man, in whom the elements of the soul are in peace and harmony one with another.
- x1. 45, 46. (The correspondence between different kinds of reciprocal Right or Obligation on the one side, and of Friendship on the other, is parenthetically discussed.)
- x1, 51-55. Comradeship is taken as a type of Friendship between equals. Where there is inequality between the partners, it is corrected by a proportionate dis-
- xil 1.5. tribution of benefits. The pre-eminence of parental over filial affection is explained by the analogy of the
- xii. 6-13. creative artist's love for his work. Next, Favour or Good-will, and Concord are compared with Friendship. The former, arising from the attraction of one

^a An inexactitude: for "unlike" and "like" (cf. § 2). 442 character for another, sometimes leads to Friendship; the latter, in its full sense of desire for the same end, approaches Friendship very closely.

Self-love is manifested by the good man in coveting sitte for himself noble action; by the bad man, in coveting pleasure or pelf. The good man, in yielding these site, things to his friend, shows greater love for the latter; but by the very act secures nobility for himself. He is a lover of good rather than of self, loving himself only because he is good. The bad man, loving himself because he is himself, is more truly termed a self-lover.

The self-sufficient man, possessing all good things, x_{1} , y_{2} , will yet need a friend, both for companionship and as y_{13} the object of his beneficence. The analogy of the x_{2} s, 4. Divine life cannot helpfully be applied to Man. A x_{2} , 5.8. friend is one's "second self"; a mirror whose contemplation aids in the difficult task of self-knowledge.

A multitude of friends taxes too severely our finite xvi. powers of love and sympathy. The number should be suited to our eircumstances and capacity.

The last chapter breaks off abruptly, after intro- vvii. ducing the question how we are to treat our friends so as to avoid recrimination. The author points out that this takes place mostly between friends who, being on an equality, demand from each other equal measure.

Not very much direct help is available to the reader of this treatise, from which students mostly turn aside to the richer and presumedly more authentic presentation of Nicomachus. The Scottish edition of the latter by Sir Alexander Grant (Longmans, 1885) has

been continually in my hands. With its illuminating essays, notes, and paraphrases it forms probably, for a British student, the best introduction to the moral philosophy of the Peripatetic School. The Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Prof. J. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1892) provide a valuable store of illustrative passages; while the more compact commentary of Prof. J. Burnet (Methuen, 1900) has the merit of adding to the Nicomachean text the parallel passages of the Eudemian.

The Greek text of the present edition is reprinted. by kind permission of Messrs. Tcubner of Leipzig, from the edition of Prof. Suscmihl, to whose Introduction I refer the reader for information about the MSS. and critical editions. (The pages, columns, and lines of Bekker's text are given in the margin.) After completing my translation, I compared it with Mr. Rackham's version of Nicomachus in this series, with a view to bringing my renderings of the ethical and psychological terms into agreement with his. Where I felt unable to do this, I have noted the difference. Adequately to represent these terms is one of the hardest parts of the translator's task. No English words bear the whole connotation of $d\rho\epsilon\tau \eta$, $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma \sigma s$, $\phi \rho \dot{0} \nu \eta \sigma \iota s$, $\theta \upsilon \mu \dot{0} s$, $\pi \rho \sigma a \dot{0} \rho \sigma \iota s$, and the like; to convey as much of it as I could, I have had frequent recourse to adjectives or alternatives.

Angular brackets $\langle \rangle$ in the translation denote that words are inserted to complete the sense.

I have occasionally consulted Mr. Stock's translation of the *Magna Moralia* in the Oxford edition, and have been enabled thereby to detect one or two misprints in the Teubner text.

The work of Prof. E. Zeller on Aristotle and the

MAGNA MORALIA

Earlier Peripatetics (Longmans, 1897) comprises a discussion of the relations between the three treatises, as well as an abstract of the Nicomachean. I may also mention the essays of Dr. Hans you Arnim (Die drei aristotelischen Ethiken, 1924, and Der neuste Versuch, die Magna Moralia als unecht zu erweisen, 1929), to whose view I alluded above (p. 427); and on the other side, the tract of Prof. R Walzer (Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik). These may be found in the Library of the British Museum. Lastly. Dr. K. Oskar Brink, in Stil und Form der pseudaristotelischen Magna Moralia (Ohlan, 1933), undertakes a careful comparison of the language and structure of the "drei Ethiken." He concludes from the stiffer and more formal style of the Magna Moralia that they are a post-Aristotelean compilation; and shows, as I have already mentioned, that they follow the main lines of Nicomachus rather than those of Eudemus.

I have only to add that any corrections or suggestions with which readers may favour me will be very gratefully received.

G. C. A.

June 1985.

[ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ] Ηθικών μεγάλων

А

1181 I. Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν ὑπερ ἡθικῶν, 1 πρῶτον ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον τίνος ἐστὶ μέρος τὸ ἦθος. 25 ὡς μεν οὖν συντόμως εἰπεῖν, δόξειεν 〈ἂν〉 οὖκ ἄλλης ἢ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι μέρος. ἔστι γὰρ οὐθεν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι, λέγω δ' οἶον σπουδαῖον· τὸ δὲ 1181 ʰ σπουδαῖον εἶναί ἐστι τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν· δεῖ ἅρα, 2 εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ 25 ἦθος εἶναι σπουδαῖος· μέρος ἐστὶν ἅρα, ὡς ἔοικε, 3 καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς, τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν δικαίως δοκεῖ ἄν μοι ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία οὖκ ἦθικὴν ἀλλὰ πολιτικήν.

^a In its wider sense $\pi o \lambda truch$, as here, includes the whole field of "sociology." In its narrower sense it is limited to the structure and administration of the State ($\pi \delta \lambda s$).

^b The distinction between Moral Character $(\eta \partial \sigma_s)$ and Intellect ($\delta i \dot{\alpha} \nu \sigma_i \alpha$) is drawn at the end of the first and the beginning of the second book of Nicomarhus. (See especially I. e. xiii. §§ 19-20: and II. e. 1. § 1, where $\eta \partial \sigma_i$ is derived from $\ell \partial \sigma_s$, "habit," because by habit character is formed.) Each has its proper excellences ($\dot{\alpha} \rho \epsilon \tau a$); but the Greek **446**

[ARISTOTLE] MAGNA MORALIA

BOOK I

(With §§ 1-1 and 9-10 cf. Nicomachus I. 1, ii.)

1 I. As we are undertaking to treat of Ethics or Ethics are a Morality, we must begin by inquiring by what branch Branch of Sociology. of science moral character is considered. We may answer briefly, by Political or Social science,^{*a*} and no other. For without character, a man can achieve nothing in association with his fellows. He must be a man of moral worth; and moral worth means 2 possession of the virtues.⁶ Whoseever therefore would achieve anything in social or political life must 3 be of good moral character; which indicates that the discussion of character not only belongs to Social science, but is its very foundation or starting-point. And I would go so far as to assert that such a discussion would more fittingly be termed Social than Ethical.

word is commonly used without qualification to denote the excellences of Character (deeral $\eta \theta_{inval}$) and is thus equivalent to the English "Virtues." For the deeral $\delta_{iavo\eta riskal}$ of. c. v. §§ 1. 2 below : for the deeral of an artist as artist of. c. iii. § 5 : for a definition of apern see c. iv. § 10, and Eudemus II. c. 1. § 2.

1182 a Δεῖ ἄρα, ώς ἔοικε, πρῶτον ὑπέρ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, 4 τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἴσως ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, πῶς δὲ ἔσται καὶ ἐκ τίνων μὴ ἐπαίειν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπως εἰδήσομεν τί ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται ◊ σκέψασθαι. ἅμα γὰρ εἰδῆσαι βουλόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοιοῦτοι· τοῦτο δ' οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ εἰδῶμεν καὶ ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς ἕσται.

'Αναγκαΐον μέν οῦν εἰδησαι τί ἐστιν ἀρετή (οὐ 5 γὰρ ῥάδιον εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται καὶ πῶς ἔσται, ἀγνοοῦντα τὸ τί ἐστίν, ιὕσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν).

- 10 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν οὐδ' εἴ τινες πρότεροι ὑπὲρ τούτων εἰρήκασιν. πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησεν ο Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος.
- 15 Μετὰ τοῦτον Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόμενος βέλτιον η καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἶπεν ὑπὲρ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδ' οῦτος. τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν είναι ἀδύνατον. ai γὰρ ἐπιστήμαι πᾶσαι μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν τῷ διανοητικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεται μορίω· γίνονται οὖν ai ἀρετὰ πῶσαι κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ²ο μορίω· συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο

^a The word $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ is used in many shades of meaning, subjective and objective. (See Grant's note on Nic. II. in. 2.) Here it might seem to signify the reasoning power or faculty; but having regard to its general use as the moral standard in this treatise, I have followed Rackham and translated as in the text. Cf. Burnet on Nic. I. x. 4. 4 It seems, then, that we must begin by treating of Nature and Virtue---its nature and its origin. For it may fairly virtue. be maintained that a knowledge of Virtue is useless, nuless one also understands how and from what elements it can be produced. Not only must we consider how we shall know its nature, but from what constituents we may form it. We desire to know Virtue; but at the same time we desire to be virtuous ourselves ; and thus will be impossible if we are ignorant of the sources and conditions of its birth.

5 We must begin then by inquiring what Virtue is ; since if we are ignorant of this, we shall find it no easier to discover its sources and conditions than we should in the case of a science or an art.

In the first place, we must not fail to acquaint Earlier ourselves with the opinions of former writers on the Moralists: 6 subject. Now Pythagoras was the first who under- Pythagoras; took to speak of Virtue ; but his method is erroneous. In referring Virtue to numerical relations, he considered it from an inappropriate point of view, Justice, for example, is not the " product of two even numbers "

After him came Socrates, who dealt more fully socrates, 7 and satisfactorily with the matter; still even he did not escape error. For he regarded the Virtues as mere departments of science ; which they cannot possibly be. All departments of science presuppose a Rational Principle or Standard a; and this is the product of the soul's intellectual part. According therefore to Socrates, all the virtues arise in the reasoning part of the soul ; from which it follows that in making the virtues departments of science he ignores our irrational part, and thus ignores both

VOL. II

1182 a

δε ποιῶν ἀναιρεί καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ήψατο ταύτη τῶν ἀρετῶν.

Μετά ταῦτα δὲ Πλάτων διείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἴς 8
 25 τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ [τὰς] ἀρετὰς τὰς προσηκούσας. μέχρι μὲν οῦν τούτου καλῶς· μετὰ μέντοι τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὀρθῶς. τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν κατέμιξεν [καὶ συνἑζευξεν] εἰς τὴν πραγματείαν τὴν ὑπὲρ τἀγαθοῦ, οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον· ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα οὐκ ἔδει ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῷ κἀκείνῷ κοινόν.

Ούτοι μέν ούν έπι τοσούτον έφήψαντο και ούτως 9 έχόμενον δ' αν είη μετά ταύτα σκέψασθαι τί δεί αύτούς λέγειν ύπερ τούτων.

Πρωτον μέν οῦν ἰδεῖν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήμης καὶ δυνάμεως ἐστί τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν οὐδεμία γὰρ οὕτ' ἐπιστήμη οὕτε δύναμις ἕνεκεν Νι κακοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ οῦν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθόν 10

το τέλος, δήλον ώς και της βελτίστης βέλτιστον αν

1182 b εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη | ἀγαθόν.' ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῦν λεκτέον, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῦν οὐ γὰρ τοῦ θεῶν ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτου καὶ ἄλλος ▷ λόγος καὶ ἀλλοτρία ἡ σκέψις. ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄρα ἡμῦν λεκτέον ἀγαθοῦ.

Πάλιν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διελεῖν δεῖ. ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ 11 πῶς λεγομένου; οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν. λέγεται ¹ Reading <τὸ ἄριστον> ἀγαθόν (Bonitz).

^a Republic IV. xvi. foll.

 $^{^{}h}$ The dissent from Plato is very striking. To him, the Ideal Good is at once the highest object of knowledge, the fairest pattern of conduct, and the primal cause of the 450

passion and the moral character. Clearly then this was not the right way to deal with the virtues

The next step was taken by Plato, who rightly Plato 8 divided the soul into a rational and an irrational part, and assigned to each its befitting virtues or excellences.^a So far, he was right; but after this, he fell into error For he confused the treatment of Virtue with that of Ideal Good. This was wrong, because inappropriate. The subject of (moral) Virtue should have been excluded from the discussion of Being and Truth ; for the two subjects have nothing in common.^b Such then is the nature and extent of these previous 9 inquiries. We must now consider how we ourselves are going to treat the subject.

First, we must realize that every science and every The Aim of faculty has an end proposed to it, which is something the tion of Man good ; for no science and no faculty exists for an evil in Society.

10 end. If, then, all faculties aim at a good end, the aim of the best faculty will be the best of ends. But the best of all faculties is surely that of social life and action; wherefore its aim will be the best of goods. It appears, then, that we must treat of what is good ; and not of what is absolutely good, but good for us men. We are not to deal with the good the gods enjoy; another science treats of this, and the consideration of it is of a different nature. The good of man in society is, then, the subject of our discourse.

(Eudemus I. viii, : Nicomachus I. vi.)

11 A further division is however necessary. We must ask in what sense we are using the term ; for several

451

universe : even as to the Christian Christ is Truth, Way, and Life. Cf. Nic. 1, vi. 13; Eud. I. vini. 6; and Plato, Republic VI. xviii. foll.

1182 b

γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ διὰ τὴν αύτοῦ φύσιν αἱρετόν· ἢ οῦ τἆλλα μετασχόντα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ.

¹⁰ Πότερον οῦν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεῖ, ἢ οὕ, 12 ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ κοινὸν ἐν ἄπασιν ὑπάρχον ἀγαθόν; ἕτερον γὰρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦτο δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἰδέα χωριστὸν καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό· τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστιν δὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ 15 χωριστῷ. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ είναι ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχοι.

Πότερου οῦν ὑπὲρ τούτου δεῖ λέγειν τἀγαθόῦ τοῦ 13 ἐνυπάρχοντος; ἢ οῦ; διὰ τί; ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ κοινόν, ὡς ὁ ὁρισμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπαγωγή· ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς βούλεται τὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν λέγειν, ἤτοι
 ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὅτι κακὸν ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο ἦ· λέγει δὲ ὁ ὅρος ὅτι τὸ τοιόνδ' ἀγαθὸν καθόλου, ὅ ἂν ἦ αὐτὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἅπασιν ἐνυπάρχον ὅμοιον τῷ ὅρω ἐστίν.

⁶O δέ ὄρος λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἐπιστήμη δέ γε 14 οὐδὲ δύναμις οὐδεμία λέγει ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἄλλης δυνάμεώς 25 ἐστι θεωρῆσαι (οὕτε γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς οὕτε ὁ οἰκοδόμος

^a So in mediaeval times "*universalia ante res*" and "*universalia in re*" became the respective watchwords of Platonic and Aristotehan Schoolmen. (*Cf.* the disputations in the School of Salerno in Longfellow's *Golden Legend*, canto vi.)

^b This is one of the crucial difficulties of Plato's "Theory of Ideas"; discussed very acutely by Plato himself in *Parmenides* cc. i.-vii. See Professor Jackson's paper in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xi.

^c Taking öre as a pronoun. If taken as a conjunction, 452

1182 b

λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγίεια οὐδὲ ἡ οἰκία, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὅ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, καὶ ὡς ποιεῖ, ὅ δ' οἰκίαν)· δῆλον 15 τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ τῆ πολιτικῆ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λε-κτέον τοῦ κοινοῦ. μία γάρ ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς ῆν λέγειν
 οὕτε δυνάμεως οὕτ' ἐπιστήμης ὡς τέλος· οὐδ' ἄρα τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστιν τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

Αλλά μήν οὐδὲ τοῦ κατὰ τήν ἐπαγωγήν κοινοῦ. 18 διὰ τί; ὅτι ὅταν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαί [καί] τι τῶν μέρος ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῷ ὅρισμῷ δείκνυμεν ὅτι ὅ αὐτὸς
³⁵ λόγος ἐφαρμόττει ἐπί τε τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅ ἂν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαι ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τῆ ἐπαγωγῆ, οἶον ὅταν θέλωμεν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἡ μεγαλοψυχία ἐστὶν
1183 a ἀγαθόν, φαμὲν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἁπλῶς ai ἀρεταί, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία ἀρετή, ὥστε καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία ἀγαθόν οὐδὲ δὴ 17 ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον τῆ πολιτικῆ, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀδύνατα συμβήσεται
⁵ τούτψ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὸν ὅρον κοινῷ ἀγαθῷ. ὅτι γὰρ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐρεῖ.

Δήλον τοίνυν ὅτι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀγαθοῦ λε- 18 κτέον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀρίστου τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀρίστου· τὸ δ' ὅλον ἴδοι ἄν τις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν μιῶς οὖτ' ἐπιστήμης οὖτε δυνάμεως τὸ ὑπὲρ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ σκοπεῖν.

Διὰ τί; ὅτι τάγαθὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις 10 ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ 454 thing, nor the builder that a house is a good thing. The former tells us that he produces health, and how he does it : the latter, that he makes a house, and

- 15 how he makes it. No more, then, is social science entitled to speak of the good that is common to good tlings. For she too is a science among the rest; and we have seen that no faculty nor science has the right to predicate goodness of its end. Social science, therefore, is debarred from speaking of that common good which we attribute in defining.
- 16 Not again may it speak of the common good which we predicate as the result of induction; and for this reason. When we wish to designate some individual good thing, we either show by definition that the same description fits the general conception of goodness and what we wish to designate as good; or else we use induction. For instance, when we wish to point out that greatness of soul is a good thing, we declare that justice is a good thing, and courage, and so with all the virtues. But greatness of soul is a virtue; whence it follows that this, too, is a good
- 17 thing. Social science is therefore equally debarred from speaking of the common good we predicate by induction, because the same obstacles will arise as in the case of the common good predicated in definition. Here, as there, the statement that "it is good" would have to be made.
- 18 It is clear, then, that the good of which we have to treat is "the best good," and "the best that is best for us men"; whereas we may lay it down as an obvious general truth, that with the "universal good" no single science or faculty is competent to deal.

The reason is this. "Good" may be predicated in every category : in Substance, Quality, Quantity, 1188 a

^{*} ποσῷ καὶ πότε καὶ πρός τι [καὶ τινὶ] καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν ἁπάσαις. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἐν μὲν ἰατρικῃ ₁₉ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν, ἐν δὲ κυβερνητικῃ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἐκάστῃ δ' ἕκαστος. πότε μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τεμεῖν ὁ 15 ἰατρὸς οἶδεν, πότε δὲ δεῖ πλεῖν ὁ κυβερνήτης. ἐν ἐκάστῃ δὲ τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν εἰδήσει· οὕτε γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ ἐν τῃ κυβερνητικῃ ἀγαθὸν πότε εἰδήσει, οὕτε ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ ἐν ἰατρικῃ. οὐκ ἅρα οὐδ' οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον· τὸ γὰρ πότε ἐν πάσαις κοινόν.

Ομοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πρός τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ 20 20 τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας κοινὸν μὲν ἑπάσαις, οὐδεμιᾶς δ' ἐστὶν οὖτε δυνάμεως οὖτ' ἐπιστήμης εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστη [πότε]' ἀγαθοῦ, οὐδ' αὖ τῆς πολιτικῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀρίστου.

²⁵ "Ισως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμενόν τι δεικνύναι, τοῖς 21 μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. [καὶ] ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτερα. ὅταν οῦν ὑπὲρ τἀγαθοῦ τις ἐγχειρῆ λέγειν, οὐ λεκτέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας. καίτοι οἴονταί γε [δεῖν],³
³⁰ ὅταν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγωσιν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας δεῖν 22 λέγειν. ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ μάλιστα ἀγαθοῦ φασι δεῖν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον μάλιστ ἐστὶν [τὸ] τοιοῦτον,

¹ Omitting $\pi \delta \tau \epsilon$, which has been incorrectly added from § 19.

² Omitting $\delta \epsilon i \nu$ with one MS. (bracketed by Scaliger).

^a For the ten Categories see *Categoriae* c. 4; *Topica*, I. c. 9: also Milton, *Vacation Exercise*, where they are called "the ten sons of *Ens.*"

- 10 Time, Relation, and the rest.^a Now taking goodness of Time, it is obvious that in Medicine, this is known to the Leech; in Navigation, to the Pilot; and in each science, to hun who is proficient therein. The Leech knows when to apply the knife, and the Pilot when to set his sail. In every science, the proficient will know only that goodness or rightness of Time which concerns himself. The Leech will be ignorant of the right time in navigation, and the Pilot of the right time in medicine. Here also it is evident that (no one science) must speak of the " common good " (for goodness in Time is a good common to all the sciences).
- 20Similarly, what is good in Relation to something, and goodness predicated under the other categories, are common to all the sciences ; and no one science nor any one faculty is competent to speak of this goodness which is common to all alike. And of this disability Social science of course partakes; it cannot speak of that " common good." The good of which it does speak is " the best good," and " the best that is best for us men."
- Moreover, when we would make something clear, 21it is presumably best to avoid comparison with what is itself obscure. Rather we should use plain things to illustrate the obseure; and objects of sense to illustrate the objects of intellect, since the former are plainer than the latter. When therefore we undertake to treat of the good, we should not begin with Ideal 22 Good. Yet writers think it incumbent on them, when dealing with the good, to speak of the Ideal. "We must speak," they say," of Good in its perfeetion. Now nothing is seen in perfection except in its

1183 a

ώστε μάλιστ' ἂν εἰη ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς οἴονται.
ό δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἀληθὴς μέν ἐστιν ἴσως ἀλλ' 23
οὐχ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δύναμις, ὑπὲρ ἦς νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τούτου σκοπεῖ τἀγαθοῦ,
35 ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῶν ἀγαθοῦ. [οὐδεμία γὰρ οὕτ' ἐπιστήμη οὕτε δύναμις ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἡ πολιτική.]' διὀ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

'Αλλ' Ισως [φησί] τούτω τάγαθῶ ἀρχῆ χρησά-24 μενος ὑπερ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐκ τούτου προβάς,
1183 b ἐρεῖ. οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς. δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς
οἰκείας λαμβάνειν. ἄτοπον γάρ, εἴ τις βουλόμενος
τὸ τρίγωνον ὡς δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ὕσας ἔχον δεῖξαι,
λάβοι ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος. οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία, 25
δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἰκείαν εἶναι καὶ συνημμένην· νῦν
δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον δείξει τις
δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ὕσας ἔχον τὸ τρίγωνον.
δμοίως δὲ 28
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι θεάσασθαι τὰ ἄλλα ἄνευ
τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ διὸ οὐκ οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν

*Ούκ όρθως δε ούδ' ό Σωκράτης επιστήμας εποίει τας άρετάς. εκείνος γαρ ούδεν φετο δείν μάτην είναι, εκ δε τοῦ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας είναι συνέβαινεν αὐτῶ τὰς ἀρετὰς μάτην είναι. διὰ τί;

¹ Bracketed by Wilson and Susemihl.

² Reading διά το ούκ οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν είναι τοῦτο τἀγαθόν (Bonitz).

^a Contrast with this the view of Ruskin (Mornings in Florence, § 137). In describing the order in which the Arts and Sciences are represented on the Campanile at Florence, he says "After this sculpture" (the Lamb, with the symbol of Resurrection) " come the Christian arts, -those which necessarly imply the conviction of immortality." The first of these arts is Geometry. 458 pure essence. Wherefore the Ideal is the Good 23 m its perfection." Such is their inference; and perhaps they are right. But we are now dealing with the Social science and faculty; and this does not investigate this Ideal Good, but what is good for us men. [For no science or faculty predicates goodness of its end; and Social science is no exception to the rule.] Ideal Good is therefore not the subject of its discourse.

- 24 It is suggested, however, that our science may take this Ideal Good for starting-point, and from it proceed to discuss particular goods. This again is a mistake. We must choose starting-points which are appropriate to the matters in hand. Suppose we desire to prove that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; it would be absend to make the
- 25 immortahty of the soul our starting-point. It is not appropriate; and the starting-point must be both appropriate to the subject and closely connected with it. In the above instance, one can quite well prove that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether the soul be immortal or not.^a
 26 Similarly, in the case of things good, one can investigate the rest of them without reference to the Ideal; seeing that this good is not an appropriate starting-point (for demonstration).

^b Socrates again was in error when he treated the virtues as departments of science. It was his opinion that nothing should be useless; but the consequence of turning the virtues into sciences was to make his virtues useless. And the reason is this. To under-

^b The following passage (with which cf. Eud. I. v.15) seems out of place here, as the "error of Socrates" has been dealt with earlier in the chapter (§ 7).

1183 b

ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει ἅμα εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστι καὶ εἶναι ἐπιστήμονα (εἰ γὰρ ἰατρικήν τις οἶδεν τί ἐστίν, καὶ ἰατρὸς οῦτος εὐθέως ἐστίν, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ¹ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν)· ἀλλ
18 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τοῦτο συμβαίνει. οὐ γὰρ εἴ 27 τις οἶδεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην τί ἐστίν, εὐθέως δίκαιος ἐστίν, ὡς δ' αὖτως κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. συμβαίνει οὖν καὶ μάτην τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμας.*

II. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπερ τούτων διώρισται, πειραθώμεν 1 λέγειν τάγαθὸν ποσαχῶς λέγεται.

²⁰ Έστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μèν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θείον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἶον ψυχή, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, ἡ ἀρχή, τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίμια γὰρ ἐφ' οἶς ἡ τιμή, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις πᾶσιν τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ.
²⁵ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τίμιον, ὅταν γε δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς σπουδαῖός τις γένηται· ἤδη γὰρ οῦτος εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς σχῆμα ἤκει. τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, οἶον ἀρεταί· 2 ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος γίνεται. τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, οίον ἀρχή πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εῦ ἂν δύνηται χρή²⁰ σασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς· διὸ δυνάμεις τὰ τοιαῦτα

¹ Perhaps *kani* should be read.

* i.e. on the supposition that we have merely to know them.

^d For the use of oxipa cf. Philippians ii. 8.

^a Eudemus, in the parallel passage, does not commit this absurdity; but distinguishes accurately between knowledge of a science and proficiency in an art.

^e See Rackham's note on Nic. I. xil. 1.

stand the nature of a science at once makes one a savant. If a man understands the nature of medicine, he is *ipso facto* a physician,^a and so with the other sciences. But this by no means follows in the case of 27 the Virtues – A man does not straightway become just by understanding the nature of justice : and so it is with the rest. The conclusion is that the virtues ^b are useless : wherefore they cannot really be departments of science.

(Cy. Nic. I. vi. and I. vi., vi.)

 II. After thus defining our subject, we will consider Distinction the various senses in which the term "good" is Goodsemployed. (1) reversed.

Now of good things, some are honoured or revered ; others praised or commended; whilst others again are but potentially good. Among things revered 1 reckon the Divine, and higher things in general, such as the soul and mind of man; things ancient or original; and the like. Revered things, in fact, are those which command reverence; and to all the above, and their kind, reverence is attached. Virtue. therefore, is a thing revered, when the possession of it renders a man good; for so he himself assumes 2 the form of virtue,^d On the other hand, the virtues ⁽²⁾ comthemselves are examples of things commended; since praise attends upon the deeds they inspire.^e Other goods, again, are potentialities : as authority, (3) potential, riches, strength, and beauty; for of these the good man has power to make good use, and the bad man

power to make evil use. Hence goods of this kind • Virtue in the abstract is an $\epsilon \pi a u \epsilon r \sigma r$, when embodied in a good man it is a $\tau i \mu a \sigma r$ distinction not found in

Nic. or Eud. (Stock).

1183 b καλοῦνται ἀγαθά. ἀγαθὰ μὲν δὴ εἰσίν (δοκιμάζεται 3 γὰρ τῆ τοῦ σπουδαίου αὐτῶν ἕκαστον χρήσει, οὐ τῆ τοῦ φαύλου)· τοῖς δ' αὐτοῖς τούτοις συμβέβηκεν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἀπὸ τύχης γὰρ καὶ πλοῦτος γίνεται καὶ 35 ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλως ὅσα εἰς δυνάμεως τάξιν ἤκει. λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ σωστικὸν 4 καὶ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, οἶον γυμνάσια ὑγιείας καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

'Αλλ' ἔτι καὶ ἄλλην ἔχει τἀγαθὰ διαίρεσιν· οἰόν ⁵
 ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἰρετά,
 1184 = τὰ δ' οὕ. οἶον ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
 ἀρεταὶ καὶ πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἰρεταί, ἰσχὺς δὲ
 καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ δύναμις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὕτε πάντῃ
 οὕτε πάντως.

["]Ετι καὶ ἄλλως· τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ၒ τέλη τὰ δ' οὐ τέλη, οἶον ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια τέλος, τὰ δὲ ⁵ τῆς ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν οὐ τέλη. καὶ ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει, τούτων ἀεὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον, οἶον ἡ ὑγίεια βέλτιον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινά, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ καθόλου τοῦτο βέλτιον οῦ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

Πάλιν αὐτῶν τῶν τελῶν βέλτιον ἀεἰ τὸ τέλειον 7 τοῦ ἀτελοῦς. τέλειον δέ ἐστιν οῦ παραγενομένου 10 μηθενὸς ἔτι προσδεόμεθα, ἀτελὲς δὲ οῦ παραγενομένου προσδεόμεθα τινός, οἶον τῆς δικαιοσύνης μὲν [μόνον] παραγενομένης πολλῶν προσδεόμεθα, τῆς δὲ εὐδαιμονίας παραγενομένης οὐδενὸς ἕτι προσδεόμεθα. τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἡμῖν ὅ ζητοῦ-

^a This inferior class of goods appears to be identical with the auxiliary good of § 4 above. See Nic. I. vi. 8, 9. 462

- 3 are termed "potentialities." Such potentialities are undoubtedly good things (since in each ease the touchstone is the use made of them by the good man, and not by the bad); they are, however, goods conferred on us by the fortune of birth. For tiches, and authority and all things else that come under this heading of "potentialities" are the gift of fortune.
- ⁴ The fourth and last class of good things comprises (t)auxiliary those which create and preserve some other good ; as, for example, gymnastic exercises which create and preserve health.
- ⁵ There is yet another way in which we may classify Good good things. Some of them we would choose without absolute ind inductive, reservation and under every circumstance; but not others. Justice, for example, and her sister virtues are entirely and under all circumstances worthy of our choice; but with strength and riches and power it is not so.
- 6 Yet another classification of good things is that Good as under ends and means Health, for instance, is an end; End and but those good things we seek for the sake of it are not. In all such cases the end is a higher good than the means, for instance, health and the good things which promote it; and we may lay it down as an universal law that whatever things are sought for the sake of something else are inferior to it.^a
- 7 Again, even among ends a complete end is superior Ends comto a partial one. A complete end is one whose plete and attainment wholly satisfies us ; while the attainment of a partial end leaves us longing for something more. If we attain Justice, there are still many things we desire ; but if we attain Happiness, we are wholly content. Happiness, then, is that "best of human Happiness goods" which is the object of our inquiry. It is a plete End

1184 a

μεν, ο έστι τέλος τέλειον το δε δη τέλειον τέλος τάγαθόν έστι και τέλος των άγαθων.

- ¹⁵ Μετά ταῦτα τοίνυν πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; 8 πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου; ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδή ἐστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντίθεμεν· ἐἀν δὴ τὸ
- 20 βέλτιστον σκοπών καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῆς, ἀὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐσται βέλτιον. αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἐστίν. οἶον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεἰς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκόπει τί τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον βέλτιστον δέ ἐστιν ὑγίεια εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ βέλτιστον.³ ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει. οὐ δὴ 9 ἴσως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον.
- 25 'Αλλά άρά γε ούτω πως, οίον χωρίς αὐτοῦ³; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον; ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν ἔκ τινων ἀγαθῶν συγκειμένη· τὸ δ' ἐξ ῶν ἀγαθῶν σύγκειται, σκοπεῖν εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν βέλτιον, ἄτοπον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τι χωρὶς τούτων ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
- ⁸⁰ 'Αλλ' άρά γε ούτωσί πως αν τις όρθως σκοποίτο 10 συγκρίνων το άριστον; οίον αὐτὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν οῦσαν συγκρίνων προς άλλα ἅ μή ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῆ ἐνόντα, οῦτω το ἀριστον σκοπῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν σκοποίτο; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλοῦν τὸ ἀριστον ὅ ζητοῦμεν νῦν. οίον λέγοι ἀν 35 τις είναι ἀριστον τὴν φρόνησιν ἁπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν

 1 Rassow's emendation of Ms. dyabóv éati kal télos tó dyabóv.

² Reading βέλτιον (Spengel) for MS. βέλτιστον.

³ Stock suggests avrow: "in isolation from the several goods ? "

464

complete end ; and the complete end is " The Good," or best human and the end or goal of all good things.

8 The next question is, how are we to consider this Lappiness a Compound "Best of goods"? Are we to count it as one among the sum the rest? That is absurd. For seeing that the total of human "Best" is a complete end, and this complete end Goods. appears to be simply Happiness and nothing else; and seeing, moreover, that our notion of Happiness is composed of many goods : if in considering "the Best " we reckon it among other goods, it will appear better than itself, since it is in itself best of all. Take the parallel instance of health and the good things which promote it, and consider which of all these is best. Health surely is best; but if it is best " of all these goods," it is better than itself; and this is an 9 absurd conclusion. Accordingly this cannot be the right way to consider the " Best."

Are we, then, to consider it as if in isolation from itself? This too is absurd. Happiness is a compound of certain other good things; and to consider whether the compound is better than its constituent goods is absurd. Happiness is not something isolated from these goods; it is their sum total.

10 Another way of considering "the Best" in comparison with other goods might be suggested. If one took Happiness, the compound of these various goods, and compared it with other goods which do not enter into its composition, would this be the right method of considering it? But we must remember that "the Best" which is the object of our inquiry is a compound, and not a simple thing. On comparing all (simple) goods severally with each other, we might come to the conclusion that wisdom was the

human Good. Happiness

VOL. 11

- ^{1184 a} καθ' εν συγκρινομένων. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως 11 ζητητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ζητοῦμεν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις μόνη οῦσα οὐ τέλειον· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ ἄριστον ὅ ζητοῦμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ οὕτως ἄριστον.
- 1184 b III. Μετά τοίνυν τοῦτο ἔχει τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἄλλην 1 διαίρεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῆ, οἶον αἱ ἀρεταί, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἶον ὑγίεια κάλλος, τὰ δ' ἐκτός, πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμὴ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν ψυχῆ ι βέλτιστα. τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῆ διώρισται ἀγαθὰ εἰς ² τρία, εἰς φρόιτησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.

^{*} Ήδη τοίνυν το μετά τοῦτο, δ καὶ λέγομεν πάντες καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τελειότατον είναι, ή εὐδαιμονία, καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτό φαμεν είναι 10 τδ¹ εῦ πράττειν καὶ εῦ ζῆν. το δὲ τέλος ἐστιν οὐχ 3 ἁπλοῦν ἀλλὰ διττόν· ἐνίων μὲν γάρ ἐστι το τέλος αὐτή ή ἐνέργεια καὶ ή χρῆσις, οἰον τῆς δἰψεως [ἐστιν ή ὅρασις]· καὶ ἔστιν γε ή χρῆσις αἰρετωτέρα τῆς ἔξεως· τέλος γὰρ ή χρῆσις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν βούλοιτο ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν μὴ μέλλων όρῶν ἀλλὰ μύειν. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ῶν 4 15 ἄρα καὶ [ή] χρῆσις καὶ ἕζις ἐστίν, ἀεὶ βέλτιον καὶ

¹ Perhaps τŵ should be read for τὸ Mss.

^a $\phi p \delta v \eta \sigma s$ is here used in the sense of $\sigma \sigma \phi la$ —" Philosophic Thought"—from which it is carefully distinguished in c. xxxiv. 16 below. *Cf. Eud.* I. iv. 2, 3, where three kinds of life— $\phi i \delta \sigma \sigma \phi \sigma$, $\pi \sigma \delta a v \sigma \tau w \delta \sigma$ —are mentioned as pursuing respectively these three kinds of "Good."

⁶ The other kind, which is a product (ϵ_{PYOV}) distinct from the activity which produces it, is here ignored. *okia*, for example, is the ϵ_{PYOV} of the activity *okodóμησis* (Eud. II. i. 5), 466

11 best of them; but this method can hardly lead to the discovery of the "Best of goods," The object of our search is the "Complete Good," and wisdom by itself is not a thing complete. This, then, is not "the Best" which we are seeking, nor do we look for what is in this sense " best."

(Cf. Eud. 11. i. + Na. I. vui.)

III. There is yet another method by which we may Distinction 1 classify good things. Some, like the virtues, belong between goods of to the soul, others, like health and beauty, to the Soul, Body, body, whilst others are external to us--riches, cuinstance, 2 authority, honour and the like. Moreover, those Goods of which belong to the soul have been classed under the Soul: three headings of Wisdom,^a Virtue, and Pleasure.

Happiness, which we all say and believe is the bind Happiness of all good things and the most complete, we may well and doing now proceed to identify with "living well and doing ing well." 3 well." We must premise, however, that "ends" are activity or of two different kinds.^b In some cases, the End of a Use better thing is its activity and use, as with sight : and the or Possesuse is preferable to the mere state or possession, ^e such ^{sion} use being the true End. No man would care to possess sight if instead of seeing he were doomed to keep his eyes shut, and so with hearing and the like. 4 Wherever, therefore, one may use as well as possess something, the use is better than the mere possession,

^c \mathcal{E}_{is} usually = habitus : to give the \mathcal{E}_{is} of a thing is to answer the question $\pi \hat{\omega} s \, \hat{\epsilon} \chi \epsilon i$; quomodo se habel? Hence it is almost equivalent to diabeous (ro mas diakeirai .), though a distinction is made in Categories vin. § 5 (Grant, vol. i. p. 497). Here, however, it is used (as in Eud. VI. (Nic. VII.) c. vii, § 7) rather in the sense of possessio, corresponding to the transitive verb exer. Cf. cc. vii. and xxi. below; and Metaphysics IV. (V.) xx.

and Cit+ (2) Virtue,

1184 b

αίρετώτερον ή χρήσις της έξεως ή γαρ χρήσις και ή ένέργεια τέλος, ή δ' έξις της χρήσεως ένεκεν. Μετά τοῦτο τοίνυν τοῦτ' ἐάν τις σκοπή ἐπὶ τῶν 5

Μετά τοῦτο τοίνυν τοῦτ' ἐάν τις σκοπῆ ἐπὶ τῶν 5 ἐπιστημῶν πασῶν, ὄψεται οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν ποιοῦσαν οἰκίαν, ἄλλην δὲ σπουδαίαν οἰκίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκο-20 δομικήν·καὶ οῦ ποιητικὸς ὁ οἰκοδόμος, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου εῦ ποιητική. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

IV. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν ὅτι οὐθενἱ ἄλλῳ 1 ἢ ψυχῆ ζῶμεν· ἐν ψυχῆ δέ ἐστιν ἀρετή· τὸ αὐτό γέ τοί φαμεν τήν τε ψυχὴν ποιεῦν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς 25 ἀρετήν. ἀλλ ἡ μέν ἀρετὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο ποιεῖ 〈εῦ〉 οῦ ἐστιν ἀρετή,¹ ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ τᾶλλα μέν,³ ψυχῆ δὲ ζῶμεν· διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν ἄρα εῦ ζήσομεν.

Τό δέ γε εῦ ζῆν καὶ εῦ πράττειν οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ τό 2 εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγομεν. τὸ ἄρα εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εῦ ζῆν ἐστίν, τὸ δ' εῦ ζῆν ἐν τῷ 30 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶν τέλος καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

Έν χρήσει τοίνυν τινὶ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐνεργεία ἡ 3 εὐδαιμονία. ὧν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρῆσις, ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξις ἐστίν ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ [ή] χρῆσις αὐτῆς 55 τῶν ἀρετῶν³· ὥστε τέλος ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ

¹ Reading άλλ' ή μέν ἀρετή ἐν ἐκάστω τοῦτο ποιεῖ <εῦ> (Bonitz) <ô ποιεῖ> οῦ ἐστιν ἀρετή.

^a Possibly the words ή δέ ψυχή και τάλλα μέν are corrupt or interpolated (Bonitz).

³ Omitting τῶν ἀρετῶν (Spengel).

^a See note on c. i. 1 above.

^b Sce above, c. iii. 3, and note.

and preferable thereto; for the use of a thing and its mise en action are its true end, for the sake of which we possess it.

Another point which we may now observe in regard Vitue or Excellence 5 to all the arts and sciences is this. A house and a in Claftsgood house are not produced by two different crafts ; man or Craft probut by one and the same craft of architecture ; so duces good that what the architect can build, that his appropriate Work, virtue or excellence a can build well. And so in all other eases.

(Eud. IL i.)

- IV. We next observe that by the soul, and it alone, o Virtue in the Soul 1 we live; and the soul has its own proper excellence produces or virtue. Accordingly, we assert that the thing good Life. which soul produces and the thing which soul's excellence or virtue produces are one and the same. But we have seen that the excellence of anything makes well whatever that thing itself makes. Now soul, [among its other products ?] gives us our life ; wherefore it is through the excellence or virtue of the soul that we shall live well.
- 2 But " living well and doing well " we identify with Happiness Happiness. Happiness and being happy consist there- is Life fore in living well; and living well, in living in accord-according ance with the virtues. This then is "the End," and to Virtue. Happiness, and " the Best."
- Happiness moreover must consist in the use and 3 activity of something (we possess). For we saw that where something is both possessed and used, its use and mise en action are its End. Now Virtue is a possession or disposition b of the soul; but this Virtue can be used, and set in action. The use and activity of Virtue are therefore the End. And so we

1184 b

χρήσις αὐτής· ή εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. ἐπειδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν 4 ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὕτη τέλος καὶ τέλειον τέλος ἐνεργεία,¹ ζῶντες ἂν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαίμονες ἂν εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν.

1185 a

' Επεί δ' ούν έστιν ή ευδαιμονία τέλειον άγαθον 5 και τέλος, ουδέ τοῦτο δει λανθάνειν ὅτι και ἐν τελείω ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γάρ ἐστι παῖς εὐδαίμων), ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρί· οῦτος γὰρ τέλειος.

⁵ Ούδ' ἐν χρόνω γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείω. τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος, ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὀρθῶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῷ χρόνῷ τοῦ βίου κρίνειν, ὡς δέον τὸ τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῷ τελείῷ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

⁶ Ότι δὲ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ὕδοι ἄν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν. 6 10 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις, οἶον εἴ τις καθεύδοι διὰ βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πάνυ βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὅ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέλλον λέγεσθαι οὔτε λίαν δόξειεν 7 15 ἅν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τούτων οὔτε μακρὰν ἀπέχον. οἶον ἐπειδήπερ ἔστιν, ὡς δοκεῦ, μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ῷ τρεφόμεθα, ὅ καλοῦμεν θρεπτικόν (τοῦτο γὰρ εὕλογόν ἐστιν εἶναι· τοὺς γοῦν λίθους ὅρῶμεν ἀδυνάτους τρέφεσθαι ὄντας, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τῶν

¹ Or reading, with Stock, *ivépyeta*, "and this is an end; and the complete end is an activity."

^b § 3 above. *Uf.* c. xix. below. 470

^a Attributed to Solon by Herodotus (I. 33). Cf. Nic. I. x. I, Eud. II. i. 10.

see that Happiness consists in living in accordance 4 with the virtues. Since, therefore, the "Best good" is Happiness, and this in its activity is an End and a Complete End: by living in accordance with the virtues we shall be happy and shall possess the "Best of goods."

⁵ Again : seeing that Happiness is a Complete Good ^{9uch a Life} and End, we must further admit that it must dwell in (1) ^{requires} a complete being. It cannot dwell in a child, for a of ^{Soul}, child does not enjoy full happiness ; but only in adult man, since he has attained completeness.

Nor can it be realized in an incomplete period of (2) Length time, but only in one that is complete; such a period is ^{of Days}; the normal span of human life. The common saying ^a that we must judge of a man's happiness from the longest portion of his life is a true one; since completeness ean only be realized in a period and in a human being that are themselves complete.

⁶ That Happiness is an activity is plain from another ⁽³⁾ Waking consideration. Supposing a man to pass all his life in $\frac{Connectine-Connectine-Connectine$ slumber; we should certainly refuse to regard hum ashappy. Life indeed he possesses, but not life inaccordance with the virtues; for this we took to belife in their active exercise.^b

(Cf. Nic. I. siii, 11-14 : Eud. II. 1, 15-18.)

7 What we are now about to add might be regarded The nublas not specially germane to the subject; yet it will of the Soul, prove to be closely connected therewith. Apparently lacking there is a part of the soul to which, as the instrument live annot of our bodily nutrition, we give the name of "nutritive." (That there is reason for surmising such a part Happiness, may be shown as follows. We notice that minerals are unable to nourish themselves, so that this faculty

1185 a εμψύχων εστι το τρέφεθαι· εί δε τῶν εμψύχων, ή 20 ψυχή ῶν εἰη αἰτία· τῆς δε ψυχῆς τούτων μεν τῶν 8 μορίων οὐθεν αιτιον ῶν εἴη τοῦ τρέφεσθαι, οἶον το λογιστικον ἢ το θυμικον ἢ το επιθυμητικόν, ἄλλο δε τι παρά ταῦτα, ῷ οὐθεν ἔχομεν οἰκειότερον ὄνομα επιθεῖναι ἢ θρεπτικόν)· τί οῦν, ἄν τις εἴποι, 9 πότερον καὶ τούτου τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν 25 ἀρετή; εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτῃ δεήσει ενεργεῖν· τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ενέργεια εὐδαιμονία.

Εἰ μέν οῦν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τούτου ἢ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλος λόγος εἰ δ' ἄρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ταύτης ἐνέργεια. ῶν γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ὅρμή, οὐδ' ἐνέργεια τούτων ἕσται οὐκ ἔοικεν δὲ εἶναι ὅρμὴ ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτω, ἀλλ'
⁸⁰ ὅμοιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῷ πυρί. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὅ τι ἂν ἐμβάλῃς καταναλώσει, κἂν μὴ ἐμβάλῃς, οὐκ ἔχει ὅρμὴν πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν. οῦτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐμβάλῃς τροφήν, τρέψει, ἂν δὲ μὴ ἐμβάλῃς τροφήν, οὐκ ἔχει ὅρμὴν τοῦ τρέφειν. διὸ οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια οῦ μηδὲ ὅρμή. ῶστ'
⁸⁵ οὐδὲν συνεργεῖ τὸ μόριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

΄ Μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν λεκτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἐστιν ἡ 10 ἀρετή, ἐπείπερ ἡ ταύτης ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὡς μὲν οῦν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ

¹ ^b Cf. Nic. VI. = Eud. V. xil. 6. 472

^a These three parts of the soul are distinguished by Plato logically in the *Republic*, IV. pp. 436-441; mythologically, under the figure of a Charioteer and two horses, in the *Phaedrus*, pp. 246 foll.; and physiologically in the *Timaeus*, pp. 69, 70 (Stephanus).

is clearly confined to animate beings. If this is so, its 8 cause is to be sought in soul. Now none of those parts of soul which we term "rational," "passionate," or "desirous "a can be the cause of nutrition, but some other element; to which we can give no more ap-9 propriate name than this of "nutritive.") Now we may be asked whether this part of the soul also possesses its proper excellence or virtue; "since if it does, there must be activity here also, seeing that Happiness is activity of the complete excellence or virtue of the soul."

Now whether this element possesses such an excellence of its own or not is the subject of a different inquiry; but even if it does, this excellence would not be capable of activity.^b Only those things which are subject to spontaneous impulse ^c are capable of true activity : and it seems that this part of the soul feels no such impulse; herein resembling fire. Fire devours what we throw into it; but what we withhold, it feels no impulse to take. So it is with the nutritive element of soul. If we throw it nourishment, it nourishes (the body) therewith; but if we refrain, it feels no impulse to do so. So, then, that which lacks spontaneous impulse lacks also activity; and therefore this part of the soul makes no contribution towards Happiness.^d

10 We must now consider what Virtue is, since it is Virtue in activity which constitutes Happiness. In general, Virtue or Excellence may be defined as the

° $\delta\rho\mu\eta$, a word used occasionally by Nic. and Eud. ; as later by the Stores.

⁴ For the Nutritive part of the Soul *cf. De Anima* II. iv., where its difference from fire is emphasized : also De Inima III. ix. 2, where it is attributed to plants in common with animals.

473

^{1185 μ} έξις ή βελτίστη· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἰκανὸν οὕτως ἅπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.

- 1185 ^b V. Πρώτον μέν οὖν λεκτέον ὑπέρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν 1 ἡ ἐγγίνεται, οὐ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ (ὑπὲρ μὲν γὰρ τούτου ἄλλος λόγος), ἀλλ' ὡς τύπῳ διελέσθαι. ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύο μέρη διηρημένη, ⁵ εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ αῦται αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἤθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ εἶναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα·κατὰ ² δὲ τὰς τοῦ [τὸν] λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεἰς ἐπαινεῖται. ¹⁶ οὕτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεἰς ἐπαινεῖται, οὕτε ὅτι
 - φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅλως κατά τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἄλογον, εἰ μὴ ῇ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστιν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι μορίω.

ύπηρετεί τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι μορίῳ. "Εστιν δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ 3 ὑπερβολῆς φθειρομένη. ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἔνδεια καὶ ἡ 15 ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν (δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι). εὐθέως γὰρ ἐπὶ γυμνασίων ἴδοι αν τις.

¹ Reading alothytŵv (Susemihl) for $\eta \theta i \kappa \hat{\omega} v$ MSS. Cf. I. i. 21.

^a Cf. Eud. II. i. 2; and see note on Ess, c. iii. 3 above.

^b This inquiry is carried out in Aristotle's treatise DeAnima (II ϵpl $\psi v \chi \hat{\eta} s$), in three Books.

^o For λόγοs see c. i. 7 above, and note.

⁴ For a_{YX} loose De Virtutibus et Vitiis c. iv. § 2. The word seems not to be used by Nic. or Fud.

^o Cf. c. ii. 1, 2 above.

^t The author here differs both from Nic. (I. xiii, 20) and Eud. (II. i. 19), who assign praise to intellectual as well as to 474

best state or disposition of a thing.^a But this general definition is hardly adequate, and needs to be made more particular.

(Cf Eud. II i. 15 foll.)

V. We must hegin then by saying something of the The rational and ir. 1 soul, in which Virtue arises; not defining its nature, rational for this is the subject of another inquiry "; but Parts of the Soul, describing in outline its constituent parts. Now these and their have been ranged under two headings, namely the states. rational and the irrational. In the rational part arise Prudence, Shrewdness," Wisdom, Aptitude, Memory, and the like ; while in the irrational part arise these states or dispositions which we call Virtues : namely Temperance, Justice, Courage, and all other states 2 of character which are considered praiseworthy. For "Virtuas" it is in respect of these that we men are said to commonly deserve praise "; whereas no one receives praise in are States respect of the excellences of his rational nature. No of the man is commended for being wise or prudent nor in Soul, and respect of any kindred state of soul.⁷ On the other Commenda hand, praise is not given to the irrational part except tion. in so far as it is qualified to be subservient to the rational, and does actually subserve it.

(Nic. II. ii, 6, 7.)

3 Now Excellence of Character or Virtue is liable to Moral Virtue be injured either by defect or by excess. That both other by are alike destructive to it, is clear from the evidence Excess or by Dofect of our senses ; and we must use the testimony of what of Feelings. Is plain to interpret what is obscure. One need go no further than gynmastic exercises for an example ;

moral excellence. Moreover in c. xxxiv. 12 below we are told that the prudent do merit pruise.

1185 b

πολλών γαρ γινομένων φθείρεται ή ίσχύς, όλίγων τε ώσαύτως. έπί τε ποτών και σιτίων ώσαύτως. πολλών τε γάρ δή γινομένων φθείρεται ή ύγίεια. 20 δλίγων τε ώσαύτως, συμμέτρων δε γινομένων σώζεται ή ίσχυς και ή ύγίεια. όμοίως δε τούτοις 4 συμβαίνει και έπι σωφροσύνης και έπι ανδρείας και τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ἐὰν μὲν γάρ τινα λίαν ποιήσης άφοβον, ώστε μηδε τούς θεούς φοβείσθαι, ούκ ²³ άνδρεῖος άλλὰ μαινόμενος, ἂν δὲ φοβούμενον πάντα, δειλός άνδρείος άρα έσται ούτε ό φοβούμενος πάντα ούτε ό μηθέν. ταύτ' άρα και αύξει και φθείρει την άρετήν. και γαρ οι λίαν φόβοι και πάντες' φθεί- 5 ρουσι, καί οί περί μηθέν δε όμοίως. έστιν δ' ή άνδρεία περί φόβους, ώστε οι μέτριοι φόβοι αύξουσι 80 την ανδρείαν. ύπο των αυτων άρα και αυξεται και φθείρεται ή ανδρεία· ύπο φόβων γαρ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. δμοίως δέ και αι άλλαι αρεταί.

VI. "Ετι οὐ μόνον τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν ἀρετὴν 1 ἀφορίσειεν ἄν τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῃ. διὰ
³⁵ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα· ὅλως τε οἰκ ἔστιν λαβεῖν ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
⁶ Η δ' ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐντεῦθεν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, 2
εἰ δεῖ παρὰ γράμμα λέγοντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὡς ἔχει

1188 a σκοπείν (δεί δ' ίσως). το γαρ ήθος από τοῦ έθους ¹ Reading παντός (Spengel) for πάντες MSS.

476

since alike by their excess and by their defect the strength of the body is injured. So too with food and drink : too much or too little of them is injurious to health, but when they are used in appropriate measure, health and strength are preserved.

- 4 The same results follow in the case of Temperance, Courage, and the other virtues. Suppose a man so excessively fearless that he fears not even the gods; he is not courageous but mad. Suppose a man fears everything; he is a coward The courageous man, therefore, is neither he who fears everything nor he who fears nothing. It follows that Virtue is enhanced
- 5 and injured by the same influences. For excessive fears, and fears excited by everything alike, injure Courage; and so does their absence even when there is due cause for them. Yet fears are the field wherein Courage works; so that fear in moderation actually enhances it. Courage, therefore, is both enhanced and injured by the same influences; such being the effect of (different degrees of) fear on the human soul. And so with the other virtues.

(Nic, 11. in.)

1 VI. These, however, are not the only terms in which Moral Virtue can be defined; we can also define it in terms ^{Virtue deals} of pain and pleasure. For pleasure incites us to do Pleasure ill, while pain deters us from doing well; and we may ^{and Pains.} lay it down that to become either virtuous or vicious without pain or pleasure is impossible. Virtue, therefore, is concerned with pleasures and pains.

(Nic. II, i.: Eud. II. ii.)

² If in our consideration of "ethic" virtue we are to It is not keep close, as perhaps we should do, to the literal inatio, but habitual. meaning of the word, we shall remark that it takes its

1186 a

⁶ έχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἠθικὴ γὰρ καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι. ῷ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἡμῖν τῶν ³ ἀρετῶν τῶν τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους φύσει ἐγγίνεται.
⁵ οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων φύσει ἕθει ἄλλως γίνεται.
οἶον ὁ λίθος καὶ ὅλως τὰ βαρέα πέφυκε κάτω φέρεσθαι. ἄν τις οῦν ἄνω ῥίπτῃ πολλάκις καὶ ἐθίζῃ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὅμως οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄνω ἐνεχθείη, ἀλλ ἀεὶ κάτω.

VII. Μετά τοίνυν τοῦτο δεί βουλομένους εἰπείν 1 τό τί έστιν ή άρετή, είδησαι τίνα έστιν τὰ έν τη 10 ψυχή γινόμενα, έστιν δ' & γίνεται ταῦτα, πάθη δυνάμεις έξεις ωστε δήλον ότι τούτων άν τι είη ἀρετή. πάθη μέν οῦν ἐστιν ὀργὴ φόβος μίσος πόθος 2 ζήλος έλεος τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἶς εἴωθεν παρακολουθεῖν λύπη και ήδονή δυνάμεις δε καθ' ας παθητικοί 16 τούτων λεγόμεθα, οΐον καθ' ας δυνατοί έσμεν όργισθήναι λυπηθήναι έλεήσαι, [καί] τὰ τοιαῦτα· έξεις δ' είσιν καθ' άς πρός ταῦτα έχομεν εῦ η 3 κακῶς, οἶον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν λίαν όργίλως, κακώς έχομεν πρός όργήν, εί δ' όλως μή όργιζόμεθα έφ' οἶς δεῖ, καὶ οὕτως κακῶς ἔχομεν 20 πρός δργήν. τὸ ắρα μέσως ἔχειν τὸ μήτε λίαν ύπεραλγείν μήτε παντελώς άναλγήτως έχειν. όταν 4 οῦν οῦτως ἔχωμεν, εὐ διακείμεθα. ὁμοίως δὲ [καί]

^a Grant, in the corresponding passage of Nic., translates these three terms by "feelings, faculties, states." Rackham gives "feelings, capacities, dispositions," and uses "states" to include them all. See note on c. in. 3 above. 478 name from "*ēthos*" or habit; it is called "ethie" 3 because we attain it by habituation. This makes it clear that none of these virtues of our irrational nature is born in us; for no innate quality can by habituation be altered. For example, stones and heavy bodies in general naturally tend downwards; and though one were to habituate them to the contrary movement by repeatedly throwing them upwards, still they would never come of themselves to tend upwards, but would retain their downward tendency. And so it is in all such cases.

(Nic, H. v., vi. : Eud. H. n., in.)

- VII. Furthermore, if we would explain the essential Phenonuma 1 nature of Virtue, we must make ourselves acquainted of Boul with the phenomena that arise in the soul. They are Fooling; of three kinds: feelings or affections, powers or faculties, and states or dispositions.^a Clearly, then, 2 Virtue must fall under one of these headings. Now among feelings we have anger, fear, hatred, longing, envy, pity, and the like; and these are all accompanied by pain or pleasure. Faculties, again, are the Faculty; potentialities by which we are said to be capable of these feelings : the potentialities of anger, grief, pity, 3 and the like. Lastly, states or dispositions are the State. conditions of soul which render us well or ill disposed in regard to the affections. For instance, if we are too much disposed to anger, our disposition is a bad one as regards that affection; nor is it otherwise if we fail to conceive anger when due occasion arises. The mean or middle state is thus one which avoids excess of emotion on the one hand, and entire 4 insensibility on the other. When, therefore, such is
- our state of soul, (as regards anger) our disposition is

1186 a πρός τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὅμοια. τὸ γὰρ εὐόργητον καὶ τό πράον έν μεσότητί έστιν όργης και άναλγησίας τής πρός δργήν. δμοίως [καί] $\epsilon \pi$ αλαζονείας καί 25 είρωνείας. τὸ μέν γὰρ πλείω προσποιεῖσθαι τῶν ύπαρχόντων έχειν άλαζονείας, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττω εἰρωνείας. ή άρα μεσότης ή τούτων ή αλήθεια έστίν. VIII. 'Ομοίως και έπι των άλλων πάντων. τουτο 1 γάρ έστι της έξεως, τὸ εῦ η κακῶς πρὸς ταῦτα έχειν, τὸ δ' εῦ έχειν πρὸς ταῦτ' ἐστίν τὸ μήτε πρὸς 30 την ύπερβολην έχειν μήτε πρός την ένδειαν πρός 2 μεσότητα άρα των τοιούτων καθ' ά έπαινετοί λεγόμεθα ή έξις έστι τοῦ εἶ έχειν, τοῦ δὲ κακῶς πρός ύπερβολήν και ένδειαν. έπει τοίνυν έστιν ή άρετή των παθών τούτων μεσότης, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἤτοι λυπαί είσιν η ήδοναι η ούκ άνευ λύπης η ήδονης. $_{35}$ ή ἄρα ἀρετή ἐστιν' περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ έντεῦθέν ἐστι δήλον.

"Εστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν τινι, ἐφ' 3 ὡν ἡ κακία οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἐλλείψει τινί, οἶον μοιχεία καὶ ὁ μοιχός· οὐκ ἔστιν οῦτος ὁ 1188 μ μᾶλλον τὰς ἐλευθέρας διαφθείρων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτόν ἐστίν, ὃ περιέχεται ἡδονῆ τῆ κατ' ἀκολασίαν, ἢ καὶ ὃ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ὅ ἐν ὑπερβολῆ τὸ ψεκτὸν ἔχει.*

¹ Reading, with Bonitz, ori for coriv.

⁸ Reading έν αύτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἐλλείψει η̈ ἐν ὑπερβολη̈ τὸ ψεκτὸν ἔχει (after Susemihl) for ŋ̈ καὶ ὅ . . . ἔχει of Mss.

good; and similarly as regards the other feelings. For whereas gentleness of temper and mildness are a mean state between wrathfulness and insensibility to anger, so it is with boastfulness and self-depreciation. To overrate one's endowments is the part of the former, to dissemble them, the part of the latter; so that it is the just mean between these two which constitutes sincerity.

VIII. What we have said holds good of all the other A good 1 affections. The state of our soul determines whether State of Soni tends our disposition regarding them be good or bad ; and to Modera tion in a good disposition is one which avoids alike their Feelings. 2 excess and their defect. And so the state or disposition which we call good is one which tends to moderation in those feelings whose control entitles us to praise ; while the opposite state is one tending either to excess therein or to defect. Since, then, Virtue is a just mean or moderation of these affections; and the affections are either themselves pains or pleasures or else are accompanied by pain or pleasure : it follows from these considerations also that Virtue is concerned with pains and with pleasures.

(Nic. II. vi. 18-20; Eud. H. iii. 17, 18.)

It might, however, appear to some that there are some 3 other affections whose evil does not lie in any excess or revicious defect. They instance adultery,^a and the adulterer. in them. The adulterer, they say, cannot be described as one merely in who debauches free women "to excess." But this their Excess or affection, and any other which falls under the heading Detect. of intemperate pleasure, incurs censure in itself, and not by its defect or excess.

selves, not

" Cf. St. Matthew v. 28. In the corresponding passage, Nicomachus distinguishes between the cvil passion or affection, and the evil act which consummates it.

VOL. II

1186 b

1X. Μετὰ τοίνυι τοῦτο ἀναγκαιόν ἐστιν ἴσως 1 ⁵ ἡηθήναι τί τῆ μεσότητι ἀντίκειται, πότεροι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἢ ἡ ἕνδεια. ἐνίαις μὲν γὰρ μεπότησιν ἐνδεια ἐναντίον, ἐνίαις δὲ ὑπερβολή, οἶον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οῦσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔνδεια οῦσα, τῆ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ μεσότητι οὕση ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ ἡδοι'ὰς οὐ 10 δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οῦσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία οῦσα ὑπερβολή.

"Εστι δ' ἀμφότερα ἐναντία τῆ μεσότητι, καὶ ἡ 2 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἕιδεια· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς ἐνδεέστερον, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ὑπερβάλλον. διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄσωτοι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἀνελευ-10 θέρους φασὶν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἀνελεύθεροι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἀσώτους, καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς καὶ προπετεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρείους καλοῦσι δειλούς, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους προπετεῖς καὶ μαινομένους.

Διὰ δὴ δύο αἰτίας δόξαιμεν ἂν ἀντιτιθέναι τῆ 3 μεσότητι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειαν. ἢ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος σκοποῦσιν πότερον ἐγ-20 γύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ μέσου ἢ πορρώτερον, οἶον ἐλευθεριότητι πότερον ἀσωτία ἢ ἀνελευθερία πορρώτερον. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἐλευθεριότης ἡ ἀσωτία ἢ ἡ ἀνελευθερία· πορρώτερον ἄρα ἡ ἀνελευθερία. τὰ δὲ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα τοῦ μέσου 4 ἐναντιώτερα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. ἐκ μὲν ἄρα αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔνδεια ἐναντιώτερον φαίνεται.

^{. &}lt;sup>a</sup> Cf. Isaiah xxwi, 5 "The foolish person shall no more be called liberal nor the niggard wealthy." 482

(Mir. II. ym., is)

1X. After this we ought perhaps to consider what one Ł is the true opposite of this just mean -1s if the excess $\frac{E_{\rm extreme}}{\max b_0}$ of the feeling, or its defect? In some cases it is the more former, in others the latter The opposite of courage. opposed to for instance, is not rashness, which is the excess of an than the affection, but cowardice, which is its defect. On the other hand, whereas temperance is a mean betwist intemperance or profligacy and insensibility to pleasures, we do not regard this latter, which is a defect of feeling, as its true opposite, but the former, which is feeling in excess.

- (Strictly speaking,) however, both excess and 2 defect are opposite to the just mean ; for the mean is defective in comparison with the excess, and excessive in comparison with the defect. Wherefore while the prodigal stigmatizes the liberal as illiberal and mean, the mean call the hberal man a prodigal.⁴ Again, the rash and headlong call brave men cowards, while cowards say that the brave are headlong and crazy.
- 3 It seems, then, that there are two reasons which Distance influence us in assigning to the just mean the excess mean may or the defect as its opposite. On the one hand, men be naturally guater, consider the thing itself, and ask which extreme is nearer to the mean or further from it. For example, is produgality or meanness further removed from liberality ? Surely it is easier to confuse prodigality than meanness with true liberality; and so in this 4 case meanness is the further removed. And what is further removed from the muddle state is naturally regarded as more opposed to it. So that here from the purely objective standpoint it appears that the defect is more opposed to the mean than is the excess.

other is

483

1186 b

"Εστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, οἶον πρὸς ἅ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ. οἶον πεφύκαμεν μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστοι ἢ κόσμιοι εἶναι· ἡ οῦν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἅ πεφύκαμεν· πρὸς ἅ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οὸς ἅ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα· ὥστ' ἐναντιώτερον ἂν εἴη ὑπερ-βολὴ μεσότητος· ἡ γὰρ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ σωφροσύνης.

⁶ Τι μέν οῦν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, ἐπέσκεπται (μεσότης 5 γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τῶν παθῶν, ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὸν 85 μέλλοντα κατὰ τὸ ἡθος εὐδοκιμήσειν τὴν μεσότητα τῶν παθῶν ἑκάστου διατηρεῖν· διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶν σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἑκάστῷ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν 6 ἔργον, οἶον κύκλον μὲν γράψαι παντὸς ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη λαβεῖν χαλεπόν, ὁμοίως

1187 κ δὲ καὶ ὀργισθῆναὶ μὲν ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δὲ τούτῳ, τὸ δὲ μέσως ἔχειν χαλεπόν· ἁπλῶς δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν παθῶν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἐμπεριέχον τὸ μέσον ῥάδιον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπόν, καθ' ὅ ἐπαινούμεθα· διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον).

⁵ Ἐπεί δ' οὖν ὑπερ ἀρετῆς εἴρηται * *, μετὰ τοῦτ' 7 ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον πότερον δυνατὴ παραγενέσθαι ἢ οὖ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησίν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὁντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο

¹ Some editors suspect a lacuna. Ramsauer inserts $\langle \tau i$ $\dot{\epsilon} \sigma \tau i \rangle$, "Having thus explained the nature of Virtue."

^a As Rackham observes on Nic. II. viii. 8, we should expect "insensibility" (*àvaioθησla*) which is the opposite extreme, rather than "sobriety," which is the mean. 484

Another standpoint is, however, possible, from which on it may the extreme to which we are by nature more inclined in our own appears more opposed to the mean For example, Proclivity. we are naturally more inclined to profligacy than to sobriety.^a Now our trend is more in the direction of our natural bias : and that towards which we trend is more opposed to the mean Now we do in fact trend more towards profligacy than towards sobriety ; so that excess over the mean is here the more opposed (to it). For profligacy is the excess where temperance is the mean.

We have thus surveyed the nature of Virtue. We Difficulty of 5 find it to be a just mean or moderation of our feelings attaining the Mean. or affections; so that he who would be esteemed for his moral character must preserve moderation in

6 every one of them. It is thus no small task to be a good man, since the middle position is always difficult to find. Anyone may draw a circle ; but to find the centre of a given circle is difficult. Similarly, it is easy to be angry, and easy to be indifferent; the middle state is difficult to attain. And of all our affections it is true that whereas to stray right or left is easy enough, to keep the middle or mean state, which alone entitles us to praise, is a difficult matter. And this makes goodness rare.

(Cf. Nic. III. v.)

Having thus treated of Virtue, we may next pro- Can Virtue 7 ceed to consider whether it can be inculcated, or be taught? whether on the contrary Socrates was right in saying View of that to be good men or bad is placed beyond our own Socrates. power. Should any man whatsoever, he declares, be asked whether he would prefer to be just or unjust,

1187 n

¹⁰ δίκαιος είναι η άδικος, ούθεις αν έλοιτο την άδικίαν, δμοίως δ' έπ' άνδρείας και δειλίας και των άλλων 8 άρετων άει ώσαύτως. δηλον δ' ώς εί φαῦλοί τινες εἰσίν, οὐκ αν έκόντες είησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δηλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.

⁶Ο δη τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. διὰ τί 9 γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐκ ἐặ τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ ¹⁵ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κελεύει; καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς φαύλοις ζημίαν τάττει, ἂν πράττῃ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἂν μη πράττῃ; καίτοι ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ä μη ἐφ' ήμῖν ἐστι πράττειν. ἀλλ' ὡς 10 ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ήμῖν τὸ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαύλοις. —ἔτι δὲ μαρτυροῦσω οἴ τ' ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι ²⁰ γινόμειοι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῃ ἀρετῃ ἕπαινος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῃ κακία ψόγος· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ὡσαύτως¹ ἐφ' ήμῖν καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖά ἐστι πράττειν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα.

^{*}Ελεγον δὲ καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ παραβολήν, βουλό- 11 μενοι δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον. διὰ τί γάρ, ²⁵ φασίν, ὅταν νοσῶμεν ἢ αἰσχροὶ ῶμεν, οὐδεἰς ψέγει τοὺς τοιούτους; τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀληθές· ψέγομεν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, ὅταν αὐτοὺς οἰηθῶμεν αἰτίους είναι τοῦ νοσείν ἢ τοῦ κακῶς ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα, ὡς ὃν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐκούσιον. ἔοικεν οὖν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν είναι τὸ ἑκούσιον.

¹ Or, reading with the Laurentian MS. Kal $o\tilde{v}\tau ws$ instead of $\omega\sigma a\tilde{v}\tau ws$, "on this ground also it is clear that to do well and to do ill are both within our power."

^a Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia III. 1x. έφη τά τε δίκαια και πάντα όσα άρετ] πράττεται καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ είναι· καὶ οὐτ ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα είδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδἐν προελέσθαι οὕτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττει· . . . 486

- 8 none would choose injustice." And so with courage and cowardice, and all other vutues (and vices); the rule is universal. If there are bad men, it is clear that they cannot be bad of their own will; and so it is clear that they cannot of their own will be good,
- 9 Such an argument is surely fallacions. For why Anneal to does the legislator forbid us to do evil and order us to Law and do what is honourable and good, assessing penalties Usage for the commission of the one and the neglect of the other? Surely it were absurd of him to enjoin by
- 10 law what is beyond our power to fulfil. On the contrary, it would seem within our power to be good men or bad; and further testimony is borne to this by the praises and censures which are meted out to us. Praise is the meed of virtue, and censure of vice ; and these are not assigned to things which our will does not control. It is clear, then, that to do well and to do ill are alike within our power.

(Nic. 11I. v. 15.)

To prove that virtue and vice are beyond our con-11 trol, use was made of the following comparison. Why, it was asked, does no one censure us when we are sick or ugly ? There is, however, a mistake here. We do censure the sick and ugly when we are of opinion that they are themselves the cause of their physical disease or deformity; regarding the will as concerned even here. It seems, therefore, that there is a voluntary element in the virtuous or vicious life.

The author here gives a one-sided presentation of Socrates' view. He held that vice is ignorance, and that ignorance is involuntary; yet he did not deny the possibility of learning. Cicero (Academica II, 74) similarly misrepresents him when he says : Socrati nihil visum est sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, nihil amplius.

4.87

1187 a

³⁰ X. "Ετι δ' άν τις τοῦτο ἐναργέστερον καὶ ἐν-1 τεῦθεν ἕδοι. πῶσα γὰρ φύσις γεννητική ἐστιν οὐσίας τοιαύτης οἶα ἐστίν, οἶον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα· ἀμφότερα γὰρ γεννητικά. γεννητικὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἶον τὸ δένδρον ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος· αὕτη γάρ τις ἀρχή. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς οὕτως ἔχει·
³⁵ ὡς γὰρ ἂν ἔχωσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἔχει. ἐναργέστερον δ' ἔστι κατιδεῖν τοῦτο² ἐν τοῖς κατὰ γεωμετρίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐπειδή τινες λαμβάνονται ἀρχαί, ὡς ἂν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἔχωσιν, οῦτω καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς, οἶον εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἕσας ἔχει, τὸ δὲ τετράγωνον τέτταρσιν,
¹¹⁸⁷ ʰ καὶ ὡς ἂν μεταβάλλῃ τὸ τρίγωνον, οὕτω καὶ τὰ εὰν τὸ τετράγωνον μὴ ἔχῃ τέτταρσιν ὀρθαῖς ἕσας, οὐδὲ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔζει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἕσας.

 XI. Ούτώ τοίνυν καὶ ὁμοίως τούτοις καὶ ἐπ' 1
 ἐ ἀνθρώπου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γεννητικόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος οὐσίας, ἔκ τινων ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν πράξεων ῶν πράττει ἄνθρωπος γεννητικὸν ἐστίν. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο;
 οὕτε γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν λέγομεν πράττειν οὕτε τῶν ἐμψύχων τῶν ἄλλων ἔξω ἀνθρώπων. δῆλον οῦν
 ὅ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πράξεών ἐστι γεννητικός. ἐπεὶ 2
 10 οῦν ὁρῶμεν μεταβαλλούσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πράττομεν, εἰσὶν δὲ αἱ πράξεις γεγενημέναι ἔκ τινων ἀρχῶν, δῆλον ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ αἱ

¹ I would suggest transposition of $dratorpé \phi ai \gamma d\rho$ to the end of the paragraph, rendering: "... change in the quadrilateral. And if the angles of the quadrilateral are not equal to four right angles, those of the corresponding triangle will not be equal to two. For they are conversely related."

^a The geometrical *principia* are of course not really liable to change; but for the sake of illustration the author (as 488

(Eud. II. vi.)

1 X. A still clearer proof of this may be derived from Like Conthe following considerations. Every natural growth, sequences whether plant or animal, has the power of producing from the from the from the from the from the second sec and they produce from the originating cause or principium. Such in the tree, for example, is the seed from which it grows Of what succeeds these principia, it always holds good that the character of

- 2 the principia determines that of the produce. Light 11 the Cause is thrown on this by a geometrical comparison In so does geometry, when we assume certain principia, their the Concharacter determines that of all their consequences. If we assume that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the angles of a quadrilateral will be equal to four right angles : and any change in the triangle a produces a corresponding change in the quadrilateral which is its counterpart. And (conversely), if the angles of the quadrilateral are not equal to four right angles, those of the corresponding triangle will not be equal to two.
- 1 XI. Now the case of man is closely parallel. Man The human has the power of producing or creating ; and among Cauve of other things he produces, from certain originating Action. causes or principia, his deeds and actions. For what else (has this power)? True action cannot be ascribed to any inanimate substance, nor to any animate being except man; clearly, therefore, it is man who has this power of originating actions.
- Now we see that actions are liable to change, and Human 2 that we constantly act in different ways. As, there-changeable. fore, our acts have originated from certain principia, Eudemus in the corresponding passage) supposes that they are, and imagines a triangle of 3 or 4 right angles! (Eud. 11. vi. 6).

sequence.

1187 b πράξεις μεταβάλλουσιν, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πράξεων, ἀφ' ῶν εἰσί, μεταβάλλουσιν, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν παρα-15 βάλλοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρία. ἀρχή δ' ἐστὶ 3 πράξεως καὶ σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης προαίρεσις καὶ βούλησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ αῦται μεταβάλλουσιν. μεταβάλλομεν δέ' καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐκόντες· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρχή [καὶ]² ἡ προαίρεσις μεταβάλλει [γὰρ]³ ἐκουσίως. ὥστε ²⁰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῦν ἂν εἴη καὶ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ φαύλοις.

^{*}Ισως οῦν λέγοι ἀν τις, ἐπειδήπερ ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν ± τὸ δικαίω εἶναι καὶ σπουδαίω, ἐὰν βούλωμαι, ἔσομαι πάντων σπουδαιότατος. οὐ δὴ δυνατὸν τοῦτο. διὰ τί; ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γίγνεται τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ ἀν τις βούληται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ
²⁵ σώματος, καὶ δὴ πάντων ἄριστον ἔξει τὸ σῶμα. δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μόνον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆ φύσει γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα καλὸν κἀγαθόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν ἔξει τὸ σῶμα, ἄριστα μέντοι πάντων οὕ. ὅμοίως δὲ δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς. 5 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὅ προαιρούμενος εἶναι σπουδαιότατος,
⁸⁰ ἂν μὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπάρξῃ, βελτίων μέντοι ἔσται.

 XII. Ἐπεἰ οῦν φαίνεται ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄν τὸ σπου-1 δαῖον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἐκουσίου, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸ ἑκούσιον. ἐκού-⁸⁵ σιον δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν οὕτως ῥηθῆναί ἐστιν ὅ πράττομεν μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι· ἀλλ' ἴσως σαφέστερον λεκτέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

1 Se Bonitz for yap mss.

^a Kal inserted here in some MSS. does not affect the meaning. The $d\rho_X \dot{\eta}$ in this case is *mpoalpesus*.

- ³ yap bracketed by Scaliger.
- 490

1187 b

"Εστιν ούν καθ' δ πράττομεν ἤρεξις· ὀρέξεως 2 δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἐπιθυμία θυμὸς βούλησις.

Πρώτον μέν οῦν τὴν κἀτ' ἐπιθυμίἀν πράξιν ἐπισκεπτέον, πότερον ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀκούσιον. 1188 » [οίον] τὸ μὲν οῦν ἀκούσιον οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν. διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν; ὅτι ὅσα μὴ ἐκόντες πράττομεν, ἀναγκαζόμενοι πράττομεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης πραττομένοις πᾶσιν ἕπεται λύπη, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν πραττομένοις ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστε οὑτωσί γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν πραττόμενα ἀκούσια, ἀλλ' ἑκούσια.

⁵ 'Αλλά πάλιν άλλος λόγος τις τούτω ἐναντιοῦται, 3 δ ἐπὶ τῆ ἀκρασία. οὐθεἰς γάρ, φησί, πράττει ἑκών τὰ κακά, εἰδώς ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μήν, φησίν, ὅ γε ἀκρατὴς εἰδώς ὅτι ταῦτα φαῦλά ἐστιν ὅμως πράττει, καὶ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γε πράττει· οὐκ ἅρα

¹⁰ έκών ἀναγκαζόμενος ἄρα. ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς 4 λόγος ἀπαντήσεται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῆ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Kal άλλως τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο δηλον, ὅτι ὁ ἀκρατης ἐκών πράττει. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες ἐκόντες

^a Nicomachus (III. 11.) assumes that Purposive Choice or Determination ($\pi\rhooai\rhoe\sigma_{4S}$) is a species of "the Voluntary" ($\tau \delta \,\epsilon \kappa o \delta \sigma c \sigma \nu$); and proceeds to distinguish it from Desire, Passion, Wish, and "a kind of Opinion." Eventually (c. iii. 19) he defines it as "Deliberate Appetence of things within our power" ($\beta o \nu \lambda e \sigma \tau \kappa \eta$) of $\rho \epsilon s \tau \sigma \nu \epsilon \phi$ $\dot{\eta} \mu \tilde{\nu} \nu$).

Eudemus (II. vii.) says that the motive of a voluntary act must be either Appetence ($\delta\rho\epsilon\xi$ s) or Determination ($n\rho\sigma$ alpeaus) or Intelligence ($\delta\iota\delta rota$). Trusceting Appetence as the author of M.M. does, he dismisses in turn its three species, and also Determination; and so by exhaustion concludes that voluntary action is action which follows Intelligence (c. ix.). 492 2 The motive power of our actions is what we term 1s to Desire, an Appetence Now of Appetence there are three or Passion, with? kinds, namely Desire, Passion, and Wish.^a

Let us first then consider those actions of which Each Desire is the motive. Are they voluntary or in- Supportion voluntary ? We can hardly suppose they come under Antmondes. the latter heading; and the reason of this is as follows. All we do involuntarily we do under compulsion ; and compulsory actions are accompanied by pain. On the other hand, actions whose motive is Desire are attended by pleasure This would seem to show that what is done from the motive of Desire is not involuntary but voluntary.

3 This argument, however, is opposed by another, which, taking the case of Self-Indulgence,^b declares that whereas no one voluntarily does evil knowing it to be evil, the self-indulgent man, knowing that certain acts are base, nevertheless does them, and that from the motive of Desire. Therefore he does not act voluntarily; and consequently is under com-4 pulsion. This argument can, however, be countered by the one we have already given. If a man acts from the motive of Desne, he is not under compulsion, because Desire is followed by pleasure ; and what is done for the sake of pleasure is not compulsory.

Another way of showing that the self-indulgent man acts voluntarily is this. Those who commit

In c. x. he reverts to Determination, and accepts the definitions of Nic. given above. His treatment of the subject is confusing, and gives the impression of a patch applied to the fabric of Nicomachus.

^b The adjective asparos (literally " undiluted ") is sometimes applied to feelings (doyn, noord, etc.). The abstract noun akpaoia is used (perhaps by confusion) instead of άκράτεια as the opposite of εγκράτεια (self-control). Grant renders it by " incontinence," Rackham by " unrestraint."

- 1188 a
 - ¹⁵ άδικοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν· ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἑκών ἂν πράττοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν.

 XIII. 'Λλλά πάλιν ἄλλος λόγος ἐναντιοῦται, ὅς 1 φησιν οὐχ ἑκούσιον εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς ἑκών πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· ἐπαινεῖται γάρ, ἐπαινοῦνται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν τὸ 20 κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον, τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιοι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει· ὥστε ὁ ἐγκρατὴς οὐχ ἑκών ἂν εἴη ἐγκρατής. ἀλλ' οὐ δυκεῖ· οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον ἐστίν.

Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοίως· οἱ γὰρ 2 αὐτοὶ λόγοι οἴπερ καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἁρμότ-26 τουσιν, ὥστε τὴν ἀπορίαν ποιήσουσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ ὀργῆς εἶναι.

"Ετι λοιπή έστιν των όρέξεων ων διειλόμεθα ή 3 βούλησις, πρός τό ἐπισκέπτεσθαι εἴ ἐστιν ἐκούσιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶ γε ἀκρατεῖς ἐφ' ἃ ὅρμωσιν, ταῦτα τέως βούλονται· πράττουσιν ἄρα οἱ ἀκρατεῖς τὰ φαῦλα
³⁰ βουλόμενοι. ἐκὼν δέ γε οὐθεὶς τὰ κακὰ εἰδὼς πράττει ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής, εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά, πράττει βουλόμενος. οὐκ ἄρα ἑκών, οὐδ' ή βούλησις ἑκούσιον ἄρα ἐστίν.

'Αλλ' ούτος δ λόγος αναιρεί ακρασίαν και τον 1

^a $\theta u\mu \delta s$, for which our language has no equivalent word, is the Combative instinct enlisted by Plato as the ally of Reason against Desire. See *Republic* IX. vir.; *Phaedrus* XXV., XXIV.; *Timaeus* XXXI.; and Grant's note on *Nic*. III. viii. 10.

^b For δρμώσι ef. δρμή, c. iv. 9 above. 494

injustice do so voluntarily. Now the self-indulgent are unjust and commit injustice; whence it follows that the self-indulgent man commits voluntarily the acts which his self-indulgence urges.

- ¹ XIII. Yet another argument is adduced to show that (action whose motive is desire) is not after all voluntary. It is admitted that the self-controlled man performs voluntarily those actions which accord with his self-control; since he receives praise for them, and it is on voluntary action that praise is bestowed. But if action in accordance with Desire is voluntary, action contrary to Desire must be involuntary. Now the man of self-control acts contrary to his desire; whence it would follow that his self-control is not voluntary. But this is obviously untrue; so that action in accordance with Desire cannot be voluntary.
- 2 Similar questions arise in the case of actions whose motive is Passion or Temper.^a The same arguments apply as apply to Desire, and lead to the same difficulty; for one may lack or possess self-control in anger (as well as in Desire).
- 3 Of the kinds of Appetence we have distinguished there remains deliberate Wish; we have still to consider if this be voluntary. Now it is obvious that the self-indulgent for the moment deliberately wish those things to which they feel impelled b; so that their base actions are wishfully done. Yet no man voluntarily does evil actions knowing that they are evil. If therefore the self-indulgent man, knowing that his evil actions are evil, nevertheless does them because he wishes, he cannot be acting voluntarily; whence it follows that Wish is not voluntary.
- 4 But this argument destroys (our conception of) Self-Indulgence; and of the self-indulgent man.

1188 a

^a ἀκρατῆ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκών, οὐκ ἔστιν ψεκτός· ἀλλ³ 35 ἔστιν ὁ ἀκρατὴς ψεκτός· ἑκὼν ἄρα· ἡ ἄρα βούλησις ἑκούσιον.

'Επεί οῦν λόγοι τινὲς ἐναντίοι φαίνονται, σαφέστερον λεκτέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑκουσίου.

XIV. Πρότερον τοίνυν ἂν εἕη λεκτέον ὑπερ βίας 1
1188 b καὶ ὑπερ ἀνάγκης. ἡ μεν γὰρ βία ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τοῦς ἀψύχοις. ἐκάστοις γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀψύχων οἰκεῖος τόπος ἀποδεδομένος, τῷ μεν πυρὶ ὁ ἄνω, τῆ δὲ γῆ ὁ κάτω· ἔστι μέντοι γε βιάσασθαι καὶ τὸν λίθον
5 ἄνω φέρεσθαι καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ 2 ζῷον βιάσασθαι, οἶον ἕππον ἐπ' ὀρθὸν θέοντα ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ἀποστρέψαι. ὅσοις μεν οῦν ἐστιν ἐκτὸς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν τι ἢ παρ' ἁ βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἐροῦμεν βιαζομένοις¹ ἅ ἂν ποιῶσι ποιεῖν· ἐν
10 βιάζεσθαι ἐροῦμεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀντερεῖ, 3 οὐ φάσκων φαῦλος εἶναι· βιαζόμενος γὰρ φήσει ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν.

 XV. Τοῦ οὖν βιαίου οὖτος ἡμιν ἔστω ὁ ὁρισμός, 1 ῶν ἐκτός ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία, ὑφ ἡς βιάζονται πράττειν (ῶν δ' ἐντὸς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰτία, οὐ βία)· πάλιν δ'
 ¹⁵ ὑπὲρ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου λεκτέον. τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ἐν παντὶ λεκτέον ἐστίν,
 οἶον ὅσα ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν πράττομεν. εἰ γάρ τις

¹ A misprint for βιαζομένους (Stock).

^a See Aristotle, De Caelo, IV, iv. 5.

^b The distinction between βla and $d\nu d\gamma \kappa \eta$ seems to be that the former is imposed by human wills, the latter by the nature of things. It is not drawn by Nic. or Eud. On βlos $\beta laios$ —the straitened life of the acquisitive—see Nic. I. v. 8 and Grant's note there.

For if a man does not act voluntarily, he deserves no censure. The self-indulgent man, however, does deserve censure; so that he must be acting voluntarily, and Wish must be a voluntary thing after all.

Now since we meet with these various objections, a fuller consideration of "the Voluntary "is desirable.

(Eud. H. vin, v cf. Nic, 111, 1.)

- XIV. We must begin, then, by considering force bace 1 majeure and compulsion. Now even inanimate an external things are liable to force majeure Each of them Cause of has its proper place assigned : fire above, and earth Action below; yet we may force a stone to ascend and fire to
- 2 descend,^a So too we may force a living animal; a horse may be seized and diverted from its direct course. Now whenever anyone is by some external cause made to do what is against his nature or his wish, we shall say that he does it under force majoure. But where the cause of action is internal, we shall no longer 3 regard such an one as foreed. Otherwise, the selfindulgent man will meet our censure with the plea
- that he is not morally base : for his base actions are done, he will say, under force majeure of desire.
- 1 XV. Let this, then, stand as our definition of force majeure: it is an external cause compelling us to action (Where the cause of action is internal, within ourselves, there is no force majeure.) And now we must turn to consider compulsion and the compulsory.b

We must not plead compulsion under every circum- Compulsion. stance nor for every ineitation. For example, (we cannot say that) what we do under the incitement of pleasure (is compulsory). The man who should

VOL. II

497

1188 b

λέγοι ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. τὸ γὰρ 2 ἀναγκαῖων οὐκ ἐι παντί, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός,
20 οἶον ὃς ἂν καταβλάπτηται ἀντικαταλλαττόμενός τι ἄλλο μεῖζον ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων.
οἶον ἡναγκάσθην συντονώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγρών· εἰ γὰρ μή, ἀπολωλότ' ἂν εῦρον τὰ ἐν ἀγρῶ. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἄρα τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

25 XV1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκούσιον ἐν οὐδεμιậ ὅρμῆ 1 έστίν, λοιπόν αν είη το έκ διανοίας γιγνόμενον. το γαρ ακούσιόν έστι τό τε κατ' ανάγκην και κατά βίαν γιγνόμενον, καὶ τρίτον ὅ μὴ μετὰ διανοίας γίγνεται. δήλον δ' έστι τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων. όταν γάρ τις πατάξη τινὰ η ἀποκτείνη ή τι τῶν 30 τοιούτων ποιήση μηδέν προδιανοηθείς, ἄκοντά φαμεν ποιήσαι, ώς του έκουσίου όντος έν τω διανοηθήναι. οδόν φασί ποτέ τινα γυναίκα φίλτρον 2 τινί δουναι πιείν, είτα τον άνθρωπον αποθανείν ύπο τοῦ φίλτρου, τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον ἐν ᾿Αρείω πάγω άποφυγείν^{1.} οῦ παροῦσαν δι' οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀπέλυσαν 85 η διότι ούκ έκ προνοίας. έδωκε μέν γαρ φιλία, διήμαρτεν δε τούτου διο ούχ εκούσιον εδόκει είναι, ότι την δόσιν του φίλτρου ου μετά διανοίας του άπολέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐδίδου. ἐνταῦθα ἄρα τὸ ἑκούσιον πίπτει είς το μετά διανοίας.

¹ Reading *φυγεῖν* for *ἀποφυγεῖν* (Bernays and one MS.).

^a $\delta\rho\mu\eta$ (see c. iv. 9 above) seems to be used here as the equivalent of $\delta\rho\epsilon\beta$ s, whose three species have been reviewed in cc. xii. and xin. So again in c. xvii. 5 below.

^b This Court, which took its name from the "Hill of Ares" at Athens (*cf.* Acts voi. 19, 22), on which it niet, tried cases 498

say "1 was compelled by pleasure to defile my 2 friend's wife "would make a foolish plea. Not every incitement can be compulsory, but only those which come from without; as, for example, when a man is compelled by his affairs to forgo one advantage for the sake of another more important. "1 was compelled," one might plead. "to visit my estate more assiduously; otherwise I should have found the crops ruined." In such meitations as these we must therefore look for "the compulsory"

(Eud. II. is.)

XVI. Since the Voluntary cannot be found in any Ł kind of spontaneous Impulse," only actions which proceed from Intelligence can deserve the name. For the Involuntary is that which is done either under compulsion, or under force majeure, or lastly, without Intelligence or Understanding. This is obvious from our experience. When one smites or kills another. or the like, without understanding what he is about to do, we say he acted involuntarily, regarding Intelligence as that which alone makes the decd 2 voluntary. We are told that a woman once gave a man a love-potion which proved fatal to him. She was put on her trial before the court of Areopagus b; and was acquitted expressly on the ground that she acted without understanding the consequence. Affection prompted the deed ; and she failed of her loving purpose. Because, then, the cup was given with no thought of the man's death, it was regarded as an involuntary homicide. In this case, then, the Voluntary falls under the head of Understanding.

of murder. In the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, Orestes is acquitted of matricide by it.

1189 a XVII. "Ετι δέ λοιπόν έστιν επισκεψασθαι τήν 1 προαίρεσιν, πότερόν έστιν ὄρεξις, ή ου. ὄρεξις μέν γάρ και έν τοις άλλοις ζώοις έγγίγνεται, προαίρεσις δε ού ή γαρ προαίρεσις μετά λόγου, λόγος δε έν ούδενί των άλλων ζώων έστίν. δρεξις μέν δή ούκ 5 αν είη· αλλ' αρά γε βούλησις; η ουδέ τουτο; βούλησις μέν γάρ έστιν και των άδυνάτων, οίον 2 βουλόμεθα μεν αθάνατοι είναι, προαιρούμεθα δε ού. έτι δε προαίρεσις μεν ούκ εστιν του τέλους, άλλά των πρός το τέλος, οίον ούθεις προαιρείται 10 ύγιαίνειν, άλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ύγίειαν προαιρούμεθα, περιπατείν, τροχάζειν βουλόμεθα δε τα τέλη. ύγιαίνειν γάρ βουλόμεθα. ώστε δήλον και ούτως 3 ότι οὐ ταὐτὸν ή βούλησις καὶ ή προαίρεσις ἀλλὰ ή προαίρεσις έοικεν ούτως έχειν, ώσπερ και τούνομα αὐτῆς ἔχει, οἶον προαιρούμεθα τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε, οἶον τό βέλτιον άντι τοῦ χείρονος. ὅταν οῦν ἀντιιο καταλλαττώμεθα το βέλτιον αντί τοῦ χείρονος έν αίρέσει όντος, ένταῦθα τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δόξειεν ἂν οίκεῖον είναι.

² Έπεὶ οῦν ή προαίρεσις οὐθὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἀρά 4 γέ ἐστιν τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐν προαιρέσει; ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο; πολλὰ γὰρ διανοούμεθα καὶ δοξάζομεν κατὰ διάνοιαν· ἀρ' οῦν ἅ διανοούμεθα, ταῦτα καὶ ²⁰ προαιρούμεθα; ἢ οῦ; πολλάκις γὰρ διανοούμεθα

^a For $\pi\rho oalpeous of$. Nic. III. ii. and the notes of Grant and Rackham thereon. Observe that the dismissal of its claim to be the "Motive" of voluntary action in *Eud.* II. viii. 1 is not reproduced here.

^b See c. 1. 7 above, and note.

[•] A striking piece of carelessness on the author's part. In 500

(End. II. x. : Nuc. III. if , iu., iv.)

XVII. We have still to consider purposive Choice, Determina-1 or Determination, and to ask whether it is an Appet- hon, or pupper the pupper to a sk whether it is an Appetence or not." Now Appetence is found in the beasts Choice as well as in man; but Determination only in the (1) from latter For Determination is based on a Rational Appotence, Principle^b; and man is the only animal that possesses such. So purposive Choice, or Determination, cannot be mere Appetence Can it then be a kind of (2) from 2 Wish ? " Hardly. Wishes may be directed to impossible objects; for instance we wish, but do not purpose, to be immortal. Moreover, the object of Determination is not the End, but the means thereto. No man determines to be healthy ; we determine on means to that end, such as walking or running. But the Ends are the object of our Wish : for we wish to 3 be healthy. Here again it is clear that Wish and purposive Choice are two different things. The nature of purposive Choice would seem to agree with its name. We purposely choose one thing instead of another, for example, the better instead of the worse. When we can choose between the two, and purposely take the better in exchange for the worse, in such a case the term purposive Choice would appear to be correctly used.

Secing, then, that Determination is neither Appet- (3) from 4 ence nor Wish, is the object of Intelligence the intelligence. same as that of purposive Choice? Again, this can hardly be so. Through Intelligence we have understanding and opinion of many things; but do we purpose all that we thus understand? Surely not. Often we have understanding of what is happening

cc, xii, and xiii, he has accepted Boilhous as a species of ορεξις ! Cf. Eud. 11. x. 3.

i189 a

ύπερ των εν Ίνδοῖς, ἀλλ' οὔτι καὶ προαιρούμεθα. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδε διάνοιά ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις.

Ἐπεὶ οῦν καθ' ἕκαστον τούτων οὐθέν ἐστιν ή 5 προαίρεσις, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν τὰ ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ γινόμενα, ἀναγκαῖον [δη] συνδυαζομένων τινῶν τούτων εἶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν.

25 Ἐπεὶ οῦν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέχθη, ἡ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ τέλους, καὶ τῶν δυνατῶι ἡμῦν, καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογίαν παραδιδόντων πότερον τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο αἰρετόν, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν πρότερον διανοηθῆναι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ βουλεύσασθαι, εἶθ ὅταν ἡμῦν φανῇ κρεῖττον διανοη-30 θεῖσιν, οὕτως ὅρμή τις τοῦ πράττειν ἐστίν, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράττοντες κατὰ προαίρεσιν δοκοῦμεν

Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ προαίρεσις ὄρεξίς τις βουλευτικὴ β μετὰ διανοίας, οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἐκούσιον προαιρετόν.⁴ ἐκόντες γὰρ πολλὰ πράττομεν πρὸ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι, οἶον καθίζομεν καὶ ἀνιστάμεθα 85 καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκόντες μὲν ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν πῶν ἦν μετὰ 1189 ʰ διανοίας. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐκούσιον προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ 7 τὸ προαιρετὸν ἑκούσιον. ἄν τι γὰρ προαιρώμεθα πράττειν βουλευσάμενοι, ἑκόντες πράττομεν.

Φαίνονται δέ τινες όλίγοι καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν ¹ Perhaps we should read <τό> προαιρετόν with the

^b § 2 above.

πράττειν.

Laurentian Ms.

^a Indian affairs gamed interest in Greece through the campaigns of Alexander, and subsequently through the relations between Selencus Nicator and Chandragupta. The illustration is given by Eud.; Nic. speaks of "Scythians."

[°] The function of Intelligence ($\delta_i d_{ioia}$) as a factor in 502

in India ": yet none of it is matter for our determination. Determination therefore is distinct also from Intelligence.

Since, then, these are the phenomena of the soul, but is com-5 and in none of them, taken severally, is purposive Appointence Choice or Determination to be found, it must be and intellicomposed of two (or more ?) in association.

Now we have already seen that Determination deals not with the End but with those goods which are means thereto,^b are within our power to compass, and present alternatives for our choice. It follows that we must, before determining, submit them to our Intelligence and its deliberation. Then, when Intelligence has decided that one is better than the other, there follows an impulse to act in this way ; and in so acting, it seems that we act with purposive Choice.

If, then, Determination is a deliberate Appetence and may be 6 accompanied by Understanding, "the Voluntary" deliberate, cannot be identified with it. For we perform many mtelligent Appetence. an action voluntarily before Intelligence has reflected and deliberated thereon : such as sitting down and rising up and many other actions of the kind, which are indeed done voluntarily, but without that Intelligence which, as we have seen, always accompanies

7 whatever is deliberately done. It follows, then, that The Actions what is voluntary is not always determined, though it induces what we determine is always voluntary; since voluntary whatever action we determine after deliberation to there are perform, we perform voluntarily.

other Kinds of voluntary

Even among legislators a few seem to draw the Action.

προαίρεσις is deliberative. Hence διανοείσθαι and βουλεύεσθαι are in these chapters practically equivalent. Cf. Nic. III. ii. 17.

1189 b

διορίζειν τό τε έκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐκ προαιρέσεως 5 ἕτερον ὄν, ἐλάττους τὰς ζημίας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τάττοντες.

"Εστιν ούν ή προαίρεσις έν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ 8 τούτοις ἐν οἶς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι, καὶ οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως, καὶ ἐν οἶς ἔστι λαβειν το δια τί. το δε δια τί ουχ άπλουν εστίν. 10 ἐν μέν γὰρ γεωμετρία, ὅταν φῆ τὸ τετράγωνον 9 τέτταρσιν δρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν, καὶ ἐρωτῷ διὰ τί, ὅτι, φησίν, και το τρίγωνον δυσιν όρθαις ισας έχει. έν μέν οῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡρισμένης έλαβον το δια τι έν δέ γε τοις πρακτοις, έν οις ή προαίρεσις, ούχ ούτως (ούδεμία γαρ κείται ώρι-15 σμένη), άλλ' αν απαιτή τις, δια τί τοῦτο ἕπραξας; ότι ούκ ένην άλλως, η ότι βέλτιον ούτως. έξ αυτων των συμβαινόντων, όποι' αν φαίνηται βελτίω είναι, ταῦτα προαιρεῖται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα. διὸ δὴ ἐν τοῖς 10 τοιούτοις το βουλεύσασθαί έστι το πως δέι, έν δέ ταις επιστήμαις ού. ούθεις γαρ βουλεύεται πως 20 δεῖ γράψαι τὸ ὄνομα ᾿Αρχικλέους, ὅτι ἐστὶν ώρισμένον πως δει γράψαι το όνομα 'Αρχικλέους. ή οῦν ἁμαρτία οὐ γίγνεται ἐν τῆ διανοία, ἀλλ' ἐν τῆ ένεργεία τοῦ γράφειν. ἐν οἶς γὰρ μή ἐστιν ἡ

^a $\tau \delta$ " $\delta \iota \delta \tau l$;" or $\tau \delta$ $\delta \delta$ *ëvexa* of an Action is its End ($\tau \epsilon \lambda \sigma s$), Purpose, or Final Cause. In the case of a mathematical proposition, $\tau \delta \delta \iota \delta \tau l$ is rather the Formal Cause ($\tau \delta$ " $\tau l \eta \nu$,"). It is part of the $\epsilon l \delta \sigma s$ or $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ of the quadrilateral that it is divisible into two triangles, and part of the $\epsilon l \delta \sigma s$ of a triangle to contain two right angles. (*Cf. Eud.* II. x. 24, and *Metaphysics* IV. (V.) ii.)

^b Cf. Nic. III. iii. $\hat{\mathfrak{s}}$ (with the notes of Grant and Burnet), and Eud. II, x. 13. $\hat{\mathfrak{s}}$ normalized between the second con-Nic. distinguishes those $\hat{\mathfrak{s}}$ normalized which are fixed and complete—like writing—from those which are less definitely 504 correct distinction between deeds done voluntarily and those done of Purpose ; and to assign, accordingly, less severe penalties to the former class of offences then to the latter

- Determination, therefore, is concerned with actions. It chaoses between 8 and with those actions which it is in our power to Actions perform or not to perform, or to perform in two which are in different ways ; actions moreover whose " wherefore " a we can comprehend (Now we speak of the "where-and whose wherefore f
- 9 fore " of a thing in more senses than one. In werangiasp geometry, when we are told that the angles of a quadrilateral are equal to four right angles, and are asked, wherefore? the answer is "because the angles of a triangle are equal to two right mgles." In such eases as this, the "wherefore " is inferred from a principium already defined. But in the case of actions. with which Determination is concerned, it is not so : for here there exists no previously defined principium. If, then, one is asked " wherefore did you thus act ? " he answers "Because I could not act otherwise," or "Because it was the better alternative." It is in view of their (expected) results that a man determines on whatever actions appear better; and these (results) are the "wherefore" of his determination.
- 10 And this is why, in matters of this kind, we deliberate with ourselves how we should act : but not in the sciences and arts, b No one debates with himself how the name of Archieles should be written. for that is already defined ; so that errors arise, not in the conscious Understanding, but in activity of writing. For where there is no possibility of error in grounded, like medicine. About the rules of the latter we deliberate ; not about those of the former. rexen affords greater scope for deliberation than does emerippy in the stricter sense of the term.

1189 b

άμαρτία ἐν τῆ διανοία, οὐδὲ βουλεύονται ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀλλ' ἐν οἶς ἤδη ἀόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ,
ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἁμαρτία. ἔστιν δ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸ 11 ἀόριστον, καὶ ἐν οῖς διτταὶ αἱ ἁμαρτίαι. ἁμαρτάνομεν οῦν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑμοίως. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς στοχαζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν ἐπὶ τὰς' πεφυκυίας ὁδούς. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ἐν ὑπερβολῆ ἁμαρτία, ἐφ'
ἕκάτερα δὲ τούτων φερόμεθα δι' ήδονὴν καὶ λύπην διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ήδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τὰ καλὰ φεύγομεν.

XVIII. "Ετι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια οὐχ ὥσπερ 1 αἴσθησις, οἶον τῆ ὅψει οὐκ ἂν δύναιτ' οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο ποιῆσαι ἢ ἰδεῖν, οὐδὲ τῆ ἀκοῆ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ
³⁵ ἀκοῦσαι. ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευόμεθα πότερον δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι τῆ ἀκοῆ ἢ ἰδεῖν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια οὐ τοιοῦτον,
¹¹⁹⁰ a ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δύναται πράττειν καὶ ἄλλα. διὰ τοῦτο βουλεύεσθαι ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ὑπάρχει. ἔστιν οῦν 2 ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῆ αἰρέσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ περὶ τὰ τέλη (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἄπαντες ὅμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἶον τὴν ὑγίειαν ὅτι ἀγαθόν), ἀλλ' ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὸ τέλος,
⁵ οἶον πότερον ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ὑγίειαν φαγεῖν τοῦτο ἢ οὕ. μάλιστα οῦν ποιεῖ ἐν τούτοις τὸ σφάλλεσθαι ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· τὴν μὲν γὰρ φεύγομεν, τὴν δὲ αἰρούμεθα.

'Επεί οῦν διήρηται ἐν τίνι ἡ άμαρτία καὶ πῶς, 3 λοιπόν ἐστι τίνος ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ στοχαστική, πότε-

1 Reading έπὶ ‹διτ>τὰs πεφυκυίαs όδούs

506

the intellectual concept, we do not need to take counsel with ourselves; but wherever the right course is undefined, there is the possibility of error.

11 Now it is in action that this uncertainty exists, and It is in the wherever two different kinds of error are possible, and moral Our errors, therefore, in action and in morals are Error in alike. In aiming at moral virtue, we eri in ways possible, which are by nature twofold ; since error is possible and Deliberation either by defect or by excess, and we are borne in one needed. direction or the other through pleasure or pain. For pleasure induces us to perform base actions, and pain to avoid noble ones.

1 XVIII. Understanding differs from Sense Per-The Senses ception in one important way. By the sense of sight what is we are enabled to see, and nothing else; and by before them, hearing, merely and solely to hear. We do not ean take deliberate whether we should hear with our ears, or different see. It is otherwise with our Intelligence, which has same the power of acting in different ways. It is here, Matter. when we come to make a purposive Choice, that there is room for deliberation with ourselves.

(End. II, xi.)

- Error, then, arises in the choice of what is good, Error arises 2But not in the realm of Ends ; for about these all are the Choice of agreed. No man, for example, doubts that health is Means, and a good. It is when we come to choose our means in chiefly that we err; for example, in deciding whether such Pleasure and such a food is good for our health. In this choice, it is pleasure and pain that chiefly lead us astray; since we choose the former and seek to avoid the latter.
- 3 Having thus defined where and how error arises, Vatue is we have still to consider what is the goal at which more con-

and Pain,

1190 a

10 ρον τοῦ τέλους ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἶον πότερον τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τῶν πρός τὸ καλόν. πῶς οῦν ἡ 4 έπιστήμη; πότερον τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐστιν ἐπι-στήμης τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρός τὸ τέλος ίδειι; αν γαρ τουτο καλώς προθήται, οίον καλήν οικίαν ποιήσαι, και τὰ πρός τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλος τις ευρήσει και ποριεί η οικοδόμος. όμοίως δε και 15 έπι των άλλων άπασων έπιστημών. ώσαύτως άρα 5 δόξειεν αν έχειν και έπ' άρετης, μαλλον είναι αυτής τον σκοπόν [πρός] το τέλος, δ δει όρθως προθέσθαι, η τα πρός το τέλος και έξ ων τουτ' έσται ούθεις άλλος ποριεί, και ευρήσει & δεί προς τουτο, και 20 εύλογον δέ τούτου είναι προθετικήν την αρετήν έν οίς γαρ ή άρχη τοῦ βελτίστου έστίν, εκαστον καί προθετικόν και ποιητικόν. ούθεν οῦν βέλτιον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν ταύτης γὰρ ἕνεκα και ταλλα ἐστίν, και πρός ταύτην ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχή, [και τούτου ἕνεκει μαλλον τα πρός τουτ' έστίν το δε τέλος άρχη τινι 6 25 έοικεν, και τούτου ένεκέν έστιν έκαστον, άλλά κατά τρόπον τοῦτο ἔσται.] ωστε δηλον ώς κάπι της αρέτης, επειδή βελτίστη εστίν αίτία, ότι του τέλους έστι στοχαστική μάλλον ή των πρός τό τέλος.

ΧΙΧ. 'Αρετής δέ γ' έστι τέλος το καλόν. τούτου 1

¹ Reading, with Scaliger, $\tau \delta \delta \dot{\epsilon} \tau \epsilon \lambda \rho s \eta \epsilon \sigma \epsilon \nu, \kappa a i \tau o \dot{\tau} \sigma v \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \nu \mu a \lambda \lambda o \nu \tau a m \rho \delta s \tau o \hat{\upsilon} \tau' \dot{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \nu, instead of the passage between the brackets, which is corrupt.$

^a Is this consistent with c. i. 14 above, where we are told that no science or art can predicate goodness of its End?

^b Cf. Eud. 11. xi. 5, 6: especially ιδυπερ γώρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ul ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχή καὶ ὑπόθεσις. An alternative rendering is "— and with 508

Virtue aims. Is it an end, or means thereto; moral the End beauty, for example, or such things as conduce to it? the Means, How with the Means,

4 How is it with arts and sciences? Is it the task of architecture well and truly to propose its own end, or merely to seek the means of attaining it? But assuming it to have done the former—to have proposed, for example, the construction of a noble house,^a it is again the architect and none other who will devise and provide the means of accomplishing it. And so it is with all other arts and sciences ; whence 5 we may infer the like of Virtue. Its goal is the right establishment of the End more than (the provision of) the means ; yet the materials and means will be provided and devised by none other (than the virtuous

- man himself). And it is with reason that we attribute to Virtue this task of proposing her End; for wherever we find the origin or *principium* of what is best, there resides the power both of proposing the End and of accomplishing it. Now (whilst) nothing is better than Virtue—since it is for her sake that other things are, and towards her the *principium* points (as to an
- 6 End)—yet in her case the End itself may be regarded as a *principium* ^b: and it is for the sake of the End that the means exist rather (than the converse). And so even in her case it is plain that, being as she is the best of all causes, her task is to seek rather the End than the means thereto.^c
- 1 XIX. Now the End of Virtue is the morally

her the principium abides; yet in her case . . " (With $\pi\rho\deltas$ rawry might he compared St. John i. 1 & $\lambda\delta\gamma\sigmas$ for $\pi\rho\deltas$ rds $\theta\epsilon\delta\nu$.)

^e A corrupt and obscure passage. Perhaps the meaning is that Virtue, whilst herself a $\tau \epsilon \lambda \sigma s$, is also the $d\rho \chi \gamma$ of another $\tau \epsilon \lambda \sigma s$, *i.e.* $\tau \delta$ salor, which it is therefore her task to set up and pursue.

^{1190 a} ἄρ' ἐστί[ν ή ἀρετή] στοχαστική μαλλον ή ἐξ 30 ῶν ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ταύτης. ὅλως δὲ δή¹ φαίνεται ἄτοπον. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν ἐν γραφικῆ εἴη τις ἀγαθὸς μιμητής, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινεθείη, ἂν μὴ τὸν σκοπὸν θῆ τὰ βέλτιστα μιμεῖσθαι. τῆς ἀρετῆς ἅρα παντελῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ καλὸν προθέσθαι.

Διὰ τί οῦν, ἄν τις εἴποι, πρότερον μὲν ἐλέγομεν 2 85 τὴν ἐνέργειαν κρεῖττον εἶναι ἢ τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτήν, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἐξ οῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦτο τῆ ἀρετῆ ἀποδίδομεν ὡς κάλλιον, ἀλλ' ἐν ῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια;

1190 b ναί, άλλὰ καὶ νῦν ψαμεν τοῦτο ὁμοίως, τὴν ἐνέργειαν 3 τῆς ἔξεως βέλτιον είναι. οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τόν σπουδαίον θεωροῦντες κρίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν είναι δηλῶσαι τὴν ἑκάστου προαίρεσιν ῆν ἔχει, ἐπεὶ εἰ ῆν εἰδέναι τὴν ἑκάστου b γνώμην, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν σπουδαῖος ἂν ἐδόκει είναι.

['Επεί δε μεσότητάς τινας των παθών κατηριθμησάμεθα, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ ποῖα τών παθών εἰσίν.]

XX. * * Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστιν ή ἀνδρεία περὶ θάρρη 1 10 καὶ φόβους, σκεπτέον ἂν εἰη περὶ ποίους φόβους καὶ θάρρη. Ἱρ' οὖν εἰ μέν τις φοβεῖται μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ τὴν οὖσίαν, οῦτος δειλός, εἰ δέ τις θαρρεῖ

¹ Reading $d\lambda \partial \omega s$ de dý (suggested by Susemihl) for $d\lambda \omega s$ de dý.

^a Cf. Poetica c, u. ^b c. u. 3 above. ^c Cf. St. James c, ii. ^d These "mean states" are of course the Moral Virtues ($\eta \theta ucal d peral$), as explained in cc. v.-ix, above. Ramsauer and Susemihil think that the bracketed sentence has been inserted to fill a lacuna in the text; and Ramsauer suggests that a "table of virtues" (and their "provinces"?) like that in Eud. II. iii. 4 originally stood in its place. 510

beautiful or noble; so that this, rather than its Moral Beauty materials, is the goal at which she aims, though she is the End concerned with its materials also. The contrary of Virtue, would be obviously impossible. A painter might be an excellent copyist; but he would receive no honour if he failed to make it his aim to portray the best models.^a There can, therefore, be no questioning the office of Virtue to propose the noble as her end.

- But here it may possibly be objected that whereas Yet Virtue we formerly stated the use or activity of anything to is better 2 be better than the corresponding possession of it.^b than Vitue we are now assigning to Virtue, as the nobler province, not the materials of her activity, but something in
- 3 which there is no activity. Our view, however, is still the same : we still assert that virtuous activity is better than the mere state or possession of Virtue. When mankind behold a virtuous man they judge him by his actions, because his inward Determination or Purpose is necessarily hidden from them. If, however, they could look into a man's mind and see its attitude towards what is morally beautiful, the virtuous man would be known for such even apart from his activity.º

(Eud. III. i. 1 : Nio. III. v. 21-23.)

[Having enumerated certain "mean states"^d of the feelings or affections, we must now specify the kind of feelings with which they are severally concerned.]

(Eud. III. i. : Nic. III. vi.-ix.)

XX. ... Since, then, feelings of fear and intrepidity Nature and Provinces of 1 are the province of Courage, we must consider the the several kinds of fear and intrepidity with which it deals. Is a Virtues: 1) of man a coward if he fears the loss of his property, and Courage;

511

1190 b

 περὶ ταῦτα, ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ οὕ; ὅμοίως δ' εἴ τις φοβεῖται νόσον ἢ θαρρεῖ, οὕτε δειλὸν φατέον εἶναι τὸν φοβούμενον οὕτ' ἀνδρεῖον τὸν μὴ φοβούμενον.
 ¹⁵ οὐκ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φόβοις καὶ θάρρεσίν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἶον 2 εἰ μή τις φοβεῖται βροντὰς ἢ ἀστραπὰς ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον φοβερῶν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος ἀλλὰ μαινόμενός τις. ἐν φόβοις ἄρα καὶ θάρρεσίν ἐστιν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τοῖς κατ' ἀνθρώπους λέγω δὲ οἶον ἅ οἱ
 ²⁰ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες, ἐν τούτοις ὁ ὣν θαρραλέος, οὕτος ἀνδρεῖος.

Τούτων τοίνυν διωρισμένων σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη, 3 ἐπειδὴ κατὰ πολλά εἰσιν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὁ ποῖος ἀνδρεῖος. ἐστιν γὰρ καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀν-δρεῖος, οἶον οἱ στρατιῶται. οῦτοι γὰρ οἴδασι δι'
²⁵ ἐμπειρίαν ὅτι ἐν τοιούτω τόπω ἢ ἐν τοιούτω καιρῶ ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἀδύνατόν τι παθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα εἰδῶς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὑπομένων τοὺς πολεμίους οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος. ἐἀν γὰρ τούτων μηθὲν ὑπάρχῃ, οὐχ ὑπο-4 μένει. διὸ τοὺς δι' ἐμπειρίαν οὐ φατέον ἀνδρείους. Οὐδὲ Σωκράτης δὴ ὀρθῶς ἕλεγεν ἐπιστήμη ἐξ
³⁰ ἔθους τὴν ἐμπειρίαν λαβοῦσα ἐπιστήμη γίνεται· τοὺς δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένωντας οὕ φαμεν, οὐδ' ἐροῦσιν ἀνδρείους αὐτοὺς εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρρείο

Πάλιν δ' αῦ εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς 5 ἐμπειρίας· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι τῶν ἐκβησομένων οὐ φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν. οὐδὲ δὴ οὐδὲ τούτους ³⁵ φατέον ἀνδρείους.

^a For what Socrates actually said see Xenophon, Memorabilia, III. ix. 1, 2. 512

brave if he faces it with intrepidity? Hardly so; nor can we rightly predicate Cowardice and Courage of those who respectively fear or do not fear disease.

- 2 These, then, are not the kinds of fear and intrepidity with which Courage deals. Supposing again that a man has no fear of thunder or lightning or other superhuman terrors : he is not brave, but mad. The fears and intrepidities with which a brave man deals are clearly those commensurate with human powers. That man, I mean, is brave who shows intrepidity in the midst of perils which most men or all men fear.
- 3 After thus much of definition, seeing that brave men are (brave) in many different ways, we must consider what kinds of men are rightly so called. In the first place, men may be brave through experience, as soldiers are. They know by experience that in certain places, times, or positions they are quite safe. But one who knows this, and in the confidence of such
- 4 knowledge awaits the foe, is not brave ; for if these conditions be lacking, he flees. We cannot therefore call the man who is brave from experience truly brave.

Again. Socrates was surely mistaken in declaring that Courage is a branch of science or knowledge.^a Knowledge becomes such through attaining experience by practice. But we deny that those who are brave from experience are really brave; and our denial will be generally approved. Courage, therefore, is not a branch of science.

5 Again, some men are brave through the very opposite of experience; for those who have no experience of results have, for that reason, no fear of them. These, too, have no just claim to the title. VOL, II 2L 513

^{1190 b} Eίσιν δ' αῦ ἄλλοι δοκοῦντες ἀιδρεῖοι είναι διὰ τὰ 6 πάθη, οἶον οἱ ἐρῶντες ἢ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες. οὐδὲ δὴ τούτους φατέον ἀνδρείους είναι· ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῶν
^{1191 a} τὸ πάθος ἀφαιρεθῆ, οὐκέτι εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι, δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀιδρεῖον ἀεὶ είναι ἀνδρεῖον. διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ θηρία 7 οίον τοὺς σῦς οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι ἀνδρείους διὰ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πληγέντες λυπηθῶσιν, οὐδὲ δεῖ τὸν ἀιδρεῖον διὰ [τὸ] πάθος είναι ἀνδρεῖον.

5 Πάλιν ἕστιν ἄλλη ἀνδρεία πολιτική δοκοῦσα 8 είναι, οίον εἰ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀνδρείοι είναι. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· καὶ γὰρ "Ομηρος πεποίηκε τὸν "Εκτορα λέγοντα

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρώτος έλεγχείην ἀναθήσει,

¹⁰ διό οἴεται δεῖν μάχεσθαι. οὐδὲ δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην φατέον εἶναι· ὅ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τούτων διορισμὸς ἁρμόσει. οῦ γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένου¹ μὴ διαμένει ἡ ἀνδρεία, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἀνδρεῖος· ἂν οῦν τὴν αἰσχύνην περιέλω δι' ἣν ἦν ἀνδρεῖος, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀνδρεῖος.

^{*}Ετι καί άλλως εἰσὶν ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οἱ θ ¹⁵ δι' ἐλπίδα καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀγαθοῦ. οὐδὲ δὴ τούτους φατέον εἶναι ἀνδρείους, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρείους λέγειν ἄτοπον φαίνεται.

Ούδένα οῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρεῖον θετέον εἶναι·

¹ Perhaps <*ti>should be inserted.*

^a See Plato, Phaedo XXXI. ^b Iliad XXII. 100.

6 There are, besides, others reputed brave owing to the feelings which possess them—such as love, or divine inspiration. These, too, are not really entitled to the name. If they lose the feeling, they cease to 7 be brave; and true Courage is permanent. It is for this reason that no one would eall boars and other wild beasts brave because they defend themselves when wounded and in pain. No more can the truly brave man owe his courage to his feelings.

8 Moreover there is another so-called Courage which is of a civic or social nature a; shown, for example, by those who face perils and win reputation for courage because they are ashamed to appear cowards in the eyes of their fellow-citizens. Testimony to this we find in Homer, whose Hector declares that

First will Pulydamas for faint-heart temper reproach me *

and therefore determines to fight. And here again we must withhold the name of true Courage. For in all the above cases, the same criterion may be applied; whenever the loss $\langle of \text{ some incentive} \rangle$ involves the loss of courage, the man $\langle who \text{ is ap$ $parently brave} \rangle$ will be brave no longer. If, then, I strip a man $\langle who \text{ is civically or socially brave} \rangle$ of that feeling of shame which was his incentive, he will no longer be brave at all.

9 Another type of apparent courage is that of men who win the title under the incentive of hope and expectation of good to come. These, too, we must refuse the name. To call men brave who are only brave in this way and under these circumstances seems, indeed, absurd.

Since, then, of none of the above types can we predicate true Courage, let us consider what kind of

1191 a

τόν [ό] ποΐον οὖν' ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τίς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος σκεπτέοι. ὡς ἁπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὁ διὰ μηθὲν τῶν 10 μη προειρημένων ἀνδρεῖος ὤν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νομίζειν αὐτὸ εἶναι καλόν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶν κἂν παρῆ τις κἂν μὴ παρῆ.

Ούδε δή παντελώς άνευ πάθους και όρμης έγγίγνεται ή ανδρεία. δεί δε την δρμην γίνεσθαι από τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὸ καλόν. ὁ δὴ ὁρμῶν διὰ λόγον ένεκει τοῦ καλοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἄφοβος ών 25 περί ταῦτα, οῦτος ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία περί ταῦτα. ἄφοβος δὲ οὐχ ὅταν οὕτω συμπέση τῷ 11 ἀνδρείω ὥστε ὅλως μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἀνδρείος, ῷ ὅλως μηθέν ἐστι φοβερόν ούτω μέν γαρ (αν) ο λίθος είη και τάλλα άψυχα άνδρεία· άλλά δεί φοβείσθαι μέν, υπομένειν δέ· εί 80 γàρ aữ μη φοβούμενος ύπομένει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνδρείος.— ἕτι δε και ώσπερ επάνω διειλόμεθα, περί 12 φόβους και κινδύνους ου πάντας αλλα' τους άναιρετικούς τής ούσίας.- έτι δε ούδ' έν τω τυχόντι και παντί χρόνω, αλλ' έν ώ οι φόβοι και οι κίνδυνοι πλησίον είσιν. ει γάρ τις τον εις δέκατον έτος κίνδυνον μή φοβείται, ούπω άνδρείος ένιοι γάρ 35 θαρροῦσιν διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον γένωνται, αποθνήσκουσιν τω δέει.

¹ Spengel for δποιονοῦν MSS.

² In § I it is suggested that peril to one's odola (property?) is not the field in which true Courage is shown. This is the regular meaning of the word odola in Nic. (see IV. i. passim), save where it serves as a logical term (= substance). Perhaps therefore we should read od $\pi\epsilon\rho i \phi \delta\beta \sigma s \kappa a \kappa a \kappa b \delta \sigma \sigma s \sigma ds$ dvacperikods $\tau \eta s$ odolas, "nor . . . will true Courage concern itself with fears and dangers that threaten property." 516 10 man (we can so term), and who is the truly brave. We may define him simply by saying that he is one who owes his courage to none of the above incentives, but is brave because he thinks it noble so to be, and brave whether he is alone or in company.

Courage, however, does not arise wholly apart from feeling and impulse. But the impulse must start from Rational Principle," with moral beauty or nobility as its aim. He, therefore, who is rationally impelled to face danger for the sake of what is fair and noble, being fearless of that danger, is a brave

- ¹¹ man; and this is the true province of Courage I do not however mean the fearlessness of one (reputed) brave who happens to be incapable of fear. A man is not truly brave in whose sight nothing whatever is formidable. By the same token a stone were brave, or any other inanimate thing. The brave man will fear, but will nevertheless stand firm; for if he stands
- 12 firm without fearing, he cannot be truly brave. Moreover, in accordance with the distinctions we made above, true Courage will not concern itself with all kinds of fear and peril; but only with those which threaten one's very existence.^b Nor can it be shown at all times, or on any chance occasion; but only when fears and perils are close at hand. If a man has no fear of a peril which is to be encountered nine years hence, that does not prove him brave. For some are intrepid because the peril is afar who on its approach are ready to die of fear.

^a Cf. Nic. III. vn., Eud. III. i. 12; also i. 7 above, with note.

^b See note on text.

The corruption might be that of a scribe who misunderstood the word ovora. *Of.* c. xxxiii. 31 below.

1191 a

XXI. 'Η μέν οῦν ἀνδρεία καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος τοιοῦ-1 τος σωφροσύνη δ' ἐστίν μεσότης ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἁπλῶς ἅπασα ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἡ βελτίστη,
 1191 ὑ ἡ δὲ βελτίστη ἕξις τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, βέλτιστον δὲ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας τὸ μέσον κατ' ἀμφότερα γάρ εἰσι ψεκτοί, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολῆν καὶ κατ' ἕνδειαν. ὥστε εἴπερ τὸ μέσον βέλτιστον, ἡ σωφροσύνη μεσότης τις ἂν εἴη ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας.

Μεσότης μέν οῦν ἂν εἴη τούτων· ἔστιν δὲ ή 2 σωφροσύνη περὶ ήδονὰς καὶ λύπας, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς περὶ πάντα. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἤδεται θεωρῶν γραφὴι· ἢ ἀνδριάντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δὴ οῦτος ἀκόλαστος, ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ ἀκοῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὀσφρήσεως· ἀλλ' ἐν ήδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ

- ουδέ περί οσφρήσεως. ἀλλ ἐν ήδοναις ταις περί 10 ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ταύτας ἀνὴρ 3 σώφρων ἔσται ζόζο ῦτως ἔχων ὥστε μηδ' ὑπὸ μιᾶς τῶν τοιοῦτων ήδονῶν μηθὲν πάσχειν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀναίσθητος), ἀλλ' ἤδη ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος, ὥστε εἰς ὑπερβολὴν αὐτῶν ἀπολαύων πάντα τᾶλλα ποιείσθαι πάρεργα, καὶ αὐτών γε τὸν
- πάντα ταλλα ποιείσθαι πάρεργα, και αὐτόν¹ γε τὸν 15 ἦδη αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκεν και μὴ ἄλλου πράττουτα σώφρονα * *.^{*} ὅστις γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων 4 ἡδονῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀπέχεται ἢ διὰ φόβον ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τάλλα ζῷα λέγομεν είναι σώφρονα ἔξω ἀνθρώπου, διὰ τὸ

Reading αὐτό (Scaliger).
 Inserting <καλοῦμεν> (Rieckher) or the like.

^a See c. iii. 3 above. Here the author, after using $\xi_{\ell s}$ in its neuter sense of *habitus*, proceeds to construct it with the 518

(End. III. n. : Nic. III. x.)

- 1 XXI. Such is the nature of Courage and of the (3 of the brave man. We next proceed to consider Temper-^{peranet}, ance, which is a mean betwirt Profligacy and Insensibility to pleasures. Temperance, hke all other virtues, is a "best state (of the soul)." Now a best state is a state which possesses what is best^a; and what is best is the mean betwirt excess and defect, since for both of these, men are liable to blame. As therefore the mean is best, the virtue of Temperance will be a mean state betwirt Profligacy and Insensibility.
- ² Such, then, are the extremes between which Temperance mediates. Pleasures and pains are its province, though not with all pleasures and pains does it deal, nor with those arising from all sources. Because a man takes pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or statue or other beautiful object, he is not on that account a profligate ; nor again because he enjoys the pleasures of hearing or of smell; only in those pleasures which arise from touch or taste is
- 3 there profligacy. Nor of course is a man temperate who is so constituted as to be entirely unaffected by any of these pleasures; for such a man is simply indifferent. The temperate man is he who is affected by them, and yet not led away to take such excessive delight therein that he regards all else as of secondary importance. It is the man who thus resists pleasure for the sake of what is morally beautiful or noble, and for no other cause, that we term tem-
- 4 perate; for he who refrains from such pleasures through fear or the like motive is not truly temperate. We do not call the brute beasts temperate; since

objective genitive proper to its active sense (έξις τοῦ βελτίστου =τὸ τὸ βέλτιστου έχειν).

μή είναι έν αὐτοῖς λόγον, ῷ δοκιμάζοντα τὸ καλὸν 20 αίροῦνται. πασα γὰρ ἀρετή τοῦ καλοῦ¹ καὶ πρὸς τό καλόν έστίν. ώστε είη αν ή σωφροσύνη περί ήδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἐν ἁφῆ καὶ γεύσει γινομένας.

XXII. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν είη τούτου λέγειν ὑπέρι πραότητος, [καί] τί έστι καὶ ἐν τίσιν. ἔστιν [μέν] 25 οῦν ή πραότης ἀνὰ μέσον ὀργιλότητος καὶ ἀοργησίας, και όλως δε δοκούσιν αι άρεται μεσότητές τινες είναι. ότι δ' είσι μεσότητες, και ούτως άν τις είποι εί γάρ έστιν έν μεσότητι το βέλτιστον, ή δ' ἀρετή ἐστιν ή βελτίστη ἕξις, [βέλτιστον δ' έστι τὸ μέσον,] ή ἀρετή ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον. δηλον 2 30 δε έσται μάλλον και καθ' έκαστον σκοπούσιν.

'Επειδή γάρ έστιν όργίλος ό παντί και πάντως και ἐπι πλεῖον ὀργιζόμενος, και ψεκτὸς δὲ ὁ τοιούτος (ούτε γάρ παντί δεί όργίζεσθαι ούτ' έπί πασιν ούτε πάντως και αεί, ούδ' αδ πάλιν ούτως έχειν δεί, ώστε μηθενί μηδέποτε και γάρ ούτος 3 ⁸⁵ ψεκτός, ἀνάλγητός γε ὤν).² ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὅ κατὰ την ύπερβολην ψεκτός και ό κατά την έλλειψιν ό μέσος ἂν τούτων εἴη καὶ πραος καὶ ἐπαινετός. οὖτε γὰρ ὁ ἐλλείπων τῆ ὀργῆ οὕτε ὁ ὑπερβάλλων έπαινετός, άλλ' ό μέσως έχων πρός ταῦτα, οῦτος πραος. και ή πραότης δε τούτων των παθών μεσότης αν είη.

¹ Reading τοῦ καλοῦ <ἔνεκεν> (?).

² I place the bracket after *dei* and a comma after *ων*.

³ Stopping ό μέσως έχων πρός ταῦτα. οῦτος πρâος· κal ή πραότης δὲ . . . (So Stock.) 520

191 b

they possess not the touchstone of reason wherewith to test moral beauty before choosing it. For moral beauty is ever the End of Virtue, and towards this she is drawn.—Temperance, then, is concerned with such pleasures and pains as arise from touch and taste.

(Eud. III, in. : Nic. IV, v.)

 XXII. From this we may pass to treat of Gentle- (3) of Goutleness; its character and its province. Now Gentleness occupies a mid position between Irascibility and Lack of Spirit. (The virtues would seem in every case to be mean states between extremes; and this may be demonstrated as follows. If the best occupies a mean position, and Virtue is the best state (of the soul),
 Virtue must be a mean. But this will be clearer from a consideration of the virtues severally) a

For the irascible man is one who is liable to excessive anger against everyone and on all occasions; and he deserves our censure. It is not right to be angry with all men, nor for every cause, nor on all occasions and at all times. On the other hand, the opposite state, that of never being angry with any-3 one, is also wrong; such a man is insensible, and he too deserves our blame.-Since, then, the man who shows excess of anger deserves censure, and hkewise he who shows defect, he who keeps the just mean is the gentle man who merits our praise. Praise is not for him who is deficient in anger, nor for him who is therein excessive; but for one whose state is between the two. This man is gentle; and gentleness will be a mean state between these two affections.

^a An awkwardly placed parenthesis.

ARISTOTLE

1191 b

 1191 b XXIII. Ἐλευθεριότης δέ ἐστιν μεσότης ἀσωτίας 1
 1192 a καὶ ἀνελευθερίας. ἔστιν δὲ περὶ χρήματα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη· ὁ τε yàp ἄσωτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀναλίσκων είς â μὴ δεί καὶ πλείω ῶν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, ὄ τ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐναντίως τούτω ὁ μὴ ἀναλίσκων εἰς 5 ἁ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. ἀμφότεροι δὲ οῦτοι 2 ψεκτοί. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ὁ μὲν κατ' ἕλλειψιν ὁ δὲ καθ' ύπερβολήν. ό άρα έλευθέριος, ἐπειδή ἐστιν έπαινετός, μέσος τις αν είη τούτων. τίς ούν έστίν; ό αναλίσκων είς ά δεί και όσα δεί και ότε δεί.

XXIV. "Εστι δέ και της ανελευθεριότητος είδη 1 πλείω, οίον κίμβικάς τινας καλουμεν καί κυμινοπρίστας και αισχροκερδείς και μικρολόγους. πάντες

- 10 δ' ούτοι ύπό την ανελευθεριότητα πίπτουσιν. $\tau \delta$ μέν γάρ κακόν πολυειδές, τό δ' άγαθόν μονοειδές, οΐον ή μέν ύγίεια άπλοῦν, ή δὲ νόσος πολυειδές. όμοίως ή μέν άρετη άπλοῦν, ή δὲ κακία πολυειδές. πάντες γάρ οῦτοι περί χρήματά είσι ψεκτοί.
- 15 Πότερον ούν του έλευθερίου και το κτήσασθαί 2 έστι και τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι χρήματα; ή ού; ούδε γάρ άλλης άρετης ούδεμιας. ούτε γάρ της ανδρείας έστι το όπλα ποιησαι, αλλ' αλλης, ταύτης δε λαβούσης τούτοις όρθῶς χρήσασθαι, όμοίως ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὕτε δὴ τῆς ἐλευ θεριότητος, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρηματιστικῆς.

XXV. Η δε μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης μέν έστιν 1 χαυνότητος και μικροψυχίας, έστι δε περί τιμήν

¹ Perhaps $\delta\pi\lambda\sigma\pi\sigma\sigma\iota\kappa\eta$ s should be restored in place of $\tilde{a}\lambda\lambda\eta_s$: "this is the task of the armourer; from hum Courage. . . ."

" Or " Meanness " (Rackham).

^b Or " skinflints " (Grant and Rackham).

(Eud. 111. iv. : Nie. IV. i.)

- 1 XXIII. Liberality is a mean state between Prodi-(i) of gality and Illiberality.^a Such affections have wealth ^{Liberality}; for their province ; for the produgal is one who spends excessively for wrong purposes and at wrong times, while the illiberal on the contrary does not spend as much as he ought, nor where he ought nor when.
- 2 Both deserve censure; the one errs in defect, and the other m excess. The liberal man therefore, deserving as he is of praise, will occupy a position midway between them. Who then is thus liberal man? One who spends the right amount, on the right objects, and at the right time.
- 1 XXIV. Of Illiberality there are various forms; we speak for example of the niggards, the grain-splitters,^b the greedy and the penurious. All these fall under the heading of illiberality. Evil takes various forms, where good has only one : health, for example, is a simple thing, but disease is manifold. So too virtue is simple, and vice manifold. For all those whom we have enumerated deserve censure for their misuse of wealth.
- 2 Is it, then, the duty of the liberal man (as such) to acquire property and provide himself wealth? Hardly. Such tasks are not for liberality nor for any other virtue. Courage is not expected to provide arms; a different (activity) provides them, and Courage takes them and uses them aright. So it is with Temperance and the other virtues. Finance therefore, and not Liberality, provides us with wealth.

(Eud. 111. v. : Nic. IV. iii.)

 XXV. Greatness of Soul is a state midway between (5) of Great-Vanity and Littleness of Soul. Its province is honour ness of Soul;

ARISTOTLE

1192 a

καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ περὶ τιμὴν οὐ τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀλλὰ τὴν παρὰ τῶν σπουδαίων, καὶ μᾶλλον ½5 δὲ' δὴ περὶ ταύτην. οἱ γὰρ σπουδαῖοι εἰδότες καὶ κρίνοντες ὀρθῶς τιμήσουσιν· βουλήσεται οῦν μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν συνειδότων αὐτῷ ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμῆς τιμᾶσθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ πᾶσαν τιμὴν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν βελτίστην, καὶ τὰ τίμιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀρχῆς τάξιν ἔχον.

Οἱ μέν οῦν εὐκαταφρόνητοι ὄντες καὶ φαῦλοι, 2
³⁰ μεγάλων δ' αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τιμᾶσθαι οἰόμενοι δεῖν, χαῦνοι· ὅσοι δὲ ἐλαττόνων αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦσιν ἢ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, μικρόψυχοι.
ὁ ἄρα μέσος τούτων ἐστὶν ὅς μήτε ἐλάττονος τιμῆς 3 αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἢ προσήκει, μήτε μείζονος ἢ ἄξιος ἐστίν, μήτε πάσης· οῦτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος.
³⁵ ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἐστὶ χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας.

XXVI. Μεγαλοπρέπεια δ' ἐστίν μεσότης σαλα-1 κωνείας καὶ μικροπρεπείας. ἔστιν δ' ή μεγαλο-1192 b πρέπεια περὶ δαπάνας ầς τῷ πρέποντι γίνεσθαι προσήκει. ὅστις μὲν οῦν δαπανῷ οῦ μὴ δεῖ, σαλά-κων, οῖον εἴ τις ἑστιῷ ἐρανιστὰς ὡς ἂν γάμους τις ἑστιῶν, ὁ τοιοῦτος σαλάκων (ὁ γὰρ σαλάκων τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐν ῷ μὴ δεῖ καιρῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος s τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εὐπορίαν). ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς ὁ ἐναντίος 2

¹ Reading $\eta \mu a \lambda \lambda \delta r \gamma \epsilon$ (? Susemihl) for $\kappa a \mu a \lambda \lambda \delta r \delta \epsilon$ (MSS.).

^a Cf. c. ii. 1 above, Eud. III. v. 10, Nic. I. xii. 8.

^b The word caldxwv comes from Eud. who also gives $\delta a \pi a \nu p / a$, "extravagance," as the excess. Nic. prefers $\beta a \nu a v / a$, "vulgarity," and $d \pi \epsilon \rho p \alpha a l a$, "lack of taste." 524

and dishonour : not such honour as the multitude confer, but that paid by the good—or at any rate the latter kind more than the former. For the good know and judge aright when they honour a man ; a great soul, therefore, will prefer to be honoured by those who know, as he knows, that he is worthy of honour. For he will not concern himself with every kind of honour, but with the best ; with that good which confers honour, and ranks as something original or fundamental.^a

2 Now men who are despicable and of small worth, but account themselves of great worth, and believe moreover that they are entitled to honour, are vain; while they who account themselves of less worth than

3 is their due are little of soul. Between the two, therefore, stands he who, though claiming his full meed of honour, expects neither more than he deserves nor all that man can give; and this is the man who is great of soul. It is clear, therefore, that Greatness of Soul is a state midway between Vanity and Littleness of Soul.

(Eud. III. vi. : Nic. IV. il.)

1 XXVI. Munificence or Magnificence is a state of (0) of soul midway between Ostentation ^b and Niggardliness.⁶ Its province is the expenditure (of large ^{crence} amounts) where due measure should be observed. He who is lavish in the wrong place is ostentations. A man, for example, who entertains the members of his club with all the lavishness of a wedding feast is ostentatious; such being the name we give to one who displays his wealth on the wrong 2 occasion. His opposite is the niggard, who where

" " Pettiness," Giant ; " shabbiness," Rackham,

1192_b

τούτω, ὃς οῦ δεῖ μὴ μεγαλείως δαπανήσει, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν, οἶον εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν δαπανῶν, μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς, ὁ τοιοῦτος μικροπρεπής.¹

⁶Η δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος 3 φανερά ἐστιν οῦσα τοιαύτη οϊαν λέγομεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ 10 ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῷ πρέποντι τὸ μέγα δαπανῷ, ὀρθῶς τῆ μεγαλοπρεπεία τοῦνομα κεῖται. ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀρα ἂν εἶη, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐπαινετή, μεσότης τις ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς τῆς περὶ δαπάνας τὰς προσηκούσας, ἐν οῖς δεῖ.

Εἰσὶ δέ, ὡς οἴονται, καὶ πλείους μεγαλοπρέπειαι, ↓ 15 οἶόν φασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς τ' ἐβάδισε, καὶ ἄλλαι δὴ τοιαῦται μεγαλοπρέπειαι μεταφοραῖς λέγονται, οὐ κυρίως· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἀλλ' ἐν οἶς εἰρήκαμεν.

 XXVII. Νέμεσις δέ έστιν μεσότης φθονερίας ι καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας· ἀμφότεραι γὰρ αὖται ψεκταὶ
 20 εἰσίν, ὅ δὲ νεμεσητικὸς ἐπαινετός. ἔστι δ' ἡ νέμεσις περὶ ἀγαθά, ἅ τυγχάνει ὑπάρχοντα ἀναξίω ὅντι, λυπή τις. νεμεσητικὸς οὖν ὅ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λυπητικός. καὶ ὁ αὐτός γε πάλιν οὖτος λυπήσεται, ἄν τινα ἴδῃ κακῶς πράττοντα ἀνάξιον ὅντα.

¹ Reading δς ού δεῖ μεγαλείως δαπανῆσαι ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖ, σίου εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν, ἡ μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς. ὅ τοιοῦτος μικροπρεπής. (μὴ omitted before μεγαλείως by the Laurentian MS. and another. Perhaps σίον εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν should be placed after δαπανῆσαι.)

^a The intermediate states of Righteous Indignation and Modesty are not regarded as virtues by Nic. or Eud. The former's discussion of them (promised in II. vii.) is broken off at the end of Bk. IV. The latter (III. vii.) extends the conception of $r \neq \mu \sigma \sigma s$ to include pleasure when prosperity or adversity is deserved, as well as pain when they are un-526

lavish expense is called for, either shuts his pursefor example when a wedding or the equipment of a public chorus demands expenditure—or else spends inadequately and unworthily of the occasion. Such a man then is a mggard.

- 3 As for Magnificence, the very word shows that the state is what we describe it to be. Truly is that virtue termed megaloprepeia which lavishes great (mega) wealth on the fitting (preponti) occasion. Magnificence therefore, being a state worthy of prase, lies intermediate between deficiency and excess of fitting expenditure on the right occasions.
- [‡] There are commonly thought to be several kinds of magnificence; men say, for example, "he strode along magnificently"; and there are other similar kinds of magnificence to which the term is applied not properly but metaphorically. True Magnificence is not shown in such matters; but in the province we have defined.

(Eud. III. vii. ; cf. II. iii. and Nic. II. vii.)

1 XXVII. Righteous Indignation stands midway (of Hightbetween Grudge of Good and Pleasure at Ill.^a Both dignation), these are deserving of censure; whereas he who is given to Righteous Indignation is worthy of our praise. Now this feeling is a kind of pain excited by the good things which an unworthy man enjoys. One, therefore, to whom such goods occasion pain, is a man of Righteous Indignation; and the same man will feel pain if he sees another suffering undeserved ills.

deserved. It is thus not merchy "Righteous Indignation," but rather "Love of the Just Meed." As Grant and Rackham observe in their notes on Nie, II. iii. 15, Aristotle in the Rhetoric recognizes that $\phi\theta\delta\sigma\sigma$ s and $\epsilon\pi\chi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\alpha\kappa ia$ are two manifestations of one state of feeling. 1192 b

- ¹ Η μέν οῦν νέμεσις καὶ ὁ νεμεσητικὸς ἴσως 2 ²⁵ τοιοῦτος, ὁ δέ γε φθονερὸς ἐναντίος τούτῳ. ἀπλῶς γάρ, ἀν τε ἄζιός τις ἡ ἀν τε μὴ τοῦ εῦ πράττειν, λυπήσεται. ὁμοίως τούτῷ ὁ ἐπιχαιρέκακος ἡσθήσεται κακῶς πράττοντι καὶ τῷ ἀζίῷ καὶ τῷ ἀναζίῷ. ὁ δέ γε νεμεσητικὸς οῦ [τοιοῦτος], ἀλλὰ μέσος τίς ἐστι τούτων.
- ³⁰ XXVIII. Σεμνότης δέ έστιν αύθαδείας ἀνὰ μέσον 1 τε καὶ ἀρεσκείας, ἕστιν δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις. ὅ τε γὰρ αὐθάδης τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἶος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι (ἀλλὰ τοὕνομα ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρόπου κεῖσθαι· ὁ γὰρ αὐθάδης αὐτοάδης τις ἐστίν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν)· ὁ δὲ ἄρεσκος τοιοῦ- 2
- ³⁵ τος οίος πάσιν όμιλείν και πάντως και πανταχή. ουδέτερος δή τούτων ἐπαινετός, ό δέ γε σεμινός ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων ῶν ἐπαινετός· οὔτε γὰρ πρός πάντας, ἀλλὰ πρός τοὺς ἀξίους, οὕτε πρός οὐθένα, ἀλλὰ πρός τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους.
- 1193 B XXIX. Αίδώς δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ 1 καταπλήξεως, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἃ ἔτυχεν, ὁ δὲ καταħπεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ πάντα καὶ [πρὸς] πάντας εὐλαβούμενος καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ εἰπεῖν (ἄ-

^a In *End.* iii. 7 the treatment of Dignity follows that of Modesty.

^b With Truthfulness, Urbanity and Friendship, Nic. closes his list of Virtues in II. vn. In IV. vi. he distinguishes from Friendship a dispassionate state, for which he finds no name; Eud. calls it $\sigma\epsilon\mu\nu\sigma\etas$ (Dignity). Friendship itself is fully discussed in Nic. VIII. and IX. (Eud. VII.). Eud. (III. vii. 10) denies the name of Virtue to all four states "since they do not proceed from Determination," 528 2 Such perhaps is the feeling, and such the man who feels it. His opposite is the grudging man; who will feel an indiscriminate grudge against the fortunate, whether he descive his good fortune or not. Similarly, the man who rejoices in ill fortune will feel pleasure when another suffers ills, whether he deserve them or not. Not so the man of Righteous Indignation ; his nosition is between the two.

(End. II. m., III. vii. : Nic. II. vn., IV. vi.)

1 XXVIII.^a Dignity occupies a position midway (of Dignity), between Self-Sufficiency and Easy Complansance.^b Its province is social intercourse. The self-sufficient man is one who avoids all intercourse and conversation with his fellows; his very name seems to have been given him from this peculiarity, for the self-sufficient 2 is one who suffices himself. The complaisant ^c man on the other hand will consort with all in every way and under every circumstance. Neither of these is deserving of praise : but the dignified man, holding an intermediate position, does deserve it ; since he neither consorts with all men, nor yet with no man; but with the worthy, and with them alone.

(Eud. H. iii., HI. vil. : Nic. H. vil., IV. iv.)

XXIX. Modesty or Honourable Shame is a mean (of and Bashfulness. betwixt Shamelessness Both actions and words are its province. The shameless man is one who speaks and acts on every occasion and to all men just as occurs to him. His opposite is the bashful ^d man, who shrinks altogether from speech or

VOL. II 2 M 529

Modestv).

1193 a

πρακτος γάρ ό τοιοῦτος, ό πάντα καταπληττόμενος). ή δε αίδώς και ό αιδήμων μεσότης τις τούτων. 2 ούτε γαρ απαντα και πάντως, ώς ό αναίσχυντος, καί έρει και πράξει, ούτε ώς ό καταπλήξ, έν παντί 10 καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράξει καὶ ἐρεῖ έν οίς δεί και ά δεί και ότε δεί.

ΧΧΧ. Ευτραπελία δ' έστι μεσότης βωμολοχίας] καὶ ἀγροικίας, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ [τὰ] σκώμματα. ὅ τε γάρ βωμολόχος έστιν ό πάντα και παν οιόμενος δείν σκώπτειν, ό τε άγροικος ό μήτε σκώπτειν 15 βουλόμενος δεΐν μήτε σκωφθήναι, άλλ' δργιζόμενος. ό δ' εὐτράπελος ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων, ὁ μήτε πάντας 2 καί πάντως σκώπτων μήτ' αύ[τος]¹ άγροικος ών. έσται δε ό εὐτράπελος διττῶς πως λεγόμενος· καὶ γάρ δ δυνάμενος σκώψαι έμμελως, και ός αν ύπομείνη σκωπτόμενος, εὐτράπελος καὶ ή εὐτραπελία τοιαύτη.

20 ΧΧΧΙ. Φιλία δ' έστιν μεσότης κολακείας και 1 έχθρας, έστιν δε περί πράξεις και λόγους· ό μεν γαρ κόλαξ έστιν δ πλείω των προσηκόντων και όντων προστιθείς, ό δε απεχθητικός εχθρός καί τών ύπαρχόντων περιαιρών. οὐδέτερος οῦν ὀρθώς έπαινετός έστίν, ό δε φίλος ανα μέσον τούτων ? 25 ούτε γάρ πλείω των ύπαρχόντων προσθήσει, ούτ'

¹ [ros] bracketed by Spengel.

530

^a Rackham gives "Wittiness... Buffoonery... Boor-ishness." See Grant's notes on Nic. IV. viii, with the references to passages on Wit and Humour in the Rhetoric and Poetics. ^b Or "Flattery."

action towards his fellows; such a man, being complete in bashfulness, is necessarily deharred from 2 action. Honourable Shame, and the man who is inspired by it, stand midway between the two. Such a man will not, hke the shameless man, say and do anything and everything without regard to circumstances; nor, like the bashful man, will he on every occasion and under every circumstance refrain; but will, at the right occasion and time, do and speak what is right.

(Eud. II. iii., III. vii. : Nic. II. vii., IV. viu.)

 XXX. Urbanity is a state intermediate between (of Buffoonery and Dullness ^a: its province is wit and ^{Urbanity),} humour. The buffoon is a man who must needs make jest of everything without discrimination : the dullard is he who dislikes to make a jest, or to be the object of
 one; if he is, he grows angry. The urbane occupies a position midway between. He neither jests on every man or under every circumstance, nor again is he dull of wit. And we shall predicate urbanity of a man

in two senses; for not only is he urbane who can jest gracefully, but urbane, also, is he who takes another's jest in good part. Such is the nature of Urbanity.

(Eud. III. vii.: Nic. II. vii., iv., vi.; and see note on xxviii. I above.)

1 XXXI. Friendship is a state intermediate between (of Friend-Sycophancy ^b and Hatred; both actions and words ^{ship}), are its province The sycophant is one who eulogizes another beyond truth and desert; the hater is his neighbour's enemy, and strips him of the credit that is justly his. Neither of these can rightly be com-2 mended; but midway between them stands the true friend, who will neither attribute to a man more than

ARISTOTLE

1193 a

ἐπαινέσει τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, οὔτ' αὖ πάλω ἐλάττω ποιήσει, οὕτε πάντως ἐναντιώσεται παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ.

XXXII. Ό μέν οῦν φίλος τοιοῦτος· ἀλήθεια δέ 1 ἐστιν μεταξὺ εἰρωνείας καὶ ἀλαζονείας. ἕστι δὴ περὶ λόγους, οὐ πάντας δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών
²⁰ ἐστιν ὁ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὑτῷ προσποιούμενος εἶναι, ἢ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ δ' εἴρων ἐναντίος τούτῷ καὶ ἐλάττω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος αὑτῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἅ οἶδεν μὴ φάσκων, ἀλλ' ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὸ εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς οὐδέτερον τού- 2 των ποιήσει. οὔτε γὰρ προσποιήσεται πλείω τῶν
²⁶ ὑπαρχόντων οὕτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὑτῷ ταῦτα φήσει καὶ εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι.

Εἰ μέν οῦν εἰσιν αῦται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος· ὅτι δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι τῶν εἰρημένων, δῆλον. οἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ζῶντες ἐπαινοῦνται.

XXXIII. Περί δε δικαιοσύνης λοιπόν αν είη 1 είπεῖν, τί έστι καὶ εν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα.

1193 b Πρώτον μέν οὖν εἰ λάβοιμεν τί ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον, ἔστιν δὴ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ῶν τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ νόμον. δίκαια γάρ φασιν εἶναι ἃ ὅ νόμος προσ-2 τάττει. ὅ δὲ νόμος κελεύει τἀνδρεῖα πράττειν καὶ

^a "Self-depreciation," Rackham. See his note on N_ic, II. vii. 12, and Grant's note on N_ic. IV. vii. 3. Observe also that in II. vii. Nic. provisionally terms the virtue $d\lambda \eta \theta \epsilon u$, whereas in IV. vii. he prefers to leave it nameless. ^b Comparing Eud. III. vii. 1-10, we may take these to

^b Comparing *Eud.* III. vii. 1-10, we may take these to be the six states treated in cc. xxvii.-xxxii. See notes on cc. xxvii. 1 and xxviii. 1. 532 has due, nor commend what does not deserve praise; nor on the other hand will be detract, nor ever set himself in opposition unless he feels it is right – Such is the genuine Friend.

(End 11. iii., 111. vii., Nie. II. vii., IV vii.)

XXXII. Truthfulness lies between Dissimulation ^a of (Truthand Boastfulness; words are its province, but words ^{tulness}; of certain kinds only. The boaster is one who claims to possess more than is really his, or to know what he really knows not. His opposite is the dissembler, who pretends to less than is really his. or denies his
 real knowledge, concealing what he knows. The truthful man will avoid both these extremes, claiming neither more nor less than he really possesses, but declaring the truth concerning his qualities and his knowledge.

Now whether these states b are virtues or not, is matter for another discourse. That they are states intermediate between the said extremes is however clear; since those who live in them receive honour.

(The next Chapter is based according to Susemihl on Nic, V = Eud, IV, the Sections corresponding as follows:

1-3, to Nic. V. i. 1-18; 4-14, to iii.-v. 16; 15-21, to vi. 4-vii. 5; 23-26, to vii. 7-viii., with insertions from Nic. 111, ii and v.; 27-30, to ix. 1-7; 31-35, to xi.; and the concluding portion to ix. 8-13.)

¹ XXXIII. We have still to speak of Justice ^o: its (7) of essence, occasions, and province.

In the first place, if we grasp the essential Principle The of Justice,^d we find that it is of two kinds. One of ^{Drinciple} 2 these is Legal Justice; for men say that what the law ^{twofold} enjoins is just. Now the law commands brave and ^{(1) Legal};

δικαιοσύνη. Justice the Virtue or State of soul.
 ^d τὸ δίκαιον: Justice the Rule or Principle.

1193 b

⁶ τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται. διὸ καί, φασίν, δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μέν ἐστιν ἃ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἀρετὰς ὄντα προστάττει, ὁ ὅρα τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίοις τελείως σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ὥστε ὁ δίκαιος ¹⁰ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.

Έν μέν δή τι δίκαιον έν τε τούτοις έστι και περί 3 ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαια ἔστιν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὄντα δίκαιον είναι (ὅ γὰρ σώφρων καὶ ὅ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὅ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ 15 αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος)· ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἄλλο τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δικαίου ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον δικαίοις οῦσιν καθ' αὐτὸν είναι δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅ ζητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα.

Γο τοίνυν δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸ πρὸς ἔτερον ὡς ἑπλῶς 4 20 εἰπεῖν τὸ ἴσον. τὸ γὰρ ἄδικον τὸ ἀνισον ἐστίν ὅταν γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μείζω αὐτοῖς νέμωσι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν τὰ ἐλάσσονα, ἀνισον τοῦτ ἐστί, καὶ οὕτως ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι οἴονται. δῆλον ἄρα 5 ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν ἀνίσοις, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ 25 τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἰσότητι συμβολαίων. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἂν εἴη ὑπεροχῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ πολλοῦ καὶ ὀλίγου. ὅ τε γὰρ άδικος β τῷ ἀδικεῖν πλεῖον ἔχει, καὶ ὁ ἀδικούμενος δὲ τῷ

^b Cf. Plato's definition of Justice as "doing one's own business" (*Republic*, IV. x.).

° The author here diverges from Nic. V. i. 15, where we read that Legal Justice is perfect Virtue, $d\lambda\lambda'$ où $\chi \ d\pi\lambda \hat{\omega}_s$, 534

^a See Rackham on Nic. V. i. 1.

temperate action ; and in a word, all action which we recognize as inspired by the virtues. On this account we are told that Justice or Righteonsness " may be regarded as a kind of perfect Virtue. For if what the law bids us do is just, and the law enjoins actions inspired by all the virtues, he who observes the precepts of Justice given by law is a good man; and so of the just man and his Justice we may predicate a perfect virtue.^b

- 3 This then is one kind of Justice : and such are its occasions and province. Yet it is not this principle, nor the kind of virtue which rules in this province that is the object of our inquiry. A man who observes these rules of Justice may be just even in solitude, since the temperate and self-controlled are such in and by themselves ^e; but Justice in our dealings with our neighbour is something different from this legal Justice of which we have been speaking. The Justice that is seen in our dealings with another cannot be merely self-contained. And it is this (principle of social) Justice, and the corresponding virtue whose province is social hfe, for which we are now inquiring.
- ⁴ Broadly speaking, social Justice may be defined as equality. Injustice is inequality; for example, when (2) Equative, men apportion to themselves the larger share of good things and the less share of evil things, this is unequal,
- 5 and we say that Injustice is done and suffered. Since, therefore, Injustice is found in unequal conditions, the Rule and Virtue of Justice are both manifested when our dealings are on equal terms. Clearly, therefore, the virtue of Justice is a mean betwixt excess and
- 6 defect, nucl and little. By doing Injustice the unjust man receives more; through suffering Injustice the

aλλà πρός ἕτερον, "though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others" (Rackham.)

1193 b

ἀδικείσθαι ἕλαττον τὸ δέ γε μέσου τούτων δίκαιου ἐστί. τὸ δὲ μέσου ἴσου ὥστε τὸ ἴσου ἂν πλείουος
30 καὶ ἐλάττονος cἴη δίκαιου, καὶ δίκαιος δὲ ὁ τὸ ἴσου βουλόμευος ἔχειν. τὸ δέ γε ἴσου ἐυ ἐλαχίστοις 7 δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται· τὸ ẳρα πρὸς ἕτερου ἴσου εἶναι δίκαιου ἐστί, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη.

ἐΕπεί οῦν ή δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίω καί' ἐν ἴσω καὶ 8
ἐν μεσότητι, (καὶ)³ τὸ μὲν δίκαιόν [ἐν]³ τισι
³⁵ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἔν τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ³ μέσον . ὥστε ή δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρός τινας καὶ ἐν τισίν.

Έπεὶ οῦν ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ἀνά- 9 λογον ἴσον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται ἐλαχίστοις· ὡς γὰρ τὸ Α πρὸς τὸ Β, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ. οἶον ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν τὸν 1194 κ τὰ πολλὰ κεκτημένον πολλὰ εἰσφέρειν, τὸν δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα κεκτημένον ἀλίγα· πάλιν ὁμοίως τὸν μὲν πολλὰ πεπονηκότα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν, τὸν δὲ ἀλίγα πεπονηκότα ὀλίγα λαμβάνειν. ὡς δὲ ἔχει ὁ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὸν μὴ πεπονηκότα, οὕτω τὰ πολλὰ 5 πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα. ὡς δὲ ὅ πεπονηκώς πρὸς τὰ πολλά, οὕτως ὁ μὴ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα.

"Εοικεν δέ καὶ Πλάτων τῆ ἀναλογία ταύτη τοῦ 10 δικαίου χρῆσθαι ἐν τῆ πολιτεία. ὅ μὲν γὰρ γεωρ-γός, φησί, σῖτον ποιεῖ, ὅ δ' οἰκοδόμος οἰκίαν, ὅ δὲ ὑφάντης ἱμάτιον, ὅ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὑπόδημα.
10 ὅ μὲν οῦν γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῷ σῖτον δίδωσιν, ὅ δ' οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ οἰκίαν· ὅμοίως δὲ οἱ

¹ Reading Kal $\tau \delta$ δ iKalov (Spengel) for $\epsilon v \delta$ iKalow Kal (MSS.). ² Omitting $\langle Kal \rangle$ (inserted by Rieckher and Susemuhl) and $[\epsilon v]$ (bracketed by the same editors).

wronged man receives less. The mean state betwixt this more and less is Justice; and such a mean is equality. Equality therefore, which avoids alike the more and the less, will be Justice, and the just man, he who desires to share equally with his neighbour; 7 such equality implying at least two terms. So that

- equality with another is Justice, and the man who is satisfied with it is just.
- Since, then, the virtue and principle of Justice are Justice 8 found in equality and in mediety, we speak of Justice proportion. towards someone, of an equality of two or more ally terms, and of a mean betwixt certain extremes; and accordingly virtue and principle alike demand certain persons and a certain sphere for their manifestation
- Seeing, then, that the principle of Justice is an 9 equality, it is the proportionate kind of equality that will be Justice. Now proportion requires at least four terms, being an equality between the two ratios A to B and C to D. It is proportionate, for example, that one who has large possessions should pay a large amount in taxes, whilst he who possesses hitle pays little; and likewise that one who has toiled much should receive much, whilst he who has toiled little also receives little. The ratio of the labours should equal the ratio of the receipts, and the ratios of labour to receipt equal one another.
- Plato apparently makes use of this proportionate 10 Justice in his model State. The farmer, he says, produces food, the builder a house, the weaver a dress, the shoemaker shoes. Accordingly the farmer gives the builder food, and the builder gives the farmer a

³ Reading TIVWV (Spengel) for TIOL (MSS.). (Cf. Nic. V. m. 4 foll.)

⁴ Or, omitting δίκαιον, "it will be the proportionate kind of equality."

1194 a

άλλοι πάντες ούτως έχουσιν ώστε τὰ παρ' αύτοις άντικαταλλάττεσθαι τῶν παρὰ τοις άλλοις.

["]Εστιν δ' ή ἀναλογία αὕτη' ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ 11 οἰκοδόμω, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ ὑ ὑμοίως 15 τῷ σκυτεῖ, τῷ ὑφάντῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀναλογία πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνεται· καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὕτη 〈ἡ〉 ἀναλογία τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δ[™] ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον.

['] Έπεὶ δὲ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πλείονος ἄξιον ποιεῖ τὸ 12 20 αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἢ ὁ σκυτεύς, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλλάτεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεῖ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ ὑποδημάτων δ' οὐκ ἦν οἰκίαν λαβεῖν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνόμισαν, οῦ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνητὰ ἐστίν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτῷ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ἐκάστου διδόντας τὴν ἄλλαξιν 25 ποιεῖσθαι παρ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τούτῷ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν.

²Επεί οῦν τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τοῖς 13 εἰρημένοις ἔμπροσθεν, ἡ περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνη ἂν εἴη τῆ ἕξει³ ὅρμὴν ἔχουσα μετὰ προαιρέσεως περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τούτοις.

^{*}Εστιν δὲ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, οὐ μέντοι 30 γε ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔλεγον. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ῷοντο δίκαιον είναι, ἅ τις ἐποίησεν, ταῦτ' ἀντιπαθεῖν· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν πρὸς ἅπαντας.

house; in like manner all the other producers are inter-related by mutual exchange of their produce.^a

- 11 Now this is the nature of the proportion : as the farmer is to the builder's produce, so is the builder to the farmer's produce. And so too with the shocmaker, weaver, and the rest. The same proportion must be observed between them, and this proportion is the bond of the commonwealth. Justice therefore is proportion; for Justice is the bond of commonwealths. Justice then is the same as proportion.
- 12 But since the produce of the builder is of more value than that of the shoemaker, and difficulty arose in effecting an exchange between them—it being impossible to buy a house with pairs of shoes—the practice became current of using, as common means Currency of buying, the silver which was therefore termed "currency"; and for every purchaser to effect the exchange by giving the value of his purchase (in silver) which thus became the bond of social unity.
- 13 Since then Justice as a principle is concerned with these matters and with those we have previously mentioned, the Virtue whose province they are will be a state of the soul which produces a purposive impulse concerning them and within their limits.^b

Reprisal is also a kind of Justice, though not in the Reprisal sense the Pythagoreans meant. They thought it just for a man to suffer in return whatever he had done; but such reprisal is not just between all men.

^a Republic, II. xi. ^b Cf. c. xx. 10 above.

rather nearer the MSS. "Farmer" and "Builder" seem to stand for the labour each respectively spends on his product. See Stewart on Nic. V. v. 10.

² Putting a full stop at $\pi o \lambda u \tau \epsilon i as$ and reading (with two MSS.) $\delta \eta$ for δ' .

³ Reading τις έξις (Spengel) for τη έξει MSS.

^{1194 a} ου γάρ έστι δίκαιον οἰκέτῃ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον ταὐτόν ¹⁴ ό οἰκέτης γὰρ ἐἀν πατάξῃ τὸν ἐλεύθερον, οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος ἀντιπληγῆναι, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις. καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεποιθὸς δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον. ὡς ³⁵ γὰρ ὁ ἐλεύθερος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δοῦλον τῷ βελτίων εἶναι, οὕτως τὸ ἀντιποιῆσαι πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον ἕξει οὐ γὰρ δίκαιοι, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τιιός, ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνοι, ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν, ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίą· καὶ γὰρ ῆρξε πρότερος καὶ ^{1194 b} ἡδίκησει, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ ἀμφότερα, ὥστε ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλείω ῶν ἐποίησεν δίκαιον ἐστίν.

'Επεί δε το δίκαιον πολλαχώς λέγεται, διοριστέον 15 αν είη ύπερ ποίου δικαίου εστιν ή σκέψις.

"Εστιν δή δίκαιόν τι, ώς φασίν, οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ὁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ (τὸ) δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οῦ ἐστιν ή σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον)· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστά 18 ἐστιν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινωνοὶ γὰρ οἱ πολῖταί τινες, καὶ
¹⁰ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι τῆ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἔτεροι), τῷ δὲ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθέν. οὖτε γὰρ τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὖτε τῆ χειρί, ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν μορίων· ὡσαύτως ἂν οῦν δόξειεν εἰχειν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· ὡσπερ
¹⁵ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός. πλὴν ὅταν 540

14 Justice for instance between slave and free is not the same $\langle as$ that between freemen \rangle . For if a slave strikes a freeman, he will justly receive, not blow for blow, but many blows. But this kind of Justice, too, is contained in proportion. For as the free man is related to the slave in rank, so is the reprisal he may take to the mjury he suffered. And a like proportionateness will govern reprisals between the free. If one man has knocked out another's eye, Justice demands not merely that his eye be knocked out in return, but that he suffer a worse penalty in accordance with the law of proportion. He was the aggressor, and he inflicted an injury; he is therefore guilty of a twofold injustice. So that acts of injustice also fall under the law of proportion : and it is just that one suffer in return more than one has inflicted.

(Nuc. $N_{i} = Eucl. (V, vi)$)

15 Since the word Justice is used in a number of different senses, we must define the kind of Justice we are to investigate.

In the first place, men speak of a Justice between "Domestic slave and master, and between son and father. But Justice" Justice in these relationships would seem identical only in name with social Justice : that social Justice 16 into which we are inquiring. The latter consists chiefly in equality; for fellow-citizens are partners in

eommon, and accept a fundamental parity though their characters differ. But of the relation between son and father, slave and master, Justice is hardly predicable. Justice does not operate between my foot or hand or other of my members and myself; and so it seems to be with son and father. The son may be regarded as a part of his father, until he is separated 1194 b

⁹ ήδη λάβη τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῆ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότ' ήδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητί ἐστιν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολῖται τοιοῦτοί τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι.
 ⁶ Ως δ' αὕτως οὐδ' οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην ἐστὶ 17 δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἐστιν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ
 ⁸⁰ δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν.
 οὐ τοῦτο δέ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔοικεν είναι.

'Αλλά δή τὸ μέν ἐν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνία 18 δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου· χεῖρον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ή γυνή τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' οἰκἐιότερον, καὶ μετέχει ἰσότητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἐγγὺς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα μάλιστά πως ἤδη τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστι δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῆ κοινωνία 19 ὄν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔσται.

80 Τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμω. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἂν μεταπεσόντα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς. λέγω δ' οἶον εἰ τῆ ἀριστερậ 20 μελετῷμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γινοίμεθα ἂν ἀμφι-35 δέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστίν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὐδὲν ἦττον φύσει βελτίω¹ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, κἂν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῆ ἀριστερῷ καθάπερ τῆ δεξιῷ. ¹ Reading ή δεξιὰ. βελτίων.

^a Cf. Oeconomica I. iv., and III. passim.

^b Or "since then one kind of Justice is that which operates 542

from him by attaining manhood. Not till then is he his father's equal and peer, as fellow-citizens would fain be one of another.

- 17 Similarly, and for the same reason, Justice does not operate between slave and master; for the slave is a chattel of his lord. Even if we grant that he has some right in Justice, it is Justice of the domestic on household kind. Not this, however, but social Justice is the object of our research; for this latter appears to consist in equality and parity.
- ¹⁸ On the other hand, the Justice which operates in the partnership of husband and wife approaches near to the social kind. The wife is inferior to her husband, yet closer to him than others (of his household), and in a sense is more nearly his equal than they. Married life, therefore, is closely akin to the partnership between citizens; so that in a sense the Justice that operates hetween the pair is of a kind more social than that between the others.⁴
- 19 Since, then, Justice (in its strict sense) is Justice as Justice shown in the social partnership of the commonwealth, proprio the virtue of Justice and the just man will find their province in this kind.^b

(Nic. $V_* = Eud$, IV. vii.)

Now some kinds of Justice are natural, others Natural conventional. And we must not think of them as and Conventional wholly exempt from alteration. Even nature's rules Justice. 20 are sometimes liable to change. For instance if we all constantly practised throwing with our left hands, we should become ambidextrous; yet the left hand is such by nature, and the right hand is none the less superior to the left, however much we equalize the

in the social partnership of fellow-citizens, there will be scope for Justness and the just man in this kind."

543

1194 b

ούδ' ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φύσει· ἀλλ' εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὕτω διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ οὖσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιά, τοῦτο φύσει ἐστίν.

1195 ⁶ Ωσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίων, μή, εἰ μετα-21 βάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν χρῆσιν, διὰ τοῦτ' οἰκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει; ἀλλ' ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές. ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ 5 ἔστι δίκαιον ἤδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον. βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὃ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν. τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμω, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

Τὸ δ' ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα ὅόξειεν ἂι είναι 22 οὕτω ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἔστι δέ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἐστιν
10 τὸ νόμω ὡρισμένον, οἶον τὸ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι ἄδικον ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἀδίκημά ἐστιν τὸ ἤδη ἀδίκως τι πρâξαι. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα οὐ ταὐτόν τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμω ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγημα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

13 Πότε οῦν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὕ; ὡς ἁπλῶς 23 μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἑκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἑκουσίως ὅ ἦν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῦς ἐπάνω ἡμῖν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδὼς καὶ ῦν καὶ ῷ καὶ οῦ ἕνεκα, οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει. ὅμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ῷ καὶ οῦ ἕνεκα.

^a Nic, V. vn. I on the contrary admits that both types belong to "Social Justice."

^b Understanding πράττει τις or the like. The author's distinction would, I think, be clearer had be written δικαίως here, in l. 14, and m l. 19 instead of τδ διλαιον, τὰ δίλαια, and δίκαιον.

^a See above, I. xii.-xvi., Eud. II. vii.-ix., Nic. III. i,-v.

544

use of the two. Change of use does not abolish the natural distinction. If in general and at most times left retains the familiar character of left, and right of right, the distinction is a natural one.

- 21 And so with the rules of natural Justice. If through our practice they are changed, is there on that account no such thing as natural Justice? Surely there is such a thing. For that which in general prevails is obviously natural Justice; whilst the law we ourselves lay down and observe takes thereby the character of Justice, and is termed by us conventional Justice. Natural Justice, then, is superior to the other kind; but what we are seeking is social Justice; and this is the conventional and not the natural type.^a
- 22So far, Injustice and the wrongful deed might seem injustice to be identical; and yet they differ. Injustice is and Wrongwhat the law defines as such; for example, it is unjust to rob a man of goods he has committed to one's keeping; while a wrong does not occur until one has committed an unjust act. Similarly, Justice and the just deed are not identical; the former is what the law has defined as such, while the just deed consists in doing such things as are just.

(Nic. $V_{i} = Eud_{i} IV_{i} vni_{i}$)

Now when is (a deed) ^b just, and when is it not? In Just Deeds 23 general, we may state that (a man acts justly) when must he done he acts with purposive Choice and voluntarily; what purposely, we mean by voluntarily we have previously defined.^{*e*} ^{voluntarily}, Moreover, it is when he acts knowing the person he knowingly. acts upon, and the instrument and aim of his action, that a man really does a just act. And the unjust man is he who likewise acts with knowledge of person, of instrument, and of aim. But when a man has done 545

VOL. II

1195 a

20 ὅταν δὲ μηθὲν τούτων εἰδώς πράξη τι ἄδικον, ἄδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχὴς δέ. εἰ γὰρ οἰόμενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνειν τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἄδικον μέν τι ἕπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μέντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ.

Έπει ούν το μη άδικειν τα άδικα πράττοντα έν 24 τω άγνοειν έστι τουτο, δ και μικρόν επάνω ελέγετο, 2 όταν μη είδως μήθ' δν βλάπτει μήθ' & μηθ' ου ένεκεν αλλ' ήδη και την άγνοιαν διοριστέον έστίν, πῶς ἂν γινομένης τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὅν βλάπτει, οὐκ άδικήσει. έστω δη ούτος ό διορισμός. όταν μεν 25 γαρ ή άγνοια αίτία ή του πράξαί τι, ούχ έκων τοῦτο πράττει, ώστε οὐκ ἀδικεί ὅταν δε τῆς άννοίας αὐτὸς ή αἴτιος, καὶ πράττη τι κατὰ τήν 30 άννοιαν ής αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἐστίν, οῦτος ἤδη ἀδικεῖ, και δικαίως άδικος ό τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντές τι κακόν άδικοῦσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ώστ' άγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τον πατέρα. όμοίως 26 35 [καί] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὄσαι μὲν γίνονται δι' αύτούς, οί κατά ταύτας άδικοῦντες ἄδικοι· ῶν δὲ μή αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ή ἄγνοια κἀκείνοις ἐστίν αίτία τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πρᾶξαι, οὐκ ἄδικοι. ἔστιν δ' ή τοιαύτη άγνοια ή φυσική, οໂον τὰ παιδία 1195 μ άγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτοις άγνοια φυσική ούσα ού ποιεί δια την

^a Cf. Nic. V. viii. 2 άδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ ' ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἢ, ψέγεται, ἄμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μέν, ἀδίκημα δὲ οὕπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιων προσῆ. 546

something unjust in ignorance of all these things, Thus one he is not unjust, but unfortunate. Supposing, for something example, he has slain his father, thinking that he was unjust slaying a foeman; he has done a thing that is unjust, committing and yet he is only unfortunate, and is guilty of an Unjust unjust action against no man."

- 24 Since, then, the condition of doing what is unjust without committing a wrong is ignorance such as we have described a few lines above; namely, that the deed be done without knowing either the person injured, the instrument used, or the end anned at ; we must further define this ignorance, and show how it must arise, if it is to relieve the agent from the charge of wronging the man whom he harms.
- 25 Let this then be our definition. When ignorance Self-caused is the cause of an action, the agent acts in- Ignorance voluntarily and so is innocent ; except when he is the cause of his own ignorance. In that case, when he acts in self-caused ignorance, (and harms another.) he inflicts a wrong, and will rightly be termed unjust. In the case of the intoxicated, for example, those who do harm under the influence of drink inflict a wrong; since they are the cause of their own ignorance. They were free to refrain from the excess which robbed them of their wits, and allowed them (for 26 example) to strike a father. And so it is with all other kinds of self-caused ignorance. Those who inflict injury therein, are unjust; while those who act in ignorance of which they are not the causewhose ignorance, on the contrary, is of itself the cause of their acting as they do-are not unjust. This kind of ignorance is the "natural" kind. For instance, young children ignorantly strike their fathers; but their ignorance, being a natural one, does not cause

1195 b

πραξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἄδικα· ή γὰρ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δ' ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια, διὸ οὐδ' ἄδικα λέγονται.

- 5 Υπέρ δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι πῶς; πότερον 27 ἐκόντα ἔστιν ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἢ οὕ; δίκαια μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄδικα πράττομεν ἑκόντες, ἀδικούμεθα δὲ οὐκέτι ἑκόντες· τὸ γὰρ κολάζεσθαι φεύγομεν, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοίμεθα ἑκόντες. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν βλάπτεσθαι ὑπομένει· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι βλάπτεσθαι ἐστίν.
- ¹⁰ Ναί, ἀλλ' εἰσί τινες οι δέον αὐτοὺς τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν 28 παραχωροῦσι τισίν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἦν δίκαιον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἔχειν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστίν, ἔλαττον δὲ ἑκών ἔχει, ἑκών ἄρα, φησίν, ἀδικεῖται.

'Αλλ' ἐντεῦθεν δήλον πάλιν ὅτι οὐχ ἐκών. πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἔλαττον λαμβάνοντες ἀντικαταλλάττονται η̈ ¹⁵ τιμην η̈ ἔπαινον η̈ δόξαν η̈ φιλίαν η̈ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ δ' ἀντικαταλλαττόμενός τι ἀνθ' οῦ προἰεται, οὐκέτι ἀδικεῖται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖται, οὐδὲ ἑκῶν ắρα.

"Ετι πάλιν οἱ τὸ ἐλαττον λαμβάνοντες καὶ ἀδικού- 29
μενοι, ἡ οὐκ ἴσον λαμβάνουσιν, οῦτοι καλλωπίζονται
καὶ σεμνύνονται ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅτι φασὶν
ἐξόν μοι ἴσον λαμβάνειν οὐκ ἐλάμβανον, ἀλλὰ

^a Cf. Nic. 111. v. 8.

548

them to be termed unjust on account of such act. The act is caused by ignorance; but for the ignorance they are not themselves responsible ; and so no one calls them unjust.ª

(Nic. V, $\approx Eud$, $1V_{ix}$)

- 27 We must now turn to the case of the sufferer, and Can one ask whether one can voluntarily suffer wrong. It suffer seems impossible; for whilst we act both justly and Wrong? unjustly of our own free will, when we suffer injustice we are no longer free agents. Even just punishment we seek to escape; which clearly shows that we would not voluntarily submit to be wronged Tο suffer a wrong is to be harmed ; and this no man voluntarily endures.
- 28And yet there are some who, though entitled to an equality, yield their right to others. If, then, equality would have been a man's just due, and to receive less is to suffer injustice; and if in spite of this he is content to take less : such a man must, we are told, be suffering injustice of his own free will.

The following consideration will, however, show that here too there is no voluntary (suffering of injustice). All those who take less (than their just duc) are exchanging their duc for honour, praise, credit, friendship, or the like. But he who forgoes one thing and takes another in exchange for it, suffers no injustice. He does not "suffer voluntarily " simply because he suffers not at all.

Moreover those who take less than their due and 29 thus, (we are told,) suffer injustice, in so far as they miss their equal portion, plume and pride themselves on their forbearance. " I might have taken an equal share," they say, "but instead of this I gave way to 549

^{1195 b} παρηκα τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ η τῷ φίλῳ.'' ἀδικούμενος δέ γε οὐδεἰς σεμνύνεται. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδικήμασι μη σεμνύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις σεμνύνονται, ὅλως οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοῦντο οὕτως ἐλαττούμενοι. εἰ δὲ μη ἀδικοῦνται, οὐδ' ἂν ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντο.

- Πρός δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦς τοιούτοις λόγοις¹ ὁ ἐπὶ 30 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς λόγος ἐναντιοῦται· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτὸν τὰ φαῦλα πράττων, καὶ ἐκών γε ταῦτα πράττει, βλάπτει ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰδώς, ὥστε ἑκὼν αὐτὸς ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ἀδικεῖται.
- 'Αλλ' ἐνταῦθα [ό] διορισμὸς προστεθεὶς κωλύσει πον λόγον τοῦτον. ἔστιν δὲ ὁ διορισμὸς οῦτος, τὸ μηδένα βούλεσθαι ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁ δέ γε ἀκρατὴς βουλόμενος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὥστε αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ· βούλεται ἄρα τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν αὑτῷ. ἀλλ' οὐδεἰς βούλεται ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὥστ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἀκρατὴς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἑκὼν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀδικοίη.
- ³⁵ 'Αλλ' ἴσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἁρά 31
 γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ
 ἀκρατοῦς σκοπουμένῳ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχεσθαι. καὶ πάλιν
 οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἃ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτά
 1198 a ἐστιν δίκαια, ὁ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ· καὶ εἰ
 πρὸς ὃν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς κοῦτον εἰ μὴ
 πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα

 1 Keeping, with Stock, rods rowsirous $\lambda \acute{o}yous,$ the reading of the Laurentian and of other MSS.

550

my elder or my friend." But no man who is suffering an injustice prides himself thereon; and if men do not pride themselves on their wrongs, but do pride themselves on such forbearance as this, those who thus accept less than their due can suffer no manuer of injustice. But if they suffer not at all, they cannot " suffer voluntarily."

To all this, and to reasonings of a like character, is Or wrong 30opposed the argument drawn from the case of one humself? lacking self-control.^a Such a man by his evil actions harms himself. These actions are voluntary ; so that he harms himself knowingly; and therefore suffers voluntary mjustice at his own hands.

There is however a definition which if applied here will traverse this argument. It is that "the endurance of miustice is never the subject of a deliberate wish." Now the self-indulgent man, (we are told,) performs the actions suggested by his lack of control with deliberate wish, thus wronging himself; and so wishes to do himself evil. But (according to our definition) no one deliberately wishes to be wronged. It cannot, therefore, be that even the uncontrolled man voluntarily wrongs himself.

Yet at this point a doubt may perhaps still be felt 31 by some, whether after all it is quite impossible for a man to do himself injustice. Not only does the case of the self-indulgent man seem to indicate that he can, but there is besides this further difficulty. If acts which the law enjoins are just, he who does them not is acting unjustly. And if he fails to perform such acts towards one whom the law points out as their proper object, on that man he inflicts injustice. Now the law enjoins that one should be temperate, should

^a See above, cc. xii., xiii., xiv.

1196 a

 είναι, ούσίαν κεκτήσθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελείσθαι, καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὁ ẳρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεί
 ⁵ αύτόν. εἰς οὐθένα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων ἡ ἀναφορὰ ἐστίν.

² Αλλά μή ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθη ήν, οὐδ' ἐν- 32 δέχεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν. τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαπτον, οὐδ' ἐκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα'· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ ¹⁰ ἀδικῶν, ἡ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὅ δ' ἀδικούμενος, ἡ ἀδικεῖται, ἕλαττον. εἰ ἅρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον·οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αῦτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

^{*} Ετι ό μέν ἀδικῶν ἑκῶν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος 33 ¹⁵ ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν ἅμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἑκουσίως πράττειν τι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

^{*}Ετι εἴ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικη- 34 μάτων. ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἤτοι παρακαταθήκην ω ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἤ τι ἀλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιοῦντες· οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὑτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρησεν, οὐδ' ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, οὐδ' ἕκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστίν, τούτων δὲ μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

Ei δè μή, οὐ τό γε πολιτικόν ἀδίκημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ 35 οἰκονομικόν. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ εἰς πλείω μεμερισμένη ἔχει τι αὐτῆς τὸ μèν χεῦρον τὸ δè βέλτιον, ὥστ' εἴ

¹ Omitting одб' ёко́юта а́µа кай а́коюта (bracketed by Ramsauer), 552 hold property, care for one's body, and so forth. The man, then, who does not so act is wronging himself; since to no other object can such unjust deeds be referred.

- 32 Probably, however, this is erroneous, and selfwrong an impossibility. For the same man cannot at the same time have more and less (than his due). But surely he who does injustice, in so far as he does it, takes more (than his due), whilst he who is wronged, in so far as he is wronged, receives less. If then a man really wrongs himself, it is possible for the same person at the same time to have more and less (than his due). This, however, cannot be; whence it follows that self-wrong is impossible.
- 33 Moreover, he who commits an injustice does so voluntarily, while he who suffers one is wronged involuntarily. Hence, if it is possible for a man to wrong himself, it were also possible to do the same action both involuntarily and voluntarily. This however is impossible, so once again we see there can be no such thing as wronging oncself.
- 34 Again, if we take injust acts one by one (the same inference follows). Those who inflict a wrong do so by appropriating a deposit, committing adultery, stealing, or inflicting some other specific wrong. But no man yet robbed himself of his own deposit, or committed adultery with his own wife, or stole his own goods. Wherefore if unjust action consists in such deeds as these, none of which it is possible to do against oneself, to wrong oneself were an impossibility.
- ³⁵ If such an act is at all possible, it is a wrong of the "domestic" and not of the social or civic kind. The soul is divided into several parts, and possesses an inferior as well as a superior element; and any unjust act

1196 a

 τι ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἐν ψυχη ἀδίκημα, τῶν μερῶν ἐστι πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δὲ ἀδίκημα διειλόμεθα
 τῶ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ βέλτιον· ὡς γίνεσθαι πρὸς αὑτὸν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον. οὐ τοῦτο δ' ἡμεῖς ἐπισκοπούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικόν. ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς 36 τοιούτοις ἀδικήμασιν, ἐν οἶς ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

Πότερος δὲ πάλιν ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ^{\$5} ἀδίκημα, ἐν τῷ ἀδίκως ὅτιοῦν ἔχοντι; ἢ τῷ κρίναντι καὶ τῷ ἀπονείμαντι, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν; καὶ γὰρ ὁ λαβών τὸν φοίνικα παρὰ τοῦ ἐφεστῶτος καὶ ταῦτα κρίναντος οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, κἂν ἀδίκως αὐτῷ ἀποδοθῆ· ἀλλ' ἤδη ὁ κρίνας κακῶς καὶ δούς, οῦτος ¹¹⁹⁶ ▷ ἀδικεῖ. καὶ οῦτος ἔστι μὲν ῇ ἀδικεῖ, ἔστι δὲ ῇ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ῇ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀληθεία καὶ τῇ ψύσει ὂν δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν, ταύτῃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ῇ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ

δοκοῦν είναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ. XXXIV. Ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται, 1 5 καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα, καὶ περὶ έκάστης αὐτῶν, ὅτι εἰ πράττοιμεν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ὑγίεια ἅριστ' ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις τὰ

^o See §§ 15-18 above.

^b Cf. § 23 above; according to which the man who acts in error άδικόν τι ἕπραξεν, άδικεῖ μέντοι οὐδένα.

^c That is, with the Moral Virtues ($\eta\theta\iota\kappa ai$ dperal). See Rackham's note on Nic. VI. i. 3.

^σ This is, however, the first mention of this formula (κατά τόν δρθόν λόγον) in the work. It occurs in Nie. II. ii. and Eud. II. v., in both Chapters with promise of future elucidation. This is fulfilled in Nic. VI = Eud. V., to which Book the present chapter mainly corresponds. (Susemill says the 554

done within the soul must be done by one part against another. Now we have distinguished the "domestie" or internal kind of wrongs as done (not to an equal but) to an inferior or a superior; so that in this way a man may be unjust or just towards himself. But it is not this kind of injustice, but the social or civic ³⁶ kind, which we are now surveying.^a We conclude, therefore, that within the limits of those wrongs to which we are confining our research, a man cannot truly commit injustice against himself.

Again ; when a man possesses something to which injustice he is not justly entriled, is it the possessor, or he artsingwho has adjudged and assigned the possession, who another's commits injustice, and is responsible for the wrong? (b) from Take for example an athletic contest. Surely the one's own. man who has received the palm from the presiding judge does no injustice, even if it be unjustly assigned to him The injustice is his who has wrongly adjudged and given the prize. And yet in a sense even he is guiltless. So far as he failed to give a decision just in truth and in fact, he is guilty of injustice; but guiltless so far as his decision was a just one to the best of his own belief.^b

(Nic, VI. = Eud, V. i.)

1 XXXIV. We have dealt with the Virtues,^c their Moral characters, their spheres, and provinces; showing Action in that each of them consists in acting in the best pos- accordance with Right sible way in accordance with Right Principle.^d Now ^{with Right} Principle.^d this formula, "Action in accordance with Right Principle " is no more definite than if we were to say that health would best be attained by the employ-

first three §§ of Nic, VI. i, are certainly spurious.) For dodds $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma see on I. i. 7 above.$

555

1198 b ύγιεινὰ προσφέροιτο. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἀσαφές· ἀλλ' 10 ἐρεῖ μοι, τὰ ποῖα διασάφησόν ἐστιν ὑγιεινά. οὕτως 2 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος;

'Αναγκαίον ίσως έστιν πρώτον μέν, έν ώ ό λόγος έγγίνεται, ύπερ τούτου διελέσθαι. διωρίσθη μέν 3 ουν ύπερ ψυχής ώς τύπω και πρότερον, ότι το μεν 15 αυτής έστι λόγον έχον, το δε άλογον μόριον τής ψυχής έστιν δ' είς δύο την διαίρεσιν έχον το λόγον έχον μόριον της ψυχης, ών έστι τό μέν βουλευτικόν τό δε επιστημονικόν. ότι δε ετερα αλλήλων εστίν. έκ των ύποκειμένων αν γένοιτο φανερόν. ώσπερ 4 γαρ δή ετερά εστιν αλλήλων χρωμά τε και χυμός 20 και ψόφος και όσμή, ώσαύτως και τας αισθήσεις έτέρας αυτών ή φύσις απέδωκεν (ψόφον μεν γαρ άκοή, χυμόν δε γεύσει γνωρίζομεν, χρώμα δε όψει). όμοίως δε και τάλλα τον αυτόν τρόπον δει ύπολαμβάνειν έπει δη έτερα τα ύποκείμενα έστιν, έτερα καί τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς είναι μέρη οίς ταῦτα γνωρίζομεν. 25 έτερον δ' έστι το νοητόν και το αισθητόν ταῦτα δέ 5 ψυχή γνωρίζομεν έτερον άρ' αν είη το μόριον το περί τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν καί προαιρετικών περί τα αίσθητα και έν κινήσει καὶ ἑπλῶς ὄσα ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορậ ἐστίν. 80 βουλευόμεθα γὰρ ὑπέρ τούτων ἅ ἐφ' ἡμιν ἐστιν καὶ 6 πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι προελομένοις, περὶ ἄ ἐστιν [καί] βουλή και προαίρεσις του πράξαι η μή πράξαι.1 ταθτα δ' έστιν αίσθητα και έν κινήσει του μετα-

 1 A curiously redundant clause. Can it be a "gloss" on the preceding one?

556

ment of healthy measures. We might justly be asked 2 to define those healthy measures; and so we may be asked, what is this Rational Principle, and when is it " Right "?

Perhaps we ought to begin by giving a clear and definite account of that wherein Rational Principle

- 3 originates. Now we have already sketched in outline Parts of the nature of the soul, distinguishing its rational part (i) Rational from its irrational.^a And this rational part is again and (ii) Irrational; divisible into two : the property of one being to de- the former liberate on action and that of the other to acquire (1) Delibera-tion (1) Delibera-
- knowledge. That these are distinct may be proved Belentine. 4 by comparing their respective provinces. We know that colour, flavour, sound and smell are all distinct, and that Nature has assigned distinct senses to perceive them; since we recognize sound by hearing, flavour by taste, and colour by sight. A similar distinction must be applied to our other faculties. The provinces being different, different also must be the parts of the soul whereby we take cognisance of them.
- 5 Now the objects of Understanding and of Sense are distinct, though we take cognisance of both by means of the soul. It follows that the parts of the soul concerned with them are likewise distinct. Now the deliberative and purposive faculty is concerned with objects of sense; with things in motion; and-to speak comprehensively---with whatever is liable to
- 6 growth and decay. We deliberate on what 1s in our power to do or not to do by purposive action; (in other words,) on matters which admit of deliberation and of purpose whether positive or negative ; such matters being perceptible by sense, and subject to the movement of change. So that, according to our

^a See cc. iv. 7-v. 1 above.

1198 b

βάλλειν· ωστε τὸ προαιρετικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστίν.

Τούτων δη διωρισμένων, μετά ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν 7 36 εἴη, ἐπειδη ὑπὲρ τἀληθοῦς ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τἀληθὲς ὡς ἔχει σκοπούμεθα, ἔστιν δ' ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις νοῦς σοφία ὑπόληψις, περὶ τί δη ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστίν.

'Η μέν οῦν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ περὶ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ 8 1197 = τοῦτο μετ' ἀποδείζεως καὶ λόγου διατεινόμενον.¹

'Η δε φρόνησις περί τὰ πρακτά, εν οις αίρεσις και φυγή και εφ' ήμιν εστιν πράξαι και μή πράξαι.

*Εστιν δη των ποιουμένων και πραττομένων ού 9 ταὐτὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν και πρακτικόν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ η ποιητικῶν ἐστί τι παρὰ την ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, οἶον παρὰ την οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ποιητική οἰκίας, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ την ποίησιν, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς και τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθὲν 10 τέλος παρ' αὐτην την πραξιν, οἶον παρὰ τὸ κιθα-10 ρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια και ἡ πραξις. περι μὲν οῦν την ¹ Reading διατεινομένων (of. Nic. 1X, vin. 7).

" " Intelligence " (Rackham).

^b The nouns (with one exception) are those adopted by Mr. Rackham in Nic. VI. 11. The adjectives will help in elucidating further the connotation of the Greek terms. On comparing the two lists, it will be seen that the author rejects $\tau \epsilon_{XYY}$ —Art—and admits $i\pi \delta \lambda \eta \psi_B$ —Conception—instead. See Grant's note on Nic. VI. iii. 1, and the extract there given from Analytica Posteriora I. xxxiii. 8.

"" Science " (Grant) ; " Scientific Knowledge " (Rackham).

558

MAGNA MORALIA, I. AXXIV. 6-10

reasoning, the purposive faculty of the soul is concerned with perceptible things.

(Nic. $VI_{\cdot} = Eud_{\cdot} V_{\cdot}$ ini.)

- 7 Having made the above distinctions we must pro-Intellectual ceed a step further. The subject of our discourse $\frac{Faculties}{Whose}$ is Truth, and we are considering what the nature of $\frac{Object}{Truth}$: Truth may be. (For its attainment) we possess the following kinds of Thought; Scientific, or Knowledge; Practical, or Prudence; Intuitive, or Intuition^a; Philosophical, or Wisdom; and Apprehensive, or Conception.^b What, then, are the kinds (of Truth) with which they severally deal ?
- 8 Scientific Thought, or Knowledge,^c is concerned Knowledge, with the knowable, when we strive (to know it) by means of demonstration and reasoned discourse.

(Nic. $VI_{\cdot} = Eud_{\cdot} V_{\cdot} v_{\cdot}$)

Practical Thought, or Prudence, deals with the Prudence, sphere of actions; where election and rejection are alike open to us, and it lies in our power to act or not to act.

9 (Now the faculty by which we make what we make (distinue is different from the faculty by which we do what we guished do. The former kind of faculty has an end over and above the process itself. The art of building, for example, since it possesses the faculty of making a house, has, over and above that process, the house as its end; and so it is with the art of carpentry and

10 other constructive arts. In the case of the other faculties, however,—those which do, but make not, —there is no other end apart from the action or process itself. Harping, for example, has no further end; the activity or practice itself being its own end.

1197 n πράξιν καὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν καὶ τὰ ποιητὰ ἡ τέχνη ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ποιητοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐστι τὸ τεχνάζεω.
"Ωστε ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἶη ἕξις τις προαιρετικὴ 11
15 καὶ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι, ὅσα εἰς τὸ συμφέρον ἤδη συντείνει.
ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή, ὡς δόζειεν ἄν, οὐκ 12 ἐπιστήμη. ἐπαινετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ φρόνιμοι, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς· ἔτι δ' ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετὴ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς
20 ἔοικεν, αὐτό τἰ ἐστιν ἀρετή.

Ο δε νοῦς ἐστι περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν νοητῶν καὶ 18 τῶν ὅντων· ἡ μεν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς.

⁶Η δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ συγ- 14 ¹⁵ κειμένη. ἕστιν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἤδη δεικνύμενα, περὶ ἅ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτὴ¹ μετέχει, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὅντα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἔκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης συγκειμένη, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν περὶ ταὐτά, περὶ ἅ καὶ ὅ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

¹ Reading, with several MSS., αύτη.

^a This digression, distinguishing between the faculty of action ($\phi\rho\phi\eta\sigma\mu$) and that of construction ($\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\eta$), corresponds to Nic. VI. (Eud. V.) iv.

^b Cf. c. v. 2 above, and note there.

⁶ Cf. Nia. VI. v. 3 οὐκ ἀν εἰη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ τέχνη· ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἀλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἀλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως . . . [. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν . . δῆλον οῦν ὅτι ἀρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. 560 Now Prudence or Practical Thought is concerned with what we can do and the doing of it, while Art or Handicraft is concerned with what we make and its making ; craftsmanship being manifested in what is made rather than in what is done.) a

- 11 Prudence, therefore, will be a state of the soul which purposes and performs such actions as it rests with us to do or not to do; and such as contribute to our
- 12 welfare. Nor, apparently, is this Practical Thought a and from kind of Science; but a virtue or excellence (of the soul). Science or Knowledge), For the prudent merit praise ; and praise is the meed of virtue.^b Moreover, whereas every kind of Science or Knowledge has its own peculiar excellence, there is no excellence of Prudence, which appears on the contrary to be itself a kind of excellence or virtue.^c
- 13 Intuitive Thought, or Intuition, deals with the Intuition, principia of the intelligible and truly existent world. For whereas Scientific Thought considers what can be demonstrated, the first principia are undemonstrable ; so that they fall within the province not of Science but of Intuition.

(Nic. V1. = Eud, V, vii.)

Philosophic Thought or Wisdom is a compound of Philosophic Scientific Thought and Intuition. It is concerned Wisdom, 14 firstly with the *principia*, and then with truths which we demonstrate by their aid; those in fact which are the province of Science. So far, therefore, as Philosophic Thought deals with principia, it partakes of Intuition; and so far as it deals with what can thereafter be demonstrated, it partakes of Scientific Thought, or Knowledge. Clearly then it is (as we have said) a compound of these two kinds of thought ; and its province is thus coterminous with theirs.

VOL. II.

561

1197 a 300 'Η δε υπόληψίς εστιν, ή υπερ άπάντων επ- 15 αμφοτερίζομεν, πρός τό και είναι ταυτα ούτω και μή είναι.

 Πότερον δ' έστιν ή φρόνησις και ή σοφία ταὐτόν; 16
 η οὕ; ή μὲν γὰρ σοφία ἐστιν περι τὰ μετ' ἀποδείξεως και ἀει ὡσαύτως ὄντα, ή δὲ φρόνησις οὐ περι
 ³⁵ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ περι τὰ ἐν μεταβολη ὅντα. λέγω δὲ οἱον εὐθὐ μὲν ἢ καμπύλον και κοῖλον και τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἀει τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα οὐκέτι οὕτως ἔχουσιν τὸ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο τι μεταβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλουσιν, και νῦν μὲν συμφέρει τοῦτο, αὕριον δ' οὕ, και τῷ μέν, τῷ δ' οὕ, και οὕτω μὲν συμφέρει,
 1197 ὑ ἐκείνως δὲ οὐ συμφέρει. περι δὲ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἡ δὲ σοφία οὕ. ἕτερον ἅρα ἡ σοφία και ἡ φρόνησις.

σοφία και ή φρόνησις. Πότερον δ' έστιν ή σοφία ἀρετή ἢ οῦ; διὰ τοῦτο 17 δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, ὅτι ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ^b φρονήσεως. εἰ γὰρ ή φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τοῦ μορίου τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, ἔστιν δὲ χείρων ή φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας (περι χείρω γὰρ ἐστίν ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία περι τὸ ἀίδιον και τὸ θεῖον, ὡς φαμέν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περι τὸ συμφέρον ἀνθρώπω), εἰ οῦν τὸ χεῖρον ἀρετὴ ἐστί, τό γε ¹⁰ βέλτιον εἰκός ἐστιν ἀρετὴν είναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ή σοφία ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.

⁶ Ή δε σύνεσις τί εστιν η περί τί; εστιν δ' η 18 σύνεσις εν οίσπερ και η φρόνησις, περί τα πρακτά. δ γάρ συνετός που λέγεται τῷ δυνατός βουλεύεσθαι

^a Excluded from the list of "Faculties of Truth" in Nic. VI. lii. on the ground that (like Opinion) it may mislead. 562

- Apprehensive Thought, or Conception a is that Conception 15 faculty by which we hold different opinions on all kinds of subjects, conceiving that they are so, or that they are otherwise.
- Are Practical and Philosophie Thought identical ? Instinction Surely not. The latter deals with demonstrable truth Prodonce 16 - 16and with invariable fact; while Practical Thought is con- and Wisdom cerned not with these but with the world of changing phenomena. For example, such facts as straightness, curvature, concavity are always the same; but with expediency it is otherwise. So far from being exempt from change, it changes; the same thing may be expedient to-day, but not to-morrow; expedient for me, but not for you ; expedient under some circumstances, but not under others. And matters of expediency are the province of Practical, not of Philosophic Thought. These two faculties are accordingly distinct.
- 17 Is Philosophic Thought, or Wisdom, a virtue or not? The one is a By comparison with Practical Thought we may show Virtue of the Deliber. that it is. Prudence or Practical Thought is a virtue, ative Part as we assert, of one of the two rational divisions of other of the the soul; but it is lower than Philosophie Thought, Scientific Part. since its province is an inferior one. For whilst Wisdom, as we assert, deals with the eternal and the Divine, Prudence is concerned with what is expedient for us men. If, then, the lower faculty is a virtue, it is surely reasonable to suppose that the higher one Clearly, therefore, Philosophic is also a virtue. Thought is a virtue.
- 18 What is the nature of Shrewdness or Sagacity, and Shrawdness what is its province? It operates in the same field as Prudence ; that, namely, of practical affairs. Men, I take it, are termed shrewd because they are able

(είναι > καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀρθῶς τι κρίναι καὶ ἰδεῖν· περὶ 16 μικρῶν δὲ καὶ ἐν μικροῖς ἡ κρίσις αὐτοῦ. ἔστιν οῦν ή σύνεσις καὶ ὁ συνετὸς μέρος τι φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ φρονίμου, καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν χωρίσαις τὸν συνετὸν τοῦ φρονίμου.

Όμοίως δ' ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς 19 δεινότητος. ἡ γὰρ δεινότης καὶ ὁ δεινὸς οὐκ ἔστι
μὲν οὕτε φρόνησις οὕτε φρόνιμος, ὁ μέντοι φρόνιμος δεινός, διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ πως τῆ φρονήσει ἡ δεινότης· ἀλλὰ δεινὸς μὲν καὶ ὁ φαῦλος λέγεται, οῖον 20 Μέντωρ δεινὸς μὲν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ φρόνιμος ῆν. τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου καὶ τῆς φρονήσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῶν βελτίστων ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τούτων προαιρετικὸν
είναι καὶ πρακτικὸν ἀεί, τῆς δὲ δεινότητος καὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ σκέψασθαι ἐκ τίνων ἂν ἕκαστον γένοιτο τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὸ ταῦτα πορίσαι.

Δόξειεν αν ούν είναι ό δεινός έν τοις τοιούτοις τε και περί ταυτα.

Απορήσειε δ' άν τις καὶ θαυμάσειε, διὰ τί ὑπὲρ 21 ήθων λέγοντες καὶ πολιτικῆς τινος πραγματείας
³⁰ ὑπὲρ σοφίας λέγομεν. ὅτι ἴσως γε πρῶτον μὲν οὐδ' ἀλλοτρία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ή σκέψις ή ὑπὲρ aὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὡς φαμέν. ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν φιλοσόφου καὶ περὶ τούτων παρεπισκοπεῖν ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνουσιν ὅντα. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον 22

1197 b

^a Prudence and Shrewdness (or Understanding, as Mr. Rackham translates the word) arc similarly contrasted in Nic. VI. x. But there the distinction is that the former gives precepts, whereas the latter only pronounces judgements. 564

counsellors, and can judge and discern anglit; the judgement of the shrewd, however, is in and about matters of small importance. Shrewdness, therefore, is essentially a part of Prudence, and the shrewd man, $\langle as such, \rangle$ a part of the prudent man. To separate him from the prudent is impossible.^a

(Nic. VI. = Eud. V. xn. 9.)

- ¹⁹ The case of Cleverness would seem to be similar. Cleverness, Cleverness and the clever man are not identical with Prudence or the prudent man; yet the prudent man is clever; wherefore Cleverness acts as a kind of
- 20 auxiliary to Prudence. But the bad man as well as the good may be styled clever; even as Mentor was regarded as clever, though prudent he was not. For whereas it is the task of the prudent and of Prudence to aim at what is best, and to be ever ready to purpose it and put it into action, it is the part of Cleverness and of the elever man to consider the conditions necessary for every action, and to see that they are forthcoming.

Such then would appear to be the sphere and province of the elever man.

21 That in a treatise on morals, while we are discussing the social relations of man, we should introduce the subject of Philosophic Thought, may cause some difficulty and surprise. In the first place, we may suggest that the consideration of this kind of thought is not altogether alien to our theme, since it is, as we assert, a virtue. In the second place, it may not beseem a philosopher ill if he extends his survey to other phenomena (than those with which he is mainly concerned) if their region or seat is the 22 same ; indeed, it may be our duty, as we are speaking 565

1197 b δέ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχη λέγομεν, περὶ ἀπάντων 35 λέγειν έστι δε και ή σοφία εν ψυχη. ώστε οὐκ άλλοτρίως ύπέρ * * ψυχής' ποιούμεθα τούς λόγους. "Ωσπερ δ' έχει ή δεινότης πρός φρόνησιν, ούτως 23 δόξειεν αν έχειν επί των αρετών άπασων. λέγω δε οίον είσιν άρεται και φύσει έν εκάστοις εγγινόμεναι, οΐον δρμαί τινες έν έκάστω άνευ λόγου πρός τά 1198 & ανδρεία και τα δίκαια και καθ' έκάστην πρός τα τοιαθτα είσι δε δή και έθει και προαιρέσει. αι δε 24 δή μετά λόγου ούσαι τελέως άρεταί είσιν έπαινεταί έπιγινόμεναι. έστιν οῦν ή φυσική ἀρετή αὕτη ή άνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μέν τοῦ λόγου μικρά καὶ · ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καί την προαίρεσιν προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεί την αρετήν. διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγω καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν² άνευ τοῦ λόγου ή φυσική δρμή προς άρετήν. οὐδ' 25 αθ δ λόγος και ή προαίρεσις ου πάνυ τελειουται 10 τω είναι άρετή άνευ της φυσικής όρμης. διό ούκ ορθώς Σωκράτης έλεγεν, φάσκων είναι την αρετήν λόγον ούδεν γαρ όφελος είναι πράττειν τα ανδρεία καί τὰ δίκαια, μὴ είδότα και προαιρούμενον τώ λόγω. διο την αρετην έφη λόγον είναι, ούκ ορθως,

¹ Reading a $\dot{v}r\tilde{\eta}s$ (Spengel) for $\psi v_X \tilde{\eta}s$ (MSS.). Susemilul suspects a lacuna.

2 Reading ούκ έστι <τελεία>.

^a This apology does not appear in Nic. or Eud. That Philosophic Thought is a "virtue" would not prima facile entitle it to a place in a treatise on Ethics, since it is obviously an intellectual and not an ethical virtue. $Cf. \S 1$ above.

^b See c. iv. 9 above.

 $^{^{\}circ}$ For the importance of Habit in the formation of Virtue see Nic. II. i.

of the phenomena of soul, to include them all in our discourse. Now Philosophic Thought is a phenomenon of soul; so that in dealing with it we are not really wandering from our subject.^a

(Nic. VI. - End, V. xni.)

23 We may suppose that there are states of soul Moral Virtue related to the other virtues as Cleverness is related (1) natural, and (2) to Prudence. I mean that in every province there rational. is a kind of excellence which arises spontaneously by nature ; irrational impulses b towards what is brave and just, or otherwise in accordance with one of the 24 true virtues. Other excellences arise from habitude \circ and purposive Choice a; and it is only to those which are conscious of a Rational Standard or Rule that we assign the full rank of virtues. They appear later, and are worthy of praise." And so the natural kind of virtue, being of itself irrational, when divorced from any such Rule is a slight thing and fails to win praise; but when it is associated with a Standard and a deliberate Choice, the result is the full and complete sort of virtue. In producing virtue, therefore, the natural impulse collaborates with the Rule, and does not reach completeness apart from it; 25 nor on the other hand do the Rational Rule and deliberate Choice ever reach their consummation in virtue without the natural impulse. Socrates, therefore, was mistaken when he declared that Virtue was merely a Rational Rule, on the ground that it is useless to act in a brave and just manner unless one knows what one does and makes a rational choice. On this account he pronounced Virtue to be a Rational

^d See cc. xi. and xvii. above.

See cc. ii. 2 and xxxiv. 12 above.

¹¹⁹⁸ ^a άλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
¹⁵ πράττειν τὰ καλά, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ὀρθῶς 26
μèν οὐδ' οὖτοι. πράξαι μèν γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ δίκαια
προαιρέσει μèν οὐδεμιậ, οὐδὲ γνώσει τῶν καλῶν,
ἀλλ' ὁρμῆ τινι ἀλόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ
τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς
κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν)· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοιαύτη
20 πρâξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς
ήμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μὰτ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν
πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετή καὶ

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἢ οὕ, ἀπορή-27 σειεν ἄν τις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον ὅτι ἀρετή. εἴπερ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ 25 ἀνδρεία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί, διότι τῶν καλῶν πρακτικαί, καὶ ἐπαινεταὶ εἰσίν, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἄν τι εἰη καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀρετῆς τάζει ὄντων. ἐφ' ἂ γὰρ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὅρμậ πράττειν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ὡς ἂν αῦτη προστάττῃ, οῦτω καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία πράττει, ⁸⁰ ῶστε εἰ αὐτὴ ἐπαινετὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἂ ἂν ἡ φρόνησις προστάττῃ, ἥ γε φρόνησις τελείως ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐπαινετὴ καὶ ἀρετή.

^a That is, not the mere act, but the state of soul in which it is performed or willed, determines its moral excellence. For the $(d\rho ds) \lambda \delta \gamma s$ see note on § 1 above. In Nic. VI. xiii. 5 it seems to be actually identified with $\phi \rho \delta \gamma \eta s$; but this is perhaps an inexactitude, and the former should be distinguished as the rational Standard and the latter as the 568

Rule; but he was in error, and the moralists of to-day do better when they define virtue as "noble action in 26 agreement with right Principle." Yet even here there is a mistake. One might act justly with no deliberate purpose, nor knowledge of what is noble, but under some irrational impulse; and yet one's acts might be right and in accordance with right Rule; in cases, I mean, where one has acted as the Rule *nould* prescribe. But such action does not carry any title to praise. Better, as we do, to define Virtue as the "impulse towards what is noble," guided by Rational Principle; such a state of the soul is a true virtue, and a thing which deserves praise.^a

27 Now some may feel a doubt whether Prudence, or Practical Thought, is itself a virtue or not.^b The following considerations however will prove that it is. For since Justice and Courage and the other (recognized) virtues are deserving of praise because they inspire noble acts, on the same grounds it is clear that Prudence too is a thing worthy to be commended and placed among the virtues. For it impels us to the same acts as Courage. In every case, Courage acts as Prudence directs; so that if the former itself wins honour by doing the behests of the latter, surely Prudence has every right to be regarded as a praiseworthy state and a true virtue.

rational Faculty which sets it up. (See Rackham's and Burnet's notes on the above passage.)

^b The sense in which Prudence is a "virtue" has already been discussed in § 12, where it is shown to be an "excellence of the Deliberative soul." Here the status of a virtue seems to be claimed for it because it co-operates with the moral Virtues—" excellences of the Irrational soul." §§ 27-29 correspond to nothing in Nic. VI.

1198 a Πότερον δ' έστιν ή φρόνησις πρακτική ή ου, ίδοι 28 άν τις έντεῦθεν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐπιβλέψας, οἶον έπι την οικοδομικήν. ἔστιν γάρ, ώς φαμέν, έν 35 οἰκοδομική ὃ μέν ἀρχιτέκτων τις καλούμενος, ὃ δè ύπηρετών τούτω οἰκοδόμος· οῦτος δ' ἐστίν ποιητικός οἰκίας. ἐστίν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καθὸ ούτος εποίει οικίαν, ποιητικός οικίας. όμοίως δε έπι των άλλων των ποιητικών έχει, έν αίς έστιν 1198 b άρχιτέκτων και ύπηρέτης τούτου. ποιητικός άρα τινός και ό άρχιτέκτων έσται, και τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου $(0\hat{v})^1$ ποιητικός και ό ύπηρετικός. εί τοίνυν 29 όμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει, ὅπερ εἰκὸς καὶ εύλονον, και ή φρόνησις αν είη πρακτική. αι γαρ s ἀρεταὶ πασαι πρακτικαὶ εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ὥσπερ άρχιτέκτων τις αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅπως γὰρ αὕτη προστάξει, ούτως αί άρεται και οι κατ' αυτάς πράττουσιν· έπει οῦν αι άρεται πρακτικαί, και ή φρόνησις πρακτική ἂν είη.

Πότερον δὲ αὖτη πάντων ἄρχει τῶν ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ, 30 ¹⁰ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπορεῦται; ἢ οὖ; τῶν γὰρ βελτιόνων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν, οἶον τῆς σοφίας οὐκ ἄρχει. ἀλλά, φησίν, αὕτη ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων, καὶ κυρία ἐστὶ προστάττουσα.

'Αλλ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκία ὁ ἐπίτροπος. 31 οῦτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ· ἀλλ' οῦπω οῦτος ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ 15 δεσπότη σχολήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ κωλυόμενος

¹ <05> inserted by Bonitz and Bussemaker. Breier inserts it after mongrixos. 570

Whether Prudence is practical and leads to 28^{-1} action, or not, we can see by comparing the case of a handicraft such as building. In building, we recognize a director, whom we call architect, and a builder, who carries out his behests. The latter has the power of constructing a house, and this power the architect shares inasmuch as the house was also his work. So too it is with the other constructive arts, where there is this distinction between master and journeyman. The architect is himself a constructor of something; of that very thing, namely, which the journeyman too constructs. 29 If then the same holds good of the (moral) virtues, as there is every reason to suppose, Prudence too will be active or practical. For all the virtues inspire to action, and Prudence is their architect or mastercraftsman; for as she enjoins, so the virtues act, and those who act in accordance with them Since, then, the virtues are practical, so too will Prudence be practical.

(Nic.
$$VI. = Eud. V. xin.$$
)

- 30 Is Prudence mistress of all the soul's faculties, as Prudence some think, though others doubt it ? Hardly so. One the Steward of Wisdom. (than herself); she is not, for instance, dominant over Wisdom or Philosophic Thought. Still, it is urged, she has all the faculties in her care, and the right of issuing orders to them.
- 31 Perhaps her position is rather that of a steward or housekeeper. Such an one has rights over everything in the house, and exercises dispensation thereof; still, he is not the master of all, but ministers leisure to his lord, so that he, undistracted by the care of

1198 b

ύπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκλείηται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκόντων πράττειν. οὕτω καὶ ὅμοίως 32 τούτῷ ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπός τίς ἐστι τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτῃ σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ 20 ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα. daily necessities, may not be debarred from any of those noble actions which befit him.

32 So hkewise, Prudence or Practical Thought is a dispenser or steward to Philosophic Thought, ministering to it leisure and the freedom to perform its own task, by restraining and disciplining the passions of the soul.

.

1198 b

I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἐπιεικείας δέοι ἂν τὴν 1 25 ἐπίσκεψιν ποιήσασθαι, τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ ποῦα. ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἐπιείκεια καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς τῶν δικαίων τῶν κατὰ νόμον. ἅ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ἀλλὰ καθόλου λέγει, ὁ ἐν τούτοις παραχωρῶν, καὶ ταῦθ' αἱρούμενος ἅ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐβού-50 λετο μὲν τῷ¹ καθ' ἕκαστα διορίσαι, οὐκ ἠδυνήθη δέ, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικής. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ἐλαττωτικὸς τῶν δικαίων ἁπλῶς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσει καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων δικαίων οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον, ἅ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατῶν ἀπέλιπεν.

II. 'Η δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνη καὶ ὁ εὐγνώμων ἐστὶν περὶ 1
 ³⁵ ταὐτὰ περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, περὶ τὰ δίκαια [καὶ]
 τὰ ἐλλελειμμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῷ μὴ ἀκριβῶς
 διωρίσθαι, κριτικὸς ῶν τῶν ἐλλελειμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ
 νομοθέτου, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νομο θέτου ἐλλέλειπται, ἔστι μέντοι δίκαια, ὅ τοιοῦτος
 1199 ε εὐγνώμων.

"Εστι μέν οῦν οὐκ ἀνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνω-¹ "τῷ falsum" Susemihl.

В

^a Grant and Rackham translate by "Considerateness"; a word which bears a moral connotation that seems better to fit $\ell melkela$. The $\ell melekela$ has not only $\gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta$ but also $\sigma \nu \gamma \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta$; perhaps "Consideration" might be kept for this latter term. (In Nic. VI. xi. 1, I would suggest, following 574

BOOK II

(Nic. I. v. = Eud. IV. s.)

I. We must now discuss Equity or Considerateness : Equity 1 its nature, its field and province. Now Equity, and the equitable or considerate man, are distinguished by readiness to take less than their just legal right. Where the lawgiver is unable to make mee distinctions, but lays down broad general rules, a man who there stands aside, and is content with what the lawgiver would have assigned him had he been able to distinguish individual cases, is an equitable man. He is not indeed one who always waives the fulfilment of his just claims; what is naturally and essentially just, he does not waive, but only such legal claims as the lawgiver was obliged to leave unqualified.

(Nic, VL = Eud, V, XL)

II. Discrimination,^a and the man who possesses it, Discrimina-1 are concerned with the same matters as Equity; tion. namely with those rights which the lawgiver has left insufficiently distinguished. Of such rights the discriminating man has a keen appreciation. He recognizes that the lawgiver has passed them over, but that they are none the less rights. Such a man we eall discriminating.

Discrimination, then, is closely associated with the lead of Trendelenburg and Stewart, $\dot{\eta} \delta \dot{\epsilon} [\sigma v \gamma \gamma v \dot{\omega} \mu \eta]$ γνώμη έστι κριτική του έπιεικούς [ορθή] ορθή δ' ή του άληθούς). 575

1199 a

μοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν [καί] κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς.

III. 'Η δέ γε εὐβουλία ἐστὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτὰ τῆ 1
φρονήσει (περὶ γὰρ τὰ πρακτά ἐστι τὰ περὶ αἴρεσιν καὶ ψυγὴν ὅντα), ἔστιν δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ ψρονήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ τούτων ἐστί, ἡ δὲ εὐβουλία ἔξις ἢ διάθεσις ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἡ ἐπιτευκτικὴ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς βελτίστων καὶ συμφορωτάτων. διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐβουλίας ἂν 2
¹⁰ δόξειεν, τὰ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου συμβαίνοντα κατὰ τρόπον. οἶς γὰρ μή ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὁ σκοπῶν τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴποις, ῷ συνέβη τι κατὰ

τρόπον, τοῦτον εὔβουλον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχῆ· τὰ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κρίνοντος γινόμενα κατορθώματα εὐτυχήματα ἐστίν.

Πότερον δέ ποτε τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶν τὸ τῆ ἐντεύξει 3 ¹⁵ τὸ ἴσον ἐκάστῷ ἀποδιδόναι (λέγω δὲ οἶον, ὅποῖος ἂν ἡ ἕκαστος, τοιοῦτον γινόμενον ἐντυγχάνειν); ἢ οῦ; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ κόλακος καὶ ἀρέσκου δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκάστῷ ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἔντευξιν, τοῦτο καὶ δικαίου καὶ σπουδαίου ἁπλῶς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι.

²⁰ Απορήσειε δ' αν τις καί τοῦτο. εἰπερ ἐστὶ τὸ 4 ²⁰ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα καὶ εἰδότα καὶ ὅν καὶ ῶs¹ καὶ οῦ ἕνεκα, ἔστι δ' ἡ βλάβη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν

¹ Perhaps we should read ψ, "where with" (MSS. ωs, δσον, or δs. Cf. I. xxxiii. 23, 24).

 a Cf. the distinction between Shrewdness and Prudence drawn in Nic. VI. x.

^b "Deliberative Excellence," Rackham.

^c For the terms έντευξις, έντυγχάνω, ἄρεσκος see I. xxviii, above. For the distinction between flattery and complaisance of. Nio. II. vii. 13, IV. vi. 9. 576

MAGNA MORALIA, II. 11. 1-111. 4

Equity ; the discriminating man discerns, and the equitable man acts according to that discernment.^a

(Nic. $VI_i = Eud_i, V_i, IX_i$)

- III. The province of Good Counsel^b is the same Good as that of Prudence or Practical Thought; since it is concerned with our actions in choosing or refusing, it is closely associated with Prudence, which leads us to (good) actions, whilst Good Counsel is the state, condition, or the like, which discovers the best and most expedient ways in which we can perform them.
 2 Accordingly we shall not assign to Good Counsel expressed by here any for the performance.
- successes which happen spontaneously. When a man who lacks the reasoning power that looks for what is best, has met with some success, one would not term him wise of counsel, but fortunate; for successes which happen apart from reason's decision are the windfalls of luck, (and not the gatherings of counsel).

(The remainder of c. iii. proposes and answers five inoral questions. They seem out of place here, and correspond to nothing in Nic. V. or VI. See Introduction, p. 437.)

- In social intercourse, will the just man render equal Problems: measure to each ? Will he, I mean, assimilate himself (1) will the Just render to the character of those with whom he converses ? Use same Surely not. We should deem such conduct that of a Measure flatterer or one who is weakly complaisant; ^c our universal rule being that the wise and good man will in his converse with others treat each according to his worth.
- 4 A second difficulty is this. Whereas to injure a man (2) How far is to harm him voluntarily, knowing whom we harm ^{is the} unjust and how and why we do it; and whereas the field and prudent? sphere of harm and injustice are things which are

VOL. II

1199 a

ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθά, ὅ ἀδικῶν ἄρα καὶ ὅ ἀδικος εἰδείη ἂν ὅποῖα ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὅποῖα κακά· τὸ δέ γε ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἴδιον τοῦ
 ᅆρονίμου καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως· ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ τῷ ἀδίκῷ συμπαρακολουθεῖν τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν.

 ^{*}H οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν παρακολουθεῖν τῷ ἀδίκῳ ή 5 φρόνησις; οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἄδικος οὐδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αύτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ β
 ³⁰ ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν ἑπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν οἴδαμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος

- καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αί τομαὶ καὶ αί καὐσεις ὑγιεινά εἰσιν καὶ ὑγιείας ποιητικά, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ
- 85 έχομεν την ἰατρικήν ἐπιστήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν τίνι ἐστὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς διακειμένῷ· ἐν τούτῷ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη. τὰ μὲν οῦν ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ εἰδότες ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐδὲ παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη.
- 1199 b Ώς δ' αυτως ό άδικος. ὅτι μέν οῦν ἀπλῶς καὶ ή η τυραννὶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ή ἀρχὴ καὶ ή ἐξουσία, οἶδεν ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μή, ἢ πότε, ἢ πῶς διακειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἶδεν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν μάλιστα τῆς ⁵ φρονήσεως, ὥστε τῷ ἀδίκῳ οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ή φρόνησις. αἰρεῖται γὰρ τἀγαθά, ὑπὲρ ῶν ἀδικεῖ,

^a Powerful drugs which only an adept can employ with safety and success. 578

good; it follows that he who inflicts an injury and is unjust will know the nature of good things and of evil things. But knowledge of this kind is the prerogative of the prudent and of Prudence; whence follows the absurd inference that Prudence, that greatest of good things, accompanies the unjust man.

- ⁵ Or should we not rather deny that Prudence accompanies the unjust; since (as it seems) he does not consider or discern (the difference between) what is absolutely good and what is good for himself, but falls into error concerning it?
- ⁶ The fact is, that the power of Prudence rightly to distinguish what is good finds a parallel in the realm of medicine. We all know what is absolutely and essentially healthful and health-giving; that such, \langle for instance, \rangle are hellebore and claterium^a and the applications of kmfe and cautery. And yet we lack the science of medicine; since we are still ignorant of what is good in particular cases. We do not know for whom a particular treatment is good, or when, or under what conditions. All this the physician knows; for without it medical knowledge is not complete. Thus, even while knowing what is absolutely healthful, we yet lack medical science; the general knowledge does not involve the particular.
- 7 Now this is exactly the case of the unjust man. He knows that supreme power, and rule, and authority are in themselves good things; but he is still in ignorance whether for him they be good or not; or (if they are) when they are good and under what conditions. This latter knowledge is the special province of Prudence or Practical Thought; wherefore she is no companion of the unjust. The good things he chooses as the sphere of his injustice are

^{1199 b} τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, οὐ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά. ὁ γὰρ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ μέντοι ἴσως οὐκ ἀγαθόν· εὐπορήσας γὰρ καὶ ἄρξας πολλὰ κακὰ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ποιήσει καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ἀρχῆ ὀρθῶς χρήσασθαι.

- ¹⁰ "Έχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν καὶ σκέψιν, πότερόν 8 ἐστι πρὸς τὸν φαῦλον ἀδικία, ἢ οὕ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀδικία ἐστὶν ἐν βλάβῃ, ἡ δὲ βλάβῃ ἐν στερήσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν βλάπτειν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ ἅ αὑτῷ οἴεται εἶναι ἀγαθά, οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἰσίν· ἡ γὰρ ¹⁶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τὸν φαῦλον οὐ δυνάμενον αὐτοῖς
- χρήσθαι όρθως βλάψει εί ούν αυτόν βλάψει παραγενόμενα, ό τούτων στερίσκων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν άδικεῖν. ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι 9 παράδοξος τοῖς πολλοῖς πάντες γὰρ οἴονται καὶ άρχη και δυνάμει και πλούτω δυνατοί είναι χρη-20 σθαι, ούκ όρθώς ύπολαμβάνοντες. δήλον δε τοῦτο 10 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ νομοθέτου ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπει τὸ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ὥρισται καὶ ἡ ἡλικία καὶ ή εθπορία ην δει θπάρχειν τω μέλλοντι άρχειν, ώς ου δυνατόν ον παντί άρχειν υπάρξαι. εί δή τις άγανακτοίη ότι οὐκ ἄρχει η οὐδείς αὐτὸν έά 26 κυβερναν, ''ου' γαρ ἔχεις ΄΄ είποι αν τις '΄ουδέν τοιοῦτον ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ ῷ δυνήση καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ κυβερναν.' η έπι μεν του σώματος δρώμεν ου 11 δυναμένους ύγιαίνειν τους τα άπλως αγαθά προσφερομένους, ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει τις ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα τὸ φαῦλον, ὕδωρ αὐτῷ πρότερον καὶ ὀλίγα σιτία 30 προσενεκτέον· τῷ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν φαύλην ἔχοντι πρὸς τὸ μηθέν κακόν ἐργάζεσθαι οὐκ ἀφεκτέον καὶ

those which are in themselves good, not those which are good for himself. For riches and rule are good things absolutely, yet perhaps not such for him. By obtaining wealth and rule he may bring much evil upon hunself and his friends ; since he may not prove competent rightly to use his power.

- A further problem which arises for our considera- (3) Can one 8 tion is whether one can or cannot commit injustice $b_{ad\ Man\,\gamma}^{injure\ a}$ against a bad man. For if injustice involves harm, and harm involves deprivation of what is good, it would seem that one cannot hurt a bad man : because the good things which he considers good for himself are not really so. Rule and riches will harm the bad man who cannot use them aright; so that if their presence hurts him, it would seem that one who 9 deprives him of them does him no injustice. Such an argument will indeed seem strange to the majority; because all imagine themselves able to make use of 10 rule and power and wealth. But they are mistaken, as is shown among other things by the practice of legislators. Legislators do not entrust rule to every man, but define the age and property that qualify for rule ; it being impossible, as they suppose, to leave open the right of ruling to all. If then anyone were to express indignation at being debarred from rule, or not permitted to steer a ship, the answer might well be, that he has none of the mental qualifications for 11 the one task or the other. When men are ailing in body, we see that they cannot recover health by treating themselves with things absolutely and essentially good. An ill body can only become sound if the
 - patient is first placed on a diet of water and scanty food. And if a man's soul be ill, to save him from doing evil decds, must he not all the more refrain

1199 b

⁷ πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσῷ εὐκινητότερον καὶ εὐμεταβολώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἦν ἐπιτήδειος διαιτᾶσθαι, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἐπιτήδειος διάγειν, μηθὲν τῶν τοιού-35 των ἔχων.

"Εχεί δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίαν, οἶον ἐπειδὰν 12 μὴ ἢ ἅμα πραξαι τἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, πότερ' ἄν τις πράξειεν; ἐν μὲν δὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀρεταῖς
1200 a ἔφαμεν τὴν ὁρμὴν μόνον [δεῖν] τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ λόγου· ῷ δ' ἐστὶν αἴρεσις, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα τὸ ἐλέσθαι [καὶ] παρέσται καὶ ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρξει, ῆν ἔφαμεν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι, οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς
⁵ φυσικῆς ὅρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ καλόν. οὐδ' ἐναντιώ- 13 σεται ἀρετὴ ἀρετῆ. πέφυκεν γὰρ ὑπείκειν τῷ λόγῳ, [ἢ] ὡς οῦτος προστάττει, ὥστ' ἐφ' ὃ ἂν οῦτος ἄγῃ, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀποκλίνει. τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον οῦτος ἔστιν ὁ αἰρούμενος. οὕτε γὰρ ἄνευ τῆς φρονήσεως αἰ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ γίνονται, οῦθ' ἡ φρόνησις τελεία ἄνευ
10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεργοῦσί πως μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐπακολουθοῦσαι τῆ φρονήσει.

Ούχ ήττον δε και τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήσεται, πότε-14 ρόν ποτε και ἐπι τῶν ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐπι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν τ' ἐκτὸς και τῶν περι σῶμα. 15 ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν γινόμενα χείρους ποιεî, οΐον πλοῦτος πολὺς γενόμενος ὑπερόπτας και

^a c. xxxiv. 23-26 above.

^b As in Nic. VI. xiii. 5, φρόνησιs and (ὀρθὸς) λόγος are treated as interchangeable terms. See notes on I. i. 7, I. xxxiv. 1, 26 above; also Nic. V. i. 2, where the ὀρθὀς λόγος 582

from riches, rule, power, and the like, in proportion as the soul is a thing more easily moved and more readily changed than the body ? For even as we saw that a sparing diet was the fitting one for a man whose body is ill, so a frugal life without such " good things " as these is the one which best befits a man ailing in soul

- 12 Another type of difficulty is the choice between (1) Can the Virtues be acting bravely, or justly, when both at once are im- in Conflict possible Now we have stated that in the case of those one with another" virtues which arise by nature, the mere impulse towards what is good exists apart from reason; but where there is choice, that choice abides in the rational Principle and in the rational part of the soul " So that only when choice is present shall we find that complete Virtue which we said was associated with Prudence or Practical Thought, though there must also be the
- 13 natural impulse towards good. And Virtue cannot be in opposition to Virtue; since its very nature is to obey rational Principle. Wherever this leads, in that direction therefore Virtue inclines; since rational Principle it is which chooses what is better. In fine: the other virtues cannot come into being without Prudence, nor can Prudence herself be complete without the other virtues, which collaborate with one another whilst they follow her lead.^b
- Another kind of question which equally demands (5) Can we 14 an answer is whether the virtues resemble other good suffer from things--the weal of body and estate--in the following Virtue? respect. These latter, if enjoyed in excessive measure, render men worse. Great riches, for example, have been known to make them proud and disagreeable;

is compared to the science of Medicine, and δ τον λόγον ἔχων to the physician (Burnet, ad loc.).

583

1200 a

 ² ἀηδεῖς ἐποίησεν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ἀρχῆς τιμῆς κάλλους μεγέθους. πότερον 15 οῦν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς οῦτως ἔχει, ὥστε ἐάν τινι δικαιοσύνη ἢ ἀνδρεία εἰς ὑπερβολὴν παραγένηται, χείρων ἔσται, ἢ οῦ; (οῦ,) φησίν.¹ ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν
 ²⁰ τῆς ἀρετῆς τιμὴ γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τιμὴ μεγάλη γινομένη χείρους ποιεῖ· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι, φησίν, ἀρετὴ εἰς ἐπίδοσιν βαδίζουσα μεγέθους χείρους ποιήσει· τῆς γὰρ τιμῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιοίη ἂν χείρους μείζων γινομένη.

- ¹Η τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές; τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς εἰ καὶ 18
 ²⁵ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἔργα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, τὸ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τούτοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις δύνασθαι ὀρθῶς παραγενομένοις χρῆσθαι:
 εἰ δὴ ὁ σπουδαῖος παραγενομένης αὐτῷ ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ἀρχῆς μεγάλης μὴ χρήσεται ὀρθῶς τούτοις, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη σπουδαῖος. οὕτε δὴ ἡ τιμὴ οὕτε ἡ ἀρχὴ
 ³⁰ ποιήσει τὸν σπουδαῖον χείρω, ὥστε οὐδ' ἡ ἀρετή.
 τὸ δ' ὅλον ἐπειδήπερ ἡμῖν ἐν ἀρχῆ διώρισται, ὅτι 17
 εἰ δὴν ἐστι μεσότητες, καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον ἀρετὴ μᾶλλόν ἐστι μεσότης. ὥστ' οὐχ ὅτι χείρω ποιήσει
 εἰς μέγεθος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἰοῦσα, ἀλλὰ βελτίω· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης.
- ¹⁷ ΙV. Ταῦτα μέν μέχρι τούτου· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα 1 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένοις λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. ὥσπερ δὲ [καl] ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία αῦταί εἰσιν ἀτοποι, ὡσαύτως

¹ MSS. $\eta \circ v$, $\phi \eta \sigma i v$. Bonitz and Bussemaker insert $\langle o v \rangle$. I prefer to bracket $\phi \eta \sigma i v$ with Scaliger and Ramsauer. The $\lambda \lambda$ ' then introduces an objection to the second alternative, $\eta \circ v$; 584.

and so it is with the other goods—power and bonour, 15 beauty and stature. Is this, then, true of Virtue also ? If a man possesses Justice or Courage in excessive measure, will be be a worse man? Surely not. Nevertheless, honour is the fruit of Virtue; and if men enjoy great honour they become worse. It is therefore plain, we are told, that Virtue when it advances in degree, will make men worse; for the virtue is the cause of the honour, and is therefore by its own increase responsible for the result.

- ¹⁶ But surely this is not true. Many, indeed, are the properties of Virtue; yet chief among them all is that of enabling us to make right use of such goods as these when they befall us. If then the virtuous man, when great honour or power befall him, does not make right use of them, he will be a virtuous man no longer. Seeing, therefore, that neither honour nor power can make a really good man worse, much 17 here over the set of the set offered.
- 17 less can Virtue have that effect. And speaking generally, since we originally defined the virtues as mean states; and the better the virtue, the nearer it approaches the perfect mean : it follows that Virtue, as it advances in degree, will make a man better instead of worse; for the mean state of which we spoke was a just mean betwixt excess and deficiency of the various passions.

(Nic. VII. = Eud. VI. i.)

1 IV. Having dealt with these questions, we must now States akin treat of Self-Control and Self-Indulgence. These we to Virtue must approach from a different standpoint.^a As both the virtue and the vice are anomalous, our treatment

^a "... begin a fresh part of the subject," Rackham (*Nic.* VII. i. 1). Note that Nic. (or Eud.) commences more logically with the classification that here follows in § 3.

^{1200 a} ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους λεχθησο-1200 b μένους ἀτόπους γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ ἀρετὴ 2 αὕτη ἐστὶν ταῖς ἄλλαις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη ὅρμῶσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις ὅ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη.

⁵ "Εστι δὲ τρία τὰ ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ γινόμενα, καθ' â 3 φαῦλοι λεγόμεθα, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσιν, εἴρηται ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω· νῦν δὲ ὑπὲρ ἀκρασίας καὶ θηριότητος λεκτέον ἂν εἴη.

V. Έστιν δὲ ή θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσά τις κακία. 1 10 ὅταν γάρ τινα παντελῶς ἴδωμεν φαῦλον, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπόν φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὡς οῦσαν τινὰ κακίαν θηριότητα. ή δὲ ἀντικειμένη ἀρετὴ ταύτη 2 ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμος, ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον οῦσα, οἶον ἡρωϊκή τις καὶ θεία. ἀνώνυμος δέ ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀρετή, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν θεοῦ ἀρετή· ὁ γὰρ

- 15 θεός βελτίων τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ οὐ κατ' ἀρετήν ἐστι σπουδαῖος· οὕτω μεν γὰρ βέλτιον ἔσται ἡ ἀρετὴ ϗ τοῦ θεοῦ. διὸ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τῆ κακία τῆ θηριότητι ἀντικειμένη. θέλει δὲ τῆ τοιαύτῃ ἀντικεῖσθαι ἡ θεία καὶ ὑπερ ἄνθρωπον ὤσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ κακία ἡ θηριότης ὑπερ ἀνθρωπον ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀντικειμένη.
- 20 VI. Υπέρ δε άκρασίας και εγκρατείας πρώτον ι (äν) δεοι είπειν τὰ ἀπορούμενα και τους εναντιουμένους λόγους τοις φαινομένοις, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν

^a So that, strictly speaking, it is not a Virtue at all. Cf. 586

- 2 of them must needs be anomalous also; for the virtue of Self-control is unlike the other virtues. In the case of the others, the impulse of reason and of the passions is in the same direction; there is no antagonism between them. But in the case of this virtue, reason and the passions are in opposition to one another.^a
- 3 Now among the phenomena presented by the soul, there are three which cause men to be styled bad. These are Vice, Self-Indulgence, and Bestiality. Of the nature and provinces of Vice and Virtue we have spoken above; it remains for us to speak of Self-Indulgence and of Bestiality.
- 1 V. Bestiality is a kind of vice which exceeds all Bestiality measure. For when we behold a man who is utterly and its bad, we say that he is not a man but a beast—imply-
- 2 ing that bestiahty is a species of vice.^b But the virtue opposed to it has no name; such virtue is of a superhuman kind, fit for a hero or a god. It is namcless because Virtue is not really predicable of God. For God is better than Virtue itself; His goodness is not good-
- 3 ness in accordance with Virtue, or else Virtue would be something better than He. Therefore we assign no name to the virtue which is opposed to Bestiality, but regard it as a godlike one, which is beyond the measure of a man. For even as the vice of Bestiality is beyond human measure, so is its opposing virtue.
- VI. In dealing with Self-Indulgence and Self-Solf. Control, our best method will be to state first the indulgence and its difficulties they raise and the arguments which are opposite. brought against the received views of them; so that Nic. IV. ix. 8 οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ή ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή, Eud. II. xi. 1 ἔστι δ' ἀρετή καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἔτερον.

^b In Nic. VII. i. 2-4, v. 5-6, it is shown that Bestiality is not really a Vice, since those who exhibit it are devoid, like beasts, of any rational Standard.

1200 b

ἀπορουμένων καὶ ἐναντιουμένων λόγων συνεπισκεψάμενοι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάσαντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ὕδωμεν· ῥậον γὰρ οὕτως ἰδεῖν τἀληθὲς ἔσται.

25 Σωκράτης μέν οῦν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἀνήρει ὅλως καὶ 2 οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά εἰσιν ἕλοιτ' ἄν ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς δοκεῖ, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα εἰσίν, αἰρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. διὰ δὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ 30 ὤετ' εἶναι ἀκρασίαν οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς. ἄτοπον γὰρ τῷ 3 λόγω τούτω πεισθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ πιθανῶς γινόμενον ἀκρατεῖς γὰρ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι φαῦλα ὅμως ταῦτα πράττουσιν.

³ Έπει δ' ούν ἔστιν ἀκρασία, πότερον ὁ ἀκρατὴς 4 ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, ἢ θεωρεῖ καὶ ἐξετάζει τὰ φαῦλα; ἀλλὰ πάλιν οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν. ἄτοπον γὰρ 35 τὸ κράτιστον καὶ βεβαιότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡττᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τινός· ἐπιστήμη γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μονιμώτατόν ἐστι καὶ βιαστικώτατον· ὥστε πάλιν ὁ λόγος οῦτος ἐναντιοῦται * * τῷ¹ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην.

^a Socrates is called δ apeabirns in Eud. I. v. 15, and δ yépow in Eud. VII. 1. 14 to distinguish him from Σ . δ vecárepos (Metaphysics, V. xi.; cf. Plato, Theaet. 147 c, Soph. 218 B, Pol. 257 cfoll.), a contemporary of Theaetetus, and probably a student in Plato's "Academy" (Lutoslawski, Origin of Plato's Logic, p. 55). For the view of Socrates see Grant on Nic. VII. ii. 1, who cites Plato, Protag. 352 B and 357 E. Cf. also I. ix. 7 above, and note thereon, 588 after considering these and critically examining them we may discern as far as we can the true nature of the opposed qualities. This we shall find the easiest approach to the truth.

(Nic. VII, = Eud. VI, ii.)

- 2 Now Socrates the elder ^a simply swept away the Problems. notion of Self-Indulgence, declaring that there was (1) How far no such thing. For he said that none would choose Selfevil knowing that it is evil; whereas the self-indulgent posses man seems to know that evil is bad, and yet to Knowledge? choose it under the influence of passion. From this reasoning, then, he concluded that the vice of Self-Indulgence does not exist.
- But surely he was mistaken. It is absurd for us in 3 deference to such an argument as this to dony what in all appearance exists. For there are self-indulgent men, and they do what is bad, though themselves know it to be such.
- 4 Assuming, then, that Self-Indulgence exists, does the self-indulgent man possess a species of knowledge whereby he surveys moral evil and examines it critically? But this again seems impossible. It is absurd to suppose that the best and most firmly grounded of our faculties should be overcome by something else; for of all those faculties, Knowledge is at once the most steadfast and the most forceful. This argument then supports our contention that the self-indulgent is not possessed of Knowledge.
- Can it be, then, that while devoid of Knowledge he 5 yet possesses Opinion ? If, however, the self-indulgent man possesses Opinion, we should not justly blame him. For if without accurate Knowledge he commits wickedness under the influence of Opinion,

589

1201 a

 δοξάζων, συγγνώμην ἄν τις ἀποδοίη προσθέσθαι τῆ ήδονῆ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ φαῦλα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδότα ὅτι [οὐ] φαῦλα εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντα· οἶς δέ γε
 συγγνώμην ἔχομεν, τούτους οὐ ψέγομεν· ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατής, εἴπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οὐκ ἔσται ψεκτός. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ψεκτός.

Οί δὴ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν β γὰρ οὐκ ἔφασαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, ἄτοπόν τι γὰρ συμβαίνειν ἐποίουν· οΐ δὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ δόξαν, καὶ γὰρ οῦτοι ἄτοπόν τι πάλιν [ἐποίουν] συμβαίνειν.

10 'Αλλά δὴ καὶ ταῦτ' ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ η δοκεῖ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι, πότερον τῷ σώφρονί τι ποιήσει σφοδρὰς ἐπιθυμίας; εἰ μὲν οῦν ἔσται ἐγκρατής, σφοδρὰς δεήσει αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἐπιθυμίας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴποις ἐγκρατῆ, ὅστις μετρίων ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖ)· εἰ δέ γε σφοδρὰς [μη]¹ ἕξει 16 ἐπιθυμίας, οὐκέτι ἔσται σώφρων (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων ἐστὶν ὁ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν μηδὲ πάσχων μηθέν).

^{*} Εχει δέ και τὰ τοιαῦτα πάλιν ἀπορίαν. συμ-8 βαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τῶν λόγων και τὸν ἀκρατῆ ποτε ἐπαινετὸν είναι και τὸν ἐγκρατῆ ψεκτόν. ἔστω γάρ τις, φησίν, διημαρτηκώς τῷ λογισμῷ, και δοκείτω
²⁰ αὐτῷ λογιζομένῷ τὰ καλά είναι φαῦλα, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπί τὰ καλά είναι φαῦλα, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπί τὰ καλά οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει πράττειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀγόμενος πράσσει (τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἀκρατής)· πράξει ἄρα τὰ καλά, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀγέτω (ὁ δὲ

 $^1~\mu\dot{\eta}$ is bracketed by Rassow and Susemihl. It appears to destroy the sense.

^a See I. xxxiv. 1, and note there.

we should pardon his cleaving to pleasure and committing the wickedness on the ground that he does not accurately know that it is wickedness, but is of opinion (that it is not) And those whom we pardon we do not blame; so that if the self-indulgent possesses Opinion, he will not be deserving of blame. Yet deserve it he does.

- 6 Arguments of this kind, then, lead us into difficulties. Some of them sought to prove that the self-indulgent had not Knowledge, by deducing an absurdity (from his possession of it); others again refused him even Opinion, again by deducing an absurdity.
- Another difficulty that may be raised is this. To (2) 14 the 7 the man of Temperance we attribute also Self-Control. self. Can anything cause such a man to feel strong desires ? controlled? On the one hand, if he is self-controlled, such desires he must have ; since one would not call him selfcontrolled if the desires he controls are no more than moderate. On the other hand, if he has strong desires, he ceases to be temperate ; for the temperate man is one who lacks desire, and passion of any kind.
- A further kind of difficulty is the following. It may (3) Does 8 actually be argued that at times the self-indulgent solf-Control always deserves praise and the self-controlled, blame. For deserve we are asked to imagine a man whose reasoning is in error, and leads him to believe that what is good is bad; while his desire draws him towards the good. Rational Rule,^a then, will forbid him to do the good ; but he does it under the influence of desire; this being our definition of the self-indulgent. This man, therefore, will do what is good, since we suppose that his desire draws him thereunto, though rational Principle will hold him back, since we premise that he reasons wrongly about good. It follows that such a

Praise?

1201 a

καλῶν)· οὐκοῦν οῦτος ἀκρατὴς μὲν ἔσται, ἐπαινετὸς μέντοι· ἡ γὰρ πράττει τὰ καλά, ἐπαινετός. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ συμβαῖνον.

Πάλιν δ' αῦ διαμαρτανέτω τῷ λόγω, καὶ τὰ καλὰ 9 αὐτῷ μὴ δοκείτω καλὰ εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλά· ἐγκρατὴς δέ γέ ἐστιν δ' ἐπιθυμῶν

- 80 μέν, μή πράττων δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸν λόγον· οὐκοῦν ὁ διαμαρτάνων τῷ λόγῳ⁸ τῶν καλῶν κωλύσει ῶν ἐπιθυμεῖ πράττειν, κωλύει ἄρα τὰ καλὰ πράττειν (ἐπὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ή ἐπιθυμία ἤγαγεν)· ὁ δέ γε τὰ καλὰ μὴ πράττων δέον πράττειν ψεκτός· ὁ ἄρα ἐγκρατὴς ἔσται ποτὲ ψεκτός. ἄτοπον δὴ καὶ οὕτω τὸ συμβαῖνον.
- ⁸⁵ Πότερον δ' ή ἀκρασία καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐν ἄπασίν 10 ἐστιν καὶ περὶ πάντα, οἶον περὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ δόξαν (περὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δοκοῦσιν ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι), ἢ οὕ, ἀλλὰ περί τι ἀφωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία, ἀπορήσειεν ἅν τις. 1201 b Τὰ μὲν οῦν τὴν ἀπορίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
- 1201 δ Τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λῦσαι τὰς ἀπορίας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν 11 τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· ἀτοπον γὰρ ἐδόκει είναι ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα ταύτην ἀποβάλλειν ἢ μεταπίπτειν.

⁶ Ο δ' aὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης οὐθὲν γὰρ 12 ^b διαφέρει δόξαν εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμην εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ δόξα σφοδρὰ τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον, οὐθὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης, δόξης ἐχούσης τὸ - πιστεύειν οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς δοξάζουσιν, οἶον Ἡρά-

Reading γε έστω, for γε έστιν ό MSS.
 Reading, with Bonitz, λόγοs for τῷ λόγῳ MSS.

592

man, though self-indulgent, will yet deserve praise ; for he is praiseworthy in that he does what is good. The conclusion is of course absurd.

- Once more let us suppose a man's Principle to be 9 in error, and good not to be good in his opinion; but let desire draw him towards the good. And let him be a man of self-control-one who desires, but on account of his Principle refrains from doing In this case his Principle, which is in error concerning good, will prevent him from doing what he desires, and therefore from doing good, since it was towards good that his desire drew him. But he who does not good when good should be done is worthy of blame. Wherefore the self-controlled man is at times blameworthy. This conclusion is, like the other, absurd.
- Finally it may be asked whether Self-Indulgence (4) How is and the self-indulgent are revealed on every kind of of self-10 occasion and in every province-those, for instance, Indulgence, defined? of property, honour, temper and pride, matters in all of which men are reckoned to show Self-Indulgence -or is the fault-confined, on the contrary, to some particular sphere ?

(Nic, VII. = Eud. VI. iii.)

Such, then, are the questions which raise difficulty; Solutions 11 and these difficulties it behaves us to resolve. And ledge may be first, the difficulty concerning Knowledge; for it possessed, seemed absurd that a man who possessed Knowledge should cast it aside, or change.

The same holds good of Opinion ; it is indifferent 12 which we suppose a man to have. For if Opinion through its firm and tenacious quality be very strong, it will not differ (m effect) from Knowledge, since Opinion involves belief that things are as we opine them to be. Such for instance was the " Opinion "

VOL. 11

yet inactive ;

1201 h

κλειτος ό Ἐφέσιος τοιαύτην ἕχει δόξαν ὑπὲρ ῶν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

- 10 Οὐθὲι δὲ ἄτοπον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, οὔτ' εἰ ἐπιστήμην 13 ἐχει οὕτ' εἰ δόξαν οϊαν λέγομεν, πράττειν τι φαῦλον. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι διττόν, ῶν τὸ μέν ἐστι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν (ἐπίστασθαι γάρ φαμεν τότε, ὅταν τις ἐπιστήμην ἔχη), τὸ δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἐνεργεῖυ ἤδη τῆ ἐπιστήμη. ἀκρατὴς οῦν ἐστιν ὁ 15 ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν καλῶν, οὐκ ἐνεργῶν δὲ αὐτῆ. ὅταν οῦν μὴ ἐνεργῆ τῆ ἐπιστήμῃ ταύτῃ, 14 οὐδὲν ἄτοπον αὐτόν ἐστιν πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην. ὅμοιον γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν καθευδόντων. οῦτοι γὰρ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅμως ἐν τῷ ὕπνῷ πολλὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ
- πράττουσι καὶ πάσχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν 20 αὐτοῦς ἡ ἐπιστήμη. ὡσαύτως δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. ὡσπερ γὰρ καθεύδοντι ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆ ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. λύεται δὴ ἀπορία οὕτως. ἡπορεῖτο γὰρ 15 πότερον ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐκβάλλει τότε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ μεταπίπτει. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἀμφότερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. ᾿Αλλὰ πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, ὥσπερ

Άλλά πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, ὥσπερ 25 ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς, ἐκ δύο προτάσεων γίνεσθαι τὸν συλλογισμόν, καὶ τούτων εἶναι τὴν μὲν πρώτην καθόλου, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ὑπὸ ταύτην τε καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους. οἶον ἐπίσταμαι πάντ' ἀνθρωπον πυρέττοντα ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι· οὑτοσὶ δὲ πυρέττει· ἐπίσταμαι ἀρα καὶ τοῦτον ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι. ἔστιν οὖν ¹ Reading δὴ <ἤ> (Susemial).

^a Cf. Republic, IX. c. i.

^b Analytica priora, I., II. Cf. An. pr. I. iv. 25 b 32: "When three Terms are so related that the third (e.g. this man) is contained by the second (e.g. fevered) and the 594

of Heracleitus of Ephesns touching those matters on which he held one.

- 13 But there is nothing absurd in the notion that the self-indulgent docs evil though he possesses Knowledge, or Opmion of the kind we have mentioned. There are in fact two different grades of knowing. One is the mere possession of Knowledge ; for when a man possesses Knowledge, we say that he knows. The other is its active use. Now one who possesses Knowledge of what is good, but makes no active use
- 14 of it, is self-indulgent; so that while he is thus inactive there is nothing absurd in the notion that he does evil though possessing this Knowledge. His case is like that of sleepers, who though possessing the knowledge (of good) yet both do and suffer many unpleasant things in their sleep ; since their Knowledge is inactive." And so it is with the self-indulgent. He is like a man asleep; his Knowledge is inactive.
- 15 Thus then we solve our difficulty, which was whether the self-indulgent loses for a time his Knowledge, or changes; either alternative seeming absurd

The difficulty can also be solved in the light of our (2) The Major treatise on the Syllogism.^b We there explained that Premiss deductive reasoning depends on two premisses, the may be known, but first being general, and the second subordinate to it not the Minor: and particular. For example

- " I know how to cure all sufferers from fever ;
- " This man suffers from fever :
- "Therefore, I can cure this man."

second contained (or excluded) by the first (e.g. curable by me) we have a perfect Syllogism (this man is (or is not) cur-able by me)." The first Term predicated of the second gives the major or general Premiss; the second predicated of the third gives the minor or particular Premiss (.1n. pr. I. i. 24 b 16).

1201 b

¹80 δ τῆ μέν καθόλου ἐπιστήμη ἐπίσταμαι, τῆ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους οὕ. γίνεται οῦν ἁμαρτία τῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ¹⁸ ἔχοντι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, οἶον ἅπαντα μέν τὸν πυρέττοντα ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι 〈ἐπίσταμαι〉, εἰ μέντοι οῦτος πυρέττει, οὐκ οἶδα. ὡσαύτως τοίνυν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς τοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντος ἡ αὐτὴ ἁμαρτία ⁸⁵ συμβήσεται. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν ἀκρατῆ τὴν μὲν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα φαῦλα καὶ βλαβερά, μὴ μέντοι γε ὅτι ἐστὶν ταῦτα φαῦλα' ἐπὶ μέρους εἰδέναι, ὥστε οῦτως ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἁμαρτήσεται· ἔχει γὰρ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ μέρους οὕ.

Ουδέν οῦν ἄτοπον οὐδ' οῦτω συμβήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ 17 ἀκρατοῦς, τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην φαῦλόν τι 1202 * πράττειν. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἡ μέθη ἀπαλλαγῆ, πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσίν· οὐκ ἐξέπεσεν δ' αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος οὐδ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἐκρατήθη ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης, ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῆς μέθης πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσίν. ὁμοίως οῦν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής [πάλιν]. ἐπικρατῆσαν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἦρεμεῖν ἐποίησε τὸν λογισμόν· ὅταν δ' ἀπαλλαγῆ τὸ πάθος ὥσπερ ἡ μέθη, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν.

 ^{*}Ην δὲ καὶ ἄλλος τις λόγος ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας ὅς 18 παρεῖχεν ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἐπαινετοῦ ποτε τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς
 ¹⁰ ἐσομένου καὶ ψεκτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. οὐ συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὖτ' ἐγκρατὴς οὖτ' ἀκρατὴς

¹ Reading ταῦτα τοιαῦτα for ταῦτα φαῦλα or τὰ φαῦλα MSS.

^a *i.e.* where I know the first or major Premiss, but not the second or minor. Perhaps one might suggest $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\nu\nu$ οῦν οῦ, "there is a case where," for $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\nu$ οῦν δ MSS. It is rather awkward to take $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\nu\nu$ δ first as the object of general 596

- Now there are cases where I possess the general 16 knowledge, but lack the particular "; and it is just here that the possibility of error lies for the man who possesses Knowledge. "I know," he says, "how to cure all sufferers from fever : but whether this man suffers from fever, I know not." And so in the same way an identical error may occur in the case of the self-indulgent, though he possesses Knowledge (of good and evil). He may quite well possess the general Knowledge, that a whole class of things is evil and hurtful, and yet not know in particular that this or that belongs to such class. And so he will be hable to error although he possesses this Knowledge ; for he possesses the general kind, but not the particular.
- Here again we see that no absurdity is involved 17 in the case of the self-indulgent who does evil while possessing moral knowledge. His case is like that of men intoxicated. When they are rid of their intoxication, they are themselves again. Neither rational Principle nor Knowledge has deserted them, but intoxication has proved victorious over these : and when they are freed from it, they are again themselves. So it is, then, with the self-indulgent. His passion has overcome his reasoning power and reduced it to inaction; but when, hke intoxication, the passion has passed away, he is himself once more.
- 18 We mentioned another argument on the subject of (3) Self-Self-Indulgence which suggested the difficulty that its Opposite the self-indulgent might on occasion deserve praise attributable and the self-controlled deserve blame. The inference to the Man is false. It is not the man deceived by a faulty of Right Principle.

knowledge, and then as the (different) object of particular knowledge as the sense seems to demand.

1202 Β ό τῷ λόγω διεψευσμένος, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγον ἔχων ὀρθὸν και τούτω τὰ φαῦλα ὄντα κρίνων και τὰ καλά, και άκρατής μέν ό τω τοιούτω λόγω άπειθων, έγκρατής δε ό πειθόμενος και μη ύπο των επιθυμιών αγό-15 μενος · οὐδὲ γὰρ ῶ τινι οὐ δοκεί τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν αίσχρον είναι, επιθυμών¹ δε τύπτειν, ό τούτου άπεχόμενος έγκρατής έστι ωστε εί μή έστιν έπί 19 των τοιούτων μήτε έγκράτεια μήτε άκρασία, ουδ' αν επαινετή είη ή ακρασία ουδε ψεκτή ή εγκράτεια, ώσπερ έδόκει.

Είσι δε των ακρασιών αι μεν νοσηματικαι αι δε 20 20 φύσει, οίον νοσηματικαί μέν αί τοιαθται· είσι γάρ τινες οι τίλλοντες τρίχας * * διατρώνουσιν. εί ουν τις ταύτης της ήδονης κρατεί, ούκ έστιν έπαινετός, ούδε ψεκτός, εί μη κρατεί, η ού σφόδρα γε. φύσει δέ, οໂον υίόν ποτέ φασι κρινόμενον έν δικαστηρίω, 25 ότι τον πατέρα τύπτοι, απολογείσθαι λέγονθ' ότι '' καὶ γὰρ οῦτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα,'' καὶ ἀποφυγείν δή. δοκείν γάρ τοις δικασταίς φυσικήν είναι την άμαρτίαν. εί δή τις³ του τον πατέρα τύπτειν κρατοίη, οὐκ ἐπαινετός. οὐ δη τὰς τοιαύτας 21 ζητοῦμεν νῦν ἀκρασίας οὐδ' ἐγκρατείας, ἀλλὰ καθ' *ầs ψεκτο*ι άπλως και επαινετοι λεγόμεθα.

¹ Or adopting Susemihl's conjecture <οὐκ> ἐπιθυμῶν, " hecause he has no desire."

² Susemihl suggests ζέτεροι δ' ὄνυχας> (Nic. has τριχών thous kal orby we tradees), " pluck off their hairs, or of others who chew their nails."

³ Perhaps we should read (TOLOUTOS) TIS "Such an one . . ."

598

Principle that is either self-controlled or self-indulgent, but the man who possesses the right Principle a and thereby judges of evil and good. He who disobeys this right Principle is self-indulgent, while he who obeys it and is not led by his desires is self-controlled. For it is not the man who deems it no disgrace to strike his father, and yet reframs from doing 50 in 19 spite of his desire, who is self-controlled, and if in such cases there can be neither Self-Control nor Self-Indulgence the paradox of the former deserving blame and the latter praise is avoided.

(Nic, VII. = Eud. VI. v.)

There are forms of self-indulgence which are not are we 20morbid, and others again which are implanted by with Of morbid self-indulgence we may take as morbid and nature. an example that of some people who pluck off their congenital hairs and chew them. Now one who masters this Selfpleasure does not deserve praise, nor if he fails to master it does he deserve blame, or at any rate much blame. Of self-indulgence implanted by nature we may take for example that of the son who, we are told, was brought into court on a charge of striking his He defended himself by the plea that the father. father had treated his own father in the same way ^b; and he was acquitted, as the jury accounted the fault as natural or congenital. One, then, who should overcome the desire to strike his father would deserve 21 no praise for it. Such kinds of self-indulgence and self-control as these are not the object of our inquiry, but only those which render us liable to unqualified blame or praise.

> ^a Cf. § 8 above. ^b See Nic. VII. vi. 2.

Indulgouce .

1202 a

³⁰ "Έστιν δέ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐκτός, οἶον πλοῦτος ἀρχή τιμή φίλοι δόξα, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ περὶ σῶμα ἐστίν, οἶον ἀφή τε καὶ γεῦσις [ὁ οὖν περὶ ταῦτα ἀκρατής, οὕτος ἁπλῶς ἂν [καὶ] ἀκρατής δόξειεν είναι,] καὶ ήδοναὶ σωματικαί^{ι1} + + καὶ ἣν ζητοῦμεν ἀκρασίαν, ἤδη περὶ ταῦτα δόξειεν ⟨ἂν⟩ ⁸³ είναι. ἠπορεῖτο δὲ περὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τιμὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής· 22 ἐπαινεῖται γάρ πως ὁ περὶ τιμὴν ἀκρατής· φιλότιμος γάρ τις [ἐστίν]. τὸ δ' ὅλον λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων τὸν ἀκρατῆ προστιθέντες, περὶ τιμὴν 1202 b ἀκρατὴς ἢ δόξαν ἢ ὀργήν. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατεῖ οὐ προστίθεμεν περὶ ἅ, ὡς ὑπάρχοντος αὐτῷ καὶ φανεροῦ ὅντος ἄνευ τῆς προσθέσεως, περὶ ἃ ἐστίν· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής.

Δήλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκρασία· 23 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀκρατής, ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· τιμὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσὶν ψεκτά, αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταί· διὸ εἰκότως ὁ περὶ ταύτας ῶν μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, οῦτος ἀκρατὴς τελέως λέγεται.

¹ Placing (with Rassow and Susemihl) the words $[\delta \ ov$ $b \ \delta \delta \xi etcev elvai after ownarmal. <math>\eta \delta ova$ is Rassow's emendation of olov at (ass.). The whole passage down to $\delta \delta \xi etcv \langle av \rangle elvai$ looks like an interpolation. It anterpates the result of the discussion in § 22, and I have bracketed it in the translation.

600

(Nic. VII. = Eud. VI. iv)

Now of good things, some are external, as riches, (4) The power, honour, friends, reputation ; others are bound sphere of up with our bodily nature, as touch and taste [and all Sellbodily pleasures. The man then who is self-indulgent is Bodily in these last may be considered self-indulgent without Pleasure, further qualification; and we may consider that they are the province of that Self-Indulgence about which we are inquiring. And we asked ourselves the question, with which good things in particular Self-Indulgence is concerned.

- 22 Now no man is self-indulgent in the unqualified vetwe sense regarding honour : for one who herein indulges transfer the himself is praised; we call him a lover of honour. spheres of Yet even in the case of such things as these we do in common parlance use the word "self-indulgent," though with a qualification; we say that a man indulges himself in honour or reputation or temper. But when a man is self-indulgent in the unqualified meaning of the term, we do not specify wherein he is self-indulgent; this being already pre-supposed and plain without such specification. For the man of unqualified self-indulgence is self-indulgent in the province of bodily pleasures and pains.
- And we have a further reason for assurance that this 23is the proper province of Self-Indulgence. Since the self-indulgent is liable to blame, the material with which he deals must be so liable. Now no blame is attached to honour and reputation and power and wealth, and other things wherein men are said specifically to be self-indulgent. The pleasures of the body, however, are hable to blame: so that we are reasonable in speaking of one who is concerned with these to an exeessive degree as self-indulgent without qualification.

Ambition

1202 b

¹⁰ Ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀκρασιῶν 24 λεγομένων ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν οῦσα ἀκρασία ψεκτοτάτη, πότερον ψεκτοτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς;

Έστιν οῦν ή περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἀκρασία ὁμοία τῶν παίδων τοις πρός το διακονείν προθύμως έχουσιν. και γαρ ουτοι, όταν είπη ό δεσπότης ' δός μοι,' 15 τη προθυμία έξενεχθέντες, πρό του ακούσαι ό δεί δουναι, έδωκαν, και έν τη δόσει διήμαρτον πολλάκις γαρ δέον βιβλίον δούναι γραφείον έδωκαν. όμοιον δε πέπονθε τούτω ό της όργης ακρατής 25 όταν γάρ ακούση τὸ πρώτον ἑήμα ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ώρμησεν ό θυμός πρός τό τιμωρήσασθαι, οὐκέτι 20 άναμείνας άκοῦσαι πότερον δεῖ ἢ οὐ δεῖ, ἢ ὅτι γε ούχ ούτω σφόδρα. ή μέν οῦν τοιαύτη όρμη πρός 26 οργήν, ή δοκεί ακρασία είναι οργής, ου λίαν έπιτιμητέα έστίν, ή δε πρός [την] ήδονην δρμή ψεκτή γε. έστιν γάρ διαφοράν έχουσα¹ πρός ταύτην διά τόν λόγον, δε αποτρέπει τοῦ μη πράττειν, άλλ' 25 όμως πράττει παρά τον λόγον. διο ψεκτή έστι μαλλον της δι' όργην άκρασίας. ή μέν γάρ δι' οργήν ακρασία λύπη έστιν (ούδεις γαρ οργιζόμενος ού λυπείται), ή δε δι' επιθυμίαν μεθ' ήδονης. διο μαλλον ψεκτή ή γαρ δι' ήδονήν ακρασία μεθ' ύβρεως δοκεί είναι.

Πότερον δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ καρτερία ταὐ- 27 30 τόν ἐστιν; ἢ οῦ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι περὶ

¹ Or, reading $\langle \eta \rangle$ before *mpositivation*, "For the propensity towards pleasure is different through its relation to reason." 602

1202 b

ήδονας και ό έγκρατής ό κρατών των ήδονων, ή δέ καρτερία περί λύπας ό γαρ καρτερών και ύπομένων τας λύπας, ούτος καρτερικός έστίν.

Πάλιν ή ακρασία και ή μαλακία ούκ έστιν ταυ-28 τόν. ή μέν γαρ μαλακία έστιν και ό μαλακός ό μή 35 ύπομένων πόνους, ούχ απαντας δε άλλ' ούς άναγκαίως αν άλλος τις ύπομείνειεν, ό δ' ακρατής ό μή δυνάμενος υπομένειν ήδονάς, άλλα καταμαλακιζόμενος και ύπο τούτων αγόμενος.

"Εστιν αθ πάλιν τις καλούμενος ακόλαστος· πό-29 1203 a τερον ούν δ ακόλαστος [ακρατής] και δ ακρατής δ αύτός; η ού; ό μέν γαρ ακόλαστος τοιουτός τις οΐος οι εσθαι. ά πράττει, ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα είναι αύτω και συμφορώτατα, και λόγον ουδένα έχειν έναντιούμενον τοίς αύτω φαινομένοις ήδέσιν. ό δε · άκρατής λόγον έχει δς έναντιοθται αὐτώ, ἐφ' ä ή έπιθυμία άγει.

Πότερος δε εδιατότερος, ό ακόλαστος η ό α-30 κρατής; ούτω μέν οῦν δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως οὐχ δ άκρατής. δ γαρ άκόλαστος εδιατότερος. εί γαρ αδτώ λόγος ἐγγένοιτο ὁ διδάξων ὅτι φαῦλά, οὐκέτι 10 πράξει τῷ δέ γε ἀκρατεῖ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅμως πράττει, ωστε αν δ τοιούτος δόξειεν ανίατος είναι. 'Αλλὰ πότερος διάκειται χεῖρον, & μηδὲν ἀγαθόν 31 τι υπάρχει, ζη ώ αγαθόν τέ τι υπάρχει) και τα

¹ The words in brackets are added by Bonitz.

^c This suggestion is controverted below, § 42. (So Nic. VII. ii. 10 is corrected by VII. vn. 2, viii. 1.) 604

 ^a Or "Softness" (Grant and Rackham).
 ^b So rendered by Marchant in Thucydides Ilist, I. 64.

the province of Self-Control is (bodily) pleasure, and the self-controlled is one who masters it; whereas Endurance deals with pain. For he who endures and bears pain is a man of endurance.

28 Nor again are Self-indulgence and Feebleness ^a one and selfand the same. Feebleness and the feeble man can-Indulgence not bear hardships; those hardships, I mean, which Freebleness another would endure with resignation ^b The selfindulgent on the other hand is one who cannot bear pleasures; it is they which make him "feeble" and lead him astray.

(Nic, $VII_{i} = Eud_{i}, VI_{i}, vin_{i}$)

- 29 There is, moreover, a type of man whom we style How Self. profligate. Is, then, such a man as this identical with Indulgence the self-indulgent? Surely not. For it is character-Profligacy istic of the profligate man that he believes what he does to be the best and most advantageous for himself; nor does he possess any Principle that opposes what he deems pleasant. The self-indulgent on the other hand possesses a Principle which opposes him (when he turns) whither his lust leads.
- 30 Of these two types, the profligate and the selfindulgent, which is more amenable to treatment? The following considerations seem to suggest that it is not the self-indulgent, but the profligate.^c For if a rational Rule were set up within him which showed him that his deeds were evil, he would cease to do them; whilst the self-indulgent possesses that Rule or Principle and yet does evil; so that one might regard him as incurable.
- 31 On the other hand, which is in a worse state, he who has nothing good in him, or he who has something good, but also such vices as we have described?

1203 a

κακὰ ταῦτα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ὄσῳ γε ὅ τιμιώτερον κακῶς διάκειται. ἔστι τοίνυν ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς ἀγαθὸν ἔχων τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα· ὁ δὲ 15 ἀκόλαστος οὐκ ἔχει. ἔτι ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἑκάστου 32 ἀρχή· τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοῦς ἡ ἀρχὴ τιμιώτατον ὂν εῦ διάκειται, τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστου κακῶς· ὥστε χείρων ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.

Έτι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θηριότητος ῆς ἐλέγομεν 33 κακίας οὐκ ἕστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν θηρίω οὖσαν, ἀλλ' ἐν
²⁰ ἀνθρώπω· ἡ γὰρ θηριότης ὄνομά ἐστιν τῆ ὑπερβαλλούση κακία—διὰ τί; δι' οὐδὲν ἢ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαύλη ἐν θηρίω οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ πότερος ἂν πλείω κακὰ ποιήσειεν, λέων, ἢ Διο-νύσιος ἢ Φάλαρις ἢ Κλέαρχος ἤ τις τούτων τῶν μοχθηρῶν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οῦτοι; ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ
²⁵ ἐνοῦσα φαύλη μεγάλα συμβάλλεται, ἐν δὲ θηρίω ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. ἐν μὲν οῦν τῷ ἀκολάστω 34 ἐνοῦσα ὑρχὴ φαύλη. ἦ γὰρ πράττει φαῦλα ὄντα

ένεστιν άρχή φαύλη. ή γάρ πράττει φαῦλα ὄντα καὶ ὁ λόγος σύμφησιν ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δεῖν πράττειν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐνεστιν οὐχ ὑγιής. διὸ βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ ἀκολάστου.

80 "Εστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἴδη, ἡ μὲν 35 προπετική τις καὶ ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἐξαίφνης γινομένη (οἶον ὅταν ἴδωμεν καλὴν γυναῖκα, εὐθέως τι ἐπάθομεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ὁρμὴ ἐγένετο πρὸς

^a Cf. §§ 8, 18. For δρθός λόγος see notes on I. i. 7, I. xxxiv. 1.

^b Uf. Nic. VII. vi. 7 dσuveστέρα γὰρ ή φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. νοῦς is here used generally, of the reasoning power which distinguishes man from beast. 606 Clearly the former; and in just such measure as the most precious part of him is corrupted. Now the self-indulgent is possessed of something good: namely of a right rational Principle ^a; and this the profilgate 32 man lacks. Moreover, whilst each possesses a rational Principle as his guide, in the self-indulgent this guide—the most precions thing he owns—is uncorrupt, but in the profilgate it is corrupted; so that the latter is worse than the former.

- 33 Let us illustrate this by reference to the kind of vice which we termed Bestiality. It is not in a beast that we behold it, but in man; for we use the word to designate an excessive degree of (human) vice. Now what is the reason of this? Simply that in a beast there exists no evil guide (of conduct); the guide (of conduct) being the rational Principle.^b For which of the two is more potent for mischief—a lion, or a pestilent man like Dionysus, Phalaris, Clearchus? Obviously the latter. For the existence of an evil guide within is a mighty factor (in mischief): but the beast has no guide (of conduct), either good
- 34 or evil. On the other hand in the profligate man such an evil guide undoubtedly exists. For inasmuch as he does what is evil, and his rational Principle consents thereto, and he believes that he ought to do what he does, the guide within him is diseased. Wherefore we may regard the self-indulgent as a better man than the profligate.

(Nic, VII. = Eud, VI. vn. 8, viii.)

35 Of Self-Indulgence moreover there are two forms. Two kinds One is headlong, unpremeditated, sudden; as when of Selfindulgence. the sight of a fair woman inspires us with an immediate passion, and from this passion arises an

1203 a

τὸ πρâξαί τι ὦν ἴσως οὐ δεῖ), ή δ' ἐτέρα οἶον ἀσθενική τις, ή μετὰ τοῦ λόγου οὖσα τοῦ ἀποτρέποντος.

- ³⁵ 'Εκείνη μέν οῦν οὐδ' ἂν λίαν δόξειεν είναι ψεκτή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῦς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν
- 1208 b τοῖς θέρμοῖς καὶ εὐφυέσιν ή δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί. ἔτι τέ 36 ἐστιν τῷ λόγῳ προλαβόντα μηθὲν παθεῖν, ὅτι ήξει γυνὴ εὐπρόσωπος, δεῖ οῦν κατασχεῖν αὐτόν. τῷ δὴ τοιοὐτῷ λόγῳ προκαταλαβών ὁ ἐκ τῆς προσφάτου ⁵ φαντασίας ἀκρατὴς οὐδὲν πείσεται οὐδὲ πράξει οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ὁ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μὲν εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ήδονὴν ἐνδιδοὺς καὶ καταμαλακιζόμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ψεκτότερος. οὕτε γὰρ ὁ σπουδαίος οὐδέποτε οὕτω γένοιτ' ἂν ἀκρατής, ὅ τε λόγος προκαταλαβῶν οὐκ ἂν ἰάσαιτο. ἡγεμῶν γὰρ 10 οῦτος ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ῷ οὕτι πειθαρχεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῆ ήδονῆ ἐνδίδωσιν, καὶ καταμαλακίζεται καὶ ἐξ-ασθενεῖ πώς.

Πότερον δ' ό σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς ἐστίν, ἀπορήθη 37 μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν. ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατής· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατής ἐστιν οὐ μόνον ὁ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνουσῶν ταύτας κατέχων διὰ

^a Or, if with Spengel we transpose $\hat{\eta}$ $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$ $\hat{\epsilon}\nu \tau \sigma \hat{\iota}s \psi \nu \chi \rho \sigma \hat{\iota}s$ after $\mu \epsilon \lambda a \chi \chi \alpha \lambda \iota \kappa \sigma \hat{\iota}s$, " if they be of a warm, vigorous and billous temperament; whereas the second is found in colder natures, and such natures are deserving of blame." In his note on Nic. VII. vii. 8, Grant explains that " both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations" of $\mu \hat{\epsilon} \lambda a \lambda \alpha \lambda \eta$ (citing *Problemata*, xx, 1). Nic, indeed couples the $\mu \epsilon \lambda a \chi \chi \alpha \lambda \kappa \sigma \delta \iota$ with the $\delta \hat{\epsilon} \hat{\epsilon} \hat{s}$ and $\pi \rho \sigma \pi \epsilon \tau \hat{\epsilon} \hat{s}$; but the author may have misread him, or be seeking to correct him. 608

impulse to act in a way which may well be wrong. The other is a weaking kind, which exists alongside of the Rational Principle that seeks to prevent (wrong action).

Now the first of these would seem not to deserve any very great blame; for it is found in good men, if they be of a warm and vigorous temperament; whereas the second is found in cold and atrabilious natures, and such natures as these are deserving of 36 blame.^a Besides, if forewarned by reason.^b one can avoid the passion. " A woman fair of face is coming : therefore one must control oneself." Forewarned by such reasoning as this, the man who loses self-control through some recent impression ^c will avoid passion, and will do nothing of which he need be ashamed. On the other hand, the type of man who though Principle tells him that some act is wrong, feebly surrenders to pleasure, is more deserving of blame. For a good man would never yield to self-indulgence of this kind; and even if reason forewarned such an one, it would not cure the evil. He has in fact within him a leader whose command he disobeys, and surrenders instead to pleasure, acting the part of a weak and feeble man.

(Nic. VII, =Eud, VI, ix, 6.)

37 We will now answer the question we raised above, whether the temperate man is self-controlled. He is; and for this reason. The man of self-control is not merely one who possesses desires and yet restrains

^b λόγος is here subjective, "the reasoning power." Cf. Nic. VII. vii. 8 προεγείραντες έαυτούς και τον λογισμόν.

⁶ For $\phi_{avraola}$ see Grant's note on Nic. III. v. 17. It is the image or idea which a sense-impression leaves on the mind.

VOL. II

1203 b

- ¹⁵ τον λόγον, άλλὰ καὶ ὅ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἶος καὶ μὴ ἐνουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος¹ εἰ ἐγγένοιντο κατέχειν. ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων ὅ μὴ ἔχων ἐπι- 38 θυμίας φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν, ὅ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ὅ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχων φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν.² ὥστ' ἀκολουθήσει τῷ ²⁰ σώφρονι ὅ ἐγκρατής, καὶ ἔσται ⟨ό⟩³ σώφρων ⟨ἐγκρατής, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων⟩.³ ὅ μὲν γὰρ σώφρων ὅ μὴ πάσχων, ὅ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ὅ πάσχων καὶ τούτων κρατῶν ἢ οἶός τε ὢν πάσχειν· οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων τῷ σώφρων.
- Πότερον δε ό ἀκόλαστος ἀκρατὴς ἐστίν, ἢ δ 39 25 ἀκρατὴς ἀκόλαστος; ἢ οὐδετέρω ἕτερος ἀκολουθεῖ; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής ἐστιν οῦ ὁ λόγος τοῖς πάθεσι μάχεται, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ τῷ πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἅμα τὸν λόγον σύμψηφον ἔχων· οὕτε δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος οἶος ὁ ἀκρατὴς οῦθ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς οῖος ὁ ἀκόλαστος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαυλότερος 40 80 ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. δυσιατότερα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ τῶν ἐξ ἔθους γενομένων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔθος

1 Removing rowords elvar olos as redundant.

^a $\epsilon\sigma\tau\nu$ $\delta\epsilon$ $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\omega\nu$... $\tau\delta\nu$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$ $\tau\alpha\delta\taua$ $\delta\rho\theta\delta\nu$] these words give a narrower definition of δ $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\gamma$ s than is consistent with the following conclusion. I have therefore bracketed the translation of them. In Nic. VII. ix. we read that selfcontrol is predicated of the temperate only by analogy. $\kappa a\theta'$ $\delta\mu\omega\delta\tau\eta\tau\alpha$.

⁸ Inserted by Bonitz and Susemilul.

^a The meaning of this confused and probably corrupt passage (§§ 37-38) seems to be that Self-Control is a power which exists independently of the activity of desire in the sonl. The temperate possess this power, but are never called npon to use it : because, unlike the genuinely self-controlled, 610

them under the guidance of Rational Rule. He is also one who even when he has no desires is of such a character that if desires arose he could still restrain 38 them. [A man is temperate when he has no evil desires, and possesses the Rule which rightly judges of such matters : whereas the man of self-control is one who, along with that Rule, has evil desires. " Temperate " therefore connotes " Self-controlled "; and the temperate will have Self-Control though the (mcrely) self-controlled will not have true Temperance. For the temperate man is one who feels no desires, while the self-controlled feels desires which he controls, or is at least able to feel them. Such desires the temperate neither feels nor can feel; wherefore the self-controlled is not truly temperate.^a

(*Clt. Nic.*, $VII_{i} = Eud_{i}$, VI_{i} , v_{i} , v_{i})

Again, we ask whether the profligate man is self- Solf-Indul-39 indulgent, or the self-indulgent profligate ? " Or genes and Profligacy does neither connote the other? For the self-indulgent is one in whom Principle is at strife with passions, whilst in the profligate, on the contrary, Principle is a consenting party to evil doing. The two are thus quite different from one another in character. Moreover, the profligate is worse than the self-indulgent. 40 For qualities implanted by nature are less amenable to cure ^c than those induced by habit; since habit

they are free not only from evil desire but from the possibility thereof. The question of course arises, how one can be sure of the existence of a power which is never seen m exercise.

^b This section, which reverts to the questions raised in §§ 29-32 above, seems out of place here.

° Cf. § 31 and contrast § 30 above. Here it seems to be assumed that less curable evils are necessarily worse.

1203 b διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι εἰς φύσιν καθίστησιν)· ὁ μὲν οῦν ἀκόλαστος¹ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτός 41 ἐστιν οἶος φαῦλός τις τῆ φύσει εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ὁ λόγος φαῦλος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστί· ἀλλ' οὐχ
36 ὁ ἀκρατὴς οῦτως· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ὁ λόγος οὐ σπουδαῖος (φαῦλον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔδει είναι,
1204 a εἰ αὐτὸς τῆ φύσει τοιοῦτος ἦν οἶος ὁ φαῦλος)· ὁ 42 μὲν [οῦν] ἄρα ἀκρατὴς ἔθει ἔοικε φαῦλος είναι, ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος φύσει· δυσιατότερος δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔθος ἄλλῷ ἔθει ἐκκρούεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδενὶ ἐκκρούεται.

⁵ Πότερον δε επείπερ εστίν ο άκρατής τοιούτος 43 [τις] οίος είδέναι καὶ μὴ διεψεῦσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὁ φρόνιμός τοιοῦτος ὁ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ὀρθῷ ἕκαστα θεωρῶν, πότερον [δ³] ἐνδέχεται τὸν φρόνιμον ἀκρατῆ είναι, ἢ οὕ; ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ εἰρημένα· ἐὰν δὲ παρακολουθήσωμεν τοῖς ἔμπροσ-

10 θεν εἰρημένοις, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ φρόνιμος ἀκρατής. ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι οὐχ ῷ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον φαινόμενα βέλτιστα· εἰ δὲ πράττει τὰ βέλτιστα ὁ φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ἂν ἀκρατὴς εἴη ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλ' ὁ τοιοῦτος δεινὸς μὲν ἐστίν. διηρήμεθα γὰρ 44 ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω τόν τε δεινὸν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ταὐτά· ἀλλ' ὅ μὲν

¹ Perhaps (ori) should be inserted here.

^a Cf. "naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret," Horace, Ep. I. x. 24.

^b See I. xxxiv. 11, 12, 20 above.

^o I. xxxiv. 20.

^a i.e. τά πρακτά; see I. xxxiv. 8.

itself we reckon strong just because it becomes 41 a second nature. Now whereas it is characteristic of the profligate that he is evil by nature, the result and outcome of this is that the Rational Principle within him is evil. But with the self-indulgent it is otherwise. He suffers from no vice of the Rational Principle arising from his mnate character; for were he by nature as the bad man is, his Principle too were 42 of necessity bad. It seems, then, that while the selfindulgent is a man who is bad by habit, the profligate is had by nature. And so the latter is less amenable to treatment; for while one habit can be expelled by another, there is nothing which can expel a man's nature.ª

(Nic, VII. = Eud, VI. x_i)

- And since the self-indulgent is a man who knows The self-43 (what is right) and has not been deceived by his indulgent be Principle, and the man of prudence is of similar quality prodent, since he surveys everything in the light of right Principle; is it possible for the prudent man to be self-indulgent ? Not so: for whilst what we have (just) said might cast doubts upon the matter, if we are consistent with our previous statements, we shall find that the prudent cannot lack self-control. For we laid it down that the prudent was one who is not merely possessed of right Principle, but also performs what, when tested by that Principle, seems best.^b Now if the prudent man performs what is best, he cannot be self-indul-44 gent. Such a man (--one, that is, who possesses right but may
- Principle but does not act in accordance with it--> be clover may however he clever; for between the merely clever man and the prudent we have already drawn our distinction.^c Both have the same province ^d; but

- ¹⁵ πρακτικός περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ὅ δ' οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν οῦν δεινὸν ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ πρακτικὸς περὶ ἃ καὶ δεῖ),¹ τὸν φρόνιμον δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀκροτῆ εἶναι.
- V11. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν «ἔη περὶ ήδονῆς, 1 20 ἐπειδήπερ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οἶονται πάντες ἤτοι ήδονὴν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ήδέως ζῆν, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε ήδονῆς. οἱ δὲ καὶ τῆ ήδονῆ δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ οὐκ οἰόμενοι δεῖν τὴν ήδονὴν ἐναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἄλυπον προστιθέασιν· ἐγγὺς οῦν τὸ ἀλύπως τῆς ήδονῆς ἐστίν.
- Διόπερ λεκτέον ύπὲρ ήδονῆς, οὐ μόνον δὲ διότι 2 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἴονται δεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῦν ἐστιν λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἡμῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν διωρίκαμεν καὶ φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν ἐν βίω τελείω, ἡ δ' ἀρετή ἐστι περὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην. ⁸⁰ ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄνευ ἡδονῆς.

Πρώτον μέν ούν είπωμεν ά τινες λέγοντες ούκ 3

¹ Reading *mepi* a kal dewos with the MSS. If dei be read for dewos (with Ricckher), "does not connote right action "

¹²⁰⁴ a

^a *i.e.* a man may be clever at planning right acts, without ever doing them.

^{*b*} The differing views of Pleasure taken in Nic. X. and Nic. VII. (=Eud. VI.) are noticed in the Introduction, pp. 427, 429, 432. I have there mentioned that Susemihl, though treating Nic. V., VI., VII. as in the main the work of Nicomachus, excepts this particular part of Bk. VII. 614

while it is the part of the latter to put into action what is right, the elever man (as such) does not act, (but merely provides the conditions for action). He, therefore, may be self-indulgent, since his cleverness does not connote action within its province "; the prudent, on the other hand, may not be.

(Nic. VII. = Eud. VI. xi., $xi.^b$)

- VII. We must now consider Pleasure, since we are on 1 treating of Happiness, and since all regard Happiness Pleasure. as either identical with Pleasure or a pleasant life, or at any rate as impossible without it. Even those who dislike the conception of Pleasure and would refuse it a place in the tale of things good, count nevertheless freedom from Pain among the constituents (of happiness); now a life free from Pain is very close to Pleasure.
- For these reasons we must treat of Pleasure; 2 and yet not merely because common opinion enjoins it. There is a further reason which makes it essential for us to deal with the subject For since we are treating of Happiness; and in our definition we state that Happiness is "the activity of Virtue in a complete life"; and since Virtue deals with Pleasure and Pain: ^o on this account we must needs treat of Pleasure, seeing that Happiness cannot be separated from it.
- Let us begin then by recounting the arguments by The Good-3

ness of

(xi,-xiv,). As an ancient commentary in the Vatican Library remarks the divergence, and attributes the identification of Pleasure and Happiness not to Aristotle but to Eudemus, the authorship of the latter may be provisionally accepted. See Grant, Essay I., and note on Nic. VII. xiii. 2, also Susemihl, Introd. to Eth. Eud. p. x.

^o Cf. I. iv. 1-6; vi. 1.

1204 a

οΐονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μέρει λαμβάνειν.

Πρωτον μέν γάρ φασιν είναι την ήδονην γένεσιν, την δε γένεσιν άτελές τι, το δε άγαθον οὐδέποτε 15 την τοῦ ἀτελοῦς χώραν ἔχειν.

'Δεύτερον δ' ὄτι είσι τινες φαῦλαι ήδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε ἐν φαυλότητι είναι.

Πάλιν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἐγγίγνεται καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ καὶ ἐν θηρίῳ καὶ ἐν βοσκήματι τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀμιγές ἐστι τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ οὐ πολύκοινον * *.¹

1204 b Καὶ ὅτι οὐ κράτιστον ἡδονή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν κράτιστον.

Καὶ ὅτι ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πράττειν τὰ καλά, τὸ δὲ κωλυτικὸν τῶν καλῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.

Πρωτον μέν ούν πρός τὸ πρωτον ἀν εἰη λεκτέον, 5 πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ πειρατέον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λύειν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ πρωτον μὲν οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις. ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴ γινομένη οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, οὐδ' ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ⟨ἰδεῖν καὶ⟩³ ὀσφρανθῆναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας γινομένη, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων, οἶον ἐκ τοῦ

¹ Spengel thinks that (ral ori horns our enterthy) (which I have translated), or the like, has fallen out after moduleouv. Cf. § 26 below.

² <ίδεῖν καί > inserted by Susemihl.

^a See note on Greek text.

(b) that most pleasures are evil;

(c) that Pleasure is at any rate not the highest good.

(a) was held by Speusippus, Plato's successor; (b) by Plato himself; and (c) by Nicomachus (X. ii., iii.). (See the notes 616

^b In Nic. VII. (Eud. VI.) xi. three views are distinguished : (a) that no pleasure is a good thing;

which some thinkers support their refusal to reckon Pleasure 19 denfed Pleasure among things good.

In the first place, they state that Pleasure is a because " process of becoming "; that such a process is some-"Process of thing incomplete : and that in the realm of the in-Becoming", complete there is no room for what is good.

Secondly, they tell us that there are certain evil (2) because pleasures; and that what is good has no place in around Pleasures, moral evil.

Thirdly, we are told that Pleasure is enjoyed by (8) because all; by the bad man as well as by the good, and by by all alike: animals both wild and tame ; whereas what is good is no common possession, and eannot be shared by the bad.

Fourthly, that there is no scientific knowledge of (4) because Pleasure.^a

Fifthly, that what is good is best of all things; (5) because and this, Pleasure is not; and

Sixthly, that Pleasure is a hindrance to noble (6) because action ; and whatever is such cannot be good.^b

We will begin by meeting the first of these objec- Actions. 4 tions, the (one which insists that Pleasure is a) We answer to (1) that process; and will attempt to solve the difficulty by many proving the argument untrue. For in the first place, Pleasures not every pleasure is a " process of becoming." The deutly not pleasure arising from mental contemplation is no Processes, process, nor is that which arises from hearing and sight and smell. For these are not the consequence of some need or deficiency, as in the case of the others; those, for example, which follow eating or drinking.

of Grant and Rackham on the above passage). Only (a) is here definitely propounded for discussion. Of the six arguments by which it is supported, the second and the fifth are almost identical with (b) and (c) above. The others are adduced against (a) by Eudemus.

there is no Science of

15 18 not " Best " ; it hinders noble

617

1204 b

¹⁰ φαγεῖν η πιεῖν. αῦται μèν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς γίνονται, τῷ η τὴν ἔνδειαν ἀναπληροῦσθαι η τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· διὰ γένεσις δοκεῖ εἶναι. ή δ' ἔνδεια καὶ ὑπερβολὴ λύπη. λύπη 5 οῦν ἐνταῦθα ἐνθα ήδονῆς γένεσις. ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐκ ἔστιν ¹⁵ προλυπηθῆναι· οὐδεἰς γὰρ ήδόμενος τῷ ὁρῶν ἢ τῷ ὀσφραίνεσθαι προελυπήθη. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς 6 διανοίας ἔστι θεωροῦντά τι ήδεσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ προλυπηθῆναι. ὥστ' εἴη ἄν τις ήδονὴ η οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις.

Eἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ἔφη, διὰ 20 τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι γένεσις, ἔστι δέ τις ἡδονή, ἢ οὕκ ἐστιν γένεσις, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.

Το δ' όλον ούκ έστιν ούδεμία ήδονή γένεσις ούδε 7 γάρ αῦται αί ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναὶ οὐκ είσι γενέσεις, άλλα διαμαρτάνουσιν οι ταύτας φάσκοντες είναι τὰς ήδονὰς γενέσεις. οιονται γάρ, 25 ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφοράς γινομένης γίνεται ήδονή, διὰ τούτο γένεσιν είναι· έστι δ' ού. επειδή γάρ εστι 8 τής ψυχής τι μέρος & ήδόμεθα άμα τη προσφορά ών έσμεν ένδεεις, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ένεργεί καὶ κινείται, ή δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ή ένέργειά έστιν ήδονή. διὰ δή τὸ άμα τη προσφορά 30 ἐκείνο τὸ μόριον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείν, ἢ διὰ τὴν αύτοῦ ἐι έργειαν, οιονται γένεσιν είναι την ήδονην τῶ τὴν προσφορὰν δήλην είναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον άδηλον. όμοιον οῦν εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον 9 οίεται είναι σώμα, ότι τούτο μέν αισθητόν έστίν, ή 618

These latter arise from deficiency or excess, either when the deficiency is replenished or when we are deprived of the excess; and so we regard them as a pro-

- 5 cess. But deficiency and excess are pain; so that where pleasure arises, there is pain. But in the case of sight and hearing and smell there is no previous pain; for no one, who takes pleasure in seeing or in smelling,
- 6 suffers an antecedent pain. So, too, in the ease of the mind's activity one can take pleasure in the contemplation of something without any antecedent pain. There is, therefore, a kind of pleasure which is not a process.

If, then, Pleasure, as its opponents declare, is not a good thing (merely) because it is a process; and if it is proved that there is a pleasure which is not a process, it follows that this pleasure is a good thing.

- But more than this : no pleasure is ever a " pro- and a fullor 7 eess of becoming." Not even these pleasures which shows that arise from eating and drinking are processes, but no Pleasure those who declare them to be such are quite mistaken Process; They suppose that because pleasure is felt when our need is in process of being supplied therefore the
- 8 pleasure (itself) is a process. But this is not so. For whereas there is a part of the soul in which we feel pleasure contemporaneously with the supply of what we lack, this part is in activity and movement; and its movement and activity are Pleasure. And so because this part of the soul is in activity when the need is being supplied, or again mercly because it is in activity, some fancy that the pleasure is a process; the supply being manifest to them, whilst the 9 part of the soul concerned is not. It is just like believing that a human being is all body, because the body can be perceived while the soul cannot; whereas

is really a

^{1204 b} δὲ ψυχή ου^{*} ἔστι δέ γε καὶ [ή] ψυχή. ὁμοίως δὲ ³⁵ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου[•] ἔστιν γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ῷ ἡδόμεθα, ὃ ἅμα τῆ προσφορậ ἐνεργεῖ. διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις.

Καὶ ἀποκατάστασις δέ, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. 10 καὶ γὰρ μὴ ἀποκαθισταμένοις εἰς φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκαθίστασθαί ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς 1205 κ τῆ φύσει, τούτου τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν γενέσθαι, ἔστιν δέ, ὡς φαμέι, μὴ ὄντα ἐνδεῶ ἥδεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔνδεια λύπη, ἀνευ δὲ λύπης καὶ πρὸ λύπης φαμὲν ἥδεσθαι· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀποκατάστασις 5 τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς· ἐνδεὲς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν οὐδέν.

"Ωστε εἰ διότι μὲν γένεσις ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονή.

'Αλλά μετά τοῦτο οὐ πῶσα, φασίν, ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. 11 συνίδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου οὕτως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τἀγαθόν φαμεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγε¹⁰ σθαι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν οὐσία καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι καὶ ποσῷ καὶ πότε καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἁπάσαις), ἤδη γ' ἐκεῖνο φανερόν. κατὰ πάσας γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείας ἡδονή τις ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν πάσαις

^a $d\pi o \kappa a \tau a \sigma a \sigma s$; (or $\kappa a \tau a \sigma \sigma a \sigma s$; *Rhet.* I. xi. 1) is no doubt a process (yéveous), and therefore, according to \$\$ 7-9, no pleasure can be identified with it. The author, however, leaves this to be inferred; specifically, he only 620

he is in fact soul as well as body. And so it is in the present case; for there exists a part of the soul which is the seat of Pleasure, and this is active when the need is being supplied.—Thus we have proved that no pleasure is a "process of becoming."

¹⁰ Agam, some speak of Pleasure as a "perceptible restoration to a natural state." But the fact is that we feel pleasure even when we are not undergoing such "restoration." Restoration is the making good of what our nature lacks; but as we have said, one may feel pleasure without being in need; for need or deficiency is pain, and we assert that we feel pleasure apart from pain and before pain. This pleasure, therefore cannot be a "restoration of something we lack"; since in the case of such pleasures, there is nothing lacking."

It follows that if Pleasure was considered to be no good thing (merely) because it is a process; and it is now proved on the contrary that no pleasure is a process: Pleasure must then be something good.

(§§ 11-18 contain but little of Eudemus.)

11 Next, we are told that "not every pleasure is a to (2) that good thing." The error of this objection also can be pleasure seen from the following considerations. Since we companies assert that "good" may be predicated in all the at Activit categories—in Substance, Relation, Quantity, Time, and the rest b—the case of Pleasure too becomes at once clear. For every activity of Good is accompanied by a pleasure; so that since Good is predicated proves that the definition will not cover all kinds of

proves that the definition will not cover all kinds of pleasure.

b See I. i. 18, 19 above, and cf. Nic. l. vi. 3 and Eud. I. vii. 7.

^{1205 a} ταῖς κατηγορίαις, καὶ ήδονὴ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν¹· ὥστ' ¹⁵ ἐπειδή ἐν τούτοις³ μὲν τἀγαθὰ καὶ ήδονή, ή δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ήδονὴ ήδονή, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἰη πῶσα ήδονή.

"Λμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτου ὅτι καὶ διάφοροι τῷ 12 είδει αι ήδοναι εισίν. διάφοροι γαρ και αι κατ-ηγορίαι, εν αις εστιν ήδονή. ου γαρ ωσπερ επι των ἐπιστημῶν ἔχει, οໂον τῆς γραμματικῆς ἡ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν. ἐὰν ἔχῃ γὰρ Λάμπρος τὴν γραμ-20 ματικήν, δμοίως [δέ] διακείσεται ύπο της γραμματικής ταύτης ό γραμματικός άλλω ότωοῦν ἕχοντι γραμματικήν, οὐ ⟨δὲ ⟩ δύο εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμματικαί, η τ' έν Λάμπρω καὶ ἐν Ἱλεῖ.^{*} ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ήδονῆς οὐχ' οὕτως. ή γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ήδονὴ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγίνεσθαι οὐχ ὁμοίως δια-25 τιθέασιν. διὸ διάφοροι τῷ εἴδει δόξαιεν ἂν εἶναι αί ήδοναί.

'Α΄λλὰ δή καὶ διότι φαῦλαί εἰσιν ήδοναί τινες, καὶ 13 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡ ἡδονὴ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τό δέ τοιοῦτον καὶ ή τοιαύτη κρίσις οὐκ ἴδιός ἐστιν ήδονης, άλλα και έπι φύσεως και έπιστήμης. έστι 20 γὰρ καὶ φύσις φαύλη, οἶον ή τῶν σκωλήκων καὶ ή

¹ Reading èν aπάσαις (Rassow) for ayaθόν Mss. This alteration mends the logic; but in any case the argument (which is not found in *Eud.*) seems to rest on two doubtful assumptions : (1) that the pleasure which accompanies any category of Good must itself belong to that category, and . (2) that there is no pleasure that does not accompany an "activity of Good." In Eud. VII. v. the existence of evil pleasures is expressly recognized; so, too, in § 15 below.

² Reading èv tois autois (Rassow) for èv toútois Mss.

³ Some Mss. read Nηλεî.

in every category, Pleasure too must be so predicable. Thus we conclude that as good things and Pleasure are found together, and the pleasure which comes from good things is indeed Pleasure, every pleasure is a good thing.

- 12 It is at the same time clear from this consideration that pleasures also differ in their form or kind; for so do the categories in which they are found. It is quite otherwise with grammar and knowledge in its various branches. If Lamprus possesses a knowledge of grammar, the effect upon him of this knowledge will be the same as its effect on anyone else who possesses it; nor are the grammatical knowledge in Lamprus and that in Ilcus ^a of two different kinds. Not so with Pleasure. The pleasure, $\langle \text{for example}, \rangle$ which is given by strong drink and that which arises from sexual intercourse differ in their effects upon us; and it would therefore seem that pleasures differ in kind.
- ¹³ ^b Again, the existence of certain pleasures which and that arc base has been another ground for this belief are base that Pleasure is no good thing. Neither the fact there are however nor the criticism grounded on it can be also base confined to Pleasure, but must apply also to natural Knowledge and of products and to knowledge.^c Some natural products and minuted; are base—as maggots and beetles and vermin in

^a See note on Greek text. Wilamowitz remarks that a certam Neleus was the friend and heir of Theophrastus. This reading would point to a late date for the treatise. (R. Walzer in the Essay mentioned in the Introduction.)

^b This Section might follow naturally after § 10.

Cf. Nic, VII, xiii, 2.

1205 a

^{*} τῶν κανθάρων καὶ ὅλως ἡ τῶν ἀτίμων ζώων, ἀλλ'
 οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψύσις τῶν φαύλων· ὁμοίως δ' εἰσὶ 14
 καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι φαῦλαι, οἶον αἱ βάναυσοι, ἀλλ' ὅμως
 οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν τῷ
 γένει καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ φύσις. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ'
 ⁸⁵ ἀνδριαντοποιὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ ποῦός τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ῶν
 ἀπέτυχε καὶ κακῶς εἰργάσατο, ἀλλ' ἐζ ῶν εῦ, οὕτως
 οὐδ' ἐπιστήμην οὐδὲ φύσιν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ποῦόν

1205 b Όμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ήδονὴ τῷ γένει ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, 15 ἐπεὶ ὅτι γέ εἰσιν φαῦλαι ἡδοναἰ, οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς λανθάνει.
ἐπεὶ ὅτι γέ εἰσιν φαῦλαι ἡδοναἰ, οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς λανθάνει.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ φύσεις τῶν ζώων εἰσιν διάφοροι, οἶον καὶ φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, οἶον ἡ μὲν ἀνθρώπου
⁵ σπουδαία ἡ δὲ λύκου ἤ τινος ἄλλου θηρίου φαύλη,
ὅμοίως δ' ἑτέρα φύσις ἕππου καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὅνου καὶ κυνός, ἡ δὲ ἡδονή ἐστι κατάστασις ἐκ τοῦ 18 παρὰ φύσιν εἰς φύσιν ἐκάστῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ· ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἴδιον, τῆ γε φαύλη φύσει ἡ φαύλη ἡδονή. οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕπτῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ,
¹⁰ ὅμοίως οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ αἱ φύσεις διάφοροι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ διάφοροι. ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ ἦν ἀποκατάστασις, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν καθίστη, ὥστε τῆς μὲν φαύλης φύσεως ἡ κατάστασις φαύλη, τῆς δὲ σπουδαίας σπουδαία.

^a Cf. J. G. Wood on the "Burying Beetles": "It is owing to the exertions of these httle scavengers that the carcasses of birds, small mammals, and reptiles are never seen to cumber the ground, being buried at a depth of several inches, where they serve to increase the fertility of the earth instead of tainting the purity of the atmosphere." Also J. H. Fabre on the "Dor Beetles": "Les services rendus par ces ensevelisseurs sont d'une hante importance dans l'hygiène des champs; et nous, principaux intéressés en ce travail incessant d'épuration, à peine accordons-nons un regard dédaigneux 624 general ^a; yet nature is not on this account to be 14 placed among things base. Likewise there are base kinds of knowledge, such as the mechanical; yet knowledge is not therefore a base thing; both knowledge and nature belong to the class of good things. For just as one should not judge a sculptor's quality from his bad and unsuccessful work, but from his good work, so the quality of knowledge or nature or anything else is not to be gauged by its base products, but by its good ones.

15 In like manner, Pleasure too belongs to the class of good things; for (we are sure of this, though) we too are well aware that some pleasures are base. For different creatures have different natures, some for instance being base and some good : as the nature of man is good, and that of the wolf or other wild beast is base, while similarly the natures of horse, man, 16 ass, and dog are all different. But Pleasure, (it is maintained.) is the "restoration" of every creature.

maintained.) * is the "restoration" of every creature from what is unnatural to its own proper nature; whence it follows that base pleasure is a thing peculiar to a base nature. Pleasure is not the same thing for horse and man, or in general for one creature and another; their natures differ, and so accordingly do their pleasures. For Pleasure, we were told, is a restoration, and a restoration restores us to our true nature; hence the restoration of a base nature is base, and that of a good nature is good.

à ces vaillants." (The comparison is not made by Eudemus.) For contempt of mechanical skill and invention—to be expected in a slave-based polity—*ef.* Seneca, *Epist. Moral.* XIV. ii. 25. ^b I insert these words to show that this is the opinion of the "anti-hedonist," here adduced *argumenti rausa*; not the view of the author himself. See § 10 above, and note

VOL. 11

thereon.

1205 b

 Αλλ' οί φάσκοντες είναι τὴν ήδονὴν οὐ σπου-17 δαίαν πεπόνθασιν οίον οἱ μὴ εἰδότες τὸ νέκταρ
 οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς οἶνον πίνειν καὶ οὐκ είναι τούτου ἤδιον οὐδέν. τοῦτο δὲ πάσχουσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. οἶς ὅμοιον πεπόνθασιν οἱ πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις φάσκοντες είναι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἄλλας ήδονὰς ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς σωματικάς, ταύτας τε ὁρῶν γενέσεις τε οῦσας καὶ μὴ σπουδαίας,
 ὅἴλως οὐκ οἴονται είναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν.

² Επεί δ' οῦν ἐστιν ή ήδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς 18 φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἶον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οῦσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἴησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς 26 φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ήδοναὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσίν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τὴς ὅψεως ήδοναὶ καὶ τὴς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἴησαν, ἐπεὶ αι γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.

*Ετι καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ 19 30 ἐν πῶσιν εἶναι καὶ πῶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλοτίμου μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκεῖον ἐστίν. ὅ γὰρ φιλότιμός ἐστιν ὅ μόνος βουλόμενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν· καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν οῦν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τοιοῦτον δεῖν εἶναι.

"Η ού, άλλα και τουναντίον δια τουτο αν δόξειεν 20

^a Again the author appears to be stating the view of his opponents, not his own; the latter being that the pleasure is not the process of supplying a deficiency, but an activity of the soul while that process is going on. See §§ 7, 8 above. 626

- 17 The mistake of those who deny that Pleasure is good is in fact the mistake of those who being ignorant of nectar suppose the gods to drink wine, than which they imagine nothing is more delicious. But this is only through their ignorance. And so it is with those who declare that all pleasures are " processes " and not one is a good thing. It is because they are ignorant of all pleasures save those of the body, and see that these arc, (as they think,) a " processes " and not morally good, that they suppose Pleasure as a whole to be no good thing.
- To resume : since there is a pleasure which is felt 18 when the natural state is being restored, and another when it is fully established,--the former class including replenishment after deficiency, and the latter, pleasures arising from sight, hearing, and the like-the activities which operate when the natural state is established will be better than the others; for pleasures in both these senses of the term are " activities " (of the soul). It is clear, then, that the pleasures which arise from sight and hearing and thought will be the best kind, since the bodily pleasures are the result of a replenishment.

(Nic. VII, =Eud, VI, xin. 5-7.)

- Another objection was this : Pleasure is not a good to (3) that 19 thing, because it is not good to be enjoyed by all all naturally such what and common to all. What is good, they say, is the 18 good ; possession rather of the morally ambitious, and the fruit of his ambition; for the ambitious man desires exclusive possession of something, wherein he would fain surpass his fellows. So that Pleasure, too, if it is to be a good thing, must be something which can thus be monopolized.
- But surely the exact opposite is true; and Pleasure 20 627

1205 b

- ³⁵ άγαθον είναι, ὅτι πάντα τούτου ἐφίεται; τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι, ὥστ' εἰ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάντ' ἐφίεται, ἀγαθον ἂν εἰη τῷ γένει ἡ ἡδονή
- Πάλιν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον ἡ ἡδονή, οὐκ 21 ἔφασαν αὐτὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ἐμπόδιον φά-1208 a σκειν είναι δια το μή δρθως σκοπειν φαίνετ' αυτοις. ού γάρ έστιν έμπόδιον ή από τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ πραττομένου ήδονή έὰν μέντοι ἄλλη, ἐμπόδιον, ⁵ οໂον ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ἡδονὴ ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τοῦ 22 πράπτειν, ἀλλ' οὕτω μὲν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης ἐμπόδιον ἔσται· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἅμα ἀμφοτέραις ένεργείν. άλλα δια τι ούκ αγαθόν ή επιστήμη, αν ποιή την από της επιστήμης ήδονήν; και πότερον έμπόδιον ἕσται; ἢ οὕ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πράξει; ἡ 23 10 γὰρ ἡδονὴ παρορμậ πρòs τὸ μâλλον πράττειν ἀπ αύτοῦ γινομένη, ἐπεὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ποίησον πράττειν τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ ἡδέως ταῦτα πράττειν ἀρα ού πολλώ μαλλον ένεργήσει κατά την πράξιν; καί έαν μέν γε ήδόμενος πράπτη, σπουδαίος έσται, αν δὲ λυπούμενος τὰ καλὰ πράττη, οὐ σπουδαίος. ή 15 γαρ λύπη έπι τοις δι' ανάγκην έστιν, ωστ' εί λυπείται τις τὰ καλὰ πράττων, ἀναγκαζόμενος πράττει ὁ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πράττων οὐ σπουδαίος.
 - ^a The above argument is an expansion of Nic. VII. xii. § 5. Contrast Schiller's Gewissensscrupel :
 - Gerne dien' ich den Freunden, doch thu' ich es leider mit Neigung,
 - Und so wurmt es mir oft, dass ich nicht tugendhaft bin.
 - The poet's own view is expressed in his "Ode to Joy " (An die Freude): e.g.

628

is proved to be a good thing just because it is the aim of all All creatures by nature seck what is good ; so that if all seek Pleasure, Pleasure must be assigned to the class of good things.

- Again, some have denied that Pleasure is a good to (6) that Pleasure 21 thing on the ground that it is a "hindrance." It is furthers clear that they only say this because they do not the Action rightly consider the matter. For the pleasure which it arises ; arises from the deed we are performing is no hindrance to it; though another pleasure well may be.
- 22 The pleasure of intoxication, for instance, is one which hinders performance ; but in this way one kind of knowledge, too, may hinder another; for the soul cannot lend its activity to both at the same time. But if some kind of knowledge is producing its own proper pleasure, does it therefore cease to be a good thing ? and will it thereby hinder its own activity ? 23 Surely not. Performance will on the contrary be stimulated, for the pleasure encourages the performance from which it arises. For suppose that the good man not only does virtuous deeds, but finds the doing of them pleasant. Will not the activity shown in his performance be thereby greatly enhanced ? Moreover, if a man does noble deeds with Pleasure, he will be a good man; but if he performs them with Pain, he will not be good. For Pain is the accompaniment of deeds done by compulsion; so that if a man feels Pain in doing noble things, he does them under compulsion; and one who does noble deeds perforce is not himself good.ª

Freude trinken alle Wesen An den Brüsten der Natur : Alle Guten, alle Bosen Folgen ihrer Rosenspur.

1208 a

Αλλά μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν γε μὴ λυπούμενον ἢ ήδό-24 μενον τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· τὸ δ' ἀνὰ μέσον οὐκ ἔστιν. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐν πάθει, τὸ δὲ 20 πάθος ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ήδονῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνὰ μέσον οὐκ ἔστιν· δηλον οῦν ὡς καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λύπης ἢ ήδονῆς. εἰ μὲν οῦν λυπούμενός τις τὰ καλὰ πράττει, οὐ σπουδαῖος. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λύπης· μεθ' ήδονῆς ἄρα. οὐ μόνον ἄρα οὐκ 25 ἐμπόδιόν ἐστιν ἡ ήδονή, ἀλλὰ καὶ προτρεπτικὸν
 25 πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ήδονῆς εἶναι τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῆς γινομένης.

Αλλος ήν λόγος ότι οὐδεμία ποιεί ἐπιστήμη 26 ήδονήν. ἔστιν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. οἱ γὰρ δειπνοποιοἱ καὶ στεφανοποιοἱ καὶ [οί] μυρεψοὶ ήδονής εἰσιν ποιητικοί. [ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ήδονὴ ὡς τέλος, ἀλλὰ μεθ³
 ήδονῆς τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ήδονῆς.] ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ ήδονῆς.*¹

"Ετί δέ καὶ ἄλλος έλέγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον. ἀλλ 27 οὕτως μὲν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῷ λόγῷ ἀναιρήσεις καὶ τὰς καθ' ἕκαστα λεγομένας ἀρετάς. ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία οὐκ ἔστιν ἄριστον· ἆρ' οῦν διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν; 35 ἢ τοῦτ' ἄτοπον; ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐδὲ ἡδονὴ διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον.

¹ Susemihl suggests transposition of the last two sentences, and I have followed this in translating.

^a *i.e.* the one which Spengel supposes to have dropped out in § 3 above.

⁶ τέχνης μή είναι έργον ήδονήν μηδεμίαν, "no art devoted to the production of any form of pleasure" (Rackhain, Nic. VII. xii. 6). The author seems here to have confused τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, as English writers confuse the corre-630

- 24 Yet again, the performance of virtuous deeds must needs be accompanied either by Pain or by Pleasure; indifference is impossible. Why is this ?-Because Virtue deals with passion or feeling; and in passion, we feel Pain and Pleasure, and are not indifferent. Thus it is obvious that Virtue also is accompanied by Pain or by Pleasure. Now if a man performs noble deeds with Pain, he is not a good man. Virtue then cannot be accompanied by Pain ; therefore it must
- 25 be accompanied by Pleasure. Pleasure, then, so far from being a hindrance, is an encouragement to performance; and indeed Virtue can in no wise exist apart from the pleasure which it evokes.
- Another argument " was that no kind of science b to (4) that produces Pleasure. This also is untrue. Cooks, the Object 26 wreath-makers, and perfumers are engaged in the ground of direct production of Pleasure. There is therefore a Science, branch of knowledge whereof this is the end; and and the inseparable even the other kinds, though Pleasure is not their end Accompaniand aim, are nevertheless accompanied by it, and ment of all; apart from it cannot exist.
- 27 Another objection was that Pleasure is not the best to (5) that of all things. But the use of such an argument as this same may be is equally fatal to the several particular virtues. and of Courage Courage for instance is not the best of all things. Is and the it on that account not a good thing? Is not the con-virtues. sequence an absurdity? And so with the other virtues. No more, then, can Pleasure be denied goodness because it is not the best of all.

sponding terms. Cf. I. xvii. 10. But his argument that Scientific Knowledge is always accompanied by Pleasure is quite different from that of Fudemus that Art produces the conditions of Pleasure, though not the Pleasure itself. (See Grant's and Burnet's notes, ad loc.)

631

ARISTOTLE

1208 a

'Απορήσειε δ' άν τις μεταβάς και έπι των άρετων 28 το τοιούτον. οίον επειδή ό λόγος κρατεί ποτε τών παθών (φαμέν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς), καὶ τὰ πάθη δε πάλιν αντεστραμμένως του λόγου κρατεί (οίον 1208 b έπι των ακρατών συμβαίνει), έπει οῦν το άλογον μέρος της ψυχης έχον την κακίαν κρατεί του λόγου εῦ διακειμένου (ό γὰρ ἀκρατής τοιοῦτος), καὶ ό λόγος δμοίως φαύλως διακείμενος¹ κρατήσει τῶν παθών εδ διακειμένων και εχόντων την οικείαν 5 ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, συμβήσεται τῆ ἀρετῆ ·κακώς χρήσθαι (ό γὰρ λόγος φαύλως[®] διακείμενος καὶ χρώμενος τῆ ἀρετῆ κακῶς αὐτῆ χρήσεται) τὸ δή τοιούτον άτοπον αν συμβαίνειν δόξειεν.

Πρός δή την τοιαύτην απορίαν ράδιον αντειπείν 29 και λυσαι έκ των έμπροσθεν ήμιν είρημένων ύπερ 10 άρετής. τότε γάρ φαμεν είναι άρετήν, όταν ό λόγος εθ διακείμενος τοῖς πάθεσιν έχουσι τὴν οἰκείαν άρετην σύμμετρος ή, και τα πάθη τω λόγω ούτω γαρ διακείμενα συμφωνήσουσι πρός άλληλα, ώστε τόν μέν λόγον προστάττειν αεί το βέλτιστον, τα δέ πάθη βαδίως εξ διακείμενα ποιείν δ αν ό λόγος 15 προστάττη αν ούν ό λόγος φαύλως ή διακείμενος, 30

 Mielach's conjecture for φαθλος · διο κακείνος Mss.
 Spengel's conjecture for λόγω φαύλω Mss. Perhaps λόγω $dav\lambda\omega s$ (which I have translated) would be preferable; making the man, rather than his Principle, the subject of yphalau and yphostal.

" In the next three sections the author reverts to a problem already discussed (see note on § 29). Susemihl (Introd. pp. xiv foll.) suggests that these sections are based on a lost passage of Eud. which formed part of the fragment appearing in the better MSS. as VIII. i.-iii. They certainly deal with 632

- 28 To approach another subject ": the virtues too Can we may suggest a difficulty of the following kind. It when happens sometimes that Principle masters the pas- Use of sions, as we say it does in the man of self-control : and sometimes conversely that the passions master Principle, as in the case of the self-indulgent. Not only, therefore, may the unreasoning part of the soul, when tainted by vice, overcome the Rational Prineiple when the latter is in its right condition (such being the state of the self-indulgent); but Principle too, when ill conditioned, may equally overcome the passions when they are rightly conditioned and in possession of their own proper virtue or excellence. Now in this latter case it will follow that (the man) will use his own virtue viciously ; for he who, having his Rational Principle corrupted, makes use of his own virtue, must needs use it viciously. And such a consequence would seem absurd.
- A difficulty of this kind is however easily answered; 29 what we have already said about Virtue suffices for a solution.^b For Virtue, we say, is found only when rational Principle, rightly conditioned, is in harmony with the passions possessing their own proper excellence, and they in turn with it. Thus conditioned, they will agree with one another, so that Principle always enjoins what is best, and the passions, being 30 in right condition, readily execute its behests. If,
- therefore, the condition of Principle be evil, and that

the question discussed in VIII. i., whether Virtue can be used to commit vicious acts.

^b Cf. I. xxxiv. 23-26; and II. vi. 8, 9, 18, 19. The difficulty springs from the equivocal use of aperi to denote (1) excellence of any kind and (2) moral excellence or "Virtue." Here we see that apern Loyou and apern nation combine to produce 'Apern' (noun').

Virtue ?

1206 b

τὰ δὲ πάθη εῦ, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετὴ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ λόγου (ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή)· ὥστ' οὐδὲ κακώς χρήσθαι ένδέχεται άρετή. άπλώς δ' ούχ, ώσπερ οιονται οι άλλοι, της άρετης άρχη και ήγεμών έστιν ό λόγος, ἀλλὰ μαλλον τὰ πάθη. 20 δέει γαρ πρός το καλον όρμην άλογόν τινα πρώτον εγγίνεσθαι (ὃ καὶ γίνεται), είθ' οὕτως τὸν λόγον ὕστερον ἐπιψηφίζοντα είναι καὶ διακρίνοντα. ίδοι δ' άν τις τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν παιδίων και 31 των άνευ λόγου ζώντων έν γάρ τούτοις άνευ του λόγου έγγίνονται όρμαι των πάθων πρός το καλόν 25 πρότερον, ό δε λόγος υστερος επιγινόμενος καί σύμψηφος ών ποιεί πράττειν τὰ καλά. άλλ' οὐκ ἐἀν ἀπό τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀρχὴν λάβη πρὸς τὰ καλά, οὐκ¹ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ πάθη ὁμογνωμονοῦντα, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις έναντιοῦται· διὸ μάλλον ἀρχή ἔοικεν πρός τήν άρετην το πάθος εθ διακείμενον η ό λόγος.

80 VIII. Ἐχόμενον δ' äν εἶη τούτων εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδή 1 περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, περὶ εὐτυχίας. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον τὸν εὐτυχῆ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε εὐτυχίας, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἴσως· ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ῶν ή τύχη ἐστὶ κυρία, οὐκ 86 ἐνδέχεται εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. διὸ ῥητέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ εὐτυχίας, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ εὐτυχὴς τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ τί.

Πρώτον μέν οὖν ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἄν τις ἐλθών καὶ 2 ἐπιβλέψας ἀπορήσειεν. οὖτε γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις τὴν τύχην ὥς ἐστι φύσις. ἡ γὰρ φύσις [ἀεἰ]² οῦ ἐστιν ¹ οὐκ seems redundant, and is omitted by two MSS. Perhaps ἀεἰ should be read in its place.

² [*del*] bracketed by Rieckher.

^a Probably the Stores (Susemihl, Introd. p. xn).

of the passions be good, the defect in the former precludes Virtue, since Virtue is the product of both. To make a vicious use of Virtue is accordingly impossible. And we may state without any qualification that, contrary to the opinion of other (moralists)," it is not Rational Principle which originally points the way to Virtue, but rather the passions. For first of all, there must needs arise (as we know there actually does) an unreasoning impulse towards what is noble and good ; afterwards, Principle must give its vote and verdict

31 (on the suggested act). This is seen in the case of children and other unreasoning beings. In them there arise at first unreasoning impulses of the passions towards noble aims; not till afterwards does Principle supervene, and by its approving vote bring about the performance of noble actions. On the other hand where Principle originally points to noble ends, the passions by no means (always) follow with their assent; often they oppose it. Wherefore passion, if in right condition, has more claim than Principle to be the original motive force which inclines us to Virtue.

(Eud. VIII. ii.)

- 1 VIII. As we are discussing Happiness, we are next Of Good led to speak of Good Fortune or Luck. For most men suppose that the happy life is the fortunate life, or at any rate includes Good Fortune. And perhaps they are right. For without external advantages life cannot be happy ; and they are in Fortune's control. We are obliged, therefore, to speak of Good Fortune ; and in fact to define its nature, seat, and province.
- 2 On the first approach and survey, these questions Is Good Fortune present some difficulty. On the one hand, we can natural, that hardly assert that Fortune is part of Nature. For

635

1206 b αιτία, τούτου ώς επί το πολύ η *1 ώσαύτως ποιη-1207 & τική έστίν, ή δέ γε τύχη οὐδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως και ώς έτυχεν διό ή τύχη έν τοις τοιούτοις λέγεται. ούτε δη νοῦν γέ τινα η λόγον δρθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οὐχ ηττόν ἐστι τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, ή² δὲ τύχη οῦ. διὸ καὶ οῦ πλεῖστος νοῦς ₅ καὶ λόγος, ἐνταῦθα ἐλαχίστη [καὶ] τύχη, οῦ δὲ πλείστη τύχη, ένταῦθ' ἐλάχιστος νοῦς.

'Αλλ' άρά γε ή εὐτυχία ἐστίν ώς ἐπιμέλειά τις 3 θεών; η τουτ' ουκ αι δόξειεν; τον γαρ θεόν άξιουμεν κύριον όντα των τοιούτων τοις άξίοις άπονέμειν καί τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, ή δὲ τύχη καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς 10 τύχης ώς άληθως ώς ἂν τύχη γίνεται. εί δέ γε τῷ θεώ το τοιούτον απονέμομεν, φαύλον αυτόν κριτήν ποιήσομεν η ού δίκαιον τοῦτο δ' οὐ προσηκόν ἐστι [τῷ] θέῷ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔξω γε τούτων εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο 4 την τύχην αν τις τάξειεν, ώστε δηλον ότι τούτων άν τι είη. νοῦς μέν δή και λόγος και ἐπιστήμη 15 παντελώς άλλότριόν τι έοικεν είναι. άλλα μην ούδ ή ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἡ εὔνοια παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξειεν ἂν είναι εύτυχία διά τό και έν τοῦς φαύλοις έγγίγνεσθαι τόν δε θεόν των φαύλων ούκ είκος επιμελείσθαι. λοιπόν τοίνυν και οικειότατον της εύτυχίας 5 έστιν ή φύσις.

"Εστιν δ' ή εὐτυχία καὶ ή τύχη ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐφ' 20 ήμιν ούσιν, μηδ' ών αυτοί κύριοι έσμεν και δυνατοί

Reading < η del η> ώς enl το πολυ (Bonitz).
 Or reading of for η, "which that of Fortune lacks."

^a For vovs in the general sense cf. note on vi. 33 above. $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$, if it is to be distinguished from rows, is the reasoned ruling or decision which rous makes. 636

whatever Nature canses, it is wont usually if not invariably to reproduce. With Fortune it is never so. Its results are produced without order, and "fortnitously"; this being indeed the reason why we speak of Fortune as the cause of such events. On the other hand, it is surely impossible to regard Fortune as a kind of intelligent Perception ^a or rational Ruling; rational, for their domain also exhibits an orderly sequence and invariability which Fortune lacks; so that where there is most of Intelligence and Rationality, there is least of Fortune or Luck; and most of the latter where there is least intelligence.

- 3 Can Good Fortune, then, be a kind of Divine provi- or providendence? This we cannot believe; for we look to Goo, that? as controlling good and evil things, to apportion them in accordance with desert; whereas Fortune and its gifts are bestowed in very truth "fortuitously." If we attribute these gifts to Goo, we shall make Him either an incompetent judge or an unjust one; and
- 4 this is alien to His nature. And yet apart from these three, (Naturc, Intelligence, Gon,) there is nothing to which Fortune can be ascribed; to one of them, accordingly, it must clearly belong. Now Intelligence, Reason and Knowledge appear to be something wholly foreign to it; nor again can we regard the providence and benevolence of Gon as Good Fortune, seeing that this latter befails the bad as well as the good; and it is not likely that Gon provides for the 5 bad.^b It remains, therefore, to choose Nature as that which is nearest akin to Good Fortune.

Now Good Fortune and Luck operate in a sphere it is beyond beyond our competence, where we have no control our control

^b Contrast St. Matthew v. 45. The author seems here to diverge from the view of *Eud.* (VIII. n. 24).

637

1207 a

πράξαι. διὸ τὸν δίκαιον, ἡ δίκαιος, οὐθεὶς λέγει εὐτυχῆ οὐδὲ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον οὐδ᾽ ὅλως τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐδένα· ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκειότερον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐροῦμεν· τὸν γὰρ εὐγενῆ εὐτυχῆ 25 λέγομεν, καὶ ὅλως ῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχει, ῶν μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος ἐστίν.

Αλλ' όμως ούδ' ένταῦθα κυρίως ἂν ή εὐτυχία ⁶ λέγοιτο. ἔστιν δὲ πολλαχῶς ὁ εὐτυχὴς λεγόμενος· καὶ γὰρ ῷ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ συνέβη τι ἀγαθὸν πρᾶξαι, εὐτυχῆ φαμέν, καὶ ῷ κατὰ λόγον
⁸⁰ ζημίαν ῆν λαβεῖν, τὸν τοιοῦτον κερδάναντα εὐτυχῆ φαμέν. ἔστιν οῦν ἡ εὐτυχία ἐν τῷ ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι ⁷ παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἐν τῷ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν εὕλογον. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἡ εὐτυχία ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν καθ' αὐτὸ δόξειεν ἂν εὐτύχημα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κακὸν
⁸⁵ μὴ λαβεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτύχημα.

Έστιν οὖν ή εὐτυχία ἄλογος φύσις. ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχής 8
ἐστιν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως. ἐν γὰρ τῆ ψυχῆ ἕνεστιν τῆ φύσει τοιοῦτον ῷ ὁρμῶμεν
1207 b ἀλόγως πρὸς ἅ ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν.' καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσειε ⁹ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω πράττειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησίν, ἀλλ' ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ

¹ Or perhaps εὐτυχῶμεν, " our good fortune."

^a See I. ix. 7 above.

nor can take effective action. It is on this account that no one speaks of the just man as lucky in being just, nor the courageous or any other man of virtue (as owing his virtue to Luck); since the possession or absence of these qualities is within our own competence.^a There are, however, other advantages which and is the we can attribute more appropriately to Luck. We ment of say for example that the man of good birth is Good fortunate; and similarly any man endowed with the rational kind of good things that is beyond his control.

Yet even this is not the proper application of the word. There are more senses than one in which we term a man fortunate. We do so when he has happened to achieve something good beyond his own calculation; and when he who might reasonably expect to lose has gained instead, we say that he too is

7 lucky. Good Fortune, then, appears to consist in the enjoyment of some good which reason would not expect, or the avoidance of some ill which it would anticipate. It is, however, in the good we receive that Luck is more clearly and appropriately recognized. To receive something good is essentially a piece of luck ; to escape something evil is so incidentally.

Luck, then, is a natural instinct, not guided by other reason. For the fortunate man is he who has an intrough a unreasoning impulse towards good things, and more- Instinct over obtains them. But this comes by Nature ; Nature has implanted in our soul something which

9 impels us irrationally towards our advantage. And should you ask one who is thus favoured why he thinks fit to act as he does, he will tell you he does not know, but merely sees fit to do so. His case is like that of men inspired ; for they too have an unreasoning impulse towards some particular act.

Expectation

1207 b

Τὴν δ' εὐτυχίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν οἰκείω καὶ ἰδίω 10 ἀνόματι προσαγορεύειν, ἀλλ' αἰτίαν πολλάκις φαμέν είναι αὐτήν· ἡ δ' αἰτία ἀλλότριον τοῦ ἀνόματος. ἡ γὰρ αἰτία καὶ οῦ ἐστιν αἰτία ἄλλο ἐστίν, καὶ ἄνευ ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπιτυγχανούσης τῶν ἀγαθῶν¹ αἰτία 10 λεγομένη, οໂον ἡ τοῦ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν ἢ πάλιν τοῦ μὴ οἰόμενον ἀγαθὸν λήψεσθαι ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν. ἔστιν 11 οῦν ἡ τοιαύτη εὐτυχία διάφορος ἐκείνης, καὶ ἔοικεν αὕτη ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς μεταπτώσεως γίνεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτυχία. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν εὐτυχία, ἀλλ' οῦν πρός γε τὴν εὐδαι-14 μονίαν ἡ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη εὐτυχία οἰκειοτέρα, ῆς ἐν αὐτῷ² ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁρμῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι τῆς ἐπιτεύξεως.

Ἐπεὶ οῦν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἀνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς 12 ἀγαθῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς εὐτυχίας, οἶον ἀρτίως ἕφαμεν, συνεργὸς ἂν εἴη τῆ εὐδαιμονία.

 IX. Περί μέν οῦν εὐτυχίας τοσαῦτα ἐπειδή δὲ 1
 ²⁰ ὑπερ ἐκάστης τῶν ἀρετῶν κατὰ μέρος εἰρήκαμεν, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη καθόλου συνθέντας τὰ καθ ἕκαστα κεφαλαιωσαμένους εἰπεῖν.

"Εστι μέν οῦν οὐ κακῶς λεγόμενον τοὕνομα ἐπὶ 2 τοῦ τελέως σπουδαίου, ἡ καλοκἀγαθία. καλὸς κἀγαθὸς γάρ, φασίν, ὅταν τελέως σπουδαῖος ή. 25 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν,

1 Reading <n> airla Leyouern.

² Or, reading air_n with Scaliger, "which contains in its own self the origin of that impulse which leads . . ."

^a In "a piece of good luck" we cannot distinguish cause and effect; or rather, as *Eud.* (VIII. ii. 10) puts it, if it is a cause, it is a cause of which we can render no rational account (*alriar ăloyor àrdpomiro loyiopip*). 640

ARISTOTLE

^{1207 b} οίον τον δίκαιον καλον κάγαθον φασί, τον άνδρείον, τον σώφρονα, όλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν.

'Επειδή ούν είς δύο διαιρούμεν, και τα μέν φαμεν 3 είναι καλά τά δέ [καί] άγαθά, και των άγαθων τά μέν άπλως άγαθά τὰ δὲ οὕ, καὶ καλὰ μὲν οἶον τὰς 30 άρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς πράξεις, ἀγαθὰ δὲ [οἶον] άρχήν πλοῦτον δόξαν τιμήν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔστιν οῦν ό καλός κάγαθός ώ τὰ άπλως άγαθά έστιν άγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἐστίν. ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλός καὶ ἀγαθός. $\tilde{\omega}$ δὲ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν 4 ³³ άγαθά, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ύγιαίνειν αν δόξειεν ῷ τὰ ἁπλως ύγιεινα μη ύγιεινα έστίν. εί γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραγινόμενά τινα βλάπτοιεν, ούκ αν αίρετα είη, άλλα τα τοιαθτα όσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βουλήσεται αὐτῷ είναι. ὁ ῦ 1208 1 δέ τοιούτος ών οίος ύποστελλόμενός τι των άγαθών πρός τὸ μὴ είναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν καλὸς κάγαθός είναι άλλ ῷ τάγαθὰ πάντα ὄντα ἀγαθά έστιν και ύπο τούτων μη διαφθείρεται, οίον ύπο πλούτου και άρχης, ό τοιοῦτος καλός κάγαθός.

5 Χ. Υπέρ δέ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὀρθῶς πράτ-1 τειν εἴρηται μέν, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δέ. ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ἐρωτήσειεν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τί ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ποῦ ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος;

^a See I. xxxiv. 1, 25, 26.

man, the brave man, the temperate man who is called "noble and good"; in a word, it is virtue that wins a man the name.

Now we are accustomed to distinguish between the 3 things we call noble and those we call good; and to divide the latter again into those which are absolutely good, and those which are only relatively so. Among noble things we class the virtues and the deeds which arise from virtue; and among good things power, riches, glory, honour and the like. The noble and good man, then, is one to whom what is absolutely good is good and what is absolutely noble is noble : 4 for such a man is himself both noble and good. On the other hand, he to whom absolute goods are not good, cannot be noble and good; any more than we should regard as healthy one to whom things absolutely healthy are not healthy. For to a man who should be harmed by the accession of riches and power, those things would not be meet objects of choice; rather he will desire the possession of such 5 things as will do him no harm. But the sort of man who shrinks from the acquisition of some good thing would not be regarded as noble and good. It is the kind of man to whom all that is good is good-the man incorruptible by riches and power, or by any other good thing-who alone is noble and good.

(Cf. Eud. VIII. ni, 12-17.)

1 X. We have already spoken of acting rightly in We act in accordance with the Virtues "; but on that subject with Right more remains to be said. For whereas we stated that $\frac{Princeple}{Princeple}$ (virtuous action) was action " in accordance with Right Principle," it is possible that someone night in ignorance ask us what we mean by this phrase ; and where we are to look for this Right Principle or 643 1208 a

 ^{*} έστιν οῦν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅταν τὸ 2
 ¹⁰ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν
 ^ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. τότε γὰρ ἡ πρâξις
 ^ĕσται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
 ^{*}

Έπειδη γάρ τι της ψυχης τὸ μèν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ἀεἰ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχης τὸ
¹⁵ σῶμα της ψυχης ἕνεκεν, καὶ τότ' ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχη ὥστε μὴ κωλύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμῶν πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτης ἕργον (τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν, πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελτίονι). ὅταν οῦν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ 3
²⁰ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐνεργεῖν, τότ' ἔσται τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον γινόμενον.

Ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως εἶποι τις ἄν, ὅταν πῶς ἔχωσι τὰ πάθη, οὐ κωλύουσι, καὶ πότε οὕτως ἔχουσιν; οὐ γὰρ οίδα. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ῥάδιον. 4 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἰατρός· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἶπη τῷ πυρέττοντι πτισάνην προσφέρεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ πυρέττειν πῶς 25 αἰσθάνομαι; ὅταν, φησίν, ὅρậς ἀχρὸν ὄντα· τὸ δ' ἀχρὸν πῶς εἰδήσω; ἐνταῦθα δὴ συνιέτω ὁ ἰατρός·

^a In Nic. VI. 1. 6 $\tau \partial \lambda \alpha \gamma \iota \sigma \tau \kappa \delta \nu$ is confined to that part of the rational soul which deals with the Contingent or Variable ($= \tau \partial \beta \alpha \nu \lambda \epsilon \sigma \tau \kappa \delta \nu$ of I. xxxiv. 3 above). Here, as elsewhere, it includes the entire reasoning faculties. See Burnet's note on the former passage.

^b For vois see I. xxxiv. 13. Intuitive and Scientific Thought together make Wisdom $(\sigma o \phi a)$, the Virtue of the Scientific part of the soul. In this chapter, which corresponds on the whole with *Eud*. VIII. nn. 12-17, the rôle of the moral Virtues is to keep the passions from interfering with the exercise of the highest intellectual Virtue; whose work, according to *Eud*., consists in the contemplation of GoD $(\tau \dot{\eta} \nu$ 644 2 Rational Rule of Conduct? To this we reply that when our men act in accordance with Right Principle when the Part does unreasoning part of the soul does not prevent the not balk our rational reasoning part " from fulfilling its own proper activity ; Part. for under these conditions, the action will be in accordance with Right Rule.

This appears from the following considerations. The soul includes an inferior part as well as a superior one. Now the inferior always exists for the sake of the superior; for example, in the case of body and soul, the former exists for the sake of the latter, and we shall declare the body's condition to be good when it is such that so far from preventing the soul from completing its own task, the body assists and encourages it therein. For the inferior exists for the 3 sake of the superior, so as to co-operate with it. And just in the same way, when the passions do not prevent the Intuitive faculty ^b from being active in its own proper work, action takes place in accordance with a Right Rational Standard.

"Very true," someone may reply; "but what is Diagnons the state of the passions when they permit the is to some mind's activity? And when are they in that state? Extent 4 For of this I am ignorant." Such a question as this "nultive. is not easy to answer. A physician may be faced with a similar difficulty, when for instance he prescribes a decoction of barley " in case the patient is feverish." "How do I perceive," (he may be asked,) "that he is feverish?" "When you see that he is pale." "But how am I to distinguish this pallor?" Then the physician has to realize (that he can do no

τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν). Cf. Nic. X. vii., viii. One misses these noble "colophons" of Nic. and Eud. in the present work.

1208 a

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔχεις παρὰ σαυτῷ, φησί, τῶν γε τοιούτων αἴσθησιν, * * οὐκ ἔτι.¹ ὡσαύτως ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων κοινός ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος. ὁμοίως 5 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παθῶν τοῦ γνωρίζειν. δεῖ γὰρ 30 αὐτὸν συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς αἴσθησίν τι.

Ἐπιζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις ἴσως και τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἀρά 6 γε ἔργω εἰδήσας ταῦτα και δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσομαι; οἴονται γάρ. τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον. οὐδεμία γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν παραδίδωσι τῷ μανθάνοντι τὴν χρῆσιν και τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ^{\$5} ἔξιν μόνον· οὕτως οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωσιν τὸ εἰδῆσαι ταῦτα τὴν χρῆσιν (ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ὡς φαμέν), ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔξιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ εἰδέναι ἐξ ῶν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ τούτοις χρήσασθαι. τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν και τὴν ἐνέργειαν 7 τούτων οὐκ ἔστι ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας τὸ παρα-1208 ▷ διδόναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τὴν χρῆσιν παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

 XI. 'Εφ' απασι δὲ τούτοις ὑπὲρ φιλίας ἀναγ-1 καῖόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστιν καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ
 τί· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὅρῶμεν παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον παρατείνουσαν καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, καὶ οῦσαν ἀγαθόν, συμπαραληπτέα ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Πρώτον μέν οῦν ἴσως δ ἀπορεῖται καὶ ζητεῖται, 2 βέλτιον διελθεῖν. πότερον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φιλία ἐν

¹ Reading obκ έστι (διδάξαι) or the like. (The Aldine edition has obκ έστι.)

^a Something like this has to be supplied to complete the sense. But possibly *awuérw* is corrupt, as Rieckher thinks. ^b The treatment of Friendship which occupies Books VIII. and IX. of *Nic.* (16 pp. in Bekker's text) is by *Eud.* 646

more).^a " If you cannot perceive this much yourself," 5 he will answer, "I cannot explain it." And this will apply equally to other cases of the kind. So, too, 18 it with the distinguishing of the passions. One must oneself contribute towards the perception (of their slate).

- Another question which may be asked is of this The more 6 kind. "Supposing that I know all this, shall I in very or Science truth straightway become a happy man?" For men of Ethics annot fancy they will. But this is far from being the case. make us None of the other kinds of knowledge imparts to him good. who learns it the power to use and act upon it ; but only the possession of it. No more in the present case does the knowledge of these things impart the power to use them-for happiness we define as an Activity -but only their possession; and Happiness does not eonsist in the knowledge of its components, but comes
- 7 by making use of them. But the use of these things, and how to aet upon them, it is not the task of our present treatise to impart; for indeed no other branch of knowledge imparts the use but only the possession of itself.
- XI. Besides all this, it is incumbent on us to deal Of Priend-1 with Friendship: ^b its nature, its abode, and its ^{ship}. province. For seeing as we do that it extends throughout life and is present on every occasion, and that it is a good thing, we seem bound to admit it as an aid to Happiness.
- It may be best to begin with an enumeration of the (1) Is Like-2 difficulties and questions it raises. In the first place, Unlikeness then, does Friendship flourish between those alike, its Basis?

compressed into one Book (VII. of 12 pp.); in the present work (M.M. II. xi.-xvi.) it covers only 5 pp. Chapter xi. corresponds mainly to the first six chapters of Eud. VII.

ARISTOTLE

^{1208 b} τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ '' κολοιός '' φασι '' παρὰ κολοιὸν ἰζάνει,'' καὶ

10 αἰεί τοι τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον.

φασίν δὲ καὶ κυνός ποτε ἀεὶ καθευδούσης ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμιδος, ἐρωτηθέντα τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, διὰ τί ποτε ἡ κύων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμιδος καθεύδει, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τι τῆ κεραμιδι ὅμοιον ἡ κύων, ὡς 15 διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον τὴν κύνα φοιτῶσαν. πάλιν δ' αῦ 3 δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τισἰν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον ἐγγίνεσθαι ἡ φιλία. '' ἐρῷ μὲν'' γάρ, φασίν, '' ὅμβρου γαῖα, ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον.'' τὸ δὴ ἐναντίον, φασίν, τῷ ἐναντίω βούλεσθαι φίλον εἶναι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὅμοίοις οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ 20 ὅμοιον, φασίν, τοῦ ὅμοίου οὐδὲν προσδεῖται, καὶ τὰ

"Ετι δε πότερον έργον εστι φίλον γενέσθαι η 4 ράδιον γενέσθαι; οί γοῦν κόλακες ταχέως προσεδρεύσαντες φίλοι μεν οὐκ εἰσίν, φαίνονται δε φίλοι είναι.

"Ετι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορεῖται, πότερον ἔσται 5 δ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ φίλος; ἢ οὕ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ 25 φιλία ἐν πίστει καὶ βεβαιότητι, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ἤκιστα τοιοῦτος· καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ φαύλῳ, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;

Πρώτον μέν ούν διοριστέον αν είη ύπερ φιλίας 6 ποίας σκοπουμεν. έστι γάρ, ώς οιονται, φιλία και πρός θεόν και τα άψυχα, ούκ όρθως. την γαρ φιλίαν ένταυθά φαμεν είναι ου έστι το άντιφιλει-

^o This question and remark do not appear in *Eud*. or *Nic*. But *of*. *Eud*. III. vii. 4, VII. iv. 7. 648

τοιαῦτα δή.

^a See Odyssey xvii. 218. The quotation is not exact.

^b See Dindorf, *Poetas Scenici* (ed. 8), where the entire passage of Euripides is given (Frag. 839).

as men think and say? "Jackdaw"-so runs the proverb-" perches by jackdaw," and

Ever is like unto like, men say, through Destiny guided.ª

There is also a story of a dog that always would sleep upon the same tile; and of how Empedocles, when asked why it did so, declared that there was some affinity between the dog and the tile which caused

- 3 the former always to seek the latter. Others, however, believe that on the contrary Friendship arises between opposites. "Earth is of rain enamoured," they say, "when 'tis dry "^b; and so they maintain that opposite desires the friendship of opposite; for between those alike it is not even possible that such a relation should arise. For like, they say, has no need of like : and so forth.
- Another question is whether to become a friend 1s (2) Is it easy to attain? 4 a difficult task or an easy one ? Certainly flatterers. who rapidly attach themselves to us, are not friends, though they appear to be.^o

Moreover, there are such problems as whether a (3) Can the good man can be friend to a bad one? This seems friend to 5 impossible; for Friendship depends on loyalty and the Bad Y steadfastness, and of these qualities the bad man has but small store. Again, can a bad man be friend (4) Or the to another bad man ? or is this equally impossible ? Bad to the Bad ? First, then, we must make clear what kind of Friendship 6 friendship is the object of our inquiry. Men fancy requires mutual that friendship for Gon is possible, and also friendship Affection. for lifeless things. But they are mistaken. Friend-

ship as we define it exists only where the friendly affection is returned.^d But the (so-called) friendship

^d Cf. Nuc. VIII. ii. 3 λέγουσιν . . . εύνοιαν έν άντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν είναι.

 1208 b 80 σθαι, ή δὲ πρὸς θεὸν φιλία οὔτε ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δέχεται, οὕθ' ὅλως τὸ φιλεῖν· ἅτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις φαίη φιλεῖν τὸν Δία· οὐδὲ δὴ παρὰ τῶν ἀψύχων η ἐνδέχεται ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. φιλία μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα ἐστίν, οἶον οἶνον ἢ ἄλλο δὴ τῶν τοιούτων. Διὸ δὴ οὕτε τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φιλίαν ἐπιζητοῦμεν
 85 οὕτε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἕμψυχα, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἐν οἶς ἐστι τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν.

Ei δή τις μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκέψαιτο τί ἐστι τὸ 8 φιλητόν, ἔστιν οῦν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τἀγαθόν. ἕτερον μὲν οῦν ἐστι τὸ φιλητὸν καὶ τὸ φιλητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ βουλητὸν καὶ τὸ βουλητέον. βουλητόν μὲν γὰρ 9
1209 κ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλητέον δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῷ ἀγαθόν· οῦτω καὶ φιλητὸν μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, φιλητέον δὲ τὸ αύτῷ ἀγαθόν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φιλητέον καὶ φιλητόν, τὸ δὲ φιλητὸν οὐκ ἔστι φιλητέον.

³ Ένταῦθα οὖν ἐστιν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀπορία, 10
⁵ πότερόν ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῷ φίλος ἢ οὔ.
⁵ συνῆπται γάρ πως τἀγαθῷ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φιλητέον τῷ φιλητῷ, ἔχεται δὲ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέρον. ἡ μὲν 11
οῦν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀντιφιλῶσιν ἀλλήλους. φιλοῦσι δὲ ἀλλήλους, ἡ φιλητοὶ

^a Cf. Eud. VII. iv. 5, Nic. VIII. v1, 4-6. Friendship of God and Man, which fills the Greek mythology, was banished by philosophy's higher and remoter conception of the Divine; but is restored by Christianity (St. John xv. 15).

^b Eud. (VII. iv. 2) denies friendship between man and child, though there be mutual love.

• Nio. (VIII. i.) starts with the threefold division of $\tau \delta$ φιλητόν into τάγαθόν, τό ήδό, and τό χρήσιμου. The following distinction seems first to have been drawn by the Stoics. It does not appear in Nic. or in Eud. (See Grant, Essay I. pp. 38, 39.)

650

for Gop admits of no such return, not even of affection on our part; since it were an absurdity for a man to

7 profess a friend's affection for Zeus.^a Equally impossible is the return of affection by things that are lifeless; yet even towards them we may have a friendly feeling—as we have for wine and other things of the kind.

We are not, then, concerned with the so-called friendship for GoD or for things without life, but with that whose objects are living beings, and such living beings as can return the affection.

- 8 If we next proceed to inquire what things are Things naturally lovable, the answer is, only such things as good are are good.^c Now there is a difference between what naturally lovable. is in itself lovable, and that which draws someone to love it; just as there is between what is intrinsically
- 9 desirable, and what one is drawn to wish. Un-Things good qualified or absolute Good is desirable; but each will mend my wish that which is good for himself; and in the same Love. way what is absolutely good is lovable, but one is drawn to love what is good for oneself. It follows that whereas the object of one's love is always lovable, what is lovable does not (in every case) command one's love.
- 10 Here and hence arises the problem whether or not the virtuous man can be friend to the bad man. For the individual's good is not unconnected with absolute good, nor what we are drawn to love with what is naturally lovable; and the powers of affording pleasure and advantage attend on goodness, and
- 11 follow in its train. Now friendship between the Good Men virtuous consists in their loving one another; and Friends they love one another inasmuch as they are lovable; because both are and they are lovable inasmuch as they are good. lovable;

1209 a

¹⁰ δέ, ή ἀγαθοί. οὐκοῦν ὁ σπουδαῖος, φησίν, τῷ 12 φαύλῳ οὐκ ἔσται φίλος; ἔσται μὲν οῦν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τἀγαθῷ ἠκολούθει τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ή ἐστιν φαῦλος ῶν ἡδύς, ταύτῃ φίλος. πάλιν αῦ συμφέρων, ή συμφέρων, ταύτῃ φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐκ 13 ἔσται γε κατὰ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡ τοιαύτῃ φίλία. φιλη-¹⁵ τὸν γὰρ ἦν τἀγαθόν, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος οὐ φιλητός· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φιλητέον· εἰσὶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς παντελοῦς φιλίας, τῆς ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, καὶ αῦται αί φιλίαι, ἤ τε κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

⁶Ο οῦν κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐ φιλεῖ τὴν κατὰ τὸ 14 ἀγαθὸν φιλίαν, οὐδὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· εἰσὶν δὲ 15 20 καὶ ai φιλίαι αῦται, ἥ τε κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, οὐχ ai αὐταὶ μέν, οὐ παντελῶς δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότριαι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ πως ἡρτημέναι εἰσίν. οἶον φαμέν ἰατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἰατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ 25 ἰατρικὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς ἰατρικὴν ἰατρικὸν λέγεται, ὅ δ' ἀνθρωπος τῷ ποιητικὸς εἶναι ὑγιείας, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ aἰτία εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ai φιλίαι οὐχ ὡσαὐτως, 16 ἤ τε τῶν σπουδαίων ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ

30 ήδὺ καὶ ή κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον. οὐδὲ δὴ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, περὶ ταὐτὰ

^a A somewhat obscure passage. It might be paraphrased thus. The good man, along with his goodness, has the power to please and to profit. The bad man is thus attracted to him, and exchanges with him his own pleasantness and profitableness. The good man has a complete capacity for friendship, and can enjoy the exchange of pleasure or profit with the bad as well as of true affection with 652

- 12 " Is it therefore impossible," we are asked, " for the and good virtuous to be friend to the bad?" Surely not. For and Bad since advantage and pleasantness, as we saw, follow they are in the train of goodness, even if a man be bad, he is pleasant or vet friend (to the good man) inasmuch as he is prolitable. pleasant (to him); and again, if he is advantageous,
- 13 so far as this goes he is a friend. It is true that these friendships cannot be based on what is naturally lovable (for we saw that only goodness is such, and the bad man cannot be thus lovable)-but rather on what one is drawn to love. For even these friendships. which are on a footing of pleasure or advantage, spring from that full affection which exists in virtuous men.ª
- 14 Those, therefore, whose love springs from pleasure or from advantage do not experience the friendship
- 15 whose basis is goodness. These kinds of friendship, in fact-the friendships of virtue, of pleasure, and of profit-are not identical; and yet they are not wholly alien to one another, but partake of a common principle. In the same way when we speak of a "medical" lancet, a "medical" man, and a "medical" science we apply the term in different ways. The lancet is called "medical" because it is useful in medicine, the man, because he is a purveyor of health, and the science as being the cause 16 and origin thereof. Just so, when we speak of good men's friendship founded on virtue, and friendship founded on pleasure or on profit, we are using the term in different ways. These kinds of "friendship" are not synonymous with one another; they are different things, though their province and origin are

the good. § 13 seems inconsistent with § 9, where we are told that what we are drawn to love is also naturally lovable.

ARISTOTLE

1209 a

δέ πως καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσίν. εἰ δή τις λέγοι 17
 '' ὁ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐκ ἔστιν φίλος τούτῳ· οὐ
 γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φίλος ἐστίν,'' βαδίζει ὁ τοιοῦ τος ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλίαν, τὴν ἐξ ἁπάν των τούτων οὖσαν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
 ³⁵ ἡδέος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ὥστ' ἀληθῶς οὐκ
 ἔστιν [κατ'] ἐκείνην γε τὴν φιλίαν φίλος, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

Πότερον οῦν ἔσται ὁ σπουδαίος τῷ σπουδαίω 18 φίλος, η̈ οῦ; οὐδὲν γὰρ προσδεῖται, φησίν, ὁ ὅμοιος τοῦ ὁμοίου. ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ζητεῖ τὴν κατὰ 1209 b τὸ συμφέρον φιλίαν ℌ γὰρ προσδεῖται ὁ ἔτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου, ταύτῃ ὄντες φίλοι ἐν τῆ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλία εἰσίν. ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα διώρισται ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμ-19 φέρον φιλία καὶ ἡ κατ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν. εἰκὸς δὴ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τούτους· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ⁵ ὑπάρχει, τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῷ· ℌ γὰρ ἴσως ἡδύς, ταύτῃ καὶ φίλος. καὶ ὁ φαῦλὸς γε τῷ φαύλῷ· 20 ℌ γὰρ ἴσως τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρει, ταὐτῃ φίλοι. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοῦτο γινόμενον, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἦ τὸ συμφέρον, φίλους τούτους διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ὤστ¹ ¹⁰ οὐδὲν κωλύσει καὶ φαύλοις οῦσιν ταὐτόν τι συμφέρειν.

Βεβαιοτάτη μέν οῦν καὶ μονιμωτάτη καὶ καλ- 21 λίστη ή ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις φιλία, ή κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τἀγαθὸν οῦσα, εἰκότως. ή μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀμετάπτωτον, δι' ῆν ή φιλία, ὥστε εἰκὸς τὴν φιλίαν 16 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμετάπτωτον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον

¹ Reading ws for wor' MSS.

^a Lit. " walking."

- 17 the same. If, then, one were to say "the man who loves another for pleasure is not really a friend to him, since his friendship is not based on virtue,"--such an one is looking a towards the friendship of good mcn, which is based upon all three, upon goodness, and pleasure and advantage. Quite truly, that man's friendship is not of this kind, but of the kind based only on pleasure or on profit.
- This being so, can the good man be friend to the 18 good, or not? For it is objected that like has no need of like. Now an argument of this kind is thinking of the friendship of profit; for those who are friends inasmuch as the one has need of the other are united
- 19 by this kind of friendship. We have, however, drawn a clear distinction between this friendship and those based on virtue and on pleasure. The probability is that good men will be far more inclined to friendship. possessing as they do all its three foundations, both
- 20 goodness and pleasantness and profitableness. And the good man will even be a friend to the bad man; for he may possibly be his friend in so far as he is pleasant to him. Moreover, the bad man may be friend to the bad man; for m so far as the same thing Bad Men is advantageous to both, there is possibility of friend- may be Friends ship. For it is a matter of experience that when men's if their interests are identical, they become friends through agree advantage; since nothing will prevent even bad men having some interest in common.
- Friendship between good men is in fact the firmest, Friendship the most enduring, and the most noble; the friend- the Good 21 ship whose basis is virtue and goodness. And this is is alone enduring. only reasonable. Virtue, on account of which the friendship arises, is an unchangeable thing; so that one may reasonably infer the same of the friendship.

655

1209 b

οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν· διὸ ἡ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλία οὐ βεβαία, ἀλλὰ τῷ συμφέροντι συμμεταπίπτει· ὁμοίως 22 καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.

'Η μέν οῦν τῶν βελτίστων φιλία ή κατ' ἀρετὴν γινομένη ἐστίν, ή δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ή κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ή δὲ κατὰ τὴν ήδονὴν ἐν τοῖς φορτικοῖς καὶ τυχοῦσιν.

20 Συμβαίνει δε και άγανακτεῖν, ὅταν φαύλοις 23 έντύχωσιν τοις φίλοις, και θαυμάζειν έστι δέ ούδεν ατοπον. όταν γαρ ή φιλία λάβη την ήδονην άρχήν, δι' ην φίλοι είσιν, η το συμφέρον, άμα ταῦτ' άπολείπει και ή φιλία ου διαμένει. πολλάκις δε 24 25 μένει μεν ή φιλία, κακώς δ' έχρήσατο τῷ φίλω, διό άγανακτοῦσιν ἔστι δε οὐδε τοῦτο ἄλογον. οὐ γαρ δι' αρετήν ή φιλία σοι πρός τοῦτον ὑπήρχεν, διό ούδ' άτοπον μηδέν ποιείν αύτόν των καθ' άρετήν. άγανακτοῦσιν οῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. δι' ήδονην γαρ ποιησάμενοι την φιλίαν, την δι' άρετην οιονται 20 δείν αύτοις υπάρχειν το δ' ου δυνατόν ου γάρ έστιν ή δι' ήδονην και το συμφέρον αρετής έχομένη. κοινωσάμενοι ούν ήδονη άρετην ζητούσιν, ούκ 25 όρθως· οὐ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῆ ἡδονῆ καὶ τῷ συμψέροντι ή ἀρε΄τή, ἀλλὰ τῆ ἀρε΄τῆ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ μή τις οἰήσεται τοὺς σπουδαίους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἡδίστους εἶναι καὶ γὰρ 85 οί φαῦλοι, ὡς φησιν Εὐριπίδης, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἡδείς εἰσίν· "κακὸς κακῷ" γὰρ "συντέτηκεν." οὐ γὰρ

^a Cf. Ovid, Ex Ponto, II. iii. 7:

turpe quidem dictu, sed (si modo vera fatemur) vulgus amicitias utilitate probat.

Advantage, on the other hand, is always changing : wherefore the friendship based thereon is not firm, 22 but changes along with it. And the same is true of friendship based on pleasure.

The friendship, therefore, of the best men is the kind that springs up through virtue; while that of the multitude is based on profit,^a and the friendship based on pleasure is found between coarse and commonplace persons.

- Men are sometimes indignant and surprised when 23 they find their friends are bad. But there is nothing strange herein. For when friendship takes its origin from pleasure, and the friends are friends for pleasure's sake, or again, when profit is its origin, so soon as these things fail the friendship also passes with them.
- 24 Often, however, even while the friendly feeling abides, the one whom we love treats us ill; and we are angry on that account. Yet here too there is nothing unreasonable in the event. Your friendship for this man did not anse on account of his virtue; so that if his actions are by no means in accordance with virtue, there is nothing strange in it. Men have no right, therefore, to be indignant. After contracting a friendship for the sake of pleasure, they expect to possess the kind whose origin is virtue; and this is impossible, seeing that friendship for pleasure or for 25 profit has nothing to do with virtue. Having formed an alliance of pleasure, men look for virtue; and this they have no right to do. Virtue does not attend upon pleasure and profit; but these conversely upon her. For it were strange not to suppose that good men are surpassingly pleasant to their like; since even the bad, as Euripides tells us, are pleasing to one

VOL. 11

1209 b

ἀκολουθεῖ τῆ ἡδονῆ ἡ ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τῆ ἀρετῆ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ.

Πότερον δὲ καὶ δεῖ ἐν τῆ τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία 28 τὴν ἡδονὴν είναι, ἢ οὐ δεῖ; ἄτοπου γὰρ τὸ μἡ 1^{210 Δ} φάναι δεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἀφελεῖς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡδεῖς είναι ἀλλήλοις, ἄλλους ποριοῦνται φίλους εἰς τὸ συζῆν, τοὺς ἡδεῖς· εἰς γὰρ τὸ συζῆν οὐδὲν μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ ἡδεῖς είναι· ἄτοπον οῦν τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν τοὺς 27 σπουδαίους μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις συζῆν· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ 5 ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέος· δέοι ἂν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μάλιστα τούτοις ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἡδέσιν είναι.

² Έπεὶ δὲ διήρηνται ai φιλίαι εἰς τρία εἴδη, καὶ ἐν 28 ταύταις ἠπορείτο, πότερον ἐν ἰσότητι ἡ φιλία ἐγγίνεται ἢ ἐν ἀνισότητι ἔστιν οῦν κατ' ἀμφότερα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἡ τελεία φιλία· ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀνομοιότητα ἡ κατὰ τὸ 10 συμφέρον. τῷ γὰρ εὐπόρῷ ὁ πένης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ῶν ὁ πλούσιος εὐπορεῖ φίλος ἐστί, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίω ὁ φαῦλος διὰ ταὐτό· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἕνδειαν τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς, παρ' οῦ οἴεται αύτῷ ἔσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο τούτῳ φίλος. γίνεται οῦν ἐν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις φιλία 29 κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· διὸ καὶ Εὐριπίδης

^a Dindorf, Poetae Scenici (ed. 8) gives

άνηρ δε χρηστός χρηστόν ου μισεί ποτε, κακώ κακός τε συντέτηκεν ήδοναις. φιλεί δε θουμόφυλον άνθρώπους άγειν

from Bellerophon (Frag. 310). Eud. VII. v. 4 gives κακός κακώ (δέ) συντέτηκεν ήδονή.

^b See § 10, and note on § 8. The reference to a classification given directly in *Nic.* but only indirectly here, strongly suggests, like the similar one in § 40 below, that we are dealing with a compilation. *Cf.* also I. xxxiv. 1 note *d.*

^e This seems to be a slip on the author's part, which he 658

bad." a Virtue, in fact, does not attend upon pleasure, but pleasure upon virtue.

26 Is it actually necessary that there be pleasure in Pleasure the friendship of good men, or is it not ? To deny it attends the were absurd. For if we deprive them of pleasure in of the Good each other's society, they will provide themselves with other friends for companionship, friends who will give them pleasure; since for companionship 27 nothing is more important than pleasantness. As, then, it is absurd to suppose that good men are not specially drawn to mutual companionship; and such companionship is impossible without pleasure : it would seem to follow that such men are specially endowed with the gift of pleasantness.

(Eud. VII. in.-v. ; Nic. VIII. vi. 7-vin.)

Again, since we have divided friendships into three 28classes,^b and the question was raised whether in these classes the friendship arises under conditions of equality or of inequality °; we find that friendship Friendship does in fact exist under both conditions. The of Likenese friendship of likeness is the friendship of good men, the Good, the perfect friendship ; while that of unlikeness is the of Unkind whose basis is profit. For the poor man is friend between to the wealthy owing to his need of those things seek Profit wherein the rich man abounds ; and the bad man is friend to the good for the same reason; through his own lack of virtue, he is friend to one from whom he 29 hopes to be supplied with it. Friendship based on profit arises, therefore, between the unlike; so that Euripides writes :

repeats at the beginning of § 31. The question raised in § 2 and answered here is whether Friendship is based on Likeness or Unlikeness. There may be inequality even between those who are alike; cf. Nic. VIII. xiii. 1.

ARISTOTLE

έρα μεν ὄμβρου γαί, ὅταν ξηρόν πέδον.

· ώς έναντίοις ούσιν τούτοις έγγίγνεται φιλία ή διà τὸ συμφέρον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ θέλεις τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ποιήσαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις χρήσιμα εἰσίν. τὸ γὰρ πῦρ φασίν, ἐὰν μἡ ἔχη ὑγρόν, 30 φθείρεσθαι, ὡς τοῦτ' αὐτῷ παρασκευάζον ὥσπερ τροφήν τινά, ταύτην δε τοσαύτην, όσης κρατήσειεν 20 $\langle a \nu \rangle$ $a \nu$ $\mu \epsilon \nu$ $\gamma a \rho \pi \lambda \epsilon i \rho \nu$ $\pi \rho i \eta \sigma \eta s$ $\tau \delta \nu \rho \rho \nu$, $\epsilon \pi i$. κρατήσαν (ποιήσει) φθείρεσθαι τὸ πῦρ, ἐὰν δὲ σύμμετρον, συνοίσει. δηλον ούν ότι και έν τοις έναντιωτάτοις φιλία έγγίνεται δια το συμφέρον. 'Ανάγονται δε πασαι αί φιλίαι, και αί εν ισότητι 31 καί αί έν ανισότητι, είς τας διηρημένας τρείς. 25 "Εστιν δ' έν άπάσαις ταῖς φιλίαις διαφορά γινομένη προς άλλήλους, όταν μη όμοίως φιλωσιν η εΰ ποιώσιν η ύπηρετώσιν η ό τι αν των τοιούτων όταν μέν γάρ δ μέν έκτενως ποιη δ δ' έλλείπη, κατά την έλλειψιν τό έγκλημα και ή μέμψις. ου μην αλλ' 32 έπι μέν των τοιούτων ών το αυτό έστι τέλος της 80 φιλίας, οΐον εἰ ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι η κατά το ήδυ η κατ' άρετήν, εύδηλος ή έλλειψις ή παρά τοῦ ετέρου, εάν οῦν πλείω ἀγαθὰ σύ μοι ποιής η έγω σοί, οὐδ' ἀμφισβητω ἔτι μη οὐ δείν σε μαλλον ύπ' έμου φιλείσθαι έν ή δε φιλία μή 33 B5 διὰ ταὐτὸ φίλοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον αί διαφοραί. ἄδηλος γὰρ ή ἔλλειψις παρ' ἑκατέρου. οໂον εἰ ὃ μὲν δι'

> ^a See § 3 above. ^b Such as that contained in oil-fuel.

1210 a

MAGNA MORALIA, II. XI. 29-33

Earth is of tain enamoured when 'tis dry,^{*a*}

since between these opposites there springs up the friendship of profit or advantage. For if you choose to regard fire and water as of all things most utterly opposed, yet arc they profitable the one to the other. 30 Fire, we are told, apart from moisture^b dics down; since the latter supplies it with a kind of nourishment.

which must, however, be no more than it can overcome; for if we supply the moisture in excess, it will overcome the fire and cause it to die down; only in right proportion will it be profitable to it It is clear, then, that even between things most utterly opposed there springs up friendship based on profit.

(Eud. VII. iv., x.: Nic. VIII. vii., vii., xii., xiv.-IX. i.)

Every kind of friendship, whether between equals 31 or unequals, may be referred to one of these three classes.

In all kinds of friendship differences will arise Differences between the friends when love or benefit or service between or the like is not equal on both sides. For when the one shows himself keen and active therein, and the other falls short of him, from this shortcoming arise

- 32 complaint and blame. It is, however, to be observed that in the case of those friends whose friendship has the same object-if both friends, that is, are friends for profit or for pleasure or for virtue-any shortcoming on the part of one is easy to discern; so that if you confer more benefits on me than I on you, I do not dispute that you have a claim to receive more love
- 33 from me. But if in our friendship we have diverse objects in view, differences are more serious, because shortcoming on either side is difficult to discern. Where, for instance, one is a friend for the sake of

ARISTOTLE

^{1210 a} ήδονην φίλος ἐστιν ὅ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐνταῦθα ή ἀμφισβήτησις· οὖτε γὰρ ὁ τῷ συμφέροντι ὑπερέχων ἀξίαν οἴεται την ήδονην ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος, οὖτε ὁ τῃ ήδονῃ ὑπερέχων
1210 b ἀξίαν τῆς ήδονης ἐν τῷ συμφέροντι χάριν ἀπολαμβάνειν. διὸ μᾶλλον ai διαφοραὶ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις φιλίαις γίνονται.

Οί δ' έν ανισότητι φίλοι όντες, οί μέν ύπερέχοντες 34 πλούτω η άλλω τινί τοιούτω ούκ οιονται δειν αυτοί 5 φιλείν, άλλ' ύπό των ένδεεστέρων οιονται δείν αὐτοί φιλείσθαι έστιν δε βέλτιον το φιλείν η το φιλείσθαι. -τό μέν γάρ φιλείν ένέργειά τις ήδονής και άγαθόν, 35 άπο δε του φιλείσθαι ουδεμία τῷ φιλουμένω ενέργεια γίνεται. - έτι δε βελτιον το γνωρίζειν η το 38 γνωρίζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φι-10 λείσθαι και τοις άψύχοις υπάρχει, το δε γνωρίζειν και τὸ φιλεῖν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις.—ἔτι τὸ εὐποιητικὸν 37 είναι βέλτιον η το μή ό μέν ουν φιλων ευποιητικός, ή φιλει, ό δε φιλούμενος, ή φιλειται, ου.--άλλ' οι 38 άνθρωποι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν φιλεῖσθαι μαλλον βού-15 λονται η φιλείν, διά το έν τω φιλείσθαι ύπεροχήν τινα είναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ φιλούμενος ὑπερέχει ἡδονη η εύπορία η αρετή, ό δε φιλότιμος τής ύπεροχής ορέγεται. και ούκ οιονται δείν αύτοι φιλείν οι έν 39 ύπεροχή όντες αντιδιδόναι γαρ έν οίς ύπερέχουσιν τοις φιλουσιν αυτούς. έτι δε και ήττους αυτών 20 είσίν· διό ούκ οιονται δείν φιλείν άλλα φιλείσθαι. ό δ' ένδεής χρημάτων η ήδονων η άρετης θαυμάζει

^a Cf. Nic. IX. vii. 6: and xii. 4 below,

pleasure and the other for profit, there it is that disputes arise. The one who confers a surplus of profit does not consider the pleasure he receives is worth the profit he gives; while he who confers a surplus of pleasure does not consider the profit he receives a worthy acknowledgement of the pleasure he gives. And so it is in friendship of this kind that differences mostly arise.

When there is inequality between friends, those 34 who are superior in wealth or the like do not expect to love, but to be loved by their inferiors. But to love Loving is

- 35 is better than to be loved. For love is an active being loved pleasure and a good thing "; whilst merely to be
- 36 loved creates no activity in the soul. To know, too, is better than to be known; for while the latter, hke being loved, is possible even for things without life,^b knowing, like loving, is only permitted to living
- 37 beings. Again, the quality of beneficence is better than the lack of it : now he that loves, in so far as he loves, is conferring benefit; while he who is loved, in
- 38 so far as he is loved confers none. But ambition makes men desire to be loved rather than to love, because the former involves a certain superiority; seeing that one who is loved is always superior in pleasantness, wealth, or virtue, and superiority is the aim of the
- 39 ambitious. Those who possess superiority do not expect to love; for they consider that they are repaying those who love them with the things in which they themselves are superior. The others too are on a lower level; wherefore they claim, not to love them, but to be loved by them. On the other hand he who is lacking in property or pleasantness or virtue admires one who is his superior in these.

^b § 7 above.

ARISTOTLE

1210 b

τὸν ὑπερέχοντα τούτοις, καὶ φιλεῖ διὰ τὸ τούτων η̈ τυγχάνειν η̈ οϊεσθαι τεύξεσθαι.

Éἰσιν δὲ και τοιαῦται ψιλίαι ἐξ ὁμοιοπαθείας, ἐκ 40 τοῦ τἀγαθὸν βούλεσθαί τινι εἶναι. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ
²⁵ ἡ ἐπὶ τούτων γινομένη ψιλία πάντα ταῦτα ἔχουσα· πολλάκις γὰρ ἄλλψ μὲν εἶναι βουλόμεθα τἀγαθά, συζῆν μέντοι μετ' ἄλλου. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πότερον 41 ψιλίας δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἢ τῆς τελείας ψιλίας τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν πάθη; ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ τῃ ψιλία πάντα ταῦτα ἐνυπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μετ' οὐδενὸς
⁸⁰ ἄλλου ἂν θέλοιμεν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ σπουδαίψ ὑπάρχει) καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εῦ ζῆν οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τούτψ.

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ [φιλία]¹ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν 42 φιλία, ἢ οὔ, νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω, ὕστερον δ' ἐροῦμεν. ⁸⁵ πάντα δὲ βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μεθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα (ἴσως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαῖον) καὶ τὸ εῦ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι⁸ τἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί. ἕτι ὁμοιοπαθεῖς 43 ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἐσμέν· ἂν γὰρ προσπταίσωμεν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ περιπέσωμεν τῶν τοιούτων, εὐθὺς λυπούμεθα. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν οὕτως εἶναι αὐτῷ πρὸς 1211 × αὐτὸν³ φιλία.

¹ The MSS. read $a\dot{v}\bar{\omega}$ $\phi_i\lambda la$, $a\dot{v}\tau\dot{o}$ $\phi_i\lambda la$, or $a\dot{v}\tau\phi_i\lambda la$. Sylburg deletes $\phi_i\lambda la$. Perhaps it would be better to delete kal also, and read $\pi \delta \tau \epsilon \rho \sigma v$ $\delta' \epsilon \sigma \tau v$ $a\dot{v}\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\pi \rho \delta s$ $a\dot{v}\tau \delta v$ $\phi_i\lambda la$ (which I have translated).

² Omitting [το βούλεσθαι].

³ Bekker's text has αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν.

^a Cf. § 27 above. The marks of Friendship are given seriatim in Nic. IX. iv. 1. See note on § 28.

^b For this use of πάθος cf. Eud. III. v. 7 τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ' ^fναι πάθος ἴδιον. 664

and loves him because he either obtains them from him or hopes to do so.

- 40 There are, moreover, friendships of this kind (between those who are unequal) whose origin is a feeling of sympathy, that desires another's welfare. The friendship, however, which arises in this case does not possess all the characteristics of which we have spoken. We often wish for one man's welfare,
- 41 whilst preferring another's companionship.^a But are such things to be considered as accompaniments b of Friendship in general, or only of the perfect friendship based on virtue ? For they are all found in that kind of friendship. With none other than such a friend would we keep company (seeing that the good man possesses both pleasantness and profit and virtue); and for him especially would we desire welfare : long and happy life for him, as for no one else.^c

42 The question whether a man can be his own friend Can a Man we will leave unsettled for the moment, but return Friend? later to answer it.^d In any case it is true that we desire all things for ourselves. We wish for our own company (as we can scarcely help doing); and long and happy life and everything that is good, for our-43 selves as for none other. Moreover we feel a special

degree of sympathy for ourselves. For if we suffer failure or other misfortune we at once feel distress. This at any rate points to the existence of friendship for oneself.

" With these two sections cf. Eud. VII. vi. 3-9, vii. : and Nic, VIII, v. 3, vi. 4, IX, iv. 1, 2, ix. 10.

4 The discussion of the analogy between friendship for self and for another in §§ 42-44 and 47-50 corresponds to Eud. VII. vi. (cf. Nic. IX. iv.). The promise here made, and its definite fulfilment in § 17, are peculiar to the author. See Grant's note on Nic. IX. iv. 6.

be his own

ARISTOTLE

1211 a

Τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα, οἶον τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ εῦ 44 ζῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἤτοι εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς φιλίαν ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν ἢ εἰς τὴν τελείαν· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ 5 [καὶ] τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸ εῦ εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἐν ταύταις ἐστίν.

^{*}Ετι δὲ ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν, ἐν οἶς ἐστι δίκαιον, ἐν 45 τούτοις καὶ φιλίαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὅσα περ δικαίων εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ φιλιῶν. τὸ δὴ δίκαιόν ἐστιν καὶ ξένω πρὸς πολίτην καὶ δούλω πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ 10 πολίτη πρὸς πολίτην καὶ υίῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα, καὶ ὅσαι ἀπλῶς ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι καὶ φιλίαι ἕνεισιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτων. βεβαιοτάτη 48 δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τῶν φιλιῶν ἡ ξενική· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς τέλος κοινὸν ὑπὲρ οῦ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἶον ἐν τοῖς πολίταις· διαμφισβητοῦντες 15 γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ μένουσιν φίλοι ὅντες.

' Ἐχόμενον δ' ἃν εἴη νῦν τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν, πότερόν 47 ἐστι πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία, ἢ οὕ. ἐπεὶ δ' οῦν ὁρῶμεν, ὥσπερ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἐκ μὲν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ φιλεῖν γνωρίζεται τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα 20 αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἂν μάλιστα βουλοίμεθα (καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εῦ εἶναι· ὁμοιοπαθέστατοι δ' αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐσμέν· καὶ συζῆν δὲ μεθ' ἑαυτῶν μάλιστα βουλόμεθα)· ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται ἡ φιλία, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἂν βουλοίμεθα ὑπάρχειν, δῆλόν ἐστιν 26 ὡς ἕστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν

^a With these two sections cf. Nic. VIII. ix.-xi. ^b § 42 above.

- 44 As for sympathy, then, and the desire for happy life, and the other things we have mentioned, in speaking of such things we can attribute them either to our (supposed) friendship for ourselves, or to the perfect friendship (between good men). They all exist in both alike; the wish for companionship, and continued and happy existence and the rest are all found in them.
- 45 Again, it may perhaps be thought that where there Friendship exist reciprocal rights, there friendship is found and Right's also; and accordingly that friendships correspond in kind to those rights. Now there are reciprocal rights between stranger and citizen, slave and master, citizen and citizen, son and father, wife and husband; and in these and all other human relationships, friend-
- 46 ships too are possible between the parties. Friendship between strangers might be supposed firmest of all, seeing that strangers have no common object for which they dispute with one another as fellowcitizens do. The latter, when competing for superiority they engage in violent dispute, cease to be friends.^a
- 47 At this point we must answer our previous question ^b whether friendship towards oneself is possible or not. Now since we perceive, as we just now stated, that love or friendship is discerned by several characteristic desires ; and it is for ourselves that we pre-eminently desire them (for we desire good things for ourselves, and a long and happy existence ; and are also most in sympathy with ourselves ; and desire our own company rather than any other):---if, then, love is discerned by its several characteristic desires, and these desires we feel for our own behoof : it clearly follows that love or friendship for ourselves does exist, even

1211 a έφαμεν πρός αύτόν είναι. ἐπειδή γὰρ ἕτερος μὲν 48 ό ἀδικῶν ἕτερος δὲ ὁ ἀδικούμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς δ' εἰς ἐστιν ἕκαστος, διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐδόκει είναι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικία· ἔστι μέντοι, ὡς ἔφαμεν σκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν, ἐπειδή ἐστι
30 πλείω, ὅταν ταῦτα μὴ ὁμονοῶσιν, τότε είναι πρὸς αὐτὸν τῆν ἀδικίαν ὅτο τούτῷ καὶ ἡ φιλία 49 δόξειεν ἂν είναι πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα σφόδρα φίλον εἰπεῖν, μία φαμέν' ψυχὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ τούτου· ἐπεὶ οῦν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς πλείω μέρη, τότ' ἔσται μία
35 ψυχή, ὅταν συμφωνῶσι πρὸς ἄλληλα ὅ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη (οῦτω γὰρ μία ἔσται)· ὥστε μιᾶς γενομένης ἕσται πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία.

Αυτή δ' έσται ή πρός αυτόν φιλία ἐν τῷ σπου-50 δαίω· τούτω γὰρ μόνω τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εῦ ἐχουσιν μέρη πρός ἄλληλα τῷ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε 40 φαῦλος οὐδέποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, μάχεται γὰρ ἀεὶ ἑαυτῷ. ὅ γοῦν ἀκρατής, ὅταν πράξῃ τι 1211 ʰ τῶν καθ' ἡδονήν, μετ' οὐ πολὺ μεταμελεῖται καὶ κακίζει αὐτὸς αὐτόν· ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακιῶν ὁ φαῦλος ἔχει. διατελεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς αῦτῷ μαχόμενος καὶ ἐναντιούμενος.

"Εστιν δε φιλία και εν ισότητι, οίον ή μεν των 51 ⁵ έταίρων εν ισότητι άριθμω και δυνάμει άγαθοῦ (οὐδέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἄζιος θατέρου πλέον ἔχειν οὕτε κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθῶν οὕτε κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτε κατὰ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον ισοι γάρ τινες

¹ Omitting *φaµèv*.

^a See I. xxxiii. 31-35 above.

- 48 as we said that injustice towards oneself exists. It is true that because he who commits injustice and he who suffers it are two different persons, whilst each individual self is one, on this account self-injury seemed at first sight impossible. It does however exist, as we declared in our survey of the parts of the soul. As these are several in number, we said that self-injury occurs 49 when they are in discord one with another.^a Much in the same way it would appear that friendship for oneself arises. A friend, as we say when we desire to mark someone as eminently such, is "my soul and another's in one." And whereas each soul itself consists of several parts, it will only be " one soul " when rational Principle and the passions are in harmony
 - with one another. Then indeed it will be one; and with a soul at unity in itself, the man will be his own friend and lover.
- But such friendship for self will exist only in the Only the good man; for in him alone the parts of the soul, is his own 50 being nowise at variance, are well-disposed towards Friend. one another. For the bad man, being ever at strife with himself, can never be his own friend. The selfindulgent indeed, when he has acted as pleasure suggests, soon repents and upbraids himself; and so, too, with the bad man's other vices ; he is continually at strife and in opposition with himself.

(Cf. Nic. VIII, xni., xiii, 1.)

Of the friendship which flourishes under equal con- Friendships ភា ditions, we may take as an example that between (1) where the Concomrades, who exchange benefits equal in number ditions and in potency. Neither of them claims a larger are equal, share of those benefits than the other, whether in number, potency, or magnitude, but only the same

1211 b

ἐθέλουσιν είναι οἱ ἑταῖροι)· ἐν ἀνισότητι δὲ ή 52 πατρὸς πρὸς υἰόν, καὶ ἀρχομένου καὶ ἀρχοντος, καὶ
10 κρείττονος καὶ χείρονος, καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν οἶς ἐστιν ὁ τὴν τοῦ χείρονος καὶ κρείττονος τάξιν ἔχων ἐν τῆ φιλία. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν 53 ή ἐν ἀνισότητι φιλία κατὰ λόγον. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῦ δόσει οὐδεὶς ἴσον ἂν δοίη τῷ βελτίονι καὶ τῷ χείρονι, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον τῷ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ὅντι
15 ἀεί. τοῦτο δ' ἴσον ἐπτὶν τῷ λόγῳ. ἴσον γάρ πώς ἐστιν ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔχων ἀγαθὸν χείρων ῶν τῷ μεῖζον ἔχοντι κρείττονι ὅντι.

XII. Των δε φιλιων άπασων των εἰρημένων τού-1 των μάλιστά πως ἐγγίνεται τὸ φιλεῖν ἐν τῆ συγ20 γενικῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῆ πατρὶ πρὸς υίόν. καὶ διὰ τί ποτε ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υίὸν μῶλλον φιλεῖ ἢ ὁ υἰὸς τὸν πατέρα; πότερον οῦν, ὡς ἕνιοι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς πρός γε τοὺς πολλούς, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πατὴρ εὐεργέτηκέν πως τὸν υἱόν, ὁ δ' υἰὸς χάριν ὀφείλει τῆς εὐεργεσίας; αὕτη μὲν οῦν ἡ αἰτία [καὶ] ἐν τῆ κατὰ τὸ 2
25 συμφέρον φιλία δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὁρῶμεν ἔχον, οὕτω πως ἔχει καὶ ἐνταῦθα. λέγω δ' οἶον [ἐστιν] ἔστι μὲν ῶν τὸ 3 αὐτὸ τέλος τε καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τέλος, οἶον τῷ αὐλητῆ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐνέρ-80 γεια καὶ τέλος (τὸ γὰρ αὐλεῖν καὶ τέλος αὐτῷ ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια), ἀλλ' οὐ τῆ οἰκοδομικῆ (καὶ γὰρ

^a If affection is the appropriate makeweight, the son should give more of it than he receives. Actually, as the next chapter points out, he gives as a rule less. He is thus under a twofold obligation to render honour to his parents. (Cf. Nic. VIII. Niv. 2 $\tau \eta s$ aper ηs kal $\tau \eta s$ evepyeolas $\eta \tau u \mu \eta \gamma to \alpha s$.)

⁶⁷⁰

share ; for comrades are willing to live under conditions approximately equal.

On the other hand, between father and son, subject (2) where 52 and ruler, superior and inferior, wife and husband, - they need wherever in fact one of the partners in the friendship equalized by holds an inferior position and the other a superior one -friendship still exists, but under conditions of 53 inequality. For this is the friendship between unequals, which is governed by proportion. In the distribution of benefit no one would assign the same share to superior as to inferior, but would always allot the greater share to the former.4 Thus equality is effected by proportion ; since where the inferior takes the lesser benefit, and the superior the greater one, a certain kind of equality is attained between them.

(Eud. VII. vin. : cf. Nic. IX. vin.)

- XII. Of all the kinds of friendship we have Patental 1 mentioned, it is in the friendships between kindred Affection. that love is pre-eminently manifest; and above all, in the friendship of father for son. Why is it, we ask, that the father loves the son more than the son the father ? Is it, as some with the approval of most men declare, because the father has conferred some benefit on his son, and the son owes him acknowledgement 2 therefor ? Such a cause as this would seem to operate
- in friendship based on profit; but the present case resembles what we notice in the arts and sciences.
- 3 What I mean is that in some of these, end and activity are one and the same; beyond the practice of the art, there is no ulterior aim. The flute-player's activity and aim are, for instance, identical; to him, his playing is end and activity at once. But with the art of building it is otherwise; besides the activity,

Proportion.

ARISTOTLE

¹²¹¹ ^b ἕτερον τέλος παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν)· ἔστιν οὖν ή 4 φιλία ἐνέργεια τις, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν ἄλλο τέλος παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ φιλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτό. ὁ μὲν οὖν πατὴρ ἐνεργεῖ πως ἀεὶ μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸ¹ αὐτοῦ ³⁵ τι εἶναι ποίημα τὸν υίόν. τοῦτο δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν· πάντες γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν αὐτοὶ ποιήσωσιν, πρὸς τοῦτό πως καὶ εῦνοι εἰσίν. ὁ οῦν 5 πατὴρ εὐνοεῖ πως πρὸς τὸν υίὸν αύτοῦ ὄντα ποίημα, τῆ μνήμῃ καὶ τῆ ἐλπίδι ἀγόμενος· διὸ μᾶλλον φιλεῖ ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υίὸν ἢ ὁ υίὸς τὸν πατέρα.

40 Δεί δε και ύπερ των άλλων φιλιων των λεγο- B 1212 2 μένων και δοκουσών έπισκέψασθαι ει είσιν φιλίαι. οίον ή εύνοια φιλία δοκεί. άπλως μέν ούν ούκ άν η δόξειεν είναι ή εύνοια φιλία (πολλοίς γαρ πολλάκις η από του ίδειν η από του ακούσαι τι ύπέρ τινος , άγαθόν εύνοι γινόμεθα· αρ' ούν ήδη και φίλοι; η ού; ού γάρ εί τις ην Δαρείω εύνους έν Πέρσαις όντι, ώσπερ ίσως ήν, εύθέως και φιλία ήν αυτώ πρός Δαρείον)· άλλ' άρχη μέν άν ποτε φιλίας ή 8 εύνοια δόξειεν είναι, γένοιτο δ' αν ή εύνοια φιλία, εί προσλάβοι βούλησιν του τάγαθά δυνατός ών πραξαι πράττειν έκείνου ένεκεν ω έστιν εύνους.--10 έστιν δ' ή εύνοια τοῦ ήθους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ήθος α ούδεις γάρ λέγεται εύνους οίνω η άλλω τινί των αψύχων αγαθών η ήδέων, αλλ' αν τις ή το ήθος σπουδαίος, πρός τουτον ή εύνοια.-ούκ έστιν δέ 10

¹ Reading παρά (τοῦ)το (τῷ) for παρὰ τό Mss.

672

4 there is a further aim. Now Friendship or Love is a species of activity; and it has no aim beyond its own activity; this is its sole end. The father's activity, however, is always of a fuller kind than this, because the son is his own creation. This we see in the case of other creators; in one way or another, they are all favourably disposed to what they have themselves made. So the father has a favour towards the son as towards his own work, being led by memory and by hope; and on this account he loves his son more than his son loves him.

(Eud. VII. vii. : cf. Nic. IX. v., vi.)

- 6 We have also to consider those other feelings which Favour control in common thought and parlance are classed as love to the feeling of Favour, for instance, is regarded as a species
- 7 of friendship. Now, strictly speaking, Favour should not be accounted as friendship. In many cases through sceing someone, or hearing some good of him from another, we are favourably disposed to him. But do we thereby become his friends? Surely not. For if when Darius was reigning in Persia some were favourably disposed to him, as it may well have been, yet this did not straightway constitute love or friend-
- 8 ship towards him. On the other hand, Favour would sometimes appear to be the origin or source of friendship; and may be turned into it by the addition of a desire to confer benefit, if one has the power, upon
- 9 the favoured person. Favour is a feeling of character for character. We do not say that anyone is favourable to wine or anything else manimate, whether good or pleasant; but if a man's character
- 10 be morally good, he attracts our favour. And Favour

1212 a

χωρὶς τῆς φιλίας ἡ εὔνοια, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· διὸ δοκεῖ φιλία εἶναι.

⁶ Η δ' όμόνοιά ἐστιν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῆ φιλία, ἐὰν ¹¹
¹⁵ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν λάβῃς τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην. εἰ γάρ
¹⁵ τὰν ὅμόνοιαν λάβῃς τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην. εἰ γάρ
¹⁵ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμοιως ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ δοκεῖ
αὐτῷ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἅ κἀκείνῳ, ἆρά γε οὖτος
² Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμονοεῖ; ἢ οὕ; ἐπεὶ περί τι ἄλλο
¹⁶ τοιοῦτον.¹ πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἐν ¹²
²⁰ οὐχ ἡ νοοῦσι ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἅμα τῷ ταὐτὸν νοεῖν
²⁰ οἰχ ἡ νοοῦσι ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἅμα τῷ ταὐτὸν νοεῖν
²⁰ οἰχ ἡ νοοῦσι ν ἀμφότεροι ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ὅ μὲν αὐτὸν
⁶ δ' αὐτόν, ἄρά γε ήδη ὁμονοοῦσιν; ἢ οὕ; ἀλλ'
⁸ εἰ κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἄρχειν κἀκεῖνος ἐμέ,
⁹ σύτως ήδη ὁμονοοῦμεν. ἕστι δὴ ὁμονοεῖν ἐν τοῖς ¹³

 XIII. Ἐπεί δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν 1 φιλία, πότερον ὁ σπουδαῖος ἔσται φίλαυτος ἢ οὕ;
 ⁸⁰ ἔστιν δὲ φίλαυτος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν πάντα πράττων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ λυσιτελές. ὁ μὲν οῦν φαῦλος φίλαυτος ἐστίν (αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκεν πάντα πράττει). ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ

¹ Reading (τὸ τοιοῦτον) with Spengel. ³ Omitting ἐν πρακτοῖς, after Susemihl's conjecture.

 a Or " in the same dispositions " (taking $a\dot{v}\tau\dot{\varphi}$ as masculine),

^b xi. 47 above.

 o $\phi i\lambda a \upsilon \tau o s$ usually carries an evil connotation like that of the English word " selfish."

674

is not far from friendship or love, but exists under the same conditions a; and this is why they are supposed identical.

- 11 Concord approaches closely to friendship; but only Concordif it be attained in the full sense of the term. For if a man holds the same opinions as Empedoeles, and believes the world formed from the same elements as he did, is that man in concord with Empedoeles? Surely not; since this kind of agreement lies in a
- 12 different field. In the first place, Concord operates not in what we think and believe, but in what we plan to do. And in this practical sphere, we are in concord not merely in so far as we have the same things in mind, but in so far as besides this we have a determination about them which points in the same direction. For suppose we both have in mind some office, but each is minded that he himself shall fill it; is this enough to constitute concord? Surely not. But if I desire that I shall hold the office, and the other also desires that I shall, then we are really in
- 13 concord. Concord, then, must operate in the sphere of practice, (not merely in that of behef,) and is accompanied by desire for the same end. So that concord in the appointment of the same man as magistrate is an example of Concord in the full sense of the word.

(Nic. IX. viii.)

1 XIII. Since, as we maintain, it is possible for a self-love, man to feel love or friendship for himself,^b will the noble and good man be a self-lover or not? Now the man whose every act in matters of lucre is for his own behoof is a self-lover °; so that the bad man, who always acts for his own behoof, is a self-lover, while the good man is not. For what makes him a good man is just this, 675

ARISTOTLE

1212 a έστι σπουδαίος, ότι άλλου ένεκεν τοῦτο πράττει διό ούκ έστιν φίλαυτος. άλλ' όρμωσι μέν απαντες 2 35 έπι τάγαθά, και οἴονται αύτοῖς δεῖν μάλιστα ὑπάρχειν. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μάλιστα φανερόν ἐπὶ πλούτου και άρχης. ό μέν ούν σπουδαίος έκστήσεται τούτων άλλω, ούχ ώς ού προσήκον αύτω μάλιστα, άλλ' άν δρά άλλον δυνησόμενον μαλλον τούτοις αύτοῦ χρήσθαι· οί δ' άλλοι τοῦτο οὐ ποιήσουσι δι' άγνοιαν 1212 b (ού γαρ οιονται κακώς αν χρήσασθαι τοις τοιούτοις άγαθοῖς) η διὰ φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ σπου-3 δαΐος οὐδέτερον τούτων πείσεται. διὸ οὐδὲ ψίλαυτος κατά γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθά. ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ 5 καλόν. τούτου γάρ μόνον άλλω οὐκ ἂν ἐκσταίη, τὰ δέ συμφέροντα και ήδέα' έκστήσεται. την μέν ούν 4 κατά τὸ καλὸν αιρεσιν φίλαυτος ἔσται· τὴν δὲ κατά τό συμφέρον και καθ' ήδονην λεγομένην ούκ έσται ό σπουδαίος, άλλὰ ό φαῦλος.

XIV. Πότερον δέ ποτε ό σπουδαΐος φιλήσει 1 αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ οὕ; ἔστι μὲν οῦν αὐτὸς 10 αὑτὸν μάλιστα ὡς φιλήσει, ἔστι δ' ὡς οῦ. ἐπειδὴ γάρ φαμεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ἐκστήσεσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ φίλῳ, τὸν φίλον μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ φιλήσει. ναί, ἀλλ' ῇ τούτων ἐξιστάμενος τῷ 2 φίλῳ αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν περιποιεῖται, ταύτῃ ἐξίσταται

¹ To avoid the harsh change of construction from the gen. to the acc. in dependence on $\epsilon\kappa\sigma\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau a$, Scaliger reads $\kappa\alpha\tau\dot{a}$ for $\tau\dot{a}$, and Spengel $\tau\sigma\vartheta$ de $\sigma\mu\mu\phi\epsilon\rho\sigma\tau\sigma\kappa$ ad $\eta\delta\epsilon\sigmas$.

^α For όρμή see I. iv. 9.

^b For τδ' καλόν as the aim of Moral Virtue see I. xx., xxi. above.

that he acts in such matters for the sake of another : 2 and therefore he is no "lover of self." On the other hand, all men are naturally impelled " toward things good, each claiming them in a special degree for himself; a fact especially manifest in the case of riches and office. Now the good man is ready to yield these things to another; not that he lacks a preeminent elaim to them, but if he perceives that another will be able to make better use of them than Other men, on the contrary, will fail to himself do this, either through ignorance (for they do not believe that they would make bad use of these good 3 things) or through the ambition to hold office. The good man, however, will be free from both failings; so that in regard to such good things as these, he is not a "lover of self" If he is a self-lover at all, it is in regard to what is noble or morally beautiful.^b This and this only he will not yield to another; 4 advantages and pleasures he will yield.^c And so in his pursuit of what is noble he will be a "lover of self"; whereas in the pursuit of profit and pleasure, which is usually called (love of self), not he, but the bad man will be a self-lover

 XIV. Will the good man on any occasion love himself more than anyone else, or will he not? In one sense, he will; in another, he will not. Inasmuch as we declare that the good man will yield to his friend such things as are good in the sense of being profitable, he will love his friend more than himself.
 True; but in the very yielding of these things to his friend, he secures for himself moral beauty or nobility.

• Nic. IX. vni. 10 suggests that the good man "may on occasion give up to his friend the doing of noble acts" (Grant, ad loc.).

- 1212 b 15 τῶν τοιούτων. ἔστι μέν οῦν ὡς τὸν φίλον αὐτὸς αῦτοῦ μᾶλλον φιλεῖ, ἔστι δὲ ὡς αὐτὸς αῦτὸν μάλιστα· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμφέρον τὸν φίλον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸς αῦτὸν μάλιστα· αῦτῷ γὰρ ταῦτα περιποιεῖται κάλλιστα ὄντα. ἔστι μὲν 3 οῦν καὶ φιλάγαθος, οὐ φίλαυτος· μόνον γάρ, εἴπερ 20 φιλεῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, ὅτι ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ φαῦλος φίλαυτος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δι' ὃ φιλήσει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οἶον καλόν τι, ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλήσει, ἦ αὐτός. διὸ καὶ οῦτος ἂν κυρίως λέγοιτο φίλαυτος.
 - XV. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ αὐταρκείας εἰπεῖν 1
 καὶ τοῦ αὐτάρκους, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης προσδεήσεται φιλίας, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αὐτάρκης
 ἔσται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο. λέγουσι γὰρ τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.

όταν δ' ό δαίμων εὐ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

δθεν καὶ ἡ ἀπορία γίγνεται, πότερον ὁ πάντα
τάγαθὰ ἔχων καὶ ῶν αὐτάρκης προσδεήσεται φίλου;
ἢ τότε καὶ μάλιστα; τίνα γὰρ εῦ ποιήσει, ἢ μετὰ
τοῦ συμβιώσεται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ μόνος γε διάζει. εἰ 2
τοίνυν τούτων δεήσεται, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
ἄνευ φιλίας, προσδέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.
Ἡ μὲν οῦν ἐν τοῦς λόγοις εἰωθυῖα ὁμοιότης 3
λαμβάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ οὕτ' ἐκεῖ ὀρθῶς οὕτ' ἂν

^a For τό καλόν καὶ ἀγαθόν see II. 1x. above.

^b Rackham. From Europides, Orestes 667.

See Rackham's note on εγκυκλίοιs in Nio. I. v. 6; and Grant's Appendix B " On the εξωτερικοί λόγοι."
 678

ARISTOTLE

1212 b ένταῦθα εἴη χρήσιμος οὐ γὰρ εἰ ὁ θεός ἐστιν αὐτάρκης καὶ μηδενὸς δεῖται, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδ' ἡμεῖς οὐδενὸς δεησόμεθα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις 4 λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ λεγόμενος. ἐπεὶ γάρ, φησί, πάντα ἔχει τἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐστιν αὐτάρκης, τἰ ποιήσει; οὐ γὰρ καθευδήσει. θεάσεται δή τι,
1218 μησίν· τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον καὶ οἰκειότατον. τἰ οῦν θεάσεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι θεάσεται, βέλτιον θεάσεται τι αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἄτοπον, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄλλο τι εἶναι βέλτιον. αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄρα
^π θεάσεται. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος [ὃs] ἂν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκοπῆται, ὡς ἀναισθήτῷ ἐπιτιμῶμεν. ἄτοπος οῦν, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς ἔσται αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν θεώμενος.

Τί μὲν οῦν ὁ θεὸς θεάσεται, ἀφείσθω· ὑπὲρ δὲ 5 τῆς αὐταρκείας οὐ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν σκέψιν ποιούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπίνης, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης
Ἱ¹ δεήσεται φιλίας ἢ οὕ; εἰ δή τις ἐπὶ τὸν φίλον ἐπιβλέψας ἴδοι τί ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὁ φίλος, * *' τοιοῦτος οἶος ἕτερος εἶναι ἐγώ, ἄν γε καὶ σφόδρα φίλον ποιήσης, ὥσπερ τὸ λεγόμενον '' ἄλλος οῦτος ' Ηρακλῆς, ἄλλος φίλος ἐγώ.²¹' ἐπεὶ οῦν ἐστι καὶ 6 χαλεπώτατον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν σοφῶν τινες εἰρή-¹⁵ κασιν, τὸ γνῶναι αὐτόν, καὶ ἥδιστον (τὸ γὰρ αῦτὸν

¹ Inserting $\langle \delta \delta \xi \epsilon \iota \epsilon \nu \ \tilde{a} \nu \rangle$ or the like.

² Omitting allos allos eya. Or, transposing with Scaliger the first two words, "a friend is another self." See Eud. VII. xii. 13.

^a These questions are raised by Aristotle in Metaphysics \sim XI, vii., ix. The author here denies the utility of comparison ($\pi a \rho a \beta o \lambda \eta$) and contrast between the Divine and human life and consciousness as set forth by Eud. in VII. 680

unhelpful here as it is misleading there - For if we this not so with Man. admit that GoD is self-sufficient and needs nothing, it 4 does not prove that we men need nothing. For the argument about the Divine Being that we meet with is this. "Since Gop possesses all good things and is self-sufficient, in what will His action consist? For His existence will not be one long sleep. Nay, He will contemplate something; for this is the noblest kind of activity and the most suited to Him. What then will He contemplate? If He contemplates anything else, it must be something still better than Hunself. But that anything should be better than Gon is absurd. It follows that He will contemplate Himself. But this too is absurd. If a man makes himself the object of his own research, we stigmatize him as a dullard. Gop in contemplation of Himself is therefore an absurdity." a

5 With the object of the Divine contemplation we A Fuend need not however concern ourselves. We are "second investigating the Self-Sufficiency not of Gop but of Self"; man : whether the self-sufficient man will or will not need friendship. Now supposing a man looks upon his friend and marks what he is and what is his character and quality; the friend-if we figure a friend of the most intimate sort-will seem to him to be a kind of second self, as in the common saying 6 "This is my second Hercules." Now to know oneself is an Aid a very difficult thing as even philosophers have told to Solf Knowledge

xii.; and he may possibly have felt that such discussions are beyond the scope of finite minds. It is to be noted that Aristotle denics to God the joy of the artist in creation, which Plato attributes to Him in the Timaeus. (Cf. Tim. c. vi., where it is said that He created the world "that all things should be as like Himself as they could be.")

us-and a very pleasant thing, knowledge of self

 εἰδέναι ήδύ), αὐτοὶ μὲν οῦν αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ δυνάμεθα θεάσασθαι (ὅτι δ' αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνάμεθα, δῆλον ἐξ ῶν ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ποιοῦντες· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται δι' Τ εὕνοιαν ἢ διὰ πάθος· πολλοῖς δὲ ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐπι σκοτεῖ πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς)· ὥσπερ οῦν ὅταν θέλωμεν αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν τὸ πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον ἐμβλέψαντες εἴδομεν, ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς βουληθῶμεν γνῶναι, εἰς τὸν φίλον ἰδόντες γνωρίσαιμεν ἄν· ἔστι γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, ὅ φίλος ἕτερος ἐγώ. εἰ οῦν ἡδὺ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸν 8
 εἰδέναι, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ἄνευ ἄλλου φίλου, δέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν

" Έτι δε καὶ εἴπερ ἐστὶν καλόν, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, τὸ 9 εῦ ποιεῖν ἔχοντα τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθά, τίνα εῦ ποιήσει; μετὰ τίνος δὲ συμβιώσεται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ μόνος γε διάξει· τὸ γὰρ συμβιοῦν ήδὺ καὶ ⁸⁰ ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ¹²¹⁸ ὑ ἀναγκαῖα, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ φιλίας, προσδέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.

 XVI. Πότερον δε πολλούς κτητέον φίλους η 1 ολίγους; οὕτε δη πολλούς, ώς άπλως εἰπεῖν, οὕτ'
 οἰλίγους δεῖ [ἀεί]. πολλών μεν γὰρ ὄντων ἔργον ἐφ'
 ἕκαστον μερίσαι τὸ φιλεῖν. ἐφ' ἁπάντων γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαδυνατεῖ ήμῶν ή φύσις ἀσθενὴς οῦσα πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὕτε γὰρ τῆ ὄψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὕτε γὰρ τῆ ὄψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὕτε γὰρ τῆ ὄψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὕτε γὰρ τῆ ὅψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὕτε γὰρ τῆ ὅψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀρωμεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν πλέον ἀποστήσης τοῦ συμμέτρου, ἐλλείπει διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως, 10 οὕτ' ἐπ' ἀκοῆς, οὕτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἁπάν-

^a Cf. St. James i. 23, 24.

1213 a

being (proverbially) pleasant Direct contemplation of ourselves is moreover impossible, as is shown by the censure we inflict on others for the very things we 7 ourselves unwittingly do-favour or passion being the cause, which in many of us blind our judgement. And so, just as when wishing to behold our own faces we have seen them by looking upon a muror, whenever we wish to know our own characters and personalities, we can recognize them by looking upon a friend;

- 8 since the friend is, as we say, our "second self." If, therefore, it be pleasant to know oneself, and this knowledge is impossible without another who is a friend, it follows that the self-sufficient man will need friendship in order to recognize what manner of man he is."
- Again, if it is a noble act, as it certainly is, for one an Object 9 who is endowed with the good things of fortune to for Bene. confer benefits in his turn, on whom will he confer them? Or with whom will he dwell? For surely he will not spend his life in solitude ; companionship is necessary as well as pleasant. If, then, the things we and a have mentioned are noble and pleasant and necessary, Companion. and if without friendship they are not to be had, even the self-sufficient man will need the addition of friendship.

(Eud. VII. xii. 17 foll. : cf. Nic. IX. x., xi.)

1 XVI. Ought we to seek many friends, or few ? The Number We may say at once, neither the one nor the other. Friends If we have many, it is a difficult task to give each his should match our share of our love. As in all other matters, our weak Character nature finds it impossible to extend its action afar. stances, Our eyes cannot sce far; if we withdraw them beyond the distance that suits them, they fail in their task owing to their natural weakness. So it is with the hearing, and with all our other faculties.

ARISTOTLE

^{1218 b} των. ἐλλείπων οὖν τῷ φιλεῖν δι' ἀδυναμίαν καὶ 2 ἐγκλήματ' ἅν τις ἔχοι δικαίως, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φίλος, μὴ φιλῶν γε ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ γε λόγῳ· ἡ δὲ φιλία οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται. ἔτι ἂν ῶσιν πολλοί, οὐκ 3 ἔστιν παύσασθαι λυπούμενον· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων 15 εἰκὸς ἀεἰ περὶ ἕνα γέ τινα συμβαίνειν τι ἀτύχημα, ῶν γινομένων ἀναγκαῖον λυπεῖσθαι. οὕτ' αῦ πάλιν ὀλίγους, ἕνα ἢ δύο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτρους τῷ καιρῷ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὸ φιλεῖν.

XVII. Μετά δε ταῦτα σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη πῶς δεί 1 φίλω χρῆσθαι. ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἐν ἁπάση φιλία ή
²⁰ σκέψις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἡ μάλιστα ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ φίλοι. οὐκ ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὅμοίως,
οἶον ἐν τῆ πατρὸς πρὸς υίὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτον οἶον ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν ἐνίαις, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σοί,
οὕτως καὶ σὺ ἐμοί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνταῦθα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἔγκλημα· ἐν δὲ ἀνίσοις φίλοις οὐκ ἄστι τὸ ἴσον, 2
²⁵ ἔστι δὲ ἡ πατρὸς πρὸς υίὸν φιλία ἐν ἀνίσω, ὅμοίως
ή γυναικὸς πρὸς ἄνδρα ἢ οἰκέτου πρὸς δεσπότην,
καὶ ὅλως δὲ χείρονος καὶ βελτίονος. οὐχ ἔξουσιν δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγκλήματα. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις
φίλοις καὶ ἐν τῆ (τοι⟩αύτη ψιλία τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα. ὥστε σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη τὸ πῶς δεῖ χρῆ³⁰ σθαι φίλω ἐν τῆ ἐν ἴσοις φίλοις φιλία. **.

^a Cf. the beautiful letter of Plinius Caecilius (VIII. xvi.) beginning "Confecerunt me infirmitates meorum . . ."

^{\overline{v}} Susemihl thinks that in this fragment the author is following a lost portion of the *Ethics of Eudemus* which came therein after VII. xii. See his note at the end of that Chapter.

684

- 2 If, then, through weakness one failed in loving, one would meet with just consures, and would not be a true friend One would be loving in name only; 3 and that is not the meaning of Friendship. Moreover, if one's friends be many, one can have no respite from pain. Amid a large number, it is likely that one at least will always be suffering inisfortune; and for this we must needs feel pain.^a On the other hand, we need more friends than a merc one or two; the number should be suited to our circumstances and to our individual impulse towards friendship.
- XVII.^b We must next inquire how a friend should How 1 be treated. This inquiry does not concern every hould be kind of friendship, but only that where the friends tieated. are most given to finding fault with one another. In the other kinds, they are loss inclined thereto; for example, between father and son there is no such fault-finding as that which in some kinds of friendship men think fit to indulge. "As I treat you," they say, "so you must treat me"-and if he does 2 not, a bitter fault-finding ensues. But between friends who are unequal, this equal (balance of benefits) has no place. And the friendship of father with son is a friendship where the conditions are unequal, as is that of wife with husband, or slave with master, or in any case where one is inferior and the other superior. These cases, then, will admit of no such fault-finding. The kind of complaint of which we have Complaints spoken arises between friends who are equal, and in a arise when friendship of that type. So the question we have to is on equal consider is how to treat a friend when the friendship is between equals....

Terms.

a

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

- Analytica II. vi 15 Four Books (An. Priora I., II., An. Posteriona I., II.) on Logice In An Proora the "Syllogisms" or forms of deductive reasoning are laid down by Artistotle
- Archlelis 1 xvli, 16. A proper nsme used (like Coriscus in Eud. vii. vi. 15) exempli gratia
- Arcopagus i. xvi. 2. (See note thore)
- Clearchus II vi. 23 Despot of Heraclea in Bithynia, 365-353 n.o. Quoted as an example of crucky
- Darlus 11. xii, 7. The name of three Persian kings. The last acceded in 230 s.c. and was dethroned by Alexander of Macodonia in 881
- Dionfelins II. v1. 88. Two despots of thus name, father and son, ruled st Syracuse; the hrst from 405-867 BC, the second from 807-366 and again from 346-848. Dark stories are told of their unscruptiousness and cruely; probably with exsgeration
- Empedoclös 11. x1. 2, x16. 11. Of Agrigentum in Sicily, where he flourished in the middle of the flith century n.c. and won renown as a statesman, orator, physician, magician and natural philosopher. Fragments of his poem on "Nature" are preserved, in which he ascribes the origin of the world to four elements (earth,

au, fire and water), mingled together by "Love" or separated by "Strife"

- Ephesus 11. vi. 12. A Hourishing city at the mouth of the River Caystrue in W Asia Minor, colonized by Ionian Gleeks perluaps in the eleventh contury n c.
- Euripides 11, x1 25, 20: quoted also in 11, x1, 3, xy, 1 An Atheniau dramatic poet, 480-406 n.c., noted for his interest in nutural philosophy and his friendship with the philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates
- Hectir 1. xx. 8. Eldest son of Pram, king of Troy in the *lind*. His father and mobber urge him not to meet the Greek chieftsin Achilles in the field, but he remembers how be lind neglected the advice of bis friend Pulydamas to lend the Trojans back to the city at nightfall, instead of bivouacking in the plan. This had cost many lives; and if he new shelters himsoff behind the walls, he anticipates his friend's reproaches. (*litiad* xxil : cf. xvin. 243 foll.)
- Heracleitus II. vi. 12. Of Ephcaus, where he flourished towards the end of the sixth century B.C. He was noted for the obscirity of his writings, in which he maintained this bil things are in continual process of change or flux (márra jel). Firo is the pimmi element out of which

other things arise and into which they are resolved

- Heroules (Latin form of Greek Heroalis) 11 xv. 5 A hero famous in Greek legend for his wonderful feats of strength and coulage
- Homer (Greek Hömöros) I, xx 8: quoted also II xl. 2 A Greek poet of Asla Minor to whom the composition of the Maad and Odysary was traditionally assigned

Hells 11 vii. 12. A grammarian. (But see note there)

Indians 1, xvii. 4. (See note there)

- Lamprus II vil. 12. A grammarian Probably distinct from the famous musican of that name, mentioned by Plato (Menezerus) and Nepos (Vita Epananondae). (See Fabriclus, Bibl Gr. 11 Xv. 36)
- Mentör I. xxviv. 20. A Rhodian captain who served euccassively under Attabazus (who revolted against king Artaxerses II in 566), Nertanlöfe (the last native king o' Egypt), and Darina III. who made him governor of W. Asia Minor

Persians II. xii. 7

- Phaiaris 11. vi. 33. Despot of Agrigentum in Sicily about 570-554 B.C. He had an unenviable reputation for cruelty
- Plato (Greek Platon) 1. 8, xxuii. 10 An Athenian philosopher, 428-347 B.C., founder of the "Academic" School In which Aristotle studied. His greatest work, the Republic of Model State, is cited in the above passages. In r. i. 12-26 is emphasized Aristotle's chief dissent from his

teaching: denual, that is, of the self-existent Form or "Idea" of Good to which Plato attributed the goodness in earthly things

- Palydanas 1 xx 8. (See Hector)
- Pythagoras I i. 6: Pythagoraans (his followers) I. VXVIII 18. A. native of the isle of Samos, who founded at Croton in S. Italy, the philosophical school or brotherhood called after his name He flourished about 500 B c. and was famous as a mathematician, astronomer and musician. He taught the trans. migration of souis, and say in numerical relations the groundwork of the material and moral worlds The teaching of the Pythagorean Philolana, who settled at Thebes, appears to have had a powerful influence on Piato's thought
- Sociatés 1. i 7, 26 ix. 7; xx. 4: XXXIV. 25: II. vi. 2. Of Athens. B.C. 460-899. The master of Plato He wrote nothing, but sought through conversation with others to attain, inductively, general notions, chiefly in the moral sphere. His view that vutue is merely a matter of knowledge, and vice merely a matter of ignorance, so that both are involuntary, is vigorously combated bv Aristotie Probably his extraordinary power of self-control made him under rate the force of passion in others
- Syliogiem, Treatise on the. (See Analytica)
- Zens (cf. Latin Ju-piter) 11 x1. 6. The Greek god of the sky, son of Oronus and chief of the Olympian dynasty; worshipped as ruler of gods and men

Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. CLAKK, LIMITED, Edinburgh

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED

LATIN AUTHORS

APULEIUS. THE GOLDEN ASS (METAMOR-PHOSES). W. Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gaselce. (6th Imp.)

AULUS GELLIUS, J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. AUSONIUS. H. G. Evelyn White, 2 Vols.

BEDE. J. E. King. 2 Vols.

BOETHIUS: TRACTS AND DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE. Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. (2nd Imp.)

CAESAR : CIVIL WARS. A. G Peskett. (8rd Imp.) CAESAR : GALLIC WAR. H. J. Edwards. (6th Imp.)

CATO AND VARRO: DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash and

W. D. Hooper. (2nd Imp.) CATULLUS. F. W. Cornish; TIBULLUS. J. B. Postgate; AND PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. J. W. Mackail. (10th Imp.)

CELSUS: DE MEDICINA. W. G. Spencer. 2 Vols. Vol. I.

CICERO DE FINIBUS. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp. revised.)

CICERÓ: DE NATURA DEORUM AND ACADEMICA. H. Rackham.

CICERO: DE OFFICIIS. Walter Miller. (Srd Imp.)

CICERO: DE REPUBLICA AND DE LEGIBUS. Clinton W. Keyes.

CICERO: DE SENECTUTE, DE AMICITIA, DE DIVINATIONE. W. A. Falconer. (3rd Imp.) CICERO: LETTERS TO ATTICUS. E. O. Winstedt.

3 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II. Srd Imp. and Vol. III. 2nd Imp.)

CICERO: LETTERS TO HIS FRIENDS. W. Glynn Williams. 3 Vols.

CICERO: PHILIPPICS. W. C. A. Ker.

CICERO: PRO ARCHIA, POST REDITUM, DE DOMO, DE HARUSPICUM RESPONSIS, PRO PLANCIO, N. H. Watts. (2nd Imp.) CICERO: PRO CAECINA, PRO LEGE MANILIA,

PRO CLUENTIO, PRO RABIRIO. H. Grose Hodge.

CICERO: PRO MILONE, IN PISONEM, PRO SCAURO, PRO FONTEIÓ, PRO RABIRIÓ POS-TUMO, PRO MARCELLO, PRO LIGARIO, PRO REGE DEIOTARO. N. H. Watts.

CICERO: PRO QUINCTIO, PRO ROSCIO AMERINO, PRO ROSCIO COMOEDO, CONTRA RULLUM. J. H. Freese.

CICERO: TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. J. E. King. CICERO: VERRINE ORATIONS. L. H G. Greenwood, 2 Vols.

CLAUDIAN. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. FLORUS: E. S. Forster, and CORNELIUS NEPOS: J. C. Rolfe.

FRONTINUS: STRATAGEMS AND AQUEDUCTS. C. E. Bennett and M. B. McElwain.

FRONTO: CORRESPONDENCE, C. R. Haines, 2 Vols, HORACE: ODES AND EPODES. C. E. Bennett. (10th Imp. revised.)

HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES, ARS POETICA. H. R. Fairclough. (3rd Imp. revised.)

JEROME : SELECT LETTERS. F. A. Wright.

JUVENAL AND PERSIUS. G. G. Ramsay, (5th Imp.)

LIVY. B. O. Foster and E. Sage. 18 Vols. Vols. I.-V. and IX. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp. revised.)

LUCAN. J. D. Duff.

LUCRETIUS. W. H. D. Rouse. (3rd Imp. revised.) MARTIAL. W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp. revised.) MINOR LATIN POETS: from Publillus Syrus to RUTILIUS NAMATIANUS, including GRATTIUS, CALPURNIUS SICULUS, NEMESIANUS, ÁVIANUS, with "Aetna," "Phoenix" and other poems. J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff.

(2nd Imp.) OVID: THE ART OF LOVE AND OTHER POEMS. J. H. Mozley.

OVID : FASTI. Sir James G. Frazer.

OVID: HEROIDES AND AMORES. Grant Showerman, (3rd Imp.)

OVID: METAMORPHOSES, F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (5th Imp.)

OVID: TRISTIA AND EX PONTO. A. L. Wheeler.

PETRONIUS. M. Heseltine; SENECA: APOCOLO-CYNTOSIS. W. H. D. Rouse. (5th Imp. revised.) PLAUTUS. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. Vols. I.-IV. (Vol. I.

4th Imp., Vols. II. and III. 3rd Imp.)

PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth's Translation revised by W. M. L. Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (4th Imp.)

PROPERTIUS. H. E. Butler. (1th Imp.)

QUINTILIAN. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

REMAINS OF OLD LATIN. E. H. Warmington, 3 Vols. Vol. It. (Ennus and Caecilius.)

ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS OF. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.)

ST. AUGUSTINE, SELECT LETTERS. J. H. Baxter.

SALLUST. J. Rolfe. (2nd Imp. rovised.)

SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTÁE. D. Magie. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp. revised.)

SENECA: APOCOLOCYNTOSIS. Cf. PETRONIUS.

SENECA: EPISTULAE MORALES. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp. rovised.)

SENECA: MORAL ESSAYS. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. Vols. I. and H. (Vol. H. 2nd Imp. revised.)

SENECA: TRAGEDIES. F. J. Miller, 2 Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.)

SILIUS ITALICUS. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols.

STATIUS. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols.

SUETONIUS. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (4th Imp. revised.)

TACITUS : DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson ; and AGRI-

COLA AND GERMANIA. Maunice Hutton. (4th Imp.)

TACITUS: HISTORIES AND ANNALS. C. H. Mooré and J. Jackson. 3 Vols. Vols. I. and II. (Histories and Annals I-III.)

TERENCE. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (5th Imp.)

TERTULLIAN : APOLOGIA AND DE SPECTACULIS.

T. R. Glover. MINUCIUS FELIX. G. H. Rendall.

VALERIUS FLACCUS. J. H. Mozley.

VELLEIUS PATERCULUS AND RES GESTAE DIVI AUGUSTI, F. W. Shipley.

VIRGIL, H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 11th Imp., Vol. II. 9th Imp. revised.)

VITRUVIUS: DE ARCHITECTURA. F. Granger. 2 Vols.

GREEK AUTHORS

ACHILLES TATIUS. S. Gaselee.

AENEAS TACTICUS: ASCLEPIODOTUS AND ONA-SANDER. The Illinois Greek Club.

AESCHINES. C. D. Adams.

AESCHYLUS, H Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. Srd Imp., Vol. II, 2nd Imp.)

APOLLODORUS. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols.

APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. R. C. Seaton, (4th Imp.)

THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vol II. 4th Imp.) APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY. Horace White. 4 Vols.

APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY. Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., III. and IV. 2nd Imp.)

ARATUS. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.

ARISTOPHANES. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. S Vols (3rd Imp.) Verse trans

ARISTOTLE : "ART" OF RHETORIC. J. H. Freese. ARISTOTLE : ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, EUDE-

MIAN ETHICS, VICES AND VIRTUES. II. Rackham. ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS. H. Tiedennick. 2 Vols.

ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. H Rackham. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: OECONOMICA AND MAGNA MOR-ALIA. G. C. Armstrong; with Metaphysics. Vol. II.

ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL, PARVA NATURALIA, ON BREATH. W. S. Hett.

ARISTOTLE: PHYSICS. Rev. P. Wieksteed and F. M. Cornford. 2 Vols. (Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: POETICS AND LONGINUS. W. Hamilton Fyfe; DEMETRIUS ON STYLE. W. Rhys Roberts. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE : POLITICS. H. Rackham.

ARRIAN: HISTORY OF ALEXANDER AND INDICA. Rev. E. Iliffe Robson. 2 Vols.

ATHENAEUS: DEIPNOSOPHISTAE. C. B. Guliek. 7 Vols. Vols. I-V.

CALLIMACHUS AND LYCOPHRON. A. W. Mair; ARATUS. G. R. Mair,

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth.

COLLUTHUS. Cf. OPPIAN.

DAPHNE AND CHLOE. Thornley's Translation revised by J. M. Edmonds; AND PARTHENIUS. S. Gaselee. (3rd Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA AND DE FALSA LEGATIONE. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince.

DEMOSTHENES: OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS AND MINOR ORATIONS: I-XVII AND XX, J. H. Vince.

- DIO CASSIUS : ROMAN HISTORY. E. Carv. 9 Vols. (Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)
- DIO CHRYSOSTOM, J. W. Cohoon. 4 Vols. Vol. I.
- DIODORUS SICULUS. C. H. Oldfather, 10 Vols. Vol. I.
- DIOGENES LAERTIUS. R. D. Hieks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

EPICTETUS. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. EURIPIDES. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vol. I., II., IV. 5th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp.) Verse trans.

EUSEBIUS: ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Kirsopp Lake and J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols.

GALEN: ON THE NATURAL FACULTIES. A. J. Brock. (2nd Imp.)

THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.)

GREEK ELEGY AND IAMBUS WITH THE ANACRE-ONTEA. J. M. Edmonds. 2 Vols.

THE GREEK BUCOLIC POETS (THEOCRITUS, BION, MOSCHUS). J. M. Edmonds. (5th Imp. revised.)

HERODES. Cf. THEOPHRASTUS : CHARACTERS.

HERODOTUS. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd. Imp., Vols. II.-IV. 2nd Imp.)

HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS. H. G. Evelyn White. (5th Imp. revised and enlarged.)

HIPPOCRATES AND THE FRAGMENTS OF HERA-CLEITUS. W. H. S. Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. HOMER : ILIAD. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

HOMER: ODYSSEY. A. T. Murray, 2 Vols. (4th Imp.) ISAEUS. E. W. Forster.

ISOCRATES. George Norlin. 3 Vols. Vols. I. and II.

JOSEPHUS. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 8 Vols, Vols, I.-V. (Vol. V. 2nd Imp.) JULIAN. Wilmer Cave Wright_ 8 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

LUCIAN. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-IV. (Vols. I. and II. 3rd Imp.)

LYCOPHRON. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.

LYRA GRAECA. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Ed. revised and enlarged.) LYSIAS. W. R. M. Lamb.

- MARCUS AURELIUS. C. R. Haines. (3rd Imp. revised.)
- MENANDER. F. G. Allinson. (2nd Imp. revised.)

OPPIAN, COLLUTHUS, TRYPHIODORUS, A. W. Mair.

PAPYRI (SELECTIONS). A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar. 4 Vols, Vols. I. and H.

PARTHENIUS. Cf. DAPHNIS AND CHLOE.

PAUSANIAS : DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. S. Jones. 5 Vols. and Companion Vol. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

PHILO. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. Whitaker. 9 Vols. Vols. I-V. F. H. Colson, Vol. VI.

PHILOSTRATUS: THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA. F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols, (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)

PHILOSTRATUS. IMAGINES : CALLISTRATUS. DESCRIPTIONS. A. Fairbanks.

PHILOSTRATUS AND EUNAPIUS : LIVES OF THE SOPHISTS. Wilmer Cave Wright.

PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. (5th Imp. revised.)

PLATO : CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, HIPPÁRCHUS THE LOVERS, THEAGES, MINOS AND EPINOMIS. W. R. M. Lamb.

PLATO: CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, GREATER HIPPIAS, LESSER HIPPIAS. H. N. Fowler.

PLATO: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAE-DO, PHAEDRUS. H. N. Fowler. (7th. Imp.) PLATO: LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHY-

DEMUS, W. R. M. Lamb.

PLATO: LAWS. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. PLATO: LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp. revised.)

PLATO: REPUBLIC. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols.

PLATO: STATESMAN, PHILEBUS, H. N. Fowler. ION. W. R. M. Lamb.

PLATO: THEAETETUS AND SOPHIST. H. N. Fowler. (2nd Imp.)

PLATO: TÍMAEUS, CRITIAS, CLITOPHO, MENEXE-NUS, EPISTULAE. Rev. R. G. Bury.

PLUTARCH: MORALIA. F. C. Babbitt. 14 Vols. Vols. L-III.

PLUTARCH: THE PARALLEL LIVES. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. (Vols. I., II., III. and VII. 2nd Imp.)

POLYBIUS. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. PROCOPIUS: HISTORY OF THE WARS. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. Vols. I.-VI. (Vol. I, 2nd Imp.)

QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS. A. S. Way. Verse trans.

- ST. BASIL: LETTERS. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols.
- ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOA-
- SAPH. Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Rev. R. G. Burv. In 3 Vols.
- Vols. I. and II.
- SOPHOCLES. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.) Verse trans.
- STRABO: GEOGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols, I and VIII. 2nd Imp.)
- THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds; HERODES, etc. A. D. Knox.
- THEOPHRASTUS: ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Sir Arthur Hort, Bart. 2 Vols.
- THUCYDIDES. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., III. and IV. 2nd Imp. revised.)
- TRYPHIÓDORUS. Cf. OPPIAN.
- XENOPHON: CYROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
- XÉNOPHON: HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, AND SYMPOSIUM. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (2nd Inup.)
- XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUS. E. C. Marchant.
- XENOPHON : SCRIPTA MINORA. E. C. Marchant.

VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

GREEK AUTHORS

- ARISTOTLE: ON HISTORY, MOTION AND PRO-GRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. S. Forster and A. Peek.
- ARISTOTLE: ORGANON. II. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick.
- ARISTOTLE: RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM. H. Rackham.
- DEMOSTHENES: MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTO-CRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON. J. H. Vinec.
- DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS. A. T. Muiray.
- DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS : ROMAN ANTI-QUITIES. Spelman's translation revised by E. Cary.

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

GREEK MATHEMATICAL WORKS. J. Thomas. MINOR ATTIC ORATORS (ANTIPHON, ANDOCIDES DEMADES, DEINARCHUS, HYPEREIDES). K. Maidment.

NONNUS. W. H. D. Rouse.

LATIN AUTHORS

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, J. C. Rolfe. S. AUGUSTINE : CITY OF GOD. J. H. Baxter.

CELSUS. W G. Spencer.

CICERO: AD HERENNIUM. H. Caplan. CICERO: IN CATILINAM PRO FLACCO, PRO MURENA, PRO SULLA Louis E. Lord.

CICERO : DE ORATORE. Charles Stuttaford and W. E Sutton.

CICERO : ORATOR, BRUTUS. H. M. Hubbell.

CICERO: PRO SESTIO, IN VATINIUM, PRO CAELIO, DE PROVINCIIS CONSULARIBUS, PRO BALBO. J. H. Freese.

COLUMELLA: DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash.

ENNIUS, LUCILIUS and other specimens of Old Latin. E. H. Warmington.

PLINY: NATURAL HISTORY. W. H. S. Jones.

PRUDENTIUS. J. H. Baxter and C. J. Fordyce.

SIDONIUS: LETTERS & POEMS. E. V. Arnold and W. B. Anderson.

VARRO : DE LINGUA LATINA. R. G. Kent.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

London WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD Cambridge, Mass. , HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS