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
EDITED BY

JEFFREY HENDERSON

PLATO

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PLATO

EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY · CRITO PHAEDO

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

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AND

WILLIAM PREDDY

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
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CONTENTS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION	vii
CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S LIFE AND WORKS	xxvii
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	xxxii
EUTHYPHRO	1
APOLOGY	85
CRITO	195
PHAEDO	265
INDEX OF NAMES	525
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	529



GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The grouping of the four works of Plato (ca. 429–347 BC)¹ in this volume follows the scheme of the scholar Thrasyllus of Alexandria (d. AD 36), who is credited with organizing Plato's dialogues into Tetralogies, by analogy with the production by the fifth-century tragedians of groups of four related plays. These four works highlight four episodes in the trial, imprisonment, and death of Plato's friend and master, Socrates: *Euthyphro*, a conversation with a self-styled expert on religion, the gods, and the nature of holiness, which takes place outside the King's Stoa (Stoa Basileos) in the Athenian Agora, where S. (ca. 469–399) has come for a preliminary hearing (*anakrisis*) of the charge against him of *asebeia* (impiety); *Apology*, a version of S.'s speech at his public trial; *Crito*, a private conversation between the imprisoned S. and one of his faithful followers concerning the morality of escape from his death sentence; and finally *Phaedo*, S.'s last conversation with a group of his followers about the afterlife and the immortality of the soul, which is followed by his death by the

¹ Throughout this volume all dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

drinking of hemlock. These events proved a crucial philosophical and personal influence on Plato in a long and prolific career, and through Plato's portrait S. became for later ages a paradigm of the resolute and ever-questioning philosopher in conflict with the state.

The relationship of these four works² owes a great deal to the questioning, ironic, yet forceful and unorthodox personality of Socrates, as drawn by Plato. The power of this presentation, which has influenced numerous thinkers (not to mention artists) through the ages, vividly portrays a man resolutely determined to live the good life through a close philosophical examination of himself and others. We see him critically engaged in relentless questioning of the ethical and religious assumptions of his associates, an activity that has been thought to be mainly responsible for his trial and condemnation.³ In the last and by far the longest of the four works, *Phaedo*, we see him, within hours of his own death, no less determinedly engaged with his followers in arguments about the survival of the soul after death and the necessity for the true philosopher to cultivate purity of soul to ensure the prospect of a good life in the next world. *Phaedo* concludes with perhaps the most famous scene of all: the steadfast and cheerful manner in which S. bids farewell to his friends and drinks the hemlock.

² *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, like almost all of Plato's works, are in dialogue form; *Apology* is the single exception, but it also contains a section of dialogue between S. and one of his prosecutors, Meletus.

³ On the circumstances of S.'s trial and possible motives for his prosecution, see Introduction to *Apology*, sections 4 and 5.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The dramatic effect of Plato's presentation of Socrates' "Last Days" has made it hard to resist as a convincing account of what actually happened in Athens in 399, the year of S.'s trial and execution. Yet the appearance of historical accuracy is deceptive. To take the most public event, the trial, at which Plato was apparently present (*Ap.* 38b6), there is one other major source in the soldier and historian Xenophon, whose *Apology* differs radically from that of Plato in detail and general tone.⁴ Another instance is to be found in *Phaedo*: the metaphysical ideas discussed in that dialogue concerning the soul and its survival after death have generally been associated with the Middle Period of Plato's philosophical writing, up to thirty years after S.'s death.⁵ The "other-worldly" emphasis differs radically from that of the previous three works, and at one point, the introduction of the idea of the possession of knowledge as recollection of what is acquired before birth, which, one of S.'s companions says, "you've frequently put forward" (*Phd.* 72e), almost definitely refers back to a previous discussion in *Meno*, also a Middle Period dialogue, dating probably from the late 380s.⁶ Plato continues to use "S." as a participant in almost all his dialogues throughout

⁴ For detailed discussion, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 3.

⁵ We accept the broad developmental pattern of dialogues into Early, Middle, and Late that represents the consensus of the majority of scholars. However, in the absence of firm dating for almost all of Plato's dialogues, precise ordering is difficult and other structural approaches to the ordering have been proposed (for bibliography, see Chronology of Plato's Life and Works).

⁶ See Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

his long productive life into the 350s, only abandoning it for his last work, *Laws*.

2. PORTRAITS OF SOCRATES

(i) *Aristophanes*

The picture of Socrates that differs most radically from Plato's is that of Aristophanes (ca. 450–ca. 385), the comic dramatist whose *Clouds*, performed in Athens in 423 (revised 418), depicts S. as the head of a *phrontistērion* (“thinking shop” or “thinking school,” a comic invention), whose inhabitants concern themselves with fantastic speculations about the nature of the universe and, under S.'s leadership, teach aspiring students the trick of winning arguments, “making the unjust defeat the just argument,”⁷ an activity associated with contemporary popular teachers known as sophists. It is this portrait, arguably a comic exaggeration or even fictional creation based on S.'s eccentric appearance,⁸ dress, and allegedly unorthodox views, that Plato's S. explicitly blames for what he terms the *diabolē* (slander, prejudice) that has arisen against him (*Ap.* 19b–c). This source, while bearing no resemblance to Plato's portrayal, tells us, at least, that S. was a well-known, and possibly notorious, figure in Athens in the last quarter of the fifth century.⁹

⁷ *Ar. Clouds*, 112–18.

⁸ Sculptures of S. dating back to the fourth century reveal his startlingly distinctive stocky figure, snub nose and fixed gaze (on the latter, see esp. *Phd.* 117b5).

⁹ There are brief disparaging references to S. and his associates that survive in several other contemporary comic dramatists.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

(ii) *Xenophon*

Xenophon (428–ca. 354) was a wealthy Athenian citizen who associated with Socrates. Absent as a mercenary soldier on a military expedition in Asia Minor during the period of S.'s trial, and relying on an informant, he wrote a different version of the trial that suggested S. did not bother to spend time preparing his defense because at that point he really wanted to die rather than face the burdens of old age.¹⁰ Xenophon also wrote a series of works designed to rehabilitate S.'s memory, chief of which is the *Memorabilia* (*Memoirs of Socrates*). In defending him against the charges of the indictment, Xenophon gives his reminiscences of S. as a man of conventional piety and virtue. While there is much in Xenophon's S. that recognizably corresponds to some of the ideas we find in Plato, it lacks the subversive bite, ironic thrust, yet deadly seriousness and philosophical depth, of Plato's portrait.

(iii) *Sōkratikoī Logoi*

Socrates is famous for having written nothing himself. The desire to commemorate him was not confined to Plato and Xenophon. A number of S.'s friends and associates composed philosophical dialogues and memoirs, which collectively were recognized by Aristotle (384–322) in *Poetics* as a literary genre, the "Socratic dialogues" (*Sōkratikoī*

Plato, however, in *Symposium*, a later dialogue, presents a gathering, supposedly taking place circa 416, in which S. and Aristophanes both appear as convivial fellow guests.

¹⁰ See Xen. *Ap.* 1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Logoi: Poet. 1447b11). The gathering of friends and associates at the beginning of *Phaedo* (59b–c) includes a number of writers whose memoirs of S. are either referred to or exist in fragmentary form.¹¹ Their purpose may have been to defend S.'s memory against attacks, such as that of Polycrates, a teacher of rhetoric, who in the 390s wrote an *Accusation of Socrates* (now lost, but whose existence is known through "replies" in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.1–2), and from a later *Defense* by the Greek rhetorician Libanius (4th c. AD). These dialogues constitute evidence of a "Socratic literature" that had great influence on his reputation in later centuries. Xenophon and Plato too belong to this genre. Taken collectively, it is clear that these writers did not see themselves as writing biography as we would understand it, that is, a strictly accurate historical account of S.'s life.

(iv) Aristotle

In *Metaph.* 1078b9–32, Aristotle, who was for some years a member of Plato's Academy, makes a distinction between Socrates and Plato: the former was the first person to search for universal definitions of moral virtues (see in particular *Euthyphro* as an example) but did not regard these universals as having a separate existence, whereas Plato did separate them and referred to them as "Ideas" or "Forms." On the face of it this is good evidence that on this topic at least we can distinguish the philosophical

¹¹ The fragments of the Socratics are collected in Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

ideas of S. from those of Plato. What Aristotle claims is that on this, as on a number of other Socratic topics, one can discern the broad lines of Socratic method and doctrine and distinguish them in a general way from Plato's later development, notably the separation of universals, the "Forms" (as discussed in *Phaedo*, for example). What is not certain, on Aristotle's evidence, despite his position as a member of Plato's Academy, is how far the dramatic presentation and detailed argument between "S." and his interlocutors found in Plato's early dialogues represent the conversations and beliefs of the historical S. rather than Plato's own version.

The question of how far we can establish the beliefs of the historical Socrates, as opposed to those of Plato using "S." as a mouthpiece, therefore remains, and is likely to remain, problematic. In the history of Platonic scholarship, the problem of "the historical S.," based on a thorough analysis of the above main sources and others, is a controversial topic, on which arguments for and against the view that we can discern a substantial philosophical contribution from S. have had considerable currency for a very long time.¹² For the purposes of this volume, however, we will be regarding this as a side issue. While not ignoring the fact that there is almost definitely some historical basis to Plato's presentation of the ideas and method of S. and

¹² For both sides of the argument, see Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 45–106 (a detailed case for the view that we can establish a Socratic phase in Plato's early dialogues), and Stokes, "Socrates' Mission," 26–81 (esp. n. 1); *Plato, Apology*, 1–7, for a skeptical view.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

the events of his later life, and especially the last weeks, our focus will be on the four dialogues as Plato's philosophical and dramatic presentations, and, henceforth, references to "S." will mean "Plato's S.," unless otherwise stated.

3. SOCRATIC THOUGHT IN THE FOUR DIALOGUES

(i) *Knowledge*

In *Apology* Socrates claims that the priestess at the Delphic oracle, when questioned by his friend Chaerephon, said that there was no one wiser than S. (*Ap.* 21a). Conscious of his own ignorance and attempting to refute this claim, S. questioned a number of different groups of people around Athens who claimed expertise and discovered that he was wiser than they were "in just this one minor respect" (21d): that their claims of knowledge were false, whereas he did not claim to know what he did not know.

The question arises: what did Socrates think he did not know that these others thought they did? *Euthyphro* gives us a clue: the religious and opinionated Euthyphro appears as a representative example of the so-called experts whom S. went around questioning. Euthyphro thinks it quite simple to define the value on which he, of all people, should be an expert, namely "piety" or "the holy" (*to hōsion*), by giving examples of pious actions (*Euthyphr.* 5d8 ff.). The problem for Euthyphro is that by the end of the dialogue, S. claims that Euthyphro does not actually know, or at least has not yet disclosed, what holiness is, and, on

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

the face of it, S. does not know either.¹³ On the evidence of this dialogue, S.'s criteria for knowledge are very strict: rather than simply assuming knowledge through giving representative examples, or offering a definition that may admit exceptions, which Euthyphro thinks quite sufficient, they have to discover the particular characteristic (*idea* or *eidōs*) that all examples of *to hosion* (the holy) have to share.¹⁴

Euthyphro, like many of the early Socratic dialogues, is aporetic: ending in perplexity (*aporia*, literally, "no way through"). On the face of it, then, at the end of *Euthyphro*, Socrates, like Euthyphro himself, cannot claim to know what *to hosion*, or "piety," is, on the strict criteria that he has himself set. And he claims that awareness of his own ignorance, unlike those with false knowledge, is a kind of wisdom, in that he has no illusion of knowledge.

"Socrates the skeptic," that is, the claim that he knows nothing for certain, has had considerable currency in later thought. Yet it is clear from his trial speech, *Apology*, that S. does claim to know a number of things, or at least he is convinced enough of their truth to risk conviction in his trial and ultimately the death sentence. For S. it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, which in his case would include abandoning his mission to question Athenians, which he regards as a direct command by the Delphic god. He asks

¹³ The question whether in *Euthyphro* Plato intends to suggest that S. is actually implying an answer to the question asked is debatable; see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) (d).

¹⁴ On the development of *eidōs/idea* from "characteristic" into a separable "Form" or "Idea," see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (iii).

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

rhetorically whether he should propose as a counterproposal to the death penalty something "I well know" (*eu oida*: 37b7) to be bad, for example, imprisonment, a fine, or banishment from Athens. In *Crito* 49c-d S. puts forward the thesis, which he states with conviction that one should never return harm for harm, a principle that forms the basis of his decision to stay in Athens and face the death penalty rather than abscond.¹⁵ This in its turn is related to more fundamental ethical convictions (on which see immediately below, section 3 (ii)). It seems clear, therefore, that unless we believe that S.'s claim of ignorance in the dialogues is to be seen as disingenuous, simply a ploy to encourage his interlocutor to join him in seeking out the truth,¹⁶ S. must ascribe value to beliefs that, on his strict definitional criteria, he cannot justify, but which were sufficiently firmly held to justify his claim that he "knows" them to be true and which motivate a heroic defense of principles that he states unequivocally.¹⁷

(ii) *Ethics and the "Good Life"*

Socrates' convictions about the primacy of knowledge lie at the basis of his ethics. At *Apology* 25cff., he attempts to

¹⁵ See detailed discussion in Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (ii).

¹⁶ For this view, see, for example, Gulley, *The Philosophy of Socrates*, 69. Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.36, presents a hostile respondent accusing S. of being in the habit of asking questions to which he knows the answer.

¹⁷ Attempts to solve the apparent contradiction involved in S.'s claims concerning knowledge in *Apology* and elsewhere have

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

counter the accusation of corrupting the youth of Athens, one of the key charges against him, by running the following argument against Meletus, one of his accusers: he says that if he has corrupted the young, he will have done so unintentionally, because nobody does wrong intentionally; so if he has done evil, he has done so inadvertently, and so should be taught the correct way rather than be punished. Whatever the jurors made of this argument, it enshrined a basic Socratic ethical belief: virtue is knowledge; we all basically want what is good for us, so any wrongdoing is the result of ignorance. Moreover, if S. corrupts the youth, he runs the risk of receiving something bad back from them (*Ap.* 25e), and, since nobody, if they know what is good, would desire something bad, S., or anybody else, in doing evil must be acting through ignorance. To know what is good is to do it. Where good people differ from bad is simply in their *knowledge* of what is best for them.

This intellectualist view of ethics, that knowing what one should do means doing it, and that failure to do what is right is the result of ignorance, can be distinguished from the belief that moral choice involves not only knowing what to do but also wanting to do it, a distinction that can be found in later Plato, such as *Republic*, in the sepa-

spawned a large bibliography; see, e.g., Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," and "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge"; Mackenzie, "The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance"; Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory*, 39ff.; Weiss, "Socrates: Seeker or Preacher?" Plato's systematic study of Socratic distinctions between knowledge (*episteme*) and belief (*doxa*) would take us well beyond the bounds of the dialogues discussed in this volume (see esp. *Grg.* 454cff., *Resp.* 476dff.).

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

ration within the individual of the opposing forces of intellect and desire. On this latter model, one can know what is good and what one should do, yet not do it, the knowledge of the good being overcome by desire.¹⁸ However, for Socrates in *Apology* and other early dialogues, this conflict is impossible.

It follows from this that values such as piety, bravery, justice, and the like are objects of knowledge (*epistēmē*) and that those who aspire to this knowledge may be said to possess expertise, in the form of a *technē*, or “skill,” just like individuals who practice a professional craft, such as doctors or musicians. And if they really have knowledge, on the argument above, they must necessarily do good to those on whom they exercise their skill. In *Apology*, in an exchange with Meletus, Socrates makes it clear that this moral expertise is not vouchsafed to most people (*Ap.* 25b–c).

If Socrates is not a self-confessed possessor of knowledge in the strict sense, he is, unlike other people, conscious of his ignorance and wishes to remedy the situation. This means carrying on with his careful investigation, at the behest of Apollo, of the beliefs of himself and others, *Ap.* 38a5: “The unexamined life is not fit for a man to live.” For S. the freedom to carry out such a search overrides all other considerations.

Socrates’ convictions concerning goodness aim at redefining the central Greek concept of *aretē* (excellence), closely identified in popular Greek thought with personal

¹⁸ See the discussion in *Resp.* 439eff., with the example of one Leontius, who is unable to resist a desire to look at the bodies of men who have been executed, despite knowing that this is wrong.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

prestige, power, and wealth. While not dismissing these things, he believes that what is more fundamental is the well-being of one's soul. As such, his reappraisal of "excellence," signified by *aretē*, might be better rendered as "goodness" or "virtue."¹⁹ In trying to make his fellow citizens examine themselves, and pay attention to goodness, S. claims that if he is successful, his activity will make them genuinely happy (*eudaimōn*), which is the greatest benefit he can bestow.²⁰ In the closing sections of *Apology* (40–42), and more extensively throughout *Phaedo*, S. extends this *eudaimonia* to the afterlife. The individual who has purified his soul throughout life can expect great happiness in the hereafter.

(iii) *Politics and Attitudes Toward Society*

In *Crito*, Socrates, in prison awaiting execution, hears Crito's impassioned appeal to him to contemplate escape as a choice that most people would urge on him and counters (46bff.), by stating that in looking for the right course, one should listen to the expert (see previous section) and not public opinion. In a state like Athens (the nearest thing to a democracy among the Greek city-states of the classical period), where major political decisions were taken by a massed Assembly, this would not, on the face of it, meet with approval. Yet, later in the dialogue, S., in citing obe-

¹⁹ Socratic *aretē* is discussed in more detail in Introduction to *Apology*, section 5 (ii). For the "soul," see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (ii).

²⁰ *Eudaimōn* = "happy," not in a psychological sense, but = "fortunate," "fulfilled."

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

dience to the Laws of Athens as his overriding reason for accepting the death sentence, appears to be taking respect for civic institutions to extraordinary lengths.²¹

In *Apology*, Socrates addresses the massed jury as a kind of “adversarial adviser,” characterizing himself as like a horsefly assigned by the god to sting the large thoroughbred horse that is Athens (30e). He also appropriates the key civic concept of *aretē* (excellence), traditionally associated with social position, wealth, reputation, and honor (29d–e), and reassigns it, as it were, to the cultivation of wisdom and truth (see previous section). Yet at the same time, in order to characterize his philosophical mission as a military order to remain at his post, he uses the kind of Homeric imagery that would be familiar to his audience of ordinary Athenian citizens (28c). He also emphasizes his military service, in which he served as a *hoplite* (heavily-armed foot soldier) (28e).

Thus Plato portrays Socrates as the unorthodox (see *Euthyphro*) and troublesome outsider, an *idiōtēs* (private citizen) keeping his distance from politics, but at the same time presents evidence that S. behaved in many vital respects (e.g., on military service) as a solid civic-minded citizen.

In the period leading up to Socrates’ trial and death, Athens suffered considerable political upheaval. Five years previously (404) the city had finally been defeated by the Spartans, after a twenty-seven year war, and was forced to demolish the city walls. This defeat was followed

²¹ For discussion of the ethical and political implications of *Crito*, see Introduction to *Crito*, sections 3 (iv) and 4.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

by a short-lived oligarchic coup (the "Thirty Tyrants"), during which the opposition removed itself to the Piraeus, the port of Athens. S. remained in Athens during this period, which may have rendered him politically suspect by the restored democracy, under which government he was eventually tried. There is also later evidence that he was also suspect as the teacher of the notoriously right-wing Critias, a leader and extreme member of the Thirty Tyrants, who was killed in the fighting that immediately preceded the fall of the regime.²²

The question of Socrates' political attitudes is therefore complex and may well be related to a degree of ambivalence within Plato's retrospective image of his master.²³

4. PLATO'S DIALOGUE FORM AND TRANSLATION

Unlike his predecessors, the Presocratics and Sophists, and his successor Aristotle in his principal surviving works, Plato wrote dialogues. As we have seen (above, section 2 (ii) and (iii)), composers of the *Sōkratikoī Logoi*, including Xenophon, also wrote dialogues, as did later imitators. It is likely that the dialogue form originated in the oral method of the historical Socrates, who wrote nothing but appears to have believed that progress in philosophy is made through mutual discussion between two

²² Plato was a relation of Critias (see Stemma: Plato, in Nails, 244).

²³ See further, Introduction to *Apology*, section 5 (iii).

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

or more individuals rather than through a philosophical treatise.²⁴

None of the other writers of dialogues, however, achieved the subtle interaction of characters and exchange of ideas that we find in Plato. The dialogue form in Plato is, therefore, in no way an ornamental facade, but rather an essential part of his creative purpose. This is reflected in his style: in “staging”²⁵ his dialogues, he makes full use of the intricacies and nuances of Greek prose style to convey not only ideas but emotions and relationships between characters.

The four dialogues in this volume raise in acute and practical form issues that have remained in the forefront of philosophical and, indeed, popular debate ever since; as such, they have attracted a large number of translators, aiming primarily at readers without knowledge of, or access to, the Greek (see General Bibliography). Our purpose is different: we operate on the assumption that our readers are interested in being able to refer across from translation to the text (or from text to translation), particularly important, for example, in the complex metaphysical discussions in the latter stages of *Phaedo*. We therefore attempt to keep closer to the Greek than the

²⁴ The adoption of the form may also have owed something to the dramatic interaction of characters in fifth-century Athenian tragedy; also the prose mimes of Sophron (Syracusan, 5th c.) may have suggested a realistic setting and a conversational style. See Rutherford, *The Art of Plato*, 11–12.

²⁵ It is not known whether any of the dialogues were ever actually performed in Plato's Academy or elsewhere; for a hypothetical reconstruction, see Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, 21–32.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

average standalone translation, consistent with clarity of meaning and acceptable English style. In particular, we have generally endeavored to consistently render value terms such as *aretē* (excellence, goodness) or *dikē* (justice), and other key concepts that occur in the course of the dialogues, with explanations where necessary, in footnotes.²⁶

In the translation and notes for each of the four dialogues, the names of the main speakers are abbreviated: S. (Socrates), E. (Euthyphro), C. (Crito), P. (Phaedo), E. (Echecrates).

5. THE TEXT

The text is based on the revised Oxford Classical Text, vol. I, 1995 (OCT²), by E. A. Duke et al. (W. S. M. Nicholl, ed., *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito*; J. C. G. Strachan, ed., *Phaedo*). Our text differs from OCT² on only one occasion (*Euthyphr.* 14c3–4). The variants flagged in notes to the text are confined to instances where a divergence in reading significantly affects translation or interpretation of the Greek. On the very few occasions when an issue of interpretation is at stake, we have included a footnote to the translation.

The system of reference to sections and lines of the Greek text is by page, letter, and number of the sixteenth-century edition of Stephanus, which is standard in almost all modern editions of Plato. Divisions within the num-

²⁶ On the assumption that not all users of this volume will wish to read all the dialogues, information concerning key words and subjects is occasionally duplicated in introductions and footnotes.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

bered sections are indicated at every fifth line by a vertical stroke (|); where the original lineation splits a word, the stroke appears after that word.

The following manuscripts of the four dialogues are cited in the textual notes; all dates are AD. For a comprehensive apparatus and detailed discussion of all relevant manuscripts and papyri, the Oxford Text should be consulted.

Family I β

B	Cod. Bodl. MS E. D. Clarke 39	AD 895
C	Cod. Tub. gr. Mb 14	11th c.
D	Cod. Ven. gr. 185	12th c.

Family II T

T	Cod. Ven. app. cl. 4.1	10th c.
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Family III δ


W	Cod. Vind. suppl. gr. 7	11th c.
S	Cod. Par. suppl. gr. 668	11th c.
V	Cod. Vat. gr. 225	12th c.?
Q	Cod. Par. gr. 1813	13th c.
Arm.	Versio Armeniaca	11th c. or earlier
P	Cod. Vat. Pal. gr. 173	10th–11th c.
Ven 511	Cod. Ven. gr. 511 (<i>Apol- ogy</i> 17a1–18a5)	14th c.
B ²	ancient corrector of B	end 9th c.
T ²	ancient corrector of T	end 10th c.?

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Papyrus

Π³ Pap. Oxy. 2181 (*Phaedo* 2nd c.
 frags. from 75a–117d)

In addition, on two occasions we include testimonia from Eusebius (3rd–4th c.) and Stobaeus (5th c.). We have also included, where appropriate, modern editorial conjectures.



CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S LIFE AND WORKS

The dates and order of composition of Plato's dialogues cannot be established with certainty. The events of his life, and, in particular, details of his visits to Sicily, depend to a large extent on *Letter 7*, which may or may not be genuine. On the order of dialogues, the following represents a general, but not universal, consensus that they can be divided into three broad periods: Early, Middle, and Late (omitting dialogues sometimes attributed to Plato, but generally regarded as not genuine). For differing approaches to questions of the chronology of Plato's dialogues, see, e.g., Brandwood, *Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*; Kahn, "On Platonic Chronology"; Ledger, *Recounting Plato*; Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*; Vlastos, *Socrates*.


- ca. 429** Birth of Plato from an old and wealthy Athenian family.
- 404** Defeat of Athens in the war with Sparta (the Peloponnesian War).
- 403** The rule of an oligarchic junta in Athens (the "Thirty Tyrants"), involving Plato's relatives, followed by the restoration of the democracy.

CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S LIFE AND WORKS

- 399** The trial, condemnation, and execution of Socrates on a charge of impiety: "not acknowledging the gods that the city acknowledges, but introducing new divinities and corrupting the youth."
- 390s–early 380s** Following the death of Socrates, Plato and other followers of Socrates withdraw from Athens to the nearby city of Megara. Plato travels extensively. Composition of the short Early Period dialogues: *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Lysis*.
- 389/8** Plato visits Italy and Sicily, probably in order to make contact with Pythagorean philosophers.
- ca. 387** Plato founds the Academy on the site of the shrine of the hero Academus in the northwest district of Athens.
- 380s** The later Early Period dialogues ("transitional"): *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, *Protagoras*.
- Late 380s** The Middle Period Dialogues: *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Phaedo*.
- 370s** The later Middle Period dialogues: *Parmenides*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*.
- 367** Plato visits Sicily for the second time at the invitation of Dion, uncle of the young Dionysius, ruler of Syracuse, possibly in the hope of influencing the government of the city. The attempt is unsuccessful.
- 360s–350s** The Late Period dialogues: *Critias*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus*.

CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S LIFE AND WORKS

- 361** Final visit to Sicily, ending again in failure to influence Dionysius.
- Late 350s** Final dialogue: *Laws*.
- 347** Death of Plato.



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
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EUTHYPHRO



INTRODUCTION

1. THE DRAMATIC SETTING

The precise date of the composition of *Euthyphro* is uncertain, as are the dates of all Plato's dialogues; but it can be placed among the short Early Period aporetic dialogues (dialogues with inconclusive outcome): *Charmides*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, usually dated to the period following Socrates' death (390s—early 380s).¹

Chronologically it is the first of the four works in this volume and marks the initial stages of the legal accusation against Socrates; the other works deal with his trial and its aftermath (*Apology*, *Crito*) up to his final day, which ended with his death by the drinking of hemlock (*Phaedo*). The setting of this dialogue is the Athenian Agora, the Stoa of the King Archon, the state official who presided over charges of a religious nature, in S.'s case impiety (*asebeia*); the year is 399. Following normal legal procedure, S. has been called to a preliminary hearing (*anakrisis*) of the charge against him and a confrontation with his accusers.² As with *Apology* we might expect a dramatization of this

¹ For division of dialogues into Early—Middle—Late, see *Chronology of Plato's Life and Works*.

² For details of the charge, its significance, and the legal procedure, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

hearing; but instead Plato presents a conversation between S. and another citizen, Euthyphro, who is also involved with a legal case of a religious nature. This conversation is presumed to take place outside the Stoa prior to the hearing.³ We can assume that in accordance with normal legal procedure, S.'s hearing actually took place, but Plato may well have invented this actual conversation in order to introduce his main subject, an attempt to define "the holy" (*to hosion*) and to explore philosophical aspects of religious belief.

This main subject is somewhat delayed: the first quarter of the dialogue is taken up with exchanges between the two speakers regarding their respective legal cases and the contrast between them: Socrates defending and Euthyphro prosecuting. It will be seen, however, that this initial conversation is not simply introductory, but has a close thematic connection with the argument that follows.

2. THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT

(i) *Euthyphro's Lawsuit*

Euthyphro has initiated a private prosecution for homicide (*dikē phonou*) against his father (3e8–4e3).⁴ While he and his father were farming on Naxos, a free laborer, a dependent of Euthyphro who worked for his keep (*pelatēs*), got drunk, took a knife to one of the household slaves, and

³ For the archaeological remains of the King's (Royal) Stoa, see Camp, *The Athenian Agora*, 100–105.

⁴ Although initiated by private citizens, the case against S. is, in contrast, a public prosecution (*graphē*); see *Euthyphr.* 2a5–6.

EUTHYPHRO

killed him. Euthyphro's father tied up the offender and threw him into a ditch, where he died of exposure. Euthyphro's prosecution is based on the claim that his father killed the man unlawfully, and that he, Euthyphro, is obliged to prosecute his father to purify both of them from the religious pollution (*miasma*) caused by his father's alleged crime.

Socrates' surprised reaction (4a7ff.) shows that Euthyphro's case is unusual in several respects:

1. Prosecution of one's father, whatever the pretext, went against Athenian instincts and conventions enshrined in laws against neglect or abuse of parents dating back to Solon, the sixth-century Athenian statesman. Euthyphro's father and relatives regard such a prosecution as itself impious (*anosion*) (4d5-e3).
2. It is not clear from 4b7-d5 whether Euthyphro's father could really be held directly responsible for the man's death. Euthyphro's relations believe that he is not responsible and that, even supposing he were, it is not necessary to be concerned with a man who was himself a murderer (4d9).
3. Socrates makes the conventional assumption (4b4-6) that the dead man must have been one of Euthyphro's household (*oikeios*) since it may not usually have been permitted under Athenian law for someone who was neither master nor relative of the deceased to initiate a prosecution for homicide (*dikē phonou*).⁵ As a *pelatēs* was technically free, but

⁵ On whether E. actually had the right to initiate a *dikē phonou* on behalf of a *pelatēs*, see Kidd, "The Case of Homicide in

bound to his employer by financial or other ties of obligation, it is not entirely clear in law whether he might come under Euthyphro's protection in this instance; but in any case, Euthyphro argues, whatever the status of the victim, he, Euthyphro, is polluted by his father's crime as sharing "hearth and board" (*sunestios kai homotrapezos*) with him (4b7-c1).

The circumstantial detail is so convincing that it is hard to remember that this may not be a real case. The apparent anachronism of introducing an incident on Naxos involving Athenian *klērouchoi* (citizens cultivating a portion of land [*klēros*] abroad) (4c4-5) five years after Naxos was lost by Athens (404) has been discussed in some detail,⁶ but we are in no position to estimate how far Plato's story might be based on any historical events, and we know very little about Euthyphro outside the pages of Plato.⁷

Plato has deliberately made the issue equivocal in order to throw doubt on Euthyphro's unhesitating belief that his case is straightforward. Euthyphro's certainty, however, not only leads naturally to Socrates' familiar starting point of questioning the self-styled "expert" (see *Ap.* 21cff.) but also signals the reader, even before the argument proper begins, that there are problems about holiness that

Plato's *Euthyphro*," who argues that he did, against MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law*, 11ff.; see further, Edwards, "In Defense of Euthyphro."

⁶ See Burnet, note on 4c4.

⁷ He is mentioned by S. at *Crat.* 396dff. (probably ironically) as an inspired seer. For the (scanty) historical information to be gathered on E., see Nails, 152-53.

EUTHYPHRO

are thrown up by everyday experience, for example, that it can be regarded as both holy *and* unholy to prosecute one's father. Euthyphro's failure to appreciate this point is underlined by S.'s ironical praise and desire to have *him* as his teacher. As such he, Euthyphro, and not S. should mount a convincing defense against the prosecutor Meletus at the forthcoming trial (see 5a3-b8).⁸

(ii) Popular Religious Belief

For Euthyphro, his conduct is sanctioned by the behavior of the gods as related in traditional myth by, for example, Hesiod (early 7th c.). If people agree that Zeus is the best and most just of all the gods, but at the same time believe that he punished his father for unjust treatment of *his* children (Hes. *Theog.* 154-82, 453ff.), then it must be just (*dikaion*) for Euthyphro to follow this precept and mete out harsh treatment for injustice to *his* father (6a1-6).

Greek religion contained an implicit tension between the all-powerful, but not necessarily virtuous, gods of Greek myth in Homer and Hesiod, and the idea of deities as ideally good and just. There is evidence as far back as the philosopher Xenophanes (late sixth century) of a critical attitude to mythical stories about the gods (see DK 21B11, Waterfield, 27). In the fifth century it was the story of Zeus punishing his father that led Aristophanes in his comedy *Clouds* (Ar. *Nub.* 904-6) to have a character point

⁸ Note the implications of E.'s name: in Greek, "*Euthuphrōn*" = "Straight thinker." For a more favorable assessment of E. as in some respects a theological progressive, and a corresponding playing down of S.'s ironical stance, see McPherran, "Justice and Pollution in *Euthyphro*," 1-22.

out the incongruity of believing that justice resides with a god who maltreated his father.⁹ Another way out of the dilemma taken, for example by Pindar (Theban lyric poet, 518–438), was to disbelieve the traditional stories, and so preserve the gods' moral authority (Pind. *Ol.* 1.82). Ambivalence about the morality of the gods is also a key feature of many of the plays of Euripides (ca. 485–406). Euthyphro's attitude, however, might be described in modern terms as "naïve fundamentalist"; he sees no problem in the inconsistency between gods' status as a moral paradigm and their reprehensible deeds. In Euthyphro's opinion his relatives are contradicting themselves by laying down one rule for the gods and another for him (6a4–6).

When asked to say what "the holy"¹⁰ is, initially Euthyphro comes up with two successive answers. It is:

1. [such actions as] prosecuting a wrongdoer whether it involves murder, or the theft of sacred objects or committing any other crime of a similar kind (5d9–10);
2. "Something that the gods love (6e11–7a1)," later amended by Socrates for the sake of argument to "whatever all the gods love" (9d1–5).

Although swiftly demolished by Socrates (see below), these definitions represent how the average Athenian would be likely to respond to his question. "Piety" or respect for "the holy" consisted in behaving toward the gods

⁹ *Clouds* was produced in 423. On this play's relevance to the historical S., see General Introduction, section 2 (i).

¹⁰ For this formulation of the concept in Greek, see *Euthyphro*, trans. n. 20.

EUTHYPHRO

in a way that would meet with their approval (i.e., what they love, or approve of) and avoiding sacrilegious acts.¹¹

Socrates' own attitude toward the gods is harder to pin down. Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.1.2), in attempting to defend his S. against the charge of impiety, is at pains to present him as impeccably orthodox in performing sacrifices in public and in private.¹² In *Apology*, Plato's S. strives to distance himself from what Athenians might see as the atheistic implications of the teaching of sophists and natural scientists in whose company Aristophanes has placed him in *Clouds*, by claiming this association was the source of a long-standing slander (*diabolē*) against him that was behind the prosecution (see *Ap.* 19a8ff.). In his reaction to Euthyphro's prosecution of his father, S. initially takes a cautiously skeptical line on the truth of the traditional stories about the gods and even questions myths associated with the sacred robe in the procession carried to the Acropolis at the festival of the Great Panathenaia (6a7–c4), only then to shelve the topic rather abruptly (c8–9) in order to progress to what he really wants to talk about: defining "the holy" in order to "know" what it is. Success in this enterprise is, he maintains, the way in which he will show his accusers and the jury that he is not impious: to know what is holy, just and good, is to do it (on "virtue is knowledge"; see General Introduction, section 3 (ii)).

¹¹ On popular attitudes to piety in fifth-century Athens, see, e.g., Dover, 246ff., McPherran, "Socratic Religion," 112–14.

¹² Plato also, at the very end of *Phaedo*, has S. order Crito to dedicate a cock to Asclepius, 118a7–8 (the dedication to the god of healing suggesting he shares the conventional hope that he will awake cured in the next life).

3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS

(i) The Context

Although oblivious of the fact, Euthyphro has put himself in an awkward position by claiming that he has precise knowledge about what constitutes piety and impiety (4e9–5a2). Taking him at his word, Socrates subjects him to a cross-examination known as the *elenchus* (“examination” or “scrutiny”). On this basis the argument proceeds, with S. always taking care to secure agreement to his suggestions before passing on. So, on one level the investigation can be seen as a positive cooperative venture, and the final result is the mutually agreed outcome of all the steps that have preceded it.

There is, however, another side to this agreement. One of Socrates’ commonest methods of argument is to lure his associate into an admission that he has contradicted himself (e.g., 15c5–10).¹³ This state of intellectual perplexity is called *aporia* (“failure to find a way through” the argument). When this difficulty is not resolved at the end of the dialogue by either of them, it receives the modern conventional classification “aporetic.”¹⁴ An important aspect of this *aporia* is Socrates’ “ignorance.”¹⁵ In *Euthyphro* he claims that any wisdom he might possess is acci-

¹³ S. typically treats his opponents’ (often less than convincing) “agreement” as their mutual ownership of the argument (for an example see *Euthyphro*, trans. 6d11 and n. 27).

¹⁴ For the question of whether the dialogue may actually imply a positive answer to S.’s attempt to reach a definition of “the holy,” see below, section 3 (ii) (d).

¹⁵ On this see the General Introduction, section 3 (i)

EUTHYPHRO

dental ("I'm wise despite myself," he says at 11d7). To use a metaphor from a much later Platonic dialogue, *Theaetetus*, S. is the midwife who, though himself barren, assists others to give birth to their ideas and tests them for signs of life (*Theaet.* 149ff). For those at the sharp end of S.'s questioning, the metaphors are less positive: he is the "stingray," a fish that benumbs all who touch it (*Meno* 80a) or, as he says at his trial (*Ap.* 30e4-6), he is the horsefly that stings Athens, the large, lazy, thoroughbred horse. Here, Euthyphro ruefully accepts the suggestion that their arguments are like the creations of Daedalus, whose sculptures were endowed with the power of movement (11b9-e1). There is a dispute over which of them is Daedalus: that is, which of them is responsible for the shifting around of the arguments and ultimately the discovery that they appear to have gone round in a circle (15b7-c3).

(ii) *The Arguments*

(a) Initial Attempts to Find a "Characteristic" (*Eidos*) of All Instances of "the Holy"¹⁶

Socrates asks Euthyphro what sort of thing he claims the holy and unholy to be (5c8-d5); in asking this, he makes it clear that what he is looking for is a definition that is

¹⁶ At this stage of Plato's development, *eidos* should be regarded as (in modern terms) an "immanent" characteristic (following Aristotle, *Metaph.* 987a32-b7, 1078b30, 1086a32-b7) rather than as the separable "Form" it became in the Middle Period dialogues, e.g., *Phaedo* 74ff. On the use of *eidos* before Plato and his own "nontechnical" use, see Emlyn-Jones, *Euthyphro*, Appendix, 99).

adequate to call all examples of “the holy” by that name. It must also exclude any examples that fail to meet the criteria laid down by the definition.

On these strict criteria, it is therefore hardly surprising that Euthyphro’s first attempt fails (5d8–e2 and 6c8–e2). In listing examples of holy and unholy actions, he has failed to understand what sort of definition Socrates is trying to find.¹⁷

However, Euthyphro’s second attempt (6e11–7a1), “something that the gods love is holy and what they do not love is unholy,” is more successful, especially when emended by Socrates to (9d1–6) “whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever is loved by them is holy.” This definition, which now excludes, for the sake of argument, the problem of divine disputes (8a10ff), Euthyphro believes to be correct, and it does appear, finally, to meet S.’s criteria—what the gods unanimously love is sufficient and necessary: it encompasses all that is holy and is necessary in order to define it; and it excludes all things that the gods do not love or are in dispute over. So, why do they have to go any further?

(b) Does the Gods’ Love Actually Define the Holy?

Socrates is not so easily satisfied, however. The definition is in the correct form, and it would probably have been

¹⁷ Whether E. is being given a fair hearing here, and whether S.’s strict criteria are actually required for a definition, has however been disputed, notably in a influential article by Geach, “Plato’s *Euthyphro*, 369–82. Geach questions whether S.’s search for a single characteristic is an appropriate or even necessary strategy in order to say truthfully that you know what “the holy” is.

EUTHYPHRO

accepted unhesitatingly by most Athenians; but is it true? Does the gods' love *define* the holy in the strict sense that S. requires? As he puts it, to Euthyphro's initial mystification (10a2-4), is what is holy loved by the gods *because* it is holy or is it holy *by virtue of the fact that* it is loved by the gods? In the latter case, the gods' love defines "the holy," and we need go no further, as it conforms to Euthyphro's second definition above; in the former case, however, it is merely an incidental characteristic (the gods *happen to love* the holy). If we then ask what holiness actually is (i.e., its *defining* characteristic), we have to investigate further. In 11a8-9, S. explicitly distinguishes the "essence" (*ousia*) of "the holy" (according to S., not yet found) from an "attribute" (*pathos*), in this case, the love of (all) the gods. The holy and what is loved by the gods may coincide, but they cannot, strictly speaking, be identical.

In order to demonstrate that the gods' love does not *define* "the holy," in 10a1-11b1 S. employs an argument that takes the form of a sequence that became known in Aristotelian logic (*Metaph.* 178b27-30) as an *epagōgē*, a "leading on," or, as we would say, a presentation of a series of analogies, leading logically to a conclusion.¹⁸ In arguing for the gods' love as an incidental characteristic of the holy, Socrates is trying to secure agreement that, in any given case, an activity is causally prior to the state that results from that activity. So he gives a series of examples: just as the state of being carried is a result of the activity of carrying, so the state of being loved is the result of the activity of loving. It follows, S. claims, that this relationship is not reciprocal: an activity cannot depend on the state. So

¹⁸ Not actually an inductive argument in modern terms: see Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 267-69.

what the gods love is in a state of being loved because it is being loved by them (just as something is a carried object because it is being carried, and so on); it is not the case that the gods love what they love because it is in a state of being loved. But "the holy" does not behave in the same way; the state of holiness, so S. argues, does not depend on the activity of the gods' love. But, if this is so, holiness cannot be defined as "what the gods love." They may well all *happen to love* the holy, but for a *definition* of this "object of love" we must look elsewhere.¹⁹

There has been criticism of Socrates' argument here from the point of view of logic: there are ambiguities in the supposed relationship between activity and state in the examples of S.'s *epagōgē*. The connection implied by the use of "because," "for the reason that" (*dioti*: 10b1, etc.) is unclear; rather than stating a causal relationship, it can simply indicate that state and activity are merely different aspects of, or ways of describing, the same thing.²⁰ It might

¹⁹ For the detailed argument, see *Euthyphro*, trans. 10a5–11b5 and n. 38. Theologians and philosophers, including St. Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz, have debated the influential "*Euthyphro* problem": the issue of whether it is meaningful to describe something as good simply because it is God's will (pleasing to God), or whether an adequate account of a moral judgment must include a standard of goodness and badness which is, in logic at least, independent of God's will (for a concise account of the issue, see Flew, *An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, 26ff.).

²⁰ See Geach, "Plato's *Euthyphro*," 31, and further, Benson, *Socratic Wisdom*, 59–62; Cohen, "Socrates on the Definition of Piety"; and Paxson, "Plato's *Euthyphro* 10a–11b." The distinction between state and activity is sometimes quite hard to maintain in Greek, since *pheronomenon esti* (it is [in a state of being] carried)

EUTHYPHRO

also be doubted whether “being loved” is, strictly speaking, parallel to “being carried,” etc. (10c7ff.); the latter implies movement and alteration of position, the former does not. However, Euthyphro, predictably, does not protest, and the argument is sufficient, at this stage of the dialogue, to carry S.’s key contention that defining “the holy” in terms of the gods’ love is inadequate by the strict criteria he lays down.

(c) An Attempt at a Third Series of Definitions

The following short interlude (11b6–e4), in which Socrates and a bemused Euthyphro spar with each other as to which of them is responsible for the shifting of the arguments, is a dramatic device common to a number of dialogues, nowhere more appropriate than here, as a brief respite for the reader/listener after the complexities of the previous argument. The interlude also marks a change in S.’s style of argument (from 11e4 onward). Having drawn a blank so far, in the second part of the attempt to define “the holy,” S. adopts the tactic of trying to define a general area within which the concept is located and then attempting to narrow down its precise place within that area.

His first suggestion is that all the holy must be *dikaion* (just, right) but that it is not the case that all *dikaion* is holy; some is and some is not (11e7–12d4). So the next

is often used in later Plato indistinguishably from *pheretai* (it is carried—see, e.g., *Laws* 822e: *tithemenous einai* for *tithesthai*, [“laws] in a state of having been enacted/having been enacted.” See Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 4:105n2, for further examples from Plato).

step is to try and define what particular place the holy occupies within this larger category of *dikaion*. Euthyphro accordingly offers a definition (12e6–9): the holy is that part of *dikaion* concerned with *therapeia*, “attendance on” the gods. Socrates then attempts to clarify *therapeia* by citing the analogy of the everyday skill of husbandry: attendance on animals implies acting for the good of the object of care, that is, making them better. It follows from this that human *therapeia* would make the gods better. But human “attendance on” the gods cannot succeed in making the gods better, for how could mere mortals do that?

Having drawn a blank with this definition, Socrates then proceeds to suggest to Euthyphro another aspect of *therapeia*, *hupēretikē* (service to [gods]), for example, the relationship of slaves to masters. After some discussion, this is defined by S. as a relationship of mutual service, an *epistēmē* (science) of asking and giving, a “skill of trading” (*emporikē technē*) between gods and men (13d5–14e7). But while it is obvious what benefits humans gain from gods in the trade-off, what benefits, S. asks rhetorically, could the gods receive in return? Euthyphro’s answer, that humans give the gods honor, esteem, and gratitude, leads S. to conclude that, since these gifts do not benefit the gods, they must be acceptable by virtue of being dear to the gods. So holiness (by Euthyphro’s last definition of holiness as “service to the gods”) is, once again, what the gods love (14e10–15b6), a definition already disposed of earlier in the dialogue (10e10ff.). However, Euthyphro has to go elsewhere urgently with S.’s reproaches ringing in his ears, that he is not to learn from Euthyphro the vital

EUTHYPHRO

knowledge about the holy that will enable him to face his accusers in court (15b–end).

(d) The Conclusion

Euthyphro is frequently held up as a classic example of an aporetic dialogue (a discussion in which the participants fail to reach their objective; they can see “no way through”). That Socrates and Euthyphro do not explicitly reach a positive conclusion is self-evident, since S. finally says as much (15c8–end). Whether any positive conclusion may be implied is less clear. The problem turns, to a great extent, on the interpretation of 12e6–14c1. At 12e6–9, when Euthyphro defines the holy as *therapeia* with respect to the gods, S.’s answer at 12e10–13a1 comprises praise of Euthyphro followed by the comment that he is “still short of one minor thing.”²¹ Further investigation reveals the nature of this “minor thing”: redefining the relationship of humans to gods as *hupēretikē* (service [to the gods]: 13d8), they reach the question that is troubling S.—what on earth is that *pankalon ergon* (splendid work) that the gods achieve using our service? (13e11–13). This question might be taken as rhetorical, implying the absurdity of the query (i.e., “there is no splendid *ergon* the gods could possibly need *our* help to accomplish!”). On the other hand, it has been suggested that S. is here sincerely asking for an answer, the implication being there is a *pankalon ergon* that gods and humans can jointly accomplish, and they are on the brink of identifying it.

²¹ S.’s ironic characterization of a major objection as a “minor thing” can be found elsewhere, e.g., *Prt.* 328e4.

In reducing the human-divine exchange to the level of a “skill of trading” (*emporikē technē*), Socrates appears at the last minute to be veering away from “service to the gods” as a correct definition of “the holy.” Euthyphro’s answer, that the gifts we give the gods as service to assist them in their *pankalon ergon* are honor and reverence, does not necessarily deserve S.’s summary dismissal at 15b4–5. If the end of *Euthyphro* is considered in relation to *Apology* (a version of S.’s defense at his trial, which, chronologically, must closely follow the encounter with Euthyphro), S. might claim, as he does in *Apology*, that his search for “the holy” is his “‘service’ to the god.”²² This service, his mission, is to question fellow citizens from a standpoint of ignorance, following a pronouncement by the Delphic oracle that there was no one wiser than himself (see *Ap.* 30a6–7). Yet, as mere mortals, none of us (not even S.) can discover the whole truth about the *pankalon ergon*, for the accomplishment of which we can offer the gods any assistance.²³ Hence, S.’s apparent forcing of a negative conclusion, at least at this stage of Plato’s Socratic investigation.

4. EUTHYPHRO IN CONTEXT

Where Plato’s Socrates is concerned, we must always be aware of the long shadow cast by his imminent prosecu-

²² At *Ap.* 30a7 to describe his service to the god, S. uses the nominal form (*hupēresia*) of the adjectival term for the “art of service” (*hupēretikē*) featured here (13d8).

²³ See McPherran, “Socratic Piety in the *Euthyphro*,” 292; Taylor, “The End of the *Euthyphro*.”

EUTHYPHRO

tion. Despite the apparently negative conclusion to the dialogue, it is part of Plato's purpose in *Euthyphro* to create the memory of S. not as a laughable eccentric, as the Athenians viewed Euthyphro, as he himself admits (3b9–c3), or as a dangerous subversive, but as a man who, contrary to the claim of his prosecutors, genuinely cared about "the holy" (*to hosion*), an impression only strengthened further by the transparent irony with which S. places the unsuspecting Euthyphro in the role of teacher.

To this end, Plato has presented Socrates as a figure with something of a dual personality, which may reflect an amalgamation of Plato's retrospective portrait with the historical figure: on the one hand as a man of conventional piety toward the gods (he is genuinely surprised at Euthyphro's lawsuit), but whose questioning attitude nevertheless shows that, unlike Euthyphro the self-styled expert and the mass of his fellow citizens, he has thought seriously about such matters, and he is not afraid of exploring unconventional ideas. In this way *Euthyphro* foreshadows the tensions that come fully to light in *Apology* and *Crito*.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

- 2 ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οὔσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί. |

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν.

- b ΕΥΘ. Τί φῆς; γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε. |

ΕΥΘ. Τίς οὔτος;

¹ The Lyceum, a gymnasium in the precinct of Apollo Lykeios (just outside the city boundary to the east) was S.'s regular haunt, see *Euthyd.* 271a, *Symp.* 223d8, as was the Athenian Agora (*Ap.* 17c8, *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.10).

² The king Archon was the public official presiding over Athenian religious affairs. The Stoa Basileios (King's Stoa) has been identified as a small building, excavated in 1970 by the American

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO SOCRATES

EUTHYPHRO: What on earth has happened, Socrates, 2
to make you of all people abandon your usual haunts in
the Lyceum,¹ and here you are hanging around the King's
Stoa? I can't imagine you too have a lawsuit before the
King Archon just as I have.²

SOCRATES: Oh no, Euthyphro, the Athenians don't
call this a lawsuit, but an indictment.³

E. What do you mean? Someone has brought an in- b
dictment against you, I take it. I will never accuse you of
bringing one against someone else.

S. No, indeed I wouldn't.

E. It's the other way round then?

S. Precisely.

E. Who is it?

School at Athens, situated in the northwest Agora, near the Pan-
athenaic Way, as described by Pausanias, 1.3.1 (2nd c. AD). E.'s
surprise is to see S. at this particular building, since he has steered
clear of litigation throughout his life.

³ For the significance of the charge against S. as a *graphē*
(public indictment), as opposed to a *dikē* (private suit), the nature
of the charge, and the general historical and legal background to
S.'s trial, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γινώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνῶς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιθεύς, λέει τινα νῶ ἔχεις Πιθθέα Μέλητον οἶον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γρα-
c φήν σε γέγραπται;

ΣΩ. Ἦντινα; οὐκ ἀγενηῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον
ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν.
ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι δια-
φθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς. | καὶ
κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατ-
ιδῶν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται
κατηγορήσων μου ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πό-
λιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι
d ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆ-
ναι ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγα-

⁴ On the identity of Meletus, see Nails, 202. The deme of Pitthus lay to the northeast of Athens.

⁵ A reference to one of the two charges in the *antōmosia* (formal charge), to answer which S. is at the Stoa for a preliminary hearing. S. consistently regarded the charge of corrupting the youth as the more serious of the two elements in the indictment (on the details of which, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4).

⁶ “Smart” = *sophos* (wise), a word that can have a pejorative connotation, as here and, with an ironic connotation with regard to E., see 4b1–2.

EUTHYPHRO

S. I hardly know the fellow at all myself, Euthyphro. I get the impression he's young and unknown, but as I understand it, they say his name is Meletus. He's from the deme of Pitthus, if you can recall anyone from Pitthus called Meletus who has straight hair, not much of a beard, oh, and a bit of a hooked nose.⁴

E. I can't think of anyone, Socrates, but tell me, what's this indictment he's brought against you? c

S. The indictment? No trivial one, it seems to me. It's no mean achievement for a youngster to have got his head round such a major question. He's the one, so he claims, who knows how the young are being corrupted and who are the ones corrupting them.⁵ And he's probably a smart fellow,⁶ and having spotted the fact that in my ignorance I'm corrupting his peers, he's coming to bring the charge against me before the city just like a child running to its mother. Again he seems to me to be the only one starting his political career in the right way. You see it's right first to look after⁷ the young so that they turn out as well as possible, just as it makes sense for a good farmer to look after his young plants first and then everything else after d

⁷ "Look after": Plato repeats forms of the Greek *melō* (care for); see *epimelēthēnai* 2d2, and see also d4, 3a3). S. makes punning use of Meletus' name as the man whose name (Meletus) suggests one that "cares for" the city (for S.'s use of the pun in direct confrontation with Meletus, see *Ap.* 24c8, d4; 26b2). While ostensibly commending Meletus for his diligence and public spirit, the whole speech (2c2–3a5) is riddled with words and phrases having an ironical nuance that undercuts this impression. E.'s reply (3a6ff.) shows that he does not perceive the irony (see also E.'s retort to S. at 5b9–c3).

- 3 θὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς συμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξάμενῳ. |

ΕΤΘ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρρωδῶ μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται· ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ' ἐστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καὶ μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

- b ΣΩ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὡς φησιν. |

- ΕΤΘ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα,

⁸ In choosing here to give prominence to the part of the indictment that emphasizes religious heterodoxy, S. anticipates the main theme of the dialogue. For S.'s direct answer to this charge in court, see Ap. 26b3–28a2.

EUTHYPHRO

that. And so perhaps Meletus too is clearing out first those 3
of us who are blighting the young shoots, as he claims.
Following this then, it's clear that when he's taken care of
the older ones, he'll be responsible for bringing very many
of the greatest good things to the city, as at least is likely
to happen when you begin from such a starting point.

E. I should hope so, Socrates, but I'm afraid the op-
posite may happen. You see in trying to do you an injustice,
it really seems to me that by starting, as it were, at its very
heart, he's harming the city. And tell me, what is it he says
you're doing that corrupts the young?

S. Strange things, my good friend, at least when you b
hear it put like this. You see the reasons he's indicting me
are that I'm an inventor of deities and I create newfangled
gods and don't acknowledge the old ones, so he claims.⁸

E. I see, Socrates; presumably because you yourself
say that your divine sign comes upon you from time to
time. And so he has brought this indictment on the basis
that you're breaking new ground in the matter of religion
and so he's coming to court intending to misrepresent you
knowing that this is easy to do with the common crowd.⁹
And indeed from my own experience, whenever I address c
the Assembly¹⁰ on religious matters and predict to them
what's going to happen, they laugh at me as if I'm mad,
and although nothing of what I've told them by way of

⁹ S.'s "divine sign" (*to daimonion*), his personal guardian spirit, is assumed by E. to be the ostensible basis of the charge, as S. also suggests at *Ap.* 31d1-5 (a connection also made by *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.2 and *Ap.* 12).

¹⁰ The sovereign political body in fifth-/fourth-century Athens; all male citizens were entitled to attend.

καταγελώσιν ὡς μαινομένον· καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶρηκα ὧν προείπον, ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι. |

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν
d δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμούνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πᾶν ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν | καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτιπερ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἠδέως εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον,
e μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, | ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν· εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, | ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιῇ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

¹¹ S. elsewhere (e.g., *Ap.* 33a6) claims he never taught anyone; here he is saying only that the Athenians may think he does. At *Ap.* 23c2ff. S. fixes on the imitation of his investigative question-

EUTHYPHRO

prediction has been untrue, still they disparage all people like us. Anyway, we mustn't worry about any of this: just face up to them.

S. But my dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is probably no big deal. You see it seems to me that the Athenians aren't terribly bothered if they think someone is clever, that is, provided he's not in the business of teaching his own wisdom. But with anyone they think is also influencing others to be like him, they get angry either out of resentment in fact, as you say, or for some other reason.¹¹ d

E. Actually, how they feel about me in this regard, I'm not very interested in finding out.

S. Perhaps it's because you appear to be reluctant to put yourself forward and unwilling to explain your own wisdom to them. But as for me, I'm afraid they'll think that, as a result of my love of my fellow human beings, I say whatever I have to say to everyone indiscriminately, not only free of charge,¹² but also I'd happily give something if anyone is willing to listen to me. So, as I was saying just now, if they were to make fun of me in the way you say they make fun of you, then it wouldn't be at all unpleasant to spend the time in the trial having some fun and laughs. But if they're going to take it seriously, then it won't be clear how things will turn out except to prophets like yourself. e

E. Well perhaps it won't come to anything, Socrates. Anyway, I'm sure you'll contest your case according to your own ideas, and I think I too will conduct mine in my own way.

ing by the well-placed youth of Athens as a root cause of the resentment. ¹² Unlike the sophists, Plato's S. had the reputation of not charging for what he offered (*Ap.* 19e1, 33b).

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτήν ἢ διώκεις;

ΕΥΘ. Διώκω. |

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

4 ΕΥΘ. Ὅν διώκων ἀ¹ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὦν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος; |

ΕΥΘ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥΘ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις. ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε
b τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς¹ αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΥΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; | ἢ δήλα δή; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξῆσθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέρειν εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεὼς, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας

¹ ὀρθῶς secl. Burnet

EUTHYPHRO

S. Oh yes, what *is* this lawsuit¹³ of yours, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

E. Prosecuting.

S. Whom?

E. Again, a man they think I'm mad to prosecute. 4

S. What? Are you after someone with wings?¹⁴

E. Ha! He's far from flying; he's actually really rather old.

S. Who is this?

E. My father.

S. Your *own father*, you excellent fellow!

E. Yes, that's right.

S. So what's the *charge* and what's the *suit* about?

E. Murder, Socrates.

S. Heracles! I suppose, Euthyphro, that most people are ignorant of what on earth the right course is. You see I don't think just anybody could rightly act like this, but someone already far advanced in wisdom. b

E. Yes indeed, very far advanced, by Zeus, Socrates.

S. Well is the man killed by your father a member of your household? Obviously he must be, as I can't imagine you'd be prosecuting him for the murder of someone outside the household.

E. It's ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it makes a difference whether the dead man is from outside or inside the household, but that you don't have to watch out solely

¹³ *Dikē*: see above, n. 3. For details of E.'s lawsuit and the social and religious implications, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 2 (i).

¹⁴ S. introduces a proverbial phrase: "to chase a bird on the wing," and plays on the technical and nontechnical meanings of *diōkō* ("prosecute" and "pursue").

- εἶτε μή, καὶ εἰ | μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, εἶαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι,
 c εἶανπερ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ἦ·
 ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίasma γίνεται ἐὰν συνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ
 συνειδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ
 δίκῃ ἐπεξιῶν. ἐπεὶ ὁ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἦν
 ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωροῦμεν ἐν τῇ | Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ
 παρ' ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν
 τιμῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν. ὁ οὖν πατήρ
 συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, κατα-
 βαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσό-
 μενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὅτι χρεῖη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ
 d χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὀλιγῶρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς ἀν-
 δροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν πρᾶγμα εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι, ὅπερ
 οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν· ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρίγους καὶ τῶν
 δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξ-
 ηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. | ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ τε
 πατήρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκέοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφό-
 νου τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξέρχομαι οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι,
 ὡς φασιν ἐκείνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀν-
 δροφόνον γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δέιν φρον-
 e τίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου—ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑὸν
 πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξιέναι—κακῶς εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

¹⁵ I.e., E. wishes to deny that the distinction between “household” (*oikeios*) and “nonhousehold/stranger” (*allogrios*) is relevant to the question of whether or not a relative of the slayer incurs pollution. On the detailed circumstances of E.’s case and the issues involved, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 2 (i).

EUTHYPHRO

for whether the slayer slew lawfully or not, and if it was lawful, let him go and if not, prosecute, even if the slayer shares your hearth and board. You see the pollution is just as great if you knowingly associate with such a person and don't cleanse both yourself and the other man by taking him to court.¹⁵ Although in point of fact, the dead man was a hired laborer of mine, and as we were farming on Naxos, that's where he worked for us. Now, having got himself drunk he flew into a rage with one of our household slaves and cut his throat. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to ask an adviser¹⁶ what he should do. In the meantime he disregarded the man he'd had tied up, and paid no attention to him as a murderer and thought it would be of no importance even if he died, which is just what did in fact happen. For through hunger, cold and being tied up he died before the messenger returned from the adviser. So this is actually why both my father and the rest of the household are angry, because I'm prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of the murderer. Either my father didn't kill him, they're saying, or, even if there were not the slightest doubt that he had killed him, given that the dead man was a murderer, one shouldn't worry about such a person, for they believe it's unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder—little knowing, Socrates, what the position of divine law is over what is holy and what is unholy.

¹⁶ An *exēgētēs* (adviser, interpreter) was an elected state official whose function was to expound and interpret religious matters, especially those concerning cases of pollution.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ᾧ Εὐθύφρων, οὕτως ἰ ἀκριβῶς οἶε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων ὅπῃ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβῆ ἰ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρὶ ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῷ ἂν διαφέρῃ Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδέην.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μοι, ᾧ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῶ γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς ἰ Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλείσθαι αὐτόν, λέγοντα ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεία περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναί, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα
 b σός—“καὶ εἰ μὲν, ᾧ Μέλητε,” φαίνῃ ἂν, “Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκείνον δὲ νοθετοῦντί τε καὶ ἰ κολάζοντι”—καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἂ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν;

¹⁷ “challenge . . . before the trial”: *prokaleisthai* (challenge) is a technical legal term referring to the impending preliminary hearing (*anakrasis*). Such challenges and their acceptance or refusal would be recorded and used at the trial proper. Here S. is imagining his challenge as being formally issued to Meletus in

EUTHYPHRO

S. Zeus! Do you really think, Euthyphro, that your knowledge of the position of the divine laws, both as to what is holy and what is unholy, is so precise that, given these things have happened as you say, you're not afraid that in bringing your father to court it's not you in fact who will turn out to be committing an unholy deed?

E. Yes, for I'd be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be no different at all from the majority of people if I didn't have a precise knowledge of all such matters. 5

S. So is it best, my good Euthyphro, for me to become your pupil and challenge Meletus on these very points before the trial¹⁷ by saying that even in the past I myself thought it important to know the divine laws, and now, since *he* claims that by talking irresponsibly and breaking new ground I'm in error as regards the divine, I have indeed become your pupil? "And if, Meletus," I'd say, "you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, then consider me to be right in my thinking too, and drop the case. If not, then get a writ against him, my teacher, rather than me on the grounds that he corrupts his elders, both me and his own father, me by his teaching and his father by admonishing and punishing him." And if he doesn't do as I say and drop the case, or prosecute you instead of me, should I repeat at the trial the points on which I had already challenged him?¹⁸ b

circumstances in which a refusal would weaken the credibility of the latter's case.

¹⁸ In this long, rambling speech (formally a question and an unbroken sentence in the Greek), S. ostensibly takes E.'s claim of expertise at face value and claims that the person Meletus should really be prosecuting is E., "S.'s teacher."

ΕΥΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχει-
 ρήσεις γράφεσθαι, εὐροίμ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός
 c ἔστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος
 ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων
 | μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος
 πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὀρᾶν,
 ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥαδίως κατεῖδεν ὥστε ἀσε-
 βείας ἐγράφατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι ὁ νυνδὴ
 σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζου, ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῆς
 d εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων; ἢ οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ
 αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐτῷ τοῦ μὲν ὀσίου παντὸς ἐνα-
 ντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινα ἰδέαν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον
 εἶναι; |

ΕΥΘ. Πάντως δῆπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δῆ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνό-
 σιον;

ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ
 νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνοισι ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν
 κλοπᾶς ἢ | τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπ-

¹⁹ At 4e9-5a2.

²⁰ Plato's manner of expressing the question indicates what the remainder of the dialogue takes for granted—that reverence (literally, “the pious,” etc.) must be some “thing.” *To eusebes* (definite article + neuter adjective = “the pious [thing]”) is synonymous here with *to hosion* (= “the holy” in d2).

EUTHYPHRO

E. Zeus, yes! Socrates; if indeed he were to try to indict me, I'd discover, I think, where his weakness lies and the line of argument in court would be much more likely to be about him than about me. c

S. And realizing this I tell you, my good friend, I'm keen to become your pupil, knowing that this fellow Meletus, along with others, no doubt, doesn't even seem to see you, but he has so shrewdly and easily marked me down that he has indicted me for impiety. So now in Zeus' name tell me what you affirmed only just now you know clearly:¹⁹ what kind of a thing are reverence and irreverence²⁰ as regards murder and as regards other things? Is what is holy not the same, identical with itself, in every action,²¹ and again isn't what is unholy entirely the opposite of the holy, identical with itself, everything that is to be characterized as unholy having a single characteristic in respect of its unholiness?²² d

E. Completely so, in my view, Socrates.

S. Tell me then, what do you say the holy and the unholy are?

E. Well I say that the holy is doing what I'm now doing, prosecuting a wrongdoer whether it involves murder, or the theft of sacred objects or committing any other crime

²¹ Note the emphasis on *actions* rather than beliefs, reflecting the ambivalence of *nomizō* ("acknowledge" or "believe in" [the gods]) in the indictment against S. (see Introduction to *Apology* section 4.

²² On the philosophical implications of S.'s request for a definition and E.'s attempts at answering, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) (a).

- e εξιέναι, εάντε πατήρ ὢν τυγχάνη εάντε μήτηρ εάντε ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει—ὁ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν | τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὅστισοῦν τυγχάνη ὢν. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιοτάτον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι ὅτι τοὺς ὑεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, ἀκείνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ | οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

- ΣΩ. Ἄρα γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐ οὐνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; διὸ δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσῃ | τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ b σοὶ ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ τῷ εἶδότη περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἳ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναί; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίον, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγῆ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεμέναι; |

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

23 I.e., Cronus had castrated *his* father, Uranus. For the stories, see Hesiod (*Theog.* 154–82 and 453ff.). These violent struggles of successive generations of gods were much quoted in the later sixth and fifth centuries (e.g., by Xenophanes the Presocratic

EUTHYPHRO

of a similar kind, whether they happen to be my father, or e
mother, or anyone else whosoever; and, on the other hand,
not to prosecute is unholy. Since, see, Socrates, how deci-
sive is the proof I'm about to give you, that this is how the
law stands—which I've already explained to other people,
that this would be the right way to act: not to give way to
anyone impious, no matter who it may be. You see the very
people who actually believe that Zeus is the best and most 6
just of the gods, also admit that that he put his own father
in chains because he devoured his children without justifi-
cation, and that god in his turn had castrated his own fa-
ther for other similar deeds.²³ And yet they're angry with
me because I'm prosecuting my father for breaking the law
and thus they're contradicting themselves both with re-
gard to the gods and to me.

S. So can this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I'm de-
fending this indictment, because whenever anyone says
things like this about the gods, somehow I find it difficult
to accept them? I suppose that must be why someone will
say I'm making a mistake. Well now, if you, with a good b
understanding of such things, also agree in approving
these beliefs, it seems that people like me have to go along
with them as well. For what shall those of us say, who
admit that we ourselves know nothing about these mat-
ters? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you truly
believe this is how things happened?

E. Yes, and there are things even more wonderful than
these that the majority of people know nothing about.

philosopher, Aeschylus and Euripides, tragedians) to cast doubt
on the *moral integrity of the gods*, or conversely, as by E. here, to
justify human conduct (see further, Introduction to *Euthyphro*,
section 2 (ii)).

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγή σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποικιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; |

ΕΤΘ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλη, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγῆσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήση.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαναμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰς αὐθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγῆση· νυνὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἡρόμην πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ' εἶη, ἀλλὰ μοι εἶπες ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὃν ὁ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί. |

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά φῆς εἶναι ὅσια.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, εἶν τι | ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὀσίων, ἀλλ'

²⁴ We follow Burnet (n. ad loc.) in assuming that the reference here to "good" painters is ironic.

²⁵ These paintings have not survived, but an example, the

EUTHYPHRO

S. And do you then think that the gods really make war against each other, and that there are terrible feuds and battles, and many other similar events such as those described by the poets; added to which our various shrines that have been elaborately adorned by our good friends the painters,²⁴ and especially the robe covered with these kinds of embroideries that is carried up to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaic Festival?²⁵ Are we saying these are true, Euthyphro? c

E. Not only these, Socrates, but as I said just now, I'll explain many other aspects of religious affairs if you wish, which, believe me, will amaze you when you hear them.

S. I wouldn't be surprised, but you can do that later when there's more time. But for the moment try and tell me more clearly what I asked you about a moment ago. You see, my friend, you didn't adequately explain to me before when I asked what the holy might be, but told me that what you're now doing, prosecuting your father for murder, happens to be holy. d

E. And I was telling the truth, Socrates.

S. Perhaps, but the fact is, Euthyphro, you're saying that many other things are holy.

E. As indeed they are.

S. Well then, do you remember I didn't tell you to explain one or two of the many examples of the holy to me,

binding of the goddess Hera by her son Hephaistus in the temple of Dionysus near the theater, is described by Pausanias (1.20.2). The robe (*peplos*) woven for the statue of Athena was carried to the Acropolis in a ceremonial procession at the spring festival of the Great Panathenaia (every four years).

ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὄσια ὄσιά ἐστιν;
 e ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ιδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι
 καὶ τὰ ὄσια ὄσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ιδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἦ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττη φῶ ὄσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω. |

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς
 7 ὄσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθῶς, τοῦτο οὐπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις ὡς ἔστιν | ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνν μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν

²⁶ "Characteristic" translates *eidos* (d11, etc.), a term that later evolved into Plato's "Form/Idea." On its meaning in early Socratic dialogues, see General Introduction, section 3 (i).

²⁷ It was actually S. who said this (5d1-5), though E. left himself open to S.'s comment here by emphatically agreeing without understanding (d6). There is, however, a serious point here: S. insists on securing agreement to each logical step as he goes,

EUTHYPHRO

but that one particular characteristic²⁶ by which all examples of the holy are holy? You see, I think you said²⁷ things that are unholy are unholy by virtue of a single characteristic, and things that are holy are holy by virtue of a single characteristic, or don't you remember? e

E. I do.

S. Then explain to me what this characteristic can be, so that by looking hard at it and using it as a model I can say that on the one hand such and such an action that you or someone else takes is holy, and on the other an action that is not such, isn't.

E. Well if that's the way you want it, Socrates, that's the way I'll explain it to you.

S. Yes, that's just what I do want.

E. Well then, something that the gods love is holy and what they do not love is unholy.²⁸ 7

S. Excellent, Euthyphro! The answer you're now giving me is just the sort I was looking for. However, I don't yet know if it's true, but clearly you're going to go on and explain how what you're saying is true.

E. Of course.

S. Come on then, let's examine what we're saying. That

so that any statement so agreed might legitimately be seen as the responsibility of both of them. (See also 7e5, e9, 9d7, 15b7-c3.)

²⁸ The key terms *prospheiles tois theois* (what the gods love) and *mē prospheiles tois theois* (what the gods do not love/hate), are susceptible to a variety of translations, e.g., "what is [is not] agreeable to/acceptable to/cherished by the gods." For consistency we maintain a basic translation throughout: "what is loved/hated by the gods." See further, Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) (a).

θεοφιλές τε καὶ θεοφιλῆς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισῆς καὶ ὁ θεομισῆς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταυτὸν δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ | ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρησθαι;

b ΕΥΘ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.²

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται; |

ΕΥΘ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἢ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἄρ' ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὅποτερα πλείω, ἢ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ | ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;

c ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς | διαφορᾶς;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἂν;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; |

² post Σώκρατες add. εἴρηται γάρ βΤδ: secl. Naber

EUTHYPHRO

which the gods love and a person whom the gods love is holy and what the gods hate and the person who is hated by the gods is unholy.²⁹ The holy is not the same as the unholy, but the complete opposite: isn't that so?

E. It is indeed.

S. And does it seem to have been well expressed?

E. I think so, Socrates.

S. And hasn't it also been said that the gods are up in arms and are in dispute with one another and engage in feuds with each other?³⁰

E. It has.

S. But what is the dispute about that creates the hostility and fury, my good man? Let's look at it this way: if you and I were having an argument about which of two groups of numbers was the greater, would our difference of opinion make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or would we get down to the arithmetic, at least in such disputes as these, and quickly settle our differences?

E. Of course.

S. And if we were disagreeing over bigger and smaller we'd would set about measuring and quickly end our disagreement?

E. That's right.

S. And we'd settle our differences over what is heavier and what is lighter by resorting to weighing?

E. Of course.

²⁹ See previous note.

³⁰ At 6b7ff.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοι d ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκοπεῖ εἰ τάδε ἔστι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἄρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, | ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὐκ εἶπερ τι διαφέρονται, | δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα διαφέρουσιν ἄν;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

e ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναίε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποῦ ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο ἢ γάρ; |

ΕΥΘ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε. |

ΣΩ. Ταῦτά δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦν-

EUTHYPHRO

S. So over what then would we have got into a dispute, and, being unable to reach a settlement, would we be enemies of each other and get angry? Perhaps you don't have an answer to hand, but from what I'm saying consider if these are questions about what is just and unjust, honorable and shameful, and good and bad. Aren't these the things over which we would have argued and, being unable to reach an adequate settlement, we'd become each other's enemy whenever this occurs, both you and I and everyone else as well?³¹ d

E. Yes, this is the dispute, Socrates, and what it's about.

S. What about the gods, Euthyphro? If they do indeed have some dispute, don't they quarrel about these very same things?

E. Of course they must do.

S. And according to your account³² my noble Euthyphro, do different gods consider different things to be just, and honorable and shameful, and good and bad? You see, presumably they wouldn't quarrel with each other if they were not in dispute over these things. Isn't that so? e

E. You're right.

S. Then does this mean that what they each consider to be fine, good and just they love, and they hate their opposites?³³

E. Very much so.

S. Yes, but it's the same things, as you claim, that some

³¹ For the distinction between terms where there is an agreed standard of measurement and where not, see also *Alc.* 1.112aff., *Phdr.* 263a.

³² This follows from what E. said about divine disputes in the Hesiodic myths at 6aff.

³³ On the gods' "love" and "hate," see above, n. 28.

8 ται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα, περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἄρα οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ | φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὧ Εὐθύφρων, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥΘ. Κινδυνεύει. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὧ θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὁ τυγχάνει ταῦτόν ὃν ὀσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὁ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ἦ καὶ θεομισὲς ἐστίν, b ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὧ Εὐθύφρων, ὁ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν | θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ὧ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ. |

c ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὧ Εὐθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκου-

EUTHYPHRO

of them think are just and others unjust, over which they
are rising up and making war on each other; isn't that so? 8

E. It is.

S. Then, as it seems, the same things are both loved
and hated by the gods, and the same things would be "god-
hated" and "god-loved."

E. It appears so.

S. Then the same things would be holy and unholy,
Euthyphro, by this argument.

E. I suppose so.

S. Then you didn't answer my question, my good man.
You see my question wasn't what is both holy and unholy
at the same time. Yet what would be loved by the gods is,
it seems, also hated by them. The result, Euthyphro, is b
that there's nothing surprising if in doing what you're now
doing, punishing your father, it's loved by Zeus, but an-
tagonistic to Cronus and Uranus; loved by Hephaestus,
but not by Hera;³⁴ and again if any other gods are in dis-
pute over this, the same applies to them too.

E. Well, my view, Socrates, on this point at least is that
none of the gods is disputing with any of the others: that
anyone who has killed someone unjustly must be pun-
ished.

S. What, Euthyphro? Have you ever heard any human c

³⁴ This latter example alludes to a quarrel between Hera and
her son Hephaestus, whom she hated because of his deformity
and hurled from Olympus (see Hom. *Il.* 18.394-405). In revenge
he sent her a golden chair that bound her fast once she sat down:
see Paus. 1.20.2).

σας ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὅτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ἀδικούντες γὰρ | πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς
d οὐχὶ εἶπερ ἀδικούσιν γε δοτέον δίκην, ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκείνo γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, | ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστίν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἶπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὡς ὁ σὸς | λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκείνo γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς
e οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

³⁵ The drawing of an elementary distinction between (1) es-

EUTHYPHRO

being arguing that he who has killed unjustly, or committed any other crime should not be punished?³⁵

E. On the contrary, they never stop arguing about this both generally and in the law courts. You see those committing all kinds of wrongs do or say everything to avoid punishment.

S. Does that mean they admit to doing wrong, Euthyphro, and in doing so nevertheless claim they shouldn't be punished?

E. No, they don't go that far!

S. So they don't do or say *everything*. You see I think they don't have the effrontery to say or argue that, if they're in the wrong, they shouldn't be punished, but I think they do deny doing anything wrong; isn't that right? d

E. You're right.

S. Then the point they're arguing is not that the wrongdoer is not to be punished, but what they are perhaps arguing about is who the wrongdoer is and what he's doing and when.

E. You're right.

S. Is this therefore the very same thing experienced by the gods too, if indeed they're in dispute over the just and the unjust, as your argument suggests, and each side claims that the other side acts unjustly, while the other side claims they don't? Because in my view, my good man, no one, be he god or man, would have the nerve to argue that the wrongdoer should not be punished. e

establishing the principle that wrongdoing should be punished, and (2) deciding who is guilty and what constitutes guilt, seems unnecessarily long drawn-out (8b10-d6) but may perhaps be explained dramatically by the need for S. to lead a not particularly intelligent E. every inch of the way.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε κεφάλαιον. |

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί· πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπραχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτω; |

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

- 9 ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκείνον ἀδίκως τεθνάαι, ὃς ἂν θητεῦων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, συνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότη τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, | φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμὰ πρὶν τὸν συνδῆσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι τί χρῆ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκῆπτεσθαι
- b φόνου τὸν ὑὸν τῷ πατρί; Ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πράξιν· κἄν μοι ἰκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφία οὐδέποτε παύσομαι. |

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδείξαι σοι.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξῃ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν. |

EUTHYPHRO

E. Yes, what you're saying here, Socrates, is true, at least in principle.

S. Well, Euthyphro, I think that those who are in dispute argue about individual actions, both men and gods, if indeed the gods do dispute: in differing over a particular action some say that the action was just, others unjust: isn't that so?

E. Definitely.

S. Come on then, Euthyphro, teach me too, so I may be made wiser. What proof do you have that all the gods consider that a man has died unjustly who has committed murder while working as a hired laborer and has been tied up by the master of the dead man and dies on account of his bonds before he who tied him up could find out from the interpreters of the law what he should do about him; and that it is indeed right for the son to prosecute and denounce his father for murder on behalf of such a man?³⁶ Come on, try and demonstrate to me clearly that in these circumstances all the gods undoubtedly consider that this action is right. And if you do give me an adequate demonstration, I shall never cease singing your praises for your wisdom. 9

E. Well maybe it's no small undertaking, Socrates, and yet I *could* explain it to you very clearly indeed. b

S. I understand; it's because you think I'm harder to instruct than the jurymen since you'll demonstrate to them that these acts were clearly unjust and all the gods hate such things.

³⁶ For the basic story and its social and religious implications, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 2 (i).

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴνπερ ἀκού-
ωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.

- c ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσονται, εἴνπερ εὖ δοκῆς λέγειν.
τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος καὶ πρὸς ἐμαντὸν
σκοπῶ. "Εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν ὡς οἱ
θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον
εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ | μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τί
ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὀσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισῆς μὲν
γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὠρισμένα τὸ ὀσιον καὶ μὴ· τὸ γὰρ
θεομισῆς ὃν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη." ὥστε τούτου μὲν
d ἀφήμί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγεί-
σθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα
τούτο ὃ νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ—ὡς ὁ μὲν ἂν
πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἂν φιλῶ-
σιν, ὀσιον· ὁ δ' ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν,
οὐδέτερα ἢ | ἀμφοτέρα—ἄρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὠρί-
σθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΥΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ
σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾶστά με δι-
δάξεις ὃ | ὑπέσχου.

- e ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀσιον ὃ
ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάν-
τες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρων,
εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν

EUTHYPHRO

E. Very clearly indeed, Socrates, assuming they'll actually listen to what I'm saying.

S. Oh yes, they'll give you a hearing, provided they think you're making a good speech. But the following occurred to me while you were actually speaking and I think to myself: "Suppose Euthyphro were to demonstrate to me quite conclusively that all the gods consider this kind of death unjust, how am I any nearer learning from Euthyphro what the holy and the unholy are? You see this action would appear to be hated by the gods. But it appeared just now that the holy and its opposite didn't seem to be defined in this way since what was hated by the gods was evidently also loved by the gods." Consequently, I'm letting you off this one, Euthyphro. If you like, let all the gods consider it unjust and all hate it. Well, is this the amendment we're now making in our discussion, that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever is loved by them is holy and whatever some of them love and others hate is neither or both of these: is that how you now want us to define the holy and the unholy?

E. Yes, what's to stop us, Socrates?

S. There's nothing to stop me, Euthyphro, but look at your own position and see if by accepting this hypothesis you'll most easily demonstrate to me in this way what you promised.

E. Well I'd say myself that on the one hand the holy is what all the gods love, and on the other what all gods hate is unholy.

S. So shall we look at this again,³⁷ Euthyphro, to see if it's right, or shall we let it be and accept without more ado

³⁷ As they did with the definitions at 5d8ff. and 6e11ff.

ἀποδεχόμεθα | καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῆ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω συγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥΘ. Σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

10 ΣΩ. Τάχ', ὦγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὀσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὀσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. Λέγομέν | τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὀρώμενον καὶ ὀρών καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαυθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ ἕτερα;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μαυθάνειν. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

b ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὀρώμενον | διότι ὀράται;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνν γε.

³⁸ In the examples that follow (10b7–d10), S. claims that an activity is causally prior to the state that results from the activity, i.e., something can be described as in a state of being carried because it is carried; it is not the case that it is carried because it is in a state of being carried, and so on with the other examples,

EUTHYPHRO

our own arguments and those of others, and agree if someone just says that something is so? Or must we examine what he who says this means?

E. Yes we must, although I myself think this is now correct.

S. We'll know better soon, my good friend. Look, consider the following: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved? 10

E. I don't see what you mean, Socrates.

S. Well then, I'll try to put it more clearly. Don't we talk about something "being carried" and "carrying," something "being led" and "leading," something "being seen" and "seeing," and you understand that all such examples are different from each other and in what way they are different?³⁸

E. Yes, I think I understand.

S. And that means "being loved" is one thing and "loving" is different from this, doesn't it?

E. Of course.

S. Then tell me, is something "being carried" carried because it's carried, or for some other reason? b

E. No, it's for the first reason.

S. And "being led" because it's led, and "being seen" because it's seen?

E. Definitely.

concluding that something is in a state of being loved because it is loved, and not vice versa. So what the gods love is in a state of being loved because it is loved by them; they do not love it because it is being loved. On the other hand (10d1-e8), the holy is loved because it is holy; it is not holy because it is loved. Hence, the gods' love cannot define the holy.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὀράται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὀράται, διὰ τοῦτο ὀρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, | ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται φερόμενον.

c ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι εἴ τι γίννεται ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι γίννεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίννεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστὶ πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ | συγχωρεῖς οὕτω;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε. |

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται φιλούμενον;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀνάγκη.

d ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

³⁹ We have chosen to translate the whole of this passage (10b7–c8) literally. For the basic logic of the argument, see the previous note; for the detailed complexities and wider implications of the argument, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) b.

EUTHYPHRO

S. Then it's not because it's "being seen" that it's seen, but the opposite: because it's seen it's "being seen," and again it's not because it's "being led" that it is led, but because it is led it's "being led," and once again it's not because it's "being carried" that it's carried, but because it's carried it's "being carried." Do I make my meaning quite clear, Euthyphro? What I mean is this: if something is coming into being or is being acted on, it doesn't become something because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes something; and again it's not acted upon because it's something being acted upon, but because it's acted upon it's something being acted upon. Or don't you accept this? c

E. I do.

S. So then isn't what is "being loved" either something that is in a state of becoming or something being acted upon by something?³⁹

E. Certainly.

S. Then is this example just like the previous ones: it's not because it's in a state of being loved that something is loved by those who love it, but it's in a state of being loved because it's loved?

E. It must be so.

S. So then what is it we're saying about the holy, Euthyphro? Surely it is loved by all the gods according to your reckoning?⁴⁰ d

E. Yes.

⁴⁰ I.e., the revised second definition of "the holy" ("what is loved by all the gods," 9e1-3).

ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο
τι; |

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι
φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν φι-
λούμενόν | ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ὧ Εὐθύ-
φρων, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ'
ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

e ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δὴ, ὧ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσιον διὰ τοῦτο φι-
λεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται ὁσιον
εἶναι ἢ γάρ; |

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλές ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ
τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλές εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεο-
φιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. |

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν, ὧ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ
11 θεοφιλές καὶ τὸ ὁσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὁσιον εἶναι ἐφι-
λεῖτο τὸ ὁσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλές εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν
τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεο-

⁴¹ The omission of the definite article before *hosion* (holy) in the text of d12 creates potential ambiguity, and some translators

EUTHYPHRO

S. Is it because of this—because it's holy, or for some other reason?

E. No, it's because of this.

S. So it's because it's holy that it's loved, and not because it's loved that it's holy?

E. Apparently.

S. But that must mean that it's because it's loved by the gods, that something is loved and god-loved.

E. Of course.

S. Then what is god-loved isn't holy⁴¹ Euthyphro, and the holy isn't god-loved, as you say, but something else different from this

E. How do you mean, Socrates?

S. Because we agree⁴² that the holy is loved for the reason that it is holy, but it's not holy because it's loved. Isn't that it?

E. Yes.

S. Whereas the god-loved, because it's loved by the gods, by virtue of that very love is god-loved; but it's not because it's god-loved that it is loved.

E. What you say is true.

S. Well, my dear Euthyphro, if what is loved by the gods and the holy were actually the same, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, so too what is god-loved would be loved because it is god-loved, but if what is god-loved were god-loved because it's loved by the gods, so too

(e.g., Gallop) supply the missing article. The context, however, makes it clear that S. means (d12–13) that “god-loved” and “the holy” are not identical (as he has already demonstrated).

⁴² At d6–7 above.

φιλῆς θεοφιλῆς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὄσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὄσιον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ὀρᾶς ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχεται, ὡς παντά-
 πασιν ἐτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ | μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται,
 ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι,
 διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρω-
 τώμενος τὸ ὄσιον ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι
 αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ
 λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὄσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ
 b πάντων θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὄν, οὐπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον,
 μή με ἀποκρύψῃς ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπέ· ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε
 ὄν τὸ ὄσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὀτιδὴ πάσχει—
 οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διωισόμεθα—ἀλλ' εἰπέ προθύμως
 τί ἐστὶν τό τε | ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι
 εἶπω ὃ νοῶ· περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν αἰεὶ ὃ ἂν προ-
 θώμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα
 αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἔοικεν
 c εἶναι Δαιδάλον τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ
 ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες ὡς
 ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς
 λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου
 ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· | νῦν δὲ σοὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν.

⁴³ S. is here demonstrating that *to hosion* (the holy) and *to theophiles* (the god-loved) cannot be identical, since assuming they are identical leads to contradiction. The result is that, at roughly midpoint in the main argument of the dialogue, they have reached *aporia*.

EUTHYPHRO

the holy would be holy because it's loved by them. In fact, you see that the two are opposite and differ from each other in every possible way. On the one hand there is, you see, the sort of thing that is loved because it is loved; on the other there is something loved because it's the sort of thing that is loved.⁴³ Consequently, Euthyphro, it seems as if, on being asked what the holy might be, you don't want to reveal to me its essence, but mention some attribute of it that this thing, the holy, just happens to possess: that it is loved by all gods.⁴⁴ But you've yet to say what it actually is. So, please, don't keep it from me, but tell me *once more from the beginning* what the holy *is*—whether it's loved by the gods, or whatever its attributes are, since we won't differ on that point—but come on, tell me seriously, what are the holy and the unholy? b

E. Well, Socrates, I don't know how I'm to explain to you what I mean. You see whatever we propose somehow or other goes round in circles and refuses to stay put where we fixed it.

S. What you're saying, Euthyphro, sounds just like the work of my ancestor Daedalus. And if this was what *I* was saying and proposing, you'd probably make fun of me on the grounds that following the family tradition the figures I create in my discussions run away and refuse to stay put no matter where you put them. But as it is the propositions are yours, you see, so we want a different gibe, since yours refuse to stay put, just as you yourself realize. c

⁴⁴ The first definite articulation in Greek philosophy of the influential *ousia/pathos* (essence/attribute) distinction.

ἄλλον δὴ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος, ὃ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περι-
 d εἶμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος, ἐπεὶ
 ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς
 δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτω, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν
 τὰ | αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς
 ἔμαντοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό
 μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἶμι σοφός·
 ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκι-
 e νήτως ἰδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ
 τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν
 ἄδην· ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι συμ-
 προθυμήσομαι ὅπως ἂν με διδάξης περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου.
 καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης· ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι |
 δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὀσιον.

⁴⁵ S. alluding to his “ancestor” Daedalus (c1), makes a joke out of his alleged family profession as sculptor (though there is no evidence that S. ever practiced any trade or craft, and at *Ap.* 22d he actually disclaims knowledge of any craft). The point of the joke is that Daedalus was a legendary craftsman, a byword for ingenuity, who, among other things, was able to give his statues the power of movement, just as S. appears to be doing with the arguments (for the parallel drawn by S. between the mobility of Daedalus’ works and arguments concerning the distinction between knowledge and true opinion, see *Meno* 97d9ff.). Note that

EUTHYPHRO

E. What I think, Socrates, is that what we said deserves more or less the same gibe. You see I'm not the one who's making them move and not letting them stay in the same place, but I think you're the Daedalus, since if it was up to me they'd have just stayed put.⁴⁵ d

S. Then, my friend, it seems that I've become much cleverer in my art than that man to the extent that while he only made his own creations not stay still, it seems I make other people's do so in addition to my own. And indeed, this is real beauty about my skill, that I'm wise despite myself. You see I'd want my arguments to stay still and settle without moving, rather than acquire the wealth of Tantalus⁴⁶ as well as Daedalus' skill. So, enough of this. Since I think you're being indolent,⁴⁷ I myself will gladly join with you in helping you to instruct me about the holy. And don't cry off too soon. So consider whether you think all the holy has to be just.⁴⁸ e

at d1-2 E. seems finally to recognize that it is S. who is foisting the arguments on him!

⁴⁶ A son of Zeus and a nymph Pluto (otherwise unknown), and proverbial for his wealth. A notable mythical transgressor, he suffered variously described punishments in Hades: the best-known being his inability to consume food and drink placed just beyond his reach.

⁴⁷ The exact significance of *truphan* in e2 (to be indolent, fastidious, spoiled, give oneself airs) is uncertain. Burnet (n. ad loc.) suggests that S. (with heavy irony) "means that Euthyphro is so wise that he has lost his appetite for strict argument."

⁴⁸ We are maintaining the literal translation of *dikaion* (just) though the Greek word has a broader connotation, e.g., "right." For this new line of argument, division into genus and species, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) (c).

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

- 12 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὄσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὄσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὄσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὄσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐχ ἔπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὄσῳ | σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, σύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὃ ποιητῆς ἐποίησεν ὃ ποιήσας—

- b Ζήνα δὲ τὸν ἔρξαντα καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ' ἐφύτευσεν οὐκ ἐθέλει νεικεῖν³ ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἶπω σοι ὅπη;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι “ἵνα δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς”. πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μὲν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν· οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ

³ ἐθέλει νεικεῖν Burnet: ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν β

⁴⁹ Attributed by a scholiast to the *Cypria* of the poet Stasinus, possibly the author of the poem of the epic cycle that takes the Trojan War from its divine beginnings up to the events in the

EUTHYPHRO

E. Yes, I do.

S. So, is everything that is just, holy? Or is the holy completely just, while the just is not all holy but one part 12
of it is holy and another part something else?

E. I don't follow your line of argument, Socrates.

S. Ha! And yet you're younger than me by just as much as you're wiser. But, as I say, you're being indolent because of your wealth of wisdom. Well, my friend, brace yourself. After all it's not difficult to grasp what I'm saying. In fact I'm saying the opposite of what the poet said when he wrote:

Even he who made all these things grow
Does not wish to dispute with Zeus the creator,
For where there is dread, there too is shame.⁴⁹ b

Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?⁵⁰

E. Yes, do.

S. I don't accept that it is true that "where there is dread there too is shame." You see I think there are many people who fear disease, poverty and many other such things, but while being afraid they're not ashamed of what they fear in any way. Don't you agree with that too?

E. Completely.

S. But where there is shame there is fear as well, since

Iliad. The text is uncertain (see textual note) but the key final phrase is clear.

⁵⁰ Plato frequently uses the received wisdom of poetry as a target for his critical analysis (see above, 6b7ff., and, more extensively, *Prt.* 339–47, *Resp.* 331e–35e).

ἔστιν | ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος
οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;

c ΕΥΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν. "ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα
καὶ αἰδῶς," ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδῶς ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέν-
τοι ἵνα γε | δέος πανταχοῦ αἰδῶς· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι
δέος αἰδοῦς. μόριον γὰρ αἰδῶς δέους ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ
περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμὸς ἔνθα καὶ περιτ-
τόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμὸς. ἔπη γάρ που
νῦν γε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνν γε. |

d ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἡρώτων
ἄρα ἵνα δίκαιον ἔνθα καὶ ὄσιον; ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὄσιον ἔνθα
καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πανταχοῦ ὄσιον· μόριον
γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὄσιον; οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι
δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω. φαίνη γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέ-
γειν. |

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὄσιον
τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον
μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὄσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με
ἡρώτας τι τῶν νυνδῆ, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ

⁵¹ In other words, "shame" (*aidōs*) falls within the genus of "fear" or "dread" (*deos*). *Aidōs* has a wide range of associations both (1) in the context of an individual's attitude to others, especially gods: "respect," "reverence," and (2) with regard to an individual's estimate of his own personal worth, especially in the eyes of others: "shame" in the sense of "self-respect," "sense of

EUTHYPHRO

is there anyone who feels shame and dishonor about some action, who does not also fear and dread gaining a reputation for wickedness?⁵¹

E. Yes, he's seized with fear.

S. Then it's not right to say "for where there is dread there too is shame," but where there is shame, there too is dread, even though shame is not everywhere that dread is; for I think dread is of greater extension than shame. You see shame is a part of dread just as an odd number is a part of number, so where you have number there isn't necessarily an odd number, but where you have an odd number, there's number there too. Can I take it you follow me now?

E. Yes, completely.

S. Well that's the kind of thing I was asking about previously: where there's justice is holiness there too, or where there's holiness is justice also there, though not holiness wherever there's justice, for holiness is a part of justice? Is this what we should say, or do you think otherwise?

E. No, that's it. I think what you're saying is right.

S. Then consider what comes next. You see if the holy is a part of the just, then I think we've got to find out which part of the just the holy would be. If therefore you were asking me something like what we mentioned just a moment ago, such as what kind of instance of number is the

honor" (similar in meaning to *aischunē*, see b10). While we might regard it as debatable whether fear is an *inevitable* adjunct to *aidōs* in sense (2) above, the "shame culture" of classical Athens would make this a natural assumption for S. and E. See further, Dover, 236-42.

τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον
 ἂν ὅτι ὁς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς | ἢ ἄλλ' ἰσοσκελῆς· ἢ οὐ
 δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

- e ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺν ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι τὸ ποῖον
 μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτω λέγω-
 μεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι,
 ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη | παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ
 καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ
 μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ
 τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

- 13 ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, φαίνη λέγειν
 ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι· τὴν γὰρ θερα-
 πείαν οὕτω συνίημι ἦντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που
 λέγεις γε, οἰαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπείαι εἰ-
 σιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοῦς· λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν
 φαμεν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς | ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ
 ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἢ γάρ που ἵππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

⁵² "Scalene" = "uneven" (referring to a triangle with three sides unequal) and "isosceles" = "with equal sides." The expression of arithmetical concepts in geometrical terms is common in Greek philosophy and mathematics.

EUTHYPHRO

even number and what this number actually is, I would say that it is whatever is not scalene but isosceles: or do you not think so?⁵²

E. I do.

S. Right, so you try and explain to me what aspect of the just holy is so that we can tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to impeach us for impiety, as by then I shall have been adequately instructed by you in what things are pious and holy and what things are not. e

E. Well now, it seems to me, Socrates, that the aspect of the just that is pious and holy is that concerning our attendance on the gods, while our attendance on our fellow human beings is the remaining aspect of the just.

S. And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to put this very well, but I'm still short of one minor thing. You see I don't yet understand this attendance you mention. For I'm sure you don't mean that our attendance on the gods is like our attendance on other things, because I suppose we do use the expression: for example we say not everyone knows how to attend horses, but a horseman does. Isn't that so? 13

E. Certainly.

S. So horsemanship is attendance on horses.⁵³

E. Yes.

⁵³ S. here introduces a familiar Socratic/Platonic analogy from diverse arts or skills (*technai*), knowledge possessed by the expert, who alone has the ability to teach it, and, furthermore (13b8–11), crucially for S.'s argument, will inevitably *qua* expert, use his skill to benefit its object. For a similar sequence of argument, see *Ap.* 25bff.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, |
ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΤΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

b ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὀσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, | ᾧ
Εὐθύφρων; οὕτω λέγεις;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταῦτὸν διαπράττε-
ται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ τινὶ ἔστι καὶ ὠφελία τοῦ
θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὀρας δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς
ἵππικῆς | θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελούνται καὶ βελτίους γί-
γνονται ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

c ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς,
καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα
ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἶει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν
θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελία; |

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης θεραπεία οἷσα θεῶν
ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ;
καὶ σὺ τοῦτο συγχωρήσῃς ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὄσιον
ποιῆς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζῃ; |

ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

EUTHYPHRO

S. Nor does everyone know how to attend to hounds, but a dog trainer does.

E. Yes.

S. And I suppose the art of dog training is our attendance on dogs.

E. Yes.

S. And herdsmanship is all about cattle.

E. Certainly.

S. And holiness and reverence are about the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?

E. I do.

S. So doesn't that mean that all attendance achieves the same end? It's something like this: the aim is for something good and beneficial for the one being attended upon, just as indeed you can see that horses being attended to are benefited by the horseman's skill and improve, or don't you think so?

E. I do.

S. And dogs, I imagine, by the huntsman's skill and cattle by the herdsman's and all the others in the same way; or do you think the purpose of the attention is for the harm of the one being attended upon?

E. Zeus, I do not!

S. For beneficial reasons then?

E. Of course.

S. Therefore is holiness too, being the attendance upon the gods, beneficial to the gods and does it improve them? And would you also go along with this that, whenever you do something holy, you make one of the gods better?

E. Zeus, I certainly do not!

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν—πολλοῦ καὶ δέω—ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν,
d οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω. |

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἶη ἂν ἡ ὀσιότης;

ΕΥΘ. Ἦνπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότης θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη θεοῖς.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. |

ΣΩ. Ἐχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὔσα ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἶει;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

e ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ; εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἐστίν;

ΕΥΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας; |

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἶη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστα φῆς εἰδέναί ἀνθρώπων. |

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

EUTHYPHRO

S. No, I certainly don't think this is what you're saying, Euthyphro—far from it—but this is the reason I actually asked what you might mean by attendance on the gods, as I don't think you mean this sort of thing. d

E. And rightly so, Socrates. That's not the sort of thing I mean.

S. All right, yet what kind of attendance on the gods would holiness be?

E. It would be what slaves pay to their masters, Socrates.

S. I see. It would be some kind of service to the gods, it seems.

E. Very much so.

S. Now could you tell me, at the achievement of what end does service appropriate to doctors actually aim? Don't you think it's health?⁵⁴

E. I do.

S. What about service appropriate to shipwrights? e
What end does their service achieve?

E. Obviously building a ship, Socrates.

S. And builders', I suppose, building houses?

E. Yes.

S. Tell me then, my good man, what function is the service to the gods meant to perform? It's quite clear that you know since you claim to know the affairs of the gods better than anyone.

E. I do. And what I'm saying is true, Socrates.

⁵⁴ S. reruns the previous sequence of argument involving analogies with skills, e.g., doctors, shipwrights, builders, but this time substitutes "service" (*hupēretikē*).

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπὴ-
ρέταις χρώμενοι;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.

14 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ; |

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δέ γ', οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; | τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας;

b ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίσθηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σώζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς τε | ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

c ΣΩ. Ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι—δήλος εἶ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω,

EUTHYPHRO

S. So in the name of Zeus, say what on earth is that splendid work the gods perform using our service?⁵⁵

E. Many fine things, Socrates.

S. Yes, as do our military commanders, my friend. Yet nevertheless you could easily state what the chief of these is, that they achieve victory in war, isn't it? 14

E. Of course.

S. Again I think farmers achieve many fine things, but nevertheless their main aim is the production of food from the earth.

E. Certainly.

S. So what of the many fine achievements of the gods? What is the crown of their achievements?

E. I told you just a little while ago,⁵⁶ Socrates, it's too much of a task to understand exactly how all of these matters stand, yet I'll simply say this to you, that if one understands how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, these activities are holy and such practices keep private households as well as the common affairs of our cities safe, while those activities that are the opposite of what is pleasing are impious, which indeed overthrow and destroy everything. b

S. Why indeed, Euthyphro, you could have told me much more succinctly, had you wished, what was the chief aspect of what I was asking about, but the fact is that you're not keen to instruct me, that's for sure. You see just now when you were on the verge, you turned away. Had c

⁵⁵ For the interpretation of this sentence, the question of how far S. (Plato) intends a positive interpretation of "that splendid work" (*ekeino to pankalon ergon*: 13e11-12), see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (ii) (d). ⁵⁶ At 9b5-6.

ικανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὀσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη.
 νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρῶντα⁴ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ⁵ ἀκολου-
 θεῖν ὅπη ἂν ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ· | τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὀσιον
 εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ
 θύειν τε καὶ εὔχασθαι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ
 δ' εὔχασθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς; |

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

d ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς
 ὀσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, συνήκας ὁ εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητῆς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας
 καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, | ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται
 ὅτι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον τίς αὕτη ἢ ὑπηρεσία
 ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκεί-
 νοις;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τό γε ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη ὧν δεό-
 μεθα παρ' ἐκείνων, | ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλὰ τί;

⁴ ἐρῶντα βΤ² Burnet: ἐρωτῶντα ΤWV Arm. Nicholl

⁵ ἐρωμένῳ βΤ Burnet: ἐρωτωμένῳ V Arm. Nicholl

⁵⁷ The correct textual reading here is uncertain. We follow Burnet (OCT¹) in assuming that S. is presenting himself jokingly as E.'s lover. S. as the lover of his young followers, both in the physical and intellectual sense, is common in the early and middle dialogues (see e.g., *Meno* 76b4, *Chrm.* 154bff.). Here

EUTHYPHRO

you answered the question, I would by now have learned adequately about holiness from you. But now you see the lover is forced to follow the beloved wherever he may lead.⁵⁷ So what do you claim this time that the holy and holiness are? Is it not some kind of knowledge of sacrifice and prayer?⁵⁸

E. I'd say so.

S. So is sacrifice the giving of gifts to the gods while praying is making petitions to them?

E. Very much so, Socrates.

S. Then by this argument holiness would be a knowledge of appealing to and giving to the gods.

E. You've understood what I said very well, Socrates.

S. You see I'm a keen follower of your wisdom, my friend, and I'm giving it my full attention, so whatever you say won't fall on stony ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it's both asking them for things and giving to them?

E. I do.

S. Then wouldn't the right way to ask be asking for things we need from them?

E. Well, what else would it be?

the application to the "indolent" E. (11e2) is likely to be intentionally comic. Burnet, n. ad loc. convincingly defends his OCT¹ reading against the arguably more commonplace reading, adopted by OCT² (Nicoll), "your questioner has to follow the person he's questioning"—see textual note.

⁵⁸ "Knowledge," "understanding" = *epistēmē*, taking up E.'s use of it at 14b3. *Epistēmē* is a term that later assumes great importance in Plato's theory of knowledge. Here it simply equates holiness with the other "arts" mentioned earlier by S.

e ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκείνοι τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται. |

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τέχνη ἡ ὀσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμπορικῆ, εἰ οὕτως ἦδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἦδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. | φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὔσα ἀπὸ τῶν δῶρων ὧν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδῶσι παντὶ δήλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν
15 ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δῶσιν. ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελούνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκείνοι δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδέν; |

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἃ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς; |

ΕΤΘ. Τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἢ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

b ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΤΘ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὄσιον, | τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

⁵⁹ With the culmination of this argument, S. claims to have

EUTHYPHRO

S. And again the right way to give would be to give e
them the things they actually want from us in return? I
don't think it would be very clever for a donor to give
someone something he has no need of.

E. You're right, Socrates.

S. Then holiness would be a sort of skill of mutual
trading, Euthyphro, between gods and men.

E. Trading, if you prefer to call it that.

S. Well nothing is preferable to me, unless it's actually
true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods actually get
from the gifts they receive from us? For what they give is
clear to everyone, for nothing is good for us that they
themselves do not give. But in what way do they benefit 15
from what they receive from us? Or do we gain so great
an advantage over them in our dealings that we get all
good things from them, but they get nothing from us?

E. But, do you think, Socrates, the gods get any bene-
fit from what they take from us?

S. Well otherwise, what on earth, Euthyphro, would
these gifts be that the gods get from us?

E. What else do you think apart from honor and hom-
age and, as I was saying a little while ago, gratitude?

S. So the holy is pleasing to the gods, Euthyphro, but b
not beneficial to or loved by them?

E. I think it's loved above all else.

S. So this then, it seems, is once again what holiness
is: what is loved by the gods.⁵⁹

taken them both in a circle back to E.'s (unsuccessful) second
definition of "the holy" (see 6e11-7a1). A typical Socratic *aporia*,
as S. hammers home in 15b7ff. For the element of contrivance in
this reversion on S.'s part, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section
3 (ii) (d).

ΕΤΘ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσῃ οὖν ταῦτα λέγων ἂν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσῃ τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ γε ἰτεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλω περιούντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν ἤκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τό τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτόν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγε. |

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὄσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὐ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα. |

ΕΤΘ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον τί ἐστι τὸ ὄσιον, ὡς ἐγὼ πρὶν ἂν μάθω ἐκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ με ἀτιμάσῃς ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσσχὼν τὸν νοῦν ὅτι μάλιστα νῦν εἶπε τὴν ἀλήθειαν· οἶσθα γὰρ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς πρὶν ἂν εἴπησ. εἰ γὰρ

⁶⁰ At 10e6-8.

⁶¹ S. (deliberately?) takes E.'s agreement that holiness is what is loved by the gods, a fact about holiness (b4-5), as a statement of their identity, which was disproved at 10d12. This apparent failure enables S. to conclude the dialogue in *aporia*.

EUTHYPHRO

E. Very much so.

S. In saying this are you then surprised if arguments don't seem to stay put for you, but move about, and you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them move, while you are much more skilled than Daedalus in making them go round in circles? Or don't you realize that in going round our argument has returned to the same place? You see I'm sure you recall that earlier on what is holy and what is god-loved didn't appear to be the same thing, but different from each other.⁶⁰ Or don't you remember? c

E. I do.

S. So don't you now realize that you're saying that the holy is what is loved by the gods? Does that, or does it not make it god-loved?⁶¹

E. Very much so.

S. So either we didn't reach a proper agreement just now, or if we did then, we haven't got it right now.

E. So it seems.

S. Then we must once again consider what holiness is from the beginning, since I won't be keen to cry off before I understand it. Come on, don't turn your back on me, but concentrate your mind in every way as best you can and this time tell me the truth, for if any man knows, you know, and like Proteus you're not going to be released until you tell me.⁶² For if you didn't know clearly what the holy and d

⁶² S.'s intellectual persistence is well documented (see esp. *Ap.* 28dff.). Proteus is a sea god who, at *Hom. Od.* 4.435ff., is able to take on different shapes but must be held by the marooned Menelaus until he resumes his true appearance, because only then will he answer questions. So E. will not be released by S. until he answers.

μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς
 ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
 e αὐτὸ ποιήσῃς, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡσχύνῃς· νῦν δὲ
 εὖ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἶει εἰδέναι τό τε ὄσιον καὶ μὴ.
 εἰπέ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς ὅτι
 αὐτὸ ἠγῆ.

ΕΥΘ. Εἰς αὐτὸς τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ
 σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὦρα ἀπιέναι. |

ΣΩ. Οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἐταῖρε. ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με κατα-
 βαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχῃ ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μα-
 θὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς
 16 ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη
 παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεία γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ'
 ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ
 δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

EUTHYPHRO

the unholy are, there is no way you would ever have undertaken to prosecute a man who is old and your father for murder on behalf of a man who is a hired laborer.⁶³ But also the fear of the gods would have prevented you risking not doing it in the right way; and you'd be a disgrace among men. But now I know well that you think you know e clearly what the holy is and what it isn't. So tell me, excellent Euthyphro, and don't conceal what you believe it is.

E. Another time, Socrates. You see I'm in a hurry to go somewhere right now and it's time for me to leave.

S. What a thing to do, my friend! You're off, dashing the great hope I had that I'd learn from you what things are holy and what are not, and I'd be acquitted of Meletus' indictment when I'd demonstrated to him that I'd become 16 wise in religious matters thanks to Euthyphro, and that I'd no longer talk about them unadvisedly through my ignorance nor break new ground over them, and what's more I'd live the rest of my life better.⁶⁴

⁶³ With this reference to E.'s lawsuit, S. neatly concludes the conversation by returning to the practical situation with which it opened.

⁶⁴ "Break new ground [in religion]" (*kainotomō*) recalls the first charge in the indictment against S. (see above, 3b1-4, and Introduction to *Apology*, section 1).

APOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The *Apology* (not an apology in the modern sense, but so named from its traditional Greek title, *apologia* = “defense”) is unique among the works of Plato, being in the form not of a dialogue but of a speech, which purports to be the defense speech that Socrates made at his trial in 399 on a charge of impiety (*asebeia*). The charge is quoted by Diogenes Laertius (early 3rd c. AD) and also recorded by the orator and philosopher Favorinus (2nd c. AD), who says that the detail of the charge was still preserved in his day in the Metroon, the building in the Athenian Agora where the archives were kept: “Meletus, son of Meletus of the deme Pitthus has made the following charge against S. the son of Sophroniscus of the deme Alopeke: S. is guilty of not acknowledging the gods that the city acknowledges, but of introducing new divinities, and is guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty demanded is death” (Diog. Laert. 2.40).¹ As the penalty indicates, this was a serious charge. Although brought by private citizens, it was a public prosecution (*graphē*), an offense against the

¹ Similar formulations of the charges are also found at Ap. 24b8-c1, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1.

APOLOGY

state, as opposed to a private suit (*dikē*), as explained by S. to Euthyphro at the beginning of *Euthyphro* (2a5–6).

2. THE TRIAL

Some details of Athenian court procedure are relevant to understanding the nature of the speech: a large jury (probably about five hundred citizens) chosen by lot would try the case and would vote not only for the guilt or the innocence of the accused but also for the penalty. These were the “men of Athens,” “gentlemen of the jury” (*andres Athēnaioi*, *andres dikastai*). The presiding legal authorities (*archontes*) were responsible merely for observing correct procedure, leaving all the power in the hands of the mass jury. Socrates’ speech, therefore, was aimed at a broad cross-section of his fellow citizens, who might well shout him down when what he said did not please them, which suggests more the atmosphere of a political speech than that of a courtroom. The directness, even uncompromising bluntness of S.’s style in *Apology* in comparison with the other works in this volume is perhaps intended by Plato to convey the occasion and circumstances of a public trial.² Xenophon (*Ap.* 1) emphasizes S.’s *megalēgoria* (lofty style, condescension), which he says was noticed by all of those who had written about S.’s trial.

² Professional speech writers could be employed to compose speeches for defendants. Plato has S. not only deliver his own speech but also claim that he is speaking simply with “words spoken randomly as they happen to occur to me” (17c2–3, but see also *Apology*, trans. n. 2).

PLATO

There were three prosecutors: Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon. Their speeches are not recorded.³ Cross-examination was not a major feature of the process, though witnesses could be called, and there is a section of *Apology* (24c–28a) in which Socrates cross-examines Meletus. We have no witness statements for either prosecution or defense, though normal procedure suggests that these would have been made.⁴ Indeed, Plato's S. implies this in challenging the prosecution to produce anyone who admits to having been corrupted by him (33dff.).

The duration of speeches was comparatively short by modern standards, the length controlled by a water clock (*klepsydra*). Plato's *Apology* falls into three parts, corresponding to the three speeches of Socrates: the longest, his defense speech, and second, following the guilty verdict, his proposal for a "counterpenalty" (*antitimēsis*).⁵ The third speech, S.'s "farewell" (38c1–42a5 [end of speech]), has no precedent in the extant forensic literature, and it

³ Little is known for certain about Meletus and Lycon (though there is an unflattering physical description of the former at *Euthphr.* 2b8–11). For what details there are, see discussion in Nails, 202, 188. Anytus, a prominent democratic politician, figures in Plato's *Meno* as severely anti-sophist and warns S. against adopting a critical stance toward prominent individuals (*Meno* 94e).

⁴ MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens*, 242–47.

⁵ The defense would be concerned to propose a penalty lighter than that of the prosecution, but one severe enough to recommend it to the jury as a suitable punishment: the obvious choice being prison or exile. S. refuses to comply (see *Ap.* 37b8–e2).

seems probable that no such speech, or anything like it, was actually delivered.⁶

3. PLATO'S VERSION OF THE SPEECH

This last point takes us on to a key question: did Plato's version of the speech, or any part of it, comprise what was actually said by Socrates at the trial? As well as presenting a speech and not a dialogue, the *Apology* is also unique among Plato's works in apparently recording a datable public event and, as such, one would expect Plato's accuracy to be subject to corroboration by those who had attended the trial.

There is, however, another version of Socrates' trial, by Xenophon (also an *Apology*). He tells us that he was not himself present but gleaned his account from an informant (*Xen. Ap.* 2). While having some content in common with Plato, this account differs radically from it in treatment, tone, and style, besides being much shorter. According to Xenophon (*Ap.* 3–9 and *Mem.* 4.8.4–10), S., following a forewarning from God, did not prepare a defense ahead of his trial, but resigned himself to a guilty verdict on the ground that it was better for him to die before the sickness of old age came upon him.⁷

⁶ For S.'s thoughts on death in this part of his speech (*Ap.* 40c5–41d), see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (ii).

⁷ There is also late testimony from Maximus of Tyre (2nd c. AD) *Lectures*, 3.6, suggesting a tradition that S. made no defense at all ("Socrates kept silence; it was the safest course; he could not speak without loss of honor.") Ferguson, *Socrates: A Source Book*, p. 209.

PLATO

The question cannot be settled by noting the presence of Plato at the trial (as he tells us in his own *Apology*, 34a2), where Socrates refers to "Plato here," and later states that he has offered, along with others, to stand surety for a fine of three thousand drachmas as a proposed penalty (38b7). We cannot assume from this that Plato's account is, for that reason, more trustworthy than Xenophon's secondhand version. As a recent commentator notes, in a survey of eyewitness claims in Plato, Xenophon, and others, "Autopsy is not, and was not, an unknown device for lending verisimilitude to a fictional narrative."⁸ The issue is also complicated by uncertainty as to how long after the event Plato's *Apology* was composed.⁹

The brilliance and emotive power of Plato's representation of Socrates' defense speech made it *the* definitive version for later ages. There is a vast Socratic literature from the fourth century BC to the fifth century AD, much of it concerned with the trial, for and against S., and derived to a greater or lesser extent from the fourth-century sources, chiefly Plato, but also others.¹⁰ Plato's version might, for all we know, contain material that derives, in some form or other, from the actual speech, but for the speeches of the prosecutors we depend on the Socratic literature, chiefly, of course, Plato himself, and those later sources dependent on, or reacting to, him, which puts us in danger of a circular argument.

⁸ Stokes, *Plato, Apology*, 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

¹⁰ For a comprehensive collection of sources, see Ferguson, *Socrates: A Source Book*.

APOLOGY

Therefore, to what extent Plato's version represents Socrates' actual defense at his trial cannot be decided on the evidence available. It is perhaps more fruitful to consider Plato's S. as partly drawn from real life and partly invented by the authors of the tradition. Plato's version may have been composed with an eye to S.'s reputation among various groups in the period after his death. As such, it can be related to the *Sōkratikoī Logoi* (see General Introduction, section 2 (iii)), in Plato's particular case, aimed at securing S.'s posthumous fame and summing up the meaning of his life as a paradigm of how a good man and a philosopher should conduct himself in the face of supreme adversity.¹¹

4. THE CHARGES AGAINST SOCRATES

There is general agreement among the sources concerning the broad categories of the indictment (see above, section 1): Socrates was accused of (1) heterodoxy as regards state religion and (2) corrupting the young; these together amounted to the charge of impiety (*asebeia*). Exactly what detailed activities provoked this indictment is less clear. In the absence of the prosecution speeches, we have to use evidence from the largely pro-Socrates sources to infer what he was up against.

The first charge of "not acknowledging the gods that the city acknowledges, but introducing new divinities" is

¹¹ For a balanced discussion of the issue of the historical authenticity of Plato's *Apology*, see Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 4:72-80.

interpreted by Socrates near the beginning of his speech as linking him with the skepticism concerning the gods of traditional mythology that was associated with the natural scientists; their investigations into the origins and nature of the universe threw doubt on the power and authority, and occasionally even the existence, of Zeus and other deities.

Socrates argues that this charge is totally unfounded and the result of prejudice or slander (*diabolē*: 19a1ff.) that he believes originated with Aristophanes' caricature of him in *Clouds* (dated 423, revised 418): S. is portrayed as acting as the leader of a school of young men, and he "wastes his time searching what's below the ground and in the heavens" (19b4-5) and substitutes for the traditional gods strange cosmic forces and their manifestations in the world, in thunder, lightning, etc. (Ar. *Nub.* 248ff.). S. firmly dissociates himself from all such activities and their subversive implications.¹²

In his *Memorabilia* (*Memoirs of Socrates*), Xenophon answers the charge of religious heterodoxy in a matter-of-fact way, by pointing out that Socrates was assiduous in sacrificing to the state gods and performing other rituals in public as well as in private (*Mem.* 1.1.2). Plato's S., characteristically, takes a more incisive line: he cross-examines the chief prosecutor, Meletus, and decoys him into accusing him of being *atheos* (atheist): "That's what I'm saying; you don't acknowledge the gods at all" (26c8).

¹² In *Phd.* 96a-98b, S. states that there was a period in which he did interest himself in scientific speculation, but soon found it unsatisfactory (see *Phd.* 96aff. and, for the scientific theories mentioned there, see *Phaedo*, trans. nn. 91-97).

APOLOGY

Behind this confrontation lies an ambiguity in the word for “acknowledge [the gods]” (*nomizein*) in the accusation: the word, cognate with *nomos* (“law” or “custom”), lays more emphasis on due observance in words and actions than on intellectual belief (i.e., “believing something is the case” or “believing that someone/thing exists”). Playing on this ambiguity, Socrates has much fun in pointing out that, since the affidavit accuses him of acknowledging “newfangled deities” (26b5), he self-evidently cannot be *atheos* in the sense of total disbelief in the existence of gods (27a5–6), since *daimonia* (divine beings) are gods or the offspring of gods (27d1–2).¹³ So on either interpretation of *nomizein*, Meletus is refuted.

However, despite Socrates’ dexterity in argument and his ability to make Meletus look foolish, it is not clear if such distinctions would have been appreciated or even understood by the jury.¹⁴ While there is no firm evidence for formal legal moves against atheism,¹⁵ the popular prej-

¹³ Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.1.2, *Ap.* 12) connects the accusation of acknowledging (believing in) “new divinities” with the activity of S.’s personal spirit (*daimonion*) that warns him against ill-advised action (*Ap.* 31c–d). At *Euthphr.* 3b5–9, Euthyphro assumes that S.’s *daimonion* is the basis of the charge, a supposition not confirmed or denied by S.

¹⁴ For the details and possible blurring of the distinction between “acknowledge the gods” (*nomizein theous*) and “believe that there are gods” (*nomizein/hēgeisthai einai theous*), see Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 3:237n2.

¹⁵ Plutarch (1st–2nd c. AD) mentions a decree against atheism introduced by a certain Diopieithes in 432 (*Pericles* 32.2), but this is supported by no other ancient authority, and there is no firm evidence of any prosecutions for atheism under this decree.

udice that arose, S. alleges, from Aristophanes' *Clouds*, must be seen against a background of evidence for skepticism about the gods and religious belief during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404), recorded in particular by the historian Thucydides and revealed in the teaching of the sophists, especially the evidence of the sayings of Protagoras.¹⁶

The other charge, corrupting the young, was clearly regarded by Socrates as more serious; in his version of the indictment (24b8–c1), S. reverses the order of charges (see above) and tackles the corruption of the youth first in his cross-examination of Meletus. He refutes his prosecutor by deploying two well-known Socratic arguments (see General Introduction, sections 3 (i) and (ii)). First, the argument from expertise: by analogy with such skills as horse training, it is the single expert in what is good and evil whose knowledge of what is good enables him to exercise a beneficial influence on his fellows, as opposed to that of the mass of citizens (24dff.). Second, S. advances

For a skeptical survey of alleged prosecutions for crimes against religion in the fifth century, see Dover, "Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society."

¹⁶ Thuc. 2.47–55 (breakdown of traditional religious observance as a consequence of the Athenian plague), 6.27–29 (mutilation of the Hermae [religious images] on the eve of a military expedition to Sicily). On sophists, see Protagoras, DK B4, "Concerning the gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not, nor what they are like; for many things prevent such knowledge, for example the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life" (see Waterfield, 211). For a general survey of fifth-century rationalism, see Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 3:226–49.

the argument that "nobody intentionally does wrong" (25d1ff.):¹⁷ either S. is not corrupting the young or he is doing so unintentionally, and so should be instructed and admonished rather than punished (26a1-5).

As with Socrates' refutation of the first charge (see above), it is doubtful if the arguments, dependent as they are on specific Socratic premises, would have had much weight with a jury, and, far from revealing Meletus' apparent lack of concern for the youth, might well have had the effect of antagonizing S.'s fellow citizens. Moreover, the argument that "nobody intentionally does wrong" is actually in danger of proving too much: if all wrongdoing is involuntary, nobody should ever be punished.

What really lies behind the charge of corrupting the young, Socrates argues, is what fellow citizens regard as his *polypragmosynē* (meddlesomeness, literally, "business in many things"), going around the city questioning them, and especially those who claimed expertise in various fields, about their knowledge of what they claimed (21c-22e: and for a classic example of this Socratic inquiry, see *Euthyphro*). S. claims that this activity originated in a pronouncement of the Delphic oracle. He feels obliged to disprove the oracle, who when asked by his associate Chaerephon whether there was anyone wiser than S. replied that there was no one wiser. A way of showing the oracle to be mistaken would be to find someone who knew what he did not know, and was therefore wiser (20e-

¹⁷ For the argument by analogy from expertise in skills (*technai*), see *Cri.* 47aff. For the argument that no one does wrong intentionally ("Virtue is Knowledge"), see *Prt.* 358c.

21b).¹⁸ The young, sons of wealthy and influential fathers, have gathered around S., he says, and not only enjoy hearing this questioning of their elders but also try the technique out for themselves, thereby increasing the hostility toward him (23c).

Socrates does not claim to impart knowledge, unless it is an awareness of one's ignorance, and he does not charge fees (19e). In both these respects he is determined to distance himself from the sophists, who not only charge their pupils considerable sums but also claim to instruct them in a variety of subjects. He is also anxious that his method of cross-examination, the *elenchus*, a likely source of the accusation that he was a "clever speaker" (17b1), should not be confused in the public mind with teaching the ability to win an argument, making "the weaker argument the stronger" (23d7), as taught by the sophists and pinned on him by Aristophanes.¹⁹ S. asserts that, on the contrary, the phrase "clever speaker" only applies to him if those using it mean "someone who tells the truth" (17b5).

¹⁸ It seems possible that the Delphic oracle story is an invention. The only references to it are in the two *Apologies* (Plato 21a; Xenophon 14), and these differ as to the nature of the oracle's response. There is also silence in the other sources, in particular those likely to seize on such a story, for example, the comic dramatists. For detailed arguments, see Stokes, *Plato, Apology*, n. on 21a4–8 (115–16).

¹⁹ See *Ar. Nub.* 102–4. For sophistic-inspired arguments on either side of a series of topics, see the anonymous *Dissoi logoi* (*Double arguments*), DK 90B1–9, (ca. 400) (Waterfield, 285ff.), and for a demonstration of this technique on an unsuspecting youth, Cleinias, by two visiting sophists, see *Euthyd.* 275d–77d.

APOLOGY

5. SOCRATES AND ATHENS: THE PUBLIC IMAGE

It should by now be clear that for Plato's Socrates the actual charges were thought to have been a front for accusations of subversion that were much harder to pin down. Plato accordingly broadens S.'s defense, as the speech progresses, into a justification for his whole active life, the course of which he will refuse to alter, even if acquitted.

(i) *Socrates' Mission*

The Delphic oracle's answer to Chaerephon, that there was no one wiser than Socrates (21a), whether fact or fiction,²⁰ is presented by S. as the foundation of what he claims is his sacred duty to vindicate Apollo, the god of the oracle. Since the god cannot be lying, S. solves the dilemma by attempting to demonstrate that the oracle must be taking him, S., as an example of the wisest man in recognizing that he "is, in truth, of no value when it comes to wisdom" (23 b3-4). Oracular answers required correct human interpretation,²¹ and S. chooses to interpret the Delphic response as a divine order to search for wisdom among his fellow citizens and thereby "help the god" (b7).

Having harnessed, so to speak, the god to his mission, Socrates proceeds to invoke human civic values by introducing the incontrovertible authority of the epic poet Ho-

²⁰ See above, n. 18.

²¹ For a notorious example of human *mis*interpretation of an oracle with catastrophic result, see, for example, the Delphic reply to the Lydian king Croesus at Hdt. 1.53.

mer (8th c.). In 28b3–29a4 he compares his absolute devotion to his intellectual activity to the heroic bravery of Achilles at Troy in the *Iliad*, by quoting a version of *Il.* 18.95–104, in which Achilles prefers death to dishonor. He then immediately reinforces this by reminding the jury of his own military service as a hoplite (heavily armed foot soldier) (28e).²² Just as it would have been shameful to leave his post and disobey orders, so, when assigned by the god to examine himself and others, it would be unthinkable to give up his quest.

It was customary for defendants in Athenian trials to emphasize their services to the state. Socrates, therefore, is attempting to place his highly idiosyncratic conduct alongside his exemplary military record, in order to gain the support of the jury. Yet shortly afterward, in what would surely have been seen as a provocative gesture—hardly a “service” as the jury would have understood it—he presents himself as a “gift the god has given you” (30d9), sent, like a horsefly, to sting the large, thoroughbred but lazy horse that is Athens; he is “the kind of person who wakes you up . . . reproaches each one of you . . . and never stops landing on you all day long all over the place.”

(ii) *Socrates and aretē*

In 29d6–30b4 Socrates chooses to distance himself from his audience (and the mass of Athenians) by focusing on a key positive value of which they would universally approve, namely *aretē*, usually translated “excellence,”

²² Plato emphasizes S.’s bravery in battle and physical endurance at *La.* 181b, 189b. See also *Chrm.* 153aff., *Symp.* 219eff.

APOLOGY

“goodness,” or “virtue,” a value that established the status of a citizen and warrior from as far back as the heroic society of Homer. The word basically denotes a proper function, whether of humans, animals, or objects. At the beginning of his speech (18a5–6), S. uses the word in a way to which the jury could hardly object: the *aretē* of a good jurymen, that is, his proper function, is to concentrate on whether what is being said is just or not, that of a good orator is to tell the truth.

The conventional view of what enabled an Athenian to function well in society was that he should exhibit *aretē* in the highest degree: a command of wealth (*chrēmata*), reputation (*doxa*), and honor (*timē*). In his scheme of things, however, Socrates subordinates these to practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) and truth (*alētheia*), which are essential to secure the best state of the individual soul (*psuchē*).²³ He tells the hypothetical Athenian he encounters, “Aren’t you ashamed to be spending your time acquiring as much money as you can, or gaining reputation and honor, but show no interest or concern for wisdom and truth and seeing to it that your soul will be in the best possible state?” (29d8–e3). In bringing into play the powerfully negative value of “shame” (*aischunē*), and attaching it to the exclusive pursuit of the conventionally positive values of money, reputation, etc., S. is reversing the traditional associations of these values and dissociating himself radically from the values of his fellow citizens.

In his second speech, having been found guilty, Socrates is required to offer an alternative penalty (*antitīmēsis*)

²³ For the Platonic/Socratic concept of the soul, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (ii).

to the prosecution's proposal of death. He proposes public maintenance in the Prytaneum, the symbolic center of the *polis*, where civic hospitality was offered (36d7-9), of which, he maintains, he is more deserving than the customary recipients: victors in the Olympic Games. This may seem at first like the kind of *megalēgoria* (see above) that will ensure the jury's choosing the prosecution's alternative punishment (not mitigated by his eventual proposal of a more realistic fine, guaranteed by his friends [38b5-10]). However, S. is once again placing his philosophical search at the center of the *polis*. The language he uses is significant: "There is nothing more appropriate, my fellow Athenians, for such a man [i.e., S.] than that he should be given his meals in the Prytaneum, much more so in fact than if one of you won the Olympic Games in the one-, two-, or four-horse races. He makes you seem to be happy, but I actually make you happy" (36d6-10). *Eudaimōn*, the word Socrates uses here for "happy," implies not happy in a purely emotional or material sense, but in the sense of fulfillment in life.

(iii) Socrates and Athenian Politics

One underlying motive for Socrates' trial may have been political. Following the fall of the Thirty, an oligarchic group that ruled Athens immediately after Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War (403), a democratic constitution was restored and an amnesty was declared, which prevented an indictment on ostensibly political grounds.²⁴ So,

²⁴ On the amnesty, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.43; Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 40.2-3.

APOLOGY

the argument goes, the actual indictment may have been a cover for the real charge—S.'s behavior, his ethical beliefs, and his association with individuals, which marked him out as antidemocratic.

Taking these three aspects in turn: Plato's Socrates is emphatic that, out of a sense of self-preservation, and in obedience to his "divine sign," he avoided the political arena (31d).²⁵ In the participatory democracy of fifth-century Athens, all citizens were in theory generally expected to attend the Assembly and take a turn at serving on the executive Council (*Boulē*).²⁶ To stand aloof from politics (to be "quiet": *hēsuchazein*) was to court suspicion.²⁷

Socrates emphasizes two exceptions to his noninvolvement: during service on the *Boulē* (for which he would have been chosen by lot during the period of office of his tribe), he tells the jury (32b1–c3) that he single-handedly opposed an illegal decision by the Assembly to execute by a single order six generals who had failed to rescue survivors at the sea battle of Arginousae (406).²⁸ The second

²⁵ On S.'s *daimonion*, see *Euthyphro*, trans. n. 9.

²⁶ On the structure and workings of the Council and Assembly, see *Apology*, trans. n. 28.

²⁷ The "Funeral Speech" of the Athenian statesman Pericles in 431, as presented by Thucydides (Thuc. 2.35–46), sets out one attitude toward citizen participation in Athenian government; see esp. chap. 40: "We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all" (trans. R. Warner). On "quietism," see Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, 117ff.

²⁸ See Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.7–35. Xenophon confirms S.'s lone stand against the massed Assembly.

occasion was the order of the Thirty to arrest Leon of Salamis, which S. says he refused to obey, thereby putting his life in danger, his own arrest and execution having been avoided only by the fall of the regime (32c4–e1). S.'s emphasis on these two events, one opposing democratic power, the other opposing oligarchic power, suggests Plato's need to both assert S.'s independence and counter the suspicion that he had oligarchic sympathies, which might also have been aroused by S.'s staying in Athens during the period of the Thirty regime instead of fleeing to the Piraeus (the port of Athens) with the democratic opposition.

Plato's presentation of Socrates' ethical beliefs, moreover, does not suggest a ringing endorsement of Athenian democracy. In the argument from expertise with which S. counters Meletus' claim that he alone, S., corrupts the youth, he seems to be going out of his way to antagonize the jury, by implying that they, as well as the Athenian Council and the Assembly (all in effect drawn from the general citizen body), are more likely to be corrupting influences, as opposed to the single expert individual who is doing them good (24d–25c).

The forensic orator Aeschines (ca. 390–315), speaking about fifty years after Socrates' death, addressing a jury in the course of a prosecuting speech, says that they (i.e., his jury's predecessors) "put to death Socrates the sophist, because he was clearly shown to have taught Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy."²⁹ Plato's dialogues indicate that Critias (ca. 460–403) and Alcibiades

²⁹ Aeschin. *Against Timarchus* 1.173.

APOLOGY

(ca. 450–404) consorted with S., the latter intimately.³⁰ The suspicion of S.'s supposed corruption of Critias and Alcibiades probably derives from the sophist Polycrates' lost *Accusation of Socrates*, almost certainly written after Plato's *Apology* and known through the rebuttal of Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.12ff.).³¹ An answer to the specific accusation of the corruption of Critias and Alcibiades is notably absent from Plato's *Apology* and, if Plato's S. is to be believed, did not feature in the witness testimony called by Meletus in the course of his prosecution speech (*Ap.* 34a). It is possible, despite the political amnesty, that if such testimony had been available it might have been legally permitted on the grounds that, as Aeschines suggested, S., if not directly involved politically, was the evil genius behind the oligarchic coup.³²

The question of Socrates' attitudes toward the oligarchy and the democratic government that followed the downfall of the Thirty is therefore far from clear, and it is complicated by the fact that, once again, we know little or nothing of the political views of the historical S.; the contradictory evidence we do have reflects the variety of

³⁰ For Critias, see *Chrm.* 162cff. (S.'s main interlocutor); see also *Prt.* 316a, 336d–e. For Alcibiades, see *Symp.* 212d–23a, *Prt.* 316a. Critias, one of the extreme leaders of the Thirty, was killed fighting in the downfall of the Thirty in 403; although Alcibiades, who defected to Sparta during the Sicilian Expedition (415), returned to Athens, he remained politically suspect and died in exile just before the end of the war.

³¹ Stokes, *Plato, Apology*, 3–4.

³² For an examination of the trial from the Athenian side, see Hansen, *The Trial of Socrates*.

sources and the probable motives of their authors, including Plato, in using the trial to commemorate S. in the most effective way they knew how.³³

For Plato, what led to the trial and condemnation appears to have been Socrates' popular association with the sophists and natural scientists, coupled with his refusal to abandon his examination of the Athenians in order to make them better and happier—his divine mission, as he interpreted the answer of the Delphic oracle: “the unexamined life is not fit for a man to live” (*Ap.* 38a5–6). It might also be conjectured that S.'s uncompromising defense (clearly indicated, whichever source is chosen) ensured his condemnation during a particularly unsettled period for the Athenians following a long war and particularly violent political upheaval.

6. APOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF PLATO'S LATER WORK

Plato's presentation of Socrates' trial and death has been described as “philosophy's founding myth”:³⁴ the philosopher as a person of exceptional intellectual power and bravery executed for his convictions and going calmly to his death in the face of popular prejudice and ignorance.

³³ For opposing modern views on S.'s political convictions, see, for example, Ober (“Socrates and Democratic Athens”), who sees in S. “no necessary contradiction between being a critic of democratic ideology and a good citizen of the democratic community” (165), and on the other side, Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*, who uses the evidence to argue that the Athenians had very good reason to suspect S. of undermining the democracy.

³⁴ Nails, “The Trial and Death of Socrates,” 1.

APOLOGY

This myth became a powerful influence not only on later generations but on Plato himself. For example, in *Gorgias*, composed in the 380s, where "S." is involved in a discussion with three rhetoricians, the trial is very near the surface; near the end of the dialogue Plato has S. construct a comic parody of his presentation of the real trial, in which S. imagines himself as a doctor and the jury are children cajoled by a prosecutor/cook who puts on "parties for you, with lots of sweets and all kinds of goodies," whereas doctor S. prescribes medicines to make them healthy: "What do you think the doctor would be able to say, caught up in this dreadful situation? If he told the truth: 'I did all this, children, because I wanted to make you healthy,' don't you think that a jury like that would make an uproar, and shout pretty loudly?" (522a2-7).³⁵

The doctor/philosopher is the expert who has the skill to know what is best for his patients/citizens and the care of their souls but fails to convince them and suffers for it. In *Republic*, however, the great culmination of the first half of Plato's career (370s), this victim is transformed in his imagination into the philosopher-ruler of an Ideal State, one of a class of Guardians, experts in how to live the good life, who understand the human soul and how it must be cultivated in their citizens and who are, moreover, able to put their beliefs into practice. Set in Plato's imagination more than twenty years before Socrates' actual trial and death, and outlined by "S." as an Utopia yet to be realized, *Republic* nevertheless represents the retrospective vindication of S.'s life and beliefs.

³⁵ Plato returns to the theme of the philosopher's probable fate in the law court at *Theaet.* 172-77 (late 370s).

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

- 17 Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἔμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. | μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν¹ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυρθῆναι ὅτι ἀντίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μηδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυρότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν | οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν ἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθές εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε

¹ χρῆν βW (ἔδει schol. T): χρῆ V Ven. 511

¹ One of a number of formal ways of addressing juries found in extant forensic speeches. S.'s avoidance of the conventional *ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί* (members [men] of the jury) at this point in the

APOLOGY

In what respect you, men of Athens,¹ have been affected 17
by my accusers I do not know; however that may be,
thanks to them even I myself almost forgot who I was, they
spoke so plausibly. Yet almost nothing of what they said is
true. One of their many lies in particular surprised me, the
one where they were saying that you ought to be on your
guard not to be fooled by me because I'm a clever speaker. b
You see, for them not to feel any shame because they will
be immediately proved wrong by me in fact, since there is
no way whatever I can appear to be clever at speaking—
that's what seemed to me to be the most shameful thing
about them, unless, that is, these people use the phrase "a
clever speaker" for someone who tells the truth. If this is
indeed what they mean, I myself would agree I'm an ora-
tor, but not as they would understand the word. These
people then, as I say, have said little or nothing that is true,
but from me you will hear nothing but the truth—not
however, by Zeus, men of Athens, arguments tricked out
with phrases and fine words as theirs are, nor ornately ar- c

speech may be deliberate on Plato's part, since at 40a2-3 he addresses those who voted to acquit him as those whom he can truly call "members of the jury." For their function as both judge and jury, and details of the historical and forensic context of S.'s trial, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 2.

καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία ὥσπερ μαιρακίῳ | πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάννυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, | ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασιν, καὶ ἄλλοιθι, μήτε θαυμάζην μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγυνῶς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὢν, συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἂν | μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆ φωνῇ

d
18
τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐὰν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· | δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθῆ λέγειν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγο-

² S.'s claim of inexperience in rhetorical speaking as an indication of truth is itself a common forensic convention to gain the sympathy of the jury (e.g., Dem. *Against Aphobus*, 2–3; Isaeus, *Against Xenaenetus*, 1). The convention is perhaps more telling

APOLOGY

ranged, but you'll hear words spoken randomly as they happen to occur to me—for I'm convinced that what I'm saying is just—and let none of you expect otherwise: for it would hardly be fitting for someone of my age to come before you fabricating my speech like some teenager. And what's more, men of Athens, I do very much beg and implore this of you: if you hear me making my defense using the same arguments that I normally use both in the Agora at the money-changers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, don't be surprised and don't heckle me because of this. You see this is how it is: this is the first time I've come to court, even though I'm seventy years old: so I'm simply a stranger to the way people speak here. So, just as if I really happened to be an outsider, I imagine you would excuse me if I were speaking in the dialect and in the manner in which I was brought up, so particularly on this occasion I make this request of you, a just one, at any rate as it seems to me, to indulge my way of speaking—perhaps it could be worse, perhaps better—and consider just this point, and concentrate on whether I'm speaking justly or not: that is the mark of a good juror, but the orator's is to speak the truth.²

Therefore to begin with it is right,³ fellow Athenians, that I answer the first false accusations laid against me,

here in that Plato's S. is delivering his own speech rather than entrusting it to a forensic orator, and, of course, he uses it for his own distinctive purposes. On the question of the historical speech, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 3.

³ Literally, "I am right (just)." *Dikaios* = "just" or "right," here, as often in *Ap.*, indicating what S. claims is in accordance with *dikē* = "just" (in a legal context); see also above, 18a4.

- ρημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς
 b τὰ ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατ-
 ἡγοροὶ γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβούμαι
 ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δει-
 νούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, | οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς
 πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ
 κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις
 Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς
 c καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξήτηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λό-
 γον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, <οἱ>
 ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκευάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν
 μου κατήγοροι οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς
 ταῦτα ζητούντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν
 οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι | πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη
 κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγον-
 τες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες
 ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν καὶ μεράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατη-
 γοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένοι οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλο-
 γώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι
 d καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

⁴ Anytus, one of the three prosecutors of S., was a prominent democratic politician who had been active in the political upheavals of the previous ten years. He features in *Meno* 90c ff. as strongly antisophist and cautions S. against pursuing his favorite lines of philosophical investigation (see further, Nails, 37–38).

⁵ “Wise” (*sophos*) often, as here, with pejorative connotation = “cunning,” “smart.” “Thinker” (*phrontistēs*), also ironic in the

APOLOGY

and my first accusers, and secondly the subsequent accusations and accusers. You see, for many years now many people have been bringing before you accusations against me saying nothing that was true, and who I'm more afraid of than Anytus⁴ and his cronies, though those are formidable enough; but the former, my friends, are more to be feared who took you under their wing when you were boys and gained your confidence and made accusations against me, none of which was any more true: there is someone called Socrates, a wise fellow,⁵ who as a thinker has investigated all things above and below the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger. These people, fellow Athenians, who spread this reputation around are my formidable accusers: for those who listen to them think that those who make such inquiries don't even acknowledge⁶ the gods. Secondly there are many of these accusers and they've been making accusations for a long time now, and in addition, by talking to you at an age when you'd be very likely to believe them, some of you being boys and teenagers, they were making their accusations simply uncontested with no one there to give a defense. But what is most absurd of all is that it's impossible to know and even name them, unless one happens to be a comic playwright.⁷

context; also found as a nickname of S. in the comic poets (Ar. *Nub.* 266): S.'s "school" in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is called, satirically, a *phrontistḗrion*, "thinking shop" (94, etc.).

⁶ For distinctions between *nomizein* = "acknowledge" and "believe in [the existence of] gods" (significant in the exchange with Meletus at 26bff.), see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

⁷ I.e., Aristophanes in *Clouds*, 112–15 and 358–427, where there is a comic parody of "Socrates" and his students pursuing the scientific and sophistic subjects mentioned here (18b7–c1).

ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν | αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιῶσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγορούμενους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, | ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἤκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. |

- 19 Εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν. | ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

- b Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἣ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ

⁸ Contrast Xen. *Ap.* 3ff., who states that S. was not really interested in preparing a speech.

APOLOGY

Those who won you over by resorting to resentment and slander, and those who being convinced themselves persuade others, all of these are the hardest to deal with: you see it's impossible to get any of them to come here to court and to prove them wrong. Instead you simply have to defend yourself as if you're shadowboxing and prove the other party wrong without anyone making a defense. So you too should consider, as I argue, that my accusers fall into two groups: first the ones who have just brought these accusations, secondly those who did so long ago who I'm talking about, and allow that I must make my defense against those first. Indeed you've heard them making their accusations before and much more than these recent ones.

Well then, my fellow Athenians, I must make my defense and I must try in such a short time to rid you of this prejudice that you have acquired over a long time. Indeed I would wish that to happen in this way, if it is better in any way both for you and for me, and to succeed in my defense.⁸ But I think it's difficult, and I'm not wholly unaware of the nature of the task. All the same let this go whichever way it pleases the god.⁹ I must obey the law and submit my defense. 19

Let's take this from the beginning: what is the accusation from which the slander against me derives, which is exactly what Meletus relied on in bringing this indictment against me.¹⁰ Well now, what did my detractors say b

⁹ The use of the nonspecific singular, "the god," simply indicates the singular used collectively as a general reference to the ruling deities.

¹⁰ On the indictment, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν “Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ ἰ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων.” τοιαύτη τίς ἐστίν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ἢ ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι— ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πῶποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγόμενου—πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν—φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ ἢ πῶποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγόμενου, καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γ’ εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ’ εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ

APOLOGY

when they slandered me? So, as if they were making the charge, I must read out their affidavit: "Socrates is guilty and wastes his time searching what's below the ground and in the heavens, and makes the weaker argument the stronger one and teaches others these same things." It's something like this: for you too have seen them in Aristophanes' comedy, someone called Socrates swinging around there claiming that he's treading on air and burbling a lot of other nonsense of which I have no understanding great or small.¹¹ And I'm not saying this to disparage such knowledge, if someone is wise in such matters—I hope I don't have to defend myself at all against charges of this magnitude from Meletus—but the fact is, men of Athens, I have no interest in these things. I offer the majority of you yourselves as witnesses, and I expect you to instruct and tell each other—those of you who have ever heard me in discussion (and many of you come into this category)—to make it clear to each other, if any of you have heard anything small or great from me in discussing such topics, and from this you will be aware that this is the case as well with everything else that the majority of people say about me.

But the fact is none of these things is true, not even if you've heard anyone say I try to teach people and make money out of it: that's not true either. Although for that matter I do think it's good if one is able to educate people, as Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of

¹¹ See above, n. 5; also *Phd.* 96aff., where S. recounts his early interest in, and subsequent disillusion with, scientific speculation.

- ἕκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, | οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν
 πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεσσι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν
 20 προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι
 τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσι συνεῖναι
 χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ
 ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν ἐγὼ
 ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα: ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ
 ὃς | τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες
 οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου τοῦτον οὖν ἀνη-
 ρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ὑεῖ—“ὦ Καλλία,” ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, “εἰ μὲν σου τῷ ὑεῖ πῶλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην,
 εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσα-
 b σθαι ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθῷ ποιήσειν τὴν
 προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν
 τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν,
 τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς
 τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, |
 ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν
 ὑέων κτήσιν. ἔστιν τις,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “ἢ οὐ;” “Πάνυ γε,”
 ἦ δ' ὅς. “Τίς,” ἦν δ' ἐγώ, “καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου
 διδάσκει;” “Εὐνμος,” ἔφη, “ὢ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε

¹² Gorgias (ca. 485–ca. 380), a Greek from Leontini in Sicily, taught rhetoric and acted as his city's ambassador to Athens in 427. Prodicus also taught rhetoric and had a special interest in language. Hippias had a reputation as a polymath. The latter two were probably near contemporaries of S. S.'s carefully neutral treatment here is belied by Plato's ironic or negative portraits

APOLOGY

Elis do.¹² You see each of these, gentlemen, is capable of going to each and every city and persuade the young, who can associate with any of their fellow citizens they like without charge, to leave the company of those people, join them and pay money and be happy to do so besides. And in this respect there's another fellow here from Paros who's wise, who I discovered was visiting the city. You see I happened to approach a man who has spent more money on sophists than anyone else, Callias, Hipponicus' son.¹³ So I asked him (he has two sons, you know): "Callias," I said, "if your two sons had been two foals or calves we would have been able to find and pay a trainer whose job was to make them fine and good in their appropriate excellence.¹⁴ And this man would be either an expert in horse rearing or in farming. But as it is, since they're human beings, who do you intend to take on as their trainer? Who is there who has an understanding of this kind of excellence, that of the human being and the citizen? You see I imagine you've looked into this on account of your having two sons. Is there anyone, or not?" I said. "Certainly," he said. "Who?" I asked, "where's he from and what does he charge for teaching?" "Evenus, Socrates," he said, "from

elsewhere (Gorgias in *Grg.*, Prodicus in *Prt.* 330e, Hippias in *Hp. Mi.*)¹³ A rich Athenian, whose house is the venue for the gathering of sophists and S. in Plato's *Protagoras* and who is the host in Xen. *Symp.* See Nails, 68–74.

¹⁴ "Excellence" = *aretē*, the key positive value in the Greek value system, also translated "goodness," "virtue." It represents the proper function, the positive end for which something exists, whether (as usually) humans in society, animals (as here), or even implements. Cf. 18a5–6 on the *aretē* of a journeyman and orator.

μνῶν.” καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐῆνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 c ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει.
 ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμεν
 ἂν εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

Ἵπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· “Ἄλλ’, ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες, | τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι
 αὐταὶ γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν
 ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσ-
 αύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες
 d ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ
 ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.” ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ
 δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεί-
 ξαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα
 καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω
 τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν· | εἰ μὲντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν
 ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν
 δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σο-
 φία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὔτοι
 e δὲ τάχ’ ἂν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρω-
 πον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
 ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ’ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε
 καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ’ εἰ δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα

¹⁵ Evenus is mentioned at *Phd.* 60c–e as a poet particularly interested in the poetic compositions that S. wrote while in prison.

APOLOGY

Paros; five minas.”¹⁵ And I thought Evenus was lucky if he really did have such skill and teaches for such a modest sum.¹⁶ At least I too would be proud and flaunt myself if I understood these things; but in fact I don't, Athenians. c

So perhaps one of you might take the point up, “Well, Socrates, what is your line of business? Where do these prejudices come from? For I can't imagine that with you engaged in nothing out of the ordinary compared with others, such rumors and talk would have arisen unless you were doing something other than what most people do. Tell us what it is then, so that we may not jump to conclusions about you.” I think that he who says this is speaking justly and I shall try to explain to you just what it is that has created for me the reputation and prejudice. Do listen then. Perhaps some of you may think I'm playing about; yet be well assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. You see, my fellow Athenians, I have acquired this reputation through nothing but a certain kind of wisdom. And just what kind of wisdom is this? It is perhaps a human type of wisdom. For it's possibly true that in this respect I am wise. Perhaps these people I was talking about just now may be wise in a wisdom greater than human wisdom, or I have nothing to say, for I have no understanding of it, but he who claims I do is telling lies and speaking to my discredit. Please, my fellow Athenians, don't make such a rumpus, not even if I seem to you to be saying something d e

¹⁶ Five minas (five hundred drachmas) was a considerable sum (on the basis that a skilled craftsman earned about one drachma a day). On the other hand, S.'s remark might be seen as doubly ironic, as for him the teaching of excellence was beyond any price.

- λέγειν· | οὐ γὰρ ἔμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιοχρεῶν ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἴα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ
- 21 ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἶος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅτι ὀρμήσειεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο | μαντεύσασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ᾧ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἶη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.
- b Σκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως· “Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν | σύννοϊδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ᾶν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δῆπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.” καὶ πολλὸν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει· ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τιὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ
- c τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἶπερ

¹⁷ For this whole incident, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

¹⁸ Reference is to the democratic party that fled from Athens

APOLOGY

arrogant. For the explanation I'm giving is not mine, but I'll refer you to the one who said this, who is worthy of your belief. As witness to my wisdom, if wisdom indeed it is and of what kind, I shall present to you the god at Delphi.¹⁷ I think you know Chaerephon. He was my comrade from early days and both companion and fellow fugitive in your democracy during that exile of yours and returned from exile with you.¹⁸ And of course you know what kind of man Chaerephon was and how passionate he was in whatever he turned his hand to. Indeed one day he went to Delphi and had the temerity to ask the following question of the oracle—and, as I say, don't heckle me, gentlemen—he actually asked if anyone was wiser than me. Now the Pythian priestess replied that no one was wiser. His brother here will testify to you on these matters, since he himself has died. 21

Now consider why I say these things. It's because I'm going to tell you where my bad reputation comes from. You see, when I heard of this, I reasoned with myself as follows: "Whatever does the god mean? And what on earth is he hinting at? I assure you I'm conscious that I'm not wise in any way great or small. So whatever does he mean by declaring that *I* am the wisest? I can't possibly think he's lying: it wouldn't be right for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he could possibly mean. Then with much hesitation I turned to a search along the following sort of lines. I went to one of the people reputed to be wise to refute the oracular response there if anywhere, and 21

to Piraeus during the regime of the Thirty. S. stayed in Athens (see further, Introduction to *Apology*, section 5 (iii)). On Chaerephon, see Nails, 86–87.

που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι “Οὐτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.” διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὄνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, | ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ—ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὐκ ἄπειρα ἐπειρώμενη αὐτῷ δεικνύναι

d ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ’ οὐκ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ’ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, | ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἶεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καὶ μοι ταῦτα

e ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

Μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιείσθαι· | ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάλθηθῆ λέγειν—ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμούντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγον δεῖν τοῦ πλεί-

22

APOLOGY

prove to the oracle that: "This man is wiser than I am, but you said I was the wisest." So by examining him carefully—there's no need for me to tell you his name; he was one of the politicians who, when I investigated him, gave me this impression, fellow Athenians—and by engaging him in conversation it seemed to me that this man seemed to be wise both to a lot of other people and above all to himself, but he wasn't. Then I attempted to demonstrate to him that he thought he was wise, but wasn't. Consequently then I earned his dislike and that of many of those who were standing by. But I went away thinking to myself that I was wiser than this particular fellow. It's probable, of course, that neither of us knows anything that is fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something without knowing it, whereas I, just as I don't know, I don't think I do either. At least it seems I'm wiser than this man in just this one minor respect, that I don't even think I know what I don't know. Then I went to another of those reputed to be wiser than the first fellow, and I got exactly the same impression. And there too I upset him and a lot of others who were there.

After this I now went on to one after another, realizing with distress and fear that I was disliked. Nevertheless it seemed essential to consider the god's activities as being of the highest importance. So I had to go on to all those who seemed to be wise in my search for the meaning of the oracle. And, by the dog,¹⁹ my fellow Athenians—for I have to tell you the truth—this was indeed the sort of impression I got. Those with a particularly high reputation

¹⁹ A particular oath of S., linked at *Grg.* 482b with the dog that is a god of the Egyptians (see also *Phd.* 99a).

- στου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, | ἄλλοι δὲ
 δοκοῦντες φανλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς
 τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπι-
 δεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινας ποιοῦντος ἵνα μοι καὶ
 ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτι-
 κούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ
 b τὸς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα
 ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἔμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον
 ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα
 ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διη-
 ρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, | ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθά-
 νοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄν-
 δρες, τάληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν
 ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον
 περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ
 τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ
 c ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τιμὴ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ
 θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφοδοὶ· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι
 μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι.
 τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πε-
 ποιηθότες, | καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν
 οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ
 οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος
 περιγεγονέναι ὧπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.
 d Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἦα· ἔμαυτῷ γὰρ

²⁰ The dithyramb was a choral song in honor of Dionysus, performed at dramatic festivals in Athens and elsewhere.

APOLOGY

it seemed to me were almost the most lacking as I investigated at the god's command. On the other hand others reckoned inferior were the most estimable people as regards sound thinking. Indeed I must explain my wanderings to you, like one undertaking laborious tasks, only to find that the oracle turned out to be unrefuted. After the politicians I went to the writers of tragedy and dithyrambs²⁰ and the rest, thinking that there I'd catch myself red-handed as more ignorant than them. So I would take up those of their works that seemed to me to have cost them the most effort and ask them what they meant, so that at the same time I might learn something from them. So, I'm ashamed to tell the truth, gentlemen, nevertheless I must do so. In a word, practically all of those present would have talked about what they had written better than the authors themselves. So once again in a short time I realized as regards the poets that they don't do what they do from wisdom, but from some natural inspiration, like prophets and oracle mongers.²¹ For indeed these people also say many fine things, but they know nothing of what they're talking about. It seemed to me that the poets too had had some such experience as this, and at the same time I noticed that because of their writings they thought they were the wisest of men in other ways as well, which they weren't. So I went away from there also thinking I was the superior in exactly the same way as I was to the politicians.

So I ended up going to the artisans, as I was aware that

²¹ For poets as speaking through inspiration rather than wisdom, see *Ion* 535eff.

συνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, | ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν
 e αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν ὥστε με ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. | ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 23 πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθαι μοι γέγονασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. | τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτου λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκρησθαι δὲ τῷ
 b ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν <εἶ> εἴποι ὅτι "Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός

APOLOGY

I understood nothing so to speak, whereas I knew that I'd find that they understood a lot of fine things. And in this I was not mistaken and indeed they understood things I didn't, and in this respect they were wiser than me.²² But, my fellow Athenians, it seemed to me that these fine craftsmen had the same shortcoming as the poets—because each of them practiced his craft well, he considered himself very wise in other highly important subjects as well—and this error of theirs concealed what wisdom they had. Consequently I asked myself on behalf of the oracle whether I should accept that I am what I am, being neither wise in any way in their kind of wisdom nor ignorant in their kind of ignorance, or have both qualities, as they do. So I replied to myself and the oracle that it would be to my advantage to be as I am. e

So as a result of this scrutiny, men of Athens, I incurred a great deal of enmity of a very harsh and grievous kind, so that from this there have arisen many slanders, and I got this label "wise." You see the bystanders think every time that I myself am wise in those matters in which I refute someone else. Whereas the probability is, fellow Athenians, that the god is in truth wise and this is what he means in this oracle: that human wisdom is of little worth, even worthless. And he seems to mean this man, Socrates, adding the use of my name, thus making an example of *me*, just as if one were to say: "This man is the wisest among you, you mortals, who, like Socrates, has recog- b

²² For S.'s (limited) respect for craftsmen and other professionals as practicing a definite skill (*technē*), see, e.g., *Grg.* 448ff.

ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.” ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ ἰ νῦν περιωὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἶωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ’ ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τῆν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι <οἱ>² ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κάπειτα οἶμαι εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, ἰ τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι “τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς” καὶ “θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν” καὶ “τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.” τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ οἶομαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν οἶμαι φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ

² add. De Strycker Slings

APOLOGY

nized that he is in truth of no value when it comes to wisdom."²³ So even now I'm still going round exploring these matters, inquiring in accordance with the god who among our citizenry and outsiders I am to consider wise. And whenever I consider someone isn't, I assist the god and demonstrate that he isn't wise. And as a result of this pursuit I've had no leisure to get involved in any civic duties worth mentioning, nor my own affairs, but am desperately poor on account of my service to the god. c

In addition to all this, the young men who follow me, who have plenty of time, the sons of the most wealthy, of their own free will delight in hearing people being cross-questioned, and frequently they try to emulate me and so engage in cross-examining others. Then I think they discover no lack of people who think they know things, but in fact know little or nothing. Consequently those who are interrogated by them get angry with me, but not themselves, and say that Socrates is a most disgusting individual and corrupts the young. And when anyone asks them what it is he does and what it is he teaches, they can't say and don't know, and in order not to appear to be lost for words, they trot out the stuff ready to hand against all philosophers, such as "the things in heaven and the things under the ground," and "not acknowledging the gods," and "he makes the weaker argument the stronger."²⁴ You see, I don't think they'd want to tell the truth, that they are conspicuous in giving the impression of knowledge, but actually knowing nothing. So in as much as I think they're d e

²³ For S.'s claims to knowledge, see General Introduction, section 3 (i).

²⁴ See above, 18b7-c1 and n. 7.

πολλοί, καὶ συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄρα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, | Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν
 24 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ, | καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμῆ καὶ τὰ αἴτια
 b ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ εἴαντε νῦν εἴαντε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουσαν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον | τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολι, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογῆσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ
 c πῶς ὦδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐξετάσωμεν.

APOLOGY

glory hunters, passionate and numerous, and talk about me intensely and plausibly, they have crammed your ears with their long-standing passionate slanders. As a result of this both Meletus and Anytus and Lycon²⁵ have attacked me: Meletus angry on behalf of the poets, Anytus the artisans and politicians, Lycon the orators. The result is, as I was saying at the beginning, I'd be surprised if I could get this slander that has become so prevalent out of your heads in so short a time. So this I tell you, men of Athens, is the truth and I speak without concealing anything great or small, or holding anything back. And yet I know more or less that I am hated by these very people, which is both evidence that I speak the truth and that this is the slander against me and these are the reasons for it. And whether you go searching now or another time, this is how you'll find it.

So let this be sufficient defense before you as regards the charges brought against me by my first accusers. I shall now attempt to make my defense against Meletus, the worthy patriot as he claims, and after this the subsequent accusers. Right, once again let's take their affidavit as if these are a different lot of accusers from the former ones. It goes something like this: it claims Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and does not acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges, but other newfangled divinities.²⁶ Such is the charge, but let's examine each item of this charge separately.

²⁵ On Anytus, see above, n. 4, and see Nails, on Lycon, 188–89, and on Meletus, 202, and (for an unflattering description) *Euthphr.* 2b7–3a5.

²⁶ The indictment is also quoted, with minor differences from *Apology*, by Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1 and Diog. Laert. 2.40.

Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. | ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι. |

d καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πλείστου ποιῆ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἴθι δὴ νυν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἴσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, | ὡς φῆς, ἐμέ, εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. — Ὅρας, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, | τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ;

Οἱ νόμοι.

e Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρώπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους;

Οὔτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί.

Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἰοί τέ | εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν;

Μάλιστα.

APOLOGY

You see he says I'm guilty of corrupting the young. But I say, men of Athens, that Meletus is the guilty one because he's playing about with what is serious, irresponsibly bringing people to court, pretending to be in earnest about matters and concerned about things he never cared about before. I shall try to prove to you too that this is so.²⁷

Come up here, Meletus, and tell me: do you think there is *nothing of greater importance than how our young people are to be the best possible?* d

I do.

Then come on and tell these people: who makes them better? It's clear you know: after all you do care. Having discovered who it is who corrupts them, me, as you claim, you bring me forward and accuse me in front of these people. So come on and say who makes them better and point out to them who it is. Do you see, Meletus, you're silent and have nothing to say? And yet don't you think it's a disgrace and sufficient evidence of what I'm saying that you've never cared about this. Well tell us, like the good man you are, who makes them better?

The laws.

But that's not what I'm asking, my very good friend, but who is the person who first and foremost knows what the laws actually are? e

The jurymen here, Socrates.

How do you mean, Meletus? Are these people able to educate the young and make them better?

Certainly.

²⁷ For the Socratic ethical arguments underlying the subsequent interrogation of Meletus (24c10–28a2), see General Introduction, section 3 (ii).

Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ;
Ἄπαντες.

Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δῆ; οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους
ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ; |

25 Καὶ οὗτοι.

Τί δέ, οἱ βουλευταί;

Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. |

Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ
ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεῖ-
νοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;

Κάκεῖνοι.

Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς
ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, | ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω
λέγεις;

Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.

b Πολλὴν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι
ἀπόκριναί· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ
μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶ-
ναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοῦναντίον τούτου πάν
εἷς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι,
οἱ ἵππικοί, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ συνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται
ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; | οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε,
καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάν-
τως δῆπου, ἐάντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε

²⁸ "The Council" (*Boulē*), a body of five hundred, fifty mem-
bers from each of the ten tribes, elected annually by lot from

APOLOGY

Do you mean all of them, or only some and not others?
All of them.

Well done, by Hera! You're saying there's no shortage of people to help. What then? Do the members of the public here make them better or not?

Yes, they too.

25

What then, the members of the Boule²⁸ too?

Yes the councilors too.

Well you don't mean to say, Meletus, that the people in the Assembly, the Assemblymen, corrupt the young? Or do they too, all of them, make them better?

Yes those as well.

It seems then that the Athenians all make them finer and better except me: I'm the only one who corrupts them. Is that what you're saying?

That's exactly what I'm saying.

Ha! You're condemning me to a great misfortune. Again answer me this: do you think it's the same with horses? Is it that all human beings make them better, but only one ruins them? Or is it the complete opposite of this, there's one person, or very few, trained equestrians, who can make them better? But the majority, even if they're familiar with and use horses, ruin them? Isn't this the case, Meletus, with horses and all other animals. Entirely so, I think, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree with it. It

b

citizens over thirty, who sat in shifts of fifty (*aprytany*) continually throughout the year in the Tholos in the Agora, and carried on state business, preparing an agenda for the Assembly (*Ekklesia*) (see 25a5). S.'s point here concerning the Assembly gains force from the fact that membership was open to all adult male citizens.

πολλή γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ
 εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελού-
 c σιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι
 οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀπο-
 φαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέλη-
 κεν περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις. |

Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον
 ἐστὶν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολιταῖς χρηστοῖς ἢ πονη-
 ροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδέν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ.
 οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγ-
 γυτάτω αὐτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; |

Πάνυ γε.

d Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων βλά-
 πτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις
 βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; |

Οὐ δῆτα.

Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθεί-
 ροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα
 ἢ ἄκοντα;

Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε.

Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος
 εἶ | τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν
 ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ
 τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν,

²⁹ The verbal root of "care" is *mel-*, in its various forms; S. is punning on Meletus' name as the man whose name leads us to

APOLOGY

would be a very happy circumstance regarding the young if only one person corrupts them and the rest do them good. But the fact is, Meletus, that you're giving adequate proof that you've never had any concern for the young and you're clearly revealing your indifference because you've never had any care for the things for which you have brought me here.²⁹ c

And tell us another thing, in the name of Zeus, Meletus, whether it's better to live among good citizens, or bad ones? Well, man, answer! It's not a difficult question I'm asking. Don't the bad ones always do some harm to those who are regularly closest to them, and the good ones some good?

Of course.

Is there anybody who wants to be harmed by those who live around him rather than be benefited? Answer, like the good man you are. Indeed the law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who wants to be harmed? d

Certainly not.

Come on then, are you bringing me here on the grounds that I corrupt the young men and make them worse deliberately, or involuntarily?

Deliberately, I say.

What? Are you at your age so much wiser than me at mine that *you* know that bad people always do some harm to those who live in close contact with them, and good

imagine he "cares," often used in close proximity to Meletus' name; cf. *ameleian* ("absence of care," "indifference," c3) and see also 24c8, d4; 26b1-2. Similar punning on Meletus' name by S. is also found in *Euthphr.* 2dff.

e ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἂν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο <τὸ> τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, | ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλου
26 ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδη. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοθετεῖν· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἂν μάθω, | παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφηνες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

Ἄλλα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δηλὸν
b ἤδη ἐστὶν οὐγὰρ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πάποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δηλὸν δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἢ ἐγράψω θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; | οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.

Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ
c τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινος θεοῦς—καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ

APOLOGY

people do good, whereas *I* have come to such a pitch of e
ignorance that I don't even know that if I make one of my
associates evil it's probable that I shall be badly treated by
him, so that I do as much harm as this intentionally, as you
claim? I don't believe this accusation of yours, Meletus,
and I don't think anybody else does either. Either I don't
corrupt them, or, if I do, it's involuntary: so you're lying on 26
both counts. But if I do corrupt them involuntarily, it's not
the law to bring people here for such misdemeanors but
take them aside and give them a good talking to and put
them straight. You see it's clear that if I understand, I shall
stop doing what I'm doing involuntarily. You on the other
hand ducked the issue and were unwilling to pardon me
and give me a talking to, and brought me here instead,
where it's the law to bring those in need of punishment,
not instruction.

Well anyhow the fact is, fellow Athenians, that what I
was saying is by now clear, that Meletus has never yet had b
any care great or small for these things. Nevertheless,
Meletus, tell us in what way do you claim that I corrupt
the young? Or is it clear that according to the indictment
you have submitted I've been teaching them not to ac-
knowledge the gods the city acknowledges, but newfan-
gled deities? Is it by teaching this sort of thing you claim
I corrupt them?

Of course, that's exactly what I'm saying.

Then by these very gods, Meletus, that this argument is c
about, tell me and these men here more specifically, be-
cause I cannot understand whether you mean I'm teach-
ing them to acknowledge that certain gods exist—and so
I myself accept that gods exist and I'm not completely

τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικῶ—οὐ μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, | καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους, ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.

Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς.

d Ὡ θανμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, | τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.

Ἄναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε; καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπίερους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἄναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι | ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθηθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελάω, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα; ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι; |

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, στυγῶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-

³⁰ S. is here exploiting the ambiguity in the Greek *nomizō* ("acknowledge" or "believe in") to provoke Meletus into making the easily refutable charge of atheism (e5); see further, Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

APOLOGY

atheist, and I'm not guilty on this count—though not the ones the city acknowledges, but different ones, and that's what you're charging me with: they're different; or are you saying that I myself don't acknowledge the gods at all and this is what I'm teaching the rest?

That's what I'm saying: you don't acknowledge the gods at all.³⁰

My dear Meletus! What makes you say that? I don't accept that the sun and moon are gods, as everyone else does? d

No, by Zeus, members of the jury, since he claims the sun is made of stone and the moon of earth.

My dear Meletus, do you think you're prosecuting Anaxagoras? And you are so contemptuous of these people here and think they're so illiterate that they don't know that the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are bursting with such topics?³¹ And furthermore are the young learning this sort of stuff from me, which they can buy for a drachma at most from the orchestra and have a laugh at Socrates if he claims the ideas as his own, especially as they're so absurd? Well, in the name of Zeus, is this what you think of me? I don't acknowledge that any god exists? e

Indeed you don't, by Zeus, in any way, shape or form.

You're incredible, Meletus; what's more, it seems to me, you don't believe this yourself. You see, fellow Athe-

³¹ On Anaxagoras and his "books," see *Phd.* 97c–98b8. For Anaxagoras' reported views on the nature of the sun and the moon, see DK 59A42, (Waterfield, 128). The *orchestra* mentioned here (e1) was an area of the Athenian Agora.

ναίοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτε-
 χνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ
 27 νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν γὰρ ὡσπερ αἶνιγμα συν-
 τιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ “Ἄρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ
 σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντίᾳ ἐμαντῶ
 λέγοντος, ἢ ἔξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς
 ἀκούοντας;” | οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέ-
 γειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι
 “Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νο-
 μίζων.” καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

Συνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἧ μοι φαίνεται
 b ταῦτα λέγειν | σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς
 δέ, ὅπερ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ
 μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους
 ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν
 νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; |
 ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυ-
 βείτω· ἔσθ’ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ
 πράγματα; ἢ ἀλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἀλητικὰ
 δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ
 βούλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀποκρίναι· ἔσθ’ ὅστις
 c δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ
 νομίζει;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ὡς ὠνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωῖ ἀναγ-
 καζόμενος. | οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν

APOLOGY

nians, this man seems very much to me to be an outrageous intemperate fellow and he's simply submitted this indictment out of some kind of insolence, self-indulgence and youthfulness. In fact he's like someone putting together a riddle to test somebody. "Will Socrates, the so-called wise man, realize that I'm having a laugh and talking against myself, or shall I fool him and the rest of those listening?" You see he seems to me to be contradicting himself in the indictment, as if he were to say: "Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods, but is a believer in gods." Yet this is typical of someone playing games. 27

So consider with me, members of the jury, what he appears to mean by this. You, Meletus, answer my questions, and you people, as I pleaded with you right at the start, remember not to heckle me if I present my arguments in my usual way. b

Is there any human being, Meletus, who thinks that human affairs exist, but not human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make one disruption after another. Or is there anyone who doesn't admit the existence of horses, but does admit things related to horses? Or who does not admit the existence of flute players, yet admits there are things related to flute players? There is none, you most excellent of fellows. If you don't wish to answer, I'm telling you and everyone else here. But at least answer the question that follows on from this: is there anyone who admits the existence of things related to spiritual matters, but doesn't admit the existence of spirits? c

There isn't.

How helpful you've been with this reluctant answer under pressure from these people here! Therefore you claim that I both acknowledge spiritual matters and teach

καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἶτε παλαιά, ἀλλ' οὖν
 δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω,
 καὶ δαίμονας δῆπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν
 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ· | τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα,
 d ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνη. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θε-
 οὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὔ;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, | εἰ
 μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη ὃ ἐγὼ
 φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ
 ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπει-
 δήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν
 παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλ-
 λων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, | τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν
 e παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτο-
 πον εἶη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο [ἦ]³
 καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμίονους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ
 ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ
 ταῦτα⁴ οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γρα-
 φὴν | ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς
 ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθεις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν
 νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαι-
 28 μόνια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε
 δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή
 ἐστίν.

³ Secl. Forster

⁴ Secl. Schanz

APOLOGY

them, whether in fact they're new or old; but in any case I acknowledge spiritual matters according to your argument, and you've even sworn this in your indictment. And if I admit spiritual matters, then I presume I must also admit spiritual beings. Isn't this so? Of course it is. I take it you agree as you're not answering. And do we not regard the spirits as either gods, or the children of gods? Do you agree or not? d

Certainly.

If then I do acknowledge spirits,³² as you claim, if the spirits are some sort of gods, then this would be what I say, that you are making riddles and playing about, saying that I don't believe in gods and yet on the other hand again I do believe in gods, if indeed I do believe in spirits. But if again the spirits are some kind of bastards of the gods or children of nymphs, or indeed any others they're said to come from: what human being would believe that children of gods exist, but not gods? Why, it would be just as absurd if someone admitted that there are offspring of horses and asses, namely mules, but didn't believe that horses and asses exist. Well, Meletus, there's no way you brought this indictment except as a way of trying this out on us, or else you were at a loss for a true offense you could bring against me; but there is no contrivance by which you could persuade any human being even with limited intelligence that a person can think that there are things spiritual and god-like, and again that same person thinks there are neither spirits, nor gods, nor heroes. e 28

³² *Daimones*, semidivine beings, offspring of gods or gods and mortals, who serve as intermediaries between gods and mortals.

Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, | ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴανπερ αἰρήῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ
 b φθόνος. ἂ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· “Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;” | ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι “Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ
 c ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἢ μῆτηρ | αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ “Ἐκτορα ἀποκτείνειν, θεὸς οὐσα, οὐτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· “ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῆ—αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, ‘μεθ’ Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος’—ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ | τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ

APOLOGY

But the fact is, fellow Athenians, to show that I'm not guilty according to Meletus' indictment, I don't think I need much by way of a defense, but even this much is enough. But what I was saying in my previous remarks, the fact that a great deal of hostility has arisen against me among many people, that, you can be very sure, is true. And this is what will convict me, if I'm convicted, not Meletus nor Anytus, but the prejudice and resentment of the majority. Indeed what has convicted many other good men too, I think, will also convict me. There's no fear it will stop with me. b

So perhaps someone might say: "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, that you have pursued such activities as a result of which you risk being put to death?" To this I would offer the just response that: "You are wrong, my friend, if you think a man who has even a little bit of worth in him has to take the risk of life or death into account, rather than considering this only when he does something—whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, and whether it's the action of a good or a bad man. You see by your argument those demigods who died at Troy would be worthless, all of them, including the son of Thetis who so scorned danger rather than endure some disgrace, that when, in his eagerness to kill Hector, his mother, who was a goddess, said to him something like this, I think: 'My son, if you are going to avenge the death of your companion Patroclus and kill Hector, you will die yourself—for immediately, I tell you,' she says, 'after Hector doom awaits'—on hearing this he thought little of death and danger, but c

d δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, ‘Αὐτίκα,’ φησί, ‘τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης.’ μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;”¹

Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ’ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐδ’ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις τις καὶ ἐκινδύνεον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, | ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤθηται τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντᾳ με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, 29 ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ’ ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τὰν εἶη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ’ ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος | σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γὰρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἄ

³³ “Son of Thetis” is Achilles. The words of Thetis and those of Achilles are a paraphrase of Hom. *Il.* 18.95–104.

³⁴ A timely reminder to the jury of S.’s military service and its

APOLOGY

being much more afraid of living the life of an evil man and not avenging his friends: 'May I die right now,' he says, 'when I have made the unjust man pay the penalty, in order not to remain here a laughing stock beside the crooked-beaked ships, a burden on the earth.'³³ You don't think he had any thought for death and danger, do you?"

This is in truth how it is, fellow Athenians. Wherever someone takes his stand thinking it's the best thing to do, or is posted by his commander, he must remain there, in my opinion, and face the danger without taking into account either death or anything else rather than the prospect of disgrace. So I would have done a dreadful thing, fellow Athenians, if, when the commanders whom you had chosen to lead me gave me orders both in Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, on that occasion I remained where they had posted me like anyone else and risked being killed, but when the god commanded, as I thought and assumed, that I must spend my life in philosophy and examining myself and others, I then abandoned my post because I was afraid of dying or some other difficulty.³⁴ That would have been dreadful and in truth then someone would have justly taken me to court because I don't believe gods exist, disobeying the oracle and fearing death and thinking I'm wise, though I'm not. For fear of death I tell you, gentlemen, is nothing other than thinking you're wise when you're not: you see, it is to think you know what

connection with his present stance. For the campaign at Potidaea in Thrace in 432, see Thuc. 1.56-65, the battle of Delium (424), Thuc. 4.90, and for the fighting at Amphipolis, (422) Thuc. 5.2. S.'s exceptional hardiness and bravery are described by Plato at *Symp.* 219e-20c, 221a-b, *La.* 181b.

- οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν
- b ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτο⁵ πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονεΐδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, | ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει
- c οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς | ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται —εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε· “³Ω Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀλῶς ἔτι
- d τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῆῃ” —εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἶποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι “Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ

⁵ καὶ τοῦτο βΤWΡV Stob.: καίτοι Eus.

APOLOGY

you don't know. For nobody knows about death whether it is the greatest of all good things for mankind, but they fear it as if they know full well it's the greatest of evils. And how can this, thinking you know things that you don't know, not be ignorance of a most disgraceful kind? Perhaps it's here too, members of the jury, that I'm different from most people, and if indeed I were to say I'm wiser than someone in some way, it's in this respect: that not adequately knowing what goes on in Hades, I also think that I don't know.³⁵ But that to do wrong and disobey one's superior, both god and human, is bad and shameful, that I do know. So I shall never be afraid of nor run away from those things of which I don't know if they are actually good, in preference to those things that I know are evil. The result is that not even if you now acquit me, not believing Anytus, who said either I should not have been brought here in the first place,³⁶ or, since I have been brought here, it's impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I were to be acquitted your sons, in already eagerly pursuing what Socrates teaches, will all be totally corrupted—if in view of this if you were to say to me: "Socrates, we're not on this occasion following Anytus' advice and we're discharging you on condition however that you no longer spend your time on this inquiry and have no more to do with philosophy; but if you are caught still doing this, you will be put to death."—if then, as I was saying, you were to release me on these terms, I would

³⁵ This agnostic attitude toward the afterlife (see also *Ap.* 40c5ff.) should be compared with S.'s position in *Phaedo*.

³⁶ Compare *Cri.* 45e for the view that S.'s trial was unnecessary.

ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ
 οἶός τε ᾧ, | οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ
 ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι Ὡ ἄριστε
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδο-
 κιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ
 αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα,
 e καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ
 τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ
 φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῆ
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, |
 30 ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν
 μοι μὴ δοκῆ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι
 τὰ πλείστον ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαν-
 λότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυ-
 τέρῳ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ,
 μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, | ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρῳ ἔστὲ γέ-
 νει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι
 οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ
 τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδέν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων
 ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ
 b πρεσβυτέρους μῆτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μῆτε χρη-
 μάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς
 ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι Ὅνκ ἐκ χρημάτων
 ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα

APOLOGY

say to you: "Much as I have affection and love for you, men of Athens; yet I shall obey the god rather than you; and so long as I have breath and am able, I shall not stop practicing philosophy and giving advice and explanations to whichever one of you I regularly bump into, saying the sort of thing I usually do: 'Most excellent of men, as an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest of cities and one most distinguished for wisdom and strength, aren't you ashamed to be spending your time acquiring as much money as you can, or gaining reputation and honor, but show no interest or concern for wisdom and truth and seeing to it that your soul will be in the best possible state?'³⁷ And if anyone disputes this and says he does have concern, I shall not let him go immediately, or go away, but question him, examine him closely and test him. And if he seems to me not to have acquired goodness, but says he has, I shall reproach him because he regards things of the highest value to be of least value and inferior things to be of higher value. Indeed I shall do this no matter who I encounter, young or old, citizen or noncitizen, though more to you citizens, to the extent that you are closer to me by kinship. You see this is what the god commands, be assured, and I think that no greater good has come to you in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing other than persuading both the younger and the older ones among you not to concern yourselves with your physical and monetary needs as a priority nor so intently, as to see to it that your soul is in the best possible condition, saying that 'Goodness'³⁸ comes not from money, but from goodness

³⁷ The nature, significance and destiny of the soul is the main topic of *Phaedo*.

³⁸ On "goodness" (*aretē*) see above, n. 14. (see also 31b5).

ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.
 | εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ'
 ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ· εἰ δέ τις μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ
 ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, “ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ
 c μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ
 μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.”

Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμένιατέ
 μοι οἷς ἐδεθήτην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω
 ἀλλ' ἀκούειν | καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε
 ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῶν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα
 ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο.
 εἶ γὰρ ἴστε, εἴαν με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον
 ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν | βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυ-
 d τος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι
 ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε
 μεντὰν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς πον μεγάλα
 κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, | ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν
 ἢ οὐτοσὶ νῦν ποιεῖ, ἀνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτει-
 νύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ
 ὑπὲρ ἐμαντοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ
 ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν
 e ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. εἴαν γὰρ με ἀποκτείνητε,
 οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ

APOLOGY

money and the other good things all come to men in both their public and private lives.' If therefore I corrupt the young by saying this, this would be harmful; but if anyone claims I'm saying anything other than this, he's talking nonsense." In response to this I would say: "men of Athens, either follow Anytus, or don't, and either acquit me, or not, bearing in mind that I'm not going to do anything else, even if I'm going to be put to death many times."³⁹ c

Don't heckle, fellow Athenians, but keep to what I asked of you, which was not to heckle at anything I say, but listen. You see I think you'll benefit by listening. The reason is that I'm going to tell you something else at which you'll perhaps protest, but don't do this on any account, because you know full well that if you put me to death, being the kind of person I say I am, you'll not harm me more than you'll harm yourselves. For neither Meletus nor Anytus would harm me: they couldn't; for I don't think it's allowed by divine law for a better man to be harmed by an inferior. The latter might perhaps put a person to death, exile him or deprive him of his citizenship. Well perhaps this man, and some other for all I know, thinks this is a great evil, but I don't think so, but far more it's to do what he's now doing: attempting to put a man to death unjustly. Now therefore, my fellow Athenians, far from making a defense on my own behalf, as one might suppose, I must make it on your behalf to prevent you from making a mistake regarding the gift the god has given you, by condemning me. For if you put me to death, you won't easily find another like me, literally, even if it's rather comical to say e

³⁹ On the apparent differences between S.'s stance here and in *Crito*, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 4.

- γελιοότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ἢ ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι—τοιούτον τινα ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ
- 31 πείθων καὶ ὄνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιούτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, ἢ κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιούτος οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαίτε·
- b οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἔμαντοῦ πάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὡσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. ἢ καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα.
- c ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

APOLOGY

so, attached by the god to the city as if to a horse that, while it's large and of good stock, nevertheless is rather sluggish because of its size and needing waking up by some horse-fly; just as such, it seems to me, the god has attached me to the city—the kind of person who wakes you up, prevails upon you and reproaches each one of you and never stops landing on you all day long all over the place. You won't get anyone else like this easily, but if you do as I say, you will spare me. It may be perhaps because you are irritated, like people in a half sleep being woken up, you would swat me, do what Anytus says, and easily put me to death; then you'd spend the rest of your lives asleep, unless the god were to send you someone else, in his care for you. That I really am the sort of person who has been gifted to the city by the god, you'd realize from the following. You see it doesn't seem to be in human nature for me to have neglected all my own affairs, and put up with my household being neglected for so many years now, but to be doing your business constantly, approaching each of you individually like a father or elder brother and persuading you to concern yourself with goodness. And if I gained anything from all of this and urged you on in this while making money out of it, I would have some explanation for my conduct. But as it is, you can see for yourselves that my accusers, while proceeding so shamelessly with their accusations in all other respects, in this particular instance were unable to find the nerve to provide a witness to say that I ever exacted or asked for any payment. For I think I can provide an adequate witness that I'm telling the truth: my poverty.

31

b

c

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ
 μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλευῶ περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, |
 δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ
 ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτίον
 ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέ-
 d γοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ
 καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο.
 ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις
 γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ
 ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. | τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
 ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν, καὶ παγκά-
 λως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι. εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πο-
 λιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν
 e ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ
 ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀνθρώ-
 πων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῶν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ
 γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα
 32 καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν
 ἐστὶ τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ
 μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ
 μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῶν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων,
 | οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ
 μοι τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπει-
 κάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δέισας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων
 δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῶν φορτικά μὲν καὶ
 δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλ-

APOLOGY

Perhaps then it would seem absurd that I do go around offering this advice in private and meddle in other people's business, yet in public I don't have the guts to come forward in your Assembly and offer the city my advice. The reason for this is what you've heard me say in various places, that something god-inspired and spirit-like comes to me, which of course Meletus put in his indictment by way of a joke. This is something that began when I was a boy; it's a kind of voice and whenever it occurs it always diverts me away from what I was about to do, but never turns me toward it. It's this that stops me taking up politics, and a jolly good thing it does, it seems to me.⁴⁰ Because you know all too well, my fellow Athenians, that if I'd tried to enter political life way back, I would have perished long ago and I would have been of no benefit at all either to you or myself. And don't get angry at my telling the truth: for there is no one on earth who will survive if he genuinely opposes you or any other democracy and prevents much injustice and lawbreaking taking place in the city; but he who in actual fact fights on behalf of what is just must, if he's going to survive even for a short time, do so in his capacity as a private citizen and not as a public servant.

I shall provide you with important evidence for these things, not arguments, but something you respect: deeds. Hear then from me what has happened to me so that you'll know that I would not give way to a single person contrary to justice for fear of being put to death, not doing so even if I were to die there and then. I'll tell you some of the low-down stuff typical of the law courts, yet true. I never

⁴⁰ On S.'s "spirit voice" (*daimonion*), see *Euthyphro*, trans. n. 9.

- b λην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε⁶ ἀθρόους κρίνειν, | παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων ἐνδεικνύμαι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελεύοντων
- c καὶ βοῶντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧ μὴ μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους
- d ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐτὸ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν

⁶ ἐβουλεύσασθε T Arm.: ἐβούλεσθε BWPV

⁴¹ The "prytany," the period of the tenth of the year of the fifty members of the *Boulē* from the tribe whose turn it was for duty, b6 (and see above, n. 28).

⁴² The incident is the sea battle of Arginusae in the Peloponnesian War (406), a victory for the Athenians, but involving great

APOLOGY

ever held any other political office, but I was a member of the Council. It so happened that our tribe Antiochis was on executive duty⁴¹ when you decided to put the ten commanders on trial all together for not picking up their shipwrecked crews: illegally, as it was decided by all of you at a later date.⁴² At the time I was the only one of the Prytany who opposed you doing anything illegal and voted against it. So with the orators ready to denounce me and arrest me, and you shouting at them to get on with it, I thought I should rather run the risk with the law and justice on my side than side with you in your unjust proposals for fear of imprisonment or execution. And this was when the city was still run by the democracy. When the oligarchy took over, the Thirty in their turn sent for me and four others to go to the Tholos and ordered us to bring Leon the Salmianian from Salamis for execution.⁴³ Indeed such were the orders they gave on many occasions to many others as they wanted to implicate as many as they could. On that occasion, however, I made it clear again not in my words but in my actions that my worries about death were absolutely nil, if it wasn't rather blunt to say so, but not to carry

loss of life through drowning. The whole incident is recorded at *Xen. Hell.* 1.7., including S.'s opposition to the motion (see also *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.2).

⁴³ The Thirty was the name given to the oligarchic junta that took over at Athens for a short period after the defeat of Athens in 404. The Tholos was the round chamber, the foundations of which are still visible in the Agora, where the Council met, taken over by the Thirty at this period. Salamis is a small island just off the Attic coast. For Leon, see Nails, 185–86. For this incident in context, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 5 (iii).

ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, | οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὄχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθαι-
 e νον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο
 33 περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; | πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὐς δὴ διαβάλλοντες | ἐμὲ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἔμαν-
 τούτου πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοὶ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε
 b πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἔμαντὸν ἐρω-
 τᾶν, καὶ ἕαν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, | οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδί-
 दाξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ

APOLOGY

out anything unjust or impious, *that* is my whole concern. You see that regime didn't scare *me*, strong as it was, into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the Tholos, the other four went off to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went off back home. And perhaps I'd have been executed for this, if the regime hadn't been broken up soon after. You'll have many witnesses to this. e

So do you think I would have lasted so many years if I had been active in public life, and in doing things worthy of a good man, had defended the just and, as one must, considered this of the highest importance? Far from it, my fellow Athenians, nor would any other human being. But throughout my life this is how I shall appear to have been, both in public life, if I suppose I did accomplish anything, and in my private life the same, having never ever colluded with anyone in anything contrary to justice, including any of those who my slanderers claim to be my pupils. I have never been anyone's teacher, but if anyone, young or old, is keen to hear me speak and getting on with my activities, I have never begrudged anyone; I don't charge for conversation, nor do I refuse if no money is offered, but I make myself available to rich and poor alike for questioning as well as if anyone wants to hear and give an answer to whatever I have to say. And if any of these people turns out good or not, I would not rightly be held responsible when I have never ever promised anyone anything, nor have I taught them. But if anyone claims he ever learned anything from me or heard anything in private that none b 33

ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

Ἄλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὓσι δ' οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἢ προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ᾧπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστιν καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δῆπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὓσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πῶποτε τι συνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· ἢ εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὦν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἢ ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τε-

APOLOGY

of the others have heard, be well assured that he's not telling the truth.

Well then, why ever do some people enjoy spending a lot of time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth. They take pleasure in hearing people being cross-questioned who think they're wise, but aren't in fact; for it's not unpleasant. But I've been instructed by the god to do this, as I claim, both in oracles and dreams and in every way that any other divine dispensation tells man to do anything whatever.⁴⁴ This, my fellow Athenians, is true and easy to prove. For if I am indeed corrupting some youngsters and have corrupted others, if some of them realized when they were older that in their youth I gave them bad advice at any time, they should surely by now have come forward and accuse me and have me punished. But if they themselves were not willing, then other members of their household should come forward, fathers, brothers and the rest of their relations; if their kinsmen suffered any harm from me, now's the time to recall it and have me punished. But in any case there are many of them actually here who I can see. First there's Crito over there, a man of my own age and fellow demesman, father of Critobulus here, then Lysanias of the deme Sphettus, father of Aeschines here. Again there's Antiphon of the deme Cephisia, father of Epigenes and now others here whose brothers were involved in this business, Nicostratus, Theozotides' son, Theodotus' brother—well

⁴⁴ For the significance of dreams for S., see *Cri.* 44a–b, *Phd.* 60e–61b.

τελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεη-
 θείη—καὶ Παράλιος ὄδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης
 34 ἀδελφός· ὄδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελ-
 φός οὐτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδω-
 ρος ὄδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν
 εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ
 παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· | εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελά-
 θετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω
 εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τούναντίον εὔρη-
 σετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ δια-
 φθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν,
 b ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ δι-
 εφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ
 ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων
 προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες
 ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, | ὅτι συνίσασσι
 Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖ-
 σθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα.
 c τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεῖς ἑαυ-
 τοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῖ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα
 ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς
 μετὰ πολλῶν δακρῶν, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασά-

⁴⁵ One of only three references in the Platonic corpus by Plato to himself, the others being 38b below and *Phd.* 59b10, where his absence is noted from the gathering in prison on the day of S.'s execution (see Introduction to *Phaedo*, n. 4). Of the others men-

APOLOGY

Theodotus is dead so he can't appeal to him—and here's Paralius, Demodocus' son, whose brother was Theages, here's Adeimantus, Ariston's son whose brother Plato is here,⁴⁵ and Aeantodorus whose brother is Apollodorus here. And many others I could name for you, one of whom Meletus should have produced as a witness particularly in his own speech, but if he forgot then let him call him forward now—I'll stand aside—and let him say if he has anything of this kind. But you'll find it's completely the opposite of this, gentlemen, they're all ready to support me, the corrupter, the one who treats their families badly, so Meletus and Anytus claim. For perhaps those who have been corrupted themselves have a reason to support me, but those who are uncorrupted, rather elderly by now, the kinsmen of these people, what other reason do they have for supporting me except the right and just one: that they are aware that Meletus is lying, and I am telling the truth? 34

Well then, gentlemen, what I may have by way of a defense is more or less this, and perhaps some more of a similar nature. But perhaps one or other of you may be annoyed on calling to mind his own situation, if, in defending a less important case than this one, he begged and implored the jurors with many tears, and brought forward b

tioned: for Crito, see *Cri.* passim, and *Phd.* 115bff.; Apollodorus is the narrator of the *Symposium* and is noted for his emotional outbursts at *Phd.* 59a and 117d. Adeimantus, Plato's brother, is one of the two main respondents to S. in *Republic*. Aeschines (of Sphettus) was a writer of *Sōkratikoī Logoi* (on which, see General Introduction, section 2 (iii)). For the others, see brief mentions in Nails. c

μενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, | καὶ ἄλλους τῶν
 οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων
 ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν
 ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας
 αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς
 d τούτοις θέιτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν
 οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν—ἐπι-
 εικῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι “Ἐμοί,
 ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ
 τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, | οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ'
 ἀπὸ πέτρης' πέφυκα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ
 οἰκείοί μοι εἰσι καὶ ὑεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς,
 εἷς μὲν μεράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ-
 δένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν
 ἀποψηφίσασθαι.” τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; |
 e οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς
 ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θά-
 νατον ἢ μῆ, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ
 καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι
 ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο
 τοῦνομα ἔχοντα— | εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος,
 35 ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστί τῳ Σωκράτῃ διαφέρειν
 τινὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες
 διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν
 ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχυρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ
 πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας ὅταν κρίνονται, | δοκοῦντας

APOLOGY

his children to arouse the maximum sympathy as well as many other members of his family and friends. But I shall do none of these things even though, as it might seem, I'm running the ultimate risk. Perhaps someone with this thought in mind may be more unbending toward me and enraged by these very things cast his vote in anger. Indeed, d
if there is any of you in this frame of mind—I don't actually think I deserve it, but if there is—I think it would be fair to address this person and say: "I surely also have some relations, my very good friend, and on this very point there is this from Homer: I too was not born 'of oak or of rock,'⁴⁶ but of men, so I do have family and indeed sons, men of Athens, three: one is already in his teens, the other two are children; but nevertheless I shall bring none of them up here and implore you to acquit me." Why then won't I do any of this? Not out of stubbornness, my fellow Athenians, nor out of disrespect to you. Whether I'm being e
courageous in the face of death or not, that's another story. But in view of my reputation, yours and that of the whole city I don't think it's honorable for me to do any of these things both because of my age and having the name I have: whether in fact it's true or false, all the same it's established that Socrates is different from the majority of people in some way. If then those of you who are reputed to be distinguished either in wisdom or courage or any other excellent quality,⁴⁷ are going to behave in such a way, it would be a disgrace. I have often seen people like this when they come to trial who are thought to amount to 35

⁴⁶ Hom. *Od.* 19.163.

⁴⁷ *Aretē* (see above, n. 14); see also below, b2.

μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ
 b ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃν τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετῇν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἕν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οἷοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς⁷ χρῆ ποιεῖν τοὺς | δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπῆοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἔλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος. |

Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι
 c δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κáθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, | ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὖν χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 d τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου

⁷ ἡμᾶς V Arm.

APOLOGY

something, but do some extraordinary things as if they think they'll suffer something terrible if they're put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you didn't put them to death! In my opinion these people bring disgrace to the city, so that any foreigner too would assume that those of the Athenians who are conspicuous for their goodness, whom they select from themselves for public offices and other duties, are no better than women.⁴⁸ This, my fellow Athenians, those of you who have any kind of reputation must not do,⁴⁹ nor if we do it, must you allow it, but make it absolutely clear that you'll be all the more likely to condemn him who produces these pitiful performances and makes the city a laughing stock, rather than the person who keeps quiet. b

But quite apart from reputation, members of the jury, it doesn't seem just to me to make appeals to the jury, nor to win acquittal by begging, but instruct them and win them over. For this is not the purpose for which a jurymen is sitting: to dispense justice as a personal favor, but to judge these cases with discrimination. Likewise he has sworn on oath not to favor whoever he pleases but to judge according to the laws. Consequently neither must we get you into the habit of perjuring yourselves, nor must you get used to doing so: for neither of us would be showing due piety. Do not therefore, my fellow Athenians, expect me to have to treat you in such ways that seem to me neither honorable nor just nor sanctified, especially, by Zeus, as I'm actually defending myself against a charge of c d

⁴⁸ On the Athenian popular attitude to women, see Dover, 98–102. See on S.'s wife, Xanthippe, *Phd.* 60a4–8.

⁴⁹ Or (on the alternative textual reading) “. . . those of us who have any kind of reputation . . .” (see textual notes).

τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἄν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἠγείσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, | καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἄν ἐμαντοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζω τε γάρ, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπη μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

- e
36 Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὥοιμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ. | νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη
- b Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὧφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

⁵⁰ On "acknowledging/believing in the gods," see above, 26b–28a, and Introduction to *Apology*, section 4.

⁵¹ The interval between the speeches was occupied by the casting of votes by the jury (for the procedure, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 2).

⁵² With a jury of, say, 500 and 280 to 220 against S., a transfer of 30 votes would have meant equal votes and, apparently, acquit-

APOLOGY

impiety by Meletus here. For clearly, if I were to win you over and coerce you by my pleadings, you who are under oath, I would be instructing you to believe that gods don't exist and by defending myself I would simply condemn myself on the charge that I don't acknowledge the gods.⁵⁰ But this is far from the truth. I do acknowledge them, my fellow Athenians, as none of my accusers does and I turn to you and to the god to make your judgment about me in a way that is likely to turn out best both for me and for you.

Many different causes contribute, my fellow Athenians, to my not being angry at this result: that you have found me guilty,⁵¹ and especially because what has happened is not unexpected to me; but I'm much more surprised at the number of votes that have been cast both for and against, for I wouldn't have thought the difference would be so small, but much larger. But as it is, it seems if only thirty had been cast on the other side, I would have got off. What's more, it seems to me, I've been acquitted as far as Meletus is concerned even now, and not only am I acquitted, but it's also clear to everyone that, if Anytus and Lycon hadn't come forward to prosecute me, he would have had to pay his 1,000 drachmas for not having gained a fifth share of the votes.⁵²

tal (see Stokes n. ad loc. for detailed discussion). S. jokingly postulates a three-way split of the votes against him between the three prosecutors, which implies that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in the prosecution, Meletus should have incurred a statutory fine of 1000 drachmas (intended to discourage frivolous or malicious prosecutions) for obtaining less than 100 votes, i.e., less than a fifth of the whole jury.

- Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ
 τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμῆσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ
 δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; | τί οὖν; τί ἀξίός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ
 ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον,
 ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ
 οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν
 c τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἠγησάμενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι
 ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σῶζεσθαι,
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα οἱ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἑμαυτῷ
 ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον
 ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ
 φημι, | ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν
 μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελείσθαι
 πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆῖ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρο-
 νιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς
 d τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρό-
 πον ἐπιμελείσθαι—τί οὖν εἰμι ἀξίος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος
 ὢν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν
 τοιοῦτον ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. | τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ
 πένητι εὐεργέτη δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
 τέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
 πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν

⁵³ On the proposal of alternative penalties by defense and prosecution, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 2.

APOLOGY

So then, the fellow reckons the penalty for me should be death. Well what penalty shall I propose in return, men of Athens?⁵³ Clearly what I deserve? What, then? What do I deserve to have done to me, or pay? Just because I didn't lead a quiet life, but showed no interest in what other people do: making money, running the household, military commands, political careers and the rest of the public offices, political clubs and factions that exist in the city,⁵⁴ since I thought I was in fact too fair-minded to be safe by entering on one of these. So I didn't then go where I wasn't going to be of any use either for you or myself if I went there, but by approaching individuals privately to offer them the greatest service, as I claim, that's where I went in my efforts to persuade each of you not to look to your own possessions before taking care of yourself with the aim of being as good and prudent as possible, nor to look to the interests of the city before looking to the city itself and to care for other things in the same way. What then do I deserve to have done to me seeing what sort of a man I am? Something good, men of Athens, if I must be given a penalty such as I truly deserve, and at that, the kind of good that would be appropriate for me. So what is fitting for a poor man, a benefactor, who needs leisure for the purpose of encouraging you? There is nothing more appropriate, my fellow Athenians, for such a man than that he should be given his meals in the Prytaneum, much more so in fact than if one of you won the Olympic Games

⁵⁴ "Clubs" and "factions" were associations representing and fighting for conflicting political interests in Athens (see Thuc. 8.54, on the oligarchic factions of the late fifth century).

ἵππῳ ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν· ὁ
 μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς | ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ
 e εἶναι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι.
 εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι,
 37 τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως
 δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβο-
 λήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· | τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι
 ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς
 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγ-
 μεθα. ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, | περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν
 b μόνον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύε-
 σθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω
 ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς
 ἀξίος εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου τινὸς
 ἑμαυτῷ. | τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὐ Μέλητός μοι
 τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ
 κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδά τι
 κακῶν ὄντων τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;
 c καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰ
 καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ

⁵⁵ The Prytaneum was on the northwest slope of the Acropolis, a building where guests of the state and Olympic victors were given hospitality. This provocative (and obviously illegal) suggestion has its serious side for S.; his point is that his activity is

APOLOGY

in the one-, two-, or four-horse races. He makes you seem to be happy, but I actually make you happy; he doesn't need feeding, but I do. If then I must receive a penalty in accordance with my just deserts, I pronounce sentence: meals in the Prytaneum.⁵⁵ e 37

Perhaps in saying this then I seem to you to be speaking out of bravado, in much the same way as I did about pity and entreaty. But it isn't like this, my fellow Athenians, but more like the following. I'm convinced that that I do not do anyone wrong intentionally, but I can't persuade you of this: after all we've only been talking to each other for a short time. Because, in my view, if you had a law concerning a capital charge, as other people do, that a trial should last not one day, but many days, you'd have been convinced. But as it is, it's not easy to clear myself of grave slanders in a short time. Being convinced then that I do no wrong to anybody, there's no way I'm going to wrong myself and speak against myself by saying that I deserve something bad and pronounce such a penalty for myself. What am I afraid of? That I should undergo the penalty Meletus proposes for me, which I claim I don't know whether it's good or bad? Instead of this then, am I to choose one of those that I well know to be bad and propose that as my sentence? Should it be prison? And why should I live in a prison, a slave to the authorities who may be appointed at the time, the Eleven?⁵⁶ How about a fine and c

more important than that of Olympic victors. On the comparison between the philosopher and the Olympic hero (unfavorable to the latter), see Xenophanes of Colophon (6th–5th centuries) DK 21B2.

⁵⁶ Men appointed annually to administer the prison (see *Phd.* 59e).

δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσω; ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν μοί ἐστιν ὅπερ
 νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν
 ἐκτείσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; | ἴσως γὰρ ἂν
 μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλή μεντᾶν με φιλοψυχία
 ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι
 ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες
 πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμάς
 d διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γε-
 γόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ
 ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως;
 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι
 ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλ-
 λης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. | εὖ
 γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσων-
 ται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω,
 οὗτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους·
 e εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες δὲ καὶ οἰκείοι
 δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· “Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν
 ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔση ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν
 ζῆν;” | τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τι-
 νας ὑμῶν. εἴαντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τουτ'
 38 ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τουτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πεί-
 σεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εἴαντ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ
 τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκά-
 στης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ

57 Compare Cri. 53aff.

APOLOGY

imprisonment until I've paid it? Well this is the same for me as what I was talking about just now: I've no funds from which to pay it. How about sentencing myself to exile? Indeed perhaps you would propose such a sentence for me. I would have to have a desperate love of life, my fellow Athenians, if I'm so irrational as not to be able to work out that you who are my fellow citizens have become unable to put up with my discourses and arguments, and they have become so irksome and hateful that you're now seeking to get rid of them. Will others in that case put up with them easily? Far from it, fellow Athenians. I would have a fine life going into exile, a man of my age, swapping one city for another and being turned away.⁵⁷ You see I know very well that wherever I go, the young will listen to me talking just as they do here. And even if I drive them away, they themselves will talk their elders round and drive me out; but if I don't drive them away their fathers and relatives will do it on their behalf.

Perhaps someone may say: "If you keep silent and lead a quiet life, Socrates, won't you be able to carry on living away from us in exile?" This is the most difficult thing of all to convince some of you of. You see, if I say that this is to disobey the god and because of this it's impossible to lead a quiet life, you won't be convinced, on the grounds that I'm pulling a fast one.⁵⁸ Again, if I say that this is actually the greatest good for a human being, to spend every day in discussion about excellence and the other topics

⁵⁸ A reference to S.'s *eironeia* (irony), meaning "playful or sly evasion," with the implication of insincerity (e.g., *Resp.* 337a4). See also a fifth-century meaning of "deliberate deceit" at *Ar. Vesp.* 169–74, *Av.* 1208–11, *Nub.* 444–51.

τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενου
 | καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέτα-
 στος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον
 πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ
 φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα
 b οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιῶν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα
 ἐμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ
 γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι,
 τοσοῦτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. | ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναί-
 μην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσοῦτου οὖν
 τιμῶμαι.

Πλάτων δὲ ὄδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ
 Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριά-
 κοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι τιμῶμαι
 οὖν τοσοῦτου, | ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυ-
 ρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

c Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν
 πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σο-
 φόν—φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμι, οἱ
 βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν· | εἰ γοῦν περιεμέινατε ὀλί-
 γον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγέ-

⁵⁹ One hundred drachmas. A small sum in view of the seriousness of the charge (though in line with S.'s own estimate of his poverty). Thirty minas (three thousand drachmas) (38b7–10) was

APOLOGY

you hear me debating while questioning both myself and others closely, and the unexamined life is not fit for a man to live, you'll be even less convinced if I say that. So this is how things stand, as I claim, gentlemen, but it's not easy to persuade you. At the same time I'm not accustomed to thinking I deserve anything bad. If I had any money, I would have proposed a fine as my sentence; as much as I could pay, as I wouldn't have been harmed in any way. But as it is, it isn't possible, unless you're willing to set my fine at as much as I can pay. Perhaps I would be able to pay, let's say, a silver mina: so that's the sum I propose.⁵⁹ b

Plato here,⁶⁰ fellow Athenians, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus are telling me to make the assessment thirty minas and they'll guarantee it. So that is my assessment and you'll have these men as sufficient guarantors for the money.

For the sake of no great length of time, my fellow Athenians, you'll have the reputation and blame, by those who wish to denigrate the city, for putting Socrates to death, a wise man—for those who want to put the blame on you will claim that I am wise, even if I'm not.⁶¹ At any rate if you had waited a little while, this would have happened of c

a more normal proposal as a penalty for such a serious offense. Xen. *Ap.* 23 says that S., despite the urging of his friends, refused to name a penalty on the grounds that this would amount to an admission of guilt. ⁶⁰ For Plato's self-reference and the identity of the other guarantors, see above, n. 45.

⁶¹ For the probable inauthenticity of S.'s final speech, and indeed whether such a speech would have been legally permitted, see Introduction to *Apology*, section 3.

νετο· ὁράτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ
 d τοῦ βίου θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς
 πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμέ-
 νους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς
 τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπορία
 λόγων ἐάλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ
 ὤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν | καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν
 τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα,
 οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ
 τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷ ἂν ὑμῖν
 μὲν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν—θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυ-
 ρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ
 e ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾤήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα
 τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι
 μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
 αἰροῦμαι | ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνᾶναι ἢ ἐκείνως
 ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ'
 39 ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξε-
 ται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολ-
 λάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκ-
 φύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος
 τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί | εἰσιν ἐν
 ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἴαν
 τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ

62 S. (b. 469) was approximately seventy years old at the time of his trial.

APOLOGY

its own accord. For to be sure you can see that I'm already
getting on in years and death is near.⁶² I say this not to all d
of you, but to those who voted for the death penalty.⁶³ And
I also say the following to these same people. Perhaps,
Athenians, you think I've been caught out by a lack of the
kind of arguments by which to persuade you, if I thought
that I must do and say everything I could to be acquitted
of the charge. Far from it. I'm convicted through a lack,
not of arguments, but of effrontery and shamelessness and
my unwillingness to say to you the sort of things that would
be most agreeable for you to hear—me weeping and wail-
ing, doing and saying many other things unworthy of me,
so I claim, that you're used to hearing from others. But e
neither did I think I should do anything servile then be-
cause I was in danger, nor do I now regret making my
defense as I did. But I far prefer to be put to death after
making my defense in this way, rather than live after mak-
ing my defense the other way. Neither I nor anyone else
either in court or in war should contrive to escape the 39
death penalty by employing every possible means. Indeed
in battle it often becomes clear that you might at least
escape being killed by throwing down your weapons and
turning to your pursuers with pleas for mercy. And there
are many other ways in every dangerous situation to avoid
being killed if one has the nerve to do anything and every-
thing. Well it's not this that may be difficult, gentlemen, to

⁶³ Diogenes Laertius (2.42) says that the vote for the death penalty was eighty votes greater than that for condemnation; if true, S.'s insouciant attitude toward the jury in proposing his alternative penalty (36b–38b) may have increased the vote for death (on the “mishandling” of S.'s defense, see *Cri.* 45e).

- b χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπότερον πονηρίαν· θάπτου γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάπτονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν, | οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.
- c Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοφθῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμοφδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, | τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον
- d ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσφ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὄνειδίζειν | τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζήτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς

APOLOGY

escape being killed, but it's much harder to escape depravity. It flies faster than fate, you see.⁶⁴ And now I, in as much as I'm slow, an old man, am caught by the slower one, but my accusers, in as much as they're cunning and sharp, are caught by the faster one: villainy. And now I'm going away after being sentenced to death by you, but these men are convicted by truth of wickedness and injustice. I abide by my sentence as do they. I suppose perhaps that these things had to be so, and I think this is reasonable. b

And after that I want to give you a prophecy, you who voted against me. For indeed I'm already at that point where people generally do make prophecies: when they're about to die.⁶⁵ For I declare, you men who have just condemned me to death, that vengeance will come to you immediately after my execution, much harsher, by Zeus, than the death you have condemned me to. For now you have done this, thinking you will avoid having to give an account of your lives, but it will turn out the very opposite for you, as I claim. There will be more to put you to the test, who up to now I have managed to hold back, but you didn't notice. And they'll be harsher the younger they are, and you'll be even more annoyed. For if you think that by putting people to death you'll prevent anyone remonstrating with you for not living your lives in the right way, you're not thinking straight. You see this is not a very practicable or honorable way to get out of it. But the best and easiest way is not to restrain everyone else, but prepare oneself c d

⁶⁴ An alliterative jingle in Greek (*thatton . . . thanatou thei*), possibly indicating a proverbial saying.

⁶⁵ For S. on prophetic insight on the point of death, see *Phd.* 85a-b.

βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι. |

- e Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῦ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογήσαι
- 40 πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἕξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι συμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ | τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ἅπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται
- b ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκωθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐντανθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· | νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως
- c ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγο-

APOLOGY

to be the best possible. So, having made my prophecy to those of you who have voted for my execution, I depart.

I would be happy to talk with those who voted for my acquittal about what has taken place while the magistrates are busy and I'm not yet on my way to the place I must go for my execution. But please, gentlemen, just wait that long since there's nothing to stop us chatting together while we can. You see I want to explain to you as my friends the meaning of what has now happened to me. You see, members of the jury—for in calling you members of the jury I would be giving you your rightful name⁶⁶—something remarkable has happened to me. My usual prophetic voice from my spiritual sign always on every occasion in the past used to come very frequently and opposed me even on quite trivial matters if I was about to do something wrong. But now things have happened to me that you can see for yourselves: things that one would think, and are considered to be the extreme of evil; but the god's sign didn't oppose me either when I left home at dawn or when I came here up into court, or at any point in my speech when I was about to say something. Yet in other discussions in all sorts of places it stopped me in mid-speech. But now in these proceedings it hasn't opposed me anywhere in either word or action. What should I take to be the reason for this? I will tell you. You see there's a probability that what has happened to me has turned out for the good, and those of us who think that death is a bad thing cannot be making a right assumption. I've had sig-

⁶⁶ I.e., in having voted for acquittal they truly deserve to be called *dikastai*, "jurymen" or "judges." See above, n. 1.

νεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰω-
θὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν. |

Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν
ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνά-
ναι· ἢ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν
μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα
μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ
τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. | καὶ εἴτε δὴ
μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις
d καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἄν
εἴη ὁ θάνατος· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον
δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἣ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε
μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας
τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ
νυκτὶ | δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ
ἡδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν
ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ
e τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἄν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν
ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας· εἰ οὖν
τοιούτου ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ
γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ
εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ |
θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν τὰ
λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί
μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ
41 γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τουτωνὶ
τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀλη-
θῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν,

APOLOGY

nificant proof of this, for there's no way my usual sign would not have opposed me, unless I was about to do something good.

And let's look at it this way too: that there is much hope that it is a good thing. You see death is one of two things, for either it's as if the dead person has no existence, and has no perception of anything, or according to what we're told, it's actually a change and removal of the soul from its place here to another place. And if there's no sensation, but as in sleep, when someone while sleeping sees nothing, not even in a dream, then death would be a wonderful benefit. For I would think, if someone had to choose that night during which he slept so deeply as not even to dream, and compare all the rest of the days and nights of his life with this night and then after consideration say how many days and nights he had spent during his lifetime better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not just a private citizen, but the Great King of Persia himself would find these easy to count up when set against the rest of his days and nights.⁶⁷ If then this is what death is like, I say it is a benefit, for in that case the whole of time seems to be nothing more than a single night. But if death is a kind of migration from here to another place, and what they say is true, that indeed all the dead are there, what greater good could there be than this, members of the jury? For if someone, after getting to Hades, having rid himself of these self-proclaimed jurors, will find real jurors, who also are said to judge cases there, Minos and

⁶⁷ For the king of Persia as the proverbial ideal of human happiness, see *Grg.* 470e, *Euthyd.* 274a.

- Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων | δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεὶ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ.
- b ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλουσι τὰ ἔμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, | οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη—καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστιν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ
- c Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσεά ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συνείναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε | ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἶπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.
- Ἄλλα καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι τούτο διανοεῖσθαι
- d ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε

68 For this picture of the afterlife, see *Grg.* 523a–27a.

APOLOGY

Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and others of the demigods who were just in their lives, would this be a bad transfer?⁶⁸ Or again, to meet up with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer, what price would any of you pay for that? You see I'm willing to die many times over if this is the truth, since for myself spending time there would be wonderful, when I could meet Palamedes and Aias, Telemon's son, and any others of olden times who died as a result of an unjust judgment,⁶⁹ and compare my experiences with theirs—in my view it would not be unpleasant—and what's more, the most important thing, I could go round, examine and inquire, just as I did here, who is wise and who thinks he is, but isn't. What price, members of the jury, would one pay to examine the leader of the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or the countless others one could mention, men and women, to converse with whom there, and meet and examine them would be utmost happiness? At any rate, I don't suppose they put people to death there for doing this: in fact there are other reasons why they are more blessed there than those down here, not to mention that from then on they're immortal for the rest of time, if, that is, what is said is true.

Well you too, members of the jury, must be optimistic in the face of death and keep in mind this one thing that is true: that nothing can be bad for a good man, either alive

⁶⁹ Palamedes and Aias were both falsely accused and cheated by Odysseus during the Greek expedition to Troy, led by Agamemnon (41b8–c1); see *Ov. Met.* 13.34–62, and *Soph. Aj.* passim. Sisyphus (c2), another trickster, was condemned to eternal punishment in Hades.

ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ
 τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτο-
 μάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη
 τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι | πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν
 μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμέ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον,
 καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατ-
 ηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ δια-
 νοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴομε-
 νοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε
 μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἠβήσωσι,
 τιμωρήσασθε, ὡς ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἄπερ
 ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπων, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ
 ἄλλου του | πρότερον ἐπιμελείσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν
 δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μὴδὲν ὄντες, οὐνεκίετε αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ
 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι
 42 εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δί-
 καια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ
 υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθα-
 νουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρ-
 χονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ
 θεῷ. |

APOLOGY

or dead, and his affairs are not ignored by the gods. Indeed as a matter of fact my own situation hasn't come about spontaneously, but it's clear to me that to die now and get free from troubles was better for me.⁷⁰ For this reason nowhere did my sign turn me away and I'm not at all resentful toward those who voted for my execution and my accusers. And yet it was not with this thought in their mind that they voted against me and brought the accusation; instead they thought to harm me. For this they deserve blame. However this much I do ask them: when my sons grow up, punish them, Athenians, and inflict on them the same amount of pain I inflicted on you, if you think they care more for money or anything else in preference to goodness. And if they think they're something when they're not, tell them off as I did you because they're not interested in the things they should be and think they're something when they're worth nothing. If you do this, I and my sons will have been treated justly by you. But the fact is that the time is already approaching for me to go to my death, and for you to live; and which of us goes to a better fate is unclear to everyone except the god.

⁷⁰ According to Xenophon (*Ap.* 5–9), a wish to escape the ills of old age was what motivated S.'s attitude toward his trial.



CRITO

INTRODUCTION

1. SETTING AND CONTEXT

Like *Euthyphro*, *Crito* is a dialogue between two speakers who are alone. The scene is the state prison at Athens very early in the morning, about a month after Socrates' trial¹ and two days before he is to die by the drinking of hemlock. The execution of the sentence awaits the return of a sacred mission to Delos, an annual event that commemorates the deliverance of the seven Athenian youths and seven maidens from the Cretan Minotaur by the hero Theseus. The ship left Athens the day before the trial and has not yet returned, but will do so shortly; during its absence the city must remain pure, and no executions may take place.²

Crito, Socrates' friend, is making a last-ditch attempt to save S.'s life, by persuading him to escape from prison and take refuge elsewhere in Greece. In reply S. refuses to contemplate such a move, explaining why escape would not be in accordance with justice.

The hiatus between Socrates' sentence and execution would have left his friends plenty of time to visit him in prison, and *Crito* was not the only literary re-creation of a

¹ See Plato, *Apology*.

² For a detailed account of the mission, see *Phd.* 58a-c.

CRITO

conversation that may have been held during such a visit. According to Diogenes Laertius (3rd c. AD), the role of persuader may originally have been filled by another of S.'s associates, Aeschines of Sphettus, who may have written a dialogue on the subject (Diog. Laert. 2.60). A more contemporary source, a literary papyrus written in fourth-century Attic Greek, contains the fragmentary remains of a conversation between S. and an unknown associate, in which S. defends himself against the reproach that he had failed to make a satisfactory defense at his trial by asking whether, after living a reasonable life, he should be grieved at the approach of death.³ Xenophon also enlarges on this theme when he reports, "Then, when his friends wished to snatch him away, he would not comply, but instead appeared to be making fun of them, asking them if they knew of any spot outside Attica that was inaccessible to death" (Xen. *Ap.* 23). Xenophon was not actually in Greece during this period, but his later account undoubtedly draws on earlier versions of the story, or perhaps on oral traditions.

Plato's *Crito* fits smoothly into the sequence of events surrounding Socrates' last days and faithfully represents the "S. must be persuaded to escape" theme. It must be viewed, however, not as a definitive account of what actually happened—about which, in a strict historical sense, we know very little—but as part of the *Sōkratikoí Logoi*,⁴ where it takes its place as one version of events. However, *Crito* is not just "a version"; the superior literary and philosophical qualities of Plato's creation (not to mention its

³ See Gronewald, "Sokratischer Dialog," 33–53.

⁴ See General Introduction, section 2 (iii).

completeness) make it for us, as with the other dialogues in this volume, the definitive image of S. Yet its emphasis is, as will be seen, markedly different from other sources, including Plato's own *Apology*, and the manner in which the theme is treated is, in certain key aspects, problematic.

2. CRITO, SOCRATES, AND THE DRAMATIC STRUCTURE

(i) *Crito and Socrates*

Crito, the faithful associate who gives the dialogue its title, was about the same age as Socrates and from the same Athenian *deme* of Alopeke (*Ap.* 33d9).⁵ Plato's Crito was one of a group of friends, including Plato himself, we are told, who were prepared to stand surety for the fine that S. finally, and unsuccessfully, proposed as the penalty at his trial (*Ap.* 38b6). Crito, a wealthy man, was also said to have pledged a sum of money to the court that S. would not escape, with the intention of sparing him the indignity of prison (*Phd.* 115d). He had great affection for S., which was reciprocated; he is presented in *Phaedo* as the follower chosen by S. to minister to him during his last moments, and it is to Crito that S. utters his memorable last words: "Crito," he said, "we owe Asclepius a cock. See that you buy one, and don't forget" (*Phd.* 118a7-8).

Crito's emotional reaction to Socrates' situation in *Crito* is sympathetically—even humorously—portrayed, and his overwrought and occasionally confused syntax in

⁵ A *deme* was a local district, part of a larger division (a *trittys*), three of which made up an Athenian tribe.

the early stages of the dialogue⁶ provides the perfect foil for S.'s cool and reasoned response. Through the rising tide of Crito's worry and concern, we catch glimpses of a background of friends and associates who are willing to help with money and influence (45b2ff.), but who (with half an eye on their own reputations; see 46a1) cannot comprehend why S. has failed, throughout the process, to act in an acceptable manner. Crito regards the whole episode of the trial as a farce that could have been avoided if S. had behaved properly, rather than letting down those who supported him.

As in *Apology*, the presentation of Socrates demonstrates his contempt for public opinion and his calm concentration, even *in extremis*, on the overriding importance of acting on the basis of correct ethical conclusions reached by valid arguments (46b1ff., 48d9–49a2). As will be seen, however, the presentation of S. in *Crito*, especially the arguments for staying and facing his sentence, differs in important respects from that in the other dialogues, particularly *Apology*.

(ii) *Structure of the Dialogue*

At twelve Stephanus pages,⁷ *Crito* is the shortest of Plato's dialogues. It follows in some respects a pattern similar to *Euthyphro*: a lightly but vividly sketched dramatic setting followed by Socrates' questioning of the respondent in order to expose logical inconsistencies in his position. Fol-

⁶ See, e.g., *Cri.* 43b3, 45d9–46a2

⁷ For an explanation of the Stephanus numbering of Plato, see General Introduction, section 5.

lowing this questioning, however, *Crito* follows a different pattern; instead of pursuing the argument further and concluding with an admission of failure, S. takes a very different tack and introduces an extended monologue by the personified Laws of Athens. Far from ending in *aporia* (impasse), strongly expressed arguments against escape, couched in markedly rhetorical form, round off the dialogue on a strongly positive note.⁸

Even where *Crito* does follow the *Euthyphro* pattern, the content is very different. *Crito's* initial contribution is persuasive in intent rather than explanatory, and the balancing protreptic (exhortation) of the Laws at the end underlines *Crito's* uniqueness: in many other dialogues (notably *Euthyphro*), practical issues serve as a background for theoretical discussion, whereas in *Crito* the position is reversed, whereby Socratic philosophical arguments are used to underpin the main subject of the dialogue—what practical course should be followed.

In the final section Socrates surrenders the floor to “the Laws,” and he himself becomes the respondent, a role in which he normally places others. The effect of representing the arguments as coming from outside himself allows him to exhibit a certainty and an authority that are in marked contrast to the questioning stance he is accustomed to adopt. This authoritative mode is underlined by the religious dimension at the very end, which matches S.’s report of his dream at the beginning (44a5–b5). In his final words S. says to *Crito* that he seems to hear the words of the Laws “just as the Corybantes think they hear the

⁸ For an explanation of *aporia*, see Introduction to *Euthyphro*, section 3 (i).

CRITO

flutes, and this sound of these words resonates within me and makes me unable to hear any others" (54d3-8).

3. THE ARGUMENTS

(i) *Crito's Exhortation* (44b6-46a9)

Crito makes what amounts to an extended speech in rhetorical style that is divided between his expression of genuine concern for Socrates and his worry about his own standing and that of his friends if they are seen to be unsuccessful in saving him. He associates being "just" or "right" (*dikaion*) with their willingness to help a friend (45a1), and it is not *dikaion* for S. to let himself down and bring on himself the destruction that his enemies intend (45c6-9). Crito's arguments are implicitly grounded in a popular ideal of Athenian male excellence (*aretē*), to help friends and injure enemies.⁹ This leaves an unasked question, however: if, according to Crito, defiance of the court's decision is *dikaion* for both S. and Crito, what attention should be paid to legal authority? The central issue of the dialogue is foreshadowed.

(ii) *Socrates' Reply* (46b1-50a5)

Socrates meets Crito's concern for popular opinion head-on, first by dismissing its *power* to change his mind by coercion or fear: the only way of convincing him is by deploying adequate arguments (46b1-d7). Second, he

⁹ For an explicit account in Plato of this popular value, see, e.g., *Meno* 71e.

questions the *value* of popular opinion, using the argument from expertise, already deployed at *Euthphr.* 13aff. and at *Ap.* 24dff. Only the expert in any particular field has the requisite skill to make correct judgments. This principle of expertise applies particularly to doing what is just and unjust, related not to the body but, more vitally, “won’t we destroy and abuse that which was improved by what is just and was ruined by what is unjust,” by which we infer “the soul” (47d4–5).¹⁰

Having demolished Crito’s arguments concerning the power and authority of public opinion, Socrates next goes on to the question of what he ought to do. He agrees with Crito to this extent—that what he should do must be *dikaion* (just), because this is the basis of living well (48b5). Nevertheless, while accepting this value-term, S. proceeds to interpret it in a very different way.

Socrates argues in stages, to each one of which he gets Crito’s assent. Moving from “since we must in no circumstances act unjustly” (49b7), S. also establishes that this includes not retaliating to injustice (49b9–10). Correspondingly, he moves from stating that one must not do harm, to concluding that it is not just, having suffered harm, to return it (49c4–5). And harming people does not differ from acting unjustly (49c7–8).¹¹ These positions,

¹⁰ S. here makes use of the “craft analogy,” a bridge (as it appears to us) between craft knowledge possessed by doctors, physical trainers, etc., and knowledge of values such as goodness, justice, etc.; just as there are experts in physical training, so too are there experts in questions involving justice, injustice, and the like.

¹¹ There is an underlying assumption (not explicit in *Crito*) that simple “harm,” e.g., injury inflicted on an enemy in battle

CRITO

argued more extensively in other dialogues (e.g., *Grg.* 474bff.), are here briefly rehearsed, enabling S. to use them as a basis for more practical questions that set the scene for the Laws' argument that follows. S.'s concluding questions are:

1. Should one do whatever one agrees with another, if it's just, or should one mislead him? (49e6-7)
2. If we leave this place without first persuading the state [to let us go], are we harming certain people and those whom we should do least harm to, or not? (49e9-50a2)
3. [In such an action] do we stand by what we agreed to be just, or not? (50a2-3)

Having agreed to (1), Crito confesses that he is not clear about (2) and (3), presumably because the conversation has taken a characteristic Socratic path: having agreed to a progressive series of propositions one by one, Crito is then asked to make a choice the implications of which contradict his original contention that it is just for Socrates to try to escape. The result for Crito is typical Socratic *aporia* (50a4-5).

Yet a contradiction with his earlier assertions might not be Crito's only reason for puzzlement. The choices Socrates offers may be difficult to make because the terms in which they are offered are, at this stage, vague. In (1) it is by no means clear what agreement involves, and whether

(with which S. would have been familiar) should be distinguished from "harm" that constitutes injustice, a distinction blurred by Tredennick, (trans. in Tarrant, *Last Days of Socrates*), translating *kakourgein*, "do harm" (49c2ff.), as "inflict injuries."

“if it’s just” refers to the content of what is agreed or the terms under which it is made, or both. This vagueness extends to (2) and (3): the answer to these questions will depend on what agreement with the city is thought to involve, and without this clarification it is difficult to say whether or not S.’s escape will constitute acting unjustly toward the city.

(iii) *The Laws of Athens 50a6–end*

In the final section of *Crito*, Socrates presents a hypothetical personification, unique in Plato, of “the Laws and the community of the state” coming to S. and asking him a series of questions, all of which serve to reinforce his decision not to escape. Initially, these questions imply a series of propositions, to which S., as the respondent, agrees:

1. By contemplating disobedience to the legal decision of the court in his case, S. is intending, as far as in him lies, to destroy the laws and the whole city. (50b1–2)
2. A city cannot continue in existence and not be overturned in which legal judgments reached by the courts have no force, but are rendered invalid and destroyed by private individuals. (50b2–5)

The Laws claim that defiance of a legal decision is equivalent to an intent to destroy the city itself. The logical connection here seems to depend on a “universalization” argument; the challenge to the single law (that legal verdicts must be binding, 50b8–c1) is “universalized” into

CRITO

defiance of a whole system of law, which will potentially lead to the city's overthrow. So even if the city was guilty of reaching a false verdict at Socrates' trial, (1) and (2) above, combined with an earlier argument of S., that one should not return injustice for injustice (and acting unjustly = doing harm, 49b9-10), may seem to demonstrate that, whatever the rights and the wrongs of the jury's judgment in S.'s case, he should still submit to the city's verdict.

Nevertheless Socrates, in the guise of the Laws, clearly feels that the matter should not be left there; he goes on to develop the argument in a rather different direction: the idea of defiance of the city as "destruction" in (1) and (2) above, is expanded by focusing on the nature of the agreement that he is presumed to have made with his city, which obliges him to remain, whatever the rights and the wrongs of the verdict in his case. This takes the form of an elaborate analogy, in which the Laws relate themselves to individual citizens as parent to child, or master to slave (50c10-51c3). The Laws have presided over the life of S. as a citizen, the marriage of his parents that led to his birth, his upbringing and education. He is therefore the Laws' offspring and slave (50e3-4), which means his rights are not equal with theirs; just as children or slaves may not retaliate against a father or a master, so, to an even greater extent, citizens may not oppose their country. S. must either persuade it otherwise, or do and suffer whatever it requires of him.

The Laws then proceed to develop the idea of the state as parent or master. The Athenian state allows a citizen, once he attains the age when he undergoes a *dokimasia* (scrutiny on coming of age; see further, *Crito*, n. 37), and

if the city's laws do not satisfy him, to leave the city and go elsewhere. In these circumstances, remaining in the city is equivalent to a tacit agreement to either persuade the city otherwise or practice obedience (51e2–5). Since Socrates has hardly ever traveled outside the city, he must be presumed to be uniquely satisfied with the city's institutions, and so particularly obliged to comply with its verdicts.

The Laws then enlarge on the practical disadvantages of choosing exile, marshaling arguments that Crito used earlier in his exhortation, but here to support the other side of the case—the damage that Socrates' exile will do to his friends—and pointing out that as a “destroyer of laws” S. would not be welcome in “well-governed” states, such as Thebes and Megara (53b7–8). Then again, resorting to disordered and lawless states, such as Thessaly, would be a public humiliation and repudiation of all his principles (53d3–4). In the case of S.'s children, the Laws actually reverse Crito's point: on the question of S.'s parental responsibility, death is no more a desertion of his family than exile, and his children would be better off brought up in Athens by friends than living as foreigners (54a2–10).

(iv) Critical Analysis of the Laws' Arguments

The force of the Laws' arguments depends on attempting to locate “agreement” in the context of an Athenian political and social framework that Socrates as a citizen is presumed to accept. In an extension of reference, which would have seemed natural in the fifth and fourth centuries, the Laws become a symbol of the state as a total po-

CRITO

litical and cultural system, city, and fatherland (*polis* and *patris*), being used interchangeably with *nomoi*.¹² Agreement to this broad framework made at his *dokimasia* leaves voluntary exile for S. as the only alternative to obedience, and this option is, on the basis of his arguments in 49bff., no longer open to him.

The Laws are therefore being consistent: if one accepts their argument, the agreements, which Socrates entered into at age eighteen as part of his assumption of the citizen's role, hold as long as he or any other citizen remains in Athens, irrespective of the justice of individual cases. A high price, however, is apparently being paid for consistency; the conclusion seems to be that not only S. on this occasion, but any citizen on any occasion is obliged to obey whatever the law decides, even if it is an order to do or suffer injustice, or be guilty of attempting the laws' destruction. Quite apart from its unappealing authoritarianism, this conclusion does not appear consistent with a basic Socratic principle, stated at 49b7: that in no circumstances must one act unjustly.

There have been a number of attempts to modify the Laws' position. For example, it has been argued that the obligation to obey is not absolute but only applies when all things are equal; when all things are not equal, the citizen may have to choose between obeying the law and doing what is just, and the latter must always win.¹³ Another in-

¹² For the law as a symbol of Athenian political identity, see e.g., Eur. *Supp.* 439ff., Thuc. 2.37.

¹³ See Santas, *Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues*, 18ff.; Vlastos, "Socrates on Political Obedience and Disobedience," 525; Irwin, "Socratic Inquiry and Politics," 405-6.

fluent solution focuses on the Laws' repeated phrase "persuade [the city] or do whatever it bids" (e.g., 51b4). It is argued not only that there is room for the citizen to persuade the laws either beforehand or in retrospect that they are wrong but also that an *attempt* to persuade them of the rightness or wrongness of any decision or action, even if unsuccessful, gives sufficient moral authority to pursue or disobey the decision or action.¹⁴ This solution has not found general acceptance for two main reasons: (1) unsuccessful persuasion as a basis for legitimate disobedience seems clearly ruled out by the master/slave analogy as the Laws present it;¹⁵ (2) the Greek *peithein* ("to persuade," 51b4) cannot mean "trying to persuade" as a justification for disobedience if unsuccessful.¹⁶

A third way out of the dilemma is to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, obedience to laws that are just and, on the other, the justice of obedience to the law, an interpretation designed to relieve citizens of the responsibility of obeying unjust laws, since the parent/child analogy suggests that the state, and not the citizens, should be held responsible for what citizens are commanded to do. As a "child" or "slave" of the city, Socrates need not be considered as morally responsible for unjust acts that the city initiates.¹⁷ The problem with this and previous solu-

¹⁴ Kraut, *Socrates and the State*, 55–90.

¹⁵ See Bostock, "The Interpretation of Plato's *Crito*," 14–15, *contra* Kraut, *Socrates and the State*, 91–103.

¹⁶ Criticism of Kraut's "conative" application of "[try to] persuade," in Penner, "Two Notes on the *Crito*," 161–66; see also Panagiotou, "Socrates and Civil Disobedience," 98–105.

¹⁷ See Brickhouse and Smith, *Plato's Socrates*, 151–52.

CRITO

tions is that they require us to make inferences that are not in the text, and furthermore, if one assumes, as do the Laws again and again, that disobeying them constitutes injustice, these attempts to solve the problem all come up against S.'s simple proposition, agreed to by Crito (49b7-8), that *in no circumstances* must one commit injustice.

Perhaps the most promising way out of this dilemma is to interpret the Laws as requiring the citizen (e.g., Socrates) to obey only legal commands that involve *suffering* injustice; the Laws, it is maintained, do not require obedience to commands to *do* injustice, and all their emphasis (e.g., the master/slave analogy) is on the victim *submitting* to injustice: "just as a child has no right to strike back at a punishing father, so an unjustly treated citizen has no right to strike back at the system that has maltreated him."¹⁸

4. SOCRATES IN CRITO AND APOLOGY

The above problems stem to some extent from a perception that the Socrates figure in *Crito* is markedly different from that in *Apology*. In *Crito*, the Laws emphasize the lifelong law-abiding contented citizen, and S. does not dissent; his abstention from practical politics, which in *Apology* is thought to require a defense, is in *Crito* simply

¹⁸ Gallop, *Plato, Defense of Socrates, Euthyphro, Crito*, xxix. For this position, see also DeFilippo, "Justice and Obedience in the *Crito*," 257. This interpretation would, for example, justify S.'s refusal to commit injustice by participating in the decision of the Assembly to execute the Athenian generals en masse after the battle of Arginousae (see *Ap.* 32b-c), a decision ostensibly legal (initially passed by the democratic Assembly) but actually illegal.

ignored by the expedient of representing his legal and civic duty (obeying the laws, raising a family, and serving in the armed forces) as the sum total of activity required "to live among us as a citizen" (*politeuesthai* 52c2).¹⁹ In *Apology*, however, S. is at pains to emphasize the degree to which his ethical beliefs inevitably put him outside, and occasionally in opposition to, practical politics (*Ap.* 31e2-4).

In *Apology* Socrates explains his divinely-ordered mission that he would not give up even if the jury were to make this a condition of acquittal (*Ap.* 29d1-6). This is apparently in conflict with *Cri.* 50b2ff., which, as we have seen, emphasizes the necessity of obeying legal judgments. The situation S. envisages in *Apology*, however, may be purely hypothetical, a rhetorical emphasis on his absolute devotion to the practice of philosophy. In *Apology* he never seriously contemplates defiance of the law.

Be that as it may, Socrates' ethical position in both dialogues, that it is the expert in what is just and unjust who should be the guide to living well, is in *Apology* developed in explicit opposition to the view of "the many" who govern Athens (e.g., *Ap.* 24c9-25c4). S. is the horsefly sent by the god to sting the large lazy thoroughbred horse, which is the Athenian democratic state, and to goad its citizens into

¹⁹ Contrast Thuc. 2.37, 40 (Pericles' Funeral Speech, delivered over the fallen in the early part of the Peloponnesian war [431 BC]) where, while giving prominence to the rule of law, Pericles also emphasizes the need for active participation ("we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say he has no business here at all," trans. R. Warner). On S. and his associates as *apragmones* (quietists), see Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, 117ff.

giving thought to truth and the perfection of their souls (*Ap.* 29dff., 30eff.).²⁰

Second, there is the argument against exile: in *Apology* the primary objection to exile is that, besides being a coward's way out, it would be incompatible with the effective continuation of Socrates' philosophic mission, as he would undoubtedly be thrown out of city after city for allegedly trying to corrupt the young (*Ap.* 37c5-e2). In *Crito*, however, the arguments against exile have a different emphasis, deriving directly from the Laws' arguments: a breach of S.'s alleged agreement with the city and the bad reputation he will get in "well-governed" cities as a destroyer of laws (53a9-54b2).

An interpretation that attempts to slice through the Gordian knot, as it were, of inconsistencies both within *Crito* and between dialogues, argues that the Laws' speech does not actually represent the genuine beliefs of Socrates, but a second-best ethic, a kind of civic morality that represents S.'s only hope of persuading Crito, who clearly shows himself unable to comprehend S.'s genuinely radical position. This line of interpretation puts a great deal of weight on Crito's admission of incomprehension (50a4-5), a not uncommon reaction to S.'s conclusions (see, e.g., *Euthphr.* 12a3). But in this particular case, it is at this point, it is argued, that the disjunction between Crito's "yes/no" answers and what S. suspects are his real beliefs force the latter to change course; he abandons his dialectical argument in favor of a rhetorical defense of his deci-

²⁰ For an argument that S.'s criticism of the practice of Athenian democracy did not necessarily prevent him from being a good citizen, see Ober, "Socrates and Democratic Athens," 174-76.

sion to remain in Athens that he estimates is most likely to convince Crito.²¹

5. CRITO IN CONTEXT

One of the few indisputable facts about Socrates is that he was tried and condemned by an Athenian court and executed after having been found guilty on a charge of impiety. Exactly why he chose to stay in prison and face his sentence rather than go into exile is less clear. If, however, we move away from an assumption that we can reach an historical character "S.," consistently presented by Plato through the four dialogues in this volume,²² a possible explanation is opened up by the final interpretation in the previous section; the respect of Plato's S. for the Laws might not be intended to convince just Crito within the context of the dialogue, but could perhaps also be a construction by Plato as an answer to the sympathetic but nonintellectual patriotic Athenians (represented by Crito) who had failed to understand S.'s conduct.²³ This intended audience might also explain the prominence given by the Laws to Spartan and Cretan *eunomia* (good order) of which S. is presumed to approve (52e6). S., Plato is perhaps implying, was no revolutionary, as his submission to the Laws proves.

This speculation would gain still further in plausibility

²¹ See Weiss, *Socrates Dissatisfied*, 2ff. See also Brown, "The Structure of Plato's *Crito*"; Miller, "The Arguments I Seem to Hear."

²² See General Introduction, section 1.

²³ See Tarrant, *The Last Days of Socrates*, 73-75 (Introduction to *Crito*).

CRITO

if we can accept that *Crito* may be answering the accusation of the early fourth-century rhetorician and sophist Polycrates in a lost work known through a rebuttal in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.9) that Socrates taught contempt for the laws. Far from destroying the laws, Plato is saying, S. gave them lifelong respect, and never more so than when his life was at stake.²⁴

It can be argued that *Crito* shares the basic motivation of the *Sōkratikoí Logoi*, a commemoration and celebration of the qualities of Plato's revered teacher and associate, but with subject matter aimed in this particular case at a more general audience, in contrast, perhaps, to *Phaedo*, whose complex metaphysics was surely aimed at an inner circle. Well after Socrates' demise, Plato might also have been using the Socratic persona and the dramatic context to explore his own slightly later perspective on the reality of late fifth-/early fourth-century political life in Athens, just as he also used "S." to explore his theories of the metaphysics of the soul and the afterlife in the later *Phaedo*.

Yet, however suggestive, these are all, to a varied extent, conjectures. Does *Crito* actually fit a "last days" context? Is this later glimpse of Socrates not of the calm defiance of the *Apology* but an acknowledgment of the overriding power of the state? For all its apparent simplicity, *Crito* remains an enigmatic work.

²⁴ The conjecture that the composition of *Crito* follows the *Accusation* of Polycrates, and the assumption that *Apology* precedes it (see Stokes, *Plato, Apology of Socrates*, 3–4) is strengthened by the presence of linguistic forms indicating comparatively late composition for *Crito* within Plato's Early Period (see Tarant, *The Last Days of Socrates*, 72 and 208n8; Ledger, *Recounting Plato*, 185).

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

43 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὸ ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς. |

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Συνήθης ἦδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι; |

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

b ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἠθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι, | ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἠδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον ἵνα ὡς ἤδιστα

¹ S.'s surprise is related to C.'s departure from the daily habit

CRITO

SOCRATES CRITO

SOCRATES: Why have you come here at this hour, 43
Crito? It's still quite early isn't it?¹

CRITO: Yes, very early.

S. What time is it roughly?

C. It's some way before dawn.

S. I'm surprised the prison guard was willing to answer
the door to you.

C. He's used to me by now, Socrates, owing to my
frequent visits here, and he's also had the odd favor from
me.

S. Have you just got here, or have you been here long?

C. Quite a long time.

S. Then how come you didn't wake me up straightaway b
rather than sit there in silence?

C. Certainly not, by Zeus, Socrates; I only wish I
weren't myself so sleepless and sorrowful. But I've been
surprised at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you
were sleeping. Besides, I deliberately kept from waking

of associates meeting and talking with his friends until the prison
officially opened later for the day (see *Phd.* 59d1ff.). C.'s reasons
for being allowed the early visit are revealed in c5ff.

διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ἠὲ δαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσῃ συμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶως φέρεις. |

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἶη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτου ὄντα εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

- c ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις συμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸς ἀφίξαι; |

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρείαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

- d ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὐτοὶ δὴ ἀφίεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν μὲν μοι ἤξει τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκουτές τινας ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων¹ ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, | καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ, εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω· οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

¹ τῶν ἀγγέλων βΤ et marg. W: τῶν ἀγγελίων WSV: secl. Hirschig

CRITO

you so that you could carry on as peacefully as possible. Indeed even in the past throughout your life I've thought how blessed you are in your disposition, but so much more so now in your present misfortune, for the way you take it so easily and calmly.

S. Well of course, Crito: it would be out of character for a man of my age to be angry about it if I now have to die.

C. Others of your age too, Socrates, are caught up in such misfortunes, but their age does nothing to relieve their anger at the predicament they're in. c

S. That's true. But why *did* you come here so early?

C. Bringing a difficult message, Socrates, not for you, it appears to me, but for me and all your friends: a message both difficult and grievous, and, I think, hardest of all for me to bear.

S. What is this? Has the boat arrived from Delos, on whose arrival I must be put to death?² d

C. No, it hasn't actually arrived, but to my thinking it'll come today from what some people who have come from Sunium and left it there are saying.³ So it's clear from these messengers that it'll come today and tomorrow it will indeed be necessary for you, Socrates, to end your life.

S. Well, Crito, may this be for the best; if it pleases the gods this way, so be it. However I don't think it'll come today.

² For the circumstances surrounding the delay between S.'s imprisonment and execution, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 1.

³ Cape Sunium, about thirty miles southeast of Athens, is the southernmost point of Attica, round which a ship from Delos would have to sail.

44 ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρη;
 ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δέι με
 ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἡ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι. |

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ
 ἤξειν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐν-
 νπνίου ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός·
 καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τι νὺκ ἐγείραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθούσα καλὴ καὶ
 εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν·

b “ὦ Σώκρατες,

ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.”

ΚΡ. ὡς ἄποπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ’, ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες,
 ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ
 ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία συμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν
 τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἶον ἐγὼ οὐδένα
 μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, | ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ
 c σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασι, ὡς οἷός τ’ ὦν σε σώζειν εἰ ἤθε-
 λον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν
 αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ
 πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ

⁴ The “Eleven,” Athenian officials responsible for carrying out legal punishments and maintaining the city prisons.

⁵ Hom. *Il.* 9.363, spoken by Achilles when, having rejected the

C. Where do you get that idea from?

S. I'll tell you. I must be put to death, I take it, on the day after the boat arrives.

C. At any rate that's what the people responsible for these things say.⁴

S. Then I don't think it'll arrive on the day coming, but on the one after. My proof comes from a dream I saw a short while ago this very night: and maybe it was opportunity you didn't wake me up.

C. And what was the dream?

S. A beautiful attractive woman appeared to be coming toward me wearing a white cloak. She called me and said: "Socrates,

On the third day you may reach most fertile Phthia."⁵

C. What a strange dream, Socrates.

S. On the contrary, a clear one in my view, Crito.

C. Too clear, it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now do as I say and save yourself since, if you die, for myself it isn't just a single disaster but, apart from being deprived of such a companion, the like of whom I shall never ever find again, in addition many people who don't know me and you well will think that, as I would be in a position to save you if I were willing to spend my money, I have deserted you. And yet what more shameful reputation could there be than appearing to value money more than one's friends? You see the majority of people won't

gifts of Agamemnon as an inducement to rejoin the war against Troy, he is contemplating a return to Phthia, his home (Plato alters to second-person singular). The clear meaning is that S. will die and so "reach home" two days hence. The woman in white may likely be "Fate" (see *Phd.* 115a3).

πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων. |

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπραχθῆαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῆ.

- d ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ὁρᾶς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εἰάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ. |

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τ' ᾗσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, | ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι.

- e ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων μή, εἰάν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, | καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς 45 τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβῆ, ἔασον αὐτὸ

⁶ The emphasis C. puts on *doxa* (reputation, opinion, appearance, "what people think"), revelatory of his character, is underlined by the repeated use of this word and its cognates in his speeches (e.g., b10, c2, c7, d2, 45e1, 46a1).

⁷ In a legal system where prosecution in a public suit (*graphē*:

CRITO

believe that you yourself were unwilling to get out of here despite our encouragement.⁶

S. But my dear Crito, why is our reputation among the majority of people of any concern to us? You see the most sensible people, who are much more worthy of our attention, will think matters have been carried out in this way just as they have been.

C. But you surely do see, Socrates, that we're also d compelled to have some regard for the opinion of the majority. Your present situation by itself now makes it clear that the majority of people are capable of committing not the smallest of evil acts but just about the greatest, if one is discredited among them.

S. Yes, but if only, Crito, the majority were capable of committing the greatest evil so that they could also be able to accomplish the greatest good, all indeed would be well. But now they're capable of neither: you see they can neither make someone wise nor foolish, but whatever they do happens by chance.

C. Then so be it. But just tell me this, Socrates: are you e afraid that if you show concern for me and the rest of your friends if you get out of this place, the informers will cause us trouble on the grounds that we smuggled you out, and we'll be forced to lose all our property, or a great deal of 45 money, or even suffer further on top of this?⁷ For if you're

on which see *Euthphr.* 2a5ff.) was largely left to private citizens, "informer" (= *sukophantai*) made money either by prosecuting in order to gain financial rewards or by blackmailing someone who wished to avoid prosecution; they might also initiate a further prosecution against C. and his friends for aiding the escape of a condemned criminal. ". . . suffer further . . ." (e6) indicates a harsher penalty, perhaps exile or even death.

χαίρειν ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τούτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. |

- ΚΡ. Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ—καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριον ἐστὶν ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὀρᾶς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς
- b πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἰκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμὰ, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τούτο ἀργύριον ἰκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνν. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μῆτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σταντὸν σώσαι, μῆτε, ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅτι χρῶο σταντῶ·
- c πολλαχού μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν

⁸ *Dikaioi* = "just." The word has a broader connotation than English "just" (nearer to "right"), but we prefer to keep the narrower meaning of *dikaios* (and its opposite, "unjust") for the sake of clarity of argument. C.'s claim that his proposed action is "just," subsequently questioned by S. (e.g., 48b11), foreshadows the main theme of the dialogue; is breaking the law in the way C. urges actually *dikaion*? See Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (ii).

⁹ Simmias and Cebes were Pythagorean friends of S. from

CRITO

afraid of something like this, forget about it. You see I think we're acting justly⁸ in rescuing you and risking this danger and more than this if necessary. Come now, follow my advice and do as I say.

S. Indeed I am concerned about this, Crito, and many other things.

C. Well then, have no fears on this account—and in point of fact the money people are willing to accept to rescue you and get you out of here isn't a lot. There again, don't you realize how cheap these informers are and that it wouldn't take a lot of money to get round them? For one thing you have my money at your disposal, enough, I think; and then if out of consideration for me you don't think I should spend my money, there are these people from outside Athens who are ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simias the Theban, has brought with him enough money for this very purpose, and there's also his companion Cebes ready to help and very many others.⁹ So as I say, don't give up the chance to save yourself because you're afraid of this, nor trouble yourself, as you were saying at your trial, that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself if you went into exile:¹⁰ for everywhere, wherever you may end up, they will welcome you. If you want to go to

Thebes and the major interlocutors with him in *Phaedo*. For the wider Greek spread of S.'s friends and followers, see *Phd.* 59b–c.

¹⁰ See *Ap.* 37d on the futility, from S.'s point of view, of his proposing the counterpenalty of exile to other Greek cities. In *Apology*, however, the emphasis is different: there S. suggests that he could find plenty to do in his accustomed manner (conducting philosophical inquiry with the young) but was likely to be prevented by the authorities.

ἔμοι ἐκεῖ ξένοι οἷ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν. |

Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι ἄπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. | πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς
 d τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἰάπερ εἴωθεν γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. | ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρή ποιείσθαι παῖδας ἢ συνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. χρή δέ, ἄπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ
 e παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελείσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρα πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἢ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν² ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ

² εἰσῆλθεν β: εἰσῆλθες T

¹¹ On “just” (*dikaios*); see above, n. 8. C.’s standpoint embodied in *dikaios* the Athenian popular male values that S. appears to ignore: it was just/right to support friends and defend oneself against enemies.

CRITO

Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and give you a safe harbor so that no one throughout Thessaly will distress you.

And again Socrates, I think what you're proposing to do isn't even just:¹¹ giving yourself up when you could be rescued, and you eagerly seek to bring on yourself the kind of fate that your enemies too would be keen on and have been eager for in their desire to destroy you. In addition to this I think you're letting down your sons whom you're deserting, and when you could bring them up and educate them you're leaving them in the lurch, and as far as you're concerned their fortune will be whatever comes their way.¹² It's likely that they'll experience the sorts of things that usually happen to orphans when they lose their parents. Why, either one shouldn't have children, or one should get involved in the troublesome task of rearing and educating them as long as it takes; but you seem to me to be choosing the easiest way out. You should choose what any good brave man would choose: since you *say* at least that you have devoted yourself throughout your whole life to virtue.¹³ So I am myself ashamed both on your behalf and those of us who are your friends that the whole of this predicament of yours may appear to have been caused by some cowardly act of ours: both how the entrance of the case into court came about when it need not have got that

¹² On S.'s sons, see *Ap.* 41e, *Phd.* 116b1.

¹³ "Virtue" = *aretē*, a key Greek value term indicating broadly "excellence," "goodness," in practical as well as moral contexts. It is over what constitutes *aretē* that C. and S. fundamentally differ.

αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, | καὶ τὸ τελευ-
 ταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατὰ γελως τῆς πράξεως, κακί-
 ατινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς
 46 δοκεῖν, οὔτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαντόν,
 οἶόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατὸν εἶ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος
 ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ
 αἰσχροῦ ἢ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου—μᾶλλον
 δὲ οὐδὲ | βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύεσθαι—
 μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα
 δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι, εἰ δ' ἔτι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ
 οὐκέτι οἶόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου
 μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

b ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία
 εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅσῳ μείζων
 τοσοῦτω χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε
 ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μὴ· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ
 καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος οἶος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδεὶ ἄλλῳ πείθε-
 σθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ | ὅς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος
 φαίνεται. τοὺς δὴ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλε-
 γον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη

¹⁴ C.'s language here reflects the close analogy between the language of the law court and the theater stage in Athens: entrance into court/entering on stage, the trial/dramatic exchange of arguments. And the outcome of S.'s "play," C. is saying, can be summed up not as a tragedy but as "farcical" (*katagelōs*).

¹⁵ The disordered syntax of this sentence mirrors the Greek and reflects C.'s emotional state.

¹⁶ C. sums up his persuasive appeal by combining two pow-

far, and how the legal contest itself was conducted, and this final episode, to complete the farce, as it were,¹⁴ make it seem that through some cowardice and unmanliness on our part the whole affair has slipped from our grasp, seeing that we failed to save you and you failed to save yourself, which was perfectly possible, if you'd had the slightest bit of help from us.¹⁵ So make sure, Socrates, that this is not shameful as well as bad for both you and us.¹⁶ But make up your mind about it—though rather this is no longer the time for thinking: it should have been done—just one decision: all this has to be accomplished this coming night. Yet if we hang around, it will be beyond our power and no longer possible. Come on, Socrates, do as I say in all respects and don't act any other way. 46

S. My dear Crito, your eagerness would be worth a great deal if there were a measure of rightness about it. But if not, the greater it is, the harder that makes it. Thus we must consider if what you're urging should be pursued or not. Not now for the first time, but always I have been the sort of person who follows none other of my thoughts than the line of argument that from my deliberation appears to be the best. The very lines of argument I was previously taking I cannot now throw overboard just because this fate has overtaken me, but they strike me as b

erful negative forces governing conduct of Athenians: (46a3–4) what is “bad” or “harmful” for them (*kakon*) and (an even stronger negative value) what will be “shameful” or “a disgrace” (*aischron*), involving both him and his friends. For the whole of C.'s speech as a rhetorical *parainesis* (exhortation), see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (i), and, for detailed stylistic analysis, Emlyn-Jones, *Crito*, 58–60.

- c γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὐσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὦν ἔαν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι συγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, | δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν.
- d πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ; ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; | ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανέεται, ἐπειδὴ ὦδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἔασομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὦδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν
- e δοξῶν ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσιν δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιείσθαι, τὰς δὲ μὴ. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν
- 47 αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἢ παρούσα συμφορά· σκόπει δὴ· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν ἀλλὰ

CRITO

being pretty much the same and I respect and honor the same ones as I did before. If we're going to have none better than these to argue in the present circumstances, rest assured that I shall *not* go along with you, not even if the power of the majority scares us, like children, conjuring up more goblins to frighten us than at present, letting loose upon us imprisonment, execution and the confiscation of our property. What then would be the most reasonable way to consider these things? If we were first to take up this argument that you offer about beliefs: was it argued rightly every time or not that we should pay attention to some of these beliefs and not to others? Or was the argument right before I was sentenced to death, but now it's become abundantly clear that it was argued then for no good reason, for the sake of argument, and it was trivial nonsense to be honest? I myself am keen, Crito, to consider together with you if the argument has in any way changed now I am in this position, or is the same, and whether we'll either dismiss it, or go along with it. It always used to be argued as follows, as I believe, by those who thought they had something worth saying: as I was saying just now, of the beliefs that people hold some should be highly regarded, others not. By the gods, Crito, don't you think this was argued correctly? You see, in all human probability, you are excluded from the prospect of being put to death tomorrow and the present catastrophe shouldn't knock you sideways.¹⁷ Just think about it: don't you think it has been argued adequately that one should not respect all the beliefs that people have, but just

¹⁷ Clearly a joke at C.'s expense in view of the contrast between S.'s and C.'s emotional state up to this point.

τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φήσ; | ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

KP. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μῆ;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; |

KP. Πῶς δ' οὐ; |

b ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν;

KP. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

KP. Δῆλα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ | ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ, τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ σύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

¹⁸ The purpose of the following sequence of argument is to get C. to agree to what has up until now been merely asserted—the distinction between informed and uninformed opinions (see also S.'s confrontation with Meletus at *Ap.* 24c10–25a11). Note that S., without actually arguing the point, is moving the emphasis away from the idea that an individual might have good and bad

CRITO

some and not others, and not those of everyone, but those of some and not of others? What do you say? Isn't this right?¹⁸

C. It is.

S. Therefore we should respect good beliefs, but not bad ones.

C. Yes.

S. And good ones are those of intelligent people, and bad ones those of those who are ignorant.

C. Of course.

S. Come on then, how were such points established?¹⁹ Would a man in training and fully engaged in it pay attention to the encouragement, criticism and opinion of every person, or only that of one person who is actually his doctor or trainer?

C. Only the one.

S. Therefore he must fear the criticisms and welcome the encouragement from that one person, and not those of the majority?

C. Obviously.

S. So he must get down to it and train, eat and drink in the way that seems right to that one person who is the expert and has knowledge, rather than what seems right to everyone else.

opinions (a possible implication of a3-4 above) toward the idea of the expert, the wise person whose opinions will (all) be good (47a9ff.). For the logical progression of argument at 47a2-48a10, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (ii).

¹⁹ A reference presumably to arguments with C. and others on previous occasions (see above, 46c8-d2). For a possible instance, see the exchange at *La.* 184d.

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

c ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; |

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι.

d ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διΐωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων | καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῶν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστίν ἐπαῖων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, | ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἰὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον | διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ,

CRITO

C. That's right.

S. Well then, if he disobeys the one and scorns his opinion and encouragements, but respects those of the majority who have no understanding, surely he'll suffer some harm? c

C. Of course.

S. What harm is this and to what does it tend, and what part of him who disobeys does it affect?

C. Clearly his body, for this is what he's damaging.

S. You're right, and isn't this true of everything else, Crito, to save us going through all of it; and above all when it comes to matters concerning the just and unjust and dishonorable and honorable and good and bad, those we are now discussing, whether we should follow the opinion of the majority and fear it, or that of the one person, if there is someone with understanding who we should respect and fear rather than all the others? If we don't follow him, won't we destroy and abuse that which was improved by what is just and was ruined by what is unjust:²⁰ or is that not so? d

C. I think it is, Socrates.

S. Come then, if we're going to destroy that which was improved by what is healthy and ruined by what is diseased by not following the opinion of those who have un-

²⁰ An oblique reference to the human soul (*psuchē*), which S. believed contained the intellectual and spiritual essence of the individual (see *Ap.* 29d–e). The existence of some part of the individual that can be benefited/harmed by justice/injustice, just as the body can be affected by beneficial/harmful physical influences, gives plausibility to the shift (as we might see it) from crafts to moral values.

e ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο³ σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; |

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἀδίκον μὲν λωβάται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φανλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος
48 ἐκείνου, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τιμώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνν ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγῆ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων | καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. “Ἄλλὰ μὲν δῆ,” φαίη γ' ἄν τις, “οἰοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτείνουαι.”

³ τοῦτο T: τοῦτο τὸ βδ

derstanding, are we fit to live if that part is ruined? And this is surely the body, isn't it? e

C. Yes.

S. So are our lives worth living with a distressed and degenerating body?

C. Not at all.²¹

S. Well then are we to live with that part of us ruined that the unjust damages, but that the just benefits? Or do we consider that that part with which justice and injustice are concerned, whichever part of us it is, is inferior to the body? 48

C. Not at all.

S. Rather more to be valued?

C. Very much so.

S. Then, my good friend, we shouldn't thus be overconcerned by what the majority will tell us, but what the person tells us who has an understanding of just and unjust matters, the single individual, and the truth itself. The result is that firstly you're not going about it in the right way when you propose that we must be concerned with the opinion of the majority about matters just and fine and good and their opposites. "But all the same," someone might say, "the majority have the power to put us to death."

²¹ C. assents here to an *ad hominem* argument—*ad hominem* in the sense that strictly speaking, for S., physical injury and illness, etc., are of comparatively little significance for living well, provided the soul is unaffected (e.g., *Ap.* 30a8–b1). Here he merely wishes to show that if a serious bodily ailment is popularly thought to make life unliveable, how much less is life worth living if the *soul* is damaged, as he goes on to show (e7–48a1).

b KP. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν,⁴ ᾧ Σώκρα-
τες.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ᾧ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ
λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι
καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε δὲ αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν
ἢ οὐ, | ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ
εὖ ζῆν.

KP. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταυτὸν
ἐστίν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

KP. Μένει. |

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκε-
πτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι
c μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ εἰ μὲν φαί-
νηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐῷμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ
λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ
δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ᾧ
Κρίτων, | σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτεινόντων καὶ
ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἰοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ,
τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως
αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγο-

⁴ φαίη γὰρ ἄν secl. Schanz, qui b2 ἀλ. λέγ. Critoni dat

²² An alternative textual reading adopted by Burnet in OCT¹ gives S.'s first words at b2 to C. ("You're right"), leaving it uncertain, on that reading, whether C. is endorsing the truth of the statement in a11 (as Burnet appears to suggest in his note ad loc.)

C. Indeed this is clear: someone might say that, Socrates.²² b

S. You're right, but, my dear man, this argument we've been through seems to me to be as valid as it was before; and consider whether the following as well still holds good for us or not, that we shouldn't put the highest value on living, but on living well.²³

C. Of course, it holds good.

S. And that living well and nobly and justly are the same: does that stand or not?

C. But of course.

S. So from what we agree we must consider whether it's just for me to try to get out of here, when the Athenians won't let me go, or not just; and if it seems just, let's try, but if not, let's drop it. But as for the questions you speak of regarding spending money and reputation and bringing up children, I suspect that these are in truth the speculations of those, this majority, who'd put people to death without a second thought and bring them back to life again if they could, men without any sense.²⁴ But as for us, since this is the way our argument is tending, let's not consider anything other than what we were talking about just now, c

or merely agreeing with S. that it is true that someone "would say that" (see textual note). ²³ The expression of how one ought to live is almost formulaic in Plato, elaborated at *Grg.* 512dff. (cf. *Ap.* 38a, *Grg.* 500c, *Resp.* 344e2-3, 353d6).

²⁴ Possibly, an oblique reference to an incident in the Peloponnesian war (*Xen. Hell.* 1.7.7-35) when the Athenian Assembly experienced a change of heart after executing six Athenian generals following the battle of Arginousae (406), a sentence that S. says he publicly opposed (*Ap.* 32b-c, and see discussion ad loc.).

μεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελούντες
 d τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ
 αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
 ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιούντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα
 ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι
 οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν
 ἄγοντας, | οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.
 ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα
 δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις
 e ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λόγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καὶ σοι πείσομαι·
 εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων
 ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμαι πείσας σε
 ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέ-
 49 ψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐάν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἶη.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι,
 | ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό-
 γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν
 καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; ἢ πᾶσαι
 ἡμῖν ἐκείναι αἰ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς

²⁵ It is a characteristic of C. that he now endorses a conclusion of S. that invalidates his own earlier arguments in his *parainesis* (45a6ff.) about money, reputation, and childcare. He also thinks the theoretical argument is over!

²⁶ A basic Socratic principle. S. further argues elsewhere, e.g.,

CRITO

whether we shall be acting justly in paying out money and doing favors to those who are going to take me out of here: both those who are themselves rescuers and we the rescued, or shall we in truth be acting unjustly in doing all of these things. And if in doing them it appears that we are acting unjustly, the question whether in staying here and holding our peace we will have to die or endure anything else whatsoever, ought not to be considered sooner than acting unjustly. d

C. I think you're right, Socrates;²⁵ but consider what we're to do.

S. Let's look at it together, my good friend, and if at any point you have an objection while I'm talking, speak up and I shall listen to what you say. But if not, my good fellow, just stop telling me the same thing over and over again, that I must get out of here against the will of the Athenians; because I think it's very important to act in these matters with your consent, but not against your will. Right then, have a look at the starting point of our inquiry and see if you think it's been adequately set out, and try and answer my questions to the best of your judgment. e 49

C. Well, I'll try.

S. Do we say that people should on no account act unjustly willingly, or that they may do it in one way but not in another? Or, is acting unjustly in no way good or noble, as has often been agreed by us in the past?²⁶ Or have all our previous agreements been thrown overboard in

in his exchange with Meletus at *Ap.* 25d1ff., that "virtue is knowledge"; willingly acting unjustly is impossible, since knowing what is good entails doing it, and wrongdoing is the product of ignorance. See further, General Introduction, section 3 (ii).

ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμένοι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, | ἄρα τηλικοῖδε ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῆ
 b διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν
 διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε
 ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν· εἴτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε
 δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ
 πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν
 καὶ | αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, | ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

c ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, | ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. |

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

27 The use of “bad” (*kakon*) and “shameful/disgraceful” (*aischron*) here recalls, and implicitly corrects, C.’s use of the terms to recommend escape at all costs (see 46a3–4 and n. 16 above).

28 On C.’s inconsistency between his endorsement of popular morality and his emphatic assent to Socratic positions here (as S.

CRITO

these last few days and has it turned out that men of our age, seriously discussing with each other have long since failed to notice, Crito, that we ourselves are no different from children? Or is the situation above all things just as we said it was then, whether the majority say so or not, and whether we must endure even more distressful things than these or even more pleasant ones: that all the same, to act unjustly is actually both bad and shameful for the perpetrator in every respect.²⁷ Yes or no?

C. Yes.

S. Then we mustn't act unjustly in any way.

C. Certainly not.

S. And we mustn't retaliate if we are treated unjustly, as most people think, since we must in no circumstances act unjustly.

C. It seems we mustn't.

S. And what about this point: should we do harm, Crito, or not?

C. I suppose we mustn't, Socrates.

S. And this: if we've been harmed, is to return the harm, as most people say, just or not?

C. In no way.²⁸

S. So I suppose that harming people is no different from behaving unjustly toward them.

C. You're right.²⁹

suspects at d1-2) and elsewhere in the dialogue, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (ii). For a basic statement of popular Athenian belief in the justice of returning harm for harm, see *Meno* 71e.

²⁹ C.'s acceptance of this conflation of "behaving unjustly" and "harming" is fundamental to S.'s subsequent argument.

ΣΩ. Ούτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.
 d καὶ ὄρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογήῃς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ἢ ὀρώντας ἀλλήλων τὰ βουλευόμενα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εἶ μάλα πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχόμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρώντα κακῶς, ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ
 e κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. ἢ

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἑξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς
 50 μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἤκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὖσιν ἢ οὐ;

CRITO

S. Then we shouldn't act unjustly in retaliation or do harm to any human being at all, no matter how we're being maltreated by them. And if you accept these arguments, Crito, make sure you're not agreeing contrary to your own belief: you see I know that some few hold these beliefs and will hold them. Therefore between those who hold these beliefs, and those who don't, there's no common ground, but they inevitably pour scorn on each other when they examine each other's deliberations. So then, have a really good look yourself and see whether you share these views and agree that they're right, and let's begin our discussion from the point that it's never right to act unjustly, nor to retaliate, nor should anyone who's being maltreated defend himself by retaliation: or do you take a different stance and don't share this view as a starting point? You see, for me, I have long thought it right and still do; but if you think otherwise in any way, tell me and guide me. But if you stand by what you said before, then listen to what follows.

C. Well, I do stand by it and think it's right. Anyway, do continue.

S. Then I shall tell you what follows, or rather I'll ask you a question: should one do whatever one agrees with another, if it's just,³⁰ or should one mislead him?

C. One should keep agreements.

S. Then consider what follows: if we leave this place without first persuading the state, are we harming certain people and those whom we should do least harm to, or not? And do we stand by what we agreed to be just, or not?

³⁰ For this key proviso and its significance for S.'s whole argument, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (ii).

KP. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. |

- ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρουντο. “Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ποιεῖν;
- b ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοῆ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετραφῆθαι, ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί | τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται;” τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστά-
- c τει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι “Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν;” ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

KP. Ταῦτα νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

³¹ Speaking in the persona of somebody else is an occasional device of Plato's S. (e.g., *Symp.* 201dff.), but this sustained personification is unique in Plato in terms of extent and central importance in the argument of the dialogue. S is presented (despite the conditional) as receiving the Laws as an external visitation (the word for “standing over” is regularly used of visitations from Homer onward). The inclusion of “the community of the state” shows that Plato intends the Laws to be interpreted in the widest possible sense, as the embodiment of the legal, social, and cul-

CRITO

C. I can't answer your question, Socrates, because I don't understand it.

S. Well, look at it this way: if we were getting ready to abscond from here, or whatever you ought to call it, and the Laws and the community of the state were to come to me and standing over me were to ask:³¹ "Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? By this action b you're undertaking are you planning to do anything other than actually destroy us, the Laws, and the whole state in as far as it's in your power to do so? Or do you think that that state can continue to exist and not be overturned in which legal judgments have no force but are rendered invalid and destroyed by private individuals?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to these and similar questions? You see someone, especially a public advocate,³² would have plenty to say about the violation of this law that directs that judgments, once pronounced, are sovereign. Or shall we c say in response to them that "yes, the state has behaved unjustly toward us because it has not given the right verdict in this case." Shall we say this, or what?

C. We shall, by Zeus, Socrates.

tural authority of the *polis*, as the Laws' argument goes on to demonstrate. Hence our translation here of *polis* (city, b2) as "state." For detailed outline of the Laws' argument and critical analysis, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (iii) and (iv).

³² "Public advocate" (*rhetōr* = "orator"), in this case an official appointed to defend laws slated for abrogation. Such an official, it might be claimed by the Laws, would wish to argue strongly against violating the fundamental principle enunciated in the rest of this sentence "that judgments, once pronounced, are sovereign" (50b8-c1).

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἦ ἔμμενεῖν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζη;” εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι | τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

d φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφῃ τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν;” | “Οὐ μέμφομαι,” φαίην ἄν. “Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἧ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἦ οὐ καλῶς προσέτατον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ

e σῶ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;” “Καλῶς,” φαίην ἄν. “Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχouis ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, | ἄρ’ ἐξ

33 The Laws are here suggesting that a contract between state and citizen (whatever its nature might be) precludes S. from disobeying the state (e.g., by absconding), even if it pronounces an unjust verdict; this is *the* central argument of *Crito*, which the Laws go on to amplify. See Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (iii).

34 “The arts” = a rough modern translation of *mousikē* (poetry and music) and “physical exercise” (*gumnastikē*), which were the traditional staples of Athenian education. S. approves here of an

CRITO

S. Then what if the Laws say: "Socrates, was that too in the agreement between us and you, or was it to keep to whatever judgment the state has pronounced."³³ Therefore if we were to be surprised at them saying this, perhaps they'd say: "Socrates, don't be surprised at what's been said, but give us an answer since it's always been your practice to ask and answer questions. Come on then, what blame do you attach to us and the city, that you are attempting to destroy us? Wasn't it we who gave you birth in the first place, and your father married your mother through us and gave you life? So tell us: would you have some complaint against those of us here who are the laws of marriage because they're faulty?" "I have no complaint," I would say. "Well what about those related to the nurture and education of the child by which you too were brought up? Or did those of us Laws who are responsible for this not carry out our instructions properly when we exhorted your father to train you in the arts and physical exercise?"³⁴ "You did it well," I'd say. "Well then, since you were born, brought up and trained, could you say in the first place that you were not both our offspring and slave: yourself as well as your ancestors? And if this is the case,

attitude to education and parental upbringing that differs somewhat from that presented elsewhere, notably in *Apology*, where he presents himself as incurring the anger of parents because he is seen as corrupting their children. For Plato's highly critical attitude to traditional education in *mousikē*, cf. *Resp.* 2-3. For the charge that S. encouraged children not to respect their parents, see *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.49, *Xen. Ap.* 20, an attitude possibly dating back to his portrayal in Aristophanes' comedy *Clouds* (421).

- ἴσον οἶε εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὦν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε ἄπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,
- 51 οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε, ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, | καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀναπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελούμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἶ σοφὸς ὥστε λέλθῃν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
- b προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν πατρίς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέικειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἂν κελεύῃ, | καὶ πάσχειν ἐάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάντε τύπτεσθαι ἐάντε δεῖσθαι, ἐάντε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμε-

³⁵ The Athenians strongly disapproved of maltreatment of parents, and there were legal sanctions against those who offended. One of the questions asked of a candidate for public office at the *dokimasia* (scrutiny of fitness for office) was whether he treated his parents well (Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 55.3-4).

³⁶ The Laws' substitution of "fatherland"/"native city" (*patris*)

CRITO

do you think what is just applies equally to you and us, and whatever we try to do to you, do you think it's just for you to do back to us as well? Or is it the case, then, that when what is just did not apply equally to you in respect of your father and a slave master, if you happened to have one, so that whatever was done to you, you could not do back, and when you were told off you could not answer back, and when beaten you could not hit back, or any of the many other things of this kind;³⁵ but yet it will be possible for you to be on equal terms with your fatherland³⁶ and with its laws so that, if we think it's just and attempt to put you to death, will you on your part attempt in return to destroy us, the Laws, and your fatherland in so far as you can, and say that in doing this you're acting justly—you, the one who really cares for goodness? Or are you so wise that you've failed to see that your native city is a thing of greater worth than your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors, and more worthy of respect, holier and held in greater esteem both among the gods and men of good sense, and you should revere, defer to and humor your native city when it is angry sooner than your father, and you should persuade it, or do whatever it bids and put up with it without fuss if it orders you to endure hardship? Or if it orders you to be flogged or put in chains, if it leads you to war to be wounded or killed, this must be done, and

51
b

for *polis* (city/state) suggests that they are sliding the argument away from a sociological emphasis and toward a patriotic appeal. The whole of this section of the speech is, in choice of vocabulary and style, a subtle exercise in persuasive rhetoric; for detailed stylistic and logical analysis of 51a7–c4, see Emlyn-Jones, *Crito*, 79–80, and see also Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (iii) and (iv).

νου, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ
 οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν
 τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ καὶ
 πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς,
 c ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε βιάζεσθαι δὲ
 οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων
 ἔτι ἤττον τὴν πατρίδα;” τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ
 Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ; ἢ

ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. “Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες,” φαίεν ἂν ἴσως
 οἱ νόμοι, “εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δί-
 καια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἂν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς
 d γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, με-
 ταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ’ ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξου-
 σίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν
 δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ
 ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς ἐξείναι
 λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐ-
 δεῖς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἔστιν οὐδ’ ἀπαγορεύει,
 εἴαντε τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ
 ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαντε μετοικεῖν
 e ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται,
 ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅς δ’ ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὄν

37 “Scrutiny” (*dokimasia*) was also undergone by young citi-
 zens of eighteen (for its use to scrutinize seekers of office, see
 above, n. 35) to confirm them in citizenship by being enrolled in
 the register of their deme, at which point they became *epheboi*.

CRITO

this is what is just, and on no account must you give way or retreat or leave your station. But you must do whatever your state and native land order you, both in war and in the law court: indeed everywhere, or you must persuade it as to where justice lies; to use violence against your mother or father is not sanctioned, and against your native city it is even less so than against them, isn't it?" What shall we say in reply to this, Crito? Do you think the Laws are telling the truth or not? c

C. Well I think they are.

S. "Then consider, Socrates," perhaps the Laws would say, "if what we're saying is true, that what you're now proposing to do to us is not just. For, having given you birth, having brought you up and educated you, having shared all good things we're capable of with you and the rest of your fellow citizens, we nevertheless proclaim that we've given permission to any Athenian who wishes it, if, when he has been scrutinized³⁷ and sees the city in operation and us the Laws, he finds us unsatisfactory, to take his belongings and go anywhere he wishes. Moreover none of us laws stands in your way or forbids you, whether any of you wishes to go to a colony, if both we and the city are displeasing, or go and emigrate somewhere else wherever he wishes with his property.³⁸ But whoever of you stays d e

The Laws see this as being the obvious time for the newly adult citizens to renew the "contract" or to make other arrangements.

³⁸ Note the distinction between an Athenian "colony" (*apoi-
kia*) and emigration (*metoikein*) out of the area of Athenian influ-
ence. Voluntary exile allowed the retention of property, as op-
posed to a severe legal penalty of exile, which might involve
forfeiture of property.

- τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέναί ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, | καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῆ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείσεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει
- 52 ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιτατόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ. ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂ ἐπινοεῖς, | καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.” εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι “Διὰ τί δή;” ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιτο λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὠμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω
- b ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις εἰ μὴ σοὶ διαφερόντως ἠρεσκεν, | καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πρόποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν,⁵ οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πρόποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης

⁵ ὅτι μὴ . . . Ἴσθμόν T et legit Athenaeus (cf. 216b): om. βδ

behind, observing how we make legal decisions and administer the other aspects of city life, we say that this person has already agreed with us by his action to do whatever we bid him to do; we say that anyone who does not obey is committing a wrong on three counts: that he is not obeying us, his parents, that he is not obeying his nurturers, and that despite having agreed to obey us, he does not obey, nor does he persuade us if we are not doing something well, although we propose and order him in no uncivilized way to do whatever we say, but when we offer him one of two choices, either to persuade us or do what we say, he does neither.³⁹ Indeed we say that you too, Socrates, you of all Athenians will incur these charges if you go and do what you propose—you, not least of the Athenians, but among the most culpable.” If then I were to say “Why so?” perhaps they could legitimately accost me, saying that I, among the Athenians, have actually most emphatically made this agreement with them. You see they would say: “Socrates, we have important evidence that both we and the city were to your satisfaction; as you would never have stayed at home more than all the rest of the Athenians unless it satisfied you above all others, and you have never gone away from the city for a festival, except once to the Isthmus,⁴⁰ nor anywhere else ever, except somewhere on military expeditions.⁴¹ And you have never made any other trip abroad like other people. Nor did any desire seize you

52

b

³⁹ On the significance of “either persuade or obey” in this sentence, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 3 (iv).

⁴⁰ The Isthmus of Corinth, for the Isthmian Games. Some manuscripts omit this phrase (see textual note).

⁴¹ For S.’s military service, see *Ap.* 28e, *La.* 181a–b.

- c πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναί, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἤμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ καὶ ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοῖνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκη ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἰ ἐβούλου, | καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἤροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνῃ, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπη, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δούλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν συνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, | εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὠμολογηκέναί πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργω ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ.” τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;
- d

KP. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- ΣΩ. “Ἄλλο τι οὖν,” ἂν φαίην, “ἢ συνθήκας τὰς
e πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν

⁴² In *Ap.* 37c–38a, S. refuses to propose exile as a less severe alternative to the prosecution's proposal of death, when it would have been prudent of him to propose this penalty as sufficiently severe for the jury to be likely to accept (on S.'s actual proposals

CRITO

to become acquainted with another city or other laws, but we were good enough for you, and our city too; so keenly did you take to us and agree to live among us as a citizen, and among other things you had children here, demonstrating that the city suited you. And again in the actual trial it was still possible for you to be sentenced to exile, if you had so wished, and to have done then with the city's consent what you are now planning to do against its will.⁴² But at the time you made a fine display of not objecting if you had to be put to death, but, as you said, you chose death rather than exile; yet now you show no shame for those words, nor do you pay heed to us the Laws in your attempts to destroy us. In fact you're doing what the most cowardly slave would do in attempting to abscond contrary to the articles and agreements according to which you agreed to conduct your life as a citizen. So first of all, then, answer us on this very point: are we telling the truth when we assert that you've agreed to lead your life as a citizen in obedience to us in deed but not in word,⁴³ or is that not true?" What are we to say to this in reply, Crito? Anything other than that we are to agree?

C. It must be so, Socrates.

S. "Then are you breaking anything," they would say, "other than the covenants and agreements that you have made with us, not ones you have agreed on out of necessity, nor even because you have been misled, nor even

for a penalty, see *Ap.* 38a–b). On the emphasis given to this incident by the Laws, markedly different from S. in *Apology*, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 4.

⁴³ The Laws clearly intend the agreement "in deed" (i.e., remaining in Athens) to indicate a binding commitment on S.'s part.

ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξήν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ | δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε
 53 Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομείσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοῖ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὔτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκειν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ | ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίμι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; εἰ ἂν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσῃ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

“Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι | τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσῃ σταντὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σταντοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτηδαιοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, | ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε—εὐνομοῦνται

⁴⁴ In contesting a breach of an Athenian legal contract, it was possible to plead duress, deception, or time pressure. In S.'s “contract” with the Laws, they claim that none of these can be represented as invalidating the agreement.

⁴⁵ An exaggeration: S. would have had the option of leaving Athens only from the time of his *dokimasia* (i.e., at age eighteen; see above, 51d3, and n. 37).

⁴⁶ Xenophon presents S. as strongly approving of Spartan obe-

CRITO

ones you were forced to decide on in a short space of time;⁴⁴ but over the course of seventy years in which you could have gone away if we didn't satisfy you, or if the agreements didn't seem just to you.⁴⁵ But you showed preference for neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which indeed you frequently say are well governed,⁴⁶ nor any other of the Greek states, nor even any foreign ones; but you visited other places less often than the lame and the blind and other disabled people. Thus it's clear that the city satisfied you far more than the rest of the Athenians, and presumably so did we the Laws. For, who would a city without laws satisfy? So now after all this, aren't you going to stand by what's been agreed? Yes, you will, if you take our advice, Socrates; at least then you won't be the object of ridicule by leaving the city. 53

“For just consider now what good you'll be doing yourself and your friends by breaking these agreements and offending in any of these respects. That there is a danger that your friends will be exiled themselves and be deprived of their citizenship and forfeit their property, is pretty clear.⁴⁷ As for you, firstly, if you go to the nearest of the cities, Thebes or Megara, (for both are well- b

dience to the law (*Mem.* 3.5.15, 4.4.15). Aristophanes represents S. and his followers as having a popular reputation as “Laconian,” i.e., lacking in both diet and hygiene (e.g., *Ar. Av.* 1281–83). Crete and Sparta (both authoritarian societies) are coupled by Plato at *Resp.* 544c as representing the next best constitution after S.'s ideal state-organization (*politeia*), and these states feature prominently in Plato's last dialogue, *Laws*.

⁴⁷ A direct answer to C., who made light of these possibilities at 44eff. above.

γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι—πολέμιος ἤξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων ὑποβλέπονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστὶν σφόδρα πονεὶ δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξῃ τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; | καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἤξει δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος; ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσποτηρίου | ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα

48 "Well-governed" = oligarchic, similar to Lacedaemon (Sparta) and Crete (above, 53a1). Both Thebes and Megara were oligarchies at this time, and S. had friends in both cities (see above, n. 9).

49 While Plato's dialogues as a whole give overwhelming evidence of S.'s focus on goodness and justice (*aretē* and *dikē*), his concern for institutions and laws (*ta nomima* and *hoi nomoi*) is hard to find elsewhere among the early Socratic dialogues. On the

CRITO

governed),⁴⁸ you'll go there as an enemy, Socrates, to their constitution and such people as have a care for their own cities will give you ugly looks, regarding you as destroyer of the laws, and will reinforce the opinion among the jurymen that it seems they judged your case correctly. You see whoever is a destroyer of the laws would very likely, one supposes, be seen as a destroyer of young and foolish people. Will you then avoid both the well governed cities and the most civilized of men? And in doing so, will your life be worth living? Or will you approach these people and have the nerve to converse with them—what arguments will you give them, Socrates? Or will they be the ones you use here, that goodness and justice are of the highest value to mankind together with institutions and laws?⁴⁹ And don't you think Socrates' action will appear to be discreditable? You should certainly think so! Well, will you leave these places and come to Thessaly and Crito's friends? Without a doubt there's a great deal of disorder and lawlessness there,⁵⁰ and perhaps they'd gladly hear the ridiculous story of how you escaped from prison wrapped in some disguise, or wearing a goatskin, or some other kind of getup that absconders usually equip them-

possible significance of this addition for the presentation of S. and the placing of *Crito* in the sequence of Plato's oeuvre, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 5.

⁵⁰ A standard Athenian assumption about Thessaly (see *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.24). Thessaly had only recently emerged from a primitive form of government noted for interfamilial aristocratic infighting, and in the late fifth and early fourth centuries was marked by short-lived tyranny and civil strife.

δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ
 τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ,
 σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος ὡς τὸ εἰκός,
 e ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως⁶ ἐπιθυμῆν ζῆν, νόμους
 τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ
 τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσῃ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ
 ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσῃ πάντας ἀν-
 θρώπους καὶ δουλεύων—τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν
 Θετταλία, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δείπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετ-
 54 ταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
 τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν
 παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃ καὶ
 παιδεύσῃ; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέ-
 ψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, | ἵνα καὶ
 τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφό-
 μενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσου-
 νται μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ
 ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἔαν μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν
 ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἔαν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδη-
 μήσῃς, | οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος
 b αὐτῶν ἔστιν τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι,
 οἷεσθαί γε χρή.

“Ἄλλ’, ᾧ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τρο-
 φεύσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν
 μήτε ἄλλο | μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου
 ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκέ-

⁶ οὕτω γλίσχρως TB² Eus.: οὕτως αἰσχρῶς βWS

CRITO

selves with, as well as having changed your appearance. Is there no one who'll say that you, an old man, with, in the nature of things, not much longer to live, had the effrontery to yearn so greedily for life after breaking the most stringent laws? Perhaps not, as long as you offend nobody; otherwise you'll hear many unworthy things said about you, Socrates. Indeed you'll live kowtowing to all men and being their slave—and what'll you be doing, other than living it up in Thessaly as if you'd gone to live in Thessaly for a feast? In that case where, we ask, will those discussions about justice and the rest of goodness be? But, naturally, you want to live for the sake of your children in order to bring them up and educate them? What!? You're going to bring them up and educate them by taking them to Thessaly, having made foreigners of them, so that they can have this to enjoy too? Or if not that, if they are brought up here, will they be brought up and educated better with you alive, when you're not here with them? Yes, for your friends will take care of them. Is it the case that if you go off to Thessaly they'll look after them, but if you relocate to the House of Hades, they won't? If those who claim to be your friends are of any use at all, you must believe they will.

“Come now, Socrates, obey us your nurturers and don't value your children, or your life, or anything else more highly than what is just, in order that when you get to Hades you may offer all this in your defense before those

ἀρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράτ-
 τουντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιοτέρον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον,
 οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένω
 c ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικοημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν
 ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων·
 ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχροῦς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ
 ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ συν-
 θήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμε-
 νος | τούτους οὓς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους
 καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν
 ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι
 οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπε-
 d χείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείση
 Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.”

Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ
 ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ-
 σιν ἀκούειν, | καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχῇ τούτων τῶν
 λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν
 λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει
 πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

e ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη,
 ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

⁵¹ Traditionally, there were three judges of the underworld, Minos, Radamanthus, and Aeacus, who had the reputation of having been supremely just men in their lifetime and received their status in Hades from Zeus as a reward (see Grg. 523e–24a).

CRITO

who rule there.⁵¹ For just as doing what you propose seems neither better for you in this world, and not more just or more holy, nor for any of your friends, so it will not be better for you when you get to the next. As it is now, you will leave here, if you do leave, having been treated unjustly, not under the auspices of us the Laws, but of men. But if you go having retaliated and caused harm in such a disgraceful way, having broken both your own agreements and covenants with us, and having done wrong to those here who are the last people you should have done it to: yourself, your friends, your native city and us, then we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and in the next world our brothers the Laws in Hades will not receive you kindly, knowing that you attempted to destroy us in as far as you could. Come now, don't let Crito persuade you to do what he says rather than what we say."

This, my dear friend Crito, be assured, is what I seem to hear, just as the Corybantes think they hear the flutes, and this sound of these words resonates within me and makes me unable to hear any others.⁵² Well, be assured that, as far as my current beliefs go, if you argue against those, you will argue in vain. All the same however, if you think you will accomplish anything more, speak.

C. No, Socrates, I've nothing to say.

S. In that case, Crito, let it be, and let's do it this way since this is the way the god is guiding me.

⁵² The Corybantes were priests of the Phrygian goddess Cybele (a cult introduced into Athens in the late fifth century), and they performed frenzied dancing to flutes and drums. S.'s reversion to quasi-religious imagery at the conclusion of the dialogue matches his recounting of the dream at the beginning (44a6ff.).

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PHAEDO

INTRODUCTION

1. SETTING AND CONTEXT

Longer than the other three works in this volume put together, *Phaedo* stands apart in other ways too. While linked by Plato with the Early Period *Euthyphro*, and *Apology and Crito* in a “last days of Socrates” dramatic context, this dialogue discusses its given subject—the fate of the soul after death—in a manner that clearly relates it to a metaphysical Theory of Forms that presupposes a previous discussion of the Theory of Recollection in *Meno* 81a ff. (see esp. *Phd.* 72e ff.), belonging to the Middle Period of Plato’s development, probably up to thirty years following the death of S.¹

Although written much later than the event it purports to relate, in its length and complexity *Phaedo* nevertheless reflects Plato’s conviction of the seriousness of the issues that actually confronted Socrates and his followers on his last day: life and death. At the end of the day S. will drink hemlock and actually experience the truth or falsity of what they are discussing, a reality that throughout the dialogue we are never allowed to forget. So the arguments

¹ See General Introduction, section 1, and Chronology of Plato’s Life and Works. On the Theory of Forms, see below, section 3 (iii), and on the Theory of Recollection, see section 3 (v).

PHAEDO

for and against the immortality of the soul, which take up most of the work, gain a particular urgency from the occasion. The beginning and the ending, the assembly of companions, and especially S.'s last moments have an intensity of emotion that makes it hard not to view these parts of the dialogue, at least, as representing the atmosphere of what happened in prison on this particular day in 399.

Phaedo is also unlike the other three works in this volume in being a "reported dialogue." One of Socrates' followers who was present, Phaedo, traveling back from Athens through the small Peloponnesian town of Phlius, satisfies the curiosity of a Pythagorean, Echechrates, by filling him in on all that was said and done on this momentous last day.² This narrative freedom enables Plato to do justice to the emotional atmosphere surrounding S.; Phaedo reports that there was much weeping and anguish displayed by the followers, though notably not by S. himself, who reproaches them for these outbursts of emotion and often provokes the opposite emotion, laughter: "Indeed

² One can only guess why P. gives his name to the dialogue; no other narrated dialogue is named after the narrator, and P. is only a very minor participant (in contrast to the respondents in *Euthyphro* and *Crito*, and in many other dialogues of Plato). Tarrant (*The Last Days of Socrates*, 96) conjectures that as an enslaved prisoner of war, released from a brothel perhaps at S.'s request (Diog. Laert. 2.31), P. might epitomize for Plato the theme of release, along with the theme of the freeing of the philosopher's soul from pursuits of the flesh; or perhaps more plausibly, in the opening sections, release may be symbolized in the story of the escape of Theseus and the youths and maidens from the Minotaur's labyrinth.

PLATO

everyone present was affected pretty much in this way, laughing one moment and crying the next" (59a8-9). Throughout, S. maintains a characteristic serenity, never more so than in his final moments, following the drinking of the hemlock.³

2. CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE

Plato presents this as an unusually large gathering, and most of Socrates' followers who were in Athens at the time were there: some fifteen named individuals and others unnamed. Three of those named were present at his trial and had been prepared to pay a fine for S. as an alternative penalty to death (*Ap.* 38b). These had included Plato, but in *Phaedo* he tells us, through the narrator, that he was absent: "Plato was ill, I think" (59b10).⁴ Among those present were Crito (see *Crito*) and a number of others who were credited by Diogenes Laertius with the composition

³ Gill, in a seminal article ("The Death of Socrates"), argues that the actual medical symptoms of hemlock poisoning, including nausea and vomiting, are far from dignified and do not correspond at all to the account at the end of *Phaedo*; Plato was adapting them to match the idea of the departure of an exceptionally pure philosophical soul: "a historical event is transformed into a representation of a philosophical idea" (28).

⁴ Whether or not Plato was present on the actual day in 399, emphasizing his *absence*, with the area of doubt expressed, is a subtle device to distance himself from the events he presents through his narrator; "it also, paradoxically, reminds us of his presence as author—while also denying it (after all, he wasn't even *there*)" (Rowe, n. ad loc.).

PHAEDO

of *Sōkratikoī Logoi*.⁵ Apollodorus is singled out as excessively emotional, and the narrator, Phaedo himself, becomes the center of S.'s attention for a short time, by taking on the respondent's role for a brief period (89a-90d), where he is the object of S.'s teasing. Crito, S.'s devoted friend, although an unsophisticated thinker (both qualities in evidence in *Crito*) has an important role in attending S. in his last moments and being the addressee of his last utterance: "Crito . . . we owe Asclepius a cock. See that you buy one, and don't forget" (118a7-8). Crito is also devoted to practicalities, such as his brief futile intervention at 63d to try to stop S. from getting hot through talking (some chance!), which, he has been told, may eventually nullify the effects of the hemlock.

By far the most important characters in *Phaedo*, however, after Socrates himself, are Cebes and Simmias, visitors from Thebes, philosophers in their own right, who take on the main respondent's role.⁶ Unlike Euthyphro or Crito (see *Euthyphro* and *Crito*), these are not relatively unsophisticated men, but rather cogent thinkers, steeped in Pythagorean teaching. They are not easily satisfied by S.'s initial arguments and put up important objections and counterarguments that require answers from S. and that control the dialectic dynamic of the whole work.

⁵ Clay ("The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue," 26ff.) points out that in point of historical fact, at the time of S.'s death, Plato was still a minor Socratic, in marked contrast to what he later became, as founder of the Academy.

⁶ They are mentioned briefly in *Crito* as being willing to pay to enable S. to escape (*Cri.* 45b).

3. THE DIALOGUE

(i) Preliminary Scene (57a1-61c1)

The introductory background draws on material already met at the beginning of the more intimate visit of Crito the previous day (*Cri.* 43a-44b), and in particular presents a more detailed version of the myth of Theseus and the mission to Delos (appropriate in an explanation to non-Athenians) that has, for reasons of religious purity, delayed Socrates' execution until the mission should return. We learn that his followers had been in the habit of spending this interval day by day with S. On this last occasion, S.'s children and his emotional wife, Xanthippe, are present, only to be summarily dismissed (60a), to return at the end (116a-b).

Socrates, just released from chains in preparation for execution, sits up and comments on the close connection of pleasure and pain (pain from his fetters and the subsequent pleasure at being rid of them).⁷ S.'s suggestion of a fable in the style of Aesop illustrating this combination of sensations leads on to questions about S.'s recent composition of poetry in response, he says, to a dream he had frequently experienced (60e). His friends tell him that Evenus, a philosopher (see *Ap.* 20b), has been inquiring about S. turning to poetry. S.'s advice that Evenus should be told to "come chasing after me as quickly as possible" (61b9) leads seamlessly into the first argument of the dialogue (see below (iii)).

⁷ On the relation between pleasure and pain, see also *Resp.* 583c-85a and *Phlb.* 52ff.

PHAEDO

(ii) *Soul and Body*

In *Ap.* 40c ff., the final section of his trial speech, Socrates discusses the nature of death, to which he has just been condemned. He proposes to those of the jury who voted for his acquittal a simple dichotomy: death is either nothing at all or a migration (*apodēmia*) to the other world, where he would have the great good fortune of conversing with all the old heroes of Greek myth and questioning them in a Socratic manner. In particular, he describes death as a “wonderful benefit” if it is like the first alternative, “when someone while sleeping sees nothing, not even in a dream” (40c10–d1).

In *Phaedo* the issue has become much more complex. The idea that at death the individual effectively ceases to exist, leaving nothing at all, is the subject of a long and complex to-and-fro of argument. This “nothingness,” which in *Apology* Socrates makes sound so pleasant, is in *Phaedo* the underlying fear expressed by S.’s associates. Cebes gives this expression: he is concerned that “emerging like a breath or puff of smoke it [the soul] may fly away and disappear and no longer exist anywhere” (70a5–7). It is S.’s aim to convince his associates that this is not the case and that the soul is immortal.

That the individual consisted of two distinct elements, a body and a soul, is in *Phaedo* a belief shared by all participants and was an unspoken assumption in Greek thought as far back as Homer, where, at death, an insubstantial image of the body could be seen departing like a puff of smoke to dwell in Hades, leaving a lifeless corpse (numerous Homeric references, e.g., *Hom. Il.* 16.855–57). In Socratic, and to some extent popular, thought, the soul

(*psuchē*) had come to represent the morally-aware, rational, intellectual part of the individual, which Socrates has little difficulty in opposing to the irrational, sensual part that represented the demands of the body (see esp. *Ap.* 29d–e).

Pythagorean thought (6th–4th c.), with which Simmias and Cebes would have been familiar, was closely related to a number of beliefs related to initiation into Mystery Religion (see *Phd.* 81a), where the afterlife was given substantial detailed form as a destination for human souls, and especially those that had been initiated into the various religious cults (at shrines such as *Eleusis*). Plato himself visited Italy and Sicily in the 380s, where he probably came into contact with Pythagorean philosophers. The Pythagorean idea of the body as a “prison house of the soul” underlies the whole of *Phaedo* (epitomized by the Orphic/Pythagorean wordplay *sōma* (body), *sēma* (tomb), Orph. DK 1B3, reflected by Socrates at *Phd.* 81aff.).

There is an underlying tension throughout the dialogue between this kind of religious revelation and the formal logical arguments for immortality, with the result that the nature of the soul and the kind of immortality Socrates wishes to establish for it remain largely undefined in the course of the dialogue. The broad, diverse, and occasionally contradictory functions that soul appears to perform lead to a number of problems of interpretation.⁸ The following sections will outline the basic arguments; more detailed comment will be postponed to section 4 below.

⁸ For a useful outline of the main aspects of the soul relevant to *Phaedo*, see Gallop, 88–91.

(iii) Death and Suicide (61c2-69e4)

The discussion follows directly from Socrates' advice to be passed on to Evenus (see above). Cebes queries the implied contradiction in the popular prohibition on suicide and S.'s contention that a philosopher should be willing to follow a friend who dies. While death might seem to be a benefit to some (those so bad or so unlucky that death is a release), our life is under the guardianship of the gods, and, like a slave under a good master, an intelligent person should wish to remain alive as long as the gods require it. So why should a philosopher desire death?

Socrates offers a defense, a more convincing one, he hopes, than he managed in front of the Athenian jury. He answers that the person who has practiced the good life can expect good things hereafter. If death is a release of the soul from the body, then the philosopher will attempt as far as possible to keep his soul pure by avoiding common pleasures, such as food and drink, bodily ornament, and sex. Moreover the distractions of sense impressions and other manifestations of the physical world divert our attention from objects of the intellect, which are absolute justice, beauty, etc., and other qualities "in themselves," which are not found in our imperfect world: namely, the Forms. The "Form" or "Idea" (*eidos, idea*) is conceived by Plato, at this stage of his development, as separable from the world of observable particulars: it is an essence, a "thing in itself" that supplies the reality of which sensible things are imperfect copies. Forms are accessible not through the senses but through reason. In *Phaedo* in particular, Forms are closely related to the "other world," the

destination of the pure immortal soul.⁹ The body, which is open to all these worldly distractions, is left behind at death when the soul departs. Therefore “those who are true philosophers are practicing dying and for them of all people death is the least thing to be feared” (67e5–7).

Popular virtues, such as courage and temperance, are practiced by most people through fear and dread of something worse. The resulting “goodness” is illusory, in fact a kind of prudential hedonism; real goodness is a purification from such illusions and can be attained only when the soul is as pure as possible, so that, when it is released from the body and all its desires, it may attain good things in the hereafter. The aim of true philosophers is to attain that purity of soul.

(iv) *Cebes' Objection and Socrates' Answer: The Argument from Opposites (69e5–72d10)*

Cebes immediately puts his finger on the fundamental problem with Socrates' argument: while, like all others, he accepts that the soul exists as an entity separate from the body, obtaining good things in the hereafter is nevertheless based on the assumption that the soul actually continues to exist as a cohesive entity after death.

Socrates initially refers to the Pythagorean/Orphic doctrine of Transmigration, the belief that when souls die they

⁹ For the distinction between the “Socratic” *eidōs*, a defined characteristic, as requested by Plato's S. in, for example, *Euthphr.* 5c8–d5, and the separable *eidōs* of Middle Period dialogues, see Aristotle, *Metaph.* 987a32–b7 (discussed in the General Introduction, section 2 (iv)).

PHAEDO

come into being again in a new form (the most elaborate Platonic description of this is in *Resp.* 10.614bff.) On this basis it follows that souls must exist after death in order to be born again. However, S. himself appears to realize that a religious belief is not, in the present context, an adequate philosophical argument and endeavors to argue from growth and degeneration in the natural world: opposites come to be from opposites—the bigger comes from the smaller, the weaker from the stronger, the faster from the slower, the just from the unjust, etc. From this S. concludes that “all things come into being in this way: opposite things from their opposites” (71a9–10). Cebes appears satisfied with this argument (a11).

Socrates goes further in arguing that there is a reciprocal process at work: between each pair of opposites there is increase and decrease (71a12–b4), which leads to the comparison: just as falling asleep is the opposite of waking up, there is an opposite to living, which is being dead. If the comparison holds, and life and death are, like sleeping and waking, a reciprocal pair, then living beings come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living. Assuming anything else implies that “the nature of things will be lopsided” (71e9).

Once this has been agreed, Socrates is free to point out that if there were not a reciprocal cycle between life and death, everything would proceed in one direction toward death, and ultimately there would be no life.

(v) *The Theory of Recollection* (72e1–78b3)

Proof that our souls existed before birth is advanced with the Theory of Recollection. Socrates' audience is pre-

sumed to have already encountered this theory on a number of occasions; we know it from *Meno* 80dff. In *Meno* S. and his young friend Meno are puzzling over the conundrum of how one moves from a position of ignorance to that of knowledge, which means full knowledge in the Socratic sense.¹⁰ In *Phaedo*, our experience of imperfect things in this world—equal things, beautiful things, and so on—through the senses, leads us by some process to have knowledge of absolute equality and other concepts. How was this knowledge acquired? S. argues that knowledge of real equality, etc., cannot have been acquired in this world via imperfect copies perceived through sight, hearing, etc., but that we must have had previous knowledge of the perfect “thing in itself” before we were born:

SOCRATES: Wouldn't what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge? And in my view in referring to this as recollection are we right to use this word?

SIMMIAS: Certainly. (75e5–8)

The only time that the soul could have acquired knowledge of these absolutes is before birth, and it is with the soul that the philosopher in life pursues knowledge of absolutes through recollection. S. then points out that this argument reinforces, despite both Simmias' and Cebes' doubts, the previous argument from opposites (see above, (iv)), namely that souls must exist *after* death, in order to be in a position *before* birth to be born again.

¹⁰ On knowledge, see General Introduction, section 3 (i).

PHAEDO

(vi) *The Argument from Affinity* (78b4–84b7)

Socrates then proceeds to set up a series of dichotomies based upon that to which, they are agreed, the soul has greater affinity: not the composite but the incomposite, that is, more like things in themselves (see previous section), rather than their changeable manifestations in the world that we can see, feel, etc. It follows that the soul is invisible rather than visible, invariable rather than variable, divine rather than mortal, governing the body rather than being governed by it. At death the visible composite body, over a longer or shorter time, disintegrates, whereas the soul departs to the place with which it has affinity: the unchanging, pure, and invisible world.

The soul that is least tainted by the influence of the body will find its passage to this place the least impeded. At this point Socrates introduces the theory of the Transmigration of Souls (given more elaborate exposition in *Republic* 10), by which souls assume different forms, of humans, animals, insects, depending on their conduct during life; this particular doctrine would not be unfamiliar to S.'s Pythagorean audience. The philosopher's task is to allow philosophy to set his soul free from the chains of worldly pleasures and so have the best chance after death of avoiding this cycle and attaining the pure divine world. *This should successfully banish the fear that Cebes voiced, that the separated soul will be "blown away by the winds, go flying off, and no longer be anything anywhere at all" (84b6–7).*

PLATO

(vii) *Further Objections from Simmius and Cebes (84c1-88c7)*

Simmius and Cebes are not convinced. Simmius is concerned to use the best available argument as a "raft" in default of proceeding on "a more secure vessel, some divine doctrine" (85d4): possibly an implicit criticism of the mixing of philosophical inquiry with religious revelation, of which, we might think, Socrates has been guilty. Simmius draws on his Pythagorean background to put a further objection: he likens what S. has said about the invisibility and incorporeality of the soul to the concept of *harmonia* (attunement), manifest in the strings of a tuned instrument, for example.¹¹ Applying this musical analogy to the soul, the theory might be advanced that *harmonia* is what maintains it in existence, an attunement of opposites in a certain ideal proportion. But Simmius argues that if the soul is a *harmonia* or attunement of opposites, when the tension in the composite body is broken, the soul must be destroyed. He challenges S.: "So consider what we'll say in answer to this argument, if one were to claim that the soul, being a mixture of the elements in the body is the first to perish in what we call death" (86d1-3).

Cebes, in turn, accepts Socrates' argument that the soul existed before it entered the body (see above (iv) and (v)), but, although he concedes that it is stronger and more durable than the body and survives the changing states of the individual body, he argues that it may nevertheless not

¹¹ *Harmonia*: the basic root means "fitting together," hence, "attunement," "musical tuning." *Harmonia* is also personified as a goddess, wife of Cadmus, mythical founder of Thebes (95a4-6).

survive forever, but ultimately perish. Even if one were to go so far as to accept that the same soul may be born and die several times in different incarnations, there is no guarantee that it may not ultimately perish after one of these. Just as, says Cebes, in a memorable illustration, a tailor may outlive the many garments he weaves but not outlive the last one that he makes for himself (87b–88a).

This takes us to the midpoint of the dialogue and the conclusion of the negative case made by Simmias and Cebes. There follows an interlude (88c8–91c6), in which, as in the midpoint of a number of Plato's Socratic dialogues, there is a brief discussion of the conduct of the argument,¹² which here notably brings in the narrator as respondent. It is important, Socrates emphasizes, not to become "misologists" (89d1), and treat argument as if it were a competition or to experience all arguments as "sometimes appearing to be actually true, sometimes not" (90d2–3).¹³ This is a signal that he will proceed, via criticism of the arguments of Simmias and Cebes, to build up a positive case for the immortality of the soul, which takes up most of the rest of the dialogue.

(viii) *Socrates' Criticism of the Arguments of
Simmias and Cebes (91c7–96a4)*

Socrates dismisses the idea that the soul is a *harmonia* as Simmias has outlined it. The idea is incompatible with the Theory of Recollection (see above, (v)), which is the one

¹² For another example, see *Euthphr.* 11b6–e4.

¹³ On the background to this aspect of argument, see *Phd.* n. 81.

aspect of S.'s argument that they have all three agreed on. An attunement cannot be in existence before that of the bodily elements of which it is composed. Second, as S. explains, there are degrees of attunement, but not of soul: "No soul will have anything bad in it if it is an attunement, for attunement is surely altogether just that: attunement, and will never participate in lack of attunement" (94a2-4). So the attunement theory leads to the absurd conclusion that all souls are equally good.¹⁴ Finally, it has just been agreed (94bff.) that an attunement follows the tension of its bodily constituents, whereas the soul directs the bodily elements.

Cebes' contention, that the soul, while very long-lived, ultimately is worn down and perishes, so that nobody can be certain it will survive their particular death, is a harder objection to answer and leads naturally into Socrates' final lengthy proofs of the immortality of the soul. The sense that they are reaching a crucial stage is perhaps indicated by the fact that S. continues "after a long pause wrapped up in his own thoughts" (95e8).

(ix) *Socrates' Analysis and Criticism of Presocratic
Materialist Theories (96a5-100a9)*

Socrates says that in his earlier life he was interested in the branch of investigation associated with the Presocratic

¹⁴ On the complexities of this second argument, see Gallop, 157-66. All three arguments are, strictly speaking, open to objections based on failure clearly to define the nature of the soul and its functions.

philosopher/scientists whose theories of how the world worked came under the general heading "On Nature" (*peri Phuseōs*). However, the variety of theories available concerning creation and destruction left him bewildered, he claims, until he discovered Anaxagoras, who posited "mind" (*nous*) as the originating and controlling factor in the development and organization of the world, only then to find that he made no real use of it.¹⁵ S. proceeds to clarify what sort of reason or cause of everything he is looking for: if one follows Anaxagoras, it is as if the reason he is sitting in prison is that his bones and sinews have operated in a certain manner, which demonstrates a failure to distinguish between mechanical causes and actions motivated by intellectual beliefs about justice and right.

SOCRATES: But if someone were to say that without having such things as bones and sinews and whatever else I've got, I wouldn't be able to do what I consider right, he'd be telling the truth. However, to say that this is the reason why I'm doing what I'm doing and I'm doing it by using my mind but not by choosing what is best, would be an extremely sloppy way of expressing it. For not to be able to see the difference that one thing is the actual cause, but that without which the cause could never be the cause is something else! (99a5-b4)

¹⁵ Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.1.11) and Plato (*Ap.* 26d) argue strongly against S.'s interest in scientific theories as opposed to human issues; caricature in comic poets, especially Aristophanes in *Clouds*, suggests support for what Plato says here, that S. might have been attracted to such theories earlier in his career.

PLATO

As a result of this impasse, Socrates decides he has to abandon reliance on sense perception and go back to theoretical principles, by moving away from the danger of blinding his soul by "looking at these matters with my eyes" (*blepōn pros ta pragmata tois ommasi*) and instead trying to discover the truth by taking "refuge in theories" (*eis tous logous kataphugonta*, 99e2-5).

(x) *The Forms as Causes and Their Operation* (100b1-105c7)

Going over what he represents as territory that they have explored before, the nature and operation of the Forms, which were introduced earlier (see above, 76d7-8), Socrates demonstrates their effectiveness as an explanation of the causes of everything that is more convincing than those of the Presocratics. Particulars are what they are by participating in the Forms, for example, instances of beauty gain their quality from "the beautiful in itself."¹⁶ This also applies to such Forms as largeness and smallness: to say that someone is larger than someone else, but smaller than a third person, involves the contradiction that such a person contains both largeness and smallness. Meeting the objection that they have previously agreed, that opposites come from opposites (see above, section

¹⁶ "Cause" = *aitia*, also meaning "explanation" (and in a legal sense, "responsibility," "blame"). Exactly how Plato sees the Forms in *Phaedo* and their operation (or even what constitutes a Form) is a complex and occasionally obscure issue; see, for example, Harte, "Plato's Metaphysics," 191-216; Taylor, "Forms as Causes in the *Phaedo*"; Sedley, "Platonic Causes."

PHAEDO

(iv)), S. makes a distinction between what they were talking about before—accidental properties—and those opposites that are the essences of things (Forms), and describes how the essences relate to each other: “You see, it seems to me not only is actual largeness never willing to be large and small at the same time, but also largeness within us never wants to let small in, nor wants to be overtopped, but has one of two alternatives: either to retreat and get out of the way whenever its opposite, the small, approaches, or to perish when the other has approached” (102d6–e2).

This military metaphor of approach and retreat may have suggested itself to Plato from the concrete examples of snow and fire (103d), which bring with them the Forms of cold and warmth. Fire (bringing with it heat) cannot become cold, but must either withdraw or be destroyed (a military metaphor reminiscent of the contest of opposite elements in Presocratic cosmology).¹⁷ This principle is extended to numbers. In rejecting the empirical explanation that duality is explained by the addition of $1 + 1$ or that a division of a unit is “caused by” that division, Socrates advances the hypothesis that while not Forms or opposites themselves, numbers participate in Forms: three and five, for example, participate in the Odd, and two and four, for example, are in the same relation to the Even. So three and four, while not opposites, cannot admit each other, by virtue of participating in their respective Forms of Odd and Even. When one approaches, the other is not destroyed, but must withdraw (104b–c).

¹⁷ See Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo*, 155–56.

PLATO

(xi) The Soul as an Opposite That Does Not Admit Its Opposite (105c8–7a7)

Building on the above argument, Socrates takes the essential property of soul as bringing life to that which it occupies: the body. The opposite to living is dying. Life and death cannot admit one another, but one or other must either withdraw or be destroyed. The soul, which is always accompanied by life, can never admit the opposite of that which accompanies it; so it will not admit death.¹⁸ Therefore the soul is “undying,” that is, immortal. What is immortal cannot admit death; so the soul is imperishable. At the approach of death, since it cannot perish, the only alternative for the soul is to withdraw unharmed.

SOCRATES: Then when death approaches a man it seems his mortal part dies, but his immortal side gets away safely and intact after escaping the clutches of death.

CEBES: It appears to.

SOCRATES: So . . . it is established beyond all doubt that soul is immortal and indestructible and in truth our souls will exist in Hades. (106e4–107a1)

(xii) Cosmology and the Fate of Souls after Death (107a8–15a9).

Strictly speaking, this section does not contain any actual argument for the immortality of the soul. Socrates has

¹⁸ A dead soul is “something as impossible as an even trio or a hot snowball” (Sedley, xxxiii).

PHAEDO

concluded the arguments of *Phaedo* and continues with an account of the afterlife, a myth: "The story goes like this . . ." (*legetai de houtōs*, literally, "this is how it's told," 107d5-6). He does not insist on the complete accuracy of what he outlines here, but believes that it is in essence the truth (114d1-3). Two other major works of Plato, *Gorgias* and *Republic*, also conclude a closely argued dialogue with a myth; in these works, as in *Phaedo*, the precise logical relationship between the argument and the myth is left unclear by S., but all three myths take their character from the main topics of their respective dialogues.¹⁹

This takes the form, in *Phaedo*, of a sharp distinction between our bodily world and the purer world of the afterlife reflected in the prominence given to this aspect in the myth, where, although we are hardly aware of it, and assume we live on the surface of the earth, we are actually living in its hollows, our perception of a much brighter and more perfect world above being similar to that of an individual's perception of our world if he were to view it from under the ocean (109c).

Following a complex account of the movements of the various rivers of the Underworld, which owes much to tradition (111c-13c), Socrates elaborates on the fate of various souls, traveling on formidable underground rivers—both those individuals of surpassing badness in life and those whose bad deeds are deemed curable. The climax of the myth concerns those who have led a particularly good life, and among them, those who have purified themselves through philosophy; this select group inhabits regions that are particularly beautiful, difficult to describe (114b-c).

¹⁹ See Annas, "Plato's Myths of Judgment."

4. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS IN
THE ARGUMENT OF PHAEDO

I have read it [*Phaedo*] and, by Hercules, very often; somehow while I am reading it, I agree, but when I have put the book down and begin to think about the soul's immortality for myself, all that agreement ebbs away. (Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.11.24)

These feelings about *Phaedo*, expressed by the anonymous student in a philosophical dialogue of Cicero (106–43 BC), might well be echoed by the modern reader. Socrates' arguments proving the immortality of the soul to his and his associates' general satisfaction²⁰ depend on certain premises that we might find difficult to accept. S.'s final proofs for the immortality of the soul (100b7–107a1) especially contain some of the most difficult and obscure metaphysical argument of Plato's Middle Period, which has generated a large, and often quite specialized, secondary literature. Here it will be possible to give only the bare outlines of the main issues.²¹

There are three main bases to Socrates' proofs for the immortality of the soul: ideas derived from Presocratic

²⁰ Though it should be noted that Simmias, with S.'s approval, expresses some "reservations" (107b2–3), just before the start of the myth, and S. himself encourages close scrutiny of the arguments.

²¹ Readers wishing to delve more deeply are referred in the first instance to the article by Harte, "Plato's Metaphysics," and to Frede, "The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul"; see also the very detailed discussions in Gallop's commentary, and the extensive bibliographies in Rowe, 14–19, and Sedley, xxxvii–xxxix.

cosmology, myths associated with Mystery Religions, and the workings of the Theory of Forms.

Despite Socrates' fundamental disagreement with the mechanistic aspect of the theories of the Presocratics and his ostentatious departure from them on the subject of *aitia* (cause, explanation) for things being as they are (98bff.), much of the early argument of *Phaedo*, and especially the superficially unconvincing argument of opposites from opposites (70d-72e), has behind it the assumptions of biological "coming to be" (*genesis*) and "destruction" (*phthora*), which underlay most Presocratic theories of the composition of the universe. "Well then, don't look at this," S. says, "only from the human angle, if you want to understand it more easily, but from that of all animals and plants, and by looking collectively at all things that come into being let's see whether everything comes into being in this way, from nowhere but opposites from their opposite, where they happen to have this kind of characteristic" (70d7-e1). Having made this connection, S. immediately makes a hazardous logical leap (from our point of view) from biological examples to such opposites as beauty/ugliness, right/wrong, bigger/smaller, and, crucially for the argument, sleeping/waking, living/dead (70e-71a).

What does not feature explicitly in Socrates' theory, but which may have been lying at the back of Plato's notion of unchanging eternal entities such as the Forms, is the Presocratic idea that matter cannot cease to exist, but that generation and destruction were in reality modifications of a basic, eternal substance, whether one of the elements, such as Anaximenes' air, Heraclitus' fire or, perhaps more suggestively, Anaximander's *to apeiron* (the boundless), a

PLATO

kind of reservoir from which opposites were generated and to which they returned.²²

Second, *Mystery Religions*: in his presentation of the myth (section 3 (xii)), Socrates assumes the existence of an afterlife and describes it in some detail. Homer describes an unattractive afterlife of attenuated souls who inhabit a dark underworld, maintaining the shape, appearance and behavior, but not the substance, of the individual (section (ii) above). Such a picture perhaps survives in S.'s description, possibly semihumorous, of "shadowy apparitions" (*skioeidē phantasmata*) of souls flitting around tombs (81d1), unable to escape owing to the weight of their corporeal baggage. In the seventh and sixth centuries there arose an alternative picture associated with the Mystery cults, in which chosen initiates were assured of a better afterlife. S. introduces this at an early stage of the dialogue as a *palaios logos* (old story: 70c5–6), which, if true, would clinch the truth of the survival of the soul after death, and would do so independently of the philosophical argument. Although S. appears to recognize that the myth is not in itself adequate proof (70d4–5), his elaborate picture of the afterlife at the end of the dialogue, and especially at 113dff., serves to underline the ethical emphasis given in the whole dialogue: two worlds—that of the body's desires and appetites weighing down the soul and the world of the true philosopher, whose soul, when it leaves the body untainted by worldly desires, will attain eternal bliss. In no other dialogue is this division between the corporeal and the eternal so clearly maintained.

²² See Anaximander (ca. 570) DK 12B1 (Waterfield, 14).

The clinching argument, however, on which the whole "Immortality of the Soul" thesis rests, is clearly intended by Socrates to lie in his exposition of the way in which the indestructibility of the soul is tied to the Theory of Forms. At 76e4-5 S. appears to recognize this close relationship: "But if these [the essences = Forms] don't exist, wouldn't this line of argument [the Theory of Recollection] be pointless? . . . is it equally necessary both that these essences exist, and that our souls existed before we came into being; and if the one did not, neither did the other?" If the Forms did not exist, there is little with which S. would be able to counter Cebes' fear that the soul will fly away like a breath or a puff of smoke (70a5).

We are told that Forms are timeless, nonspatial, and immutable entities set against a changing world of sensible things. This division is reflected in the individual: the body is related to the world of the senses, the soul to the Forms. It is this latter relationship that finally convinces Simmias and Cebes that Socrates is right and that the soul, through its association with life and the transcendent Forms, cannot be destroyed by its opposite, death, but that when death comes, the soul moves out of the way, leaves the body, and remains intact and imperishable (see above, sections 3 (x) and (xi)).

The idea that in order to "know" what the just, the holy, and so on really are, one has to reach a single definition that covers all instances of that concept, was the main, and ostensibly unsuccessful, goal of *Euthyphro*. In *Phaedo* these definitions become, as we have seen, perfect models, or Forms, whose existence Socrates and his associates clearly regard as firmly established by the Theory of Rec-

ollection (see section 3 (v)). What remains unclear is exactly what sort of entities they are and how they are present or "in" the particular things of our world.

This vagueness of definition extends to the soul.²³ If we accept, as we must for purposes of the argument, the existence of the soul, it is never, in *Phaedo* at least, made clear what the nature and function of the soul actually is: a life principle? A moral agent? The rational element within us (opposed to emotions, desires, etc.)? All three aspects appear to be operating at one point or another in the dialogue: Plato appears to be presenting an amalgamation of, on the one hand, the "raft" of Simmias, the engagement of the intellect in the hazardous course of constructing best of possible logical arguments; or, on the other, the more straightforward "securer vessel" of the *theios logos*, the "divine doctrine" (85d1-4), in which the souls of sinners beg their victims to allow them onto the Acherusian Lake and so to judgment and ultimate purification (114a6-b5). It is a matter of debate how successful this amalgamation turns out to be, in *Phaedo* at least.

5. CONCLUSION

Philosophers have had a field day with *Phaedo*, poring in great detail over the intricacies, ambiguities, and unsatisfactory nature of many of the arguments. If, in the face of our own mortality, we are looking to be convinced purely by philosophical argument that our soul is immortal, then

²³ It should be noted that Plato's theories of the nature of both the soul and the Forms underwent further radical development in, e.g., *Republic* and *Parmenides*.

PHAEDO

it is true that Plato's reasoning renders disappointment almost inevitable, for us and for Cicero's student alike.

It is important, however, to recognize the occasion: Socrates is not, as Plato portrays him in some of the dialogues, engaged in a leisurely discussion for which there is all the time in the world. *Phaedo* shares with the other works in this volume, and especially *Crito*, an urgent concern with major practical issues, in this case the most important of all, what is going to happen to S. at his own very imminent death. We are reminded of time running out for S.: at one point he asks Phaedo for help in the argument "while there's still daylight" (89c7-8).

Moreover, the emotional aspect of the dialogue is never far from the surface, for example, in the absorption of Socrates' associates in their own grief: "how great the disaster was that had befallen us, actually thinking, like those deprived of a father, that we'd live the rest of our lives as orphans" (116a6-8). But the prevailing mood of the dialogue is most evident, paradoxically, in S.'s refusal to share in this atmosphere of mourning and the notable calmness with which he conducts himself at the very end. We note in particular his incidental comments on his own fate, for example, his remark that Crito can bury him how he likes "if you can catch me and I don't escape your clutches" (115c4-5)—a characteristic joke that, at the last, reminds his audience that "S." will no longer be there but, as he believes, will consist of an immortal soul escaping unharmed from a moribund corpse.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

57 ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκρά-
τει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ
δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες. |

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ
θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκού-
σαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλειασίων οὐδεὶς
πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος
b ἀφίκεται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές
τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι
φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν
φράζειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὄν
τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἔθανμά-

¹ "Poison" = *to pharmakon* (drug); a *pharmakon* could be either deadly poison, as here (assumed to be hemlock, though nowhere explicitly stated in *Phaedo*), or (beneficial) medicine.

² The direct dialogue of *Phaedo*, within which the main Ath-

PHAEDO

ECHECRATES PHAEDO

ECHECRATES: Were you there with Socrates yourself, 57
Phaedo, on the actual day he drank the poison¹ in the
prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

PHAEDO: I was there myself, Echeocrates.

E. So then what kind of things did he say before he
died? And how did he meet his end? I'd really like to hear
about it. You see hardly any of the Phliasi-ans get to go
to Athens these days, nor has anyone from outside come
from there in a long time who could tell us anything defi- b
nite about what happened, except of course that he drank
poison and died; as for the rest there was nothing anyone
could be specific about.²

P. You mean you haven't even heard how the trial 58
went?

E. We have actually.³ Someone did tell us about that

ens prison scene is narrated, takes place in the small northeastern
Peloponnesian settlement Phlius, where absence of news from
Athens gives the dramatic motivation for P's narration of the
events in answer to the questions of E. Phlius, along with Thebes,
was a center of mainland Pythagoreansim.

³ See *Apology*. Plato would not want to dramatize or narrate
these events again.

ζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερου φαίνεται ἀποθανών. | τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῶ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν; |

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς "δὺς ἐπτὰ" ἐκείνους
 b ὦχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῶ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι ἠϋξάντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἕκαστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῶ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῶ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν | τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτείνουσαι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῶ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχουσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολα-
 c βόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῶ Σωκράτει | ἐν τῶ δεσμοτηρίῳ ὃ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶπραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ

⁴ Thirty days, according to Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.2.

⁵ For the myth, see Introduction to *Crito*, section 1.

PHAEDO

and we were really surprised that although it took place a long time before,⁴ it seems he was put to death much later. So why was this, Phaedo?

P. He had a bit of luck as it turned out: you see it so happened that on the day before the trial the stern of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos was being garlanded.

E. And what ship is that then?

P. According to the Athenians it's the ship in which Theseus once sailed with those so-called "twice seven," and both saved them and saved himself. Now at the time the Athenians vowed to Apollo, so it's said, that if they were saved, they would send in return a mission to Delos every year, which indeed they've been doing in honor of the god since that time annually right up to the present day.⁵ So as soon as they've started the mission, the law is they must keep the city pure and not carry out any public executions before the ship has been to Delos and come back again. But sometimes this takes a long time whenever there are contrary winds. The beginning of the mission is when Apollo's priest places a wreath on the stern of the ship. This happened by chance, as I say, the day before the trial took place, and that's the reason why Socrates spent such a long time in prison between the trial and his execution.⁶

E. But what about his actual death, Phaedo? What was said and done, and which of his friends were at his side?

⁶ An explanation of the mythological *aition* of the religious ritual following the trial (alluded to in *Cri.* 43c-d), for Phliasians presumed ignorant of Athenian religious practice.

παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἶω
οἱ ἄρχοντες παρῆναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

d ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ
γε.

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα
ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει
οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν
διηγήσασθαι· ἰ καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι Σωκράτους καὶ
αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων
ἡδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους
γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ
ἀκριβέστατα διεξελλθεῖν πάντα.

e ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παρα-
γενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς
ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσήει· εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαί-
νετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων,
ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ἵ ὥστε μοι ἐκείνον
παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἄιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας
59 τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι
ἐλεινὸν εἰσήει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πέν-
θει, οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων
ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν—καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιούτοί τινες ἴ
ἦσαν—ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ

PHAEDO

Or did the authorities not allow any of his companions to be present, and he died alone without his friends?

P. Oh, by no means; several of them were there: in fact quite a lot of them. d

E. Well come on then and describe it all to us in as much detail as you can, unless you haven't actually got time.

P. Oh no, I've got time and I'll try to describe it to you. In fact recalling Socrates either by talking myself or hearing someone else talking about him is always the greatest of pleasures for me.

E. Not only that, Phaedo, you have others here who are of the same mind, even though we're only going to listen. Anyway, try and recount everything in as much detail as you can.

P. Well indeed, it was a remarkable experience for me being there. You see I wasn't filled with pity as you'd expect, being present at the death of a close friend. He seemed to me to be happy, Echecrates, in his manner and what he said, so fearlessly and nobly was he meeting his end; so that I received the firm impression that even on his way to Hades he was not without some divine destiny, and also, if anyone was ever to fare well when he arrived there, Socrates would.⁷ That then is the reason I didn't feel any sadness at all as you might expect in the presence of grief. There was no pleasure either at being in our customary philosophical discussion—you see our conversation was something along those lines—yet I just had a e 59

⁷ For the "divine destiny" overseeing the events of S.'s trial and death, and his belief that the gods protect the good man in life and death, see *Ap.* 41d.

τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη
 ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα
 ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχε-
 δόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ
 δακρύνοντες, | εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλό-
 b δωρος—οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον
 αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν,
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. |

ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων
 παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι
 Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντι-
 σθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς καὶ Μενέ-
 ξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. | Πλάτων δὲ
 οἶμαι ἠσθένει.

ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

c ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης
 καὶ Φαιδῶνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερ-
 ψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγέ-
 νοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι. |

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

PHAEDO

strange sort of feeling and a curious mixture made up of pleasure and pain in equal measure, when it came home to me that he was on the point of being put to death. Indeed everyone present was affected pretty much in this way, laughing one moment and crying the next, but one of us especially so: Apollodorus; I presume you know the man and what he's like?⁸ b

E. Indeed I do.

P. Well that's how he was, entirely so, and I myself was upset too, as were the others.

E. But who was actually there, Phaedo?

P. Of the local citizens this man Apollodorus was there of course and Critobulus and his father, and then Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes. Also there were Ctesippus from Paeania and Menexenus and some other Athenians. Plato was ill, I think.

E. And were there some outsiders there?

P. Yes, Simmias the Theban, Cebes and Phaedondes and Euclides and Terpsion from Megara.⁹ c

E. What? Weren't Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

P. Indeed no. It was said they were in Aegina.

E. Anyone else there?

P. I think that's just about everyone.

⁸ On the character of Apollodorus and his devotion to S., see further, *Phd.* 117d, *Symp.* 173d, *Xen. Mem.* 3.11.17.

⁹ On those present, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 2. Crito is referred to in a roundabout way here as the father of Critobulus (b7). Plato's illness (b10) justifies, dramatically, his "absence" from the scene. Plato never appears as a character in his dialogues, and the only other references by Plato to himself are at *Ap.* 34a1 and 38a6.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δῆ; τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διη-
 d γήσασθαι. αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθε-
 μιν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη,
 συλλεγόμενοι ἕωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ
 δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου. |
 περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμο-
 τήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀνεψέγοτο γὰρ οὐ
 πρῶ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη
 e καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ
 τότε πρῶταίτερον συνελέγημεν· τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἐπ-
 ειδῆ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθό-
 μεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγ-
 γείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἤκειν ὡς πρῶτατα εἰς τὸ
 εἰωθός. καὶ ἤκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός,
 ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, | εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ
 πρότερον παριέναι ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· “Λύουσι
 γάρ,” ἔφη, “οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν
 ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾶ.” οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν
 60 χρόνον ἐπισχῶν ἤκειν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσ-
 ιόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι
 λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην—γιγνώσκεις γάρ—
 ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς
 οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνηυφήμησέ τε καὶ
 τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, | οἶα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι

¹⁰ For the visit of Crito the previous day, see *Cri.* 43a1–44a8. The foundations of a prison in the Agora, presumed to be the

PHAEDO

E. So what next? What do you say the topics of conversation were?

P. I'll try and explain everything to you from the beginning. You see I and the rest were in the habit of going to see Socrates regularly on the preceding days too, gathering at daybreak at the court where the trial took place: it was in fact next to the prison.¹⁰ So we used to wait each time until the prison was opened and talked among ourselves since the prison didn't open early. But when it was opened, we would go in to Socrates and spend most of the day with him. And then on the day itself we assembled even earlier, since when we left the prison the day before in the evening, we found out that the ship had arrived from Delos.¹¹ So we passed word around to each other to come to the usual place as early as possible. And we came and when the doorkeeper, who usually opened the door to us, came out, he said we must wait and not go in until he told us to: "The Eleven¹² are unchaining Socrates, you see, and are directing that he is to be executed this very day." He kept us waiting for a short time and then came and told us to go in. So we went in and found Socrates who had just been unfettered and Xanthippe—well, you know her—sitting beside him with his young son. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of things that women usually do, such as: "Socrates, this is the very

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prison of S., have been excavated in the Agora by the American School of Classical Studies in Athens (see Camp, *The Athenian Agora*, 113–16).

¹¹ See above, 58a10–c5.

¹² "The Eleven": the public officials charged with the administration of prisons and the carrying out of judicial sentences.

“Ω Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους.” καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, “Ω Κρίτων,” ἔφη, “ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε.”

- Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπήγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος
- b βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα, ὧς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε | πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω δὴ
- c οὔτε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται | ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

- Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν
- d ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντέϊνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤρνοντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐῆνος πρῶην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά,

PHAEDO

last time your friends will be speaking with you, and you with them." And Socrates looked at Crito and said: "Crito, get someone to take her home."¹³

Some of Crito's men led her away shouting and wailing. But Socrates sat up on his couch, pulled up his leg and rubbed it hard with his hand. While he was rubbing it he said: "My friends, what a strange thing it is, it seems, that people call 'pleasant,' how remarkable it is in comparison with its apparent opposite 'painful': the fact that the two refuse to arise in a person together! But if someone pursues one of them and catches it, he is always pretty much forced to catch the other as well as if they're two beings fastened to a single head. What's more it seems to me," he said, "if Aesop had thought of it he would have written a fable how god wanted to reconcile them as they were warring against each other and, since he couldn't, he joined their heads together, and so whoever gets the one, the other follows on behind. This is just as in my own case, it seems: since there was a pain in my leg as a result of the fetters, so the pleasure seems to have come following on behind."

So then Cebes joined in and said: "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, you did well to remind me. You see, concerning the poems you've composed putting the tales of Aesop into verse and the prologue to Apollo, some have already asked me, but Euenus in particular the day before yesterday, what on earth were you thinking of by composing them when you came here, when you've never composed any-

¹³ On the tradition of Xanthippe's temperament, see Xen. *Symp.* 2.10, Diog. Laert. 2.36ff., and on the ancient Athenian male attitude toward women in general, see Dover, 98-102.

πρότερον οὐδὲν πάποτε ποιήσας. | εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐθύμῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὐθις ἐρωτᾷ—εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται—εἰπέ τί χρῆ λέγειν.

- Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτε-
- e χνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα—ἤδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ράδιον εἶη—ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε
- πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ | ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, “Ω Σώκρατες,” ἔφη, “μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου.” καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ
- 61 ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. | νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτῇ διεκώλνέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα
- πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημόδῃ μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ.
- b οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἢ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν

thing before.¹⁴ So if it matters to you that I should have some answer for Euenus when he asks me again (and I know very well he will ask), tell me what I should say.”

“Well, Cebes,” he said, “tell him the truth. I didn’t compose them because I wanted to rival him or his compositions—because I knew it wouldn’t be easy—but I was trying to find the meaning of certain dreams and clear my conscience in case perhaps after all they were ordering me to create this kind of art. You see, it’s like this: the same dream often haunted me in my past life, sometimes appearing in one guise, sometimes another, but saying the same thing: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘cultivate the arts and work at them.’¹⁵ And in the past I used to take this to mean it was urging and encouraging me to persist with what I’d been doing; like people encouraging runners, so too the dream was urging me to carry on doing the very thing that I was doing, cultivating the arts on the grounds that philosophy is the greatest of the arts, and this was what I was doing. But now, since the trial has taken place and while the festival of the god was holding up my execution, it seemed that if indeed the dream was repeatedly telling me to pursue this side of the arts in the popular sense, I should not disobey it, but get on with it: it would be safer not to leave before clearing my conscience by composing poetry in obedience to the dream. So I first composed a poem to the god in whose honor the current festival was held. Then

¹⁴ For Euenus, see *Ap.* 20b–c, *Phdr.* 267a. On the relation of pleasure and pain, see further, *Gr.* 496c–97a.

¹⁵ *Mousikē* has a wider meaning in Greek than “music,” covering music, poetry, dance, visual art—what is usually meant in modern parlance by “the arts.” For S.’s dreams, see *Cri.* 44a–b.

ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην, τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.

c ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἶον παρακελεύη, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνω. πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἦσθημαι οὐδ' ὀπωσιτιοῦν σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. |

Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Ἐθελήσει τοῖνυν καὶ Εὐήνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· | οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἅμα

d λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

Ἦρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, | ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι;

Τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες;

Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ Σώκρατες.

¹⁶ "Stories" = *muthoi* (stories in verse, fables) rather than *logoi* (factual prose accounts).

PHAEDO

after this poem to the god, thinking that if one were to be a poet one should compose stories, not factual accounts,¹⁶ and I myself was not a creator of stories, then for this reason I worked up the first of the fables of Aesop I came across that I had available and that I knew. So, Cebes, explain this to Euenus and bid him farewell and, if he has any sense, tell him to come chasing after me as quickly as possible. But I'm going today it seems: the Athenians command it." c

Now Simmias said: "What a way to encourage Euenus, Socrates. I've met him many times already, so I'm fairly sure, from what I've observed, there is no way whatever he'll be willing to do what you say."

"What do you mean?" he said, "Isn't Euenus a philosopher?"

"I believe so," said Simmias.

"In that case not only Euenus, but everyone who takes a worthwhile interest in the subject will be willing to. However perhaps he won't do anything violent to himself because people say it's not right." And while he was saying this he lowered his legs to the ground and remained sitting in this position for the rest of the conversation. d

So then Cebes asked him: "What do you mean, Socrates, it's not lawful to do oneself violence, but the philosopher will be willing to follow the dying man?"¹⁷

"What, Cebes? Have both you and Simmias as friends of Philolaus not heard about such things?"

"Nothing specific, Socrates."

¹⁷ For detailed discussion of the following argument, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (iii).

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ
 e γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινα αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρῃ ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ; †

Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτείνουσι, ὧ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τιῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

62 Ἄλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσῃς. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστὸν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνᾶναι ἢ ζῆν, † οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνᾶναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἡρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, ἴτω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.

b Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι

¹⁸ "In our city," i.e., Thebes. Philolaus was a Pythagorean philosopher (ca. 470–390) originally from either Croton or Tarentum

PHAEDO

"Well the same goes for me. I'm talking about them from hearsay, so there's nothing to stop me telling you what I happen to have heard. And it's perhaps especially e fitting for one who is about to take his leave to examine the life beyond and tell stories about it: what kind of experience we think it is. What else should one do in the time before sunset?"

"But what on earth are the grounds for saying that it's not right to kill oneself, Socrates? I've already heard Philolaus ask the question you've just asked when he was living in our city and I've actually heard other people too, saying you shouldn't do it, but I've never heard anyone say anything definite about it."¹⁸

"Well you must keep up the effort," he said, "because 62 you *may* hear something definite. However, perhaps it'll seem surprising to you if this alone of all things is straightforward and it never turns out, as with other things too, that sometimes and for some people it's better for a man to be dead than alive. But for those for whom it's better to be dead, perhaps it seems surprising to you that it's not holy for these people to do good to themselves but must wait for another benefactor."

Cebes chuckled quietly and said in his own dialect: "Let Zeus be my witness."¹⁹

"Well indeed," said Socrates, "put in this way it would b

in southern Italy. The extant fragments of his work are collected in DK B44.

¹⁹ Cebes, from Thebes, uses his native Boeotian dialect form of the expression (Attic *istō Zeus* = "let Zeus be my witness," emphatic agreement, probably for comic effect ["you can say that again!"]).

ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης | λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; |

Ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης.

c Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σταντοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτείνουσι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθάναι, χαλεπαίνουσι ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; |

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνουσι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

d Ἄλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. | ὁ μὲντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγε, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ραδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίοντας, | ἐν ἧ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοὶ εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οἶεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενό-

PHAEDO

seem illogical, however it doesn't mean it doesn't have some sort of sense perhaps. Now the story told in the secret writings about these things, that we humans are in a kind of prison²⁰ and one must not release oneself or run away from it, seems to me an important one and is not easy to understand. However, Cebes, I do think the following is well argued: that it is the gods who have regard for us and that we humans are one of the gods' possessions. Or do you not agree with this?"

"I certainly do," says Cebes.

"So," he said, "in your case too if one of your possessions were to destroy itself without you indicating that you wanted it to die, wouldn't you be angry with it and, if you had some means of punishment, punish it?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Then perhaps from this point of view it isn't illogical that one shouldn't do away with oneself before god sends some necessity, such as the one we now face."

"Well," said Cebes, "that at any rate seems likely. However what you were saying just now, that philosophers would easily consent to die, that's what seems odd, Socrates, if what we were saying just now is reasonable, that it's god who is concerned for us and we are his possessions. You see, for those who are most sensible, not to be displeased at leaving *this service in which the ones in charge of them are the best overseers of all, the gods, doesn't make sense. For I can't imagine the person thinks, once*

²⁰ *Phroura* = "prison" or "guard duty" (given the context, more likely the former here). S. hints here at the Orphic/Pythagorean notion of the body imprisoning the soul, an idea that becomes more explicit later in the dialogue.

μενος. ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη
 e ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ'
 ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ
 δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ πον ἂν αἰεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ
 αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, | τοῦναν-
 τίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρο-
 νίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ
 ἄφρονας χαίρειν.

Ἄκουσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἠσθῆναι τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ
 63 τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς,
 Ἄεί τοι, ἔφη, Κέβης λόγους τινας ἀνερευνᾶ, καὶ οὐ
 πάνν εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις εἴπη.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, | νῦν
 γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν
 βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμεί-
 νους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιεντο
 αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον,
 ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρ-
 χοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. |

b Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρῆ
 με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστη-
 ρίῳ.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

21 Metaphors from searching are commonly used by Plato's S. to indicate the pursuit of argument: see, e.g., *La.* 194b, *Lys.* 218c, *Resp.* 432dff., *Leg.* 654e.

he's released, he'll look after himself better. But perhaps a senseless fellow would think that: he must get away from his master and he'd never reckon that he shouldn't run away from the *good* master, but stay with him as long as possible, so there'd be no sense in his escaping. But I presume anyone with any sense would always be keen to remain with the one better than himself. And yet if this is so, Socrates, the opposite of what was said just now is likely, that in fact those with sense ought to be upset at the prospect of death and those with no sense should welcome it." e

When he heard this, Socrates seemed to me to like Cebes' persistence and with a glance at us he said: "There you are: Cebes always manages to sniff out²¹ some argument or other and he's not at all willing to be easily persuaded to accept anything anyone says." 63

Simmius joined in and said: "But on this occasion at least, Socrates, I think myself too that Cebes is talking sense, because why would truly wise men want to run away from masters who are better than themselves and lightly rid themselves of them? It also seems to me that Cebes is directing his argument at you because you're taking it so lightly that you're leaving behind both us and, as you admit yourself, our good rulers the gods."²²

"What you're both saying is just," he said, "because I think you mean I should defend myself against these charges as in a court of law." b

"Very much so," said Simmius.

²² For Cebes and Simmius as unusually sophisticated and tenacious among the Platonic respondents to S., see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 2.

Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἤξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουσι ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εἶ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνν δι-
 c ισχυρισαίμην—ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνν ἀγαθοὺς ἤξειν, εἶ ἴστε ὅτι εἶπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων δισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ἴ ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν
 d μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἢ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης.

Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνά τόνδε σκεψόμεθα τί ἐστίν ὁ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. ἴ

Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρῆ σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερ-

²³ As dramatized in *Apology*, where, of course, his defense failed.

PHAEDO

“Well then,” he said, “let me try and defend myself before you more convincingly than I did before the jury.²³ For if, Simmias and Cebes,” he said, “I did not think I would be going firstly to other gods who are wise and good and secondly to men who have died and are better than those who are down here, I’d be wrong not to be disturbed at the idea of dying. But as it is, be fully aware that I expect to go to men who are in fact good—though I wouldn’t affirm this absolutely; however, the conviction that I expect to go to the gods who are very good masters—be well assured that on such matters this is the one thing I would affirm, if nothing else. Consequently for these reasons I’m not so much disturbed, but am confident there is something there for the dead and, as has long been said, it is better for those who are good than those who are bad.”²⁴

“What does this mean, Socrates?” asked Simmias. “Is it your intention to go off keeping this thought to yourself, or would you share it with us too? In fact it certainly seems to me that this good thing is to be shared by us as well, and at the same time it’ll be a defense for you if you can persuade us of what you say.”

“Well I’ll try,” he said. “First of all let’s examine what it is that Crito here seems to me to have been wanting to say for some time.”

“What else, Socrates,” said Crito, “other than that the man who is going to give you the poison has been telling me for some time that you must be advised to talk as little as possible? You see he says that people get heated

²⁴ For accounts in Plato of the fate of good and bad humans in the afterlife, see later in this dialogue (*Phd.* 107d7ff.); cf. *Grg.* 524b, *Resp.* 614bff.

μαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοι-
 e οὔτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκά-
 ζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιούντας.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων, εἰ δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς. |

Ἄλλα σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάσαι πράγματα παρέχει.

Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ | τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν
 64 βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἶσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι | φιλοσοφίας ληληθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθῆναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δῆπου ἂν εἴη προθυμείσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἤκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάσαι προθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. |

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασεῖοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας—καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν

PHAEDO

through talking too much and that you mustn't do anything like this to affect the action of the poison. If not, those who do that kind of thing are sometimes forced to drink it two or three times." e

Socrates said: "Well, take no notice of him. Just let him be prepared to give me a second dose of his stuff, and a third if necessary."

"Well I more or less knew you'd say something like that," said Crito, "but he's been pestering me for some time."

"Never mind him," he said. "But right now with you as the jury I want to deliver my argument that it seems reasonable that a man who really has spent his life on philosophy is steadfast when he is about to die and optimistic that he'll be rewarded with the greatest of good things in the world to come when he dies. So how this may in fact be so, Simmias and Cebes, I'll try to explain. 64

"You see it's likely that other people don't realize that those who engage with philosophy in the right way are practicing nothing else but dying and being dead. So if this is true, it would surely be absurd to show a keen interest in nothing but this for the whole of their life, but, when it actually comes, to be angry about what they have enthused and busied themselves over for so long."

Simmias laughed and said: "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, though I didn't feel much like laughing a moment ago, you've made me laugh. You see I think that most people when they hear this very point would think it's been very well said against philosophers—and people from our city b

ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφούντες
θανατώσι, | καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσιν
τοῦτο πάσχειν.

Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ
σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναί. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἧ̄ τε θανα-
τώσι καὶ ἧ̄ ἄξιοι εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ
c ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θά-
νατον εἶναι;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.

Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώμα-
τος ἀπαλλαγὴν; | καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθάναι, χωρὶς
μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ
σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώμα-
τος ἀπαλλαγεῖσάν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ
ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. |

Σκέψαι δὴ, ὦγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῆ ἄπερ
d ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ
ᾧ σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοὶ φιλοσόφον ἀνδρὸς εἶναι
ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοι-
ᾶσδε, οἷον σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν; |

Ἦκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

²⁵ The existence of the soul and body as separate entities, each
“alone by itself” (*auto kath' hauto*: c5–8) first appears in Homer
and early Greek thought generally. S.’s definition of death here

PHAEDO

would very much agree—that philosophers are in the process of dying in actual fact and they would add that they are perfectly aware that the philosophers deserved it.

“And they’d be telling the truth, Simmias, except the bit about their being perfectly aware themselves. You see what they fail to notice is the way in which those who are truly philosophers want to die and the way in which they’re worthy of death and the kind of death it is. Well then,” he said, “Let’s keep this conversation among ourselves, and never mind talking to them. We think death is something specific, don’t we?”

“Certainly,” said Simmias, joining in.

“Is it nothing else but the separation of the soul from the body? And this is what death is: separated away from the soul the body alone by itself; and the soul separated away from the body gets to be alone by itself? Death can’t be anything other than this, can it?”²⁵

“No, that’s it,” he said.

“Consider then, my friend, if in that case you think as I do. You see from this I think we shall know more what we’re inquiring about. Does it seem to you that it’s suitable for a philosopher to have shown a keen interest in so-called pleasures such as food and drink?”²⁶

“Indeed, no, Socrates,” said Simmias.

“What about those of sex?”

does not, of course, prejudge the issue of whether the soul does actually survive and continue to have intelligent existence apart from the body, argument over which occupies most of *Phaedo*. See further, *Introduction to Phaedo*, section 3 (ii).

²⁶ For the distinction between the pleasures of the body and the soul, see, e.g., *Ap.* 30a–b, *Resp.* 581ff.

Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγέισθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;

Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, | πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;

Ἔμοιγε.

Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὧ | μηδὲν ἠδὲ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἶσιν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; | πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνῶν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς

PHAEDO

"Definitely not!"

"What about the other ways in which we look after our physical needs? Do you think such a person regards them as of value? Do you think for example he attaches any value to the acquisition of fine clothes and shoes and all the rest of our bodily embellishments, or does he look down on them except in so far as there's an overriding necessity to have any of them?" e

"I think he looks down on them, at least the real philosopher does," he said.

"So altogether," he said, "it seems to you that such a person's concerns are not directed at the body, but that as far as he can he has distanced himself from it and his attention is turned toward his soul?"

"I do."

"So firstly, does this then mean that in such matters the philosopher clearly frees his soul as much as possible from its association with the body in a way different from other people?" 65

"It seems so."

"And I suppose, Simmias, most people think that the man for whom none of such things is pleasing and who doesn't take part in them, doesn't deserve to live; but he who has no concern for the pleasures that are for physical satisfaction is aiming to come quite close to death."

"Indeed, what you're saying is very true."

"And then what about the acquisition of understanding? Is the body a hindrance or not, if one includes it as a partner in one's inquiry? What I mean is as follows: do seeing and hearing in human beings contain an element b

ἀνθρώποις, ἣ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ
θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβῆς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὀρώ-
μεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων
μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἶ γε ἄλλαι
πάσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραὶ εἰσιν. ἣ σοὶ οὐ
δοκοῦσιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Πότε οὖν, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἣ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται; |
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν,
δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

c Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι
κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων;

Ναί. |

Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν
τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε
ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ'
αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον
δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγη-
ται τοῦ ὄντος. |

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

d Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἣ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλι-
στα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ
αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι;

²⁷ See later sixth-/early fifth-century poets and philosophers, e.g., Epicharmus DK 23B12: "intelligence sees; intelligence hears; the others are deaf and blind." See also Heraclitus, DK

PHAEDO

of truth, or at any rate don't the poets too constantly babble on at us about this sort of thing, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately?²⁷ Yet if *these* bodily senses are neither precise nor clear, then the rest are hardly likely to be either: you see I presume they are all of a lower order than these—or do you not think so?"

"I certainly think they are."

"So when does the soul grasp the truth?" he asked. "Because whenever it sets about investigating something in conjunction with the body, that's when it's clearly misled by it."

"You're right."

"Isn't it in reasoning, if anywhere at all, that some aspect of reality²⁸ becomes quite clear to it?"

"Yes."

"Yes, and it reasons best, I think, when none of these things, hearing, seeing, pain, even pleasure of any sort is a harmful distraction, but above all when it gets to be alone by itself it can dismiss the body and as far as possible without associating with it, or being affected by it, it can reach out to reality."

"That's right."

"So in this case too, does the philosopher's soul especially look down on the body, run away from it and seek to be alone by itself?"

22B107 ("Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have souls who cannot understand their language," trans. Waterfield, 40).

²⁸ Reality = "things that are/exist" (*ta onta*); see also c9. On the verb "to be" in this context, see further, Gallop, 92–93.

Φαίνεται.

Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον
αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; |

Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία.

Καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἦδη οὖν πρόποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς
εἶδες; |

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος
ἐφήσω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους
πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάν-
των τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν. ἄρα διὰ τοῦ
σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε
ἔχει ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρα-
σκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκο-
πεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; |

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρῶτατα
ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν' ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε
66 τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λο-
γισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ
χρῶμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχει-
ροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα

PHAEDO

"It seems to."

"Now what about the following, Simmias? Do we say there exists by itself something just, or not?"²⁹

"Zeus, yes, we do!"

"And something actually beautiful, and good?"

"Of course."

"And have you ever yet set eyes on anything of this sort?"

"Never," he said.

"But have you ever perceived them by any other of the bodily senses? I'm talking about all of them, such as size, health, strength and in a word about the essence of all of other things like this, what each one actually is. Is the truest view of these seen by means of the body, or is it as follows: whoever of us prepares himself to apply his mind most rigorously and carefully to the essence of each thing he's investigating, he's the one who will get closest to a knowledge of each one?"

"Very much so."

"Then would that person do this most purely who would approach each object with the mind alone as far as possible, neither taking into account the evidence of his eyes in his thinking, nor dragging in any other sense organ alongside his reasoning, but by using his mind alone by itself and uncorrupted, he'd attempt to track down³⁰ the pure and actual form of each and everything that exists by itself and dispensing as far as possible with the eyes and

²⁹ For the first mention in this dialogue of the Forms and their implications here, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (iii).

³⁰ For the hunting metaphor, see above, 63a3. The metaphor is continued in b4 and c2.

ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὧτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος | εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταραττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἑώντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἀρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἶπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;

Ἐπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

- b Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι “Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, | ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν
- c ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δέ, ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, | ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται, τὰ δὲ
- d χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολία ἀγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ'

PHAEDO

the ears and, in a word, the whole of the body on the grounds that it disturbs the soul and prevents it ever possessing truth and understanding whenever it is in association with it? Isn't this the person, Simmias, who will attain reality, if indeed anyone can?"

"What you say is extraordinarily true, Socrates," said Simmias.

"Therefore," he said, "from all this it necessarily follows that some such belief must present itself to genuine philosophers so that they say to each other something like: 'it is indeed likely that there is, leading us astray along with our reasoning in our inquiry, some sort of sidetrack as it were'³¹—that while we have our bodies and our soul is contaminated with such evil, we shall never adequately attain what we desire; and this we say is the truth. You see the body provides us with countless distractions because it must have nourishment, and furthermore, if any illnesses attack, they hinder our pursuit of reality. It fills us with all kinds of passions, desires, fears and illusions as well as much nonsense so that the result is, as the saying goes, because of it we really and truly do not have it in us ever to think about anything. For nothing causes us wars, revolts and battles other than the body and its appetites. You see all wars are caused by the acquisition of money and we're compelled to acquire money because of the body, being slaves to its service; and as a result of this for all these reasons we lack the time for philosophy. And worst

³¹ Or "there is some sort of track as it were, which carries us out . . . in our inquiry to the conclusion that . . ."

ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, εἴαν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται
 ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, | ἐν ταῖς
 ζητήσεσιν αὐτῷ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτου θόρυβον παρ-
 ἔχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι
 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδει-
 κται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι,
 e ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ
 τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπι-
 θυμούμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἔρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως,
 ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ
 οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθ-
 αρῶς γινῶναι, | δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτή-
 67 σασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ αὐτῇ
 καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότε-
 ρον δ' οὔ. καὶ ἐν τῷ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυ-
 τάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, εἴαν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν
 ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πάσα
 ἀνάγκη, | μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως,
 ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς
 ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλακτόμε-
 νοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ
 τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
 b πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ
 καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ."
 τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλ-
 λήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς
 φιλομαθεῖς. | ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;

Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

PHAEDO

of all, if any of us does get time away from the body and we turn to some inquiry, during our researches noise coming at us once again from all directions causes both confusion and shock, so that because of it we are unable to discern what is true. But in fact it's been demonstrated to us that, if we're ever going to attain pure knowledge we must get rid of the body and contemplate things themselves using the soul alone. And that is when, it seems, we shall be able to gain understanding, which is what we desire and what we claim to be passionate about, when we die, as our argument indicates, but not while we are alive. For if it's impossible to know anything in its pure state with the aid of the body then one of two things follows: either it's impossible to acquire knowledge anywhere, or only when we're dead. For then the soul will be alone by itself separated from the body, but not before. And during the time we are alive, it seems that we shall be closest to knowledge in this way: if as far as possible we have no dealings and share nothing with the body, except where absolutely necessary, and we are not infected with its nature, but cleanse ourselves of it until the god himself releases us: by keeping ourselves untainted in this way away from the foolhardiness of the body it's likely that we shall be among people of like nature and we shall discover through our own real selves all that is pure, and this perhaps is what the truth is. For it may not be allowed by the gods for the impure to lay their hands on what is uncontaminated.' These are the kinds of things, Simmias, I think all who are true lovers of learning should be discussing with each other and believing. Or do you not think this is right?"

"Absolutely, Socrates."

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἴπερ πον ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλῇ | πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη
 c μετα ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίνεταί καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαυμένην.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. |

Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσει αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν
 d τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνῃ καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, | λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;

Παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Λύειν δὲ γε αὐτήν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. | ἦ οὐ;

Φαίνεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα
 e παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα

PHAEDO

"Well then," said Socrates, "if this is true, my friend, there is every hope for anyone arriving at the place where I am going, that there, if anywhere, he will gain in good measure what most of our preoccupations in our past life have been concerned with, so that the journey hence³² c that is now determined for me will actually take place with good prospects for any other person too who thinks his mind is prepared—purified, as it were."

"Very much so," said Simmias.

"Doesn't purification then, as has been argued for a while now in our discussion, turn out to be the separation of the soul as far as possible away from the body and its getting used to being gathered and assembled by itself, withdrawn from all parts of the body and living as far as possible both in the present circumstances and in the future alone by itself, released, as it were, from the chains of the body?" d

"Very much so," he said.

"So it is this that's given the name death: the freeing and separation of the soul from the body?"

"Yes, most certainly," he said.

"Yes, and the ones who always desire most to set it free, as we say, and the only ones, are the true philosophers, and just this is the proper practice of the philosophers: the freeing and separation of soul from body, or isn't it?"

"It seems to be."

"So as I was saying at the beginning, wouldn't it be ridiculous for a man who's been preparing himself during e

³² "Journey hence," "migration" = *apodēmia*, also used for a journey to the next world in S.'s brief speculation at the end of *Apology* (40e4). See also 61e2 above.

τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κᾶπειθ' ἤκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;

Γελοῖον· πῶς δ' οὐ; |

Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούν-
 τες ἀποθνήσκουν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἤκιστα
 αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ
 διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῆ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ'
 αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνο-
 μένον εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλο-
 68 γία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκείσε ἴοιεν, οἳ ἀφικομένοις
 ἐλπίς ἐστὶν οὐ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν—ἤρων δὲ φρο-
 νήσεως—ὧ̄ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συν-
 ὄντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναι-
 κῶν καὶ ὑέων¹ ἀποθανόντων | πολλοὶ δὲ ἐκόντες
 ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἄιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι
 τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν
 καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρών,
 καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδα-
 μοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἄι-
 b δον, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐχ ἄσμενος
 εἴσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, εἰ μὴ τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὦ
 ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει,
 μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ'
 ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ

¹ καὶ γυναικῶν βΤδ secl. Verdenius: καὶ ὑέων βΤδ secl. Verdenius

PHAEDO

his life to live as close as possible to death, and then when it does draw near, to be angry?"

"Ridiculous, of course."

"In reality therefore, Simmias," he said, "those who are true philosophers are practicing dying and for them of all people death is the least thing to be feared. Consider it from the following: if they've been at odds with their body at every point, but are keen to have their soul alone by itself, wouldn't it be utterly unreasonable if they were to be frightened or annoyed when this happens, if they didn't go gladly to the place where on arrival the expectation is that they'll meet with what they desired throughout their life—and what they desired was understanding—and be rid of that which has lived with them and caused them dissatisfaction? Or, when beloved young men have died, and wives and sons,³³ very many chose of their own accord to go to Hades, led on by the expectation of both seeing and being with those they longed for, will then someone with a real passion for understanding, who has seized this same expectation eagerly and wouldn't find it anywhere else worth mentioning except in Hades—will he be angry when he dies and will he not go to that very place gladly? You must think he will, if he really is a philosopher, my friend. For it will be very much his opinion that he will not encounter understanding in a pure form anywhere else but there. If this is so, as I was saying just now, wouldn't it

³³ "Young men" refers to the younger partners in a homosexual relationship. Verdenius ("Notes on Plato's *Phaedo*") suggests the reference to women and sons should be deleted as a possible later gloss irrelevant to the contrast between human sexual passion and understanding. See textual note on 68a4.

πολλή ἂν ἀλογία | εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοι-
οῦτος;

Πολλή μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν ἰκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός,
c ὄν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι
οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐ-
τὸς δέ που οὔτος τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ
φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Πάνν, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη
ἀνδρεία | τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;

Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνο-
μάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ
ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως | ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ
τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος
ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;

d Ἄνάγκη, ἔφη.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων
ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος.

Πῶς δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες; |

Οἶσθα, ἧ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἠγοῦνται πάντες
οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

PHAEDO

be very unreasonable, if such a person were afraid of death?"

"By Zeus, it would be very unreasonable," he said.

"So is this proof enough for you," he said, "of a man who you'd see being angry as he approaches death, that he wasn't after all a lover of wisdom, but of his physical needs? This same man, I suppose, turns out to be a lover of money and of honor:³⁴ indeed either one of the two, or both."

"It's very much as you say," he said.

"Doesn't this then also mean, Simmias," he said, "that so-called courage is an especially fitting quality for those who are of this kind of disposition?"

"Yes, I'd say so, absolutely," he said.

"And likewise temperance too, which is what even the majority of people call 'temperance'; not getting excited over ones desires, but treating them with indifference and in a orderly way, surely is fitting only for those people who despise the physical utterly and live by philosophy?"

"It must be," he replied.

"Yes," he said, "for if you're willing to think about the courage and temperance of everyone else you'll think it's absurd."

"How exactly, Socrates?"

"You know," he said, "that all the rest consider death to be one of the great evils?"

"Indeed," he said.

³⁴ "Lover of money and honor" (*philochrēmatos kai philotimos*), human types more fully developed in *Resp.* 9 (580ff.) and contrasted with the *philosophos*, "lover of wisdom," i.e., the philosopher.

Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρείοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; |

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρείοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείον εἶναι.

e Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταυτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασία τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος | τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ
69 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. |

Ἔοικε γάρ.

ᾧ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι,

³⁵ I.e., their so-called temperance (like their courage, and other popular virtues) is actually measured by what will maximize pleasure and minimize pain, as opposed to the philosopher whose adherence to these virtues is based solely on wisdom. In this section (68eff.), S. lists two of the four popular virtues, *andreia* and

PHAEDO

"So do the brave ones among them undergo death in fear of greater evils when they do so?"

"Yes they do."

"So all men except philosophers are brave because of fear and dread. And yet it's absurd that one should be brave because of fear and cowardice."

"Very much so."

"What about the well-ordered ones among them? Haven't they experienced the same? Are they temperate through some kind of self-indulgence? And although we *say* it's impossible, yet nevertheless their experience concerning this simpleminded temperance turns out to be similar to this: you see because they're afraid of being deprived of certain kinds of pleasures and being passionate about those, they abstain from some because they're overcome by others. And yet they call intemperance being controlled by one's pleasures, but it turns out it's because they're being overpowered by some pleasures, that they're in control of others. This is similar to what was being argued just now: they've been made temperate through some kind of self-indulgence!"³⁵

"Yes, so it seems."

"My dear Simmias, I suspect this is not the right exchange with a view to goodness,³⁶ to swap around pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, more for

sōphrosune (courage and temperance), discussed in more detail in *Republic* 4. The other two are justice and wisdom, the latter, controlling the others (69a9–10), being the exclusive province of the philosopher.

³⁶ "Goodness" = *aretē* (virtue).

- καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, | ἀντὶ οὗ δέι πάντα
- b ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις· καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ | ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς οὐδ'
- c ἀληθῆς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθῆς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, | ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδον ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασι, οἱ περὶ τὰς
- d τελετὰς, “ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι.” οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ

³⁷ Literally, “scene-painting.” In *Republic* Plato frequently uses a metaphor from dramatic/artistic representation to indicate kinds of illusion (e.g., 583b).

PHAEDO

less, exchanging them like coins; but the only true coinage
 for which you must exchange all these is wisdom. And ev- b
 erything bought and sold for this and in company with this
 really is courage, temperance, justice, and in short, true
 virtue along with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and
 all other things of that kind are added or taken away. But
 if they are separated off from wisdom and swapped around
 with each other, virtue of this sort I suspect may be a
 kind of artistic facade³⁷ and in actual fact slavish, and con-
 tains nothing sound nor even true. But the truth in reality, c
 temperance and justice and courage, may be a kind of
 cleansing of all these sorts of qualities, and wisdom itself
 may be some kind of purification. And so those who set up
 the initiations for us seem to be not some unenlightened
 types, but have in fact long been saying in riddles that
 whoever arrives in Hades without initiation and enlight-
 enment will wallow in the mud, while he who arrives
 cleansed and initiated will dwell among the gods. There
 are, I assure you, as those who are concerned with the
 rituals say, 'many who carry the fennel rod, but true initi- d
 ates are few.'³⁸ In my opinion these initiates are none other
 than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.
 Indeed I too have neglected nothing of this in my life, at
 least as far as I've been able, but have striven in every way

³⁸ The language of this passage closely connects S.'s philo-
 sophic purification with Orphic rituals: those who arrive in Hades
 "without initiation and enlightenment" (*amuētos kai atelestos*: c5)
 will "wallow in the mud" (c6, and see also *Resp.* 363c). The "fen-
 nel rod" in the verse at c8 refers to the wand (*thyrsos*) carried by
 the initiates of the god Dionysus.

τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι· | εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καὶ τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκέϊσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς
 e ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἠγούμενος κακεῖ οὐδὲν ἤττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις· εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογία ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. |

Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ
 70 καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ἢ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, | καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὡσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ. ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἴη πού αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπίς καὶ καλὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ

to become one of these. If I've shown the right kind of enthusiasm and we have achieved anything, when we get there we shall discover for certain, if god wills it, shortly afterward, I think. This then is my defense, Simmias and Cebes," he said, "that it's reasonable for me to be leaving you and that I bear no grudge against those in authority here, nor am I angry, as I think that there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and companions. If therefore I am any more persuasive to you in my defense than I was before the Athenian jury, that would be well." e

Now when Socrates had said this, Cebes joined in and said: "Socrates, everything else that's been said seems fine to me, but what was said about the soul arouses much disbelief in people that when it separates from the body it may no longer exist anywhere, but be destroyed and annihilated on that very same day the person dies, at the very moment of being separated from the body and emerging like a breath or puff of smoke it may fly away and disappear and no longer exist anywhere.³⁹ Since, if it indeed were somewhere, gathered together alone by itself and separated from all those evil things you described just now, there would be considerable and auspicious hope, Socrates, that what you are saying is true. But perhaps this needs not a little reassurance and proof that the soul exists after the person has died and has some power and intelligence." b

"What you say is true, Cebes," said Socrates. "But what

³⁹ This description of the soul emerging from the body reflects a popular image: see, e.g., Hom. *Il.* 23.100–101, 22.467. In the popular view the soul continues a disembodied existence in Hades.

τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μῆ;

Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἣντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. |

Οὐκ οὖν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα
 c νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχωῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἰδίου εἰσὶν αἱ | ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων
 d τῶν τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, | ἄλλου ἂν του δέοι λόγου.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν
 e σιν περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα,

⁴⁰ The comic playwright is Aristophanes and "I'm talking gibberish" (*adoleschō*: c1) is a probable reference to *Clouds* 1485,

then are we to do? Or do you want us to go on talking about these very matters, whether this is likely to be the case or not?"

"As far as I'm concerned," said Cebes, "I'd be happy to hear whatever opinion you have about them."

"Well I certainly don't think," said Socrates, "that anyone, not even if he were a comic playwright,⁴⁰ who has heard us would now say that I'm talking gibberish and putting forward arguments that are of no concern to me. So, if you agree, we ought to continue to look into this. c

"Let's look at it in the following way: whether the souls of the dead are in fact in Hades or they aren't. Now there's an old story we recall that they do exist, having got there from here, and moreover that they come back here again and are born from the dead.⁴¹ And if it is the case that the living are born again from the dead, what else could it be but that our souls are there? For I can't imagine they'd be brought into being again if they didn't exist! And this would be sufficient proof that this is so, if it were actually to become clear that the living come into being from nowhere other than the dead. But if this is not so, then we would need another line of argument." d

"Indeed we would," said Cebes.

"Well then, don't look at this," he said, "only from the human angle, if you want to understand it more easily, but from that of all animals and plants, and by looking collectively at all things that come into being let's see whether e

where Strepsiades plans to burn down S.s' school of *adoleschön* (of idle prattlers).

⁴¹ For a more detailed account of the "old story," see *Meno* 81a-c, where S. attributes the story to "priests and priestesses" and quotes Pindar (fr. 133 Snell).

οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, | ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι;

Ναί. |

- 71 Οὐκοῦν κὰν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;

Ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάπτον; |

Πάνυ γε.

Τί δέ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνουτος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, | ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;

Πάνυ γε.

- Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων δύο
b γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ

⁴² For discussion of the argument from a “counterbalance” (antapodosis) of opposites (70c4–72d10), see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (iv).

PHAEDO

everything comes into being in this way, from nowhere but opposites from their opposite, where they happen to have this kind of characteristic, for example: the beautiful is opposite to the ugly, I suppose, the just to the unjust; and indeed there are countless others like this. So let's consider whether for those things that have an opposite, it must follow that a particular thing comes into being from nowhere else but what is opposite to it. For example, when something larger comes into being it must, I suppose, be from something that was previously smaller and that then became larger, mustn't it?"⁴²

"Yes."

"Likewise, if something comes to be smaller, will it then come to be smaller from something that was previously larger?" 71

"That's right," he said.

"And furthermore, the weaker from the stronger and the quicker from the slower."

"Yes indeed."

"And what about if something worse comes into being, isn't it from something better, and the more just from the more unjust?"

"Of course."

"Then we're satisfied on this point then," he said, "that all things come into being in this way: opposite things from their opposites?"

"Very much so."

"But what about this? Is there also something like this in them: two kinds of generation between all the pairs of opposites, as they occur in pairs, from one to the other and b

τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγμα-
τος καὶ ἐλάττωνος μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ
καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; |

Ναί, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ
ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κὰν εἰ
μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γούν
πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ
ἐξ ἀλλήλων | γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

c Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ
ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί; |

Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναν-
τία ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο
δυοῖν ὄντων;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

d Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον
ἐγώ σοι, | ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς
γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ-
εύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ
ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ
καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρ-
θάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἦ
οὐ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. |

PHAEDO

conversely from the second to the first? You see, between a larger object and a smaller one isn't there a process of growing and diminishing, and so we refer to the one as increasing and the other as decreasing?"

"Yes," he said.

"And so too, we have separation and combination, cooling and warming and everything like this; even if sometimes we don't use these terms, in actual fact it must apply in all instances that their coming into existence from each other is the process of coming-to-be into each other?"

"Very much so," he agreed.

"And what does that imply?" he asked. "That there's an opposite to living, just being awake is to sleeping?"

"Indeed there is."

"What?"

"Being dead," he said.

"So do these things come into being from each other, if indeed they are opposites and are the processes of their coming into being two, as they are in pairs?"

"Of course."

"Right then, I'll give you the first pair that I was telling you about just now," said Socrates, "both itself and its processes, and you give the other one. I mean sleeping and being awake, and that being awake comes about from sleeping and sleeping from being awake and their processes are first going to sleep and second waking up. Is that enough for you," he asked, "or not?"

"Perfectly."

Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;

Ἔγωγε.

Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων;

Ναί. |

Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;

Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.

Τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος;

Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.

Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; |

e Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄιδου.

Ἔοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὔσα τυγχάνει; | τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δῆπου, ἢ οὔ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἢ φύσις; | ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;

Πάντως που, ἔφη.

Τίνα ταύτην;

Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι.

72 Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἶπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι, ἐκ

PHAEDO

"Good. Now you tell me in this way," he said, "about life and death. Aren't you saying that being dead is the opposite of being alive?"

"I am."

"And they come about from each other."

"Yes."

"So what is it that comes about from that which is living?"

"That which is dead," he said.

"And what is that comes from that which is dead?"

"It must be agreed," he said, "that it's the living."

"Then living things and beings must come into existence from the dead, Cebes?"

"It looks like it."

"So then our souls exist in Hades" he said.

"It seems so."

"Then is the one of the two processes regarding these things actually obvious? Dying is quite obvious presumably, or isn't it?"

"Very much so," he said.

"How shall we deal with this then?" he asked. "Shall we not put forward the opposite process as a counterbalance, otherwise the nature of things will be lopsided in this respect? Or should we set some opposite process against dying?"

"Yes I suppose we should," he said.

"What will this be?"

"Coming back to life."

"Therefore," he said, "if there is a return to life, then 72

τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἶη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὐτή, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι;

Πάνν γε.

Ὅμολογείται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν | τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίνεσθαι.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν. |

Ἴδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὠμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερὶ κύκλω περιμόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ τις εἶη ἢ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταπτικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπήν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ | σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἶη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ | γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' <ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα

⁴³ The "bending back" is an image taken from the racecourse, where the competitors turn round at the far point of the track and

this process of coming back to life would be from the dead to the living.”

“Indeed.”

“In that way too we’re agreed then that the living have come into being from the dead no less than the dead have from the living, and this being the case I presume that it seemed sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere from where indeed they come back into being.”

“It seems to me, Socrates,” he said, “from what we’ve agreed this must be how it is.”

“Then consider it in this way, Cebes,” he said, “and you will see, I think, that we’re not wrong to have made this agreement. For if things did not always balance out with their opposites when they come into being, going round in a circle as it were, but if coming into being were only in a straight line from the opposite to the opposite and did not bend back to the other side and make the turn,⁴³ do you realize that all dying things would have the same pattern and would undergo the same process and coming into being would cease.”

“How do you mean?” he said.

“It’s not at all difficult to understand what I’m saying,” he said; “after all, for example, if there was a going to sleep, but waking didn’t balance it up by coming into being out of sleeping, do you realize that in dying everything would show that Endymion is insignificant and would nowhere to be seen on account of everything else being in

return to the starting point. The “circle” (b1) reflects the Pythagorean/Orphic Wheel of Birth.

πάντα ταῦτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπουθέναι, καθεύδειν. κὰν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μὴ, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη. | “Ὅμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.” ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθά-
 νοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ
 d τῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, | ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι. |

e Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἰώθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὐσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν | προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἂ νῦν
 73 ἀναμνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που

⁴⁴ I.e., Endymion, condemned to sleep for ever according to the myth, would be indistinguishable from anyone/anything else.

⁴⁵ Anaxagoras was a fifth-century natural scientist whose book began with a sentence (DK 59B1, Waterfield, 122) that described

the same state as he, namely being asleep?⁴⁴ And if everything were combined together and not separated out, then Anaxagoras' maxim would soon come true: 'All things together.'⁴⁵ Likewise also, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were to die, and when it died the dead were to remain in this form and not come back to life again, isn't it absolutely inevitable that all things that are dying would be dead and nothing would be alive? For if the living came from things other than the dead and the living died, what means are there to prevent everything being consumed in death?" d

"None whatsoever, it seems to me, Socrates," said Cebes, "and I think what you're saying is true in every respect."

"Yes this is most certainly the case, Cebes, as I see it, and we're not being misled in agreeing just these things: there really is coming back to life and the living come into being from the dead, and the souls of the dead do exist."

"And furthermore," said Cebes taking up the point, "according to that argument, Socrates, if what you've frequently put forward is true, that for us learning is actually nothing other than recollection, then according to that I think it must be that what we now recollect we have learned at some previous time."⁴⁶ But this is impossible e 73

the original state of things, where everything formed an inchoate mass. He features again, more crucially, in *Phaedo* at 97b-99d, and is also referred to, in passing, at *Ap.* 26d.

⁴⁶ Plato's S. developed the theory of learning as recollection in *Meno* 81-86, to which Cebes may be referring here. For discussion of this argument (73a7-77a7), see *Introduction to Phaedo*, section 3 (v).

ἡμῖν ἢ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.

Ἄλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβὼν, ἢ ποῖαι τούτων αἰ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι.

Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, εἴαν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἣ ἔχει. καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, ἢ οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα εἴαν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῆδ' ἐπὶ σοὶ σκοπομένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἢ ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἢ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν;

Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μὲντὰν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῆ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. ἢ

Τῆδ' ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. ἢ

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω

PHAEDO

unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into being in this human form. So in this way too the soul seems to be immortal."

"But Cebes," said Simmias breaking in, "what were the proofs for all of this? Remind me, as I don't quite remember right now."

"By a single argument," replied Cebes, "an excellent one: that when questioned, if one puts the question properly, people describe for themselves everything as it is. Yet if they didn't actually have knowledge and the right argument in them, they wouldn't be able to do this. Therefore if one takes them to diagrams, or anything else of this kind, then it proves most clearly that this is right."⁴⁷ b

"But if you're not convinced by *that*, Simmias," said Socrates, "consider whether you agree if you look at it in the following way. For apparently you really don't believe how so-called learning can be recollection?"

"It's not that I don't believe it," replied Simmias, "but I need to experience just that," he said, "what our discussion is about, recollection. I can just about remember from what Cebes was attempting to argue, and I'm convinced, and yet none the less I'd like to hear now how you undertook to argue it yourself."

"I did it like this," he said: "you see, I presume we agree that if someone recalls something, he must have known it at some point before." c

"Indeed," he said.

"And do we also agree that whenever knowledge comes in such a way it is recollection? Shall I tell you in what way?"

⁴⁷ A likely reference to the "diagram" in *Meno* 84d-85b, which enables Meno's slave, by being questioned, to "recollect" knowledge of some basic geometry.

δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. εἴαν τις τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, | ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔλαβεν;

Πῶς λέγεις;

Οἶον τὰ τοιαῦδε ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὐ ἦν ἢ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· | ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

Μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

e Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἐστὶν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; |

It's like this: if someone learns some particular thing either by seeing or hearing it, or applying any other kind of sense perception, not only does he recognize that thing, but he can also conceive a second object of which it isn't the same knowledge, but a different one: do we not then rightly say that he was reminded of this thing of which he had the thought?" d

"What do you mean?"

"For example the following: I take it the knowledge of a person and the knowledge of a lyre are different."

"Of course."

"Then do you think that when lovers see a lyre, or a cloak, or anything else their loved ones habitually use, their reaction that follows is that they both recognize the lyre and perceive in their mind the form of the boy whose lyre it is? This is recollection. In just such a way anyone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and I imagine there could be countless other examples like this."

"Yes indeed, by Zeus, numberless," said Simmias.

"Therefore," he said, "such a thing is a form of recollection, isn't it? Especially moreover when one experiences this about those things that have already slipped the mind through the passage of time and one's not thinking about them." e

"Very much so," he said.

"And what then?" he asked. "Is it possible from seeing a drawing of a horse, or a drawing of a lyre to be reminded of a person, and to be reminded of Cebes by seeing a drawing of Simmias?"

"Definitely."

"And therefore be reminded of the real Simmias by seeing a drawing of Simmias?"

74 Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

Συμβαίνει. |

Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐδ' ἀνεμνήσθη;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, | οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;

b Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε.

Ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυδιῇ ἐλέγομεν, | ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκείνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὄν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτ' ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ;² |

² τῷ . . . τῷ β: τότε . . . τότε TWPQ

"It's possible, certainly," he said.

"Isn't it the case, then, that in all these examples it turns out that recollection comes from their similarities, but also from their differences?"

"It does."

"But when someone is reminded of something from the similarities must he not also experience thinking whether there is or isn't something missing as regards the similarity in relation to what he's reminded of?"

"He must," he said.

"Then consider," he said, "if the following is right: we say, I think, there exists something equal. I don't mean a piece of wood is equal to a piece of wood or a stone is equal to a stone, or anything else of this sort, but something beyond all these, something different, the equal itself. Are we to say there is something such as this, or nothing?"

"Yes, we certainly are, by Zeus, most emphatically!" b

"Do we also know it, what it is?"

"Indeed we do," he said.

"Where did we get our knowledge of it from? Isn't it the case that from what we were talking about just now, when we saw pieces of wood, stones, or any other objects that are equal, that we thought of that object, it being *something other than these things?* Or does it not seem to be something other to you? Again, consider it like this: don't equal stones and pieces of wood, even though they are the same ones, seem equal to one person but not to another?"⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Or: ". . . equal to one thing . . . not to another," or: (from an alternative textual reading, see textual note) ". . . equal at one time . . . not at another."

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

c Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισία σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἢ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;

Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. |

Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενοήκας τε καὶ εἴληφας; |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου;

Πάνυ γε.

d Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγενέσθαι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἢ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς | ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅ ἐστιν, ἢ ἐνδεί τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;

Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεί.

Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι | βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὀρώ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο e τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεί δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκείνο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον

"Certainly."

"What then? Have there been times when the equals themselves appeared to be unequal to you, or equality inequality?" c

"No never Socrates!"

"Then," he said, "these equal things and the equal itself are not the same thing."

"Not at all, as I see it, Socrates."

"And yet is it from *these* equals," he said, "although they're other than that equal, that you nevertheless have brought to mind and gained your knowledge of it?"

"What you say is very true," he said.

"Either from being like or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"But anyway it makes no difference," he said; "as long as when you saw one thing from your observation you envisaged another, whether it was similar or different," he said, "it has to be that this is recollection." d

"Most definitely!"

"What then?" he asked. "Is it that we have some such experience regarding the similarities in the pieces of wood and those equalities we were just talking about? Do they seem to us to be equals, just as that which is equality itself, or do they fall short at all of that equality in respect of being such a thing as the equal, or not at all?"

"They're well short," he said.

"So we agree then that whenever someone sees something and thinks: 'what I now see tends to be like some one of the other things that exist, but falls short and can't be like that other thing, but is inferior,' it must be, I suppose, e

που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδῶτα ἐκείνο ᾧ
 φησιν αὐτὸ προσοικένας μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; |
 Ἀνάγκη.

Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὐ περι-
 τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;

Παντάπασί γε.

75 Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδένας τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκεί-
 νου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοή-
 σαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ
 ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.

Ἔστι ταῦτα. |

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ
 ἐννενοηκένας μὴδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ
 τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἀφασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων
 ταῦτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.

Ταῦτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὁ βούλεται
 δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος. |

b Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι
 ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται
 τοῦ ὁ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἔστιν ἢ πῶς
 λέγομεν;

Οὕτως.

Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ
 | τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφῶτας ἐπι-
 στήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ
 τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμείται
 μὲν πάντα τοιαυτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκείνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ
 φαυλότερα.

that he who thinks this actually has previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles but falls short."

"It has to be so."

"Well then? Have we too had such an experience, or haven't we about equal things and the equal itself?"

"Indeed we have."

"Then we must have had knowledge of equality before that time when, seeing equal things for the first time, we came to have it in mind that all these things aim to be like equality, but fall short of it." 75

"That is so."

"But yet again we also agree on this: that we didn't come to have it in mind, nor is it possible to have it in mind from anywhere except seeing, touching, or using any other of our perceptions. I regard all these as being the same."

"They are the same, Socrates, considering at least what our discussion is aiming to reveal."

"But also we must of course observe that it is from our perceptions that everything in our perceptions aims for what is actual equality and falls short of it. Or what do we mean?" b

"That is it."

"Then it must have been before we began to see and hear and have other sensations, I take it, that we acquired our knowledge of what the actual equal is, if we were going to refer to it the equals we've gained from our perceptions, having in mind the fact that all these reach out toward the actual equality, but are inferior to it."

Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν;

Πάνυ γε.

c Ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπι-
ιστήμην εἰληφέναι;

Ναί.

Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν
εἰληφέναι. |

Ἔοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι
ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι
καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον
καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον | ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ
γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ
d περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δι-
καίου καὶ ὀσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς
ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ “αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι” καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτή-
σεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινό-
μενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς | ἐπι-
ιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα,
εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναί· τὸ γὰρ
εἰδέναί τοῦτ' ἔστιν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ
μὴ ἀπολωλέκεναι. | ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμ-
μία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν;

e Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

PHAEDO

"From what's been said, it must be so, Socrates."

"Well then, were we able to see and hear and use our other senses from the moment of birth?"

"Indeed."

"But we must, we're saying, have acquired our knowledge of the equal before this?" c

"Yes."

"Then it seems we must have acquired it before we were born."

"It seems so."

"Therefore if we acquired it before we were born and were born in possession of it, did we have knowledge, both before being born and at the very moment of being born, not only of the equal and of the greater and the less, but also of all such things? You see our discussion now is no more about the equal than about the beautiful, the good, the just and the holy themselves, and, as I say, about all things on which we've put this seal, the 'what it is' both in putting our questions when we ask questions and giving our answers when we give answers. Consequently it has to be that we gained our knowledge of all these things before we were born." d

"That is so."

"And if on the one hand having gained it we have not forgotten it every time, it must be that we are always being brought into being with this knowledge and always have it throughout our lives. For this is what knowing is, having gained knowledge of something we hold on to it and have not lost it—or is this not what we mean by forgetting, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"

"Absolutely, in my view, Socrates," he said. e

Εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἅς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, | ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μαθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

Πάνυ γε.

- 76 Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὄν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, | ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὐς φάμεν μαθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.

Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ᾧ Σώκρατες.

- b Πότερον οὖν αἰρή, ᾧ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέαι, ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.

Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῆ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχει ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ; |

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες.

PHAEDO

“But on the other hand, I think, if after gaining it before birth we lost it in the process of being born and later on using our senses recover that knowledge of the absolutes that we had once before, wouldn’t what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge? And in my view in referring to this as recollection are we right to use this word?”

“Certainly.”

“Yes indeed, for it did appear possible that if someone perceived something, either by seeing it, or hearing, or applying any other kind of perception, from this he could think of something else that he had forgotten, which this came close to, either dissimilar or similar to it.⁴⁹ The result I’m saying is one of two things, either we were born with a knowledge of these things and we all know them throughout our lives, or later on those who we say are learning are doing nothing other than calling things to mind and the learning process would be recollection.” 76

“This is certainly the case, Socrates.”

“Which one do you choose then, Simmias? Were we born with knowledge, or do we later recall knowledge of things that we gained previously?” b

“I can’t make up my mind, Socrates, at this moment.”

“What then? Can you decide on the following and what do you think about it? Would a man with understanding of what he knows be able to give an account of it, or not?”

“Of course he must be able to, Socrates,” he said.

⁴⁹ This was argued at 73c5–74a8.

Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον
περὶ τούτων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; |

Βουλοίμην μεντᾶν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ-
λον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων
οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τούτο ποιῆσαι.

c Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμ-
μίας, πάντες αὐτά;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον; |

Ἀνάγκη.

Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐ-
τῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Πρότερον ἄρα. |

Ναί.

Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμίας, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν
εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμαίων, καὶ φρόνη-
σιν εἶχον.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ
χρόνος.

d Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ
χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς
ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧ περ
καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινα εἰπεῖν χρόνον; |

PHAEDO

"Indeed, and do you think everyone can give an explanation for what we were just talking about?"⁵⁰

"Well I wish they could," said Simmias, "but I'm really rather afraid that by this time tomorrow there'll no longer be anyone here capable of making a decent job of this."

"So you don't think all people have knowledge of these things, Simmias?" he said. c

"Not at all."

"Then they call to mind what they once learned?"

"They must do."

"When did our souls gain knowledge of them? It certainly wasn't since the time when we were born as human beings."

"No indeed."

"Before that, then."

"Yes."

"Then our souls existed before that, before they existed in human form, without bodies, and they had understanding."

"Unless after all we gain our knowledge of these things at the very moment we are born, Socrates: there's still this time left."

"Well then, my friend, at what other time do we lose it? After all we certainly aren't born with it, as we agreed a little while ago. Or do we lose it at the time we acquire it, or have you any other time to suggest?" d

⁵⁰ I.e., give an explanation (i.e., rational account: *dounai logon*: b5) of what was mentioned in 75c11-d2, how we know about "the beautiful," "the good," etc.—that is, provide a necessary requirement for something to qualify as knowledge, according to Plato's S. (and argued extensively in *Euthyphro*).

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἑμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπῶν.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν αἰεὶ, καλὸν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἢ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ ἄλλως ἢ ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

Ἵπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἢν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὄν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.

Ἵκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἢ ἄλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ· εἰ μὲν-

"No way, Socrates! I didn't realize I was talking nonsense."

"Is this then how it is with us, Simmias? If the things we're always on about exist: a beauty, a good, and every such essence,⁵¹ and we compare all we get from our senses with this essence, rediscovering what was formerly ours, and we compare these things with it, it must be that, just as these essences exist, so too our soul exists even before we have come into being. But if these don't exist, wouldn't this line of argument be pointless? Is this right then, and is it equally necessary both that these essences exist, and that our souls existed before we came into being; and if the one did not, neither did the other?"

"It's abundantly clear to me, Socrates," said Simmias, "the same must apply to both and it's opportune that your argument has recourse to similarity between both our soul before we were born and the essence you're now talking about. For my part I've got nothing that's as clear as this to me, that all such things exist as surely as any can: beautiful, good, and all the others that you were talking about just now. And for me at any rate I think the case is sufficiently proven."

"And how does Cebes react to it?" said Socrates. "You see we have to persuade Cebes too."

"Well enough," said Simmias, "as far as I can see. And yet he's the most obstinate of people when it comes to not accepting arguments. But still I do think he's been sufficiently persuaded that our soul existed before we were

⁵¹ "Essence" (*ousia*), often used by Plato in contrast to "attribute" (*pathos*), e.g., essential beauty itself as opposed to its attributes in objects perceived by the senses, e.g., a beautiful person, etc. For these terms contrasted elsewhere, see *Euthphr.* 11a6-b1.

τοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδείχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐν-έστηκεν ὁ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνήσκοντος | τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθεν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκεται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; |

c Εὐὶ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἡμῖσιν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ, δεῖ δὲ προσapoδείξειν ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔξειν.

Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὠμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ d ἔστιν μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάει γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; | ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἠδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ e ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ

PHAEDO

born. However, whether it'll still be there when we die, I don't think has been demonstrated, Socrates, even to me. But what Cebes was saying just now⁵² is still holding us back: the fear of most people that the soul may be dispersed at the very moment when a person dies and that is the end of its existence. Tell me what's stopping it coming into being and being brought together from somewhere else and existing before reaching a human body, and when it has arrived and then departs from it, it too dies itself and is annihilated?"

"A good point, Simmias," said Cebes, "for it seems that half, as it were, of what was wanted has been proved, that our soul existed before we were born, but we must prove in addition that when we die too it will exist just as much as before we were born, if the proof is to be made in full." c

"It has been proved even as it is, Simmias and Cebes" said Socrates, "if you're willing to combine this argument with the one we agreed to before, that every living thing comes into being from the dead.⁵³ You see if the soul on the one hand has a previous existence, and on the other it must enter the living being and come into existence from no other source than death and come into being from being dead, how can it not be essential for it to exist even when one dies, since it has to come into being again? So what you're now saying has already been proved. Nevertheless it seems to me both you and Simmias would gladly discuss this argument thoroughly still further and that you have the childish fear that the wind may really blow the soul away in all directions and scatter it when it leaves the d e

⁵² At 70a.

⁵³ Agreed at 72a-d.

ὅταν τύχη τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπέθειν μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπέθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

Ἄλλὰ χρῆ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, | ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσητε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπώδον ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

Πολλὴ μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ἧ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, | οὓς πάντας χρῆ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπώδον, μῆτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μῆτε πόρων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκετε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρῆ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ραδίως εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. |

b Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δῆ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, | δεῖ ἡμᾶς

⁵⁴ S.'s little joke has the effect of emphasizing the "childish fear" of Cebes and Simmias (d7-8) that the soul is insubstantial and easily dispersed.

PHAEDO

body, especially when someone happens to die not when there's no wind, but in a mighty tempest."⁵⁴

And Cebes chuckled and said: "Try and reassure us, Socrates, as if we were frightened. Or rather, not as if we are afraid, but perhaps as if there is some child within us who is afraid of such things. So, try and persuade him not to be afraid of death as if it's the bogeyman."

"Well you must sing to him every day," said Socrates, "until you magic it away."

"Then where, Socrates," he said, "are we going to get a good enchanter to charm away these sorts of fears, since you," he said, "are abandoning us?"⁵⁵ 78

"Greece is a large country, Cebes," he said, "where I imagine there are some good men, and there are many non-Greek people too all of whom you must track down in your search for such an enchanter, sparing neither money nor effort since there's nothing more opportune you could spend your money on. You must also look for them among yourselves. You see you probably couldn't easily find people more able to do this than yourselves."

"Well," said Cebes, "that indeed will be done; but let's get back to where we left off, if that is to your liking." b

"Indeed it is: how could it not be?"

"Good," he said.

"So then," said Socrates, "we must ask ourselves some-

⁵⁵ For the idea of "charms" as "fine words" (*kalous logous*) that cure the soul by implanting values such as temperance, etc., see *Charm.* 157a.

ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ> καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; |

Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

c Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέντῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτη ἥπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; |

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. |

d Ἴωμεν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστίν, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἠντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; | ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστίν, μονοειδὲς ὃν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;

Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

thing on the lines of: what kind of thing is liable to this fate of being dispersed, and in the case of what kind of thing is it appropriate for us to fear it may happen and for what kind is it not? Then afterward we must consider further to which class the soul belongs and from these results either feel confident or afraid on behalf of our soul?"

"You're right," he said.

"Is something that has been put together and that is naturally composite liable to undergo being taken apart in the same way it was put together, but if something is actually incomposite, isn't this alone, if anything, liable not to be affected in this way?"

"I think that's right," said Cebes.

"Well then isn't it most likely that those things that always remain in the same state consistently are the in-composite, while those that are sometimes one sometimes another and never in the same state are composite?"

"I think so."

"Right," he said, "let's move on to those same matters we were discussing in our earlier argument. Is the actual essence whose reality we are discussing in our questions and answers⁵⁶ always in the same identical state, or is it sometimes one thing, sometimes another? Does the equal by itself, the beautiful by itself, each thing by itself that exists, that which is, ever allow any kind of change? Or does what each of them is, being uniform in and of itself always keep the identical state and never allows any kind of change anywhere or anyhow?"

"It must always keep its identical state, Socrates," said Cebes.

⁵⁶ At 74b2ff.

Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν,³ οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων
 e ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων⁴ ἢ
 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχει,
 ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλ-
 λήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτά;

Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ταῦτα οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως
 ἔχει. |

79 Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς
 ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά ἐχόν-
 των οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς
 διανοίας λογισμῶ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰδιῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
 οὐχ ὁρατά;

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. |

Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν
 ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδές;

Θῶμεν, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰδές αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον, | τὸ δὲ ὁρα-
 τὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.

b Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά
 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ;

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.

Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιώτερον τῷ εἶδει φαμέν ἂν εἶναι καὶ
 συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; |

³ καλῶν secl. Classen

⁴ post ἴσων add. ἢ καλῶν βΤδ: secl. Burnet

PHAEDO

"But what about the many kinds of beauty such as of human beings, or of horses, or of clothes, or of any other such kinds of thing whatsoever, or of equals, or all the things that have the same name as those essences? Do they remain in the same state, or is it the complete opposite for them, and they virtually never ever remain in the same state consistent within themselves, or in relation to each other?" e

"Again, that's right," said Cebes. "They never remain the same."

"Now those things you can touch and see and perceive by your other senses, but for the things that remain in the same state there's nothing you could ever apprehend them with except by the application of the intellect, is there: after all, such things are invisible and not to be seen?" 79

"You're absolutely right," he said.

"Do you want us in that case to posit two kinds of existing things," he asked: "the one visible, the other invisible?"

"Yes, let's do that," he said.

"And the invisible is always in the same state, and the visible never in the same state?"

"Yes, let's posit that too."

"So come on then," he said, "is there any other part of ourselves apart from that which is body and another part which is soul?"⁵⁷ b

"No, there is nothing else," he said.

"Which class then would we say that the body is more like and more akin to?"⁵⁸

⁵⁷ For this assumption, see above, n. 25.

⁵⁸ For the "argument from affinity," see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (vi).

Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ.

Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχῆ; ὁρατὸν ἢ αἰδές;

Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῆ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἴει;

Τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶ-
ναι;

Οὐχ ὁρατόν.

Ἄιδές ἄρα; |

Ναί.

Ὅμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ αἰδεῖ, τὸ
δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ.

c Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχῆ, ὅταν
μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ
τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθή-
σεως—τοῦτο γάρ | ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι'
αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώ-
ματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτῆ
πλανᾶται καὶ ταραττέται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύ-
ουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη;

Πάνυ γε.

d Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται
εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ
ᾧσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὔσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ'

PHAEDO

"Well, that's obvious," he said, "in all respects it's more like the visible."

"What about the soul: visible or invisible?"

"Well it can't be seen by human beings at any rate, Socrates," he said.

"And yet we were talking about things that are by nature visible and other things that are not visible to human beings. Or do you think it's related to something else?"

"No, it's related to human beings."

"What are we saying about the soul then? Is it something visible or invisible?"

"It can't be seen."

"Invisible then?"

"Yes."

"Then the soul is something more like the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible."

"Absolutely, Socrates, it has to be."

"And weren't we also saying this a while ago:⁵⁹ that whenever the soul uses the body to examine something, either through sight or hearing or some other means of perception—for examining something by means of perception is examination by means of the body—then it's dragged by the body toward those things that are never in a constant state, and it wanders about itself, is confused and becomes dizzy as if drunk, in that it's in contact with that kind of thing?"

"Very much so."

"But whenever the soul examines something on its own, it departs there to the pure, the eternal, the immortal and constant state of being, and being akin to it, always

⁵⁹ At 65a-67b.

ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται
καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περι
ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, | ἅτε τοιούτων
ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις
κέκληται;

Παντάπασι, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες. |

Ποτέρω οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν
e πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῆ ὁμοίτερον
εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον;

Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, συγχωρήσαι, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, |
ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχῆ τῷ αἰεὶ ὡσαύ-
τως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή.

Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;

Τῷ ἐτέρω.

Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῆδε ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχῆ
80 καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις
προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ
ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ
πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον
ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, | τὸ δὲ θνητὸν
ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

Ἐμοιγε.

Ποτέρω οὖν ἢ ψυχῆ ἔοικεν; |

Δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἢ μὲν ψυχῆ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ
δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρη-

gets to be with the absolute whenever it comes to be by itself, and exists for itself; and it ceases its wandering about and, around those entities, it's always in the same constant state because it's in contact with beings of that sort: and this experience it goes through is known as wisdom, isn't it?"

"Certainly," he said, "you're right and what you're saying is true, Socrates."

"So from our previous discussion and what we're now saying, to which class do you think the soul has a closer resemblance and more affinity?" e

"It seems to me that everyone, Socrates," he said, "would agree from this kind of inquiry, even the most dimwitted, that the soul is completely and utterly a thing more like that which is unchanging, rather than that which isn't."

"And what about the body?"

"Like the other one."

"Then look at it this way also: whenever soul and body are in the same place nature directs the latter to serve and be governed and the former to govern and be master; and on this subject again, which one do you think resembles the divine and which the mortal? Or do you not think the divine is naturally such as to govern and control and the mortal to be governed and serve?" 80

"I do."

"Which one does the soul resemble, then?"

"It's clear, Socrates, that the soul is like the divine and the body the mortal."

"Then consider, Cebes," he said, "if from everything

- b μένων τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοióτατον εἶναι ψυχῇ, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοητῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε | κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοióτατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, ἧ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σῶματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, | ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἔγγύς τι τούτου;

- c Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὄρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὄρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, | οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχρὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνν μάλα συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγον ὄλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον,

- d ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῆ, ὅστ' αὖτε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ;

Ναί. |

Ἡ δὲ ψυχῇ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδέες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον

PHAEDO

that's been said we're agreed on this: that the entity that is most like the divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the uniform, the indivisible, and is in itself always absolutely constant is the soul, while on the other hand that which is most like the human, mortal, unintelligible, the complex and divisible and never remaining totally consistent within itself is the body. Do we have anything else to say to counter this, Cebes, whereby it is not so?" b

"No, we don't."

"What then? If this is the case, isn't it in the nature of things that the body will quickly disintegrate, but the soul on the other hand is altogether indissoluble, or something close to this?"

"Of course."

"Now you know," he said, "that whenever a person dies, the visible part of him, his body, even while it remains visible, which of course we call his corpse, is liable to disintegrate, fall to pieces and is dispersed. None of this happens immediately, but it survives for quite a long time, and if someone with a body in good condition dies, and at the right time of year, even more so. Now if the body is shrunk and embalmed as well, as they're embalmed in Egypt,⁶⁰ it remains practically intact for an incalculable length of time, and, even if it decomposes, some parts of the body, the bones and sinews and everything of that sort are still so to speak immortal. Isn't that so?" d

"Yes."

"On the other hand does the soul then, the invisible

⁶⁰ The importance of Egypt in Plato's writings is widely attested, often as an example of permanence, e.g., *Leg.* 2.656dff., 660c.

ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ αἰδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος | εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ
 e ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, | ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτῇ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο—τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούσα
 81 καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου;

Παντάσασί γε.

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰδῆς ἀπέρχεται, | τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως; |

Οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

b Ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα

⁶¹ A pun on “invisible” (*aīdēs*) and “Hades” (*Haīdēs*) that goes

PHAEDO

part, which makes its way to another place of that kind, noble, pure and invisible: Hades in the true sense,⁶¹ to be with the good and wise god where, if the god wills it, my soul too must go directly—will this soul of ours, being naturally of such a kind, be immediately dispersed and destroyed when it is separated from the body, as most people say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias; on the contrary, it's much more as follows: if it is pure when it separates off and drags nothing of the body with it since it has not willingly had any association with it in life, but has avoided it and drawn itself together into itself, since this has always been its habit—that is nothing other than practicing philosophy correctly and, in fact, practicing dying readily. Or would this not be the way to cultivate dying?"

"Yes, absolutely."

"Being in such a condition, does it then make for what is like it, the invisible, the divine and immortal and wise, and on arriving there isn't it's lot to be happy, being rid of wandering aimlessly, foolishness, fears, wild sexual passions and the other human evils, and, just as it's said of the initiated, does it not truly spend the rest of time among the gods? Are we to put it like this, Cebes, or in a different way?"

"Zeus, no! Just like this," said Cebes.

"On the other hand, in my view, if when it is released from the body it is polluted and uncleansed, in that it has

back to Hom. *Il.* 5.844–45, where the goddess Athena puts on the "cap of Hades" to make herself invisible. In *Crat.* 404b, however, Plato rejects this derivation in favor of a connection with the Greek for "to know" (*eidēnai*).

καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γοητευομένη
 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε
 μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι | ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματο-
 ειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ
 πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκο-
 τῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν,
 τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν,
 οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλι-
 κρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοει-
 δοῦς, | ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος
 διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐν-
 εποίησε σύμφυτον;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι
 καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὄρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ
 τοιαύτη | ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν
 ὄρατόν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἄιδου, ὥσπερ
 λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλι-
 δουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὄφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ
 φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἰ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴ-
 δωλα, αἰ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ
 μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρώνται. |

Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς

been continually with the body and serving it and loving it, and so bewitched by it and the influence of its desires and pleasures as to think that nothing is real but the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and use for sexual pleasure, and it has become used to hating, fearing, and avoiding what is obscure and invisible to the eyes, but intelligible and to be grasped by philosophy: do you think the soul in this state would be released untarnished alone by itself?" c

"In no way whatsoever," he said.

"No, I think it will have been bound up with the corporeal, which the association and close proximity of the body has made naturally ingrained in it, because of continual association and frequent practice?"

"Very much so."

"And you must suppose, my friend, that this corporeal element is weighty and heavy, earthy and visible. Indeed such a soul that has this is weighed down and dragged back to the visible world by fear of both the invisible and Hades, so it's said, circling aimlessly among the tombstones and graves, among which indeed some shadowy apparitions of souls have actually been seen, the kind of images that such souls produce that have not been released in a pure state, but having a share in the visible can thus be seen."⁶² d

"It seems likely, Socrates."

"Indeed it is likely, Cebes, and in no respect are they the souls of good people, but of inferior ones that are forced to roam about in such places paying the price for

⁶² An adaptation by Plato of a popular and traditional belief in ghosts haunting their graves and unable to find release, to the idea of souls as semivisible, because weighted down with corporeal elements and unable to depart to the other world.

e προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου
 πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ
 σωματοειδούς, ἐπιθυμία πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα·
 ἐνδύονται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὅποι' ἄτ'
 ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκῶσι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. |

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

82 Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ
 φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διηυλαβημένους
 εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς
 ἐνδύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυρανίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς
 προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ
 ἰκτίνων γένη· | ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας
 ἰέναι;

Ἄμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἢ ἂν ἕκαστα
 ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελέτης; |

Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη πῶς δ' οὔ;

b Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ
 εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πο-
 λιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σω-
 φροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης
 γεγонуῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πῆ δὴ οὔτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; |

Ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστὶν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφ-
 ικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν
 ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμηκῶν, καὶ εἰς ταυτὸν γε πάλιν τὸ

PHAEDO

their former way of life that was evil. Moreover they roam about to the point when through their desire for their close companion, the corporeal, they are bound again to the body. And as you'd expect they're bound to whatever characters they actually cultivated in their lifetime." e

"What types do you mean by this, Socrates?"

"For example those who have indulged in gluttony, outrageous behavior and love of drinking and haven't been on their guard against them are likely to take the form of the family of asses and such animals. Or do you not think so?" 82

"Oh I do. What you say is very likely."

"And those who have given priority to injustice, tyranny, and stealing belong to the family of wolves, hawks and kites: or where else do we say such souls go?"

"Doubtless," said Cebes, "into such families."

"So it's clear then," he said, "that wherever the others go is in each case according to the similarity of their training, isn't it?"

"It's clear indeed," he said, "of course."

"So are the happiest of these and those who go to the best place the ones who have practiced common and civic virtue, which they actually call temperance and justice, which have come about from habit and practice without philosophy and reason?" b

"In what respect are these the happiest?"

"In that it's likely that these return to a civic and cultivated family, such as of bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or

ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκός. |

c Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παν-
 τελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ
 τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε
 καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ
 τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ
 παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, | οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε
 καὶ πεινίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλο-
 χρήματοι οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας
 δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα
 ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρόποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.

d Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν
 ἅπασιν, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυ-
 χῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόν-
 τες, οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν
 ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, | αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ
 φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθ-
 αρμῷ ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἣ ἐκείνη
 ὑφηγείται.

Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

63 The idea of reincarnation of humans in animal form was Pythagorean (see Xenophanes, DK 21B7, Waterfield, 30), and, for the similarity of certain types of human beings to corresponding kinds of animals, see Semonides (Greek iambic poet, seventh century), fr. 7 Gerber.

PHAEDO

back again to the very same one, the human race, and from them we get men of moderation.”⁶³

“That’s likely.”

“But for one who hasn’t practiced philosophy and who leaves without being thoroughly purified it isn’t sanctioned to go to the family of gods, unless he is a lover of learning. This is the reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who are rightly philosophers abstain from all bodily desires, strengthen their resolve and do not surrender themselves to them, not through any fear of squandering their resources, or poverty like the majority of lovers of money; nor again do they keep away from them through fear of dishonor or the disgrace of depravity such as those who are ambitious to rule and be respected.”⁶⁴

“No, for that would not be fitting, Socrates,” said Cebes.

“Indeed it would not, by Zeus,” he said. “That’s why, Cebes, those who care in some way for their own soul, but do not live getting their bodies into shape, dismiss all these people; they don’t proceed on the same principles as the others do—men who don’t know where they’re going; but they themselves consider that they must not do anything contrary to philosophy, and by both the release of the soul and its purification they are turned *this* way and follow it where it leads.”

“How, Socrates?”

⁶⁴ For those practicing virtues for prudential reasons, whom genuine philosophers avoid, see above, 68dff. For “those who are ambitious to rule,” see *Resp.* 8.545bff., on the “Timarchic Man.”

- e Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένη ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένη, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἴργμου διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλιδουμένην, | καὶ τοῦ εἴργμου τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ
- 83 εἶη τοῦ δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γινώσκουσι οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἢ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὥτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, | πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελενομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἢ
- b αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἠγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὄρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὄρα νοητόν τε καὶ αἰδέσ. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οιομένη | δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὢν
- c ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ

PHAEDO

“I’ll tell you,” he said. “You see those who love learning e
recognize that philosophy takes in hand their soul, which
is utterly bound up in the body and fastened to it and
forced to examine reality through it, as if through prison
bars, but not by itself on its own, and is wallowing in total
ignorance; and philosophy has discerned that the cunning
thing about the prison is that it comes from desire, as if
the prisoner were himself the chief accomplice in his be-
ing tied up. So what I’m saying is that the lovers of learn- 83
ing recognize that philosophy, in taking their soul in hand
in this state, gently reassures it and tries to release it by
demonstrating that inquiry through the eyes is full of de-
ception, as also is that through the ears and the other
senses. It persuades it to retreat from these senses except
where it is necessary to use them, and encourages the soul
to gather and collect itself together and trust nothing else
but itself in itself, whichever of the realities alone by itself b
it thinks about alone by itself; but to consider nothing as
true that it examines through other means, what is variable
in varying conditions: that kind of thing is perceivable and
visible, but the soul sees what is intelligible and invisible.
So thinking it mustn’t oppose this release, the soul of a
true philosopher for that reason keeps away from plea-
sures, desires, pains, and fears as far as it can, reckoning
that whenever you’re over much affected by pleasure or
pain or fear or desire you don’t suffer so great harm from
these, the ones that you’d think, for example falling ill, or c

τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.

Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. |

Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον' ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ>⁵ ὁρατά· ἢ οὐ; |

Πάνυ γε.

d Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεύεται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος;

Πῶς δῆ;

Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα | προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσιν αὐτὰ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῆ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἴμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, | ἀλλὰ αἰεὶ τοῦ
e σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαρῶ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν· ἢ σὺ οἶει;

⁵ <τὰ> ante ὁρατά add. Heindorf, Burnet

spending money on your desires, but you do suffer the greatest and ultimate of all evils and take no account of it."

"What is this, Socrates?" said Cebes.

"That the soul of every person, at the same time as experiencing extreme pleasure or pain over something, is compelled to suppose that whatever it is suffering in particular is the most palpable and most real, even though it's not so. Things like this are especially those seen, or is that not so?"

"Very much so."

"Isn't it in this experience that the soul is especially bound fast by the body?" d

"How do you mean?"

"Because each pleasure and pain fixes it as if with a nail and pins it to the body and makes it body-like, supposing that whatever the body says is the truth. You see as a result of sharing the body's beliefs and enjoying the same things, it's compelled, I think, to become the same in its habits and upbringing that are such that it never reaches Hades in purity but must always depart infected by the body, so that it quickly falls back into another body again and grows there like a seed sown, and as a result of this has no part in communion with the divine, the pure and uniform." e

"What you say is very true, Socrates," said Cebes.

"These then are the reasons, Cebes, why those who are justly lovers of learning are orderly and courageous, not the reasons given by the majority of people:⁶⁵ or do you think otherwise?"

⁶⁵ I.e., for the prudential reasons outlined at 82c.

84 Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε.

Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, | αὐτὴν παραδιδόμην ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις εἰσαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη,
 b ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῆ, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, | ᾧ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθείσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθείσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

c Σιγῇ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ᾗν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Συμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. | καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῶ ἤρετο, Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μὴν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς,

⁶⁶ An allusion to Hom. *Od.* 2.92–105. In the absence of her husband Odysseus, Penelope was weaving a shroud for her aged

"No, indeed I don't!"

84

"Indeed no; but the soul of a philosophic man would reason it out in this way: and it wouldn't think that philosophy is obliged to set it free, yet that when philosophy has freed it, it should of its own accord hand itself back to pleasure and pain and bind itself up with them again and carry out a never-ending task of a Penelope working away in reverse at some kind of loom.⁶⁶ Rather, in bringing about a respite from these emotions, following reason and being always engaged in it, contemplating the truth, the divine and not what is based on opinion, and being nourished by it, it believes it must live in this way as long as it lives, and when it dies and reaches what is akin to it and of like nature, be rid of human evils. Indeed from such nurture and having practiced these things, Simmias and Cebes, there is no danger that it will fear that, torn apart in its separation from the body it may depart, blown away by the winds, go flying off, and no longer be anything anywhere at all." b

Now after Socrates had spoken, there was silence for a long time. And Socrates, by the look of him, was himself absorbed in the argument he had given, and so were the majority of us. Cebes and Simmias were talking together quietly and when he saw this Socrates asked them both: "What's this? Surely you don't think what's been discussed isn't enough? To be sure, there are still plenty of doubts and counterattacks to be made if one's really going c

father-in-law, Laertes, and, prolonging the task to avoid remarriage to one of her pressing suitors, she worked "in reverse," by unpicking at night what she had woven during the day.

εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων
 d ἀπορείτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ δι-
 ελθεῖν, εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἀν> λεχθῆναι,
 καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε
 μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθῆ
 σοι ἐρῶ. | πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτε-
 ρον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν
 ἀκούσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀηδὲς ἦ
 διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφορὰν.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησιν·
 Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· | ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους
 e ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν ἠγοῦμαι τὴν
 παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν,
 ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ
 φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, | οἱ ἐπειδὰν αἰ-
 85 σθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν
 τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα⁶
 ἄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέ-
 ναι οὐπὲρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ
 αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδον-
 ται, | καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ
 λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον
 ἄδει ὅταν πεινῆ ἢ ῥιγῶ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται,

⁶ κάλλιστα Blomfield: μάλιστα βΤΡQV

to explore them adequately. Now if you're contemplating something else, I'm speaking beside the point. But if you have any problems about any of these matters, don't hesitate to speak and go through them yourselves, if it seems to you it could somehow have been argued better; and what's more, take me along with you too if you think you can make better progress with my help." d

Simmius accordingly said: "Well, Socrates, I'll tell you the truth. You see each of us has been at a loss for some time and has been nudging and urging the other to ask questions in our eagerness to hear the answer, but hesitating to cause trouble in case it seems tactless to you in view of your present misfortune."

And when he heard this he chuckled quietly and said: "Dear me, Simmius! I'd find it truly difficult to persuade other people that I don't consider my present position to be a misfortune when I can't even persuade both of you, but you're afraid that I'm now somewhat more disgruntled than in my past life. Moreover it seems you think I'm inferior in my prophesying to the swans who, when they perceive that they must die, although they could sing before, they now sing at their loudest and most beautiful, rejoicing in the fact that they're about to go to the god whose servants they are.⁶⁷ But human beings, because of their own fear of dying, interpret the swans wrongly and say they're lamenting death and singing out through grief, and they don't take into account that no bird sings when it's hungry or cold, or suffering any other kind of distress, e 85

⁶⁷ For swans singing at approaching death, cf. Aesch. Ag. 1444. They are sacred to Apollo, from whom they receive their prophetic powers.

οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε ἀηδῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δὴ
 φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾄδειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι
 b φαίνεται λυπούμενα ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἄτε
 οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προ-
 ειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται
 ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν
 χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός | τε εἶναι
 τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον
 ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότη, οὐδὲ
 δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ
 τούτου γ' ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν
 βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἑώσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα. |

Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Συμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρῶ
 c ὁ ἀπορωῶ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅδε, ἧ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα.
 ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως
 ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ
 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ τὰ λε-
 γόμενα περὶ | αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν
 καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ σκοπῶν
 ἀπέιπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ
 περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν
 ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλ-
 τιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξ-

⁶⁸ These three birds were the forms assumed by Procne, Philomela, and Tereus, who died violently and would therefore be expected to sing from grief (on the legend, see Apollodorus 3.14.8.).

PHAEDO

not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe, who they say are lamenting and singing through grief.⁶⁸ But it doesn't seem to me they're grieving, nor are the swans, but rather, I believe, in as much as they belong to Apollo, they have both prophetic power, and are singing with foreknowledge of good things in Hades and are taking delight on that day more than ever before. As for myself, I think that I am a fellow servant with the swans and am under the divine protection of the same god; and I'm not worse than they are as regards my powers of prophecy from my master, nor am I any more downhearted than they are in giving up my life.⁶⁹ Well, for this reason you must speak up and ask whatever you want, as long as the eleven Athenian men allow it."⁷⁰

"You're right," said Simmias, "and I'll tell you what puzzles me, and in turn this man here will do likewise where he doesn't accept what's been said.⁷¹ You see, Socrates, in regard to these matters it seems to me, as perhaps it does to you too, that sure knowledge in this life is either something impossible, or very difficult. Yet again not to test what's being said about them in every way and to give up before one tires of looking at them from every angle is the mark of a very feeble-minded person. You see you've got to achieve at least one of the following regarding this: either learn or discover for yourself how things are, or if this is impossible, at least take the best of men's argu-

⁶⁹ For S. as prophet, see *Ap.* 39c, *Cri.* 44a.

⁷⁰ See above, n. 12.

⁷¹ For the counterarguments of Simmias and Cebes, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (vii).

d ελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλευσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. | καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαντὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρω χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαντὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

e Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς.

Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἦ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, | ὡς ἡ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ 86 πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θείον ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένη λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἡ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, | εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σὺ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι—οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανῆ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυῶν b τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην—ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς

PHAEDO

ments, those hardest to refute, and risk sailing your course through life riding on this, as it were on a raft,⁷² unless you might be able to proceed with your journey more safely and with less danger on a more secure vessel, some divine doctrine. And so now I shall not be ashamed to ask a question, since this is what you're asking for, nor shall I reprove myself in the future for not saying now what I think. From my point of view, Socrates, when I consider what's been said to me and to him, I don't think it's been discussed altogether adequately." d

And Socrates replied: "yes, maybe your view is correct, my friend, but tell me in what particular respect inadequate." e

"In this way, I think at least," he said: "the way in which one could use this same argument about tuning a lyre and its strings, that the attunement⁷³ is something invisible, incorporeal and very beautiful and divine within the tuned lyre, but the lyre itself and the strings are material and corporeal objects, composite as well as earthly and related to what is mortal. So if someone smashes the lyre, or cuts or breaks the strings, if one were to confidently affirm the same argument as you did that that attunement must still exist and not be lost—for there could be no way that the lyre and its strings, being naturally perishable, still exist once they are broken, and yet the attunement that is akin and related to the divine and the immortal, should have perished before the mortal—on the contrary, you would say that the tuning must itself still exist somewhere and" 86

⁷² Plato possibly has the raft of Odysseus in mind, Hom. *Od.* 5.228ff. ⁷³ "Attunement" = *harmonia* (fitting together, accord, agreement). b

| κατασαπήσεται πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν—καὶ γὰρ
 οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο
 ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιούτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνο-
 μεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένον τοῦ σώματος
 ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ
 c ξηροῦ καὶ ὕγρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ
 ἄρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν
 ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα—εἰ οὖν
 τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὔσα ἄρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν
 χαλασθῆ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῆ ὑπὸ |
 νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐ-
 θὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὔσαν θειοτάτην,
 ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἄρμονίαι αἶ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λεί-
 ψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολλὸν χρόνον παρα-
 μένειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῆ ἢ κατασαπῆ—ὅρα οὖν
 d πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐὰν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶ-
 σιν οὔσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ κα-
 λουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰ-
 ῶθει, | καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμ-
 μίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπ-
 εκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ
 λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως
 e ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι τί αὖ ὁδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ
 λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί
 ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐὰν
 τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδι-

PHAEDO

that the wood and the strings will rot before anything happens to it. And in actual fact, Socrates, I do think you yourself have contemplated the idea that some such thing as this is what we assume the soul to be: just as our bodies are in tension and held together by hot and cold and dry and wet⁷⁴ and other such things, our soul is also a mixture and a tuning of these same things when these are combined with each other in a good and balanced way. If therefore the soul really is some kind of tuning, it's clear that when our body is loosened or stretched out of proportion through diseases and other mishaps, necessity immediately begins to destroy the soul, no matter how divine it is, just as the other attunements in our musical sounds and all the works of our craftsmen, but the remnants of each body stay around for a long time until they are burned up or rot away. So consider what we'll say in answer to this argument, if one were to claim that the soul, being a mixture of the elements in the body is the first to perish in what we call death."

Then Socrates opened his eyes wide, as he used to on many an occasion, smiled and said: "Well, what Simmias says is a fair objection. If then any of you has a more ready answer than I do, why doesn't he answer? For he does seem to be getting a grip on the argument in no mean fashion. However, before answering I think we should first hear from Cebes what he in his turn can invoke against my argument so that when we have had time we can deliberate what we'll say. Then when we've heard him we can go along with them if they seem to strike the right note at all,

⁷⁴ For this idea, see the fifth-century Pythagorean Alcmaeon, DK 24B4.

κεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ᾧ Κέβης, | λέγε, τί
ἦν τὸ σέ αὖ θράπτον.

- 87 Δέγω δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
ἠέλεγομεν, ταῦτόν ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν
ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθε-
μαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν
εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθα-
νόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, | οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὡς μὲν
οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώμα-
τος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι
πάσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ
λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὄρας ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀν-
θρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρο-
νιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σφῆζεσθαι
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ
τι λέγω· εἰκόνας γάρ τινος, ὡς ἕοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ
Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι |
ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύ-
του ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ
ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον
δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἡμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμε-
νος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπ-
ιστοίῃ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶν πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν
c ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεῖα τε ὄντος

or if not we can then put our case for the argument at that point. Well come on, Cebes," he said, "tell us what was it that was still bothering you."

"I certainly will tell you," said Cebes. "You see it seems to me that the argument is still in the same place and is open to the same objection as we were stating before.⁷⁵ 87 You see, with regard to the theory that our soul existed even before coming to its present form, I do not retract my opinion that that has been very neatly and, if it's not an exaggeration to say so, quite satisfactorily proven. But that it still exists somewhere when we die I don't think is right in this respect. I don't go along with Simmias' objection that the soul is not stronger or more enduring than the body: I think it is far superior in all these respects. Why then, the argument would run, are you still not convinced when you see what is actually the weaker part still in existence when the person dies? Don't you think the part that survives longer must be preserved during this time? Bearing this in mind, consider if in the following respect I'm right; I, like Simmias it seems, need an illustration.⁷⁶ You see it seems to me that what is being said is as if someone used this argument about an old man, a weaver who has died, saying that the man hasn't died, but is somewhere safe and sound, and one would offer as proof that the cloak, which he had woven himself and was wearing, is still in one piece and hasn't perished, and if you weren't convinced he'd ask whether a member of the human race was longer-living than a cloak that was in use and being worn. b c

⁷⁵ At 77b1ff. ⁷⁶ An *eikōn* (image, allegory), a device frequently used by Plato as part of an argumentative strategy (see, e.g., *Resp.* 6.488a-e).

καὶ φορουμένον, ἀποκριναμένου δὴ ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοιτο ἀποδεδείχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μάλ-
λον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστιν, | ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγο-
χροنيώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία,
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἅ λέγω. πᾶς ἂν
ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ
ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ
ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν
d ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι
μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαν-
λότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶ-
μαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων
αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν,
| ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα
ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροنيώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν
φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρί-
βειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιωῶ—εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ
σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ'
e ἢ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι—ἀναγκαῖον
μεντᾶν εἶη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἢ ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταῖον
ὑφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προ-
τέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε
ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι | τὸ σῶμα
καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐπω
ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν
88 ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι
τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἅ σὺν λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δούς αὐτῷ
μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι

And when the answer duly came that man's life is much longer, he'd think it had been demonstrated that the man is assuredly intact since the object with the shorter life hadn't perished. But I don't think this is the case, Simmias. Consider for yourself what I'm saying. Everyone would take it that he who says this is talking nonsense. You see this weaver of ours, though he'd woven and worn out many such garments, perished after they did, though there were many of them; but I imagine he died before the last one; and yet a man is not, for all that, at all inferior or weaker than a cloak. I think the soul's relation with the body would admit this same analogy and anyone saying the very same things about them would seem to be talking sense, namely: the soul is something longer-lived and the body something weaker and shorter-lived. But while one would say that each of the souls wears out many bodies, especially if it lives for many years—you see if the body were to change and wear out while the person is still alive, yet the soul would continually weave anew what is worn out—however when the soul perishes it would actually have to have on the final garment and perish before this one alone, and when the soul has perished, then at last the body would reveal its natural weakness and after rotting away quickly it would be gone. Consequently by this argument it's not yet worth believing with any confidence that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. You see if anyone were to agree with someone arguing even more than what you're claiming, conceding to him that our souls existed not only in the time before we were born

⁷ ἦ del. Schleiermacher

- ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν | ἐνίῳν ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὐθις—οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν—δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι | τῶν θανάτων παντάπασι
- b ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι—ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὄψωδον αἰσθῆσθαι ἡμῶν—εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, | ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχη ἀποδείξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασι ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἰεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασι ἀπόληται.
- c Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, | ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ.
- EX. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν
- d τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται. “Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πι-

PHAEDO

even, but there's nothing to stop us saying that when we die the souls of some continue to exist, will exist and will be born and die over and over again, the soul being so strong by nature that it can withstand being born many times—but granted that, one may still not agree the point that it doesn't suffer in the many processes of being born and end up by dying altogether in one of its deaths, and were one to say that no one knows whether this is the particular death and the release from the body that brings destruction to the soul (for it's impossible for any one of us to perceive)—well, if this is the case, it's not right for anyone whatsoever to face death confidently, unless he's stupid, who hasn't the means to prove that the soul is something immortal and indestructible in every respect. But if not, anyone on the point of death must always be afraid for his own soul, that it will be completely destroyed in its present separation from the body.”

Now when we all heard them saying this we felt very uncomfortable, as we said to each other afterward, because after being very much won over by the earlier discussion, they seemed to have thrown us into confusion again and to have destroyed our conviction not only of what had been said earlier, but also of what was going to be said later, afraid that we were in fact worthless as judges or even that the arguments themselves were not to be relied on.

E. Heavens above, Phaedo, I feel really sorry for you. Because now I've heard the sort of things you were saying, it occurs to me: “What argument can we still rely on?”

στεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν.” θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, | τὸ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προεδέδοκτο. καὶ πάννυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγον ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν e πρὸς Διὸς πῆ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κακείνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρᾶως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν διέλθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα. |

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πρόποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε 89 παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἠδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως | ἦσθετο ὁ ‘πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἠττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δῆ; |

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθ- b ἡμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπίεσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—

PHAEDO

How very plausible was the argument Socrates was putting forward and yet it has now fallen into discredit." You see this argument that our soul is a kind of attunement has a remarkable hold on me now and always has; and as I was reminded, as it were, when it was mentioned, that I myself had come to that conclusion before. Indeed I very much need some other argument as it were from scratch that will persuade me that when someone dies the soul doesn't perish along with him. So tell me in Zeus' name in what way did Socrates proceed with the argument? Did he clearly become at all agitated as you say you all did: or not, e but instead set about calmly rescuing the argument? And did he do so satisfactorily, or did he fall short? Go through it all as precisely as you can.

P. Well then, Echeocrates, although I've frequently been amazed at Socrates, I've never been more full of admiration than I was when I was with him then. Now 89 his having something to say was perhaps not unexpected, but the first thing I myself was particularly struck by was his pleasant, kindly and respectful reception of the young men's argument, then how shrewdly he noticed what effect the arguments had had on us, then how well he treated us and rallied us like troops who've been routed and defeated, and brought us round to follow up and consider the argument with him.

E. Indeed! How did he do that?

P. I'll tell you. You see I happened to be sitting on his right beside his couch on a low stool and he was much b higher up than I was. So he stroked my head and squeezed the hairs on my neck—you see whenever he had the

εἰώθει γάρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—
 Αὔριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἴσως, | ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας
 κόμας ἀποκερῆ.

Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.

Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, |
 ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα
 c αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με
 διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἄν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ
 Ἄργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἄν νικήσω ἀνα-
 μαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. |

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς
 οἴος τε εἶναι.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι
 φῶς ἔστιν.

Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, | ἀλλ'
 ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι
 πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

d Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάν-
 θρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεί-
 ζον τούτου κακὸν πάθῃ ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται

⁷⁷ At Hdt. 1.82.7, the Argives, after a heavy defeat by the Spartans, made it religious offense to cut their hair until they had recovered lost territory.

chance he used to make fun of my hair—"Well tomorrow perhaps, Phaedo," he said, "you'll cut off these beautiful locks."

"It looks like it, Socrates," I said.

"You won't, if you do as I say."

"What do you mean?" I asked.

"I'll cut mine off and you'll cut yours off today," he said, "if our argument dies and we can't bring it back to life. And for myself, if I were you and the argument escaped my clutches, I'd make an oath like the Argives and not cut my hair before I'd returned to the battle and defeated Simmias' and Cebes' argument."⁷⁷

"Well," I said, "not even Heracles is said to be able to fight against two."

"Well, call on me too," he said, "as your Iolaus while there's still daylight."

"Then I call on you," I said, "not as Heracles calling on Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling on Heracles."⁷⁸

"It makes no difference," he said, "but firstly let's make sure we suffer no mishap."

"Such as?" I asked.

"Let's not become misologists," he said, "like those who become misanthropists, since one couldn't undergo a greater mishap," he said, "than hating arguments."⁷⁹ Misol-

⁷⁸ Heracles, while fighting the Hydra, was himself attacked by a crab and called on his nephew Iolaus for help (see *Euthyd.* 297c). P., as the weaker partner, is Iolaus helping the Herculean S. in the fight against "two" (i.e., Simmias and Cebes as Hydra and crab, respectively).

⁷⁹ The *misologos* is opposed to the *philologos*, the "lover of argument," i.e., the philosopher in *Resp.* 3.411d (see also *La.* 188c).

δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἠγγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αἰθίς ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολ-
 e λάκεις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἠγγήσαιο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἠγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; |

Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, αἰσχροῦν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης
 90 ἐχρήτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἠγγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Ὡσπερ, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἷε τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχύν ἢ βραδύν ἢ αἰσχροῦν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐχὶ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; |

ogy and misanthropy originate from the same practice. You see misanthropy comes on when, without expertise,⁸⁰ one trusts someone implicitly, regarding the person as entirely true, sound, and trustworthy, and discovering a little later that that person is good for nothing and untrustworthy, and then it happens again with another person. When someone has had frequent experience of this, especially at the hands of those he'd consider to be his closest and dearest friends, the final result is that he often ends up quarreling, hates them all and considers there's nothing sound at all in anyone. Or haven't you ever yourself observed this happening?"

"Indeed I have," he said.

"So isn't this disgraceful," he asked, "and isn't it clear that such a person was trying to have dealings with people when he didn't have any skill in the understanding of human behavior? You see if he did this with skill he'd have considered them as they are, the good and the bad each very few in number, and the majority in between."

"How do you mean?" I said.

"As in the case of very small and very large objects," he said. "Do you think you'd find anything rarer than an exceedingly large or an exceedingly small human being, or dog or anything else whatever? Or again something very fast or slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Or haven't you noticed that the outermost extremes of all such things are few and far between, whereas in between there are plenty in abundance?"

⁸⁰ Expertise: *technē* = "skill," "craft," to distinguish it from *phronēsis*, *sophia*, used by Plato in *Phaedo* to denote the knowledge of philosophers, i.e., "wisdom." See also 89e6, 8; 90b7.

Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

- b Οὐκοῦν οἶει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγῶν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

- Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, | ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἦ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος
c καὶ ἕτερος—καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικούς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν | Εὐρίπω ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

- Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῶτο

⁸¹ Euripus is the channel between the Greek mainland and Euboea, noted for its alternating currents. "Antilogic," the state of argument where contrary predicates seem true to the same people at different times, was practiced as a debating technique

"Indeed, I have," I said.

"So do you think then," he said, "that if a competition b
in wickedness were proposed the first to show up would
be very few even there?"

"It seems likely," I said.

"Likely, yes," he said, "but arguments don't resemble
people in that way, but I was following the route you were
taking just now. The resemblance is rather in the previous
example, where when someone believes a certain argu-
ment is true without having the skill of argumentation, and
then a little later it seems false to him: sometimes it is,
sometimes it isn't; and again with another and another, and
you know that it's those especially who spend their time in c
disputations are the ones who end up thinking they're very
wise and that they alone have observed that nothing is
sound or irrefutable, either in things or arguments, but
everything that exists flows back and forth just like the
Euripus and never stays in place for any length of time."⁸¹

"What you're saying is absolutely true," I said.

"Well then, Phaedo," he said, "It would be a wretched
experience if, when there really is some true, irrefutable
argument, and one that it's possible to grasp, then, by as- d
sociation with the sort of arguments sometimes appearing
to be actually true, sometimes not, a person blamed nei-
ther himself nor his lack of skill, but as a result of his

by fifth-century Sophists "looking for victory" (cf. *philonikōs*,
91a3), as in the "Twin Arguments" (*Dissoi Logoi*, DK B90; see
Waterfield, 285ff.), and the sophists Euthydemus and Diony-
sodorus in *Euthyd.* 275bff. See also Protagoras on "man is the
measure of all things," DK 80B1, combined with Heracliteanism
(matter in continual flux) at *Theaet.* 152–60.

μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλ-
γεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν
ἀπόσταιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν | τε καὶ
λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς
ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στέρηθείη.

Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ
μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει
e οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω
ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον
ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ
91 ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ
θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ
αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ
πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ
του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος
ἦ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, | ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα
δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι
δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂν ἐγώ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ
εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως
b αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι
γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε—θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς—εἰ μὲν
τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἂν λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πει-
σθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν
τούτῳ γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου |
ἦττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδῆς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἢ δὲ
ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ—κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν—

distress were to end up gladly shifting the blame from himself onto the arguments and henceforth spend the rest of his life hating and disparaging the arguments, and be deprived both of the truth and knowledge of the realities."

"Zeus!" I said, "Wretched indeed."

"Then," he said, "let's beware of this first, and let's not allow into the soul the thought that there's probably nothing sound in the arguments, but much rather the fact that we're not yet sound enough, but have to be bold and determined to achieve soundness: you and the rest of you for the sake of the whole of your life to come; but in my case, because of my actual death, since it's possible that at the present moment I'm not philosophically prepared for this actual event but, like those who are entirely lacking in education, am looking for victory. You see whenever these people dispute something, they don't give any thought to the truth of the topics under discussion, but are only eager about how their own position on these topics appears to those who are present. And I think I shall only differ from them in the present circumstances to this extent: for I shall not be concerned how what I say will appear to be true to those who are here, except incidentally, but how above all else the situation will appear to me myself. For, I reckon, my good friend (and note how greedy I am!), if what I say is actually true, it's good to be persuaded by it. But if there is nothing for me when I'm dead, still at any rate, during this actual period before my death, my lamenting will be less distressing to those present and this ignorance of mine won't last—that would be bad—but in a little while will be

ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ,
 ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτωςι ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν
 c λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φρον-
 τίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον,
 εἰ μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογή-
 σατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι
 ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν | τε καὶ
 ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατα-
 λιπὼν οἰχῆσομαι.

Ἄλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε,
 εἰ μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς
 ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ
 d θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὄν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύη-
 ται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει οὔσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο
 μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχῆν
 σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ
 σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα | ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τε-
 λενταῖον σῶμα καταλιπούσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται,
 καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά
 γε αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ'
 ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖ-
 σθαι;

e Συνωμολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω.

Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους
 οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ;

Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. |

Τί οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν
 ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου

at an end. So, thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I proceed to the argument. But as for you, if you do as I tell you and think little of Socrates, but much more of the truth, if you think I'm telling the truth agree with me, but if not, resist with every argument you've got, while taking care that I don't deceive both myself and you in my enthusiasm, and won't get away like a bee leaving its sting behind." c

"Well, let's go on," he said. "Firstly, remind me what you were saying, in case I don't appear to have remembered. Now, Simmias I think is not convinced and is afraid that the soul, despite being something more divine and more beautiful than the body, none the less may perish first as it's some form of attunement. Cebes on the other hand, I thought, agreed with me this much at least, that the soul is something that lives longer than the body, but what isn't clear to everyone is whether after wearing out many bodies many times the soul leaves the final body and that's when it perishes itself and that is the actual death itself, the destruction of the soul, since the body in fact never stops dying at all.⁸² So is it anything other than this that we have to look at, Simmias and Cebes?" d

Well, they both agreed that this was it. e

"Do you not accept all the previous arguments," he said, "or just some and not others?"

"Some, not others," they said.

"What then do you say about that argument in which we said that learning is recollection, and this being the

⁸² For these arguments of Simmias and Cebes, see above, 85e-86d and 86e-88c, respectively.

οὕτως ἔχοντας ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον
 ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;
 92 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς
 ἐπίεσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.

Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ
 πάνν ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ
 τι δόξειεν. |

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένη
 Θηβαίε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἕανπερ μείνη ἦδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ
 ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀρ-
 μονίαν τιὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγ-
 b κείσθαι· οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς
 πρότερον ἦν ἀρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ
 ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξῃ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. |

Αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει
 λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς
 ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ
 αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ
 ἀρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ
 c πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι
 ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάν-
 των συνίσταται ἡ ἀρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
 οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσεται;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ
 συνφθῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμονίας.

Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

case the soul must have existed somewhere else before it was bound up with the body?"

"I," said Cebes, "was wonderfully convinced by it then and stick by it now like no other argument." 92

"Yes, and I too am the same," said Simmias, "and I'd be very surprised if I ever had any other view, on this subject at least."

And Socrates said: "Well, you must change your mind, my Theban friend, if your belief stands that an attunement is a composite thing, and that the soul is an attunement made up of tensions across the body. You see I don't think you'd permit yourself to say that the attunement was already composed before those parts from which it was to be made up existed. Or would you accept that?" b

"Not at all, Socrates."

"Are you aware then," he said, "that what you're saying amounts to this, that when you say the soul exists before it even goes into the form and body of a human being, it exists as a composite of those things that don't yet exist? You see this attunement of yours isn't the sort of thing to which you're likening it, but the lyre, the strings and the notes come into being first, as yet untuned, but the attunement is the last thing of all to be put together and the first to perish. So how does this argument of yours chime in with that one?" c

"It doesn't at all," said Simmias.

"And yet," he said, "if any other argument ought to be in tune, it certainly ought to be the argument about attunement."

"It ought," said Simmias.

Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνωδός· ἀλλ' ὄρα πότερον αἰρή τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; |

- d Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνου, ᾧ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινός καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιούμενοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται εὖ μάλα, | ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆ⁸ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν
- e τὴν τοῦ "ὃ ἔστιν". ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαντὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαί. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε ἐμαντοῦ μῆτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄρμονία. |

93 Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ᾧ Συμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἄρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκείνα ἔχη ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο | παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκείνα ἢ ποιῆ ἢ πάσχη; Συνέφη.

⁸ αὐτῆ Mudge: αὐτῆς ΒΤδ, Stob., Burnet

"Then this argument of yours doesn't chime in," he said. "So consider whether you prefer the argument that learning is recollection, or that the soul is an attunement."

"I much prefer the former one, Socrates," he said, "as d
the latter came to me without proof, with some probability and plausibility, which is how it commends itself to most people. But I'm aware that arguments that construct their proof through probabilities are deceptive and if you don't watch them very carefully, they deceive you both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument about recollection and learning has been made by means of a hypothesis worth accepting. It's been stated, surely, that our soul, even before it reaches a body, exists in a similar way to how the essence itself exists under the name 'that which is.'⁸³ This, I'm convinced, I've accepted on adequate and correct grounds. So for this reason it seems I mustn't accept e
that the soul is an attunement either from my own reasoning or anyone else's."

"But what about looking at it in the following way, Simmias," he said. "Do you think it's appropriate for an attunement, or any other means of putting things together, to be 93
any different from those components of which it is composed?"⁸⁴

"Not at all."

"And again, I think, presumably what it does, or has done to it wouldn't be different from what they do and have done to them?" He agreed.

⁸³ Or, on the manuscript reading (retained by Burnet in OCT¹), ". . . exists just as the essence belonging to it [the soul] exists under the name . . ." (see textual note). ⁸⁴ For the soul as a harmony or "attunement," see above, 86b-c.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἠγέισθαί γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινήθῃναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. |

Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία ὡς ἂν ἀρμοσθῆ;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Ἡ οὐχί, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ
b πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν
ἀρμονία εἶη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον,
ἦττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ
σμικρότατον | μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον
καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι,
ψυχῆν;

Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ μὲν νοῦν
τε | ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθὴ, ἢ δὲ ἄνοίαν τε
c καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακὴ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέ-
γεται;

Ἀληθῶς μέντοι.

Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φή-
σει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν
καὶ τὴν κακίαν; | πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ
ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἠρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ

PHAEDO

"Then we should certainly not expect an attunement to lead the parts from which it is made up, but rather follow them." He thought so too.

"Then it's quite impossible that attunement undergoes movement in the opposite direction, or makes a sound or anything else in opposition to its own parts."

"Indeed, quite impossible," he said.

"What follows then? Isn't every attunement naturally an attunement in whatever way it's been tuned?"

"I don't understand," he said.

"Isn't it the case" he said, "that if it were tuned more and to a greater extent (if it's possible to do this), it would be more of an attunement and greater, and if it were done less and to a lesser extent, it would be less and to a lesser extent, wouldn't it?" b

"Certainly."

"Well then, is this then the case with the soul, so that it's it possible that, even to the smallest degree, one soul can be more a soul than another soul and to a greater extent, or be less and to a lesser extent, this very thing, a soul?"

"In no way whatsoever," he replied.

"Come on then," he said, "Zeus help us! Do we talk of one soul having intelligence, excellence and being good, and another with no intelligence, depraved, and being bad? And is this correct?" c

"It is indeed."

"Then what would one of those who hold that soul is an attunement say these things in the souls, that is excellence and evil, are? Would it be that there is yet another attunement and lack of it? And the one that's been tuned, the good one, being an attunement, also has within it an-

ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονία οὔση ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην;

Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, εἰπεῖν· ἢ δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκείνο ὑποθέμενος.

d Ἄλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλεόν μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; ἢ

Πάνυ γε.

Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἀρμονίαν οὔσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν.

Ἢ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι ἢ πλεόν ἢ ἔλαττον ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον;

Τὸ ἴσον.

e Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχὴ, ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡρμοσται;

Οὕτω.

Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλεόν ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἀρμονίας μετέχει ἄν; ἢ

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἄρ' ἄν τι πλεόν κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία εἶη; ἢ

Οὐδὲν πλεόν.

other attunement, but the one that's untuned is by itself and doesn't have another one in it?"

"I can't say myself," said Simmias, "but it's clear that it's the sort of thing he who holds that view would say."

"But it's already been agreed," he said, "that one soul is no more nor less a soul than another.⁸⁵ But this is the agreement that an attunement is no more an attunement, or to a greater extent, nor is it less an attunement, or to a lesser extent, than another. Isn't that so?"

"Indeed."

"Yes, and an attunement that is neither more nor less is neither more nor less tuned. Isn't that so?"

"It is."

"Does the one neither more nor less tuned have more or less tuning, or the same amount?"

"The same."

"So one soul, when it's in no way more nor less itself than another, namely a soul, in that case is tuned neither more nor less?"

"Yes."

"And being in this state it wouldn't share any more in lack of tuning or attunement?"

"No, of course not."

"And again in that state a soul wouldn't have any more bad or good in it than another, if badness is a lack of tuning, and excellence is an attunement, would it?"

"No."

⁸⁵ At b4-7 above.

94 Μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἄρμονία ἐστίν· ἄρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔσα, ἄρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. |

Οὐ μέντοι.

Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχὴ, οὔσα παντελῶς ψυχὴ, κακίας.

Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;

Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, | ψυχαί, εἶναι.

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

b Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν εἶναι;

Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅτι ἄλλο | λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

c Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, | καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὀρώμεν ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἦ οὔ;

Πάνν μὲν οὔν.

⁸⁶ In *Resp.* 4.439eff. Plato has come to regard such conflicts as between different parts of the soul (rather than between the

“Or rather, I suppose, according to the right reasoning, 94
no soul will have anything bad in it if it is an attunement,
for attunement is surely altogether just that: attunement,
and will never participate in lack of attunement.”

“Indeed no.”

“Nor in that case could the soul, I suppose, being completely soul have anything bad in it.”

“How could it, given what’s been said before?”

“As a result of this argument then, we conclude that all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if souls alike are equally just that: souls.”

“So it seems to me, Socrates,” he said.

“Do you really think,” he asked, “this reasoning is sound and the argument would have ended up like this if the hypothesis was right that the soul is an attunement?” b

“No, no matter how you argued it,” he said.

“What then?” he said. “Of all the parts of a human being, is it possible you’re saying anything other than that the soul rules, especially if it is an intelligent one?”

“No, I’m not.”

“Yielding to feelings in the body, or actually opposing them? I mean such as when you have a fever and are thirsty, it draws you to the opposite: not to drink, and if you’re hungry: not to eat, and the countless other things I think where we see the soul opposing what’s going on in the body. Or is that not so?”⁸⁶ c

“It certainly is so.”

soul and the body) and at *Resp.* 441b–c quotes the former of the Homeric lines quoted below (d9–e1), on *that* occasion to demonstrate conflict *within* the soul.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο | καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκείνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαὶ ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν;

Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, | ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί
 d τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, | τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὔσα ἄλλω πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποιήκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεΐα·

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠμίπαπε μύθῳ·
 e τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ'
 ἔτλης.

ἄρ' οἶε αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, | καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν;

Νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

PHAEDO

"There again, didn't we agree in our earlier discussion⁸⁷ that, assuming it's an attunement, it would never be discordant with those things from which it's made up, when they're stretched or slackened or plucked, or whatever is done to them, but would follow them and never lead them?"

"We did agree," he said, "of course."

"Well then? Doesn't it now appear to us to be working in entirely the opposite way, both leading the way for all those things they say it's made up of and opposing practically all of them throughout our whole life and dominating all our behavior, sometimes punishing us quite sternly, even painfully, using physical exercise and medicine, but sometimes more leniently with threats and warnings, by conversing with our passions, impulses and fears as if distinct from them and they from it? For example, surely, just as Homer also put it in the *Odyssey*, where he says that Odysseus:

Beat his breast and addressed his heart in reproach:
Be strong, my heart: you have endured worse than
this before⁸⁸

Do you think he composed this thinking that the soul is actually an attunement and is the kind of thing that is guided by the feelings of the body; did he not believe rather that it was the kind of thing that both leads and is master of these feelings, being itself something far more divine than befits attunement?"

"Zeus, Socrates, that's how it seems to me!"

⁸⁷ At 93a6ff.

⁸⁸ Hom. *Od.* 20.17-18.

95 Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῆ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὅμηρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῦμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

Ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

Εἶεν δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἰλεά πως, | ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τίμι λόγῳ;

Σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τουτουὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε
b ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρῆσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθύς τὴν πρῶτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. |

Ἦγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὅμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπι-
c δειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὔσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἠγούμενος ἀποθανῶν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ

PHAEDO

"In that case, my dear friend, there's no way it can be right for us to say that a soul is a kind of attunement, because it seems we'd be agreeing neither with Homer the divinely inspired poet, nor with our actual selves." 95

"That's right," he said.

"Well then," said Socrates, "as regards Harmonia of Thebes it seems things have turned out moderately propitious for us, but as for Cadmus, Cebes," he said, "how shall we appease him, and with what argument?"⁸⁹

"It looks to me," said Cebes, "as if you're about to find a way. For me at least you propounded the latter argument against tuning wonderfully unexpectedly. You see when Simmias was arguing and having problems I was very much wondering if anyone would be able to handle his argument. So it seemed very remarkable to me that straightaway it did not withstand the first attack of your argument. Indeed I wouldn't be surprised if the argument of Cadmus⁹⁰ were to suffer the same fate." b

"My good man," said Socrates, "don't boast too loudly in case some malign spirit turns the future discussion of ours upside down. But anyway the god will take care of that: but let us 'advance' in Homeric fashion and try and see if there's anything in what you say. Indeed the nub of the matter you're investigating is this: you require it to have been demonstrated that our soul is indestructible and immortal if a philosopher, taking heart when on the point of dying and thinking that after his death he'll fare in a better way over there than if he'd died having lived a c

⁸⁹ Harmonia (attunement) was in legend the wife of Cadmus of Thebes (the city of Cebes and Simmias). ⁹⁰ I.e., that of Cebes, above 87aff., summarized by S. at 95c-e below.

ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. | τὸ δὲ ἀπο-
 φαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ
 ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐ-
 δὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μνηύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν
 μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που
 d ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν
 ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλ-
 θεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαι-
 πωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη καὶ τελευτῶσά
 γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. | διαφέρειν
 δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδὲν εἶτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἶτε πολ-
 λάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσ-
 ἤκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότε
 e μῆδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον δίδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ'
 ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες
 πολλαίκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγη ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ
 τι βούλει, προσθήῃς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. |

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι,
 ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ
 ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς
 ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ
 Κέβης, ζητεῖς· | ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ
 96 φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι

different kind of life, is not to find his confidence senseless and silly. And to demonstrate that the soul is something strong and godlike, and was already in existence before we became human beings you say does nothing to prevent all this indicating not immortality, but only that a soul is very long-lived and existed somewhere before for an unimaginable length of time and both knew and did many kinds of things. But the fact is it was no more deathless for all that, but even its very entry into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease; and in fact it lives this life in distress and ends up finally being destroyed in so-called death. Furthermore you say it makes no difference whether it enters the body once or many times, at any rate as far as our individual fears are concerned. You see it makes sense for someone to be afraid, unless he's an idiot, if he doesn't know or have some argument to offer that it is immortal. I think this is roughly what you're saying, Cebes. And I am reviewing this position a number of times on purpose so we don't miss anything, and so that, if you wish, you may add or withdraw anything." d

And Cebes said: "Well there's nothing *I* want to withdraw or add for the moment. That is what I'm saying." e

So after a long pause wrapped up in his own thoughts Socrates said: "What you're looking for, Cebes, is no small matter. You see it needs a complete and thorough examination of the cause⁹¹ of coming into being and passing away. So I'll go through my own experiences of these 96

⁹¹ We translate *aitia* here as "cause"; it can also be translated as "explanation," "reason": i.e., why or how (in the broadest sense) something comes to be the way it is—a key term in the subsequent argument. See esp. 96a8, e7; 97a4, a7, c2, d7, etc. below.

δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴαν βούλη, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρῆση.

Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. |

Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐρῶντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὧν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίνεταί ἐκάστου καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί
 b ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε· “Ἄρ’ ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τιὰ λάβη, ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἔστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; | ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ’ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστή-
 c μην; καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαντῶ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἰκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαντῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, | τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως

⁹² “Some” (b3) probably refers to materialist philosopher/scientists, traditionally lumped together as “Presocratics” (see following note).

PHAEDO

things with you, if you wish. Then if any of what I say seems useful to you, you'll be able to use it to secure conviction about what *you* say."

"Well I certainly want that," said Cebes.

"Well then listen to what I'm about to say. You see, Cebes," he said, "when I was young I was remarkably keen on the branch of knowledge that they call the investigation of nature. For it seemed to me a splendid thing to know the causes of why each thing comes into being, why it perishes and why it exists. I used to change my mind frequently, back and forth, when I first looked at things such as: is it when hot and cold begin to putrify, as some used to say, that living creatures are nurtured?⁹² And whether blood, air, or fire are what we use to think with?⁹³ Or none of these? Is it the brain that gives us the sense of hearing, seeing and smell, and from these come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion remaining fixed we get knowledge?⁹⁴ And again when I looked at the destruction of these things as well as what was going on in the sky and on the earth I ended up thinking to myself that in relation to this kind of inquiry I was totally unsuited. I'll give you adequate proof of this. I became so thoroughly blinded as a result of my observation as to what I clearly knew previously, as things at least seemed to me and to others, that I unlearned even what I thought I knew be-

⁹³ Blood is associated with Empedocles (ca. 492–432) DK 31B105; air with Anaximenes (fl. 546–525) DK 13B2, fire with Heraclitus (fl. ca. 500) DK 22B30 (Waterfield, 158, 18, 41–42).

⁹⁴ A theory associated with Alcmaeon (DK 24A5).

οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα
 ἀ πρὸ τοῦ ᾧμην εἰδέναί, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ
 διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος ἀξιάναται. τοῦτο γὰρ ᾧμην πρὸ τοῦ
 παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἐπει-
 d δάν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσ-
 γένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν
 αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκέα ἐκά-
 στοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα
 ὕστερον πολλὴν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν
 σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. | οὕτως τότε ᾧμην· οὐ δοκῶ
 σοι μετρίως;”

Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾧμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δο-
 κεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστάς μέγας
 e σμικρῶ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵπ-
 που· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι
 ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτῶ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσ-
 εῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυν τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ
 ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. |

Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἰεσθαι περὶ
 τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναί, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι
 ἔμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὴν ἐνί τις προσθῆ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ
 προστετέθη δύο γέγονεν, <ἢ τὸ προστεθέν>,⁹ ἢ τὸ
 προστεθέν καὶ ᾧ προστετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ
 97 ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν

⁹ add. Wytténbach, Burnet

fore this time, about why man grows, among many other things. You see before this I thought it was obvious to everyone that it was through eating and drinking. For whenever flesh is added to flesh as a result of eating, and bones to bones and so by the same argument everything else grows by adding to its own substance, then it is that what was a small body later becomes a large one, a small man becomes a big one. Such was my thinking then: don't you think it reasonable?" d

"I do," said Cebes.

"Then again, consider these additional cases: you see I used to think I thought it sufficient that when a large man was standing beside a small one it appeared he was bigger just by the head, and likewise with horses. And again still clearer than these, I thought that the number 10 is greater than the number 8 on account of its having the extra 2, and the double cubit was greater than a cubit on account of exceeding it by a half."⁹⁵ e

"And what's your view on this now?" asked Cebes.

"Zeus! I suppose I'm a long way from thinking I know the explanation of any of these things, given that I don't even accept that when you add one to one, either the one to which it's added becomes two, or the one that's added, or that the one that's added and the one it's added to become two on account of the one being added to the other. You see I'm intrigued if, when each of them was separated 97

⁹⁵ I.e., on an analogy with the Presocratic theories of causation, S. (ironically?) presents himself as originally thinking that there must be something responsible for differences in height, number, etc., just as eating, etc. adds flesh to flesh.

ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς | ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίνεσθαι.

- b τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαντόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι | γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῆ προσίεμαι.

- Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη,
 c Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτία ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἠγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, | τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν
 d περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου

⁹⁶ Anaxagoras' book is mentioned by S. in *Ap.* 26d. For his theory of Mind (*nous*, c1) as cause, see DK 59B12 (Waterfield,

from each other, each of them was actually one and the two of them were not two at that point, but when they were placed together, this is indeed the reason for their becoming two, the combination of putting them together. Even if you divide one, I still can't convince myself that this, the division, is actually the cause of the coming to be of two. For this is the opposite cause of what produced two in the former case, because then they were put close together and the one was added to the other, but now it's because each is separated and taken away from the other. And I can't even convince myself any longer that I understand why it is that one comes to be, or to put it simply, why anything else comes into being, or perishes, or just exists, according to this method of inquiry. I don't accept it at all, but am concocting some other method of my own at random. b

"But when I once heard someone reading from a book of Anaxagoras,⁹⁶ so he said, saying that Mind is in fact the organizer and cause of everything, I liked this explanation and I thought it was somehow a good way of looking at it that the mind is the cause of everything, and I thought if this is right, then the mind in ordering everything orders and arranges each thing in the best possible way. So, if someone wants to find out the cause of how each thing comes into being, or perishes, or exists, he must find out in what way it's best for it either to exist, or to undergo or do anything whatsoever. And indeed as a result of this line d

125). For the historical veracity of S.'s earlier interest in Anaxagoras and sixth-/fifth-century natural science generally, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (ix), n. 15.

τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ
 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ
 ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν
 αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναί. | τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος
 ἄσμενος ἠύρηκέναι ᾧμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ
 τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ
 e μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεία ἐστὶν
 ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι
 τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ
 ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ
 φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν
 98 αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι,
 παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο
 εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν
 ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἄστρον, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς | ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῆ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν
 ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾧμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ
 κεκοσμηῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινα αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ
 ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει·
 b ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ
 πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾧμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν
 ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολ-

⁹⁷ This is the first mention of a spherical earth in extant literature, the idea possibly originating with the Pythagoreans (see

PHAEDO

of argument man should consider nothing else but what is the most excellent and best as regards both himself and everything else. Although this same man must know also what is worse: for understanding about these things is the same. Indeed as I thought about this I was delighted and thought I'd found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of what exists in accordance with my own thinking, and that he'd first explain whether the earth is flat or spherical.⁹⁷ e
 And when he'd done that, he'd explain besides the cause and why it must be so, saying what is better and that it was better for it to be as it is. And if he were to say that it's in the center, he'd also go on to explain that it's better for it to be in the center and if he were to prove this, I was 98
 prepared not to hanker after any other kind of cause ever again. And furthermore I was prepared to pursue my inquiries about the sun in the same way, and about the moon and the rest of the stars, both regarding their speed relative to each other, their orbits and the rest of their characteristics, in whatever way it's better for each one to act and be acted upon by these motions that they undergo. You see I would never have thought that in asserting that these things are ordered by mind he would cite any other cause for them than that it's best for them to be just as they are. So when he had assigned the cause to each of them, b
 and all in general, I thought he'd go on to explain what was best for each and what the common good was for all of

also 108e5, 110b6). A flat earth was attributed to several Pre-socratics, including Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus (see Arist. *Cael.* 294b13, Waterfield, 19). For an early theory of the earth at the center of the universe (97e7-98a1), see Anaximander (mid.-6th century) in Arist. *Cael.* 295b10, Waterfield, 16.

λοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνν σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βί-
βλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἔν' ὡς
τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. |

Ἄπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὠχόμην
φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖων καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὀρώ
ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας
c ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας
δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονηθῆναι
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα
πράττει νῶ πράττει, | κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς
αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ
ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ
σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἔστιν
d στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ
νεῦρα οἶα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα
τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει
αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμ-
βολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτε-
σθαί που ποιεῖ | οἶόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ
ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι καὶ
αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας
λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία
e τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας
λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίους ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ
καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτὸ
δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμέ-
νοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν. | ἐπεὶ νῆ

them. And I would not have parted with my hopes for a high price, but I got hold of the books⁹⁸ with all speed and read them as fast as I could so that I'd know as soon as possible what was the best and what was the worse.

“From what were indeed wondrous expectations, my friend, I came hurtling down, since in the course of my reading I see a man not using his mind at all, nor assigning any causes to the arrangement of things, but assigning air and ether and waters and a lot of other strange things. And it seemed to me that my experience was exactly as if someone, in saying that everything that Socrates does he does with mind and then in trying to say what the causes are of all the things I do, he'd say first of all that the reason that I'm now sitting here, is that my body is made up of bones and sinews, and whereas the bones are solid and separated from each other by joints, the sinews are such as to tense up and relax, and surround the bones along with flesh and skin that envelops them. So when the bones are being moved about in their joints, the relaxing and tensing of the sinews makes me somehow now able to move my limbs, and for this reason I'm sitting here with my limbs bent. What's more on the subject of my conversing with you he'd tell you of other such causes, sounds, air, hearing and countless other things like them, neglecting to mention the real causes that, when the Athenians decided it was better for me to be convicted, I thought it better to be sitting here and more just that I remain and accept whatever sentence they passed, since, as I think, by the

⁹⁸ See above n. 96. The plural “books” indicates papyrus rolls. At *Ap.* 26e S. comments that Anaxagoras' work was available for one drachma in the *orchestra*, an area of the *Agora* (marketplace).

- 99 τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστά ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἦντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ | τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστά καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' ἢ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ,
- b καὶ ταῦτα νῶ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον τῶ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκείνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ | πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἷτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατεία
- c βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμοσίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ | μᾶλλον ἅπαντα

⁹⁹ An oath particularly used by S., see *Ap.* 22a1, *Grg.* 482b5 (there explicitly referred by S. to the Egyptian god Anubis).

¹⁰⁰ On S.'s decision to stay in Athens after sentence and reject offers of help to escape, see *Cri.* 46bff.

dog,⁹⁹ these sinews and bones would have been some- 99
 where in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried along by my
 opinion of what is best, if I hadn't thought it was more just
 and finer to accept whatever sentence the state ordained
 instead of escaping and running away.¹⁰⁰ But to call things
 of this sort causes is just very odd. But if someone were to
 say that without having such things as bones and sinews
 and whatever else I've got, I wouldn't be able to do what
 I consider right, he'd be telling the truth. However, to say
 that this is why I'm doing what I'm doing and I'm doing it
 by using my mind but not by choosing what is best would b
 be an extremely sloppy way of expressing it. For not to
 be able to see the difference that one thing is the actual
 cause, but that without which the cause could never be the
 cause is something else! Which is what the majority seem
 to call the actual cause, using a name for it which doesn't
 belong to it, groping about as if in the dark. Hence one
 person makes the earth be kept stationary by the heavens
 by placing a vortex round it, whereas another puts the air
 under it as a base as it were on a flat kneading trough.¹⁰¹
 But the power for these things to be now placed as it is c
 best for them—this they don't look for, nor do they think
 that it has any divine force, but believe that one day they
 can find an Atlas stronger and more immortal¹⁰² more

¹⁰¹ For the vortex, cf. Empedocles (Arist. *Cael.* 300b2–3, Waterfield, 120–21); flat kneading-trough, cf. Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Democritus (Arist. *Cael.* 294b13–17, Waterfield, 19). Both the vortex and the kneading-trough are satirized in Ar. *Clouds*, 828, 678.

¹⁰² Atlas, in myth a god (a Titan) who sustains the world on his shoulders.

συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητῆς ὅτουοῦν ἠδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερηθήην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἶός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἧ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης;

Ἵπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἧ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, | δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν.¹⁰ διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, εἰ μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τιμι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθην, καὶ ἔδιστα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις | σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον

¹⁰ πάσχουσιν om. β

¹⁰³ On Plato's distinguishing primary and secondary causes, see *Tim.* 46cff.

¹⁰⁴ According to an ancient interpretation of the phrase "second voyage" (*deuteros plous*), the reference is to the use of propulsion by oars in the absence of a fair wind (Eust.

capable of holding everything together than the present one and, to tell the truth, they don't at all think good and necessity bind and hold everything together. Therefore I would most willingly become the student of whoever in search of such a cause.¹⁰³ But since I was deprived of this and was unable to find it out myself or from anyone else, do you want me to give you an account of my second voyage¹⁰⁴ that I've been engaged in, to discover the cause, Cebes?" d

"Yes, I'd really like that," he said.

"Well then," he said, "after this, since I'd failed in my inquiries into reality,¹⁰⁵ I thought I should take great care not to suffer what people do who study and observe the eclipse of the sun. For some of them, I believe, destroy their eyesight unless they look at its image in water, or some such medium. I did actually consider something like this and was afraid I would be altogether blinded in my soul by looking at these matters with my eyes and each of my senses in my attempt to seize hold of them. So it seemed to me that I should take refuge in theories and consider the truth of the realities in these. Then again, perhaps in some way the comparison I'm making isn't apt. You see I don't fully agree that the person who looks at things that exist through theories does it more through theories" e

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In *Od.* 1453.20). The implication is that S. wishes to pursue a slower, but more reliable argumentative route than the speculations of the scientists. ¹⁰⁵ "Things that are" (*ta onta*), which could mean "existing things" (natural phenomena), i.e., what the Ionian natural scientists called "reality." For brief discussion of the long and complex arguments of 99d4–107a1, see Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 3 (x and xi).

σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἔρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, | ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῆ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

- b Ἄλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ αἰεὶ τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότῳ λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, | καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχῇ.

- c Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνους ἐάν σοι συνδοκῆ ὡσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλην αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, | οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾶδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς;

Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς

PHAEDO

images than he who does it through physical realities. Well anyway, that's the way I started out and every time I put forward an argument that I judge to be very strong, whatever seems to me to agree with this I take to be true, both regarding causes and all the rest, and whatever doesn't I take to be not true. But I want to tell you what I mean more clearly: because I don't think you understand me right now."

"Zeus, I don't!" said Cebes, "not fully."

"Well," he said, "I argue it as follows: it's nothing new, but in fact what I've never stopped saying, both elsewhere and in the discussions we have had. So that's why I'm setting out to try and show you the kind of cause that I've been preoccupied with, and I shall go back to those principles I harp on about, and begin from them by proposing that there is a thing, the beautiful itself by itself, the good, the great, and all the rest. If you grant me this and agree these things exist, I hope from these things to explain causation to you and discover that the soul is something immortal."

"Well then," said Cebes, "I certainly concede this to you, so you might lose no time in finishing your argument."

"Right then," he said, "consider whether you think as I do about what logically follows on from this. You see it appears to me if some other thing is beautiful besides the beautiful by itself, it's beautiful for no other reason than that it has a share in that beauty. And indeed, I say everything is like this. Do you agree with such an explanation?"

"I do," he said.

"Well now I no longer understand," he said, "nor can

- d ἄλλας | αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ'
 εἴαν τις μοι λέγῃ δι' ὅτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὀτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα
 εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων,
 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐὼ,—ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλ-
 λοῖς πᾶσι—τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως
 εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, | ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ
καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοι-
 νωνία εἴτε ὄπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη.¹¹ οὐ
 γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα
 τὰ καλὰ καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέςτατον
 e εἶναι καὶ ἑμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου
 ἐχόμενος ἠγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς
 εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ
 καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

Δοκεῖ. |

Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω
 μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;

Ναί.

- 101 Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τις τινα φαίῃ ἕτερον
 ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ
 αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἐτέρου
 οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

¹¹ προσαγορευομένη Wyttenbach: προσγενομένη BTPQ

¹⁰⁶ I.e., those of the natural scientists listed at 96a–97b. “Wise” (*sophos*) here is ironic—“ingenious.”

I recognize the other causes: those wise ones.¹⁰⁶ But if someone tells me why something is beautiful, no matter what it is, either because it has a gorgeous color, or a shape, or any other such thing whatsoever, I dismiss all these other things—for I'm completely lost among all the others—but I keep to myself the simple, plain, and perhaps foolish view that nothing else makes it beautiful than either the presence of, or the participation of that beauty, or however or in what way indeed you want to name it.¹⁰⁷ You see I'm no longer definite about that,¹⁰⁸ but I am definite that all beautiful things are beautiful by the form of beauty. For this seems to me to be the safest answer to my own or someone else's question and by holding on to this I think I cannot ever fall, and it's safe both for me and anyone else whatsoever to reply that beautiful things become beautiful through the beautiful. Or do you not also agree?"

"I do."

"And therefore are big things big through bigness, and bigger ones bigger, and smaller ones smaller through smallness?"

"Yes."

"Then you wouldn't accept it either if someone were to say that one person is taller than another by a head, and the other is shorter by that same amount, but you'd enter the objection that you mean nothing other than that every comparison of one thing being bigger than another is big-

¹⁰⁷ Or, on the manuscript reading, "... or however or in what way it may actually have come to be added" (see textual note).

¹⁰⁸ I.e., what the precise relationship is between the beautiful itself, etc., and the particular physical manifestations of it.

μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ
 ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, | καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν
 σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τις σοι ἐναντίος
 λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῆς
 εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μεί-
 ζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ
 σμικρῶ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ
 b τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῶ τιμὴν μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ
 ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτῶ δυοῖν πλείω
 εἶναι, | καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φο-
 βοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος;
 καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι ἀλλ'
 οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. |

Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν
 c εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν
 οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶνς ὅτι οὐκ
 οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν
 τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν
 τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι
 ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν, | καὶ δεῖν τούτου
 μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ
 ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ
 προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας
 ἐώης ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ
 d σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιῶς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαν-

ger in no other respect than bigness and that's why it's bigger, because of its size, and the smaller is smaller in no other respect than its smallness and that is why it's smaller. I think you're afraid of some opposing argument standing in your way if you say someone is taller, or shorter by a head: firstly the taller is taller by the same measure as the shorter is shorter, secondly, the taller is taller by the head that is short; and this indeed is monstrous that someone is tall by something that is short—or wouldn't you be afraid of this?" b

Now Cebes laughed and said: "Yes I would!"

"So," he said, "wouldn't you be afraid to say that ten is greater than eight by two and this is the reason it's bigger, rather than by the size of the number and because of the form of number? And to say that the double cubit is greater than a single cubit by a half rather than by magnitude? It is the same fear I think."

"Very much so," he said.

"So then, would you not beware of saying that when one is added to one, it's the addition that is the cause of their becoming two, or when you divide, it's the division? Indeed you'd cry out aloud that you don't know any other way for each thing to come into being, than by taking on the individual essence in which it partakes, and in this you have no other cause of two coming into being than that it partakes in twoness, and anything that's going to become two must partake in this and anything that's going to become one must partake in oneness. You'd dismiss those divisions and additions and all other such refinements and leave them to those wiser than you to answer. But being afraid of your own shadow, as the saying goes, and of your c d

τοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ
 ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. εἰ δέ
 τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο,¹² χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν καὶ
 οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης | ὀρμηθέντα
 σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ
 δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν
 διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ^{προσέτιν} ἥτις τῶν
 ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις,
 e ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε
 τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμη-
 μένων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν; ἐκείνοις
 μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φρον-
 τίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ἰομοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες
 ὁμῶς δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκουσιν· σὺ δ', εἴπερ εἶ
 τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.

102 Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ
 Κέβης.

ΕΧ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε | θαυμαστῶς
 γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι
 εἰπεῖν ἐκείνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
 παρούσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν.
 | ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

¹² ἔχοιτο βΤΔΠ¹: ἔφοιτο Madvig: λάβοιτο vel ἐπιλάβοιτο
 Richards

inexperience, you would cling on to that security of the hypothesis¹⁰⁹ and this is how you'd answer. But if someone were to hold on to¹¹⁰ the hypothesis itself you'd dismiss him and not give an answer until you'd considered whether its consequences in your view are in harmony with each other or not. [But when you had to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you'd do it in the same way by putting forward in turn another hypothesis that seemed the best of those more basic until you got to something acceptable.] But you wouldn't mix things up like those disputatious types by discussing both the starting point and its consequences at the same time, if you wanted to discover something about what is real, would you? For they probably don't have a single argument or thought about this: you see, as a result of their wisdom, although they mix everything up together, nevertheless they're capable of being able to be pleased with themselves. But as for you, if you really are one of the philosophers, you'd do what I'm saying, I think." e

"That's very true," he said. In fact Simmias and Cebes said it together. 102

E. Zeus, Phaedo, with good reason! For it seems remarkable to me how clearly he said all this even for someone with limited intelligence.

P. He certainly did, Echeocrates, and everyone who was there thought the same.

E. And so did those of us who weren't there, but are hearing about it now. But anyway what was said after this?

¹⁰⁹ I.e., the hypothesis that explains change and difference in terms of the Forms (see 100dff.). ¹¹⁰ Or "attack," "question," assuming the subject to be an objector (see textual note).

ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συν-
 b εχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν
 καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν
 ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἦ
 δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σω-
 κράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις
 τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, | καὶ μέγεθος καὶ
 σμικρότητα;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερ-
 ἔχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω
 c καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν
 ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει
 ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι
 Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα
 ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; |

Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι
 Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαί-
 δων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα;

Ἔστι ταῦτα. |

Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε
 καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ
 d μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ
 μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχων. Καὶ
 ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν,
 ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. |

Λέγω δὴ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ

PHAEDO

P. As I recall, when this had been conceded to him, and it was agreed that each of the forms was something, and other things that share the character of these get their name from the forms themselves, so following on from this he asked: "If," he said, "this is what you say, when you say Simmias is taller than Socrates, but shorter than Phaedo, do you not mean that there's both tallness and shortness in Simmias at that moment?" b

"Yes, I do."

"But in any case," he said, "do you in fact agree that the phrase Simmias is taller than Socrates doesn't contain the truth as it's expressed by those words? You see I don't imagine Simmias is naturally taller than him by virtue of being Simmias, but by the largeness he happens to have. Nor again is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness in relation to the other's largeness, doesn't he?" c

"That's true."

"Nor again is he exceeded by Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has largeness in relation to the smallness of Simmias?"

"That is so."

"So it's in this way then that Simmias is referred to as being both small and large as he's in between the two, submitting his smallness to the largeness of the one to be overtopped and presenting his largeness to the other that overtops his smallness." And as he said this he smiled and added: "I seem to be speaking about this like a book, but anyway it's surely as I say." He agreed. d

"The reason I'm saying this is that I want you to think

ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος
 οὐδέ ποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ
 σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτε-
 e ρον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ
 ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολω-
 λέναι ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ
 ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος
 καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί,
 | οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκείνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν
 μέγα ὄν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν
 τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι,
 103 οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα
 τοῦναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχε-
 ται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

Παντάπασι, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

Καὶ τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν,
 | οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρό-
 σθεν ὑμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγο-
 μένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γίγνε-
 σθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς
 αὕτη εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων;
 νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι | τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 γένοιτο.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ
 b ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι
 ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ
 τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος

the same as I do. You see, it seems to me not only is actual largeness never willing to be large and small at the same time, but also largeness within us never wants to let small in, nor wants to be overtopped, but has one of two alternatives: either to retreat and get out of the way whenever its opposite, the small, approaches, or to perish when the other has approached; but what it is not willing to do is to wait for and let in smallness and thereby be anything other than what it was; just as I have admitted and waited for smallness, and, still being as I am, here am I the same small man. But the former state, being large, couldn't bring itself to be small. In the same way too the smallness in us is not willing ever to become large, or be so, nor is any other of the opposites, being still what it was, willing at the same time to become and be its opposite, but it either moves away or perishes when this happens to it." 103

"This seems to me to be entirely right," said Cebes.

And one of those present—who it was, I don't remember exactly—when he heard this, said: "By the gods, in your previous discussions wasn't the opposite of what we're now saying agreed: that the greater comes into existence from the lesser, and the lesser from the greater; and this is simply the coming into being of opposites from their opposites?¹¹¹ But now it seems to me it's being said that this would never happen."

And Socrates turned his head to one side, listened and said: "Manfully remembered; however, you don't see the difference between what's being said now and what was being said then. For before it was argued that the opposite b

¹¹¹ The unknown interlocutor is referring to the argument at 70c–72e.

τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, | οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν
 c ὧν ἐνόητων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἄρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; |

Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.

Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσσεσθαι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη. |

Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

Ἐγωγε.

Ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;

d Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;

Ναί. |

Ἄλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν

PHAEDO

thing comes about from the opposite thing, but now, that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither the one inside us nor the one in the natural world. You see, my friend, in the previous argument we were talking about the things that have opposites, calling them by the names they take from them. But now it's about those opposites themselves from whose internal presence the things named acquire their names, and it's those entities we say that would never consent to accept their coming into being from each other." At the same time he looked across at Cebes and said: "I take it," he said, "Cebes, that none of the things this man here said worried you as well?"

"I don't feel that way this time," said Cebes, "and yet I'm not in any way saying that many things don't trouble me."

"Then we're agreed on this unequivocally," he said, "that the opposite will never be the opposite of itself."

"Absolutely," he said.

"Moving on then, consider the following," he said: "and see if you can agree. You call something hot and something cold, don't you?"

"I do."

"Are they what you call snow and fire?"

"Zeus, no they aren't!"

"So the hot is something different from fire and the cold is something different from snow?"

"Yes."

"Well I think you'll agree with the following: snow as such which has admitted the hot, in the light of what we

ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολείσθαι.

Πάνυ γε. |

Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιώναι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.

e Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, | ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰεί, ὅταν περ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ;

Πάνυ γε.

104 Ἄρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων—τούτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τούτο καλεῖν αἰὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. | σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι αἰὶ προσ-αγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ b ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ

PHAEDO

were saying in the earlier discussion,¹¹² will never continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but at the approach of the hot, it'll either get out of the way, or melt."

"Certainly."

"And again when the cold approaches, fire will either get out of the way, or be extinguished. Moreover once it has admitted coldness it'll never have the strength to remain as it was: fire and cold."

"What you say is true," he said.

"The situation then," he said, "regarding some cases like this is that not only is the form itself entitled to its name for eternity, but also something else that is not actually that form, but always has its character, whenever it exists. And again what I'm saying will perhaps be clearer in the following: the odd number, I presume, must always actually have this name that we now use, or is that not so?"

"Certainly."

"Is this alone among such things—for this is the point of my question—or is there something else that isn't what the odd is, but nevertheless must be referred to by this name along with its own name because its nature is such that it's never separated from the odd? I mean the sort of thing that happens to the number three and many others. Think about the number three. Don't you think it should always be referred to by both its own name and that of the odd, although that isn't actually what the number three is? Nevertheless this is somehow the nature of the number three and the number five and half of all numbers, so that,

¹¹² See 102b-3a.

ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν αἰεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός·
καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στί-
χος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὁμῶς ἕκαστος
αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰεὶ· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη.

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἐστὶν δὲ
τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα
οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία
ἔχει αἰεὶ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην
τὴν ιδέαν ἢ | ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕση ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ'
c ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ
οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ
ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομῆναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα
ἄρτια γενέσθαι;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. |

Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει
ἐπιόντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ
ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τ' ὦμεν, ὀρισώμεθα
ὅποια ταῦτά ἐστιν;

Πάνυ γε.

d Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἶη ἂν, ἃ ὅτι ἂν

while they're not the same as the odd, each of them is always odd; and the same goes with two and four and again the whole of the other series of numbers that are not what the even number is, yet each of them is always even. Do you agree, or not?"

"Of course I do," he said.

"So now look closely at what I want to demonstrate," he said. "It's as follows: that it appears that not only do those opposites not admit each other, but also those things that, while not actually opposites to each other, always contain the opposites—these, it seems, also do not admit whatever form is opposite to the one existing within them, but on its approach either perish or get out of the way. Or shall we not say that three will be sooner be destroyed and suffer anything else whatever before it submits to becoming even, while it is still three?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"And again," he said, "the number two is certainly not the opposite of the number three."

"No, indeed."

"Then not only do opposite forms not withstand each other's approach, but some other things also do not withstand the approach of opposites."

"What you say is very true," he said.

"So," he said, "do you want us to define what sort of thing these are, if we can?"

"By all means."

"So, Cebes, would it be the things that force whatever

κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ τῷ αἰεί τινος;¹³

Πῶς λέγεις; |

Ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἂν ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

Πάνν γε.

Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ | μορφῇ ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι.

Οὐ γάρ.

Εἰργάζεται δέ γε ἢ περιττή;

Ναί.

Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου; |

Ναί.

e Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.

Ἄμοιρα. |

Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς.

Ναί.

ἌΟ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὲ

¹³ αὐτῷ τῷ αἰεί τινος Stallbaum: αὐτῷ αἰεί τινος β

they occupy not only to have their own form, but also to have the form of something always opposite to something?"¹¹³

"How do you mean?"

"As we were saying just now. You know, I presume, the things that the form of the number three occupies are necessarily not only three but also odd."

"Certainly."

"We say, then, that the form that is opposite to whatever character has this effect would never make an approach to such a thing."

"No, it wouldn't."

"So was it the odd that had that effect?"

"Yes."

"That of the even being the opposite of this"

"Yes."

"The form of the even will never come to the number three then."

"Indeed not."

"Three then has no share in the even?"

"No."

"The number three is uneven then?"

"Yes."

"Now what I was saying we were to define: what kind

¹¹³ Translation of d1-3 (and text of d3) is uncertain (for detailed discussion see Rowe, n. ad loc., Gallop, 235-36); however, the general meaning is clear and explained in the subsequent argument: the form of the particular number (e.g., "three") will force each set of things it occupies to have its own related form and to have the form of something opposite to something, by making them odd as opposed to even.

105 ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον—οἷον νῦν ἢ
 τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον
 αὐτὸ δέχεται, | τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ
 ἢ δυὰς τῷ περιπτῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα
 πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζη, μὴ μόνον τὸ
 ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο, ὃ
 ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴη,
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου | ἐναντιότητα
 μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμνησκον· οὐ γὰρ
 χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ
 δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιπτου, τὸ διπλάσιον.
 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν
 b τοῦ περιπτου οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ
 τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὄλου, καὶ τριτη-
 μόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶπερ ἔπη τε καὶ
 συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.

Πάνν σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι. |

Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ὃ
 ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὴ
 παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ
 ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν.
 εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερ-
 μὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην
 c τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ
 τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί
 ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ
 ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς

of things that, while they aren't opposite to something, nevertheless don't admit it, the opposite: for example now, the number three, though not the opposite of the even, nevertheless doesn't admit it. You see it always brings the opposite against it, as does the number two against the odd, fire against cold, and very many other things. Well now, consider if you would define the situation thus: not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but also that which brings up something opposite to that into which it itself enters, the one that does the bringing never admits the opposition of the thing being brought. Go over that again. It's not a bad thing to hear it several times. The number five doesn't admit the form of the even, nor even ten, which is twice the amount, that of the odd. Moreover this is itself opposite to something else; nevertheless it does not admit the form of the odd; nor indeed will one and a half, nor other similar numbers, the half, admit the form of the whole and again a third and all that series, if you both follow and agree it is so." 105

"I very much agree," he said "and follow."

"Right, tell me again," he said, "from the beginning. And don't answer in terms of my question, but do it by copying my example. Indeed I say that because, besides that answer I gave first time round, that 'safe' one, from what we're now discussing I can see another kind of safety. You see if you were to ask me what it is that, present in the body, would make it hot, I shall not give you that safe ill-informed answer that it would be heat, but from what we're now saying I'd give the more sophisticated answer, that it would be fire. And again, if you ask what is present in a body that will make it sick, I shall not answer that it would be illness, but fever, and again what is present in a b c

ἔσται, | οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιπτώτης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς,
καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὄρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅτι
βούλομαι.

Ἄλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἧ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι
ζῶν ἔσται; |

ᾧ ἂν ψυχῇ, ἔφη.

d Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἧ δ' ὅς.

Ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχη, ἀεὶ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο
φέρουσα ζωήν; |

Ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη.

Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;

Ἔστιν, ἔφη.

Τί;

Θάνατος. |

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ
μὴ ποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὠμολόγηται;

Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί
νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν; |

Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ
δέχεται;

¹¹⁴ At 100c–e. S. states the “safe” principle that qualities in things have those qualities by the presence of (or association with) their appropriate form. His new “safe” answer (105b9–c2) follows on from his previous point (105a1–b3) that the cause is a form

number that will make it an odd number, I shall not say oddness, but unity and the rest likewise.¹¹⁴ Well see if you now know adequately well what I mean."

"Yes, very well," he said.

"Then answer this," he said: "what is present in the body to make it a living one?"

"Soul," he said.

"Is this then always the case?"

"Of course," he said.

"Then a soul, whatever it takes possession of, always comes upon that thing bringing life?"

"It does indeed," he said.

"Is there anything that is the opposite of life, or nothing?"

"There is," he said.

"What?"

"Death."

"So a soul will never ever admit the opposite to what it itself brings, from what we have previously agreed?"¹¹⁵

"Absolutely, emphatically," said Cebes.

"What follows then? What name did we give just now to what doesn't admit the form of even?"

"Uneven," he said.

"And what doesn't admit the just and what doesn't admit the musical?"

that "brings up" one of a pair of concrete opposites that excludes an opposite occupying an opposite form: e.g., fire (admitting the form of the hot) excludes snow (admitting the form of cold).

¹¹⁵ This follows from the "safe" answer in 105b-c. Soul, although not itself an opposite, will (d10-12) never admit the opposite (death) of what it brings to the body (life).

d

e Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.
 Εἶεν· ὁ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται τί καλοῦμεν;
 Ἄθνατον, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; |

Οὔ.

Ἄθνατον ἄρα ψυχὴ.

Ἄθνατον.

Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς
 δοκεῖ; |

Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

106 Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον
 ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν
 ἦν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον
 εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα | θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξῆει ἂν
 ἢ χιῶν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε,
 οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ὡς δ' αὐτως οἶμαι καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον
 ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήγει, οὔ ποτ' ἂν
 ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, | ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν
 ᾗχετο.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ ᾧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου
 εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύ-
 νατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἦ, ἀπόλλυσθαι
 θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται

“The unmusical and the unjust.”

e

“Well then, what shall we call what doesn't admit death?”

“Immortal,” he said.

“So the soul doesn't admit death?”

“No.”

“So the soul is something immortal?”

“Yes, immortal.”

“So be it,” he said. “Are we to say then that this has been proved? Or how does it seem to you?”

“It has, very adequately, Socrates.”

“What then, Cebes?” he said. “If it were necessary for the uneven to be indestructible, surely the number three would be indestructible?”

106

“Of course.”

“That means if the not-hot also were necessarily indestructible, when someone brought hot against snow, the snow would get out of the way, remaining intact and unmelted? You see it couldn't be destroyed nor could it remain, and admit the heat.”

“What you say is true,” he said.

“In the same way also, I think, if the not-cold were indestructible, whenever something cold approached fire it would never be extinguished or destroyed, but would get away untouched.”

“It would have to,” he said.

“So,” he said, “must the same be said of the immortal? If the immortal is also indestructible, it's impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death goes against it. You see from what's been said it won't admit death and will not

b

οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, | ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφα-
 μεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδέ δὴ πῦρ
 ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. "Ἄλλὰ τί
 κωλύει," φαίη ἄν τις, "ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γί-
 γνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὁμολόγηται,
 c ἀπολομένον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;"
 τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι
 οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν
 ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν, | ῥαδίως ἄν δι-
 εμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττόν καὶ
 τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἄν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὐ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, | εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν
 ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἄν εἴη πρὸς
 d τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἄν
 δέοι λόγου.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ
 ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον
 αἰδίου ὄν φθορὰν δέξεται. |

Ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
 τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ
 πάντων ἄν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε
 καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.

e Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο
 τι ψυχὴν ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος
 ἄν εἴη;

PHAEDO

be dead, just as three won't be even, we said, any more than the odd will be, nor again fire will be cold, nor yet the heat in the fire will be. 'But,' someone may say, 'what's to prevent the odd not becoming even when the even approaches, (as it's been agreed), but when it has been destroyed, there comes to be the even in its place?' Against the one who says this, we wouldn't be able to contend that it's not destroyed; after all the uneven is not indestructible, since, if this were what was conceded to us, we could easily have contended that at the approach of the even, the odd and the number three would be up and away: and that's how we'd make out case as regards fire, heat and the rest. Or is this not so?"

"It is very much is so."

"So now concerning the immortal, if we are agreed it too is indestructible, in addition to it's being immortal, soul would be indestructible too. But if not, we would need another argument."

"Well there's no need, at least on that account," he said; "it's hardly likely that anything else would not be capable of being destroyed if the immortal, being everlasting will admit destruction."

"Well god anyway," said Socrates, "and the form of life itself, and anything else that's immortal, would never be destroyed, as I think would be agreed by all."

"By all indeed, by Zeus," he said, "both men and even more so, I think, by gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also imperishable, if the soul really is immortal would it be anything but indestructible too?"

Πολλή ἀνάγκη.

Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, | ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπίόν, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.

Φαίνεται.

107 Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχὰι ἐν Ἄιδου.

Οὐκ οὖν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ὄδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγήσαι. | ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.

b Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὄπη ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἑμαντῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, | ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τὰς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστὰ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ εἰ ἀντὶς ἰκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

PHAEDO

"It absolutely must be indestructible."

"Then when death approaches a man it seems his mortal part dies, but his immortal side gets away safely and intact after escaping the clutches of death."

"It appears to."

"So, Cebes," he said, "it is established beyond all doubt that soul is immortal and indestructible and in truth our souls will exist in Hades." 107

"Well for my part, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing to say against this and I don't doubt the argument in any way. But certainly if Simmias here, or anyone else has anything to say he'd do well not to keep quiet, since I don't know for what other occasion other than the present he should keep it back if he wants to say or listen to anything on these topics."

"Well further to that," said Simmias, "I myself no longer have any point of doubt at least as a result of our discussion. However, given the scale of what our discussion has been about and having a low opinion of our human weakness, I'm still compelled to keep some reservations in my own mind about what's been said." b

"Yes, not only that, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you're right in what you say and even if our original hypotheses are acceptable to you all, nevertheless we should look at them more closely. And if you all analyze them adequately in my view you'll follow the argument to the limits to which it's possible for a human to follow it. And if that itself becomes clear, you won't look for anything any further."

"What you say is true," he said.

- c Ἄλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, | εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ'
- d ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὔσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἄιδου ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν | τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ
- e τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἄιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσασθαι τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρῆ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. | ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου
- 108 Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἰμόν φησιν

¹¹⁶ "Spirit" = *daimon*, the personal spirit that watched over the course of one's life. For S.'s personal guardian spirit (*daimonion*), see *Ap.* 31d.

PHAEDO

“But this much at least it’s right for you to bear in mind, c
my friends,” he said: “that if the soul *is* immortal then it
needs attending to, not only for the sake of this period of
time in which what we call life occurs, but for all time, and
the danger for the present would seem to be terrible if
you’re going to neglect it. You see if death were a re-
lease from everything, it would be a godsend for evil peo-
ple when they die to be simultaneously released from the
body and from their evil ways along with their soul. But
now, since it appears to be immortal there would be no d
other refuge for it from evil and no safety except by be-
coming as good and wise as possible. You see the soul
approaches Hades with nothing but its upbringing and
nurture, which are indeed said to bring the most benefit or
harm to the one who has died at the very beginning of his
journey there. The story goes like this: When each indi-
vidual has died, the spirit¹¹⁶ of each one that he was allot-
ted when he was alive undertakes to lead him to some spot
where those who are gathered together are compelled to
submit themselves to judgment and then make their way
to Hades with that guide with whom it has been ordained e
that those from this world are to go to the next. When they
have experienced there those things that they have to, and
have waited as long as required, another guide conveys
them back here after many long periods of time. But the
journey in fact is not as Aeschylus’ Telephus describes
it.¹¹⁷ For he says a simple path leads to Hades, but to me 108

¹¹⁷ Apparently from a lost play of that name.

εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὔτε ἀπλή οὔτε μία φαίνεται
 μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις
 ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμῶσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε
 σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἵ ἀπὸ τῶν θυ-
 σιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω.
 ἢ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ
 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώμα-
 b τος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνου
 πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὄρατὸν τόπον,
 πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ
 μόγισ ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται
 ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν
 ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἢ φόνων
 ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἀ-
 τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει
 ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ
 οὔτε συνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ
 δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἕως ἂν δῆ τινες
 c χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται
 εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἢ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ
 μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ
 ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ἢ ὤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη
 τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ
 τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἶα οὔτε ὄση δοξάζεται
 ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος
 πέπεισμαι.

118 Myths of Judgment in the afterlife are also found in *Gr.* 523–27 and, most elaborately, enlarging on many of the details

PHAEDO

it seems to be neither simple nor single. It wouldn't have required guides in that case. You see I don't think anyone would go astray anywhere if it were a single path; as it is it seems to have many branches and crossroads. I say this judging from the evidence of sacrifices and rituals here. Now the well disciplined and prudent soul follows and doesn't fail to recognize its situation. But the one that lusts after the needs of the body, such as I talked about earlier, having fluttered around it and the visible region for a long time, and having resisted and suffered a great deal, is led away by force and with difficulty by his appointed spirit. When it gets to where the others are, the soul that is uncleaned and has done something such as, for example, committing unjust killings or performing any other such deeds as are akin to these or are actually the work of kindred souls—everyone avoids this soul and turns away from it and is unwilling either to be its fellow traveler or guide; instead it wanders about at a complete loss until certain periods have elapsed, and when they are completed it is conveyed compulsorily to the dwelling appropriate for it. On the other hand the soul that has passed its life in a pure and disciplined way and actually has gods as its fellow travelers and leaders, lives in the place that is appointed for each one.¹¹⁸ There are many wonderful places on the earth and it is itself neither of the kind nor size imagined by those who are accustomed to talk about the earth, as I am persuaded by someone.¹¹⁹

here on the fate of the human soul, at *Resp.* 10 614b–21d. *Phaedo* contains the most elaborate description in Plato of the geography of the Underworld that follows at 108e4–13d1.

¹¹⁹ Source not identified.

d Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἂ σὲ πείθει ἠδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι | δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι
e ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἶαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν.

Ἄλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκέι.

Πέπεισμαι τοῖνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, | εἰ
109 ἐστὶν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντα καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ | τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμῶσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Ἔτι τοῖνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς

¹²⁰ The "skill of Glaucus" is probably a proverbial expression ("it doesn't take a genius to . . ." see Rowe, n. ad loc.). The Glaucus referred to may be a son of Minos, king of Crete, or possibly a metal worker, the inventor of the art of welding (see Hdt. 1.25).

Simmias said: "What do you mean by this, Socrates? d
 You see I too have certainly heard a lot about the earth,
 but not what convinces you. So I'd be very pleased to
 hear."

"Well the truth is, Simmias, I don't think the skill of a
 Glaucus is needed to explain what's what.¹²⁰ However to
 prove that it's true seems to me to require more than
 Glaucus' skill. In the first place I probably can't, in the
 second, even if I did understand it, I don't think my
 life, Simmias, is long enough for the argument. However,
 there's nothing to stop me talking about what I'm con-
 vinced is the form of the earth and its regions." e

"Well," said Simmias, "even that is enough."

"I'm convinced then," he said, "that first of all, if the
 earth is really a sphere in the center of heaven, then it
 needs neither air nor any other such force to prevent it 109
 from falling, but the uniformity of heaven itself and the
 equilibrium of the earth itself are sufficient to hold it on
 all sides. For anything balanced placed in the center of a
 uniform medium will not be able to tilt more or less in any
 direction, and being uniform it remains steady.¹²¹ So that's
 my first conviction," he said.

"And rightly so," said Simmias.

"Well, moving on then," he said, "it's a thing of enor-

¹²¹ A theory possibly anticipated in the sixth century by Anax-
 imander (DK 12A26, Waterfield, 16) in contrast to general Pre-
 socratic theories about the support for the earth mentioned at
 99b-c.

- b οἰκεῖν, τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τιμὴ μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιοῦτοῖς τόποις οἰκεῖν. | εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῆ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ συνερρηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κείσθαι τῷ
- c οὐρανῷ ἐν ᾧ πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ συρρεῖν αἰεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἶεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, | ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὀρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυν-
- d τῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἶη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὼς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονηθέναι. | οἰκοῦντας γὰρ

¹²² These were traditionally the east and the west extremities of the known world. The river Phasis is on the east side of the Black Sea, traditionally the boundary between Europe and Asia; the Pillars of Heracles are the Straits of Gibraltar.

mous size and we inhabit a small portion of it, from the Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles,¹²² living around the sea like ants or frogs around a pool, and there are many others living elsewhere in many such places. You see, all round the earth there are many hollows of all different shapes and sizes into which water, mist and air have flowed together. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure heaven in which there are the stars. Indeed, the majority of those who are accustomed to talk about these things call it the ether.¹²³ It's of this that these elements (the water, mist and air) are the sediment and they continually flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we who live in its hollows have failed to observe this and think we live above on the earth, as if someone living in the middle of the depths of the ocean were to think he was dwelling on the surface of the sea and, seeing the sun and the rest of the stars through the water, he were to think the sea was the heaven; but, on account of his slowness and weakness, he had never yet got to the surface of the sea, or had even seen, on emerging and lifting his head out of the sea and looking up at our world here, how much purer and more beautiful it actually is than his own environment, nor had heard from anyone else who had seen it. So this then is exactly what we too have experienced, because, living in

¹²³ "Ether" (*aithēr*) in Homer is the pure upper atmosphere where the Olympian gods dwell, and in the Presocratics has significance as the most rarified of the four elements that made up the universe (earth, water, air, and fire). See Anaxagoras, DK 59B2, 15 (Waterfield, 122), and Empedocles DK 31B38 (Waterfield, 142).

ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ
 τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ
 e ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταυτόν, ὑπ'
 ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἴους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς
 διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ'
 ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν
 <ἀν> ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης
 ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὀρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, | οὕτως ἂν τινα
 καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέ-
 σθαι θεωροῦσα, γινῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀλη-
 θῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 110 γῆ. ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος
 ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα,
 ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε
 φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον
 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐστι, | σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος
 καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ
 γῆ ᾗ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ'
 ὅπωςτιοῦν ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐτῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν
 b ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν· εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέ-
 γειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὧ Σιμμία, οἶα τυγχάνει τὰ
 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε
 τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν. |

Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὧ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι
 τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο, ὥσπερ

some hollow in the earth, we think we're on the surface of it, and we call the air heaven as though this were the heaven through which the stars pass. But it's the same thing; as a result of our weakness and slowness we're unable to get out to the farthest reaches of the air. Since if someone were to get to the surface, or grew wings and flew up, he'd lift up his head and see, just as fish here look up out of the sea and see what's here, so someone would see what's up there, and if he were naturally capable of holding out and viewing the sight, he'd realize that is truly heaven and the true light and the real earth.¹²⁴ For this earth and the stones and all the region here are corroded and eaten away, just as what's in the sea is by the salt water, and neither does anything worth mentioning grow in the sea, nor is there anything without blemish, so to speak. Wherever there is land there are caves and sand, vast areas of mud and slime and, in comparison with what we judge to be beautiful, not worthy of it in any way whatever. But what's up there would in turn appear to be very much superior to the things around us; indeed, if it's a good idea to tell a tale worth listening to, Simmias, about what the things on earth under the heaven are really like."

"Certainly, Socrates," said Simmias. "We'd be happy to hear the tale."

"Well then, my friend," he said, "first of all it's said that, if one were to observe it from above, the appearance of

¹²⁴ This geographical description of humans unaware of a purer world above them is revisited in an epistemological and metaphysical context in *Republic*, in the form of the image of ascent from human ignorance in the Simile of the Cave (*Resp.* 514a–17a).

αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διει-
 λημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὡσπερ
 c δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶ-
 σαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολλὸν ἔτι ἐκ λαμ-
 προτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ
 ἀλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυ-
 σοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν,
 | καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκεκλιμένην ὡσαύτως,
 καὶ ἔτι πλείονων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωράκα-
 μεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε
 d καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχε-
 σθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ,
 ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχῆς ποικίλον φαντάζε-
 σθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔση τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φνύ-
 μενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς·
 | καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν
 καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια
 εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰά-
 e σπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ
 δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω.
 τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ
 καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι
 ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνοσ καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν
 δεῦρο συνερρηκόντων, | ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρ-
 ἔχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι
 111 καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς

PHAEDO

the earth itself is very similar to spheres made up from
 twelve leather patches, elaborately patterned, divided into
 colors, like those colors here that our artists here use as
 samples.¹²⁵ But over there, the whole earth is made up of
 such colors, but far brighter and purer than these. One
 part is of sea-purple of marvelous beauty, another is like
 gold, and all that is white is whiter than chalk or snow, and
 the earth consists of other colors like this, even more nu-
 merous and more beautiful than the sort we have seen
 here. For even the very hollows in it, being filled with both
 water and air, offer an appearance of color as they gleam
 in the variety of the other colors so as to give the appear-
 ance of a single continuous decorated surface. On this,
 being of such a nature, things that grow do so in propor-
 tion: trees, flowers, and fruits. And again in the same way
 the mountains and the rocks by the same proportions have
 a smoothness and transparency and finer colors. We even
 have prized fragments of these gemstones down here: car-
 nelians, jaspers, emeralds, and everything of this kind;
 but up there there's nothing that's not of this kind and
 they're even more beautiful than those here. The reason
 for this is that those stones are pure and not eaten away or
 damaged, like the ones here, by corrosion and brine from
 sediment that has collected together, which causes defor-
 mity and disease to stones and earth and also to animals
 and plants. But the earth itself is adorned by all of these
 and furthermore by gold and silver, and again the other

c

d

e

111

¹²⁵ For the shape of the dodecahedron as a key to the construction of the cosmos, see *Tim.* 55c.

τοιούτους. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ
 πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐ-
 τὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ'
 αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, | τοὺς μὲν
 ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ
 ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἄς περι-
 ρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ,
 ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν
 b ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ,
 ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν
 τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε
 ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ
 φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις | ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι
 τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἢ περ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν
 καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν
 ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερά αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς
 θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις
 τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς
 c πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα
 ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
 εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ
 περὶ τὴν γῆν· | τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγ-
 κοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βα-
 θυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς
 οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοῦς

PHAEDO

things of this sort. You see, they are naturally visible, being many in number and large and all over the earth, so seeing it is a spectacle for fortunate observers.¹²⁶ There are many animals besides and human beings on it: some who live inland and others who live round the air as we do round the sea, and others on islands, round which the air flows, facing the mainland. In a word, what both water and the sea are for our use, over there they have the air; what air is for us is the ether¹²⁷ for them. They have a combination of seasons such that they're free of disease and they live much longer than we do here, and as for sight, hearing and intelligence and all such things they're as far from us by the same distance as air is from water and ether from air in its purity. Moreover they have groves and precincts belonging to the gods in which the gods really dwell. They also have utterances and prophecies and perceptions of the gods, and such encounters they experience face to face, and the sun, the moon, and the stars are seen by them as they really are and the rest of their happiness is in accordance with this.¹²⁸ b c

“Indeed, the whole of the earth is like this, as are the earth's surroundings. But within it there are many regions in its hollows all around the whole in a circle, some are deeper and spread out more than the one where we live, others, while they're deeper, have a narrower opening

¹²⁶ They are “fortunate” (*eudaimōn*) in having a “good *daimōn*” (see above 107d7ff and n. 116).

¹²⁷ See above, n. 123. ¹²⁸ Plato here draws on traditional “golden age” mythology depicting the “isles of the Blessed,” the ideal world attained in the afterlife by humans who have lived an exceptionally pure life (see, e.g., Pind. *Ol.* 2.70–72).

- d ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαι τε πολλαχῆ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἧ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἰαλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ
- e καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἢ περιρροῆ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν | ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῆ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἢ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὃν
- 112 καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό

τῆλε μάλ', ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι
βέρεθρον·

- ὁ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. | εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οἷας ἂν
- b καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα

than the area where we are, and there are some shallower d
 and broader than here. All of these are connected under-
 ground with each other by channels in many directions,
 both narrower and wider, and exits where a great deal of
 water flows from one to another as if into mixing bowls.
 There are ever-flowing rivers under the ground of enor-
 mous size, with both hot and cold water, and much fire and
 great rivers of fire, and many of liquid mud, both clearer e
 and more filthy, as the rivers in Sicily flowing with mud
 ahead of the lava and the lava torrent itself.¹²⁹ Indeed,
 each of these regions is filled with these streams as the
 circling flow happens to reach them each time. All of these
 move back and forth by a kind of oscillating movement
 under the ground. Now this oscillation occurs naturally as
 follows. One of the chasms in the earth happens to be
 especially huge and is pierced right through the whole 112
 earth. It's what Homer is talking about when he says:

'Far away where there is the deepest pit under the
 earth'¹³⁰

which both he and many other poets elsewhere call Tarta-
 rus. For into this chasm all the rivers flow together, and
 flow out from it again. Each of them becomes what it is on
 account of the nature of the earth it flows through. The b
 reason all liquids flow out of there and in again, is that this

¹²⁹ If, as is probable, *Phaedo* was composed after Plato's first visit to Sicily in 389/8 (see Chronology of Plato's Life and Works), we might speculate that Plato may have witnessed an eruption of Mount Etna.

¹³⁰ Hom. *Il.* 8.14. Homer names Tartarus in the previous line.

- οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ποιεῖ· | συνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ
- c ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, | τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστοις ὁδοποιήται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν
- d δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἢ ἐπηνητλείτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, | καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρῦ ἢ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἅ παντάπασιν κύκλω περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν
- e ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἔστιν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναυτες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

PHAEDO

fluid has no bottom or foundation. Indeed it oscillates, swells back and forth and the air and the wind around it do the same; for they accompany it both whenever it rushes to that side of the earth over there and when it rushes to this side. And just as the breath of creatures who breathe exhales and inhales in a constant stream, so too over there the breath oscillates with the water and causes enormous terrifying winds as it goes in and comes out. So whenever the water retreats to the so-called nether region, it flows into the places along those streams there through the earth and fills them, like men irrigating. When again it leaves that area and rushes back this way, it fills its streams over here again and those that are full flow through the channels and through the earth, and when they have each arrived at those places where a channel has been made, they form seas and lakes, rivers and springs. From there they sink back under the ground, some going around places greater in size and number, others fewer and smaller ones, and discharge back again into Tartarus, some a long way below the point where they were channeled off, others a little way. All of them flow in lower down than where they flow out, and again some enter opposite the place where they flowed in, some around the same place. There are some that flow around in a complete circle, winding either once or a number of times around the earth like snakes, and having dropped as far as possible, burst out again. It is possible to drop on both sides as far as the center, but not beyond; you see, for both streams, the direction from either side is uphill.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ
 παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι· ἢ τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν
 τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν
 μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ ρέον περιὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος
 Ὀκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺν καὶ ἐναντίως
 113 ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ
 δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν
 Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν
 πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους
 μέινασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, ἢ
 πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος
 δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς
 τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῶ
 καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν
 θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεύθεν δὲ χω-
 b ρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ
 τῇ γῆ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς
 Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὗ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι
 περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατω-
 τέρῳ τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν
 Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα
 ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αἰ
 καταντικρὺν ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δει-
 νόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ' ἔχοντα ὄλον
 c οἶον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν

PHAEDO

“As for the other streams there are many in number,
 size and description, but among these many there are
 some four in particular, of which the biggest and the one
 that flows in a circle farthest out is the one called Ocea-
 nus,¹³¹ and opposite it, flowing in the other direction is
 Acheron,¹³² which flows through other desert regions and
 in particular flows underground and arrives at the Acheru- 113
 sian Lake where the majority of the souls of the dead ar-
 rive and, after remaining for certain appointed periods of
 time, some longer, some shorter, are sent back to be born
 as living creatures. The third river rises between these two
 and near its mouth drops into a large area blazing with a
 huge fire and creates a lake larger than the sea around
 us,¹³³ seething with water and mud. From there it pro-
 ceeds in a circle, turbid and marshy, and winding round b
 inside the earth it reaches, among other places, along the
 borders of the Acherusian Lake without mixing with its
 water. After winding round many times under the earth it
 discharges into a lower part of Tartarus. This is what they
 call Pyriphlegethon, whose lava streams spew up detritus
 at various places over the earth. Then opposite this the
 fourth river discharges first into a place that is terrifying
 and wild, so it's said, with a color entirely a kind of blue-
 gray, which they call Stygian and the lake that the dis- c

¹³¹ Oceanus was the river that encircled the earth in myth (Hom. *Il.* 18.607–8, Hdt. 4.8.) and was also seen as the boundary between the living and the dead, at Hom. *Od.* 10.508–12, 11.155–59.

¹³² Acheron, derived from *achos* (pain); Cocytus (wailing) (113c9); and Pyriphlegethon (fire blazing) (b5) are all mythical rivers of the underworld, as is Styx (the hateful) (c1), which here becomes a lake.

¹³³ I.e., the Mediterranean.

λίμνην ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι | καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

- d Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκνυται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μὴ· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, | πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνούνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται,
- e εἴ τις τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, | τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς
- 114 βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον

charging river forms is called the Styx. Having poured in there and gained formidable force in the water it descends underground and winding round passes in the opposite direction to Pyriphlegethon and meets it in the Acherusian Lake from the other side. And the water of this river does not mix with any other, but it too moves round in a circle and discharges into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. The name of this, so the poets say, is Cocytus.

“Such is the nature of these things.¹³⁴ When the dead reach the place where the spirit brings each one,¹³⁵ firstly they submit to judgment: those who have led good holy lives, and those who have not. Now those who are considered to have led a moderate life make their way toward the Acheron, embark on rafts provided for them, and on these they arrive at the lake. There they dwell, are purified and are absolved of their wrongdoings by paying penalties, if anyone has done any wrong, and they win recognition for their good deeds, each according to his worth. But those who are judged to be incorrigible on account of the enormity of their wrongdoing, having committed either much great sacrilege or unjust killings and many lawless acts, or any other cases of this kind, their appropriate destiny flings them into Tartarus whence they never emerge. If others are judged to have committed great wrongs that are remediable, such as doing violence to a father or mother out of anger, and have lived the rest of their

¹³⁴ S. returns to the fate of souls in the afterlife that he began in 107d, and broke off at 108c for the geographical excursus, which he now incorporates into the reiterated and more detailed human narrative.

¹³⁵ For “spirit” see above, n. 116.

βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τιῖ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, | τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἰκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται | πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὖς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὀσιῶς βῖωναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῆ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμαμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, | καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἄς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλώσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα χρῆ ὦν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.

PHAEDO

lives in remorse, or those who have killed in some other similar way, must firstly be thrown into Tartarus, but once they've been thrown in and spent a year there, the wave throws them out: the murderers by way of Cocytus, the violators of father and mother by way of Pyriphlegethon. When they're carried along and come up alongside the Acherusian Lake, there they cry out and call, some to those whom they've killed, others to those upon whom they've committed outrage. Having called them they beseech and beg them to be allowed to come out onto the lake and be admitted, and if they persuade them, they come out and put an end to their troubles. But if not, they're carried back to Tartarus and from there back to the rivers and they do not stop suffering in this way until they win over those whom they've wronged: for this is the sentence assigned to them by the judges. But as for those who are judged to have been distinguished in leading a holy life, those are the ones who have been set free, released from these regions in the earth as from prisons, and have come up into the pure dwelling and are settled upon the earth. Of these some people, those who have been adequately cleansed by philosophy, lead their entire lives henceforth without the body for the whole of the time to come and they reach dwellings even more beautiful than these, which it's neither very easy to describe, nor is there enough time in the present circumstances. Well, for these reasons we've talked about, Simmias, we must do everything to have a share of goodness and wisdom in our lives: for it's a noble prize and the expectations are great.

- d Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελέλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὔσα, | τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος—καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων
- e δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν | ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς
- 115 κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰς αὐθις ἐν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· | ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.
- b Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ

“Now it isn’t fitting for a man of intelligence to affirm d
 with confidence that these things are just as I’ve related
 them; however, that either these things are so, or some-
 thing like them, concerning our souls and their dwelling
 places, given that the soul is evidently something immor-
 tal—that’s what seems fitting to me, when I think about
 it, and worth the risk for one believing it to be so—for
 the risk is a noble one—one should repeat such things to
 oneself as a charm,¹³⁶ which is why I’ve been dwelling on
 this story for so long. Well for these reasons a man must
 be confident about his own soul who in his life has bid e
 farewell to the other pleasures, those of the body and its
 adornment, as being alien to him, thinking he’ll accom-
 plish more harm than good, and has eagerly pursued those
 pleasures of learning and has regulated his soul to no alien
 adornment, but to its own: with temperance, justice, cour- 115
 age, freedom, and truth; and thus he awaits the journey to
 Hades in order to proceed when the appointed hour calls.
 So then you, Simmias and Cebes,” he said, “and the rest
 of you, at some point in the future will each make the
 journey. But the appointed hour is calling me now, as a
 character in a tragedy would say, and it’s almost time for
 me to go for a bath.¹³⁷ You see I think it’s better to drink
 the poison after bathing and not put the women to the
 trouble of washing my corpse.”

When he’d said this Crito said: “Well then, Socrates, b

¹³⁶ See the charming away of fears, spoken of at 78a above. There the charm was the following *logos* (rational argument), but here it is the *muthos* of the afterlife that S. has just recounted.

¹³⁷ The use of tragic elevated language suggests the final bath as S.’s ritual cleansing.

Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; |

Ἄπερ αἰεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· εἰ δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήητε καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν | τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ
 c ζῆν, οὐδὲ εἰ πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον;

Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, εἴανπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. | Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἠσυχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν· Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ'
 d οἶεταί με ἐκείνον εἶναι ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς εὐδαιμονίας, | ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυάτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦ

PHAEDO

what instructions do you give these people or me concerning your children or anything else? Is there anything we can do in particular to please you?"

"What I've always been saying, Crito," he said. "Nothing very new, because in looking after yourselves, whatever you do, you will do a favor to both me and my family and yourselves, even if you make no promises at present. But if you neglect yourselves, and are unwilling to live your lives along the tracks, as it were, of our discussions now and in the past, even if you promise many things at the present moment, and vehemently so, you'll not do any good."

"Then we'll be keen to do as you say," he said. "But how are we to bury you?"

"However you wish," he said. "That is if you can catch me and I don't escape your clutches." At the same time he laughed quietly and looking across at us he said: "I can't persuade Crito, my friends, that I am this Socrates, who is now talking and putting in order each of the topics discussed. Instead he thinks I'm that man whom he'll see as a corpse a little later, and he's actually asking how to bury me! As to the fact that for some time I've been constructing an elaborate argument that when I drink the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but will be off and away to some happiness of the blessed, I seem to have spoken these words in vain to him, though encouraging you and myself at the same time. So give my guarantee to Crito," he said, "the opposite guarantee to the one he offered to the judges.¹³⁸ You see his guarantee was that I *should* re-

¹³⁸ Crito's formal guarantee is never actually stated but perhaps implied in *Cri.* 44eff., where Crito makes light of the money he stands to lose if S. were to flee Athens.

μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω,
 e ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾶον φέρῃ,
 καὶ μὴ ὀρώων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυπτό-
 μενον ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ
 λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει
 ἢ κατορύττει. | εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων,
 τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημ-
 μελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ
 θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ
 116 θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἦ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ
 νόμιμον εἶναι.

Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς
 λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέ-
 λευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
 διαλεγόμενοι | περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοπούν-
 τες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση
 ἡμῖν γεγυῖα εἶη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατὴρ
 στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ
 b δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδιά—δύο
 γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεὶς μικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ
 οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρί-
 τωνος διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο,
 τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, |
 αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυ-
 σμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ'
 ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα
 διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἔνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς
 c παρ' αὐτόν, Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε

main; but you make a point of assuring him that when I die, I shall *not* remain but I shall be off and away, so that Crito can bear it more easily and, when he sees my body being cremated or buried, not be upset on my account, as if I were suffering dreadfully. And at my burial don't let him say that he's laying out Socrates, or taking him off to the grave, or burying him. For you know full well, my excellent Crito," he said, "not speaking well is not only jarring in itself, but also causes some harm to souls. Rather you must take heart and say you're burying my body, and bury me in whatever way you please and that you think is most usual." 116

When he had said this, he got up and went off to a room to take a bath and Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking among ourselves about what had been said and going over it, and then moving on, we discussed how great the disaster was that had befallen us, actually thinking, like those deprived of a father, that we'd live the rest of our lives as orphans. When he'd bathed and his children had been brought in to him—he had two small sons, you see, and one older one—those female members of his household came in. When he'd spoken to them in Crito's presence and given them such instructions as he wished, he told the women and children to leave, and he himself returned to us. By this time it was close to sunset; he had spent a long time inside. He came and sat down having bathed, and not much was said after this. And the attendant of the Eleven¹³⁹ came and going over to Socrates he said: "Socrates, I shall not find fault with you" c

¹³⁹ See above, 63d.

σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγεῖλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως | ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναϊότατον καὶ πράξιον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γινώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων,
 d χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, | Ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύνει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

e Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγεληθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα, | καὶ συγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπέιγουν ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχαρεῖ.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιούσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις—οἴονται γὰρ

PHAEDO

as I do with others because they get angry with me and curse when I tell them to drink the poison on the orders of the rulers.¹⁴⁰ And during this time I have come to know that you particularly are the most noble, the most gentle and finest man who has ever come here. And now especially, I know it's not me you're angry with, but with those men, because you know who is responsible. So now, for you know what I have come to tell you, farewell and try to bear what you have to as easily as you can." And with that he burst into tears, turned round and began to leave. d

Socrates looked up at him and said: "And farewell to you too, and we'll do as you say." At the same time he turned to us and said: "What a decent fellow. Throughout my time here he's come along and talked to me sometimes and was the most excellent of men, and now how generously he weeps for me. Well come on then, Crito, let's do what he says and let someone bring in the poison, if it's been prepared; if not, let the fellow get it ready." e

And Crito said: "But Socrates, I think the sun is still on the mountain tops and hasn't set yet. And besides, I know that others have taken the poison very late when the order was given to them, having eaten and drunk very well and having had sex with whoever they happened to fancy. Well, don't hurry; there's still time." e

And Socrates said: "It's understandable, Crito, that the people you're talking about do that sort of thing; you see

¹⁴⁰ The *archontes*, the nine officials chosen annually by lot to preside over the various administrative, judicial, and military functions of the state. Those referred to here are specifically the *thesmothetai*, the officials concerned with the administration of justice.

117 κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες—καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκό-
 τως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον
 ὕστερον πῶν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ'
 ἔμαντῶ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς
 ἔτι ἐνόητος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. |

Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον
 ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον δια-
 τρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον,
 ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης
 τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων
 ἐπιστήμων, τί χρῆ ποιεῖν; |

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιμένα, ἕως ἂν σου
 b βάρους ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακείσθαι
 καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. Καὶ ἅμα ὠρεξε τὴν κύλικα
 τῷ Σωκράτει.

Καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν
 τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ
 προσώπου, | ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας
 πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ
 πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὐ;

c Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἰό-
 μεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν.

Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς
 ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρῆ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε
 εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο
 ταύτη. Καὶ ἅμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα
 εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. | καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

they think by doing this they gain something, and I, as you might expect, shall not do it. For I see no advantage in drinking the poison a bit later other than to make myself a laughingstock in my own eyes, clinging on to life and spinning it out when there's no longer anything of it left. Well, go on," he said, "do as you're told, and don't refuse." 117

When Crito heard this, he nodded to a slave boy who was standing nearby. The boy went out and when he had spent some considerable time he came back with the man who was going to administer the poison: he was holding it in a wine cup ready mixed. When Socrates saw the fellow he said: "Well my good fellow, you understand these things: what am I supposed to do?"

"Nothing," he said, "but just walk about when you've drunk it until your legs begin to feel heavy, then lie down. It'll act of its own accord." And at the same time he handed the cup to Socrates. b

So he took the cup, Echecrates, really quite cheerfully, without trembling, without losing color or expression, but as usual he looked bull-like¹⁴¹ at the fellow and said: "As for this drink, what do you say about a libation to someone? Is it allowed or not?"

"We make as much as we think is a normal dose for drinking, Socrates," he said. c

"I understand," he said. "Well, I suppose I can and must at least pray to the gods that my migration from here to there may be successful. That is indeed my prayer and may it turn out so." And on saying this he put the cup to his lips and unflinching and calmly he drank it down. Up

¹⁴¹ "Glaring" (see 86d5-6), or possibly "mischevious" (see Burnet, n. ad loc.).

τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύνειν, ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτι ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἰός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανάστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.

Ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ᾧ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημία χρηὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύνειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, ἰ κατεκλίνη ὕπτιος—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος—καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κᾶπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αισθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιῶν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχῆσεται. ἰ

to this point the majority of us were able to hold back the tears fairly well, but when we saw him drink and finish drinking, no more; the tears flowed, in my case despite myself, in floods, so that I covered myself up and wept aloud for myself, not for him, mind you, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a companion. But Crito got up and moved away even before I did since he couldn't restrain his tears. Even before this time, Apollodorus hadn't stopped crying at all, and at that moment especially burst out crying aloud causing everyone who was there to burst into tears except Socrates himself. d

But he said: "What are you doing, you strange people? This was the main reason I sent the women away so they wouldn't disrupt things in such a way. For I've heard it said one should die in silence. Do calm down and pull yourselves together." e

When we heard this, we were ashamed and stopped crying. He walked about and when he said his legs were getting heavy, he lay down on his back—that's what the man had told him to do—and at the same time this man who gave him the poison, felt him and after a short time he examined his feet and legs.¹⁴² Then squeezing his foot hard he asked if he could feel anything. He said he couldn't. Again after this in turn the shins; and moving up in this way he indicated to us he was getting cold and stiff. And he kept hold of him and said that when it got to his heart, then he would be gone. 118

¹⁴² For this presentation of the effects of hemlock, diverging from the known medical symptoms, see Gill, "The Death of Socrates" (noted in Introduction to *Phaedo*, section 1, n. 3).

Ἦδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ—εἶπεν—ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο—³Ω Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρύονα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. |

Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. |

Ἦδε ἡ τελευταῖα, ᾧ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὦν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

PHAEDO


By now he was growing cold somewhere around his abdomen and uncovering himself—he had wrapped himself up—he said—and these were the last words he uttered—“Crito,” he said, “we owe Asclepius a cock. See that you all buy one, and don’t forget.”¹⁴³

“So it shall be,” said Crito. “But see if you have anything else to say.”

There was no further answer to his question, but after a short while he moved and the man uncovered him and his eyes were in a fixed stare. When Crito saw this he closed his mouth and eyes.

This then was the end, Echeocrates, of our friend, of a man, who, as we would say of those whom we knew at that time, was the best and above all the wisest and most just.

¹⁴³ Asclepius was the god of healing; the most likely interpretation of S.’s words is that by making this sacrifice, he is expressing his gratitude to that god for aiding his recovery from the sickness of life.



INDEX OF NAMES

- Acheron, 505, 507, 509
Achilles, 98, 147
Adeimantus, 167
Aeacus, 191, 262n51
Aeantodorus, 167
Aegina, 299
Aeschines (orator), 102, 103
Aeschines of Sphettus, 197, 299
Aeschylus, 487
Aesop, 270, 303, 307
Agora, Athenian, vii, 3, 86, 109
Aias (Ajax), 191
Alcibiades, 102, 103
Alcmaeon, 443n94
Alopeke (Socrates' and Crito's *deme*), 86, 198
Amphipolis, 149
Anaxagoras, 141, 281, 353, 447, 449
Anaximander, 287, 491n121
Anaximenes, 287, 443n94
Antiphon, 165
Antisthenes, 299
Anytus, 88n3, 111, 131, 135, 147, 151, 155, 157, 167, 173
Apollo, xviii, 97, 295, 303, 403
Apollodorus, 167, 181, 269, 299, 521
Arginusae (battle), 101, 160–61n42, 209n18, 237n24
Argives, 414
Aristippus, 299
Ariston, 167
Aristophanes, x, x–xi n9, 7, 92, 94, 96, 115, 257n46, 342–43n40
Aristotle, xii–xiii, xxi
Asclepius, 523
Athenians, 21, 27, 135, 171, 237, 239, 251, 253, 295, 307, 403, 451
Athens, xvi, xix, 100, 293
Boeotia, 453
Cadmus, 439
Callias, 117
Cebes, 223, 269, 271, 274, 275, 278, 279, 303–4, 309, 311–13, 341, 409–13
Chaerephon, xiv, 95, 97, 121
Cicero, 286
Cleombrotus, 299
Cocytus, 507, 509
Corybantēs, 200, 263
Crete, 212, 257

INDEX OF NAMES

- Critias, xxi, 102, 103
 Crito, 165, 181, 196, 198–203,
 211, 212, 214–45, 250, 255,
 262, 269, 291, 303, 315, 511,
 513, 515, 517, 519, 523
 Critobulus, 165, 181
 Cronus, 47
 Ctesippus, 299
- Daedalus, 61, 63, 81
 Delium (battle), 149
 Delos, 196, 217, 295, 301
 Delphic Oracle, xiv, xv, 95,
 96n18, 104, 120, 121, 123
 Diogenes Laertius, 86, 183n63,
 197, 268
 Dionysus, 339n38
 Diopiteus, 93n15
- Echecrates, 267, 293–99, 413,
 414, 463, 523
 Egypt, 385
 Eleusis, 272
 Empedocles, 443n93
 Endymion, 351
 Epicharmus, 322n27
 Epigenes, 299
 Euclides, 299
 Euripus (channel), 421
 Euthyphro, xiv, 3–83, 93n13,
 269
 Evenus, 117, 270, 303, 305,
 307
- Favorinus, 86
- Glaucus, 490n120, 491
 Gorgias, 115, 116–17n12
 Great King of Persia, 189
- Great Panathenaic Festival, 9,
 39
 Greece, 375
- Hades, 189, 261, 263, 297, 333,
 339, 343, 349, 387, 389, 403,
 487, 511
 Harmonia (of Thebes), 439
 Hector, 147
 Hephaestus, 47
 Hera, 47
 Heracles, 417; pillars of, 493
 Heraclitus, 287, 443n93
 Hesiod, 7, 191
 Hippias of Elis, 115, 116–17n12
 Homer, xx, 7, 147, 169, 191, 271,
 288, 341n39, 437, 439, 501
- Iolaus, 417
 Isthmus of Corinth, 253
- King Archon, 3, 20n2, 21
 King's Stoa, 4, 20–21n2, 21
- Lacedaemon, 257
 Laws of Athens (personified),
 200, 204–9, 245–63
 Leon of Salamis, 161, 163
 Libanius, xii
 Lyceum, 21
 Lycon, 88, 131, 173
 Lysanias (father of Aeschines),
 165
- Maximus of Tyre, 89n7
 Megara, 206, 257, 299, 453
 Meletus, xvii, xviii, 23, 25, 33,
 35, 69, 83, 92–95, 113, 115,
 131, 133–45, 155, 177

INDEX OF NAMES

- Menexenus, 299
 Metroon, 86
 Minos, 189, 262n51
 Minotaur, 196, 267n2
 Musaeus, 191

 Naxos, 4, 31
 Nicostratus (son of Theozotides), 165

 Ocean, 505
 Odysseus, 191
Odyssey, the, 437
 Olympic Games, 100, 175-77
 Orpheus, 191

 Palamedes, 191
 Paralius (son of Demodocus), 167
 Patroclus, 147
 Peloponnesian war, xx, 94
 Penelope, 399
 Phaedo, 267, 269, 291, 293-99, 413, 414, 421, 463
 Phaedondes, 299
 Phasis, 493
 Philolaus, 309
 Phlius/Phliasiens, 293, 295
 Phrontisterion, x
 Pindar, 8
 Pitthus (Meletus' *deme*), 23
 Plato, vii, ix, xxi-xxiii, 18-19, 90, 167, 181, 268, 268-69nn4-5, 299n9
 Polycrates (rhetorician and sophist), xii, 103, 213
 Potidaea, 149
 Presocratics, xxi, 280-82
 Prodicus of Ceos, 115

 Protagoras, 94
 Proteus, 81
 Prytaneum, 100, 175
 Pyriphlegathon, 505, 507, 509
 Pythagoreans/Pythagorean thought, 272, 274
 Pythian priestess, 121

 Rhadamanthus, 191, 262n51

 Sicilian expedition, 103n30
 Sicily, 501
 Simmas, 223, 269, 276, 278-80, 289, 299, 307, 309, 313, 315, 317-41, 355-71, 403-7, 425, 485
 Sisyphus, 191
 Socrates, 115, 127, 129, 131, 141, 151, 169, 181; appearance/dress, x, x n8; death, 513-23; divine sign (*daimonion*), 93n13, 101, 159, 187; "historical Socrates," ix, xiii-xiv, 89-91, 212-13; military service, xx, 98; political activity and attitudes, xix-xxi, 159-63; poverty, 129, 157; proposed fine as penalty, 180-81n59, 181; Socratic irony, 179n58; Socratic wisdom, xiv-xvi, 119-29; trial, 86-193
 Styx, 505
 Sunium, Cape, 217

 Tantalus, 63
 Tartarus, 503, 505, 507, 509
 Telephus, 487
 Terpsion, 299

INDEX OF NAMES

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>Thebes, 206, 257, 293n2
 Theseus, 196, 270, 295
 Thessaly, 206, 225, 259, 261
 Thetis, 147
 "Thirty Tyrants," xxi, 100, 102,
 103, 161
 Tholos, 161
 Thrasyllus of Alexandria, vii
 Thucydides, 94
 Triptolemus, 191
 Troy, 147, 191</p> | <p>Uranus, 47
 Xanthippe, 270, 301
 Xenophanes, 7
 Xenophon, ix, xi, xii, 9, 87, 89,
 90, 92, 93n13, 112n8,
 193n70, 197, 256-57n46,
 281n15
 Zeus, 7, 37, 47, 65, 92</p> |
|---|---|

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- aporia/aporetic dialogues*, xv, 3, 10, 17, 78–79n59, 200, 203
- art/skill/craft (*technē*), xviii, 69n53, 73n54, 94, 135, 137, 449
- artisans, 125–27
- arts (*mousikē*), 247n34, 305
- Assembly (*Ekklēsia*), 101, 135n28
- atheism, 92–93, 141, 173
- attunement, 278, 280, 405–7, 427, 437
- belief in gods, 93, 139–45, 149.
See also atheism
- body. *See* soul/body
- builders, 73
- cause/causation (*aitia*), 282–83, 441–59
- chronology of Plato's dialogues, ix n5, xxvii–xxix, 3
- city/state, 205, 207, 245ff., 249ff.
- cold, 283, 469, 471, 477, 481
- "corruption of youth," 86, 94, 129, 131–39, 167
- Council (*Boulē*), 101, 134–35n28
- courage, 274, 335–37
- court procedure, 87–89
- death, 151, 183, 189–93, 197, 206, 217, 229, 235, 255, 271, 275, 284–85, 295, 297, 317, 319, 333, 335, 423, 479; and suicide, 273–74, 307–13
- death penalty, 151, 155, 175
- democracy, Athenian, xix, 100, 102, 103, 159
- dialogue: form, xxi–xxii; reported, 267
- dikē* (private prosecution by Euthyphro), 4–7, 21, 28, 29, 83, 87
- Dissoi Logoi* (double arguments), 96n19, 421n81
- doctor/trainer, 231
- dokimasia* (public scrutiny of citizens), 205, 207, 251
- dreams, 219, 305
- earth, description of, 285, 489–99
- elenchus* (philosophical questioning and scrutiny), 10, 96, 199–200
- ether, 493, 495

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- eunomia* (good order, in Sparta and Crete), 212, 257
- excellence (goodness, virtue: *aretē*), xviii–xx, xxiii, 98–100, 117, 153–55, 169, 201, 225
- exile, 179, 206, 211, 225, 251, 255
- expert/expertise, 210, 231, 419, 419n80. *See also* art/skill/craft
- fear/dread, 65, 67, 337
- fees for teaching, 117–19
- fine, Socrates' proposal for a penalty at his trial, 181, 180–81n59
- fire, 469, 471, 477, 483
- flute players, 143
- form/idea, 273, 282ff., 289–90, 325, 377, 457, 459, 469, 471, 473
- god(s), xx, 8ff., 19, 25, 37, 39, 69, 71, 73, 75–83, 86, 91, 127, 139–45, 313, 315, 329, 339, 499; gods' love as essence or attribute of the holy, 12–15, 41–61. *See also* atheism
- good life, the, viii, xvi–xix, 237
- graphē* (public prosecution), 21–25, 22n5. *See also* indictment against Socrates
- guardians, 105
- happiness (*eudaimonia*) xix, 100
- harmonia. *See* attunement
- heavens, the, 493, 495
- hemlock, viii, 3, 196, 266, 268n3, 315, 511, 517, 519, 521
- herdsmanship, 71
- hired laborer (*pelatēs*), 31, 51, 83
- holy/unholy, the, xiv, 11–18, 31, 33–61, 34n20, 65–83, 263
- honor, 335
- horsefly, 11, 98, 157, 210
- horsemanship, 69
- hot, 469, 471, 477, 481, 483
- immortality of the soul, vii, 278, 279, 291, 355, 385, 481, 483–87, 511
- impiety (*asebeia*), vii, 3, 9, 86, 212. *See also* holy/unholy
- indictment against Socrates, 91–96, 212. *See also* *graphē*
- informers (*sukophantai*), 220–21n7, 221, 223
- judgement of souls, 285, 487, 507, 509
- jury/jurymen, 87, 102, 187, 187n66, 205, 273, 315, 341
- just/unjust, justice/injustice, xxiii, 15, 45, 51, 63–69, 109n3, 163, 171, 201–4, 222n8, 223, 225, 227, 233, 239, 243, 251, 325, 339, 391, 511
- knowledge (*episteme*), xiv–xviii, 77n58, 96, 119–31, 443; and Theory of Recollection, 355–71. *See also* understanding; wisdom

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- law/legal judgements, 204, 210, 213, 243, 245, 257, 259, 295.
See also graphē
- lyre, 405, 427. *See also* attunement
- mind, 281, 325, 447
- misologists, 279, 417–23
- moon, 141, 449, 499
- murder, 4–7, 29–31, 35
- mystery religion, 272, 288; initiates into, 339. *See also* Orphism
- myth of the afterlife, 284, 487–89, 507–9
- natural science/scientists, 92, 104, 443–55
- “no one does wrong willingly,” xvii–xviii, 95, 137–39, 238–39n26, 239
- odd/even, 283, 471–73, 475–79
- opposites, 275, 278, 345–53, 467, 473, 475
- Orphism, 274
- ousia/pathos* (essence/attribute), 61, 61n44, 283, 371n51
- parent/child (analogy with state/citizen) 205, 208, 209
- “persuade or obey” (in *Crito*), 206, 209, 253
- physical exercise (*gumnastikē*), 247
- piety. *See* holy/unholy, the
- poets/poetry, 125, 305–7
- prejudice/slander (*diabolē*), against Socrates, x, 9, 92, 111, 113–15, 131, 147
- prison, 196–97, 300–301n10, 301
- protreptic (exhortation), 200, 201, 204–6
- prytany, 160n41, 161
- purification, 331, 339
- reason/reasoning, 323, 327, 399.
See also understanding; wisdom
- Recollection, Theory of, ix, 266, 275–76, 279, 289; and knowledge, 355–71, 425–27
- reincarnation, 391–93
- religious: belief, 7–9, 200; revelation, 278
- rivers of the underworld, 501–7
- scientific speculation, 92n12, 280–82. *See also* natural science/scientists
- senses, 323, 379
- sex, 319, 389, 517
- shame/shameful, 45, 65, 67, 99, 227
- shipwrights, 73
- snow, 469, 471
- Sōkratikoī Logoi* (Socratic Dialogues), xi–xii, 197, 213, 269
- sophists, x, xxi, 102, 104, 115–19, 420–21n81
- soul, viii, 153, 211, 213, 266, 271, 274, 276, 284, 290, 327, 343, 371, 377, 431, 441, 479

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- soul/body, 202, 233, 235n21,
271-72, 274, 277-79, 284,
319-23, 331, 373-75, 381-95,
409-15, 425, 435-37, 489,
513, 515
- spirits (*daimones*), 145; guiding
spirit of individual, 487; Soc-
rates' *daimon* (see Index of
Names, under Socrates)
- stars, 449, 493, 495
- state. See city/state
- suicide, 273-74, 307, 309
- sun, 141, 449, 493, 499
- swans, and prophesy, 401-3
- temperance, 274, 335-37, 391,
511
- text, xxiii-xxv
- trainer. See doctor/trainer
- transmigration of souls, 274,
277, 391
- trial (of Socrates), ix, xi, 3-4, 19,
33, 87-89, 223-27, 293, 301
- truth (*alētheia*), 99, 235, 511
- tyranny, 391
- understanding, 233. See also
knowledge; wisdom
- underworld, geography of, 285
- verdict at Socrates' trial, 172-
73n52, 173; voting system,
87, 88n5
- visible/invisible, 379, 389
- weaver/tailor, 279, 409
- wisdom (*sophia, phronesis*),
xiv-xvi, 99, 119-29, 153, 339,
383, 523. See also knowledge;
understanding