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CAESAR  
CIVIL WAR



*Edited and Translated by*  
CYNTHIA DAMON

Caesar (C. Iulius, 102–44 BC), statesman and soldier, defied the dictator Sulla; served in the Mithridatic wars and in Spain; entered Roman politics as a “democrat” against the senatorial government; was the real leader of the coalition with Pompey and Crassus; conquered all Gaul for Rome; attacked Britain twice; was forced into civil war; became master of the Roman world; and achieved wide-reaching reforms until his murder. We have his books of *commentarii* (notes): eight on his wars in Gaul from 58–52 BC, including the two expeditions to Britain in 55–54, and three on the civil war of 49–48. They are records of his own campaigns (with occasional digressions) in vigorous, direct, clear, unemotional style and in the third person, the account of the civil war being somewhat more impassioned.

This edition of the *Civil War* replaces the earlier Loeb Classical Library edition by A. G. Peskett (1914) with new text, translation, introduction, and bibliography. In the Loeb Classical Library edition of Caesar, Volume I is his *Gallic War*; Volume III consists of *Alexandrian War*, *African War*, and *Spanish War*, commonly ascribed to Caesar by our manuscripts but of uncertain authorship.

Cynthia Damon is Professor of Classical Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.



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# CAESAR

## CIVIL WAR

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY  
CYNTHIA DAMON



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CIVIL WAR

BOOK 1

1861

1862

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## PREFACE

This edition replaces A. G. Peskett's 1914 Loeb edition of the *Civil Wars*, which is now outdated in both text and translation. Peskett's text was based largely on the 1847 edition of Nipperdey and the 1906 edition of Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel. The century since its publication has seen new critical editions in the Teubner and Budé series, and my Oxford Classical Text, which is based on a new collation and stemma, appeared in 2015 along with a volume of studies on the text. The text presented in the present Loeb edition differs from Peskett's in more than four hundred places. The new Loeb *Civil War* also has a different editorial philosophy, one that encourages readers to acknowledge the nature of the text they are reading, which is not Caesar's text exactly, but rather a text resulting from the mediation—copying, preserving, emending, printing, studying—of many agents over the course of two millennia. Where that mediation has resulted in readings whose discrepancies significantly affect the meaning, I provide both textual notes *and* help for the reader who wants to use them: the competing readings are translated in the notes to the translation.

The translation, too, is new, and not just where the texts diverge. Our understanding of the collapse of the Republic and of Caesar's style and rhetoric has advanced consid-

## PREFACE


erably since 1914, as can be seen in the General Bibliography provided below. While far from comprehensive, the bibliography does indicate the range of work done over the course of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries on subjects as diverse as Roman history, Latin prose style, propaganda, narrative technique, and intertextuality, to mention only a few. All of this work makes Peskett's very readable translation look rather too smooth; it is the story of Caesar's triumph over yet another "foe," and we are told that the narrative "may be regarded as in the main trustworthy" (vii). Although he acknowledges in a general way that Caesar seems to have engaged in some misrepresentation (vii–viii), the places where Caesar gives an uncomplicated account of a complicated or different reality are almost never indicated in Peskett's translation. I have tried to give the reader a fuller appreciation of the way Caesar makes words work for him. I refrained from following Peskett in using the historical present, which, although wonderfully effective in Latin, is more distracting than vivid in English, or so it seems to me. But to restore some of the lost vividness, I converted many speeches from Caesar's paraphrase form into direct utterances, thereby improving the precision of the rendering, as well, since English lacks some features necessary for the grammatical construction used in the Latin ("indirect statement"). Like its predecessor, this Loeb edition has a generous index that simultaneously functions as a glossary identifying historical individuals and supplying modern place names. Place names marked with an asterisk (\*) in the index can be found on the maps at the end of the volume. English place-names on the maps identify some geographical fea-

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tures not mentioned by Caesar. A timeline of events concludes the introduction.

To the gratitude I expressed in the OCT preface to the many scholars and friends who have helped and influenced my work on Caesar over the years, I am pleased to add here an acknowledgment of new debts accrued while preparing the Loeb edition, to Philip Schwartzberg for the maps, to Cheryl Lincoln for the production of the volume, and to Michael Sullivan, Richard Thomas, and above all Jeffrey Henderson for welcoming a new edition of Caesar's *Civil War* into the Loeb Classical Library.





## INTRODUCTION

The civil war fought in 49–48 BC involved much of the Roman world, as the armies of Caesar and Pompey clashed in Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, and Greece. Rome's prodigious military strength and the expertise so long honed against external enemies turned inward, with results made more dreadful by the tumultuous political and social context of the Late Republic and the personal antipathies fueled by that turmoil. In the *Civil War* Caesar tells the story—his version of the story, that is—to an audience for whom the history surveyed in sections I–III of this Introduction would have been only too familiar. All dates are BC, and references are to the *Civil War* unless otherwise specified.

### I. THE COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLIC

#### A. *Rome Dominant*

In the middle of the second century the Greek historian Polybius, looking back at Rome's conquest of the Mediterranean world over the previous half century or so, felt that the achievement—"a thing unique in history," he says—called for explanation. "How did the Romans do this?" he asked in the opening paragraph of his *History*, and, strikingly, "With what sort of political system?" This politically

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canny writer, who knew both the Greek states over which Rome had achieved hegemony and the Roman state itself, drew particular attention to the role of Rome's (unwritten) constitution in her startling military and political success.

The distinctive feature of Rome's constitution as Polybius saw it was its stability, a result of the system's combination of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements, and the way these were balanced and controlled.

Balance was provided by the distribution of responsibilities: monarchic functions such as the enlistment and command of soldiers and the presidency of political assemblies and courts were exercised by magistrates; aristocratic functions such as deliberation about wars, finances, and legislation were exercised by the senate; and democratic functions such as elections and the ratification of laws were exercised by a variety of popular assemblies. No group ran the state alone.

Control came from effective curbs on each group's actions. Magistracies from the highest to the lowest were collegial (meaning that there was more than one magistrate at each level), and each colleague had veto power over his peers. Furthermore, a magistrate's term of office was limited to a year, and there were significant barriers to reelection to the most senior magistracy, the consulship. The senate, made up of former magistrates with lifetime membership, could allocate money and commands but could not execute its will directly. The people, as mustered in its various assemblies, could bestow office and pass laws but could not put candidates on the slate or draft the laws it wanted. A further check on the group possessed of power at its most untrammelled, the magistrates, came from the judicial system in which, after their year in office, they could be tried for abuses of power.

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This mixed and balanced constitution, impressive as it was, was not the only source of Rome's stability. Practical and cultural factors also contributed.

Chief among the practical factors was of course wealth. Wealthy men held Rome's magistracies and served in her senate. There was no property qualification for office at this period, but government service was unremunerated, and bringing oneself to the attention of the electorate was expensive. Since wealth in this period mostly took the form of land, two of the three branches of government were manned by wealthy landowners, a traditionally conservative group. And in the third branch, the popular assemblies, particularly in the assembly that elected the senior magistrates (two annual consuls and six annual praetors at this period), the votes of wealthy citizens counted for more than the votes of poor ones.

An important segment of these wealthy voters was a group called the *equites*. (The term, which means "horsemen," derives from an early phase of military organization at Rome in which the *equites* equipped themselves for military service with a cavalry mount and the appropriate paraphernalia, whereas of the ordinary citizen, on whom see below, only body armor and weapons were required.) Instead of holding public office, these men provided the financing and corporate organization that enabled the state to accomplish major undertakings such as road-building, aqueducts, temples, military supplies, and tax collection—for a price, of course. Their interests were long aligned with those of their social peers, the office-holding elite.

Below the elite were two economically distinct types of citizen, those with property and those without. The former, peasant farmers for the most part, manned the

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legions; the latter, which dominated the urban populace, were ineligible for legionary posts. The interests of citizen soldiers were guaranteed some protection by their crucial service to the state, those of the populace by their potentially disruptive presence in the city of Rome.

The political, social, and economic divisions between social groups—senators, *equites*, propertied, landless—were to some extent blurred by patronage, or *clientela*, which facilitated the creation of mutually beneficial vertical links between individuals at different levels and (not coincidentally) discouraged the formation of broad interest groups within any given level. And the profits of Rome's expanding empire made it seem possible to attend to the interests of all groups; there was ever more wealth in the "commonwealth" (*res publica*). Successful military campaigns yielded immediate booty—in the form of goods and slaves—which was distributed in varying proportions among commander, army, and commonwealth coffers. Longer-term gains were public land for distribution to individuals or to new towns called "colonies," as well as tax revenues for the state and its collection agents.

The fact that this influx of wealth long contributed to Rome's stability was due, at least as the Romans saw it, to their civic virtue, which privileged the collective good over the individual (*res publica* over *res privata*) and activity over leisure (*negotium* over *otium*). These fundamental values were enshrined in "ancestral custom" (*mos maiorum*) and transmitted by stories about meritorious men and women who provided models for all citizens. Among the upper echelons of society these values motivated both the pursuit of personal prestige (*dignitas*) and the preservation of oligarchic consensus (*concordia*). The former

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accrued from military and political achievements, the latter from a kind of senatorial self-policing that kept levels of individual wealth and prestige reasonably equal; infringement was deemed "aspiring to kingship" (*regnum*).

Such was the system that, according to Polybius, enabled Rome with its vast resources of manpower in peninsular Italy and its rigorously militaristic ethos to overwhelm its opponents around the Mediterranean in the late third and early second centuries. At the time Polybius wrote (mid-second century), this system had been fairly stable for about two centuries, a period traditionally referred to as the Middle Republic. But the stability he admired in Rome required that many powerful forces be kept in balance, a balance needing constant adjustment as real-world conditions changed; stability and the preservation of the status quo were not synonymous. Polybius in fact saw trouble coming, and he modified his work's original plan—a history of the crucial fifty-three years of Rome's rise to power (220–167)—to include a treatment of the period after 167, when Rome showed how it would run its empire. Some of the problems described by the well informed historian in the immediate post-167 period were blazingly evident by the time Caesar was born in 100.

### *B. Problems*

At the beginning of the first century the task of preserving and extending the empire was putting terrible pressure on the political system and creating dangerous tensions within Roman society. With ever more provinces to administer and ever more territory to defend, there were ever more opportunities for the exercise of power and

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the winning of personal glory; could parity be preserved? More legions were needed, and they were employed on longer campaigns; could soldiers remain farmers? Profits multiplied, too, but the additional resources were not an unmixed boon: one troubling byproduct was heightened tension over their distribution.

The expansion of the empire was not matched by expansion in Rome's political system. The traditional structure of magistrates, senate, and popular assemblies remained in place. But the thirty or so officeholders elected by the people each year did not nearly suffice to staff all of the posts needed to run the government at home and abroad, even after the modest increase in the number of junior magistrates in the revised constitution established by Sulla in the 80s (more on this below). Workarounds were devised such as extending ("proroguing") the power of senior magistrates beyond their year in office so that they could be sent off to army commands and provincial governorships as *pro*consuls and *pro*praetors. Another expedient was to contract out some of the necessary tasks. Eventually provincial defense and administration were almost entirely in the hands of ex-magistrates commanding the legions and presiding over the local courts, and of corporations holding contracts to collect the taxes owed to Rome (the tax-farmers, or *publicani*). Moreover, the institutions that traditionally curbed the exercise of power at Rome—strict term limits and veto power—were largely irrelevant in the provinces, which functioned under something akin to martial law. More men wielding power, fewer constraints: in the provinces, at least, the constitution's balance and control were under threat.

But if the pressure caused by the empire's needs was

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bad, the tensions arising from its opportunities were worse. Rome was still the center of her political world in 100, and the beneficiaries of the new opportunities for the exercise of power still focused their ambition on the offices in Rome, particularly, of course, on the two annual consulships. Competition for these offices grew increasingly fierce over the course of the first century, and so, accordingly, did the cost (construed broadly) of political ambition: a candidate needed both greater achievements and more cash than his ancestors had needed, and the consequences of his needs were more deleterious.

Provincial commands were the best and nearly the only venues in which members of the Roman political elite could enrich themselves quickly; agriculture was too slow, manufacturing too low, and trade and banking were technically off limits for senators (the *equites* occupied themselves with these). Rome's military victories had always profited her commanders, but the scale of both campaigns and profit grew drastically in this period. Furthermore, a prospective candidate's need for cash, coupled with the political influence of his class, altered in the elite's favor the distribution of the wealth accruing from campaigns. These factors also fostered a culture of corruption that led to widespread abuses: extortionate governors secured acquittal by bribing their juries, for example. The first century saw rapid growth in the wealth of the powerful few along with growing alienation on the part of those who, for a variety of reasons, did not benefit to the same extent or who suffered: the urban populace, military veterans, allies, provincials, and of course unsuccessful politicians.

The need for achievements, together with Roman militarism, encouraged ever larger wars, and as the empire



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grew these wars were fought further and further from the Italian homeland of Rome's soldiers. Agricultural production could be accomplished with slave labor (itself a newly problematic element of the Roman world in the second and first centuries), and the food supply could be supplemented by in-kind taxation of the provinces, but the soldier-farmers themselves lost out and their numbers dwindled. Like the distribution of wealth, the patterns of landownership shifted in this period, again in favor of the wealthy. The reduction in the number of smallholders, however, left Rome's ambitious generals with manpower problems. And the newly landless inevitably swelled the ranks of the urban populace, where they needed support in both the short term (food subsidies) and the long (land distribution). Neither measure was palatable to the senate, although the latter at least would have remedied the manpower shortage. Equally unpalatable was another possible remedy, namely, the extension of citizenship to Rome's Italian allies, who had been supplying auxiliaries to the army for centuries and had helped acquire the empire: the allies felt entitled to a greater share of the empire's rewards, but as new citizens they would inevitably alter the balance of power in Rome.

In the first century, then, the military task of governing the provinces and the political task of preserving the social order were bigger jobs than ever before. So, of course, was the prestige attendant upon success. But as we have seen, success brought its own problems for senatorial *concordia*. In fact, the system was seriously out of kilter, lurching toward the future. For the trends described in the preceding paragraphs were experienced not as trends but as a series of crises in which dichotomies presented them-

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selves: tradition versus innovation, collective versus individual, urban versus rural, senate versus people, wealthy versus poor, Rome versus Italy, and so on. The following example illustrates the point. A dangerous string of defeats in Numidia in the late second century discredited the traditional military leadership and threatened the empire's stability: if Numidia's wily king Jugurtha could defy Rome, so too could other powers, it was felt. In this crisis a political newcomer, one Gaius Marius, a proven commander of undistinguished antecedents (a "new man," *novus homo*), was put in charge of the war, replacing an aristocrat from a family long involved in running Rome. Not only that, but Marius' appointment was made by a popular assembly rather than, as was traditional, by the senate. His eventual victory over Jugurtha—and with it the victories of new man over aristocrat, people over senate—represented a powerful challenge to the republican status quo.

A particularly influential dichotomy in the first century concerned the location of political authority. Sovereignty, unquestionably, belonged to the people, which acted through its electoral and legislative assemblies. But for at least two centuries the senate had been the dominant authority in the polity referred to as "the senate and people of Rome" (*senatus populusque Romanus*, SPQR). At every crisis, appeals were made to each group, and at some point those who leveraged popular sovereignty and senatorial authority into political power took or acquired labels that are now used as a convenient shorthand in the analysis of first-century politics. The *optimates*, or "supporters of the best men," asserted the authority (and interests) of the senate, the *populares*, or "supporters of the people," the sovereignty (and interests) of the *populus*

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*Romanus*. So dominant was this dichotomy in the century's political struggles that other divisions clustered around it, such that "optimate" could also signify "traditional" and "aristocratic," while "popular" could signify "egalitarian" and "possessing personal merit." *Optimates* and *populares* were neither interest groups nor political parties, and a man might describe himself as an optimate in one context and a *popularis* in another; Cicero certainly did. But the labels are a convenient and now traditional device for highlighting a powerful and ultimately destructive tension in Roman political life during the Late Republic.

While any public figure could claim that he or the policy he advocated was in the popular interest, there was a particularly strong connection between the officials known as "plebeian tribunes" or "tribunes of the people" and *popularis* proposals. Early in the history of the Republic the office of tribune was created to give citizens protection against abuses of power by magistrates. Ten were elected each year, and they were eventually a force to be reckoned with: they could summon (or dismiss) assemblies and veto the actions of any magistrate, plus their persons were sacrosanct, meaning that physical harm to them would be avenged by the Roman populace. The political struggles of the Late Republic often saw one or more tribunes pitted against the authority of the senate and the executive power of the consuls; the aforementioned appointment of Marius, which was proposed and put to a vote by a tribune, is a case in point. When a still sharper crisis in the 80s prompted modifications to the constitution, some of the most important changes served to curb tribunician action. But the interests to which tribunes traditionally gave expression found other support-

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ers, and the tribunes themselves had recovered their full powers by 55 (1.7.3–4).

The response of senate and optimates to tribunician activism sometimes took the form of a declaration of emergency. Known as “the senate’s final decree,” or SCU (*senatus consultum ultimum*), this measure entreated magistrates and military commanders “to take care that the republic suffer no harm” (1.5.3, 1.7.5–6). Its passage signaled the failure of political processes and the necessity of military action. The first SCU was passed in 121; thereafter they came at ever shorter intervals.

### C. Solution?

As crisis followed crisis in the provinces and at Rome in the last century of the Republic, the precedent set by Marius’ command was followed again and again. The causes of any individual crisis are difficult to disentangle, but recourse was repeatedly had to solutions—extraordinary military commands and dictatorships superseding the power of ordinary magistrates, including tribunes—that by their very nature undermined the constitution they were meant to rescue.

Rome’s armies made a poor showing against a number of challenging enemies besides Jugurtha in this period. Correctly or not, blame was laid at the door of the commanders, and it seemed that the traditional political processes for selecting magistrates and allocating commands were no longer yielding commanders competent to preserve and extend the empire. Although the traditional processes continued to operate, the more spectacular failures were followed by ad hoc measures whereby the people

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(often through their tribunes) rather than the senate appointed men to marshal and lead their forces.

After his triumph over Jugurtha, for example, Marius received two unusual kinds of authority to head the resistance to tribes invading Italy from the north: the populace elected him to an unprecedented string of consulships (107, 104–100, 86), and it allowed him to enlist landless citizens in the legions, a first for Rome. All such soldiers—and the precedent set by Marius quickly became the norm—eventually depended on their general's political clout for the land grants upon discharge that would support them in retirement.

An even more drastic solution was attempted a decade later, after the republic was torn by successive wars against allies (the “Social War,” from *socii*, “allies”) and between citizens (the “Civil War” of the 80s), when the requisite rebuilding was entrusted to one Lucius Cornelius Sulla as “dictator for establishing the constitution of the republic.” The dictatorship was a traditional emergency office, but no dictatorships had been needed for the past century, and Sulla held onto power for nearly three years, far longer than the standard six-month term. As dictator, Sulla was beyond the reach of the veto and above the law itself (he could, for example, kill and confiscate with impunity).

Then a decade after Sulla, in the early 60s, the stability of the empire was threatened again, this time by disruptions to trade and communication caused by piratical activity in the Mediterranean. A popular assembly proceeded to give Pompey the Great, who had proven himself in earlier extraordinary commands, unprecedented powers to deal with the problem: a three-year command with authority superior to that of all provincial governors, plus

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an army more than one hundred thousand strong and the money to pay it.

Marius turned back the Northern tribes in 100, Sulla shored up the authority of the senate with his new constitution in the late 80s, and Pompey swept the Mediterranean free of pirates in 67. The success of these and other ad hoc appointments seemed to justify toleration of their dangerous byproducts, which included armies more loyal to their commanders than to the state, and vast wealth and influence for the leaders. Not to mention the example these leaders set of using (or threatening to use) military force in Rome to achieve their own ends: Marius and Sulla to secure command of the war against Mithridates in the 80s, Pompey to be honored with a triumph in the 80s and to satisfy the needs of his soldiers in the 70s and 60s. But the creation of one "strongman" after another failed to avert the collapse.

### *D. Collapse*

By the 50s the chronic problems plaguing Rome had become acute. The "strongman" precedent exacerbated political competition by setting the stakes of success ever higher, and the profits of empire, well- or ill-gotten, fueled the competition. Social tensions gave political rivals issues around which to build support: *popularis* candidates lobbied for the distribution of public lands to the poor and to veterans, or for subsidized grain, or for extensions of citizenship, while optimate candidates resisted all of these, and indeed any change to traditional practices undergirding senatorial hegemony and aristocratic privilege. Corruption, too, became more prevalent in the political and

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judicial processes, rendering the results of elections and trials suspect or even void. Meanwhile street violence covering the spectrum from intimidation to assassination became an appallingly effective political tactic. Indeed in the 50s the electoral process was so compromised that a number of years began with no magistrates in office: either elections could not be held because of the violence or those elected were disqualified for corruption. Furthermore, Pompey and Caesar were now in control of powerful armies—Rome's armies, in theory—that they could (and would) use for their own ends (1.7.7–8).

Full-scale civil war broke out between them in 49, when Caesar crossed the Rubicon (more on this below). Civil war continued after Pompey's death in 48 until Caesar's final victory over the Pompeian faction in 45, and it resumed upon his assassination in 44. During a brief period of political supremacy marked by his string of consulships and dictatorships from 48 to 44, Caesar, like Marius, Sulla, and Pompey before him, failed to restore the republic as a functioning system. His legacy was more political turmoil, more ad hoc solutions, and more civil war. Not until his heir, Octavian, defeated the last of his rivals at the battle of Actium in 31 did Rome have a stable government again. A republic it was not.

## II. CAESAR'S CAREER TO 49

One of the last extraordinary commands under the republican system was Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul, which began in March of 58. Over the next nine years Caesar transformed the territory's political organization and so-

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lified his control of the army with which he would later transform Rome. Caesar was forty-one when he took up his provincial command, fifty-five when he died. In order to understand what he achieved (and failed to achieve) in power, we need to look briefly at his route to the top.

Caesar was born at the beginning of the first century into a noble family, the Iulii Caesares, whose political record in recent generations was mixed. His father's and grandfather's careers had been undistinguished, but another branch of the family had done rather better (1.8.2). His mother's relatives were more prominent still and enjoyed particular favor under Sulla. But Caesar's most important connection by far was his aunt Julia's husband, who had triumphed over Jugurtha, saved Italy from invasion, and held the consulship seven times: Gaius Marius. (Marius also led one faction in a bloody civil war against Sulla and his supporters, but Caesar never evokes that aspect of his career, at least not deliberately.) The influence of Marius, who was consul for the last time in 86, was presumably responsible for his young nephew's first mark of political distinction, a priesthood for which Caesar was selected that year. (Priesthoods in the state religion were political offices as much as religious ones and were regularly combined with magistracies and military commands.) But Marius died early in his consulship, and his faction was driven from power by Sulla later in the decade. When Sulla required a show of allegiance from Caesar thereafter—Caesar was to divorce his wife, who had Marian connections of her own—Caesar refused. His nascent political career suffered accordingly: stripped of his priesthood, he went overseas on military service. Here, however,



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he eventually distinguished himself by earning a "civic crown" for saving the life of a fellow citizen.

Sulla's death in 78 cued Caesar's return to Rome. High-profile prosecutions of extortionate provincial governors from Sulla's faction followed, with Caesar losing his cases but showing himself willing to challenge powerful men on behalf of their victims. In 72 he started up the *cursus honorum*, the career ladder of a Roman politician, which led to a decade in which he alternated between political offices and military commands of ever-increasing authority. In 62 he held the penultimate office in the *cursus*, the praetorship, and moved then into a provincial governorship in Spain. Also acquired in this period were lifetime memberships in the senate (from 69) and the priestly order of pontiffs (from 73; he was chief pontiff, or *pontifex maximus*, from 63 until his death).

While the shape of Caesar's career thus far was fairly typical for men of his background, the political actions in which he distinguished himself had a decidedly *popularis* character. They also involved him in political alliances with far-reaching consequences. For example, as the only senator speaking in favor of a tribunician proposal to give Pompey his extraordinary command against the pirates in 67, Caesar gratified both Pompey and the popular assembly that passed the proposal and associated himself with Pompey's resounding success. As a junior magistrate he also sponsored several lavish entertainments for the populace, expensive undertakings that were now all but required for electoral success at the next level. The timing of such shows was always a problem: a candidate had to provide games *before* holding the office(s) in which he

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might hope for profits on a scale sufficient to pay for the games. In Caesar's case the pressing debts he incurred by his generosity and showmanship prompted him to seek financing from Rome's wealthiest man, Marcus Crassus.

Caesar returned to Rome from Spain in 60 after a term as governor in which he earned military distinction and remedied his financial situation. In the normal course of events he could reasonably expect a triumph and election to the top post on the political career ladder, the consulship. The political situation in 60, however, was at a stalemate. A number of issues required action, including measures proposed by Pompey and Crassus, but the more pressing the need for an action, the greater the political credit to someone for spearheading it, and some senators opposed all substantive measures lest any one senator profit. Thwarting Caesar's bid for a triumph was of relatively little consequence, but thwarting Pompey and Crassus, who represented large and powerful interest groups, prompted a response. Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus joined forces to accomplish their various priorities; the informal political alliance they forged in 60 is known as the First Triumvirate, and among its first results was the election of Caesar to the consulship of 59.

In a stormy year as consul, Caesar forced through his new allies' measures against concerted opposition. Traditional procedures and principles were flouted, and political deliberation was interrupted by violence as Caesar overrode all resistance. Even contemporaries who found the opposition to the Triumvirate obviously and frustratingly shortsighted were shocked by Caesar's actions. Compensation for the political risks he took that year and the

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reward for his success in getting necessary political business done took the form of an extraordinary five-year command, proposed to and passed by a popular assembly.

Gaul was not his original destination. Caesar's initial proconsular appointment was to five-year commands in the Balkan peninsula and Italy north of the Po. The provinces of Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul, as these areas were called, were contiguous to one another and, more importantly, to Italy, over whose politics Caesar intended to keep a watchful eye. The five-year term was unusually long but not unprecedented, and the posts provided him with immunity from prosecution for their duration. (Some of his actions as consul had been of dubious legality at best and had earned him many powerful enemies.) Later in 59, when news reached Rome of threats to her transalpine province in Gaul—a strip along the southern coast of France (modern Provence) that secured the route to the two Spanish provinces and extended up the Rhone valley to Lake Geneva—this area was added to Caesar's charge. By March of 58 the news was sufficiently alarming to draw him directly to Gaul.

Rome had been intermittently involved in southern Gaul for centuries, particularly in connection with the affairs of Marseilles, a free Greek city allied to Rome. Marseilles itself remained independent, but the rest of Provence was organized as a Roman province some time in the sixty-year period before Caesar's arrival; the precise date is a matter of scholarly debate. The governor's responsibility for his province's security required attention to and sometimes military involvement in events at a distance from Provence itself. At some point in the early first century, for example, a relationship was established with

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the Aedui of central France, who became "friends of the Roman people." And in the late 60s a war was fought to pacify a tribe based east of the Rhône, the Allobroges. Most recently (in the year of Caesar's consulship, in fact) the senate had recognized Ariovistus, a powerful German leader who had taken possession of lands southwest of the Rhine, as another "friend of the Roman people" (*BG* 1.40.2, 1.42.3). In short, Rome's sphere of influence in Gaul was extensive. So in 58 when Caesar heard from the Aedui that the Helvetii (from the area of modern Switzerland) were planning a mass migration west through Aeduan territory, he deemed it a matter requiring his attention (*BG* 1.11.6, where Caesar refrains from mentioning the complication presented by a Sullan law that prohibited a governor from leaving his province without authorization from the senate).

After his arrival in March of 58, Caesar and his legions (four at first, ten by 50) fought a series of wars ever farther from Provence: north to Belgium, northwest to Brittany, west to Aquitaine. His forces eventually crossed the Rhine into Germany and the Channel into Britain. These are the campaigns whose achievements he records in the *Gallic War*, achievements that rivaled Pompey's and dismayed his peers.

In 56, the third year of Caesar's command, the question of what would happen after the end of his original five-year term became acute. The senate, which decided such matters, had been kept apprised of Caesar's achievements and had given him unprecedented recognition for them (*BG* 2.35.4). Caesar wanted more time, however, while his political opponents wanted to replace him. In support of Caesar's position Cicero delivered a speech, *On the Con-*

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*sular Provinces*, in which he assessed Caesar's achievements; the rhetorical challenge was to communicate the magnitude of what Caesar had done without suggesting that the job itself was done. Cicero made his case, and Caesar's command was renewed for another five-year term in 55, with the support of the year's consuls—Pompey and Crassus, for the second time (the Triumvirate had been renewed in 56). Thereafter Caesar occupied himself with the conquest of Gaul until he crossed the Rubicon into Italy in 49 to fight his own countrymen.

## III. CAESAR'S CIVIL WARS

The careers of both Pompey and Caesar represented an obvious danger for the constitution that Polybius so admired. In 56 Caesar was perhaps the more pressing challenge to the aforementioned ideal of consensus (*concordia*), and Cicero urged the senate that year to put Caesar in their debt by prolonging his command (*On the Consular Provinces* 38). By so doing, he argued, the senate would both assert its role as the primary purveyor of prestige and deflect Caesar from his *popularis* path. But in the end it was Pompey, not Caesar, who turned to the senate for the affirmation of his *dignitas*.

Throughout the 50s Pompey remained in Italy, the most eminent figure of his day; Crassus was a distant second, at least in military glory. Pompey's politics were rather inscrutable, however, while Crassus was more active in the public sphere. In 57 Pompey received another extraordinary commission, this time to organize Rome's food supply for five years. As consuls in 55 he and Crassus

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acted forcefully in the interests of the Triumvirate, securing five-year proconsular appointments for themselves to match Caesar's; Pompey was to have Spain, Crassus Syria. But political conditions in Rome continued to deteriorate, and Pompey postponed his departure for Spain. (Crassus went to Syria and died campaigning against the Parthians in 53.) By 52 the situation was so unmanageable—no magistrates had been elected for the year, and widespread rioting in January prompted the senate's emergency decree, the SCU—that contrary to all republican precedent Pompey became consul without a colleague. Rome's regular magistracies had been collegial for nearly five hundred years, but for three years running regular elections had been compromised and delayed by corruption and violence. Pompey, backed by a military garrison and protected by a bodyguard, wielded his power energetically, expediting trials and passing legislation that revised procedures for elections and provincial appointments (3.1.4, 1.85.9). Some measures threatened Caesar, others worked in his favor (1.8.2–3, 1.32.3); the marriage connection uniting the two men since 59 had vanished with the death of Caesar's daughter Julia in 54 (1.4.4). When Pompey made his subsequent father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, his consular colleague for the second half of 52, the immediate political crisis had been weathered. The threat represented by Caesar, however, remained.

In 51, the year after his victory over the vast coalition of Gallic tribes assembled by Vercingetorix, Caesar began winding up his provincial command. Hirtius' narrative of the years 51–50 shows Caesar settling affairs in Transalpine Gaul and basking in his popularity in Cisalpine Gaul

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(*BG* 8). Caesar's political future required him to return to Rome, but every aspect of the timing and terms of that return required careful calculation.

The details of the process whereby the Roman world lurched toward civil war in 50 are now difficult to discern. Negotiating positions shifted considerably as months passed and parameters changed, and everything was reformulated again after Caesar's victory. The supply of contemporary evidence for this period is unusually rich thanks to Caesar himself, Cicero and his correspondents, and Asinius Pollio, among others, but historians disagree about which of the many factors in play were decisive in bringing the two sides into armed conflict. Was Caesar motivated by fear of prosecution, as his former legate Asinius Pollio, writing after Pharsalus, has him assert (*Suet. Jul.* 30)? Or was he trying to avoid undeserved and unprecedented humiliation, as he himself asserts repeatedly (1.9.2, 1.22.5, 1.32.4, 1.85.10)? Or did he foresee meeting the same fate as Clodius, a recent favorite of the Roman People and "justly murdered," according to Cicero (*Mil.* 30)? So Caelius suggests in the fall of 50 (*Cic. Fam.* 8.14.2; cf. *BC* 1.9.4; *BG* 1.44.12). Is it even possible to identify a rational motivation for Caesar's actions? Cicero could find none (*Att.* 7.4.3 etc.). The decisive factors on the other side are harder to discern, since the actors are more numerous and less well represented in the surviving sources. That Pompey and his adherents viewed Caesar as an intolerable threat to the status quo is clear. But the urgency of the threat was assessed variously, and many people, including Cicero, seem to have felt that civil war was worse than any compromise, even if the compromise represented an impermanent solution. Only the main events



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can be mentioned here. A peculiar feature of the period is that both Caesar and Pompey had to use proxies in politics because their respective military commands kept them from entering Rome. So they are largely absent from the following sketch.

One of the consuls of 50, Gaius Claudius Marcellus, was an outspoken opponent of Caesar. According to an arrangement reached in 51, the issue of appointing a successor to Caesar—and thereby terminating his command—was to come before the senate in March of 50. In 52 Pompey had fundamentally changed the process of selecting provincial governors, with the result that a successor, once appointed, would be able to relieve Caesar of his command immediately; previously, when provinces were allocated before the election of the praetors and consuls who would eventually govern them, more than a year elapsed between allocation and succession (1.85.9). In 50 discussion was hampered and in the end halted by the actions of Curio, a tribune of the people who parried attacks on Caesar's interests that year. (Curio's aims are explained variously, but Caesar favors him with a notably positive portrayal in the *Civil War* [2.23–44] despite his poor military showing.) A more modest attempt to weaken Caesar was more successful: the senate reassigned two legions from Gaul to Syria in order, ostensibly, to counter the Parthians threatening Rome's eastern borders. Caesar complied, sending two legions to Italy for the purpose (1.2.3, 1.3.2, 1.4.5, 1.9.4, 1.32.6). But he had preempted the senate's various attempts to regain control of the men serving under him by, among other favors, doubling legionary pay. At the end of the campaigning season he quartered eight legions in Transalpine Gaul, maintaining



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another on garrison duty in Cisalpine Gaul. Pompey had seven legions in Spain and, once the reassigned legions were transferred to his command in December, two in Italy. In the consular elections for 49 Caesar's candidate was defeated; his legate Mark Antony, however, was elected to a tribunate. At this point the outlook for Caesar's political future was no better than it had been in 51, and the military justification for retaining his command in Gaul was increasingly unconvincing. Late in 50 Cicero returned from a stint as provincial governor in Cilicia. His correspondents, especially Caelius, had kept him well informed about developments at Rome, and he now dedicated himself to finding a peaceful settlement, both before and after the outbreak of hostilities.

By December of 50 Caesar had established himself at Ravenna, a town in his province of Cisalpine Gaul but close to the Italian border. At the beginning of the month the senate revived the discussion of provincial appointments, and Curio's proposal that Caesar and Pompey resign their commands *simultaneously* won the approval of a large majority: 370 to 22, according to Appian (*BC* 2.118-21). The presiding consul, Marcellus, ignored the vote. Curio later conveyed a new set of Caesar's proposals to the senate: these were "menacing and harsh" according to Cicero, "extremely mild" according to Caesar (*Cic. Fam.* 16.11.2; *Caes. BC* 1.5.5). When presented on January 1, they precipitated the first phase of the civil war (1.1.1). Caesar was declared a public enemy, the tribunes acting on his behalf were themselves threatened with reprisals, and a public emergency was declared on January 7 (1.5.2-4). Caesar responded by invading Italy with the one legion he had with him in Ravenna, transforming him-

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self, in Cicero's eyes, from a Roman proconsul into a Hannibal-like figure (*Att.* 7.11.1). And not only Cicero's: shortly after crossing the Rubicon, Caesar was deserted by his long-standing political associate Labienus, who had served him ably throughout the years in Gaul (3.87). There would be no compromise.

The main events of the war between Caesar and Pompey are listed below. The battle of Pharsalus with which the war concluded in 48 was a decisive military victory for Caesar. Pompey survived the battle and began to assemble new forces in the East but was killed soon thereafter in Alexandria. Some of Pompey's adherents treated Pharsalus as decisive politically, as well, accepting Caesar's pardon and returning to (some form of) political engagement. Many, however, did not. The opposition to Caesar reformed under leaders who belonged to Pompey's party or took advantage of Rome's preoccupation (Scipio, Cato, Pompey's sons, Pharnaces), drawing Caesar and his legions to Asia Minor in 47, to Africa in 46, and to Spain in 45. Each phase of the ongoing war ended with a victory: at Zela in 47, at Thapsus in 46, at Munda in 45. The whole Roman world was convulsed, and the political consequences were as transformative as the military campaigns were murderous. Caesar's accumulation of political offices for these years tells the tale in brief: in 48 he was consul for the second time, in 46 for the third, in 45 for the fourth, in 44 for the fifth; in 48, prior to his consulship, he was dictator for the first time (for eleven days; 3.2.1); after Pharsalus he was made dictator for a year; after Thapsus, dictator for ten years; after Munda, dictator for life. As dictator he could (and did) fill Rome's "elective" offices by appointment and for years to come. A monopoly of office

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like this, and even more, his control of the path to office, made nonsense of traditional Republican competitive (if elite) officeholding. More broadly, Rome's affairs were in Caesar's hands now; nothing could be done without his favor. The motives of the senators who conspired to assassinate him on March 15, 44, were no doubt various, but there were plenty to go around.

### IV. CAESAR'S CIVIL WAR

Caesar's *Civil War* recounts his conflict with Pompey and the beginning of the war he fought on Rome's behalf in Egypt, approximately two years of action in three books. In form and style the three books of the *Civil War* have much in common with his seven books on the campaigns fought in Gaul. The content naturally puts pressure on both form and style, but Caesar creates a clear continuity between Rome's proconsul and Pompey's opponent.

The narrative starts in January of 49, with Caesar and one legion in Cisalpine Gaul. Pompey and Caesar's other political enemies are in Rome with two legions nearby in Italy. When a political solution to the standoff caused by Caesar's demands and his enemies' refusal to meet them proves impossible, Caesar moves into Italy near Rimini and advances down the Adriatic coast, apparently unstoppable. (He does not mention the Rubicon; the story of the crossing is transmitted by other sources.) After turning inland he wins a key victory at the city of Corfinium, where he forces the surrender of a sizable Pompeian force. He enrolls these soldiers in his own army and releases their officers unharmed. His opponents withdraw from Rome

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southward, and eventually leave Italy for Greece. Without ships, Caesar cannot follow, so he turns his attention to Spain. The rest of Book 1 focuses on the fight in Spain, with a brief digression on Caesar's efforts, eventually successful, to overcome the resistance shown by Marseilles. The Spanish campaign and Book 1 end in the fall of 49 with Caesar's victory.

Book 2 wraps up the story of the siege of Marseilles and some loose ends pertaining to Spain, but most of it concerns the expeditionary force sent by Caesar to gain control of the province of North Africa, an important source of grain for the always-hungry capital city. Caesar did not go to Africa himself, sending Curio instead. Curio lost his whole army there and himself died in the final battle. Book 2 ends with this failure.

The focus of Book 3 is the contest between Caesar and Pompey in Greece. It begins with Caesar's bold winter crossing of the Adriatic in January of 48 and contains a long account of his encirclement of Pompey near a place on the west coast called Dyrrachium. In this effort Caesar overreaches and suffers a damaging defeat. He withdraws to the interior of the country, changes tactics, and finally meets Pompey's forces in pitched battle near the town of Pharsalus. Here he wins a decisive victory in August of 48. The narrative then follows Pompey to Alexandria, where he is treacherously assassinated in September. Caesar himself arrives in Alexandria in October, and the narrative comes to an abrupt halt in the early phases of a war fought to impose a Roman settlement on the Egyptian kingdom of the Ptolemies.

The *Civil War* is unfinished and seems to have been

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written shortly after the end of the war in Egypt in 47. It was apparently abandoned by its author, who of course lived on until 44 (more on this below).

One might expect the *Civil War* to be structured around the contest for primacy between Pompey and Caesar. It begins with Pompey's political opposition to Caesar in early 49 and builds through two books to their military confrontation in Greece. But neither Pompey's defeat at Pharsalus nor his death at Alexandria is the end of the work. Pompey's defeat was, Caesar hoped, the end of the civil war, but he carried the narrative on into a foreign war. And Pompey's death was not part of Caesar's plan at all: it was a badly miscalculated favor from Egypt's ruler. Thus the very structure of the *Civil War* indicates that for its author the contest with Pompey was not the whole story.

Caesar's pursuit of more than victory can be seen in a letter he wrote soon after the fighting began. Addressed to two of his most loyal supporters, it was also distributed to a wider public, including Cicero, in whose collection of correspondence it is preserved (*Att.* 9.7C). Cicero describes it as "a sanely-written letter, considering the prevailing insanity."

It makes me happy indeed that you say in your letter how much you approve of the things that were done at Corfinium. I shall follow your advice willingly—the more willingly since I had of my own accord decided to behave as mildly as possible and to make an effort to win Pompey over. Let us see whether in this fashion we can recover everyone's support and experience a lasting victory.

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In this letter of March, 49, written less than three months into a civil war that would last five years, Caesar is already pondering the foundations of future stability. "There are many possibilities," he says as the letter continues; the *Civil War* was one of them.

## V. THE TEXT

When Caesar was assassinated in 44, the *Civil War* seems to have been in an unfinished state. For example, it contains references to an episode that belongs in Book 2 but is not present in our text, namely, the defeat of Caesar's legate Gaius Antonius in Illyricum (3.4.2, 3.10.5, 3.67.5); other sources supply the details. The fact that Caesar launched but did not complete the narrative of the war in Alexandria also suggests that the project was overtaken by events. In the conflict-filled months that followed the assassination, members of Caesar's inner circle and officer corps, specifically Hirtius and Balbus but presumably others as well, initiated the publication of narratives of Caesar's campaigns as a corpus (see Hirtius' prefatory letter to Balbus in *BG* 8). Suetonius knows of a corpus of Caesarian texts that includes narratives of the Gallic war and the "Pompeian civil war" by Caesar himself, and narratives of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars by other variously identified authors (*Jul.* 56.1). This corpus bears only a general resemblance to the one that Hirtius describes, which does not demarcate by military theater the campaigns of 48–45 and carries the story to the end of Caesar's life. But it matches the extant collection of five Caesarian narratives, the *corpus Caesarianum*, in both its content

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
and in the anonymity of the authors of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars. At least one copy of the collection survived from antiquity into the Middle Ages. This was copied at least twice some time early in the Carolingian period, and all of the roughly two hundred extant manuscripts of the *Civil War* descend from one of the copies. So while the series of copies made between antiquity and the present is unbroken, it cannot be traced back beyond that one Carolingian exemplar, which is called the archetype of the tradition.

The derivation of the extant manuscripts from a single copy—and a copy that was not Caesar's original—is shown by the fact that they share readings that cannot be authentic and could not have arisen independently. The most striking are errors such as lacunose syntax and nonsensical expressions, which must have been present in the common source. Inauthentic readings, or innovations, accumulated as the text was copied in the course of the centuries after the publication of the Caesarian corpus. For the *Civil War*, a work of some thirty-three thousand words, the perceptible innovations (that is, those that produce textual problems) number in the hundreds. (Some innovations will be invisible.) Most of them have been removed by conjecture over more than a millennium; at present the spots where the text is lost or uncertain number in the dozens, not hundreds. The significant problem spots are marked in this edition with notes to the Latin text. Repairs that are noted but not adopted in the text are translated in the notes on the facing page.

The text of this edition is based on the oldest and most independent descendants of the archetype. These are referred to by the initial letters of (some part of) their names,

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and the names themselves reflect (some part of) their history (more on this below): **S** and **M** from the tenth century, **T** and **U** from the eleventh, and **V** from the twelfth. Their relationships to the archetype and to one another are summarized in the following diagram, or stemma:



The innovations present in the archetype ( $\omega$ ) were transmitted to its descendants  $\mu$ , and  $\nu$ , each of which added innovations of its own as its scribe strove to produce a new and (perhaps) improved copy of the text. Similar branching structures emanate from each of these copies, and so on from generation to generation. (The solid lines in the stemma indicate the movement of text from source to copy but do not imply that the copy was taken directly from the source. So “generation” has to be understood loosely.)

This stemma shows that the extant manuscripts **M** and **U** descend from the archetype  $\omega$  via an intermediary called  $\mu$ , which is the source of innovations they share with one another but not with **S**, **T**, and **V**. Similarly, **S** descends from the archetype via the lost intermediary  $\nu$ . **T** and **V** are (at least) a generation further removed, since  $\pi$  intervenes between them and  $\nu$ . The dashed line represents a



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moment of contact between the two families and indicates that some (but by no means all) of  $\mu$ 's readings turn up in  $\pi$ , which for the most part reproduces the text of  $\nu$ . Some of  $\nu$ 's readings may have traveled the other direction, into the tradition of  $\mu$ , which for the most part reproduces the text of  $\omega$ .

For the purpose of reconstructing the text of the copy closest to Caesar's original,  $\omega$ , all other extant manuscripts can be disregarded, since they can be shown to be descended from one of the five on the stemma, M, U, S, T, or V. The full names of the manuscripts used to constitute the text are as follows:

- M Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. lat. 68.8 ("codex Mediceus")
- U Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vaticanus lat. 3324 ("codex Ursinianus")
- S Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Ashburnhamensis 33 ("codex sancti Petri Beluacensis")
- T Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 5764 ("codex Thuaneus")
- V Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 95 ("codex Vindobonensis")

This edition is largely based on my Oxford Classical Text edition of the *Civil War* and its companion volume *Studies on the text of Caesar's Bellum civile*. The two Latin texts are not, however, identical, since I print more emendations here than I accepted in the OCT, where the critical apparatus allows readers to make these mostly trivial emendations for themselves, if they so choose. I also print here repairs to some of the more difficult problems that were left unresolved and daggered in the OCT; these re-

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pairs are not perfect, but they are better than nothing. In such spots I report and translate other possible repairs in the notes. All of these differences are listed below. (The list does not include differences of punctuation or orthography. For a fuller overview of textual differences among modern editions, see the *Conspectus editionum* in the preface of the OCT.)

<i>Civil War</i>	LCL	OCT
1.2.3	ereptis	correptis
1.3.3	ipsum	†ius†
1.10.1	L. Caesar	Caesar
1.18.2	tertiaedecimae	†VIII†
1.22.3	agit orat	orat
1.39.2	huc	huic
1.39.2	aliquos addidit quod	...
1.43.3	instructa	structa
1.46.2	nonnullam partem	-ulla -te
1.47.4	praesidiumque	praesidium
1.52.3	ita	tam
1.60.1	[cum] Oscensibus	cum Oscensibus
1.64.1	sustineri	sustinere
1.64.6	ablati flumine	arma in fl- ...
1.71.3	decederent	recederent
1.74.2	Dein de	Deinde
1.74.2	fide	fidem
1.75.1	Afranius	Afranio
1.76.2	Postulat	Postulant
1.80.4	expeditis	†relictis†
1.82.1	educunt	ducunt
1.86.4	sacramentum	sacramento

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<i>Civil War</i>	LCL	OCT
2.2.6	etiam	tamen
2.5.4	in eius	eius
2.6.3	Albici	Albicis
2.14.1	erumpunt	rumpunt
2.18.4	modium	modios
2.20.6	praemisisset	promisisset
2.21.3	populis publicis	populis
2.23.1	et iam	etiam
2.29.1	At	Atque
2.31.7	At	Aut
2.31.8	uti spe	ut ipse
2.34.3	armaturae	armatura
2.37.5	loci et	et loci
3.9.8	acceptis	receptis
3.9.8	recepit	recipit
3.11.1	ideo	idem
3.11.1	oppidis	†copiis†
3.17.4	illi	illis
3.22.1	se ea	ea
3.23.1	omnia	omnium
3.29.1	recepit	recipit
3.29.1	ex oppido	oppido
3.30.1	eas terras	eas terras
3.32.6	illas ex	ex illo
3.36.1	rem fama	fama rem
3.37.1	instruit	struit
3.49.3	ut specus	†ad specust
3.49.5	succedere	†subte(r)reret

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<i>Civil War</i>	LCL	OCT
3.50.1	noctu	nocte
3.55.4	Caesari	Caesaris
3.57.1	A. Clodium	Clodium
3.58.4	quodque	quoque
3.58.5	frons	frus
3.67.5	fortissime	fortissimeque
3.68.2	pertinere	pertingere
3.69.4	[dimissis equis]	dimissis tequist
3.73.5	aliquis	aliqui
3.84.2	primum	primus
3.101.1	C. Cassius	Cassius
3.105.5	templi	templis
3.106.1	in Aegyptum	Aegyptum
3.108.2	consilii sui	conscios
3.111.3	quadriremes	triremes

### TIMELINE OF THE *CIVIL WAR*

Calendar dates are those given at the time, when the political calendar was roughly a month ahead of the seasonal calendar. *Civil War* references are provided; bold font indicates a discrepancy between narrative order and actual order, where the latter is known from Cicero's correspondence. For a more detailed timeline and Julian dates, see Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel (1959 [1906]) 367–74.

49 BC

Jan.–Dec.

The consuls are **L. Lentulus Crus** and **C. Claudius Marcellus** (1.1.2, 1.6.4)

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- Jan. 1-10 Caesar is in Cisalpine Gaul (1.5.5)
- Jan. 1 Caesar's letter is delivered to the consuls (1.1.1)
- Jan. 1-7 Senatorial debates about public affairs, esp. Caesar (1.1-2, 5-6)
- Jan. 7 State of emergency declared; Caesar-ean tribunes flee Rome (1.5.3-5)
- Jan. 8-9 The senate meets with Pompey, makes war preparations (1.6)
- Jan. 10 or 11 Caesar invades Italy with one legion, reaches Ariminum (1.8.1)
- mid-Jan. Caesar takes Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona (1.11.4)
- mid- to late Jan. Negotiations are attempted but fail (1.8.2-11.3)
- mid-Jan. Pompey and the consuls leave Rome for Brundisium (1.14.2-3)
- late Jan. Caesar takes Iguvium and Auximum (1.12-13)
- late Jan.-Feb. Caesar takes Picenum (1.15-16.1)
- Feb. 15-21 Siege of Corfinium; after victory Caesar heads to Brundisium (1.16.2-23.5)
- early Mar. Blockade of Pompey at Brundisium; the consuls are in Greece (1.25-28)
- mid-Mar. Pompey leaves for Greece (1.28.3)
- Apr. 1-7 Caesar meets the senate in Rome, leaves for Gaul (1.32-33)
- early April Caesar sends L. Fabius to Spain (1.37.1)
- mid-Apr. Caesar prepares for siege of Marseilles, orders ships built at Arles (1.34-36)

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- late Apr. Curio leaves for Sicily (1.30.2)  
mid-May Fabius reaches Ilerda (1.39.2)  
early June Caesar leaves Marseilles for Spain (1.36.5)
- Jun.–Aug. Caesar is in Nearer Spain; defeats Pompeian forces there (1.41–87)
- early Aug. Curio leaves Sicily for N. Africa (2.23.1)
- late summer Defeat of Curio in N. Africa (2.41–42)  
Sept.–Oct. Caesar is in Further Spain and Marseilles; both capitulate (2.1–22)
- late Oct. Caesar leaves Marseilles for Rome (2.22.6)
- Dec. Caesar is dictator in Rome; holds elections, conducts state business (3.1)
- mid-Dec. Caesar resigns dictatorship, leaves for Brundisium (3.2.1)
- 48 BC
- Jan.–Dec. Caesar is consul for the second time, with P. Servilius (3.1.1)
- Jan. Pompey is in Greece (3.3–5); Scipio, presumably, in Asia (3.31–33)
- Jan. 4 Caesar crosses to Greece with part of his army (3.6.1)
- Jan. Scipio leaves for Greece (3.33.2)
- Jan.–Aug. Caesar is in Greece
- Jan.–Mar. Caesar establishes garrisons along the Adriatic coast (3.7–19)

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? spring	Caelius' failed political and later military rebellion in Italy (3.20–22)
Mar.	Antony and more of the army cross to Greece, join Caesar (3.26–30)
spring	Caesar secures more territory in Greece (3.34–39); Scipio arrives (3.36.1)
Apr.–Jul.	Caesar besieges Pompey near Dyrrachium, is defeated (3.41–71)
early July	Caesar moves his forces inland (3.75.1); Pompey follows (3.75.3)
Aug. 9	Caesar defeats Pompey at Pharsalus (3.97.5); Pompey flees (3.96.3)
Aug.–Sept.	Pompey goes to Asia Minor and Egypt with Caesar following (3.102–4)
late Sept.	Pompey is murdered in Alexandria by agents of King Ptolemy (3.104.3)
Oct.–Dec.	Caesar is in Alexandria, settling a dynastic dispute, under attack (3.106–12)

## SIGLA

- $\omega$  common source of  $\mu$  and  $\nu$
- $\mu$  common source of **M** and **U**
  - M** Florence, BML Plut. lat. 68.8 (s. X/XI and XII, lacks 1.1.1–1.33.3)
  - U** Vatican, BAV Vat. lat. 3324 (s. XI<sup>4</sup> or XII<sup>1</sup>)
- $\nu$  common source of **S** and  $\pi$ 
  - S** Florence, BML Ashburnham 33 (s. X<sup>2-3</sup>)
  - $\pi$  common source of **T** and **V**
    - T** Paris, BNF lat. 5764 (s. XI<sup>3-4</sup>)
    - V** Vienna, ÖN 95 (s. XII)

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# CIVIL WAR

## LIBER I

1. . . . Litteris<sup>1</sup> [a Fabio] C. Caesaris consulibus redditis aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebis contentione ut in senatu recitarentur. Vt vero ex litteris ad
- 2 senatum referretur impetrari non potuit. Referunt consules de re publica infinite.<sup>2</sup> L. Lentulus consul senatui rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur si audacter ac forti-
- 3 ter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum; habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam
- 4 atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequam eius auxilium si postea velit senatum imploraturum.
2. Haec Scipionis oratio, quod senatus in urbe habebatur Pompeiusque aderat, ex ipsius ore Pompei mitti vide-

<sup>1</sup> *Some text is missing at the junction of the BG and the BC.*

<sup>2</sup> *infinite Hotoman (cf. Gel. 14.7.9): in civitate ω: [in civitate]*

*Faerno*

## BOOK I

1 . . . When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, their consent for it to be read out in the senate was obtained with difficulty, indeed after a huge struggle by some tribunes. But consent could not be obtained for a motion on the letter's contents. The consuls' motion initiated a 2 general debate about public affairs. One consul, Lucius Lentulus, promised that he would not fail the republic if senators were willing to announce bold and forceful proposals. "But if you look to Caesar and chase after his 3 gratitude, as you have done on previous occasions, I will consult my own interests, not comply with the senate's authority; I too can take refuge in Caesar's gratitude and friendship." Scipio made the same point, that Pompey did 4 not intend to fail the republic if he had the senate behind him. "But if you hesitate, and are too mild when you do act, the senate will call for his help—if you want it later—in vain."

2. These words were Scipio's but, because the senate was meeting in the city and Pompey was nearby, they seemed to issue from the mouth of Pompey himself.<sup>1</sup> Some speakers had made milder proposals. For example, 2

<sup>1</sup> Pompey's military office (proconsul) kept him outside Rome's civic domain.

2 batur. Dixerat aliquis leniorem sententiam, ut primo M.  
 Marcellus ingressus in eam orationem: non oportere ante  
 de ea re ad senatum referri quam dilectus tota Italia habiti  
 et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere  
 3 senatus quae vellet decernere auderet. Vt M. Calidius, qui  
 censebat ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur ne  
 quae esset armorum causa; timere Caesarem ereptis<sup>3</sup> ab  
 eo duabus legionibus ne ad eius periculum reservare et  
 retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur. Vt M. Rufus,  
 qui sententiam Calidi paucis fere mutatis rebus sequeba-  
 4 tur. Hi omnes convicio L. Lentuli consulis correpti exagi-  
 5 tabantur. Lentulus sententiam Calidi pronuntiatum se  
 omnino negavit. Marcellus perterritus conviciis a sua sen-  
 6 tentia discessit. Sic vocibus consulis, terrore praesentis  
 exercitus, minis amicorum Pompei plerique compulsi in-  
 viti et coacti Scipionis sententiam sequuntur: uti ante cer-  
 tam diem Caesar exercitum dimittat; si non faciat, eum  
 7 adversus rem publicam facturum videri. Intercedit M.  
 Antonius Q. Cassius, tribuni plebis. Refertur confestim de  
 8 intercessione tribunorum. Dicuntur sententiae graves. Vt  
 quisque acerbissime crudelissimeque dixit ita quam max-  
 ime ab inimicis Caesaris collaudatur.

3. Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes<sup>4</sup> qui sunt eius ordi-  
 nis a Pompeio evocantur. Laudat <audaces><sup>5</sup> Pompeius  
 atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque inci-

<sup>3</sup> ereptis *Nipperdey* (see 1.32.6): correptis  $\omega$

<sup>4</sup> omnes <sui> *Markland* (see 1.3.4)

<sup>5</sup> <audaces> *Paul*

<sup>2</sup> Spain, that is, which proxies held for him (1.38.1).

<sup>3</sup> In 50, by order of the senate, Caesar relinquished two le-  
 gions for a possible war against the Parthians (*BG* 8.54).

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

first, Marcus Marcellus, who opened with these words: that it was not right for the matter to be referred to the senate before troops were recruited throughout Italy and armies enlisted, so that under their protection the senate could be safe and free in venturing to make the decisions it wanted. Or Marcus Calidius, who recommended that Pompey leave for his provincial command to remove any cause for war.<sup>2</sup> “Caesar is afraid, now that two of his legions have been snatched away, that Pompey will be thought to be holding them in reserve and keeping them near Rome as a threat against himself.”<sup>3</sup> Or Marcus Rufus, who supported Calidius’ proposal with a few amendments. All of these men, derisively rebuked by the consul Lentulus, were shaken. Lentulus refused outright to ask for a vote on Calidius’ proposal. Marcellus, thoroughly alarmed by the derision, himself abandoned his proposal. Thus, what with the consul’s language, fear of the nearby army, and threats from Pompey’s friends, the majority—under compulsion, unwilling, and coerced—backed Scipio’s proposal that Caesar must dismiss his army by a set date. “If he does not, it is evident that his actions will be hostile to the republic.” This was vetoed by the tribunes Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius. The issue of the tribunes’ veto was raised immediately. Proposals were urged, and the harshest and cruelest speakers got the most praise from Caesar’s enemies.

3. After the senate’s dismissal at sunset, all<sup>4</sup> members of the order were summoned by Pompey. He praised the bold and gave them heart for the future while scolding and

<sup>4</sup> For “all,” Markland proposed “all his friends who were.”



## CAESAR

2 tat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe  
praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus  
3 legionibus quae sunt traditae a Caesare arcessuntur. Com-  
pletur urbs et ipsum<sup>6</sup> comitium tribunis [plebis] centurio-  
4 nibus evocatis. Omnes amici consulum, necessarii Pompei  
atque eorum qui veteres inimicitias cum Caesare gere-  
5 bant in senatum coguntur. Quorum vocibus et concursu  
terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur. Plerisque vero  
6 libere decernendi potestas eripitur. Pollicetur L. Piso cen-  
sor sese iturum ad Caesarem, item L. Roscius praetor, qui  
de his rebus eum doceant. VI dies ad eam rem conficien-  
7 dam spati postulant. Dicuntur etiam ab nonnullis senten-  
tiae ut legati ad Caesarem mittantur qui voluntatem sena-  
tus ei proponant.

4. Omnibus his resistitur omnibusque oratio consulis,  
Scipionis, Catonis opponitur. Catonem veteres inimicitiae  
2 Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae. Lentulus aeris alieni  
magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum  
appellandorum largitionibus movetur seque alterum fore  
Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperi re-  
3 deat. Scipionem eadem spes provinciae atque exercituum  
impellit, quos se pro necessitudine partiturum cum Pom-  
peio arbitratur, simul iudiciorum metus [adulatio]<sup>7</sup> atque

<sup>6</sup> et ipsum *Hug*: et ius  $\omega$ : militibus *Nipperdey*: forum *Köchly*

<sup>7</sup> [adulatio] *Madvig*: *Vielhaber* moved *adulatio* to before po-  
tentium. *Perhaps* *adulatioque*?

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<sup>5</sup> The text is very uncertain here; the most significant emenda-  
tions are *Nipperdey*'s, which adds "soldiers" to the list of groups  
filling the city, and *Köchly*'s, which adds the Forum to the list of  
places filled.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

prodding the slack. In large numbers and from all directions men from Pompey's previous armies were summoned with rewards and rank in prospect; in large numbers men from the two legions surrendered by Caesar were ordered to Rome. The city and the assembly place itself<sup>5</sup> were full of staff officers, centurions, reenlisted men. All of the consuls' friends as well as adherents of Pompey and of men with a long-standing enmity toward Caesar were collected for the senate meeting. Their language and convergence generated terror in the insecure, security in the undecided. But the majority were stripped of their capacity for free decision. The censor Lucius Piso and likewise the praetor Lucius Roscius volunteered to go to Caesar to inform him about these matters; they requested a six-day period to accomplish the business. A few senators even proposed that a delegation be sent to Caesar to lay out for him the senate's decision.

4. Every proposal was resisted, encountering vocal opposition from the consul, Scipio, and Cato. Motivating Cato were his long-standing enmity with Caesar and the sting of electoral defeat.<sup>6</sup> Lentulus was prompted by the size of his debts, the prospect of an army and provincial commands, and bribes from kings awaiting confirmation. Among friends he boasted that he would be a second Sulla and that supreme power would be his. Scipio was driven by the same prospect of a province and armies, which he thought, in view of the family connection, he would share with Pompey.<sup>7</sup> Also relevant were fear of prosecution and

<sup>6</sup> Cato made an unsuccessful bid for the consulship of 51.

<sup>7</sup> Scipio's daughter Cornelia was Pompey's wife in 49.

## CAESAR

ostentatio sui et potentium, qui in re publica iudiciisque  
 4 tum plurimum pollebant. Ipse Pompeius ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus—et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat—totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat, quorum ipse  
 5 maximam partem illo adfinitatis tempore iniunxerat Caesari. Simul infamia duarum legionum permotus quas ab itinere Asiae Syriaeque ad suam potentiam dominatumque converterat rem ad arma deduci studebat.

5. His de causis aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate. Nec docendi Caesaris propinquis eius spatium datur, nec tribunis plebis sui periculi deprecandi neque etiam extremi iuris intercessione<sup>8</sup> retinendi, quod L. Sulla reliquerat, facultas tribuitur, sed de sua salute septimo die cogitare coguntur, quod illi turbulentissimi superioribus temporibus tribuni plebis <post> VIII denique menses  
 2 variarum<sup>9</sup> actionum respicere ac timere consueverant. Decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus consultum, quo nisi paene in ipso urbis incendio atque in desperatione omnium salutis †latorum†<sup>10</sup> audacia numquam ante descensum<sup>11</sup> est: dent operam consules, prae-

<sup>8</sup> intercessione] intercessionis *Chacon* (see 1.7.2-3): [intercessione] *Manutius*      <sup>9</sup> <post> . . . variarum] *Dinter added* <post>, a minimal repair for this corrupt stretch of text.

<sup>10</sup> latorum] defended by *Carter 1991*, emended by others: latorum *Manutius*: paucorum *Nipperdey*: et malorum *Weissenborn*      <sup>11</sup> descensum *Kohl*: discessum  $\omega$

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<sup>8</sup> Vielhaber's transposition adds "flattery by" before "the powerful men." Another possibility is putting "flattery and" before "promotion."

CIVIL WAR. BOOK I

promotion of himself and the powerful men<sup>8</sup> who were at that time particularly influential in the government and courts. As for Pompey, spurred on by Caesar's enemies— 4  
and because he did not want anyone to match him in status—he had entirely turned away from Caesar's friendship and become reconciled with their common enemies, the majority of whom he himself had saddled Caesar with when they were relations by marriage.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, 5  
upset at being vilified over the two legions en route to Asia and Syria, which he had diverted to his own power and domination, he was eager for matters to be brought to a fight.

5. For these reasons everything was done in haste and confusion. Caesar's relatives were given no time to inform him, and the tribunes were granted no opportunity to protest their danger or even to hold onto their fundamental right by means of the veto,<sup>10</sup> a right that Lucius Sulla let them keep. Instead, seven days into January they were 2  
forced to think about their own safety, something that the most tumultuous tribunes of the past were generally attentive to and worried about only after eight months of all kinds of action.<sup>11</sup> Recourse was had to that last and final 3  
decree of the senate, to which—unless the city was all but aflame and everyone despaired of safety in view of the temerity of . . .<sup>12</sup>—the senate never before descended:

<sup>9</sup> The connection lapsed at the death of Julia, Caesar's daughter and Pompey's wife, in 54. <sup>10</sup> Chacon proposed removing "by means of," Manutius "by means of the veto."

<sup>11</sup> For some names and historical details, see 1.7.2–6.

<sup>12</sup> Different kinds of troublemakers have been suggested here: men proposing subversive laws, criminals, scoundrels, a small cabal, and the like.

## CAESAR

4 tores, tribuni plebis—quique <pro> consulibus sunt ad urbem—ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat. Haec senatus consulto perscribuntur ante diem septimum Idus Ianuarias. Itaque V primis diebus quibus haberi senatus potuit qua ex die consulatum iniit Lentulus, biduo excepto comitali, et de imperio Caesaris et de amplissimis viris, tribunis plebis, gravissime acerbissimeque decernitur.

5 Profugiunt statim ex urbe tribuni plebis seseque ad Caesarem conferunt. Is eo tempore erat Ravennae expectabatque suis lenissimis<sup>12</sup> postulatis responsa, si qua hominum aequitate res ad otium deduci posset.

6. Proximis diebus habetur extra urbem senatus. Pompeius eadem illa quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit. Senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat. Copias suas

2 exponit: legiones habere sese paratas X; praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites, neque iis posse persuaderi uti eum defendant aut

3 sequantur saltem. De reliquis rebus ad senatum refertur: tota Italia dilectus habeatur; Faustus Sulla pro praetore<sup>13</sup> in Mauretanium mittatur; pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur. Refertur etiam de rege Iuba: ut socius sit atque

4 amicus. Marcellus consul<sup>14</sup> passurum in praesentia negat.

5 De Fausto impedit Philippus, tribunus plebis. De reliquis rebus senatus consulta perscribuntur. Provinciae privatis decernuntur, duae consulares, reliquae praetoriae. Sci-

<sup>12</sup> lenissimis *m*: levissimis *USTV*

<sup>13</sup> pro praetore *Manutius*: propere *ω*

<sup>14</sup> consul (*sc. se*) *Madvig* (*see* 1.14.2): non *ω*: hoc *Herzog*

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<sup>13</sup> For prior occasions, see the Index under "SCU."

<sup>14</sup> The bulk of Pompey's forces are in Spain (1.38.1).

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

"Consuls, praetors, tribunes, and proconsuls near Rome must take care that the republic suffer no harm."<sup>13</sup> These 4  
words were recorded in a decree of the senate on January 7. Accordingly, within five days from the day Lentulus entered the consulship (not counting the two days reserved for assemblies) Caesar's governorship and some very consequential men, the tribunes, were the subject of extremely urgent and harsh decrees. The tribunes left 5  
Rome in flight immediately and made their way to Caesar. At the time, he was at Ravenna, awaiting response to his extremely mild demands, in case by some humane sense of equity the situation could be steered toward peace.

6. On the following days the senate met outside the city. Pompey made the points he had indicated through Scipio. He praised the senate for courageously standing firm, then stated his troop strength. "I have ten legions ready."<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, I know on good evidence that the 2  
soldiers are estranged from Caesar and cannot be convinced to defend or even follow him." The remaining 3  
issues were referred to the senate: recruitment should be undertaken throughout Italy, Faustus Sulla sent as praetor to Mauretania, public funds provided to Pompey. There was also a motion about King Juba, that he should be an ally and friend. The consul Marcellus<sup>15</sup> declared that 4  
he would not permit this at that time. The Faustus proposal was blocked by the tribune Philippus. On the 5  
remaining issues senatorial decrees were recorded. Provincial commands were assigned to men in private life, two

<sup>15</sup> For Madvig's "the consul Marcellus," Herzog proposed "this action Marcellus."

pioni obvenit Syria, L. Domitio Gallia. Philippus et Cotta privato<sup>15</sup> consilio praetereuntur, neque eorum sortes decipiuntur. In reliquis provincias praetores mittuntur. Neque expectant—quod superioribus annis acciderat—ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur, paludatque votis nuncupatis exeunt. Consules—quod ante id tempus accidit numquam<sup>16</sup>—ex urbe proficiscuntur <inauspicato><sup>17</sup> lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privatim contra omnia vetustatis exempla. Tota Italia dilectus habentur, arma imperantur, pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur e fanis tolluntur. Omnia divina humanaque iura permiscuntur.

7. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat. A quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtreptione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur

<sup>15</sup> privato] *Perhaps privati?*

<sup>16</sup> quod . . . numquam] *deleted by Vossius, rendering <inauspicato> unnecessary; Kindscher added <clam> after numquam*

<sup>17</sup> <inauspicato> *Damon: La Penna added <ne auspicato quidem> before ex urbe*

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<sup>16</sup> Under the system introduced by Pompey in 52, consuls and praetors became eligible for provincial commands five years after holding office. Commands were distributed to these now "private individuals" by lot annually and ratified by popular vote.

<sup>17</sup> Domitius is thus Caesar's replacement.

<sup>18</sup> A tiny emendation would alter the meaning substantially: "Philippus and Cotta, men in private life, were bypassed on pur-

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

at the consular level, the rest praetorian.<sup>16</sup> Scipio got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul.<sup>17</sup> The reason Philippus and Cotta were bypassed was not disclosed;<sup>18</sup> their lots were not even cast. Ex-praetors were sent to the remaining provinces. These men did not wait—as had happened in prior years—for the bill ratifying their commands to be put to the assembly; they departed in uniform after announcing their vows.<sup>19</sup> The consuls left Rome without taking the auspices, another thing that never happened before that occasion, and used lictors in Rome in a private capacity, contrary to every precedent.<sup>20</sup> Troops were recruited throughout Italy, weapons were requisitioned, money was extorted from towns and taken from temples. All rights, divine and human, were thrown into confusion.

7. After learning of these matters Caesar addressed the soldiers. He mentioned the perpetual series of injuries inflicted by his enemies. It was by these men, he protested, that Pompey had been steered astray, jealous and critical of Caesar's renown, although he himself had always favored and promoted Pompey's prestige and dignity. He protested that an unprecedented practice had been introduced into the republic, such that the tribunes' veto was

pose." These men, consuls in 56 and 65, respectively, were senior in standing to Scipio (*cos.* 52) and Domitius (*cos.* 54).

<sup>19</sup> For example, a general might vow to build a temple after the successful completion of the upcoming campaign. In this sentence and the next, the text is very uncertain.

<sup>20</sup> "In a private capacity" seems to allude to a constitutional irregularity (e.g., that the formalities pertaining to the consuls' installation were incomplete), but the text may be corrupt.



- 3 [quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta]:<sup>18</sup> Sullam  
 nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen inter-  
 4 cessionem liberam reliquisse; Pompeium, qui amissa re-  
 stituisse videatur omnia,<sup>19</sup> etiam quae ante habuerint  
 5 ademisse; quotienscumque sit decretum darent operam  
 magistratus ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, qua  
 voce et quo senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma  
 sit vocatus, factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia,  
 in secessione populi, templis locisque editioribus occupa-  
 6 tis. Atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Satur-  
 nini atque Gracchorum casibus docet. (Quarum rerum illo  
 tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. Nulla lex  
 promulgata, non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio  
 7 facta.) Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis  
 rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia  
 secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint,  
 ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis  
 8 defendant. Conclamant legionis tertiae decimae, quae  
 aderat, milites—hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reli-  
 quae nondum convenerant—sese paratos esse imperatoris  
 sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere.

8. Cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur. Ibi que tribunos plebis qui ad eum confuge-

<sup>18</sup> [quae . . . restituta] *Nipperdey*

<sup>19</sup> omnia *Markland* (see 1.7.3): dona ω: bona *Vittori*: [dona]

*Terpstra*

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<sup>21</sup> *Nipperdey* excised a contradiction from the text: "although it was recently restored by force."

<sup>22</sup> In place of *Markland*'s "everything they lost," editors often accept *Vittori*'s "their lost 'property.'" *Terpstra*'s excision leaves "what they lost."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

censured and suppressed by force.<sup>21</sup> “Sulla, although he 3  
completely stripped the tribunes of power, nevertheless 4  
left their veto unencumbered. Pompey, who is known for 5  
having restored everything they lost,<sup>22</sup> has taken away 6  
even what they had before. Whenever the senatorial de- 7  
cree exhorting officials to take care that the republic suffer 8  
no harm has been issued—and the decree thus worded is 9  
the Roman people’s call to arms—it has been done in situ- 10  
ations involving subversive legislation, violent tribunes, or 11  
the people’s secession to occupied temples and heights.” 12  
These past instances, he explained, had come at the cost 13  
of disaster to Saturninus and the Gracchi. (On that occa- 14  
sion none of these actions had been taken or even contem- 15  
plated. No law had been proposed, no popular assembly 16  
convened, and no secession had taken place.) He urged 17  
the men to protect from his enemies the reputation and 18  
prestige of a man under whose leadership they had done 19  
the republic’s business with outstanding good fortune for 20  
nine years while fighting a huge number of successful 21  
battles and pacifying the whole of Gaul and Germany. A 22  
shout went up from the soldiers of the thirteenth legion— 23  
it was at hand, since he had summoned this one at the start 24  
of the emergency; the rest had not yet arrived<sup>23</sup>—that they 25  
were ready to protect their commander and the tribunes 26  
from injury.

8. Apprised of the soldiers’ goodwill he set out with the thirteenth legion for Ariminum, where he met the tribunes who had taken refuge with him.<sup>24</sup> He summoned

<sup>23</sup> Two others arrived by mid-February (1.15.3, 1.18.5); the majority were still in Gaul (BG 8.54.3–4). <sup>24</sup> At Ariminum, mod. Rimini, Caesar is in Italy proper. He does not mention crossing the Rubicon, which lies between Ravenna and Rimini.

## CAESAR

rant convenit. Reliquas legiones ex hibernis evocat et subsequi iubet. Eo L. Caesar adulescens venit, cuius pater Caesaris erat legatus. Is reliquo sermone confecto cuius rei causa venerat habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum; ne ea quae rei publicae causa egerit in suam contumeliam vertat; semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora; Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis <ut> cum illis nocere se speret rei publicae noceat. Pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta. Eadem fere atque isdem <de><sup>20</sup> rebus praetor Roscius agit cum Caesare sibi que Pompeium commemorasse demonstrat.

9. Quae res etsi nihil ad levandas iniurias pertinere videbantur tamen idoneos nactus homines per quos ea quae vellet ad eum perferrentur petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint: sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque potio-  
2 rem; doluisse se quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur cuius absentis

<sup>20</sup> <de> rebus *Aldus*: verbis *Clarke*

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<sup>25</sup> For *Aldus*' emendation "on the same subjects," *Clarke* substituted "in the same words."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

the rest of his legions from winter quarters and ordered them to follow immediately. Lucius Caesar came to Ariminum; his father was one of Caesar's officers. After finishing the conversation that was the official reason for his journey, he indicated that he had a message of a personal nature from Pompey for Caesar. "Pompey wants to clear himself in your eyes, Caesar. You should not twist the things he did on behalf of the republic into disrespect for yourself. He has always considered the republic's advantage more important than personal relationships. You, too, given your standing, ought to dismiss partisan acrimony for the republic's sake, and you should not be in such a rage at your enemies that in the hope of harming them you harm the republic." He added a few things of the same sort relevant to excusing Pompey. The praetor Roscius made nearly the same points on the same subjects<sup>25</sup> with Caesar and indicated that the arguments were Pompey's.

9. Although these points were plainly not directed at alleviating the damage done to him, nevertheless, having found men suitable for conveying his wishes to Pompey, Caesar appealed to each: "Since you carried Pompey's message to me, you should not object to carrying my demands to him. Perhaps with this small effort you will be able to remove serious disputes and free all Italy from fear. Dignity has always been my primary objective, dearer than life itself. I resented the insult in having a favor granted by the Roman people torn from my grasp by personal enemies, and being dragged back to Rome stripped of six months of my command even though the people ordered that I be a valid candidate in absentia at the last

## CAESAR

- 3 rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset; ta-  
 men hanc iacturam honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo  
 animo tulisse: cum litteras ad senatum miserit ut omnes  
 ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse;  
 4 tota Italia dilectus haberi, retineri legiones duas quae ab  
 se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, civitatem esse  
 in armis: quoniam haec omnia nisi ad suam perniciem per-  
 5 tinere,<sup>21</sup> sed tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque  
 omnia pati rei publicae causa; proficiscatur Pompeius in  
 suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia  
 omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia<sup>21</sup>  
 atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano per-  
 6 mittatur; haec quo facilius certisque conditionibus fiant et  
 iureiurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se  
 patiaturs accedere; fore uti per colloquia omnes controver-  
 siae componantur.

10. Acceptis mandatis Roscius cum <L.><sup>22</sup> Caesare  
 Capuam pervenit ibique consules Pompeiumque invenit.

- 2 Postulata Caesaris renuntiat. Illi <re> deliberata re-  
 spondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt.  
 3 Quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur,  
 Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset  
 4 Pompeium in Hispanias iturum; interea quoad fides esset  
 data Caesarem facturum quae polliceretur non intermis-  
 suros consules Pompeiumque dilectus.

11. Erat iniqua conditio postulare ut Caesar Arimino

<sup>21</sup> comitia <habeantur> *Fuchs*

<sup>22</sup> <L.> *Peskett*

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<sup>26</sup> Caesar's apparent grievance is this: if he had returned to

## CIVIL WAR. BOOK I

elections.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, I accepted the loss of prestige 3  
with equanimity for the sake of the republic. When I sent  
a letter to the senate proposing that everyone leave their 4  
armies, I did not get consent even for this. Troops are be-  
ing recruited throughout Italy, two legions taken from me  
on the pretense of a Parthian war are being held back, the  
state is in arms—to what end are all these things directed  
except destroying me? But I am nevertheless prepared to 5  
lower myself and accept all of them, to tolerate all of them  
for the sake of the republic. Here is what I propose: Pom-  
pey goes to his provinces, both of us dismiss our armies,  
everyone in Italy lays arms aside, the state is relieved of  
fear, free elections and the whole government are en-  
trusted to the senate and people. To bring this about eas- 6  
ily and on set terms, and to get it ratified by oath, he should  
either come my way or let me come his. With negotiation  
all our disputes will be settled.”

10. With this message in hand Roscius, along with Lu-  
cius Caesar, arrived in Capua. There he found the consuls  
and Pompey and presented Caesar's demands. After de- 2  
liberation they replied in writing and sent the message to  
Caesar through Roscius and Lucius Caesar. The gist was  
this: Caesar was to return to Gaul, leave Ariminum, dis- 3  
miss his army. “If you do this, Pompey will go to Spain.  
Meanwhile, until we get some guarantee that you will do 4  
what you promise, we will not discontinue recruiting.”

11. The terms were unfair: to demand that Caesar leave

Rome for elections held in the summer of 50 for the magistrates  
of 49, he would have given up half a year of his military command  
(roughly July–Dec.). For some other considerations, see the In-  
troduction, section III.

## CAESAR

excederet atque in provinciam reverteretur, ipsum et provincias et legiones alienas<sup>23</sup> tenere, exercitum Caesaris  
2 velle dimitti. dilectus habere, polliceri se in provinciam  
iturum neque ante quem diem iturus sit definire, ut, si  
peracto consulatu Caesaris nondum<sup>24</sup> profectus esset,  
3 nulla tamen mendacii religione obstrictus videretur. Tem-  
pus vero colloquio non dare neque accessurum polliceri  
4 magnam pacis desperationem adferebat. Itaque ab Arimino M. Antonium cum cohortibus V Arretium mittit. Ipse Arimini cum duabus [legionibus] subsistit ibique dilectum habere instituit. Pisaurum, Fanum, Anconam singulis cohortibus occupat.

12. Interea certior factus Iguvium Thermum praetorem cohortibus V tenere, oppidum munire, omniumque esse Iguvinorum optimam erga se voluntatem, Curionem cum tribus cohortibus quas Pisauri et Arimini habebat  
2 mittit. Cuius adventu cognito diffusus municipi voluntati Thermus cohortes ex urbe reducit et profugit. Milites in  
3 itinere ab eo discedunt ac domum revertuntur. Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recipit. Quibus rebus cognitis confusus municipiorum voluntatibus Caesar cohortes legionis tertiae decimae ex praesidiis deducit Auximumque proficiscitur. Quod oppidum Attius cohortibus

<sup>23</sup> alienas] absentem *Paul*

<sup>24</sup> nondum *Damon*: cons [cs V]  $\omega$

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<sup>27</sup> For "he had no right to," Paul proposed "in absentia."

<sup>28</sup> The text is uncertain here.

<sup>29</sup> From "bound . . . lie" the Latin is terse and the meaning uncertain, but cf. 3.28.4.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

Ariminum and return to his province while Pompey controlled provinces and legions he had no right to,<sup>27</sup> to want Caesar's army to be disbanded while Pompey recruited troops, to promise that he would go to his province without specifying a date by which he would go, so that if after Caesar's consulship Pompey had not yet left<sup>28</sup> he would nevertheless not be thought to be bound by the sanctity of a lie.<sup>29</sup> The fact that Pompey was not making time for negotiation and not promising to meet made peace seem quite hopeless. Caesar therefore sent Marcus Antonius from Ariminum to Arretium with five cohorts.<sup>30</sup> He himself stayed at Ariminum with two and began to recruit troops there. He occupied Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona with one cohort each.

12. Meanwhile, having been informed that at Iguvium—a town the praetor Thermus was holding with five cohorts, and fortifying—the attitude of all the inhabitants toward him was strongly positive, Caesar sent Curio with the three cohorts he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. At news of his approach Thermus, distrusting the community's attitude, withdrew his cohorts from the city and fled; his soldiers abandoned him on the march and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium with great and universal goodwill. Learning of this, and confident of goodwill in the towns, Caesar withdrew the cohorts of the thirteenth legion from garrison duty and set out for Auximum, a town that Attius held with cohorts he had brought in. Attius

<sup>30</sup> Caesar's "therefore" falsifies the chronology and overstates his willingness to negotiate; the towns mentioned in this sentence and the next were in Caesar's hands before the negotiations described in 1.10–11 (Cic. *Fam.* 16.12.2 and *Att.* 7.14.1).



## CAESAR

introducitis tenebat, dilectumque toto Piceno circummissis senatoribus habebat.

13. Adventu Caesaris cognito decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt. Docent sui iudicium rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipales pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem bene de re publica meritum tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui. Quorum oratione permotus Varus praesidium quod introducerat ex oppido educit ac profugit. Hunc ex primo ordine pauci Caesaris consecuti milites consistere coegerunt. Commisso proelio deseritur a suis Varus. Nonnulla pars militum domum discedit, reliqui ad Caesarem perveniunt. Atque una cum iis deprensus L. Pupius, primi pili centurio, adducitur, qui hunc eundem ordinem in exercitu Cn. Pompei antea duxerat. At Caesar milites Attianos collaudat, Pupium dimittit, Auximatibus agit gratias seque eorum facti memorem fore pollicetur.

14. Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis tantus repente terror invasit ut, cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatus consulto proferendam, protinus aperto<sup>25</sup> sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius equites falso nuntiabantur. Hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt. Cn. Pompeius pridie eius diei ex urbe profectus iter ad legiones habebat quas a Caesare acceptas in Apulia hibernorum

<sup>25</sup> <non> aperto *Rubenius*

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<sup>31</sup> The "treasury reserve" was an emergency fund supported by a manumission tax (Livy 27.10.11). Other sources deny that

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

was also recruiting troops throughout Picenum by sending senators from town to town.

13. Learning of Caesar's approach the town councilors at Auximum met as a body with Attius Varus. They told him that the affair was not something for them to decide. "Neither we nor the rest of our townspeople can tolerate that Gaius Caesar, a commander who has such important public achievements to his credit, be barred from the town and its fortifications. Furthermore, you should consider the future and your danger." Disturbed by their words 2  
Varus led out the garrison he had installed, and fled. A few 3  
of Caesar's advance-guard soldiers caught up and forced him to stop. A fight began, but Varus was deserted by his 4  
men. A portion of the soldiers went home, the rest reached Caesar, bringing the chief centurion Lucius Pupius along as a prisoner. (He had earlier held that same rank in one of Pompey's armies.) Caesar for his part praised Attius' soldiers, dismissed Pupius, and thanked the people of Auximum, promising to remember their action. 5

14. When this news reached Rome the panic that suddenly hit was so great that, although the consul Lentulus had come to open the treasury to provide money for Pompey as per the senate's decree, he fled the city directly after opening the treasury reserve.<sup>31</sup> For—so went the false report—Caesar was already approaching, indeed his cavalry was already at hand. Lentulus was followed by his 2  
colleague Marcellus and most of the magistrates. Pompey, 3  
having left Rome the day before, was en route to the legions he had received from Caesar and distributed in win-

the treasury was left open: Cic. *Att.* 7.12.2; Luc. 3.117; App. *BC* 2.41.164; D.C. 41.17.2; Plut. *Caes.* 35.9.

## CAESAR

- 4 causa disposuerat. Dilectus circa urbem intermittuntur. Nihil citra Capuam tutum esse omnibus videtur. Capuae primum sese confirmant et colligunt dilectumque colonorum qui lege Iulia Capuam deducti erant habere instituunt. Gladiatoresque quos ibi Caesar in ludo habebat ad forum productos Lentulus <spe> libertatis confirmat. Atque iis equos attribuit et se sequi iussit. Quos postea, monitus ab suis quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familiae patres<sup>26</sup> conventus Campaniae custodiae causa distribuit.

15. Auximo Caesar progressus<sup>27</sup> omnem agrum Picenum percurrit. Cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius  
2 omnibus rebus iuvant. Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat, ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime  
3 facturos pollicentur. Milites imperat. Mittunt. Interea legio duodecima Caesarem consequitur. Cum his duabus Asculum Picenum proficiscitur. Id oppidum Lentulus Spinther X cohortibus tenebat, qui Caesaris adventu cognito profugit ex oppido cohortesque secum abducere  
4 conatus magna parte militum deseritur. Relictus in itinere cum paucis incidit in Vibullium Rufum missum a Pompeio in agrum Picenum confirmandorum hominum causa. A quo factus Vibullius certior quae res in Piceno gererentur

<sup>26</sup> familiae patres *Chacon*: familiares  $\omega$

<sup>27</sup> auximo . . . progressus *S*: maximo . . . progressu *MUTV*

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<sup>32</sup> The "Julian law" proposed by Caesar as consul in 59 provided land grants in Campania to Pompey's veterans.

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ter quarters around Apulia. Recruitment in the city's vicinity was put on hold; nothing above Capua felt safe to anyone. Capua was the first place they took heart and rallied, instituting recruitment among the settlers brought to Capua by the *lex Julia*.<sup>32</sup> As for the gladiators-in-training that Caesar maintained there, Lentulus brought them into the forum and encouraged them with the prospect of freedom, giving them horses and ordering them to follow him. Afterwards, advised by his supporters that this decision was universally criticized, he distributed them for safekeeping to heads of household<sup>33</sup> in the Campanian assembly. 4 5

15. Advancing from Auximum Caesar overran the entire territory of Picenum. All of the districts' communities received him with the utmost enthusiasm and assisted his army with everything. Even Cingulum, a town that Labienus established and developed at his own expense, sent representatives to him and promised to do his bidding with great eagerness. He requisitioned soldiers; they sent them. Meanwhile the twelfth legion reached Caesar. With his two legions he set out for Asculum in Picenum, a town held by Lentulus Spinther with ten cohorts. Informed of Caesar's approach Spinther fled the town. He attempted to bring his cohorts away but was deserted by a substantial portion of the soldiers. Abandoned on the march, he had few men with him when he happened upon Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey to Picenum to encourage the population. From Spinther Vibullius learned what was happening in Picenum. He took over Spinther's soldiers 2 3 4

<sup>33</sup> Cicero gives a slightly different version of this episode in a letter to his friend Atticus (*Att.* 7.14.2).

CAESAR

- 5 milites ab eo accipit, ipsum dimittit. Item ex finitimis regionibus quas potest contrahit cohortes ex dilectibus Pompeianis. In his Camerino fugientem Lucilium Hirrum cum VI cohortibus quas ibi in praesidio habuerat excipit. Quibus coactis XIII efficit. Cum his ad Domitium Ahenobarbum Corfinium magnis itineribus pervenit. Caesaremque  
6 adesse cum legionibus duabus nuntiat. Domitius per se circiter XX cohortes Alba, ex Marsis et Paelignis, finitimis ab regionibus coegerat.

16. Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo Caesar conquiri milites qui ab eo discesserant dilectumque institui iubet. Ipse unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus Corfinium contendit. Eo cum venisset cohortes V praemissae a Domitio ex oppido pontem fluminis interrumpabant, qui  
2 erat ab oppido milia passuum circiter tria. Ibi cum antecursoribus Caesaris proelio commisso celeriter Domitiani  
3 a ponte repulsi se in oppidum receperunt. Caesar legionibus transductis ad oppidum constitit iuxtaque murum castra posuit.

17. Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit qui petant atque orent ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi  
2 posse frumentoque prohiberi; quod nisi fecerit se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum.  
3 Interim suos cohortatus tormenta in muris disponit certasque cuique partes ad custodiam urbis attribuit. Militi-

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<sup>34</sup> Firmum is situated between Auximum and Asculum.

<sup>35</sup> From Asculum (1.15.3).

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

and dismissed Spinther himself. He likewise assembled 5  
 whatever he could from nearby districts, cohorts from  
 Pompeian recruiting. Among these he took in Lucilius  
 Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum along with the six cohorts  
 he had kept there as a garrison. Putting them together 6  
 Vibullius made thirteen in total. With these he reached  
 Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium after forced marches  
 and announced that Caesar was at hand with two legions.  
 Domitius for his part had collected about twenty cohorts 7  
 from Alba, from the Marsi and Paeligni of nearby districts.

16. After recovering Firmum<sup>34</sup> and expelling Lentu-  
 lus,<sup>35</sup> Caesar ordered that the soldiers who deserted Len-  
 tulus be found and recruitment begun. After spending  
 a day at Asculum to arrange for provisions, he hastened  
 toward Corfinium. When he got there, five cohorts sent 2  
 forward from Corfinium by Domitius were in the process  
 of breaking up a river bridge about three miles distant  
 from town. Domitius' men, engaging Caesar's advance 3  
 guard in a fight there, were quickly driven away from the  
 bridge; they retreated to Corfinium. Caesar, once his le- 4  
 gions were across, halted near the town and made camp  
 up against its wall.

17. In view of this, Domitius sent men to Pompey in  
 Apulia with a letter, men who knew the country and had  
 been offered a substantial reward, to request and plead for  
 assistance: "With two armies and the narrow passes—Cae-  
 sar can easily be trapped and cut off from his food supply.  
 But if you do not do this we will be in danger, I myself, 2  
 more than thirty cohorts, and a large number of senators  
 and men of equestrian rank." Meanwhile, encouraging his 3  
 men, he placed catapults along the walls and allocated to  
 each man a particular section of the city to guard. In an 4

bus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, XL<sup>28</sup> in singulos iugera et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque.

18. Interim Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses (quod oppidum a Corfinio VII milium intervallo abest) cupere ea facere quae vellet sed a Q. Lucretio senatore et Attio Paolino prohiberi, qui id oppidum VII cohortium praesidio tenebant. Mittit eo M. Antonium cum legionis tertiae<sup>29</sup> cohortibus V. Sulmonenses simul atque signa nostra viderunt portas aperuerunt universique—et oppidani et milites—obviam gratulantes Antonio exierunt. Lucretius et Attius de muro se deiecerunt. Attius ad Antonium deductus petit ut ad Caesarem mitteretur. Antonius cum cohortibus et Attio eodem die quo profectus erat revertitur. Caesar eas cohortes cum exercitu suo coniunxit Attiumque incolumem dimisit.

Caesar primis diebus castra magnis operibus munire et ex finitimis municipiis frumentum comportare reliquasque copias expectare instituit. Eo triduo legio octava ad eum venit cohortesque ex novis Galliae dilectibus XXII equitesque ab rege Norico circiter CCC. Quorum adventu altera castra ad alteram oppidi partem ponit. His castris Curionem praefecit. Reliquis diebus oppidum vallo castellisque circumvenire instituit. Cuius operis maxima parte effecta eodem fere tempore missi ad Pompeium revertuntur.

19 Litteris perlectis Domitius dissimulans in consilio

<sup>28</sup> XL] quaterna *Glarean*

<sup>29</sup> tertiaedecimae] XIII. (or XII.) *Vossius*: VIII ω

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

assembly he promised the troops land from his own estates, twenty-four<sup>36</sup> acres each and proportionally more for centurions and reenlisted men.

18. Meanwhile Caesar got word that the people of Sulmo, a town seven miles from Corfinium, desired to follow his wishes but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a man from Paelignum, who were holding the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius to Sulmo with five cohorts of the thirteenth legion. As soon as the inhabitants saw our standards they opened the gates and everyone—townspeople and soldiers alike—came out to meet and congratulate Antonius. Lucretius and Attius jumped from the wall. Attius, brought to Antonius, asked to be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned with Attius and his cohorts the same day that he started. Caesar added those cohorts to his army and sent Attius away unharmed. 2 3 4

During his first days at Corfinium, Caesar decided, he would fortify his camp with substantial earthworks, collect provisions from nearby towns, and wait for the rest of his troops. Within three days the eighth legion reached him, along with twenty-two cohorts from the recent recruiting in Gaul and about three hundred cavalry from the king of Noricum. After their arrival he established a second camp on the other side of the city and put Curio in charge of it. For the rest of his time at Corfinium the plan was to surround the city with a rampart and outposts. The majority of this task was complete when the messengers sent to Pompey returned. 5 6

19. After reading the letter through, Domitius, con-

<sup>36</sup> The number is suspect.



## CAESAR

pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum horta-  
 2 turque eos ne animo deficient quaeque usui ad defen-  
 3 ditandum oppidum sint parent. Ipse arcano cum paucis  
 familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere  
 4 constituit. Cum vultus Domiti cum oratione non consen-  
 taret atque omnia trepidantius timidiusque ageret quam  
 superioribus diebus consuisset multumque cum suis con-  
 siliandi causa secreto praeter consuetudinem colloqueretur.  
 5 concilia conventusque hominum fugeret, res diutius  
 tegi dissimularique non potuit. Pompeius enim rescripserat:  
 sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse,  
 neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum  
 Corfinium contulisse; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas,  
 ad se cum omnibus copiis veniret. Id ne fieri posset  
 obsidione atque oppidi circummunitione fiebat.

20. Divulgato Domiti consilio milites qui erant Corfini  
 prima vespera secessionem faciunt atque ita inter se per  
 tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui  
 2 generis colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare; opera munitionesque  
 prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque  
 fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere;  
 3 debere se suae salutis rationem habere. Ab his primo Marsi  
 dissentire incipiunt eamque oppidi partem quae munitissima  
 videretur occupant. Tantaque inter eos dissensio existit ut  
 4 manum conserere atque armis dimicare conentur. Post paulo  
 tamen internuntiis ultro citroque missis, quae ignorabant de  
 L. Domiti fuga cognoscunt. Itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium  
 5 productum in publicum circumstant et custodiunt lega-

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<sup>37</sup> Pompey's letters to Domitius are preserved in Cicero's correspondence (*Att.* 8.12B–12D).

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

cealing its content, announced to his war council that Pompey would come quickly to their support. He urged them not to lose heart, and to prepare whatever would be useful for the city's defense. He himself spoke secretly with a few friends and decided to plan an escape. But Domitius' face did not fit his words and his whole behavior was more fearful and timid than had been his habit in days past. Plus, his advice-taking conversations with friends were held in secret, contrary to custom, and he avoided meetings and crowds. So the matter could not be covered up and concealed any longer. For Pompey had written back: "I am not going to put our cause into extreme danger. You went to Corfinium without my advice or intention. So if there is any way you can, join me with all of your troops."<sup>37</sup> This could not be done because of the blockade and the town's encirclement.

20. After Domitius' plan was divulged the soldiers at Corfinium became mutinous early in the evening and they conferred as follows, using the most highly regarded staff officers and centurions as intermediaries: "We are blockaded by Caesar, and his fortification works are nearly complete. Hope and confidence in our leader Domitius kept us here, but he has forsaken us all and planned his escape. We ought to consider our own welfare." The Marsi initially dissented from these views and occupied what they thought was the best fortified position in Corfinium. Indeed so strong was the difference of opinion that they tried to engage and fight it out. A little later, however, after messengers were sent back and forth, the Marsi learned about Domitius' escape plan, of which they had been ignorant. So everyone was of one mind when Domitius was brought into the open, surrounded, and placed under

## CAESAR

tosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestatem tradere.

21. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, etsi magni interesse arbitrabatur quam primum oppido potiri cohortesque ad se in castra traducere ne qua aut largitionibus aut animi confirmatione aut falsis nuntiis commutatio fieret voluntatis, quod saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus  
2 intercederent, tamen veritus ne militum introitu et nocturni temporis licentia oppidum diriperetur eos qui venerant collaudat atque in oppidum dimittit, portas murosque  
3 asservari iubet. Ipse iis operibus quae facere instituerat milites disponit non certis spatiis intermissis, ut erat superiorum dierum consuetudo, sed perpetuis vigiliis stationibusque ut contingant inter se atque omnem munitionem expleant. Tribunos militum et praefectos circummittit atque hortatur non solum ab eruptionibus caveant sed etiam singulorum hominum occultos exitus asservent.  
4 Neque vero tam remisso ac languido animo quisquam  
5 omnium fuit qui ea nocte conquieverit. [tanta] Erat summa rerum<sup>30</sup> expectatio, ut alius in aliam partem mente atque animo traheretur: quid ipsis Corfiniensibus, quid Domitio, quid Lentulo, quid reliquis accideret; qui quosque eventus exciperent.

22. Quarta vigilia circiter Lentulus Spinther de muro cum vigiliis custodibusque nostris colloquitur: velle, si sibi  
2 fiat potestas, Caesarem convenire. Facta potestate ex oppido mittitur. Neque ab eo prius Domitiani milites disce-

<sup>30</sup> tanta . . . rerum] *The text is uncertain here. A pitz excised tanta.*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

guard. They sent representatives from their number to Caesar saying that they were ready to open the gates and do Caesar's bidding, and that they would deliver Domitius alive into his power.

21. When this came to his attention Caesar reasoned as follows. He judged it to be crucially important to take possession of the town as soon as possible and transfer the cohorts into his own camp, since he was worried that they might have a change of heart owing to bribes or encouragement or misinformation, seeing that in warfare small causes often produce great effects. But he was also afraid that his soldiers, entering the town under nighttime's lax discipline, would pillage Corfinium. So he praised the men who had come and sent them back into the town with orders to keep watch on the gates and walls. He himself posted soldiers on the earthworks he had begun, not at fixed intervals according to his practice on previous days but so that they were in contact with one another in a continuous line of lookouts and pickets all along the fortification. He sent out staff officers and unit commanders, exhorting them not only to beware of sallies but also to keep watch for covert individual departures. No soldier, not even the slackest and laziest, slept that night. Speculation reigned supreme, with some men's thoughts and feelings pulled in one direction, others' in another. What would happen to the people of Corfinium? What to Domitius? To Lentulus? To the rest? What would be the fate of each?

22. Some hours before dawn Lentulus Spinther communicated from the wall with our lookouts and guards: he wanted to meet with Caesar if he could. Permission granted, he was released from Corfinium; Domitius' sol-

CAESAR

- 3 dunt quam in conspectum Caesaris deducatur. Cum eo de salute sua <agit>,<sup>31</sup> orat atque obsecrat ut sibi parcat veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se  
 4 beneficia exponit, quae erant maxima quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus  
 5 erat sublevatus. Cuius orationem Caesar interpellat: se non malefici causa ex provincia egressum sed uti se a contumeliis inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis in ea re<sup>32</sup> ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret, ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret. Cuius oratione confirmatus  
 6 Lentulus ut in oppidum reverti liceat petit: quod de sua salute impetraverit fore etiam reliquis ad suam spem solatio; adeo esse perterritos nonnullos ut suae vitae durius consulere cogantur. Facta potestate discedit.

23. Caesar ubi luxit omnes senatores senatorumque liberos, tribunos militum equitesque Romanos ad se produci iubet. Erant [quingenta] <senatorii><sup>33</sup> ordinis L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Caecilius [Spinther] Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus quaestor, L. Rubrius, praeterea filius Domiti aliique complures adulescentes et

<sup>31</sup> <agit> Bentley

<sup>32</sup> in ea re] iniuria *Faerno*

<sup>33</sup> [quingenta] <senatorii> *ed. pr.*: V <s-> *Davies*

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<sup>38</sup> Caesar presided over the pontifical board from his election as pontifex maximus in 63 until his death; when Lentulus became a member is unknown. Lentulus governed Further Spain in 59. His bid for the consulship of 57 was successful.

<sup>39</sup> For "in connection with this business," *Faerno* proposed "wrongfully."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

diers did not leave his side until he was escorted into Caesar's presence. He discussed his own welfare with him, 3 begged and pleaded that Caesar spare him. He reminded Caesar about their long-standing friendship and listed the favors Caesar had done him, which were substantial. (Caesar 4 was responsible for Lentulus' membership in the pontifical board, for his governorship in Spain after his praetorship, and for the assistance he received in his bid for the consulship.<sup>38</sup>) Caesar interrupted him midspeech. "I 5 did not leave my province with harmful intent but to defend myself from the insults of my enemies, to restore the tribunes—who have been expelled from Rome in connection with this business<sup>39</sup>—to their proper dignity, and to liberate myself and the Roman people from oppression by a small faction." Encouraged by his words Lentulus 6 requested permission to return to Corfinium. "The fact that I have your consent for my preservation will comfort others, too, as they look ahead. Some people are so thoroughly alarmed as to feel under compulsion to make rather harsh plans for their own lives."<sup>40</sup> Permission granted, he departed.

23. When the sun came up, Caesar ordered all senators, sons of senators, staff officers, and men of equestrian rank to be brought before him. From the senatorial 2 order there were these: Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, the quaestor Sextus Quintilius Varus, and Lucius Rubrius. In addition, Domitius' son and several other young men and a large number

<sup>40</sup> For example, Plutarch reports that Domitius attempted suicide (*Caes.* 34.6–8).

CAESAR

- magnus numerus equitum Romanorum et decurionum,  
3 quos ex municipiis Domitius evocaverat. Hos omnes pro-  
ductos a contumeliis militum conviciisque prohibet. Pauca  
apud eos loquitur quod sibi a parte eorum gratia relata non  
sit pro suis in eos maximis beneficiis. Dimittit omnes inco-  
4 lumes. Sestertium LX, quod advexerat Domitius atque in  
publico deposuerat, allatum ad se ab IIIIviris Corfini-  
ensibus Domitio reddit ne continentior in vita hominum  
quam in pecunia fuisse videatur. Etsi eam pecuniam pu-  
blicam esse constabat datamque a Pompeio in stipendium.  
5 Milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet  
atque eo die castra movet iustumque iter conficit, VII  
omnino dies ad Corfinium commoratus. Et per fines Mar-  
rucinorum Frentanorum Larinatum in Apuliam pervenit.

24. Pompeius iis rebus cognitis quae erant ad Corfi-  
nium gestae Luceria proficiscitur Canusium atque inde  
2 Brundisium. Copias undique omnes ex novis dilectibus ad  
se cogi iubet. Servos pastores armat atque iis equos attri-  
3 buit. Ex his circiter CCC equites conficit. L. Manlius prae-  
tor Alba<sup>34</sup> cum cohortibus VI profugit, Rutilius Lupus  
praetor Tarracina cum tribus. Procul equitatum Caesaris  
conspicatae, cui praeerat Vibius Curius, relicto praetore  
4 Item reliquis itineribus nonnullae cohortes in agmen Cae-  
saris, aliae in equites incidunt. Reducitur ad eum depren-

<sup>34</sup> alba S: -am MUTV

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<sup>41</sup> Roughly equivalent to a year's pay for one legion.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

of men of equestrian rank and council members whom Domitius had summoned from the towns. When they stood before him he protected them from insults and derision by his soldiers. He spoke briefly about the failure of some of them to show gratitude for the great favors he had conferred, then dismissed all of them unharmed. As for the six million sesterces that Domitius had brought to Corfinium and deposited in the public treasury, although they were delivered to Caesar by the town's magistrates, he returned them to Domitius so that he would not be thought to have shown less self-control with respect to money than with respect to human lives.<sup>41</sup> And yet everyone knew that that this was public money and had been given by Pompey for paying the troops. He ordered Domitius' soldiers to swear fidelity to himself. That same day he struck camp and traveled a full day's march. Altogether he had spent seven days at Corfinium. Traveling through the territory of the Marrucini, the Frentani, and the Larinates he came to Apulia.

24. After learning what had happened at Corfinium, Pompey set out from Luceria for Canusium and from there for Brundisium. He ordered all of the troops from the recent recruiting, wherever they were, to be concentrated near him. He armed the slave herdsmen and gave them horses, creating thereby about three hundred cavalrymen. The praetor Lucius Manlius fled from Alba with six cohorts, the praetor Rutilius Lupus from Tarracina with three; after a distant glimpse of Caesar's cavalry with Vibius Curius in command these cohorts abandoned their praetor, transferred their standards to Curius, and went over to him. The same thing happened on subsequent marches: some cohorts fell in with Caesar's column, others



CAESAR

5 sus ex itinere N. Magius Cremona, praefectus fabrum Cn. Pompei. Quem Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas colloquendi non fuerit atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus interesse rei publicae et communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici longo itineris spatio cum per alios conditiones ferantur ac si coram de omnibus conditionibus disceptetur.

25. His datis mandatis Brundisium cum legionibus VI pervenit, veteranis tribus, at reliquis quas ex novo dilectu confecerat atque in itinere compleverat. Domitianas enim  
 2 cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat. Repperit consules Dyrrachium profectos cum magna parte exercitus, Pompeium remanere Brundisi cum cohortibus XX.  
 3 Neque certum inveniri poterat obtinendine Brundisi causa ibi remansisset quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare <cum> extremis<sup>35</sup> Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex utraque parte bellum administrare posset, an inopia navium ibi restitisset. Veritusque  
 4 ne ille Italiam dimittendam non<sup>36</sup> existimaret exitus administrationesque Brundisini portus impedire instituit.  
 5 Quorum operum haec erat ratio. Qua fauces erant angustissimae portus, moles atque aggerem ab utraque parte litoris iaciebat quod iis locis erat vadosum mare.

<sup>35</sup> <cum> extremis *Morus*: extremis *MUTV*: ex ultimis *S*

<sup>36</sup> non] [non] *Paul*

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<sup>42</sup> For "along with the coastline," editors often adopt the reading of *S*, "from the furthest parts."

<sup>43</sup> See 1.27.2 for more uncertainty about Pompey's plans. It is

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

with his cavalry. Numerius Magius of Cremona, Pompey's chief engineer, was captured on the road and brought to him. Caesar sent Magius back to Pompey with a message: 5  
"Since hitherto there has not been an opportunity for direct talks and I myself am about to arrive in Brundisium, it is in the interest of the republic and the general welfare that I speak with you directly. When negotiating points are carried by intermediaries, and there is a long interval for traveling, the results are not as good as if the whole negotiation takes place in face-to-face debate."

25. After sending off this message he reached Brundisium with six legions. Three were veteran legions but the rest he had created from fresh recruits and brought up to strength along the way, for he had sent Domitius' cohorts directly from Corfinium to Sicily. He found that the 2  
consuls had left for Dyrrachium with a large part of the army, but that Pompey was still in Brundisium with twenty cohorts. It could not be determined whether Pom- 3  
pey had remained there in order to hold Brundisium, hoping thereby to retain control of the entire Adriatic along with the coastline<sup>42</sup> of Italy and territory in Greece and be able to wage war from both directions, or whether he had stayed because of a shortage of ships. Caesar worried 4  
that Pompey would not think that Italy had to be abandoned, so he began to block his escape from and use of the harbor.<sup>43</sup>

The plan of Caesar's works was as follows. Where the 5  
harbor entrance was narrowest he extended jetties of stone and fill from the shore on both sides, since the water was

unclear whether Caesar wanted to trap Pompey in Italy (Cic. *Att.* 9.13.1) or force him out of it (Cic. *Att.* 9.14.1).

## CAESAR

- 6 Longius progressus cum agger altiore aqua contineri non  
posset rates duplices quoquo versus pedum XXX<sup>37</sup> e  
7 gione molis collocabat. Has quaternis ancoris ex IIII angu-  
8 lis destinabat ne fluctibus moverentur. His perfectis collo-  
catisque alias deinceps pari magnitudine rates iungebat.  
9 Has terra atque aggere integebat <ne> aditus atque incur-  
sus ad defendendum impediretur, a fronte atque ab utro-  
10 que latere cratibus ac pluteis protegebat. In quarta quaque  
earum turres binorum tabulatorum excitabat quo commo-  
dius ab impetu navium incendiisque defenderet.

26. Contra haec Pompeius naves magnas onerarias  
quas in portu Brundisino deprehenderat adornabat. Ibi  
turres cum ternis tabulatis erigebat easque multis tormen-  
tis et omni genere telorum completas ad opera Caesaris  
appellebat ut rates perrumperet atque opera disturbaret.  
Sic cotidie utrimque eminus fundis sagittis reliquisque  
telis pugnabatur.

- 2 Atque haec Caesar ita administrabat ut condiciones  
pacis dimittendas non existimaret. Ac tametsi magnopere  
admirabatur Magium, quem ad Pompeium cum mandatis  
miserat, ad se non remitti atque ea res saepe temptata etsi  
impetus eius consiliaque tardabat tamen omnibus rebus in  
3 eo perseverandum putabat. Itaque Caninium Rebilum  
legatum, familiarem <et><sup>38</sup> necessarium Scriboni Libonis,

<sup>37</sup> XXX] LXXX or XXXX von Göler

<sup>38</sup> <et> Damon

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<sup>44</sup> For Magius as an intermediary between Caesar and Pompey, see 1.24.4. According to a letter by Caesar preserved in Cicero's correspondence, Pompey did in fact send Magius back with terms around the time of Caesar's arrival at Brundisium (*Att.* 9.13A). Caesar replied "as he saw fit," perhaps through Magius.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

shallow there. Further out, where the deeper water pre- 6  
vented the fill from holding together, he placed double 7  
pontoons thirty feet square near each jetty. These he fixed 7  
in place with anchors from the four corners so they would 8  
not shift in the waves. When the pontoons were finished 8  
and in position he joined to them others of the same size, 9  
one by one. He covered them with earth and fill so that 9  
there would be no impediment to those running out onto 10  
them for defense, and protected them from the front and 10  
both sides with brushwood bundles and screens. On every 10  
fourth pontoon he erected two-story towers to facilitate 10  
their defense against attack by ship and fire.

26. In response Pompey outfitted the large cargo ves-  
sels he had seized in the port of Brundisium. He erected  
three-story towers on each, and after filling these with  
a multitude of catapults and all sorts of projectiles he  
brought them to bear on Caesar's works, aiming to break  
up the pontoons and disrupt his efforts. The fighting went  
on thus for days with a long-distance exchange of sling-  
shot, arrows, and other projectiles.

Caesar for his part conducted these operations still 2  
thinking that peace negotiations should not be abandoned.  
Although he was very surprised that Magius, whom he had  
sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him,  
and although the repeated attempts at negotiation delayed  
his progress and plans, nevertheless he felt that he ought  
to persevere at it by every means possible.<sup>44</sup> Therefore he 3  
sent his officer Caninius Rebilus, a close friend of Scribo-

His assertion about Pompey here is either false (if it refers to  
Magius' first mission) or inadequately contextualized (if it refers  
to a second mission).

## CAESAR

mittit ad eum colloqui causa. Mandat ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur. In primis ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur postulat. Magnopere sese confidere demonstrat si eius rei sit potestas facta fore ut aequis conditionibus ab armis discedatur; cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem perventuram si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum. Libo a colloquio Canini digressus ad Pompeium proficiscitur. Paulo post renuntiat: quod consules absint sine illis non posse agi de compositione. Ita saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello agendum.

27. Prope dimidia parte operis a Caesare effecta diebusque in ea re consumptis VIII, naves a consulibus Dyrrachio remissae, quae priorem partem exercitus eo deportaverant, Brundisium revertuntur. Pompeius sive operibus Caesaris permotus sive etiam quod ab initio Italia excedere constituerat adventu navium profectionem parare incipit. Et quo facilius impetum Caesaris tardaret, ne sub ipsa profectione milites oppidum irrumperent portas obstruit vicos plateasque inaedificat ac fossas transversas viis praeducit atque ibi sudes stipitesque praeacutus defigit. Haec levibus cratibus terraque inaequat. Aditus autem atque itinera duo quae extra murum ad portum ferebant maximis defixis trabibus atque iis praeacutis praesaepit. His paratis rebus milites silentio naves con-

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

nius Libo's, to Libo for talks. Rebilus' task was to encourage Libo to mediate a peaceful settlement. Caesar's particular request was that he himself speak directly with Pompey. He put it this way: "I am quite confident that if there is an opportunity for direct talks equitable terms will make it possible to stop fighting. And a large part of the credit and renown for this will attach to Libo if it is with his initiative and effort that the fighting stops." Libo left his meeting with Caninius and went to Pompey. Shortly thereafter he reported that without the consuls—since they were absent—it was impossible to discuss a settlement. So Caesar decided that the objective attempted so often in vain finally had to be abandoned and that he had a war to fight.

27. Nearly half of Caesar's barrier was complete, and nine days had been spent on it, when Pompey's ships were sent back from Dyrrachium by the consuls. These had transported the first part of the army and now returned to Brundisium. Pompey, either prompted by Caesar's works or because he had decided from the outset to leave Italy, began preparing his departure after the ships' arrival. The better to slow down Caesar's attack, in case his troops tried to break into Brundisium at the very moment of his own departure, Pompey blocked the gates, constructed obstacles in streets and squares, and dug trenches across the main roads; in the trenches he planted stakes and tree trunks sharpened to a point, using lightweight brush and a layer of dirt to make a level surface. As for the approach routes and the two roads outside the walls that led to the port, he barricaded them with a plantation of huge beams likewise sharpened to point. After these preparations he ordered his soldiers to embark in silence. Here and there

## CAESAR

scendere iubet. Expeditos autem ex evocatis sagittariis  
6 funditoribusque raros in muro turribusque disponit. Hos  
certo signo revocare constituit cum omnes milites naves  
conscendissent. Atque iis expedito loco actuaria navigia  
relinquit.

25. Brundisini Pompeianorum militum iniuriis atque  
ipsius Pompei contumeliis permoti Caesaris rebus fave-  
2 bant. Itaque cognita Pompei profectione concursantibus  
illis atque in ea re occupatis vulgo ex tectis significabant.  
Per quos re cognita Caesar scalas parari militesque armari  
3 iubet ne quam rei gerendae facultatem dimittat. Pom-  
peius sub noctem naves solvit. Qui erant in muro custo-  
diae causa collocati eo signo quod convenerat revocantur  
4 notisque itineribus ad naves decurrunt. Milites positus  
scalis muros ascendunt. Sed moniti a Brundisinis ut val-  
lum caecum fossasque caveant subsistunt et longo itinere  
ab his circumducti ad portum perveniunt duasque naves  
cum militibus, quae ad moles Caesaris adhaeserant, sca-  
phis lintribusque reprehendunt. Reprehensas excipiunt.

29. Caesar etsi ad spem conficiendi negoti maxime pro-  
babat coactis navibus mare transire et Pompeium sequi  
priusquam ille sese transmarinis auxiliis confirmaret, ta-  
men eius rei moram temporisque longinquitatem timebat  
quod omnibus coactis navibus Pompeius praesentem fa-  
2 cultatem insequendi sui ademerat. Relinquebatur ut ex  
longinquioribus regionibus Galliae Picenique et a freto

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

on the wall and towers he placed light-armed troops from among his reenlisted men, archers, and slingers. He arranged to summon them with a set signal when the soldiers had all embarked, and left them some fast boats in an accessible spot. 6

28. The people of Brundisium, provoked by injuries suffered at the hands of Pompey's soldiers and insults from Pompey himself, favored Caesar's side. Therefore when they recognized that Pompey was leaving—his men were rushing about busy with the departure—they signaled the fact from every rooftop. Thanks to them, Caesar recognized what was happening. He ordered ladders to be made ready and soldiers to be armed, aiming not to let any opportunity for action slip. Pompey set sail just before nightfall. The men he had placed on guard duty on the wall, summoned by the prearranged signal, ran along familiar paths to the boats. Caesar's soldiers raised their ladders and climbed the walls. Warned by the Brundisians to avoid the camouflaged barrier and trenches, they made an abrupt halt; they reached the port by following the Brundisians on a long circuitous route. Two ships full of soldiers had run aground on Caesar's jetties, and they captured these using small craft and rowboats. They took possession of the captured vessels. 2 3 4

29. Caesar's best plan, in the hope of bringing matters to a conclusion, was to collect ships and cross the Adriatic on Pompey's heels before Pompey could strengthen himself with overseas auxiliaries. Nevertheless he was afraid of the delay this would involve and the time cost, since Pompey had removed the immediate possibility of pursuit by collecting all the ships himself. This left Caesar having to wait for ships from more distant areas, from Gaul and 2



## CAESAR

naves essent expectandae. Id propter anni tempus longum  
3 atque impeditum videbatur. Interea veterem exercitum  
duas Hispanias confirmari, quarum erat altera maximis  
beneficiis Pompei devincta, auxilia equitatum parari, Gal-  
liam Italiamque temptari se absente nolebat.

30. Itaque in praesentia Pompei sequendi rationem  
omittit, in Hispaniam proficisci constituit, duumviris mu-  
nicipiorum omnium imperat ut naves conquirant Brundi-  
2 siumque deducendas curent. Mittit in Sardiniam cum le-  
gione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam Curionem pro  
praetore cum legionibus tribus. Eundem, cum Siciliam  
recepisset, protinus in Africam traducere exercitum iubet.

Sardiniam obtinebat M. Cotta, Siciliam M. Cato. Afri-  
3 cam sorte Tubero obtinere debebat. Caralitani simul ad se  
Valerium mitti audierunt, nondum profecto ex Italia sua  
sponte Cottam ex oppido eiciunt. Ille perterritus quod  
omnem provinciam consentire intellegebat ex Sardinia in  
4 Africam profugit. Cato in Sicilia naves longas veteres refi-  
ciebat, novas civitatibus imperabat. Haec magno studio  
agebat. In Lucanis Bruttiisque per legatos suos civium  
Romanorum dilectus habebat, equitum peditumque cer-  
5 tum numerum a civitatibus Siciliae exigebat. Quibus rebus  
paene perfectis adventu Curionis cognito queritur in  
contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui  
omnibus rebus imparatissimis non necessarium bellum

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<sup>45</sup> For the situation in Spain, see 1.38–39.

<sup>46</sup> The number here conflicts with that given at 2.23.1.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

Picenum and the Sicilian strait. Given the time of year, this seemed likely to be a long and difficult matter, and he did not want his absence to allow Pompey's veteran army and the two Spanish provinces to take heart in the meantime (one of the two provinces was obligated to Pompey by some very generous favors), or auxiliary troops and cavalry to be acquired, or Gaul and Italy to be disturbed.<sup>45</sup> 3

30. For the moment, therefore, he dropped the plan of following Pompey, decided to set out for Spain, and ordered magistrates in every town to find ships and see that they were conveyed to Brundisium. To Sardinia he sent his officer Valerius with a single legion, to Sicily Curio as propraetor with three.<sup>46</sup> Curio's orders, after he regained control of Sicily, were to transport his army immediately to Africa. 2

Sardinia was held by Marcus Cotta, Sicily by Marcus Cato; Africa was supposed to be in Tubero's hands, according to the provincial allotment. As soon as the people of Caralis heard that Valerius was being sent to them, and before he had even set out from Italy, of their own accord they ejected Cotta from the town. Terrified because he knew the whole province felt this way, Cotta fled from Sardinia to Africa. Cato was repairing old warships in Sicily and requisitioning new ones from the province's cities; he went about these things with great determination. In Lucania and Bruttium he recruited Roman citizens through representatives, from Sicily's cities he demanded a fixed number of infantry and cavalry. These measures were nearly complete when he learned of Curio's approach. At a public meeting he spoke with great bitterness: "I have been forsaken and betrayed by Pompey, who undertook an unnecessary war without any prepara- 3 4 5

## CAESAR

suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset. Haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit.

31. Nacti vacuas ab imperiis Sardiniam Valerius, Curio  
2 Siciliam, cum exercitibus eo perveniunt. Tubero cum in Africam venisset invenit in provincia cum imperio Attium Varum, qui ad Auximum, ut supra demonstravimus, amissis cohortibus protinus ex fuga in Africam pervenerat atque eam sua sponte vacuam occupaverat dilectuque habito duas legiones effecerat, hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae nactus aditus ad ea conanda quod  
3 Hic venientem Vticam navibus Tuberonem portu atque oppido prohibet neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit.

32. His rebus confectis Caesar ut reliquum tempus a labore intermitteretur milites in proxima municipia ducit. Ipse ad urbem proficiscitur. Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse sed expectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum quod omnibus civibus  
3 pateret; latum ab X tribunis plebis—contradicientibus inimicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina con-

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<sup>47</sup> See Pompey's brief assertion at 1.6.1.

<sup>48</sup> See 1.13.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, who reports the presence of legions at Tarentum and Sipontum, thought their locations betrayed rather Caesar's intention of blocking the exits from Italy (*Att.* 9.15.1).

<sup>50</sup> On April 1, 49 (D.C. 41.15.2).

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

tions at all. Yet when I and others questioned him in the senate, he assured us that he had everything fit and ready for war."<sup>47</sup> After his bitter words at the meeting, he left the province in flight.

31. Valerius and Curio found Sardinia and Sicily vacant of military control when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero got to Africa he discovered Attius Varus exercising command in the province. (After losing his cohorts at Auximum, as I indicated above, Varus fled and went directly to Africa.<sup>48</sup>) He had seized the vacant province on his own initiative and recruited troops for two new legions. His knowledge of people and places and his past experience of the province created openings for these attempts, since a few years earlier, after his praetorship, he been the provincial governor. When Tubero arrived at Utica with his ships, Varus barred him from the harbor and the town. He did not even permit Tubero to put his ailing son ashore, but forced him to weigh anchor and leave the area.

32. After finishing this business Caesar withdrew his men to towns in the immediate vicinity to give them a temporary break from exertion.<sup>49</sup> He himself set out for Rome. At a meeting of the senate<sup>50</sup> he recounted the injuries done by his enemies, explaining that his candidacy for office had not been anomalous; rather, he had waited until the legal time for a consulship, content with what was open to any citizen.<sup>51</sup> "A law proposed by the ten tribunes — in the face of my enemies' opposition and Cato resisting with the utmost vehemence and using his old filibuster

<sup>51</sup> The legal interval between consulships was ten years, but an exception was made for Pompey (*cos.* 70, 55, 52).

## CAESAR

suetudine dicendi mora dies extrahente—ut sui ratio abs-  
entis haberetur ipso consule Pompeio; qui si improbasset  
cur ferri passus esset? si probasset cur se uti populi bene-  
4 ficio prohibuisset? Patientiam proponit suam cum de exer-  
citibus dimittendis ultro postulavisset, in quo iacturam  
5 dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. Acerbitatem  
inimicorum docet, qui quod ab altero postularent in se  
recusarent atque omnia permisceri mallent quam impe-  
6 rium exercitusque dimittere. Iniuriam in eripiendis legio-  
nibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circum-  
scribendis tribunis plebis. Conditiones a se latas, expetita  
7 colloquia et denegata commemorat. Pro quibus rebus  
hortatur ac postulat ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una  
secum administrent; sin timore defugiant illis se oneri non  
8 futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum; legatos  
ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere; neque se  
reformidare quod in senatu Pompeius paulo ante dixisset:  
ad quos legati mitterentur his auctoritatem attribui timo-  
9 remque eorum qui mitterent significari; tenuis atque in-  
firmi haec animi videri; se vero ut opibus<sup>39</sup> anteire studue-  
rit sic iustitia et aequitate velle superare.

33. Probat rem senatus de mittendis legatis. Sed qui

<sup>39</sup> opibus] operibus V<sup>ac</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ordinarily, candidates were required to declare their candidacy in Rome. Caesar and Cato had clashed over this requirement a decade earlier, when a filibuster by Cato forced Caesar to forego a possible triumph in order to declare his candidacy for the consulship of 59 (Plut. *Caes.* 13.1–2; App. *BC* 2.30). Caesar's subsequent exemption from the requirement was passed during Pompey's consulship in 52 (D.C. 40.51.2).

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

tactic to drag the time out with delay — ruled that my candidacy in absentia should be considered valid.<sup>52</sup> Pompey himself was consul at the time. If he disapproved, why did he allow it to be proposed? If he approved, why has he prevented me from using a favor granted by the Roman people?" Caesar brought up his own forbearance in initiating a request that both armies be dismissed, a matter in which he stood to lose dignity and prestige, and showed the harshness of his enemies, who were refusing to do what they asked him to do and preferred utter confusion to giving up power and armies. He emphasized the injury they did in depriving him of his legions, and their brutality and highhandedness in obstructing the tribunes. He recounted the terms he had proposed, the negotiations requested and refused. For all these reasons he exhorted the senators and asked them to take charge of the state and administer it with him. "But if fear makes you shirk the task, I will not be a burden to you but will administer the state myself."<sup>53</sup> He said that representatives ought to be sent to Pompey for a settlement, that he did not feel the anxiety expressed by Pompey in the senate a short while before, namely, that sending representatives increased the authority of those to whom they were sent and showed the fear of those who sent them. "This bears the stamp of a petty and feeble character. As for me, just as I have worked to get ahead in resources,<sup>54</sup> so I desire to outdo others in justice and equity."

33. The senate approved the sending of representa-

<sup>53</sup> Pompey had done so as sole consul for much of 52.

<sup>54</sup> For "in resources," editors often print "in achievements."

## CAESAR

mitterentur non reperiebantur, maximeque timoris causa  
2 pro se quisque id munus legationis recusabat. Pompeius  
enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat: eodem se habi-  
turum loco qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Cae-  
3 saris fuissent. Sic triduum disputationibus excusationibus-  
que extrahitur. Subicitur etiam L. Metellus tribunus plebis  
ab inimicis Caesaris qui hanc rem distrahat reliquasque  
4 res quascumque agere instituerit impediatur. Cuius cognito  
consilio Caesar frustra diebus aliquot consumptis, ne re-  
liquum tempus dimittat infectis iis quae agere destina-  
verat ab urbe proficiscitur atque in ulteriorem Galliam  
pervenit.

34. Quo cum venisset cognoscit: missum <in Hispaniam> a Pompeio Vibullium Rufum, quem paucis ante  
2 diebus Corfinio captum ipse dimiserat; profectum item  
Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis  
VII, quas Igili et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis libertis  
3 colonis suis compleverat; praemissos etiam legatos Massilienses domum, nobiles adulescentes, quos ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent. Quibus mandatis acceptis Massilienses portas Caesari clausuram, Albicos, barbaros homines qui in eorum fide antiquitus erant montesque supra Massiliam incolebant, ad se vocaverant, frumentum ex finitimis regionibus atque [in] omnibus castellis in urbem convexerant, armorum officinas in urbe instituerant, muros portas classem reficiebant.

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<sup>55</sup> That is, in the transalpine province of Gaul, roughly modern France. Italy north of the Po was also called Gaul from the Gallic tribes that had settled in that fertile area centuries earlier.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

tives. But no one could be found to send; it was mostly out of fear that everyone turned down their appointments as representative. (As Pompey was leaving Rome he had said in the senate that he would treat those who stayed in Rome like those who were in Caesar's camp.) So three days dragged out in arguments and excuses. Plus, Lucius Metellus, a plebeian tribune, was deputized by Caesar's enemies to sidetrack this business and obstruct anything else Caesar set in motion. When he recognized Metellus' intent, and a few days had been spent to no purpose, to avoid wasting the rest of his time there Caesar left Rome without having accomplished what he had intended and went to Further Gaul.<sup>55</sup>

34. Upon arrival there he learned that Vibullius Rufus had been sent by Pompey to Spain; Caesar had taken him captive and dismissed him from Corfinium a few days earlier. Also that Domitius had set out to seize Marseilles with seven fast ships requisitioned from private owners at Igilium and near Cosa and manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and tenants. And that Marseilles' representatives, men of distinction, had been sent home ahead of him; Pompey at his departure from Rome had urged them not to let Caesar's recent services drive out the memory of the benefits he had conferred on them in the past. Upon receiving this message the people of Marseilles had closed the gates to Caesar and summoned the Albici to their side. (These natives had long been under their protection; they inhabited the hills above the city.) They had also brought into the city provisions from nearby districts and all their strongholds, and established weapon-making workshops there. Repairs to the walls, gates, and fleet were in progress.



## CAESAR

35. Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos. Cum iis agit: ne initium inferendi belli ab Massiliensibus oriatur; debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam  
2 unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur commemorat. Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec<sup>40</sup> Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum <Romanum> in partes duas; neque sui iudici neque suarum esse virium discernere ultra pars iustior  
4 tiorem habeat causam; principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem, patronos civitatis, quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice his concesserit, alter bello victas †gallias† attribuerit<sup>41</sup> vectigaliaque auxerit; quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere.

36. Haec dum inter eos aguntur Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab his receptus urbi praeficitur.  
2 Summa ei belli administrandi permittitur. Eius imperio classem quoquo versus dimittunt. Onerarias naves quas ubique possunt deprehendunt atque in portum deducunt. Parum clavis aut materia atque armamentis instructis ad

<sup>40</sup> haec] DC *Chacon*

<sup>41</sup> victas gallias attribuerit *MUS*: victas galliae a- *TV*: victos Sallyas a- *Glandorp*: victa Gallia alia tribuerit *Paul*

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<sup>56</sup> For "this official response," Chacon proposed "the response of the six hundred (*sc.* town councilors)." The name "the six hundred" is known from other sources (V. Max 2.6.7; Str. 4.1.5).

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

35. Caesar summoned from Marseilles "The Fifteen," the city's leaders, and met with them. "The first move in the war should not come from the people of Marseilles. You ought to follow the authority of the whole of Italy, not comply with the wishes of a single man." He mentioned everything else that he thought would bring them to their senses. The delegation took his words home and gave him this official response:<sup>56</sup> "We understand that the Roman people is split in two. It is not within our discretion or strength to decide which side has the juster cause. But the leaders of the two parties, Gnaeus Pompey and Gaius Caesar, are patrons of Marseilles: one of them granted Marseilles public ownership of the territory of the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii, the other allocated some of<sup>57</sup> his military conquests and increased the city's revenue. We are obliged, therefore, to accord equal goodwill to equivalent benefits. We must not help either man against the other or admit him into our city or harbors."

36. During these negotiations Domitius reached Marseilles with his ships. He was admitted by the inhabitants and put in charge of the city; the whole control of the war was placed in his hands. On his order they sent their fleet in every direction. They seized merchant ships wherever they could and brought them to the port; ships with too little in the way of hardware or timber and tackle they used

<sup>57</sup> The uncertainty of the text here deprives us of the details underlying "some" and prevents us from saying which benefaction came from which patron. For "awarded some of his military conquests," the emendations of Glandorp and of Paul substitute "assigned the defeated Sallyes" and "awarded other benefits after the conquest of Gaul," respectively.

## CAESAR

- 3 reliquas armandas reficiendasque utuntur. Frumenti quod inventum est in publicum conferunt. Reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, <si> accidat,<sup>42</sup> reseruant.
- 4 Quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones tres Massiliam adducit. Turres vineasque ad oppugnationem urbis agere, naves longas Arelate numero XII facere instituit.
- 5 Quibus effectis armatisque diebus XXX a qua die materia caesa est adductisque Massiliam, iis D. Brutum praeficit. C. Trebonium legatum ad oppugnationem Massiliae relinquit.

37. Dum haec parat atque administrat C. Fabium legatum cum legionibus tribus quas Narbone circumque ea loca hiemandi causa disposuerat in Hispaniam praemittit. Celeriterque saltus Pyrenaeos occupari iubet, qui eo tempore ab L. Afranio legato praesidiis tenebantur. Reliquas  
2 legiones, quae longius hiemabant, subsequi iubet. Fabius,  
3 ut erat imperatum, adhibita celeritate praesidium ex saltu deiecit magnisque itineribus ad exercitum Afrani contendit.

38. Adventu L. Vibulli Rufi, quem a Pompeio missum in Hispaniam demonstratum est, Afranius et Petreius et Varro, legati Pompei, quorum unus Hispaniam citeriorem <tribus legionibus, alter ulteriorem> a saltu Castulonensi ad Anam duabus legionibus, tertius ab Ana Vettonum

<sup>42</sup> si accidat S: accidant MUTV. *The text is uncertain here.*

<sup>58</sup> For Fabius' original winter quarters assignment further north, see Hirt. 8.54.5. At Narbo he was better placed to block the route of Pompey's Spanish legions to Italy and, of course, to attack them in Spain.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

to equip and repair the rest. Any provisions they found 3  
were added to the public supply. They stockpiled other  
goods and supplies for a siege, in case one occurred.

At the prompting of these provocations Caesar led 4  
three legions to Marseilles. He began to move up siege  
towers and screens for an attack on the city, and to build  
warships at Arles, a total of twelve. These were finished 5  
and equipped within thirty days from when the trees were  
cut down, then brought to Marseilles. He put Decimus  
Brutus in charge of the ships and left his officer Gaius  
Trebonius for the assault on Marseilles.

37. While making these preparations and arrange-  
ments he sent his officer Gaius Fabius ahead to Spain with  
the three legions he had stationed for the winter at Narbo  
and nearby.<sup>58</sup> He ordered the immediate occupation of the  
Pyrenees passes, which at that time were garrisoned by  
Pompey's officer Lucius Afranius. Caesar ordered the rest 2  
of the legions, whose winter quarters were further away,  
to follow. Fabius, as ordered, acted swiftly to dislodge the 3  
garrison from the pass<sup>59</sup> and hastened toward Afranius'  
army by forced marches.

38. After the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus, whose  
mission from Pompey to Spain has been mentioned,<sup>60</sup>  
Pompey's officers Afranius, Petreius, and Varro divided up  
the tasks among themselves. (One of them held Nearer  
Spain with three legions, another held Further Spain from  
the pass at Castulo to the Anas River with two legions, and

<sup>59</sup> The pass that leads most directly to Fabius' immediate destination, Ilerda (1.38.4), is the Col de la Perche.

<sup>60</sup> At 1.34.1.

- agrum Lusitaniamque pari numero legionum obtinebat,  
 2 officia inter se partiuntur, uti Petreius ex Lusitania per  
 Vettones cum omnibus copiis ad Afranium proficiscatur,  
 Varro cum iis quas habebat legionibus omnem ulteriorem  
 3 Hispaniam tueatur. His rebus constitutis equites auxi-  
 liaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae Cantabris bar-  
 barisque omnibus qui ad Oceanum pertinent ab Afranio  
 4 imperantur. Quibus coactis celeriter Petreius per Vettones  
 ad Afranium pervenit constituuntque communi consilio  
 bellum ad Ilerdam propter ipsius loci opportunitatem ge-  
 rere.

39. Erant, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones Afrani-  
 tres Petrei duae, praeterea scutatae citerioris provinciae  
 et caetratae ulterioris Hispaniae<sup>43</sup> cohortes circiter LXXX<sup>44</sup>  
 2 equitumque utriusque provinciae circiter V milia. Caesar  
 legiones in Hispaniam praemisera[ad] VI [milia],<sup>45</sup> auxi-  
 lia peditum nulla,<sup>46</sup> equitum tria milia <quae> omnibus  
 superioribus bellis habuerat et parem ex Gallia numerum  
 quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus  
 nobilissimo quoque evocato. Huc<sup>47</sup> optimi generis homi-  
 num ex Aquitanis montanisque qui Galliam provinciam  
 3 attingunt <aliquos addidit quod><sup>48</sup> audierat Pompeium

<sup>43</sup> [ulterioris Hispaniae] *Madvig* (see 1.48.7)

<sup>44</sup> LXXX] XXX *Stoffel* 1.265 (see 1.83.1)

<sup>45</sup> [ad] VI [milia] *Chacon* (see 1.42.1–2). *Fabre* substituted ad  
 VI milia for nulla after peditum.

<sup>46</sup> nulla] V milia *Nipperdey* (see *Cic. Att.* 9.13.4): [nulla] ed.  
*pr., Fabre*

<sup>47</sup> huc s; huic (sc. numero) ω: II milia *Fabre*

<sup>48</sup> <aliquos addidit quod> *Damon*

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

with the same number the third held the territory of the  
Vettones starting at the Anas, as well as Lusitania.<sup>61</sup>) Pe- 2  
treius was to make his way to Afranius, marching from  
Lusitania through the Vettones with all of his forces, Varro  
was to guard all of Further Spain with the legions he had.  
After these decisions had been made, cavalry and auxiliary 3  
troops were requisitioned by Petreius from all of Lusita-  
nia, by Afranius from Celtiberia, the Cantabrians, and all  
of the natives as far as the Atlantic coast. After these muster- 4  
ed, Petreius marched rapidly through the Vettones to  
Afranius and they decided to prosecute the war jointly  
near Ilerda because of the advantages of that location.

39. As was indicated earlier, there were three legions  
belonging to Afranius and two to Petreius, plus about  
eighty infantry cohorts (those from Nearer Spain equipped  
with large shields, those from Further Spain with small  
shields) and about five thousand cavalry from both prov-  
inces.<sup>62</sup> Caesar had sent ahead to Spain a force containing 2  
six legions, no auxiliary infantry, three thousand cavalry  
that had been with him in all previous campaigns, and an  
equal number from Gaul, which he had recently paci-  
fied—he had summoned by name the most notable men  
from every community. To this <he added some> of the  
best sort of men from Aquitania and the mountain peoples  
who border the province of Gaul, <because> he had heard 3

<sup>61</sup> The order of the two lists is different: before the outbreak of hostilities Petreius held Lusitania, Varro Further Spain.

<sup>62</sup> Textual problems make this chapter's troop numbers somewhat uncertain, but the general picture is borne out by the narrative of the Ilerda campaign: the Pompeians were superior in infantry, Caesar in cavalry.

## CAESAR

per Mauretianiam cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum. Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit. Has exercitui  
4 distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit.

40. Fabius finitimarum civitatum animos litteris nuntiisque temptabat. In Sicori flumine pontes effecerat duos distantes inter se milia passuum IIII. His pontibus pabulatum mittebat quod ea quae citra flumen fuerant superioribus <diebus> consumpserat. Hoc idem fere atque eadem de causa Pompeiani exercitus duces faciebant. Crebroque inter se equestribus proeliis contendebant.  
3 Huc cum cotidiana consuetudine egressae pabulatoribus praesidio propiore <ponte> legiones Fabianae duae flumen transissent impedimenta<sup>49</sup> et omnis equitatus sequeretur, subito vi ventorum et aquae magnitudine pons est interruptus et reliqua multitudo equitum interclusa.  
4 Quo cognito a Petreio et Afranio ex aggere atque cratibus quae flumine ferebantur, celeriter suo ponte Afranius, quem oppido castrisque coniunctum habebat, legiones IIII equitatumque omnem traiecit duabusque Fabianis  
5 occurrit legionibus. Cuius adventu nuntiato L. Plancus, qui legionibus praeerat, necessaria re coactus locum capit superiorem diversamque aciem in duas partes constituit  
6 ne ab equitatu circumveniri posset. Ita congressus impari

<sup>49</sup> impedimenta] iumenta *Paul*

<sup>63</sup> The text is lacunose and the supplement is plausible but not inevitable.



## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

that Pompey was marching through Mauretania to Spain with his legions and would arrive very soon.<sup>63</sup> Caesar also borrowed money from his staff officers and centurions; this he distributed to his legions. By so doing he gained two results: he secured the centurions' support by means of the loan, and he purchased the soldiers' goodwill by means of the largesse. 4

40. Fabius began rallying the support of nearby communities with letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the Sicoris River about four miles apart. He started sending the cavalry across these bridges to graze, since he had consumed everything on his side of the river in the preceding days. The leaders of the Pompeian army were doing practically the same thing for the same reason, and the two sides frequently clashed in cavalry battles. When Fabius' legions had gone out to this area to protect the grazers, as they did every day, crossing the river by the nearer bridge, and the baggage train<sup>64</sup> and the entire cavalry was following them, all of a sudden the bridge broke up owing to a violent windstorm and flood. The mass of cavalry that remained behind was cut off. When Petreius and Afranius understood the situation from the debris and brushwood carried by the current, Afranius quickly sent four legions and the entire cavalry across his own bridge, which was adjacent to Ilerda and his camp, and went to meet Fabius' two legions. At news of his approach Lucius Plancus, who was in command of the legions, seized high ground, as the situation required him to do, and drew up a divided battle line facing two directions so that he could not be surrounded by the cavalry. In this manner, although 6

<sup>64</sup> For "baggage train," Paul proposed "pack animals."



## CAESAR

- numero magnos impetus legionum equitatusque sustinet.
- 7 Commisso ab equitibus proelio signa legionum duarum procul ab utrisque conspiciuntur quas C. Fabius ulteriore ponte subsidio nostris miserat suspicatus fore—id quod accidit—ut duces adversariorum occasione et beneficio
- 8 Fortunae ad nostros opprimendos uterentur. Quarum adventu proelium dirimitur, ac suas uterque legiones reducit in castra.

41. Eo biduo Caesar cum equitibus DCCCC quos sibi praesidio reliquerat in castra pervenit. Pons qui fuerat tempestate interruptus paene erat reffectus. Hunc noctu
- 2 perfici iussit. Ipse cognita locorum natura ponti castrisque praesidio VI cohortes relinquit atque omnia impedimenta, et postero die omnibus copiis triplici instructa acie ad Ilerdam proficiscitur et sub castris Afrani consistit<sup>50</sup> et ibi paulisper sub armis moratus facit aequo loco pugnandi potestatem. Potestate facta Afranius copias educit et in
- 3 medio colle sub castris constituit. Caesar ubi cognovit <per> Afranium stare quo minus proelio dimicaretur, ab infimis radicibus montis intermissis circiter passibus
- 4 CCCC castra facere constituit. Et ne in opere faciendo milites repentino hostium incursu exterrerentur atque opere prohiberentur vallo muniri vetuit, quod eminere et procul videri necesse erat, sed a fronte castrorum<sup>51</sup> contra
- 5 hostem pedum XV fossam fieri iussit. Prima et secunda acies in armis, ut ab initio constituta erat, permanebat.

<sup>50</sup> consistit *ed. pr.*: constitit  $\omega$

<sup>51</sup> castrorum *Beroaldo*: castra *MUTV*: omitted by S

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<sup>65</sup> Editors often follow S and excise "of the camp."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

fighting outnumbered, he withstood heavy attacks by the  
legions and cavalry. When the cavalry battle was under way  
both sides saw the standards of two legions in the distance.  
Gaius Fabius had sent these across the further bridge in  
support of our men, suspecting the very thing that happened,  
namely, that the enemy leaders would try to use the occasion  
and Fortune's gift to crush our men. At their approach the  
battle broke up and each commander led his legions back  
to camp. 7 8

41. Within two days Caesar reached Fabius' camp with  
nine hundred cavalry that he had reserved as protection  
for himself. The bridge that had been broken up by the  
storm was nearly rebuilt; he ordered it to be finished  
during the night. He himself, when he perceived the nature  
of the location, left six cohorts and the whole baggage train  
as protection for the bridge and the camp and set out for  
Ilerda the following day with all of his forces formed up  
into three lines. He halted below Afranius' camp and by  
waiting there briefly under arms created an opportunity  
for Afranius to fight on level ground. With this opportunity  
before him Afranius led out his troops and stationed them  
halfway down the hill below his camp. When Caesar realized  
that Afranius' move meant that no battle would be fought  
he decided to make camp at an interval of about four  
hundred paces from the hill's lowest slopes. Worried that  
a sudden incursion would alarm the soldiers engaged in  
fortification and keep them from their work, he forbade  
the construction of a rampart, which would necessarily  
stand out and be visible from a distance. Instead, he  
ordered them to make a fifteen-foot trench on the side of  
the camp facing the enemy.<sup>65</sup> The first and second battle  
lines remained battle ready in their initial positions; be- 3 4 5

## CAESAR

Post hoc opus in occulto a tertia acie fiebat. Sic omne prius est perfectum quam intellexeretur ab Afranio castra muni. Sub vesperum Caesar intra hanc fossam legiones reducit atque ibi sub armis proxima nocte conquiescit.

42. Postero die omnem exercitum intra fossam continet et, quod longius erat agger petendus, in praesentia similem rationem operis instituit singulaque latera castrorum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda fossasque ad eandem magnitudinem perfici iubet. Reliquas legiones in armis expeditas contra hostem constituit. Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas ad infimas montis radices producunt et proelio lacessunt. Neque idcirco Caesar opus intermittit confisus praesidio legionum trium et munitione fossae. Illi non diu commorati nec longius ab infimo colle progressi copias in castra reducunt. Tertio die Caesar vallo castra communit. Reliquas cohortes, quas in superioribus castris reliquerat, impedimentaque ad se traduci iubet.

43. Erat inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem, ubi castra Petreius atque Afranius habebant, planities circiter passuum CCC. Atque in hoc fere medio spatio tumulus erat paulo editior. Quem si occupavisset Caesar et communivisset, ab oppido et ponte et commeatu omnium quem in oppidum contulerant se interclusurum adversarios confidebat. Hoc sperans legiones tres ex castris educit acieque in locis idoneis instructa unius legionis antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

hind these men, and out of sight, the third line fortified the camp. In this way everything was done before Afranius understood that a camp was being fortified. Towards evening Caesar withdrew his legions behind the trench and rested there under arms that night. 6

42. On the following day he kept his whole army behind the trench. Because the fill for earthworks could only be procured at a distance, he adopted a similar fortification plan for the present: he assigned each side of the camp to one legion for fortifying and ordered trenches of the same size to be completed. He placed the remaining legions, unencumbered and battle ready, facing the enemy. Afranius and Petreius led their troops out to the hill's lowest slopes in order to cause panic and hinder the fortification work, making feinting attacks. But this did not make Caesar interrupt his work; the protection of three legions and a fortification trench gave him confidence. They did not stay long or advance beyond the bottom of the hill, but withdrew their troops to camp. On the third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart. He ordered the remaining cohorts, which he had left in his previous camp, and the baggage train to be led to his present location. 2 3 4

43. Between the town of Ilerda and the hill closest to it, where Petreius and Afranius had their camp, there was level ground for about three hundred paces, and in roughly the middle of this space was a position a little higher than the rest. Caesar was confident that if he seized and fortified it he would cut off his opponents from the town and the bridge and all of the supplies they had brought into the town. With this hope in mind he led three legions out of camp. After drawing up his line in suitable positions, he ordered the elite guard of one legion to run forward and 2 3

## CAESAR

4 Qua re cognita celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant  
Afrani cohortes breviori itinere ad eundem occupandum  
5 locum mittuntur. Contenditur proelio, et quod prius in  
tumulum Afraniani venerant nostri repelluntur atque aliis  
submissis subsidiis terga vertere seque ad signa legionum  
recipere coguntur.

44. Genus erat pugnae militum illorum ut magno im-  
petu primo procurrerent, audacter locum caperent, or-  
dines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique  
2 pugnant. si premerentur pedem referre et loco excedere  
non turpe existimarent, cum Lusitanis reliquisque barba-  
ris genere quodam pugnae assuefacti. (Quod fere fit, qui-  
bus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum  
3 regionum consuetudine moveatur.) Haec tum ratio nos-  
tros perturbavit insuetos huius generis pugnae. Circumiri  
enim sese ab aperto latere procurrentibus singulis arbitra-  
bantur. Ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis  
discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum quem cepe-  
4 rant dimitti censuerant oportere. Itaque perturbatis ante-  
signanis legio quae in eo cornu constiterat locum non te-  
nuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit.

45. Caesar paene omni acie perterrita, quod praeter  
opinionem consuetudinemque acciderat, cohortatus suos  
legionem nonam subsidio ducit. Hostem insolenter atque  
acriter nostros insequentem supprimit rursusque terga  
vertere seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro  
2 consistere cogit. Sed nonae legionis milites elati studio

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<sup>66</sup> This elite guard, the *antesignani*, normally marched and fought "in front of the standards."

<sup>67</sup> The "open side" was the side on which a soldier wielded his sword, usually the right, which was unprotected by the shield in his other hand.

CIVIL WAR. BOOK I

seize the higher ground.<sup>66</sup> When this was recognized, the cohorts stationed in front of Afranius' camp were quickly sent a shorter distance to seize the same position. A fight ensued and, because Afranius' men had reached the higher ground first, ours were pushed back, and when Afranius sent other troops in support, ours were forced to turn back and retreat to the legionary standards.

44. The enemy's combat style was this. The soldiers would run forward at first with great urgency and boldly seize a position. They did not really preserve their formations, tending to fight singly and scattered. They did not think it shameful to withdraw and leave a position if hard pressed, having become accustomed to a certain style of combat with the Lusitanians and the rest of the natives. (It generally happens that a soldier is greatly affected by the local customs of the places in which he has spent his career.) On that occasion this method threw our men into confusion, unaccustomed as they were to this style of combat. For they thought they were being outflanked on their open side<sup>67</sup> by individuals advancing at a run, whereas their opinion had been that the right thing to do was preserve their formations, not put a distance between themselves and the standards, or leave a position they had taken except for some compelling reason. Therefore, given the disarray of the elite troops, the legion stationed on that wing did not hold its position, retreating to the closest hill.

45. With nearly his whole line terrified—an occurrence contrary to expectation and habit—Caesar rallied his men and brought up the ninth legion in support. He checked the enemy's insolently aggressive pursuit of our men and forced them to turn back, retreat to Ilerda, and take a position in front of its wall. But the soldiers of the ninth

## CAESAR

dum sarcire acceptum detrimentum volunt temere insecti longius fugientes in locum iniquum progrediuntur et sub montem in quo erat oppidum positum Ilerda succedunt. Hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant. Praeruptus locus erat utraque ex parte directus ac tantum in latitudinem patebat ut tres instructae cohortes eum locum explerent, ut neque subsidia ab lateribus submitti neque equites laborantibus usui esse possent. Ab oppido autem declivis locus tenui fastigio vergebat in longitudinem passus circiter CCCC. Hac nostris erat receptus quod eo incitati studio inconsultius processerant. Hoc pugnabatur loco et propter angustias iniquo et quod sub ipsis radicibus montis constiterant, ut nullum frustra telum in eos mitteretur. Tamen virtute et patientia nitebantur atque omnia vulnera sustinebant. Augebantur illis copiae, atque ex castris cohortes per oppidum crebro submittebantur ut integri defessis succederent. Hoc idem Caesar facere cogebatur ut submissis in eundem locum cohortibus defessos reciperet.

46. Hoc cum esset modo pugnatum continenter horis V nostrique gravius a multitudine premerentur consumptis omnibus telis gladiis destrictis impetum adversus montem in cohortes faciunt paucisque deiectis reliquos sese convertere cogunt. Submotis sub murum cohortibus ac nonnullam partem<sup>52</sup> propter terrorem in oppidum com-

<sup>52</sup> nonnullam partem *Paul*: nonnulla parte  $\omega$



## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

legion were carried away by enthusiasm in their desire to repair the damage incurred. In their rash pursuit of the fleeing enemy they advanced onto unfavorable ground, coming all the way up to the hill on which Ilerda was situated. When our men wanted to withdraw from this position, the enemy put pressure on them from above. The place was cliff-like, sheer on both sides and just wide enough that three cohorts in formation filled the space, with the result that reinforcements could not be sent from the flanks and the cavalry could not be of any use if the men were in difficulties. In front of Ilerda stretched a slope with an slight gradient about four hundred paces long. Our men's retreat lay along this, since spurred by enthusiasm they had rather recklessly pressed on so far. The fighting took place here, in a location unfavorable because of its narrowness and because the men had halted at the very bottom of a hill, which meant that every weapon hurled at them hit something. Nevertheless, they exerted themselves with courageous endurance and held out against every sort of wound. The enemy forces kept growing, as cohorts from their camp were sent through the town into battle one after another, so that fresh men could take the place of exhausted ones. Caesar was compelled to do the same, to get exhausted troops out by sending up cohorts to take their place.

46. After the battle had gone on in this manner for five straight hours, our men, pressed ever harder by the enemy numbers and having used up all of their projectiles, drew their swords and attacked uphill against enemy cohorts. After dislodging a few they forced the rest to turn around. With the cohorts shifted to a position in front of the wall, and some driven by terror into the town, an easy retreat



CAESAR

- 3 pulsis facilis est nostris receptus datus. Equitatus autem  
 noster ab utroque latere etsi devexis<sup>53</sup> atque inferioribus  
 locis constiterat tamen summum<sup>54</sup> <in> iugum virtute  
 conititur atque inter duas acies perequitans commodio-  
 4 rem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat. Ita vario certamine  
 pugnatum est. Nostri in primo congressu circiter LXX  
 ceciderunt, in his Q. Fulginius ex primo hastato legionis  
 quartae decimae, qui propter eximiam virtutem ex inferi-  
 oribus ordinibus in eum locum pervenerat. Vulnerantur  
 5 amplius DC. Ex Afranianis interficiuntur T. Caecilius,  
 primi pili centurio, et praeter eum centuriones IIII, mi-  
 lites amplius CC.

47. Sed haec eius diei praefertur opinio ut se utrique  
 2 superiores discessisse existimarent, Afraniani quod cum  
 esse omnium iudicio inferiores viderentur comminus tam-  
 diu stetissent et nostrorum impetum sustinuissent et ini-  
 tio<sup>55</sup> locum tumulumque tenuissent quae causa pugnandi  
 fuerat et nostros primo congressu terga vertere coegissent,  
 3 nostri autem quod iniquo loco atque impari congressi  
 numero V horis proelium sustinuissent, quod montem gla-  
 diis dstrictis ascendissent, quod ex loco superiore terga  
 vertere adversarios coegissent atque in oppidum compu-  
 4 lissent. Illi eum tumulum pro quo pugnatum est magnis  
 operibus muniverunt praesidiumque ibi posuerunt.

<sup>53</sup> devexis *Damon*: dieiectis *M*: disiectis *U*: dilectis *TV*. The manuscript *S* is missing here.

<sup>54</sup> summum] summa *Forchhammer*

<sup>55</sup> <ab> initio *Paul*

<sup>68</sup> For "valiantly struggled to the top of," Forchhammer proposed "with supreme valor struggled onto."

<sup>69</sup> The first cohort of each legion was bigger than the other nine, and its centurions accordingly commanded more men.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

was available to our men. Moreover, our cavalry, although 3  
originally positioned lower on the slope, valiantly strug-  
gled to the top of<sup>68</sup> the ridge and by riding between the  
two lines gave our men a more comfortable and safer re-  
treat. The contest in this battle had mixed results. About 4  
seventy of our men fell in the initial encounter, among  
them Quintus Fulginius, formerly a first-cohort centu-  
rion<sup>69</sup> of the fourteenth legion, who had reached that posi-  
tion from lower ranks because of his conspicuous courage;  
more than six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius' men 5  
the casualties included Titus Castricius, chief centurion,  
and besides him four centurions and more than two hun-  
dred soldiers.

47. But the prevailing opinion about the day is that  
each side thought it had come off ahead. For Afranius' 2  
men this was because, although they were generally viewed  
as inferior, they had faced the enemy so long in close  
combat, and had withstood the attack of our men, and had  
held their position initially<sup>70</sup> as well as the high ground  
that was the cause of the battle, and had forced our men  
to turn and run at the first encounter. For our men, 3  
however, it was because, despite fighting on unfavorable  
ground and at a numerical disadvantage, they had sus-  
tained the battle for five hours, because they had advanced  
uphill with drawn swords, because they had forced their  
adversaries to turn and run from a position of superiority  
and had driven them into the town. As for the high ground 4  
over which the battle had been fought, the other side for-  
tified it with substantial earthworks and stationed a gar-  
rison there.

<sup>70</sup> For "initially," Paul proposed "from the beginning."

48. Accidit etiam repentinum incommodum biduo quo  
 haec gesta sunt. Tanta enim tempestas cooritur ut num-  
 2 quam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. Tum autem  
 ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summas ripas flumi-  
 nis superavit pontesque ambo quos C. Fabius fecerat uno  
 3 die interruptit. Quae res magnas difficultates exercitui  
 Caesaris attulit. Castra enim, ut supra demonstratum est,  
 cum essent inter flumina duo, Sicorim et Cingam—spatio  
 milium XXX neutrum horum transiri poterat necessa-  
 4 rioque omnes his angustiis continebantur. Neque civitates  
 quae ad Caesaris amicitiam accesserant frumentum sup-  
 portare neque ii qui pabulatum longius progressi erant  
 interclusi fluminibus reverti neque maximi commeatus<sup>56</sup>  
 qui ex Italia Galliaque veniebant in castra pervenire pote-  
 5 rant. Tempus autem erat difficillimum, quo neque fru-  
 menta in hibernis<sup>57</sup> erant—neque multum a maturitate  
 aberant—ac civitates exinanitae quod Afranius paene  
 omne frumentum ante Caesaris adventum Ilerdam con-  
 vexerat. Reliqui si quid fuerat Caesar superioribus diebus  
 6 consumpserat. Pecora, quod secundum poterat esse in-  
 opiae subsidium, propter bellum finitimae civitates lon-  
 7 gius removerant. Qui erant pabulandi aut frumentandi  
 causa progressi hos levis armaturae Lusitani peritique  
 earum regionum caetrati citerioris Hispaniae consecra-  
 bantur, quibus erat proclive tranare flumen quod consue-  
 tudo eorum omnium est ut sine utribus ad exercitum non  
 eant.

<sup>56</sup> commeatus *Beroaldo* (see 1.54.5): comitatus ω

<sup>57</sup> hibernis] *The text is uncertain here.*

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71 The Latin, like the English, is awkward. It may be corrupt.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

48. An unexpected setback occurred two days after these events, for so powerful a storm arose that everyone agreed that the flooding in the area had never been more extensive. On that occasion the storm washed snow down 2  
from every mountain and overflowed the riverbanks and in a single day broke both of the bridges Gaius Fabius had made. These developments caused serious difficulties to 3  
Caesar's army, for with his camp, as was indicated above, being between two rivers, the Sicoris and the Cinca—neither of these could be crossed for a stretch of thirty miles and of necessity everyone was confined within this narrow space.<sup>71</sup> The communities that had come over to Caesar 4  
could not supply him with provisions, nor could those who gone some distance to forage return, cut off as they were by the rivers, nor could the extensive supplies coming from Italy and Gaul reach Caesar's camp. For the season 5  
was a very difficult one, such that there was no standing grain in the winter camps—and yet it was not far from maturity—and the local communities had been emptied out, since Afranius had taken practically all provisions to Ilerda before Caesar's arrival. Whatever was left Caesar 6  
had consumed on the preceding days. As for livestock, which could have given additional support against scarcity, the nearby communities had moved it quite far away because of the war. Anyone who left camp to forage or collect 7  
provisions was pursued by Lusitanians, part of Afranius' light-armed force, and by men knowledgeable about the area, native troops from Nearer Spain. It was a simple matter for these to swim across the river because all of them were customarily equipped with inflatable skins when they began a campaign.

## CAESAR

49. At exercitus Afrani omnium rerum abundabat copia. Multum erat frumentum provisum et convectum superioribus temporibus, multum ex omni provincia com-  
2 portabatur. Magna copia pabuli suppetebat. Harum om-  
nium rerum facultates sine ullo periculo pons Ilerdae  
praebebat et loca trans flumen integra, quo omnino Cae-  
sar adire non poterat.

50. Hae permanserunt aquae dies complures. Conatus est Caesar reficere pontes, sed nec magnitudo fluminis permittebat neque ad ripam dispositae cohortes adversa-  
2 riorum perfici patiebantur. Quod illis prohibere erat facile  
cum ipsius fluminis natura atque aquae magnitudine tum  
quod ex totis ripis in unum atque angustum locum tela  
3 iaciebantur. Atque erat difficile eodem tempore rapidis-  
simo flumine opera perficere et tela vitare.

51. Nuntiatum Afranio magnos comitatus,<sup>58</sup> qui iter habebant ad Caesarem, ad flumen constitisse. Venerant eo sagittarii ex Rutenis, equites ex Gallia cum multis carris magnisque impedimentis, ut fert Gallica consuetudo.  
2 Erant praeterea cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI cum servis liberisque,<sup>59</sup> sed nullus ordo, nullum imperium certum cum suo quisque consilio uteretur atque omnes sine timore iter facerent uti superiorum temporum  
3 atque itinerum licentia. Erant complures honesti adulescentes, senatorum filii et ordinis equestris, erant legationes civitatum, erant legati Caesaris. Hos omnes flumina

<sup>58</sup> comitatus] commeatus *Nipperdey* (see 1.48.4)

<sup>59</sup> liberisque] libertisque *Hotoman*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

49. Afranius' army, however, had an abundance of everything. A great deal of grain had been arranged for and collected earlier, and a great deal was being transported from his entire province. A large supply of fodder was available. Access to all of these things was provided by the bridge at Ilerda and the untouched districts across the river, which Caesar had no way at all of reaching. 2

50. These floodwaters stayed for several days. Caesar tried to rebuild the bridges, but the height of the river did not permit it, nor did the enemy cohorts stationed on the bank allow their completion. It was easy for them to stop him, both because of the height of the water and because weapons were being thrown from the whole riverbank into a single narrow spot. And it was difficult to complete a construction project in a rapidly rushing river while simultaneously dodging weapons. 2 3

51. Afranius received word that large convoys<sup>72</sup> on their way to Caesar had halted beside the river. The new arrivals were archers from the Ruteni and cavalry from Gaul with a multitude of wagons and a great deal of baggage, as is the Gallic custom. There were also about six thousand men of all sorts with their slaves and children.<sup>73</sup> But there was no organization, no fixed command structure, since each man was acting according to his own plan and everyone was traveling fearless, with the lax discipline appropriate to earlier times and journeys. There were a number of highly regarded young men, senators' sons and men of equestrian standing, plus delegations from communities, and Caesar's own envoys, all of them hemmed 2 3

<sup>72</sup> For "large convoys," Nipperdey substituted "abundant supplies." <sup>73</sup> For "children," Hotoman substituted "freedman."

4 continebant. Ad hos opprimendos cum omni equitatu  
 tribusque legionibus Afranius de nocte proficiscitur im-  
 prudentesque ante missis equitibus aggreditur. Celeriter  
 sese tamen Galli equites expediunt proeliumque commit-  
 5 tunt. Hi dum pari certamine res geri potuit magnum ho-  
 stium numerum pauci sustinuerunt. Sed ubi signa legionum  
 appropinquare coeperunt paucis amissis sese in proximos  
 6 montes conferunt. Hoc pugnae tempus magnum attulit  
 nostris ad salutem momentum. Nacti enim spatium se in  
 loca superiora receperunt. Desiderati sunt eo die sagittarii  
 circiter CC, equites pauci, calonum atque impedimento-  
 rum<sup>60</sup> non magnus numerus.

52. His tamen omnibus annona crevit. Quae fere res  
 non solum inopia praesentis sed etiam futuri temporis ti-  
 2 more ingravescere consuevit. Iamque ad <HS><sup>61</sup> XL in  
 singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires in-  
 opia frumenti deminuerat. Atque incommoda in dies au-  
 3 gebantur. Et ita<sup>62</sup> paucis diebus magna erat rerum facta  
 commutatio ac se Fortuna inclinaverat ut nostri magna  
 inopia necessariarum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus  
 4 abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur. Caesar iis  
 civitatibus quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant, quo minor  
 erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat, calones ad longin-  
 quiores civitates dimittebat, ipse praesentem inopiam qui-  
 bus poterat subsidiis tutabatur.

<sup>60</sup> impedimentorum] iumentorum *Eussner*

<sup>61</sup> <HS> *Carter*

<sup>62</sup> et ita *Peskett*: et tam  $\omega$

<sup>74</sup> For "baggage," *Eussner* proposed "pack animals."

<sup>75</sup> The exact price is uncertain since the text is corrupt here, but the fact that it was unusually high is clear enough. A "measure" contained roughly fifteen pounds of grain.



CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

in by the river. Afranius set out by night with his whole 4  
cavalry and three legions to crush them. Sending ahead  
his cavalry he attacked them unawares. The cavalry from  
Gaul nevertheless prepared themselves quickly and joined  
battle. So long as the situation could be kept to an equal 5  
contest, a few of them withstood a large number of the  
enemy. But when the legionary standards began to ap-  
proach, the cavalry, having suffered a few losses, removed  
themselves to the nearest hills. The time they spent fight- 6  
ing was of great consequence for the safety of our people,  
for in the interval thus gained they withdrew onto higher  
ground. The losses that day were about two hundred ar-  
chers, a few cavalry, and no great quantity of camp follow-  
ers and baggage.<sup>74</sup>

52. Nevertheless, with all this the price of grain went  
up. (The grain price generally appreciates not only with a  
shortage of the moment but also with fear about the fu-  
ture.) It had already reached forty sesterces per measure, 2  
and the soldiers' strength had diminished because of the  
scarcity of provisions.<sup>75</sup> And their troubles were increasing  
daily. Such was the huge change of circumstances pro- 3  
duced within a few days—and Fortune had so tipped her  
scales—that our men were contending with a serious  
shortage of necessities, while the other side had plenty of  
everything and was thought to have the advantage. 4  
Caesar requisitioned livestock from the communities that had  
come over to him, insofar as their grain supplies were  
inadequate. He sent the camp followers to communities  
some distance away. He himself devised defenses against  
the present shortage from every possible source of help.



## CAESAR

53. Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant. Multa rumores adfugebant,<sup>63</sup> ut paene bellum confectum videretur. Quibus litteris nuntiisque Romam perlatis magni <in> forum<sup>64</sup> concursus [ad Afranium]<sup>65</sup> magnaue gratulationes fiebant. Multi ex Italia ad Cn. Pompeium proficiscebantur, alii ut principes talem nuntium attulisse, alii ne eventum belli expectasse aut ex omnibus novissimi venisse viderentur.

54. Cum in his angustiis res esset atque omnes viae ab Afranianis militibus equitibusque obsiderentur nec pontes perfici possent imperat militibus Caesar ut naves faciant cuius generis eum superioribus annis usus Britanniae docuerat. Carinae primum ac<sup>66</sup> staturmina ex levi materia fiebant. Reliquum corpus navium viminibus contextum coriis tegebatur. Has perfectas carris iunctis devehit noctu milia passuum a castris XXII militesque his navibus flumen transportat continentemque ripae collem improvise occupat. Hunc celeriter priusquam ab adversariis sentiatur communit. Huc legionem postea traiecit. Atque ex utraque parte pontem institutum biduo perficit. Ita

<sup>63</sup> multa rumores adfugebant *Oehler*. *The manuscripts are variously corrupt here.*

<sup>64</sup> in forum *Damon*: domum  $\omega$

<sup>65</sup> [ad Afranium] *Damon*: hominum *Vossius*: ad domum Afranii *Hotoman*, transposing domum

<sup>66</sup> primum ac *Aldus*: ac primum  $\omega$ : ac prima *Nipperdey*

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

53. Afranius and Petreius and their friends sent amplified and exaggerated accounts of these events to their partisans at Rome. Rumors added many fictions,<sup>76</sup> with the result that the war seemed practically over. After these letters and announcements were brought to Rome, people rushed in great numbers<sup>77</sup> <into> the Forum and there were extensive congratulations. Many men started making their way from Italy to Gnaeus Pompey, some to be seen as the first with news like this, others to avoid being seen to have waited for the war's result or to have arrived last of all. 2

54. Since the situation had come to such a pass and every road was blocked by Afranius' soldiers and cavalry, and it was impossible to complete the bridges, Caesar ordered his men to make boats of a type that he had learned about in his past experience of Britain. First, the keels and ribs<sup>78</sup> were made from a light wood; the rest of the boat's hull was woven from canes, then covered with hides. The finished boats were carried twenty-two miles from the camp at night on coupled wagons. Caesar put his men across the river on these boats and without warning occupied a hill that touched the riverbank. He fortified the hill quickly before his opponents could find out; he later brought a legion over to this spot. Within two days he finished the bridge, which he began from both banks at once. 3 4

<sup>76</sup> The text is uncertain.

<sup>77</sup> For "people rushed in great numbers," Vossius and Hottoman substituted "a great crowd of people rushed" and "people rushed in great numbers to Afranius' house," respectively.

<sup>78</sup> For "first the keels and ribs," Nipperdey substituted "the keels and the principal ribs."

## CAESAR

commeatus<sup>67</sup> et qui frumenti causa processerant tuto ad se recipit et rem frumentariam expedire incipit.

55. Eodem die equitum magnam partem flumen traiecit, qui inopinantes pabulatores et sine ullo dissipatos timore aggressi quam magnum numerum iumentorum atque hominum intercipiunt, cohortibusque caetratis subsidio missis scienter in duas partes sese distribuunt, alii ut praedae praesidio sint, alii ut venientibus resistent atque eos propellant, unamque cohortem quae temere ante ceteras extra aciem procurrerat seclusam ab reliquis circumveniunt atque interficiunt incolumesque cum magna praeda eodem ponte in castra revertuntur.

56. Dum haec ad Ilerdam geruntur Massilienses usi L. Domiti consilio naves longas expediunt numero XVII, quarum erant XI tectae. Multa huc minora navigia addunt ut ipsa multitudine nostra classis terreatur. Magnum numerum sagittariorum, magnum Albicorum—de quibus supra demonstratum est—imponunt atque hos praemiis pollicitationibusque incitant. Certas<sup>68</sup> sibi deponit naves Domitius atque has colonis pastoribusque quos secum adduxerat complet. Sic omnibus rebus instructa classe magna fiducia ad nostras naves procedunt, quibus praerat D. Brutus. Hae ad insulam quae est contra Massiliam stationes obtinebant.

57. Erat multo inferior numero navium Brutus. Sed electos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros ante-

<sup>67</sup> commeatus  $\omega$  (see 1.48.4): comitatus *Manuttus*

<sup>68</sup> certas] ceteras van Veen: tectas *Cornelissen*

<sup>79</sup> For "specific," van Veen and Cornelissen proposed "the remaining" and "decked," respectively.

<sup>80</sup> See 1.34.2.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

In this way he brought the supplies and those who had gone out after provisions safely into camp and made it easier to feed his army. 5

55. That same day he put a large part of his cavalry across the river. In their attack on foragers who were unsuspecting and carelessly dispersed they intercepted a very large number of pack animals and men. When native cohorts were sent in support, the cavalry split expertly into two groups so that some could provide protection for the booty while others resisted and repelled the newcomers. One enemy cohort ran rashly ahead of the others and left the line; cut off from the rest it was surrounded and killed. 2  
The cavalry returned to camp by the same bridge, unscathed and with a lot of booty.

56. While this was going on at Ilerda, the Massilians, acting on the plan of Lucius Domitius, got seventeen warships ready, eleven of them with decks. To these they added many smaller vessels so that our fleet would be terrified by numbers alone. They embarked a large number of archers and Albici—information about these was given above—and excited their enthusiasm with the promise of rewards. Domitius demanded specific<sup>79</sup> ships for himself and filled them with the tenants and herdsmen he had brought with him.<sup>80</sup> In this fashion, once the equipment of their fleet was complete, they headed for our ships with great confidence. Decimus Brutus was in charge of these, and they were stationed near the island that lies opposite Marseilles. 3 4

57. Brutus was greatly outnumbered in ships. But Caesar had allocated to this fleet picked men from all of

- signanos centuriones Caesar ei classi attribuerat qui sibi  
 2 id muneri depoposcerant. Hi manus ferreas atque harpa-  
 gones paraverant magnoque numero pilorum tragularum  
 reliquorumque telorum se instruxerant. Ita cognito ho-  
 3 stium adventu suas naves ex portu educunt, cum Massi-  
 lensibus configunt. Pugnatum est utrimque fortissime  
 atque acerrime. Neque multum Albici nostris virtute ce-  
 debant, homines asperi et montani et exercitati in armis.  
 4 Atque hi modo digressi <a> Massiliensibus recentem  
 eorum pollicitationem animis continebant, pastoresque  
 Domiti spe libertatis excitati sub oculis domini suam pro-  
 bare operam studebant.

58. Ipsi Massilienses et celeritate navium et scientia  
 gubernatorum confisi nostros eludebant impetusque eo-  
 rum excipiebant <cedendo>.<sup>69</sup> Et quoad licebat latiore uti  
 spatio producta longius acie circumvenire nostros aut plu-  
 ribus navibus adoriri singulas aut remos transcurrentes  
 2 detergere, si possent, contendebant. Cum propius erat  
 necessario ventum ab scientia gubernatorum atque artifi-  
 3 cii ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant. Qui<sup>70</sup> minus  
 exercitatis remigibus minusque peritis gubernatoribus  
 utebantur—qui repente ex onerariis navibus erant pro-  
 ducti—<hi><sup>71</sup> nequedum etiam vocabulis armamentorum  
 cognitis tum etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impedi-

<sup>69</sup> excipiebant <cedendo> Damon (see Lucan 3.555); <non>  
 excipiebant Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel; decipiebant Nipperdey;  
 effugiebant Terpstra <sup>70</sup> qui MU: quo STV: <Nostri> quom  
 Elberling <sup>71</sup> <hi> Damon

<sup>81</sup> For "received their attacks by giving way," Kraner-Hofmann-  
 Meusel, Nipperdey, and Terpstra substituted "did not wait for

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

his legions—the bravest, the elite, the centurions—men who had demanded this assignment for themselves. These had prepared “iron hands”—grappling hooks—and had equipped themselves with a large number of pikes and spears and other projectiles. Thus at news of the enemy’s approach they moved their ships out of the harbor and fought the Massilians. Both sides fought with the utmost courage and vehemence, and the Albici were not much inferior to our men in prowess, being hardy mountaineers with experience in warfare; having just left Marseilles, they had the people’s recent promises firmly in mind. Domitius’ herdsmen, stimulated by the prospect of freedom, were eager to prove their effectiveness under their master’s eye.

58. For their part the Massilians, relying on both the speed of their ships and the skill of the pilots, eluded our men and received their attacks by giving way.<sup>81</sup> And as long as they had ample space at their disposal, they kept extending their line and strove to surround our men if they could, or to attack single ships in groups, or to pass alongside and strip away the oars. When they were forced to come closer, they turned for protection from the pilots’ skill and tactics to the mountaineers’ prowess. As for the side with<sup>82</sup> less experienced rowers and less knowledgeable pilots—these had been taken on short notice from the transport ships—they did not even know the terms for the ships’ tackle and were also hindered by their slow and

their attacks,” “frustrated their attacks,” and “evaded their attacks,” respectively.

<sup>82</sup> For “as for the side with,” Elberling proposed “since our men had.”

bantur. Factae enim subito ex umida materia non eundem  
 4 usum celeritatis habuerant. Itaque dum locus communis  
 pugnandi daretur aequo animo singulas binis navibus ob-  
 iciebant atque insecta manu ferrea et retenta utraque nau-  
 diversi pugnabant atque in hostium naves transcendebant.  
 Et magno numero Albicorum et pastorum interfecto par-  
 tem navium deprimunt, nonnullas cum hominibus capi-  
 5 unt, reliquas in portum compellunt. Eo die naves Massi-  
 bensiensium cum his quae sunt captae intereunt VIII.

59. Hoc primum<sup>72</sup> Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur, simul  
 2 perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur. Illi perterriti vir-  
 tute equitum minus libere minus audacter vagabantur.  
 Alias non longo a castris progressi spatio ut celerem recep-  
 tum haberent angustius pabulabantur, alias longiore cir-  
 cuitu custodias stationesque equitum vitabant aut aliquo  
 3 accepto detrimento aut procul equitatu viso ex medio iti-  
 nere proiectis sarcinis fugiebant. Postremo et plures inter-  
 mittere dies et praeter consuetudinem omnium nocti  
 constituerant pabulari.

60. Interim Oscenses et Calagurritani, qui erant (cum)  
 Oscensibus contributi, mittunt ad eum legatos seseque  
 2 imperata facturos pollicentur. Hos Tarraconenses et lace-  
 tani et Ausetani et paucis post diebus Illurgavonenses, qui  
 3 flumen Hiberum attingunt, insequuntur. Petit ab his om-  
 nibus ut se frumento iuvent. Pollicentur atque omnibus

<sup>72</sup> primum *MUTV*: primum cum *S*: proelium *Davies*: [pri-  
 mum] *Chacon*



heavy ships, built in a hurry out of green wood, they had not acquired the same capacity for speed. Thus, so long as our men had a chance for close combat, they did not mind sending one ship against two: after throwing an "iron hand" and securing each ship they would fight facing in two directions and board the enemy vessels. After killing a large number of the Albici and herdsmen they sank a proportion of the ships, captured some still manned, and drove the rest into the harbor. The Massilians lost nine ships, including those that were captured.

59. This news reached Caesar first<sup>83</sup> at Ilerda, and at once, now that the bridge was complete, his fortune changed quickly. The enemy, thoroughly cowed by the cavalry's prowess, began to roam less freely and less boldly. Sometimes they avoided going a long way from camp, in order to have a rapid retreat, and foraged in a rather restricted area. Sometimes they took quite a long detour and avoided the cavalry patrols and outposts, or else after taking some damage or seeing the cavalry in the distance they abandoned their loads midjourney and fled. Eventually their decision was to skip several days at a time and to forage by night, contrary to all custom.

60. Meanwhile the people of Osca and those of Calagurris, which paid tribute to Osca, sent delegations to him and promised to do his bidding. The Tarronconenses, Iacetani, and Ausetani followed them, and a few days later the Illurgavonenses, who border the Ebro River. He asked all of them to help him with provisions. They promised to

<sup>83</sup> For "this news reached Caesar first," Davies and Chacon substituted "news of this battle reached Caesar" and "this news reached Caesar," respectively.



## CAESAR

- 4 undique conquisitis iumentis in castra deportant. Transit  
etiam cohors Illurgavonensis ad eum cognito civitatis con-  
5 silio et signa ex statione transfert. Magna celeriter com-  
mutatio rerum. Perfecto ponte, magnis V civitatibus ad  
amicitiam adiunctis, expedita re frumentaria, extinctis  
rumoribus de auxiliis legionum, quae cum Pompeio per  
Mauretanium venire dicebantur, multae longinquiores  
civitates ab Afranio desciscunt et Caesaris amicitiam  
sequuntur.

61. Quibus rebus perterritis animis adversariorum  
Caesar, ne semper magno circuitu per pontem equitatus  
esset mittendus, nactus idoneum locum fossas pedum  
XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit quibus par-  
tem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine  
2 efficeret. His paene effectis magnum in timorem Afranium  
Petreiusque perveniunt ne omnino frumento pabuloque  
intercluderentur, quod multum Caesar equitatu valebat.  
Itaque constituunt ipsi locis excedere et in Celtiberiam  
3 bellum transferre. (Huic consilio suffragabatur etiam illa  
res, quod ex duobus contrariis generibus, quae superiore  
bello cum [L.] Sertorio steterant civitates victae nomen  
atque imperium absentis timebant, quae in amicitia man-  
serant Pompei magnis adfectae beneficii eum diligebant.  
4 Caesaris autem erat in barbaris nomen obscurius.) Hic  
magnos equitatus magnaue auxilia expectabant et suis  
5 locis bellum in hiemem ducere cogitabant. Hoc inito con-  
silio toto flumine Hiberno naves conquiri et Otogesam ad-

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

lo so. After rounding up pack animals from all over, they delivered food to his camp. Moreover, a cohort of Illurganenses left their post and came over to Caesar after learning of their community's decision. There was quickly a great change in Caesar's situation. With the bridge complete, five substantial communities allied in friendship, supplies facilitated, and the rumors about legionary reinforcements silenced—legions were said to be coming with Pompey via Mauretania—many of the more distant communities defected from Afranius and fell in behind Caesar as friends.

61. With his opponents' spirits thoroughly cowed by these developments, and to avoid always having to send the cavalry on a huge detour by the bridge, Caesar found a suitable spot and began to dig several trenches thirty feet wide to divert some portion of the Sicoris and create a ford in the river. When the project was nearly finished Afranius and Petreius became very worried that they would be entirely cut off from their food supply and fodder, since Caesar was the stronger in cavalry. So they themselves made the decision to leave the area and transfer the war to Celtiberia. (In favor of their plan was also the fact that, of the two different types of community, those that had sided with Sertorius in the earlier war, and had been defeated, feared the name and power of the absent Pompey, while those that were on Pompey's side, and had received substantial benefits, were well disposed to him. For Caesar's name was comparatively unfamiliar to the natives.) They anticipated finding large cavalry and auxiliary contingents here and contemplated extending the war into the winter season in an area they controlled. After adopting this plan they ordered men to find boats anywhere on the Ebro and

duci iubent. Id erat oppidum positum ad Hiberum mi-  
 6 liaque passuum a castris aberat XX.<sup>73</sup> Ad eum locum  
 fluminis navibus iunctis pontem imperant fieri. Legio-  
 nesque duas flumen Sicorim transducunt, castraque mu-  
 niuntur vallo pedum XII.

62. Qua re per exploratores cognita summo labore  
 militum Caesar continuato diem noctemque opere in flu-  
 mine avertendo huc iam reducerat rem ut equites, etsi  
 2 difficulter atque aegre fiebat, possent tamen atque au-  
 derent flumen transire, pedites vero tantummodo umeris  
 ac summo pectore extarent et cum altitudine aquae tum  
 3 etiam rapiditate fluminis ad transeundum [non] impe-  
 direntur. Sed tamen eodem fere tempore pons in Hiberi  
 prope effectus nuntiabatur et in Sicori vadum reperieba-  
 tur.

63. Iam vero eo magis illi maturandum iter existima-  
 bant. Itaque duabus auxiliariis cohortibus Ilerdae prae-  
 sidio relictis omnibus copiis Sicorim transeunt et cum  
 2 duabus legionibus quas superioribus diebus traduxerunt  
 castra coniungunt. Relinquebatur Caesari nihil nisi uti  
 equitatu agmen adversariorum male haberet et carperet.  
 Pons enim ipsius magnum circuitum habebat, ut multo  
 3 brevior itinere illi ad Hiberum pervenire possent. Equites  
 ab eo missi flumen transeunt et, cum de tertia vigilia Pe-  
 treius atque Afranius castra movissent, repente sese ad  
 novissimum agmen ostendunt et magna multitudine cir-  
 cumfusa morari atque iter impedire incipiunt.

64. Prima luce ex superioribus locis quae Caesaris ca-  
 stris erant coniuncta cernebatur equitatus nostri proelio  
 novissimos illorum premi vehementer, ac nonnumquam

<sup>73</sup> XX] XXX von Göler

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

bring them to Otogesa. This was a town on the Ebro about  
twenty miles from their camp. There they ordered that the  
boats be strung together to make a bridge, took two legions  
across the Sicoris, and fortified a camp with a twelve-foot  
high rampart. 6

62. Caesar learned of this from the scouts. With a huge  
effort by his soldiers, and by continuing the work of diverting  
the river day and night, Caesar had brought the project  
to the point that the cavalry could cross the river—although  
it was difficult and only just possible—and dared to do so.  
For the infantry, however, the water was up to their  
shoulders and the top of their chests, and they were hindered  
in crossing by both the depth of the water and the strength  
of the current. But just about when they had a ford across  
the Sicoris, word came that the bridge on the Ebro was  
nearly ready. 2 3

63. The enemy's immediate thought was that this was  
more reason to hasten their march. So leaving two auxiliary  
cohorts on guard at Ilerda they crossed the Sicoris with  
their whole force and camped with the two legions that  
had crossed previously. Caesar's only option was to harm  
and harass the enemy column with his cavalry, for his  
own bridge involved a long detour, so the enemy could  
reach the Ebro with a much shorter route. After Caesar  
sent his cavalry across the river, they immediately made  
their presence known to the enemy rearguard, even though  
Petreius and Afranius struck camp around midnight,  
and began to delay and hinder their march by encircling  
them in large numbers. 2 3

64. At daybreak people could see from the high ground  
adjoining Caesar's camp that the enemy rearguard was  
hard pressed when our cavalry attacked, and sometimes

## CAESAR

sustineri extremum agmen atque interrumpi, alias ferri  
signa, et universarum cohortium impetu nostros propelli  
2 dein rursus conversos insequi. Totis vero castris milites  
circulari et dolere—hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum  
necessario longius duci—centurionesque tribunosque mi-  
litum adire atque obsecrare ut per eos Caesar certior fi-  
eret: ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse  
sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen qua traductus  
3 esset equitatus. Quorum studio et vocibus excitatus Cae-  
sar etsi timebat tantae magnitudini fluminis exercitum  
4 obicere conandum tamen atque experiendum iudicat. Ita-  
que infirmiores milites ex omnibus centuriis deligi iubet,  
quorum aut animus aut vires videbantur sustinere non  
5 posse. Hos cum legione una praesidio castris relinquit.  
Reliquas legiones expeditas educit magnoque numero  
iumentorum in flumine supra atque infra constituto tra-  
6 ducit exercitum. Pauci ex his militibus ablati flumine<sup>74</sup> ab  
equitatu excipiuntur ac sublevantur. Interit tamen nemo.  
Traducto incolumi exercitu copias instruit triplicemque  
7 aciem ducere incipit. Ac tantum fuit in militibus studi ut  
miliū VI ad iter addito ad vadum circuitu magnaue  
fluminis mora interposita eos qui de tertia vigilia exissent  
ante horam diei nonam consequerentur.

65. Quos ubi Afranius procul visos cum Petreio con-  
spexit nova re perterritus locis superioribus constitit.  
2 Aciemque instruit. Caesar in campis exercitum reficit ne

<sup>74</sup> ablati flumine *Dübner*: arma in flumine *MUTV*: arma in flumine arrepta *S.* The text is variously emended, but the sense is clear enough.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

the end of their column was held up and disrupted, at other times that it took the offensive, while our men were pushed back when the enemy cohorts made a concerted charge, then pursued them again when the men turned around. Throughout the camp soldiers clustered unhappily—the enemy was slipping away, they thought, and the war was necessarily going to be further prolonged—and approached the centurions and staff officers, pleading that they inform Caesar that he should not spare them effort or danger, that they were ready, able, and willing to cross the river where the cavalry had crossed. Caesar was encouraged by the determination they expressed. Despite worries about exposing the army to so powerful a river current, he nevertheless thought that he should try and make the experiment. So he ordered a muster of every unit's less robust soldiers, those whose spirit or physique seemed incapable of holding out; these he left with one legion to guard the camp. He led out the remaining legions unencumbered. With numerous pack animals positioned in the river upstream and downstream, he took his army across. A few of these soldiers, swept away by the river, were caught and assisted by the cavalry, but no one was lost. Once the army was safely across he put his forces into formation and began moving them forward in three lines, and so great was the determination among the soldiers that despite the detour to the ford, which made their march six miles longer than the enemy's, and the significant delay interjected by the river, they caught up with those who had left around midnight before midafternoon.

65. Afranius saw them in the distance, as did Petreius. Dismayed by the new development he halted on higher ground and drew up his line. Caesar let his army recover

## CAESAR

defessum proelio obiciat. Rursus conantes progredi inse-  
 3 quitur et moratur. Illi necessario maturius quam consti-  
 tuerant castra ponunt. Suberant enim montes, atque a  
 milibus passuum V itinera difficilia atque angusta excipie-  
 4 bant. Hos intra montes se recipiebant<sup>75</sup> ut equitatum effu-  
 gerent Caesaris praesidiisque in angustiis collocatis exer-  
 citum itinere prohiberent, ipsi sine periculo ac timore  
 5 Hiberum copias traducerent. Quod fuit illis conandum  
 atque omni ratione efficiendum, et<sup>76</sup> totius diei pugna at-  
 que itineris labore defessi rem in posterum diem distule-  
 runt. Caesar quoque in proximo colle castra ponit.

66. Media circiter nocte iis qui aquandi causa longius  
 a castris processerant ab equitibus correptis fit ab his cer-  
 tior Caesar duces adversariorum silentio copias castris  
 educere. Quo cognito signum dari iubet et vasa militari  
 2 more conclamari. Illi exaudito clamore veriti ne noctu  
 impediti sub onere configere cogerentur, aut ne ab equi-  
 tate Caesaris in angustiis tenerentur, iter supprimunt co-  
 3 piasque in castris continent. Postero die Petreius cum  
 paucis equitibus occulte ad exploranda loca proficiscitur.  
 Hoc idem fit ex castris Caesaris. Mittitur L. Decidius Saxa  
 4 cum paucis qui loci naturam perspiciat. Vterque idem suis  
 renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris  
 campestris; inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui

<sup>75</sup> intra montes se recipiebant *Aldus*: montes intra se recipie-  
 bant  $\omega$ : montes intrare cupiebant *Nipperdey*

<sup>76</sup> et] sed *Estienne*. *Perhaps* at?

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<sup>84</sup> For "they were trying to retreat beyond," *Nipperdey* substituted "they wanted to get into." <sup>85</sup> For "and," *Estienne* substituted "but"; a stronger adversative might be preferable.



CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

on level terrain so as not to expose them to battle exhausted. When the enemy made another attempt to advance, he pursued, delaying them. They necessarily made camp sooner than they had intended, for the mountains were coming close, and difficult and narrow paths awaited them five miles away. They were trying to retreat beyond<sup>84</sup> these mountains in order to get clear of Caesar's cavalry, prevent the passage of his army by placing garrisons in the narrows, and take their own forces across the Ebro without danger or fear. They needed to try and accomplish this whatever the cost, and<sup>85</sup> they put the matter off until the following day, tired from the day-long fight as they were, and weary from the exertion of the march. Caesar too made camp, on the next hill. 3 4 5

66. Around midnight the cavalry caught some men who had gone too far from their camp for water. The prisoners informed Caesar that the enemy commanders were moving their troops out of camp in silence. When he learned this he ordered men to give a signal and call out "pack up!" military fashion. When the enemy heard the shouting, worried that they would have to fight by night and encumbered with baggage, or would be trapped by Caesar's cavalry in the narrows, they stopped the march and kept their troops in camp. On the next day Petreius set out undercover with a few cavalry to explore the region. The same was done from Caesar's camp: Lucius Decidius Saxa was sent with a few men to reconnoiter the character of the terrain. Each announced the same thing to his side: the first five miles of the route to the mountains were level, then rugged and mountainous terrain took over. It would 2 3 4



## CAESAR

prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negoti.

67. Disputatur in consilio ab Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri quam  
2 sentiretur. Alii quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset Caesaris castris argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam  
3 exiri: circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaue proelia esse vitanda quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori  
4 magis quam religioni consulere consuerit; at lucem multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum<sup>77</sup> etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentiam adferre, quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri soleant; quare omni ratione esse interdium perrumpendum; etsi aliquo accepto detrimento tamen summa exercitus  
5 salva locum quem petant capi posse. Haec evincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci.

68. Caesar exploratis regionibus albente caelo omnes copias castris educit. Magnoque circuitu nullo certo itinere exercitum ducit. Nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Otogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur. Ipsi erant transcendendae valles maximae ac difficillimae. Saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediabant, <ut>  
2 arma per manus necessario traderentur militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris

<sup>77</sup> multum] metum *Paul*

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<sup>86</sup> For "as does," Paul proposed "fear is brought by."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

be no trouble, they said, for an enemy to be blocked by whoever first seized the narrows.

67. Petreius and Afranius discussed the situation with their officers and asked about the timing of their departure. Most recommended marching by night: they could be at the narrows before anyone noticed. Others took the previous night's outcry in Caesar's camp as proof that leaving secretly was impossible. "During the night, Caesar's cavalry are deployed all around us and occupy every position and road. And nighttime battles should be avoided, since in a civil war context terrified soldiers usually attend to fear rather than obligation. But daylight brings a great sense of shame automatically, with everyone watching, as does<sup>86</sup> the presence of officers and centurions. And it is by these things that soldiers are generally kept in line and held to their duty. Therefore we must break out by day, whatever the cost. Even if we take some losses, we will nevertheless be able to reach our objective with most of our army safe." This opinion prevailed in the meeting, and they decided to set out the following day at first light.

68. After exploring the district, Caesar moved his troops out of camp as the sky was turning white.<sup>87</sup> Making a huge detour he took his army on a cross-country route, for the roads leading to the Ebro and Otogesa were controlled by the intervening enemy camp. The ravines they had to cross were deep and exceedingly difficult. In many places sheer cliffs held them up, such that weapons had to be passed hand to hand and the soldiers had to travel much of the route unarmed and giving one another a hand.

<sup>87</sup> The temporal expression is rare and has been taken as a reference to both morning and evening twilight.

## CAESAR

3 conficerent. Sed hunc laborem recusabat nemo quod eum omnium laborum finem fore existimabant si hostem Hiberno intercludere et frumento prohibere potuissent.

69. Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequerentur nos:<sup>78</sup> necessari victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. Erat enim iter a proposito diversum, 2 contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus ferebant quod se castris tenuissent. Multumque eorum opinionem adiuuabat quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent.
- 3 Sed ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animadverterunt nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret.
- 4 Conclamatur ad arma atque omnes copiae paucis praesidio relictis cohortibus exeunt rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt.

70. Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent. Sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afrani copias 2 equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. Res tamen ab Afranianis huc erat necessario deducta ut, si priores montes quos petebant attingissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortesque in castris relic-

<sup>78</sup> nos M: nos nec U: nec TV: omitted by S: nostros Morus

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<sup>86</sup> For Caesar's vivid "us," Morus substituted "our men," which entails the conversion of subsequent first-person expressions ("we

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

But nobody balked at the exertion, because they thought 3  
that it would be end of all their exertions if they were able  
to get between the enemy and the Ebro and keep them  
from their food supply.

69. Afranius' men at first ran out of their camp happily  
to watch, and sent jeering words after us.<sup>88</sup> We were run-  
ning away, they said, forced to do so by the scarcity of  
necessary food, and were on our way back to Ilerda. (Our  
route was different from the original one, and we seemed  
to be going in the opposite direction.) The enemy leaders 2  
extolled their own decision to stay in camp, and their opin-  
ion was greatly strengthened by seeing that we had started  
our march without the baggage train, so that they were  
confident that we could no longer endure privation. But 3  
when they observed that the column was turning gradually  
to the right and the vanguard already moving past the line  
of their camp, even the slowest and laziest felt that im-  
mediate departure and countermeasures were necessary.  
The call to arms was given and the whole force departed, 4  
leaving a few cohorts to guard the camp. They took the  
direct route toward the Ebro in a hurry.

70. The whole contest turned on speed: which of the  
two would seize the narrows and the mountains first? Cae-  
sar's army was slowed by the difficulties of their route,  
while Afranius' troops were delayed by Caesar's pursuing  
cavalry. Still, the actions of Afranius' side had inevitably 2  
brought matters to this: if they reached their mountain  
objective first, they would be out of danger themselves but  
unable to save the entire army's baggage or the cohorts left

were running away," "our route," etc.) into third-person forms  
("they were running away," "their route," etc.).

## CAESAR

tas servare non possent, quibus interclusis exercitu Caesa-  
3 ris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. Confecit prior iter  
Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac  
contra hostem aciem instruit. Afranius, cum ab equitatu  
novissimum agmen premeretur, ante se hostem videret,  
4 collem quendam nactus ibi constitit. Ex eo loco IIII cae-  
tratorum cohortes in montem qui erat in conspectu om-  
nium excelsissimus mittit. Hunc magno cursu concitatos  
iubet occupare, eo consilio uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis  
contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Otogesam perveniret.  
5 Hunc cum obliquo itinere caetrati peterent conspicatus  
equitatus Caesaris in cohortes impetum facit. Nec mini-  
mam partem temporis equitum vim caetrati sustinere  
potuerunt omnesque ab his circumventi in conspectu  
utriusque exercitus interficiuntur.

71. Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. Neque vero id Cae-  
sarem fugiebat tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento per-  
territum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim cir-  
cumdatum undique equitatu cum in loco aequo atque  
aperto confingeretur. Idque ex omnibus partibus ab eo  
2 flagitabatur. Concurrerant legati centuriones tribunique  
militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse  
3 militum paratissimos animos; Afranianos contra multis  
rebus sui timoris signa misisse, quod suis non subve-  
nissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod vix equitum  
incursum sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis con-  
4 ferti neque ordines neque signa servarent; quod si iniqui-  
tatem loci timeret datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi  
facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio  
nec sine aqua permanere posset.

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<sup>89</sup> Infantry units equipped with small round shields (1.39.1).

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

in camp; there was no way to get help to them, cut off as they were by Caesar's army. Caesar completed the distance first. Emerging from the rocky heights, he came to a flat area and drew up his line there facing the enemy. Afranius, with his rearguard under pressure from the cavalry and the enemy visible ahead, halted when he came to a hill. From there he sent four native cohorts to the highest mountain in sight.<sup>89</sup> He ordered them to move at a fast run and seize this, thinking that he would head there with his entire force and so reach Otogesa by a new route along the ridges. When the native troops deviated toward this objective they were observed and attacked by Caesar's cavalry. Unable to withstand the charge even for a moment, they were all surrounded by the cavalry and killed with both armies watching.

71. This was an opportunity for decisive action. It did not escape Caesar that after taking—and watching—such damage the terrified army could not hold out, particularly when surrounded on all sides by cavalry, since the battlefield was level and open. From every direction he heard demands for an engagement. Legionary commanders, centurions, and staff officers quickly gathered: “Do not hesitate to engage. The morale of all of our soldiers is at its peak. Afranius’ men, by contrast, have signaled their alarm in many matters: in not sending help to their own men, not coming down from the hill, barely withstanding the cavalry attacks, and not preserving their formations or units, given that they have collected their standards in a single spot and are crowded together. But if you are worried about the location’s drawbacks, there will be an opportunity to fight somewhere, because Afranius certainly has to withdraw from this area; he cannot stay long without water.”

## CAESAR

72. Caesar in eam spem venerat se sine pugna et sine  
vulnere suorum rem conficere posse quod re frumentaria  
2 adversarios interclusisset: cur etiam secundo proelio ali-  
quos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime  
meritos de se milites? cur denique fortunam periclitare-  
tur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio  
3 superare quam gladio. Movebatur etiam misericordia ci-  
vium quos interficiendos videbat, quibus salvis atque inco-  
4 lumibus rem obtinere malebat. Hoc consilium Caesaris  
plerisque non probabatur. Milites vero palam inter se lo-  
quebantur: quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur,  
etiam cum vellet Caesar sese non esse pugnatuos. Ille in  
sua sententia perseverat. Et paulum ex eo loco digreditur  
5 ut timorem adversariis minuat. Petreius atque Afranius  
oblata facultate in castra sese referunt. Caesar praesidiis  
<in> montibus dispositis, omni ad Hiberum intercluso iti-  
nere, quam proxime potest hostium castris castra com-  
munit.

73. Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati quod  
omnem rei frumentariae fluminisque Hiberi spem dimi-  
2 serant de reliquis rebus consultabant. Erat unum iter Iler-  
dam si reverti vellent, alterum si Tarraconem peterent.  
Haec consiliantibus iis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu  
3 premi nostro. Qua re cognita crebras stationes disponunt  
equitum et cohortium alariarum legionariasque interici-  
unt cohortes vallumque ex castris ad aquam ducere inci-



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72. Caesar had conceived the hope that he would be able to finish the business without fighting or shedding his men's blood, since he had cut off the enemy from their food supply. "Even if the battle goes well, why should I 2 lose any of my men? Why should I allow soldiers who have given me excellent service to be wounded? Finally, why should I tempt fortune? Especially since a strategic victory is as appropriate to a general as a military victory." He 3 was also moved by pity for the fellow citizens who he saw would inevitably be killed; he wanted instead to accomplish his goal with them safe and sound. Most people did 4 not approve of Caesar's strategy. Indeed the soldiers said openly among themselves that they would not fight, not even when Caesar wanted them to, since he was throwing away such an occasion for victory. He held firm to his position, even moving a small distance off in order to give his opponents less cause for alarm. Petreius and Afranius 5 went back to their camp when offered the opportunity. Caesar stationed garrisons in the mountains and cut off every route to the Ebro. He then fortified his camp as close as possible to the enemy's.

73. On the next day the enemy leaders, perturbed now that they had given up the prospect of a food supply and the Ebro River, held a discussion about what remained. There was one road if they wanted to return to Ilerda, 2 another if Tarraco was their objective. They were still discussing these matters when they got word that the water detail was under pressure from our cavalry. Upon learn- 3 ing this they deployed numerous outposts of cavalry and auxiliary cohorts, with legionary cohorts in between, and began to extend an earthwork from the camp to a water source, so that they would be able to get water within



## CAESAR

piunt ut intra munitionem et sine timore et sine stationibus aquari possent. Id opus inter se Petreius atque Afranius partiuntur ipsique perficiendi operis causa longius progrediuntur.

74. Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirit atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnes omnibus quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Dein de imperatoris fide quaerunt rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque quod cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petrei atque Afrani vita petunt ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmatis rebus se statim signa transluros confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. Interim alii suos in castra invitandi causa adducunt, alii ab suis abducuntur, adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur. Compluresque tribuni militum (et) centuriones ad Caesarem veniunt seque ei commendant. Idem hoc fit a principibus Hispaniae, quos illi evocaverant et secum in castris habebant obsidum loco. Hi suos notos hospitesque quaerebant per quem quisque eorum aditum commendationis haberet ad Caesarem. Afrani etiam filius adulescens de sua ac parentis sui salute cum Caesare per

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their own defenses without fear and without outposts. Petreius and Afranius divided the job between them and went some distance from camp in order to bring it to completion. 4

74. With their departure, the soldiers had a clear opportunity for negotiations, and they came out in a body, each man looking and calling for his acquaintances and townsmen in Caesar's camp. First they gave collective thanks to everyone for having spared them the previous day, when they were terrified. "Your kindness kept us alive." Then they asked about the general's reliability, and whether it would be a good move to entrust themselves to him, lamenting the fact that they had not done so from the beginning and had fought against men who were their friends and relatives. Encouraged by this discussion they asked for the general's promise concerning the future of Petreius and Afranius, so that people would not think that they had incurred guilt or betrayed their own side. 2  
Once these matters were settled the men guaranteed that they would transfer their standards immediately, and sent to Caesar a peace delegation of chief centurions. Meanwhile, some led friends into their own camp to entertain them, and others were led off by friends, with the result that the two camps seemed to have become one. Several staff officers and centurions went and commended themselves to Caesar. Spain's leading men did the same. (The enemy had summoned these men and kept them in camp with them as hostages.) These sought out their acquaintances and guests, hoping to get from them the opening of a recommendation to Caesar. Even Afranius' adolescent son began negotiations with Caesar, through Caesar's officer Sulpicius, about his own welfare and that of his father. 3  
4  
5  
6

## CAESAR

7 Sulpicium legatum agebat. Erant plena laetitia et gratulatione omnia, eorum qui tanta pericula vitasse et eorum qui sine vulnere tantas res confecisse videbantur. Magnumque fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat, consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur.

75. Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in castra recipit sic paratus, ut videbatur, ut quicumque accidisset casus hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. Petreius vero non deserit sese. Armata familiam. Cum hac et praetoria cohorte caetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis quos suae custodiae causa habere consuevit, improvise ad vallum advolat, colloquia militum interrumpit, nostros repellit a castris. Quos 3 deprensit interficit. Reliqui coeunt inter se et repentino periculo exterriti sinistras sagis involvunt gladiosque destringunt atque ita se a caetratis equitibusque defendunt castrorum propinquitate confisi seque in castra recipiunt et ab iis cohortibus quae erant in statione ad portas defenduntur.

76. Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, ne se neque Pompeium absentem imperatorem suum adversariis ad supplicium tradant obsecrat. Fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. Postulat ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis 3 consilium capturos. Princeps in haec verba iurat ipse. Idem ius iurandum adigit Afranium. Subsequuntur tribuni militum centurionesque. Centuriatim producti mi-

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Everything was full of joy and thanksgiving on both sides: 7  
the one saw themselves as having escaped great danger,  
the other as having achieved a great success without  
bloodshed. In everyone's opinion Caesar was winning  
great credit for his former clemency, and his strategy had  
everyone's approval.

75. When this news arrived Afranius left the work he  
had begun and returned to camp, apparently prepared  
to accept the situation quietly and steadily however it  
turned out. Petreius, however, remained himself, arming 2  
his household. With this and the Spanish cohort that was  
his official escort, and a few native cavalry on special as-  
signment whom he customarily used as a bodyguard, he  
raced unexpectedly to the fortification, broke off the sol-  
diers' discussions, and ejected our men from his camp.  
Whoever he caught he killed. The rest came together and, 3  
alarmed by the sudden danger, wrapped cloaks around  
their left arms and drew their swords. In this way they  
defended themselves against the Spanish infantry and cav-  
alry, counting on the proximity of the two camps, and re-  
turned to their own camp under the protection of the  
cohorts stationed near the gates.

76. When he had accomplished this Petreius went  
weeping from one unit to the next and appealed to the  
soldiers; he pleaded with them not to deliver either him  
or their absent commander Pompey to the enemy for pun-  
ishment. A crowd assembled quickly at headquarters. He 2  
demanded that everyone swear that they would neither  
desert nor betray the army or their leaders, nor take  
thought for themselves separately from the rest. He was 3  
the first to take this oath. He forced the same on Afranius.  
Staff officers and centurions followed; the soldiers came

## CAESAR

- 4 lites idem iurant. Edicunt penes quem quisque sit Caesa-  
ris miles ut producat. Productos palam in praetorio  
interficiunt. Sed plerosque ii qui receperant celant noc-  
5 tuque per vallum emittunt. Sic terrore oblato a ducibus  
crudelitas in supplicio nova religio iuris iurandi spem  
praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum convertit  
et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit.

77. Caesar milites adversariorum qui in castra per tem-  
pus colloqui venerant summa diligentia conqueri et remitti  
2 iubet. Sed ex numero tribunorum militum centurionum-  
que nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum remanserunt. Quos  
ille postea magno in honore habuit. Centuriones in priores  
ordines, equites Romanos in tribuniciam restituit ho-  
norem.

78. Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur  
aegre. Frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant  
quod dierum XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant ef-  
ferre, caetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et fa-  
cultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera  
2 portanda. Itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem  
perfugiebat. In his erat angustiis res. Sed ex propo-  
sitis consiliis duobus explicitius videbatur Ilerdam reverti,  
quod ibi paulum frumenti reliquerant. Ibi se reliquum  
3 consilium explicaturos confidebant. Tarraco aberat lon-  
gius, quo spatio plures rem posse casus recipere intellege-

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<sup>90</sup> The number seems too high.

<sup>91</sup> Their departure from Ilerda was four days behind them.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

forward by centuries and swore the same thing. Petreius 4  
and Afranius issued an edict that anyone who had a Cae-  
sarian soldier with him had to bring him forward. Those  
brought forward were openly killed at headquarters. But  
most of the men who had taken someone in concealed  
them and sent them out over the fortification during  
the night. In view of the terror thus disseminated by the 5  
commanders, the cruelty of the executions and the fresh  
scruples of an oath removed the hope of an immediate  
surrender and changed the men's minds, returning the  
situation to the previous plan of campaign.

77. Caesar ordered that the enemy soldiers who had  
come into his camp during the discussions be sought with  
the utmost diligence and sent back. But some of the staff 2  
officers and centurions remained with him of their own  
volition. Afterward he treated them with high honor, re-  
storing the centurions to their former ranks and the Ro-  
mans of equestrian status to their officer positions.

78. Afranius' army was pressed for fodder, and ob-  
tained water with difficulty. The legionaries had some re-  
serves of grain because they had been ordered to carry  
twenty-two<sup>90</sup> days' worth of grain from Ilerda.<sup>91</sup> But the  
native infantry and auxiliary troops had none, since they  
had few opportunities to acquire grain and their bodies  
were not used to carrying loads. So every day a large number 2  
of them deserted to Caesar. Such were the difficulties  
of the situation. But of the two plans before them it  
seemed simpler to return to Ilerda because they had left  
a little grain there; they were confident about working out  
the rest of the plan at Ilerda. (Tarraco was further away, 3  
and they realized that in that distance a number of misfor-  
tunes could befall the maneuver.) After this plan was ap-

## CAESAR

4 bant. Hoc probato consilio ex castris proficiscuntur. Caesar equitatu praemisso qui novissimum agmen carperet atque impediret ipse cum legionibus subsequitur. Nullum intercedebat tempus quin extremi cum equitibus proeliantur.

79. Genus erat hoc pugnae. Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen claudebant pluresque in locis campestribus  
2 subsistebant. Si mons erat ascendendus facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat quod ex locis superioribus  
3 qui antecesserant suos ascendentes protegebant. Cum vallibus aut locus declivis suberat neque ii qui antecesserant morantibus opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coiciebant, tum magno erat in  
4 periculo res. Relinquebatur ut cum eiusmodi locis esset appropinquatum legionum signa consistere iuberent magnoque impetu equitatum repellerent, eo submoto repente incitati cursu sese in valles universi demitterent atque ita  
5 transgressi rursus in locis superioribus consisterent. Nam tantum ab equitum suorum auxiliis aberant, quorum numerum habebant magnum, ut eos superioribus perterritos proeliis in medium reciperent agmen ultroque eos tuerentur. Quorum nulli ex itinere excedere licebat quin ab equitatu Caesaris exciperetur.

80. Tali dum pugnatur modo lente atque paulatim proceditur, crebroque ut sint auxilio suis subsistunt, ut tum  
2 accidit. Milia enim progressi IIII vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis

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<sup>92</sup> Or, "there were no intervals in which the rearmost were not engaged with the cavalry" (cf. *BG* 5.53.5).



proved they set out from camp. Caesar sent his cavalry 4  
 ahead to harass and delay the rearguard; he himself fol-  
 lowed with the legions. In no time the rearmost were en-  
 gaged with the cavalry.<sup>92</sup>

79. The nature of the fighting was as follows. Unen- 2  
 cumbered cohorts brought up the rear of Afranius' col-  
 umn. The majority would make a stand where the ground  
 was flat. If a hill had to be climbed, the nature of the ter- 2  
 rain itself warded off danger, in that those who had gone  
 ahead would protect their own from higher ground as they  
 came up. When they came to a ravine or descent, and 3  
 those who had gone ahead were unable to assist those  
 behind, and Caesar's cavalry was hurling weapons from  
 higher ground at their backs, then their situation was very  
 dangerous. The only thing to do when they approached 4  
 locations of this sort was to order the legions to make a  
 stand, push the cavalry back with a concerted charge, de-  
 scend into the ravines at a run and all together as soon as  
 the cavalry was out of the way, and make a stand again on  
 higher ground after crossing in this fashion. (Their cavalry, 5  
 of which they had a great number, was of so little assis-  
 tance that Afranius and Petreius took these men, thor-  
 oughly cowed as they were by earlier battles, into the  
 middle of their column and themselves provided cover for  
 them; none of them could deviate from the line of march  
 without being captured by Caesar's cavalry.)

80. When men fight in this manner, their advance is 2  
 slow and incremental, and they stop frequently to help  
 their own, as happened then. When Afranius and Petreius  
 had gone four miles and were being harassed quite vigor-  
 ously by the cavalry, they seized a high hill and fortified  
 a camp there on the one side facing the enemy. They



## CAESAR

- 3 onera deponunt. Vbi Caesaris castra posita tabernacu-  
 laque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa ani-  
 madverterunt sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta  
 eiusdem diei. Et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum  
 4 equitum iter facere incipiunt. Qua re animadversa Caesar  
 expeditis<sup>79</sup> legionibus subsequitur. Praesidio impedimen-  
 tis paucas cohortes relinquit. <Relictas><sup>80</sup> hora decima  
 subsequi. pabulatores equitesque revocari iubet. Celeriter  
 equitatus ad cotidianum itineris officium revertitur.  
 5 Pugnatur acriter ad novissimum agmen, adeo ut paene  
 terga convertant. compluresque milites—etiam nonnulli  
 centuriones—interficiuntur. Instabat agmen Caesaris at-  
 que universum imminebat.

81. Tum vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum  
 castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt  
 necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra  
 2 ponunt. Sed isdem de causis Caesar quae supra sunt de-  
 monstratae proelio non lacessit. Et eo die tabernacula  
 statui passus non est quo paratiores essent ad insequen-  
 3 dum omnes sive noctu sive interdiu erumperent. Illi ani-  
 madverso vitio castrorum tota nocte munitiones proferunt  
 castraque castris convertunt. Hoc idem postero die a  
 prima luce faciunt totumque in ea re diem consumunt.  
 4 Sed quantum opere processerant et castra protulerant  
 tanto aberant ab aqua longius, et praesenti malo aliis ma-  
 5 lis remedia dabantur. Prima nocte aquandi causa nemo

<sup>79</sup> *expeditis Nipperdey*: *relictis* [-tas *T<sup>ac</sup>*] *ω*: *refectis Deiter*.  
*relictis* <munitionibus cum> *Köchly*      <sup>80</sup> <relictas> *Kruse*

<sup>83</sup> Among the many alternatives to Nipperdey's emendation  
 "followed with unencumbered legions," are those proposed by

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

did not unload the pack animals. When they saw Caesar's camp established, his tents pitched, and his cavalry released for foraging, they suddenly launched themselves onward around noon that same day. They began their march in the hope that our cavalry's departure would cause delay. Upon seeing this, Caesar followed with unencumbered<sup>93</sup> legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage. He ordered those left behind to follow in the late afternoon and the cavalry to be recalled. The cavalry returned quickly to their regular role on the march. At the enemy's rearguard the combat was intense, such that they nearly ran away, and a number of soldiers, indeed some centurions, were killed. Caesar's whole column began to press and threaten.

81. At that point, with no chance of looking for a suitable spot for camp or advancing, they were forced to halt and make camp far from water in a spot that was by its nature disadvantageous. For the aforementioned reasons, however, Caesar did not provoke a fight. That day he did not permit the men to pitch their tents, so that everyone would be quite ready to follow whether the enemy broke out by night or by day. Aware of their camp's faults Afranius and Petreius pushed their defenses forward all night long and gradually shifted their campsite. They did the same thing the next day starting at dawn and spent the whole day on it. But the further they went with their earthwork, and the more they pushed their camp forward, the further they were from water, and the remedies for the present problem were other problems. The first night no

Deiter and Köchly: "followed with refreshed legions" and "left the fortifications and followed with his legions," respectively.

egreditur ex castris. Proximo die praesidio in castris relicto  
 universas ad aquam copias educunt. Pabulatum emittitur  
 6 nemo. His eos suppliciis male haberi Caesar et necessa-  
 riam subire deditionem quam proelio decertare malebat.  
 Conatur tamen eos vallo fossaque circummunire ut quam  
 maxime repentinas eorum eruptiones demoretur. Quo  
 7 necessario descensuros existimabat. Illi et inopia pabuli  
 adducti et quo essent ad id<sup>81</sup> expeditiores omnia sarcinaria  
 iumenta interfici iubent.

82. In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur.  
 Tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. Illi  
 impediendae rei [quae munitionis fiebat]<sup>82</sup> causa hora cir-  
 citer nona signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub ca-  
 2 stris instruunt. Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equi-  
 tatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit. Contra  
 opinionem enim militum famamque omnium videri proe-  
 3 lium defugisse magnum detrimentum adferebat. Sed is-  
 dem de causis quae sunt cognitae quominus dimicare  
 vellet movebatur atque hoc etiam magis, quod spati bre-  
 vitas etiam in fugam coniectis adversariis non multum ad  
 4 summam victoriae iuvare poterat. Non enim amplius pe-  
 dum milibus duobus a castris castra distabant. Hinc duas  
 partes acies occupabant duae. Tertia vacabat ad incursum  
 5 atque impetum militum relicta. Si proelium committere-

<sup>81</sup> id] iter *Faerno*

<sup>82</sup> rei [quae munitionis fiebat] causa *Faerno*: reliquae muni-  
 tionis causa [fiebat] *Forchhammer*. *The manuscripts offer three*  
*unacceptable variants for the words between rei and causa.*

<sup>94</sup> For "when sallying," *Faerno* proposed "for the march."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

one left the camp to get water. The following day they left a guard in the camp and led out their whole force to the water source; no one was sent out to forage. It was better that they suffer this sort of torture and submit to a necessary surrender, Caesar felt, than that he decide matters with a battle. He nevertheless tried to enclose them with an earthwork and a trench in order to maximize the delay for sudden sallies; he thought they would necessarily have recourse to this tactic. They ordered all the pack animals to be killed, induced by the shortage of fodder, and in order to reduce their encumbrances when sallying.<sup>94</sup>

82. Two days were spent fortifying and planning. On the third day a large part of Caesar's earthwork was already complete. With a signal at around midafternoon Afranius and Petreius led out their legions in order to hinder his work,<sup>95</sup> and drew up their line near his camp. Caesar recalled his legions from their work, ordered his entire cavalry to assemble, and drew up his line, for the appearance of having avoided a battle—in opposition to what the soldiers' thought and everyone said<sup>96</sup>—was very damaging. But he was inclined to want to avoid fighting for the familiar reasons, and even more because the limited space could do little to facilitate a decisive victory even if the enemy was routed. (For the two camps were no more than two thousand feet apart. The two lines occupied two thirds of this space; one third was left clear for the soldiers' running charge.) If an engagement were to begin, the proxim-

<sup>95</sup> For "his work," Forchhammer proposed "the rest of his fortification."

<sup>96</sup> The phrase "what everyone said" (cf. 3.36.1) could also be rendered "his reputation in everyone's eyes" (cf. 3.56.2).

## CAESAR

tur propinquitas castrorum celerem superatis ex fuga receptum dabat. Hac de causa constituerat signa inferentibus resistere, prior proelio non lacessere.

83. Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V, tertium in  
2 subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant, Caesaris tri-  
plex, sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legioni-  
bus tenebant. Has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae toti-  
dem suae cuiusque legionis subsequabantur. Sagittarii  
funditoresque media continebantur acie. Equitatus latera  
3 cingebat. Tali instructa acie tenere uterque propositum  
videbatur, Caesar nisi coactus proelium non committere,<sup>83</sup>  
ille ut opera Caesaris impediret. Producitur tamen res,  
aciesque ad solis occasum continentur. Inde utrique in  
castra discedunt.

4 Postero die munitiones institutas Caesar parat per-  
ficere, illi vadum fluminis Sicoris temptare si transire pos-  
5 sent. Qua re animadversa Caesar Germanos levis armatu-  
rae equitumque partem flumen traicit crebrasque in ripis  
custodias disponit.

84. Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quartum iam diem  
sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae lignorum frumenti  
inopia, colloquium petunt et id si fieri possit semoto a  
2 militibus loco. Vbi id a Caesare negatum et palam si col-  
loqui vellent concessum est datur obsidis loco Caesari fi-  
3 lius Afrani. Venitur in eum locum quem Caesar delegit.  
Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut  
ipsis aut militibus suscensendum quod fidem erga impe-

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<sup>83</sup> non committere *MU* (see 1.82.5): committere *STV*

<sup>87</sup> The text is uncertain but the sense is clear from context.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

ity of the camp gave the defeated a quick refuge after they fled. For this reason he had decided to resist an attack by the enemy, but not to initiate a fight.

83. Afranius' battle formation had two lines made up of five legions; auxiliary cohorts held the third position as reserves. Caesar's had three lines, the first of them occupied by four cohorts each from five legions. Behind and supporting these were three cohorts from the respective legions, and then the same number again. Archers and slingers were kept in the middle of the formation. Cavalry secured the flanks. With their armies drawn up thus, each commander seemed to be achieving his purpose, Caesar not to engage unless compelled,<sup>97</sup> Afranius to hinder Caesar's works. The business dragged on, however, and they maintained their formations until sunset. Then they both went back to camp.

The following day Caesar prepared to complete the fortifications he had begun, Afranius and Petreius to test the ford on the Sicoris River, to see whether they could cross. When this came to his attention Caesar sent the Germans from his light-armed force and a portion of his cavalry across the river and posted numerous patrols on the banks.

84. At last, thwarted in everything, with animals deprived of fodder for the fourth straight day and a shortage of water, firewood, and food supplies, Afranius and Petreius asked for talks, if possible somewhere away from the soldiers. When that was refused by Caesar, and he agreed to talks if they were willing to hold them in public, Afranius' son was given to Caesar as a hostage. They came to a place Caesar had chosen. Each army listened as Afranius spoke. "You should not be angry with us or our soldiers be-

## CAESAR

4 ratorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint; sed  
 satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplici tulisse perpe-  
 omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras<sup>84</sup> cir-  
 cummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque  
 corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse;  
 5 itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare si qui lo-  
 cus misericordiae relinquatur ne ad ultimum supplicium  
 progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime  
 et subiectissime exponit.

85. Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes  
 2 vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse; reli-  
 quos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse, <se,> qui  
 etiam bona conditione et loco et tempore aequo configere  
 noluerit ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia,  
 exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque inter-  
 fectis quos in sua potestate habuerit conservarit et texerit,  
 illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda  
 pace egerint, qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum  
 3 putarint; sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia  
 constitisse, ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque col-  
 loqui neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperi-  
 tos<sup>85</sup> et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse;  
 4 accidisse igitur his quod plerumque hominum nimia per-  
 tinacia atque arrogantia accidere soleat, uti eo recurrant  
 et id cupidissime petant quod paulo ante contempserint;

<sup>84</sup> feras *Vossius* (see *Lucan* 4.313): feminas  $\omega$

<sup>85</sup> imperitos] imparatos *R. Bentley*

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<sup>98</sup> For negotiations ensuring the safety of Afranius and Pe-  
 treius in particular, see 1.74.3. <sup>99</sup> For "inexperienced  
 men," Richard Bentley proposed "men caught off guard."



cause we chose to keep faith with our commander, Gnaeus Pompey. But we have now satisfied our duty and suffered 4  
 enough punishment in every sort of privation. At present, in fact, we are being kept from water, walled in almost like wild animals, kept from moving, and our bodies cannot take the pain or our spirits the humiliation. Therefore we 5  
 confess ourselves beaten. We beg and plead—if there is any room left for compassion—that you not consider it necessary to proceed to the ultimate punishment.” He laid out this case as humbly and submissively as possible.

85. To this Caesar replied: “Anyone would be more suitable than you to deliver either reproaches or appeals for pity, for everyone else has done what he should: I 2  
 myself, who chose not to fight, even when the conditions were good and the location and occasion favorable, in order to keep the whole situation as open as possible to peace; my army, which preserved and protected those whom it had in its power, even though it had been mistreated and its men had been killed; and finally the soldiers of your army, who took the initiative in arranging a truce, a matter in which they felt they ought to consider the safety of everyone on their side.<sup>98</sup> Thus the actions of 3  
 every rank involved compassion, but you leaders shied away from peace. You did not uphold the rules pertaining to talks and truces, and with extreme cruelty you killed inexperienced men<sup>99</sup> duped by the talks. You are therefore 4  
 in the situation that generally tends to arise from human obstinacy and arrogance, when excessive: you are reverting to something you scorned a little while ago, and now seek it with the utmost eagerness. I am not now going 5



CAESAR

5 neque nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis  
 6 oportunitate postulare quibus rebus opes augeantur  
 7 suae, sed eos exercitus quos contra se multos iam annos  
 8 aluerint velle dimitti: neque enim VI legiones alia de causa  
 9 missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam, neque  
 10 tot tantasque classes<sup>86</sup> paratas neque submissos duces rei  
 11 militaris peritos: nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil  
 12 ad usum provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem  
 pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit; omnia haec iam pridem  
 contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut  
 idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosis-  
 simas provincias absens tot annos obtineat; in se iura ma-  
 gistratum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut  
 semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mit-  
 tantur; in se aetatis excusationem nihil valere, quod su-  
 perioribus bellis probati<sup>87</sup> ad obtinendos exercitus evocen-  
 tur; in se uno non servari quod sit omnibus datum semper  
 imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore  
 aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum revertantur exer-  
 citumque dimittant; quae tamen omnia et se tulisse pa-  
 tienter et esse laturum; neque nunc id agere ut ab illis  
 abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile  
 non sit, sed ne illi habeant quo contra se uti possint; pro-  
 inde, ut esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque  
 dimitterent; sed si id sit factum se nociturum nemini; hanc  
 unam atque extremam esse pacis conditionem.

<sup>86</sup> tot tantasque classes] cohortes alasque *Madvig* (see 1.39.1)

<sup>87</sup> probati<sup>2</sup>] fracti *Heller*

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<sup>100</sup> For "so many large fleets," *Madvig* proposed "auxiliary infantry and cavalry."

<sup>101</sup> For "tested," *Heller* proposed "worn out."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

to use your prostration or any temporary advantage to make demands that will increase my resources. But I want the armies that you have maintained against me for many years now to be dismissed. It was for this reason alone that six legions were sent to Spain and a seventh was raised there, and that so many large fleets<sup>100</sup> were prepared, and generals with military expertise dispatched. None of this was intended for the pacification of Spain, none for the benefit of a province that, given the longstanding peace, needed no support. All of these preparations have long since been aimed at me. It is with reference to me that a new type of military command is now in place, such that one man presides over Rome's affairs just outside the city and controls two very warlike provinces in absentia for years at a time. It is with reference to me that magistrates' rights are being altered, such that men are not sent to govern provinces after serving as praetor or consul, as always, but after being approved and selected by a few men. It is with reference to me that the excuse of age is rendered invalid, such that men tested<sup>101</sup> in earlier wars are being recalled to command armies. It is with reference to me alone that a benefit always accorded to every victorious general has fallen into abeyance, namely, that after successful campaigns they return home and dismiss their armies with a degree of honor and certainly without humiliation. And yet I have borne everything patiently and will continue to do so. My present aim is not to take an army from you and keep it for myself, although this would not be difficult for me, but to prevent you from having an army to use against me. Accordingly, as I said, you must leave your provinces and dismiss your army. But if this happens, I will not harm anyone. This is the single and final condition for peace."

## CAESAR

86. Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum—ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit—ut qui victi<sup>88</sup> aliquid incommodi expectavissent ultro praemium missionis  
 2 ferrent. Nam cum de loco et de tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo ubi constiterant significare coeperunt ut statim dimitterentur; neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse si in aliud  
 3 tempus differretur. Paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum res huc deducitur ut ii qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania statim, reliqui  
 4 ad Varum flumen dimittantur. Ne quid iis noceatur neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur a Caesare caveatur.

87. Caesar ex eo tempore dum ad flumen Varum veniatur se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam ut quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, iis qui amiserant restituatur. Militibus aequa facta  
 2 aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. Quasumque postea controversias inter se milites habuerunt sua  
 3 sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt. Petreius atque Afranius cum stipendium ab legionibus paene seditione facta flagitaretur, cuius illi diem nondum venisse dicerent, Caesar ut cognosceret postulatum est eoque utrique quod  
 4 statuit contenti fuerunt. Parte circiter tertia exercitus eo biduo dimissa duas legiones suas antecedere, reliquas subsequi iussit, ut non longo inter se spatio castra facerent.

<sup>88</sup> victi aliquid *Damon*: aliqui victi *MUS*: aliqui iusti *TV*

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<sup>102</sup> In place of "being the defeated party," editors usually print *iusti*, "justified," which modifies hardship.

<sup>103</sup> That is, the eastern boundary of Transalpine Gaul.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

86. This pleased and gladdened the soldiers, as could be understood simply from their demonstrations, inasmuch as those who, being the defeated party,<sup>102</sup> had expected some hardship, were being given, without having asked for it, the reward of discharge. For when its location and timing came under discussion, they all began shouting and gesticulating from the rampart where they stood to signify that they should be discharged immediately. No pledge given in the meantime, they said, could make their discharge a sure thing if it was deferred to another time. After a brief statement on each side of the question, the matter ended thus: those who had a home or property in Spain would be dismissed immediately, the rest at the Var River.<sup>103</sup> Caesar guaranteed that they would not be harmed and that no one would be forced to enlist unwillingly.

87. Caesar promised to supply food from then until they reached the Var. He also added that whatever items any of them had lost in the war, if they were in his soldiers' possession, would be returned to those who had lost them. To his soldiers he gave monetary compensation for these items after a fair appraisal. Thereafter the soldiers of their own accord approached Caesar for adjudication of whatever internal disputes they had. As for Petreius and Afranius, when the legions demanded—in what nearly became a mutiny—their pay, and they claimed that it was not yet due, people requested that Caesar hear the case, and both sides were content with his settlement. After dismissing about a third of the army within two days, he ordered two of his legions to go ahead and the rest to follow; they were to make camp at no great distance from one another. He

- 5 *Eique negotio Q. Fufium Calenum legatum praeficit. Hoc eius praescripto ex Hispania ad Varum flumen est iter factum atque ibi reliqua pars exercitus dimissa est.*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK I

put Quintus Fufius Calenus in charge of this operation.  
The march to the Var proceeded in accordance with his 5  
instructions, and there the remainder of the army was  
discharged.

## LIBER II

1. Dum haec in Hispania geruntur C. Trebonius legatus, qui ad oppugnationem Massiliae relictus erat, duabus ex partibus aggerem vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. Vna erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad partem<sup>1</sup> qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania,<sup>2</sup> ad id mare quod vergit ad<sup>3</sup> ostium Rhodani. Massilia enim fere tribus ex oppidi partibus mari alluitur. Reliqua quarta est quae aditum habeat ab terra. Huius quoque spati pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita, longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem. Ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius magnam iumentorum atque hominum multitudinem ex omni provincia vocat, vimina materiamque comportari iubet. Quibus comparatis rebus aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX extruit.

2. Sed tanti erant antiquitas in oppido omnium rerum ad bellum apparatus tantaque multitudo<sup>4</sup> tormentorum ut

<sup>1</sup> altera (sc. oppugnatio) ad partem  $\omega$ : al- (sc. pars) ad p- *Nipperdey*: al- [ad p-] *Oudendorp*: al- ad portam *Jurin*

<sup>2</sup> [ex . . . Hispania] *Chacon*

<sup>3</sup> vergit ad *Chacon*: adigit [agit *T<sup>ac</sup>*] ad  $\omega$ : adigitur ad *Madvig*: attingit [ad] *I. Vossius*

<sup>4</sup> multitudo] magnitudo *Jurin*

## BOOK II

1. While this was going on in Spain, Caesar's officer Gaius Trebonius, who had been left behind for the assault on Marseilles, began to deploy a siege ramp, screens, and towers against the city from two sides. One was very close 2 to the harbor and dockyards, the other on the side<sup>1</sup> where there is an approach from Gaul and Spain, near the sea that faces<sup>2</sup> the Rhone mouth. For the sea washes against 3 Marseilles for practically three-quarters of the city's circumference, leaving one quarter that permits a land approach. Here too, in the part that lies near the citadel, protected as it is by the nature of the terrain and a very deep ravine, an assault is a long and difficult operation. To 4 complete his works Trebonius requisitioned a large quantity of pack animals and men from the whole province, and ordered wicker canes and timber to be delivered. After procuring these he built a siege ramp eighty feet high.

2. But from long past the city contained a great store of military supplies of every kind; so great was the quan-

<sup>1</sup> For "the other (*sc.* assault) on the side," scholars have proposed "the other (*sc.* side) on the side," "the other (*sc.* side)," and "the other (*sc.* side) near the gate."

<sup>2</sup> For "faces," Madvig and I. Vossius proposed "is driven against" and "touches," respectively.



## CAESAR

eorum vim nullae contextae viminibus vineae sustinere  
2 possent. Asseres enim pedum XII cuspidibus praefixi at-  
que ii maximis ballistis missi per IIII ordines cratium in  
3 terram defigebantur. Itaque pedalibus lignis coniunctis  
inter se porticus integebantur atque hac agger inter manus  
4 proferebatur. Antecedebat testudo pedum LX aequandi  
loci causa, facta item ex fortissimis lignis, convoluta omni-  
bus rebus quibus ignis iactus et lapides defendi possent.  
5 Sed magnitudo operum, altitudo muri atque turrium,  
multitudo tormentorum omnem administrationem tarda-  
6 bat. Crebrae etiam per Albicos eruptiones fiebant ex op-  
pido, ignesque aggeri et turribus inferebantur, quae facile  
nostri milites repellebant magnisque ultro illatis detrimen-  
tis eos qui eruptionem fecerant in oppidum reiciebant.

3. Interim L. Nasidius, ab Cn. Pompeio cum classe  
navium XVI, in quibus paucae erant aeratae, L. Domitio  
Massiliensibusque subsidio missus, freto Siciliae impru-  
2 dente atque inopinante Curione pervehitur. Appulsisque  
Messanam navibus atque inde propter repentinum ter-  
rorem principum ac senatus fuga facta <navem> ex nava-  
3 libus eorum deducit. Hac adiuncta ad reliquas naves cur-  
sum Massiliam versus perficit. Praemissaque clam navicula  
Domitium Massiliensesque de suo adventu certiores facit  
eosque magnopere hortatur ut rursus cum Bruti classe  
additis suis auxiliis configant.

4. Massilienses post superius incommodum veteres ad

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<sup>3</sup> For "quantity," Jurin proposed "size," which entails rendering *vim* with "their power" rather than "their number."

<sup>4</sup> Curio held Sicily for Caesar (1.30.2).

<sup>5</sup> See 1.58.5. Marseilles lost nine ships on that occasion.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

tity<sup>3</sup> of catapults that no screens woven from wicker canes could withstand their number. Twelve-foot long shafts fitted with points and hurled by huge engines would go through four layers of brushwood bundles and fix themselves in the earth. Therefore covered galleries were made from foot-square beams joined one to another, and the material for the ramp was passed hand to hand down these. At the front end, for leveling the ground, was a "tortoise" sixty feet wide. This too was made from the strongest timbers and covered with every kind of defense against incendiary shot and stones. But the whole operation was hindered by the size of the works, the height of Marseilles' wall and towers, and the quantity of catapults. There were also frequent sorties by the Albici, and attempts to set fire to the ramp and siege towers; our soldiers repulsed these with ease and forced those who had made the sortie back into the town after themselves inflicting significant losses.

3. Meanwhile Lucius Nasidius, who had been sent by Gnaeus Pompey as support for Lucius Domitius and Marseilles with a fleet of sixteen ships, a few equipped with rams, sailed through the Sicilian strait without Curio being aware of or anticipating the fact.<sup>4</sup> When he had put in at Messana, and the town's leaders and councilors had evacuated the place because of the sudden panic, he took a ship from their dockyards. After adding this to the rest he finished his course toward Marseilles. Sending ahead a boat in secret he informed Domitius and the people of Marseilles about his approach and urged them strongly to add his forces to their own and engage with Brutus' fleet again.

4. After the earlier setback<sup>5</sup> Marseilles had brought

## CAESAR

eundem numerum ex navalibus productas naves refece-  
rant summaque industria armaverant. Remigum guberna-  
2 torum magna copia suppetebat. Piscatoriasque adiecerant  
atque contexerant ut essent ab ictu telorum remiges tuti.  
3 Has sagittariis tormentisque compleverunt. Tali modo in-  
structa classe omnium seniorum matrum familiae virgi-  
num precibus et fletu excitati—extremo tempore civitati  
subvenirent—non minore animo ac fiducia quam ante  
4 dimicaverant naves conscendunt. Communi enim fit vitio  
naturae ut invisis [latitatis] atque incognitis rebus magis  
confidamus [vehementiusque exterreamur],<sup>5</sup> ut tum acci-  
dit. Adventus enim L. Nasidi summa spe et voluntate civi-  
5 tatem compleverat. Nacti idoneum ventum ex portu ex-  
eunt et Tauroenta, quod est castellum Massiliensium, ad  
Nasidium perveniunt. Ibi naves expediunt rursusque  
se ad conflagrandum animo confirmant et consilia com-  
municant. Dextra pars attribuitur Massiliensibus, sinistra  
Nasidio.

5. Eodem Brutus contendit aucto navium numero.  
Nam ad eas quae factae erant Arelate per Caesarem cap-  
tivae Massiliensium accesserant VI. Has superioribus die-  
2 bus refecerat atque omnibus rebus instruxerat. Itaque  
suos cohortatus—quos integros superavissent ut victos  
contemnerent—plenus spei bonae atque animi adversus  
eas proficiscitur.

<sup>5</sup> [vehementiusque exterreamur] *Fabre*: vehementiusque ef-  
feramur *Bentley*

<sup>6</sup> After “unknown things,” *Fabre* excised the nonsensical “and  
become more intensely terrified,” while *Bentley* proposed replac-  
ing it with “and become more intensely enthusiastic.”

CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

an equal number of old ships out of the dockyards, repaired them, and equipped them with the utmost effort. A large supply of rowers and pilots was available. Plus, 2  
fishing boats had been added, newly furnished with decks so that the rowers would be safe from the impact of projectiles. They filled these with archers and catapults. With 3  
the fleet thus equipped the men embarked, roused by the pleas and tears of a whole crowd of older men, matrons, and girls urging them to rescue the city in its moment of crisis. Their spirits and confidence were as high as in the earlier battle, for by a common defect of our nature it 4  
happens that we put more reliance in unseen and unknown things,<sup>6</sup> as occurred then. (The arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the city with a very great sense of hope and purpose.) When they got a suitable wind they left 5  
the harbor and went to Nasidium at Tauroeis, a stronghold belonging to Marseilles. There they got their ships ready and again encouraged one another for battle and exchanged plans. The right wing was assigned to Marseilles, the left to Nasidius.

5. Brutus made for the same spot with an augmented fleet, for to the ships made on Caesar's orders at Arles he had added six captured from Marseilles.<sup>7</sup> In the preceding days he had repaired these and equipped them fully. Therefore after encouraging his men—"You have nothing to worry about from beaten men whom you defeated when they were unscathed!"—he set out against the enemy ships full of good hope and spirit. 2

<sup>7</sup> See 1.36.4–5 for Brutus' original fleet of twelve ships.

3 Facile erat ex castris C. Treboni atque omnibus superi-  
 oribus locis prospicere in urbem ut omnis iuventus quae<sup>6</sup>  
 in oppido remanserat omnesque superioris aetatis cum  
 liberis atque uxoribus [publicis custodiisque]<sup>7</sup> aut muro ad  
 caelum manus tenderent aut templa deorum immortalium  
 4 adirent et ante simulacra proiecti victoriam ab dis ex-  
 poscerent. Neque erat quisquam omnium quin in eius diei  
 5 casu suarum omnium fortunarum eventum consistere  
 existimaret. Nam et honesti ex iuventute et cuiusque aeta-  
 tis amplissimi nominatim evocati atque obsecrati naves  
 conscenderant, ut si quid adversi accidisset ne ad conan-  
 dum quidem sibi quicquam reliqui fore viderent, si super-  
 avissent vel domesticis opibus vel externis auxiliis de salute  
 urbis confiderent.

6. Commisso proelio Massiliensibus res nulla ad virtu-  
 tem defuit, sed memores eorum praeceptorum quae paulo  
 ante ab suis acceperant hoc animo decertabant ut nullum  
 aliud tempus ad conandum habituri viderentur et—qui-  
 bus in pugna vitae periculum acciderat— non ita multo se  
 reliquorum civium fatum antecedere existimarent, quibus  
 2 urbe capta eadem esset belli fortuna patienda. Diduc-  
 tisque nostris paulatim navibus et artificio gubernatorum  
 <et> mobilitati navium locus dabatur. Et si quando nostri  
 facultatem nacti ferreis manibus iniectis navem religave-

<sup>6</sup> *Nipperdey* transposed <custodiis> to follow quae and emended publicis to supplices below.

<sup>7</sup> [publicis custodiisque] aut *Dübner*: custodiisque publicis aut *Carter*: aut supplices (sc. manus) [c-] *Nipperdey*: supplices sordidatque aut *Paul*

<sup>6</sup> *Nipperdey's* transposition adds "as guards" here.

From Trebonius' camp and every elevated location it was easy to see into the city and how the whole fighting-age generation that had stayed in town,<sup>8</sup> and all the older men with their children and wives, were either stretching<sup>9</sup> hands to heaven from the wall or visiting the gods' temples and, prostrate before their likenesses, imploring them for victory. Nor was there anyone who did not think that everyone's future fortunes were riding on that day's chances, for the most highly regarded men of fighting age, as well as the most eminent men of every age, had embarked after being summoned individually and implored. So they realized that if things went badly they would have nothing left to try, and were confident of the city's survival, either from their own resources or with outside help, if they won.

6. In combat the men of Marseilles showed no lack of courage. They remembered the injunctions received shortly beforehand from their fellow citizens, and their attitude as they fought was this: they did not seem likely to have another opportunity to try, and they thought—those who had risked their lives in battle—that they were not anticipating by very much the fate of the rest, who would have to suffer the same fortune of war if the city was taken. Our ships gradually spread out, giving room to the enemy pilots' skill and their ships' mobility. Whenever our men found an opportunity and secured a ship by casting grappling hooks onto it, the enemy would come from

<sup>9</sup> For "were either stretching," the emendations mentioned in the apparatus read, respectively, "and men posted as guards were either stretching," "were either stretching suppliant," and "suppliant and in mourning garb were either stretching." Many other emendations have been proposed for this difficult passage.

## CAESAR

3 rant undique suis laborantibus succurrebant. Neque vero  
coniuncti Albicis comminus pugnando deficiebant neque  
multum cedebant virtute nostris. Simul ex minoribus navi-  
bus magna vis eminus missa telorum multa nostris de  
improviso imprudentibus atque impeditis vulnera infere-  
4 bant. Conspicataeque naves triremes duae navem D.  
Bruti, quae ex insigni facile agnosci poterat, duabus ex  
partibus sese in eam incitaverant. Sed tantum re provisa  
Brutus celeritate navis enisus est ut parvo momento  
5 antecederet. Illae adeo graviter inter se incitatae conflix-  
erunt ut vehementissime utraque ex concursu laborarent,  
6 altera vero praefracto rostro tota collabefieret. Qua re  
animadversa quae proximae ei loco ex Bruti classe naves  
erant in eas impeditas impetum faciunt celeriterque am-  
bas deprimunt.

7. Sed Nasidianae naves nullo usui fuerunt celeri-  
terque pugna excesserunt. Non enim has aut conspectus  
patriae aut propinquorum praecepta ad extremum vitae  
2 periculum adire cogebant. Itaque ex eo numero navium  
nulla desiderata est. Ex Massiliensium classe V sunt de-  
pressae, IIII captae. Vna cum Nasidianis profugit, quae  
3 omnes citeriorem Hispaniam petiverunt. At ex reliquis  
una praemissa Massiliam huius nunti perferendi gratia  
cum iam appropinquaret urbi omnis sese multitudo ad  
cognoscendum effudit. Et re cognita tantus luctus exceptit  
4 ut urbs ab hostibus capta eodem vestigio videretur. Mas-  
silienses tamen nihilo setius ad defensionem urbis reliqua  
apparare coeperunt.

8. Est animadversum ab legionariis qui dextram par-  
tem operis administrabant: ex crebris hostium eruptioni-  
bus magno sibi esse praesidio posse si pro castello ac re-

all directions to help the men in difficulties. The allied 3  
 Albici showed themselves adequate to close combat and  
 not much inferior to our men in prowess. At the same time  
 a large quantity of projectiles hurled from smaller vessels  
 some distance off unexpectedly caused many injuries to 4  
 our men, unwary and preoccupied as they were. Two tri-  
 remes, having spotted Decimus Brutus' ship, which was  
 easily recognizable from its flag, drove against it from two  
 sides. But Brutus, foreseeing the result, made such an  
 effort that his ship's speed put him a moment ahead. 5  
 Driving in opposite directions they collided with such force  
 that both were in serious difficulties after the collision and  
 one lost its beak, capsizing completely. Noticing this, the 6  
 closest ships from Brutus' fleet attacked the entangled  
 triremes and quickly sank both.

7. As for Nasidius' ships, they were no use and quickly  
 left the battle, for they were not induced to put their lives  
 into the greatest danger by the sight of their fatherland or  
 the injunctions of their people. So none of these ships was 2  
 lost. Five from Marseilles' fleet were sunk, four captured.  
 One fled with those of Nasidius, which headed as a body  
 for Nearer Spain. One of the remaining ships was sent 3  
 ahead to bring the news to Marseilles. As it was approach-  
 ing the city, the whole population poured out to hear.  
 When they heard the news, such grief took possession of  
 the city as to give the impression that it had been captured  
 by the enemy in that instant. Yet Marseilles began to pre- 4  
 pare what remained for the city's defense nonetheless.

8. The legionaries conducting operations on the right  
 realized that, in view of the enemy's frequent sorties, they  
 would be well protected if they built a masonry tower



ceptaculo turrim ex latere sub muro fecissent. Quam  
 primo ad repentinos incursus humilem parvamque fece-  
 2 runt. Huc se referebant, hinc si qua maior oppresserat vis  
 propugnabant, hinc ad repellendum et prosequendum  
 hostem procurrebant. Patebat haec quoquo versus pedes  
 3 XXX, sed parietum crassitudo pedes V. Postea vero, ut est  
 rerum omnium magister usus, hominum adhibita sollertia  
 inventum est magno esse usui posse si haec esset in alti-  
 tudinem turris elata. Id hac ratione perfectum est.

9. Ibi<sup>8</sup> turris altitudo perducta est ubi <tigna> contabu-  
 lationis causa<sup>9</sup> in parietes instruxerunt, ita ut capita tigno-  
 rum extrema parietum structura tegerentur ne quid emi-  
 2 neret ubi ignis hostium adhaeresceret. Hanc insuper  
 contignationem quantum tectum plutei ac vinearum pas-  
 sum est latericulo adstruxerunt, supraque eum locum duo  
 tigna transversa iniecerunt [ut] non longe ab extremis  
 parietibus quibus suspenderent eam contignationem quae  
 turri tegimento esset futura, supraque ea tigna directo  
 transversas trabes iniecerunt eaque axibus religaverunt.  
 3 Has trabes paulo longiores atque eminentiores quam ex-  
 tremi parietes erant effecerunt ut esset ubi tegimenta

<sup>8</sup> ibi] ubi *Oudendorp*, who adopts *Aldus'* emendation below

<sup>9</sup> ubi <tigna> contabulationis causa *Damon*: ut contabulationis  
 causa ω: ad contabulationem, eam *Aldus*

<sup>10</sup> For Trebonius' twofold assault see 2.1.1–2.

<sup>11</sup> In the following chapters about this tower and the adjacent  
 gallery (2.9–10), the text bristles with problems, and solutions are  
 especially hard to identify, because both content and style are  
 somewhat alien to Caesar's norm. As a result, the accounts of

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at the foot of the wall as a stronghold and refuge.<sup>10</sup> At first they made it low and small to counter sudden incursions. This was the place to which they would retreat, and from which they would resist if overwhelmed by a superior force, running out to repel and pursue the enemy. The tower was thirty feet long on each side, with walls five feet thick. Later, however, experience being the universal teacher, and with the application of human ingenuity, they discovered that it would be very useful if this tower was expanded upward. This is how it was done.<sup>11</sup>

9. The height of the tower was extended in the place where they laid the beams on the walls to make the platform,<sup>12</sup> in such a way that the beam ends were covered by the wall's outermost masonry, to prevent protrusions to which the enemy's fire might adhere. On top of this platform they built up as much brickwork as the wicker screen overhead allowed, and at this level they laid two crosswise beams not far from the ends of the walls; with these they planned to hoist the platform that was going to be the tower's roof. Above and at right angles to these beams they laid joists and fastened the timbers together with planks. They made these joists somewhat longer, extending beyond the edges of the walls, so that there would be a place

these engineering feats are unusually hard to follow. It is likely that for these descriptions of siege works never seen by Caesar himself—they were destroyed and replaced with different structures before his return to Marseilles (2.14.4, 2.15)—he relied heavily on a report's wording.

<sup>12</sup> For "the height . . . platform," editors often follow Oudendorp and Aldus with "When the height of the tower reached the level for a platform, they laid the beams onto the walls."

- praependere possent ad defendendos ictus ac repellendos cum intra eam contignationem parietes extruerentur,
- 4 eamque contabulationem summam lateribus lutoque constraverunt ne quid ignis hostium nocere posset, centonesque insuper iniecerunt ne aut tela tormentis missa tabulationem perfringerent aut saxa ex catapultis latericium
- 5 discuterent. Storias autem ex funibus ancorariis tres in longitudinem parietum turris latas IIII pedes fecerunt easque ex tribus partibus quae ad hostes vergebant eminentibus trabibus circum turrim praependentes religaverunt, quod unum genus tegimenti aliis locis erant experti
- 6 nullo telo neque tormento traici posse. Vbi vero ea pars turris quae erat perfecta tecta atque munita est ab omni ictu hostium pluteos ad alia opera abduxerunt. Turris tectum per se ipsum pressionibus ex contignatione prima
- 7 suspendere ac tollere coeperunt. Vbi quantum storiarum demissio patiebatur tantum elevarant, intra haec tegimenta abditi atque muniti parietes lateribus extruebant rursusque alia pressione ad aedificandum sibi locum expediebant. Vbi tempus alterius contabulationis videbatur tigna item ut primo tecta extremis lateribus instruebant exque ea contignatione rursus summam contabulationem
- 9 storiasque elevabant. Ita tuto ac sine ullo vulnere ac periculo VI tabulata extruxerunt. Fenestrasque quibus in locis visum est ad tormenta mittenda in struendo reliquerunt.
10. Vbi ex ea turri quae circum essent opera tueri se posse sunt confisi musculum pedes LX longum ex materia bipedali quem a turri latericia ad hostium turrim mu-

<sup>13</sup> The figure sixty may be corrupt.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

hang screens to protect against and repel blows when the walls were being built up under the platform's shelter. They covered this platform with a layer of bricks and clay to prevent damage by the enemy's fire. On top they piled rag pallets to prevent artillery shot from smashing the platform and rocks hurled by the catapults from shattering the brickwork. They made three mats from anchor ropes, as long as the tower walls and four feet wide, and fastened them around the tower as a barrier on the three sides facing the enemy; the mats hung from the projecting joists. They had learned elsewhere that this was the one sort of protection that could not be pierced by any weapon or catapult. When the completed portion of the tower had been roofed and protected from every kind of enemy shot, they took the overhead screens away for other operations. They then began to hoist and raise the tower's roof as a unit, using leverage from the first platform. When they had lifted it as much as the fall of the mats allowed, concealed and secure within their protection they would build walls of brick, and again make room for themselves to build by another round of leverage. When it seemed to be time for another platform, they would lay beams as before, protected by the outermost bricks, and from this platform they would again raise the topmost platform and mats. In this way they built six stories safely and without injury or danger. While building, they left openings for the use of catapults where appropriate.

10. When they were sure that they could protect the surrounding operations from this tower, they began to make a gallery sixty feet long<sup>13</sup> from two-foot square timber; they planned to extend this from the brick tower to

CAESAR

rumque perducerent facere instituerunt. Cuius musculi haec erat forma.

- 2 Duae primum trabes in solo aequae longae distantes inter se pedes IIII collocantur inque his columellae pedum in altitudinem V defiguntur. Has inter se capreolis molli fastigio coniungunt ubi tigna quae musculi tegendi causa ponant collocentur. Eo super tigna bipedalia incidunt eaque lamminis clavisque religant. Ad extremum musculi tectum trabesque extremas quadratas regulas IIII patentes digitos defigunt quae lateres qui superstruantur<sup>10</sup>
- 5 contineant. Ita fastigato atque ordinatim structo < tecto > ut trabes<sup>11</sup> erant in capreolis collocatae, in lateribus lutus,<sup>12</sup> musculus ut ab igni qui ex muro iaceretur tutus esset
- 6 contegitur. Super lateres coria inducuntur ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere posset. Coria autem ne rursus igni ac lapidibus corrumpantur centonibus conteguntur. Hoc opus omne tectum vineis ad ipsam turrim perficiunt. Subitoque inopinantibus hostibus machinatione navali phalangis subiectis ad turrim hostium admovent ut aedificio iungatur.

11. Quo malo perterriti subito oppidani saxa quam maxima possunt vectibus promovent praecipitataque muro in musculus devolvunt. Ictum firmitas materiae
- 2 sustinet, et quicquid incidit fastigio musculi elabitur. Id

<sup>10</sup> superstruantur *Nipperdey*: super musculos struantur  $\omega$

<sup>11</sup> < tecto > *Oudendorp*

<sup>12</sup> in lateribus luto *Damon*: in lateribus luto  $\omega$ : [in] la- lutoque *Aldus*: [in] la- [luto] *Apitz*: [in] latericulo *Paul*

<sup>14</sup> Literally, "four finger-widths square."

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the enemy's tower and wall. The gallery's structure was like this:

First, two timbers of equal length were placed on the 2  
ground four feet apart. In these they inserted posts five 3  
feet tall. They joined each post to its opposite with trusses 3  
with a low pitch; on these they planned to place the beams  
to cover the gallery. On this structure they laid two-foot  
square beams and secured them with metal plates and 4  
spikes. At the edge of the gallery's roof and the ends of the 4  
beams they fastened three-inch square<sup>14</sup> battens to hold 4  
in place the bricks to be laid on top. In this way, with the 5  
roof peaked and constructed in layers—since beams had 5  
been placed on trusses, clay on bricks<sup>15</sup>—the gallery was  
covered so as to be safe from fire thrown from the wall.  
Hides were stretched over the bricks to prevent water 6  
released from pipes from being able to wash away the 6  
brickwork. The hides were covered with rag pallets to 6  
prevent damage to these too from fire and stones. They 7  
accomplished the whole project near their tower under 7  
the protection of screens. And suddenly, catching the en-  
emy off guard, they used a naval maneuver—rollers under  
the gallery—and moved it up to the enemy's tower so as  
to abut its structure.

11. Terrified by this emergency the townspeople rolled  
forward the largest possible stones with crowbars and sent  
them flying off the wall onto the gallery. The strength of  
the timber withstood the impact, and anything that landed  
slid off because of the sloping roof. Seeing this, the enemy 2

<sup>15</sup> From "in this way" to "bricks," the text is very uncertain, but the variants do not make much difference to the sense.

## CAESAR

- ubi vident mutant consilium. Cupas taeda ac pice refertas incendunt easque de muro in musculum devolvunt. Involutae labuntur, delapsae ab lateribus longuriis furcisque ab opere removentur. Interim sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium, quibus fundamenta continebantur, convellunt. Musculus ex turri latericia a nostris telis tormentisque defenditur. Hostes ex muro ac turribus submoventur. Non datur libera muri defendendi facultas.
- 3
- 4 Compluribus iam lapidibus ex illa quae suberat turri subductis repentina ruina pars eius turris concidit. Pars reliqua consequens procumbebat cum hostes urbis direptione perterriti inermes cum infulis se porta foras universi propriiunt. Ad legatos atque exercitum supplices manus tendunt.

12. Qua nova re oblata omnis administratio belli consistit, militesque aversi a proelio ad studium audiendi et cognoscendi feruntur. Vbi hostes ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt universi se ad pedes prociunt. Orant ut adventus Caesaris expectetur: captam suam urbem videre, opera perfecta, turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere; nullam exoriri moram posse quominus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent ad nutum, e vestigio diriperentur. Docent: si omnino turris concidisset non posse milites contineri quin spe praedae in urbem irruerent urbemque delerent. Haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur.
- 2
- 3
- 4

---

<sup>16</sup> The fillets were ribbons signifying supplication and sacrifice typically worn by those petitioning a god.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

changed their plan. They set on fire barrels filled with pine-wood and pitch and rolled these off the wall onto the gallery. The tumbling barrels slid off and after sliding down were moved away from the sides by means of poles and pitchforks. Meanwhile beneath the gallery soldiers 3 with crowbars were extracting the lowest stones of the enemy tower, which formed its foundation. The gallery's defense was handled by our men from the brick tower with projectiles and catapults. The enemy was dislodged from their wall and towers; they were given no real chance to defend the wall. After a number of stones had been 4 removed from the adjacent tower, there was a sudden collapse and part of it gave way. The remainder consequently began to lean forward. The enemy, terrified by the prospect of a sacked city, rushed as one out through the gate, unarmed and wearing fillets.<sup>16</sup> They stretched out their hands for mercy to the officers and army.

12. With this new development all military operations ceased and the soldiers, once diverted from the fighting, became determined to listen and understand. The enemy, 2 reaching our officers and army, threw themselves as one before their feet. Their plea was this: "Wait until Caesar arrives. We see our city taken, your works complete, our 3 tower undermined. We are therefore abandoning our defense. Nothing can happen to delay an immediate sack if, after Caesar gets here, we do not do exactly what he orders." If the tower gave way altogether, they explained, 4 it would be impossible to keep the soldiers from breaking into the city in hopes of booty, and destroying it. These pleas and several more of the same sort—these were educated men, after all—were delivered with great pathos and lamentation.



## CAESAR

13. Quibus rebus commoti legati milites ex opere deducunt, oppugnatione desistunt, operibus custodias relinquunt. Indutiarum quodam genere misericordia facta adventus Caesaris expectatur. Nullum ex muro, nullum a nostris mittitur telum. Ut re confecta omnes curam et diligentiam remittunt. Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent. Quod se facturos minabantur aegreque tunc sunt retenti quin oppidum irrumperent graviterque eam retulerunt quod stetisse per Trebonium quominus oppido potirentur videbatur.

14. At hostes sine fide tempus atque occasionem fraudis ac doli quaerunt. Interiectisque aliquot diebus nostris languentibus atque animo remissis subito meridiano tempore cum alius discessisset alius ex diutino labore in ipsis operibus quieti se dedisset, arma vero omnia reposita contactaque essent, portis se foras erumpunt, secundo magnoque vento ignem operibus inferunt. Hunc sic distulit ventus uti uno tempore agger plutei testudo turris tormenta flammam conciperent et prius haec omnia consumerentur quam quemadmodum accidisset animadverti posset. Nostri repentina fortuna permoti arma quae possunt arripiunt. Alii ex castris sese incitant. Fit in hostes impetus, sed eorum<sup>13</sup> [muro]<sup>14</sup> sagittis tormentisque fugientes persequi prohibentur. Illi sub murum se recipiunt

<sup>13</sup> sed eorum *Damon*: e- s- ω: [e-] sed *Vascosan*

<sup>14</sup> [muro] *Damon*: <ex> muro *Chacon*

13. Swayed by this, the officers withdrew the soldiers from their work, abandoned the assault, and left sentries at the siege works. After striking a sort of truce out of compassion, they waited for Caesar's arrival. No weapons were thrown from the city wall, none by our men. As if the business was concluded, everyone relaxed his care and diligence, for Caesar had written to Trebonius with emphatic instructions not to allow the city to be taken by force. He wanted to prevent the soldiers, whose grievances were considerable—hostility because of Marseilles' defection, plus the disrespect for themselves, and their long-continued exertion—from killing all of the adult males. They were threatening to do just this, and it was difficult to keep them from breaking into the town. They felt aggrieved, since Trebonius seemed to be the only reason they were not taking control of Marseilles.

14. The treacherous enemy, however, was seeking an opportune moment for a devious ruse. After a few days' interval our men were relaxed and inattentive, and suddenly at midday, when some had left the siege works and others, after their long-continued exertions, were at ease in the works, and every weapon had been put away and secured, the enemy burst out through the gates. With a strong wind in their favor they set fire to the works. The wind spread the blaze in such a way that the siege ramp, the screens, the "tortoise," the tower, and the catapults caught fire at the same time, and everything was consumed before anyone could see how it happened. Our men, prompted by the unexpected calamity, seized what weapons they could; some rushed out of the camp. An attack was mounted, but the enemy's arrows and artillery fire prevented them from pursuing those in flight.

## CAESAR

ibique musculum turrimque latericiam libere incendunt. Ita multorum mensum labor hostium perfidia et vi tempestatis puncto temporis interiit. Temptaverunt hoc idem  
 5 Massilienses postero die. Eandem nacti tempestatem maiore cum fiducia ad alteram turrim aggeremque eruptione  
 6 pugnaverunt multumque ignem intulerunt. Sed ut superioris temporis contentionem nostri omnem remiserant ita proximi diei casu admoniti omnia ad defensionem paraverant. Itaque multis interfectis reliquos infecta re in oppidum reppulerunt.

15. Trebonius ea quae sunt amissa multo maiore militum studio administrare et reficere instituit. Nam ubi tantos suos labores et apparatus male cecidisse viderunt indutiisque per scelus violatis suam virtutem irrisui fore perdoluerunt, quod unde agger omnino comportari posset nihil erat reliquum omnibus arboribus longe lateque in finibus Massiliensium excisis et convectis, aggerem novi generis atque inauditum ex latericiis duobus muris senum pedum crassitudine atque eorum murorum contignatione facere instituerunt aequa fere latitudine atque ille congesticius ex materia fuerat agger. Vbi aut spatium inter muros aut imbecillitas materiae postulare videretur pilae interponuntur. Traversaria tigna iniciuntur quae firmamento esse possint, et quicquid est contignatum cratibus conster-  
 2 nitur, lutoque crates integuntur. Sub tecto miles, dextra ac sinistra muro tectus, adversus pluteo obiecto,<sup>15</sup> operi  
 3 quaecumque sunt usui sine periculo supportat. Celeriter  
 4

<sup>15</sup> pluteo obiecto *Damon*: plutei -to ω: plutei -tu *Aldus*

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

enemy retreated to the foot of the wall, and there they were free to set fire to the gallery and brick tower. The work of many months was thus annihilated in an instant as a result of enemy treachery and a violent windstorm. 5  
Marseilles tried the same thing the next day. With the same weather and more confidence they sallied out into combat beside the second tower and ramp. They set a great fire. 6  
But although our men had reduced their exertion from its earlier level, still, warned by the previous day's disaster they had made every preparation for defense. They therefore pushed the enemy back into the city with their task undone and many casualties.

15. Trebonius started to undertake the rebuilding of what had been lost, with greatly increased determination on the soldiers' part, for they saw that their immense efforts and preparations had turned out badly and resented the fact that their prowess would seem farcical after the criminal violation of the truce. Since nothing was left that could somehow be used to assemble a siege ramp—all of the trees far and wide in the territory of Marseilles had already been cut down and brought in—they started to make an unusual siege ramp of a new type from two brick walls six feet thick with a platform between them; it was about the same width as the ramp of solid fill had been. Whenever the gap between the walls or the weakness of 2  
the material seemed to demand it, they interspersed up-rights. They laid crosswise beams that could serve as a base, and as the platform came into being a layer of wicker was added and the wicker was covered with clay. With this 3  
overhead, protected by walls on the right and left and in front by the interposition of a screen, the soldiers carried whatever was needed for the work without danger. The 4

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res administratur. Diuturni laboris detrimentum sollertia et virtute militum brevi reconciliatur. Portae quibus locis videtur eruptionis causa in muro relinquuntur.

16. Quod ubi hostes viderunt ea quae diu longoque spatio refici non posse sperassent paucorum dierum opera et labore ita refecta ut nullus perfidiae neque eruptioni locus esset neque quicquam omnino relinqueretur qua aut
- 2 telis militibus aut igni operibus noceri posset, eodemque exemplo sentiunt totam urbem, qua sit aditus ab terra, muro turribusque circumiri posse sic ut ipsis consistendi in suis munitionibus locus non esset cum paene inaedificata in muris ab exercitu nostro moenia viderentur ac te-
- 3 lum manu comiceretur, suorumque tormentorum usum, quibus ipsi magna speravissent, spati propinquitate interire parique conditione ex muro ac turribus bellandi data se virtute nostris adaequare non posse intellegunt, ad eadem deditionis condiciones recurrunt.

17. M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio—cognitis iis rebus quae sunt in Italia gestae—diffidens Pompeianis
- 2 rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: praeoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo minorem cum Caesare intercedere; neque se ignorare quod esset officium legati qui fiduciarum operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae
- 3 voluntas erga Caesarem totius provinciae. Haec omnibus ferebat sermonibus neque se in ullam partem movebat.
- 4 Postea vero, cum Caesarem ad Massiliam detineri cognovit, copias Petrei cum exercitu Afrani esse coniunctas,

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

task was handled quickly: the wreck of their long struggle was soon made good by the soldiers' skill and valor. Sally points were left at suitable locations along the wall.

16. The enemy saw that the works they had hoped could not be rebuilt for a long time and a considerable interval had been rebuilt with a few days' effort and exertion, with the result that there was no opportunity for a treacherous sortie and no way at all left of harming the soldiers with weapons or the works with fire. And they perceived that the whole city, where approached by land, could be boxed in by a wall and towers in the same fashion, such that they would have no place to stand on their own defenses, since the fortifications built by our army seemed practically to abut their wall, and weapons were being thrown by hand. They also realized that their catapults, for which they had had great hopes, lost their usefulness owing to the close quarters, and that they themselves could not match our men in prowess if the fighting was done on equal terms from walls and towers. So they resorted to surrender on the same terms.

17. In further Spain Marcus Varro lacked confidence in Pompey's cause at the outset, when he learned of events in Italy, and spoke in a very friendly fashion about Caesar. "Given the priority of my mission from Pompey, I am held fast by obligations. Nevertheless, I have no less close a connection with Caesar. I am familiar with the duties of an officer who has a position of trust—and with my resources and my province's universal favor for Caesar." These were his words in every conversation, and he did not move toward either side. Later, however, he learned that Caesar was detained at Marseilles, that Petreius' forces and Afranius' army were united, that substantial

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magna auxilia convenisse. magna esse in spe atque expectari, et consentire omnem citeriorem provinciam, quaeque postea acciderant de angustiis ad Ilerdam rei frumentariae accepit atque haec ad eum latius atque inflatus Afranius praescribebat, se quoque ad motus Fortunae movere coepit.

18. Dilectum habuit tota provincia. Legionibus completis duabus cohortes circiter XXX alarias addidit. Frumenti magnum numerum coegit quod Massiliensibus item quod Afranio Pompeioque<sup>16</sup> mitteret. Naves longas X Gaditanis ut facerent imperavit, complures praeterea
- 2 [in] Hispali faciendas curavit. Pecuniam omnem omniaque ornamenta ex fano Herculis in oppidum Gades contulit. Eo VI cohortes praesidi causa ex provincia misit. Gaiumque Gallonium equitem Romanum familiarem Domiti, qui eo procurandae hereditatis causa venerat missus a Domitio, oppido Gadibus praefecit. Arma omnia
- 3 privata ac publica in domum Galloni contulit. Ipse habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. Saepe ex tribunali praedicavit: adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse; magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium perfugisse; haec se certis
- 4 nuntiis certis auctoribus comperisse. Quibus rebus perterritos cives Romanos eius provinciae sibi ad rem publicam administrandam sestertium CLXXX et argenti pondo XX
- 5 milia, tritici modium CXX milia polliceri coegit. Quas Caesari esse amicas civitates arbitrabatur his graviora onera iniungebat praesidiaque eo deducebat. Et iudicia in privatos reddebat qui verba atque orationem adversus rem

<sup>16</sup> Pompeioque] Petrei- *ed. pr.*



reinforcements had arrived and more were hoped for and expected, and that they had the unanimous support of Nearer Spain. Subsequent events—Caesar's supply difficulties at Ilerda—came to his attention, and Afranius' letters informing him about these things were written with undue generality and exaggeration. Then Varro's movements began to mirror those of Fortune.

18. He recruited troops throughout his province, bringing his two legions up to strength and supplementing them with about thirty cohorts of allies. He collected a large quantity of grain to send to Marseilles and also to Afranius and Pompey. He ordered Cadiz to make ten warships and arranged for the construction of several more in Hispalis. He moved all of the money and treasures from the temple of Hercules into the town of Cadiz; to guard the town he sent six cohorts from the province. He also put Gaius Gallonius, a Roman of equestrian rank and a friend of Domitius, in charge of Cadiz; Gallonius was already there, having been sent by Domitius as his agent for an inheritance. Varro moved all weapons, privately owned and public, into Gallonius' house. He made speeches critical of Caesar, often declaring from his official platform that battles had turned out badly for Caesar, that a large number of soldiers had deserted him for Afranius: "I know this from reliable reports, reliable authorities." The Roman citizens in the province were thoroughly cowed by this; Varro forced them to promise him eighteen million sesterces and twenty thousand pounds of silver to use for public business, and 120,000 measures of wheat. As for communities he thought friendly to Caesar, he imposed heavier burdens on them and installed garrisons. He also issued judgments against private individuals for having spoken or



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- publicam habuissent. Eorum bona in publicum addicebat  
 Provinciam omnem in sua et Pompei verba ius iurandum  
 6 adigebat. Cognitis iis rebus quae sunt gestae in citeriore  
 Hispania, bellum parabat. Ratio autem haec erat belli ut  
 se cum duabus legionibus Gades conferret, naves frumen-  
 tumque omne ibi contineret. Provinciam enim omnem  
 Caesaris rebus favere cognoverat. In insula frumento navi-  
 busque comparatis bellum duci non difficile existimabat.
- 7 Caesar etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revo-  
 cabatur tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispa-  
 niis relinquere quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et mag-  
 nas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat. 19. Itaque  
 duabus legionibus missis in ulteriorem Hispaniam cum Q.  
 Cassio tribuno plebis, ipse cum DC equitibus magnis iti-  
 neribus praegreditur edictumque praemittit: ad quam  
 2 diem magistratus principesque omnium civitatum sibi  
 esse praesto Cordubae vellet. Quo edicto tota provincia  
 pervulgato nulla fuit civitas quin ad id tempus partem  
 3 senatus Cordubam mitteret, non civis Romanus paulo  
 notior quin ad diem conveniret. Simul ipse Cordubae con-  
 ventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias vigiliisque  
 4 in turribus muroque disposuit, cohortes duas, quae colo-  
 nicae appellabantur, cum eo casu venissent, tuendi oppidi  
 causa apud se retinuit. Isdem diebus Carmonenses, quae  
 est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas, deductis tri-

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<sup>17</sup> "Colonials" refers to the origin of the cohorts' soldiers in a Roman colony such as Italica or Carteia.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

given speeches against the public interest, confiscating their property. He forced the entire province to swear allegiance to himself and Pompey. After learning what had happened in Nearer Spain, he started preparing to fight. His plan of campaign was to move to Cadiz with two legions and to keep his ships and all of his food supplies there, for he was aware that his whole province favored Caesar's cause. He thought that it would not be difficult to prolong the war on an island with supplies and ships at hand. 6

Although matters both numerous and necessary were calling Caesar back to Italy, he had decided to leave no trace of war in Spain, since he knew that Pompey had done many favors and was patron to many in the nearer province. 19. So after ordering two legions to Further Spain with the plebeian tribune Quintus Cassius, he himself went ahead at speed with six hundred cavalry and sent on an edict indicating the day on which he wanted every community's magistrates and leading men to be ready for him in Corduba. When this edict was published throughout the province, there was no community that did not send part of its council to Corduba for the occasion, and no Roman citizen of any distinction who did not arrive on time. At the same time the association of Roman citizens at Corduba closed the gates to Varro, stationed sentries and lookouts in the towers and on the wall, and detained for the city's defense two cohorts, called "colonials," that had arrived by chance.<sup>17</sup> During the same period Carmo, which is by far the strongest city in the province and where 2 3 4

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bus in arcem oppidi cohortibus a Varrone praesidio, per se cohortes eiecit portasque praeclusit.

20. Hoc vero magis properare Varro ut cum legionibus quam primum Gades contenderet, ne itinere aut traiectu intercluderetur. Tanta ac tam secunda in Caesarem voluntas provinciae reperiatur. Progresso ei paulo longius litterae Gadibus redduntur: simul atque sit cognitum de edicto Caesaris consensisse Gaditanos principes cum tribunis cohortium quae essent ibi in praesidio ut Gallonium ex oppido expellerent, urbem insulamque Caesari servarent; hoc inuito consilio denuntiavisse Gallonio ut sua sponte dum sine periculo liceret excederet Gadibus; si id non fecisset sibi consilium capturos; hoc timore adductum Gallonium Gadibus excessisse. His cognitis rebus altera ex duabus legionibus, quae vernacula appellabatur, ex castris Varronis adstante et inspectante ipso signa sustulit seseque Hispalim recepit atque in foro et porticibus sine maleficio consedit. Quod factum adeo eius conventus cives Romani comprobaverunt ut domum ad se quisque hospitio cupidissime reciperet. Quibus rebus perterritus Varro cum itinere converso sese Italicam venturum praemisisset certior ab suis factus est praeclusas esse portas. Tum vero omni interclusus itinere ad Caesarem mittit: paratum se esse legionem cui iusserit tradere. Ille ad eum Sextum Caesarem mittit atque huic tradi iubet. Tradita legio Varro Cordubam ad Caesarem venit. Relatis ad eum publi-

three cohorts had been installed as a garrison in the citadel by Varro, expelled the cohorts on its own and closed the gates against them.

20. This increased Varro's haste to make for Cadiz as soon as possible with his legions, to avoid being cut off while marching or crossing; the province's attitude toward Caesar was found to be strongly favorable. After going a little further, he received a letter from Cadiz. "As soon as they learned about Caesar's edict, the city leaders came to an agreement with the officers of the cohorts garrisoning Cadiz to expel Gallonius and hold the city and island for Caesar. After adopting this plan they announced to Gallonius that he must leave Cadiz voluntarily while it was possible to do so without danger. If he didn't do so, they said, they were going to act for themselves. Gallonius, induced by this fear, left Cadiz." At this news one of Varro's two legions, the one called "indigenous," removed its standards from Varro's camp while he stood and watched; the legion went back to Hispalis and established itself in the forum porticoes without causing any trouble. Their action was so well thought of by the town's association of Roman citizens that each member wanted above all to welcome them as guests into his own home. When Varro, thoroughly alarmed by this, changed his route and sent word that he would be coming to Italica, he was informed by supporters that the gates had been closed against him. Then, finally, cut off in every direction, he sent to Caesar: "I am ready to surrender my legion to anyone you order." Caesar sent Sextus Caesar to him and ordered the legion to be surrendered to him. After the surrender Varro went to Caesar at Corduba. Giving Caesar a faithful reckoning

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cis cum fide rationibus quod penes eum est pecuniae tradit et quid ubique habeat frumenti ac navium ostendit.

21. Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere, Hispanis quod praesidia expulissent, Gaditanis quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicavissent, tribunis militum centurionibusque qui eo praesidi causa venerant
- 2 quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmavissent. Pecunias quas erant in publicum Varroni cives Romani polliciti remittit. Bona restituit iis quos liberius locutos hanc poenam
- 3 tulisse cognoverat. Tributis quibusdam populis publicis privatisque praemiis reliquos in posterum bona spe complet. Biduumque Cordubae commoratus Gades proficiscitur. Pecunias monumentaque quae ex fano Herculis collata
- 4 erant in privatam domum referri in templum iubet. Provinciae Q. Cassium praeficit. Huic IIII legiones attribuit. Ipse iis navibus quas M. Varro quasque Gaditani iussu Varronis fecerant Tarraconem paucis diebus pervenit. Ibi totius fere citerioris provinciae legationes Caesaris adventum expectabant. Eadem ratione privatim ac publice quibusdam civitatibus habitis honoribus Tarracone discedit
- 5 pedibusque Narbonem atque inde Massiliam pervenit. Ibi legem de dictatore latam seseque dictatorem dictum a M. Lepido praetore cognoscit.

22. Massilienses omnibus defessi malis, rei frumentariae ad summam inopiam adducti, bis proelio navali su-

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK 11

of public accounts, he surrendered the money in his possession and revealed what food supplies and ships he had anywhere.

21. Caesar held a public meeting at Corduba and thanked everyone by categories: Roman citizens, for their determination in keeping the city under their own control; Spaniards, for expelling garrisons; Cadiz, for thwarting enemy attempts and asserting its own independence; staff officers and centurions who were there on garrison duty, for putting heart in the city's plans by their own courage. He forgave the sums that Roman citizens had promised to Varro for public purposes. He restored property to those who, he learned, had spoken too freely and been punished by confiscation. By allocating public and private rewards to some communities he filled the rest with good hope for the future. After a two-day stay at Corduba, he set out for Cadiz. He ordered the money and dedications that had been moved from the temple of Hercules into a private house to be taken back into the temple. He put Quintus Cassius in charge of the province, assigning him four legions. He himself reached Tarraco in a few days in the ships built by Marcus Varro and the people of Cadiz on Varro's orders. At Tarraco delegations from practically the whole of Nearer Spain were awaiting Caesar's arrival. After conferring honors publicly and privately on certain communities in a similar fashion, he left Tarraco, traveling overland to Narbo and then Marseilles, where he learned of the passage of a law instituting a dictatorship, and that he had been proclaimed dictator by the praetor Marcus Lepidus.

22. The people of Marseilles were worn out by all of their problems. Reduced to an extreme shortage of provi-

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perati, crebris eruptionibus fusi, gravi etiam pestilentia conflictati ex diutina conclusione et mutatione victus—panico enim vetere atque hordeo corrupto omnes alebantur, quod ad huiusmodi casus antiquitus paratum in publicum contulerant—deiecta turri, labefacta magna parte muri, auxiliis provinciarum et exercituum desperatis—quos in Caesaris potestatem venisse cognoverant—sese  
2 dedere sine fraude constituunt. Sed paucis ante diebus L. Domitius cognita Massiliensium voluntate navibus tribus comparatis, ex quibus duas familiaribus suis attribuerat, unam ipse conscenderat, nactus turbidam tempestatem  
3 profectus est. Hunc conspicatae naves quae missu Bruti consuetudine cotidiana ad portum excubabant sublatis  
4 ancoris sequi coeperunt. Ex his unum ipsius navigium contendit et fugere perseveravit auxilioque tempestatis ex conspectu abiit, duo perterrita concursu nostrarum na-  
5 vium sese in portum receperunt. Massilienses arma tormenta-que ex oppido, ut est imperatum, proferunt, naves ex portu navalibusque educunt, pecuniam ex publico tra-  
6 dunt. Quibus rebus confectis Caesar magis eos pro nomine et vetustate quam pro meritis in se civitatis conservans duas ibi legiones praesidio relinquit, ceteras in Italiam mittit. Ipse ad urbem proficiscitur.

23. Isdem temporibus C. Curio in Africam profectus ex Sicilia et iam ab initio copias P. Atti Vari despiciens duas legiones ex IIII quas a Caesare acceperat D equites transportabat. Biduoque et noctibus tribus navigatione con-



sions, twice beaten in naval battles, routed in numerous sorties, contending moreover with a troublesome sickness in consequence of the long blockade and their spoiled food—for they were eating old millet and rotting barley, which had been acquired long ago and stockpiled for situations of this sort—with their tower in ruins and a large portion of the wall weakened, despairing of reinforcements from provinces and armies (which, they knew, had come into Caesar's control), they decided to make an honest surrender. But a few days beforehand Lucius Domitius, 2 recognizing their intention, procured three ships, gave two of them to his friends, and embarked on one himself, setting out when stormy weather gave him an opportunity. He was spotted by the ships doing guard duty near the 3 harbor, sent regularly every day by Brutus. They hoisted anchor and began a pursuit. One of Domitius' vessels, his 4 own, went straight ahead and persevered in its flight; it disappeared with the storm's help. Two, thoroughly cowed by the convergence of our ships, retreated to the harbor. The people of Marseilles carried their weapons and cata- 5 pults out of the city, as had been ordered, brought the ships from the port and dockyards, and surrendered the money in their treasury. When these measures were com- 6 plete, Caesar let the city persist, more on account of its fame and antiquity than for services to him. He left two legions there as a garrison; the rest he sent to Italy. He himself set out for Rome.

23. At this same period Gaius Curio was leaving Sicily for Africa. To begin with, since he thought little of the troops commanded by Publius Attius Varus, he transported two of the four legions he had received from Caesar, plus five hundred cavalry. After spending two days and



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sumptis appellit ad eum locum qui appellatur Anquillaria.  
 2 Hic locus abest a Clipeis passuum XXII milia habetque  
 non incommodam aestate<sup>17</sup> stationem et duobus eminenti-  
 3 tibus promunturiis continetur. Huius adventum L. Caesar  
 filius cum X longis navibus ad Clipea praestolans, quas  
 naves Vticae ex praedonum bello subductas P. Attius refi-  
 ciendas huius belli causa curaverat, veritusque navium  
 multitudinem ex alto refugerat appulsaque ad proximum  
 litus trireme constrata et in litore relicta pedibus Hadru-  
 4 metum perfugerat. Id oppidum C. Considius Longus  
 unius legionis praesidio tuebatur. Reliquae Caesaris naves  
 5 <ex> eius fuga<sup>18</sup> se Hadrumetum receperunt. Hunc secu-  
 tus Marcius Rufus quaestor navibus XII quas praesidio  
 onerariis navibus Curio ex Sicilia eduxerat postquam in  
 litore relictam navem conspexit hanc remulco abstraxit.  
 Ipse ad C. Curionem cum classe redit.

24. Curio Marcium Vticam navibus praemittit. Ipse  
 eodem cum exercitu proficiscitur biduique iter progressus  
 2 ad flumen Bagradam pervenit. Ibi C. Caninium Rebilum  
 legatum cum legionibus reliquit. Ipse cum equitatu an-

<sup>17</sup> incommodam aestate s: -a a- ω: -am [a-] Chacon

<sup>18</sup> <ex> eius fuga Damon: [eius] f- Jurin: <visa> eius f- Paul.  
 Perhaps, e.g., eius f- <desertae>?

<sup>18</sup> The precise location of Anquillaria is disputed; the distance mentioned here is hard to reconcile with the time required to march from Anquillaria to the Bagradas River (2.24.1). Scholars have often emended one spot or the other.

<sup>19</sup> Chacon proposed excising the phrase "for summertime." Since the surrender of Marseilles seems to have taken place in October, while Curio arrived in North Africa at the beginning of

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

three nights on the voyage, he landed at a place called Anquillaria. This place is twenty-two miles from Clipea.<sup>18</sup> 2  
It has an anchorage suitable for summertime<sup>19</sup> and is enclosed between two lofty promontories. At Clipea the 3  
younger Lucius Caesar<sup>20</sup> and ten warships had been lying in wait for his arrival. These ships had been hauled out at Utica after the pirate war; Publius Attius had arranged for them to be repaired for the present war.<sup>21</sup> Worried about the number of Curio's ships, Lucius Caesar had retreated from the open sea. After beaching a decked trireme on the nearest shore and abandoning it there, he had fled overland to Hadrumetum; the town was under the protection 4  
of Gaius Considius Longus with a garrison of one legion. The rest of Lucius Caesar's ships withdrew to Hadrumetum after he fled.<sup>22</sup> Marcius Rufus, a quaestor, followed 5  
him with twelve ships that Curio had brought from Sicily to protect the transports. Spotting the ship abandoned on the shore, he towed it off. He himself returned to Curio with his fleet.

24. Curio had Marcius sail ahead to Utica. He himself headed there with his army and after a two-day advance reached the Bagradas River. There he left his officer Gaius 2  
Caninius Rebilus with the legions. He went ahead with the

August, the chronological overlap suggested by "at this same period" at 2.23.1 is loose.

<sup>20</sup> His like-named father had been Caesar's officer (1.8.2).

<sup>21</sup> The "pirate war" was Pompey's successful campaign in 67 to repress piracy in the Mediterranean.

<sup>22</sup> For "after he fled," Jurin and Paul proposed "because of his flight" and "after observing his flight," respectively. One might also repair this spot with "after being left forsaken by his flight."

tecedit ad Castra exploranda Cornelia quod is locus  
 3 peridoneus castris habebatur. Id autem est iugum derec-  
 tum eminens in mare, utraque ex parte praeruptum atque  
 asperum sed tamen paulo leniore fastigio ab ea parte quae  
 4 ad Vticam vergit. Abest directo itinere ab Vtica paulo am-  
 plius passus mille. Sed hoc itinere est fons quo mare suc-  
 cedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat. Quem si qui vitare  
 voluerunt VI milium circuitu in oppidum perveniunt.<sup>19</sup>

25. Hoc explorato loco Curio castra Vari conspicit muro  
 oppidoque coniuncta ad portam quae appellatur Belica,  
 admodum munita natura loci, una ex parte ipso oppido  
 Vtica, altera [a] theatro, quod est ante oppidum—sub-  
 structionibus eius operis maximis, aditu ad castra difficili  
 2 et angusto.<sup>20</sup> Simul animadvertit multa undique portari  
 atque agi plenissimis viis, quae repentini tumultus timore  
 3 ex agris in urbem conferantur. Huc equitatum mittit ut  
 diriperet atque haberet loco praedae. Eodemque tempore  
 his rebus subsidio DC equites Numidae ex oppido pedi-  
 tesque CCCC mittuntur a Varo, quos auxili causa rex Iuba  
 4 paucis diebus ante Vticam miserat. (Huic et paternum  
 hospitium cum Pompeio et simultas cum Curione interce-  
 debat, quod tribunus plebis legem promulgaverat qua lege  
 5 regnum Iubae publicaverat.) Concurrunt equites inter se,  
 neque vero primum impetum nostrorum Numidae ferre

<sup>19</sup> voluerunt . . . perveniunt *MU*: -erit . . . -it *S*: -erunt . . . -it  
*TV*

<sup>20</sup> *Minimal repairs have been adopted, but the text of this sentence remains problematic.*

<sup>23</sup> This distance seems too short; a number may have fallen out of the text here.

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cavalry to scout Castra Cornelia, since this location was thought to be eminently suitable for a camp. It is a straight ridge projecting into the sea, steep and rugged on both sides but nevertheless with a slightly gentler slope on the side facing Utica. By a straight-line route it is a little more than a mile from Utica.<sup>23</sup> But in this direction there is a spring, and the sea comes up rather close to it, and the area is marshy for a wide stretch. Anyone who wants to avoid it reaches Utica after a six-mile detour.

25. After scouting this site Curio viewed Varus' camp adjacent to the city wall near the gate named for the god Baal, a camp well fortified by the nature of its site, on one side by Utica itself, on the other by the theater in front of the city, the foundation of that building being very large and the approach to the camp difficult and narrow. At the same time he noticed that much property was being transported from every direction and moving along the utterly packed roads; alarm at the sudden emergency caused its removal from the country into the city. He sent in the cavalry: they were to seize and keep it as booty. At the same moment Varus sent six hundred Numidian cavalry from the city to help the situation, plus four hundred infantry; King Juba had sent these troops to Utica a few days earlier as reinforcements. (Juba was influenced by inherited ties of hospitality with Pompey and a feud with Curio, because as a plebeian tribune Curio had sponsored a law making Juba's kingdom a Roman province.<sup>24</sup>) The cavalry clashed, but the Numidians were not able to withstand the

<sup>24</sup> The law was passed in 50; the territory was ceded by Rome to various client kings in the half-century after the victory over Jugurtha in 105, most recently to Juba's father Hiempsal in 81.

potuerunt sed interfectis circiter CXX reliqui se in castra ad oppidum receperunt.

- 6 Interim adventu longarum navium Curio pronuntiare onerariis navibus iubet—quae stabant ad Vticam numero circiter CC—se in hostium habiturum loco qui non ex  
7 vestigio ad Castra Cornelia naves traduxisset. Qua pronuntiatione facta temporis puncto sublatis ancoris omnes Vticam relinquunt et quo imperatum est transeunt. Quae res omnium rerum copia complevit exercitum.

26. His rebus gestis Curio se in castra ad Bagradam recipit atque universi exercitus conclamatione imperator appellatur. Posteroque die Vticam exercitum ducit et  
2 prope oppidum castra ponit. Nondum opere castrorum perfecto equites ex statione nuntiant magna auxilia equitum peditumque ab rege missa Vticam venire. Eodemque tempore vis magna pulveris cernebatur, et vestigio temporis  
3 primum agmen erat in conspectu. Novitate rei Curio permotus praemittit equites qui primum impetum sustineant ac morentur. Ipse celeriter ab opere deductis legionibus  
4 aciem instruit. Equitesque committunt proelium et priusquam plane legiones explicari et consistere possent tota auxilia regis impedita ac perturbata quod nullo ordine et sine timore iter fecerant in fugam [se] coniciunt. Equitatuque omni fere incolumi quod se per litora celeriter in oppidum recepit, magnum peditum numerum interficiunt.

27. Proxima nocte centuriones Marsi duo ex castris Curionis cum manipularibus suis XXII ad Attium Varum

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<sup>25</sup> Acclamation by the label *imperator*, whose literal meaning is simply "commander," marked notable victories and was one of the prerequisites for a triumph. For its misuse see 3.31.1.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

initial impact of our men. Instead, after about a hundred and twenty were killed, the rest withdrew into the camp next to the city.

Meanwhile Curio's warships arrived. He ordered an announcement to the merchant vessels anchored at Utica, around two hundred in number, that he would consider anyone who did not immediately move his ship to Castra Cornelia to be an enemy. After this announcement all of them instantly hoisted anchor, left Utica, and went where they were ordered. This development stocked the army with supplies of all kinds. 6  
7

26. After these successes Curio went back to the camp at the Bagra das and was hailed as *imperator* by his entire army.<sup>25</sup> The next day he led his army to Utica and made camp near the city. Before the camp's fortifications were complete the cavalry outposts announced that substantial infantry and cavalry reinforcements sent by Juba were coming to Utica. At the same time a large quantity of dust was spotted, and instantly the vanguard was in sight. Curio, disturbed by the unexpected development, sent the cavalry out to counter and delay the initial onslaught. He himself quickly took his legions from their work and drew up his line. The cavalry engaged. Before the legions could be fully deployed into their positions, Curio's cavalry caused all of the king's forces to flee, encumbered as they were and flustered, since they had marched in complete disarray and unafraid. Although the king's cavalry was almost entirely unscathed, since it went quickly off to Utica along the shore, Curio's killed a large quantity of infantry. 2  
3  
4

27. The following night two Marsian centurions and twenty-two of their men deserted Curio's camp for Varus.

## CAESAR

- 2 perfugiunt. Hi sive vere quam habuerant opinionem ad eum perferunt sive etiam auribus Vari serviunt. Nam quae volumus, et credimus libenter, et quae sentimus ipsi reliquos sentire speramus. Confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione, maximeque opus esse in conspectu exercitum venire et colloquendi dare
- 3 facultatem. Qua opinione adductus Varus postero die mane legiones ex castris educit. Facit idem Curio. Atque una valle non magna interiecta suas uterque copias instruit.

28. Erat in exercitu Vari Sextus Quintilius Varus, quem fuisse Corfini supra demonstratum est. Hic dimissus a Caesare in Africam venerat. Legionesque eas traduxerat Curio quas superioribus temporibus Corfinio receperat Caesar, adeo ut paucis mutatis centurionibus idem ordines
- 2 manipuli que constarent. Hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circumire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit: ne primam sacramenti quod apud Domitium atque apud se quaestorem dixissent memoriam deponerent, neu contra eos arma ferrent qui eadem essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpassi, neu pro iis pugnarent a quibus <cum> contumelia perfugae appellarentur. Huc pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate si se atque Attium secuti essent expectare deberent. Hac habita oratione nullam in partem ab exercitu Curionis fit significatio, atque ita suas uterque copias reducit.
- 3
- 4

29. At in castris Curionis magnus omnium<sup>21</sup> incessit

<sup>21</sup> omnium] -ibus *Jurin*: hostium *Herzog*: subito *Wölfel*



## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

These made a report to Varus, either their true opinion or one agreeable to Varus' ears. (What we desire we are glad to believe, too, and we hope that others see things as we do.) In fact they said with assurance that the whole army was alienated from Curio, and that it would be very useful for Varus' army to show itself and give an opportunity for talks. Induced by this view of things Varus led his troops out of camp the following day. Curio did the same, and they drew up their forces on either side of a shallow ravine. 2 3

28. Sextus Quintilius Varus, whose presence at Corfinium was mentioned above, was in Attius Varus' army; he had come to Africa after his release by Caesar.<sup>26</sup> And the legions that Curio had brought over were those that Caesar had previously captured at Corfinium, so much so that, although a few centurions had been changed, the command structure and companies were the same as before. Having this rationale for addressing them, Quintilius began to go from one spot to the next on Curio's line and beseech the soldiers: "Do not discard your earliest memory of an oath, the one you swore in Domitius' presence and mine when I was quaestor, or bear arms against men who have suffered the same misfortunes as you and endured the same things under siege, or go into combat for people by whom you are insulted as 'deserters.'" To this he added a few words to raise hopes of largesse: "If you follow me and Attius, you will necessarily have expectations from my generosity." After his speech there was no sign—neither approval nor disapproval—from Curio's army, and both men withdrew their troops. 2 3 4

29. However, in Curio's camp a vast fear attacked the

<sup>26</sup> For Varus at Corfinium, see 1.23.2.



timor animis. Is variis hominum sermonibus celeriter au-  
 getur. Unusquisque enim opiniones fingebat et ad id quod  
 2 ab alio audierat sui aliquid timoris addebat. Hoc ubi uno  
 auctore ad plures permanerat atque alius alii tradiderat  
 plures auctores eius rei videbantur.

3 †civile bellum  
 genus hominum  
 quod liceret libere facere et sequi quod vellet  
 legiones hae quae paulo ante apud adversarios fuerant  
 nam etiam Caesaris beneficium mutaverat  
 consuetudo qua offerrentur  
 municipia etiam diversis partibus coniuncta  
 neque enim ex Marsis Paelignisque veniebant  
 ut qui superiore nocte in contuberniis  
 commilitesque nonnulli graviora  
 sermones militum†

4 Dubia durius accipiebantur. Nonnulla etiam ab iis qui  
 diligentiores videri volebant fingeantur.

2 30. Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa re-  
 rum deliberare incipit. Erant sententiae quae conandum  
 omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent  
 quod huiusmodi militum [consiliis]<sup>22</sup> otium maxime con-  
 trarium esse arbitrarentur. Postremo praestare dicebant

<sup>22</sup> huiusmodi militum [consiliis] otium *Damon*: h- c- m- o-  
*Vossius*: <in> h- m- c- o- *Clarke*: <id> h- m- c- [otium] *Madvig*

<sup>27</sup> For "fear attacked the general morale," Jurin, Herzog, and Wölfel proposed "fear attacked everyone," "fear of the enemy attacked morale," and "fear suddenly attacked morale," respectively.

<sup>28</sup> From "civil war" to "the talk of the soldiers," no continuous text can be constituted. See the Introduction.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

general morale.<sup>27</sup> This was quickly augmented in people's various conversations, for each man was inventing opinions and adding something of his own fear to whatever he had heard from another. When an opinion from one source had made its way to several people, and each had transmitted it to others, there seemed to be a multiplicity of sources for it. 2

Civil war<sup>28</sup> . . . the sort of men . . . to do freely what one could and pursue what he wanted . . . legions, those that had been on the enemy's side shortly beforehand . . . for even Caesar's favor had changed . . . the regularity with which they were offered . . . townships, even those aligned with different factions . . . for they weren't in origin from the Marsi or the Paeligni . . . just as those who the previous night in the tents . . . and some fellow soldiers more gravely . . . the talk of the soldiers. 3

Unknowns were interpreted for the worse, and some things were even made up by people who wanted to seem particularly conscientious. 4

30. For these reasons Curio convened his council of war and initiated a discussion of the overall situation. Some opinions recommended that they should by all means try and attack Varus' camp, since in their view inaction on the part of soldiers of this sort<sup>29</sup> was particularly inopportune. And to conclude: "It is preferable to 2

<sup>28</sup> For "inaction on the part of soldiers of this sort was particularly inopportune," Vossius, Clarke, and Madvig proposed "inaction on the part of soldiers was particularly inopportune for plans of this sort," "in the plans of soldiers of this sort, inaction was particularly inopportune," and "this was particularly inopportune for plans of this sort," respectively.

## CAESAR

per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri quam desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium pati.

3 Erant<sup>23</sup> qui censerent de tertia vigilia in Castra Cornelia recedendum ut maiore spatio temporis interiecto militum mentes sanarentur, simul si quid gravius accidisset magna multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur.

31. Curio utrumque improbens consilium quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos

2 etiam iniquo loco dimicandum putare. "Qua enim," inquit, "fiducia et opere et natura loci munitissima castra ex-

3 pugnari posse confidimus? Aut vero quid proficimus si accepto magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? Quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia

4 concilient! Castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem omnium<sup>24</sup> et alienationem exercitus? Nam neque prudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum credi neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod illis

5 licentiam timor augeat noster, his<sup>25</sup> studia deminuat. Quod si iam," inquit, "haec explorata habeamus quae de exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora opinione esse confido, quanto haec

<sup>23</sup> pati. Erant *Damon*: pati proiecerant *M* and *U* in the margin: proiecerant *US*: petiti erant *TV*

<sup>24</sup> omnium  $\omega$ : o- <rerum> *Paul*

<sup>25</sup> his] his <suspicio> *Chacon*

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<sup>30</sup> For "universal despair," Paul proposed "despair about everything."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

experience the fortune of war courageously in combat than to be deserted and encircled by one's own men and then suffer the ultimate punishment." There were people whose opinion was that they should retreat to Castra Cornelia in the middle of the night, so that the soldiers' morale had more time to recover and likewise so that if the situation got any worse their great multitude of ships would provide a safer and easier retreat to Sicily.

31. Curio disapproved of both ideas, saying that the one was as deficient in spirit as the other was excessive, that one group was planning an utterly shameful retreat while the other felt that they should fight even at a disadvantage. "What reason do we have to be confident that we can storm a camp that is extremely well protected by fortifications and the nature of its position? On the other hand, what do we gain if we suffer significant damage and abandon an attack on the camp? As if it is not the success of their exploits that wins an army's goodwill for commanders, while failures produce hatred! Furthermore, what does changing our camp's site signify except shameful retreat and universal despair<sup>30</sup> and disaffection in the army? For decent men should not suspect that our trust in them is insufficient, nor should reprobates know that we fear them, since our fear increases the insubordination of the latter and decreases<sup>31</sup> the determination of the former. Now if," he said, "we consider the assertions about the army's disaffection to have been securely proven—things that I at least am confident are utterly false or surely less significant than people think—would it

<sup>31</sup> For "decreases," Chacon proposed "our suspicion decreases."

dissimulari et occultari quam per nos confirmari praestet!  
 6 An non uti corporis vulnera ita exercitus incommoda sunt  
 7 tegenda ne spem adversariis augeamus? At etiam ut media  
 nocte profiscamur addunt quo maiorem, credo, licen-  
 tiam habeant qui peccare conentur. Namque huiusmodi  
 res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nox max-  
 8 ime adversaria est. Quare neque tanti sum animi ut sine  
 spe castra oppugnanda censeam neque tanti timoris uti  
 spe<sup>26</sup> deficiam, atque omnia prius experienda arbitror  
 magnaque ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium  
 facturum confido."

32. Dimisso consilio contionem advocat militum. Com-  
 memorat quo sit eorum usus studio ad Corfinium Caesar,  
 ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate  
 2 eorum suam fecerit. "Vos enim vestrumque factum," in-  
 quit, "omnia deinceps municipia sunt secuta. Neque sine  
 causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime iudi-  
 3 caverunt. Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti  
 praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit. Caesar me, quem sibi  
 carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque Africam,  
 sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae  
 4 fidei commisit. At sunt qui vos hortentur ut a nobis desciscatis.  
 Quid enim est illis optatius quam uno tempore et nos  
 circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? Aut quid  
 irati gravius de vobis sentire<sup>27</sup> possunt quam ut eos proda-

<sup>26</sup> uti spe *Meusel*: ut ipse  $\omega$

<sup>27</sup> sentire] sancire *Paul*<sup>2</sup>. *Perhaps* statuere?

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<sup>32</sup> For "what harsher feelings can angry men have," Paul and I proposed "what harsher decision (or perhaps "ruling") can angry men make."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

not be much better to disguise and conceal them than to confirm them by our own actions? Should we not cover up the army's troubles as we do wounds to the body, so as not to encourage the enemy? And yet on top of this they also say that we should set out in the middle of the night—so that those who are going to try to misbehave have more license, I suppose! For this sort of behavior is kept in check either by decency or by fear, and nighttime is utterly antithetical to these. Therefore I am neither so brave as to recommend that we make a hopeless attack on their camp, nor so timid as to give up hope. Furthermore, I think we should try everything before doing either, and I am quite confident that you and I will reach a decision together about this matter.”

32. Curio dismissed his council and called a meeting of the soldiers. He reminded them of how Caesar used their support at Corfinium: he made a large part of Italy his own with their assistance and authorization. “You and your action,” he said, “were followed by every town in turn, and there is every reason both for Caesar to take an extremely friendly view of you and for the enemy to feel extremely aggrieved, for Pompey was ousted without being beaten in a single battle, leaving Italy thanks to the early verdict delivered by your action. Caesar entrusted me, whom he holds very dear, to your loyalty, as well as a province—Sicily and Africa—without which he cannot keep Rome and Italy safe. Granted, there are people who urge you to defect. Well, what more can they desire than causing trouble for us while simultaneously involving you in an unspeakable crime? Or what harsher feeling can angry men have<sup>32</sup> about you than that you should betray those who

## CAESAR

5      tis qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant, in eorum pot-  
estatem veniatis qui se per vos perisse existimant? An vero  
in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos  
exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas receptas provincias;  
6      haec acta diebus XL quibus in conspectum adversariorum  
venerit Caesar. An qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt  
perditi resistant? Vos autem incerta victoria Caesarem  
7      secuti diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum sequamini—  
cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis! Desertos  
8      enim se ac proditos a vobis dicunt et prioris sacramenti  
mentionem faciunt. Vosne vero L. Domitium, an vos Do-  
mitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos  
9      proiecit ille, non sibi clam vobis salutem fuga petivit? Non  
proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis conservati?  
10     Sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit cum proiectis  
fascibus et deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in ali-  
11     enam venisset potestatem? Relinquitur nova religio, ut eo  
neglecto sacramento quo tenemini respiciatis illud quod  
deditione ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. At,  
credo, si Caesarem probatis iam<sup>28</sup> me offenditis. Qui de  
meis in vos meritis praedicaturus non sum, quae sunt ad-  
huc et mea voluntate et vestra expectatione leviora. Sed  
tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu belli praemia  
petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus ne vos quidem dubitatis.  
Diligentiam quidem nostram aut, quem ad finem adhuc

<sup>28</sup> iam] in *Estienne*

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<sup>33</sup> For "critical," *Estienne* substituted "irritated because."



## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

judge that they owe everything to you, and come into the power of those who think that you brought about their ruin? Have you really not heard about Caesar's exploits in Spain? Two armies routed, two generals defeated, two provinces recovered, all of it done forty days from when Caesar came within sight of the enemy. Are those who were unable to resist when they were sound going to resist now that they are desperate? Are you who followed Caesar when his victory was uncertain going to follow the defeated party now that the fortunes of war have been decided—when you ought to be receiving rewards for your services? They say that they were abandoned and betrayed by you, and refer to your former oath. But did you abandon Lucius Domitius, or did Domitius abandon you? Was it not the case that he forsook men who were prepared to endure the worst? Did he not seek safety for himself in flight without your knowledge? After you were betrayed by him, were you not saved by Caesar's favor? How could he have used the oath to hold you, given that, after having thrown away the insignia of office and relinquished command, as a private citizen and prisoner of war he has himself come into the power of another? The result is a strange sort of obligation: you are to neglect the oath that currently binds you and respect one that has been invalidated by the general's surrender and loss of citizen status. But if you approve of Caesar, you are currently critical<sup>33</sup> of me, I suppose. I do not intend to boast about what I have done for you, which is still less than I wish and you expect. All the same, soldiers have always looked to the outcome of a war when seeking rewards for their effort, and not even you can be in any doubt about what sort of outcome lies ahead. Why should I not mention my dili-



- 12 res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? An paenitet <sup>von</sup> quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla <sup>omnino</sup> nave desiderata traduxerim? Quod classem hostium <sup>primis</sup> impetu adveniens profligaverim? Quod bis per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? Quod ex portu sinuque adversariorum CC naves oneratas adduxerim eoque illos compulerim ut neque pedestri itinere neque navibus com-  
 13 meatu iuvari possint? Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis <an> Corfiniensem ignominiam, an Italiae fugam, an<sup>29</sup> Hispaniarum deditionem—en<sup>30</sup> Africi belli  
 14 praeiudicia!—sequimini? Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui. Vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cuius si vos paenitet vestrum vobis beneficium remitto. Mihi meum restituite nomen ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini!”

33. Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentem interpellabant, ut magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur. Discedentem vero ex contione universi cohortantur magno sit animo neu<sup>31</sup> dubitet proelium committere et suam fidem virtutemque  
 2 experiri. Quo facto commutata omnium et voluntate et opinione, consensu suorum<sup>32</sup> constituit Curio cum primum sit data potestas proelio rem committere. Postero-

<sup>29</sup> <an> Corfiniensem . . . an . . . an *Fabre*: co- . . . in . . . an [in T] *ω*: Co- . . . [in] . . . [an] *Chacon*

<sup>30</sup> en *Bücheler*: in *ω*: [in] *Chacon*

<sup>31</sup> neu *M<sup>tr</sup>*: ne ubi *μS*: nec ubi *T*: nec ibi *V*

<sup>32</sup> suorum *Estienne* (cf. 2.37.6): suo *ω*: summo *Hotoman*

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<sup>34</sup> For “can you be following?” *Chacon* proposed “follow!” He also proposed deleting the word here rendered “in these you see,”

CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

gence, or—as things have gone so far—my good luck? Are you sorry that I brought the army across safe and sound without losing a single ship? That I scattered the enemy fleet at our first encounter upon arrival? That I was victorious twice in two days in cavalry battles? That I took two hundred boats with their cargoes out of the enemy's harbor and control, and put the enemy under so much pressure that they cannot be supplied by land or sea? After rejecting this good fortune and these leaders can you be following<sup>34</sup> the lead of the humiliation at Corfinium, the flight from Italy, the surrender of Spain? In these you see the precedents for the war in Africa! For my part, I wanted to be called Caesar's soldier; you addressed me with the title *imperator*. If you now regret it, I renounce the favor. Give me back the name I had! Otherwise people will think that your honor to me was meant as an insult."

33. Provoked by this speech, the soldiers repeatedly interrupted while Curio was still talking, making it apparent that they endured with great indignation the suspicion of disloyalty. But as he was leaving the meeting they all urged him to take heart and not hesitate to join battle<sup>35</sup> and put their loyalty and courage to the test. As a result, the general inclination and opinion shifted, so Curio had the agreement of his side<sup>36</sup> when he decided to commit the issue to battle as soon as an opportunity presented it-

which leaves "the precedents" in apposition to the preceding list of setbacks.

<sup>35</sup> Editors often print the reading of T, which adds "anywhere at all" after "battle."

<sup>36</sup> For "the agreement of his side," Hotoman substituted "the utmost consensus."

que die productos eodem loco quo superioribus diebus  
 3 constiterat in acie collocat. Ne Varus quidem Attius dubi-  
 tat copias producere, sive sollicitandi milites sive aequo  
 loco dimicandi detur occasio, ne facultatem praetermittat.

34. Erat vallis inter duas acies, ut supra demonstratum  
 est, non ita magna at difficili et arduo ascensu. Hanc uter-  
 que si adversariorum copiae transire conarentur expecta-  
 2 bat quo aequiore loco proelium committeret. Simul ab  
 sinistro cornu P. Atti equitatus omnis et una levis armatu-  
 3 raer interiecti complures, cum se in vallem demitterent,  
 cernebantur. Ad eos Curio equitatum et duas Marrucino-  
 rum cohortes mittit. Quorum primum impetum equites  
 hostium non tulerunt sed admissis equis ad suos refuge-  
 runt. Relicti ab his, qui una procurrerant levis armaturae  
 circumveniebantur atque interficiebantur ab nostris. Huc  
 tota Vari conversa acies suos fugere et concidi videbat.  
 4 Tum Rebilus, legatus Caesaris, quem Curio secum ex Sici-  
 lia duxerat quod magnum habere usum in re militari scie-  
 bat: "Perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio. Quid  
 5 dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?" Ille unum elocutus—  
 ut memoria tenerent milites ea quae pridie sibi confir-  
 massent—sequi sese iubet et praecurrit ante omnes.  
 Adeoque erat impedita vallis ut in ascensu nisi sublevati a  
 6 suis primi non facile eniterentur. Sed praeoccupatus ani-  
 mus Attianorum militum timore et fuga et caede suorum

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<sup>37</sup> The phrase "at the same time" is puzzling and may indicate that some text has been lost in the vicinity.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

self. The next day he led his men to the position they had held previously and placed them in battle formation. Attius Varus did not hesitate to lead his forces out, either, so as not to pass up a chance, if he got the opportunity, of either appealing to Curio's soldiers or fighting on favorable ground. 3

34. There was a ravine between the two lines, as was indicated above. It was not particularly large but had a difficult and steep ascent. Each side waited to see whether the adversary's forces would attempt to cross it, hoping to engage them on more favorable ground. At the same time<sup>37</sup> on Publius Attius' left wing his entire cavalry was visible with a number of light-armed troops in their midst as they descended into the ravine. Curio sent his cavalry against them, along with two cohorts of Marrucini. The enemy cavalry did not withstand the initial impact; in fact they fled to their own line at a gallop. Abandoned by these troops, the light-armed soldiers who had advanced at a run with them were surrounded and killed by our men. Varus' entire line was facing this way and saw the flight and slaughter of their men. Then Rebilus, an officer of Caesar's, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily because he knew that Rebilus had a lot of experience in military matters, said: "You see that the enemy is thoroughly cowed, Curio. Why do you hesitate to use the opportunity of the moment?" Curio said just one thing — "Remember the assurances you gave me yesterday!" — then ordered the soldiers to follow him. He rushed on ahead of everyone. The ravine was so difficult to negotiate that the leaders in the ascent had a hard struggle unless they were assisted from below by their own men. But the morale of Attius' men was in the grip of fright and the 2 3 4 5 6

nihil de resistendo cogitabat, omnesque iam se ab equitate circumveniri arbitrabantur. Itaque priusquam telum abici posset aut nostri propius accederent omnis Vari acies terga vertit seque in castra recepit.

35. Qua in fuga Fabius Paelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus de exercitu Curionis primum<sup>33</sup> agmen fugientium consecutus magna voce Varum nomine appellans requirebat, uti unus esse ex eius militibus et monere aliquid velle ac dicere videretur. Vbi ille saepius appellatus aspexit ac restitit et quis esset aut quid vellet quaesivit, humerum apertum gladio appetit, paulumque afuit quin Varum interficeret. Quod ille periculum sublato ad eius conatum scuto vitavit. Fabius a proximis militibus circumventus interficitur.

3 Hac fugientium multitudine ac turba portae castrorum occupantur atque iter impeditur, pluresque in eo loco sine vulnere quam in proelio aut fuga intereunt, neque multum afuit quin etiam castris expellerentur. Ac nonnulli protinus eodem cursu in oppidum contenderunt. Sed cum loci natura et munitio castrorum adiri <prohibebat><sup>34</sup> tum quod ad proelium egressi Curionis milites iis rebus indigebant quae ad oppugnationem castrorum erant usui. Itaque Curio exercitum in castra reducit suis omnibus praeter Fabium incolumibus, ex numero adversariorum circiter DC interfectis ac mille vulneratis. Qui omnes discessu Curionis multique praeterea per simulationem

<sup>33</sup> primum] primus *Paul, as reported by Meusel*

<sup>34</sup> adiri <prohibebat> *Manutius*: adiri ω: aditu <prohibebant> *Bentley*

flight and slaughter of their men. There was no thought of resistance, and everyone believed that they were already being surrounded by the cavalry. So before a weapon could be thrown, or our men came closer, Varus' whole line turned back and withdrew into their camp.

35. During this retreat a certain Paelignian named Fabius, one of the lowest-ranking centurions in Curio's army, reaching the fugitives' front line,<sup>38</sup> began to look for Varus, calling him by name in a loud voice and giving the impression that he was one of Varus' soldiers and wanted to give him a warning or message. After his name was called repeatedly, Varus eyed him and stopped, asking who he was or what he wanted. Fabius then struck Varus' exposed shoulder with his sword and only missed killing him by a little, a danger that Varus escaped because he raised his shield against the attempt. Fabius was surrounded and killed by the closest soldiers. 2

The large crowd of fugitives filled the gateway of the camp and obstructed the road, and more men perished there unwounded than fell in the battle or retreat. They came quite close to being driven out of their camp, and some kept running straight on into the city. But the nature of the site and the camp's fortification prevented approach, as did the fact that Curio's soldiers, having marched out for a battle, had none of equipment used in assaulting a camp. Therefore Curio led his army back to camp with all of his men unscathed except Fabius, and about six hundred of the enemy dead and a thousand wounded. After Curio's departure all of the wounded men (and many, too, 3 4 5

<sup>38</sup> For "reaching the fugitives' front line," Paul proposed "the first to reach the line of fugitives."

## CAESAR

6 vulnerum ex castris in oppidum propter timorem sese  
recipiunt. Qua re animadversa Varus et terrore exercitus  
cognito bucinatore in castris et paucis ad speciem taber-  
naculis relictis de tertia vigilia silentio exercitum in oppi-  
dum reducit.

36. Postero die Curio obsidere Vticam valloque cir-  
cummunire instituit. Erat in oppido multitudo insolens  
belli diuturnitate oti, Vticenses pro quibusdam Caesaris in  
se beneficiis illi amicissimi, conventus is qui ex variis gene-  
ribus constaret, terror ex superioribus proeliis magnus.  
2 Itaque de deditioe omnes [in] palam loquebantur et cum  
P. Attio agebant ne sua pertinacia omnium fortunas per-  
3 turbari vellet. Haec cum agerentur nuntii praemissi ab  
rege Iuba venerunt qui illum adesse cum magnis copiis  
dicerent et de custodia ac defensione urbis hortarentur.  
Quae res eorum perterritos animos confirmavit.

37. Nuntiabantur haec eadem Curioni sed aliquamdiu  
fides fieri non poterat. Tantam habebat suarum rerum fi-  
2 duciam, iamque Caesaris in Hispania res secundae in Afri-  
cam nuntiis ac litteris perferebantur. Quibus omnibus  
rebus sublatus nihil contra se regem nisurum existimabat.  
3 Sed ubi certis auctoribus comperit minus V et XX milibus  
longe ab Vtica eius copias abesse, relictis munitionibus  
4 sese in Castra Cornelia recepit. Huc frumentum compor-  
tare, castra munire, materiam conferre coepit. Statimque  
in Siciliam misit uti duae legiones reliquusque equitatus



## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

pretending to be wounded) withdrew from the camp into the city because of their fear. Observing this and recognizing his army's terror, Varus left a trumpeter and a few tents in the camp for show and around midnight quietly took the rest of the army into the city. 6

36. The next day Curio began to blockade Utica and surround it with an earthwork. The city contained a multitude unaccustomed to war because of the long-standing peace, plus citizens of Utica, who were exceedingly friendly to Caesar because of certain favors to them, plus a community of Romans, the sort of association that comprises various ranks—plus quantities of terror as a result of the past battles. Therefore everyone spoke openly about surrender and approached Publius Attius to discourage him from allowing everyone's future to be thrown into confusion because of his obstinacy. When this discussion was still under way, messengers sent ahead by Juba arrived with word that he was nearby with a large force and an exhortation about the protection and defense of their city. These developments put heart into the terrified population. 2 3

37. The same news reached Curio but was unable to gain credence for some time, so great was Curio's confidence in his situation. Caesar's successes in Spain, too, were already being conveyed to Africa by messengers and letters. Elated by all of this Curio did not think that the king would exert himself against him. But when he learned from reliable sources that the king's forces were less than twenty-five miles from Utica, he left his fortification and withdrew to Castra Cornelia. He began to convey grain to this spot, to fortify a camp, and to collect timber. And he immediately sent word to Sicily that the two legions and 4



5 ad se mitteretur. Castra erant ad bellum ducendum aptis-  
 6 sima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate et  
 aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat  
 salinis eo congesta. Non materia multitudine arborum,  
 non frumentum, cuius erant plenissimi agri, deficere pot-  
 erat. Itaque omnium suorum consensu Curio reliquas  
 copias expectare et bellum ducere parabat.

38. His constitutis rebus probatisque consiliis ex perfu-  
 gis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum finitimo  
 bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno;  
 Saburram, eius praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis mis-  
 2 sum Vticae appropinquare. His auctoribus temere cre-  
 dens consilium commutat et proelio rem committere  
 constituit. Multum ad hanc rem probandam adiuvat adu-  
 lescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proven-  
 3 tus, fiducia rei bene gerendae. His rebus impulsus equita-  
 tum omnem prima nocte ad castra hostium mittit ad  
 flumen Bagradam. Quibus praeerat Saburra, de quo ante  
 erat auditum. Sed rex cum omnibus copiis insequabatur  
 et VI milium passuum intervallo ab Saburra consederat.  
 4 Equites missi nocte iter conficiunt, imprudentes atque  
 inopinantes hostes aggrediuntur. Numidae enim quadam  
 barbara consuetudine nullis ordinibus passim consede-  
 5 rant. Hos oppressos somno et dispersos adorti magnum  
 eorum numerum interficiunt. Multi perterriti profugiunt.  
 Quo facto ad Curionem equites revertuntur captivosque  
 ad eum reducunt.

39. Curio cum omnibus copiis quarta vigilia exierat

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

remaining cavalry should be sent to him. His camp was  
5 ectly suited for prolonging a war, given the nature of  
site and its defenses and the sea's proximity and the  
ability of water and salt, of which there was already a  
6 t quantity heaped up from nearby saltworks. Timber  
d not run short, owing to the multitude of trees, or  
a, of which the fields had a great abundance. With the  
ement of all of his men, therefore, he prepared to wait  
his remaining forces and prolong the war.

8. With these arrangements in place and his plans  
oved, Curio heard from some townspeople deserting  
a that Juba, recalled because of a border war and a  
ute with Leptis, had stayed behind in his kingdom.  
arra, they said, a general of his, had been sent with a  
est force and was approaching Utica. Rashly believing  
e informants, Curio changed his plan and decided to  
mit the issue to battle. Many factors helped make  
plan appealing: youth, ambition, past outcomes, con-  
fidence in success. Urged on by such considerations, he  
3 his entire cavalry at nightfall to the enemy camp at  
Bagradas River; Saburra, about whom he had heard  
er, was in command there. But Saburra had behind  
the king and his entire force; Juba was encamped six  
s away. The cavalry Curio sent finished their journey  
4 ng the night; they attacked an enemy off guard and  
specting, for the Numidians in their barbarian fash-  
had camped here and there in complete disarray. By  
5 king while these were fast asleep and scattered, Cu-  
cavalry killed a large number of them; many fled in  
r. Thereafter the cavalry headed back to Curio with  
wners in tow.

9. Curio had set out with his whole force before dawn,

CAESAR

- cohortibus V castris praesidio relictis. Progressus milia  
 passuum VI equites convenit, rem gestam cognovit, ex  
 captivis quaerit quis castris ad Bagram praesit. Re-  
 2 spondent Saburram. Reliqua studio itineris conficiendi  
 quaerere praetermittit. Proximaque respiciens signa "Vi-  
 detisne," inquit, "milites, captivorum orationem cum per-  
 fugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas,  
 3 quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? Proinde  
 ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis  
 4 vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus." Erant  
 per se magna quae gesserant equites, praesertim cum  
 eorum exiguus numerus cum tanta multitudine Numida-  
 rum conferretur. Haec tamen ab ipsis inflatius commemo-  
 rabantur, ut de suis homines laudibus libenter praedicant.  
 5 Multa praeterea spolia praeferebantur, capti homines  
 equitesque<sup>35</sup> producebantur, ut quicquid intercederet  
 6 temporis hoc omne victoriam morari videretur. Ita spei  
 Curionis militum studia non deerant. Equites sequi iubet  
 sese iterque accelerat ut quam maxime ex fuga perterritos  
 adoriri posset. At illi itinere totius noctis confecti subsequi  
 non poterant atque alii alio loco resistebant. Ne haec qui-  
 dem res Curionem ad spem<sup>36</sup> morabatur.

40. Iuba certior factus a Saburra de nocturno proelio  
 duo milia Hispanorum et Gallorum equitum, quos suae  
 custodiae causa circum se habere consuerat, et peditum  
 eam partem cui maxime confidebat Saburrae summittit.  
 Ipse cum reliquis copiis elephantisque LX lentius subse-

<sup>35</sup> equitesque] equique *Chacon*

<sup>36</sup> [ad spem] *Chacon*

<sup>39</sup> For "infantry and cavalry," Chacon proposed "men and horses."  
<sup>40</sup> Chacon proposed deleting "in his optimism."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

leaving five cohorts on guard in the camp. After advancing six miles he met the cavalry, learned of their success, and asked the prisoners who was in charge of the camp at the Bagradas. "Saburra," they replied. In his hurry to complete the journey, he omitted the other questions. With his eyes on the nearest standards, he said "Do you see, soldiers, that the prisoners' words agree with the deserters? That the king is absent and has sent a weak force, one that was unable to measure up to a few cavalry? So make haste for booty and glory, in order that I can begin to think about your rewards and showing my gratitude." The cavalry's achievement was impressive in itself, especially when people compared their small number with the huge multitude of Numidians. But there was still exaggeration in their report, given that men are inclined to boast about their praiseworthy actions. In addition, many spoils of war were on display, and captured infantry and cavalry<sup>39</sup> were brought forward, so that every intervening moment seemed to delay victory. So the soldiers' enthusiasm matched Curio's optimism. He ordered the cavalry to follow him, and accelerated his march so as to be able to attack men when they were most thoroughly cowed after a rout. However, his cavalry, exhausted after a full night of riding, were unable to follow; they began to stay behind in bunches one after another. But not even this checked Curio in his optimism.<sup>40</sup>

40. Juba was informed by Saburra about the nighttime battle. He sent Saburra reinforcements: two thousand cavalry from Spain and Gaul, which he usually kept near him as a bodyguard, and those of his infantry that he trusted most. He himself followed more slowly with the rest of his

## CAESAR

- 2 quitur. Suspiciatus praemissis equitibus ipsum adfore Curionem Saburra copias equitum peditumque instruit atque his imperat ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac pedem referant; sese cum opus esset signum proeli daturum et quod rem postulare cognovisset imperaturum.
- 3 Curio ad superiorem spem addita praesentis temporis opinione hostes fugere arbitratus copias ex locis superioribus in campum deducit.

41. Quibus ex locis cum longius esset progressus confecto iam labore exercitu XVI milium spatio constitit.
- 2 Dat suis signum Saburra. Aciem constituit et circumire ordines atque hortari incipit. Sed peditatu dumtaxat procul ad speciem utitur, equites in aciem immittit. Non deest negotio Curio suosque hortatur ut spem omnem in virtute reponant. Ne militibus quidem ut defessis neque equitibus ut paucis et labore confectis studium ad pugnandum virtusque deerat, sed ii erant numero CC. Reliqui in itinere substiterant. Hi quamcumque in partem impetum fecerant hostes loco cedere cogeabant, sed neque longius fugientes prosequi <neque> vehementius equos incitare poterant. At equitatus hostium ab utroque cornu circumire aciem nostram et aversos proterere incipit. Cum cohortes ex acie procucurrissent Numidae integri celeritate impetum nostrorum effugiebant, rursusque ad ordines suos se recipientes circumibant et ab acie excludebant. Sic neque in loco manere ordinesque servare neque procur-

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

troops and sixty elephants. Saburra, suspecting that Curio, 2  
having sent cavalry ahead, was himself about to arrive,  
deployed his cavalry and infantry forces. He ordered them  
to yield ground gradually and retreat with a show of fear,  
saying that he would give the signal for battle when the  
time was right. His orders, he said, would be whatever  
he saw the situation demanded. Curio's assessment of 3  
the present situation—he thought the enemy was running  
away—added to his original optimism, and he brought his  
troops down from higher ground onto a level plain.

41. Curio advanced a good way from those heights.  
With his army now exhausted from exertion, he halted  
after sixteen miles. Saburra gave his men the signal. He 2  
lined them up in formation and began to circulate among  
the units, encouraging them. But he only used the infantry  
at a distance and for show; he sent the cavalry against the  
line. Curio was equal to the task and exhorted his men 3  
to put their entire hope in courage. Neither the infan-  
try, although weary, nor the cavalry, although few and ex-  
hausted from exertion, lacked the will for combat or the  
courage, but the latter only numbered two hundred. The  
rest had stayed behind on the march. Wherever our cav- 4  
alry attacked, they forced the enemy to yield but were un-  
able to pursue them in flight for any distance or spur their  
horses to greater speed. The enemy cavalry, however, be- 5  
gan to encircle our line on both flanks and ride the men  
down from behind. When our cohorts advanced at a run 6  
from the line, the Numidians would flee before their at-  
tack at full speed, and then circle around and cut our men  
off from the line when they were going back to their for-  
mations. As a result it did not seem safe either to stay  
in position and maintain their formations or to run for-

7 rere et casum subire tutum videbatur. Hostium copiae  
 summissis ab rege auxiliis crebro augebantur. Nostros  
 vires lassitudine deficiebant. Simul ii qui vulnera acceperant  
 neque acie excedere neque in locum tutum referri  
 poterant quod tota acies equitatu hostium circumdata  
 8 tenebatur. Hi de sua salute desperantes, ut extremo vitae  
 tempore homines facere consuerunt, aut suam mortem  
 miserabantur aut parentes suos commendabant si quos ex  
 eo periculo Fortuna servare potuisset. Plena erant omnia  
 timoris et luctus.

42. Curio ubi perterritis omnibus neque cohortationes  
 suas neque preces audiri intellegit unam ut in miseris rebus  
 spem reliquam salutis esse arbitratus proximos colles  
 capere universos atque eo signa inferri iubet. Hos quoque  
 2 praeoccupat missus a Saburra equitatus. Tum vero ad  
 summam desperationem nostri perveniunt et partim fugientes  
 ab equitatu interficiuntur partim integri procumbunt.  
 3 Hortatur Curionem Cn. Domitius praefectus equitum  
 cum paucis equitibus circumsistens ut fuga salutem  
 petat atque in castra contendat, et se ab eo non discessurum  
 4 pollicetur. At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu quem  
 a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit in eius conspectum  
 reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur.  
 5 Equites ex proelio perpauci se recipiunt. Sed ii quos  
 ad novissimum agmen equorum reficiendorum causa  
 substitisse demonstratum est fuga totius exercitus procul  
 animadversa sese incolumes in castra conferunt. Milites  
 ad unum omnes interficiuntur.

43. His rebus cognitis Marcius Rufus quaestor in castris  
 relictus a Curione cohortatur suos ne animo deficiant.  
 Illi orant atque obsecrant ut in Siciliam navibus reportentur.



ward and take one's chances. The enemy forces were frequently supplemented by reinforcements sent by the king. Our men's strength was beginning to fail from exhaustion. Moreover, the wounded could neither fall out nor be transported to a safe location, because the entire line was held surrounded by the enemy cavalry. As people generally do in their final moments, so these men, despairing of safety, either bewailed their own deaths or commended their relatives to anyone whom Fortune could save from the present danger. Everything was full of fear and lamentation.

42. When Curio realized that with everyone terrified neither his exhortations nor his entreaties were being heard, thinking that despite his pitiable circumstances there was one hope left, he ordered everyone to occupy the closest hills and move the standards there. The cavalry sent by Saburra seized these too ahead of him. Then indeed did our men reach the ultimate desperation; some were killed in flight by the cavalry, some collapsed without a wound. Gnaeus Domitius, a cavalry commander protecting Curio with a few horsemen, urged him to seek safety in flight and head for the camp, promising not to leave him. But Curio declared that he would never return to Caesar's sight after losing the army he had received in trust from Caesar, and so died fighting. A very few cavalry came back from the battle. But those who, as was explained, had stopped in the rear in order to rest their horses, noticing the rout of the whole army, got safely to the camp. The infantry were killed to a man.

43. Learning of this, Marcius Rufus, the quaestor left by Curio at the camp, urged his men not to lose heart. They begged and pleaded to be ferried back to Sicily.



- tur. Pollicetur magistrisque imperat navium ut primo ve-
- 2 pere omnes scaphas ad litus appulsas habeant. Sed tantus fuit omnium terror ut alii adesse copias Iubae dicerent alii cum legionibus instare Varum iamque se pulverem venientium cernere—quarum rerum nihil omnino acciderat—alii classem hostium celeriter advolaturam suspicarentur. Itaque perterritis omnibus sibi quisque consulebat.
- 3 Qui in classe erant proficisci properabant. Horum fuga navium onerariarum magistris incitabat. Pauci lenunculi
- 4 ad officium imperiumque conveniebant. Sed tanta erat completis litoribus contentio qui potissimum ex magno numero conscenderent ut multitudine atque onere nonnulli deprimerentur, reliqui hoc timore propius adire tardarentur.

44. Quibus rebus accidit ut pauci milites patresque familiae, qui aut gratia aut misericordia valerent aut <ad><sup>37</sup> naves adnare possent, recepti in Siciliam incolumes pervenirent. Reliquae copiae missis ad Varum noctu legatorum
- 2 numero centurionibus sese ei dederunt. Quorum cohortes militum postero die ante oppidum Iuba conspicatus, suam esse praedicans praedam magnam partem eorum interfici iussit, paucos electos in regnum remisit, cum Varus suam fidem ab eo laedi quereretur neque resis-
- 3 tere auderet. Ipse equo in oppidum vectus prosequentibus compluribus senatoribus, quo in numero erat Ser. Sulpicius et Licinius Damasippus, paucis diebus quae fieri vellet Vticae constituit atque imperavit. Diebus aequae post paucis se in regnum cum omnibus copiis recepit.

37 <ad> *Chacon*

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK II

He promised, and ordered the ship captains to have all of their longboats drawn up on shore at sunset. But so great was the universal terror that some were saying that Juba's forces were at hand, others that Varus and his legions were imminent and that the dust cloud of their approach was already visible to them—not one of these things had happened—and others suspected that the enemy fleet was going to sail against them soon. Everyone was terrified, so each acted for himself. Those in the fleet set out in a hurry. Their flight spurred on the transport captains. A few small vessels mustered as per their obligations and orders, but such was the struggle on the packed beaches over who of the huge number was going to embark, that some boats were sunk by the weight of the crowd and the rest hesitated to come closer for fear of this.

44. The result of these developments was that a few soldiers and family men were taken on board and reached Sicily safely, if they prevailed by favor or compassion or managed to swim out to the ships. The rest of the troops sent a nighttime delegation of centurions to Varus and then surrendered to him. The units of these soldiers were spotted by Juba the next day in front of Utica. Insisting that this was his booty, he ordered a large number of them to be killed and sent a few picked men to his kingdom, although Varus protested that his guarantee was being infringed by Juba; he did not dare resist. Juba himself rode into Utica with several senators in his train, among them Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus. Within a short period he determined what he wished done at Utica and gave orders. After an equally short period he went back to his kingdom with his whole force.

## LIBER III

1. Dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur  
Iulius Caesar et P. Servilius. Is enim erat annus quo per  
2 leges ei consulem fieri liceret. His rebus confectis cum  
fides tota Italia esset angustior neque creditae pecuniae  
solverentur constituit ut arbitri darentur: per eos fierent  
aestimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti quaeque  
earum ante bellum fuisset, atque eae creditoribus trade-  
3 rentur. Hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum  
minuendumque, qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones se-  
qui consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem  
4 esse aptissimum existimavit. Item praetoribus tribunisque  
plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus nonnullos ambi-  
tus Pompeia lege damnatos illis temporibus quibus in urbe  
praesidia legionum<sup>1</sup> Pompeius habuerat—quae iudicia  
aliis<sup>2</sup> audientibus iudicibus aliis sententiam ferentibus sin-  
gulis diebus erant perfecta—in integrum restituit, qui se  
illi initio civilis belli obtulerant si sua opera in bello uti

<sup>1</sup> legionum *is hard to credit and may be a gloss*

<sup>2</sup> aliis] a- <testes> Chacon

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<sup>1</sup> In 52, when Pompey was sole consul in Rome.

<sup>2</sup> For the vague "at the hearing," Chacon proposed "hearing the witnesses" on the basis of Asconius' commentary on Cicero's *pro Milone*, a speech delivered at a trial that year (*Mil.* 34).

## BOOK III

1. When Caesar held elections in his capacity as dictator, Julius Caesar and Publius Servilius were elected consuls, this being the year in which it was legally permissible for Caesar to be consul. After the elections were over, since credit was rather tight throughout Italy and existing loans were not being repaid, he decided to provide arbitrators. These were to make assessments of real estate and goods, determining the prewar value of each item, and the possessions themselves were to be surrendered to creditors. He thought that this would be the most suitable measure both for removing and reducing people's fear of a cancellation of debts (something that is apt to follow warfare and civil strife) and for preserving the borrowers' reputations. Furthermore, and using praetors and plebeian tribunes to put the necessary legislation before the people, Caesar reinstated some men who had been convicted of bribery under the *lex Pompeia* in the period when Pompey had kept legionary garrisons<sup>1</sup> in Rome—in trials that were concluded in the space of a day, with one set of jurors at the hearing<sup>2</sup> and another giving the verdict. These men had offered themselves to him at the beginning of the civil war, in case he wanted to use their services in the war,

5 vellet, proinde aestimans ac si usus esset quoniam sui  
 fecissent potestatem. Statuerat enim prius hos iudicio  
 populi debere restitui quam suo beneficio videri receptos,  
 ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in prae-  
 riendo populi beneficio videretur.

2. His rebus et feriis Latinis comitiisque omnibus per-  
 2ficiendis XI dies tribuit dictaturaque se abdicat et ab urbe  
 2 proficiscitur Brundisiumque pervenit. Eo legiones XII  
 equitatum omnem venire iusserat. Sed tantum navium  
 repperit ut anguste XV milia<sup>3</sup> legionariorum militum D  
 equites transportari possent. Hoc unum [inopia navium]  
 3 Caesari ad celeritatem conficiendi belli defuit. Atque eae  
 ipsae copiae hoc infrequentiores [copiae] imponuntur  
 quod multi [galli]<sup>4</sup> tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex  
 Hispania magnum numerum deminuerat, et gravis au-  
 tumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium ex saluberrimis  
 Galliae et Hispaniae regionibus omnem exercitum valetu-  
 dine temptaverat.

3. Pompeius annum spatium ad comparandas copias  
 nactus quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat  
 magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis Corcyra Athenis  
 Ponto Bithynia Syria Cilicia Phoenice Aegypto classem  
 coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat.  
 2 Magnam imperatam Asiae Syriae regibusque omnibus et  
 dinastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam

<sup>3</sup> XV milia] *The number may be too small.*

<sup>4</sup> [galli] *Klotz (see 3.87.2): Galli<cis> ed. pr.*

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<sup>3</sup> According to the manuscripts, it was Gallic troops that suc-  
 cumbed (or deserted). In the first edition the text was emended  
 to specify the Gallic campaigns as the occasion of the losses.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

something that he rated as highly as if he had used them, since they had made themselves available. For he had 5 decided that they ought to be reinstated by a popular vote before it became clear that they had been restored by his favor, lest he give the impression of being either ungrateful in thanking them or highhanded in anticipating a favor granted by the people.

2. Caesar allocated eleven days to finishing this business, the Latin Festival, and all of the elections. He resigned from the dictatorship, left Rome, and went to Brundisium. He had ordered twelve legions and all of his 2 cavalry to go there. But he only found enough ships for transporting fifteen thousand tightly packed troops and five hundred cavalry. This one deficiency kept Caesar from bringing the war to a swift conclusion. And the force that 3 did embark was the scantier because many men had succumbed in the numerous wars,<sup>3</sup> and the long march from Spain had subtracted a large number, and an oppressive autumn in Apulia and around Brundisium, after the very healthy climate of Gaul and Spain, had afflicted his whole army with sickness.

3. Pompey, with a whole year<sup>4</sup> to obtain troops, a year clear of warfare and hostile engagements, had mustered a large fleet from Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt; in all of these places he had also arranged for the construction of 2 a large fleet. A large sum of money had been requisitioned by him and collected from Asia, Syria, all of the kings,

<sup>4</sup> Pompey arrived in Greece in 49 (March), Caesar in 48 (January).

## CAESAR

exegerat, magnam societates earum provinciarum quas ipse obtinebat sibi numerare coegerat.

4. Legiones effecerat civium Romanorum VIII: V ex Italia, quas traduxerat, unam ex Cilicia veteranam, quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat, unam ex Creta et Macedonia ex veteranis militibus, qui dimissi a superioribus imperatoribus in his provinciis conederant, duas ex
- 2 Asia, quas Lentulus consul conscribendas curaverat. Praeterea magnum numerum ex Thessalia Boeotia Achaia Epiroque supplementi nomine in legiones distribuerat. His
- 3 Antonianis milites admiscuerat. Praeter has expectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones duas. Sagittarios (ex) Creta Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria reliquisque civitatibus tria milia numero habebat, funditorum cohortes sexcenarias duas, equitum VII milia. Ex quibus DC Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, D Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia. Ad eundem numerum Cotus ex Thracia dederat et
- 4 Sadalam filium miserat. Ex Macedonia CC erant, quibus Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute. D ex Gabinianis Alexandria—Gallos Germanosque quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidi causa apud regem Ptolomaeum reliquerat—Pompeius filius cum classe adduxerat. DCCC ex servis

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<sup>5</sup> "Dynasts" and "tetrarchs" ruled small "kingdoms" on Rome's eastern border; some are named in 3.4. See also 3.31.2.

<sup>6</sup> The tax companies, headed by "publicans" (*publicani*), contracted with the Roman state to collect various taxes, a profitable enterprise, particularly in the eastern provinces controlled by Pompey. See also 3.31–32 and 3.103.

<sup>7</sup> "Antonius' soldiers" are survivors of the Caesarian legions defeated with C. Antonius in late 49; the episode is absent from our text (see the Introduction). They now serve Pompey.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

dynasts, and tetrarchs,<sup>5</sup> and the free peoples of Greece. Plus, a large sum was paid to him, under compulsion, by tax companies<sup>6</sup> in the provinces he controlled.

4. Pompey had brought up to strength nine legions of Roman citizens: five from Italy, which had crossed with him, a veteran legion from Cilicia, which he called "the twin" because it had been created from two, one from Crete and Macedonia, made from veteran soldiers who had settled in those provinces after being discharged by their former commanders, two from Asia, whose conscription the consul Lentulus had arranged. In addition, he had distributed among the legions by way of supplement a large number of men from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus, and merged Antonius' soldiers into them.<sup>7</sup> Besides these, he expected two legions with Scipio from Syria. He had archers from Crete and Lacedemon, from Pontus and Syria and other communities, about three thousand in number, two six-hundred-men cohorts of slingers, and seven thousand cavalry. Of these, Deiotarus had brought six hundred Galatians, Ariobarzanes five hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus of Thrace had supplied about the same number and sent his son Sadalas. There were two hundred from Macedonia under the command of Rhascypolis, men of outstanding courage.<sup>8</sup> Pompey's son had brought, along with his fleet, five hundred ex-Gabinians from Alexandria, Gauls and Germans whom Aulus Gabinius had left as a garrison with King Ptolemy. From his slaves and his force

<sup>8</sup> The modifier "of outstanding courage" may instead apply to Rhascypolis, whose actions in a later war are reported by Dio at 47.25.2 and 47.48.2.



## CAESAR

5 suis pastorumque suorum <numero> coegerat. CCC Tarcondarius Castor et Domnilaus ex Gallograecia dederant. Horum alter una venerat, alter filium miserat. CC ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho—cui magna Pompeius praemia

6 tribuit—missi erant, in his plerique hippotoxotae. Huc Dardanos Bessos partim mercennarios partim imperio aut gratia comparatos, item Macedones Thessalos ac reliquarum gentium et civitatum adiecerat atque eum quem supra demonstravimus numerum expleverat.

5. Frumenti vim maximam ex Thessalia Asia Aegypto

2 Creta Cyrenis reliquisque regionibus comparaverat. Hiemare Dyrrachi Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposerat.

3 Praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius, Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi

4 Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius. Toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat. Ad hunc summa imperi respiciebat.

6. Caesar ut Brundisium venit contionatus apud milites: quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent. Conclamantibus omnibus imperaret quod vellet, quod-

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<sup>9</sup> "Liburnians" were ships from Illyricum.

of herdsmen Pompey had assembled eight hundred. Tar- 5  
 condarius Castor and Domnilaus had supplied three hun-  
 dred from Gallograecia; one of these men came himself,  
 the other sent his son. Two hundred had been sent from  
 Syria by Antiochus of Commagene—Pompey gave him  
 substantial rewards—the majority of them mounted ar-  
 chers. Plus, he had added Dardanians and Bessi, some of 6  
 them mercenaries, others procured by requisition or in-  
 fluence, likewise Macedonians and Thessalians and men  
 of other peoples and communities, filling out the above-  
 mentioned number.

5. Pompey had procured a very large quantity of provi-  
 sions from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and the 2  
 other regions. He had decided to winter at Dyrrachium  
 and Apollonia and all the coastal towns in order to prevent  
 Caesar from crossing the Adriatic, and for this purpose he  
 had distributed his fleet all along the coast. The com- 3  
 mander of the ships from Egypt was his son Pompeius, of  
 the ships from Asia Minor, Decimus Laelius and Gaius  
 Triarius, of those from Syria, Gaius Cassius, of those from  
 Rhodes, Gaius Marcellus with Gaius Coponius, of the Li-  
 burnians<sup>9</sup> and the fleet from Achaia, Scribonius Libo and  
 Marcus Octavius. Marcus Bibulus had been placed in 4  
 overall charge of the maritime operation and was running  
 everything; supreme authority fell to him.

6. When Caesar reached Brundisium he addressed the  
 soldiers. "Since we have come nearly to the end of our  
 labors and dangers, leaving your slaves and baggage be-  
 hind in Italy should not make you worried. Go onto the  
 ships unencumbered so that more men can be put on  
 board, and place all of your hopes on victory and my gen-  
 erosity." Everyone shouted that he should give whatever

## CAESAR

cumque imperavisset se aequo animo esse facturos, II  
2 Nonas Ianuarias naves solvit. Impositae, ut supra demon-  
3 stratum est, legiones VII. Postridie terram attigit Cerau-  
niorum saxa inter<sup>5</sup> et alia loca periculosa. Quietam nactus  
stationem et portus omnes timens quod teneri ab ad-  
versariis arbitrabantur<sup>6</sup> ad eum locum qui appellabatur  
Palaeste omnibus navibus ad unam incolumibus milites  
exposuit.

7. Erat Orici Lucretius Vespillo, et Minucius Rufus  
cum Asiaticis navibus XVIII quibus iussu D. Laeli prae-  
2 erat, M. Bibulus cum navibus CX Corcyrae. Sed neque illi  
sibi confisi ex portu prodire sunt ausi, cum Caesar omnino  
XII naves longas praesidio duxisset, in quibus erant con-  
stratae IIII, neque Bibulus impeditis navibus dispersisque  
remigibus satis mature occurrit, quod prius ad conti-  
nentem visus est Caesar quam de eius adventu fama  
omnino in eas regiones perferretur.

8. Expositis militibus naves eadem nocte Brundisium a  
Caesare remittuntur ut reliquae legiones equitatusque  
2 transportari possent. Huic officio praepositus erat Fufius  
Calenus legatus qui celeritatem in transportandis legioni-  
bus adhiberet. Sed serius a terra provectae naves neque  
3 usae nocturna aura in redeundo offenderunt. Bibulus  
enim Corcyrae certior factus de adventu Caesaris, sperans  
alicui se parti onustarum navium occurrere posse, inani-  
bus occurrit. Et nactus circiter XXX in eas diligentiae<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Cerauniorum saxa inter] inter Cerauniorum saxa *Hoffmann*

<sup>6</sup> quod . . . arbitrabantur] quos . . . arbitrabatur *ed. pr.*

<sup>7</sup> diligentiae] indiligentiae *Estienne*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

orders he wanted, and that they would do whatever he ordered without worrying. He sailed on the 4th of January. As was indicated earlier, seven legions embarked.<sup>10</sup> 2  
He reached land the next day between the Ceraunian 3  
mountain cliffs and other dangerous locations. Finding a calm anchorage, and being leery of all the harbors because people thought they<sup>11</sup> were held by the enemy, he landed the soldiers from all of his ships at a place called Palaeste without losing a single ship.

7. Lucretius Vespillo was at Oricum along with Minucius Rufus and eighteen ships from Asia Minor that he commanded by order of Decimus Laelius; Marcus Bibulus was at Corcyra with 110 ships. But the former pair, 2  
lacking self-confidence, did not dare venture out of the harbor, although Caesar had in his convoy twelve warships total for protection, four of them with decks. Nor did Bibulus confront him in time—his ships were tied up and his rowers dispersed—since Caesar was sighted offshore before even the rumor of his approach made it to that area.

8. Once the soldiers were on land, Caesar sent the ships back to Brundisium the same night so that the remaining legions and cavalry could be brought over. He put his officer Fufius Calenus in charge of this operation with instructions to act quickly in transporting the legions. But 2  
the ships set out rather late and did not make use of the evening breeze, so they ran into trouble on the return. For 3  
Bibulus, learning at Corcyra of Caesar's approach and hoping to be able to encounter some of the loaded transports, encountered empty ones. After falling in with about thirty, he vented on them the rage prompted by his "dili-

<sup>11</sup> For "because people thought they," the first edition substituted "which he thought."

CAESAR

suae ac doloris iracundiam erupit omnesque incendit. Eodemque igne nautas dominosque navium interfecit,  
 4 magnitudine poenae reliquos terreri sperans. Hoc confecto negotio a Salonis<sup>8</sup> ad Orici portum<sup>9</sup> stationes litoraque omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit. Custodiisque diligentius dispositis ipse gravissima hieme in navibus excubans neque ullum laborem aut munus despiciens neque subsidium expectans si in Caesaris complexum<sup>10</sup> venire posset . . .

9. Discessu Liburnarum ex Illyrico M. Octavius cum iis quas habebat navibus Salonas pervenit. Ibi concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris Issam a Caesaris amicitia  
 2 avertit. Conventum Salonis cum neque pollicitationibus neque denuntiatione periculi permovere posset oppidum oppugnare instituit. Est autem oppidum et loci natura et  
 3 colle munitum,<sup>11</sup> sed celeriter cives Romani, ligneis effectis turribus, his sese munierunt. Et cum essent infirmi ad resistendum propter paucitatem hominum, crebris confecti vulneribus ad extremum auxilium descenderunt ser-

<sup>8</sup> Salonis *ed. pr.*: sasonis (*sc.* portu) ω

<sup>9</sup> orici s, *Veith* (*see* 3.15.1): cor(i/y)c(i/y) ω: Curici *Mommsen*

<sup>10</sup> complexum] conspectum *Vascosan. Perhaps* classis (*sc.* Caesaris)<sup>p</sup>

<sup>11</sup> est . . . munitum] erat . . . <parum> m- *Jurin*: [e . . . m-] *Meusel*

<sup>12</sup> For the sarcastic "diligence," Estienne substituted "negligence."

<sup>13</sup> Instead of emending to "from Salonae to the port of Oricum," *Mommsen* defended the manuscripts' "from the harbor of Sason Island to that of Curicum." This adds more than two hundred miles to the Pompeian blockade.

gence<sup>12</sup> and vexation, burning them all. In the same conflagration he killed the crews and captains, hoping that the rest would be deterred by the enormity of the punishment. When this operation was complete, he had his various fleets take control of anchorages from Salonae to the port of Oricum<sup>13</sup> and every shoreline far and wide, and deployed his patrols more carefully. He himself, doing guard duty aboard ship in the depth of winter and thinking no hardship or task too small nor awaiting reinforcements if he could come into contact with Caesar . . .<sup>14</sup>

9. At the departure of the Liburnian ships from Illyricum<sup>15</sup> Marcus Octavius went to Salonae with the ships he had available. There he roused the Dalmatians and the other natives and deflected Issa from its allegiance to Caesar. Unable to influence the association of Roman citizens at Salonae either by promises or by heralding danger, he began to besiege the town. Salonae is fortified both by the nature of its site and by a hill, but the Roman citizens hastily built wooden siege towers and used these as their fortifications.<sup>16</sup> Being incapable—because of their small numbers—of standing firm in resistance, and overcome by numerous injuries, they came to the last resort, freeing all

<sup>14</sup> For the unparalleled expression “into contact with Caesar,” Vascosan substituted “within eyesight of Caesar.” Both “contact” and “eyesight” are necessarily metaphorical, since Caesar is on land and Bibulus is patrolling the Adriatic. The proposal to read “to grips with (Caesar’s) fleet” fits the context more closely.

<sup>15</sup> Not mentioned heretofore.

<sup>16</sup> Given Salonae’s actual topography (Wilkes, 221 n. 3), Jurin proposed adding “insufficiently” before “fortified,” and Meusel excised “Salonae . . . hill.”

## CAESAR

4 vosque omnes puberes liberaverunt. Et praesectis om-  
 nium mulierum crinibus tormenta effecerunt. Quorum  
 cognita sententia Octavius quinque castris oppidum circum-  
 5 dedidit atque uno tempore obsidione et oppugnationibus  
 eos premere coepit. Illi omnia perpeti parati maxime a re-  
 frumentaria laborabant. Quare<sup>12</sup> missis ad Caesarem lega-  
 6 tis auxilium ab eo petebant. Reliqua, ut poterant, incom-  
 moda per se sustinebant. Et longo interposito spatio cum  
 diuturnitas oppugnationis neglegentiores Octavianos effe-  
 cisset nacti occasionem meridiani temporis discessu eo-  
 rum, pueris mulieribusque in muro dispositis ne quid  
 cotidianae consuetudinis desideraretur, ipsi manu facta  
 7 cum iis quos nuper maxime liberaverant in proxima Octavi  
 castra irruperunt. His expugnatis eodem impetu altera  
 sunt adorti, inde tertia et quarta et deinceps reliqua.  
 Omnibusque eos castris expulerunt et magno numero  
 8 interfecto reliquos atque ipsum Octavium in naves con-  
 fugere coegerunt. Hic fuit oppugnationis exitus. Iamque  
 hiems appropinquabat, et tantis detrimentis acceptis Oc-  
 tavius desperata oppugnatione oppidi Dyrrachium sese ad  
 Pompeium recepit.

10. Demonstravimus L. Vibullium Rufum, Pompei  
 praefectum, bis in potestatem pervenisse Caesaris atque  
 ab eo esse dimissum semel ad Corfinium iterum in Hispa-  
 2 nia. Hunc pro suis beneficiis Caesar idoneum iudicaverat

<sup>12</sup> quare missis *Brutus*: qui remissis *MUTV*: cui remis sis *S*: eni rei missis *Nipperdey*

<sup>17</sup> For "therefore they sent a delegation," *Nipperdey* substituted "and they sent a delegation on this subject."



of the adult male slaves; they also cut off all the women's hair, making catapult ropes. Recognizing their decision 4  
 Octavius surrounded the town with five camps and began to apply pressure with a blockade and siege works simultaneously. Although prepared to endure everything, the 5  
 people of Saloniae were in very great difficulties over provisioning. Therefore they sent a delegation<sup>17</sup> to Caesar requesting his help. The remaining hardships they withstood on their own, insofar as they could. After a considerable interval, when the protracted siege had made Octavius' men rather careless, they took advantage of midday, when the enemy fell back. Deploying children and women on the walls so that nothing of their daily routine would be noticeably absent, they joined forces with the men they had very recently set free and burst into the closest of Octavius' camps. After storming this they continued 7  
 straight on to the next, then the third and fourth, and finally the last. They ejected the enemy from every camp and killed a large number of them, then forced the rest and Octavius himself to take refuge on their ships. This put an end to the siege. For winter was approaching, and 8  
 after suffering such substantial losses Octavius despaired of the siege of Saloniae and went back to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

10. I mentioned that Pompey's officer Lucius Vibullius Rufus came into Caesar's power twice and was released by him once at Corfinium and once in Spain.<sup>18</sup> In Caesar's 2  
 judgment the favors Vibullius had received from him

<sup>18</sup> For Corfinium, see 1.15.4. Vibullius' arrival in Spain is mentioned (1.38.1), but neither his second release nor his third capture is. See the Introduction.



quem cum mandatis ad Cn. Pompeium mitteret, eundem-  
 que apud Cn. Pompeium auctoritatem habere intellege-  
 3 bat. Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrum-  
 que pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque  
 4 amplius fortunam periclitari; satis esse magna utrumque  
 incommoda accepta quae pro disciplina et praeceptis ha-  
 5 bere possent ut reliquos casus timerent, illum Italia expul-  
 sum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis et  
 cohortibus <in> Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum  
 C atque XXX, <se> morte Curionis et detrimento Africani  
 exercitus et Antoni<sup>13</sup> militumque deditioe ad Curictam;  
 6 proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent; quantum<sup>14</sup> in bello  
 Fortuna posset iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent docu-  
 7 mento; hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi dum sibi  
 uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri  
 paulum modo tribuisset Fortuna non esse usurum condi-  
 tionibus pacis eum qui superior videretur, neque fore  
 aequa parte contentum qui se omnia habiturum con-  
 8 fideret; conditiones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non  
 potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere;

<sup>13</sup> et Antoni Menge: tanto [ton- T<sup>oc</sup>] ω

<sup>14</sup> <quoniam> quantum Klotz

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<sup>19</sup> Caesar's narrative of events at Curicta does not survive and may never have been written, but other sources tell of a conflict in the northern Adriatic between the Caesarians Dolabella and C. Antonius against the Pompeians M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo. The Caesarians were bested (App. BC 2.47.191), and Antonius was either captured by (Livy Per. 110; D.C. 41.40.2) or surrendered to Libo (Flor. Eptt. 2.13.31-32; Oros. 6.15.9). Ac-

made him a suitable person to send to Pompey with a message; he also knew that Vibullius had influence with Pompey. The gist of the message was this: "Both of us ought to put an end to our obstinacy. We ought to set arms aside and not take any further chances. Both of us have incurred substantial losses, enough that we can consider them an education and advice to be wary of misfortunes still to come: you have been driven out of Italy with the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, both Spanish provinces, and citizen cohorts in Italy and Spain, 130 of them. For me, the death of Curio, the loss of the African army, and the capitulation of Antony and his soldiers at Curicta.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, we should spare ourselves and the state; of the power of fortune in war we ourselves with our setbacks should be<sup>20</sup> sufficient evidence. The moment for negotiating a peace is when each party is confident in his position and the two seem to be equal. But if fortune ever grants a little more to either, the one who sees that he has the advantage will not adopt peace terms, nor will he be content with a fair share once confident of having everything. Peace terms ought to be sought in Rome from the senate and people, since to date we have not been able to agree. Meanwhile

according to Orosius, fifteen cohorts surrendered with him. Florus and Lucan (4.404–6) give the most precise location for the campaign, setting it on the island of Curicta; other sources speak of Illyricum or Dalmatia.

<sup>20</sup> For "we ourselves . . . should be," Klotz substituted "since . . . we ourselves . . . are."

- 9 interea et rei publicae<sup>15</sup> et ipsis parcere<sup>16</sup> oportere, uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo, exercitum dimissurum, depositis armis auxiliisque quibus nunc confiderent necessario populi senatusque iudicio, fore utrumque contentum; haec quo facilius Pompeius, probari possent omnes suas terrestres urbiumque copias dimissurum . . .

11. Vibullius<sup>17</sup> his expositis [Corcyrae]<sup>18</sup> non minus necessarium esse existimavit de repentino adventu Caesaris Pompeium fieri certiore uti ad id consilium capere posset [antequam de mandatis agi inciperet]<sup>19</sup> atque ideo continuato nocte ac die itinere atque omnibus oppidis<sup>20</sup> mutatis ad celeritatem iumentis ad Pompeium contendit  
 2 ut adesse Caesarem nuntiaret. Pompeius erat eo tempore in Candavia iterque ex Macedonia in hiberna Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque habebat. Sed re nova perturbatus maioribus itineribus Apolloniam petere coepit ne Caesar orae  
 3 maritimae civitates occuparet. At ille expositis militibus

<sup>15</sup> interea et rei publicae] in- e re publica esse *Hoffmann*: id interesse reipublicae *Madvig*      <sup>16</sup> parcere *Damon*: placere ω

<sup>17</sup> Vibullius *Aldus*: bibu(l)us ω

<sup>18</sup> [Corcyrae] *Nipperdey*

<sup>19</sup> [antequam . . . agi inciperet] *Damon*

<sup>20</sup> oppidis *Lipsius*: copiis ω

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<sup>21</sup> For "meanwhile it is appropriate to spare the state and ourselves. If . . .," *Hoffmann* and *Madvig* proposed "meanwhile it is in the public interest and ought to be pleasing to us, if . . .," and "this (i.e., seeking peace terms at Rome) is beneficial to the commonwealth and ought to be pleasing to us. If . . ."

<sup>22</sup> The reference to "urban forces" is puzzling, but compare

it is appropriate to spare the state and ourselves.<sup>21</sup> If each immediately swears in an assembly that he will dismiss his army within the next three days, after putting down the weapons and resources that we currently rely on we will both, of necessity, be content with the verdict of the people and senate.” In order to be able more easily to win Pompey’s approval for these things, he said, he would dismiss all of his land-based and urban forces . . .<sup>22</sup>

11. Once the message was laid out [at Corcyra] Vibullius thought that it was equally necessary that Pompey be informed about Caesar’s sudden arrival, so that he could make plans about it [before action began to be taken on the message],<sup>23</sup> and he therefore, without breaking his journey by night or day, and changing his teams at every town<sup>24</sup> for speed, hastened to Pompey to announce that Caesar was at hand. Pompey was in Candavia at the time, on his way from Macedonia to winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium. But perturbed by the unexpected development he began to make for Apollonia by forced marches in order to prevent Caesar from occupying the communities on the coast. Caesar, for his part, headed for Oricum

3.15.6. Some feel that the sentence is unlikely to be authentic; the gap marked in the text leaves room for a qualification to Caesar’s otherwise implausible offer.

<sup>23</sup> Vibullius was not “at Corcyra”; the phrase was added to the text after his name was corrupted to that of a man who was there, Bibulus. The clause “before . . . proposals” can likewise be explained as originating in a marginal gloss based on 3.18.3; some editors prefer to emend its manifest problems of usage.

<sup>24</sup> Neither the word “town” nor any other of the many repairs proposed for the obviously corrupt text of the archetype here is particularly compelling.

CAESAR

eodem die Oricum proficiscitur. Quo cum venisset, L. Torquatus, qui iussu Pompei oppido praeerat praesidiumque ibi Parthinorum habebat, conatus portis clausis oppidum  
 4 defendere, cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnatos negarent, oppidani autem etiam sua sponte Caesarem recipere conarentur, desperatis omnibus auxiliis portas aperuit et se atque oppidum Caesari dedit incolumisque ab eo conservatus est.

12. Recepto Caesar Orico nulla interposita mora Apolloniam proficiscitur. Eius adventu audito L. Staberius, qui ibi praeerat, aquam comportare in arcem atque eam munire obsidesque ab Apolloniatis exigere coepit. Illi vero  
 2 daturos se negare neque portas consuli praeclusuros neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia  
 3 praeiudicavisset.<sup>21</sup> Quorum cognita voluntate clam profugit Apollonia Staberius. Illi ad Caesarem legatos mittunt  
 4 oppidoque recipiunt. Hoc sequuntur Byllidenses Aman-  
 tini et reliquae finitimae civitates totaque Epiros et legatis ad Caesarem missis quae imperaret facturos pollicentur.

13. At Pompeius cognitis his rebus quae erant Orici atque Apolloniae gestae Dyrrachio timens diurnis eo nocturnisque itineribus contendit. Simul [ac] Caesar appropinquare dicebatur.<sup>22</sup> Tantusque terror incidit eius exerci-

<sup>21</sup> praeiudicavisset *Paul* (see 2.32.3): p. R. iudicavisset  $\omega$  (with abbreviations or in full)  $\omega$

<sup>22</sup> simul [ac] . . . dicebatur *Oudendorp*: [s- ac . . . d-] *Gruter*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

the day he landed his soldiers. When he arrived, Lucius Torquatus, who was in command of the town by Pompey's order and had a garrison of Parthini there, closed the gates and attempted to defend the town. He ordered the Greeks to mount the wall and take up arms. They, however, refused to fight against the legitimate authority of the Roman people. The townspeople, moreover, even tried to admit Caesar of their own accord. At that point, despairing of all help, Torquatus opened the gates and surrendered himself and the town to Caesar and was preserved unharmed by him. 4

12. After recovering Oricum, Caesar headed for Apollonia without delay. Hearing of his approach Lucius Staberius, who was in command there, began to collect water in the citadel, fortify the citadel, and demand hostages from the townspeople. But they said that they would not give them, or close the gates against a consul, or make a decision for themselves contrary to the previous decision of all Italy. Recognizing their intention Staberius fled secretly from Apollonia. They sent a delegation to Caesar and admitted him into Apollonia. This example was followed by the people of Byllis, Amantia, and the other nearby cities and all of Epirus: they sent delegations to Caesar promising that they would do his bidding. 2 3 4

13. But Pompey, after learning about developments at Oricum and Apollonia, feared for Dyrrachium; he hastened there by day and night marches. Caesar was said to be approaching at the same time.<sup>25</sup> And so great a fear of 2

<sup>25</sup> For "approaching at the same time," the archetype read "at the same time as Caesar was said to be approaching." Gruter excised the whole sentence as a gloss.

CAESAR

- tus—quod properans noctem diei coniunxerat neque iter intermiserat—ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent, ac fugae simile iter videretur. Sed cum prope Dyrrachium Pompeius constitisset castraque metari iussisset perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei Fortuna tribuisset. Hoc idem reliqui iurant legati. Hos tribuni militum centurionesque sequuntur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurat. Caesar praecoccupato itinere ad Dyrrachium finem properandi facit castraque ad flumen Apsum ponit in finibus Apolloniatium ut [castellis vigiliisque]<sup>23</sup> bene meritae civitates tutae essent praesidio. Ibi que reliquarum ex Italia legionum adventum expectare et sub pellibus hiemare constituit. Hoc idem Pompeius fecit et trans flumen Apsum positis castris eo copias omnes auxiliaque conduxit.

14. Calenus legionibus equitibusque Brundisi in naves impositis—ut erat praeceptum a Caesare—quam tum<sup>24</sup> navium facultatem habebat, naves solvit paulumque a portu progressus litteras a Caesare accipit quibus est certior factus portus litora que omnia classibus adversariorum teneri. Quo cognito se in portum recipit navesque omnes revocat. Vna ex his, quae perseveravit neque imperio Ca-

<sup>23</sup> [castellis vigiliisque] *Kayser*

<sup>24</sup> quam tum *Faerno*: quantum *ω*

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<sup>26</sup> The first part of this sentence is obscure, owing to the ambiguity of the Latin. Some editors make Pompey the subject of "joined" and "interrupted." The phrase "Caesar's army" imposes an interpretation on the expression "his (or this) army."



### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Caesar's army ensued—because in his hurry he had joined night to day, not breaking his march<sup>26</sup>—that practically everyone from Epirus and the neighboring regions abandoned the standards, many discarded their weapons, and the Pompeian march resembled a retreat. When Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium and ordered the camp to be laid out, and the army was still terrified, Labienus stepped forward first and swore that he would not desert Pompey and would undergo the same fate, whatever Fortune gave him. The remaining senior officers took the same oath; the staff officers and centurions followed them, and the whole army took the same oath. Caesar, given that the route to Dyrrachium was already held, stopped hurrying and made camp beside the Apsus River in the territory of Apollonia, so that<sup>27</sup> the cities that had served him well would be safe under guard. He decided to await the arrival of the remaining legions from Italy there, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same: making camp across the Apsus river, he collected there all of his troops and auxiliaries.

14. Calenus put the legions and cavalry on board the ships at Brundisium, as per Caesar's instructions, all the ships he had available, then weighed anchor. After going a little way out of the harbor, he received a letter from Caesar informing him that the harbors and the entire coastline were controlled by enemy fleets. Upon learning this he returned to Brundisium and recalled all of the ships. One of them kept going and disobeyed Calenus'

<sup>27</sup> After "so that" the archetype had "with strongholds and lookouts," which Kayser excised as a gloss on "under guard." Some editors remove or emend the latter expression instead.



leni obtemperavit quod erat sine militibus privatoque consilio administrabatur, delata Oricum atque a Bibulo ex-  
 3 pugnata est. Qui de servis liberisque omnibus ad impuberes supplicium sumit et ad unum interficit. Ita exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit.

15. Bibulus, ut supra demonstratum est, erat <cum> classe ad Oricum, et sicuti mari portibusque Caesarem prohibebat ita ipse omni terra earum regionum prohibe-  
 2 batur. Praesidiis enim dispositis omnia litora a Caesare tenebantur, neque lignandi atque aquandi neque naves ad  
 3 terram religandi potestas fiebat. Erat res in magna difficultate, summisque angustiis rerum necessariorum premebantur, adeo ut cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus onerariis  
 4 supportare. Atque etiam uno tempore accidit ut difficultatibus usi tempestatibus ex pellibus quibus erant tectae  
 5 naves nocturnum excipere rorem cogerentur. Quas tamen difficultates patienter atque aequo animo ferebant neque sibi nudanda litora et relinquendos portus existimabant.  
 6 Sed cum essent in quibus demonstravi angustiis ac se Libo cum Bibulo coniunxisset loquuntur ambo ex navibus cum M. Acilio et Staio<sup>25</sup> Murco legatis, quorum alter oppidi muris, alter praesidiis terrestribus praeerat: velle se de maximis rebus cum Caesare loqui si sibi eius <rei> facultas detur. Huc addunt pauca rei confirmandae causa ut de  
 7 compositione acturi viderentur. Interim postulant ut sint  
 8 indutiae, atque ab iis impetrant. Magnum enim quod adfe-

<sup>25</sup> Staio Carter: statio [-ilio V] ω

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

order; there were no soldiers on board and it was under private management. This ship got to Oricum and was captured by Bibulus. He punished them all, slave and free, children included, executing every one. The safety of the entire army thus rested on a little time and a lot of luck. 3

15. Bibulus, as was indicated earlier, was with his fleet off Oricum. While preventing Caesar from using the sea and harbors, he was himself prevented from landing anywhere in the area, for by distributing detachments Caesar controlled the entire shore, and Bibulus was given no chance either to collect firewood and water or to tie up ashore. His situation was very difficult, and his men were afflicted by extreme shortages of necessities, to the extent that they were compelled to use cargo vessels from Corcyra to transport firewood and water as well as the rest of their provisions. Indeed at one point when the weather was particularly bad it happened that they were forced to collect nighttime dew from the hides sheltering the decks. Nevertheless, they endured these difficulties patiently and steadily, nor did they think they should leave the coastline unguarded or abandon the harbors. But when they were in the aforementioned difficulties, and Libo had joined Bibulus, the two of them addressed Caesar's officers Marcus Acilius and Staius Murcus from shipboard. (One of these was in charge of the walls of Oricum, the other of the detachments on land.) They said that they would like to talk to Caesar about matters of the greatest importance, if they got the chance, adding a few things in support of their proposition to give the impression that they were going to discuss a settlement. They demanded a truce in the meantime, and Caesar's officers granted it, for what was being offered seemed significant, and they knew that 7 8

CAESAR

rebant videbatur, et Caesarem id summe sciebant cupere. Et profectum aliquid Vibulli mandatis existimabatur.

16. Caesar eo tempore cum legione una profectus ad recipiendas posteriores civitates et rem frumentariam expediendam, qua anguste utebatur, erat ad Buthrotum, oppidum <oppositum> Corcyrae. Ibi certior ab Acilio et Murco per litteras factus de postulatis Libonis et Bibuli legionem relinquit, ipse Oricum revertitur. Eo cum venisset evocantur illi ad colloquium. Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum—quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam causam colloquium vitasse ne res maxime spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia impedirentur; Pompei summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur; se<sup>26</sup> potestatem eius rei nullam habere propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint, sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium; atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis; interea manerent indutiae dum ab illo rediri posset neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.

17. Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Caesar existimavit neque nunc ut memoriae prodatur satis causae

<sup>26</sup> Pompei . . . se *Bücheler*: p- . . . sed *ω*: [p-] <suam> . . . sed *Elberling*

<sup>28</sup> See 3.10–11.      <sup>29</sup> The years are 65 and 62, respectively.

<sup>30</sup> In place of *Bücheler*'s emendation "Pompey's chief desire . . . We ourselves," many editors accept *Elberling*'s "my (or our) chief desire . . . but I (or we)."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Caesar was extremely eager to get it. Plus, something seemed to have come of Vibullius' message.<sup>28</sup>

16. At the time, Caesar was at Buthrotum, a town across from Corcyra. He had gone there with one legion to recover the allegiance of the more distant communities and to expedite provisioning, since his provisions were scanty. While there he was informed about the demands made by Libo and Bibulus by a letter from Acilius and Murcus. Leaving the legion there, he himself returned to Oricum. Upon arrival he summoned them to a meeting. Libo came out and made excuses for Bibulus, because Bibulus was extremely irascible and in addition had a personal aversion to Caesar that went back to their aedileship and praetorship.<sup>29</sup> The reason Bibulus stayed away from the meeting, he said, was so that an extremely promising and beneficial development was not hindered by his irascibility. "Pompey's chief desire is and always has been to settle matters and put arms aside. We ourselves<sup>30</sup> have no authority over the matter, since in accordance with the recommendation of the advisory council Pompey has been entrusted with the totality of the war and everything else. But Bibulus and I, after learning your demands, will send to Pompey, and he will handle the rest himself with our encouragement. In the meantime the truce should continue until word can get back from Pompey, and neither side should harm the other." To this he added a few words about their cause and their troops and auxiliaries.

17. As for these points, Caesar did not think that they needed a response even then, nor do I now feel that there

CAESAR

- 2 putamus. Postulabat Caesar ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium  
 sine periculo mittere liceret idque ipsi fore reciperent aut  
 3 acceptos per se ad eum perducerent; quod ad indutias  
 pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam ut illi classe  
 naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos  
 4 prohiberet, et si hoc sibi remitti vellent remitterent ipsi de  
 maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent se quoque id reten-  
 turum; nihilo minus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut  
 haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi<sup>27</sup> esse impe-  
 5 dimento. Libo neque legatos Caesaris recipere neque  
 periculum praestare eorum sed totam rem ad Pompeium  
 reicere, unum instare de indutiis vehementissimeque  
 6 contendere. Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis peri-  
 culi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem orationem insti-  
 tuisse neque ullam spem aut conditionem pacis adferre,  
 ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.

18. Bibulus multos dies terra prohibitus et graviore  
 morbo ex frigore ac labore implicitus cum neque curari  
 posset neque susceptum officium deserere vellet vim  
 2 morbi sustinere non potuit. Eo mortuo ad neminem unum  
 summa imperi redit, sed separatim suam quisque classem  
 ad arbitrium suum administrabat.

- 3 Vibullius sedato tumultu quem repentinus adventus  
 Caesaris concitaverat, ubi primum rursus<sup>28</sup> adhibito Li-  
 bone et L. Luceio et Theophane, quibuscum communi-  
 care de maximis rebus Pompeius consuerat, de mandatis

<sup>27</sup> illi *Madvig*: illis  $\omega$

<sup>28</sup> ubi . . . rursus  $\omega$  (*see 3.11.1*): ubi . . . e re visum est *Elberling*;  
 ibi . . . rursus *Vossius*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

is sufficient reason for putting one on record. Caesar demanded an opportunity to send envoys to Pompey securely. "You and Bibulus should guarantee this, or yourselves assume responsibility for the envoys and escort them to Pompey. As for the truce, our tactics are contrary, such that you aim to block my ships and reinforcements with your fleet, while I aim to keep you from getting water and landing, and if you want me to suspend my blockade you must suspend your naval patrols. But if you continue your tactics I will continue mine, too. Still, a settlement can be discussed even without suspensions, nor is the one thing an impediment to the other." Libo neither took responsibility for Caesar's envoys nor promised them security, but referred the entire matter to Pompey; he insisted on one thing and argued vehemently for it, a truce. When Caesar realized that the motive for Libo's whole speech was to escape his present predicament and the lack of supplies, and that he offered no prospect of or proposal for peace, he returned to thinking further about war.

18. Bibulus, prevented from landing for many days, contracted an illness made worse by cold and hardship. Since he was unable to receive treatment and unwilling to abandon the task he had undertaken, he could not withstand the violence of his illness. After his death no one individual held overall control, but independent commanders conducted naval operations at their own discretion.

Vibullius, when first he reopened negotiations on Caesar's message—once the commotion that Caesar's unexpected arrival stirred up had been settled, and in the presence of Libo and Lucius Lucceius and Theophanes, with whom Pompey was in the habit discussing his most impor-

## CAESAR

- 4 Caesaris agere instituit—quem ingressum in sermonem  
 Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit. “Quod  
 mihi” inquit “aut vita aut civitate opus est quam beneficio,  
 Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit  
 cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, reductus<sup>29</sup> existima-  
 5 bor bello perfecto.”<sup>30</sup> Ab iis Caesar haec facta cognovit qui  
 sermoni interfuerunt. Conatus tamen nihilo minus est aliis  
 rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.

19. Ut inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum  
 flumen tantum intererat Apsus, crebraque inter se collo-  
 quia milites habebant, neque ullum interim telum per  
 2 pactiones loquentium traiciebatur, mittit P. Vatinius lega-  
 tum ad ripam ipsam fluminis qui ea quae maxime ad pa-  
 cem pertinere viderentur ageret et crebro magna voce  
 pronuntiaret: liceretne civibus ad cives de pace tuto<sup>31</sup> le-  
 gatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo  
 praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim cum id agerent ne  
 3 cives cum civibus armis decertarent. Multa suppliciter  
 locutus, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silen-  
 4 tioque ab utrisque militibus auditus—responsum est ab  
 altera parte: Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad

<sup>29</sup> reductus] . . . reductus *Kübler*

<sup>30</sup> existimabor bello] existimabor. *Bello Orsini*

<sup>31</sup> tuto *Vossius*: duo *UT*: duos *MSV*: suos *Brutus*

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<sup>31</sup> For “when first he reopened negotiations,” Elberling and Vossius proposed “when the time seemed right, opened negotiations” and “then re-opened negotiations,” respectively; neither emendation for this admittedly awkward sentence is persuasive.

<sup>32</sup> For the lacuna proposed between *profectus sum* and *reductus*, Klotz suggested a supplement such as “(brought back) like a

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

tant affairs—after he embarked on his speech, Pompey 4  
interrupted him and forbade him to say more.<sup>31</sup> “What use  
is either life or citizenship to me if I am seen to have it by  
Caesar’s favor? And it will be impossible to eliminate this  
view of things when people think that I have been brought  
back to Italy, which was my starting point, after the conclu-  
sion of the war.”<sup>32</sup> Caesar learned of these events from 5  
those who took part in the discussion. He nevertheless  
attempted in other ways to use talks to work for peace.

19. The two camps of Pompey and Caesar were sepa-  
rated by just one river, the Apsus, and the soldiers fre-  
quently held talks among themselves, and no weapons  
were thrown for the duration by the speakers’ agreement.  
So Caesar sent his officer Publius Vatinius right up to the 2  
riverbank to do the things that seemed most conducive to  
peace and to repeat this message in a loud voice: “Are  
citizens permitted to send a delegation to fellow citizens  
in safety—something permitted even to deserters in the  
wilderness of the Pyrenees, and to pirates<sup>33</sup>—especially  
when their aim is to prevent armed conflict between fel- 3  
low citizens?” Speaking at length and like a suppliant, as  
he was right to do concerning his own and everyone’s sur-  
vival, he was heard in silence by soldiers on both sides. A 4  
response came from the other side, that Aulus Varro

deserter.” The thought could also be clarified by supplying “(start-  
ing point) for the war.” Some editors follow Orsini in putting  
“after the conclusion of the war” into the next sentence.

<sup>33</sup> Permitted, that is, by Pompey during his campaigns against  
Sertorius and the pirates in the 70s and 60s.



CAESAR

colloquium venturum atque una visurum quem<sup>32</sup> ad modum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent, certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset postero die ventum magna utrimque multitudo convenit magnaue erat expectatio eius rei. Atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. Qua ex frequentia Titus Labienus prodit. Summissa<sup>33</sup> oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. Quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa, quae ille obiectus armis militum vitavit. Vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus M. Plotius L. Tiburtius centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: "Desinite ergo de compositione loqui. Nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest."

20. Isdem temporibus M. Caelius Rufus praetor causa debitorum suscepta initio magistratus tribunal suum iuxta C. Treboni, praetoris urbani, sellam collocavit et si quis appellavisset de aestimatione et de solutionibus quae per arbitrum fierent—ut Caesar praesens constituerat—fore auxilio pollicebatur. Sed fiebat aequitate decreti et humanitate Treboni, qui <pro><sup>34</sup> temporibus clementer et moderate ius dicendum existimabat, ut reperiri non possent a quibus initium appellandi nasceretur. Nam fortasse inopiam excusare et calamitatem aut propriam suam aut temporum queri et difficultates auctionandi proponere

<sup>32</sup> visurum quem *Elberling*: vis utrumque ω

<sup>33</sup> summissa . . . atque] *Emendations have been proposed for every word.*      <sup>34</sup> <pro> *Damon*: <his> ed. pr.

<sup>34</sup> The generally accepted emendation "together with them would see" does not fix every problem in this difficult sentence.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

promised that he would come to a meeting on the following day and together with them would see how a delegation could come in safety and explain what they wanted.<sup>34</sup>

A specific time was fixed for this. When it reached this time on the following day, a huge crowd gathered on both sides and there was great anticipation about the matter; indeed everyone seemed to be intent on peace. Titus Labienus stepped out of the crowd. In a low tone he began to speak about peace and to quarrel with Vatinius. Their ongoing talk was suddenly interrupted by a volley of weapons from all sides. Protected by his soldiers' shields, Labienus avoided them. But several men were wounded, including Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, Lucius Tiburtius, plus some centurions and soldiers. Then Labienus: "So stop talking about a settlement, for in our view no peace is possible unless we get Caesar's head."

20. At this same period the praetor Marcus Caelius Rufus took up the cause of debtors. At the beginning of his year he established his official post close to the seat of the urban praetor, Gaius Trebonius, and promised that he would assist anyone appealing an assessment and the repayments arranged by an arbitrator according to the system Caesar set up when he was in Rome.<sup>35</sup> But it turned out to be impossible to find anyone to initiate an appeal, thanks to the equity of Caesar's decree and the decency of Trebonius, who thought that in the circumstances judicial rulings ought to be made with compassion and moderation. For even the average person, perhaps, will cite poverty as an excuse, and blame a personal calamity or that of the times, and put forward the difficulty of holding an

<sup>35</sup> See 3.1.2.

etiam mediocris est animi. Integras vero tenere possessiones, qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae est? Itaque hoc qui postulare reperiebatur nemo. Atque ipsis ad quorum commodum pertinebat durior inventus est Caelius. Et ab hoc profectus initio, ne frustra ingressus turpem causam videretur legem promulgavit ut sexenni die sine usuris creditae pecuniae solvantur.

21. Cum resisteret Servilius consul reliquique magistratus et minus opinione sua efficeret ad hominum excitanda studia sublata priore lege duas promulgavit, unam qua mercedes habitationum annuas conductoribus donavit, aliam tabularum novarum, impetuque multitudinis in C. Trebonium facto et nonnullis vulneratis eum de tribuni 2 nali deturbavit. De quibus rebus Servilius consul ad senatum rettulit, senatusque Caelium ab re publica removendum censuit. Hoc decreto eum consul senatu prohibuit et 4 contionari conantem de rostris deduxit. Ille ignominia et dolore permotus palam se proficisci ad Caesarem simulavit. Clam, nuntiis ad Milonem missis, qui Clodio interfecto eo nomine erat damnatus, atque eo in Italiam evocato quod magnis muneribus datis gladiatoriae familiae reliquias habebat, sibi coniunxit eum atque<sup>35</sup> in Thurinum ad 5 sollicitandos pastores praemisit. Ipse cum Casilinum venisset unoque tempore signa eius militaria atque arma Capuae essent comprehensa et familia Neapoli visa<sup>36</sup> deque<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> eum atque *Apitz*: a- e- ω

<sup>36</sup> visa . . . appareret *Emendations have been proposed for every word except oppidi.*

<sup>37</sup> deque *Damon*: qu(a)e ω

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<sup>36</sup> From "and evidence" to "betrayal" the text is uncertain.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

auction. But if a person who admits to owing money keeps his assets intact, what does that say about his character and his impudence? So no one was found to place a claim, and Caelius was felt to be more obdurate than those whose interests were at stake. After this beginning, and so that he would not seem to have embarked upon his disgraceful project in vain, he proposed a law making loans payable on their fifth anniversary without interest.

21. When the consul Servilius and the rest of the magistrates resisted, and he himself was achieving less than he expected by way of rousing people's enthusiasm, Caelius withdrew the first law and put forward two laws, one in which he remitted tenants' rent payments for a year, another a cancellation of debts. After a crowd attacked Gaius Trebonius, and some people were injured, Caelius ejected Trebonius from his official seat. The consul Servilius referred these matters to the senate and the senate voted to remove Caelius from his public duties. With this decree in hand the consul barred Caelius from the senate and pulled him down off the rostra when he was trying to address a public meeting. Humiliated and hurt, Caelius pretended in public that he was on his way to Caesar. In secret he sent messengers to Milo, who had been convicted of murder after the murder of Clodius, and summoned him to Italy, for Milo had the remnants of a band of gladiators from the large-scale shows he had given. Caelius joined Milo to his cause and sent him ahead to rouse the herdsmen. He himself went to Casilinum. At one and the same moment military standards and weapons were seized at Capua and gladiators were seen at Naples and evidence emerged about the betrayal of the city.<sup>36</sup> With his plans

*proditione oppidi appareret, patefactis consiliis exclusus Capua et periculum veritus quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat consilio destitit atque eo itinere sese avertit.*

22. *Interim Milo dimissis circum municipia litteris <se> ea quae faceret iussu atque imperio facere Pompei, quae mandata ad se per Vibullium delata essent, quos ex*  
 2 *aere alieno laborare arbitrabatur sollicitabat. Apud quos cum proficere nihil posset quibusdam solutis ergastulis Compsam in agro Hirpino oppugnare coepit. Eo cum a Q. Pedio praetore cum legione . . . lapide ictus ex muro per-*  
 3 *it.<sup>38</sup> Et Caelius profectus, ut dictitabat, ad Caesarem per-*  
*venit Thurios. Vbi cum quosdam eius municipi sollicitaret equitibusque Caesaris Gallis atque Hispanis, qui eo praesidi causa missi erant, pecuniam polliceretur ab his est*  
 4 *interfectus. Ita magnarum initia rerum, quae occupatione magistratum et temporum<sup>39</sup> sollicitam Italiam habebant, celerem et facilem exitum habuerunt.*

23. *Libo profectus ab Orico cum classe cui praerat navium L Brundisium venit insulamque quae contra portum Brundisinum est occupavit quod praestare arbitrabatur unum locum—qua necessarius nostris erat egressus—*  
 2 *quam omnia litora ac portus custodia clausos tueri. Hic repentino adventu naves onerarias quasdam nactus incendit et unam frumento onustam abduxit magnumque nostris terrorem iniecit. Et noctu militibus ac sagittariis in*

<sup>38</sup> *Some text is missing either before or after lapide.*

<sup>39</sup> *After temporum Nitsche supplied <difficultate>.*

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<sup>37</sup> *This incomplete sentence cannot be certainly restored.*

<sup>38</sup> *Nitsche added "the difficulty of" before "the times."*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

laid bare, he was shut out of Capua. Fearing danger because the association of Roman citizens had taken up arms and thought him to be tantamount to a public enemy, he desisted from his plan and turned aside from the road to Capua.

22. Meanwhile Milo circulated a letter to various towns, saying that his actions were taken on Pompey's order and authority and that the message had been brought to him by Vibullius. He tried to rouse those whom he believed to be in difficulties with debt. Since he was unable to make any progress with these, he opened the slave lockups and began to blockade Compsa in the territory of the Hirpini. There Milo perished, struck by a stone from the wall, after . . . by the praetor Quintus Pedius with a legion . . .<sup>37</sup> Caelius, having set out, as he said, for Caesar, reached Thurii. There, while trying to rouse certain men from the town and promising money to some of Caesar's Gallic and Spanish cavalry who had been sent to garrison the place, he was killed by the cavalry. Thus the outbreak of major developments, which kept Italy anxious with preoccupations about public office and the times,<sup>38</sup> had a swift and easy resolution. 2 3 4

23. Libo, setting out from Oricum with the fleet of fifty ships that was under his authority, came to Brundisium and occupied the island opposite Brundisium's harbor, thinking it preferable to contain one location with a guard and watch that one—the route by which our men would necessarily leave—not the whole coastline and every harbor. With his sudden arrival he captured and burned some cargo vessels, towed one away laden with provisions, and inflicted great terror on our men. By night he landed some infantry and archers and drove off the island's cavalry gar- 2

## CAESAR

terra expositis praesidium equitum deiecit. Et adeo loci opportunitate profecit uti ad Pompeium litteras mitteret: naves reliquas, si vellet, subduci et refici iuberet; sua classe auxilia sese Caesaris prohibiturum.

24. Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisi. Virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter LX cratibus pluteisque contextit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit, navesque triremes duas quas Brundisi faciendas curaverat per causam exercendorum remigum ad fauces portus prodire iussit. Has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset sperans intercipi posse quadriremes V ad eas misit. Quae cum navibus nostris propinquassent nostri veterani in portum<sup>40</sup> refugiebant, illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur. Iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt. Primoque impetu unam ex his quadriremem cum remigibus defensoribusque suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt.
- 4 Ad hoc detrimentum accessit ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. Qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.

25. Multi iam menses erant, et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. Ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus

<sup>40</sup> veterani in portum] ut erat imperatum Kübler: ut convenerat ante i- p- Castiglioni

<sup>39</sup> For "our veterans retreated into the harbor," Kübler and

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

rison. He drew such profit from the position's advantages that he wrote to Pompey: "Order the rest of the ships to be hauled out and repaired, if you like; I will block Caesar's reinforcements with my fleet."

24. Antony was at Brundisium at the time. Confident of his soldiers' courage, he camouflaged about sixty of the warships' longboats with wicker screens, put picked men on board, and stationed them separately at various spots along the shore. He ordered two triremes that he had arranged to have built at Brundisium to advance to the harbor mouth on the pretext of training the rowers. Libo saw them advance quite boldly. Hoping that they could be cut off, he sent five quadriremes against them. When these approached our ships, our veterans retreated into the harbor.<sup>39</sup> Spurred by enthusiasm, the enemy followed too recklessly. At that moment, and on his signal, Antony's longboats drove against the enemy from all directions and in the initial attack captured one of their boats, a quadrireme with its rowers and marines, and forced the rest to make a shameful retreat. On top of the loss itself was the fact that the enemy was prevented from getting water by cavalry that Antony had stationed all along the shore. Under duress and humiliated, Libo left Brundisium and abandoned his blockade of our men.

25. The months were adding up, and winter was far advanced, and the ships and legions from Brundisium had not reached Caesar. Indeed it seemed to Caesar that some occasions for crossing had been missed, since steady winds

Castiglioni suggested "retreated as had been ordered" and "retreated into the harbor as had been agreed beforehand," respectively.



## CAESAR

2 necessario committendum existimabat. Quantoque eius  
amplius processerat temporis tanto erant alacriores ad  
custodias qui classibus praeerant maioremque fiduciam  
prohibendi habebant. Et crebris Pompei litteris castiga-  
bantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohi-  
buissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent. Duriusque  
cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis ex-  
3 spectabant. Quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad  
suos severius scripsit: nacti idoneum ventum ne occa-  
sionem navigandi dimitterent sive < . . . sive > ad<sup>41</sup> litora  
Apolloniatium cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere pos-  
4 sent. Haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant  
quod se longius <a> portibus committere non auderent.

26. Illi adhibita audacia et virtute, administrantibus M.  
Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortanti-  
bus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus,  
nacti austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apol-  
2 loniam Dyrrachiumque praetervehuntur. Qui cum essent  
ex continenti visi C. Coponius, qui Dyrrachi classi Rhod-  
diae praeerat, naves ex portu educit. Et cum iam nostris  
remissiore vento appropinquasset idem auster increbuit  
3 nostrisque praesidio fuit. Neque vero ille ob eam causam  
conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum  
etiam vim tempestatis superari posse sperabat, praeter-  
vectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo secius

41 sive < . . . sive > ad *Damon*: si ad *Held*. After Apolloniatium  
*Hoffmann supplied* <sive ad Labeatium>.

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<sup>40</sup> For "for either < . . . > or," Held suggested "even for." Hoffmann pairs "the coast belonging to Apollonia" with "or that belonging to Labeate."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

had often blown; on these, he kept thinking, they would be bound to place their trust. The more the time for the crossing passed, the more attentive to patrolling the fleet commanders became and the more confidence they gained in deterrence. Plus, there were frequent scolding letters from Pompey urging them, since they had not stopped Caesar when he was first on his way, to block the rest of his forces. And they expected the weather to get more difficult for crossing every day, with lighter winds. Prompted by these considerations, Caesar wrote to his men with some severity: "When you get a suitable wind, do not miss an opportunity for sailing, if you can set a course for either < . . . > or the coast belonging to Apollonia<sup>40</sup> and beach the ships there." These places were mostly free of the fleets' patrols because they did not dare, he assumed, commit themselves too far from the harbors.

26. His men acted with daring and courage. With Mark Antony and Fufius Calenus directing operations, and the soldiers themselves urging them on and accepting any risk for Caesar's safety, they weighed anchor when they got a wind from the south. The following day they were being carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and when they were sighted from the mainland Gaius Coponius, who was in charge of the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrachium, led his ships out of the harbor. When he was already close to our ships in a rather light wind, that same south wind grew stronger and was a great help to our side. But this did not make Coponius desist from his attempt; hoping, rather, that even the storm's violence could be overcome by the sailors' effort and perseverance, he kept up his pursuit as they were carried past Dyrrachium by the wind's great force.

## CAESAR

- 4 sequebatur. Nostri usi Fortunae beneficio tamen impetum  
classis timebant si forte ventus remisisset. Nacti portum  
qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum  
tria, eo naves introduxerunt. (Qui portus ab africo tegeba-  
tur, ab austro non erat tutus, leviusque tempestatis quam  
5 classis periculum aestimaverunt.) Quo simul atque intro  
est itum incredibili felicitate auster, qui per biduum flave-  
rat, in africanum se vertit.

27. Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre li-  
cuit. Qui modo sibi timuerant hos tutissimus portus reci-  
piebat, qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant de suo  
2 timere cogebantur. Itaque tempore commutato tempestas  
et nostros texit et naves Rhodias adffixit, ita ut ad unam  
omnes constratae numero XVI eliderentur et naufragio  
interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque nu-  
mero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris  
detraheretur. Quos omnes conservatos Caesar domum re-  
misit.

28. Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noc-  
tem coniectae, cum ignorarent quem locum reliquae ce-  
2 pissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constiterunt. Has scaphis  
minoribusque navigiis compluribus summissis Otacilius  
Crassus, qui Lissi praerat, expugnare parabat. Simul de  
deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollice-  
3 batur. Harum altera navis CCXX e legione tironum sus-  
4 tulerat, altera ex veterana paulo minus CC. His cognosci  
licuit quantum esset hominibus praesidi in animi firmitu-

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Our men profited from Fortune's kindness but feared an 4  
attack by the fleet in case the wind let up. Coming to a  
harbor called Nymphaeum, three miles beyond Lissus,  
they put in there. (This harbor was protected from a south-  
west wind but not safe from a south wind, and in their  
reckoning there was less danger from the storm than from  
the enemy fleet.) The moment they entered, with incred- 5  
ible good fortune, the south wind, which had blown for  
two days straight, turned into a southwest wind.

27. At this it was possible to see a sudden reversal of  
fortune. Those who had recently been afraid for them-  
selves were received into a perfectly safe harbor; those  
who had been a danger to our ships were forced to be 2  
afraid of their own danger. Thus with the change of cir-  
cumstance the weather gave our men shelter and inflicted  
such havoc on the Rhodian ships that every one of the  
decked ships, sixteen in number, was lost to shipwreck,  
and some of their large number of rowers and fighters  
were dashed on the rocks and killed, others were rescued  
by our men. Caesar spared all of these and sent them  
home.

28. Two of our ships, having completed their journey  
rather slowly, were delayed until dark. Since they did not  
know what location the others had chosen, they anchored 2  
off Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who was in charge at Lissus,  
sent up some longboats and small craft and prepared to  
board them. At the same time he began negotiating for  
their surrender, promising safety to those who surren- 3  
dered. One of these ships carried two hundred and twenty  
men from a newly recruited legion, the other a few less  
than two hundred from a veteran legion. From these it was 4  
possible to learn how much protection men derive from

dine. Tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et sa-  
 nausiaque confecti iureiurando accepto—nihil his nocti-  
 ros hostes—se Otacilio dederunt. Qui omnes ad eu-  
 producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu  
 5 crudelissime interficiuntur. At veteranae legionis milites  
 item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiiis neque ex  
 pristina virtute remittendum aliquid putaverunt. Sed trac-  
 tandis conditionibus et simulatione deditiois extracto  
 primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem ei-  
 6 cere cogunt. Ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis  
 partem ibi confecerunt. Et luce prima, missis ad eos ab  
 Otacilio equitibus qui eam partem orae maritimae adser-  
 vabant circiter CCCC quique eos armati ex praesidio se-  
 cuti sunt, se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis  
 incolumes se ad nostros receperunt.

29. Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum qui Lis-  
 sum obtinebant, quod oppidum iis antea Caesar attribue-  
 rat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibus-  
 que rebus iuvit. Otacilius sibi timens <ex> oppido fugit et  
 2 ad Pompeium pervenit. Expositis omnibus copiis Anto-  
 nius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum  
 uniusque tironum et equitum DCCC, plerasque naves in  
 Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transpor-  
 3 tandos. Pontones, quod est genus navium Gallicarum,  
 Lissi relinquit hoc consilio ut si forte Pompeius vacuum  
 existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio  
 erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum fa-  
 cultatem haberet. Nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit:  
 quibus regionibus exercitum exposuisset et quid militum  
 transvexisset.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

sturdy morale. For the new recruits were thoroughly crowded by the number of vessels and overcome by seasickness. After receiving a sworn guarantee that the enemy would not harm them, they surrendered to Otacilius. All of them were brought before him and—a violation of the sanctity of the oath—killed with extreme cruelty in his sight. The veteran legions, however, although likewise suffering from bad weather and bilge, felt that their courage should be held to its former standard. Instead, after dragging out the first part of the night with negotiations and a pretense of surrender, they forced their pilot to run the ship aground; they found a suitable spot and spent the rest of the night there. At first light, when Otacilius sent cavalry against them—around four hundred, who were guarding that portion of the coast, followed by armed men from the garrison—they defended themselves, killing some of the enemy, and returned safely to our men. 5 6

29. After this development Antony was welcomed by the association of Roman citizens in charge of Lissus, a town that Caesar had earlier allocated to them while making arrangements for its defense. Antony was given every sort of assistance. Otacilius, afraid for himself, fled from the town and went to Pompey. Antony's troops were now all disembarked; their total was three legions of veterans and one of new recruits, plus eight hundred cavalry. He sent most of the ships back to Italy to bring the rest of the soldiers and cavalry. He left the pontoons, a variety of Gallic ship, at Lissus with the intention that, if Pompey, thinking Italy unguarded, happened to send his army across—this idea had been aired to the general population—Caesar would have some means of following. He then sent word quickly to Caesar about where he had set his troops ashore and what forces he had brought across. 2 3

30. Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi—iter secundum eas terras<sup>42</sup> derexerant—sed quo essent eae delatae primis diebus ignorabant. Cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt. Caesar ut quam primum se cum Antonio coniungeret, Pompeius ut venientibus in itinere se opponeret et si im-
- 2 prudentes ex insidiis adoriri posset. Eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt, Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque
- 3 interdiu. Sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius adverso flumine ut vado transire posset. Pompeius, quia
- 4 expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit. Atque ubi eum appropinquare cognovit idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit suosque omnes castris continuit ignesque fieri prohibuit quo occultior esset eius adventus. Haec ad Antonium
- 5 statim per Graecos deferuntur. Ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit. Altero die ad eum
- 6 pervenit Caesar. Cuius adventu cognito Pompeius ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.

31. His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appella-

<sup>42</sup> secundum eas terras] -do austro Paul. Perhaps -dum eas oras?

<sup>41</sup> For "followed the coast in those regions," Paul proposed "sailed with a following south wind"; one might also emend to "directed their route along those shores."



### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

30. Caesar and Pompey learned about these events almost simultaneously. (They themselves had seen the ships carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium—the ships had followed the coast in those regions<sup>41</sup>—but in the first days thereafter did not know where they had ended up.) Seeing the situation, they adopted contrasting plans, Caesar to join up with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey to confront the newcomers en route, and in case he could attack them unawares from an ambush. They led the troops out of their established camps and away from the Apsus on the same day, Pompey secretly and by night, Caesar openly and by day. But Caesar's route was the longer by a major detour upstream, so that he could cross at a ford. Pompey hastened toward Antony by forced marches, since he did not have to cross the river on his unobstructed route. When he learned that Antony was getting close, he found a suitable location and stationed his forces there. He kept all of his men in camp and forbade them to light fires, so that his arrival would be better concealed. These matters were immediately reported to Antony by the Greeks. He sent messengers to Caesar and stayed in camp for one day; Caesar reached him the next. Upon learning of Caesar's arrival Pompey left the area to avoid being surrounded by two armies. He went to Asparagium, a town belonging to Dyrrachium, and made camp there in a suitable location.

31. At this period Scipio had incurred some losses near the Amanus range and given himself the title *imperator*.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> As governor of Syria (1.6.5). For *imperator*, see on 2.26.1.



- 2 *verat. Quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias. Item a publicanis suae provinciae debitam bienni pecuniam exegerat et ab isdem insequentis anni mutuum praeceperat equitesque toti provinciae imperaverat.*
- 3 *Quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones*
- 4 *equitesque ex Syria deduxerat. Summaque in sollicitudine ac timore<sup>43</sup> Parthici belli [provincia] cum venisset,<sup>44</sup> ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur—sese contra hostem si ducerentur ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos—deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit. Et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.*

32. *Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. Multa praeterea generatim ad*
- 2 *avaritiam excogitabantur. In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur. Columnaria ostiaria frumentum milites arma remiges tormenta vecturae imperabantur. Cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat hoc*
- 3 *satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur. Non solum*

<sup>43</sup> *summaque in sollicitudine ac timore MUST: -amque in -nem ac -rem V*

<sup>44</sup> [*provincia*] . . . *venisset (sc. Scipio) Damon: -a [-am T] . . . v- ω: <in> provinciam . . . venisset ed. pr.*

<sup>43</sup> For "although . . . situation," the first edition substituted "although he had come into the province when it was in a state."

<sup>44</sup> Editors often print the reading of V: "although the province had come into a state of extreme anxiety and fear."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Thereafter he had requisitioned great sums from communities and rulers. Similarly, he had exacted from the tax contactors in his province the amount they owed for a two-year period, and had taken the amount for the following year in advance as a loan. Plus, he had requisitioned cavalry from the entire province. After collecting these, and leaving behind hostile Parthians on his borders—they had killed the commander Marcus Crassus a short while before and held Marcus Bibulus under siege—he had led the legions and cavalry out of Syria. Although Scipio had arrived in a situation<sup>43</sup> of extreme anxiety and fear<sup>44</sup> of a Parthian war, and some soldiers were heard to say that they would go if he led them against the enemy but would not bear arms against a citizen and consul, he led the legions to Pergamum and some extremely wealthy cities for their winter quarters and provided huge bounties. Moreover, in order to encourage the soldiers he allowed them to pillage these cities.

32. Meanwhile the money requisitioned with extreme harshness was being exacted throughout the province.<sup>45</sup> In addition, many new categories were devised to serve people's greed. A poll tax was imposed on individuals enslaved and free. "Column"- and "doorway"-taxes, provisions, soldiers, weapons, rowers, catapults, and conveyances were requisitioned. If a name at least could be found for something, that seemed sufficient to collect funds.<sup>46</sup> Individuals

<sup>45</sup> In this paragraph it is unclear whether the province in question is Syria or Asia. See also note 49.

<sup>46</sup> The text is problematic, but the general point is clear.

urbibus sed paene vicis castellisque singulis <singuli> cum imperio<sup>45</sup> praeficiebantur. Qui horum quid acerbissimè crudelissimeque fecerat is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. Erat plena lictorum et imperiorum<sup>46</sup> provincia, dif-  
 4 ferta praefectis atque exactoribus, qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant. Dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus neces-  
 5 sariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent. Accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis. Quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. Itaque aes alienum provinciae eo  
 6 biennio multiplicatum est. Neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae—sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates—certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatus consulto exigi dictitabant. Publicani,<sup>47</sup> ut †in sorte†,<sup>48</sup> fecerant insequentis anni vectigal promutuuum.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> <singuli> cum imperio *Oehler*: <s-> [cum i-] *Carter*

<sup>46</sup> et imperiorum *MUST*: -orumque *V*: et apparitorum *Forchhammer* <sup>47</sup> publicani *Damon*, with punctuation before fecerant: -nis (sc. imperabatur)  $\omega$ . Unless you prefer with *Glandorp* to supply <imperatum> before insequentis or with *Nitsche* to emend promutuuum.

<sup>48</sup> in sorte [fo- *S*]  $\omega$ : in Syria *Estienne*: in superiore (sc. anno) *Markland*: ii sortem *Constans*

<sup>49</sup> promutuuum [-mot- *S*]  $\omega$ : prae<cipiebant> mut- *Nitsche*

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<sup>47</sup> *Carter* excised "with military authority" as being of dubious historicity, but "practically" is an admission of exaggeration.

<sup>48</sup> For "authorities," *Forchhammer* proposed "magistrates' attendants."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

with military authority<sup>47</sup> were put in charge not only of cities but practically of individual villages and outposts, and any of them who accomplished anything in a particularly harsh and cruel manner was considered an outstanding man and citizen. The province was full of lictors and authorities,<sup>48</sup> bursting with officers and tax collectors. Beyond the requisitioned money, these men were attending to their private finances. (They used to say that, having been driven from home and country, they lacked every necessity, thus masking an utterly disgraceful matter with an honorable pretext.) On top of these things the interest rate was utterly extortionate, as generally tends to happen in wartime when funds are requisitioned from everyone; in this business Scipio's agents would say that an extension was a gift. Thus within a two-year period the province's indebtedness increased severalfold. This was not taken as a reason not to requisition specific sums from the province's Roman citizens, however, but the burden fell on individual civic associations and individual cities—while the Scipio's agents kept saying that these "loans" were being exacted in accordance with a decree of the senate. The tax contractors had made an advance loan of the following year's revenue, as †<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> For the daggered text, Estienne substituted "in Syria" (which would make the rest of the paragraph about Asia), while Markland suggested "in the previous (year)." Constans' emendation requires a more thorough overhaul, with *publicanis* . . . *promutuum* appended to the previous sentence: "(requisition) . . . from tax contractors, insofar as they had accrued capital, an advance loan . . ."

## CAESAR

33. Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiqui-  
 tus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. Certaue eius <rei> die  
 constituta cum in fanum ventum<sup>50</sup> esset adhibitis complu-  
 ribus ordinis senatori quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei  
 redduntur a Pompeio: mare transisse cum legionibus Cae-  
 sare; properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque  
 2 posteriora haberet.<sup>51</sup> His litteris acceptis quos advocaverat  
 dimittit, ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque  
 post diebus est profectus. Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae  
 salutem attulit.

34. Caesar Antoni exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico  
 legione quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat  
 temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum exis-  
 2 timabat. Et cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati  
 venissent qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum gen-  
 tium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum  
 cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur vicesima sep-  
 tima, atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, item<sup>52</sup> C. Calvi-  
 sium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in  
 Aetoliam misit. Maxime eos, quod erant propinquae re-  
 3 giones, de re frumentaria ut providerent hortatus est. Cn.  
 Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, undecima et  
 duodecima, et equitibus D in Macedoniam proficisci ius-  
 4 sit. Cuius provinciae ab ea parte quae libera appellabatur

<sup>50</sup> ventum] -urus *Paul*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>51</sup> omniaque posteriora haberet *Paul*, as reported by *Meusel*:  
 o- posteaqu(a)e h- *USTV*: o- quae h- *M*: omnibusque quae h- *ed.*  
 pr.: omniaque posth- *Aldus*

<sup>52</sup> item *Constans*: ire ω: [i-] *Aldus*

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<sup>50</sup> For "fixing . . . arrival," Paul proposed "When he had fixed

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

33. Furthermore, at Ephesus Scipio ordered long-standing deposits to be removed from the temple of Diana, fixing a date for it. Upon Scipio's arrival<sup>50</sup> in the temple accompanied by some men of senatorial rank whom he had summoned, a letter from Pompey was given to him: "Caesar has crossed the Adriatic with his legions. Make haste to come to me with your army and treat this as the highest priority."<sup>51</sup> Upon receiving this letter Scipio dismissed the men he had summoned and began to make preparations for his own march to Macedonia, setting out within a few days. This development saved the money at Ephesus. 2

34. After the conjunction with Antony's army, Caesar withdrew the legion that he had stationed in Oricum to guard the coastline, thinking that he ought to rally the provinces and advance further. When delegations reached him from Thessaly and Aetolia promising that their communities would do his bidding if he sent garrisons, he sent Lucius Cassius Longinus to Thessaly along with a legion of new recruits called the 27th and two hundred cavalry, and likewise Gaius Calvisius Sabinus to Aetolia with five cohorts and a small number of cavalry. His principal charge to them was to make provisioning arrangements; since those regions were close at hand. He ordered Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to set out for Macedonia with two legions, the 11th and 12th, and five hundred cavalry. Menedemus, the area's leading man, had been sent as a 2 3 4

a date on which he would arrive," which makes the coincidence of the letter's timing less striking.

51 The text underlying "the highest priority" is uncertain, but the meaning is clear.

Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legati omnium suorum excellens studium profitebatur.

35. Ex his Calvisius primo adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate praesidiis adversariorum Calydone et Naupacto deiectis<sup>53</sup> omni Aetolia potitus est.
- 2 Cassius in Thessaliam cum legione pervenit. Hic cum essent factiones duae varia voluntate civitatum utebatur. Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat. Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adulescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem enixe iuvabat.

36. Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit. Et cum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem cum legionibus magna opinione et fama omnium. Nam plerumque in novitate <rem> fama antecedit. Hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu tetendit ad Domitium. Et cum ab eo milia passuum XX afuisset subito se
- 3 ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. Hoc adeo celeriter fecit <ut> simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur. Et quo iter expeditius faceret M. Favonium ad flumen Haliaemonem, quod Macedonia a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus VIII praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit
- 4 castellumque ibi muniri iussit. Eodem tempore equitatus regis Coti ad castra Cassi advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam
- 5 esse consuerat. Tum timore perterritus Cassius cognito Scipionis adventu visisque equitibus, quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit, qui Thessaliam cin-

<sup>53</sup> deiectis *Chacon*: relic- ω

<sup>52</sup> The number seems high and has often been emended. If correct, it suggests that Scipio placed excessive value on the proceeds of his time in Syria and Asia (3.31–32).



### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

representative from the part the province called "free Macedonia"; he promised that the enthusiasm of all of his compatriots was very high.

35. Of these, Calvisius was received upon arrival with the utmost goodwill of all Aetolians. He drove enemy garrisons out of Calydon and Naupactus and took control of the whole of Aetolia. Cassius arrived in Thessaly with his legion, encountering different attitudes from place to place since there were two factions here. Hegesaretus, a man whose power was of long standing, favored the Pompeian cause. Petraeus, a younger man of the highest nobility, supported Caesar assiduously with resources belonging to himself and his associates. 2

36. Domitius came to Macedonia at the same time. Local delegations had begun to gather around him in large numbers, but then it was reported that Scipio was at hand with his legions, a man of impressive reputation and the subject of universal talk, for in novel situations rumor generally outstrips reality. Scipio did not linger anywhere in Macedonia, but headed for Domitius with great urgency. Then, when he was twenty miles away from him, he suddenly changed direction toward Cassius Longinus in Thessaly, acting so quickly in this matter that his arrival and his approach were reported simultaneously. (In order to expedite his march Scipio left Marcus Favonius at the Haliacmon River, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to protect the legions' baggage,<sup>52</sup> and ordered a stronghold to be fortified there.) At the same time the cavalry of King Cotus appeared unexpectedly near Cassius' camp; this force was often in the vicinity of Thessaly.<sup>53</sup> Cassius was terrified by the alarming 3 4 5

<sup>53</sup> Cotus' kingdom was in eastern Thrace, near the Bosphorus.



## CAESAR

gunt, atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter *facere* coe-  
 6 pit. At Scipionem properantem sequi litterae summi conse-  
 cutae a M. Favonio: Domitium cum legionibus adesse  
 neque se praesidium ubi constitutus esset sine auxilio  
 7 Scipionis tenere posse. Quibus litteris acceptis consilium  
 Scipio iterque commutat. Cassium sequi *desistit*. Favonio  
 8 auxilium ferre contendit. Itaque die ac nocte *continuato*  
 itinere ad eum pervenit tam opportuno tempore ut summi  
 Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur et primi *antecur-*  
 sores Scipionis viderentur. Ita Cassio industria Domiti  
 Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem attulit.

37. Scipio biduum castris stativis *moratus ad flumen*  
 quod inter eum et Domiti castra *fluebat*, *Haliacmonem*  
 tertio die prima luce exercitum *vado traducit*. Et castris  
 positis postero die mane copias ante *frontem castrorum*  
 2 instruit. Domitius tum quoque sibi *dubitandum non puta-*  
 vit quin productis legionibus *proelio decertaret*. Sed cum  
 esset inter bina castra campus *circiter milium passuum VI*  
 Domitius castris Scipionis *aciem suam subiecit*. Ille a vallo  
 3 non discedere perseveravit. At tamen aegre *retentis Do-*  
 mitianis militibus est factum ne *proelio contenderetur*, et  
 maxime quod rivus *difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Sci-*  
 4 pionis progressus nostrorum *impediebat*. Quorum stu-  
 dium alacritatemque pugnandi cum *cognovisset Scipio*,  
 suspicatus fore ut postero die *aut invitus dimicare cogere-*  
 tur aut magna cum infamia castris se *contineret*, qui

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<sup>54</sup> The number six is often reduced by *emendation*.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

development. Aware of Scipio's approach, and seeing cavalry that he thought belonged to Scipio, he headed for the mountains that encircle Thessaly and began to march out of this region in the direction of Ambracia. Scipio hurried in pursuit, but a letter arrived from Marcus Favonius: "Domitius is at hand with his legions, and without your help I cannot keep a garrison where I have been stationed." On receipt of the letter Scipio changed his plan and his route. He stopped pursuing Cassius and hurried to help Favonius. As a result, after marching continuously day and night, he arrived at such an opportune moment that the dust of Domitius' army and the first of Scipio's advance troops came into view simultaneously. Thus Cassius was saved by Domitius' effort, Favonius by Scipio's speed.

37. Scipio lingered for two days in the established camp beside the river that flowed between him and Domitius' camp, the Haliacmon. At dawn on the third day he led his army across at a ford. He made camp and early the next day drew up his forces in front of his camp. Domitius felt even then that he should not hesitate to bring out his legions and decide matters with a fight. Moreover, although there was level ground between the two camps for about six miles,<sup>54</sup> Domitius positioned his line close to Scipio's camp, while Scipio persisted in his refusal to move away from the rampart. Domitius' soldiers were held back with difficulty, but in the end there was no engagement, mostly because a river close to Scipio's camp had banks that were hard to negotiate and slowed our men's advance. Recognizing their determination and eagerness for battle, Scipio suspected that the next day he would be forced to fight against his will or else stay in camp getting thoroughly

## CAESAR

magna expectatione venisset temere progressus turpem habuit exitum. Et noctu neque conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transiit atque in eandem partem ex qua venerat rediit ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit.

- 5 Paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum collocavit quo in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri pabulari consuerant, et cum cotidiana consuetudine Q. Varus, praefectus equitum Domiti, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis
- 6 consurrexerunt. Sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines rediit, atque
- 7 ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt. Ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.

38. His rebus gestis Domitius sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere. Vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum tria loco idoneo et
- 2 occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque collocavit. Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitatus magnam partem ad
- 3 explorandum iter Domiti et cognoscendum praemisit. Qui cum essent progressi primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspicione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur celerem eorum
- 4 receptum conspicati restiterunt. Nostri cognitis [hostium]<sup>54</sup> insidiis, ne frustra reliquos expectarent, duas

<sup>54</sup> [hostium] *Apitz*: -i *Vossius*: <per exploratores> -ium *Kübler*: suis *Dübner*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

vilified. The man of whom great things were expected when he arrived had advanced rashly; the outcome was ignominious. He crossed the river by night without even giving the signal to pack up. Returning to his starting point he made camp there beside the river on a natural rise. During the night a few days later he laid a cavalry ambush where our men had recently been accustomed to forage, and when Quintus Varus, Domitius' cavalry commander, arrived following the regular routine, the enemy suddenly burst out of their ambush. Our men, however, bravely withstood their attack. Each man returned quickly to his formation, and as one they made a spontaneous attack on the enemy. After killing about eighty of them and putting the rest to flight ours returned to camp with a loss of two.

38. Following these developments Domitius hoped that Scipio could be enticed to fight. He pretended that supply difficulties had induced him strike camp. After giving the regulation order to pack up, he advanced three miles and stationed the whole army, cavalry included, in a suitable and hidden location. Scipio was prepared to follow him, and sent ahead a large portion of his cavalry to scout out and reconnoiter Domitius' route. When these had advanced and the first squadrons had entered the ambush, the sound of horses made them suspicious and they began to return to their own lines, while those behind them noticed the rapid retreat and halted. Our men, after the ambush was recognized,<sup>55</sup> and so as not to wait in vain for the rest of the enemy, falling in with two squadrons . . .

<sup>55</sup> In "after the ambush was recognized," an unwanted possessive "of the enemy" has been excised. Other repairs are possible.

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nacti turmas . . .<sup>55</sup> exceperunt. In his fuit<sup>56</sup> M. Opimius praefectus equitum. Reliquos<sup>57</sup> omnes earum turmarum aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.

39. Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, tres cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit quas ex Italia traduxerat. Huic officio oppidoque Caninia-  
2 nus legatus praeerat. Is naves nostras interiorem in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit. Super quas turrim effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnes repentinos casus tradidit.

40. Quibus cognitis rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navem remulco multisque contendens funibus adduxit. Atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, [ut] ex superiore pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis summittens, et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit. Deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis  
2 excepti refugerant, eam navem expugnavit. Eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiecit.

<sup>55</sup> turmas . . . exceperunt *Damon*: turmas exceperunt . . .  
*Freudenberg*      <sup>56</sup> in his fuit] unus fugit *Roscher*  
<sup>57</sup> [reliquos] *Dedertich*

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<sup>56</sup> A textual gap and related problems here occlude the fate of Marcus Opimius.

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captured.<sup>56</sup> Among these was<sup>57</sup> Marcus Opimius, a cavalry commander. All of the remaining men of those squadrons our men either killed or captured and took to Domitius.

39. When Caesar removed his garrisons from the coastline, as was indicated earlier,<sup>58</sup> he left three cohorts at Oricum to defend the town, having also given them oversight of the warships that he had brought over from Italy. His officer Caninianus was in charge of the task and the town.<sup>59</sup> He brought our ships into the inner harbor behind the town and moored them. At the mouth of the harbor he sank a transport ship as an obstacle, fastening another to it. He positioned a tower built on top of them next to the harbor entrance and filled it with soldiers who were to defend it against every eventuality. 2

40. Learning of this, Pompey's son Gnaeus, who was in charge of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum and towed away the sunken ship, pulling hard with numerous cables. He attacked the other ship, which had been put there by Acilius to guard the place, using several ships on which he had built towers of equal height. By fighting from a higher position, constantly sending fresh troops to support tired ones, and testing the town walls elsewhere by land with ladders and simultaneously with the fleet so as to divide his opponents' forces, he overcame our men with effort and a multitude of projectiles. After dislodging the defenders, who had all fled after being taken on board longboats, he boarded that ship. At the same time Gnaeus took possession of a jetty on the other side, a natural barrier 2

<sup>57</sup> For "among these was," Roscher proposed "One man got away." <sup>58</sup> At 3.34.1.

<sup>59</sup> His full name was Marcus Acilius Caninianus (3.40.1).

tam, quae paene insulam oppidum effecerat. IIII biremes  
 3 subiectis scutulibus impulsas vectibus in interiorē portum  
 erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit,  
 4 reliquas incendit. Hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab  
 Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Byllide  
 5 atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohibebat. Ipse Lis-  
 sum profectus naves onerarias XXX a M. Antonio relictas  
 intra portum aggressus omnes incendit. Lissum expugnare  
 conatus, defendentibus civibus Romanis qui eius conven-  
 tus erant militibusque quos praesidi causa miserat Caesar,  
 triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta  
 inde discessit.

41. Caesar postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse  
 cognovit eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in iti-  
 nere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium  
 habebat, tertio die [Macedoniam] ad Pompeium pervenit  
 iuxtaque eum castra posuit. Et postridie eductis omnibus  
 2 copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fe-  
 cit. Vbi illum suis locis se tenere animadvertit reducto in  
 castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.  
 3 Itaque postero die omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficili  
 angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans  
 Pompeium aut Dyrrachium compelli aut ab eo intercludi  
 posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparat-  
 4 tum eo contulisset. Vt accidit. Pompeius enim primo igno-

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<sup>60</sup> See 3.30.7.



### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

that had made the town a peninsula. He moved four biremes across it into the inner harbor, using rollers underneath and poles for propulsion. Attacking our warships thus from both sides (they were moored and empty) he towed away four of them and burned the rest. After finishing this task Gnaeus took Decimus Laelius from the Asiatic fleet and left him there; Laelius began to prevent the importation of supplies from Byllis and Amantia into Oricum. Moving on to Lissus, Gnaeus attacked thirty transport vessels that Antony had left inside the harbor, burning them all. He tried to take Lissus by storm. When a defense was mounted by Roman citizens belonging to its community association and soldiers sent by Caesar to garrison the town, Gnaeus lingered for three days, lost a few men in the attack, and left the place without accomplishing his purpose.

41. When Caesar learned that Pompey was at Asparagium,<sup>60</sup> he headed there himself with his army. On the way, he stormed a town of the Parthini in which Pompey had a garrison. He reached Pompey on the third day and made camp beside him. The next day he led out all of his forces, drew up his line, and gave Pompey a chance to decide matters militarily. When he noticed that Pompey was holding his position, he led his army back to camp, thinking that he would have to adopt a different plan. Therefore the next day he set out for Dyrrachium with all of his forces, taking a difficult and narrow route involving a substantial detour. His hope was that Pompey could either be forced to go to Dyrrachium or cut off from it, given that Pompey had conveyed there all of his supplies and his whole stock of military equipment. And so it happened. For Pompey was unaware of Caesar's plan at first, since he



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rans eius consilium quod diverso ab ea regione itin  
profectum videbat angustiis rei frumentariae compul  
discessisse existimabat. Postea per exploratores cer  
factus postero die castra movit breviori itinere se occ  
5 rere ei posse sperans. Quod fore suspicatus Caesar m  
tesque adhortatus ut aequo animo laborem ferrent par  
parte noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium ven  
cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur atque it  
castra posuit.

42. Pompeius interclusus Dyrrachio ubi propositum  
tenere non potuit secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui  
appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem at  
que eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit.  
2 Eo partem navium longiarum convenire, frumentum com  
meatumque ab Asia atque omnibus regionibus quas tene  
3 bat comportari imperat. Caesar longius bellum ductum iri  
existimans et de Italicis com meatibus desperans quod  
tanta diligentia omnia litora a Pompeianis tenebantur  
classesque ipsius quas hieme in Sicilia Gallia Italia fecerat  
morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium  
et L. Canuleium legatos<sup>58</sup> misit. Quodque hae regiones  
4 frumenti finitimis civitatibus discripsit. Item Lisso Parthi  
nisque et omnibus castellis quod esset frumenti conquiri  
5 iussit. Id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod  
sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento  
utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providebat  
et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat

<sup>58</sup> legatos V: -tum *MUST*

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inere  
 sum  
 tior  
 tur-  
 ili-  
 va  
 it  
 ni
 
 saw him taking a path going in a direction away from that area, and thought that he had been forced to leave by supply difficulties; later he received information from his scouts. He struck camp the next day, hoping that his shorter route would allow him to confront Caesar. Sus- 5  
 pecting that this would happen, Caesar urged his soldiers to endure hardship steadily, and despite a halt lasting a small part of the night reached Dyrrachium early in the morning as the front of Pompey's column came into view in the distance. He made camp there.

42. Pompey was cut off from Dyrrachium. Unable to achieve his purpose, he adopted a second plan, fortifying a camp on a height called Petra; this is reasonably acces- 2  
 sible to ships and protects them from some winds. He ordered some of his warships to muster there, and provisions and supplies to be transported from Asia and all of the regions he controlled. Caesar thought that the war was 3  
 going to be drawn out, and had given up hope of convoys from Italy, since every coastline was controlled so dili-  
 gently by the Pompeians and his own fleets were slow in coming. (He had had them built during the winter in Sic-  
 ily, Gaul, and Italy.) So he sent his officers Quintus Tillius and Lucius Canuleius to Epirus to arrange for provisions, and because those regions were quite far away he estab-  
 lished grain depots in specific locations and assigned to 4  
 nearby communities the responsibility for transport. He also ordered a search for whatever grain there was in Lis-  
 sus, among the Parthini, and in all of the outposts. The 5  
 quantities were extremely meager both because of the nature of the terrain, since these places are rugged and hilly and generally need imported grain, and because Pompey had taken precautions: treating the Parthini as

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frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites in Petram comportarat.

43. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit e loci natura. Erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. Hos primum praesidiis tenui-  
2 castellaque ibi communiit. Inde ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat ex castello in castellum perducta munitione cir-  
3 cumvallare Pompeium instituit, haec expectans<sup>59</sup>—quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat—quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul uti pabulatione Pompeium prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio ut auctoritatem, qua ille maxime apud exteris nationes niti videbatur, minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset: illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.

44. Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatus belli—tela arma tormenta—ibi collocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat nisi proelio decertare vellet. Quod eo tempore statue-  
2 rat non esse faciendum. Relinquebatur ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque  
3 copias quam maxime posset distineret. Idque accidit. Castellis enim XXIII effectis XV milia passuum circuitu

<sup>59</sup> expectans  $\omega$ : sp- *Vascosan*


<sup>61</sup> For "expectations," *Vascosan* substituted "objectives," which entails the removal of "would" later in the sentence.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

war booty, he sought out all of their grain and had his cavalry transport it to Petra, ransacking their houses and leaving them dug up.

43. After learning of these matters Caesar adopted a plan suited to the terrain. (Around Pompey's camp there were numerous high and rugged hills.) To begin with, he used garrisons to hold them and built fortified outposts there. Then he began to wall Pompey in with a fortification running from outpost to outpost insofar as the terrain allowed. His expectations<sup>61</sup>—given that his provisions were scanty and Pompey had a numerical superiority in cavalry—were these: that he would be able to transport grain and other supplies to his army with less danger and from every direction; also that he would prevent Pompey from foraging, and render his cavalry useless for action; and thirdly that he would undermine Pompey's apparent authority, especially with foreign nations, when the story spread worldwide that Pompey was besieged by Caesar and did not dare fight a battle. 2  
3

44. Pompey was unwilling to distance himself from the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had deposited all of his military equipment—projectiles, arms, catapults—in Dyrrachium and was using ships to provision his army. But he was also unable to block Caesar's fortifications unless he was willing decide matters with a battle, which he had decided should not be done at that time. It remained to pursue the final military option: occupy as many hills as possible, hold as much territory as he could with garrisons, and extend Caesar's forces as much as possible. And this is what occurred. Pompey built twenty-four outposts and enclosed within a fifteen-mile circuit a space that he used 2  
3



CAESAR

amplexus hoc spatio pabulabatur, multaque erant in  
eum locum manu sata quibus interim iumenta pasceret

- 4 Atque ut nostri perpetuas munitiones addebant perduc-  
tas<sup>60</sup> ex castellis in proxima castella—ne quo loco erum-  
perent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur ti-  
mebant<sup>61</sup>—ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones  
efficiebant ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a  
5 tergo circumvenire possent. Sed illi operibus vincebant  
quod et numero militum praestabant et interiore spatio  
6 minorem circuitum habebant. Quaecumque erant loca  
Caesari capienda—etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et  
dimicare non constituerat tamen suis locis sagittarios fun-  
ditores mittebat, quorum magnum habebat numerum,  
7 multique ex nostris vulnerabantur magnusque incesserat  
timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis  
aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fece-  
rant quibus tela vitarent.

45. In occupandis praesidiis magna vi uterque niteba-  
tur, Caesar ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret,  
Pompeius ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu  
2 occuparet. Crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. In  
his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupa-  
visset et munire coepisset huic loco propinquum et con-  
trarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere  
3 prohibere coepit. Et cum una ex parte prope aequum  
aditum haberet primum sagittariis funditoribusque circu-  
miectis postea levis armaturae magna multitudine missa  
tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediabat, neque erat

<sup>60</sup> addebant perductas *Weber*: videbant perductas  $\omega$

<sup>61</sup> From nostri . . . timebant *the text is very uncertain.*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

for foraging; within this area there were many crops with  
which he could feed his pack animals meanwhile. Just as 4  
our men were adding continuous fortifications running  
from outpost to adjacent outpost—they worried that the  
Pompeians would make a sortie somewhere and attack our  
men on the rear—so the enemy were producing continu-  
ous fortifications inside them so that our men would not  
be able to enter somewhere and surround them from be-  
hind.<sup>62</sup> But the Pompeians were beginning to prevail in 5  
the works, since they were superior in manpower and had  
a shorter circuit, being on the inside. Whatever positions 6  
Caesar had to occupy, Pompey, although he had decided  
not to use his whole force to prevent him or to engage,  
nevertheless sent out archers and slingers, of whom he had 7  
a great many, and many of our men were taking wounds,  
plus there was a great fear of arrows. Indeed almost all of  
the soldiers had made shirts or cloaks of felt or patchwork  
or hides in order to escape the projectiles.

45. Each side exerted itself with great vigor in occupy-  
ing positions, Caesar in order to confine Pompey within  
the narrowest limits, Pompey in order to occupy as many  
hills as possible in the widest circuit. Frequent clashes  
occurred because of this. In one of them, after Caesar's 2  
ninth legion occupied a certain position and began to for-  
tify it, Pompey occupied a hill adjacent to and facing this  
position and began to hinder our men in their work. From 3  
one direction he had a nearly level approach and repeat-  
edly blocked the fortifications, first by surrounding the  
position with archers and slingers, then by sending a large  
mass of light-armed troops and bringing forward cata-

<sup>62</sup> The text of this sentence is uncertain, but its point is clear.

## CAESAR


- 4 facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. *Caesar*  
cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret *recipere*  
5 se iussit et loco excedere. Erat per declive receptus *lib*  
autem hoc acrius instabant neque regredi nostros *patie-*  
bantur. quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur  
6 Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse  
non recusare se quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur  
si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese rece-  
pissent inde quo temere essent progressae.

46. Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum  
tumulum contra hostem proferri et adversas locari, intra  
has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus<sup>62</sup> obduci  
iussit locumque in omnes partes quam maxime impediri.  
2 Ipse idoneis locis funditores instruxit ut praesidio nostris  
se recipientibus essent. His rebus completis legionem  
3 reduci iussit. Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius  
nostros premere et instare coeperunt cratesque pro muni-  
4 tione obiectas propulerunt ut fossas transcenderent. Quod  
cum animadvertisset Caesar, veritus ne non reducti sed  
deiecti viderentur maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a  
medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni prae-  
erat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum  
5 fieri iussit. Milites legionis nonae subito conspirati pila

<sup>62</sup> tectis militibus *ω*. *Perhaps tectis longuriis?*

<sup>63</sup> The plural is suspect.

<sup>64</sup> For "under their protection soldiers dig a trench of moderate width," it might be better to read "downhill of these a trench of moderate width with hidden stakes be dug," in order to set up "the concealed stakes" at 3.46.5. Vielhaber proposed excising the latter phrase.



CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

...s. and it was not easy for our men to resist and fortify  
the same time. When Caesar saw that his men were  
being wounded from every direction, he ordered them to  
withdraw and leave their position; the retreat was down-  
hill. The enemy, however, began applying more intense  
pressure and refusing to allow our men to retreat, since it  
looked like fear had induced them to abandon their posi-  
tion. On that occasion Pompey is said to have spoken boastfully  
to his friends: "I don't object to your thinking me a useless  
commander if Caesar's legions<sup>63</sup> manage to withdraw  
without huge damage from the position to which they have  
rashly advanced."

46. Fearing for his men's retreat Caesar ordered brush-  
wood bundles to be brought forward against the enemy to  
the top of the hill and placed frontally. Under their protec-  
tion the soldiers were to dig a trench of moderate width  
as a barrier<sup>64</sup> and the place was to be rendered as impass-  
ible as possible in every direction. He himself stationed  
slingers in suitable positions to protect our men as they  
withdrew. When these arrangements were complete he  
ordered the legion to be led back. At this the Pompeians  
began to press and close in on our men more insolently  
and boldly, pushing the defensive obstacle of brushwood  
bundles out of their way so that they could cross the trench  
segments. When Caesar noticed this he worried that it  
would look like a rout of his men rather than a retreat, and  
that they would take more damage. So at about the half-  
way point, after rallying them with Antony's help (he was  
in command of the legion), he ordered the signal to be  
sounded and an attack made on the enemy. The soldiers  
of the ninth legion immediately pulled together and



CAESAR

coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incerta  
 cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertens  
 coegerunt. Quibus ad recipiendum crates *derectae*<sup>63</sup> longi-  
 guriique obtecti<sup>64</sup> et institutae fossae magno impedimento  
 6 fuerunt. Nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento  
 discedere, compluribus interfectis, V omnino suorum  
 amissis quietissime receperunt pauloque citra eum locum  
 aliis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.

47. Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castello-  
 rum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto  
 2 obsidionis genere tum etiam reliquis rebus. Nam quicum-  
 que alterum obsidere conati sunt percussos atque infirmos  
 hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut aliqua offensione  
 permotos continuerunt cum ipsi numero equitum mili-  
 tumque praestarent. Causa autem obsidionis haec fere  
 3 esse consuevit ut frumento hostes prohiberent. At tum  
 integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum  
 numero continebat cum illi omnium rerum copia abun-  
 darent. Cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus  
 conveniebat quae com meatum supportarent, neque ullus  
 flare ventus poterat quin aliqua ex parte secundum cur-  
 4 sum haberent. Ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe la-  
 5 teque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. Sed tamen haec  
 singulari patientia milites ferebant. Recordabantur enim  
 eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpressos labore et  
 patientia maximum bellum confecisse, meminerant ad

<sup>63</sup> *derectae* *ω*: *deiectae* *Vielhaber*

<sup>64</sup> [longuriique obtecti] *Vielhaber*

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<sup>65</sup> For "lines of," *Vielhaber* proposed "displaced."

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

hurled their spears. With a running charge from below uphill, they drove the Pompeians headlong and forced them to turn back. In their retreat the enemy found the lines of brushwood bundles,<sup>65</sup> the concealed stakes, and the unfinished trench segments to be a significant obstacle. Our men, however, who considered it enough to get away without damage, withdrew unprotestingly after killing several of the enemy, having lost altogether five of their own. After taking some other hills a little further out, they finished the fortifications. 6

47. It was a new and untried strategy, considering not only the number of outposts, the size of the area, the length of the fortifications, and the general type of blockade, but other things as well. For all others who have tried to blockade someone have attacked and confined enemies that have been demoralized and weak, or defeated in battle, or cowed by some reverse, while they themselves have had numerical superiority in cavalry and infantry. Moreover, the purpose of a blockade is generally to keep the enemy from getting provisions. But on that occasion Caesar was trying to contain a force that was whole and unscathed with a smaller number of soldiers. Plus, the enemy had an abundant stock of everything, for a great number of ships converged every day bringing supplies from every direction, and every wind that blew made for good sailing from some direction. He himself, however, was in great difficulties, since all of the grain crops far and wide had been consumed. But the soldiers nevertheless tolerated their sufferings with remarkable patience. (They reminded themselves that they had suffered the same things the previous year in Spain, and that with effort and patience they had brought a very important war to conclu- 2 3 4 5

CAESAR

Alesiam magnam se inopiam perpessos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum se gentium victores discussisse. Non illis hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant. Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat ex Epro copia, magno in honore habebant. 48. Est etiam genus radicis inventum ab iis qui fuerant †valeribus<sup>65</sup> quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. [Id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant.]<sup>66</sup> Eius erat magna copia. Ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant ut spem eorum minuerent.

49. Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant. Crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur: prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. Libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari,<sup>67</sup> reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona, cum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia adfectos. Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos qui ad mare pertinebant Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant

<sup>65</sup> fuerant in vallibus *Nipperdey*: f- in Balearibus *Herzog*: f- in operibus *Kindscher*: f- ab alebribus *Holder*: vivebant oleribus *Madvig*

<sup>66</sup> [Id . . . efficiebant.] *Vielhaber*

<sup>67</sup> <vix> tolerari *Manutius*

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<sup>66</sup> Spain: 1.48–52. Alesia and Avaricum: *BG* 7.68–90 and 17.

<sup>67</sup> No emendation so far proposed is persuasive.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

son. They remembered that after suffering great scarcity at Alesia, and even more at Avaricum, they had left the field as conquerors of supremely great peoples.<sup>66</sup>) When given barley they did not object, nor beans. As for herd animals, of which there was a large supply in Epirus, they valued them highly. 48. There was also a kind of root vegetable, found by those who had been . . .<sup>67</sup> This was called "chara," and mixed with milk it did much to alleviate the scarcity; the supply was abundant. They made loaves from it, and when the Pompeians, in crosstalk, referred mockingly to their hunger, our men generally threw these at them to lessen their hopes. 2

49. In addition, the grain crops were already beginning to ripen, and hope itself parried the scarcity, since the men were confident that they would soon have plenty. There was a saying among the soldiers on watch and in crosstalk: "We will eat the bark from the trees before we let Pompey out of our grasp." They were also pleased to learn from deserters that, while the enemy's horses were being kept alive,<sup>68</sup> the rest of their pack animals had perished, and the men themselves were not in good health, suffering both from the limited space and the foul odor of numerous corpses and their daily labors—they were unaccustomed to working—and from an extreme shortage of water, for Caesar had either diverted or obstructed with large earthworks all of the rivers and streams that ran to the sea. Indeed, insofar as the area was hilly and the ravines' nar- 3

68 Madvig proposed adding "barely" before "being kept alive."

## CAESAR

loca montuosa et ut specus angustiae<sup>68</sup> vallium, has subhi-  
 cis in terram demissis praesaepserat terramque aggresserunt  
 4 ut aquam continerent. Ita illi necessario loca sequi de-  
 missa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogebantur atque hunc  
 laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant. Qui tamen fontes a  
 quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus  
 5 exarescebant. At Caesaris exercitus optima valetudine  
 summaque aquae copia utebatur. Tum commeatus omni  
 genere praeter frumentum abundabat. Quibus cotidie  
 melius succedere<sup>69</sup> tempus maioremque spem maturitate  
 frumentorum proponi videbant.

50. In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi  
 rationes reperiebantur. Illi cum animadvertissent ex igni-  
 bus noctu cohortes nostras ad munitiones excubare, silen-  
 tio aggressi universas<sup>70</sup> inter multitudinem sagittas con-  
 2 iciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. Quibus rebus  
 nostri usu docti haec reperiebant remedia, ut alio loco  
 ignes facerent . . .

51. Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens ca-  
 stris praefecerat Caesar, auxilio cohorti venit cum legioni-

<sup>68</sup> ut specus angustiae Menge: ad s- a- ω: instar specuum a-  
 Freudenberg: asperae a- Wölffel: fauces angustae Schiller

<sup>69</sup> succedere ed. pr.: subte(r)rere ω: se terere Madvig, Perhaps  
 sibi cedere?

<sup>70</sup> universas ω: universi Nipperdey: ignes versus Jurin

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<sup>68</sup> For Menge's emendation "narrows were like a water conduit," others propose "narrows functioned as water conduits," "narrows were steep," and "outlets were narrow."

<sup>70</sup> For the first edition's emendation "the time was going by better," Madvig proposed "they were passing the time." Another possibility is "the occasion was turning out better for them."

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

rows were like a water conduit,<sup>69</sup> he had barricaded the  
ravines with poles sunk into the ground, heaping up earth  
in order to hold back the water. The enemy was thus nec- 4  
essarily compelled to have recourse to low-lying and  
marshy areas and to dig wells, and this effort was an addi-  
tion to their daily labors. Even so, their sources were at a  
considerable distance from some of the guard posts and  
dried up quickly in the heat. But Caesar's army had excel- 5  
lent health and a very large supply of water at its disposal.  
For the moment, it had an abundance of every kind of  
provisions except grain, and the men saw that thanks to  
these the time was going by better<sup>70</sup> each day, and that a  
greater hope lay ahead in the ripeness of the grain crops.

50. This being a new type of warfare, new combat  
methods were devised by each side. The enemy, when  
they noticed from the fires at night that our cohorts were  
doing guard duty beside the fortifications, would approach  
noiselessly and shoot a volley of arrows<sup>71</sup> into their midst,  
then return immediately to their own lines. Learning from 2  
experience, our men devised the following remedies for  
this: they would build their fires in one place . . .<sup>72</sup>

51. Meanwhile, Publius Sulla, whom Caesar put in  
charge of the camp when he left, upon being informed of  
this came to the cohort's aid with two legions; at Sulla's

<sup>71</sup> For "shoot a volley of arrows," Nipperdey and Jurin pro-  
posed "shoot their arrows as one" and "shoot their arrows in the  
direction of the fires," respectively.

<sup>72</sup> Some text has been lost here, perhaps as much as a page.  
In the following paragraphs, there are references to events that  
must have been reported in this lacuna.

## CAESAR

- bus duabus. Cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani.
- 2 Neque vero conspectum aut impetum nostrorum tulērunt. primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cessarunt.
- 3 Sed insequentes nostros, ne longius prosequerentur Sulla revocavit. At plerique existimant: si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finiri. Cuius consilium
- 4 reprehendendum non videtur. Aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris. Alter omnia agere ad praescriptum
- 5 alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. Sulla a Caesare <in> castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit—quae res tamen
- 6 fortasse aliquem reciperet casum—ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem adferebat. Nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant. Si per declive sese reciperent nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur. Neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat. Spe enim conficiendi negoti prope in noctem rem deduxerant.
- 7 Ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumulum quendam occupavit qui tantum aberat a nostro castello ut telum tormentumve missum adigi non posset. Hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.

52. Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est. Nam plura castella Pompeius pariter destinandae manus causa temptaverat ne ex proximis praesidiis succurrere posset. Vno loco Volcacius Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit, altero Ger-

CIVIL WAR. BOOK III

arrival the Pompeians were easily driven back. In fact, 2  
they did not endure the sight or the onset of our men, but  
after the firstcomers were dislodged the rest turned  
around and abandoned their position. But Sulla recalled 3  
our men from the pursuit to prevent them from advancing  
too far. (Most people think that if he had been willing to  
pursue more aggressively the war could have been fin-  
ished that day. But his decision does not seem to deserve  
criticism, for officers and commanders have different 4  
roles. The one ought to do everything as instructed, the  
other to act freely in view of the overall situation. Sulla had 5  
been left by Caesar in camp, and once his men had been  
extricated he was content with this and unwilling to decide  
matters with a battle—which might have a disastrous out-  
come—lest people think he had assumed the command-  
er's role.) His action gave the Pompeians great difficulty 6  
in their retreat, for they had advanced from a position of  
disadvantage and halted on the summit, and were worried  
about our men pursuing from above if they retreated  
downhill. Nor was there much time left before sunset, for  
they had prolonged the action practically until dark in the  
hope of finishing the operation. So Pompey, improvising, 7  
was forced to occupy a certain hill far enough away from  
our camp to be out of reach of projectiles discharged by  
hand or catapult. He established himself there, fortified  
the position, and kept his whole force inside it.

52. There were battles in two other places at this same  
time, for Pompey had made similar attacks on several out-  
posts to spread the enemy forces, aiming to prevent the  
possibility of assistance coming from the closest garrisons.  
In one place Volcaci<sup>us</sup> Tullus and three cohorts withstood 2  
the attack of a legion and drove it off, in another some



CAESAR

mani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.

53. Ita uno die VI proeliis factis—tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones—cum horum omnium ratio haberetur ad duo milia numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiebamus, evocatos centurionesque complures. In eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus L. filius eius qui praetor  
 2 Asiam obtinuerat. Signaque sunt militaria VI relata. Nostri  
 3 non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum quin vulneraretur,  
 4 IIIIque ex una<sup>71</sup> cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium adferre vellent milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt. Scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae  
 5 centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CCXXX.<sup>72</sup> Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritis et de re publica, donatum milibus †CC atque†<sup>73</sup> ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit. Eius enim ope castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat. Cohortemque postea duplici stipendio frumento vestiariis<sup>74</sup> militaribusque donis amplissime donavit.

54. Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres extruxit et in altitudinem pedum XV

<sup>71</sup> una] VIII<sup>a</sup> Paul

<sup>72</sup> CCXXX MU: CCXX STV: CXX in V. Max. 3.2.23, Suet. Jul. 68.4, Flor. Epit. 2.13.40, App. BC 2.60.249, ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα in Plut. Caes. 16.3

<sup>73</sup> The text cannot be restored with any certainty here.

<sup>74</sup> vestiariis Nicastius: vespe(t/c)iariis ω: veste cibariis Cujas

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<sup>73</sup> Only three are reported in the text as we have it.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Germans went outside the fortifications, killed a few of the enemy, and withdrew unscathed to their own lines.

53. Thus in one day there were six battles: three at Dyrrachium, three beside the fortifications.<sup>73</sup> When a tally was made of all of them, we found that around two thousand of the Pompeians had fallen, a few of them reenlisted men and centurions. In this group was Valerius Flaccus, the son of the Lucius Flaccus who had been a praetorian governor of Asia. In addition, six military standards were captured. No more than twenty of our men were lost in all 2  
of the battles. But in the outpost every single man had 3  
taken a wound, and four centurions from that one cohort<sup>74</sup>  
had lost an eye. When the men wanted to provide evi- 4  
dence of their dangerous struggle, they counted out for  
Caesar about thirty thousand arrows that had been shot  
into their outpost. The shield of the centurion Scaeva,  
when brought to him, was found to have been pierced  
230 times.<sup>75</sup> In view of his services to himself and the re- 5  
public, Caesar announced that Scaeva had been given a  
reward of . . .<sup>76</sup> and that he was promoting him from the  
eighth rank to chief centurion, for everyone agreed that  
the outpost was saved mostly by his help. Caesar later  
rewarded his cohort very generously with double pay, food  
and clothing allowances,<sup>77</sup> and military decorations.

54. Pompey added largely to his fortifications during the night. On subsequent days he built towers, and after

<sup>74</sup> For "from that one cohort," Paul proposed "from the eighth cohort," to explain "from the eighth rank" below.

<sup>75</sup> The number is suspect.

<sup>76</sup> The details are lost in a

textual corruption.

<sup>77</sup> For "food and clothing allowances,"

Cujas proposed "grain, clothing, rations."

## CAESAR

2 effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit. Et  
V intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus  
obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et ad impediendum  
obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in  
antiquas munitiones recepit.

55. Aetolia Acarnania Amphilochois per Cassium Lon-  
ginum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, recep-  
tis temptandam sibi Achaïam ac paulo longius progredien-  
2 dum existimabat Caesar. Itaque eo Q. Calenum misit  
3 eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. Quo-  
rum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaïam missus  
a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit ut  
4 Achaïa Fufium prohiberet. Calenus Delphos Thebas et  
Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatum recepit, non-  
nullas urbes per vim expugnavit. Reliquas civitates cir-  
cummissis legationibus amicitia Caesari conciliare stude-  
bat. In his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.

56. Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in  
aciem aequum in locum produxit si Pompeius proelio  
decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones sub-  
iceret. Tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat uti ne  
2 telo tormentove adigi posset. Pompeius autem ut famam  
opinionemque hominum teneret sic pro castris exercitum  
constituebat ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis qui-  
dem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo abiectis protegi pos-  
set.

57. Haec cum in Achaïa atque apud Dyrrachium ge-

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<sup>78</sup> If the number of cohorts was specified in the original, it has been lost; Plutarch mentions fifteen (*Caes.* 43.1). The commander of the expedition was Quintus Fufius Calenus; his three names are distributed oddly in this paragraph.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

his works reached a height of fifteen feet he protected that part of his camp with screens. He let five days elapse, then got another overcast night. After building and heaping obstructions at all of the camp's gates to make them impassable, he led his army out in silence at midnight and returned to his former fortifications. 2

55. After recovering Aetolia, Acarnania, and the people of Amphilochia thanks to Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, as I indicated, Caesar began to think that he ought to try Achaea and make a little further progress. So he sent Quintus Calenus there in tandem with Sabinus and Cassius and their cohorts.<sup>78</sup> Upon learning of their approach Rutilius Lupus, who had been sent by Pompey and controlled Achaea, began to seal off the Isthmus in order to keep Fufius out of Achaea. Calenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus by the communities' own wishes; some cities he took by storm. He sent delegations around the remaining communities, eager to bring them over to Caesar in friendship. By and large this is what Fufius spent his time on. 2 3 4

56. Every day thereafter Caesar led his army out onto level ground for battle, in case Pompey wanted to decide matters by a fight, positioning his legions practically adjacent to Pompey's camp. Indeed the distance from Pompey's rampart to Caesar's front line was just enough that projectiles thrown or shot could not reach it. Pompey, however, wanting to retain his general renown and reputation, placed his army in front of the camp with the third line touching the rampart and his whole force drawn up in such a way that weapons cast from the rampart could cover it. 2

57. With these operations under way in Achaea and

## CAESAR

rerentur Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret non oblitus pristini instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero  
2 habere instituerat. Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum, quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc<sup>75</sup> arbitrari vitio factum eorum quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset quod sua mandata perferre non  
3 opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur; Scipionem ea esse auctoritate ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere sed etiam ex magna parte compellare atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet; quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperi uni omnes acceptam relatu-  
4 turos. Haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert. Ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditus, reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus. Infectaque re sese ad Caesarem recepit.

58. Caesar quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operi-  
2 bus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. Pompeius ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit paucis intermissis diebus  
3 rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recepit. Erat

<sup>75</sup> After adhuc Meusel supplied <effecisse; hoc>.

<sup>79</sup> The narrative was presumably in the lacuna (note 72).

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

near Dyrrachium and the reports consistent that Scipio had reached Macedonia, Caesar, still having his original initiative in mind, sent Aulus Clodius to him. Clodius had connections to each of them; Caesar began to consider him as one of his own friends after Scipio first sent him along with a recommendation. Caesar gave Clodius a letter and a message to Scipio, of which these were the key points: "In my opinion, given that I have tried for peace by every possible means, it is the fault of the men whom I wanted to be its prime movers that nothing has been done, since they were afraid to present my message to Pompey at an inopportune time. You, Scipio, have the authority not only to explain freely whatever plan you approve, but also to be able to confront and correct missteps. You command an army in your own name, so that beyond authority you have the power to apply coercion. And if you do so, everyone will credit you with having brought about calm for Italy, peace for the provinces, and salvation for the empire." Clodius took this message to Scipio. At first he was heard willingly, or so it seemed, but thereafter he was not admitted to discussions, once Scipio had received a scolding from Favonius. (So I learned later, after the end of the war.) Clodius returned to Caesar without accomplishing his business.

58. In order to make it easier to confine Pompey's cavalry at Dyrrachium and prevent it from foraging, Caesar sealed off the two approaches (which were narrow, as I indicated<sup>79</sup>) with substantial earthworks, establishing strongholds there. When Pompey realized that his cavalry was accomplishing nothing, he let a few days elapse, then brought them back by sea to where he was, inside the original fortifications. Fodder was extremely scarce,

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summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent. Frumenta enim quae fuerant intra munitiones sata consumpserant. Cogebantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare quodque erat eius rei minor copia hordeo adaugere, atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare. Sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.

59. Erant apud Caesarem ex equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Roucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae<sup>76</sup> magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur. Sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertabant. Quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt: falsum ab iis equitum numerum deferri quorum stipendium averterent.

60. Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse

<sup>76</sup> pecuniariae] pecuariae "consisting of livestock" Paul

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

much so that they were feeding the horses with leaves stripped from trees and a mash made of the soft roots of reeds. (They had consumed the grain crops inside the fortifications.) They were compelled to supply fodder from 4  
Corcyra and Acarnania, a long way away by boat, and, because there was too little of it, to supplement it with barley; with these measures they sustained the cavalry. But after not only barley and fodder and hay but also the 5  
trees' foliage began to run short everywhere, and the horses were thin and wasted, Pompey thought that he ought to try to break out somehow.

59. Among the cavalry with Caesar were two Allobrogian brothers, Roucillius and Egus, sons of Adbucillus, who had been his community's leader for many years. They were men of remarkable prowess, and their service to Caesar in all of his Gallic campaigns had been excellent and valiant. For these reasons he had entrusted them with 2  
the most important magistracies at home, arranged for them to be specially adlected into their senate, granted them captured territory in Gaul and substantial monetary prizes, and brought them from poverty to wealth. On account of their prowess they were not only valued by Caesar but also popular with the army. But, relying on Caesar's 3  
friendship and carried away by a foolish native pride, they treated their men with contempt, cheating the cavalry of its pay and diverting all of the booty to themselves. Dismayed by these developments, the whole force approached 4  
Caesar, complaining openly about the injuries done by these men. A further complaint was that they were falsifying the cavalry numbers and pocketing the pay.

60. Caesar thought that this was not the moment for a



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existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam  
 distulit. Illos secreto castigavit quod quaestui equites ha-  
 berent monuitque ut ex sua amicitia omnia expectarent et  
 2 ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua sperarent. Magnam ta-  
 men haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad om-  
 nes attulit. Idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectionibus  
 3 tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia  
 intellegebant. Quo pudore adducti—et fortasse non se li-  
 berari sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati—discedere  
 ab nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias  
 4 experiri constituerunt. Et cum paucis collocuti clientibus  
 suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, pri-  
 mum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum in-  
 terficere, ut postea bello confecto cognitum est, ut cum  
 5 munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompeium viderentur. Post-  
 quam id facinus difficilius<sup>77</sup> visum est neque facultas per-  
 ficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mu-  
 tuati proinde ac <si> suis satis facere et fraudata restituere  
 vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt  
 cum iis quos sui consili participes habebant.

61. Quos Pompeius quod erant honesto loco nati et  
 instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis  
 venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Ca-  
 esarem fuerant—quodque novum et praeter consuetu-  
 dinem acciderat—omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque  
 2 ostentavit. Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques  
 a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a

<sup>77</sup> facinus difficilius *Clarke*: f- μ: facilius *T*: difficilius *SV* (*V*<sup>m</sup>  
*is illegible*)

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punishment and made great allowances for their valor; he postponed the whole business, rebuking them in private for having taken financial advantage of the cavalry. He advised them to place all of their hopes in his friendship and to expect future benefits in line with past ones. Still, their behavior brought them great dislike and universal contempt, and they perceived that this was so both from other men's reproaches and from their own judgment and conscience. Induced by this shame—and thinking, perhaps, that they were being not acquitted but deferred—they decided to abandon us, try fortune anew, and test new friendships. After conferring with a few of their dependents, men with whom they dared share a deed of this enormity, they first attempted to kill the cavalry commander Gaius Volusenus (as was discovered later, after the conclusion of the war) so that people would think they had deserted to Pompey with some service to show. After the deed was found to be rather difficult, and no opportunity for carrying it out presented itself, they borrowed as much money as they could under the pretense of wanting to satisfy the claims of their men and restore the misappropriated funds, then bought a large number of horses and went over to Pompey accompanied by those with whom they had shared their plan.

61. Pompey made the rounds of his garrisons with them and showed them off, for their birth was respectable and their gear sumptuous, they had arrived with a large company and many animals, were reputed to be brave men, and had had Caesar's respect—plus, the event was an unusual novelty. (Before that point no one from the infantry or cavalry had crossed over from Caesar to Pompey, although there were practically daily desertions from

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Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regnum omnium quae a Caesare tenebantur. Sed hi cognitum omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum in custodiendum varia diligentia animadversis prout cuiusque eorum qui negotiis praeerant aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerant.

62. Quibus ille cognitis eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. His paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit. Et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit quae pertinebant ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberant. Eodem naves quas demonstravimus aggere et levis armaturae militibus completas quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat mittit et quid a quoque fieri velit praecipit. Ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem cum legione nona positum habebat. Huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem summiserat.

63. Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallus contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat. Ab eo intermisso spatio pedum DC alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humiliore paulo munitione. Hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, dupli-

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Pompey to Caesar, indeed mass desertions were common among the soldiers enlisted in Epirus and Aetolia and all the regions then held by Caesar.) Moreover, they knew whatever was unfinished in the fortifications or seemed inadequate to military experts, and had taken notice of the timing of events and the distances between places in view of the sentries' diligence, which varied according to the nature or determination of the men in charge of operations, and had told Pompey everything. 3

62. After learning all of this Pompey, who had a break-out plan already in hand, as was mentioned, ordered his men to make wicker coverings for their helmets and to assemble rubble. When these things were ready, and night had fallen, he put a large number of light-armed soldiers and archers and all of the rubble into longboats and fast vessels. In the middle of the night he took sixty cohorts from his main camp and garrisons and led them to the section of fortifications where they reached the sea and were as far as possible from Caesar's main camp. To the same place he sent the ships that, as I indicated, were full of rubble and men from light-armed units, as well as the warships he had at Dyrrachium, and gave instructions about what he wanted each to do. Caesar had stationed his quaestor Lentulus Marcellinus at these fortifications with the ninth legion, and since Lentulus was in rather poor health he had sent Fulvius Postumus as an assistant. 2 3 4

63. At this location there was a fifteen-foot trench and a rampart facing the enemy ten feet high, and the rampart's earthwork was equally wide. Six hundred feet away there was a second rampart facing the other direction with a slightly lower fortification. (During the preceding days Caesar, worried that our men would be outflanked by 2

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3 cem eo loco fecerat vallum ut si ancipiti proelio dimicare  
 tur posset resisti. Sed operum magnitudo et continens  
 omnium dierum labor, quod milia passuum in circuitu  
 XVII [munitiones] erat<sup>78</sup> complexus, perficiendi spatium  
 4 non dabat. Itaque contra mare transversum vallum qui has  
 5 duas munitiones contingeret nondum perfecerat. Quae  
 res nota erat Pompeio, delata per Allobrogas perfugas.  
 6 magnumque nostris attulit incommodum. Nam ut ad mare  
 nostrae<sup>79</sup> cohortes nonae legionis excubuerant accessere  
 subito prima luce Pompeiani [exercitus adventus extitit].<sup>80</sup>  
 Simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorem vallum  
 tela iaciebant fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legiona-  
 rii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormen-  
 tis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant. Magnaque multi-  
 tudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur.  
 7 Multum autem ab ictu lapidum, quod unum nostris erat  
 telum, viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant.  
 8 Itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque  
 aegre resisterent animadversum est vitium munitionis  
 quod supra demonstratum est, atque inter duos vallos, qua  
 perfectum opus non erat, per mare<sup>81</sup> navibus expositi in  
 aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque muni-  
 tione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt.

<sup>78</sup> [munitiones] erat *Chacon*: -es e- *STV*: -es erant *MU*: -e erat *Clarke*

<sup>79</sup> nostrae] II *Dederich*

<sup>80</sup> [exercitus adventus extitit] *Nipperdey*, who also excised nonae legionis above. Other repairs have been proposed.

<sup>81</sup> per mare] Pompeiani *Paul*: [p- m-] *Nicastus*

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<sup>80</sup> The number is suspect.

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ships, had constructed this double rampart so that resistance would be possible if there was a fight on two sides at once. But with the scale of the works and the continuous daily toil—given that his enclosure was seventeen miles<sup>80</sup> around—there was not time to finish.) So he had not yet finished the transverse wall facing the sea, which was to extend from one fortification to the other. This fact was known to Pompey, having been reported by the Allobrogian deserters, and it caused great harm to our men. For the Pompeians arrived unexpectedly at first light where our cohorts<sup>81</sup> of the ninth legion had been doing guard duty by the sea. At one and the same moment the soldiers conveyed by boat were hurling weapons onto the outer rampart, the trenches were being filled with rubble, and legionaries were terrorizing the defenders of the inner fortification by bringing up ladders, catapults of every sort, and weapons. Plus, a great mass of archers was spreading around them from both sides. Furthermore, the wicker coverings on the enemy helmets provided significant protection from the impact of stones, which were the only weapons our men had. Thus our men were under every sort of pressure and were having trouble resisting when the above-mentioned flaw in the fortification was observed. The men conveyed by sea<sup>82</sup> were put ashore from the ships between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished. They attacked our men from behind and after driving them away from both fortifications forced them to turn and run.

<sup>81</sup> For "our cohorts," Dederich proposed "two cohorts." Klotz excised "of the ninth legion" instead. <sup>82</sup> For "by sea," Paul proposed "Pompeians," Nicasius excision.

64. Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes subsidio nostris laborantibus submittit ex castris. Quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare
- 2 potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. Itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidio id corruptum<sup>82</sup> timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat. Hominum
- 3 enim multitudine receptus impediabatur. In eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset adfectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur conspicatus equites nostros "Hanc ego" inquit "et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere—quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit—ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque
- 4 ad eum deferte." Hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.

65. Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius, qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata cum cohortibus XII descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. Cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex
- 2 maximo timore colligerent. Neque multo post Caesar—significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo—deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex
- 3 praesidiis eodem venit. Qui cognito detrimento, cum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum castra

<sup>82</sup> corruptum] correptum *Madvig*

<sup>83</sup> For "rendered useless," *Madvig* proposed "seized."

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64. At news of this emergency Marcellinus sent cohorts from the camp to the support of our struggling men. The cohorts, seeing people running away, failed to steady the latter with their arrival and themselves gave way before the enemy's attack. Thus whatever was added by way of support was rendered useless<sup>83</sup> by the fugitives' fear and then increased the terror and danger, for the mass of men was an impediment to retreat. In this battle an eagle bearer, gravely wounded and with his strength failing, caught sight of our cavalry and said: "I have defended this eagle with great diligence through the many years of my life. Now that I am dying, loyal as ever I restore it to Caesar. My fellow soldiers, do not, I beg you, make us guilty of a military disgrace—something that has not happened before now in Caesar's army—but take it back safe to him." By this chance the eagle was saved, even though every centurion of the first cohort was killed except the second in command.

65. The Pompeians were already approaching Marcellinus' camp, after slaughtering large numbers of our men and inflicting no small amount of terror on the remaining cohorts, when Antony came into view. (He held the nearest of the garrisons and made his way down from a higher position with twelve cohorts when the situation was reported to him.) His arrival checked the Pompeians and put confidence into our men, so that they pulled themselves together after their utter panic. Soon thereafter Caesar arrived at the head of some garrison cohorts; the signal had been sent from outpost to outpost by smoke, as had been regular practice earlier. Caesar, perceiving the damage and noticing that Pompey had gone outside of his fortifications and <was fortifying> a camp alongside the



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secundum mare <munire> ut libere pabulari posset nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli quoniam propositum non tenuerat iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.

66. Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est ab speculatoribus Caesaris cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci.
- 2 Castrorum hic situs erat. Superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio, cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco
- 3 posuit. Haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius
- 4 a mari passibus CCC aberant. Post mutato consilio quibusdam de causis Caesar paulo ultra eum locum castra transtulit. Paucisque intermissis diebus eadem haec Pompeius occupaverat. Et quod eo loco plures erat legiones habiturus relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. Ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque
- 5 arcis locum obtinebant. Item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passuum CCCC quo liberius ac sine periculo milites aquarentur.
- 7 Sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. Ita complures dies manserant<sup>83</sup> castra. Munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.

67. Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiaverunt. Hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. Is locus aberat <a> novis Pompei

<sup>83</sup> <vacua> manserant *Chacon*

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sea in order to be able to get fodder freely as well as to have access to his ships, changed his plan of campaign—since he had not obtained his objective—and ordered his men to fortify alongside Pompey.

66. After the fortification was complete, Caesar's scouts noticed that some enemy cohorts amounting, it seemed, to a full legion, were behind a wood and were being taken back to an old camp. The situation at the camp was as follows. Some days earlier Caesar's ninth legion had made camp there after their confrontation with the Pompeian forces while encircling them with an earthwork, as I indicated.<sup>84</sup> The camp abutted a wooded area and was no more than three hundred paces from the sea. Afterwards Caesar changed his mind for a variety of reasons and moved his camp some way past this site. After a few days' interval Pompey occupied the camp. Since he was planning to keep more legions there, he extended its fortification but left the inner rampart alone. Thus the smaller camp enclosed within the larger functioned as a stronghold and citadel. He also built a fortification running about four hundred paces from the left-hand corner of the camp to a river, so that his soldiers could get water more freely and without danger. But he too changed his mind for a variety of reasons that do not need mention, and left the place. The camp had remained in this state<sup>85</sup> for several days; all of its fortifications were intact.

67. The scouts reported to Caesar that a legion's standards had been taken to this location. As confirmation they said that the same thing had been seen from some of the

<sup>84</sup> See 3.45–46.

<sup>85</sup> For "remained in this state," Chacon

proposed "thus remained empty."

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- 2 castris circiter passus D. Hanc legionem sperans *Caesar*  
se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diem detrimentum  
3 sarcire reliquit in opere cohortes duas quae speciem mu-  
nitionis praeberent. ipse diverso itinere quam potuit oc-  
cultissime reliquas cohortes numero XXXIII, in quibus  
erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque  
4 duplici acie eduxit. Neque eum prima opinio fefellit. Nam  
et pervenit priusquam Pompeius sentire posset et tametsi  
erant munitiones castrorum magnae tamen sinistro cornu,  
5 ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo de-  
turbavit. Erat obiectus portis ericius. Hic paulisper est  
pugnatum cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra  
defenderent fortissime T. Puleione, cuius opera proditum  
exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, e<sup>84</sup> loco pro-  
6 pugnante. Sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt. Excisoque  
ericio, primo in maiora castra post etiam in castellum,  
quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruperunt quod eo  
pulsa legio sese receperat. Nonnullos ibi repugnantes in-  
terfecerunt.

68. Sed Fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis  
rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas  
2 rerum commutationes efficit, ut tum accidit. Munitionem  
quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus  
dextri Caesaris cornu cohortes ignorantia loci sunt secutae

<sup>84</sup> e *MUST*: eo V

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<sup>86</sup> The name suggests that spikes were the principal feature of this rarely mentioned defensive structure.

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higher outposts. The place was about five hundred paces  
from Pompey's new camp. Hoping that he could crush this 2  
legion, and wanting to repair the day's damage, Caesar left  
two cohorts at the works to give the appearance of fortifi-  
cation, he himself, taking a different route in the greatest 3  
possible secrecy, led out the rest of his cohorts, thirty-  
three in number, among them the ninth legion, despite the  
loss of many of its centurions and the overall reduction to  
its manpower. They headed for Pompey's legion and his  
secondary camp in two lines. Caesar's initial expectation 4  
was not wrong, for he both arrived before Pompey could  
get word and dislodged the Pompeians from the rampart  
with a swift attack on the left wing, where he himself was,  
despite the fact that the camp's fortifications were exten-  
sive. The entrance was blocked by a "hedgehog."<sup>86</sup> There 5  
was a brief fight here while our men were trying to break  
in and the enemy were defending the camp, with a very  
valiant sally<sup>87</sup> by Titus Puleio, whose responsibility for the  
betrayal of Gaius Antonius' army I indicated. But their 6  
courage made our men victorious nevertheless. After cut-  
ting away the "hedgehog" they burst into the larger camp  
first and then into the stronghold it enclosed, since the  
legion had taken refuge there after being routed. There  
they killed some who fought back.

68. But Fortune has vast power both in other activities  
and particularly in warfare, causing huge reversals by tilt- 2  
ing her balance slightly, as happened then. Unfamiliar  
with the location, the cohorts on Caesar's right wing fol-  
lowed the fortification whose line, as I indicated earlier,

<sup>87</sup> Editors often adopt the reading of V, which yields "valiant  
defense at that location" in place of "valiant sally."

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3 cum portam quaerent castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. Quod cum esset animadversa<sup>85</sup> coniuncta esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.

69. Interim Pompeius hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata V legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit. Eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat et acies instructa a nostris qui castra occupaverant cernebatur. Omniaque sunt subito mutata. Pompeiana legio celeris spe subsidi confirmata ab decimana porta resistere conatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. Equitatus Caesaris quod angusto itinere per ageres ascendebat receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat. Dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur ea parte quam proruerat sese recipiebat. Ac plerique ex his ne in angustias inciderent X pedum munitione se in fossas praecipitant. Primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. Sinistro cornu milites cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti ne angustiis intercluderentur cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem quo venerant receptu sibi consulebant. Omniaque erant tumultus timoris fugae plena, adeo ut cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet alii [dimissis equis]<sup>86</sup> eun-

<sup>85</sup> animadversa *Damon*: -sum ω

<sup>86</sup> [dimissis equis] *Nipperdey*: admissis e- *Faerno*: d- armis *Bähr*: <non> d- signis *Koch*: nihilo sequius *Haupt*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

extended from the camp to the river; they were looking for the entrance and thought this was the fortification of the camp itself. But when its connection to the river was noticed, they knocked down the undefended fortifications and went through. And our entire cavalry followed these cohorts. 3

69. Meanwhile Pompey, after a considerable delay, got word. Taking five legions from the works he led them to the relief of his men. At one and the same moment his cavalry approached ours and his legionary line was spotted by those of our men who were in possession of the camp. The reversal was sudden and complete. The Pompeian legion took heart in the hope of quick relief and attempted resistance from the camp's rear gate, initiating an attack on our men. Caesar's cavalry, coming up through the earthworks on a narrow path and fearing for its retreat, caused the beginning of the flight. The right wing, which was cut off from the left, noticed the cavalry panicking. To avoid being crushed inside the fortifications, it began to withdraw where it had knocked them down, and most of the men flung themselves from the ten-foot high wall into the trenches to avoid entering that narrow passage. The first were crushed but the rest saved themselves and got away over their bodies. On the left wing the soldiers perceived from the wall that Pompey was at hand and their own men were in flight. Afraid that they would be cut off in a narrow space, given that they had the enemy both inside and outside the camp, they took thought for themselves by retreating the same way they had come. Everything was full of confusion, fear, and flight, to such an extent that when Caesar tried to grab the standards of the fleeing men and ordered them to stop, some took refuge 2 3 4

## CAESAR

dem cursum confugerent,<sup>87</sup> alii ex metu etiam signa dimitterent, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.

70. His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant quo minus omnis deleteretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens—credo quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius qui paulo ante ex castris fugientes suos conspexerat—munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat equitesque eius angustiis [portis]<sup>88</sup> atque iis a Caesaris militibus occupatis ad insequendum tardabantur. Ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. Munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt. Eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.

71. Duobus his unius diei proeliis Caesar desideravit milites DCCCCLX et notos equites Romanos [Flegmatem] Tuticanum Gallum senatoris filium, C. Flegmatem Placentia, A. Granium Puteolis, M. Sacrativirum Capua, tribunos militum [L], et centuriones XXXII. Sed horum omnium pars magna in fossis munitionibusque et fluminis ripis oppressa suorum in terrore ac fuga sine ullo vulnere interiiit. Signaque sunt militaria amissa XXXII. Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus. Hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutari passus neque<sup>89</sup> in litteris

<sup>87</sup> eundem . . . confugerent] *Many emendations have been proposed for this stretch of text.*

<sup>88</sup> angustiis [portis] *Nipperdey*: angustis portis  $\omega$

<sup>89</sup> neque *Nipperdey*: sed  $\omega$

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<sup>88</sup> Before "fled running," the manuscripts read "after letting their horses go," which *Nipperdey* excised because the cavalry is

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

in running<sup>88</sup> as before, others in their fear even let go of the standards, and no one at all stopped.

70. The situation was extremely bad, but the following factors helped prevent the complete destruction of the army. Pompey, fearing an ambush, did not dare approach the fortifications for quite some time—in my view, because things had turned out contrary to the expectation of a man who had seen his men running away from their camp shortly before—and his cavalry was slowed down in its pursuit by the narrow space, particularly since it was held by our men. Trivial things thus tilted the balance strongly in both directions. For the fortifications built from the camp to the river interrupted a victory that Caesar had all but in hand after capturing Pompey's camp, and the same thing saved our men by slowing the pace of their pursuers. 2

71. In the two battles of this one day Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty soldiers, plus eminent men of equestrian status, Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son, Gaius Flegmas of Placentia, Aulus Granius of Puteoli, Marcus Sacrativir of Capua, who were military tribunes, and thirty-two centurions. A considerable portion of the total perished without a wound in the trenches and fortifications and on the banks of the river, overwhelmed by the terror and flight of their own side. Thirty-two military standards were also lost. Pompey was hailed as *imperator* in that battle. He kept this title and, while allowing himself to be addressed thus afterward, was not in the habit of writing it 2 3

elsewhere (3.68.3). Other repairs include "after spurring on their horses," "after letting go of their weapons," "without letting go of the standards," and "nevertheless."



CAESAR

[quas]<sup>90</sup> scribere est solitus neque in fascibus insignia la-  
 4 reae praetulit. At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset ut  
 sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes reductos—ostentationis,  
 ut videbatur, causa quo maior perfugae fides haberetur—  
 commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia  
 interrogans solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium  
 conspectu interfecit.

72. His rebus tantum fiduciae ac spiritus Pompeianis  
 accessit ut non de ratione belli cogitarent sed vicisse iam  
 2 sibi viderentur. Non illi paucitatem nostrorum militum,  
 non iniquitatem loci atque angustias praeoccupatis castris  
 et ancipitem terrorem intra extraque munitiones, non abs-  
 cisum in duas partes exercitum, cum altera alteri auxilium  
 3 ferre non posset, causae fuisse cogitabant. Non ad haec  
 addebant: non ex concursu aciei<sup>91</sup> facto, non proelio dimi-  
 catum; sibique ipsos multitudine atque angustiis maius  
 4 attulisse detrimentum quam ab hoste accepissent. Non  
 denique communes belli casus recordabantur: quam par-  
 vulae saepe causae vel falsae suspicionis vel terroris repen-  
 tini vel obiectae religionis magna detrimenta intulissent;  
 quotiens vel ducis vitio vel culpa tribuni in exercitu esset  
 offensum. Sed proinde ac si virtute vicissent neque ulla  
 commutatio rerum posset accidere per orbem terrarum  
 fama ac litteris victoriam eius diei concelebrabant.

73. Caesar a superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem  
 2 sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. Itaque uno

<sup>90</sup> [quas] *Peskett. The sense is clear from D.C. 41.52.1.*

<sup>91</sup> aciei *Chacon: agri ω: acri ed. pr.*

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<sup>89</sup> For "formations came together and did battle," editors of-  
 ten adopt the Livian "battle was joined after a fierce clash."

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

in his letters, nor did he display the laurel insignia on his fasces. Labienus, however, got Pompey to order the prisoners of war to be handed over to him. He collected them all and—apparently making a demonstration in order to give greater credibility to a deserter's loyalty, calling them his "fellow soldiers" and asking, among many other insults, whether veterans were in the habit of running away—killed them in full view. 4

72. These developments added so much confidence and morale to the Pompeians that they stopped thinking about strategy and felt that they had already won. They did not think about contributory factors: the small number of our men, the disadvantages of the site, the confined space with the enemy in control of the camp, the twofold terror inside and outside of the fortifications, nor about the fact that the army was cut in two, so that one part could not help the other. Nor did they add that it was not a fight in which formations came together and did battle,<sup>89</sup> or that the damage his men did to themselves with the crowding and the narrow space was greater than the damage taken from the enemy. Finally, they did not remember the normal chances of war: how small factors such as a false suspicion or a sudden alarm or a religious scruple have caused huge losses, how often an army has run into trouble owing to its commander's fault or an officer's mistake. But just as if courage had made them victorious, and no reversal was possible, they used word of mouth and letters to broadcast the day's victory worldwide. 2 3 4

73. Turned back from his earlier objectives, Caesar thought his whole strategy should be changed. So he si- 2

## CAESAR

tempore praesidiis omnibus deductis et oppugnatione dimissa coactoque in unum locum exercitu contionem apud milites habuit. Hortatusque est ne ea quae accidissent graviter ferrent neve his rebus terrerentur multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent; habendam Fortunae gratiam quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias belliosissimorum hominum <provincias, superatis><sup>92</sup> peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem rede-gissent; denique recordari debere qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes oppletis non solum portibus sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent transportati; si non omnia caderent secunda Fortunam esse industria sublevandam; quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpa debere tribui; locum se notum<sup>93</sup> ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum se esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes; sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam Fortuna partem iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset dandam omnibus operam ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur; quod si esset factum <futurum><sup>94</sup> ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, uti ad Gergoviam accidisset, atque ei qui ante dimicare timuissent ultro se proelio offerrent.

74. Hac habita contione nonnullos signiferos ignominia notavit ac loco movit. Exercitui quidem omni tantus inces-

<sup>92</sup> <provincias, superatis> *Damon*. Other repairs are possible.

<sup>93</sup> se notum *Damon* (see 3.66.2): secum *μST*: se eis *V*: se aequum *Vittori*

<sup>94</sup> <futurum> *Meusel*

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multaneously withdrew all of the garrisons and abandoned the blockade. He gathered the army together and addressed his soldiers, urging them not to be troubled by what had happened, or frightened by it, but rather to compare their many successes with this single reverse, not a serious one, either. "You should be grateful to Fortune: 3 you took Italy without any bloodshed, pacified the two Spains—⟨provinces⟩ containing extremely warlike peoples—⟨after overcoming⟩ Pompey's most skillful and experienced leaders, and you brought nearby grain-producing provinces back under control. Finally, you must remember how much good luck you all enjoyed in being transported safely through the midst of enemy fleets, when not only ports but also the coastline was held against us. If not everything has turned out well, we should help 4 Fortune with our own exertions. As for the damage incurred, no one deserves the blame less than me. I gave you 5 a familiar<sup>90</sup> position for the fight, gained control of the enemy camp, drove the enemy off, and defeated them in battle. Whatever interrupted a victory that was already won and in our grasp, whether it was confusion on your part or some mistake or even Fortune herself, we must all ensure that courage provides a repair for the setback we have suffered. If this is done, the damage will turn into 6 advantage, as happened at Gergovia, and those who before now were afraid to fight will offer themselves for battle of their own accord."

74. After delivering this speech he reprimanded and demoted some standard bearers. Throughout the army 2

<sup>90</sup> For Caesar's defensive "familiar," Vittori proposed "favorable." Neither matches the narrative of the debacle (1.66–69).

- sit ex incommodo dolor tantumque studium infamiae sari-  
 ciendae ut nemo aut tribuni aut centurionis imperium  
 desideraret et sibi quisque etiam poenae loco graviores  
 imponeret labores, simulque omnes arderent cupiditate  
 pugnandi, cum superioris etiam ordinis nonnulli ratione  
 permoti manendum eo loco et rem proelio committendam  
 3 existimarent. Contra ea Caesar neque satis militibus per-  
 territis confidebat spatiumque interponendum ad recre-  
 andos animos putabat.

- Relictis munitiōibus magnopere rei frumentariae ti-  
 mebat. 75. Itaque nulla interposita mora sauciorum modo  
 et aegrorum habita ratione <impedimenta> omnia silentio  
 prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemisit. Haec con-  
 quiescere ante iter confectum vetuit. Iis una legio missa  
 2 praesidio est. His explicitis rebus duas in castris legiones  
 retinuit, reliquas de quarta vigilia compluribus portis  
 eductas eodem itinere praemisit. Parvoque spatio inter-  
 misso, ut et militare institutum servaretur et quam suetis-  
 sima<sup>95</sup> eius profectio cognosceretur conclamari iussit  
 statimque egressus et novissimum agmen consecutus ce-  
 3 leriter ex conspectu castrorum discessit. Neque vero Pom-  
 peius cognito consilio eius moram ullam ad insequendum  
 intulit sed eadem<sup>96</sup> spectans si itinere impedito<sup>97</sup> perter-  
 ritos deprendere posset exercitum e castris eduxit equita-

<sup>95</sup> quam suetissima *Fabre*: q- -me ω: q- serissime *Scaliger*.  
*Perhaps* consuetudine? <sup>96</sup> eadem] eodem *Hoffmann*

<sup>97</sup> impedito ζ (*see* 3.77.2): impeditos [-iment- S] ω

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<sup>91</sup> For "seem as ordinary as possible," Scaliger substituted "recognized as late as possible." One might also substitute "appear customary."

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remorse over the setback took hold, and the men were so determined to repair the disgrace that no one needed the orders of a centurion or officer; every man punished himself with fatigues. Everyone was likewise ablaze with desire for combat, and some higher ranking men, inspired by Caesar's argument, thought they should stay there and decide matters in battle. Caesar, by contrast, did not have enough confidence in the terrified soldiers and felt that he had to allow some time for reviving morale. 3

Now that he had abandoned the siege works he was very anxious about provisions. 75. Therefore he did not delay except to attend to the men who were wounded and sick. At nightfall he sent his whole baggage train in silence out of the camp and on to Apollonia with orders not to rest before finishing the march; one legion was sent as protection. After completing these arrangements, and holding two legions in camp, he had the rest move out before dawn by various gates; he sent them on by the same route. A short time later he had the signal for packing up sounded, so as to keep to military custom and make his departure seem as ordinary as possible.<sup>91</sup> Then he left immediately and caught up with the rearguard, disappearing quickly from view of the camp. And Pompey, once he realized Caesar's intention, did not delay pursuit. Expecting the same results if he could catch terrified men marching under encumbrances,<sup>92</sup> he moved his army out of camp. He 3

<sup>92</sup> For Pompey's reasoning, see 3.30.2. For "expecting the same results," Hoffmann suggested "with the same expectations (as Caesar's)."

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tumque praemisit ad novissimum agmen demorandum, neque consequi potuit quod multum expedito itinere antecesserat Caesar. Sed cum ventum esset ad flumen Genusum, quod ripis erat impeditis, consecutus equitatus novissimos proelio detinebat. Huic suos Caesar equites opposuit expeditosque antesignanos admiscuit CCCC. Qui tantum profecerunt ut equestri proelio commisso pel-lerent omnes compluresque interficerent ipsique incolumes se ad agmen reciperent.

76. Confecto iusto itinere eius diei, quod proposuerat Caesar, traductoque exercitu flumen Genusum veteribus suis in castris contra Asparagium consedit militesque omnes intra vallum castrorum continuit equitatumque per causam pabulandi emissum confestim decimana porta in castra se recipere iussit. Simili ratione Pompeius confecto eius diei itinere in suis veteribus castris ad Asparagium consedit. Eius milites quod ab opere integris munitionibus vacabant alii lignandi pabulandique causa longius progrediebantur, alii, quod subito consilium perfectionis ceperant magna parte impedimentorum et sarcinarum relictis, ad haec repetenda invitati propinquitate superiorum castrorum depositis in contubernio armis vallum relinquebant. Quibus ad sequendum impeditis Caesar, quod fore providerat, meridiano fere tempore signo perfectionis dato exercitum educit. Duplicatoque eius diei itinere VIII milia passuum ex eo loco procedit. Quod facere Pompeius discessu militum non potuit.

77. Postero die Caesar similiter praemissis prima nocte impedimentis de quarta vigilia ipse egreditur ut si qua esset imposita dimicandi necessitas subitum casum expe-

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<sup>93</sup> See 3.41.

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sent the cavalry ahead to delay the rearguard, but it was  
unable to do so because Caesar had marched without en-  
cumbrances and was far ahead. At the Genusus River, 4  
however, whose banks were hard to negotiate, the cavalry  
caught up with the rearguard and attacked, holding them  
up. Caesar deployed his own cavalry in response, mixing 5  
in four hundred unencumbered elite troops; these were  
so effective that in a cavalry engagement they routed the  
enemy, killed several, and returned to the column unscathed.

76. After finishing the regular march that he had an-  
nounced for that day, and taking his army across the Ge-  
nusus, Caesar halted in his old camp facing Asparagium.<sup>93</sup>  
He kept all of his soldiers inside the rampart; the cavalry,  
sent out under the pretense of foraging, was ordered to  
return quickly to camp through the rear gate. Pompey 2  
likewise halted in his old camp near Asparagium when he  
had finished the day's march. His soldiers had a respite 3  
from work since the fortifications were intact; some went  
a distance to gather wood and fodder, others—since the  
decision to move out had been taken suddenly and most  
of their baggage and packs had been left behind, and  
tempted to collect them by the proximity of the previous  
camp—stowed their weapons in the tents and began leav-  
ing the rampart. When they were hindered from pursuit 4  
(which Caesar had foreseen), he gave the signal for depar-  
ture around midday and moved his army out. Doubling his  
day's march he advanced eight miles from that spot, which  
Pompey was unable to do because of the dispersal of his  
men.

77. The next day Caesar similarly sent the baggage  
ahead at nightfall and himself left before dawn so that if  
any need to fight arose he could meet the emergency with



CAESAR

- 2 dito exercitu subiret. Hoc idem reliquis fecit diebus. Quibus rebus perfectum est ut altissimis fluminibus atque impeditissimis itineribus nullum acciperet incommodum.
- 3 Pompeius enim, primi diei mora illata et reliquorum dierum frustra labore suscepto cum se magnis itineribus extenderet et praegressos consequi cuperet, quarta die finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.

78. Caesari ad saucios deponendos stipendium exercitui dandum socios confirmandos praesidium urbibus relinquendum necesse erat adire Apolloniam. Sed his rebus tantum temporis tribuit quantum erat properanti necesse. Timens Domitio ne adventu Pompei praecoccuparetur ad eum omni celeritate et studio incitatus ferebatur.
- 3 Totius autem rei consilium his rationibus explicabat: ut, si Pompeius eodem contenderet, abductum illum a mari atque ab iis copiis quas Dyrrachi comparaverat—frumento ac commeatu—abstractum pari conditione belli secum decertare cogeret; si in Italiam transiret, coniuncto exercitu cum Domitio per Illyricum Italiae subsidio proficeretur; si Apolloniam Oricumque oppugnare et se omni maritima ora excludere conaretur, obsesso Scipione necessario illum suis auxilium ferre cogeret. Itaque praemissis nuntiis ad Cn. Domitium Caesar scripsit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. Praesidioque Apolloniae cohortium III, Lissi una, tribus Orici relictis, quique erant ex vulneribus aegri depositis, per Epirum atque Athamaniam iter facere coepit. Pompeius quoque de Caesaris consilio coniectura iudicans ad Scipionem properandum sibi existimabat: si Caesar iter illo haberet, ut subsidium Scipioni ferret; si ab ora maritima Oricoque discedere nollet quod legiones

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an unencumbered army; he did the same on subsequent days. These tactics meant that he suffered no setback at rivers that were extremely deep and on roads that were hard to negotiate, for Pompey, after the first day's delay and the wasted effort of subsequent days as he exerted himself with forced marches and hoped to catch the men ahead, stopped his pursuit on the fourth day, thinking that he had to devise a new plan.

78. Caesar had go to Apollonia to settle the wounded, pay the army, encourage the allies, and garrison various cities. But the time he spent on these matters was limited by his need for haste. Fearing that Pompey's arrival might take Domitius by surprise, he moved in Domitius' direction with all speed; determination spurred him on. He laid out his overall plan reasoning as follows: "If Pompey heads for the same place, I will force him to decide matters between us with a battle on equal terms, away from the sea and separated from all of the resources—provisions and supplies—available to him at Dyrrachium. If he crosses to Italy, I will join forces with Domitius and set out to relieve Italy via Illyricum. If he tries to attack Apollonia and Oricum and cut me off from the whole coastline, I will lay siege to Scipio and force Pompey by necessity to assist his own side." So he sent written word to Gnaeus Domitius, showing what he wanted done. He garrisoned Apollonia with four cohorts, Lissus with one, and Oricum with three, settled those who were ill from their wounds, and began his march through Epirus and Athamania. Pompey, too, was making decisions based on conjecture about Caesar's plans. He thought he ought to hurry toward Scipio, intending, if Caesar went there, to assist Scipio. If Caesar was unwilling to leave the coast and Oricum, in the expect-

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equitatumque ex Italia expectaret, ipse ut omnibus copiis Domitium aggrederetur.

79. His de causis uterque eorum celeritati studebat, et suis ut esset auxilio <et> ad opprimendos adversarios ne  
 2 occasione temporis deesset. Sed Caesarem Apollonia a  
 3 directo itinere averterat. Pompeius per Candaviam iter in  
 4 Macedoniam expeditum habebat. Accessit etiam ex im-  
 proviso aliud incommodum, quod Domitius, <cum><sup>98</sup> dies  
 complures castris Scipionis castra collata habuisset, rei  
 frumentariae causa ab eo discesserat et Heracliam Senticam,<sup>99</sup>  
 quae est subiecta Candaviae, iter fecerat, ut ipsa  
 5 Fortuna illum obicere Pompeio videretur. (Haec ad id  
 tempus Caesar ignorabat.) Simul a Pompeio litteris per  
 omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis proelio ad Dyrrachium  
 facta latius inflatusque multo quam res erat gesta fama  
 percrebuerat: pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus  
 6 copiis amissis. Haec itinera infesta reddiderat, haec  
 civitates nonnullas ab eius amicitia avertebat. Quibus acci-  
 dit rebus ut pluribus dimissi itineribus a Caesare ad Domi-  
 7 tium et a Domitio ad Caesarem nulla ratione iter conficere  
 possent. Sed Allobroges, Roucilli atque Egi familiares, quos  
 per fugisse ad Pompeium demonstravimus, conspicati <in>  
 itinere exploratores Domiti, seu pristina sua consuetudine  
 quod una in Gallia bella gesserant seu gloria elati cuncta  
 ut erant acta exposuerunt et Caesaris profectionem, adventum  
 Pompei docuerunt. A quibus Domitius

<sup>98</sup> <cum> *Paul*

<sup>99</sup> [Senticam] *Cellarius*

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<sup>94</sup> There are several towns named Heraclia. Heraclia Senticam is not in fact adjacent to Candavia, hence Cellarius' excision, but the error may be Caesar's (for Heraclia Lyncestis).

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tation of legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself would attack Domitius with all of his forces.

79. For these reasons each of them was determined to make haste, in order to relieve his own side and avoid wasting an opportunity to crush his adversaries. But Apollonia had been a detour for Caesar, while Pompey's march through Candavia to Macedonia was unencumbered. An additional and unexpected setback occurred in that Domitius, although for several days he had been keeping his camp in contact with Scipio's, had parted ways for the sake of his food supply and marched to Heraclia Sentica, which is near Candavia,<sup>94</sup> so that Fortune seemed to be putting him in Pompey's way. (Caesar was unaware of this at the time.) At the same time, because of the letters distributed by Pompey to every province and city after the battle at Dyrrachium, a report had spread whose terms were overly general and exaggerated beyond the event itself: Caesar had been routed and was now in flight after losing almost all of his forces. This rendered the roads unsafe and deflected some cities from their allegiance to Caesar. As a result, messengers sent by Caesar to Domitius and Domitius to him on various routes could find no way to complete their journeys. Some Allobroges, however, connections of Roucillus and Egus, whose desertion to Pompey I mentioned, caught sight of Domitius' scouts on the march, told them everything as it had happened, and informed them about Caesar's march and Pompey's approach, either from past habit (they had fought on the same side in Gaul) or carried away with self-importance. With their information

## CAESAR

certior factus vix IIII horarum spatio antecedens hostium beneficio periculum vitavit et ad Aeginium, quod est obiectum oppositumque Thessaliae, Caesari venienti occurrit.

80. Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro. Quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, 2 praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. Sed eo fama iam praecurrerat quam supra docuimus de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerant partibus. Itaque Andros- 3 thenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praecludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit ut sibi subsidio veniant: se 4 confidere munitionibus oppidi si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse. Scipio discessu exercituum a Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat. Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat.
- 5 Caesar castris munitis scalas musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et crates parari iussit. Quibus 6 rebus effectis cohortatus milites docuit quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, 7 priusquam auxilia concurrerent. Itaque usus singulari militum studio, eodem quo venerat die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante

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<sup>95</sup> At Larisa Scipio was about forty-five miles from Gomphi.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

and a lead of barely four hours Domitius avoided danger thanks to the enemy and met Caesar on his way near Aeginium, which borders Thessaly and faces it.

80. With his forces united, Caesar went to Gomphi, which is the first town in Thessaly for those coming from Epirus. This community had spontaneously sent a delegation to Caesar a few months earlier, inviting him to make use of all of their resources; they had asked him for a garrison of soldiers. But the aforementioned report about the Dyrrachium battle had already outstripped him, and they had augmented it considerably. So Androsthenes, the top man in Thessaly, preferring to be a companion to Pompey's victory than Caesar's ally in adversity, drove the whole population of slaves and free men from the countryside into the town, shut the gates, and sent messengers to Scipio and Pompey with a request for help: "I have confidence in the town's defenses if help comes quickly. We cannot withstand a long siege." Scipio, upon learning of the armies' departure from Dyrrachium, had led his legions to Larisa; Pompey was not yet near Thessaly.<sup>95</sup>

After fortifying his camp Caesar ordered ladders and galleries built and brushwood bundles readied for an immediate assault. When these were finished he rallied his troops, explaining how useful it would be for relieving the general scarcity to take control of a town that was well stocked and wealthy, and at the same time to strike terror into other cities with the example of this one, and to do so quickly, before reinforcements could arrive. Taking advantage of the soldiers' remarkable determination, he began the attack in the middle of the afternoon the day he arrived. The town had exceptionally high fortifications,

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solis occasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

51. Metropolitae primum eodem usi consilio isdem permoti rumoribus portas clausurunt murosque armatis compleverunt. Sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis quos Caesar ad murum producendos  
2 curaverat portas aperuerunt. Quibus diligentissime conservatis collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu Gomphensium nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari  
3 parerent atque imperata facerent. Ille idoneum locum <frumentaue><sup>100</sup> in agris nactus, quae prope iam matura erant. ibi adventum expectare Pompei eoque omnem belli rationem conferre constituit.

82. Pompeius paucis post diebus in Thessaliam pervenit contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes. Receptisque omnibus in una castra legionibus suum cum Scipione honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et  
2 alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi. Auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis pristina omnium confirmatur opinio et spes victoriae augetur, adeo ut quicquid intercederet temporis id morari reditum in Italiam videretur, et si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret unius esse negotium diei sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere

<sup>100</sup> <frumentaue> *Damon* (see 3.84.1). Other repairs yield the same basic sense.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

but he stormed it before sunset and turned it over to his soldiers for plundering. He immediately moved his camp away from Gomphi and went to Metropolis, so that he arrived before messengers and news about the fallen town.

81. The townsfolk, adopting the same plan initially and prompted by the same rumors, closed their gates and had armed men occupy the walls. But later, when they learned about Gomphi's disaster from prisoners brought forward to the wall on Caesar's instructions, they opened the gates. Great care was taken to keep them safe, and after comparing the fortune of Metropolis with Gomphi's disaster every single city in Thessaly (except Larisa, which was in the grip of large armies under Scipio) became obedient to Caesar and did what he ordered. For his part, having found a suitable location and grain in the fields, nearly ripe already, Caesar decided to await Pompey's arrival there and base his whole strategy on that location. 2 3

82. Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days later. In an address to the whole army he thanked his men and encouraged Scipio's soldiers: since victory was already in hand, they should agree to share the booty and rewards. He put all of the legions into a single camp and gave Scipio a half-share of the command; by Pompey's order bugle calls were given in Scipio's area and a second headquarters was erected for him. With Pompey's forces thus strengthened and the conjunction of two large armies everyone's original expectation was validated and their hope of victory became so strong that the intervening time seemed to be a postponement of their return to Italy, and whenever Pompey acted somewhat slowly or warily, people said that it was a one-day job but he was enjoying his power 2



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- 3 numero dicerent. Iamque inter se palam de praemiis<sup>101</sup> ac  
de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum defini-  
niebant, alii domos bonaque eorum qui in castris erant  
4 Caesaris petebant. Magnaque inter eos in consilio fuit  
controversia oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio  
ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoriis abs-  
entis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implo-  
rarent Pompei—praestaret quod proficiscenti recepisset  
ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur—reliqui in  
labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet recu-  
sarent.

83. Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius Scipio Spin-  
therque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad gravissimas  
verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentu-  
lus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gra-  
tiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio adfinitate Pompei  
2 confideret. Postulavit etiam L. Afranium prodicionis exer-  
citus Acutius Rufus apud Pompeium, quod <bellum  
3 male><sup>102</sup> gestum in Hispania diceret. Et L. Domitius in  
consilio dixit: placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas  
dari ad iudicandum iis qui ordinis essent senatori belloque  
una cum ipsis interfuissent; sententiasque de singulis  
ferrent qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia

<sup>101</sup> praemiis] provinciis *Kraffert*: praeturis *Markland*: impe-  
riis *Paul. Novák excised* de sacerdotiis *instead*.

<sup>102</sup> quod <bellum male> . . . diceret *Koch. Frese defends the*  
*transmitted text, Gruter excises it.*

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<sup>96</sup> Scholars have proposed replacing the vague "rewards" with  
"provinces," "praetorships," or "commands," or else excising the  
specific "priesthoods."

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

and treating former consuls and praetors as his slaves. They were already squabbling openly about rewards<sup>96</sup> and priesthoods, and were determining future years' consulships; some were demanding the houses and property of men who were in Caesar's camp. There was also a long argument in council about whether or not it was right for Lucilius Hirrus to be a candidate in absentia at the next praetorian elections, since he had been sent by Pompey to the Parthians. His friends implored Pompey to keep his word—"Stand by the terms you offered when he was leaving, lest people think he was deceived by your guarantee"—and the rest said that no one should outstrip everyone when their hardship and danger had been the same. 3 4

83. By now in their daily squabbles on the subject of Caesar's priesthood Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus had sunk to open and extremely offensive insults, with Lentulus flaunting the prestige of his age, Domitius boasting about his influence and standing in Rome, and Scipio trusting in his relationship with Pompey. Acutius Rufus even brought a charge of betraying the army against Lucius Afranius, with Pompey as judge, the grounds being Rufus' statement that the war in Spain was conducted badly.<sup>97</sup> Lucius Domitius said in council: "In my opinion, once the war is over, three tablets should be provided for the verdicts of those who are of senatorial standing and have taken part with us in the fighting, and we should record a vote on every man who stayed in Rome or who was under Pompey's protection but did not contribute to the 2 3

<sup>97</sup> For "the war . . . was conducted badly," the transmitted text reads "which (i.e., the betrayal) . . . was perpetrated." Gruter excised the clause.

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Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent; unam fore tabellam iis <qui><sup>103</sup> liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui pecunia multarent. Postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimicitis agebant, neque quibus rationibus superare possent sed quemadmodum uti victoria deberent cogitabant.

4 S4. Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proelii intermisso quo satis perspectum habere <Caesar animum><sup>104</sup> militum videretur, temptandum existimavit quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad dimicandum haberet. Itaque ex castris exercitum eduxit aciemque instruxit primum suis locis pauloque a castris Pompei longius, continentibus vero diebus ut progredere-  
 2 tur a castris suis collibusque Pompeianis aciem subiceret. Quae res in  
 3 dies confirmatiorem eius exercitum efficiebat. Superius tamen institutum in equitibus quod demonstravimus servabat, ut quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis—electos milites ad pernicitatem—armis<sup>105</sup> inter equites proeliari iuberet, qui cotidiana consuetudine usum quoque eius  
 4 generis proeliorum perciperent. His erat rebus effectum

<sup>103</sup> iis <qui> *Damon*: in *MUS*<sup>c</sup>: qui *M<sup>mr</sup>TV*: qua *Oudendorp* here and for qui in the next two clauses

<sup>104</sup> <Caesar animum> *Bücheler*

<sup>105</sup> electos milites ad pernicitatem armis] *The text is very uncertain here.*

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<sup>98</sup> The voting mechanism is not clear. With the transmitted text, minimally emended, it involves lists of those who support

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

military effort: one tablet for those who decide that they should be completely exonerated, another for those who sentence them to death, and a third for those who impose a monetary penalty."<sup>98</sup> In short, everyone was concerned with offices for themselves or financial rewards or getting back at their enemies, not thinking about what strategies would enable them to win but about how they ought to put their victory to use. 4

84. After having arranged his provisioning and put heart into his soldiers Caesar thought that he should find out what Pompey's intention or desire for a fight was, now that enough time had elapsed since the Dyrrachium battles for him to feel that he had sufficiently observed the soldiers' morale. So he led the army out and drew up his line, at first in a spot he controlled, some distance from Pompey's camp, but on the following days advancing further from his own camp and setting his line at the foot of the hills controlled by Pompey. This made his army more confident every day. He maintained the previous arrangement among the cavalry that I mentioned: since he was numerically inferior by a wide margin, he ordered young and unencumbered men from the frontline fighters—soldiers chosen for speed—to do battle in the midst of the cavalry, men who by daily practice were gaining experience of this type of battle, too.<sup>99</sup> The result of these mea- 3 4

each of the three verdicts for each defendant. This interpretation takes the two distributives (*ternas . . . singulis*) together. With Oudendorp's emendation, each senator uses three tablets for his votes, presumably by listing the defendants thereon.

<sup>99</sup> See 3.75.5.

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ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum adesset usus, sustinere audent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrentur.

- 5 Namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit atque Egum<sup>106</sup> Allobrogem, ex duobus quos perfugisse ad Pompeium supra docuimus, cum quibusdam interfecit.

85. Pompeius, qui castra in colle habebat, ad infimas radices montis aciem instruebat, semper ut videbatur expectans si iniquis locis Caesar se subiceret. <Ille><sup>107</sup> nulla ratione ad pugnam elici posse Pompeium existimans hanc sibi commodissimam belli rationem iudicavit, uti castra ex eo loco moveret semperque esset in itineribus, haec spectans, ut movendis castris pluribusque adeundis locis commodiore frumentaria re uteretur simulque in itinere ut aliquam occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur et insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret. His constitutis rebus signo iam profectionis dato  
3 tabernaculisque detensis animadversum est paulo ante extra cotidianam consuetudinem longius a vallo esse aciem Pompei progressam, ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur. Tum Caesar apud suos cum iam esset agmen in portis "Differendum est" inquit "iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus. Animo sumus<sup>108</sup> ad dimicandum parati. Non facile occasionem postea reperiemus." Confestimque expeditas copias educit.

<sup>106</sup> egum V: uncum MUT: unum S      <sup>107</sup> <Ille> Meusel

<sup>108</sup> sumus MUTV: suus (or sivis) S: simus Manutius

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<sup>100</sup> For "we are," Manutius substituted "let us be."

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

sures was that his one thousand cavalrymen, with experience behind them, dared to withstand the attack of Pompey's seven thousand, even on relatively open terrain, and were not much dismayed by their numbers. (He even fought a successful cavalry battle during that period, and killed an Allobrogian, Egus, from the two whose desertion to Pompey I mentioned earlier, along with some others.) 5

85. Pompey, whose camp was on a rise, would draw up his line on the hill's lowest slopes, perpetually waiting, it seemed, to see whether Caesar would move into a disadvantageous position. Caesar, thinking that there was no way Pompey could be drawn out to do battle, decided that the most convenient strategy was to move his camp from that location and stay perpetually on the march. He had these things in view: if he moved his camp and went to various places, provisioning would be more convenient; also, on the march he might get an opportunity to fight; and with daily marches he would exhaust Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to hardship. He had decided accordingly and given the order for departure, and the tents had been taken down, when people noticed that shortly beforehand, and in a departure from its daily practice, Pompey's line had advanced some distance from the rampart, so that it seemed possible to fight on ground that was not disadvantageous. At that point Caesar said to his men, when his column was already at the gate: "We must postpone our march for now and think about battle—our perpetual request! We are<sup>100</sup> mentally ready to fight; hereafter it will not be easy to find an occasion." He quickly led out unencumbered troops. 2 3 4

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86. Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare. Namque etiam in consilio superioribus diebus dixerat: priusquam concurrerent acies fore uti exercitus Caesaris pelleretur.
- 2 Id cum essent plerique admirati "Scio me" inquit "paene incredibilem rem polliceri. Sed rationem consili mei acci-
- 3 pite quo firmiore animo <ad><sup>109</sup> proelium prodeatis. Persuasi equitibus nostris, idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggredierentur et circumventa ab
- 4 nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem
- 5 difficile non est cum tantum equitatu valeamus." Simul denuntiavit ut essent animo parati in posterum et quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe cogitavissent,<sup>110</sup> ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.

87. Hunc Labienus excepit et cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret "Noli" inquit "existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum
- 2 qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest. Magna pars deperit, quod accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumnii pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt,
- 3 multi sunt relictos in continenti. An non exaudistis ex iis qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt cohortes esse

<sup>109</sup> <ad> *Meusel*

<sup>110</sup> cogitavissent] flagitavissent *Markland*

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<sup>101</sup> For "thought about," *Markland* proposed "demanded." Other emendations have been proposed.

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86. Pompey, too, as people learned later, had decided to settle matters with a battle, on the urging of everyone on his side. For in council recently he had even said that Caesar's army would be routed before the lines met. When most present expressed surprise he said: "I know that I am making a nearly incredible promise. But here is the thinking behind my plan, so that you can approach the battle with sturdier morale. I have persuaded our cavalry—and they have assured me that they will do this—to attack Caesar's right wing on its open flank when the approach is complete. Once they have encircled Caesar's line from the back, they are going to rout the army in disarray before our men throw a weapon at the enemy. We will thus finish the war with no danger to the legions and practically without a wound. It is not a difficult matter, given how strong we are in cavalry." He also announced that they should be mentally ready for the next day. "Since there will be an opportunity for fighting, something you have thought about<sup>101</sup> often, do not disprove the opinion that I and everyone else has of you."

87. Labienus went next, expressing scorn for Caesar's troops and praising Pompey's plan with the utmost enthusiasm: "Do not suppose, Pompey, that this is the army that conquered Gaul and Germany. I took part in all of the battles; I am not speaking at random about something unfamiliar to me. The surviving portion of that army is exceedingly small. Most of it has perished, as was bound to happen in so many battles. Disease took many in the fall in Italy, many went home, many were left behind in Italy. Have you not heard that they formed cohorts in Brundisium from those who stayed behind because of ill-health?"



## CAESAR

4 Brundisi factas? Hae copiae quas videtis ex dilectibus  
 horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt resectae, et ple-  
 rique sunt ex colonis<sup>111</sup> Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit  
 5 roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit." Haec cum  
 dixisset iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum  
 6 reliquosque ut idem facerent hortatus est. Hoc laudans  
 Pompeius idem iuravit. Nec vero ex reliquis fuit quisquam  
 7 qui iurare dubitaret. Haec cum facta sunt in consilio  
 magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est. Ac iam animo  
 victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito  
 imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur.

58. Caesar cum Pompei castris appropinquasset ad  
 2 hunc modum aciem eius instructam animadvertit. Erant  
 in sinistro cornu legiones duae traditae a Caesare initio  
 dissensionis ex senatus consulto, quarum una prima, altera  
 3 tertia appellabatur. In eo loco ipse erat Pompeius. Me-  
 diam aciem Scipio cum legionibus Syriacis tenebat. Cili-  
 ciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas  
 traductas ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant col-  
 4 locatae. Has firmissimas se habere Pompeius existimabat.  
 Reliquas inter aciem mediam cornuaque interiecerat nu-  
 5 meroque cohortes CX expleverat. Haec erant milia XLV,  
 evocatorum circiter duo quae <se><sup>112</sup> ex beneficiariis su-  
 periorum exercituum ad eum converterant,<sup>113</sup> quae tota  
 acie disperserat. Reliquas cohortes VII castris propinquis-

<sup>111</sup> ex colonis *MUST*: coloniis V

<sup>112</sup> <se> *Damon*

<sup>113</sup> converterant] convenerant S

<sup>102</sup> For "settlers," some editors print a lightly emended version of V's text, "colonies."

<sup>103</sup> This has not in fact been explained. For the "loose ends" in the *BC*, see the Introduction.

The forces that you see were reconstituted by recruitment 4  
 in those years in Nearer Gaul, and most of the men come  
 from Transpadane settlers.<sup>102</sup> Even so, whatever was reli- 5  
 able fell in the two battles at Dyrrachium." After speaking  
 thus, he took an oath that he would not return to camp  
 except as a victor, and he urged the rest to do the same.  
 Pompey applauded and took the same oath. And not one 6  
 of the rest hesitated to take the oath. After these events in 7  
 council, they broke up in high hope and general rejoicing.  
 Indeed they already felt that victory was theirs, since on  
 so important a matter it seemed impossible that the assur-  
 ances given by so experienced a commander were empty.

88. When Caesar drew near Pompey's camp, he ob- 2  
 served that his line was drawn up as follows. On the left  
 wing were the two legions handed over by Caesar at the  
 beginning of the conflict in accordance with the senate's  
 decree. One of these was called the "First," the other the  
 "Third." Pompey was in this area. Scipio held the middle 3  
 of the line with legions from Syria. A legion from Cilicia  
 together with cohorts from Spain—brought over, as I ex-  
 plained, by Afranius<sup>103</sup>—had been positioned on the right  
 wing. Pompey thought that these were his strongest units. 4  
 He had placed the rest between the middle of the line and  
 the wings, to a total of a hundred and ten cohorts. These 5  
 amounted to forty-five thousand men, and there were  
 about two thousand reenlisted men who had made their  
 way to him,<sup>104</sup> special-assignment soldiers from his former  
 armies.<sup>105</sup> His last seven cohorts he had stationed to guard

<sup>104</sup> For the lightly emended "had made their way to him,"  
 many editors adopt the text of S, "had joined him."

<sup>105</sup> For the category (*beneficiarius*), compare 1.75.2.

## CAESAR

6 que castellis praesidio disposerat. Dextrum cornu eius rivus quidam impeditis ripis muniebat. Quam ob causam cunctum equitatum sagittarios funditoresque omnes sinistro cornu obiecerat.<sup>114</sup>

89. Caesar superius institutum servans decimam legionem in dextro cornu nonam in sinistro collocaverat, tametsi erat Dyrrachinis proeliis vehementer attenuata. Et huic sic adiunxit octavam ut paene unam ex duabus  
2 efficeret atque alteram alteri praesidio esse iusserat. Cohortes in acie LXXX constitutas habebat, quae summa erat milium XXII. Cohortes duas castris praesidio reliquerat.  
3 Sinistro cornu Antonium, dextro P. Sullam, media acie Cn. Domitium praeposuerat. Ipse contra Pompeium constitit.  
4 Simul iis rebus animadversis quas demonstravimus, timens ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas<sup>115</sup> cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuque opposuit et quid fieri vellet ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in  
5 earum cohortium virtute constare. Simul tertiae aciei [totique exercitui]<sup>116</sup> imperavit ne iniussu suo concurreret: se cum id fieri vellet vexillo signum daturum.

90. Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaque in eum perpetui temporis officia praedicaret in primis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse

<sup>114</sup> obiecerat] adiecerat *Meusel*

<sup>115</sup> ex tertia (or terna) acie singulas] extrema acie sex *Latino Latini*: sex tertiae aciei singulas *Markland*

<sup>116</sup> [totique exercitui] *Novák*

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<sup>106</sup> For "facing the enemy on," Meusel substituted "beside."  
<sup>107</sup> The numbers in this paragraph are disputed.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

the camp and nearby outposts. His right wing was pro- 6  
 tected by a river with banks that were hard to negotiate.  
 For this reason he had set his whole cavalry and all of his  
 archers and slingers facing the enemy on<sup>106</sup> his left wing.

89. Caesar, keeping to previous arrangements, had  
 placed the tenth legion on his right wing, the ninth on the  
 left, despite the fact that it was seriously shorthanded after  
 the battles at Dyrrachium. He linked the eighth to it in  
 such a way that he made the two practically one. He had  
 also ordered each to protect the other. He had drawn up 2  
 eighty cohorts in his line, a total of twenty-two thousand  
 men. He had left two<sup>107</sup> cohorts to guard the camp. On the 3  
 left wing he had put Antony in command, on the right  
 Publius Sulla, and in the middle of the line Gnaeus Domi- 4  
 tius. He himself stood opposite Pompey. In addition, hav-  
 ing observed the arrangements I mentioned and worrying  
 that his right wing might be encircled by the mass of cav-  
 alry, he quickly withdrew individual cohorts from his third  
 line.<sup>108</sup> From these he created a fourth line facing the  
 cavalry and showed what he wanted done, with a warning  
 that the day's victory rested on the courage of those co-  
 horts. He also ordered the third line not to engage without 5  
 his orders: "I will signal with a flag when I want it done."

90. While giving the customary combat exhortation,  
 and citing his continual services to the army, Caesar em-  
 phasized these points: "You soldiers can attest to the fact

<sup>108</sup> For "individual cohorts from his third line," where the  
 manuscripts are divided between *tertia* and *terna*, Latino Latini  
 proposed "six cohorts from his last line" (Plut. *Caes.* 44.3, and  
 other ancient sources), Markland "six cohorts one by one from the  
 third line" (cf. *BG* 7.47.7).

## CAESAR

- quanto studio pacem petisset, quae per Vatinius in collo-  
quiis, quae per Aulum Clodium cum Scipione egisset, qui-  
bus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis  
2 contendisset: neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine  
neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse.  
3 Hac habita oratione exposcentibus militibus et studio  
pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit.

91. Erat Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui  
superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione de-  
2 cima duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hic signo dato "Sequi-  
mini me," inquit "manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro  
imperatori quam constituistis<sup>117</sup> operam date. Vnum hoc  
proelium superest. Quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem  
3 et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus." Simul respi-  
ciens Caesarem "Faciam" inquit "hodie, imperator, ut aut  
4 vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas." Haec cum dixisset pri-  
mus ex dextro cornu procucurrit atque eum electi milites  
circiter CXX voluntarii [eiusdem centuriae]<sup>118</sup> sunt prose-  
cuti.

92. Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum spati ut satis  
2 esset ad concursum utriusque exercitus. Sed Pompeius  
suis praedixerat ut Caesaris impetum exciperent neve se  
loco moverent, aciemque eius distrahi paterentur. Idque  
admonitu C. Triari fecisse dicebatur, ut primus excursus  
visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur, at-  
que in suis ordinibus dispositi dispersos adorirentur.

<sup>117</sup> quam constituistis *MUST*: quem c- V: quam institu- *Paul*

<sup>118</sup> [eiusdem centuriae] *Fröhlich*

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<sup>109</sup> Vatinius: 3.19; Clodius: 3.57; Libo: 3.16-17.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

that I sought peace with great determination. You know what I accomplished through Vatinius in talks and through Aulus Clodius with Scipio, and how I exerted myself at Oricum with Libo over sending delegations.<sup>109</sup> I never waste soldiers' blood, and I did not want to deprive the state of one of its two armies." After this speech, when the soldiers were clamoring and blazing with enthusiasm for battle, he let the signal sound. 2 3

91. There was a reenlisted man, Crastinus, in Caesar's army, who had been his chief centurion in the tenth legion the year before, a man of remarkable courage. After the signal was given, Crastinus said "Follow me, you who were men of my unit, and give your commander the effort you have resolved on."<sup>110</sup> This one battle remains. Once it is over, he will have his dignity again and we our liberty." At the same time, looking at Caesar, he said, "My actions today, general, will make you thank me either alive or dead." After saying this he was the first to run forward from the right wing, and about a hundred and twenty picked soldiers, volunteers, followed him. 2 3 4

92. Between the two lines just enough space had been left for a charge by each army. But Pompey had instructed his men to absorb Caesar's charge; they were not to move from their position, but to allow his line to break itself up. People say that he did this on the advice of Gaius Triarius, so that the soldiers' first powerful charge would be rendered ineffective and Caesar's line distended, and that his own men in proper formation could attack a scattered 2

<sup>110</sup> For "the effort you have resolved on," the manuscript V has "whom you have put in power," and Paul proposed "the effort you initiated."

CAESAR

3 *Leviusque casura pila sperabat in loco retentis militibus  
quam si ipsi immissis telis occurrissent, simul fore ut du-  
plicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur quod<sup>119</sup> et*  
4 *lassitudine conficerentur. Quod nobis quidem nulla rati-  
one factum a Pompeio videtur propterea quod est quae-  
dam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata om-  
5 nibus quae studio pugnae incenditur. Hanc non reprimere  
sed augere imperatores debent. Neque frustra antiquitus  
institutum est ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque  
universi tollerent. Quibus rebus et hostes terreri et suos  
incitari existimaverunt.*

93. *Sed nostri milites dato signo cum infestis pilis pro-  
cucurrissent atque animadvertissent non concurriri a Pom-  
peianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua  
sponte cursum represserunt et ad medium fere spatium  
constiterunt ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent. Par-  
voque intermisso temporis spatio ac rursus renovato cursu  
pila miserunt celeriterque, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare,  
2 gladios strinxerunt. Neque vero Pompeiani huic rei defue-  
runt. Nam et tela missa exceperunt et impetum legionum  
tulerunt et ordines conservaverunt pilisque missis ad gla-  
3 dios redierunt. Eodem tempore equites ab sinistro Pom-  
pei cornu, ut erat imperatum, universi procucurrerunt  
4 omnisque multitudo sagittariorum se profudit. Quorum  
impetum noster equitatus non tulit sed paulum loco motus  
cessit. Equitesque Pompei hoc acrius instare et se turma-  
tim explicare aciemque nostram a latere aperto circumire*

<sup>119</sup> quod *omitted by S*

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<sup>111</sup> For "because they would also," editors often print the reading of S, "and they would be."



### CIVIL WAR. BOOK III

enemy. Pompey also hoped that the spears would fall more 3  
lightly on soldiers held in place than if they themselves ran  
into projectiles coming at them, likewise that Caesar's sol-  
diers would be disheartened by the double run because  
they would also<sup>111</sup> be undone by exhaustion. But to me at 4  
least this action seems to have been taken by Pompey for  
no valid reason, because there is a certain stirring of the  
spirit and an eagerness naturally inborn in all men that is  
kindled by enthusiasm for combat. Commanders should 5  
not repress this but augment it. Nor is it a pointless ancient  
institution that battle signals sound from all sides and ev-  
ery man raises a shout. By these things, they thought, the  
enemies are terrified and one's own men incited.

93. Our soldiers ran forward at the signal with spears  
poised to throw, then noticed that the Pompeians were not  
running toward them. Taught by experience and trained  
in earlier battles they stopped their run of their own ac-  
cord and halted about half way so that they would not  
approach drained of strength. After a short interval they  
started running again, then hurled their spears and  
promptly, on Caesar's instructions, drew their swords. Nor 2  
did Pompey's men fall short, for they absorbed the salvo  
of projectiles and withstood the legions' impact and kept  
their formations intact, and after throwing their own 3  
spears they went for their swords. At this moment the  
cavalry on Pompey's left wing charged as one, as ordered,  
and the entire mass of archers streamed forward. Our cav- 4  
alry failed to withstand the impact, and after being pushed  
out of position they gave a little ground. At this, Pompey's  
cavalry began to apply more intense pressure and, deploy-  
ing by squadrons, to encircle our line on its unprotected



## CAESAR

5 coeperunt. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit quartae aciei,  
 quam instituerat ex cohortium numero,<sup>120</sup> dedit signum.  
 6 Illae celeriter procucurrerunt infestisque signis tanta vi in  
 Pompei equites impetum fecerunt ut eorum nemo consis-  
 teret omnesque conversi non solum loco excederent sed  
 7 protinus incitati fuga montes altissimos peterent. Quibus  
 submotis omnes sagittarii funditoresque destituti iner-  
 8 mes<sup>121</sup> sine praesidio interfecti sunt. Eodem impetu co-  
 hortis sinistrum cornu pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistenti-  
 bus in acie Pompeianis circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt  
 adorti.

94. Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar, quae queta  
 fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrere iussit.  
 2 Ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii  
 autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non po-  
 3 tuerunt atque universi terga verterunt. Neque vero Caesarem  
 fefellit quin ab iis cohortibus quae contra equitatum  
 in quarta acie collocatae essent initium victoriae oriretur,  
 4 ut ipse in cohortandis militibus pronuntiaverat. Ab enim  
 primum equitatus est pulsus, ab isdem factae caedes  
 sagittariorum ac funditorum, ab isdem acies Pompeiana a  
 sinistra parte [erat] circumita atque initium fugae factum.  
 5 Sed Pompeius ut equitatum suum pulsum vidit atque eam  
 partem cui maxime confidebat perterritam animadvertit,  
 aliis diffisus acie excessit protinusque se in castra equo  
 contulit et iis centurionibus quos in statione ad praetoriam

<sup>120</sup> ex cohortium numero] sex c- n- *Orsini*: sex c- [n-] *Faerno*

<sup>121</sup> [inermes] *Paul*

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<sup>112</sup> For "with some of his cohorts," Orsini and Faerno proposed "of a total of six cohorts" and "of six cohorts," respectively.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

flank. When Caesar noticed this, he gave the signal to the 5  
 fourth line, which he had set up with some of his co-  
 horts.<sup>112</sup> They rushed forward promptly, and in attacking 6  
 made so powerful an impact on Pompey's cavalry that  
 none of them stood fast; the Pompeians all turned around  
 and not only left their position but straightaway and in a  
 hurried retreat headed for the highest hills. Once these 7  
 were out of the way, the archers and slingers were left  
 defenseless,<sup>113</sup> without a guard; they were all killed. In the 8  
 same movement our cohorts outflanked the left wing,  
 where the Pompeians in the line were still fighting and  
 resisting, and attacked them from behind.

94. At this point Caesar ordered the third line to  
 charge; it had not seen action and had held its position  
 until now. Therefore, since fresh, sound troops were re- 2  
 lieving tired ones, and others were attacking from behind,  
 the Pompeians all turned and ran, finding resistance im-  
 possible. Nor was Caesar wrong in thinking that the first 3  
 stage of victory would come from the cohorts stationed in  
 the fourth line facing the cavalry, as he himself had pre-  
 dicted in exhorting the men. It was by these that the Pom- 4  
 peian cavalry was routed, first, and these same units  
 slaughtered the archers and slingers, and likewise out-  
 flanked Pompey's line on the left and started the flight. As 5  
 for Pompey, when he saw his cavalry routed and realized  
 that the unit he trusted most was terrified, having no con-  
 fidence in the rest he left the line and rode immediately  
 to his camp. To the centurions stationed at the main gate

<sup>113</sup> I have rendered the surprising adjective "unarmed" meta-  
 phorically; Paul excised it.

## CAESAR

portam posuerat clare ut milites exaudirent "Tuemini" inquit "castra et defendite diligenter si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo." Haec cum dixisset se in praetorium contulit summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum expectans.

95. Caesar Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsis nullum spatium perterritis dare oportere existimans milites cohortatus est ut beneficio Fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent. Qui etsi magno aestu fatigati—nam ad meridiem res erat perducta—tamen ad omnem laborem animo parati imperio paruerunt. Castra a cohortibus quae ibi praesidio erant relictæ industrie defendebantur, multo etiam acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis. Nam qui acie refugerant milites et animo perterriti et lassitudine confecti missis plerique armis signisque militaribus magis de reliqua fuga quam de castrorum defensione cogitabant. Neque vero diutius qui in vallo constiterant multitudinem telorum sustinere potuerunt sed confecti vulneribus locum reliquerunt protinusque omnes ducibus usi centurionibus tribunisque militum in altissimos montes qui ad castra pertinebant confugerunt.

96. In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Luci etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaque praeterea quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse qui non necessarias conquirerent voluptates. At hi

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

he said loudly, so that the soldiers could hear: "Watch over the camp and defend it diligently if the situation gets any worse. I am going round the other gates and strengthening the units guarding the camp." After saying this he went to headquarters, skeptical of success but nevertheless awaiting the outcome. 6

95. Once the fleeing Pompeians had been driven behind the protection of their rampart, Caesar exhorted his troops, thinking that they should give no respite to terrified men: "Use the gift of Fortune! Attack the camp!" Although the intense heat had made them weary—the business had dragged on until midday—they nevertheless obeyed his command, mentally ready for any effort. The camp was energetically defended by the cohorts that had been left behind to guard it, but even more vehemently by the Thracian and native auxiliaries. (The soldiers who had fled from the line, mentally terrified and overcome by weariness, had mostly abandoned their weapons and their units' standards, and were thinking more about onward flight than about the camp's defense.) But those who had made a stand on the rampart were not long able to withstand the huge number of projectiles; overcome by their wounds they abandoned the position. Immediately thereafter they all followed the lead of centurions and staff officers in taking refuge in the highest hills near the camp. 2 3 4 5

96. In Pompey's camp one could see the gazebos that had been built, the large quantity of silverware set out, the tents floored with freshly cut turf—those of Lucius Lentulus and others even bowered with ivy—and many things besides that indicated undue extravagance and confidence in victory. People readily supposed, therefore, that men who went after unnecessary pleasures had not been at all

## CAESAR

miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitu Caesaris luxuriam obiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent.

- 3 Pompeius iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur equum nactus detractis insignibus imperatoris decimana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam  
4 contendit. Neque ibi constitit sed eadem celeritate paucos suos ex fuga nactus nocturno itinere non intermisso comitatu equitum XXX ad mare pervenit navemque frumentariam conscendit, saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse ut a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur.

97. Caesar castris potitus a militibus contendit ne in praeda occupati reliqui negoti gerendi facultatem dimitterent. Qua re impetrata montem opere circummunire instituit. Pompeiani quod is mons erat sine aqua diffisi ei loco relicto monte universi iugis eius Larisam versus recipere coeperunt. Qua spe<sup>122</sup> animadversa Caesar copias suas divisit partemque legionum in castris Pompei remanere iussit, partem in sua castra remisit, IIII secum legiones duxit commodioreque itinere Pompeianis occurrere coepit. Et progressus milia passuum VI aciem instruxit. Qua re animadversa Pompeiani in quodam monte constiterunt. Hunc montem flumen sublebat. Caesar milites cohortatus [est], etsi totius diei continenti labore

<sup>122</sup> spe] re ed. pr.

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<sup>114</sup> For "what they were hoping," the first edition substituted "what they were doing."

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

worried about the day's outcome. And yet the Pompeians 2  
used to reproach the extravagance of Caesar's utterly piti-  
able and long-suffering army, which was constantly short  
of every necessity.

When our men were circulating inside his defenses, 3  
Pompey got a horse, removed his general's insignia, and  
left the camp by the rear gate; his immediate destination,  
at a gallop, was Larisa. Not halting there but continuing 4  
at the same pace after meeting a few of his men who had  
escaped, and without breaking his journey during the  
night, he reached the sea with an escort of thirty cavalry  
and boarded a grain ship, complaining frequently, so peo-  
ple said, that his expectation had proven him so wrong:  
given that the rout had begun with the category of men on  
whom his hopes of victory rested, it would almost look like  
he was the victim of treachery.

97. After taking control of Pompey's camp Caesar  
pleaded with the soldiers not to spend time on plunder  
and throw away the chance of finishing their work. Suc- 2  
cessful in this, he began to encircle the hill with fortifica-  
tions. The Pompeians, having no confidence in their posi-  
tion because the hill was waterless, abandoned that hill  
and began to withdraw en masse along the ridges toward  
Larisa. Caesar realized what they were hoping<sup>114</sup> and 3  
divided his forces: he ordered some legions to remain in  
Pompey's camp, sent some back to his own camp, and took  
four with him as he started along an easier route toward  
confrontation with the Pompeians. After advancing six  
miles he drew up his line. Seeing this the Pompeians 4  
halted on a hill with a river at its base. After exhorting his  
soldiers, and despite the fact that they were exhausted by  
a full day's continual exertions and night was already com-

## CAESAR

erant confecti noxque iam suberat, tamen munitione flumen a monte seclusit ne noctu aquari Pompeiani possent.

5 Quo perfecto opere illi de deditioe missis legatis agere coeperunt. Pauci ordinis senatorii, qui se cum iis coniunxerant, nocte fuga salutem petiverunt.

98. Caesar prima luce omnes eos qui in monte considerant ex superioribus locis in planitiem descendere atque

2 arma proicere iussit. Quod ubi sine recusatione fecerunt passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt consolatus consurgere iussit. Et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus quo minore essent timore omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit ne qui eorum

3 violaretur neu quid sui desiderarent. Hac adhibita diligentia ex castris sibi legiones alias occurrere et eas quas secum duxerat invicem requiescere atque in castra reverti iussit. Eodemque die Larisam pervenit.

99. In eo proelio non amplius CC milites desideravit.

2 Sed centuriones, fortes viros, circiter XXX amisit. Interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto.

3 Neque id fuit falsum quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. Sic enim Caesar existimabat eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse optimeque eum de se

4 meritum iudicabat. Ex Pompeiano exercitu circiter milia XV cecidisse videbantur. Sed in deditioem venerunt amplius milia XXIII. Namque etiam cohortes quae praesidio in castellis fuerant sese Sullae dediderunt. Multi praeterea in finitimas civitates refugerunt. Signaque militaria ex

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

ing on. Caesar succeeded in cutting off the hill from the river by means of a fortification, so that the Pompeians would be unable to obtain water by night. When the earth-work was complete, the enemy sent a delegation and began negotiations for surrender. A few men of the senatorial order who had joined them sought safety in flight that night. 5

98. At dawn Caesar ordered all those who had halted on the hill to descend from the high ground into the plain and throw down their weapons. They did so without protest. With outstretched hands, prostrate and weeping, they sought safety from him. He comforted them and ordered them to stand. Speaking briefly to them about his clemency, to lessen their fear, he spared them all and commended them to his soldiers: "None of them is to be harmed or deprived of any possessions." After attending to this he ordered other legions to come from camp and meet him, and those that he had brought with him to have their turn at resting and return to camp. He went to Larisa the same day. 2 3

99. In that battle Caesar lost no more than two hundred soldiers. But his losses included around thirty centurions, brave men. Crastinus, too, whom I mentioned earlier, was killed fighting with exemplary bravery, taking a sword to the face. Nor was he wrong in what he said as he went into combat. For Caesar thought that Crastinus' courage in that battle was simply unmatched, and felt that Crastinus had earned his best thanks. Of the Pompeian army it appeared that around fifteen thousand had fallen. But more than twenty-four thousand surrendered, for even the cohorts that had been in the outposts surrendered to Sulla. Many, too, fled to nearby cities. After the battle 180 mili- 4



CAESAR

- proelio ad Caesarem sunt relata CLXXX et aquilae VIII.
- 5 L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens, cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab equitibus est interfectus.

100. Eodem tempore D. Laelius cum classe ad Brundisium venit eademque ratione qua factum a Libone antea demonstravimus insulam obiectam portui Brundisino tenuit. Similiter Vatinius, qui Brundisio praeerat, tectis instructisque scaphis elicuit naves Laelianas atque ex his longius productam unam quinqueremem et minores duas in angustiis portus cepit. Itemque per equites dispositos
- 3 aqua prohibere classarios instituit. Sed Laelius tempore anni commodiore usus ad navigandum onerariis navibus Corcyra Dyrrachioque aquam suis supportabat neque a proposito deterrebatur neque ante proelium in Thessalia factum cognitum aut ignominia amissarum navium aut necessariorum rerum inopia ex portu insulaque expelli potuit.

101. Isdem fere temporibus C. Cassius cum classe Syrorum et Phoenicum et Cilicum in Siciliam venit. Et cum esset Caesaris classis divisa in duas partes—dimidia parti praeesset P. Sulpicius praetor <ad> Vibonem, ad fretum dimidiae M. Pomponius ad Messanam—prius Cassius ad Messanam navibus advolavit quam Pomponius de
- 2 eius adventu cognosceret, perturbatumque eum nactus nullis custodiis neque ordinibus certis, magno vento et secundo completas onerarias naves taeda et pice et stuppa reliquisque rebus quae sunt ad incendia in Pomponianam classem immisit atque omnes naves incendit XXXV, e
- 3 quibus erant XX constratae. Tantusque eo facto timor incessit ut cum esset legio praesidio Messanae vix oppidum defen-

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<sup>115</sup> See 3.23–24.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

tary standards were brought to Caesar, and nine eagles. Lucius Domitius, who fled the camp for high ground, was killed by the cavalry when, in his exhaustion, strength failed him. 5

100. In this same period Decimus Laelius went to Brundisium with his fleet and seized the harbor's barrier island just as Libo did, as I indicated earlier.<sup>115</sup> Vatinius, who was in command at Brundisium, likewise used small craft supplied with decks and tackle to lure out Laelius' ships, capturing one quinquereme that advanced too far and two smaller boats in the harbor mouth. He too began to prevent the crews from getting water by deploying cavalry. But Laelius, with a better season for sailing, supplied water to his men using cargo ships from Corcyra and Dyrachium. He was not deterred from his operation, nor could he be expelled from the harbor and island by either the humiliation of losing ships or the shortage of necessities—until he learned about the battle in Thessaly. 2 3

101. At about the same time Gaius Cassius went to Sicily with his fleet of Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians. Caesar's fleet was divided into two parts: the praetor Publius Sulpicius was in command of half of it, at Vibo, and at the Strait Marcus Pomponius was in command of half, at Messana. Cassius therefore descended on Messana with his ships before Pomponius could learn of his arrival. He caught him in disarray, without reliable patrols or formations. With a strong wind in his favor Cassius filled cargo ships with pine, pitch, tow, and other combustibles and sent them against Pomponius' fleet, burning all thirty-five, twenty of them decked vessels. This caused so much alarm that Messana, despite its legionary garrison, was barely 2 3

- deretur. Et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris victoria per dispositos equites essent allati existimabant
- 4 plerique futurum fuisse uti amitteretur. Sed opportunissime nuntiis allatis oppidum fuit defensum Cassiusque ad Sulpicianam inde classem profectus est Vibonem. Applicatisque nostris ad terram navibus propter eundem timorem [pari atque antea ratione egerunt]<sup>123</sup> Cassius secundum nactus ventum onerarias naves [circiter XL]<sup>124</sup> praeparatas ad incendium immisit. Et flamma ab utroque
- 5 cornu comprehensa naves sunt combustae V. Cumque ignis magnitudine venti latius serperet milites qui ex veteribus legionibus erant relictis praesidio navibus ex numero a-
- 6 grorum ignominiam non tulerunt sed sua sponte naves conscenderunt et a terra solverunt impetuque facto in Cassianam classem quinqueremes duas, in quarum altera erat Cassius, ceperunt. Sed Cassius exceptus scapha refu-
- 7 giit. Praeterea duae sunt depressae triremes. Neque multo post de proelio facto in Thessalia cognitum est, ut ipsis Pompeianis fides fieret. Nam ante id tempus fingi a legatis amicisque Caesaris arbitrabantur. Quibus rebus cognitis ex his locis Cassius cum classe discessit.

102. Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit quascumque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset. Et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam
- 2 minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit. Erat edictum Pompei nomine Amphipoli propositum uti omnes eius provin-

<sup>123</sup> [pari . . . egerunt] *Damon*

<sup>124</sup> *Forchhammer excised circiter XL, Nipperdey moved it to before propter.*

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

defended. Most people think that, if the news about Caesar's victory had not arrived right then, relayed by the cavalry, the city would have been lost. But since the news did arrive in a most timely fashion, the city's defense held and Cassius set out from there for Sulpicius' fleet at Vibo. After our ships were beached because of the same fear,<sup>116</sup> Cassius, getting a favorable wind, sent against them cargo ships equipped for conflagration. The flames took hold at both ends of the line and five ships were burned. Although the strength of the wind was extending the fire's spread, the soldiers from veteran legions who had been left to guard the ships—they were on sick leave—refused to be humiliated, boarding and launching some ships of their own accord. They attacked Cassius' fleet and captured two quinqueremes. Cassius was aboard one of them but fled in a longboat. Two further triremes were sunk. Soon thereafter people learned about the battle fought in Thessaly, to the point that even Pompeians believed it. (Before this they thought it was an invention by Caesar's officers and friends.) When he understood the situation, Cassius left the area with his fleet.

102. Caesar thought that he should leave all else aside and pursue Pompey wherever he went after his escape, to make it impossible for him to procure other troops and renew the war. He covered as much ground as he could each day with the cavalry, and ordered one legion to follow by shorter stages. An edict in Pompey's name was published at Amphipolis ordering an assembly of all of the

<sup>116</sup> After "because of this same fear," the manuscripts read "acted in the same way as before," which lacks a subject. Various excisions have been proposed to repair this spot.

- ciae iuniores—Graeci civesque Romani—iurandi causa
- 3 convenirent. Sed utrum avertendae suspicionis causa Pompeius proposuisset ut quam diutissime longioris fugae consilium occultaret, an novis dilectibus, si nemo premeret, Macedoniam tenere conaretur existimari non poterat.
- 4 Ipse ad ancoram una nocte constitit. Et vocatis ad se Amphipoli hospitibus et pecunia ad necessarios sumptus corrogata cognitoque Caesaris adventu ex eo loco discessit et
- 5 Mytilenas paucis diebus venit. Biduum tempestate retentus navibusque aliis additis actuariis in Ciliciam atque inde
- 6 Cyprum pervenit. Ibi cognoscit consensu omnium Antiochensium civiumque Romanorum qui illic negotiarentur arcem captam<sup>125</sup> esse excludendi sui causa nuntiosque dimissos ad eos qui se ex fuga in finitimas <civitates> recepisse dicerentur: ne Antiochiam adirent; id si fecissent
- 7 magno eorum capitis periculo futurum. Idem hoc L. Lentulo, qui superiore anno consul fuerat, et P. Lentulo consulari ac nonnullis aliis acciderat Rhodi, qui cum ex fuga Pompeium sequerentur atque in insulam venissent oppido ac portu recepti non erant missisque ad eos nuntiis—ex his locis discederent—contra voluntatem suam
- 8 naves solverunt. Iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur.

103. Quibus cognitis rebus Pompeius deposito adeundae Syriae consilio pecunia societatibus<sup>126</sup> sublata et a

<sup>125</sup> arcem captam *Oudendorp*: arcem aram captam *M and U in the margin*: aram captam *UTV*: aram capta *S*: arma capta *Forchhammer*

<sup>126</sup> societatibus *Holder*: societatis *ω*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

province's fighting-age men—Greeks and Roman citizens—to take the military oath. It was impossible to know whether Pompey published it to avert suspicion, so that he could conceal his plan of onward flight for as long as possible, or in an attempt to hold Macedonia with new recruits, if no one applied pressure. Pompey spent one night at anchor, summoning his connections at Amphipolis and collecting money for necessary expenses. Learning of Caesar's approach he left that location and within a few days came to Mytilene. After being delayed two days by weather and acquiring some additional fast vessels he went on to Cilicia and thence to Cyprus. There he learned that the people of Antioch and all of the Roman citizens in business there had by common consent seized the citadel<sup>117</sup> in order to keep him out, and had sent word to the Pompeians who, people said, had gone to nearby communities after their escape: "Do not come to Antioch. If you do, your lives will be in great danger." The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, the previous year's consul, at Rhodes, and to the ex-consul Publius Lentulus, and some others. These men were following Pompey after their escape, and when they reached Rhodes they were not received into the city or harbor. After messengers were sent to tell them to leave the area, they reluctantly set sail. Communities were already getting word of Caesar's approach.

103. Pompey, when he understood the situation, dropped the plan of approaching Syria. He raised money

<sup>117</sup> For "seized the citadel," some editors print an emendation based on the text of S, meaning "taken up arms."

quibusdam privatis sumpta et aeris magno pondere ad  
 militarem usum in naves imposito duobusque milibus  
 hominum armatis—partim quos ex familiis societatum  
 delegerat, partim a negotiatoribus coegerat, quosque ex  
 suis quisque ad hanc rem idoneos existimabat—Pelusium  
 2 pervenit.<sup>127</sup> Ibi casu rex erat Ptolomaeus, puer aetate,  
 magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam  
 paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos  
 regno expulerat. Castraque Cleopatrae non longo spatio  
 3 ab eius castris distabant. Ad eum Pompeius misit ut pro  
 hospitio atque amicitia patris Alexandria reciperetur at-  
 4 que illius opibus in calamitate tegeretur. Sed qui ab eo  
 missi erant confecto legationis officio liberius cum militi-  
 bus regis colloqui coeperunt eosque hortari ut suum  
 <quisque><sup>128</sup> officium Pompeio praestaret neve eius fortu-  
 5 nam despiceret. In hoc erant numero complures Pompei  
 milites, quos ex eius exercitu acceptos in Syria Gabinius  
 Alexandriam traduxerat belloque confecto apud Ptol-  
 omaeum, patrem pueri, reliquerat.

104. His tum cognitis rebus amici regis, qui propter  
 aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni, sive timore ad-  
 ducti, ut postea praedicabant, sollicitato exercitu regio ne  
 Pompeius Alexandriam Aegyptumque occuparet sive des-  
 pecta eius fortuna, ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis

<sup>127</sup> *No satisfactory repair for this unwieldy sentence has yet been proposed.*

<sup>128</sup> <quisque> *Damon. Other editors make the verbs plural.*

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<sup>118</sup> That is, Roman tax-farming companies; see the note on 3.3.2.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

from companies<sup>118</sup> and took it from certain private individuals and loaded a great weight of bronze for military purposes on his ships, plus two thousand armed men, partly those he had chosen from the companies' workforces, partly collected from traders, and those that anybody thought suitable for this affair from his own people. He then went to Pelusium. By chance King Ptolemy was there, a boy in years but deploying large forces in the war with his sister Cleopatra, whom he had expelled from the kingdom a few months earlier with the help of his relatives and favorites.<sup>119</sup> Cleopatra's camp was not far from his. Pompey sent word to him: "My reception in Alexandria should match the welcome and friendship given by your father, and in this calamity your resources should provide protection." Those who had been sent by Pompey, however, began to speak quite freely with the king's soldiers once their mission's business was finished, and to urge them that each do his duty by Pompey and not despise his misfortune. Among the latter were many of Pompey's soldiers, whom Gabinius had received from Pompey's army in Syria, taken to Alexandria, and left there with Ptolemy, the boy's father, when the war was over.<sup>120</sup>

104. This came to the attention of the king's favorites, who were managing the kingdom because of his age. Perhaps they were motivated by the worry, as they later declared, that Pompey would make an appeal to the royal army and occupy Alexandria and Egypt. Or perhaps his misfortune made them contemptuous; it often happens that in a calamity enemies emerge from among one's

119 "Favorites" (*amici*) were courtiers in Hellenistic courts.

120 Gabinius restored the elder Ptolemy to his throne in 55.



## CAESAR

inimici existunt, iis qui erant ab eo missi palam liberaliter  
2 responderunt eumque ad regem venire iusserunt. Ipsi  
clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, [sin-  
gium] singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium, tribu-  
3 num militum, ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. Ab  
his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimi  
productus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem  
duxerat, naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis.  
Ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur. Item L. Lentulus  
comprenditur ab rege et in custodia necatur.

105. Caesar cum in Asiam venisset reperiebat T. Am-  
pium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano  
Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnes ex provincia  
evocavisse ut his testibus in summam pecuniae uteretur,  
2 sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. Ita duobus  
temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar auxilium tulit.  
3 Item<sup>129</sup> constabat Elide in templo Minervae—repetitis at-  
que enumeratis diebus—quo die proelium secundum  
Caesar fecisset simulacrum Victoriae, quod ante ipsam  
Minervam collocatum esset et ante ad simulacrum Miner-  
vae spectavisset, ad valvas se templi limenque convertisse.  
4 Eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus  
clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est ut in muris armata  
5 civitas discurreret. Hoc idem Ptolomaide accidit. Perga-  
mique in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacer-  
dotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci *ἄδύρα* appellant,

<sup>129</sup> . . . item *Glandorp*

<sup>121</sup> For the other, see 3.33.2.

<sup>122</sup> Glandorp hypothesized a lacuna before "likewise," the  
point of which is unclear.

<sup>123</sup> Literally, "no-go" areas.

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

friends. They gave an outwardly kind response to Pompey's emissaries, ordering him to approach the king. In secret they formed a plot and sent men to kill Pompey: Achilles, the king's general, a man of remarkable nerve, and Lucius Septimius, a staff officer. Addressed kindly by them, and drawn forward by a degree of familiarity with Septimius, since the latter held the rank of centurion under him during the war against the pirates, Pompey boarded the tiny little vessel with a few of his friends. There he was killed by Achilles and Septimius. Ptolemy laid hands on Lucius Lentulus, too; he was killed in prison.

105. When Caesar reached Asia he found that Titus Ampius had attempted to remove funds from the Diana temple at Ephesus; to that end, Caesar learned, Ampius had summoned all of the province's senators, intending to use them as witnesses to the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's arrival and fled before him. That made two times that Caesar proved helpful to the money at Ephesus.<sup>121</sup> People likewise<sup>122</sup> agreed, after thinking back and counting the days, that on the day when Caesar fought his victorious battle, the statue of Victory in the Minerva temple at Elis—it stood in front of Minerva herself and until then faced Minerva's statue—turned toward the doorway and threshold of the temple. On the same day at Antioch in Syria the shouts of an army and horn calls were heard twice, so loud that the populace armed itself and rushed to positions on the walls. The same thing happened at Ptolemais. At Pergamum, moreover, there was a drumming in the unseen inner parts of the temple, access to which is permitted only to priests; the Greeks call these *ἄδουρα*.<sup>123</sup> Likewise at Tralles in the temple of Victory,

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6 tympana sonuerunt. Item Trallibus in templo Victoriae, ubi Caesaris statuum consecraverant, palma per eos dies integra<sup>130</sup> inter coagmenta lapidum ex pavimento exitisse ostendebatur.

106. Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates, cum legione una quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat et altera quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat equitibusque DCCC et navibus longis Rhodiis  
 2 X et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit. In his erant legionibus hominum milia tria CC. Reliqui vulneribus ex proeliis et labore ac magnitudine itineris confecti conse-  
 3 qui non potuerant. Sed Caesar confusus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat atque<sup>131</sup>  
 4 omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimabat.<sup>132</sup> Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit. Atque ibi primum e nave egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidi causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri videt quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maies-  
 5 tatem regiam minui praedicabat. Hoc sedato tumultu crebrae continuis diebus ex concursu multitudinis concitationes fiebant, compluresque milites huius urbis<sup>133</sup> omnibus partibus interficiebantur.

<sup>130</sup> *integra Oudendorp*: in tecto [per V] ω: sub tecto Kübler. [in t-] Apitz      <sup>131</sup> *atque*] aequae *Nipperdey*, [a-] *ed. pr.*, both of them reading *existimans below*.

<sup>132</sup> *existimabat MU*: *existimans STV*

<sup>133</sup> *huius urbis*] eius [urbis] *Paul*: in viis urbis *Madvig*

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<sup>124</sup> In place of "between undamaged . . . joints," Kübler substituted "inside, between . . . joints." Apitz excised the phrase.

CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

where they had consecrated a statue of Caesar, a palm tree was shown to have emerged from the pavement around that time, between undamaged masonry joints.<sup>124</sup>

106. Caesar, after few days' stay in Asia, heard that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus. He guessed that Pompey was heading for Egypt on account of his ties to that kingdom and the location's other advantages. Taking the one legion that he had ordered to follow him from Thesaly and another that he had summoned from his legate Quintus Fufius in Achaea, plus eight hundred cavalry, ten Rhodian warships, and a few others from Asia, he went to Alexandria. There were only 3,200 men in these legions; the rest, rendered unfit by wounds from the battles and the hardship and length of the journey, had not been able to reach him. Counting on the fame of his achievements Caesar had not hesitated to set out with poor support, and thought he would be safe everywhere.<sup>125</sup> At Alexandria he learned about Pompey's death. Upon disembarking he heard shouts from the soldiers whom the king had left on guard in the city, and saw people converging on him, apparently because he had the fasces ahead of him. The whole crowd was shouting that this amounted to a slight on the king's majesty. This riot was calmed, but there were frequent disturbances every day thereafter as crowds gathered, and several soldiers were killed in every district of the city.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> For "and thought he would be safe," Nipperdey substituted "thinking he would be equally safe," and the first edition excised the disputed word.

<sup>126</sup> For "soldiers . . . of the city," Paul and Madvig proposed "of his soldiers" and "soldiers . . . on the city streets," respectively.

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107. Quibus rebus animadversis legiones sibi alias ex Asia adduci iussit, quas ex Pompeianis militibus confecerat. Ipse enim necessario etesiis tenebatur, qui navigantibus Alexandria fiunt adversissimi venti. Interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se, quod esset consul, pertinere existimans, atque eo magis officio suo convenire quod superiore consulatu cum patre Ptolomaeo et lege et senatus consulto societas erat facta, ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus quos haberent dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

108. Erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius, eunuchus nomine Pothinus. Is primum inter suos queri atque indignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari. Deinde adiutores quosdam consili sui<sup>134</sup> nactus ex regis amicis exercitum a Pelusio clam Alexandriam evocavit atque eundem Achillam, cuius supra meminimus, omnibus copiis praefecit. Hunc incitatum suis et regis inflatum pollicitationibus<sup>135</sup> quae fieri vellet litteris nuntiisque edocuit. In testamento Ptolomaei patris heredes erant scripti ex duobus filiis maior et ex duabus ea quae aetate antecedebat. Haec uti fierent, per omnes deos perque foedera quae Romae fecisset eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur.

6 Tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant

<sup>134</sup> consili sui *Estienne*: conscios sui *MU*: conscii [-scii S] suis *STV*: conscios <consili> sui *Apitz*

<sup>135</sup> *Many small repairs have been suggested for the first part of this sentence.*

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107. When Caesar understood the situation, he ordered other legions to be brought to him from Asia, those that he had formed from Pompey's soldiers. He himself was perforce pinned down by the etesian winds, which are extremely unfavorable for anyone sailing from Alexandria. Meanwhile, thinking that the quarrel between the rulers pertained to the Roman people and to himself, since he was consul, and that it was a matter of particular obligation for him because the alliance with the elder Ptolemy had been made by law and senatorial decree during his earlier consulship,<sup>127</sup> Caesar made his view clear: King Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra should dismiss their armies and debate the points at issue on legal grounds before him rather than in arms against one another. 2

108. Because of the boy's age, the man who was managing the kingdom was his guardian, a eunuch named Pothinus, who began to complain and object that the king was being summoned to plead his case—at first among his own friends. Then, when he found among the king's favorites some helpers for his plan,<sup>128</sup> he secretly summoned the army from Pelusium to Alexandria and put Achilles, whom I mentioned earlier, in charge of all his forces. Achilles was spurred on by Pothinus' promises and exalted by those of the king; in a letter and messages Pothinus explained what he wanted done. In his will the elder Ptolemy had written down as heirs the elder of his two sons and of his two daughters the one who had seniority. He implored the Roman people in this same will to ensure that the succession happened, invoking all the gods and the treaties he had made at Rome. One copy of the will was brought to 2  
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4  
5  
6

<sup>128</sup> The precise wording is uncertain, but the sense is clear.

allatae ut in aerario ponerentur. Hae cum propter publicas occupationes poni non potuissent apud Pompeium sunt depositae. Alterae eodem exemplo relictæ atque ob-signatae Alexandriae proferebantur.

109. De his rebus cum ageretur apud Caesarem isque maxime vellet pro communi amico atque arbitro controversias regum componere, subito exercitus regius equi-  
 2 tatusque omnis venire Alexandriam nuntiatur. Caesaris copiae nequaquam erant tantæ ut iis extra oppidum si esset dimicandum confideret. Relinquebatur ut se suis locis oppido teneret consiliumque Achillae cognosceret.  
 3 Milites tamen omnes in armis esse iussit regemque hortatus est ut ex suis necessariis quos haberet maximæ aucto-  
 4 ritatis legatos ad Achillam mitteret et quid esset suae vo-  
 5 luntatis ostenderet. A quo missi Dioscorides et Serapion, qui ambo legati Romæ fuerant magnamque apud patrem Ptolomæum auctoritatem habuerant, ad Achillam perve-  
 6 nerunt. Quos ille cum in conspectum eius venissent, priusquam adiret<sup>136</sup> aut cuius rei causa missi essent cognosceret, corripit atque interfici iussit. Quorum alter accepto vulnere †occupatus†<sup>137</sup> per suos pro occiso sublatus, alter interfectus est. Quo facto regem ut in sua potestate haberet Caesar efficit, magnam regium nomen apud suos auctoritatem habere existimans et ut potius privato paucorum et latronum quam regio consilio susceptum bellum videretur.

<sup>136</sup> adiret *MUTV*: audiret *S*

<sup>137</sup> occupatus] occipitis *Jurin*: <pallore> occupatus *Schnelle*: occupans *Cornelissen*: [o-] *Madvig*. *Perhaps* occultatus?

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<sup>129</sup> Numerous repairs have been proposed for the unintelli-

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

Rome by envoys to be deposited in the treasury. Since owing to political preoccupations it was impossible to make the deposit, it was left with Pompey. A second copy with the same text, left sealed at Alexandria, was brought out.

109. While these matters were being discussed before Caesar, who as a friend to both parties and an arbiter wanted above all to settle the rulers' dispute, news suddenly arrived that the king's army and his entire cavalry were on the way to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were too few for him to trust if they had to fight outside the city. His only option was to stay where he was inside the city and find out Achilles' plan. He nevertheless ordered everyone to arm themselves and urged the king to send the most influential of his entourage as a delegation to Achilles and communicate his wishes. The king's emissaries were Dioscorides and Serapion, who had both been ambassadors to Rome and were extremely influential with the elder Ptolemy. They reached Achilles, but when he caught sight of them, before making contact or learning why they had been sent, he ordered them to be seized and killed. One of them, after taking a wound . . .<sup>129</sup> was carried off through the midst his men as if dead, the other was killed. Thereafter Caesar ensured that he had the king in his power, thinking that the king's name had great authority with his subjects and so that people would see that the war was undertaken not on the king's initiative but on the independent initiative of a few troublemakers.

gible word that follows "after taking a wound," among them "turning pale," "collapsing," and excision. Another possibility is "hidden," which makes better sense of *per suos*.





CAESAR

110. Erant cum Achilla eae copiae ut neque numero  
neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnen-  
2 dae viderentur. Milia enim XX in armis habebat. Haec  
constabant ex Gabinianis militibus, qui iam in consuetu-  
dinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen  
disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque  
3 duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. Huc acce-  
debant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Cili-  
ciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum. Multi prae-  
4 terea capitis damnati exulesque convenerant. Fugitivis  
omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certa-  
vitae conditio ut dato nomine militum esset numero. Quo-  
rum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum  
eripiebatur, qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versa-  
5 bantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant. Hi regum ami-  
cos ad mortem deposcere, hi bona locupletum diripere,  
stipendia augendi causa regis domum obsidere, regno  
expellere alios, <alios> arcessere veterem quodam Alexan-  
drini exercitus instituto consueverant. Erant praeterea equi-  
6 tum milia duo. Inveteraverant hi omnes compluribus  
Alexandriae bellis, Ptolomaeum patrem in regnum re-  
duxerant, Bibuli filios duos interfecerant, bella cum Ae-  
gyptiis gesserant. Hunc usum rei militaris habebant.

111. His copiis fidens Achilles paucitatemque militum  
Caesaris despiciens occupabat Alexandriam praeter eam  
oppidi partem quam Caesar cum militibus tenebat, primo  
impetu domum eius irrumpere conatus, sed Caesar dispo-  
2 sitis pervias cohortibus impetum eius sustinuit. Eodemque

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<sup>130</sup> Ptolemy was restored in 55, Bibulus' sons killed in 51.

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

110. The forces with Achilles had to be taken seriously, Caesar felt, given their number, identity, and military experience. For Achilles had twenty thousand under arms, originally Gabinus' men, who had become accustomed to the dissolute lifestyle of Alexandria, forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and taken wives; most of them had children. In addition, there was a collection of former pirates and troublemakers belonging to Syria and the province of Cilicia and nearby regions. They had also been joined by a large number of exiles under a death sentence. All of our runaway slaves were guaranteed a welcome and livelihood in Alexandria, provided that each signed up and was enrolled as a soldier. If a master laid hands on any of them, concerted action on the part of the soldiers pulled him away; they protected their companions against violence as if the danger was personal, since they all had the same illegal status. These men made a habit of demanding the execution of the rulers' favorites, confiscating property from the wealthy, blockading the palace to get a pay raise, deposing some rulers and issuing invitations to others—all in accordance with a long-established custom of Alexandria's army. There were also two thousand cavalry. These men were all veterans of several wars in Alexandria: they had restored the elder Ptolemy to his kingdom, killed Bibulus' two sons, fought the Egyptians.<sup>130</sup> Such was their military experience.

111. Confident in these troops and contemptuous of Caesar's small force Achilles occupied Alexandria, except for the part of the city that Caesar controlled with his soldiers. In the initial assault he tried to break into Caesar's quarters, but Caesar had deployed his cohorts in the streets and withstood the attack. There was fighting at the

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3 tempore pugnatum est ad portum, ac longe maximam ea  
res attulit dimicationem. Simul enim diductis copiis plu-  
ribus viis pugnabatur, et magna multitudine naves longas  
occupare hostes conabantur. (Quarum erant L auxilio mis-  
sae ad Pompeium, proelioque in Thessalia facto domum  
redierant, quadriremes<sup>138</sup> omnes et quinqueremes aptae  
instructaeque omnibus rebus ad navigandum. Praeter has,  
XXII quae praesidi causa Alexandriae esse consuerant,  
4 constratae omnes.) Quas si occupavissent classe Caesaris  
erepta portum ac mare totum in sua potestate haberent  
5 commeatu auxiliisque Caesarem prohiberent. Itaque  
tanta est contentione actum quanta agi debuit cum illi  
celerem in ea re victoriam, hi salutem suam consistere  
6 viderent. Sed rem obtinuit Caesar. Omnesque eas naves  
et reliquas quae erant in navalibus incendit quod tam late  
tueri parva manu non poterat, confestimque ad Pharum  
navibus milites exposuit.

112. Pharus est in insula turris magna altitudine miri-  
2 ficis operibus extracta, quae nomen ab insula cepit. Haec  
insula obiecta Alexandriae portum efficit. Sed a superiori-  
bus regibus in longitudinem passuum DCCCC in mare  
iactis molibus angusto itinere et<sup>139</sup> ponte cum oppido con-  
3 iungitur. In hac sunt insula domicilia Aegyptiorum et vicus  
oppidi magnitudine. Quaeque ubique naves imprudentia  
aut tempestate paulum suo cursu decesserunt has more  
4 praedonum diripere consuerunt. Iis autem invitis a quibus

<sup>138</sup> quadriremes (i.e., IIIIdriremes) *Paul*: illae triremes *ω*

<sup>139</sup> et] ut *Kraffert*

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<sup>131</sup> For "and a bridge," *Kraffert* proposed "like a bridge," since there were two strategically important bridges on the Heptastadion (*BAlex* 19.1-2).

## CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

harbor at the same time, and this affair turned into the biggest battle by far, for there was fighting in various streets where troops had been deployed, and the enemy was simultaneously making an attempt with large numbers to seize the warships. (There were fifty of these that had been sent in support of Pompey and returned home after the battle in Thessaly, all quadriremes and quinqueremes, ready and completely fitted out for sailing, and beyond these, twenty-two that regularly guarded Alexandria, all of them decked ships.) If they seized these, taking away Caesar's fleet, they were going to have the harbor and the sea as a whole in their power and prevent Caesar from getting supplies and reinforcements. So the struggle was consistent with the stakes, since one side saw that a swift victory was at issue in this action, the other that their lives were. But Caesar met his objective. He also burned all of the enemy ships, plus the others in the boatyards, because he could not guard so much territory with his small corps, and immediately landed troops near the lighthouse.

112. The lighthouse is a tower on Pharos Island, very tall and of marvelous construction; it takes its name from the island. This barrier island at Alexandria makes a harbor. But previous rulers joined it to the city with a narrow causeway and a bridge<sup>131</sup> by extending jetties into the sea for a stretch of nine hundred paces.<sup>132</sup> The island contained some Egyptian residences and a settlement the size of a town. Whenever ships deviated slightly from their course, in ignorance or bad weather, they would as a rule be plundered by the inhabitants, pirate fashion. (Because

<sup>132</sup> Named for its length: "seven stades" in Greek units.

## CAESAR

Pharus tenetur non potest esse propter angustias navibus  
5 introitus in portum. Hoc tum veritus Caesar hostibus in  
pugna occupatis militibusque expositis Pharumprehendit  
6 atque ibi praesidium posuit. Quibus est rebus effectum uti  
tuto frumentum auxiliaque navibus ad eum supportari  
possent. Dimisit enim circum omnes propinquas provin-  
7 cias atque inde auxilia evocavit. Reliquis oppidi partibus  
sic est pugnatum ut aequo proelio discederetur et neutri  
pellerentur. Id efficiebant angustiae loci. Paucisque utrim-  
que interfectis Caesar loca maxime necessaria complexus  
8 noctu praemuniit. In eo tractu oppidi pars erat regiae ex-  
igua, in quam ipse habitandi causa initio erat inductus, et  
theatrum coniunctum domui, quod arcis tenebat locum  
9 aditusque habebat ad portum et ad reliqua<sup>140</sup> navalia. Has  
munitiones insequentibus auxit diebus ut pro muro obie-  
10 tas haberet neu dimicare invitus cogeretur. Interim filia  
minor Ptolomaei regis vacuum possessionem regni spe-  
rans ad Achillam sese ex regia traiecit unaque bellum ad-  
11 ministrare coepit. Sed celeriter est inter eos de principatu  
controversia orta, quae res apud milites largitiones auxit.  
Magnis enim iacturis sibi quisque eorum animos concilia-  
12 bat. Haec dum apud hostes geruntur Pothinus [nutricius  
pueri et procurator regni, in parte Caesaris,]<sup>141</sup> cum ad  
Achillam nuntios mitteret hortareturque ne negotio de-  
sisteret neve animo deficeret, indicatis deprehensisque  
internuntiis a Caesare est interfectus. [Haec initia belli  
Alexandrini fuerunt.]<sup>142</sup>

<sup>140</sup> reliqua] regia *Morus*


<sup>141</sup> [nutricius . . . Caesaris] *Kraner*

<sup>142</sup> [haec . . . fuerunt] *Forchhammer*

### CIVIL WAR, BOOK III

of the narrow channel it is impossible to enter the harbor  
against the will of anyone who holds the lighthouse.) Wor- 5  
ried about this, and while the enemy was occupied in fight-  
ing, Caesar landed soldiers and seized the lighthouse, then  
established a garrison there. The result of this operation 6  
was that provisions and reinforcements could be shipped  
to him safely. For he sent word around all the nearby  
provinces, summoning reinforcements from them. In the 7  
rest of the city the fighting was such that the two sides  
separated after an indecisive engagement and neither was  
routed. This was the result of the site's narrow dimensions.  
After a few casualties on both sides, Caesar took control  
of crucial positions and sealed them off during the night.  
A small section of the palace was in this area of the city; 8  
Caesar had been installed in residence here at the outset.  
There was also a theater adjacent to the residence, which  
functioned as a stronghold and gave access to the harbor  
and the other<sup>133</sup> boatyards. He extended his fortifications 9  
on the following days so that he would have a wall-like  
barrier and would not be forced to fight against his will.  
Meanwhile King Ptolemy's younger daughter left the pal- 10  
ace and went over to Achillas and began to direct the war  
together with him, hoping to seize a vacant throne. But a 11  
dispute over leadership arose between them right away,  
and this increased the largesse to the soldiers, for each was  
spending a lot in trying to win their loyalty. While this was 12  
going on in the enemy camp, Pothinus was sending mes-  
sages to Achillas and exhorting him not to abandon his task  
or lose heart. His go-betweens were named and caught,  
and he was put to death by Caesar.

133 For "other," Morus substituted "royal" (*BAlex* 13.1).



Place-names marked with an asterisk (\*) are included on the maps. Cities are in Italy unless otherwise identified. Individuals are given their entry number in Brill's New Pauly (NP), where available.

All dates are BC.

The following abbreviations are employed: *aed.* = aedile, *cens.* = censor, *cos.* = consul, *cos. suff.* = suffect consul, *mod.* = modern place-name, *pr.* = praetor, *qu.* = quaestor, *tr. pl.* = tribune of the plebs.

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GAUL

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SPAIN

NEARER  
SPAIN

HIBERUS

NARBONENSIS

CISALPINE  
GAUL

Massilia

CORSICA

Tarraco

Gades

BAETIS

Munda

SARDINIA

Caralis

Roma

MEDITERRANEAN

MAURETANIA

NUMIDIA

AFRICA  
NOVA

AFRICA  
Carthage  
Thapsus



Roman territory prior to Caesar's consulship, 59 BC



BLACK SEA

THRACIA

MACEDONIA

ASIA

BITHYNIA

PONTUS

ARMENIA

Zela

CAPPADOCIA

CYPRUS

Antiochia

SYRIA

PHOENICE

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Alexandria

EGYPTUS

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
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