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**ARRIAN**

**I**

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# ARRIAN

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES

I

ANABASIS ALEXANDRI  
BOOKS I-IV



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## PREFACE

The Greek text is, with minor changes, that of the Teubner edition of 1967, edited by A. G. Roos and revised by G. Wirth; I am indebted to Ernst Heimeran-Verlag of Munich for permission to use it.

I must express my most grateful acknowledgments to successive editors of the Loeb Classical Library, to Professor E. H. Warmington for many improvements in the translation and to Professor G. P. Goold, and also to his wife, for care in correction of the proofs.

Brasenose College  
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## INTRODUCTION

### THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ARRIAN<sup>1</sup>

1. Lucius (or Aulus) Flavius Arrianus came, as he told himself in his now lost Bithynian history, from a family at Nicomedia, a Hellenized city in Bithynia, where he was born and educated and held the priesthood of Demeter and Kore. From his name, most fully recorded in a recently found inscription, we can see that he was a Roman citizen; evidently his father or grandfather had received the honour from one of the Flavian emperors (A.D. 69–96), and he was connected with another family, the Arrii, which enjoyed the same status. In Greek-speaking cities the citizenship was seldom granted except to members of the local ruling class, and Arrian's priesthood also points to wealth and high birth. Indeed he was eligible for a senatorial career at Rome itself. We know from inscriptions and allusions in his own works that he was governor of Cappadocia from c. A.D. 132 to 137; he had previously been consul, probably in 129. If he reached this office at the normal age, he would have been born not later than 89 and have entered the senate before the death of Trajan in 117.

<sup>1</sup> For abbreviations and short titles see p. lxxxv. The Teubner edition by A. G. Roos, revised by G. Wirth, Leipzig, 2 vols, 1967–8, with large bibliography, prints in vol. ii the minor works and fragments of A. and *testimonia* to his life, on which see esp. E. Schwartz, *RE* ii 1230 ff. = *Griechische Geschichtsschreiber* 130 ff.; A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 1972, 163 ff. with two new inscriptions and further bibliography. P. A. Stadter, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 1967, 155 ff., argues that Arrian was actually named Xenophon, but cf. § 6.

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It has, however, recently been argued that he was admitted to the senate and rapidly promoted by Hadrian as a reward for literary productions, including the *Anabasis*.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it may be that before entering the senate he had held equestrian military commissions. He could well have been somewhat older than forty in 129.

2. Before his public career began, Arrian had attended the classes of the Stoic teacher, Epictetus, at Nicopolis in Epirus, and was so impressed that probably at the end of each day he wrote down extensive notes of his master's lectures or sermons, trying to preserve what he had said word for word in the manner of Boswell. Years later, he published these *Discourses* in eight books (of which four survive), explaining in an introductory letter to Lucius Gellius that defective copies had somehow fallen into other hands; he wished that the published text should be authentic. He also wrote a Manual (*Enchiridion*) summarizing Epictetus' teaching, which is still extant. Allusions in the *Discourses* show that it was in the first decade of the second century that he sat under Epictetus. In his own age Arrian was styled a philosopher, but perhaps not only because of these writings: he also composed a little work on meteorology, which was then comprised under philosophy, and this too survives. How far he was permanently influenced by Stoicism must be doubted; I can detect no Stoic colouring in the *Anabasis*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Trajan was very ready to promote men from the Greek world. The first view is commonly held; Bosworth advocates the second.

<sup>3</sup> See Oldfather's Loeb edition; F. Millar, *Journal of Roman Studies*, 1965, 141 ff. A. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa* (1890) and *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet* (1894) are fundamental on his beliefs.

## INTRODUCTION

3. No details are recorded of Arrian's early career in the service of Rome. The governor of Cappadocia had the task of protecting the upper Euphrates frontier with an army, including two legions, of about 20,000 men.<sup>4</sup> It is natural to suppose that he had obtained some military experience before he held this post, and the fact that he had himself seen the Danube and some of its tributaries (*Ind.* 4, 15) suggests service in that area, perhaps as an equestrian officer, though this inference has been challenged, and high military command was occasionally entrusted to mere civilians. Early in his tenure of the province Arrian inspected the forts on the Black Sea coast; he reported officially to Hadrian in Latin, but also presented him with a little literary work in Greek called 'The Voyage round the Black Sea' (*Periplous Euxini*), mostly culled from previous topographical writings (for he had not seen all the coasts for himself), but with some account of his own experiences and observations and special attention to works of art and antiquity that would interest the emperor. There is an old-world piety in his assertion that he will pacify a brigand tribe 'if God so wills' (11, 2, cf. *Anab.* vii 30). Later he was confronted with a serious danger of an Alan invasion, and again wrote a short description of his preparations to repel it (*Ectaxis contra Alanos*), a tract of no literary pretensions, very valuable for the evidence it provides on the Roman army in the province and on its marching and fighting practices. His fellow-countryman, Cassius Dio (*fl.* c. 200), who was to compose a biography of Arrian, now lost, says in his history that Arrian in fact deterred the Alans from attack (lxix

<sup>4</sup> See H. F. Pelham, *Essays on Roman History* 212 ff.

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15, 1). He was still governor when he wrote a third treatise in 136/7 on *Tactics*; the material is mostly borrowed from earlier writers, rephrased with greater elegance, but it includes an account of contemporary methods for training cavalry.

4. There is no evidence that Arrian was employed again by Rome. He presently retired to Athens, where he was a citizen and became *archon* (chief magistrate) in 148/9. The name of Flavius Arrianus, which occurs on Athenian prytany lists, probably in 167/8 and certainly in 172/3, may be that of his son rather than his own. He is said to have lived into the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161–180), but was dead when Lucian wrote his *Alexander the False Prophet* shortly after 180. Most of his writings doubtless date from his retirement. Whether the *Anabasis* and *Indica* belong to this period will be discussed in volume II.

5. Arrian was a prolific writer, though apart from the works mentioned above and those comprised in this edition, his essay on *Hunting* (*Cynegeticus*) is the only one to survive. Mere fragments, or summaries by the ninth-century Byzantine scholar, Photius, attest his *History of Affairs after Alexander* in ten books (presumably a sequel to the *Anabasis*) which ended so abruptly in 321 B.C. that it must have been left unfinished, a *History of Parthia* in 17 books, which had reached Trajan's Parthian war in the 8th, and a *History of Bithynia* from mythical times to its annexation by Rome in 74 B.C. in eight books. His preface to this work (known from Photius) referred to lost biographies of Dion and Timoleon and implied that these lives, as well as the *Anabasis*, were exercises in historiography, preparing him for his great life-work of recording the story of his own fatherland;



## INTRODUCTION

this is curious, when we consider that in the *Anabasis* (i 12, cf. *preface* and vii 30) he seems to claim that that work is an inspired production, worthy of its great subject and destined to place its author among the masters of Greek literature. There was also another biography of a bandit named Tilliborus or Tillorobus of which not a word remains.

6. The connecting link between many of these varied productions may be found in Arrian's admiration for Xenophon, who also ranked both as philosopher and historian. In the *Ectaxis* he even assumes Xenophon's name (§ 10), and elsewhere he refers to him as 'the elder Xenophon' (e.g. *Periplous* 12, 5) or 'that Xenophon' (ib. 1, 1 etc.) or 'my namesake' (*Cynegeticus* 22, 1). It has been inferred that he actually possessed the name from the first (it is not uncommon) or later assumed it, but this is not confirmed by any of the inscriptions in which his own name appears. Be this as it may, he claims to have 'followed the same pursuits from youth, hunting and warfare and philosophy' (ibid. 1, 4). His work on hunting in fact recalled Xenophon's on the same subject, just as his *Discourses of Epictetus* had their counterpart in Xenophon's *Recollections of Socrates* (*Memorabilia*), while he gave to his account of Alexander the same title as Xenophon had used for his story of the Ten Thousand, to which Arrian refers in i 12, 3; ii 4, 3; 7, 8; 8, 11. In the eyes of Lucian he was a man whose whole life was concerned with culture (*paideia*) and an inscription refers to his intellectual eminence (*sophia*); he was regarded as one of the ornaments of an age to which some moderns now credit a renaissance of Greek civilization. However, his works illustrate how derivative were its ideas and literary forms; he and his con-

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temporaries found their inspiration in the past. This is reflected in Arrian's style. Photius admired his clarity of diction and arrangement and held that he hit a happy mean between excessive bareness and excessive adornment,<sup>5</sup> but though this be granted, it is certain that except in the *Discourses* and *Manual* he adopted the style and language of the past, imitating Xenophon in particular. In the *Anabasis* he writes in the old Attic, while in the *Indica* he seeks to reproduce the Ionic of Herodotus, in each case eschewing the idioms of the living language. No doubt this was a *tour de force* and may explain his boast that he was a master of Greek speech (i 12) and his claim (vi 28, 6) that the *Indica* would be a 'Greek book' on the theme, i.e. more literary than the memoir of Nearchus on which most of it was based.

### THE TEXT OF THE *ANABASIS* AND *INDICA*

7. In the previous Loeb edition Robson followed the Didot text edited by Dübner and based on a fifteenth-century manuscript at Paris (B, called A by Dübner). However, A. G. Roos is held to have shown that this, and all other extant manuscripts, were copied from an extant codex in Vienna (A), written about A.D. 1200. In his Teubner edition (see n. 1) he, therefore, relied solely on A, where possible, except for a few passages where he considered that the true text, corrupted in A, had been preserved in ancient excerpts and quotations from Arrian. Unfortunately, A had suffered from damp, and as early as the fifteenth century the pages

<sup>5</sup> Teubner ed. of Arrian, vol. ii, p. LXVI f.

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nearest the cover, corresponding to some two pages in this edition at the beginning of the *Anabasis* and half a page at the end of the *Indica*, were lost. Elsewhere too a later scribe (A<sup>2</sup>) wrote in, with his own hand, words which he found barely legible; where the original writing can still be made out, it proves that he was negligent and ignorant. Worse still, he tore out twenty pages, which were presumably hardest to read, and substituted his own, presumably bad, copy. The codex, thus amended or rather defaced, was transcribed in a fifteenth-century Laurentian manuscript (k), which was once regarded as primary evidence for the text. However, the remaining 36 manuscripts, of which 29 include the *Indica* as well as the *Anabasis*, were copied from A before its maltreatment, and can be used to restore A's readings, where A is lost or illegible. Roos, who divided them into two classes (the second of which was marked by certain lacunae), chose to rely mainly on B from the first class and a Laurentian manuscript (L) from the second. He had not in fact collated or even seen all these manuscripts, but further work on them is taken into account by Wirth in his revision of Roos' edition. Not being a textual critic, I have simply reprinted this revised text, with only a few changes, mostly suggested in Wirth's addenda and corrigenda (which often reveal Roos' own final judgement). The apparatus will draw attention to all these changes,<sup>6</sup> and occasionally to other textual points, but the student of Arrian's text must turn to the Teubner edition.

<sup>6</sup> This text differs from that of Roos in i 7, 2; 17, 2; ii 1, 4; 2, 2; 23, 2; iii 6, 5 and 6; 7, 7; 11, 7 and 8; 13, 3; 20, 4; 30, 7; iv 4, 3; 5, 3; 8, 9; 12, 1; 21, 7; 23, 1; 25, 2; 28, 4 and 7; 29, 4; 30, 6. Cf. n. 99.

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### THE TRANSLATION

8. Robson's translation was notoriously marred by frequent inaccuracies. None the less, I have found it a necessary economy of time to revise it rather than replace it. In trying to remove errors, I have also chosen in many places to introduce stylistic changes. Robson affected an old-world style, as indeed did Arrian. I doubt whether any translator can reproduce the kind of effect Arrian made on contemporary readers, but a systematic attempt to do this would no doubt involve him in the most careful study of (let us say) the English of Hakluyt or Clarendon, and the more successful he might be in imitation of models analogous in English to Arrian's models in Greek, the less his version would serve to make Arrian accessible to a modern English public. If we want to savour Arrian's style, we must read him in the original. But the truth is surely that he will mostly be read, alike in Greek and in translation, for what he has to tell. My object is to make that as plain as possible.

### THE COMMENTARY

9. Arrian unquestionably provides us with the best evidence we have for Alexander, and a full commentary might be no less than an exhaustive, critical examination of all, or almost all, our material for Alexander's reign; this would clearly transcend any reasonable limits for a Loeb edition.<sup>7</sup> My purpose in the rest of this introduction and in the notes and appendixes is to explain what Arrian says, where

<sup>7</sup> A. B. Bosworth is preparing a full commentary.

## INTRODUCTION

explanation seems to be required, and to furnish some material and guidance for an evaluation of his work. Arrian takes for granted much that a modern reader (and perhaps some of his own public) might not know; in particular, he plunges into the story of Alexander's campaigns without telling us anything about the condition of Macedon, Greece or Persia at the time, of the circumstances of his own accession or of the military resources at his command. By setting the stage in the introduction I shall incidentally explain many allusions he makes to transactions he never describes. To evaluate his work we have to compare it with our other accounts of Alexander. The comparison shows clearly enough that his is the best. Arrian himself was very conscious of this superiority of his treatment to the histories read in his own day, and explains it by his choice of better sources (*preface*). It is then necessary to determine the value of his sources, so far as possible. It will appear that they have their defects as well as great merits, and that the inferior accounts cannot be wholly neglected. To facilitate detailed comparison I have given references throughout to the principal texts which the student has to collate with Arrian's own statements, though for brevity I have not normally noted or commented on their divergences from Arrian. Crucial questions which bear on the reliability of his sources or on his own methods and interpretation are treated at greater length, but from a historiographical rather than a historical standpoint; for instance my aim in discussing Alexander's visit to the oracle of Ammon (Appendix V) is not to discover, if indeed it be discoverable, what actually happened and what its importance was for Alexander, but what the various historians told and thought. For an assessment of

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Arrian and his main sources omissions are sometimes no less relevant than divergences from the rest of the tradition. The reader will be assisted (I hope) to form his own judgement, as he proceeds; a final statement of my own view will be deferred to the second volume, and there I shall discuss Arrian's own contribution to his theme. It will be best too to consider in that connection when he wrote the *Anabasis* and *Indica* (cf. § 1). Assuming that they are works of his full maturity, many scholars have seen them as products of a man versed in government and war. I can detect no clear evidence of this, and no grounds in the quality of Arrian's historical judgement to rule out the thesis that they were composed before he had gone far in his senatorial career.

### THE SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF ALEXANDER

10. Archaeology, inscriptions and coins tell us little of Alexander: we have to rely mainly on literary sources, and of the many contemporary accounts of his reign, none survives; all extant narratives are rather late. (i) In the mid first century B.C. Diodorus the Sicilian composed a *Universal History* in Greek, of which book xvi deals with Philip, xvii with Alexander (there is a long lacuna, and only a table of contents shows what he recounted between winter 330/29 and summer 327), and xviii-xx with Alexander's successors. (ii) Between 29 B.C. and A.D. 226, and almost certainly in the first century A.D., Quintus Curtius Rufus wrote a Latin history of Alexander in ten books, of which the first two which went down to spring 333 are lost; there are also some later gaps. (iii) Early in the second century



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A.D. Plutarch included Alexander in his *Parallel Lives*. (iv) A lost Latin Universal History written by Pompeius Trogus under Augustus was epitomized probably in the third century A.D. by Justin; his work is of small value. (v) There are of course allusions in other writers, notably the scholarly *Geography* by Strabo (c. A.D. 1), whose lost historical work also contained something on Alexander (ii 1, 9).<sup>8</sup> Naturally there must have been many other treatments of Alexander written in antiquity after Alexander's own time. We do not know which were those Arrian hoped to supersede (*pref.* 3). Even their names may not be preserved. It is significant that he himself cites the works of Aristos and Asclepiades (vii 15, 5), of which the first is almost and the second, but for his allusion, totally unknown to us. A few fragments from such shadowy or anonymous later historians still survive. Clearly the evidentiary value of all such non-contemporary historians, including Arrian himself, rests on their ability to obtain and transmit reliable contemporary information. Even if it had been the practice of classical historians to search out documentary records for the past, they could not have found much to their purpose, and at best they had to turn to contemporary narratives. Their proper course was to examine and collate such narratives, written by eye-witnesses or at least by men who had themselves been able to question eye-witnesses. (Even a companion of Alexander could not have seen and heard for himself more than a little of what occurred.) But some of them simply paraphrased,

<sup>8</sup> All, except Justin, in Loeb editions. On Curtius' date see D. Korzeniewski, *Die Zeit des Q. Curtius Rufus*, Köln dissertation, 1969; G. V. Sumner, *Australasian Universities Modern Language Association*, 1961; H. U. Instinsky, *Hermes* 1962. For Plutarch see J. R. Hamilton's good commentary, 1969.

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summarized or expanded existing works by authors who themselves depended directly or indirectly on the primary authorities; the possibilities of error were thus multiplied at every stage, as careless or wilful omissions and additions might occur. Thus it is clear that whatever sources Curtius used he embellished what he found with all the arts of Silver Latin rhetoric, and any later writer who trusted him implicitly would be to that extent further from the truth. Still, all accounts of Alexander which are not mere fiction (see § 18) must ultimately go back to contemporary sources. Recently C. B. Welles suggested that Diodorus drew on Trogus.<sup>9</sup> But Trogus probably wrote after Diodorus (see Addendum, p. lxxxiv). In any case he himself must ultimately have drawn on a first-hand account, and even if Welles' theory is correct, it does nothing to discredit the orthodox hypothesis that the ultimate source of Diodorus is Clitarchus (cf., however, § 22).

11. There were many contemporary accounts of Alexander; I name only the most notable.<sup>10</sup> *Callisthenes* of Olynthus, Aristotle's kinsman and pupil, already an accredited historian, was taken with him by Alexander to commemorate his deeds; he perished at Alexander's hands in 327, but his narrative went down to 331 and perhaps to 329. *Anaximenes* of Lampsacus continued his history of Philip with a work on Alexander that is cited only twice. *Chares* of Mitylene, an usher in Alexander's court, is credited with at least ten books which *may* have comprised no more than a series of reminiscences and anecdotes of court life. A work by the Cynic philosopher, *Onesicritus* of Astypalaea, a pilot in

<sup>9</sup> Introd. to Loeb edition of Diodorus vol. viii.

<sup>10</sup> Pearson, *LH*, discusses each writer in turn.



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Alexander's Indus flotilla and in Nearchus' fleet, is cited mainly for geographical descriptions and marvels, and treated by Arrian with contempt (vi 2, 3; *Ind.* 3, 6), but it may have had a far wider scope and certainly ranged further than the memoir of his voyage by *Nearchus* himself, which was Arrian's chief source in the *Indica*.<sup>11</sup> *Clitarchus* of Alexandria wrote at least twelve books on Alexander; though he may not have actually served on the expedition, the suggestion that he was not a contemporary has been refuted, and he must surely have published before Ptolemy.<sup>12</sup> A somewhat older friend of Alexander, *Ptolemy* played a part of growing importance in the campaigns and became satrap of Egypt on Alexander's death; here he made himself an independent ruler and assumed the royal title in 304, founding a dynasty which lasted till the death of Cleopatra in 30; he more or less retired in 285, three years before his death. Since Arrian refers to him as king, it is commonly assumed that he did not write his history until after 304, and perhaps not until his years of leisure and extreme old age. These assumptions seem to me unwarranted. Naturally Arrian knew that he became king, whether or not he was so described on Arrian's copy, and Arrian's point is perhaps that the man with the qualities of a king would not tell lies; this point, if valid at all, would

<sup>11</sup> More on this in vol. II.

<sup>12</sup> Badian, *Cl. World* 1971, 37 ff., 77 ff., cf. *Proceedings of African Classical Associations*, 1965, 5 ff. (I retract the contrary view, expressed in *CQ* 1962, 141 ff., an article in which I believe I refuted the hypothesis of Tarn and others, that Diodorus and Curtius used an author who obtained valuable information from the mercenaries in Persian service; this matter will not be mentioned again.) Probably A. did not read *Clitarchus*, cf. vi 28, 2 n.; vii 15, 5 n.

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hold good at whatever date the 'kingly man' was writing. Moreover, even if Arrian supposed that he wrote when king, we do not know that the supposition was justified by anything in Ptolemy's text. And we have only to think of Caesar to see that the claims of government and warfare do not exclude literary composition. Finally, *Aristobulus* too accompanied Alexander, and was employed to repair the tomb of Cyrus (vi 29); we do not know what professional expertise he had, nor where he came from, but he ultimately became a citizen of Cassandria in Macedonia, founded by Antipater's son in 316; he was writing after the battle of Ipsus in 306 (vii 18, 5, cf. 22, 5), and allegedly began only when he was eighty-three; this, if true, tells us little, as the date of his birth is not on record.<sup>13</sup>

12. The 'fragments' of these writers are collected in Jacoby's *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* and have been translated by C. A. Robinson (*The History of Alexander the Great*, 1953). The term 'fragments' is misleading. Very seldom do we have their actual words as distinct from summaries or mere allusions; thus Plutarch reports (*Alex.* 46) that Alexander was visited by the queen of the Amazons 'as most writers say, among whom are Clitarchus, Polyclitus, Onesicritus, Antigenes and Ister; but Aristobulus, Chares the royal usher, Ptolemy . . . (and others) say that this is a fiction', and this passage is cited as a fragment of each author named. Moreover, the fragments, such as they are, may give us a very imperfect idea of the scope and importance of their works. If Arrian's *Anabasis* were lost, only three or four

<sup>13</sup> The best and most cautious account of all these writers is by Pearson, *LH* (cf. E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* 250 ff.), though he is wrong on Clitarchus' date.

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uninformative fragments of Ptolemy would survive, and while we should know more of Aristobulus through Strabo, we might have supposed that he was primarily interested in geographical descriptions, whereas Arrian uses him for other matters as well, and in fact gives little space to geography in the *Anabasis*, as distinct from the *Indica*. Chares alone is much *quoted*, but by Athenaeus, who was interested in food, drink, luxury and the like, and excerpts passages from Chares on these topics: this may give no juster an impression of Chares' range than Strabo with his geographical theme gives of the scope of either Aristobulus or Onesicritus. Finally, the almost complete disappearance of Ptolemy's history except in the pages of Arrian must warn us not to ignore the possible importance of Anaximenes, and indeed of other writers who were with Alexander, like Polyclitus and Medeios of Larissa, who are hardly ever cited or whose sparse 'fragments' may again be untypical.

13. Callisthenes alone is *known* to have been actually writing during the course of the campaigns.<sup>14</sup> By contrast Aristobulus composed his work not less than 20–30 years after the events he described, and it is generally but rashly assumed that Ptolemy too wrote after a long lapse of time. Callisthenes, it is true, need not have been the only historian actually engaged in writing in Alexander's lifetime, and others may have made contemporary notes. A historian who did neither must, when at last he came to compose, have relied on works previously published by others, on documentary evidence, on his own and others' recollections, or on all these kinds of informa-

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, *pro Archia* 24 says that Alexander had many historians with him, but this statement has perhaps no value.

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tion. Now it is a marked feature of Arrian's work that he gives very detailed reports of a dry factual kind; he tells who commanded particular regiments, who were given particular provincial appointments at particular times, how many days the army took to reach a specified place or how many stades it covered. Similar information is also found in Curtius, and even in Diodorus; though the brevity of his account compels him generally to omit such data, there is enough to show that they appeared in his source.<sup>15</sup>

All this suggests that some of the contemporary historians, including the sources of Curtius and Diodorus as well as Arrian, disposed of documentary material.

14. Both Arrian (vii 25 f.) and Plutarch (76) purport to describe Alexander's last days from 'the royal journals', to which there are a few other references elsewhere, all concerned with his spending days drinking and sleeping! We are also told that the journals were 'written up' by Eumenes, the royal secretary (who was to play a turbulent part in the struggles after Alexander's death), in collaboration with one Diodotus. It has commonly been supposed that the journals in fact recorded all important decisions made by Alexander and all notable events reported to him, as well as an account of his own actions day by day; it would seem that the Ptolemies in Egypt kept such journals, and perhaps required their officials to do so; in that case an extract preserved from such a journal of a Roman official in Egypt (Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 41) attests a practice that conjecturally goes back to Alexander. It is further assumed that a copy of Alexander's journals came into the possession of Ptolemy, presumably in

<sup>15</sup> I shall note all such data in the commentary.

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321 on the death of Perdiccas, and that he used them for his history. This hypothesis is not proved, nor probable. (a) The journals are cited only for Alexander's personal habits and particularly for his last days (Jacoby no. 117), not for any military or political measures; for instance Plutarch (55, 3) seeks to show the innocence of Callisthenes from a royal letter, not from the journals, and Arrian cannot resolve his doubts about Callisthenes' fate (iv 14, 3) from the journals. If Ptolemy used them here and elsewhere, he certainly never made this plain to Arrian. (b) It is far from clear from vii 26, 3 that even for Alexander's last days Arrian obtained his knowledge of the journals from Ptolemy (or Aristobulus) rather than directly, but it is certain that the version he knew was materially different from that known to Plutarch; neither was necessarily authentic. (c) If Arrian's 'documentary' material comes from the journals through Ptolemy, we must ask how some such material also reached Diodorus and Curtius; evidently part of it was in their common source, and that source is usually taken to be Clitar-chus, who must be supposed to have written before Ptolemy (cf. Curtius ix 5, 21). It seems to me clear that the so-called journals were of limited scope and circulated in different versions, which were literary compositions. Various theories have been proposed by scholars who do not accept the orthodox but (in my judgement) incorrect dogma that official journals underlie Ptolemy's history. On one view, the fact that they are not attested except for Alexander's final residence at Babylon can be readily explained: it was at Babylon that local records were kept under the old kings, as later under the Seleucids, narrating all the doings of the king; such records could have been the

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basis for literary compositions. Alternatively an alleged 'record' of Alexander's last days was circulated by Eumenes himself (or perhaps rather in his name) to show that there was no truth in the stories that Alexander had been poisoned at the instance of Antipater or others, and this 'record' might in turn have been altered by various hands for propagandist purposes. One account of Alexander spending his time in drinking and sleeping ascribed to Eumenes (Jacoby no. 117 F. 2) might even be taken as fabrication designed to depreciate the king.<sup>16</sup> In any event the notion that Ptolemy's history was specially reliable because he had access, and perhaps sole access, to the king's own journals, should be given up.<sup>17</sup>

15. Plutarch and others often cite the letters of Alexander and other figures of his time. Some are undeniably spurious, as they contain manifest absurdities. Others make statements which are or might be true. Scholars commonly hold that each must be treated on its merits.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, we do not possess any unquestionably authentic letters, which would make stylistic tests possible. Moreover, a forger would obviously draw on histories of Alexander, and might use true information by this method. Hence we cannot properly infer that a letter must be genuine, if its statements are correct.

<sup>16</sup> A. E. Samuel, *Historia* 1965, 1 ff.; A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 1971, 112 ff.

<sup>17</sup> L. Pearson, *Historia* 1955, 429 ff.; Pearson also deals with the letters and bematists' reports.

<sup>18</sup> This view is sometimes ascribed to J. Kaerst, *Philologus*, 1892, 602 ff. (the fundamental discussion), but this seems to me a misunderstanding of his cautiously expressed scepticism. Cf. notes on vi 1, 4; vii 12, 6 f.; the latter text does not imply that A. himself used the letters.



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Now it seems that all those used by Plutarch (and others) came from one collection, and it is hard to see how genuine letters would have been mixed up with spurious letters or in what circumstances genuine private letters would have been published at all. In my judgement all should be rejected. Official letters which cities received from Alexander and inscribed (e.g. Tod 185) are another matter. So are the letters Arrian or Curtius purport to give. They also affect to record speeches and conversations in the very words of the speaker, yet it cannot be doubted that (as in other ancient histories) the words they use are their own; at most the substance may be true, or at least derived from sources they believed. This practice went back to Herodotus and Thucydides, and the latter included a letter (vii 10 ff.) which is certainly his own composition, even though it probably gives the sense of what its imputed author actually wrote. The letters Arrian puts in direct speech (ii 14; vii 23, 8) probably belong to the same genre, that is to say, like the speeches in his work, they are his own literary compositions based on the material he found in his sources; by contrast, the mere summary of a letter in ii 25 is likely to be wholly drawn from his sources. I shall discuss the speeches and letters more fully in vol. II and argue that when they are of his own composition he was apt to use material not entirely drawn from the sources he was following in the surrounding narrative.

16. One kind of documentary material does seem to have been available to the historians of Alexander, viz. the reports of 'bematists' on marches and distances discussed in Appendix VIII.

17. From all this it follows that historians like Aristobulus who wrote some time after the events

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had to rely on their own and others' recollections, on contemporary notes and on already published accounts which had come their way. Callisthenes' official record, so far as it went, must therefore have been of great value to all his successors. But we do not know that it was the only truly contemporaneous version of events. And the difficulty of understanding how minute details could be given for the period Callisthenes certainly did not cover will be mitigated by the assumption that later writers, including Clitarchus and Ptolemy, composed their stories much sooner after Alexander's death than is often assumed, or that (whenever they wrote) they could refer to their own notes made at the time.

18. Callisthenes was censured in antiquity for his rhetoric, his adulation of Alexander and (by Polybius, quite unjustly) for incompetence in military matters.<sup>19</sup> Clitarchus, the only other contemporary historian who is known to have been read widely for a long period, was thought to be clever but mendacious.<sup>20</sup> Strabo, who often cites Onesicritus, Nearchus and Aristobulus, was contemptuous of the way in which all the historians who accompanied Alexander 'toyed with facts', glorifying Alexander, imposing fables on the credulity of their readers and contradicting each other on matters of which, as eye-witnesses, they should have been able to give true and uniform reports. He had in mind their geographical descriptions, but his criticisms have a wider relevance.<sup>21</sup> Onesicritus, whom he once characterizes as the arch-liar (xv 1, 28), had the audacity to tell how Alexander

<sup>19</sup> Jacoby no. 124 T. 20 f. (cf. Pearson 24); 30-32 f.; App. III.

<sup>20</sup> Jacoby no. 137 T. 6-9; 13.

<sup>21</sup> App. XII.



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cohabited with the queen of the Amazons (§12); so did Clitarchus, though he (unlike Onesicritus) was perhaps not with the army at the time. Even Ptolemy and Aristobulus did not eschew the fabulous in recounting Alexander's visit to Siwah (iii 3). It is less surprising that in the end an 'Alexander-Romance' was fashioned, perhaps by the first century B.C., which bears as little relation to the historic king as the *Chanson de Roland* to Charlemagne.<sup>22</sup> In his preface Arrian himself speaks with contempt of the current histories of Alexander (cf. vi 11), and with an emphasis unique in ancient historiography proclaims his reliance on the more trustworthy accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus.

19. I shall discuss Arrian's sources more fully in the second volume, but some preliminary observations are required here. He undertakes to record as facts what Ptolemy and Aristobulus agreed in recording and, where they differed, to select what he thinks most credible and memorable. Although he sometimes notes discrepancies between them, that is certainly not his invariable practice, nor did he promise to follow such a practice. One divergence gravely disturbed him (iv 14, 4), and it seems likely that if they had often *disagreed* he would have lost confidence in one, if not in both. I suppose, therefore, that the differences he has in mind arose mainly when one provided information that the other did not give; in such circumstances Arrian could reasonably have treated their stories as complementary. In fact neither is often cited specifically, nor when either or both are cited, is it always easy to see why; there seems to be an element of caprice. Similarly in his

<sup>22</sup> ed. Kroll<sup>2</sup>, 1958; cf. R. Merkelbach, *Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans*, 1954.

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great book on Alexander, written for the general reader, Wilcken gives his authority even for controversial statements quite infrequently and for apparently arbitrary reasons.) However, Arrian's preface seems to promise that all statements of fact will come from Ptolemy or Aristobulus or both, whereas what he derives from other sources will be given as mere 'tales' (cf. § 21). His actual practice is not quite so simple. On the one hand, some parts of the 'factual' narrative in books vi and vii seem to come from Nearchus, his chief source for the *Indica*, whom he regarded as no less reliable than Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and with good reason; on the other hand, there are occasions, registered in the notes, in which 'tales' can be shown to have been told by one or both of his main authorities.<sup>23</sup>

20. Most scholars assume that he normally relied more on Ptolemy than on Aristobulus.<sup>24</sup> This may be true, though it is usually taken too much for granted. Certainly, as an old friend of Alexander (iii 6) and a high ranking officer in his army, Ptolemy should have been better placed to know the truth than Aristobulus, and his military and political experience might well have given him more insight into matters of war and statecraft. But though these considerations have had much weight with the moderns, they do not seem to have occurred to Arrian. If he shows some preference for Ptolemy

<sup>23</sup> ii 12, 3-5, cf. vii 14, 7 with 23, 6: i 1, 1 n. Note also that Ptolemy or Aristobulus could record a 'tale' told at the time, e.g. ii 3.

<sup>24</sup> See e.g. E. Schwartz, *RE* ii 911 ff. = *Gr. Geschichtschreiber* 119 ff. (cf. also n. 1); H. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, 1934; E. Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I*, 1935 (largely refuted by Strasburger, *Gnomon* 1937, 483 ff.); G. Wirth, *RE* xxxii 2467 ff.

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in the preface, it is on the ludicrous ground that as a king he could not have lied without special dishonour. It is also clear from comparison of Arrian's narrative with 'fragments' of Aristobulus preserved elsewhere that Arrian omitted much that Aristobulus told, particularly geographical descriptions.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately Ptolemy is so seldom cited elsewhere that we have virtually no independent check on Arrian's use of his work, and cannot tell how much he omitted from it, or whether he at times silently rejected Ptolemy in favour of Aristobulus; it would have been perfectly in accord with his own preface if he had done so, whenever he found Aristobulus' account more credible or memorable. I hope to show that Arrian did in fact omit much 'documentary' material; one kind of omission is discussed in Appendix VIII (cf. § 56), and others will be reviewed in volume II. On the common view that Ptolemy was his preferred source, these omissions may well be from Ptolemy's history, and we certainly ought not to assume that even if Arrian is mainly Ptolemy, Ptolemy is mostly in Arrian. Again, Arrian's own express avowals in v 7, 1 and vi 2, 4 that he agrees with or follows Ptolemy perhaps need not be given an application to the whole history. The importance of Aristobulus as a source may be generally underrated; on the other hand I have some doubt (of a subjective kind) whether Arrian was capable of systematically collating and dovetailing both narratives, and there are occasions when Ptolemy is not actually cited in which he is unquestionably the authority used, at least for military

<sup>25</sup> In vii 20, 1 a 'prevalent tale' apparently comes from Aristobulus, and he may be the source, though unnamed, for vi 24, 4-26, an account widely different from Ptolemy's, if that is to be found in 23, 1-24, 1, but see discussion in vol. II.

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operations in which he played a large part himself. It may then seem *probable* that Ptolemy was more extensively used than Aristobulus.

21. In his preface Arrian adds that he has also recorded, but only as tales (*legomena*), statements he found in other writers, if he thought them memorable and not entirely untrustworthy; in fact he sometimes mentions such 'tales', only to reject them as incredible, presumably because they were so prevalent that he felt bound to notice them, or because they illustrated his contention that the usual versions of Alexander's expedition were often worthless. It is conventional to refer to the accounts of Alexander which do not depend on Ptolemy, Aristobulus or Nearchus as 'the vulgate'. This is an expression I shall use for convenience. It must not be taken to imply that the *legomena* belong to a single tradition. On the contrary, variants were numerous and outright contradictions not infrequent. It appears that though the *legomena* retailed by Arrian are sometimes found, along with many other 'tales' that he ignored, in Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Justin and elsewhere, Arrian's own versions of them are often peculiar to himself; I believe that he culled them from very late writers, those which were read in his own day, whereas our other authorities may preserve much earlier versions. This thesis again will be more fully set out in volume II, where I shall argue that Arrian never inspected any of the contemporary historians of Alexander except Ptolemy, Aristobulus and Nearchus.

22. Diodorus is generally held to have used only one source at a time, for instance in books xviii-xx the excellent contemporary historian, Hieronymus of Cardia (c. 360-260); evidence from these books which

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bears on Alexander is of first rate value. In book xvii his one source (if this theory is correct) was also used, perhaps at second hand, by Curtius, whose account often shows striking concurrences but preserves more of the common source than Diodorus' briefer story. Curtius, it is true, must also have drawn on another tradition, perhaps Ptolemy, for he is also sometimes at variance with Diodorus. As Clitarchus is named once by Diodorus (though not in book xvii) and twice by Curtius, and as there are some (but very few) significant agreements between the fragments of his work and their accounts, he is generally identified as their common source, all the more readily as he was much read down to the first century B.C., though little respected.<sup>26</sup> However, since the fragments of Clitarchus are meagre, this identification adds little to the picture we can form of their common source from the works of Diodorus and Curtius alone, and it is positively harmful if it induces the error of thinking that the evidence for Alexander in antiquity came to consist only of the 'Clitarchean vulgate' and of Arrian's chosen authorities. In fact there was a multiplicity of versions of many events, and we should not disregard any of the historians of Alexander's own time or those who may later have distorted and embellished what they read. In this edition I shall claim less knowledge of Clitarchus than most scholars profess.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Jacoby, *RE* xi 622 ff. But cf. now E. N. Borza, *Proc. of African Classical Ass.* 1968 with further bibliography.

<sup>27</sup> The discussion of the sources in Tarn ii 1-134 is largely discredited, see especially H. Strasburger, *Bibliotheka Orientalis* 1952, 202 ff. Even the adulation of Ptolemy (and what in Arrian is divined to be from Ptolemy), which Tarn shared with most earlier scholars, is now diminishing.

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23. Arrian's account is in general at once more detailed, clear and coherent than those given by Diodorus and Curtius, and it has less of the trivial and fabulous; Ptolemy and Aristobulus were among those who denied or omitted absurd stories like that of the queen of the Amazons, such as even Onesicritus and Clitarchus, though contemporaries, retailed. So little, however, is known of their works except from Arrian that it is the qualities of his history that do most to prove their superiority as sources and confirm his judgement in relying mainly on them. However, he himself was too much of an admirer of Alexander to detect that their histories were often apologetic, especially in tendentious omissions (cf. Appendixes II, V, VI, VIII 15; XIV); nor did it occur to him that Ptolemy's version might have been affected by the feuds after Alexander's death in which he played a great part. Moreover, Arrian himself lacks some of the 'documentary' material which other writers, notably Curtius, have preserved; it seems to me probable that he must have omitted much detail that his own main sources contained. We cannot, therefore, neglect other accounts of Alexander, even Diodorus and Curtius despite their general inferiority, and still less Plutarch and Strabo, especially when they themselves cite other contemporary authorities. Nor can it in my view be maintained that Arrian contributes much, if anything, of his own that is important to understanding Alexander. His merit was to have unearthed better accounts than were current in his day, and to have followed them without the embellishments of a Curtius, but just as his style is less brilliant than that of Curtius, so his own judgement is more naïve. He was a simple, honest soul, but no historian.



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### THE MACEDONIANS<sup>28</sup>

24. In the time of Alexander and his father, Philip, the heart of the Macedonian kingdom with its centres at Aegae and Pella lay in the 'rich Emathian plain' formed by the alluvial deposits of the rivers, Haliacmon, Lydias, Axios and Echedorus; it extended southwards to the vale of Tempe and eastwards to the river Strymon, with Pella as capital. It was a land rich in timber and grain, capable of supporting a fairly large population, with abundant pasturage; the military strength of the Macedonians lay above all in their cavalry. However, the mountainous cantons to the north-west, Pelagonia, Lyncestis, Orestis, Eordaea, Elimeia, Tymphaea, also counted as Macedonian. These cantons in Upper Macedon had their own 'kings' until Philip's time, who had often been able to combine a loose allegiance to their overlords at Pella with a high degree of independence. It was one of Philip's great achievements to have brought them under closer control; three of the six foot regiments Alexander took with him to Asia were recruited in Upper Macedon (D. 57, 2), and their native habitat fitted them particularly well for the mountain campaigns Alexander undertook in Iran and the Hindu Kush. The picture that Arrian (vii 9) makes Alexander draw of the primitive conditions in which the Macedonians had lived before Philip's

<sup>28</sup> Cf. G. T. Griffith, *GR*, 125 ff. Geography: S. Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria* 1926, chapters I-II; N. G. L. Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 1972, 1-213. Early history: esp. F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II*, 1930. Philip: A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, 1934; F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonien u. Griechenland* 1938; P. Cloché, *Philippe II*, n.d.

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reign (359–336), clad in skins and tending a few sheep in the mountains, can at most apply only to the people of Upper Macedon; though Philip undoubtedly encouraged urban life, and set a precedent for Alexander by founding new towns like Philippopolis that bore his name, older towns such as Pella had long existed in Lower Macedon. However, whereas Greek cities enjoyed or sought to enjoy full sovereignty, the towns in Macedon can at most have possessed local self-government as municipalities within the kingdom. A Greek would describe himself as an Athenian or a Corinthian or the like, but in Macedon a man was said to be a Macedonian, coming from such and such a town or rural canton.<sup>29</sup> The army was organized on a territorial basis, divided into units recruited from these urban or rural districts.<sup>30</sup>

25. The relics of the Macedonian language, such as the names of places and persons, both human and divine, e.g. Zeus, show that it was basically Greek with an admixture of (probably) Illyrian. However, to Greeks in the fourth century it was evidently unintelligible.<sup>31</sup> Macedonian institutions too, though they resembled those we find in the Homeric poems, were alien to the Greeks of Alexander's time, who were accustomed to city-states with oligarchic or democratic institutions. Hence they did not see that the Macedonians were of the same stock as themselves but at an earlier, indeed Homeric, stage of development. Demosthenes (iii 17) called Philip a barbarian, Isocrates (v 107 f.) a Greek ruling over barbarians; technically Isocrates was right, since the royal house of the Argeads, who traced their

<sup>29</sup> e.g. vi 28, 4; *Ind.* 18; 27, 8; Tod 164; 186.

<sup>30</sup> iii 16, 5, cf. i 2, 5; 12, 7; ii 9, 3; D. 57, 2.

<sup>31</sup> Kalléris, *Les anciens Macédoniens*, 1954.



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descent to Heracles and origin to Argos (e.g. A. ii 5, 9; iv 11, 6), had been admitted as Greeks to the Olympic games in the fifth century.<sup>32</sup> In the end the Macedonians were all to count as Greek (e.g. Polybius ix 37), but in Alexander's time they themselves perhaps did not wish to be so regarded, for Arrian, following his main sources, who were Macedonian by birth (Ptolemy) or adoption (Aristobulus and Nearchus), is normally careful to distinguish and even to contrast Macedonians and Greeks.<sup>33</sup> Still the process of Hellenization had already begun. Euripides had produced his *Bacchae* at the Macedonian court. Philip employed Aristotle as tutor for Alexander and, though it is absurd to suppose that the adolescent prince comprehended his teacher's philosophy, he was saturated in Homer (App. IV), became a patron of Apelles and Lysippus (i 16, 4), the best painter and sculptor respectively of the time, and took a number of Greek men of letters and science to Asia, notably Callisthenes. Philip had also incorporated Greek cities in the kingdom, and these supplied some of his cavalry (i 2, 5; 12, 7); indeed Greeks like Nearchus were admitted to the noble order of Companions. It is no surprise that Ptolemy, one of the old nobility, was himself to write a history of Alexander, obviously inspired by Greek models. Eventually the whole people was thoroughly Hellenized, and the Macedonian kingdoms in the near east which arose out of the ruins of Alexander's empire were to diffuse Greek

<sup>32</sup> Herodotus v 20-2; viii 137-9.

<sup>33</sup> ii 10, 7 of. 7, 4; iii 22, 2; iv 11, 8 ('vulgate'); v 26, 6; 27, 4 f.; 27, 8; vii 9, 4 f.; *Ind.* 18, 3 and 7 (Nearchus, cf. 18, 11). Contrast ii 14, 4: 'Macedonia and the rest of Greece'; the words, ascribed to Al., must be A's, and reflect the later conception.

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culture among their Oriental subjects. This was how Greek became the *lingua franca* in which the Gospel could be preached centuries later, the language in which even Jews, like Paul, chose to write.

26. As we have seen, the Macedonians were governed by kings. From the earliest times they had been normally drawn from the Argead dynasty. Herodotus (viii 137-9) seems to have thought that down to his own day the crown had descended in unbroken succession from father to son. This was certainly not true in later generations. Thus Philip himself became King in preference to his elder brother's child, Amyntas, who continued to live honourably at court, till he was put out of the way after Alexander's accession (§ 46). Philip is said to have had the assent of the army, the people in arms, to his usurpation (J. vii 5, 10), and it is generally held that it was a *right* of the army to elect their kings, though only from the Argead line;<sup>34</sup> to my mind it is more probable that they exercised this *power*, not of right but only when the succession was disputed; that was admittedly frequent.

27. Callisthenes is reported to have said that the kings had always ruled Macedon by *nomos*, not by force (iv 11, 6). *Nomos* means both law and custom. So primitive a people as the Macedonians would not have had a code of laws: they were ruled by custom. Thus we find Alexander often performing the sacrifices that custom required.<sup>35</sup> Evidently the king was also the chief intermediary between his subjects and the

<sup>34</sup> So most fully F. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung* 1931, with much evidence from the successor kingdoms which I think irrelevant to Macedon.

<sup>35</sup> e.g. iii 16, 9; 25, 1; 28, 4; iv 4, 1; v 3, 6; 8, 2 f.; 20, 1; 29, 2; vi 3, 1 f. (cf. *Ind.* 18, 11); vii 11, 8; 14, 1; 24, 4; 25.

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gods. A few texts indicate that he was likewise the supreme judge.<sup>36</sup> Quintus Curtius indeed states (vi 8, 25) that it was an ancient Macedonian custom that the king could do no more than investigate capital offences and had then to bring them before the people in arms for trial. This procedure is apparently illustrated by the trials of Philotas and his supposed accomplices, and of Hermolaus and others implicated in the pages' conspiracy. But on other occasions both Alexander and later Macedonian kings executed Macedonians summarily. If the people enjoyed the customary right of which Curtius tells, it was one which the kings set at naught whenever they felt it safe.<sup>37</sup> Some hold that the people possessed only one other right, that of electing the kings (*supra*). More probably the kings would consult the army on any occasions when they felt themselves in need of popular consent. Otherwise they could and did act autocratically. Demosthenes says that ' Philip, a single man, decides all questions open and secret for himself; he is his own general, his own master, his own treasurer.'<sup>38</sup> Similarly Alexander constantly seeks the advice of a council, drawn from the nobles, but he is free to disregard it.<sup>39</sup>

28. In principle the king was the state. Coins

<sup>36</sup> D. xvi 93, 8; P. 43, 2; *Demetrius* 42, 4; *Moralia* 178 AF; 179 A.

<sup>37</sup> See iii 26 f.; iv 14, 2, but also vi 27, 4 f.; vii 8, 3. Cf. App. XI 5. Polybius v 27 is instructive. QC. vi 11, 20 and viii 6, 28 are inconsistent with viii 8, 18 and not credible as an explanation of Parmenio's killing, especially as his brother, Asander, was allowed to survive (A. iv 7, 2).

<sup>38</sup> i 4, cf. xviii 235.

<sup>39</sup> i 25, 4 f.; ii 6, 1; 16, 8 and 18, 1; 25, 2; iii 9, 3 f.; v 25-8 etc.

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were issued in his name, not in that of the Macedonians.<sup>40</sup> Treaties were made by him and with him; it is not till the third century that we get documentary mention of the 'commonalty (*koinon*) of the Macedonians'; Arrian vii 9, 5 is anachronistic. He alone could bind his subjects by inter-state agreements. Thus the so-called League of Corinth (*infra*) could properly be described as 'Philip (or Alexander) and the Greeks'; this does not mean that the Macedonians stood outside the league: they were represented by their king.<sup>41</sup> However, other states would not be content with the royal oath to a treaty, if they had reason to think that he was not in full control of his people, and in the past they had sometimes extracted, or reserved the right to extract, confirmatory oaths from the king's son, or from Macedonian nobles, as well as from the king himself; even then the Macedonians as such do not appear.<sup>42</sup> Such arrangements were required when the king was weak, and until Philip's reign that had been common.

29. This weakness appears to have been partly due to the turbulence of the barons and disloyalty of the 'kings' of Upper Macedon; moreover, dissidents within the realm could always look for support to the enemies who beset it on every frontier. Probably the kings had sought to counteract the disloyalty of the greater nobles by appealing to other elements in the population. This hypothesis will explain some confusing technical terms that often recur in Arrian's history.

30. There the Macedonian cavalry, thousands strong, are commonly described as 'Companions'

<sup>40</sup> Head, *Hist. Nummorum* 218 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Tod 111; 177; 183; 191, 6; cf. § 38.

<sup>42</sup> *SEG* x 86; Tod 129; 158.

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(*hetairoi*).<sup>43</sup> But the same term is also used of a more limited class who attend Alexander's council, are banqueted by him or receive (in 324) Oriental brides from him; of these marriages there were only 92.<sup>44</sup> It seems probable that the term was first used in this narrower sense; the original 'Companions' will have been the royal *comitatus*, his entourage consisting chiefly of the principal nobles. Similarly in Homer, king Idomeneus calls himself the 'Companion' of his overlord, Agamemnon, and Patroclus and the Myrmidons are the 'Companions' of Achilles.<sup>45</sup> At some stage a king conferred this honorific title on all those who served him on horse, appealing to the 'knights' against the barons, but the old title continued to be used in a pregnant sense of individuals, whether or not they were actually accompanying the king, who belonged to the higher class; when Arrian says of a particular man that he was a 'Companion', he does not mean simply that he was a horseman; it is only in the plural that 'Companions' is used of the cavalry. Later on, but before Philip's reign, even the foot had been designated as 'foot-companions' (*pezetairoi*), presumably by a king who wished to broaden the basis of his power by relying

<sup>43</sup> Cf. i 14, 1; vii 6, 3 etc. Theopompus (Jacoby no. 115) F. 225, referring to 800 Companions in Philip's time, must have in mind an addition of so many Greeks to the cavalry force, brought about by new allotments of royal (conquered) land on condition of knight service; cf. n. 51; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 332. Some foreigners like Nearchus were admitted to the Companions in the narrower sense, cf. *Ind.* 17 with notes. F. Carrata-Thomes, *Il problema degli eteri nella monarchia di Alessandro Magno*, 1955, usefully assembles evidence.

<sup>44</sup> e.g. i 25, 4 f.; iv 8, 8; vii 4. 'Friends' is an untechnical synonym, i 25, 2 and 4.; usual in D.

<sup>45</sup> e.g. *Iliad* i 345; iv 266.

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more on the peasants able to serve in heavy armour.<sup>46</sup>

31. We can actually see this process at work in 324. The grandees of the Persian court were styled ' kinsmen ' by the Persian king, and Alexander adopted this usage. But to conciliate the mutinous Macedonians at Opis, he declared that henceforth they should all be his ' kinsmen '.<sup>47</sup>

32. The confusion of terminology goes further.<sup>48</sup> At times all the squadrons of the Macedonian ' companions ' are called ' royal ', but one of them, which fought by the side of the king himself, is also called royal *par excellence* (see § 58). Again, the élite regiments of foot, the hypaspists (§ 61), can be described as ' the bodyguards ', since it was they whom the king would choose out of the foot to accompany him on some special expedition. But the same term is also applied to a group, normally restricted in number to seven (vi 28, 4), of high-ranking officers, attached to the king's person, who lose this rank, if they are given permanent posts elsewhere. Again, it is plausible to suppose that at one time they were the only ' bodyguards ' and that there was only one ' royal ' squadron. It is curious that the seven bodyguards retained their title and that the hypaspists had acquired it, though by Alexander's time neither were actually charged with the ordinary protection of the king's person, which was committed to pages (§ 34).

33. Before Philip external pressures had helped to keep Macedon and its kings weak. The country

<sup>46</sup> iv 23, 1, cf. Demosthenes ii 17; Anaximenes (Jacoby no. 72) F. 4. See also n. 99.

<sup>47</sup> vii 11, 6 of. 11, 1; see QC. iii 3, 14 and 21.

<sup>48</sup> For what follows cf. Tarn ii 138-41.



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was always in danger of invasions from Illyrian tribes in the north and Thracians in the east. At his accession the coast was mainly in the hands of Greek cities, some organized in the federation of the Chalcidians with a centre at Olynthus, and others under Athenian control. Macedon's neighbours freely intervened in her internal affairs. Here Philip's achievement can only be summarized. Olynthus was destroyed and all the coastal cities brought within the kingdom. The south Thracian principalities were absorbed as far as the Hellespont and Bosphorus. In the north Philip failed to establish a secure frontier, and Alexander felt it indispensable to carry the terror of his arms to the Danube before embarking for Asia; in fact his expedition served to keep the peace there throughout the rest of his reign. Some of the northern tribes had actually been reduced to vassal-dom and, like the Thracians, contributed to Alexander's army. The creation of greater internal security seems to have promoted a population explosion, and the new territories incorporated in the kingdom further augmented Alexander's manpower.<sup>49</sup> In Mount Pangaeum Philip also discovered rich gold and silver mines which gave him abundant financial resources and provided funds for Alexander to launch his large and costly expedition.<sup>50</sup>

34. Early in his reign Philip had made his control of the Upper Macedonian principalities more effective. His other successes fortified his internal authority. Conquered land, for instance that of the Greek cities on the coast, became his property; by granting it in return for knight-service, he increased

<sup>49</sup> Griffith (n. 28) 129 ff.

<sup>50</sup> *ib.* 127 f.



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his patronage and the strength of his cavalry.<sup>51</sup> Members of 'royal' lines, presumably of Upper Macedon, are said now to come from towns in the plain, Leonnatus from Pella and Perdiccas from Amphipolis;<sup>52</sup> presumably they had moved down to estates granted them in places where they would be more under the king's eye. Even so their fidelity might be suspect, like that of the Lyncestian princes under Alexander (§ 46). Philip also arranged that the sons of notables should be attached to his person as pages (A. iv 13, 1), and some were sent out to Alexander in Asia (D. xvii 65, 1); whether or not they came to feel affection or awe for the king, at court they were hostages for the loyalty of their fathers. In general, the conquests of both Philip and Alexander offered the nobility opportunities to gratify their taste for warfare, plunder and glory. But only a strong ruler could keep them in order. Alexander began his reign with blood and terror, his relations with many of the notables remained uneasy, and after his death when the kingship was divided between his infant son and half-wit brother, his empire was disrupted by their rivalry, in which his former officers, who appear as lay figures in the pages of Arrian, overshadowed by Alexander, displayed great talent and inordinate ambition and rancour.

35. In fact the power of the king rested essentially on his own ability and personality, especially as he lived among his companions on terms of comradeship. They shared his table and drinking bouts, and Alexander would strip to play ball-games with them (Plut. 73). Long after his time Polybius (v 27, 6)

<sup>51</sup> e.g. at Amphipolis, *Ind.* 18, 4 and 10; Methone, D. xvi 34; Bottiaea, *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 332; Griffith 134 f.; cf. n. 43.

<sup>52</sup> QC. x 7, 8, cf. A. vi 28, 4; *Ind.* 18, 4.

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could write of the *isegoria*, the equal right to speak freely, that Macedonians had always enjoyed in addressing the king. Similarly Curtius says that though used to royal power the Macedonians 'lived in a greater shade of freedom' than others so placed; he alleges that such freedom was reduced after the murder of Clitus, which followed a scene vividly illustrating the old practice of equality.<sup>53</sup> It is clear that the Companions resented the pompous trappings of Oriental monarchy which Alexander began to adopt after he could claim to have succeeded Darius as king of kings. His attempt to introduce the Persian custom of *proscynesis* (Appendix XIV) foundered on their opposition, though to the end of his reign he persisted in Orientalizing measures that were designed to win the hearts of his leading Iranian subjects. They were abandoned after his death; we can only surmise whether he would have been strong enough to surmount the resentment among Macedonians of all ranks that this policy provoked. Certainly at the Hyphasis even he had had to yield to the common objection of both officers and men to advancing further into India (v 25-9). Despite the lack of constitutional limits on his authority, enhanced as it was by his unexampled successes, Alexander discovered there that the most self-willed autocrat may at times have no choice but to defer to the strength of public opinion.

### GREECE AND MACEDON<sup>54</sup>

36. Philip had also imposed his will on Greece. His predecessors had always had a natural desire to

<sup>53</sup> iv 7, 31 cf. vi 6, 2; viii 4, 30.

<sup>54</sup> I give no references for many statements documented in all standard works.

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dominate Thessaly, immediately to the south of their kingdom. In Philip's time the Thessalians were torn by internal feuds and had lost their traditional control of the shrine of Delphi to the Phocians. By a series of interventions Philip re-established peace within the country and restored in appearance the special position of the Thessalians at the shrine. In fact he himself was now its master, all the more because he was elected *tagos* or president of the Thessalian confederation. None the less most of the Thessalians seem to have been grateful for his services. Alexander succeeded him as *tagos*, and the Thessalian cavalry, the best in Greece, who were regularly stationed on his left wing in the great battles down to 331, were one of his most valuable units. Later in his reign discontent increased in Thessaly, and the Thessalians revolted in the Lamian war which broke out in Greece just after his death, but this does not concern us here.

37. By his action against the Phocians, who were allies of Athens, and still more by seizing places on the Macedonian seaboard which Athens had held or claimed, Philip had incurred the deep hostility of the most powerful maritime city in Greece. A peace patched up in 346 was regarded by Demosthenes and his friends, who gradually came to dominate Athenian counsels, as no more than a respite during which they could prepare a war of revenge. The intrigues and coups by which Philip tried to extend his influence in Greece, perhaps to counter that of Athens, strengthened the impression that his power menaced the liberties of all Greek cities, and enabled Athens to organize a strong coalition against him.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Brunt, *CQ* 1969, 245 ff., also on the particularism that determined the policy of all Greek cities.

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It was even joined by the Thebans, who had the best army in Greece (cf. i 9, 6); old enemies of Phocis and Athens and former allies of Philip, they had become aware that their previous dominance in central Greece had been undermined by Philip's successes. This coalition was decisively defeated at Chaeronea in 338. Under the settlement Philip imposed Athens' maritime league was dissolved, and Thebes was still more harshly treated; the Boeotian federation was freed from her control, the anti-Macedonian leaders killed or banished, and a Macedonian garrison installed in her citadel, the Cadmea (cf. i 7). Philip next settled affairs in the Peloponnese to the disadvantage of Sparta and in the interest of the cities there which were his friends, because they feared Spartan power. For the time being opposition was cowed, but Athens, Thebes and Sparta naturally resented the foreign hegemony, nor was discontent confined to them. As soon as Philip died there was a widespread movement of disaffection in Greece (§ 49); in 335 not only Athens but Elis, the Aetolians and some of the Arcadians almost came to the assistance of Thebes in her revolt (i 7, 4; 10, 1 f.), in 331 Sparta enjoyed the support of Elis and most of the Arcadians and Achaeans, while in 323 Athens was able to organize a still more formidable revolt in the Lamian war. Arrian occasionally indicates that Alexander himself was aware of such general discontent (i 7, 4; 18, 8; ii 26, 3) and of the need to terrorize the Greeks (i 29, 6), especially Athens and Sparta (ii 17). It is not disproved by flattering embassies the Greeks felt obliged to send in his honour (iii 5; vii 14; 23). Of course some Greeks were apprehensive of the ambitions of the great cities and looked for protection to Macedon (Polybius xviii 14); the bitter

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feelings that Thebes had provoked by prolonged oppression of her neighbours contributed to the harshness of her treatment in 335 (i 8, 8; 9, 6-9), and in 331 Antipater obtained indispensable aid against Sparta from her old enemies in the Peloponnese, Argos, Messene and the Arcadians who followed the lead of Megalopolis. It was fear of Sparta that made them loyal to Alexander (iii, 6, 3); once this had been allayed by Sparta's crushing defeat, even Argos and Messene were ready to rise against Macedon in 323. We may doubt if there was anywhere a party sincerely sympathetic to Macedon, as distinct from men who saw that the particular interests of their own cities, or sometimes their own private advantage, lay for the time in seeking Macedonian support.

38. However, in 337 Philip's power enabled him to dictate to the whole of the Greek mainland and many of the island cities, and to organize what moderns call the League of Corinth, since it was at Corinth that the Greeks met by plenipotentiaries and concluded a new 'common peace' (cf. ii 14, 6). This was the latest in a series of such treaties,<sup>56</sup> the first of which had been imposed on the Greek world by the combined will of the Persian king, Artaxerxes II, and Sparta in 387/6 and which was known either as the king's peace or the peace of Antalcidas, from the name of the Spartan diplomat concerned (cf. ii 1, 4; 2, 2). Under that peace, as under every 'common peace' that followed, including Philip's, all Greek cities, great and small, were declared free and autonomous; the fine phrase always veiled the truth that some were in practice to be in subjection;

<sup>56</sup> T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 1965.

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in 337 Thebes was not the only city actually under the 'protection' of a Macedonian garrison. In 387/6 indeed it had been expressly provided that the Greek cities in Asia were to be excepted from the rule and subject to Persia; this was certainly not re-affirmed in 337 (§ 39). In the past there had been no machinery to enforce the preservation of peace and the principle of autonomy: now all the member states were bound to take common action for these purposes (and also to suppress internal revolutions). Such common action was to be decided by a *synedrion*, consisting of plenipotentiaries sent by the members, in conjunction with the *hegemon*, that is to say, Philip himself (and his heirs after him).<sup>57</sup> Thus, though the members were officially termed 'the cities that shared in the peace', in effect a league was created, and its very first act was to proclaim a common war against Persia. Hence Arrian (iii 24, 4 f.) refers to the organization as a league (*koinon*) or alliance and to the members as 'allies' (i 9, 9; 24, 3; iii 19, 5). On Philip's death Alexander succeeded to his position as *hegemon* (§ 49, cf. ii 14, 4); though the Greeks evidently renewed their treaties with him, he already had a hereditary right to that position. All league decisions required the concurrence of the *hegemon* as well as that of a majority in the *synedrion*,<sup>58</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Tod 177 (with bibliography); the other chief texts are Ps-Demosthenes xvii (dated c. 330 BC), D. xvi 89, 3 (cf. xviii 56, which shows that the scheme was propounded in an edict or *diagramma* by Philip); J. ix 5; the relevance of *IG iv*<sup>2</sup> 1, 68 is conjectural. The articles by U. Wilcken, (1) *Sitzungsberichte München* 1917, 35 ff.; (2) *Berlin* 1922, 97 ff., (3) *ibid.* 1929, 291 ff.; 316 ff. are of fundamental importance. I pass over matters that are not directly related to understanding of Arrian. For decrees of the *synedrion* see iii 23, 8.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the hegemonic position of Sparta or Athens in the



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but in addition Philip seems to have been appointed 'general with full powers', i.e. given the right to act at his own discretion in the conduct of the war on behalf of the league, e.g. to accept new members, and Arrian's allusion to Alexander as '*hegemon* with full powers' (vii 9, 5), incorrectly amalgamating the two functions, suggests that he too, as we should expect, was formally given this same role, presumably in 336 (i 1, 2). All this explains Arrian's references to the peace and alliance concluded by the Greeks with the Macedonians, i.e. with their kings (iii 24, 5, cf. § 28), and to the treaties made with him or, more correctly, with him and the Greeks by two islands which acceded to the league (ii 1, 4; 2, 2). The Persian war was carried on by 'Alexander and the Greeks except Sparta' (i 16, 7); Sparta alone in mainland Greece stood outside the league on the pretext given in i 1, 2, but in reality because Macedonian power entrenched on her sovereignty and adversely affected her interests (§ 37). Philip or Alexander could easily have coerced her, but her manifest hostility may have actually suited them, binding to them other states in the Peloponnese. It can of course be seen that the league was an instrument of their dominance; this comes out in Arrian's statements that in 334 Alexander put Antipater in charge of the Greeks (i 11, 3, cf. ii 2, 4; iii 16, 10; Diodorus xviii 8, 4) and that in 324 Craterus as his successor was 'to direct the freedom (!) of the Greeks' (vii 12, 4). Both may have been formally designated by the

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leagues named 'the Lacedaemonians' (or 'Athenians') 'and their allies' (see G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 1972, 303 ff., 339 f.); 'Alexander and the Greeks' is a corresponding description. And see Tod 177, 20-2.

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*synedrion* too as persons ' appointed for the common protection ' (Ps-Demosthenes xvii 15).

39. The league had two possible pretexts for attacking Persia. One is given only by Diodorus (xvi 91, 2; xvii 24, 1): to free the Greeks in Asia from Persian rule. This objective was perhaps adopted by Alexander only after initial hesitation, when he ordered that the cities previously subject to Asia should be given autonomy and immunity from tribute and that they should be governed democratically (cf. i 18, 2). Immunity from tribute did not mean that they were not required to make a contribution (*syntaxis*) to war costs, which was probably obligatory on all league cities; though there is no testimony that the Asian cities were admitted to the league, it is reasonable to assume that they were. However, as Alexander came into possession of the Persian hoards of precious metal (App. X 3), he ceased to need Greek contributions, and we happen to hear of his remitting that previously demanded from Priene; in the end at least the Greek cities gained financially from the abolition of the tribute permanently exacted by Persia. As autonomous, the Asian cities were theoretically to be free from interference by Alexander as king or his satraps: in practice, they were no more exempt from Macedonian control than those of old Greece. Indeed, the establishment of democracies in 334 was in itself an interference in their internal affairs. Its motive cannot have been that Alexander intrinsically preferred democracy (cf. v 2, 3); elsewhere he even backed tyrants, but in Asia the oligarchs had favoured the cause of the Persian king, who had upheld their local authority. No doubt, however, the overthrow of those oligarchs was of great benefit to

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the Asian Greeks, and the gratitude they felt for liberation was still commemorated by cults centuries later.<sup>59</sup>

40. The other pretext for the league's war with Persia was retribution for the Persian invasion of Greece in 480–479.<sup>60</sup> Officially it was in fulfilment of this war aim that Alexander set Persepolis on fire and destroyed its temples (iii 18, 12). The war was now over for the league, and their contingents, even the valued Thessalians, were disbanded soon afterwards (iii 19, 6). Athens had suffered more than any other city from the Persian invasion (iii 18, 12), and though well aware of her hostility, Alexander sought to give colour to the Panhellenism of his enterprise by dedicating trophies at Athens after the Granicus (i 16, 7) and restoring the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton which Xerxes had removed to Susa (iii 16, 7). He claimed to be fighting for Greece (i 29, 5) and could punish as traitors Greeks who served Darius (cf. also i 16, 6); indeed he treated any Greek cities, whether or not members of the league, which showed sympathy for Persia, as in principle liable to penalties, though he could also pardon both communities and individuals on the ground that they had acted under *force majeure*, or simply because it was in his own interest to show clemency.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> E. Badian, *Ancient Society and Institutions, Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg* 1966, 37 ff. cites and supersedes previous discussions. *Syntaxis*: Tod 185 (c. 332 BC), cf. A. i 26, 3 (Aspendus counted as Greek, n. 61). *Cults*: C. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum u. griechische Städte* 17 ff.

<sup>60</sup> A. ii 14; D. xvi 89; Polybius quoted in § 42.

<sup>61</sup> See i 16, 6 f.; 17, 2; 19, 6 (cf. 24, 4); 22, 7 and 23, 4 (Halicarnassus was Greek, *pace* Tarn ii 218, cf. Herodotus ii 178, vii 99); 26, 3 and 27, 4 on Aspendus (reputed an Argive colony, Strabo xiv 4, 2); ii 5, 5 and 8 and 12, 2 (Soli, said to have been founded by Achaeans and Rhodians, Strabo xiv

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41. Isocrates had long been urging the Greeks to combine in a war of conquest against Persia, and had latterly incited Philip to lead the enterprise. But Isocrates evinced little concern for the 'enslavement' of the Asian Greeks or desire to revenge the atrocities of the Persians in 480-479.<sup>62</sup> In his conception a Panhellenic crusade would promote peace at home and provide the Greeks with new lands on which to settle their surplus population; Philip was to be content with the glory of benefiting the Greeks by victories over the barbarians.<sup>63</sup> If we can believe the 'vulgate', Callisthenes may well have shared this naïve idea, for we are told that he reminded Alexander of his original purpose, to annex 'Asia' to Greece (iv 11, 7).<sup>64</sup> It is quite unlikely that either Philip or Alexander ever entertained such a purpose. They could allege Macedonian *casus belli*: in the fifth century the Persians had invaded Macedon

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5, 8); 5, 9 ('Argive' Mallus); 20, 3 (Cyprus); iii 24, 4 (Sinope); 23, 8 and 24, 5 (mercenaries). Note also release of Athenian captives, iii 6, 2, contrast i 29, 5 f.; he now felt conciliation of Athens to be most prudent.

<sup>62</sup> He alludes to these themes only in iv 155; 181; 183; 185; v 124-6 (?); xii 103; *ep.* ix 8.

<sup>63</sup> iv 131-3; 174; 182; 187; v (addressed to Philip) 9; 84 f.; 107 f.; 112; 120-2; 129-45.

<sup>64</sup> 'Asia' means the Persian empire in Isocrates v 66; 76 and often; cf. A. ii 7, 6; 12, 5; 14, 8 f.; iii 9, 6; 18, 11; 25, 3, and presumably ii 3, 6; iv 4, 3. But in iv 15, 5 f.; v 4, 4; v 26 (three times) it includes India, cf. *Ind.* 2, 2; 3, 6, even (most clearly in v 26) beyond the utmost conceivable confines of the Persian empire; indeed the Indus was sometimes regarded as the boundary between 'India' and that empire, cf. App. XV. Al's claim to rule all Asia thus came to be a claim to rule more than the Persian empire, though when he had failed to conquer all India (v 25 ff.), he could revert to the other sense of 'Asia' in his boast that he had traversed all Asia and was in possession of it (Nearchus *ap.* *Ind.* 35, 8). Cf. n. 76.

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as well as Greece, and in 340 they had helped Perinthus to repel Philip's attack; Alexander even had the impudence to add that Darius had been guilty of hostile acts against him—after Philip had already invaded Asia (ii 14, 4 f.).<sup>65</sup> But all these were surely pretexts. Conquest must have been the real purpose. Immediately after the Granicus Alexander began to organize provinces and collect taxes (i 17, 1-8); he continued to do so, as he advanced. In his letter to Darius he already claimed to be 'king of Asia' (ii 14, 7), and to make good this Macedonian or personal objective, he carried on the war after dismissing the league troops; indeed 'Asia' came to mean more than the Persian empire as it was in 336, or had ever been (cf. n. 64). The Greeks benefited in that his requirements for mercenaries gave many of them opportunity of employment, and that he founded cities where they were settled, but these benefits were incidental to the aggrandizement and protection of his own dominions.<sup>66</sup>

42. Arrian altogether fails to make Alexander's aims clear: in fact he does not discuss them. He seems to assume that the war needs no explanation. Even the *casus belli* are mentioned quite late in his narrative (ii 14), and he gives no hint that they are to be considered mere pretexts, and that some of them were simply absurd. Contrast the observation of Polybius (iii 6) that the real cause of the war lay in

<sup>65</sup> For the intervention at Perinthus perhaps authorized only by the local satrap cf. Ps-Demosthenes (Anaximenes) xi 5 f.; D. xvi 75. The date and even the historicity of the alliance between Philip and Persia it breached are disputed.

<sup>66</sup> Greek mercenaries proved to be unwilling settlers in Bactria and tried to make their way home in defiance of Al., cf. D. xvii 99, 5 f.; xviii 4, 8; 7, 1 ff.; QC. ix 7; to this there is a mere allusion in A. v 27, 5 (speech).

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Philip's conviction that the Persian empire was weak, that an attack on it would bring him handsome rewards and win popularity in the Greek world and that he seized on the pretext of avenging Persian 'lawlessness' in 480.

43. Even Polybius was mistaken (like many moderns) if he thought that the war did reconcile the Greeks to Macedonian hegemony. Panhellenism derived its true force from the sense that all Greeks had certain characteristics in common which distinguished them from barbarians (Herodotus viii 144). But not the least of these characteristics was attachment to a free, independent city state. The political unity of the Greek 'nation' would involve the sacrifice of an element essential to Greekness. This was one of the rocks on which the attempts had foundered which Greek cities, Athens and Sparta, had made to create larger political units. But the Macedonians were not even Greek: they were as barbarian in Greek eyes as the Persians. In Philip's lifetime it had still been possible to style the Persian king 'the common enemy of the Greeks' (Demosthenes xiv 3), but such conventional language, for a century past, had not prevented Greek cities seeking aid from him, and now it was evident that the true threat to Greek liberty came from Macedon. It was in the name of liberty that Athens, Thebes and Sparta all contended with the Macedonians and they felt no shame in accepting and avowing Persian aid.<sup>67</sup> Arrian himself mentions the Theban appeal to 'freedom and liberty of speech, time-honoured and fine-sounding words' (i 7, 2); there is a nuance of contempt. He does not wholly conceal the extent of

<sup>67</sup> Demosthenes x 31 ff.; D. 9, 5; 62, 1-3.

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discontent in Greece, though he almost ignores the anti-Macedonian movement immediately after Philip's death (§ 49), merely alludes to Agis' revolt (Appendix VI) and has nothing on the actions of Alexander in 324 which provoked the Lamian war. But he is clearly unsympathetic to it. The ideal of the independent *polis* was remote to this Hellenized and Romanized Bithynian, and he could hardly have grasped that to contemporaries the Macedonians were not Greeks and Alexander not at all the 'national' hero that he might seem later. In the context of his general admiration for Alexander and uncritical reporting of his claim to be fighting for Greece, the reader is surely meant to feel that revolts and 'medism' were as treasonable as Alexander pretended. He cannot avoid describing the atrocious treatment of Thebes, but he conveys the impression (i 9, 6 ff.) that it was just retribution for her own misdeeds and that in any event Alexander was not primarily responsible.<sup>68</sup> He makes us feel that towards Athens Alexander was remarkably forbearing, failing (again like many modern scholars) to make it clear that it would have been an odd prelude to a war of retribution on Persia, if Alexander had shown severity to Persia's chief victim in 480, and, more important, that Athens was strongly fortified, that all experience before the capture of Tyre suggested that such a city could not be taken by assault, that her ships commanded the seas and could bring in supplies, and that in the event of a long siege Persian intervention east of the Aegean and further revolts in Greece were to be apprehended.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Contrast D. 9, 4.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Polybius' mistaken view that Philip's humanity to Athens won the Athenians over (v 10). The honours paid to



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44. It was not only the revolts that manifested Greek sentiments. The soldiers the league contributed to Alexander's army were neither numerous (§ 56) nor, except for the Thessalians who stood in a special relation to their *tagos* (§ 36), important. The army did indeed include a steadily growing proportion of Greek mercenaries, but they were individuals serving Alexander for pay, as their compeers served Darius.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, his fleet in 334 was Greek (i 18, 4 n.), and it was inadequate: 160 ships, when Athens alone had 400 in her dockyards<sup>71</sup> and could have given Alexander something

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Philip, and to Al. in 336 B.C. (A i. 1, 3, cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* iii \* 32 and 97), and to other Macedonians (Tod 180 f.), like the embassy sent in 331 (iii 6, 2), are not evidence of their true feelings. Demosthenes and his friends (i 10, 4) remained the most influential politicians at Athens, though the pro-Macedonian, Demades (i 10, 3), was useful in conducting negotiations with Macedon. The acquittal of Ctesiphon in 330 B.C. was a vindication of the past policy Demosthenes defended in his speech *On the Crown*. In 336, 335 and 331 B.C. he all but took Athens over the brink into war with Macedon; probably it was his reluctance to do so in 324 that led to his banishment at the instance of extremists. A. notes Athenian discontent in i 1, 3; 7, 4; 10, 2 ff.; 29, 5 f.; ii 17, 2; iv 10, 3 ('vulgate'), and communications with Persia in ii 15, 2; iii 24, 4 (though he ignores Demosthenes' intrigues with Persia D. 4, 7 ff.; 5, 1), and shows how Al. tried to keep Athens loyal by pressure (i 29, 5 f.) or kindness (iii 6, 12; 16, 7), cf. n. 61; in i 10, 6 he does perhaps hint at the considerations which surely determined the policy of Al. (and Philip). Cf also F. Mitchel, *Greece and Rome*, 1965, 189 ff.

<sup>70</sup> Numbers: § 56 f.; App. XIII; in addition on the Hydaspes Al. was joined by over 37,000 foot and 6,000 horse, D. 95, 4; QC. ix 3, 21.

<sup>71</sup> *IG* ii \* 1627b 266 ff.; 1628, 22 ff.; 1629 d 783 ff. She could not man and equip them all, but put 170 to sea in 322 (D. xviii 15, 8), after sustaining losses; in 323 it had been decided to equip 240 (ib. 10, 2).



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approaching naval parity with the Persians. He dismissed it, keeping 20 Athenian ships, presumably as hostages. Naval inferiority distorted his strategy. For fear that the Persian navy even after Issus might stir up a great revolt in Greece and strike at his home base in Macedon, he adopted the plan of capturing the Persian naval bases and thereby bringing about the disintegration of the enemy fleet; hence, instead of pursuing Darius with his usual speed and audacity, marching at once into Mesopotamia and depriving him of the chance to mobilize new forces and fight again in conditions much less favourable to the Macedonians, he had to spend a year in the conquest of Phoenicia. Arrian explains this strategy plainly enough (ii 16, 8 n.), without drawing out its unfortunate consequences. It may be added that in 331 Alexander relied on the old Persian navy to repress his own 'allies' in Greece (iii, 6, 3), and that in 322 the Phoenicians played a decisive part in the Macedonian sea victory at Amorgos, in which the Athenian navy was finally destroyed and Salamis at last avenged.

### PHILIP'S LAST YEAR AND ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION

45. By beginning his history with Alexander's accession and passing over his first actions in a few sentences (i 1, 1-3), Arrian denies his readers knowledge of events which are highly relevant to his chosen subject and to which he later makes a few, dark allusions. Having failed to show how Philip had built up the power that made Alexander's conquests possible, or to explain the genesis of the war with

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Persia, he also almost conceals the initial operations of the war (Diod. xvi 91; xvii 7). In 336 Philip despatched a force of about 10,000 men (§ 56) to Asia under Parmenio and Attalus. At first they gained considerable successes; hence a party favourable to Philip gained power in his lifetime at Ephesus, only to be overmastered later by pro-Persian oligarchs (i 17, 10–12), once a Persian counter-offensive had been launched in 335 by the Greek condottiere, Memnon of Rhodes (cf. i 12, 9). But though Memnon defeated Calas, the general who had taken command of the Macedonian forces after Attalus had been murdered (§ 48) and Parmenio withdrawn, an essential bridgehead at Abydus (i 11, 6) remained in the hands of the troops Philip had sent to Asia, and they were to augment the expeditionary army which crossed there under Alexander himself in 334 (§ 56).

46. Philip had of course intended to take command himself, but delayed his own departure until after the wedding of his daughter, Cleopatra, in the late summer of 336.<sup>72</sup> At the wedding he was struck down by Pausanias, one of his Bodyguards (§ 32). At the instance of Antipater, one of Philip's leading advisers, his eighteen-year-old son, Alexander, was at once proclaimed king. Antipater's reward was to be left in charge of Macedon during the absences of Alexander in 335 and 334–323. Diodorus (xvi 93 f.) recounts in some detail that Pausanias acted from a

<sup>72</sup> For § 46–48 see D. xvi 91–5; xvii 2, 1; P. 9 f.; J. ix 6 f.; xi 2 and other scattered evidence, discussed by E. Badian, *Phoenix* xvii 244 ff. Cf. also J. R. Hamilton, *GR* 117 ff.; A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 1971, 93 ff. K. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander* 1971, ch. 1 rejects complicity of Alexander or Olympias.

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personal grudge of his own, and this was the view expressed by our only contemporary source, Aristotle (*Politics* 1311 b 1), who thus gave the lie to the official version, that he was merely a tool of others. Alexander lost no time in executing as his instigators two brothers, perhaps of the old Lyncestian royal house (§ 24; 34); their guilt is assumed in i 25, where we read of the alleged treason of the third brother, Alexander, the son-in-law of Antipater, who had saved himself for the time by promptly doing homage to the new king, and had been promoted to be governor of Thrace and then to high commands in Alexander's army, only to perish later (App. XI 5). At some time before his Balkan campaign (i 5, 4 n.), Alexander also put out of the way his cousin, Amyntas who, as son of Philip's elder brother, Perdiccas II, could have been held to have the better title to the throne, and whose friend, Amyntas, son of Antiochus, fled to take service with the Persians.<sup>73</sup> Alexander was also to claim in 332 that the Persian king had instigated Philip's assassination; this has no credibility.

47. Aristotle was not alone in rejecting the official account. Others actually imputed guilt to Alexander himself or at least to his mother, Olympias. A motive can be assigned. Philip had had many wives or concubines besides Olympias (Athenaeus 557 b-e), but until 337 she was his queen, and Alexander the heir presumptive; indeed his only other son, Philip Arrhidaeus, who was ultimately to succeed Alexander *faute de mieux*, was a half-wit. But in that year he took a new wife, Cleopatra, called Eurydice in iii 6, 5, the niece of Attalus (§ 45); she came from the

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Tod 164, to be dated to 337.

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Macedonian nobility, whereas Olympias was sister of Alexander, king of Epirus, and any son she might bear to Philip might have a better chance of succeeding him; since Philip was only forty-six himself, he could easily have lived long enough for such a son to reach man's estate. At the wedding banquet Attalus expressed the hope that Philip might now have a legitimate heir; Alexander resented this, and after a brawl, he and Olympias fled to Epirus (Plut. 9, 4 f.). Although he soon returned, on one view the rift had not been healed; either before or after his return his most intimate friends, including Ptolemy, were banished (iii 6, 4 f., cf. Plut. 10, 3), and his prospects of the succession may have seemed precarious. Some scholars suppose that by marrying his daughter by Olympias to her uncle, king Alexander of Epirus, Philip intended to weaken the support that her mother and brother could otherwise have expected in that quarter: this conjecture need not be correct.

48. There is no confirmation of this sinister hypothesis. It is not to be found in the fact that Alexander procured the assassination of Attalus, with the complicity of Attalus' own father-in-law, Parmenio, or that Cleopatra-Eurydice with her newborn child, perhaps a boy, Caranus, rather than a daughter (though this is not the generally accepted view), were also put out of the way. Like the removal of the Lyncestian brothers and of the prince Amyntas, these actions merely show how insecure Alexander felt, and how little scruple he had in eliminating potential rivals or enemies. The violence of Olympias is notorious. Perhaps neither would have hesitated to kill a father or husband to preserve their own position. Naturally Arrian's partial sources

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would not have hinted at Alexander's guilt. It can also be argued that it was not safe for Aristotle to suggest their complicity. Yet he had no need to allude to the affair at all, and his rejection of the official version demonstrates his independence; I doubt if he believed, or had heard, the allegations. Moreover, it is far from clear that Philip intended to put Alexander out of the succession on the eve of a momentous foreign expedition, or that Alexander would have imputed to him such a design. As the discarded wife, Olympias had reason for vengeance, but the stories purveyed by Justin that she avowed her approval of Pausanias' deed are hardly credible; that could only have cast doubt on the official account and endangered her position and Alexander's. At most we must pronounce the charges against both 'not proven'.

49. The past history of Macedon gave her enemies in Greece good hope that her power would vanish with Philip's death; anarchy might ensue, or the new king lack ability. Alexander was young and unknown; Demosthenes spoke of him with contempt (Aeschines iii 77; 160). News of the murder set off an anti-Macedonian movement in Aetolia, Ambracia, Thebes, Athens (where Demosthenes was in receipt of Persian subsidies) and in the Peloponnese. Late in 336 Alexander marched south and successively obtained recognition as *hegemon* of the league in Thessaly, in central Greece and from the *synedrion* at Corinth.<sup>74</sup> In conformity with his general tendency to minimize anti-Macedonian feeling in Greece, A. deals briefly with this expedition (i 1, 1-3), men-

<sup>74</sup> D. 3 f. (correctly analysed by Wilcken (3) in n. 57); A. i 1, 2 f. refers (by implication) to discontent only at Athens and to A's recognition only by the Peloponnesians.

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tioning only the hostility of Sparta and Athens. The events of the next year show that in fact Alexander had not yet established his authority in Greece. For that purpose he resorted to deliberate terrorism by destroying Thebes; characteristically, A. suggests that this decision was taken by his Greek allies (i 9, 9); some of them were undoubtedly full of bitterness against Thebes, but the destruction of the city naturally required Alexander's approval. And yet opposition still continued, and broke out into the revolts led by Agis of Sparta in 331 (App. VI) and by Athens in 323, soon after Alexander's death. Until Gaugamela there appeared to be some chance of a Persian victory, and as throughout his reign Alexander was in constant danger of sudden death and had no heir, Greeks could continue to hope that, if he were removed, Macedonian dominance would be dissolved in civil wars. Such wars were in fact to tear his empire in pieces, but they began just too late to assist Athens and her friends in 323-322.

## THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

50. Although Alexander was bent on conquest from the start, we have no evidence that he hoped to subdue 'Asia' (n. 64) before the incident at Gordium (ii 3), and it was at Tyre that he first formally claimed to be ruler of all Asia (ii 14). Isocrates (v 120) had envisaged that Philip might be content with Asia Minor west of a line drawn from Sinope to Cilicia, and Parmenio is said to have advised Alexander in 332 to accept Darius' offer to cede all territory west of Euphrates (ii 25). The vast extent of the Persian empire might well have made



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any more ambitious plan seem quite chimerical. Yet Cyrus, the founder of that empire, had had a power-base no greater than Alexander's, as Alexander presumably knew. The sources magnify his success, remarkable as it was on any reckoning, by inflating the numbers of the Persian armies he defeated. In reality, the Persian empire was weak when he attacked it, and its weakness was not only known in the Greek world but exaggerated, for instance by Isocrates.<sup>75</sup>

51. At all times it was a loosely knit structure with no ethnical, linguistic or religious ties to unite it. It was based solely on conquest, on the 'right of the stronger'. The Achaemenid kings ruled absolutely by grace of their great god, Ahura-Mazda, but they had not developed any elaborate bureaucratic or military system to support their power. Large provinces were entrusted to governors or 'satraps', who were generally chosen from the Persian nobility, occasionally from the barons of the other Iranian peoples (Medes, Bactrians etc), and very rarely, as in Caria (cf. i 22), from local dynasts; the authority bestowed on Memnon, a Greek (i 20, 3), was exceptional. These satraps, in the fourth century at least, exercised complete military, financial and administrative control in their provinces; those on the Anatolian seaboard, of whom we know most from their relations with the Greeks, sometimes conducted a foreign policy of their own, and in conflict with each other. There was no large standing army, and military or naval forces were raised as they were required. Thus in 334 the Persian fleet, largely supplied by the cities of Phoenicia and Cyprus, was mobilized

<sup>75</sup> e.g. iv 135; 140-9; 182; v 95-104; xii 14.



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too late to interfere with Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont, while the powerful cavalry forces of east Iran were not available to Darius before the campaign of 331 (iii 8, 2 n.). The subject peoples were obliged to contribute not only men and (where appropriate) ships for the king's service but to pay heavy tribute, a large part of which accumulated in the royal coffers to be seized by Alexander. In the west they were certainly left to manage their local affairs under a variety of institutions that the king approved. Thus the Greek cities in Asia were administered by oligarchies, the Phoenicians and Cypriotes by kings, and the Jews by a priestly hierarchy. Like the Roman emperors, the Persian kings preserved the peace, though less successfully, since revolts were frequent, but they did not, like the Romans, win the hearts of their subjects (outside Iran) by giving their leading men an increasing share in the imperial government.

52. Numerous revolts occurred in the fourth century; so far as they are known, they were of two kinds. First, satraps themselves from time to time threw off their allegiance. Second, some of the subjects sought independence. Egypt was actually free of Persian domination from 405 to 343/2, and repelled three great invasions; there was further trouble even after the reconquest, and Alexander was welcomed by the native population (iii 1, 2 n.). Even at Babylon the destruction by Xerxes of the nation's temples after a revolt in 482 had not been forgiven (iii 16, 4). In Phoenicia and Cyprus there had been formidable revolts as late as the 340s, and Sidon had been atrociously punished. Indeed it was only late in this decade that the Rhodian condottiere, Mentor, the elder brother of Darius'

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general, Memnon, restored Persian authority on the west coast of Asia Minor. Little is known of conditions further east, but before Alexander the Achaemenids had lost control of the lower Indus valley (App. XV 1).

53. Alexander could thus suppose that in the task of defeating the king's forces he would not be hampered by the hostility of the peoples whose lands he traversed but might well receive their active assistance. In fact none of Darius' subjects actually revolted, while the satraps and Iranian nobility, who had displayed such turbulence in the recent past, remained faithful to him, until his cause was lost. Individual governors or commanders of course surrendered, as at Sardis (i 17, 3) and in Egypt (iii, 1, 2), when they had no chance of resisting, but it was only after Gaugamela that Alexander could venture on the systematic policy of employing such men in his own service; if we ignore the despatch of a satrap with an Iranian name to Cappadocia (ii 4, 2 n.), the first case is the re-appointment of Mazaeus at Babylon (iii 16, 4). Darius, it is true, was ultimately murdered by Bessus and other Iranian nobles, but their aim was pretty clearly to continue the war under more effective leadership. Alexander had now begun to pose as the legitimate successor of the Achaemenids<sup>76</sup> and to seek to win for himself the courageous and faithful service that most of the old ruling class had rendered to Darius and that he had evidently come to admire.

54. On the other hand, until 329–327 Alexander

<sup>76</sup> P. 34 says that he was formally proclaimed king of Asia (cf. n. 64) after Gaugamela. Cf. iii 22, 4; 30, 4; iv 7, 3; vi 29, 4–30, 1; App. XIV 1 f. and 8 f.

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seldom met with determined resistance from the local population; for the most part, they were evidently indifferent to a change of masters, even if they did not positively welcome it, as in Egypt. This was a factor of the utmost importance in his success. For instance, a small number of men could have held the Cilician Gates against him, and in the absence of regular Persian forces, the satrap might have employed Cilicians, if they could have been relied on. Any attempt by Persian generals to impede his advance by a 'scorched earth' strategy was surely doomed to fail, especially in view of Alexander's strength in cavalry, unless they had had enough soldiers to carry it out without local co-operation; the peasants had no such love of Persian rule as to destroy their own food supplies.<sup>77</sup> For his part Alexander was bound to live off the country (we cannot imagine trains of supplies hauled hundreds of miles from Europe), and seems to have found no difficulty in obtaining what he needed. Of course it is no evidence of loyalty to Persia that some mountain peoples, who are known or can be assumed to have been recalcitrant to every imperial power, including the Persian, refused submission to him.<sup>78</sup> Elsewhere local resistance is very uncommon, that of Tyre and Gaza being the most remarkable, and can be explained only conjecturally, if at all. It is most surprising that there was little in Persia itself or generally in west Iran. It was not till he entered

<sup>77</sup> Cf. i 12, 9; iii 7, 1 n. Darius and Bessus proposed this strategy with more reason to expect success in east Iran, iii 19, 1; 28, 8.

<sup>78</sup> e.g. in south Anatolia, i 24 ff.; Antilebanon, ii 20, 4; Uxii, iii 17; Cossaei, vii 15. The Uxian *hillmen* had not owed allegiance to Persia, iii 17, 1; this is probably typical.

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Sogdiana (Russian Turkestan) that Alexander encountered something like national opposition and then he had to spend two years carrying fire and sword through the country. Obviously his advance would have been delayed indefinitely if the other subjects of Persia had fought as stubbornly. Even here the resistance was probably so obdurate because the necessary leaders were found, as they were not in western Iran.

55. Earlier fighting between Greeks and Persians had demonstrated that heavily armed Greek hoplites could beat the bowmen who on horse and foot formed the main strength of Persian armies; at any rate this was true in narrow plains and valleys.<sup>79</sup> In the fourth century the Persian kings and satraps had themselves come to rely heavily on Greek mercenary foot,<sup>80</sup> who still provided their infantry, or the best part of it, at the Granicus and Issus. Isocrates was doubtless not the only Greek to infer that the Persian empire was easy prey.<sup>81</sup> In reality, the Greek cities had no cavalry to equal the Persian and could never have exploited any victories won in conditions that favoured hoplites; to pursue the defeated enemy and destroy his forces once for all, or to command wide plains where they could have been encircled and shot down, was beyond their power. Philip and Alexander, however, had at their disposal a cavalry force that proved superior to the Persian, and it was

<sup>79</sup> W. W. How, *JHS* 1923, 117 ff.

<sup>80</sup> H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 1933, chs XI and XVI; Isocrates iv 135.

<sup>81</sup> See n. 75 and A. ii 7, 8 f.; in fact the Persian cavalry made no all-out effort to destroy the Ten Thousand and were able to prevent Agesilaus of Sparta exploiting his successes in Asia Minor (396–395 B.C.).

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this fact that made the plan of conquest feasible from the start (cf. § 64).

### ALEXANDER'S ARMY<sup>82</sup>

56. Arrian (i 11, 3) says that Alexander marched to the Hellespont in 334 with not many more than 30,000 foot and over 5,000 horse. Contemporary historians gave the following figures,<sup>83</sup> rounded up or down; it is evident that Arrian adopted Ptolemy's.

	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Cavalry</i>
Callisthenes	40,000	4,500
Ptolemy	30,000	5,000
Aristobulus	30,000	4,000
Anaximenes	43,000	5,500

Although Arrian frequently refers to individual units, for instance when he describes the deployment of the army in the great battles, he nowhere gives any particulars of the strength of those units, and the details that he does furnish on such occasions are in consequence almost meaningless, or would be if we lacked any information to supplement his data. It is hardly credible that his authorities, particularly Ptolemy, who were so careful to state with what units Alexander carried out this or that operation, had never given a breakdown of the army with the strength of the different units. Such a breakdown is found in summary form in Diodorus xvii 17.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Brunt, *JHS* 1963, 27 ff. (here somewhat modified).

<sup>83</sup> For all these figures see Polybius xii 19, 1; Plutarch 327 D-E.

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### *Infantry*

Macedonians	12,000
[Greek] allies	7,000
[Greek] mercenaries	5,000
Odrysians, Triballians, Illyrians [Balkan troops]	7,000
Agrianians [javelin-men] and archers	1,000
Total	32,000

### *Cavalry*

Macedonians [i.e. Companion cavalry]	1,800
Thessalians [allies]	1,800
Other Greeks [allies]	600
Thracians, <i>prodromoi</i> and Paeonians <sup>84</sup>	900
Total (given by Diodorus as 4,500)	5,100

'Macedonians' evidently refers only to the phalanx regiments, hypaspists and Companions, and not to archers (some of whom were Macedonian) nor to *prodromoi*, of whose five squadrons four were Macedonian (§ 58; 64). There is no reason to distrust the figures, especially as the totals agree with Ptolemy's. It remains, however, to account for the discrepancies in the totals given by contemporary writers. Now according to Polyænus (v 44, 4) the advance force Philip had sent to Asia numbered 10,000, no doubt a round figure. There is no evidence or likelihood that these troops had been withdrawn: they were needed to hold the bridgehead in Asia. The advance force may well have consisted mainly of mercenaries, and in 334 Alexander demonstrably had more mercenary foot than Diodorus allows

<sup>84</sup> The text is corrupt; R. D. Milns' Ἰσθμῶν δὲ <καὶ> πρόδρομοι καὶ Παιῶνες gives the right sense (*JHS* 1966, 167 f.). The *prodromoi* are also called lancers (*sarissophoroi*), cf. i 14, 1 and 6; iii 12, 3 with *QC.* iv 15, 13; § 64 below.



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(Arrian i 18, 1 and 5), and mercenary cavalry (i 23, 6), of whom he makes no mention. Anaximenes' total for foot, 11,000 more than that given by Diodorus and probably by Ptolemy (*ap.* i 11, 3), is plausible if the strength of this force is counted in; Callisthenes' figure is no doubt rounded down. (Both Callisthenes as reported by Polybius and Diodorus must be inaccurate in that the former purports to give the numbers before the crossing and the latter those after it.) On the other hand, Anaximenes' total for cavalry is only 400 greater than that given by Diodorus and (probably) Ptolemy, yet it seems improbable that Alexander took over no more than 400 additional horse from the advance force. As the Persians' main strength lay in cavalry, and as Philip had plenty of cavalry at his disposal, it is quite unlikely that he sent only 400 horse to Asia; 1,000 would make a better proportion. Now it may be significant that in giving his own total of the cavalry Diodorus left out 600 men, probably omitting a contingent which joined late, after a muster to which his total really relates. I conjecture that Anaximenes too made the same error, assumed that Alexander brought across only 4,500 horse, not 5,100, added 1,000 and obtained his total of 5,500, which should have been 6,100. Callisthenes and Aristobulus (the latter rounding down) likewise gave the number of those who crossed with Alexander, omitting the same contingent. It may be added that Anaximenes, when counting in the troops already in Asia before 334, probably made no allowance for losses. On this hypothesis the nominal strength of the army, once Alexander had crossed, was 43,000 foot and 6,100 horse, and its real strength somewhat less. Certainty is unattainable.



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57. Before Issus Arrian records the arrival as reinforcements of only 3,000 Macedonian foot, 300 Macedonian horse and 350 Greek horse (i 29, 4). Callisthenes' total of 5,000 foot and 800 horse 'from Macedon' (Polybius xii 19, 2) may include mercenaries, even the 300 Alexander took into his service at Miletus (i 19, 6), if he has been inaccurately reported.<sup>85</sup> At Gaugamela Alexander is credited with about 40,000 foot and 7,000 horse (iii 12, 5). In the interim he had been joined by 7,400 more mercenary foot (ii 20, 5; iii 5, 1; QC. iv 5, 18) and 500 Thracian horse (iii 5, 1). However, no single source records all reinforcements, and we cannot even assume that all are mentioned somewhere. Similarly our authorities minimize losses in battle and say almost nothing of losses by sickness, which modern scholars too tend to ignore, though they must have carried off far more men than fighting (cf. v 27, 5 f.); they also give only incomplete data about the size of garrisons. By the time of Gaugamela the total number of men who had ever been in the army, so far as recorded, was as follows:

Infantry: 43,000 + 12,400	55,400
Cavalry: 6,100 (5,500) + 1,300	7,400 (6,800)

It is not wholly implausible that the cavalry had suffered lower proportionate casualties than the foot, and that as they were the principal striking arm, few had been left in garrisons; only on these assumptions can we account for their reputed strength in 331. However, unrecorded reinforcements seem to me likely. For numbers after Gaugamela see Appendix XIII.

<sup>85</sup> R. D. Milns, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 1966, 159 ff. (against Brunt, op. cit.).

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58. At that battle the Companions formed 8 *ilai* or squadrons (iii 11, 8), of which one was the 'royal squadron', the 'King's Own Horse Guards' (iii 1, 4, etc.). Plutarch's 13 squadrons at the Granicus (16, 2) must include 5 squadrons of *prodromoi*, one Paeonian (cf. i 14, 6; iv 4, 6). Each squadron of Companions should have been on average 225 strong until the arrival of 500 more men in winter 331/0, when Alexander divided each squadron into two *lochoi* or companies (iii 6, 10; QC. v 1, 39 ff.). The whole force was under Philotas, Parmenio's son (iii 11, 8, etc.), till his execution late in 330, when Alexander divided the command between two hipparchs (commanders of cavalry), Hephæstion and 'Black' Clitus, thinking it imprudent to entrust the whole force to one man (iii 27, 4). After Clitus' murder he went further in the same direction; from late 327 we find at least 6 hipparchs, 'White' Clitus, Coenus, Craterus, Demetrius, Hephæstion and Perdiccas,<sup>86</sup> but in fact it seems that there were 8 hipparchies, including the *agema*, which corresponds to the old 'royal' squadron (last named as such in iii 18, 5 and anachronistically called *agema* in i 8, 3). This can be inferred from the facts that in 327 Alexander had with him half the Companions, amounting to 4 hipparchies including the *agema* (iv 22, 7; 23, 1; 24, 1), as again in 326, when his own force comprised at least 4 hipparchies (vi 16, 1 n.). The names of one hipparch and of the commander of the *agema* have not been preserved. By 324 the number had again been reduced to 4 or 5 (vii 6, 4 n.), probably as a result of losses in the Gadrosian march.

59. The squadron commanders, except for 'Black'

<sup>86</sup> iv 27, 5; v 11, 3; 12, 2; 16, 3; 21, 5; 22, 6; vi 6, 4; 8, 2.

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Clitus who commanded the royal squadron, were men of little note, whereas the hipparchs after 328 were leading figures in Alexander's entourage. They bore the same grand title that had once belonged to Philotas alone. Were the old squadrons simply renamed hipparchies to correspond to the enhanced style of their commanders? They were indeed themselves divided into squadrons, as the squadrons had been divided into companies after 331/0, and Griffith contends with some force that they must have differed from the squadrons in more than name.<sup>87</sup> Most scholars believe that long before 324, when this is clearly attested (vii 6, 4; 8, 2 with notes), Alexander had incorporated Oriental horsemen in the hipparchies. It is indeed certain that he was using such horsemen from 330, and particularly in the Indian campaign; we hear of mounted javelin-men and mounted archers,<sup>88</sup> and there were no such units among his European cavalry; various troops of Scythian and east Iranian horse are also specifically named (v 11, 3). None of these units appears to belong to the hipparchies of the Companions, but Griffith remarks that we have no specific mention of any cavalry from west Iran, which had once supplied the king with crack regiments, and conjectures that *they* were incorporated in the hipparchies. Arrian refers to three hipparchies forming only part of the Companions in 329 (iii 29, 7; iv 4, 7); in the second passage we also hear of squadrons, and Griffith urges that the hipparchies are brigades divided into squadrons, some of which would be barbarian; when

<sup>87</sup> *JHS* 1963, 68 ff.

<sup>88</sup> iii 24, 1; 29, 7; iv 4, 7; 23, 1; 24, 3; 25, 6; 26, 4; 28, 8; v 11, 3; 12, 2; 16, 4; 18, 3. This explains how he had c. 5,000 horse at the Hydaspes, v 14, 1.

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he writes (v 13, 4) of ' the *agema* of the cavalry and the best men of the remaining hipparchies ', he means the purely Macedonian squadrons by ' the best men '. By contrast, I argued that the hipparchies were still purely Macedonian but larger than the old squadrons, since Alexander had received considerable reinforcements and might have incorporated the *prodromoi*, last mentioned in 329 (iv 4, 6), in the Companions.

60. On this view the use of ' hipparchy ' in iii 29, 7; iv 4, 7 must be anachronistic, or rather (as in i 24, 3) non-technical, denoting simply a force of cavalry under one particular commander. Indeed I cannot see how the cavalry could have been organized in more than two groups technically called hipparchies, so long as there were only two hipparchs, i.e. before the death of Black Clitus in late summer 328. If Griffith is right that Orientals were already brigaded with the Companions on the Iaxartes, they must have been armed in the Macedonian fashion rather than as bowmen, since Arrian does not suggest that the hipparchies of the Companions by themselves had any answer to Scythian tactics (iv 4). Arrian's language is also gravely misleading in iv 24, 1 and vi 6, 1 and 4, unless the Orientals supposedly incorporated in the hipparchies already counted as Companions, and in that case one might have expected Macedonian opposition before the mutiny at Opis (but cf. vii 8, 2 n.). As for ' the best men ' in v 13, 4, it does not seem inconceivable that in each hipparchy the fittest and best mounted troopers had been formed into one of the squadrons, precisely in order that they might be used as Alexander did use them at the Hydaspes.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Cf. perhaps vi 21, 3, which does readily fit Griffith's view.

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However, my own hypothesis is open to the objection that the Macedonian reinforcements Alexander had received by 328 were probably smaller than I had estimated, and once we allow for losses, even the incorporation of the surviving Macedonian *prodromoi*, originally perhaps 800, might not have made the hipparchies significantly stronger than the old *ilai*,<sup>90</sup> None the less, I still incline to the view that all references to hipparchies before Clitus' death are non-technical and that thereafter the hipparchies remained Macedonian till c. 324, though they were perhaps not much stronger than the *ilai*; the change of name in the units primarily reflected the change of title, and higher status, of their commanders.

61. The Macedonian foot (apart from the archers) consisted of the hypaspists (' shield-bearers ') and of the battalions (*taxeis*) of the phalanx; at Gaugamela the latter numbered 6 (iii 11, 9 f.), but at the Hydaspes 7 (v 11, 3 with 12, 1 f.); another was perhaps formed when Alexander was reinforced at Susa (iii 16, 11). Confirmation can be found. Of the 12,000 men in the phalanx of Alexander's expeditionary force (§ 56), the 6 battalions of the phalanx must account for 9,000, as the hypaspists apparently numbered 3,000. Thus each battalion was 1,500 strong. But in 330 Alexander left 6,000 of them at Ecbatana,

<sup>90</sup> Milns (n. 85). In particular the officers sent for reinforcements in winter 328/7 B.C. (iv 18, 3) are not known to have brought any, and they could not in any case have arrived by autumn 327 B.C., when the 8 hipparchies were in being, unless we suppose that they were already on the way from Macedon in 328 B.C. This remains *possible*, as our information on reinforcements is defective. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 343 conjectured that the officers concerned secured the (non-Macedonian) reinforcements which reached Alexander in India (App. XIII 8).

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evidently a notional figure for 4 battalions, yet even before this force rejoined him (App. XIII 6), he had just 3 battalions under his own command (iii 23, 2; 24, 1).<sup>91</sup> The hypaspists were a *corps d'élite* (§ 62), sometimes called the bodyguards or royal hypaspists, or even the hypaspists of the Companions (i 14, 2); two of the three battalions were commanded by chiliarchs (iv 30, 6; v 23, 7 cf. i 22, 7), and therefore consisted of 1,000 men; the third, the *agema* or royal footguard, was presumably of the same strength, since after Alexander's time, when the whole corps was called 'Silver-shields', their number is given as 3,000. (Arrian's terminology is confusing; he can write of the *agema* and the hypaspists, meaning the other hypaspists, i 8, 3, and probably calls the *agema* alone the hypaspists.<sup>92</sup>)

62. The Macedonian phalanx differed somewhat from the Greek. Greek hoplites, equipped with helmet, cuirass, greaves, a round shield about 3 feet across, a spear 8–9 feet long and a short sword for slashing, were usually marshalled eight deep and fought battles that were generally won 'at push of pike'. Heavily encumbered, they were not easily manoeuvrable.<sup>93</sup> Alexander's Greek allies, who played no important part in the war, will have been soldiers of this type. The mercenaries on both sides were probably peltasts, carrying a smaller and lighter shield (*pelta*), but a spear over 12 feet long and a sword longer than the hoplite's.<sup>94</sup> The Macedonian phalanx was also less heavily armoured than hoplites

<sup>91</sup> Milns (n. 85).

<sup>92</sup> Tarn ii 148 ff.

<sup>93</sup> A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* 1967, chs III–IV, cf. How (n. 79).

<sup>94</sup> See Parke (n. 80) 79 f. on D. xv 44.



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(cf. iii 18, 1; iv 25, 5 f.), with helmet and greaves but apparently no cuirass, and with a *pelta* about 2 feet in diameter, probably suspended from the neck, so that both arms were free to wield the formidable *sarissa*.<sup>95</sup> This was a lance normally 21 feet long in the second century (Polybius xviii 29), but evidently rather shorter in Alexander's time, as it was made from the hard wood of the male cornel tree, and Theophrastus, a contemporary, says that the tree had an average height of 12 cubits, the greatest length of the *sarissa* (*History of Plants* iii 12, 2). The cubit is normally equated with  $1\frac{1}{2}$  feet, and Tarn's hypothesis (ii 169 f.) that the Macedonian cubit was shorter has not found favour. Hence the longest *sarissa* was 18 feet.<sup>96</sup> In Polybius' time the lances of the first five ranks protruded before the front line, and in Alexander's that must have been true of the first three or four. Men in the ranks behind would hold their lances upright, offering some protection against missiles. At Issus the phalanx was 8 deep, and I consider this to have been normal,<sup>97</sup> though it was to be deepened later. The hypaspists are often included in the phalanx (iii 11, 9; iv 28, 8; 30, 3), but that need mean only that they formed part of the infantry line. In ii 4, 3 Arrian clearly contrasts them, together with archers and javelin men, with all the other infantry as less heavily equipped, and this helps to explain why they were picked for forced marches and other special tasks; no doubt they

<sup>95</sup> Snodgrass 117 ff.

<sup>96</sup> In Alexander's time men in the front rank (cf. Aslepiodotus v) and also the *prodromoi* (§ 64) may have had shorter *sarissae*.

<sup>97</sup> App. III 4 (p. 461); App. IX 3. The Greek line was normally 8 deep (How cited in n. 79), though the Thebans had sometimes made it much deeper. Cf. Lane Fox 76 and 511.



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were also more highly trained. Lane Fox argues from their name that they had larger and heavier shields (which might be left behind when occasion demanded) but that in compensation they did not carry the *sarissa*.<sup>98</sup> His account, like all others, is conjectural.<sup>99</sup>

63. In encounters with Greek hoplites, the phalanx had an advantage, perhaps partially offset by the heavier armour of the former, in the greater length of their lances. Persian foot, who mostly had little defensive armour and only short spears, relying chiefly on the bow, were at the mercy of either Greek or Macedonian infantry in fighting at close quarters. On the other hand, the Macedonian phalanx (like the Greek) was not easily manoeuvrable and tended to break line on rough ground.

64. In fact the decisive arm in Alexander's battles with the Persians was his cavalry.<sup>100</sup> It was in cav-

<sup>98</sup> Cf. J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* 1955, 218 ff.; Lane Fox 78 f. against G. T. Griffith, *Proc. of Cambridge Philol. Soc.* 1956, 3 ff.

<sup>99</sup> Lane Fox 512 and Bosworth, *CQ*, 1973, 245 ff., have independently urged the retention of the manuscript readings ἀσθηταῖροι or ἀσθητέροι in ii 23, 2; iv 23, 1; v 22, 6; vi 6, 1; 21, 3; vii 11, 3. Lane Fox supposes that the *asthetairoi* were less heavily armoured than the *pezetairoi* (for this there is no evidence), Bosworth, more plausibly, that they are the phalanx regiments from Upper Macedon, the *pezetairoi* those from Lower Macedon. Clearly, they would be 'Companions' of some kind (*hetairoi*), though the force of the prefix 'ast' is obscure. Scribes will hardly have substituted a meaningless word six times for the well-known *pezetairoi*, and I have kept the manuscript text, contrary to the practice of all modern editors in amending to *πεζηταῖροι*.

<sup>100</sup> For what follows cf. J. K. Anderson, *Greek Horsemanship*, 1961, 40-78; F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* 1957; H. Delbrück, *Gesch. der Kriegskunst*<sup>3</sup> 1920, I iv and III i.

## INTRODUCTION

alry that the main strength of Darius' armies lay (apart from his Greek mercenaries). Like the Persians' foot, they too relied mostly on bows and javelins, with short spears and swords or scimitars for hand to hand fighting.<sup>101</sup> In the fourth century (and long afterwards) horses were unshod and riders had no stirrups; and hence instead of charging like modern cavalry with lance at rest and the full force of man and beast behind it, they had to wield the lance with the strength of their arms; horsemen often had much ado to keep their seats.<sup>102</sup> Greek cavalry had been used mainly for reconnaissance, for ravaging the country or hampering similar operations by the enemy, for pursuing a broken army or covering its retreat, or for hurling missiles at a hoplite line; indeed even Philip and Alexander could never attempt a frontal cavalry assault on serried ranks of pikes. What they did do, with success, thanks to the high level of horsemanship their men had reached in constant practice, was to charge the cavalry that covered the flanks of the enemy foot, and then turn on the foot from side or rear; finally, they completed the destruction of the enemy by relentless pursuit. The Macedonian Companions, and presumably the Thessalian horse, were protected by helmet and corselet, and armed with a lance (*dory* or *xyston*), and a curved slashing sword (*kopis*). However, the *prodromoi* (n. 84) carried *sarissae*, presumably longer than the lances of the rest, and requiring (like those of the infantry) both hands to wield them; they must

<sup>101</sup> Cf. i 15, 1; so too at Issus Al. fears Persian archers (ii 10, 3). But at Issus the Persian cavalry charged (ii 11, 2), as also at Gaugamela (iii 13), curiously not adopting the tactics of the Scythians (iv 4) and of Spitamenes (iv 5).

<sup>102</sup> Xenophon, *Anab.* ii 2, 18 f.

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therefore have controlled the horses with their legs alone, which modern horsemen assure me is possible.<sup>103</sup> Arrian notes that at the Granicus the Persian horse were at a disadvantage, as they were less well trained, and as the Macedonians had spears of cornel wood longer than the Persian javelins (*patta*), which were doubtless designed more for throwing than for thrusting; they also carried short slashing swords (i 15, 5–8). It was not till 331 that some attempt was made to equip them with longer spears and swords and give them more defensive armour (iii 8, 2 n.).<sup>104</sup> Perhaps only some units were thus re-equipped; we continue to hear of Oriental light horse afterwards.<sup>105</sup> In that case Alexander's cavalry, though heavily outnumbered at Gaugamela (App. IX), still retained a superiority in armament as well as in training over most of their opponents; otherwise Alexander's victory must be wholly ascribed to the skill with which he deployed his forces.

65. Demosthenes had remarked that Philip's army did not consist only of a phalanx (like that of most Greek cities) but of light troops, cavalry, archers, mercenaries (i.e. peltasts), and that he was well provided with artillery (ix 49 f.; cf. A. ii 7, 8). Arrian makes Alexander refer to the value of the Balkan

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Lane Fox 75. See n. 96.

<sup>104</sup> Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* vii 1, 2 makes out that the elder Cyrus' Companions had *patta* of cornel-wood, which were used by Persian cavalry in 396 (id., *Hellenica* iii 4, 14), and bronze corselets; in 402 some of the younger Cyrus' horsemen were so protected, and their horses too were armoured (*Anab.* i 8, 6 f.). Herodotus (vii 84–6, cf. 61 ff.) tells that in 480 only some Persians and no other Oriental cavalry even had helmets; perhaps only a few Oriental horsemen, especially the nobles (cf. ix 22; A. i 15, 8), normally had much defensive armour.

<sup>105</sup> iv 4 f., cf. § 59.

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contingents, who constituted most of the light infantry (ii 7, 5); the Agrianian javelin-men, in particular, were a *corps d'élite*, mentioned 47 times by Arrian (cf. iv 25, 6 n.). Alexander far excelled Philip in the success of his siege operations, notably at Tyre, and his ability to transport machines over difficult mountain country is astounding.<sup>106</sup> But his debt to Philip can hardly be over-estimated even in the strictly military sphere. Philip's constant campaigns bequeathed him a ready-made professional army. Its discipline and manoeuvrability are seen at the very outset of his reign (i 1, 8 f.; 6, 2 f.); his men were already inured to long marches and to winter operations, almost unprecedented in Greek practice. It was in Philip's school that Alexander's officers had been trained, many of whom were to show remarkable ability after his own death. Speed of movement, so striking and effective an element in his successes, had been no less characteristic of Philip, and the basic tactical plan of his victories over the Persians was inherited from his father.<sup>107</sup> Alexander's military genius of course appeared in the way he adapted what he had learned from Philip to the particular conditions of his own operations.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

66. For editions of the text I refer to Roos-Wirth's edition. The *editio princeps* was issued at Venice in 1535 by Trincavalius; his most important

<sup>106</sup> Cf. E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 1969, index *s.v.* Alexander and Philip.

<sup>107</sup> See Demosthenes i 4; viii 11; ix 48-50; D. xvi 3; 4, 5-7; 8, 2; 84, 1 f.; 86; Polybius viii 12; Polyænus iv 2, 10; Frontinus, *Stratagems* iv 1, 6.

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successors were Stephanus (1625), Gronovius (1704) and Krüger (1835–1851), none of whom relied on the archetypal manuscript.

67. For works on Alexander and his historians students can now turn to a full, classified bibliography by J. Seibert.<sup>108</sup> A survey of work since 1948 by E. Badian<sup>109</sup> is particularly valuable for his critical comments, but since he naturally says nothing of his own articles, I would add that no one in this period has done so much to advance our knowledge. On most subjects the basis for all new inquiries is H. Berve's collection of material about the court, army and administration and about every person who comes into the story of Alexander's reign.<sup>110</sup> Pearson has provided the most reliable account of the sources.<sup>111</sup> In the English-reading world the works of Sir William Tarn<sup>112</sup> have long exercised most influence, but his brilliant style, vast erudition and curious ingenuity were employed to devise an apologia for Alexander suited to modern conceptions but perhaps even more misleading than those of any ancient writer who made a hero out of the king. Safer guidance can be found in Ulrich Wilcken's introductory book;<sup>113</sup> though he rarely cites authorities, he not only presents a vigorous narrative but puts Alexander in the context of his age and looks forward to the

<sup>108</sup> *Alexander der Grosse (Erträge der Forschung)*, 1972

<sup>109</sup> *Alexander the Great 1948–1967* in *The Classical World* 1971, 37–56; 77–83.

<sup>110</sup> *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 volumes, 1926. In vol. ii personages are numbered, and references to this volume are given by these numbers.

<sup>111</sup> *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 1960

<sup>112</sup> Especially *Alexander the Great*, 2 volumes, 1948.

<sup>113</sup> *Alexander the Great*; the English translation (1932) has been reprinted in a paperback edition.

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new era which Alexander's conquests inaugurated; this is one of the great histories. For brevity I shall cite modern works rather sparingly, and generally when they give more information than I have room for, and shall normally refer only to the most important ancient evidence.

### ADDENDUM (see p. xx)

Diodorus visited Egypt in 60–56 B.C.; in his history, which went down to 54 B.C., the latest event mentioned is the foundation of a Roman colony at Tauromenium, c. 36 B.C. (Brunt, *Italian Manpower* 597). Trogus' work, published before c. 2 B.C., ended in 20 B.C.; his grandfather or great-grandfather received Roman citizenship in the 70s. See *RE* V 663 (Schwartz); XXI 2300 f. (Klotz). It is at least unlikely that Diodorus did not write before Trogus.

## ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT TITLES

A. = Arrian	J. = Justin
Al. = Alexander	P. = Plutarch, <i>Alexander</i>
Ar. = Aristobulus	Pt. = Ptolemy
D. = Diodorus	QC. = Quintus Curtius

Where no other author is indicated, references in the form iii 2, 3 are to Arrian's *Anabasis*; *Ind.* refers to *Indica*.

Book numbers for all authors are in Roman numerals, and are omitted where the context shows what book is intended.

All references to D. are to book xvii, unless otherwise specified.

Beloch	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> <sup>2</sup>
Berve	H. Berve, <i>Das Alexanderreich</i> (see Introd. n. 110)
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
Fuller	Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, <i>The Generalship of Alexander the Great</i> , 1958
GR	<i>Greece and Rome</i> , vol. XII, 2, 1965 ( <i>Alexander the Great</i> )
Jacoby	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . The historians are numbered, and I refer to them by these numbers, e.g. no. 124 (Callisthenes) T[estimonium] 1 or F[ragmentum] 1; Jacoby's numbering of volumes is confusing.
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>



## ABBREVIATIONS

Lane Fox	R. Lane Fox, <i>Alexander the Great</i> , 1973
Pearson, <i>LH</i> or Pearson	L. Pearson, <i>The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great</i> , 1960
<i>RE</i>	Pauly-Wissowa, <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
Tarn	W. W. Tarn, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (2 vols.), 1948
Tod	M. N. Tod, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions II</i>

**ARRIAN**  
**ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER**  
**BOOK I**

ΑΡΡΙΑΝΟΥ  
ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΑΝΑΒΑΣΕΩΣ

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

- 1 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος ὁ Ἀριστοβούλου ὅσα μὲν ταῦτ' ἄμφω περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φιλίππου συνέγραψαν, ταῦτα ἐγὼ ὡς πάντῃ ἀληθῆ ἀναγράφω, ὅσα δὲ οὐ ταῦτά, τούτων τὰ πιστότερα ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα καὶ ἅμα ἀξι-  
2 αφηγητότερα ἐπιλεξάμενος. ἄλλοι μὲν δὴ ἄλλα ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀνέγραψαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑπὲρ ὅτου πλείονες ἢ ἀξυμφωνότεροι ἐς ἀλλήλους· ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ Πτολεμαῖός τε καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος πιστότεροι ἔδοξαν ἐς τὴν ἀφήγησιν, ὁ μὲν ὅτι συνεστράτευσε βασιλεῖ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, Ἀριστόβουλος, Πτολεμαῖος δὲ πρὸς τῷ ξυστρατεῦσαι ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ βασιλεῖ ὄντι αἰσχροτέρον ἢ τῷ ἄλλῳ ψεύσασθαι ἦν· ἄμφω δέ, ὅτι τετελευτηκότος ἤδη Ἀλεξάνδρου ξυγγράφουσιν [ὅτε] αὐτοῖς ἢ τε ἀνάγκη καὶ ὁ μισθὸς τοῦ  
3 ἄλλως τι ἢ ὡς συνηνέχθη ξυγγράψαι ἀπῆν. ἔστι δὲ ἅ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων ξυγγεγραμμένα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ ἀξιαφήγητά τέ μοι ἔδοξε καὶ οὐ πάντῃ ἄπιστα, ὡς λεγόμενα μόνον ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀνέγραψα. ὅστις δὲ θαυμάσεται ἀνθ' ὅτου ἐπὶ τοσοῖσδε συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐπὶ νοῦν ἦλθεν ἠδε ἢ συγ-

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\* See p. lxxxv for abbreviations and short titles, Introd. 30-2; 58-62 for technical Macedonian terms, App. VIII 1 for the meaning of 'stade' (normally ·185 km.).

# ARRIAN

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER\*

### BOOK I

#### PREFACE

Wherever Ptolemy son of Lagus and Aristobulus son of Aristobulus have both given the same accounts of Alexander son of Philip, it is my practice to record what they say as completely true, but where they differ, to select the version I regard as more trustworthy and also better worth telling. In fact other writers have given a variety of accounts of Alexander, nor is there any other figure of whom there are more historians who are more contradictory of each other, but in my view Ptolemy and Aristobulus are more trustworthy in their narrative, since Aristobulus took part in king Alexander's expedition, and Ptolemy not only did the same, but as he himself was a king, mendacity would have been more dishonourable for him than for anyone else; again, both wrote when Alexander was dead and neither was under any constraint or hope of gain to make him set down anything but what actually happened. However, I have also recorded some statements made in other accounts of others, when I thought them worth mention and not entirely untrustworthy, but only as tales told of Alexander. Anyone who is surprised that with so many historians already in the field it should have

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γραφῆ, τά τε ἐκείνων πάντα τις ἀναλεξάμενος καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐντυχὼν οὕτω θαυμαζέτω.

1. Λέγεται δὴ Φίλιππος μὲν τελευτήσαι ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Πυθοδήλου Ἀθήνησι· παραλαβόντα δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀλέξανδρον, παῖδα ὄντα Φιλίππου, εἰς Πελοπόννησον παρελθεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τότε ἀμφὶ τὰ
- 2 εἴκοσιν ἔτη Ἀλέξανδρον. ἐνταῦθα ξυναγαγόντα τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὅσοι ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου ἦσαν, αἰτεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατιᾶς, ἣντινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδοσαν· καὶ αἰτήσαντα λαβεῖν παρ' ἐκάστων πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων· Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ εἶναί σφισι πάτριον ἀκολουθεῖν ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς
- 3 ἄλλων ἐξηγεῖσθαι. νεωτερίσαι δὲ ἅττα καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ Ἀθηναίους γε τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πλείονα ἔτι τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εἰς τιμὴν συγχωρῆσαι. ἐπανελθόντα δὲ εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐν παρασκευῇ εἶναι τοῦ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν στόλου.
- 4 Ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ Θράκης, εἰς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριοὺς, ὅτι τε νεωτερίζειν ἐπύθετο Ἰλλυριοὺς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοὺς, καὶ ἅμα ὁμόρους ὄντας οὐκ ἐδόκει ὑπολείπεσθαι ὅτι μὴ πάντῃ ταπεινωθέντας οὕτω μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας στελλόμενον.
- 5 ὀρμηθέντα δὴ ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς Θράκην τὴν τῶν αὐτονόμων καλουμένων

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<sup>1</sup> For A's sources Introd. 10-23; a fuller discussion will appear in vol. II.

<sup>2</sup> The 'tale' is apparently not from the 'vulgate', but rather what all tell; §1-3 summarize well-known facts

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 1. 1-5

occurred to me too to compose this history should express his surprise only after perusing all their works and then reading mine.<sup>1</sup>

1. Now we are told<sup>2</sup> that the death of Philip occurred in the archonship of Pythodelus at Athens; then about twenty, Alexander succeeded, as Philip's son, and arrived in the Peloponnesus. There he assembled the Peloponnesian Greeks and requested from them the leadership of the Persian expedition, which they had already granted to Philip. Each people agreed except the Lacedaemonians, who replied that their country's tradition did not permit them to follow others; it was theirs to take the lead. At Athens too there was a revolutionary movement, but the Athenians collapsed at Alexander's first approach and conceded to him honours still greater than had been given to Philip. Alexander returned to Macedonia and began to get ready for the Asian expedition.

336  
B.C.

2

3

At the advent of spring<sup>3</sup> he marched towards Thrace against the Triballi and Illyrians, since he learned that they were restless; moreover, as they marched with his borders, he did not think it well to leave them behind him, when going on an expedition so far from home, unless they had been thoroughly humbled. Starting from Amphipolis, he invaded the part of Thrace that belongs to the independent

4 335  
B.C.

5

(Introd. 38, 49); § 4-ch. 6 at end give a seamless narrative in which direct speech replaces indirect at the end of 1,5, presumably from Pt./Ar.; Pt. is actually cited in 2, 7 and followed in 4, 6-8.

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps this suggests too early a date; 4, 1 may indicate that it was early June when Al. was on the Danube; 5, 9 that the harvest was already in near Pellium; Thebes did not fall till October (10, 2 n.).

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- Θρακῶν, Φιλίππους πόλιν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἔχοντα καὶ τὸν Ὀρβηλον τὸ ὄρος. διαβὰς δὲ τὸν Νέστον ποταμὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτι δεκαταῖος ἀφίκετο ἐπὶ τὸ
- 6 ὄρος τὸν Αἴμον. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπήντων αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰ στενὰ τῆς ἀνόδου τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος τῶν τε ῥέμπόρων<sup>1</sup> πολλοὶ ὠπλισμένοι καὶ οἱ Φρᾶκες οἱ αὐτόνομοι, παρεσκευασμένοι εἶργειν τοῦ πρόσω κατειληφότες τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Αἴμου τὸν στόλον,
- 7 παρ' ἣν ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι ἡ πάροδος. ξυναγαγόντες δὲ ἀμάξας καὶ προβαλόμενοι πρὸ σφῶν ἅμα μὲν χάρακι ἐχρῶντο ταῖς ἀμάξαις ἐς τὸ ἀπομάχεσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, εἰ βιάζοντο, ἅμα δὲ ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἐπαφιέναι ἀνιούσιν ἢ ἀποτομώτατον τοῦ ὄρους ἐπὶ τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν Μακεδόνων τὰς ἀμάξας. γνώμην δὲ πεποίηντο ὅτι ὅσω πυκνοτέρᾳ τῇ φάλαγγι καταφερόμεναι συμμίζουσιν αἱ ἅμαξαι, τοσῶδε μᾶλλον τι διασκεδάσουσιν αὐτὴν βία ἐμπεσοῦσαι.
- 8 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ βουλή γίνεται ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα ὑπερβαλεῖ τὸ ὄρος· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔδόκει διακινδυνευτέα, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἄλλη τὴν πάροδον, παραγγέλλει τοῖς ὀπλίταις, ὅποτε καταφέρουντο κατὰ τοῦ ὀρθίου αἱ ἅμαξαι, ὅσοις μὲν ὁδὸς πλατεῖα οὔσα παρέχοι λῦσαι τὴν τάξιν, τούτους δὲ διαχωρῆσαι, ὡς δι' αὐτῶν ἐκπεσεῖν τὰς ἀμάξας· ὅσοι δὲ
- 9 περικαταλαμβάνοντο, ξυννεύσαντας, τοὺς δὲ καὶ πεσόντας ἐς γῆν, συγκλεῖσαι ἐς ἀκριβὲς τὰς ἀσπίδας, τοῦ κατ' αὐτῶν φερομένας τὰς ἀμάξας καὶ τῇ ῥύμῃ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπερπηδῶσας ἀβλαβῶς ἐπελ-

<sup>1</sup> corrupt. Editors have proposed βαρβάρων, ἐγχωρίων, ἐμπείρων, ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν, ὀμόρων, ὀρείων, ἐκεῖ ἐμπόρων.



## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 1. 5-9

335  
B.C.

Thracians,<sup>4</sup> with Philippi and Mount Orbelus on his left. Then he crossed the river Nestus and is said in ten days to have reached Mount Haemus [Great Balkan mountain], where he was met in the defile of the approach to the mountains by many of the . . . <sup>5</sup> in arms and by the independent Thracians; prepared to bar his advance, they had occupied the height of Haemus on the line of the army's march. They collected carts and set them up in their front as a stockade from which to put up a defence, if they were pressed; but it was also in their mind to launch the carts at the Macedonian phalanx as the troops mounted the slope just where the mountain was most precipitous. Their idea was that the closer packed the phalanx when the descending carts charged it, the more their violent descent would scatter it. 6 7

Alexander consulted how he could most safely cross the ridge; and since he saw that the risk must be run, for there was no way round, he sent orders to his hoplites that whenever the carts tumbled down the slope, those who were on level ground and could break formation were to part to right and left, leaving an avenue for the carts; those caught in the narrows were to crouch close together; and some were actually to fall to the ground and link their shields closely together so that when the carts came at them they were likely to bound over them by their 8 9

<sup>4</sup> As distinguished from the Thracian principalities near the coast which Philip had annexed. For this campaign, cf. *Introd.* 33; *D.* 8, 1; *P.* 11; *Strabo* vii 3, 8. Al.'s route from Amphipolis is unclear, see Seibert (*Introd.* n. 108) 78; the Lyginus (2, 1) and Peuce are not certainly identified. At this time the Triballi extended from round Sofia to the Danube, perhaps as far as Silistria (*RE* VI A 2392 ff.).

<sup>5</sup> See textual note; the MS reading 'merchants' is senseless; editors propose 'local barbarians' or the like.

## ARRIAN

θεῖν. καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅπως παρήνεσέ τε Ἄλέ-  
 10 ξανδρος καὶ εἵκασεν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ διέσχον τὴν  
 φάλαγγα, αἱ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἐπικυλισθεῖσαι  
 ὀλίγα ἔβλαψαν· ἀπέθανε δὲ οὐδεὶς ὑπὸ ταῖς  
 ἀμάξαις. ἔνθα δὴ οἱ Μακεδόνες θαρσήσαντες, ὅτι  
 ἀβλαβεῖς αὐτοῖς, ἃς μάλιστα ἐδεδίασαν, αἱ ἄμαξαι  
 ἐγένοντο, σὺν βοῇ ἐς τοὺς Θρακάς ἐνέβαλον.  
 11 Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ τοὺς τοξότας μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ  
 κέρως πρὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος, ὅτι ταύτη εὐπο-  
 ρώτερα ἦν, ἐλθεῖν ἐκέλευσε καὶ ἐκτοξεύειν ἐς τοὺς  
 Θρακάς ὅπῃ προσφέροντο· αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὸ  
 ἄγῃμα καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας  
 12 κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον ἤγεεν. ἔνθα δὴ οἱ τοξόται βάλ-  
 λοντες τοὺς προεκθέοντας τῶν Θρακῶν ἀνέστελλον·  
 καὶ ἡ φάλαγξ προσμίζασα οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐξέωσεν ἐκ  
 τῆς χώρας ἀνθρώπους ψιλοὺς καὶ κακῶς ὀπλι-  
 σμένους βαρβάρους, ὥστε Ἄλέξανδρον ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 εὐωνύμου ἐπάγοντα οὐκέτι ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ ῥύψαντες  
 ὡς ἐκάστοις προὔχῳρει τὰ ὄπλα κατὰ τοῦ ὄρους  
 13 ἔφυγον. καὶ ἀπέθανον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐς χιλίους καὶ  
 πεντακοσίους, ζῶντες δὲ ἄνδρες μὲν ὀλίγοι ἐλή-  
 φθησαν δι' ὠκύτητα καὶ τῆς χώρας ἐμπειρίαν,  
 γυναῖκες δὲ ὅσαι ξυνείποντο αὐτοῖς ἐάλωσαν πᾶσαι,  
 καὶ τὰ παιδάρια καὶ ἡ λεία πᾶσα ἐάλω.

2. Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ τὴν μὲν λείαν ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμ-  
 ψεν ἐς τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσση, Λυσανία καὶ  
 Φιλώτα παραδοὺς διατίθεσθαι· αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ ἄκρον  
 ὑπερβαλὼν προῆει διὰ τοῦ Αἴμου ἐς Τριβαλλούς,  
 καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸν Λύγινον ποταμόν· ἀπέχει δὲ  
 οὗτος ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰστρου ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Αἴμον ἰόντι  
 2 σταθμοὺς τρεῖς. Σύρμος δὲ ὁ τῶν Τριβαλλῶν  
 βασιλεύς, ἐκ πολλοῦ πυνθανόμενος τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου

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gathered impetus and pass without doing harm. The event corresponded to Alexander's advice and conjecture. Part of the phalanx divided, while the carts sliding over the shields of the others did little harm; not one man perished beneath them. The Macedonians now took heart, finding that the carts they had most dreaded proved harmless, and they charged the Thracians, shouting as they did so. Alexander ordered the archers from the right wing to the front of the phalanx as on that side it was easier to shoot at the Thracians wherever they attacked. He himself took the *agema*, the hypaspists and the Agrianians and led them on the left. Then by their volleys the archers held back those Thracians who were rushing forward and the phalanx, coming to close quarters, easily drove from their position men who were lightly clad and ill-armed barbarians; so they did not await the charge of Alexander on the left, but casting away their arms as best they could fled down the mountain-side. Some fifteen hundred perished; few were captured alive, by reason of their speed and their knowledge of the country; the women, however, who followed them were all taken, with the children and all their impedimenta.

2. Alexander sent the booty back to the cities on the coast, appointing Lysanias and Philotas<sup>1</sup> to deal with it; he himself crossed the ridge, marched over Haemus against the Triballians, and arrived at the river Lyginus; as you approach the Haemus, it is three days' march from the Ister (Danube). Syrmus, King of the Triballians, learning some time before

<sup>1</sup> Berve no. 805; Parmenio's son (ib. no. 802) is probably meant in § 5.

## ARRIAN

- τὸν στόλον, γυναῖκας μὲν καὶ παῖδας τῶν Τριβαλλῶν προὔπεμψεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰστρον διαβαίνειν κελεύσας τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς νῆσόν τινα τῶν ἐν τῷ
- 3 Ἰστρῷ. Πεύκη ὄνομα τῇ νήσῳ ἐστίν. εἰς ταύτην δὲ τὴν νῆσον καὶ οἱ Θράκες οἱ πρόσχωροι τοῖς Τριβαλλοῖς προσάγοντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκ πολλοῦ συμπεφευγότες ἦσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Σύρμος εἰς ταύτην συμπεφεύγει ξὺν τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτόν. τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος τῶν Τριβαλλῶν ἔφυγεν ὀπίσω ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν, ἔνθενπερ τῇ προτεραίᾳ ὠρμήθη Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 4 Ὡς δὲ ἔμαθεν αὐτῶν τὴν ὀρμήν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποστρέψας τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Τριβαλλοὺς ἦγεν, καὶ καταλαμβάνει καταστρατοπεδεύοντας ἤδη. καὶ οἱ μὲν καταληφθέντες πρὸς τῷ νάπει τῷ παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν παρετάσσοντο. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν μὲν φάλαγγα εἰς βάθος ἐκτάξας ἐπῆγε, τοὺς τοξότας δὲ καὶ τοὺς σφενδονήτας προεκθέοντας ἐκέλευσεν ἐκτοξεύειν τε καὶ σφενδονᾶν εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἴ πως προκαλέσαιτο αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ ψιλὰ
- 5 ἐκ τοῦ νάπου. οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐντὸς βέλους ἐγένοντο, παιόμενοι ἐξέθεον ἐπὶ τοὺς τοξότας, ὅπως εἰς χεῖρας συμμίξειαν γυμνοῖς οὖσι τοῖς τοξόταις. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προήγαγεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς νάπης ἔξω, Φιλώταν μὲν ἀναλαβόντα τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἰππέας προσέταξεν ἐμβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ κέρας τὸ δεξιόν, ἥπερ μάλιστα προὔκεχωρήκεσαν ἐν τῇ ἐκδρομῇ. Ἡρακλείδην δὲ καὶ Σώπολιν τοὺς ἐκ Βοττιαίας τε καὶ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἰππέας κατὰ τὸ
- 6 εὐώνυμον κέρας ἐπάγειν ἔταξε. τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἵππον πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος παρατείνας κατὰ μέσους ἐπῆγε. καὶ ἔστε μὲν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 2. 2-6

of Alexander's march, sent on the women and children to the Ister, ordering them to cross to an island in the river called Peuce. To this island the Thracians who are neighbours to the Triballians had also fled some time before on Alexander's approach, and Syrmus and his men now joined them there; but the mass of the Triballians fled back to the river from which Alexander had started out the day before.

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Hearing of their move, Alexander turned back in person to attack the Triballians, and found them already encamping. Caught as they were, they formed line near the glen by the river; but Alexander threw his phalanx into deep formation and led it against them in person, ordering the bowmen and slingers to run out ahead and discharge their arrows and stones on the barbarians, to see if he could provoke them into the open out of the glen. When they were in range and came under fire, they ran out against the bowmen to come to grips with them, unarmed as bowmen are. But having drawn them out of the glen, Alexander ordered Philotas to take the cavalry of upper Macedonia and charge their right wing, where they had advanced farthest in their outward rush. Heracleides and Sopolis were ordered to lead the cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis against the left wing. The infantry phalanx and the remaining cavalry, which he deployed in advance of the phalanx, he led against the centre. While the

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ἀκροβολισμὸς παρ' ἐκατέρων ἦν, οἱ Τριβαλλοὶ οὐ  
 μείον εἶχον· ὡς δὲ ἢ τε φάλαγξ πυκνὴ ἐνέβαλλεν ἐς  
 αὐτοὺς ἐρρωμένως καὶ οἱ ἵππεῖς οὐκ ἀκοντισμῶ  
 ἔτι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἵπποις ὠθοῦντες ἄλλη καὶ  
 ἄλλη προσέπιπτον, τότε δὴ ἐτράπησαν διὰ τοῦ  
 7 νάπους εἰς τὸν ποταμόν. καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι μὲν  
 τρισχίλιοι ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, ζῶντες δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ τούτων  
 ἐλήφθησαν, ὅτι ὕλη τε δασεῖα πρὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἦν  
 καὶ νύξ ἐπιγενομένη τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς διώξεως  
 ἀφείλετο τοὺς Μακεδόνας. αὐτῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων  
 τελευτήσαι λέγει Πτολεμαῖος ἵππέας μὲν ἕνδεκα,  
 πεζοὺς δὲ ἀμφὶ τοὺς τεσσαράκοντα.

3. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς μάχης τριταῖος ἀφικνεῖται Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν τὸν Ἰστρον, ποταμῶν  
 τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην μέγιστον ὄντα καὶ πλείστην  
 γῆν ἐπερχόμενον καὶ ἔθνη μαχιμώτατα ἀπεί-  
 ργοντα, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ Κελτικά, ὅθεν γε καὶ αἱ  
 πηγαὶ αὐτῶ ἀνίσχουσιν, ὧν τελευταῖους Κουάδους  
 2 καὶ Μαρκομάνους· ἐπὶ δὲ Σαυροματῶν μοῖραν,  
 Ἰάζυγας· ἐπὶ δὲ Γέτας τοὺς ἀπαθανατίζοντας·  
 ἐπὶ δὲ Σαυρομάτας τοὺς πολλούς· ἐπὶ δὲ Σκύθας  
 ἔστε ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκβολάς, ἵνα ἐκδιδοῖ κατὰ πέντε  
 3 στόματα ἐς τὸν Εὐξείνιον πόντον. ἐνταῦθα κατα-  
 λαμβάνει αὐτῶ ἠκούσας ναῦς μακρὰς ἐκ Βυζαντίου  
 διὰ τοῦ πόντου τοῦ Εὐξείνου κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν.  
 ταύτας ἐμπλήσας τοξοτῶν τε καὶ ὀπλιτῶν τῇ νήσῳ  
 ἐπέπλει, ἵνα οἱ Τριβαλλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ Θράκες  
 συμπεφευγότες ἦσαν, καὶ ἐπειράτο βιάζεσθαι τὴν

<sup>2</sup> Pt. is perhaps cited because A. felt that such precise figures needed justification.

<sup>1</sup> An explanatory note by A. The Quadi and Marcomanni

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battle was still at long range, the Triballians did not have the worst of it, but when the phalanx in close formation charged them in full force and the cavalry, no longer shooting, but actually thrusting them with their horses, fell on them here, there and everywhere, they turned in flight through the glen to the river. Three thousand perished in the flight, but only a few were captured alive, as the wood in front of the river was dense, and as nightfall prevented the Macedonians from any thorough pursuit. Of the Macedonians, according to Ptolemy, eleven cavalrymen and about forty foot-soldiers were killed.<sup>2</sup> 7

3. On the third day after the battle Alexander reached the Ister, the greatest river of Europe, traversing the greatest tract of country and acting as a barrier to the most warlike tribes, Celts for the most part<sup>1</sup>—its springs rising in Celtic territory; the farthest of these peoples are the Quadi and Marcomanni; then it passes the Iazyges, a branch of the Sauromatae, the Getae who call themselves immortals,<sup>2</sup> most of the Sauromatae, and the Scythians down to the outlets, where it runs through five mouths into the Black Sea. There Alexander found at the mouth of the river warships come to join him from Byzantium through the Black Sea. He manned them with archers and hoplites and sailed against the island where the Triballians and Thracians had taken refuge, and attempted to force 2 3

were important in his time, not Al's. They were German, the Getae Thracian; 'Celts' often has no precise ethnic or linguistic significance for Greeks, but denotes northern barbarians, sometimes Germans, though Ephorus (Jacoby no. 70 F. 30) in the fourth century put Celts in the western extremity of the world, Scythians in the north; the last term is used indifferently of all nomads.

<sup>2</sup> Belief in immortality: Herodotus iv 93 f.



## ARRIAN

4 ἀπόβασιν. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἀπήντων ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν, ὅπη αἱ νῆες προσπίπτοιεν· αἱ δὲ ὀλίγαι τε ἦσαν καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ οὐ πολλή <ἡ> ἐπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῆς νήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἀπότομα ἐς προσβολήν, καὶ τὸ ρεῦμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ παρ' αὐτήν, οἷα δὴ ἐς στενὸν συγκεκλεισμένον, ὄξυ καὶ ἄπορον προσφέρεσθαι.

5 Ἐνθα δὴ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπαγαγὼν τὰς ναῦς ἔγνω διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἰστρον ἐπὶ τοὺς Γέτας τοὺς πέραν τοῦ Ἰστροῦ ὠκισμένους, ὅτι τε συνειλεγμένους ἑώρα πολλοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ, ὡς εἴρξοντας, εἰ διαβαίνοι, — ἦσαν γὰρ ἵππεῖς μὲν ἐς τετρακισχιλίους, πεζοὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν μυρίων — καὶ ἅμα πόθος ἔλαβεν αὐτὸν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Ἰστροῦ ἐλθεῖν. τῶν μὲν δὴ νεῶν ἐπέβη αὐτός· τὰς δὲ διφθέρας, ὑφ' αἷς ἐσκήνουν, τῆς κάρφης πληρώσας καὶ ὅσα μονόξυλα πλοῖα ἐκ τῆς χώρας ξυναγαγῶν — ἦν δὲ καὶ τούτων εὐπορία πολλή, ὅτι τούτοις χρῶνται οἱ πρόσοικοι τῷ Ἰστρῷ ἐφ' ἀλιεία τε τῇ ἐκ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ καὶ εἶποτε παρ' ἀλλήλους ἀνά τὸν ποταμόν στέλλοιντο καὶ ληστεύοντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν οἱ πολλοί — ταῦτα ὡς πλείστα ξυναγαγῶν διεβίβαζεν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῆς στρατιᾶς ὅσους δυνατὸν ἦν ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. καὶ γίνονται οἱ διαβάντες ἅμα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἵππεῖς μὲν ἐς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, πεζοὶ δὲ ἐς τετρακισχιλίους.

4. Διέβαλον δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς ἡ λήιον ἦν σίτου βαθύ· καὶ ταύτῃ μᾶλλον τι ἔλαθον προσχόντες τῇ ὄχθῃ. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἔω Ἀλέξανδρος διὰ τοῦ ληίου ἦγε, παραγγείλας τοῖς πεζοῖς πλαγίαις ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἐπικλίνοντας τὸν σῖτον οὕτω προάγειν ἐς τὰ οὐκ ἐργάσιμα. οἱ δὲ ἵππεῖς ἔστε μὲν διὰ τοῦ ληίου  
2 προῆει ἡ φάλαγξ ἐφείποντο· ὡς δὲ ἐκ τῶν

a landing. The barbarians, however, came down to the river-side wherever the ships touched land; these were few in number, and carried only a small force; the island was for the most part steep for landing; and the current past the island, as was natural in a narrow strait, was swift and difficult to contend with.

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Thereupon Alexander withdrew his ships and decided to cross the Ister to attack the Getae settled on the farther side, both because he saw a large force of them gathered on the bank, to repel him, should he cross—there were about four thousand mounted men, and more than ten thousand on foot—and also because he had been seized with a longing<sup>3</sup> to go beyond the river. He himself embarked in the fleet; he filled the leather tent covers with hay, collected as many as possible of the boats from the countryside made from single tree trunks (they were plentiful, for the river-side dwellers use them for fishing, at times for river expeditions among themselves, and even more for thieving), and ferried across as much of his force as he could in this way. About fifteen hundred cavalry and four thousand foot-soldiers crossed with him.

5

6

4. The crossing was made at night where there was a deep cornfield, and this concealed them more, as they reached the bank. About dawn, Alexander led the troops through the field, ordering the infantry to smooth down the corn with their spears, held obliquely, and so advance to untilled ground. As long as the phalanx was marching through the corn the cavalry followed; but when they emerged

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<sup>3</sup> Appendix V 3.

## ARRIAN

- ἐργασίμων ἐξήλασαν, τὴν μὲν ἵππον ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν  
 κέρας αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος παρήγαγεν, τὴν φάλαγγα  
 3 δὲ ἐν πλαισίῳ Νικάνορα ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε. καὶ οἱ  
 Γέται οὐδὲ τὴν πρώτην ἐμβολὴν τῶν ἱππέων  
 ἐδέξαντο· παράδοξος μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἡ τόλμα  
 ἐφάνη τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι εὐμαρῶς οὕτως τὸν  
 μέγιστον τῶν ποταμῶν διεβεβήκει ἐν μιᾷ νυκτὶ τὸν  
 Ἰστρον οὐ γεφυρώσας τὸν πόρον, φοβερὰ δὲ καὶ  
 τῆς φάλαγγος ἡ ξύγκλεισις, βιαία δὲ ἡ τῶν ἱππέων  
 4 ἐμβολή. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐς τὴν πόλιν κατα-  
 φεύγουσιν, ἣ δὴ ἀπεῖχεν αὐτοῖς ὅσον παρασάγγην  
 τοῦ Ἰστροῦ· ὡς δὲ ἐπάγοντα εἶδον σπουδῇ  
 Ἀλέξανδρον τὴν μὲν φάλαγγα παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν,  
 ὡς μὴ κυκλωθεῖεν πη οἱ πεζοὶ ἐνεδρευσάντων τῶν  
 Γετῶν, τοὺς ἱππέας δὲ κατὰ μέτωπον, λείπουσιν αὐ  
 καὶ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Γέται κακῶς τετειχισμένην, ἀνα-  
 λαβόντες τῶν παιδαρίων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς  
 5 ἵππους ὅσα φέρειν οἱ ἵπποι ἠδύναντο· ἦν δὲ αὐτοῖς  
 ἡ ὄρμη ὡς πορρωτάτῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐς τὰ  
 ἔρημα. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τὴν τε πόλιν λαμβάνει καὶ  
 τὴν λείαν πᾶσαν ὅσῃν οἱ Γέται ὑπελίποντο. καὶ  
 τὴν μὲν λείαν Μελεάγρῳ καὶ Φιλίππῳ ἐπαναγαγεῖν  
 δίδωσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ κατασκάψας τὴν πόλιν θύει τε  
 ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ Διὶ Σωτῆρι καὶ Ἡρακλεῖ  
 καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἰστρῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄπορος αὐτῷ ἐγένετο,  
 καὶ ἐπανάγει αὐτῆς ἡμέρας σώους σύμπαντας ἐπὶ  
 τὸ στρατόπεδον.
- 6 Ἐνταῦθα ἀφίκοντο πρέσβεις ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον  
 παρὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα αὐτόνομα ἔθνη προσοικεῖ  
 τῷ Ἰστρῷ καὶ παρὰ Σύρμου τοῦ Τριβαλλῶν  
 βασιλέως· καὶ παρὰ Κελτῶν δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰονίῳ  
 κόλπῳ ὠκισμένων ἦκον· μεγάλοι οἱ Κελτοὶ τὰ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 4. 2-6

from the tilled land, Alexander in person took off the  
the cavalry to the right wing, ordering Nicanor  
to lead the phalanx in rectangular formation. The 3  
Getae did not even withstand the first charge of the  
cavalry; for Alexander's bold stroke came as a  
great shock to them, in crossing the Ister, the  
greatest of rivers, so easily in one night without  
bridging the stream; the solidity of the phalanx was  
terrifying, and the onslaught of the cavalry violent.  
They first took refuge in the city, about a parasang<sup>1</sup> 4  
away from the Ister; then, seeing that Alexander  
was rapidly bringing up his phalanx along the river,  
so that the infantry might not be encircled by an  
ambush of the Getae, with the cavalry on the front,  
the Getae in their turn deserted their city, which  
was feebly fortified, taking up on horseback as many  
of the women and children as the horses could carry;  
and then marched as far as possible away from the 5  
river towards the desert. Alexander captured the  
city and all the plunder the Getae left behind.  
This plunder he ordered Meleager and Philip to take  
to the base; he himself razed the city and sacrificed  
on the bank of the Ister to Zeus the Preserver and  
Heracles and Ister himself, for permitting the  
passage. Then the same day he took all his force  
safe and sound back to the camp.

At this juncture ambassadors came to Alexander 6  
from Syrmus, King of the Triballi and from the other  
self-governing tribes near the Ister; others from  
the Celts settled on the Ionian gulf [Adriatic].

<sup>1</sup> The use of this Persian term (part of a day's march, c. 5-6 km) is strange.

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## ARRIAN

σώματα καὶ μέγα ἐπὶ σφίσι φρονοῦντες· πάντες δὲ  
 φιλίας τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐφιέμενοι ἤκειν ἔφασαν.  
 7 καὶ πᾶσιν ἔδωκε πίστεις Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἔλαβε-  
 τοὺς Κελτοὺς δὲ καὶ ἤρετο, ὅ τι μάλιστα δεδίττεται  
 αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἐλπίσας ὅτι μέγα ὄνομα τὸ  
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐς Κελτοὺς καὶ ἔτι προσωτέρω ἤκει καὶ  
 8 ὅτι αὐτὸν μάλιστα πάντων δεδιέναι φήσουσι. τῷ  
 δὲ παρ' ἐλπίδα ξυνέβη τῶν Κελτῶν ἡ ἀπόκρισις.  
 οἶα γὰρ πόρρω τε ὠκισμένοι Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ  
 χωρία δύσπορα οἰκοῦντες καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐς ἄλλα  
 τὴν ὄρμην ὀρῶντες ἔφασαν δεδιέναι μήποτε ὁ  
 οὐρανὸς αὐτοῖς ἐμπέσοι, Ἀλέξανδρον τε ἀγασθέντες  
 οὔτε δέει οὔτε κατ' ὠφέλειαν πρεσβεῦσαι παρ'  
 αὐτόν. καὶ τούτους φίλους τε ὀνομάσας καὶ  
 ξυμμάχους ποιησάμενος ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμψε, το-  
 σοῦτον ὑπειπὼν ὅτι ἀλαζόνες Κελτοὶ εἰσιν.

5. Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπ' Ἀγριάνων καὶ Παιόνων προῦ-  
 χῶρει. ἔνθα δὴ ἄγγελοι ἀφίκοντο αὐτῷ Κλεῖτόν τε  
 τὸν Βαρδύλεω ἀφεστάναι ἀγγέλλοντες καὶ Γλαυ-  
 κίαν προσκεχωρηκένοι αὐτῷ τὸν Ταυλαντίων  
 βασιλέα· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Αὐταριάτας ἐπιθήσεσθαι  
 αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν πορείαν ἐξήγγελλον· ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα  
 2 κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐδόκει ἀναζευγνύναι. Λάγγαρος δὲ  
 ὁ τῶν Ἀγριάνων βασιλεὺς ἤδη μὲν καὶ Φιλίππου  
 ζῶντος ἀσπαζόμενος Ἀλέξανδρον δῆλος ἦν καὶ  
 ἰδίᾳ ἐπρέσβευσε παρ' αὐτόν, τότε δὲ παρῆν αὐτῷ  
 μετὰ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν, ὅσους τε καλλίστους καὶ

<sup>2</sup> §6–8 from Pt. (Strabo vii 3, 8).

<sup>1</sup> Striking SW for the upper Strymon (Struma) and Axios (Vardar) valleys. For chapters 5 and 6 in general see N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* 1974, with full topographic discussion,

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 4. 6-5. 2

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R.C.

The Celts were of great height and had a high conceit of themselves; but all professed to have come in desire for Alexander's friendship, and with all he exchanged pledges. Of the Celts he enquired what mortal thing they most dreaded, hoping that his own great name had reached the Celts and gone still farther, and that they would say that they dreaded him more than anything else. Their answer, however, was not what he expected, for, living in difficult country far from Alexander, and seeing that his aim lay elsewhere, they said that their greatest dread was that the sky would fall upon them, and that, while they admired Alexander, neither fear nor interest had prompted their embassy.<sup>2</sup> He declared them his friends, made them his allies and sent them home, only remarking, 'What braggarts Celts are!'

5. He then advanced towards the Agrianians and Paeonians.<sup>1</sup> There messengers reached him with the news that Clitus, son of Bardylis, was in revolt, and that Glaucias, king of the Taulantians, had joined him.<sup>2</sup> They also told him that the Autariates were going to attack him on his march. For these reasons he decided to move rapidly. Langarus, king of the Agrianians, had shown his regard for Alexander even in Philip's lifetime, had been on an embassy to him personally, and was now in attendance on him with the finest and best-armed hypas-

which I was able to see in typescript, but which is too complex to summarize here.

<sup>1</sup> Bardylis is presumably 'the Illyrian king' decisively beaten by Philip in 358 (D. xvi 4); Hammond argues that he and Clitus were kings of the Dardanians on the upper Vardar and White Drin, and that the Taulantii dwelt round Tiranë in Albania (*Annual of British School at Athens* 1966, 243 ff.). The Autariatae are placed on the upper Neretsa (Naron).

## ARRIAN

- 3 εὐοπλοτάτους ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶχε· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔμαθεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Αὐταριατῶν πυνθανόμενον Ἀλέξανδρον, οἷτινές τε καὶ ὅπόσοι εἶεν, οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθαι Αὐταριάτας· εἶναι γὰρ ἀπολεμωτάτους τῶν ταύτη· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἀμφὶ τὰ σφέτερα μᾶλλον τι ἔχοιεν. καὶ κελεύσαντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐσβάλλει ἐς αὐτούς καὶ ἐμβαλὼν ἦγε καὶ ἔφερε τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν.
- 4 Αὐταριάται μὲν δὴ ἀμφὶ τὰ αὐτῶν εἶχον· Λάγγαρος δὲ τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐτιμήθη μεγάλως πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ δῶρα ἔλαβεν, ὅσα μέγιστα παρὰ βασιλεῖ τῷ Μακεδόνων νομίζεται· καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου Κύναν καὶ ταύτην ὠμολόγησε δώσειν αὐτῷ ἐς Πέλλαν ἀφικομένῳ Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 5 Ἀλλὰ Λάγγαρος μὲν ἐπανελθὼν οἴκαδε νόσῳ ἐτελεύτησεν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ παρὰ τὸν Ἐριγόνα ποταμὸν πορευόμενος ἐς Πέλλιον πόλιν ἐστέλλετο. ταύτην γὰρ κατειλήφει ὁ Κλεῖτος ὡς ὀχυρωτάτην τῆς χώρας· καὶ τρὸς ταύτην ὡς ἦκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, καταστρατοπεδεύσας πρὸς τῷ Ἐορδαϊκῷ ποταμῷ
- 6 τῇ ὑστεραία ἐγνώκει προσβάλλειν τῷ τείχει. οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Κλεῖτον τὰ κύκλω τῆς πόλεως ὄρη ὑπερδέξιά τε ὄντα καὶ δασέα κατεῖχον, ὡς πάντοθεν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς Μακεδόσιν, εἰ τῇ πόλει προσβάλλοιεν· Γλαυκίας δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ τῶν Ταυλαντίων
- 7 βασιλεὺς οὐπω παρῆν. Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν δὴ τῇ πόλει προσῆγεν· οἱ δὲ πολέμοι σφαγιασάμενοι παῖδας τρεῖς καὶ κόρας ἴσας τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ κριοὺς μέλανας τρεῖς, ὠρμηντο μὲν ὡς δεξόμενοι ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς Μακεδόνας· ὁμοῦ δὲ γενομένων ἐξέλιπον καίτοι καρτερὰ ὄντα τὰ κατειλημμένα πρὸς σφῶν



## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 5. 3-7

pists he had; and when he learnt that Alexander was 3 335  
 enquiring who the Autariates were and how num- B.C.  
 erous, he told him not to trouble about them, as they  
 were the least warlike of the tribesmen in those  
 parts; he would himself invade their country, so that  
 they might be preoccupied with their own affairs.  
 On Alexander's instructions he invaded and devas-  
 tated their country. Thus the Autariates were kept 4  
 busy at home. Langarus received great honours  
 from Alexander and what were considered at the  
 court of Macedon the greatest gifts. Alexander  
 actually promised to wed his sister Cyna<sup>3</sup> to him,  
 when he came to Pella. However, after reaching 5  
 home, Langarus sickened and died.

Alexander, marching along the river Erigon  
 [Cerna Reka], made for Pellium, a city Clitus had  
 occupied, as the strongest in the country. When  
 he reached it, he camped by the river Eordaicus  
 [Devoll] and decided to assault the wall next day.<sup>4</sup>  
 Clitus' forces held the heights surrounding the city, 6  
 which were commanding and thickly wooded, so as to  
 attack the Macedonians from all sides, if they made  
 the assault on the city, but Glaucias, king of the  
 Taulantians, was not yet present. Alexander 7  
 proceeded against this city, on which the enemy  
 sacrificed three boys and three girls and three black  
 rams, and advanced to close combat with the Mace-  
 donians; but once engaged, they deserted the

<sup>3</sup> Or Cynnana, previously married to Al's cousin, Amyntas (Introd. 46). The Agrianians, a Paeonian branch of the Thracians on the upper Strymon, provided a valuable contingent for the Asian expedition.

<sup>4</sup> Hammond (§1 n.) places Pellium by the modern Goricë about 25 km S.E. of Lake Ochrid in the fertile plain of Poloskë watered by the river Devoll (Eordaicus); the operations can only be followed with maps as detailed as he supplies.

## ARRIAN

- χωρία, ὥστε καὶ τὰ σφάγια αὐτῶν κατελήφθη ἔτι κείμενα.
- 8 Ταύτη μὲν δὴ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κατακλείσας αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν πόλιν καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενος πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἐγνώκει περιτειχισμῷ ἀποκλείσαι αὐτούς· τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία παρῆν μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως Γλαυκίας ὁ τῶν Ταυλαντίων βασιλεύς. ἔνθα δὴ Ἀλέξανδρος τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπέγνω εἰλεῖν ἂν ξὺν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει, πολλῶν μὲν ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ μαχίμων συμπεφευγόντων, πολλῶν δὲ ἅμα τῷ Γλαυκίᾳ προσκεισομένων, εἰ αὐτὸς τῷ τείχει προσμάχοιτο.
- 9 Φιλώταν δὲ ἀναλαβόντα τῶν ἰππέων ὅσους ἐς προφυλακὴν καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐς ἐπισιτισμὸν ἔπεμπε. καὶ ὁ Γλαυκίας μαθὼν τὴν ὀρμὴν τῶν ἀμφὶ Φιλώταν ἐξελαύνει ἐπ' αὐτούς, καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὰ κύκλω ὄρη τοῦ πεδίου, ὅθεν οἱ ξὺν Φιλώτᾳ ἐπισιτιεῖσθαι ἔμελλον.
- 10 Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἀπηγγέλθη αὐτῷ, ὅτι κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ τε ἰππεῖς καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια, εἰ νῦν αὐτοὺς καταλήψεται, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ ἰππέας ἐς τετρακοσίους ἐβοήθει σπουδῇ· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στράτευμα πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἀπέλιπεν, ὡς μὴ ἀποχωρήσαντος παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιδραμόντες τοῖς ἀμφὶ Γλαυκίαν συμμίξειαν.
- 11 ἔνθα δὴ Γλαυκίας προσάγοντα Ἀλέξανδρον αἰσθόμενος ἐκλείπει τὰ ὄρη· οἱ δὲ ξὺν Φιλώτᾳ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον διεσώθησαν. ἐδόκουν δ' ἔτι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν δυσχωρίᾳ
- 12 ἀπειληφέναι οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Κλεῖτον καὶ Γλαυκίαν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὄρη τὰ ὑπερδέξια κατεῖχον πολλοῖς μὲν ἰππεῦσι, πολλοῖς δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς καὶ σφενδονήταις

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 5. 7-12

positions they had occupied, strong as they were, so that their victims were found still lying there.

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B.C.

On this day then Alexander shut them up in their city and camped by the wall, intending to cut them off by a circumvallation, but next day Glaucias, king of the Taulantians, appeared with a large force. Thereupon Alexander gave up the idea of taking the city with the forces at his disposal, as many fighting men had taken refuge inside, and Glaucias' strong force would fall upon him, should he assault the wall. He sent Philotas to obtain food with as many horsemen as he needed for a screen, and all the baggage animals from the camp. Glaucias, on learning of this move of Philotas, set off to attack his troops, and occupied the heights encircling the plain where Philotas' troops were to obtain food. When it was reported to Alexander that the cavalry and baggage animals would be in danger, if night overtook them, he himself went with the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians and some four hundred horsemen at full speed to their aid, leaving the rest of the army near the city, as there was a risk that, if the whole force had withdrawn, the enemy in the city might have sallied out and joined with Glaucias' forces. As a result, on seeing Alexander's approach, Glaucias abandoned the heights, and Philotas and his party got safe back to the camp. Clitus and Glaucias with their troops still appeared to have caught Alexander in a disadvantageous position; they held the commanding heights with many horsemen, javelin-men, and slingers, as well as a large number

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καὶ ὀπλίταις δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοις, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει κατειλημμένοι προσκείσασθαι ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἡμελλον· τὰ τε χωρία δι' ὧν ἡ πάροδος ἦν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ στενὰ καὶ ὑλώδη ἐφαίνετο, τῇ μὲν πρὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀπειργόμενα, τῇ δὲ ὄρος ὑπερύψηλον ἦν καὶ κρημνοὶ πρὸς τοῦ ὄρους, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ἀσπίδων ἂν τῷ στρατεύματι ἡ πάροδος ἐγένετο.

6. Ἐνθα δὴ ἐκτάσσει τὸν στρατὸν Ἀλέξανδρος ἕως ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι τὸ βάθος τῆς φάλαγγος. ἐπὶ τὸ κέρας δὲ ἐκατέρωθεν διακοσίους ἱππέας ἐπιτάξας παρήγγελλε σιγῇ ἔχειν τὸ παραγγελ-  
 2 λόμενον ὀξέως δεχομένους. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐσήμηνεν ὀρθὰ ἀνατεῖναι τὰ δόρατα τοὺς ὀπλίτας, ἔπειτα ἀπὸ ξυνομήματος ἀποτεῖναι ἐς προβολήν, καὶ νῦν μὲν ἐς τὸ δεξιὸν ἐγκλῖναι τῶν δοράτων τὴν σύγκλεισιν, αὐθις δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα ἔς τε τὸ πρόσω ὀξέως ἐκίνησε καὶ  
 3 ἐπὶ τὰ κέρατα ἄλλοτε ἄλλη παρήγαγε. καὶ οὕτω πολλὰς τάξεις τάξας τε καὶ μετακοσμήσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον οἶον ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς φάλαγγος ἐπήγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. οἱ δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἐθαύμαζον τὴν τε ὀξύτητα ὀρώντες καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν δρωμένων· τότε δὲ προσ-  
 4 ἀγοντας ἤδη τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ λείπουσι τοὺς πρώτους λόφους. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐπαλαλάξαι ἐκέλευσε τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ τοῖς δόρασι δουπήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἀσπίδας· οἱ δὲ Ταυλάντιοι ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκπλαγέντες πρὸς τῆς βοῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐπανήγαγον σπουδῇ τὸν στρατόν.

5 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ λόφον τινὰς κατέχοντας ἰδὼν οὐ πολλοὺς τῶν πολεμίων, παρ' ὧν αὐτῷ ἡ πάροδος

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B.C.

of hoplites, and the forces enclosed in the city were likely to attack as Alexander's men drew off, while the ground through which Alexander must pass seemed narrow and forested, bounded on the one side by the river, and on the other by a lofty mountain and cliffs on the side of the mountain, so that the army could not have passed through even four abreast.

6. In the circumstances Alexander drew up his phalanx with a depth of 120 files. On either wing he posted 200 horsemen, bidding them keep silent and smartly obey the word of command; the hoplites were ordered first to raise their spears upright, and then, on the word, to lower them for a charge, swinging their serried points first to the right, then to the left; he moved the phalanx itself smartly forward, and then wheeled it alternately to right and left. Thus he deployed and manoeuvred it in many difficult formations in a brief time, and then making a kind of wedge from his phalanx on the left, he led it to the attack. The enemy, long bewildered both at the smartness and the discipline of the drill, did not await the approach of Alexander's troops, but abandoned the first hills. Alexander ordered the Macedonians to raise their battle-cry and clang their spears upon their shields, and the Taulantians, even more terrified at the noise, hastily withdrew back to the city.

Alexander saw that a few of the enemy were holding a hill on his line of march, and ordered his

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ἐγίνετο, παρήγγειλε τοῖς σωματοφύλαξι καὶ τοῖς  
 ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἑταίροις, ἀναλαβόντας τὰς ἀσπίδας  
 ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὸν  
 γήλοφον· ἐκεῖσε δὲ ἐλθόντας, εἰ ὑπομένοιεν οἱ  
 κατειληφότες τὸ χωρίον, τοὺς ἡμίσεας καταπηδῆσαι  
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ ἀναμιχθέντας τοῖς ἵππεῦσι  
 6 πεζοὺς μάχεσθαι. οἱ δὲ πολέμοι τὴν ὄρμην τὴν  
 Ἀλεξάνδρου ἰδόντες λείπουσι τὸν γήλοφον καὶ  
 παρεκκλίνουσιν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῶν ὄρων. ἔνθα δὴ  
 καταλαβὼν Ἀλέξανδρος τὸν γήλοφον σὺν τοῖς  
 ἑταίροις τοὺς τε Ἀγριᾶνας μεταπέμπεται καὶ τοὺς  
 τοξότας, ὄντας ἐς δισχιλίους· τοὺς δὲ ὑπασπιστὰς  
 διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν ἐκέλευσε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις  
 τὰς τάξεις τῶν Μακεδόνων· ὅποτε δὲ διαβάντες  
 τύχοιεν, ἐπ' ἀσπίδα ἐκτάσσεσθαι, ὡς πυκνὴν εὐθὺς  
 διαβάντων φαίνεσθαι τὴν φάλαγγα· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν  
 προφυλακῇ ὦν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἀφεώρα τῶν  
 7 πολεμίων τὴν ὄρμην. οἱ δέ, ὄρωντες διαβαίνουσαν  
 τὴν δύναμιν, κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἀντεπήεσαν, ὡς τοῖς μετὰ  
 Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιθησόμενοι τελευταίοις ἀποχω-  
 ροῦσιν. ὁ δὲ πελαζόντων ἤδη αὐτὸς ἐκθεῖ σὺν τοῖς  
 ἀμφ' αὐτόν, καὶ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπι-  
 οῦσα, ἐπηλάλαξεν· οἱ δὲ πολέμοι πάντων ἐπὶ  
 σφᾶς ἐλαυνόντων ἐγκλίναντες ἔφευγον· καὶ ἐν  
 τούτῳ ἐπήγεν Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς τε Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ  
 τοὺς τοξότας δρόμῳ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν. καὶ  
 8 πρῶτος μὲν αὐτὸς φθάσας διαβαίνει· τοῖς τε-  
 λευταίοις δὲ ὡς εἶδεν ἐπικειμένους τοὺς πολεμίους  
 ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ τὰς μηχανὰς ἑξακοντίζειν  
 ὡς πορρωτάτῳ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐκέλευσεν ὅσα ἀπὸ  
 μηχανῶν βέλη ἑξακοντίζεται, καὶ τοὺς τοξότας δὲ  
 ἐκ μέσου τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐκτοξεύειν, ἐπεσβάντας καὶ

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B.C.

bodyguards<sup>1</sup> and the Companions with him to take their shields, mount and charge the hill; on reaching it, supposing those who held it should stand their ground, half were to dismount and, mingling with the cavalry, fight on foot. But the enemy, observing Alexander's onset, abandoned the hill and withdrew to the mountains on either side. So after occupying the hill with his Companions, Alexander sent for the Agrianians and the archers, up to the number of two thousand; the hypaspists were ordered to cross the river, and the battalions of the Macedonian phalanx to follow them. Once across, they were to extend to the left, so that the phalanx might appear solid the moment they had crossed. He himself was in an advanced covering position, watching the enemy's movement from the hill. On seeing the force crossing, the enemy charged down the mountain with the idea of attacking the last of Alexander's troops to withdraw. When they were already close, he himself with the troops he had with him ran out, and the phalanx coming to the attack through the river raised its battle-cry; under this combined onslaught the enemy broke and fled, whereupon Alexander brought up the Agrianians and the archers at the double in the direction of the river. He himself got over first, but seeing the enemy pressing on the hindmost, he set up his engines on the bank and ordered every kind of missile to be discharged from them at furthest range, and the archers to shoot from mid-river, as they too had

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the hypaspists.



## ARRIAN

τούτους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Γλαυκίαν εἴσω βέλους παρελθεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμων, οἱ Μακεδόνες δὲ ἐν τούτῳ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπέρασαν τὸν ποταμόν, ὥστε οὐδεὶς ἀπέθανεν ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει αὐτῶν.

- 9 Τρίτη δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμέρας καταμαθὼν Ἀλέξανδρος κακῶς αὐλιζομένους τοὺς ἀμφὶ Κλεῖτον καὶ Γλαυκίαν, καὶ οὔτε φυλακὰς ἐν τῇ τάξει αὐτοῖς φυλαττομένας οὔτε χάρακα ἢ τάφρον προβεβλημένους, οἷα δὴ ξὺν φόβῳ ἀπηλλάχθαι οἰομένων Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐς μῆκος τε οὐκ ὠφέλιμον ἀποτετα-  
[γ]μένην αὐτοῖς τὴν τάξιν, ὑπὸ νύκτα ἔτι λαθῶν διαβαίνει τὸν ποταμόν, τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς ἅμα οἱ ἄγων καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τὴν  
10 Περδίκκου καὶ Κοίνου τάξιν. καὶ προσετέτακτο μὲν ἀκολουθεῖν τὴν ἄλλην στρατιάν· ὡς δὲ καιρὸν εἶδεν εἰς ἐπίθεσιν, οὐ προσμείνας ὁμοῦ γενέσθαι πάντας ἐφῆκε τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας· οἱ δὲ ἀπροσδόκητοί τε ἐπιπεσόντες καὶ φάλαγγι κατὰ κέρας, ἥπερ ἀσθενεστάτοις αὐτοῖς καρτερωτάτη τῇ ἐμβολῇ προσμίξειν ἔμελλον, τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς κατέκτεινον, τοὺς δὲ φεύγοντας εὐμαρῶς αἰροῦντες, ὥστε πολλοὶ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐγκατελήφθησαν καὶ ἀπέθανον, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει ἀτάκτῳ καὶ φοβερᾷ γενομένη· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ ζῶντες  
11 ἐλήφθησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ δίωξις τοῖς ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον μέχρι πρὸς τὰ ὄρη τῶν Ταυλαντίων· ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἀπέφυγον αὐτῶν, γυμνοὶ τῶν ὅπλων διεσώθησαν. Κλεῖτος δὲ ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγὼν ἐμπρήσας τὴν πόλιν ἀπηλλάγη παρὰ Γλαυκίαν ἐς Ταυλαντίους.

7. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῶν φυγάδων τινὲς τῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν φευγόντων παρελθόντες νύκτωρ ἐς τὰς

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breasted the stream. Glaucias' troops did not venture within range; the Macedonians meanwhile crossed the river safely and lost not a man in the withdrawal.

On the third day after this Alexander learned 9 that Clitus' and Glaucias' troops were carelessly bivouacked, no sentry posts in due order, no palisade, no trench in front of them—for they thought that Alexander had retreated in panic—and their line unduly elongated; he crossed the river unobserved under cover of night with the hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and the battalion of Perdiccas and Coenus.<sup>3</sup> He had left orders for the rest of the army to follow, 10 but seeing an opportunity for attack, he did not wait for all to join him, but sent on all the archers and Agrianians: his forces attacked when not expected and in deep formation on the flank of the line, where they were likely to make the strongest onslaught on the enemy at his weakest point; they killed several in their beds and easily seized the fugitives, so that many were caught and killed there and then, and many others in panic-stricken and headlong flight; a good number too were taken alive. Alexander's men carried on the pursuit of 11 the Taulantians as far as the mountains; those who did escape survived with the loss of their arms. Clitus, who had originally taken refuge in the city, set fire to it and fled to Glaucias among the Taulantians.

7. Meanwhile some of the exiles from Thebes slipped into Thebes by night on the invitation of

<sup>3</sup> Later they each command a battalion. A. is doubtless careless and should have written 'battalions'.

- Φήβας, ἐπαγ(αγ)ομένων τινῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ νεωτε-  
 ρισμῷ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, Ἀμύνταν μὲν καὶ Τιμόλαον  
 τῶν τὴν Καδμείαν ἔχόντων οὐδὲν ὑποτοπήσαντας  
 πολέμιον ἔξω τῆς Καδμείας ἀπέκτειναν ξυλ-  
 2 λαβόντες· ἐς δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν παρελθόντες ἐπήραν  
 τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀποστήναι ἀπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἐλευ-  
 θερίαν τε(καὶ παρρησίαν<sup>1</sup>) προῖσχόμενοι, παλαιὰ  
 καὶ καλὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τῆς βαρύτητος τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων ἤδη ποτὲ ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πιθανώτεροι δὲ ἐς  
 τὸ πλῆθος ἐφαίνοντο τεθνηκέναι Ἀλέξανδρον  
 3 ἰσχυριζόμενοι ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ  
 λόγος οὗτος καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε  
 χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία  
 παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀφίκτο, ὥστε, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ἐν τοῖς  
 τοιοῖσδε, οὐ γιννώσκοντες τὰ ὄντα τὰ μάλιστα καθ'  
 ἡδονὴν σφισιν εἵκαζον.
- 4 Πυθομένῳ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων  
 οὐδαμῶς ἐδόκει ἀμελητέα εἶναι, τὴν τε τῶν  
 Ἀθηναίων πόλιν δι' ὑποψίας ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντι καὶ  
 τῶν Θηβαίων τὸ τόλμημα οὐ φαῦλον ποιουμένῳ, εἰ  
 Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε πάλαι ἤδη ταῖς γνώμαις ἀφε-  
 στηκότες καὶ τινες καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ  
 καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ οὐ βέβαιοι ὄντες συνεπιλήψονται τοῦ  
 5 νεωτερισμοῦ τοῖς Θηβαίοις. ἄγων δὴ παρὰ τὴν  
 Ἑορδαίαν τε καὶ τὴν Ἐλιμιῶτιν καὶ παρὰ τὰ τῆς  
 Στυμφαίας καὶ Παρ(α)υαίας ἄκρα ἑβδομαῖος  
 ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πέλιναν τῆς Θετταλίας. ἔνθεν δὲ  
 ὀρμηθεὶς ἕκτη ἡμέρα ἐσβάλλει ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν,  
 ὥστε οὐ πρόσθεν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἔμαθον εἴσω Πυλῶν  
 παρεληλυθότα αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐν Ὀγχηστῷ γενέσθαι

<sup>1</sup> So Krüger.

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persons in the city with revolutionary designs, and seized and killed Amyntas and Timolaus, members of the force occupying the Cadmea, who had no suspicion of hostile movement outside.<sup>1</sup> Then 2 appearing in the assembly they incited the Thebans to rebel against Alexander, on the pretence of freedom and of liberty of speech—time-honoured and fine sounding words: now at last had come the time to shake off Macedon's heavy yoke. They won readier trust from the populace by affirming that Alexander had died in Illyria: in fact this was com- 3 mon talk, and many put it about; he had been long away and no word had come from him, so that, in ignorance of the facts, they conjectured (as often happens in such cases) what they most desired.<sup>2</sup>

Alexander hearing of what occurred at Thebes was 4 fully convinced that it had to be taken seriously; for he had long had suspicions of Athens, and was much concerned about the Theban coup, in case the Lacedaemonians (long ago rebels at heart) as well as some other Peloponnesians and the Aetolians, who were unreliable, should join in the revolutionary movement of the Thebans.<sup>3</sup> He marched, therefore, 5 past Eordaea and Elimiotis, and the heights of Stymphaea and Paravaea, and on the seventh day reached Pelinna in Thessaly. Thence in five days he entered Boeotia, so that the Thebans did not learn that he was within the Gates until he arrived, with

<sup>1</sup> For other accounts of and allusions to the revolt of Thebes see Aeschines iii 239 f.; Dinarchus, *contra Demosthenem* 10; 18; D. 8-14; P. 11-13 (and his life of Demosthenes 23); J xi 3 f. Cf. *Introd.* 37 f.; 43; 49. A. omits the story of Timoclea from Ar. (F. 2), though it illustrates Al's magnanimity.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Thuc. iv 108, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Introd.* 37; 49.

- 6 ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ πάσῃ. καὶ τότε δὲ οἱ πράξαντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν στράτευμα ἐκ Μακεδονίας Ἀντιπάτρου ἀφίχθαι ἔφασκον, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον τεθνάναι ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὅτι οὗτος αὐτὸς προσάγει Ἀλέξανδρος χαλεπῶς εἶχον· ἄλλον γάρ τινα ἦκειν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου.
- 7 Ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξ Ὀγχηστοῦ ἄρας τῇ ὑστεραία προσῆγε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Θηβαίων κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἰολάου τέμενος· οὐδὲ καὶ ἐστρατοπέδευσεν, ἐνδιδούς ἔτι τοῖς Θηβαίοις τριβὴν, εἰ μεταγνόντες ἔτι τοῖς κακῶς ἐγνωσμένοις πρεσβεύ-  
8 σαιντο παρ' αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτου ἐδέησαν ἐνδόσιμόν τι παρασχεῖν ἐς ξύμβασιν, ὥστε ἐκθέοντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως οἷ τε ἵππεῖς καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἠκροβολίζοντο ἐς τὰς προφυλακάς, καὶ τινὰς καὶ ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολ-  
9 λούς τῶν Μακεδόνων. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκπέμπει τῶν ψιλῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν, ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀναστεῖλαι τὴν ἐκδρομήν· καὶ οὗτοι οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀνέστειλαν ἤδη τῷ στρατοπέδῳ αὐτῷ προσφερομένους. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν πᾶσαν καὶ περιελθὼν κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς φερούσας ἐπ' Ἐλευθεράς τε καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, οὐδὲ τότε προσέμιξε τοῖς τείχεσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐστρατοπέδευσεν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχων τῆς Καδμείας, ὥστε ἐγγὺς εἶναι ὠφέλειαν τῶν Μακεδόνων τοῖς τὴν Καδμείαν  
10 ἔχουσιν. οἱ γὰρ Θηβαῖοι τὴν Καδμείαν διπλῶ χάρακι ἐφρούρουν ἀποτειχίσαντες, ὡς μήτε ἔξωθέν τινα τοῖς ἐγκατειλημμένοις δύνασθαι ἐπωφελεῖν, μήτε αὐτοὺς ἐκθέοντας βλάπτειν τι σφᾶς, ὅποτε

\* In 339 with Thermopylae held by Thebes Philip had come

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all his force, at Onchestus.<sup>4</sup> At that time the authors of the revolt were saying that a force of Antipater had come from Macedon, but confidently affirmed that Alexander himself was dead, getting annoyed at anyone who reported Alexander's own proximity at the head of his men: it was, said they, a different Alexander, the son of Aeropus.<sup>5</sup> 6 335 B.C.

Alexander left Onchestus and next day reached Thebes, near the enclosure of Iolaus, where he encamped, giving the Thebans a period of grace, in case they should repent of their bad decisions and send an embassy to him. They were so far from making any concession that might lead to an agreement that their cavalry and many of their light troops sallied out against the camp, discharged volleys at the outposts, and actually killed a few Macedonians. Alexander sent out some of his light troops and archers to hold up their sally; they easily checked the Thebans, who by now were approaching the camp. Next day Alexander moved his whole force and came round to the gates leading to Eleutheræ and Attica, yet even then he did not actually assault the walls, but pitched camp not far from the Cadmea, so that support would be close at hand for its Macedonian garrison. The Thebans were investing the Cadmea with a double stockade, so that no one from without could help those shut up inside, nor could they sally out and 7 8 9 10

south through Heraclea, the Asopus pass and Cytinium (Beloch iii 563). Crossing Thessaly by an unusual easterly route, Al. may well have done the same for the purpose of a surprise; in that case the 'Gates' do not refer to Thermopylae but to the pass south of Heraclea.

<sup>5</sup> As in 334-323 B.C., Antipater had evidently been left in charge of Macedon. Alexander the Lyncestian: Introd. 46.

τοῖς ἔξω πολεμίοις προσφέροντο. Ἀλέξανδρος δέ  
 —ἔτι γὰρ τοῖς Θηβαίοις διὰ φιλίας ἐλθεῖν μᾶλλον τι  
 ἢ διὰ κινδύνου ἤθελε—διέτριβε πρὸς τῇ Καδμείᾳ  
 11 κατεστρατοπεδευκώς. ἔνθα δὴ τῶν Θηβαίων οἱ  
 μὲν τὰ βέλτιστα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν γιννώσκοντες ἐξελθεῖν  
 ὤρμηστο παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ εὐρέσθαι συγ-  
 γνώμην τῷ πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀποστάσεως·  
 οἱ φυγάδες δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τοὺς φυγάδας ἐπικεκλημένοι  
 ἦσαν, οὐδενὸς φιλανθρώπου τυχεῖν ἂν παρ' Ἀλε-  
 ξάνδρου ἀξιοῦντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ βοιωταρχοῦντες  
 ἔστιν οἱ αὐτῶν, παντάπασιν ἐνήγον τὸ πλῆθος ἐς  
 τὸν πόλεμον. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ οὐδ' ὡς τῇ πόλει  
 προσέβαλλεν.

8. Ἀλλὰ λέγει Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου, ὅτι  
 Περδίκκας, προτεταγμένος τῆς φυλακῆς τοῦ  
 στρατοπέδου σὺν τῇ αὐτοῦ τάξει καὶ τοῦ χάρακος  
 τῶν πολεμίων οὐ πολὺ ἀφεστηκώς, οὐ προσμείνας  
 παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸ ἐς τὴν μάχην ξύνθημα αὐτὸς  
 πρῶτος προσέμιξε τῷ χάρακι καὶ διασπάσας αὐτὸν  
 2 ἐνέβαλεν ἐς τῶν Θηβαίων τὴν προφυλακὴν. τούτῳ  
 δὲ ἐπόμενος Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀνδρομένους, ὅτι καὶ  
 ξυντεταγμένος τῷ Περδίκκα ἦν, ἐπήγαγε καὶ αὐτὸς  
 τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν, ὡς εἶδε τὸν Περδίκκαν προ-  
 εληλυθότα εἰσω τοῦ χάρακος. ταῦτα δὲ ἰδὼν  
 Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς μὴ μόνοι ἀποληφθέντες πρὸς τῶν  
 Θηβαίων κινδυνεύσειαν, ἐπήγε τὴν ἄλλην στρατιάν.  
 3 καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριαῖνας ἐκδραμεῖν  
 ἐσήμηνεν εἰσω τοῦ χάρακος, τὸ δὲ ἄγημά τε καὶ  
 τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς ἔτι ἔξω κατεῖχεν. ἔνθα δὴ



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harm the Thebans when engaged with their enemies without. But Alexander still hoped to win Theban friendship rather than to incur any danger and waited, encamped near the citadel. At this point 11 those Thebans who best saw the city's advantage were anxious to go out to Alexander and obtain pardon for the Theban people for their revolt; but the exiles and those who had called them in, not expecting to receive kind treatment from Alexander, especially some of them who were Boeotarchs, used every method of urging their countrymen to war. Yet even so Alexander did not attack.<sup>6</sup>

8. Ptolemy son of Lagus, however, says that Perdiccas, who was officer in charge of the camp guard with his own battalion and lay not far from the enemy palisade, did not await Alexander's signal for battle, but himself first attacked the palisade and tearing it apart broke in upon the Theban advance guard.<sup>1</sup> Amyntas son of Andromenes followed, as he was 2 brigaded with Perdiccas, and led on his own battalion when he saw Perdiccas had advanced within the palisade. Seeing this, Alexander brought up the rest of the army, so that they might not be stranded and at the mercy of the Thebans. He ordered 3 the archers and Agrianians to run out in advance

\* Contrast D. 9, 6. Boeotarchs were magistrates of the federation of Boeotian cities, long dominated by Thebes. Some hold that Philip in 338 dissolved this federation, in which case Thebes on her revolt had sought to revive it.

<sup>1</sup> Perdiccas (Berve no. 627 cf. Introd. 34), a figure of growing importance under Al., became virtual ruler of the empire outside Greece and Macedon, on his death. Pt., who played a large part in encompassing his ruin in 321, may have sought to shift any blame for the sack of Thebes from Al. (cf. 7, 7-11), on to his enemy's unauthorized impetuosity; D. 12, 3 says that P. acted under orders. Cf 21, 1 f. for more indiscipline in his regiment.

## ARRIAN

Περδίκκας [μὲν] τοῦ δευτέρου χάρακος εἴσω  
 παρελθεῖν βιαζόμενος αὐτὸς μὲν βληθεὶς πίπτει  
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποκομίζεται κακῶς ἔχων ἐπὶ τὸ  
 στρατόπεδον, καὶ χαλεπῶς διεσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 τραύματος· τοὺς μέντοι Θηβαίους ἐς τὴν κοίλην  
 ὁδὸν τὴν κατὰ τὸ Ἡράκλειον φέρουσαν οἱ ἅμα  
 αὐτῷ εἰσπεσόντες ὁμοῦ τοῖς παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 4 τοξόταις συνέκλεισαν. καὶ ἔστε μὲν πρὸς τὸ  
 Ἡράκλειον ἀναχωροῦσιν εἶποντο τοῖς Θηβαίοις,  
 ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐπιστρεψάντων αὐθις σὺν βοῇ τῶν  
 Θηβαίων φυγὴ τῶν Μακεδόνων γίγνεται· καὶ  
 Εὐρυβώτας τε ὁ Κρής πίπτει ὁ τοξάρχης καὶ αὐτῶν  
 τῶν τοξοτῶν ἐς ἑβδομήκοντα· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ  
 κατέφυγον πρὸς τὸ ἄγλημα τὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ  
 5 τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς τοὺς βασιλικούς. κὰν τούτῳ  
 Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ φεύγοντας κατιδὼν,  
 τοὺς Θηβαίους δὲ λευκότας ἐν τῇ διώξει τὴν  
 τάξιν, ἐμβάλλει ἐς αὐτοὺς συντεταγμένη τῇ  
 φάλαγγι· οἱ δὲ ὠθοῦσι τοὺς Θηβαίους εἴσω τῶν  
 πυλῶν· καὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐς τοσόνδε ἡ φυγὴ  
 φοβερὰ ἐγίνετο, ὥστε διὰ τῶν πυλῶν ὠθούμενοι  
 ἐς τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔφθησαν συγκλεῖσαι τὰς πύλας.  
 ἀλλὰ συνεσπίπτουσι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἴσω τοῦ τείχους  
 ὅσοι τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐγγὺς φευγόντων εἶχοντο, ἅτε  
 καὶ τῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὰς προφυλακὰς τὰς πολλὰς  
 6 ἐρήμων ὄντων. καὶ παρελθόντες ἐς τὴν Καδμείαν  
 οἱ μὲν ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τὸ Ἀμφεῖον σὺν τοῖς κατέχουσι  
 τὴν Καδμείαν ἐξέβαινον ἐς τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, οἱ δὲ  
 κατὰ τὰ τείχη, ἐχόμενα ἤδη πρὸς τῶν συνεισπε-  
 σόντων τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ὑπερβάντες ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν  
 7 δρόμῳ ἐφέροντο. καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν τινα χρόνον  
 ἔμειναν οἱ τεταγμένοι τῶν Θηβαίων κατὰ τὸ

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behind the palisade; but he still retained the *agema*  
and hypaspists outside. Then Perdiccas, trying to  
force his way into the second palisade, was wounded  
and fell on the spot; he was borne off to the camp  
in a serious condition; only with difficulty was he  
healed of his wound. The troops who had broken  
in with him along with Alexander's archers hemmed  
the Thebans into the sunken road leading down by  
the Heracleum; so long as the Thebans were in re- 4  
treat towards the Heracleum, the Macedonians  
followed; but then the Thebans turned at bay with  
shouting, and the Macedonians took flight. Eury-  
botas the Cretan, commander of the archers, fell with  
about seventy of his men; the rest took refuge with  
the Macedonian *agema*, and the royal hypaspists. At 5  
this point Alexander, seeing that his own men were  
in flight and that the Thebans had broken formation  
in the pursuit, charged them with phalanx in battle  
order. The Thebans were pushed inside the gates;  
their flight became a panic, so that while being  
thrust through the gates into the city they could  
not shut them in time. The Macedonians who  
were pressing on the fugitives passed with them  
inside the wall; the walls were undefended on  
account of the large number of advanced posts.  
Some Macedonians reached the Cadmea and thence 6  
went along the Ampheum,<sup>2</sup> joined by the garrison  
of the Cadmea, and entered the rest of the city; those  
on the walls, already held by the troops that had  
poured in together with the fugitives, crossed over  
and rushed to the market-place. For a short while 7  
the Theban armed forces stood their ground by the

\* A hill continuing the Cadmea northwards.

Ἄμφειον· ὡς δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοῖς οἱ Μακεδόνες καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἄλλοτε ἄλλη ἐπιφαινόμενος προσέκειντο, οἱ μὲν ἵππεῖς τῶν Θηβαίων διεκπεσόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐς τὸ πεδῖον ἐξέπιπτον, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ  
 8 ὡς ἑκάστοις προὔχῳρει ἐσώζοντο. ἔνθα δὴ ὀργῇ οὐχ οὕτως τι οἱ Μακεδόνες, ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς τε καὶ Πλαταιεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐδὲ ἀμυνομένους τοὺς Θηβαίους ἔτι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔκτεινον, τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ἐπείσπιπτοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐς ἀλκὴν τετραμμένους, τοὺς δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἱκετεύοντας, οὔτε γυναικῶν οὔτε παίδων φειδόμενοι.

9. Καὶ πάθος τοῦτο Ἑλληνικὸν μεγέθει τε τῆς ἀλούσης πόλεως καὶ ὀξύτητι τοῦ ἔργου, οὐχ ἠκιστα δὲ τῷ παραλόγῳ ἔς τε τοὺς παθόντας καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας, οὐ μείον τι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας ἢ καὶ  
 2 αὐτοὺς τοὺς μετασχόντας τοῦ ἔργου ἐξέπληξε. τὰ μὲν γὰρ περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναίοις ξυνενεχθέντα, εἰ καὶ πλήθει τῶν ἀπολομένων οὐ μείονα τὴν ξυμφορὰν τῇ πόλει ἤνεγκεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τε πόρρω ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας διαφθαρῆναι αὐτοῖς τὸν στρατόν, καὶ τὸν πολὺν ξυμμαχικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεῖον ὄντα, καὶ τῷ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλειφθῆναι, ὡς καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ πολέμῳ ἀντισχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦντας, οὔτε αὐτοῖς τοῖς παθοῦσιν ἴσῃν τὴν αἰσθησιν τῆς ξυμφορᾶς προσέθηκεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ πάθει ἐκπληξιν ὁμοίαν  
 3 παρέσχε. καὶ τὸ ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς αὖθις Ἀθηναίων πταῖσμα ναυτικόν τε ἦν καὶ ἡ πόλις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ τῶν μακρῶν τειχῶν καθαιρέσει

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 8. 7-9. 3

335  
B.C.

Ampheum, but as the Macedonians pressed on them from all sides, and Alexander appeared, now here, now there, the Theban cavalry, pushing their way through the city, streamed out upon the plain; with the infantry it was *sauve qui peut*. And then, in hot blood, it was not so much the Macedonians as Phocians and Plataeans and the other Boeotians who slaughtered the Thebans without restraint, even when they no longer offered resistance, some in their houses, which they broke into, some showing fight; others actually suppliant at the shrines;—they spared neither woman nor child. 8

9. This Greek disaster, because of the size of the captured city, the sharpness of the action, and not least the general unexpectedness of the event, both to victors and victims, horrified the other Greeks as much as those who had a hand in it.<sup>1</sup> The misfortunes of the Athenians in Sicily brought no less a disaster upon their city measured by the number of the dead, yet their army was destroyed far from home; it was mainly composed of allies rather than of citizens, and their city was left them, so that they held out long afterwards in the war against Sparta, her allies, and Persia; even this disaster did not make the victims themselves equally conscious of misfortune, and did not strike the other Greeks with like horror at the catastrophe. Again, the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami was at sea, and though the city was humbled, yet it only suffered from the 2 [413 B.C.] 3 [405 B.C.]

\* Exonerating the Macedonians, cf. 9, 6, *contra* D. 13, 1, though D. too admits (13, 5 f.) that the Thespians, Plataeans and Orchomenians worked off old grudges on the Thebans. Note also ii 15, 3 f.

<sup>1</sup> §1-5 seem to give A's own reflections, 6-8 recite the charges apparently made against Thebes by A's Greek allies, cf. D. 14, 1-4.

## ARRIAN

- καὶ νεῶν τῶν πολλῶν παραδόσει καὶ στερήσει τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐς ταπεινότητα ἀφικομένη τό τε σχῆμα τὸ πατριον ὅμως ἐφύλαξε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τὴν πάλαι ἀνέλαβεν, ὡς τά τε μακρὰ τεῖχη ἐκτειχίσει καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης αὐθις ἐπικρατῆσαι καὶ τοὺς τότε φοβερούς σφισι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ παρ' ὀλίγον ἐλθόντας ἀφανίσει τὴν πόλιν αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων διασώσασθαι.
- 4 Λακεδαιμονίων τε αὐτὸ κατὰ Λευκτρα καὶ Μαντίνειαν πταῖσμα τῷ παραλόγῳ μᾶλλον τι τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἢ τῷ πλήθει τῶν [τε] ἀπολομένων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξέπληξεν· ἢ τε ξὺν Ἐπαμεινώνδῃ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Ἀρκάδων γενομένη προσβολὴ πρὸς τὴν Σπάρτην καὶ αὐτῇ τῷ ἀήθει τῆς ὄψεως μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τοῦ κινδύνου αὐτοὺς τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμετασχόντας αὐτοῖς τῶν τότε
- 5 πραγμάτων ἐφόβησεν. ἢ δὲ δὴ Πλαταιῶν ἄλωσις τῆς πόλεως τῇ σμικρότητι . . . τῶν ἐγκαταληφθέντων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν διαπεφεύγεσαν πάλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, οὐ μέγα πάθημα ἐγένετο. καὶ ἢ Μήλου καὶ Σκιώνης ἄλωσις, νησιωτικά τε πολίσματα ἦν καὶ τοῖς δράσασιν αἰσχύνην μᾶλλον τι προσέβαλεν ἢ ἐς τὸ ξύμπαν Ἑλληνικὸν μέγαν τὸν παράλογον παρέσχε.
- 6 Θηβαίοις δὲ τὰ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ὀξέα καὶ ξὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ γεγόμενα, καὶ ἢ ἄλωσις δι' ὀλίγου τε καὶ οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν ἐλόντων ξυνενεχθεῖσα, καὶ ὁ φόνος <ὁ> πολὺς, οἷα δὴ ἐξ ὁμοφύλων τε καὶ παλαιᾶς ἀπεχθείας ἐπεξιόντων, καὶ ὁ τῆς πόλεως παντελῆς ἀνδραποδισμός, δυνάμει τε καὶ δόξῃ ἐς τὰ πολέμια τῶν τότε προεχούσης ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἐς μῆνιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 9. 3-6

destruction of its long walls, the surrender of most of its ships, and the loss of its empire, it retained its ancestral form, and soon recovered its old strength; the Athenians rebuilt their long walls, recovered dominion on the sea, and themselves in turn saved from the most extreme danger the Lacedaemonians, who had inspired such terror and had come so near to annihilating Athens. The defeat of the Lacedaemonians themselves at Leuctra and Mantinea came as a great shock to them rather by the unexpectedness of the disaster than by the number of the dead, while the onslaught of Epaminondas with his Boeotians and Arcadians on Sparta scared the Spartans and their then allies rather by the strangeness of such a sight than by the measure of the danger. The capture, again, of Plataea was no great tragedy because of the smallness of the city and . . . <sup>2</sup> of those captured in the city—the greater number having fled long before to Athens. Finally, the capture of Melos and Scione, which were little island towns, brought more shame to the perpetrators than any great shock to the whole Greek world.

With Thebes, on the other hand, the hastiness and lack of consideration in the revolt, her sudden capture, with so little trouble to the victors, the great massacre, a natural act to kindred people working off old feuds, the complete enslavement of the city, then foremost in Greece for power and military prestige, were quite naturally set down to divine wrath: Thebes, men said, had thus paid the price,

835  
B.C.

[808  
B.C.]

4

[371,  
362 B.C.]

[370—  
369 B.C.]

5

[427  
B.C.]

[416, 421  
B.C.]

6

<sup>2</sup> The lacuna presumably mentioned the small number of prisoners.



## ARRIAN

- 7 ἀνηνέχθη, ὡς τῆς τε ἐν τῷ Μηδικῷ πολέμῳ προδοσίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ μακροῦ ταύτην δίκην ἐκτίσαντας Θηβαίους, καὶ τῆς Πλαταιῶν ἐν τε ταῖς σπονδαῖς καταλήψεως καὶ τοῦ παντελοῦς ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τῆς τῶν παραδόντων σφᾶς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐχ Ἑλληνικῆς γενομένης διὰ Θηβαίους σφαγῆς, καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τῆς ἐρημώσεως, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Ἕλληνες παραταξάμενοι Μήδοις ἀπώσαντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν κίνδυνον, καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναίους αὐτοὶ τῇ ψήφῳ ἀπώλλουν, ὅτε ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πόλεως γνώμη προὔτεθη ἐν
- 8 τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων συμμάχοις. ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς πολλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐπισημῆναι ἐλέγετο, ἃ δὴ ἐν μὲν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡμελήθη, ὕστερον δὲ ἡ μνήμη αὐτὰ ἐς λογισμὸν τοῦ ἐκ πάλαι ἐπὶ τοῖς ξυνενεχθεῖσιν προσημανθῆναι ἀνήνεγκεν.
- 9 Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου συμμάχοις, οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι, τὴν μὲν Καδμείαν φρουρᾷ κατέχειν ἔδοξε, τὴν πόλιν δὲ κατασκάψαι ἐς ἔδαφος καὶ τὴν χώραν κατανεῖμαι τοῖς συμμάχοις, ὅση μὴ ἱερά αὐτῆς· παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ ὅσοι ὑπελείποντο Θηβαίων, πλὴν τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερείων καὶ ὅσοι ξένοι Φιλίππου ἢ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἢ ὅσοι πρόξενοι
- 10 Μακεδόνων ἐγένοντο, ἀνδραποδίσει. καὶ τὴν Πινδάρου δὲ τοῦ ποιητοῦ οἰκίαν καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους τοῦ Πινδάρου λέγουσιν ὅτι διεφύλαξεν Ἀλέξανδρος αἰδοῖ τῇ Πινδάρου. ἐπὶ τούτοις Ὀρχόμενόν τε καὶ Πλαταιὰς ἀναστήσαι τε καὶ τειχίσει οἱ σύμμαχοι ἔγνωσαν.

10. Ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ὡς ἐξηγγέλθη

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 9. 7-10. 1

at length, for betraying the Greek cause in the Persian wars, for seizing Plataea in time of truce, for completely enslaving the Plataeans, for her responsibility for the un-Greek massacre of men who had surrendered to Sparta, and for the desolation of the Plataean countryside, on which the Greeks, ranged shoulder to shoulder against Persia, had repelled the common danger of Greece, and last, for voting before the allies of Sparta that the Athenians should be sold into slavery. People said that the coming disaster cast its shadow before, in many divine warnings neglected then, but the memory of them later made people realize that there had long been prognostications, now confirmed by the event.

7 [480-479,  
431,  
427 B.C.]

[404  
B.C.]

8

The allies who took part in the action, to whom Alexander actually entrusted the settlement of Thebes,<sup>3</sup> decided to garrison the Cadmea, but to raze the city to the ground, and to apportion its land among the allies, in so far as it had not been consecrated, and to enslave the women and children and any Theban survivors, save for priests and priestesses, and any guest-friends of Philip or Alexander, or *proxenoi*<sup>4</sup> of Macedonians. They say<sup>5</sup> that Alexander saved the poet Pindar's house and any of his descendants out of reverence for Pindar. Besides this, the allies determined to rebuild and fortify Orchomenus and Plataea.<sup>6</sup>

9

10

10. When the fate of Thebes was notified to the

<sup>3</sup> D. 14, 4 makes this a formal decree of the *synedrion* (Introd. 38), but still ascribes the real decision to Al., who wished to terrorize the Greeks, cf. P. 11, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Citizens who performed consular functions for members of particular foreign communities.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. P. 11, 6; 'vulgate', unless 'they' are Pt. and Ar.

<sup>6</sup> Previously destroyed by Thebes.

## ARRIAN

τῶν Θηβαίων τὸ πάθος, Ἀρκάδες μὲν, ὅσοι  
βοηθήσοντες Θηβαίοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὠρμήθησαν,  
θάνατον κατεψηφίσαντο τῶν ἐπαράντων σφᾶς ἐς  
τὴν βοήθειαν. Ἡλείοι δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας σφῶν  
κατεδέξαντο, ὅτι ἐπιτήδειοι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἦσαν.  
2 Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ πρεσβείας σφῶν κατὰ ἔθνη πέμψαντες  
ξυγγνώμης τυχεῖν ἐδέοντο, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ τι πρὸς τὰ  
παρὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀπαγγελθέντα ἐνεωτέρισαν.  
Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, μυστηρίων τῶν μεγάλων ἀγομένων  
ὡς ἤκόν τινες τῶν Θηβαίων ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου, τὰ  
μὲν μυστήρια ἐκπλαγέντες ἐξέλιπον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν  
3 ἀγρῶν ἐσκευαγῶγον ἐς τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δῆμος δὲ ἐς  
ἐκκλησίαν συνελθὼν Δημάδου γράψαντος δέκα  
πρέσβεις ἐκ πάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπιλεξάμενος  
πέμπει παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, οὓστινας ἐπιτηδειοτά-  
τους Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐγίνωσκον, ὅτι τε σῶος ἐξ  
Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Τριβαλλῶν ἐπανῆλθε χαίρειν τὸν  
δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ ἀπαγγελοῦ-  
ντας καὶ ὅτι Θηβαίους τοῦ νεωτερισμοῦ ἐτιμω-  
4 ρήσατο. ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φιλανθρώπως πρὸς τὴν  
πρεσβείαν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐπιστολὴν δὲ γράψας πρὸς  
τὸν δῆμον ἐξῆτει τοὺς ἀμφὶ Δημοσθένην καὶ  
Λυκοῦργον· καὶ Ὑπερείδην δὲ ἐξῆτει καὶ Πο-  
λύευκτον καὶ Χάρητα καὶ Χαρίδημον καὶ Ἐφιάλτην  
5 καὶ Διότιμον καὶ Μοιροκλέα· τούτους γὰρ  
αἰτίους εἶναι τῆς τε ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ συμφορᾶς τῇ  
πόλει γενομένης καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίππου

<sup>1</sup> Introd. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Early Oct. 335.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 23 says that Idomeneus and Duris (third-century writers) gave 10 names (cf. D. 15, 1, perhaps those in

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 10. 1-5

other Greeks, the Arcadians who had left home to help Thebes condemned to death those who had persuaded them to take this step, while the Eleans restored their own exiles, as they were persons ready to serve Alexander.<sup>1</sup> The Aetolians sent embassies, tribe by tribe, and begged forgiveness for revolting on the news brought from Thebes. The Athenians, who were celebrating their great mysteries<sup>2</sup> when some of the Thebans arrived hot foot from the action, abandoned the mysteries in consternation and began to get in their belongings from the country into the city. The people met in an assembly, and on the motion of Demades chose ten ambassadors from the whole body of citizens, men known to be most acceptable to Alexander, and sent them to him bearing the city's rather belated congratulations on his safe return from the Illyrians and Triballians and on his punishment of the Theban revolt. Alexander replied in a friendly way to the embassy, except that he wrote a letter to the city demanding the surrender of Demosthenes and Lycurgus, as well as Hyperides, Polyceutas, Chares, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Diotimus and Moerocles,<sup>3</sup> whom he held responsible for the city's disaster at Chaeronea and for the wrongs later committed,

335  
B.C.

2

3

4

5

[338  
B.C.]

Suidas *s.v.* Antipatros), but that the majority and best of the sources gave eight, which he lists; he then reports a *mot* of Demosthenes from Ar. (F. 3). If P. had read Ar., it follows that Ar. either gave no names, or the eight P. lists, which exclude Hyperides, Chares, Diotimus and Moerocles and include two not listed by A. In that case, as A. does not cite the 'vulgate', he must be following Pt., without mentioning the discrepancy with Ar. A's list agrees with that in Suidas, if Thrasybulus has dropped out of A's manuscripts and if we amend Patrocles to Moerocles in Suidas. See also *Introd.* n. 69.

## ARRIAN

τελευτῇ πλημμεληθέντων ἔς τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἔς  
 Φίλιππον· καὶ Θηβαίοις δὲ τῆς [τε] ἀποστάσεως  
 ἀπέφαινε αἰτίους οὐ μείον ἢ τοὺς αὐτῶν Θηβαίων  
 6 νεωτερίσαντας. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας οὐκ  
 ἐξέδοσαν, πρεσβεύονται δὲ αὐθις παρὰ Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρον, ἀφεῖναι δεόμενοι τὴν ὀργὴν τοῖς ἐξαι-  
 τηθεῖσι· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀφῆκε, τυχὸν μὲν αἰδοῖ  
 τῆς πόλεως, τυχὸν δὲ σπουδῇ τοῦ ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν  
 στόλου, οὐκ ἐθέλων οὐδὲν ὑποπτον ἐν τοῖς Ἑλ-  
 λησιν ὑπολείπεσθαι. Χαρίδημον μόνον τῶν  
 ἐξαιτηθέντων τε καὶ οὐ δοθέντων φεύγειν ἐκέλευσε·  
 καὶ φεύγει Χαρίδημος ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν παρὰ βασιλέα  
 Δαρεῖον.

11. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς  
 Μακεδονίαν· καὶ τῷ τε Διὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ τὴν  
 θυσίαν τὴν ἀπ' Ἀρχελαίου ἔτι καθεστῶσαν ἔθυσσε  
 καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐν Αἰγαῖς διέθηκε τὰ Ὀλύμπια· οἱ  
 δὲ καὶ ταῖς Μούσαις λέγουσιν ὅτι ἀγῶνα ἐποίησε.  
 2 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀγγέλλεται τὸ Ὀρφέως τοῦ Οἰάγρου  
 τοῦ Θρακὸς ἄγαλμα τὸ ἐν Πιερίδι ἰδρῶσαι  
 ξυνεχῶς· καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλα ἐπεθείαζον τῶν μάντεων,  
 Ἀρίστανδρος δέ, ἀνὴρ Τελμισσεύς, μάντις, θαρρεῖν  
 ἐκέλευσεν Ἀλέξανδρον· δηλοῦσθαι γάρ, ὅτι ποι-  
 ηταῖς ἐπῶν τε καὶ μελῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἀμφὶ ὠδὴν  
 ἔχουσι πολὺς πόνος ἔσται ποιεῖν τε καὶ ἄδειν  
 Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα.

3 Ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἡρι ἀρχομένῳ ἐξελαύνει ἐφ' Ἑλ-  
 λησπόντου, τὰ μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς  
 Ἑλληνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτρέψας, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄγων  
 πεζοὺς μὲν σὺν ψιλοῖς τε καὶ τοξόταις οὐ πολλῶ

<sup>4</sup> Cf P. 13, 1 f. Only a hint of the difficulty of reducing Athens, Introd. 43.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 10. 5-11. 3

at Philip's death, against himself and Philip. He also showed that they were just as guilty of the Theban rebellion as the Theban revolutionaries themselves. The Athenians did not give up the men, but sent a second embassy to Alexander, begging him to relent to those whose surrender he had demanded. Alexander did so, whether from reverence for Athens, or because he was anxious to hurry on his Asian expedition and did not wish to leave any ill-feeling behind in Greece.<sup>4</sup> Charidemus alone, however, of those men whose surrender he had demanded but not obtained, he ordered to be exiled; and he took refuge in Asia with King Darius.<sup>5</sup> 6

335  
B.C.

11. After completing these operations Alexander returned to Macedonia, where he offered the traditional sacrifice (established by Archelaus) to Olympian Zeus and celebrated the Olympian games at Aegae: others add<sup>1</sup> that he held games in honour of the Muses. Meanwhile, it was reported that the statue of Orpheus, son of Oeagrus the Thracian, in Pieria, had sweated continuously; the seers interpreted this variously, but Aristander of Telmissus encouraged Alexander by saying that it meant that makers of epics and choric songs and writers of odes would be hard at work on poetry and hymns honouring Alexander and his exploits. 2

In early spring he marched to the Hellespont, leaving Macedonian and Greek affairs in charge of Antipater. His infantry including light troops and archers numbered not much above thirty thou- 3

334  
B.C.

<sup>5</sup> This well-known general was allegedly first honoured, then executed by Darius, D. 30; QC. iii 2, 10 ff. (with variants).

<sup>1</sup> 'Vulgate', cf. D. 16, 3 f. A. omits D's story (16, 1 f.) that Al. rejected the advice of Parmenio and Antipater to defer the expedition till he had married and had a son.



## ARRIAN

- πλείους τῶν τρισμυρίων, ἰππέας δὲ ὑπὲρ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους. ἦν δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ στόλος παρὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Κερκινῆτιν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τοῦ
- 4 Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ τὰς ἐκβολάς. διαβὰς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα παρήμειβε τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος τὴν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀβδηρα καὶ Μαρώνειαν, πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἐπὶ θαλάσση ὠκισμένας. ἔνθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑβρον ποταμὸν ἀφικόμενος διαβαίνει καὶ τὸν Ἑβρον
- 5 εὐπετῶς. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ διὰ τῆς Παιτικῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Μέλανα ποταμὸν ἔρχεται. διαβὰς δὲ καὶ τὸν Μέλανα ἐς Σηστον ἀφικνεῖται ἐν εἴκοσι ταῖς πάσαις ἡμέραις ἀπὸ τῆς οἴκοθεν ἐξορμήσεως. ἔλθων δὲ ἐς Ἐλαιούντα θύει Πρωτεσιλάῳ ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου, ὅτι καὶ Πρωτεσίλαος πρῶτος ἐδόκει ἐκβῆναι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἅμα Ἀγαμέμνονι ἐς Ἴλιον στρατευσάντων. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς θυσίας ἦν ἐπιτυχεστέραν οἱ γενέσθαι ἢ Πρωτεσιλάῳ τὴν ἀπόβασιν.
- 6 Παρμενίων μὲν δὴ τῶν τε πεζῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ τὴν ἵππον διαβιβάσαι ἐτάχθη ἐκ Σηστοῦ ἐς Ἀβυδον· καὶ διέβησαν τριήρεσι μὲν ἑκατὸν καὶ ἑξήκοντα πλοίοις δὲ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς στρογγύλοις. Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ ἐξ Ἐλαιούντος ἐς τὸν Ἀχαιῶν λιμένα κατὰραι ὁ πλείων λόγος κατέχει, καὶ αὐτὸν τε κυβερνῶντα τὴν στρατηγίδα ναῦν διαβάλλειν καὶ, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ μέσον τὸν πόρον τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ἐγένετο, σφάξαντα ταῦρον τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καὶ Νηρηῖσι σπένδειν ἐκ χρυσῆς φιάλης ἐς τὸν
- 7 πόντον. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νεῶς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐκβῆναι αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀσίαν

<sup>1</sup> Numbers: Introd. 56. Pt. and Ar. agreed as to the foot;



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sand, his cavalry over five thousand.<sup>2</sup> His route was past Lake Cercinitis in the direction of Amphipolis and the delta of the river Strymon [Struma]. He crossed the Strymon and passed Mount Pangaeum, on the way to Abdera and Maronea, Greek cities settled by the sea. Thence he reached the Hebrus [Maritza] and crossed it with ease; from there he went through Paetice to the Black River, crossed it, and reached Sestus twenty days in all after starting from home.<sup>3</sup> Arriving at Elaeus, he sacrificed to Protesilaus at his tomb, since he was thought to be the first to disembark on Asian soil of the Greeks who fought with Agamemnon against Troy. The intention of the sacrifice was that his own landing on Asian soil might be luckier than that of Protesilaus.

Parmenio was appointed to see to the ferrying over from Sestus to Abydos of the cavalry and most of the infantry; they crossed in a hundred and sixty triremes<sup>4</sup> and in a good number of cargo boats. According to the prevalent story<sup>5</sup> Alexander made from Elaeus for the Achaean harbour, and steered the admiral's ship himself when he crossed, sacrificing a bull to Posidon and the Nereids in the midst of the Hellespont strait, and pouring into the sea a drink offering from a golden bowl. They also say that he was the first to disembark on Asian soil armed *cap-*

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A. ignores Ar's variant (4,000) for horse, and his statement that he had only 70 Talents (*contra* vii 9, 6; for other variants, P. 15), though this deserved full treatment; initial costs were inevitably heavy; hence in 334 shortage of cash, cf. i 20; vii 9. 6; App. II 1.

<sup>2</sup> Landing in Asia, D. 17-18, 1; P. 15. For § 5-8 see App. IV 1 f.

<sup>4</sup> App. II 1.

<sup>5</sup> 'Vulgate' to end of ch.

καὶ βωμοὺς ἰδρύσασθαι ὅθεν τε ἐστάλη ἐκ τῆς  
 Εὐρώπης καὶ ὅπου ἐξέβη τῆς Ἀσίας Διὸς ἀπο-  
 βατηρίου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡρακλέους. ἀνελθόντα  
 δὲ ἐς Ἴλιον τῇ τε Ἀθηνᾷ θῦσαι τῇ Ἰλιάδι, καὶ τὴν  
 πανοπλίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀναθεῖναι ἐς τὸν νεών, καὶ  
 8 καθελεῖν ἀντὶ ταύτης τῶν ἱερῶν τινα ὄπλων ἔτι ἐκ  
 τοῦ Τρωικοῦ ἔργου σωζόμενα. καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσιν  
 ὅτι οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ ἔφερον πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰς μάχας.  
 θῦσαι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Πριάμῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦ  
 Διὸς τοῦ Ἐρκείου λόγος κατέχει, μῆνιν Πριάμου  
 παραιτούμενον τῷ Νεοπτολέμου γένει, ὃ δὴ ἐς  
 αὐτὸν καθῆκεν.

12. Ἀνιόντα δ' αὐτὸν ἐς Ἴλιον Μενοίτιός τε ὁ  
 κυβερνήτης χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἐστεφάνωσε καὶ ἐπὶ  
 τούτῳ Χάρης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐκ Σιγείου ἐλθὼν καί  
 τινες καὶ ἄλλοι, οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες, οἱ δὲ ἐπιχώριοι.  
 . . . οἱ δὲ, ὅτι καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέως ἄρα τάφον  
 ἐστεφάνωσεν. Ἡφαιστίωνα δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι τοῦ  
 Πατρόκλου τὸν τάφον ἐστεφάνωσε. καὶ εὐδαι-  
 μόνισεν ἄρα, ὡς λόγος, Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀχιλλέα, ὅτι  
 2 Ὀμήρου κήρυκος ἐς τὴν ἔπειτα μνήμην ἔτυχε. καὶ  
 μέντοι καὶ ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου  
 ἔνεκα εὐδαιμονιστέος Ἀχιλλεύς, ὅτι αὐτῷ γε  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιτυχίαν, τὸ  
 χωρίον τοῦτο ἐκλιπὲς ξυνέβη οὐδὲ ἐξηνέχθη ἐς  
 ἀνθρώπους τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα ἐπαξίως, οὔτ' οὖν  
 καταλογάδην, οὔτε τις ἐν μέτρῳ ἐποίησεν. ἀλλ'  
 οὐδὲ ἐν μέλει ἦσθη Ἀλέξανδρος, ἐν ὅτῳ Ἱέρων τε  
 καὶ Γέλων καὶ Θήρων καὶ πολλοὶ ἄλλοι οὐδέν τι  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐπεικότες, ὥστε πολὺ μείον γινώ-  
 σκεται τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἢ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν πάλαι  
 3 ἔργων. ὁπότε καὶ ἡ τῶν μυρίων ξὺν Κύρῳ ἄνοδος

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*à-pie*, that he set up altars both where he started from Europe and where he landed in Asia to Zeus of Safe Landings, Athena, and Heracles, and that he then went up to Troy, and sacrificed to the Trojan Athena, dedicated his full armour in the temple, and took down in its place some of the dedicated arms yet remaining from the Trojan war, which, it is said, the hypaspists henceforth used to carry before him into battle. Then he sacrificed also to Priam at the altar of Zeus of Enclosures (so runs the story), praying Priam not to vent his anger on the race of Neoptolemus, of which he himself was a scion. 8

12. When Alexander reached Troy Menoetius the pilot crowned him with a golden wreath and then Chares the Athenian<sup>1</sup> arrived from Sigeum with others, Greeks or natives of the place . . .<sup>2</sup> Some say that Alexander crowned the tomb of Achilles, while Hephaestion, others say, placed a wreath on Patroclus' tomb; and Alexander, so the story goes, blessed Achilles for having Homer to proclaim his fame to posterity.<sup>3</sup> Alexander might well have counted Achilles happy on this score, since, fortunate as Alexander was in other ways, there was a great gap left here, and Alexander's exploits were never celebrated as they deserved, either in prose or verse; there were not even choral lyrics for Alexander as for Hiero, Gelo, Thero and many others not to be compared with him, so that Alexander's exploits are far less known than very minor deeds of old times. Why, 3

<sup>1</sup> The Athenian general, earlier (10, 4) and later (iii 2, 6) hostile.

<sup>2</sup> The text has a lacuna.

<sup>3</sup> 'Vulgate', as often with variant versions; A's own reflections follow. (Hephaestion was A's most intimate friend.)

ἐπὶ βασιλέα Ἀρτοξέρξην καὶ τὰ Κλεάρχου τε καὶ τῶν ἄμα αὐτῷ ἀλόντων παθήματα καὶ ἡ κατάβασις αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ἣν Ξενοφῶν αὐτοὺς κατήγαγε, πολὺ τι ἐπιφανέστερα ἐς ἀνθρώπους Ξενοφῶντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἢ Ἀλέξανδρός τε καὶ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 4 ἔργα. καίτοι Ἀλέξανδρος οὔτε ξὺν ἄλλῳ ἐστράτευσεν, οὔτε φεύγων μέγαν βασιλέα τοὺς τῆ καθόδῳ τῆ ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἐμποδῶν γιγνομένους ἐκράτησεν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἄλλος εἰς ἀνὴρ τοσαῦτα ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἔργα κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἐν Ἑλλησιν ἢ βαρβάροις ἀπεδείξατο. ἔνθεν καὶ αὐτὸς ὀρμηθῆναί φημι ἐς τήνδε τὴν ξυγγραφὴν, οὐκ ἀπαξιώσας ἑμαυτὸν φανερὰ καταστήσειν ἐς ἀνθρώ-  
 5 πους τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα. ὅστις δὲ ὦν ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ γινώσκω, τὸ μὲν ὄνομα οὐδὲν δέομαι ἀναγράψαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἄγνωστον ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, οὐδὲ πατρίδα ἣτις μοί ἐστιν οὐδὲ γένος τὸ ἐμόν, οὐδὲ εἰ δὴ τινα ἀρχὴν ἐν τῇ ἑμαυτοῦ ἤρξα· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀναγράφω, ὅτι ἐμοὶ πατρίς τε καὶ γένος καὶ ἀρχαὶ οἶδε οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἀπὸ νέου ἔτι ἐγένοντο. καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ ἑμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ οὖν καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις.

6 Ἐξ Ἰλίου δὲ ἐς Ἀρίσβην ἦκεν, οὐ πᾶσα ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ διαβεβηκυῖα τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον ἐστρατοπεδεύκει, καὶ τῇ ὑστεραία ἐς Περκώτην· τῇ δὲ ἄλλῃ Λάμψακον παραμείψας πρὸς τῷ Πρακτίῳ<sup>1</sup> ποταμῷ ἐστρατοπέδευσεν, ὃς ῥέων ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν τῶν Ἰδαίων ἐκδιδοῖ ἐς θάλασσαν τὴν μεταξὺ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου τε καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου. ἔνθεν δὲ ἐς Ἐρμῶτον ἀφίκετο, Κολωνὰς

<sup>1</sup> Freinsheim; προσακτίῳ A: παρ' ἀκτὴν Lane Fox 515.

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the march up into Asia of the Ten Thousand with  
 Cyrus against King Artaxerxes, the sufferings of  
 Clearchus and those captured with him, and the  
 descent to the sea of those Ten Thousand under  
 the leadership of Xenophon, are, thanks to Xenophon,  
 far better known to the world than Alexander and  
 Alexander's exploits. Yet Alexander did not take  
 the field in another's army; he did not flee from the  
 Great King, defeating only those who tried to stop  
 the march down to the sea; no other single man  
 performed such remarkable deeds, whether in  
 number or magnitude, among either Greeks or  
 barbarians. That, I declare, is why I myself have  
 embarked on this history, not judging myself un-  
 worthy to make Alexander's deeds known to men.  
 Whoever I may be, this I know in my favour; I need  
 not write my name, for it is not at all unknown  
 among men, nor my country nor my family nor any  
 office I may have held in my own land; this I do set  
 on paper, that country, family, and offices I find and  
 have found from my youth in these tales. That is  
 why I think myself not unworthy of the masters of  
 Greek speech, since my subject Alexander was  
 among the masters of warfare.<sup>4</sup>

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From Ilium Alexander came to Arisbe, where his  
 whole force had encamped after crossing the Helles-  
 pont; next day to Percote, the next he passed  
 Lampsacus and camped by the river Practius, which  
 flows from Mount Ida and runs into the sea that  
 lies between the Hellespont and the Black Sea.  
 Then he reached Hermotus, passing by Colonae.

<sup>4</sup> I shall discuss this in an Appendix on A's career in vol. II. For the striking and strange language (derived from *Iliad* vi 429 f.) cf. Aelius Aristides xxxiii 20; I owe these references to E. Bowie.

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- 7 πόλιν παραμείψας. σκοποὶ δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπέμποντο πρὸ τοῦ στρατεύματος· καὶ τούτων ἡγεμῶν ἦν Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀρραβαίου, ἔχων τῶν τε ἐταίρων τὴν ἴλην τὴν ἐξ Ἀπολλωνίας, ἧς ἰλάρχης ἦν Σωκράτης ὁ Σάθωνος, καὶ τῶν προδρόμων καλουμένων ἴλας τέσσαρας. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πάροδον Πρίαπον πόλιν ἐνδοθεῖσαν πρὸς τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοὺς παραληψομένους ἀπέστειλε σὺν Πανηγόρῳ τῷ Λυκαγόρου, ἐνὶ τῶν ἐταίρων.
- 8 Περσῶν δὲ στρατηγοὶ ἦσαν Ἀρσάμης καὶ Ῥεομίθρης καὶ Πετήνης καὶ Νιφάτης καὶ ξὺν τούτοις Σπιθριδάτης ὁ Λυδίας καὶ Ἰωνίας σατράπης καὶ Ἀρσίτης ὁ τῆς πρὸς Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίας ὑπαρχος. οὗτοι δὲ πρὸς Ζελεΐα πόλει κατεστρατοπεδευκότες ἦσαν ξὺν τῇ ἵππῳ τε τῇ βαρβαρικῇ καὶ
- 9 τοῖς Ἑλλησι τοῖς μισθοφόροις. βουλευομένοις δὲ αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων, ἐπειδὴ Ἀλέξανδρος διαβεβηκῶς ἠγγέλλετο, Μέμνων ὁ Ῥόδιος παρήνει μὴ διὰ κινδύνου ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας, τῷ τε πεζῷ πολὺ περιόντας σφῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου παρόντος, αὐτοῖς δὲ ἀπόντος Δαρείου· προϊόντας δὲ τὸν τε χιλὸν ἀφανίζειν καταπατοῦντας τῇ ἵππῳ καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ γῇ καρπὸν ἐμπιπράναι, μηδὲ τῶν πόλεων αὐτῶν φειδομένους. οὐ γὰρ μενεῖν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀπορία τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.
- 10 Ἀρσίτην δὲ λέγεται εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν Περσῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν περιῖδοι μίαν οἰκίαν ἐμπρησθεῖσαν τῶν ὑπὸ οἷ τεταγμένων ἀνθρώπων· καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας Ἀρσίτη προσθέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ὑποπτὸν τι αὐτοῖς ἦν ἐς τὸν Μέμνονα τριβὰς ἐμποιεῖν ἐκόντα τῷ πολέμῳ τῆς ἐκ βασιλέως τιμῆς οὕνεκα.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 12. 7-10

He sent scouts ahead of the army; Amyntas, son of Arrabaeus, led them with the squadron of Companions from Apollonia, whose squadron leader was Socrates, son of Sathon, with four squadrons of the so-called *prodromoi*. On his march the city of Priapus was surrendered to him by the citizens, and he sent a party to take it over under Panegorus son of Lycagorus, one of the Companions. 7 334 B.C.

The Persian commanders were Arsames, Rheomithres, Petenes, Niphates, and with them Spithridates the satrap of Lydia and Ionia and Arsites the hyparch<sup>5</sup> of Hellespontine Phrygia. They had already encamped by the city of Zeleia with the barbarian cavalry and the mercenary Greeks. They held a council of war when Alexander's crossing was reported and Memnon of Rhodes advised them to run no risk against the Macedonians, as the latter were far superior in infantry, while Alexander was present and Darius absent on their own side; they had far best march on, destroying the fodder by trampling it with their cavalry, and burning the growing crops, not even sparing the very cities; then Alexander would not stay in the country for want of provisions. However, it is said that Arsites stated in the Persian council that he would not suffer one house to be burned belonging to his subjects, and that the Persians supported Arsites, suspecting Memnon of deliberately holding up warlike operations for the sake of the honour he held from the king.<sup>6</sup> 8 9 10

<sup>5</sup> Properly an official subordinate to a satrap, but here, as in iv 18, 3 (cf. iii 16, 4), meaning a satrap.

<sup>6</sup> On Memnon (brother-in-law of Artabazus, iii 21, 4 n.) and his strategy cf. Introd. §45; 54.



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13. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος προὔχῳρει ἐπὶ τὸν  
 Γράνικον ποταμὸν συντεταγμένῳ τῷ στρατῷ,  
 διπλὴν μὲν τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τάξας, τοὺς  
 δὲ ἰππέας κατὰ τὰ κέρατα ἄγων, τὰ σκευοφόρα δὲ  
 κατόπιον ἐπιτάξας ἔπεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ προκατα-  
 σκεφομένους τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἤγεν αὐτῷ Ἡγέ-  
 2 λοχος, ἰππέας μὲν ἔχων τοὺς σαρισσοφόρους, τῶν  
 δὲ ψιλῶν ἕς πεντακοσίους. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρός τε οὐ  
 πολὺ ἀπέειχε τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ Γρανίκου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ  
 τῶν σκοπῶν σπουδῇ ἐλαύνοντες ἀπήγγελλον ἐπὶ τῷ  
 Γρανίκῳ πέραν τοὺς Πέρσας ἐφεστάναι τεταγμέ-  
 νους ὡς ἕς μάχην. ἔνθα δὴ Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν τὴν  
 στρατιὰν πᾶσαν συνέταπτεν ὡς μαχουμένους·  
 Παρμενίων δὲ προσελθὼν λέγει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τάδε.  
 3 “Ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, βασιλεῦ, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐν τῷ  
 παρόντι καταστρατοπεδεῦσαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ  
 ὄχθῃ ὡς ἔχομεν. τοὺς γὰρ πολεμίους οὐ δοκῶ  
 4 τολμήσειν πολὺ τῷ πεζῷ λειπομένους πλησίον  
 ἡμῶν αὐλισθῆναι, καὶ ταύτῃ παρέξειν ἔωθεν  
 εὐπετῶς τῷ στρατῷ διαβαλεῖν τὸν πόρον· ὑπο-  
 φθάσομεν γὰρ αὐτοὶ περάσαντες πρὶν ἐκείνους ἕς  
 5 τάξιν καθίστασθαι. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκινδύνως μοι  
 δοκοῦμεν ἐπιχειρήσειν τῷ ἔργῳ, ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐν  
 μετώπῳ διὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἄγειν τὸν στρατόν.  
 6 πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὁράται βαθέα, αἱ δὲ ὄχθαι  
 αὐταὶ ὁρᾶς ὅτι ὑπερύψηλοι καὶ κρημνώδεις εἰσὶν αἱ  
 αὐτῶν· ἀτάκτως τε οὖν καὶ κατὰ κέρας, ἥπερ  
 ἀσθενέστατον, ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐπικείσονται ἕς φάλαγγα  
 ζυντεταγμένοι τῶν πολεμίων οἱ ἰππεῖς· καὶ τὸ  
 πρῶτον σφάλμα ἕς τε τὰ παρόντα χαλεπὸν καὶ ἕς  
 τὴν ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου κρίσιν σφαλερόν.”  
 Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, “ταῦτα μὲν”, ἔφη, “ὦ Παρμε-

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13. Meanwhile, Alexander was advancing to the river Granicus<sup>1</sup> with his force all ready for battle, after drawing up his hoplites in two lines, with the cavalry on the wings, and ordering the baggage train to follow behind. The reconnoitring force was under the command of Hegelochus, with the lancers as cavalry, and five hundred light troops. Alexander was not far from the river Granicus, when some of the scouts, riding in at full speed, reported that the Persians were drawn up for battle on the farther bank of the Granicus. Alexander then formed the whole army for battle; but Parmenio came forward and said:

' My view, sir, is that we should encamp at once on the river bank, as we are; the enemy outnumbered in infantry will, I believe, not dare to bivouac near us; and this will make it easy for the army to cross at dawn; we shall be across ourselves before they get into order. As things are, I feel that we should run great risk in taking action, since we cannot take the army across the river on a wide front, for one can see that many parts of it are deep; its banks, as you see, are very high, sometimes like cliffs. As we emerge in disorder and in column, the weakest of formations, the enemy cavalry in good solid order will charge: the initial disaster would be damaging at present, and most harmful for the general result of the war.'

Alexander, however, replied: ' All this I know,

<sup>1</sup> For chs 13-16 see App. I. The battle was fought in May-June. The Granicus descends from Mt. Ida to the Propontis.

## ARRIAN

νίων, γιννώσκω· αἰσχύνομαι δέ, εἰ τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον διέβην εὐπετῶς, τοῦτο δέ, σμικρὸν ρεῦμα,—οὕτω τῷ ὀνόματι τὸν Γράνικον ἐκφασίσεις,—εἴρξει ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ οὐ διαβῆναι ὡς ἔχομεν.  
 7 καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε πρὸς Μακεδόνων τῆς δόξης οὔτε πρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους ὀξύτητος ποιούμαι· ἀναθαρρήσειν τε δοκῶ τοὺς Πέρσας <ὡς> ἀξιωμαχοὺς Μακεδόσιν ὄντας, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄξιον τοῦ σφῶν δέους ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἔπαθον.”

14. Ταῦτα εἰπὼν Παρμενίωνα μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας πέμπει ἡγησόμενον, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν παρήγε. προετάχθησαν δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ Φιλώτας ὁ Παρμενίωνος, ἔχων τοὺς ἐταίρους τοὺς ἵππεάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς· Ἀμύντας δὲ ὁ Ἀρραβαίου τοὺς τε σαρισσοφόρους ἵππεάς ἔχων Φιλώτα ἐπετάχθη καὶ τοὺς Παίονας καὶ τὴν Ἴλην  
 2 τὴν Σωκράτους. ἐχόμενοι δὲ τούτων ἐτάχθησαν οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἐταίρων, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Νικάνωρ ὁ Παρμενίωνος· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἡ Περδίκκου τοῦ Ὀρόντου φάλαγξ· ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Κοίνου τοῦ Πολεμοκράτους· [ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Κρατεροῦ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου·] ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ Ἀνδρομένους· ἐπὶ δὲ ὧν  
 3 Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου ἦρχε. τοῦ δὲ εὐωνύμου πρῶτοι μὲν οἱ Θετταλοὶ ἵππεῖς ἐτάχθησαν, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Κάλας ὁ Ἀρπάλου· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἵππεῖς, ὧν ἦρχε Φίλιππος ὁ Μενελάου· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις οἱ Θράκες, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἀγάθων· ἐχόμενοι δὲ τούτων πεζοὶ ἢ τε Κρατεροῦ φάλαγξ καὶ ἡ Μελεάγρου καὶ ἡ Φιλίππου ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 13. 6-14. 3

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B.C.

Parmenio, but I should feel ashamed if after crossing the Hellespont easily, this petty stream (by this epithet did he belittle the Granicus) hinders us from crossing, just as we are. I consider this unworthy either of the prestige of the Macedonians or of my own celerity in dealing with dangers; I believe it would encourage the Persians to think themselves equal to fighting the Macedonians, since they have not experienced any immediate disaster to justify their alarm.' 7

14. After saying this, he sent off Parmenio to lead the left wing; he himself passed along to the right. In front of his right he had already posted Philotas son of Parmenio, with the Companion cavalry, the archers, and the Agrianian javelin-men. Next to Philotas Amyntas son of Arrabaeus was posted, with the lancers,<sup>1</sup> the Paeonians and Socrates' squadron. Next to them were marshalled the hypaspists of the Companions, led by Nicanor son of Parmenio; beside these was the phalanx<sup>2</sup> of Perdicas son of Orontes, then that of Coenus son of Polemocrates, [then that of Craterus son of Alexander,]<sup>3</sup> then that of Amyntas son of Andromenes, then the troops under Philip son of Amyntas. On the left wing the Thessalian cavalry came first, commanded by Calas son of Harpalus, next, the allied cavalry under Philip son of Menelaus, then the Thracians under Agatho; on their right were the infantry, the phalanx regiments of Craterus, of Meleager and of Philip,<sup>4</sup> up to the centre of the whole line. 2 3

<sup>1</sup> Amyntas: App. XI 5. 'Lancers': Introd. § 58; 64.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. a battalion of the Foot-Companions, Introd. § 61.

<sup>3</sup> Craterus was on the left (§ 3), as in other battles, ii 8, 4; iii 11, 10. Hence, these words are interpolated.

<sup>4</sup> A. mentions Philip's battalion twice, counting first from the right, then from the left.

- 4 Περσῶν δὲ ἵππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν ἐς δισμυρίους, ξένοι δὲ πεζοὶ μισθοφόροι ὀλίγον ἀποδέοντες δισμυρίων· ἐτάχθησαν δὲ τὴν μὲν ἵππον παρατείναντες τῷ ποταμῷ κατὰ τὴν ὄχθην ἐπὶ φάλαγγα μακράν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς κατόπιον τῶν ἵππέων· καὶ γὰρ ὑπερδέξια ἦν τὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν ὄχθην χωρία. ἦ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτὸν καθεώρων—δῆλος γὰρ ἦν τῶν τε ὄπλων τῆ λαμπρότητι καὶ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν τῆ σὺν ἐκπλήξει θεραπείᾳ—κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον [μὲν] σφῶν ἐπέχοντα, ταύτη πικνὰς ἐπέταξαν τῆ ὄχθῃ τὰς ἴλας τῶν ἵππέων.
- 5 Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφοτέρωτα τὰ στρατεύματα ἐπ' ἄκρου τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφειστώτες ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλή ἀφ' ἑκατέρων. οἱ γὰρ Πέρσαι προσέμενον τοὺς Μακεδόνας, ὅποτε ἐσβήσονται ἐς τὸν πόρον, ὡς ἐπικει-
- 6 σόμενοι ἐκβαίνουσιν· Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἀναπηδήσας ἐπὶ τὸν ἵππον καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐγκελευσάμενος ἔπεσθαί τε καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν προδρόμους ἵππέας καὶ μὴν καὶ τοὺς Παίονας προεμβαιεῖν ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἔχοντα Ἀμύνταν τὸν Ἀρραβαίου <ἔταξε> καὶ τῶν πεζῶν μίαν τάξιν, καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὴν Σωκράτους ἴλην Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου ἄγοντα, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐτύγχανε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦ ἵππικοῦ παντὸς ἔχουσα[ν] ἐκείνη τῆ ἡμέρα·
- 7 αὐτὸς δὲ ἄγων τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ὑπὸ σαλπύγγων τε καὶ τῷ Ἐνναλίῳ ἀλαλάζοντας ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν αἰεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ἣ παρεῖλκε τὸ ρεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀνυστὸν τῆ φάλαγγι προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.

15. Οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι, ἣ πρῶτοι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀμύνταν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 14. 4-15. 1

The Persians had about 20,000 cavalry, and little short of the same number of foreign mercenary infantry. They were drawn up with the cavalry in an extended phalanx, on the bank parallel to the river, the infantry behind them; the land above the bank was high and commanding. Where they observed Alexander himself—he was unmistakable, from the splendour of his equipment and the enthusiasm of the men in attendance round him—aiming at their left, they massed their cavalry squadrons on the bank there. 4 334  
B.C.

For some time the two forces on the river's brink, dreading to precipitate the event, remained still and in deep silence on either side. For the Persians were waiting for the Macedonians, so as to fall on them emerging from the river, whenever they attempted the crossing; but Alexander leapt on his horse, and calling on his suite to follow and show themselves brave men and true, ordered the *prodromoi* and the Paeonians to plunge first into the stream, under command of Amyntas son of Arrabaeus, with one battalion of the infantry and in advance Socrates' squadron under Ptolemy son of Philip (this was on the list as leading the whole cavalry on that day); then he himself, leading the right wing, with bugles sounding, and the battle cry going up to the God of Battles, went into the stream, continually extending his troops obliquely in the direction in which the current was pulling them, so that the Persians should not fall on him in column as he emerged, but that he himself might attack them, as far as might be, in deep formation. 5  
6  
7

15. At the point where the vanguard under Amyntas

## ARRIAN

καὶ Σωκράτην προσέσχον τῇ ὄχθῃ, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 ἄνωθεν ἔβαλλον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄχθης ἐξ  
 ὑπερδεξίου ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἔσακοντίζοντες, οἱ δὲ  
 2 κατὰ τὰ χθαμαλώτερα αὐτῆς ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ ὕδωρ  
 καταβαίνοντες. καὶ ἦν τῶν τε ἰππέων ὠθισμός,  
 τῶν μὲν ἐκβαίνειν ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τῶν δ' εἶργειν  
 τὴν ἔκβασιν, καὶ παλτῶν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν  
 πολλὴ ἄφεςις, οἱ Μακεδόνες δὲ ξὺν τοῖς δόρασιν  
 ἐμάχοντο. ἀλλὰ τῷ τε πλήθει πολὺ ἐλαττούμενοι  
 <οἱ> Μακεδόνες ἐκακοπάθουν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσ-  
 βολῇ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξ οὐ βεβαίου τε καὶ ἅμα κάτωθεν  
 ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀμυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι ἐξ  
 ὑπερδεξίου τῆς ὄχθης· ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸ κράτιστον  
 τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου ταύτῃ ἐπετέτακτο, οἱ τε  
 Μέμνονος παῖδες καὶ αὐτὸς Μέμνων μετὰ τούτων  
 3 ἐκινδύνευε. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρώτοι τῶν Μακεδόνων  
 ζυμμίξαντες τοῖς Πέρσαις κατεκόπησαν πρὸς  
 αὐτῶν, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι, ὅσοι γε μὴ πρὸς  
 Ἀλέξανδρον πελάζοντα ἀπέκλιναν αὐτῶν. Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος γὰρ ἤδη πλησίον ἦν, ἅμα οἱ ἄγων τὸ κέρας  
 τὸ δεξιόν, καὶ ἐμβάλλει ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας πρῶτος,  
 ἵνα τὸ πᾶν στίφος τῆς ἵππου καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἡγεμόνες  
 τῶν Περσῶν τεταγμένοι ἦσαν· καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν  
 4 ζυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερά· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ'  
 ἄλλαις τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ  
 χαλεπῶς ἤδη. καὶ ἦν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ἡ μάχη,  
 πεζομαχία δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐώκει. ζυνεχόμενοι γὰρ  
 ἵπποι τε ἵπποις καὶ ἄνδρες ἀνδράσιν ἡγωνίζοντο, οἱ  
 μὲν ἐξῶσαι εἰς ἅπαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄχθης καὶ ἐς τὸ  
 πεδίον βιάσασθαι τοὺς Πέρσας, οἱ Μακεδόνες, οἱ δὲ  
 εἶρξαι τε αὐτῶν τὴν ἔκβασιν, οἱ Πέρσαι, καὶ ἐς τὸν  
 5 ποταμὸν αὐθις ἀπώσασθαι. καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐπλεο-



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 15. 1-5

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B.C.

and Socrates touched the bank, the Persians shot volleys on them from above, some hurling their javelins into the river from their commanding position on the bank, others going down to the stream on the more level ground. There was a great shoving by the cavalry, as some were trying to get out of the river, others to stop them, great showers of Persian javelins, much thrusting of Macedonian spears. But the Macedonians, much outnumbered, came off badly in the first onslaught; they were defending themselves from the river on ground that was not firm and was beneath the enemy's while the Persians had the advantage of the bank; in particular, the flower of the Persian cavalry was posted here, and Memnon's sons and Memnon himself ventured their lives with them. The first Macedonians who came to grips with the Persians were cut down, despite their valour, save those of them who fell back on Alexander as he approached. For he was already near, with the right wing which he was leading, and he charged the Persians at the head of his men just where cavalry were massed and the Persian commanders were posted. A fierce fight raged round him; and meanwhile the Macedonians, battalion after battalion, kept crossing, a task now not so difficult. Though the fighting was on horseback, it was more like an infantry battle, horse entangled with horse, man with man in the struggle, the Macedonians trying to push the Persians once and for all from the bank and force them on to the level ground, the Persians trying to bar their landing and thrust them back again into the river.

## ARRIAN

νέκτουν ἤδη οἱ σὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῇ τε ἄλλῃ ῥώμῃ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ ὅτι ξυστοῖς κρανεῖνοις πρὸς παλτὰ ἐμάχοντο.

- 6 Ἐνθα δὴ καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ξυντρίβεται τὸ δόρυ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ· ὁ δὲ Ἀρέτην ἤτει δόρυ ἕτερον, ἀναβολέα τῶν βασιλικῶν· τῷ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ πονουμένῳ συντετριμμένον τὸ δόρυ ἦν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἡμίσει κεκλασμένου τοῦ δόρατος οὐκ ἀφανῶς ἐμάχετο, καὶ τοῦτο δείξας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἄλλον αἰτεῖν ἐκέλευεν· Δημάρατος δέ, ἀνὴρ Κορίνθιος, τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐταίρων,
- 7 δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τὸ αὐτοῦ δόρυ· καὶ ὃς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ ἰδὼν Μιθριδάτην τὸν Δαρείου γαμβρὸν πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων προῖππεύοντα καὶ ἐπάγοντα ἅμα οἷ ὥσπερ ἔμβολον τῶν ἰππέων ἐξελαύνει καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ παίσας ἐς τὸ πρόσωπον τῷ δόρατι καταβάλλει τὸν Μιθριδάτην· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Ῥοισάκης μὲν ἐπελαύνει τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ παίει
- 8 Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν κεφαλὴν τῇ κοπίδι· καὶ τοῦ μὲν κράνουσ τι ἀπέθραυσε, τὴν πληγὴν δὲ ἔσχε τὸ κράνος· καὶ καταβάλλει καὶ τοῦτον Ἀλέξανδρος παίσας τῷ ξυστῷ διὰ τοῦ θώρακος ἐς τὸ στέρνον· Σπιθριδάτης δὲ ἀνετέτατο μὲν ἤδη ἐπ' Ἀλέξανδρον ὀπισθεν τὴν κοπίδα, ὑποφθάσας δὲ αὐτὸν Κλεῖτος ὁ Δρωπίδου παίει κατὰ τοῦ ὤμου καὶ ἀποκόπτει τὸν ὤμον τοῦ Σπιθριδάτου ξὺν τῇ κοπίδι· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπεκβαίνοντες αἰεὶ τῶν ἰππέων ὅσοις προὔχῳρει κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν προσεγίγνοντο τοῖς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον.

16. Καὶ οἱ Πέρσαι παιόμενοί τε πανταχόθεν ἤδη ἐς τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτοί τε καὶ ἵπποι τοῖς ξυστοῖς καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἰππέων ἐξωθούμενοι, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῶν ψιλῶν ἀναμεμιγμένων τοῖς ἰππεῦσι βλαπτό-

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 15. 5-16. 1

Already, however, Alexander's men were getting the best of it, not only through their strength and experience but because they were fighting with cornelwood lances against short javelins. 5 334 B.C.

At this point in the *mêlée* Alexander's lance was broken in the battle; he called on Aretas, a groom of the royal suite, for another, but Aretas had also snapped his lance, and was hard pressed, though putting up a brave fight with the half of his broken weapon. Showing this to Alexander, he told him to call on someone else. Demaratus of Corinth, one of his Companions, gave him his own lance. Alexander grasped it and seeing Mithridates, son-in-law of Dareius, riding far ahead of the line and leading on a wedge shaped body of horse, charged out alone in advance of his own men, thrust his lance into Mithridates' face and hurled him to the ground. Then Rhoesaces rode at Alexander, and struck him on the head with his scimitar; though he sheared off part of the helmet, still the helmet parried the blow. Alexander hurled him too to the ground, piercing with his lance through the cuirass into his chest. Spithridates had already raised his scimitar against Alexander from behind when Clitus son of Dropides, slipping in first, struck Spithridates' shoulder with his scimitar and cut it off. Meanwhile cavalry who made good their way down stream kept coming up and joining the band round Alexander.<sup>1</sup> 6 7 8

16. The Persians were now being roughly handled from all quarters; they and their horses were struck in the face with lances, they were being pushed back by the cavalry, and were suffering heavily from

<sup>1</sup> D's parallel account (ch. 20) has some differences in names and other details. On weapons used see Introd. 63f.

- μενοι ἐγκλίνουσι ταύτη πρῶτον, ἢ Ἄλέξανδρος προεκινδύνευεν. ὡς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἐνεδεδώκει αὐτοῖς, παρερρήγνυτο δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα τῆς ἵππου, 2 καὶ ἦν δὴ φυγὴ καρτερά. τῶν μὲν δὴ ἱππέων τῶν Περσῶν ἀπέθανον εἰς χιλίους. οὐ γὰρ πολλὴ ἡ δίωξις ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἐξετράπη Ἄλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους· ὦν τὸ στίφος, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτάχθη, ἐκπλήξει μᾶλλον τι τοῦ παραλόγου ἢ λογισμῶ βεβαίῳ ἔμενεν· καὶ τούτοις τὴν τε φάλαγγα ἐπαγαγὼν καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας πάντη προσπεσεῖν κελεύσας ἐν μέσῳ δι' ὀλίγου κατακόπτει αὐτούς, ὥστε διέφυγε μὲν οὐδεὶς, ὅτι μὴ διέλαθέ τις ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς, ἐξωγρήθησαν δὲ ἀμφὶ τοὺς 3 δισχιλίους. ἔπεσον δὲ καὶ ἡγεμόνες τῶν Περσῶν Νιφάτης τε καὶ Πετήνης καὶ Σπιθριδάτης ὁ Λυδίας σατράπης καὶ ὁ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν ὑπαρχος Μιθροβουζάνης καὶ Μιθριδάτης ὁ Δαρείου γαμβρὸς καὶ Ἄρβουπάλης ὁ Δαρείου τοῦ Ἄρτοξέρξου παῖς καὶ Φαρνάκης, ἀδελφὸς οὗτος τῆς Δαρείου γυναικός, καὶ ὁ τῶν ξένων ἡγεμῶν Ὠμάρης. Ἄρσίτης δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῆς μάχης φεύγει εἰς Φρυγίαν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀποθνήσκει αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτοῦ, ὡς λόγος, ὅτι αἴτιος ἐδόκει Πέρσαις γενέσθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ τότε πταίσματος.
- 4 Μακεδόνων δὲ τῶν μὲν ἐταίρων ἀμφὶ τοὺς εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ ἀπέθανον· καὶ τούτων χαλκαῖ εἰκόνες ἐν Δίῳ ἐστᾶσιν, Ἄλεξάνδρου κελεύσαντος Λύσιππον ποιῆσαι, ὅσπερ καὶ Ἄλέξανδρον μόνος προκριθεὶς ἐποίει· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἱππέων ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐξήκοντα, πεζοὶ δὲ ἐς τοὺς

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 16. 1-4

the light troops, who had intermingled with the cavalry, and so they began to give way, first at the point where Alexander was in the front of the line. But when their centre had given way, then the cavalry wings also were broken, and they really turned to flight in earnest. About a thousand Persian horsemen perished; there was not a long pursuit, since Alexander turned against the foreign mercenary troops. Their serried ranks stood where they had been first drawn up, not so much from steadiness based on calculation as because they were stunned by the unexpectedness of the situation. Bringing his phalanx to bear on them and bidding the cavalry fall on them from all quarters, he hemmed them in and soon massacred them; not one got away except by escaping notice among the dead, and some two thousand were taken prisoners. Of Persian commanders there fell Niphates, Petenes, Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, Mithrobuzanes the Cappadocian hyparch, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, Arbupales son of Darius who was son of Artaxerxes,<sup>1</sup> Pharnaces, brother of Darius' wife, and Omares, commander of the mercenaries. Arsites fled from the battle into Phrygia, but there died by his own hand, it is said because the blame of the present blunder seemed to the Persians to lie at his door.

On the Macedonian side about twenty-five of the Companions fell in the first shock. There are brazen statues of them set up at Dium; Alexander gave the order to Lysippus,<sup>2</sup> the only sculptor he would select to portray himself. Of the rest of the cavalry more

<sup>1</sup> i.e. king Artaxerxes II (404-358 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> Lysippus was the greatest sculptor of the day. A. is unaware that the statues had been removed to Rome in 146 B.C., cf. A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 1972, 173 (giving 148 B.C.).

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B.C.

2

3

4

6 τριάκοντα. καὶ τούτους τῇ ὑστεραία ἔθαψεν  
 Ἄλέξανδρος ξὺν τοῖς ὄπλοις τε καὶ ἄλλῳ κόσμῳ·  
 γονεῦσι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ παισὶ τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν χώραν  
 ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκε καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι ἢ τῷ σώματι  
 λειτουργίαι ἢ κατὰ τὰς κτήσεις ἐκάστων εἰσφοραί.  
 καὶ τῶν τετρωμένων δὲ πολλὴν πρόνοιαν ἔσχεν,  
 ἐπελθὼν τε αὐτὸς ἐκάστους καὶ τὰ τραύματα ἰδὼν  
 καὶ ὅπως τις ἐτρώθη ἐρόμενος καὶ ὅ τι πράττων  
 6 εἰπεῖν τε καὶ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι οἱ παρασχών. ὁ δὲ  
 καὶ τῶν Περσῶν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἔθαψεν· ἔθαψε δὲ  
 καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, οἱ ξὺν τοῖς πολε-  
 μίοις στρατεύοντες ἀπέθανον· ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν  
 αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις  
 εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψε ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ  
 τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες  
 ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο.  
 7 ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας τριακοσίας πανο-  
 πλίας Περσικὰς ἀνάθημα εἶναι τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν πόλει·  
 καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπιγραφῆναι ἐκέλευσε τόδε· Ἄλέ-  
 ξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακε-  
 δαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν  
 κατοικούντων.

17. Καταστήσας δὲ Κάλαν σατραπεύειν τῆς  
 Ἀρσίτης ἦρχε καὶ τοὺς φόρους τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπο-  
 φέρειν τάξας, οὗσπερ Δαρείῳ ἔφερον, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν  
 βαρβάρων κατιόντες, ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐνεχειρίζον  
 σφᾶς, τούτους μὲν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν  
 2 ἐκάστους ἐκέλευεν, Ζελεΐτας δὲ ἀφῆκε τῆς αἰτίας,  
 ὅτι πρὸς βίαν ἔγνω συστρατεῦσαι τοῖς βαρβάροις·  
 Δασκύλιον δὲ παραληψόμενον Παρμενίωνα ἐκπέμ-

<sup>3</sup> Ar. ap. P. 16, 7 said that Al. lost only 25 of his cavalry and 9 footmen. Probably he did not include any non-Macedonians,

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 16. 4-17. 2

than sixty perished, and about thirty infantry.<sup>3</sup> 5 334  
 Alexander buried them next day with their arms B.C.  
 and other accoutrements; to their parents and  
 children he gave remission of land taxes and of all  
 other personal services and property taxes. He  
 took great care of the wounded, visiting each man  
 himself, examining their wounds, asking how they  
 were received, and allowing them to recount and  
 boast of their exploits. He also buried the Persian 6  
 commanders and the mercenary Greeks who fell in  
 the enemy ranks; the prisoners were sent in chains  
 to Macedonia to hard labour, because though  
 Greeks they had violated the common resolutions  
 of the Greeks by fighting with barbarians against  
 Greece. He sent to Athens three hundred Persian 7  
 panoplies to be set up to Athena in the acropolis;  
 he ordered this inscription to be attached: 'Alex-  
 ander son of Philip and the Greeks, except the  
 Lacedaemonians, set up these spoils from the bar-  
 barians dwelling in Asia'.<sup>4</sup>

17. Alexander then made Calas satrap of the  
 territory Arsites ruled, ordering the inhabitants to  
 pay the same taxes as they used to pay to Darius;<sup>1</sup>  
 natives who came down from the hills and gave them-  
 selves up were told to return home. He exempted 2  
 the city of Zeleia<sup>2</sup> from blame, because he recog-  
 nized that it had been impressed to fight on the  
 barbarian side. He also sent Parmenio to take over

for the first figure coincides with A's 25 Companions. It looks  
 as if A's data come from Pt. as his other main source.

<sup>4</sup> P. 16, 8 has the same formula (from Ar.?). Cf. Introd.  
 §28; 38. For Athenian prisoners see i 29, 5; Introd n. 69.

<sup>1</sup> See Introd. §41; Badian, *GR* 166 ff.

<sup>2</sup> By implication, not otherwise confirmed, Zeleia ranked as  
 Greek.



## ARRIAN

πει· καὶ παραλαμβάνει<sup>1</sup> Δασκύλιον Παρμενίων  
ἐκλιπόντων τῶν φρουρῶν.

- 3 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων προὔχῳρει· καὶ ἀπέχοντος  
αὐτοῦ ὅσον ἑβδομήκοντα σταδίους Σάρδεων ἦκον  
παρ' αὐτὸν Μιθρήνης τε ὁ φρούραρχος τῆς ἀκρο-  
πόλεως τῆς ἐν Σάρδεσι καὶ Σαρδιανῶν οἱ δυνατώ-  
τατοι, ἐνδιδόντες οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ Μιθρήνης  
4 τὴν ἄκραν καὶ τὰ χρήματα. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ αὐτὸς  
μὲν κατεστρατοπέδευσε ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμῷ ποταμῷ·  
ἀπέχει δὲ ὁ Ἑρμος ἀπὸ Σάρδεων σταδίους ὅσον  
εἴκοσιν· Ἀμύνταν δὲ τὸν Ἀνδρομένους τὴν ἄκραν  
παραληψόμενον ἐκπέμπει εἰς Σάρδεις· καὶ Μιθρήνην  
μὲν ἐν τιμῇ ἅμα οἱ ἦγεν, Σαρδιανούς δὲ καὶ τοὺς  
ἄλλους Λυδοὺς τοῖς νόμοις τε τοῖς πάλαι Λυδῶν  
χρῆσθαι ἔδωκεν καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἀφήκεν.  
5 ἀνῆλθε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ἄκραν, ἵνα τὸ φρούριον  
ἦν τῶν Περσῶν· καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὄχυρόν τὸ  
χωρίον· ὑπερύψηλόν τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἀπότομον πάντη  
καὶ τριπλᾶ τείχει πεφραγμένον· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ  
ἄκρᾳ ναόν τε οἰκοδομήσαι Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἐπενόει  
6 καὶ βωμὸν ἰδρύσασθαι. σκοποῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς  
ἄκρας ὅπερ ἐπιτηδειότατον χωρίον ὦρα ἔτους  
ἐξαίφνης χειμῶν ἐπιγίνεται καὶ βρονταὶ σκληραὶ  
καὶ ὕδωρ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πίπτει, οὗ τὰ τῶν Λυδῶν  
βασιλεία· Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ ἔδοξεν ἐκ θεοῦ σημα-  
θῆναι, ἵνα χρῆ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι τῷ Διὶ τὸν νεών, καὶ  
7 οὕτως ἐκέλευσε. κατέλιπε δὲ τῆς μὲν ἄκρας τῆς  
Σάρδεων ἐπιμελητὴν Πausανίαν τῶν ἐταίρων, τῶν  
δὲ φόρων τῆς συντάξεώς τε καὶ ἀποφορᾶς Νικίαν,  
Ἄσανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλῶτα Λυδίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς

<sup>1</sup> παραλαμβάνει. Roos prints παραληψόμενον, which seems to be meaningless dittography.

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Dascylion, and this he duly did, the guards having evacuated the place.

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He himself marched towards Sardis; and when 3  
he was still about seventy stades away he was met by  
Mithrenes, commander of the citadel garrison, and  
the chief citizens of Sardis; they gave up the city,  
and Mithrenes the citadel and treasury.<sup>3</sup> Alexander 4  
himself camped on the Hermus river, which runs  
about twenty stades from Sardis, but sent Amyntas,  
son of Andromenes, to Sardis to take over the citadel;  
Mithrenes remained with him, with the honours  
of his rank, while the Sardians and the other Lydians  
were granted the use of the old Lydian customs, and  
allowed to be free.<sup>4</sup> Alexander himself ascended to 5  
the citadel, where the Persian garrison was stationed.  
He noted the strength of the position, which was very  
high, sheer on every side, and fortified all round with  
a triple wall. He was thinking of building a temple  
on the citadel to Olympian Zeus, and of setting up  
an altar near it, but as he was surveying the citadel 6  
for the best place, suddenly (it was summer-time) a  
storm broke with heavy crashes of thunder and  
violent rain, just where the palace of the Lydian  
kings was; Alexander supposed that here was a  
divine intimation where he must build the temple  
of Zeus, and gave orders accordingly. He left as 7  
commandant of the citadel Pausanias, one of the  
Companions, put Nicias in charge of the assessment  
and receipt of tribute, and appointed Asander, son

<sup>3</sup> D. 21, 7; P. 17, 1.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. allowed local self-government; the Persians are unlikely to have denied such rights.

## ARRIAN

- Σπιθριδάτου ἀρχῆς, δούς αὐτῷ ἰππέας τε καὶ ψιλοὺς ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐδόκουν.
- 8 Κάλαν δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἐκπέμπει, ἄγοντας τοὺς τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τοὺς πολλοὺς πλὴν Ἀργείων· οὗτοι δὲ ἐν Σάρδεσι κατελείφθησαν τὴν ἄκραν φυλάττειν.
- 9 Ἐν τούτῳ δέ, ὡς τὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἵππομαχίας ἐξηγγέλθη, οἱ τε τὴν Ἐφεσον φρουροῦντες μισθοφόροι ὦχοντο φεύγοντες, δύο τριήρεις τῶν Ἐφεσίων λαβόντες, καὶ ξὺν αὐτοῖς Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀντιόχου, ὃς ἔφυγεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας Ἀλέξανδρον, παθῶν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου, δυσνοία δὲ τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπαξιώσας τι παθεῖν πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἄχαρι.
- 10 Τετάρτη δὲ ἡμέρα ἐς Ἐφεσον ἀφικόμενος τοὺς τε φυγάδας, ὅσοι δι' αὐτὸν ἐξέπεσον τῆς πόλεως, κατήγαγε καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καταλύσας δημοκρατίαν κατέστησε· τοὺς δὲ φόρους, ὅσους τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπέφερον, τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ξυντελεῖν ἐκέλευσεν.
- 11 ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἐφεσίων, ὡς ἀφηρέθη αὐτοῖς ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων φόβος, τοὺς τε Μέμνονα ἐπαγομένους καὶ τοὺς τὸ ἱερὸν συλήσαντας τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τοὺς τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν Φιλίππου τὴν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ καταβαλόντας καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀνορύξαντας τὸν Ἡροπύθου τοῦ ἐλευ-  
 12 θερώσαντος τὴν πόλιν ὥρμησαν ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ Σύρφακα μὲν καὶ τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ Πελάγοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀδελφῶν τοῦ Σύρφακος παῖδας ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐξαγαγόντες κατέλευσαν· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους διεκώλυσεν Ἀλέξανδρος προσωτέρω ἐπιζητεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, γνοὺς ὅτι ὁμοῦ τοῖς αἰτίοις καὶ οὐ

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of Philotas, governor of Lydia and the rest of Spithridates' district with cavalry and light troops that seemed sufficient for present needs. Calas and Alexander son of Acropus were sent to Memnon's country,<sup>5</sup> with the Peloponnesians and the greater part of the allies except the Argives who were left in Sardis to garrison the citadel. 8

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Meanwhile, when the news of the cavalry engagement came through, the mercenary troops garrisoning Ephesus made off, taking two Ephesian triremes; along with them went Amyntas son of Antiochus<sup>6</sup> who had fled from Macedon to avoid Alexander; he had not actually suffered at Alexander's hands, but he was disaffected and did not think he deserved to suffer harm at his hands. Alexander reached Ephesus on the fourth day, restored the exiles who had been turned out of the city on his account, destroyed the oligarchy, and established a democracy; he also ordered them to contribute to Artemis the taxes they had been paying to the barbarians. The Ephesian populace, relieved from fear of the oligarchs, rushed to kill those who had been for calling in Memnon, those who had plundered the temple of Artemis, and those who threw down the statue of Philip in the temple and dug up the tomb of Heropythes, the liberator of the city, in the marketplace. Syrphax, his son Pelagon, and the sons of the brothers of Syrphax were pulled from the temple and stoned: but Alexander prevented further inquiry or punishment, knowing that once permission was given the people would put to death innocent 9 10 11 12

<sup>5</sup> Apparently in the Troad, Polyænus iv 3, 15; Strabo xiii 1, 11.

<sup>6</sup> Introd. 46.

ξὺν δίκη τινάς, τοὺς μὲν κατ' ἔχθραν, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ ἀρπαγὴν χρημάτων ἀποκτενεῖ, ξυγχωρηθὲν αὐτῷ, ὁ δῆμος. καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἐφέσῳ πραχθεῖσιν Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῷ τότε εὐδοκίμει.

18. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ Μαγνησίας τε καὶ Τράλλων παρ' αὐτὸν ἦκον ἐνδιδόντες τὰς πόλεις· καὶ ὡς πέμπει Παρμενίωνα, δούς αὐτῷ δισχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους πεζοὺς τῶν ξένων καὶ Μακεδόνας παραπλησίους, ἰππέας δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐς διακοσίους. Ἀλκίμαχον δὲ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέους ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰολίδας τε πόλεις ξὺν δυνάμει οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἐξέπεμψε καὶ ὅσαι Ἰωνικαὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔτι ἦσαν. καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας πανταχοῦ καταλύειν ἐκέλευσεν, δημοκρατίας δὲ [τε] ἐγκαθιστάναί καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς σφῶν ἐκάστοις ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ τοὺς φόρους ἀνεῖναι, ὅσους τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπέφερον. αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπομείνας ἐν Ἐφέσῳ θυσίαν τε ἔθυσεν τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καὶ πομπὴν ἔπεμψε ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ πάσῃ ὤπλισμένην τε καὶ ὡς ἐς μάχην ξυντεταγμένην.

3 Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε πεζῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τοὺς Θράκας ἰππέας καὶ τῶν ἐταίρων τὴν τε βασιλικὴν ἵλην καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τρεῖς ἄλλας ἐπὶ Μιλήτου ἐστέλλετο· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔξω[δον] καλουμένην πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔλαβεν ἐκλιπούσης τῆς φυλακῆς· ἐνταῦθα δὲ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἔγνω ἀποτειχίζειν 4 τὴν εἴσω πόλιν. Ἠγησίστρατος γάρ, ὅτῳ ἡ φρουρὰ ἢ Μιλησίων ἐκ βασιλέως ἐπετέτραπτο, πρόσθεν γράμματα παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἔπεμπεν ἐνδιδοὺς τὴν Μίλητον· τότε δὲ ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπὶ τῷ Περσῶν στρατῷ οὐ μακρὰν ὄντι διασώζειν τοῖς

men along with the guilty, from private hatred or in order to seize their property. Seldom did Alexander win a higher reputation than he did on that occasion by his treatment of Ephesus.<sup>7</sup>

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18. About this time representatives of Magnesia and Tralles came to Alexander to hand over their cities; so he sent Parmenio with 2,500 mercenary infantry and as many Macedonians, and 200 of the Companion horse. He sent also Alcimachus son of Agathocles, with at least an equal force, to the Aeolian cities and to any Ionian towns still subject to the barbarians. He ordered the oligarchies everywhere to be overthrown and democracies to be established; he restored its own laws to each city and remitted the tribute they used to pay to the barbarians.<sup>1</sup> He himself remained in Ephesus and sacrificed to Artemis and held a great procession with his troops armed *cap-à-pie* in full battle order.

Next day he took the remainder of the infantry, the archers, the Agrianians, the Thracian horse, the royal squadron of the Companions and three others in addition, and marched against Miletus.<sup>2</sup> He captured in his stride what they called the outer city, which the garrison had abandoned, and camping there, decided to invest the inner city. For Hegesistratus, to whom Darius had entrusted command of the Milesian garrison, had previously sent a letter to Alexander surrendering the city, but he had taken heart again, because the Persian force was no distance

<sup>7</sup> Al. and Ephesus: E. Badian, cited in *Introd.* n. 59.

<sup>1</sup> *Introd.* 39 and last note.

<sup>2</sup> D. 22 thinks Memnon was in command at Miletus. A. omits some description of Miletus in *Ar. F.* 6.



## ARRIAN

Πέρσαις ἐπενόει τὴν πόλιν. Νικάνωρ δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ναυτικὸν ἄγων ὑποφθάνει τοὺς Πέρσας τρισὶν ἡμέραις πρότερος καταπλεύσας ἢ τοὺς Πέρσας Μιλήτῳ προσχεῖν, καὶ ὀρμίζεται ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τῇ Λάδῃ· κεῖται δὲ αὕτη ἐπὶ τῇ Μιλήτῳ. αἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν νῆες ὑστερήσασαι, ἐπειδὴ ἔμαθον οἱ ναύαρχοι τῶν ἀμφὶ Νικάνορα τὴν ἐν τῇ Λάδῃ προκαταγωγὴν, πρὸς τῇ Μυκάλῃ τῷ ὄρει ὠρμίσθησαν. τὴν γὰρ Λάδην τὴν νῆσον προκατειλήφει Ἀλέξανδρος, οὐ τῶν νεῶν μόνον τῇ ἐγκαθορμίσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Θράκας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐς τετρακισχιλίους διαβιβάσας ἐς αὐτήν. ἦσαν δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων αἱ νῆες ἀμφὶ τὰς τετρακοσίας.

6 Παρμενίων μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς παρήνει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ναυμαχεῖν, τὰ τε ἄλλα κρατήσσειν τῷ ναυτικῷ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπελπίζων καὶ τι καὶ θεῖον ἀνέπειθεν αὐτόν, ὅτι αἰετὸς ὤφθη καθήμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ κατὰ πρύμναν τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου νεῶν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ νικήσαντας μὲν μεγάλα ὠφεληθήσεσθαι ἐς τὰ ὅλα, νικηθεῖσι δὲ οὐ παρὰ μέγα ἔσεσθαι τὸ πταῖσμα· καὶ ὡς γὰρ θαλασσοκρατεῖν τοὺς Πέρσας. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ἔφη ἐπιβῆναι ἐθέλειν τῶν νεῶν καὶ τοῦ  
7 κινδύνου μετέχειν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῇ τε γνώμῃ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔφη Παρμενίωνα καὶ τοῦ σημείου τῇ οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς συμβλήσει· ὀλίγαις τε γὰρ ναυσὶ πρὸς πολλῷ πλείους ξὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ ναυμα-  
8 χήσειν καὶ οὐ μεμελετηκότι τῷ σφῶν ναυτικῷ <πρὸς> προησκημένον τὸ τῶν Κυπρίων τε καὶ Φοινίκων· τὴν τε ἐμπειρίαν τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἐν ἀβεβαίῳ χωρίῳ οὐκ ἐθέλειν παρα-  
δοῦναι τοῖς βαρβάροις· καὶ ἠττηθεῖσι τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ οὐ



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away; his intention was now to save the city for Persia. Nicanor, however, brought up the Greek fleet,<sup>3</sup> reached Miletus by sea three days before the Persians put in, and anchored with 160 ships at the island of Lade off Miletus. The Persian fleet were too late, and when their commanders learnt that Nicanor had already put in at Lade, they anchored under Mount Mycale. For by seizing Lade Alexander had forestalled them, not only anchoring his fleet there, but also transporting the Thracians and about 4000 of the other mercenaries to the island. The barbarians had about 400 ships. 5

Parmenio, notwithstanding, urged Alexander to fight by sea; he expected the Greeks to win with their fleet for various reasons, and in particular he used an omen to persuade him: an eagle had been seen perching on the shore astern of Alexander's ships. If they won, he argued, it would be of great advantage to the expedition generally, whereas a defeat would not be very serious; for even as things were the Persians held supremacy at sea. He said that he was willing even to embark himself and share the peril. Alexander, however, said that Parmenio's judgment was at fault, and his interpretation of the omen improbable; it would be wholly irrational to fight a much greater fleet with an inferior one, and face the trained Cyprian and Phoenician fleet with his own, which was unpractised. He would not risk sacrificing the experience and daring of the Macedonians to the barbarians on so uncertain an element; 6 7 8

<sup>3</sup> Cf. §6; 19, 7. Evidently the fleet was mainly provided by the Greek allies (cf. QC. iii 1, 20), since A. is careful to distinguish Greeks from Macedonians (Introd. n. 33), though Macedonians would presumably serve as marines in a battle (§8). Numbers of Greek and Persian ships: App. II 1. Cf. Introd. 44.

9 μικρὰν τὴν βλάβην ἔσεσθαι ἐς τοῦ πολέμου τὴν  
 πρώτην δόξαν, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας  
 νεωτεριεῖν πρὸς τοῦ ναυτικοῦ παιάματος τὴν  
 ἐξαγγελίαν ἐπαρθέοντας. ταῦτα μὲν τῷ λογισμῷ  
 ξυντιθεῖς οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ ἀπέφαινε ναυμαχεῖν· τὸ  
 θεῖον δὲ αὐτὸς ἄλλη ἐξηγεῖσθαι· εἶναι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς  
 αὐτοῦ τὸν αἰτόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπὶ γῆ καθήμενος  
 ἐφαίνετο, δοκεῖν οἱ μᾶλλον τι σημαίνειν, ὅτι ἐκ γῆς  
 κρατήσῃ τοῦ Περσῶν ναυτικοῦ.

19. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Γλαύκιππος, ἀνὴρ τῶν δοκί-  
 μων ἐν Μιλήτῳ, ἐκπεμφθεὶς παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον  
 παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τε καὶ τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφόρων,  
 οἷς μᾶλλον τι ἐπετέτραπτο ἢ πόλις, τὰ τε τείχη  
 ἔφη ἐθέλειν τοὺς Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς λιμένας  
 παρέχειν κοινούς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ τὴν  
 2 πολιορκίαν ἐπὶ τούτοις λύειν ἡξίου. Ἀλέξανδρος  
 δὲ Γλαυκίππῳ μὲν προστάσσει ἀπαλλάττεσθαι κατὰ  
 τάχος ἐς τὴν πόλιν καὶ Μιλησίοις ἀπαγγέλλειν  
 παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχουμένους ἔωθεν. αὐτὸς δ'  
 ἐπιστήσας τῷ τείχει μηχανάς, καὶ τὰ μὲν καταβα-  
 λῶν δι' ὀλίγου τῶν τειχῶν, τὰ δὲ κατασεύσας ἐπὶ  
 πολὺ προσῆγε τὴν στρατιὰν ὡς ἐπιβησομένους ἢ  
 κατερήριπτο ἢ ἐσεσάλευτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐφομαρτού-  
 ντων καὶ μόνον οὐ θεωμένων τῶν Περσῶν ἀπὸ τῆς  
 Μυκάλης πολιορκουμένους τοὺς φίλους σφῶν καὶ  
 ξυμμάχους.

3 Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Νικάνορα ἀπὸ τῆς  
 Λάδης τὴν ὄρμην τῶν ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κατιδόντες  
 ἐς τὸν λιμένα ἐπέπλεον τῶν Μιλησίων παρὰ γῆν τὴν  
 εἰρεσίαν ποιούμενοι, καὶ κατὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ  
 λιμένος, ἥπερ τὸ στενότατον ἦν, ἀντιπρώρους βύζην  
 τὰς τριήρεις ὄρμίσαντες ἀποκεκλείκεσαν τῷ μὲν

if they lost the engagement, it would be a serious blow to their initial prestige in the war, especially with the Greeks also ready to blaze into revolt at the news of a naval defeat. Adducing these rational arguments, he showed that it was no time to fight by sea, and that he interpreted the omen differently: the eagle was indeed on his side but, since it was seen sitting on the land, it rather meant (he thought) that he would beat the Persian fleet from the land.<sup>4</sup> 9

19. Meanwhile, Glaucippus, one of the notables of Miletus, was sent to Alexander by the people and the foreign mercenaries to whose care the city had been chiefly entrusted, and declared that the citizens were prepared to open their walls and harbours to Alexander and the Persians in common; he demanded that on these terms he should raise the siege. Alexander, however, ordered Glaucippus to leave without delay for the city and tell the Milesians to be ready to fight at dawn. He personally saw engines being set against the wall and, after knocking down part of the walling for a little way, and shattering it over a great distance, he brought up his force to be ready to go over where the wall had been demolished or shaken, though the Persians from Mycale were close by and all but witnesses of the siege of their friends and allies. 2

At this point Nicanor's fleet from Lade, which had sighted Alexander's attack and sailed into the harbour of Miletus, rowing along the coast, jammed their triremes, with prows facing an enemy attack, at the narrowest part of the entrance, and so barred 3

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 20, 1.

4 Περσικῶ ναυτικῶ τὸν λιμένα, τοῖς Μιλησίοις δὲ τὴν ἐκ τῶν Περσῶν ὠφέλειαν. ἔνθα οἱ Μιλήσιοί τε καὶ οἱ μισθοφόροι πανταχόθεν ἤδη προσκειμένων σφίσι τῶν Μακεδόνων οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ῥιπτοῦντες σφᾶς ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ὑπτίῳν ἐς νησιῖδά τινα ἀνώνυμον τῇ πόλει ἐπικειμένην διενήχοντο, οἱ δὲ ἐς κελήτια ἐμβαίνοντες καὶ ἐπειγόμενοι ὑποφθάσαι τὰς τριήρεις τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐγκατελήφθησαν ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος πρὸς τῶν τριήρων· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει ἀπώλοντο.

5 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐχομένης ἤδη τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον καταπεφευγότας ἐπέπλει αὐτός, κλίμακας φέρειν ἐπὶ τὰς πύρας τῶν τριήρων κελεύσας, ὡς κατὰ τὰ ἀπότομα τῆς νήσου, καθάπερ πρὸς τεῖχος, ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τὴν ἀπόβασιν ποιησόμενος. ὡς δὲ διακινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἑώρα, οἶκτος λαμβάνει αὐτὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὅτι γενναῖοί τε καὶ πιστοὶ αὐτῷ ἐφαίνοντο, καὶ σπένδεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῷδε ὡς αὐτῷ ξυστρατεύειν· ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι μισθοφόροι Ἕλληνες ἐς τριακοσίους. αὐτοὺς δὲ Μιλησίους, ὅσοι μὴ ἐν τῇ καταλήψει τῆς πόλεως ἔπεσον, ἀφήκεν καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἔδωκεν.

7 Οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἀπὸ τῆς Μυκάλης ὀρμώμενοι τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπέπλεον τῷ Ἑλληνικῶ ναυτικῶ, προκαλέσασθαι ἐς ναυμαχίαν ἐλπίζοντες· τὰς δὲ νύκτας πρὸς τῇ Μυκάλῃ οὐκ ἐν καλῷ ὠρμίζοντο, ὅτι ὑδρεύεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου ποταμοῦ τῶν ἐκβολῶν διὰ μακροῦ ἠναγκάζοντο. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ τὸν λιμένα ἐφύλαττε τῶν Μιλησίων, ὡς μὴ βιάσαιντο οἱ βάρβαροι τὸν ἔσπλον, ἐκπέμ-

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 19. 3-8

the harbour against the Persian fleet, and cut off  
 Persian help for Miletus. Then, as the Milesians  
 and mercenaries were hard pressed on all sides by the  
 Macedonians, some threw themselves into the sea  
 and inverting their shields paddled over to a little  
 nameless island off the city, while others got into  
 small boats and hurried to get in front of the Mace-  
 donian triremes, but were caught by them at the  
 harbour entrance; the greatest number perished in  
 the city itself.

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With the city now under control, Alexander sailed  
 in person against those who had fled to the islet,  
 ordering ladders to be brought to the bows of the  
 triremes, so as to disembark from the ships on the  
 cliffs of the island as if on a city wall. But when he  
 saw that the men on the island were going to fight to  
 the death, he was seized with pity for them, as fine,  
 loyal soldiers, and made terms with them on which  
 they should join his forces; there were about 300 of  
 these Greek mercenaries. The Milesians themselves  
 who had not fallen at the city's capture were released  
 and granted their freedom.

The Persians with Mycale as a base by day-time  
 used to sail towards the Greek navy,<sup>1</sup> hoping to pro-  
 voke an engagement; but at night they could not  
 ride in comfort at Mycale, because they were obliged  
 to get water from the mouths of the Maeander,  
 some way off. While guarding the harbour of  
 Miletus with his fleet, so that the Persians might  
 not force the entrance, Alexander sent Philotas to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 18, 4 n.

πει δ' ἐς τὴν Μυκάλην Φιλώταν, ἄγοντα τοὺς τε ἱππέας καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τάξεις τρεῖς, παραγγείλας εἶργειν τῆς ἀποβάσεως τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν. οἱ δέ, ὕδατός τε σπάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ πολιορκούμενοι ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἐς Σάμον ἀπέπλευσαν. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάμενοι  
 9 αὐθις ἐπέπλεον τῇ Μιλήτῳ· καὶ τὰς μὲν πολλὰς τῶν νεῶν πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος ἐν μετεώρῳ παρέταξαν, εἴ πη ἐκκαλέσαιντο ἐς τὸ πέλαγος τοὺς Μακεδόνας, πέντε δὲ αὐτῶν εἰσέπλευσαν ἐς τὸν μεταξύ τῆς τε Λάδης νήσου καὶ τοῦ στρατοπέδου λιμένα, ἐλπίσαντες κενὰς καταλήψεσθαι τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου ναῦς, ὅτι τοὺς ναύτας ἀποσκεδάνυσθαι τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ φρυγανισμῶ, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ ξυγκομιδῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐς προνο-  
 10 μὰς ταττομένους, πεπυσμένοι ἦσαν. ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν τι ἀπὴν τῶν ναυτῶν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παρόντων συμπληρώσας Ἀλέξανδρος δέκα ναῦς, ὡς προσπλεύσας τὰς πέντε τῶν Περσῶν κατείδε, πέμπει ἐπ' αὐτὰς κατὰ σπουδὴν, ἐμβάλλειν ἀντιπρώρους κελεύσας. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πέντε ναυσὶ τῶν Περσῶν, ὡς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἀναγομένους τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶδον, ὑποστρέψαντες ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔφευγον πρὸς  
 11 τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν Ἰασσέων ναῦς ἀλίσκεται αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, οὐ ταχυναυτοῦσα· αἱ δὲ τέσσαρες ἔφθασαν καταφυγεῖν ἐς τὰς οἰκείας τριήρεις. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἀπέπλευσαν ἄπρακτοι ἐκ Μιλήτου οἱ Πέρσαι.

20. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καταλῦσαι ἔγνω τὸ ναυτικὸν χρημάτων τε ἐν τῷ τότε ἀπορία καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἀξιόμαχον ὄρων τὸ αὐτοῦ ναυτικὸν τῷ Περσικῷ, οὐκ οὐκ ἐθέλων οὐδὲ μέρει τινὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς κινδυ-

Mycale with the cavalry and three battalions of infantry, instructing him to hinder the Persians from disembarking. So, from want of water and other necessities, they were as good as besieged in their ships, and sailed off to Samos; after provisioning there, they made for Miletus again. They 9 drew up most of their ships in line out at sea opposite the harbour, hoping to provoke the Macedonians to action in the open water; but five ships slipped into the harbour between Lade and the camp, hoping to capture Alexander's ships unmanned, as they had learned that most of the crews had scattered, away from the ships, under instructions to get firewood or collect provisions or fodder. But though a certain 10 number of sailors were absent, Alexander had manned ten ships with the available hands, which he sent, when he sighted the five Persian ships bearing down, to meet them at full speed with orders to ram, head on. The crews of the five Persian ships, seeing the Macedonians making for them (the last thing they expected), doubled back, while still far off, and joined the main fleet. One ship (manned by 11 Iassians) was captured with its crew in the retreat, as it was a slow sailer; the other four got safe to their own triremes. Hence the Persians sailed away from Miletus without success.<sup>2</sup>

20. Alexander now decided to disband his navy, as he was then short of money and also perceived that his fleet could not face an action with the Persian navy; he was unwilling to risk disaster with even part of his forces. Further, he reflected that as he now

<sup>2</sup> D. 22 is vague on operations at Miletus.



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νεύειν. ἄλλως τε ἐπενόει, κατέχων ἤδη τῷ πεζῷ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅτι οὔτε ναυτικοῦ ἔτι δέοιτο, τὰς τε παραλίους πόλεις λαβὼν καταλύσει τὸ Περσῶν ναυτικόν, οὔτε ὀπόθεν τὰς ὑπηρεσίας συμπληρώσουσιν οὔτε ὅποι τῆς Ἀσίας προσέξουσιν ἔχοντας. καὶ τὸν αἰτὸν ταύτῃ συνέβαλλεν, ὅτι ἐσήμηνεν αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς γῆς κρατήσειν τῶν νεῶν.

- 2 Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐστέλλετο, ὅτι ἐν Ἀλικαρνασσῷ συνεστηκέναι οὐ φαύλην δύναμιν τῶν τε βαρβάρων καὶ ξένων ἐξηγγέλλετο. ὅσαι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ πόλεις Μιλήτου τε καὶ Ἀλικαρνασοῦ, ταύτας ἐξ ἐφόδου λαβὼν καταστρατοπεδεύει πρὸς Ἀλικαρνασσῷ, ἀπέχων τῆς πόλεως ἐς πέντε
- 3 μάλιστα σταδίου, ὡς ἐπὶ χρονίῳ πολιορκίᾳ. ἢ τε γὰρ φύσις τοῦ χωρίου ὀχυρὸν ἐποίει αὐτὸ καὶ ὅπητι ἐνδεῖν ὡς πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν ἐφαίνετο, ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρών, ἤδη ἀποδεδειγμένος πρὸς Δαρείου τῆς τε κάτω Ἀσίας καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμών, ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, καὶ στρατιῶται πολλοὶ μὲν ξένοι μισθοφόροι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐγκατελείφθησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ Περσῶν αὐτῶν, αἵ τε τριήρεις ἐφώρμουν τῷ λιμένι, ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν γίνεσθαι ἐς τὰ ἔργα.
- 4 Τῇ μὲν δὴ πρώτη ἡμέρᾳ προσάγοντος Ἀλεξάνδρου τῷ τείχει κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ Μύλασα φερούσας πύλας ἐκδρομὴ τε γίνεται τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἀκροβολισμός· καὶ τούτους οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀνέστειλάν τε οἱ παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀντεκδραμόντες καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν κατέκλεισαν.
- 5 Οὐ πολλαῖς δὲ ὕστερον ἡμέραις Ἀλέξανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐταίρων

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controlled Asia with his land troops, he no longer needed a navy, and that by capturing the cities on the coast he would break up the Persian fleet, since they would have nowhere to make up their crews from, and no place in Asia where they could put in. This was what he took the eagle to mean; he was to overcome the ships from dry land.<sup>1</sup>

When he had carried out this decision, he marched 2  
towards Caria, on reports that a considerable force of barbarians and mercenaries had mustered at Halicarnassus.<sup>2</sup> He captured on the march the cities between Miletus and Halicarnassus, and encamped against Halicarnassus, at about five stades distance, settling down for a long siege. For the nature of the 3  
site made it strong, and where any defect in its security was apparent, Memnon, who was present in person and had now been appointed by Darius to the command of lower Asia and the whole fleet,<sup>3</sup> had made all the necessary preparations long ago; a large force of foreign mercenaries had been left in the city, with many of the Persians themselves; the triremes were guarding the harbour, so that the sailors too lent much assistance to the operations.

On the first day, as Alexander was approaching the 4  
wall near the gate leading to Mylasa, there was a sally from the men in the city and volleying at safe distance; Alexander's troops had no difficulty in driving back the assailants by a counter charge, and shut them up in the city.

A few days later Alexander took the hypaspists, the 5  
Companion cavalry and the infantry battalions of

<sup>1</sup> At present Al. was probably thinking only of the coast of Asia Minor; after Issus he continued the same strategy (ii 17). Cf. D. 22, 5-23, 3; P. 17, 2; Introd. 44; App. II.

<sup>2</sup> For operations in Caria cf. D. 23, 4-27, 6.

<sup>3</sup> D. 23, 5 f.

- ἵππον καὶ τὴν Ἀμύντου τε καὶ Περδίκκου καὶ Μελάγρου τάξιν τὴν πεζικὴν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας περιῆλθε τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸ πρὸς Μύνδον μέρος, τό τε τεῖχος κατοψόμενος, εἰ ταύτῃ ἐπιμαχώτερον τυγχάνει ὄν εἰς τὴν προσβολὴν, καὶ ἅμα εἰ τὴν Μύνδον ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς δύναίτο λαθὼν κατασχεῖν· ἔσεσθαι γὰρ οὐ σμικρὰν τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ πολιορκίαν τὴν Μύνδον οἰκείαν γενομένην· καὶ τι <καὶ> ἐνεδίδοτο αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν Μυυδίων, εἰ λάθοι νυκτὸς
- 6 προσελθὼν. αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα ἀμφὶ μέσας νύκτας προσῆλθε τῷ τείχει· ὡς δὲ οὐδὲν ἐνεδίδοτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον, αἱ τε μηχαναὶ καὶ αἱ κλίμακες αὐτῷ οὐ παρήσαν, οἷα δὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολιορκίαν σταλέντι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ ἐνδιδομένης τῆς πόλεως, προσήγαγε καὶ ὡς τῶν Μακεδόνων τὴν φάλαγγα, ὑπορύπτειν κελεύσας τὸ τεῖχος. καὶ ἓνα γε πύργον κατέβαλον οἱ Μακεδόνες, οὐ μέντοι
- 7 ἐγύμνωσέ γε τὸ τεῖχος πεσῶν· καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἅμα εὐρώστως ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολλοὶ ἤδη παραβεβοηθηκότες ἄπορον ἐποίησαν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὴν αὐτοσχέδιόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς κατάληψιν τῆς Μύνδου. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἐπανέρχεται Ἀλέξανδρος οὐδὲν πράξας, ὧν ἔνεκα ὠρμήθη, καὶ τῇ πολιορκίᾳ τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ αὐθις προσεῖχε.
- 8 Καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τὴν τάφρον, ἣ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ὀρώρυκτο αὐτοῖς, πλάτος μὲν τριάκοντα μάλιστα πηχῶν, τὸ δὲ βάθος εἰς πεντεκαίδεκα, ἐχώννυε, τοῦ ραδίαν εἶναι τὴν προσαγωγὴν τῶν τε πύργων, ἀφ' ὧν ἔμελλε τοὺς ἀκροβολισμοὺς εἰς τοὺς προμαχομένους τοῦ τεύχους ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

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Amyntas, Perdicas, and Meleager, with the archers also and the Agrianes, and went round the city to the side that lay towards Myndus,<sup>4</sup> to reconnoitre the wall in case it should prove more open to an assault there, and also to see if perhaps he could capture Myndus by a sudden raid. The possession of Myndus, he thought, would be a great help to the siege of Halicarnassus. A proposal of surrender had been received from the Myndians, provided he could approach secretly by night. He therefore in person approached the wall about midnight, as agreed; but there was no sign of surrender from the people inside; his engines and ladders had been left behind, naturally enough, since he had not come for a siege, but to receive a treacherous surrender of the city. None the less he brought up the Macedonian phalanx with orders to sap the wall. They did bring down one tower, but its fall did not strip the wall; the citizens resisted stubbornly, and by this time numerous troops had sailed up from Halicarnassus and deprived Alexander of the means of rushing the capture of Myndus without preparation. So Alexander retreated without effecting his purpose, and concentrated once more on the siege of Halicarnassus.

6

7

First he began to fill up the moat they had dug before the city, about 30 cubits broad and 15 deep, so as to facilitate the approach of the siege-towers, from which he intended to shower missiles on the defenders of the wall, and of the other engines with

8

A Carian town.

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9 μηχανῶν, αἷς κατασεῖειν ἐπενόει τὸ τεῖχος. καὶ ἦ  
 τε τάφρος αὐτῷ ἐχώσθη οὐ χαλεπῶς καὶ οἱ πύργοι  
 προσήγοντο ἤδη. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ  
 νυκτὸς ἐκδραμόντες, ὡς ἐμπρῆσαι τοὺς τε πύργους  
 καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ προσηγμέναι ἢ οὐ πόρρω  
 τοῦ προ(σ)άγεσθαι ἦσαν, ὑπὸ τῶν φυλακῶν τε  
 τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ ὅσοι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ  
 ἐξεγερθέντες παρεβοήθησαν οὐ χαλεπῶς κατεκλεί-  
 10 σθησαν ἐς τὰ τεῖχη αὐθις. καὶ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν  
 ἄλλοι τε ἐς ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ Νεοπτό-  
 λεμος ὁ Ἀρραβαίου, τοῦ Ἀμύντου ἀδελφός, τῶν  
 παρὰ Δαρεῖον αὐτομολησάντων· τῶν δὲ Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου στρατιωτῶν ἀπέθανον μὲν ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα,  
 τραυματῖαι δὲ ἐγένοντο ἐς τριακοσίους, ὅτι ἐν νυκτὶ  
 γενομένης τῆς ἐκδρομῆς ἀφυλακτότεροι ἐς τὸ  
 τιτρώσκεσθαι ἦσαν.

21. Οὐ πολλαῖς δὲ ἡμέραις ὕστερον δύο τῶν  
 Μακεδόνων ὀπλίται ἐκ τῆς [ὕστερον] Περδίκκου  
 τάξεως ξυσκηνοῦντές τε καὶ ἅμα ξυμπίνοντες  
 αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἑκάτερος ἐπὶ μέγα τῷ λόγῳ  
 ἦγεν. ἔνθα δὴ φιλοτιμία τε ἐσπίπτει αὐτοῖς, καί τι  
 καὶ ὁ οἶνος ὑπεθέρμαινεν, ὥστε ὀπλισάμενοι αὐτοὶ  
 ἐπὶ σφῶν προσβάλλουσι τῷ τείχει κατὰ τὴν ἄκραν  
 τὴν πρὸς Μύλασα μάλιστα τετραμμένην, ὡς  
 ἐπίδειξιν τῆς σφῶν ῥώμης μᾶλλον τι ἢ πρὸς  
 πολεμίους μετὰ κινδύνου τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιησόμενοι.  
 2 καὶ τούτους κατιδόντες τινὲς τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως  
 δύο τε ὄντας καὶ οὐ ξὺν λογισμῷ προσφερομένους  
 τῷ τείχει ἐπεκθέουσιν. οἱ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐγγὺς πελά-  
 σαντας ἀπέκτειναν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀφεστηκότας

<sup>5</sup> See E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, esp. ch. II and p. 101. For plan see Fuller 201.

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which he designed to batter down the wall.<sup>5</sup> The ditch was filled up by him without difficulty and he began at once to bring up the towers. The garrison of Halicarnassus, however, made a night sally, to burn the towers and the other engines which had been brought up, or were nearly in position. But they were easily enclosed again in their city walls by the Macedonian guards and others who were aroused in the course of the action itself and rushed to their help. They lost up to 170 men, including Neoptolemus son of Arrabaeus, brother of Amyntas, one of those who had deserted to Darius: up to sixteen of Alexander's troops fell, but three hundred were wounded, since the sally was at night and they were less protected against wounds.<sup>6</sup>

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10

21. Not many days after, two Macedonian men-at-arms of Perdiccas' battalion, who were bivouacked and drinking together, were each boasting of his own prowess and actions: rivalry arose, assisted by the heating fumes of wine; so they armed themselves and attacked the wall by the height which looks chiefly towards Mylasa, their idea being to exhibit their strength rather than to force a perilous encounter with the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Some of those in the city sighted them, only two men rashly approaching the wall, and made a dash out at them. But they killed those who came up close and discharged

2

<sup>6</sup> D. 24, 4-25, 5 supplements § 7-10, but makes Neoptolemus fall on the Macedonian side, rightly according to Welles *ad loc.* since Amyntas remained in A's favour; but he is last mentioned in 28, 4, and Alexander the Lyncestian was still employed after his brothers had been executed for treason (25); an error in A's Macedonian sources is less likely than a careless assumption by D. that a Macedonian notable *must* have fought for Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> D. 25, 5 f.

## ARRIAN

- ἠκροβολίζοντο, πλεονεκτούμενοι τῷ τε πλήθει καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τῇ χαλεπότητι, ὅτι ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου τοῖς πολεμίοις ἢ ἐπιδρομῇ τε καὶ ὁ ἀκροβολισμὸς
- 3 ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀντεκθέουσὶ τινες καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν τοῦ Περδίκκου στρατιωτῶν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ ἄλλοι καὶ ξυμπίπτει μάχη καρτερὰ πρὸς τῷ τείχει· καὶ κατακλείονται αὖθις πρὸς τῶν Μακεδόνων εἴσω τῶν πυλῶν οἱ ἐπεκδραμόντες.
- 4 παρ' ὀλίγον δὲ ἦλθε καὶ ἀλῶναι ἡ πόλις. τά τε γὰρ τείχη ἐν τῷ τότε οὐκ ἐν ἀκριβεῖ φυλακῇ ἦν καὶ δύο πύργοι καὶ μεσοπύργιον ἐς ἔδαφος καταπεπτωκότα οὐ χαλεπὴν ἂν τῷ στρατεύματι, εἰ ἅπαν προσήψατο τοῦ ἔργου, τὴν ἐς τὸ τείχος πάροδον παρέσχε, καὶ ὁ τρίτος πύργος κατασεισμένος οὐδὲ οὗτος χαλεπῶς ἂν ἠρίφθη ὑπορυσσόμενος· ἀλλὰ ἔφθησαν γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ πεπτωκότος τείχους ἔσωθεν πλίνθινον μηνοειδὲς ἀντοικοδομησάμενοι οὐ χαλεπῶς ὑπὸ πολυχειρίας.
- 5 Καὶ τούτῳ ἐπῆγε τῇ ὑστεραία τὰς μηχανὰς Ἀλέξανδρος· καὶ ἐκδρομῇ αὖθις γίνεται τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῷ ἐμπρῆσαι τὰς μηχανάς. καὶ μέρος μὲν τι τῶν πλησίον τοῦ τείχους γέρρων καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν πύργων τῶν ξυλίνων κατεκαύθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διεφύλαξαν οἱ περὶ Φιλώταν τε καὶ Ἑλλάνικον, οἷς ἢ φυλακῇ αὐτῶν ἐπετέτραπτο· ὡς δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπεφάνη ἐν τῇ ἐκδρομῇ, τὰς τε δᾶδας, ὅσας ἔχοντες ἐκβεβοηθήκεσαν, ἀφέντες καὶ τὰ ὄπλα οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ρίψαντες εἴσω τοῦ τείχους
- 6 ἔφευγον. καίτοι τά γε πρῶτα τῇ φύσει τε τοῦ χωρίου, ὑπερδεξίου ὄντος, ἐπεκράτουν καὶ οὐ κατὰ μέτωπον μόνον ἠκροβολίζοντο ἐς τοὺς προμαχομένους τῶν μηχανῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν πύργων, οἱ



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missiles at the more distant enemies, though they were at a disadvantage in numbers and in the difficulty of the ground; the enemy could charge or volley on them from above. At this point more of Perdiccas' men hurried up, and others from the city too, and a stiff fight was joined near the wall. Once more the Macedonians drove the sallying force back inside the gates, and indeed the city was not far from being captured. For at the time the walls were not carefully guarded, and as two towers and one intervening curtain<sup>2</sup> had fallen to their foundations, the approach to the wall would have been easy for the army, if all had applied themselves to the business. The third tower, moreover, had been badly shaken, and if undermined would itself easily have been brought down, but the besieged anticipated this by building on the inner side, in place of the wall where it had collapsed, a crescent-shaped brick structure;<sup>3</sup> as they had many hands, this was easy work.

Next day Alexander brought up his engines against this wall; again a sally was made by those in the city to burn them. Part of the fence of mantlets near the walls and part of one of the wooden towers were burnt down; the rest was saved by Philotas and Hellanicus and their men, who had been entrusted with their protection. But when Alexander also appeared in the sally, they dropped the torches with which they had rushed out to attack, and most cast away their arms and escaped within the wall.<sup>4</sup> Yet at first, from the nature of their commanding position, the besieged had the best of it, and they used to fire at the force protecting the engines not only from in front but also from the towers which

<sup>2</sup> D. 25, 5.

<sup>3</sup> D. 26, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Not in D.

## ARRIAN

δὴ ἑκατέρωθεν τοῦ ἐρημιμένου τείχους αὐτοὶ ὑπολειμμένοι ἐκ πλαγίου τε καὶ μόνον οὐ κατὰ νώτου παρείχον ἀκροβολίζεσθαι ἐς τοὺς τῷ ἀντωκοδομημένῳ τείχει προσάγοντας.

22. Οὐ πολλαῖς δὲ ὕστερον ἡμέραις ἐπάγοντος αὐθις Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰς μηχανὰς τῷ πλινθίνῳ τῷ ἐντὸς τείχει καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐφεστηκότος τῷ ἔργῳ, ἐκδρομὴ γίνεται πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἐρημιμένον τείχος, ἢ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπετέτακτο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ Τρίπυλον, ἢ οὐδὲ πάνυ  
 2 τι προσδεχομένοις τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἦν. καὶ οἱ μὲν δαδὰς τε ταῖς μηχαναῖς ἐνέβαλλον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐς τὸ ἐξάψαι τε φλόγα καὶ ἐπὶ μέγα προκαλέσασθαι, τῶν δὲ ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτῶν τε ἐμβαλλόντων ἐς αὐτοὺς ἐρρωμένως καὶ ταῖς μηχαναῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων λίθων τε μεγάλων ἀφιεμένων καὶ βελῶν ἐξακοντιζομένων οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπεστράφησάν τε καὶ  
 3 ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φόνος ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀλίγος ἐγένετο, ὅσῳ πλείονές τε καὶ ξὺν μείζονι τῇ τόλμῃ ἐξέδραμον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθόντες τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἀπέθανον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τῷ τείχει τῷ καταπεπτωκότι, στενωτέρας τε ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν τῆς παρόδου οὔσης καὶ τῶν κατερημιμένων τοῦ τείχους χαλεπὴν τὴν ὑπέρβασιν αὐτοῖς παρεχόντων.

4 Τοῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ Τρίπυλον ἐκδραμοῦσιν ἀπῆντα Πτολεμαῖος ὁ σωματοφύλαξ ὁ βασιλικός, τὴν τε Ἀδαίου καὶ Τιμάνδρου ἅμα οἱ τάξιν ἄγων καὶ ἔστιν οὗς τῶν ψιλῶν· καὶ οὗτοι οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ χαλεπῶς  
 5 ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τούτοις ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει κατὰ στενὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τάφρου πεποιημένην φεύγουσι τὴν τε

had been left standing on either side of the breach and which made it possible to fire from the flanks and almost at the back of those assailing the replacement wall.

22. A few days afterwards Alexander again brought up his engines to the inner brick wall, taking charge of operations himself, and there was a sally from the city in full force; <sup>1</sup> some of the enemy attacked near the breach, where Alexander had himself taken up position, others at the triple gate, the last place the Macedonians looked for a sally. Some flung torches on the siege engines, and anything else which might light a flame and make a great blaze; but Alexander's immediate supports counter-attacked vigorously; large stones were hurled by the engines from the towers, missiles were showered in volleys, and the besieged were easily repulsed and fled into the city. Here there was great carnage, proportionate to their number and the greater boldness of their sally. Some fell in hand-to-hand fight with the Macedonians, others round the fallen wall, where the passage was too narrow to admit such a number and the fallen parts of the wall made it difficult to pass over them.

As for those who sallied by the triple gate, Ptolemaeus, the royal bodyguard, met them, bringing up the battalions of Adaeus and Timander and some of the light troops; they too had no difficulty in driving back the sallying party, who in fact also suffered in the retreat over a narrow bridge thrown across the moat, which gave way under their numbers;

<sup>1</sup> D. 26 with variant details; he makes the Athenian Ephialtes (A. i 10, 4) the leader.

γέφυραν αὐτὴν ὑπὸ πλήθους ξυντρῖψαι καὶ πολλοὺς  
 αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν τάφρον ἐμπεσόντας τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ  
 σφῶν καταπατηθέντας διαφθαρῆναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ  
 6 ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων βαλλομένους. ὁ  
 πλείστος δὲ φόνος περὶ ταῖς πύλαις αὐταῖς ξυνέβη,  
 ὅτι ἡ ξύγκλεισις τῶν πυλῶν φοβερὰ τε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ  
 καιροῦ γενομένη, δεισάντων μὴ συνεισπέσοιεν τοῖς  
 φεύγουσιν ἐχόμενοι αὐτῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες, πολλοὺς  
 καὶ τῶν φιλίων τῆς εἰσόδου ἀπέκλεισεν, οὓς πρὸς  
 7 αὐτοῖς τοῖς τείχεσιν οἱ Μακεδόνες διέφθειραν. καὶ  
 παρ' ὀλίγον ἤκεν ἀλῶναι ἡ πόλις, εἰ μὴ Ἄλέξανδρος  
 ἀνεκαλέσατο τὸ στράτευμα, ἔτι διασῶσαι ἐθέλων  
 τὴν Ἀλικαρνασσόν, εἴ τι φίλιον ἐνδοθείη ἐκ τῶν  
 Ἀλικαρνασσέων. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν μὲν ἐκ τῆς  
 πόλεως ἐς χιλίους, τῶν δὲ ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀμφὶ  
 τοὺς τεσσαράκοντα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις Πτολεμαῖός τε  
 ὁ σωματοφύλαξ καὶ Κλέαρχος ὁ τοξάρχης καὶ  
 Ἀδαῖος <ὁ> χιλιάρχης, οὗτοι καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν οὐκ  
 ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων.

23. Ἐνθα δὴ ξυνελθόντες οἱ ἡγεμόνες τῶν  
 Περσῶν, Ὀροντοβάτης τε καὶ Μέμνων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν  
 παρόντων γνόντες σφᾶς τε οὐ δυναμένους ἐπὶ πολὺ  
 ἀντέχειν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ τοῦ τείχους τὸ μὲν τι  
 καταπεπτωκὸς ἤδη ὄρωντες, τὸ δὲ καὶ κατασει-  
 σμένον, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς  
 ἐκδρομαῖς τοὺς μὲν διεφθαρμένους, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ  
 2 τοῦ τετρώσθαι ἀπομάχους ὄντας, ταῦτα ἐν νῶ  
 λαβόντες ἀμφὶ δευτέραν φυλακὴν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸν τε  
 ξύλινον πύργον, ὃν αὐτοὶ ἀντωκοδόμησαν ταῖς  
 μηχαναῖς τῶν πολεμίων, ἐμπιπράσι καὶ τὰς στοάς,  
 ἐν αἷς τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς ἀπέκειτο. ἐνέβαλον δὲ καὶ  
 3 ταῖς οἰκίαις πῦρ ταῖς πλησίον τοῦ τείχους· τῶν δὲ

many fell into the moat and some of them were  
trampled to death by their comrades, and others shot  
down by the Macedonians from above. The greatest 6  
slaughter was round about the gates themselves; for  
they were shut prematurely in panic, as the de-  
fenders feared that the Macedonians also might  
enter, pressing hard upon the fugitives; thus many  
friends were shut out, to be destroyed by their foes  
close to the walls themselves. The city indeed 7  
came near to capture, had not Alexander sounded  
the retreat, in a desire even now to save Halicarnassus  
if the citizens would surrender amicably. About a  
thousand of the garrison perished and about forty  
of Alexander's forces, including Ptolemaeus the  
bodyguard, Clearchus, the commander of the  
archers, Addaeus, a chiliarch, and other Mace-  
donians of repute.

23. The leaders of the Persians, Orontobates  
and Memnon, now met and decided that as things  
were they could not long hold out against the siege,  
with part of the wall gone, as they saw, and part  
badly shaken, many soldiers lost in the sallies, many  
disabled by wounds. With all this in mind, about 2  
the second watch of the night they burned the  
wooden tower they themselves had built to oppose  
the enemy engines and the sheds in which their  
missiles were stored. They also fired all houses  
near the walls, while others caught alight from 3

## ARRIAN

καὶ προσήψατο ἢ φλόξ ἀπό τε τῶν στοῶν καὶ τοῦ  
 πύργου πολλή ἀπενεχθεῖσα καὶ τι καὶ τοῦ ἀνέμου  
 ταύτη ἐπιφέροντος· αὐτῶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἄκραν  
 τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀπεχώρησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὴν Σαλμα-  
 4 κίδα, ἄκραν οὕτω καλουμένην. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ ὡς  
 ἐξηγγέλθη ταῦτα πρὸς τινων αὐτομολησάντων ἐκ  
 τοῦ ἔργου καὶ τὸ πῦρ πολὺ καθεώρα αὐτός, καίτοι  
 ἀμφὶ μέσας που νύκτας ἦν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὁ δὲ καὶ  
 ὡς ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς Μακεδόνας τοὺς μὲν ἔτι  
 ἐμπιπράντας τὴν πόλιν ἔκτεινεν, ὅσοι δὲ ἐν ταῖς  
 οἰκίαις καταλαμβάνοντο τῶν Ἀλικαρνασσέων,  
 τούτους δὲ σώζειν παρήγγειλεν.

5 Ἦδη τε ἠὼς ὑπέφαινε καὶ κατιδὼν τὰς ἄκρας, ἃς  
 οἱ τε Πέρσαι καὶ οἱ μισθοφόροι κατειλήφεσαν,  
 ταύτας μὲν ἀπέγνω πολιορκεῖν, τριβὴν τε ἐπινοῶν  
 οὐκ ὀλίγην ἔσεσθαι οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὰς τῇ φύσει τῶν  
 χωρίων καὶ οὐ παρὰ μέγα εἶναι ἐξελόντι οἱ τὴν  
 6 πόλιν ἤδη πᾶσαν. θάψας δὲ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας ἐν  
 τῇ νυκτὶ τὰς μὲν μηχανὰς ἐς Τράλλεις ἀπαγαγεῖν  
 ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἐπ' αὐταῖς τεταγμένους, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν  
 πόλιν ἐς ἔδαφος κατασκάψας αὐτῆς τε ταύτης καὶ  
 τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπὼν ξένους  
 μὲν πεζοὺς τρισχιλίους, ἰππέας δὲ ἐς διακοσίους  
 καὶ Πτολεμαῖον ἡγεμόνα αὐτῶν ἐπὶ Φρυγίας  
 7 ἐστέλλετο. τῆς δὲ Καρίας συμπάσης σατραπεύειν  
 ἔταξεν Ἄδαν, θυγατέρα μὲν Ἐκατόμνω, γυναῖκα  
 δὲ Ἰδριέως, ὅς καὶ ἀδελφὸς αὐτῇ ὦν κατὰ νόμον  
 τῶν Καρῶν ξυνώκει. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰδριεὺς τελευτῶν  
 ταύτη ἐπέτρεψε τὰ πράγματα, νενομισμένον ἐν

<sup>1</sup> D. 27, 5 (most of the forces allegedly evacuated to Cos).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ii 5, 7: Ptolemaeus (Berve no. 674, not the historian)

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 23. 3-7

the sheds and the tower, where the blaze was  
 furious and wafted by the wind in this direction.  
 They themselves retreated, some to the citadel on  
 the island and others to the height called Salmacis.<sup>1</sup>  
 When this news was reported to Alexander by men  
 who deserted in this action, and when he himself saw  
 the fire spreading, though all this took place about  
 midnight, none the less he brought out his Mace-  
 donians and put to the sword those who were still  
 setting fire to the city; he gave orders that Hali-  
 carnassians found in their houses should be spared.

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Dawn was breaking; and observing the heights  
 which the Persians and the mercenaries had seized,  
 he decided not to besiege them, considering that it  
 would mean much delay for him round about the  
 heights, owing to the nature of the ground, and no  
 great advantage now he had captured the whole city.  
 He buried those who had fallen during the night,  
 ordered the troops placed in charge of the siege  
 engines to remove them to Tralles, himself razed the  
 city to the ground and, to guard it and the rest of  
 Caria, left three thousand mercenary foot and two  
 hundred horse under Ptolemaeus, while he set out for  
 Phrygia.<sup>2</sup> As satrap of all Caria he appointed Ada,  
 daughter of Hecatomnos, wife of Hidrieus;<sup>3</sup> though  
 her brother, he had lived with her in accordance with  
 Carian custom. On his death Hidrieus had handed  
 over affairs to her; from Semiramis<sup>4</sup> down, it had

was made general in Caria, as Ada (§8), like other 'native'  
 satraps Al. appointed, would only have had civil power. Al.  
 proceeded towards Phrygia only by a very devious route.

<sup>1</sup> D. 24, 2 f. puts this before the fall of Halicarnassus. The  
 Carians, and their local dynasty, were partly Hellenized, cf.  
 Tod 138, 155.

<sup>2</sup> A legendary figure probably based on Sammuamat, queen  
 regent of Assyria, 810-805 B.C.



τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἔτι ἀπὸ Σεμιράμεως καὶ γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἀνδρῶν. Πιζώδαρος δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐκβάλλει τῆς 8 ἀρχῆς, αὐτὸς δὲ κατεῖχε τὰ πράγματα. τελευταῖος δὲ Πιζωδάρου Ὀροντοβάτης τὴν Καρῶν ἀρχὴν ἐκ βασιλέως πεμφθεὶς εἶχε, γαμβρὸς ὢν Πιζωδάρου. Ἄδα δὲ Ἄλινδα μόνον κατεῖχε, χωρίον τῆς Καρίας ἐν τοῖς ὀχυρώτατον, καὶ ἐσβαλόντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς Καρίαν ἀπήντα, τὰ τε Ἄλινδα ἐνδιδοῦσα καὶ παῖδά οἱ τιθεμένη Ἀλέξανδρον. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ τε Ἄλινδα αὐτῇ ἐπέτρεψε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ παιδὸς οὐκ ἀπηξίωσε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀλικαρνασσόν τε ἐξεῖλε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας ἐπεκράτησεν, αὐτῇ ἄρχειν ἀπάσης ἔδωκε.

24. Τῶν Μακεδόνων δὲ ἔστιν οἱ συνεστρατευμένοι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἦσαν νεωστὶ πρὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς γεγαμηκότες· καὶ τούτων ἔγνω οὐκ ἀμελητέα εἶναί οἱ Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλ' ἐκπέμπει γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκ Καρίας διαχειμάσοντας ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ἅμα ταῖς γυναῖξιν, ἐπιτάξας αὐτοῖς Πτολεμαῖόν τε τὸν Σελεύκου, ἓνα τῶν σωματοφυλάκων τῶν βασιλικῶν, καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν Κοῖνόν τε τὸν Πολεμοκράτους καὶ Μελέαγρον τὸν Νεοπτολέμου, ὅτι καὶ 2 αὐτοὶ τῶν νεογάμων ἦσαν, προστάξας, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοὶ τε ἐπανίωσι καὶ τοὺς μετὰ σφῶν ἐκπεμφθέντας ἐπαναγάγωσι, καταλέξαι ἵππέας τε καὶ πεζοὺς ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅσους πλείστους. καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ τῷδε, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ Μακεδόσιν Ἀλέξανδρος. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Κλέανδρον τὸν Πολεμοκράτους ἐπὶ ξυλλογῇ στρατιωτῶν εἰς Πελοπόννησον.

3 Παρμενίωνα δὲ πέμπει ἐπὶ Σάρδεων, δούς αὐτῷ τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἵππαρχίαν καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 23. 7-24. 3

been accepted in Asia that women should actually rule men. Pixodarus, however, turned her out of the government and held power himself. On his death Orontobates, his brother-in-law, was sent down by the king and assumed the government. Ada meanwhile held only Alinda, the strongest fortress in Caria; and when Alexander entered Caria she went to meet him, surrendering Alinda and adopting Alexander as her son. Alexander gave Alinda to her charge, and did not reject the title of son, and when he had taken Halicarnassus and become master of the rest of Caria, made her ruler of the whole country. 8

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24. Some of the Macedonians serving under Alexander had recently married before taking the field; Alexander thought he ought to consider these men, and sent them off from Caria to spend the winter with their wives in Macedonia, putting them under Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus, one of the royal Bodyguards, and attaching to him two of his generals, Coenus son of Polemocrates and Meleager son of Neoptolemus, as they themselves were among the newly wed. He directed them, when they returned and brought back their party, to enrol as many horse and foot from the country as they could. Alexander gained as much popularity by this act among the Macedonians as by any other. He also sent Cleander son of Polemocrates to the Peloponnese to collect troops.<sup>1</sup> 2

Parmenio was sent to Sardis, with a hipparchy of the Companions, the Thessalian cavalry, the other 3

<sup>1</sup> QC. iii 1, 1 (not in D.).

## ARRIAN

- ἰππέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὰς ἀμάξας ἄγειν· καὶ κελεύει προῖέναι ἀπὸ Σάρδεων ἐπὶ Φρυγίαν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Λυκίας τε καὶ Παμφυλίας ἦει, ὡς τῆς παραλίου κρατήσας ἀχρεῖον
- 4 καταστήσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸ ναυτικόν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐν παρόδῳ Ὑπαρνα, χωρίον ὄχυρόν, φυλακὴν ἔχον ξένους μισθοφόρους, ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔλαβεν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας ξένοι ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξῆλθον. ἔπειτα εἰσβαλὼν εἰς Λυκίαν Τελμισσέας μὲν ὁμολογία προσηγάγετο, περάσας δὲ τὸν Ξάνθον ποταμὸν Πίναρα καὶ Ξάνθον τὴν πόλιν καὶ Πάταρα ἐνδοθέντα ἔλαβε καὶ ἄλλα ἐλάττω πολίσματα ἐς τριάκοντα.
- 5 Ταῦτα καταπράξας ἐν ἀκμῇ ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐς τὴν Μιλυάδα καλουμένην χώραν ἐσβάλλει, ἣ ἐστὶ μὲν τῆς μεγάλης Φρυγίας, ξυνετέλει δὲ ἐς τὴν Λυκίαν τότε, οὕτως ἐκ βασιλέως μεγάλου τεταγμένον. καὶ ἐνταῦθα Φασηλιτῶν πρέσβεις ἦκον περὶ φιλίας τε καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανῶσαι Ἀλέξανδρον· καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκεύμενοι ἐπρέσβευον Λυκίων τῶν κάτω οἱ πολλοί.
- 6 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ Φασηλίτας τε καὶ Λυκίους παραδοῦναι τὰς πόλεις τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτο στελλομένοις ἐκέλευσε· καὶ παρεδόθησαν ζύμπασαι. αὐτὸς δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Φασηλίδα παραγενόμενος συνεξαιρεῖ αὐτοῖς φρούριον ὄχυρόν, ἐπιτετειχισμένον τῇ χώρᾳ πρὸς Πισιδῶν, ὅθεν ὀρμώμενοι οἱ

<sup>2</sup> D. 27, 6 (vague). Hipparchy: Introd. 60.

<sup>3</sup> D. 27. 7, cf. 31. 3 ff., takes Al. along the coast to Cilicia in 334! 28 has the story of a Lycian hill-town not in A., whose account in 24, 4-29, 6 is virtually all that we know of

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 24. 3-6

allies and the waggons, and given orders to proceed from Sardis to Phrygia.<sup>2</sup> He himself went towards Lycia and Pamphylia, so as to gain control of the coast and render the enemy's navy useless.<sup>3</sup> On his route he first took in his stride Hyparna, a strong place with a mercenary garrison; the mercenaries received terms and marched out of the citadel. Then on entering Lycia he took over the Telmis-seans by surrender, and after crossing the Xanthus he received Pinara and the city of Xanthus and Patara in submission with about thirty smaller little towns.

By the time he had completed all this it was the depth of winter, but he attacked the Milyan territory, as it is called; it belongs to Greater Phrygia, but was then reckoned part of Lycia by the Persian king's orders. There envoys from Phaselis came to offer friendly relations and to crown Alexander with a gold crown; most of the Lower Lycians also sent envoys with overtures on the same matters. Alexander ordered Phaselis and the Lycians to hand over their cities to those appointed for the purpose; and all were handed over. He came soon after to Phaselis, and, along with these places, took a strong outpost, fortified to threaten this district by Pisidians,

334  
B.C.

4

334-3  
B.C.

5

6

the operations described, from autumn 334 (24, 1) to spring 333, cf. also P. 17, 2-18, 1. The routes taken are often unclear (cf. Freya Stark, *JHS* 1958, 102 ff.), and Al's aims have never been explained; most of his marching was in the interior, and the coastal cities were not important as naval bases or suppliers of ships to Persia; it may be relevant that Phaselis (a Greek city) lay on the sea-route between Athens and Egypt, a potential supplier of Athens' essential grain imports. Al. evidently planned to unite with Parmenio and the newly married in Phrygia (i 29, 4 f.). A. neglects to record the appointment of Nearchus as satrap of Lycia (iii 6, 6).

βάρβαροι πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον τῶν Φασηλιτῶν τοὺς τὴν γῆν ἐργαζομένους.

25. Ἐπι δὲ αὐτῷ περὶ τὴν Φασηλίδαν ὄντι ἐξαγγέλλεται Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου ἐπιβουλεύειν, τὰ τε ἄλλα τῶν ἐταίρων ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε Θεσσαλῶν τῆς ἵππου ἄρχοντα. ἦν μὲν δὴ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος οὗτος ἀδελφὸς Ἡρομένους τε καὶ Ἀρραβαίου τῶν ξυνεπιλαβόντων τῆς σφαγῆς τῆς Φιλίππου· καὶ τότε αἰτίαν σχόντα αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρος ἀφῆκεν, ὅτι ἐν πρώτοις τε ἀφίκετο τῶν φίλων παρ' αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ Φίλιππος ἐτελεύτησε, καὶ τὸν θώρακα συνενδὺς συνηκολούθησεν αὐτῷ εἰς τὰ βασίλεια· ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶχε, στρατηγὸν τε ἐπὶ Θράκης στείλας καὶ ἐπειδὴ Κάλας ὁ τῶν Θετταλῶν ἵππαρχος ἐπὶ σατραπείᾳ ἐξεπέμφθη, αὐτὸν ἀπέδειξεν ἄρχειν τῆς Θεσσαλικῆς ἵππου. τὰ δὲ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς ἐξηγγέλθη ὧδε.

3 Δαρεῖος, ἐπειδὴ Ἀμύντας αὐτομολήσας παρ' αὐτὸν λόγους τέ τινας καὶ γράμματα παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου τούτου ἐκόμισε, καταπέμπει ἐπὶ θάλασσαν Σισίνην, ἄνδρα Πέρσῃν τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν πιστῶν, πρόφασιν μὲν παρὰ Ἀτιζύην τὸν Φρυγίας σατράπην, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τούτῳ συνεσόμενον καὶ πίστει δώσοντα, εἰ ἀποκτείνει βασιλέα Ἀλέξανδρον, αὐτὸν βασιλέα καταστήσειν Μακεδονίας καὶ χρυσίου τάλαντα πρὸς τῇ βασιλείᾳ ἐπιδώσειν χίλια. ὁ δὲ Σισίνης ἀλοὺς πρὸς Παρμενίωνος λέγει πρὸς Παρμενίωνα ὧν ἔνεκα ἀπεστάλη· καὶ τοῦτον ἐν φυλακῇ πέμπει Παρμενίων παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον, καὶ πυνθάνεται ταῦτα παρ' αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρος. ξυναγαγὼν δὲ τοὺς φίλους βουλήν προὔτιθει, ὅ τι χρὴ ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου γνῶναι.

a base from which the barbarians did much injury to the people of Phaselis tilling the soil.

384-3  
B.C.

25. While Alexander was still operating round Phaselis it was reported to him that his namesake, son of Aeropus, was conspiring; he was one of the Companions, and at the time commander of the Thessalian cavalry. This Alexander was brother to Heromenes and Arrabaeus, who had a part in the murder of Philip. Though he was implicated at the time, Alexander let him off, since he had been among the first of his friends to rally to him on Philip's death, and had put on his cuirass and accompanied Alexander into the palace; later Alexander had even held him in honour near his person, had sent him to command in Thrace, and when Calas, commander of the Thessalian cavalry, had been transferred to a satrapy,<sup>1</sup> appointed him commander of the Thessalian horse. The story of the plot was reported as follows.

Darius, when Amyntas deserted to him bringing overtures and a letter from this Alexander, sent Sisines, a trusty Persian from his suite, to the sea. The pretext was that he was to visit Atizyes, satrap of Phrygia, but in fact he was to meet this Alexander and give him assurances that if he assassinated Alexander the king, the Persian king would make him king of Macedonia and give him a thousand gold Talents as well. Sisines fell into Parmenio's hands and revealed to him the object of his mission; and Parmenio sent him under escort to Alexander, who heard the same story from him. So he called together his friends, to consider what should be de-

<sup>1</sup> 17, 1.

## ARRIAN

- 5 καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς ἑταίροις μήτε πάλαι εὖ βεβουλευ-  
 σθαι τὸ κράτιστον τοῦ ἵππικοῦ ἀνδρὶ οὐ πιστῶ  
 ἐπιτρέψας, νῦν τε χρῆναι αὐτὸν κατὰ τάχος ἐκπο-  
 δῶν ποιεῖσθαι, πρὶν καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον γενόμενον  
 6 τοῖς Θετταλοῖς ξὺν αὐτοῖς τι νεωτερίσαι. καὶ τι  
 καὶ θεῖον ἐφόβει αὐτούς. ἔτι γὰρ πολιορκουῖντος  
 αὐτοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀλικαρνασσὸν ἀναπαύεσθαι  
 μὲν ἐν μεσημβρία, χελιδόνα δὲ περιπέτεσθαι ὑπὲρ  
 τῆς κεφαλῆς τρύζουσαν μεγάλα καὶ τῆς εὐνῆς ἄλλη  
 καὶ ἄλλη ἐπικαθίζειν, θορυβωδέστερον ἢ κατὰ τὸ  
 7 εἰωθὸς ἄδουσαν· τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ καμάτου ἐγερθῆναι  
 μὲν ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ὕπνου, ἐνοχλούμενον δὲ  
 πρὸς τῆς φωνῆς τῇ χειρὶ οὐ βαρέως ἀποσοβῆσαι  
 τὴν χελιδόνα· τὴν δὲ τοσοῦτου ἄρα δεῆσαι  
 ἀποφυγεῖν πληγείσαν, ὥστε ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῆς  
 τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου καθημένην μὴ πρόσθεν ἀνεῖναι  
 8 πρὶν παντελῶς ἐξεγερθῆναι Ἀλέξανδρον. καὶ  
 Ἀλέξανδρος οὐ φαῦλον ποιησάμενος τὸ τῆς  
 χελιδόνος ἀνεκοίνωσεν Ἀριστάνδρῳ τῷ Τελμισσεῖ,  
 μάντει· Ἀρίστανδρον δὲ ἐπιβουλήν μὲν ἔκ του τῶν  
 φίλων σημαίνεσθαι αὐτῶ εἰπεῖν, σημαίνεσθαι δὲ  
 καί, ὅτι καταφανῆς ἔσται. τὴν γὰρ χελιδόνα  
 σύντροφόν τε εἶναι ὄρνιθα καὶ εὖνουν ἀνθρώποις καὶ  
 λάλον μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλην ὄρνιθα.  
 9 Ταῦτά τε οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πέρσου ξυνθεῖς  
 πέμπει ὡς Παρμενίωνα Ἀμφοτερόν τὸν Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου μὲν παῖδα, ἀδελφὸν δὲ Κρατεροῦ. καὶ  
 ξυμπέμπει αὐτῶ τῶν Περγαίων τινὰς τὴν ὁδὸν  
 ἠγησομένους. καὶ ὁ Ἀμφοτερὸς στολὴν ἐνδύς  
 ἐπιχώριον, [καὶ] ὡς μὴ γνῶριμος εἶναι κατὰ τὴν  
 10 ὁδὸν, λανθάνει ἀφικόμενος παρὰ Παρμενίωνα· καὶ  
 γράμματα μὲν οὐ κομίζει παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου· οὐ



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 25. 5-10

cided about Alexander. The Companions held 5 334-3  
that he had originally acted unwisely in committing B.C.  
the best of the cavalry to an untrustworthy officer,  
and that he should now get rid of him as soon as  
possible, before he became more popular with the  
Thessalians and secured their help for a revolution.  
They were also troubled by an omen: while Alex- 6  
ander was still besieging Halicarnassus and was  
taking his midday rest, a swallow circled over his  
head chattering loudly, and perched here and there  
on his bed; its song was noisier than the usual  
swallow's twittering. Alexander was too weary to 7  
awaken, but troubled by the sound, he gently brushed  
the swallow away; but the bird would not fly off when  
hit; rather it perched on Alexander's very head  
and kept on till Alexander was fully awake. Alex- 8  
ander took the incident seriously and informed  
Aristander of Telmissus, a seer; he replied that it  
meant a plot on the part of one of his friends but  
also that the plot would come to light. For the  
swallow is a domestic bird, friendly to man, and  
more talkative than any other bird.

Putting this together with the Persian's story, he 9  
sent Amphoterus son of Alexander, brother of  
Craterus, to Parmenio with some Pergaeans as guides.  
Amphoterus wore a native dress, so as not to be  
recognized on the journey, and so reached Parmenio  
safely. He brought no letter from King Alexander; 10  
it was thought unwise to write plainly in a matter

## ARRIAN

γὰρ ἔδοξε γράφειν ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς τοιούτου ἐς τὸ ἐμφανές· τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ γλώσσης οἱ ἐντεταλμένα ἐξήγγειλεν, καὶ οὕτω ξυλλαμβάνεται ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος οὗτος καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ ἦν.

26. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἄρας ἐκ Φασηλίδος μέρος μὲν τι τῆς στρατιᾶς διὰ τῶν ὄρων πέμπει ἐπὶ Πέργης, ἣ ὠδοπεποιήκεσαν αὐτῷ οἱ Θράκες χαλεπὴν ἄλλως καὶ μακρὰν οὖσαν τὴν πάροδον· αὐτὸς δὲ παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν διὰ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἦγε τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτόν. ἔστι δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ ὁδὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὅτι μὴ τῶν ἀπ' ἄρκτου ἀνέμων πνεόντων· εἰ δὲ νότοι κατέχοιεν, ἀπόρως ἔχει διὰ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ὁδοιπορεῖν. τῷ δὲ ἐκ νότων σκληροὶ βορραὶ ἐπιπνεύσαντες, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, εὐμαρῇ καὶ ταχεῖαν τὴν πάροδον παρέσχον. ἐκ Πέργης δὲ ὡς προῆει, ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν πρέσβεις Ἀσπενδίων αυτοκράτορες, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐνδιδόντες, φρουρὰν δὲ μὴ εἰσάγειν δεόμενοι. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς φρουρᾶς πράξαντες ἀπῆλθον, ὅσα ἡξίουں πεντήκοντα δὲ τάλαντα κελεύει τῇ στρατιᾷ δοῦναι αὐτοῖς ἐς μισθὸν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους, οὓς δασμὸν βασιλεῖ ἔτρεφον. οἱ δὲ ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ τοὺς ἵππους παραδώσειν ξυνθέμενοι ἀπῆλθον.
- 4 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπὶ Σίδης ἦει. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ Σιδῆται Κυμαῖοι ἐκ Κύμης τῆς Αἰολίδος· καὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὑπὲρ σφῶν τόνδε τὸν λόγον, ὅτι, ὡς κατῆράν τε ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐκείνην οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ Κύμης

<sup>2</sup> For this Alexander and Amyntas see Introd. 46 and Appendix XI 5.

<sup>1</sup> This 'miracle', when the sea did 'obeisance' to Al. (Callisthenes F. 31, not a quotation of his words), is said to

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 25. 10-26. 4

of this sort; but he gave a verbal message as directed. As a result the other Alexander was arrested and kept under guard.<sup>2</sup>

334-3  
B.C.

26. Leaving Phaselis, Alexander sent part of his force through the mountain passes towards Perge, where the Thracians had made him a road, the approach being otherwise difficult and long. He himself led his men by the sea along the shore, a route practicable only with north winds blowing; south winds make the passage along the shore impossible. There had been southerlies but a north wind had set in, not without divine interposition, as Alexander and his followers interpreted it, and made the passage easy and swift.<sup>1</sup> As he went on from Perge, plenipotentiaries from Aspendus met him on the way surrendering their city, but begging it might not be garrisoned. This point about the garrison they won; but Alexander ordered them to provide fifty Talents for the army as pay, with the horses they bred as tribute to the King of Persia.<sup>2</sup> They agreed on the money and to hand over horses, and left.

Alexander now went towards Side,<sup>3</sup> whose inhabitants are Cymaeans from Aeolian Cyme; according to their own account of themselves, when the first emigrants from Cyme put into land and

have appeared in all the histories of Al. (Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* ii 348) and was ridiculed by Menander (died c. 290 B.C.), fr. 924 Koch; but cf. P. 17 (no mention in a supposed letter of Al.); Strabo xiv, 3, 9.

<sup>1</sup> Introd. 39.

<sup>2</sup> Al. seems to have by-passed Aspendus as well as Syllium, keeping closer to the coast, on his march further east to Side, whence he returned towards Syllium and Perge (27, 5), again by-passing Aspendus, until he marched back against that city on news of its disloyalty.

## ARRIAN

σταλέντες καὶ ἐπὶ οἰκισμῶ ἐξέβησαν, αὐτίκα τὴν  
 μὲν Ἑλλάδα γλώσσαν ἐξελάθοντο, εὐθύς δὲ  
 βάρβαρον φωνὴν ἴεσαν, οὐδὲ τῶν προσχώρων  
 βαρβάρων, ἀλλὰ ἰδίαν σφῶν οὐπω πρόσθεν οὔσαν  
 τὴν φωνήν· καὶ ἔκτοτε οὐ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους  
 5 προσχώρους Σιδῆται ἐβαρβάριζον. καταλιπὼν δὲ  
 φρουρὰν ἐν Σίδῃ προῆει ἐπὶ Σύλλιον, χωρίον  
 ὄχυρόν καὶ φρουρὰν ἔχον ξένων μισθοφόρων καὶ  
 αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων βαρβάρων. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ  
 Σύλλιον ἐξ ἐφόδου αὐτοσχεδίου ἠδυνήθη λαβεῖν,  
 ἐπεὶ τ' ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τοὺς Ἀσπεν-  
 δίους ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ξυγκειμένων πράξαι ἐθέλοιεν,  
 οὔτε τοὺς ἵππους παραδοῦναι τοῖς πεμφθείσιν οὔτε  
 ἀπαριθμῆσαι τὰ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι  
 ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὰς τε πύλας ἀποκε-  
 κλείκασιν τοῖς παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τὰ τείχη, ὅπη  
 πεπονηκότα ἦν, ἐπισκευάζουσι, ταῦτα πυθόμενος  
 ἐπὶ Ἀσπένδου ἀνεζεύγνυεν.

27. Ὡκισται δὲ τῆς Ἀσπένδου τὰ μὲν πολλὰ  
 ἐπὶ ἄκρᾳ ὄχυρᾳ καὶ ἀποτόμῳ καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν  
 ἄκραν ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ποταμὸς ρεῖ· ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς  
 καὶ περὶ τῆ ἄκρᾳ ἐν τῷ χθαμαλῷ οὐκ ὀλίγαι  
 οἰκῆσαι καὶ τεῖχος περιεβέβλητο αὐταῖς οὐ μέγα.  
 2 τὸ μὲν δὴ τεῖχος εὐθύς, ὡς προσάγοντα Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρον ἔγνωσαν, ἐκλείπουσιν ὅσοι ἐπώκουν καὶ  
 τὰς οἰκίας, ὅσας ἐν τῷ χθαμαλῷ ὠκισμένας οὐκ  
 ἐδόκουν διαφυλάξαι ἂν δύνασθαι· αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐς τὴν  
 ἄκραν συμφεύγουσιν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς ἀφίκετο  
 ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει, εἴσω τοῦ ἐρήμου τεύχους παρελθὼν  
 κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ταῖς καταλε-  
 3 λειμμέναις πρὸς τῶν Ἀσπενδίων. οἱ δὲ Ἀσπένδιοι  
 ὡς εἶδον αὐτόν τε Ἀλέξανδρον παρ' ἐλπίδα

disembarked to found a colony, they at once forgot their native tongue and talked a foreign language straight away, and not that of the neighbouring barbarians, but their own idiom, in fact a new dialect; and from that time the people of Side spoke like barbarians but not like the other peoples of the neighbourhood. Alexander left a guard at Side and went on to Syllium, a strong place with a garrison of foreign mercenaries and of barbarians too from those parts. But he could not take Syllium at the first assault without preparation, and, when it was reported to him on his march that the Aspendians were unwilling to carry out any of the terms of the pact, would not hand over the horses to the party sent to fetch them, nor pay the money, and had packed up and brought their belongings in to the city from the countryside, had shut their gates upon Alexander's envoys, and were repairing dilapidations in their walls, the news made him march towards Aspendus. 5

27. Aspendus is built, for the most part, on a strong hill-top, sheer, with the river Eurymedon flowing right past the height. Round this hill-top on the flat, they had a number of dwellings surrounded by a low wall. As soon as they were aware of Alexander's approach, the inhabitants deserted this wall, as well as the houses built on the level which they thought it impossible to defend; they all took refuge on the hill-top. On arriving with his force, Alexander penetrated within the deserted wall and camped in the houses abandoned by the Aspendians. When the citizens saw with surprise Alexander present in person and his army all round them, 2 3

## ARRIAN

- ἤκοντα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν κύκλῳ σφῶν πάντη, πέμψαντες πρέσβεις ἐδέοντο ἐφ' οἷσπερ τὸ πρότερον ξυμβῆναι. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τό τε χωρίον ἰσχυρὸν ἰδὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ χρόνιον πολιορκίαν παρεσκευασμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ ὡς
- 4 ξυνέβη πρὸς αὐτούς· ὁμήρους δὲ δοῦναι σφῶν τοὺς δυνατωτάτους ἐκέλευσεν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους, οὓς πρόσθεν ὠμολόγησαν, καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἀντὶ τῶν πεντήκοντα, καὶ πείθεσθαι τῷ σατράπῃ τῷ <ὕπ' > Ἀλεξάνδρου ταχθέντι καὶ φόρους ἀποφέρειν ὅσα ἔτη Μακεδόσι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας διακριθῆναι, ἣν τῶν προσχώρων οὖσαν βία κατέχειν ἐν αἰτία ἦσαν.
- 5 Ὡς δὲ πάντα οἱ ἐπεχώρησαν, ἀνέζευξεν ἐς Πέργην, κακεῖθεν ἐς Φρυγίαν ὤρμητο· ἦν δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ πορεία παρὰ Τελμισσὸν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι οὗτοι τὸ μὲν γένος Πισίδαί εἰσὶ βάρβαροι, χωρίον δὲ οἰκοῦσιν ὑπερύψηλον καὶ πάντη ἀπότομον, καὶ ἡ
- 6 ὁδὸς παρὰ τὴν πόλιν χαλεπή. καθήκει γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὄρος ἔσπε ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδόν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἀποπαύεται, ἀντίπορον δὲ αὐτῷ ἄλλο ὄρος ἐστὶν οὐ μείον ἀπότομον. καὶ ταῦτα τὰ ὄρη ὥσπερ πύλας ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τῇ ὁδῷ, καὶ ἔστιν ὀλίγη φυλακῇ κατέχοντας τὰ ὄρη ταῦτα ἄπορον ποιεῖν τὴν πάροδον. καὶ τότε οἱ Τελμισσεῖς πανδημεὶ ἐκβεβοηθηκότες ἀμφοτέρα τὰ ὄρη κατεῖ-
- 7 χον. ταῦτα δὴ ἰδὼν Ἀλέξανδρος στρατοπεδεύεσθαι αὐτοῦ, ὅπως εἶχον, ἐκέλευε τοὺς Μακεδόνας, γνοὺς, ὅτι οὐ μενούσι πανδημεὶ οἱ Τελμισσεῖς ἀυλιζομένους σφᾶς ἰδόντες, ἀλλ' ἀποχωρήσουσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν πλησίον οὖσαν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσον φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι. καὶ ξυνέβη

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 27. 3-7

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they sent envoys to beg for an agreement on their old terms. Alexander saw that the position was strong, and that he was not prepared for a long siege, yet even so he refused a pact with them on the same conditions. He demanded their most influential men as hostages, the horses they had previously promised and a hundred Talents in place of fifty; they were to be subject to the satrap appointed by him, and pay yearly tribute to Macedon and an adjudication was to be held about the territory they were accused of having annexed by violence from their neighbours. 4

When all this had been conceded, he moved to Perge and thence began his march to Phrygia, which led past the city of Telmissus.<sup>1</sup> The Telmissians are Pisidian barbarians in origin, and inhabit a very high position, precipitous all round; the road past the city is difficult. A mountain stretches down from the city to the road, and there ends; but opposite is another, equally abrupt. These mountains virtually make gates on the road, and a small guard can prevent all approach by holding them. On this occasion the Telmissians came out in full force and occupied both mountains. Seeing this, Alexander ordered the Macedonians to camp where they were, knowing that the Telmissians, on seeing them in bivouacks, would not wait there in full force, but would for the most part drift away to the city close by, leaving only a guard on the mountains. 5 6 7

<sup>1</sup> Properly Termessus (coins and inscriptions).



ὅπως εἵκαζεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἀπῆλθον,  
 8 αἱ φυλακαὶ δὲ ἐγκατέμειναν. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους  
 εὐθύς ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε τοξότας καὶ τὰς τῶν  
 ἀκοντιστῶν τάξεις καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ὅσοι κουφό-  
 τεροι ἐπήγαγεν. οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔμειναν βαλλόμενοι,  
 ἀλλὰ ἔλιπον τὸ χωρίον· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπερβα-  
 λῶν τὰ στενὰ πρὸς τῇ πόλει κατεστρατοπέδευσε.

28. Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀφικνοῦνται παρ' αὐτὸν Σελ-  
 γέων πρέσβεις. οἱ δὲ εἰσι καὶ αὐτοὶ Πισίδαι  
 βάρβαροι καὶ πόλιν μεγάλην οἰκοῦσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 μάχιμοί εἰσιν· ὅτι δὲ πολέμιοι τοῖς Τελμισσεῦσιν  
 ἐκ παλαιοῦ ἐτύγχανον, ὑπὲρ φιλίας πρὸς Ἀλέξαν-  
 δρον πεπρεσβευμένοι ἦσαν. καὶ πρὸς τούτους  
 σπένδεται Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ ἐκ τούτου πιστοῖς ἐς  
 2 ἅπαντα ἐχρήσατο. τὴν Τελμισσὸν δὲ ἀπέγνω  
 ἐλεῖν ἂν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ Σαγαλασσοῦ  
 ἐστέλλετο. ἦν δὲ καὶ αὕτη οὐ μικρὰ πόλις·  
 Πισίδαι καὶ ταύτην ᾤκουν, καὶ ἐδόκουν πάντων  
 Πισιδῶν μαχίμων ὄντων αὐτοὶ εἶναι [οἱ] μαχιμώ-  
 τατοι· καὶ τότε τὸν λόφον τὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὅτι  
 καὶ οὗτος οὐ μείον τοῦ τείχους ὄχυρός ἐς τὸ  
 3 ἀπομάχεσθαι ἦν, κατειληφότες προσέμενον. Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος δὲ τὴν μὲν φάλαγγα τῶν Μακεδόνων  
 τάττει ὧδε· ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἵνα καὶ  
 αὐτὸς ἐπετέτακτο, τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς εἶχεν, ἐχο-  
 μένους δὲ τούτων τοὺς πεζεταίρους ἔσπε ἐπὶ τὸ  
 εὐώνυμον παρατείνας, ὡς ἐκάστοις τῶν στρατηγῶν  
 4 ἡ ἡγεμονία τῆς τάξεως ἐν τῇ τότε ἡμέρᾳ ἦν. ἐπὶ  
 δὲ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ ἐπέταξεν ἡγεμόνα Ἀμύνταν τὸν  
 Ἀρραβαίου. προετάχθησαν δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ μὲν  
 δεξιοῦ κέρως οἱ τε τοξόται καὶ οἱ Ἀγριᾶνες, τοῦ δὲ  
 εὐωνύμου οἱ ἀκοντισταὶ οἱ Θρᾶκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 27. 7-28. 4

His guess proved right; most of them left, the guards remained. At once he took the archers, the javelin battalions, and the lighter armed hoplites and led them against the guards, who did not stand firm at the volleys but left their position. Alexander passed the narrows and encamped near the city.

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8

28. At this point arrived envoys from the Selgians, who are also barbarian Pisidians with a large city, a warlike people; they were old enemies of the Telmissians and that is why they had sent an embassy to Alexander to ask for his friendship. Alexander made a treaty with them, and thereafter found them wholly trustworthy allies. He concluded that the capture of Telmissus would be a long business, and moved on to Sagalassus, also a large city, inhabited by Pisidians who were thought to be the most warlike of this warlike people; on this occasion they had occupied the hill in front of the city which was as strong for defensive operations as the wall itself, and held their ground. Alexander deployed the Macedonian phalanx as follows: on the right wing, where he had stationed himself, he had the hypaspists, and next to them the foot-companions, extended to the left wing, each battalion under the commanders in the order of precedence for the day. On the left he placed Amyntas son of Arrabaeus in command. In front of the right wing were posted the archers and the Agrianians, of the left the Thracian javelin-

2

3

4

## ARRIAN

Σιτάλκης· οἱ γὰρ ἵππεῖς αὐτῷ οὐκ ὠφέλιμοι ἐν τῇ δυσχωρίᾳ ἦσαν. τοῖς Πισίδαῖς δὲ καὶ Τελμισσεῖς προσβεβοηθηκότες ξυνετάξαντο.

- 5 Ἦδη τε οἱ ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον προσβεβληκότες τῷ ὄρει, ὅπερ κατεῖχον οἱ Πισίδαί, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποτομώτατον τῆς ἀνόδου ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι λόχοις κατὰ κέρας ἐκάτερον, ἧ σφίσι μὲν εὐπροσοδώτατον ἦν, τοῖς πολεμίοις δὲ χαλεπωτάτη ἢ πρόσβασις. καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοξότας, οἳ δὴ οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ὠπλισμένους καὶ πρῶτους πελάσαντας, ἐτρέψαντο, οἱ δὲ Ἀγριᾶνες
- 6 ἔμειναν. ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἦδη καὶ ἡ φάλαγξ τῶν Μακεδόνων προσῆγε καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐφαίνετο. ὡς δὲ ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο, γυμνοί τε οἱ βάρβαροι ὄντες ὀπλίταις προσεφέροντο καὶ πάντῃ κατατιτρωσκόμενοι ἐπιπτον [δὲ], ἐνταῦθα
- 7 δὴ ἐγκλίνουσιν· καὶ ἀπέθανον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐς πεντακοσίους, . . . κοῦφοι γὰρ ὄντες καὶ ἔμπειροι τῶν χωρίων οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπεχώρουν· καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες διὰ βαρύτητα τῶν ὄπλων καὶ ἀπειρίαν τῶν ὁδῶν οὐ
- 8 θαρραλέοι ἐς τὸ διώκειν ἦσαν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐχόμενος τῶν φευγόντων τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν αἰρεῖ κατὰ κράτος. τῶν δὲ ξὺν αὐτῷ Κλέανδρός τε ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν τοξοτῶν ἀποθνήσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμφὶ τοὺς εἴκοσιν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πισίδας ἤγε· καὶ τὰ μὲν τινα τῶν φρουρίων βία ἐξεῖλε, τὰ δὲ ὁμολογίᾳ προσηγάγετο.

29. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἦει ἐπὶ Φρυγίας παρὰ τὴν λίμνην, ἧ ὄνομα Ἀσκανία, ἐν ἧ ἄλες πήγνυνται αὐτόματοι, καὶ τούτοις χρῶνται οἱ ἐπιχώριοι οὐδὲ θαλάσσης τι ἐπὶ τούτῳ δέονται· καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Κελαινὰς πεμπταῖος. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Κελαιναῖς ἄκρα ἦν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 28. 4-29. 1

men under Sitalces. The cavalry were of no use to him in this rough country. The Pisidians' line included Telmissians who had come to their help.

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In their assault on the height held by the Pisidians, Alexander's troops had already reached the steepest part of the ascent when barbarians in bands attacked them on either wing, where they could best approach and the Macedonians found the means to advance hardest. They drove back the archers, as they were lightly armed and first to make contact; but the Agrianians held firm. For the Macedonian phalanx was already coming up, and Alexander himself was visible at its head. Once hand-to-hand fighting had begun, the barbarians who had no protective armour and were engaged with hoplites were wounded and fell on all sides and at length gave way. Some five hundred perished.<sup>1</sup> . . . Unencumbered and knowing the country, they got away easily; from weight of armour and ignorance of the paths the Macedonians had little heart for the pursuit. Alexander, however, kept on the heels of the fugitives and stormed the city, losing Cleander, the commander of the archers, and some twenty more of his followers. Then he attacked the remaining Pisidians, captured some of their forts and received the surrender of others.

29. Thence he passed into Phrygia by Lake Ascania, where salt crystallizes naturally, and is used by the inhabitants, who thus need no sea salt; in four days he reached Celaenae, where a citadel sheer on every side was held under orders from the satrap of Phrygia

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<sup>1</sup> The number of prisoners was given in the lacuna.

## ARRIAN

πάντη ἀπότομος, καὶ ταύτην φυλακὴν κατείχεν ἐκ  
 τοῦ σατράπου τῆς Φρυγίας Κᾶρες μὲν χίλιοι,  
 2 Ἕλληνες δὲ μισθοφόροι ἑκατόν. καὶ οὗτοι πρεσ-  
 βεύονται παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, εἰ  
 μὴ ἀφίκοιτό σφισι βοήθεια ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἧ ξυνέκειτο,  
 φράσαντες τὴν ἡμέραν, ὅτι παραδώσουσι τὸ  
 χωρίον. καὶ ἔδοξε ταῦτα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὠφελι-  
 μώτερα ἢ πολιορκεῖν ἀπορον πάντη προσφέρεσθαι  
 3 τὴν ἄκραν. πρὸς μὲν δὴ ταῖς Κελαιναῖς φυλακὴν  
 καταλείπει στρατιώτας ἐς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους.  
 μείνας δὲ αὐτοῦ ἡμέρας δέκα καὶ σατράπην ἀπο-  
 δείξας Φρυγίας Ἀντίγονον τὸν Φιλίππου, ἐπὶ δὲ  
 τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτ' ἐκείνου στρατηγὸν Βάλακρον  
 τὸν Ἀμύντου ἐπιτάξας, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ Γορδίου ἐστέλ-  
 λετο. καὶ Παρμενίῳ ἐπέστειλεν, ἄγοντα ἅμα οἱ  
 τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείσε ἀπαντᾶν· καὶ ἀπήντα ξὺν τῇ  
 4 δυνάμει Παρμενίων. καὶ οἱ νεόγαμοι δὲ οἱ ἐπὶ  
 Μακεδονίας σταλέντες εἰς Γόρδιον ἦκον καὶ ξὺν  
 αὐτοῖς ἄλλη στρατιὰ καταλεχθεῖσα, ἣν ἤγε Πτο-  
 λεμαῖός τε ὁ Σελεύκου καὶ Κοῖνος ὁ Πολεμοκρά-  
 τους καὶ Μελέαγρος ὁ Νεοπτολέμου, πεζοὶ μὲν  
 Μακεδόνες τρισχίλιοι, ἵππεῖς δὲ ἐς τριακοσίους καὶ  
 Θεσσαλῶν ἵππεῖς διακόσιοι, Ἡλείων δὲ ἑκατόν καὶ  
 πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἠγεῖτο Ἀλκίας Ἡλείος.

Τὸ δὲ Γόρδιον ἔστι μὲν τῆς Φρυγίας τῆς ἐφ'  
 Ἑλλησπόντου, κεῖται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Σαγγαρίου  
 ποταμοῦ· τοῦ δὲ Σαγγαρίου αἱ μὲν πηγαὶ ἐκ  
 Φρυγίας εἰσίν, αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ τῆς Θρακῶν τῶν

<sup>1</sup> QC. iii 1, 1-8 (Celaenae surrendered after expiry of time limit of 60 days); iv 1, 35 says that Antigonus later sent on to Alexander most of the troops left to him.

<sup>2</sup> Wrongly styled satrap of Lydia by QC. iv 1, 34 f. (cf. ii

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 29. 1-5

by a garrison of a thousand Carians and a hundred  
 Greek mercenaries. They sent envoys to Alexander, 2  
 offering, in case help did not come to them on a day  
 previously appointed (the date was specified), to  
 surrender the position. Alexander thought this  
 more advantageous than a siege of a height in-  
 accessible on every side. So he left 1,500 troops 3  
 as a guard over Celaenae.<sup>1</sup> After waiting there  
 ten days and appointing Antigonus son of Philip  
 satrap of Phrygia,<sup>2</sup> and replacing him as commander  
 of the allies by Balacrus son of Amyntas, he in person  
 set out for Gordium, ordering Parmenio to meet  
 him there bringing his force with him, as he did.  
 The recently married Macedonians who had gone to 4  
 Macedonia also came to Gordium,<sup>3</sup> and with them a  
 freshly levied army, led by Ptolemaeus son of  
 Seleucus, Coenus son of Polemocrates and Meleager  
 son of Neoptolemus; there were 3,000 Macedonian  
 foot, 300 horse, 200 Thessalian horse, 150 Eleians  
 under Alcias of Elis.<sup>4</sup>

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Gordium is in Hellespontine Phrygia on the river 5  
 Sangarius, the springs of which are in Phrygia; it

4, 2 n.), he was prominent after Al's death, almost reunited the  
 empire under his rule and was the ancestor of the kings of  
 Macedon, 284-168 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> As Gordium is 500 miles from Pella, they could not have  
 arrived before May 333 B.C. On Al's arrival, he presumably  
 lost little time before 'loosing' the Gordian knot (ii 3, 1)  
 and then set out 'next day' (ii 4, 1); he too then did not reach  
 Gordium before May. K. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander*  
 86 ff., reasonably suggests that Gordium was made the rendez-  
 vous (cf. 24, 3 n.), as a place on the main road from Syria to  
 the Hellespont, where Al. could withstand any Persian  
 counter-offensive, and that his unwillingness to tarry in  
 besieging Telmissus and Celaenae was due to his need to meet  
 the rest of his forces there at the appointed time.

<sup>4</sup> See *Introd.* 57.

## ARRIAN

Βιθυνῶν χώρας ἐξίησιν ἐς τὸν Εὐξείνιον πόντον.  
 ἐνταῦθα καὶ Ἀθηναίων πρεσβεία παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον  
 ἀφίκετο, δεόμενοι Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀφεῖναι σφισι τοὺς  
 αἰχμαλώτους, οἳ ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ ποταμῷ ἐλήφθησαν  
 Ἀθηναίων ξυστρατευόμενοι τοῖς Πέρσαις καὶ τότε  
 ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ξὺν τοῖς δισχιλίοις δεδεμένοι ἦσαν.  
 6 καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄπρακτοι ἐν τῷ τότε ἀπῆλθον.  
 οὐ γὰρ ἔδόκει ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἔτι  
 ξυνεστῶτος τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πέρσῃν πολέμου ἀνεῖναι  
 τι τοῦ φόβου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὅσοι ἐναντία τῇ  
 Ἑλλάδι στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ  
 ἀπηξίωσαν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται, ἐπειδὰν τὰ παρόντα  
 καλῶς γένηται, τότε ἤκειν ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσ-  
 βευομένους.



## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER I. 29. 5-6

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runs through Bithynian Thrace into the Black Sea. An embassy also arrived there from Athens, begging Alexander to let them have the Athenian prisoners captured at the Granicus fighting on the Persian side and now under chains in Macedonia with the 2,000 captives. Their request on the prisoners' behalf was not granted for the time being, and they departed.<sup>5</sup> Alexander did not think it safe, with the Persian war still in progress, to relax intimidation of the Greeks who did not scruple to fight for the barbarians against Greece; but he answered that when circumstances were favourable they were to approach him again on the same subject. 6

<sup>5</sup> Cf. iii 6, 2, Introd. n. 69. QC. iii 1, 9 says he now (apparently before arrival at Gordium) promised to restore all Greeks to their homes at the end of the war.



## **BOOK II**

## ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου Μένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμῶν ἐκ βασιλέως Δαρείου καθεστηκῶς καὶ τῆς παραλίου ξυμπάσης, ὡς ἐς Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀποστρέψων τὸν πόλεμον, Χίου μὲν λαμβάνει προδοσίαν ἐνδοθεῖσαν, ἔνθεν δὲ ἐπὶ Λέσβου πλεύσας, ὡς οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ οἱ Μιτυληναῖοι, τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις τῆς Λέσβου προσ-  
2 ηγάγετο. ταύτας δὲ παραστησάμενος καὶ προσχῶν τῇ Μιτυλήνῃ τὴν μὲν πόλιν χάρακι διπλῶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐς θάλασσαν ἀπετείχισε, στρατόπεδα δὲ πέντε ἐποικοδομησάμενος τῆς γῆς ἐκράτει οὐ χαλεπῶς. καὶ μέρος μὲν τι τῶν νεῶν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσε, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τῆς Λέσβου τὸ Σίγριον, ἵνα ἢ προσβολὴ μάλιστα ἐστὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τε Χίου καὶ ἀπὸ Γεραιστοῦ καὶ Μαλέας ὀλκάσιν, ἀποστείλας τὸν παράπλου ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχεν, ὡς μή τινα ὠφέλειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν γίνεσθαι τοῖς  
3 Μιτυληναῖοις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸς μὲν νόσῳ τελευτᾷ, καὶ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τότε ἔβλαψε τὰ βασιλέως πράγματα. Αὐτοφραδάτης δὲ καὶ Φαρνάβαζος ὁ Ἀρταβάζου, ὅτῳ καὶ ἐπέτρεψε τελευτῶν ὁ Μένων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν ἔστε Δαρεϊόν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς γνῶναι, ἀδελφιδῶ αὐτοῦ ὄντι, οὗτοι  
4 τῇ πολιορκίᾳ οὐκ ἀρρώστως προσέκειντο. καὶ οἱ Μιτυληναῖοι τῆς τε γῆς εἰργόμενοι καὶ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης πολλαῖς ναυσὶν ἐφορμούσαις φρουρούμενοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τὸν Φαρνάβαζον ὁμολογίας ἐποιήσαντο, τοὺς μὲν ξένους τοὺς παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου

## BOOK II

1. Subsequently Memnon, who had been appointed by Darius commander-in-chief of the whole navy and all the coast, sought to divert the war into Macedonia and Greece,<sup>1</sup> and captured Chios, delivered over by treachery; thence he sailed to Lesbos, and though Mitylene did not adhere to him, he won over the remaining cities of Lesbos. After securing their support, he put in at Mitylene, fenced off the city by a double stockade from sea to sea, built up five camps and had no trouble in mastering its territory. While part of his fleet guarded the Mitylenean harbour, other ships were despatched to Sigrium, the promontory of Lesbos, where cargo vessels from Chios and Geraistus and Malea usually approach, and so guarded the sea-route, to prevent help coming to Mitylene by sea. While thus engaged, Memnon fell ill and died, the severest blow during this period to the Persian cause. But the blockade was vigorously carried on by Autophradates and Pharnabazus son of Artabazus, to whom, as his nephew, Memnon handed over his command at death, pending Darius' decision on the matter. As the people of Mitylene were kept out of their land and guarded on the seaward side by many ships anchored offshore, they sent to Pharnabazus, and made an agreement to send away the mercenaries whom Alexander had

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2

3

4

<sup>1</sup> For chs. 1 and 2 see generally Appendix II.

## ARRIAN

σφίσι κατὰ συμμαχίαν ἤκοντας ἀπελθεῖν, Μιτυληναίους δὲ καθελεῖν μὲν τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον σφίσι γενομένας στήλας, συμμάχους δὲ εἶναι Δαρείου κατὰ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου γενομένην πρὸς βασιλέα [Δαρείον], <sup>1</sup> τοὺς φυγάδας δὲ αὐτῶν κατιέναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσι τῶν τότε  
 5 ὄντων, ὅτε ἔφευγον. ἐπὶ τούτοις μὲν δὴ ἡ ξύμβασις τοῖς Μιτυληναίοις πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας ξυνέβη. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ καὶ Αὐτοφραδάτης, ὡς παρῆλθον ἅπαξ εἰσω τῆς πόλεως, φρουράν τε ἐς αὐτὴν εἰσήγαγον καὶ φρούραρχον ἐπ' αὐτῇ Λυκομήδην Ῥόδιον, καὶ τύραννον ἐγκατέστησαν τῇ πόλει Διογένην, ἓνα τῶν φυγάδων, χρήματά τε εἰσέπραξαν τοὺς Μιτυληναίους τὰ μὲν βία ἀφελόμενοι τοὺς ἔχοντας, τὰ δὲ ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιβαλόντες.

2. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενοι Φαρνάβαζος μὲν ἔπλει ἐπὶ Λυκίας ἄγων τοὺς ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, Αὐτοφραδάτης δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ καταπέμπει Δαρείος Θυμώνδαν τὸν Μέντορος, αὐτὸν μὲν τοὺς ξένους παρὰ Φαρναβάζου παραληψόμενον καὶ ἀνάξοντα παρὰ βασιλέα, Φαρναβάζῳ <δὲ> ἐροῦντα ἄρχειν ὅσων Μέμνων  
 2 ἦρχεν· καὶ παραδοὺς τούτῳ τοὺς ξένους Φαρνάβαζος ἔπλει παρ' Αὐτοφραδάτην ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. ὡς δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐγένοντο, δέκα μὲν ναῦς στέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Κυκλάδας νήσους Δατάμην ἄνδρα Πέρσην ἄγοντα, αὐτοὶ δὲ ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν ἐπὶ Τενέδου

<sup>1</sup> Δαρείον, a gloss, unless an error by Arrian (cf. also ch. 2, 2); the king concerned was Artaxerxes.

<sup>2</sup> See Introd. 38. A. should have written 'agreement with Alexander and the Greeks', cf. 2, 2. Here as in 2, 2, Darius is an error (perhaps a scribal gloss) for Artaxerxes II, the king

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despatched to fight for them under their alliance, destroy the pillars on which their agreement with Alexander was inscribed, and become allies of Darius on the basis of the peace of Antalcidas with (the Persian) king [Darius];<sup>2</sup> the exiles were to return with possession of half the property they had held at the time of their exile. Though these were the terms of the Mitylenean agreement with the Persians, Pharnabazus and Autophradates, once within the city, put in a garrison under the command of Lycomedes of Rhodes, and made Diogenes, one of the exiles, tyrant over the city: they also exacted money from Mitylene, taking part from the rich citizens by force and the rest by imposing a levy on the community.<sup>3</sup> 5

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2. After this success Pharnabazus sailed for Lycia with the foreign mercenaries, Autophradates to the other islands. At this juncture Darius sent Thymondas son of Mentor<sup>1</sup> to take over himself the mercenaries from Pharnabazus and lead them up-country to Darius, and to instruct Pharnabazus to take over Memnon's command.<sup>2</sup> Pharnabazus handed over the mercenaries, and sailed to join Autophradates and the fleet. Once together, they sent ten ships to the Cyclades under Datames, a Persian, while they themselves proceeded with a 2

reigning in 387 B.C. In fact, the Peace of Antalcidas left island cities, like Mitylene and Tenedos, free of Persian control; no doubt the Persian commanders deliberately misconstrued its terms.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. iii 2, 6; for other Lesbian cities iii 2, 4; QC. iv 5, 19 ff.; Tod 191.

<sup>1</sup> Memnon's deceased brother.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. QC. iii 3, 1. D. 30-31, 1 and QC. iii 2 report with variants Darius' mobilization and decision to fight Al. in person.



## ARRIAN

- ἔπλευσαν· κατακομισθέντες δὲ τῆς Τενέδου εἰς τὸν Βόρειον καλούμενον λιμένα πέμπουσι παρὰ τοὺς Τενεδίους καὶ κελεύουσι τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας γενομένας σφίσι, ταύτας μὲν καθελεῖν, πρὸς Δαρεῖον δὲ ἄγειν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἣν ἐπὶ Ἀνταλκίδου [Δαρείῳ]<sup>1</sup> συνέθεντο.
- 3 Τενεδίοις δὲ τὰ μὲν τῆς εὐνοίας ἐς Ἀλέξανδρόν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἐποίει μᾶλλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἄπορον ἄλλως ἐδόκει ὅτι μὴ προσχωρήσαντας τοῖς Πέρσαις σώζεσθαι· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ Ἡγελόχῳ, ὅτῳ προσετέτακτο <ὑπ'> Ἀλεξάνδρου αὐθις ξυναγαγεῖν δύναμιν ναυτικήν, τοσαύτη ξυνηγμένη ἦν ὡς δι' ὀλίγου προσδοκᾶν ἔσεσθαι ἂν σφίσι παρ' αὐτοῦ τινα ὠφέλειαν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ οἱ ἀμφὶ Φαρνάβαζον τοὺς Τενεδίους φόβῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐθέλοντας παρεστήσαντο.
- 4 Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἀνδρονίκου ἐτύγχανε μὲν ξυναγαγὼν ἐξ Εὐβοίας τε καὶ Πελοποννήσου ναῦς μακρὰς ὑπὸ Ἀντιπάτρου τεταγμένος, ὡς εἶναί τινα ταῖς τε νήσοις φυλακὴν καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἰ, καθάπερ ἐξηγγέλλετο, ἐπιπλέοιεν οἱ βάρβαροι· πυθόμενος δὲ Δατάμην περὶ Σίφνον ὄρμεῖν δέκα ναυσίν, αὐτὸς ἔχων πεντεκαίδεκα νυκτὸς ἀνάγεται ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ
- 5 Εὐρίπῳ· καὶ προσχὼν ἔωθεν Κύθνῳ τῇ νήσῳ τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ αὐλίζεται, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε διαπυθέσθαι τὰ περὶ τῶν δέκα νεῶν καὶ ἅμα ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερώτερον προσπυθεῖν τοῖς Φοίνιξιν· ὡς δὲ ἔμαθε σαφῶς τὸν Δατάμην ξὺν ταῖς ναυσίν ἐν Σίφνῳ ὄρμουντα, ἐπιπλεύσας ἔτι νυκτὸς ὑπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἔω καὶ ἀπροσδοκῆτοις ἐπιπυθεῖν ὀκτώ μὲν ναῦς

<sup>1</sup> Δαρείῳ, see on ch. 1, 4.

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hundred sail to Tenedos. They came to port in the 'north harbour' of Tenedos and ordered the city to destroy the inscribed pillars of the agreement concluded by Tenedos with Alexander and the Greeks, and to observe the peace of Antalcidas [made with Darius].<sup>3</sup> The inclination of Tenedos was rather towards Alexander and the Greeks; but at the moment there seemed no hope of safety but in joining the Persians, since Hegelochus, who had received orders from Alexander to re-assemble a fleet, had not raised a force sufficient to make them expect any speedy help from him. It was in this way, rather by terrorism than by their consent, that Pharnabazus brought Tenedos over.

Meanwhile Proteas son of Andronicus had collected certain ships of the line from Euboea and the Peloponnese under a commission from Antipater, in order to protect the islands and mainland of Greece, in case, as reports suggested, the Persians descended there. On learning that Datames was anchored near Siphnos with ten ships, he weighed anchor with fifteen sail by night from Chalcis on the Euripus. At dawn he put in at the island of Cythnus, and encamped there during the day-time, to get clearer intelligence about the ten ships, and also to attack the Phoenicians, and by night, to create greater alarm. When he found for certain that Datames was anchored with the ships at Siphnos, he sailed there, while it was still night, attacked just at dawn when the enemy were expecting nothing, and

<sup>3</sup> Cf. ch. 1, 4 n.

αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔλαβε, Δατάμης δὲ μετὰ δυοῖν  
 τριήρων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσμίξει τῶν ἅμα Πρωτέα  
 νεῶν ὑπεκφυγῶν ἀπεσώθη πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικόν.

3. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς ἐς Γόρδιον παρῆλθε, πόθος  
 λαμβάνει αὐτὸν ἀνελθόντα ἐς τὴν ἄκραν, ἵνα καὶ τὰ  
 βασίλεια ἦν τὰ Γορδίου καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ  
 Μίδου, τὴν ἅμαξαν ἰδεῖν τὴν Γορδίου καὶ τοῦ ζυγοῦ  
 2 τῆς ἀμάξης τὸν δεσμόν. λόγος δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀμάξης  
 ἐκείνης παρὰ τοῖς προσχώροις πολὺς κατεῖχε,  
 Γόρδιον εἶναι τῶν πάλαι Φρυγῶν ἄνδρα πένητα καὶ  
 ὀλίγην εἶναι αὐτῷ γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ζεύγη βοῶν  
 δύο· καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀροτριᾶν, τῷ δὲ ἀμαξεύειν τὸν  
 3 Γόρδιον. καὶ ποτε ἀρουῆντος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ  
 τὸν ζυγὸν ἀετὸν καὶ ἐπιμεῖναι ἔστε ἐπὶ βουλυτὸν  
 καθήμενον· τὸν δὲ ἐκπλαγέντα τῇ ὄψει ἶέναι  
 κοινώσοντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ θείου παρὰ τοὺς Τελμισσέας  
 τοὺς μάντεις· εἶναι γὰρ τοὺς Τελμισσέας σοφοὺς τὰ  
 θεῖα ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφισιν ἀπὸ γένους δεδόσθαι  
 αὐτοῖς καὶ γυναῖξιν καὶ παισὶ τὴν μαντείαν.  
 4 προσάγοντα δὲ κώμη τινὶ τῶν Τελμισσέων ἐντυχεῖν  
 παρθένῳ ὑδρευομένῃ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην εἰπεῖν ὅπως  
 οἱ τὸ τοῦ ἀετοῦ ἔσχε· τὴν δέ, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν  
 τοῦ μαντικοῦ γένους, θύειν κελεῦσαι τῷ Διὶ τῷ  
 βασιλεῖ, ἐπανελθόντα ἐς τὸν τόπον αὐτόν. καὶ,  
 δεηθῆναι γὰρ αὐτῆς Γόρδιον τὴν θυσίαν ξυνεπισπο-  
 μένην οἱ αὐτὴν ἐξηγήσασθαι, θῦσαί τε ὅπως ἐκείνη  
 ὑπετίθετο τὸν Γόρδιον καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι ἐπὶ γάμῳ  
 τῇ παιδί καὶ γενέσθαι αὐτοῖν παῖδα Μίδα ὄνομα.  
 5 ἤδη τε ἄνδρα εἶναι τὸν Μίδα καλὸν καὶ γενναῖον  
 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ στάσει πιέζεσθαι ἐν σφίσι τοὺς  
 Φρύγας, καὶ γενέσθαι αὐτοῖς χρησμὸν, ὅτι ἅμαξα  
 ἄξει αὐτοῖς βασιλέα καὶ ὅτι οὗτος αὐτοῖς καταπαύ-

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captured eight ships with their crews; Datames with two triremes escaped in the first encounter with Proteas' ships and safely joined the rest of the fleet.

3. When Alexander reached Gordium, he was seized with a longing<sup>1</sup> to ascend to the acropolis, where the palace of Gordius and his son Midas was situated, and to see Gordius' waggon and the knot of the waggon's yoke. There was a widespread local tradition<sup>2</sup> about that waggon; Gordius, they said, was a poor man among the old Phrygians, who tilled a small amount of land with two yoke of oxen, one for the plough and one to drive his waggon. Once, as he was ploughing, an eagle settled on the yoke and stayed sitting there, till it was time to loose the oxen; Gordius was astonished at the sight, and went off to consult the Telmissian prophets about the prodigy; for they were skilled in the interpretation of prodigies, inheriting, women and children too, the prophetic gift. Approaching a Telmissian village, he met a girl drawing water and told her his story of the eagle; she too was of the prophetic line, and told him to return to the exact spot and sacrifice to Zeus the King. So then Gordius begged her to come along with him and prescribe the sacrifice; he sacrificed as she directed, and married the girl; they had a son called Midas. Midas was already a grown man, handsome and noble, when the Phrygians were in trouble among themselves with civil strife; they received an oracle that a waggon would bring them a

<sup>1</sup> Appendix V 3.

<sup>2</sup> This tale is not from the 'Vulgate', but was recounted by at least one of A's main sources.

## ARRIAN

σει τὴν στάσιν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βου-  
 λευομένοις ἔλθειν τὸν Μίδαυ ὁμοῦ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ  
 μητρὶ καὶ ἐπιστῆναι τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ αὐτῇ ἀμάξει.  
 6 τοὺς δὲ συμβαλόντας τὸ μαντεῖον τοῦτον ἐκείνον  
 γνῶναι ὄντα, ὄντινα ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἔφραζεν,  
 ὅτι ἄξει ἢ ἄμαξα· καὶ καταστήσῃ μὲν αὐτοὺς  
 βασιλέα τὸν Μίδαυ, Μίδαυ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν στάσιν  
 καταπαῦσαι, καὶ τὴν ἄμαξαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ  
 ἀναθεῖναι χαριστήρια τῷ Διὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ  
 αἰετοῦ τῇ πομπῇ. πρὸς δὲ δὴ τούτοις καὶ τότε περὶ  
 τῆς ἀμάξης ἐμυθεύετο, ὅστις λύσειε τοῦ ζυγοῦ τῆς  
 ἀμάξης τὸν δεσμόν, τοῦτον χρῆναι ἄρξαι τῆς  
 7 Ἀσίας. ἦν δὲ ὁ δεσμὸς ἐκ φλοιοῦ κρανίας καὶ  
 τούτου οὔτε τέλος οὔτε ἀρχὴ ἐφαίνετο. Ἀλέξαν-  
 δρος δὲ ὡς ἀπόρως μὲν εἶχεν ἐξευρεῖν λύσιν τοῦ  
 δεσμοῦ, ἄλυτον δὲ περιδεῖν οὐκ ἤθελε, μή τινα καὶ  
 τοῦτο ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς κίνησιν ἐργάσῃται, οἱ μὲν  
 λέγουσιν, ὅτι παῖσας τῷ ξίφει διέκοψε τὸν δεσμόν  
 καὶ λελύσθαι ἔφη. Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ λέγει ἐξελό-  
 ντα τὸν ἔστορα τοῦ ῥυμοῦ, ὃς ἦν τύλος διαβε-  
 βλημένος διὰ τοῦ ῥυμοῦ διαμπάξ, ξυνέχων τὸν  
 δεσμόν, ἐξελκύσαι ἔξω τοῦ ῥυμοῦ τὸ <ν> ζυγόν.  
 8 ὅπως μὲν δὴ ἐπράχθη τὰ ἀμφὶ τῷ δεσμῷ τούτῳ  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ οὐκ ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι. ἀπηλλάγη δ'  
 οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμάξης αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ὡς  
 τοῦ λογίου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ λύσει τοῦ δεσμοῦ συμβεβη-  
 κότης. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκείνης βρονταί τε  
 καὶ σέλας ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐπεσήμηναν· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις  
 ἔθνε τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς φήνασι θεοῖς τά  
 τε σημεῖα καὶ τοῦ δεσμοῦ τὴν λύσιν.

\* P. 18 also cites Ar. against the general view that Al. cut the knot (QC. iii 1. 14-19; J, xi 7). Pt. evidently did not

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 3. 5-8

king and he would put an end to the strife. While they were still discussing this, Midas arrived with his parents and stopped, waggon and all, for the assembly to see. The Phrygians, interpreting this oracle, decided that he was the man who the gods had told them would come in a waggon, and made him king, and he put an end to the civil strife. He set up his father's waggon in the acropolis as a thank-offering to Zeus the King for sending the eagle. Over and above this there was a legend about the waggon, that anyone who untied the knot of the yoke would rule Asia. The knot was of cornel bark, and you could not see where it began or ended. Alexander was unable to find how to untie the knot but unwilling to leave it tied, in case this caused a disturbance among the masses; some say that he struck it with his sword, cut the knot, and said it was now untied—but Aristobulus says that he took out the pole-pin, a bolt driven right through the pole, holding the knot together, and so removed the yoke from the pole. I cannot say with confidence what Alexander actually did about this knot, but he and his suite certainly left the waggon with the impression that the oracle about the undoing of the knot had been fulfilled, and in fact that night there was thunder and lightning, a further sign from heaven; so Alexander in thanksgiving offered sacrifice next day to whatever gods had shown the signs and the way to undo the knot.<sup>3</sup>

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confirm Ar., hence A's hesitation. Yet A. is confident about the impression made on Al. and his suite, and about the subsequent omen and sacrifice; on these matters Pt. must have agreed with Ar., and he cannot then have ignored the incident, but just failed to say *how* Al. loosed the knot; for a curious parallel, v 7, 1. Al's success doubtless encouraged his claim after Issus to be lord of 'Asia' (14, 7 f., apparently from Pt. and/or Ar. cf. QC, P. and J.; iii 15, 5 n.). See Introd. n. 64.

## ARRIAN

4. Αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπ' Ἀγκύρας τῆς  
 Γαλατικῆς ἐστέλλετο· κακεῖ αὐτῷ πρεσβεία  
 ἀφικνεῖται Παφλαγόνων, τό τε ἔθνος ἐνδιδόντων  
 καὶ ἐς ὁμολογίαν συμβαινόντων· ἐς δὲ τὴν χώραν  
 2 ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει μὴ ἐσβαλεῖν ἐδέοντο. τούτοις μὲν  
 δὴ προστάσσει Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπακούειν Κάλα τῷ  
 σατράπῃ τῷ Φρυγίας. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Καππαδοκίας  
 ἐλάσας ξύμπασαν τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλυος ποταμοῦ  
 προσηγάγετο καὶ ἔτι ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἄλυν πολλήν·  
 καταστήσας δὲ Καππαδοκῶν Σαβίκταν σατράπην  
 3 αὐτὸς προῆγεν ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας τὰς Κιλικίας. καὶ  
 ἀφικόμενος ἐπὶ τὸ Κύρου τοῦ ξὺν Ξενοφῶντι  
 στρατόπεδον, ὡς κατεχομένας τὰς πύλας φυλακαῖς  
 ἰσχυραῖς εἶδε, Παρμενίωνα μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει  
 σὺν ταῖς τάξεσι τῶν πεζῶν, ὅσοι βαρύτερον  
 ὤπλισμένοι ἦσαν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἀμφὶ πρώτην φυλακὴν  
 ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ  
 τοὺς Ἀγριαῖνας προῆγε τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας,  
 4 ὡς οὐ προσδεχομένοις τοῖς φύλαξιν ἐπιπεσεῖν. καὶ  
 προσάγων μὲν οὐκ ἔλαθεν, ἐς ἴσον δὲ αὐτῷ κατέστη  
 ἡ τόλμα. οἱ γὰρ φύλακες αἰσθόμενοι Ἀλέξανδρον  
 αὐτὸν προσάγοντα λιπόντες τὴν φυλακὴν ὤχοντο  
 φεύγοντες. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἅμα τῇ ἔω ξὺν τῇ  
 δυνάμει πάσῃ ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας κατέβαινε ἐς  
 5 τὴν Κιλικίαν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγγέλλεται αὐτῷ Ἀρ-  
 σάμης ὅτι πρόσθεν μὲν ἐπενόει διασώζειν Πέρσαις  
 τὴν Ταρσὸν, ὡς δὲ ὑπερβεβληκότα ἤδη τὰς πύλας  
 ἐπύθετο Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκλιπεῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχειν τὴν  
 πόλιν· δεδιέναι οὖν τοὺς Ταρσέας μὴ ἐφ' ἀρπαγὴν  
 τραπεῖς οὕτω τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῆς Ταρσοῦ ποιήσῃται.  
 6 ταῦτα ἀκούσας δρόμῳ ἦγεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ταρσὸν τοὺς τε



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 4. 1-6

4. Next day Alexander set out for Ancyra in Galatia; there a Paphlagonian embassy met him who offered their people's submission and agreed to terms; they begged him not to enter their country in force. Alexander instructed them to take orders from Calas, satrap of Phrygia. He himself marched to Cappadocia, won over all the country this side of the river Halys and much beyond it. He made Sabictas satrap of Cappadocia and pushed on himself to the Cilician Gates.<sup>1</sup> When he reached the camp of Cyrus, who had been with Xenophon, and saw that the Gates were strongly held, he left Parmenio there with the heavier-armed foot-battalions, while he himself, about the first watch, took the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians, and marched by night to the Gates, meaning to take the guards unawares. His march was detected, but his daring counted just as much in his favour; the guards, observing that he was leading in person, left their posts in flight. Next day at dawn he passed the Gates with his full force and descended into Cilicia. There it was reported to him that Arsames, who had previously planned to save Tarsus for the Persians, after learning that Alexander had already passed the Gates, was intending to abandon the city, and that the Tarsians were therefore afraid Arsames would resort to plunder before deserting it. Hearing this, Alexander led on

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<sup>1</sup> QC. iii 1, 22-4; 4, 1 (with 'Abistamenes' for 'Sabictas'); P. 18, 3; Introd. 53. Al. never entered Paphlagonia and would have traversed only a small part of Cappadocia on the direct route from Ancyra to the Cilician Gates; the Cappadocians had to be defeated by Antigonos in Phrygia after Issus (QC. iv 1, 34, cf. A. R. Burn, *JHS* 1952, 81 ff., an important event doubtless ignored in A's main sources, because it was not part of Al's own story), fought for Darius at Gaugamela (A. iii 11, 7), and were subdued only after Al's death (D. xviii 3, 1; 16).

## ARRIAN

ἰππέας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν ὅσοι κουφότατοι, ὥστε ὁ Ἄρσάμης μαθὼν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὄρμην σπουδῇ φεύγει ἐκ τῆς Ταρσοῦ παρὰ βασιλέα Δαρεῖον οὐδὲν βλάβας τὴν πόλιν.

- 7 Ἄλέξανδρος δέ, ὡς μὲν Ἀριστοβούλῳ λέλεκται, ὑπὸ καμάτου ἐνόσησεν, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὸν Κύδνον [τὸν] ποταμὸν λέγουσι ῥίψαντα νήξασθαι, ἐπιθυμήσαντα τοῦ ὕδατος, ἰδρῶντα καὶ καύματι ἐχόμενον. ὁ δὲ Κύδνος ῥέει διὰ μέσης τῆς πόλεως· οἶα δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ταύρου ὄρους τῶν πηγῶν οἱ ἀνισχουσῶν καὶ διὰ χώρου καθαροῦ ῥέων, ψυχρός τέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ
- 8 καθαρὸς· σπασμῶ τε οὖν ἔχεσθαι Ἄλέξανδρον καὶ θέρμαις ἰσχυραῖς καὶ ἀγρυπνία ξυνεχεῖ· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἰατροὺς οὐκ οἶεσθαι εἶναι βιώσιμον, Φίλιππον δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνα, ἰατρόν, ξυνόντα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ τὰ τε ἀμφὶ ἰατρικὴν ἐς τὰ μάλιστα πιστευόμενον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀδόκιμον ἐν τῷ στρατῷ ὄντα, καθῆραι ἐθέλειν Ἄλέξανδρον φαρμάκῳ· καὶ τὸν κελεύειν καθῆραι.
- 9 τὸν μὲν δὴ παρασκευάζειν τὴν κύλικα, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοθῆναι ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος φυλάξασθαι Φίλιππον· ἀκούειν γὰρ διεφθάρθαι ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὥστε φαρμάκῳ ἀποκτεῖναι Ἄλέξανδρον. τὸν δὲ ἀναγνόντα τὴν ἐπιστολὴν καὶ ἔτι μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοντα αὐτὸν μὲν λαβεῖν τὴν κύλικα ἐν ἧ ἦν τὸ φάρμακον, τὴν ἐπιστολὴν δὲ τῷ
- 10 Φιλίππῳ δοῦναι ἀναγνῶναι. καὶ ὁμοῦ τὸν τε Ἄλέξανδρον πίνειν καὶ τὸν Φίλιππον ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Παρμενίωνος. Φίλιππον δὲ εὐθὺς ἐνδηλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι καλῶς οἱ ἔχει τὰ τοῦ φαρμάκου· οὐ γὰρ ἐκπλαγῆναι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μόνον παρακαλέσαι Ἄλέξανδρον, καὶ ἐς τὰ

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the cavalry and the most mobile of the light troops at full speed to Tarsus, so that Arsames learning of his onrush fled to King Darius without harming the city.<sup>2</sup>

Here Alexander fell ill, from fatigue according to Aristobulus, but others tell the following story.<sup>3</sup> Alexander dived into the river Cydnus and had a swim; he wanted to bathe as he was in a sweat and overcome by heat. The Cydnus runs right through the city, and as its springs are in Mount Taurus and it runs through open country, it is cold and its water is clear. Alexander therefore caught a cramp, and suffered from violent fever and continuous sleeplessness. All his physicians gave him up except Philip, an Acarnanian doctor in his suite who was very much trusted in medical matters, and in general enjoyed honour in the army; he proposed a strong purge, and Alexander told him to administer it. He was making up the draught when a note was given Alexander from Parmenio, 'Beware of Philip! I hear that Darius has bribed him to poison you.' Alexander read the letter, and still holding it, took the cup with the draught and gave the note to Philip to read; at one and the same moment Alexander drank the dose and Philip read Parmenio's note. Philip at once made it clear that all was well with the dose; he was not panic-struck at the letter, but simply re-assured Alexander and told him to follow

<sup>2</sup> QC. iii 4, 2-15; J. xi 8, 1 f.; cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis* i 2, 21 on the Cilician Gates.

<sup>3</sup> 'Vulgate' (§7-11); D. 31, 4-6, QC. iii 5 f.; J. xi 8, 3 ff. differ in detail; P. 19 gives Ar's account without naming him.

## ARRIAN

11 ἄλλα οἱ πείθεσθαι ὅσα ἐπαγγέλλοιτο· σωθήσεσθαι γὰρ πειθόμενον. καὶ τὸν μὲν καθαρθῆναί τε καὶ ραῖσαι αὐτῷ τὸ νόσημα, Φιλίππῳ δὲ ἐπιδειῖξαι, ὅτι πιστός ἐστιν αὐτῷ φίλος, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς φίλοις βέβαιος εἰς τὸ ἀνύποπτον τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἐρρωμένος.

5. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου Παρμενίωνα μὲν πέμπει ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας πύλας, αἱ δὴ ὀρίζουσι τὴν Κιλικῶν τε καὶ Ἀσσυρίων χώραν, προκαταλαβεῖν καὶ φυλάσσειν τὴν πάροδον, δούς αὐτῷ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων τοὺς πεζοὺς καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας τοὺς μισθοφόρους καὶ τοὺς Θρᾶκας, ὧν Σιτάλκης ἡγείτο, καὶ τοὺς ἵππέας δὲ τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς. αὐτὸς δὲ ὕστερος ἄρας ἐκ Ταρσοῦ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ἐς Ἀγχιάλον πόλιν ἀφικνεῖται. ταύτην δὲ Σαρδανάπαλον κτίσαι τὸν Ἀσσύριον λόγος· καὶ τῷ περιβόλῳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεμελίοις τῶν τειχῶν δήλη ἐστὶ μεγάλη τε πόλις κτισθεῖσα καὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐλθοῦσα δυνάμεως. καὶ τὸ μνήμα τοῦ Σαρδαναπάλου ἐγγὺς ἦν τῶν τειχῶν τῆς Ἀγχιάλου· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφειστήκει ἐπ' αὐτῷ Σαρδανάπαλος συμβεβληκῶς τὰς χεῖρας ἀλλήλαις ὡς μάλιστα ἐς κρότον συμβάλλονται, καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπεγέγραπτο αὐτῷ Ἀσσύρια γράμματα· οἱ μὲν Ἀσσύριοι καὶ μέτρον ἔφασκον ἐπεῖναι τῷ ἐπιγράμματι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἦν αὐτῷ ὃν ἔφραζε τὰ ἔπη, ὅτι Σαρδανάπαλος ὁ Ἀνακунδαράξου παῖς Ἀγχιάλον καὶ Ταρσὸν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ ἐδείματο. σὺ δέ, ὦ ξένε, ἔσθιε καὶ πῖνε καὶ παῖζε, ὡς τᾶλλα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα οὐκ ὄντα τούτου ἄξια· τὸν ψόφον αἰνισσόμενος, ὄνπερ αἱ χεῖρες ἐπὶ τῷ κρότῳ ποιούσι· καὶ τὸ

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any further instructions from him; if he did so, he would recover. The purge worked and eased the illness; and Alexander showed Philip that as his friend he trusted him, and his suite in general that he was resolute in refusing to suspect his friends and steadfast in the face of death. 11

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5. Next he sent Parmenio to the other Gates which divide the Cilician and Assyrian lands, to seize the passage before the enemy and guard it, giving him the allied infantry, the Greek mercenaries, the Thracians under Sitalces and the Thessalian horse.<sup>1</sup> Later on he left Tarsus and on the first day reached Anchialus, founded, as legend says, by Sardanapalus the Assyrian. The circumference and the foundations of the walls show that the city was large when founded, and grew to great power. Sardanapalus' monument was near the walls of Anchialus; over it stood Sardanapalus himself, his hands joined just as if to clap, and an epitaph was inscribed in the Assyrian script; the Assyrians said that it was in verse. In any case its meaning according to the words was: 'Sardanapalus son of Anakyndaraxes built Anchialus and Tarsus in one day; you, stranger, eat, drink and be merry, since other human things are not worth *this*'—the riddle referring to the noise of a 2 3 4

<sup>1</sup> For Issus campaign see App. III and VIII 3. Nothing of value in J. xi 9, little in P. 20. I shall note parallels to A. in D. and QC. (book iii throughout) without pointing out all divergencies. Parmenio's mission: QC. 7, 6 (put too late in D. 32, 2).

## ARRIAN

παίξε ραδιουργότερον ἐγγεγράφθαι ἔφασαν τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ ὀνόματι.

- 5 Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἀγχιάλου εἰς Σόλους ἀφίκετο· καὶ φρουρὰν ἐσήγαγεν εἰς Σόλους καὶ ἐπέβαλεν αὐτοῖς τάλαντα διακόσια ἀργυρίου ζημίαν, ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς
- 6 Πέρσας μᾶλλον τι τὸν νοῦν εἶχον. ἔνθεν δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν μὲν πεζῶν τῶν Μακεδόνων τρεῖς τάξεις, τοὺς τοξότας δὲ πάντας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας ἐξελαύνει ἐπὶ τοὺς τὰ ὄρη κατέχοντας Κίλικας· καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ ταῖς πάσαις ἡμέραις τοὺς μὲν βία ἐξελῶν, τοὺς δὲ ὁμολογίᾳ παραστησάμενος ἐπαν-
- 7 ἦκεν εἰς τοὺς Σόλους· καὶ ἐνταῦθα μανθάνει Πτολεμαῖον καὶ Ἀσανδρον ὅτι ἐκράτησαν Ὀροντοβάτου τοῦ Πέρσου, ὃς τήν τε ἄκραν τῆς Ἀλικαρνασσοῦ ἐφύλασσε καὶ Μύνδον καὶ Καῦνον καὶ Θήραν καὶ Καλλίπολιν κατεῖχε· προσῆκτο δὲ καὶ Κῶ καὶ Τριόπιον· τοῦτον ἠττήσθαι ἔγραφον μάχη μεγάλη· καὶ ἀποθανεῖν μὲν τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν πεζοὺς εἰς ἑπτακοσίους καὶ ἵππείας εἰς πεντήκοντα,
- 8 ἀλῶναι δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν χιλίων· Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐν Σόλοις θύσας τε τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ καὶ πομπεύσας αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ πᾶσα καὶ λαμπάδα ἐπιτέλεσας καὶ ἀγῶνα διαθεῖς γυμνικὸν καὶ μουσικὸν Σολεῦσι μὲν δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἔδωκεν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναζεύξας εἰς Ταρσὸν τοὺς μὲν ἵππείας ἀπέστειλεν Φιλώτα δούς ἄγειν διὰ τοῦ Ἀλη[ν]ίου πεδίου ἐπὶ
- 9 τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πύραμον, αὐτὸς δὲ σὺν τοῖς πεζοῖς καὶ τῇ ἰλῆ τῇ βασιλικῇ εἰς Μάγαρσον ἦκεν καὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ τῇ Μαγαρσίδι ἔθυσεν· ἔνθεν δὲ εἰς Μαλλὸν ἀφίκετο καὶ Ἀμφιλόχῳ ὅσα ἤρωι ἐνήγισε· καὶ στασιάζοντας καταλαβὼν τὴν στάσιν αὐτοῖς

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hand-clap. (It was said that the words 'be merry' had a less delicate original in the Assyrian.)<sup>2</sup>

From Anchialus he reached Soli; he put a garrison in the place, and fined them two hundred silver Talents, because they were inclined to favour Persia.<sup>3</sup> From there he took three battalions of the Macedonian infantry, all the archers, and the Agrianians, and marched against the Cilicians holding the heights. In no more than seven days he drove some of them out, induced others to enter into agreements, and returned to Soli.<sup>4</sup> There he learnt that Ptolemaeus and Asander had conquered Orontobates the Persian, who had been defending the citadel of Halicarnassus, was in control of Myndus, Caunus, Thera and Callipolis, and had won over Cos and Triopium. The letter stated that they had beaten him in a great battle with a loss of about 700 foot and 50 cavalry, and taken at least 1,000 prisoners.<sup>5</sup> At Soli Alexander sacrificed to Asclepius and held a procession of his whole army, with a torch relay race and athletic and musical competitions.<sup>6</sup> He granted a democracy to Soli. He then proceeded to Tarsus and sent off the cavalry, commissioning Philotas to conduct them to the river Pyramus through the Aleian plain, while he himself went with the infantry and the royal squadron to Magarsus and sacrificed to Athena of Magarsus. He next arrived at Mallus and made offerings for the dead to Amphilochochus as a hero; he found the Mallians torn by factions and put a stop

<sup>2</sup> Ar. F. 9 (Strabo xiv 5, 9; Athenaeus 530 A-B; A. is fullest), derived probably from Callisthenes (F. 34).

<sup>3</sup> QC. 7, 2. Soli is treated as Greek, cf. 12, 2; Introd. n. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Not in QC.

<sup>5</sup> QC. 7, 4. Cf. App. II 2.

<sup>6</sup> QC. 7, 3 and 5 takes Al. straight to Mallus.



## ARRIAN

κατέπαυσε· καὶ τοὺς φόρους, οὓς βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ ἀπέφερον, ἀνῆκεν, ὅτι Ἀργείων μὲν Μαλλωταὶ ἄποικοι ἦσαν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπ' Ἀργους τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν εἶναι ἠξίου.

6. Ἐπι δὲ ἐν Μαλλῶ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἀγγέλλεται Δαρείον ἐν Σώχοις ξὺν τῇ πάσῃ δυνάμει στρατοπεδεύειν. ὁ δὲ χῶρος οὗτός ἐστι μὲν τῆς Ἀσσυρίας γῆς, ἀπέχει δὲ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν Ἀσσυρίων εἰς δύο μάλιστα σταθμούς. ἔνθα δὴ ξυναγαγὼν τοὺς ἐταίρους φράζει αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐξηγγελμένα ὑπὲρ Δαρείου τε καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς Δαρείου. οἱ δὲ αὐτόθεν ὡς εἶχεν ἄγειν ἐκέλευον. ὁ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐπαιέσας αὐτοὺς διέλυσε τὸν ξύλλογον, τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία προ[σ]ῆγεν ὡς ἐπὶ Δαρείον τε καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας. δευτεραῖος δὲ ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας ἐστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς Μυριάνδρῳ πόλει· καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς χειμῶν ἐπιγίγνεται σκληρὸς καὶ ὕδωρ τε ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ πνεῦμα βίαιον· τοῦτο κατέσχευεν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ Ἀλέξανδρον.

3 Δαρείος δὲ τέως μὲν ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ διέτριβεν, ἐπιλεξάμενος τῆς Ἀσσυρίας γῆς πεδῖον πάντῃ ἀναπεπταμένον καὶ τῷ τε πλήθει τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπιτήδειον καὶ ἐνιππάσασθαι τῇ ἵππῳ ξύμφορον. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ξυμβούλευσεν αὐτῷ μὴ ἀπολείπειν Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀντιόχου, ὁ παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου αὐτόμολος· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν πρὸς τοῦ πλήθους τε καὶ τῆς σκευῆς τῶν Περσῶν. καὶ ἔμενε Δαρείος. ὡς δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πολλὴ μὲν [ἡ] ἐν Ταρσῷ τριβὴ ἐπὶ τῇ νόσῳ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ὀλίγη δὲ ἐν Σόλοις, ἵνα ἔθνέ τε καὶ ἐπόμπευε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρεινους Κίλικας διέτριψεν ἐξελάσας, τοῦτο ἔσφηλεν Δαρείον τῆς γνώμης· καὶ αὐτός τε, ὅ τι περ

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to them; he remitted the tribute paid to Darius, since Mallus was a colony of Argos, and he himself claimed descent from the Argive Heraclidae.<sup>7</sup>

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6. Alexander was still at Mallus when a report came that Darius with his full force was encamped at Sochi, a place in Assyrian territory, about two marching days from the Assyrian Gates. Alexander therefore assembled the Companions and told them the news of Darius and his army, on which they urged him to advance without more ado. He then thanked them and dismissed the council and marched next day to attack Darius and the Persians. On the second day he passed the Gates and camped near a city called Myriandrus, and in the night a severe storm came on with rain, and a violent gale, which kept Alexander in his camp.<sup>1</sup>

Darius meanwhile was marking time with his army. He had selected a plain in the Assyrian land open all round, convenient for the great number of his army and suitable for the manoeuvres of his cavalry. Amyntas son of Antiochus, the deserter from Alexander, advised him not to leave this place; there was, he said, elbow-room favourable for the numbers and equipment of the Persians.<sup>2</sup> So Darius stayed where he was. But as Alexander spent a long time in Tarsus on account of his illness, and a good deal at Soli, where he sacrificed and held the parade, and was delayed by his raid on the Cilician hillmen,<sup>3</sup> all this made Darius waver in his decision. He himself was

<sup>7</sup> Al. treats Mallus as Greek, like its 'founder', Amphiloehus.

<sup>1</sup> D. 32, 2; QC. 7, 6-10; App. III 3.

<sup>2</sup> P. 20, 1; QC. 8, 1-11 is very different.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix VIII 3. For Darius' mobilization, D. 30 f.; QC. iii 2 f.

## ARRIAN

ἡδιστον ἦν δοξασθέν, ἐς τοῦτο οὐκ ἀκουσίως  
 ὑπήχθη καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν ξυνόντων τε καὶ  
 ξυνεσομένων ἐπὶ κακῷ τοῖς αἰὲ βασιλεύουσιν  
 ἐπαιρόμενος ἔγνω μηκέτι Ἀλέξανδρον ἐθέλειν  
 5 προΐεναι τοῦ πρόσω, ἀλλ' ὀκνεῖν γὰρ πυνθανόμενον  
 ὅτι αὐτὸς προσάγοι· καταπατήσειν τε τῇ ἵππῳ  
 τῶν Μακεδόνων τὴν στρατιὰν ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν αὐτῷ  
 6 ἐπαίροντες ἔλεγον· καίτοι γε Ἀμύντας ἤξειν τε  
 Ἀλέξανδρον ἰσχυρίζετο, ὅπου ἂν πύθηται Δαρεῖον  
 ὄντα, καὶ αὐτοῦ προσμένειν ἐκέλευεν. ἀλλὰ τὰ  
 χεῖρω μᾶλλον, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡδίῳ  
 ἀκοῦσαι ἦν, ἔπειθε· καί τι καὶ δαιμόνιον τυχὸν  
 ἤγεν αὐτὸν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χῶρον, οὐ μήτε ἐκ τῆς  
 ἵππου πολλὴ ὠφέλεια αὐτῷ ἐγένετο, μήτε ἐκ τοῦ  
 πλήθους αὐτοῦ τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἀκοντίων  
 τε καὶ τοξευμάτων, μηδὲ τὴν λαμπρότητα αὐτὴν  
 τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπιδειῖξαι ἠδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 τε καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εὐμαρῶς τὴν νίκην παρέ-  
 7 δωκεν. ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἤδη καὶ Πέρσας πρὸς Μακε-  
 δόνων ἀφαιρεθῆναι τῆς Ἀσίας τὴν ἀρχήν, καθάπερ  
 οὖν Μῆδοι μὲν πρὸς Περσῶν ἀφηρέθησαν, πρὸς  
 Μήδων δὲ ἔτι ἔμπροσθεν Ἀσσύριοι.

7. Ὑπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς  
 πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας ὡς ἐπὶ Ἴσσον  
 προῆγε· καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθῶν.  
 τὴν δὲ Ἴσσον κατασχών, ὅσους διὰ νόσον ὑπολε-  
 λειμμένους αὐτοῦ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατέλαβε,  
 τούτους χαλεπῶς αἰκισάμενος ἀπέκτεινεν· ἐς δὲ  
 τὴν ὑστεραίαν προῦχώρει ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν  
 2 Πίναρον. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς ἤκουσεν ἐν τῷ  
 ὀπισθεν αὐτοῦ ὄντα Δαρεῖον, ἐπεὶ οὐ πιστὸς αὐτῷ  
 ὁ λόγος ἐφαίνετο, ἀναβιβάσας εἰς τριακόντορον τῶν

readily induced to adopt any opinion it was most agreeable to hold; and ingratiating courtiers, such as do and will haunt each successive king to his detriment,<sup>4</sup> encouraged him to conclude that Alexander was no longer willing to advance further, but was hesitating on hearing of Darius' own approach. On all sides they egged him on, telling him that he would trample the Macedonian force underfoot with his cavalry.<sup>5</sup> Amyntas, however, persisted that Alexander would come wherever he found Darius to be, and urged him to remain where he was. But the worse counsels prevailed, as they were more agreeable to hear at the time; moreover, some divine power led Darius into the very position where his cavalry did not much help him, nor the number of his men and javelins and arrows, where he could make no display even of the splendour of his army, but delivered the victory easily to Alexander and his force. In fact it was destined that the Persians should forfeit the sovereignty of Asia to Macedonians, just as Medes had lost it to Persians, and Assyrians even earlier to Medes.<sup>6</sup>

7. Darius then crossed the mountains by the so-called Amanian Gates, advanced towards Issus and slipped in behind Alexander. On seizing Issus, he savagely tortured and killed all the invalid Macedonians left behind there whom he captured. Next day he advanced to the river Pinarus.<sup>1</sup> Alexander heard that Darius was in his rear but did not credit the report; he embarked some of the Companions

<sup>4</sup> A's own comment, cf. iv 8, 3.

<sup>5</sup> So at this time Demosthene was predicting, Aeschines, iii 164.

<sup>6</sup> More of A's own comment.

<sup>1</sup> QC. 8, 13-15.

## ARRIAN

ἑταίρων τινὰς ἀποπέμπει ὀπίσω ἐπὶ Ἴσσόν, κατα-  
σκεψομένους εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἐξαγγέλλεται. οἱ δὲ  
ἀναπλεύσαντες τῇ τριακοντόρῳ, ὅτι κολπώδης ἦν ἡ  
ταύτη θάλασσα, μᾶλλον τι εὐπετῶς κατέμαθον  
αὐτοῦ στρατοπεδεύοντας τοὺς Πέρσας· καὶ ἀπαγ-  
γέλλουσιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐν χερσὶν εἶναι Δαρεῖον.

- 3 Ὁ δὲ συγκαλέσας στρατηγούς τε καὶ ἱλάρχας καὶ  
τῶν ξυμμάχων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν  
μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἤδη σφίσι καλῶς κεκινδυνευμένων καὶ  
ὅτι πρὸς νενικημένους ὁ ἀγὼν νενικηκόσιν αὐτοῖς  
ἔσται καὶ ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὑπὲρ σφῶν στρατηγεῖ ἄμεινον,  
ἐπὶ νοῦν Δαρείῳ ἀγαγὼν καθεῖρξαι τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ  
τῆς εὐρυχωρίας ἐς τὰ στενόπορα, ἵνα σφίσι μὲν  
ξύμμετρον τὸ χωρίον ἀναπτύξαι τὴν φάλαγγα, τοῖς  
δὲ ἀχρεῖον τὸ πλῆθος [ὅτι] ἔσται τῇ μάχῃ, οὔτε τὰ  
4 σώματα οὔτε τὰς γνώμας παραπλησίσις. Μακε-  
δόνας τε γὰρ Πέρσαις καὶ Μήδοις, ἐκ πάνυ πολλοῦ  
τρυφῶσιν, αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς πόνοις τοῖς πολεμικοῖς  
πάλαι ἤδη μετὰ κινδύνων ἀσκουμένους, ἄλλως τε  
καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέρους, εἰς χεῖρας ἤξειν·  
ὅσοι τε Ἕλληνας Ἕλλησιν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν  
μαχεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ξὺν Δαρείῳ ἐπὶ μισθῷ  
καὶ οὐδὲ τούτῳ πολλῷ κινδυνεύοντας, τοὺς δὲ ξὺν  
σφίσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐκόντας ἀμυνομένους·  
5 βαρβάρων τε αὖ Θραῶνας καὶ Παίονας καὶ Ἰλ-  
λυριοὺς καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους τε τῶν  
κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην καὶ μαχιμωτάτους πρὸς τὰ

<sup>2</sup> Ib. 16-19.

<sup>3</sup> Sections 3-7 are naturally taken as derived from a speech in Pt. or Ar., contrast 8 f. The speech (3) takes their view of the tactical situation (6, 3 but the 'favour of God' is also in

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in a thirty-oared ship and sent them back to Issus, to see if it was true. They discovered the more easily that the Persians were camped there, since the sea takes the form of a bay there, and reported to Alexander that Darius was at hand.<sup>2</sup>

Alexander summoned the generals, squadron 3  
 leaders and officers of the allies<sup>3</sup> and urged them to be confident in view of the dangers they had successfully surmounted in the past; already conquerors they were to fight men they had conquered, and God was a better strategist on their own side, putting it into Darius' mind to bring his force out of the open country and hem it into the narrow pass, an area just the size for the deployment of their phalanx; in the battle the Persians would have no benefit from their numbers, while their physique and morale were no match for their own. 'We Macedonians,' he continued, 'are to fight 4  
 Medes and Persians, nations long steeped in luxury, while we have now long been inured to danger by the exertions of campaigning. Above all it will be a fight of free men against slaves. And so far as Greek will meet Greek, they will not be fighting for like causes; those with Darius will be risking their lives for pay, and poor pay too; the Greeks on our side will fight as volunteers in the cause of Greece. As for our bar- 5  
 barian troops, Thracians, Paeonians, Illyrians, Agrianians, the most robust and warlike races of Europe,

D. 33, 1), makes their kind of distinction between Greeks and Macedonians (4 cf. 10, 7, but note iv 11, 8 from 'vulgate'), stresses the value of the Balkan troops which they would have appreciated more than a later writer (5), and has their figure for mercenaries at the Granicus (6, cf. App. I 1). The suggestion in 7 that Issus would decide the war proved false, but could easily have been voiced at the time. QC. viii 20 f. alleges that Al. lost confidence at this juncture. Cf. 10, 2 n.

## ARRIAN

ἀπονώτατά τε καὶ μαλακώτατα τῆς Ἀσίας γένη  
 ἀντιτάξεσθαι· ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀντιστρατηγεῖν  
 6 Δαρείω. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐς πλεονεξίαν τοῦ ἀγῶνος  
 ἐπεξῆει. τὰ δὲ ἄθλα ὅτι μεγάλα ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ  
 κινδύνου ἐπεδείκνυεν. οὐ γὰρ τοὺς σατράπας τοὺς  
 Δαρείου ἐν τῷ τότε κρατήσειν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἵππον τὴν  
 ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ ταχθεῖσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς δισφυρίους  
 ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἀλλὰ Περσῶν τε ὅτι περ  
 ὄφελος καὶ Μήδων καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔθνη Πέρσαις καὶ  
 Μήδοις ὑπήκοα ἐποικεῖ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ αὐτὸν μέγαν  
 βασιλέα παρόντα, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπολειφθήσεται  
 σφισιν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ ἀγῶνι ὅτι μὴ κρατεῖν τῆς  
 Ἀσίας ξυμπάσης καὶ πέρας τοῖς πολλοῖς πόνοις  
 7 ἐπιθεῖναι. ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τῶν τε ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ξὺν  
 λαμπρότητι ἤδη πεπραγμένων ὑπεμίμνησκειν καὶ εἰ  
 δὴ τῷ ἰδίῳ τι διαπρεπὲς ἐς κάλλος τετολμημένον,  
 ὀνομαστὶ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ ἀνακαλῶν. καὶ τὸ  
 αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀκίνδυνον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ὡς ἀνεπαχθέ-  
 8 στατα ἐπεξῆει. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντος καὶ  
 τῶν ἅμα Ξενοφῶντι μυρίων ἐς μνήμην ἔλθειν, ὡς  
 οὐδὲν τι οὔτε κατὰ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην  
 ἀξίωσιν σφίσι ἐπεοικότες, οὐδὲ ἱππέων αὐτοῖς  
 παρόντων Θεσσαλῶν, οὐδὲ Βοιωτῶν ἢ Πελοπον-  
 νησίων, οὐδὲ Μακεδόνων ἢ Θρακῶν, οὐδὲ ὅση ἄλλη  
 σφίσι ἵππος ξυντέτακται, οὐδὲ τοξοτῶν ἢ σφενδο-  
 νητῶν, ὅτι μὴ Κρητῶν ἢ Ῥοδίων ὀλίγων, καὶ  
 τούτων ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ ὑπὸ Ξενοφῶντος αὐτοσχε-  
 9 διασθέντων, οἱ δὲ βασιλέα τε ξὺν πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει  
 πρὸς Βαβυλῶνι αὐτῇ ἐτρέψαντο καὶ ἔθνη ὅσα  
 κατιόντων ἐς τὸν Εὐξείνιον πόντον καθ' ὁδὸν σφισιν  
 ἐπεγένετο νικῶντες ἐπῆλθον· ὅσα τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ  
 τοιῷδε πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐς παράκλησιν ἀνδράσι



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will be ranged against the most indolent and softest tribes of Asia. In addition you have Alexander commanding against Darius.' Besides rehearsing these advantages they had in the contest, he pointed out the greatness of the rewards for which they were incurring danger. It was not Darius' satraps whom they were now to overcome, nor the cavalry that lined the Granicus, nor the twenty thousand foreign mercenaries, but the flower of Medes and Persians and all their subject nations living in Asia; the Great King was there himself; nothing remained after this final struggle but to rule the whole of Asia and set an end to their long exertions. In addition, he reminded them of all they had already achieved with brilliant success for the common cause, and cited any noble act of personal daring, naming both the deed and the man; with the utmost delicacy he mentioned the dangers he himself had faced in battles. He is also said to have recalled that Xenophon and his Ten Thousand, though they were not to be compared to themselves in number and other qualities, with no cavalry, Thessalian, Boeotian, Peloponnesian, Macedonian or Thracian, nor such other horse as they now had in their own ranks, no archers or slingers, save a few Cretans and Rhodians, and those hastily scraped together by Xenophon in the crisis. Yet the Ten Thousand routed the Great King with his whole power near Babylon itself, and victoriously attacked the various other tribes which barred their way as they descended to the Black Sea. He also told them of anything else which at such a time, before dangers, a brave general

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<sup>4</sup> 'Vulgate'. Not necessarily false; Al. is likely to have read Xenophon. A's source here in sections 8 f., as in 3-7, is apparently not that followed by QC., cf. 10, 2 n.

## ARRIAN

ἀγαθοῖς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος παραινέσθαι εἰκός. οἱ δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν δεξιούμενοί τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπαίροντες ἄγειν ἤδη ἐκέλευον.

8. Ὁ δὲ τότε μὲν δειπνοποιεῖσθαι παραγγέλλει, προπέμπει δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας τῶν τε ἰππέων ὀλίγους καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν προκατασκευασμένους τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ὀπίσω [ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας]. καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν πᾶσαν ἦει, ὡς  
 2 κατασχεῖν αὖθις τὰς πύλας. ὡς δὲ ἀμφὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐκράτησεν αὖθις τῶν παρόδων, ἀνέπαυε τὴν στρατιὰν τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν πετρῶν, προφυλακὰς ἀκριβεῖς καταστησάμενος. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἔω κατῆει ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν· καὶ ἔως μὲν πάντῃ στενόπορα ἦν τὰ χωρία, ἐπὶ κέρως ἦγεν, ὡς δὲ διεχώρει ἐς πλάτος, ἀνέπτυσσεν αἰεὶ τὸ κέρας ἐς φάλαγγα, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τάξιν παράγων, τῇ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος, ἐν  
 3 ἀριστερᾷ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν. οἱ δὲ ἰππεῖς αὐτῷ τέως μὲν κατόπιν τῶν πεζῶν τεταγμένοι ἦσαν, ὡς δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν προήεσαν, συνέτασεν ἤδη τὴν στρατιὰν ὡς ἐς μάχην, πρῶτους μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως πρὸς τῷ ὄρει τῶν πεζῶν τό τε ἄγημα καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Νικάνωρ ὁ Παρμενίωνος, ἐχομένην δὲ τούτων τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὴν Περδίκκου. οὗτοι μὲν ἔσταν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ  
 4 ἀρξαμένῳ τεταγμένοι ἦσαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ εὐωνύμου πρώτη μὲν ἦ Ἀμύντου τάξις ἦν, ἐπὶ δὲ ἦ Πτολεμαίου, ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἦ Μελεάγρου. τοῦ δὲ εὐωνύμου τοῖς πεζοῖς μὲν Κρατερὸς ἐπετέτακτο

<sup>1</sup> Contrast QC. 8, 22-3.

would naturally tell brave men by way of encouragement. They crowded round and clasped their king's hand, and with cries of encouragement urged him to lead them on at once.

8. For the moment, however, Alexander told his troops to take their meal, but he sent a few horsemen and archers on [towards the Gates] to reconnoitre the road that lay behind them; then at nightfall he himself marched with his whole force to seize the Gates again. When about midnight he was in possession of the passes once more, he rested his army for the remainder of the night there on the crags, after carefully setting outposts.<sup>1</sup> Just upon dawn he descended from the Gates along the road; as long as the defile enclosed on every side remained narrow, he led the army in column, but when it grew broader, he deployed his column continuously into a phalanx, bringing up battalion after battalion of hoplites, on the right up to the ridge, and on the left up to the sea. His cavalry so far had been ranged behind the infantry, but when they moved forward into open ground, he at once drew up his army in battle order; <sup>2</sup> on the right wing towards the mountain ridge he placed first of the infantry the *agema* and hypaspists under Nicanor son of Parmenio, next to them Coenus' battalion, and then that of Perdicas. From right to left these regiments stretched to the centre of the hoplites. On the left, Amyntas' battalion came first, <sup>4</sup> then Ptolemaeus', and next Meleager's. Craterus <sup>3</sup> had been put in command of the infantry on the left

<sup>1</sup> QC. 8, 24; 9, 12 (muddled). D. 33, 1 puts the horse in front.

<sup>2</sup> A. obscures the fact that Craterus also had a battalion (i 14, 3; iii 11, 10). Battle order: QC. 9, 7-9.

## ARRIAN

ἄρχειν, τοῦ δὲ ξύμπαντος εὐωνύμου Παρμενίων ἠγεῖτο· καὶ παρήγγελλτο αὐτῷ μὴ ἀπολείπειν τὴν θάλασσαν, ὡς μὴ κυκλωθεῖεν ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὅτι πάντη ὑπερφαλαγγήσειν αὐτῶν διὰ πλῆθος ἤμελλον.

- 5 Δαρεῖος δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐξηγγέλθη αὐτῷ προσάγων ἤδη Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς ἐς μάχην, τῶν μὲν ἰππέων διαβιβάζει πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ Πινάρου ἐς τρισμυρίους μάλιστα τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μετὰ τούτων τῶν ψιλῶν ἐς δισμυρίους, ὅπως τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν
- 6 καθ' ἡσυχίαν συντάξειε. καὶ πρώτους μὲν τοῦ ὀπλιτικοῦ τοὺς Ἑλληνας τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἔταξεν ἐς τρισμυρίους κατὰ τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τῶν Καρδάκ[κ]ων καλουμένων ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν ἐς ἑξακισμυρίους· ὀπλίται δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οὗτοι. τοσοῦτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἀπλῆς
- 7 ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο. ἐπέταξε δὲ καὶ τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ σφῶν κατὰ τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου δεξιὸν ἐς δισμυρίους· καὶ τούτων ἔστιν οἱ κατὰ νώτου ἐγένοντο τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατιᾶς. τὸ γὰρ ὄρος ἵνα ἐπετάχθησαν πῆ μὲν διεχώρει ἐς βάθος καὶ κολπῶδές τι αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάσῃ ἐγίγνετο, ἔπειτα ἐς ἐπικαμπὴν προῖον τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑπερ-  
 8 ρείαις τεταγμένους κατόπιν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐποίει. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πλῆθος αὐτοῦ ψιλῶν τε καὶ ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ ἔθνη συντεταγμένον ἐς βάθος οὐκ ὠφέλιμον, ὀπισθεν ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος τεταγμένου βαρβαρικοῦ. ἐλέγετο γὰρ ἢ πᾶσα ξὺν Δαρείῳ στρατιὰ μάλιστα ἐς ἑξήκοντα μυριάδας μαχίμους εἶναι.
- 9 Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, ὡς αὐτῷ πρόσω ἴοντι τὸ

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and Parmenio of the entire left wing, with orders not to edge away from the sea, for fear the barbarians should surround them, since with their great numbers they were likely to overlap them on all sides.

When the approach of Alexander in battle order was reported to Darius, he sent about 30,000 of his cavalry across the river Pinarus with 20,000 light infantry, so that he might deploy the rest at his leisure. He placed the Greek mercenaries, about 30,000, foremost of his hoplites facing the Macedonian phalanx; next, on either side, 60,000 of the so-called Cardaces, who were also hoplites; this was the number which the ground where they stood allowed to be posted in one line. He also stationed about 20,000 men on the ridge on his left over against Alexander's right; some of these actually got to the rear of Alexander's force, since the mountain ridge where they were posted was deeply indented in one part and formed something like a bay as in the sea; then bending outwards again it brought those posted on the foothills to the rear of Alexander's right wing. The general mass of his light and heavy troops, arranged by their nations in such depth that they were useless, was behind the Greek mercenaries and the barbarian<sup>4</sup> force drawn up in phalanx formation. Darius' whole force was said to amount to some 600,000 fighting men.<sup>5</sup>

Alexander, however, finding the ground opening

<sup>4</sup> Darius' dispositions: QC. 8, 24-9, 6 (cf. 2 *passim*). On numbers cf. App. III 5. The mercenaries are unlikely to have numbered 30,000, cf. H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 183 f.

<sup>5</sup> Not 'Vulgate' but a report in A's main source(s).

## ARRIAN

χωρίον διέσχεν ὀλίγον ἐς πλάτος, παρήγαγε τοὺς ἰππέας, τοὺς τε ἑταίρους καλουμένους καὶ τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας.<sup>1</sup> καὶ τούτους μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρα ἅμα οἱ ἔταξε, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον πέμπει ὡς Παρμενίωνα.

- 10 Δαρείος δέ, ὡς συντεταγμένη ἤδη ἦν αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, τοὺς ἰππέας, οὕσυνας πρὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπὶ τῷδε προτετάχει ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς αὐτῷ ἡ ἔκταξις τῆς στρατιᾶς γένοιτο, ἀνεκάλεσεν ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος. καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρατι πρὸς τῇ θαλάσῃ κατὰ Παρμενίωνα ἔταξεν, ὅτι ταύτη μᾶλλον τι ἰππάσιμα ἦν, μέρος δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον πρὸς τὰ ὄρη παρ-
- 11 ἤγαγεν. ὡς δὲ ἀχρεῖοι ἐνταῦθα διὰ στενότητα τῶν χωρίων ἐφαίνοντο, καὶ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς παριππεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρασ σφῶν ἐκέλευσεν. αὐτὸς δὲ Δαρείος τὸ μέσον τῆς πάσης τάξεως ἐπεῖχεν, καθάπερ νόμος τοῖς Περσῶν βασιλεῦσι τετάχθαι· καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῆς τάξεως ταύτης Ξενοφῶν ὁ τοῦ Γρύλλου ἀναγέγραφεν.

9. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος κατιδὼν ὀλίγου πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν Περσῶν ἵππον μετακεχωρηκυῖαν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὡς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, αὐτῷ δὲ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους μόνους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἰππέας ταύτη τεταγμένους, πέμπει κατὰ τάχος τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς ἰππέας ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον, κελεύσας μὴ πρὸ τοῦ μετώπου τῆς πάσης τάξεως παριππεῦσαι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς τοῖς πολεμίοις γενέσθαι μεταχωροῦντας, ἀλλὰ

<sup>1</sup> See historical note.

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outwards a little as he went forward, brought into line his cavalry, the so-called Companions, the Thessalians and the . . . whom he posted with himself on the right wing while the Peloponnesians and other allies were sent to Parmenio on the left.<sup>6</sup>

His phalanx once in due order, Darius recalled by 10 signal the cavalry he had placed in front of the river <sup>7</sup> to cover the deployment of the army and posted most of them opposite Parmenio on the right wing by the sea, because it was rather better ground for cavalry, though some were sent to the left wing near the hills. But as they appeared useless there for want 11 of space, he ordered most of them too to ride round to their right wing. Darius himself held the centre of his whole host, the customary position for Persian kings; Xenophon son of Gryllus has recorded the purpose of the arrangement.<sup>8</sup>

9. At this Alexander, observing that nearly all the Persian cavalry had been transferred to his left, resting on the sea, while he had only the Peloponnesians and the other allied horse on this side, despatched the Thessalian cavalry at full speed to the left, with orders not to ride in front of the line, so that their change of position might not be sighted by the enemy, but to pass unobserved behind the

<sup>6</sup> QC. 9, 8. I have marked a lacuna where the MSS read 'Macedonians'; some other cavalry units must be meant, perhaps *prodromoi* (9, 2).

<sup>7</sup> QC. 8, 27 f. confuses this force with the outflanking force on the Persian left.

<sup>8</sup> Xen., *Anab.* i 8, 21 f. Contrast QC. 9, 4.



## ARRIAN

- 2 κατόπιν τῆς φάλαγγος ἀφανῶς διελθεῖν. προέταξε δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰππέων κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν τοὺς προδρόμους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Πρωτόμαχος, καὶ τοὺς Παίονας, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀρίστων, τῶν δὲ πεζῶν τοὺς τοξότας, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἀντίοχος· τοὺς δὲ Ἀγριᾶνας, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἀτταλος, καὶ τῶν ἰππέων τινὰς καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἐς ἐπικαμπὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος τὸ κατὰ νότου ἔταξεν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα ἐς δύο κέρατα διέχουσαν τετάχθαι, τὸ μὲν ὡς πρὸς Δαρεῖόν τε καὶ τοὺς πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοὺς πάντας Πέρσας, τὸ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ὄρει
- 3 κατὰ νότου σφῶν τεταγμένους. τοῦ δὲ εὐωνύμου προετάχθησαν τῶν μὲν πεζῶν οἱ τε Κρήτες τοξόται καὶ οἱ Θράκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Σιτάλκης, πρὸ τούτων δὲ ἢ ἵππος ἢ κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι ξένοι πᾶσιν ἐπετάχθησαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πυκνὴ αὐτῷ ἢ φάλαγξ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐφαίνετο, πολὺ τε ταύτῃ ὑπερφαλαγγήσειν οἱ Πέρσαι ἐδόκουν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκέλευσε δύο ἴλας τῶν ἐταίρων, τὴν τε Ἀνθεμουσίαν, ἧς ἰλάρχης ἦν Περοΐδας ὁ Μενεσθέως, καὶ τὴν Λευγαίαν καλουμένην, ἧς ἡγεῖτο Παντόρδανος ὁ Κλεάνδρου, ἐπὶ τὸ
- 4 δεξιὸν ἀφανῶς παρελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς τοξότας δὲ καὶ μέρος τῶν Ἀγριάνων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων ἔστιν οὓς κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ μετώπου παραγαγὼν ἐξέτεινεν ὑπὲρ τὸ τῶν Περσῶν κέρας τὴν φάλαγγα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὄρους τεταγμένοι οὔτε κατήεσαν, ἐκδρομῆς τε ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἀγριάνων καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ὀλίγων κατὰ πρόσταξιν Ἀλεξάνδρου γενομένης ῥαδίως

<sup>1</sup> QC. 11, 3, though in 11, 13 f. he unintelligibly separates

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 9. 2-4

phalanx.<sup>1</sup> He posted the *prodromoi* under Protomachus' command in front of the cavalry on the right, with the Paeonians led by Ariston, and in front of his foot the archers commanded by Antiochus. The Agrianians under Attalus, with some of the cavalry and archers, he threw back at an angle with the heights in his rear, so that on his right wing his line forked into two parts, one facing Darius and the main body of Persians across the river, the other towards the force posted in the Macedonian rear in the heights. On the left wing of the infantry the Cretan archers and the Thracians under Sitalces had been posted in front, with the cavalry of the left wing further in advance. The foreign mercenaries were drawn up in support of the whole line. But as his phalanx did not seem very solid on his right, and the Persians seemed likely to overlap them considerably there, he ordered two squadrons of the Companions from the centre, that from Anthemus, commanded by Peroedes son of Menestheus, and that called the Leugaeon, under Pantordanus son of Cleander, to transfer unobserved to the right wing.<sup>2</sup> He brought over the archers and some of the Agrianians and Greek mercenaries to the front of his right and so extended his phalanx to out-flank the Persian wing. For since the troops posted on the heights had not descended, but on a sally made by the Agrianians and a few archers at Alexander's order, had been easily dislodged from the foothills

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3

4

Parmenio from the Thessalians. D. 37, 2 also puts them on the left. QC. 9, 9 f. has some of the following details, not making it clear that they represent last minute changes.

<sup>2</sup> This move was no doubt consequential on taking the Thessalians out of the line on the right.

## ARRIAN

ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπὼρ(ε)ίας ἀνασταλέντες ἐς τὸ ἄκρον ἀνέφυγον, ἔγνω καὶ τοῖς κατ' αὐτοὺς τεταγμένοις δυνατὸς ὦν χρήσασθαι ἐς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς φάλαγγος· ἐκείνοις δὲ ἰππέας τρικοσίους ἐπιτάξαι ἐξήρκεσεν.

10. Οὕτω δὴ τεταγμένους χρόνον μὲν τινα προῆγεν ἀναπαύων, ὥστε καὶ πάνυ ἔδοξε σχολαία γενέσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρόσοδος· τοὺς γὰρ βαρβάρους, ὅπως τὰ πρῶτα ἐτάχθησαν, οὐκέτι ἀντεπῆγε Δαρείος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῖς ὄχθαις, πολλαχῆ μὲν ἀποκρήμνοις οὔσαις, ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ χάρακα παρατείνας αὐταῖς ἵνα εὐεφοδώτερα ἐφαίνετο, οὕτως ἔμενε· καὶ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς δῆλος ἐγένετο τοῖς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος.

2 ὡς δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη ἦν τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἐνταῦθα παριππεύων πάντῃ Ἀλέξανδρος παρεκάλει ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, οὐ τῶν ἡγεμόνων μόνον τὰ ὀνόματα ξὺν τῷ πρέποντι κόσμῳ ἀνακαλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰλάρχας καὶ λοχαγοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφόρων, ὅσοι κατ' ἀξίωσιν ἢ τινα ἀρετὴν γνωριμώτεροι ἦσαν· καὶ αὐτῷ πανταχόθεν βοή ἐγένετο μὴ διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ ἐσβάλλειν ἐς τοὺς

3 πολεμίους. ὁ δὲ ἦγεν ἐν τάξει ἔτι, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, καίπερ ἐν ἀπόπτῳ ἤδη ἔχων τὴν Δαρείου δύναμιν, βάδην, τοῦ μὴ διασπασθῆναί τι ἐν τῇ ξυntonωτέρᾳ πορείᾳ κυμῆναν τῆς φάλαγγος· ὡς δὲ ἐντὸς βέλους ἐγίνοντο, πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ κατὰ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τεταγμένος

\* QC. 9, 11 (put too early).

<sup>1</sup> Not 'many', but some banks are 3-4 metres high, too steep for the phalanx to have descended from them; they had to go round; hence breaks in the line (§ 5).

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and had fled to the summit,<sup>3</sup> Alexander decided that he could use those who had been posted to hold them in check to fill up his phalanx. To watch the hill-troops he reckoned it enough to tell off three hundred horsemen.

10. His forces thus marshalled, Alexander led them on for some time with halts, so that their advance seemed quite a leisurely affair. Once the barbarians had taken up their first positions, Darius made no further advance; he remained on the river bank, which was in many <sup>1</sup> places precipitous, in some parts building up a stockade, where it appeared more accessible. This made it plain to Alexander and his staff that Darius was in spirit a beaten man. When 2 the two armies were close, Alexander rode all along his front and bade them be good men and true, calling aloud with all proper distinctions the names not only of generals but even of commanders of squadrons and companies, as well as any of the mercenaries who were conspicuous for rank or for any brave action.<sup>2</sup> An answering cry went up from all sides to delay no longer, but to charge the enemy.<sup>3</sup> He continued to lead on in line, at marching 3 pace at first, though he now had Darius' force in view, to avoid any part of the phalanx fluctuating in a more rapid advance and so breaking apart. Once within missile range, Alexander himself and his entourage were the first, stationed on the right, to charge in the

<sup>1</sup> QC. 10, 3-10 here interpolates a speech by Al., which seems to derive from a source common to J. xi 9, 3 ff., not followed in A. 6, 3 ff.

<sup>2</sup> From this point the narrative in QC. 11 resembles that in D. 33 f. (cf. also 10, 1 f. with D. 33, 4) and departs widely from A., giving no clear picture. To allow time for Al's march, the battle must have begun at or after 1 p.m.

## ARRIAN

δρόμῳ ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐνέβαλον, ὡς τῇ τε ὀξύτητι  
 τῆς ἐφόδου ἐκπλήξαι τοὺς Πέρσας καὶ τοῦ θᾶσσον  
 ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθόντας ὀλίγα πρὸς τῶν τοξοτῶν  
 βλάβεσθαι. καὶ ξυνέβη ὅπως εἵκασεν Ἀλέξαν-  
 4 δρος. εὐθὺς γὰρ ὡς ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο,  
 τρέπονται τοῦ Περσικοῦ στρατεύματος οἱ τῷ  
 ἀριστερῷ κέρα ἐπιτεταγμένοι· καὶ ταύτη μὲν  
 λαμπρῶς ἐνίκα Ἀλέξανδρός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτόν.  
 οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες οἱ μισθοφόροι οἱ ξὺν Δαρείῳ, ἧ  
 διέσχε τῶν Μακεδόνων ἡ φάλαγξ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν  
 5 κέρας παραρραγεῖσα, ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν σπουδῇ  
 ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἐν χερσὶ τὴν μάχην  
 ποιήσας ἐξώθει ἤδη τοὺς ταύτη τεταγμένους τῶν  
 Περσῶν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μέσον τῶν Μακεδόνων οὔτε  
 τῇ ἴσῃ σπουδῇ ἤψαντο τοῦ ἔργου καὶ πολλαχῇ  
 χρημνώδεσι ταῖς ὄχθαις ἐντυγχάνοντες τὸ μέτωπον  
 τῆς φάλαγγος οὐ δυνατοὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ  
 τάξει διασώσασθαι, — ταύτη ἐμβάλλουσιν οἱ Ἕλ-  
 ληνες τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἧ μάλιστα διεσπασμένην  
 6 αὐτοῖς τὴν φάλαγγα κατεῖδον. καὶ τὸ ἔργον  
 ἐνταῦθα καρτερόν ἦν, τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν  
 ἀπώσασθαι τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ τὴν νίκην τοῖς ἤδη  
 φεύγουσι σφῶν ἀνασώσασθαι, τῶν Μακεδόνων δὲ  
 τῆς τε Ἀλεξάνδρου ἤδη φαινομένης εὐπραγίας μὴ  
 λειφθῆναι καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς φάλαγγος, ὡς ἀμάχου  
 7 δὴ ἐς τὸ τότε διαβεβοημένης, μὴ ἀφανίσαι. καί τι  
 καὶ τοῖς γένεσι τῷ τε Ἑλληνικῷ καὶ τῷ Μακε-  
 δονικῷ φιλοτιμίας ἐνέπεσεν ἐς ἀλλήλους. καὶ  
 ἐνταῦθα πίπτει Πτολεμαῖός τε ὁ Σελεύκου, ἀνὴρ  
 ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος, καὶ ἄλλοι ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ  
 ἑκατὸν τῶν οὐκ ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων.

11. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως

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river, in order to strike panic into the Persians by  
the rapidity of the attack, and by coming more  
quickly to close quarters to reduce losses from the  
Persian archers. Everything happened as Alex-  
ander guessed. The moment the battle was joined 4  
hand-to-hand, the Persian left gave way; and here  
Alexander and his followers won a brilliant success.  
But Darius' Greek mercenaries attacked the Mace-  
donian phalanx, where a gap appeared as it broke  
formation on the right; while Alexander plunged 5  
impetuously into the river, came to close quarters  
with the Persians posted here, and was pushing  
them back, the Macedonian centre did not set to  
with equal impetus, and finding the river banks  
precipitous in many places, were unable to maintain  
their front in unbroken line; and the Greeks attacked  
where they saw that the phalanx had been particularly  
torn apart. There the action was severe, the Greeks 6  
tried to push off the Macedonians into the river  
and to restore victory to their own side who were  
already in flight, while the Macedonians sought to  
rival the success of Alexander, which was already  
apparent, and to preserve the reputation of the  
phalanx, whose sheer invincibility had hitherto been  
on everyone's lips. There was also some emulation 7  
between antagonists of the Greek and Macedonian  
races.\* Here it was that Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus  
fell, after showing himself a brave man, and about  
a hundred and twenty Macedonians of note.

11. At this point the battalions on the right wing,

\* Cf. *Introd.* n. 33.

## ARRIAN

τάξεις, τετραμμένους ἤδη τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς τῶν  
 Περσῶν ὄρωντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους τε τοὺς μισθο-  
 φόρους τοὺς Δαρείου καὶ τὸ πονούμενον σφῶν  
 ἐπικάμψαντες ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀπώσαντο  
 αὐτούς, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρερρωγὸς τοῦ Περσικοῦ  
 στρατεύματος ὑπερφαλαγγήσαντες ἐς τὰ πλάγια  
 2 ἐμβεβληκότες ἤδη ἔκοπτον τοὺς ξένους· καὶ οἱ  
 ἵππεῖς δὲ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν κατὰ τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς  
 τεταγμένοι οὐκ ἔμειναν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ  
 τῷ ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπιδιαβάντες εὐρώστως ἐνέβαλον ἐς  
 τὰς Ἰλας τῶν Θετταλῶν. καὶ ταύτῃ ξυνέστη  
 ἵππομαχία καρτερά, οὐδὲ πρόσθεν ἐνέκλιναν οἱ  
 Πέρσαι πρὶν Δαρείῳ τε πεφευγότα ἦσθοντο καὶ  
 πρὶν ἀπορραγῆναι σφῶν τοὺς μισθοφόρους συγκο-  
 3 πέντας ὑπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος. τότε δὲ ἤδη λαμπρά τε  
 καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἡ φυγὴ ἐγίνετο· καὶ οἱ τε τῶν  
 Περσῶν ἵπποι ἐν τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ἐκακοπάθουν  
 βαρέως ὠπλισμένους τοὺς ἀμβάτας σφῶν φέροντες,  
 καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἵππεῖς κατὰ στενὰς ὁδοὺς πλήθει τε  
 πολλοὶ καὶ πεφοβημένως ξὺν ἀταξία ἀποχωροῦντες  
 οὐ μείον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καταπατούμενοι ἢ πρὸς τῶν  
 διωκόντων πολεμίων ἐβλάπτοντο. καὶ οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ  
 εὐρώστως αὐτοῖς ἐπέκειντο, ὥστε οὐ μείων ἢ  
 τῶν πεζῶν φόνος ἐν τῇ φυγῇ τῶν ἱππέων ἐγίνετο.  
 4 Δαρεῖος δέ, ὡς αὐτῷ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπ' Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου ἐφοβήθη τὸ κέρας τὸ εὐώνυμον καὶ ταύτῃ  
 ἀπορρηγνύμενον κατείδε τοῦ ἄλλου στρατοπέδου,  
 εὐθὺς ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρματος ξὺν τοῖς πρώτοις  
 5 ἔφευγε. καὶ ἔστε μὲν ὀμαλοῖς χωρίοις ἐν τῇ φυγῇ

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. 33, 2; QC. 11, 14 f.; P. 24, 1.

<sup>2</sup> QC. 11, 18 says that they got away in good order; for survivors App. VI 2.



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seeing that the Persians opposed to them were  
 already routed, bent round towards Darius' foreign  
 mercenaries, where their own centre was hard  
 pressed, drove them from the river, and then over-  
 lapping the now broken part of the Persian army,  
 attacked in the flank and in a trice were cutting down  
 the mercenaries. The Persian cavalry posted op- 2  
 posite to the Thessalians did not keep their ground  
 behind the river, once the engagement had actually  
 begun, but crossed manfully and charged the Thes-  
 salian squadrons, and here there was a desperate  
 cavalry fight;<sup>1</sup> the Persians did not give way till  
 they realized that Darius had fled and till their mer-  
 cenaries were cut off, mowed down by the phalanx.<sup>2</sup> 3  
 But then the rout was patent and universal. The  
 Persian horses suffered much in the retreat, with  
 their riders heavily armoured, while the riders too,  
 hurrying by narrow paths in a crowded horde in  
 terror and disorder, suffered as heavy losses from  
 being ridden over by one another as from the pursuit  
 of their enemies. The Thessalians fell on them with  
 vigour, and there was as much slaughter in the  
 cavalry-flight as in the infantry.

As for Darius, the moment his left wing was panic- 4  
 stricken by Alexander and he saw it thus cut off from  
 the rest of his army, he fled just as he was in his  
 chariot, in the van of the fugitives.<sup>3</sup> So long as he 5

<sup>1</sup> A's sources make Darius a poltroon; in the 'Vulgate' (D. and QC.) he fights bravely; the contemporary, Chares (P. 20, 4), made him give Al. the wound he received in the battle (A. 12, 1); this must be false, though not refuted by a so-called letter of Al. (P. 20, 5, cf. Introd. 15); but it tended to Al's greater glory, if Darius was a Hector to his Achilles, and Al. himself treated Darius with posthumous respect (iii 22, 1; 23, 7; 25, 8; 30, 4), thus perhaps stimulating Chares' invention. Cf. App. IX 4.

## ARRIAN

ἐπετύγχανεν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρματος διεσώζετο, ὡς δὲ  
 φάραγξί τε καὶ ἄλλαις δυσχωρίαις ἐνέκυρσε, τὸ μὲν  
 ἄρμα ἀπολείπει αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸν  
 κἀνδυν ἐκδύς· ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸ τόξον ἀπολείπει ἐπὶ τοῦ  
 ἄρματος· αὐτὸς δὲ ἵππου ἐπιβάς ἔφευγε· καὶ ἡ  
 νύξ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐπιγενομένη ἀφείλετο αὐτὸν τὸ  
 6 πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀλῶναι. Ἀλέξανδρος γὰρ ἔσπε  
 μὲν φάος ἦν ἀνὰ κράτος ἐδίωκεν, ὡς δὲ συνεσκό-  
 ταζέ τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πρὸ ποδῶν ἀφανῆ ἦν, εἰς τὸ  
 ἔμπαλιν ἀπετρέπετο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον· τὸ  
 μέντοι ἄρμα τοῦ Δαρείου ἔλαβε καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἐπ'  
 7 αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν κἀνδυν καὶ τὸ τόξον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ  
 δίωξις βραδυτέρα αὐτῷ ἐγεγόνει, ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ  
 παραρρήξει τῆς φάλαγγος ἐπιστρέψας καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ  
 πρόσθεν ἐς τὸ διώκειν ἐτράπετο πρὶν τοὺς τε  
 μισθοφόρους τοὺς ξένους καὶ τὸ τῶν Περσῶν  
 ἵππικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀπωσθέντας κατεΐδε.  
 8 Τῶν δὲ Περσῶν ἀπέθανον Ἀρσάμης μὲν καὶ  
 Ῥεομίθρης καὶ Ἀτιζύης τῶν ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ ἠγησα-  
 μένων τοῦ ἵππικοῦ· ἀποθνήσκει δὲ καὶ Σαυάκης ὁ  
 Αἰγύπτου σατράπης καὶ Βουβάκης τῶν ἐντίμων  
 Περσῶν· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πλῆθος εἰς δέκα μάλιστα  
 μυριάδας καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἵππεῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους,  
 ὥστε λέγει Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου ξυνεπισπόμενος  
 τότε Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τοὺς μετὰ σφῶν διώκοντας  
 9 Δαρεῖον, ὡς ἐπὶ φάραγγί τινι ἐν τῇ διώξει ἐγέ-  
 νοντο, ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν διαβῆναι τὴν φάραγγα. τό-  
 τε στρατόπεδον τὸ Δαρείου εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔάλω

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<sup>4</sup> *Contra* D. 37, 2, but of. 35, 1, QC. 12, 1. With night-  
 fall about 6 p.m., the battle and pursuit might have lasted  
 4-5 hours. Most of the fugitives, all on the left and centre,

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found level ground in his flight, he was safe in his chariot; but when he came to gullies and other difficult patches, he left his chariot there, threw away his shield and mantle, left even his bow in the chariot, and fled on horseback; only night, speedily falling, saved him from becoming Alexander's captive, since Alexander pursued with all his might as long as daylight held, but when it was growing dark and he could not see his way, turned back towards the camp,<sup>4</sup> though he took Darius' chariot, and with it his shield, mantle and bow. The fact is that his pursuit had become slower because he had wheeled back when the phalanx first broke formation and had not himself turned to pursue till he had seen the mercenaries and the Persian cavalry driven back from the river.<sup>5</sup>

The Persians killed included Arsames, Rheomithres and Atizyes who had been among the cavalry commanders on the Granicus, and also Savaces the satrap of Egypt and Bubaces among the Persian nobles; as for the rank and file, some 100,000 fell, including over 10,000 cavalry, so that Ptolemy son of Lagos, who was then with Alexander, says that the pursuers of Darius meeting a deep gully in the pursuit crossed it over bodies of the dead.<sup>6</sup> Darius' camp was stormed at once, and captured with his mother,

must have fled towards the Toprak Kalessi Pass, about 200 stades from the battle (App. III 3).

<sup>4</sup> So QC. 11, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Different names in D. 34, 5; QC. 11, 10; same Persian totals in D. 36, 6; QC. 11, 27; P. 20, 5; J. XI 9, 10 (except that he includes 40,000 prisoners)—all incredible; on unreliability of casualty figures see my *Italian Manpower*, App. 28. Macedonian losses: about 450 killed or missing in D. and QC., 280 in J., 1,000 foot and 200 horse in the fragment of an unknown historian (Jacoby no. 148, 44); A. 10, 7 does not purport to give the total.

## ARRIAN

καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ἡ γυνή, αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὴ  
 Δαρείου, καὶ υἱὸς Δαρείου νήπιος· καὶ θυγατέρες  
 δύο ἐάλωσαν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀμφ' αὐτὰς Περσῶν τῶν  
 ὁμοτίμων γυναῖκες οὐ πολλαί. οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι  
 Πέρσαι τὰς γυναῖκας σφῶν ξὺν τῇ ἄλλῃ κατασκευῇ  
 10 ἐς Δαμασκὸν ἔτυχον ἑσταλκότες· ἐπεὶ καὶ Δαρείος  
 τῶν τε χρημάτων τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα μεγάλῳ  
 βασιλεῖ ἐς πολυτελῆ δίαιταν καὶ στρατευομένῳ  
 ὁμῶς συνέπεται πεπόμφει ἐς Δαμασκόν, ὥστε ἐν  
 τῷ στρατεύματι οὐ πλείονα ἢ τρισχίλια τάλαντα  
 ἐάλω. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν Δαμασκῷ χρήματα ὀλίγον  
 ὕστερον ἐάλω ὑπὸ Παρμενίωνος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
 σταλέντος. τοῦτο τὸ τέλος τῇ μάχῃ ἐκείνῃ ἐγένετο  
 ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις Νικοκράτους μηνὸς Μαι-  
 μακτηριῶνος.

12. Τῇ δὲ ὕστεραία, καίπερ τετρωμένος τὸν  
 μηρὸν ξίφει Ἀλέξανδρος, ὁ δὲ τοὺς τραυματίας  
 ἐπῆλθε, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ξυναγαγὼν ἔθαψε  
 μεγαλοπρεπῶς ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει πάσῃ ἐκτεταγμένη  
 ὡς λαμπρότατα ἐς πόλεμον· καὶ λόγῳ τε ἐπεκόσ-  
 μησεν ὅσοις τι διαπρεπὲς ἔργον ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ἢ  
 αὐτὸς ξυνέγνω εἰργασμένον ἢ ἀκοῇ συμφωνού-  
 μενον ἔμαθεν, καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσει ὡς ἐκάστους  
 2 ξὺν τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἐτίμησεν. καὶ Κιλικίας μὲν ἀπο-  
 δεικνύει σατράπην Βάλακρον τὸν Νικάνορος, ἕνα  
 τῶν σωματοφυλάκων τῶν βασιλικῶν, ἀντὶ δὲ  
 τούτου ἐς τοὺς σωματοφύλακας κατέλεξε Μένητα  
 τὸν Διονυσίου· ἀντὶ δὲ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Σελεύκου

<sup>7</sup> D. 35 f.; QC. 11, 20 ff.; P. 20, 6–21 with elaborations.

<sup>8</sup> A. characteristically mentions this only when it becomes relevant to Al's doings, cf. P. 20, 6; contrast D. 32, 3; QC. 8, 12.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 11. 9-12. 2

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B.C.

wife, who was also his sister, and his infant son; two daughters were taken too, with a few noble Persian ladies in their suite.<sup>7</sup> The other Persians had in fact despatched their women-folk and baggage to Damascus; Darius too had sent there the greater 10 part of his money and everything else a great king takes with him even on campaign for his extravagant way of living; so <sup>8</sup> they found no more than three thousand Talents in the camp. However, the money at Damascus too was captured soon after by Parmenio, who was specially detailed for the purpose.<sup>9</sup> So ended this battle, fought in the archonship at Athens of Nicocrates and in the month Maimacterion.<sup>10</sup>

12. Next day, despite a sword wound in his thigh, Alexander went round to see the wounded; he gathered together the dead and gave them a splendid military funeral, the whole army marshalled in their finest battle array. His speech contained citations of all whom he knew, from his own eyes or from the agreed report of others, to have distinguished themselves in the battle; he honoured each of them by a donation suitable to their worth. He appointed 2 as satrap of Cilicia Balacrus son of Nicanor,<sup>1</sup> one of the royal bodyguards; and selected Menes son of Dionysius to take his place among the bodyguards; and in place of Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus, who had

<sup>9</sup> QC. 13, with much detail, giving 2600 Talents in coins and 500 lbs of silver. Parmenio was sent over 200 miles ahead of the main army.

<sup>10</sup> The Attic month corresponding to Nov./Dec. 333 B.C., but Beloch, III 2, 304 ff. gives reasons for thinking that A. has sometimes falsely converted Macedonian months in his sources into Attic, and that Issus was fought in October; the Persian fleet was still at sea (13, 5) a little later. QC. 8, 8 makes winter imminent.

<sup>1</sup> D. xviii 22, 1.

τοῦ ἀποθανόντος ἐν τῇ μάχῃ Πολυπέρχοντα τὸν Συμμίου ἄρχην ἀπέδειξε τῆς ἐκείνου τάξεως. καὶ Σολεῦσι τὰ τε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα, ἃ ἔτι ἐνδεᾶ ἦν ἐκ τῶν ἐπιβληθέντων σφίσι χρημάτων, ἀνήκεν καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους ἀπέδωκεν.

- 3 Ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τῆς μητρὸς τῆς Δαρείου οὐδὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ἢ τῶν παιδῶν ἠμέλησεν. ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν τινες τῶν τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου γραψάντων τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτῆς, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως τῆς Δαρείου ἐπανῆκεν, ἐς τὴν σκηνὴν παρελθόντα αὐτὸν τὴν Δαρείου, ἣτις αὐτῷ ἐξηρημένη ἦν, ἀκοῦσαι γυναικῶν οἰμωγὴν καὶ ἄλλον τοιοῦτον θόρυβον οὐ πόρρω τῆς σκηνῆς·
- 4 πυθέσθαι οὖν αἵτινες γυναῖκες καὶ ἀνθ' ὅτου οὕτως ἐγγὺς παρασκηνοῦσι· καὶ τινα ἐξαγγεῖλαι, ὅτι· ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἢ μήτηρ τε καὶ ἢ γυνὴ Δαρείου καὶ οἱ παῖδες, ὡς ἐξηγγέλη αὐταῖς ὅτι τὸ τόξον τε τοῦ Δαρείου ἔχεις καὶ τὸν κἀνδυν τὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ ἢ ἄσπις ὅτι κεκόμισται ὀπίσω ἢ Δαρείου, ὡς ἐπὶ
- 5 τεθνεῶτι Δαρείῳ ἀνοιμώζουσιν. ταῦτα ἀκούσαντα Ἀλέξανδρον πέμψαι πρὸς αὐτὰς Λεοννάτον, ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων, ἐντειλάμενον φράσαι ὅτι ζῆ Δαρείος, τὰ δὲ ὄπλα καὶ τὸν κἀνδυν ὅτι φεύγων ἀπέλιπεν ἐπὶ τῷ ἄρματι καὶ ταῦτα ὅτι μόνον ἔχει Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ Λεοννάτον παρελθόντα ἐς τὴν σκηνὴν τὰ τε περὶ Δαρείου εἰπεῖν καὶ ὅτι τὴν θεραπείαν αὐταῖς ξυγχωρεῖ Ἀλέξανδρος τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον καὶ καλεῖσθαι βασιλίσσας, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ κατὰ ἔχθραν οἱ γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς Δαρείον, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς Ἀσίας διαπεπολεμησθαι
- 6 ἐννόμως. ταῦτα μὲν Πτολεμαῖος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος λέγουσι· λόγος δὲ ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ ὑστεραία ἐλθεῖν εἴσω ξὺν Ἡφαιστίωνι

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B.C.

fallen in the battle, he appointed Polyperchon son of Simmias commander of his battalion. To the citizens of Soli he remitted the fifty Talents still due from the fine he had imposed on them, and restored their hostages.

Nor did he neglect Darius' mother, wife, or 3  
children. Now, some of the accounts of Alexander relate that the very night after his return from the pursuit of Darius he entered Darius' tent, which had been put aside for his own use, and heard a lament and other confused sounds of women's voices near the tent; he enquired what women they were 4  
and why they were accommodated so near him; and was told, 'Sire, it is Darius' mother, wife and children; as they have heard that you are in possession of his bow and royal mantle and that his shield has been brought back, they are mourning his death.' On 5  
hearing this, Alexander sent Leonnatus, one of the Companions, to them with instructions to tell them that Darius was alive and had left his arms and mantle in the chariot while escaping, and that these were all Alexander had. Leonnatus entered the tent and gave Alexander's message about Darius, adding that Alexander granted them the right of royal state and all other marks of royalty, with the title of queens, since he had not made war with Darius from personal enmity but had fought for the sovereignty of Asia lawfully. This is the 6  
account of Ptolemaeus and Aristobulus; there is, however, a story<sup>2</sup> that next day Alexander himself

<sup>2</sup> 'Vulgate'. Cf. D. 37, 3-38, 3; QC. 11, 24-6; 12, 1-26; P. 21.



μόνω τῶν ἐταίρων· καὶ τὴν μητέρα τὴν Δαρείου ἀμφιγνοήσασαν ὅστις ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶη αὐτοῖν, ἐστάλθαι γὰρ ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ κόσμῳ, τὴν δὲ Ἑφαιστίωνι προσελθεῖν καὶ προσκυνῆσαι, ὅτι  
 7 μείζων ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος. ὡς δὲ ὁ Ἑφαιστίων τε ὀπίσω ὑπεχώρησε καὶ τις τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτήν, τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον δείξας, ἐκεῖνον ἔφη εἶναι Ἀλέξανδρον, τὴν μὲν καταιδεσθεῖσαν τῇ διαμαρτία ὑποχωρεῖν, Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ οὐ φάναι αὐτὴν ἀμαρτεῖν· καὶ γὰρ  
 8 ἐκεῖνον εἶναι Ἀλέξανδρον. καὶ ταῦτα ἐγὼ οὐθ' ὡς ἀληθῆ οὔτε ὡς πάντα ἄπιστα ἀνέγραψα. ἀλλ' εἶτε οὕτως ἐπράχθη, ἐπαινῶ Ἀλέξανδρον τῆς τε ἐς τὰς γυναῖκας κατοικτίσεως καὶ τῆς ἐς τὸν ἐταῖρον πίστεως καὶ τιμῆς· εἶτε πιθανὸς δοκεῖ τοῖς συγγράψασιν Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ἂν πράξας καὶ εἰπὼν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐπαινῶ Ἀλέξανδρον.

13. Δαρεῖος δὲ τὴν μὲν νύκτα ξὺν ὀλίγοις τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἔφυγε, τῇ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναλαμβάνων αἰετῶν τε Περσῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας ἐκ τῆς μάχης καὶ τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἐς τετρακισχιλίους ἔχων τοὺς πάντας, ὡς ἐπὶ Θάψακόν τε πόλιν καὶ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν σπουδῇ ἤλαυνεν, ὡς τάχιστα μέσον αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸν  
 2 Εὐφράτην ποιῆσαι. Ἀμύντας δὲ ὁ Ἀντιόχου καὶ Θυμώνδας ὁ Μέντορος καὶ Ἀριστομήδης ὁ Φεραῖος καὶ Βιάνωρ ὁ Ἀκαρνάν, συμπαῖντες οὗτοι αὐτόμολοι, μετὰ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτοὺς στρατιωτῶν ὡς ὀκτακισχιλίων εὐθὺς ὡς τεταγμένοι ἦσαν κατὰ τὰ ὄρη φεύγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς Τρίπολιν τῆς Φοινίκης·

<sup>3</sup> A's reflections may be compared with those of D., QC. and P. (cited above); P. praises him for not enjoying any of the

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B.C.

visited the tent with Hephaestion and no other Companion; and Darius' mother, not knowing which of the two was the king, as both were dressed alike, approached Hephaestion and did him obeisance, since he appeared the taller. Hephaestion drew back, and one of her attendants pointed to Alexander and said he was the king; she drew back in confusion at her mistake, but Alexander remarked that she had made no mistake, for Hephaestion was also an Alexander. I have written this down without asserting its truth or total incredibility. If it really happened, I approve of Alexander's compassion for the women and of the trust and honour bestowed on his companion. If the historians of Alexander think it plausible that he would have acted and spoken in this way, I approve of Alexander on that ground too.<sup>3</sup>

13. Darius fled through the night with a handful of his suite, but in the daylight he kept picking up Persians who had got off safe from the battle and also some of the foreign mercenaries; and with a body of about 4,000 in all he rode at full speed for the city of Thapsacus and the river Euphrates, meaning to put the river between Alexander and himself as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup> Amyntas son of Antiochus, Thymondas son of Mentor, Aristomedes of Pherae and Bianor the Acarnanian, all deserters to Darius, with their troops to the number of 8,000, fled straight to the hills at once in the order in which they had been drawn

women, except Barsine, daughter of Artabazus (iii 21, 4 n.): Ar. attested Al's liaison with her, and a son, Heracles, claimed the Macedonian throne in 309; Tarn ii 330 ff. rejects the story, but see my article in *Rivista di filologia classica* 1975, 22 ff. Cf. also iv 19, 6-20, 3.

<sup>1</sup> QC. iv 1, 1-3 (4,000 'Greeks', i.e. mercenaries).

## ARRIAN

- 3 καὶ ἐνταῦθα καταλαβόντες τὰς ναῦς νενεωλκημένας ἐφ' ὧν πρόσθεν ἐκ Λέσβου διακεκομισμένοι ἦσαν, τούτων ὅσαι μὲν ἱκαναί σφισιν ἐς τὴν κομιδὴν ἐδόκουν, ταύτας καθελκύσαντες, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις κατακαύσαντες, ὡς μὴ παρασχεῖν ταχεῖαν σφῶν τὴν δίωξιν, ἐπὶ Κύπρου ἔφευγον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον, ἵναπερ ὀλίγον ὕστερον πολυπραγμονῶν τι Ἀμύντας ἀποθνήσκει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωρίων.
- 4 Φαρνάβαζος δὲ καὶ Αὐτοφραδάτης τέως μὲν περὶ τὴν Χίον διέτριβον· καταστήσαντες δὲ φρουρὰν τῆς Χίου τὰς μὲν τινὰς τῶν νεῶν ἐς Κῶν καὶ Ἀλικαρνασσὸν ἔστειλαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἑκατὸν ναυσὶ ταῖς ἄριστα πλεούσαις ἀναγ(αγ)όμενοι ἐς Σίφνον κατέσχον. καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀφικνεῖται Ἄγισ ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ μιᾶς τριήρους, χρήματά τε αἰτήσων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ δύναμιν ναυτικὴν τε καὶ πεζικὴν ὅσην πλείστην ἀξιῶσων
- 5 συμπέμψαι οἱ ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀγγελία αὐτοῖς ἔρχεται τῆς μάχης τῆς πρὸς Ἴσσω γενομένης. ἐκπλαγέντες δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐξαγγελθέντα Φαρνάβαζος μὲν σὺν δώδεκα τριήρεσι καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων ξένων ξὺν χιλίοις καὶ πεντακοσίοις ἐπὶ Χίου ἐστάλη, δείσας μή τι πρὸς τὴν
- 6 ἀγγελίαν τῆς ἥττης οἱ Χῖοι νεωτερίσωσιν. Ἄγισ δὲ παρ' Αὐτοφραδάτου τάλαντα ἀργυρίου λαβὼν τριάκοντα καὶ τριήρεις δέκα, ταύτας μὲν Ἴππίαν ἄξοντα ἀποστέλλει παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπὶ Ταίναρον· καὶ παραγγέλλειν ἐκέλευσεν Ἀγησιλάῳ, διδόντα τοῖς ναύταις ἐντελῆ τὸν μισθὸν πλεῖν τὴν ταχίστην ἐπὶ Κρήτης, ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ καταστησόμενον. αὐτὸς δὲ τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 13. 3-6

up, and reached Tripolis in Phoenicia. There they seized the ships that had been hauled ashore and had previously brought them from Lesbos, launched as many of them as they thought enough for their transport, burnt the rest there in the dockyards, to prevent speedy pursuit of them, and fled to Cyprus and thence to Egypt, where a little later Amyntas, stirring up some trouble or other, was killed by the natives.<sup>2</sup>

3 333  
B.C.

Meanwhile Pharnabazus and Autophradates had been waiting at Chios; after installing a garrison at Chios, they sent part of their fleet to Cos and Halicarnassus, while they themselves put to sea with the hundred best-sailing ships and arrived at Siphnus. They were met by Agis king of Sparta with a single trireme; he came to ask them to give him funds for the war and to send as many ships and men as possible to him in the Peloponnese. Just at this moment came the news of the battle of Issus. Utterly dumbfounded at the news, Pharnabazus with twelve triremes and fifteen hundred of the foreign mercenaries made for Chios, fearing that the Chians would rebel on the news of the defeat. Agis got thirty silver Talents from Autophradates and ten triremes and despatched Hippias to take them to his brother Agesilaus at Taenarum. He ordered him to tell Agesilaus to pay the crews in full and sail as quickly as possible to Crete, to settle things there. He himself remained for the present there at Siphnos

4

5

6

\* D. 48, 1-3; QC. iv 1, 27-33; App. VI 2.

## ARRIAN

ταῖς νήσοις ὑπέμενεν, ὕστερον δὲ εἰς Ἀλικαρνασσὸν παρ' Αὐτοφραδάτην ἀφίκετο.

- 7 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ σατράπην μὲν Συρία τῇ κοιλῇ Μένωνα τὸν Κερδίμμα ἐπέταξε δούς αὐτῷ εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας τοὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἰππέας, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Φοινίκης ἦει. καὶ ἀπαντὰ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν Στράτων ὁ Γηροστράτου παῖς τοῦ Ἀραδίων τε καὶ τῶν Ἀράδω προσοίκων βασιλέως· ὁ δὲ Γηρόστρατος αὐτὸς μετ' Αὐτοφραδάτου ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἳ τε τῶν Φοινίκων καὶ οἱ τῶν Κυπρίων βασιλεῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ Αὐτοφραδάτη
- 8 ξυνέπλεον. Στράτων δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐντυχὼν στεφανοῖ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν τε Ἀραδον αὐτῷ τὴν νῆσον καὶ τὴν Μάραθον τὴν καταντικρὺ τῆς Ἀράδου ἐν τῇ ἠπειρῷ ὠκισμένην, πόλιν μεγάλην καὶ εὐδαίμονα, καὶ Σιγῶνα καὶ Μαριάμμη πόλιν καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα τῆς σφῶν ἐπικρατείας ἐνδίδωσιν.

14. Ἐτι δὲ ἐν Μαράθῳ Ἀλεξάνδρου ὄντος ἀφίκοντο παρὰ Δαρείου πρέσβεις, ἐπιστολὴν τε κομίζοντες Δαρείου καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης δεησόμενοι ἀφεῖναι Δαρείῳ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν
- 2 γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας. ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστολή, ὅτι Φιλίππῳ τε πρὸς Ἀρτοξέρξην φιλία καὶ ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο καὶ, ἐπειδὴ Ἀρσῆς ὁ υἱὸς Ἀρτοξέρξου ἐβασίλευσεν, ὅτι Φίλιππος ἀδικίας πρῶτος ἐς βασιλέα Ἀρσῆν ἤρξεν οὐδὲν ἄχαρι ἐκ Περσῶν παθῶν. ἐξ οὗ δὲ αὐτὸς βασιλεύει Περσῶν,

<sup>3</sup> App. II and VI.

<sup>4</sup> A. presumably so describes north Syria, as distinct from the Phoenician coast and Palestine, which were parts of 'Syria', cf. A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 1975 and iii 6, 8 n.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 13. 6-14. 2

among the islands, but later joined Autophradates at Halicarnassus.<sup>3</sup>

333  
B.C.

Alexander appointed Menon son of Cerdimmas as satrap of 'hollow' Syria,<sup>4</sup> giving him the allied cavalry to protect the country, while he himself proceeded towards Phoenicia. On his way he was met by Straton son of Gerostratus, king of the Aradians and people near Aradus; Gerostratus himself was sailing with Autophradates, like the rest of the Phoenician and Cypriot kings. On meeting Alexander, Straton crowned him with a golden crown and surrendered to him the island of Aradus and Marathus which lay opposite it on the mainland, a large and prosperous city, with Sigon and the city of Mariamme and all the other places under his control.

7 332  
B.C.

8

14. While Alexander was still at Marathus, envoys reached him from Darius, bringing a letter from him;<sup>1</sup> they were themselves to plead by word of mouth for the release to Darius of his mother, wife and children. The letter argued as follows: Philip had been in peace and alliance with Artaxerxes,<sup>2</sup> and when Arses son of Artaxerxes became king,<sup>3</sup> Philip first did wrong to King Arses, although he had sustained no injury from the Persians. From the

2

<sup>1</sup> Significant variants in D. 39; QC. iv 1, 7 ff.; J. xi 12. D. makes Al. substitute a fictitious letter from Darius and reply to it. G. T. Griffith, *Proceedings of Cambridge Philological Society* 1968, 33 ff. conjectures that A. used the fictitious letter. A. appears to be following his main sources, though the summary of Darius' letter and the 'text' of Al's will be in his own words (Introd. 15). Al's letter contains several allusions to 'facts' otherwise unattested; if they are really fictitious, they may be Al's own propaganda.

<sup>2</sup> Introd. n. 65.

<sup>3</sup> 338-336 B.C. Philip's invasion of Asia preceded Darius' accession, D. 5; Beloch, III<sup>2</sup> 2, 310.

## ARRIAN

οὔτε πέμψαι τινὰ Ἀλέξανδρον παρ' αὐτὸν ἐς  
 βεβαίωσιν τῆς πάλαι οὔσης φιλίας τε καὶ ξυμ-  
 μαχίας, διαβῆναί τε ξὺν στρατιᾷ ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ  
 3 πολλὰ κακὰ ἐργάσασθαι Πέρσας. τούτου ἔνεκα  
 καταβῆναι αὐτὸς τῇ χώρᾳ ἀμυνῶν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν  
 τὴν πατρώαν ἀνασώσων. τὴν μὲν δὴ μάχην ὡς  
 θεῶν τῷ ἔδοξεν οὕτω κριθῆναι, αὐτὸς δὲ βασιλεὺς  
 παρὰ βασιλέως γυναικὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰτεῖν καὶ  
 μητέρα καὶ παῖδας τοὺς ἀλόντας, καὶ φιλίαν  
 ἐθέλειν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ ξύμ-  
 μαχος εἶναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ· καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων πέμπειν  
 ἠξίου Ἀλέξανδρον παρ' αὐτὸν ξὺν Μενίσκῳ τε καὶ  
 Ἀρσίμα τοῖς ἀγγέλοις τοῖς ἐκ Περσῶν ἤκουσι τοὺς  
 τὰ πιστὰ ληψομένους τε καὶ ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 δώσοντας.

4 Πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιγράφει Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ξυμπέμ-  
 πει τοῖς παρὰ Δαρείου ἔλθοῦσι Θέρσιππον, παραγ-  
 γείλας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν δοῦναι Δαρείῳ, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ  
 διαλέγεσθαι ὑπὲρ μηδενός. ἡ δὲ ἐπιστολὴ ἢ  
 Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔχει ὡδε· Οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι  
 ἐλθόντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα  
 κακῶς ἐποίησαν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν προηδικημένοι· ἐγὼ  
 δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμῶν κατασταθεὶς καὶ τιμω-  
 ρήσασθαι βουλόμενος Πέρσας διέβην ἐς τὴν  
 5 Ἀσίαν, ὑπαρξάντων ὑμῶν. καὶ γὰρ Περινθίοις  
 ἐβοηθήσατε, οἱ τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα ἠδίκουν, καὶ εἰς  
 Θράκην, ἧς ἡμεῖς ἤρχομεν, δύναμιν ἔπεμψεν  
 Ὀχρος. τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ τῶν  
 ἐπιβουλευσάντων, οὓς ὑμεῖς συνετάξατε, ὡς αὐτοὶ  
 ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς ἅπαντας ἐκομπάσατε, καὶ  
 Ἀρσῆν ἀποκτείναντός σου μετὰ Βαγώου, καὶ τὴν  
 ἀρχὴν κατασχόντος οὐ δικαίως οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 14. 2-5

time Darius had been King of Persia, Alexander had sent no envoy to him to confirm the ancient friendship and alliance, but had crossed with an army into Asia and had done great harm to the Persians. That was why Darius had come down to defend his country and to rescue his ancestral dominion. The battle had been decided as some god had willed; but as a king he begged a king to restore his captive mother, wife and children; and he was ready to make friendship and an alliance with Alexander, and for these arrangements he thought it fitting that Alexander should send to him along with Meniscus and Arsimes (the envoys who had come from Persia) persons appointed to exchange pledges. 3

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Alexander wrote a reply and sent Thersippus along with Darius' envoys with instructions to deliver the letter, but not to discuss anything with Darius. This is how Alexander's letter runs: 'Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece and did us great harm, though we had done them no prior injury; I have been appointed *hegemon* of the Greeks, and invaded Asia in the desire to take vengeance on Persia for *your* aggressions. For you assisted Perinthus, which wronged my father, and Ochus sent a force into Thrace, which was under our rule.<sup>4</sup> My father was murdered by conspirators, whom you Persians organized, as you yourselves boasted in your letters to all the world;<sup>5</sup> you assassinated Arses with the help of Bagoas, and seized the throne unjustly and in actual contra- 4 5

[480-  
479 B.C.]

<sup>4</sup> Introd. n. 65. Nothing is known of an invasion of Thrace.

<sup>5</sup> Introd. 46.

Περσῶν νόμον, ἀλλὰ ἀδικοῦντος Πέρσας, καὶ ὑπὲρ  
 ἐμοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας γράμματα οὐκ ἐπιτήδεια  
 6 διαπέμποντος, ὅπως πρὸς με πολεμῶσι, καὶ  
 χρήματα ἀποστέλλοντος πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ  
 ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων  
 πόλεων οὐδεμιᾶς δεχομένης, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ  
 λαβόντων, καὶ τῶν παρὰ σοῦ πεμφθέντων τοὺς  
 ἐμοὺς φίλους διαφθειράντων καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην, ἣν  
 τοῖς Ἑλλησι κατεσκεύασα, διαλύειν ἐπιχειρούντων,  
 ἐστράτευσα ἐπὶ σέ ὑπάρξαντος σοῦ τῆς ἔχθρας.  
 7 ἐπεὶ δὲ μάχη νενίκηκα πρότερον μὲν τοὺς σοὺς  
 στρατηγοὺς καὶ σατράπας, νῦν δὲ σέ καὶ τὴν μετὰ  
 σοῦ δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν χώραν ἔχω τῶν θεῶν μοι  
 δόντων, ὅσοι τῶν μετὰ σοῦ παραταξαμένων μὴ ἐν  
 τῇ μάχῃ ἀπέθανον, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἐμὲ κατέφυγον,  
 τούτων ἐπιμέλομαι καὶ οὐκ ἄκοντες παρ' ἐμοί  
 εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ ἐκόντες ξυστρατεύονται μετ'  
 8 ἐμοῦ. ὡς οὖν ἐμοῦ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀπάσης κυρίου  
 ὄντος ἦκε πρὸς ἐμέ. εἰ δὲ φοβῆ μὴ ἐλθὼν πάθῃς  
 τι ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι, πέμπε τινὰς τῶν φίλων τὰ πιστὰ  
 ληψομένους. ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸς με τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν  
 γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ εἰ ἄλλο τι θέλεις αἴτει  
 καὶ λάμβανε. ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν πείθῃς ἐμὲ ἔσται σοι.  
 9 καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ ὅταν πέμπῃς παρ' ἐμέ, ὡς πρὸς  
 βασιλέα τῆς Ἀσίας πέμπε, μηδὲ [ἀ] ἐξ ἴσου  
 ἐπίστελλε, ἀλλ' ὡς κυρίῳ ὄντι πάντων τῶν σῶν  
 φράζε εἰ τοῦ δέῃ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγὼ βουλευσομαι περὶ  
 σοῦ ὡς ἀδικοῦντος. εἰ δ' ἀντιλέγεις περὶ τῆς  
 βασιλείας, ὑπομείνας ἔτι ἀγώνισαι περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ  
 μὴ φεῦγε, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐπὶ σέ πορεύομαι οὐ ἂν ἦς.

15. Πρὸς μὲν Δαρεῖον ταῦτ' ἐπέστειλεν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔμαθεν τὰ τε χρήματα ὅσα σὺν Κωφῆνι τῷ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 14. 5-15. 1

vention of Persian law, doing wrong to Persians; you sent unfriendly letters to the Greeks about me, urging them to make war on me. You despatched sums of money to the Lacedaemonians and certain other Greeks, which no other city accepted but the Lacedaemonians. Your envoys destroyed my friends and sought to destroy the peace I had established in Greece.<sup>6</sup> Although I marched against you, it was you that started the quarrel. As I have conquered in battle first your generals and satraps, and now yourself and your own force, and am in possession of the country by the gift of heaven, I hold myself responsible for all of your troops who did not die in the field but took refuge with me; they are with me of their own free will, and voluntarily serve in my army. You must then regard me as Lord of all Asia and come to me. If you fear that by coming you may receive some harm at my hands, send some of your friends to receive pledges. Ask for your mother, wife and children and what you will, when you have come, and you will receive them. You shall have whatever you persuade me to give. And in future when you send to me, make your addresses to the king of Asia,<sup>7</sup> and do not correspond as an equal, but tell me, as lord of all your possessions, what you need; otherwise I shall make plans to deal with you as a wrongdoer. But if you claim the kingship, stand your ground and fight for it and do not flee, as I shall pursue you wherever you are.'

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15. This was Alexander's letter to Darius.<sup>1</sup> When he learned that the moneys Darius had sent with

<sup>6</sup> Persian attempts to foster Greek resistance to Macedon all seem to be later than Philip's invasion!

<sup>7</sup> QC. iv 1, 7 and 13 f. with different details.

<sup>1</sup> All this is apparently from A's main source.

- Ἄρταβάζου ἀποπεπόμφει εἰς Δαμασκὸν Δαρεῖος ὅτι ἐάλωκε, καὶ ὅσοι Περσῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὰ ἐγκατελείφθησαν ξὺν τῇ ἄλλῃ βασιλικῇ κατασκευῇ ὅτι καὶ οὗτοι ἐάλωσαν, ταῦτα μὲν ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς
- 2 Δαμασκὸν Παρμενίωνα φυλάσσειν ἐκέλευε. τοὺς δὲ πρέσβεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ πρὸς Δαρεῖον πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀφυγμένοι ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτους ἐάλωκέναι ἔμαθεν, παρ' αὐτὸν πέμπειν ἐκέλευεν. ἦσαν δὲ Εὐθυκλῆς μὲν Σπαρτιάτης, Θεσσαλίσκος δὲ Ἴσμηνίου καὶ Διονυσόδωρος Ὀλυμπιονίκης Θηβαῖοι, Ἰφικράτης δὲ ὁ Ἰφικράτους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
- 3 Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ οὗτοι ὡς ἤκον παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, Θεσσαλίσκον μὲν καὶ Διονυσόδωρον καίπερ Θηβαίους ὄντας εὐθὺς ἀφῆκεν, τὸ μὲν τι κατοικτίσει τῶν Θηβῶν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι συγγνωστὰ δεδρακέναι ἐφαίνοντο, ἠνδραποδισμένης ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων τῆς πατρίδος σφίσιν τε ἦντινα ἠδύναντο ὠφέλειαν εὐρισκόμενοι καὶ εἰ δὴ τινα καὶ τῇ πατρίδι ἐκ
- 4 Περσῶν καὶ Δαρείου· ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιεικῇ ἐνθυμηθεῖς, ἰδία δὲ Θεσσαλίσκου μὲν αἰδοῖ τοῦ γένους ἀφιέναι εἶπεν, ὅτι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν Θηβαίων ἦν, Διονυσόδωρον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ τῶν Ὀλυμπίων. Ἰφικράτην δὲ φιλία τε τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως καὶ μνήμη τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς ζῶντά τε ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἔχων ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἐτίμησε καὶ νόσω τελευτήσαντος τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τοῖς πρὸς
- 5 γένους ἀπέπεμφεν. Εὐθυκλέα δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιον τε ὄντα, πόλεως περιφανῶς ἐχθρᾶς ἐν τῷ τότε, καὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἰδία εὐρισκόμενον ἐς ξυγγνώμην ὅ τι καὶ λόγου ἄξιον, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ εἶχεν, ὕστερον δέ, ὡς ἐπὶ μέγα εὐτύχει, καὶ τοῦτον ἀφῆκεν.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 15. 1-5

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B.C.

Cophen son of Artabazus to Damascus had been seized, and that all the Persians left to guard them had also been seized with the rest of the royal equipage, he ordered Parmenio to take the spoils back to Damascus and guard them there. As for the Greek envoys who had reached Darius before the battle, when he learned that they too had been captured, he ordered them to be sent to him. They were Euthycles the Spartiate, Thessaliscus son of Ismenias and Dionysodorus, an Olympian victor, from Thebes, and Iphicrates son of Iphicrates the general from Athens.<sup>2</sup> When they reached Alexander, he at once dismissed Thessaliscus and Dionysodorus, Thebans as they were, partly from compassion for Thebes and partly because he thought that they had acted pardonably, since their country had been enslaved by Macedonians and they were looking for any conceivable help they could get for themselves and for their country too from Darius and Persia; he took a kindly view of the doings of both, but privately he said that he was releasing Thessaliscus from regard for his family, since he was one of the Theban nobles, and Dionysodorus because of his victory at Olympia. From friendship for Athens and remembrance of his father's fame, he kept Iphicrates in attendance and paid him special honour; when he died, he sent back his bones to his relatives at Athens. Euthycles, however, as a Lacedaemonian, from a city conspicuously hostile to him at the moment, and as a person unable to produce any reasonable claim to individual pardon, was at first kept under guard, though not in bonds; but later, when successes crowded in on Alexander, he too was released.

<sup>2</sup> Apart from Iphicrates, QC. iii 13, 15 gives different names.

- 6 Ἐκ Μαράθου δὲ ὄρμηθεις Βύβλον τε λαμβάνει  
 ὁμολογία ἐνδοθεῖσαν καὶ Σιδῶνα αὐτῶν Σιδωνίων  
 ἐπικαλεσαμένων κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Περσῶν καὶ  
 Δαρείου. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ προὔχῳρει ὡς ἐπὶ Τύρον·  
 καὶ ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν πρέσβεις  
 Τυρίων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐσταλμένοι ὡς ἐγνωκότων  
 Τυρίων πράσσειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 7 ὁ δὲ τὴν τε πόλιν ἐπαιέσας καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις (καὶ  
 γὰρ ἦσαν τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἐν Τύρῳ οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ  
 τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν Τυρίων παῖς. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ  
 βασιλεὺς Ἀζέμιλκος μετ' Αὐτοφραδάτου ἔπλει)  
 ἐκέλευσεν ἐπανελθόντας φράσαι Τυρίοις, ὅτι ἐθέλοι  
 παρελθὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν θῦσαι τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ.

16. Ἔστι γὰρ ἐν Τύρῳ ἱερόν Ἡρακλέους παλαιό-  
 τατον ὧν μνήμη ἀνθρωπίνη διασώζεται, οὐ τοῦ  
 Ἀργείου Ἡρακλέους τοῦ Ἀλκμήνης· πολλαῖς γὰρ  
 γενεαῖς πρότερον τιμᾶται ἐν Τύρῳ Ἡρακλῆς ἢ  
 Κάδμον ἐκ Φοινίκης ὄρμηθέντα Θήβας κατασχεῖν  
 καὶ τὴν παῖδα Κάδμω τὴν Σεμέλην γενέσθαι, ἐξ ἧς
- 2 καὶ ὁ τοῦ Διὸς Διόνυσος γίγνεται. Διόνυσος μὲν  
 δὴ τρίτος ἂν ἀπὸ Κάδμου εἴη, κατὰ Λάβδακον τὸν  
 Πολυδώρου τοῦ Κάδμου παῖδα, Ἡρακλῆς δὲ ὁ  
 Ἀργεῖος κατ' Οἰδίποδα μάλιστα τὸν Λαῖου.  
 σέβουσι δὲ καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἄλλον Ἡρακλέα, οὐχ
- 3 ὄνπερ Τύριοι ἢ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλὰ λέγει Ἡρόδοτος,  
 ὅτι τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν Ἡρακλέα ἄγουσιν Αἰγύπτιοι,  
 καθάπερ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Διόνυσον τὸν Διὸς καὶ  
 Κόρης σέβουσιν, ἄλλον τοῦτον Διόνυσον· καὶ ὁ  
 Ἰακχος ὁ μυστικὸς τούτῳ τῷ Διονύσῳ, οὐχὶ τῷ
- 4 Θηβαίῳ, ἐπάδεται. ὡς τὸν γε ἐν Ταρτησσῷ πρὸς

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 15. 6-16. 4

Alexander marched from Marathus and received the surrender of Byblus and Sidon; the Sidonians who loathed Persia and Darius called him in themselves.<sup>3</sup> Thence he proceeded towards Tyre, and on the way Tyrian envoys met him, sent by the community to say that Tyre had decided to accept Alexander's orders. He commended both the city and its envoys—for they were Tyrian nobles and included the son of their king, Azemilcus, who was himself at sea with Autophradates' fleet—and told them to return and inform the Tyrians that he proposed to visit Tyre and sacrifice to Heracles.<sup>4</sup>

16. At Tyre there is the most ancient temple of Heracles of which there is any human recollection, not the Argive Heracles, son of Alcmene, for a Heracles was honoured at Tyre many generations before Cadmus sailed from Phoenicia, occupied Thebes, and had a daughter Semele, mother of Dionysus son of Zeus. For Dionysus would appear to be in the third generation from Cadmus, along with Labdacus son of Polydorus, son of Cadmus; while the Argive Heracles was probably a contemporary of Oedipus son of Laius. The Egyptians too worship another Heracles, different from the Heracles of Tyre and the Heracles of Greece; Herodotus<sup>1</sup> says that the Egyptians reckon him one of the Twelve Deities, just as the Athenians worship a different Dionysus, son of Zeus and Kore. It is to him, not the Theban Dionysus, that the mystic chant 'Iacchus' is sung.<sup>2</sup> I think that the Heracles honoured by the

<sup>3</sup> QC. iv 1, 15. Sidon had suffered much in 344/3 B.C. for revolting from Persia. Cf. 24, 5 n.

<sup>4</sup> D. 40, 2; QC. iv 2, 1-5, also for ch. 16, 7 ff.

<sup>1</sup> ii 43, § 1-6 are clearly A's own digression, cf. App. IV, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Oxf. Class. Dict.* s.v. Iacchus.



## ARRIAN

Ἰβήρων τιμώμενον Ἡρακλέα, ἵνα καὶ στηλαί τινες  
 Ἡρακλέους ὠνομασμένοι εἰσὶ, δοκῶ ἐγὼ τὸν  
 Τύριον εἶναι Ἡρακλέα, ὅτι Φοινίκων κτίσμα ἢ  
 Ταρτησσὸς καὶ τῷ Φοινίκων νόμῳ ὃ τε νεὸς  
 πεποιήται τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ ἐκεῖ καὶ αἱ θυσίαι  
 5 θύονται. Γηρυόνην δέ, ἐφ' ὄντινα ὁ Ἀργεῖος  
 Ἡρακλῆς ἐστάλη πρὸς Εὐρυσθέως τὰς βοῦς  
 ἀπελάσαι τὰς Γηρυόνου καὶ ἀγαγεῖν ἐς Μυκήνας,  
 οὐδέν τι προσήκειν τῇ γῆ τῇ Ἰβήρων Ἐκαταῖος ὁ  
 λογοποιὸς λέγει, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ νῆσόν τινα Ἐρύθειαν  
 <τῆς> ἔξω τῆς μεγάλης θαλάσσης σταλῆναι  
 Ἡρακλέα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἠπείρου τῆς περὶ Ἀμπρακίαν  
 τε καὶ Ἀμφιλόχους βασιλέα γενέσθαι Γηρυόνην  
 καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου ταύτης ἀπελάσαι Ἡρακλέα τὰς  
 6 βοῦς, οὐδὲ τοῦτον φαῦλον ἄθλον τιθέμενον. οἶδα  
 δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἔτι εὐβοτον τὴν ἠπειρον  
 ταύτην καὶ βοῦς τρέφουσιν καλλίστας· καὶ ἐς  
 Εὐρυσθέα τῶν μὲν ἐξ Ἠπείρου βοῶν κλέος  
 ἀφίχθαι καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως τῆς Ἠπείρου τὸ ὄνομα  
 τὸν Γηρυόνην οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος τίθεμαι· τῶν δὲ  
 ἐσχάτων τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰβήρων οὔτ' ἂν τοῦ βασι-  
 λέως τὸ ὄνομα γινώσκειν Εὐρυσθέα, οὔτε εἰ βοῦς  
 καλαὶ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ταύτῃ νέμονται, εἰ μὴ τις τὴν  
 Ἡραν τούτοις ἐπάγων, ὡς αὐτὴν ταῦτα Ἡρακλεῖ  
 δι' Εὐρυσθέως ἐπαγγέλλουσαν, τὸ οὐ πιστὸν τοῦ  
 λόγου ἀποκρύπτειν ἐθέλοι τῷ μύθῳ.  
 7 Τούτῳ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ ἔφη ἐθέλειν  
 θῆσαι Ἀλέξανδρος. ὡς δὲ ἀπηγγέλθη ταῦτα πρὸς  
 τῶν πρέσβων εἰς τὴν Τύρον, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔδοξέ  
 σφισι ποιεῖν ὅ τι περ ἐπαγγέλλοι Ἀλέξανδρος, ἐς

<sup>3</sup> This Iberian kingdom in south Spain was often confused

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 16. 4-7

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B.C.

Iberians at Tartessus, where certain Pillars have also been named after him, is the Tyrian Heracles, since Tartessus is a Phoenician foundation<sup>3</sup> and it is in the Phoenician style that the temple of Heracles there has been built and that the sacrifices are offered. Moreover, Geryones against whom the Argive Heracles was sent by Eurystheus, to drive off his oxen and bring them to Mycenae, has no connection with Iberia according to Hecataeus the historian<sup>4</sup>; nor in his view was Heracles sent to an island, Erytheia, beyond the Great Sea, but Geryones was king of the mainland in the region of Ambracia and the Amphilochoi, and it was from this mainland here that Heracles drove off the oxen; and that was in itself no mean prize-task that he set himself either. What I do know<sup>5</sup> is that this part of the mainland is capital pasture to this very day and rears excellent oxen; and I reckon it quite likely that the fame of these mainland oxen reached Eurystheus together with the name of the king of the mainland, Geryones; but I feel sure that Eurystheus would not have known the name of the king of the Iberians, right at the ends of Europe, nor whether there were fine cattle in those parts, unless anyone cares to bring in Hera and suppose that she passed on the news of them to Heracles through Eurystheus, and so to veil the unlikeliness of the tale with legend.<sup>6</sup>

It was to this Tyrian Heracles that Alexander said he wished to sacrifice. When this was announced at Tyre by the envoys, the Tyrians decided to obey in Roman times with the Phoenician colony of Gades (e.g. Sallust, *Histories* ii 5; Cicero, *de senectute* 69), which had a famous temple of Heracles (Melkarth).

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby no. 1, F. 26. H. flourished c. 500 B.C.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably from autopsy.

<sup>6</sup> A. does not question but rationalizes the old legends.

δὲ τὴν πόλιν μήτε τινὰ Περσῶν μήτε Μακεδόνων  
δέχεσθαι, ὡς τοῦτο ἔς τε τὰ παρόντα τῷ λόγῳ  
εὐπρεπέστατον καὶ ἔς τοῦ πολέμου τὴν κρίσιν,  
ἄδηλον ἔτι οὖσαν, ἀσφαλέστατόν σφισι γνωσόμενοι.  
8 ὡς δὲ ἐξηγγέλθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Τύρου,  
τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὄργην ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμψεν,  
αὐτὸς δὲ συναγαγὼν τοὺς τε ἑταίρους καὶ τοὺς  
ἡγεμόνας τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ ταξιάρχας καὶ ἰλάρχας  
ἔλεξεν ὧδε.

17. Ἄνδρες φίλοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἡμῖν οὔτε τὴν  
ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου πορείαν ἀσφαλῆ ὄρω θαλασσοκρα-  
τούντων Περσῶν, Δαρεῖόν τε διώκειν ὑπολειπο-  
μένους αὐτὴν τε ὀπίσω τὴν τῶν Τυρίων πόλιν  
ἀμφίβολον καὶ Αἴγυπτον καὶ Κύπρον ἐχομένας  
πρὸς Περσῶν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀσφαλές ἔς τε τὰ ἄλλα  
2 καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ἔς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ πράγματα, μή ποτε  
ἄρα ἐπικρατήσαντες αὐθις τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσση χωρίων  
οἱ Πέρσαι, προχωρησάντων ἡμῶν ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει  
ὡς ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον, αὐτοὶ ξὺν  
πλείονι στόλῳ μετ[αγ]άγοιεν τὸν πόλεμον ἔς τὴν  
Ἑλλάδα, Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως ἡμῖν  
πολεμούντων, τῆς δὲ Ἀθηναίων πόλεως φόβῳ  
μᾶλλον τι ἢ εὐνοίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν  
3 κατεχομένης. ἐξαιρεθείσης δὲ Τύρου ἢ τε Φοινίκη  
ἔχοιτο ἂν πᾶσα καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ὅπερ πλείστον τε  
καὶ κράτιστον τοῦ Περσικοῦ, τὸ Φοινίκων, παρ'  
ἡμᾶς μεταχωρήσειν εἰκός· οὐ γὰρ ἀνέξονται οὔτε  
οἱ ἐρέται οὔθ' οἱ ἐπιβάται Φοινίκες ἐχομένων  
σφίσι τῶν πόλεων αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων πλείοντες  
κινδυνεύειν· Κύπρος δὲ ἐπὶ τῷδε ἢ οὐ χαλεπῶς ἡμῖν  
προσχωρήσει ἢ ἐξ ἐπίπλου εὐμαρῶς ληφθήσεται.  
4 καὶ ταῖς τε ἐκ Μακεδονίας ναυσὶ καὶ ταῖς Φοινίσ-

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all Alexander's other commands, but not to admit any Persians or Macedonians within their city, as this decision would be the easiest to excuse in the existing circumstances, and safest for the future and for the issue of the war, which was still obscure. When Alexander received this answer, he angrily sent back the envoys, and assembling the Companions and the generals of the army, with the battalion and squadron commanders, made the following speech.<sup>7</sup>

17. ' My friends and allies, so long as Persia is supreme at sea I am aware that we cannot march in safety to Egypt. Nor, again, is it safe to pursue Darius, leaving in our rear the city of Tyre itself with its allegiance doubtful and Egypt and Cyprus still in Persia's hands, especially in view of the state of Greek affairs; the Persians might again secure control of the coastal places, when we have advanced in full force against Babylon and Darius, and with a larger expedition transfer the war into Greece, where the Lacedaemonians are openly at war with us, while Athens is kept in control for the present by fear rather than goodwill towards us. But with Tyre once destroyed, Phoenicia would all be in our hands, and the best and strongest part of the Persian navy, the Phoenician, would probably come over to us. For if their cities are in our hands neither rowers nor marines from Phoenicia will tolerate dangers at sea for the sake of others. After this Cyprus will either readily come over to our side or be captured easily by naval attack. Then if we keep the sea with

<sup>7</sup> The speech is apparently based on A's main source(s); no mention of Heracles but an explanation of A's strategy (cf. i 18, 9; 20, 1; 24, 3; Introd. 44).

## ARRIAN

σαις πλεόντων ἡμῶν τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ Κύπρου ἅμα προσγενομένης θαλασσοκρατοῦμέν τε ἂν βεβαίως καὶ ὁ ἐς Αἴγυπτον στόλος εὐμαρῶς ἡμῖν ἐν ταύτῳ γίγνεται. Αἴγυπτον δὲ παραστησαμένοις ὑπὲρ τε τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῆς οἰκείας οὐδὲν ἔτι ὑποπτον ὑπολείπεται, τὸν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον μετὰ τοῦ ἐς τὰ οἴκοι ἀσφαλοῦς καὶ ξὺν μείζονι ἅμα ἀξιώσει ποιησόμεθα ἀποτετμημένοι τὴν τε θάλασσαν Περσῶν ξύμπασαν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Εὐφράτου γῆν.

18. Ταῦτα λέγων οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔπειθεν ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ Τύρῳ· καί τι καὶ θεῖον ἀνέπειθεν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐνύπνιον αὐτῆς ἐκείνης τῆς νυκτὸς ἐδόκει αὐτὸς μὲν τῷ τείχει προσάγειν τῶν Τυρίων, τὸν δὲ Ἡρακλέα δεξιούσθαι τε αὐτόν καὶ ἀνάγειν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοῦτο ἐξηγεῖτο Ἀρίστανδρος ὡς ξὺν πόνῳ ἀλωσομένην τὴν Τύρον, ὅτι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἔργα ξὺν πόνῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ γὰρ καὶ μέγα ἔργον τῆς
- 2 Τύρου ἢ πολιορκία ἐφαίνετο. νῆσός τε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἢ πόλις ἦν καὶ τείχεσιν ὑψηλοῖς πάντῃ ὠχύρωτο· καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης πρὸς τῶν Τυρίων μᾶλλον τι ἐν τῷ τότε ἐφαίνετο, τῶν τε Περσῶν ἔτι θαλασσοκρατούντων καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Τυρίοις νεῶν ἔτι πολλῶν περιουσῶν.
- 3 Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα ὁμως ἐκράτησε, χῶμα ἐγνωχωννύναι ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἔστι δὲ πορθμὸς τεναγώδης τὸ χωρίον καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ τῆς θαλάσσης βραχέα καὶ πηλώδη αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, ἵνα τὸ βαθύτατον

<sup>1</sup> QC. iv 2, 17; P. 24, 3 put this later in the siege.

<sup>2</sup> It lasted 6 or 7 months, D. 46, 5; QC. iv 4, 9; P. 24, 3,

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our Macedonian ships, and the Phoenician, and with Cyprus ours as well, we should hold the sea-power securely, and our expedition to Egypt would be easy on the very same account. But once we have brought Egypt over, we shall have no cause of uneasiness for Greece and our own home, and we shall make the expedition to Babylon, with safety at home as well as enhanced prestige, with the whole sea and all the country this side of Euphrates cut off from Persia.'

18. With these words Alexander easily won over his staff to the attack on Tyre. In some degree an omen influenced him, for in a dream that very night he found himself approaching the wall of Tyre, and there was Heracles, stretching out his right hand, and conducting him into the city. Aristander interpreted this dream to mean that Tyre would be taken, but with an effort, for Heracles' achievements involved effort.<sup>1</sup> The fact is that the siege of Tyre was manifestly a large task.<sup>2</sup> The city was an island, and had been fortified all round with high walls; and at that time the advantage by sea apparently lay with Tyre, as the Persians were still supreme at sea and the Tyrians also still had many ships available.

But as Alexander's arguments, none the less, won the day, he decided to build a mole from the mainland to the city.<sup>3</sup> The place is one where people cross over shoal-water; it has shallows and patches of mud towards the mainland; next to the city itself where

c. Feb.-Aug. 332 B.C., cf. 24, 6 n. For its course cf. D. 40-46; QC. iv 2-4; P. 24 f. Al's artillery: Marsden (cf. i 20, 8 n.), esp. 61 f. 102 f. Plan: Fuller 209.

<sup>3</sup> Four stades, D. 40, 4; QC 2, 6.

τοῦ διάπλου, τριῶν μάλιστα ὀργυιῶν τὸ βάθος.  
 ἀλλὰ λίθων τε πολλῶν ἀφθονία ἦν καὶ ὕλης, ἥντινα  
 τοῖς λίθοις ἄνωθεν ἐπεφόρουν, χάρακές τε οὐ  
 χαλεπῶς κατεπήγνυντο ἐν τῷ πηλῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ  
 πηλὸς ξύνδεσμος τοῖς λίθοις ἐς τὸ ἐπιμένειν  
 4 ἐγίγνετο. καὶ προθυμία τῶν τε Μακεδόνων ἐς τὸ  
 ἔργον καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου πολλή ἦν παρόντος τε καὶ  
 αὐτοῦ ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου καὶ τὰ μὲν λόγῳ  
 ἐπαίροντος, τὰ δὲ καὶ χρήμασι τοὺς τι ἐκπρεπέ-  
 στερον κατ' ἀρετὴν πονουμένους ἐπικουφίζοντος.  
 ἀλλ' ἔστε μὲν τὸ πρὸς τῇ ἠπειρῷ ἐχώννυτο, οὐ  
 χαλεπῶς προὔχῳρει τὸ ἔργον, ἐπὶ βάθος τε ὀλίγον  
 5 χωννύμενον καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐξείργοντος. ὡς δὲ τῷ τε  
 βαθυτέρῳ ἤδη ἐπέλαζον καὶ ἅμα τῇ πόλει αὐτῇ  
 ἐγγὺς ἐγίγνοντο, ἀπὸ τε τῶν τειχῶν ὑψηλῶν ὄντων  
 βαλλόμενοι ἐκακοπάθουν, ἅτε καὶ ἐπ' ἐργασία  
 μᾶλλον τι ἢ ὡς ἐς μάχην ἀκριβῶς ἐσταλμένοι, καὶ  
 ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ χώματος  
 ἐπιπλέοντες οἱ Τύριοι, ἅτε δὴ θαλασσοκρατοῦντες  
 ἔτι, ἄπορον πολλαχῇ τὴν πρόσχωσιν τοῖς Μακε-  
 6 δόσιν ἐποίουν. καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες πύργους ἐπ'  
 ἄκρου τοῦ χώματος, ὃ τι περ προκεχωρήκει αὐτοῖς  
 ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης, ἐπέστησαν δύο καὶ μηχανὰς  
 ἐπὶ τοῖς πύργοις. προκαλύμματα δὲ δέρρεις καὶ  
 διφθέραι αὐτοῖς ἦσαν, ὡς μήτε πυρφόροις βέλεσιν  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους βάλλεσθαι, τοῖς τε ἐργαζομένοις  
 προβολὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοξεύματα.  
 ἅμα τε ὅσοι προσπλέοντες τῶν Τυρίων ἔβλαπτον  
 τοὺς χωννύντας, ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων βαλλόμενοι οὐ  
 χαλεπῶς ἀνασταλήσεσθαι ἔμελλον.

19. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιμηχανῶνται  
 τοιόνδε. ναῦν ἵππαγωγὸν κλημάτων τε ξηρῶν καὶ



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the crossing is deepest, the water is about three fathoms deep. But there was plenty of stones and wood, which they heaped on to the stones; then it was easy to fix stakes in the mud, and the mud itself made a stable binding for the stones. The Macedonians were very eager for the work, like Alexander; he was present directing each step himself, inspired the men with his words and encouraged their exertions by gifts to those who did work of exceptional merit. As long as the building of the mole was near the mainland, the operation went forward without difficulty; for the depth of the pile was not great, and no resistance was offered. But once they got into deeper water and also nearer the city, they were greatly distressed by volleys from the high walls, especially as they were properly clad for labouring rather than for fighting; and the Tyrians sailed up in their triremes here and there by the mole, being still masters of the sea, and in many places made it impossible for the Macedonians to build up the mole. The Macedonians set two towers on the mole, which had now run far out into the sea, with engines on the towers, and covered them with hides and skins, to prevent their being pelted with fire-darts from the wall, and to screen the workers also against arrows; besides, any Tyrians who rowed up and tried to injure the men building the mole would receive volleys from the towers and would probably be easily repulsed.<sup>4</sup>

19. The Tyrians, however, took a counter step;<sup>1</sup> they filled a cavalry transport-ship with dry boughs

<sup>4</sup> D. 40, 4-41; QC 2, 8-24 supply other details.

<sup>1</sup> QC. 3, 1 ff. (in Al's absence, 20, 4 below); ignored by D. QC. 3, 9 f. tells of other Tyrian devices.

## ARRIAN

ἄλλης ὕλης εὐφλέκτου ἐμπλήσαντες δύο ἰστοὺς ἐπὶ  
 τῇ πρῶρᾳ καταπηγνύουσι καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιφράσ-  
 σουσιν ἐς ὅσον μακρότατον, ὡς φορυτόν τε ταύτη  
 καὶ δᾶδας ὅσας πλείστας δέξασθαι· πρὸς δὲ πίσσαν  
 τε καὶ θεῖον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐς τὸ παρακαλέσαι  
 2 μεγάλην φλόγα ἐπὶ ταύτη ἐπεφόρησαν. παρέτειναν  
 δὲ καὶ κεραίαν διπλῆν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰστοῖς ἀμφοτέροις,  
 καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐξήρτησαν ἐν λέβησιν ὅσα ἐπιχυ-  
 θέντα ἢ ἐπιβληθέντα ἐπὶ μέγα τὴν φλόγα ἐξάψειν  
 ἔμελλεν, ἔρματά τε ἐς τὴν πρύμναν ἐνέθεσαν, τοῦ  
 ἐξᾶραι ἐς ὕψος τὴν πρῶραν πιεζομένης κατὰ  
 3 πρύμναν τῆς νεώς. ἔπειτα ἄνεμον τηρήσαντες ὡς  
 ἐπὶ τὸ χῶμα ἐπιφέροντα ἐξάψαντες τριήρεσι τὴν  
 ναῦν κατ' οὐρὰν εἶλκον. ὡς δὲ ἐπέλαζον ἤδη τῷ τε  
 χῶματι καὶ τοῖς πύργοις, πῦρ ἐμβαλόντες ἐς τὴν  
 ὕλην καὶ ὡς βιαιότατα ἅμα ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἐπανελ-  
 κύσαντες τὴν ναῦν ἐνσείουσιν ἄκρῳ τῷ χῶματι·  
 αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ νηϊ καιομένη ἤδη ἐξενήξαντο οὐ  
 4 χαλεπῶς. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἢ τε φλόξ πολλὴ ἐνέπιπτε  
 τοῖς πύργοις καὶ αἱ κεραῖαι περικλασθεῖσαι ἐξέχεαν  
 ἐς τὸ πῦρ ὅσα ἐς ἔξαιψιν τῆς φλογὸς παρεσκευασ-  
 μένα ἦν. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν τριήρων πλησίον τοῦ  
 χῶματος ἀνακωχεύοντες ἐτόξευον ἐς τοὺς πύργους,  
 ὡς μὴ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι πελάσαι ὅσοι σβεστήριόν τι τῇ  
 5 φλογὶ ἐπέφερον. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κατεχομένων ἤδη  
 ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς τῶν πύργων ἐκδραμόντες ἐκ τῆς  
 πόλεως πολλοὶ καὶ ἐς κελήτια ἐμβάντες ἄλλη καὶ  
 ἄλλη ἐποκείλαντες τοῦ χῶματος τὸν τε χάρακα οὐ  
 χαλεπῶς διέσπασαν τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προβεβλημένον  
 καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς ξυμπάσας κατέφλεξαν, ὅσας μὴ τὸ  
 6 ἀπὸ τῆς νεώς πῦρ ἐπέσχεν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τό τε  
 χῶμα ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου ἀρξαμένους πλατύτερον

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and other combustible wood, fixed two masts in the bows, and built bulwarks round, extended as far as possible, so that it would contain the greatest amount of chips and shavings and torches; to say nothing of pitch, sulphur, and anything else to stir a great blaze, which they added liberally. They lashed a double yardarm to each mast, and hung from it in cauldrons anything which could be poured or thrown on to increase the flame, and they ballasted the stern to lift the bows as high as possible by the weight aft. Then they waited for a wind blowing towards the mole and, making fast hawsers, towed the transport astern with triremes. When they got near the mole and the towers, they lit the material, hauled with the triremes as violently as possible and dashed the ship on to the edge of the mole. The crew of the ship, already ablaze, swam off without difficulty. At this point a great flame was falling on the towers, and as the yards broke, they poured on to the fire the material that had been made ready to feed the flame. The men in the triremes lay to near the mole, and shot at the towers, so that it was not safe for anyone to get near with materials to quench the fire. At this stage, the towers being well alight, the citizens sallied out in large numbers, jumping into small boats, and put in at different parts of the mole, where they easily tore down the palisade set up to protect it and burned all the engines which had not been caught by fire from the ship. Alexander, however, ordered his men to make the mole

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χωννύναι, ὡς πλείονας δέξασθαι πύργους, καὶ τοὺς μηχανοποιοὺς μηχανὰς ἄλλας κατασκευάζειν ἐκέλευσεν. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα παρεσκευάζετο, αὐτὸς τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστὰς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας ἐπὶ Σιδῶνος ἐστάλη, ὡς ἀθροίσων ἐκεῖ ὅσαι ἤδη ἦσαν αὐτῷ τριήρεις, ὅτι ἀπορώτερα τὰ τῆς πολιορκίας ἐφαίνετο θαλασσοκρατούντων τῶν Τυρίων.

20. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Γηρόστρατός τε ὁ Ἀράδου βασιλεὺς καὶ Ἐνυλος ὁ Βύβλου ὡς ἔμαθον τὰς πόλεις σφῶν ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐχομένας, ἀπολιπόντες Αὐτοφραδάτην τε καὶ τὰς ξὺν αὐτῷ νέας παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον ξὺν τῷ ναυτικῷ τῷ σφετέρῳ ἀφίκοντο καὶ αἱ τῶν Σιδωνίων τριήρεις σὺν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε Φοινίκων μὲν νῆες ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα αὐτῷ  
 2 παρεγέγοντο. ἤκον δὲ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ἐκ Ῥόδου τριήρεις ἧ τε περίπολος καλουμένη καὶ ξὺν ταύτῃ ἄλλαι ἐννέα, καὶ ἐκ Σόλων καὶ Μαλλοῦ τρεῖς καὶ Λύκiai δέκα, ἐκ Μακεδονίας δὲ πεντηκόντορος, ἐφ' ἧς Πρωτέας ὁ Ἀνδρονίκου ἐπέπλει.  
 3 οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ὕστερον καὶ οἱ τῆς Κύπρου βασιλεῖς ἐς τὴν Σιδῶνα κατέσχον ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν μάλιστα καὶ εἴκοσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὴν τε ἦσαν τὴν κατ' Ἴσσον Δαρείου ἐπύθοντο καὶ ἡ Φοινίκη πᾶσα ἐχομένη ἤδη ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐφόβει αὐτούς. καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἔδωκεν Ἀλέξανδρος ἄδειαν τῶν πρόσθεν, ὅτι ὑπ' ἀνάγκης μᾶλλον τι ἢ κατὰ γνώμην τὴν σφῶν ἐδόκουν ξυνταχθῆναι τοῖς Πέρσαις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν.

4 Ἐν ᾧ δὲ αἱ τε μηχαναὶ αὐτῷ ξυνεπήγγυντο καὶ αἱ νῆες ὡς εἰς ἐπίπλουν τε καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν ἐξηρτύοντο, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε ἰππέων ἴλας ἔστιν ἅς καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς καὶ τοὺς

broader starting from the mainland, so as to hold more towers, and the engineers to construct new engines.<sup>2</sup> While these were being got ready, he made for Sidon with the hypaspists and the Agrianians, to collect all the triremes he already had there, since the siege seemed unlikely to succeed as long as the Tyrians were masters of the sea.<sup>3</sup>

20. At this time Gerostratus king of Aradus and Enylus of Byblus, on learning that Alexander held their cities, left Autophradates and his ships and joined Alexander with their own fleet, along with the Sidonian triremes; thus some eighty Phoenician sail came over to him. In the same days nine triremes came from Rhodes, in addition to their state guardship, three from Soli and Mallus and ten from Lycia, and a fifty-oar ship from Macedon, its captain being Proteus son of Andronicus. Soon afterwards the kings of Cyprus put in at Sidon with about 120 sail; they had learnt of Darius' defeat at Issus, and were alarmed at the whole of Phoenicia being already in Alexander's power.<sup>1</sup> To all of them Alexander let bygones be bygones, supposing that it was rather from necessity than their own choice that they had contributed to the Persian fleet.

While his engines were being fitted together, and his ships were being equipped for attack and for trying the issue of a naval battle, Alexander marched with some of the cavalry squadrons, the hypaspists,

<sup>2</sup> QC. 3, 8 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Omitted in other accounts.

<sup>1</sup> QC. 3, 11 notes only the arrival of 120 ships from Cyprus; D. 42, 3 presupposes, without explaining, Al's later command of the sea.

## ARRIAN

- Ἄγριανός τε καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἐπ' Ἀραβίας στέλλεται εἰς τὸν Ἀντιλίβανον καλούμενον τὸ ὄρος·  
 5 καὶ τὰ μὲν βία, τῶν ταύτη ἐξελών, τὰ δὲ ὁμολογία παραστησάμενος ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις ἐπανῆγεν εἰς τὴν Σιδῶνα, καὶ καταλαμβάνει Κλέανδρον τὸν Πολεμοκράτους ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἦκοντα καὶ ζὺν αὐτῷ μισθοφόρους Ἑλληνας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους.
- 6 Ὡς δὲ συνετέτακτο αὐτῷ τὸ ναυτικόν, ἐπιβίβασας τοῖς καταστρώμασι τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ ἐδόκουν εἰς τὸ ἔργον, εἰ μὴ διέκπλοις μᾶλλον τι ἢ ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ναυμαχία γίγνοιτο, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς Σιδῶνος ἐπέπλει τῇ Τύρῳ ζυντεταγμέναις ταῖς ναυσίν, αὐτὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, ὃ δὴ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος αὐτῷ ἀνεῖχε, καὶ ζὺν αὐτῷ οἱ τε Κυπρίων βασιλεῖς καὶ ὅσοι Φοινίκων, πλὴν Πνυταγόρου. οὗτος δὲ καὶ Κρατερός τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας εἶχον
- 7 τῆς πάσης τάξεως. τοῖς δὲ Τυρίοις πρότερον μὲν ναυμαχεῖν ἐγνωσμένον ἦν, εἰ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπιπλέοι σφίσιν Ἀλέξανδρος, τότε δὲ πλῆθος νεῶν πολὺ ἀπροσδοκῆτως κατιδόντες (οὐ γάρ πω πεπυσμένοι ἦσαν τὰς τε Κυπρίων ναῦς καὶ τὰς
- 8 Φοινίκων ζυμπάσας Ἀλέξανδρον ἔχοντα) καὶ ἅμα ζυντεταγμένως τοῦ ἐπίπλου γιγνομένου (ὀλίγον γὰρ πρὶν προσχεῖν τῇ πόλει ἀνεκώχευσαν ἔτι πελάγαιαί ζὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ νῆες, εἴ πως ἄρα εἰς ναυμαχίαν τοὺς Τυρίους προκαλέσαιτο, ἔπειτα οὕτως ζυνταξάμενοι, ὡς οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, πολλῷ τῷ ῥοθίῳ ἐπέπλεον)—ταῦτα ὁρῶντες οἱ Τύριοι ναυμαχεῖν μὲν ἀπέγνωσαν, τριήρεσι δὲ ὅσας τῶν λιμένων τὰ στόματα ἐδέχοντο βύζην τὸν ἔσπλουν φραξάμενοι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 19, 1 n. and P. 24, 6 (anecdotes from Chares); QC. 2, 24

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the Agrianians and the archers in the direction of Arabia to the mountain called Antilebanon.<sup>2</sup> Here he stormed and destroyed some places and brought others to terms; in ten days he was back at Sidon, and found that Cleander son of Polemocrates had arrived from the Peloponnese with four thousand Greek mercenaries.<sup>3</sup>

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When his fleet was organized, he put on deck as many of the hypaspists as he thought sufficient for the action (in case the engagement were not rather a matter of breaking the line of ships than of hand-to-hand fighting), and weighing anchor sailed from Sidon to Tyre with his ships in formation; himself on the right wing, that is, seaward, with the Cyprian kings and all the Phoenicians, except Pnytagoras who with Craterus commanded the left wing of the whole line. The Tyrians had previously decided to give battle by sea, if Alexander attacked them there. But when they sighted an armada far beyond their estimate—for they had not been apprized earlier that the Cyprian and the Phoenician ships were all with Alexander—and observed the sea-attack coming in regular order—just before closing on the city Alexander's ships, while still in the open sea, had lain to, hoping to draw out the Tyrians to an engagement, and then, as they did not put out in their original order, came on with a loud din of oars and waves—the Tyrians, observing all this, refused a sea-battle, but used as many of the triremes as the mouths of their harbours would hold to block the entrances

and 3, 1, explaining that the natives were interfering with the dispatch of timber from Lebanon (cf. 2, 18), not Antilebanon, and stating that Perdiccas and Craterus were left in command.

<sup>2</sup> QC. 3, 11 makes them arrive with the ships from Cyprus.



## ARRIAN

ἐφύλασσον, ὡς μὴ ἐς τῶν λιμένων τινὰ ἐγκαθορμισθῆναι τῶν πολεμίων τὸν στόλον.

- 9 Ἄλεξάνδρος δέ, ὡς οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο οἱ Τύριοι, ἐπέπλει τῇ πόλει· καὶ ἐς μὲν τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς Σιδῶνος βιάζεσθαι ἀπέγνω διὰ στενότητα τοῦ στόματος καὶ ἅμα ἀντιπρώροις τριήρεσι πολλαῖς ὀρῶν πεφραγμένον τὸν ἔσπλουν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς ἐξωτάτω ἐφορμούσας τῷ στόματι τριήρεις προσπεσόντες οἱ Φοίνικες καὶ ἀντίπρωροι ἐμβαλόντες καταδύουσιν· οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν οὐ χαλεπῶς
- 10 ἀπενήξαντο ἐς τὴν γῆν φιλίαν οὔσαν. τότε μὲν δὴ οὐ πόρρω τοῦ ποιητοῦ χώματος κατὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν, ἵνα σκέπη τῶν ἀνέμων ἐφαίνετο, οἱ σὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὠρμίσαντο· τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία τοὺς μὲν Κυπρίους ξὺν ταῖς σφετέραις ναυσὶ καὶ Ἀνδρομάχῃ τῷ ναυάρχῃ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τὸν ἐκ Σιδῶνος φέροντα ἐκέλευσεν ἐφορμεῖν τῇ πόλει, τοὺς δὲ Φοίνικας κατὰ τὸν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ χώματος τὸν πρὸς Αἴγυπτον ἀνέχοντα, ἵνα καὶ αὐτῷ ἡ σκηνὴ ᾖ.

21. Ἦδη δὲ καὶ μηχανοποιῶν αὐτῷ πολλῶν ἐκ τε Κύπρου καὶ Φοινίκης ἀπάσης συλλελεγμένων μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ συμπεπηγμέναι ἦσαν, αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ χώματος, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππαγωγῶν νεῶν, ἃς ἐκ Σιδῶνος ἅμα οἱ ἐκόμισεν, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τριήρων
- 2 ὅσαι αὐτῶν οὐ ταχυναυτοῦσαι ἦσαν. ὡς δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἤδη ξύμπαντα, προσῆγον τὰς μηχανὰς κατὰ τε τὸ ποιητὸν χῶμα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ τείχους προσορμιζομένων τε καὶ ἀποπειρωμένων τοῦ τείχους.
- 3 Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπάλξεων τῶν κατὰ τὸ

<sup>4</sup> With § 6–9 cf. D. 42, 3; QC. 3, 11 f. D. 42, 3 puts the incident in 9 rather later.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 20. 8-21. 3

closely, and kept guard to prevent the enemy fleet from anchoring in any of the harbours.<sup>4</sup>

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When the Tyrians refused battle, Alexander sailed 9  
against the city; he decided not to force an entry  
into the harbour facing Sidon because of the narrow-  
ness of its mouth, and also because entry was blocked  
with numerous triremes, bows on, though the  
Phoenicians did charge, bow to bow, the three triremes  
moored farthest out and sank them; their crews  
swam away comfortably to the friendly shore. For 10  
the time being Alexander's fleet came to anchor  
near the new-made mole along the shore, where there  
seemed to be protection from the winds. Next day  
Alexander ordered the Cyprians, with their contin-  
gent of ships and with Andromachus the admiral,  
to blockade the city at the harbour that faced Sidon,  
and the Phoenicians to do the same at the harbour  
on the other side of the mole, facing Egypt, where  
his own tent was.

21. By this time many engineers had been col-  
lected from Cyprus and the whole of Phoenicia,<sup>1</sup>  
and many engines had been fitted together on the  
mole or on the horse-transport. Alexander had  
brought with him from Sidon or on the slower  
triremes. When everything was now ready, they 2  
brought forward the engines down the new-made  
mole and from the ships which were anchored along-  
side the wall at various points and were testing it  
out.<sup>2</sup>

The Tyrians set wooden towers on the battlements 3

<sup>1</sup> D. 41, 3, 43, 1 and 44, 7 stresses the importance to the defence of the number of engineers at Tyre.

<sup>2</sup> QC. 3, 13 makes the battering begin the day after the ships arrived; but 3, 13-4, 4, like D. 42, 5-45, 7 (divergent in details), ignore the operations A. describes (§ 3-7) and describe others.

## ARRIAN

χῶμα πύργους ξυλίνοὺς ἐπέστησαν, ὡς ἀπομά-  
 χεσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ εἴ πη ἄλλη αἰ μηχαναὶ  
 προσήγοντο, βέλεσί τε ἠμύνοντο καὶ πυρφόροις  
 οἰστοῖς ἔβαλλον αὐτὰς τὰς ναῦς, ὥστε φόβον  
 4 παρέχειν τοῖς Μακεδόσι πελάζειν τῷ τείχει. ἦν δὲ  
 αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ κατὰ τὸ χῶμα τό τε ὕψος  
 εἰς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μάλιστα πόδας καὶ ἐς  
 πλάτος ξύμμετρον λίθοις μεγάλοις ἐν γύψῳ κειμέ-  
 νοις συμπεπηγότα. ταῖς δὲ ἵππαγωγοῖς τε καὶ ταῖς  
 τριήρεσι τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὅσαι τὰς μηχανὰς προσ-  
 ἦγον τῷ τείχει, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐκ εὐπορον ἐγίγνετο  
 πελάζειν τῇ πόλει, ὅτι λίθοι πολλοὶ ἐς τὸ πέλαγος  
 προβεβλημένοι ἐξεῖργον αὐτῶν τὴν ἐγγὺς προσβο-  
 5 λήν. καὶ τούτους Ἀλέξανδρος ἔγνω ἐξελκύσαι ἐκ  
 τῆς θαλάσσης· ἠνύετο δὲ χαλεπῶς τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον,  
 οἷα δὴ ἀπὸ νεῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ γῆς βεβαίου γιγνό-  
 μενον· ἄλλως τε καὶ οἱ Τύριοι ναῦς καταφράξαντες  
 παρὰ τὰς ἀγκύρας ἐπήγον τῶν τριήρων καὶ  
 ὑποτέμνοντες τὰς σχοίνους τῶν ἀγκυρῶν ἄπορον  
 τὴν προσόρμισιν ταῖς πολεμίαις ναυσὶν ἐποίουν.  
 6 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τριακοντόρους πολλὰς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν  
 τρόπον φράξας ἐπέστησεν ἐγκαρσίας πρὸ τῶν  
 ἀγκυρῶν, ὡς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀναστέλλεσθαι τὸν  
 ἐπίπλουν τῶν νεῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ὕφαλοι κολυμ-  
 βηταὶ τὰς σχοίνους αὐτοῖς ὑπέτεμνον. οἱ δὲ  
 ἀλύσεσιν ἀντὶ σχοίνων εἰς τὰς ἀγκύρας χρώμενοι,  
 οἱ Μακεδόνες, καθίεσαν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἔτι πλέον τοῖς  
 7 κολυμβηταῖς γίνεσθαι. ἐξάπτοντες οὖν βρόχους  
 τῶν λίθων ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος ἀνέσπων αὐτοὺς ἔξω  
 τῆς θαλάσσης, ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς μετεωρίσαντες κατὰ  
 βάθους ἀφίεσαν, ἵνα οὐκέτι προβεβλημένοι βλάψειν  
 ἔμελλον. ὅπου δὲ καθαρὸν πεποίητο τῶν προβόλων

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 21. 3-7

facing the mole, from which to fight; and wherever  
else the engines were brought up, they defended  
themselves with missiles and shot fiery arrows at the  
ships themselves, so as to deter the Macedonians  
from an approach to the wall. The walls facing the  
mole were about 150 feet high and of corresponding  
breadth, constructed of big blocks of stone fitted  
in mortar. The Macedonian horse-transport and  
triremes, which were bringing up engines against  
the wall, found it hard to approach the city at this  
point, since heaps of stones cast into the sea in front  
of it prevented a close attack. Alexander deter-  
mined to drag these stones out of the sea, but this  
work made slow progress as it was carried on from  
ships and not from firm land, especially as the  
Tyrians had protected some of their ships with ar-  
mour and bore down on the anchors of the triremes  
and cut the cables, thus making it impossible for the  
enemy ships to lie near by. Alexander protected  
several thirty-oar boats in the same way, and laid  
them athwart in front of the anchors to repel the  
attack of the Tyrian ships. Even so, divers would  
swim under the surface and cut the ropes. The  
Macedonians then substituted chains for ropes in  
anchoring, and lowered them, so that the divers had  
no further success. From the mole then they cast  
nooses round the stones, drew them out of the sea,  
and then lifting them on high with engines let them  
drop into deep water, where they were not likely to  
be in the way and do any more harm. Where they

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4

5

6

7

τὸ τεῖχος, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη ταύτη αἰ νῆες προσεῖχον.

- 8 Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι πάντη ἄποροι γιγνόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ἐπίπλουν ποιήσασθαι ταῖς Κυπρίαις ναυσίν, αἱ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐφώρμουν τὸν ἐς Σιδῶνα τετραμμένον· ἐκ πολλοῦ δὴ καταπετάσαντες τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ἰστίοις, τοῦ μὴ καταφανῆ γενέσθαι τῶν τριήρων τὴν πλήρωσιν, ἀμφὶ μέσον ἡμέρας, ὅποτε οἱ τε ναῦται ἐπὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐσκεδασμένοι ἦσαν καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιθάτερα τῆς πόλεως ναυτικοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν
- 9 ἀπεχώρει, πληρώσαντες πεντήρεις μὲν τρεῖς καὶ τετρήρεις ἴσας, τριήρεις δὲ ἑπτὰ ὡς ἀκριβεστάτοις τε τοῖς πληρώμασι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μάχεσθαι μέλλουσιν εὐοπλοτάτοις καὶ ἅμα εὐθαρσεστάτοις ἐς τοὺς ναυτικούς ἀγῶνας, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἀτρέμα τῇ εἰρεσίᾳ ἐπὶ μιᾶς νεῶς ἐξέπλεον ἄνευ κελευστῶν τὰς κώπας παραφέροντες· ὡς δὲ ἐπέστρεφον ἤδη ἐπὶ τοὺς Κυπρίους καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ καθορᾶσθαι ἦσαν, τότε δὴ ξὺν βοῇ τε πολλῇ καὶ ἐγκελευσμῶ ἐς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἅμα τῇ εἰρεσίᾳ ξυντόνω ἐπεφέροντο.

22. Ξυνέβη δὲ ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀποχωρῆσαι μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν, οὐ διατρίψαντα δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς δι' ὀλίγου ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπανελθεῖν.
- 2 οἱ δὲ Τύριοι προσπεσόντες ἀπροσδοκῆτως ταῖς ναυσίν ὀρμούσαις καὶ ταῖς μὲν πάντη κεναῖς ἐπιτυχόντες, τῶν δ' ὑπ' αὐτὴν τὴν βοῆν καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν χαλεπῶς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων πληρουμένων, τὴν τε Πνυταγόρου τοῦ βασιλέως πεντήρη εὐθὺς ὑπὸ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐμβολῇ κατέδυσαν καὶ τὴν Ἀνδροκλέους τοῦ Ἀμαθουσίου καὶ τὴν Πασικράτους τοῦ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 21. 7-22. 2

had cleared the approach to the wall of obstructions, the ships at last lay alongside quite easily.

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The Tyrians, now becoming hard pressed in every way, determined to attack the Cyprian vessels blockading the harbour facing Sidon.<sup>3</sup> For a long time they kept sails stretched in front of the harbour mouth, so that the manning of the triremes should not be seen, and about midday, when the sailors had scattered on necessary business and Alexander had just left the fleet on the other side of the city for his tent, they manned three quinqueremes, as many quadriremes and seven triremes, with their smartest crews and the best-armed marines to fight from the decks, men who were also boldest in sea-fights, and at first quietly paddled<sup>4</sup> out in line ahead, without anyone to call the stroke; but once they began to turn towards the Cyprian ships and were nearly in view, they came on with much shouting and calling of the time among themselves, rowing with unified stroke.

22. It so happened that on that day Alexander, after retiring to his tent, did not rest there as usual, but returned to the ships quite soon. The Tyrian attack on the anchored ships was unexpected; they found some quite empty, others were being manned with difficulty in the middle of the noise and attack by any who chanced to be there, and at the first charge the quinqueremes of King Pnytagoras, Androcles of Amathus and Pasicrates of Curium

<sup>3</sup> QC. 4, 5-9 (different account of sortie); nothing in D.

<sup>4</sup> Professor Warmington suggests that the Greek means that they were not even rowing gently but holding their oars motionless, propelled by wind or current, or at most making occasional strokes for momentum. I feel no certainty on the exact sense.

## ARRIAN

Κουριέως, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐξωθοῦντες ἔκοπτον.

- 3 Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς ἤσθετο τὸν ἔκπλουν τῶν Τυρίων τριήρων, τὰς μὲν πολλὰς τῶν ξὺν αὐτῷ νεῶν, ὅπως ἐκάστη πληρωθείη, ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος ἀνακωχεύειν ἔταξεν, ὡς μὴ καὶ ἄλλαι ἐκπλεύσειαν τῶν Τυρίων νῆες· αὐτὸς δὲ πεντήρεις τε τὰς ξὺν αὐτῷ ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τῶν τριήρων ἐς πέντε μάλιστα, ὅσαι ἔφθησαν αὐτῷ κατὰ τάχος πληρωθεῖσαι, περιέπλει τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς
- 4 ἐκπεπλευκότητας τῶν Τυρίων. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους, τὸν τε ἐπίπλουν τῶν πολεμίων κατιδόντες καὶ Ἄλέξανδρον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, βοῆ τε ἐπανάγειν ἐνεκελεύοντο τοῖς ἐκ τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐξακουστὸν ἦν ὑπὸ θορύβου ξυνεχομένων ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, σημείοις ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεκάλουν ἐς τὴν ἀναχώρησιν. οἱ δὲ ὀψέ ποτε αἰσθόμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ἀμφ' Ἄλέξανδρον ὑποστρέψαντες ἐς τὸν
- 5 λιμένα ἔφευγον. καὶ ὀλίγαι μὲν τῶν νεῶν φθάνουσι ὑπεκφυγοῦσαι, ταῖς δὲ πλείοσιν ἐμβαλοῦσαι αἱ ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἅπλους ἐποίησαν, πεντήρης δέ τις καὶ τετρήρης αὐτῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος ἐλήφθησαν. φόνος δὲ τῶν ἐπιβατῶν οὐ πολὺς ἐγένετο. ὡς γὰρ ἤσθοντο ἐχομένας τὰς ναῦς ἀπενήξαντο οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐς τὸν λιμένα.
- 6 Ὡς δὲ οὐδεμία ἔτι τοῖς Τυρίοις ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ὠφέλεια ἦν, ἐπῆγον ἤδη οἱ Μακεδόνες τὰς μηχανὰς τῷ τείχει αὐτῶν. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ χῶμα προσαγόμεναι διὰ ἰσχὺν τοῦ τείχους οὐδὲν ἦνυον ὅ τι καὶ λόγου ἄξιον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρὸς Σιδῶνα τετραμμένον τῆς πόλεως τῶν νεῶν τινὰς τῶν μηχανοφό-



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 22. 2-6

were sunk and the rest driven ashore and broken up.

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But when Alexander observed the sally of the 3  
Tyrian triremes, while directing most of the ships  
with him to lie to at the harbour mouth as soon as  
each was manned, to prevent any other Tyrian ships  
sailing out, he took what quinqueremes he had and  
some five triremes, which had got their crews on  
board in all haste, and sailed round the city against  
the Tyrians who had sailed out. The Tyrians on the 4  
wall, seeing the enemy attack and Alexander himself  
aboard, shouted orders to the men on their own ships  
to put about, and as this did not reach the hearing,  
in the confusion, of men pre-occupied in the action,  
they used various signals to recall them, but it was too  
late when they noticed the attack of Alexander's  
ships; they went about and made for refuge in the  
harbour; few of the ships managed to get to safety 5  
in time, most were rammed by Alexander's ships,  
some put out of action, and a quinquereme and  
quadrireme captured at the very entrance of the  
harbour. There was no great slaughter of the  
crews; as soon as they saw that their ships were  
caught, they swam off without much difficulty into  
the harbour.

Now that the Tyrians could look for no help from 6  
their ships, the Macedonians began to bring up their  
engines against the wall.<sup>1</sup> When moved up along  
the mole, they had no success worth mention, owing  
to the strength of the wall, while on the side of the city  
looking towards Sidon, where they brought up some

<sup>1</sup> Nothing in D. or QC. corresponds to § 6 f.

7 ρων προσήγον. ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτη ἦννευ, ἐς τὸ πρὸς νότον αὐτῷ ἄνεμον καὶ πρὸς Αἴγυπτον ἀνέχον τεῖχος μετήει πάντη ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ ἔργου. καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρῶτον κατεσεύσθη τε τὸ τεῖχος ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ τι καὶ κατηρίφθη αὐτοῦ παραρραγόν. τότε μὲν δὴ ὅσον ἐπιβαλὼν γεφύρας ἢ ἐρήριπτο τοῦ τεύχους ἀπεπειράθη ἐς ὀλίγον τῆς προσβολῆς· καὶ οἱ Τύριοι οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπεκρούσαντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας.

23. Τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡμέρα νηνεμίαν τε φυλάξας καὶ παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν τάξεων ἐς τὸ ἔργον ἐπῆγε τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τὰς μηχανάς. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν κατέσεισε τοῦ τεύχους ἐπὶ μέγα, ὡς δὲ ἀποχρῶν εἰς πλάτος ἐφάνη τὸ παρερρηγμένον, τὰς μὲν μηχανοφόρους ναῦς  
 2 ἐπανάγειν ἐκέλευσεν· ὁ δὲ δύο ἄλλας ἐπῆγεν, αἱ τὰς γεφύρας αὐτῷ ἔφερον, ἃς δὴ ἐπιβάλλειν ἐπενόει τῷ κατερρηγμένῳ τοῦ τεύχους. καὶ τὴν μὲν μίαν τῶν νεῶν οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ ἔλαβον, ἢ ἐπετέτακτο Ἄδμητος, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ ἢ Κοίνου τάξις οἱ ἀσθ-  
 3 ἐπιβήσεσθαι τοῦ τεύχους ἢ παρείκοι ἔμελλεν. τὰς τριήρεις δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐπιπλεῖν κατὰ τοὺς λιμένας ἀμφοτέρους ἐκέλευσεν, εἴ πως πρὸς σφᾶς τετραμμένων τῶν Τυρίων βιάσαιντο τὸν ἔσπλουν· ὅσαι δὲ αὐτῶν βέλη ἀπὸ μηχανῶν βαλλόμενα εἶχον ἢ ὅσαι τοξότας ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἔφερον, ταύτας δὲ ἐκέλευσεν ἐν κύκλῳ περιπλεύσας τὸ τεῖχος ἐποκέλλειν τε ὅπῃ παρείκοι καὶ ἀνακωχεύειν ἐντὸς βέλους, ἔστε τὸ ἐποκεῖλαι ἄπορον γίγνοιτο, ὡς

<sup>1</sup> Editors generally amend to πεζέταιροι, but cf. Introd. n. 99.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 22. 7-23. 3

of their ships carrying engines, they again did not succeed, so Alexander turned to the south and the wall facing Egypt, and tested the work at every point. It was here that the wall was first badly shaken and in part broken down by a rent. At that time Alexander made a slight and tentative attack, going so far as to throw gangways over the broken part of the wall: the Tyrians, however, easily repulsed the Macedonians. 7 332  
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23. Two days afterwards,<sup>1</sup> having waited till he got a calm, and urged his battalion commanders to action, Alexander brought up the engines on board the ships against the city. First he battered down the wall for a good space. But when the breach seemed wide enough, he ordered the engine-carrying ships to back water; and sent in two others, carrying his gangways, which he intended to let fall where the wall was breached. The hypaspists took over one of the ships, Admetus being its captain; the other was manned by Coenus' battalion of the so-called *astheteroi*.<sup>2</sup> Alexander himself intended to mount on the wall with his hypaspists where practicable. Some of his triremes were ordered to sail round about each harbour, in case they might force an entrance by sea while the Tyrians were occupied with his own party. Other triremes, which had missiles to fire from engines on board or which carried archers on the decks, were ordered to circle about the wall, run ashore wherever possible, or lie to within range, so long as it was impracticable to run ashore. In this way the Tyrians would be under 2  
3

<sup>1</sup> Vague accounts of final assault, diverging from A., in D. 46; QC. 4, 10 ff. (two days after naval sortie). J. xi 10, 14 makes Tyre fall by treachery.

<sup>2</sup> See Introd. n. 99.

πανταχόθεν βαλλομένους τοὺς Τυρίους ἐν τῷ δεινῷ ἀμφιβόλους γίνεσθαι.

- 4 Ὡς δὲ αἱ τε νῆες αἱ σὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προσέσχον τῇ πόλει καὶ αἱ γέφυραι ἐπεβλήθησαν τῷ τείχει ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐνταῦθα οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ εὐρώστως κατὰ ταύτας ἀνέβαινον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. ὃ τε γὰρ Ἄδμητος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐν τῷ τότε ἐγένετο καὶ ἅμα Ἀλέξανδρος εἶπετο αὐτοῖς, τοῦ τε ἔργου αὐτοῦ καρτερῶς ἀπτόμενος καὶ θεατῆς τῶν ἄλλων ὅτω τι λαμπρὸν
- 5 κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ ἐτολμᾶτο. καὶ ταύτῃ πρῶτον ἢ ἐπετέτακτο Ἀλέξανδρος ἐλήφθη τὸ τεῖχος, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀποκρουσθέντων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν Τυρίων, ἐπειδὴ πρῶτον βεβαίῳ τε καὶ ἅμα οὐ πάντῃ ἀποτόμῳ τῇ προσβάσει ἐχρήσαντο οἱ Μακεδόνες. καὶ Ἄδμητος μὲν πρῶτος ἐπιβὰς τοῦ τείχους καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐγκελευόμενος ἐπιβαίνειν βληθεὶς λόγχῃ ἀποθνήσκει αὐτοῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ
- 6 Ἀλέξανδρος ἔσχε τὸ τεῖχος ζὺν τοῖς ἐταίροις. ὡς δὲ εἶχοντο αὐτῷ πύργοι τε ἔστιν οἱ καὶ μεταπύργια, αὐτὸς μὲν παρῆει διὰ τῶν ἐπάλξεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ βασίλεια, ὅτι ταύτῃ εὐπορωτέρα ἐφαίνετο εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ κάθοδος.

24. Οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, οἳ τε Φοίνικες κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς Αἰγύπτου, καθ' ὄνπερ καὶ ἐφορμούοντες ἐτύγχανον, βιασάμενοι καὶ τὰ κλεῖθρα διασπάσαντες ἔκοπτον τὰς ναῦς ἐν τῷ λιμένι, ταῖς μὲν μετεώροις ἐμβάλλοντες, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐξωθοῦντες, καὶ οἱ Κύπριοι κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον λιμένα τὸν ἐκ Σιδῶνος φέροντα οὐδὲ κλεῖθρον τοῦτόν γε ἔχοντα εἰσπλεύσαντες εἶλον εὐθύς ταύτῃ τὴν πόλιν.

- 2 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν Τυρίων τὸ μὲν τεῖχος, ὡς ἐχόμενον εἶδον, ἐκλείπουσιν, ἀθροισθέντες δὲ κατὰ

fire from all sides and not know where to turn in the crisis.

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As soon as Alexander's ships closed upon the city and the gangways were let down on the wall from them, the hypaspists went down them gallantly on to the wall; Admetus then showed his courage and Alexander too was there with them, taking a strenuous part in the action itself and keeping his eyes open for any conspicuous display of courage, and daring by others in the danger. The part of the wall captured first was, in fact, that where Alexander had posted himself; the Tyrians were easily pushed off it, since for the first time the Macedonians had access that was secure and not absolutely sheer. Admetus, first on the wall, was wounded by a spear while calling on his men to mount, and died there;<sup>3</sup> Alexander followed him and seized the wall with the Companions. When some of the towers and the curtains between them were in his possession, he passed on through the battlements towards the royal quarters; this way it appeared that descent into the city was easier.

24. To turn to the ships and their crews, the Phoenicians who were moored near the harbour facing Egypt, forcing their way and tearing asunder the booms, battered the ships in the harbour, ramming some afloat, and driving others ashore; the Cyprians by the other harbour in the direction of Sidon, which did not even have a boom, sailed in and at once captured the city on this side. The main body of the Tyrians deserted the wall when they saw

<sup>3</sup> D. 45, 6 kills off Admetus earlier in the siege.

τὸ Ἄγηνόριον καλούμενον ἐπέστρεψαν ταύτη ἐπὶ  
 τοὺς Μακεδόνας. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ξὺν τοῖς ὑπα-  
 σπισταῖς ἐπὶ τούτους χωρήσας τοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ  
 μαχομένους διέφθειρεν αὐτῶν, τοῖς δὲ φεύγουσιν  
 3 ἐφείπετο. καὶ φόνος ἦν πολὺς, τῶν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 λιμένος ἐχόντων ἤδη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς Κοίνου  
 τάξεως παρεληλυθυίας ἐς αὐτήν. ὀργῇ γὰρ ἐχώρου  
 ἐπὶ πᾶν οἱ Μακεδόνες, τῆς τε πολιορκίας τῇ τριβῇ  
 ἀχθόμενοι καὶ ὅτι λαβόντες τινὰς αὐτῶν οἱ Τύριοι  
 πλέοντας ἐκ Σιδῶνος ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβιβάσαντες,  
 ὅπως ἀποπτον εἶη ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, σφά-  
 4 ξαντες ἔρριψαν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν. ἀπέθανον δὲ  
 τῶν μὲν Τυρίων ἐς ὀκτακισχιλίους, τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων δὲ ἐν τῇ τότε προσβολῇ Ἄδμητός τε ὁ  
 πρῶτος ἐλὼν τὸ τεῖχος, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος,  
 καὶ ξὺν αὐτῷ εἴκοσι τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν· ἐν δὲ τῇ  
 πάσῃ πολιορκίᾳ μάλιστα ἐς τετρακοσίους.  
 5 Τοῖς δὲ ἐς τὸ ἱερόν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους καταφυ-  
 γούσιν (ἦσαν δὲ αὐτῶν τε τῶν Τυρίων οἱ μάλιστα  
 ἐν τέλει καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀζέμιλκος καὶ Καρχηδο-  
 νίων τινὲς θεωροὶ ἐς τιμὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους κατὰ  
 δὴ τι[να] νόμιμον παλαιὸν εἰς τὴν μητρόπολιν  
 ἀφικόμενοι) τούτοις ξύμπασιν ἄδειαν δίδωσιν  
 Ἀλέξανδρος· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἠνδραπόδισε, καὶ  
 ἐπράθησαν Τυρίων τε καὶ τῶν ξένων ὅσοι ἐγκατε-  
 6 λήφθησαν μάλιστα ἐς τρισμυρίους. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ

<sup>1</sup> 6,000, QC. 4, 16, who makes Al. crucify 2,000 more (cf. D. 46, 3; all male survivors, not less than 2,000, J. xviii 3, 18).

<sup>2</sup> Called Straton by D. 46, 6-47, 6 (cf. J. xviii 3, 9 ff.), with story of his being replaced by 'Ballonymus' ('Abdalonimus' in QC. iv 1, 15 ff., locating the incident at Sidon, cf. J. xi 10, 8).

<sup>3</sup> In QC. 4, 18 he only spares the envoys.

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it was in enemy possession: but they massed together at what is called the Shrine of Agenor, and there turned to resist the Macedonians. Alexander with his hypaspists attacked them, killed some of them fighting there, and pursued the fugitives. The slaughter was great, now that those coming from the harbour were already masters of the city and Coenus' battalion had passed inside. The rage of the Macedonians was indiscriminate, as they were embittered by the protracted nature of the siege and because the Tyrians had captured some of their men sailing from Sidon, made them mount the wall, so that they might be seen from the camp, cut them down and cast them into the sea. Some eight thousand Tyrians fell;<sup>1</sup> in the actual attack the Macedonians lost Admetus, the first to mount on the wall, after he proved himself a brave man, with twenty of the hypaspists; in the entire siege the losses were about four hundred.

As for those who fled to the temple of Heracles, including among the Tyrians themselves the men of most authority and King Azemilcus,<sup>2</sup> as well as some Carthaginian envoys who had come to their mother-city to pay honour to Heracles, according to an ancient custom, Alexander granted them all complete pardon;<sup>3</sup> he enslaved the rest; some 30,000<sup>4</sup> were sold, what with Tyrians and foreigners

<sup>1</sup> A conventional figure. D. 46, 4 has only the women and children enslaved (the men are massacred), but alleges (cf. 41, 2) that most had been shipped off to Carthage, whereas QC. 3, 20 with 4, 18 suggests a decision to send them off which was never (and presumably could not have been) carried out. (Early hopes of help from Carthage had been disappointed, D. 40, 3; QC. 3, 19; J. xi 10, 12.) QC. 4, 15 f. alleges that the Sidonians saved 15,000 Tyrians from the victor's cruelty. Repopulation of Tyre by Al., J. xviii 3, 19, cf. D. xviii 37.



τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἔθυσέ τε καὶ πομπὴν ἔστειλε ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ὠπλισμένη· καὶ αἱ νῆες ξυνεπόμπευσαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ καὶ λαμπάδα ἐποίησε· καὶ τὴν μηχανήν, ἣ τὸ τεῖχος κατεσεύσθη, ἀνέθηκεν ἐς τὸν νεῶν καὶ τὴν ναῦν τὴν Τυρίαν τὴν ἱεράν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ἣντινα ἐν τῷ ἐπίπλω ἔλαβε, καὶ ταύτην τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀνέθηκεν καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ἣ αὐτὸς ποιήσας ἢ ὄτου δὴ ἄλλου ποιήσαντος, οὐκ ἄξιον μνήμης τὸ ἐπίγραμμα· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸ ἀναγράψαι ἀπηξίωσα. Τύρος μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐάλω ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Νικήτου Ἀθήνησι μηνὸς Ἑκατομβαιῶνος.

25. Ἐπι δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ τῆς Τύρου ξυνεχομένου Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀφίκοντο παρὰ Δαρείου πρέσβεις ὡς αὐτὸν ἀπαγγέλλοντες μύρια μὲν τάλαντα ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρός τε καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν παίδων δοῦναι ἐθέλειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ Δαρείῳ· τὴν δὲ χώραν πᾶσαν τὴν ἐντὸς Εὐφράτου ποταμοῦ ἔστω ἐπὶ θάλασσαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου εἶναι· γήμαντα δὲ τὴν Δαρείου παῖδα Ἀλέξανδρον φίλον τε εἶναι Δαρείῳ καὶ ξύμμαχον. καὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπαγγελθέντων Παρμενίωνα μὲν λέγουσιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι αὐτὸς ἂν Ἀλέξανδρος ὧν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἠγάπησε καταλύσας τὸν πόλεμον μηκέτι τὸ πρόσω κινδυνεύειν· Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ Παρμενίωνι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν, εἴπερ Παρμενίων ἦν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρός ἐστιν, ἀποκρινεῖσθαι Δαρείῳ ἄπερ δὴ καὶ ἀπεκρίνατο. ἔφη γὰρ οὔτε χρημάτων δεῖσθαι παρὰ Δαρείου οὔτε τῆς χώρας λαβεῖν ἀντὶ τῆς πάσης τὸ μέρος· εἶναι γὰρ τά τε χρήματα καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν· γῆμαί τε εἰ

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captured at Tyre. Alexander sacrificed to Heracles <sup>5</sup> 6 332  
 and held a procession in his honour, with his forces B.C.  
 under arms; there was a naval review too in honour  
 of Heracles, and Alexander held athletic games  
 in the temple enclosure and a relay torch-race; the  
 engine which battered down the wall was dedicated  
 to the temple; and the Tyrian sacred ship, conse-  
 crated to Heracles, which he captured in the attack,  
 was dedicated to Heracles with an inscription, either  
 of his own composition or of someone else's, not  
 worth recording; that is why I did not trouble to  
 copy it.<sup>6</sup> It was in this way that Tyre was captured  
 in the archonship of Nicetus at Athens in the month  
 Hecatombaeon.<sup>7</sup>

25. While Alexander was still occupied in the  
 siege of Tyre, envoys came to him from Darius  
 announcing that Darius was ready to give Alexander  
 10,000 Talents for his mother, wife and children;  
 to cede all the country west of Euphrates to the  
 Greek sea, to give Alexander his daughter in mar-  
 riage and be his friend and ally. When this was 2  
 reported in the council of the Companions, it is said  
 that Parmenio told Alexander that if he were  
 Alexander he would be glad to stop the war on these  
 terms without further risks, and that Alexander  
 answered Parmenio that he too would have done  
 this if he had been Parmenio, but as he was Alex-  
 ander, he would make the reply to Darius he actually  
 made: he needed no money from Darius, nor a part 3  
 of the country instead of the whole; for the money  
 and country all belonged to him; if he chose to marry

<sup>5</sup> D. 46, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably Pt. or Ar. did.

<sup>7</sup> July/Aug. 332 B.C.

## ARRIAN

ἐθέλοι τὴν Δαρείου παῖδα, γῆμαι ἂν καὶ οὐ  
 διδόντος Δαρείου· ἐκέλευέ τε αὐτὸν ἦκειν, εἴ τι  
 εὐρέσθαι ἐθέλοι φιλάνθρωπον παρ' αὐτοῦ. ταῦτα  
 ὡς ἤκουσε Δαρεῖος, τὰς μὲν ξυμβάσεις ἀπέγνω τὰς  
 πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐν παρασκευῇ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου  
 αὐθις ἦν.

- 4 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου ἔγνω ποιεῖσθαι τὸν  
 στόλον. καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῆς Παλαι-  
 στίνης καλουμένης Συρίας προσκεχωρηκότα ἤδη,  
 εὐνοῦχος δέ τις, ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Βάτις, κρατῶν τῆς  
 Γαζαίων πόλεως, οὐ προσεῖχεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ἀλλὰ  
 Ἀραβὰς τε μισθωτοὺς ἐπαγαγόμενος καὶ σῖτον ἐκ  
 πολλοῦ παρεσκευακῶς διαρκῆ ἐς χρόνιον πολιορ-  
 κίαν καὶ τῷ χωρίῳ πιστεύων μήποτε ἂν βία  
 ἀλῶναι, ἔγνω μὴ δέχεσθαι τῇ πόλει Ἀλέξανδρον.

26. Ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Γάζα τῆς μὲν θαλάσσης εἴκοσι  
 μάλιστα σταδίου, καὶ ἔστι ψαμμώδης καὶ βαθεῖα  
 ἐς αὐτὴν ἡ ἄνοδος καὶ ἡ θάλασσα ἡ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν  
 τεναγώδης πᾶσα. μεγάλη δὲ πόλις ἡ Γάζα ἦν καὶ  
 ἐπὶ χώματος ὑψηλοῦ ᾧκιστο καὶ τεῖχος περιεβέ-  
 βλητο αὐτῇ ὀχυρόν. ἐσχάτη δὲ ᾧκεῖτο ὡς ἐπ'  
 Αἴγυπτον ἐκ Φοινίκης ἰόντι ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐρήμου.

- 2 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς ἀφίκετο πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τῇ  
 μὲν πρώτη κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἢ μάλιστα ἐπίμα-  
 χον αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο τὸ τεῖχος, καὶ μηχανὰς

<sup>1</sup> QC. 5, 1 ff. puts arrival of letter *after* siege, and *now* makes Darius offer to surrender lands west of Halys, contrast D., cf. 14, 1 n. J. xi 12, 3 f. is vague, but D. 54, 1-6; QC. iv 11; J. xi 12, 5 ff. put the offer A. records here (but with 30,000 Talents) just before Gaugamela, along with the exchange

Darius' daughter, he would marry her, even if Darius did not give her; and Darius must come to him, if he wished for favourable treatment at his hands. When Darius received this reply he despaired of making terms with Alexander and began to prepare again for war.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander now determined to make his expedition to Egypt.<sup>2</sup> Palestinian Syria (as it is called) had already come over to him, except for a eunuch named Batis, who was master of the city of Gaza; he procured a force of Arab mercenaries, and some time before had got ready grain for a long siege; trusting that the place could never be taken by assault, he decided not to admit Alexander into the city. 4

26. Gaza is about 20 stades from the sea, and the way up to it is over deep sand, while the sea by the city is nothing but shoals. Gaza was a large city, built on a high mound, with a strong wall round it. It was the last town on the edge of the desert on the way from Phoenicia to Egypt.<sup>1</sup>

When Alexander reached the city, he encamped the first day where the wall seemed easiest to attack, and ordered siege engines to be fitted together. 2

(rhetorically amplified by QC.) between Al. and Parmenio. § 2 appears to be from the 'vulgate'.

<sup>2</sup> D. 48 here interpolates the activity of Agis and Amyntas (13, 2-6; App. VI) and a decree of the Greek *synedrion* to send envoys to congratulate Al. on Issus; perhaps they reached Al. at Tyre, as QC. 5, 11 dates the decree to the Isthmia (early summer), but cf. iii 5, 1 n. QC. 5, 13 ff. inserts an account of operations by sea (App. II 3) and in Asia Minor, cf. 5, 9 for surrender of Rhodes, and gives certain appointments, see Berve nos. 76, 732 (for error by QC.), 806, which were probably mentioned in A's source(s) and omitted by him.

<sup>1</sup> Siege of Gaza, D. 48, 7, two months long (Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* xi 325), i.e. Sept.-Nov., cf. 24, 6 n.; QC. 5, 10; 6, 7 ff. (in many details different from A.); P. 25, 3 f. (Al's wound).

συμπηγνύναι ἐκέλευσεν. οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην  
 ἀπεδείκνυντο ἄπορον εἶναι βία ἐλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος διὰ  
 3 ὕψος τοῦ χώματος. ἀλλὰ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ αἰρετέον  
 ἐδόκει εἶναι ὅσω ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ τοὺς  
 πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ  
 μὴ ἐλεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς  
 Ἕλληνας καὶ ἔς Δαρεῖον. ἐδόκει δὴ χῶμα ἐν  
 κύκλῳ τῆς πόλεως χωννύναι, ὡς ἐξ ἴσου ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 χωσθέντος ἐπάγεσθαι τὰς μηχανὰς τοῖς τείχεσι.  
 καὶ ἐχώννυτο κατὰ τὸ νότιον μάλιστα τῆς πόλεως  
 4 τεῖχος, ἵνα ἐπιμαχώτερα ἐφαίνετο. ὡς δὲ ἐδόκει  
 ἐξῆρθαι συμμέτρως τὸ χῶμα, μηχανὰς ἐπιστή-  
 σαντες οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος τῶν  
 Γαζαίων. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ θύοντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ  
 ἐστεφανωμένῳ τε καὶ κατάρχεσθαι μέλλοντι τοῦ  
 πρώτου ἱερείου κατὰ νόμον τῶν τις σαρκοφάγων  
 ὀρνίθων ὑπερπετόμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βωμοῦ λίθον  
 ἐμβάλλει ἔς τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὄντινα τοῖν ποδοῖν  
 ἔφερε. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤρετο Ἀρίστανδρον τὸν  
 μάντιν, ὃ τι νοοῖ ὁ οἰωνός. ὁ δὲ ἀποκρίνεται ὅτι  
 ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὴν μὲν πόλιν αἰρήσεις, αὐτῷ δέ σοι  
 φυλακτέα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῆδε τῆ ἡμέρα.

27. Ταῦτα ἀκούσας Ἀλέξανδρος τέως μὲν πρὸς  
 ταῖς μηχαναῖς ἔξω βέλους αὐτὸν εἶχεν· ὡς δὲ  
 ἐκδρομὴ τε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καρτερὰ ἐγίγνετο καὶ  
 πῦρ τε ἐπέφερον ταῖς μηχαναῖς οἱ Ἀραβες καὶ τοὺς  
 Μακεδόνας ἀμυνομένους κάτωθεν αὐτοὶ ἐξ ὑπερδε-  
 ξίου τοῦ χωρίου ἔβαλλόν τε καὶ ὤθουν κατὰ τοῦ  
 ποιητοῦ χώματος, ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐκὼν ἀπειθεῖ Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος τῷ μάντει ἢ ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οὐκ  
 ἐμνημόνευσε τῆς μαντείας, ἀλλ' ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς

The engineers, however, suggested that it was impracticable to take the city by force owing to the height of the mound. Alexander thought, on the contrary, that the more impracticable it was, the more necessary was the capture; for the achievement would strike great terror into his enemies just because it was beyond calculation, while not to take it would be a blow to his prestige when reported to the Greeks and Darius.<sup>2</sup> It was decided to raise a mound all round the city, and so bring up the engines against the walls, at an equal height on the earth heaped up. The mound was built chiefly against the city's southern part of the wall, where the assault seemed most likely to succeed. When the Macedonians thought they had built the mound to the proper height, they set engines on it and brought them up against the city wall. Just at this time, as Alexander was sacrificing, wearing garlands, and just about to consecrate the first victim according to the ceremonial, a carnivorous bird, as it flew over the altar, dropped on his head a stone which it was carrying in its talons. Alexander asked Aristander the seer what the omen meant, and he answered, 'Sire, you will capture the city; but today you must take care of your own person.'

27. On hearing this Alexander kept himself for a time by the engines, out of range; but then there was a vigorous sally from the city, the Arabs tried to set fire to the engines, pelting the Macedonians, who were resisting below, from a commanding position, and pushing them down the artificial mound, and Alexander disobeyed the seer on purpose, unless he lost control of himself in the action and forgot the prophecy, for he brought up the hypaspists

<sup>2</sup> Cf. i 4, 3; 13, 6 f.; ii 4, 4; iv 21, 3; vi 16, 2; vii 15, 3.

- ὑπασπιστὰς παρεβοήθει, ἵνα μάλιστα ἐπιέζοντο οἱ  
 2 Μακεδόνες. καὶ τούτους μὲν ἔσχε τὸ μὴ οὐκ  
 αἰσχρᾶ φυγῇ ὠσθῆναι κατὰ τοῦ χώματος, αὐτὸς δὲ  
 βάλλεται καταπέλτη διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος διαμπὰξ καὶ  
 τοῦ θώρακος ἐς τὸν ὦμον. ὡς δὲ ἔγνω τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ  
 τραῦμα ἀληθεύσαντα Ἀρίστανδρον, ἐχάρη, ὅτι καὶ  
 τὴν πόλιν δὴ αἰρήσειν ἐδόκει Ἀριστάνδρου ἕνεκα.  
 3 Καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ τραῦμα ἐθεραπεύετο χαλεπῶς·  
 ἀφικνουῦνται δ' αὐτῷ μετάπεμπτοι ἀπὸ θαλάσσης αἱ  
 μηχαναί, αἷς Τύρον εἶλε. καὶ χῶμα χωννύναι ἐν  
 κύκλῳ πάντοθεν τῆς πόλεως ἐκέλευσεν, εὖρος μὲν  
 ἐς δύο σταδίους, ὕψος δὲ ἐς πόδας πενήκοντα καὶ  
 4 διακοσίους. ὡς δὲ αἶ τε μηχαναὶ αὐτῷ ἐποιήθησαν  
 καὶ ἐπαχθεῖσαι κατὰ τὸ χῶμα κατέσεισαν τοῦ  
 τείχους ἐπὶ πολὺ, ὑπονόμων τε ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη  
 ὀρυσσομένων καὶ τοῦ χουῦ ἀφανῶς ἐκφερομένου τὸ  
 τεῖχος πολλαχῆ ἠρείπετο ὑφιζάνον κατὰ τὸ κε-  
 νούμενον, τοῖς τε βέλεσιν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ  
 Μακεδόνες ἀναστέλλοντες τοὺς προμαχομένους τῶν  
 πύργων, ἐς μὲν τρεῖς προσβολὰς οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως  
 ἀποθνησκόντων τε αὐτοῖς πολλῶν καὶ τιτρωσκο-  
 5 μένων ὅμως ἀντεῖχον. τῇ τετάρτῃ δὲ τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων τὴν φάλαγγα πάντοθεν προσαγαγὼν Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος τῇ μὲν ὑπορυσσόμενον τὸ τεῖχος  
 καταβάλλει, τῇ δὲ παιόμενον ταῖς μηχαναῖς κατα-  
 σείει ἐπὶ πολὺ, ὡς μὴ χαλεπὴν ταῖς κλίμαξιν τὴν  
 6 προσβολὴν κατὰ τὰ ἐρημιμμένα ἐνδοῦναι. αἶ τε  
 οὖν κλίμακες προσήγοντο τῷ τείχει καὶ ἔρις πολλή  
 ἦν τῶν Μακεδόνων ὅσοι τι ἀρετῆς μετεποιοῦντο

<sup>1</sup> Though we could take the engines from Tyre to be additional to those mentioned in 26, 2 f., this sentence suggests



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 27. 1-6

and went to the help of the Macedonians where they were most hardly pressed. He did, in fact, stay them from being driven down the mound in ignominious flight, but was himself hit by a shot from a catapult right through his shield and corselet in the shoulder. But his knowledge that Aristander had been right about the wound made him glad, since on Aristander's account he thought that he would surely take the city too.

332  
B.C.

2

Alexander was not easily treated of his wound. However, the engines with which he had captured Tyre now arrived; he had sent for them by sea. He ordered a mound to be erected the whole way round the city, two stades broad, two hundred and fifty feet high.<sup>1</sup> When his engines had been constructed and brought up to the mound and had battered down much of the wall, tunnels were driven here and there and the earth below removed secretly, till the wall collapsed in several places, subsiding where the soil was emptied away, while the Macedonians controlled a large space with their volleys and drove back the defenders from the towers. The defenders, though losing many dead and wounded, held out against three onslaughts. But in the fourth Alexander brought up his phalanx of Macedonians on all sides, threw down the wall, now undermined, at one place, and brought it down for a great stretch in another, battered as it was with his engines, so that it was not hard to make the assault with ladders over the fallen parts. So the ladders were set against the wall, and there was much rivalry among those Macedonians who laid

3

4

5

6

that 26, 2-27, 2 and 27, 3 ff. are doublets, the first perhaps from Ar., the second from Pt. So Wirth *RE* xxiii 2472.

## ARRIAN

ὅστις πρῶτος αἰρήσει τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ αἰρεῖ πρῶτος  
Νεοπτόλεμος τῶν ἐταίρων τοῦ Αἰακιδῶν γένους·  
ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ ἄλλαι καὶ ἄλλαι τάξεις ὁμοῦ τοῖς  
7 ἡγεμόσιν ἀνέβαινον. ὡς δὲ ἅπαξ παρηλθόν τινες  
ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τῶν Μακεδόνων, κατασχίσαντες  
ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας πύλας, ὅσαις ἕκαστοι ἐπετύγχανον,  
δέχονται εἴσω τὴν στρατιὰν πᾶσαν. οἱ δὲ Γαζαῖοι  
καὶ τῆς πόλεως σφισιν ἤδη ἐχομένης ξυνεστηκότες  
ὁμως ἐμάχοντο, καὶ ἀπέθανον πάντες αὐτοῦ μαχό-  
μενοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐτάχθησαν· παῖδας δὲ καὶ  
γυναῖκας ἐξηνδραπόδισεν αὐτῶν Ἀλέξανδρος. τὴν  
πόλιν δὲ ξυνοικίσας ἐκ τῶν περιοίκων ἐχρήτη ὅσα  
φρουρίῳ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον.

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER II. 27. 6-7

some claim to distinction for their courage, which would take the wall first; the first was Neoptolemus, one of the Companions and of the family of the Aeacidae. After him, battalion after battalion went up with their officers. As soon as some of the Macedonians had got inside the wall they tore down gate after gate, as they came to them, and admitted the entire army. The Gazaeans held together and continued to resist, though their city was already in enemy hands; and all perished there, fighting each man at his post. Alexander sold their women and children into slavery, populated the city from the surrounding tribesmen and used it as a fortress town for the war.<sup>2</sup>

332  
B.C.

7

<sup>2</sup> For other 'native' foundations by Al. cf. iv 28, 4; vi 17, 4; *Ind.* 40, 7 f.; perhaps vi 22, 3 (cf. QC. ix 10, 7); QC. ix 10, 3; n. on A. iii 24, 5. QC. iv 6, 31 here says that after the capture Al. despatched Amyntas to levy reinforcements in Macedon; for their arrival cf. A. iii 16, 10. Probably A. omitted this item, which would have been in his source.



# BOOK III

## ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ

1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου, ἵναπερ τὸ  
πρῶτον ὠρμήθη, ἐστέλλετο, καὶ ἑβδόμη ἡμέρα  
ἀπὸ τῆς Γάζης ἐλαύνων ἦκεν εἰς Πηλούσιον τῆς  
Αἰγύπτου. ὁ δὲ ναυτικὸς στρατὸς παρέπλει αὐτῷ  
2 τὰς ναῦς ἐν Πηλουσίῳ ὀρμούσας. Μαζάκης δὲ ὁ  
Πέρσης, ὃς ἦν σατράπης Αἰγύπτου ἐκ Δαρείου  
καθεστηκώς, τὴν τε ἐν Ἴσσω μάχην ὅπως συνέβη  
πεπυσμένος καὶ Δαρείον ὅτι αἰσχροῦ φυγῆ ἔφυγεν,  
καὶ Φοινίκην τε καὶ Συρίαν καὶ τῆς Ἀραβίας τὰ  
πολλὰ ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐχόμενα, αὐτῷ τε οὐκ  
οὔσης δυνάμεως Περσικῆς, ἐδέχετο ταῖς τε πόλεσι  
3 φιλίως καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ Ἀλέξανδρον. ὁ δὲ εἰς μὲν  
Πηλούσιον φυλακὴν εἰσήγαγε, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν  
νεῶν ἀναπλεῖν κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν κελεύσας ἔστε ἐπὶ  
Μέμφιν πόλιν αὐτὸς ἐφ' Ἡλιουπόλεως ἦει,  
ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Νεῖλον, καὶ ὅσα  
καθ' ὁδὸν χωρία ἐνδιδόντων τῶν ἐνοικούντων  
κατασχῶν διὰ τῆς ἐρήμου ἀφίκετο εἰς Ἡλιούπολιν.  
4 ἐκεῖθεν δὲ διαβὰς τὸν πόρον ἦκεν εἰς Μέμφιν· καὶ  
θύει ἐκεῖ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις θεοῖς καὶ τῷ Ἄπιδι καὶ  
ἀγῶνα ἐποίησε γυμνικόν τε καὶ μουσικόν· ἦκον δὲ  
αὐτῷ οἱ ἀμφὶ ταῦτα τεχνῖται ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οἱ

<sup>1</sup> Nov. 332 B.C., cf. ii 26, 1 n., the right season for invading Egypt.

<sup>2</sup> The Persian garrison had presumably been removed to fight at Issus under the satrap, Sauaces, ii 11, 8.

## BOOK III

332-1  
B.C.

1. Alexander now set out for Egypt, his original goal, and marching from Gaza arrived after six days at Pelusium in Egypt.<sup>1</sup> His fleet coasted along with him from Phoenicia towards Egypt; and he found them already at anchor at Pelusium. Mazaces the Persian, who had been appointed satrap of Egypt by Darius, on learning how the battle of Issus had gone, of the shameful flight of Darius, and that Phoenicia, Syria, and the greater part of Arabia were in Alexander's hands, and being without any Persian force,<sup>2</sup> received Alexander in a friendly way into the cities and the country.<sup>3</sup> Alexander put a garrison into Pelusium, told the officers of his fleet to sail up the river as far as Memphis and went in person towards Heliopolis, with the river Nile on his right; he took over all the districts on his route through the surrender of the inhabitants, and traversed the desert to reach Heliopolis. Thence he crossed the river and went to Memphis, where he sacrificed to the gods, especially Apis, and held athletic and musical games; the most famous performers in both athletics

<sup>1</sup> D. 49, 1 f. and QC. iv 7, 1 ff. rightly stress that the Egyptians, who had been independent of Persia between 405 B.C. and the imperfect reconquest by Artaxerxes Ochus in 343/2 B.C. and again in 338-6 B.C. (F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Gesch. Aegyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert* 102 ff.; A. T. Olmstead, *Hist. of Persian Empire* 440 f.; 491 ff.), welcomed the enemy of Persia (cf. also ii 13, 3 n.), especially no doubt as he, unlike Ochus, was careful to honour Egyptian gods (§ 4 f.).



## ARRIAN

δοκιμώτατοι. ἐκ δὲ Μέμφιος κατέπλει κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν λαβῶν καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἄγριανας καὶ τῶν ἰππέων τὴν βασιλικὴν ἴλην τὴν  
 5 τῶν ἐταίρων. ἔλθων δὲ ἐς Κάνωβον καὶ κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Μαρίαν περιπλεύσας ἀποβαίνει, ὅπου νῦν Ἀλεξάνδρεια πόλις ᾠκισται, Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπώνυμος. καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος κάλλιστος κτίσαι ἐν αὐτῷ πόλιν καὶ γενέσθαι ἂν εὐδαίμονα τὴν πόλιν. πόθος οὖν λαμβάνει αὐτὸν τοῦ ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ σημεῖα τῇ πόλει ἔθηκεν, ἵνα τε ἀγορὰν ἐν αὐτῇ δείμασθαι ἔδει καὶ ἱερά ὅσα καὶ θεῶν ὠντινων, τῶν μὲν Ἑλληνικῶν, Ἴσιδος δὲ Αἰγυπτίας, καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἦ περιβεβληθῆσθαι. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐθύετο, καὶ τὰ ἱερά καλὰ ἐφαίνετο.

2. Λέγεται δὲ τις καὶ τοιόσδε λόγος, οὐκ ἄπιστος ἔμοιγε· ἐθέλειν μὲν Ἀλέξανδρον καταλείπειν αὐτὸν τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ τειχισμού τοῖς τέκτοσιν, οὐκ εἶναι δὲ ὅτῳ τὴν γῆν ἐπιγράψουσιν· τῶν δὲ τεκτόνων τινὰ ἐπιφρασθέντα, ὅσα ἐν τεύχεσιν ἄλφита οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκόμιζον ξυναγαγόντα ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ γῆ, ἵναπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑφηγεῖτο, καὶ τὸν κύκλον οὕτω περιγραφῆναι τοῦ περιτειχισμού, ὅντινα τῇ  
 2 πόλει ἐποίει. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλεξαμένους τοὺς μάντεις καὶ μάλιστα δὴ Ἀρίστανδρον τὸν Τελμισσέα, ὃς δὴ

<sup>4</sup> Cf. P. 26; D. 52, QC. iv 8, 1 f. and 5 f. and J. xi 11, 3 put the foundation of Alexandria after the visit to Siwah, cf. App. V 1. Site: Strabo xvii 1, 6 f.; P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* ch. 1. Strabo says that the settlers were natives (cf. QC. iv 8, 5), mercenaries and Greeks; for parallels: A.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 1. 4-2. 2

and music came to him there from Greece. From Memphis he sailed downstream towards the sea, taking on board the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians, and from the cavalry the royal squadron of the Companions. When he had reached Canopus and sailed round Lake Mareotis, he went ashore where the city of Alexandria, named after him, is now situated. It struck him that the position was admirable for founding a city there and that it would prosper.<sup>4</sup> A longing for the work therefore seized him;<sup>5</sup> he himself marked out where the city's marketplace was to be built, how many temples there were to be and the gods, some Greek, and Isis the Egyptian, for whom they were to be erected, and where the wall was to be built round it. With this in view he offered sacrifice, and the sacrifice proved favourable.

332-1  
B.C.

2. A story of the following sort is told,<sup>1</sup> and personally I do not disbelieve it; Alexander desired to leave the builders outlines of the fortification, but had no means of marking the ground. One of the builders, however, had the happy thought of collecting the meal which the soldiers carried in vessels, and of dropping it on the ground wherever the king indicated. In this way was the circle of the surrounding wall which he proposed to make for the city marked out. The soothsayers, and especially Aristander the Telmissian, who was reported to have

iv 4, 1; 22, 5; 24, 7; v 29, 3; vii 21, 7. A's motives for founding cities: iv 1, 3 f.; 24, 7; vi 15, 2; 21, 5; 22, 3; vii 21, 7. He inherited from Philip the practice of commemorating his own name in such foundations, cf. Philippi, Philippopolis.

<sup>4</sup> App. V 3.

<sup>1</sup> 'Vulgate', cf. QC. iv 8, 6; P. 26. For A's comment, cf. his preface.

## ARRIAN

πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἀληθεῦσαι ἐλέγετο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, φάναι εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν εἶνεκα.

- 3 Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Ἡγέλοχος κατέπλευσεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον καὶ ἀπαγγέλλει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ Τενεδίους τε ἀποστάντας Περσῶν σφίσι προσθέσθαι (καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄκοντας Πέρσαις προσχωρήσαι) καὶ Χίων ὅτι δὴ ὁ δῆμος ἐπηγάγετο σφᾶς βία τῶν κατεχόντων τὴν πόλιν, οὗς Αὐτοφραδάτης τε καὶ Φαρνάβαζος
- 4 ἐγκατέστησαν· ἀλῶναι δὲ αὐτόθι καὶ Φαρνάβαζον ἐγκαταληφθέντα καὶ Ἀριστόνικον Μηθυμναῖον τὸν τύραννον ἐσπλεύσαντα ἐς τὸν λιμένα τῆς Χίου ξὺν ἡμιολίαις ληστρικαῖς πέντε, ὑπὸ σφῶν ἐχόμενον τὸν λιμένα οὐ γνόντα, ἀλλ' ἐξαπατηθέντα γὰρ πρὸς τῶν τὰ κλειῖθρα ἐχόντων τοῦ λιμένος, ὅτι τὸ
- 5 Φαρναβάζου ἄρα ναυτικὸν ὄρμει ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ληστὰς πάντας αὐτοῦ κατακοπήναι πρὸς σφῶν, Ἀριστόνικον δὲ ἦγε παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Ἀπολλωνίδην τὸν Χίον καὶ Φησίνον καὶ Μεγαρέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοι τῆς τε ἀποστάσεως τῆς Χίων ξυνεπελάβοντο καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε τὰ πράγματα
- 6 τῆς νήσου βία εἶχον· καὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ Χάρητα ἔχοντα ὅτι ἀφείλετο καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν Λέσβῳ πόλεις καὶ αὐτὰς ὁμολογία προσηγάγετο, Ἀμφοτερόν δὲ σὺν ἐξήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπὶ Κῷ ἔπεμψεν· ἐπικαλεῖσθαι γὰρ σφᾶς τοὺς Κῶους· καὶ αὐτὸς καταπλεύσας ὅτι εὔρε τὴν Κῷ πρὸς Ἀμφοτεροῦ
- 7 ἤδη ἐχομένην· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ὅσοι αἰχμάλωτοι ἦγεν Ἡγέλοχος, Φαρνάβαζος δὲ ἀπέδρα ἐν Κῷ λαθὼν τοὺς φύλακας. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τοὺς τυράννους μὲν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐς τὰς πόλεις πέμπει χρήσασθαι ὅπως ἐθέλοιεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀμφὶ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 2. 2-7

made many other correct prophecies to Alexander, reflecting upon this, said that the city would be prosperous in general, but particularly in the fruits of the earth.

332-1  
B.C.

Hegelochus now arrived by sea in Egypt and reported to Alexander that the people of Tenedos had revolted from the Persians and come over to them (in fact they had joined the Persians against their will) and that the people of Chios had brought his forces into the city, in spite of the men occupying it, installed by Autophradates and Pharnabazus; Pharnabazus had been caught and captured there, with Aristonicus of Methymna, the tyrant, who had sailed into the harbour of Chios with five pirate frigates, unaware that the Macedonians were in possession of the harbour, for he had been misled by the assertion of the men in control of the boom to the harbour, that Pharnabazus' fleet was anchored there; the pirates had all been cut down by his own men, but he had brought Aristonicus to Alexander, with Apollonides the Chian and Phesinus and Megareus and the rest of those who had assisted the revolt of the Chians, and who were for the time ruling the island by force. He reported also that he had captured Mitylene from Chares, and had won over by agreement the other cities in Lesbos as well. He had sent Amphoterus with sixty ships to Cos on appeal from the people of Cos, and had sailed himself to Cos and found it already in the possession of Amphoterus. All the remaining captives Hegelochus brought with him, except Pharnabazus, who had slipped his guards in Cos and escaped. Alexander sent the tyrants to the cities from which they came, to be treated as the citizens pleased; but the Chians with Apollonides

## ARRIAN

Ἐπολιωνίδην τοὺς Χίους εἰς Ἐλεφαντίνην πόλιν Αἰγυπτίαν ξὺν φυλακῇ ἀκριβεῖ ἔπεμψεν.

3. Ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ πόθος λαμβάνει αὐτὸν ἔλθειν παρ' Ἄμμωνα εἰς Λιβύην, τὸ μὲν τι τῷ θεῷ χρησόμενον, ὅτι ἀτρεκὲς ἐλέγεται εἶναι τὸ μαντεῖον τοῦ Ἄμμωνος καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ Περσέα καὶ Ἡρακλέα, τὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν Γοργόνα ὅτε πρὸς Πολυδέκτου ἐστέλλετο, τὸν δὲ ὅτε παρ' Ἀνταίων ἦει εἰς Διβύην καὶ παρὰ Βούσιριν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.
- 2 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ φιλοτιμία ἦν πρὸς Περσέα καὶ Ἡρακλέα, ἀπὸ γένους τε ὄντι τοῦ ἀμφοῖν καὶ τι καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γενέσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ εἰς Ἄμμωνα ἀνέφερε, καθάπερ οἱ μῦθοι τὴν Ἡρακλέους τε καὶ Περσέως εἰς Δία. καὶ οὖν παρ' Ἄμμωνα ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ ἐστέλλετο, ὡς καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀτρεκέστερον εἰσόμενος ἢ φήσων γε ἐγνωκέναι.
- 3 Μέχρι μὲν δὴ Παραιτονίου παρὰ θάλασσαν ἦει δι' ἐρήμου, οὐ μόντοι δι' ἀνύδρου τῆς χώρας, σταδίους εἰς χιλίους καὶ ἑξακοσίους, ὡς λέγει Ἀριστόβουλος. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν ἐτράπετο, ἵνα τὸ μαντεῖον ἦν τοῦ Ἄμμωνος. ἔστι δὲ ἐρήμη τε ἢ ὁδὸς καὶ ψάμμος ἢ πολλὴ αὐτῆς καὶ
- 4 ἀνυδρὸς. ὕδωρ δὲ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πολὺ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐγένετο, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνηνέχθη. ἀνηνέχθη δὲ εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τόδε· ἄνεμος νότος ἐπὶ πνεύσῃ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χώρῳ, τῆς ψάμμου ἐπιφορεῖ κατὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ ἀφανίζεται τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ σημεῖα οὐδὲ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ἵνα χρὴ πορεύεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν πελάγει τῇ ψάμμῳ, ὅτι σημεῖα οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν

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<sup>2</sup> A. returns to his main source(s), who normally recorded actions in which Al. was not personally engaged, not when

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 2. 7-3. 4

were sent to the city of Elephantine in Egypt, with a strong guard.<sup>2</sup>

332-1  
B.C.

3. After this a longing seized Alexander to pay a visit to Ammon in Libya, for one reason to consult the god, since the oracle of Ammon was said to be infallible, and to have been consulted by Perseus, when he was sent by Polydectes against the Gorgon, and by Heracles when he was on his way into Libya to find Antaeus, and into Egypt to find Busiris. Alexander sought to rival Perseus and Heracles, as he was descended from them both; and in addition he himself traced his birth in part to Ammon, just as the legends traced that of Heracles and Perseus to Zeus. In any case he set out for Ammon with this idea, hoping to secure more exact knowledge of his affairs, or at least to say he had secured it.<sup>1</sup>

331  
B.C.

As far as Paraetonium [Mersah Matruh] he went along the coast through country which, though desert, is not wholly waterless, a distance of sixteen hundred stades, as Aristobulus tells us. There he turned into the interior, where the oracle of Ammon lay. The route is desolate; most of it is sand, and waterless. Alexander, however, had plenty of rain, and this was attributed to the divinity. And so was the following incident. Whenever a south wind blows in that country, it makes a great heap of sand on the route and obscures its marks, and one cannot get one's bearings in a sort of ocean of sand, since

they occurred but when they were reported to him. QC. iv 8, 11-13 (with other particulars) puts Al's decisions about the Greek islands after the visit to Siwah, cf. 5, 1 n. See also App. II. Al's imprisonment of the Chian oligarchs hardly gave effect to Chios' decree (Tod 192) that they should be tried by the Greek *synedrion*.

<sup>1</sup> For the visit to the oracle of Ammon in the oasis of Siwah see App. V; for Heracles and Perseus, App. IV.



ὁδὸν οὔτε που ὄρος οὔτε δένδρον οὔτε γήλοφοι  
 βέβαιοι ἀνεστηκότες, οἷσιν οἱ ὀδίται τεκμαίροντο  
 ἂν τὴν πορείαν, καθάπερ οἱ ναῦται τοῖς ἄστροις·  
 ἀλλὰ ἐπλανᾶτο γὰρ ἡ στρατιὰ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ οἱ  
 5 ἡγεμόνες τῆς ὁδοῦ ἀμφίβολοι ἦσαν. Πτολεμαῖος  
 μὲν δὴ ὁ Λάγου λέγει δράκοντας δύο ἰέναι πρὸ τοῦ  
 στρατεύματος φωνὴν ἰέντας, καὶ τούτοις Ἀλέξαν-  
 δρον κελεῦσαι ἔπεσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας πιστεύ-  
 σαντας τῷ θεῷ, τοὺς δὲ ἡγήσασθαι τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν  
 6 τε εἰς τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ὀπίσω αὐθις· Ἀριστόβουλος  
 δέ, καὶ ὁ πλείων λόγος ταύτη κατέχει, κόρακας δύο  
 προπετομένους πρὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς, τούτους γενέσθαι  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας. καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι  
 ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ  
 εἰκὸς ταύτη ἔχει, τὸ δὲ ἀτρεκὲς τοῦ λόγου ἀφεί-  
 λοντο οἱ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

4. Ὁ δὲ χῶρος, ἵναπερ τοῦ Ἀμμωνος τὸ ἱερόν  
 ἐστι, τὰ μὲν κύκλῳ πάντα ἔρημα καὶ ψάμμον τὸ  
 πᾶν ἔχει καὶ ἄνυδρον, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν μέσῳ ὀλίγος ὢν  
 (ὅσον γὰρ πλείστον αὐτοῦ εἰς πλάτος διέχει εἰς  
 τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους ἔρχεται) κατά-  
 πλεῶς ἐστὶν ἡμέρων δένδρων, ἐλαιῶν καὶ φοινίκων,  
 2 καὶ ἔνδροσος μόνος τῶν πέριξ. καὶ πηγὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ  
 ἀνίσχει οὐδέν τι εἰκυῖα ταῖς πηγαῖς, ὅσαι ἄλλαι ἐκ  
 γῆς ἀνίσχουσιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ μεσημβρία ψυχρὸν τὸ  
 ὕδωρ γευσάμενῳ τε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀψαμένῳ οἶον  
 ψυχρότατον· ἐγκλίνας δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου εἰς ἑσπέραν  
 θερμότερον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας ἔτι θερμότερον  
 ἔστε ἐπὶ μέσας τὰς νύκτας, μέσων δὲ νυκτῶν  
 ἑαυτοῦ θερμότερον· ἀπὸ δὲ μέσων νυκτῶν ψύχεται  
 ἐν τάξει, καὶ ἔωθεν ψυχρὸν ἤδη ἐστί, ψυχρότατον  
 δὲ μεσημβρίας· καὶ τοῦτο ἀμείβει ἐν τάξει ἐπὶ



## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 3. 4-4. 2

there are no marks along the route, no mountain any-  
where, no tree, no solid hillocks standing up, by  
which the wayfarers might judge their proper course,  
as sailors do from the stars; in fact Alexander's army  
went astray, and the guides were in doubt as to the  
route. Now Ptolemy son of Lagos says that two 5  
serpents preceded the army giving voice, and Alex-  
ander told his leaders to follow them and trust the  
divinity; and the serpents led the way to the oracle  
and back again. But Aristobulus agrees with the 6  
more common and prevalent version, that two crows,  
flying in advance of the army, acted as guides to  
Alexander. That some divine help was given him I  
can confidently assert, because probability suggests it  
too; but the exact truth of the story cannot be told;  
that is precluded by the way in which different  
writers about Alexander have given different ac-  
counts.

4. The district [Siwah] in which the Temple of Am-  
mon lies is desert all round, covered with sand, and  
without water. But the site in the centre, which is  
small (for its broadest stretch only comes to about  
forty stades), is full of garden trees, olives and palms,  
and of all the surrounding country it alone catches  
the dew. A spring, too, rises from it, not at all like 2  
other springs which rise from the ground. For at  
midday the water is cold to the taste and even more  
to the touch, as cold as can be, but when the sun  
sinks towards evening it is warmer, and from evening  
on it grows warmer and warmer till midnight, and at  
midnight it is at its warmest; but after midnight it  
cools off in turn, and from dawn onwards it is already  
cold, but coldest at midday. This change occurs

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3 ἐκάστη [τῆ] ἡμέρα. γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἅλεις  
 αὐτόματοι ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ τούτῳ ὄρυκτοί· καὶ  
 τούτων ἔστιν οὓς ἐς Αἴγυπτον φέρουσι τῶν ἱερέων  
 τινὲς τοῦ Ἄμμωνος. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐπ' Αἴγύπτου  
 οτέλλωνται, ἐς κοιτίδας πλεκτὰς ἐκ φοίνικος  
 ἐσβαλόντες δῶρον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποφέρουσιν ἢ εἴ τῳ  
 4 ἄλλῳ. ἔστι δὲ μακρὸς τε ὁ χόνδρος (ἤδη <δέ>  
 τινες αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τρεῖς δακτύλους) καὶ  
 καθαρὸς ὥσπερ κρύσταλλος· καὶ τούτῳ ἐπὶ ταῖς  
 θυσίαις χρῶνται, ὡς καθαρωτέρῳ τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσ-  
 σης ἁλῶν, Αἴγύπτιοί τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τοῦ θείου  
 5 οὐκ ἀμελῶς ἔχουσιν. ἐνταῦθα Ἀλέξανδρος τὸν τε  
 χῶρον ἐθαύμασε καὶ τῷ θεῷ ἐχρήσατο· καὶ  
 ἀκούσας ὅσα αὐτῷ πρὸς θυμοῦ ἦν, ὡς ἔλεγεν,  
 ἀνέζευξεν ἐπ' Αἴγύπτου, ὡς μὲν Ἀριστόβουλος  
 λέγει, τὴν αὐτὴν ὀπίσω ὁδόν, ὡς δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ  
 Λάγου, ἄλλην εὐθείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Μέμφιν.

5. Εἰς Μέμφιν δὲ αὐτῷ πρεσβεῖαί τε πολλαὶ ἐκ  
 τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦκον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντινα ἀτυχή-  
 σαντα ὧν ἐδεῖτο ἀπέπεμψε, καὶ στρατιὰ παραγί-  
 γνεται παρὰ μὲν Ἀντιπάτρου μισθοφόροι Ἕλληνες  
 ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὧν ἠγεῖτο Μενόϊτας <sup>1</sup> ὁ Ἠγησάν-  
 δρου, ἐκ Θράκης δὲ ἵππεῖς ἐς πεντακοσίους, ὧν  
 2 ἦρχεν Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ Εὐνίκου. ἐνταῦθα θύει  
 τῷ Διὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ πομπεῦει ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐν  
 τοῖς ὄπλοις καὶ ἀγῶνα ποιεῖ γυμνικὸν καὶ μουσικόν.  
 καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐνταῦθα ἐκόμησε· δύο  
 μὲν νομάρχας Αἴγύπτου κατέστησεν Αἴγυπτίους,  
 Δολόασπιν καὶ Πέτισιν, καὶ τούτοις διένειμε τὴν

<sup>1</sup> Μενόϊτας; some read Μενίδας (cf. iii 12, 3; 13, 3 etc).

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 4. 3-5. 2

regularly every day. Then there are natural salts in 3 331  
 this district, to be obtained by digging; some are B.C.  
 taken by priests of Ammon to Egypt. Whenever  
 they are going off to Egypt, they pack the salt into  
 baskets woven of palm leaves, to be conveyed as a  
 present to the king or to someone else. The grains 4  
 of this salt are large, some of them have been known  
 to be more than three fingers' breadth, and clear as  
 crystal. Egyptians and others who are particular  
 about religious observance use this salt in their  
 sacrifices, as being purer than the sea-salts. Now 5  
 Alexander surveyed the site with wonder, and made  
 his enquiry of the god; he received the answer his  
 heart desired, as he said, and turned back for Egypt,  
 by the same route according to Aristobulus, but  
 according to Ptolemy son of Lagos, by a different  
 way, direct to Memphis.

5. At Memphis many embassies reached him from  
 Greece, and he sent away no one disappointed in his  
 request.<sup>1</sup> He was also joined by a force sent by  
 Antipater, Greek mercenaries four hundred strong,  
 under the command of Menoetas<sup>2</sup> son of Hegesander,  
 and about five hundred Thracian horse, under com- 2  
 mand of Asclepiodorus son of Eunicus. Then Alex-  
 ander sacrificed to Zeus the King and held a proces-  
 sion with his force under arms and celebrated athletic  
 and musical games. He then made his arrangements  
 for Egypt; he appointed two Egyptians, Doloaspis  
 and Petisis as nomarchs, dividing the whole country

<sup>1</sup> The embassies may include that mentioned in ii 25, 4 n.,  
 but QC. iv 8, 12 f. specifically names Athens, Rhodes, Chios  
 and Mitylene, and Al. perhaps deferred decisions recorded in  
 2, 7 till now, so QC. He also makes Al. go up the Nile to  
 Memphis and beyond, iv 8, 2 and 7 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Or Menidas, see critical note.

## ARRIAN

3 χώραν τὴν Αἰγυπτίαν· Πετίσιος δὲ ἀπειπαμένου  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν Δολόασπις ἐκδέχεται πᾶσαν. φρουρ-  
 ἀρχοὺς δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐν Μέμφει μὲν Πανταλέοντα  
 κατέστησε τὸν Πυδναῖον, ἐν Πηλουσίῳ δὲ Πολέ-  
 μωνα τὸν Μεγακλέους Πελλαῖον· τῶν ξένων δὲ  
 ἀρχεῖν Λυκίδα Ἀἰτωλόν, γραμματέα δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ξένων Εὐγνωστον τὸν Ξενοφάντου τῶν ἐταίρων·  
 ἐπισκόπους δὲ αὐτῶν Αἰσχύλον τε καὶ Ἐφιππον  
 4 τὸν Χαλκιδέως.<sup>1</sup> Λιβύης δὲ τῆς προσχώρου  
 ἀρχεῖν δίδωσιν Ἀπολλώνιον Χαρίνου, Ἀραβίας δὲ  
 τῆς πρὸς Ἡρώων πόλει Κλεομένην τὸν ἐκ Ναυ-  
 κράτιος· καὶ τούτῳ παρηγγέλλετο τοὺς μὲν  
 νομάρχας εἶναι ἀρχεῖν τῶν νομῶν τῶν κατὰ σφᾶς  
 καθάπερ ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθειστήκει, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκλέγειν  
 παρ' αὐτῶν τοὺς φόρους· οἱ δὲ ἀποφέρειν αὐτῷ  
 5 ἐτάχθησαν. στρατηγοὺς δὲ τῇ στρατιᾷ κατέστη-  
 σεν, ἦντινα ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ὑπελείπετο, Πευκέσταν τε  
 τὸν Μακαρτάτου καὶ Βάλακρον τὸν Ἀμύντου,  
 ναύαρχον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν Πολέμωνα τὸν Θηραμέ-  
 νους· σωματοφύλακα δὲ ἀντὶ Ἀρρύβα<sup>2</sup> [τὸν]  
 Λεοννάτον τὸν † Ὀνάσου<sup>3</sup> ἔταξεν· Ἀρρύβας γὰρ  
 6 νόσῳ ἀπέθανεν. ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ  
 ἀρχὼν τῶν τοξοτῶν, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτου ἀρχεῖν  
 ἐπέστησε τοῖς τοξόταις Ὀμβρίωνα Κρήτα. ἐπὶ δὲ  
 τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς πεζοὺς, ὧν Βάλακρος ἡγεῖτο,

<sup>1</sup> Χαλκιδέως: Χαλκιδέα Geier.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀρρύββας would be the right form.

<sup>3</sup> Leonnatus is son Ἀντέου (vi 28. 4): Ἄνθους (Arrian ed. Roos vol. ii 254, 4), Εὐνού (*Ind.* 18. 3); the true name cannot be determined.

<sup>4</sup> Or, with Geier's emendation, 'a Chalcidean'; he can then be identified with Ehippus of Olynthus (since Olynthus had been the centre of the Chalcidean federation), author of a work

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 5. 2-6

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of Egypt between them; Petisis, however, declined  
the power, and Doloaspis took it all. As garrison 3  
commandants he appointed Companions, Pantaleon  
of Pydna at Memphis, and Polemon, son of Megacles  
of Pella at Pelusium; Lycidas, an Aetolian, was to  
command the mercenaries and Eugnostos son of  
Xenophantes, one of the Companions, to be secretary  
in charge of the mercenaries, with Aeschylus and  
Ephippus son of Chalcideus as their overseers.<sup>3</sup> The 4  
government of the neighbouring country of Libya  
was given to Apollonius son of Charinus; and that of  
Arabia round Heroönpolis to Cleomenes from Nau-  
cratis.<sup>4</sup> He was instructed to permit the nomarchs  
to govern their own districts in accordance with the  
ancient practices, but to exact the tribute from them  
himself, while they were ordered to pay it over to  
him. As generals of the army which he was leaving 5  
behind in Egypt he appointed Peucestas son of  
Macartatus and Balacrus son of Amyntas, and as  
admiral of the fleet, Polemon son of Theramenes.  
As bodyguard in place of Arrhybas, who had died of  
disease, he appointed Leonnatus son of Anteas.  
Antiochus, the commander of the archers, had also 6  
died, and in his place Alexander appointed as com-  
mander of the archers Ombrion, a Cretan. The  
allied infantry, of which Balacrus had been com-

'On the Death of Al. and Hephæstion' (Jacoby no. 126), very hostile to Al., as one might expect most of those who came from a city Philip had destroyed to have been, though the attitude is stranger if Ephippus, like Callisthenes, had taken service with Al., and might, if the identification is right, be more plausibly connected with Al's treatment of Callisthenes. However, Chalcideus is attested as a personal name, and emendation is not required.

<sup>4</sup> See vii 23, 6 ff. with notes. The other officers named are totally or almost unknown.

## ARRIAN

ἔπει Βάλακρος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ὑπελείπετο, Κάλανον  
 7 κατέστησεν ἡγεμόνα. κατανεῖμαι δὲ λέγεται ἐς  
 πολλοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὴν τε φύσιν τῆς  
 χώρας θαυμάσας καὶ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, ὅτι οὐκ  
 ἀσφαλές οἱ ἐφαίνετο ἐνὶ ἐπιτρέψαι ἄρχειν Αἰγύπτου  
 πάσης. καὶ Ῥωμαῖοί μοι δοκοῦσι παρ' Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου μαθόντες ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν Αἴγυπτον καὶ  
 μηδένα τῶν ἀπὸ βουλῆς ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐκπέμπειν  
 ὑπαρχον Αἰγύπτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τοὺς ἰππέας  
 σφίσι ξυντελούντων.

6. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ὑποφαίνοντι ἐκ  
 Μέμφιος ἦει ἐπὶ Φοινίκης· καὶ ἐγεφυρώθη αὐτῷ ὅ  
 τε κατὰ Μέμφιν πόρος τοῦ Νείλου καὶ αἱ διώρυχες  
 αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι. ὡς δὲ ἀφίκετο ἐς Τύρον, καταλαμ-  
 βάνει ἐνταῦθα ἦκον αὐτῷ ἤδη καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν.  
 ἐν Τύρῳ δὲ αὖθις θύει τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ ἀγῶνα  
 2 ποιεῖ γυμνικόν τε καὶ μουσικόν. ἐνταῦθα ἀφικνεῖ-  
 ται παρ' αὐτὸν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἡ Πάραλος πρέσβεις  
 ἄγουσα Διόφαντον καὶ Ἀχιλλέα· ξυνεπρέσβευον δὲ  
 αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ Πάραλοι ξύμπαντες. καὶ οὗτοι τῶν  
 τε ἄλλων ἔτυχον ὧν ἔνεκα ἐστάλησαν καὶ τοὺς  
 αἰχμαλώτους ἀφῆκεν Ἀθηναίοις ὅσοι ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ

<sup>5</sup> QC. iv 8, 4f. names only Aeschylus of Rhodes and Peucestas the Macedonian, who were 'put in charge' of Egypt with 4,000 soldiers, Apollonius 'put in charge' of the adjoining region of Africa, Cleomenes appointed to collect the taxes of Egypt and Africa, and Polemon to protect the mouths of the Nile with 30 triremes. Clearly Al. divided civil administration from military command, and gave Cleomenes special fiscal duties as well as other civil powers in 'Arabia'; for 'Arabia' and 'Libya' cf. Strabo xvii 1, 30, which does not make clear their delimitation from Upper Egypt. The military arrangements are impenetrable. Berve distinguished the 'army' of



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 5. 6-6. 2

mander, were placed under Calanus, since Balacrus was being left behind in Egypt.<sup>5</sup> It is said that he divided the government of Egypt between many officers, as he was strongly impressed by the character and defensibility of the country and did not think it safe to entrust the command of all Egypt to one man.<sup>6</sup> The Romans, I think, learnt from Alexander to keep a watch on Egypt, and never to send anyone from the Senate as governor, but only those whom they class as Knights.<sup>7</sup>

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6. When spring began to show itself, Alexander started from Memphis for Phoenicia; bridges were made for him to cross over the river Nile at Memphis and over all its canals. When he reached Tyre, he found his fleet had already arrived there. At Tyre he sacrificed a second time to Heracles and held athletic and musical games.<sup>1</sup> There the *Paralus*<sup>2</sup> from Athens reached him, bringing Diophantus and Achilles as envoys; the entire crew of the *Paralus* were associated with them in the embassy. They achieved all the objects of their mission; in particular Alexander gave up to the Athenians all the Athenians

2

Peucestas and Balacrus from the mercenaries: not convincing. For a consortium of generals cf. the later arrangements in Media (vi 27, 3). I doubt if A. or QC. gives a true picture. Recent history suggested that the danger for Al. lay in native revolt strengthened by Greek mercenaries: a wholly divided command would have been least fitted to prevent this.

<sup>5</sup> Pt. in fact used the natural strength of Egypt to turn himself from satrap into independent king. But I doubt for that reason if the comment is his: more probably 'vulgate'.

<sup>7</sup> A's comment; in fact the circumstances and Roman organization were different, cf. Tacitus, *Annals* ii 59; *Histories* i 11; Dio Cassius li 17.

<sup>1</sup> QC iv 8, 16; P. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Athens' sacred galley, used to convey ambassadors.



## ARRIAN

- 3 Ἀθηναίων ἐάλωσαν. τὰ δὲ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὅτι αὐτῶ νεωτερίσθαι ἀπήγγελλτο, Ἀμφοτερόν πέμπει βοηθεῖν Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι ἔς τε τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον βέβαιοι ἦσαν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ κατήκουον. Φοίνιξι δὲ καὶ Κυπρίοις προσετάχθη ἑκατὸν ναῦς ἄλλας πρὸς αἷς ἔχοντα Ἀμφοτερόν ἔπεμπε στέλλειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου.
- 4 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἤδη ἄνω ὠρμάτο ὡς ἐπὶ Θάψακόν τε καὶ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν, ἐν Φοινίκη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν φόρων τῇ συλλογῇ καταστήσας Κοίρανον Βεροιαῖον, Φιλόξενον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου ἐκλέγειν. τῶν ξὺν αὐτῶ δὲ χρημάτων τὴν φυλακὴν ἀντὶ τούτων ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀρπάλῳ τῷ Μαχάτα ἄρτι
- 5 ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς ἦκοντι. Ἀρπαλος γὰρ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἔφυγε, Φιλίππου ἔτι βασιλεύοντος, ὅτι πιστὸς ἦν (Ἀλεξάνδρῳ<sup>1</sup>), καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου ἐπὶ τῶ αὐτῶ ἔφυγε καὶ Νέαρχος ὁ Ἀνδροτίμου καὶ Ἐριγύϊος ὁ Λαρίχου καὶ Λαομέδων ὁ τούτου ἀδελφός, ὅτι ὑποπτα ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς Φίλιππον, ἐπειδὴ Εὐρυδίκην γυναῖκα ἠγάγετο Φίλιππος, Ὀλυμπιάδα δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου μητέρα
- 6 ἠτίμασε. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Φιλίππου κατελθόντας ἀπὸ τῆς φυγῆς ὅσοι δι' αὐτὸν ἔφευγον Πτολεμαῖον μὲν σωματοφύλακα κατέστησεν, Ἀρπαλον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὅτι αὐτῶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς τὰ πολέμια ἀχρεῖον ἦν, Ἐριγύϊον δὲ ἱππάρχην τῶν συμμάχων, Λαομέδοντα δὲ τὸν τούτου ἀδελφόν, ὅτι δίγλωσσος ἦν [ἐς τὰ βαρβαρικὰ γράμματα],<sup>2</sup> ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις βαρβάροις, Νέαρχον δὲ σατραπεύειν Λυκίας

<sup>1</sup> I have followed a suggestion of Roos and inserted Ἀλεξάνδρῳ. Arrian's style always favours absolute explicitness.

<sup>2</sup> [ἐς . . . γράμματα]. Surely a gloss.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 6. 3-6

captured at the Granicus.<sup>3</sup> On learning that there 3 331  
 was a movement of revolt against him in the Pelopon- B.C.  
 nese, he sent Amphoterus to help the Peloponnesians  
 who were loyal in regard to the Persian war and were  
 not giving ear to the Lacedaemonians. Orders were  
 also given to the Phoenicians and Cyprians to send to  
 the Peloponnese a hundred ships in addition to those  
 he was despatching under command of Amphoterus.

Alexander himself was already starting inland 4  
 towards Thapsacus and the river Euphrates, after  
 appointing Coeranus, a Beroean, to collect taxes in  
 Phoenicia, and Philoxenus to be collector in Asia this  
 side of the Taurus.<sup>4</sup> In their place he entrusted the  
 custody of the moneys with him to Harpalus son of  
 Machatas, who had just returned from exile; 5  
 Harpalus had first been sent into exile while Philip  
 was still on the throne, because he was loyal to  
 Alexander; Ptolemy son of Lagos was exiled on the  
 same account, with Nearchus son of Androtimus,  
 Erigyius son of Larichus and Laomedon his brother,  
 since there was a lack of confidence between Alex-  
 ander and Philip after Philip took Eurydice to wife,  
 and disgraced Olympias the mother of Alexander.<sup>5</sup>  
 On Philip's death those who had been banished on 6  
 Alexander's account returned, Ptolemy was ap-  
 pointed one of the bodyguards, Harpalus treasurer,  
 since his physique made him unfit for fighting,  
 Erigyius commander of the allied cavalry, Laomedon  
 his brother, since he was bilingual,<sup>6</sup> officer in charge  
 of the barbarian captives, and Nearchus satrap of

<sup>3</sup> Cf. i 29, 5; on § 3 f. see App. VI.

<sup>4</sup> See Badian, *GR* 1965, 168 f.; *Ancient Society and Institutions* (*Studies presented to V. L. Ehrenberg*) 54 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Introd. § 47; for the name Eurydice cf. Berve no. 434.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably meaning that he knew Persian or Aramaic.

## ARRIAN

καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης Λυκίας χώρας ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸν  
 7 Ταῦρον τὸ ὄρος. ὀλίγον δὲ πρόσθεν τῆς μάχης τῆς  
 ἐν Ἰσσω γενομένης ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς Ταυρίσκου  
 ἀνδρὸς κακοῦ Ἄρπαλος φεύγει ξὺν Ταυρίσκῳ.  
 καὶ ὁ μὲν Ταυρίσκος παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν  
 Ἡπειρώτην εἰς Ἰταλίαν σταλεὶς ἐκεῖ ἐτελεύτησεν,  
 Ἄρπάλῳ δὲ ἐν τῇ Μεγαρίδι ἡ φυγὴ ἦν. ἀλλὰ  
 Ἀλέξανδρος πείθει αὐτὸν κατελθεῖν πίστει δούς  
 οὐδέν οἱ μείον ἔσεσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ φυγῇ· οὐδὲ ἐγένετο  
 ἐπανελθόντι, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη  
 Ἄρπαλος. εἰς Λυδίαν δὲ σατράπην Μένανδρον  
 8 ἐκπέμπει τῶν ἐταίρων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ξένοις, ὧν  
 ἠγεῖτο Μένανδρος, Κλέαρχος<sup>1</sup> αὐτῷ ἐτάχθη.  
 ἀντὶ δὲ Ἀρίμμα<sup>1</sup> σατράπην Συρίας Ἀσκληπιό-  
 δωρον τὸν Εὐνίκου ἀπέδειξεν, ὅτι Ἀρίμματος βλακεῦ-  
 σαι ἐδόκει αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ παρασκευῇ, ἣντινα ἐτάχθη  
 παρασκευάσαι τῇ στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἄνω.  
 7. Καὶ ἀφίκετο εἰς Θάψακον Ἀλέξανδρος μηνὸς  
 Ἑκατομβαιῶνος ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησιν Ἀριστο-  
 φάνους· καὶ καταλαμβάνει δυοῖν γεφύραιν ἐξευγ-

<sup>1</sup> See historical note.

<sup>7</sup> Brother of Olympias, he was fighting for the Greek city of Taras against her south Italian neighbours and perished in 331/30 B.C.

<sup>8</sup> Probably an error, A's or a scribe's, for Cleander, cf. iii 12, 2; 26, 3; vi 27, 4.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. ii 13, 7 n. If the text is right, Arimmas had succeeded Menon for reasons unknown. Droysen, however, amended 'Arimmas' to 'Menon, son of Cerdimmas'. The conjecture is bold. QC. states (a) that after his capture of Damascus (A. ii 11, 10 n.) Parmenio (not Menon) was put in charge of Hollow Syria (iv 1, 4); (b) that after the capture of Tyre, where he presumably rejoined Al. (cf. A. ii 25), Parmenio handed over

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 6. 6-7. I

Lycia and the country bordering on Lycia as far as  
 Mount Taurus. But not long before the battle of  
 Issus Harpalus was led astray by Tauriscus, a scoun-  
 drel, and fled with him. Tauriscus made his way to  
 Italy to Alexander (King) of Epirus,<sup>7</sup> and died there;  
 Harpalus took refuge in the Megarid. However,  
 Alexander persuaded him to return, giving him  
 assurances that he would not suffer for his flight; and  
 in fact on his return he was again set in charge of the  
 treasure. Alexander sent Menander, one of the  
 Companions, to Lydia as satrap, appointing Clear-  
 chus<sup>8</sup> to command the mercenaries of whom Men-  
 ander had had charge. In place of Arimmas he made  
 Asclepiodorus son of Eunicus satrap of Syria, since  
 he considered Arimmas to have been slack in the  
 preparations he had been instructed to make for the  
 army in its march up country.<sup>9</sup>

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 B.C.

7

8

7. Alexander arrived at Thapsacus in the month  
 Hecatombaeon [July-Aug.] of the year in which  
 Aristophanes was archon at Athens.<sup>1</sup> There he

Hollow Syria to Andromachus (iv 5, 9); (c) that Andromachus,  
 whom Al. had put in charge of Syria, was burned alive by  
 the Samaritans, that Al. personally avenged him by an ex-  
 pedition presumably from Tyre in 331, and appointed Memnon  
 (editors 'Menon') in his place (iv 8, 9-11). As to (a) we can  
 suppose that Parmenio was in general control of Syria, so long  
 as he operated there with his expeditionary force (cf. his  
 operations in Phrygia, A. i 24, 3), without prejudice to the  
 appointment of Menon as permanent satrap and commander  
 in north Syria; as to (b) that Andromachus' province lay to the  
 south of Menon's province; as to (c) that Menon was trans-  
 ferred to this southern province on his death and himself re-  
 placed in the north by Arimmas. Cf. Bosworth, *CQ* 1975 with  
 valuable discussion of the varied meanings of Hollow Syria.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for chs 7-10 D. 53-6; QC. iv 9-11 (analogies both  
 with A. and variant tradition in D.); P. 31; J. xi 12; chrono-  
 logy, App. VIII 4 f.; route, App. VII.

- μένον τὸν πόρον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ Μαζαῖος, ὅτῳ ἢ φυλακὴ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐκ Δαρείου ἐπετέτραπτο, ἰππέας μὲν ἔχων περὶ τρισχιλίους, <πεζοὺς δὲ . . .><sup>1</sup> καὶ τούτων Ἑλληνας μισθοφόρους δισχιλίους, τέως μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ
- 2 ἐφύλασσε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐ ξυνεχῆς ἢ γέφυρα ἐξευγμένη ἦν ἔστε ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντιπέρας ὄχθην τοῖς Μακεδόσι, δειμαίνουσι μὴ ἐπιθοῖντο οἱ ἀμφὶ Μαζαῖον τῇ γεφύρᾳ ἵνα ἐπαύετο. Μαζαῖος δὲ ὡς ἤκουσεν ἤδη προσάγοντα Ἀλέξανδρον, ὤχετο φεύγων ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ πάσῃ. καὶ εὐθὺς ὡς ἔφυγε Μαζαῖος ἐπεβλήθησαν αἱ γέφυραι τῇ ὄχθῃ τῇ πέραν καὶ διέβη ἐπ' αὐτῶν ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 3 Ἐνθεν δὲ ἐχώρει ἄνω, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἔχων τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀρμενίας τὰ ὄρη, διὰ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας καλουμένης χώρας. οὐκ εὐθείαν δὲ ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος ἦγεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐφράτου ὀρμηθεῖς, ὅτι τὴν ἐτέραν ἰόντι εὐπορώτερα τὰ ξύμπαντα τῷ στρατῷ ἦν, καὶ χιλὸς τοῖς ἵπποις καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκ τῆς χώρας λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ
- 4 καῦμα οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἐπιφλέγον. ἀλόντες δέ τινες κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δαρείου στρατεύματος κατασκοπῆς ἔνεκα ἀπεσκεδασμένων ἐξήγγειλαν, ὅτι Δαρεῖος ἐπὶ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ κάθηται ἐγνωκῶς εἶργειν Ἀλέξανδρον, εἰ διαβαίνοι· καὶ εἶναι αὐτῷ στρατιὰν πολὺ μείζονα ἢ ξὺν ἢ ἐν
- 5 Κιλικίᾳ ἐμάχετο. ταῦτα ἀκούσας Ἀλέξανδρος ἦει σπουδῇ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Τίγρητα. ὡς δὲ ἀφίξετο, οὔτε αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον καταλαμβάνει οὔτε τὴν φυλακὴν,

<sup>1</sup> πέζους δὲ ἴσους Roos.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 7. 1-5

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found the river crossing secured by two bridges. The fact was that Mazaeus, to whom Darius had entrusted the defence of the river, with about three thousand cavalry and . . .<sup>2</sup> foot, including two thousand Greek mercenaries,<sup>3</sup> for some time kept guard over the river, and so the bridge had not been completed by the Macedonians right up to the opposite bank, for fear that Mazaeus' troops would attack the bridge where it stopped short; but on learning that Alexander was already marching up, Mazaeus hurried off with all his forces. As soon as Mazaeus fled, the bridges were carried right over to the far bank and Alexander crossed over them with his army. 2

Thence he continued inland through the country called Mesopotamia, keeping on his left the Euphrates and the mountains of Armenia. On setting out from the Euphrates he did not take the direct route for Babylon, since by going the other road all supplies were easier to obtain for the army, green fodder for the horses and provisions from the country, and the heat was less intense. Some of those who had been sent out in different directions from Darius' army as scouts were captured, and reported that Darius was in position on the River Tigris, determined to check Alexander if he crossed, and that he had a much larger army than that with which he had fought in Cilicia. On hearing this Alexander hurried towards the Tigris, but once he arrived there he found neither Darius himself nor the guard which Darius had left 3 4 5

<sup>2</sup> The figure is lost. QC. gives Mazaeus 6,000 horse, thinks he was to defend Euphrates and then Tigris (sometimes confused, cf. 9, 7 and 9), and to 'scorch the earth' (9, 7 f. and 12-14; 10, 12-14), cf. D. 55, 1 relating only to Tigris.

<sup>3</sup> App. VI 2.



ἤντινα ἀπολελοίπει Δαρείος, ἀλλὰ διαβαίνει τὸν πόρον, χαλεπῶς μὲν δι' ὀξύτητα τοῦ ῥοῦ, οὐδενὸς δὲ εἴργοντος.

- 6 Ἐνταῦθα ἀναπαύει τὸν στρατόν· καὶ τῆς σελήνης τὸ πολὺ ἐκλιπὲς ἐγένετο· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔθνε τῇ τε σελήνῃ καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ γῆ, ὅτων τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο λόγος εἶναι κατέχει. καὶ ἔδόκει Ἀριστάνδρῳ πρὸς Μακεδόνων καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου εἶναι τῆς σελήνης τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς ἔσεσθαι ἢ μάχη, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν νίκην σημαίνε-
- 7 σθαι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ. ἄρας δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ἦει διὰ τῆς Ἀσσυρίας χώρας, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ μὲν ἔχων τὰ Γορδυηνῶν ὄρη, ἐν δεξιᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν Τίγρητα. τετάρτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως οἱ πρόδρομοι αὐτῷ ἐξαγγέλλουσιν, ὅτι ἵππεῖς ἐστὶν οἱ<sup>1</sup> πολέμιοι ἀνὰ τὸ πεδῖον φαίνονται, ὅσοι δέ, οὐκ ἔχειν εἰκάσαι. ξυντάξας οὖν τὴν στρατιὰν προὔχῳρει ὡς ἐς μάχην· καὶ ἄλλοι αὐτῶν προδρόμων προσελάσαντες ἀκριβέστερον οὗτοι κατιδόντες ἔφασκον δοκεῖν εἶναί σφισιν οὐ πλείους ἢ χιλίους τοὺς ἵππείας.

8. Ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τὴν τε βασιλικὴν ἴλην καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων μίαν καὶ τῶν προδρόμων τοὺς Παίονας ἤλαυνε σπουδῇ, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην στρατιὰν βάδην ἔπεσθαι ἐκέλευσεν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν ἵππεῖς κατιδόντες τοὺς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον ὀξέως ἐπάγοντας ἔφευγον ἀνὰ κράτος. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος διώκων
- 2 ἐνέκειτο· καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἀπέφυγον, τοὺς δέ τινας καὶ ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοις οἱ ἵπποι ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ἔκαμον, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ζῶντας αὐτοῖς ἵπποις ἔλαβον·

<sup>1</sup> ἐστὶν οἱ Schmieder. Roos kept the MS οὗτοι.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 7. 5-8. 2

behind, and crossed the river; this was difficult because of the swiftness of the current, but there was no opposition.<sup>4</sup>

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There he gave his army a rest. There was an almost total eclipse of the moon, and Alexander sacrificed to the Moon, Sun and Earth, who are all said to cause an eclipse. Aristander thought that the eclipse was favourable to the Macedonians and Alexander, that the battle would take place that month, and that the sacrifices portended victory to Alexander.<sup>5</sup> Starting from the Tigris, Alexander passed through the Assyrian land with the Gordyenan mountains on his left,<sup>6</sup> and the Tigris on his right. On the fourth day after the crossing,<sup>7</sup> the *prodromoi* reported that some enemy cavalry were to be seen over the plain, but they could not guess their numbers. So he drew up his force and advanced as to battle; then other *prodromoi* rode in, who had made a more accurate inspection, and reported that they estimated the cavalry at no more than a thousand.

6

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Sept.]

7

8. Alexander then took with him the royal squadron, one squadron of Companions and the Paeonian *prodromoi* and moved on rapidly, ordering the rest of the army to follow at marching pace. But the Persian cavalry, observing the troops with Alexander coming up rapidly, lost no time in flight. Alexander pressed the pursuit, and though the greater number of them got away, some whose horses wearied in the flight were killed and others captured alive with their

2

<sup>4</sup> D. 55, 3 ff.; QC. 9, 15 ff. make much of the difficulty of fording the river; QC. 9, 23 has Mazaeus attack immediately afterwards.

<sup>5</sup> App. VIII 5. D. 55, 6 is worthless.

<sup>6</sup> QC. 10, 8.

<sup>7</sup> The place, not the day, of the crossing, to fit the timetable; the Greek word is ambiguous.

## ARRIAN

καὶ παρὰ τούτων ἔμαθον, ὅτι οὐ πόρρω εἶη Δαρεῖος ξὺν δυνάμει πολλῇ.

- 3 Βεβοηθήκεσαν γὰρ Δαρείῳ Ἰνδῶν τε ὅσοι Βακτρίοις ὄμοροι καὶ αὐτοὶ Βάκτριοι καὶ Σογδιανοί· τούτων μὲν πάντων ἡγεῖτο Βῆσσοσ ὁ τῆς Βακτριῶν χώρας σατράπης. εἶποντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Σάκαι—Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐποικούντων Σκυθῶν—οὐχ ὑπήκοοι οὗτοι Βῆσσοσ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμμαχίαν τὴν Δαρείου· ἡγεῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν Μαυάκης· αὐτοὶ δὲ ἵπποτοξόται ἦσαν.
- 4 Βαρσαέ<ν>της δὲ Ἀραχωτῶν σατράπης Ἀραχωτούς τε ἦγε καὶ τοὺς ὀρείους Ἰνδοὺς καλουμένους. Σατιβαρζάνης δὲ ὁ Ἀρείων σατράπης Ἀρείους ἦγεν. Παρθυαίους δὲ καὶ Ὑρκανίους καὶ Τοπείρους,<sup>1</sup> τοὺς πάντας ἱππέας, Φραταφέρνης ἦγεν. Μήδων δὲ ἡγεῖτο Ἀτροπάτης· ξυνετάτοντο δὲ Μήδοις Καδούσιοί τε καὶ Ἀλβανοὶ καὶ
- 5 Σακεσῖναι. τοὺς δὲ προσοίκους τῇ ἐρυθρᾷ θαλάσῃ Ὀροντοβάτης καὶ Ἀριοβαρζάνης καὶ Ὀ<ρ>ξίνης ἐκόσμου. Οὔξιοι δὲ καὶ Σουσιανοὶ ἡγεμόνα παρείχοντο Ὀξάθρην τὸν Ἀβουλίτου. Βουπάρης δὲ Βαβυλωνίων ἡγεῖτο. οἱ <δ> ἀνάσπαστοι Κᾶρες καὶ Σιττακηνοὶ σὺν Βαβυλωνίοις ἐτετάχατο. Ἀρμενίων δὲ Ὀρόντης καὶ Μιθραύστης ἦρχε, καὶ
- 6 Ἀριάκης Καππαδοκῶν. Σύρους δὲ τοὺς τε ἐκ τῆς

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Ταπούρους; the spelling varies in different passages.

<sup>1</sup> QC. iv 10, 9 ff.; in 9, 1-10 and D. 39, 3 f. and 53 we have some account of Persian mobilization and army movements; D. 53, 1 says that his troops were given longer swords and lances to match the Macedonian (cf. A. i 15, 5); QC. 9, 3 refers to better defensive armour. Perhaps all this applies only to

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 8. 2-6

mounts. From these they learnt that Darius was not far off with a large force.<sup>1</sup>

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B.C.

It was large because Darius had obtained the help of those Indians who bordered on the Bactrians, together with the Bactrians and Sogdianians themselves, all under the command of Bessus, the satrap of Bactria. They were joined by Sacae, a Scythian people, belonging to the Scyths who inhabit Asia, who came, not as subjects of Bessus, but on the basis of an alliance with Darius; Mauaces was their commander, and they were mounted archers.<sup>2</sup> Barsantes, satrap of the Arachotians, led both the Arachotians and the Indian hillmen, as they were called, Satibarzanes, their satrap, the Areians, Phraterphernes the Parthyaean, Hyrcanians and Topeirians, all cavalry, Atropates the Medes; along with the Medes, Cadusians, Albanians and Sacesinians were marshalled. The tribes bordering on the Red Sea were directed by Orontobates, Ariobarzanes and Orxines.<sup>3</sup> The Uxians and Susianians had Oxathres son of Abulites as commander. Bupares was in command of the Babylonians. The Carians who had been transplanted<sup>4</sup> and Sittacenians had been brigaded with the Babylonians. The Armenians were under Orontes and Mithraustes, the Cappadocians under Ariaces. The Syrians of Hollow Syria<sup>5</sup> and all

some contingents, cf. A. iii 13, 4; vii 6, 5. For following list cf. 11, 3 n. For troops from the eastern satrapies, separated from west Iran by the Elburz mountains and central Persian desert, and absent in 333 B.C. (QC. iii 2, 9) cf. D. 39, 3; QC. iv 9, 2.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently from the Pamir highlands in Tadzhik, U.S.S.R., not nomad Scyths (Herrmann, *RE* s.v. Sakai).

<sup>2</sup> QC. 12, 7 f. gives them different commands.

<sup>4</sup> The Persians sometimes transplanted rebellious subjects.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably men who had escaped from Issus.

## ARRIAN

κοίλης καὶ ὅσοι τῆς μεταξύ τῶν ποταμῶν Συρίας Μαζαῖος ἦγεν. ἐλέγετο δὲ ἡ πᾶσα στρατιὰ ἡ Δαρείου ἵππεῖς μὲν ἐς τετρακισμυρίους, πεζοὶ δὲ ἐς ἑκατὸν μυριάδας, καὶ ἄρματα δρεπανηφόρα διακόσια, ἐλέφαντες δὲ οὐ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ ἐς πεντεκαίδεκα μάλιστα Ἰνδοῖς τοῖς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ἦσαν.

- 7 Ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει ἐστρατοπεδεύκει Δαρεῖος ἐν Γαυγαμήλοις πρὸς ποταμῶ Βουμήλω, ἀπέχων Ἄρβήλων τῆς πόλεως ὅσον ἑξακοσίους σταδίους, ἐν χώρῳ ὀμαλῶ πάντῃ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἵππασίαν, ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἄρμασιν ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῇ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ ἵππάσιμα. ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ ἀνέπειθον Δαρεῖον ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς Ἰσσω γενομένης μάχης, ὅτι ἄρα ἐμειονέκτησε τῶν χωρίων τῇ στενότητι καὶ Δαρεῖος οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐπέιθετο.

9. Ταῦτα ὡς ἐξηγγέλη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πρὸς τῶν κατασκόπων τῶν Περσῶν ὅσοι ἐάλωσαν, ἔμεινεν αὐτοῦ ἵνα ἐξηγγέλη ἡμέρας τέσσαρας· καὶ τὴν [τε] στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ ἀνέπαυσε, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον τάφρῳ τε καὶ χάρακι ἐτείχισεν. ἔγνω γὰρ τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα ἀπολείπειν καὶ ὅσοι τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπόμαχοι ἦσαν, αὐτὸς δὲ ζῦν τοῖς μαχίμοις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ ὄπλα φέρουσιν ἵεναί ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα.
- 2 ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τὴν δύναμιν νυκτὸς ἦγεν ἀμφὶ δευτέραν φυλακὴν μάλιστα, ὡς ἅμ' ἡμέρα προσμῖξαι τοῖς βαρβάροις. Δαρεῖος δέ, ὡς προσηγγέλη αὐτῷ προσάγων ἤδη Ἀλέξανδρος, ἐκτάσσει τὴν στρατιὰν ὡς ἐς μάχην· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἦγεν ὡσαύτως τεταγμένους. καὶ ἀπέιχε μὲν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 8. 6-9. 2

from Mesopotamian Syria were led by Mazaeus. The number of Darius' forces was said to be 40,000 horse, 1,000,000 foot, 200 chariots carrying scythes,<sup>6</sup> and a few elephants; the Indians on this side of the Indus had some fifteen.<sup>7</sup>

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B.C.

With this army Darius had encamped at Gaugamela by the River Bumelus, about six hundred stades from the city of Arbela,<sup>8</sup> in a position level on all sides. In fact where the ground was uneven for cavalry, the Persians had for some time past been making it easy for chariots to drive and for cavalry to ride over;<sup>9</sup> for some argued that in the battle of Issus Darius had really had the worst of it because of the narrowness of the battlefield, and Darius very readily assented.

9. On receiving this information from the captured Persian scouts, Alexander stopped where he had received it for four days; he rested his army after the march and strengthened his camp by a ditch and palisade, as he had decided to leave behind the baggage animals and soldiers unfit for fighting, and to advance to battle himself with his fit troops burdened with nothing but their arms.<sup>1</sup> So taking his force by night, he led them off just about the second watch, so as to meet the enemy at dawn. Darius, on hearing that Alexander was already advancing, arrayed his army for battle, while Alexander was also bringing up his army in battle array. The armies

<sup>6</sup> For description, D. 53, 2; QC. 9, 4 f.; previous use, Xenophon, *Anabasis* i 6, 1; *Hellenica* iv 1, 17 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Appendix IX, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. vi 11, 4 (Pt. and Ar.); P. 31, 3; Strabo xvi 1, 3. QC. 9, 9 (unlike D. 53, 4) was perhaps aware of the truth.

<sup>9</sup> QC. 9, 10.

<sup>1</sup> QC. iv 10, 15. Yet some *impedimenta* were moved forward, cf. A. 12, 5; 14, 5; QC. 12, 3.

## ARRIAN

ἀλλήλων τὰ στρατόπεδα ὅσον ἐξήκοντα σταδίου, οὐ μὴν πω καθεώρων ἀλλήλους· γήλοφοι γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ ἐπίπροσθεν ἀμφοῖν ἦσαν.

- 3 Ὡς δὲ ἀπεῖχεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὅσον ἐς τριάκοντα σταδίου καὶ κατ' αὐτῶν ἤδη τῶν γηλόφων ἦει αὐτῷ ὁ στρατός, ἐνταῦθα, ὡς εἶδε τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἔστησε τὴν αὐτοῦ φάλαγγα· καὶ ξυγκαλέσας αὐτοὺς τε ἑταίρους καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ ἰλάρχας καὶ τῶν συμμάχων τε καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων ξένων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐβουλεύετο, εἰ αὐτόθεν ἐπάγοι ἤδη τὴν φάλαγγα, ὡς οἱ πλείστοι ἄγειν ἐκέλευον, ἢ καθάπερ
- 4 Παρμενίωνι [καλῶς] ἐδόκει, τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύειν, κατασκέψασθαι δὲ τὸν τε χῶρον ξύμπαντα, εἰ δὴ τι ὑποπτον αὐτοῦ ἢ ἄπορον, ἢ εἴ πη τάφροι ἢ σκόλοπες καταπεπηγότες ἀφανεῖς, καὶ τὰς τάξεις τῶν πολεμίων ἀκριβέστερον κατιδεῖν. καὶ νικᾷ Παρμενίων τῇ γνώμῃ, καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύουσιν αὐτοῦ ὅπως τεταγμένοι ἔμελλον ἵεναι ἐς τὴν μάχην.
- 5 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ψιλοὺς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων τοὺς ἑταίρους περιήει ἐν κύκλῳ σκοπῶν τὴν χώραν πᾶσαν, ἵνα τὸ ἔργον αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι ἔμελλεν. ἐπανελθὼν δὲ καὶ ξυγκαλέσας αὐθις τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας, αὐτοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι παρακαλεῖσθαι πρὸς οὐδ' ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα· πάλαι γὰρ εἶναι δι' ἀρετὴν τε τὴν σφῶν παρακεκλημένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
- 6 πολλάκις ἤδη καλῶν ἔργων ἀποδεδειγμένων. τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς δὲ ἐκάστους ἐξορμᾶν ἡξίου, λοχαγόν τε λοχίτας καὶ ἰλάρχην τὴν ἴλην τὴν αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον

<sup>3</sup> Q.C. makes them 150 stades apart (10, 15), interpolates here an attempt by Darius to stir up disloyalty among Al's Greek troops (10, 16 f.), the death of Darius' wife and the



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were about sixty stades apart, but had not yet sighted one another, for there were hills intervening in front of both.<sup>2</sup>

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Alexander was about thirty stades away and his army was already descending these hills, when he sighted the enemy; he stopped his phalanx there, and again summoned the Companions, generals, squadron commanders and commanders of the allies and foreign mercenary troops, and put the question whether he should advance his phalanx at once from this point, as most of them urged, or, as Parmenio thought best, camp there for the time being, survey the whole of the terrain, in case any part afforded ground for suspicion or was impassable, or in case there were ditches anywhere, or hidden stakes fixed in the soil,<sup>3</sup> and make a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's dispositions. Parmenio's advice prevailed, and they camped there, in the order in which they were to engage in battle.

Taking with him the light-armed troops and the Companion cavalry, Alexander rode all round, inspecting the whole of the ground where his work was to be done. Then he returned and again summoned the same officers, and said that there was no need for him to inspire them to the fight; they had long ago been inspired by their own bravery and by their many splendid exploits in the past; but he required each of them to encourage his own men; the infantry captains their companies, the squadron commanders

negotiations in A. ii 25, 1 (10, 18-12, 1; both before the Tigris crossing in D. 54), and makes Persians as well as A. advance and cause a panic in Al's army, which bivouacks; only on the next day does Al. occupy the hills and call the council of § 3 (12, 14-24).

<sup>2</sup> For use of stakes, QC. 13, 36 f.



καὶ ταξιάρχους τὰς τάξεις, τοὺς τε ἡγεμόνας τῶν πεζῶν τὴν φάλαγγα ἕκαστον τὴν οἱ ἐπιτετραμμένην, ὡς ἐν τῇδε τῇ μάχῃ οὐχ ὑπὲρ Κοίλης Συρίας ἢ Φοινίκης, οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου, ὡς πρόσθεν, μαχουμένους, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς ξυμπάσης Ἰασίας, οὕστινας χρὴ ἄρχειν, ἐν τῷ τότε κριθησόμενον. οὐκ οὖν τὴν ἐς τὰ κατὰ ἐξόρμησιν διὰ πολλῶν ἀναγκαίαν αὐτοῖς εἶναι οἴκοθεν τοῦτο ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ κόσμου τε ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ ὅπως τις καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιμελήσεται καὶ σιγῆς ἀκριβοῦς, ὅποτε σιγῶντας ἐπιέναι δέοι, καὶ αὐτὸς λαμπρᾶς τῆς βοῆς, ἵνα ἐμβοῆσαι καλόν, καὶ ἀλαλαγμοῦ ὡς φοβερωτάτου, ὅποτε ἐπαλαλάξαι καιρός, αὐτοὶ τε ὅπως ὀξέως κατακούοιεν τῶν [τε] παραγγελομένων καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ὅπως ἐς τὰς τάξεις ὀξέως παραδιδῶνται τὰ παραγγέλματα· ἐν τε τῷ καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πᾶν μεμνήσθαι ξυγκινδυνεύόν τε ἀμελουμένῳ καὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἐκπονουμένῳ ξυνορθούμενον.

10. Ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐ πολλὰ παρακαλέσας τε καὶ ἀντιπαρακληθεὶς πρὸς τῶν ἡγεμόνων θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ σφίσι, δειπνοποιεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι ἐκέλευσε τὸν στρατόν. Παρμενίων δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηπὴν, νύκτωρ παρήνει ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς Πέρσας· ἀπροσδοκῆτοίς τε γὰρ καὶ ἀνατεταραγμένοις καὶ ἅμα ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερωτέροις ἐπιθήσεσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἀποκρίνεται, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι κατήκουον τῶν λόγων, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κλέψαι τὴν νίκην, ἀλλὰ φανερώς καὶ

<sup>4</sup> Callisthenes imputed to Al. 'lengthy discourses' with the Greek allies just before the battle (P. 33, 1); at that point D. 56, 4 and QC. 13, 38-14 fin. set speeches.

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their own squadrons, the battalion commanders their battalions, and the infantry commanders the phalanx of which each was placed in charge. In this battle, he pointed out, they were to fight, not as before, for Hollow Syria or Phoenicia or Egypt: it was the sovereignty of all Asia that was there and then to be decided. There was then no need for them to employ long speeches to make their men act with that sense of honour which was born in them, but they were to urge each man in the moment of danger to attend in his own place in the line to the requirements of order, to keep perfect silence when that was necessary in the advance, and by contrast to give a ringing shout when it was right to shout, and a howl to inspire the greatest terror when the moment came to howl; they themselves were to obey orders sharply and to pass them on sharply to their regiments, and every man should recall that neglect of his own duty brought the whole cause into common danger, while energetic attention to it contributed to the common success.<sup>4</sup>

10. These and other such brief exhortations brought in return assurances from the commanders that he could rely on them. So he ordered his army to take their meal and rest. They say<sup>1</sup> that Parmenio went to him in his tent and advised him to attack the Persians at night; they would be surprised, confused and more prone to panic in a night attack. Alexander, however, replied, since others were listening, that it was dishonourable to steal the vic-

<sup>1</sup> 'Vulgate', or Pt. and Ar.? Unlike P. 31, 5 ff., QC. iv 13, 3 ff. transposes this to the council, where most ('the older Companions', P.) agreed with Parmenio.

## ARRIAN

ἄνευ σοφίσματος χρῆναι νικῆσαι Ἀλέξανδρον.  
 καὶ τὸ μεγαλήγορον αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπέρογκον  
 μᾶλλον τι ἢ εὐθαρσὲς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐφαίνετο.  
 δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε, καὶ λογισμῶ ἀκριβεῖ ἐχρήσατο ἐν  
 3 τῷ τοιῷδε· ἐν νυκτὶ γὰρ τοῖς τε ἀποχρώντως καὶ  
 τοῖς ἐνδεῶς πρὸς τὰς μάχας παρεσκευασμένοις  
 πολλὰ ἐκ τοῦ παραλόγου συμβάντα τοὺς μὲν  
 ἔσφηλε, τοὺς κρείσσονας, τοῖς χείροσι δὲ παρὰ τὰ  
 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐλπισθέντα τὴν νίκην παρέδωκεν.  
 αὐτῷ τε κινδυνεύοντι τὸ πολὺ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις  
 σφαλερὰ ἢ νύξ κατεφαίνετο, καὶ ἅμα ἠσσηθέντι τε  
 αὐθις Δαρείῳ τὴν ξυγχώρησιν τοῦ χείροσι ὄντι  
 χειρόνων ἠγείσθαι ἢ λαθραία τε καὶ νυκτερινὴ ἐκ  
 4 σφῶν ἐπίθεσις ἀφηρεῖτο, εἴ τί τι ἐκ τοῦ παραλόγου  
 πταῖσμα σφίσι συμπέσοι, τοῖς μὲν πολεμίοις τὰ  
 κύκλω φίλια καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς χώρας ἔμπειροι, σφεῖς  
 δὲ ἄπειροι ἐν πολεμίοις τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὧν οὐ μικρὰ  
 μοῖρα οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦσαν, ξυνεπιθησόμενοι ἐν  
 νυκτὶ μὴ ὅτι πταίσασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ παρὰ πολὺ  
 νικῶντες φαίνονται. τούτων τε τῶν λογισμῶν  
 ἔνεκα ἐπαινῶ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοῦ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν  
 ὑπερόγκου οὐ μείον.

11. Δαρείος δὲ καὶ ὁ ξὺν Δαρείῳ στρατὸς οὕτως  
 ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐτάξαντο ἔμειναν τῆς νυκτὸς  
 ξυντεταγμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε στρατόπεδον αὐτοῖς περι-  
 εβέβλητο ἀκριβὲς καὶ ἅμα ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ σφίσι  
 2 νύκτωρ ἐπιθοῖντο οἱ πολέμοι. καὶ εἶπερ τι ἄλλο,  
 καὶ τοῦτο ἐκάκωσε τοῖς Πέρσαις ἐν τῷ τότε τὰ  
 πράγματα, ἢ στάσις ἢ πολλὴ ἢ ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ  
 τὸ δέος, ὅ τι περ φιλεῖ πρὸ τῶν μεγάλων κινδύνων  
 γίνεσθαι, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραυτίκα σχεδιασθέν, ἀλλ'

tory, and that Alexander had to win his victory openly and without stratagem.<sup>2</sup> This grandiloquence looked like confidence in danger rather than arrogance,<sup>3</sup> but in my own view he made a careful calculation on some such principle as this: at night, whether forces are adequately or deficiently prepared for battle, things have so often turned out contrary to rational expectation that the stronger side has been foiled and victory gone to the weaker, contrary to the expectations of both. Though Alexander commonly ran risks in battle, the hazards of the night were manifest to him; moreover, if Darius were again defeated, the fact that their attack had been covert and nocturnal would prevent him conceding his inferiority and that of the troops he commanded, but if his own Macedonian forces were to incur any incalculable reverse, all the country round was friendly to the enemy and familiar to them, while his own men had no knowledge of it, and enemies in everyone, no small part of whom were the prisoners of war, and these would join in attack by night, if the Macedonians should not be clearly and decisively victorious, let alone if they were to fail. These considerations, not less than the arrogance he paraded, lead me to commend Alexander.

11. Darius and his army remained during the night marshalled in their original order; for they had no proper camp surrounding them, and they also feared that the enemy would make a night attack. It did more harm than anything else to the Persian cause at this crisis, that they stood so long under arms and that the fear, which usually precedes great dangers,

<sup>2</sup> So too QC. and P.

<sup>3</sup> A. probably means that the reply seemed arrogant, yet really showed confidence, and in his own view prudence; his comments were not original, cf. P. 31, 7 f.

## ARRIAN

ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ μελετηθέν τε καὶ τὰς γνώμας αὐτοῖς δουλωσάμενον.

- 3 Ἐτάχθη δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ στρατιὰ ὧδε· ἕαλω γὰρ ὑστερον ἡ τάξις, ἣντινα ἔταξε Δαρεῖος, γεγραμμένη, ὡς λέγει Ἀριστόβουλος. τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον αὐτῷ κέρας οἷ τε Βάκτριοι ἵππεῖς εἶχον καὶ ξὺν τούτοις Δάαι καὶ Ἀραχωτοί· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις Πέρσαι ἐτετάχατο, ἵππεῖς τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πεζοὶ ἀναμεμιγμένοι, καὶ Σούσιοι ἐπὶ Πέρσαις, ἐπὶ δὲ
- 4 Σουσίοις Καδούσιοι. αὕτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ εὐωνύμου κέρως ἔσπε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς πάσης φάλαγγος τάξις ἦν· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν οἷ τε ἐκ Κοίλης Συρίας καὶ οἷ ἐκ τῆς μέσης τῶν ποταμῶν ἐτετάχατο, καὶ Μῆδοι ἔτι κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν, ἐπὶ δὲ Παρθυαῖοι καὶ Σάκαι, ἐπὶ δὲ Τόπειροι καὶ Ὑρκάνιοι, ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀλβανοὶ καὶ Σακεσ[ε]ῖναι, οὗτοι μὲν ἔσπε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς πάσης φάλαγγος.
- 5 κατὰ τὸ μέσον δέ, ἵνα ἦν βασιλεὺς Δαρεῖος, οἷ τε συγγενεῖς οἷ βασιλέως ἐτετάχατο καὶ οἷ μηλοφόροι Πέρσαι καὶ Ἰνδοὶ καὶ Κᾶρες οἷ ἀνάσπαστοι καλούμενοι καὶ οἷ Μάρδοι τοξόται· Οὔξιοι δὲ καὶ Βαβυλώνιοι καὶ οἷ πρὸς τῇ ἐρυθρᾷ θαλάσῃ καὶ
- 6 Σιττακηνοὶ εἰς βάθος ἐπιτεταγμένοι ἦσαν. προετατάχατο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ εὐωνύμου κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου οἷ τε Σκύθαι ἵππεῖς καὶ τῶν Βακτριανῶν ἑς χιλίους καὶ ἄρματα δρεπανηφόρα ἑκατόν.

<sup>1</sup> *Contra*, QC. iv 13, 11-14.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps from Callisthenes; where else? Pt. neglected the information, but perhaps 8, 3 ff. represent his account; Sogdianians and Aeriens only occur there, and Persians(!). Dahae (= 'Scythians' of § 6; 13, 2; they lived in steppes east of Caspian and north of the Parthyaens) and Mardians only

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was not produced suddenly by a crisis, but cultivated for a long period, till it mastered their minds.<sup>1</sup>

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Darius' army was drawn up as follows (Aristobulus tells us that a document giving the order as Darius drew it up was afterwards captured).<sup>2</sup> His left wing was held by the Bactrian cavalry with the Dahae and Arachotians; next to them Persians had been marshalled, cavalry and infantry mixed, and after the Persians Susians, and then Cadusians. This was the disposition of the left wing up to the centre of the entire phalanx. On the right<sup>3</sup> had been marshalled the troops from Hollow Syria and Mesopotamia; and further to the right were Medes, then Parthyaean and Sacians, then Topeirians and Hyrcanians, next Albanians and Saccsinians, right up to the centre of the entire phalanx. In the centre, with king Darius, had been posted the king's kinsmen,<sup>4</sup> the Persians whose spears are fitted with golden apples,<sup>5</sup> the Indians, the 'transplanted' Carians, as they were called, and the Mardian bowmen.<sup>6</sup> The Uxians, Babylonians, Red Sea peoples and Sittacenians had been posted in deep formation behind them. Then, in advance, on the left wing, facing Alexander's right, had been posted the Scythian cavalry, some thousand Bactrians, and a hundred chariots carrying scythes.

here; hence neither Ar. nor Pt. gave a full list, unless A. has excerpted carelessly. QC. 12, 5 ff. is different again.

<sup>2</sup> Commander, Mazaeus, D. 59, 5; by a slip QC. 15, 2 gives Bessus whom he correctly puts on the left in 12, 6.

<sup>4</sup> 1,000 strong, D. 59, 2; an honorific title, cf. 'Companions'.

<sup>5</sup> The royal bodyguard, 1,000 strong, with apples instead of spikes at butt-ends of spears, cf. Herodotus vii 40 f.

<sup>6</sup> D. 59, 2 ff. and QC. 14, 8, who divide the line into left and right, put Darius on the left, perhaps because in fact, the Persian line being longer, he was opposite Al. (A. 13, 1; 14, 2). Carians: 8, 5 n.

οἱ δὲ ἐλέφαντες ἕστησαν κατὰ τὴν [Δαρείου] <sup>1</sup>  
 ἴλην τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἄρματα ἐς πεντήκοντα.  
 7 τοῦ δὲ δεξιοῦ οἱ τε Ἀρμενίων καὶ Καππαδοκῶν  
 ἵππεῖς προετετάχαστο καὶ ἄρματα δρεπανηφόρα  
 πεντήκοντα. οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες οἱ μισθοφόροι παρὰ  
 Δαρείον τε αὐτὸν ἐκατέρωθεν καὶ τοὺς ἅμα αὐτῷ  
 Πέρσας κατὰ τὴν φάλαγγα αὐτὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων  
 ὡς μόνοι δὴ ἀντίρροποι τῇ φάλαγγι ἐτάχθησαν.  
 8 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ ἡ στρατιὰ ἐκοσμήθη ὧδε. τὸ  
 μὲν δεξιὸν αὐτῷ εἶχον τῶν ἵππέων οἱ ἑταῖροι, ὧν  
 προετέτακτο ἡ ἴλη ἡ βασιλική, ἧς Κλεῖτος ὁ  
 Δρωπίδου ἰλάρχης ἦν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτῃ Γλαυκίου ἴλη,  
 ἐχομένη δ' αὐτῆς ἡ Ἀρίστωνος, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Σωπόλι-  
 δος τοῦ Ἐρμοδώρου, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ  
 Ἀντιόχου, ἐπὶ ταύτῃ δὲ ἡ Δημητρίου τοῦ Ἀλθαι-  
 μένου, ταύτης δὲ ἐχομένη ἡ Μελεάγρου, τελευταία  
 δὲ τῶν [βασιλικῶν] <sup>2</sup> ἰλῶν ἧς Ἡγέλοχος ὁ  
 Ἴπποστράτου ἰλάρχης ἦν. ζυμπάσης δὲ τῆς ἵππου  
 9 τῶν ἑταίρων Φιλώτας ἦρχεν ὁ Παρμενίωνος. τῆς  
 δὲ φάλαγγος τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐχόμενον τῶν ἵπ-  
 πέων πρῶτον τὸ ἄγῆμα ἐτέτακτο τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν  
 καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπασπισταί· ἠγείτο δὲ  
 αὐτῶν Νικάνωρ ὁ Παρμενίωνος· τούτων δὲ  
 ἐχομένη ἡ Κοίνου τοῦ Πολεμοκράτους τάξις ἦν,  
 μετὰ δὲ τούτους ἡ Περδίκκου τοῦ Ὀρόντου, ἔπειτα  
 ἡ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Νεοπτολέμου, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Πολυπέρ-  
 χοντος τοῦ Σιμμίου, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ  
 Φιλίππου· ταύτης δὲ ἠγείτο Σιμμίας, ὅτι Ἀμύντας  
 ἐπὶ Μακεδονίας ἐς ξυλλογὴν στρατιᾶς ἐσταλμένος  
 10 ἦν. τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον τῆς φάλαγγος τῶν Μακεδόνων

<sup>1</sup> Deleted by Gronovius.

<sup>2</sup> I have bracketed βασιλικῶν.



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The elephants were posted ahead of [Darius'] royal squadron, with fifty chariots. In front of the right wing had been posted the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry and fifty chariots carrying scythes. The Greek mercenaries <sup>7</sup> were stationed on either side of Darius and of the Persian troops with him, exactly opposite the Macedonian phalanx, as they were considered the only troops capable of being a counterpoise to it.

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7

Alexander's army was marshalled as follows.<sup>8</sup> His right wing was held by the Companion cavalry, the royal squadron in front; it was commanded by Clitus son of Dropides; in successive order came those of Glaucias, Aristo, Sopolis son of Hermodorus, Heraclides son of Antiochus, Demetrius son of Althamenes, Meleager and lastly that commanded by Hegelochus son of Hippostratus. The Companion cavalry as a whole was commanded by Philotas son of Parmenio. As for the Macedonian infantry phalanx, the *agema* of the hypaspists was stationed first next the cavalry and then the rest of the hypaspists; they were under Nicanor son of Parmenio; then came successively the battalions of Coenus son of Polemocrates, Perdicas son of Orontes, Meleager son of Neoptolemus, Polyperchon son of Simmias and Amyntas son of Philip;<sup>9</sup> this was led by Simmias, since Amyntas had been sent to Macedonia to collect troops. The left of the Macedonian phalanx was

8

9

10

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 7, 1; never mentioned by D. and QC.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. D. 57, 1-4; QC. 13, 26 ff., incomplete extracts from a common source which (i) gave the hypaspists the anachronistic name of silver-shields; (ii) gave the ethnic composition of phalanx battalions (cf. A. 16, 11); (iii) substituted Philip for Simmias as taxiarch.

<sup>9</sup> An error for Andromenes, cf. 16, 10 and often.

ἡ Κρατεροῦ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου τάξις εἶχε, καὶ αὐτὸς Κρατερὸς ἐξῆρχε τοῦ εὐωνύμου τῶν πεζῶν· καὶ ἵππεῖς ἐχόμενοι αὐτοῦ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἐριγύϊος ὁ Λαρίχου· τούτων δὲ ἐχόμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ἵππεῖς, ὧν ἦρχε Φίλιππος ὁ Μενελάου. ξύμπαν δὲ τὸ εὐώνυμον ἦγε Παρμενίων ὁ Φιλώτα, καὶ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν οἱ τῶν Φαρσαλίων ἵππεῖς οἱ κράτιστοί τε καὶ πλείστοι τῆς Θεσσαλικῆς ἵππου ἀνεστρέφοντο.

12. Ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ μετώπου τάξις Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὧδε κεκόσμητο· ἐπέταξε δὲ καὶ δευτέραν τάξιν ὡς εἶναι τὴν φάλαγγα ἀμφίστομον. καὶ παρηγγέλλετο τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων, εἰ κυκλουμένους τοὺς σφῶν πρὸς τοῦ Περσικοῦ στρατεύματος κατίδοιεν, ἐπιστρέψαντας ἐς τὸ ἔμπαλιν δέχεσθαι  
 2 τοὺς βαρβάρους· ἐς ἐπικαμπὴν δέ, εἴ που ἀνάγκη καταλαμβάνοι ἢ ἀναπτύξαι ἢ ξυγκλείσαι τὴν φάλαγγα, κατὰ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐχόμενοι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης τῶν Ἀγριάνων ἐτάχθησαν οἱ ἡμίσεες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀτταλος, καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ Μακεδόνες οἱ τοξόται, ὧν Βρίσων ἦρχεν, ἐχόμενοι δὲ τῶν τοξοτῶν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καλούμενοι ξένοι καὶ  
 3 ἄρχων τούτων Κλέανδρος. προετάχθησαν δὲ τῶν τε Ἀγριάνων καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν οἱ τε πρόδρομοι ἵππεῖς καὶ οἱ Παῖονες, ὧν Ἀρέτης καὶ Ἀρίστων ἡγοῦντο. ξυμπάντων δὲ προτεταγμένοι ἦσαν οἱ μισθοφόροι ἵππεῖς, ὧν Μενίδας ἦρχε. τῆς δὲ βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐταίρων προτεταγμένοι ἦσαν τῶν τε Ἀγριάνων καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν οἱ

<sup>10</sup> Part only, cf. 12, 4.

<sup>1</sup> Clearly hoplites, i.e. Greek allies (not otherwise mentioned)

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held by the battalion of Craterus son of Alexander, who also commanded the (entire) left of the infantry. Next to them came the allied cavalry,<sup>10</sup> under Erigyus son of Larichus; next them, on the left wing, were the Thessalian cavalry under Philippus son of Menelaus. The commander of the entire left was Parmenio son of Philotas, and round him rode the Pharsalian cavalry, the finest and most numerous of the Thessalian horsemen.

12. This was the order in which Alexander had marshalled his front, but he also posted a second line, so that his phalanx faced both ways.<sup>1</sup> The commanders of this reserve had instructions to face about and receive the barbarian attack, if they saw their own forces being surrounded by the Persian army. However, in case a need arose to extend or contract the line, on the right wing but at an angle to it,<sup>2</sup> half the Agrianians under Attalus were posted next to the royal squadron, along with the Macedonian archers under Brison, and next to the archers the so-called old mercenaries under Cleander; in front of the Agrianians and archers cavalry were stationed, consisting of the *prodromoi* and the Paeonians under the command of Aretas and Ariston, and in front of all these the mercenary cavalry<sup>3</sup> under Menidas. The royal squadron and the other Companions had half the Agrianians and archers<sup>4</sup> stationed in their front

and mercenaries other than Cleander's force, which comprised either (i) those who had crossed to Asia with Al. or (ii) those previously sent there by Philip, as against (iii) later reinforcements.

<sup>1</sup> The translation is certain, but cf. App. IX 2.

<sup>2</sup> Some only, cf. § 5.

<sup>4</sup> Macedonians?

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ἡμίσεες, καὶ οἱ Βαλάκρου ἀκοντισταί· οὗτοι κατὰ  
 4 <τὰ> ἄρματα τὰ δρεπανηφόρα ἐτετάχατο. Μενίδα  
 δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν παρήγγελλτο, εἰ περιῦπ-  
 πεύοιεν οἱ πολέμοι τὸ κέρας σφῶν, ἐς πλαγίους  
 ἐμβάλλειν αὐτοὺς ἐπικάμψαντας. τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ  
 δεξιοῦ κέρως οὕτως ἐτέτακτο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ· κατὰ  
 δὲ τὸ εὐώνυμον ἐς ἐπικαμπὴν οἱ τε Θράκες  
 ἐτετάχατο, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Σιτάλκης, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ  
 ξύμμαχοι ἵππεῖς, ὧν ἦρχε Κοίρανος,<sup>1</sup> ἐπὶ δὲ οἱ  
 Ὀδρῦσαι ἵππεῖς, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀγάθων ὁ Τυρίμμα.  
 5 ξυμπάντων δὲ ταύτῃ προετάχθη ἡ ξενικὴ ἵππος ἢ  
 τῶν μισθοφόρων, ὧν Ἀνδρόμαχος ὁ Ἰέρωνος  
 ἦρχεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σκευοφόροις οἱ ἀπὸ Θράκης  
 πεζοὶ ἐς φυλακὴν ἐτάχθησαν. <ἦν δὲ> ἡ πᾶσα  
 στρατιὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἵππεῖς μὲν ἐς ἑπτακισχιλίους,  
 πεζοὶ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὰς τέσσαρας μυριάδας.

13. Ὡς δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐγίγνετο,  
 ὤφθη Δαρεῖός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτόν, οἱ τε μηλο-  
 φόροι Πέρσαι καὶ Ἴνδοι καὶ Ἀλβανοὶ καὶ Κᾶρες οἱ  
 ἀνάσπαστοι καὶ οἱ Μάρδοι τοξόται, κατ' αὐτόν  
 Ἀλέξανδρον τεταγμένοι καὶ τὴν ἴλην τὴν βασι-  
 λικὴν. ἦγε δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ Πέρσαι ἀντιπαρῆγον,  
 ὑπερφαλαγγοῦντες πολὺ ἐπὶ τῷ σφῶν εὐωνύμῳ.  
 2 ἤδη τε οἱ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἵππεῖς παριππεύοντες  
 ἤπτοντο τῶν προτεταγμένων τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 τάξεως καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔτι ὅμως ἦγεν ἐπὶ δόρυ,  
 καὶ ἐγγὺς ἦν τοῦ ἐξαλλάσσειν τὸν ὠδοποιημένον

<sup>1</sup> Κοίρανος; perhaps rather Κάρανος (cf. iii 28, 2; iv 3, 7; 5, 7; 6, 2, but Berve nos. 412 and 442 distinguishes them).

<sup>5</sup> Probably Balkan troops.

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with the javelin-men of Balacrus;<sup>5</sup> they were posted  
opposite the chariots carrying scythes. Menidas and  
his men had instructions to wheel at an angle and  
attack the enemy on the flank, if they rode round  
their wing. This was the disposition of Alexander's  
right; on the left at an angle he posted the Thracians  
under Sitalces' command,<sup>6</sup> and next them the allied  
cavalry under Coeranus, and then the Odrysian horse  
under Agathon, son of Tyrimmas.<sup>7</sup> Here, in front of  
the whole force, was stationed the foreign mercenary  
cavalry under Andromachus, son of Hieron. The  
Thracian foot<sup>8</sup> were posted to guard the baggage  
animals. Alexander's entire army numbered some  
7,000 cavalry and about 40,000 infantry.<sup>9</sup>

13. As the armies were now nearing one another,  
Darius and his immediate followers were in full sight;  
there were the Persians 'with the Golden Apples',  
Indians, Albanians, the 'transplanted' Carians and  
the Mardian archers, all ranged opposite Alexander  
himself and the royal squadron. But Alexander  
moved his men rather in the direction of his right, on  
which the Persians moved accordingly, their left far  
outflanking Alexander's army.<sup>1</sup> The Scythian cav-  
alry, riding along Alexander's line, were already in  
contact with the troops posted in front of it; but  
Alexander still continued steadily his march towards  
his right, and was nearly clear of the ground which

<sup>5</sup> Javelin-men, cf. i 28, 4.

<sup>7</sup> The Thracians of i 14, 3. D. 57, 5 puts the Cretan archers on the left, where they could have fulfilled the same function as Brison's men on the right. Another omission in A. or his sources.

<sup>8</sup> Other than Sitalces' men.

<sup>9</sup> App. IX 3.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. perhaps D. 57, 6; QC. iv 15, 1. For the battle cf. App. IX.

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πρὸς τῶν Περσῶν χώρον. ἔνθα δὴ δείσας Δαρείος μὴ προχωρησάντων ἐς τὰ οὐχ ὀμαλὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἀχρεΐά σφισι γένηται τὰ ἄρματα, κελεύει τοὺς προτεταγμένους τοῦ εὐωνύμου περιῖππεύειν τὸ κέρας τὸ δεξιόν, ἧ Ἄλέξανδρος ἦγε, τοῦ μηκέτι  
 3 προσωτέρω αὐτοὺς ἐξάγειν τὸ κέρας. τούτου δὲ γενομένου Ἄλέξανδρος ἐμβάλλειν κελεύει ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἰππέας, ὧν Μενίδας ἠγείτο. ἀντεκδραμόντες δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς οἱ τε Σκύθαι ἰππεῖς καὶ τῶν Βακτριῶν οἱ ξυντεταγμένοι τοῖς Σκύθαις τρέπουσιν ὀλίγους ὄντας πολλῶ πλείονες. Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ τοὺς περὶ Ἀρίσωνα<sup>1</sup> τε, τοὺς Παίονας, καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἐμβαλεῖν τοῖς Σκύθαις ἐκέλευσε.  
 4 καὶ ἐγκλίνουσιν οἱ βάρβαροι. Βάκτριοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι πελάσαντες τοῖς Παίοσιν τε καὶ ξένοις τοὺς τε σφῶν φεύγοντας ἤδη ἀνέστρεψαν ἐς τὴν μάχην καὶ τὴν ἵππομαχίαν ξυστῆναι ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἔπιπτον μὲν πλείονες τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου, τῷ τε πλήθει τῶν βαρβάρων βιαζόμενοι καὶ ὅτι αὐτοὶ τε οἱ Σκύθαι καὶ οἱ ἵπποι αὐτοῖς ἀκριβέστερον εἰς φυλακὴν πεφραγμένοι ἦσαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς τὰς τε προσβολὰς αὐτῶν ἐδέχοντο οἱ Μακεδόνες καὶ βία κατ' ἴλας προσπίπτοντες ἐξώθουν ἐκ τῆς τάξεως.

5 Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἄρματα τὰ δρεπανηφόρα ἐφῆκαν οἱ βάρβαροι κατ' αὐτὸν Ἄλεξάνδρον, ὡς ἀναταράξοντες αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα. καὶ ταύτῃ μάλιστα ἐψεύσθησαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς ὡς προσεφέρετο κατηκόντισαν οἱ τε Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ οἱ ξὺν Βαλάκρω

<sup>1</sup> Ἀρίσωνα Schmeider: Ἀρέτην codd.

<sup>2</sup> Aretas in the manuscripts, but the *prodromoi* are not named, and cf. 14, 1, which, however, Schwartz (Introd. n. 24) took to be Pt's version of 13, 1-4 (Ar.). And cf. § 4 n. 4.

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had been made a treadable level by the Persians. This made Darius fear that if the Macedonians reached the uneven ground his chariots would cease to be of service, and he ordered the troops in advance of his left wing to ride round the Macedonian right, where Alexander was leading, so that they might not prolong their wing any farther. In reply Alexander ordered his mercenary cavalry under Menidas to charge them. At once the Scythian cavalry and those of the Bactrians brigaded with them rushed out in a counter-charge, and drove them back, as they were far more numerous than Menidas' small squadron. But Alexander ordered the Paeonians with Ariston<sup>2</sup> and the mercenaries to charge the Scythians, and the barbarians wavered. The rest of the Bactrians, however, came up against the Paeonians and mercenaries, restored to the battle those on their own side who were then turning to flight, and made the cavalry engagement a close one. Alexander's men fell in greater numbers, under pressure from the number of the barbarians, and also because the Scythians, riders and horses alike, were better protected by defensive armour. Yet even so the Macedonians<sup>3</sup> stood up against their onsets, attacked vigorously, squadron after squadron,<sup>4</sup> and broke their formation.

At this point the Persians launched their scythe-carrying chariots direct against Alexander, to throw his line out of formation; but in this they were signally disappointed. For first, as they approached, the Agrianians and the javelin-men under Balacrus, who

<sup>3</sup> i.e. Al's troops, cf. 14, 5 for lack of ethnic meaning.

<sup>4</sup> Odd, if only Menidas' and Ariston's squadrons were engaged.



ἀκοντισταὶ οἱ προτεταγμένοι τῆς ἵππου τῶν  
 ἑταίρων· τὰ δὲ τῶν ῥυτήρων ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι  
 τοὺς τε ἀναβάτας κατέσπων καὶ τοὺς ἵππους  
 6 περιϊστάμενοι ἔκοπτον. ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ διεξέπεσε  
 διὰ τῶν τάξεων· διέσχον γάρ, ὡσπερ παρήγγελτο  
 αὐτοῖς, ἵνα προσέπιπτε τὰ ἄρματα· καὶ ταύτη  
 μάλιστα ξυνέβη αὐτά τε σῶα καὶ οἷς ἐπηλάθῃ  
 ἀβλαβῶς διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων οἱ τε ἵπποκό-  
 μοι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατιᾶς καὶ οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ οἱ  
 βασιλικοὶ ἐκράτησαν.

14. Ὡς δὲ Δαρεῖος ἐπῆγεν ἤδη τὴν φάλαγγα  
 πᾶσαν, ἐνταῦθα Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀρέτην μὲν κελεύει  
 ἐμβαλεῖν τοῖς περιῖππεύουσι τὸ κέρας σφῶν τὸ  
 2 δεξιὸν ὡς ἐς κύκλωσιν· αὐτὸς δὲ τέως μὲν ἐπὶ  
 κέρως τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἦγε, τῶν δὲ ἐκβοηθησά-  
 ντων ἵππέων τοῖς κυκλουμένοις τὸ κέρας τὸ δεξιὸν  
 παραρρηξάντων τι τῆς πρώτης φάλαγγος τῶν  
 βαρβάρων ἐπιστρέψας κατὰ τὸ διέχον καὶ ὡσπερ  
 ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς τε ἵππου τῆς ἑταιρικῆς καὶ  
 τῆς φάλαγγος τῆς ταύτη τεταγμένης ἦγε δρόμῳ τε  
 3 καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον· καὶ χρόνον  
 μὲν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν ἢ μάχῃ ἐγένετο· ὡς δὲ οἱ  
 τε ἵππεῖς οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι  
 καὶ τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα· τῶν Περσῶν  
 κόπτοντες, ἢ τε φάλαγξ ἢ Μακεδονικὴ πυκνὴ καὶ  
 ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα ἐμβεβλήκει ἤδη αὐτοῖς,  
 καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῶ  
 ὄντι Δαρείῳ ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας  
 ἔφευγεν· ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ περιῖππεύοντες τῶν

had been stationed in front of the Companion cavalry, met them with volleys; and then they snatched hold of the reins, pulled down the drivers, and crowding round the horses, cut them down. Some did pass right through the Greek lines, which, as they had been ordered, parted where the chariots attacked; this was the main reason why the chariots passed through unscathed and the troops against which they were launched were unharmed. These chariots too were overpowered by the grooms of Alexander's army and the royal hypaspists.<sup>5</sup> 6

14. When Darius now attacked all along the line, Alexander ordered Aretas to charge the Persian cavalry which was riding round his right wing to encircle it; he himself for a short time led on his army in column;<sup>1</sup> but when the cavalry, sent off to attack the Persians who were encircling the right wing, had in some degree broken the front of the Persian phalanx, he wheeled towards the gap, and making a wedge<sup>2</sup> of the Companion cavalry and the part of the phalanx stationed there, led them on at the double with a loud battle cry straight at Darius. Now for a little time it became a hand-to-hand fight, but when the cavalry with Alexander, and Alexander himself, pressed vigorously, shoving the Persians and striking their faces with their spears, and the Macedonian phalanx, solid and bristling with its pikes, had got to close quarters with them, and Darius, who had now long been in a panic, saw nothing but terrors all around, he was himself the first to turn and flee. The Persians who were trying on horseback to 2 3

<sup>5</sup> Inexplicable, as 11, 9 puts them in the front line.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably referring to his oblique advance.

<sup>2</sup> Marsden, *Campaign of Gaugamela* 68 f., shows how this applies to the horse, but not to the foot.

Περσῶν τὸ κέρας ἐμβαλόντων ἐς αὐτοὺς εὐρώστως τῶν ἀμφὶ Ἀρέτην.

- 4 Ταύτη μὲν δὴ τῶν Περσῶν φυγὴ καρτερὰ ἦν, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐφεπόμενοι ἐφόνευον τοὺς φεύγοντας. οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Σιμμίαν καὶ ἡ τούτου τάξις οὐκέτι ξυνεξορμηῆσαι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δυνατοὶ ἐγένοντο ἐς τὴν δίωξιν, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήσαντες τὴν φάλαγγα αὐτοῦ ἠγωνίζοντο, ὅτι τὸ εὐώνυμον τῶν Μακε-
- 5 δόνων πονεῖσθαι ἠγγέλλετο. καὶ ταύτη παραρραγείσης αὐτοῖς τῆς τάξεως κατὰ τὸ διέχον διεκπαίουσι τῶν τε Ἰνδῶν τινες καὶ τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ σκευοφόρα τῶν Μακεδόνων· καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἐκεῖ καρτερόν ἐγίγνετο. οἱ τε γὰρ Πέρσαι θρασέως προσέκειντο ἀνόπλοις τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ οὐ προσδοκήσασιν ἐπὶ σφᾶς διεκπεσεῖσθαι τινὰς διακόψαντας διπλῆν τὴν φάλαγγα, καὶ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι βάρβαροι ἐμβαλόντων τῶν Περσῶν ξυνεπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ.
- 6 τῶν δὲ ἐπιτεταγμένων τῇ πρώτῃ φάλαγγι οἱ ἠγεμόνες ὀξέως μαθόντες τὸ γιγνόμενον μεταβαλόντες, ἦπερ παρήγγελλτο αὐτοῖς, τὴν τάξιν ἐπιγίγνονται κατὰ νότου τοῖς Πέρσαις, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ ἀμφὶ τοῖς σκευοφόροις ξυνεχομένους ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐγκλίναντες ἔφευγον. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως τῶν Περσῶν οὐπω τῆς φυγῆς τῆς Δαρείου ἠσθημένοι περιῦππεύσαντες τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου εὐώνυμον κατὰ κέρας τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Παρμενίωνα ἐνέβαλλον.

15. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀμφιβόλων τὰ πρῶτα γενομένων τῶν Μακεδόνων πέμπει Παρμενίων παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον σπουδῇ ἀγγελοῦντα, ὅτι ἐν ἀγῶνι ξυνέχεται τὸ κατὰ σφᾶς καὶ βοηθεῖν δεῖ. ταῦτα

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envelop the Macedonian right also took fright at the vigorous charge of Aretas and his men.

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At this place indeed the Persian rout was complete, and the Macedonians in pursuit were slaughtering the fugitives. But Simmias and his battalion were no longer able to join Alexander in the pursuit, but had halted their phalanx and were fighting where they stood, since the Macedonian left was reported to be in difficulties. At this point their line had been broken, and into the gap some Indians and Persian cavalry made a thrust right up to the Macedonians' baggage animals. There the action was becoming severe, for the Persians fell boldly on men who were mostly unarmed and had never expected that anyone would cut through the double line of the phalanx and get right through to attack them; what is more, the captive barbarians themselves, as the Persians broke in, joined with them in the action and attacked the Macedonians. However, the commanders of the troops which formed the reserve to the first phalanx quickly learned what had happened, turned about face, according to previous orders, appeared in the rear of the Persians, and killed large numbers of them there, crowded together round the baggage animals. Some, however, gave way and escaped. The Persians of the right wing, who had not yet noticed Darius' flight, wheeling round Alexander's left, were assailing Parmenio's troops.

15. At this juncture, since at first the Macedonians were between two fires, Parmenio sent a despatch rider to Alexander to report with all haste that his troops were in distress and needed help. On receiv-

## ARRIAN

- ὡς ἐξηγγέλθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τοῦ μὲν διώκειν ἔτι ἀπετράπετο, ἐπιστρέψας δὲ ζὺν τῇ ἵππῳ τῶν ἑταίρων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν βαρβάρων ἦγε δρόμῳ. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τοῖς φεύγουσι τῶν πολεμίων ἵππεῦσι, τοῖς τε Παρθυαίοις καὶ τῶν Ἰνδῶν ἔστιν οἷς καὶ Πέρσαις τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ κρατίστοις
- 2 ἐμβάλλει. καὶ ἵππομαχία αὕτη καρτερωτάτη τοῦ παντὸς ἔργου ζυνέστη. ἐς βάθος τε γὰρ οἶα δὴ ἰληδὸν τεταγμένοι ἀνέστρεφον οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ ἀντιμέτωποι τοῖς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον ζυμπεσόντες οὔτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι οὔτ' ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἤπερ ἵππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο, ἀλλὰ διεκπαῖσαι πᾶς τις τὸ καθ' αὐτόν, ὡς μόνην ταύτην σωτηρίαν σφίσιν οὔσαν, ἐπειγόμενοι ἔκοπτόν τε καὶ ἐκόπτοντο ἀφειδῶς, οἶα δὴ οὐχ ὑπὲρ νίκης ἀλλοτρίας ἔτι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας οἰκείας ἀγωνιζόμενοι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα πίπτουσι μὲν ἀμφὶ ἐξήκοντα τῶν ἑταίρων τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, καὶ τιτρώσκεται Ἡφαιστίων τε αὐτὸς καὶ Κοῖνος καὶ Μενίδας· ἀλλὰ ἐκράτησε καὶ τούτων Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 3 Καὶ τούτων μὲν ὅσοι διεξέπαισαν διὰ τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἔφευγον ἀνὰ κράτος· Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐγγὺς ἦν προσμῖξαι ἤδη τῷ δεξιῷ κέρατι τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ἵππεῖς λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενοι οὐχ ὑπελείποντο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τοῦ ἔργου· ἀλλὰ ἔφευγον γὰρ ἤδη οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως τῶν βαρβάρων, ὅποτε Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτοῖς ζυνέμιξεν, ὥστε ἀποτραπόμενος Ἀλέξανδρος ἐς τὸ διώκειν αὐθις Δαρεῖον ἐξώρμησε·
- 4 καὶ ἐδίωξεν ἔστε φάος ἦν· καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Παρμενίωνα τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς διώκοντες εἶποντο. ἀλλὰ Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν διαβὰς τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Λύκον

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 15. 1-4

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ing this message, Alexander turned back from further pursuit, and wheeling round with the Companion cavalry, came galloping down on the Persian right and charged first the enemy cavalry in flight, the Parthyaean, some Indians and the Persians, the most numerous and best of the enemy forces. This proved the fiercest cavalry engagement of the whole action. The barbarians, who were drawn up in depth, since they were in squadrons, rallied, and clashed with Alexander's troops front to front: there was no more javelin-throwing and no manoeuvring of horses, as usual in a cavalry engagement, but each strove hard to break his own way through; they kept on giving and taking blows unsparingly, treating this as the one hope of safety, inasmuch as they were men now no longer fighting for another's victory, but for their own very lives. There about sixty of the Companions of Alexander fell, and Hephaestion himself, Coenus and Menidas were wounded. Still, Alexander overcame these enemies also. 2

Those of the Persians who broke their way through Alexander's troops took to headlong flight, and Alexander was now ready to come to blows with the enemy's right wing. Meanwhile the Thessalian cavalry, who fought brilliantly, showed no inferiority to Alexander in the action; in fact the barbarian right were already in flight when Alexander encountered them. So Alexander turned away and resumed his pursuit of Darius, which lasted as long as the light held; and Parmenio's troops followed, pursuing their opponents. However, when Alexander had crossed the river Lycus,<sup>1</sup> he encamped there, 3 4

<sup>1</sup> Greater Zab. Cf. D. 61, 1 f.; QC iv 16, 7 ff.; v 1, 3-10 for Darius' flight and the pursuit to Arbela.

## ARRIAN

- κατεστρατοπέδευσεν αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναπαῦσαι ὀλίγον τοὺς τε ἄνδρας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους· Παρμενίων δὲ τότε στρατόπεδον τῶν βαρβάρων εἶλε καὶ τὰ σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας καὶ τὰς καμήλους.
- 6 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἀναπαύσας τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἱππέας ἔστε ἐπὶ μέσας νύκτας προὔχῳρει αὐθις κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπ' Ἀρβηλα, ὡς Δαρεῖόν τε αἰρήσων ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν τὴν βασιλικήν. καὶ ἀφίκετο εἰς Ἀρβηλα τῇ ὑστεραία διώξας τοὺς πάντας ἐκ τῆς μάχης σταδίου μάλιστα ἐς ἑξακοσίους. καὶ Δαρεῖον μὲν οὐ καταλαμβάνει ἐν Ἀρβήλοις, ἀλλὰ ἔφευγεν οὐδέν τι ἐλινύσας Δαρεῖος· τὰ χρήματα δὲ ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ ἡ κατασκευὴ πᾶσα, καὶ τὸ ἄρμα τὸ Δαρείου αὐθις ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ ἡ ἀσπίς αὐθις καὶ τὰ τόξα ἑάλω.
- 6 Ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἄνδρες μὲν ἐς ἑκατὸν μάλιστα, ἵπποι δὲ ἔκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ τῆς κακοπαθείας τῆς ἐν τῇ διώξει ὑπὲρ τοὺς χιλίους, καὶ τούτων τῆς ἑταιρικῆς ἵππου σχεδόν τι οἱ ἡμίσεες. τῶν βαρβάρων δὲ νεκρῶν μὲν ἐλέγοντο ἐς τριάκοντα μυριάδας, ἑάλωσαν δὲ πολὺ πλείονες τῶν ἀποθανόντων καὶ οἱ ἐλέφαντες καὶ τῶν ἁρμάτων ὅσα μὴ κατεκόπη ἐν τῇ μάχῃ.
- 7 Τοῦτο <τὸ> τέλος τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις Ἀριστοφάνους μηνὸς Πυανεψιῶνος· καὶ Ἀριστάνδρῳ ξυνέβη ἡ μαντεία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηνί, ἐν ὧτῳ ἡ σελήνη ἐκλιπῆς ἐφάνη, τὴν τε μάχην Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ τὴν νίκην γενέσθαι.
16. Δαρεῖος μὲν δὴ εὐθύς ἐκ τῆς μάχης παρὰ τὰ ὄρη τὰ Ἀρμενίων ἤλαυνεν ἐπὶ Μηδίας, καὶ ξὺν

<sup>2</sup> P. 34, 1 has Al. proclaimed king of Asia at Arbela, cf. Introd. n. 64.



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to give his men and horses a little rest, while Parmenio took the Persian camp with the baggage train, elephants and camels.

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Alexander rested his cavalry till towards midnight, and hurried on again to Arbela, to seize Darius there with his treasure and the other royal belongings. He arrived at Arbela next day, having covered in all, since the battle, about six hundred stades in the pursuit. However, he did not catch Darius at Arbela, as he continued his flight without pause, though his treasure and all his equipment was captured and his chariot was seized then a second time, and his shield was taken a second time, and his bow and arrows too.<sup>2</sup>

Up to a hundred of Alexander's troops were lost, with over a thousand horses from wounds and distress in the pursuit, of which about half belonged to the Companions. The barbarian corpses were said to number some three hundred thousand, but far more were made prisoner than killed, and the elephants and all the chariots which had not been cut down in the battle were also captured.<sup>3</sup>

So ended this battle in the month Pyanepsion of the archonship at Athens of Aristophanes.<sup>4</sup> Aristander's prophecy came true, that Alexander's battle and victory would occur in the same month in which the moon was partially eclipsed.

16. Darius made straight from the battle by the Armenian mountains for Media, accompanied in

<sup>2</sup> D. 61: 90,000 Persians, 500 Macedonians (plus many wounded, who might well die later); QC. iv 16, 26: 40,000 Persians, under 300 Macedonians.

<sup>4</sup> An error (October/November); really 26 Boedromion = 1 Oct. (Plut., *Camillus* 19, 3), cf. App. VIII 5.

## ARRIAN

- αὐτῷ οἱ τε Βάκτριοι ἰππεῖς, ὡς τότε ἐν τῇ μάχῃ  
 ξυνετάχθησαν, ἔφευγον καὶ Περσῶν οἱ τε συγ-  
 γενεῖς οἱ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν μηλοφόρων καλουμένων  
 2 οὐ πολλοί. προσεγένοντο δὲ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν  
 καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων ξένων ἐς δισχιλίους, οὓς  
 Πά(τ)ρων τε ὁ Φωκεὺς καὶ Γλαῦκος ὁ Αἰτωλὸς  
 ἤγον. ταύτῃ δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ φυγὴ ἐπὶ Μηδίας ἐγίγνετο,  
 ὅτι ἐδόκει τὴν ἐπὶ Σούσων τε καὶ Βαβυλῶνος ἤξειν  
 Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ τῆς μάχης, ὅτι οἰκουμένη τε  
 ἐκείνη πᾶσα ἦν καὶ ὁδὸς τοῖς σκευοφόροις οὐ  
 χαλεπή, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ πολέμου τὸ ἄθλον ἡ Βαβυλῶν  
 καὶ τὰ Σοῦσα ἐφαίνετο· ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ Μηδίας μεγάλῳ  
 στρατεύματι οὐκ εὖπορος.
- 3 Καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη Δαρείος. Ἀλέξανδρος γὰρ ἐξ  
 Ἀρβήλων ὄρμηθεις τὴν ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος εὐθὺς  
 προὔχῳρει. ἤδη τε οὐ πόρρω Βαβυλῶνος ἦν καὶ  
 τὴν δύναμιν ξυντεταγμένην ὡς ἐς μάχην ἤγε, καὶ  
 οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι πανδημεὶ ἀπήντων αὐτῷ ξὺν ἱερεῦσί  
 τε σφῶν καὶ ἄρχουσι, δῶρά τε ὡς ἕκαστοι φέροντες  
 καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐνδιδόντες καὶ τὴν ἄκραν καὶ τὰ  
 4 χρήματα. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς τὴν Βαβυ-  
 λῶνα τὰ ἱερά, ἃ Ξέρξης καθεῖλεν, ἀνοικοδομεῖν  
 προσέταξε Βαβυλωνίοις, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῦ Βήλου  
 τὸ ἱερόν, ὃν μάλιστα θεῶν τιμῶσι Βαβυλώνιοι.  
 σατράπην δὲ κατέστησε Βαβυλῶνος Μαζαῖον,  
 Ἀπολλόδωρον δὲ τὸν Ἀμφιπολίτην στρατηγὸν  
 τῶν μετὰ Μαζαίου ὑπολειπομένων στρατιωτῶν,  
 καὶ Ἀσκληπιόδωρον τὸν Φίλωνος τοὺς φόρους  
 5 ἐκλέγειν. κατέπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐς Ἀρμενίαν Μιθρή-

<sup>1</sup> D. 64, 1; QC. v 1, 3-9.

<sup>2</sup> D. 64, 3 f.; QC. v 1, 11-23 and 45 (also on donatives to troops).

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 16. 1-5

flight by the Bactrian cavalry, as they had been posted with him in the battle on that occasion; he also had an escort of Persians, the royal kinsmen and a few of the 'spearmen of the Golden Apples'. He was joined during the flight by some two thousand of the foreign mercenaries led by Patron the Phocian and Glaucus the Aetolian. The reason why he fled towards Media was that he thought Alexander after the battle would take the route to Susa and Babylon, since all of it was inhabited and the road itself was easy for the baggage trains, and besides, Babylon and Susa were the obvious prize of the war, whereas the route to Media was not easy for a large force.<sup>1</sup>

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Darius was not mistaken, for on leaving Arbela Alexander at once advanced on the road to Babylon. He was already near Babylon, and was leading his force in battle order, when the Babylonians came to meet him in mass, with their priests and rulers, each section of the inhabitants bringing gifts and offering surrender of the city, the citadel and the treasure.<sup>2</sup> On entering Babylon Alexander directed the Babylonians to rebuild the temples Xerxes destroyed, and especially the temple of Baal, whom the Babylonians honour more than any other god. He appointed Mazaeus satrap of Babylon and Apollodorus of Amphipolis general of the troops left behind with Mazaeus, and Asclepiodorus son of Philo to collect the taxes.<sup>3</sup> He also sent as satrap to Armenia

[482-81  
B.C.]

<sup>1</sup> Mazaeus (11, 4 n.) fled to Babylon (QC. iv 6, 17) and, as satrap, surrendered it (v 1, 17); QC. v 1, 43 f. agrees on his appointment and that of Apollodorus (cf. D. 64, 5), makes Agathon commandant of citadel and gives numbers of garrison forces.

<sup>4</sup> It never came under Al's control (D. xix 23, 3). Cf. D. 64, 6; QC. v 1, 44.

νην σατράπην, ὃς τὴν ἐν Σάρδεσιν ἀκρόπολιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐνέδωκεν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις ἐνέτυχεν, καὶ ὅσα ἐδόκει Χαλδαίοις ἀμφὶ τὰ ἱερά τὰ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἔπραξε, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τῷ Βήλῳ καθ' ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἐξηγοῦντο ἔθυσεν.

- 6 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Σούσων ἐστέλλετο· καὶ ἐντυγχάνει αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὃ τε παῖς τοῦ Σουσίων σατράπου καὶ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐπιστολεύς. Φιλόξενον γὰρ εὐθύς ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ Σούσων ἐστάλκει Ἀλέξανδρος. τῇ δὲ ἐπιστολῇ τῇ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐνεγέγραπτο, ὅτι τὴν τε πόλιν οἱ Σούσιοι παραδεδώκασιν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα σῶά ἐστιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.
- 7 ἀφίκετο δὲ ἐς Σούσα Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκ Βαβυλῶνος ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι· καὶ παρελθὼν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τά τε χρήματα παρέλαβεν ὄντα ἀργυρίου τάλαντα ἐς πεντακισμύρια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν τὴν βασιλικήν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κατελήφθη αὐτοῦ, ὅσα Ξέρξης ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄγων ἦλθε, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογεί-  
8 τονος χαλκαῖ εἰκόνες. καὶ ταύτας Ἀθηναίοις ὀπίσω πέμπει Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ νῦν κεῖνται Ἀθήνησιν ἐν Κεραμεικῷ αἱ εἰκόνες, ἧ ἄνιμεν ἐς πόλιν, καταντικρὺ μάλιστα τοῦ Μητρώου, <οὐ> μακρὰν τῶν Εὐδανέμων τοῦ βωμοῦ· ὅστις δὲ μεμύηται ταῖν θεαῖν ἐν Ἐλευσίνι, οἶδε τοῦ Εὐδανέμου τὸν βωμὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δαπέδου ὄντα.
- 9 Ἐνταῦθα θύσας τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ λαμπάδα ποιήσας καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικόν, καταλιπὼν σατράπην μὲν τῆς Σουσιανῆς Ἀβουλίτην ἄνδρα Πέρσην, φρούραρχον δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῶν

<sup>5</sup> Cf. i 17, 6; ii 24, 6; iii 1, 4 f.; vii 17.

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Mithrenes, who had surrendered the acropolis of Sardis to Alexander. At Babylon too he met the Chaldaeans, and carried out all their recommendations on the Babylonian temples, and in particular sacrificed to Baal, according to their instructions.<sup>5</sup>

He himself set out for Susa.<sup>6</sup> On the way he was met by the son of the satrap of Susa<sup>7</sup> and a letter-carrier from Philoxenus, whom Alexander had sent to Susa directly after the battle. In Philoxenus' letter it was stated that the people of Susa had handed over the city and that all the treasure was in safe-keeping for Alexander. Alexander reached Susa in twenty days from Babylon; he entered the city and took over the treasure, up to fifty thousand Talents of silver,<sup>8</sup> and all the rest of the royal belongings. A good deal was captured there in addition, all that Xerxes brought back from Greece, notably bronze statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which Alexander sent back to the Athenians; they are now set up at Athens in the Cerameicus, on the way by which we ascend the Acropolis, just opposite the Metroön, not far from the altar of the Eudanemoi. Anyone who has been initiated into the mysteries of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis is aware that the altar of Eudanemos is in the plain.<sup>9</sup>

[480-79  
B.C.]

There Alexander sacrificed in accordance with ancestral custom, and held a relay torch race and athletic contest. He left behind Abulites, a Persian, as satrap of Susiana, Mazarus one of the Companions as garrison commandant in the citadel of Susa and

<sup>5</sup> D. 65; QC. v 2, 1 ff. See App. VIII 6.

<sup>7</sup> Abulites, vii 4, 1; D. 65, 5; QC. v 2, 8 ff; cf. §9 below.

<sup>8</sup> App. X 3.

<sup>9</sup> Contrast vii 19, 2 ('vulgate'). No proof here that A. was yet domiciled at Athens.

## ARRIAN

Σούσων Μάζαρον τῶν ἐταίρων καὶ στρατηγὸν  
 Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Θεοδώρου, προὔχῳρει ὡς ἐπὶ  
 Πέρσας· ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δὲ κατέπεμψεν ὑπαρχον  
 10 Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ Κιλικίας Μένητα. καὶ  
 τούτῳ ἔδωκεν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα ἐς τρισχίλια  
 φέρειν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστεῖλαι  
 παρ' Ἀντίπατρον ὅσων ἂν δέηται Ἀντίπατρος ἐς  
 τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμον. ἐνταῦθα καὶ  
 Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀνδρομένους ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἀφίκετο,  
 11 ἣν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἤγε. καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν  
 ἰππέας ἐς τὴν ἵππον τὴν ἐταιρικὴν κατέταξεν  
 Ἀλέξανδρος, τοὺς πεζοὺς δὲ προσέθηκεν ταῖς  
 τάξεσι ταῖς ἄλλαις, κατὰ ἔθνη ἐκάστους ξυντάξας.  
 κατέστησε δὲ καὶ λόχους δύο ἐν ἐκάστη ἴλη, οὐ  
 πρόσθεν ὄντας λόχους ἰππικούς, καὶ λοχαγοὺς  
 ἐπέστησε τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν προκριθέντας ἐκ τῶν  
 ἐταίρων.

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. QC. v 2, 16 f., replacing Mazarus by Xenophilus, perhaps his successor (cf. D. xix 17, 3; 18, 1; 48, 6), naming Callicrates as treasurer and giving garrison force of 3,000.

<sup>11</sup> D. 64, 5 makes Apollodorus and Menes 'generals' of Babylon and of the other provinces as far as Cilicia; QC. v 1, 43 gives this with the names in reverse order, wrongly since Apollodorus was certainly in Babylonia. A modern view that Menes was a financial official has no support in the evidence. As a former bodyguard (ii 12, 2), he was certainly of high rank. Hence 'hyparch' is most naturally construed as 'satrap', cf. i 12, 8 n. Did he then succeed Asclepiodorus and perhaps Menon too in Syria (iii 6, 8 n)—the former had certainly been superseded by 327 (iv 13, 4)—and Balacrus in Cilicia (ii 12, 2), who was killed fighting there at some unknown date in Al's lifetime (D. xviii 22, 1)? So Bosworth, *CQ* 1975. Against this, in iv 7, 2 (see note) Asclepiodorus is still described as a hyparch in 329/8 B.C., when he brought reinforcements to Al. Perhaps Menes had a general control

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 16. 9-11

Archelaus son of Theodorus as general; and then he advanced against the Persians.<sup>10</sup> He sent down Menes to the sea as hyparch of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia,<sup>11</sup> and gave him up to three thousand silver Talents to take to the sea, from which he was to despatch to Antipater whatever Antipater required for the Lacedaemonian war.<sup>12</sup> There too Amyntas son of Andromenes arrived with the troops he brought from Macedon.<sup>13</sup> Of these Alexander assigned the horsemen to the Companion cavalry, and attached the foot to the other battalions, assigning them in accordance with their national origins. He also formed two companies in each squadron of cavalry (there had formerly been no cavalry companies), and as company-captains he appointed men distinguished for courage among the Companions.<sup>14</sup>

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over the satrapies of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia, especially as D. and QC. both say that he was given power (like Apollodorus) to levy troops, probably to provide the reinforcements for Al. that arrived from Cilicia and Syria in 330-328 B.C. (QC. v 7, 12; vii 10, 11 f., cf. A. iv 7, 2), as well as a special responsibility to send money to Antipater (D. and QC. give the sum entrusted to him as 1000 Talents). On Bosworth's own view Phoenicia did not lie in the satrapy of Asclepiodorus; QC. iv 7, 9 says that Philotas (Berve no. 806, otherwise unknown) was put in charge of the area round Tyre, cf. also the fiscal post of Coeranus (A. iii 6, 4). No more is heard of Menes unless in iv 7, 2. On Al's death new satraps were appointed in both Syria and Cilicia; their immediate predecessors are unknown (D. xviii 3).

<sup>10</sup> Appendix VI.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. ii 27 n. D. 65, 1 makes him arrive on the march to Susa, QC. v 1, 39 ff. at Babylon, with 6,000 foot and 500 horse from Macedon, 3,500 foot and 600 horse from Thrace, 4,000 foot and 380 horse from Peloponnese; some discrepancies in D., who adds 50 Macedonian pages.

<sup>14</sup> Different military changes *en route* Babylon-Susa in QC. v 2, 2-7, cf. D. 65, 2.



## ARRIAN

17. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Πασιτι-  
 γριν ποταμὸν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.  
 Οὐξίων δὲ οἱ μὲν τὰ πεδία οἰκοῦντες τοῦ τε  
 σατράπου τῶν Περσῶν ἤκουον καὶ τότε Ἄλε-  
 ξάνδρῳ σφας ἐνέδοσαν· οἱ δὲ ὄρειοι καλούμενοι  
 Οὐξιοὶ Πέρσαις τε οὐχ ὑπήκοοι ἦσαν καὶ τότε  
 πέμψαντες παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ ἄλλως παρήσειν  
 ἔφασαν τὴν ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἰόντα ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ  
 λαβεῖν ὅσα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως ἐπὶ τῇ  
 2 παρόδῳ ἐλάμβανον. καὶ τούτους ἀποπέμπει Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος, ἠκεῖν κελεύσας ἐπὶ τὰ στενά, ὧν κρατοῦ-  
 ντες ἐπὶ σφίσιν ἐδόκουν τὴν πάροδον εἶναι τὴν εἰς  
 Πέρσας, ἵνα καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ λάβοιεν <τὰ> τεταγ-  
 μένα. αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς σωματοφύλακας  
 τοὺς βασιλικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τῆς  
 ἄλλης στρατιᾶς εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους τῆς νυκτὸς ἦει  
 ἄλλην ἢ τὴν φανεράν ἠγησαμένων αὐτῷ τῶν  
 3 Σουσίων. καὶ διελθὼν ὁδὸν τραχεῖαν καὶ δύσπορον  
 ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπιπίπτει ταῖς κώμαις τῶν Οὐξίων,  
 καὶ λείαν τε πολλὴν ἔλαβε καὶ αὐτῶν ἔτι ἐν ταῖς  
 εὐναῖς ὄντων πολλοὺς κατέκτεινεν· οἱ δὲ ἀπέφυγον  
 εἰς τὰ ὄρη. αὐτὸς δὲ ἦει σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τὰ στενά, ἵνα  
 ἀπαντήσῃται οἱ Οὐξιοὶ πανδημεῖ ἐδόκουν ληψό-  
 4 μνοι τὰ τεταγμένα. Κρατερόν δὲ ἔτι πρόσθεν  
 ἀπέστειλε τὰ ἄκρα καταληψόμενον, ἔνθα ᾤετο  
 βιαζομένους τοὺς Οὐξίους ἀποχωρήσειν. αὐτὸς δὲ  
 πολλῷ τάχει ἦει· καὶ φθάνει τε κρατήσας τῶν  
 παρόδων καὶ ξυντεταγμένους τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἔχων  
 ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων χωρίων ἐπῆγεν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβά-  
 5 ρους. οἱ δὲ τῷ τε τάχει τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκπλα-  
 γέντες καὶ τοῖς χωρίοις, οἷς μάλιστα δὴ ἐπεποί-  
 θεσαν, πλεονεκτούμενοι ἔφυγον οὐδὲ εἰς χεῖρας

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 17. 1-5

330  
B.C.

17. Leaving Susa and crossing the river Pasitigris [Karun], Alexander invaded the land of the Uxians.<sup>1</sup> The Uxians who inhabited the plains had obeyed the Persian satrap, and now surrendered to Alexander; but the Uxian hillmen, as they were called, were not subject to Persia, and now sent a message to Alexander that they would only permit him to take the route towards Persia with his army if they received what they used to receive from the Persian king on his passage. Alexander sent them away, with orders to go to the pass, their control of which made them think that the way through to Persia was in their hands, in order to receive from him too what was prescribed. He took the royal bodyguards, the hypaspists and some eight thousand of the rest of the army, marched by night on a road different from the obvious way, with Susian guides, and passing along a rough and difficult path in one day, fell upon the Uxian villages, obtained a great deal of plunder, and killed many of them still in their beds; the rest escaped to the hills. Then he marched swiftly to the pass where the Uxians were likely to meet him in full force, to receive what was prescribed. He sent Craterus even further in advance, to seize the heights where he supposed the Uxians would retreat under pressure, but he himself came on very rapidly, got first to the pass and occupied it, and with his men in due battle order led them from a commanding position to attack the Uxians. Astounded at Alexander's speed of movement, and placed at a disadvantage by the very terrain in which they had put their chief trust, they fled without so much as coming to close quarters.

<sup>1</sup> After 3 days march, D. 67; QC. v 3, 1 ff. There are various discrepancies from A. in their accounts.

## ARRIAN

ἔλθόντες· καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν κρημνώδη οὔσαν· οἱ πλείστοι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη ἀναφεύγοντες ἐμπίπτουσιν ἐς τοὺς ἀμφὶ  
 6 Κρατερόν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπώλοντο. ταῦτα τὰ γέρα παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου λαβόντες χαλεπῶς εὔροντο δεόμενοι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν χώραν τὴν σφῶν ἔχοντες φόρους ὅσα ἔτη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀποφέρειν. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Λάγου λέγει τὴν Δαρείου μητέρα δεηθῆναι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου δοῦναί σφισι τὴν χώραν οἰκεῖν. ὁ φόρος δὲ ὁ συνταχθεὶς ἦν ἵπποι ἐς ἔτος ἑκατὸν καὶ ὑποζύγια πεντακόσια καὶ πρόβατα τρισμύρια. χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἦν Οὐξίοις οὐδὲ ἡ γῆ οἷα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομεῖς αὐτῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἦσαν.

18. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους τοὺς ξένους καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τοῦ στρατεύματος βαρύτερον ὠπλισμένοι ξὺν Παρμενίωνι ἐκπέμπει ὡς ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν  
 2 ἀμαξιτὸν τὴν ἐς Πέρσας φέρουσαν. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς τε Μακεδόνας τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τὴν ἵππον τὴν ἑταιρικὴν καὶ τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἤει σπουδῇ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὄρων. ὡς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας τὰς Περσίδας ἀφίκετο, καταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ Ἀριοβαρζάνην τὸν Περσῶν σατράπην πεζοὺς μὲν ἐς τετρακισμυρίους ἔχοντα, ἱππέας δὲ ἐς ἑπτακοσίους, διατετειχικότα τὰς πύλας καὶ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἐστρατοπεδευκότα, ὡς εἴργειν τῆς παρόδου Ἀλέξανδρον.

<sup>a</sup> A's specific reference to Pt. may suggest that this detail, unlike others, was not in Ar.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 17. 5-18. 2

330  
B.C.

Some of them were killed by Alexander's troops in the flight, and many too perished on the precipitous path. The greater number escaped to the hills, only to encounter Craterus' forces and be destroyed by them. These were the gifts of honour they received from Alexander; and it was only with difficulty that they obtained from him their request to retain their own territory, paying annual tribute to Alexander. Ptolemy son of Lagus says that the mother of Darius implored Alexander on their behalf to give them their territory to dwell in.<sup>2</sup> The tribute assessed was a hundred horses every year with five hundred transport animals and thirty thousand from their flocks and herds. For the Uxians had no money or arable land, but were mostly herdsmen. 6

18. After this,<sup>1</sup> Alexander sent off the baggage train, the Thessalian cavalry, the allies, the foreign mercenaries, and all the other heavier-armed troops of his army with Parmenio, who was to lead them against the Persians by the carriage way that goes into their country. He himself took with him the Macedonian foot, the Companion cavalry and *prodromoi*, the Agrianians and the archers, and marched at full speed over the mountain route. When he arrived at the Persian Gates,<sup>2</sup> he found there Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persia,<sup>3</sup> with some forty thousand infantry and seven hundred horse;<sup>4</sup> he had built a wall across the Gates and was encamped there by the wall, to bar Alexander's passage. 2

<sup>1</sup> D. 68; QC. v 3, 16-4, 34 differ on various points from A. on this campaign, for which see Fuller 228 ff., with map; Al's route is not certain. Cf. Strabo xv 3, 6.

<sup>2</sup> On the fifth day (D. and QC.).

<sup>3</sup> The province of Persia proper.

<sup>4</sup> D. gives 25,000 (so QC.) + 300.

## ARRIAN

- 3 Τότε μὲν δὴ αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπεδεύσατο· τῇ δὲ  
 ὑστεραία ξυντάξας τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπήγε τῷ τείχει.  
 ὡς δὲ ἄπορόν τε διὰ δυσχωρίαν ἐφαίνετο αἰρεθῆναι  
 καὶ πολλὰς πληγὰς οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐλάμβανον ἐξ  
 ὑπερδεξίου τε χωρίου καὶ ἀπὸ μηχανῶν βαλλόμε-  
 4 νοι, τότε μὲν ἀποχωρεῖ ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον· τῶν δὲ  
 αἰχμαλώτων φρασάντων ἄλλην ὁδὸν περιιάξειν  
 αὐτόν, ὡς εἴσω παρελθεῖν τῶν πυλῶν, ἐπεὶ  
 τραχεῖαν τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ στενὴν ἐπύθετο, Κρατερόν  
 μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου τὴν τε  
 αὐτοῦ τάξιν ἔχοντα καὶ τὴν Μελεάγρου καὶ τῶν  
 τοξοτῶν ὀλίγους καὶ τῶν ἰππέων ἐς πεντακοσίους,  
 5 καὶ προστάττει αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴν ἐκπεριεληλυθότα  
 αὐτὸν αἰσθηταὶ καὶ προσάγοντα ἤδη τῷ στρατο-  
 πέδῳ τῶν Περσῶν (αἰσθήσεσθαι δὲ οὐ χαλεπῶς,  
 σημαεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰς σάλπιγγας), τότε δὲ  
 προσβαλεῖν τῷ τείχει· αὐτὸς δὲ προὔχωρει νύκτωρ  
 καὶ διελθὼν ὅσον ἑκατὸν σταδίους ἀναλαμβάνει  
 τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τὴν Περδίκκου τάξιν καὶ τῶν  
 τοξοτῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ  
 τῶν ἐταίρων τὴν ἴλην τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ τετραρ-  
 χίαν πρὸς ταύτη μίαν ἰππικὴν, καὶ ξὺν τούτοις  
 ἦει ἐπικάμψας ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας, ἵν' οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι  
 6 ἦγον. Ἀμύνταν δὲ καὶ Φιλώταν καὶ Κοῖνον τὴν  
 ἄλλην στρατιὰν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πεδῖον ἄγειν καὶ τὸν  
 ποταμόν, ὃν ἐχρῆν περᾶσαι ἰόντα ἐπὶ Πέρσας,  
 γεφυροῦν ἐκέλευσεν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἦει ὁδὸν χαλεπὴν καὶ  
 τραχεῖαν καὶ ταύτην δρόμῳ τὸ πολὺ ἦγε. τὴν μὲν  
 δὴ πρώτην φυλακὴν τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν φάους  
 ἐπιπεσῶν διέφθειρε καὶ τῶν δευτέρων τοὺς πολ-  
 7 λούς· τῆς τρίτης δὲ οἱ πλείους διέφυγον, καὶ οὐδὲ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 18. 3-7

For the moment Alexander encamped there, but 3  
 next day he marshalled his troops and led them to the 330  
 assault of the wall. But as it appeared impregnable B.C.  
 from the difficulty of the ground, and as his troops  
 were suffering many blows from fire directed from  
 commanding heights and from catapults, for the  
 moment he fell back on the camp. His prisoners <sup>5</sup> 4  
 undertook to lead him round by a different road, so  
 that he would make his way within the gates; but as  
 he gathered from enquiry that this road was rough  
 and narrow, he left Craterus there in charge of the  
 camp with his own battalion and Meleager's, a few of  
 the archers, and about five hundred horse, and in- 5  
 structed him to attack the wall, as soon as he observed  
 that Alexander himself had managed to get right  
 round and was nearing the Persian camp (Craterus  
 would easily observe this from a bugle signal). So  
 he himself advanced by night, and after traversing  
 about a hundred stades, took the hypaspists, with  
 Perdiccas' battalion, the lightest armed of the archers,  
 the Agrianians, the royal squadron of the Compan-  
 ions, and a tetrarchy <sup>6</sup> of cavalry in addition, and with  
 them made a turning movement towards the gates,  
 guided thither by the prisoners. Amyntas, Philotas 6  
 and Coenus were instructed to march the remainder  
 of the army to the plain, and to bridge the river <sup>7</sup>  
 which he had to cross to enter Persia. He himself  
 traversed a difficult and rough path, and most of it at  
 full speed. He fell upon the first barbarian guard  
 before dawn and destroyed it together with the  
 greater part of the second; most of the third escaped, 7

<sup>5</sup> A bilingual Lycian in D. and QC., and P. 37, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Obscure: evidently more than one squadron, cf. Introd. 58-60.

<sup>7</sup> Araxes (Palvar), D. 69, 2; QC 5, 2. The plain is Ardakan.

## ARRIAN

- οὗτοι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Ἀριοβαρζάνου ἔφυγον, ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν ὡς εἶχον ἐς τὰ ὄρη πεφοβημένοι, ὥστε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἔω ἐπιπεσῶν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ ἅμα μὲν προσέβαλλε τῇ τάφρῳ, ἅμα δὲ αἱ σάλπιγγες ἐσήμαινον τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατε-  
 8 ρόν, καὶ Κρατερός προσῆγε τῷ προτειχίσματι. οἱ πολέμιοι δὲ πάντοθεν ἀμφίβολοι γιγνόμενοι οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθόντες ἔφυγον, ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν γὰρ εἵργοντο, τῇ μὲν Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπικειμένου, ἄλλη δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν παραθεόντων, ὥστε ἠναγκά-  
 9 σθησαν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ τεῖχη ἀποστρέψαντες φεύγειν· εἶχετο δὲ καὶ τὰ τεῖχη πρὸς τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων ἤδη. Ἀλέξανδρος γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅπερ ξυνέβη ὑποτοπήσας Πτολεμαῖον ἀπολελοίπει αὐτοῦ, ἔχοντα τῶν πεζῶν ἐς τρισχιλίους, ὥστε οἱ μὲν πλείστοι τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν χερσὶ πρὸς τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων κατεκόπησαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ φυγῇ φοβερᾷ γενομένη κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν ῥύψαντες ἀπώλοντο· αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Ἀριοβαρζάνης ξὺν ὀλίγοις ἵππεῦσιν ἐς τὰ ὄρη ἀπέφυγεν.  
 10 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ σπουδῇ αὐθις ἦγεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ καταλαμβάνει ἤδη πεποιημένην ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γέφυραν καὶ διαβαίνει ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ εὐπετῶς. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ αὐθις σπουδῇ ἤλαυνεν ἐς Πέρσας, ὥ(σ)τε ἔφθη ἀφικέσθαι πρὶν τὰ χρήματα διαρπάσασθαι τοὺς φύλακας. ἔλαβε δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν Πασαργάδαις χρήματα ἐν τοῖς Κύρου τοῦ πρώτου  
 11 θησαυροῖς. σατράπην μὲν δὴ Περσῶν κατέστησε Φρασαόρτην τὸν Ῥεομίθρου παῖδα· τὰ βασιλεία δὲ τὰ Περσικὰ ἐνέπρησε, Παρμενίωνος σώζειν ξυμ-

<sup>8</sup> See iii 29, 6 n.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 18. 7-II

330  
B.C.

yet even they did not flee to Ariobarzanes' camp, but ran in terror from the spot just as they were to the mountains, so that he had not been observed by the time he assaulted the enemy's camp about dawn. At the same moment as he attacked the trench, the bugles sounded, notifying Craterus' troops, and Craterus assaulted the wall. So the enemy were 8 caught on all sides, never so much as came to blows, and took to flight; but as they were hemmed in from all quarters, Alexander pressing on one side, Craterus' troops hastening up on the other, most of them were forced to turn back to the walls for refuge. However, by this time the walls themselves were in Macedonian hands, for Alexander had surmised what actually 9 happened, and had left Ptolemy<sup>8</sup> there with some three thousand infantry, so that most of the Persians were cut down by the Macedonians at close quarters, while the others threw themselves over the cliffs in their flight, when it became a panic, and perished; Ariobarzanes himself escaped with a handful of horsemen to the hills.<sup>9</sup>

Once again Alexander marched at full speed to the 10 river, found the bridge there already constructed and crossed with his army without difficulty. Thence he hurried on again towards Persia<sup>10</sup> and arrived there before the garrison had plundered the treasure. He also captured the treasure which had been at Pasargadae in the treasury of Cyrus the First.<sup>11</sup> He ap- 11 pointed Phrasaortes the son of Rheomithras satrap of Persia. He set the Persian palace on fire, though Parmenio urged him to preserve it, arguing, among

<sup>8</sup> QC. 4, 33 ff. gives him 5,000 men and makes him try to seize Persepolis and die fighting its garrison, but cf. A. iii 23, 7.

<sup>10</sup> Persepolis. See App. X for what follows.

<sup>11</sup> 559-529 B.C.

βουλεύοντος, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλὸν αὐτοῦ κτήματα ἤδη ἀπολλύναι καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ὡσαύτως προσέξουσιν αὐτῷ οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἄνθρωποι, ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἐγνωκότει κατέχειν τῆς Ἀσίας τὴν  
 12 ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ ἐπελθεῖν μόνον νικῶντα. ὁ δὲ τιμωρήσασθαι ἐθέλειν Πέρσας ἔφασκεν ἀνθ' ὧν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάσαντες τὰς τε Ἀθήνας κατέσκαψαν καὶ τὰ ἱερά ἐνέπρησαν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κακὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰργάσαντο, ὑπὲρ τούτων δίκας λαβεῖν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ σὺν νῷ δράσαι τοῦτό γε Ἀλέξανδρος οὐδὲ εἶναί τις αὕτη Περσῶν τῶν πάλαι τιμωρία.

19. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος προὔχῳρει ἐπὶ Μηδίας· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐπυνθάνετο εἶναι Δαρεῖον. γνώμην δὲ πεποίητο Δαρεῖος, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ Σούσων καὶ Βαβυλῶνος μένοι Ἀλέξανδρος, αὐτοῦ προσμένειν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Μήδοις, εἰ δὴ τι νεωτερισθείη τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον· εἰ δ' ἐλαύνοι ἐπ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄνω ἰέναι τὴν ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους τε καὶ Ὑρκανίαν ἔσπε ἐπὶ Βάκτρα, τὴν τε χώραν φθείρων πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπορον ποιῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὴν πρόσω  
 2 ὁδόν. τὰς μὲν δὴ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν ἔτι ἀμφ' αὐτόν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὰς ἄρμαμάξας ἐπὶ τὰς Κασπίας καλουμένας πύλας πέμπει, αὐτὸς δὲ ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει, ἣτις ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνείλεκτο αὐτῷ, προσέμενεν ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις. ταῦτα ἀκούων Ἀλέξανδρος προὔχῳρει ἐπὶ Μηδίας. καὶ Παρ(α)ιτάκας μὲν εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐμβαλὼν κατεστρέψατο καὶ σατραπεύειν ἔταξεν αὐτῶν Ὁξ[ο]άθρην τὸν Ἀβουλίτου τοῦ [πρότερον]  
 3 Σούσων σατράπου παῖδα. αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἠγγέλθη κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὅτι ἐγνωκὼς εἶη Δαρεῖος ἀπαντᾶν

other things, that it was not good to destroy what was now his own property, and that the Asians would not so readily adhere to him, but would suppose that even he had not decided to retain the empire of Asia but only to conquer and pass on. Alexander said that he wished to punish the Persians for sacking Athens and burning the temples when they invaded Greece, and to exact retribution for all the other injuries they had done to the Greeks. I too do not think that Alexander showed good sense in this action nor that he could punish Persians of a long past age.

330  
B.C.12  
[480  
B.C.]

19. After these measures Alexander went on towards Media, for he was getting information that Darius was there. Darius had determined, if Alexander were to remain at Susa and Babylon, to wait himself where he was in Media, in case there were any new developments on Alexander's side, but if Alexander were to march straight against him, he proposed to go up country to the Parthyaean and Hyrcania, as far as Bactra, ravaging all the country and making further progress impossible for Alexander. He sent the women, all the belongings he had still with him and the closed waggons to what are called the Caspian gates, while he stayed himself in Ecbatana with the force he had collected from available resources. On hearing this, Alexander went on towards Media, and subdued the Paraetacae by invading their territory, and appointed Oxathres, son of Abulites the satrap of Susa, as satrap over them. As he was informed on the road that Darius had decided to meet him in battle and fight it out again,

## ARRIAN

τε αὐτῷ ὡς ἐς μάχην καὶ αὖθις διακινδυνεύειν,  
 Σκύθας τε γὰρ αὐτῷ ἦκειν καὶ Καδουσίους συμ-  
 μάχους, τὰ μὲν ὑποζύγια καὶ τοὺς τούτων φύλακας  
 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ἔπεσθαι ἐκέλευσε, τὴν  
 στρατιὰν δὲ τὴν ἄλλην ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν ἐσταλμένους  
 ὡς ἐς μάχην. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται δωδεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐς  
 4 Μηδίαν. ἔνθα ἔμαθεν οὐκ οὔσαν ἀξιόμαχον δύνα-  
 μιν Δαρείῳ οὐδὲ Καδουσίους ἢ Σκύθας αὐτῷ  
 συμμάχους ἦκοντας, ἀλλ' ὅτι φεύγειν ἐγνωκῶς εἶη  
 Δαρεῖος· ὁ δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦγε σπουδῇ. ὡς δὲ  
 ἀπεῖχεν Ἐκβατάνων ὅσον τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν,  
 ἐνταῦθα ἀπήντα αὐτῷ Βισθάνης ὁ Ὠχοῦ παῖς τοῦ  
 5 πρὸ Δαρείου βασιλεύσαντος Περσῶν· καὶ οὗτος  
 ἀπήγγειλεν, ὅτι Δαρεῖος ἐς πέμπτην ἡμέραν εἶη  
 πεφευγῶς ἔχων τὰ τε κρήματα <τὰ> ἐκ Μήδων ἐς  
 ἑπτακισχίλια τάλαντα καὶ στρατιὰν ἰππέας μὲν ἐς  
 τρισχιλίους, πεζοὺς δὲ ἐς ἑξακισχιλίους.

Ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Ἐκβάτανα Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς μὲν  
 Θετταλοὺς ἰππέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους  
 ἀποπέμπει ὀπίσω ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, τὸν τε μισθὸν  
 ἀποδοὺς αὐτοῖς ἐντελῇ τὸν ξυντεταγμένον καὶ  
 6 δισχίλια παρ' αὐτοῦ τάλαντα ἐπιδούς· ὅστις δὲ  
 ἰδία βούλοιο ἔτι μισθοφορεῖν παρ' αὐτῷ, ἀπογρά-  
 φεσθαι ἐκέλευσε· καὶ ἐγένοντο οἱ ἀπογραφάμενοι  
 οὐκ ὀλίγοι. Ἐπόκιλλον δὲ τὸν Πολυειδοῦς ἔταξε  
 καταγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, ἰππέας  
 ἄλλους ἔχοντα ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν· οἱ γὰρ Θεσσαλοὶ  
 τοὺς ἵππους αὐτοῦ ἀπέδοντο. ἐπέστειλε δὲ καὶ

<sup>1</sup> For Darius' plans and movements from Gaugamela to arrest by Bessus see D. 64, 1; 73, 1; QC. v 1, (3-9); 8-12. The Cadusii lived in mountains SW. of Caspian (Strabo xi 7, 1) and the Scythians of §3 presumably W. of Caspian, as Ecbatana

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since he had been joined by Scythian and Cadusian allies, he ordered the draught animals with their keepers and all the rest of the stores to follow, while he took the rest of the army with him ready for battle. He reached Media on the twelfth day. There he learned that Darius' force was not capable of fighting and that the Cadusians and Scythians had not arrived to help him, but that Darius had resolved on flight. Alexander marched on all the more rapidly. But when he was about three days' journey from Ecbatana he was met by Bisthanes son of Ochus, the predecessor of Darius as King of Persia, who reported that Darius had fled four days before, with his treasure from Media of seven thousand Talents and with about three thousand cavalry and about six thousand infantry.<sup>1</sup>

On arriving at Ecbatana, Alexander sent back the Thessalian cavalry and the rest of the allies to the sea, giving the agreed pay in full, and adding as a personal gift two thousand Talents; on his orders any individual who wanted to continue serving in his army as a mercenary was to enrol, and a great number did so enrol.<sup>2</sup> He appointed Epocillus son of Polyides to conduct them to the sea, with other cavalry to escort them, for the Thessalians sold their horses on the spot.

is the intended mobilization centre; Darius finally decided to carry on the war in east Iran (QC. v 9, 5 ff.); D. 73, 2 gives him 30,000 Persians and Greek mercenaries, QC. 8, 3 f. 34,000 foot (including 4,000 mercenaries, but cf. 23, 9 n.) and 4,000 horse. See App. VIII.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. iii 25, 4; 29, 4; v 27, 5; D. 74, 3 and QC. vi 2, 17 (dismissal at Hecatompylos, cf. 23, 1 n.); P. 42, 3 (after news of Darius' arrest); A. v 27, 5 n. QC. v 7, 12 records arrival in Media of reinforcements for Al. from Cilicia of 5000 foot and 1000 horse—under 'Plato' of Athens (Berve no. 732)! For Alexander's army after Ecbatana (Hamadan) see App. XIII.

## ARRIAN

Μένητι, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκωνται ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, ἐπιμε-  
 ληθῆναι ὅπως ἐπὶ τριήρων κομισθήσονται ἐς  
 7 Εὐβοίαν. Παρμενίωνα δὲ προσέταξε τὰ χρήματα  
 τὰ ἐκ Περσῶν κομιζόμενα εἰς τὴν ἄκραν τὴν ἐν  
 Ἐκβατάνοις καταθέσθαι καὶ Ἀρπάλῳ παραδοῦναι.  
 Ἄρπαλον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπέλιπε καὶ  
 φυλακὴν τῶν χρημάτων Μακεδόνας ἐς ἑξακισχι-  
 λίους καὶ ἵππέας καὶ ψιλοὺς ὀλίγους· αὐτὸν δὲ  
 Παρμενίωνα τοὺς ξένους ἀναλαμβάνοντα καὶ τοὺς  
 Θραῖκας καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι ἵππεῖς ἔξω τῆς ἵππου τῆς  
 ἑταιρικῆς παρὰ τὴν χώραν τὴν Καδουσίων ἐλαύνειν  
 8 ἐς Ὑρκανίαν. Κλείτῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης  
 ἡγεμόνι ἐπέστειλεν, ἐπειδὴν ἐκ Σούσων εἰς  
 Ἐκβάτανα ἀφίκηται, κατελέλειπτο γὰρ ἐν Σούσοις  
 ἀρρωστῶν, ἀναλαμβάνοντα τοὺς Μακεδόνας τοὺς ἐπὶ  
 τῶν χρημάτων τότε ὑπολειφθέντας ἵεναι τὴν ἐπὶ  
 Παρθυαίους, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς ἦξειν ἔμελλεν.

20. Αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὴν τε ἵππον τῶν  
 ἑταίρων καὶ τοὺς προδρόμους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους  
 ἵππέας, ὧν Ἐριγύϊος ἡγεῖτο, καὶ τὴν φάλαγγα τὴν  
 Μακεδονικὴν ἔξω τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ταχθέντων  
 καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας ἤλαυνεν ὡς  
 ἐπὶ Δαρείον. καὶ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν σπουδῆ  
 γιγνομένην τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν πολλοὶ κάμνοντες  
 2 ὑπελείποντο καὶ ἵπποι ἀπέθνησκον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς  
 ἦγε, καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ῥάγας ἑνδεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.  
 διέχει δὲ ὁ χώρος οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν Κασπίων πυλῶν  
 ὁδὸν ἡμέρας μιᾶς ἐλαύνοντι ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἦγε.  
 Δαρείος δὲ ἐφθάκει ἤδη παρεληλυθὼς εἰσω τῶν

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 16, 9.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendixes X 3, XI 4, XIII 5 (we do not know why

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 19. 6-20. 2

He instructed Menes<sup>3</sup> too, when they reached the coast, to see to their being conveyed on triremes to Euboea. Parmenio was ordered to deposit in the citadel of Ecbatana the treasure conveyed from Persia and to hand it over to Harpalus; for he left Harpalus in charge of the treasure, with some six thousand Macedonians, cavalry and a few light troops to protect it. Parmenio himself was instructed to take the mercenaries, Thracians and any cavalry other than the Companion cavalry past the land of the Cadusians and march into Hyrcania.<sup>4</sup> Clitus the commander of the royal squadron was ordered, on reaching Ecbatana from Susa, where he had been left sick, to take the Macedonians who had been left for the time being to protect the treasure and proceed on the road for Parthyaea, where he himself also proposed to go.

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20. Alexander then taking the cavalry, Companions and *prodromoi*, and the mercenary horse under Erigyus, and the Macedonian phalanx (except for those detailed to protect the treasure) along with the archers and the Agrianians, began his march against Darius.<sup>1</sup> By reason of the speed of his march many of his troops were left behind worn out, while the horses were dying. Still Alexander went on and reached Rhagae on the eleventh day. This place is one day's journey from the Caspian gates for anyone marching like Alexander. Darius, however, was too

Parmenio remained in Media, 26, 3). Harpalus: iii 6, 4-7; vii 12, 7 n.; E. Badian, *Historia* 1960, 245 ff.; *JHS* 1961, 16 ff.

<sup>1</sup> App. VIII 7. D. compresses the pursuit of Darius into one sentence, P. 42 f. is anecdotal, QC. v 13 often discordant with A.



## ARRIAN

πυλῶν τῶν Κασπίων. τῶν δὲ συμφευγόντων  
 Δαρείῳ πολλοὶ μὲν ἀπολιπόντες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ  
 ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ἀπεχώρουν, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ  
 3 καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ σφᾶς ἐνεδίδοσαν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ  
 ὡς ἀπέγνω κατὰ πόδας αἰρήσειν Δαρείον, μείνας  
 αὐτοῦ πέντε ἡμέρας καὶ ἀναπαύσας τὸν στρατὸν  
 Μηδίας μὲν σατράπην ἀπέδειξεν Ὀξυδάτην Πέρσην  
 ἄνδρα, ὃς ἐτύγχανε πρὸς Δαρείου ξυνειλημμένος καὶ  
 ἐν Σούσοις εἰργόμενος· τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἐς πίστιν ἦν  
 πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον· αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους  
 4 ἦγε. καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ πρὸς ταῖς Κασπίαις  
 πύλαις ἐστρατοπέδευσε, τῇ δευτέρᾳ δὲ εἴσω παρ-  
 ἦλθε τῶν πυλῶν ἔστε οἰκούμενα ἦν. ἐπισιτισό-  
 μενος <sup>1</sup> δὲ αὐτόθεν, ὅτι ἔρημον τὴν πρόσω χώραν  
 ἤκουεν, ἐς προνομὴν ἐκπέμπει Κοῖνον ξὺν ἵππεύσι  
 τε καὶ τῶν πεζῶν ὀλίγοις.

21. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀφικνεῖται παρ' αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 Δαρείου στρατοπέδου Βαγιστάνης Βαβυλώνιος  
 ἀνὴρ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ ξὺν τούτῳ Ἀντίβηλος τῶν  
 Μαζαίου παίδων. οὗτοι ἀπήγγειλαν ὅτι Ναβαρ-  
 ζάνης τε, χιλιάρχης τῶν ξὺν Δαρείῳ φευγόντων  
 ἵππέων, καὶ Βῆσσοις ὁ Βακτρίων σατράπης καὶ  
 Βαρσαέντης ὁ Ἀραχωτῶν καὶ Δραγγῶν σατράπης  
 2 ξυνειληφότες εἶεν Δαρείον. ταῦτα ἀκούσας Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦγε σπουδῇ, τοὺς ἐταίρους  
 μόνους ἔχων ἀμφ' αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς προδρόμους  
 ἵππέας καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους τε καὶ  
 κουφοτάτους ἐπιλεξάμενος, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Κοῖνον  
 προσμείνας ἐκ τῆς προνομῆς ἐπανελθεῖν. τοῖς δὲ  
 ὑπολειπομένοις ἐπιστήσας Κρατερόν προστάττει

<sup>1</sup> ἐπισιτισόμενος Krüger; ἐπισιτισάμενος codd.

quick and had already passed the Caspian gates. Many of those who shared his flight deserted him during its course, and went off to their homes, and a good number had surrendered to Alexander. Despairing of capturing Darius by close pursuit, Alexander remained there five days and rested his force; he appointed Oxydates satrap of Media, a Persian who had been arrested by Darius and imprisoned at Susa;<sup>2</sup> this made Alexander trust him. Alexander then marched towards the Parthyaean. The first day he encamped by the Caspian gates, on the second he passed within the gates to the limit of the inhabited country. In order to get provisions there, since he heard that the country beyond was desert, he sent Coenus to forage with cavalry and a few foot-soldiers.

21. At this point Bagistanes came to him from Darius' camp, a Babylonian and a noble, with Antibelus, one of Mazaeus' sons. They reported that Nabarzanes, chiliarch of the cavalry which had shared Darius' flight, Bessus satrap of Bactria and Barsaentes satrap of the Arachotians and the Drangians<sup>1</sup> had arrested Darius. On learning this Alexander pressed on faster than ever, with only the Companions, the mounted *prodromoi*, and the strongest and lightest of the infantry, carefully selected, without even waiting for Coenus and his men to return from foraging. He put Craterus in command of those left behind and ordered him to follow, but not by forced marches.

<sup>2</sup> QC. vi 2, 11 puts this after Darius' death.

<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere called Zarangians.

## ARRIAN

- 3 <ἔπεσθαι> μὴ μακρὰς ὁδοὺς ἄγοντα. οἱ δὲ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν τὰ ὄπλα εἶχον μόνον καὶ δύο ἡμερῶν σιτία. ἔλθων δὲ τὴν τε νύκτα ὅλην καὶ τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας μέχρι μεσημβρίας ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀναπαύσας τὸν στρατὸν αὐθις ἦει ὅλην νύκτα, καὶ ἅμα ἡμέρα ὑποφαινούση παρῆν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὅθεν
- 4 ἀφωρμήκει ὀπίσω Βαγιστάνης. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους οὐ κατέλαβε, Δαρείου δὲ πέρι ἐπύθετο αὐτὸν μὲν συνειλημμένον ἄγεσθαι ἐφ' ἄρμαμάξης, Βῆσσω δὲ ἀντὶ Δαρείου εἶναι τὸ κράτος καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὠνομάσθαι Βῆσσον πρὸς τε τῶν Βακτρῶν ἰππέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι βάρβαροι ξυνέφευγον Δαρείῳ, πλὴν Ἀρταβάζου καὶ τῶν Ἀρταβάζου παίδων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν μισθοφόρων· τούτους δὲ πιστοὺς εἶναι Δαρείῳ, καὶ εἶργειν μὲν τὰ γιγνόμενα οὐ δυνατοὺς εἶναι, ἐκτραπέντας δὲ ἔξω τῆς λεωφόρου ὁδοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη ἵεναι κατὰ σφᾶς, οὐ μετέχοντας τοῖς ἀμφὶ Βῆσσον τοῦ ἔργου.
- 5 γνώμην δὲ πεποιῆσθαι τοὺς ξυλλαβόντας Δαρεῖον, εἰ μὲν διώκοντα σφᾶς Ἀλέξανδρον πυνθάνοιντο, παραδοῦναι Δαρεῖον Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ σφίσι τι ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκεσθαι· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἐπανεληλυθότα μάθοιεν, τοὺς δὲ στρατιάν τε ξυλλέγειν ὅσῃν πλείστην δύναιντο καὶ διασώζειν ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τὴν ἀρχήν. Βῆσσον δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐξηγεῖσθαι κατ' οἰκειότητά τε τὴν Δαρείου καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ σατραπείᾳ τὸ ἔργον ἐγίνετο.
- 6 Ταῦτα ἀκούσαντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀνὰ κράτος διωκτέα ἐφαίνετο. καὶ ἤδη μὲν ἐξέκαμνον οἱ τε ἄνδρες καὶ οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ τῇ ξυνεχεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἦγε, καὶ διελθὼν ὁδὸν πολλὴν τῆς τε

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His own men had nothing but their arms and two days' rations. Travelling all night and the next day till noon, he rested his troops a short time and then went on again all night, and at dawn he reached the camp, from which Bagistanes had started back. But he did not overtake the enemy, though he learnt that Darius was being carried in a closed waggon under arrest, that Bessus had the sovereignty in place of Darius and had been saluted as leader by the Bactrian cavalry and the other barbarians who had fled with Darius, except by Artabazus<sup>2</sup> and his sons and the Greek mercenaries, that they were loyal to Darius, and as they were unable to prevent what was taking place, had turned off the main road and were making for the mountains<sup>3</sup> by themselves, taking no part in the action of Bessus and his followers, while those who had seized Darius had decided, if they learned that Alexander was pursuing them, to give him up to Alexander and make good terms for themselves, but if they learned that he had turned back, to collect as large an army as they could and preserve their power in common; Bessus was in command for the time because of his relationship to Darius and because the act was done in his satrapy.<sup>4</sup>

On hearing this, Alexander decided that he must pursue with the utmost vigour. Already his men and horses were growing utterly wearied under the continued hardship; none the less, he pressed on, and

<sup>2</sup> Connected by marriage with Darius, and also with Memnon (i 12, 9 n.), he had spent some years in exile at Philip's court, and was loyal first to Darius, then to Al.

<sup>3</sup> Of Tapuria (23, 1), i.e. Elburz.

<sup>4</sup> A mistake; Bessus' satrapy was not Parthyaea but Bactria.

## ARRIAN

νυκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἡμέρας ἔστε ἐπὶ μεσημ-  
 βρίαν ἀφικνεῖται ἔς τινα κώμην, ἵνα τῇ προτεραίᾳ  
 7 ἔστρατοπεδεύκεσαν οἱ Δαρεῖον ἄγοντες. ἐνταῦθα  
 ἀκούσας ὅτι νυκτὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν ἐγνωσ-  
 μένον εἶη τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἤλεγχε τοὺς προσχώ-  
 ρους, εἰ δὴ τινα εἶδεῖεν ἐπιτομωτέραν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς  
 φεύγοντας. οἱ δὲ εἰδέναί μὲν ἔφασαν, ἐρήμην δὲ  
 εἶναι τὴν ὁδὸν δι' ἀνυδρίαν. ὁ δὲ ταύτην ἄγειν  
 ἐκέλευσε· καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι οὐχ ἔφονται οἱ πεζοὶ αὐτῷ  
 σπουδῇ ἐλαύνοντι τῶν μὲν ἵππέων ἔς πεντακοσίους  
 κατεβίβασεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων, τοὺς ἡγεμόνας δὲ  
 τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιλεξάμενος τοὺς  
 κρατιστεύοντας ἐπιβῆναι τῶν ἵππων ἐκέλευσεν  
 8 οὕτως ὅπως οἱ πεζοὶ ὠπλισμένοι ἦσαν. Νικάνορα  
 δὲ τὸν τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἡγεμόνα καὶ Ἄτταλον τὸν  
 τῶν Ἀγριάνων κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ἦντινα οἱ ἀμφὶ  
 Βῆσσον προῦκεχωρήκεσαν, τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας  
 ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε, καὶ τούτους ὡς κουφότατα ἔσταλ-  
 μένους, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους πεζοὺς ἐν τάξει ἔπεσθαι.  
 9 αὐτὸς δὲ ἀμφὶ δεῖλῃν ἄγειν ἀρξάμενος δρόμῳ  
 ἡγεῖτο· διελθὼν δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς σταδίους ἔς τε-  
 τρακοσίους ὑπὸ τὴν ἔω ἐπιτυγχάνει τοῖς βαρβάροις  
 ἀτάκτως ἰούσι καὶ ἀνόπλοις, ὥστε ὀλίγοι μὲν τινες  
 αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμυνόμενοι ὤρμησαν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ εὐθὺς  
 ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτὸν κατεῖδον οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας  
 ἐλθόντες ἔφευγον· καὶ οἱ τραπέντες ἐς ἀλκὴν  
 10 ὀλίγων πεσόντων καὶ οὗτοι ἔφυγον. Βῆσσος δὲ  
 καὶ οἱ ξὺν αὐτῷ τέως μὲν ἐφ' ἀρμαμάξης Δαρεῖον  
 μετὰ σφῶν ἐκόμιζον· ὡς δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη ἦν Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος, Δαρεῖον μὲν Σατιβαρζάνης καὶ Βαρσα-  
 έντης κατατρώσαντες αὐτοῦ ἀπέλιπον, αὐτοὶ δὲ  
 ἔφυγον ξὺν ἵππεῦσιν ἑξακοσίοις. Δαρεῖος δὲ ἀπο-

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accomplishing a great distance during the night and  
the following day till noon, he reached a village  
where the party with Darius had bivouacked the day  
before. As he heard there that the barbarians had  
determined to travel by night, he asked the inhabi-  
tants whether they knew of any short cut to get to  
the fugitives. They replied that they did, but that  
the road was desolate for lack of water. He told  
them to guide him along this road, and seeing that  
his infantry would not keep up with him if he pushed  
on at full speed, he dismounted some five hundred  
horsemen, selected from the officers of the infantry  
and the rest those who had best kept up their  
strength, and ordered them to mount the horses,  
carrying their usual infantry arms. Nicanor the  
commander of the hypaspists, and Attalus com-  
mander of the Agrianians, were ordered to lead the  
men who were left behind along the road already  
taken by Bessus and his party with the lightest possible  
equipment, and the rest of the infantry were to  
follow in ordinary formation. Alexander then  
started off himself at evening, and led his troops on  
at full speed; during the night he covered up to four  
hundred stades, and just at dawn came upon the  
Persians marching in disorder without arms, so that  
only a few of them attempted resistance; as soon as  
they saw Alexander himself, most of them did not  
even wait to come to close quarters but took to flight;  
those who did turn to make a fight of it also fled on  
losing a few of their number. For a time Bessus and  
his immediate followers continued to convey Darius  
with them in the closed waggon; but when Alex-  
ander was right upon them, Satibarzanes and Bar-  
saentes wounded Darius, left him where he was and  
escaped themselves with six hundred horsemen.

θνήσκει ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐκ τῶν τραυμάτων πρὶν ὀφθῆναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.

22. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοῦ Δαρείου ἐς Πέρσας ἀπέπεμψε, θάψαι κελεύσας ἐν ταῖς βασιλικαῖς θήκαις, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ πρὸ Δαρείου βασιλεῖς· σατράπην δὲ ἀπέδειξε Παρθυαίων καὶ Ὑρκανίων Ἀμμινάπην Παρθυαῖον· ἣν δὲ οὗτος τῶν Αἴγυπτον ἐνδόντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μετὰ Μαζάκου. Τληπόλεμος δὲ Πυθοφάνους τῶν ἐταίρων ξυνετάχθη αὐτῷ σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐν Παρθυαίοις τε καὶ Ὑρκανίοις.

- 2 Τοῦτο τὸ τέλος Δαρείῳ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις Ἀριστοφῶντος μηνὸς Ἑκατομβαιῶνος, ἀνδρὶ τὰ μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῶ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, εἰς δὲ τὰλλα οὐδὲν ἀνεπιεικὲς ἔργον ἀποδειξαμένῳ ἢ οὐδὲ ἐγγεγόμενον αὐτῷ ἀποδείξασθαι, ὅτι ὁμοῦ μὲν ἐς τὴν βασιλείαν παρελθεῖν, ὁμοῦ δὲ προσπολεμῆσθαι πρὸς τε Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυνέβη. οὐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ ἐθέλοντι ἐξῆν ἔτι ὑβρίζειν ἐς τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἐν μείζονι κινδύνῳ ἢ περ ἐκεῖνοι καθεστηκότι. ζῶντι μὲν δὴ ξυμφοραὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλαι ἐπ' ἄλλαις ξυνηνέχθησαν, οὐδέ τις ἀνακωχὴ ἐγένετο ἐπειδὴ πρῶτον ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν παρῆλθεν· ἀλλὰ εὐθὺς μὲν τὸ τῶν σατραπῶν ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ πταῖσμα ξυνέβη τὸ ἵππικόν, εὐθὺς δὲ Ἰωνία τε καὶ Αἰολίς εἶχοντο καὶ Φρύγες ἀμφότεροι καὶ Λυδία καὶ Κᾶρες πλὴν Ἀλικαρνασ-  
3  
4 σέων· ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον καὶ Ἀλικαρνασσὸς ἐξήρητο, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ παραλία πᾶσα ἔσπε ἐπὶ Κιλικίαν· ἔνθεν δὲ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐπ' Ἰσσω ἦσα, ἵνα τὴν τε μητέρα

<sup>5</sup> In the 'vulgato' Darius was still alive when found by



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Darius died of his wound soon after, before Alexander had seen him.<sup>5</sup>

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B.C.

22. Alexander sent Darius' body to Persepolis, ordering it to be buried in the royal tomb, like the other kings who ruled before him.<sup>1</sup> He appointed as satrap of the Parthyaean and Hyrcanians Amminapes, a Parthyaean; he was one of those with Mazacus, who had surrendered Egypt to Alexander.<sup>2</sup> Tlepolemus son of Pythophanes, one of the Companions, was associated in the appointment with him, to superintend Parthyaea and Hyrcania.

This was the end of Darius, when Aristophon was archon at Athens in the month Hecatombaeon.<sup>3</sup> No man showed less spirit or sense in warfare; but in other matters he committed no offence, perhaps for lack of opportunity, since the moment of his accession was also the moment of the attack on him by the Macedonians and Greeks. So even if he had had the will, he was no longer free to play the tyrant to his subjects, as his position was more dangerous than theirs. His life was one series of disasters, with no respite, after his accession. The cavalry disaster of his satraps on the Granicus happened at once, and at once Ionia and Aeolis were in the enemy's hands, with both Phrygias, Lydia and all Caria except Halicarnassus; the loss of Halicarnassus, and then of all the coast-line as far as Cilicia soon followed. Next came his defeat at Issus, where he saw his mother

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the Macedonians, QC. v 13, 24 f. (broken by lacuna); P. 43; J. xi 15.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vi 29.

<sup>2</sup> QC. vi 4, 25 puts this in Hyrcania, ignoring Tlepolemus. Amminapes was eventually replaced by Phrataphernes (iii 23, 4) at least by 326 B.C. (v 20, 7) but perhaps not as early as autumn 330 B.C. (cf. iii 28, 2).

<sup>3</sup> July 330, cf. App. VIII 6-10. A's reflections follow.

## ARRIAN

αἰχμαλωτισθεῖσαν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἐπέιδεν· ἐπὶ τῷδε Φοινίκη τε ἀπώλετο καὶ Αἴγυπτος πᾶσα· ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐν Ἀρβήλοις ἔφυγε τε ἐν πρώτοις αἰσchrῶς καὶ στρατιὰν πλείστην  
 5 παντὸς τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ γένους ἀπώλεσε· φυγὰς τε ἐκ τούτου τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς πλανώμενος καὶ τελευτῶν πρὸς τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα προδοθεὶς, βασιλεύς τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ δεσμώτης ζὺν ἀτιμία ἀγόμενος, τέλος δὲ πρὸς τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ἀπώλετο. ζῶντι μὲν Δαρείῳ τοιαῦτα  
 6 ξυνηνέχθη, τελευτήσαντι δὲ ταφή τε ἢ βασιλικὴ καὶ τῶν παίδων ὅποια καὶ βασιλεύοντος αὐτοῦ τροφή τε <παρ'> Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ παιδεύσεις, καὶ γαμβρὸς Ἀλέξανδρος. ὁπότε δὲ ἐτελεύτα, ἐγεγόνει ἀμφὶ τὰ πεντήκοντα ἔτη.

23. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας ἐν τῇ διώξει τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀναλαβὼν ἐς Ὑρκανίαν προὔχῳρει. κεῖται δὲ ἡ Ὑρκανία χώρα ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐπὶ Βάκτρα φερούσης· καὶ τῇ μὲν ὄρεσιν ἀπείργεται δασέσι καὶ ὑψηλοῖς, τὸ πεδῖον δὲ αὐτῆς καθήκει ἔστε ἐπὶ τὴν μεγάλην τὴν ταύτη θάλασσαν. ταύτην δὲ ἦγεν, ὅτι ταύτη τοὺς ξένους τοὺς ἀμφὶ Δαρείον διαπεφευγέναι ἐς τὰ τῶν Ταπούρων ὄρη ἐπύθετο καὶ αὐτοὺς ἅμα τοὺς  
 2 Ταπούρους χειρωσόμενος. τριχῇ δὴ διελὼν τὸν στρατὸν αὐτὸς μὲν τὴν ἐπιτομωτάτην καὶ χαλεπωτάτην ἠγήσατο, τὸ πλείστον καὶ ἅμα τὸ κουφότατον τῆς δυνάμεως ἄγων· Κρατερόν δὲ τὴν τε αὐτοῦ τάξιν ἔχοντα καὶ τὴν Ἀμύντου καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἔστιν οὓς καὶ ὀλίγους τῶν ἰππέων ἐπὶ Ταπούρων ἔστειλεν· Ἐριγύϊον δὲ τοὺς τε ξένους

with his wife and children taken prisoners; then Phoenicia and all Egypt were lost; and then he himself was among the first to flee dishonourably at Arbela, and lost the greatest army of the whole barbarian race; a fugitive from his own kingdom and a wanderer, he was at last betrayed by his own escort to the worst of fates, to be at once a king and prisoner carried off in dishonour; finally he perished by a conspiracy of his closest connections. These were the tragedies of Darius' life. After death he had a royal burial and his children were brought up and educated by Alexander as if he were still on the throne, and Alexander married his daughter.<sup>4</sup> At his death he was about fifty years old.

330  
B.C.

23. Alexander, taking over the troops left behind in the pursuit, advanced into Hyrcania, which lies on the left of the road leading to Bactria;<sup>1</sup> on one side it is bounded by high, wooded mountains, but its plain stretches to the Great Sea [Caspian] in those parts. Alexander marched this way because he had learned that the mercenaries with Darius had escaped to the Tapurian mountains [Elburz]; besides, he intended to subdue the Tapurians themselves. He divided his army into three parts, and himself took the shortest and hardest road with the largest part and lightest armed of his force; he sent Craterus with his own battalion and that of Amyntas, some of the archers, and a few horsemen, against the Tapurians, and Erigyus was ordered to take the mercenaries and

<sup>4</sup> In 324, vii 4, 4; she was murdered after Al's death by Roxane (P. 77). Education: D. 67, 1; QC. v 2, 18 ff.

<sup>1</sup> Hyrcanian campaign: App. VIII 10; D. 75 f.; QC. vi 4 f.; P. 44; 46 f.; Strabo xi 7 (cf ii 1, 14) with citations from Ar. F 19 f., whose topographical material A. ignores. QC. vi 2, 15 ff (at Hecatompylos, cf. D. 74) and P. 47 (in Hyrcania) tell that Al. had to persuade the Macedonians to march on,

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καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ἵππον ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν λεωφόρον τε καὶ μακροτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι ἐκέλευσε, τὰς ἀμάξας καὶ τὰ σκευοφόρα καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ὄμιλον ἄγοντα.

- 3 Ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὰ πρῶτα ὄρη καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας αὐτοῦ ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἔστιν οὗς ἦει χαλεπὴν ὁδὸν καὶ δύσπορον, φύλακας τῶν ὁδῶν καταλιπὼν, ἵνα σφαλερόν τι αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο, ὡς μὴ τοῖς ἐπομένοις κατ' ἐκεῖνα ἐπιθοῖντο οἱ τὰ ὄρη ἔχοντες τῶν βαρβάρων.
- 4 αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν τοξοτῶν διελθὼν τὰ στενὰ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς ποταμῷ οὐ μεγάλῳ. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄντος αὐτοῦ Ναβαρζάνης τε ὁ Δαρείου χιλιάρχης καὶ Φραταφέρνης ὁ Ὑρκανίας τε καὶ Παρθυαίων σατράπης καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἀμφὶ Δαρεῖον Περσῶν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι ἀφικόμενοι παρέδωσαν σφᾶς αὐτούς. ὑπομείνας δὲ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τέσσαρας ἡμέρας ἀνέλαβε τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀσφαλῶς διελθόντας, τοῖς δὲ Ἀγριαῖσιν ὀπισθοφυλακοῦσιν ἐπέθεντο οἱ ὄρειοι τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μείον ἔχοντες τῷ ἀκροβολισμῷ ἀπηλλάγησαν.
- 6 Ἄρας δὲ ἐντεῦθεν προῆει ὡς ἐφ' Ὑρκανίαν εἰς Ζαδράκαρτα πόλιν Ὑρκανίων. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ περὶ Κρατερόν ξυνέμιξαν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν ξένοις τοῖς Δαρείου οὐκ ἐντετυχηκότες, τὴν χώραν δὲ ὅσῃν διαπεπορευμένοι ἦσαν τὴν μὲν βία, τὴν δὲ ἐνδιδό-

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\* Al. had only 3 phalanx battalions with him at this time (Introd. 61), the third being that of Coenus (24, 1). Contra

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 23. 2-6

the rest of the cavalry and bring them along the high-road, which was longer, convoying the waggons, the baggage train and the rest of his people.<sup>2</sup>

330  
B.C.

After he had crossed the first mountains and had encamped there, Alexander took the hypaspists and the lightest armed of the Macedonian phalanx and some of the archers, and marched along a rough and difficult road, leaving troops behind to guard the roads where he thought there was danger, so that the barbarians in possession of the heights might not attack the forces coming after at those points. He himself with the archers crossed the pass and camped in the plain by a small river. While he was there, Nabarzanes, Darius' chiliarch, Phrataphernes the satrap of Hyrcania and Parthyaea and other very highly placed Persian officers of Darius came and gave themselves up.<sup>3</sup> After waiting four days in the camp, he picked up those who had been left behind on the march, most of whom had got through with safety; the native hillmen had attacked the Agrians, guarding the rear, but had the worst of a long range skirmish and withdrew.

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Starting off again, Alexander advanced towards Hyrcania to Zadracarta, a city of the Hyrcanians.<sup>4</sup> At this point Craterus and his troops joined him; they had not fallen in with Darius' mercenaries, but partly by force and partly by the surrender of the

Lane Fox (cf. *Introd.* n. 99) A's words do not imply that Coenus' battalion was less heavily armoured than the rest; Al. took not only the lightest armed (e.g. the hypaspists) but the largest part of the force.

<sup>3</sup> Phrataphernes (henceforth unswervingly loyal), *QC.* vi 4, 23; he puts Nabarzanes' surrender later, after prior negotiations, 4, 8 ff.; 5, 22.

<sup>4</sup> *App.* VIII 10.

ιτων τῶν κατοικούντων προσπεποιημένοι. ἐνταῦθα  
 καὶ Ἐριγύϊος ἦκε σὺν τοῖς σκευοφόροις καὶ ταῖς  
 7 ἀμάξαις. ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον Ἀρτάβαζος ἀφίκετο  
 παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ Κωφὴν  
 καὶ Ἀριοβαρζάνης καὶ Ἀρσάμης καὶ ξὺν τούτοις  
 παρὰ τῶν ξένων τῶν ξὺν Δαρείῳ πρέσβεις καὶ  
 Αὐτοφραδάτης ὁ Ταπούρων σατράπης. Αὐτο-  
 φραδάτη μὲν δὴ τὴν σατραπείαν ἀπέδωκεν,  
 Ἀρτάβαζον δὲ καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἅμα οἱ ἐν τιμῇ ἦγε,  
 8 τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις Περσῶν ὄντας καὶ τῆς  
 ἐς Δαρεῖον πίστεως ἕνεκα. τοῖς πρέσβεσι δὲ τῶν  
 Ἑλλήνων δεομένοις σπείσασθαι σφισιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ  
 παντὸς ξενικοῦ ἀπεκρίνατο ὁμολογίαν μὲν οὐκ ἂν  
 ποιήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐδεμίαν· ἀδικεῖν γὰρ  
 μεγάλα τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι  
 παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἑλ-  
 λήνων· ἐκέλευσε δὲ ἦκειν ξύμπαντας καὶ παραδι-  
 δόναι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιτρέποντας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 9 χρῆσθαι ὅ τι βούλοιτο, ἢ σώζεσθαι ὅπῃ δύναιντο.  
 οἱ δὲ ἐπιτρέπειν ἔφασαν σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς  
 ἄλλους Ἀλεξάνδρῳ· ξυμπέμπειν τε ἐκέλευον τὸν  
 ἡγησόμενον αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἀσφαλῶς διακομισθεῖεν  
 παρ' αὐτόν· εἶναι δὲ ἐλέγοντο ἐς χιλίους καὶ  
 πεντακοσίους. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πέμπει Ἀνδρόνι-  
 κον τὸν Ἀγέρρου καὶ Ἀρτάβαζον παρ' αὐτοῦς.

24. Αὐτὸς δὲ προῆγεν ὡς ἐπὶ Μάρδους, ἀναλα-  
 βὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς  
 Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τὴν Κοίνου καὶ Ἀμύντου τάξιν καὶ  
 τῶν ἐταίρων ἱππέων τοὺς ἡμίσεας καὶ τοὺς ἱπ-

<sup>b</sup> QC. 4, 24 and 5, 1 ff. puts Autophradates' surrender before Artabazus'. Al. rewards or punishes men for their conduct to Darius as it suits him; the motivation in A. is naive.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 23. 6-24. 1

330  
B.C.

inhabitants, they had taken over all the territory they had traversed. Erigyius too arrived there with the baggage trains and the waggons. Soon after, Artabazus came to join Alexander with Cophen, Ariobarzanes and Arsames among his sons and Autophradates, satrap of the Tapurians, and envoys from the mercenaries who had been with Darius. Alexander gave the satrapy back to Autophradates, while he kept Artabazus and his sons by him in an honourable position, as they were among the most eminent Persians and especially because of their loyalty to Darius.<sup>5</sup> To the envoys of the Greeks, however, who begged him to grant them terms for the whole mercenary force, he replied that he would make no compact with them whatever; men who fought with the barbarians against Greece against the decrees of the Greeks were guilty of grave wrongs.<sup>6</sup> He ordered them to come in a body and surrender, leaving it to him to do what he would with them; if not, they must take what steps they could for their own safety. They replied that they placed themselves and the rest in Alexander's hands, and urged him to send an officer to lead them under safe conduct to his camp. They were said to be about one thousand five hundred.<sup>7</sup> Alexander sent Andronicus, son of Agerrus, and Artabazus to them.

24. He himself proceeded against the Mardians,<sup>1</sup> taking the hypaspists, archers, Agrianians, the battalions of Coenus and Amyntas, half the Com-

<sup>5</sup> See *Introd.* 38 and 40.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 19, 5 n. *QC.* 5, 6-10 (cf. *D.* 76, 2) now also gives 1500; 500 had evidently been lost since 331.

<sup>1</sup> Or Amardi, west of Hyrcanian coastal plain (*Strabo xi* 8. 8; 13. 3). Cf. *D.* 76, 3 f.; *QC.* 5, 11 ff.



## ARRIAN

πακοντιστάς· ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἵππακοντισταὶ  
 2 τάξεις ἦσαν. ἐπελθὼν δὲ τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῆς χώρας  
 τῶν Μάρδων πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτῶν  
 φεύγοντας, οὓς δέ τινας ἐς ἀλκὴν τετραμμένους,  
 πολλοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις  
 χρόνου ἐμβεβλήκει ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ  
 διὰ τε δυσχωρίαν καὶ ὅτι πένητες οἱ Μάρδοι καὶ  
 μάχιμοι ἐπὶ τῇ πενίᾳ ἦσαν. οὐκ οὐδὲ Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἄν ποτε δείσαντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ  
 προκεχωρηκότα ἤδη ἐς τὸ πρόσω, ταύτῃ μᾶλλον τι  
 3 ἀφύλακτοι ἠλίσκοντο. πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὰ  
 ὄρη κατέφυγον, ἃ δὴ ὑπερύψηλά τε καὶ ἀπότομα  
 αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐστίν, ὡς πρὸς ταῦτά γε οὐχ  
 ἤξοντα Ἀλέξανδρον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ προσῆγεν,  
 οἱ δὲ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς ἐνέδοσαν  
 καὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτοὺς μὲν  
 ἀφῆκεν, σατράπην δὲ ἀπέδειξεν αὐτῶν Αὐτοφρα-  
 δάτην, ὄνπερ καὶ Ταπούρων.

4 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπανελθὼν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἔνθεν-  
 περ ὠρμήθη ἐς τῶν Μάρδων τὴν γῆν, κατέλαβε  
 τοὺς Ἑλληνας τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἤκοντας καὶ τοὺς  
 Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις, οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα Δαρεῖον  
 ἐπρέσβευον, Καλλιστρατίδαν τε καὶ Παύσιππον καὶ  
 Μόνιμον καὶ Ὀνόμαντα, καὶ Ἀθηναίων Δρωπίδην.  
 τούτους μὲν δὴ ξυλλαβὼν ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχε, τοὺς  
 Σινωπέων δὲ ἀφῆκεν, ὅτι Σινωπεῖς οὔτε τοῦ  
 κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μετεῖχον, ὑπὸ Πέρσαις τε  
 τεταγμένοι οὐκ ἀπεικότα ποιεῖν ἐδόκουν παρὰ τὸν  
 5 βασιλέα σφῶν πρεσβεύοντες. ἀφῆκεν δὲ καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ὅσοι πρὸ τῆς εἰρήνης τε καὶ τῆς  
 συμμαχίας τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας γενομένης παρὰ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 24. 1-5

panion cavalry and the mounted javelin-men, for by this time they formed a battalion. Passing through the greater part of the Mardian country, he killed many of them in flight, and some who had offered resistance; a great number were captured alive. Now, no one had invaded their country for a long time, owing to the difficulty of the terrain, and because the Mardians were not only poor, but warlike. So they could never have had any apprehension that Alexander would invade their country, especially as he had already marched so far beyond it, and for this reason they were taken more off their guard. But many of them also took refuge in the mountains, which are very high and precipitous in their country, feeling sure that Alexander would not penetrate so far. But when he actually reached this refuge, they sent envoys and surrendered themselves and their country; and Alexander released them, and appointed as their satrap Autophradates, whom he had also made satrap of the Tapurians.

330  
B.C.

He himself returned to the camp from which he had set out for the Mardian land, and found that the mercenary Greeks had arrived with the Lacedaemonian envoys who were on an embassy to king Darius, Callistratidas, Pausippus, Monimus and Onomas, with Dropides from Athens. He arrested these men and kept them in custody, but released envoys from Sinope, since the Sinopeans were not part of the Greek league but subject to Persia, and he did not think they were acting unreasonably in sending an embassy to their own king.<sup>2</sup> He released the other Greeks too who served the Persians as mercenaries before the peace and alliance made (by the Greeks)

<sup>2</sup> QC. 5, 6 ff.; cf. Introd. 40; App. VI. QC. says the Athenian Democrates fell on his sword.

## ARRIAN

Πέρσαις ἐμισθοφόρου, καὶ Καλχηδονίων Ἡρακλείδην. τὸν πρεσβευτὴν ἀφῆκεν· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυστρατεύεσθαι οἱ ἐπὶ μισθῷ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐκέλευσε· καὶ ἐπέταξεν αὐτοῖς Ἀνδρόνικον, ὅσπερ ἤγαγέ τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔνδηλος γέγονει οὐ φαῦλον ποιούμενος σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας.

25. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἦγεν ὡς ἐπὶ Ζαδράκαρτα, τὴν μεγίστην πόλιν τῆς Ὑρκανίας, ἵνα καὶ τὰ βασίλεια τοῖς Ὑρκανίοις ᾦν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα διατρίψας ἡμέρας πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς νόμος καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν ποιήσας ὡς ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους ἦγεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀρείας ὄρια καὶ Σουσίαν, πόλιν τῆς Ἀρείας, ἵνα καὶ Σατιβαρζάνης ἦκε παρ' αὐτὸν ὁ τῶν Ἀρείων  
2 σατράπης. τούτῳ μὲν δὴ τὴν σατραπείαν ἀποδοὺς ξυμπέμπει αὐτῷ Ἀνάξιππον τῶν ἐταίρων δοὺς αὐτῷ τῶν ἵππακοντιστῶν ἑς τεσσαράκοντα, ὡς ἔχοι φύλακας καθιστάναι τῶν τόπων, τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τοὺς Ἀρείους πρὸς τῆς στρατιᾶς κατὰ τὴν πάροδον.

3 Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀφικνοῦνται παρ' αὐτὸν Περσῶν τινες, οἱ ἠγγελλον Βῆσσον τὴν τε τιάραν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν καὶ τὴν Περσικὴν στολὴν φοροῦντα Ἀρτοξέρξην τε καλεῖσθαι ἀντὶ Βῆσσου καὶ βασιλέα φάσκειν εἶναι τῆς Ἀσίας· ἔχειν τε ἀμφ' αὐτὸν Περσῶν τε τοὺς ἐς Βάκτρα διαφυγόντας καὶ αὐτῶν Βακτριανῶν πολλούς· προσδοκᾶσθαι δὲ ἦξειν αὐτῷ καὶ Σκύθας συμμάχους.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Introd.* 38.

<sup>3</sup> *QC.* v 9, 15 (cf. *A.* 16, 2) makes Patron their leader. Andronicus, a Macedonian, replaced him.

with the Macedonians,<sup>3</sup> as well as Heraclides, the envoy from Calchedon, and ordered the other Greeks to join his army for the same pay as they had been receiving, under the command of Andronicus, who had been their leader and had shown his anxiety to save their lives.<sup>4</sup>

25. After carrying all this out, he made for Zadracarta, the greatest city of Hyrcania, the place where the Hyrcanian palace was. There he spent fifteen days, and sacrificed to the gods as custom directed, and held an athletic contest,<sup>1</sup> and then marched towards the Parthyaean, and thence to the borders of Areia and to Susia, a city of Areia, where he was also met by Satibarzanes, the satrap of the Areians. Alexander confirmed him in his satrapy,<sup>2</sup> and sent with him Anaxippus, one of the Companions, with about forty mounted javelin-men, so that he might have guards to set for various places, to prevent the Areians being injured by the army on its passage.

Meanwhile some Persians met Alexander and reported that Bessus was wearing his cap upright, dressing in Persian royal garb,<sup>3</sup> calling himself Artaxerxes instead of Bessus, and giving out that he was King of Asia; he was attended by the Persians who had escaped to Bactria and by many of the Bactrians themselves; and he was expecting Scythian allies as well to join him.

<sup>1</sup> D. 77; QC. vi 5, 24 ff.; J. xii 3 put here (P. 46 beyond Jaxartes) a visit from the queen of the Amazons, cf. Introd. 12. A. omits the denials of Pt. and Ar. Cf. iv 15, 4; vii 13. See also App. XII 1 f.

<sup>2</sup> QC. 6, 13 makes him give Al. the news about Bessus; no mention of Anaxippus, but cf. D. 78, 1. For Al's route, and for dates, covering chs 25-28 see App. VIII 11-14; his army, App. XIII.

<sup>3</sup> App. XIV 2.

## ARRIAN

- † Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη ἔχων τὴν πᾶσαν  
 δύναμιν ἦει ἐπὶ Βάκτρων, ἵνα καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ  
 Μενελάου παρ' αὐτὸν ἀφίκετο ἐκ Μηδίας, ἔχων  
 τοὺς τε μισθοφόρους ἱππέας, ὧν ἠγεῖτο αὐτός, καὶ  
 Θεσσαλῶν τοὺς ἐθελοντὰς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς  
 ξένους τοὺς Ἀνδρομάχου. Νικάνωρ δὲ ὁ Παρμε-  
 νίωνος ὁ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἄρχων τετελευτήκει ἤδη  
 † νόσω. ἰόντι δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὴν ἐπὶ Βάκτρα  
 ἐξηγγέλη Σατιβαρζάνης ὁ Ἀρείων σατράπης  
 Ἀνάξιππον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἱππακοντιστὰς τοὺς ξὺν  
 αὐτῷ ἀπεκτονῶς, ὀπλίζων δὲ τοὺς Ἀρείους καὶ  
 ξυνάγων εἰς Ἀρτακόανα πόλιν, ἵνα τὸ βασίλειον ᾗν  
 τῶν Ἀρείων· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ὅτι ἔγνωκεν, ἐπειδὴν  
 προκεχωρηκότα Ἀλέξανδρον πύθηται, ἵεναι ξὺν τῇ  
 δυνάμει παρὰ Βῆσσον, ὡς ξὺν ἐκείνῳ ἐπιθησό-  
 † μενος ὅπη ἂν τύχη τοῖς Μακεδόσι. ταῦτα ὡς  
 ἐξηγγέλη αὐτῷ, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ Βάκτρα ὁδὸν οὐκ  
 ἦγεν, ἀναλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς τε ἑταίρους ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς  
 ἱππακοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας  
 καὶ τὴν Ἀμύντου τε καὶ Κοίνου τάξιν, τὴν δὲ  
 ἄλλην δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καταλιπὼν καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ  
 Κρατερόν ἠγεμόνα, σπουδῇ ἦγεν ὡς ἐπὶ Σατιβαρ-  
 ζάνην τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀρείους καὶ διελθὼν ἐν δυσὶν  
 ἡμέραις σταδίους ἐς ἑξακοσίους πρὸς Ἀρτακόανα  
 ἦκεν.
- 7 Σατιβαρζάνης μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔγνω ἐγγὺς ὄντα  
 Ἀλέξανδρον, τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς ἐφόδου ἐκπλαγεὶς ξὺν  
 ὀλίγοις ἱππεῦσι τῶν Ἀρείων ἔφυγε· πρὸς γὰρ τῶν  
 πολλῶν στρατιωτῶν κατελείφθη ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, ὡς  
 κακῆνοι ἔμαθον προσάγοντα Ἀλέξανδρον. Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος δέ, ὅσους ξυναιτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως  
 κατέμαθε καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε ἀπολελοιπότας τὰς κώμας,

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 25. 4-7

With his whole force now reassembled Alexander 4 330  
 was on his way towards Bactra when Philip son of 330  
 Menelaus joined him from Media with the mercenary 330  
 cavalry under his own command, the Thessalian 330  
 volunteers who had remained in the army and 330  
 Andromachus' foreign corps. Nicanor son of Par- 330  
 menio, commander of the hypaspists, had already 330  
 died of sickness.<sup>4</sup> While Alexander was on his way 5  
 to Bactra, news was brought that Satibarzanes, satrap 5  
 of Areia, had massacred Anaxippus and his mounted 5  
 javelin-men, was arming the Areians and leading 5  
 them in a body to the city of Artacoana, where the 5  
 Areian palace was, and that he had decided, on 5  
 learning of Alexander's advance, to go from there 5  
 with his troops to Bessus and join him in attacking the 5  
 Macedonians wherever opportunity offered. When 6  
 this was reported to Alexander he did not continue 6  
 on the road to Bactra, but took the Companion 6  
 cavalry, the mounted javelin-men, archers, Agrianians, 6  
 and Amyntas' and Coenus' battalions, and leaving 6  
 behind there the rest of the army with Craterus in 6  
 charge, advanced swiftly against Satibarzanes and the 6  
 Areians; after covering about six hundred stades in 6  
 two days, he arrived at Artacoana.<sup>5</sup>

Satibarzanes, on learning of Alexander's proximity, 7  
 was astounded at the speed of his approach, and fled 7  
 with a few Areian horsemen; for in his flight he was 7  
 deserted by most of his soldiers, as they too learnt 7  
 that Alexander was approaching. Alexander pur- 7  
 sued sharply all those he found to have had a hand

<sup>4</sup> QC. vi 6, 18 f., making Philip and others join Al. at Artacoana and with different forces, cf. App. XIII 4 f.

<sup>5</sup> At or near Herat, App. VIII 11. Other tales in D. 78; QC. 6, 20-34.



## ARRIAN

τούτους δὲ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη, ὀξείας τὰς διώξεις ποιησάμενος, τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἠνδραπόδισε· σατράπην δὲ Ἀρείων ἀπέδειξεν Ἀρσάκην, 8 ἄνδρα Πέρσην. αὐτὸς δὲ ξὺν τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν ὑπολελειμμένοις, ὁμοῦ οὖσιν ἤδη, ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ζαραγγαίων χώραν ἦγε· καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἵνα τὰ βασιλεία τῶν Ζαραγγαίων ᾖν. Βαρσαέντης δέ, ὃς τότε κατεῖχε τὴν χώραν, εἰς ὧν τῶν ξυνεπιθεμένων Δαρείῳ ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, προσιόντα Ἀλέξανδρον μαθὼν εἰς Ἰνδοὺς τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ ἔφυγε. ξυλλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ Ἰνδοὶ παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἀπέστειλαν, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου τῆς εἰς Δαρείον ἀδικίας ἕνεκα.

26. Ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν Φιλῶτα ἐπιβουλήν τοῦ Παρμενίωνος ἔμαθεν Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ λέγει Πτολεμαῖος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος, ὅτι προσηγγελημένη <μὲν ᾖν> ἤδη οἱ καὶ πρότερον ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, οὐ μόντοι πιστὴ γε ἐφάνη τῆς τε φιλίας τῆς πάλαι ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰς Παρμενίωνά τε τὸν πατέρα τὸν Φιλῶτα τιμῆς καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν Φιλῶταν 2 πίστεως. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Λάγου λέγει εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς Μακεδόνας Φιλῶταν καὶ κατηγορῆσαι μὲν αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀπολογήσασθαι δὲ αὐτὸν Φιλῶταν· καὶ τοὺς ἐπιμηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλῶταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλῶτας πεπύσθαι μὲν ἐπιβουλήν τινα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ παρασκευαζομένην συνέφη, ἐξηλέγχετο δὲ κατασιωπήσας ταύτην πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, καίτοι δις ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ὄσημέραι τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου



in the revolt, who had at the time deserted their villages, and going in different directions, he killed some and enslaved the rest. As satrap of Areia he appointed Arsaces, a Persian.<sup>6</sup> With the force left under Craterus, which had now joined him, he marched towards the territory of the Zarangaeans, and arrived at the place where their palace was.<sup>7</sup> Barsaentes, who was then in occupation of the country, and was one of those who had joined in attacking Darius on his flight, on learning that Alexander was approaching, fled to the Indians on this side of the river Indus; but they seized him and sent him to Alexander, who put him to death for the wrong he had done Darius.

330  
B.C.

8

26. It was there too that Alexander learnt of the conspiracy of Philotas son of Parmenio.<sup>1</sup> Ptolemy and Aristobulus say that it had already been reported to him earlier in Egypt, but he did not think it credible because of their long friendship, the honour he had shown to Parmenio, Philotas' father, and the trust he had reposed in Philotas himself. Ptolemy son of Lagus gives the following account. Philotas was summoned before the Macedonians, Alexander vigorously accused him, Philotas made his defence; then those who had denounced the plot came forward and convicted Philotas and his associates with clear proofs; in particular, they showed that while Philotas himself admitted that he had heard of some sort of plot being laid against Alexander, he was convicted of having said nothing of it to Alexander, though he

2

<sup>6</sup> Presumably 'Arsames', made satrap of the Zarangaeans after Philotas' death in QC. vii 3, 1.

<sup>7</sup> The Zarangaeian capital should be at or near Farah, App. VIII 12 f. Cf. D. 78, 4; QC. vi 6, 36; 7, 1.

<sup>1</sup> See App. XI on 26-27, 4.

3 φοιτῶν. καὶ Φιλώταν μὲν κατακοντισθῆναι πρὸς  
 τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι μετέσχον αὐτῷ τῆς  
 ἐπιβουλῆς ἐπὶ Παρμενίωνα δὲ σταλῆναι Πολυδά-  
 μαντα, ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων, γράμματα φέροντα παρ'  
 Ἀλεξάνδρου πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ἐν Μηδία,  
 Κλέανδρόν τε καὶ Σιτάλκην καὶ Μεν[ν]ίδαν· οὗτοι  
 γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἧς Παρμενίων ἦρχε, τεταγ-  
 4 μένοι ἦσαν· καὶ πρὸς τούτων ἀποθανεῖν Παρμε-  
 νίωνα, τυχὸν μὲν ὅτι οὐ πιστὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος Φιλώτα ἐπιβουλεύοντος μὴ συμμετασχεῖν  
 Παρμενίωνα τῷ παιδὶ τοῦ βουλευμάτος, τυχὸν δὲ  
 ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μὴ συμμετέσχε, σφαλερὸς ἤδη ἦν περιῶν  
 Παρμενίων τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ ἀνηρημένου, ἐν  
 τοσαύτῃ ὧν ἀξιῶσει παρά τε αὐτῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα, μὴ ὅτι τὸ Μακεδονικόν,  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, ὧν πολλάκις καὶ ἐν  
 μέρει καὶ παρὰ τὸ μέρος κατὰ πρόσταξιν τὴν  
 Ἀλεξάνδρου ξὺν χάριτι ἐξηγεῖτο.

27. Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ Ἀμύνταν τὸν Ἀνδρομένους  
 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὑπαχθῆναι ἐς κρίσιν καὶ  
 Πολέμωνα καὶ Ἀτταλον καὶ Σιμμίαν τοὺς  
 Ἀμύντου ἀδελφούς, ὡς συμμετασχόντας καὶ  
 αὐτοὺς τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς τῆς κατ' Ἀλεξάνδρου κατὰ  
 2 πίστιν τε καὶ ἐταιρίαν τὴν Φιλώτα. καὶ ἐδόκει  
 πιστοτέρα ἢ ἐπιβουλή ἐς τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι Πολέμων,  
 εἷς τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῶν Ἀμύντου, ξυλληφθέντος  
 Φιλώτα ἔφυγεν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους. ἀλλ' Ἀμύντας  
 γε ξὺν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὑπομείνας τὴν δίκην καὶ  
 ἀπολογησάμενος ἐν Μακεδόσι καρτερῶς ἀφίεται  
 τῆς αἰτίας· καὶ εὐθὺς ὡς ἀπέφυγεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ  
 ἠξίωσεν ἐφεθῆναι οἱ ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ  
 3 ἐπαναγαγεῖν αὐτὸν παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον· καὶ οἱ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 26. 3-27. 3

visited Alexander's tent twice daily. Philotas was 3 330  
shot down with javelins by the Macedonians, along B.C.  
with all his accomplices. As for action against Par-  
menio, Polydamas, one of the Companions, was sent  
with a letter from Alexander to the generals in  
Media, Cleander and Sitalces and Menidas, who had  
been posted to the force under Parmenio's command.<sup>2</sup>  
At their hands Parmenio perished, possibly because 4  
Alexander could not believe that when Philotas was  
conspiring, Parmenio had no share in his own son's  
design, possibly because, even supposing he had no  
such share, it had now become a danger for Parmenio  
to survive his son's execution, on account of the high  
honour which he enjoyed with Alexander himself and  
in the view of the army too—not only the Macedonian  
but the foreign troops also, whom he had often com-  
manded with popularity both in and out of turn by  
Alexander's order.

27. They also say that Amyntas son of Andromenes  
was brought to trial at the same time, together with  
Polemon, Attalus and Simmias, his brothers, on the  
charge that they too had joined in the conspiracy  
against Alexander as loyal comrades of Philotas.  
Moreover the conspiracy seemed more credible to the 2  
masses, because Polemon, one of Amyntas' brothers,  
deserted to the enemy as soon as Philotas was ar-  
rested. However, Amyntas at least with his (other)  
brothers stood his trial, made a vigorous defence  
before the Macedonians, and was acquitted of the  
charge; and the moment he was acquitted, he asked  
leave to go and bring Polemon back again to Alex-  
ander; the Macedonians agreed. He departed that 3

<sup>2</sup> For the ride across the central Persian desert Strabo xv  
2, 10; D. 80, 3; QC. vii 2, 18.

## ARRIAN

Μακεδόνες συγχωροῦσιν. ὁ δὲ ἀπελθὼν αὐτῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τὸν Πολέμωνα ἐπανήγαγε. καὶ ταύτῃ πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρόσθεν ἔξω αἰτίας ἐφάνη Ἀμύντας. ἀλλὰ ὀλίγον γὰρ ὕστερον κώμην τινὰ πολιορκῶν τοξευθεὶς ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς ἐτελεύτησεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ γίγνεται τὴν κρίσιν ἀποφυγόντι ὅτι μὴ ἀγαθῷ νομιζομένῳ ἀποθανεῖν.

- 4 Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, καταστήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους ἱππάρχας δύο, Ἡφαιστίωνα τε τὸν Ἀμύντορος καὶ Κλείτον τὸν Δρωπίδου, καὶ δίχα διελὼν τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἑταίρων, ὅτι οὐδὲ φίλτατον ἂν ἠβούλετο ἓνα τοσοῦτων ἱππέων, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν κρατίστων τοῦ παντὸς ἱππικοῦ κατὰ τε ἀξίωσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοὺς πάλαι μὲν Ἀριάσπας καλουμένους, ὕστερον δὲ Εὐεργέτας ἐπονομασθέντας, ὅτι Κύρῳ τῷ Καμβύσου ξυνεπε-
- 5 λάβοντο τῆς ἐς Σκύθας ἐλάσεως. καὶ τούτους Ἀλέξανδρος ὦν τε ἐς Κῦρον ὑπῆρξαν οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτῶν τιμήσας καὶ αὐτοὺς καταμαθῶν ἄνδρας οὐ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτῃ βαρβάρους πολιτεύοντας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἴσα καὶ τοῖς κρατίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων μεταποιουμένους, ἐλευθέρους τε ἀφῆκεν καὶ χώραν τῆς ὁμόρου ὄσῃν αὐτοὶ σφίσιν ἤτησαν, οὐ πολλὴν δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἤτησαν, προσέθηκεν. ἐνταῦθα θύσας τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι Δημήτριον μὲν ἓνα τῶν σωματοφυλάκων ὑποπτεύσας μετασχεῖν Φιλώτῃ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς ξυνέλαβε· σωματοφύλακα δὲ ἀντὶ Δημητρίου ἀπέδειξε Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Λάγου.

28. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος προῆει ὡς ἐπὶ

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<sup>1</sup> i.e. not even Hephaestion.

very day and brought him back; and thus his own innocence appeared much clearer than before. Soon after, however, when besieging a village, he received an arrow wound of which he died; so that all he gained from his acquittal was that he died with his good name unsmirched.

Alexander now put two hipparchs in charge of the 4  
Companions, Hephaestion son of Amyntor and Clitus son of Dropides, and after dividing the Companions' brigade into two parts, since he would not have wished a single man, though his closest friend,<sup>1</sup> to command so large a body of cavalry, especially as it was the best of all his mounted force in reputation and valour, he arrived among the people formerly called Ariaspans, but later also nicknamed Benefactors, because they assisted Cyrus son of Cambyses in his Scythian expedition. Alexander honoured this 5  
people for the services their ancestors had done to Cyrus and from his own observation that they were not governed like the other barbarians of these parts, but also claimed to follow justice as much as the best of the Greeks; he therefore granted them freedom and added to their territory as much as they asked for themselves of the neighbouring country, though they only asked for a modest portion.<sup>2</sup> There he sacrificed to Apollo, arrested Demetrius, one of the bodyguards, suspecting that he had a hand in Philotas' conspiracy,<sup>3</sup> and appointed as bodyguard Ptolemy son of Lagus in his place.

28. After carrying out all these measures, Alex-

<sup>1</sup> D. 81; QC. vii 3, 1 f. make Al. appoint a governor with different names, five days out of the Zarangaeon capital (QC.). Cf. App. VIII 11 f.

<sup>2</sup> QC. vi 11, 35 ff. makes him die with Philotas.

## ARRIAN

- Βάκτρα τε καὶ Βήσσον, Δράγγας τε καὶ Γαδρω-  
 σούς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ παραστησάμενος. παρεστήσατο  
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀραχώτας καὶ σατράπην κατέστησεν  
 ἐπ' αὐτοῖς Μένωνα. ἐπῆλθε δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἰνδῶν  
 τοὺς προσχώρους Ἀραχώταις. ζύμπαντα δὲ ταῦτα  
 τὰ ἔθνη διὰ χιόνος τε πολλῆς καὶ ξὺν ἀπορίᾳ τῶν  
 ἐπιτηδείων καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ταλαιπωρία  
 2 ἐπῆλθε. μαθὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἀρείους αὐθις ἀφεστάναι,  
 Σατιβαρζάνου ἐς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐμβαλόντος σὺν  
 ἵππεῦσι δισχιλίοις, οὓς παρὰ Βήσσου ἔλαβεν,  
 ἀποστέλλει παρ' αὐτοὺς Ἀρτάβαζόν τε τὸν  
 Πέρσην καὶ Ἐριγύϊον καὶ Κάρανον τῶν ἐταίρων.  
 προσέταξε δὲ καὶ Φραταφέρνην τὸν τῶν Παρθυαίων  
 σατράπην ξυνεμβαλεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς Ἀρείους.  
 3 καὶ γίγνεται μάχη τοῖς ἀμφὶ Ἐριγύϊον καὶ  
 Κάρανον πρὸς Σατιβαρζάνην καρτερά, οὐδὲ πρόσ-  
 θεν οἱ βάρβαροι ἐνέκλιναν πρὶν Σατιβαρζάνην  
 συμπεσόντα Ἐριγυῖω πρὸς Ἐριγυῖου πληγέντα  
 δόρατι ἐς τὸ πρόσωπον ἀποθανεῖν. τότε δὲ  
 ἐγκλίναντες οἱ βάρβαροι προτροπάδην ἔφευγον.  
 4 Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος πρὸς τὸν Καύκασον τὸ  
 ὄρος ἦγεν, ἵνα καὶ πόλιν ἔκτισε καὶ ὠνόμασεν  
 Ἀλεξάνδρειαν· καὶ θύσας ἐνταῦθα τοῖς θεοῖς ὅσοις  
 νόμος αὐτῷ ὑπερέβαλε τὸ ὄρος τὸν Καύκασον,  
 σατράπην μὲν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπιτάξας Προέξην, ἄνδρα  
 Πέρσην, τῶν δὲ ἐταίρων Νειλόξενον τὸν Σατύρου  
 ἐπίσκοπον ξὺν στρατιᾷ ἀπολιπών.

<sup>1</sup> App. VIII 9.

<sup>2</sup> QC. vi 3, 5 gives him 4,000 foot and 600 horse. For arrival of reinforcements ib. 2 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> D. 81, 3; QC. vii 3, 2 (in Ariaspia).



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER III. 28. 1-4

330  
B.C.

ander proceeded towards Bactra and against Bessus and on the way won over the Drangians and Gadrosians,<sup>1</sup> and the Arachotians as well, appointing Menon as satrap to govern them.<sup>2</sup> He also came upon the Indians nearest the Arachotians. He came on all these tribes through deep snow, with provisions wanting and his men in distress. On learning that the Areians had again revolted, since Satibarzanes had invaded their country with two thousand horse, whom he had received from Bessus, he sent Artabazus the Persian and two Companions, Erigyus and Caranus to their country and also ordered Phrataphernes, the satrap of Parthyaea, to help them in their attack on the Areians.<sup>3</sup> A fierce battle took place between the troops of Erigyus and Caranus and Satibarzanes; indeed, the Persians did not give way till in single combat with Erigyus Satibarzanes was struck in the face with a spear and killed. Then the barbarians turned and fled headlong.<sup>4</sup>

2

3

Meanwhile Alexander led his army to Mount Caucasus,<sup>5</sup> where he founded a city he called Alexandria.<sup>6</sup> There he sacrificed to the gods to whom he customarily sacrificed, and then crossed Mount Caucasus, appointing as satrap of the district Proexes, a Persian, with Niloxenes son of Satyrus, one of the Companions, as overseer in command of troops.<sup>7</sup>

4 330-29  
B.C.

329  
B.C.

<sup>1</sup> D. 83; QC. 4, 33 ff. (embellished), who makes Erigyus rejoin Al. at Bactra, in 329 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Hindu-Kush, cf. App. XII. March: App. VIII 10 f.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. iv 22 4; Strabo xv 2, 10; D. 83, 2, (mentioning other (or another) settlements nearby, e.g. perhaps Nicaea (iv 22, 6)); QC. vii 3, 23. The settlers in Alexandria (QC.) or all the cities (D.) were 7,000 natives; D. adds 3,000 camp-followers and some volunteers among mercenaries, QC. unfit soldiers. Cf. App. VIII 14-16 for march.

<sup>4</sup> QC. ignores these appointments. Cf. iv 22, 5.



- 5 Τὸ δὲ ὄρος ὃ Καύκασος ὑψηλὸν μὲν ἐστὶν ὡσπερ  
 τι ἄλλο τῆς Ἀσίας, ὡς λέγει Ἀριστόβουλος, ψιλὸν  
 δὲ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ τό γε ταύτη. μακρὸν γὰρ ὄρος  
 παρατέταται ὃ Καύκασος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τὸ  
 ὄρος, ὃς δὴ τὴν Κιλικίαν τε καὶ Παμφυλίαν ἀπείρ-  
 γει, ἀπὸ τοῦ Καυκάσου εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλα  
 ὄρη μεγάλα, ἀπὸ τοῦ Καυκάσου διακεκριμένα ἄλλη  
 6 καὶ ἄλλη ἐπωνυμία κατὰ ἡθῆ τὰ ἐκάστων. ἀλλὰ  
 ἔν γε τούτῳ τῷ Καυκάσῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ  
 τέρμινθοι πεφύκασι καὶ σίλφιον, ὡς λέγει Ἀριστό-  
 βουλος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐπωκεῖτο πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις  
 καὶ πρόβατα πολλὰ καὶ κτήνη ἐνέμοντο, ὅτι καὶ  
 χαίρουσι τῷ σιλφίῳ τὰ πρόβατα, καὶ εἰ ἐκ πολλοῦ  
 πρόβατον σιλφίου αἰσθοῖτο, καὶ θεῖ ἐπ' αὐτὸ καὶ τό-  
 τε ἄνθος ἐπινέμεται καὶ τὴν ρίζαν ἀνορύττον καὶ  
 7 ταύτην κατεσθίει. ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐν Κυρήνῃ ὡς μακρο-  
 τάτῳ ἀπελαύνουσι τὰς ποιμένας τῶν χωρίων, ἵνα  
 αὐτοῖς τὸ σίλφιον φύεται. οἱ δὲ καὶ περιφράσσουσι  
 τὸν χῶρον, τοῦ μηδὲ εἰ πελάσειεν αὐτῷ πρόβατα,  
 δυνατὰ γενέσθαι εἴσω παρελθεῖν, ὅτι πολλοῦ ἄξιον  
 Κυρηναίοις τὸ σίλφιον.
- 8 Βῆσσοι δὲ ἔχων ἀμφ' αὐτὸν Περσῶν τε τοὺς  
 μετασχόντας αὐτῷ τῆς Δαρείου συλλήψεως καὶ  
 αὐτῶν Βακτριῶν ἐς ἑπτακισχιλίους καὶ Δάας τοὺς  
 ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Τανάϊδος ποταμοῦ ἐποικοῦντας  
 ἔφθειρε τὴν ὑπὸ τῷ ὄρει τῷ Καυκάσῳ, ὡς ἐρημία  
 τε τῆς χώρας τῆς ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου καὶ ἀπορία τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπείρξων Ἀλέ-  
 9 ξανδρον τοῦ μὴ ἐλαύνειν πρόσῳ. ἀλλὰ Ἀλέξανδρος  
 ἤλαυνεν οὐδὲν μείον, χαλεπῶς μὲν διὰ τε χιόνος  
 πολλῆς καὶ ἐνδείας τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἦει δὲ ὅμως.  
 Βῆσσοι δέ, ἐπεὶ ἐξηγγέλλετο αὐτῷ οὐ πόρρω ἤδη

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Mount Caucasus, according to Aristobulus, is as high as any mountain in Asia; most of it is bare, at least on this side. In fact it is a long mountain range, so that they say that even Mount Taurus, which forms the boundary of Cilicia and Pamphylia, is really a part of Mount Caucasus as well as other great mountains which have been distinguished from Mount Caucasus by various names traditional among the different peoples.<sup>8</sup> In this particular Mount Caucasus, however, nothing grows save terebinths and silphium according to Aristobulus. But even so it was inhabited by a large number of people and many flocks and herds grazed there, since the flocks like the silphium, and if they notice it ever so far away they run to it, nibble its flower, and dig up and eat the root. For this reason in Cyrene they drive their flocks as far as possible from the places where their silphium grows; some even hurdle off the area, so that even if the flocks approach they cannot get in, since silphium is very valuable to the Cyrenaeans.

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Bessus, attended by the Persians who had joined in the arrest of Darius, by some seven thousand of the Bactrians themselves, and by the Dahae who live on this side of the river Tanais [Syr-darya], was ravaging the land lying under Mount Caucasus, hoping that this desolation of the country lying between himself and Alexander and want of provisions would stop Alexander from proceeding farther. But Alexander advanced none the less, with difficulty indeed, through thick snow and with necessaries lacking, but still he came on. As soon as Bessus was told that Alexander

8

9

<sup>8</sup> A. inserts his own comment, from Eratosthenes (App. XII 3), between two citations from Ar.

ῶν Ἀλέξανδρος, διαβὰς τὸν Ὀξὸν ποταμὸν τὰ μὲν πλοῖα ἐφ' ὧν διέβη κατέκαυσε, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς  
 10 Ναύτακα τῆς Σογδιανῆς χώρας ἀπεχώρει. εἶποντο δὲ αὐτῷ οἱ τε ἀμφὶ Σπιταμένην καὶ Ὀξυάρτην, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Σογδιανῆς ἰππέας, καὶ Δάαι οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Τανάϊδος. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βακτριῶν ἰππεῖς ὡς φεύγειν ἐγνωκότα ἔμαθον Βῆσσον, ἄλλος ἄλλη ἐπὶ τὰ σφῶν ἕκαστοι ἀπηλλάγησαν.

29. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐς Δράψακα ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀναπαύσας τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς Ἀορνόν τε ἦγε καὶ Βάκτρα, αἱ δὴ μέγισταί εἰσι πόλεις ἐν τῇ Βακτριῶν χώρα. καὶ ταύτας τε ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔλαβε καὶ φυλακὴν ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῆς Ἀόρνου ἀπέλιπε καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Ἀνδρόκλου τῶν ἐταίρων· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις Βακτρίοις οὐ χαλεπῶς προσχωρήσασιν ἐπέταξε σατράπην Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Πέρσην.

2 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἦγεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀξὸν ποταμὸν. ὁ δὲ Ὀξὸς ῥέει μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ Καυκάσου, ἔστι δὲ ποταμῶν μέγιστος τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ὅσους γε δὴ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ οἱ ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐπῆλθον, πλὴν τῶν Ἰνδῶν ποταμῶν· οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοὶ πάντων ποταμῶν μέγιστοί εἰσιν. ἐξίησι δὲ ὁ Ὀξὸς ἐς τὴν μεγάλην  
 3 θάλασσαν τὴν κατὰ Ὑρκανίαν. διαβάλλειν δὲ ἐπιχειροῦντι αὐτῷ τὸν ποταμὸν πάντῃ ἄπορον ἐφαίνετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖρος ἦν ἐς ἕξ μάλιστα σταδίους, βάθος δὲ οὐ πρὸς λόγον τοῦ εὖρους, ἀλλὰ πολὺ δὴ τι βαθύτερος καὶ ψαμμώδης καὶ ῥεῦμα ὀξύ(ς), ὡς τὰ καταπηγνύμενα πρὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ῥοῦ ἐκστρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐ χαλεπῶς, οἷα δὴ οὐδὲ  
 4 βεβαίως κατὰ τῆς ψάμμου ἰδρυμένα. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπορία ὕλης ἐν τοῖς πόνοις ἦν καὶ τριβὴ πολλή

was now not far off, he crossed the river Oxus [Amu-  
darya], burned the boats on which he had crossed, and  
himself retreated towards Nautaca in the Sogdianian  
country, accompanied by the followers of Spitamenes 10  
and Oxyartes with the horsemen from Sogdiana, and  
by the Dahae from the Tanais, though the Bactrian  
cavalry, when they learnt that he had determined on  
flight, dispersed in different directions to their homes.<sup>9</sup>

29. Alexander arrived at Drapsaca, and after  
resting his army led them on to Aornos and Bactra,  
the greatest cities of Bactria, which he took at his first  
attempt. He left a garrison in the citadel of Aornos  
under command of Archelaus son of Androcles, one of  
the Companions. To govern the rest of the Bactrians,  
who readily adhered to him, he appointed Artabazus  
the Persian as satrap.<sup>1</sup>

He himself marched towards the river Oxus, which 2  
flows from Mount Caucasus and is the greatest of the  
Asian rivers Alexander and his followers reached,  
except the rivers of India; they are the greatest of  
all rivers. The Oxus flows into the Great Sea in its  
Hyrceanian part.<sup>2</sup> When Alexander attempted to 3  
cross the river it appeared impossible at every point.  
It was about six stades broad, but disproportionately  
deeper, in fact far deeper, sandy and fast-flowing, so  
that piles fixed into the bed were easily twisted out  
of the ground by the stream alone, not getting a firm  
hold in the sand. Apart from this, want of timber 4  
was another difficulty, and it was clear that there

<sup>9</sup> Cf. D. 83; QC. vii 3, 22-4, 25.

<sup>1</sup> QC. vii 5, 1. (For operations against Bessus, D. 83;  
QC. vii 5; App. VIII 16.)

<sup>2</sup> App. XII.

## ARRIAN

- ἐφαίνετο, εἰ μακρόθεν μετίοιεν ὅσα ἐς γεφύρωσιν τοῦ πόρου. ξυναγαγὼν οὖν τὰς διφθέρας, ὑφ' αἷς ἐσκήνουν οἱ στρατιῶται, φορυτοῦ ἐμπλήσαι ἐκέλευσεν ὡς ξηροτάτου καὶ καταδῆσαί τε καὶ ξυρράψαι ἀκριβῶς, τοῦ μὴ ἐσδύεσθαι ἐς αὐτὰς τοῦ ὕδατος. ἐμπλησθεῖσαι δὲ καὶ ξυρραφεῖσαι ἱκαναὶ ἐγένοντο διαβιβάσαι τὴν στρατιὰν ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις.
- 5 Πρὶν δὲ διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν τῶν τε Μακεδόνων ἐπιλέξας τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους καὶ ἤδη ἀπολέμους καὶ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν τοὺς ἐθελοντὰς καταμείναντας ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπέστειλεν. ἐκπέμπει δὲ καὶ Στασάνορα, ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων, ἐς Ἀρείους, προστάξας Ἀρσάκην μὲν τὸν σατράπην τῶν Ἀρείων ξυλλαβεῖν, ὅτι ἐθελοκακεῖν αὐτῷ Ἀρσάκης ἔδοξεν, αὐτὸν δὲ σατράπην εἶναι ἀντ' ἐκείνου Ἀρείων.
- 6 Περάσας δὲ τὸν Ὄξον ποταμὸν ἦγε κατὰ σπουδὴν, ἵνα Βῆσσον εἶναι ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπυρθάνετο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀφικνοῦνται παρὰ Σπιταμένους καὶ Δαταφέρνου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀγγέλλοντες, ὅτι Σπιταμένης καὶ Δαταφέρνης, εἰ πεμφθεῖη αὐτοῖς καὶ ὀλίγη στρατιὰ καὶ ἡγεμῶν τῇ στρατιᾷ, ξυλλήψονται Βῆσσον καὶ παραδώσουσιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἀδέσμῳ φυλακῇ φυλάσσεσθαι
- 7 πρὸς αὐτῶν Βῆσσον. ταῦτα ὡς ἤκουσεν Ἀλέξανδρος, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀναπαύων ἦγε τὴν στρατιὰν σχολαίτερον ἢ πρόσθεν, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ τὸν Λάγου ἀποστέλλει τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἰππαρχίας τρεῖς ἄγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἰππακοντιστὰς ξύμπαντας, πεζῶν δὲ τὴν

<sup>3</sup> So QC. vii 5, 17.

<sup>4</sup> QC. 5, 27 makes Al. send home 900 men a little later.

<sup>5</sup> In QC. viii 3, 17 Stasanor replaces 'Arsames' only in 328.

<sup>6</sup> Pt. is clearly the source down to 30, 5 at least; he is not

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would be long delay if they were to fetch from a distance enough to bridge the stream. So he collected the hides the troops used for tent covers and ordered them to be filled with the driest possible chaff, and then to be tied down and stitched neatly together so as to be watertight. When they were filled and stitched together they were efficient enough to take the army across in five days.<sup>3</sup>

Before crossing the river Alexander selected from the Macedonians the oldest men who were no longer fit for service and the Thessalian volunteers who had remained behind and sent them on their way home.<sup>4</sup> He also sent Stasanor, one of the Companions, to Areia, with instructions to arrest Arsaces, satrap of the Areians, because he thought him guilty of treason to himself; Stasanor was to take his place as satrap of Areia.<sup>5</sup>

After crossing the river Oxus he marched rapidly to the place where according to his information Bessus and his force were to be found. At this time men came to him from Spitamenes and Dataphernes with the message that if quite a small force were sent them, and a man to command it, they would seize Bessus and hand him over to Alexander; in fact they already had him under open arrest. On hearing this, Alexander for his own part rested his army and led it on more leisurely than before, but sent Ptolemy son of Lagus<sup>6</sup> with three hipparchies of the Companion cavalry, all the mounted javelin-men and of

named in QC's different story, and C. B. Welles (*Miscellanea Rostagni* 1963, 101 ff.) questions if he had the commands reported here and in 18, 9; iv 29, 1; vi 11, 8, or tells credible stories of them; I agree with the refutation of his criticisms of Pt. by J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I*, 4 ff. Hipparchies: Introd. 58 ff.

## ARRIAN

τε Φιλώτα τάξιν καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν χιλιαρχίαν μίαν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριαῖνας πάντας καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεας, σπουδῇ ἐλαύνειν κελεύσας ὡς Σπιταμένην τε καὶ Δαταφέρνην. καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἦει ὡς ἐτέτακτο, καὶ διελθὼν ἐν ἡμέραις τέτταρσι σταθμοὺς δέκα ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον, οὗ τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἠὺλισμένοι ἦσαν οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Σπιταμένην βάρβαροι.

30. Ἐνταῦθα ἔμαθε Πτολεμαῖος ὅτι οὐ βεβαία τῷ Σπιταμένει καὶ Δαταφέρνῃ ἡ γνώμη ἐστὶν ἀμφὶ τῇ παραδόσει τοῦ Βῆσσου. τοὺς μὲν δὴ πεζοὺς κατέλιπε, προστάξας ἔπεσθαι ἐν τάξει, αὐτὸς δὲ ξὺν τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν ἐλάσας ἀφίκετο πρὸς κώμην τινά, ἵνα ὁ Βῆσσος ἦν ξὺν ὀλίγοις στρατιώ-  
 2 ταις. οἱ γὰρ ἀμφὶ τὸν Σπιταμένην μετακεχωρήκεσαν ἤδη ἐκεῖθεν, καταιδεσθέντες αὐτοὶ παραδοῦναι τὸν Βῆσσον. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ περιστήσας ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς κώμης τοὺς ἵππέας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον καὶ πύλαι κατ' αὐτὸ) ἐπεκηρυκεύετο τοῖς ἐν τῇ κώμῃ βαρβάροις ἀπαθεῖς σφᾶς ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι παραδόντας Βῆσσον. οἱ δὲ  
 3 ἐδέχοντο τοὺς ξὺν Πτολεμαίῳ ἐς τὴν κώμην. καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ξυλλαβὼν Βῆσσον ὀπίσω ἐπανῆει. προπέμψας δὲ ἤρετο Ἀλέξανδρον, ὅπως χρή ἐς ὄψιν ἄγειν Ἀλεξάνδρου Βῆσσον. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος γυμνὸν ἐν κλοιῷ δήσαντα οὕτως ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ καταστήσαντα ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἣ αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ παρελεύσεσθαι ἔμελλε. καὶ Πτολεμαῖος οὕτως ἐποίησεν.

4 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἰδὼν τὸν Βῆσσον ἐπιστήσας τὸ ἄρμα ἤρετο ἀνθ' ὅτου τὸν βασιλέα τὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅμα καὶ οἰκεῖον καὶ εὐεργέτην γενόμενον Δαρεῖον τὰ



the infantry the battalion of Philotas, one chiliarchy of the hypaspists, all the Agrianes, and half the archers, with orders to proceed by forced marches to Spitamenes and Dataphernes. Ptolemy went as directed, and traversing ten days' marches in four days arrived at the camp where the barbarians with Spitamenes had bivouacked the previous day.

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30. There he learnt that Spitamenes and Dataphernes had not quite made up their mind about the surrender of Bessus. He therefore left the infantry behind, with instructions to follow in formation, and rode on himself with the cavalry, and arrived at a village where Bessus was with a few soldiers. Spitamenes and his men had already withdrawn, as they were ashamed to hand Bessus over personally. Ptolemy stationed the cavalry in a cordon round the village—it had some sort of wall thrown round it, and gates in the wall—and made a proclamation to the barbarians in the village that they would depart unscathed if they handed Bessus over. They admitted Ptolemy and his troops into the village, and after seizing Bessus he retired. Then he sent a messenger ahead and asked Alexander in what way he should bring Bessus into his presence. Alexander ordered him to bring Bessus bound, naked, and wearing a wooden collar, and set him on the right of the road by which Alexander and his army were to pass. Ptolemy did so.

On seeing Bessus Alexander stopped his car and asked him why he had first seized Darius, who had been his king, and in addition his relative and bene-

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- μὲν πρῶτα ξυνέλαβε καὶ δήσας ἤγεν, ἔπειτα ἀπέκτεινε. καὶ ὁ Βῆσσος οὐ μόνω οἱ ταῦτα δόξαντα πράξαι ἔφη, ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖς τότε ἀμφὶ Δαρεῖον οὖσιν, ὡς σωτηρίαν σφίσιν εὐρέσθαι παρ' 5 Ἄλεξάνδρου. Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε μαστιγοῦν ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιλέγειν τὸν κήρυκα ταῦτὰ ἐκεῖνα ὅσα αὐτὸς τῷ Βῆσσω ἐν τῇ πύστει ὠνείδισε. Βῆσσος μὲν δὴ οὕτως αἰκισθεὶς ἀποπέμπεται ἐς Βάκτρα ἀποθανούμενος. καὶ ταῦτα Πτολεμαῖος ὑπὲρ Βῆσσου ἀνέγραψεν. Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Σπιταμένην τε καὶ Δαταφέρνην Πτολεμαίῳ ἀγαγεῖν Βῆσσον καὶ παραδοῦναι Ἄλεξάνδρῳ γυμνὸν ἐν κλοιῷ δήσαντας.
- 6 Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ ἀναπληρώσας τὸ ἵππικὸν ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἵππων (πολλοὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἵπποι ἔν τε τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τοῦ Καυκάσου καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐπὶ τὸν Ὄξον τε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὄξου πορεία ἐξέλιπον) ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα ἤγε· τὰ δὲ ἐστὶ βασιλεία τῆς Σογδιανῶν χώρας. 7 ἔνθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Τάναϊν ποταμὸν προῆει. τῷ δὲ Τανάϊδι τούτῳ, ὃν δὴ καὶ Ἰαξάρτην<sup>1</sup> ἄλλῳ ὀνόματι πρὸς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων βαρβάρων καλεῖσθαι λέγει Ἀριστόβουλος, αἱ πηγαὶ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Καυκάσου ὄρους καὶ αὐτῷ εἰσιν· ἐξίησι δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ποταμὸς εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν θάλασσαν. 8 ἄλλος δὲ ἂν εἴη Τάναϊς ὑπὲρ ὅτου λέγει Ἡρόδοτος ὁ λογοποιὸς ὄγδοον εἶναι τῶν ποταμῶν τῶν

<sup>1</sup> Ἰαξάρτην, *Palmarius*: Ὀρξάντην *codd.* See historical note.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. iv 7, 3, giving the sequel, not a variant story from another source. Different versions: D. 83, 8 (followed by long lacuna); QC. vii 5, 40 ff.; 10, 10.

<sup>2</sup> The minor discrepancy (*Pearson LH* 166) suggests that Ar. had not read Pt. or was correcting him silently.

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factor, led him about in chains, and then murdered him. Bessus replied that he had acted not by any private decision of his own but in concert with all then attending on Darius, to obtain immunity from Alexander. At this Alexander ordered him to be whipped and the herald to announce during the whipping the crimes for which he himself had blamed Bessus in his question. After this torture Bessus was sent to Bactra to be put to death.<sup>1</sup> This is Ptolemy's account of Bessus: Aristobulus, however, says that it was the followers of Spitamenes and Dataphernes who took Bessus to Ptolemy and handed him over to Alexander naked and bound, wearing a wooden collar.<sup>2</sup> 5

Alexander brought his cavalry to full strength with horses from the vicinity, for a good many horses had been lost in the crossing of Mount Caucasus and on the marches both to and from the Oxus, and led his troops towards Maracanda [Samarcand], a royal residence of the Sogdianian land. Thence he advanced to the river Tanais [Syr-darya]. The springs of this Tanais too, which Aristobulus says is called by the natives a different name, Jaxartes,<sup>3</sup> rise in Mount Caucasus; and this river also flows out into the Hyrcanian Sea. The Tanais [Don], which the historian Herodotus describes as the eighth of the Scy- 6 7 8

<sup>3</sup> The Syr-darya, which in fact rises in the Kirgiz, not the 'Caucasus' (here Hindu-Kush), and flows into the Aral Sea, not the 'Hyrcanian' (Caspian); cf. App. XII for these and other geographical confusions. Greek writers normally give the Iranian name for the Syr-darya as Jaxartes; here the manuscripts read 'Orxantes', and in vii 16, 3 (the only other place where A. does not use 'Tanais') 'Oxyartes'; P. 45 has 'Orexartes'. It is thus doubtful what A. (or Ar.) actually wrote: I have hesitantly adopted emendations in both places in the *Anabasis*.

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- Σκυθικῶν Τάναϊν, καὶ ῥέειν μὲν ἐκ λίμνης μεγάλης ἀνίσχοντα, ἐκδιδόναι δὲ ἐς μείζω ἔτι λίμνην, τὴν καλουμένην Μαιῶτιν· καὶ τὸν Τάναϊν τοῦτον εἰσὶν
- 9 οἱ ὄρον ποιούσι τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης, οἷς δὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μυχοῦ τοῦ πόντου τοῦ Εὐξείνου ἢ λίμνη τε ἢ Μαιῶτις καὶ ὁ ἐς ταύτην ἕξιεις ποταμὸς ὁ Τάναϊς οὗτος διείργει τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, καθάπερ ἢ κατὰ Γάδειρά τε καὶ τοὺς ἀντιπέρας Γαδείρων Λίβυας τοὺς Νομάδας θάλασσα τὴν Λιβύην αὐτὴ καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην διείργει, οἷς γε δὴ ἢ Λιβύη ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας τῆς ἄλλης τῷ Νείλῳ ποταμῷ διακέκριται.
- 10 Ἐνταῦθα ἀποσκεδασθέντες τινὲς τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐς προνομὴν κατακόπτονται πρὸς τῶν βαρβάρων· οἱ δὲ δράσαντες τὸ ἔργον ἀπέφυγον ἐς ὄρος τραχύτατον καὶ πάντη ἀπότομον· ἦσαν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τρισμυρίους. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς κουφοτάτους τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀναλαβὼν
- 11 ἦγεν. ἔνθα δὴ προσβολαὶ πολλαὶ ἐγίνοντο τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐς τὸ ὄρος· καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἀπεκρούοντο βαλλόμενοι ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ τραυματῖαι ἐγένοντο καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐς τὴν κνήμην τοξεύεται διαμπὰξ καὶ τῆς περόνης τι ἀποθραύεται αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ τοξεύματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἔλαβέ τε τὸ χωρίον, καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ κατεκόπησαν πρὸς τῶν Μακεδόνων, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τῶν πετρῶν ῥίψαντες σφᾶς ἀπέθανον, ὥστε ἐκ τρισμυρίων οὐ πλείους ἀποσωθῆναι ὀκτακισχιλίων.

thian rivers, rising and flowing out of a great lake, and running into a greater lake, called Maeotis [Sea of Azov], will be a different Tanais. Some make this Tanais the boundary between Asia and Europe; in their view, from the corner of the Euxine Sea Lake Maeotis and this river Tanais, which flows into it, separate Asia and Europe, just as the sea between Gadeira [Cadiz] and the nomad Libyans opposite separates Libya in turn from Europe; in their view Libya is divided from the rest of Asia by the river Nile.<sup>4</sup>

Here some of the Macedonians who had scattered for foraging were cut down by the barbarians. The authors of the deed took refuge in a very rugged and completely precipitous mountain; they numbered about thirty thousand. Alexander took his lightest troops and led them to attack the fugitives. Then the Macedonians attempted many assaults upon the mountain; at first they were driven back by volleys from the barbarians, and a great many were wounded; notably, Alexander himself was shot right through the leg with an arrow, and a part of his fibula-bone was broken. But even so he captured the position, and some of the barbarians were cut down there and then by the Macedonians, while many perished by throwing themselves down the rocks, so that out of thirty thousand not more than eight thousand saved their lives.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In antiquity the division between Asia and 'Libya' (Africa) was sometimes placed at the Suez isthmus (e.g. Herodotus ii 16 f.), sometimes at the Nile (e.g. Strabo ii 5, 26); before Herodotus Libya was often included in Asia, but those who regarded it as separate would treat Arrian as meaning that 'Libya is parted from the rest that is Asia . . .'

<sup>5</sup> With §6-11 cf. QC. vii 6, 1-10; App. VIII 12.



# BOOK IV



## ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΝ

1. Οὐ πολλαῖς δὲ ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἀφικνοῦνται παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον πρέσβεις παρά τε Σκυθῶν τῶν Ἀβίων καλουμένων (οὓς καὶ Ὅμηρος δικαιότατους ἀνθρώπους εἰπὼν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει ἐπήνεσεν· οἰκοῦσι δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ οὗτοι αὐτόνομοι, οὐχ ἤκιστα διὰ πενίαν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην) καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Σκυθῶν, οἳ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον
- 2 ἔθνος [Σκυθικόν] ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἐποικοῦσιν. καὶ τούτοις συμπέμπει Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐταίρων, πρόφασιν μὲν κατὰ πρεσβείαν φιλίαν ξυνηθομένων, ὃ δὲ νοῦς τῆς πομπῆς ἐς κατασκοπὴν τι μᾶλλον ἔφερε φύσεώς τε τῆς χώρας τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ πλήθους αὐτῶν καὶ νομαίων καὶ ὀπλίσεως, ἧντινα ἔχοντες στέλλονται ἐς τὰς μάχας.
- 3 Αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς τῷ Τανάϊδι ποταμῷ ἐπενόει πόλιν οἰκίσαι, καὶ ταύτην ἑαυτοῦ ἐπώνυμον. ὃ τε γὰρ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο αὐξῆσαι ἐπὶ μέγα τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐν καλῷ οἰκισθήσεσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ Σκύθας, εἴποτε συμβαίνοι, ἐλάσεως καὶ τῆς προφυλακῆς τῆς χώρας πρὸς τὰς καταδρομὰς τῶν
- 4 πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐποικούντων βαρβάρων. ἐδόκει δ' ἂν καὶ μεγάλη γενέσθαι ἡ πόλις πλήθει τε τῶν ἐς αὐτὴν ξυνοικισομένων καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῇ λαμπρότητι. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πρόσχωροι τῷ ποταμῷ βάρβαροι τοὺς τε τὰ φρούρια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σφῶν ἔχοντας στρατιώτας τῶν Μακεδόνων ξυλλαβόντες ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐς ἀσφάλειάν

## BOOK IV

1. Not many days later, envoys came to Alexander from the Abian Scythians, as they are called, whom Homer praised in his epic by calling them 'most just of men'; they live in Asia, and are independent, chiefly through their poverty and their sense of justice. Envoys came too from the European Scythians, the largest nation dwelling in Europe. Alexander sent some of the Companions with them, pretending it was an embassy to conclude a friendly agreement; but the idea of the mission was rather to spy out the nature of the Scythians' land, their numbers, their customs and the arms they use on their warlike expeditions.<sup>1</sup>

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He was himself planning to found a city on the Tanais, and to give it his own name. For in his view the site was suitable for the city to rise to greatness, and it would be well placed for any eventual invasion of Scythia and as a defence bastion of the country against the raids of the barbarians dwelling on the other side of the river. He thought that the city would actually rise to greatness because of the number of settlers and the splendour of its name.<sup>2</sup> At this point the barbarians near the river seized and killed the Macedonian troops garrisoning their cities, and then began to strengthen the defences of the

<sup>1</sup> QC. vii 6, 11 f. Scyths: App. XII. Cf. i 3, 1 n.; iii 8, 3 n.; iv 3, 6 n.

<sup>2</sup> QC. 6, 13. Motivation: iii 1, 5 n. Cf. App. VIII for all topographical matters in this book.

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5 τινὰ μάλλον ὠχύρου. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως καὶ τῶν Σογδιανῶν οἱ πολλοί, ἐπαρθέντες πρὸς τῶν ξυλλαβόντων Βῆσσον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν Βακτριανῶν ἔστιν οὓς σφισιν οὗτοι ξυναπέστησαν, εἴτε δὴ καὶ δείσαντες Ἀλέξανδρον, εἴτε καὶ λόγον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀποστάσει διδόντες, ὅτι ἐς ἓνα ξύλλογον ἐπηγγέλκει Ἀλέξανδρος ξυελθεῖν τοὺς ὑπάρχους τῆς χώρας ἐκείνης εἰς Ζαρίασπα, τὴν μεγίστην πόλιν, ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ οὐδενὶ τοῦ ξυλλόγου γιγνομένου.

2. Ταῦτα ὡς ἀπηγγέλθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, παραγγείλας τοῖς πεζοῖς κατὰ λόχους κλίμακας ποιεῖσθαι ὅσα(ι) ἐκάστῳ λόχῳ ἐπηγγέλθησαν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ὀρμηθεὶς πόλιν προὔχρει, ἣ ὄνομα ἦν Γάζα· ἐς γὰρ ἑπτὰ πόλεις ξυμπεφευγέναι ἔλέγοντο οἱ ἐκ τῆς χώρας βάρβαροι.
- 2 Κρατερόν δὲ ἐκπέμπει πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην Κυρούπολιν, ἥπερ μεγίστη πασῶν καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν οἱ πλείστοι ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν τῶν βαρβάρων. παρήγγελλτο δὲ αὐτῷ στρατοπεδεῦσαι πλησίον τῆς πόλεως καὶ τάφρον τε ἐν κύκλῳ αὐτῆς ὀρύξαι καὶ χάρακα περιβαλέσθαι καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς ὅσαις χρῆσθαι ξυμπηγνύναι, ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν τὴν γνώμην τετραμμένοι οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ἀδύνατοι ὡσι ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἐπωφελεῖν.
- 3 αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Γάζαν ἐπεὶ ἀφίκετο, ὡς εἶχεν ἐξ ἐφόδου σημαίνει προσβάλλει τῷ τείχει γήινῳ τε καὶ οὐχ ὑψηλῷ ὄντι, προσθέντας ἐν κύκλῳ πάντοθεν τὰς κλίμακας· οἱ δὲ σφενδονῆται αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ τοξόται τε καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὁμοῦ τῇ ἐφόδῳ τῶν πεζῶν ἐσηκόντιζον ἐς τοὺς προμαχομένους ἀπὸ τοῦ

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cities for their security. They were joined in the revolt by most of the Sogdianians, stirred up by the party which had arrested Bessus, so that they also drew into their revolt some of the Bactrians; it may be that they were really terrified of Alexander, or that it was a pretext they gave for revolt that Alexander had instructed the hyparchs of that country to come to a joint conference at Zariaspa, the greatest city, and that this conference was not for their benefit.<sup>3</sup>

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2. When this was reported to Alexander, he ordered the infantry, company by company, to make ladders, each company a certain number; and he advanced himself to the first city on leaving the camp, called Gaza; the barbarians of the district were said to have taken refuge in seven cities. He sent Craterus to that called Cyropolis, the largest of them all, where the greatest number of barbarians had collected. Craterus was ordered to encamp near the city, to dig a ditch and throw a stockade round it, and to fit together as many siege engines as he required, so that the defenders of this city might have their minds fully occupied with Craterus and his troops and be unable to help those in the other cities. When Alexander himself arrived at Gaza, on his first approach without more ado he ordered his men to attack the wall, which was made of earth and of no great height, and to place their ladders against it on all sides; at the moment of the infantry attack his slingers, archers and javelin-men showered volleys

2  
2  
3

<sup>3</sup> For capture of rebel cities, QC. vii 6, 13-23.

τείχους καὶ βέλη ἀπὸ μηχανῶν ἠφίετο, ὥστε ὀξέως μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν βελῶν ἐγυμνώθη τὸ τεῖχος τῶν προμαχομένων, ταχεῖα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις τῶν κλιμάκων καὶ ἢ ἀνάβασις τῶν Μακεδόνων ἢ  
 4 ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἐγίνετο. τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἄνδρας πάντας ἀπέκτειναν, οὕτως ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου προστεταγμένον, γυναῖκας δὲ καὶ παῖδας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λείαν διήρπασαν. ἔνθεν δὲ εὐθύς ἦγεν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἀπ' ἐκείνης πόλιν ὠκισμένην, καὶ ταύτην τῷ αὐτῷ τε τρόπῳ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ λαμβάνει καὶ τοὺς ἀλόντας τὰ αὐτὰ ἔπραξεν. ὁ δὲ ἦγεν ἐπὶ τὴν τρίτην πόλιν, καὶ ταύτην τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ εἶλεν.

5 Ἐν ᾧ δὲ αὐτὸς ξὺν τοῖς πεζοῖς ἀμφὶ ταῦτα εἶχε, τοὺς ἰππέας ἐκπέμπει ἐς τὰς δύο τὰς πλησίον πόλεις προστάξας παραφυλάττειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἔνδον, μήποτε τὴν ἄλωσιν αἰσθόμενοι τῶν πλησίον πόλεων καὶ ἅμα τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔφοδον οἱ δὲ ἐς φυγὴν τραπέντες ἄποροι αὐτῷ διώκειν γένωνται. καὶ ξυνέβη τε οὕτως ὅπως εἵκασε, καὶ ἐν δέοντι ἐγένετο αὐτῷ ἢ πομπὴ τῶν  
 6 ἰππέων. οἱ γὰρ τὰς δύο τὰς οὕπω ἐαλωκυίας πόλεις ἔχοντες τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς καπνὸν τε εἶδον ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸ[ς] σφῶν πόλεως ἐμπιπραμένης καί τινες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους αὐτοῦ διαφυγόντες αὐτάγγελοι τῆς ἀλώσεως ἐγένοντο, ὡς τάχους ἕκαστοι εἶχον ἀθρόοι ἐκ τῶν πόλεως φεύγοντες ἐμπίπτουσιν ἐς τὸ στίφος τῶν ἰππέων ξυντεταγμένον καὶ κατεκόπησαν οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν.

3. Οὕτω δὴ τὰς πέντε πόλεις ἐν δυσὶν ἡμέραις ἐλών τε καὶ ἐξανδραποδισάμενος ἦει ἐπὶ τὴν μεγίστην αὐτῶν τὴν Κύρου πόλιν. ἢ δὲ τετειχι-

upon the defenders on the walls, and missiles were  
 hurled from the catapults, so that the wall was soon  
 cleared of defenders by the great shower of missiles,  
 and it was quick work for the Macedonians to set up  
 the ladders and ascend the wall. They put all the  
 men to the sword according to Alexander's orders and  
 seized as plunder the women, children and other  
 spoils. Thence Alexander marched at once to the  
 second city, which lay next to this one, captured it  
 too in the same fashion on the same day, and gave his  
 captives the same treatment. He advanced then to  
 the third city, and took it next day at the first  
 assault.

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While he himself was thus busied with his infantry,  
 he despatched the cavalry to the two next cities, with  
 instructions to watch the men within carefully, in  
 case they learned of the capture of the neighbouring  
 cities and also of his own impending approach, and  
 took to flight, and then pursuit might be impractic-  
 able. Things turned out just as he guessed, and the  
 despatch of the cavalry came none too soon. For the  
 barbarians who held the two yet untaken cities saw  
 the smoke rising, as the city next in front of them was  
 ablaze, and when a few who escaped the catastrophe  
 itself gave first-hand information of the capture, they  
 attempted as fast as they could to escape from these  
 cities in a mass, but ran straight into the close array  
 of cavalry, and most of them were cut down.

4

5

6

3. After thus capturing the five cities in two days  
 and enslaving the survivors, Alexander marched  
 against the largest of them, Cyropolis [Ura-Tyube].

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σμένη τε ἦν ὑψηλοτέρῳ τείχει ἢπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, οἷα δὴ ὑπὸ Κύρου οἰκισθεῖσα, καὶ τοῦ πλείστου καὶ μαχιμωτάτου τῶν ταύτη βαρβάρων ἐς ταύτην συμπεφευγότες οὐχ ὡσαύτως ῥαδία ἐξ ἐφόδου ἐλεῖν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐγίνετο. ἀλλὰ μηχανὰς γὰρ προσάγων τῷ τείχει Ἀλέξανδρος ταύτη μὲν κατασείειν ἐπενόει τὸ τεῖχος καὶ κατὰ τὸ αἰὲ παραρηγνύμενον αὐτοῦ τὰς προσβολὰς ποιεῖσθαι. αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς κατεῖδε τοὺς ἔκρους τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ὅς διὰ τῆς πόλεως χειμάρρους ὧν διέρχεται, ξηροὺς ἐν τῷ τότε ὕδατος καὶ οὐ ξυνεχεῖς τοῖς τείχεσιν, ἀλλ' οἷους παρασχεῖν πάροδον τοῖς στρατιώταις διαδῦναι ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε σωματοφύλακας καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τετραμμένων τῶν βαρβάρων πρὸς τὰς μηχανὰς καὶ τοὺς ταύτη προσμαχομένους λανθάνει κατὰ τοὺς ἔκρους ξὺν ὀλίγοις τὸ πρῶτον παρελθὼν ἐς τὴν πόλιν· ἀναρρήξας δὲ ἔνδοθεν τῶν πυλῶν, αἱ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ἦσαν, δέχεται καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους στρατιώτας εὐπετῶς. ἔνθα δὴ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐχομένην ἤδη τὴν πόλιν αἰσθόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον ὅμως ἐτράπησαν· καὶ γίνεται προσβολὴ αὐτῶν καρτερά, καὶ βάλλεται λίθῳ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος βιαίως τὴν τε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸν αὐχένα καὶ Κρατερὸς τοξεύματι καὶ πολλοὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἡγεμόνων· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐξέωσαν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τοὺς βαρβάρους. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ κατὰ τὸ τεῖχος προσβεβληκότες ἔρημον ἤδη τὸ τεῖχος τῶν προμαχομένων αἰροῦσιν. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῇ πρώτῃ καταλήψει τῆς πόλεως ἀπέθανον τῶν πολεμίων μάλιστα ἐς ὀκτακισχιλίους· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ (ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ πάντες ἐς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους μαχίμους οἱ



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This was fortified with a higher wall than the rest, since Cyrus had founded it; and as the greatest number and the best fighters of the barbarians round about had taken refuge in it, it was not so easy for the Macedonians to capture it straight off. However, Alexander brought up engines to the wall and proposed to batter it down in this way and to make assaults wherever breaches occurred. But when he personally observed that the outlets of the river, a winter torrent which runs through the city, were dry at the time, and did not reach up to the wall, but were low enough to permit a passage by which soldiers could pass into the city, he took the bodyguards, hypaspists, archers and Agrianes, and while the tribesmen were engaged with the siege-engines and the troops attacking there, he slipped unobserved along the channels, penetrated the city at first with only a few men, and broke open the gates from within which were at that point and easily admitted the rest of the troops. Then the barbarians, seeing that their city was already in the enemy's hands, none the less turned upon Alexander and his force. They made a vigorous onslaught; Alexander himself was struck violently with a stone on his head and neck, and Craterus was wounded by an arrow, as were many other officers. None the less they cleared the market-place of the tribesmen. Meanwhile those who had assaulted the wall captured it, now that it was denuded of defenders. In the first occupation of the city about eight thousand of the enemy perished; the rest (the whole number gathered together there

ξυνεληλυθότες) καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὴν ἄκραν. καὶ τούτους περιστρατοπεδεύσας Ἄλέξανδρος ἡμέραν μίαν ἐφρούρησεν· οἱ δὲ ἐνδεία ὕδατος ἐνεχείρισαν σφᾶς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.

- 5 Τὴν δὲ ἐβδόμην πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔλαβε, Πτολεμαῖος μὲν λέγει, ὅτι αὐτοὺς σφᾶς ἐνδόντας, Ἀριστόβουλος δέ, ὅτι βία καὶ ταύτην ἐξεῖλεν καὶ ὅτι πάντας τοὺς καταληφθέντας ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπέκτεινε. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ κατανεῖμαι λέγει αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ δεδεμένους κελεῦσαι φυλάσσεσθαι ἔστ' ἂν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπαλλάττηται αὐτός, ὡς μηδένα ἀπολείπεσθαι τῶν τὴν ἀπόστασιν πραξάντων.
- 6 Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῶν τε ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Σκυθῶν στρατιὰ ἀφικνεῖται πρὸς τὰς ὄχθας τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ Τανάϊδος, ἀκούσαντες οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἔστιν οἱ καὶ τῶν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ποταμοῦ βαρβάρων ἀπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀφεστᾶσιν, ὡς, εἰ δὴ τι λόγου ὄν ἄξιον νεωτερίζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπιθησόμενοι τοῖς Μακεδόσι. καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Σπιταμένην δὲ ἀπηγγέλθησαν ὅτι τοὺς ἐν Μαρακάνδοις καταλειφθέντας
- 7 ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ πολιορκουῖσιν. ἔνθα δὴ Ἄλέξανδρος ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ἀμφὶ Σπιταμένην Ἀνδρόμαχόν τε ἀποστέλλει καὶ Μενέδημον καὶ Κάρανον, ἵππέας μὲν ἔχοντας τῶν ἐταίρων ἐς ἐξήκοντα καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων ὀκτακοσίους, ὧν Κάρανος ἡγεῖτο, πεζοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους ἐς χιλίους πεντακοσίους· ἐπιτάσσει δὲ αὐτοῖς Φαρνούχην τὸν ἑρμηνέα, τὸ μὲν γένος Λύκιον τὸν Φαρνούχην, ἐμπείρως δὲ τῆς τε φωνῆς τῶν ταύτη βαρβάρων ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμιλῆσαι αὐτοῖς δεξιὸν φαινόμενον.

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came to some fifteen thousand fighting men) took refuge in the citadel: Alexander blockaded and kept guard on them for a day, and because of want of water they surrendered to him.

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The seventh city he took at first assault. Ptolemy says that they surrendered, Aristobulus that Alexander captured this city too by force, and killed all he found within; Ptolemy also says that he distributed the men among his army and ordered them to be kept bound and under guard till he left their country, so that none of those responsible for the revolt should be left behind. 5

Meanwhile an army of the Asian Scythians arrived on the banks of the river Tanais; most of them had heard that some of the barbarians on that side of the river had revolted from Alexander, and they intended, should any important rising occur, to join in attacking the Macedonians.<sup>1</sup> News was also brought that Spitamenes and his troops were besieging those who had been left behind at Maracanda in the citadel. On this Alexander sent against the troops of Spitamenes, Andromachus, Menedemus, and Caranus, with cavalry comprising some sixty Companions and eight hundred of the mercenaries under Caranus, and with about fifteen hundred mercenary infantry; and he placed these forces under command of Pharnuches the interpreter, a Lycian by birth who was expert in the language of the barbarians of these parts and seemed in general to be skilful in dealings with them.<sup>2</sup> 6 7

<sup>1</sup> QC. vii 7, I think they were menaced by the new city. 'Asia': there is a muddle here. On any view Al. was in Asia, but if the 'Tanais' was the frontier between Europe and Asia (App. XII 4), Scythians across the river were in Europe!

<sup>2</sup> QC. 6, 24 names only Menedemus and gives him 3,000 foot and 800 horse.

## ARRIAN

4. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν, ἣν ἐπενόει, τειχίσας ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι καὶ ξυνοικίσας ἐς αὐτὴν τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων καὶ ὅστις τῶν προσοικούντων βαρβάρων ἐθελοντῆς μετέσχε τῆς ξυνοικήσεως καὶ τινὰς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Μακεδόνων, ὅσοι ἀπόμαχοι ἤδη ἦσαν, θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς νόμος αὐτῷ καὶ ἀγῶνα ἵππικόν τε καὶ γυμνικὸν ποιήσας, ὡς οὐκ ἀπαλλασσομένους ἑώρα τοὺς
- 2 Σκύθας ἀπὸ τῆς ὄχθης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκτοξεύοντες ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἑωρῶντο οὐ πλατὺν ταύτη ὄντα, καὶ τινὰ καὶ πρὸς ὑβρίν τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου βαρβαρικῶς ἐθρασύναντο, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαντα Ἀλέξανδρον ἄψασθαι Σκυθῶν ἢ μαθόντα ἂν ὅτι περ τὸ διάφορον Σκύθαις τε καὶ τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς βαρβάροις, — ὑπὸ τούτων παροξυνόμενος ἐπενόει διαβαίνειν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς διφθέρας παρε-
- 3 σκεύαζεν ἐπὶ τῷ πόρῳ. θυομένῳ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διαβάσει τὰ ἱερά οὐκ ἐγίγνετο· ὁ δὲ βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον οὐ γιγνομένων, ὅμως δὲ ἐκαρτέρει καὶ ἔμενεν. ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἀνίεσαν οἱ Σκύθαι, αὐθις ἐπὶ τῇ διαβάσει ἐθύετο, καὶ αὐθις <sup>1</sup> κίνδυνον αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι Ἀρίστανδρος ὁ μάντις ἔφραζεν· ὁ δὲ κρεῖσσον ἔφη ἐς ἔσχατον κινδύνου ἐλθεῖν ἢ κατεστραμμένον ζύμπασαν ὀλίγου δεῖν τὴν Ἀσίαν γέλωτα εἶναι Σκύθαις, καθάπερ Δαρείος ὁ Ξέρξου πατὴρ πάλαι ἐγένετο. Ἀρίστανδρος δὲ οὐκ ἔφη παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ θείου σημαινόμενα ἄλλα ἀποδείξεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλλα ἐθέλει ἀκοῦσαι Ἀλέξανδρος.
- 4 Ὁ δέ, ὡς αἶ τε διφθέραι αὐτῷ παρεσκευασμένα ἦσαν ἐπὶ τῷ πόρῳ καὶ ὁ στρατὸς ἐξωπλισμένος

<sup>1</sup> αὐθις Castiglioni: αὐ ἐς codd.

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 4. 1-4

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4. Alexander himself now spent twenty days in building the wall of the city he proposed to found, and settling there some Greek mercenaries, any of the neighbouring barbarians who shared in the settlement as volunteers, and also some Macedonians from the army who were no longer fit for active service.<sup>1</sup> He then sacrificed to the gods in accordance with his custom and held a cavalry and athletic contest. As he saw that the Scythians were not leaving the river bank but were observed shooting from it arrows into the river, which was not very broad here, and were also insulting Alexander with barbaric boasts that he would not dare to touch Scythians or he would learn the difference between Scythians and the barbarians of Asia, his irritation made him plan to cross and attack them, and he began to get ready the hides for the crossing. But when he sacrificed with a view to crossing, the omens were not favourable. Though much annoyed by this, still he restrained himself and stayed where he was. But as the Scythians did not give up, he sacrificed again with a view to crossing, and Aristander the prophet again said that danger to him was portended. Alexander replied that it was better to go to any extremity of danger than, after subduing almost the whole of Asia, to be a laughing-stock to Scythians, as Darius the father of Xerxes had been long ago. Yet Aristander refused to interpret the sacrifices in any way contrary to the signs from heaven because Alexander desired to hear something different.

As soon as the hides had been got ready for his crossing, and the army was stationed on the bank

<sup>1</sup> App. VIII 16. Types of settlers: iii 1, 5n.

## ARRIAN

ἐφειστήκει τῷ ποταμῷ, αἱ τε μηχαναὶ ἀπὸ  
 ξυρθήματος ἐξηκόντιζον ἐς τοὺς Σκύθας παριπ-  
 πεύοντας ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ καὶ ἔστιν οἱ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρώ-  
 σκοντο ἐκ τῶν βελῶν, εἰς δὲ δὴ διὰ τοῦ γέρρου τε  
 καὶ τοῦ θώρακος διαμπὰξ πληγεῖς πίπτει ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 ἵππου, οἱ μὲν ἐξεπλάγησαν πρὸς τε τῶν βελῶν τὴν  
 διὰ μακροῦ ἄφεισιν καὶ ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς αὐτοῖς  
 τετελευτήκει, καὶ ὀλίγον ἀνεχώρησαν ἀπὸ τῆς  
 5 ὄχθης· Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τεταραγμένους πρὸς τὰ  
 βέλη ἰδὼν ὑπὸ σαλπύγγων ἐπέρα τὸν ποταμὸν  
 αὐτὸς ἡγούμενος· εἶπετο δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη  
 στρατιά· πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ σφεν-  
 δονήτας ἀποβιβάσας σφενδονᾶν τε καὶ ἐκτοξεύειν  
 ἐκέλευσεν ἐς τοὺς Σκύθας, ὡς μὴ πελάζειν αὐτοὺς  
 τῇ φάλαγγι τῶν πεζῶν ἐκβαινούσῃ, πρὶν τὴν ἵππον  
 6 αὐτῷ διαβῆναι πᾶσαν· ὡς δὲ ἀθρόοι ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ  
 ἐγένοντο, ἐφῆκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον  
 μίαν ἵππαρχίαν τῶν ξένων καὶ τῶν σαρισσοφόρων  
 ἵλας τέσσαρας· καὶ τούτους δεξάμενοι οἱ Σκύθαι  
 καὶ ἐς κύκλους περιῦππεύοντες ἔβαλλον τε πολλοὶ  
 ὀλίγους <καὶ> αὐτοὶ οὐ χαλεπῶς διεφύγγανον.  
 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τοὺς τε τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας  
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψιλούς, ὧν Βάλακρος ἦρχεν,  
 ἀναμίξας τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν ἐπῆγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας.  
 7 ὡς δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο, ἐλάσαι ἐκέλευσεν ἐς  
 αὐτοὺς τῶν τε ἐταίρων τρεῖς ἵππαρχίας καὶ τοὺς  
 ἵππακοντιστάς ξύμπαντας· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν  
 λοιπὴν ἵππον ἄγων σπουδῇ ἐνέβαλεν ὀρθίαις ταῖς  
 ἵλαις· οὐκ οὐκ ἔτι οἰοί τε ἦσαν ἐξελίσειν τὴν ἵπ-



## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 4. 4-7

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fully armed, the catapults on a signal hurled their volleys at the Scythians riding along the bank, and some were wounded by the missiles; one was actually pierced right through his shield and corslet, and fell from his horse. The Scythians were dismayed at the long-range discharge of the missiles and at the loss of a brave man and retreated a little from the bank. Seeing them in disorder because of the missiles, 5 Alexander sounded his bugles and began the crossing of the river, himself in the van; the rest of the army followed him. He first disembarked the archers and slingers, and told them to shoot their bullets and arrows at the Scythians, to keep them from approaching the phalanx of the infantry as it disembarked, before his cavalry had fully crossed. When they were 6 all in a body on the bank, he launched at the Scythians first a hipparchy of the mercenaries and four squadrons of the lancers.<sup>2</sup> The Scythians awaited their onslaught, riding round in circles and shooting at them; they were many against few, and easily evaded their attack. Alexander then mixed up his archers, the Agrianians and the other light troops under Balacrus, with the cavalry, and led them against the Scythians. Once they were quite close, he ordered 7 three hipparchies<sup>3</sup> of the Companions and all the mounted javelin-men to charge at them; and he himself brought up the rest of the cavalry at full speed and went in with his squadrons in column. So the Scythians were no longer able to wheel round in

<sup>2</sup> Introd. n. 84.

<sup>3</sup> Introd. 59 f.



## ARRIAN

πασίαν ἐς κύκλους, ὡς πρόσθεν ἔτι· ὄμοῦ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἢ ἵππος προσέκειτο αὐτοῖς, ὄμοῦ δὲ οἱ ψιλοὶ  
 ἀναμεμιγμένοι τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν οὐκ εἶων τὰς ἐπι-  
 στροφὰς ἀσφαλεῖς ποιεῖσθαι. ἔνθα λαμπρὰ ἤδη  
 8 φυγὴ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἦν· καὶ πίπτουσι μὲν αὐτῶν ἐς  
 χιλίους καὶ εἰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων, Σατράκης, ἐάλωσαν  
 δὲ ἐς ἑκατὸν καὶ πενήκοντα. ὡς δὲ ἡ δίωξις  
 ὄξειά τε καὶ διὰ καύματος πολλοῦ ταλαιπώρως  
 ἐγένετο, δύψει τε ἡ στρατιὰ πᾶσα εἶχετο καὶ αὐτὸς  
 Ἄλέξανδρος ἐλαύνων πίνει ὅποῖον ἦν ὕδωρ ἐν τῇ γῆ  
 9 ἐκείνῃ. καὶ ἦν γὰρ πονηρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ, ρεῦμα  
 ἀθρόον κατασκήπτει αὐτῷ ἐς τὴν γαστέρα· καὶ  
 ἐπὶ τῷδε ἡ δίωξις οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων Σκυθῶν ἐγένετο·  
 εἰ δὲ μή, δοκοῦσιν ἂν μοι καὶ πάντες διαφθαρῆναι  
 ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, εἰ μὴ Ἄλεξάνδρῳ τὸ σῶμα ἔκαμεν.  
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς ἔσχατον κινδύνου ἐλθὼν ἐκομίσθη  
 ὀπίσω ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ἡ  
 μαντεία Ἀριστάνδρῳ.

5. Ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ Σκυθῶν βασι-  
 λέως ἀφικνοῦνται παρ' Ἄλεξάνδρον πρέσβεις, ὑπὲρ  
 τῶν πραχθέντων ἐς ἀπολογίαν ἐκπεμφθέντες, ὅτι  
 οὐκ ἀπὸ <τοῦ> κοινοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἐπράχθη,  
 ἀλλὰ καθ' ἀρπαγὴν ληστικῶ τρόπῳ σταλέντων,  
 καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπαγγελόμενα.  
 καὶ τούτῳ φιλόφρονος ἐπιστέλλει Ἄλέξανδρος,  
 ὅτι οὔτε ἀπιστοῦντα μὴ ἐπεξιέναι καλὸν αὐτῷ  
 ἐφαίνετο, οὔτε κατὰ καιρὸν ἦν ἐν τῷ τότε  
 ἐπεξιέναι.

2 Οἱ δὲ ἐν Μαρακάνδοις ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ φρουρούμενοι  
 Μακεδόνες προσβολῆς γενομένης τῇ ἄκρᾳ ἐκ Σπιτα-  
 μένους τε καὶ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐπεκδραμόντες  
 ἀπέκτεινάν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἔστιν οὗς καὶ ἀπώ-

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circles as they had been doing up till then; for the cavalry was now pressing them, and at the same moment the light troops, mingled with the cavalry, prevented their turning about safely. The Scythians were by now in open flight; about a thousand fell, with one of their commanders, Satraces, while about a hundred and fifty were captured. The pursuit was sharp and distressing because of the great heat, so that all the army was consumed by thirst, and Alexander himself, as he rode on, drank whatever kind of water there was in that country. The water was in fact bad, and so sudden diarrhoea attacked his stomach; for this reason the pursuit did not extend to all the Scythians. Otherwise I think they would all have perished in their flight, had not Alexander been taken ill. Personally he fell into serious danger, and was carried back into the camp. In this way Aristander's prophecy came true.<sup>4</sup>

5. Soon afterwards envoys reached Alexander from the Scythian king;<sup>1</sup> they had been sent to excuse what had occurred, on the ground that it had not been the action of the Scythian community, but only that of raiders and freebooters; the king himself was ready to do what was required of him. Alexander gave a kindly answer, since he thought it dishonourable not to press the attack, if he distrusted the king, and not the right moment to press it.<sup>2</sup>

The Macedonians who were blockaded in the citadel at Maracanda, when an assault was made on the citadel by Spitamenes and his troops, sallied out, killed some of the enemy, drove off the whole body,

<sup>4</sup> See Fuller 236 ff. QC. vii 7, 1-9, 16 has many divergencies. Cf. also Marsden (i 20, 8 n.) 97, 165 f.

<sup>1</sup> QC. vii 9, 17 ff.

<sup>2</sup> What follows is clearly from Pt. (of. 6, 1). See App. VIII 12.

## ARRIAN

σαντο ξύμπαντας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπαθείς ἀπεχώρησαν  
 3 ἐς τὴν ἄκραν. ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 ἐσταλμένοι ἐς Μαράκανδα ἤδη προσάγοντες Σπι-  
 ταμένει ἐξηγγέλλοντο, τὴν μὲν πολιορκίαν ἐκλείπει  
 τῆς ἄκρας, αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐς τὰ βασίλεια<sup>1</sup> τῆς  
 Σογδιανῆς ἀνεχώρει. Φαρνούχης δὲ καὶ οἱ ξὺν  
 αὐτῷ στρατηγοὶ σπεύδοντες ἐξελάσαι αὐτὸν παντά-  
 πασιν ἐπὶ τε τὰ ὄρια τῆς Σογδιανῆς ξυνείποντο  
 4 ὑποχωροῦντι καὶ εἰς τοὺς Νομάδας τοὺς Σκύθας  
 οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ ξυνεσβάλλουσιν. ἔνθα δὴ προσλα-  
 βὼν ὁ Σπιταμένης τῶν Σκυθῶν ἰππέων ἐς ἑξακο-  
 σίους προσεπήρθη ὑπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας τῆς Σκυθικῆς  
 δέξασθαι ἐπιόντας τοὺς Μακεδόνας· παρατα-  
 ξάμενος δὲ ἐν χωρίῳ ὀμαλῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐρήμῳ τῆς  
 Σκυθικῆς ὑπομεῖναι μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ αὐτὸς ἐς  
 αὐτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν οὐκ ἤθελε, περιῦππεύων δὲ ἐτό-  
 5 ξευεν ἐς τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν πεζῶν. καὶ ἐπελαυ-  
 νόντων μὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀμφὶ Φαρνούχην ἔφευγεν  
 εὐπετῶς, οἷα δὲ ὠκυτέρων τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν τῷ  
 τότε ἀκμαιοτέρων ὄντων τῶν ἵππων, τοῖς δὲ ἀμφὶ  
 Ἀνδρόμαχον ὑπὸ τε τῆς ξυνεχοῦς πορείας καὶ ἅμα  
 χιλοῦ ἀπορία κεκάκωτο ἢ ἵππος· μένουσι δὲ ἢ  
 ὑποχωροῦσιν ἐπέκειντο εὐρώστως οἱ Σκύθαι.  
 6 ἔνθα δὴ πολλῶν μὲν τιτρωσκομένων ἐκ τῶν  
 τοξευμάτων, ἔστι δὲ ὧν καὶ πιπτόντων, ἐς πλαίσιον  
 ἰσόπλευρον τάξαντες τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀνεχώρουν  
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πολυτίμητον, ὅτι νάπος  
 ταύτη ἦν, ὡς μήτε τοῖς βαρβάροις εὐπετές ἔτι  
 εἶναι ἐκτοξεύειν ἐς αὐτούς, σφίσι τε οἱ πεζοὶ  
 ὠφελιμώτεροι ὦσι.

<sup>1</sup> βασίλεια codd: βόρεια Polak, Roos etc, but see App. VIII 16.

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 5. 3-6

and retired unharmed themselves to the citadel. As 3 329  
soon as Spitamenes heard that the force sent by B.C.  
Alexander to Maracanda was already drawing near,  
he abandoned the siege of the citadel and retreated  
himself towards the royal residence of Sogdiana.<sup>3</sup>  
Pharnuches and the officers with him, hurrying on to  
drive him out altogether, pursued as he withdrew to  
the frontiers of Sogdiana, and without calculating the  
risk came into conflict with the nomad Scythians as  
well. On this Spitamenes, adding some six hundred 4  
Scythian horse to his force, was encouraged by the  
Scythian reinforcement to await the Macedonian  
attack; he drew up his men on a level space near the  
Scythian desert, but his plan was not merely to await  
the enemy, or to charge them himself; wheeling  
round and round, he shot volleys of arrows into  
the infantry phalanx. When Pharnuches' troops 5  
charged them, he had no difficulty in riding off, as  
his horses were swifter and at the moment fresher,  
while the horses of Andromachus' troops had suffered  
from the forced march and want of fodder. But when  
they stood their ground or withdrew, the Scythians  
swooped vigorously upon them. By now many were 6  
being wounded by the arrows, and some actually  
falling, and the officers formed their men into a square  
and withdrew towards the river Polytimetus [Zerav-  
shan], as there was a wooded glen near by, so that the  
Scythians could no longer easily shoot at them, and  
their infantry might be of more use to them.

<sup>3</sup> See App. VIII 16.

## ARRIAN

7 Κάρανος δὲ ὁ ἱππάρχης οὐκ ἀνακωνώσας Ἀνδρο-  
 μάχῳ διαβαίνειν ἐπεχείρησε τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐς  
 ἀσφαλὲς ταύτη καταστήσων τὴν ἵππον· καὶ οἱ  
 πεζοὶ αὐτῷ ἐπηκολούθησαν, οὐκ ἐκ παραγγέλματος,  
 ἀλλὰ φοβερὰ τε καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἢ  
 ἔσβασις ἢ ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν κατὰ κρημνώδεις τὰς  
 8 ὄχθας. καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν  
 τῶν Μακεδόνων αὐτοῖς ἵπποις ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν  
 ἐσβάλλουσι ἐς τὸν πόρον. καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν ἤδη  
 διαβεβηκότων καὶ ἀποχωρούντων εἶχοντο, οἱ δὲ  
 τοὺς διαβαίνοντας ἀντιμέτωποι ταχθέντες ἀνείλουν  
 9 ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πλαγίων ἐξετόξευον  
 ἐς αὐτούς, οἱ δὲ τοῖς ἔτι ἐσβαίνουσιν ἐπέκειντο,  
 ὥστε ἀπορία πάντοθεν ξυνεχόμενοι οἱ Μακεδόνες  
 ἐς νῆσόν τινα τῶν ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ συμφεύγουσι οὐ  
 μεγάλην. καὶ περιστάντες αὐτούς οἱ Σκύθαι τε καὶ  
 οἱ ξὺν Σπιταμένει ἵππεῖς ἐν κύκλῳ πάντα κατετό-  
 ξευσαν· ὀλίγους δὲ ἠνδραποδίσαντο αὐτῶν, καὶ  
 τούτους πάντα ἀπέκτειναν.

6. Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ ἐνέδρα τὸ πολὺ τῆς στρατιᾶς  
 διαφθαρῆναι λέγει, τῶν Σκυθῶν ἐν παραδείσῳ  
 κρυφθέντων, οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ἐπεγέροντο τοῖς  
 Μακεδόσιν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ· ἵνα τὸν μὲν Φαρνού-  
 χην παραχωρεῖν τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῖς συμπεμφθεῖσι  
 Μακεδόσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἐμπείρως ἔχοντα ἔργων  
 πολεμικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ καθομιλῆσαι τοὺς βαρβά-  
 ρους μᾶλλον τι πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς  
 μάχαις ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἐσταλμένον, τοὺς δὲ Μακεδόνας  
 2 τε εἶναι καὶ ἐταίρους βασιλέως. Ἀνδρόμαχον δὲ

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 5. 7-6. 2

Caranus, the commander of the cavalry, without notifying Andromachus attempted to cross the river, hoping to get his cavalry into safety there, and the infantry followed him, without any instructions, in a panic-stricken and disorderly descent into the river from the banks which were precipitous. The barbarians on seeing the error of the Macedonians dashed, mounted as they were, from all directions into the stream. Some pressed on after those who had already crossed and were in retreat, others were ranged in front of the men crossing and penned them back into the river, or showered arrows at them from the flanks, or attacked those still entering the river. Then the Macedonians, helpless and pressed on every side, took refuge in a body on one of the small islands in the river. The Scythians and Spitamenes' cavalry stationed themselves round in a circle and shot them all down; a few were made prisoners but they too were all killed.

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B.C.

8

9

2

6. Aristobulus, however, states that the greater part of this force was destroyed by an ambush; the Scythians, having hidden themselves in a park, attacked the Macedonians from their concealment in the very course of the action, at the moment when Pharnuches was retiring from his command in favour of the Macedonians who had been sent with him, on the ground that he had no military experience, but had been sent by Alexander to treat with the barbarians rather than to command in battles, while they were both Macedonians and Companions of the king. However, Andromachus, Caranus and Mene-

## ARRIAN

καὶ Κάρανον καὶ Μενέδημον οὐ δέξασθαι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὸ μὲν τι ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν παρὰ τὰ ἐπηγγελμένα ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου αὐτοὺς τι κατὰ σφᾶς νεωτερίζειν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δεινῷ οὐκ ἐβελήσαντας, εἰ δὴ τι πταίσειαν, μὴ ὅσον κατ' ἄνδρα μόνον μετέχειν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς τὸ πᾶν αὐτοὺς κακῶς ἐξηγησαμένους. ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ θορύβῳ τε καὶ τῇ ἀταξίᾳ ἐπιθεμένους αὐτοῖς τοὺς βαρβάρους κατακόψαι πάντας, ὥστε ἰππέας μὲν μὴ πλείονας τῶν τεσσαράκοντα ἀποσωθῆναι, πεζοὺς δὲ ἕς τριακοσίους.

- 3 Ταῦτα δὲ ὡς ἠγγέλθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ἤλγησέ τε τῷ πάθει τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ ἔγνω σπουδῇ ἐλαύνειν ὡς ἐπὶ Σπιταμένην τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν βαρβάρους. ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἰππέων τοὺς ἡμισείας καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς ζύμπαντας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους ἦει ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα, ἵνα ἐπανήκειν Σπιταμένην ἐπυρθάνετο καὶ αὐθις πολιορκεῖν τοὺς
- 4 ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις διελθὼν χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους σταδίους τῇ τετάρτῃ ὑπὸ τὴν ἔω προσῆγε τῇ πόλει. Σπιταμένης δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐξηγγέλθη προσάγων Ἀλέξανδρος, οὐκ ἔμειναν, ἀλλ' ἐκλιπόντες τὴν
- 5 πόλιν φεύγουσιν. ὁ δὲ ἐχόμενος αὐτῶν ἐδίωκεν· ὡς δὲ ἐπὶ <τὸν> χῶρον ἦκεν, οὗ ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο, θάψας τοὺς στρατιώτας ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων εἶπετο ἔστε ἐπὶ τὴν ἔρημον τοῖς φεύγουσιν. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἀναστρέφων ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς

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<sup>1</sup> QC. vii 7, 30 ff. also has an ambushade but does not



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demus did not accept the command, partly to avoid the appearance of taking any initiative of their own contrary to the commands of Alexander, and partly because in the very moment of crisis they were not disposed, in case of a disaster, to be involved in it not simply as individuals but as men who had themselves directed the whole enterprise badly. It was in this confusion and disorder that the barbarians charged and cut them all to pieces, so that not more than forty cavalry and about three hundred foot-soldiers escaped.<sup>1</sup>

When this was reported to Alexander he was 3  
distressed at the disaster to his men and decided to  
march at full speed against Spitamenes and the  
barbarians with him.<sup>2</sup> He therefore took half the  
Companion cavalry, the archers and Agrianians, and  
the lightest-armed of the phalanx and marched to  
Maracanda, where he learnt Spitamenes had returned  
and was again besieging the garrison in the citadel.  
Alexander covered fifteen hundred stades in three 4  
days,<sup>3</sup> and approached the city on the fourth about  
dawn. Spitamenes and his troops did not stay on  
learning that Alexander was drawing near, but left  
the city and fled. Alexander pursued them closely, 5  
and when he reached the place of the battle, he buried  
the soldiers as best he could and followed the fugitives  
right up to the desert. Thence he turned back,

much resemble Ar. Losses: 2,000 foot and 300 horse, cf. 3, 7 n.

<sup>1</sup> In QC. 7, 39 Al. hears the news before crossing the Syrdarya and conceals it. For his operations against Spitamenes cf. QC. 9, 20-10, 9; App. VIII 12.

<sup>2</sup> From Ar., cf. Strabo xi 11, 5. He knew that Polytimetus was a Macedonian name and may have given Ochus as the native name, cf. Pearson *LH* 168 f.

ες τὰ ἐρύματα καταπεφευγότας τῶν βαρβάρων  
 ἔκτεινεν, ὅτι ξυνεπιθέσθαι ἐξηγγέλλοντο καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 τοῖς Μακεδόσι· καὶ ἐπῆλθε πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν ὄσπην  
 ὁ ποταμὸς ὁ Πολυτίμητος ἐπάρδων ἐπέρχεται.  
 6 ἵνα δὲ ἀφανίζεται τῷ ποταμῷ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐντεῦθεν  
 ἤδη τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἔρημος ἢ χώρα ἐστίν· ἀφανίζεται  
 δὲ καίπερ πολλοῦ ὦν ὕδατος ἐς τὴν ψάμμον. καὶ  
 ἄλλοι ποταμοὶ ὡσαύτως ἐκεῖ ἀφανίζονται μεγάλοι  
 καὶ ἀέ[ν]ναοι, ὃ τε Ἐπαρδος, ὃς ῥέει διὰ Μάρδων  
 τῆς χώρας, καὶ Ἄρειος, ὃτου ἐπώνυμος ἢ τῶν  
 Ἄρειων γῆ ἐστίν, καὶ Ἐτύμανδρος, ὃς δι' Εὐεργε-  
 7 τῶν ῥέει. καὶ εἰσὶ ξύμπαντες οὗτοι τηλικούτοι  
 ποταμοὶ ὥστε οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν μείων ἐστὶ τοῦ  
 Πηνειοῦ τοῦ Θεσσαλικοῦ ποταμοῦ, ὃς διὰ τῶν  
 Τεμπῶν ῥέων ἐκδιδοῖ ἐς θάλασσαν· ὁ δὲ Πολυτί-  
 μητος πολὺ ἔτι μείζων ἢ κατὰ τὸν Πηνειὸν ποτα-  
 μόν ἐστι.

7. Ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἐς Ζαρίασπα ἀφί-  
 κετο· καὶ αὐτοῦ κατέμενεν ἔστε παρελθεῖν τὸ  
 ἀκμαῖον τοῦ χειμῶνος. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀφίκοντο παρ'  
 αὐτὸν Φραταφέρνης τε ὁ Παρθυαίων σατράπης καὶ  
 Στασάνωρ ὁ ἐς Ἄρειους ἀποπεμφθεὶς ὡς Ἀρσάκην  
 ξυλληψόμενος, τὸν τε Ἀρσάκην δεδεμένον ἄγοντες  
 καὶ Βραζάνην, ὄντινα Βῆσσοσ τῆς Παρθυαίων  
 σατράπην κατέστησε, καὶ τινας ἄλλους τῶν τότε  
 2 ξὺν Βῆσσω ἀποστάντων. ἤκον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ  
 Ἐπόκιλλος καὶ Μελαμνίδας καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ τῶν  
 Θρακῶν στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης, οἳ τὰ τε  
 χρήματα (τὰ) ξὺν Μένητι πεμφθέντα καὶ τοὺς  
 ξυμμάχους ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν κατήγαγον. καὶ  
 Ἄσανδρος δὲ ἐν τούτῳ ἤκεν καὶ Νέαρχος, στρατιὰν  
 Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων ἄγοντες, καὶ †Βῆσσός τε ὁ

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ravaged the country and killed the barbarians who had taken refuge in the forts, because they too were reported to have joined in the attack on the Macedonians. He traversed the entire country the river Polytimetus [Zeravshan] waters; at the very point where the stream disappears there is nothing but desert: the stream, though it carries much water, disappears into the sand. Other rivers, though great and perennial, disappear there in the same way; the Epardus, which runs through the Mardian country, the Areius, which gives its name to the country Areia, and the Etymandrus, which runs through the country of the Euergetae. All these rivers are so great that none is inferior to the Peneius, the river of Thessaly which runs through Tempe and then discharges into the sea; the Polytimetus is out of all comparison larger than the river Peneius.

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7. After Alexander had carried out these measures, he arrived at Zariaspa, and remained there till the depth of winter was past.<sup>1</sup> At this time Phrartaphernes the satrap of Parthyaëa came to him with Stasanor who had been sent to Areia to arrest Arsaces, bringing him in chains along with Brazanes, whom Bessus had made satrap of Parthyaëa, and others who had revolted with Bessus.<sup>2</sup> He was joined at the same time from the seacoast by Epocillus, Melamnidas and Ptolemaeus the commander of the Thracians who had escorted the treasure sent with Menes and the allies down to the sea. Asander and Nearchus also arrived at this time with a Greek mercenary force, as did 'Bessus', the satrap of Syria,

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<sup>1</sup> Winter 329/8 B.C. Zariaspa: App. VIII 13. Cf. QC. vii 10, 10 for his leaving Peucolaus with 3,000 men in Sogdiana.

<sup>2</sup> Ignored in QC., perhaps rightly, cf. 18, 3 n.

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- Συρίας σατράπης καὶ Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ ὑπαρχος,  
ἀπὸ θαλάσσης καὶ οὗτοι στρατιὰν ἄγοντες.
- 3 Ἐνθα δὴ ξύλλογον ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυναγαγῶν  
Ἀλέξανδρος παρήγαγεν ἐς αὐτοὺς Βῆσσον· καὶ  
κατηγορήσας τὴν Δαρείου προδοσίαν τὴν τε ῥῆνα  
Βήσσου ἀποτμηθῆναι καὶ τὰ ὦτα ἄκρα ἐκέλευσεν,  
αὐτὸν δὲ ἐς Ἐκβάτανα ἄγεσθαι, ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ  
Μήδων τε καὶ Περσῶν ξυλλόγῳ ἀποθανούμενον.
- 4 καὶ ἐγὼ οὔτε τὴν ἄγαν ταύτην τιμωρίαν Βήσσου  
ἐπαινῶ, ἀλλὰ βαρβαρικὴν εἶναι τίθεμαι τῶν ἀκρω-  
τηρίων τὴν λώβην καὶ ὑπαχθῆναι Ἀλέξανδρον  
ξύμφημι ἐς ζῆλον τοῦ Μηδικοῦ τε καὶ Περσικοῦ  
πλούτου καὶ τῆς κατὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους βασιλέας  
οὐκ ἴσης ἐς τοὺς ὑπηκόους ξυνδιαιτήσεως, ἐσθῆτά  
τε ὅτι Μηδικὴν ἀντὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς τε καὶ  
πατρίου Ἡρακλείδης ὧν μετέλαβεν, οὐδαμῆ  
ἐπαινῶ, καὶ τὴν κίταριν τὴν Περσικὴν τῶν νενι-  
κημένων ἀντὶ ὧν αὐτὸς ὁ νικῶν πάλαι ἐφόρει
- 5 ἀμεῖψαι οὐκ ἐπηδέσθη, οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπαινῶ, ἀλλ'  
εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου μεγάλα πράγ-  
ματα ἐς τεκμηρίωσιν τίθεμαι ὡς οὔτε τὸ σῶμα  
ὄτω εἶη καρτερόν, οὔτε ὅστις γένει ἐπιφανῆς, οὔτε

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<sup>8</sup> 'Bessus' is corrupt. QC. 10, 12 makes Asclepiodorus bring him 4,500 troops from Syria, while Antipater sends 8,000 Greeks, including 600 horse; these might be the men brought by the 'hyparch from the coast'; Schmieder proposed to substitute Asclepiodorus for 'Bessus' and Menes for Asclepiodorus, but while we must suppose that a scribe wrote 'Bessus' for some other name, because his mind was still preoccupied with the true Bessus of § 1, the additional error of transposition is less easy to accept. Bosworth, *CQ* 1975, would read 'Menon' (cf. iii 6, 8 n.); on his view of iii 16, 9 (see n.), Menes had replaced both Menon and Asclepiodorus in the

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and Asclepiodorus the hyparch from the coast, also bringing troops.<sup>3</sup>

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Then Alexander summoned a council of those present, brought Bessus before them, and accusing him of treachery towards Darius, commanded that his nose and ear-laps should be cut off, and that he should be taken to Ecbatana, to be put to death there in the assembly of Medes and Persians.<sup>4</sup> For my part, I do not approve of this excessive punishment of Bessus; I regard the mutilation of the extremities as barbaric, and I agree that Alexander was carried away into imitation of Median and Persian opulence and of the custom of barbarian kings not to countenance equality with subjects in their daily lives. Nor do I at all approve the facts that, though a descendant of Heracles, he substituted the dress of Medes for that traditional with Macedonians and that he exchanged the tiara of the Persians, whom he himself had conquered, for the head-dress he had long worn,<sup>5</sup> but I take it that nothing is clearer proof than Alexander's great successes of the truth that neither bodily strength in anyone nor distinction of birth nor

satrapies of north and south Syria, and they were freed to bring on troops he had raised to Al. But if this were right, both men should have been designated as former satraps and the circumscription of each should have been given. I should prefer to read 'Menes', even though this means that he did not stay long in his large province (which on my hypothesis embraced more than Syria), and to take 'hyparch' here to indicate Asclepiodorus' subordination to him; this is its proper sense, even though it is sometimes equivalent to satrap. QC. gives other details of the reinforcements, amounting to 19,400 foot and 2,600 horse.

<sup>4</sup> QC. vii 10, 10. For what follows to end of ch. 14 see App. XV.

<sup>5</sup> But cf. vii 29, 4.

κατὰ πόλεμον εἰ δὴ τις διευτυχοίη ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἄλέξανδρος, οὐδὲ εἰ τὴν Λιβύην τις πρὸς τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, καθάπερ οὖν ἐπενόει ἐκεῖνος, ἐκπεριπλεύσας κατάσχοι, οὐδὲ εἰ τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀσίᾳ τε καὶ Λιβύῃ τρίτην, τούτων πάντων οὐδέν τι ὄφελος ἐς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μὴ σωφρονεῖν ἐν ταύτῳ ὑπάρχοι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ τὰ μεγάλα, ὡς δοκεῖ, πράγματα πράξαντι.

8. Ἐνθα δὴ καὶ τὸ Κλείτου τοῦ Δρωπίδου πάθημα καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπ' αὐτῷ συμφορὰν, εἰ καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐπράχθη, οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ ἀφηγήσομαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ ἡμέραν ἱερὰν τοῦ Διονύσου Μακεδόσι καὶ θύειν Διονύσῳ ὅσα ἔτη ἐν αὐτῇ Ἀλέξανδρον· τὸν δὲ τοῦ Διονύσου μὲν ἐν τῷ τότε ἀμελήσαι λέγουσι, Διοσκούροι δὲ θῦσαι, ἐξ ὅτου δὴ ἐπιφρασθέντα τοῖν Διοσκούροι τὴν θυσίαν· πόρρω δὲ τοῦ πότου προϊόντος (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν πότων ἤδη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον νενεωτέριστο) ἀλλ' ἐν γε τῷ πότῳ τότε ὑπὲρ τοῖν Διοσκούροι λόγους γίνεσθαι, ὅπως ἐς Δία ἀνηνέχθη αὐτοῖν ἡ γένεσις ἀφαιρεθεῖσα Τυνδάρεω.  
 2 αὐτῆς καὶ τινος τῶν παρόντων κολακείᾳ τῇ Ἀλεξάνδρου,  
 3 οἳ δὴ ἄνδρες διέφθειράν τε αἰεὶ καὶ οὔποτε παύσονται ἐπιτρίβοντες τὰ τῶν αἰεὶ βασιλέων πράγματα, κατ' οὐδέν ἀξιούν συμβάλλειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τε καὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργοις τὸν Πολυδεύκην καὶ τὸν Κάστορα. οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἀπείχοντο ἐν τῷ πότῳ· ἀλλὰ τὸν φθόνον γὰρ ἐμποδῶν ἴστασθαι τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ μὴ οὐ τὰς δικαίας τιμὰς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ξυνόντων γίνεσθαι.

<sup>1</sup> Chronologically this comes after 16, 3.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 7. 5-8. 3

continuous good fortune in war, greater even than Alexander's—no matter if a man were to sail out right round Libya as well as Asia and subdue them, as Alexander actually thought of doing, or were to make Europe, with Asia and Libya, a third part of his empire—that not one of all these things is any contribution to man's happiness, unless the man whose achievements are apparently so great were to possess at the same time command of his own passions.

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8. At this point it will be the moment for me to relate the tragedy of Clitus son of Dropides and the suffering it caused to Alexander, even though it actually occurred later.<sup>1</sup> The story goes as follows. The Macedonians kept a day sacred to Dionysus and Alexander sacrificed to him yearly on that day; only on this particular occasion he neglected Dionysus but sacrificed to the Dioscuri; some reason had made him think of sacrificing to them. The drinking was prolonged (and, in fact, Alexander had already taken to new and more barbaric ways in drinking), and in the course of the drinking-bout talk occurred about the Dioscuri and how Tyndareus was robbed of their fatherhood which was now referred to Zeus. Some of the company (that type of men who have always and will always continue to injure the interests of kings)<sup>2</sup> out of flattery to Alexander claimed that there was no comparison between Castor and Pollux and Alexander and Alexander's achievements. In the bout others did not even leave Heracles untouched; it was only envy, they said, which stood in the way of living men and kept them from receiving their due honours from their fellows.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. ii 6, 4 and 6; vii 12, 5; 29, 1.



## ARRIAN

- 4 Κλείτον δὲ δῆλον μὲν εἶναι πάλαι ἤδη ἀχθόμενον  
 τοῦ τε Ἀλεξάνδρου τῇ ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον  
 μετακινήσει καὶ τῶν κολακευόντων αὐτὸν τοῖς  
 λόγοις· τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου παρ-  
 οξυνόμενον οὐκ ἔαν οὔτε ἐς τὸ θεῖον ὑβρίζειν, οὔτε  
 [ἐς] τὰ τῶν πάλαι ἡρώων ἔργα ἐκφραυλίζοντας  
 χάριν ταύτην ἄχαριν προστιθέναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.
- 5 εἶναι γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου οὕτω τι μεγάλα  
 καὶ θαυμαστά ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ἐπαίρουσιν· οὔκουν  
 μόνον καταπράξει αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ γὰρ μέρος  
 Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον  
 ἀνιᾶσαι Ἀλέξανδρον λεχθέντα. οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ  
 τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὸν γὰρ εἶναι τίθεμαι ἐν τοιαῦδε  
 παροιμία τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν σιγῶντα ἔχειν μηδὲ τὰ
- 6 αὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐς κολακείαν πλημμελεῖν. ὡς δὲ  
 καὶ τῶν Φιλίππου τινὲς ἔργων, ὅτι οὐ μεγάλα οὐδὲ  
 θαυμαστά Φιλίππῳ καταπράχθη, οὐδεμιᾶ ξὺν δίκῃ  
 ἐπεμνήσθησαν, χαριζόμενοι καὶ οὗτοι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ,  
 τὸν Κλείτον ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα πρεσβεύειν  
 μὲν τὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καταβάλλειν δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον  
 τε καὶ τὰ τούτου ἔργα, παροινούντα ἤδη τὸν  
 Κλείτον, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ πολὺν εἶναι ἐξονειδίζοντα  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἐσώθη, ὅποτε ἢ  
 ἵππομαχία ἢ ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ ξυνειστήκει πρὸς Πέρσας·
- 7 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν τὴν αὐτοῦ σοβαρῶς ἀνατεί-  
 ναντα, αὕτη σε ἢ χεῖρ, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἐν τῷ  
 τότε ἔσωσε. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκέτι φέρειν τοῦ  
 Κλείτου τὴν παροιμίαν τε καὶ ὑβριν, ἀλλὰ ἀναπηδᾶν  
 γὰρ ξὺν ὀργῇ ἐπ' αὐτόν, κατέχεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν  
 ξυμπινόντων. Κλείτον δὲ οὐκ ἀνιέναι ὑβρίζοντα.
- 8 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐβόα ἄρα καλῶν τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς·  
 οὐδενὸς δὲ ὑπακούοντος ἐς ταῦτα ἔφη καθεστη-

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 8. 4-8

Clitus, however, had made it plain for some time past that he was aggrieved both by Alexander's change-over to the more barbaric style and by the expressions of his flatterers; and now under the stimulus of wine he would not let them show disrespect for the divine power, or belittle the deeds of the heroes of old, to do Alexander a favour that was none. Nor in his view were Alexander's achievements so great and wonderful as they cried them up to be; and Alexander had not achieved them by himself, but they were in great part Macedonian achievements. Alexander was deeply hurt by his words. Nor do I approve them; I think it enough, amid such drunkenness, for a man to keep his own views to himself without committing the same errors of flattery as the rest. But when some even referred to Philip's achievements, quite unjustly suggesting that his achievements were not great or remarkable, again trying to gratify Alexander, Clitus could no longer control himself but spoke up in favour of Philip's achievements, making little of Alexander and his; he was now heated with wine and heaped reproaches on Alexander; after all Alexander owed his life to him, when the cavalry battle on the Granicus had been joined with the Persians; what is more, he actually raised his right hand with an insolent gesture and cried, 'This very hand, Alexander, saved you then!'<sup>3</sup> Alexander could no longer bear Clitus' drunken arrogance and leapt up in anger to strike him, but was held back by his fellow drinkers. Still Clitus did not restrain his insults and Alexander shouted out for the hypaspists; but as no one obeyed,

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. i 15, 8.

κέναι Δαρείω, ὅποτε πρὸς Βῆσσου τε καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ Βῆσσον ξυλληφθεὶς ἤγετο οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ ὄνομα ὦν βασιλέως. οὐκ οἶους τε εἶναι κατέχειν αὐτὸν τοὺς ἐταίρους, ἀλλ' ἀναπηδήσαντα γὰρ οἱ μὲν λόγχην ἀρπάσαι λέγουσι τῶν σωματοφυλάκων  
 9 τινὸς καὶ ταύτῃ παίσαντα Κλεῖτον ἀποκτεῖναι, οἱ δὲ σάρισσαν παρὰ τῶν φυλάκων τινὸς [καὶ ταύτῃ].<sup>1</sup> Ἄριστόβουλος δὲ ὅθεν μὲν ἢ παροινία ὠρμήθη οὐ λέγει, Κλεῖτου δὲ γενέσθαι μόνου τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, ὃν γε ὠργισμένου Ἄλεξάνδρου καὶ ἀναπηδήσαντος ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὡς διαχρησομένου ἀπαχθῆναι μὲν διὰ θυρῶν ἔξω ὑπὲρ τὸ τεῖχος τε καὶ τὴν τάφρον τῆς ἄκρας, ἵνα ἐγίνετο, πρὸς Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Λάγου τοῦ σωματοφύλακος· οὐ καρτερήσαντα δὲ ἀναστρέψαι αὐθις καὶ περιπετῇ Ἄλεξάνδρῳ γενέσθαι Κλεῖτον ἀνακαλοῦντι, καὶ φάναι ὅτι· οὗτός τοι ἐγὼ ὁ Κλεῖτος, ὦ Ἄλέξανδρε· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πληγέντα τῇ σαρίσση ἀποθανεῖν.

9. Καὶ ἐγὼ Κλεῖτον μὲν τῆς ὕβρεως τῆς ἐς τὸν βασιλέα τὸν αὐτοῦ μεγαλωστὶ μέμφομαι· Ἄλεξάνδρον δὲ τῆς συμφορᾶς οἰκτείρω, ὅτι δυοῖν κακοῖν ἐν τῷ τότε ἠττημένον ἐπέδειξεν αὐτόν, ὑφ' ὅτων δὴ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐκ ἐπέοικεν ἄνδρα σωφρονοῦντα  
 2 ἐξηττᾶσθαι, ὀργῆς τε καὶ παροινίας. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε αὐτῷ ἐπαινῶ Ἄλεξάνδρου, ὅτι παραυτίκα ἔγνω σχέτλιον ἔργον ἐργασάμενος. καὶ λέγουσιν εἰσὶν οἱ [τὰ Ἄλεξάνδρου] ὅτι ἐρείσας τὴν σάρισσαν πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον ἐπιπίπτειν ἐγνώκει αὐτῇ, ὡς οὐ καλὸν  
 3 αὐτῷ ζῆν ἀποκτείναντι φίλον αὐτοῦ ἐν οἴνῳ. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ ξυγγραφεῖς τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσιν,

<sup>1</sup> Deleted by Castiglioni.

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he cried that he had come to the same pass as Darius, when he was led prisoner by Bessus and his confederates, and that he had nothing now left but the name of king. No longer could the Companions hold him back; he leapt up and, as some say, snatched a spear from one of the bodyguards and struck Clitus a mortal blow with it; according to others, it was a long pike from one of the guards he used. But Aristobulus, while not telling the origin of this drinking bout, holds that the entire fault lay with Clitus, since when Alexander leapt up in passion to kill him, Clitus was hurried away outside through the doors over the wall and ditch of the citadel (where all this happened) by Ptolemy son of Lagus, one of the bodyguards, but could not control himself, and turned back; he met with Alexander just as Alexander was calling out 'Clitus!' and cried, 'Here I am, Clitus, Alexander!' and there and then was struck with the pike and died.

9. I myself strongly blame Clitus for his insolence towards his king, and pity Alexander for his misfortune, since he then showed himself the slave of two vices, by neither of which is it fitting for a man of sense to be overcome, namely, anger and drunkenness. But for the sequel I commend Alexander, in that he immediately recognized the savagery of his action. Some say that Alexander leaned the pike against the wall, intending to fall upon it himself, as it was not honourable for him to live after killing a friend in his cups. But most historians have a different story:

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ἀπελθόντα δὲ εἰς τὴν εὐνὴν κείσθαι ὀδυρόμενον, αὐτόν τε τὸν Κλείτον ὀνομαστί ἀνακαλοῦντα καὶ τὴν Κλείτου μὲν ἀδελφὴν, αὐτόν δὲ ἀναθρεψαμένην, Λανίκην τὴν Δρωπίδου παῖδα, ὡς καλὰ ἄρα αὐτῇ  
 4 τροφεῖα ἀποτετικῶς εἶη ἀνδρωθεῖς, ἣ γε τοὺς μὲν παῖδας τοὺς ἑαυτῆς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μαχομένους ἐπέιδεν ἀποθανόντας, τὸν ἀδελφὸν δὲ αὐτῆς αὐτὸς αὐτοχειρία ἔκτεινε· φονέα τε τῶν φίλων οὐ διαλείπειν αὐτόν ἀνακαλοῦντα, ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον καρτερεῖν ἔστε ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην θεραπείαν θεραπεῦσαι τὸ σῶμα.

5 Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τῶν μάντεών τινες μῆνιν ἐκ Διονύσου ἤδον, ὅτι ἡ θυσία ἐξελείφθη Ἄλεξάνδρῳ ἢ τοῦ Διονύσου. καὶ Ἄλέξανδρος μόγις πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων πεισθεὶς σίτου τε ἤψατο καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἐθεράπευσε· καὶ τῷ Διονύσῳ τὴν θυσίαν ἀπέδωκεν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἄκοντι ἦν εἰς μῆνιν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλλον τι ἢ τὴν αὐτοῦ κακότητα ἀναφέρεσθαι  
 6 τὴν ξυμφοράν. ταῦτα μεγαλωστί ἐπαινῶ Ἄλεξάνδρου, τὸ μήτε ἀπαυθαδιάσασθαι ἐπὶ κακῷ, μήτε προστάτην τε καὶ ξυνήγορον κακίονα ἔτι γενέσθαι τοῦ ἀμαρτηθέντος, ἀλλὰ ξυμφῆσαι γὰρ ἐπταικέναι ἄνθρωπόν γε ὄντα.

7 Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λέγουσιν Ἀνάξαρχον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐλθεῖν μὲν παρ' Ἄλεξάνδρου κληθέντα, ὡς παραμυθησόμενον· εὐρόντα δὲ κείμενον καὶ ἐπιστένοντα, ἀγνοεῖν, φάναι ἐπιγελάσαντα, διότι ἐπὶ τῷδε οἱ πάλαι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον τῷ Διὶ ἐποίησαν ὡς ὅ τι ἂν πρὸς τοῦ Διὸς κυρωθῆ, τοῦτο ξὺν δίκῃ πεπραγμένον. καὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἐκ βασιλέως μεγάλου γιγνόμενα δίκαια χρῆναι νομίζεσθαι, πρῶτα μὲν πρὸς αὐτοῦ βασιλέως, ἔπειτα

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they say that Alexander took to his bed and lay there mourning, crying out the name of Clitus and of Clitus' sister, Lanice,<sup>1</sup> daughter of Dropides, who had nursed him: what a fine return for her nursing had he given her, now that he was a man! She had seen her sons die fighting for him, and now with his own hand he had killed her brother. He kept again and again calling himself the murderer of his friends, refused firmly all food or drink for three days, and neglected all other bodily needs. 4

In these circumstances some of the prophets 'sang the wrath' of Dionysus, because Alexander had neglected the sacrifice to him. With some difficulty Alexander was persuaded by his friends to eat, and take some slight care of his person; and he paid the due sacrifice to Dionysus, since it was not uncongenial to him that the disaster should be referred to divine wrath rather than to his own evil nature. In this I highly commend Alexander; he did not brazen out his evil act, nor degenerate further by becoming champion and advocate of his error; he admitted that he had erred, as a man may.<sup>2</sup> 5 6

Some say that Anaxarchus the Sophist<sup>3</sup> came by summons to Alexander to offer consolation, and finding him groaning on his bed, laughed at him and said that he had not learnt why the old philosophers made Justice sit by the throne of Zeus, because whatever is determined by Zeus is done with Justice; so too the acts of a great King should be held just, first by the king himself and then by the rest of man- 7

<sup>1</sup> Hellanicæ .QC. viii 1, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. vii 29, 2.

<sup>3</sup> For his life and works see Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* no. 72. Here and in ch. 11 he may be translated.

## ARRIAN

8 πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. ταῦτα εἰπόντα παρα-  
 μυθήσασθαι μὲν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν τῷ τότε, κακὸν δὲ  
 μέγα, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐξεργάσασθαι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ  
 μείζον ἔτι ἢ ὅτῳ τότε ξυνείχετο, εἴπερ οὖν σοφοῦ  
 ἀνδρὸς τήνδε ἔγνω τὴν δόξαν, ὡς οὐ τὰ δίκαια ἄρα  
 χρή σπουδῇ ἐπιλεγόμενον πράττειν τὸν βασιλέα,  
 ἀλλὰ ὅ τι ἂν καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἐκ βασιλέως πραχθῆ,  
 9 τοῦτο δίκαιον νομίζειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ προσκυνεῖσθαι  
 ἐθέλειν Ἀλέξανδρον λόγος κατέχει, ὑπούσης μὲν  
 αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς ἀμφὶ τοῦ Ἀμμωνος πατρὸς μᾶλλον τι  
 ἢ Φιλίππου δόξης, θαυμάζοντα δὲ ἤδη τὰ Περσῶν  
 καὶ Μήδων τῆς τε ἐσθῆτος τῇ ἀμείψει καὶ τῆς  
 ἄλλης θεραπείας τῇ μετακοσμήσει. οὐκ ἐνδεῆσαι  
 δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτῷ τοὺς κολακεία ἐς αὐτὸ  
 ἐνδιδόντας, ἄλλους τέ τινας καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν σοφι-  
 στῶν τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν Ἀνάξαρχόν τε καὶ Ἄγιν  
 Ἀργεῖον, ἐποποιόν.

10. Καλλισθένην δὲ τὸν Ὀλύμπιον Ἀριστοτέλους  
 τε τῶν λόγων διακηκοότα καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὄντα  
 ὑπαγροικότερον οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν ταῦτα. τούτου μὲν  
 δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ αὐτὸς Καλλισθένει ξυμφέρομαι, ἐκεῖνα  
 δὲ οὐκέτι ἐπιεικῇ δοκῶ τοῦ Καλλισθένους, εἴπερ  
 ἀληθῆ ξυγγέγραπται, ὅτι ὑφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀπέφαινε  
 καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ξυγγραφῇ Ἀλέξανδρόν τε καὶ τὰ  
 2 Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα, οὐκ οὖν αὐτὸς ἀφῖχθαι ἐξ Ἀλε-  
 ξάνδρου δόξαν κτησόμενος, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνον εὐκλεᾶ ἐς  
 ἀνθρώπους ποιήσων· καὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ θείου τὴν  
 μετουσίαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν Ὀλυμπίας ὑπὲρ  
 τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ ψεύδεται ἀνηρτηῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐξ  
 ὧν ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου ξυγγράψας ἐξενέγκη  
 3 ἐς ἀνθρώπους. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τάδε ἀνέγραψαν, ὡς  
 ἄρα ἤρετο αὐτόν ποτε Φιλώτας ὄντινα οἶοιτο



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kind. These words are said to have consoled Alexander 8  
 for the time, but I say that he did Alexander even 328  
 greater harm than the affliction he then suffered from, B.C.  
 if indeed he gave this opinion as that of a sage, that  
 the duty of the king is not to act justly after earnest  
 consideration, but that anything done by a king in 9  
 any form is to be accounted just. The fact is that the  
 report prevails that Alexander desired people actually  
 to do him obeisance, from the underlying idea that  
 his father was Ammon and not Philip,<sup>4</sup> and as he was  
 now expressing his admiration for the ways of the  
 Persians and Medes, both in his change of dress and  
 in addition by the altered arrangements for his  
 attendance, and that even as to obeisance there was  
 no lack of flatterers to give him his wish, among whom  
 the most prominent were Anaxarchus and Agis of  
 Argos, an epic poet, two of the sophists at his court.

10. It is said that Callisthenes of Olynthus, a past  
 pupil of Aristotle, and with something of the boor in  
 his character, did not approve of this, and here I my-  
 self agree with Callisthenes; on the other hand I  
 think Callisthenes went beyond reason, if the record  
 is true, in declaring that Alexander and his exploits 2  
 depended on him and his history; it was not he who  
 had come to win fame from Alexander, but it would  
 be his work to make Alexander renowned among  
 men; and again, that Alexander's share in divinity  
 did not depend on Olympias' invention about his  
 birth, but on the account he would write and publish  
 in Alexander's interest. Some too have recorded 3  
 that Philotas once asked him whom he thought to be

<sup>4</sup> App. V. Cf. vii 29, 3; 30, 2.

## ARRIAN

- μάλιστα τιμηθῆναι πρὸς τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· τὸν δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα, ὅτι τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν τυράννοιον ἔκτειναν καὶ τυραν-  
 4 νίδα ὅτι κατέλυσαν. ἐρέσθαι δὲ αὖθις τὸν Φιλώταν εἰ τῷ τύραννον κτείναντι ὑπάρχοι παρ' οὐστίνας ἐθέλει τῶν Ἑλλήνων φυγόντα σώζεσθαι· καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι αὖθις Καλλισθένην, εἰ καὶ μὴ παρ' ἄλλους, παρά γε Ἀθηναίους ὅτι φυγόντι ὑπάρχοι σώζεσθαι. τούτους γὰρ καὶ πρὸς Εὐρυσθέα πολε-  
 μῆσαι ὑπὲρ τῶν παίδων τῶν Ἡρακλέους, τυραν-  
 νοῦντα ἐν τῷ τότε τῆς Ἑλλάδος.
- 5 Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς προσκυνήσεως ὅπως ἦναντιώθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ τοιόσδε κατέχει λόγος. ξυγκεῖ-  
 σθαι μὲν γὰρ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστάς τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων τοὺς δοκιμωτάτους μνήμην τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε ἐν πότῳ  
 6 ἐμβαλεῖν· ἄρξαι δὲ τοῦ λόγου Ἀνάξαρχον, ὡς πολὺ δικαιότερον ἂν θεὸν νομιζόμενον Ἀλέξανδρον Διονύσου τε καὶ Ἡρακλέους, μὴ ὅτι τῶν ἔργων ἔνεκα ὅσα καὶ ἡλίκα καταπέπρακται Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι Διόνυσος μὲν Θηβαῖος ἦν, οὐδέν τι προσήκων Μακεδόσι, καὶ Ἡρακλῆς Ἀργεῖος, οὐδὲ οὗτος προσήκων ὅτι μὴ κατὰ γένος τὸ Ἀλε-  
 ξάνδρου· Ἡρακλείδην γὰρ εἶναι Ἀλέξανδρον·  
 7 Μακεδόνας δὲ ἂν τὸν σφῶν βασιλέα δικαιότερον θείαις τιμαῖς κοσμοῦντας. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι ἀμφίλογον ὅτι ἀπελθόντα γε ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ὡς θεὸν τιμήσουσι· πόσω δὴ δικαιότερον ζῶντα

<sup>1</sup> The two joint tyrants were Hippias and his brother Hipparchus. By killing Hipparchus only, Harmodius and Aristogiton did not destroy the tyranny, but in fact caused Hippias to become a severe despot.

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held in highest honour by the Athenians; and he replied, Harmodius and Aristogiton, because they slew one of the two tyrants, and destroyed the tyranny,<sup>1</sup> and that when Philotas asked him again if a tyrannicide could find a safe refuge among any of the Greeks he wished, Callisthenes again answered that he would find a safe refuge in Athens at least; the Athenians had even fought on behalf of the children of Heracles against Eurystheus, who was tyrant then over Greece.

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As to Callisthenes' opposition to Alexander regarding obeisance, the following story is also prevalent. It had been agreed between Alexander and the Sophists and the most illustrious of the Persians and Medes at his court that mention of this topic should be introduced at a wine-party.<sup>2</sup> Anaxarchus began the subject, saying that it would be far more just to reckon Alexander a god than Dionysus and Heracles, not so much because of the magnitude and nature of Alexander's achievements, but also because Dionysus was a Theban, and had no connection with Macedon, and Heracles an Argive, also unconnected with Macedon, except for Alexander's family, for he was descended from Heracles; but that Macedonians in their turn would be more justified in paying the respect of divine honours to their own king; in any case there was no doubt that when Alexander had departed from men they would honour him as a god; how much more just, then, that they should give him his due in life rather than

<sup>2</sup> This story, though surely false, may reflect early controversies on the propriety of deifying Al. QC. viii 5, 8 substitutes the poets Agis and Cleo for Anaxarchus. Besides App. XIV see App. IV.

γεραίρειν ἤπερ τελευτήσαντα ἐς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῷ τιμωμένῳ.

11. Λεχθέντων δὲ τούτων τε καὶ τοιούτων λόγων πρὸς Ἀναξάρχου τοὺς μὲν μετεσχηκότας τῆς βουλῆς ἐπαιεῖν τὸν λόγον καὶ δὴ ἐθέλειν ἄρχεσθαι τῆς προσκυνήσεως, τοὺς Μακεδόνας δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀχθομένους τῷ λόγῳ σιγῇ ἔχειν.
- 2 Καλλισθένην δὲ ὑπολαβόντα, Ἀλέξανδρον μὲν, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Ἀνάξαρχε, οὐδεμιᾶς ἀνάξιον ἀποφαίνω τιμῆς ὅσαι ξύμμετροι ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ διακεκρίσθαι γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσαι τε ἀνθρώπινα τιμαὶ καὶ ὅσαι θεῖαι πολλοῖς μὲν καὶ ἄλλοις, καθάπερ ναῶν τε οἰκοδομήσει καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἀναστάσει καὶ τεμένη ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξαιρεῖται καὶ θύεται ἐκείνοις καὶ σπένδεται, καὶ ὕμνοι μὲν ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς ποιοῦνται, ἔπαινοι δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους—ἀτὰρ οὐχ ἦκιστα τῷ τῆς
- 3 προσκυνήσεως νόμῳ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους φιλεῖσθαι πρὸς τῶν ἀσπαζομένων, τὸ θεῖον δέ, ὅτι ἄνω που ἰδρυμένον καὶ οὐδὲ ψαῦσαι αὐτοῦ θέμις, ἐπὶ τῷδε ἄρα τῇ προσκυνήσει γεραίρεται, καὶ χοροὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἴστανται καὶ παιᾶνες ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄδονται. καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, ὅποτε γε καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν ἄλλοις ἄλλαι τιμαὶ πρόσκεινται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία ἦρωσιν ἄλλαι, καὶ αὗται ἀποκεκρι-
- 4 μέναι τοῦ θείου. οὐκ οὐκ εἰκὸς ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ἀναταράσσοντας τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐς σχῆμα ὑπέρογκον καθιστάναι τῶν τιμῶν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς, τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ τό γε ἐπὶ σφίσις ἐς ταπεινότητα οὐ πρέπουσαν καταβάλλειν τὰ ἴσα ἀνθρώποις τιμῶντας. οὐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀνασχέσθαι ἄν, εἰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τις εἰσποιοῖτο ταῖς βασιλικαῖς τιμαῖς
- 5 χειροτονία ἢ ψήφῳ οὐ δικαία. πολὺ ἂν οὖν

when he was dead and the honour would profit him nothing.

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11. When Anaxarchus had said this and the like, those who shared in the scheme approved his argument and were actually ready to begin doing obeisance, but the Macedonians for the most part were opposed to it, though silent. Callisthenes broke in and said: 'Anaxarchus, I declare Alexander unworthy of no honour appropriate for a man; but we have used numerous ways of distinguishing all the honours which are appropriate for men and for gods; thus we build temples and erect images and set aside precincts for the gods, and we offer them sacrifices and libations and compose hymns to them, while eulogies are for men; but the most important distinction concerns the matter of obeisance. At greeting men receive a kiss, but what is divine, I suppose because it is seated above us and we are forbidden even to touch it, is for that very reason honoured by obeisance; dances, too, are held for the gods, and paeans sung in their praise. In this distinction there is nothing surprising, since among the gods themselves all are not honoured in the same way; and what is more, there are different honours for the heroes, distinct again from those paid to gods. It is not, therefore, proper to confuse all this, by raising mortals to extravagant proportions by excesses of honour, while bringing the gods, as far as men can, down to a demeaning and unfitting level by honouring them in the same way as men. So Alexander himself would not endure it for a moment, if some private person were to thrust himself into the royal honours by unjust election or vote, and the gods would have

δικαιότερον τοὺς θεοὺς δυσχεραίνειν ὅσοι ἄνθρωποι  
 εἰς τὰς θείας τιμὰς σφᾶς εἰσποιοῦσιν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλων  
 εἰσποιοῦμενοι ἀνέχονται. Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ πόρρω  
 τοῦ ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸν ἄριστον εἶναί τε καὶ  
 δοκεῖν, καὶ βασιλέων τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ στρα-  
 6 τηγῶν τὸν ἀξιοστρατηγώτατον. καὶ σέ, εἴπερ τινὰ  
 ἄλλον, ὦ Ἀνάξαρχε, εἰσηγητὴν τε τούτων τῶν  
 λόγων ἐχρῆν γίνεσθαι καὶ κωλυτὴν τῶν ἐναντίων,  
 ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδεύσει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ξυνόντα.  
 οὐκ οὐκ ἄρχειν γε τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου πρέπον ἦν, ἀλλὰ  
 μεμνησθαι γὰρ οὐ Καμβύση οὐδὲ Ξέρξη ξυνόντα ἢ  
 συμβουλεύοντα, ἀλλὰ Φιλίππου μὲν παιδί, Ἡρα-  
 κλείδῃ δὲ ἀπὸ γένους καὶ Αἰακίδῃ, ὅτου οἱ  
 πρόγονοι ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδὲ  
 βία, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν.  
 7 οὐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ζῶντι ἔτι θεῖαι  
 τιμαὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τελευ-  
 τήσαντι πρόσθεν ἢ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ εἰς Δελφοῖς  
 ἐπιθεσπισθῆναι ὡς θεὸν τιμᾶν Ἡρακλέα. εἰ δέ,  
 ὅτι ἐν τῇ βαρβάρῳ γῇ οἱ λόγοι γίνονται, βαρβα-  
 ρικὰ χρὴ ἔχειν τὰ φρονήματα, καὶ ἐγὼ τῆς Ἑλ-  
 λάδος μεμνησθαί σε ἀξιῶ, ὦ Αλέξανδρε, ἧς ἔνεκα  
 ὁ πᾶς στόλος σοι ἐγένετο, προσθεῖναι τὴν Ἀσίαν τῇ  
 8 Ἑλλάδι. καὶ οὖν ἐνθυμήθητι, ἐκεῖσε ἐπανελθὼν  
 ἀρά γε καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας τοὺς ἐλευθερωτάτους  
 προσαναγκάσεις εἰς τὴν προσκύνησιν, ἢ Ἑλλήνων  
 μὲν ἀφέξῃ, Μακεδόσι δὲ προσθήσεις τήνδε τὴν  
 ἀτιμίαν, ἢ διακεκριμένα ἔσται σοι αὐτῷ τὰ τῶν  
 τιμῶν εἰς ἅπαν, ὡς πρὸς Ἑλλήνων μὲν καὶ Μακε-  
 δόνων ἀνθρωπίνως τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς τιμᾶσθαι,  
 9 πρὸς δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων μόνων βαρβαρικῶς; εἰ δὲ  
 ὑπὲρ Κύρου τοῦ Καμβύσου λέγεται πρῶτον προσ-



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far better cause to be displeased with any men who thrust themselves or permit others to thrust them into divine honours. Alexander both is and is thought to be above all measure the bravest of the brave, most kingly of kings, most worthy to command of all commanders. As for you, Anaxarchus, you above all should have expounded these arguments and stopped those on the other side, as you are attending on Alexander as philosopher and instructor. It was improper for you to take the lead in this topic; you should rather have remembered that you are not attending nor advising a Cambyses<sup>1</sup> or Xerxes, but a son of Philip, a descendant of Heracles and of Aeacus, whose forefathers came from Argos to Macedonia, and have continued to rule the Macedonians not by force but in accordance with custom. Even Heracles himself did not receive divine honours from the Greeks in his own lifetime, nor even after his death till the god of Delphi gave his sanction to honouring him as a god. If, however, we must think like barbarians, as we are speaking in their country, even so I appeal personally to you, Alexander, to remember Greece, on whose behalf you made your whole expedition, to annex Asia to Greece. Consider this too; when you return there, will you actually compel the Greeks as well, the freest of mankind, to do you obeisance, or will you keep away from the Greeks, but put this dishonour on the Macedonians, or will you yourself make a distinction once for all in this matter of honours and receive from Greeks and Macedonians honours of a human and Greek style, and barbarian honours only from barbarians? But if it is said of Cyrus son of Cambyses that he was the

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<sup>1</sup> King of Persia 528-522 B.C.



## ARRIAN

κυνηθῆναι ἀνθρώπων Κῦρον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐμ-  
 μῆναι Πέρσαις τε καὶ Μήδοις τήνδε τὴν ταπεινό-  
 τητα, χρὴ ἐνθυμείσθαι ὅτι τὸν Κῦρον ἐκεῖνον  
 Σκύθαι ἐσωφρόνισαν, πένητες ἄνδρες καὶ αὐτό-  
 νομοι, καὶ Δαρεῖον ἄλλοι αὖ Σκύθαι, καὶ Ξέρξην  
 Ἄθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ Ἀρτοξέρξην  
 Κλέαρχος καὶ Ξενοφῶν καὶ οἱ ξὺν τούτοις μύριοι,  
 καὶ Δαρεῖον τοῦτον Ἀλέξανδρος μὴ προσκυνού-  
 μενος.

12. Ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἰπόντα Καλλισθένην  
 ἀνιᾶσαι μὲν μεγαλωστί Ἀλέξανδρον, Μακεδόσι δὲ  
 πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν. καὶ τοῦτο γνόντα Ἀλέξανδρον  
 πέμψαντα κωλύσαι Μακεδόνας <sup>1</sup> μεμνήσθαι ἔτι τῆς  
<sup>2</sup> προσκυνήσεως. ἀλλὰ σιγῆς γὰρ γενομένης ἐπὶ  
 τοῖς λόγοις ἀναστάντας Περσῶν τοὺς πρεσβυτά-  
 τους ἐφεξῆς προσκυνεῖν. Λεοννάτον δέ, ἓνα τῶν  
 ἐταίρων, ἐπειδὴ τις ἐδόκει τῶν Περσῶν αὐτῷ οὐκ  
 ἐν κόσμῳ προσκυνῆσαι, τὸν δὲ ἐπιγελάσαι τῷ  
 σχήματι τοῦ Περσοῦ ὡς ταπεινῷ· καὶ τούτῳ  
 χαλεπήναντα τότε Ἀλέξανδρον ξυναλλαγῆναι αὐθις.  
<sup>3</sup> ἀναγέγραπται δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦσδε λόγος. προπίνειν  
 φιάλην χρυσῆν ἐν κύκλῳ Ἀλέξανδρον πρώτοις μὲν  
 τούτοις πρὸς οὔστινας ξυνέκειτο αὐτῷ τὰ τῆς  
 προσκυνήσεως, τὸν δὲ πρῶτον ἐκπιόντα τὴν φιάλην  
 προσκυνῆσαί τε ἀναστάντα καὶ φιληθῆναι πρὸς  
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐφεξῆς διὰ πάντων χωρῆσαι.  
<sup>4</sup> ὡς δὲ ἐς Καλλισθένην ἦκεν ἡ πρόποσις, ἀναστῆναι  
 μὲν Καλλισθένην καὶ ἐκπιεῖν τὴν φιάλην, καὶ  
 προσελθόντα ἐθέλειν φιλῆσαι οὐ προσκυνήσαντα.  
 τὸν δὲ τυχεῖν μὲν τότε διαλεγόμενον Ἡφαιστίωνι·

<sup>1</sup> Roos bracketed this word.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 11. 9-12. 4

first of men to receive obeisance and that therefore this humiliation became traditional with Persians and Medes, you must remember that this very Cyrus was brought to his senses by Scythians, a people poor but free, Darius too by other Scythians,<sup>2</sup> Xerxes by Athenians and Lacedaemonians,<sup>3</sup> and Artaxerxes by Clearchus, Xenophon and their Ten Thousand,<sup>4</sup> and Darius by Alexander here, who does not receive obeisance.'

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12. By these and the like words Callisthenes greatly provoked Alexander, but pleased the Macedonians, and realizing this, Alexander sent and told the Macedonians to think no more of obeisance. When, however, a silence fell after these words, the senior Persians arose and did obeisance one by one. Leonatus, one of the Companions, thinking that one of the Persians made his obeisance ungracefully, mocked his posture as abject; Alexander was angry with him at the time, though reconciled later. The following story has also been recorded. Alexander sent round a loving cup of gold, first to those with whom he had made an agreement about obeisance; the first who drank from it rose, did obeisance, and received a kiss from Alexander, and this went round all in turn. But when the pledge came to Callisthenes, he rose, drank from the cup, went up to Alexander and made to kiss him without having done obeisance. At the moment Alexander was talking to Hephaestion, and therefore was not attending to see

<sup>2</sup> For the defeat and death of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire, in 529 B.C. by the Scythian Massagetae see Herodotus i 208-214; for the defeat of Darius I by the European Scythians c. 513 B.C., ib. iv 1, 83-142.

<sup>3</sup> 480-479 B.C.

<sup>4</sup> 401-400 B.C.

## ARRIAN

οὐκ οὐκ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῆς προσκυ-  
 5 νήσεως ἐπιτελῆ τῷ Καλλισθένει ἐγένετο. ἀλλὰ  
 Δημήτριον γὰρ τὸν Πυθώνακτος, ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων,  
 ὡς προσήει αὐτῷ ὁ Καλλισθένης φιλήσων, φάναι  
 ὅτι οὐ προσκυνήσας πρόσεισιν. καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξαν-  
 δρον οὐκ παρασχεῖν φιλήσαι ἑαυτόν· τὸν δὲ Καλ-  
 λισθένην, φιλήματι, φάναι, ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι.

6 Καὶ τούτων ἐγώ, ὅσα ἐς ὕβριν τε τὴν Ἀλεξάν-  
 δρου τὴν ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα καὶ ἐς σκαιότητα τὴν  
 Καλλισθένους φέροντα, οὐδὲν οὐδαμῆ ἐπαινῶ, ἀλλὰ  
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν γὰρ κοσμίως τίθεσθαι ἐξαρκεῖν  
 φημί, αὐξοῦντα ὡς ἀνυστὸν τὰ βασιλέως πράγματα  
 7 ὅτω τις ξυνεῖναι οὐκ ἀπηξίωσεν. οὐκ οὐκ ἀπει-  
 κότης δι' ἀπεχθείας γενέσθαι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ Καλ-  
 λισθένην τίθεμαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἀκαίρῳ τε παρρησίᾳ καὶ  
 ὑπερόγκῳ ἀβελτερίᾳ. ἐφ' ὅτω τεκμαίρομαι μὴ  
 χαλεπῶς πιστευθῆναι τοὺς κατειπόντας Καλλι-  
 σθένους, ὅτι μετέσχε τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς τῆς γενομένης  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐκ τῶν παίδων, τοὺς δέ, ὅτι καὶ ἐπήρην  
 αὐτὸς ἐς τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσαι. ξυνέβη δὲ τὰ τῆς  
 ἐπιβουλῆς ὡδε.

13. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἤδη καθεστηκὸς τῶν ἐν  
 τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν  
 ἐμειρακιεύοντο καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ  
 βασιλέως, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν τοῦ  
 σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ καὶ κοιμώμενον  
 φυλάσσειν τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο. καὶ ὅποτε ἐξ-  
 ελαύνοι βασιλεύς, τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἵπποκόμων  
 δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον καὶ ἀνέβαλλον οὗτοι  
 βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρα  
 2 φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ἦσαν. τούτων καὶ  
 Ἐρμόλαος ἦν, Σωπόλιδος μὲν παῖς, φιλοσοφία δὲ

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whether the ceremony of obeisance had been carried out by Callisthenes himself. But as Callisthenes approached to kiss Alexander, Demetrius son of Pythonax, one of the Companions, remarked that he was coming without having done obeisance. Alexander did not permit Callisthenes to kiss him; and Callisthenes remarked, 'I shall go away short of a kiss.'

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In these incidents I do not at all approve either of Alexander's arrogance at the time or of Callisthenes' tactlessness, but in fact I think it enough for a man to show moderation in his own individual conduct, and that he should be ready to exalt royalty as far as practicable, once he has consented to attend on a king. So I think that Alexander's hostility to Callisthenes was not unreasonable in view of his untimely freedom of speech and arrogant folly, and on this account I infer that Callisthenes' detractors were readily believed that he had a part in the plot laid against Alexander by his pages, some of them even saying that Callisthenes had incited them to the plot. The plot occurred as follows.<sup>1</sup>

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13. It was a practice going back to Philip's time that the sons of Macedonian notables who had reached adolescence should be enlisted for the service of the king; and besides general attendance on his person the duty of guarding him when asleep had been entrusted to them. Again, whenever the king rode out, they received the horses from the grooms and led them up, and they mounted the king in Persian fashion, and were his companions in the rivalry of the chase. One of them was Hermolaus son of Sopolis; he was reputed to be a zealous student

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. 22, 1 for the date.

## ARRIAN

ἔδοκει προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ Καλλισθένην θεραπεύειν ἐπὶ τῷδε. ὑπὲρ τούτου λόγος κατέχει, ὅτι ἐν θήρᾳ προσφερομένου Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συὸς ἔφθη βαλὼν τὸν σὺν ὃ Ἑρμόλαος· καὶ ὃ μὲν σὺς πίπτει βληθείς, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ ὑστερήσας ἐχαλέπηνε τῷ Ἑρμολάῳ καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν πρὸς ὄργην πληγὰς λαβεῖν ὀρώντων τῶν ἄλλων παιδῶν, καὶ τὸν ἵππον αὐτοῦ ἀφείλετο.

- 3 Τοῦτον τὸν Ἑρμόλαον ἀλγήσαντα τῇ ὕβρει φράσαι πρὸς Σώστρατον τὸν Ἀμύντου, ἡλικιώτην τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐραστήν ὄντα, ὅτι οὐ βιωτόν οἱ ἐστὶ μὴ τιμωρησαμένῳ Ἀλέξανδρον τῆς ὕβρεως, καὶ τὸν Σώστρατον οὐ χαλεπῶς συμπεῖσαι μετασχεῖν τοῦ
- 4 ἔργου, ἅτε ἐρώντα. ὑπὸ τούτων δὲ ἀναπεισθῆναι Ἀντίπατρόν τε τὸν Ἀσκληπιοδώρου τοῦ Συρίας σατραπεύσαντος καὶ Ἐπιμένην τὸν Ἀρσαίου καὶ Ἀντικλέα τὸν Θεοκρίτου καὶ Φιλώταν τὸν Κάρσιδος τοῦ Θρακός. ὡς οὖν περιῆκεν ἐς Ἀντίπατρον ἢ νυκτερινὴ φυλακὴ, ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ξυγκείμενον εἶναι ἀποκτεῖναι Ἀλέξανδρον, κοιμωμένῳ ἐπιπεσόντας.
- 5 Ἐυμβῆναι δὲ οἱ μὲν αὐτομάτως λέγουσιν ἔστε <ἐφ'> ἡμέραν πίνειν Ἀλέξανδρον, Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ ᾧδε ἀνέγραψε. Σύραν γυναῖκα ἐφομαρτεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κάτοχον ἐκ τοῦ θείου γιγνομένην καὶ ταύτην τὸ μὲν πρῶτον γέλωτα εἶναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτόν· ὡς δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν τῇ κατοχῇ ἀληθεύουσα ἐφαίνετο, οὐκέτι ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἀλλ' εἶναι γὰρ τῇ Σύρᾳ πρόσοδον πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, καὶ καθεύδοντι πολλάκις ἤδη ἐπιστῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀπαλλασσομένου ἐκ τοῦ πότου κατεχομένην ἐκ τοῦ
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of philosophy and to be a follower of Callisthenes for this purpose. The story is prevalent about him that in a hunt a wild boar charged Alexander and that Hermolaus struck it before Alexander could; it fell from his stroke, and Alexander, too late for his chance, was angry with Hermolaus and in his passion ordered him to be whipped in the presence of the other pages, and took his horse from him.

According to the story, this Hermolaus felt the outrage bitterly and told Sostratus son of Amyntas, a boy of the same age and his lover, that he found life no longer worth living until he had avenged himself on Alexander for the outrage, and easily persuaded Sostratus as his lover to join in the enterprise; they won over Antipater son of Asclepiodorus, who had been satrap of Syria, Epimenes son of Arseus, Anticles son of Theocritus, and Philotas son of Carsis the Thracian, and so when the turn of keeping guard by night fell to Antipater, it was agreed to kill Alexander that night by attacking him in his sleep.

But it so happened according to some writers that Alexander went on drinking unprompted till day-break, whereas Aristobulus tells this story. A Syrian woman possessed by the divine spirit followed Alexander constantly; at first she was a laughing-stock both to Alexander and his court; but when it became clear that everything she uttered when possessed came true, Alexander no longer treated her with contempt but gave her access to his person day and night and she now often watched over him as he slept. So on this occasion, when Alexander ceased from his potations, she met him, while possessed by

θείου ἐντυχεῖν, καὶ δεῖσθαι ἐπανελθόντα πίνειν ὅλην τὴν νύκτα· καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον θεῖόν τι εἶναι νομίσαντα ἐπανελθεῖν τε καὶ πίνειν, καὶ οὕτως τοῖς παισὶ διαπεσεῖν τὸ ἔργον.

7 Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία Ἐπιμένης ὁ Ἀρσαίου τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς φράζει τὴν πράξιν Χαρικλεῖ τῷ Μενάνδρου, ἐραστῇ ἑαυτοῦ γεγονότι· Χαρικλῆς δὲ φράζει Εὐρύλοχῳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ τῷ Ἐπιμένου. καὶ ὁ Εὐρύλοχος ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηπὴν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Λάγου τῷ σωματοφύλακι καταλέγει ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα· ὁ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἔφρασε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ξυλλαβεῖν κελεύει ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα εἶπεν ὁ Εὐρύλοχος· καὶ οὗτοι στρεβλούμενοι σφῶν τε αὐτῶν κατεῖπον τὴν ἐπιβουλήν καὶ τινὰς καὶ ἄλλους ὠνόμασαν.

14. Ἀριστόβουλος μὲν λέγει ὅτι καὶ Καλλισθένην ἐπᾶραι σφᾶς ἔφασαν ἐς τὸ τόλμημα· καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὡσαύτως λέγει. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὐ ταύτη λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μῖσος γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ὄν πρὸς Καλλισθένην ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ ὅτι ὁ Ἐρμόλαος ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἐπιτήδειος ἦν τῷ Καλλισθένει, οὐ χαλεπῶς πιστεῦσαι τὰ χεῖρω ὑπὲρ Καλλισθένους Ἀλέξανδρον. ἤδη δὲ τινες καὶ τάδε ἀνέγραψαν, τὸν Ἐρμόλαον προαχθέντα ἐς τοὺς Μακεδόνας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἐπιβουλεῦσαι—καὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι ἔτι ἐλευθέρῳ ἀνδρὶ φέρειν τὴν ὕβριν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου—πάντα καταλέγοντα, τὴν τε Φιλώτα οὐκ ἔνδικον τελευτῆν καὶ <τὴν> τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ Παρμενίωνος ἔτι ἐκνομωτέραν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τότε ἀποθανόντων, καὶ τὴν Κλείτου ἐν μέθῃ ἀναίρεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα τὴν Μηδικήν, καὶ τὴν προσκύνησιν τὴν βουλευθεῖσαν καὶ οὕπω πεπαυμένην, καὶ πότους τε



the divine spirit, and begged him to return and continue drinking all night long; Alexander believed this to be a divine sign, returned to his cups, and so the boys' plot came to nothing.

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Next day Epimenes son of Arseus, one of the conspirators, told Charicles son of Menander, his lover, of the plot, Charicles told Eurylochus brother of Epimenes, and Eurylochus went to Alexander's tent, and revealed the whole affair to Ptolemy son of Lagus who told Alexander, and Alexander ordered the arrest of all whose names Eurylochus had given; they were put on the rack, revealed their own plot and implicated others as well.

14. Aristobulus tells that they said Callisthenes had urged them on to the attempt, and Ptolemy agrees. But most authorities have a different version, that it was only because he had already come to hate Callisthenes and because Hermolaus was particularly close to Callisthenes, that Alexander readily believed the worst of Callisthenes. Some have also recorded that Hermolaus, when summoned before the Macedonians, confessed his plot, for (he said) no free man could longer endure Alexander's arrogance, and went over the whole story, the unjust end of Philotas, and the still more illegal death of Parmenio and of the others who perished at that time, the drunken murder of Clitus, the Median dress, the plan not yet abandoned

## ARRIAN

καὶ ὕπνου τοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου· ταῦτα οὐ φέροντα  
 ἔτι ἐλευθερῶσαι ἐθελῆσαι ἑαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς  
 3 ἄλλους Μακεδόνας. τοῦτον μὲν δὴ αὐτὸν τε καὶ  
 τοὺς ξὺν αὐτῷ ξυλληφθέντας καταλευσθῆναι πρὸς  
 τῶν παρόντων. Καλλισθένην δὲ Ἀριστόβουλος  
 μὲν λέγει δεδεμένον ἐν πέδαις συμπεριάγεσθαι τῇ  
 στρατιᾷ, ἔπειτα νόσω τελευτῆσαι, Πτολεμαῖος δὲ  
 ὁ Λάγου στρεβλωθέντα καὶ κρεμασθέντα ἀποθα-  
 νεῖν. οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πάνυ πιστοὶ ἐς τὴν ἀφήγησιν  
 καὶ ξυγγερόμενοι ἐν τῷ τότε Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὑπὲρ τῶν  
 γνωρίμων τε καὶ οὐ λαθόντων σφᾶς ὅπως ἐπράχθη  
 4 ζύμφωνα ἀνέγραψαν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὲρ  
 τούτων αὐτῶν ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἀφηγήσαντο, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ  
 ταῦτα ἀποχρῶντα ἔστω ἀναγεγραμμένα. ταῦτα  
 μὲν δὴ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πραχθέντα ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖσδε  
 τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κλεῖτον ξυνενεχθεῖσιν Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 ἀνέγραψα, τούτοις μᾶλλον τι οἰκεῖα ὑπολαβὼν ἐς  
 τὴν ἀφήγησιν.

15. Παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ ἦκεν καὶ αὖθις Σκυθῶν  
 τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης πρεσβεία ξὺν τοῖς πρέσβεσιν  
 οἷς αὐτὸς ἐς Σκύθας ἔστειλεν. ὁ μὲν δὴ τότε  
 βασιλεὺς τῶν Σκυθῶν ὅτε οὗτοι ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 ἐπέμποντο τετελευτηκῶς ἐτύγχανεν, ἀδελφὸς δὲ  
 2 ἐκείνου ἐβασίλευεν. ἦν δὲ ὁ νοῦς τῆς πρεσβείας  
 ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πᾶν τὸ ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπαγγελ-  
 λόμενον Σκύθας· καὶ δῶρα ἔφερον Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν Σκυθῶν ὅσα μέγιστα  
 νομίζεται ἐν Σκύθαις· καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα ὅτι ἐθέλει  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοῦναι γυναῖκα βεβαιότητος οὐνεκα  
 3 τῆς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον φιλίας τε καὶ ξυμμαχίας. εἰ  
 δὲ ἀπαξιοῖ τὴν Σκυθῶν βασίλισσαν γῆμαι Ἀλέ-

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to introduce obeisance, and Alexander's drinking and sleeping habits; it was all this he would bear no longer and sought to liberate himself and the other Macedonians; he was then stoned to death by the assemblage, along with his fellow prisoners. As for Callisthenes, Aristobulus says he was bound with fetters and carried round with the army, but at length died of sickness, Ptolemy son of Lagus that he was racked and put to death by hanging. Thus not even those whose narratives are entirely trustworthy and who actually accompanied Alexander at that time agree in their accounts of events which were public and within their own knowledge. There are many other varying accounts of the same events in different histories, but I must be content with what I have recorded. They occurred a little later, but I have recorded them in connection with the affair between Clitus and Alexander, thinking them to be more relevant here to my narrative.

3

4

15. Envoys came to Alexander<sup>1</sup> a second time from the European Scythians, together with the envoys he himself had sent to Scythia, for the king of the Scythians at the time when they were being sent by Alexander had died; and his brother was reigning. The purpose of the embassy was to express the readiness of the Scythians to do whatever Alexander commanded; they brought gifts for Alexander from the king of Scythia which are most highly regarded in Scythia, and said that the king was willing to give Alexander his daughter in marriage, to confirm his friendship and alliance. If, however, Alexander should not think fit to marry the Scythian princess,

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2

3

<sup>1</sup> Presumably at winter-quarters at Zariaspa (7, 1), whence his departure is recorded in 15, 7; QC. vii 1, 7 ff. gives an account parallel to 1-4 (omitting 5 f.) in midsummer 328.

## ARRIAN

ξανδρος, ἀλλὰ τῶν γε σατραπῶν τῶν τῆς Σκυθικῆς χώρας καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δυνάσται κατὰ τὴν γῆν τὴν Σκυθίδα, τούτων τὰς παῖδας ἐθέλειν δοῦναι τοῖς πιστοτάτοις τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον· ἤξειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφασκεν, εἰ κελεύοιτο, ὡς παρ' αὐτοῦ Ἀλε-  
 4 ξάνδρου ἀκοῦσαι ὅσα ἐπαγγέλλοι. ἀφίκετο δ' ἐν τούτῳ παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Φαρασμάνης ὁ Χορασμίων βασιλεὺς ξὺν ἵππεῦσι χιλίοις καὶ πεντακοσίοις. ἔφασκεν δὲ ὁ Φαρασμάνης ὁμορος οἰκέων τῷ τε Κόλχων γένει καὶ ταῖς γυναῖξι ταῖς Ἀμαζόσι, καὶ εἰ θέλοι Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ Κόλχους τε καὶ Ἀμαζόνας ἐλάσας καταστρέψασθαι τὰ ἐπὶ τὸν πόντον τὸν Εὐξείνον ταύτῃ καθήκοντα γένη, ὁδῶν τε ἡγεμῶν ἔσεσθαι ἐπηγγέλλετο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ παρασκευάσειν.

5 Τοῖς τε οὖν παρὰ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἤκουσι φιλάνθρωπα ἀποκρίνεται Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἐς τὸν τότε καιρὸν ξύμφορα, γάμου δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖσθαι Σκυθικοῦ, καὶ Φαρασμάνην ἐπαινέσας τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν ξυνθέμενος αὐτῷ μὲν τότε οὐκ ἔφη ἐν καιρῷ εἶναι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὸν Πόντον· Ἀρταβάζω δὲ τῷ Πέρσῃ, ὅτῳ τὰ Βακτρίων ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπετέτακτο, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι πρόσχωροι τούτῳ σατράπαι ξυστήσας Φαρασμάνην ἀποπέμπει  
 6 ἐς τὰ ἤθη τὰ αὐτοῦ. αὐτῷ δὲ τὰ Ἰνδῶν ἔφη ἐν τῷ τότε μέλειν. τούτους γὰρ καταστρεψάμενος πᾶσαν ἂν ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν Ἀσίαν· ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπανιέναι ἂν ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐκεῖθεν δ' ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντου τε καὶ τῆς Προποντίδος ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει πάσῃ τῇ τε ναυτικῇ καὶ τῇ πεζικῇ ἐλάσειν εἴσω τοῦ Πόντου· καὶ ἐς τὸ τότε ἡξίου ἀποθέσθαι Φαρασμάνην ὅσα ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἐπηγγέλλετο.

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he was still willing to give the daughters of the satraps of the Scythian territory and of the chief personages in Scythia to Alexander's most trusted followers; he would also come to visit Alexander, if summoned, and hear Alexander's commands from Alexander himself. At the same time Pharasmanes, king of the Chorasmians, came to Alexander with fifteen hundred horsemen; he said that he lived on the borders of the Colchians and the Amazons, and if Alexander desired to attack Colchis and the Amazons and subdue all the races that extended in these regions to the Euxine Sea, he promised to act as guide and to provide supplies for the army.<sup>2</sup> 4

Alexander then replied to the Scythian envoys graciously and as his interest at the time demanded, that he had no need of a Scythian marriage. He commended Pharasmanes and entered into friendship and alliance with him, but said that for him it was not then the moment to march to Pontus. But he recommended Pharasmanes to Artabazus the Persian, to whom he had entrusted affairs in Bactria, and to all the other neighbouring satraps, and sent him back to his own abode. He said that for the time being his own concern was India; for by subduing India he would at once be in possession of Asia as a whole, and with Asia in his possession he would return to Greece, and march thence by the Hellespont and Propontis to Pontus with all his naval and land forces; he expected Pharasmanes to save up the promises he made now till that time.<sup>3</sup> 5 6

<sup>2</sup> App. XII.

<sup>3</sup> For subsequent operations QC. vii 10, 13 ff. (very different); App. VIII 14.

7 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀξὸν τε ποταμὸν ἦει αὖθις καὶ εἰς τὴν Σογδιανὴν προχωρεῖν ἐγνώκει, ὅτι πολλοὺς τῶν Σογδιανῶν ἐς τὰ ἐρύματα ξυμπεφευγέναι ἠγγέλλετο οὐδὲ ἐθέλειν κατακοῦειν τοῦ σατράπου, ὅστις αὐτοῖς ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπετέτακτο. στρατο-  
 πεδεύοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Ὀξῷ οὐ μακρὰν τῆς σχηνῆς τῆς αὐτοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου πηγὴ ὕδατος καὶ ἄλλη ἐλαίου πηγὴ πλησίον αὐτῆς  
 8 ἀνέσχε. καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Λάγου τῷ σωματο-  
 φύλακι ἐπειδὴ ἐσηγγέλθη τὸ τέρας, Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἔφρασεν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἔθυεν ἐπὶ τῷ φάσματι ὅσα οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο. Ἀρίσταν-  
 δρος δὲ πόνων εἶναι σημεῖον τοῦ ἐλαίου τὴν πηγὴν ἔφασκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νίκην ἐπὶ τοῖς πόνοις σημαίνειν.

16. Διαβὰς οὖν ξὺν μέρει τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐς τὴν Σογδιανὴν, Πολυπέρχοντα δὲ καὶ Ἀτταλον καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Μελέαγρον αὐτοῦ ἐν Βάκτροις ὑπολι-  
 πόμενος τούτοις μὲν παρήγγειλεν τὴν τε χώραν ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν, ὡς μή τι νεωτερίσωσιν οἱ ταύτη βάρβαροι, καὶ τοὺς ἔτι ἀφεστηκότας αὐτῶν ἐξαι-  
 2 ρεῖν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς πέντε μέρη διελὼν τὴν ἅμα οἱ στρατιὰν τῶν μὲν Ἡφαιστίωνα ἄρχειν ἔταξε, τῶν δὲ Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Λάγου τὸν σωματοφύλακα·  
 τοῖς τρίτοις δὲ Περδίκκαν ἐπέταξε· τῆς δὲ τετάρτης τάξεως Κοῖνος καὶ Ἀρτάβαζος ἠγοῦντο αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ πέμπτην μοῖραν ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς  
 3 ἐπήει τὴν χώραν ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὡς ἐκάστοις προὔχωρει ἐπήεσαν, τοὺς μὲν τινὰς τῶν ἐς τὰ ἐρύματα ξυμπεφευγόντων βία ἐξαιροῦντες, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ὁμολογία προσχωροῦντάς σφισιν ἀναλαμβάνοντες. ὡς δὲ ξύμπασα αὐτῷ ἡ δύναμις ἐπελθοῦσα τῶν Σογδιανῶν τῆς χώρας τὴν πολλὴν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 15. 7-16. 3

He himself returned to the river Oxus; he had determined to move into Sogdiana, since it was reported that many of the Sogdianians had taken refuge in their forts and would not obey the satrap set over them by Alexander. While he was encamped on the river Oxus, not far from his own tent a spring of water, and another of oil near by, came up from the ground. When this prodigy was notified to Ptolemy son of Lagus, the royal bodyguard, he told Alexander, and Alexander sacrificed on account of this portent as the soothsayers directed. Aristander said that the spring of oil was a sign of tribulations to come, but that it portended victory after the tribulations.<sup>4</sup>

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8

16. Passing with part of his force into Sogdiana, he left behind Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager there in Bactra and told them to protect the country, prevent the barbarians there giving trouble and destroy those still in revolt. He himself divided the force with him into five parts, and appointed Hephaestion to command one, Ptolemy son of Lagus, the bodyguard, another; the third was put under Perdiccas, and the fourth brigade was commanded by Coenus and Artabazus; he took the fifth himself and invaded the country in the direction of Maracanda. Each of the other divisions carried out such attacks as its success allowed, violently destroying some of those who had taken refuge in the forts, and accepting the surrender of others by agreement. But when his whole force, after traversing the greater part of Sogdiana, arrived at Mara-

2

3

<sup>4</sup> Presumably from Pt. Cf. P. 57, 4 f. (with no mention of Pt.). Strabo xi 7, 3 puts the discovery of petroleum on the Ochus, perhaps following Ar., cf. Pearson, *LH* 169.



## ARRIAN

ἐς Μαράκανδα ἀφίκετο, Ἡφαιστίωνα μὲν ἐκπέμπει τὰς ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πόλεις συνοικίζειν, Κοῶνον δὲ καὶ Ἀρτάβαζον ὡς ἐς Σκύθας, ὅτι ἐς Σκύθας καταπεφευγέναι Σπιταμένης αὐτῷ ἐξηγγέλλετο, αὐτὸς δὲ ξὺν τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπιὼν τῆς Σογδιανῆς ὅσα ἔτι πρὸς τῶν ἀφεστηκότων κατείχετο ταῦτα οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐξήρει.

4 Ἐν τούτοις δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου ὄντος Σπιταμένης τε καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τῶν Σογδιανῶν τινες φυγάδων ἐς τῶν Σκυθῶν τῶν Μασσαγετῶν καλουμένων τὴν χώραν συμπεφευγότες ξυναγαγόντες τῶν Μασσαγετῶν ἰππέας ἑξακοσίους ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τι  
5 φρούριον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Βακτριανήν. καὶ τῷ τε φρουράρχῳ οὐδὲν πολέμιον προσδεχομένῳ ἐπιπεσόντες καὶ τοῖς ξὺν τούτῳ τὴν φυλακὴν ἔχουσιν τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας διέφθειραν, τὸν φρούραρχον δὲ ἐλόντες ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον. θαρσήσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ φρουρίου τῇ καταλήψει ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ὕστερον Ζαριάσποις πελάσαντες τῇ μὲν πόλει προσβαλεῖν ἀπέγνωσαν, λείαν δὲ πολλὴν περιβαλλόμενοι ἤλαυ-  
νον.

6 Ἦσαν δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ζαριάσποις νόσῳ ὑπολελειμμένοι τῶν ἐταίρων ἰππέων οὐ πολλοὶ καὶ ξὺν τούτοις Πείθων τε ὁ Σωσικλέους, ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς θεραπείας τῆς ἐν Ζαριάσποις τεταγμένος, καὶ Ἀριστόνικος ὁ κιθαρωδός. καὶ οὗτοι αἰσθόμενοι τῶν Σκυθῶν τὴν καταδρομὴν (ἤδη γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἀναρρωσθέντες ὅπλα τε ἔφερον καὶ τῶν ἵππων ἐπέβαινον) ξυναγαγόντες τοὺς τε μισθοφόρους ἰππέας ἐς ὀγδοήκοντα, οἳ ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῶν Ζαριάσπων ὑπολελειμμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τῶν παιδῶν τινὰς τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐκβοηθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Μασ-

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 16. 3-6

canda, he sent Hephæstion to settle people in cities in Sogdiana, and Coenus and Artabazus in the direction of Scythia, since news came that Spitamenes had taken refuge there, while he himself with the rest of the troops went on to parts of Sogdiana still held by the rebels, and destroyed them without trouble.

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While Alexander was thus engaged, Spitamenes and some fugitives from Sogdiana in his company had fled for refuge to the land of the Scythians called Massagetæ<sup>1</sup>; there they collected six hundred horsemen of the Massagetæ and arrived at one of the forts in the Bactrian region. Attacking the commandant of the fort, who was not expecting enemy action, and his garrison, they destroyed the soldiers, took the commandant prisoner and kept him in custody. Emboldened by capturing the fort, they approached Zariaspa a few days later, and though they decided not to assault the city, they surrounded it and carried off much booty.

In the city of Zariaspa there were a few of the Companion cavalry, left there as invalids with Pithon son of Sosicles, who had been put in charge of the royal retinue at Zariaspa, and Aristonicus the harpist. On learning of the Scythian raid, as they had now recovered and could bear arms and mount horseback, they assembled about eighty mercenary cavalry, who had been left behind to garrison Zariaspa, and some of the King's pages, and sallied out against the

<sup>1</sup> Probably between Oxus and Caspian. QC. viii 1, 3 ff. tells another story, also featuring Craterus (A. 17, 1), whose command is not recorded.

## ARRIAN

7 σαγέτας. καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτη προσβολῇ οὐδὲν ὑποτοπήσασιν τοῖς Σκύθαις ἐπιπεσόντες τὴν τε λείαν ξύμπασαν ἀφείλοντο αὐτοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀγόντων τὴν λείαν οὐκ ὀλίγους ἀπέκτειναν. ἐπανιόντες δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀτάκτως, ἅτε οὐδενὸς ἐξηγουμένου, ἐνεδρευθέντες πρὸς Σπιταμένους καὶ τῶν Σκυθῶν τῶν μὲν ἑταίρων ἀποβάλλουσιν ἑπτὰ, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων ἵππέων ἑξήκοντα. καὶ Ἀριστόνικος ὁ κιθαρωδὸς αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, οὐ κατὰ κιθαρωδὸν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος. Πείθων δὲ τρωθεὶς ζῶν λαμβάνεται πρὸς τῶν Σκυθῶν.

17. Καὶ ταῦτα ὡς Κρατερῶ ἐξηγγέλθη, σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τοὺς Μασσαγέτας ἤλαυνεν. οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐπύθοντο πλησίον ἐπελαύνοντά σφισι Κρατερόν, ἔφευγον ἀνὰ κράτος ὡς εἰς τὴν ἐρήμην. καὶ Κρατερὸς ἐχόμενος αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς τε ἐκείνοις περιπίπτει οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἐρήμου καὶ ἄλλοις ἵππεῦσι Μασσαγετῶν ὑπὲρ τοὺς  
2 χιλίους. καὶ μάχη γίνεταί τῶν τε Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Σκυθῶν καρτερά· καὶ ἐνίκων οἱ Μακεδόνες. τῶν δὲ Σκυθῶν ἀπέθανον μὲν ἑκατὸν καὶ πενήκοντα ἵππεῖς· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐς τὴν ἐρήμην διεσώθησαν, ὅτι ἄπορον ἦν προσωτέρω τοῖς Μακεδόσι διώκειν.

3 Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀρτάβαζον μὲν τῆς σατραπείας τῆς Βακτρῶν ἀπαλλάττει δεηθέντα διὰ γῆρας, Ἀμύνταν δὲ τὸν Νικολάου σατράπην ἀντ' αὐτοῦ καθίστησι. Κοῖνον δὲ ἀπολείπει αὐτοῦ τὴν τε αὐτοῦ τάξιν καὶ τὴν Μελεάγρου ἔχοντα καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων ἵππέων ἐς τετρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ἵππακοντιστὰς πάντας καὶ τῶν Βακτρῶν τε καὶ

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<sup>1</sup> QC. viii 1, 19 and 2, 14 has first Clitus, then Amyntas,

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 16. 7-17. 3

Massagetae. At the first charge, falling on the Scythians when they suspected nothing, they robbed them of their entire plunder, and killed many who were driving it off, but when they were returning, in some disorder since there was no one in command, Spitamenes and the Scythians caught them in an ambush, where they lost seven Companions, and sixty mercenary cavalry. Aristonicus the harpist died there, with more courage than a harpist might have. Pithon was wounded and taken alive by the Scythians.

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17. When this was reported to Craterus, he marched at all speed against the Massagetae, and when they learned that he was coming up close to them, they fled headlong towards the desert. Craterus pressed upon and overtook them not far from the desert with over a thousand other Massagetaean horsemen. A fierce battle took place between the Macedonians and the Scythians, which the Macedonians won. Of the Scythians a hundred and fifty horsemen perished, but the rest easily got away into the desert, since it was impracticable for the Macedonians to pursue further.

Meanwhile Alexander relieved Artabazus of the satrapy of Bactria at his own request on account of old age and appointed Amyntas son of Nicolaus in his place.<sup>1</sup> He left Coenus there with his own battalion and Meleager's, about four hundred of the Companion cavalry, all the mounted javelin-men, and

succeed Artabazus, whom he makes out to be 95 (he could not have been over 57, Berve no. 152); place, Maracanda. Al. sends Hephaestion to winter in Bactria, and after further operations, marches to Nautaca, 2, 13-9, leaving winter quarters there after 2 months, 4, 1, cf. A. 18, 1; 19, 4; 21, 10; 22, 3.

## ARRIAN

Σογδιανῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι μετὰ Ἀμύντου ἐτάχθησαν, προστάξας ἅπασιν ἀκούειν Κοίνου καὶ διαχειμάζειν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ, τῆς τε χώρας ἕνεκα τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ εἴ πη ἄρα Σπιταμένην περιφερόμενον κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα ἐνεδρεύσαντας ξυλλαβεῖν.

- 4 Σπιταμένης δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ὡς φρουραῖς τε πάντα κατειλημμένα ἐώρων ἐκ τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ σφιν ἄπορα πάντῃ τὰ τῆς φυγῆς ἐγίγνετο, ὡς ἐπὶ Κοῖνόν τε καὶ τὴν ξὺν τούτῳ στρατιὰν ἐτρέποντο, ὡς ταύτῃ μᾶλλον τι ἀξιόμαχοι ἐσόμενοι. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Γαβάς, χωρίον τῆς Σογδιανῆς ὄχυρόν ἐν μεθορίῳ τῆς τε Σογδιανῶν γῆς καὶ τῆς Μασσαγετῶν Σκυθῶν ὠκισμένον, ἀναπείθουσιν οὐ χαλεπῶς τῶν Σκυθῶν ἰππέας ἐς τρισχιλίους
- 5 συνεμβάλλειν σφίσιν ἐς τὴν Σογδιανήν. οἱ δὲ Σκύθαι οὗτοι ἀπορία τε πολλῇ ἔχονται καὶ ἅμα ὅτι οὔτε πόλεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἐδραῖοι οἰκοῦσιν, ὡς δειμαίνειν ἂν περὶ τῶν φιλτάτων, οὐ χαλεποὶ ἀναπεισθῆναί εἰσιν ἐς ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον πόλεμον. ὡς δὲ Κοῖνός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἔμαθον προσιόντας τοὺς ξὺν Σπιταμένει ἰππέας, ἀπήντων καὶ
- 6 αὐτοὶ μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς. καὶ γίγνεται αὐτῶν μάχη καρτερά, καὶ νικῶσιν οἱ Μακεδόνες, ὥστε τῶν μὲν βαρβάρων ἰππέων ὑπὲρ τοὺς ὀκτακοσίους πεσεῖν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, τῶν δὲ ξὺν Κοίνῳ ἰππέας μὲν ἐς εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε, πεζοὺς δὲ δώδεκα. οἳ τε οὖν Σογδιανοὶ οἱ ἔτι ὑπολειπόμενοι ξὺν Σπιταμένει καὶ τῶν Βακτρίων οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπολείπουσιν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ Σπιταμένην καὶ ἀφικόμενοι παρὰ Κοῖνον παρέδοσαν
- 7 σφᾶς αὐτοὺς Κοίνῳ, οἳ τε Μασσαγέται οἱ Σκύθαι κακῶς πεπραγότες τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα τῶν ξυμπα-

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B.C.

Winter  
328-7  
B.C.

the Bactrians and Sogdianians attached to Amyntas, commanding them all to take their orders from Coenus, and to winter there in Sogdiana, to protect the region and to try to ambush and capture Spitamenes, if he moved around anywhere in the winter.<sup>2</sup>

Spitamenes and his troops, seeing every place 4  
occupied by Macedonian garrisons and no means of escape anywhere for themselves, turned against Coenus and his troops, on the basis that they would be rather more equal to fighting there. On arriving at Gabae, a stronghold of Sogdiana, lying on the border of Sogdiana and the land of the Massagetaean Scythians, they easily induced about three thousand Scythian horsemen to join them in a raid on Sogdiana. These Scythians are in the grip of dire poverty, and, 5  
since they have no cities and no settled habitations, and hence no fear for their loved ones, they are easy to inveigle into one war after another. When Coenus and his colleagues learned that the cavalry with Spitamenes was approaching, they went to meet them with their troops. There was a fierce battle, which 6  
the Macedonians won, so that over eight hundred of the barbarian cavalry fell in the battle, but of Coenus' troops only about twenty-five horsemen and twelve foot-soldiers. At this the Sogdianians still left with Spitamenes and the greater number of the Bactrians deserted Spitamenes in the flight, came to Coenus and surrendered to him. The Massagetaean Scy- 7  
thians after this disaster plundered the baggage

<sup>2</sup> In winter 329/8 B.C. Al. had almost evacuated Sogdiana and had then to reconquer it.

## ARRIAN

ραταξαμένων σφίσι Βακτρίων τε καὶ Σογδιανῶν διήρπασαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ξὺν Σπιταμένει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ἔφευγον. ὡς δὲ ἐξηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν ὄρμηϊ ὧν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔρημον ἐλαύνειν ἀποτεμόντες τοῦ Σπιταμένου τὴν κεφαλὴν παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον πέμπουσιν, ὡς ἀποτρέφοντες ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ.

18. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Κοῖνός τε εἰς Ναύτακα παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπανέρχεται καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν τε καὶ Φραταφέρην τὸν τῶν Παρθυαίων σατράπην καὶ Στασάνωρ ὁ Ἀρείων, πεπραγμένων σφίσι
- 2 πάντων ὅσα ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐτέτακτο. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ περὶ Ναύτακα ἀναπαύων τὴν στρατιὰν ὅτι περ ἀκμαῖον τοῦ χειμῶνος, Φραταφέρην μὲν ἀποστέλλει εἰς Μάρδους καὶ Ταπ(ο)ύρους (Αὐτο)-φραδάτην ἐπανάξοντα τὸν σατράπην, ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη μετάπεμπος ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου γιγνόμενος οὐχ
- 3 ὑπήκουε καλοῦντι. Στασάνωρα δὲ εἰς Δράγγας σατράπην ἐκπέμπει, εἰς Μήδους δὲ Ἀτροπάτην ἐπὶ σατραπείᾳ καὶ τοῦτον τῇ Μήδων, ὅτι Ὀξυδάτης ἐθελοκακεῖν αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο. Σταμένην δὲ ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στέλλει, ὅτι Μαζαῖος ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ὑπαρχος τετελευτηκέναι αὐτῷ ἐξηγγέλλετο. Σώπολιν δὲ καὶ Ἐπόκιλλον καὶ Μεν[ν]ίδαν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐκπέμπει, τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἐκ Μακεδονίας αὐτῷ ἀνάξοντας.
- 4 Ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἡρι ὑποφαίνονται προὔχῳρι ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πέτραν, εἰς ἣν πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν

<sup>a</sup> QC. viii 3, 1 ff. has Spitamenes killed by his wife, with no record of these operations; the ' Dahae ' then submit.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 17. 7-18. 4

trains of the Bactrians and Sogdianians who had been with them in line of battle, and fled themselves with Spitamenes to the desert. When they learnt that Alexander was already on the move and marching towards the desert, they cut off Spitamenes' head and sent it to Alexander, to keep him away from themselves by this action.<sup>3</sup>

Winter  
328-7  
B.C.

18. Meantime Coenus had returned to Alexander at Nautaca as had Craterus, Phrataphernes the satrap of Parthyaea, and Stasanor satrap of Areia, after carrying out all Alexander's orders. Alexander, while resting his force at Nautaca, since it was the depth of winter, despatched Phrataphernes to the Mardians and Tapurians, to bring back the satrap Autophradates, as he had often before been sent for by Alexander but ignored the summons. He sent Stasanor to the Drangians as satrap, and Atropates to the Medes as satrap of Media, since he thought Oxydates was wilfully neglecting his duty to him. He despatched Stamenes to Babylon, since Mazaeus the hyparch of Babylon was reported to him to be dead.<sup>1</sup> Sopolis and Epocillus and Menidas were sent to Macedonia, to bring up for him the force from Macedonia.<sup>2</sup>

With the first appearance of spring Alexander marched forward towards the Rock of Sogdiana<sup>3</sup>

4 327  
B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. QC. viii 3, 17 (Arsaces for Atropates; nothing on Sopolis, Hermolaus' father (!) etc). 'Hyparch': 12, 8 n. A. seems to be partly duplicating 7, 1; probably Pt. and Ar. put the return of Phrataphernes and Stasanor (cf. iii 29, 5) at different times; 18, 1 is likely to be correct.

<sup>2</sup> Introd. n. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Early spring 327 B.C., cf. 17, 3 n. QC. vii 11, 1 ff. calls this the rock of 'Ariamazes', puts its capture early in 328 B.C. and has Al. execute the leading men.

## ARRIAN

Σογδιανῶν συμπεφευγέναι αὐτῷ ἐξηγγέλλετο· καὶ ἢ Ὀξυάρτου δὲ γυνὴ τοῦ Βακτρίου καὶ αἱ παῖδες αἱ Ὀξυάρτου ἐς τὴν πέτραν ταύτην συμπεφευγέναι ἐλέγοντο, Ὀξυάρτου αὐτὰς ὡς ἐς ἀνάλωτον δῆθεν τὸ χωρίον ἐκείνο ὑπεκθεμένου, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀφειστήκει ἀπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου. ταύτης γὰρ ἐξαιρεθείσης οὐκέτι οὐδὲν ὑπολειφθήσεσθαι ἐδόκει τῶν
   
 5 Σογδιανῶν τοῖς νεωτερίζειν ἐθέλουσιν. ὡς δὲ ἐπέλασαν τῇ πέτρᾳ, καταλαμβάνει πάντη ἀπότομον ἐς τὴν προσβολὴν σιτία τε ξυγκεκομισμένους τοὺς βαρβάρους ὡς ἐς χρόνιον πολιορκίαν. καὶ χιῶν πολλὴ ἐπιπεσοῦσα τὴν τε πρόσβασιν ἀπορωτέραν ἐποίει τοῖς Μακεδόσι καὶ ἅμα ἐν ἀφθονία ὕδατος τοὺς βαρβάρους διῆγεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς προσβάλλειν
   
 6 ἐδόκει τῷ χωρίῳ. καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ὑπέρογκον ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων λεχθὲν ἐς φιλοτιμίαν ξὺν ὀργῇ ἐμβεβλήκει Ἀλέξανδρον. προκληθέντες γὰρ ἐς ξύμβασιν καὶ προτεινομένου σφίσιν, ὅτι σώοις ὑπάρξει ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα ἀπαλλαγῆναι παραδοῦσι τὸ χωρίον, οἱ δὲ σὺν γέλῳτι βαρβαρίζοντες πτηνοὺς ἐκέλευον ζητεῖν στρατιώτας Ἀλέξανδρον, οἵτινες αὐτῷ ἐξαιρήσουσι τὸ ὄρος, ὡς τῶν γε ἄλλων
   
 7 ἀνθρώπων οὐδεμίαν ὥραν σφίσιν οὔσαν. ἔνθα δὴ ἐκήρυξεν Ἀλέξανδρος τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ ἀναβάντι δώδεκα τάλαντα εἶναι τὸ γέρας, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτῳ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, ὡς τελευταῖον εἶναι τῷ τελευταίῳ ἀνελθόντι τριακοσίους δαρεικοὺς τὸ γέρας. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κήρυγμα παρώξυνεν ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ἄλλως τοὺς Μακεδόνας ὠρμημένους.

19. Ἐυνταξάμενοι δὴ ὅσοι πετροβατεῖν ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις αὐτῷ μεμελετήκεσαν, ἐς τριακοσίους

where, he was told, many of the Sogdianians had fled for refuge; the wife of Oxyartes the Bactrian and his daughters were also said to have taken refuge on this rock, Oxyartes having put them there out of the way in a place he thought impregnable at the time of his own revolt from Alexander. Once this rock had been taken, Alexander thought that the Sogdianians who were ready to revolt would have no further recourse left. But when they approached the rock, Alexander found that it was sheer on all sides against attack, and that the tribesmen had stored provisions there for a long siege; a deep fall of snow made the approach more impracticable for the Macedonians, while it assured the tribesmen of abundant water. Yet even so Alexander decided to assault the place. A boastful remark by the barbarians had contributed to Alexander's passionate pursuit of the glory of success; when summoned to make terms, which were offered on the basis that they would be allowed to go safe to their homes if they gave up the position, they told Alexander with barbaric laughter to look for soldiers with wings to capture the mountain for him, since no other men would give them any concern. Then Alexander proclaimed that the first to scale the height should have a prize of twelve Talents, the second a second prize, the third another prize and so on, the last to reach the top to have three hundred darics.<sup>4</sup> Eager as the Macedonians already were, this proclamation still further increased their ardour.

19. So then when all had mustered who had practised rock-climbing in their previous sieges,

<sup>4</sup> Persian gold coins.

## ARRIAN

τὸν ἀριθμὸν, καὶ πασσάλους μικροὺς σιδηροῦς, οἷς αἱ σκηναὶ καταπεπήγεσαν αὐτοῖς, παρασκευάσαντες, τοῦ καταπηγνύναι αὐτοὺς ἔς τε τὴν χιόνα ὅπου πεπηγυῖα φανείη καὶ εἴ πού τι τῆς χώρας ἔρημον χιόνος ὑποφαίνοιτο, καὶ τούτους καλωδίους ἐκ λίνου ἰσχυροῖς ἐκδήσαντες τῆς νυκτὸς προὔχωρον κατὰ τὸ ἀποτομώτατόν τε τῆς πέτρας καὶ  
 2 ταύτῃ ἀφυλακτότατον. καὶ τούτους τοὺς πασσάλους καταπηγνύντες τοὺς μὲν ἔς τὴν γῆν, ὅπου διεφαίνετο, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τῆς χιόνος ἔς τὰ μάλιστα οὐ θρυφθησόμενα, ἀνεῖλκον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἄλλοι ἄλλη τῆς πέτρας. καὶ τούτων ἔς τριάκοντα μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει διεφθάρησαν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἔς ταφὴν εὐρέθη ἔμπεσόντα ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη  
 3 τῆς χιόνος. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἀναβάντες ὑπὸ τὴν ἕω καὶ τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ ὄρους καταλαβόντες συνδόνας κατέσειον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Μακεδόνων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου παρηγγελμένον. πέμψας δὲ κήρυκα ἐμβοῆσαι ἐκέλευσε τοῖς προφυλάσσοισι τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ διατρίβειν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ παραδιδόναι σφᾶς· ἐξευρῆσθαι γὰρ δὴ τοὺς πτηνοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἔχεσθαι ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τοῦ ὄρους τὰ ἄκρα· καὶ ἅμα ἐδείκνυεν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς κορυφῆς στρατιώτας.

4 Οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἐκπλαγέντες τῷ παραλόγῳ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ πλείονάς τε ὑποτοπήσαντες εἶναι τοὺς κατέχοντας τὰ ἄκρα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ὠπλισμένους ἐνέδοσαν σφᾶς αὐτούς· οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ὀλίγων ἐκείνων Μακεδόνων φοβεροὶ ἐγένοντο. ἔνθα δὴ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες ἐλήφθησαν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἡ Ὀξυάρτου καὶ οἱ παῖδες.  
 5 καὶ ἦν γὰρ Ὀξυάρτη παῖς παρθένος ἐν ὥρᾳ γάμου,

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 19. 1-5

numbering about three hundred, and had got ready  
small iron pegs, with which their tents had been  
pegged down, to fix them into the snow where it  
appeared to be frozen firm and also in any space bare  
of snow which might show through, and had bound  
the pegs to strong linen ropes, they set out at night  
to the part of the rock which was least guarded,  
because most precipitous. They fixed the pegs into  
the ground where it was visible, or in the snow where  
it seemed least likely to give way, and each in a  
different place, hauled themselves up the rock.  
About thirty of them perished in the ascent, in such  
a way that their bodies were not even found for burial,  
having fallen in different parts of the snow. The rest,  
however, climbed up about dawn, seized the summit  
of the mound, and waved linen flags to the Mace-  
donian camp, in accordance with Alexander's  
instructions to them. Then Alexander sent a herald  
and told him to shout to the front line of the barbari-  
ans, not to delay further but to give themselves up,  
for he had actually found the men with wings, and  
the summit of their mound was in their hands, point-  
ing at the same time to the soldiers on the peak.

The barbarians were astounded at a sight they had  
never reckoned on, and suspecting that the soldiers  
occupying the heights were more numerous and fully  
armed, they surrendered; such was their panic at see-  
ing those few Macedonians. Here were captured the  
wives and children of many men, notably the wife and  
daughters of Oxyartes. Now Oxyartes had a maiden

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B.C.

2

3

4

5

Ῥωξάνη ὀνόματι, ἣν δὴ καλλίστην τῶν Ἀσιανῶν  
 γυναικῶν λέγουσιν ὄφθῆναι οἱ ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 στρατεύσαντες μετὰ γε τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα. καὶ  
 ταύτην ἰδόντα Ἀλέξανδρον ἐς ἔρωτα ἐλθεῖν αὐτῆς·  
 ἐρασθέντα δὲ οὐκ ἐθελῆσαι ὑβρίσαι καθάπερ  
 6 αἰχμάλωτον, ἀλλὰ γῆμαι γὰρ οὐκ ἀπαξιῶσαι. καὶ  
 τοῦτο ἐγὼ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸ ἔργον ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον τι  
 ἢ μέμφομαι. καίτοι τῆς γε Δαρείου γυναικός, ἣ  
 καλλίστη δὴ ἐλέγτο τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ γυναικῶν, ἣ  
 οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐς ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ καρτερός αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ  
 ἐγένετο, νέος τε ὢν καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐν ἀκμῇ τῆς  
 εὐτυχίας, ὅποτε ὑβρίζουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ὁ δὲ  
 κατηδέσθη τε καὶ ἐφείσατο, σωφροσύνη τε πολλῇ  
 διαχρώμενος καὶ δόξης ἅμα ἀγαθῆς οὐκ ἀτόπῳ  
 ἐφέσει.

20. Καὶ τοίνυν καὶ λόγος κατέχει ὀλίγον μετὰ  
 τὴν μάχην, ἣ πρὸς Ἰσσω Δαρείῳ τε καὶ Ἀλε-  
 ξάνδρῳ ξυνέβη, ἀποδράντα ἐλθεῖν παρὰ Δαρείον  
 τὸν εὐνοῦχον τὸν φύλακα αὐτῷ τῆς γυναικός. καὶ  
 τοῦτον ὡς εἶδε Δαρείος, πρῶτα μὲν πυθέσθαι εἰ  
 ζῶσιν αὐτῷ αἱ παῖδες [καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ] καὶ ἡ γυνή τε  
 2 καὶ ἡ μήτηρ. ὡς δὲ ζώσας τε ἐπύθετο καὶ βασιλί-  
 σαι ὅτι καλοῦνται καὶ ἡ θεραπεία ὅτι ἀμφ' αὐτάς  
 ἐστίν, ἦντινα καὶ ἐπὶ Δαρείου ἐθεραπεύοντο, ἐπὶ  
 τῷδε αὖ πυθέσθαι εἰ σωφρονεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ γυνή ἐτι.  
 ὡς δὲ σωφρονοῦσαν ἐπύθετο, αὐθις ἐρέσθαι μή τι  
 βίαιον ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου αὐτῇ ἐς ὑβριν ξυνέβη· καὶ  
 τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐπομόσαντα φάναι ὅτι· ὦ βασιλεῦ,  
 οὕτω τοι ὡς ἀπέλιπες ἔχει ἡ σὴ γυνή, καὶ Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος ἀνδρῶν ἄριστός τέ ἐστι καὶ σωφρονέ-  
 3 τατος. ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀνατεῖναι Δαρείον ἐς τὸν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 19. 5-20. 3

327  
B.C.

daughter of age to marry called Roxane,<sup>1</sup> and those who served with Alexander<sup>2</sup> said that she was the loveliest woman they had seen in Asia next to Darius' wife, and that when Alexander saw her he fell in love with her; despite his passion he was not ready to violate her as a war captive, but did not think it beneath him to take her in marriage. This was an action of Alexander that I approve and do not censure. As for Darius' wife, who was said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia, either he felt no desire for her or he controlled himself, young as he was and at the very height of good fortune, when men act violently: he respected and spared her, showing much restraint as well as an ambition for good repute which was not misplaced.<sup>3</sup> 6

20. There is indeed a story prevalent<sup>1</sup> that soon after the battle of Issus between Darius and Alexander the eunuch in charge of Darius' wife escaped to Darius. When Darius saw him, he first asked if his daughters, wife and mother were alive. When he learnt that they were, and had the title of queens, and the same attendance as in Darius' court, he next asked if his wife remained true to him. On learning that she was, he enquired again whether she had been outraged by Alexander. The eunuch replied on his oath, 'Your wife, sir, is as you left her, and Alexander is the noblest and most self-controlled of men.' Darius then stretched his hands to the heavens and 3

<sup>1</sup> QC. viii 4, 19 ff. (cf. P. 47, 4) does not connect the marriage with Roxane and the capture of this rock (cf. 18, 4 n.), while Strabo xi 11, 4 connects it with that of the rock of Sisimithres (A. 21). The marriage may in fact be later, after Oxyartes' submission, 20, 4, perhaps recorded by QC. in its due time.

<sup>2</sup> 'Vulgate'? More probably Pt./Ar.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. ii 12, 8 n.

<sup>1</sup> 'Vulgate'. Main sources again from § 4.



οὐρανὸν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ εὐξασθαι ὧδε· ἀλλ' ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, ὅτω ἐπιτέτραπται νέμειν τὰ βασιλέων πράγματα ἐν ἀνθρώποις, σὺ νῦν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμοὶ φύλαξον Περσῶν τε καὶ Μήδων τὴν ἀρχήν, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔδωκας· εἰ δὲ δὴ ἐγὼ οὐκέτι σοι βασιλεὺς τῆς Ἀσίας, σὺ δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτι μὴ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ παραδοῦναι τὸ ἐμὸν κράτος. οὕτως οὐδὲ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἄρα ἀμελεῖται ὅσα σῶφρονα ἔργα.

- 4 Ὁξυάρτης δὲ ἀκούσας τοὺς παῖδας ἐχομένους, ἀκούσας δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ Ῥωξάνης τῆς θυγατρὸς ὅτι μέλει αὐτῆς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, θαρσήσας ἀφίκετο παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, καὶ ἦν ἐν τιμῇ παρ' αὐτῷ, ἥπερ εἰκὸς ἐπὶ ξυντυχίᾳ τοιαύτῃ.

21. Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, ὡς τὰ ἐν Σογδιανοῖς αὐτῷ διεπέπρακτο, ἐχομένης ἤδη καὶ τῆς πέτρας ἐς Παρειτάκας προὔχῳρει, ὅτι καὶ ἐν Παρειτάκαις χωρίον τι ὄχυρόν, ἄλλην πέτραν, κατέχειν ἐλέγοντο πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων. ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ αὕτη Χοριήνου ἡ πέτρα· καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν αὐτός τε ὁ Χοριήνης συμπεφεύγει καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑπάρχων οὐκ ὀλίγοι.

- 2 ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν ὕψος τῆς πέτρας ἐς σταδίους εἴκοσι, κύκλος δὲ ἐς ἐξήκοντα· αὕτη δὲ ἀπότομος πάντοθεν, ἀνοδος δὲ ἐς αὐτὴν μία καὶ αὕτη στενή τε καὶ οὐκ εὐπορος, οἷα δὴ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ χωρίου πεποιημένη, ὡς χαλεπὴ εἶναι καὶ μηδενὸς εἴργοντος καὶ καθ' ἓνα ἀνελθεῖν, φάραγξ τε κύκλῳ περιεῖργε τὴν πέτραν βαθεῖα, ὥστε ὅστις προσάξειν στρατιὰν τῇ πέτρᾳ ἔμελλε, πολὺ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ τὴν φάραγγα εἶναι χωστόον, ὡς ἐξ ὀμαλοῦ ὀρμᾶσθαι προσάγοντα ἐς προσβολὴν τὸν στρατόν.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 20. 3-21. 2

prayed in these terms: ' O Zeus the King, to whom it has been given to order the affairs of Kings among men, I beseech thee most of all to preserve my sovereignty over Persians and Medes, as thou didst grant it me; but if I am by your wish no longer to be king of Asia, to give my power to none but Alexander.' Thus even enemies are not indifferent to virtuous acts.

327  
B.C.

When Oxyartes heard that his daughters were captives, but also that Alexander was showing solicitude for his daughter Roxane, he ventured to come to Alexander and was honourably treated by him, as was appropriate on so happy an event. 4

21. After completing his work in Sogdiana, with the rock now in his possession, Alexander advanced to the Pareitacae, since many of the barbarians were reported to be holding a strong place in their country, another rock, called the Rock of Chorienes; Chorienes himself and many other hyparchs had taken refuge there.<sup>1</sup> The height of this rock was about twenty stades,<sup>2</sup> its circuit about sixty; it was sheer on all sides; there was only one way up to it, and this was narrow and difficult, since it had been constructed in defiance of the nature of the place, so that it was hard, even without opposition, to ascend even in single file. A deep ravine also protected the rock all round, hence anyone who was going to bring an army up to the rock would be obliged first to do much filling up of the ravine, so as to start from level ground when bringing up his force to the assault. 2

<sup>1</sup> Sisimithres in QC. viii 2, 19 ff. (who puts the episode late in 328) and Strabo xi 11, 4; Chorienes was perhaps the official title of this local chief ('hyparch'). P. 58 has an allusion.

<sup>2</sup> This can only mean 20 stades from foot to peak; it is not a measurement of height (von Schwarz, App. VIII 2).

- 3 Ἄλλα καὶ ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἤπτετο τοῦ ἔργου· οὕτως πάντα ᾤετο χρῆναι βατά τε αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξαιρετέα εἶναι, ἐς τοσόνδε τόλμης τε καὶ εὐτυχίας προκεχωρήκει. τέμνων δὴ τὰς ἐλάτας (πολλαὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερύψηλοι ἐλάται ἦσαν ἐν κύκλῳ τοῦ ὄρους) κλίμακας ἐκ τούτων ἐποίει, ὡς κάθοδον εἶναι ἐς τὴν φάραγγα τῆ στρατιᾶ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλως κατελθεῖν
- 4 ἐς αὐτήν. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐφειστήκει τῷ ἔργῳ τὸ ἡμισυ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἔχων ἐργαζόμενον, τὰς δὲ νύκτας ἐν μέρει οἱ σωματοφύλακες αὐτῷ εἰργάζοντο, Περδίκκας τε καὶ Λεοννάτος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου, τῷ λοιπῷ μέρει τῆς στρατιᾶς τριχῆ διανενημένῳ, ὅπερ αὐτῷ ἐς τὴν νύκτα ἀπετέτακτο. ἦνυτον δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας οὐ πλέον ἢπερ εἴκοσι πήχεις καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ὀλίγον ἀποδέον, καίτοι ξυμπάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐργαζομένης· οὕτω τό τε χωρίον ἄπορον ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔργον
- 5 ἐν αὐτῷ χαλεπόν. κατιόντες δ' ἐς τὴν φάραγγα πασσάλους κατεπήγνυον ἐς τὸ ὀξύτατον τῆς φάραγγος, διέχοντας ἀλλήλων ὅσον ξύμμετρον πρὸς ἰσχύν τε καὶ ξυνοχὴν τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων. ἐπέβαλλον δὲ πλέγματα ἐκ λύγων εἰς γεφύρας μάλιστα ἰδέαν, καὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοῦντες χοῦν ἄνωθεν ἐπεφόρουν, ὡς ἐξ ὀμαλοῦ γίνεσθαι τῆ στρατιᾶ τὴν πρόσοδον τὴν πρὸς τὴν πέτραν.
- 6 Οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κατεφρόνουν ὡς ἀπόρου πάντῃ τοῦ ἐγχειρήματος· ὡς δὲ τοξεύματα ἤδη ἐς τὴν πέτραν ἐξικνεῖτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν ἄνωθεν ἐξείργειν τοὺς Μακεδόνας (ἐπεποίητο γὰρ αὐτοῖς προκαλύμματα πρὸς τὰ βέλη, ὡς ὑπ' αὐτοῖς ἀβλαβῶς ἐργάζεσθαι) ἐκπλαγεῖς ὁ Χοριήνης πρὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα κήρυκα πέμπει πρὸς Ἀλέ-

## ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 21. 3-6

Even so, Alexander took the work in hand, as he 3 327  
 thought that no place should be beyond him to get B.C.  
 up to and capture, to such a point of daring and  
 success had he advanced.<sup>3</sup> So he felled the pines  
 (for there were many tall pines all round the moun-  
 tain) and made ladders of them, to enable the army  
 to descend into the ravine, as there was no other  
 means to get down. By day Alexander himself 4  
 superintended the operations, keeping half his army  
 at work; by night his bodyguards worked in relays,  
 Perdiccas, Leonnatus and Ptolemy son of Lagus,  
 with the rest of the army, divided into three sections,  
 which he had assigned for the night work. By day-  
 time they could not complete more than twenty  
 cubits, at night rather less, even though all the army  
 was at work; so difficult was the ground, and so hard  
 the work there. They would first descend into the 5  
 ravine and fix stakes in its narrowest part, just so far  
 apart from one another that they could be strong  
 enough to bear and hold together the loads piled upon  
 them. They would then fix upon the stakes withies  
 plaited into wicker-work, very much in the shape of  
 a bridge, bind these closely together and heap earth  
 on them from above, so that the approach for the  
 troops to the rock might be on the level.

At first the tribesmen treated the enterprise with 6  
 contempt as wholly impracticable; but when at  
 length arrows began to find the range of the rock,  
 while they proved unable from above to interfere with  
 the Macedonians who had made screens against the  
 missiles, so as to work beneath them unharmed,  
 Chorieneas was aghast at what was happening and  
 sent a herald to Alexander begging him to send

<sup>3</sup> Cf. ii 26, 3 n. No doubt A. follows Pt. (cf. § 4).

## ARRIAN

- ξανδρον, δεόμενος Ὀξυάρτην οἱ ἀναπέμψαι. καὶ  
 7 πέμπει Ὀξυάρτην Ἀλέξανδρος. ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος  
 πείθει Χοριήνην ἐπιτρέψαι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ αὐτόν τε  
 καὶ τὸ χωρίον. βία μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐχ ἄλωτὸν  
 εἶναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ τῇ στρατιᾷ τῇ ἐκείνου, ἐς  
 πίστιν δὲ ἔλθόντος καὶ φιλίαν, . . .<sup>1</sup> τὴν πίστιν τε  
 καὶ δικαιοσύνην μεγαλωστὶ ἐπήγει τοῦ βασιλέως, τά  
 τε ἄλλα καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐν πρώτοις ἐς βεβαίωσιν τοῦ  
 8 λόγου προφέρων. τούτοις πεισθεὶς ὁ Χοριήνης  
 αὐτὸς τε ἦκε παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τῶν οἰκείων  
 τινὲς καὶ ἑταίρων αὐτοῦ. ἐλθόντι δὲ τῷ Χοριήνῃ  
 φιλόφρονά τε ἀποκρινάμενος καὶ πίστιν ἐς φιλίαν  
 δοῦς αὐτόν μὲν κατέχει, πέμψαι δὲ κελεύει τῶν  
 συγκατελθόντων τινὰς αὐτῷ ἐς τὴν πέτραν τοὺς  
 9 κελεύσοντας ἐνδοῦναι τὸ χωρίον. καὶ ἐνδίδοται  
 ὑπὸ τῶν συμπεφευγόντων, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέ-  
 ξανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐς πεντακο-  
 σίους ἀνέβη κατὰ θέαν τῆς πέτρας, καὶ τοσοῦτου  
 ἐδέησεν ἀνεπιεικὲς τι ἐς τὸν Χοριήνην ἔργον  
 ἀποδείξασθαι, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίον ἐκεῖνο  
 ἐπιτρέπει Χοριήνῃ καὶ ὑπαρχὸν εἶναι ὅσωνπερ καὶ  
 πρόσθεν ἔδωκεν.
- 10 Ἐυνέβη δὲ χειμῶνί τε κακοπαθῆσαι αὐτῷ τὴν  
 στρατιὰν πολλῆς χιόνος ἐπιπεσοῦσης ἐν τῇ πολιορ-  
 κίᾳ καὶ ἅμα ἀπορία τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐπιέσθησαν.  
 ἀλλὰ Χοριήνης ἐς δίμηνον σιτία ἔφη δώσειν τῇ  
 στρατιᾷ καὶ ἔδωκεν σίτον τε καὶ οἶνον τῶν ἐν τῇ  
 πέτρᾳ ἀποθέτων κρέα τε ταριχηρὰ κατὰ σκηνήν.  
 καὶ ταῦτα δοῦς οὐκ ἔφασκεν ἀναλώσει τῶν παρε-  
 σκευασμένων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν οὐδὲ τὴν δεκάτην  
 μοῖραν. ἔνθεν ἐν τιμῇ μᾶλλον τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἦν

<sup>1</sup> I agree with Krüger that there is a lacuna after φιλίαν.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 21. 6-10

Oxyartes<sup>4</sup> to him. Alexander complied, and when 7 327  
 Oxyartes arrived, he urged Chorieneſes to ſurrender B.C.  
 himſelf and the ſtronghold to Alexander; there was  
 not a place in the world Alexander and his army  
 could not take by force, but if Chorieneſes tried his  
 good faith and friendship . . . He commended highly  
 the good faith and juſtice of the King, chiefly adduc-  
 ing his own treatment as proof of his contention.  
 Chorieneſes was perſuaded by his words, and preſented 8  
 himſelf to Alexander with ſome of his kinſfolk and  
 friends. On his arrival Alexander gave him a  
 friendly reply and an aſſurance of his friendship,  
 retaining Chorieneſes himſelf, but telling him to ſend  
 ſome of thoſe who came down with him to the rock  
 to order the ſtronghold to be given up. And it was 9  
 ſurrendered by the refugees, ſo that Alexander  
 himſelf could actually take five hundred of the  
 hypaſpiſts and go up to view the rock. Far from  
 maltreating Chorieneſes, he even entrusted this very  
 ſtronghold to him and made him hyparch of the people  
 he had previously adminiſtered.

The army, as it happened, had ſuffered much in the 10  
 winter, a great deal of ſnow having fallen during the  
 ſiege, and they were alſo diſtreſſed by want of  
 provisions. But Chorieneſes ſaid he would furniſh the  
 army with provisions for two months, gave them corn  
 and wine from the ſtores in the rock, and diſtributed  
 dried meat among the tents.<sup>5</sup> After all theſe gifts  
 he ſaid he had not uſed up even a tenth of what they  
 had laid in for the ſiege. This made Alexander  
 regard him with the greater reſpect as a man who

<sup>4</sup> QC., 'Oxartes', Oxyartes having not yet ſubmitted!

<sup>5</sup> Cf. anecdote in QC. viii 4, 18 ff. in different context.

## ARRIAN

ὡς οὐ πρὸς βίαν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ γνώμην ἐνδοὺς τὴν πέτραν.

22. Ταῦτα δὲ καταπραξάμενος Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτὸς μὲν εἰς Βάκτρα ἦει, Κρατερόν δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἰππέας ἔχοντα ἑξακοσίους καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τὴν τε αὐτοῦ τάξιν καὶ τὴν Πολυπέρχοντος καὶ Ἀττάλου καὶ τὴν Ἀλκέτα ἐπὶ Κατάνην τε καὶ Αὐστάνην ἐκπέμπει, οἳ δὴ μόνοι ἔτι ὑπελείποντο ἐν τῇ
- 2 Παρειτακηνῶν χώρα ἀφεστηκότες. καὶ μάχης γενομένης πρὸς αὐτοὺς καρτερᾶς νικῶσιν οἳ ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν τῇ μάχῃ· καὶ Κατάνης μὲν ἀποθνήσκει αὐτοῦ μαχόμενος, Αὐστάνης δὲ ξυλληφθεὶς ἀνήχθη παρ' Ἀλέξανδρον· τῶν δὲ ξὺν αὐτοῖς βαρβάρων ἰππεῖς μὲν ἀπέθανον ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι, πεζοὶ δὲ ἀμφὶ τοὺς χιλίους πεντακοσίους. ταῦτα δὲ ὡς ἐπράχθη τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν, καὶ οὗτοι εἰς Βάκτρα ἦσαν. καὶ ἐν Βάκτροις τὸ ἀμφὶ Καλλισθένην τε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας πάθημα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ξυνηνέχθη.
- 3 Ἐκ Βάκτρων δὲ ἐξήκοντος ἤδη τοῦ ἤρος <sup>1</sup> ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν προὔχῳρει ὡς ἐπ' Ἰνδοὺς, Ἀμύνταν ἀπολιπὼν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῶν Βακτριῶν καὶ ξὺν αὐτῷ ἰππέας μὲν τρισχιλίους καὶ πεντακο-
- 4 σίους, πεζοὺς δὲ μυρίους. ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὸν Καύκασον ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις ἀφίκετο εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν πόλιν τὴν κτισθεῖσαν ἐν Παραπαμισάδαις, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ Βάκτρων ἐστέλλετο. καὶ τὸν μὲν ὑπαρχον, ὅστις αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως τότε ἐτάχθη, παραλύει τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐξηγεῖ-
- 5 σθαι ἔδοξε· προσκατοικίσας δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τῶν

<sup>1</sup> codd.: θέρος A. Fränkel. See historical note.



had given up the stronghold not so much under force as from free will.

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22. After this achievement Alexander himself took the road to Bactra, but sent Craterus with six hundred of the Companion cavalry, his own battalion of the infantry and those of Polyperchon, Attalus and Alcetas against Catanes and Austanes, the only rebels left in Pareitacene. In a fierce battle with them Craterus' troops won the day; Catanes perished on the field, Austanes was captured and brought before Alexander; of the barbarians who fought with them a hundred and twenty cavalry and about fifteen hundred foot perished.<sup>1</sup> After their success Craterus' force too made for Bactra, where Alexander's misfortune with Callisthenes and the pages occurred.<sup>2</sup>

Now that spring was ending, Alexander took his force from Bactra and advanced towards India, leaving Amyntas in Bactria with three thousand and five hundred cavalry and ten thousand infantry.<sup>3</sup> Crossing the Caucasus in ten days,<sup>4</sup> he arrived at Alexandria, the city he had founded in the district of the Parapamisadae during his first expedition to Bactra. The hyparch whom he had then put in charge of the city was now dismissed from his office, as he appeared to have governed badly. He settled in Alexandria

<sup>1</sup> QC. VIII 5, 1 f., giving Polyperchon (cf. 27, 5 n.) a separate mission.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo xi 11, 4 says that Callisthenes was 'arrested and imprisoned' at Caryatae in Bactria.

<sup>3</sup> QC. does not mention the garrison. A. in turn is silent on the great revolt of this presumably mercenary force in 325 (D. 99, 5 f.; QC. ix 7); Amyntas is not mentioned in this connection and had been replaced as satrap at Al's death by Philippus (D. xviii 3, 3 etc.). Chronology: App. VIII 19. Emendation (reading 'summer' for 'spring') would remove a puzzle, but seems palaeographically too daring.

<sup>4</sup> Not by the same pass as in 329, Strabo xv 1, 26.

## ARRIAN

- περιοίκων τε καὶ ὅσοι τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπόμαχοι  
 ἦσαν ἐς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν Νικάνορα μὲν, ἓνα τῶν  
 ἑταίρων, τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν κοσμεῖν ἐκέλευσε, σατρά-  
 πην δὲ Τυρίεσπιν κατέστησε τῆς τε χώρας τῆς  
 Παραπαμισαδῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸν  
 6 Κωφῆνα ποταμόν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ ἐς Νίκαιαν  
 πόλιν καὶ τῇ Ἀθηναῖ θύσας προὔχῳρει ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν  
 Κωφῆνα, προπέμψας κήρυκα ὡς Ταξίλην τε καὶ  
 τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ, κελεύσας  
 ἀπαντᾶν ὅπως ἂν ἐκάστοις προχωρῇ. καὶ Ταξίλης  
 τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπαρχοὶ ἀπήντων, δῶρα τὰ μέγιστα  
 παρ' Ἰνδοῖς νομιζόμενα κομίζοντες, καὶ τοὺς  
 ἐλέφαντας δώσειν ἔφασκον τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι  
 ὄντας, ἀριθμὸν ἐς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν.
- 7 Ἐνθα δὴ διελὼν τὴν στρατιὰν Ἡφαιστίωνα μὲν  
 καὶ Περδίκκαν ἐκπέμπει ἐς τὴν Πευκελαῶτιν  
 χώραν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμόν, ἔχοντας τὴν τε  
 Γοργίου τάξιν καὶ Κλείτου καὶ Μελεάγρου καὶ τῶν  
 ἑταίρων ἰππέων τοὺς ἡμίσεας καὶ τοὺς μισθο-  
 φόρους ἰππέας ζύμπαντας, προστάξας τὰ τε κατὰ  
 τὴν ὁδὸν χωρία ἢ βία ἐξαιρεῖν ἢ ὁμολογία παρ-  
 ἴστασθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμόν ἀφικομένους  
 παρασκευάζειν ὅσα ἐς τὴν διάβασιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ  
 ζύμφορα. ζὺν τούτοις δὲ καὶ Ταξίλης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι  
 8 ὑπαρχοὶ στέλλονται. καὶ οὗτοι ὡς ἀφίκοντο πρὸς  
 τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμόν, ἔπρασον ὅσα ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 ἦν τεταγμένα. Ἄστις δὲ ὁ τῆς Πευκελαώτιδος  
 ὑπαρχος νεωτερίσας αὐτὸς τε ἀπόλλυται καὶ τὴν  
 πόλιν προσαπώλεσεν, ἐς ἧντινα ζυμπεφεύγει.

<sup>5</sup> For Alexandria and Nicaea see iii 28, 4 n.

<sup>6</sup> The river Kabul. See App. VIII 19 f. on chronology and geography of all operations in the rest of this book.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 22. 5-8

more people from the neighbourhood together with all the soldiers unfit for fighting and ordered Nicanor, one of the Companions, to govern the city itself, while he appointed Tyriespis satrap of the country both of the Parapamisadae and of the land as far as the river Cophen. Then after reaching Nicaea <sup>5</sup> and sacrificing to Athena, he advanced towards the Cophen,<sup>6</sup> having sent a herald in advance to Taxilas and the Indians on this side of the river Indus with orders to meet him, each at their earliest convenience; Taxilas and the other hyparchs <sup>7</sup> complied, bringing the gifts the Indians prize most, and promised to give him the elephants they had, twenty-five in number.

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6

Here he divided his army, and sent Hephæstion and Perdicas to the territory of Peucelaotis towards the river Indus, with the battalions of Gorgias, Clitus and Meleager, half of the Companion cavalry and all the mercenary cavalry, with instructions to take by storm or receive in surrender all towns on their march; when they had reached the Indus, they were to get everything ready for the crossing of the river.<sup>8</sup> Taxilas and the other hyparchs were sent with them. They arrived at the river Indus and carried out Alexander's instructions. But Astis, the hyparch of the district of Peucelaotis, attempted revolt, and perished himself, besides involving in ruin the city to

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8

<sup>7</sup> App. XV 2. Taxilas had submitted to Al. while in Sogdiana (D. 86, 4, cf. QC. viii 12, 5), probably in hope of aid against Porus, his old enemy (v 18, 7); he ruled at Taxila near Rawalpindi, Porus between Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Acesines (Chenab). §8 shows that Taxilas was supporting a rebel against the ruler of the Astaceni (capital, Charsadda), whose own 'revolt' against Al. was probably provoked by fear of Taxilas.

<sup>8</sup> QC. viii 10, 2. A. does not mention the mercenary foot, most Balkan troops and the mounted archers in either army.

## ARRIAN

ἔξεϊλον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἐν τριάκοντα ἡμέραις προσκαθήμενοι οἱ ξὺν Ἡφαιστίωνι. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν Ἄστις ἀποθνήσκει, τῆς πόλεως δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐτάχθη Σαγγαῖος, ὃς ἔτι πρόσθεν πεφευγὼς Ἄστιν παρὰ Ταξίλην ἠὺτομολήκει· καὶ τοῦτο ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ πιστὸν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον.

23. Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, ἄγων τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τῶν ἐταίρων ἰππέων ὅσοι μὴ σὺν Ἡφαιστίωνι ἐτετάχατο καὶ τῶν ἀσθεταίρων<sup>1</sup> καλουμένων τὰς τάξεις καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τοὺς ἰππακοντιστάς, προὔχῳρει ἐς τὴν Ἀσπ(ασ)ίῳν τε καὶ Γουραίων χώραν καὶ Ἀσσακηνῶν.
- 2 πορευθεὶς δὲ παρὰ τὸν Χόην καλούμενον ποταμὸν ὄρεινὴν τε ὁδὸν καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ τοῦτον διαβάς χαλεπῶς τῶν μὲν πεζῶν τὸ πλῆθος βάδην ἔπεσθαί οἱ ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἰππέας ξύμπαντας καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐς ὀκτακοσίους ἐπιβιβάσας τῶν ἵππων ξὺν ταῖς ἀσπίσι ταῖς πεζικαῖς σπουδῇ ἦγεν, ὅτι τοὺς ταύτῃ οἰκουντας βαρβάρους συμπεφευγέναι ἔς τε τὰ ὄρη τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐξηγγέλλετο αὐτῷ καὶ ἐς τὰς
- 3 πόλεις ὅσαι ὄχυραὶ αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ ἀπομάχεσθαι. καὶ τούτων τῇ πρώτῃ καθ' ὁδὸν πόλει ὠκισμένη προσβαλὼν τοὺς μὲν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τεταγμένους ὡς εἶχεν ἐξ ἐφόδου ἐτρέψατο καὶ κατέκλεισεν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸς δὲ τιτρώσκεται βέλει διὰ τοῦ θώρακος ἐς τὸν ὤμον· τὸ δὲ τραῦμα οὐ χαλεπὸν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο· ὁ γὰρ θώραξ ἔσχε τὸ μὴ οὐ διαμπὰξ διὰ τοῦ ὤμου ἐλθεῖν τὸ βέλος· καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου ἐτρώθη καὶ Λεοννάτος.

<sup>1</sup> πεζεταίρων editors, but cf. Introd. n. 99.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 22. 8-23. 3

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which he had fled for refuge; for Hephaestion and his troops captured it after a siege of thirty days. Astis himself was put to death and Sangaeus appointed to govern the city; he had previously escaped from Astis and gone over to Taxilas; this guaranteed his loyalty to Alexander.

23. Taking the hypaspists, all the Companion cavalry not detailed with Hephaestion, and the battalions of the so-called *asthetairoi*,<sup>1</sup> with the archers, Agrianians, and mounted javelin-men,<sup>2</sup> Alexander advanced to the district of the Aspasiens, Guraeans and Assaceniens.<sup>3</sup> After marching along the river called Cheos by a mountainous, rough route, and crossing the river with some difficulty, he ordered the infantry force to follow him at marching pace, while he took all the cavalry himself with about eight hundred of the Macedonian foot-soldiers, whom he had mounted, with their infantry shields, and moved at full speed, as he had learnt that the barbarians living here had fled for refuge to the hills of the district and to the cities which were their defensive strongholds. Attacking the first of these cities which was built on his route without making preparations, he put to flight the forces drawn up in front of the city and at the first onslaught shut them up in the city, though he himself received an arrow wound through the corselet in his shoulder. (The wound caused him little trouble, for the breastplate prevented the dart passing right through the shoulder.) Ptolemy son of Lagus and Leonnatus were also wounded.

<sup>1</sup> Introd. n. 99

<sup>2</sup> Introd. § 59.

<sup>3</sup> QC. viii 10 f. recounts operations described in rest of this book, with variants, mostly of small value.

4 Τότε μὲν δὴ ἵνα ἐπιμαχώτατον τοῦ τείχους  
 ἐφαίνετο ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο πρὸς τῇ πόλει· τῇ δὲ  
 ὑστεραία ὑπὸ τὴν ἔω, διπλοῦν γὰρ τεῖχος περιε-  
 βέβλητο τῇ πόλει, ἐς μὲν τὸ πρῶτον ἄτε οὐκ  
 ἀκριβῶς τετειχισμένον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐβιάσαντο οἱ  
 Μακεδόνες, πρὸς δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ ὀλίγον ἀντισχόντες  
 οἱ βάρβαροι, ὡς αἶ τε κλίμακες προσέκειντο ἤδη  
 καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν βελῶν πάντοθεν ἐτιτρώσκοντο οἱ  
 προμαχόμενοι, οὐκ ἔμειναν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς πύλας  
 5 ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ  
 τούτων οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὅσους δὲ  
 ζῶντας ἔλαβον αὐτῶν, ξύμπαντας ἀποκτείνουσιν οἱ  
 Μακεδόνες, ὅτι ἐτρώθη ὑπ' αὐτῶν Ἀλέξανδρος  
 ὀργιζόμενοι· οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ ἐς τὰ ὄρη, ὅτι οὐ  
 μακρὰν τῆς πόλεως τὰ ὄρη ἦν, ἀπέφυγον. τὴν  
 πόλιν δὲ κατασκάψας ἐς Ἄνδακα ἄλλην πόλιν ἤγε.  
 ταύτην δὲ ὁμολογία ἐνδοθεῖσαν κατασχὼν Κρατερὸν  
 μὲν ξὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι τῶν πεζῶν καταλείπει  
 αὐτοῦ ἐξαιρεῖν ὅσαι ἂν ἄλλαι πόλεις μὴ ἐκούσαι  
 προσχωρῶσι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὅπως συμφο-  
 ρώτατον ἐς τὰ παρόντα κοσμεῖν.

24. Αὐτὸς δὲ ἄγων τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς τε καὶ τοὺς  
 τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τὴν Κοίνου τε καὶ  
 Ἀττάλου τάξιν καὶ τῶν ἰππέων τὸ ἄγημα καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων ἐταίρων ἐς τέσσαρας μάλιστα ἰππαρχίας καὶ  
 τῶν ἰπποτοξοτῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν  
 τὸν † Εὐασ . . . πόλεως προὔχῳρει, ἵνα ὁ τῶν  
 Ἀσπασίων ὑπαρχος ἦν· καὶ διελθὼν πολλὴν ὁδὸν  
 2 δευτεραῖος ἀφίκετο πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι

\* Q.C. 10, 3-6 makes Al. defer attack till Craterus arrived with the foot, and order the massacre. He then inserts the surrender of Nysa, see A. v 1 ff.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 23. 4-24. 2

Alexander then placed his camp by the city where the wall appeared easiest to assault, and next day about dawn, there being a double wall about the city, the Macedonians easily forced their way through the first, as it had not been built with care; at the second wall the barbarians made a short stand, yet once the ladders had been put up and the defenders were being wounded on all sides by the missiles, they did not stand their ground, but came tumbling out of the city by the gates in the direction of the hills. Some of them perished in the flight, and the Macedonians killed all they captured alive, out of anger that they had wounded Alexander; however, most of them escaped to the hills, as they were not far from the city.<sup>4</sup> Alexander razed the city to the ground and went on to another named Andaca. When it had surrendered on terms and was in his possession, he left Craterus there with the other infantry commanders to destroy any other cities that did not come over of their free will, and to make the arrangements in the country most advantageous for the time being.

4 327-6  
B.C.

5

2

24. He himself took the hypaspists, archers, and Agrianians, with Coenus' and Attalus' battalions, the *agêma* of cavalry and other Companions up to about four hipparchies<sup>1</sup> and half the mounted archers, and advanced towards the river . . . a city<sup>2</sup> where the hyparch of the Aspasiens was; after a long road-march, he reached the city on the second day. When the barbarians learned of Alexander's

<sup>1</sup> Introd. 58-60.

<sup>2</sup> In the lacuna the letters 'Euas . . .' may belong to the name of a river or a city.



## ARRIAN

προσάγοντα αισθόμενοι Ἀλέξανδρον ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἔφευγον πρὸς τὰ ὄρη. οἱ δ' ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον εἶχοντο τῶν φευγόντων ἔστε ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ φόνος πολὺς γίγνεται τῶν βαρβάρων, πρὶν εἰς τὰς δυσχωρίας φθάσαι ἀπελθόντας.

- 3 Τὸν δὲ ἡγεμόνα αὐτὸν τῶν ταύτη Ἰνδῶν Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου πρὸς τινὶ ἤδη γηλόφῳ ὄντα κατιδὼν καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἔστιν οὗς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ζῦν πολὺ ἐλάττοσιν αὐτὸς ὧν ὅμως ἐδίωκεν ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ ἵππου· ὡς δὲ χαλεπὸς ὁ γηλόφος τῷ ἵππῳ ἀναδραμεῖν ἦν, τοῦτον μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει παραδούς τινι τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἄγειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς εἶχε πεζὸς τῷ
- 4 Ἰνδῷ εἶπετο. ὁ δὲ ὡς πελάζοντα ἤδη κατεῖδε τὸν Πτολεμαῖον, αὐτὸς τε μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἔμπαλιν καὶ οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ ζῦν αὐτῷ. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰνδὸς τοῦ Πτολεμαίου διὰ τοῦ θώρακος παίει ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς τὸ στήθος ζυστῷ μακρῷ, καὶ ὁ θώραξ ἔσχε τὴν πληγὴν· Πτολεμαῖος δὲ τὸν μηρὸν διαμπὰξ βαλὼν
- 5 τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ καταβάλλει τε καὶ σκυλεύει αὐτόν. ὡς δὲ τὸν ἡγεμόνα σφῶν κείμενον οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶδον, οὗτοι μὲν οὐκέτι ἔμενον, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὄρων αἰρόμενον τὸν νεκρὸν τοῦ ὑπάρχου ἰδόντες πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἤλγησάν τε καὶ καταδραμόντες ζυνάπτουσιν ἐπ' αὐτῷ μάχην καρτεράν πρὸς τῷ γηλόφῳ. ἤδη γὰρ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔχων τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων καταβεβηκότας πεζοὺς πρὸς τῷ γηλόφῳ ἦν. καὶ οὗτοι ἐπιγενόμενοι μόγισ ἐξέωσαν τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς εἰς τὰ ὄρη καὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ ἐκράτησαν.
- 6 Ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὰ ὄρη Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς πόλιν κατῆλθεν, ἣ ὄνομα ἦν Ἀριγαῖον· καὶ ταύτην καταλαμβάνει ἐμπεπρησμένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πεφευγότας. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἀφίκοντο

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 24. 2-6

approach, they burned the city and fled to the mountains. Alexander's troops followed close on the fugitives as far as the mountains, and there was a great slaughter of the barbarians, until they got away first into the rough country.<sup>3</sup>

327-6  
B.C.

The actual leader of the Indians of this district was observed by Ptolemy son of Lagus, already close to a foothill; Ptolemy had with him some of the hypaspists, and though far inferior in numbers, he still continued to pursue him on horse, but as the hill was hard for his horse to go up, he left his mount there, handing it to one of the hypaspists to lead, and in person followed the Indian on foot, just as he was. When the Indian saw Ptolemy drawing near, he himself turned round at bay, and his hypaspists with him, and with his long spear struck at close quarters through Ptolemy's corselet to his breast; the corselet checked the blow. But Ptolemy drove right through the Indian's thigh, and felled and despoiled him. While his followers, on seeing their leader lying there, did not continue to stand their ground, others from the hills, seeing the enemy carrying off their hyparch's body, rushed down in their distress and joined in a fierce battle near the hill. Now Alexander was already near the hill with his infantry dismounted. When they came on the scene they pushed the Indians back to the mountains, though with difficulty, and got possession of the body.

After crossing the hills, Alexander descended at a city called Arigaeum and found that it had been set on fire by its inhabitants; and that the people had

<sup>3</sup> At least the following story must be from Pt.

## ARRIAN

- αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Κρατερὸν ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ πεπραγ-  
 μένων σφίσι ξυμπάντων ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως  
 7 ἐτέτακτο. ταύτην μὲν δὴ τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι ἐν  
 ἐπικαίρῳ χωρίῳ ἔδόκει ὠκίσθαι, ἐκτειχίσαι τε  
 προστάσσει Κρατερῷ καὶ ξυνοικίσαι ἐς αὐτὴν τοὺς  
 τε προσχώρους ὅσοι ἐθελονταί καὶ εἰ δὴ τινες  
 ἀπόμαχοι τῆς στρατιᾶς. αὐτὸς δὲ προὔχῳρει ἵνα  
 ξυμπεφευγέναι ἐπυρθάνετο τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ταύτῃ  
 βαρβάρων. ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸς τι ὄρος κατεστρατοπέ-  
 δευσεν ὑπὸ ταῖς ὑπωρείαις τοῦ ὄρους.
- 8 Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου ἐκπεμφθεὶς  
 μὲν ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐς προνομίην, προελθὼν δὲ  
 προσωτέρῳ αὐτὸς ξὺν ὀλίγοις ὡς ἐς κατασκοπήν,  
 ἀπαγγέλλει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πυρὰ κατιδεῖν τῶν βαρβά-  
 ρων πλείονα ἢ ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατοπέδῳ.
- 9 καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῷ μὲν πλήθει τῶν πυρῶν ἠπί-  
 στησεν, εἶναι δὲ τι ξυνεστηκὸς τῶν ταύτῃ βαρβά-  
 ρων αἰσθόμενος μέρος μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς αὐτοῦ  
 καταλείπει πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ὡς εἶχον ἐστρατοπεδευ-  
 μένους· αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν ὅσοι ἀποχρῶντες ἐς τὰ  
 ἀπηγγελμένα ἐφαίνοντο, ὡς πλησίον ἤδη ἀφεύρων
- 10 τὰ πυρὰ, τρίχα διανέμει τὴν στρατιάν. καὶ τῷ μὲν  
 ἐνὶ ἐπέταξε Λεοννάτον τὸν σωματοφύλακα, ξυντά-  
 ξας αὐτῷ τὴν τε Ἀττάλου καὶ τὴν Βαλάκρου  
 τάξιν· τὴν δευτέραν δὲ μοῖραν Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ  
 Λάγου ἄγειν ἔδωκε, τῶν τε ὑπασπιστῶν τῶν βασι-  
 λικῶν τὸ τρίτον μέρος καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου καὶ  
 Φιλώτα τάξιν καὶ δύο χιλιαρχίας τῶν τοξοτῶν καὶ  
 τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τῶν ἰππέων τοὺς ἡμίσεας· τὴν  
 δὲ τρίτην μοῖραν αὐτὸς ἤγεν ἵνα οἱ πλείστοι τῶν  
 βαρβάρων ἐφαίνοντο.

25. Οἱ δὲ ὡς ἤσθοντο προσάγοντας τοὺς Μακε-

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 24. 6-25. 1

fled. Here he was met by Craterus and his colleagues with the army, after they had carried out all Alexander's instructions.<sup>4</sup> As this city seemed to be on a favourable site for a settlement, he instructed Craterus to fortify it and to bring into the place as settlers any volunteers from the neighbouring people and any soldiers unfit for service.<sup>5</sup> He himself advanced where he was told most of the barbarians of the region had taken refuge; and reaching the mountain he camped there at its foot.

327-6  
B.C.

At this time Ptolemy son of Lagus,<sup>6</sup> who had been sent foraging by Alexander, and had himself advanced further ahead with a few others to scout, reported to Alexander that he had sighted barbarian fires more numerous than in Alexander's camp. Alexander was incredulous about the number of fires, but realizing that there was a concentration of barbarians who belonged to this region, he left part of his army behind, encamped as they were by the hill, and himself taking what appeared to be a number sufficient in view of this report, divided his men into three parts as soon as they saw the fires close at hand. He put Leonnatus the bodyguard in command of one, assigning him the battalions of Attalus and Balacrus; the second, consisting of a third of the hypaspists, the battalions of Philip and Philotas, and two chiliarchies of archers, the Agrianians and half the cavalry, was placed under Ptolemy son of Lagus, while he himself led the third division, where the greatest number of the barbarians appeared to be.

25. When they saw the Macedonians approach,

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 23, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. iii 1, 5 n. Tarn ii 248 is perverse.

<sup>6</sup> Pt. again the source at least till 25, 4.

- δόνας, κατεῖχον γὰρ χωρία ὑπερδέξια, τῷ τε  
 πλήθει σφῶν θαρσήσαντες καὶ τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὅτι  
 ὀλίγοι ἐφαίνοντο, καταφρονήσαντες ἐς τὸ πεδῖον  
 ὑποκατέβησαν· καὶ μάχη γίνεται καρτερά. ἀλλὰ  
 2 τούτους μὲν οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ ἐνίκα Ἀλέξανδρος· οἱ δὲ  
 ἀμφὶ Πτολεμαῖον οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμαλῷ παρετάξαντο,  
 ἀλλὰ γήλοφον γὰρ κατεῖχον οἱ βάρβαροι, ὀρθίους  
 ποιήσαντας<sup>1</sup> τοὺς λόχους Πτολεμαῖος προσῆγεν  
 ἥπερ ἐπιμαχ[ιμ]ώτατον τοῦ λόφου ἐφαίνετο, οὐ  
 πάντη τὸν λόφον κυκλωσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἀπολιπὼν, εἰ  
 φεύγειν ἐθέλοιεν οἱ βάρβαροι, χώραν αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν  
 3 φυγὴν. καὶ γίνεται καὶ τούτοις μάχη καρτερά  
 τοῦ χωρίου τῇ χαλεπότητι καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τοὺς  
 ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτη βαρβάρους οἱ Ἴνδοί, ἀλλὰ πολὺ  
 δὴ τι ἀλκιμώτατοι τῶν προσχώρων εἰσίν. ἐξώ-  
 σθησαν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους ὑπὸ τῶν  
 Μακεδόνων· καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Λεοννάτον τῇ τρίτῃ μοίρᾳ  
 τῆς στρατιᾶς ὡσαύτως ἔπραξαν· ἐνίκων γὰρ καὶ  
 4 οὗτοι τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς. καὶ λέγει Πτολεμαῖος  
 ἀνθρώπους μὲν ληφθῆναι τοὺς πάντας ὑπὲρ τετρα-  
 κισμυρίους, βοῶν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰς τρεῖς καὶ εἴκοσι  
 μυριάδας· καὶ τούτων τὰς καλλίστας ἐπιλεξάμενον  
 Ἀλέξανδρον, ὅτι διαφέρουσαι αὐτῷ κάλλει τε καὶ  
 μεγέθει ἐφαίνοντο, πέμψαι ἐθέλειν ἐς Μακεδονίαν  
 ἐργάζεσθαι τὴν χώραν.  
 5 Ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀσσακηνῶν χώραν ἦγεν·  
 τούτους γὰρ ἐξηγγέλλετο παρεσκευάσθαι ὡς μα-  
 χουμένους, ἵππεας μὲν ἐς δισχιλίους ἔχοντας,  
 πεζοὺς δὲ ὑπὲρ τοὺς τρισμυρίους, τριάκοντα δὲ  
 ἐλέφαντας. Κρατερός μὲν δὴ ἐκτετειχικῶς ἤδη

<sup>1</sup> Reiske: ποιήσαντες codd.; Roos.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 25. 1-5

for they were occupying a commanding position, confident in their numbers and despising the Macedonians, as they appeared to be few, they descended below to the plain; a fierce battle followed. Still Alexander defeated them without much difficulty. Ptolemy's troops marshalled themselves on uneven ground, but as the barbarians were holding a hill, they formed into columns, and Ptolemy led them up to the point where the hill seemed most open to assault, not surrounding it on all sides, but leaving a space for flight, in case the barbarians chose to flee. Here too the battle was fierce, both because of the difficulty of the position and because these Indians were not like the other barbarians of these parts but much the most warlike people of the region. But even they were pushed off the hill by the Macedonians. Leonnatus and his troops in the third division of the army were equally successful; they too defeated their opponents. Ptolemy says that over forty thousand men in all and over two hundred and thirty thousand oxen were captured and that Alexander selected the finest oxen because he thought them of unusual beauty and size and wished to send them into Macedonia to work the soil.

Thence he proceeded to the territory of the Assaceni-<sup>1</sup>ans, who were reported to have prepared for battle with some two thousand horsemen, over thirty thousand infantry, and thirty elephants. Craterus,

<sup>1</sup> By implication previous operations had been against the Aspasi-ans (23, 1), no opposition being recorded from Guraeans.

327-6  
B.C.

τὴν πόλιν, ἐφ' ἧς τῷ οἰκισμῷ κατελέλειπτο, τοὺς τε  
 βαρύτερον ὠπλισμένους τῆς στρατιᾶς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ  
 ἤγεν καὶ τὰς μηχανάς, εἴ που πολιορκίας δεήσειεν.  
 6 αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς τε ἑταίρους ἰππέας  
 ἄγων καὶ τοὺς ἵππακοντιστάς καὶ τὴν Κοίνου καὶ  
 Πολυπέρχοντος τάξιν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς  
 χιλίους<sup>1</sup> καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἤει ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀσ-  
 7 σακηνοὺς· ἤγε δὲ διὰ τῆς Γουραίων χώρας. καὶ  
 τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν ἐπώνυμον τῆς χώρας τὸν Γουραῖον  
 χαλεπῶς διέβη, διὰ βαθύτητά τε καὶ ὅτι ὄξυς ὁ  
 ῥοῦς ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λίθοι στρογγύλοι ἐν τῷ  
 ποταμῷ ὄντες σφαλεροὶ τοῖς ἐπιβαίνουσιν ἐγίγνο-  
 ντο. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ὡς προσάγοντα ἤσθοντο  
 Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀθρόοι μὲν ἐς μάχην καταστήναι οὐκ  
 ἐτόλμησαν, διαλυθέντες δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις  
 ταύτας ἐπενόουν ἀπομαχόμενοι διασώζειν.

26. Καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πρῶτα μὲν ἐπὶ Μάσσαγα  
 ἤγε, τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ταύτη πόλεων. ὡς δὲ  
 προσῆγεν ἤδη τοῖς τείχεσι, θαρρήσαντες οἱ βάρβα-  
 ροὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πρόσω Ἰνδῶν,  
 ἦσαν γὰρ οὗτοι ἐς ἑπτακισχιλίους, ὡς στρατοπε-  
 δευομένους εἶδον τοὺς Μακεδόνας, δρόμῳ ἐπ'  
 2 αὐτοὺς ἤεσαν. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἰδὼν πλησίον τῆς  
 πόλεως ἐσομένην τὴν μάχην προσωτέρω ἐκκαλέ-  
 σασθαι αὐτοὺς βουλευθεὶς τῶν τειχῶν, ὡς εἰ τροπὴ  
 γίγνοιτο, ἐγίνωσκεν γὰρ ἐσομένην, μὴ δι' ὀλίγου  
 ἐς τὴν πόλιν καταφυγόντες εὐμαρῶς διασώζοντο,  
 ὡς ἐκθέοντας εἶδε τοὺς βαρβάρους, μεταβαλλομέ-  
 νους κελεύει τοὺς Μακεδόνας ὀπίσω ἀποχωρεῖν ὡς

<sup>1</sup> codd.; Roos. Others write καὶ τοὺς ψιλούς (cf. IV 30, 6) or ἐς χιλίους. See historical note.



ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 25. 5-26. 2

who had finished fortifying the city of whose settle-  
 ment he had been left in charge, brought Alexander  
 the heavier armed troops of the army with the siege  
 engines, in case a siege proved necessary. Alexander  
 marched himself with the Companion cavalry, the  
 mounted javelin-men, the battalions of Coenus and  
 Polyperchon, the thousand Agrianians,<sup>2</sup> and the  
 archers, towards the Assaceniens through the country  
 of the Guraeans. He crossed the river Guraeus<sup>3</sup>  
 (which shares its name with the country) with diffi-  
 culty, because of its depth and rapid current, and the  
 rounded stones in the river proved slippery to step  
 on. But when the barbarians became aware of his  
 approach, they dared not take their stand in mass  
 for a battle, but dispersed to their own cities with the  
 intention of securing the defence and safety of each.

327-6  
 B.C.

6

7

26. Alexander marched first against Massaga, the  
 greatest city of the region. When he was already  
 close to the walls, the barbarians, relying on mercen-  
 ary Indians brought from further India, about seven  
 thousand men,<sup>1</sup> charged the Macedonians at the  
 double as soon as they saw them pitching camp.  
 Alexander who had seen that the battle would be  
 near the city, wished to entice them out further from  
 their walls, so that if a rout took place (and he was  
 sure it would) they should not have their city close at  
 hand for refuge and easily escape, and as soon as he  
 saw the barbarians sallying out, he ordered the

2

<sup>2</sup> Hardly more than 500 in 334 B.C. (Introd. 56), but 1,000 in 331/30 B.C. (QC. v 3, 6), they must have been reinforced by 'Thracians' (Berve i 137 ff.). Cf. Introd. 65. But the text is suspect (see critical note).

<sup>3</sup> Panjkora or Landai (united Panjkora-Swat river).

<sup>1</sup> QC. viii 10, 23 gives 38,000 foot, probably referring to the whole Assaceniens force, cf. 24, 5-7 above; his story of the siege, 10, 26-36, is incompatible with A's.

## ARRIAN

- πρὸς γήλοφόν τινα ἀπέχοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρίου, ἵναπερ στρατοπεδεύειν ἐγνώκει, ἑπτὰ που μάλιστα  
 3 σταδίου. καὶ οἱ πολέμοι ἀναθαρσήσαντες, ὡς ἐγκεκλικότων ἤδη τῶν Μακεδόνων, δρόμῳ τε καὶ ξὺν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐφέροντο ἐς αὐτούς. ὡς δὲ ἐξικνεῖτο ἤδη τὰ τοξεύματα, ἐνταῦθα Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος ἐπιστρέψας ἐς αὐτούς τὴν φάλαγγα  
 4 δρόμῳ ἀντεπήγε. πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ ἵππακοντισταί τε αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ οἱ τοξόται ἐκδραμόντες ξυνέμιξαν τοῖς βαρβάροις· αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα ἐν τάξει ἤγεν. οἱ δὲ Ἴνδοι τῷ τε παραλόγῳ ἐκπλαγέντες καὶ ἅμα ἐν χερσὶ γεγενημένης τῆς μάχης ἐγκλίναντες ἔφευγον ἐς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἀπέθανον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμφὶ τοὺς διακοσίους, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἐς τὰ τείχη κατεκλείσθησαν. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος προσήγε τῷ τείχει τὴν φάλαγγα, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τοξεύεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἐς τὸ σφυρὸν οὐ  
 5 χαλεπῶς. ἐπαγαγὼν δὲ τὰς μηχανὰς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ τῶν μὲν τειχῶν τι εὐμαρῶς κατέσεισε, βιαζομένους δὲ ταύτῃ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἢ παρέρρηκτο τοῦ τείχους οὐκ ἀτόλμως οἱ Ἴνδοι ἠμύνοντο, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀνεκαλέσατο τὴν στρατιάν. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ τῶν τε Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν ἢ προσβολὴ καρτερωτέρα ἐγίνετο καὶ πύργος ἐπήχθη ξύλινος τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅθεν ἐκτοξεύοντες οἱ τοξόται καὶ βέλη ἀπὸ μηχανῶν ἀφιέμενα ἀνέστελλεν ἐπὶ πολὺ τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὡς βιάσασθαι εἴσω τοῦ τείχους οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο.
- 6 Τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ προσαγαγὼν αὐθις τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς γέφυραν ἐπιβαλὼν τοῦ τείχους ἢ παρερρωγὸς ἦν, ταύτῃ ἐπήγε τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς, οἵπερ αὐτῷ καὶ Τύρον ὡσαύτως ἐξεῖλον. πολλῶν

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 26. 2-6

Macedonians to turn right about and withdraw  
towards a hill, just about seven stades away from the  
place where he had decided to camp. Emboldened 3  
by the belief that the Macedonians had already given  
way, the enemy rushed on them at full speed and in  
disorder. When the arrows were just reaching his  
troops, Alexander wheeled his phalanx towards them  
by a signal and led it on at the double. The mounted 4  
javelin-men, the Agrianians and the archers first  
dashed forward and joined battle with the barbarians,  
while Alexander himself kept the phalanx in forma-  
tion. The Indians were appalled at what they had  
never reckoned on, and as soon as it had come to  
hand to hand fighting, they turned and fled to the  
city. Some two hundred perished, but the rest were  
shut up inside their walls. Alexander brought up  
his phalanx to the wall, and was then wounded in his  
ankle by an arrow from the wall, but not seriously.  
Next day he brought up the engines and easily 5  
destroyed a part of the walls; the Macedonians  
pressed in at the breach made, but the Indians re-  
sisted bravely, and so that day Alexander recalled his  
troops. On the next the Macedonian attack was  
stronger, and a wooden tower was brought up against  
the walls, from which the archers shot volleys, while  
the engines hurled missiles; they pushed the Indians  
a long way back, but even so they could not force  
their way inside the wall.

However, on the third day Alexander brought up 6  
the phalanx and threw a bridge from an engine on to  
the breach in the wall, over which he led the hypas-  
pists, who had helped him in the same way to capture

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## ARRIAN

δὲ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ὠθουμένων ἄχθος λαβοῦσα μεῖζον ἢ γέφυρα κατερράγη καὶ πίπτουσι ξὺν αὐτῇ οἱ  
 7 Μακεδόνες. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἰδόντες τὸ γιγνόμενον λίθοις τε ξὺν βοῇ ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ ἄλλῳ ὄτῳ τις μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχων ἐτύγγανεν ἢ ὄτῳ τις ἐν τῷ τότε ἔλαβεν ἐξηκόντιζον ἐς τοὺς Μακεδόνας· οἱ δὲ καὶ κατὰ θύρας, αἵτινες αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰ μεσοπύργια μικραὶ ἦσαν, ἐκθέοντες ἐκ χειρὸς ἔπαιον τεταραγμένους.

27. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ πέμπει Ἀλκέταν ξὺν τῇ αὐτοῦ τάξει τοὺς τε κατατετρωμένους ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ὅσοι προσεμάχοντο ἐπανακαλέσασθαι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τῇ τετάρτῃ ὡσαύτως ἀπ' ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἄλλη ἐπιβάθρα αὐτῷ προσήγετο πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος.

2 Καὶ οἱ Ἰνδοί, ἕως μὲν αὐτοῖς ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ χωρίου περιῆν, ἀπεμάχοντο καρτερῶς· ὡς δὲ βέλει ἀπὸ μηχανῆς τυπεῖς ἀποθνήσκει ἐκεῖνος, αὐτῶν τε οἱ μὲν τινες πεπτωκότες ἐν τῇ ξυνεχεῖ πολιορκίᾳ, οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ τραυματῖαι τε καὶ ἀπόμαχοι ἦσαν,  
 3 ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. τῷ δὲ ἀσμένῳ γίνεται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς διασῶσαι· καὶ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῷδε Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς μισθοφόροις Ἰνδοῖς ὡς καταταχθέντας ἐς τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὰν ξὺν αὐτῷ στρατεύεσθαι. οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐξῆλθον ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν κατὰ σφᾶς ἐπὶ γηλόφῳ, ὃς ἦν ἀντίπορος τοῦ τῶν Μακεδόνων στρατοπέδου. νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπενόουν δρασμῶ διαχρησάμενοι ἐς τὰ σφέτερα ἦθη ἀπαναστῆναι οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ἐναντία  
 4 αἵρεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰνδοῖς ὅπλα. καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἐξηγγέλθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, περιστήσας τῆς νυκτὸς τῷ γηλόφῳ τὴν στρατιὰν πᾶσαν κατακόπτει τοὺς

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 26. 6-27. 4

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B.C.

Tyre. Many were shoved forward in eagerness, the bridge received too great a weight and broke, and the Macedonians fell with it. Seeing what was happening, the barbarians shouted and volleyed stones on the Macedonians from the walls, and arrows and anything else anyone happened to have in his hands or could seize at the moment, while others ran out at the small gates in the curtain walls and struck at them in their confusion at close quarters. 7

27. Alexander sent Alcetas with his battalion to pick up the wounded and to recall to the camp all who were still offering resistance. On the fourth day another step-ladder was brought up to the wall in the same way by another engine.

The Indians resisted strongly as long as the commander of the place survived, but when he was hit by a missile from a catapult and killed, with part of their number already fallen in continuous siege and most of them wounded and unfit for service, they sent a herald to Alexander. He was glad to be able to save the lives of brave men, granted terms to the mercenary Indians on the basis that they should join the rest of his army and take the field with him. They came out with their arms, and encamped by themselves on a hill facing the Macedonian camp; however, they intended to slip away at night and escape to their own homes, as they had no wish to bear arms against the rest of the Indians. When this was reported to Alexander, he threw his whole force round the hill in the night, and cut down the 2 3 4

## ARRIAN

Ἰνδοὺς ἐν μέσῳ ἀπολαβῶν, τὴν τε πόλιν αἰρεῖ κατὰ κράτος ἐρημωθεῖσαν τῶν προμαχομένων, καὶ τὴν μητέρα τὴν Ἀσσακάνου καὶ τὴν παῖδα ἔλαβεν. ἀπέθανον δὲ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ξὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἑς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν.

- 5 Ἐνθεν δὲ Κοῖνον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ Βάζιρα ἐκπέμπει, γνώμην ποιησάμενος ὅτι μαθόντες τῶν Μασσακωνῶν τὴν ἄλωσιν ἐνδώσουσι σφᾶς αὐτοῦς. Ἀτταλον δὲ καὶ Ἀλκέταν καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν ἱππάρχην ἐπὶ Ὠρα στέλλει, ἄλλην πόλιν, παραγγείλας περιτει-  
6 χίζειν τὴν πόλιν ἔστ' ἂν ἀφίκηται αὐτός. καὶ γίννεται ἐκδρομὴ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀλκέταν. οὐ χαλεπῶς δὲ τρεψάμενοι αὐτοῦς οἱ Μακεδόνες εἴσω τοῦ τείχους ἑς τὴν πόλιν ἀποστρέφουσι. καὶ Κοῖνω οὐ προχωρεῖ τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βαζίροις, ἀλλὰ πιστεύοντες γὰρ τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ὀχυρότητι, ὅτι ὑπερύψηλόν τε ἦν καὶ πάντῃ ἀκριβῶς τετειχισμένον, οὐδὲν ξυμβατικὸν ἐνεδίδουσαν.
- 7 Ταῦτα μαθὼν Ἀλέξανδρος ὤρμητο μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ Βάζιρα, γνοὺς δὲ ὅτι τῶν προσοίκων τινὲς βαρβάρων παριέναι ἑς τὰ Ὠρα τὴν πόλιν λαθόντες μέλλουσι, πρὸς Ἀβισάρου ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐσταλμένοι, ἐπὶ τὰ Ὠρα πρῶτον ἦγε. Κοῖνον δὲ ἐπιτειχίσει τῇ πόλει τῶν Βαζιρέων καρτερόν τι χωρίον προτέταξε, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντα ἀποχρῶσαν, ὡς μὴ ἄδεια εἴη τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει χρῆσθαι τῇ χώρᾳ, αὐτὸν ἄγοντα τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν λοιπὴν παρ' αὐτὸν  
8 ἰέναι. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν Βαζιρέων ὡς εἶδον ἀπιόντα ξὺν

<sup>1</sup> D. 84 (after long lacuna), cf. QC. viii 10, 34 ff, tells of surrender of the 'queen'; QC. and J. xii 7 suggest that Al. had a son by her. The massacre, ignored by QC. and differently described by D., is condemned by P. 59, 3 f.; not all

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 27. 4-8

Indians whom he had thus enclosed, took their city by assault, deprived as it was of its defenders, and captured Assacenus' mother and daughter.<sup>1</sup> In the entire siege some twenty-five of Alexander's men perished.<sup>2</sup>

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From this place he sent Coenus to Bazira, having formed the belief that on learning of the capture of Massaga it would surrender, while Attalus, Alcetas and Demetrius the hipparch<sup>3</sup> were sent against another city, Ora, and directed to throw a wall round it pending his own arrival. The townsmen made a sally against Alcetas' forces, but the Macedonians easily repulsed them and drove them back into the city within the wall. Coenus was not successful at Bazira, where the townspeople, trusting in the strength of their site, since it was very high and fortified carefully all round, gave no signs of surrendering on terms.

On learning this, Alexander started towards Bazira; but knowing that some of the neighbouring barbarians were preparing to slip unseen into the city of Ora, as Abisares<sup>4</sup> had despatched them for this purpose, he advanced first against Ora, and commanded Coenus to fortify a strong position near the city of Bazira and leave a sufficient garrison in it, to prevent the townsmen having the use of the country without risk, and then himself to bring the rest of the army to join him. The men in Bazira, on seeing

ancients need have shared his view, cf. Caesar, *Gallic Wars* iv 13-15.

<sup>1</sup> QC. viii 10, 22 wrongly makes the siege begin before that of Massaga.

<sup>2</sup> QC. viii 11, 1 makes Polyperchon sole commander (cf. 22, 1 n.).

<sup>4</sup> He ruled in Hazara; for his covert hostility cf. iv 30, 7; v 8, 3; 20, 5; 22, 2; 29, 4 f.



## ARRIAN

τῷ πλείστῳ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν Κοῖνον, καταφρο-  
νήσαντες τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς οὐ γενομένων ἂν  
σφισιν ἀξιομάχων, ἐπεκθέουσιν ἐς τὸ πεδῖον· καὶ  
γίγνεται αὐτῶν μάχη καρτερά. καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ  
πίπτουσι μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων ἐς πεντακοσίους,  
ζῶντες δὲ ἐλήφθησαν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἑβδομήκοντα· οἱ  
δὲ λοιποὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυμφυγόντες βεβαιότερον ἤδη  
εἶργοντο τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτειχίσματος.  
9 καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ τῶν Ὠρων ἡ πολιορκία οὐ  
χαλεπὴ ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐξ ἐφόδου προσβαλὼν  
τοῖς τείχεσι τῆς πόλεως ἐκράτησε, καὶ τοὺς  
ἐλέφαντας τοὺς ἐγκαταλειφθέντας ἔλαβε.

28. Καὶ ταῦτα οἱ ἐν τοῖς Βαζίροις ὡς ἔμαθον,  
ἀπογνόντες τὰ σφέτερα πράγματα ἀμφὶ μέσας  
νύκτας τὴν πόλιν ἐκλείπουσιν, ἔφυγον δὲ ἐς τὴν  
πέτραν. ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι ἔπραττον·  
ἀπολιπόντες τὰς πόλεις ζύμπαντες ἔφευγον ἐς τὴν  
πέτραν τὴν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τὴν Ἄορνον καλουμένην.  
μέγα γάρ τι τοῦτο χρῆμα πέτρας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ  
ταύτῃ ἐστί, καὶ λόγος ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κατέχει οὐδὲ  
Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Διὸς ἀλωτὸν γενέσθαι τὴν πέτραν.  
2 εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐς Ἰνδοὺς ἀφίκετο ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ὁ  
Θηβαῖος ἢ ὁ Τύριος ἢ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ἐς οὐδέτερα ἔχω  
ἰσχυρίσασθαι· μᾶλλον δὲ δοκῶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀφίκετο,  
ἀλλὰ πάντα γὰρ ὅσα χαλεπὰ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐς  
τοσόνδε ἄρα αὖξουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν χαλεπότητα, ὡς  
καὶ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἂν ἄπορα γενέσθαι μυθεύειν.  
καγὼ ὑπὲρ τῆς πέτρας ταύτης οὕτω γιννώσκω, τὸν  
Ἡρακλέα ἐς κόμπον τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφημίζεσθαι.

<sup>1</sup> A's comment cf. App. IV 4. § 4, if not also 30, 4, shows that the story stood in one of A's main sources, perhaps Ar.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 27. 8-28. 2

Coenus depart with most of the army, made light of the Macedonians, supposing that they would not be their equals in the field, and sallied out into the plain; there was a fierce battle, in which about five hundred of the barbarians fell, and over seventy were taken alive; the rest took refuge in the city, where they were now more firmly barred from the country by those who held the stronghold facing the wall. The siege of Ora caused Alexander no difficulty; he attacked the walls at once, seized the city at the first attempt, and captured the elephants left there. 9

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28. When the inhabitants of Bazira learnt this, they despaired of their position, and about midnight deserted the city and fled to the rock, as did the other barbarians; leaving their cities they all fled to the rock in this neighbourhood called Aornos. It is an enormous sort of rock in this country, and the prevalent story about it is that even Heracles the son of Zeus was unable to capture it. In fact I cannot assert with confidence if Heracles, whether the Theban or the Tyrian or the Egyptian Heracles,<sup>1</sup> ever actually reached India; I incline to think that he did not, but that men will magnify difficulties they meet, so far as to make up a story that even Heracles would not have overcome them. So it is my own view about this rock, that the name of Heracles is 2

rather than Pt., cf. App. XVI in vol ii.; A. first gives it with reserve, because of his own disbelief that the Greek Heracles had come to Aornos, but then treats it as a fact that Al. believed it. The story of the dimensions of Aornos (Pt/Ar?) is certainly well-founded, cf. Sir A. Stein (App. VIII 2) pp. 128 ff. D. 85, 2; QC. viii 11, 2 tell that Heracles was thwarted by an earthquake, Strabo (incredulous of the whole tale) that he was thrice repulsed (xv 1, 8). No doubt there were many variants. Fuller 245 ff. supplies plan and photographs of Aornos = Pir-Sar.

- 3 τὸν μὲν δὴ κύκλον τῆς πέτρας λέγουσιν ἐς διακο-  
 σίους σταδίους μάλιστα εἶναι, ὕψος δὲ αὐτῆς,  
 ἵναπερ χθαμαλώτατον, σταδίων ἔνδεκα, καὶ ἀνά-  
 βασιν χειροποίητον μίαν χαλεπὴν· εἶναι δὲ καὶ  
 ὕδωρ ἐν ἄκρᾳ τῇ πέτρᾳ πολὺ καὶ καθαρὸν, πηγὴν  
 ἀνίσχουσαν, ὡς καὶ ἀπορρεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς πηγῆς ὕδωρ,  
 καὶ ὕλην καὶ γῆν ἀγαθὴν ἐργάσιμον ὄσσην καὶ  
 χιλίοις ἀνθρώποις ἀποχρῶσαν ἂν εἶναι ἐργάζεσθαι.
- 4 Καὶ ταῦτα ἀκούοντα Ἀλέξανδρον πόθος λαμβά-  
 νει ἐξελεῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄρος, οὐχ ἠκιστα ἐπὶ τῷ  
 ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα μύθῳ πεφημισμένῳ. τὰ μὲν  
 δὴ Ὄρα καὶ τὰ Μάσσαγα φρούρια ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ τῇ
- 5 χώρᾳ, τὰ Βάζιρα δὲ πόλιν<sup>1</sup> ἐξετείχισε. καὶ οἱ  
 ἀμφὶ Ἡφαιστιῶνά τε καὶ Περδίκκαν αὐτῷ ἄλλην  
 πόλιν ἐκτειχίσαντες, Ὀροβάτις ὄνομα τῇ πόλει  
 ἦν, καὶ φρουρὰν καταλιπόντες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰνδὸν  
 ποταμὸν ἦεσαν· ὡς δὲ ἀφίκοντο, ἔπρασσον ἤδη  
 ὅσα ἐς τὸ ζεῦξαι τὸν Ἰνδὸν ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου  
 ἐτέτακτο.
- 6 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῆς μὲν χώρας τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ  
 Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ σατράπην κατέστησε Νικάνορα τῶν  
 ἐταίρων. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν  
 Ἰνδὸν ποταμὸν ἦγε, καὶ πόλιν τε Πευκελαῶτιν οὐ  
 πόρρω τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ὠκισμένην ὁμολογία παρεστή-  
 σατο καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ φρουρὰν καταστήσας τῶν  
 Μακεδόνων καὶ Φίλιππον ἐπὶ τῇ φρουρᾷ ἡγεμόνα,  
 ὃ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα προσηγάγετο μικρὰ πολίσματα πρὸς  
 τῷ Ἰνδῷ ποταμῷ ὠκισμένα. ξυνείποντο δὲ αὐτῷ  
 Κωφαῖός τε καὶ Ἀσσαγέτης οἱ ὑπαρχοὶ τῆς
- 7 χώρας. ἀφικόμενος δὲ ἐς Ἐμβόλιμα πόλιν, ἣ

<sup>1</sup> Roos inserted <τὴν> before πόλιν.

ANABASIS OF ALEXANDER IV. 28. 3-7

brought into the tale as a boast. The circumference 3 327-8  
of the rock, it is said, is about two hundred stades, its  
height at its lowest part eleven stades,<sup>2</sup> with only one  
way up, made by hand and rough. On the top of the  
rock there is said to be plenty of pure water which  
comes from a perennial spring, from which water  
actually pours out, as well as wood and good arable  
land which would be enough for a thousand men to  
till. B.C.

As soon as Alexander heard this, he was seized with 4  
a longing to capture this mountain too, not least  
because of the legend about Heracles.<sup>3</sup> He made  
Ora and Massaga into forts to control the district, and  
fortified Bazira as a city. Hephaestion, Perdicas 5  
and their men fortified another city for him, called  
Orobatis, and leaving a garrison there went on to-  
wards the river Indus; on arrival, they were engaged  
in following all Alexander's instructions for bridging  
the Indus.

Alexander appointed Nicanor, one of the Com- 6 328  
panions, satrap of the region this side of the river  
Indus. He himself first went towards the river Indus  
and took over by surrender the city of Peucelaotis,  
situated not far from it, and set a Macedonian  
garrison there with Philippus as commandant; he  
also took over various small towns lying near the river  
Indus. Cophaeus and Assagetes, the hyparchs of the  
country, were in attendance on him. Then on reach- 7

<sup>2</sup> Cf. iv 21, 2 n.

<sup>3</sup> App. IV 3.

## ARRIAN

ξύνεγγυς τῆς πέτρας τῆς Ἀόρνου ὤκειτο, Κρατε-  
 ρὸν μὲν ξὺν μέρει τῆς στρατιᾶς καταλείπει αὐτοῦ,  
 σῆτόν τε ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὡς πλεῖστον ξυνάγειν (κε-  
 λεύσας)<sup>1</sup> καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐς χρόνιον τριβὴν, ὡς  
 ἐντεῦθεν ὀρμωμένους τοὺς Μακεδόνας χρονίῳ  
 πολιορκίᾳ ἐκτρυχῶσαι τοὺς κατέχοντας τὴν πέτραν,  
 8 εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἐφόδου ληφθείη. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς τοξότας τε  
 ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τὴν Κοίνου  
 τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς  
 κουφοτάτους τε καὶ ἅμα εὐοπλοτάτους καὶ τῶν  
 ἐταίρων ἰππέων ἐς διακοσίους καὶ ἵπποτοξότας ἐς  
 ἑκατὸν προσῆγε τῇ πέτρᾳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ  
 ἡμέρᾳ κατεστρατοπεδεύσατο, ἵνα ἐπιτήδειον αὐτῷ  
 εἰφαίνετο, τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία ὀλίγον προελθὼν ὡς πρὸς  
 τὴν πέτραν αὖθις ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο.

29. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἤκον παρ' αὐτὸν τῶν προσ-  
 χώρων τινές, σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς ἐνδιδόντες καὶ  
 ἠγγήσεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐς τῆς πέτρας τὸ ἐπιμα-  
 χώτατον, ὅθεν οὐ χαλεπὸν αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι ἐλεῖν τὸ  
 χωρίον. καὶ ξὺν τούτοις πέμπει Πτολεμαῖον τὸν  
 Λάγου τὸν σωματοφύλακα τοὺς τε Ἀγριᾶνας  
 ἄγοντα καὶ τοὺς ψιλοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ τῶν  
 ὑπασπιστῶν ἐπιλέκτους, προστάξας, ἐπειδὴν κατα-  
 λάβῃ τὸ χωρίον, κατέχειν μὲν αὐτὸ ἰσχυρᾷ φυλακῇ,  
 2 οἱ δὲ σημαίνειν ὅτι ἔχεται. καὶ Πτολεμαῖος  
 ἐλθὼν ὁδὸν τραχεῖάν τε καὶ δύσπορον λανθάνει τοὺς  
 βαρβάρους κατασχὼν τὸν τόπον· καὶ τοῦτον  
 χάρακι ἐν κύκλῳ καὶ τάφρῳ ὀχυρώσας πυρσὸν

<sup>1</sup> Some such word must have been omitted (Polak).

<sup>1</sup> See also D. 85 f.; QC. viii 11. Pt. is evidently A's source (even if the allusions to Heracles are inserted from Ar.).

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ing the city of Embolima, which lay near the rock of Aornos, he left Craterus there with part of the army with instructions to get as much grain as possible into the city and everything else a long delay would make necessary, so that the Macedonians might use the city as a base, and wear out the holders of the rock by a long blockade, if it were not captured by first assault. He himself took the archers, the Agrianians and Coenus' battalion and, selecting the most nimble but at the same time the best armed men from the rest of the phalanx, about two hundred of the Companion cavalry and a hundred mounted archers, approached the rock. That day he encamped in a place he thought convenient; on the next he advanced a little nearer the rock and camped again. 8

29. At this point some of the neighbouring people came to Alexander and surrendered, promising to lead him to the part of the rock which could best be assaulted, from which he could capture the position without difficulty.<sup>1</sup> With these men he sent Ptolemy son of Lagus, the bodyguard, in command of the Agrianians, the light troops including men chosen from the hypaspists,<sup>2</sup> ordering him as soon as he captured the position to occupy it with a strong garrison, and signal to him that it was in his hands. Ptolemy pursued a rough and difficult track and seized the place, unobserved by the barbarians; he strengthened it with a stockade all round and a trench, and raised a fire-signal from the height where 2

See iii 29, 7 n. Note that Pt. records an implied criticism of himself in § 4. Chares (Jacoby no. 125 F. 16) has an anecdote that may relate to this siege and date it c. April 326 B.C., cf. Stein pp. 152 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Intro.* 62.

## ARRIAN

αἶρει ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους ἔνθεν ὀφθήσεσθαι ὑπὸ Ἄλε-  
 ξάνδρου ἔμελλεν. καὶ ὤφθη τε ἅμα ἡ φλόξ καὶ  
 Ἄλέξανδρος ἐπῆγε τῇ ὑστεραία τὴν στρατιάν·  
 ἀμυνομένων δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων οὐδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ  
 3 ὑπὸ δυσχωρίας ἐγίγνετο. ὡς δὲ Ἄλεξάνδρω  
 ἄπορον τὴν προσβολὴν κατέμαθον οἱ βάρβαροι,  
 ἀναστρέψαντες τοῖς ἀμφὶ Πτολεμαῖον αὐτοὶ προσ-  
 έβαλλον· καὶ γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Μακε-  
 δόνων μάχη καρτερά, τῶν μὲν διασπάσαι τὸν  
 χάρακα σπουδῆν ποιουμένων, τῶν Ἰνδῶν, Πτο-  
 λεμαίου δὲ διαφυλάξαι τὸ χωρίον· καὶ μείον  
 σχόντες οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν τῷ ἀκροβολισμῷ νυκτὸς  
 ἐπιγενομένης ἀπεχώρησαν.

4 Ἄλέξανδρος δὲ τῶν Ἰνδῶν τινα τῶν αὐτομόλων  
 πιστόν τε ἄλλως καὶ τῶν χωρίων δαήμονα ἐπιλε-  
 ξάμενος πέμπει παρὰ Πτολεμαῖον τῆς νυκτὸς,  
 γράμματα φέροντα [τὸν Ἰνδόν],<sup>1</sup> ἵνα ἐνεγέγραπτο,  
 ἐπειδὴν αὐτὸς προσβάλλῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ, τὸν δὲ ἐπιέναι  
 τοῖς βαρβάροις κατὰ τὸ ὄρος μηδὲ ἀγαπᾶν ἐν  
 φυλακῇ ἔχοντα τὸ χωρίον, ὡς ἀμφοτέρωθεν βαλ-  
 5 λομένους τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς ἀμφιβόλους γίγνεσθαι. καὶ  
 αὐτὸς ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἄρας ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου  
 προσῆγε τὴν στρατιάν κατὰ τὴν πρόσβασιν, ἣ  
 Πτολεμαῖος λαθὼν ἀνέβη, γνώμην ποιούμενος,  
 ὡς, εἰ ταύτῃ βιασάμενος ξυμμίξει τοῖς ἀμφὶ  
 Πτολεμαῖον, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἔτι ἐσόμενον αὐτῷ τὸ  
 6 ἔργον. καὶ ξυνέβη οὕτως. ἔστε μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ  
 μεσημβρίαν ξυνειστήκει καρτερὰ μάχη τοῖς τε  
 Ἰνδοῖς καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν, τῶν μὲν ἐκβιαζομένων  
 ἐς τὴν πρόσβασιν, τῶν δὲ βαλλόντων ἀνιόντας· ὡς  
 δὲ οὐκ ἀνίεσαν οἱ Μακεδόνες, ἄλλοι ἐπ' ἄλλοις

<sup>1</sup> Deleted by Polak.



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Alexander was likely to see it. The flare was seen at once, and next day Alexander brought up his army; the barbarians offered opposition and he had no success, owing to difficulties of terrain. But as soon as the barbarians realized that Alexander's advance was impracticable, they turned and attacked Ptolemy and his troops, and a fierce battle took place between them and the Macedonians, the Indians trying strenuously to pull down the stockade, Ptolemy to keep his hold on the position; the barbarians had the worst of the exchange of missiles, and withdrew at nightfall. 3

Alexander selected a deserter from the Indians, whom he trusted and who also had exact knowledge of the locality, and sent him by night to Ptolemy with a letter directing him, as soon as Alexander himself approached the rock, to attack the barbarians from the height and not to content himself with merely defending the position; the Indians would then not know which way to turn, when they were fired on from both sides. At dawn Alexander himself moved from his camp and brought his army to the approach by which Ptolemy had secretly ascended, reckoning that if he could force his way in this direction and join Ptolemy's force, he would have no more difficulty in the task. That was what happened. Until midday there was a fierce battle between the Indians and the Macedonians, who tried to force the approach, while the Indians volleyed at them as they climbed up. But as the Macedonians kept constantly coming up, one detachment after another, while their 4 5 6

## ARRIAN

ἐπιόντες, οἱ δὲ πρόσθεν ἀναπαυόμενοι, μόγισ δὴ ἀμφὶ δείλην ἐκράτησαν τῆς παρόδου καὶ ξυνέμιξαν τοῖς ξὺν Πτολεμαίῳ. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ὁμοῦ ἤδη γενομένη ἢ στρατιὰ πᾶσα ἐπήγετο αὐθις ὡς ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν πέτραν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔτι ἄπορος ἦν αὐτῇ ἢ προσβολή, ταύτη μὲν δὴ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος γίνεταί.

7 Ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἔω παραγγέλλει στρατιώτῃ ἐκάστῳ κόπτειν χάρακας ἑκατὸν κατ' ἄνδρα. καὶ οὗτοι κεκομμένοι ἦσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐχώννυεν ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς κορυφῆς τοῦ λόφου, ἵνα ἐστρατοπεδευκότες ἦσαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν χῶμα μέγα, ἔνθεν τοξεύματα τε ἂν ἐξικνεῖσθαι ἐς τοὺς προμαχομένους [δυνατὰ] αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο καὶ ἀπὸ μηχανῶν βέλη ἀφιέμενα· καὶ ἐχώννυον αὐτῷ πᾶς τις ἀντιλαμβανόμενος τοῦ ἔργου· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφειστήκει θεατῆς καὶ ἐπαινέτης τοῦ ξὺν προθυμίας περαινομένου, κολαστῆς δὲ τοῦ ἐν τῷ παραχρήμα ἐκλιποῦς.

30. Τῇ μὲν δὴ πρώτη ἡμέρᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ στάδιον ἔχωσεν αὐτῷ ὁ στρατός. ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν οἱ τε σφενδονῆται σφενδονῶντες ἐς τοὺς Ἴνδους ἐκ τοῦ ἤδη κεχωσμένου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μηχανῶν βέλη ἀφιέμενα ἀνέστελλε τῶν Ἰνδῶν τὰς ἐκδρομὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς χωννύοντας. καὶ ἐχώννυτο αὐτῷ ἐς τρεῖς ἡμέρας ξυνεχῶς τὸ χωρίον. τῇ τετάρτῃ δὲ βιασάμενοι τῶν Μακεδόνων οὐ πολλοὶ κατέσχον ὀλίγον γήλοφον ἰσόπεδον τῇ πέτρᾳ. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος οὐδέν τι ἐλινύων ἐπήγε τὸ χῶμα ξυνάψαι ἐθέλων τὸ χωννύμενον τῷ γηλόφῳ, ὄντινα οἱ ὀλίγοι αὐτῷ ἤδη κατεῖχον.

2 Οἱ δὲ Ἴνδοι πρός τε τὴν ἀδιήγητον τόλμαν τῶν ἐς τὸν γήλοφον βιασαμένων Μακεδόνων ἐκπλα-

predecessors rested from the attack, with much difficulty they mastered the ascent in the afternoon and joined up with Ptolemy's force. From that moment the army, now united, made a renewed onslaught as a whole on the rock itself. But the attack there still proved impracticable. This was the close of operations that day.

At dawn Alexander told each soldier to cut a hundred stakes; when they had all been cut, he himself started to raise a great mound, beginning from the top of the crest of the hill on which they had encamped and extending up to the rock; from this he thought arrows and missiles hurled from the engines would reach the defenders. All hands took part in the work of building the mound; Alexander himself stood by, watching and approving where it proceeded with vigour, and punishing failures to make immediate progress. 7

30. On the first day the army built the mound to about a stade in length. On the next, the slingers fired on the Indians from the mound so far as it had been built, and missiles were flung from the engines; this checked the sallies the Indians made against the builders of the mound. The pile went on growing for three days continuously on the chosen spot. On the fourth a few Macedonians made a rush and held a small hill on the same level as the rock, and Alexander without a moment's delay extended the mound, anxious to connect it with the hill this small party was already holding for him

The Indians were astounded at the indescribable boldness of the Macedonians who had forced their 2

- γέντες καὶ τὸ χῶμα ξυνάπτον ἤδη ὄρωντες, τοῦ μὲν ἀπομάχεσθαι ἔτι ἀπείχοντο, πέμψαντες δὲ κήρυκας σφῶν παρὰ Ἀλέξανδρον ἐθέλειν ἔφασκον ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πέτραν, εἴ σφισι σπένδοιτο. γνώμην δὲ ἐπεποίηντο ἐν τῷ ἔτι διαμέλλοντι τῶν σπονδῶν διαγαγόντες τὴν ἡμέραν νυκτὸς ὡς ἕκαστοι δια-
- 3 σκεδάννυσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα ἦθη. καὶ τοῦτο ὡς ἐπύθετο Ἀλέξανδρος, ἐνδίδωσιν αὐτοῖς χρόνον τε ἐς τὴν ἀποχώρησιν καὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τὴν κύκλωσιν τὴν πάντη ἀφελεῖν. καὶ αὐτὸς ἔμενεν ἔστε ἤρξαντο τῆς ἀποχωρήσεως· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν σωματοφυλάκων καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐς ἑπτακοσίους κατὰ τὸ ἐκλελειμμένον τῆς πέτρας ἀνέρχεται ἐς αὐτὴν πρῶτος, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἄλλος ἄλλη
- 4 ἀνιμῶντες ἀλλήλους ἀνήεσαν. καὶ οὗτοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποχωροῦντας τῶν βαρβάρων τραπόμενοι ἀπὸ ξυνηθήματος, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ καὶ πεφοβημένως ἀποχωροῦντες κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν ῥύψαντες σφᾶς ἀπέθανον. εἶχετό τε Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἢ πέτρα ἢ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἄπορος γενομένη καὶ ἔθνευ ἐπ' αὐτῇ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ κατεσκεύασε φρούριον, παραδοὺς Σισικότητι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς φρουρᾶς, ὃς ἐξ Ἰνδῶν μὲν πάλαι ἠὔτομολήκει ἐς Βάκτρα παρὰ Βῆσσον, Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ κατασχόντος τὴν χώραν τὴν Βακτρίαν ξυνεστράτευέ τε αὐτῷ καὶ πιστὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἐφαίνετο.
- 5 Ἄρας δ' ἐκ τῆς πέτρας ἐς τὴν Ἀσσακηνῶν χώραν ἐμβάλλει. Τὸν γὰρ ἀδελφὸν τὸν Ἀσσακάνου ἐξηγγέλλετο τοὺς τε ἐλέφαντας ἔχοντα καὶ τῶν προσχώρων βαρβάρων πολλοὺς συμπεφευγέναι ἐς τὰ ταύτη ὄρη. καὶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Δύρτα πόλιν

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way to the hill, and seeing the mound already connected with it, began to desist from any defence, and sent a herald on their behalf to Alexander, saying they were willing to surrender the rock, on terms being granted them. They had formed a plan of spending the day in the delays incident to the treaty and scattering at night to their various homes. But when Alexander discovered this, he gave them time to withdraw and to remove the round of sentries who guarded all points, waited himself till they began their withdrawal and then took some seven hundred of the bodyguards and hypaspists to the deserted part of the rock. He was himself the first to scale it and the Macedonians followed, pulling each other up at different points. At a signal they turned on the retreating barbarians and killed many of them in flight; in the panic of their escape some threw themselves down the cliffs and perished. Alexander was now in possession of the rock Heracles could not take, sacrificed on it, and set a garrison there, appointing to command the guard Sisicottus,<sup>1</sup> who had long ago deserted from the Indians and joined Bessus at Bactra, but taken service under Alexander when he became master of Bactria and shown himself especially trustworthy.

On leaving the rock, Alexander invaded the district of the Assaceniens,<sup>2</sup> for it was reported that Assacanus' brother with the elephants and many of the neighbouring barbarians had taken refuge in the hills there. When he arrived at a city called Dyrta,

<sup>1</sup> 'Sisicostus', QC. viii 11, 25, recording his appointment.

<sup>2</sup> D. 86, 2; QC. viii 12, 1 ff. record different operations against 'Aphrices' or 'Erices'.

## ARRIAN

- τῶν μὲν <ἐν>οικοῦντων οὐδένα καταλαμβάνει οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ πρὸς τῇ πόλει· ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν Νεάρχον τε καὶ Ἀντίοχον τοὺς χιλιάρχους τῶν
- 6 ὑπασπιστῶν ἐκπέμπει· καὶ Νεάρχῳ μὲν τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας <καὶ><sup>1</sup> τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἄγειν ἔδωκεν, Ἀντιόχῳ δὲ τὴν τε αὐτοῦ χιλιαρχίαν καὶ δύο ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἄλλας. ἐστέλλοντο δὲ τὰ τε χωρία κατοψόμενοι καὶ εἴ πού τινας τῶν βαρβάρων ξυλλαβεῖν ἐς ἔλεγχον τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μάλιστα δὴ τὰ ἀμφὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἔμελεν αὐτῷ μαθεῖν.
- 7 Αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμὸν ἤδη ἦγε, καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὠδοποίει τὸ πρόσω ἰούσα ἄπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία. ἐνταῦθα ξυλλαμβάνει ὀλίγους τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ παρὰ τούτων ἔμαθεν, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ Ἰνδοὶ παρὰ Ἀβισάρῃ ἀποπεφευγότες εἶεν, τοὺς δὲ ἐλέφαντας ὅτι αὐτοῦ κατέλιπον νέμεσθαι πρὸς τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Ἰνδῷ· καὶ τούτους ἠγήσασθαι οἱ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκέ-
- 8 λευσεν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἰνδῶν πολλοὶ κυνηγέται τῶν ἐλεφάντων, καὶ τούτους σπουδῇ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶχεν Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ τότε ἐθήρα ξὺν τούτοις τοὺς ἐλέφαντας· καὶ δύο μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπόλλυνται κατὰ κρημνοῦ σφᾶς ρίψαντες ἐν τῇ διώξει, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξυλληφθέντες ἔφερόν τε τοὺς
- 9 ἀμβάτας καὶ τῇ στρατιᾷ ξυνετάσσοντο. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὕλη ἐργασίμῳ ἐνέτυχε παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν, καὶ αὕτη ἐκόπη αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ ναῦς ἐποιήθησαν. καὶ αὗται κατὰ τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμὸν ἤγοντο ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν, ἣντινα Ἡφαιστίων καὶ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ἐξωκοδομηκότες πάλαι ἦσαν.

<sup>1</sup> Added by Gronovius.

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he found none of the inhabitants there, nor in the neighbourhood; but next day he sent out Nearchus and Antiochus, the chiliarchs of the hypaspists<sup>3</sup>; Nearchus was given the Agrianians and the light troops, and Antiochus his own chiliarchy and two more. They were sent to spy out the land and to seize any of the barbarians they might find for interrogation about details of the district; he was especially anxious to find out about the elephants. 6

He was himself now on the way to the river Indus, and his army as it went forward made a road, since the country here was otherwise impracticable. Here he seized a few barbarians and learnt from them that the Indians of the district had fled to Abisares,<sup>4</sup> but that they had left their elephants grazing there near the river Indus. He commanded them to guide him on the way to the elephants. Many Indians are hunters of elephants, and Alexander took pains to have them among his attendants, and at this time had their help in elephant hunts. Two of the beasts threw themselves over cliffs in the pursuit and perished; the rest were captured, permitted riders to mount them, and were put on the strength of the army. He also found a wood good for felling near the river, and had it cut down by his troops, and ships built, which went down the river Indus to the bridge Hephaestion and Perdicas had built for Alexander long before.<sup>5</sup> 7 8 9

<sup>3</sup> Introd. 61.

<sup>4</sup> iv 27, 7 n.

<sup>5</sup> v 7, 1 n.





## APPENDIX 1

### THE BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS

1. Memnon proposed a strategy (on which see *Introd.* 54) that implied that the Persian forces were weaker than A1's (A. i 12; D. 18). According to A. his army numbered about 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse; more probably, he had 43,000 foot and 6,100 horse (*Introd.* 56). A. gives the Persians at the Granicus 20,000 horse and nearly as many mercenary foot; he mentions no other infantry (i 14, 4). D. reduces the cavalry to over 10,000, but makes their foot at least 100,000 strong; he never mentions mercenaries (19, 4 f.). J. xi 6 (brief and worthless) gives 600,000 as the Persian total. All these estimates of their forces are doubtless exaggerated, though A. 15, 5 could explain why the Macedonian cavalry were superior, even if outnumbered. They evidently consisted of local levies and mercenaries at the disposal of the satraps in Anatolia who were in command. According to D. 19, 4 the cavalry included not only Paphlagonians but even Medes, Hyrcanians and Bactrians. If this is true, we may suppose that these troopers had not been sent from Iran, but were settlers in Anatolia with a hereditary obligation to military service. Lane Fox p. 516 acutely adduces evidence (especially Strabo xiii 4, 13) for such a Hyrcanian settlement in Lydia established by Cyrus the Great.

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2. P. 16 is in close accord with A. on the battle. D. 19–21 is in fundamental disagreement. He omits the debate between Al. and Parmenio and makes Al. adopt the plan A. ascribes to Parmenio; he encamps for the night and crosses at dawn, unopposed. If this is correct, 14, 5–15, 5 is all sheer fiction. Of the cavalry engagement D. has somewhat different details (cf. Welles' notes), though like A. he too concentrates on Al's heroic deeds; his source was no less laudatory of Al. In his account the Persian foot are not surrounded or, except for some 2,000 prisoners, massacred; most of them fled, though 10,000 were killed (as were 2,000 of the cavalry—A. 16, 2 gives over 1,000), and the prisoners, horse and foot, numbered 20,000. P. too differs from A. in saying that 2,500 Persian cavalry and 20,000 footmen fell; in the very next sentence (16, 8) he cites Ar., and this may suggest that Ar. is the source of all his figures; in that case it is natural to think that A. followed Pt. at least on this point, cf. i 16, 4 n.

3. D's descriptions of Al's other battles are patently unreliable; his account of the Granicus is too vague to be rejected, if it stood by itself, but on general grounds it is natural to prefer A's, since A. appears to be following one or both of his main sources with no reference to the 'vulgate'. Many modern scholars, none the less, adopt D's story (or arbitrarily combine it with A's, e.g. by accepting A's account of the destruction of the mercenaries) on the ground that it is unthinkable that Al. could have crossed the stream in the face of enemy opposition and that he must have deferred the attack and surprised the Persians at dawn (cf. Lane Fox ch. 8). General

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Fuller, a practised soldier, accepted A. without demur (147 ff.).

4. H. Strasburger (*Gnomon* 1937, 483 ff.) held that A's story was so absurd that it could not come from Pt., although he was among those who have held that A. normally followed Pt. alone, especially on the incidents of war. Yet we should then have no right to assume that Pt. was A's source for any statement, unless he is actually cited or there is some other positive argument for attribution. Surely, had A. adopted an account of Al's first battle totally at variance with that given by Pt., even if it came from Ar., he would have noted such a major discrepancy (cf. v 14, 3 ff.). We should also be obliged to form the lowest estimate of A's own judgement, in preferring a story that was less well authenticated and (so it is claimed) utterly incredible. I have no doubt that in fact A's version derived not only from Ar. (as the citation of Ar. in P's similar account suggests) but also from Pt.

5. The earliest account of the battle was no doubt that given by Callisthenes, whom A's sources seem to follow on Issus (App. III). Writing for eye-witnesses, Callisthenes cannot have falsified his account to the extent of making Al. cross the stream at once in the face of opposition, if he really crossed at dawn, unopposed. If Pt. and Ar. departed from the truest and earliest narrative, it must be that they themselves had forgotten what actually occurred or that they told a deliberate lie, which many others still alive would have recognized for what it was. In either case their authority would be vitiated, not only for this event but for every other that they recounted. The truth of A's account of the battle of

## APPENDIX I

the Granicus is crucial for the whole value of his history of Alexander.

6. Certainly Pt. and Ar. were apologists for Al. and capable of disguising or distorting the truth. Sheer mendacity on matters of common knowledge was surely not in their manner. What purpose would it have served here? They were not averse to telling that Al. could show caution (i 18; 20, 1; iii 9, 4) and craft (i 20, 5 f.; 27, 7; iv 3, 2; 26, 3); the suggestion by Lane Fox that 'cunning at dawn seemed less dashing in retrospect' can thus not explain the wilful perversion of the truth with which he taxes them. In fact, P. shows that Al's decision to attack at once was criticized as foolhardy. The writer whom D. followed, who was no less of an admirer of Al., perhaps thought it best to meet the charge by denying the facts on which it was based; since the 'vulgate' is full of fictions, it is not surprising to find another here. Pt. or Ar. or both met the criticism by inserting Al's own justification of his conduct in the debate with Parmenio. Now this debate may well have been private, and here invention could have had free scope. Parmenio is often traduced in our sources, perhaps by the malignity of Callisthenes (App. IX; X 2; XI 4). We may, if we choose, believe that the debate is unhistoric (which is not to say that Pt. and Ar. knew it to be such). But it would have been very maladroit for its inventor both to claim falsely that Alexander attacked without delay and that Parmenio advised the course that in reality Al. took. Those who knew the truth about the battle could then easily accept the debate and infer that Al. was saved by Parmenio from his own imprudence. It would have

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been better to have suppressed Parmenio's advice (cf. D's account) or even to have made Parmenio advise instant attack and give Al. the credit for waiting, cf. i 18.

## APPENDIX II

### NAVAL OPERATIONS 334-332

1. In 334 Al. had 160 ships (A. i 11, 6); the manuscripts of D. 17, 2 give 60, which may be amended to 160; J. xi 6, 2 has 182, presumably in error. QC. iv 5, 14 gives the same number of 160 for the fleet when reassembled in 332. Al. was able to cross the Hellespont unopposed, as the Persian fleet had not mobilized in time. When it appeared off Miletus, A. i 18, 5 says that it comprised about 400 ships. This may be an over-estimate. D. (29, 2; 31, 3) gives 300 in 333, not contradicted by A. ii 13, 4 which refers to the 100 best sailers. In 332 at Tyre Al. was joined by 120 Cypriote and 80 Phoenician ships (ii 20, 1-3), while Tyre is plausibly said to have had 80 (D. 41, 1). A Persian total of 300 ships is reasonable. In any event it is clear that in 334 it was vastly superior to Al's. We are told that partly on this account, partly for lack of money to pay the crews (cf. i 11, 3 n.), Al. disbanded his fleet (A. i 20; D. 22, 5), except for a few, including 20 from Athens, which he kept to transport siege-engines (D. 1.c.). The last point seems absurd; how could he venture to send artillery by sea, when the ships might be sunk or captured by the superior Persian forces? Surely the Athenian ships were

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kept as hostages. Al's ships were mainly Greek (Introd. 44), and to judge from Tod 192, league members should have borne the cost themselves of their naval contingents. However, they may have failed to provide enough funds; Al. lacked money for the time, and ships manned by mutinous crews would have been of little use. Probably his financial shortage was the vital cause of his decision, since even an inferior fleet, if it could have been kept at sea at all, would have hampered Persian naval activity, preventing the enemy admirals from sending out squadrons simultaneously to the Hellespont, the Macedonian coast and Greece. In 333 Al. saw that it was necessary to provide some naval force, though it would still be outnumbered. For other consequences of his decision see Introd. 44.

2. As A. always tends to concentrate on Al's own actions, we have to turn for supplementary information about Persian naval operations to D. and QC. According to D. Memnon (= M.), who had received large funds from Darius, mobilized 300 ships early in 333, with a substantial mercenary force, won over Chios and all the Lesbian cities except Mitylene which he took by force (29, 1 f.; A. ii 1 makes Chios fall by treachery, and Mitylene surrender but after M's death); most of the Cyclades sent envoys to him, and among the Greeks who favoured Persia (the majority, 31, 3), especially the Spartans, his successes raised hopes which he fomented by paying subsidies; at this point he died (29, 2-4). QC. iii 1, 19-21 tells that at Gordium Al., who had not yet heard of M's death, appointed Amphoterus as admiral and Hegelochus as general to recover Lesbos, Chios and Cos and provided



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money and instructions for Antipater to defend the homeland and Hellespont. Like D., he probably put the fall of Mitylene (his 'Lesbos') in M's lifetime. (For Cos cf. A. ii 5, 7; 13, 4; iii 2, 6.) In ii 1 f. A. does not give a full account of Persian naval successes before or after M's death; ii 13, 6 implies that the lower town of Halicarnassus was lost; so was Miletus, QC. iv 1, 37; 5, 13, and the land forces of the Persians in Caria ventured on a battle with the Macedonians there, in which they were indeed decisively beaten; both A. ii 5, 7 and QC. iii 7, 4 recount this only indirectly by telling how Al. heard of it at Soli. From A. ii 2, 3; iii 2, 6 we can see that Amphoterus was subordinate to Hegelochus; ii 2, 3 also shows that he received his commission early in 333, and presumably, as QC. says, before Al. moved east from Gordium. But as he was still there in May (i 29, 4 n.), M's operations must have begun in March or April, earlier and not later than the arrival of 'the newly-wed' at Gordium from Macedon. D. 31, 3 ff. also says that Al. heard of the loss of Chios and Lesbos and of the danger to Macedon and Greece before M. died; he dates the news of the last event, which greatly relieved Al., just before he fell ill; this must be his illness at Tarsus (ii 4)—and D. 27, 7 has already brought Al. to Cilicia in 334! If M. died in May, or even June, Darius had ample time after hearing the news (surely at Babylon, QC. iii 2, 1, and not earlier at Susa, D. 30, 1; 31, 1) to recall the mercenaries who were to fight at Issus under Thymondas (ii 2, 1; 13, 2, etc.), having joined the Grand Army in Syria shortly before the battle (QC. iii 8, 1).

3. A's account of the Persian naval operations does

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not make clear the full extent of their success and minimizes Greek support; while he is no doubt right in making out that island cities went over to them only as a result of treachery or *force majeure*, too little is said of the effects in Greece, cf. App. VI. Presumably the Spartan and Athenian envoys to Darius captured after Issus (ii 15, 2) had been sent off at this time. The Persian admirals would surely have done better to waste no time in the islands, and to have kept Antipater pre-occupied by threatening the Macedonian coast with part of their fleet, while taking the rest at once to Greece and raising revolts there; this criticism affects M., whose merits are commonly exaggerated, no less than his successors. Of course it was Darius who made the major error in withdrawing the mercenaries and putting everything to the test of battle with Al.

4. As no reliance could be placed on Athens, Hegelochus was able to do no more in 333 than defeat a Persian squadron in the Hellespont (QC. iv 1, 36) and perhaps then regain Tenedos (A. iii 2, 3); only after Issus, when Greek cities despaired of Persian victory, could he once more mobilize 160 ships; his successes contemporary with the siege of Tyre (perhaps Feb.–Aug. 332) are described in some detail by QC. iv 5, 14 ff., cf. A. iii 2, who characteristically relates them in connection with the report he made in person to Al. in Egypt (cf. iii 2, 3 n.), and with decisions Al. then took, cf. QC. iv 8, 11–14. Here again A. stresses that the Greeks of the islands really favoured Macedon throughout, and says nothing of sentiments on the mainland. No doubt this represents the line taken by Pt. and Ar. For Eresus and Chios Tod 191 f. supply further data.

## APPENDIX III

### ISSUS

1. This appendix is concerned principally with the relation of A's account to that of Callisthenes (henceforth C.), which in my judgement was the basis of those A. found in his sources. For an account of the battle and previous manoeuvres see Fuller 154 f. Like most other modern discussions this rests on the topographical investigations of Col. Janke (*Auf Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden*, 1904, cf. *Klio* X 137 ff.), whose findings are summarized by F. W. Walbank in his commentary on Polybius XII 17-22; they are rejected by Lane Fox. Maps are supplied by e.g. Fuller and Walbank.

2. In describing military operations ancient writers were in a difficulty in that they and their readers normally had no relevant maps. The best they could do was to provide a verbal description of the terrain. This was what C. attempted, but in some points his description was false or misleading. We do not know if Pt. or Ar. repeated or corrected his topographical account; certainly A. failed to do so; likewise QC., whose story seems in part to derive from the same ultimate source and sometimes supplements what A. tells us, at any rate for events before the battle itself. Probably neither of them understood the topography better than P., who thought that the two armies 'missed one another in the night' (20, 3). Certainly their accounts of the marches before the battle must have been obscure to any reader not possessed of the kind of information Janke supplied.

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3. All our authorities except J., whose account is totally vague, agree that Darius placed himself in Al's rear. A. tells that at Tarsus, before marching west to Soli, Al. sent Parmenio east to seize the 'Gates' dividing Cilicia from Syria (ii 5, 1). These comprise (a) a sandy defile between mount Amanus and the sea, through which runs the river Merkes Su; (b) the Jonah Pass, immediately to the south, a path zigzagging up an outrunner of Amanus; (c) the Beilan Pass a few kilometres south-east. QC. iii 7, 6 f. suggests that Parmenio got no further than Issus, through the Kara Kapu coastal pass between Mallus and Issus, on the route to the Syrian Gates, but this may not be true. It was after Al. had himself returned to Tarsus and moved east to Mallus that he heard from Parmenio that Darius was at Sochi (unidentified), two days march from the Syrian Gates, and evidently in the wide plain of the Melas or Kara Su (6, 1 cf. 6, 3); he then marched from Mallus, whose precise site on the Pyramus is not established, to Myriandros, which must have been south of the Jonah Pass near Alexandretta, since he had to descend on his return march to the Merkes Su plain (cf. 8, 2). These places can hardly have been less than about 105 km apart. A. seems to say that he covered this distance in two days, only to return and fight Darius, after a further march of 18.5 km according to C., but more probably of 31 km. Fuller (156) reports that a French corps in 1797 marched 72 miles and fought a battle in 48 hours, but this was in the north Italian plain, not in rough Cilician terrain. I doubt if Al. had any need to exhaust his men in this way, and suspect that as in other cases (App. VIII 3) an intermediate stage has been omitted; probably he paused at Issus, where

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the sick were left, and reached Myriandrus on the second day thereafter. Meanwhile Darius had marched via the Arslan Boghaz through the Toprak Kalessi pass over the interior of Amanus (the Amanian Gates of 7, 1) and encamped just north of the mouth of the Pinarus; this must have taken rather over a week. Janke identified the Pinarus with the Deli Chai; Lane Fox revives the view that it was the Payas further south. This fits C's statement that Al. at Myriandrus was 100 stades away, i.e. about 18.5 km (the Deli Chai is 31 km from Alexandretta); moreover, C. gave the breadth of the Pinarus plain where the battle was to be fought as 14 stades, i.e. 2.59 km, whereas that of the Deli Chai is 6.7 km; the plain of the Payas, 4.4 km wide, is at least nearer to his estimate. However, the banks of the Payas are too steep to fit the course of the battle, and the deployment of Al's army, as described by C., could only have taken place between the Payas and the Deli Chai. Again, although A. (8, 1) supposed that Al's 'whole army' had reached Myriandrus, it may well be that much of it was really still north of the Jonah Pass at the time when he turned to meet Darius, and this may account for C's figure of 100 stades, while his estimate of the breadth of the battle plain is on any view too low. Janke's judgement should be accepted.

4. Thus, starting at nightfall from Myriandros, when he had heard of Darius' presence behind him, i.e. about 6.30 p.m., Al. had to cover 31 km before the battle; he rested his men on the heights north of the Merkes-Su plain; the battle cannot have begun till the afternoon. Polybius criticizes C's account of the evolutions of both armies, on the ground that

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they could not be reconciled with his statements about numbers and terrain. It was those statements that he should have challenged; C. exaggerated the Persian numbers at least, and his estimates of distances were much less likely to be reliable than his record of manoeuvres. In any event it is significant that Polybius plainly thought that his account, however absurd, was generally accepted (in vi 45, 1 he names him among the most learned of the old historians), and the summary Polybius gives of his story suggests that A's main sources largely agreed with and could have drawn on C.; we have no right to suppose that Pt. provided a more accurate account. As to (a) the distance between Myriandrus and the Pinarus and (b) the extent of the Pinarus plain (§ 3) A. indeed gives no estimates; the true extent of the Deli Chai plain allows ample room for even the excessive number of men that he, like all other sources, places in the front lines. (c) Both C. and A. (8, 5) have 30,000 Persian cavalry on the right and 30,000 mercenaries in the centre; C. puts an unstated number of peltasts on the left with 'the phalanx behind', whereas A. (8, 6-8) makes the left consist of 60,000 hoplite Cardaces with other troops in the rear and mentions a flanking force of 20,000. The Cardaces cannot have been hoplites (Tarn ii 180 ff.); here the advantage lies with C. Polybius may simply have omitted what C. too had on the flanking force (cf. (f) below), as well as a parallel to A's statement that Darius threw troops over the Pinarus, which were withdrawn before the battle (8, 5 and 10); it is always important to remember that C's account must have been very detailed, and that little of it is preserved. (d) Both C. (Pol. 18, 9 f.) and A. (8, 6 and 11) placed



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Darius in the centre with the mercenaries. (e) According to C. Al. marched north with the foot in front and horse behind (cf. A. 8, 3), but on reaching more open country deployed the foot in line of battle, at first 32 deep, then 16, then 8 (19, 6; 21, 1); A. 8, 2 f. has different but congruent details. (It was not to Polybius' purpose to mention the different regiments, as no doubt C., like A., did.) The deployment could have begun just north of the Kurudere ravine, about 40 stades from the battlefield; C. did not necessarily mean, as Polybius thought (20, 1), that it was complete at that point; the line could only have been thinned in stages as the country opened out. On the battlefield itself there was room for the 42,000 foot and 5,000 horse whose presence was in Polybius' view implied in C's history (19, 2); but P's own words show that in fact C. did not actually state how many men were engaged. (f) Like A. 8, 7; 9, 2 C. referred to the force Al. posted at an angle to his line to prevent outflanking (21, 5); this surely implies that he also mentioned the Persian flanking movement. (g) Whereas A. 8, 9 puts Al. (as always) on the right, C. allegedly said that he took care to be opposite Darius in the centre; but probably Polybius (22) has abbreviated; no doubt it was Al's plan to turn against Darius after smashing the Persian left, and the invention of the contemporary, Chares (11, 4 n.), cf. D. 33, 5 ff. and QC. iii 11, 7 ff., may suggest that his attack did reach the Persian centre before Darius fled, though this is not made clear by A. Polybius' contention that Al. could not have known where Darius would be posted betrays his own ignorance. (h) Polybius ridicules a manoeuvre recorded only by C., which Walbank explains (18, 9 n.); it is not inconsistent



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with A. (i) He urges that if the banks of the Pinarus were as steep as C. says, neither the Persian cavalry nor the Macedonian phalanx could have crossed the stream. Evidently C. exaggerated the steepness; so does A. 10, 1 (see note). (It follows that the Pinarus cannot be the Payas, cf. supra.) (j) Polybius taxes C. with other absurdities. His criticisms would have been just as apposite to the manoeuvres A. describes in 8, 11 and 9, 1 and 3; he would surely have pronounced them impracticable on broken ground in face of the enemy. Hence, if we believe that Polybius demonstrates that C. had no understanding of war, we must on the same reasoning convict A. and presumably Pt. If on the other hand Callisthenes' errors are confined to mistakes on numbers (shared by A's sources) and on estimates of distances (which they may not have given), there is no reason to deny that he was the prime source used by Pt. and Ar. themselves both for Issus and presumably for other military operations described in his history. (There is no evidence here or elsewhere that A. himself consulted C.)

5. A's topographical vagueness would have been for Polybius (xii 25 g) another and fully deserved ground for censure. Of course we can conjecture that Pt. or Ar. gave topographical details as detailed as C. and more exact, and that A. has omitted them, just as he commonly fails to excerpt anything from the geographical excursuses in Ar., which Strabo used, although they must have assisted a better understanding of A's campaigns. But it does Pt. or Ar. or both no credit that they gave absurd estimates of the size of the Persian army, 600,000 men, and of its front line, 140,000, equalling or outdoing not only

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C. but the estimates in D. 31, 2 (500,000 in all) and QC. iii 2 (310,000 in total) and 9 (160,000 in the front line); it is little excuse that this exaggeration of Persian numbers was traditional; even Xenophon, though an eye-witness, had reported one million in the Persian army at Cunaxa (*Anab.* i 7, 12). The conversion of the Cardaces into hoplites was also a lie. At most we can say that Al's tactical dispositions, like the advice of Amyntas (6, 3), imply that he must have been outnumbered and therefore in danger of being outflanked. The exaggerations tended to his greater glory, which Pt. and Ar., no less than C., sought to enhance at the cost of truth.

6. As to D. and QC., once the armies were joined in battle, their accounts, which suggest a common source, are incompatible with A. But QC. (unlike D. 33, 1) roughly agrees with A. about the Macedonian array, though not about the Persian, and there are many affinities in his narrative of the previous manoeuvres, on which D. is extremely vague. It would seem that QC. drew ultimately on the same tradition as A. (as well as on one followed by D. that diverged markedly), though he is much less full and clear, even at his best. One point is of special interest. In 7, 8 ff. he makes Al. accept Parmenio's advice not to advance beyond Issus but fight in a narrow space. In fact (as he too shows) Al. did advance, with the evident intention of facing Darius in Syria. Thus he did not accept Parmenio's advice. The result was that Darius took Issus and massacred the Macedonians there. Al's decision cost them their lives. Two modes of apology, if QC. is right that the advice was tendered, were open. One was to suppress the fact: thus A's sources. The second

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was to make out that Al. adopted the advice in the hope that the reader, knowing that in the end (thanks to Darius) Al. did fight in Cilicia, would not notice that so far as in him lay Al. had disregarded it.

## APPENDIX IV

### ALEXANDER AND THE HEROES

1. As an Argead, Al. was reputed a descendant in the male line from Heracles and through Heracles' mother, Alcmene, from Perseus; through his own mother, Olympias, he claimed descent from Achilles by his son, Neoptolemus. In general the Greek world did not distinguish legend from history, and there is no reason to think that such genealogies, which were actually used to justify territorial claims in the fourth century, were not believed. Almost certainly, to Al., Heracles, Perseus and Achilles were real persons and his actual ancestors.

2. He was also strongly influenced by Homer, cf. P. 8; 26; Strabo xiii 1, 26 f.; Lane Fox ch. 3. A. had read in the 'vulgate' that he sought from childhood to emulate Achilles (vii 14, 4, cf. i 12, 1). He was ostensibly engaged in a Panhellenic crusade (cf. *Introd.* 40). Herodotus (i 3 f.) had represented the Trojan war as an incident in the struggle between Greeks and Asians continued in the Persian invasions of Greece in the fifth century, which he was to avenge. Isocrates had more than once touched on this theme (iv 154; 181; x 67; xii 42; 189), and had

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urged Philip to emulate his ancestor, Heracles, who had shown his beneficence in uniting the Greeks for an earlier expedition against Troy (v 109 ff.). By his sacrifice at the tomb of Protesilaus, (i 11, 5, from Pt./Ar.), Al. symbolized that he was, like his ancestors, fighting for Greece against the barbarians. The account of his acts immediately after he crossed to Asia in A. i 11, 6 ff. seems to come from the 'vulgate', but is perfectly credible, and is confirmed at one point, his taking arms supposedly dedicated in the Trojan war, by a later allusion from the main sources (vi 10, 2). We are told that he sacrificed to Heracles (cf. i 4, 5; *Ind.* 36, 3), and sought to placate Priam for his death at the hands of Neoptolemus. Fragments of Callisthenes indicate that that historian sought to connect Al's advance through Asia with Homeric and other heroic stories (Pearson 39 ff.). Even the version of the Granicus A. follows depicts Al's *aristeia* in the Homeric style. Al. may well, then and later, have risked his life so recklessly, not only because this set his troops an example, but because such conduct was required by the heroic model he adopted.

3. It is no surprise then that we hear of Al. seeking to rival Heracles and Perseus by his visit to Siwah (iii 3, 2), or to outdo Heracles at Aornos (iv 28, 4 cf. 30, 4), or to follow in Dionysus' footsteps at Nysa (v 2, 5). At least one of A's main sources, perhaps Ar., lies behind these statements, and the *motiv* of his emulation of Heracles and Dionysus, though more prominent in the 'vulgate', is not confined to an inferior tradition, cf. further App. XVI in vol. II. Its credibility is supported by Nearchus' statement that he wished to outdo Cyrus and Semiramis

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in marching through Gadosia (Strabo xv i, 15), which also appeared in the 'vulgate' (A. vi 24, 2).

4. It seems that in Afghanistan and India Al. and his men came across legends of figures they identified with Heracles and Dionysus (App. XVI). Similarly Al. had equated the Tyrian Melkarth with Heracles (ii 15, 7; 24, 5 f.; iii 6, 1), just as he had assumed that a Phrygian god was 'Zeus the king' (ii 3, 6), and (on my view) identified Ammon with Zeus (App. V, cf. also vii 20, 1). It is A., following Herodotus (ii 43-5), who differentiates between the Greek, Tyrian and Egyptian Heracles and later distinguishes the Indian Heracles from these (ii 16, 1-6; iv 28, 2; *Ind.* 5 13), just as he doubts (v 1) if the Indian Dionysus is the Theban or Lydian; it is somewhat misleading when he says (ii 16, 7) that Al. wished to sacrifice to 'this Heracles', i.e. the Tyrian; the very special honour Al. paid to the god at Tyre shows that Al. must have taken the Tyrian god to be his own ancestor.

5. 'After quitting this life, Heracles became a god instead of a mortal' (Isocrates vi 17); he owed this exaltation to his 'virtue' (ib. i 50; v 132), i.e. to noble and beneficent acts. We can only speculate whether a belief that he had equalled or excelled Heracles led Al. to expect a similar reward, and whether the fictitious debate in iv 10 reflects contemporary opinions and a prevalent view that deification should be at least deferred till death.

## APPENDIX V

### THE VISIT TO SIWAH (iii 3-4)

1. Though aware of other accounts (3, 5), A. seems to rely entirely on Pt. or Ar. or both. Ar. is his source for the distance, roughly correct, from Paraetonium (Mersah-Matruh) to the oasis (3, 3), and since he was more interested than Pt. in geographical matters, probably for the description of the oasis (4, 1-4); if so, the allusion to 'the king' in 4, 3 suggests that he wrote after Ptolemy assumed that title in 304. (However that may be, A's use of the present tense about dues paid to the king shows that he was mechanically copying his source.) A. twice records discrepancies between Pt. and Ar. (3, 5 f.; 4, 5) and evinces some incredulity in the reported miracles, which appeared in some form in all accounts (D. 49-51; QC. iv 7; P. 26-8; J. xi 11); Strabo too observed that the Alexander-historians were guilty of many flatteries in describing the visit to Siwah, though he held that something (just what he does not say) in their stories deserved acceptance (xvii 1, 43). On 4, 5 C. B. Welles (*Historia* 1962, 274 ff.) argues that Pt. gave an impracticable route for Al's return; this is refuted by P. M. Fraser, *Opuscula Atheniensia* 1967, 23 ff. He also contends that Ar. brought Al. back to the site of Alexandria and agreed with the 'vulgate' that the foundation of that city was later than the visit to Siwah. But A. would surely have noted this divergency from Pt. in a context in which he records others. Welles thinks the vulgate's chronology right, since Ps-Callisthenes, an Alexandrian writer who may be trusted on this point, says

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the city was founded on 25 Tybi = 7 April. But 25 Tybi is probably 20 January, as in the Roman period when Ps-Callisthenes wrote (P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* ii p. 3). Welles supposes that Al. wished to consult the oracle about the foundation, but he had already ascertained the divine will on this matter (1, 5), and felt no need for oracular sanction when founding other cities. Finally, 6, 1 shows that he left Egypt before 7 April.

2. Strabo (l.c.) summarizes the account of Callisthenes (C.). Of course C. gave much more detail (cf. P. 27, 3); Strabo preserves only the following points.

(a) Al. wished to visit Siwah from 'love of glory', to emulate Perseus and Heracles (cf. 3, 1).

(b) He went by Paraetonium (cf. 3, 3).

(c) The army was assisted by rain but impeded by a sandstorm (cf. 3, 3 f.).

(d) It was guided by two crows. (So Ar. and most writers, 3, 4; QC. has a flock of birds appearing near the oasis—where their presence would be natural; Pt's serpents are his own fabrication, perhaps somehow related to their association with the cult of Ammon.)

(e) Al. entered the inner shrine alone in his customary garb, whereas his entourage had to change their clothes and remain outside, where they could, none the less, hear what was said.

(f) The god gave his responses mainly by nods and signs.

(g) However, the prophet 'acted the part of Zeus' or 'interpreted Zeus' (τὸν Δία ὑποκριναμένου) and told Al. expressly that he was 'son of Zeus'. (He clearly spoke Greek, being accustomed to Greek enquirers.)



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(h) Subsequently envoys arrived at Memphis from the oracle of Branchidae near Miletus with oracles 'about the *genesis* (cf. 5 below) of Al. from Zeus, the future victory near Arbela, the death of Darius and the Spartan revolt', and the Sibyl of Erythrae also spoke about Al's noble birth. *Contra Tarn* (ii 357) C. cannot simply have invented these oracular responses. No doubt they were ambiguous in the usual manner, and were interpreted *post eventum* in C.'s sense; it follows that C. at least amended his history of Al. in Egypt after Gaugamela. 'Arbela' is not the correct name for the battle (cf. iii 8, 7 n.; vi 11, 4), as Strabo also knew (xvi 1, 3 f.); but despite his own polemic on the topic, A. could use it himself (iii 22, 4), and Strabo may have preferred to give the name most easily intelligible to his readers; we are not to infer that C. was unreliable in his location of the battle, and therefore in other ways.

3. In (a)–(d) C. seems to have told a story substantially similar to A's (apart from Pt's serpents). Both connect the expedition with Al's romantic emulation of heroes (cf. App. IV). The difficulties of the journey were probably magnified in all sources, to make it seem more heroic; the journey was in fact often performed by Greeks and others, and it was the right season, winter, when rain could be expected; at most it may have been harder for Al., if he had a considerable force with him (its size is not recorded). Strabo's summary is so brief that we should not infer that C. mentioned no other motive for the expedition but Al's love of glory (A. 3, 2) nor that he neglected to record that Al. 'was possessed by a longing (*pothos*) to go to Ammon' (ib.). For *pothos* cf. i 3, 5; ii 3, 1; iii 1, 5; iv 28, 4; v 2, 5;

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vii 1, 1; 2, 2; 16, 2; in *Ind.* 20, 1, Nearchus paraphrases it (20, 2) as 'a desire (*epithymia*) to do something always new and extraordinary'; for *epithymia* cf. also v 25, 2. (The use of *pothos* and its related verb in invented speeches in v 26, 1 and 27, 6 cannot be regarded as of much significance.) The 'ingens cupido' in QC. iv 7, 8 (cf. iv 8, 3; vii 11, 4) probably represents *pothos*; in ix 2, 2 he writes: 'vicit cupido rationem'. Ehrenberg (*Al. and the Greeks* ch. II) conjectured that Al. himself used to speak of his *pothos* and that this illustrates an irrational part of his character which led him to undertake extraordinary enterprises. K. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander*, ch. IV treats it in each case as either representing a desire that was *per se* reasonable for a general and statesman, or more often as referring to a natural curiosity, which still did not interfere with his political and military objectives; apart from the remarks of Nearchus, which he does not discuss, the texts fit this interpretation well enough, and better than the most high-flown interpretations which he contests. On this occasion it was reasonable enough for Al. to wish to consult an oracle reputed infallible, given that he had no need to leave Egypt for the Euphrates till the spring. As Kraft observes, he seems to have abandoned as untimely his desire to see Upper Egypt and Ethiopia (QC. iv 8, 3).

4. As to the journey, all accounts broadly agree and, miracles apart, are credible. Whether or not present in person, C., Pt. and Ar. could all have come by reliable reports. But once Al. reaches the shrine, C. disagrees with the vulgate, though not with A., who provides virtually no explicit information at all. (a) In the 'vulgate' (D. 51; QC. iv 7, 25; P. 27, 3;

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J. xi 11, 7) Al. is first *greeted* by the priest as son of 'God' or 'Zeus'; P. 27, 5 also reports a tale that his words 'O paidion' ('My son') were misheard as 'O pai Dios' ('Son of Zeus'). In answer to his enquiries he was then told (all versions in varying order) that (b) he had punished all the assassins of Philip (Introd. § 46), though Philip was not his father, and (c) that he would rule the whole world, as an unconquerable god; J. alone adds that his companions were bidden by the oracle to honour him as a god. It is clear that C. cannot have had (c); the oracle from Branchidae, which he did report, would have been an anti-climax, if Ammon had already predicted world-rule. This being so, it is imprudent to use the vulgate to establish what C. said or meant, even though the details given by D. and QC. of the oracular procedure amplify Strabo's allusion to the god's 'nods and signs' and may also derive from C. (The details accord with the known ritual in Egyptian oracles, cf. Lane Fox 208 f.; 523 f.) It is generally held that C., like the vulgate, told that Al. was greeted as son of Zeus by the priest, and not that the sonship was revealed in an oracular response, since the responses were heard by Al. alone and not made known by him nor reported by C., Pt. or Ar. It would probably have made little difference to Al's later view of his relation to Ammon, if this interpretation of the evidence were correct, but it is at least open to question. (i) C., according to Strabo, directly stated that Al's companions could hear what went on inside the temple, though they remained without, and he is naturally taken to mean that it was within the temple that he heard that he was son of Zeus, nor does the vulgate, for what it is worth, contradict this. (ii) Strabo's summary of C. naturally suggests, by giving

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first an account of the oracular procedure, that the priest's statement that Al. was son of Zeus was his verbal interpretation of the nods and signs by which the god announced a question put by Al. (iii) The authenticity of a letter from Al. to Olympias (P. 27, 5), in which he referred to certain responses that he would reveal only to her on his return, should not be admitted (Introd. 16); but even if it were genuine, it would not show that he kept all the responses secret, and in fact he did make it public that the oracle had instructed him on the gods to whom he should sacrifice (vi 19, 4; *Ind.* 18, 11), perhaps in answer to an enquiry about his best hope of achieving victory (cf. Xen., *Anabasis* iii 1, 6). Al. naturally wanted guidance on his future actions and would not have kept silent on any responses that might encourage his men. (iv) It cannot be inferred from Strabo that C. recorded none of the responses; as to Pt. and Ar. see 5 below. (The argument from their silence proves too much, as they did not report here the response on sacrifices.) It should at least be clear that C. made out that the priest recognized Al. as son of Zeus, and he cannot have written what was either displeasing to Al. or susceptible of ready disproof.

5. According to A. one reason why Al. went to Siwah was that 'he was tracing (*ἀνέφερε*) his *genesis* in part to Ammon, as the myths traced that of Heracles and Perseus to Zeus.' The word 'genesis' naturally means 'birth' and not descent (Lane Fox 524), and in the myths Heracles and Perseus were *sons* of Zeus. On becoming Pharaoh (as such, he sacrificed to the Egyptian gods, iii 1, 4), Al. was officially son of Amun-Ra, whom Al. would naturally have identified with Zeus (*infra*). To the new

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Achilles the divine filiation must have been a congenial and plausible notion, of which he was seeking confirmation from the oracle that could give him more accurate information about his 'own affairs'. Kraft indeed has argued that that vague phrase does not refer to his sonship, for he went to Siwah in the conviction (*Überzeugung*) that he was son of Ammon. But this interpretation violates the logic of the Greek; the imperfect *ἀνέφερε* must mean that he was 'seeking to trace his birth to Ammon' and *γνώμη* must be rendered 'purpose' and not 'conviction'; for it would make no sense to say that Al. knew he was son of Ammon and *therefore* went to Siwah to find out about his (other) concerns. Thus A's authorities imply that he intended to enquire about his paternity, and they also say that he himself claimed that he had heard what was to his heart's desire (4, 5). This is oblique confirmation of C's story. Al. was evidently fortified in the belief that he wished to hold that he was son of Ammon. Now, if the assurance were couched in the usual dark ambiguities of an oracle, the construction C. and Al. himself preferred may not have been equally clear to everyone. One or both of A's sources may have had this obscurity in mind when stating Al's purpose as 'to acquire more accurate information or to say that he had acquired it' (3, 4), and the same attitude is shown, no doubt by the same writer, when he notes the king's satisfaction with what he had heard, without telling us what this was. Both Pt. and Ar. were evidently reluctant to concede that Al. ever claimed to be son of a god with the alleged sanction of the oracle (cf. 10 f. below). As on other occasions (App. XIV), they resorted to deceptive reticence.

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6. After 332 we hear of Al's real or alleged claim to be son alternatively of Ammon (iv 9, 9; vii 8, 3; P. 27. 5; 50, 6) or of Zeus (iv 8, 2; vii 2, 2; 29, 3; P. 27, 5; 28, 2; cf. C. in P. 33, 1) or of a god (vi 14, 2); QC. consistently writes 'son of Jupiter', i.e. Zeus, but then he also equates Jupiter and 'Hammon' (iv 7, 5), a common Latin practice. The equation of Ammon and Zeus was normal, both for Amun of Egyptian Thebes, and for the god at Siwah, whose cult was held to be derived from Thebes (Hdt. ii 42, 54-7), rightly in the view of many modern scholars (F. Chamoux, *Cyrène sous la Monarchie des Battiades* 56). The coins of Cyrene clearly identify Ammon and Zeus (ib. 329 ff.), just as Pindar (*Pythians* iv 28; fr. 36) and Herodotus (ii 55; iii 25) had done. Under the Ptolemies Thebes itself was renamed Diospolis, the city of Zeus (cf. *RE. s.v. Ammon*; Diod. i 15; Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* ch. v n. 24; for other such equations of Greek and Egyptian gods ib. nn. 30, 36, 50, 56, 150, 173 and in particular for that of Osiris or Serapis with Dionysus, ib. vol. i pp. 206, 255 f.; cf. also App. IV 4 above). Callisthenes, reported without demur by Strabo, makes the priest at Siwah impersonate or interpret Zeus (§ 2 f.). It would have been perfectly natural for Al. too to identify Ammon with Zeus.

7. It is true that Greeks referred to Ammon at times in ways which might suggest that they distinguished two gods. (a) The god worshipped at Siwah is normally called Ammon, not Zeus. But the Greeks had no name for Siwah; the oracle there is 'that in Ammon' (Strabo xvii 1, 43), and just as they would speak of men going to Delphi or Dodona for oracular



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help, so they spoke of going to Ammon. (b) Ammon as such had his cults in Athens and elsewhere in Greece by Alexander's time (C. J. Classen, *Historia* 1959, 349 ff.). That does not prove that the votaries distinguished Ammon from Zeus. Men could not be sure of a god's true name, cf. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 160 ff. with Fraenkel's note *ad loc.*, and E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* 144 ff., nor whether other peoples might not have surer access to him; hence in religious acts it might be prudent to address him by more than one name, or to worship him with foreign rites, using his foreign name. Hence Al. himself swore both by Zeus of the Greeks and by Ammon of the Libyans (Nearchus, *Ind.* 35, 8) and regularly sacrificed to Ammon (vi 3, 1). To Al. the Greek and Macedonian god, Zeus, was ruler of gods and men, the supreme god, as doubtless was Ammon to the people of Siwah, and he means to invoke the supreme god who is at once Zeus to Greeks and Ammon to Libyans. Even writers like Herodotus, who expressly identified Zeus and Ammon, could speak at times of Ammon (especially when they refer to the oracle) and at times of Zeus.

8. Al. prayed the gods for aid, εἴπερ ὄντως Διόθεν ἔστι γεγονώς (P. 33, 1). This statement in the official history cannot have been false (*contra* Tarn ii 352, cf. App. IX 5). But what does it mean? The word εἴπερ can signify either 'if' or 'since', but as the formulation resembles such a Homeric prayer as we have in *Odyssey* IX 529, and Al. was influenced by Homer, I think that 'since' is to be preferred, and we should not infer that Al. had any doubt about the relation to Zeus he referred to. The words Διόθεν γεγονώς are more naturally construed to mean 'son



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of Zeus ' than ' descendent of Zeus ' (which Al. was officially, through Heracles), and in the light of C's own account of what the prophet at Siwah had said, that is surely what C. intended to convey. Thus he represents Al. as accepting that he was a son of Zeus. Doubts may still arise: Al's true formulation in the prayer may have been more ambiguous. There is no clear confirmation of the statements of QC. iv 7, 30 and vi 11, 23 (implicitly contradicted in viii 5, 5) that he officially *ordered* his divine filiation to be acknowledged, while still in Egypt, or at any time. His *wish* for such recognition, however, consistently appears in 'vulgate' accounts of opposition to Al. among his own followers, in the trial of Philotas (QC. vi 10, 26 f.), in connection with Clitus' murder (A iv 8, 2; QC. viii 1, 42; P. 50, 6) and with *proscynesis* (A. iv 9, 9; QC. viii 5, 5) and in the trial of Hermolaus (QC. viii 7, 12; 8, 14; 10, 1 and 29). Ehippus of Olynthus, a contemporary (Pearson, *LH* 61), albeit hostile, averred that he dressed up as Ammon (but also as Artemis and Hermes) and that Gorgos, who was at least a historic person (Pearson 64), crowned him as son of Ammon. More important, A. tells on the authority of one or both of his main sources that the Oxydracae had heard that Al. was son of a god (vi 14, 2, reading  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ ; see note *ad loc.*) and that at Opis the mutinous troops giped at his supposed claim to be son of Ammon (vii 8, 3). The story in vii 2, 3 and Strabo xv 1, 68 also presupposes that Al. was claiming in 326 to be son of Zeus; Strabo's version comes from Megasthenes, a contemporary who was familiar with Sibyrtius, one of Al's satraps, but A's may perhaps be derived from Nearchus (cf. note *ad loc.*); in any event the authority is good. At Athens in 324 Demosthenes could allude contemp-

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tuously to Al's desire to be son of Zeus or Posidon (Hyperides, *contra Dem.* 31).

9. Tarn and others hold that as Pharaoh Al. was son of Amun-Ra in a mystic sense that did not exclude Philip's paternity, and that the meaning of his mystic relation to the god was privately explained to him by the prophet at Siwah. Such a private interview remains possible, even if there were other responses which his companions overheard, and this theory gives a good sense to 'in part' in 3, 2. Yet, as on Tarn's view Al. never divulged what he had been told (*supra*), there is necessarily no direct evidence for his hypothesis. Equally, it cannot be refuted by Al's supposed denial in a letter to the Samians that Philip was his father (P. 28); the fact that this letter corresponds in other respects to what we know to be true does not prove its authenticity, and it should be rejected, not because it does not fit Tarn's case, but on general grounds (Introd. 15). It is only one of many texts that show how men took Al. to be claiming that he was son of Zeus in the same sense as Heracles. A. himself clearly adopted this view (vii 29, 3). So presumably did the mutineers at Opis (vii 8, 3). Tarn concedes this and says that the misunderstanding provoked Al. to fury. But his indignation is equally easy to explain, if the men understood him perfectly well: he was angry because they were ridiculing its absurdity. On the other hand we cannot call in as proof that they were right the stories (possibly true) that Olympias herself put it about that she had been impregnated by a snake, sacred to Ammon and disguising the god (P. 2 etc., cf. A. iv 10, 2 from the 'vulgate'), for we do not know that Al. himself favoured them.

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10. Tarn found indirect confirmation of his hypothesis in the fact that at Opis Al. is said to have referred to Philip as his father (vii 9, 2). But as I hope to show when discussing speeches in A. in vol. II (cf. also F. R. Wüst, *Historia* 1953/54, 177 ff.), this speech is A's invention. Admittedly, A. is here implicitly contradicting his own conception of Al's claim (vii 29, 3), no doubt without being conscious of inconsistency; and this makes it likely that he is using material from one of his main sources. It was again one of these sources that recorded how on one occasion Al. sacrificed to Heracles *as his ancestor* (vi 3, 1); in another speech, which Tarn himself regarded as fictitious, and rightly, even though not all his arguments are acceptable (ii 286 ff.), Al. himself is made to describe Heracles in this way (v 26, 5). But Heracles was his ancestor, only if he still acknowledged Philip as his father. Thus Pt. or Ar. or both not only failed to report that Al. claimed to be son of Zeus-Ammon (in any sense, even Tarn's), except indirectly in an account of the gibes of the mutineers, but implicitly denied, at least in vi 3, 1, that he ever disowned Philip as his father.

11. Pt. at least may have had a reason for suppressing Al's claim to be son of Zeus. Pt. himself was officially descended through his mother, Arsinoe, from king Amyntas I and was thus a Heraclid and cousin of Al.; as Theocritus put it (xvii 27), both numbered Heracles as their furthest ancestor (Satyrus, Jacoby no. 631). There was also a story that he was really a bastard son of Philip (QC. ix 8, 22, etc.); this cannot be true, nor even have seemed plausible, if he was born (Ps-Lucian, *Macrobioi* 12) in 367/6 B.C. when Philip was only 16 and in captivity at

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Thebes, but perhaps he was born later, and himself propagated the tale, to give him an even closer connection with the Argead line than rival dynasts in the struggle for power within Al's empire could assert. (See Volkmann, *RE* xxiii 1603 f.) Pt's affinity with Al. would have been dissolved in either case, if Al. were regarded as son of Zeus-Ammon and not of Philip: yet to admit that Al. had made the claim and to impugn its veracity would have marred the ideal picture that Pt. clearly wished to draw of his former friend and king, a picture that inevitably had political overtones, since Pt. was in possession of Al's body and benefited from the prestige derived from the cult at his tomb. The safer course was thus to omit any direct reference to an inconvenient historical fact. No doubt the claim that Al. was son of a god helped to prepare the way for his deification, which took place in Egypt under the rule of Pt. himself, but perhaps only at a time after Pt. wrote his history (Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* 215 f. with Introd. § 11 above). It is less easy to see why Ar. should have concealed the truth, if such it was. One possibility is that he had read Pt. and on this, as on many other matters, deferred to his authority. But this is not a necessary explanation. The Macedonian high nobility in general can hardly have relished the suggestion that Al. was of divine birth and not, therefore, a member of the old reigning dynasty, to which many must have been related by marriage or descent. Domiciled in Macedon, Ar. may have been influenced by the feelings of many of Al's old Companions, whose admiration for their leader was perhaps commonly mixed with distaste for some of his more extravagant pretensions, his assumption of Oriental state and his claims to be son of

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a god. If a connexion is to be seen between Al's divine filiation and his own apotheosis, it is also relevant that in Macedon the ruler-cult never took hold.

12. For the enormous bibliography see Seibert (Introd. n. 108).

## APPENDIX VI

### THE REVOLT OF AGIS

1. In 331 B.C. (cf. *infra*) king Agis of Sparta raised a formidable revolt against Macedon in Greece; to this, and to Agis' earlier activities, Arrian makes only brief allusions; and his reticence demands an explanation. Our chief sources are D. 62 f.; QC. vi 1 (though most of his account is lost); J. xxi 1; Aeschines iii 165 and Dinarchus i 34. Athens stood aloof, but in the Peloponnese Sparta was joined by her traditional allies, the Arcadians (except Megalopolis), the Achaeans (except Pellene) and Elis; Agis is said by D. to have mustered 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse; he defeated a Macedonian force under Corragus and besieged Megalopolis, while Antipater was long in collecting an army to meet him (Aeschines), no doubt because he was at first pre-occupied by a revolt in Thrace (D., who makes Memnon, the governor, its leader; this is mysterious and not easily believed, as Memnon later took reinforcements to Al., cf. QC. ix 3, 21, and Al. was not one to pardon disloyalty). Ultimately, Antipater mobilized 40,000 men, including Greek allies (D.), and defeated and

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killed Agis near Megalopolis. The strength of his army is remarkable; in 334 he had been left only 12,000 Macedonian foot and 1,500 horse (D. 17, 5), and more Macedonians had been later sent east (Introd. 57, cf. § 3 below), but probably available manpower was growing every year (cf. Griffith, *G. & R.* 1965, 129 ff.), and of course we do not know how many allies joined him. After his victory Antipater referred the punishment of Sparta to the allied *synedrion*, and that body in turn left the decision to Al. (D. 73, 5 f.). Aeschines tells that Spartan representatives were about to go up to Al. and plead their case, when he was speaking; that was in July/Aug. 330 (cf. iii 254). By then the revolt was over, but Aeschines does not show just when it was suppressed. If the decisive battle be placed in autumn 331, we can readily assume that the *synedrion* did not meet till the Isthmian festival in late spring or early summer 330 and that the Spartans were slow in despatching their emissaries. The date of the revolt's outbreak is also disputed, and here A's allusions are crucial.

2. A. ii 13, 4 ff. tells how Agis met the Persian admirals on Siphnos just when the news of Issus came through (Oct. 333), that he received 30 Talents and 10 triremes from them, which he gave his brother to use in Crete, and that he later rejoined Autophradates at Halicarnassus, but he neglects his later activity in Crete, where in 332 he was winning over cities (D. 48, 1; QC. iv 1, 39 f.), and probably securing mercenaries; in the war he allegedly had 10,000 (Dinarchus), and according to D. and QC. 8,000 survivors of Issus had joined him in Crete. This estimate is incompatible with A's statement that

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only 8,000 in all escaped from Issus (H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 199 thinks even this figure too high); moreover, A. seems to make them all go with Amyntas to Egypt (whereas D. and QC. iv 1, 27 give Amyntas only 4,000); there they must have sustained further losses (A. ii 13, 2 f.), and it is not recorded that any from this party ultimately went to Crete. However, A. is probably wrong in thinking that all the survivors from Issus were with Amyntas; the 2,000 still in Darius' service in 331 (iii 7, 1; 16, 2; in QC. iv 1, 3 they number 4,000) may be another remnant. All that we can say is that some who had fought at Issus found their way to Agis.

3. A. says that at Tyre in 331, perhaps as late as early July (App. VIII 4), Al. sent Amphoterus with ships to help the loyal Peloponnesians against a movement of revolt in the Peloponnese led by Sparta; he also ordered 100 Phoenician and Cypriote ships to Greece (iii 6, 2 f.). By contrast QC. iv 8, 15 makes him despatch Amphoterus from Egypt to free Crete and clear the seas of piracy, whereas A. iii 2, 6 does not suggest that Amphoterus, as well as Hegelochus, came to Egypt at all. Perhaps we can partially reconcile their evidence by assuming that Amphoterus' original instructions, given in Egypt, were amended when it was clear that the prime danger was no longer in Crete but in Greece. *Prima facie* A. seems to imply that Al. had already heard at latest in early July of Agis' success in raising other Peloponnesians in revolt. It is no objection that he sent only ships when troops were most needed to defeat the rebels. Al. could not spare troops without postponing his offensive in Mesopotamia. He could reckon that Antipater could outmatch Agis by land



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without reinforcements. On the other hand a fleet, which he was free to send, could provide Antipater, in case of need, with the means of rapidly transporting forces by sea; it could cut off Agis, who was now presumably back at Sparta, from further supplies of soldiers from Crete, and it could help to neutralize Athens; at the very same time Al. at last ordered the release of Athenian prisoners taken in 334 (contrast i 29, 5), to conciliate that city (iii 6, 2). And, though our accounts of the revolt say nothing of the part played by Al's ships, they may in fact have served at least the last two purposes. It is more puzzling that in December 331 (iii 16, 10) Al. was to be joined by Amyntas, son of Andromenes, whom he had despatched home to bring him reinforcements late in 332 (D. 49, 1; QC. iv 6, 30) and who now brought him 6,500 Macedonians, 4,100 Thracians and 4,000-5,000 Peloponnesians (D. 65, 1; QC. v 1, 40 f.); these men can hardly have started later than July, if they marched all the way, but if they were shipped to Syria, they would have set out even later, and it seems strange that Antipater should have let them go, if he was then aware of the full dimensions of the revolt. That may suggest that in July, though the situation in the Peloponnese was already menacing, Sparta's allies were not yet committed to war and that Antipater did not feel justified in delaying compliance with Al's orders for reinforcements. It was perhaps from Amyntas that Al. himself first learned in December that the seditious movement in the Peloponnese had culminated in war, and as he then sent Antipater money for his operations, he did not yet know that the revolt had been repressed (iii 16, 10). All this must cast some doubt on the statement in QC. vi 1, 21 that the revolt broke out

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suddenly and was ended before Gaugamela, i.e. 1 October. It had been preparing for some time, and if Antipater's victory occurred so early, we might expect a courier to have brought the news to Al. by December, when he was at Susa or (see n. *ad loc.*) approaching it. Aeschines actually says that Antipater was long in mustering his forces; but conceivably he is counting from the time when the Spartans were in arms and not from the later point when they had secured allies, and his testimony need not prove that the revolt was not put down till spring 330; we might prefer a date in October if we need to give QC. any credence; he would then be guilty of only a small chronological error.

4. QC. chose to describe the revolt after his narrative of Darius' death, perhaps because one of his sources recorded that it was then that Al. heard of its suppression; so J. (whose account is, however, full of errors). In fact QC. himself says that the report reached Al. only when he was at Bactra (vii 4, 32) in spring 329; this is far too late, and perhaps he garbled a statement in his source that it was there that the Spartans sent to plead for their city overtook Al. (Earlier, in summer 330, Al. had captured Spartan emissaries sent to Darius, A. iii 24, 4; we can suppose that they had left in 332, before it was known at Sparta that Al. was master of the seas and the Syrian ports and that they had to make their way via Egypt and the Red Sea, reaching Darius by a long, slow detour.) D. recorded the revolt immediately after Gaugamela and absurdly makes it a consequence of that battle; he also dates it to the next Athenian archon year, 330/329, which is refuted by Aeschines as well as by A. D's dates are

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notoriously unreliable; in 40, 1 and 64, 3 he makes Al. bury his dead after Issus and Gaugamela in the next archon year! If he, QC. and J. all drew ultimately on a common source for the revolt, it is plain that each took a different way of relating the story to Al's operations (cf. R. A. Lock, *Antichthon* 1972, 10 ff.), and thus fell into various chronological errors.

5. See also E. Badian, *Hermes* 1967, 170 ff., though I do not accept his conjecture that Al. tarried at Persepolis, because he was anxiously awaiting news from Greece, see App. VIII 6 for another explanation); G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 1969, 163 ff. (dating the revolt to 330); G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 376 ff.

6. Why did A. and presumably his sources almost ignore these events? Perhaps because of their persistent tendency to minimize discontent in Greece, which made nonsense of Al's Panhellenic claims; they were equally silent about the events that led up to the Lamian war that broke out in autumn 323 (unless much is crammed into the lacuna in A. vii 12), for which Al's own actions were partly responsible, though they were careful to record the insincere congratulations of Greek envoys in vii 23, 2. But they were mainly concerned with Al's own campaigns and perhaps did not see it as their task to write a general history of his reign. And Al. did not allow the revolt to disturb his own strategy in 331; he assumed that somehow Antipater could cope with Agis, and he was proved right.

## APPENDIX VII

### THE SITE OF THAPSACUS

E. W. Marsden, *Campaign of Gaugamela* 81, with map and bibliographical references, observes that Thapsacus has been located anywhere between Jerablus and Deir ez Zor on the Euphrates; he prefers Sura without excluding somewhere near Meskene (which Strabo xvi 1, 13 might naturally suggest), but *contra* W. J. Farrell, *JHS* 1961, 153 ff., rejects Jerablus as inconsistent with our information about Al's march. I can see no inconsistency; the railway from the coast of Phoenicia to Mosul crosses the Euphrates at Jerablus, and if Al., having presumably read the account in Xen. *Anab.* i 5 of the difficulty of marching towards Babylon down the left bank of the Euphrates, had decided in advance to take the Tigris route (cf. A. iii 7, 3), it would have been rational to march north as far as Jerablus. On this hypothesis it is much easier to see why A. could say (*ibid.*) that from the time he crossed the river he had on his left the Euphrates (*sc.* after its eastward bend to the north) and the Armenian mountains. Furthermore, after Issus, Darius was in a hurry to put the river between Al. and himself, but he crossed at Thapsacus, coming south from the Amanid Pass (ii 13, 1). It is hard to see why he should have deferred a crossing not only until the bend of the river near Meskene but for another 60 miles thereafter. Similarly in 401 Jerablus was the nearest crossing for Cyrus to make for from the Syrian Gates, and it also fits well with the information in Ar. *ap.* A. vii 19, 3; Strabo xvi 3, 3 that shipbuilding materials

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and other cargoes could be shipped down- or up-stream to Thapsacus whence they were conveyed by portage to or from the coast. However the bend of the river near Meskene cannot be ruled out; Sura by contrast seems too far east.

## APPENDIX VIII

### GEOGRAPHICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 333-326 B.C.

1. A., and sometimes QC. and D., may tell us that Al. marched from one point to another in so many days, or that he covered so many stades. These bits of information are recorded irregularly, and one bit is sometimes in one author, one in another. It is apparent that they are unmethodically excerpting from a much fuller body of material in their own sources, such as Pt. If we reject the hypothesis that Pt. or other historians writing after Al's death had access to 'royal journals' (Introd. 14), data of this kind must have come to them in turn from some other contemporary source. Callisthenes may have recorded such data, but his history broke off early. Probably they used the records of the 'bematists', who accompanied Al. (cf. Tod 188), measured routes by *bemata* or paces (Pliny, *Natural History* vi 61), and published reports under the title of *Stathmoi* (Stages), which also contained descriptions of lands that Al. visited or merely heard of. These descriptions were not free from inventions and fables, but no doubt the *Stathmoi* were fairly accurate about Al's actual

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marches; Pliny (l.c., cf. vi 44 f.) cites them for distances, and they were apparently also used by Eratosthenes (c. 285–194 B.C.) for his great geographical work; see Jacoby nos. 119–23 with bibliography (cf. L. Pearson, *Historia* iii 439 ff.) Figures are particularly liable to corruption by copyists, and Pliny (vi 62) noticed that there were already variants in manuscripts at his disposal; some discrepancies between the totals produced by adding up the individual figures in Pliny or Strabo and those which each author supplies himself, and perhaps between particular figures in Pliny and Strabo, may be due to manuscript corruption. Pliny gives figures in Roman miles, but shows in vi 45 that he has converted stades into miles at 8:1. Unfortunately the stade is itself a unit of measurement based on the foot, and the length of the 'foot' varied in different Greek systems, but in general the stade seems to be .185 km for our purposes. To some extent such data can be controlled by the distances on modern routes, though the modern route need not correspond exactly to the ancient. For a day's march we can also adduce the experience of modern unmechanized armies. Clausewitz (cf. Marsden, *Campaign of Gaugamela* 19) set the average at 16 km a day, see J. Kromayer, *Hermes* 1896, 96 ff., for a wealth of comparative material; this applies indeed only to large armies, of the size Al. had at least until he left Ecbatana (cf. 7 below), and to significant distances; for several days even a large army can move faster, but it must then pause, to rest and let stragglers come up. In hard mountain country or intense heat or cold such a rate will be less easy to maintain. And Al. often had to pause for another reason: to collect provisions for further advance, especially when he had

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little information about the country ahead, or knew it to be desolate as well as potentially hostile.

2. Some works I have consulted for what follows are cited only by the author's name, viz:

E. Borza, *Classical Philology* 1972 (for the stay at Persepolis)

J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* <sup>2</sup>, 1877

K. Fischer, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 1967, 129 ff. (Afghanistan)

A. Foucher (and E. Bazin-Foucher), *Mémoires de la Délégation archéologique française en Afghanistan*, I-II, 1942, 1947

J. Hansman, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* 1968, 111 ff. (cf. Hansman and D. Stronach, *ib.* 1970, 29 ff.)

S. J. Marquardt, *Philologus, Supplementband X*, 1905, 19 ff.

G. Radet, *Mélanges Glotz II*, 1932, 765 ff.

F. von Schwarz, *Alexanders des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan*, 1893 (second edition, 1906, not accessible)

A. F. von Stahl, *Geographical Journal* 1924, 312 ff.

Sir Aurel Stein, *On Alexander's Track to the Indus*, 1929

R. M. Wheeler, *Charsadda*, 1962

Further, W. W. Tarn, *GBI—Greeks in Bactria and India* <sup>2</sup>, 1951

3. On the basis of mileage we may calculate that starting from Gordium in May 333 (i 29, 4 n.) Al. should have reached Tarsus early in July; nearly three months elapsed before Issus (ii 11, 10 n.), and though part of this interval was filled by his long illness (P. 19, 1), about a fortnight was spent on the visit to Soli, west of Tarsus, and in operations based



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on that city before he began to move east. It is characteristic that A. records that he took a day to reach Anchialus on the route to Soli, and seven days in subduing the highlanders to the north (ii 5, 2 and 6), yet gives no other indication of the passage of time except for the statement that he reached Myriandrus 'on the second day' *prima facie* from Mallus: one instance of the way in which only some of the bematists' records get into his narrative; in fact it seems probable that the 'second' day is counted from a place between Mallus and Myriandrus (cf. ii 6, 2 n.). Perhaps the long delay and diversion to Soli can be explained: Al. may have hoped that Darius would put his army at risk in the Cilician hills and narrow plains; if so, he lost patience and began to advance into Syria at the very moment when his hope was fulfilled. A. provides no explanation and is not even conscious that there was anything to explain.

4. We find exactly the same phenomenon in the campaign of 331. Al. left Egypt at the very beginning of spring (iii 6, 1), presumably in March, but was not at Thapsacus on the Euphrates until some date between 10 July and 8 August (7, 1), and probably at the end of that period (*infra*), after pausing for an unspecified period at Tyre. QC. iv 9, 12 says that he reached the Euphrates 'in his eleventh camp'; this is another instance of (at best) unintelligent reportage from the bematists' records, for it naturally suggests that he took 11 days from Tyre to the river, and this is impossible; some intermediate and unrecorded halt is implied. Now the site of Thapsacus is unknown (App. VII), but Eratosthenes said that it was 2,400 stades from the

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point at which Al. crossed the Tigris (Strabo ii 1, 38), and wherever either of these places may be located, his estimate of about 440 km is not widely different from those which Marsden 22 gives for the distance between his Thapsacus or mine (App. VII) and any of the probable crossing places of the Tigris. To cover this distance A. needed not 13 days (QC. iv 9, 14), but about 4 weeks; once again, QC. has (at best) omitted some intermediate stage. In fact not less than 43 days elapsed between Al's arrival at Thapsacus and the lunar eclipse of 20/21 September, which occurred after he had crossed the Tigris and rested his army (7, 6); no doubt several days were occupied in crossing each river, and Al. may himself have reached the Euphrates before most of his army had come up. Thus the time between 8 August and 20 September can readily be filled. But if Al. had marched without delay from the Nile to Thapsacus, he would have been there in June. The campaign in Samaria (QC. iv 8, 9-11) and the alleged inefficiency in making preparations (i.e. collecting supplies) on the part of the satrap of Syria (iii 6, 8) may be relevant, but once again he may have hoped that Darius would leave the broad plains of Mesopotamia and come to meet him in the hilly country of Syria. And once again, A. attempts no explanation of his strategical problems or plans.

5. P. 31, 4 makes the night preceding the battle of Gaugamela the eleventh after the eclipse; thus the battle occurred, if we reckon inclusively, on 1 October; this date is confirmed in his life of Camillus (19; cf. iii 15, 7 n.; Beloch, III, 2, 304 ff., 315), and there is no reason to reject it, especially as it agrees with the detailed time-table in A., given the as-

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sumption that the day of 21 September was occupied with sacrifices (and no doubt with allaying alarm caused by the eclipse), cf. iii 7, 6.

Sept. 21	Sacrifices
22-24	Three days' advance (7, 7)
25	Contact with enemy (7, 7-9, 1)
26-9	Four days' rest (9, 1)
30	Renewed advance (night of 29th, 9, 2)
Oct. 1	Battle (for night of 30 Sept./1 Oct., 10-11).

Here, for once, we have a full record derived ultimately from the bematists. QC. also had information from the same source; he too knew of the four days' rest after contact had been made (iv 10, 10-15) and of the postponement of the battle by a day (iv 13), but he makes Al. set out from the Tigris at the second watch of 20/21 Sept., the eclipse having occurred at the first(!), and make contact with the enemy at daybreak of the 21st (10, 1-9). We must not interpret A's time-table from him, especially in view of the fiction of 10, 18-12, 2.

6. Al. took 20 days to cover 370 easy km from Babylon to Susa (A. iii 16, 7); we might allow as many for *c.* 400 km from Gaugamela to Babylon; there he stayed 34 days (QC. v 1, 36-9, cf. D. 64, 5). But conceivably he moved very fast to Babylon and stayed so long, partly to let his rear come up; even so, he can hardly have reached Susa before *c.* 5 December. After perhaps a short pause he crossed the mountains to Persepolis about 70 km NE of Shiraz; Eratosthenes' estimate of 4,200 stades from Susa (Strabo xv 3, 1) is grossly excessive, if correctly recorded, but the true distance is *c.* 590 km and he cannot have

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arrived, even though he eventually had with him only a relatively small and quick moving force (iii 18, 2), before early January 330 (cf. § 7). QC. v 6, 11 ff. records a punitive expedition in the surrounding country with snow still on the ground 'about the setting of the Pleiads', visible perhaps in late March rather than in late April (Borza n. 29). P. 37, 3 says that he remained at Persepolis for 4 months; if that means (parts of) 4 calendar months, he can have left in late April. The need to procure supplies (in winter) and to await the time when snow or mud would less impede his marching can account for so long a delay. It is a hard march of 700 km from Persepolis to Ecbatana (Hamadan), where he can hardly have arrived till early June; A. iii 19 supplies incomplete data, but till he was 3 days' march from Hamadan, he did not know that he would have no battle to fight, and could not risk dividing his army or wearying it by forced marches. QC. v 13, 2 makes him by-pass Hamadan, pursuing Darius on the direct route from Arak to Teheran, but A. shows that this is an error; Radet guesses that at this point he did divide his army, which would now have been safe, and that part took that route. Al. himself certainly went to Hamadan. If Darius had already gathered in supplies and then left them behind in hurried flight, he will not have needed to stay there long to collect provisions, and if he left Persepolis on (say) 25 April and Hamadan on 9 June, the average rate of progress would be 16 km a day.

7. Al. left Hamadan with a much smaller army, and probably beyond Rhagae he regularly divided it into detachments (App. XIII), as he no longer had to

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contemplate a major battle, and this eased the problem of procuring food and water. He was thus able to make more rapid progress. Herodotus iv 201 reckons a day's journey as 200 stades, about 37 km, but he was not thinking of even a small army with its *impedimenta*. Kromayer (para. 1) shows that in the late nineteenth century a division of about 12,000 men could march on average 25–30 km a day; 33 was thought extraordinary. As Al. was often moving in difficult country or in harsh weather, and had to pause to gather supplies when he reached fertile districts, we should not expect an average rate of progress over the immense distances he covered in 330–329 above 30 km, though for many days together he must have marched at 35. See also § 21.

8. He reached Rhagae, 8 km S.E. of Teheran (its modern counterpart), on the 11th day from Hamadan (iii 20, 1), and the speed of his march forced him to pause there for 5 days. By the most direct route the distance is about 310 km (von Stahl), an average of about 28 km. Both von Stahl and Radet suppose that he took a more circuitous route, since Arrian *l.c.* says that at his rate of progress the Caspian Gates were only one day's march away, and the distance is about 70 km. But Arrian was surely judging by the rate of his pursuit of Darius on the last day, which was quite exceptional (*infra*). A pause at Rhagae was required no doubt for supplies. At any rate if he reached Hamadan in early June, he probably did not reach Rhagae till c. 20 June nor set out again till c. 25 June. The earlier we can date these movements, the better it will suit subsequent chronology.

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9. He then got through the Caspian Gates, 82 km to the end of the defiles of Sialek and Sardar south of the Elburz mountains, at breakneck speed on the second day, and paused in the fertile plain of Choarene to obtain provisions, as he knew that the country ahead was desolate (iii 20, 4); von Stahl takes him to Aradan, 124 km from Teheran on the modern road, Radet not quite so far. Both assume that it was on this same day that he heard of Darius' arrest and resumed his advance that night, before the return of a foraging party (iii 21, 1 f.). But the text of A. does not require that assumption: A. was quite capable of omitting to record one or more days' rest in Choarene, and the speed of his pursuit of Darius in the next four days is more credible, if we accept that there had been such a rest. Von Stahl and Radet offer rival and conjectural reconstructions of that pursuit, which is said to have culminated in a final march of up to 400 stades or 70 km in the last night and part of the last day, perhaps 18 hours (21, 9), the only distance A. records. Until this last stage Al. had had foot as well as horse with him, and the distances he had covered were no doubt shorter. Radet ends the pursuit at Kharian not far from Shahrud, makes him cover 400 km in all from Rhagae and 270 from Choarene and cites the opinions of French military experts that this rate of marching is just, but only just, within the bounds of credibility (it was all in broiling heat). Von Stahl put the end of the pursuit near Damghan, only 344 km from Teheran on the modern road. Now after the pursuit Al. waited for the rest of his army to come up (23, 1), and QC. (vi 2, 15) puts the pause at the city later called Hecatompulos; nothing suggests that Al. turned back to meet the rest of his troops. Excava-



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tions have revealed a city 32 km west of Damghan, not far from the main road, which has been identified with Hecatompylos by Hansman, on the very site where von Stahl guessed it would be found. If Hansman is right, Al's pursuit would seem to have covered not much more than 300 km in six days, or more if a pause is admitted in Choarene. This is easier to credit. However, Hansman's identification is based partly on the statements of Apollodorus of Artemita (first century B.C.) *ap.* Strabo xi 9, 1 that Rhagae was 500 stades from the Caspian Gates and Hecatompylos 1,260 further on; Hansman suggested that the stade must be taken as .163 km here, since the true distance from Rhagae to the end of the defiles is 82 km, and that Hecatompylos had to be roughly where he was to find it. He wrongly invoked as well Pliny's estimate of 133 miles from the Gates, which at 8 stades to the mile is only 1,064 stades; this does not fit Hansman's site, and must be an error on any view, like Ammianus' 1,040 (xxxiii 6, 43). Marquardt would read 233 miles (= 1,860 stades) and this would then nearly agree with Eratosthenes' figure of 1960 in our manuscripts of Strabo xi 8, 9 (also amended by Marquardt to 1860); Strabo gives no indication that the distance was in dispute. Eratosthenes is also reported there to have given the distance of Hecatompylos to Alexandria in Areia (Herat) as 4,530 (Pliny vi 61 gives 4,600) and of the Caspian Gates to Alexandria as 6,400. Hecatompylos lay on the route, and the sum of the distances is really 6,490, if the figures are correct; on Marquardt's emendation, which gives 6,390, Strabo's 6,400 is closer as a round sum and, being equivalent to 1,182 km with the stade at .185 km, nearer to the distance by the modern road (about 1,130 km). All



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this suggests that the figure of 1,260 km is a copyist's error, that Hansman's city is not Hecatompylos, which should have lain further east, and that it is unjustified to take the stade as .163 km, an equation which does not yield possible results elsewhere (§ 13) and which is not necessary to account for the 500 stades, a round figure, from Rhagae to the Caspian Gates; even if Apollodorus' stade is .185 km it is only 10 km too high. Thus Radet may be right on the length of the pursuit of Darius, though not about the number of days it occupied; we should add two or three of rest in Choarene.

10. On any view Darius' death falls early in July, and by mid-July, after a rest at Hecatompylos, Al. should have been ready to march into Hyrcania. A. (iii 23, 4; 25, 1) mentions a four-day wait in one camp, and a rest for 15 days at Zadracarta, the capital, which has been variously and uncertainly identified with Sari (which would fit best as base for the Mardian campaign, but cf. § 11) or Astrabad; QC. (vi 4, 8) confirms the first wait, gives additional topographical details, which von Stahl held to be accurate, and makes the Mardian campaign end on the fifth day (5, 22); this well illustrates how each writer is excerpting from much fuller data. Neither tells how much time in all was spent in Hyrcania, but it cannot have been less than a month. The country is exceptionally rich (iii 23, 1 n.), and once again Al. must have been provisioning himself for his march 'to Bactria' (24, 4). He cannot have started before mid-August.

11. His route took him within about 600 stades from Artacoana, the capital of Areia (25, 6). No one doubts that this town, like the city of Alexandria he

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founded in Areia, lay on or near the site of the modern Herat. It therefore follows that he did not mean to go by the oasis of Merv, surrounded by deserts; this was a place he never visited, though a city was founded there by his orders (Tarn ii 234). He must have joined the modern (and ancient) highroad from Teheran (Rhagae) via Meshed to Herat. Meshed is 840 km beyond the Caspian Gates and 709 from Astrabad by modern roads, but further from Sari (Strabo reckons roughly 6,000 stades from the Caspian sea to Areia (xi 8, 1; 10, 1) against 6,490 from the Gates to Alexandria in Areia). Hereabouts in a fertile oasis we should expect Al. to pause, and in fact he 're-assembled' his force at Susia (25, 1-4), surely the modern Tus near Meshed, and once the centre of that area. From Meshed to Herat is another 390 km by the modern road. QC. vi 6, 19 says that he marched fast because of shortage of supplies. A. (25, 6) suggests that he would never have visited Herat but for Satibarzanes' revolt, but this is implausible: Herat with 200,000 cultivated acres has been called 'a green island in a lifeless sea', and Al. would have had little choice but to pause here again for rest and supplies, before proceeding on what Strabo (xv 2, 8) calls the most direct route to Bactra (Balkh or Wazirabad), skirting the north side of the Hindu-Kush by Maimana and Mezar-i-Sharif for about 600 km (Foucher I 10 f.). Satibarzanes' revolt induced him to take Strabo's more circuitous southern route (below), 1,138 km by the modern road to Kabul with the Hindu-Kush still to cross. No doubt he wished to complete the subjugation of Areia, though the time-table forbids us to accept D's statement that he spent 30 days doing so (78, 4)—perhaps that was the time the

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march to the border of Areia occupied—just as he cannot have taken 60 days to settle Ariaspian affairs (QC. vii 3, 3)—perhaps the time of his march as far as the border of Arachosia. But other considerations may have made him change his original plan. He can hardly have arrived at Herat before late September, nor left until early October. The northern road is harder than the southern, and the climate more severe. It would have been rash to enter a hostile country with no guarantee of supplies and winter coming on, far from any secure base such as Al. had for other winter operations.

12. His march (we are told) lay through the lands of the Zarangaeans (or Drangaeans), Ariaspian, Arachotians and Parapamisadae (A. iii 25–8; Strabo xv 2, 10). In the first of these he rested (for 9 days, according to QC. vi 6, 36) at the ancient capital of Phra or Phrada, where a city was founded by his directions under the name of Prophthasia in memory of the detection there of Philotas' plot. Two cities, Alexandria and Alexandropolis, also commemorated him in Arachosia. His historians do not mention these foundations, and he certainly had no time to attend to them personally in autumn 330; like Alexandria-Merv and even Alexandria in Areia, they were doubtless founded later by his orders. (Droysen, iii<sup>2</sup> 193 ff. remains the clearest account, with evidence, for Al's colonies.) Strabo (xi 8, 9) and Pliny (vi 61), both apparently following the *Stathmoi*, give distances between Alexandria in Areia, Prophthasia, 'the Arachotian town' and Ortospana near the modern Kabul. The modern road, which must always have been in use, since it is fairly easy, takes 1,138 km from Herat to Kabul via Farah (270), Girishk,

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Kandahar (647), Kalat-i-Ghilzai (785) and Ghazni (1,010); figures in brackets show distances in km from Herat. I believe that Kiepert in his atlas rightly marked this as Al's route. Strabo (xv 2, 10) says that he reached the territory of the Parapamisadae, then covered in snow, *about* the setting of the Pleiads, i.e. in mid or late November (cf. § 21), and wintered in the place where he founded Alexandria 'under Caucasus' (§ 14); A. iii 28, 1-4 refers more vaguely to deep snow, and fails to mention his winter quarters. Deep snow is most likely round Ghazni, where the climate is far harsher than either to the south or to the north. Ghazni may have been in the satrapy of Arachosia rather than of Parapamisus, but Strabo could have been thinking in geographical, not administrative terms; here Al. was in the heart of the mountains so named. Leaving Herat in early October, he could have reached Ghazni at the season named by Strabo, if he had taken the direct route and (to allow for rests) marched at the remarkably fast average rate of 35 km a day. But Strabo's statement must be false, if we take him by the kind of detour south of Farah which most scholars since Kiepert prefer, extending to near the Seistan or Helmund lake; for instance, Fischer makes him traverse 810 km. between Farah and Kandahar instead of 377. Moreover this detour seems without purpose, and I cannot discover good reasons for assuming it. Nothing prevents us from supposing that Drangiane then extended as far north as Farah and that the Ariaspian lived round about the Farah-Kandahar road; if they did not, then it would be best to hold that Al. never entered their land, and that they sent ambassadors with their submission, as the Gadosians (A. iii 28, 1) must have done.

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13. Turn now to the distances given by Strabo and Pliny. With a stade of .185 km, Strabo's 6,490 stades from the Caspian Gates to Herat are 70 km too many by modern measurements, though the excess falls to 50, if we emend to 6,390 (§ 9). With a stade of .163 km, the distance is about 70 km too small. Since ancient routes may well have taken slightly different courses, either discrepancy is acceptable. But, though our manuscripts of Pliny give a larger distance between Hecatompylos and Herat than Strabo, this does not compensate for the lower figure from the Gates to Hecatompylos; the sum of the figures (708 miles = 5,664 stades) is much too low, another reason for Marquardt's emendation (§ 9). From Herat to Prophthasia we have variants, 1,500, 1,592 or 1,600 stades, i.e. 280–296 km. (If the stade were .163 km, the equation would be 245–260 km.) This clearly points to Prophthasia being at or near Farah, 270 km from Herat, *contra* Droysen 216 with wrong distance. These correspondences encourage us to expect light on Al's later route. But difficulties appear. I give Strabo's figures, with Pliny's (converted into stades) in brackets, and equivalents in km for Strabo's, taking the stade under A to be .185 km and under B to be .163 km. (It will emerge that the second equivalent is impossible.)

	Stades	Km	
		A	B
Prophthasia to			
Arachotian town	4,120 (4,520)	762	671
Arachotian town to			
Ortospana	2,000 (1,400)	370	326
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,120 (5,920)</b>	<b>1,132</b>	<b>997</b>

But by the direct modern road it is only 892 km from

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Farah to Kabul. And where is the Arachotian town? It should be at or near some modern centre, as town sites are within limits determined by permanent geographical factors. Under A Ghazni is the right distance from Farah, Kalat right from Kabul; under B nothing offers. (Pliny gives no help; his mileage from Prophthasia to the Arachotian town may easily be emended to produce Strabo's 4,120 stades, but the distance thence to Ortospana remains too far from Ghazni, whatever the length of the stade; this figure too must be corrupt.) However, Strabo's data will make sense if we suppose that his source, also followed by Pliny, was guilty of taking the distance from Herat to Farah to be an additional item when it should really have been included in the distance from Herat to the Arachotian town. If Strabo's total under A. really represents the whole distance from Herat (Artacoana or Alexandria in Areia), and not just that from Farah (Prophthasia) to Kabul (near Ortospana), it is only 6 km. too short. The Arachotian town would now be near Kalat, long regarded as a candidate; by the modern road it is only 23 km. further from Herat and 17 nearer to Kabul than Strabo's figures would now suggest, discrepancies that are perfectly acceptable. Fischer indeed argues powerfully that Alexandria in Arachosia is Kandahar; that is suggested by the fertility of its plain, its importance on the route to the lower Indus (cf. vi 17, 3 n.) and evidence that it was a Hellenized centre in the early third century. Let this be so: the very fact that Strabo and Pliny speak of the Arachotian town and not of Alexandria in Arachosia (whereas they do refer to Alexandria in Areia and Prophthasia) suggests that the two places were not identical, and that Fischer's hypo-



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thesis does not oblige us to equate the Arachotian town with Kandahar rather than with a site near Kalat.

14. The new city (A. iii 28, 4) from which Al. crossed the Hindu-Kush to Bactra in spring 329 (cf. Strabo xv 2, 10) and to which he returned in late spring 326 (iv 22, 3 f.), wrongly placed by D. 83, 2 and QC. vii 3, 23 north of the range, was founded 'sub ipso Caucaso' (Pliny vi 62) and 'in radicibus montis' (QC.); Pliny puts it 400 stades (c. 70 km) from Ortopana; though its exact site has not been found, it was evidently near Begram and Charikar, perhaps at the junction of the Ghorband and Panjshir rivers in what Foucher (I 29) describes as the largest, richest and most populous basin of north Afghanistan, and close to the ancient Kapica, then more important than Kabul; for further speculation see Tarn, *GBI* 460 ff. The true distance from Kabul is c. 50 km. QC. vii 3, 18 plausibly tells that the army was revived after its march on reaching cultivated lands with abundant supplies; this valley, like that of Kabul (where perhaps some of the troops bivouacked, to ease the supply problem), enjoys a milder climate than the region of Ghazni which the army had traversed.

15. The topography of the campaigns of 329–327 is explained with exemplary conciseness and clarity by von Schwarz; though he wrongly denied the traditional equation of Bactra with Zariaspa (Reuss, *Rheinisches Museum* lxii, 591 ff; Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* I<sup>2</sup> 438), I follow him in general. A. makes little use of the descriptive material Ar. provided, but see iii 28, 5 f. (cf. Strabo xv 2, 10); 30, 7; iv 6, 6 (cf. Strabo xi 11, 5); perhaps 29, 2 ff.



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There is often more in QC., esp. vii 5, 1 ff.; 6, 1 ff. (better than A. iii 30, 10); 11, 1 ff. (better than A. iv 18, 4 ff.); viii 2, 19 ff. Von Schwarz shows that here again he must be following a good first hand source. Except by allusion in iii 30, 6, A. has nothing on the fearful hardships of the crossing of the Hindu-Kush (QC. vii 4, 22-5) and of the waterless route from Balkh to the Oxus (ib. 5, 1 ff.). In general (but cf. iii 28, 8 f.; iv 21, 10) he tends to suppress evidence of the risks Al. took with his men, see commentary on vi 22 ff.

16. In spring 329 Al. with the snow still thick (A. iii 28, 8) crossed the Hindu-Kush in 15 (Strabo xv 2, 10), 16 (D. 83, 1) or 17 (QC. vii 3, 21) days; perhaps the whole march took longer, and different writers took different views of the time spent in the actual pass. The usual descent lay via Chulum or Tashkurgan (Aornos), but perhaps because Bessus expected Al. here and had ravaged the country (A. iii 28, 7), Al. came down at Drapsaca (Adrapsa in Strabo), i.e. Kunduz, and then proceeded to Bactra, a great trading centre and in the heart of a fertile land (Strabo ii 1, 14; xv 1, 18; QC. 3, 26 ff.), where he must have stayed some time, resting his men and getting in supplies, as it was high summer when he advanced to the Oxus (Amu-Darya) at Khelif; QC's distance, c. 74 km at a stade of .185 km, is about right and his description admirable (5, 1 ff.). A. iii 29, 3 is accurate on the breadth of the Oxus; it is 100 m. deep, runs at 8-10 km a hour; the region lacks timber, and Al. crossed it by a local method known to von Schwarz. Bessus fled to Nautaca, conjecturally Shahr-i-Sabz, and then probably towards Maracanda (Samarkand); the place where he was

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captured cannot be identified. Al. must have replaced his horses at Karshi (iii 30, 6), still the great centre for horse-trading c. 1900, and the fort where he was wounded (30, 10) will be Kungur-tau nearby. Karshi is 142 km from Samarkand, which Al. reached on the 4th day (QC. 6, 10), i.e. at about 35 km a day. Thence he must have marched along the foot of the Alai range to the Syr-Darya at a point von Schwarz decisively identified with Khodjend near Lenina-bad. His new city here, Alexandria Eschate, was built in 20 days (A. iv 4, 1) or 17 (QC. 6, 26 f.); in von Schwarz' day all buildings in this region were still of mud. Of the rebel cities in iv 3 von Schwarz conclusively identified Cyropolis with Ura-Tyube from A's description, and on the ground that town sites here are unalterably fixed by geographical factors gave more conjectural identities to the others. In iv 5, 3 we read that on Pharnuches' approach Spitamenes withdrew from the siege of Samarkand to the 'royal residence (*βασιλεια*)' of Sogdiana. Since Samarkand itself was the capital of Sogdiana, editors have emended, with little palaeographical plausibility, to 'the north (*βόρεια*)' of Sogdiana. The emendation should be rejected: von Schwarz observed that the emirs, and presumably the satraps, needed both winter and summer capitals, Bukhara and Samarkand; here the former is meant. Pharnuches' force was destroyed by the river Zeravshan on the road to Bukhara. According to iv 6, 3 Al. covered 1,500 stades or 278 km in his march to relieve Samarkand; by the modern road the distance is 290. But A. makes him cover this mileage in 3 days; this is surely incredible (with infantry). QC. vii 9, 21 reports that he reached the scene of Pharnuches' defeat on the 4th day out of

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Samarkand, and I suspect that A. has confused the two marches.

17. After extensive devastations Al. withdrew to Bactra for the winter 329/8 (iv 7, 1), returning in spring (15, 7) for systematic pacification with five separate forces (16, 2), whose movements cannot be traced. QC. vii 10, 14 ff. takes him on a waterless march of 330 km from the Oxus to Merv, which A. ignores and of which QC. gives no details, though the hardships would have been appalling. Von Schwarz rightly rejects it (like most historians), but makes Al. visit Merv in 330, which is also impossible; he never went there (§ 11). Spitamenes attacked Bactra while A. was in Sogdiana (16, 4 ff.); the desert of 17, 1 (*contra* von Schwarz) must be that between Balkh and the Oxus. After his attack failed, Spitamenes must have withdrawn to the Turkestan steppes west of the Oxus, where the Massagetae may be located, though Gabae cannot be identified (17, 4).

18. In 328/327 Al. wintered in Sogdiana, himself at Nautaca (17, 3; 18, 2), but started operations very early in spring 327 (18, 4), with deep snow still on the mountains (18, 5; 21, 10). He must have taken the road leading towards Termez from Shahr-i-Sabz, for von Schwarz locates the Rock of Sogdiana at Baisun-tau, some 20 km east of Derbend, more on the basis of QC's than of A's description. Thence he moved further east, for A's Rock of Choriene (QC's Rock of Sisimithres) can be certainly identified with Koh-i-Nor at a point where the road from Dushambe (Stalinabad) to Boldzhuan crosses the river Vachsh about 80 km SE of Stalinabad; von

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Schwarz shows that it was in fact impregnable. Once again QC. has an excellent description; the emendation in viii 2, 19 of an unknown place-name to Nautaca is the product of editorial ignorance. From this rock Al. must have returned to the Oxus at Termez via Stalinabad and roughly the modern railway route down the Surkhan valley; thence to Balkh.

19. It was late spring 327 when he recrossed the Hindu-Kush in 10 days by a different pass to his city under the 'Caucasus' (iv 22, 4 n.). Thence he will have descended to Jellalabad in the Kabul valley (22, 6) via the Laghman route (Foucher). Here he divided his forces. Hephæstion and Perdikkas were sent direct to Peucelaotis, i.e. Charsadda (Wheeler) and the Indus (22, 7), not by the Khyber pass which leads to Peshawar but by the Michni pass further north (Foucher I 36 ff.). He himself proceeded to pacify the peoples in the hills and valleys north of the Kabul river. Strabo xv 1, 17, summarizing Ar's account of the climate in N.W. India, which A. omits, says on his authority that the march from Alexandria began only after the setting of the Pleiads, i.e. in November. Here again we have a long pause in Al's operations which A. does not mention, still less explain. Perhaps he had sent envoys to Taxilas and other Indian princes and was awaiting news of their attitudes. Taxilas in fact came to offer him allegiance, presumably at Jellalabad (22, 6 n.). The delay meant that the operations recounted by A. iv 23 ff. took place in winter and early spring 327/326. Stein thinks Aornos may have fallen in April (iv 29, 1 n.). Al. reached Taxila in spring 326 (Ar. *ap.* Strabo l.c.). This made it impossible for

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the hostile tribes to take refuge in snow-clad mountains; Aornos, with a large, flat and cultivated surface on the summit, was an exceptional stronghold. A. ignores these conditions, though they were described by Ar.

20. Al's own route cannot be followed in any detail until his arrival in Swat. The river Choes (23, 2) must be the Kūnar; after marching up this valley, he crossed the mountains into Bajaur (24, 6); the passage of the Guraios (Sanskrit, Gaurī) or Panjkora (25, 7) brought him into the land of the Assaceni, which must be Swat and Bunēr. Sir Aurel Stein held on good grounds that Bazira (27, 5, etc.) or Beira (QC. viii 10, 22) is Bir-Kot in Upper Swat and Ora, evidently higher up the Swat valley, probably Ude-Gram; the capital of the Assaceni, Massaga (26, 1, cf. Strabo xv 1, 27), must be in Lower Swat, where there is more rich land; moreover, Al. reached it first, moving up the valley. All this fits the fact that at Ora there was hope of aid from Abisares (27, 7), ruling in Hazara (round Abbottabad) across the Indus; moreover the people in these parts took refuge at Aornos, which Stein proved was Pir-Sar, overlooking the Indus (this detail in QC. viii 11, 7 was vital for Stein's discovery, though in general A's description is better); easy passes lead from Upper Swat to the right bank of the Indus. Before assailing Aornos, Al. had thus to descend to the Indus via Charsadda (28, 6). Embolima (28, 7) or Ecbolima (QC.) cannot be identified. The final operations against the Assaceni are thought to have been in Bunēr (30, 5 f.; the site of Dyrta is not known). Fuller's account (245 ff.) makes Stein's discoveries more accessible, see also map, p. 125.

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21. We hear of catapults in use in Sogdiana (iv 2, 3; 4, 4) and of perhaps other siege-engines there (3, 1) and at Massaga (26, 5) and Aornos (30, 1). In India sailors from the Mediterranean were available to man Al's river-flotilla (vi 1, 6; *Ind.* 18, 1). These allusions suggest that Al. had with him on his marches considerable *impedimenta* and many camp-followers, adding to the number of his men, as estimated in Appendix XIII (cf. 7 above), and making it harder to see how he could have kept up the rate of advance in 330 which the evidence seems to require. On certain occasions we are told that the baggage was despatched by easier and presumably longer routes than those he took himself (iii 18, 1; 23, 2). I would suppose that this was usual, and that in the long march from Hyrcania to Parapamisus the baggage train must have followed in the rear. The *whole* army need not have reached Ghazni in Nov. 330, nor have crossed the Hindu-Kush in early spring 329; note the long wait at Bactra before the march to the Syr-Darya, where we first hear again of engines.

## APPENDIX IX

### GAUGAMELA

1. The diversity of modern accounts (e.g. Tarn ii 182 ff., G. T. Griffith, *JHS* 1947, 77 ff., A. R. Burn, *ib.* 1952, 84 f., N. G. L. Hammond, *Hist. of Greece*, 615 ff., Fuller, 163 ff. and E. W. Marsden, *Campaign of Gaugamela*) shows that agreement among scholars on



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the problems has not been attained and suggests that it is unattainable.

2. Not even the *site* has been securely identified, but this hardly matters, since it is clear that the battle was fought in a wide plain, advantageous to Darius' numerical superiority. That superiority is proved by A's dispositions of his forces with a reserve phalanx which could face about, if the Persian got to his rear, and with mixed forces of cavalry and infantry (see Marsden 50, citing Xenophon, *Hippiarchicus* 5, 13) set at an angle to his right and left flanks, to impede envelopment. This arrangement cannot be questioned, since D. 57 and QC. iv 13, 26 ff., drawing on a common source which is not A's, from which each gives incomplete extracts, broadly agree with A's account, and while the actual confusion in the fighting may help to explain the confusion in all descriptions of it, there was no like reason why historians should have been unable to ascertain the prior dispositions of the commanders. Unfortunately 'at an angle' can be interpreted in various ways (see the works and plans of the scholars cited above), between which I cannot decide.

3. All the sources also give the Persian infantry, ill-armed and ill-trained, no important part in the battle. Hence, their numbers do not matter; the figures given (1,000,000 with some reserve by A's sources, 800,000 by D. 53, 3, 400,000 by J. xi 12, 5 and 200,000 by QC. iv 12, 13, though inconsistently in 9, 3 he makes Darius' army half as large again as in 333, for which see iii 2, 2), like those for the cavalry, were of course intended to show Al. as a David destroying a Goliath, whereas in fact he had a decisive superiority in quality. As to the cavalry,



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we can disregard D's 200,000 and J's 100,000, but A's 40,000 and QC's 45,000 are more reasonable; perhaps the document used by Ar. gave their number (in which case QC's figure must be invention). Marsden estimates their strength at 34,000, on the assumptions that the lines of the two armies were approximately equal and that the length of the Macedonian line can be calculated; of these the first seems to be false (cf. para. 2), and the second far too optimistic. We do not know if A's figure for Al's numbers (40,000 foot and 7,000 horse) is accurate (App. XIII 1), and indeed Marsden himself reaches a new estimate, not much different, on the basis of the original size of Al's army in 334 (forgetting the forces he took over in Asia), plus attested reinforcements (not all of which may be recorded) and less garrisons and casualties, which he minimizes. He also assumes that the phalanx was drawn up 16 deep, and not 8 deep, as at Issus (App. III 3), though at Gaugamela Al. had every reason to extend rather than deepen his line. For other objections see Hammond's review in *JHS* 1966, 252 f. All that we can safely say is that the Macedonian cavalry were substantially outnumbered.

4. Of the actual battle A's account is not wholly clear (as shown especially by Griffith) and has too little about fighting under Parmenio on the left, not perhaps because Ptolemy, fighting on the right, knew little of it (he could surely have found out), but because all historians wished to attribute the glory to Al., if not to depreciate Parmenio. Nor does A. harmonize with D. 57-61, still less with the muddled story (evidently from D's source) in QC., who can even confuse left and right wings. Neither does

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more than allude (D. 59, 8; QC. 15, 1-2) to the initial fighting on Al's extreme right (A. 13), and though both put the chariot charge early, allowing it rather more effect than A., and have the decisive conflict between Al. and Darius (who behaves with more courage in their narratives, cf. ii 11, 3 n.), they wholly differ about the break-through to the baggage. In A. this is effected by Persian cavalry in the centre coming through a gap in the Macedonian phalanx after the attack by Al. on the right (14, 4 ff.), but D. and QC. know nothing of this, nor consequently of the fierce fighting described by A. 15, 2. D. makes Mazaeus on the Persian right send cavalry round Al's flank to the camp; unfortunately the units he names are known to have been on the Persian left. P. 32, 3 f., who also records this movement, makes a similar mistake, and QC. actually transposes to the camp the fighting between Bessus' forces on the Persian left and Alexander's troops on his right flank, described in A. 13 and 14, 3. As for the romantic story in D. and QC. that Darius' mother refused to be freed by the Persians who took the camp, would not she, and the other captive women, have been left behind in the rear camp (A. 9, 1)?

5. P's account is anecdotal and unintelligible. He twice refers to Callisthenes, once for Al's prayer to Zeus (App. V 7) and again on the lack of energy allegedly shown by Parmenio (33, 1 and 6). It is not clear to me that P. ever cites Callisthenes from personal inspection, but be that as it may, he was quite capable of muddling his account, especially as it was not even his purpose to provide a full historical record but only to bring out the characteristics of his hero (P. 1). Callisthenes evidently depreciated

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Parmenio's services on this and probably other occasions, and glorified Al. It is quite another matter to suppose that he placed Persian units on the wrong wing, especially if his work is the source of Aristobulus' document (iii 11, 3 n.), or that he distorted the story except for flattery, or even for that purpose to an extent that was *patently* untrue. In particular, we cannot tax him with the absurdity of telling that Parmenio was heavily engaged at a time when he sent a message to Alexander, stationed on the other wing (as P's account implies) and still not fully armed and horsed for action, and that Al. then made a long speech—to the men under Parmenio's command; *contra* Tarn ii 352 f., this nonsense can only be P's.

6. Yet here we may have a substratum of truth. Parmenio is made to warn Al. of an outflanking movement round his left, threatening the baggage (so also QC. 15, 6 ff.); Al. refuses to take any action (for good reasons). Suppose that such a movement was made, probably before rather than after Parmenio (or Al.) was engaged; this could explain the 'vulgate' story that the camp was actually taken by Mazaeus' men. It was clearly proper, and at this stage practicable, for Parmenio to notify Al. Now contrast the other message Parmenio is reported by A. 15, 1 and all other sources (D. 60, 7; QC. 16, 1 ff.; P. 33, 6) to have sent to Al., when he was in hot pursuit of Darius, imploring his help against the Persian right. How could Parmenio know where Al. was then to be found amid all the dust (D. 60, 4; 61, 1; QC. 15, 32, cf. Fuller 178)? How could the messenger overtake him? D. in fact says that the message never got through, and in A. Parmenio

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defeats the Persian right without help in the end. It does more credit too to Al. as a general to suppose that he turned back from his initial pursuit, *in case* Parmenio were in danger. However, in retrospect it appeared a misfortune that Darius had escaped, and as the facts were that Parmenio had more difficulty in overcoming the enemy and that Al. did turn back to help him, those who sought to depreciate Parmenio (perhaps with Al's encouragement) made out that he was to blame for the incompleteness of the victory. If it were also a fact that he had sent a message to Al. early in the battle, or rather before it had started, pointing out that he needed reinforcement if he were to block an outflanking movement, it was easier perhaps to fabricate a second message in support of the contention that his failings had hampered Al's success. And since P. cites Callisthenes on these failings in the context in which he mentions the second message, the story, whether true or false, may probably be his, and invented after Parmenio's death; note that he did not describe an event of winter 332/1 till after summer 330 (App. V 3), so that his record was in substantial arrears. I have indeed little doubt that Al's official version of the battle largely springs from Callisthenes.

## APPENDIX X

### PERSEPOLIS

1. Though D. 69 and QC. v 5, 1 ff. (unlike A.) say that Persepolis was surrendered to Al. by the Persian officer, Tiridates, to whom Al. allegedly confided

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the Persian treasury (QC. 6, 11), they also hold that Al. sacked the *city* on entry (D. 70; QC. 6, 1-9), and P. 37, 2 cites one of Al's supposed letters as evidence that he ordered the massacre of the inhabitants. A's account is so misleadingly brief, considering that Al. stayed at Persepolis from January to May 330 (App. VIII 6), that these stories cannot be discounted. The burning of the *palace* (iii 18, 11 f.) (confirmed by excavations, see E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* I 78) is plausibly set by QC. 7 and P. 38, 1 on the eve of his departure for Ecbatana, though D. 72 puts it before Al's campaign against neighbouring 'cities', which occurred in March-April (App. VIII 6) and in QC's account (6, 11 ff.) before the fire; it is at least probable that he deferred the act till he had ceased to require it as a residence. A. clearly gives the official view, adopted by Pt. and Ar. (also in Strabo xv 3, 6, who often uses Ar.), that it was deliberate retribution for the burning of Greek temples by the Persians in 480; it accords with this that Al. disbanded the Greek allies, even the Thessalians, at Ecbatana (iii 19, 5 and note); this was nearer home than Persepolis, and moreover Al. had then learned that Darius had been unable to mobilize another powerful army (iii 19, 4); the Panhellenic aims of the war had now been realized (Introd. 39 ff.), and all that remained was to fulfil Al's personal or Macedonian designs of conquest. (This is brought out in D. 74, 3; QC. vi 2, 15-4, 1; P. 47, 1 and J. xii 3 with variations.) However, the arson was inconsistent with the role he was about to assume as the rightful successor of Darius; hence, it was officially admitted that he regretted it later, not at once (P. 38, 4) but on his return to Persepolis in 324 (vi 30, 1). By contrast, in the 'vulgate', going back to Clitarchus (Jacoby

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no. 137) F. 11 (Athenaeus xiii 576 DE), Al. acted after a drunken party at the instigation of the courtesan, Thais (D., QC. and 'some accounts' in P.). If this was true, Pt. had a special reason (apart from his partiality to Al.) to conceal it; Thais was his mistress by whom he had three children, one of whom, Lagus, was old enough to win a chariot race in 308/7 (Athenaeus l.c., cf. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*<sup>3</sup> 314). QC 7, 10 f. says that the official version was invented to cover up the truth.

2. However this may be, it must be admitted that in this instance A's sources did justice to the good sense of Parmenio. The reference to his disagreement with Al., like all others, may go back to Callisthenes, who probably traduced him (App. VI 6). Callisthenes could well have fully approved of retribution on the Persians, and he wrote before Al. himself had repented; his design would not have been to set Parmenio in a favourable light. There is some reason to think that his history went down to 329 (Jacoby on F. 38); the argument that he cannot have recorded Al's Scythian campaign (iv 1 ff.), because he did not mention or deny Al's meeting with the queen of the Amazons (iv 15, 4 n.), is absurd; he would not have recorded what did not happen, and he had no occasion to refute a fiction that had not yet been invented. If he did tell of Parmenio's advice here, it was hard for later writers to expunge it from the record.

3. A's account in iii 18 has various omissions. Nothing of the appointment of a Macedonian general alongside the Persian satrap, which we should expect, cf. QC. v 6, 11 (Nicarchides with 3,000 men). Nothing of Tiridates (§ 1), and no details of the Persian treasure. Here our sources are discordant

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and untrustworthy. Cf. for treasure seized at Arbela, A. iii 15, 5 (no figure); D. 64, 3 (3,000 Talents of silver); QC. v 1, 10 (4,000); at Babylon, A. iii 16, 3; QC. v 1, 23 (no figures); at Susa, A. iii 16, 7 (c. 50,000, cf. QC. 2, 11); D. 66, 1 (40,000 plus 9,000 of gold, i.e. perhaps gold bullion worth 9,000 T.); P. 36, 1 (40,000 in coin); Strabo xv 3, 9 (50,000 or 40,000); at Persepolis, A. iii 18, 10 (no figure); D. 71, 1 (gold bullion worth 120,000, cf. QC. 6, 9 adding 6,000 at Pasargadae); P. 37, 2 (as much in coins as at Susa, i.e. 40,000). Strabo *l.c.* says that all were brought together at Ecbatana (A. iii 20, 7) and amounted to 180,000, perhaps implying 10,000–20,000 at Babylon, but much more if P. 37, 2 is right. Darius left Ecbatana with 7,000 T. (A. 19, 5) or 8,000 (Strabo), all taken by his murderers (Strabo), but D. makes Al. receive 8,000 from the royal treasurers after his death (74, 4) and QC. vi 2, 10 26,000 from recent booty.

## APPENDIX XI

### THE DEATHS OF PHILOTAS AND PARMENIO

1. A. cites Ar. as well as Pt. at iii 26, 1, but thereafter for reasons unknown relies solely on Pt's account of the trial of Philotas and murder of Parmenio. At 27, 1 he then proceeds: 'they say that Amyntas too...'; the 'they' are certainly Pt. and Ar. once more. QC. (vi 7-vii 2) has rhetorically embellished the story, especially with fictitious speeches, but no one thinks that the 'vulgate' can here be totally neglected, cf. also D. 79 f.; P. 48 f.; J. xii 5.



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2. The obscure allusion in 26, 1 to previous charges made against Philotas is probably illuminated by P. 48, 3-49, 2, telling that Philotas' mistress conveyed through Craterus to Al. his criticisms of Al. and boasts that Al's successes were due to him and his father. (QC. vi 8, 1 also makes Craterus' rivalry with Philotas a cause of his ruin.) QC. 9, 18; 10, 26 ff.; 11, 5 and 23 f. makes out that Philotas showed disapproval of Al's claim to be son of Zeus-Ammon; this will not be credited by those who deny that Al. made any such claim, but if true, it would help to explain why delations against Philotas began in Egypt (Pt. and Ar.). Cf. also iv 10, 3 ('vulgate').

3. D., QC. and P. all give details of the plot of Dymnus which Philotas admittedly failed to reveal to Al. and here again credibly supplement Pt's story. Pt. allows that there was other 'evidence' of Philotas' guilt, but regards his failure to reveal the plot as the clearest proof; from this we may judge (a) that the other evidence was still more contemptible and (b) that there may be truth in what P. tells (§ 2 above) and perhaps in QC. vi 9, 14 (an ambiguous letter intercepted from Parmenio to his son). In QC. vi 11, 8 ff. the trial before the army is adjourned for a day; Philotas confesses in fear of torture, but is none the less barbarously tortured (cf. D. and P.) and then amplifies his confession, implicating Parmenio. It could be suggested that Pt. had nothing of this, because he disapproved of the torture of a noble or put no faith in a confession obtained under duress, but cf. iv 13, 7 and 14, 3; moreover, in antiquity such confessions were commonly treated as decisive. However, QC's story of Philotas' extorted confession and implication of Parmenio

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cannot be true, as Pt. had to allow that against Parmenio there was no evidence. Nor is it any proof of Philotas' guilt that the army convicted him: we know how feeble was the best evidence against him, and they were faced with the alternative of disbelieving Al. With good reason D. 79, 1 and P. 50, 1, cf. 49, 7, condemn the killing of both Philotas and Parmenio. Al. himself may indeed have been persuaded of Philotas' guilt, however unjustifiably, but the murder of Parmenio is a different matter. Pt. did not profess to know his mind and suggests that he either believed in Parmenio's complicity or simply thought it unsafe to leave him alive after the execution of his son. The second explanation is pure *raison d'état*. Though given to moralizing, A. makes no comment.

4. The claims Philotas may have made (§ 2 above) that Parmenio and his sons were really responsible for Al's success were met by the Alexander-historians by stressing the occasions when Al. rejected Parmenio's advice, cf. i 13 and 18 from A's main sources, though ii 4; 25; iii 10 come from the 'vulgate', cf. also i 11, 1 n.; App. III 6; X 2; at Gaugamela his conduct was depreciated, App. IX 7. All this may go back to Callisthenes; it is not peculiar to Pt. and Ar. and indeed not prominent in their accounts; note also in contrast iii 9, 4. If they say little of Parmenio's actions in the great battles, where he always commanded the left, or in the important tasks confided to him (i 24, 3; ii 5, 1; 11, 10: more here in QC.), this is perhaps because they always concentrate on Al's own doings: Pt. seems merely to have mentioned the expedition that kept him personally away from Mallus (vi 11, 8). There is

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no sign that Al. himself had lost his trust in Parmenio, though he was now about 70 (QC. vi 11, 32; vii 2, 33), before Philotas' 'plot' was denounced; his command in Media was important (App. XIII).

5. What A. (and QC.) say of the trial of Amyntas and his brothers tends to give the impression that Al. was more fair minded than the critical reader of ch. 26 might infer. Here too A. draws on Pt. and Ar. He says nothing of the execution of Alexander the Lyncestian after the semblance of a trial, but as our authorities for this event, D. (80, 2) and QC. (vii 1, 5-9, cf. viii 8, 6), betray no uneasiness about his guilt, this is more likely to be an omission by A. than a suppression by Pt. and Ar. of what they thought did Al. no credit. They had presumably told, as A. does (i 25), that Alexander (for whom cf. *Introd.* 46) had been arrested in winter 334/333 on the ground that Darius had made overtures to him through Sisines. (No words need be wasted here on the fantasy of Lane Fox ch. 10 that Ar. fr. 2 shows that Ar. had killed the man off at Thebes in 335.) Of course this was no better evidence against Alexander than that which Pt. held to be decisive against Philotas; it is not suggested that Alexander had even received, much less responded to Darius' letter, though QC. viii 8, 6 may mean that he had; this was probably fiction to justify the king's conduct to the incredulous. D. 32, 1 f. indeed makes out that the Lyncestian was only arrested in 332 in Cilicia on a warning from Olympias; and the same date is implied by QC's statements that he was kept in bonds for 3 years before trial; on the other hand, QC. evidently mentioned the arrest in one of his first two books (vii 1, 6) before he had brought Al. to Cilicia. Per-

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haps he combined two versions, as Berve later did in supposing that the Lyncestian was deposed in 334/333 and arrested only in Cilicia; QC's two informers against him would then be Sisines (whom he places in a different story in iii 7, 11 f.) and Olympias. Berve argued that Al. would not have arrested the man and still employed his nephew, Amyntas son of Arrha-baeus, in a high command (i 28, 4); he explains Amyntas' later disappearance from the record by his connection with the Lyncestian. But the identification of Amyntas' father with the Arrha-baeus Al. had put to death in 336 is unattested and implausible; would Al. have ever trusted the son of one he had done to death? And would he have continued to trust him after deposing, but not after arresting, his uncle? Berve's view involves rejection of A. i 25, 10, presumably of Pt. Lane Fox does not hesitate to say that Pt's story in i 25 is fabrication. But Pt. surely had a reason when he concealed or distorted the truth, and here none can be seen. The arrest of the Lyncestian on evidence Olympias supplied would have been easier to justify than the imputation of guilt from Darius' letter to him. I do not doubt that to Al. and his friends the Lyncestian had always seemed 'unreliable' (i 25, 5), to be removed at the first chance. Anything could be believed against a man with good cause for treason. So too his final execution required neither concealment nor apology.

6. See further the important article of E. Badian, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 1960, 324 ff.

## APPENDIX XII

### CASPIAN, CAUCASUS, TANAIIS

1. In both Al's day and A's it was believed that the known landmass of Europe, Asia and Africa was encircled by the Ocean or 'great sea' to which A. often refers. Before Al. little was known in Greece of Iran and India. Much was discovered on the expedition; however, Al. and those who recorded his journeys were dependent on mere reports of country they did not see for themselves, which they could easily misinterpret; moreover, Strabo, following Eratosthenes (cf. A. v 3), castigates their contradictions and geographical falsifications, designed in his view to magnify Al's exploits (ii 1, 9; xi 5, 5; 6, 4; 7, 4; xv 1 *passim*, especially § 2, 9 and 28; xvi 1, 3); in reality some at least of the errors were due to genuine misunderstandings. Much more became known of Iran and India under Al's successors, but even this increase of knowledge did not save Eratosthenes (c. 275-194) and later geographers from serious mistakes.

2. Thus before Al. it had been disputed whether the Caspian sea (vii 16, 3), sometimes called the Hyrcanian sea (A. iii 29, 2; v 5, 4 and 26, 1) or 'the Caspian and Hyrcanian sea' (vii 16, 2), was a gulf of the Ocean or, as Herodotus held (i 202 f.), a lake (cf. P. 44, 1 f.); on the latter view, Al. thought that it might be connected with the Black Sea, or more precisely with the Sea of Azov (the Maeotic lake), whose size Herodotus grossly exaggerated (iv 86), and at the end of his life he was preparing an exploratory expedition

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to ascertain the truth (A. vii 16). Thus he was not as certain of this hypothesis as, according to Strabo xi 7, 4, his historians were. Polyclitus (who, to judge from this last text, accompanied Al.) took the Caspian to be a lake, as it had sea-serpents (unconfirmed) and as the water was sweetish (in fact salinity is low, especially by river mouths); he held it was connected by an underground passage with the Sea of Azov. This may be reconcileable with Ar's account (Strabo v 26, 1) of a trade route from Oxus to Caspian and then overland to the Black Sea (on which see Pearson 163), but a 'speech of Al.' (written up by A.) treats the Caspian as a gulf of Ocean (v 26, 1). Patrocles' explorations, c. 284/283, were to convince Eratosthenes and Strabo (ii, 5, 18, cf. A. v 3, 4) that this was true, and A. iii 29 follows suit by making the Oxus flow into the 'great sea in its Hyrcanian part'. Here, in giving the Oxus (Amu Darya) an outlet into the Caspian, he agrees with Ar. (Strabo xi 7, 3), nor did he doubt (vii, 16, 3) that Ar. (iii 30, 7) was right in making the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) have the same outlet. Today both rivers flow into the Aral Sea, and the Syr Darya has always done so, though there is some evidence that the Oxus did once flow into the Caspian; the Aral, however, was apparently not known in antiquity (J. O. Thomson, *Hist. of Anc. Geography* 128; *contra* but unconvincingly, J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* 1971, 110 ff.). Ar. was also wrong in making the Jaxartes rise in the Hindu-Kush, and not 700 miles north-west in the modern Kirgiz.

3. A. iii 28, 4 f. and 30, 7 show that Caucasus was Ar's name for the Hindu-Kush. The followers of Alexander thus identified the true ('Scythian')



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Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian with the Hindu-Kush. Eratosthenes exposed this error (cf. v 3, 2 f.; 5, 3 ff.; *Ind.* 2, 2 ff.; 5, 10), substituting a highly simplified picture of a continuous range of mountains extending eastwards from Pamphylia to the northern border of India (i.e. the Himalayas), which he chose to call Taurus (cf. Strabo xi 8, 1), though acknowledging that they had various local names and that the true name for Ar's Caucasus was Parapamisus (or the like; there are various spellings); he argued (cf. also Strabo xi 5, 5) that the Alexander-historians misnamed Parapamisus, in order to bring Al. to the regions where Heracles had performed exploits (D. 83, 1; QC. vii 3, 22), where Prometheus had suffered at the ends of the earth and where Jason had penetrated; for such motivation cf. App. IV. Though aware of the facts, A. prefers to use the nomenclature of his sources.

4. It had long been known that the Tanais (Don) flowed into the Sea of Azov (Herodotus iv 57) and some thought it rose in the true Caucasus (Strabo xi 2, 2). Having identified the Hindu-Kush with the Caucasus, the Alexander-historians then supposed that the Iaxartes, which in their view rose in that mountain and had its outlet in a lake connected perhaps with the Sea of Azov, must be the Tanais; it is clear from A. iii 30, 7 f. that this error was not founded on a local name resembling Tanais, and iv 5, 6 (cf. Ar. F. 28 = Strabo xi 11, 5) shows how the Macedonians could impose their own names on rivers. Again, Strabo xi 7, 4 (from Eratosthenes) suggests that as it was agreed that the Tanais (Don) separated Asia from Europe (cf. A. iii 30, 8; QC. vii 7, 2), and as the region between the Don and the Caspian, ' a



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considerable part of Asia', had not been conquered by Al., the false equation was a deliberate attempt to obscure the truth; this explanation makes little sense, and again genuine misunderstanding seems more likely. It explains why on the Jaxartes Al. supposed himself to be in contact with both Asian and European Scythians (iv 1, 1; 3, 6); similarly he must have misinterpreted what he was told by Pharasmanes, king of the Chorasmians, who were domiciled east of the Caspian and south of the Aral (Tarn, *Greeks in Bactria and India*<sup>2</sup> 478 ff.); he no doubt mentioned a great lake, which was taken to be the Caspian/Black Sea, and other things he said, doubtless jumbled in translation, were referred by his hearers to peoples they knew by report or legend to be near the Black Sea, the Colchians and Amazons (iv 15). It is at least clear that Al. thought it possible for a people to be not far from both Bactria and the Black Sea. Compare his conjecture that the Indus was the upper Nile (vi. 1, 2; Nearchus *ap.* Strabo xv 1, 25) and the estimate that the Black Sea was not far from the Persian Gulf (*Ind.* 40, 5). The confusions found in A's main sources were of course shared by the 'vulgate' (in D. etc), which I forbear to analyse. Once again A. obscures the geography by normally using Tanais for the Jaxartes (iv 1; 3; v 25; vii 10, 6), though aware of the truth (cf. iii 30, 8 and vii 16, 3, as emended).

## APPENDIX XIII

### ALEXANDER'S ARMY 331-326

1. At Gaugamela the Grand Army consisted of (at most) about 40,000 foot and 7,000 horse, cf. *Introd.* 56 f. The Macedonians included in these totals were the survivors of 15,000 foot (archers excluded) and 2,100 Companions and perhaps 800 *prodromoi*, who had been with Alexander since 334 or joined him in 333.

2. Both before and after Gaugamela the numbers of reinforcements and garrisons are more often reported by QC., or even D., than by A. There is no reason in principle to distrust their data, since they seem to preserve 'documentary' material of other kinds (appointments and marches), though in detail they may be in error, and they too are not necessarily more complete in this kind of documentation than in any other. The size of the garrison A. records in Bactria (*iv* 22, 3) in itself shows that Al. must have received considerable reinforcements between 331 and 327, especially as he must also have left troops behind in other parts of Iran (§ 3); so much is implied by A. himself, when he names provincial generals or commandants of citadels, and is stated in *iii* 19, 7 (*Media*). Al's foundations of cities in Iran are also relevant; for the best collection of evidence cf. *Droysen* (*App.* VIII 12). A. mentions only the Alexandrias in *Parapamisus* and on the *Jaxartes* (*iii* 28, 4; *iv* 1, 3; 4, 1; 22, 5), perhaps because they alone were founded under Al's personal superintendence, but other such cities in *Areia*, *Drangiane*, *Arachosia* and

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Bactria were evidently founded on his orders, and (it is natural to suppose) in 330–327, since he was never in these parts again; presumably all had a nucleus of soldiers drawn from the local garrisons, including Macedonians unfit for further campaigns, but predominantly mercenaries.

3. The following garrisons and detachments are actually attested outside Media (for which see § 5 below):

Babylon	1,000 (including 700 Macedonians, QC. v 1, 43; D. 64, 5)
Syria and Babylonia	2,000 (QC. 1.c.)
Persepolis	3,000 (Macedonians, QC. v 6, 11)
Arachosia	4,600 (QC. vii 3, 5)
Bactria	13,500 (A. iv 22, 3)
Total	24,100

The force in Bactria was no doubt intended to hold down Sogdiane and perhaps Parapamisis too; it would be unwise to assume that Media, Hyrcania, Areia and Drangiane did not also require substantial forces, who were probably found from the troops Al. left in Media in June 330.

4. In the same period reinforcements are attested, amounting to 45,500 foot and perhaps over 6,000 horse.

331–330 (up to Alexander's arrival at Ecbatana); see A. iii 16, 10; D. 65, 1; QC. v 1, 40 f.; 7, 12.

Macedonians	6,000 foot, 500 horse
Thracians	3,500 foot, 600 horse
Mercenaries	9,000 foot, 2,000 (?) horse

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330 (after Darius' death); A. iii 23, 8 f.; D 76, 2; QC. vi 5, 10; 6, 35.

Mercenaries (Greek) 2,000 foot, 130 horse  
(Others) 5,600 foot, 300 horse

329/328 (Bactria); see A. iv 7, 2; QC. vii 10, 11 f.

Mercenaries 19,400 foot, 2,600 horse.

5. A. iii 19, 5 ff. says that at Ecbatana Al. (a) dismissed all the Greek allies, except those who would take service as mercenaries, i.e. the survivors of 7,000 foot and 2,750 horse, mainly Thessalian (Introd. 56 f.); (b) detached up to 6,000 Macedonians, apparently foot (Introd. 61), with a few horse and light troops under Harpalus to guard the treasures; the 6,000 seem to have rejoined him later; (c) left Parmenio in command of the mercenaries, Thracians and all cavalry except the Companions. This last statement is not correct, since Al. still had the *prodromoi* with him in his pursuit of Darius (cf. also iv 4, 6), as well as Erigyus' mercenary horse (iii 20, 1; 23, 2), and he could give Erigyus and others 6,000 Greek foot and 600 horse against Satibarzanes (QC. vii 3, 2, cf. A. iii 28, 2), at a time when Greek reinforcements received earlier in the summer numbered only 2,000 foot and 130 horse, and before any troops left with Parmenio had yet rejoined him (*infra*). However, we should probably assume that Parmenio had command of *most* of the forces A. names, while Al. had all the Macedonians except those detached with Harpalus (*supra*) together with the Balkan contingents (e.g. the Agrianians, iii 20, 1) other than the Thracians. With no allowance for losses, the Macedonians numbered 17,900 (§ 1) — 3,700 (§ 3) + 6,500 (§ 4) — 6,000 (§ 5) = 14,700; the Balkan troops can

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never have exceeded *c.* 4,000; and though the strength of the other units with Al. cannot be determined, it is clear that with losses taken into account, his army is unlikely to have numbered 25,000 men. The larger part of his forces, *c.* 47,000 less losses at Gaugamela, detachments of 6,000 (§ 3) and Greek allies sent home but plus reinforcements of up to 21,600 (§ 4), must have been left with Parmenio and Harpalus. Parmenio was intended to invade Hyrcania from the west (iii 19, 7), a task he never performed, we do not know why. As for Harpalus' 6,000 Macedonians, Black Clitus had instructions to bring them on to Parthyaea after the treasure had been deposited at Ecbatana (iii 19, 8), and they were evidently the 6,000 who joined Al. on the road to Arachosia along with 200 'nobiles' (probably Companion cavalry also left behind) and 5,000 Greek foot and 500 horse (QC. vii 3, 4); these men had apparently been sent forward by Parmenio and are not included in my figures for reinforcements.

6. Media lay on the most direct route to the Mediterranean, via Babylon but by-passing Susa and Persepolis, and it would not be surprising if an exceptionally large garrison remained there, perhaps larger than the 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse with which its generals rejoined Al. in Carmania later in 325 (QC. x 1, 2, cf. A. vi 27, 3). But probably some of Parmenio's men were moved forward into Hyrcania (where Thracians were serving in 327/326, cf. A. iv 18, 2; v 20, 7) and Parthyaea. It would be consistent with the known data if the total of troops left in these regions were about 12,000, and that figure would also correspond to the garrisons in Areia-Arachosia and Bactria.

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7. By autumn 330 Al's field army had been increased by over 8,000 new mercenaries (§ 4) and by nearly 12,000 men sent on from Ecbatana (§ 5). This would have brought up its strength to perhaps over 40,000. However, it was immediately reduced by 11,200. First, Al. detached 6,600 men to repress Satibarzanes (§ 5); Erigyius, the commander, rejoined him at Bactra in summer 329 (QC. vii 4, 40, cf. A. iii 28, 2), but surely without his whole army, since shortly afterwards Stasanor was despatched to deal with new trouble in Areia (iii 29, 5), with no mention of troops, and Al. would hardly have left Areia and Drangiane ungarrisoned. Secondly, he left 4,600 men in Arachosia (§ 3) and surely some troops in Parapamisis, the jumping off ground for the Indian campaign he meditated in 328 (iv 15) and probably earlier; perhaps it is enough to point to the Alexandria founded there. A fair balance between casualties and detachments on the one side, and reinforcements on the other, might suggest that he invaded Bactria in spring 329 with some 25,000 European troops. Erigyius doubtless brought up part of his army, and in 329/328 he received 22,000 more men from Europe (§ 4). But casualties from hardships in the fighting of 329-327 cannot have been light; 2,000 men were lost in his one disaster here (iv 6, 2 cf. 3, 7), and he left 13,500 men at Bactra (iv 22, 3). He must have had no more than 35,000 European troops with him at the outset of the Indian campaign.

8. Curtius, however, alleges that he had 120,000 men for this expedition (viii 5, 4). If this were the truth, we should have to suppose that two thirds of his army consisted of Orientals. Some were undoubtedly now in his army (Introd. 59), but the proportion must be

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vastly too high. Now Nearchus estimated that he had 120,000 'fighting men' with him on the Hydaspes in 326 (*Ind.* 19, 5), explicitly including Orientals, and Plutarch (66, 2) makes this the maximum of his foot in the Indian campaigns, adding 15,000 horse. But by 326 he had received further reinforcements from the west, over 30,000 foot and nearly 6,000 horse according to D. 95, 4, though only 7,000 foot and 5,000 horse according to QC. ix 3, 21. Moreover Taxilas, Porus and other Indian princes had provided over 10,000 men (v 8, 5; 24, 4). These figures alone show that Curtius is wrong; perhaps he has retrojected to the outset of the expedition the total given in his source for the largest army Al. commanded in India. But that total, despite the authority of Nearchus, is surely too high. For his operations in India, especially after Porus' defeat, Al. did not need forces so much greater than those with which he had conquered the Persian empire, and how could he have supplied them? One may suspect that as in the past his historians inflated Persian numbers to make his victories appear more astounding, so they now inflated the size of his own army, to impress readers with the magnitude of his power. In any event his real strength still lay in his European and especially in his Macedonian troops.

9. The relatively small size of Al.'s army after Ecbatana helps to explain the increased rapidity of his movements (cf. App. VIII 7); a still smaller force, like the 11,000 men who caught him up in Arachosia, could make still greater speed. (It might seem from iii 19, 7 that the 6,000 Macedonians among them had had to march from Ecbatana to Persepolis and back before coming on to Al., of course without any



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deviation into Hyrcania; this is hard to credit, and the truth may be that these men formed a rearguard who had not reached Ecbatana when Al. left, but were still bringing up the treasures from Persepolis.) Indeed his own army was at times divided, and perhaps more often than is recorded; iii 25, 2 implies that he expected it to march through Areia in detachments, not all under his own eye; 25, 4 refers to their reunion; 27, 3 to minor operations that he did not direct himself. A's account is not precise or complete; it is a grave defect that he leaves us in constant ignorance of the forces at Al.'s disposal, ignorance that we can remedy only in part from the record, also incomplete, in D. and QC.

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### ARRIAN IV 7, 4-14, 4

1. The barbarity with which Al. treated Bessus evokes from A. disapproval of his adoption of Persian royal dress (contrast vii 29, 4). He evidently thought the matter important (cf. 9, 9), but does not say when Al. began the practice. D. 77, 4 ff.; QC. vi 6, 2 ff. and J. xii 3, 8 date it to his stay in Hyrcania, P. 45 in Parthyaea; the discrepancy is the less significant, if D. is right that he adopted Persian customs rather sparingly, to conciliate the Macedonians; in any case according to all these writers the date was summer 330, yet A. refers to it first in connection with an incident of summer 329. It seems evident that his main sources were silent as to the first occasion, though later they were bound to refer to Al's

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' medism ' as a cause of the mutiny at Opis in 324, saying inexactly that it had offended the troops ' during the whole expedition ' (vii 8, 2 f., cf. 6, 2 with notes); in addition Pt. alludes to it indirectly in vi 30, 2 f. (see note), and Ar. mentions the diadem *ap.* vii 22, 4. But clearly it embarrassed them that their hero had abandoned the style of a Macedonian king, and what they could not deny they did their best to veil, cf. App. V 9 f. A. had to turn to the ' vulgate ', as we must, for fuller information.

2. The most complete descriptions of Persian royal dress, which was of Median origin (Herodotus i 135; vii 61 f.; Strabo xi 13, 9), are given by Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* viii 3, 13 and QC. iii 3, 17 ff.; see H-W. Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft* for much of what follows. Eratosthenes (Jacoby no. 241, F. 30 = P. 330 A) says that Al. did not assume the *tiara*, i.e. the stiff or ' upright ' peaked cap which was the sole prerogative of the king (A. iii 25, 3; Xenophon, *Anabasis* ii 5, 23), and must be identified with the *kitaris* or *kidaris*, nor the *kandys* (a cloak of purple and gold) or the (scarlet) trousers, cf. also P. 45 and D. (with no mention of the *tiara*), while D. says that he did wear the diadem (cf. A. vii 22, 4), the *chiton*, a tunic of purple and white, and the belt (of gold). Ehippus, who was certainly a contemporary (Pearson 61), mentions the *chiton*, purple mantle and diadem bound round the *kausia*, a traditional Macedonian hat (Jacoby no. 126, F. 5). Writing from memory, A. iv 7, 4 is apparently mistaken about the *tiara*.

3. A's excursus on dress leads him to describe out of chronological order (iv 8, 1; 14, 4) first the death of Clitus, second the *proscynesis* affair, and third the

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pages' conspiracy. The first event is placed by QC. viii 1, 19 ff. at Maracanda just after the retirement of Artabazus (cf. A. 16, 3; 17, 3), to whom in his account Clitus was designated successor, and before Al. wintered at Nautaca (viii 2, 13-19, cf. A. 13, 3; 18, 1), sc. in 328/327, i.e. over a year after the point at which A. chooses to recount it. The second and third he puts after the measures described by A. in 22, 1 (cf. QC. viii 5, 2); and in fact A. 22, 2 confirms that the pages' conspiracy occurred then, i.e. at Bactra in the later part of that winter, 328—327. In QC. too (viii 5 ff.) the pages' conspiracy follows immediately on Callisthenes' objection to *proscynesis*, but Clitus' murder was clearly several months earlier. Adopting (as usual) a logical rather than a temporal order, P. connects the three incidents not only with each other but also with the prior execution of Philotas, for his purpose is to illustrate the king's tendency to behave despotically and the resistance it aroused; the Philotas affair itself is recounted immediately after particulars have been given of Al's Orientalizing measures, even including his later marriage to Roxane (47, 4). The table of contents of D. xvii shows that he too described the death of Callisthenes immediately after that of Clitus and before other incidents which intervened temporally. And A. makes roughly the same kind of links. Yet his order is normally chronological. Why did he change it?

4. Little in these chapters comes from his main sources. Ar's account of the death of Clitus is cited (8, 9), but it was clearly unsatisfactory, as it did not make clear 'the origin of the drinking bout', naturally enough, as Ar. was at pains to deny that

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Al. was given to hard drinking, quite implausibly (vii 29, 4 n.), and to explain away another all-night sitting (iv 13, 5). Ar. gave a part in the affair to Ptolemy (different from that in QC. viii 1, 48), but A. does not cite Pt. to confirm or refute it, and presumably found nothing of it in Pt. Indeed the main account in 8, 1-8, is in *oratio obliqua* throughout after λέγουσι in 8, 2. Now it is evident that the writers in question do not include Ar., in view of the reference to Al's 'barbaric' drinking habits (ibid.), and the suggestion that when he writes 'they say' Arrian means 'Pt. says' ought not to receive any consideration. The whole account in 8, 1-8, like that of A's conduct after the murder (9, 2-4, 7 ff.), must then come from the 'vulgate'; at most 9, 5 should be from Pt. or Ar. or both, and if from Pt., he may simply have reported that Clitus was killed with no circumstantial details, except that it was the result of Al's failure to pay Dionysus due reverence, a failure he duly made good; for a similar reticence cf. ii 3, 8 n. (Ephippus fr. 3, in a quite different context, traced the wrath of Dionysus back to the destruction of Thebes; that shows how the same *motiv* could be adapted by different writers.) For an apologist the best course was to say as little as possible. Again, A's whole account of *proscynesis* is certainly from the 'vulgate'. Even when we come to the pages' plot (para 11 f.), its origin (in Al's arbitrary behaviour) is taken from 'a prevalent story'; what the main sources told was simply that the conspirators, including Callisthenes, were detected and punished; they did not record Hermolaus' defence (14, 2), which in the 'vulgate' contained bitter criticisms of Al., and by their silence on Callisthenes' resistance to *proscynesis*, they obviously hoped to

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conceal that part of his conduct which could command sympathy even among Macedonians. A. himself was worried by the disagreement of Pt. and Ar. on his fate (14, 4), and was not certain about his guilt (12, 7; 14, 1). But it was not such disquiet that obliged him to forsake his chief authorities; here they had too little, or nothing, to say about stories that 'were notable and not wholly incredible', and he had to turn to some other writer or writers, who probably did not follow a strictly chronological plan; it was then beyond A's skill to insert their account or accounts at the right temporal point.

5. The story in 12, 3-5 comes from the contemporary, Chares (cf. P. 54); the slight differences in the two versions, in particular the mention of the hearth in P., omitted by A., illustrates how in transmission details could be added or subtracted. We do not know of course that either A. or P. read Chares for himself, nor (as often assumed) that Chares was an eye-witness. However, his account may well be true, whereas the story of the debate in 10, 5-12, 2, told with significant variations in QC. viii 5, 5 ff., where Agis and Cleo replace Anaxarchus, must be false (cf. § 7 ff. below). Not even the statement in 12, 1 (cf. QC. viii 5, 21), that Al. gave up the attempt to impose *proscynesis* on the Macedonians can be trusted in itself; it is incompatible with another tale from the 'vulgate' in 14, 2. The anecdote about Leonnatus in 12, 2 finds parallels (and differences) in stories of Polyperchon in QC. viii 5, 22 and (in a later context) of Cassander in P. 74, 1; whether true or false, all have some value in illustrating the repugnance Macedonians felt for *proscynesis*, but for which they would not even have been invented; it is noteworthy

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that it does not feature among the Oriental practices of which the Macedonians complained at Opis in 324 (vii 6, 3 ff.; 8, 2 f.); and this does make it probable that Al. had ceased to demand it of his western followers. It is plain that the 'vulgate', whether or not the term be used to include Chares, of whose general reliability we may have our doubts (cf. § 13 below and ii 11, 4 n.), consists of a variety of traditions or fictions, cf. also 9, 2; 14, 4.

6. A's account of the murder of Clitus can be compared with those of QC. vii 1, 19 ff. and P. 50 f. All know of the official version that the neglect of Dionysus' rites was to blame (cf. also the table of contents in D.). A. has it that the quarrel started with men talking in a way that implied that Al. was son of Zeus (8, 2 cf. 9, 9), and QC. 1, 42 and P. 50, 5 make Clitus gibe at his claim to be son of Ammon (cf. App. V 6). P. 51, 1-3 makes him complain of A's Orientalizing, and one would guess that this was in A's source, to explain his inserting the story after 7, 4 ff., though he forgets to bring the point out in his own narrative. In all accounts Clitus depreciates Al's achievements in comparison with those of Philip and the Macedonians. There are also many minor divergencies. It would be unrewarding to analyse them. Even if all our sources went back to one basically reliable witness, his testimony could easily have been carelessly transmitted or deliberately altered by later writers; or equally, if there was more than one such witness, we could expect confused and contradictory recollections of a drunken brawl. The exact truth cannot be recovered. For the sequel QC. viii 2, 1-12 and P. 52 again show both similarities with and differences from the 'vulgate' in A., one of many



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illustrations of the way in which that 'tradition' varied, partly no doubt because of its mutations in successive writers.

7. Of the two stories about *proscynesis* that told by Chares, which may repose on knowledge he acquired as a court usher (P. 46), is credible and does not suggest that it was claimed as an honour due to a god. That interpretation is presupposed in the tale of the debate, and it is certainly false. For what follows see Lane Fox ch. 23 with bibliography, especially E. J. Bickermann, *Parola del Passato* 1963, 241 ff., correcting in some points J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Historia* 1950, 363 ff.

8. 'Obeisance' is a rather misleading translation of *proscynesis*, used *faute de mieux*. It was performed by kissing one's fingers towards the person honoured, perhaps by blowing a kiss. Greeks and presumably Macedonians rendered the honour only to the image that represented a god; it was a mark of the 'superstitious man' that he would perform it only on his knees (Theophrastus, *Characters* 16, 5). But in Persia it was a mark of respect paid to superiors in rank, and therefore by all to the king (cf. Herodotus i 134). Herodotus suggests that the inferior fell on his knees, and QC. viii 5, 6 suggests that prostration always accompanied *proscynesis* to the king; it was certainly expected of Greek ambassadors (e.g. Herodotus vii 136). But in Persian eyes they were doubtless very lowly beings; the Persepolis reliefs (cf. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* Plate XXX) show that Persian dignitaries did no more than make a half-bow in obeisance to the king. In Chares' story there is no place for prostration at



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Alexander's banquet. Thus the Persian ceremony was, at least when performed by men of rank, no different in principle from the Greek, except that it was rendered to men. Greeks who forgot or did not know that in Persia all superiors received it believed that it betokened that the Persians worshipped the king as a god (cf. Isocrates iv 151); in fact the Persian king was not a god (*contra* QC. viii 5, 11), though he ruled by the grace of the supreme god, Ahura-Mazda.

9. Since Greeks and Macedonians in Alexander's court must have seen Persians performing *proscynesis* to superiors other than the king, they can hardly have shared the illusions of Isocrates. But that did not dispel the prejudices in which they had been reared. Greeks boasted that they 'did obeisance to no man as a master but only to the gods' (Xenophon, *Anabasis* iii 2, 13, cf. iv 1, 35). To Aristotle it was an honour that only barbarians paid to men (*Rhetoric* 1367a 27). It is plausible to suppose that Al. sought to introduce the practice among all his courtiers, only in order to create a greater measure of equality between Persian and western notables and thus to conciliate the Persians. But that was not a motive with which the Macedonians would have sympathized. Their aversion to a ceremony they thought demeaning probably led Alexander to abandon this attempt at assimilation—with more prudence than he had made it. Callisthenes may have had a leading part in the resistance, and paid the price for it.

10. It is indeed evident that neither A. nor his source was aware that *proscynesis* did not import deification. It follows that the substance of Callis-

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thenes' speech (11, 2 ff.) must have been invented by a writer who had no contact with persons then at Al's court or else misunderstood what they told him. Part of it reads like an attack on any deification of a mere human (11, 2-6), but it may also suggest that deification is only inappropriate in a man's own lifetime (11, 7). Neither of these contentions is likely to have been original to A. himself. He lived in a time when for centuries past people in the Greek world had been accustomed to deify the living ruler, king or emperor. Admittedly at Rome itself official apotheosis of the Caesars was deferred till after death, and it might be suggested that A., writing when already a highly placed senator (but cf. *Introd.* I and *Appendix* in vol. II), composed the speech under the influence of such Roman ideas. But though the words are surely his, I doubt if he would himself have consciously invented the substance of the speech or have imputed to Callisthenes a purely Roman conception, which had no currency in the contemporary Greek world where he had been brought up. It is far more likely that the invention belongs to the late fourth or early third century when ruler cults still attracted objections (C. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*, 213 ff.); in Macedonia, on whose customs the speech lays weight, it was never introduced, and in other Hellenistic kingdoms Al's immediate successors were not officially recognized as gods in their own lifetime. The fact that A. gives so much space to the contentions ascribed to Callisthenes may suggest that when he read them he was favourably impressed; certainly he explicitly commends Callisthenes for his disapproval of Al's claim to *proscynesis* and adoption of Persian dress and ceremonies (10, 1). In vii 29 he

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was to take a different view. It looks as if he was readily influenced by what he had last perused.

11. By contrast he condemns Callisthenes for his alleged boastfulness (10, 2) and, unlike P. (54, 2), for his insolence to Al. at the banquet scene (12, 6), which in his view made it natural for Al. to suspect him of treason (12, 7). His comments on the conduct appropriate to a king's servant (12, 6) may recall 'Tacitus' preference for a middle path between 'abruptam contumaciam et deforme obsequium' (*Annals* iv 20) and be taken as giving some support to the hypothesis that he wrote when he had known from his experience the practical conditions of life at a court; this would not, however, imply that the *Anabasis* was composed after his legateship in Cappadocia. The attitude revealed betrays no affinity with the admiration his old teacher, Epictetus, had expressed for the outspoken Helvidius Priscus (Epict. i 2 *passim*, esp. 19 ff.). True, Epictetus is advocating the principle that a man must be true to his own personality, and the personality of Helvidius was very different from that of Callisthenes, who was accused in antiquity of 'deifying' Al. in his history, though making him into a son of Zeus (App. V) hardly amounted to that, and of whom Timaeus said that he deserved his fate for corrupting Al. with his flattery (Jacoby no. 124 T. 20 f., cf. F 31). Neither A. nor P., who has other anecdotes about Callisthenes' rift with Al. which illustrate his lack of tact (52 ff.), explains or even notices the seemingly flagrant contradiction between the character of his history and his conduct at court. One might think that if they had read the history for themselves that problem must have impinged on them too forcibly to be ig-

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nored, and that even P.'s citations from it must be second-hand. A. alludes to it only once (10, 1, from which we are not to infer that it was actually in the history that Callisthenes claimed that Al's fame would depend on what he wrote), and not in such a way as to indicate that he had read it. It seems clear to me that he had not; otherwise we should expect a different account of the visit to Siwah, nor would Ar. have been cited in iii 11, 3, if he was himself drawing on Callisthenes; indeed we should expect explicit citations elsewhere, even if A. preferred other authorities. Probably he had assumed that the work was too adulatory because written in Al's lifetime (*pref.* 2).

12. In his account of the pages' conspiracy A. draws 13, 1—4 from the 'vulgate' (cf. QC. viii 6, 1—11) and contrasts Ar. with the 'vulgate' in 13, 5 f. (QC. 6, 12 ff. combines their versions), whereas Pt. is probably used in 13, 7, as he is named as an agent in the discovery of the plot. (I see no reason to think that he concealed the role played by Leonnatus, QC. 6, 22, as he had no known quarrel with Leonnatus, and A. probably derives from Pt. honourable mentions of Leonnatus in other places; if QC. is right, we may tax A. himself with a careless omission.) Pt. also recorded that the conspirators under torture implicated Callisthenes (Ar. concurring) and that he was racked and hanged (14, 1 and 3). However for Hermaeus' speech to the army justifying his conduct, A. turns again to the 'vulgate'; the speech is embellished in QC. viii 7 f., who also gives Al. a reply. So it would seem that Pt. and Ar. adopted the same laconic style for this affair as for the fall of Philotas, merely recording that a plot was discovered and the

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authors punished by the army (what they said of the fate of the pages has dropped out in A's version), and passing over in silence those aspects of Al's behaviour which provoked Macedonian discontent.

13. A. himself was disconcerted by the discrepancy in their stories of Callisthenes' fate (14, 3 f.); he does not notice Chares' statement (P. 55, 5) that Callisthenes died after seven months in fetters, but in 325! As Jacoby observed, 'Pt. denied Callisthenes' innocence, Chares his execution, and Ar. both.' A. failed to see that what Pt. and Ar. said and omitted required a more critical assessment than he attempts. For QC. Callisthenes is 'in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam aulae et assentantium accommodatus ingenio', and Al. himself repented of his death, another device for exculpation (viii 8, 20 ff.); in his story the pages confessed, but not under torture and without implicating Callisthenes (6, 24 ff.; 7, 10), and it was only after trial that they were all tortured to death. P. too cites as proof of Callisthenes' innocence a letter of Al. to Craterus, Attalus and Alcetas (55, 3), which gives a somewhat different account: the pages did not denounce Callisthenes even under torture. J. R. Hamilton (see his Commentary *ad loc.*) supposes this letter to be genuine, since the addressees were in fact absent on mission at the time (A. iv 22, 1, cf. QC. viii 5, 2), and that would have been unknown to a forger; but this argument ignores the obvious possibility that a forger used a current history in which such true information could have been found; in my view (Introd. 15) all such letters stand, or rather fall, together, and this letter does no more than attest yet another variant in the 'vulgate'. (It must have purported to give *some* justification,

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omitted by P., for the execution, even if it coheres with the story of Al's later repentance, which the continued assertion of Callisthenes' guilt by Pt. and Ar. makes improbable.) Once again we find that the 'vulgate' is not an unified, 'Clitarchean' tradition. Faced with all these irreconcilable divergencies in his sources, A. himself left the question of Callisthenes' complicity open, while suggesting that even if he were innocent he had brought his own fate on himself (12, 6 f.). At all costs Al. had to be excused.

## APPENDIX XV

### INDIA AND THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

1. In *Ind.* I A. says that the Assaceni (who lived in Swat and Bunēr, App. VIII 20) and the Astaceni, whose centre was Peucelaotis or Charsadda (ib. 19), were subject to Cyrus (559–29 BC). Herodotus (iv. 44) tells how Darius I (521–486) sent Scylax on a voyage down the Indus to its mouth and thence round by sea to Egypt and how he shortly afterwards subdued the 'Indians', i.e. peoples in the Indus valley, and 'made use of the sea'. Darius' inscriptions and Herodotus' lists of Persian army contingents and tributaries (see vii 65; iii 94, 97 ff.) present further evidence, lucidly discussed in *Cambridge History of India* I ch. XIV, for Persian power in India in the late sixth and fifth centuries. Its original extent is not to be defined with certitude. In the south the desert east of the Indus formed the frontier (Herodotus iii 98), but it is less clear how much of the



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plain between the Indus and Hyphasis ever belonged to Persia.

2. A. constantly refers to the local rulers in India on both sides of the Indus as hyparchs or under-governors (iv 22, 8; 24, 1; 28, 6; v 8, 5; 20, 6; 29, 4) or nomarchs, i.e. district governors (v 8, 3; 18, 2; vi 16, 1). If these Greek terms translate Indian or Persian titles, it might be inferred that their holders had once received authority from Persia and had, at least in theory, been subject to satraps. They also commonly bear the name of the people or city they rule, e.g. Abisares of the Abhisara, Assacenus (iv 27, 4), Astis, i.e. Astacenus (iv 22, 8, Porus of the Paurava, Taxilas of Taxila; his personal name was Omphis or Mophis (QC. viii 12, 4; D. 86, 4). Evidently they are native rajahs. A. also calls Porus a king (vi 2, 1, cf. v 19, 2), a title other writers accord to Taxilas, Abisares, the bad Porus, Sopithes (e.g. D. 86, 4; 90, 4; 91, 1 and 7). Even if this is correct, it does not imply that they, or their predecessors, had not been Persian vassals; compare the kings in Cyprus and Phoenicia. Similarly the 'self-governing' cities may be communities which like some Greek cities in Asia enjoyed republican forms of local government under Persian suzerainty. Nor is it surprising that A's narrative does not explicitly refer to Persian rule beyond the Indus. There is not even any indication in book iv that Darius III had been in control of the peoples Al. conquered in 327-326 before crossing that river. Yet Indians who were 'neighbours of the Bactrians' (iii, 8, 3), or lived 'this side of Indus' (8, 6), or 'mountain Indians' (8, 4) whose satrap was delivered up to Al. by Indians 'on this side of Indus' (25, 8), had served in his armies. If Al. had con-



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quered the Persian empire from the east, there would have been as little trace of Persian authority after Darius' death on the Mediterranean coast as there was in the valleys of the Indus and its tributaries.

3. However, just as frequent revolts in the west had at times reduced Persian dominion in the fourth century, so it could have contracted in India. Local rajahs could have made themselves independent, while retaining the official titles conferred by Persia, like later Nizams and Nabobs, or Dukes and Counts in mediaeval Europe. The facts that Al. was at first unaware that the Indus was not the upper Nile, knew nothing of the sea-route to Egypt and gave Nearchus a less venturesome task than Scylax suggest that the Persian nobility at his court were also ignorant of the lower Indus and that the maritime trade between its mouth and Egypt had ceased (cf. vi 1; *Ind.* 20, 1 and 5; 32). This implies that Sind had been lost since the fifth century. (It is immaterial that Aristotle, *Politics* 1332b 23 ff., knew about Scylax; we should not suppose that before leaving Macedon Al. took geographical lessons from him about a land he probably never then thought of entering or that he perused Herodotus, and that the stories of his ignorance must be mere inventions.) Again, 'India', though the name must have first denoted the Indus plain, had come to mean the country beyond the river, and Eratosthenes held that in Al's time the Indus was the boundary between India and the Persian empire (Strabo xv 1, 10), while Megasthenes could aver that Alexander was the first to invade India, so defined, since Dionysus and Heracles (*Ind.* 5, 1-8; 9, 10 f.). This view was certainly propagated

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to glorify Al., but it surely implies that there was no memory of Persian dominion beyond the Indus. It seems to me a mere fantasy to think that Al's men mutinied on the Hyphasis, because they did not wish to proceed beyond the Persian frontiers, and consented to return home by the mouth of the Indus, because they would still be within its confines: they were war-weary, and probably deluded into thinking this the easiest route; legalistic considerations would not have operated. And it flouts all the evidence to assume that Al. himself now merely sought to complete the conquest of the Persian empire. Beyond the Indus, in his own estimation, he was already going further.



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


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