

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

I

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM



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INTRODUCTION

I. THE EARLIER DOGMATIC PHILOSOPHIES

THE writings of Sextus contain not only an exposition of Scepticism but also a critique of the doctrines of "the Dogmatists." The main task of the Sceptic is, in fact, to expose the folly of every form of positive doctrine; and consequently the bulk of these works of Sextus is controversial. Scattered through his pages there are references to almost every known name in the history of ancient Greek thought, and without some previous acquaintance with the main outlines of that history it is hardly possible to appreciate the points or estimate the value of his arguments. Accordingly I give here, for the convenience of the reader, a short summary of the history of Greek philosophy.

1. *The Ionian Physicists.*—Of the School of Miletus the founder was *Thales* (circa 600 B.C.). He declared that the fundamental substance of which the world was made is *water*. His successor, *Anaximander* (circa 570 B.C.), described that substance as "*the boundless*" (*τὸ ἄπειρον*), since out of it were formed "countless" (*ἄπειροι*) worlds. He regarded this primitive stuff as being in itself indeterminate, or of no one definite quality, and evolving into the forms of earth, fire, etc., by a process of "separation" of hot from cold, moist from dry, etc. Also he called his primal substance "divine." *Anaximenes* (circa 540 B.C.), like Thales, took one definite element as his primary

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matter, but chose *air*, or vapour, instead of water. He explained the passage of this into other forms of matter as due to a process of "condensation and rarefaction."

2. *Heracleiteans and Eleatics*.—In chronological order the first of the Eleatic School, *Xenophanes* of Colophon (circa 520 B.C.), comes before *Heracleitus*. He was less a philosopher than a religious reformer who declaimed against traditional mythology and preached a pantheism which identified the One Universe with God.

As against this Unity of the Eleatic doctrine, which precludes diversity, *Heracleitus* of Ephesus (circa 490 B.C.) declared that things are never one and the same but continually changing. Reverting to the view of the Milesians, he looked for one primary world-substance and found it in *fire*; this, as being also mind-stuff, he called "Reason" (*λόγος*) and God. By a kind of circular process ("the upward and downward way") the primal fire passes through the forms of air, water and earth, and returns to its own nature again. The World is "a harmony of opposites," since "War is father of all and king of all," and conflict lies at the heart of things. "All things are in flux" (*πάντα ῥεῖ*), and since things have no permanent identity the reports of our senses are delusive, and opposite statements about an object may be equally true or false. In fact, to the eyes of God, life and death, good and evil, and all opposites are identical—there is no dividing line, and they are for ever passing into one another. Thus, as a Dogmatist who dissolves all dogma, *Heracleitus* is acclaimed by the Sceptics as one of the pioneers of their tradition. (*Cf. Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 210 ff.)

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Parmenides of Elea (circa 470 B.C.) defended the unitary doctrine of *Xenophanes* as against the flux doctrine of *Heracleitus*. In his view "only Being is," and change, motion, and Becoming are illusions. The World is a single self-contained Sphere, uncreated and imperishable. In his great poem "On Nature" *Parmenides* calls this "the Way of Truth"; but he follows it up by an account of the World and its constituents on the lines of current physical Science (especially that of the Pythagoreans) which he calls "the Way of Opinion," without giving any explanation of how the one "Way" can be related to the other.

Zeno of Elea (circa 450 B.C.) supported the doctrine of the Unity of Being by attacking the notions of multiplicity and motion. These notions, he argued, are self-contradictory. As against the possibility of motion he is said to have evolved the arguments known as "The Achilles" (and the tortoise) and "The Flying Arrow." The kernel of his reasoning is that any *quantum* (as of space or time) must be regarded either as consisting of a plurality of indivisible units or as itself divisible *ad infinitum*; but in the latter case, how can the sum of infinite parts make up a finite whole? and in the former, the unitary parts of the *quantum* must themselves be *quanta* or magnitudes, and as such they cannot be indivisible.

Melissus, the Samian admiral (circa 440 B.C.), likewise taught that Being is One, infinite, uncreate and everlasting, motionless and without void.

Thus, in spite of their metaphysical dogmatism, the Eleatics were akin to the Sceptics in so far as they rejected the evidence of the senses and criticized the ordinary belief in the phenomenal world.

3. *Fifth-century Pluralists*.—Hitherto the Cosmologists had attempted to explain the World by assuming either the Unity of its primal substance or its Unity as a static Totality (the Eleatics). And a direct contradiction had arisen between the position of Heraclitus ("All is in motion") and that of Parmenides ("All is at rest"). We come next to a number of theorists who—though otherwise divergent—agree in adopting a *plurality* of primary substances or principles to explain the world. Also, in relation to the opposing views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, they take up a mediating position.

Empedocles of Agrigentum (circa 450 B.C.) assumed as primary indestructible substances "four Roots of all things," viz. the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. He explained all Becoming and change as due to the mixing and unmixing of these elements. As the motive forces effecting these opposite processes he assumed the two rival powers Love and Hate, or Harmony and Discord, which oust each other alternately from control of the World. When Love is in full control, all the "roots" are fused together in a compact mass forming the "Sphere," which he terms "a blessed god." When Hate is in full control, all the "roots" are completely separated, each massed apart by itself. But in the world as we know it both forces are in play, so that its constituents are neither wholly in union nor wholly in disunion. The nature of particular things depends upon the proportion of the "roots" of which they are composed. As regards knowledge, Empedocles declared that "like is known by like," fire and water in the eyes (for example) perceiving the fire and water in the objects of sight by means of effluences. He also regarded the blood

as the seat of intelligence, it being the best mixture of all the elements. And he shared the Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of souls, saying that he himself had in times past been "a bush and a bird and a mute sea-fish."

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (circa 450 B.C.) lived mostly at Athens, where he was intimate with Pericles and Euripides, until he was condemned on a charge of atheism and escaped to Lampsacus. Like Empedocles, he held that becoming and change are due to composition and decomposition of primary indestructible substances: "Nothing becomes and nothing perishes." But the primary substances ("seeds of all things") are not merely four but numberless, all existing forms of matter (bone, hair, gold, etc.) being equally ultimate. Originally "all things were together," in a chaotic mass of all kinds of matter, then "Reason (*Nous*) came and set them in order." That is Anaxagoras's most important contribution to philosophy—the introduction of Reason or Intelligence as the Moving Cause and the principle of order and harmony in the world. He described *Nous* as alone "unmixed," and ordering the mixed mass of the world by setting up in it a vortex motion which disintegrates the mass and unites like "seeds" of matter with like.

Leucippus of Miletus (?), the first Atomist, was probably a contemporary of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, but we know little that is definite about him. His views were developed by *Democritus of Abdera* (circa 420 B.C.). He held that the World is made up of "the Full" and "the Empty," i.e. of solid, indivisible molecules of matter, the *atoms*, and empty space or *void*. The atoms differ only in size and shape, and

the forms and qualities of visible objects depend on their atomic structure. The atoms are supposed to rain down through space and collide with one another owing to the differences in the speed of their movement, their speed varying in proportion to their size. As against Anaxagoras's doctrine of *Nous*, the Atomists spoke of "Necessity" as the governing force of the World, allowing only mechanical causation. Sensation was explained as due to the reception through "pores" of "images" projected from the atoms of the object perceived; but the apparent qualities of objects have only "conventional" reality, the only true reals being the Atoms and the Void. No clear distinction is made between sense and thought, and we can make no assertion about the truth of sense-objects, since these depend on the state of the percipient and the arrangement of the atoms of which he is composed. Belief in gods is due to the "images" projected by certain anthropomorphic beings who dwell in the air. Knowledge is of two kinds, "genuine" and "bastard," the latter being that derived from the senses, the former that of the understanding which discerns the only real existents, the atoms and the void. Democritus appears also to have named "Well-being," or tranquil cheerfulness, as the ethical "end" or "good." The relation of Democriteanism to Scepticism is discussed by Sextus in *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 213 ff.

The Pythagoreans.—*Pythagoras* (circa 530 B.C.) was a contemporary of Xenophanes, born at Samos, but mainly resident at Crotona in South Italy. There he founded a religious Order, and a Way of Life akin to that of the Orphics in its asceticism, its belief in re-incarnation, and its precepts for the salvation of the soul from its "body-tomb" ($\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\text{-}\sigma\hat{\eta}\mu\alpha$). But

nothing is known of Pythagoras himself as scientist or philosopher, and as a philosophy Pythagoreanism seems to date from the fifth century, its chief exponent being *Philolaus* (circa 440 B.C.). Thus Pythagoreanism is, in the main, contemporary with the other "pluralist" systems mentioned above. The chief subjects cultivated by the Pythagoreans were mathematics, music, medicine and gymnastics. Their main tenet was "Things are numbers," or "The principles of things are the principles of numbers." And, as all numbers are either odd or even, the world is made up of opposites, which can be arranged in ten classes. Even numbers are always divisible by 2 and so are named "Unlimited"; and 1, being the primary odd number, may be called the "Limit." Regarded geometrically, 1 is the point, 2 the line, 3 the plane, 4 the solid. They called 10 (the *Decad*) the perfect number, as being the sum of the first four numbers ("the Tetractys") and thus containing all the elements of number. "Harmony" is the principle which unites opposites and resolves cosmical as well as musical discords. The Universe consists of ten bodies (the heaven of fixed stars, the five planets, moon, sun, earth, "counter-earth") revolving around the "central fire" or cosmic "hearth"; it is surrounded by air which it breathes in and out. Its life lasts for a "Great Year" (10,000 years), at the end of which it starts anew on the same course; and in every such period history repeats itself. Soul was defined as a harmony, and the virtues identified with special numbers.

4. *The Fifth-century Sophists.*—While the thinkers hitherto mentioned dealt mainly with the world of Nature, the group known as "Sophists" were chiefly

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concerned with Humanity. It was "the Age of Enlightenment" in Greece, when old beliefs and customs were being challenged by a new spirit of doubt and inquiry. With the rise of democracy every citizen became a potential politician, and instruction to fit men for public life was in general demand. This demand the Sophists laid themselves out to supply. They were the professional Educators of the public, and what they taught was "Virtue," as they called it, *i.e.* civic excellence, and the arts which enable a man to succeed in life. And since, for a political career and to achieve success in the law-courts, debating power is of supreme importance, the art of Rhetoric is the most useful aid to "Virtue"; and we find that the Sophists cultivated it in particular. The earliest of the Sophists was *Protagoras* of Abdera (*circa* 440 B.C.) who resided for some time at Athens until he was convicted of impiety and had to flee.* He is chiefly noted for his dictum—"Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not" (*cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 216 ff.*). This means that the individual man is the criterion of truth, and denies that there is any universal standard or any absolute truth. The subjective impressions of each man are true for him, but not necessarily for anyone else. Hence, all opinions are equally true, and falsehood has no meaning, and contradictory statements are both equally credible. But to reject objective truth is also to reject the possibility of knowledge, and this consequence of Protagoreanism was further developed by the second great Sophist, *Gorgias* of Leontini

* So Sextus in *Ph. i. 56*, but the story is doubtful.

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(*circa* 440 B.C.). His book "On the Non-ent or Nature" essayed to prove (1) that nothing exists; (2) that if anything exists it is incognizable; (3) that even if cognizable it is incommunicable (*cf. Pyrr. Hyp. ii. 59, 64*). In this we see the strongest possible expression of the agnostic tendency and a Scepticism more dogmatic than that of the professed Sceptics of a later age. Another important Sophist was *Hippias* of Elis, the "polymath," who boasted of his ability to give an extempore lecture on any subject, and (like other Sophists) contrasted "law" or convention with "nature" or instinctive impulse. Of *Prodicus* of Ceos we are told that he specialized in linguistics, the precise use of synonyms, and ethical discourses. Other Sophists of the eristic type, who helped to undermine religious belief and to promote intellectual anarchy, were *Euthydemus* and *Dionysodorus*, *Critias* the Athenian (one of "The Thirty"), and *Diagoras* of Melos.

5. *Socrates and the Minor Socratics.*—*Socrates* (469–399 B.C.) was the contemporary of the Sophists and so far akin to them that he held that "the proper study of mankind is man," and was a humanist rather than a physicist. But his aim was exactly the reverse of theirs—to establish morality on a sound basis, instead of proclaiming the futility of the moral law. By means of the *inductive* method and *definition* he sought to build up a system of *conceptual* knowledge which should possess objective truth, as contrasted with the merely subjective opinions derived from sense-perception. As an ethical teacher he preached "well-doing," or right conduct, as the aim of life, and urged self-knowledge and self-control as things more valuable than any external goods, his most

distinctive doctrine being that of the identity of knowledge and virtue, and of vice and ignorance; for "no man," he said, "is voluntarily wicked." But there is much uncertainty about the details of the teaching of Socrates, since the "Socrates" of the Platonic dialogues is by no means always "the historic Socrates," and the evidence of Xenophon (our other chief authority) does not appear to be altogether trustworthy.

Four "Minor Socratic" Schools were formed by the disciples of Socrates. *Euclides* of Megara founded the *Megaric* School in which, it would seem, Socratic tenets were combined with Eleatic doctrines, and the indirect method of proof was developed. Its interest was mainly in logic and dialectic; and to *Eubulides* (*Euclides*' successor) is ascribed the invention of many logical puzzles ("the Liar," Sorites, etc.). Curiously enough, although Sextus often refers to *Diodorus Cronos* (circa 300 B.C.), he hardly mentions the earlier Megarics, although many of the Sceptic arguments must have been borrowed from them. The *Elean* School was founded by *Phaedo* of Elis, whose teaching seems to have resembled that of *Euclides*. It, too, is not referred to by Sextus. *Antisthenes* founded the *Cynic* School. It subordinated logic and physics to ethics. Virtue, said *Antisthenes*, is the only good, all else is indifferent and of no account. Virtue is wisdom, self-control and self-sufficiency: the wise man cuts himself free from all earthly interests—pleasure, society, religion; he stands secure in himself, above all temptation. And, as in their Ethics, so in their Logic the Cynics stood for individuality and independence. Only identical judgements, they said, are possible; contradiction is

impossible, and therefore knowledge equally so. Thus they reverted to the Sceptical position of *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. Other notable Cynics were *Diogenes* (circa 340 B.C.), famed for his blunt coarse speech and his contempt for civilized customs, and *Crates* (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 72, 153).

The *Cyrenaic* School was founded by *Aristippus* of Cyrene, who was succeeded by his daughter *Arete*, and she by his grandson *Aristippus*. Later members of the School were *Theodorus* "the atheist," *Anniceris*, *Hegesias* ("the *suasor mortis*"). Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics concentrated on Ethical theory. The *summum bonum*, they said, is *Pleasure*, and pleasure consists in "smooth motion," pain being "rough motion," and the neutral state "immobility." These are the three states of consciousness or psychic "affections" in which sensation consists and to which knowledge is confined. As the causes of these internal states are unknown, knowledge is wholly subjective, and each individual is his own standard of truth—the Protagorean position again. As the end of life is to gain from it the maximum of pleasurable sensations, the "Wise Man" of the Cyrenaics is he who best knows how to secure enjoyment from all possible sources, and to ward off discomfort and pain. Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics stood for "nature" as against "convention," but they interpreted nature in a very different way (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 215, *Adv. Log.* i. 11).

6. *Plato and the Old Academy*.—The philosophy of *Plato* (427–347 B.C.) defies a brief summary. Only a few outstanding points can be mentioned. As against the Sophists, he maintained the possibility of knowledge, and the existence of an objective standard of

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truth ; and by identifying the " natural " with the " rational " he suppressed the Sophistic appeal from " law," or convention, to " nature." His theory of knowledge and of Being may be said to be based on a reconciliation of the rival doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heraclitus was right in regarding the sense-world as being in a state of continual flux and therefore not a subject of knowledge, but he was wrong in treating it as the only world. Parmenides, too, was right in holding that the world as known must be changeless and self-identical, but he was wrong in trying to force this conception on the phenomenal world. There are, in fact, two distinct worlds and two distinct kinds of apprehension to deal with them. Sensation tells us of the phenomenal and gives rise to " opinion " ; Reason and thought deal with objects supersensible. For the content of his " intelligible " world Plato is indebted to Socrates' theory of concepts. The general (Aristotelian) view is that by " hypostatizing " these concepts he framed his " Ideas." He presents the Ideas as the ultimate Realities, the only objects of knowledge in the strict sense. The logical method which deals with the Ideas is " Dialectic," which combines induction with deduction. The supreme Idea is " the Good." In the physical theory of the *Timaeus*, the " Demiurge " (God, or Mind) frames the Universe with a view to the most Good, by means of harmony and proportion. Ethics is interwoven with psychology ; the soul is a whole with three component parts or faculties (rational, spirited, appetitive), and is defined as " the self-moving "—the source of all motion. Virtue is the " goodness " of the soul both as a whole and in each of its parts—so that virtue is fourfold (wisdom,

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courage, temperance, justice). Virtue in the State corresponds to that in the individual : each class must be efficient and loyal, and all together must be united in harmony. Thus Plato's Idealism contemplates the rule of Reason, acting for " the Best," in all three spheres—that of the Individual, of the State, and of the Universe. How far it contains a Sceptical element is discussed in *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 221 ff.

Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, succeeded him as Head of the Academy (347–339 B.C.) and was in turn succeeded by *Xenocrates* (339–314 B.C.). Both seem to have amalgamated Idealism with the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers. *Polemo* (314–270 B.C.) was the next Head of the School. Other noted members, or allies, of the Academy were *Heraclides* of Pontus, *Philip* of Opus, *Eudoxus* of Cnidus, the astronomer, and the Pythagorean mathematician *Archytas* of Tarentum. The general character of their teaching was, it seems, in the direction of lowering the standard of the Idealism of Plato and adapting it to the interests of inferior minds. The most gifted of Plato's disciples was undoubtedly Aristotle, the man who deserted the Academy to found a rival school of his own and to teach a revised Platonism.

7. *Aristotle and the Peripatetics* (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* iv. 31, 136, 218).—*Aristotle* of Stageira (384–322 B.C.) joined the Academy in 367 B.C., and after Plato's death, about 335 B.C., founded a School of his own in the *Lyceum* at Athens, lecturing as he walked about—whence the name " Peripatetic " (" walking round "). Aristotle was the great systematizer in all branches of philosophy and science. In his *Logical* treatises (" *Organon* ") he formulates the " Categories," or ten heads of predicables ; the rules for the conversion of

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propositions ; the doctrine of the Syllogism, as based on the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle ; the meaning of Demonstration or Proof as concerned with necessary causes, and how First Principles, or axiomatic truths, are indemonstrable ; problematic or imperfect syllogisms ; the various kinds of eristic argument or fallacy. In his *Metaphysics* he argues, as against Plato, that the Universals, the objects of knowledge, are not separate from the sensibles but *in* them. The first principles of Being are *actuality* and *potency* ; and *Cause* is analysed into four kinds—material, formal, efficient and final. *Form* is the essence of things, and the object of cognition, and Form *plus* Matter compose the concrete substance. God is pure actuality, “thought thinking upon thought,” the *primum mobile*. In his *Physics* and *Psychology* he postulated *Ether* as a fifth element, and the Earth as stationary in the centre of the Cosmos. Life is the power of self-movement, of which Soul is the principle, it being the “form” or “entelechy”^a of the body. The faculties of Soul are five—nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, rational. In sensation we receive “the form without the matter” of the percept ; and besides the five external senses, each with its proper object, there are three internal senses, memory, imagination, and the central *communis sensus*, with its seat in the heart, by which we note and compare the several reports of the special senses. As the senses deal with the concrete and individual, so the Intellect deals with the abstract and universal ; but though distinct from Sense it is dependent on it for its material,

^a *i.e.* actuality or realization of what is otherwise merely “potential.”

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being of itself a *tabula rasa*. The intellect is also described as twofold, active and passive. His *Ethics* is chiefly notable for his doctrine of Virtue as consisting in “the Mean” between two extremes, and for his preference of mental to moral virtues. Also, he included bodily goods (health, wealth, pleasure) as well as virtue in his description of the ethical “End” (“Happiness”). In his *Political Theory* he rejects Plato’s communism and abolition of private property, and regards the State as a means for the moral advancement of the citizens and as the guardian of justice. He also wrote treatises on biology and aesthetics and rhetoric.

Theophrastus was Head of the Peripatetic School from 322 to 287 B.C., when he was succeeded by *Strato*, and he in turn by *Lyco* (269–225 B.C.). They, and other leading Peripatetics—such as *Dicaearchus*, the historian, and *Aristoxenus*, the musician—cultivated the special sciences rather than the metaphysical and logical aspects of Aristotelianism, and empirical interests tended to outweigh theoretical in the later history of the School.

II. THE LATER DOGMATISTS

On its theoretical and constructive side the philosophical movement which culminated in the architectonic systems of Plato and Aristotle came to an abrupt end. The philosophic *Epigoni* of the post-Aristotelian age showed less breadth of vision and but little originality of mind : the glory had departed from Israel. This was, no doubt, partly due to the depressing social and political conditions which prevailed in the Greek-speaking world during the third and following cen-

turies. These conditions tended to make men concentrate their thoughts on purely human interests—the welfare, destiny, salvation of the individual—to the neglect of the other departments of philosophy and science. In so far as they were cultivated at all, those other departments came to be treated merely as the handmaids of Ethics, thus reviving the mainly humanistic attitude of the Sophists. Philosophy, in fact, became the substitute for an out-of-date and exploded Religion, and had for its aim, not the attainment of objective truth, but the provision of a subjective spiritual salvation from the manifold ills of life. Its task was no longer theoretical, but the very practical and urgent one of supplying distressed humanity with “arms against a sea of troubles,” with shield and buckler against “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.” Truth was now a matter for the heart rather than the head; philosophy, like faith, was to be judged by its “works”; it was bound to be pragmatical. To meet this situation two great Dogmatic systems were evolved, the Epicurean and the Stoic, and, to counter them, the system of the Sceptics. These three were contemporaneous, all dating from the end of the fourth century B.C.

1. *The Epicureans.*—*Epicurus* of Samos (341–270 B.C.) founded his School in his garden (hence “the Garden School”) at Athens in 306 B.C. Epicurus reverted to Democritus for his Physics, and to Aristippus for his Ethics, being both an Atomist and a Hedonist. In his physical theory he followed Democritus closely, except in explaining the collision of atoms as due to slight arbitrary deviations from the straight line in their downward course. The Soul, he said, is material, composed (as are the gods) of a

finer sort of atoms, and mortal. Sensation, with its immediate evidence (*εἰσάργεια*), is the only criterion of truth; it is effected by effluent images (*εἰδωλα, ἀπορροαί*) from the external objects impinging on the sense-organs. The aggregation of several sensations forms the notion or concept (*πρόληψις*), and from notions arise opinion (*δόξα*) and conviction (*ὑπόληψις*). This theory of knowledge constitutes “*Canonic*,” the Epicureans’ name for Logic. Physics and Logic were regarded as subordinate to Ethics, and in Ethics Epicurus, like Aristippus, held that the Good is Pleasure, but he defined pleasure rather differently—not as a satisfying “smooth motion” but as a state of rest, “painlessness,” or absence of all unsatisfied desire, or “unperturbedness” (*ἀταραξία*). Also he regarded freedom from mental distress, fear and prejudice, as even more important than bodily satisfaction; and it is the task of the “*Wise Man*” (*φρόνιμος*), by means of a kind of hedonistic calculus, to estimate the comparative value of the different kinds of pleasurable affections (*πάθη*) so as to win for himself the maximum of mental satisfaction and repose throughout his life. Virtue, and the special virtues, are of value only in so far as they contribute to this end. Right and wrong become matters of merely subjective feeling. Religion was abolished as the cause of intolerable mental “perturbation,” and the gods were banished to the *intermundia*. Lucretius’s great poem *De Rerum Natura* is our most complete exposition of Epicureanism.

2. *The Stoics.*—*Zeno* of Citium, in Cyprus (350–258 B.C.), started his School about 305 B.C. in the “*Painted Porch*” (*στοὰ ποικίλη*) at Athens—whence the name “*Stoic*.” He was succeeded by *Cleanthes*, author of

the famous "Hymn to Zeus," who, in turn, was followed by *Chrysippus* of Cilicia (280-206 B.C.), who systematized the doctrines of the School. With *Panaetius* of Rhodes (180-111 B.C.), *Poseidonius* of Apamea (130-46 B.C.), and the later Stoics, the system tended to become more eclectic, with infiltrations of Peripatetic and Academic doctrine. The main tenets of Stoicism were briefly these :—

In *Physics* they reverted to Heracleiteanism, and taught a materialistic monism. All that exists is corporeal: only body can act on body, therefore God is as much corporeal as the world, the soul as the body. The primal world-stuff is *Fire*, which by the "upward and downward way" transforms itself into the other elements and produces the Cosmos, until finally, at the end of the "Great World-Year," it returns to its original form in the World-Conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*); and this cyclical process of evolution goes on for ever. This primary matter has two aspects, active and passive: as "artistic fiery vapour" it is the Soul of the World, Reason (*λόγος*), Thought, Destiny, God. Hence the World, though wholly material, is rational: because governed and permeated by *Logos* (the divine "Word") it exhibits order, harmony and beauty, as the artistic products of creative design. But the *Logos* is also the Cosmic Law, which binds all things in the rigid nexus of cause and effect, the bonds of Destiny (*εἰμαρμένη*). Hence, too, there can be no freedom of the Will for the individual. The Divine *Logos* contains all the "seminal *Logoi*," which are the active reproductive principles in all living creatures. Of the four elements, fire and air were contrasted as "active" with earth and water as "passive," and the forms and qualities of things were explained as

due to the action of air or "aeriform tension" (*τόνος*). The unity of inorganic objects was ascribed to "condition" (*ἕξις*), of plants to "nature" (*φύσις*), of animals to "soul" (*ψυχή*). The souls of living creatures are parts of the Cosmic Soul, and consist of hot vapour or "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*). Human souls (or at least those of the Wise) persist after death until the Ecpyrosis. The Soul has eight parts or faculties, viz. the five senses, the vocal, the generative, and the *hegemonic* or ruling. To this "Regent Part" all the rest are attached, it being their source of motion, with its seat in the heart, whence the *pneuma* radiates to the various local organs. It is in the "Regent Part," too, that perception (presentations and impulses) takes place.

For their *Logic* the Stoics were mainly indebted to Aristotle. They subdivided Logic into Rhetoric and Dialectic. All knowledge comes through the senses, the mind being a *tabula rasa* upon which sense-impressions are made. The "presentation" (*φαντασία*) is defined as "an affection (*πάθος*) arising in the soul" or "an impression (*τύπωσις*) on the soul" (Zeno) or "an alteration in the soul" (Chrysippus). Of these presentations some come through the senses, others are mental. How are we to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy presentations? What is the *Criterion* of truth? Here we come to the most distinctive feature of the Stoic doctrine. The *Criterion*, they said, is to be found in the subjective reaction of the percipient. If the presentation is true, proceeding from a real object, it wins the "assent" or approbation (*συγκατάθεσις*) of the percipient: such an "apprehensive presentation" (*καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*) constitutes the *Criterion*. In

the development of knowledge they distinguished four stages—sense-perception (*αἴσθησις*), memory (*μνήμη*) or retained presentation of an absent object, experience (*ἐμπειρία*) formed by a plurality of like memories, notions (*ἐννοιαί*). “Notions” may be either involuntary—termed “common notions” or “concepts” (*προλήψεις*)—or voluntary, due to the reflex action of the mind. The “concept” is defined as “the natural notion of universals.” The reasoning faculty (*λόγος*) deals with “notions,” and all notions, as substances, are corporeal. The concepts were classified under four heads, the Stoic *Categories*, viz. substance (*ὑποκείμενον*), essential quality (*τὸ ποιόν*), accidental quality (*πρὸς ἕχον*), relation (*πρὸς τί πως ἔχον*). These they called “highest universals” or *συνταγματα* (*τὰ γενικώτατα*), and of these the first is also termed Being. In order to include also Non-being, another, still higher, category was postulated—“Something” (*τό τι*). All qualities, as gaseous currents (*πνεύματα*), are corporeal; but essential or intrinsic qualities or “states” (*ἕξεις*) are distinguished from imported or accidental qualities or “conditions” (*σχέσεις*). Under “relation” are classed all attributes which imply a connexion between co-existing objects.

In their *Ethics* the Stoics followed the Cynics, declaring Virtue to be the only *Good*, and presenting the Ideal “Sage” as the embodiment of virtue. Like all the post-Aristotelian Schools they regarded Ethics as the crown of their philosophy to which Physics and Logic were merely adjuncts, since Ethics deals with the one thing needful—human happiness and the rules for its attainment. Happiness—the End (*τέλος*) or Good—they defined as “Living in conformity with Nature” (*ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει*),

or without contravening the Cosmic “Law” which is Right Reason (*λόγος*), which means obeying God or Necessity. This subjection to the Law of the Logos is ultimately unavoidable, since “volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt.” Action in accordance with “Nature” is Virtue, which does not admit of increase or decrease and is termed a “disposition” (*διάθεσις*) rather than a “state” (*ἕξις*). The four virtues—wisdom, temperance, justice, courage—are defined as four forms of knowledge. Between the extremes of virtue and vice there is no middle state; but an important distinction was made between three classes of conduct—perfect moral actions (*κατορθώματα*), “becoming” actions or “duties” (*καθήκοντα*), “undutiful” or sinful actions (*παρὰ τὸ καθήκον*). The first kind is peculiar to the Stoic “Sage,” the second proper for those “progressing” towards wisdom (*προκόπτοντες*). As the only “goods” are the virtues and the only “evils” their opposite vices, there is a large class of things which come under neither of these heads: these “neutral” things—such as life, health, wealth, beauty, pleasure, and their opposites—are, strictly speaking, “indifferent” (*ἀδιάφορα*). But, even so, they differ in value and were divided into two classes, “the desirable and preferred” (*προηγμένα*), and “the undesirable and unpreferred” (*ἀποπροηγμένα*). Non-rational affections are the “passions” or emotions (*πάθη*), of which there are four kinds—one being of the body, viz. involuntary sensuous feeling, and the other of the soul, viz. the rational emotion of the Sage, natural and involuntary states which are harmless, and vicious or morbid emotions. In all such mental passions there is an element of intellect and will as well as of feeling.

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The primary passions are four—desire, fear, pain and pleasure; and one definition of passion is “an excessive impulse.” To give way to such an impulse is to “assent” to it, or approve of it by a perverted act of judgement, and hence “passions” were called “judgements” by Chrysippus. The root of evil passions is “intemperance,” “a defection of the whole mind from right Reason,” and their fruits are the diseases of the soul we call vices and sins. The Ideal Wise Man or Sage, being moved only by rational emotions, is said to be “passionless” (*ἀπαθής*). In him virtue and wisdom are personified. He only is happy and at peace with himself, unperturbed by fightings without or fears within, indifferent to externals, self-sufficient and self-controlled, master of his fate and captain of his soul. Their portrait of the Ideal Sage is one of the features of Stoicism which attracted world-wide attention, alike from critics and admirers of the School. Horace alludes to the *sapiens* more than once in his *Satires*, e.g. ii. 7. 83 ff. :

quisnam igitur liber ? sapiens sibi qui imperiosus,
quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent,
respondere cupidinibus, contemnere honores
fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus.

Of “the Wise” it was said also that all were friends of all and that they had all things in common and that the whole world was their city and their home (whence the term “cosmopolitan”). They form one of the two classes into which mankind is divided—the “good” (*σπουδαῖοι*) and the “bad” (*φᾶνλοι*), the sheep and the goats. Here again we note the ingrained ethical dualism of the Stoic system. The “bad,” the poor in virtue, we have always with us,

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a multitude whom no man can number, but where shall wisdom be found and who exactly are the truly “wise”? Socrates, they said, and Antisthenes and Diogenes approximated to the Ideal, but the perfect Sage is nowhere discoverable upon the earth; either, then, he had his being in the far-off Golden Age or he remains for ever a “pattern laid up in the heavens.”

I have enlarged thus much upon the details of Stoic doctrine because it is the type of Dogmatism which the Sceptics criticized most frequently and most severely. We pass on now to the Sceptics themselves.

III. SCEPTICISM AND THE SCEPTICS

A “Sceptic,” in the original sense of the Greek term, is simply an “inquirer” or investigator. But inquiry often leads to an *impasse*, and ends in incredulity or despair of a solution, so that the “inquirer” becomes a “doubter” or a “disbeliever,” and Scepticism receives its usual connotation. All down the history of Greek philosophy we have found traces of sceptical thought in the repeated discrediting of sense-perception and the frequent insistence on the folly of vulgar opinion. But, with the exception of Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, all the philosophers agreed in assuming that truth existed and that knowledge of it was possible. When Scepticism was revived and reorganized under the name of “Pyrrhonism” its main task was to challenge this assumption and to maintain, if not the impossibility of knowledge, at least the impossibility of positively affirming its possibility. Its watchword was “Suspend judgement.”

The history of Scepticism, as a definite tradition or

“School,” may conveniently be divided into four periods or stages, viz. :

- (1) Practical Scepticism of *Pyrrho* of Elis (circa 360–275 B.C.), and his pupil *Timon* of Phlius (circa 315–225 B.C.).
- (2) Critical Scepticism and probabilism of the New Academy—*Arcesilas* of Pitane (circa 315–241 B.C.) and *Carneades* of Cyrene (circa 213–129 B.C.). This ended in the Eclecticism of *Philo* and *Antiochus* (ob. 69 B.C.).
- (3) Pyrrhonism revived, systematized and developed dialectically by *Aenesidemus* (circa 100–40 B.C.) and *Agrippa* (? first century A.D.).
- (4) Final development of Empiric Scepticism, culminating in *Sextus Empiricus* (circa 160–210 A.D.).

A brief account of each of these stages must here suffice.

1. *Pyrrho* of Elis—in spite of some later traditions about him—was probably not at all a full-blown Sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere and ascetic type—as Cicero represents him (*Acad. Pr.* ii. 130, *De Fin.* iv. 43, 49)—who cultivated insensibility to externals and superiority to environment. Probably he derived from Democritus a deep distrust of the value of sense-perception, but otherwise he seems to have been imbued with dogmatism, though it was the dogmatism of the will rather than of the intellect. We may fairly assume that the causes which led to the Scepticism of *Pyrrho* and his immediate followers were twofold—firstly, the intellectual confusion which resulted from the number of conflicting doctrines and rival schools, and secondly, the political confusion

and social chaos which spread through the Hellenic world after Alexander's death, together with the new insight into strange habits and customs which was given by the opening up of the East. The natural result of the situation at the close of the fourth century was to shake men's belief in tradition and custom, to dissolve the old creeds and loyalties, and to produce the demand for a new way of salvation in the midst of a crumbling world. *Pyrrho*, it would seem, shared this attitude, and stood out as the apostle of disillusionment. He would not seek or promise “happiness,” in the usual sense of the word, but he sought and taught the negative satisfaction of freedom from care and worry by the cultivation of a neutral, non-committal attitude towards all the problems of life and thought. In self-defence he sought refuge within himself, there to achieve a self-centred “apathy” which his disciples were to acclaim, under the name of “ataraxy,” as the Chief End of Man. Probably, then, the main, if not the only, interest of *Pyrrho* was in the ethical and practical side of Scepticism as the speediest cure for the ills of life.

Timon of Phlius spent the latter part of his long life at Athens. In his earlier days he is said to have sat under Stilpo at Megara, as well as under *Pyrrho* at Elis. His admiration for the latter was unbounded, although it would seem that he did not copy his ascetic habits too closely. He was a voluminous writer of both prose and poetry—epics, tragedies, satires—but only a few fragments of two of his works have survived, viz. the “Images” or “Illusions” (*Ἰνδαλμοί*), and the “Silli” or “Lampoons” (*Σίλλοι*). The latter evidently became very popular because of its mordant wit. It consisted of three books, all deriding the

professors of philosophy, and written in hexameters in the Homeric style, beginning thus :

Come now, listen to me, ye polypragmatical Sophists.

The second and third books were in the form of a dialogue between Timon and Xenophanes, in which the latter expresses his contempt for nearly all the rival schools of thought. It appears, then, that the only philosophers for whom Timon entertained any respect were the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras—the most severe critics of knowledge in the form of sense-perception. This exposure of the futility of philosophizing served to support the indifferentist attitude of Pyrrho ; and Timon by his writings (for Pyrrho wrote nothing) popularized the Sceptical view that the way to make the best of life is to eschew dogma and to cultivate mental repose. It is probably a mistake of Sextus (*Adv. Math.* iii. 2, vi. 66) to ascribe to Timon formal argumentation concerning “ hypotheses ” and the “ divisibility of time,” considering his ridicule of dialectic and his avoidance of “ the strife of tongues ” ; and it is very doubtful whether he (or Pyrrho) invented or used any of the technical vocabulary of Scepticism (e.g. “ Suspension,” “ No more,” “ Equipollence ”) which is commonly ascribed to him or his master.

2. *Scepticism in the New Academy* (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 220 ff.).—With *Arcesilas* Scepticism entered upon a new stage of development. It ceased to be purely practical, and became mainly theoretical. Arcesilas succeeded Crates as Head of the Academy about 270 B.C. He appears to have been influenced by the Megarics as well as by Pyrrho, and was eminent as a dialectician and controversialist. His delight was

to argue *in utramque partem* and balance argument against argument ; and he took up the position that to know we know is an impossibility, and to seek for absolute truth an absurdity. His polemic was chiefly directed against the Stoic epistemology and its doctrine of the “ apprehensive presentation ” as the “ Criterion.” He maintained that we can “ assent ” to no sense-impression as carrying conviction and indubitably true, and that the objective realities are consequently incognizable, and we can only “ suspend judgement ” about them, unless we content ourselves with fallible “ opinion ” instead of scientific “ knowledge.” But the Stoic “ Sage ” never “ opines ” ; neither can he “ know ” ; therefore he must suspend judgement and turn Sceptic. False and true presentations are indistinguishable : no valid criterion exists : we have no guide but opinion, and we can only think, believe, and act in accordance with what seems reasonable (εὐλογον) or probably right. Thus, while Pyrrho had renounced and Timon flouted the Dogmatics, Arcesilas started the practice of refuting them scientifically and systematically, and earned thereby the abuse of Timon for his lapse from pure Pyrrhonism.

Carneades of Cyrene, like Arcesilas and Pyrrho, left no writings, but his views were preserved by his disciple Cleitomachus (Hasdrubal). He was a brilliant teacher, a formidable dialectician, and perhaps the most talented philosopher of the post-Aristotelian period. His energies were mainly devoted to negative criticism of the theories of the Dogmatists, especially the Stoics. He resumed and developed the arguments with which Arcesilas had attacked the Stoic theory of knowledge, and which Chrysippus had, in the meanwhile, attempted to rebut. Neither the senses nor

the reason, he argued, can supply any infallible "criterion": there is no specific difference between false "presentations" and true: beside any true presentation you can set a false one which is in no wise different. The dreamer, the drunkard, the madman have illusions of the truth of which they are convinced: you see two eggs or two hairs and cannot tell the one from the other: you cannot distinguish the true impression from the false, or assert that the one rather than the other is produced by a real object. It is in vain, then, to look to the senses for certainty; and it is equally vain to look to the reason since it (as the Stoics held) is wholly dependent on the senses and based on experience. Logic, the product of the reasoning faculty, is discredited because of the number of insoluble fallacies for which it is responsible—such as "The Liar" ("The Cretan says 'I lie': is he a liar?"), "The *Cornutus*" ("Have you shed your horns—yes or no?"), "The *Sorites*" or Chain-argument ("How many grains make a heap? 'Take 10, 20, 30, etc., away, is it still a heap?"). Chrysippus when confronted with the *Sorites* in a dialectical discussion is said to have called a halt and refused to answer, thus giving in to the Sceptic by "suspending judgement." Reason is thus found to be as fallible as sensation, and certitude impossible.

Carneades also attacked the Ethical system of the Stoics, exposing their inconsistency in saying that Virtue is directed to choosing the prime objects of natural desire while denying to these objects the name of "good." He criticized also their Theology, their doctrines of the Divine Nature, of Providence, of Divination and Prophecy. The Stoics were fond of appealing to the *consensus gentium*, or the universal

belief in the existence of the gods: Carneades ridiculed that appeal. For how do we know that the belief is universal? And why appeal to the multitude who—the Stoics tell us—are all fools? why call in ignorance as judge? And as to divination and prognostication, they rest on no principles of science but are mere quackery and tricks of the trade. The God of the Stoics is an incredible Being because he is composed of contradictory attributes. If He is to be infinite, omniscient, all-good, and imperishable, He cannot be either composite or corporeal or animate or rational or virtuous—all such qualities belonging to objects which lie in the sphere of becoming and perishing. In support of their theory of Providence the Stoics brought forward evidences of design in Nature. Carneades retorted by quoting cases of snake-bites and wrecks at sea. Reason, said the Stoics, is a gift of Providence to man: why then, replied Carneades, did not Providence see to it that the majority were endowed with a "right reason" instead of one that only enables them to outdo the brutes in brutishness? Only a few possess right reason; so the Stoic God must be miserly in his gifts!

In all this the position of Carneades is purely agnostic. He does not wish to affirm a negative, but merely to show up the untenability of the Stoic dogmas, and to reassert as regards all departments of knowledge the impossibility of attaining absolute certitude. When the pretentious structure of the Stoics had been thus riddled by the arrows of Carneades, their Ideal Sage must have appeared but as a figment to many, and their anthropomorphic Deity as an incredible bundle of contradictions.

But there was a constructive as well as a destructive side to the teaching of Carneades. He took over, modified, and developed the theory of Arcesilas that, despite the impossibility of objective knowledge, a sufficient ground for practical choice and action might be found in the "reasonable" (εὐλογον) or subjectively satisfying. He granted to the Stoics that some sense-impressions or opinions *seem* to the percipient superior to others, and this apparent superiority provided a sufficient reason for preference and consequential action. Impressions being thus subjectively distinguishable, judgements may be graded in value as more or less "persuasive" or "probable" (πιθανοί). Carneades then classified presentations in this way: (1) the apparently false; (2) the apparently true, which are of three grades—(a) the probable in itself; (b) the probable and "uncontradicted" (*i.e.* by accompanying conditions—ἀπερίσπαστος); (c) the probable and uncontradicted and "closely scrutinized" or "tested" (διεξωδευμένη). These apparently true impressions produce varying degrees of "conviction" and deserve proportionate "assent" (συγκατάθεσις) of a relative kind—the only kind of assent possible for the Sceptic who denies that objective certitude is attainable. In connexion with this doctrine of "probabilism" Carneades defended human freedom, in "assent," choice and action, as against the determinism of the Stoics with their rigid theory of Destiny and Necessity; and he subjected their doctrine on this subject to a searching criticism which exposed its inherent inconsistency.

With Carneades the dialectical Scepticism of the New Academy came to an end. His successors, *Philo of Larissa* (*ob. circa* 80 B.C.) and *Antiochus of Ascalon*

(*ob.* 69 B.C.), surrendered his theory of nescience, and reverted to a more dogmatic position. Both were Eclectics—Antiochus so much so that he asserted the harmony, if not the practical identity, of the doctrines of the Academy with those of the Peripatetics and Stoics, and his teaching was a curious amalgam of them all. This tendency to doctrinal conflation continued to characterize the philosophers of the succeeding generations till the rise of Neoplatonism, excepting only those attached to the Epicurean School and the Later Sceptics.

3. The first of the "Later Sceptics," who revived the original "Pyrrhonism," was *Aenesidemus*, a younger contemporary of Antiochus. Cnossus in Crete may have been his birthplace, Alexandria was where he taught. Though originally an Academic, he denounced Arcesilas and Carneades as dogmatists in disguise rather than true Sceptics, since we cannot know that knowledge is impossible. His treatise *Pyrrhonian Discourses* consisted of eight books in which he explained his dissent from the New Academy, and criticized in detail the logic, ethics, and physics of Stoicism. In another work, *Introductory Outline of Pyrrhonism*, he set forth his famous "Ten Tropes," or "Modes" of procedure, for the refuting of Dogmatism in all its forms. Apparently the order in which they are drawn up was not fixed, since Sextus's order differs from that of Diogenes Laertius; nor does it seem to be governed by any logical principle. The Tropes themselves merely formulate arguments in favour of the relativity of knowledge, borrowed from earlier Sceptical teachers—Sophists, Megarics, Academics; and, as Lotze says,^a

^a *Logic*, III. i. § 310 (English translation).

“The ten tropes, or logical grounds of doubt, all come to this, that sensations by themselves cannot discover to us what is the nature of the object which excites them.”

Besides these ten Tropes, Aenesidemus (in his *Pyrrhonian Discourses*, bk. 5) summarized the arguments against causality and current theories of “cause” in his “Eight (Aetiological) Tropes.” These form a list of fallacious methods of reasoning about “cause.” His objections rest mainly on the assumption that “cause” is a thing in itself, and causality a real objective quality inherent therein.

Similarly he attacked the Stoic and Epicurean doctrine of “Signs” (*σημεία*), or “effects” which point back to “causes,” arguing that no phenomenon can safely be regarded as a “sign,” because “doctors differ” in interpreting symptoms.

But, to judge by several remarks of Sextus, Aenesidemus was not consistent in his Scepticism. We are told that he regarded “the Sceptic system (*ἀγωγή*) as a road leading to the Heracleitean philosophy, on the ground that the (Sceptic) view that opposites *apparently* belong to the same object is prefatory to the (Heracleitean) view that they *really* so belong.” We are told also that he held that the primary world-principle is *air*, which he identified with *time* and number; and that he explained the origin of the world in all its variety from this unitary substance by supposing it to be receptive of opposite qualities, and every whole self-identical in all its parts. He is also said to have reduced the six kinds of *motion* distinguished by Aristotle, and the ten of Plato, to two, viz. locomotion and alteration or transformation;

and a peculiar theory of *Soul*, or reason (*διάνοια*), is ascribed to him, according to which the reason exists outside the body and is somehow inspired so that it can act from within through the senses. With the theory of reason as external, and therefore not individualized but “common” (*κοινή*), like the “Logos” of Heracleitus, is connected the further theory, ascribed to Aenesidemus, that some phenomena appear alike to all men “in common,” while others appear different to different percipients, and that the former class are “true,” the latter “false”—universality of experience thus being the “Criterion” of truth.

How we are to reconcile this hybrid dogmatism with the undoubted Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus is a puzzling question which has much exercised the historians of philosophy. It has been suggested that Sextus has misunderstood or misrepresented Aenesidemus; or that Aenesidemus did ultimately pass over from the Sceptical to the Dogmatic position; or that his apparent Dogmatism can be explained away as no real surrender of Scepticism but rather an unconscious yielding to the Eclectic influences of his intellectual environment. None of these suggestions seems wholly satisfactory; but perhaps the least difficult supposition is that Sextus is unintentionally misrepresenting Aenesidemus by a loose use of language when he ascribes the dogmas mentioned above to “Aenesidemus and his followers” (*οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον*). If so, we may suppose that while Aenesidemus may have given a start to the dogmatizing tendency by enlarging on the points of similarity between Scepticism and Heracleiteanism and claiming Heracleitus as a forerunner, certain of his adherents

pushed that tendency to excess and indulged in an Eclectic dogmatism, after the fashion of Antiochus, which blended Scepticism with Heracleitean and Stoic doctrine.

Of the successors of Aenesidemus we know no more than the names until we come to *Agrippa*, about a century later. To him is attributed the presentation of Sceptical theory in "five Tropes," which are briefly these: (1) Based on the conflict among opinions (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας); (2) Every proof requires a fresh proof in endless regress (ὁ εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκβάλλον); (3) Based on the relativity of perceptions (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι τρόπος); (4) Proof must not presuppose unproved premisses (ὁ ὑποθετικός); (5) Reasoning involves a vicious circle (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος). Of these (1) and (3) resume and sum up the former "ten Tropes," which exhibited the fallibility of the senses and the relativity of perceptual knowledge; while (2), (4) and (5) are directed against the Aristotelian theory of "immediate" axioms (ἄμεσα) and the possibility of logical demonstration.

Agrippa was followed by *Zeuxippus*, *Zeuxis*, and *Antiochus*, who remain mere names, though we may suppose that they adhered to the tradition of dialectical Scepticism.

4. The last stage in the history of Greek Scepticism is marked by its alliance with medical empiricism (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 236 ff.). *Menodotus* of Nicomedia and *Theodas* appear to have been the first of these medical Sceptics, and we may date them about A.D. 150. *Galen* criticizes the views of both regarding medicine and natural science. *Herodotus* of Tarsus, who succeeded *Menodotus*, is thought to have belonged to the "pneumatic" rather than to the

"empiric" school of medicine; but in any case he was the teacher of *Sextus Empiricus*.

To one or other of the foregoing Sceptics we may probably attribute two further developments of doctrine, viz. a further reduction of the "Tropes" to two (arguing against the possibility of either immediate or mediate certitude), and a new distinction between "commemorative" (ὑπομνηστικά) and "indicative" (ἐνδεικτικά) "signs" (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* ii. 99).

Sextus Empiricus (circa A.D. 200) is our main authority for the history and doctrine of the Sceptic School. We know that he was a Greek physician and that he succeeded *Herodotus* as Head of the School, but we know little else about the details of his life. He seems to have resided for some time in Rome, and to have been acquainted with Athens and Alexandria. Although named "Empiricus" he seems to imply that he adhered rather to the "methodic" than to the "empiric" tradition in medicine. His surviving works are three—(1) "Outlines (ὑποτυπώσεις) of Pyrrhonism" in three books; (2) "Against the Dogmatists" in five books,^a—1 and 2 "Against the Logicians," 3 and 4 "Against the Physicists," 5 "Against the Ethicists"; (3) "Against the Professors" in six books—a book each against Grammarians, Rhetors, Geometers, Arithmeticians, Astrologers, Musicians, in this order. Other works ascribed to him are a treatise "On the Soul" and "Notes on Medicine."

Of the surviving works the *Hypotyposes*, or "Outlines," is a kind of summary of Scepticism, the first book stating and defending the Sceptic position, and

^a These five books are sometimes entitled *Adversus Mathematicos*, vii-xi. Cf. p. xlii.

the other two books attacking the Dogmatic position. The other two works are usually put together as a whole under the title *Adversus Mathematicos*—which we might construe “Against the Professors of all Arts and Sciences,”—and they resume and expand the critical and polemical arguments of books 2 and 3 of the “Outlines.”

Probably there is but little original matter in these works. Sextus was mainly a compiler: he drew freely on the writings of his predecessors, especially Aenesidemus, Cleitomachus (for Carneades), and Menodotus. He was evidently interested in the history of thought, and provides us with much valuable information about the earlier Schools, although he is not wholly reliable. He writes mostly in a plain, dry style, enlivened but rarely by touches of humour. As a controversialist he studies fairness by quoting the opponent’s own views, often at great length; but he wearies the reader by his way of piling argument upon argument for the mere sake of multiplying words—bad argument and good heaped together indiscriminately. Obviously his books are not intended to be works of art, but rather immense arsenals stored with all the weapons of offence and defence of every conceivable pattern, old and new, that ever were forged on the anvil of Scepticism by the hammer blows of Eristic dialecticians. From these storehouses the Sceptic engaged in polemics may choose his weapon to suit his need; for (as Sextus naïvely observes) the Sceptic is a “philanthropic” person who spares his adversary by using against him only the minimum of force necessary to bowl him over, so that the weakest and most flimsy arguments have their uses as well as the weightiest. Or is Sextus here the veiled humorist?

IV. TEXT AND EDITIONS

The text of Sextus is derived from two main sources—the Greek Manuscripts and a Latin Translation. For the *Hypotyposes* the most important mss.—as described by the latest editor, Mutschmann—are:

- M = Monac. gr. 439, late fourteenth century, containing *Pyrr. Hyp.*
- L = Laur. 81. 11, dated A.D. 1465, containing all the works of Sextus.
- E = Parisinus 1964, late fifteenth century, containing all Sextus (plus *διυλέξεις*).
- A = Parisinus 1963, dated 1534, containing all Sextus (plus *διυλέξεις*).
- B = Berol. Phill. 1518, dated 1542, nearly a duplicate of A.

Of these, the last three seem to be closely akin, so that we have three main lines of ms. tradition, derived from the same Archetype, viz. M, L, and EAB.

T denotes (in Mutschmann’s notation, which is here followed) the Latin Translation, which is preserved in the ms. known as Parisinus lat. 14700 (fol. 83-132). It contains the whole of Sextus except for two omissions, viz. p. 51, 11-26, and p. 145, 3-160, 20. As it was first brought to light by C. Jourdain in 1888, earlier editors were ignorant of its existence, and it is only in the latest Teubner edition that its readings are reported. The Teubner editor, H. Mutschmann, dates it in the thirteenth century, and regards it as equal in importance to any of the Greek mss., and derived from an independent Archetype.

There are three early editions of Sextus—by P.

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and J. Chouet (Geneva, 1621); by J. A. Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718), incorporating the Latin version by H. Stephens (Paris, 1562), as well as additional Notes; by I. Bekker (Berlin, 1842), giving the text and index only. The first volume of the Teubner edition (containing *Pyrr. Hyp.*) was published in 1912, the second volume in 1914.

A literal German version of the three books of *Pyrr. Hyp.*, with an Introduction and useful Notes, by E. Pappenheim, appeared in 1877 (Leipzig); and an English version of *Pyrr. Hyp.*, book i., is included in M. Patrick's volume *Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism* (Cambridge, 1899). The latest considerable contribution to the textual criticism of Sextus is Werner Heintz's *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus* (Halle, 1932).

The present four volumes include "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I); "Against the Logicians" (Vol. II); "Against the Physicists" and "Against the Ethicists" (Vol. III); and "Against the Professors" (Vol. IV). "Against the Professors" vii-xi (*Adversus Mathematicos* vii-xi) is an alternative title for "Against the Logicians" i-v (*Adversus Dogmaticos* i-v).

The text in these volumes is based on that of Bekker. Bekker, it may be noted, omitted both the Tables of Contents prefixed to the several books in the mss. and the corresponding Chapter-headings, although the earlier editors had retained both. In these volumes the Chapter-headings are restored, for the convenience of the reader, while the Tables of Contents are, after Bekker, omitted, as a superfluous duplication.

In addition to the accounts of Greek Scepticism

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given in the standard Histories of Ancient Philosophy, attention may be drawn to the special treatment of the subject in *The Greek Sceptics* by N. MacColl (1869); *Les Sceptiques grecs* by V. Brochard (1887), copious and clear; *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* by A. Goedeckemeyer (1905), good for details; *Stoic and Epicurean* by R. D. Hicks (1910), chapters 8 and 10; *Stoics and Sceptics* by E. Bevan (1913), less detailed, but scholarly, suggestive and interesting, and thus probably the best introduction to the subject for the general reader.

The following abbreviations are used in the foot-notes on the text:

L = ms. Laur. 85. 11.

M = „ Monac. 439.

E = „ Paris. 1964.

A = „ Paris. 1963.

B = „ Berol. Phill. 1518.

G = consensus of foregoing mss.

T = Latin Translation.

Fabr. = Fabricius.

Bekk. = Bekker.

Mutsch. = H. Mutschmann.

Papp. = Pappenheim.

OUTLINES OF
PYRRHONISM

ΠΥΡΡΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΥΠΟΤΤΠΩΣΕΩΝ

ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΡΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

Α.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΩΤΑΤΩ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΩΝ

1 Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὔρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν
εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὔρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολο-
2 γίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἴσως καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρη-
κένοι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφάναντο μὴ
3 δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι
ζητοῦσιν. καὶ εὐρηκένοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως
καλούμενοι δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην
καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς στωικοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές,
ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφάναντο οἱ περὶ
Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδη-
4 μαῖκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί. ὅθεν εὐλόγως
δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι, δογ-
ματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτικὴ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
ἄλλων ἐτέροις ἀρμόσει λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῆς σκεπ-
τικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμεῖς
ἐρούμεν, ἐκείνο προειπόντες ὅτι περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν

^a See *Introd.* pp. xxxii ff.

^b "Doctrines," "School," "system" or "way" are other

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM

BOOK I

CHAPTER I.—OF THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS

THE natural result of any investigation is that the 1
investigators either discover the object of search or
deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be
inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, 2
with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy,
this is probably why some have claimed to have dis-
covered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot
be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring.
Those who believe they have discovered it are the 3
"Dogmatists," specially so called—Aristotle, for
example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain
others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other
Academics^a treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics
keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to 4
hold that the main types of philosophy are three—
the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Of
the other systems it will best become others to speak:
our task at present is to describe in outline the
Sceptic doctrine,^b first premising that of none of our
possible renderings of ἀγωγή. "Procedure," "way of
thought," "trend," or "line of argument," "leading" (ἀγων)
up to a definite goal, is rather what it connotes.

λεχθησομένων διαβεβαιούμεθα ὡς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἑκάστου.

B'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΨΕΩΣ

5 Τῆς σκεπτικῆς οὖν φιλοσοφίας ὁ μὲν λέγεται καθόλου λόγος ὁ δὲ εἰδικός, καὶ καθόλου μὲν ἐν ᾧ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐκτιθέμεθα, λέγοντες τίς ἔννοια αὐτῆς καὶ τίνες ἀρχαὶ καὶ τίνες λόγοι τί τε κριτήριον καὶ τί τέλος, καὶ τίνες οἱ τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς, καὶ πῶς παραλαμβάνομεν τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῆς σκέψεως ἀπὸ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφιῶν, 6 εἰδικὸς δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλέγομεν. περὶ τοῦ καθόλου δὲ πρῶτον διαλάβωμεν λόγου, ἀρξάμενοι τῆς ὑφηγήσεως ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὀνομάτων.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗΣ

7 Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγή καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινόμενου πάθους, καὶ ἀπορητικὴ ἥτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, ὡς ἐνίοι φασιν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμνηχανεῖν πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ἢ ἀρνήσιν, καὶ Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικώτερον

^a Cf. *Introd.* p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. *infra*.

^b Bks. II. and III. belong to the "special" part of the exposition.

future statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment.

CHAPTER II.—OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SCEPTICISM

Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch 5 of exposition) is called "general," the other "special." In the general argument we set forth the distinctive features of Scepticism, stating its purport and principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; the "Tropes," also, or "Modes,"^a which lead to suspension of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the philosophies which stand next to it. In the special argument we state our objections 6 regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy.^b Let us, then, deal first with the general argument, beginning our description with the names given to the Sceptic School.

CHAPTER III.—OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF SCEPTICISM

The Sceptic School, then, is also called "Zetetic" 7 from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and "Ephectic" or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and "Aoretic" or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and "Pyrrhonian" from the fact that Pyrrho^c appears to us to

^c See *Introd.* pp. xxx f.

καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.

Δ.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

- 8 "Ἐστί δὲ ἡ σκεπτική δύναμις ἀντιθετική φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένους πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχὴν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.
- 9 δύναμιν μὲν οὖν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περιεργον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι φαινόμενα δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διόπερ ἀντιδιαστέλλομεν αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ " καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον " δύναται προσαρμύζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἀπλῶς τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὄνομα, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῷ " ἀντιθετικῇ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ". ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποικίλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ ἀντιτιθέντες, ἵνα πᾶσαι αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἐμπεριέχωνται, λέγομεν " καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον. " ἢ καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων, ἵνα μὴ ζητῶμεν πῶς φαίνεται τὰ φαινόμενα ἢ πῶς νοεῖται τὰ νοούμενα,
- 10 ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν. ἀντικειμένους δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχὶ πάντως ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένου. ἰσοσθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ

^a *i.e.* "opposites" includes, for the Sceptics, "contraries" (*e.g.* "All are wise") ("None are wise"), as well as "contradictories" (*e.g.* "Some are wise") ("None are wise"), whereas the Stoics used it of the latter only.

have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.

CHAPTER IV.—WHAT SCEPTICISM IS

Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways—appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or *alternando* appearances to judgements,—in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements."^a "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability

ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκείσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον. ἐποχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ στάσις διανοίας δι' ἣν οὔτε αἴρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν. ἀταραξία δὲ ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης. πῶς δὲ τῇ ἐποχῇ συνεισέρχεται ἡ ἀταραξία, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τέλους ὑπομνήσομεν.

Ε'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΥ

- 11 Καὶ ὁ Πυρρώνειος δὲ φιλόσοφος δυνάμει τῇ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐννοία συναποδέδοται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως.

Σ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΨΕΩΣ

- 12 Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φάμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτῆσειν· οἱ γὰρ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρή μᾶλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν τί τε ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτῆσοντες. συστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικείσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν δοκοῦμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.

Ζ'.—ΕΙ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΖΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 13 Λέγομεν δὲ μὴ δογματίζειν τὸν σκεπτικὸν οὐ κατ' ἐκείνο τὸ σημαίνον του δόγματος καθ' ὃ καὶ δόγμα εἶναι φασι τινες κοινότερον τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινὶ πράγματι (τοῖς γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν κατ-

bility, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End."

CHAPTER V.—OF THE SCEPTIC

In the definition of the Sceptic system there is also 11 implicitly included that of the Pyrrhonian philosopher: he is the man who participates in this "ability."

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SCEPTICISM

The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the 12 hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement of this question to attain quietude. The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.

CHAPTER VII.—DOES THE SCEPTIC DOGMATIZE?

When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogma- 13 tizing we do not use the term "dogma," as some do, in the broader sense of "approval of a thing" (for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which

ηναγκασμένοις πάθεισιν συγκατατίθεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἷον οὐκ ἂν εἴποι θερμαινόμενος ἢ ψυχόμενος ὅτι δοκῶ μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ψύχεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μὴ δογματίζειν λέγομεν καθ' ὃ δόγμα εἶναι φασί τινες τὴν τιμὴν πράγματι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητουμένων ἀδήλων συγκατάθεσιν· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων συγκατατίθεται ὁ Πυρρώνειος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ προφέρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰς σκεπτικὰς φωνάς, οἷον τὴν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" ἢ τὴν "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω" ἢ τινα τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὕστερον λέξομεν, δογματίζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ὡς ὑπάρχον τίθεται τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγεται δογματίζειν, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας οὐχ ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας· ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι ὡσπερ ἢ "πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ" φωνὴ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἢ "οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές" ὁμοίως, οὕτως καὶ ἢ "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν φησι μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθείη. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστωσιν, μὴδὲν περὶ τῶν ἕξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.

^a Cf. §§ 187 ff. As there explained, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον is elliptical for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸδε ἢ τὸδε.

^b Lit. "underlying things," i.e. the essences or reals which

are the necessary results of sense-impressions, and he would not, for example, say when feeling hot or cold "I believe that I am not hot or cold"; but we say that "he does not dogmatize" using "dogma" in the sense, which some give it, of "assent to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry"; for the Pyrrhonian philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident. Moreover, even in the act of ¹⁴ enunciating the Sceptic formulae ^a concerning things non-evident—such as the formula "No more (one thing than another)," or the formula "I determine nothing," or any of the others which we shall presently mention,—he does not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the formula "All things are false" asserts the falsity of itself as well as of everything else, as does the formula "Nothing is true," so also the formula "No more" asserts that itself, like all the rest, is "No more (this than that)," and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other formulae we say the same. If then, ¹⁵ while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in his enunciation of these formulae he states what appears to himself and announces his own impression in an undogmatic way, without making any positive assertion regarding the external realities.^b

lie behind, and give rise to, sensations or "appearances": cf. p. 30 note a.

Η.—ΕΙ ΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ ΕΧΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 16 'Ομοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶσθαι εἰ ἔχει αἵρεσιν ὁ σκεπτικὸς. εἰ μὲν τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι λέγει πρόσκλισιν δόγμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ φαινόμενα, καὶ λέγει δόγμα τινὶ ἀδήλω συγκατάθεσιν, φήσομεν μὴ ἔχειν αἵρεσιν. εἰ δέ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι φάσκει τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀγωγὴν, ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἔστιν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ζῆν ὑποδεικνύοντος (τοῦ ὀρθῶς μὴ μόνον κατ' ἀρετὴν λαμβανομένου ἀλλ' ἀφελέστερον) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν δύνασθαι διατείνοντος, αἵρεσιν φαμεν ἔχειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν γάρ τινι λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ὑποδεικνύντι ἡμῖν τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ οἰκεία πάθη.

Θ.—ΕΙ ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 18 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ· ἔνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίον πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ φυσιολογοῦμεν, ἔνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἀπτόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἠθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ἐπερχόμεθα.

^a Lit. "more smoothly" or "simply"; hence "in a less restricted, more extensive, way."

CHAPTER VIII.—HAS THE SCEPTIC A DOCTRINAL RULE?

We follow the same lines in replying to the question 16 "Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?" For if one defines a "doctrinal rule" as "adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances," and defines "dogma" as "assent to a non-evident proposition," then we shall say that he has not a doctrinal rule. But if one 17 defines "doctrinal rule" as "procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word 'rightly' being taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense^a) and tending to enable one to suspend judgment," then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive feelings.

CHAPTER IX.—DOES THE SCEPTIC DEAL WITH PHYSICS?

We make a similar reply also to the question 18 "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so-called "philosophy."

Γ.—ΕΙ ΑΝΑΙΡΟΥΣΙ ΤΑ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ ΟΙ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ

19 Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα οἱ
 σκεπτικοὶ ἀνήκοοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν παρ'
 ἡμῖν λεγομένων· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικῆν¹
 ἀβουλήτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ
 ἀνατρέπομεν, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν· ταῦτα
 δέ ἐστι τὰ φαινόμενα. ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν εἰ τοιοῦτον
 ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι
 φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομέ-
 νου ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινο-
 μένου· τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ
 20 τοῦ φαινομένου. οἷον φαίνεται ἡμῖν γλυκαζέειν
 τὸ μέλι. τοῦτο συγχωροῦμεν· γλυκαζόμεθα γὰρ
 αἰσθητικῶς. εἰ δὲ καὶ γλυκύ ἐστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ
 λόγῳ, ζητοῦμεν· ὃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλὰ
 περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου λεγόμενον. εἴαν δὲ καὶ ἄντι-
 κρυς κατὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἐρωτῶμεν λόγους,
 οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν βυλλόμενοι τὰ φαινόμενα τούτους
 ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύντες τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν
 προπέτειαν· εἰ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀπατεῶν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν
 ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ ὑφορᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν
 τοῖς ἀδῆλοις, ὥστε μὴ κατακολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ
 προπετεῦσθαι;

¹ παθητικῆν LMT: παθητικὰ EAB, Bekk.

^a *i.e.* "impressions" or "presentations" which cause
 "affections" or "feelings" (πάθη), as described in § 13 *supra*.

^b Cf. § 213.

CHAPTER X.—DO THE SCEPTICS ABOLISH
 APPEARANCES?

Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appear-
 19 ances," or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted
 with the statements of our School. For, as we said
 above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-
 impressions^a which induce our assent involuntarily;
 and these impressions are "the appearances." And
 when we question whether the underlying object is
 such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears,
 and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself
 but the account given of that appearance,—and that
 is a different thing from questioning the appearance
 itself. For example, honey^b appears to us to be
 20 sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness
 through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in
 its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is
 not an appearance but a judgement regarding the
 appearance. And even if we do actually argue
 against the appearances, we do not propound such
 arguments with the intention of abolishing appear-
 ances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the
 Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all
 but snatch away the appearances from under our very
 eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the
 case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness
 by following it.^c

^c *i.e.* the "reason," or logic, which serves to discredit
 phenomena may be used *a fortiori* to discredit ultra-sensible
 objects. Instead of "abolishing appearances" it really (as
 the Sceptics contend) abolishes itself.

I.A.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗΣ

CHAPTER XI.—OF THE CRITERION OF SCEPTICISM

- 21 "Ὅτι δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχομεν, δηλον ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς. κριτήριον δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τῷ ἀντιρρητικῷ λέξομεν λόγῳ, τό τε τοῦ πράσσειν, ᾧ προσέχοντες κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν πράσσομεν τὰ δ' οὐ, περὶ οὗ νῦν λέγομεν.
- 22 κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμέν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητεῖ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.
- 23 Τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. εἴκοι δὲ αὕτη ἢ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑψηγῆσει φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἔθῶν,
- 24 τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, ὑψηγῆσει μὲν φυσικῇ καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἐσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφῆν ἡμᾶς ὀδηγεῖ δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἔθῶν δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὡς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνενέργητοὶ ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμέν ἀδοξάστως.

That we adhere to appearances is plain from what 21 we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality," (and this we shall discuss in our refutation ^a); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that we are now speaking. The 22 criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be.

Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accord- 23 ance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.^b And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by 24 which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically.

^a Cf. II. 14 ff.^b Cf. §§ 226, 237-238.

25 Τούτοις ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διελθεῖν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὐ χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. φάμεν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηνα-
26 κασμένοις μετριопάθειαν. ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν τίνες μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐπέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεον ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἢ ἐν
27 τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν φύσει κακῶν νομίζει πονηλατεῖσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὡς οἶεται ἄπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει διὰ τε τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ τὸ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι, καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα πράσσει ἵνα μὴ
28 ἀποβάλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι. ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε διώκει συντόμως· διόπερ ἀταρακτεῖ.

Ἐπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τοῦτο ὑπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος

^a Cf. Cic. *De fin.* i. 12. 42 "vel summum bonum vel ultimum vel extremum, quod Graeci τέλος nominant, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes." Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 1. 1 καλῶς ἀπεφῆσαντο τὰγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται; *ibid.* 5 τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δ' δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο.

Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic 25 system. Now an "End" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appetency."^a We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the Sceptic, having set out to 26 philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For 27 the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, 28 the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.

The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles.^b Once,

^b Court painter to Alexander the Great (circa 350-300 B.C.).

ἵππον γράφων καὶ τὸν ἀφρόν τοῦ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουλευθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύγγανεν ὡς ἀπειπεῦν καὶ τὴν σπογγίαν εἰς ἣν ἀπέμασσε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου χρώματα προσρῦσαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσαιψαμένην ἵππου ἀφροῦ ποιῆσαι μίμημα.
 29 καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἠλπίζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρίναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχούσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιά σώματι. οὐ μὴν ἀόχλητον πάντῃ τὸν σκεπτικὸν εἶναι νομίζομεν, ἀλλ' ὀχλεῖσθαι φαμεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταναγκασμένων· καὶ γὰρ ῥιγοῦν ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ διψῆν καὶ τοιουτότροπά τινα πάσχειν.
 30 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται δισσαῖς συνέχονται περιστάσεσιν, ὑπὸ τε τῶν παθῶν αὐτῶν καὶ οὐχ ἦττον ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰς περιστάσεις ταύτας κακὰς εἶναι φύσει δοκεῖν· ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὸ προσδοξάζειν ὅτι ἔστι κακὸν τούτων ἕκαστον ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν περιαιρῶν μετριώτερον καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπαλλάσσει. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξίαν τέλος εἶναι φαμεν τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καταναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίμων σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκάν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχὴν.

ΠΓ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΩΝ ΤΡΟΠΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΟΧΗΣ

31 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν

* Viz. Timon and Aenesidemus; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 107.

they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the 29 Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are 30 afflicted by two circumstances,—namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature,—the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics* have added the further definition "suspension of judgement in investigations."

CHAPTER XIII.—OF THE GENERAL MODES LEADING TO SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT

Now that we have been saying that tranquillity 31 follows on suspension of judgement, it will be our

ὅπως ἡμῶν ἡ ἐποχὴ περιγίνεται. γίνεται τοίνυν αὕτη, ὡς ἂν ὀλοσχερέστερον εἶποι τις, διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ 32 ἐναλλάξ, ὅλον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις, ὅταν λέγωμεν "ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος," νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τούτου συνάγω- 33 μεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ λευκῇ εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ἀντετίθει ὅτι ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἔστι πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἔστι μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινα ἔστιν. καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὅτε μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν, ὡς τὰ προειρημένα, ὅτε δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ μέλλουσιν, ὅλον ὅταν τις 34 ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ λόγον ὃν λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φάμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἴρεσιν ἢν μετέρχη, οὐδέπω ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιῆς ὢν ἐφαίνετο, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω δ' ἡμῶν φαίνεσθαι, ὥστε οὐδέπω χρῆ συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ δοκοῦντι νῦν ἰσχυρῶ εἶναι λόγῳ. 35 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῶν ὑποπσεῖν, καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσομαι δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους

next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension. Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or *alternando*. For instance, we 32 oppose appearances to appearances when we say "The same tower^a appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand"; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist. And thoughts 33 we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras^b countered the notion that snow is white with the argument, "Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black." With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply, "Just 34 as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."

But in order that we may have a more exact under- 35 standing of these antitheses I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding

^a Cf. § 118.

^b See *Introd.* p. xi; *cf.* ii. 244.

οὔτε περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων.

ΙΑ'. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΕΚΑ ΤΡΟΠΩΝ

36 Παραδίδονται τοῖνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συναγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τόπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, 37 ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας, ἑβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, ἔνατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις 38 καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς.

Τούτων δὲ ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἢ ζῶον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου ἀνάγονται¹ ὁ ἑβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ 39 ὄγδοος καὶ ὁ ἔνατος. πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι

¹ <ἀνάγονται> add. Papp.

either their number or their validity ; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.

CHAPTER XIV.—CONCERNING THE TEN MODES

The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is 36 that the "modes" by which "suspension" is supposed to be brought about are ten in number ; and they also give them the synonymous names of "arguments" and "positions." They are these : the first, based on the variety in animals ; the second, on the differences in human beings ; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense ; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions ; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations ; the sixth, on intermixtures ; 37 the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects ; the eighth, on the fact of relativity ; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence ; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we adopt without 38 prejudice.

As superordinate to these there stand three Modes—that based on the subject who judges, that on the object judged, and that based on both. The first four of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based on the subject (for the subject which judges is either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in some condition) : the seventh and tenth Modes are referred to that based on the object judged : the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode based on both subject and object. Furthermore, 39

ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι, ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεθηκότας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τάδε.

- 40 Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ἔκ τε τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἔκ τῆς περὶ τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παρα-
- 41 λαγῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς. καὶ τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἔκ πυρὸς γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνοις φαινόμενα ζωῦφια, τὰ δ' ἔξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κώνωπες, τὰ δ' ἔξ οἴνου τρεπομένου ὡς σκνῖπες, τὰ δ' ἔκ γῆς <ὡς τέττιγες>¹, τὰ δ' ἔξ ἰλύος ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ' ἔκ βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες, τὰ δ' ἔξ ὄνων ὡς κάνθαροι, τὰ δ' ἔκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμπαι, τὰ δ' ἔκ καρπῶν ὡς οἱ ἔκ τῶν ἐρινεῶν ψῆγες, τὰ δ' ἔκ ζώων σηπομένων ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφήκες ἵππων·
- 42 τῶν δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἔξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς τὰ πλείστα, τὰ δ' ἔξ ἀνομοιογενῶν ὡς ἡμίονοι. πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ζωοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ' ὠστοκεῖται ὡς ὄρνιθες, τὰ δὲ σαρκοτοκεῖται
- 43 ὡς ἄρκτοι. εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ ἀσύγκρατον καὶ ἀσυνάρμοστον καὶ μαχόμενον ἐκείθεν φερομένης.
- 44 Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν

¹ <ὡς τέττιγες> addidi: <ὡς μῦς> ej. Fabr.

these three Modes are also referred to that of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the highest *genus*, and the three as *species*, and the ten as subordinate *sub-species*. We give this as the probable account of their numbers; and as to their argumentative force what we say is this:

The *First* argument (or *Trope*), as we said, is that 40 which shows that the same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals. This we infer both from the differences in their origins and from the variety of their bodily structures. Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced without sexual union, others by coition. 41 And of those produced without coition, some come from fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces, others from putrid water, like gnats; others from wine when it turns sour, like ants; others from earth, like grasshoppers; others from marsh, like frogs; others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps from horses. Of the animals generated by coition, 42 some—in fact the majority—come from homogeneous parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, like men; others are born as eggs, like birds; and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears. It is 43 natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant modes of birth should produce much contrariety of sense-affection, and that this is a source of its divergent, discordant and conflicting character.

Moreover, the differences found in the most important parts of the body, and especially in those of

καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων, μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν [παρὰ τῆν τῶν ζώων παραλλαγῆν].¹ οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ἄχρᾳ φασιν εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἰμωπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ἄχρους ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροιάν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι, διάφορον αὐτοῖς τῆν τῶν
 45 χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνατενίσαντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον τῷ ἡλίῳ, εἴτα ἐγκύψαντες βιβλίῳ τὰ γράμματα χρυσοειδῆ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι καὶ περιφερόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τιὰ φύσει λαμπηδόνα ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχει καὶ φῶς λεπτομερές τε καὶ εὐκίνητον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστέλλει, ὡς καὶ νυκτὸς ὄραν, δεόντως ἂν νομίζομεν ὅτι μὴ
 46 ὅμοια ἡμῖν τε κάκεινοις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποπίπτει. καὶ γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἰῶ χαλκοῦ καὶ θολῶ σηπίας ποιῶσιν ὅτε μὲν χαλκοῦς ὅτε δὲ μέλανας φαίνεσθαι τοὺς παρόντας διὰ τὴν βραχεῖαν τοῦ μιχθέντος παρασποράν. πολὺ δὲ ἴσου εὐλογώτερόν ἐστι, χυμῶν διαφόρων ἀνακεκραμένων τῇ ὁράσει τῶν ζώων, διαφόρους τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 47 φαντασίας αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι. ὅταν τε παραθλίψωμεν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ φαίνεται τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὁρατῶν. εἰκός οὖν ὅτι ὅσα τῶν ζώων λοξῆν ἔχει τὴν κόρην καὶ προμήκη, καθάπερ αἴγες αἰλουροὶ καὶ τὰ εἰκότα, διάφορα φαντάζεται τὰ ὑποκείμενα εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ ὅσα τὰ περιφερῆ τὴν κόρην ἔχοντα ζῶα εἶναι αὐτὰ
 48 ὑπολαμβάνει. τὰ τε κάτοπτρα παρὰ τὴν διάφορον

¹ [παρὰ . . . παραλλαγῆν] secl. Mutsch

which the natural function is judging and perceiving, are capable of producing a vast deal of divergence in the sense-impressions [owing to the variety in the animals]. Thus, sufferers from jaundice declare that objects which seem to us white are yellow, while those whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since, then, some animals also have eyes which are yellow, others bloodshot, others albino, others of other colours, they probably, I suppose, have different perceptions of colour. Moreover, if we bend down
 45 over a book after having gazed long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be golden in colour and circling round. Since, then, some animals possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they can even see by night,^a we seem bound to suppose that they are differently affected from us by external objects. Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp-
 46 wicks with the rust of copper or with the juice of the cuttle-fish make the bystanders appear now copper-coloured and now black—and that by just a small sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have much more reason to suppose that when different juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their impressions of the objects will become different. Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the
 47 forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated—such as goats, cats, and similar animals—have impressions of the objects which are different and unlike the notions formed of them by the animals which have round pupils. Mirrors, too, owing to differences in
 48

^a Cf. § 84.

κατασκευὴν ὅτε μὲν μικρότατα δείκνυσι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, ὡς τὰ κοῦλα, ὅτε δ' ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενά, ὡς τὰ κυρτά· τινὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν κεφαλὴν κάτω δείκνυσι τοῦ κατοπτριζομένου, τοὺς δὲ πόδας ἄνω.

40 ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγγείων τὰ μὲν ἐξόφθαλμα κομιδῇ πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ κυρτότητος, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερά ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἐν ὑπτίῳ πλάτει βέβηκεν, εἰκὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μήτε ἴσα τοῖς μεγέθεσι μήτε ὅμοια ταῖς μορφαῖς ὄραν τὰ αὐτὰ κύναις ἰχθύας λέοντας ἀνθρώπους πάρνοπας, ἀλλ' οἷαν ἐκάστου ποιεῖ τύπωσιν ἢ δεχομένη τὸ φαινόμενον ὄψις.

50 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων λόγος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λεχθεῖ ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν τὰ τε ὀστρακόδεσμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῆ καὶ τὰ ἠκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; πῶς δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὰ τε στενωτάτου ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουστικὸν καὶ τὰ εὐρυτάτω τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ ὠτα καὶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν παραβύσαντες τὰ ὠτα, ἄλλως δὲ

51 ἦν ἀπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα. καὶ ἡ ὀσφρησις δὲ διαφέρει ἂν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα ἐμφυγέτες καὶ τοῦ φλέγματος πλεονάσαντος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἄλλως δὲ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἡμῶν μέρη πλεονασμὸν αἵματος

their construction, represent the external objects^a at one time as very small—as when the mirror is concave,—at another time as elongated and narrow—as when the mirror is convex. Some mirrors, too, show the head of the figure reflected at the bottom and the feet at the top. Since, then, some organs of sight 49 actually protrude beyond the face owing to their convexity, while others are quite concave, and others again lie in a level plane, on this account also it is probable that their impressions differ, and that the same objects, as seen by dogs, fishes, lions, men and locusts, are neither equal in size nor similar in shape, but vary according to the image of each object created by the particular sight that receives the impression.

Of the other sense-organs also the same account 50 holds good. Thus, in respect of touch, how could one maintain that creatures covered with shells, with flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with scales, are all similarly affected? And as for the sense of hearing, how could we say that its perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in one way when we have our ears plugged and in another way when we use them just as they are. Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals. 51 For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and in another way when the parts about our head are filled with an excess of blood, feeling an aversion to

the percipient. I render the term indifferently by "objects," "real objects" or "realities," and "underlying objects."

^a τὰ ὑποκείμενα (Lat. *sub-stantia*) is a favourite term with Sextus for the objective realities which "underlie," or lie behind, the subjective impressions of sense (phenomena): they are called ἐκτὸς as "outside" of and not dependent on

ὑποδέξεται, ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὰ εὐώδη τοῖς ἄλλοις
δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ ὥσπερ πλήττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν
νομίζοντες, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν πλαδαρά τέ
ἐστὶ φύσει καὶ φλεγματώδη, τὰ δὲ πολυαίμα
σφόδρα, τὰ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσαν καὶ πλεονάζουσαν
ἔχοντα τὴν ξανθὴν χολήν ἢ τὴν μέλαιναν, εὐλογον
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διάφορα ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι
52 τὰ ὀσφρητά. καὶ τὰ γευστὰ ὁμοίως τῶν μὲν
τραχείαν καὶ ἄνικμον ἔχόντων τὴν γλώσσαν τῶν
δὲ ἔνυγρον σφόδρα, εἶγε καὶ ἡμεῖς¹ ξηροτέραν ἐν
πυρετοῖς τὴν γλῶτταν σχόντες γεώδη καὶ κακό-
χυμα ἢ πικρὰ τὰ προσφερόμενα εἶναι νομίζομεν,
τοῦτο δὲ πάσχομεν καὶ παρὰ τὴν διάφορον ἐπι-
κράτειαν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χυμῶν εἶναι λεγομένων.
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ζῶα διάφορον τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθη-
τήριον ἔχει καὶ διαφόροις χυμοῖς πλεονάζον, δια-
φόρους ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν φαντασίας τῶν
53 ὑποκειμένων λαμβάνοι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τροφή
ἀναδιδομένη ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλέψ ὅπου δὲ
ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὀστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑποδεχο-
μένων αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη δύνα-
μιν, καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδό-
μενον εἰς τὰ δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου
δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ καρπὸς καὶ ἤδη σῦκον καὶ ροῖα
54 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσ-
ουργοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ
αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξύ ὅπου δὲ βαρὺ καὶ ἡ
αὐτὴ ἐπέρεισις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου μὲν
βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπου δὲ ὀξύ, οὕτως εἰκόσ
καὶ τὰ ἑκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διάφορα θεωρεῖσθαι

¹ εἶγε κ. ἡμεῖς MT: κ. ἡμεῖς εἶγε L, Bekk.

smells which seem sweet to everyone else and regard-
ing them as noxious, it is reasonable to suppose that
animals too—since some are flaccid by nature and
rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked
by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall—
are in each case impressed in different ways by the
objects of smell. So too with the objects of taste ; 52
for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others
extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when
our tongues are very dry, in cases of fever, think the
food proffered us to be earthy and ill-flavoured or
bitter—an affection due to the variation in the
predominating juices which we are said to contain.
Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which
differ and which have different juices in excess,
in respect of taste also they will receive different
impressions of the real objects. For just as the same 53
food when digested becomes in one place a vein, in
another an artery, in another a bone, in another a
sinew, or some other piece of the body, displaying a
different potency according to the difference in the parts
which receive it;—and just as the same unblended 54
water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one
place bark, in another branch, in another blossom,
and so finally fig and quince and each of the other
fruits;—and just as the single identical breath of a
musician breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill
note and there a deep note, and the same pressure
of his hand on the lyre produces here a deep note and
there a shrill note;—so likewise it is probable that the
external objects appear different owing to differences

παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζῶων.

55 Ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἡδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάροις δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ, σφήκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσας ἀναρεῖ καταρραϊνόμενον· καὶ τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀγδές ἐστι πινόμενον καὶ φαρμα-
56 κῶδες, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἡδιστον καὶ πότιμον. σῦες δὲ ἡδιον βορβόρω λούονται δυσωδεστάτῳ ἢ ὕδατι διειδεῖ καὶ καθαρῷ. τῶν τε ζῴων τὰ μὲν ἐστι ποηφάγα τὰ δὲ θαμνοφάγα τὰ δὲ ὑληνόμα τὰ δὲ σπερμοφάγα τὰ δὲ σαρκοφάγα τὰ δὲ γαλακτοφάγα, καὶ τὰ μὲν σεσηπυῖα χαίρει τροφῇ τὰ δὲ νεαρᾶ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὠμῆ τὰ δὲ μαγειρικῶς ἐσκευασμένη· καὶ κουνῶς τὰ ἄλλοις ἡδέα ἄλλοις ἐστὶν ἀγδῆ καὶ
57 φευκτὰ καὶ θανάσιμα. τὸ γοῦν κύνειον πιαίνει τοὺς ὄρνυγας καὶ ὁ ὕοσκύαμος τὰς ὕς, αἱ δὲ χαίρουσι καὶ σαλαμάνδρας ἐσθίουσαι, ὡσπεροῦν ἔλαφοι τὰ ἰοβόλα ζῶα καὶ αἱ χελιδόνες κανθαρίδας. οἱ τε μύρμηκες καὶ οἱ σκνίπες ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀγδίας καὶ στρόφους ἐμποιοῦσι καταπινόμενοι· ἡ δὲ ἄρκτος ἦν ἀρρωστίᾳ τινὶ περιπέσει, τούτους κατα-
58 λιχμωμένη βῶννυται. ἐχίδνα δὲ θιγόντος αὐτῆς μόνον φηγοῦ κλάδου καροῦται, καθάπερ καὶ νυκτερίς πλατάνου φύλλου. φεύγει δὲ κριὸν μὲν ἐλέφας, λέων δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ θραγγὸν κυάμων ἐρεικομένων τὰ θαλάττια κήτη, καὶ τίγρις ὑόφον τυμπάνου. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἐνεοσι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκῶμεν, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγδῆ τοῖς

in the structure of the animals which experience the sense-impressions.

But one may learn this more clearly from the 55 preferences and aversions of animals. Thus, sweet oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; and sea-water is a disagreeable and poisonous potion for men, but fish drink and enjoy it. Pigs, too, enjoy 56 wallowing in the most stinking mire rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others feed in woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk; some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly. Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by 57 henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows gnats. So ants and wood-lice, when swallowed by men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear, whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them up. The mere touch of an oak-twig paralyses the 58 viper, and that of a plane-leaf the bat. The elephant flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea-monsters from the crackle of bursting beans, and the tiger from the sound of a drum. One might, indeed, cite many more examples, but—not to seem unduly prolix—if the same things are displeasing to some

δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κείται, διάφοροι γίνονται τοῖς ζώοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίαι.

59 Εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ὅποιον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνασόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τὰς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος
60 δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι. καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις γινομένων οὔτε μετ' ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἴσως, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν, αὐτῇ ἢ λεγομένη ἀπόδειξις ἤτοι φαινομένη ἡμῖν ἔσται ἢ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προσησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων τοῖς ζώοις ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζώοις οὖσι, καὶ αὐτῇ ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό
61 ἔστι φαινομένη. ἀτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἄπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἢ βούλεται ἀποδεικνύειν, ἄπιστον δὲ

^a See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that logical demonstration or "proof" is "non-existent." The argument here is that, even if we grant the existence of "proof" in the abstract we cannot prove anything in the particular case before us—the question as to the superiority of our impressions to those of animals. For all proof must be either "apparent" to us, or "non-apparent": the latter kind we reject as incompre-

but pleasing to others, and pleasure and displeasure depend upon sense-impression, then animals receive different impressions from the underlying objects.

But if the same things appear different owing to 59 the variety in animals, we shall, indeed, be able to state our own impressions of the real object, but as to its essential nature we shall suspend judgement. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own impressions and those of the other animals, since we ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore, rather in need of a judge than competent to pass judgement ourselves. Besides, we are unable, 60 either with or without proof, to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is, as we shall show,^a a non-entity, the so-called proof itself will be either apparent to us or non-apparent. If, then, it is non-apparent, we shall not accept it with confidence; while if it is apparent to us, inasmuch as what is apparent to animals is the point in question and the proof is apparent to us who are animals, it follows that we shall have to question the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent. It is, indeed, 61 absurd to attempt to establish the matter in question by means of the matter in question,^b since in that case the same thing will be at once believed and disbelieved,—believed in so far as it purports to prove, but disbelieved in so far as it requires proof,—which

hensible; the former "apparent" proof is indecisive, its "apparency" being relative to us, who are a species of animal, and thus involved in the dispute. Further, as relative to us the "apparent proof" is not absolute, and therefore not necessarily "true."

^b This would be the fallacy of *petitio principii*, or "arguing in a circle": cf. §§ 117, 164.

ἢ ἀποδείκνυται. οὐχ ἔξομεν ἄρα ἀπόδειξιν δι' ἧς προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις καλουμένων ζώοις γνωμένων. εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ἃς ἐπικρῖναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν, ἐπέχει ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

- 62 Ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ συγκρίνομεν τὰ ἄλογα καλούμενα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φαντασίαν· καὶ γὰρ καταπαίξειν τῶν δογματικῶν τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαιτολογούντων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν μετὰ τοὺς πρακτικούς τῶν λόγων. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτεροι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἀπλῶς εἰώθασιν 62 συγκρίνειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἐπεὶ δὲ εὐρεσιλογοῦντες οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄνισον εἶναι φασὶ τὴν σύγκρισιν, ἡμεῖς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐπὶ πλέον παίζοντες ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ζώου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον, οἷον ἐπὶ κυνός, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦ εὐτελεστάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. εὐρήσομεν γὰρ καὶ οὕτω μὴ λειπόμενα ἡμῶν τὰ ζῶα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν πίστιν τῶν φαινομένων.
- 64 Ὅτι τοίνυν αἰσθήσει διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ζῶον ἡμῶν, οἱ δογματικοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὀσφρήσει μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ μὴ ὀρώμενα αὐτῷ θηρία διὰ ταύτης ἀνιχνεύων, καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς θάπτον ἡμῶν ταῦτα ὁρῶν καὶ τῇ 65 ἀκοῇ αἰσθανόμενος ὀξέως. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔλθωμεν. τούτου δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. ἴδωμεν οὖν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνδια-

^a *i.e.* as a further, superfluous or jocular, kind of argument, which serves to "cap" the serious treatment of the questions: cf. §§ 63, 78.

^b *Esp.* the Stoics.

^c The Stoic theory of *logos* thus distinguished between its

is impossible. Consequently we shall not possess a proof which enables us to give our own sense-impressions the preference over those of the so-called irrational animals. If, then, owing to the variety in animals their sense-impressions differ, and it is impossible to judge between them, we must necessarily suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

By way of super-addition,^a too, we draw comparisons 62 between mankind and the so-called irrational animals in respect of their sense-impressions. For, after our solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists.^b As a rule, our School compare the irrational animals in the mass with mankind; but since the Dogmatists 63 captiously assert that the comparison is unequal, we—super-adding yet more—will carry our ridicule further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for instance if you like, which is held to be the most worthless of animals. For even in this case we shall find that the animals we are discussing are no wise inferior to ourselves in respect of the credibility of their impressions.

Now it is allowed by the Dogmatists that this 64 animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; and with its ears it is keen of perception. Next let 65 us proceed to the reasoning faculty. Of reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other externally expressed.^c Let us consider first the

two senses—internal *reason*, or conception, and the enunciation of thought in the uttered *word*.

θέτου. οὗτος τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, ἐν τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν, τῇ αἰρέσει τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῇ γνώσει τῶν εἰς τοῦτο συντενουσῶν τεχνῶν, τῇ ἀντιλήψει τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν <καὶ>¹ τῶν περὶ
 66 τὰ πάθη. ὁ τοίνυν κύων, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἔδοξε στήσαι παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, αἴρεσιν ποιεῖται τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν βλαβερῶν, τὰ μὲν τρόφιμα διώκων, μᾶστιγος δὲ ἀναταθείσης ὑποχωρῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, τὴν
 67 θηρευτικὴν. ἐστὶ δὲ οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἐκτός· τῆς γέ τοι δικαιοσύνης οὔσης τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀποδοτικῆς ἐκάστω, ὁ κύων τοὺς μὲν οἰκείους τε καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντας σαίνων καὶ φρουρῶν τοὺς δὲ ἀνοικείους καὶ ἀδικοῦντας ἀμυνόμενος οὐκ ἔξω ἂν εἴη τῆς
 68 δικαιοσύνης. εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει, τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀντακολουθουσῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχει, ἃς οὗ φασιν ἔχειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀθρώπους οἱ σοφοί. καὶ ἄλκιμον δὲ αὐτὸν ὄντα ὁρῶμεν ἐν ταῖς ἀμύναις, καὶ συνετόν, ὡς καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐμαρτύρησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀθρώποις ἀγνώτα ὄντα ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ τοῦ Ἄργου ἐπιγνωσθέντα, μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τάνδρὸς ἀπατηθέντος τοῦ κυνός, μήτε ἐκστάντος τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας, ἣν μᾶλλον
 69 τῶν ἀθρώπων ἔχων ἐφάνη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρυσίππον τὸν μάλιστα ὀμιλοῦντα² τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις καὶ τῆς αἰοιδίου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. φησὶ γοῦν

¹ <καὶ> add. T.

² ὀμιλοῦντα ego: πολεμοῦντα GT, Bekk. . προσέχοντα Diels.

internal reason. Now according to those Dogmatists who are, at present, our chief opponents—I mean the Stoics—internal reason is supposed to be occupied with the following matters: the choice of things congenial and the avoidance of things alien; the knowledge of the arts contributing thereto; the apprehension of the virtues pertaining to one's proper nature and of those relating to the passions. Now 66 the dog—the animal upon which, by way of example, we have decided to base our argument—exercises choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful, in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which supplies what is congenial, namely hunting. Nor is 67 it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice consists in rendering to each his due,^a the dog, that welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but drives off strangers and evil-doers, cannot be lacking in justice. But if he possesses this virtue, then, since 68 the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,^b the majority of men do not possess. That the dog is also valiant we see by the way he repels attacks, and intelligent as well, as Homer too testified^c when he sang how Odysseus went unrecognized by all the people of his own household and was recognized only by the dog Argus, who neither was deceived by the bodily alterations of the hero nor had lost his original apprehensive impression, which indeed he evidently retained better than the men. And according to 69 Chrysippus, who shows special interest in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed “Dia-

^a Cf. [Plato], *Deff.* 411 E.

^b i.e. the Stoics.

^c See *Odys.* xvii. 300.

αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλει τῷ πέμπτῳ
 διὰ πλειόνων ἀναποδείκτῳ,¹ ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον
 ἔλθων καὶ τὰς δύο ὁδοὺς ἰχνεύσας δι' ὧν οὐ διήλθε
 τὸ θηρίον, τὴν τρίτην μὴδ' ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὀρμήσῃ
 δι' αὐτῆς. δυνάμει γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογιζέσθαι
 φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος " ἦτοι τῆδε ἢ τῆδε ἢ τῆδε διήλθε
 τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῆδε οὔτε τῆδε· τῆδε ἄρα."
 70 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικός τέ ἐστι
 καὶ παραμυθητικός· σκόλοπος γὰρ αὐτῷ κατα-
 παγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν τοῦτου ὀρμῆ τῆ τοῦ ποδὸς
 πρὸς τὴν γῆν παρατρίψει καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων.
 ἔλκος τε εἰ ἔχει που, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ῥυπαρὰ ἔλκη
 δυσαλθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ καθαρὰ ῥαδίως θεραπεύεται,
 71 πρῶτος ἀποψῆ τὸν γινόμενον ἰχώρα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
 Ἱπποκράτειον φυλάσσει μάλα καλῶς· ἐπεὶ γὰρ
 ποδὸς ἄκος ἀκνησία, εἴ ποτε τραῦμα ἐν ποδὶ
 σχοίη, μετεωρίζει τοῦτον καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε ἄσкулτον
 σθρεῖ. ὀχλούμενός τε ὑπὸ χυμῶν ἀνοικείων πῶαν
 ἐσθίει, μεθ' ἧς ἀποβλύζων τὸ ἀνοικεῖον ὑγιάζεται.
 72 εἰ τοίνυν ἐφάνη τὸ ζῶον, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἐστή-
 σαμεν παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, καὶ αἰρούμενον τὰ
 οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ὀχληρὰ φεῦγον, τέχνην τε ἔχον πορι-
 στικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντι-
 ληπτικὸν καὶ παραμυθητικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω ἀρετῆς,
 ἐν οἷς κείται ἡ τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου,
 τέλειος ἂν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ κύων· ὅθεν μοι δοκοῦσιν

¹ ἀναποδείκτῳ T, Prantl: -δείκτων MSS., Bekk.

* *i.e.* the Stoic logic, cf. ii. 94.

^b The Stoics had five syllogisms which they termed *anapodeictic*, or "indemonstrable," since they required no proof themselves but served to prove others. The "com-

plex" syllogism was of the form: "Either A or B or C exists; but neither A nor B exists; therefore C exists."
^c The famous physician, of Cos (circa 460-400 B.C.).

τινες τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἑαυτοὺς σεμνῶναι τῇ τοῦ ζώου τούτου προσηγορίᾳ.

- 73 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου τέως μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖν· τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνιοι παρητήσαντο ὡς ἀντιπράττοντα τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναλήψει, διὸ καὶ περὶ τὸν τῆς μαθήσεως χρόνον ἤσκησαν σιωπὴν· καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἐνεός, οὐδεὶς φήσει αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄλογον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, μάλιστα μὲν ὀρώμεν τὰ ζῶα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως προφερόμενα φωνάς, ὡς κίττας καὶ ἄλλα
74 τινά. ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰσώσωμεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνίεμεν τὰς φωνὰς τῶν ἀλόγων καλουμένων ζώων, ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικὸς διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ταῦτα ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴ συνιέναι· καὶ γὰρ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων φωνῆς ἀκούοντες οὐ συνίεμεν ἀλλὰ μονοειδή
75 ταύτην εἶναι δοκοῦμεν. καὶ ἀκούομεν δὲ τῶν κυνῶν ἄλλην μὲν φωνὴν προεπιμένων ὅταν ἀμύνωνται τινὰς, ἄλλην δὲ ὅταν ὠρύωνται, καὶ ἄλλην ὅταν τύπτωνται, καὶ διάφορον ἑπὶ σαίνωσιν. καὶ ὅλως εἴ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀτεισίσειεν, εὖροι ἂν πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἐν ταῖς διαφόροις περιστάσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα εἰκότως λέγοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ μετέχειν λόγον τὰ καλούμενα ἄλογα ζῶα.
76 εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀκριβεῖα τῶν αἰσθήσεων λείπεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα μήτε τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ εἰπεῖν μηδὲ τῷ προφορικῷ, οὐκ ἂν

And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title of this animal.^a

Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary for the present to inquire; for it has been rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which reason they used to practise silence^b during the period of instruction; and besides, supposing that a man is dumb, no one will therefore call him irrational. But to pass over these cases, we certainly see animals—the subject of our argument—uttering quite human cries,—jays, for instance, and others. And, leaving 74 this point also aside, even if we do not understand the utterances of the so-called irrational animals, still it is not improbable that they converse although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it, and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter. More- 75 over, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are driving people off, another when they are howling, and one sound when beaten, and a quite different sound when fawning. And so in general, in the case of all other animals as well as the dog, whoever examines the matter carefully will find a great variety of utterance according to the different circumstances, so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational animals may justly be said to participate in external reason. But if they neither fall short of mankind in 76 the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason, or speech, then they will deserve no less credence

^a A sarcastic allusion to the Cynics; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 13, *Introd.* p. xvi.

^b For the Pythagorean rule of silence (*ἐχεμυθία*) cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 10.

77 ἀπιστότερα ἡμῶν εἶη κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἴσως ἰσάντας τὸν λόγον ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύειν δυνατὸν ἔστιν. οἷον γοῦν τίς οὐκ ἂν εἶποι τοὺς ὄρνιθας ἀγχνόια τε διαφέρειν καὶ τῷ προφορικῶ κεκρησθαι λόγῳ; οἷ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐπίστανται καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις προδηλοῦσιν, ἄλλως τε σημαίνοντες καὶ τῇ φωνῇ προαγορεύοντες.

78 Τὴν δὲ σύγκρισιν ἐποιησάμην, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεσημηνάμην, ἐκ περιόντος, ἰκανῶς, ὡς οἶμαι, δείξας ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἡνωμένων. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπιστότερα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων παραλλαγὴν, ὅποιον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δυνήσομαι λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστι τῇ φύσει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι.

79 Καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἵνα γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εὐρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην. δύο τοίνυν εἶναι λεγομένων ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, οἷον κατὰ σῶμα ταῖς τε 80 μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις. διαφέρει μὲν

* Our word "idiosyncrasy" comes from ἰδιοσυγκρασία, a later form for ἰδιοσυγκρῆσις. σύγκρισις (or σύμμιξις) is Anax-

than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions. Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing 77 our argument on each single class of irrational animals. Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel in quickness of wit or that they employ external reason? For they understand not only present events but future events as well, and these they foreshow to such as are able to comprehend them by means of prophetic cries as well as by other signs.

I have drawn this comparison (as I previously 78 indicated) by way of super-addition, having already sufficiently proved, as I think, that we cannot prefer our own sense-impressions to those of the irrational animals. If, however, the irrational animals are not less worthy of credence than we in regard to the value of sense-impressions, and their impressions vary according to the variety of animal,—then, although I shall be able to say what the nature of each of the underlying objects appears to me to be, I shall be compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgement as to its real nature.

Such, then, is the First of the Modes which induce 79 suspense. The Second Mode is, as we said, that based on the differences in men; for even if we grant for the sake of argument that men are more worthy of credence than irrational animals, we shall find that even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense. For man, you know, is said to be compounded of two things, soul and body, and in both these we differ one from another.

Thus, as regards the *body*, we differ in our figures and "idiosyncrasies," or constitutional peculiarities.^a

agoras's term for the process of "composition" by which the world comes into being; cf. *Introd.* p. xi.

γὰρ κατὰ μορφήν σῶμα Σκύθου Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἢ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ παρεστήσαμεν. ταυτὰ τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς διαφορά πολλή κατ' αὐτοὺς ἔστιν· ἄλλοις γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἰνδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ διαφόροις χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλλαγμένας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας λαμβάνειν ἔστι 81 μνηστικόν. κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὡς ἐνίου κρέα βόεια πετραίων ἰχθυοῖν ῥᾶον πέττειν καὶ ὑπὸ Λεσβίου οἰναρίου εἰς χολέραν περιτρέπεται. ἦν δέ, φασίν, γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὀγκὰς κωνείου ἀκινδύνως προσφερομένη, Αὔσις δὲ καὶ μηκωνείου τέσσαρας ὀγκὰς ἀλύπως ἐλάμβανεν. 82 καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιοῦς ἐν ἡλίῳ γινόμενος ἦ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἐρρίγου, ἐν σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλλετο, Ἀθηναγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος ὑπὸ σκορπίων καὶ φαλαγγίων ἀλύπως ἐπλήσσετο, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Ψυλλαεῖς οὐδ' ὑπὸ ὄφειν ἢ ἀσπίδων 83 δακνόμενοι βλάπτονται, οἱ δὲ Τεντυρίται τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὐ βλάπτονται πρὸς [ἄνω κάτω]² τῶν κροκοδείλων. ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰθιοπῶν οἱ ἀντιπέραν τῆς Μερῆς παρὰ τὸν Ἀστάπουν³ ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντες σκορπίους καὶ ὄφεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀκινδύνως ἐσθίουσιν. καὶ Ρουφίνος δὲ ὁ ἐν Χαλκίδι πίνων ἐλλέβορον οὔτε ἡμεῖς οὔτε ὄλως ἐκαθαίρετο, ἀλλ' ὡς τι τῶν συνήθων προσεφέρετο 84 καὶ ἔπασσεν. Χρῦσερμος δὲ ὁ Ἡροφίλειος εἶ ποτε

The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of 80 a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation is a difference in the predominant humours. Owing to this difference in the predominant humours the sense-impressions also come to differ, as we indicated in our First Argument.^a So too in respect of choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit great differences: thus Indians enjoy some things, our people other things, and the enjoyment of different things is an indication that we receive varying impressions from the underlying objects. In respect 81 of our "idiosyncrasies," our differences are such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more easily than rock-fish, or get diarrhoea from the weak wine of Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt. Demo- 82 phon, Alexander's butler, used to shiver when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade: Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,^b as they are called, are not harmed by bites from snakes and asps, nor are the Tentyritae^c of Egypt 83 harmed by the crocodile. Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake Meroë^d on the banks of the river Astapous eat with impunity scorpions, snakes, and the like. Rufinus of Chalcis when he drank hellebore neither vomited nor suffered at all from purging, but swallowed and digested it just like any ordinary drink. Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor 84

^a See § 52.

^b A tribe of N. Africa, cf. Hdt. iv. 173.

^c Tentyra was a town in Upper Egypt; cf. Juvenal xv.

35.

^d In S. Egypt. The "Astapous" is the Blue Nile.

¹ δὲ MT: om. Bekk. ² [ἄνω κάτω] om. T, Apelt.

³ Ἀστάπουν T, Hercher: Ἰδάσπην mss., Bekk.

πέπερι προσηνέγκατο, καρδιακῶς ἐκινδύνευεν. καὶ Σωτήριχος δὲ ὁ χειρουργὸς εἶ ποτε σιλούρων ἤσθετο κνίσσης, χολέρα ἤλίσκετο. Ἄνδρων δὲ ὁ Ἄργειος οὕτως ἀδιψος ἦν ὡς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὀδεύειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιζητοῦντα ποτόν. Τιβέριος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐν σκότῳ ἑώρα. Ἄριστοτέλης δὲ ἱστορεῖ Θάσιόν τινα ὃς ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπου εἶδωλον προηγείσθαι αὐτοῦ διὰ παντός.

85 Τοσαύτης οὖν παραλλαγῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν εἰπόντες, εἰκός ἐστι καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τις ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς καὶ ἡ φυσιογνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον δείγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου διαφορᾶς ἢ διαφωνίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίνα οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιητὰι περὶ τούτων ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πίνδαρός φησιν

ἀελλοπόδων μὲν τιν' εὐφραίνουσιν ἵππων τιμαὶ
καὶ στέφανοι,
τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά·
τέρπεται δὲ καὶ τις ἐπ' οἶδμ' ἄλιον ναῖ θεῶ [σῶς]¹
διαστείβων.

ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς λέγει

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τραγωδία μεστή τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ
λέγει γούν

¹ [σῶς] om. LMT.

was liable to get a heart attack if ever he took pepper; and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhoea whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed the waterless country of Libya without needing a drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark; and Aristotle^a tells of a Thasian who fancied that the image of a man was continually going in front of him.

Seeing, then, that men vary so much in body—to⁸⁵ content ourselves with but a few instances of the many collected by the Dogmatists,—men probably also differ from one another in respect of the *soul* itself; for the body is a kind of expression of the soul, as in fact is proved by the science of Physiognomy. But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences in men's intelligence is the discrepancy in the statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other things. Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed⁸⁶ themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says^b:

The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds
Give joy to one; yet others find it joy
To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt;
Some even take delight in voyaging
O'er ocean's billows in a speeding barque.

And the poet^c says: "One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another." Tragedy, too, is full of such sayings; for example:

^a See Aristot. *Meteorol.* iii. 4.

^b *Fragm.* 242 (Boeckh), Sandys' *Pindar*, in Loeb Library, p. 610, copied by Horace, *Odes*, i. 1. 3 ff.

^c See Homer, *Odyss.* xiv. 228. Cf. Virgil, *Ecl.* ii. 65 "trahit sua quemque voluntas"; and "quot homines, tot sententiae."

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτὸν καλὸν ἔφν σοφὸν θ' ἄμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις,

καὶ πάλιν

δεινὸν γε ταῦτὸν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδάνειν βροτῶν
τοῖς δ' ἔχθος εἶναι.

- 87 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἴρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει κείται καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἰρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινουῦνται, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἤρουντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον. εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ διαφόρως κινεῖ παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰσάγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐποχὴ, ὃ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστην διαφορὰν ἴσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ ἔστι [κατὰ δύναμιν]¹ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἷων τε ὄντων ἀποφύνασθαι.
- 88 ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι Πλάτῳ, ὁ Ἐπικουρίου δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες αὐθις ἡμᾶς
- 89 εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν. ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι παιδαριῶδές τι προσίεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς

¹ [κατὰ δύναμιν] secl. Mutsch., Papp.

Were fair and wise the same thing unto all,
There had been no contentious quarrelling.^a

And again :

'Tis strange that the same thing abhorr'd by some
Should give delight to others.^b

Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on 87 pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure depend on sensation and sense-impression, whenever some men choose the very things which are avoided by others, it is logical for us to conclude that they are also differently affected by the same things, since otherwise they would all alike have chosen or avoided the same things. But if the same objects affect men differently owing to the differences in the men, then, on this ground also, we shall reasonably be led to suspension of judgement. For while we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is in reality. For we shall have to believe either all 88 men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting contradictions ; and if some, let us be told whose opinions we are to endorse. For the Platonist will say " Plato's " ; the Epicurean, " Epicurus's " ; and so on with the rest ; and thus by their unsettled disputations they will bring us round again to a state of suspense. Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent 89 to the majority is making a childish proposal, since no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and determine what pleases the majority of them ; for

^a From Eurip. *Phoen.* 499 ff.

^b See *Fragm. Trag. adesp.* 462 (Nauck) : perhaps from Eurip.

πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐν τισιν ἔθνεσιν, ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν σπάνια τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβαίνοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ φαλαγγίων δακνομένους μὴ ἀλγεῖν τινὰς δὲ σπανίως ἀλγεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων ἰδιοσυγκρισίων τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχὴν.

90 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοὶ τινες ὄντες οἱ δογματικοὶ φασὶ δεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν (μέρος γὰρ εἶσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντες οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον¹ συναρπάξουσιν, 91 ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες), ὅμως δ' οὖν ἵνα καὶ ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν λόγον ἰστάντες, ὅλον τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄνειροπολουμένου σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν κατανῶμεν, τὸν τρίτον τῇ τάξει τρόπον ἐγχειριζόμεθα.

Τοῦτον δὲ λέγομεν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς 92 ἀλλήλας, πρόδηλον. αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῆ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τινων, τοῖς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἡδὺ ἐστὶν εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὄσφρησιν 93 εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ἀηδίζει. τὸ τε εὐφόρβιον

there may possibly be races of whom we know nothing amongst whom conditions rare with us are common, and conditions common with us rare,—possibly, for instance, most of them feel no pain from the bites of spiders, though a few on rare occasions feel such pain; and so likewise with the rest of the “idiosyncrasies” mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, the differences in men afford a further reason for bringing in suspension of judgement.

When the Dogmatists—a self-loving class of men— 90 assert that in judging things they ought to prefer themselves to other people, we know that their claim is absurd; for they themselves are a party to the controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they have already given the preference to themselves, then, by thus entrusting themselves with the judgement, they are begging the question before the judgement is begun. Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive 91 at suspension of judgement by basing our argument on one person—such as, for example, their visionary “Sage”^a—we adopt the Mode which comes Third in order.

This *Third Mode* is, we say, based on differences in the senses. That the senses differ from one another is obvious. Thus, to the eye paintings 92 seem to have recesses and projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems to some^b pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes; so that it is impossible to say whether it is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil, for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste.

^a The ideal “Wise Man” of the Stoics; see *Introduct.* p. xxviii.

^b For exceptions see § 101.

¹ τὸ ζητούμενον T; τὰ φαινόμενα mss., Bekk.

ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπηρόν ἐστι τῷ δὲ ἄλλω σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἄλυπὸν ἐστὶν εἰλικρινῶς τοῖς σώμασιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρόν. τό τε ὄμβριον ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ πνεύμονα τραχύνει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν. καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις προστεθείσα ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, τῷ δ' ἄλλω σώματι ἀλύπως παρατίθεται. διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἐκάστοτε δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν.

- 94 Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ διατρίβωμεν διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν [τοῦ τρόπου]¹ τῆς συγγραφῆς, ἐκείνο λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτει δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μὲν ἐστὶν παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινας αὐτῶν.
- 95 μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐν αὐλοῖς καὶ σύργξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ὀργάνοις· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μονοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον δὲ θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων περὶ ἃ γίνεται αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις.
- 96 πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιότητων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα.

So too with spurge^a: since it pains the eyes but 93 causes no pain to any other part of the body, we cannot say whether, in its real nature, it is absolutely painful or painless to bodies. Rain-water, too, is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the wind-pipe and the lungs; as also does olive-oil, though it mollifies the epidermis. The cramp-fish, also, when applied to the extremities produces cramp, but it can be applied to the rest of the body without hurt. Consequently we are unable to say what is the real nature of each of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the moment appears to be.

A longer list of examples might be given, but to 94 avoid prolixity, in view of the plan of our treatise, we will say just this. Each of the phenomena perceived by the senses seems to be a complex: the apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet and yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but one quality but appears varied owing to the varying structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it has more qualities than are apparent, some of which elude our perception. That the apple has but one 95 quality might be argued from what we said above^b regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water sucked up by trees, and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple likewise may be all of one sort but appear different owing to differences in the sense-organs in which perception takes place. And that the apple may possibly possess 96 more qualities than those apparent to us we argue in

^a A species of plants with acrid, milky juice.

^b See § 53.

¹ [τοῦ τρόπου] secl. Mutsch.

ἐνοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἀφῆν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὀρώντα. οὗτος τοῖνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὄρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιότητων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντι-
97 λαμβάνεσθαι δύνανται. καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνως αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμ-
βάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιότητων, ὧν ἐσμὲν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷον τέ ἐστι ποιότητος, ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχέκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν.

98 Ἄλλ' ἢ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὕσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ' αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἶη, ἄπιστος ἔσται κατ' αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὧν μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς
99 ἄλλ' οὐ κριτής. πλὴν ἄλλ' εἰ ἐγχωρεῖ¹ καὶ ταύτας μόνως ὑποκεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ μῆλῳ τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦμεν, καὶ πλείους τούτων ἢ πάλιν μηδὲ τὰς ἡμῖν ὑποπιπτούσας, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται ὅποιον ἔστι τὸ μῆλον. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν λόγος. τῶν αἰσθήσεων μέντοι μὴ καταλαμβανουσῶν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα δύνανται καταλαμβάνειν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ περὶ τῶν ἐκτός ὑποκειμένων ἐποχῆ συνάγεσθαι δόξει.

100 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἰστάντες

¹ εἰ ἐγχωρεῖ Heintz: ἐνεχώρει mss.: εἰ ἐνεχώρει T, Bekk.

this way. Let us imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch, taste and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then, will assume that nothing visible or audible has any existence, but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to apprehend. Possibly, then, we also, having only 97 our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and possibly it may possess other underlying qualities which affect other sense-organs, though we, not being endowed with those organs, fail to apprehend the sense-objects which come through them.

"But," it may be objected, "Nature made the 98 senses commensurate with the objects of sense." What kind of "Nature"? we ask, seeing that there exists so much unresolved controversy amongst the Dogmatists concerning the reality which belongs to Nature. For he who decides the question as to the existence of Nature will be discredited by them if he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher he will be a party to the controversy and therefore himself subject to judgement and not a judge. If, 99 however, it is possible that only those qualities which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non-evident to us what the nature of the apple really is. And the same argument applies to all the other objects of sense. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, neither can the mind apprehend them; hence, because of this argument also, we shall be driven, it seems, to suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

In order that we may finally reach suspension by 100

τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις. θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν φαμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν <ἔχειν>,¹ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, [ἦ] 101 παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν. οἷον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀποφορᾶς στύρακος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ τινος τοιοῦτου καὶ ἄλλων πλείονων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πολλάκις λέγουσιν, ἡμῶν μὴ αἰσθανομένων. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ φλεγμαίνουσι μὲν τόποις ἐπιχυθὲν ζεστόν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡμῖν δὲ χλιαρόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἱμάτιον τοῖς μὲν ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχουσι φαίνεται κερρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκὺ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν. 102 εἰ δὲ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινῶν παραπλοκὴ ἀνοικείους φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα φύσει ὅποια φαίνεται τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχον λεγομένοις, 103 ἕτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικῆν τῶν ὑποκει-

¹ <ἔχειν> add. Mutsch.

basing our argument on each sense singly, or even by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the *Fourth Mode* of suspension. This is the Mode based, as we say, on the "circumstances," meaning by "circumstances" conditions or dispositions.^a And this Mode, we say, deals with states that are natural or unnatural, with waking or sleeping, with conditions due to age, motion or rest, hatred or love, emptiness or fullness, drunkenness or soberness, predispositions, confidence or fear, grief or joy. Thus, according as 101 the mental state is natural or unnatural, objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear daemons' voices, while we do not. Similarly they often say that they perceive an odour of storax or frankincense, or some such scent, and many other things, though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. And the same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour to men with blood-shot eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice. Now 102 should anyone say that it is an intermixture of certain humours which produces in those who are in an unnatural state improper impressions from the underlying objects, we have to reply that, since healthy persons also have mixed humours, these humours too are capable of causing the external objects—which really are such as they appear to those who are said to be in an unnatural state—to appear other than they are to healthy persons. For to ascribe the power of 103

^a *i.e.* the mental or physical state of the subject at the moment of perception.

μένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τούτοις δὲ μὴ, πλασματικόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὡσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων ἔχουσι παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσοῦντες παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, ὥστε ἀκείνοις πρὸς τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον.

104 Παρὰ δὲ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὡς καθ' ὑπνους φανταζόμεθα, οὐ φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὡς φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε <τὸ>¹ εἶναι αὐταῖς² ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὑπνους ἢ πρὸς ἐγρήγορσιν. εἰκότως οὖν καθ' ὑπνους ὁρῶμεν ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἀνύπαρκτα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ καθάπαξ ἀνύπαρκτα ὄντα· ἐστὶ γὰρ καθ' ὑπνους, ὡσπερ τὰ ὑπάρ ἐστὶν, κἂν μὴ ἢ καθ' ὑπνους.

105 Παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῖς μὲν γέρονσι ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὐκρατος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν κατακορές, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἢ αὐτῇ τοῖς μὲν ἀμαυρὰ
106 δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ' ἐξάκουστος. καὶ παρὰ τὰς αἰρέσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινεῖνται οἱ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες· πασι μὲν γάρ, εἰ τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσὶν, οἱ ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἰροῦνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες. ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἡλικίας.

¹ <τὸ> cj. Mutsch. ² αὐταῖς Apelt: αὐτοῖς mss., Bekk.

altering the underlying objects to those humours, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a natural state.^a

Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different 104 impressions, since we do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we imagine when awake; so that the existence or non-existence of our impressions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things which to our waking state are unreal,^b although not wholly unreal; for they exist in our dreams, just as waking realities exist although non-existent in dreams.

Age is another cause of difference.^c For the same 105 air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their prime; and the same colour appears faint to older men but vivid to those in their prime; and similarly the same sound seems to the former faint, but to the latter clearly audible. Moreover, those who differ in 106 age are differently moved in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. And from this we conclude that differences in age also cause different impressions to be produced by the same underlying objects.

^a This is aimed against the Stoic view that only the healthy, or normal, is "natural."

^b ἀνύπαρκτα (from ὑπάρχω, "subsist") is an Epicurean term for "non-existent."

^c For age as affecting character cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 12 ff.

107 Παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἐστῶτες ὀρώμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦ-
108 μιν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν, ὅτι κρέα ὕεια τινὲς μὲν ἀποστρέφονται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τινὲς δὲ ἥδιστα προσφέρονται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Μένανδρος ἔφη

οἶος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι φαίνεται;
ἀφ' οὗ τοιοῦτος γέγονεν; οἶον θηρίον.
τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοῦς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ.

πολλοὶ <δὲ>¹ καὶ ἐρωμένες αἰσχρὰς ἔχοντες ὠραιο-
109 τάτας αὐτὰς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ πεινῆν ἢ κεκορέσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεσμα τοῖς μὲν πεινώσιν ἥδιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ κεκορεσμένοις ἀηδές. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, ὅτι ἅπερ νήφοντες αἰσχρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν με-
110 θύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται. παρὰ δὲ τὰς προ- διαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγοῦσιν ὀξύωδης φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ κάρνα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προσενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἢ τοῦ βαλανείου παραστὰς τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσιόντας θερμαίνει, ψύχει δὲ τοὺς ἐξιόντας,
111 εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβουεν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ μὲν δειλῷ φοβερόν καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ θαρραλωτέρῳ δὲ οὐδαμῶς. παρὰ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα τοῖς μὲν λυπουμένοις ἐστὶν ἐπαχθῆ τοῖς δὲ χαίρουσιν ἡδέα.

¹ <δὲ> cj. Bekk.

* Cf. Lucret. iv. 388.

^b *Fragm.* 518 (Kock). It is supposed that these lines were spoken by a maiden of her lover who had fallen into evil ways.

Another cause why the real objects appear different 107 lies in motion and rest. For those objects which, when we are standing still, we see to be motionless, we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing past them.^a

Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have 108 an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said ^b:

Mark now his visage, what a change is there
Since he has come to this! How bestial!
^c'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face.

Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think them most beautiful.^c

Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food 109 seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to the sated.

Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since actions which we think shameful when sober do not seem shameful to us when drunk.

Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine 110 which seems sour to those who have previously eaten dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibule^d of the bath-house, which warms those entering from outside, chills those coming out of the bath-room if they stop long in it.

Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to 111 the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so in the least to the bold man.

Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to those who rejoice.

^c Cf. Horace, *Sat.* i. 3. 38.

^d i.e. the *tepidarium*, of moderate temperature.

- 112 Τσαύτης οὖν οὔσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς
 διαθέσεις, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως¹ ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσι
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνωμένων, ὅποιον μὲν ἕκαστον
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐκάστω φαίνεται ῥάδιον ἴσως
 εἶπεῖν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστιν οὐκέτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτός
 ἔστιν ἡ ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων ταύτην ἤτοι
 ἐν τισι τῶν προειρημένων διαθέσεων ἔστιν ἢ ἐν
 οὐδεμῇ τὸ παράπαν ἔστι διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμῇ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν,
 οἷον οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε
 ἡρεμεῖ, οὔτε ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ ἐστίν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, τελῶς ἀπεμφαίνεται.
 εἰ δὲ ἐν τινι διαθέσει ὦν κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας,
 113 μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας, καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλι-
 κρινῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ κριτῆς διὰ τὸ
 τεθλωσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν αἷς ἔστιν. οὔτε
 οὖν ὁ ἐγρηγορῶς δύναται συγκρίνειν τὰς τῶν
 καθευδόντων φαντασίας ταῖς τῶν ἐγρηγορότων,
 οὔτε ὁ ὑγιαίνων τὰς τῶν νοσοῦντων ταῖς² τῶν
 ὑγιαίνοντων· τοῖς γὰρ παροῦσι καὶ κινουσιν ἡμᾶς
 κατὰ τὸ παρὸν συγκατατιθέμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
 μὴ παροῦσιν.
 114 Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων
 φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ προκρίνων φαντασίαν
 φαντασίας καὶ περίστασιν περιστάσεως ἤτοι ἀκρι-
 τως καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἢ κρίνων καὶ
 ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἄνευ τούτων, ἄπιστος γὰρ
 ἔσται, οὔτε σὺν τούτοις. εἰ γὰρ κρινεῖ τὰς φαν-
 115 τασίας, πάντως κριτηρίῳ κρινεῖ. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ

¹ ἄλλως MLT: ἄλλων Bekk.

² ταῖς T: καὶ τὰς mss., Bekk.

Seeing then that the dispositions also are the cause 112
 of so much disagreement, and that men are differently
 disposed at different times, although, no doubt, it is
 easy to say what nature each of the underlying objects
 appears to each man to possess, we cannot go on to
 say what its real nature is, since the disagreement
 admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who
 tries to settle it is either in one of the afore-mentioned
 dispositions or in no disposition whatsoever. But to
 declare that he is in no disposition at all—as, for
 instance, neither in health nor sickness, neither in
 motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of
 all the other dispositions as well—is the height of
 absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions
 while he is in some one disposition, he will be a
 party to the disagreement,^a and, moreover, he will 113
 not be an impartial judge of the external underlying
 objects owing to his being confused by the disposi-
 tions in which he is placed. The waking person, for
 instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers
 with those of men awake, nor the sound person those
 of the sick with those of the sound; for we assent
 more readily to things present, which affect us in the
 present, than to things not present.

In another way, too, the disagreement of such 114
 impressions is incapable of settlement. For he who
 prefers one impression to another, or one “circum-
 stance” to another, does so either uncritically and
 without proof or critically and with proof; but he
 can do this neither without these means (for then he
 would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to
 pass judgement on the impressions he must certainly
 judge them by a criterion; this criterion, then, he 115

^a Cf. § 90.

κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀληθές εἶναι λέξει ἢ ψευδές. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ψευδές, ἄπιστος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές εἶναι τοῦτο φήσει, ἤτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως λέξει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, πάντως δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄπιστος ἔσται. ἀληθῆ οὖν λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πίστωσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου λαμβανομένην πότερον κεκρικώς αὐτὴν
 116 ἢ μὴ κεκρικώς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κρίνας, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κρίνας, δηλὸν ὅτι κριτηρίῳ φήσει κεκρικέναι, οὐ κριτηρίου ζητήσομεν ἀπόδειξιν, κἀκείνης κριτήριον. χρῆζει γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ ἢ ἀποδείξεις κριτηρίου, ἵνα βεβαιωθῆ, καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως, ἵνα ἀληθές εἶναι δειχθῆ· καὶ οὔτε ἀποδείξεις ὑγιῆς εἶναι δύναται μὴ προϋπάρχοντος κριτηρίου ἀληθοῦς, οὔτε κριτήριον ἀληθές μὴ προ-
 117 πεπιστωμένης τῆς ἀποδείξεως. καὶ οὕτως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τὸ τε κριτήριον καὶ ἢ ἀποδείξεις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμφοτέρα εὐρίσκεται ἄπιστα· ἐκάτερον γὰρ τὴν θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον ὁμοίως τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως καὶ κριτηρίου μήτε σὺν τούτοις δύναται τις προκρίναι φαντασίαν φαντασίας, ἀνεπίκριτοι ἔσονται αἱ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς διαθέσεις διάφοροι γινόμεναι φαντασίαι, ὥστε εἰσάγεται ἢ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
 118 Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, οἷον

will declare to be true, or else false. But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited; and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having judged it or without judging it? If 116 without judging, he will be discredited; but if after judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a proof, and of that proof again a criterion. For the proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth; and neither can a proof be sound without the previous existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be true without the previous confirmation of the proof. So in this way both the criterion and the proof are 117 involved in the circular process of reasoning,^a and thereby both are found to be untrustworthy; for since each of them is dependent on the credibility of the other, the one is lacking in credibility just as much as the other. Consequently, if a man can prefer one impression to another neither without a proof and a criterion nor with them, then the different impressions due to the differing conditions will admit of no settlement; so that as a result of this Mode also we are brought to suspend judgement regarding the nature of external realities.

The *Fifth Argument* (or *Trope*) is that based on 118 positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different; for

^a Cf. §§ 60, 122; ii. 34, 121, etc.

ἡ αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρωμένη μύουρος φαίνεται ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πλοῖον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὼς ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετραγώνος.

119 Ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκοτῷ δὲ λαμπρὸν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἕναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη ἕξαλος δὲ εὐθεῖα, καὶ τὸ ὦν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀρνιθι ἀπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ λυγγούριον ἐν μὲν λυγγί ὑγρὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ κοράλιον ἐν θαλάττῃ μὲν ἀπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν σύριγγι γνωμένη, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν αὐλῷ, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν ἀέρι ἀπλῶς.

120 Παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν λεία φαίνεται, ποσῶς δὲ ἐπινευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα.

121 Ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν τινι θεωρεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος ἢ κατὰ τινὰ θέσιν, ὧν ἕκαστον πολλὴν ποιεῖ παραλλαγὴν περὶ τὰς φαντασίας, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, ἀναγκασθησόμεθα καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου καταστῆναι εἰς ἐποχὴν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ βουλόμενος τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν προ-
122 κρίνειν τινὰς ἀδυνάτους ἐπιχειρήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ποιήσεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν,

^a Cf. Lucret. iv. 428 ff.

^b "Lyngurion," so called from the belief that the stone was made of the urine of the lynx frozen or crystallized.

example, the same porch ^a when viewed from one of its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a distance to be small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion; and the same tower from a distance appears round but from a near point quadrangular.

These effects are due to distances; among effects due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and the same oar bent when in the water but straight when out of the water; and the egg soft when inside the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth ^b fluid when in the lynx but hard when in the air; and the coral soft when in the sea but hard when in the air; and sound seems to differ in quality according as it is produced in a pipe, or in a flute, or simply in the air.

Effects due to positions are such as these: the same painting when laid flat appears smooth, but when inclined forward at a certain angle it seems to have recesses and prominences. The necks of doves, also, appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.

Since, then, all apparent objects are viewed in a certain place, and from a certain distance, or in a certain position, and each of these conditions produces a great divergency in the sense-impressions, as we mentioned above, we shall be compelled by this Mode also to end up in suspension of judgement. For in fact anyone who purposes to give the preference to any of these impressions will be attempting the impossible. For if he shall deliver his judgement simply and without proof, he will be discredited; and

ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται χρή-
 σασθαι, εἰ μὲν ψευδῆ λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι,
 ἑαυτὸν περιτρέψει, ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγων εἶναι τὴν ἀπό-
 δεῖξιν αἰτηθήσεται ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν
 εἶναι, κακείνης ἄλλην, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι
 δεῖ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἔστιν ἀ-
 123 πείρους ἀποδείξεις παραστήσαι· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μετὰ
 ἀποδείξεως δυνήσεται προκρίνειν φαντασίαν φαν-
 τασίας. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μήτε μετὰ
 ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸς ἔσται τις ἐπικρίνειν τὰς προ-
 ειρημένους φαντασίας, συνάγεται ἢ ἐποχή, ὅποιον
 μὲν φαίνεται ἕκαστον κατὰ τήνδε τὴν θέσιν ἢ κατὰ
 τὸδε τὸ διάστημα ἢ ἐν τῷδε εἰπεῖν ἴσως δυναμένων
 ἡμῶν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀδυνα-
 τούντων ἀποφαίνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

124 Ἐκτός ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιγὰς, καθ'
 ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ'
 ἑαυτὸ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σὺν τινι, ὅποιον
 μὲν ἔστι τὸ μίγμα ἕκ τε τοῦ ἐκτός καὶ τοῦ ᾧ συν-
 θεωρεῖται τάχα δυνατόν εἰπεῖν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστι τὸ
 ἐκτός ὑποκείμενον εἰλικρινῶς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν λέγειν.
 ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκτός καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ
 πάντως σὺν τινι, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοιον θεω-
 125 ρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. τὸ γοῦν ἡμέτερον χρώμα
 ἄλλοιον μὲν ὁράται ἐν ἀλεσιῶ ἀέρι ἄλλοιον δὲ
 ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν ὅποιον
 ἔστι τῇ φύσει τὸ χρώμα ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅποιον σὺν

^a Cf. ii. 128.

^b i.e. the real ("external") object of perception (cf. p. 30 note a) plus the physical conditions which accompany the act of perception; these latter may be either external (e.g.

should he, on the other hand, desire to adduce proof, he will confute himself if he says that the proof is false, while if he asserts that the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of its truth, and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also must be true, and so on *ad infinitum*.^a But to produce proofs to infinity is impossible; so that neither by the use of proofs will 123 he be able to prefer one sense-impression to another. If, then, one cannot hope to pass judgement on the afore-mentioned impressions either with or without proof, the conclusion we are driven to is suspension; for while we can, no doubt, state the nature which each object appears to possess as viewed in a certain position or at a certain distance or in a certain place, what its real nature is we are, for the foregoing reasons, unable to declare.

The *Sixth Mode* is that based on admixtures, by 124 which we conclude that, because none of the real objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, though we may possibly be able to state the nature of the resultant mixture^b formed by the external object and that along with which it is perceived, we shall not be able to say what is the exact nature of the external reality in itself. That none of the external objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, and that, in consequence, it assumes a different appearance, is, I imagine, quite obvious. Thus, our own complexion is of one hue 125 in warm air, of another in cold, and we should not be able to say what our complexion really is, but only what it looks like in conjunction with each of

atmospheric) or internal (e.g. peculiarities in the sense-organs of the percipient).

ἐκάστῳ τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἄλλοια μὲν φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι ἄλλοια δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν βαλανείῳ καὶ ἥλιῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος μὲν περιεχόμενον κοῦφόν ἔστιν ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρύ.

126 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἕξωθεν ἐπιμιξίας ἀποστῶμεν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν ὄρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀνευ τούτων θεωρεῖται, οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἰκτερικοὶ πάντα ὠχρὰ ὀρῶσιν, οἱ δ' ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες ὑφαίμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄλλοια μὲν φαίνεται ἐν ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις ἄλλοια δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ ἐλικοειδέσι, καὶ ἄλλοια μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ ἀέρι ἄλλοια δὲ ἐν τεθολωμένῳ, εἰκὸς ἔστι μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ ὠτα σκολιόπορά ἔστι καὶ στενόπορα καὶ ἀτμώδεσιν ἀποφορήσεσιν, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσθαι λέγονται τόπων, τεθολωμένα.

127 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυζωτήρσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς γένσεως τόποις ὑλῶν ὑποκειμένων, μετ' ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν γενεστῶν καὶ τῶν ὀσφρητῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς. ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται ὅποια πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ἔστιν.

128 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὀδηγοὶ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλονται· ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ ἐπιμίξιαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ

these conditions. And the same sound appears of one sort in conjunction with rare air and of another sort with dense air; and odours are more pungent in a hot bath-room or in the sun than in chilly air; and a body is light when immersed in water but heavy when surrounded by air.

But to pass on from the subject of external ad- 126 mixture,—our eyes contain within themselves both membranes and liquids. Since, then, the objects of vision are not perceived apart from these, they will not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive is the resultant mixture, and because of this the sufferers from jaundice see everything yellow, and those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.^a And since the same sound seems of one quality in open places, of another in narrow and winding places, and different in clear air and in murky air, it is probable that we do not apprehend the sound in its real purity; for the ears have crooked and narrow passages, which are also befogged by vaporous effluvia which are said to be emitted by the regions of the head. Moreover, since there reside substances in the 127 nostrils and in the organs of taste, we apprehend the objects of taste and of smell in conjunction with these and not in their real purity. So that, because of these admixtures, the senses do not apprehend the exact quality of the external real objects.

Nor yet does the mind apprehend it, since, in the 128 first place, its guides, which are the senses, go wrong; and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain admixture of its own to the messages conveyed by the senses; for we observe that there are certain humours present in each of the regions which the Dogmatists

^a Cf. §§ 44, 101 *supra*.

δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὀτιδῆποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζώου τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον ὀράμεν ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα.

- 129 Ἐβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, δῆλον. οἷον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος τῆς αἰγὸς φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ συνθέσεως θεωρούμενα, συντιθέμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου [τὰ μέρη]¹ τὰ ῥινήματα κατ' ἴδιαν μὲν ὄντα μέλανα φαίνεται, σὺν δὲ τῷ ὄλῳ ὡς λευκὰ ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τῆς Ταυναρείας λίθου τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὀράται ὅταν λεανθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὀλοσχερεῖ ξανθὰ φαίνεται. καὶ αἱ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδασμένοι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται, ὡς σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἀπαλῶς κινουσί τὴν αἰσθησιν. καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβορος λεπτὸς μὲν καὶ χροῡδῆς προσφερόμενος πνιγμὸν ἐπιφέρει, κριμνώδης δὲ ὡν οὐκ ἐπι. καὶ ὁ οἶνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος ῥώννυσιν ἡμᾶς, πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφή παραπλησίως παρὰ τὴν ποσότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται δύναμιν· πολλάκις γοῦν διὰ τὸ πολλὴν προσενεχθῆναι καθαιρεῖ τὸ σῶμα

¹ [τὰ μέρη] secl. Mutsch.

* For the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν see Introd. p. xxv; for the dispute as to its location cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 313.

regard as the seat of the "Ruling Principle" ^a— whether it be the brain or the heart, or in whatever part of the creature one chooses to locate it. Thus, according to this Mode also we see that, owing to our inability to make any statement about the real nature of external objects, we are compelled to suspend judgement.

The *Seventh Mode* is that based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by "constitution" the manner of composition. And it is evident that by this Mode also we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects. Thus, for example, the filings of a goat's horn appear white when viewed simply by themselves and without combination, but when combined in the substance of the horn they look black. And silver filings appear black when they are by themselves, but when united to the whole mass they are sensed as white. And chips of the marble of Taenarum ^b seem white when planed, but in combination with the whole block they appear yellow. And pebbles when scattered apart appear rough, but when combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness. And hellebore if applied in a fine and powdery state produces suffocation, but not so when it is coarse. And wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity, but when too much is taken it paralyses the body. So likewise food exhibits different effects according to the quantity consumed; for instance, it frequently upsets the body with indigestion and attacks of purging because

^b Taenarum was the most southerly promontory of Laconia; its marble was yellowish green in colour (like serpentinite).

- 132 *διὰ τε ἀπεισιῶν καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν. ἔξομεν οὖν κἀνταῦθα λέγειν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος τὸ λεπτόν καὶ ὁποῖον τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν συγκείμενον, καὶ ὁποῖος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ μικρομερῆς ἄργυρος ὁποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρομερῶν συγκείμενος, καὶ ὁποῖα μὲν ἢ ἀκαριαία Ταυναρεία λίθος ὁποῖα δὲ ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκειμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψάμμων καὶ τοῦ ἔλλεβόρου καὶ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρὸς τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλίαν.*
- 133 *Καθόλου γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα λυπηρὰ γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κατὰ ποσότητα ἀμετρον αὐτῶν χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἐν τῷ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἀκαριαῖα μὴ λυπεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἰατρικὰς δυνάμεις θεωρούμενον, ἐν αἷς ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν μίξις τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων ὠφέλιμον ποιεῖ τὸ συντεθέν, ῥοπής δὲ βραχυτάτης ἐνίοτε παροραθείσης οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερώτατον*
- 134 *καὶ δηλητήριον πολλάκις. οὕτως ὁ κατὰ τὰς ποσότητος καὶ σκευασίας λόγος συγχέει τὴν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ὑπαρξιν. διόπερ εἰκότως ἂν καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς περιάγοι μὴ δυναμένους εὐλικρινῶς ἀποφῆνασθαι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.*
- 135 *Ὁ γδοός ἐστι τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολύτως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. ἐκείνο δὲ χρῆ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ ἐστὶ καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ*

of the large quantity taken. Therefore in these cases, too, we shall be able to describe the quality of the shaving of the horn and of the compound made up of many shavings, and that of the particle of silver and of the compound of many particles, and that of the sliver of Taenarean marble and of the compound of many such small pieces, and the relative qualities of the pebbles, the hellebore, the wine and the food,—but when it comes to the independent and real nature of the objects, this we shall be unable to describe because of the divergency in the sense-impressions which is due to the combinations.

As a general rule, it seems that wholesome things 133 become harmful when used in immoderate quantities, and things that seem hurtful when taken to excess cause no harm when in minute quantities. What we observe in regard to the effects of medicines is the best evidence in support of our statement; for there the exact blending of the simple drugs makes the compound wholesome, but when the slightest oversight is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens, the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently even most harmful and deleterious. Thus the argu- 134 ment from quantities and compositions causes confusion as to the real nature of the external substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will bring us round to suspension of judgement, as we are unable to make any absolute statement concerning the real nature of external objects.

The *Eighth Mode* is that based on relativity; and 135 by it we conclude that, since all things are relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are absolutely and really existent. But this point we must notice—that here as elsewhere we use the term

- τοῦ φαίνεται, δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες “πρὸς τι πάντα φαίνεται.” τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἅπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κρίνον (τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ κρινόμενον πρὸς τὸ κρίνον φαίνεται), καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ
- 136 δεξιὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρίνον ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται, καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.
- 137 Καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ διαφέρον πρὸς τι ἐστίν (λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνο
- 138 ὃ διαφέρει), πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν. τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνωτάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ’ ἔσχατα εἶδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη· πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ

* The main point urged here is that no object can be apprehended in its purity. As perceived it is always conditioned by (1) the physical or mental state of the percipient (“the thing which judges”), and (2) by the “concomitant percepts” which accompany its emergence into the world of space and time. As thus conditioned, the object is no longer “absolute” but “relative.”

^b Cf. § 39 *supra*.

^c Or “have a distinct existence of their own,” as opposed to a merely relative existence. This is a technical term for

“are” for the term “appear,” and what we virtually mean is “all things appear relative.” And this statement is twofold, implying, firstly, relation to the thing which judges (for the external object which is judged appears in relation to that thing), and, in a second sense, relation to the accompanying percepts, for instance the right side in relation to the left. Indeed, we have already argued ^b that all things are 136 relative—for example, with respect to the thing which judges, it is in relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each object appears, and in relation to such and such a circumstance; and with respect to the concomitant percepts, each object appears in relation to some one particular admixture or mode or combination or quantity or position.

There are also special arguments to prove the 137 relativity of all things, in this way: Do things which exist “differentially” ^c differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something (for it has its name from its relation to that from which it differs), things which exist differentially are relative. Again,—of existing 138 things some, according to the Dogmatists,^d are *summa genera*, others *infimae species*, others both genera and species; and all these are relative; the class of objects which are “self-existent,” “absolute,” or “independent.”

^d Including the Peripatetics, as well as the Stoics. A *summum genus* (e.g. “Being”) may be divided into *genera* (e.g. “Animals,” “Minerals”), and these sub-divided into *species* (e.g. “Men,” “Dogs,” etc.), down to the *infimae species* (e.g. “Negroes”) which cannot be further subdivided. The intermediate species (e.g. “Men”) are both *genera* (in relation to their sub-species) and *species* (in relation to higher genera).

πρός τι. ἔτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαίνόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων τὰ ἄδηλα· ὅψις γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ σημαίνόμενόν ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πρὸς τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα. πρὸς 139 τούτοις τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅμοια τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἄνισα· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι βεβαιοὶ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ <μὴ>¹ εἶναι πάντα πρὸς τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται.

140 Πλήν ἄλλ' οὕτω παριστάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, δηλὸν ἐστὶ λοιπὸν ὅτι ὅποιον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εἰλικρινῶς λέγειν οὐ δυνασόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅποιον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι. ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

141 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις τρόπου, ὃν ἔννατον εἶναι λέγομεν τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτά τινα διεξίμεν. ὁ ἥλιος πολλῶν δήπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν ἀστέρος κομήτου· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὀρώμεν τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι ἐκπλησσομέθα ὥστε καὶ διοσημεῖαν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. εἰάν μέντοι γε ἐνοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον σπανίως δὲ

¹ <μὴ> add. Papp.

therefore all things are relative. Further, some existing things are "pre-evident,"^a as they say, others non-evident; and the apparent things are significant, but the non-evident signified by the apparent; for according to them "the things apparent are the vision of the non-evident." But the significant and the signified are relative; therefore all things are relative. Moreover, some existent things are similar, 139 others dissimilar, and some equal, others unequal; and these are relative; therefore all things are relative. And even he who asserts that not all things are relative confirms the relativity of all things, since by his arguments against us he shows that the very statement "not all things are relative" is relative to ourselves, and not universal.

When, however, we have thus established that all 140 things are relative, we are plainly left with the conclusion that we shall not be able to state what is the nature of each of the objects in its own real purity, but only what nature it appears to possess in its relative character. Hence it follows that we must suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects.

The *Mode* which, as we said, comes *Ninth* in order 141 is based on constancy or rarity of occurrence, and we shall explain it as follows. The sun is, of course, much more amazing than a comet; yet because we see the sun constantly but the comet rarely we are so amazed by the comet that we even regard it as a divine portent, while the sun causes no amazement at all. If, however, we were to conceive of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting

^a i.e. superlatively, or wholly, manifest. Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 141.

- δυνόμενον, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιάζεσθαι ποιούντα, πολλὴν ἔκ-
 142 πληξὶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσομεν. καὶ ὁ σεισ-
 μὸς δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τοὺς τε πρῶτον αὐτοῦ
 πειρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἔθει τοῦτου γεγενημένους.
 πόσῃν δὲ ἔκπληξιν ἀνθρώπῳ φέρεי θάλασσα πρῶ-
 τον ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρω-
 πίνου πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκινεῖ
 143 μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐν ἔθει τοῦ ὀράσθαι γένοιτο.
 καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια τίμια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ
 σύντροφα ἡμῖν καὶ εὐπορα οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν γοῦν
 ἐνοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν τῶν
 τιμιῶν εἶναι δοκούντων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν
 φανείη. ἢ ἐὰν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν τὸν χρυσὸν ἀπλῶς
 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρριμμένον πολὺν παραπλησίως τοῖς
 λίθοις, τίνοι δόξομεν ἕσσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατά-
 κλειστον οὕτως;
- 144 Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς
 ἢ σπανίους περιπτώσεις ὅτε μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ
 τίμια ὅτε δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα
 ὅτι ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται τούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ
 συνεχοῦς περιπτώσεως ἢ σπανίας ἴσως δυνησό-
 μεθα λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν
 ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἔσμεν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπ-
 ἔχομεν.
- 145 Δέκατος ἐστὶ τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει
 πρὸς τὰ ἠθικά, ὃ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη
 καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς
 δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν
 αἴρεσις βίου ἢ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλοῦς

rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and throwing everything into shadow suddenly, then we should experience much amazement at the sight. An earthquake also does not cause the same alarm 142 in those who experience it for the first time and those who have grown accustomed to such things. How much amazement, also, does the sea excite in the man who sees it for the first time! And indeed the beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first sudden view than when it becomes a customary spectacle. Rare things too we count as precious, but not what is familiar to us and easily got. Thus, 143 if we should suppose water to be rare, how much more precious it would appear to us than all the things which are accounted precious! Or if we should imagine gold to be simply scattered in quantities over the earth like stones, to whom do we suppose it would then be precious and worth hoarding?

Since then, owing to the frequency or rarity of 144 their occurrence, the same things seem at one time to be amazing or precious and at another time nothing of the sort, we infer that though we shall be able perhaps to say what nature appears to belong to each of these things in virtue of its frequent or rare occurrence, we are not able to state what nature absolutely belongs to each of the external objects. So because of this Mode also we suspend judgement regarding them.

There is a *Tenth Mode*, which is mainly concerned 145 with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions. A rule of conduct is a choice of a way of life, or of a particular action, adopted by one person

* Cf. Plato, *Euthyd.* 304 B.

γινομένη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας·
 146 νόμος δὲ ἐστὶν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πο-
 λιτευομένοις, ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δὲ
 ἢ συνθήχεια (οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων
 κοινὴ πράγματός τινος παραδοχῆ, ἣν ὁ παραβὰς
 οὐ πάντως κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ
 μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικί
 147 μίγνυσθαι. μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων
 ἀγενήτων τε καὶ πεπλασμένων παραδοχῆ, οἷα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου μυθεύμενα·
 ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. δογματικὴ δὲ
 ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παραδοχῆ πράγματος δι' ἀναλογισ-
 μου ἢ τινος ἀποδείξεως κρατύνεσθαι δοκοῦσα, οἷον
 ὅτι ἄτομα ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ ἢ
 ἐλάχιστα ἢ τινα ἄλλα.
 148 Ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὅτε μὲν ἑαυτῷ
 ὅτε δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστω. οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει
 οὕτως. τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν στίζουσι τὰ βρέφη,
 ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ
 ποδήρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς
 δὲ ἀπρεπὲς· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἴνδοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ
 μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν
 149 τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγούνται. νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως αντι-
 τίθεμεν. παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὁ τῆς πατρῶας
 ἀποστάς οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
 χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις πάντως ἀποδίδωσιν·
 καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας νόμος ἦν τοὺς
 ξένους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καλλιερῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν
 150 ἀνθρωπον ἀπείρηται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι. ἀγ-

^a The Cynic philosopher.

^b Democritus and Epicurus took the first view, Anaxagoras the second, Diodorus Cronos the third; *cf.* iii. 32.

or many—by Diogenes,^a for instance, or the
 Laconians. A law is a written contract amongst the 146
 members of a State, the transgressor of which is
 punished. A habit or custom (the terms are equi-
 valent) is the joint adoption of a certain kind of action
 by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not
 actually punished; for example, the law proscribes
 adultery, and custom with us forbids intercourse
 with a woman in public. Legendary belief is the 147
 acceptance of unhistorical and fictitious events, such
 as, amongst others, the legends about Cronos; for
 these stories win credence with many. Dogmatic
 conception is the acceptance of a fact which seems
 to be established by analogy or some form of demon-
 stration, as, for example, that atoms are the elements
 of existing things, or homoeomerics, or *minima*,^b or
 something else.

And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now 148
 to each of the others. For example, we oppose habit
 to habit in this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo
 their children, but we do not; and while the Persians
 think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reach-
 ing to the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas
 the Indians have intercourse with their women in
 public, most other races regard this as shameful. And 149
 law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans
 the man who renounces his father's property does
 not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians
 he always pays them; and among the Scythian
 Tauri^c it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed
 to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to slay a
 human being at the altar. And we oppose rule of 150

^c *i.e.* inhabitants of the Crimea; *cf.* Hdt. iv. 103, and Eurip. *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

γὴν δὲ ἀγωγῆ, ὅταν τὴν Διογένους ἀγωγὴν ἀντι-
τιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων
τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυ-
θικῆ, ὅταν ὅπου μὲν <λέγωμεν>¹ τὸν Δία μυθεύε-
σθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε ὅπου δὲ τὸν
᾿Ωκεανόν, λέγοντες

᾿Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

151 δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν,
ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν ἐν εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἀπο-
φαίνεσθαι τοὺς δὲ ἀπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν
τὴν ψυχὴν τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοία
θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως.

152 Τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθεμεν, οἷον νόμῳ
μὲν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι
ἀρρενομιξίαις χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγο-
ρεῦεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν
τὸ μοιχεύειν ἀπειρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις
ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδόσθαι, ὡς Εὐδόξος ὁ
Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περιόδου, καὶ
παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀπηγορευθῆναι μητράσι μίγνυσθαι,
παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι μάλιστα οὕτω
γαμεῖν. καὶ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ τὰς ἀδελφὰς
153 γαμοῦσιν, ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀπειρῆται νόμῳ. ἀγωγῆ
δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι
ἀναχωροῦντες μιγνύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖξιν, ὁ
δὲ Κράτης τῇ Ἰππαρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν
Διογένης ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος περιήει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς

¹ <λέγωμεν> add. T.

^a Homer, *Il.* xiv. 201.

conduct to rule of conduct, as when we oppose the
rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus or that of the
Laconians to that of the Italians. And we oppose
legendary belief to legendary belief when we say
that whereas in one story the father of men and gods
is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos—
“Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother
that bare them.”^a And we oppose dogmatic con-
ceptions to one another when we say that some
declare that there is one element only, others an
infinite number; some that the soul is mortal, others
that it is immortal; and some that human affairs are
controlled by divine Providence, others without
Providence.

And we oppose habit to the other things, as for
instance to law when we say that amongst the
Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with
males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by
law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is
forbidden, amongst the Massagetæ it is traditionally
regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of
Cnidus^b relates in the first book of his *Travels*; and
that, whereas intercourse with a mother is forbidden
in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to
form such marriages; and also among the Egyptians
men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by law
amongst us. And habit is opposed to rule of conduct
when, whereas most men have intercourse with their
own wives in retirement, Crates^c did it in public
with Hipparchia; and Diogenes went about with one
shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary

^b Flourished about 360 B.C., famed as astronomer, geo-
meter, legislator and physician.

^c A Cynic philosopher, circa 320 B.C.; cf. iii. 24.

- 154 εἰώθαμεν. μυθικῇ δὲ πίστει, ὡς ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος κατήσθιεν αὐτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ὄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι παιδῶν· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν συνήθεια ὡς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀπαθείς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεοὺς, τιτρωσκόμοιοι δὲ καὶ φθοιοῦντες
- 155 ἀλλήλοιοι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται. δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ἢ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγῃ μὴ ἐπιστρέφεισθαι ἡμῶν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ὁ μὲν Ἀρίστιππος ἀδιάφορον ἡγήται τὸ γυναικείαν ἀμφιένυσθαι στολήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα εἶναι.
- 156 Ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀντιτίθεμεν νόμῳ μὲν, ὅταν νόμου ὄντος μὴ ἐξείναι τύπτειν ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον καὶ εὐγενῆ οἱ παγκρατιασταὶ τύπτωσιν ἀλλήλοιοι διὰ τὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίου, καὶ ὅταν ἀπειρημένοιοι τοῦ ἀνδροφονεῖν οἱ μονομάχοι ἀναιρῶσιν ἀλλήλοιοι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀγωγῇ ἀντιτίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν μῦθοι παρὰ τῇ Ὀμφάλῃ τὸν Ἡρακλέα λέγουσιν

εἰρία τε ζαίνειν καὶ δουλοσύνης ἀνέχεσθαι

- καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἄπερ οὐδ' ἂν μετρίως προηρημένος ἐποίησεν ἂν τις, ἢ δὲ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ
- 158 Ἡρακλέους ἦν γενναῖα. δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀθλοιοι ὡς ἀγαθοῦ τῆς δόξης ἀντιποιοῦμενοι ἐπίπονον ἀγωγὴν βίου δι' αὐτὴν ἐπαναιρῶνται, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων φαῦλον εἶναι
- 159 τὴν δόξαν δογματίζωσιν. τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀντιτίθεμεν μυθικῇ μὲν πίστει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ εἰσάγωσιν τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ μοιχεύοντας καὶ ἀρρενομιξίαις

manner. It is opposed also to legendary belief, as 154 when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own children, though it is our habit to protect our children; and whereas it is customary with us to revere the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are presented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another. And habit is opposed to 155 dogmatic conception when, whereas it is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, Epicurus^a declares that the Divinity pays no heed to us; and when Aristippus^b considers the wearing of feminine attire a matter of indifference, though we consider it a disgraceful thing.

And we oppose rule of conduct to law when, 156 though there is a law which forbids the striking of a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one another because of the rule of life they follow; and when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy one another for the same reason. And we 157 oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house of Omphale "toiled at the spinning of wool, enduring slavery's burden,"^c and did things which no one would have chosen to do even in a moderate degree, whereas the rule of life of Heracles was a noble one. And we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic concep- 158 tion when, whereas athletes covet glory as something good and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life, many of the philosophers dogmatically assert that glory is a worthless thing. And we oppose law 159 to legendary belief when the poets represent the gods as committing adultery and practising intercourse with

^a Cf. iii. 219.

^b Cf. iii. 204.

^c Homer, *Odyss.* x. 423.

χρωμένους, νόμος δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν κωλύη ταῦτα πράτ-
 160 τειν, δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περὶ
 Χρυσίππου ἀδιάφορον εἶναι λέγωσι τὸ μητράσι
 ἢ ἀδελφαῖς μίγνυσθαι, ὃ δὲ νόμος ταῦτα κωλύη.
 161 μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν δογματικῇ ὑπολήψει ἀντιτίθεμεν,
 ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ λέγωσι τὸν Δία κατελθόντα
 θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς δογματι-
 162 κοῖς ἀδύνατον τοῦτο εἶναι νομίζηται, καὶ ὃ μὲν
 ποιητῆς λέγει ὅτι Ζεὺς διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ ἐπὶ Σαρ-
 πηδόνι αἱματοέσσας ψεκάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε,
 δόγμα μέντοι φιλοσόφων ἀπαθές εἶναι τὸ θεῖον,
 καὶ ὅταν τὸν τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν,
 ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα τὸν ἵπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν
 φέροντες.
 163 Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐνὴν καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν
 προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παραδείγματα·
 ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν
 τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τούτου
 τοῦ τρόπου δεικνυμένης, ὅποιον μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκεί-
 μενον κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον
 δὲ φαίνεται πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε
 τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς τόδε τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον. καὶ διὰ τούτων οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως
 τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἐπέχειν ἡμᾶς
 ἀνάγκη. οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν δέκα τρόπων
 καταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν.

males, whereas the law with us forbids such actions ;
 and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when 160
 Chrysippus^a says that intercourse with mothers or
 sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids
 such things. And we oppose legendary belief to 161
 dogmatic conception when the poets say that Zeus
 came down and had intercourse with mortal women,
 but amongst the Dogmatists it is held that such a
 thing is impossible ; and again, when the poet relates^b 162
 that because of his grief for Sarpedon Zeus " let fall
 upon the earth great gouts of blood," whereas it is
 a dogma of the philosophers that the Deity is im-
 passive ; and when these same philosophers demolish
 the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the
 hippocentaur as a type of unreality.^c

We might indeed have taken many other examples 163
 in connexion with each of the antitheses above
 mentioned ; but in a concise account like ours, these
 will be sufficient. Only, since by means of this Mode
 also so much divergency is shown to exist in objects,
 we shall not be able to state what character belongs
 to the object in respect of its real essence, but only
 what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of
 conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the
 rest. So because of this Mode also we are compelled
 to suspend judgement regarding the real nature of
 external objects. And thus by means of all the Ten
 Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgement.

^a See Introd. pp. xxvii-xxviii ; cf. iii. 205.

^b Homer, *Il.* xvi. 459.

^c Cf. our use of " chimera " (lion+goat+dragon) for what is fantastic.

164 Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι σκεπτικοὶ παραδιδόασι τρόπους
 τῆς ἐποχῆς πέντε τούσδε, πρῶτον τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς
 διαφωνίας, δεύτερον τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα,
 τρίτον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, τέταρτον τὸν ὑπο-
 165 θετικόν, πέμπτον τὸν διάλληλον. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ
 τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὃν περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος
 πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιμ παρά τε τῷ βίῳ
 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εὐρίσκομεν γεγενημένην,
 δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἰρεῖσθαι τι ἢ ἀποδοκιμάζειν
 166 καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχὴν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς
 ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ τὸ φερόμενον εἰς
 πίστιν τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πίστει εἰτέρας
 χρήζειν λέγομεν, κακείνο ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου,
 ὡς μὴ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς κατα-
 167 σκευῆς τὴν ἐποχὴν ἀκολουθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 πρὸς τι, καθὼς προειρήκαμεν, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς μὲν τὸ
 κρίνον καὶ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα τοῖον ἢ τοῖον
 φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁποῖον δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν
 168 φύσιν ἐπέχομεν. ὁ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐστὶν ὅταν
 εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμενοι οἱ δογματικοὶ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀρξῶνται ὃ οὐ κατασκευάζουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς καὶ
 ἀναποδείκτως κατὰ συγχώρησιν λαμβάνειν ἀξιοῦ-
 169 σιν. ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται ὅταν τὸ
 ὀφείλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιω-
 τικὸν χρεῖαν ἔχη τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως·
 ἔνθα μηδέτερον δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν πρὸς κατασκευὴν
 θατέρου, περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπέχομεν.

^a *i.e.* those posterior to Aenesidemus; but the reference here is specially to Agrippa (see *Introd.* p. xl); *cf.* *Diox. Laert.* ix. 88.

The later Sceptics ^a hand down Five Modes leading 164 to suspension, namely these: the first based on discrepancy, the second on regress *ad infinitum*, the third on relativity, the fourth on hypothesis, the fifth on circular reasoning. That based on discrepancy 165 leads us to find that with regard to the object presented there has arisen both amongst ordinary people and amongst the philosophers an interminable conflict because of which we are unable either to choose a thing or reject it, and so fall back on suspension. The Mode based upon regress *ad* 166 *infinitum* is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the consequence is suspension, as we possess no starting-point for our argument. The 167 Mode based upon relativity, as we have already said,^b is that whereby the object has such or such an appearance in relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant percepts, but as to its real nature we suspend judgement. We have the Mode based on 168 hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede *ad infinitum*, take as their starting-point something which they do not establish by argument but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. The Mode of circular reasoning is 169 the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of inquiry requires confirmation derived from that matter; in this case, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.

^b See §§ 135 ff.

- Ἔτι δὲ πάν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰς τούτους ἀνάγειν τοὺς τρόπους ἐνδέχεται, διὰ βραχέων ὑποδείξομεν οὕτως. τὸ προτεθὲν ἤτοι αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν ἢ νοητὸν, 170 ὅποιον δ' ἂν ᾖ, διαπεφώνηται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα φασὶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, οἱ δὲ μόνα τὰ νοητά, οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τινὰ δὲ νοητά. πότερον οὖν ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσι τὴν διαφωρίαν ἢ ἀνεπικριτον; εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικριτον, ἔχομεν ὅτι δεῖ ἐπέχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωρουμένων οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔστιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ 171 ἐπικριτὴν, πόθεν ἐπικριθήσεται πυνθανόμεθα. οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν (ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ προτέρου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον) πότερον ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλου δεήσεται πρὸς πίστιν. εἰ δὲ κάκεινο αἰσθητὸν ἔσται, πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλου δεήσεται τοῦ πιστώσοντος, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρῃς 172 ἀπείρου. εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο νοητὸν ὃν κρίσεώς τε καὶ πίστεως. πόθεν οὖν πιστωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται ὁμοίως· εἰ δ' ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητὸν πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πίστιν αἰσθητὸν, ὃ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος.
- 173 Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φεύγων, ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος ἡμῶν

* Of these views the first was maintained, e.g. by Protagoras and Epicurus, the second by Plato and Democritus, the third by Peripatetics and Stoics.

^b Lit. "the through-one-another mode" (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as *circulus in probando*, by which

That every matter of inquiry admits of being brought under these Modes we shall show briefly in this way. The matter proposed is either a sense-object or a thought-object, but whichever it is, it is an object of controversy; for some say that only sensibles are true, others only intelligibles, others that some sensible and some intelligible objects are true.^a Will they then assert that the controversy can or cannot be decided? If they say it cannot, we have it granted that we must suspend judgement; for concerning matters of dispute which admit of no decision it is impossible to make an assertion. But if they say that it can be decided, we ask by what is it to be decided. For example, in the case of the sense-object (for we shall base our argument on it first), is it to be decided by a sense-object or a thought-object? For if they say by a sense-object, since we are inquiring about sensibles that object itself also will require another to confirm it; and if that too is to be a sense-object, it likewise will require another for its confirmation, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the sense-object shall have to be decided by 172 a thought-object, then, since thought-objects also are controverted, this being an object of thought will need examination and confirmation. Whence then will it gain confirmation? If from an intelligible object, it will suffer a similar regress *ad infinitum*; and if from a sensible object, since an intelligible was adduced to establish the sensible and a sensible to establish the intelligible, the Mode of circular reasoning^b is brought in.

If, however, our disputant, by way of escape from 173

each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other.

κατὰ συγχώρησιν καὶ ἀναποδείκτως ἀξιώσει λαμβάνειν τι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ἐξῆς, ὁ ὑποθετικὸς εἰσάγεται τρόπος, ἄπορος ὑπάρχων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος πιστὸς ἔστω, ἡμεῖς αἰεὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὑποτιθέμενοι οὐκ ἐσόμεθα ἀπιστότεροι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές τι ὑποτίθεται ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος, ὑποπτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καθ' ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὸ λαμβάνων ἀλλὰ μὴ μετὰ κατασκευῆς· εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος, σαθρὰ
 174 ἔσται ἢ ὑποβάθρα τῶν κατασκευαζομένων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνύει τι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι πρὸς πίστιν, αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον ὑποτιθέσθω, καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν τι δι' οὗ δὴ κατασκευάσει τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ ἄτοπὸν ἔστι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἄτοπον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκός.
 175 Ὅτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τί ἔστι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά, δηλόν· ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ὅπερ ἂν ἡμῖν προτεθῆ πρᾶγμα αἰσθητόν, εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους ἀνάγειν τοῦτο εὐμαρές ἔστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφωνῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δοθήσεται ἡμῖν τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν περὶ
 176 αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ ἐπικριθῆσεται ἢ διαφωνία, εἰ μὲν διὰ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλοῦμεν, εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητόν πάλιν διαφωνοῦμενον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τοῦ νοητοῦ δεήσεται ὡς περὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

^a Lit. "without exit (or way of escape)"; i.e. it hopelessly entangles the opponent.

^b i.e. the super-ordinate, or more universal, proposition.

this conclusion, should claim to assume as granted and without demonstration some postulate for the demonstration of the next steps of his argument, then the Mode of hypothesis will be brought in, which allows no escape.^a For if the author of the hypothesis is worthy of credence, we shall be no less worthy of credence every time that we make the opposite hypothesis. Moreover, if the author of the hypothesis assumes what is true he causes it to be suspected by assuming it by hypothesis rather than after proof; while if it is false, the foundation of his argument will be rotten. Further,
 174 if hypothesis conduces at all to proof, let the subject of inquiry itself be assumed and not some other thing which is merely a means to establish the actual subject of the argument; but if it is absurd to assume the subject of inquiry, it will also be absurd to assume that upon which it depends.^b

It is also plain that all sensibles are relative; for
 175 they are relative to those who have the sensations. Therefore it is apparent that whatever sensible object is presented can easily be referred to one of the Five Modes. And concerning the intelligible object we argue similarly. For if it should be said that it is a matter of unsettled controversy, the necessity of our suspending judgement will be granted. And if, on
 176 the other hand, the controversy admits of decision, then if the decision rests on an intelligible object we shall be driven to the regress *ad infinitum*, and to circular reasoning if it rests on a sensible; for since the sensible again is controverted and cannot be decided by means of itself because of the regress *ad infinitum*, it will require the intelligible object, just as also the intelligible will require the sensible. For 177

177 διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὁ λαμβάνων τι πάλιν ἄτοπος ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὰ νοητά· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν νοοῦντα λέγεται, καὶ εἰ ἦν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ὅποιον λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν διεφωνήθη. ἀνήχθη οὖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους, διόπερ ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πάντως ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις παρα-
διδόμενοι πέντε τρόποι· οὓς ἐκτίθενται οὐκ ἐκ-
βάλλοντες τοὺς δέκα τρόπους, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ
ποικιλώτερον καὶ διὰ τούτων σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐλέγχειν
τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν.

15'.—TINEΣ ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ

178 Παραδιδόασιν δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς
ἐτέρους· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἦτοι
ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρου
ὑπομνησκόντες ὅτι οὔτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι οὔτε ἐξ
ἐτέρου¹ καταλαμβάνεται, τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν
εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσιν. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
καταλαμβάνεται, φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς γεγενημένης
παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν
νοητῶν ἀπάντων, οἶμαι, διαφωνίας, ἣ δὴ ἀνεπί-
κριτός ἐστι μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μῆτε αἰσθητῶ
μῆτε νοητῶ κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶν, ὅπερ
179 ἂν λάβωμεν, ἀπίστον εἶναι διαπεφωνημένον. διὰ

¹ Ἐπομ. . . . ἐτέρου add. T.

* For this final reduction of the "Tropes" to two—arguing against the possibility of either (1) immediate or (2) mediate certitude—see *Introd.* p. xli.

^b "Physics," as a branch of philosophy, was treated of by all the Schools alluded to in § 170 *supra*, which are specially here in mind.

these reasons, again, he who assumes anything by hypothesis will be acting illogically. Moreover, objects of thought, or intelligibles, are relative; for they are so named on account of their relation to the person thinking, and if they had really possessed the nature they are said to possess, there would have been no controversy about them. Thus the intelligible also is referred to the Five Modes, so that in all cases we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the object presented.

Such then are the Five Modes handed down amongst the later Sceptics; but they propound these not by way of superseding the Ten Modes but in order to expose the rashness of the Dogmatists with more variety and completeness by means of the Five in conjunction with the Ten.

CHAPTER XVI.—OF THE TWO MODES

They hand down also *Two* other *Modes* leading¹⁷⁸ to suspension of judgement.^a Since every object of apprehension seems to be apprehended either through itself or through another object, by showing that nothing is apprehended either through itself or through another thing, they introduce doubt, as they suppose, about everything. That nothing is apprehended through itself is plain, they say, from the controversy which exists amongst the physicists^b regarding, I imagine, all things, both sensibles and intelligibles; which controversy admits of no settlement because we can neither employ a sensible nor an intelligible criterion, since every criterion we may adopt is controverted and therefore discredited. And the reason why they do not allow¹⁷⁹

δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι συγ-
χωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ τι καταλαμβάνεται
ἀεὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι δεήσει, εἰς τὸν
διάλληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι τρόπον. εἰ
δὲ βούλοιτό τις λαβεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμ-
βανόμενόν τι ἐξ οὗ τι καταλαμβάνεται¹ ἕτερον,
ἀντιπίπτει τὸ μηδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι
διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. τὸ δὲ μαχόμενον πῶς ἂν
δύναιτο καταληφθῆναι <ἦ>² ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀφ'
ἑτέρου, ἀποροῦμεν, τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ
τῆς καταλήψεως μὴ φαινομένου, σημείων δὲ καὶ
δίχα ἀποδείξεως διατρεπομένων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξῆς εἰσόμεθα.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆς
ἐποχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

ΙΖ'.—ΤΙΝΕΣ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ Αἴτιολογικῶν
ΑΝΑΤΡΟΠΗΣ

- 180 "Ὡσπερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς παραδίδομεν,
οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενται τινες καθ' οὓς ἐν ταῖς
κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις διαποροῦντες ἐφιστῶμεν
τοὺς δογματικούς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις
αὐτοὺς μέγα φρονεῖν. καὶ δὴ Αἰνησίδημος ὀκτῶ
τρόπους παραδίδωσι καθ' οὓς οἴεται πᾶσαν δογ-
ματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν ὡς μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφή-
181 νασθαι, ἃν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναί φησι καθ' ὃν τρόπον
τὸ τῆς αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανέσιν ἀναστρεφό-
μενον οὐχ ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινο-

¹ καταλαμβάνεται TM: λαμβάνειν mss., Bekk.

² <ἦ> add. T.

* See ii. 96 ff.

that anything is apprehended through something
else is this: If that through which an object is
apprehended must always itself be apprehended
through some other thing, one is involved in a process
of circular reasoning or in regress *ad infinitum*.
And if, on the other hand, one should choose to
assume that the thing through which another object
is apprehended is itself apprehended through itself,
this is refuted by the fact that, for the reasons already
stated, nothing is apprehended through itself. But
as to how what conflicts with itself can possibly be
apprehended either through itself or through some
other thing we remain in doubt, so long as the criterion
of truth or of apprehension is not apparent, and signs,
even apart from demonstration, are rejected, as we
shall discover in our next Book.^a

For the present, however, it will suffice to have said
thus much concerning the Modes leading to suspen-
sion of judgement.

CHAPTER XVII.—OF THE MODES BY WHICH THE
AETIOLOGISTS ARE CONFUTED

Just as we teach the traditional Modes leading to¹⁸⁰
suspense of judgement, so likewise some Sceptics
propound Modes by which we express doubt about
the particular "aetiologies," or theories of causation,
and thus pull up the Dogmatists because of the special
pride they take in these theories. Thus Aenesidemus
furnishes us with *Eight Modes* by which, as he thinks,
he tests and exposes the unsoundness of every dog-
matic theory of causation. Of these the First, he¹⁸¹
says, is that which shows that, since aetiology as a
whole deals with the non-apparent, it is unconfirmed

μένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν· δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃν πολλάκις
 εὐεπιφορίας οὔσης δαψιλοῦς ὥστε πολυτρόπως
 αἰτιολογήσαι τὸ ζητούμενον, καθ' ἓνα μόνον τρό-
 182 πον τοῦτό τινες αἰτιολογοῦσιν· τρίτον καθ' ὃν τῶν
 τεταγμένως γινομένων αἰτίας ἀποδιδόασιν οὐδεμίαν
 τάξιν ἐπιφαινούσας· τέταρτον καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα
 λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομί-
 ζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατειληφέναι, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως
 τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα
 183 δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως· πέμπτον καθ' ὃν
 πάντες ὡς ἔπος ἐπιείν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν στοι-
 χείων ὑποθέσεις ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τινὰς κοινὰς καὶ
 ὁμολογουμένας ἐφόδους αἰτιολογοῦσιν· ἕκτον καθ'
 ὃν πολλάκις τὰ μὲν φωρατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι
 παραλαμβάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀντιπίπτοντα καὶ τὴν
 184 ἴσῃν ἔχοντα πιθανότητα παραπέμπουσιν· ἕβδομον
 καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ἀποδιδόασιν αἰτίας οὐ μόνον τοῖς
 φαινομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι μαχο-
 μένας· ὄγδοον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων
 ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν ἐπι-
 ζητούμενων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν
 185 ὁμοίως ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας. οὐκ
 ἀδύνατον δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τινὰς ἐπιμίκτους τρό-
 πους, ἡρτημένους ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, διαπίπτειν
 ἐνίους ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις.

Τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πέντε τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς ἀπαρ-
 κοῦσι πρὸς τὰς αἰτιολογίας. ἤτοι γὰρ σύμφωνον
 πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἰρέσεσι καὶ τῇ

* See §§ 164 ff. *supra*.

by any agreed evidence derived from appearances. The Second Mode shows how often, when there is ample scope for ascribing the object of investigation to a variety of causes, some of them account for it in one way only. The Third shows how to orderly 182 events they assign causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how, when they have grasped the way in which appearances occur, they assume that they have also apprehended how non-apparent things occur, whereas, though the non-apparent may possibly be realized in a similar way to the appearances, possibly they may not be realized in a similar way but in a peculiar way of their own. In the Fifth Mode it 183 is shown how practically all these theorists assign causes according to their own particular hypotheses about the elements, and not according to any commonly agreed methods. In the Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit only such facts as can be explained by their own theories, and dismiss facts which conflict therewith though possessing equal probability. The Seventh shows how they 184 often assign causes which conflict not only with appearances but also with their own hypotheses. The Eighth shows that often, when there is equal doubt about things seemingly apparent and things under investigation, they base their doctrine about things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful. Nor is it impossible, he adds, that the overthrow of 185 some of their theories of causation should be referred to certain mixed Modes which are dependent on the foregoing.

Possibly, too, the Five Modes of suspension^a may suffice as against the aetiologies. For if a person propounds a cause, it will either be or not be in accord

σκέβει καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις αἰτίαν ἐρεῖ τις ἢ οὐ.
καὶ σύμφωνον μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τὰ τε γὰρ
186 φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα πάντα διαπεφώνηται. εἰ
δὲ διαφωνεῖ, ἀπαιτηθήσεται καὶ ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν,
καὶ φαινομένην μὲν φαινομένης ἢ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου
λαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται, ἐναλλάξ δὲ
αἰτιολογῶν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ἰστάμενος δέ που,
ἢ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις λέξει τὴν αἰτίαν συν-
εστάναι, καὶ εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀναιρῶν τὸ πρὸς
τὴν φύσιν, ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι λαμβάνων ἐπι-
σχεθήσεται. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐλέγχειν
ἴσως τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις
προπέτειαν.

III'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΩΝ ΦΩΝΩΝ

187 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ χρώμενοι τούτων τε καὶ τῶν
τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων ἐπιφθεγγόμεθα φωνάς τινας
τῆς σκεπτικῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς
πάθους μνηστικῆς, οἷον λέγοντες “οὐ μᾶλλον”
“οὐδὲν ὀριστέον” καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, ἀκόλουθον ἂν
εἶη καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐξῆς διαλαβεῖν. ἀρξώμεθα
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς “οὐ μᾶλλον.”

with all the philosophical systems and with Scepticism
and with appearances. Probably, however, it is im-
practicable to propound a cause in accord with all
these, since all things, whether apparent or non-
evident, are matters of controversy. But if, on the 186
other hand, the cause propounded be not in accord
therewith, the theorist will be asked in turn for the
cause of this cause, and if he assumes an apparent
cause for an apparent, or a non-evident for a non-
evident, he will be involved in the regress *ad infinitum*,
or reduced to arguing in a circle if he grounds each
cause in turn on another. And if at any point he
makes a stand, either he will state that the cause is
well-grounded so far as relates to the previous ad-
missions, thus introducing relativity and destroying
its claim to absolute reality, or he will make some
assumption *ex hypothesi* and will be stopped by us.
So by these Modes also it is, no doubt, possible to
expose the rashness of the Dogmatists in their
aetiologies.

CHAPTER XVIII.—OF THE SCEPTIC EXPRESSIONS
OR FORMULAE

And because when we make use of these Modes 187
and those which lead to suspension of judgement we
give utterance to certain expressions^a indicative of
our sceptical attitude and tone of mind—such as
“Not more,” “Nothing must be determined,” and
others of the kind—it will be our next task to discuss
these in order. So let us begin with the expression
“Not more.”

^a Cf. §§ 14, 15 *supra*.

188 Ταύτην τοίνυν ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἔφην προφερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον”· οὐ γάρ, ὡς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τὴν μὲν “οὐ μᾶλλον” ἐν ταῖς εἰδικαῖς ζητήσεσι παραλαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον” ἐν ταῖς γενικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε “οὐ μᾶλλον” καὶ τὴν “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον” προφερόμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὡς περὶ μιᾶς διαλεξόμεθα. ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὕτη ἡ φωνὴ ἑλλιπής. ὡς γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν διπλῆ, δυνάμει φαμέν ἐστία διπλῆ, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν πλατεία, δυνάμει λέγομεν πλατεία ὁδός,¹ οὕτως ὅταν εἴπωμεν “οὐ μᾶλλον,” δυνάμει φαμέν

189 “οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε, ἀνω κάτω.” τινὲς μὲντοι τῶν σκεπτικῶν παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀντὶ [τοῦ πύσματος]² τοῦ οὗ τὸ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε, τὸ τί παραλαμβάνοντες νῦν ἀντὶ αἰτίας, ἢ ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον “διὰ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε;” σύνηθες δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ πύσμασιν ἀντὶ ἀξιωμαίων χρῆσθαι, οἶον

τίς τὸν Διὸς σύλλεκτρον οὐκ οἶδε βροτῶν;
καὶ ἀξιώμασιν ἀντὶ πυσμάτων, οἶον “ζητῶ ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίῳ” καὶ “πυθάνομαι τίνος ἕνεκα χρῆθαυμάζειν ἄνδρα ποιητῆν.” ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τί ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ τί παραλαμβάνεται παρὰ Μενάνδρῳ·

τί γὰρ ἐγὼ κατελειπόμην;

190 δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ “οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε” καὶ πάθος

¹ πλατεία . . . πλατεία ὁδός Diels: πλατεῖαν . . . πλατεῖαν ὁδόν mss., Bekk.

² [τοῦ πύσματος] del. ego.

^a i.e. (perhaps) a two-storied house (taking ἐστία as meaning οἰκία). Fabric. proposed ἐσθής, διπλῆ then being = διπλοῖς, “a double cloak.” πλατεία, “square,” lit. “broad, open, place.”

This expression, then, we sometimes enunciate 188 in the form I have stated but sometimes in the form “Nowise more.” For we do not, as some suppose, adopt the form “Not more” in specific inquiries and “Nowise more” in generic inquiries, but we enunciate both “Not more” and “Nowise more” indifferently, and we shall discuss them now as identical expressions. This expression, then, is elliptical. For just as when we say “a double” we are implicitly saying “a double hearth,”^a and when we say “a square” we are implicitly saying “a square roadway,”^b so when we say “Not more” we are implicitly saying “Not this more than that, up than down.” Some of the Sceptics, however, in place of the “Not” 189 adopt the form “(For) what this more than that,” taking the “what” to denote, in this case, cause, so that the meaning is “For what reason this more than that?”^c And it is a common practice to use questions instead of assertions, as for example—“The bride of Zeus, what mortal knows her not?”^d And also assertions in the place of questions; for instance—“I am inquiring where Dion lives,” and “I ask you what reason there is for showing surprise at a poet.” And further, the use of “What” instead of “For what reason” is found in Menander,^d “(For) what was I left behind?” And the expression “Not 190 more this than that” indicates also our feeling, where-

^b The *τι*, here substituted for *οὐ*, is capable of meaning either “what” (or “in what respect”) or “why,” “for what cause or reason” (= *διὰ τί*). Thus *τι* gives an interrogative form (*πύσμα*) to the formula, as distinct from the affirmative form (*ἀξιωμα*) with *οὐ*.

^c Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 1.

^d *Fragm.* 900 (Kock).

ἡμέτερον, καθ' ὃ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων πραγμάτων εἰς ἀρρεψίαν καταλήγομεν, ἰσοσθένειαν¹ μὲν λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὴν ἰσότητά τὴν² κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν πιθανόν, ἀντικείμενα δὲ κοινῶς τὰ μαχόμενα, ἀρρεψίαν δὲ τὴν πρὸς μηδέτερον συγκατάθεσιν.

- 191 Ἡ γοῦν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" φωνὴ κἂν ἐμφαίνῃ χαρακτήρα συγκαταθέσεως ἢ ἀρνήσεως, ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως αὐτῇ χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτὴν παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, ἥτοι ἀντὶ πύσματος ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν "ἀγνοῶ τίς μὲν τούτων χρῆ συγκατατίθεσθαι τίς δὲ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι." πρόκειται ἡμῖν δηλῶσαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν κατὰ δὲ τὴν φωνὴν δι' ἧς αὐτὸ δηλοῦμεν ἀδιαφοροῦμεν. κἀκεῖνο δὲ χρῆ γινώσκειν ὅτι προφερόμεθα τὴν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" φωνὴν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι περὶ τοῦ πάντως ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ βεβαίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς λέγοντες.

Κ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΑΣΙΑΣ

- 192 Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀφασίας λέγομεν τάδε. φάσις καλεῖται διχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως, κοινῶς μὲν ἢ δηλοῦσα θέσιν ἢ ἄρσιν φωνῆ, οἷον "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἰδίως δὲ ἢ δηλοῦσα θέσιν μόνον, καθ' ὃ σημαίνομενον τὰ ἀποφατικά οὐ καλοῦσι φάσεις. ἢ οὖν ἀφασία ἀπόστασις ἔστι τῆς κοινῶς λεγομένης φάσεως, ἢ ὑποτάσσεσθαι λέγομεν τὴν τε κατάφασιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὡς εἶναι ἀφασίαν

¹ ἰσοσθένειαν Papp.: ἰσότητα mss., Bekk.

² <ἰσότητα τῆν> add. Papp.

by we come to end in equipoise because of the equipollence of the opposed objects; and by "equipollence" we mean equality in respect of what seems probable to us, and by "opposed" we mean in general conflicting, and by "equipoise" a refusal of assent to either alternative.

Then as to the formula "Nowise more," even though it exhibits the character of a form of assent or of denial, we do not employ it in this way, but we take it in a loose and inexact sense, either in place of a question or in place of the phrase "I know not to which of these things I ought to assent, and to which I ought not." For our aim is to indicate what appears to us; while as to the expression by which we indicate this we are indifferent. This point, too, should be noticed—that we utter the expression "Nowise more" not as positively affirming that it really is true and certain, but as stating in regard to it also what appears to us.

CHAPTER XX.—OF "APHASIA" OR NON-ASSERTION

Concerning non-assertion what we say is this. The term "assertion" has two senses, general and special; used in the general sense it indicates affirmation or negation, as for example "It is day," "It is not day"; in its special sense it indicates affirmation only, and in this sense negations are not termed assertions. Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of assertion in the general sense in which it is said to include both affirmation and negation, so that non-assertion

* This is the typical Sceptic's attitude of complete mental neutrality, or "state of even balance" (ἀρρεψία, Diog. Laert. ix. 74).

193 πάθος ἡμέτερον δι' ὃ οὔτε τιθέσθαι τι οὔτε ἀναιρεῖν φαμέν. ὅθεν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀφασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστε πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἡμεῖς νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν. κάκεῖνο χρή μνημονεύειν ὅτι μηδὲν τιθέσθαι μηδὲ ἀναιρεῖν φαμέν τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄδηλον δογματικῶς λεγομένων· τοῖς γὰρ κινουσίην ἡμᾶς παθητικῶς καὶ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἄγουσιν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν εἰκομεν.

KA'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ΤΑΧΑ," ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ἘΞΕΣΤΙ," ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ἘΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ"

194 Τὸ δὲ "τάχα" καὶ "οὐ τάχα" καὶ "ἔξεστι" καὶ "οὐκ ἔξεστι" καὶ "ἐνδέχεται" καὶ "οὐκ ἐνδέχεται" παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχα μὲν ἔστιν τάχα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἔξεστι μὲν εἶναι ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ἐνδέχεται μὲν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς παραλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς συντομίας χάριν τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξεῖναι μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ οὐ τάχα ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχα μὴ εἶναι.
195 πάλιν δὲ ἐνταῦθα οὐ φωνομαχοῦμεν, οὐδὲ εἰ φύσει ταῦτα δηλοῦσιν αἱ φωναὶ ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτάς, ὡς εἴπω, παραλαμβάνομεν. ὅτι μέντοι αὐταὶ αἱ φωναὶ ἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικαί, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ γοῦν λέγων "τάχα ἔστιν" δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, τὸ

is a mental condition of ours because of which we refuse either to affirm or to deny anything. Hence 193 it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we now, at the time of uttering it, are in this condition regarding the problems now before us. It must also be borne in mind that what, as we say, we neither posit nor deny, is some one of the dogmatic statements made about what is non-apparent; for we yield to those things which move us emotionally and drive us compulsorily to assent.

CHAPTER XXI.—OF THE EXPRESSIONS "PERHAPS," "POSSIBLY," AND "MAYBE"

The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," and 194 "possibly" and "possibly not," and "maybe" and "maybe not," we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," and "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not," so that for the sake of conciseness we adopt the phrase "possibly not" instead of "possibly it is not," and "maybe not" instead of "maybe it is not," and "perhaps not" instead of "perhaps it is not." But here again we do not fight 195 about phrases nor do we inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we adopt them, as I said,^a in a loose sense. Still it is evident, as I think, that these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is" is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory

^a Cf. §§ 13, 191 *supra*.

τάχα μὴ εἶναι, τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιουῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτό. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔχει.

ΚΒ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ "ΕΠΕΧΩ"

196 Τὸ δὲ "ἐπέχω" παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν τίνι χρῆ τῶν προκειμένων πιστεῦσαι ἢ τινι ἀπιστῆσαι, δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἴσα ἡμῖν φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα πρὸς πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσα ἐστίν, οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτε ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει, λέγομεν. καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ δὲ εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπέχεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς μήτε τιθέναι τι μήτε ἀναιρεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ζητουμένων.

ΚΓ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ "ΟΤΑΔΕΝ ΟΡΙΖΩ"

197 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω" ταῦτα φημέν. ὀρίζειν εἶναι νομίζομεν οὐχὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγειν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀδηλον προφέρεσθαι μετὰ συγκатаθέσεως. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ὀρίζων ὁ σκεπτικὸς τάχα εὔρεθῆσεται, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω"· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δογματικὴ ὑπόληψις, τουτέστιν ἀδηλῶ συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ πάθους ἡμετέρου δηλωτικῆ. ὅταν οὖν εἴπη ὁ σκεπτικὸς "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω," τοῦτό φησιν "ἐγὼ οὕτω πέπονθα νῦν ὡς μηδὲν

* Cf. §§ 7, 10 *supra*.

phrase "perhaps it is not" by his refusal to make the positive assertion that "it is." And the same applies to all the other cases.

CHAPTER XXII.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"I SUSPEND JUDGEMENT"

The phrase "I suspend judgement" * we adopt in 196 place of "I am unable to say which of the objects presented I ought to believe and which I ought to disbelieve," indicating that the objects appear to us equal as regards credibility and incredibility. As to whether they are equal we make no positive assertion; but what we state is what appears to us in regard to them at the time of observation. And the term "suspension" is derived from the fact of the mind being held up or "suspended" so that it neither affirms nor denies anything owing to the equipollence of the matters in question.

CHAPTER XXIII.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"I DETERMINE NOTHING"

Regarding the phrase "I determine nothing" this 197 is what we say. We hold that "to determine" is not simply to state a thing but to put forward something non-evident combined with assent. For in this sense, no doubt, it will be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the very proposition "I determine nothing"; for this is not a dogmatic assumption, that is to say assent to something non-evident, but an expression indicative of our own mental condition. So whenever the Sceptic says "I determine nothing," what he means is "I am now in such a state of mind as neither to affirm

τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν τήνδε πεπτωκότων τιθέναί δογματικῶς ἢ ἀναίρειν." τοῦτο δέ φησι λέγων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων [οὐκ] ἀπαγγελτικῶς, <οὐ δογματικῶς>¹ μετὰ πεποιθίσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ πάσχει διηγούμενος.

ΚΔ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ' "ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΩΡΙΣΤΑ"

- 198 Καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία δὲ πάθος διανοίας ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃ οὔτε αἰρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τουτέστι τῶν ἀδήλων. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα," τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λαμβάνει ἀντὶ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ, πάντα δὲ λέγει οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀλλ' ἅπερ διεξήλθε τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων, ἀόριστα δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰ ἄντικειμένων ἢ κοινῶς μαχομένων
- 199 κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ ὡςπερ ὁ λέγων "περιπατῶ" δυνάμει φησὶν "ἐγὼ περιπατῶ," οὕτως ὁ λέγων "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα" συσσημαίνει καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμέ ἢ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον "ὅσα ἐπῆλθον τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τοιαῦτά μοι φαίνεται ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένου προὔχει μοι δοκεῖν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν."

ΚΕ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ' "ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ"

- 200 Οὕτω δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα". καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὁμοίως

¹ [οὐκ] . . . <οὐ δογματικῶς> om. et add. T.

^a For "opposed" and "conflicting" see § 10 above.

^b i.e. the personal pronoun "I" is potentially, or implicitly, expressed in the ending of the Greek verb (first person singular).

^c Cf. § 1.

dogmatically nor deny any of the matters now in question." And this he says simply by way of announcing undogmatically what appears to himself regarding the matters presented, not making any confident declaration, but just explaining his own state of mind.

CHAPTER XXIV.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"ALL THINGS ARE UNDETERMINED"

Indetermination is a state of mind in which we 198 neither deny nor affirm any of the matters which are subjects of dogmatic inquiry, that is to say, non-evident. So whenever the Sceptic says "All things are undetermined," he takes the word "are" in the sense of "appear to him," and by "all things" he means not existing things but such of the non-evident matters investigated by the Dogmatists as he has examined, and by "undetermined" he means not superior in point of credibility or incredibility to things opposed, or in any way conflicting.^a And just 199 as the man who says "(I) walk about"^b is potentially saying "I walk about," so he who says "All are undetermined" conveys also, as we hold, the meaning "so far as relates to me," or "as appears to me," so that the statement amounts to this—"All the matters of dogmatic inquiry which I have examined appear to me to be such that no one of them is preferable to the one in conflict with it in respect of credibility or incredibility."

CHAPTER XXV.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"ALL THINGS ARE NON-APPREHENSIBLE"

We adopt a similar attitude when we say "All 200 things are non-apprehensible."^c For we give a

ἐξηγοῦμεθα καὶ τὸ ἐμοὶ συνεκδεχόμεθα, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον " πάντα ὅσα ἐφώδευσα τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων φαίνεται μοὶ ἀκατάληπτα." τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οὐ διαβεβαιουμένου περὶ τοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητούμενα φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὡς εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλοντος, καθ' ὃ, φησίν, ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι ἄχρι νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἐκείνων ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ εἰς περιτροπὴν φερόμενα πάντα ἀπᾶδοντα εἶναι δοκεῖ μοι τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων.

ΚΣ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ "ΑΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΩ" ΚΑΙ "ΟΤ
ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΩ"

201 Καὶ ἡ "ἀκαταληπτῶ" δὲ καὶ ἡ "οὐ καταλαμ-
βάνω" φωνὴ πάθους οἰκείου ἐστὶ δηλωτικὴ, καθ'
ὃ ἀφίσταται ὁ σκεπτικὸς ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοῦ
τιθεῖναι τι τῶν ζητουμένων ἀδήλων ἢ ἀναιρεῖν, ὡς
ἔστι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων φωνῶν.

ΚΖ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΙ ΛΟΓΩΙ ΛΟΓΟΝ ἸΣΟΝ
ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ

202 "Ὅταν δὲ λέγωμεν "παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος
ἀντίκειται," παντὶ μὲν λέγομεν τῷ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διεξ-
ωδευμένῳ, λόγον δὲ φάμεν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν
κατασκευάζοντά τι δογματικῶς, τουτέστι περὶ

similar explanation of the word "all," and we similarly supply the words "to me," so that the meaning conveyed is this—"All the non-apparent matters of dogmatic inquiry which I have investigated appear to me non-apprehensible." And this is the utterance not of one who is positively asserting that the matters investigated by the Dogmatists are really of such a nature as to be non-apprehensible, but of one who is announcing his own state of mind, "wherein," he says, "I conceive that up till now I myself have apprehended nothing owing to the equipollence of the opposites; and therefore also nothing that is brought forward to overthrow our position seems to me to have any bearing on what we announce."

CHAPTER XXVI.—OF THE EXPRESSIONS "I AM
NON-APPREHENSIVE" AND "I APPREHEND NOT"

Both the expressions "I am non-apprehensive" 201 and "I apprehend not" are indicative of a personal state of mind, in which the Sceptic, for the time being, avoids affirming or denying any non-evident matter of inquiry, as is obvious from what we have said above concerning the other expressions.

CHAPTER XXVII.—OF THE PHRASE "TO EVERY
ARGUMENT AN EQUAL ARGUMENT IS OPPOSED"

When we say "To every argument an equal argu- 202
ment is opposed," we mean "to every argument"
that has been investigated by us, and the word
"argument" we use not in its simple sense, but of
that which establishes a point dogmatically (that is to
say with reference to what is non-evident) and estab-

ἀδήλου, καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸν ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ὅπως οὖν κατασκευάζοντα. ἴσον δέ φαμεν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, τό τε ἀντίκειται λαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεται κοινῶς, καὶ τὸ “ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται” συνεκδεχόμεθα.

203 ὅταν οὖν εἶπω “παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται,” δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι “παντὶ τῷ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξητασμένῳ¹ λόγῳ, ὃς κατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτερος λόγος κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, ἀντικείμεθα φαίνεταιαί μοι,” ὡς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λόγου προφορὰν οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπιεῖον πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὃ ἐστὶ φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.

204 Προφέρονται δέ τινες καὶ οὕτω τὴν φωνήν “παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἀντικείμεθα τὸν ἴσον,” ἀξιοῦντες παραγγεσματικῶς τοῦτο “παντὶ λόγῳ δογματικῶς τι κατασκευάζοντι λόγον δογματικῶς ζήτουντα, ἴσον κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, μαχόμενον αὐτῷ ἀντιτιθῶμεν,” ἵνα ὁ μὲν λόγος αὐτοῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸν σκεπτικόν, χρῶνται δὲ ἀπαρεμφάτω ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ, τῷ ἀντικείμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀντιτιθῶμεν.

205 παραγγέλλουσι δὲ τοῦτο τῷ σκεπτικῷ, μὴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ δογματικοῦ παρακρουσθεὶς ἀπέιπη τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦς² ζήτησιν, καὶ τῆς φαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀταραξίας, ἣν νομίζουσι παρυφίστασθαι τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, σφαλῆ προπετευσάμενος.

¹ ἐξητασμένῳ Heintz: ἐξητημένῳ ML: ζητουμένῳ Bekk.

² αὐτοῦς cj. Heintz: αὐτοῦ Bekk.: αὐτῆς EAB.

^a i.e. by the use of syllogisms.

^b As with Protagoras, who seems to have originated it.

lishes it by any method, and not necessarily by means of premisses and a conclusion.^a We say “equal” with reference to credibility or incredibility, and we employ the word “opposed” in the general sense of “conflicting”; and we supply therewith in thought the phrase “as appears to me.” So whenever I say 203 “To every argument an equal argument is opposed,” what I am virtually saying is “To every argument investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically, it seems to me there is opposed another argument, establishing a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect of credibility and incredibility”; so that the utterance of the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,^b but the announcement of a human state of mind which is apparent to the person experiencing it.

But some also utter the expression in the form 204 “To every argument an equal argument is to be opposed,”^c intending to give the injunction “To every argument which establishes a point dogmatically let us oppose an argument which investigates dogmatically, equal to the former in respect of credibility and incredibility, and conflicting therewith”; for they mean their words to be addressed to the Sceptic, although they use the infinitive form “to be opposed” instead of the imperative “let us oppose.” And they 205 address this injunction to the Sceptic lest haply, through being misled by the Dogmatist, he may give up the Sceptic search, and through precipitancy miss the “quietude”^d approved by the Sceptics, which they—as we said above^e—believe to be dependent on universal suspension of judgement.

^c The infinite is here used in a jussive sense.

^d Cf. §§ 10, 25 ff.

^e Cf. § 29.

ΚΗ'.—ΠΑΡΑΠΗΓΜΑΤΑ ΤΗΠΕΡ ΤΩΝ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΩΝ ΦΩΝΩΝ

- 206 Περὶ τοσοῦτων ἀρκέσει τῶν φωνῶν ὡς ἐν ὑπο-
 τυπώσει διεξελεθῆναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῶν
 νῦν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων δυνατόν ἐστὶ λέγειν καὶ περὶ
 τῶν παραλελειμμένων. περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπ-
 τικῶν φωνῶν ἐκεῖνο χρῆ προειληφέναι ὅτι περὶ
 τοῦ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς εἶναι πάντως οὐ διαβεβαιού-
 μεθα, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι
 λέγομεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας ἐκείνοις
 περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ τῶν φαρ-
 μάκων οὐ μόνον τοὺς χυμοὺς ὑπεξαιρεῖ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὰ τοῖς χυμοῖς συνεξάγει.
- 207 φαμέν δὲ καὶ ὡς οὐ κυρίως δηλοῦντες τὰ πράγ-
 ματα, ἐφ' ὧν παραλαμβάνονται, τίθεμεν αὐτάς,
 ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως καὶ εἰ βούλονται καταχρηστικῶς·
 οὔτε γὰρ πρέπει τῷ σκεπτικῷ φωνομαχεῖν, ἄλλως
 τε ἡμῖν συνεργεῖ τὸ μηδὲ ταύτας τὰς φωνὰς
 εἰλικρινῶς σημαίνειν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
- 208 πρὸς τοὺς σκεπτικούς. πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνον δεῖ
 μεμνήσθαι ὅτι οὐ περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων
 καθόλου φαμέν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ
 τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φαινό-
 μενον ἡμῖν φαμέν καὶ οὐχὶ διαβεβαιωτικῶς περὶ
 τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἀποφαινόμεθα·
 ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶν σόφισμα πρὸς φωνὴν ἐνεχθὲν
 σκεπτικὴν οἴομαι δύνασθαι διατρέπεσθαι.
- 209 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ κρι-
 τήριον καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς
 ἐποχῆς ἐφοδεύσαντες, καὶ περὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν

^a Cf. § 195 *supra*.^b Suggesting that such attacks must involve the fallacy
 of *ignoratio elenchi*.CHAPTER XXVIII.—SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON
 THE SCEPTIC EXPRESSIONS

In a preliminary outline it will be sufficient to have 206
 explained the expressions now set forth, especially
 since it is possible to explain the rest by deductions
 from the foregoing. For, in regard to all the Sceptic
 expressions, we must grasp first the fact that we make
 no positive assertion respecting their absolute truth,
 since we say that they may possibly be confuted by
 themselves, seeing that they themselves are included
 in the things to which their doubt applies, just as
 aperient drugs do not merely eliminate the humours
 from the body, but also expel themselves along with
 the humours. And we also say that we employ them 207
 not by way of authoritatively explaining the things
 with reference to which we adopt them, but without
 precision and, if you like, loosely; for it does not
 become the Sceptic to wrangle over expressions,^a and
 besides it is to our advantage that even to these ex-
 pressions no absolute significance should be ascribed,
 but one that is relative and relative to the Sceptics.
 Besides this we must also remember that we do not 208
 employ them universally about all things, but about
 those which are non-evident and are objects of dog-
 matic inquiry; and that we state what appears to us
 and do not make any positive declarations as to the
 real nature of external objects; for I think that, as
 a result of this, every sophism^b directed against a
 Sceptic expression can be refuted.

And now that we have reviewed the idea or purpose 209
 of Scepticism and its divisions, and the criterion and
 the end, and the modes, too, of suspension, and have
 discussed the Sceptic expressions, and have thus made

φωνῶν εἰπόντες, τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐμπεφανίκαμεν, ἀκόλουθον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφῶν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν διάκρισιν συντόμως ἐπελθεῖν, ἵνα σαφέστερον τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν ἀγωγὴν κατανοήσωμεν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλείτειου φιλοσοφίας.

ΚΘ'.—ΟΤΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ Ἡ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΩΓῆ ΤΗΣ
ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΕΙΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

210 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη διαφέρει τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀγωγῆς, πρόδηλον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος περὶ πολλῶν ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεται δογματικῶς, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχί, καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδῆμον ἔλεγον ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγείται τοῦ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτειοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ μετέρχονται, φάμεν πρὸς τούτους ὅτι τὸ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι οὐ δόγμα ἐστὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα οὐ μόνον τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
211 ὑποπίπτουν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν τολμήσει ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μέλι οὐ γλυκάζει τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας ἢ ὅτι τοὺς

^a For Heraclitus see *Introd.* p. viii; *cf.* ii. 59, 63. For Aenesidemus see *Introd.* pp. xxxvii ff.

^b *i.e.* the Sceptic view that the same thing *apparently* possesses opposite attributes or qualities is regarded as a step on the road to the Heraclitean view that it *really* possesses such qualities. But, as Sextus proceeds to argue,

clear the character of Scepticism, our next task is, we suppose, to explain briefly the distinction which exists between it and the philosophic systems which lie next to it, in order that we may more clearly understand the "suspensive" Way of thought. Let us begin with the Heraclitean philosophy.

CHAPTER XXIX.—THAT THE SCEPTIC WAY OF
THOUGHT DIFFERS FROM THE HERACLEITEAN
PHILOSOPHY

Now that this latter differs from our Way of thought 210 is plain at once; for Heraclitus ^a makes dogmatic statements about many non-evident things, whereas we, as has been said, do not. It is true that Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading up to the Heraclitean philosophy, since to hold that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances is a preliminary to holding that it is the subject of opposite realities, and while the Sceptics say that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances, the Heracliteans go on from this to assert their reality.^b But in reply to them we declare that the view about the same thing having opposite appearances is not a dogma of the Sceptics but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics alone but also by the rest of philosophers and by all mankind; for certainly no one would venture to 211 say that honey ^c does not taste sweet to people in sound health or that it does not taste bitter to those

the ascription of *apparently* contradictory attributes to a thing is not peculiar to the Sceptics but common to all men, so that all others might equally well be regarded as Heracliteans in the making. For the opposition of "appearances" *cf.* §§ 32, 91 ff., 101 ff. ^c *Cf.* § 101 *supra*.

ικτερικούς οὐ πικράζει, ὥστε ἀπὸ κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεως ἄρχονται οἱ Ἡρακλείτειοι, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἴσως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι φιλοσοφίαι. διόπερ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τινος τῶν σκεπτικῶς λεγομένων ἐλάμβανον τὸ τὰναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκεῖσθαι, οἷον τοῦ “ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα ” ἢ τοῦ “ οὐδὲν ὀρίζω ” ἢ τινος τῶν παραπλησιῶν, ἴσως ἂν συνῆγον ὁ λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ τῷ βίῳ ὑποπιπτούσας, τί μᾶλλον τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀγωγὴν ἢ ἐκάστην τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφιῶν ἢ καὶ τὸν βίον ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι λέγοι τις ἂν, ἐπειδὴ πάντες κοιναῖς ὕλας κεκρήμεθα;

212 Μήποτε δὲ οὐ μόνον οὐ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῆς Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγωγή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποσυνεργεῖ, εἴγε ὁ σκεπτικὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου δογματιζόμενα ὡς προπετῶς λεγόμενα διαβάλλει, ἐναντιούμενος μὲν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἐναντιούμενος δὲ τῷ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς δόγματος τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου τὴν μὲν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν διασύρων, τὸ δὲ “ οὐ καταλαμβάνω ” καὶ τὸ “ οὐδὲν ὀρίζω ” ἐπιφθεγγόμενος, ὡς ἔφην ἔμπροσθεν· ὅπερ μάχεται τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν μαχομένην ἀγωγὴν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν τῆς αἰρέσεως ἐκείνης ἢ μάχεται· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν.

^a i.e. general human experience and observation, derived from sense-impressions.

suffering from jaundice; so that the Heracliteans start from the general preconception of mankind, just as we also do and probably all the other philosophies. Consequently, if they had derived their theory that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities from one of the Sceptic formulae, such as “ All things are non-apprehensible,” or “ I determine nothing,” or some similar expression, probably they would have reached the conclusion they assert; but since their starting-points are impressions experienced not by us only but by all the other philosophers and by ordinary people, why should anyone declare that our Way of thought is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy any more than any of the other philosophies or even than the ordinary view, since we all make use of the same common material ^a?

Rather it is the case that the Sceptic Way so far 212 from being an aid to the knowledge of the Heraclitean philosophy is actually an obstacle thereto, seeing that the Sceptic decries all the dogmatic statements of Heraclitus as rash utterances, contradicting his “ Ecpyrosis,” ^b and contradicting his view that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities, and in respect of every dogma of Heraclitus scoffing at his dogmatic precipitancy, and constantly repeating, as I said before, his own “ I apprehend not ” and “ I determine nothing,” which are in conflict with the Heracliteans. Now it is absurd to say that a conflicting Way is a road to the system with which it is in conflict; therefore it is absurd to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading to the Heraclitean philosophy.

^b i.e. “ world-conflagration,” by which all things are resolved into the primal Fire.

Α'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ Η ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΑΓΩΓΗ ΤΗΣ
ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΕΙΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

CHAPTER XXX.—WHEREIN THE SCEPTIC WAY
DIFFERS FROM THE DEMOCRITTEAN PHILOSOPHY

213 Ἄλλα καὶ ἡ Δημοκρίτειος φιλοσοφία λέγεται
κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ τῇ
αὐτῇ ὕλη ἡμῖν κεχρησθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοῖς μὲν
γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μέλι τοῖς δὲ πικρὸν τὸν Δημό-
κριτον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι φασι τὸ μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ
εἶναι μήτε πικρὸν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι
τὴν “οὐ μᾶλλον” φωνὴν σκεπτικὴν οὖσαν· δια-
φόρως μέντοι χρώνται τῇ “οὐ μᾶλλον” φωνῇ οἷ
τε σκεπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου· ἐκείνοι
μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ μηδέτερον εἶναι τάττουσι τὴν
φωνήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν πότερον ἀμφοτέρα
214 ἢ οὐθέτερον τι ἔστι τῶν φαινομένων· ὥστε καὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν διαφέρομεν, προδηλοτάτη δὲ
γίνεται ἡ διάκρισις ὅταν ὁ Δημόκριτος λέγῃ “ἐτεῖ
δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν”· ἐτεῖ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ἀντὶ
τοῦ ἀληθείας· κατ’ ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὑφ’ ἐστάναι λέγων
τάς τε ἀτόμους καὶ τὸ κενὸν ὅτι διενήνοχεν ἡμῶν,
εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας τῶν φαινομένων ἄρ-
χεται, περιττόν, οἶμαι, λέγειν.

But it is also said that the Democritean ^a philo- 213
sophy has something in common with Scepticism,
since it seems to use the same material as we; for
from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and
bitter to others, Democritus, as they say, infers that
it really is neither sweet nor bitter, and pronounces
in consequence the formula “Not more,” which is
a Sceptic formula. The Sceptics, however, and the
School of Democritus employ the expression “Not
more” in different ways; for while they use it to
express the unreality of either alternative, we express
by it our ignorance as to whether both or neither of
the appearances is real. So that in this respect 214
also we differ, and our difference becomes specially
evident when Democritus says “But in verity atoms
and void” (for he says “In verity” in place of “In
truth”); and that he differs from us when he says
that the atoms and the void are in truth subsistent,
although he starts out from the incongruity of appear-
ances, it is superfluous, I think, to state.

ΑΑ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΡΗΝΑΙΚΗΣ Η ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

CHAPTER XXXI.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM CYRENAICISM

215 Φασὶ δὲ τινες ὅτι ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγή ἢ αὐτὴ ἔστι
τῇ σκέψει, ἐπειδὴ κάκεινη τὰ πάθη μόνα φησὶ κατα-
λαμβάνεσθαι.¹ διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνη
μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν
τέλος εἶναι λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν, ἣ ἐναν-
τιοῦται τὸ κατ’ ἐκείνους τέλος· καὶ γὰρ παρούσης

Some assert that the Cyrenaic ^b doctrine is identical 215
with Scepticism since it too affirms that only mental
states are apprehended. But it differs from Scepticism
inasmuch as it says that the End is pleasure and the
smooth motion of the flesh, whereas we say it is
“quietude,” which is the opposite of their End; for

¹ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. Pohlenz, Mutsch.: καταλαμβάνειν MSS.,
Bekk.

^a See Introd. pp. xi ff.

^b See Introd. p. xvii; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 191 ff.

τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ μὴ παρούσης παραχὰς ὑπομένει ὁ διαβεβαιούμενος τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐπελογισάμην. εἶτα ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐπέχομεν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖκοι ἀποφαίνονται φύσιν αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἀκατάληπτον.

ΔΒ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΥ ΔΙΩΓΗΣ
Η ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

216 Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρον μὲν λέγων τὸ κριτήριον, χρημάτων δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω μόνον, καὶ οὕτως
217 εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνεῖους. διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰσόμεθα τὴν διαφορὰν, ἐξαπλῶσαντες συμμέτρως τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ.

Φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, ῥεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρά τε ἡλικίας καὶ
218 παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεται. τοὺς

^a §§ 25 ff. *supra*.

whether pleasure be present or not present the man who positively affirms pleasure to be the End undergoes perturbations, as I have argued in my chapter "Of the End."^a Further, whereas we suspend judgement, so far as regards the essence of external objects, the Cyrenaics declare that those objects possess a real nature which is inapprehensible.

CHAPTER XXXII.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM THE PROTAGOREAN DOCTRINE

Protagoras^b also holds that "Man is the measure 216 of all things, of existing things that they exist, and of non-existing things that they exist not"; and by "measure" he means the criterion, and by "things" the objects, so that he is virtually asserting that "Man is the criterion of all objects, of those which exist that they exist, and of those which exist not that they exist not." And consequently he posits only what appears to each individual, and thus he introduces relativity. And for this reason he seems also 217 to have something in common with the Pyrrhoneans. Yet he differs from them, and we shall perceive the difference when we have adequately explained the views of Protagoras.

What he states then is this—that matter is in flux, and as it flows additions are made continuously in the place of the effluxions, and the senses are transformed and altered according to the times of life and to all the other conditions of the bodies. He says also 218 that the "reasons" of all the appearances subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends on itself, is capable of being all those things which appear to

^b See *Introd.* p. xiv. In his physical theory Protagoras follows Heracleitus

δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν ἃ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τοὺς
219 δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἃ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· γίνεται τοίνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἀνθρώπος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

Ὅρωμεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκείσθαι δογματίζει, ἀδήλων ὄντων καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεκτῶν.

ΔΓ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΪΚΗΣ
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ Ἡ ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

220 Φασὶ μέντοι τινὲς ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει· διόπερ ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τούτου διεξελεῖν.

Ἀκαδήμια δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὡς <οἱ μὲν πλείους> φασὶ, [πλείους μὲν ἢ]¹ τρεῖς, μία μὲν καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἢ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ μέση ἢ τῶν περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέμωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα ἢ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον· ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασιν τῶν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Χαριμίδαν, τινὲς δὲ καὶ

¹ add. et om. e conj. Bekk.

^a i.e., in brief, all "appearances" (sensations, opinions, etc.) are due to inter-action between the matter of the

all.^a And men, he says, apprehend different things at different times owing to their differing dispositions; for he who is in a natural state apprehends those things subsisting in matter which are able to appear to those in a natural state, and those who are in a non-natural state the things which can appear to those in a non-natural state. Moreover, precisely the same
219 account applies to the variations due to age, and to the sleeping or waking state, and to each several kind of condition. Thus, according to him, Man becomes the criterion of real existences; for all things that appear to men also exist, and things that appear to no man have no existence either.

We see, then, that he dogmatizes about the fluidity of matter and also about the subsistence therein of the "reasons" of all appearances, these being non-evident matters about which we suspend judgement.

CHAPTER XXXIII.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

Some indeed say that the Academic philosophy^b is
220 identical with Scepticism; consequently it shall be our next task to discuss this statement.

According to most people there have been three Academies—the first and most ancient that of Plato and his School, the second or middle Academy that of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, and his School, the third or New Academy that of the School of Carneades and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add as a fourth that of the School of Philo and Charmidas; and some percipient subject and the matter of the objective world, both of which are in constant flux. Thus "matter" is potentially the "phenomenon."

^b See *Intro.* pp. xxxii f.

πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον.
221 ἀρξάμενοι τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἴδωμεν τὴν
διαφορὰν τῶν εἰρημένων φιλοσοφῶν.

Τὸν Πλάτωνα οὖν οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τι ἀπο-
ρητικὸν κατὰ δέ τι δογματικόν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς
γυμναστικοῖς [φασί] λόγοις, ἔνθα ὁ Σωκράτης
εἰσάγεται ἤτοι παίζων πρὸς τινας ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος
πρὸς σοφιστάς, γυμναστικόν τε καὶ ἀπορητικόν
φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα, δογματικὸν δὲ
222 ἔνθα σπουδάζων ἀποφαίνεται ἤτοι διὰ Σωκράτους
ἢ Τιμαίου ἢ τινος τῶν τοιούτων. περὶ μὲν οὖν
τῶν δογματικῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι λεγόντων, ἢ κατὰ μὲν
τι δογματικὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀπορητικόν, περισσὸν ἂν
εἶη λέγειν νῦν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν πρὸς
ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς
σκεπτικὸς πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι
διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν¹
κατὰ τῶν περὶ² Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον (οἱ τοὶ
γὰρ μάλιστα ταύτης προσέστησαν τῆς στάσεως) ὅτι
ὅταν ὁ Πλάτων ἀποφαινηται περὶ ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ
τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι ἢ περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον
αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ μετὰ κακιῶν, εἴτε ὡς ὑπ-
άρχουσι τούτοις συγκατατίθεται, δογματίζει, εἴτε
ὡς πιθανωτέροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ προκρίνει τι
κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, ἐκπέφευγε τὸν σκεπτικὸν
χαρακτῆρα· ὡς γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἔστιν ἀλλό-
τριον, ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον.

¹ λέγομεν T, cj. Bekk.: διαλαμβάνομεν mss.

² τῶν περὶ M. Heintz: περιμηδοτον mss.: κατὰ M. Fabr., Bekk.

^a i.e. those which aim at training the mind—subdivided

even count the School of Antiochus as a fifth. Be- 221
ginning, then, with the Old Academy let us consider
how the philosophies mentioned differ <from ours>.

Plato has been described by some as “dogmatic,” by
others as “dubitative,” and by others again as partly
dogmatic and partly dubitative. For in his exercita-
tory discourses,^a where Socrates is introduced either
as talking playfully with his auditors or as arguing
against sophists, he shows, they say, an exercitatory
and dubitative character; but a dogmatic character
when he is speaking seriously by the mouth either
of Socrates or of Timaeus or of some similar personage.
Now as regards those who describe him as a dogmatist, 222
or as partly dogmatic and partly dubitative, it would
be superfluous to say anything now; for they them-
selves acknowledge his difference from us. But the
question whether Plato is a genuine Sceptic is one
which we discuss more fully in our “Commentaries”^b;
but now, in opposition to Menodotus^c and Aenesi-
demus (these being the chief champions of this view),
we declare in brief that when Plato makes state-
ments about Ideas or about the reality of Providence
or about the virtuous life being preferable to the
vicious, he is dogmatizing if he is assenting to these as
actual truths, while if he is accepting them as more
probable than not, since thereby he gives a preference
to one thing over another in point of probability or
improbability, he throws off the character of a Sceptic;
for that such an attitude is foreign to us is quite plain
from what has been said above.

(in Diog. Laert. iii. 49 ff.) into “maeutic” (“akin to the
midwife’s art” or “mental obstetrics”) and “peirastic” (or
“tentative,” e.g. *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Euthyphro*, *Meno*).

^b i.e. the five books *Against the Dogmatists*; see *Introduct.*
p. xli. ^c See *Introduct.* p. xl.

223 Εἰ δέ τινα καὶ σκεπτικῶς προφέρεται, ὅταν, ὡς φασί, γυμνάζηται, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται σκεπτικός· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνὸς δογματίζων, ἢ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας ὅλως κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν <ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος>¹ περὶ τίνος τῶν ἀδήλων, τοῦ δογματικοῦ γίνεται χαρακτηῆρος, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Τίμων διὰ τῶν περὶ Ξενοφάνους αὐτῷ λεγομένων.

224 ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐπαίνεσας [τὸν Ξενοφάνην],² ὡς καὶ τοὺς σίλλους αὐτῷ ἀναθεῖναι, ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὀδυρόμενον καὶ λέγοντα

ὡς καὶ ἐγὼν ὄφελον πυκνικοῦ νόου ἀντιβολήσαι ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος· δολίη δ' ὁδῶ ἐξαπατήθην πρεσβυγενῆς ἔτ' ἐὼν καὶ ἀμενθήριστος³ ἀπάσης σκεπτοσύνης. ὄππη γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι, εἰς ἐν ταυτὸ τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο· πᾶν δ' ἐὼν αἰεὶ πάντη ἀνεκτόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσαθ' ὁμοίην.

διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ ὑπάτυφον αὐτὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ τέλειον αἰτυφον, δι' ὧν φησὶ

Ξενοφάνης ὑπάτυφος, ὀμηραπάτης ἐπισκώπτης, ἐκτὸς ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων θεὸν ἐπλάσατ' ἴσον ἀπάντη, <ἀτρεμῆ>⁴ ἀσκηθῆ, νοερώτερον⁵ ἢ ἐ νόημα.

ὑπάτυφον μὲν γὰρ εἶπε τὸν κατὰ τι αἰτυφον, ὀμηραπάτης δὲ ἐπισκώπτην, ἐπεὶ τὴν παρ' Ὀμήρω
225 ἀπάτην διέστυρεν. ἐδογματίζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι, εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογι-

¹ <ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος> add. Papp.

² [τὸν Ξ.] del. Kayser, Mutsch.

³ ἀμενθήριστος Bergk: ἀπερθ. mss., Bekk.

⁴ <ἀτρεμῆ> add. Diels.

⁵ νοερώτερον Diels: νοερωτὸν mss., Bekk.

And if Plato does really utter some statements in a 223 sceptical way when he is, as they say, "exercising," that will not make him a Sceptic; for the man that dogmatizes about a single thing, or ever prefers one impression to another in point of credibility or incredibility, or makes any assertion about any non-evident object, assumes the dogmatic character, as Timon^a also shows by his remarks about Xenophanes. For 224 after praising him repeatedly, so that he even dedicated to him his *Satires*, he represented him as uttering this lamentation—

Would that I too had attained a mind compacted of wisdom, Both ways casting my eyes; but the treacherous pathway deceived me, Old that I was, and as yet unversed in the doubts of the Sceptic.

For in whatever direction I turned my mind in its questing All was resolved into One and the Same; All ever-existing Into one self-same nature returning shaped itself all ways.

So on this account he also calls him "semi-vain," and not perfectly free from vanity, where he says—

Xenophanes semi-vain, derider of Homer's deceptions, Framed him a God far other than Man, self-equal in all ways, Safe from shaking or scathe, surpassing thought in his thinking.

He called him "semi-vain" as being in some degree free from vanity, and "derider of Homer's deceptions" because he censured the deceit mentioned in Homer.^b Xenophanes, contrary to the preconceptions 225 of all other men, asserted dogmatically that the All is one, and that God is consubstantial with all things, and is of spherical form and passionless and unchange-

^a See Introd. p. xxxi; and for Xenophanes, *ibid.*, p. viii.

^b e.g. Homer, *Il.* ii. 114 where Agamemnon says of Zeus
νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατ'. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 380 D ff.

κόν· ὄθεν καὶ ῥάδιον τὴν Ξενοφάνους πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν ἐπιδεικνύουσι. πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τινῶν ἐπαπορή ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τισι φαίνεται ἢ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἀποφαινόμενος πραγμάτων ἀδήλων ἢ προκρίνων ἀδηλα κατὰ πίστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶη σκεπτικός.

226 Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας, εἰ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι πάντα φασί, διαφέρουσι τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ λέγειν πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα (διαβεβαιοῦνται γὰρ περὶ τούτου, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός ἐνδέχεται καὶ καταληφθῆναι τινα προσδοκᾶ), διαφέρουσι δὲ ἡμῶν προδήλως ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν κρίσει. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὁ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως, ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν εἶναι λεγόντων οὐδὲν μετὰ τοῦ πιθανόν εἶναι νομίζω ὃ φάμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστως ἐπομένων

227 τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἀνερέγγητοι ὦμεν. τὰς τε φαντασίας ἡμεῖς μὲν ἴσας λέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐκείνοι δὲ τὰς μὲν πιθανὰς εἶναι φασὶ τὰς δὲ ἀπιθάνους.

Καὶ τῶν πιθανῶν δὲ λέγουσι διαφορὰς· τὰς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανὰς ὑπάρχειν ἡγοῦνται, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ διεξωδευμένας, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ

able and rational; and from this it is easy to show how Xenophanes differs from us. However, it is plain from what has been said that even if Plato evinces doubt about some matters, yet he cannot be a Sceptic inasmuch as he shows himself at times either making assertions about the reality of non-evident objects or preferring one non-evident thing to another in point of credibility.

The adherents of the New Academy, although they 226 affirm that all things are non-apprehensible, yet differ from the Sceptics even, as seems probable, in respect of this very statement that all things are non-apprehensible (for they affirm this positively, whereas the Sceptic regards it as possible that some things may be apprehended); but they differ from us quite plainly in their judgement of things good and evil. For the Academicians do not describe a thing as good or evil in the way we do; for they do so with the conviction that it is more probable^a that what they call good is really good rather than the opposite, and so too in the case of evil, whereas when we describe a thing as good or evil we do not add it as our opinion that what we assert is probable, but simply conform to life undogmatically that we may not be precluded from activity.^b And as regards 227 sense-impressions, we say^c that they are equal in respect of probability and improbability, so far as their essence is concerned, whereas they assert that some impressions are probable, others improbable.

And respecting the probable impressions they make distinctions: some they regard as just simply probable, others as probable and tested, others as

^a Carneades was the chief exponent of this "probabilism"; see *Introd.* pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

^b *Cf.* §§ 15, 23 f.; ii. 13.

^c *Cf.* § 117.

περιωδευμένας καὶ ἀπερισπάστους. ὅσον ἐν οἴκῳ σκοτεινῷ ποσῶς κειμένου σχοινίου ἐσπειραμένου πιθανῆ ἀπλῶς φαντασία γίνεται ἀπὸ τούτου ὡς
 228 ἀπὸ ὄψεως τῷ ἀθρόως ἐπισηθόντι τῷ μέντοι περισκοπήσαντι ἀκριβῶς καὶ διεξοδεύσαντι τὰ περὶ αὐτό, ὅσον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται, ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, φαίνεται σχοινίον κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία τοιάδε ἐστίν. λέγεται ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀποθανοῦσαν τὴν Ἄλκηστιν αὖθις ἐξ ᾄδου ἀναγαγεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τῷ Ἀδμήτῳ, ὃς¹ πιθανὴν ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν τῆς Ἄλκηστιδος καὶ περιωδευμένην· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἦδει ὅτι τέθηκεν, περιεσπάτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἐκκλινεν.
 229 προκρίνουσιν οὖν οἱ ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας τῆς μὲν πιθανῆς ἀπλῶς τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην φαντασίαν, ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τούτων τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ πείθεσθαι τισιν οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λέγουσι, πρόδηλος καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο διαφορά τῶν φιλοσοφῶν.
 230 τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι λέγεται διαφόρως, τὸ τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἔπεισθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς προσκλίσεως καὶ προσπαθείας, ὡς ὁ παῖς λέγεται πείθεσθαι τῷ παιδαγωγῷ· ἅπαξ δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἰρέσεως καὶ οἰονεῖ συμπαθείας κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι συγκατατίθεσθαι τινι, ὡς ὁ ἄσωτος

¹ ὃς T: καὶ mss., Bekk.

^a διεξοδευμένας and περιωδευμένας mean literally "gone all through" (or "all over"), hence "thoroughly inspected,"

probable, tested, and "irreversible."^a For example, when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, to one who enters hurriedly it presents the simply "probable" appearance of being a serpent; but to the
 228 man who has looked carefully round and has investigated the conditions—such as its immobility and its colour, and each of its other peculiarities—it appears as a rope, in accordance with an impression that is probable and tested. And the impression that is also "irreversible" or incontrovertible is of this kind. When Alcestis had died, Heracles, it is said, brought her up again from Hades and showed her to Admetus, who received an impression of Alcestis that was probable and tested; since, however, he knew that she was dead his mind recoiled from its assent and reverted to unbelief.^b So then the philosophers
 229 of the New Academy prefer the probable and tested impression to the simply probable, and to both of these the impression that is probable and tested and irreversible.

And although both the Academics and the Sceptics say that they believe some things, yet here too the difference between the two philosophies is quite plain. For the word "believe" has different meanings: it
 230 means not to resist but simply to follow without any strong impulse or inclination, as the boy is said to believe his tutor; but sometimes it means to assent to a thing of deliberate choice and with a kind of sympathy due to strong desire, as when the incontinent man believes him who approves of

"scrutinized": ἀπερίσπαστους, "not able to be drawn round" (or "stripped off"), hence "indubitable."

^b This is a curious example of an "irreversible" impression. If the text is right, it looks as if Sextus was nodding.

πείθεται τῷ δαπανητικῶς βιοῦν ἀξιούντι. διόπερ ἐπειδὴ οἱ μὲν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον μετὰ προσκλίσεως σφοδρᾶς πείθεσθαι τε καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναι τι φασίν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἴκειν ἄνευ προσπαθείας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν αὐτῶν διαφέρομεν.

- 231 Ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ τέλος διαφέρομεν τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι λέγοντες ἄνδρες τῷ πιθανῷ προσχρῶνται κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πάθεσι ἐπόμενοι βιοῦμεν ἀδοξάστως. καὶ πλείω δ' ἂν εἴπομεν πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν, εἰ μὴ τῆς συντομίας ἔστοχαζόμεθα.
- 232 Ὁ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνν μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνεῖοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας τινὸς ἀποφαινόμενος εὐρίσκεται, οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχει. καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἢ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς
- 233 ἐφάσκομεν. λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐποχάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος συγκαταθέσεις. [ἤτοι] πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι αὐτὴν λέγειν τὴν ἐποχὴν,
- 234 κακὸν δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν. εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν, φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ

an extravagant mode of life. Since, therefore, Carneades and Cleitomachus declare that a strong inclination accompanies their credence and the credibility of the object, while we^a say that our belief is a matter of simple yielding without any consent, here too there must be a difference between us and them.

Furthermore, as regards the End (or aim of life)^b 231 we differ from the New Academy; for whereas the men who profess to conform to its doctrine^c use probability as the guide of life, we^d live in an undogmatic way by following the laws, customs, and natural affections. And we might say still more about this distinction had it not been that we are aiming at conciseness.

Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said,^e the 232 president and founder of the Middle Academy, certainly seems to me to have shared the doctrines of Pyrrho, so that his Way of thought is almost identical with ours. For we do not find him making any assertion about the reality or unreality of anything, nor does he prefer any one thing to another in point of probability or improbability, but suspends judgement about all. He also says that the End is suspension—which is accompanied, as we have said, by “quietude.” He declares, too, that suspension regarding particular 233 objects is good, but assent regarding particulars bad. Only one might say that whereas we make these statements not positively but in accordance with what appears to us, he makes them as statements of real facts, so that he asserts that suspension in itself really is good and assent bad. And if one ought to credit 234 also what is said about him, he appeared at the first

^a Cf. §§ 22, 27 ff. *supra*.

^c Cf. § 226.

^d Cf. §§ 23, 24.

^b See §§ 25 *supra*.

^e Cf. § 220 *supra*.

μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρώνειος ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς εἰ εὐφύως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς μέντοι γε εὐφύεσι τῶν ἐταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχειρεῖν. ἔνθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστωνα εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ

πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὅπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσοις Διόδωρος,

διὰ τὸ προσχρησθαι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τῇ κατὰ τὸν Διόδωρον, εἶναι δὲ ἀντικρὺς Πλατωνικόν.

235 Οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τοῦτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καταληπτά. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν στοᾶν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρήσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κείμενα τὰ τῶν στωικῶν δόγματα. ὡς πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διαφορὰν πρὸς τε τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τὴν πέμπτην καλουμένην Ἀκαδημίαν.

ΛΔ'.—Εἰ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐμπειρία ἢ αὐτῇ ἐστὶ τὴ σκεψῆ

236 Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσει τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσιν εἶναι τὴν σκεπ-

^a Ariston of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic.

^b The verse is a parody of Homer, *Il.* vi. 181 (*cf.* Hesiod,

glance, they say, to be a Pyrrhonian, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and because he used to test his companions by means of dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought to be a dubitative philosopher, but he actually passed on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted the dogmas of Plato. And this was why Ariston^a described him as "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in the midst Diodorus"^b; because he employed the dialectic of Diodorus, although he was actually a Platonist.

Philo^c asserts that objects are inapprehensible 235 so far as concerns the Stoic criterion, that is to say "apprehensive impression," but are apprehensible so far as concerns the real nature of the objects themselves. Moreover, Antiochus^c actually transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said of him that "In the Academy he teaches the Stoic philosophy"; for he tried to show that the dogmas of the Stoics are already present in Plato. So that it is quite plain how the Sceptic "Way" differs from what is called the Fourth Academy and the Fifth.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—WHETHER MEDICAL EMPIRICISM IS THE SAME AS SCEPTICISM

Since some allege that the Sceptic philosophy 236 is identical with the Empiricism of the Medical

Theog. 323), who thus describes the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ὅπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα ("Lion the head of her, Dragon the tail of her, trunk of a She-goat"). Diodorus Cronos was a Megaric philosopher (*circa* 300 B.C.).

^c See *Intro.* pp. xxxvi f.

τικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γνωστότερον ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιούται, οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει οὔτε ἀρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην μέθοδον, 237 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύναται ἂν μετιέναι· αὐτὴ γὰρ μόνη τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσεων περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδήλων δοκεῖ μὴ προπετεύεσθαι, πότερον καταληπτὰ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀκατάληπτα λέγειν αὐθαδειαζομένη, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἐπομένη ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὸ συμφέρειν δοκοῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀκολουθίαν. καὶ ἐλέγομεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὅτι ὁ βίος ὁ κοινός, ᾧ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικός χρῆται, τετραμερής ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν τι ἔχων ἐν ὑψηλῇ φύσει, τὸ δ' ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν παραδόσει νόμων 238 τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν. ὡσπερ οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῶν παθῶν ὁ σκεπτικός ὑπὸ μὲν δίψους ἐπὶ ποτὸν ὀδηγεῖται ὑπὸ δὲ λιμοῦ ἐπὶ τροφήν, καὶ ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς ἰατρός ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ὀδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ μὲν στεγνώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν χαύνωσιν, ὡς καταφεύγει τις ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ ψυχῆς ἐπιτεταμένον πυκνώσεως ἐπὶ ἀλέαν, ὑπὸ δὲ ῥύσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἰδρώτι πολλῷ περιρρέομενοι καὶ ἐκλυόμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτοῦ παραγίνονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὸν ψυχρὸν ἀέρα καταφεύγουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀλλότρια ἐπὶ τὴν λύσιν¹ αὐτῶν

¹ λύσιν ego: φύσιν mss., Bekk.: ἄρσιν Papp.

* The later schools of Medicine were three: (1) the Dogmatic or Logical, which theorized about the "non-

sect,^a it must be recognized that inasmuch as that Empiricism positively affirms the inapprehensibility of what is non-evident it is not identical with Scepticism nor would it be consistent in a Sceptic to embrace that doctrine. He could more easily, in my opinion, adopt the so-called "Method"; for it alone of the Medical 237 systems appears to avoid rash treatment of things non-evident by arbitrary assertions as to their apprehensibility or non-apprehensibility, and following appearances derives from them what seems beneficial, in accordance with the practice of the Sceptics. For we stated above^b that the common life, in which the Sceptic also shares, is four-fold, one part depending on the directing force of Nature, another on the compulsion of the affections, another on the tradition of laws and customs, and another on the training of the arts. So then, just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the 238 compulsion of the affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger to food, and in like manner to other such objects, in the same way the Methodical physician is guided by the pathological affections to the corresponding remedies—by contraction to dilatation, as when one seeks refuge in heat from the contraction due to the application of cold, or by fluxion to the stoppage of it, as when persons in a hot bath, dripping with perspiration and in a relaxed condition, seek to put a stop to it and for this reason rush off into the cool air. It is plain, too, that conditions which are naturally alien compel us to take measures for their

evident" causes of health and disease; (2) the Empiric, which regarded such causes as undiscoverable and confined itself to observation of evident facts; (3) the Methodic, which adopted an intermediate position, refusing either to affirm or deny "non-evident" causes; cf. *Introd.* p. xl.

^b § 23.

ἵεναι καταναγκάζει, πρόδηλον, ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ κύων
 σκόλοπος αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτοῦ
 239 παραγίνεται. καὶ ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγων
 ἐκβαίνω τὸν ὑποτυπωτικὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς,
 πάντα οἶμαι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν μεθοδικῶν οὕτω λεγόμενα
 ὑποτάσσεσθαι δύνασθαι τῇ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν ἀνάγκῃ,
 τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, πρὸς τῷ
 καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστόν τε καὶ ἀδιάφορον τῆς χρήσεως
 240 τῶν ὀνομάτων κοινὸν εἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ
 σκεπτικὸς <ἀδοξάστως>¹ χρῆται τῇ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω"
 φωνῇ καὶ τῇ "οὐδὲν καταλαμβάνω," καθάπερ εἰ-
 ρήκαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς κοινότητα λέγει καὶ
 διήκειν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀπεριέργως. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
 τὸ τῆς ἐνδείξεως ὄνομα ἀδοξάστως παραλαμβάνει
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων παθῶν τῶν τε κατὰ
 φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ὀδηγήσεως ἐπὶ τὰ κατ-
 ἄλληλα εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ δίψους καὶ ἐπὶ
 241 λιμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπεμίμησκον. ὅθεν οἰκειό-
 τητά τινα ἔχειν τὴν ἀγωγὴν τὴν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν
 τῶν μεθοδικῶν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
 κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσεων καὶ ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν
 ἐκείνων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ῥητέον ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν
 παραπλησίων τούτοις τεκμαιρομένοις.

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν παρακείμεθα δοκούντων
 τῇ κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικὸς ἀγωγῇ διεξεληθόντες, ἐν
 τούτοις ἀπαρτίζομεν τὸν τε καθόλου τῆς σκέψεως
 λόγον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.

¹ <ἀδοξάστως> add. Mutsch. e T.

* Or "generic character." All diseases being referred to one or other of the two "general" morbid states, over-contraction or over-dilatation of the pores or passages of the

removal, seeing that even the dog when it is pricked
 by a thorn proceeds to remove it. And in short—to 239
 avoid exceeding the limits proper to an outline of this
 kind by a detailed enumeration—I suppose that all
 the facts described by the Methodic School can be
 classed as instances of the compulsion of the affections,
 whether natural or against nature.

Besides, the use of terms in an undogmatic and
 indeterminate sense is common to both systems. For 240
 just as the Sceptic uses the expressions "I determine
 nothing" and "I apprehend nothing," as we have
 said, in an undogmatic sense, even so the Methodic
 speaks of "generality" and "pervade" and the like
 in a non-committal way. So also he employs the
 term "indication" in an undogmatic sense to denote
 the guidance derived from the apparent affections, or
 symptoms, both natural and contra-natural, for the
 discovery of the seemingly appropriate remedies—
 as, in fact, I mentioned in regard to hunger and thirst
 and the other affections. Consequently, judging 241
 from these and similar indications, we should say that
 the Methodic School of Medicine has some affinity
 with Scepticism; and, when viewed not simply by
 itself, but in comparison with the other Medical
 Schools, it has more affinity than they.

And now that we have said thus much concerning
 the Schools which seem to stand nearest to that of
 the Sceptics, we here bring to a conclusion both our
 general account of Scepticism and the First Book of
 our "Outlines."

body, each of these "general" states was said to "pervade"
 all the cases which exhibited the symptoms of that state.
 The "genus" "pervades" (its characteristics run through)
 its "species" and "particulars."

A'.—ΕΙ ΔΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΖΗΤΕΙΝ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ
ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΙΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΙΣ

- 1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικοὺς
μετήλλομεν, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς καλουμένης
φιλοσοφίας συντόμως καὶ ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐφοδεύ-
σωμεν, πρότερον ἀποκρινάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς αἰ-
θρυλοῦντας ὡς μήτε ζητεῖν μήτε νοεῖν ὄλως οἷός
τέ ἐστὶν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν δογματιζομένων
2 παρ' αὐτοῖς. φασὶ γὰρ ὡς ἤτοι καταλαμβάνει ὁ
σκεπτικὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα ἢ οὐ
καταλαμβάνει· καὶ εἰ μὲν καταλαμβάνει, πῶς ἂν
ἀποροίη περὶ ὧν κατείληφεν αἰετὸς λέγει; εἰ δ' οὐ
καταλαμβάνει, ἄρα περὶ ὧν οὐ κατείληφεν οὐδὲ
3 οἶδε λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδώς, εἰ τύχοι, τί
ἐστὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο τροπι-
κῶν θεώρημα, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν τι δύναται περὶ αὐτῶν,
οὕτως ὁ μὴ γινώσκων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων
παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὐ δύναται ζητεῖν πρὸς

^a *i.e.* the "special" section of this Sceptical treatise, as distinguished from the "general" exposition contained in Bk. I.; *cf.* i. 5, 6, 21.

^b *i.e.* Stoics and Epicureans.

^c This argument is not elsewhere mentioned; possibly it refers to some form of the "Sorites"; *cf.* § 253. But T has

CHAPTER I.—CAN THE SCEPTIC INVESTIGATE THE
STATEMENTS OF THE DOGMATISTS?

SINCE we have undertaken this inquiry in criticism 1
of the Dogmatists,^a let us review briefly and in outline
the several divisions of so-called philosophy, when we
have first made reply to those who keep constantly
repeating that the Sceptic is incapable of either
investigating or in any way cognizing the objects
about which they dogmatize. For they^b maintain 2
that the Sceptic either apprehends or does not
apprehend the statements made by the Dogmatists;
if, then, he apprehends, how can he be perplexed
about things which he has, as he says, apprehended?
Whereas if he apprehends not, then neither does he
know how to discuss matters which he has not appre-
hended. For just as he who is ignorant, for instance, 3
of the arguments known as "How far reduced"^c or
"By two hypotheses,"^d is unable also to say anything
about them, so the man who does not know each of
the statements made by the Dogmatists is unable to

"qui non novit . . . quid est omnis triangulus habet tres
angulos equales duobus rectis."

^d The hypothetical syllogism "by two hypotheses" has
its major premiss in double form; *e.g.* "If A is, B is, and if
A is not, B is; but A either is or is not; therefore B is."
Cf. §§ 131, 186 *infra*.

αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δύναται
 ζητεῖν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς
 4 δογματικοῖς. οἱ δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντες ἀποκρινά-
 σθωσαν ἡμῖν πῶς λέγουσι νῦν τὸ καταλαμβάνειν,
 πότερον τὸ νοεῖν ἀπλῶς ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς
 ὑπάρξεως ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους
 διαβεβαιούσθαι, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ [νοεῖν]¹ καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξίν
 ἐκείνων τιθέναι περὶ ὧν διαλεγόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 καταλαμβάνειν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
 καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατατίθεσθαι, τῆς κατα-
 ληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὔσης ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένης καὶ ἐναπεσφρα-
 γισμένης, οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον-
 τος, οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ βουλήσονται τάχα μὴ δύνασθαι
 ζητεῖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἃ μὴ κατελήφασιν οὕτως.
 5 οἷον γοῦν ὅταν ὁ στωικὸς πρὸς τὸν Ἐπικούρειον
 ζητῆ λέγοντα ὅτι διήρηται ἡ οὐσία ἢ ὡς ὁ θεὸς
 οὐ προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἢ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν,
 πότερον κατείληφεν ἢ οὐ κατείληφεν; καὶ εἰ μὲν
 κατείληφεν, ὑπάρχει αὐτὰ λέγων ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖ
 τὴν στοάν· εἰ δ' οὐ κατείληφεν, οὐ δύναται τι πρὸς
 αὐτὰ λέγειν.
 6 Τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
 αἰρέσεων ἀναγομένους λεκτέον, ὅταν τι ζητεῖν περὶ
 τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις αὐτῶν ἐθέλωσιν.

¹ [νοεῖν] del. Heintz.

* For this term in the Stoic epistemology see *Intro.* p. xxv. The argument is, in brief, that the Stoic cannot consistently criticize the Epicurean unless he allows that his "apprehensive impression" of their dogmas is an impression of things which have no basis in reality, and this contradicts the Stoic definition of "apprehensive impression."

^b It is uncertain to what "division" this refers—whether

criticize them concerning matters of which he has no knowledge. Thus the Sceptic is wholly incapable of investigating the statements made by the Dogmatists.

Now let those who speak thus make answer and ⁴ tell us in what sense they are now using the term "apprehend," whether simply of mental conception without the further affirmation of the reality of the objects under discussion, or with the further assumption of the reality of the objects discussed. For if they say that "to apprehend" means, in their argument, to assent to an "apprehensive impression,"^a the apprehensive impression being derived from a real object and being an imprint or stamp upon the mind corresponding to the actual object, such as would not result from what is unreal, then probably not even they themselves will wish to allow their inability to investigate things which, in this sense, they have not apprehended. Thus, for example, when the ⁵ Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that "Being is divided,"^b or that "God does not foreknow events in the Universe," or that "Pleasure is the Good," has he apprehended or has he not apprehended? If he has apprehended these dogmas, by asserting their real truth he entirely overthrows the Porch; while if he has not apprehended them, he is unable to say anything against them.

And we must use a like argument against those ⁶ who issue from any of the other Sects, whenever they desire to make any critical investigation of the tenets of those who differ from them in doctrine. Con- that of God from the world (Fabricius), of Body from Void (Zimmermann), of the "numberless worlds" from one another (Pappenheim), or (as seems simplest) of Body into numberless atomic fractions. For the *dicta* about "God" and "Pleasure" *cf.* iii. 219.

ὥστε οὐ δύνανται περί τινος ζητεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. μάλλον δέ, εἰ χρή μὴ ληρεῖν, συγχυθήσεται μὲν αὐτῶν ἅπαντα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ δογματική, συντόμως δὲ προσαχθήσεται ἢ σκεπτική φιλοσοφία, διδομένου τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ μὴ 7 οὕτως κατεληγμένου. ὁ γὰρ περί τινος ἀδήλου πράγματος ἀποφαινόμενός τε καὶ δογματίζων ἤτοι κατεληφώς αὐτὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέξει ἢ μὴ κατεληφώς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ κατεληφώς, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ κατεληφώς, ἤτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ τοῦτο λέξει κατεληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης καὶ 8 ζητήσεως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ περιπτωτικῶς κατ' ἐνάργειαν λέγοιτο ὑποπεσεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ κατεληγῆναι τὸ ἄδηλον, οὕτως ἂν οὐδὲ ἄδηλον εἶη ἀλλὰ πᾶσι ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμολογούμενον καὶ μὴ διαπεφωνημένον. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀδῆλων ἀνήνυτος γέγονε παρ' αὐτοῖς διαφωνία· οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ κατεληφώς ἂν εἶη τὸ ἄδηλον ὁ περὶ τῆς 9 ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ διαβεβαιούμενός τε καὶ ἀποφανόμενος δογματικός. εἰ δὲ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης, πῶς οἶός τε ἦν ζητεῖν πρὸ τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν; τῆς μὲν γὰρ ζητήσεως χρηζούσης τοῦ πρότερον ἀκριβῶς κατεληγῆναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτω ζητεῖσθαι, τῆς δὲ καταλήψεως τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγ-

* For this distinction cf. i. 178 ff.

sequently they are debarred from indulging in any criticism of one another. Or rather—to avoid talking nonsense—practically the whole of Dogmatism will be confounded and the Sceptic philosophy will be firmly established once it is granted that it is impossible to inquire regarding an object which is not, in this sense, apprehended. For he who makes a 7 dogmatic statement about a non-evident object will declare that he is making it either after having apprehended or after having not apprehended it. But if he has not apprehended it he will not gain credence; while if he has apprehended it, he will say that he has apprehended the object directly and through itself and owing to the clear impression it has made on him, or else by means of some kind of search and inquiry.^a But if he shall say that the 9 non-evident object has impressed him and has been apprehended through itself, immediately and clearly, in this case the object would not be non-evident but apparent to all men equally, an acknowledged and uncontroverted fact. But about every single object that is non-evident there exists amongst them endless controversy; so that the Dogmatist who makes positive assertions about the reality of a non-evident object cannot have apprehended it because of its having made on him a direct and clear impression. If, on the other hand, his apprehension is a result of 9 search, how was he in a position to make inquiry before he had accurately apprehended the object, without violating our present assumption? For since the inquiry necessitates as a preliminary the existence of an accurate apprehension of that which is to be the subject of inquiry, while the apprehension of the subject of inquiry demands, in its turn, the previous

ματος δεομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς τοῦ προεξηγήθησθαι πάντως αὐτό, κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀδύνατον αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τὸ δογματίζειν, ἦν τε ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως ἄρχεσθαι βούλωνται τινες, μεταγόντων ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν αὐτὸ προεξηγηκέναι πρὸ τοῦ κατειληφέναι, ἦν τε ἀπὸ τῆς ζητήσεως, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν κατειληφέναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε καταλαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τι τῶν ἀδήλων μῆτε ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. ἐξ ὧν ἀναιρεῖσθαι μὲν τὴν δογματικὴν εὐρεσιλογίαν αὐτόθεν, οἶμαι, συμβήσεται, τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν δὲ εἰσαγάσθαι φιλοσοφίαν.

- 10 Εἰ δὲ φήσουσι μὴ τοιαύτην λέγειν κατάληψιν ἡγεῖσθαι ζητήσεως προσήκειν, νόησιν δὲ ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον [ἐν] τοῖς ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν ἀδήλων ζητεῖν. νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι, ἀπὸ τε τῶν παθηματικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων αὐτῷ λόγῳ γινομένης καὶ μὴ πάντως εἰσαγωγύσης τὴν ὑπαρξίν τῶν νοουμένων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ ὑπάρχοντα νοοῦμεν, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα. ὅθεν καὶ ζητῶν καὶ νοῶν ἐν τῇ σκεπτικῇ διαθέσει μένει ὁ ἐφεκτικός· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ὑποπίπτουσιν αὐτῷ, καθὼ φαίνεται αὐτῷ, συγκατατίθεται, δεδηλωται.
- 11 Ὅρα δὲ μὴ καὶ νῦν οἱ δογματικοὶ ζητήσεως ἀπείργονται. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὡς

existence of a complete inquiry into that subject, owing to this circular process of reasoning^a it becomes impossible for them either to inquire concerning things non-evident or to dogmatize; for if some of them wish to make apprehension their starting-point we force them to grant that the object must be investigated before it is apprehended, while if they start from inquiry we make them admit that before inquiring they must apprehend the object of the inquiry, so that for these reasons they can neither apprehend any non-evident object nor make positive statements about them. From this there will follow automatically, as I think, the demolition of the Dogmatic sophistry^b and the establishment of the Suspensive philosophy.

If, however, they say that it is not this kind of 10 apprehension that ought, in their view, to precede inquiry, but simply mental conception, then it is no longer impossible for those who suspend judgement to inquire about the reality of things non-evident. For the Sceptic is not, I suppose, prohibited from mental conception which arises through the reason itself as a result of passive impressions and clear appearances and does not at all involve the reality of the objects conceived; for we conceive, as they say, not only of real things but also of unreal. Hence both while inquiring and while conceiving the Suspensive person continues in the Sceptical state of mind. For, as has been shown, he assents to what he experiences by way of subjective impression, according as that impression appears to him. But consider whether, even in this case, the 11 Dogmatists are not precluded from inquiry. For to continue the investigation of problems is not

^a Cf. i. 61.^b Cf. i. 63, ii. 84.

ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁμολογοῦσι τὸ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνακόλουθον, τοῖς δ' ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς οἰομένοις ταῦτα γινώσκειν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πέρας ἤδη πάρεστιν ἢ ζήτησις, ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν, οἷς δὲ τὸ δι' ὃ πᾶσα συνίσταται ζήτησις ἀκμὴν ὑπάρχει, τὸ νομίζειν ὡς οὐχ εὐρήκασιν.

- 12 Οὐκοῦν ζητητέον ἡμῖν περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλὴ γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς διαφωνία περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τῶν μὲν ἓν τῶν δὲ δύο τῶν δὲ τρία εἶναι λεγόντων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἂν εἴη προσήκον πλείω νῦν διεξιέναι, τὴν δόξαν τῶν δοκούντων τελειότερον ἀνεστράφθαι κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐκθέμενοι κατ' αὐτὴν προσάξομεν τὸν λόγον.

B'.—ΠΟΘΕΝ ΑΡΚΤΕΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΖΗΤΗΣΕΩΣ

- 13 Οἱ στωικοὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τρία μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἶναι λέγουσι, λογικὸν φυσικὸν ἠθικὸν· καὶτοι πολλῆς καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόθεν ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ στάσεως γεγεννημένης. οἷς ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδοξάστως, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ μέρεσι λεγόμενα κρίσεως χρήζει καὶ κριτηρίου, ὃ δὲ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τῷ λογικῷ μέρει, ἀρξώμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους.

^a Cf. *Adv. Log. i. ad init.*

^b The others mentioned in *Adv. Log. i. 16* are Plato, Xenocrates, and the Peripatetics; so too the Epicureans.

inconsistent in those who confess their ignorance of their real nature, but only in those who believe they have an exact knowledge of them; since for the latter the inquiry has already, as they suppose, reached its goal, whereas for the former the ground on which all inquiry is based—namely, the belief that they have not found the truth—still subsists.

Thus we have to inquire briefly, on the present occasion, concerning each several division of philosophy so called. And since there exists much dispute amongst the Dogmatists regarding the divisions of philosophy^a—some saying there is one division, some two, some three—and it would not now be convenient to discuss the question at length, we will explain fairly and impartially the view of those who seem to have treated it most fully, and take their view as the subject of our discourse.

CHAPTER II.—THE STARTING-POINT FOR CRITICISM OF THE DOGMATISTS

The Stoics, then, and several others,^b say that there are three divisions of philosophy, namely, Logic, Physics, and Ethics; and they begin their teaching with Logic,^c although the question of the right starting-point is also a matter of much controversy. So we shall follow them in an undogmatic way; and since the subject matter of all three divisions requires testing and a criterion, and the doctrine of the criterion seems to be included in the division of Logic, we shall begin with the doctrine of the criterion and the division of Logic.

^c So Chrysippus. Sextus treats of Logic in this Bk. ii., Physics in iii. 1-167, Ethics in iii. 167-278.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΥ

CHAPTER III.—OF THE CRITERION

- 14 Ἐκείνο προειπόντες ὅτι κριτήριον μὲν λέγεται τό τε ᾧ κρίνεσθαι φασὶν ὑπαρξῆναι καὶ ἀνυπαρξῆναι καὶ τὸ ᾧ προσέχοντες βιοῦμεν, πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν νῦν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι λεγόμενου διαλαβεῖν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον σημαινόμενον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς σκέψεως λόγῳ διεξήλθομεν.
- 15 Τὸ κριτήριον τοίνυν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν λέγεται τριχῶς, κοινῶς ἰδίως ἰδιαίτατα, κοινῶς μὲν πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ οὕτω προσαγορεύεται κριτήρια, ὡς ὄρασις, ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ὡς κανὼν καὶ διαβήτης, ἰδιαίτατα δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικὰ οὐ λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ ἅπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ φέρουσι πρὸς τὴν
- 16 τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν. φαμέν οὖν προηγουμένως περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ κριτηρίου διεξιέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγοιτ' ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ, οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἀνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἦτοι αἰσθησις ἢ διάνοια, καθ' ὃ δὲ ἢ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλει κρίνειν διὰ τινος τῶν προειρημένων.
- 17 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀρμόζον ἦν ἴσως προειπεῖν, ἵνα ἐννοήσωμεν περὶ οὗ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· λοιπὸν δὲ

^a See i. chap. xi.

^b i. e. standards of weight and measure (e.g. pound, pint, yard).

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 261.

^d Examples of these three criteria are—the carpenter, his rule, the “applying” of his rule; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 35 f.

But first we must notice that the word “criterion”¹⁴ is used both of that by which, as they say, we judge of reality and non-reality, and of that which we use as the guide of life; and our present task is to discuss the so-called criterion of truth, since we have already dealt with the criterion in its other sense in our discourse “On Scepticism.”^a

The criterion, then, with which our argument is¹⁵ concerned, has three several meanings—the general, the special, and the most special. In the “general” sense it is used of every standard of apprehension, and in this sense we speak even of physical organs, such as sight, as criteria. In the “special” sense it includes every technical standard of apprehension, such as the rule and compass. In the “most special” sense it includes every technical standard of apprehension of a non-evident object; but in this application ordinary standards^b are not regarded as criteria but only logical standards and those which the Dogmatists employ for the judging of truth. We¹⁶ propose, therefore, in the first place to discuss the logical criterion. But the logical criterion also may be used in three senses^c—of the agent, or the instrument, or the “according to what”; the agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument either sense-perception or intelligence, and the “according to what” the application of the impression “according to” which the man proceeds to judge by means of one of the aforesaid instruments.^d

It was appropriate, I consider, to make these preliminary observations so that we may realize what is the exact subject of our discourse; and it remains

ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησην χωρῶμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας προπετῶς κατεληφέναι τὸ κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας¹ ἀρξάμενοι.

Δ'.—Εἰ τῖα παρκεῖ τι κριτήριον ἀληθείας

18 Τῶν διαλαβόντων τοίνυν περὶ κριτηρίου οἱ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο ἀπεφήναντο, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Κορίνθιος Ξενοιάδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, λέγων

δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται·

ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπέσχομεν² πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. 19 ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἤτοι ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσιν ἢ ἀνεπικριτον· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικριτον, αὐτόθεν εἶναι δώσουσι τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικρίνεται, τίμη κριθήσεται λεγέτωσαν, μήτε κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, μήθ' ὅλως εἰ 20 ἔστιν εἰδόντων ἀλλὰ ζητούντων. καὶ ἄλλως, ἵνα ἡ γενομένη περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνία ἐπικριθῆ, δεῖ κριτήριον ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ὁμολογημένον, δι' οὗ δυνησόμεθα κρίνειν αὐτήν· καὶ ἵνα κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἔχωμεν, δεῖ πρότερον ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνίαν. οὕτω δὲ εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτοντος τρόπον τοῦ λόγου ἄπορος ἢ εὕρεσις τοῦ κριτηρίου γίνεται, μήτε ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἡμῶν ἐόντων αὐτοὺς κριτήριον λαμβάνειν, ἐάν τε κριτηρίῳ τὸ κριτήριον κρίνειν ἐθέλωσιν, εἰς ἀπει-

¹ διαφωνίας T: ἀληθείας mss., Bekk.

² ἐπέσχομεν Kayser: ἐπίσχομεν mss., Bekk.

^a Earlier than Democritus; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 53, 388.

^b Cf. i. 224; *Adv. Log.* i. 48, 110.

^c Cf. i. 164 ff., 115 ff.

for us to proceed to our counter-statement aimed against those who rashly assert that they have apprehended the criterion of truth, and we will begin with the dispute which exists about this question.

CHAPTER IV.—DOES A CRITERION OF TRUTH REALLY EXIST?

Of those, then, who have treated of the criterion 18 some have declared that a criterion exists—the Stoics, for example, and certain others—while by some its existence is denied, as by the Corinthian Xenias,^a amongst others, and by Xenophanes^b of Colophon, who says—“Over all things opinion bears sway”; while we have adopted suspension of judgement as to whether it does or does not exist. This dispute,^c 19 then, they will declare to be either capable or incapable of decision; and if they shall say it is incapable of decision they will be granting on the spot the propriety of suspension of judgement, while if they say it admits of decision, let them tell us whereby it is to be decided, since we have no accepted criterion, and do not even know, but are still inquiring, whether any criterion exists. Besides, in order to decide the 20 dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a

ρίαν αὐτοὺς ἐκβαλλόντων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις δέεται κριτηρίου ἀποδεδειγμένου τὸ δὲ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐκβάλλονται τρόπον.

- 21 Οἰόμενοι οὖν ἰκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι δεικνύουσι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν κατὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγον, ἵνα καὶ ποικίλως αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχωμεν ἔχωμεν, οὐκ ἄτοπον προσκαρτερῆσαι τῷ τόπῳ. οὐ μὴν ἐκάστη τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου δοξῶν ἀμιλληθῆναι προαιρούμεθα εἰδικῶς (ἀμύθητος γὰρ ἡ διαφωνία γέγονεν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀμέθοδον καὶ ἡμᾶς λόγον ἐμπεσεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται), ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ζητοῦμεν τρισὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὸ τε ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ, ἕκαστον τούτων ἐπελθόντες ἐν μέρει τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν αὐτοῦ παραστήσομεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμέθοδος ἅμα καὶ τέλειος ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσται. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ δοκεῖ γάρ πως συναπορεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

Ε'. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΨ' ΟΤ

- 22 Ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοίνυν δοκεῖ μοι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ μόνον ἀκατάληπτος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνεπινώτος εἶναι. ἀκούομεν γοῦν τοῦ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Σωκράτους διαρρηθῆναι ὁμολογοῦντος μὴ εἰδέναι πότερον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. παριστάναί τε βουλόμενοι τὴν ἔννοιαν
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criterion we force them to a regress *ad infinitum*. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.

We suppose, then, that this is sufficient to expose 21 the rashness of the Dogmatists in respect of their doctrine of the Criterion; but in order to enable us to confute them in detail, it will not be out of place to dwell at length upon this topic. We do not, however, desire to oppose their opinions about the criterion severally, one by one—for their controversy is endless, and to do so would necessarily involve us as well in a confused discussion,—but inasmuch as the criterion in question is three-fold (the agent, the instrument, and the “according to what”), we shall discuss each of these in turn and establish the non-apprehensibility of each, since in this way our exposition will be at once both methodical and complete. Let us begin with the agent; for the perplexity which attaches to this seems somehow to involve the rest as well.

CHAPTER V.—OF THE CRITERION “BY WHOM,”
OR AGENT

Now “Man” (if he is “the agent”) seems to me, 22 so far as regards the statements made by the Dogmatists, to be not only non-apprehensible but also inconceivable. At least we hear the Platonic Socrates^a expressly confessing that he does not know whether he is a man or something else. And when they wish to establish the concept of “Man” they disagree in

^a Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 229 E f., *Theæt.* 174 B.

αὐτοῦ πρώτον μὲν διαφωνοῦσιν, εἶτα καὶ ἀσύνετα λέγουσιν.

- 23 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημόκριτός φησιν ὅτι ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ πάντες ἴσμεν. ὅσον δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὐ γνωσόμεθα τὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ κύνα ἴσμεν, καὶ παρὰ τούτο ἔσται καὶ ὁ κύων ἀνθρωπος. τινάς τε ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἴσμεν· διὸ οὐκ ἔσονται ἀνθρωποι. μᾶλλον δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταύτῃ, οὐδεὶς ἔσται ἀνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μὲν φησὶ δεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων γνωσκεσθαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον, οὐδένα δὲ ἀνθρωπον ἴσασι πάντες ἀνθρωποι, οὐδεὶς ἔσται κατ' αὐτὸν
- 24 ἀνθρωπος. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ σοφιζόμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀκολουθίας φαίνεται. μόνα γὰρ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχειν φησὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν, ἅπερ φησὶν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ζώοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρίμασιν ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ιδιότητα, ἐπειδὴ κοινὰ πάντων ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ ταῦτα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔξομεν δι' οὐ τὸν ἀνθρωπον διακρίναί τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων καὶ εἰλικρινῶς νοῆσαι δυνασόμεθα.
- 25 Ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρός φησιν ἀνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτοῦ μόρφωμα μετὰ ἐμφυχίας. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δέ, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπος δείξει ἐμφανίζεται, ὁ μὴ δεικνύμενος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος. καὶ εἰ μὲν γυναικα δείκνυσί τις, ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ ἀνδρα, ἢ γυνῆ ἀνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν

the first place, and in the second place they speak unintelligibly.

Thus Democritus ^a declares that "Man is that 23 which we all know." Then, so far as his opinion goes, we shall not know Man, since we also know a dog, and consequently Dog too will be Man. And some men we do not know, therefore they will not be men. Or rather, if we are to judge by this concept, no one will be a man; for since Democritus says that Man must be known by all, and all men know no one man, no one, according to him, will be a man. And it is 24 evident from the relevance of this criticism that we are not now arguing sophistically. For this thinker proceeds to say that "Only the atoms and the void truly exist," and these he says "form the substrate not only of animals but of all compound substances," so that, so far as depends on these, we shall not form a concept of the particular essence of "Man," seeing that they are common to all things. But besides these there is no existing substrate; so that we shall possess no means whereby we shall be able to distinguish Man from the other animals and form a precise conception of him.

Again, Epicurus says that Man is "This sort 25 of a shape combined with vitality."^b According to him, then, since Man is shown by pointing out, he that is not pointed out is not a man, and if anyone points out a female, the male will not be Man, while if he points out a male the female will not be Man. And we shall also draw the same inferences from the by sense-perception: the percept is the real "thing in itself"; hence we have no general concepts which can be logically "defined" but only particular phenomena which are "indicated" or pointed out as "such and such, look you" (τοιοῦτος); cf. *Introd.* p. xxiii.

^a Cf. i. 213 ff.; *Adv. Log.* i. 265.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 267. Epicurus taught that truth is given

περιστάσεων ἃς ἴσμεν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τρόπου τῆς ἐποχῆς.

- 26 "Ἄλλοι ἔφασκον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν δείκνυται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπῳ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ζῶον ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστὶ πάντα, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένοις οὐ γνωσόμεθα τί ποτε λέγουσιν.
- 27 τὰ τε κείμενα ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ συμβεβηκότα ἤτοι κατ' ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν ἢ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἠδὴ τελείαν ἀπειληφώς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τέλειος ὢν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καθεστώς· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα θνητόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων τέλειον οὔτε ὁ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀνειληφώς· [καὶ] τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον.

Καὶ ταύτη ἄρα ἀσύστατος πέφηνεν ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ
 28 ἀνθρώπου. ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων ὅταν ἀξιολογῇ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον ἄπτερον δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀξιολογῇ διαβεβαιωτικῶς τοῦτο ἐκτίθεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τί ἐστὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν γινομένων μὲν ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄντων, ἀδύνατον δὲ περὶ τῶν μηδέποτε ὄντων διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιώσει τὸν ὄρον

^a Cf. i. 100.

^b Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 211 *infra*.

^c See i. 40 ff.

difference in the circumstances which we learn from the Fourth Mode of Suspension.^a

Others ^b used to assert that "Man is a rational 26 mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science." Now since it is shown by the First Mode of Suspension ^c that no animal is irrational but all are receptive of intelligence and science, so far as their statements go, we shall be unable to perceive what they mean. And the attributes contained 27 in this definition are used either in an "actual," or full, or in a potential sense ^d; if in a full sense, he that has not already acquired complete science and is not rationally perfect and in the very act of dying—for this is to be mortal in the full sense of the word—is not a man. And if the sense is to be potential, then he will not be a man who possesses reason in perfection or who has acquired intelligence and science; but this conclusion is even more absurd than the former.

In this way, then, the concept of Man is shown to be one which it is impossible to frame. For when Plato ^e 28 declares that "Man is a featherless two-footed animal with broad nails, receptive of political science," not even he himself claims to affirm this positively; for if Man is one of the class of things which, as he puts it,^f come into being but never possess absolute being, and if it is impossible, in his view, to make a positive declaration about things which never really exist, then even Plato will not claim to be taken as

^d The familiar Aristotelian distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality" is here used by Sextus to confute the Peripatetics, cf. *Introd.* p. xx.

^e Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 281; *Diog. Laert.* vi. 40; [Plato], *Deff.* 415 A.

^f Cf. *Theaet.* 152 D, *Tim.* 27 D.

ἐκτίθεσθαι δοκεῖν ὡς διαβεβαιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴωθεν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγων.

- 29 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὅτι ἐπινοεῖσθαι δύναται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀκατάληπτος εὔρεθήσεται. συνέστηκε μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνεται τάχα
30 οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ σῶμα οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τὰ συμβεβηκότα τινὶ ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. ὅταν οὖν χρῶμα ἢ τι παραπλήσιον ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτῃ, τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ σώματι εἰκὸς ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. τό γέ τοι σῶμα τριχῆ διαστατὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν· ὀφείλομεν οὖν τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὸ πλάτος καὶ τὸ βάθος καταλαμβάνειν, ἵνα τὸ σῶμα καταλάβωμεν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπέπιπτεν, ἐγινώσκομεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑπάργυρα χρυσία. οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα.
- 31 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμφισβήτησιν παρῶμεν, πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος εὔρισκεται ἀκατάληπτος διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν αὕτη, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς διαλαβόντων, ἵνα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν, οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήμιον Δικαί-
32 αρχον, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον. ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον εἶναι λέξουσιν οἱ

¹ τό γέ τοι: the particles seem out of place here; read perhaps αὐτό τε τὸ.

^a "Perchance," one of the Sceptic formulae, *cf.* i. 194.

^b *i.e.* a "substance" in the Aristotelian sense, as distinguished from its "attributes," "properties," or "accidents"; *cf. Adv. Log.* i. 283 ff.

putting forward this definition positively, but rather as making, in his usual way, a probable statement.

But even if we should grant, by way of concession, 29 that Man can be conceived, yet he will be found to be non-apprehensible. For he is compounded of soul and body, and neither body nor soul perchance ^a is apprehended; so that Man is not apprehended. Now that body is not apprehended is easily shown 30 thus: the attributes of an object ^b are different from the object whereof they are attributes. So when colour or any similar quality is perceived by us, what we perceive is probably the attributes of the body but not the body itself. Certainly the body, they say, exists in three dimensions; we ought therefore to apprehend its length and breadth and depth in order to apprehend the body. For if we perceived depth ^c we should also discern silver pieces under their coating of gold. Therefore we do not apprehend the body either.

But, not to dwell on the controversy about the 31 body, Man is also found to be non-apprehensible owing to the fact that his soul is non-apprehensible. That it is non-apprehensible is plain from this: of those who have treated of the soul—so that we may avoid dwelling on the long and endless controversy—some have asserted, as did Dicaearchus ^d the Messenian, that the soul has no existence, others that it has existence, and others have suspended judgement. If, then, the Dogmatists shall maintain 32

^a Lit. "this" (ταῦτο: Mutsch. suggests ταῦτα). The argument would be clearer if we inserted the words "But we do not apprehend depth" after "body"; the text as it stands is too obscure to be sound.

^d A pupil of Aristotle, *cf. Adv. Log.* i. 349; Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 10. 22.

δογματικοί, δώσουσιν αὐτόθεν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκαταληψίαν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτὴν, τίνι ἐπικρινούσῃ αὐτὴν εἰπάτωσαν. αἰσθήσει μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τὸ νοητὴν ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεσθαι· εἰ δὲ λέξουσιν ὅτι διανοία, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἢ διάνοια, ὡς δεικνύουσιν οἱ περὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοφωνοῦντες 33 περὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας διαφερόμενοι, εἰ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθέλουσι καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς διαφωνίαν ἐπικρίνειν, τῷ μᾶλλον ζητούμενῳ τὸ ἦττον ζητούμενον ἐπικρίνειν τε καὶ βεβαιοῦν ἐθελήσουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῖσιν ἐπικριθήσεται ἢ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνία. οὐδενὶ ἄρα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀκατάληπτος ἐστίν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καταλαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.

34 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ δῶμεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μήποτε οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο δεῖξαι ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρίνεσθαι δεῖ τὰ πράγματα. ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὅτι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἦτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέξει ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. οὔτε δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ κεκριμένην, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπότινος κεκριμένην. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ' οὗ κριθῆναι δυνήσεται αὐτῇ ἢ ἀπόδειξις (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸ κριτήριον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ), οὐ δυνησόμεθα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπικρίνειν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἀπο- 35 δεικνύται. εἰ δὲ ἀναποδείκτως λεχθήσεται ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κριθῆναι τὰ πράγματα, ἄπιστον

^a Cf. i. 115, 164 ff. Note that, in the context, the words "test," "judge," "decide," are various renderings of κρίνω (whence κριτήριον).

that this dispute is incapable of decision, they will be admitting thereby the non-apprehensibility of the soul, while if they say it is capable of decision, let them tell us by what means they will decide it. For they cannot say "by sense-perception," since the soul is said by them to be an object of intelligence; and if they shall say "by the intellect," we will say that inasmuch as the intellect is the least evident part of the soul—as is shown by those who agree about the real existence of the soul, though differing about the intellect,—if they propose to apprehend the soul and 33 to decide the dispute about it by means of the intellect, they will be proposing to decide and establish the less questionable matter by the more questionable, which is absurd. Thus, neither by the intellect will the dispute about the soul be decided; therefore there is no means to decide it. And this being so, it is non-apprehensible; and, in consequence, Man too will not be apprehended.

But even supposing we grant that Man is appre- 34 hended, it would not, probably, be possible to show that objects ought to be judged by him. For he who asserts that objects ought to be judged by Man will be asserting this either without proof or with proof.^a Not with proof; for the proof must be true and tested, and therefore tested by some standard. Since, then, we are unable to make an agreed statement as to the standard by which the proof itself can be tested (for we are still inquiring about the criterion "By whom"), we shall be unable to pronounce judgment on the proof, and therefore also to prove the criterion, which is the subject of discussion. And 35 if it shall be asserted without proof that objects ought to be judged by Man, the assertion will be

ἔσται, ὥστε οὐχ ἔξομεν διαβεβαιουῖσθαι ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὑπὸ τίνος δὲ καὶ κριθήσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο λέγοντες πιστευθήσονται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ζητού-
 36 μενον συναρπασθήσεται. εἰ δ' ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ζώου, πῶς ἐκείνο πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ κριτήριον παραλαμβάνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρίτως, οὐ πιστευθήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κρίσεως, πάλιν ἐκείνο ὑπό τινος ὀφείλει κριθῆναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μένει ἢ αὐτῆ ἀτοπία (τὸ ζητούμενον γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κριθήσεται), εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος· εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ τινος παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλου, πάλιν ἐκείνου τὸ κριτήριον ἀπαιτήσομεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄρα οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα.

37 Ἔστω δὲ καὶ πεπιστώσθω τὸ δεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ πολλῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔστι διαφορά, πρότερον οἱ δογματικοὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν ὅτι τῶδε τῶ ἀνθρώπῳ δεῖ προσέχειν, εἴθ' οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτῶ θέσθαι κελευέτωσαν. εἰ δ'

ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρα μακρὰ τεθήλη, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοῦ λόγου, περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνήσουσιν, πῶς ἡμᾶς ἐπέιγουσι προπετῶς τινὶ συγκατα-
 38 τίθεσθαι; ἦν γὰρ καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τῶ σοφῶ πιστευτέον, ἐρωτήσομεν αὐτοὺς ποῖω σοφῶ, πότερον τῶ κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἢ τῶ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἢ

disbelieved, so that we shall be unable to affirm positively that the criterion "By whom" (or Agent) is Man. Moreover, who is to be the judge that the criterion of the Agent is Man? For if they assert this without a judgement (or criterion) they will surely not be believed. Yet if they say that a man is to be the 36 judge, that will be assuming the point at issue^a; while if they make another animal the judge, in what way do they come to adopt that animal for the purpose of judging whether Man is the criterion? If they do so without a judgement, it will not be believed, and if with a judgement, it in turn needs to be judged by something. If, then, it is judged by itself, the same absurdity remains (for the object of inquiry will be judged by the object of inquiry); and if by Man, circular reasoning is introduced; and if by some judge other than these two, we shall once again in his case demand the criterion "By whom," and so on *ad infinitum*. Consequently we shall not be in a position to declare that objects ought to be judged by Man.

But let it be granted and established that objects 37 ought to be judged by Man. Then, since there exists great difference amongst men, let the Dogmatists first agree together that this is the particular man to whom we must attend, and then, and only then, let them bid us also to yield him our assent. But if they are going to dispute about this "long as the waters flow on and the tall trees cease not to burgeon" (to quote the familiar saying),^b how can they urge us to assent rashly to anyone? For if they declare that 38 we must believe the Sage, we shall ask them "What Sage?" Is it the Sage of Epicurus or of the Stoics,

^a From the inscription on the tomb of Midas quoted in Plato, *Phaedr.* 264 D; cf. Tibullus i. 4. 60.

^a The fallacy of *petitio principii*, cf. §§ 57, 60, 67 *infra*.

τῷ <Κυρηναϊκῷ ἢ τῷ>¹ Κυρικῷ· οὐχ ἕξουσι γὰρ συμφώνως εἰπεῖν.

- 39 Εἰ δὲ ἀξιῶσει τις ἡμᾶς τῆς περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ζήτησεως ἀποστάντας ἀπλῶς τῷ συνετωτέρῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων πιστεύειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίς συνετώτερός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων διαφωνήσουσιν, εἶτα κἂν δοθῇ συμφώνως δύνασθαι ληφθῆναι τίς ἐστι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων συνετώτερος, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται πίστεως οὗτος ἀξίος.
- 40 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πολλή καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπειρός ἐστιν ἐπίτασις τε καὶ ἀνεσις κατὰ σύνεσιν, φαμὲν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὃν λέγομεν εἶναι τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερον, ἕτερον συνετώτερον ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι. ὥσπερ οὖν τῷ νῦν εἶναι λεγομένῳ φρονιμωτέρῳ τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ πιστεύειν ἀξιούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένῳ τούτου συνετωτέρῳ μᾶλλον τούτου χρὴ πιστεύειν. καὶ ἐκείνου γενομένου πάλιν ἄλλον ἐλπίζειν χρὴ συνετώτερον αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι, κακείνου ἄλλον, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
- 41 καὶ ἀδηλον πότερον ποτε συμφωνήσουσιν ἀλλήλοις οὗτοι ἢ διάφωνα λέξουσιν. διόπερ κἂν τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερος εἶναι ὁμολογηθῇ τις, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐσται τούτου ἀγχινοῦστερος (ἀδηλον γάρ), ἀεὶ δεήσει τὴν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου συνετωτέρου κρίσιν περιμένειν καὶ μηδέποτε συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ κρείττονι.
- 42 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ κατὰ συγχώρησιν δῶμεν ὅτι οὐδεὶς τοῦ ὑποτιθεμένου συνετοῦ συνετώτερος οὔτε ἔστιν

¹ Κ. ἢ τῷ add. T.

the Cyrenaic Sage or the Cynic? For they will be unable to return a unanimous answer.

And if anyone shall demand that we should desist 39 from our inquiry about the Sage and simply believe the man who is more sagacious than all others, then, in the first place, they will dispute as to who is more sagacious than the rest, and in the next place, even if it be granted that it can be unanimously agreed who the man is who is more sagacious than those of the present and the past, even so this man will not deserve credence. For inasmuch as sagacity is liable 40 to a great, indeed almost incalculable, advance or decline in intensity, we assert that it is possible for another man to arise who is more sagacious than this man who, we say, is more sagacious than those of the past and present. So, then, just as we are requested to believe the man who is now said to be wiser than those of the present and the past because of his sagacity, so it is still more proper to believe his successor in the future who will be more sagacious than he. And when that successor has arisen, then it is right to expect that yet another will arise more sagacious than he, and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor is it 41 evident whether all these men will agree with one another or contradict one another. And consequently, even when one of them is acknowledged to be more sagacious than those of the past and present, seeing that we are unable to affirm positively that no man will be more clever than he (this being non-evident), we shall always have to wait for the judgement of the more sagacious man of the future, and never give our assent to this superior person.

And even should we grant, by way of concession, 42 that no one either is, was, or will be more sagacious

οὔτε ἐγένετο οὔτε ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὡς πιστεύειν αὐτῷ προσήκει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ συνετοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κατασκευῇ τοῖς σαθροῖς παριστάμενοι πράγμασιν ὑγιῆ και ἀληθῆ ταῦτα δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν, ὅταν τι λέγῃ οὗτος ὁ ἀγχινοῦς, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα πότερον ποτε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα φύσεως, οὕτω λέγει, ἢ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς ἀληθές παρίστησι και ἡμᾶς πείθει φρονεῖν ὡς περὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἅτε δὴ συνετώτερος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὑπάρχων και διὰ τοῦτο ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλέγχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος. οὐδὲ τούτῳ τοῖνυν συγκαταθησόμεθα ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντι, διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ <ἐνεῖναι>¹ λέγειν, οἰεσθαι δ' ὅτι δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγχινοίας τὰ ψευδῆ τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἀληθῆ βουλόμενος παριστᾶν ἃ φησι λέγει. διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν ἀπάντων ἀγχινουστάτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων χρῆ πιστεύειν.

- 43 Εἰ δὲ φήσει τις ὅτι τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συμφωνίᾳ δεῖ προσέχειν, λέξομεν ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι μάταιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ σπάνιον ἴσως ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, και διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται ἓνα τῶν πολλῶν φρονιμώτερον εἶναι. εἶτα και παντὶ κριτηρίῳ πλείους ἀντιδοξοῦσι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ συμφωνούντων· οἱ γὰρ ὅποιοι οὖν ἀπολιπόντες κριτήριον ἕτερον τοῦ συμφωνεῖσθαι δοκοῦντος παρά τισιν ἀντιδοξοῦσὶ τε αὐτῷ και κατὰ πολὺ πλείους εἰσὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ συμφωνούντων.
- 44 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, οἱ συμφωνούντες ἤτοι ἐν διαφοροῖς εἰσὶ διαθήσεσιν ἢ ἐν μιᾷ. ἐν διαφοροῖς μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν

than our hypothetical Sage, not even so is it proper to believe him. For since it is the sagacious above all who, in the construction of their doctrines, love to champion unsound doctrines and to make them appear sound and true, whenever this sharp-witted person makes a statement we shall not know whether he is stating the matter as it really is, or whether he is defending as true what is really false and persuading us to think of it as something true, on the ground that he is more sagacious than all other men and therefore incapable of being refuted by us. So not even to this man will we assent, as one who judges matters truly, since, though we suppose it possible that he speaks the truth, we also suppose that owing to his excessive cleverness he makes his statements with the object of defending false propositions as true. Consequently, in the judgement of propositions we ought not to believe even the man who is thought to be the most clever of all.

And if anyone shall say that we ought to attend to 43 the consensus of the majority, we shall reply that this is idle.^a For, in the first place, truth is a rare thing, and on this account it is possible for one man to be wiser than the majority. And, next, the opponents of any criterion are more numerous than those who agree about it; for those who admit any kind of criterion different from that which seems to some to be generally agreed upon oppose this latter, and they are much more numerous than those who agree about it. And besides all this, those who agree are either 44 in diverse dispositions^b or in one and the same. Now they certainly are not in diverse dispositions so far as regards the matter under discussion; else how could

¹ <ἐνεῖναι> addidi: <εἶναι> add. EBA.

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 327 ff.

^b Cf. i. 100; *Adv. Log.* i. 333.

τὰ αὐτὰ ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ ἐν μιᾷ, ἐπεὶ
καὶ ὁ εἰς ὁ λέγων ἕτερόν τι μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καὶ
οἱ πάντες οἱ συμφωνοῦντες μίαν, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς
διαθέσεσιν αἰς προσέχουσαν οὐδὲ κατὰ πλήθος
45 εὐρίσκεται διαφορὰ τις. διόπερ οὐ χρὴ τοῖς πολ-
λοῖς προσέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἐνί, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τρόπῳ
τῆς σκέψεως ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὴν κατὰ πλήθος δια-
φορὰν τῶν κρίσεων, ἀπειρών τῶν κατὰ μέρος
ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ ἡμῶν μὴ δυναμένων
ἀπάντων αὐτῶν τὰς κρίσεις ἐπελθεῖν καὶ ἀποφή-
νασθαι τί μὲν οἱ πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων
ἀποφαίνονται τί δὲ οἱ ἐλάττους. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
οὖν ἄτοπος ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλήθος πρόκρισις τῶν
κρινόντων.

46 Εἰ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει προσέξομεν, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν
οὐδένα ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι
τοσαῦτα κατὰ συγχώρησιν διδόντες. διόπερ ἐξ
ἀπάντων τούτων ἀκατάληπτον εὐρίσκεται τὸ κρι-
τήριον ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα.

47 Συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
κριτηρίων, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἦτοι μέρος ἢ πάθος
ἢ ἐνέργημα ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀκόλουθον μὲν ἦν
ἴσως ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐξῆς ἰεῖνα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς καὶ περὶ
ἐκεῖνων ἰκανῶς εἰρημένον ἐν τούτοις· ἵνα δὲ μηδὲ
τὴν εἰδικὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντίρρησιν φεύγειν
δοκῶμεν, ὀλίγα καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου λέξο-

^a Cf. i. 100 ff. for the fourth trope; but the reference ought rather to be to the second, in i. 89.

^b ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, lit. "as extra-measure" or "overplus"; "into the bargain."

they have made identical statements about it? And if they are in one disposition, inasmuch as both the one man who makes a different statement is in one disposition and all these who agree together are also in one, so far as regards the dispositions in which we find ourselves, no difference is found even on the ground of numbers. Consequently we ought not to pay heed to the many more than to the one; besides the 45 further fact that—as we pointed out in "The Fourth Mode of Scepticism"^a—the difference in judgements that is based on numbers is non-apprehensible, since individual men are innumerable and we are incapable of investigating and expounding the judgements of all of them—what it is the majority of all mankind affirm and what the minority. Thus, on this showing also, the preference given to men's judgements on the ground of their numbers is absurd.

But if we are not even to give heed to numbers, 46 we shall not find anyone by whom objects are to be judged, in spite of our having granted so much by way of concession. Therefore, on all these grounds, the criterion "By whom" objects are to be judged is found to be non-apprehensible.

And seeing that the other criteria are included in 47 this one, since each of them is either a part or an affection or an activity of Man, our next task might perhaps have been to proceed in our discussion to one of the subjects which follows next in order, supposing that those criteria also have been sufficiently dealt with in what we have now said; yet in order that we may not seem to be shirking the specific counter-statement proper to each case, we will exceed our brief^b and deal with them also shortly. And we shall

μεν. πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ δι' οὗ
καλουμένου διαλεξόμεθα.

5'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΙ' ΟΥ

48 Πολλή μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄπειρος σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ
γέγονε διαφωνία παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς· ἡμεῖς
δὲ πάλιν τοῦ ἐμμεθόδου προνοούμενοι φημὲν ὅτι,
ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κρίνεται
τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν δὲ οὗτος ἔχει ἂν δι' οὗ κρίνεται
δυνήσεται, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ἡ
αἰσθησὶν καὶ διάνοιαν, εἰὰν δεῖξωμεν ὅτι οὔτε δι'
αἰσθήσεως μόνης δύναται κρίναι οὔτε διὰ μόνης
τῆς διανοίας οὔτε δι' ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν, συντόμως
πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς κατὰ μέρος δόξας εἰρήκαμεν· πᾶσαι
γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας ἀναφέρεσθαι
49 στάσεις. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν κενοπαθεῖν τὰς αἰσθήσεις
φασίν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείσθαι ὡν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
δοκοῦσιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα ὑποκείσθαι ὑφ' ὧν οἴονται
κινεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑποκείσθαι τὰ δὲ
μὴ ὑποκείσθαι, τίνι συγκαταθησόμεθα οὐχ ἔξομεν·
οὔτε γὰρ τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρινοῦμεν,
ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ζητοῦμεν πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ
ἀληθῶς καταλαμβάνει, οὔτε ἐτέρῳ τινί, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ
ἔστιν ἄλλο τι κριτήριον δι' οὗ χρὴ κρίναι κατὰ
50 τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν. ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 343.

^b e.g. Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 126 ff.

^c Epicurus and Protagoras; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 204, 369.

^d Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academics; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 369, 388.

discuss first the criterion "By means of which" (or
Instrument) as it is called.

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE CRITERION "BY MEANS OF
WHICH" (OR INSTRUMENT)

Concerning this criterion ^a the controversy which 48
exists amongst the Dogmatists is fierce and, one may
say, unending. We, however,—with a view here also
to a systematic treatment,—maintain that inasmuch
as Man is, according to them, the criterion "By
whom" matters are judged, and Man (as they also
themselves agree) can have no other instrument
by means of which he will be able to judge except
sense and intellect, then if we shall show that he is
unable to judge by means of either sense alone or
intellect alone or both conjoined, we shall have given
a concise answer to all the individual opinions; for
they can all, as it seems, be referred to these three
rival theories. Let us begin with the senses. 49

Since, then, some ^b assert that the senses have
"empty" impressions (none of the objects they seem
to apprehend having any real existence), and others ^c
say that all the objects by which they suppose them
to be moved are really existent, and others again ^d
say that some of the objects are real, some unreal,
we shall not know whom we should assent to. For
we shall not decide the controversy by sense-percep-
tion, since it is regarding this that we are making
our inquiry whether it is illusory or apprehends truly,
nor yet by anything else, seeing that there does not
even exist any other criterion "by means of which"
one ought to judge, according to the present hypo-
thesis. So then the question whether the senses have 50

ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ αἰσθησις ἢ καταλαμβάνει τι· ᾧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνει τι.

- 51 Ἄλλ' ἔστω κατὰ συγχώρησιν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀντιληπτικὰς εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον καὶ οὕτως ἀπιστοὶ εὐρεθήσονται πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων. αἱ γοῦν αἰσθήσεις ὑπεναντίας κινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς, οἷον ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέλιτος ὅτε μὲν πικράζεται ὅτε δὲ γλυκάζεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα ὅτε μὲν αἰμωπὸν ὅτε δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι <δοκεῖ>.¹ ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἑαυτῇ συμφωνεῖ· τὸ γοῦν μύρον ὃ μὲν κεφαλαλγικὸς ἀηδὲς εἶναι φησιν, ὃ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχων ἡδύ. καὶ οἱ θεόληπτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ φρενιτίζοντες ἀκούειν δοκοῦσὶ τιῶν διαλεγόμενων αὐτοῖς, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐπακούομεν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ τοῖς μὲν φλεγμαίνουσιν ἀηδὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ δι' ὑπερβολὴν
- 53 θερμότητος, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις χλιαρὸν. πότερον οὖν πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φήσει τις, ἢ τάσδε μὲν ἀληθεῖς τάσδε δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἢ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπάσας, εἰπεῖν ἀμήχανον, μηδὲν ἡμῶν ἐχόντων κριτήριον ὠμολογημένον δι' οὐ κρινοῦμεν ὃ προκρίνειν μέλλομεν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἀποδείξωμεν εὐπορούντων ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ κεκριμένης, διὰ τὸ μέχρι νῦν ζητεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, δι' οὐ καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ ἀποδείξειν ἐπικρίνεσθαι προσήκει.
- 54 διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἀξιῶν τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν [ἐν τούτοις]² πιστεῦειν, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις μηδαμῶς, ἄτοπος ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ

¹ <δοκεῖ> add. T.

² ἐν τούτοις om. Stephanus.

illusory affections or apprehend some real object will be incapable of either decision or apprehension; and there follows the corollary, that we must not attend to sensation alone in our judgement of matters, since regarding it we cannot so much as affirm that it apprehends anything at all.

But let it be granted, by way of concession, that 51 the senses are apprehensive; yet, even so they will not be found any the less unreliable for judging the external real objects. For certainly the senses are affected in diverse ways by external objects—taste, for instance, perceives the same honey now as bitter and now as sweet; and vision pronounces the same colour now blood-red and now white.^a Nay, even 52 smell is not consistent with itself; for certainly the sufferer from headache declares myrrh to be unpleasant, while one who does not so suffer calls it pleasant. And those who are possessed or in a frenzy fancy they hear persons conversing with them whom we do not hear. And the same water seems to those in a fever to be unpleasant because of its excessive heat, but to all others tepid. Whether, then, one is to call 53 all the appearances true, or some true and some false, or all false, it is impossible to say since we possess no agreed criterion whereby we shall judge the question we are proposing to decide, nor are we even provided with a proof that is true and approved, because we are still in search of the criterion of truth “By means of which” the true proof itself ought to be tested. For these reasons he also who asks us to 54 believe those who are in a natural state, but not those whose disposition is non-natural, will be acting absurdly; for he will not gain credence if he says

^a Cf. i. 100 ff.

ἀναποδείκτως τούτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται, οὔτε ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ καὶ κεκριμένην ἔξει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

55 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ συγχωρήσειέ τις τὰς μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων φαντασίας εἶναι πιστὰς τὰς δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων ἀπίστους, καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατος εὐρεθήσεται ἢ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μόνων κρίσις τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων. ἢ ὄρασις γοῦν καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα τὸν <αὐτὸν>¹ πύργον ὅτε μὲν στρογγύλον ὅτε δὲ τετράγωνον εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τὰ αὐτὰ σιτία ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κεκορεσμένων ἀηδῆ ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πεινῶντων ἡδέα φησὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή παραπλησίως τῆς αὐτῆς φωνῆς νυκτὸς μὲν ὡς εὐμεγέθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡμέρας

56 δὲ <ὡς>² ἀμαυρᾶς, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν δυσώδη ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βυρσοδεψῶν οὐδαμῶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ αὐτῆ ἀφή εἰσιόντων μὲν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον θερμαίνεται ὑπὸ τῆς παραστάδος, ἐξιόντων δὲ ψύχεται. διόπερ ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἑαυταῖς μάχονται, καὶ ἡ διαφωνία ἐστὶν ἀνεπίκριτος, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχομεν ὠμολογημένον <κριτήριον>³ δι' οὗ κρίνεσθαι δύναται, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω μεταφέρειν πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν ἐνδέχεται ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων. διόπερ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές ἴσως τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν μόνην δύνασθαι κρίνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα.

57 Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν μετέλθωμεν τῷ λόγῳ. οἱ τοίνυν ἀξιούντες τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ προσέχων ἐν

this without proof, and, for the reasons given above, he will not possess a true and approved proof.

And even were one to concede that the sense-⁵⁵ impressions of those in a natural state are reliable, and those of men in a non-natural condition unreliable, even so the judgement of external real objects by means of the senses alone will be found to be impossible. For certainly the sense of sight, even when it is in a natural state, pronounces the same tower^a to be at one time round, at another square; and the sense of taste declares the same food to be unpleasant in the case of those full-fed, but pleasant in the case of those who are hungry; and the sense of hearing likewise perceives the same sound as loud by night but as faint by day; and the sense of smell⁵⁶ regards the same objects as malodorous in the case of most people, but not so in the case of tanners; and the same sense of touch feels warmth in the outer hall,^b when we enter the bath-rooms, but cold when we leave them. Therefore, since even when in a natural state the senses contradict themselves, and their dispute is incapable of decision, seeing that we possess no accepted criterion by means of which it can be judged, the same perplexities must necessarily follow. Moreover, for the establishment of this conclusion we may derive still further arguments from our previous discussion of the Modes of Suspension.^c Hence it would probably be untrue to say that sense-perception alone is able to judge real external objects.

Let us, then, proceed in our exposition to the intellect. Now those who claim^d that we should attend

¹ <αὐτὸν> add. Mutsch.

² <ὡς> add. cj. Bekk.

³ <κριτήριον> add. T.

^b Cf. i. 110.

^c Cf. i. 118.

^e See i. 36 ff.

^d Cf. Adv. Log. i. 89 ff.

τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο οὐχ ἔξουσιν δεικνύναι ὅτι καταληπτὸν ἔστι τὸ εἶναι διάνοιαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν Γοργίας οὐδὲν εἶναι φάσκων οὐδὲ διάνοιαν εἶναι φησι, τινὲς δὲ ταύτην ἀποφαίνονται ὑπάρχειν, πῶς οὖν ἐπικρινοῦσι τὴν διαφωνίαν; οὔτε γὰρ διανοία, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν, οὔτε ἄλλω τινί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο εἶναι φασι κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν νῦν ὑποκειμένην, δι' οὗ κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα. ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται πότερον ἔστι διάνοια ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κρίσει, τῇ μηδέπω κατειλημμένῃ.

58 Ἀλλὰ κατειλήφθω ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ὁμολογήσθω τὸ εἶναι ταύτην καθ' ὑπόθεσιν λέγω ὅτι οὐ δύναται κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' ἑαυτὴν ἀκριβῶς ὄρα, ἀλλὰ διαφωνεῖ περὶ τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, πῶς ἂν δυνηθεῖη τῶν ἄλλων
59 τι ἀκριβῶς καταλαμβάνειν; διδομένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν κριτικὴν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν πῶς κατ' αὐτὴν κρινοῦμεν. πολλῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ διάνοιαν διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἕτερα μὲν ἔστιν ἡ Γοργίου διάνοια, καθ' ἣν φησι μηδὲν εἶναι, ἕτερα δὲ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου, καθ' ἣν λέγει πάντα εἶναι, ἕτερα δὲ ἡ τῶν λεγόντων τάδε μὲν εἶναι τάδε δὲ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπικρινώμεν τὴν τῶν διανοιῶν διαφορὰν οὐχ ἔξομεν, οὐδὲ δυνησόμεθα εἰπεῖν ὅτι

^a See *Introd.* p. xv; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 65.

^b i.e. whether in the head or breast or elsewhere; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 313, 348.

to the intellect only in our judgement of things will, in the first place, be unable to show that the existence of intellect is apprehensible. For when Gorgias,^a in denying that anything exists, denies also the existence of intellect, while some declare that it has real existence, how will they decide this contradiction? Not by the intellect, for so they will be assuming the matter in question; nor yet by anything else, since, as they assert, according to our present assumption there exists nothing else by means of which objects are judged. So then the problem as to whether intellect does or does not exist will not admit of decision or apprehension; and from this it follows, as a corollary, that in the judgement of objects we ought not to attend to the intellect alone, which has not as yet been apprehended.

But let it be granted that the intellect has been 58 apprehended, and let us agree, by way of assumption, that it really exists; I still affirm that it cannot judge objects. For if it does not even discern itself accurately but contradicts itself about its own existence and the mode of its origin and the position in which it is placed,^b how can it be able to apprehend anything else accurately? And even if it be granted 59 that the intellect is capable of judging objects, we shall not discover how to judge according to it. For since there exists great divergence in respect of the intellect—for the intellect of Gorgias, according to which he states that nothing exists, is one kind, and another kind is that of Heraclitus, according to which he declares that all things exist, and another that of those who say that some things do and others do not exist—we shall have no means of deciding between these divergent intellects, nor shall we be able to

τῇ μὲν τοῦδε διανοίᾳ κατακολουθεῖν προσήκει τῇ
 60 τοῦδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἦν τε γὰρ διανοία τιμὴ κρίνειν
 τολμῶμεν, τῆς διαφωνίας μέρει συγκατατιθέμενοι
 τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσομεν· ἦν τε ἑτέρῳ τιμῇ,
 ψευσόμεθα ὅτι μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ
 πράγματα.

61 Λοιπὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ λεγο-
 μένου ῥηθέντων δεικνύναι δυνησόμεθα ὅτι μήτε
 τὴν ἀγχινουστέραν τῶν ἄλλων διάνοιαν εὐρεῖν
 δυνάμεθα, ὅτι τε ἂν εὐρωμεν τῶν τε γεγενημένων
 καὶ οὐσῶν διανοιῶν ἀγχινουστέραν διάνοιαν, ἐπεὶ
 62 ἄδηλόν ἐστιν εἰ πάλιν ταύτης ἕτερα ἔσται ἀγχι-
 νουστέρα, οὐ δεῖ προσέχειν αὐτῇ, ὅτι τε κἂν ὑπο-
 θώμεθα διάνοιαν ἧς ἐντρεχεστέρα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,
 οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα τῷ δι' αὐτῆς κρίνοντι, εὐλα-
 βούμενοι μὴ ψευδῆ τιὰ λόγον προφερόμενος διὰ
 τὸ δξυτάτης διανοίας μετεσχηκέναι δύναται ἡμᾶς
 πείθειν ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἐστιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ
 μόνῃ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.

63 Λέιπεται λέγειν ὅτι δι' ἀμφοτέρων. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν
 ἀδύνατον· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐχ ὀδηγοῦσιν αἱ αἰ-
 σθήσεις τὴν διάνοιαν πρὸς κατάληψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐναντιοῦνται αὐτῇ. ἀμέλει γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ μέλι
 τοῖσδε μὲν πικρὸν τοῖσδε δὲ γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι ὁ
 μὲν Δημόκριτος ἔφη μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε
 πικρὸν, ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
 οὕτως ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὀρμωμένη ἡ διάνοια
 διάφορά τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἀναγκά-
 190

assert that it is right to take this man's intellect as
 our guide but not that man's. For if we venture 60
 to judge by any one intellect, by thus agreeing to
 assent to one side in the dispute we shall be assuming
 the matter in question; while if we judge by any-
 thing else, we shall be falsifying the assertion that
 one ought to judge objects by the intellect alone.

Further, we shall be able to show, from the state- 61
 ments made concerning the criterion "By whom"
 (as it is called), that we are unable to discover the
 intellect that is cleverer than all others; and also
 that if we should discover the intellect that is cleverer
 than past and present intellects we ought not to 62
 attend to it, since it is not evident whether yet
 another intellect may not arise which is cleverer than
 it; and further, that even if we assume an intellect
 which none could possibly surpass, we shall not
 assent to the man who judges by means of it, dread-
 ing lest he may put forward some false statement
 and succeed in persuading us of its truth because
 he possesses the keenest intellect. Neither, then, by
 the intellect alone ought we to judge objects.

The only remaining alternative is judgement by 63
 means of both senses and intellect.^a But this again is
 impossible; for not only do the senses not guide the
 intellect to apprehension, but they even oppose it. For
 it is certain, at any rate, that from the fact that honey
 appears bitter to some and sweet to others, Demo-
 critus declared that it is neither sweet nor bitter,
 while Heracleitus said that it is both. And the same
 account may be given of all the other senses and
 sensibles. Thus, when it starts out from the senses,
 the intellect is compelled to make diverse and con-

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 354 ff.

ζεται. τούτο δὲ ἀλλότριόν ἐστι κριτηρίου καταληπτικοῦ.

- 64 *Εἶτα κάκεινο λεκτέον· ἦτοι πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς πάντων διανοαῖς κρινοῦσι τὰ πράγματα ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσαις λέξει τις, ἀδύνατα ἀξιώσει τοσαύτης μάχης ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς διανοαῖς ἐμφαινομένης, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ τῆς Γοργίου διανοίας ἀπόφασίς ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖν μῆτε αἰσθῆσαι μῆτε διανοία προσέχειν, περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος. εἰ δὲ τισίν, πῶς κρινοῦσιν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ <τῆδε>¹ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν δεῖ ταῖσδε δὲ οὐ, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ὠμολογημένον δι' οὗ τὰς διαφόρους αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ διανοίας ἐπικρινοῦσιν; ἦν δὲ λέγωσιν ὅτι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι κρινοῦμεν, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάξουσιν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰ δύναται τις διὰ τούτων κρίνειν ζητοῦμεν.*
- 66 *Εἶτα κάκεινο ῥητέον ὅτι ἦτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας κρινεῖ τις,² ἢ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀμφοτέρα κρίνειν ἐβελήσουσιν, οὐκέτι δι' αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας κρινοῦσιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἐνὸς τούτων, ὅπερ ἂν ἔλωνται· καὶ παρακολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς αἱ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημέναὶ ἀπορίαι. εἰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ*

¹ <τῆδε> add. cj. Bekk.

² κρινεῖ τις ego; κρίνεται L; κρίνετε MEAB, Bekk.: κρινοῦσιν T, Mutsch.

flicting statements; and this is alien to a criterion of apprehension.

Then there is this also to be said: they will judge 64 objects either by all the senses and by all men's intellects or by some. But if a man shall say "by all," he will be claiming what is impossible in view of the immense discrepancy which obviously exists amongst the senses and the intellects; and moreover, by reason of the assertion of Gorgias's intellect that "we must not give heed either to sense or to intellect," the man's statement will be demolished. And if they shall say "by some," how will they decide that we ought to give heed to these senses and this intellect and not to those, seeing that they possess no accepted criterion by which to judge the differing senses and intellects? And if they shall say that we will judge 65 the senses and the intellects by the intellect and the senses, they are assuming the matter in question; for what we are questioning is the possibility of judging by means of these.

Another point we must make is this: either one 66 will judge both the senses and the intellects by the senses, or both the senses and the intellects by the intellects, or the senses by the senses and the intellect by the intellects, or the intellects by the senses and the senses by the intellect. If then they shall propose to judge both objects by the senses or by the intellect, they will no longer be judging by sense and intellect but by one of these two, whichever one they may choose, and thus they will be entangled in the perplexities previously mentioned. And if they shall 67 judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by

τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσιν, ἐπειδὴ μάχονται καὶ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ διάνοιαι διανοίαις, ἥτινα ἂν λάβωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν· μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας ὡς πιστὸν ἤδη λήφονται πρὸς τὴν τῶν
 68 ἐπ' ἴσης αὐτῷ ζητουμένων ἐπίκρισιν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διανοιῶν λόγος. εἰ δὲ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσι τῇ διανοίᾳ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὁ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, καθ' ὃν ἵνα μὲν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπικριθῶσι δεῖ προκεκρίσθαι τὰς διανοίας, ἵνα δὲ αἱ διάνοιαι δοκιμα-
 69 σθῶσι, χρὴ προδιακρίνεσθαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ἐπεὶ οὖν μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τὰ ὁμογενῆ κριτήρια δύναται ἐπικρίνεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ ἐνὸς γένους ἀμφοτέ-
 70 τερα τὰ γένη μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἐναλλάξ, οὐ δυνασόμεθα προκρίνειν διάνοιαν διανοίας ἢ αἰσθησιν αἰσθήσεως. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔξομεν διὰ τίνος κρινόμεν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις κρίνειν δυνασόμεθα, μήτε εἰσόμεθα ποίαις μὲν δεῖ κρίνειν ποίαις δὲ μή, οὐχ ἔξομεν δι' οὗ κρινόμεν τὰ πράγματα.
 Ὡστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀνύπαρκτον ἂν εἴη τὸ κριτήριον τὸ δι' οὗ.

Z'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΘ' Ο

70 Ἴδωμεν οὖν ἐξῆς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα. πρῶτον τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἀνεπινόητός

* i.e. the Stoics, cf. § 16; *Adv. Log.* i. 35, 370. For the Stoic doctrine of "presentation" and the "Criterion" see *Intro.* p. xxv.

the intellect, then, since both senses conflict with senses and intellects with intellects, whichever of the conflicting senses they shall adopt for judging the rest of the senses, they will be assuming the matter in question; for they will be adopting one section of the series in dispute, as being already reliable, to decide about the others which, equally with it, are in question. And the same argument applies to the 68 intellects. And if they shall judge the intellects by the senses, and the senses by the intellect, this involves circular reasoning inasmuch as it is required that the intellects should be judged first in order that the senses may be judged, and the senses be first scrutinized in order that the intellects may be tested. Since, therefore, criteria of the one species cannot be 69 judged by those of a like species, nor those of both the species by those of one species, nor conversely by those of an unlike species, we shall not be able to prefer intellect to intellect or sense to sense. And because of this we shall have nothing by which to judge; for if we shall be unable to judge by all the senses and intellects, and shall not know either by which of them we ought and by which we ought not to judge, then we shall possess no means by which to judge objects.

Consequently, for these reasons also the criterion "By means of which" will have no real existence.

CHAPTER VII.—OF THE CRITERION "ACCORDING TO WHICH"

Let us consider next the Criterion "According to 70 which," as they^a say, objects are judged. In the first place, then, we may say this of it, that "presentation"

ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία. λέγουσι γὰρ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν τι πνεύματος, ὡς φασίν, οὐ δυνήσεται τις τύπωσιν ἐπινοεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε κατ' εἰσοχὴν καὶ ἐξοχὴν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σφραγίδων ὀρώμεν, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τερατολογουμένην ἑτεροωτικήν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μνήμην τοσούτων ἀναδέξαιτο θεωρημάτων ὅσα συνίστησι τέχνην, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις ἑτεροώσεσι τῶν

71 προὑποκειμένων ἀπαλειφομένων. εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναίτο ἡ φαντασία, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ καταληψόμεθα.

72 Εἶτα εἰ καὶ δοίημεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ἡ φαντασία, οὐ δύναται κρίνεσθαι [καὶ] κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ φαντασιοῦται ἢ διάνοια, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσιν, μόνα δέ, εἰ ἄρα, τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη. καὶ ἡ φαντασία οὖν τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσται, ὅπερ διαφέρει τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαι με καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι,

73 ἀλλὰ διαφέρει. εἰ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἡ φαντασία ἔσται οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου ἀλλ' ἑτέρου τινὸς διαφέροντος αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταύτην κρίνει ἡ διάνοια,

^a Or "ruling principle," *cf.* i. 128, *Adv. Log.* i. 380; *Introd.* p. xxv.

^b *Cf.* § 81 *infra*, iii. 188; *Introd.* p. xxv.

^c The first of these views is ascribed to Cleanthes, the second to Chrysippus, *cf. Adv. Log.* i. 228, 372; *Introd.* p. xxv.

is inconceivable. They declare that "presentation" is an impression on "the regent part."^a Since, then, the soul, and the regent part, is breath or something more subtle than breath,^b as they affirm, no one will be able to conceive of an impression upon it either by way of depression and eminence, as we see in the case of seals, or by way of the magical "alteration" they talk about^c; for the soul will not be able to conserve the remembrance of all the concepts that compose an art, since the pre-existing concepts are obliterated by the subsequent "alterations." Yet 71 even if "presentation" could be conceived, it would still be non-apprehensible; for since it is an affection of the regent part, and the regent part, as we have shown,^d is not apprehended, neither shall we apprehend its affection.

Further, even were we to grant that the "presenta- 72 tion" is apprehended, objects cannot be judged according to it; for the intellect, as they assert, does not make contact with external objects and receive presentations by means of itself but by means of the senses, and the senses do not apprehend external real objects but only, if at all, their own affections.^e So then the presentation will be that of the affection of the sense, which is different from the external reality; for honey is not the same as my feeling of sweetness nor gall the same as my feeling of bitterness, but a different thing. And if this affection differs 73 from the external real object, the presentation will not be that of the external reality but of something else which is different therefrom. If, therefore, the intellect judges according to this, it judges badly and

^d See §§ 57 ff. *supra*.

^e *i.e.* sensations or feelings.

φαύλως κρίνει καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὰ ἐκτὸς κρίνεσθαι λέγειν.

74 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καταλαμβάνει διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν παθῶν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διὰ τὸ ὅμοια τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις. πόθεν γὰρ εἴσεται ἡ διάνοια εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, μήτε αὐτῇ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐντυγχάνουσα, μήτε τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῇ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν δηλοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐαυτῶν πάθη, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπελογισάμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν μὲν Σωκράτην εἰκόνα δὲ τούτου θεασάμενος οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστὶν ἢ εἰκὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ διάνοια τὰ μὲν πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐποπτεύουσα τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς μὴ θεωροῦσα οὐδὲ εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθη τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις εἴσεται. οὐδὲ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἄρα δυνήσεται ταῦτα κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν.

78 Ἄλλὰ δώμεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, πρὸς τῷ ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἔτι καὶ ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι τοῦ κρίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι τοῦ λόγου πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπομνήσαντος. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι πάση φαντασίᾳ πιστεύομεν <καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐπικρινοῦμεν, ἢ τιμὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάση, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ξενιάδου φαντασίᾳ πιστεύομεν>¹ καθ' ἣν ἔλεγε πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀπίστους εἶναι, καὶ περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ὥστε

¹ <καὶ . . . πιστεύομεν> add. T.

not according to reality. Consequently, it is absurd to say that external objects are judged according to the presentation.

Nor, again, is it possible to assert that the soul ⁷⁴ apprehends external realities by means of the affections of sense owing to the similarity of the affections of the senses to the external real objects. For how is the intellect to know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has not itself encountered the external objects, and the senses do not inform it about their real nature but only about their own affections, as I have argued from the Modes of Suspension?^a For just as the man ⁷⁵ who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of him does not know whether the picture is like Socrates, so also the intellect when it gazes on the affections of the senses but does not behold the external objects will not so much as know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the external realities. So that not even on the ground of resemblance will he be able to judge these objects according to the presentation.

But let us grant by way of concession that in ⁷⁶ addition to being conceived and apprehended the presentation is also such that it admits of objects being judged according to it, although the argument points to an entirely opposite conclusion. In this case we shall either believe every presentation, or impression, and judge according thereto, or some one impression. But if we are to believe every impression, clearly we shall believe also that of Xenias ^b according to which he asserted that all impressions are untrustworthy, and our statement will be reversed and made to say that all impressions are not of such a sort

^a See i. 100 ff.

^b Cf. § 18 *supra*.

καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματα·
 77 εἰ δὲ τισὶν, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς
 φαντασίαις πιστεύειν προσήκει ταῖσδε δὲ ἀπιστεῖν;
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄνευ φαντασίας, δώσουσιν ὅτι παρέλκει
 ἢ φαντασία πρὸς τὸ κρίνεω, εἶγε χωρὶς αὐτῆς
 κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματά [τινα] λέξουσιν·
 εἰ δὲ μετὰ φαντασίας, πῶς λήψονται τὴν φαντα-
 78 σίαν ἢν παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φαν-
 τασίων κρίσιν; ἢ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ἄλλης φαντασίας
 δεήσει πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν [τῶν ἄλλων φαντασιῶν],¹
 καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνης κρίσιν ἄλλης, καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον.
 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρῖναι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα εὐρεῖν
 ποίαις μὲν φαντασίαις ὡς κριτηρίοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι
 ποίαις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν κἂν δῶμεν ὅτι κατὰ
 τὰς φαντασίας δεῖ κρίνεω τὰ πράγματα, ἐκατέ-
 ρωθεν περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάσης
 πιστεύειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τισὶ μὲν πιστεύειν ὡς κρι-
 τηρίοις τισὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν, συνάγεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν
 τὰς φαντασίας πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
 ὡς κριτήρια παραλαμβάνειν.

79 Ταῦτα μὲν ἀρκεῖ νῦν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγ-
 ματα ἐλέγετο. εἰδέναι δὲ χρῆ ὅτι οὐ πρόκειται
 ἡμῶν ἀποφῆσθαι ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ κρι-
 τήριον τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας (τοῦτο γὰρ δογματικόν)·
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ πιθανῶς δοκοῦσι κατ-
 εσκευακέναι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι κριτήριον ἀληθείας, ἡμεῖς
 αὐτοῖς πιθανοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι λόγους ἀντεθή-
 καμεν, οὔτε ὅτι ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶ διαβεβαιούμενοι οὔτε
 ὅτι πιθανώτεροι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν φαινο-

¹ [τῶν δ. φ.] del. Papp.

^o Cf. § 103 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* i. 443.

that objects can be judged according to them. And 77
 if we are to believe some, how shall we decide that
 it is proper to believe these and disbelieve those?
 For if they say we are to do so without presentation,
 they will be granting that presentation is superfluous
 for judging, inasmuch as they will be stating that
 objects can be judged without it; while if they say
 “by the aid of presentation,” how will they select
 the presentation which they are adopting for the
 purpose of judging all the other presentations? Once 78
 again they will need a second presentation to judge
 the first, and a third to judge the second, and so on
ad infinitum. But it is impossible to judge an infinite
 series; and therefore it is impossible to discover what
 sort of presentations we ought to employ as criteria,
 and what we ought not. Seeing, then, that, even
 should we grant that one ought to judge objects
 according to presentations, whether we adopt the
 alternative of trusting all as criteria or that of trusting
 some and distrusting others, in either case the argu-
 ment is overthrown, and we are forced to conclude
 that we ought not to adopt presentations as criteria
 for the judging of objects.

This is enough to say now, in our outline sketch, 79
 with reference to the criterion “According to which,”
 as it was said, objects are judged. But one should
 notice that we do not propose to assert that the
 criterion of truth is unreal ^a (for that would be dog-
 matism); but since the Dogmatists appear to have
 established plausibly that there really is a criterion of
 truth, we have set up counter-arguments which appear
 to be plausible; and though we do not positively
 affirm either that they are true or that they are more
 plausible than their opposites, yet because of the

μένην ἴσθην πιθανότητα τούτων τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων τὴν ἐποχὴν συναγορτες.

H'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΛΗΘΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

80 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν κριτήριον, ἀχρηστον εὐρίσκεται καὶ μάταιον, εἰάν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀνύπαρκτος μὲν
81 ἔστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια ἀνυπόστατον δὲ τὸ ἀληθές. ὑπομνήσκομεν δὲ οὕτως. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθές τριχῶς, οὐσία συστάσει δυνάμει· οὐσία μὲν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικῆ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα·
82 ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα), συστάσει δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἀπλοῦν τί ἐστιν, οἷον "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ [τῆς] πολλῶν ἀληθῶν
83 γνώσεων¹ συνίσταται, δυνάμει δὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν.

¹ γνώσεων T; γνώσεως MSS. (τῆς . . . γν. Bekk.).

^o Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 38 ff. S. argues that, to go by the Stoics' own statement, neither "truth" (which is "corporeal") nor "the true" (particular "judgement," which is "incorporeal") has any real existence: he terms the former "unreal," or "non-existent" (ἀνύπαρκτος), the latter "non-substantial" (ἀνυπόστατον).

apparently equal plausibility of these arguments and of those propounded by the Dogmatists we deduce suspension of judgement.

CHAPTER VIII.—OF THE TRUE AND TRUTH

Even were we to grant, by way of hypothesis, that 80 a criterion of truth exists, it is found to be useless and vain if we recall that, so far as the statements of the Dogmatists go, truth is unreal and the true non-substantial.^a The passage we recall is this: "The 81 true is said to differ from truth in three ways—in essence, composition, potency. In essence, since the true is incorporeal (for it is judgement and "expression"^b), while truth is a body (for it is knowledge declaratory of all true things, and knowledge is a particular state of the regent part, just as the fist is a particular state of the hand, and the regent part is a body; for according to them it is breath). In com- 82 position, because the true is a simple thing, as for example 'I converse,' whereas truth is a compound of many true cognitions.^c In potency, since truth 83 depends on knowledge but the true does not altogether so depend. Consequently, as they say, truth exists only in the good man, but the true in the bad man as well; for it is possible for the bad man to utter something true."

^b Literally "the utterable" (*lekton*), or thought in its relation to speech; *i.e.* the meaning or significance of a word or name (the idea or mental picture evoked by it) as distinguished from (1) the name itself, as uttered (*φωνή*), and (2) the real object, existing outside the mind (*ἐκτός*), denoted by the name: these two last were said (by the Stoics) to be "corporeal."

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 41 ff.

84 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί· ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τῆς κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν προαιρέσεως στοχαζόμενοι πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἀληθὲς νῦν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα, ἐπεὶ συμπεριγράφεται τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, σύστημα τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως εἶναι λεγομένη. πάλιν δὲ ἐπεὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι καθολικώτεροι, δι' ὧν αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κινούμεν, οἱ δὲ εἰδικοί, δι' ὧν δείκνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ἐν λεκτῷ ἢ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας, τοὺς καθολικωτέρους ἐκθέσθαι μόνους ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖν ἡγοούμεθα. ὡσπερ γὰρ τείχος θεμελίῳ κατενεχθέντι καὶ τὰ ὑπερκείμενα πάντα συγκαταφέρεται, οὕτω τῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ὑποστάσει διατρεπομένη καὶ αἱ κατὰ μέρος τῶν δογματικῶν εὔρεσιλογίαι συμπεριγράφονται.

Θ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ

85 Διαφωνίας τοίνυν οὔσης περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν φασιν εἶναι τι ἀληθὲς τινὲς δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρῖναι, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λέγων εἶναι τι ἀληθὲς οὔτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν· ἢν τε καὶ ἀπόδειξιν βούληται φέρειν, ἢν μὲν ψευδῆ ταύτην εἶναι συνμολογήσῃ, ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι λέγων εἰς τὸν διάλληλόν τε ἐμπίπτει λόγον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπίρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδείξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα γνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

204

Such are the statements of the Dogmatists. But ⁸⁴ we,—having regard here again to the plan of our treatise,—shall confine our present discussion to the true, since its refutation entails that of truth as well, it being defined as the “system of the knowledge of things true.” Again, since some of our arguments, whereby we dispute the very existence of the true, are more general, others of a specific kind, whereby we prove that the true does not exist in utterance or in expression or in the movement of the intellect, we deem it sufficient for the present to set forth only those of the more general kind. For just as, when the foundation of a wall collapses, all the superstructure collapses along with it, so also, when the substantial existence of the true is refuted, all the particular inventions of the logic of the Dogmatists are included in the refutation.

CHAPTER IX.—DOES ANYTHING TRUE REALLY EXIST ?

Seeing, then, that there is a controversy amongst ⁸⁵ the Dogmatists regarding “the true,” since some assert that something true exists, others that nothing true exists, it is impossible to decide the controversy, because the man who says that something true exists will not be believed without proof, on account of the controversy ; and if he wishes to offer proof, he will be disbelieved if he acknowledges that his proof is false, whereas if he declares that his proof is true he becomes involved in circular reasoning and will be required to show proof of the real truth of his proof, and another proof of that proof, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to prove an infinite series ; and so it is impossible also to get to know that something true exists.

205

- 86 Καὶ μὴν τό τι, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώ-
 τατον, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἔστω ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές
 οὔτε ψεῦδος ἢ καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ψεῦδος αὐτὸ εἶναι φήσουσιν, ὁμολογήσουσιν ὅτι
 ἔστι πάντα ψευδῆ. ὡςπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον
 ἔμφυχόν ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ζῶα τὰ κατὰ μέρος
 ἔμφυχά ἐστιν, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γενικώτατον πάντων
 τό τι ψεῦδος ἔστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔσται
 ψευδῆ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. ὥ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδὲν
 εἶναι ψεῦδος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ "πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ"
 καὶ τὸ "ἔστι τι ψεῦδος" τῶν πάντων καθεστῶς
 ψεῦδος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστὶ τό τι, πάντα ἔσται
 ἀληθῆ· ὥ συνεισάγεται πάλιν τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές,
 εἶγε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τι ὑπάρχον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μηδὲν
- 87 εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ψεῦδος ἔστι
 καὶ ἀληθές τό τι, ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ
 ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ ἀληθές. ἐξ οὗ συνάγεται τὸ
 μηδὲν φύσει ἀληθές εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ φύσιν ἔχον
 τοιαύτην ὥστε εἶναι ἀληθές, πάντως οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὔτε ψεῦδος ἔστιν οὔτε ἀληθές τό
 τι, ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους μήτε
 ψευδῆ μήτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔσται ἀληθῆ·
 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰ ἔστιν
 ἀληθές.
- 88 Πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ
 ἀληθῆ, ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν
 ἄδηλά ἐστι τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν
 ἀληθές, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ
 μὲν οὖν φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἤτοι
 πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λέξουσιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἢ τινά.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν πάντα, περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος· φαίνεται

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 32 ff.; *Introd.* p. xxvi.

Moreover, the "something," which is, they declare, 86
 the highest genus of all,^a is either true or false
 or neither false nor true or both false and true.
 If, then, they shall assert that it is false they will
 be confessing that all things are false. For just as it
 follows because "animal" is animate that all parti-
 cular animals also are animate, so too if the highest
 genus of all ("something") is false all the particulars
 also will be false and nothing true. And this involves
 also the conclusion that nothing is false; for the very
 statements "all things are false," and "something
 false exists," being themselves included in the "all,"
 will be false. And if the "something" is true, all
 things will be true; and from this again it follows
 that nothing is true, since this statement itself (I
 mean that "nothing is true") being "something" is
 true. And if the "something" is both false and 87
 true, each of its particulars will be both false and true.
 From which we conclude that nothing is really true;
 for that which has its real nature such that it is true
 will certainly not be false. And if the "something"
 is neither false nor true, it is acknowledged that all
 the particulars also, being declared to be neither
 false nor true, will not be true. So for these reasons
 it will be non-evident to us whether the true exists.

Furthermore, the true things are either apparent 88
 only, or non-evident only, or in part non-evident and
 in part apparent; ^b but none of these alternatives is
 true, as we shall show; therefore nothing is true. If,
 however, the true things are apparent only, they will
 assert either that all or that some of the apparent are
 true. And if they say "all," the argument is over-

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 17 ff. By "true things" are meant
 judgements or propositions which conform to fact.

- γάρ τισι τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ τινά, ἀνεπικρίτως μὲν οὐ δύναται τις λέγειν ὅτι τάδε μὲν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ, κριτηρίω δὲ χρώμενος ἦτοι φαινόμενον εἶναι λέξει τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἀδῆλον. καὶ ἀδῆλον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· μόνα γὰρ 89 ὑπόκειται νῦν ἀληθῆ τὰ φαινόμενα. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἐπεὶ ζητεῖται τίνα μὲν φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τίνα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον φαινόμενον πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαινομένων πάλιν ἑτέρου δεήσεται κριτηρίου φαινομένου, κάκεινο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρίνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καταλαβεῖν εἰ φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ.
- 90 Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ὁ λέγων τὰ ἀδῆλα μόνον εἶναι ἀληθῆ πάντα μὲν οὐ λέξει εἶναι ἀληθῆ (οὐ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀληθές εἶναι λέξει καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν)· εἰ δὲ τινά, τίνοι κρινοῦμεν ὅτι τάδε μὲν τὰ ἀδῆλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; φαινομένω μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀδῆλω, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν² τίνα τῶν ἀδῆλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τίνα ψευδῆ, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδῆλον ἀδῆλου ἑτέρου τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος αὐτό, κάκεινο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀδῆλα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ.
- 91 Λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἀδῆλα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἦτοι γὰρ πάντα τὰ τε φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀδῆλα

¹ καὶ Heintz: ἢ mss., Bekk.

² ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν T: ἐπιζητοῦμεν mss., Bekk.

* This is incorrect; on the hypothesis, non-evidents may also be true.

thrown; for it is apparent to some that nothing is true. If, again, they say "some," no one can assert without testing that these phenomena are true, those false, while if he employs a test or criterion he will say either that this criterion is apparent or that it is non-evident. But it is certainly not non-evident; for it is now being assumed^a that the apparent objects only are true. And if it is apparent, since the matter 89 in question is what apparent things are true and what false, that apparent thing which is adopted for the purpose of judging the apparent objects will itself in turn require an apparent criterion, and this again another, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to judge an infinite series; and hence it is impossible to apprehend whether the true things are apparent only.

Similarly also he who declares that the non-evident 90 only are true will not imply that they are all true (for he will not say that it is true that the stars^b are even in number and that they are also odd); while if some are true, whereby shall we decide that these non-evident things are true and those false? Certainly not by an apparent criterion; and if by a non-evident one, then since our problem is which of the non-evident things are true and which false, this non-evident criterion will itself also need another to judge it, and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. Neither, then, are the true things non-evident only.

The remaining alternative is to say that of the true 91 some are apparent, some non-evident; but this too is absurd. For either all the apparent and all the non-evident are true, or some of the apparent and

^b A favourite example of the "non-evident," cf. § 97 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* ii. 147, etc.

ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ἢ τινὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τινὰ ἄδηλα. εἰ
 μὲν οὖν πάντα, πάλιν περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος,
 ἀληθοῦς εἶναι διδομένου καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές,
 λεχθήσεται τε ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ἀπίους εἶναι τοὺς
 92 ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τοῦτους ὑπάρχειν. εἰ
 δὲ τινὰ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τινὰ τῶν ἀδήλων
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν ὅτι τῶν φαινομένων
 τάδε μὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; εἰ μὲν διὰ
 φαινομένου, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται ὁ λόγος· εἰ
 δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα δεῖται κρίσεως,
 πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ ἄδηλον διὰ τίνος κριθήσεται; εἰ
 μὲν διὰ φαινομένου, ὁ διάλληλος εὕρισκεται τρόπος,
 93 εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων λεκτέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδήλω
 τινὶ κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται,
 ὁ δὲ φαινομένῳ ἢ αἰεὶ φαινόμενον προσλαμβάνων
 εἰς ἄπειρον, ἢ ἐπὶ ἄδηλον μεταβαίνων εἰς τὸν
 διάλληλον. ψεῦδος ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τῶν ἀληθῶν
 τὰ μὲν εἶναι φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα.
 94 Εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ μήτε τὰ
 ἄδηλα μόνα, μήτε τινὰ μὲν φαινόμενα τινὰ δὲ
 ἄδηλα, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν
 ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ
 ἀληθοῦς χρησιμεύειν, ἄχρηστον καὶ μάταιόν ἐστι
 τὸ κριτήριον, κἄν δώμεν αὐτὸ κατὰ συγχώρησιν
 ἔχειν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν. καὶ εἴγε ἐφεκτέον περὶ τοῦ
 εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοὺς λέγοντας
 ὡς διαλεκτικῆ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ψευδῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν
 καὶ οὐδετέρων προπετεύεσθαι.

* For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 229, 247; *Adv. Eth.* 187; it is ascribed to Poseidonius by Diog. Laert. vii. 62.

some of the non-evident. If, then, we say "all," the argument will again be overthrown, since the truth is granted of the statement "nothing is true," and the truth will be asserted of both the statements "the stars are even in number" and "they are odd." But if some of the apparent are true and some of the 92 non-evident, how shall we judge that of the apparent these are true but those false? For if we do so by means of an apparent thing, the argument is thrown back *ad infinitum*; and if by means of a thing non-evident, then, since the non-evidents also require to be judged, by what means is this non-evident thing to be judged? If by an apparent thing, we fall into circular reasoning; and if by a thing non-evident, into the regress *ad infinitum*. And about the non- 93 evident we must make a similar statement; for he who attempts to judge them by something non-evident is thrown back *ad infinitum*, while he who judges by a thing apparent or with the constant assistance of a thing apparent falls back *ad infinitum*, or, if he passes over to the apparent, is guilty of circular reasoning. It is false, therefore, to say that of the true some are apparent, some non-evident.

If, then, neither the apparent nor the non-evident 94 alone are true, nor yet some apparent and some non-evident things, nothing is true. But if nothing is true, and the criterion seems to require the true for the purpose of judging, the criterion is useless and vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it possesses some substantial reality. And if we have to suspend judgement as to whether anything true exists, it follows that those who declare that "dialectic is the science of things true and false and neither" ^a speak rashly.

95 Ἀπόρου δὲ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας φανέντος, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν εἶναι δοκούντων, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἔτι οἶόν τέ ἐστι διασχυρίζεσθαι, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν ταῦτα καταλαμβάνει οἱ δογματικοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἐὰν ἐπέχειν περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν καλουμένων ἀναγκαζώμεθα, πῶς ἂν περὶ τῶν
96 ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμήσῃμεν; ἐκ πολλοῦ δὲ τοῦ περιόντος καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων ἰδίως ἐνστησόμεθα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διὰ σημείου τε καὶ ἀποδείξεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ κρατύνεσθαι δοκεῖ, διὰ βραχέων ὑπομνήσομεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν προσήκει. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ σημείου· καὶ γὰρ ἢ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείου εἶναι δοκεῖ.

I.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥ

97 Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἀδηλα τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδηλα τὰ δὲ φύσει ἀδηλα. καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γινῶσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἶόν ἐστι τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, καθάπαξ δὲ ἀδηλα ἃ μὴ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν κατάληψιν, ὡς τὸ ἀρτίους
98 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας, πρὸς καιρὸν δὲ ἀδηλα ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρὰ τινος ἕξωθεν περιστάσεις κατὰ καιρὸν ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, ὡς ἐμοὶ νῦν ἢ

^a Cf. i. 62-63.

^b i.e. the Stoics. "Pre-evident" = evident of themselves, self-manifesting; cf. i. 138.

^c Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141, 144, 316.

^d Cf. § 90 supra.

And since the criterion of truth has appeared to be 95 unattainable, it is no longer possible to make positive assertions either about those things which (if we may depend on the statements of the Dogmatists) seem to be evident or about those which are non-evident; for since the Dogmatists suppose they apprehend the latter from the things evident, if we are forced to suspend judgement about the evident, how shall we dare to make pronouncements about the non-evident? Yet, by way of super-addition,^a we shall 96 also raise separate objections against the non-evident class of objects. And since they seem to be apprehended and confirmed by means of sign and proof, we shall show briefly that it is proper to suspend judgement also about sign and proof. We will begin with sign; for indeed proof seems to be a kind of sign.

CHAPTER X.—CONCERNING SIGN

Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogma- 97 tists,^b are pre-evident, some non-evident; and of the non-evident, some are altogether non-evident, some occasionally non-evident, some naturally non-evident. Pre-evident are, as they assert, those which come to our knowledge of themselves,^c as for example the fact that it is day-time; altogether non-evident are those which are not of a nature to fall within our apprehension, as that the stars^d are even in number; occasionally non-evident are those which, though 98 patent in their nature, are occasionally rendered non-evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,^e

^e i.e. distance in space. From this we infer that Sextus was not then residing at Athens.

τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτει ἐνάργεια, ὡς οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν φαίνονται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἐξ ἑτέρων καταλαμβάνεσθαι ἂν νομισθῆεν, οἷον τῶν ἰδρώτων ἢ τινος παρα-
 99 πλησιου. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλα μὴ δεῖσθαι σημείου φασίν· ἐξ ἑαυτῶν γὰρ αὐτὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνόμενα. τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα καὶ τὰ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ σημείων μὲν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐ μὴν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν.

100 Τῶν οὖν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ὑπομνηστικά κατ' αὐτοὺς τὰ δ' ἐνδεικτικά. καὶ ὑπομνηστικὸν μὲν σημεῖον καλοῦσιν ὃ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας ἅμα τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν, ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ἐναργῶς μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός.

101 ἐνδεικτικὸν δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον, ὡς φασίν, ὃ μὴ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς σημαίνει τὸ οὐδ' ἔστι σημεῖον, ὡςπεροῦν αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεις σημειᾶ εἰσι τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅθεν καὶ ὀρίζονται τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον οὕτως· σημείον ἔστιν ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον,

^a Cf. §§ 146, 318. For the "pores" (or excretory "ducts," or "passages") as "intelligible" (νοητοί), or objects of thought as opposed to sense, cf. § 140, *Adv. Log.* ii. 306.

^b The Stoic doctrine. Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 151 ff., 156.

^c Cf. § 104 *infra*. As smoke "indicates" fire, so in the

as the city of Athens is now to me; naturally non-evident are those which are not of such a nature^a as to fall within our clear perception, like the intelligible pores; for these never appear of themselves but may be thought to be apprehended, if at all, owing to other things, such as perspirations or something of the sort. Now the pre-evident objects, they say, do
 99 not require a sign, for they are apprehended of themselves. And neither do the altogether non-evident, since of course they are not even apprehended at all. But such objects as are occasionally or naturally non-evident are apprehended by means of signs—not of course by the same signs, but by "suggestive" signs in the case of the occasionally non-evident and by "indicative" signs in the case of the naturally non-evident.

Of the signs, then, according to them, some are
 100 suggestive, some indicative.^b They term a sign "suggestive" when, being mentally associated with the thing signified, it by its clearness at the time of its perception, though the thing signified remains non-evident, suggests to us the thing associated with it, which is not clearly perceived at the moment—as for instance in the case of smoke and fire. An
 101 "indicative" sign, they say, is that which is not clearly associated with the thing signified, but signifies that whereof it is a sign by its own particular nature and constitution, just as, for instance, the bodily motions are signs of the soul. Hence, too, they define this sign as follows: "An indicative sign is an antecedent judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,^c hypothetical syllogism—"If there is smoke, there is fire; but in fact there is smoke; therefore there is fire"—the "antecedent" (or "if"-clause) "reveals" (or is a "sign" of) the "consequent" judgement "there is fire."

102 ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος." διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν σημείων διαφορᾶς, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐ πρὸς πᾶν σημεῖον ἀντιλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν πεπλάσθαι δοκοῦν. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνηστικὸν πεπίστευται ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου, ἐπεὶ καπνὸν ἰδὼν τις σημειοῦται πῦρ καὶ οὐλήν θεασάμενος τραῦμα γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. ὅθεν οὐ μόνον οὐ μαχόμεθα τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ συναγωνιζόμεθα, τῷ μὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεπιστευμένῳ ἀδοξάστως συγκατατιθέμενοι, τοῖς δὲ <ὑπὸ>¹ τῶν δογματικῶν ἰδίως ἀναπλαττομένοις ἀνθιστάμενοι.

103 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἤρμοζεν ἰσως προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς σαφηνείας τοῦ ζητουμένου· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησην χωρῶμεν, οὐκ ἀνύπαρκτον δεῖξαι τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον πάντως ἐσπουδακότες, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαινομένην ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν φερομένων λόγων πρὸς τε τὴν ὑπαρξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν ὑπομινύσκοντες.

IA'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ

104 Τὸ σημεῖον τοίνυν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἀνεπινόητον ἐστίν. αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διεληφέναι δοκοῦντες, οἱ στωικοί, βουλόμενοι παραστήσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σημείου, φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀξίωμα φασιν εἶναι λεκτὸν αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὑγιές δὲ συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον

¹ <ὑπὸ> add. T, cj. Bekk.

which serves to reveal the consequent." Seeing, 102 then, that there are, as we have said, two different kinds of sign, we do not argue against every sign but only against the indicative kind as it seems to be invented by the Dogmatists. For the suggestive sign is relied on by living experience, since when a man sees smoke fire is signified, and when he beholds a scar he says that there has been a wound. Hence, not only do we not fight against living experience, but we even lend it our support by assenting undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing the private inventions of the Dogmatists.

These prefatory remarks it was, perhaps, fitting to 103 make for the sake of elucidating the object of our inquiry. It remains for us to proceed to our refutation, not in any anxiety to show that the indicative sign is wholly unreal, but reminding ourselves of the apparent equivalence of the arguments adduced for its reality and for its unreality.

CHAPTER XI.—DOES AN INDICATIVE SIGN EXIST?

Now the sign, judging by the statements of the 104 Dogmatists about it, is inconceivable. Thus, for instance, the Stoics, who seem to have defined it exactly, in attempting to establish the conception of the sign, state that "A sign is an antecedent judgement in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves to reveal the consequent"; and "judgement" they define as "A self-complete expression^a which is of itself declaratory"; and "valid hypothetical syllo-

^a An "expression," *lekton* (see p. 203 note b), may be either "deficient" (e.g. "writes") or "complete" (e.g. "he writes"); cf. § 81, *Adv. Log.* ii. 71.

- 105 ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον ἤτοι ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτερωτή ἔστιν ἡ γῆ," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ ἔστιν ἡ γῆ, πέταται ἡ γῆ," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ." τούτων δὲ μόνον τὸ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος μοχθηρὸν εἶναι φασι, τὰ
- 106 δ' ἄλλα ὑγιῆ. προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐν συνημμένῳ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές ἡγούμενον. ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δὲ ἔστι τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ "γάλα ἔχει αὐτῇ" τοῦ "κεκύηκεν αὐτῇ" δηλωτικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ "εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὐτῇ, κεκύηκεν αὐτῇ."
- 107 Ταῦτα μὲν οὗτοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν πρῶτον ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοί φασι μὴ εἶναι τι λεκτόν οἱ δὲ στωικοὶ εἶναι, ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ στωικοὶ εἶναι τι λεκτόν, ἤτοι μόνῃ φάσει χρῶνται ἢ καὶ ἀποδείξει. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φάσει, ἀντιθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τι λεκτόν· εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξιν παραλήψονται, ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν συνέστηκε λεκτῶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἐκ τῶν λεκτῶν δὲ συνεστῶσα οὐ δυνήσεται πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ λεκτόν εἶναι παραλαμβάνεσθαι (ὃ γὰρ μὴ διδοῦς εἶναι λεκτόν πῶς συγχωρήσει σύστημα λεκτῶν

^a i.e. with a true antecedent, or "if" clause. Cf. generally *Adv. Log.* ii. 112, 245 ff., 449.

^b For this stock example cf. *Aristot. Anal. pr.* ii. 27, *Rhet.* i. 2. 18; Plato, *Menex.* 237 e.

gism" as one "which does not begin with truth" and end with a false consequent." For either the syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true (e.g. "If there is day, there is light"), or it begins with what is false and ends in falsehood (like "If the earth flies, the earth is winged"), or it begins with truth and ends in falsehood (like "If the earth exists, the earth flies"), or it begins with falsehood and ends in truth (like "If the earth flies, the earth exists"). And they say that of these only that which begins with truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest valid. "Antecedent," they say, is "the precedent clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in truth and ends in truth." And it "serves to reveal the consequent," since in the syllogism "If this woman has milk, she has conceived," the clause "If this woman has milk" seems to be evidential of the clause "she has conceived."^b

Such is the Stoic doctrine. But we assert, firstly, that it is non-evident whether any "expression" exists. For since some of the Dogmatists, the Epicureans, declare that expression does not exist, others, the Stoics, that it does exist, when the Stoics assert its existence they are employing either mere assertion or demonstration as well. If assertion, then the Epicureans will confute them with the assertion which states that no expression exists. But if they shall adduce demonstration, then since demonstration is composed of expressed judgements, and because it is composed of expressions will be unable to be adduced to confirm the existence of expression (for how will he who refuses to allow the existence of expression grant the reality of a system compounded

108 ὑπάρχειν;)—διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου τοίνυν τὸ ζητούμενον πιστοῦσθαι βούλεται ὁ ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ συστήματος τῶν λεκτῶν εἶναι τι λεκτὸν πειρώμενος κατασκευάζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως ἐνδέχεται παριστᾶν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν, ἀδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν.

Ἵμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα· λεκτὸν γάρ 109 ἔστι τὸ ἀξίωμα. μήποτε δὲ καὶ εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι τι λεκτὸν δοθείη, τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκειται, συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λεκτῶν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις. οἷον γοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ὅτε λέγω τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," οὐδέπω ἔστι τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," καὶ ὅτε λέγω τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," οὐκέτι ἔστι τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν." εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν συγκείμενα ἐκ τινῶν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις τῶν μερῶν αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τὸ ἀξίωμα οὐ συνυπάρχει ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸ ἀξίωμα.

110 Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον ἀκατάληπτον εὐρεθήσεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Φίλων φησὶν ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον ἡμέρας οὔσης καὶ ἐμοῦ διαλεγόμενου τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ὁ δὲ Διόδωρος, ὁ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος· καθ' ὃν τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον συνημμένον ψεύδος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρας μὲν οὔσης ἐμοῦ δὲ σιωπήσαντος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος κατα-

of expressions?),—it follows that the man who 108 attempts to establish the existence of expression from the reality of the system of expressions is proposing to confirm the problematic by the problematic. If, then, it is impossible to establish either simply or by means of demonstration that any expression exists, it is non-evident that any expression exists.

So, too, with the question whether judgement exists; for the judgement is a form of expression. And very possibly, even should it be granted by 109 way of assumption that expression exists, judgement will be found to be non-existent, it being compounded of expressions not mutually co-existent.^a Thus, for example, in the case of "If day exists, light exists," when I say "day exists" the clause "light exists" is not yet in existence, and when I say "light exists" the clause "day exists" is no longer in existence. If then it is impossible for things compounded of certain parts to be really existent if those parts do not mutually co-exist, and if the parts whereof the judgement is composed do not mutually co-exist, then the judgement will have no real existence.

But passing over this objection, it will be found that 110 the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible. For Philo^b says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is "that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood," as for instance the syllogism "If it is day, I converse," when in fact it is day and I am conversing; but Diodorus^c defines it as "that which neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth and ending with a falsehood"; so that according to him the syllogism now mentioned seems to be false, since if it is in fact day but I have remained silent it will begin with a truth but end with a falsehood,

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 80 ff.

^b A Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.), not the Academic mentioned in i. 235, and *Introd.* pp. xxxvi f.; cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 113 ff.

^c Cf. i. 234, *Adv. Log.* ii. 115.

- 111 λήξει, ἐκείνο δὲ ἀληθές “ εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ”. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ “ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ” εἰς ἀληθές καταλήξει καθ’ αὐτὸν τὸ “ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα.” οἱ δὲ τὴν συνάρτησιν εἰσάγοντες ὑγιᾶς εἶναι φασὶ συνημμένον ὅταν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντι μάχηται τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ καθ’ οὗς τὰ μὲν εἰρημμένα συνημμένα ἔσται μοχθηρά, ἐκείνο
 112 δὲ ἀληθές “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” οἱ δὲ τῇ ἐμφάσει κρίνοντές φασιν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστὶ συνημμένον οὐ τὸ λήγον ἐν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ περιέχεται δυνάμει καθ’ οὗς τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστι ” καὶ πᾶν διαφορούμενον [ἀξίωμα] συνημμένον ἴσως ψεύδος ἔσται· αὐτὸ γὰρ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχεσθαι ἀμήχανον.
 113 Ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικριθῆναι ἀμήχανον ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξει. οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως προκρίνοντές τινα τῶν στάσεων τῶν προειρημένων πιστοὶ ἐσόμεθα οὔτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ ἢ ἀπόδειξις ὑγιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα αὐτῆς ὡς λήγον ἡγουμένῳ, ὡς οὕτως “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν. [εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· καὶ
 114 ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν.]”¹ ζητουμένου δὲ περὶ

¹ [εἴπερ . . . ἔστιν] secl. Papp.: T om. καὶ ἡμέρα . . . ἔστιν.

^a The opposite is “diartesis,” incoherence or incompatibility, §§ 146, 152, 238 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* ii. 430.

^b “Implication” (*emphasis*) is power of signifying more

whereas the syllogism “ If atomic elements of things 111 do not exist, atomic elements exist,” seems true, since it begins with the false clause “ atomic elements do not exist ” and will end, according to him, with the true clause “ atomic elements exist.” And those who introduce “ connexion,” or “ coherence,”^a assert that it is a valid hypothetical syllogism whenever the opposite of its consequent contradicts its antecedent clause ; so that, according to them, the above-mentioned syllogisms are invalid, whereas the syllogism “ If day exists, day exists ” is true. And those who judge by “ implication ”^b declare 112 that a hypothetical syllogism is true when its consequent is potentially included in its antecedent ; and according to them the syllogism “ If day exists, day exists,” and every such duplicated syllogism, will probably be false ; for it is not feasible that any object should itself be included in itself.

Probably, then, it will not seem feasible to get this 113 controversy resolved. For whether we prefer any one of the above-mentioned rival views without proof or by the aid of proof, in neither case shall we gain credence. For proof itself is held to be valid whenever its conclusion follows the combination of its premisses as the consequent follows the antecedent ; thus, for example—“ If it is day it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light ” : [“ If it is day it is light,” “ it is day and also it is light.”]^c But when 114

than is explicitly expressed. An example of this “ potential inclusion ” is “ If a man exists, a beast exists.”

^c The words bracketed give an unintelligible form of syllogism, and the Greek text is evidently corrupt. Possibly we should read—“ It is day ; and if it is day it is light ; therefore it is light ”—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism (*cf.* § 137).

τοῦ πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ λήγοντος
 πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὃ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος.
 ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀποδείχθῃ,
 τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῖς λήμμασι τῆς ἀποδείξεως
 ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἵνα δὲ πάλιν τοῦτο
 πιστευθῇ, δεῖ τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν
 115 ἐπιεξεκρίσθαι. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἀκατάληπτον ἄρα τὸ
 ὑγιὲς συνημμένον.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ τὸ προκαθηγούμενον ἄπορον ἔστιν.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ προκαθηγούμενον, ὡς φασίν, ἔστι τὸ
 ἡγούμενον ἐν τοιοῦτῳ συνημμένῳ, ὃ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ
 116 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν
 ἔστι τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ σημεῖον, ἥτοι πρόδηλόν ἔστι
 τὸ λήγον ἢ ἄδηλον. εἰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλον, οὐδὲ
 τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος δεῖσεται, ἀλλὰ συγκαταληφθή-
 σεται αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημειωτόν,
 διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο τούτου σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον,
 ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διαπεφώνηται ἀνεπικρίτως
 ποῖα μὲν ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ
 ὅλως εἰ ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, ἄδηλον ἔσται εἰ εἰς
 ἀληθές λήγει τὸ συνημμένον. ᾧ συνεισέρχεται
 καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἰ προκαθηγείται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ
 117 ἡγούμενον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, οὐ
 δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ λήγοντος, εἴγε
 πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἔστι τὸ σημειωτόν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἀλλή-
 λους συγκαταλαμβάνεται· καὶ ὡς περὶ τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸ
 τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ὡς δεξιὸν ἀριστεροῦ καταληφθῆναι

^a Cf. §§ 105 f. *supra*.

we inquire how we are to judge the logical sequence
 of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent,
 we are met with the argument in a circle. For in
 order to prove the judgement upon the hypothetical
 syllogism, the conclusion of the proof must follow
 logically from its premisses, as we said above; and,
 in turn, in order to establish this, the hypothetical
 syllogism and its logical sequence must be tested;
 and this is absurd. So then the valid hypothetical
 115 syllogism is non-apprehensible.

But the "antecedent" also is unintelligible. For
 the antecedent, as they assert, is "the leading clause
 in a hypothetical syllogism of the kind which begins
 with a truth and ends in a truth."^a But if the sign
 116 serves to reveal the consequent, the consequent is
 either pre-evident or non-evident. If, then, it is
 pre-evident, it will not so much as need the thing
 which is to reveal it but will be apprehended along
 with it and will not be the object signified thereby,
 and hence also the thing mentioned will not be a
 "sign" of the object. But if the consequent is non-
 evident, seeing that there exists an unsettled con-
 troversy about things non-evident, as to which of them
 are true, which false, and in general whether any of
 them is true, it will be non-evident whether the
 hypothetical syllogism ends in a true consequent.
 And this involves the further fact that it is non-
 evident whether the leading clause in the syllogism
 is the logical antecedent. But to pass over this
 117 objection also, the sign cannot serve to reveal the
 consequent, if the thing signified is relative to the
 sign and is, therefore, apprehended along with it. For
 relatives are apprehended along with each other;
 and just as "right" cannot be apprehended as "right

οὐ δύναται, οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 πρὸς τι παραπλησίως, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον πρὸ
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ <ὡς σημειωτοῦ>¹ καταληφθῆναι
 118 δυνατὸν ἔσται. εἰ δ' οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ
 σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν αὐτοῦ
 δύναται ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἅμα αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ μετ' αὐτὸ
 καταλαμβανομένου.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινότερον λεγομένοις
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἀνεπινοήτῳ ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον.
 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ,
 πρὸς ᾧ φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι, τοῦτο εἶναι λέγουσιν.
 119 ὅθεν εἰ μὲν πρὸς τί ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ,
 συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι πάντως ὀφείλει τῷ σημειωτῷ,
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῷ δεξιῷ καὶ τὸ ἄνω τῷ
 κάτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τι. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἔστι
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ πάν-
 τως ὀφείλει, ἵνα προεπιγνωσθῆν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς
 ἀγάγη τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνωσκομένου πράγματος.
 120 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐννοῆσαι πρᾶγμα μὴ δυνάμενον πρὸ
 ἐκείνου γνωσθῆναι οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀνάγκη
 ἔχει· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐπινοεῖν τι καὶ πρὸς τι ὄν καὶ
 ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχον πρὸς ᾧ νοεῖται. τὸ
 δὲ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τί φασιν εἶναι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ
 σημεῖον.

121 Πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. διαφωνία γέγονε
 παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τῶν μὲν λεγόντων εἶναι τι

¹ <ὡς σημειωτοῦ> add. T, ML corr.

of left " before " left," nor *vice versa*—and the same
 holds good of all other relative terms,—so neither will
 it be possible for the sign, as " sign of signified," to be
 apprehended before the thing signified.^a And if the 118
 sign is not apprehended before the thing signified,
 neither can it really serve to reveal the actual thing
 which is apprehended along with itself and not after
 itself.

Thus also, so far as we may judge by the usual
 statements of the dissenting philosophers (the
 Stoics), the sign is inconceivable. For they assert
 that it is both relative and serving to reveal the
 thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
 Accordingly, if it is relative and in relation to the 119
 thing signified it certainly ought to be apprehended
 along with the thing signified, as is " left " with
 " right," " up " with " down," and the rest of the
 relative terms. Whereas, if it serves to reveal the
 thing signified, it certainly ought to be apprehended
 before it, in order that by being foreknown it may
 lead us to a conception of the object which comes to
 be known by means of it. But it is impossible to form 120
 a conception of an object which cannot be known
 before the thing before which it must necessarily be
 apprehended ; and so it is impossible to conceive of
 an object which is both relative and also really serves
 to reveal the thing in relation to which it is thought.
 But the sign is, as they affirm, both relative and
 serving to reveal the thing signified ; wherefore it is
 impossible to conceive of the sign.

Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Amongst 121
 our predecessors there existed a controversy, some

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 163 ff.

- σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν, τῶν δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν φασκόντων. ὁ λέγων οὖν εἶναι τι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν ἤτοι ἀπλῶς ἐρεῖ καὶ ἀναποδείκτως, ψιλῆ φάσει χρώμενος, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φάσει μόνῃ χρήσεται, ἀπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται, τὸ ζητούμενον συν-
 122 αρπάσει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείου εἶναι λέγεται, ἀμφισβητουμένου τοῦ πότερον ἔστι τι σημείον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται καὶ περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐδαμῶς, ὥσπερ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ζητουμένου εἰ ἔστι ζῶον, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος· ζῶον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ἐπ' ἴσης ζητουμένου ἢ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀποδεικνύναι· οὐδὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως ἄρα δυνήσεται τις
 123 διαβεβαιούσθαι ὅτι ἔστι σημείον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως οἶόν τέ ἐστι περὶ τοῦ σημείου διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ καταληπτικὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιήσασθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνεται μετὰ ἀκριβείας τὸ σημείον, οὐδὲ σημαντικόν εἶναι λεχθήσεται· τινος ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ αὐτὸ ὁμολογούμενον· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ σημείον ἔσται. ὅθεν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται τὸ σημείον καὶ ἀνεπινώθητον.
 124 Ἔτι μέντοι κἀκεῖνο ῥητέον. ἤτοι φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ σημεία ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὑγιές· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημείον.

^a Cf. § 99: the "others" include some of the Academics and medical Empirics (cf. i. 236).

^b Cf. § 96; *Adv. Log.* ii. 178 ff.

declaring that an indicative sign exists, others maintaining that no indicative sign exists.^a He, then, who asserts the existence of an indicative sign will assert it either simply and without proof, making a bald assertion, or by the aid of proof. But if he shall employ mere assertion he will not gain credence; while if he shall propose to prove it he will be assuming the matter in question. For since proof is stated 122 to come under the genus sign,^b seeing that it is disputed whether or not a sign exists, there will also be a dispute as to whether proof does or does not at all exist—just as, when we make, let us suppose, the inquiry "Does animal exist?" we are inquiring also "Does man exist?" But it is absurd to try to prove the matter in question either by means of what is equally in question or by means of itself. So that neither will one be able by means of proof to affirm positively that sign exists. And if it is not possible 123 either simply or with the aid of proof to make a positive declaration about the sign, it is impossible to make an apprehensive affirmation^c concerning it; and if the sign is not apprehended with exactness, neither will it be said to be significant of anything, inasmuch as there is no agreement even about itself; and because of this it will not even be a sign. Hence, according to this line of reasoning also, the sign will be unreal and inconceivable.

But there is this further to be said. Either the signs 124 are apparent only or non-evident only, or some are apparent and some non-evident.^d But none of these alternatives is valid; therefore sign does not exist.

^c A curious expression, only used here by Sextus; it seems to mean "an affirmation which treats the thing as though it were apprehended."

^d Cf. § 88; *Adv. Log.* ii. 171 ff.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄδηλα οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τὰ σημεῖα, ἐντεῦθεν δείκνυται. τὸ ἄδηλον οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται, ὡς οἱ δογματικοὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρου ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν, εἰ ἄδηλον εἴη, ἑτέρου δεήσεται σημείου ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἅπειρα σημεῖα λαμβάνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον καταληφθῆναι ἄδηλον ὄν. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται, μὴ δυνάμενον σημαίνειν τι καὶ σημεῖον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

125 Εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ σημεῖα φαινόμενά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλους, τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα σὺν τοῖς φαινόμενοις καταλαμβανόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἅμα ὑποπιπτόντων τοῦ τε δεξιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ἢ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τοῦ δεξιοῦ φαίνεσθαι λέγεται, οὕτω συγκαταλαμβανόμενων τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ σημεῖον ἢ τὸ σημειωτὸν φαίνεσθαι

126 ῥητέον. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημειωτόν ἔσται μὴ δεόμενον τοῦ σημαίνοντος αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκκαλύψοντος. ὅθεν ὥσπερ ἀναιρουμένου δεξιοῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν ἔστιν, οὕτως ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐδὲ σημεῖον εἶναι δύναται, ὥστε ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ φαινόμενα μόνον εἶναι λέγοι τις τὰ σημεῖα.

127 Λεπίεται λέγειν ὅτι τῶν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· καὶ οὕτως δὲ αἱ ἀπορίαι

Now that all the signs are not non-evident is shown by the following argument. The non-evident does not become apparent of itself, as the Dogmatists assert, but is perceived by means of something else. The sign, therefore, if it were non-evident, would require another non-evident sign—since, according to the hypothesis assumed, there is no apparent sign—and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to grasp an infinite series of signs; and so it is impossible for the sign to be apprehended when it is non-evident. And for this reason it will also be unreal, as it is unable to signify anything and to be a sign owing to its not being apprehended.

And if all the signs are apparent, then, because 125 the sign is a relative thing and in relation to the thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,^a the things said to be signified, being apprehended along with what is apparent, will be apparent. For just as when the right and left are perceived together, the right is not said to appear more than the left nor the left than the right, so when the sign and the thing signified are apprehended together the sign should not be said to appear any more than the thing signified. And if the thing signified is apparent, 126 it will not even be signified, as it requires nothing to signify and reveal it. Hence, just as when "right" is abolished there exists no "left," so when the thing signified is abolished there can exist no sign, so that the sign is found to be unreal, if one should declare that the signs are apparent only.

It remains to declare that of the signs some are 127 apparent, others non-evident; but even so the diffi-

^a Cf. §§ 119, 169.

μένουσιν. τῶν τε γὰρ φαινομένων σημείων τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν, καὶ μὴ δεόμενα τοῦ σηματοῦντος οὐδὲ σημειωτὰ ὅλως ὑπάρξει, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα

128 σημεία ἔσται, μηδὲν σημαίνοντα· τὰ τε ἄδηλα σημεία χρῆζοντα τῶν ἐκκαλυφόντων αὐτά, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπὸ ἀδῆλων σημαίνεσθαι λέγηται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτοντος τοῦ λόγου ἀκατάληπτα εὐρίσκεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνύπαρκτα, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπὸ φαινομένων, φαινόμενα ἔσται σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις αὐτῶν σημείοις καταλαμβανόμενα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τι πρᾶγμα ὃ καὶ ἄδηλόν ἐστι φύσει καὶ φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ σημεία περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἄδηλα ὑποτεθέντα, φαινόμενα εὐρέθη κατὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν τοῦ λόγου.

129 Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάντα τὰ σημεία φαινόμενά ἐστι μήτε πάντα ἄδηλα, μήτε τῶν σημείων τινὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἀνύπαρκτα ἔσται τὰ λεγόμενα σημεία.

130 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀρκέσει νῦν εἰρησθαι πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν· ἐξῆς δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑπομνήσεις τοῦ εἶναι τι σημείον ἐκθυσόμεθα, ἵνα τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων παραστήσωμεν.

* Ἦτοι οὖν σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου

culties remain. For the things said to be signified by the apparent signs will, as we said before, be apparent and require nothing to signify them, and will not even be things signified at all, so that neither will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything. And as to the non-evident signs which need things 128 to reveal them, if we say that they are signified by things non-evident, the argument will be involved in a regress *ad infinitum*, rendering them non-apprehensible and therefore unreal, as we said before ^a; whereas, if they are to be signified by things apparent, they will be apparent, because apprehended along with their apparent signs, and therefore also unreal. For it is impossible for any object really to exist which is by nature both non-evident and apparent; but the signs which we are discussing though assumed to be non-evident have been found to be apparent owing to the reversal of the argument.^b

If, therefore, the signs are neither all apparent nor 129 all non-evident, nor yet some of the signs apparent and some non-evident, and besides these there is no other alternative, as they themselves affirm, then the so-called signs will be unreal.

So then these few arguments out of many will be 130 enough for the present to suggest to us the non-existence of an indicative sign. Next, we shall set forth those which go to suggest the existence of a sign, in order that we may exhibit the equipollence of the counter-balancing arguments.

Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the

^a Cf. § 124 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 185, 187.

φωναί φερόμεναι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄσημοι εἰσιν, πῶς ἂν κινήσειαν τὴν ὑπαρξίν τοῦ
 131 σημείου; εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσί τι, ἔστι σημείον. ἔτι ἦτοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐκ ἀποδεικνύουσι τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημείον· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, ἐπεὶ ἢ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείον ἐστίν, ἐκκαλυπτική οὖσα τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἔσται σημείον. ὅθεν καὶ συνερωτᾶται λόγος τοιοῦτος. εἰ ἔστι τι σημείον, ἔστι σημείον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημείον, ἔστι σημείον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι σημείον δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἢ δὴ ἔστι σημείον, δείκνυται. ἦτοι δὲ ἔστι σημείον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημείον·
 132 ἔστιν ἄρα σημείον. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ παράκειται τοιοῦτος λόγος· εἰ οὐκ ἔστι τι σημείον, οὐκ ἔστι σημείον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι σημείον ὃ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ σημείον εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι σημείον· τὸ γὰρ σημείον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται, ὡς
 133 παρεστήσαμεν. ἦτοι δὲ ἔστι σημείον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημείον· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημείον.

Καὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ σημείου αὐτοὶ ἀποκρινάσθησαν οἱ δογματικοί, πότερον

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130-133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130-131) (1) that the Sceptics' objections to "sign" must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign's existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against "sign" prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of "sign," while if they prove something, they are "proofs," *i.e.* a species of "sign," and thus prove sign's existence. Hence,

sign signify something or they signify nothing.^a But if they are non-significant how could they affect the reality of the sign? While if they signify something, there exists a sign. Further, the arguments against 131 the sign are either probative or non-probative; but if they are non-probative they do not prove the non-existence of a sign; while if they are probative, since proof, as serving to reveal the conclusion, belongs to the genus sign, sign will exist. Whence this argument also is propounded: "If sign exists, sign exists; and if sign exists not, sign exists; for the non-existence of sign is shown by proof, which is a form of sign. But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign exists." And this argument is counter- 132 balanced by the following argument: "If any sign does not exist, sign does not exist; and if sign is that which the Dogmatists declare sign to be, sign does not exist (for the sign under discussion, according to the conception of it and as stated to be both relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, is found to be unreal, as we have shown). But sign 133 either exists or exists not; therefore sign does not exist."

Regarding also the phrases used in support of the sign,^b let the Dogmatists themselves say in reply to our argument whether they signify something or signify whichever view we take—the Dogmatists' that "sign exists," or the Sceptics' that "sign exists not"—we arrive at the same conclusion that "sign exists." In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, "reversing" that of the Dogmatists.

^b In this § 133 the Sceptics are replying to the first argument of the Dogmatists (in § 130); the conclusion that "the existence of sign" proves its "non-existence" is based on the arguments in § 132, which "reverses" that of the Dogmatists.

σημαίνουσί τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν, οὐ πιστοῦνται τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσιν, ἀκολουθήσει αὐταῖς τὸ σημειωτόν. τούτο δὲ ἦν τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ <μη>¹ εἶναι σημεῖον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου περιτροπήν.

Πλήν ἀλλ' οὕτω πιθανῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι λόγων φερομένων, οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι σημεῖον ἢ μὴ εἶναι ῥητέον.

IB'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ

- 134 Φανερόν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὁμολογούμενόν τι πρᾶγμα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐπέχομεν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δὲ σημείον τί ἐστὶ, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ γὰρ εὐρήσομεν τοὺς περὶ τοῦ σημείου λόγους ἠρωτημένους ἐφαρμοζέσθαι δυναμένους καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτική τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οἷς ἠκολούθει τὰ πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἡμῖν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα.
- 135 εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἰδίως περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν, συντόμως ἐπελεύσομαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον, πρότερον σαφηνίσαι πειραθεὶς διὰ βραχέων τί φαίνονται εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

"Ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογούμενων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. σαφέστερον δὲ ὁ λέγουσιν ἔσται διὰ τούτων. λόγος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ λημμά-

¹ <μη> add. Kayser, Papp.

^a For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188.

nothing. For if they signify nothing, the existence of sign is not confirmed; whereas if they signify something, the thing signified will follow them; and it was "the existence of a sign." And from this follows, as we have shown, the non-existence of sign, because of the reversal of the argument.

In short, then, since such plausible arguments are adduced both for the existence and for the non-existence of sign, we must declare that sign is "no more"^a existent than non-existent.

CHAPTER XII.—OF PROOF

Now it is plain from this that neither is proof a 134 matter upon which there is agreement; for if we suspend judgement about the sign, and proof also is a sign,^b we must necessarily suspend judgement about proof likewise. And in fact we shall find that the arguments propounded concerning the sign can be adapted to apply to proof as well, since it seems to be both relative and serving to reveal the conclusion, and from these properties followed nearly all the results we mentioned in the case of the sign. If, 135 however, one ought to devote a separate discussion to proof, I shall proceed to treat of it concisely after endeavouring first to explain shortly the definition they give of proof.

Proof is, as they assert, "an argument which, by means of agreed premisses, reveals by way of deduction a non-evident inference." What their statement means will be made clearer by what follows. "An argument is a system composed of premisses and an

^b Cf. §§ 96, 122, 131 *supra*; and for the next ten sections cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 299 ff.

- 136 των καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς· τούτου δὲ λήμματα μὲν εἶναι λέγεται τὰ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος συμφώνως λαμβανόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐπιφορὰ δὲ [ἢ συμπεράσμα] τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευαζόμενον ἀξίωμα. οἷον ἐν τούτῳ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” τὸ μὲν “ φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” συμπεράσμα ἔστι, τὰ
- 137 δὲ λοιπὰ λήμματα. τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ ἀσύνακτοι, συνακτικοὶ μὲν ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου λημμάτων συμπεπλεγμένου, λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν αὐτοῦ, ὑγιὲς ἢ, οἷον ὁ προειρημένος λόγος συνακτικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ταύτῃ “ ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν ” ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ “ φῶς ἔστιν ” ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ “ [εἰ]² ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν < φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν >.”³ ἀσύνακτοι δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες.
- 138 Τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν ὅταν μὴ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς, ὡς προειρήκαμεν, ὑγιὲς ἢ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπεράσμα καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχη, ὃ ἔστιν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἀληθὲς δὲ συμπεπλεγμένον ἔστι τὸ πάντα ἔχον ἀληθῆ, ὡς τὸ “ ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.” οὐκ ἀληθεῖς δὲ οἱ μὴ
- 139 οὕτως ἔχοντες. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὐσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνακτικός μὲν ἔστιν,

inference. The premisses of it are (it is said) the 136 judgements adopted by consent for the establishment of the inference, and the inference is the judgement established by the premisses.” For example, in the argument “ If it is day, it is light ; but it is in truth day ; therefore it is light,” the clause “ therefore it is light ” is a conclusion, and the rest are premisses. And of arguments some are conclusive, some inconclusive—conclusive when the hypothetical syllogism^a which begins with the combination made by the premisses of the argument and ends with its inference is valid ; thus, for example, the argument just stated is conclusive since the combination of its premisses—“ it is day ” and “ if it is day, it is light ”—is followed by “ it is light ” in the syllogism “ it is day, and if it is day it is light ; therefore it is light.” But arguments that are not like this are inconclusive.

And of the conclusive arguments some are true, 138 some not true—true when not only the syllogism formed by the combination of the premisses and the inference is valid,^b as we said above, but the conclusion also and the combination of the premisses, which is the antecedent in the syllogism, is really true. And a combination is true when it has all its parts true, as in the case of “ It is day, and if it is day, it is light ” ; but those of a different kind are not true. For an argument such as this—“ If it is 139 night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—is indeed conclusive, since the syllogism

^a τὸ συνημμένον, lit. “ the combination ” ; cf. p. 246 note a.

^b “ Valid ” refers only to logical form ; “ true ” to content ; cf. § 139 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 413.

¹ ἢ om. MSS., συμπεράσμα om. T.

² [εἰ] secl. Rüstow.

³ < φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν > add. Papp.

ἐπεὶ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο ὑγιές ἐστιν “ [εἶ] νύξ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστι, <σκότος ἐστι,>² σκότος ἄρα ἐστιν,” οὐ μέντοι ἀληθής. τὸ γὰρ ἡγούμενον συμπεπλεγμένον ψευδὸς ἐστι, τὸ “ νύξ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστι, σκότος ἐστι,” ψευδὸς ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ “ νύξ ἐστιν ”. ψευδὸς γὰρ ἐστι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ψευδὸς. ἔνθεν καὶ ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι φασι τὸν δι’ ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα.

140 Πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀποδεικτικοὶ οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μὲν οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἀδηλόν τι συνάγοντες, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος λόγος “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν ” οὐκ ἐστίν ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος “ εἰ ἰδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἰδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας· εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι ” ἀποδεικτικός ἐστίν, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον ἀδηλόν, τὸ “ εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι.”

141 Τῶν δὲ ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. οἷον ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτήσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος “ εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοι δὲ ὁ θεός ” (δεικνυμι δὲ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) “ εἰπέ σοι ὅτι

¹ [εἶ] secl. Rüstow.

² <σκότος ἐστι> add. Rüstow.

“ it is night, and if it is night it is dark, therefore it is dark ” is a valid one, but, when it is day-time, it is not true. For the antecedent combination—“ it is night, and if it is night it is dark ”—is false since it contains the falsehood “ it is night ”; for the combination which contains a falsehood is false. Hence they also say that a true argument is that which deduces a true conclusion from true premisses.

Of true arguments, again, some are “ probative,”¹⁴⁰ some “ non-probative ”; and the probative are those which deduce something non-evident by means of pre-evident premisses, the non-probative those not of this sort.^a For example, an argument such as this—“ If it is day it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light ” is not probative; for its conclusion, that “ it is light,” is pre-evident. But an argument like this—“ If sweat pours through the surface, there are insensible pores^b; but in fact sweat does pour through the surface; therefore there are insensible pores ”—is a probative one, as its conclusion (“ there are therefore insensible pores ”) is non-evident.

And of arguments which deduce something non-¹⁴¹ evident, some conduct us through the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. By progression, for instance, are those which seem to depend on belief and memory, such as the argument “ If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that

^a For this and the following sections cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 305 ff.

^b Cf. § 98 *supra*.

πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος". συγκατατιθέμεθα γὰρ τῷ συμπεράσματι οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τῶν λημμάτων ἀνάγκην ὡς πιστεύοντες
 142 τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει. οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα"· τὸ γὰρ ῥεῖν τοὺς ἰδρώτας ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ πόρου εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προειληφθῆαι ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι.

143 Ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικὸς καὶ ἀληθῆς καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπεέρασμα [καὶ]¹ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον.
 Διὰ τούτων μὲν οὖν σαφηνίζειν εἰώθασιν τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως.

Π'.—ΒΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

144 Ὅτι δὲ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν λέγουσιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, ἕκαστον τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ διατρέποντα. οἷον γοῦν ὁ λόγος σύγκειται ἐξ ἀξιωματίων, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα πράγματα οὐ δύναται ὑπάρχειν ἐὰν μὴ τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀλλήλοισιν συνυπάρχῃ, ὡς πρόδηλον ἀπὸ κλίνης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ

¹ [καὶ] om. T.

^o See the definition of "proof" in §§ 135-136. It is with "hypothetical syllogisms" that Sextus is here concerned. The

this man will be rich ; therefore he will be rich " ; for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account of the logical force of the premisses as because of our belief in the statement of the god. But some arguments conduct us to the conclusion by way of discovery as well as of progression, like the following : " If sweat pours through the surface, there are insensible pores ; but the first is true, therefore also the second " ; for the pouring of the sweat makes discovery of the fact of the existence of pores, because of the prior assumption that moisture cannot pass through a solid body.

So, then, proof ought to be an argument which is deductive and true and has a non-evident conclusion which is discovered by the potency of the premisses ; and because of this, proof is defined as " an argument which by means of agreed premisses discovers by way of deduction a non-evident inference." It is in these terms, then, that they are in the habit of explaining the conception of proof.

CHAPTER XIII.—DOES PROOF EXIST ?

That proof has no real existence may be inferred from their own statements, by refuting each of the assumptions implied in its conception.^a Thus, for instance, the argument is compounded of judgements, but compound things cannot exist unless its component elements mutually co-exist, as is pre-evident from the case of a bed and similar objects ; but the parts

" component elements " of the syllogism (or " argument ") are the " judgements " (or propositions) which go to form its " premisses."

λόγου ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνυπάρχει. ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον λήμμα, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον λήμμα οὔτε ἡ ἐπιφορά· ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερόν φαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον λήμμα οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφορά οὐδέπω ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν προφερόμεθα, τὰ λήμματα αὐτῆς οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ συνυπάρχει ἄρα ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχειν δόξει.

- 145 Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ οὗτος κρίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολουθίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνημμένον ἀκολουθία ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται καὶ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκατάληπτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ σημείου λόγῳ ὑπεμνήσαμεν, καὶ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτος
- 146 ἔσται. οἱ γὰρ μὴν διαλεκτικοὶ φασὶν ἀσύνακτον λόγον γίνεσθαι ἴητοι παρὰ διάρτησιν ἢ παρὰ ἔλλειψιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ μοχθηρὸν ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχῆμα ἢ κατὰ παρολκήν. οἷον κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν ὅταν μὴ ἔχη τὰ λήμματα ἀκολουθίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
- 147 πωλοῦνται· Δίων ἄρα περιπατεῖ.” παρὰ δὲ παρολκήν ὅταν εὐρίσκηται λήμμα παρέλκον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου συναγωγὴν, οἷον “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ὅταν μὴ ἡ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου συνακτικόν, οἷον ὄντων συλλογισμῶν, ὡς φασί, τούτων “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν,” “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν,”

^a i.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235.

of an argument do not mutually co-exist. For when we are stating the first premiss, neither the second premiss nor the inference is as yet in existence; and when we are stating the second premiss, the first is no longer existent and the inference is not yet existent; and when we announce the inference, its premisses are no longer in being. Therefore the parts of the argument do not mutually co-exist; and hence the argument too will seem to be non-existent.

But apart from this, the conclusive argument is 145 non-apprehensible; for if it is judged by the coherence of the hypothetical premiss, and the coherence in that premiss is a matter of unsettled dispute and is probably non-apprehensible, as we suggested in our chapter (xi) “On the Sign,” then the conclusive argument also will be non-apprehensible. Now the 146 Dialecticians^a assert that an argument is inconclusive owing to inconsistency or to deficiency or to its being propounded in a bad form or to redundancy. An example of inconsistency is when the premisses are not logically coherent with each other and with the inference, as in the argument “If it is day, it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore Dion is walking.” And it is a case of redundancy 147 when we find a premiss that is superfluous for the logic of the argument, as for instance “If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day and Dion also is walking; therefore it is light.” And it is due to the bad form in which it is propounded when the form of the argument is not conclusive; for whereas the really syllogistic arguments are, they say, such as these: “If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light”; and “If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day,”—the inconclusive

ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστιν οὗτος " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν." 148 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ συνημμένον ὄντος¹ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, εἰκότως τοῦ ἡγουμένου προσλαμβανομένου ἐπάγεται καὶ τὸ λῆγον, καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀναιρουμένου ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὸ λῆγον. τοῦ δὲ λήγοντος προσλαμβανομένου οὐ πάντως τίθεται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο τὸ συνημμένον τῷ λήγοντι ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡγούμενῳ τὸ λῆγον μόνον. 149 διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λῆγον συνάγων συλλογιστικὸς εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικείμενου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ συνάγων· ὁ δὲ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἡγούμενον συνάγων ἀσύνακτος, ὡς ὁ προειρημένος, παρὸ καὶ ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημάτων αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγει, ὅταν λυχνιαίου φωτὸς ὄντος νυκτὸς λέγηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι " συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ " ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστι " πρόσληψις, ἡ δὲ " ἡμέρα ἄρα " ἐπιφορὰ 150 ψευδής. κατὰ παράλειψιν δὲ ἐστὶ μοχθηρὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ παραλείπεται τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν συναγωγὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος χρησιμεύοντων· οἷον ὑγιούς ὄντος, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ λόγου τούτου " ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός ἢ ἀδιάφορος· οὔτε δὲ κακός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀδιάφορος· ἀγαθός ἄρα ἐστίν,"

¹ ὄντος Heintz: ἐνός mss. Bekk.

^a i.e. (in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 *infra*. Note that the term *συνημμένον* ("combination") mostly means the "hypothetical, or major,

argument runs thus: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is light; therefore it is day." For since the 148 major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists its consequent also exists, naturally when the antecedent is admitted the consequent also is inferred, and when the consequent is denied the antecedent also is denied; for if the antecedent had existed, the consequent also would have existed. But when the consequent is admitted, the antecedent is not necessarily admitted as well; for the major premiss did not promise that the antecedent should follow the consequent, but only the consequent the antecedent.

Hence, the argument which deduces the conse- 149 quent from the major premiss and the antecedent is said to be syllogistic,^a and also that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent; but the argument which, like that stated above, deduces the antecedent from the major premiss and the consequent is inconclusive, so that it makes a false deduction, even though its premisses are true, whenever it is uttered by lamplight at night. For though the major premiss "If it is day, it is light" is true, and also the minor premiss, "but in fact it is light," the inference "therefore it is day" is false. And the 150 argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from the omission of some factor needed for the deducing of the conclusion: thus, for instance, while we have, as they think, a valid argument in "Wealth is either good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor indifferent; therefore it is good,"^b the following premiss of a hypothetical syllogism," but sometimes the whole syllogism. ^b Cf. iii. 177 ff.

- φαῦλός ἐστι παρὰ ἔλλειψιν οὗτος ὁ λόγος " ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κακός· 151 ἀγαθός ἄρα ἐστίν." εἰάν οὖν δείξω ὅτι οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν ἀσυνάκτων διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν, ἔδειξα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ὡς περιττὰς εἶναι τὰς κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν αὐτοῖς φερομένας ἀπειρολογίας. δείκνυμι δὲ οὕτως.
- 152 Ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος ἐλέγετο ἐγνωρίσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν τὰ λήμματα αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ συνημμένου, ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνημμένον, ὡς ἐπελογοισάμην, ἀδιάκριτος ἔσται καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος 153 λόγος. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέγων κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτον εἶναι τινα λόγον, φάσιν μὲν προφερόμενος μόνην ἀντιτιθεμένην αὐτῷ φάσιν ἔξει τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ προειρημένῃ· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ διὰ λόγου ἀκούσεται ὅτι δεῖ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρότερον συνακτικὸν εἶναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἀποδεικνύειν ὅτι ἀσυνάρτητα τὰ λήμματα τοῦ διηρηθῆσθαι λεγομένου λόγου. οὐ γνωσόμεθα δὲ εἰ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς, μὴ ἔχοντες συνημμένου σύμφωνον κρίσιν, ἢ κρινόμενοι εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐχ ἔξομεν διακρίνειν τῶν συνακτικῶν τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λεγόμενον.

* Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic ("dialectic"), are ascribed to Chrysippus.

^b With §§ 152-156 *cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 435 ff.

^c *i.e.* the syllogism as a whole, which is a "combination"

is faulty by way of deficiency: "Wealth is either good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good." If, then, I shall show that, according to them, it is 151 impossible to distinguish any difference between the inconclusive and the conclusive arguments, I shall have shown that the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible, so that their endless disquisitions on "dialectic"^a are superfluous. And I show it in this wise.

It was said that the argument which is inconclusive 152 owing to inconsistency is recognized by the want of coherence which marks its premisses in their relation both to each other and to the inference.^b Since, then, the recognition of this coherence ought to be preceded by the judgement on the hypothetical syllogism,^c and that syllogism, as I have argued, does not admit of judgement, the argument that is inconclusive through inconsistency will likewise be incapable of being distinguished. For he who declares that any particular 153 argument is inconclusive through inconsistency will, if he is merely uttering a statement, find himself opposed by a statement which contradicts his own; while if he tries to prove it by argument, he will be told that this argument of his must itself be conclusive before he can prove that the premisses of the argument said to be inconsistent are devoid of consistency. But we shall not know whether it is probative, since we have no agreed test of the syllogism whereby to judge whether the conclusion follows the logical connexion formed by the premisses. And thus, also, we shall be unable to distinguish the argument that is faulty through inconsistency from those that are conclusive.

of premisses and conclusion, *cf.* § 137; for another sense of the word *cf.* note on § 149.

- 154 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λόγον τινὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν φαύλῳ σχήματι ἤρω-
τῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ κατασκευάζων ὅτι μοχθηρὸν τι
σχῆμά ἐστιν, οὐχ ἔξει ὁμολογούμενον συνακτικὸν
155 λόγον δι' οὗ δυνήσεται συνάγειν ὁ φησιν. δυνάμει
δὲ ἀντειρήκαμεν¹ διὰ τούτων² καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πει-
ρωμένους παρ' ἑλλειψιν ἀσυνάκτους λόγους εἶναι
δεικνύναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐντελής <καὶ>³ ἀπρητισμένος
ἀδιάκριτός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἐν ἑλλείψει ἀδηλος ἔσται.
καὶ ἐτι ὁ διὰ λόγου δεικνύναι τινὰ ἑλλιπῆ βουλό-
μενος λόγον, μὴ ἔχων συνημμένου κρίσιν ὁμο-
λογημένην, δι' ἧς κρίνεται δυνήσεται τὴν ἀκολουθίαν
τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένου λόγου, οὗ δυνήσεται
κεκριμένως καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἑλλιπής ἐστιν.
- 156 Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν λεγόμενος εἶναι
μοχθηρὸς ἀδιάκριτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν.
ὅσον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ καὶ οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ
τοῖς στωικοῖς ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὐρεθί-
σσονται, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἢ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ ἀνα-
τρέπεται· οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν οὗς φασιν ἀποδείξεως
μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀπο-
δεικτικούς δὲ ὑπάρχειν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συν-
άγειν λόγους. ὅτι δὲ παρέλκουσιν, ἔσται σαφές
ἐκθεμένων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ οὕτως ὁ
φάμεν ἐπιλογιζομένω.
- 157 Πολλοὺς μὲν ἀναποδείκτους ὄνειροπολοῦσιν, πέντε
δὲ τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτίθενται, εἰς οὓς οἱ λοιποὶ

¹ ἀντειρήκαμεν T: ἀντειρήσομεν EAB: ἀντειρήσθω L, Bekk.

² τούτων T, cj. Bekk.: τούτο mss. ³ <καὶ> add. T.

^a i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle's "perfect syllogisms," and i. 69; *Adv. Log.* ii. 223 ff.

And we will make the same reply to the man who 154
says that an argument is unsound owing to its being
propounded in a faulty form; for he who maintains
that a form is unsound will have no argument agreed
to be conclusive whereby he will be able to draw the
conclusion he states. And hereby we have also 155
potentially refuted those who try to show that there
are arguments which are inconclusive through defi-
ciency. For if the complete and finished argument
is indistinguishable <from others>, the deficient also
will be non-evident. And, further, he who proposes
to prove by argument that a certain argument is
deficient, seeing that he has no agreed test of a
hypothetical syllogism whereby he can judge the
coherence of the argument he is talking about, will
be unable to make a tested and true pronouncement
that it is deficient.

Moreover, the argument that is said to be faulty 156
through redundancy is indistinguishable from those
that are probative. For, so far as concerns redun-
dancy, even the "non-demonstrable" arguments^a so
much talked of by the Stoics will be found to be
inconclusive, and if they are demolished the whole of
dialectic is overturned; for they are the arguments
which, they say, need no proof to establish them,
and themselves serve as proofs of the conclusiveness
of the other arguments. And that they are re-
dundant will be clear when we have set forth these
non-probative arguments and thus confirm our state-
ment by reasoning.

Now there are, in their imaginings, many non- 157
demonstrable arguments, but the five which they
chiefly propound, and to which all the rest can, it

πάντες ἀναφέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, πρῶτον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λήγον συνάγοντα, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." δεῦτερον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου συνάγοντα, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ φῶς· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν." τρίτον τὸν ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν." τέταρτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον "ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν." πέμπτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἐνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ λοιπὸν συνάγοντα, οἷον "ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν."

159 Οἷοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ θρυλούμενοι ἀναπόδεικτοι, πάντες δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀσύνακτοι εἶναι κατὰ παρολικήν. αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀρξώμεθα, ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" τῷ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἡγουμένῳ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" συνημμένῳ, ἢ ἀδηλόν ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀδηλόν ἔστιν, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ συνημμένον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἔστιν ὅτι ὄντος τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι καὶ

^a Literally, the "combination," which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the "if," clause is the "antecedent," the other clause the "consequent."

seems, be referred, are these. The first is that which deduces the consequent from the major premiss^a and the antecedent, as for example "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light." The second is that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent, as for example "If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day." The third deduces from the negation of a coupled^b premiss^b and <the affirmation of> one of its clauses the opposite of the other clause, as for example "It is not both night and day; but it is day; therefore it is not night." The fourth deduces from a disjunctive premiss and one of its alternative clauses the opposite of the other, as for example "Either it is day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is not night." The fifth^c deduces from a disjunctive premiss and the opposite of one of its clauses the other clause, as for example "Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day."

These, then, are the much talked of non-demonstrable arguments, but they all seem to me to be inconclusive through redundancy. Thus for instance, to begin with the first, either it is agreed, or else it is non-evident, that in the major premiss "If it is day, it is light," the clause "it is light" follows from its antecedent "it is day." But if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the major premiss as agreed; if, however, it is pre-evident that if the clause "it is day" be true, the clause "it is light" will necessarily

^b i.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses "coupled" by "and" (or "both . . . and"); a "conjunctive" premiss (as opposed to a "disjunctive," coupled by "either . . . or").

^c Cf. i. 69.

τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," εἰπόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν, συνάγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον "ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν," καὶ παρέλκει τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" συνημμένον.

160 Ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος μὴ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς τὸ συνημμένον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ "οὐχὶ τὸ λῆγον" τίθεται καὶ τὸ "οὐχὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον," καὶ παρέλκει πάλιν τὸ συνημμένον, τῆς συνερωτήσεως τοιαύτης γινομένης "οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν."

161 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ συνυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται τὸ λοιπόν, καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν."

162 Τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μετὰ μάχης τελείας, ὅπερ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ διεξευγμένον, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ διεξευγμένον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, τεθέντος ἑνὸς ἀπ' αὐτῶν φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ λοιπόν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος ἑνὸς

* An example of the *sylllogismus decurtatus*, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167.

be true also, then, once we have asserted that "it is day," the statement "it is light" is also inferred, so that an argument in the form "It is day, therefore it is light" is sufficient,^a and the major premiss "If it is day, it is light" is redundant.

And in the case of the second non-demonstrable 160 argument we make a similar objection. For it is either possible or impossible for the antecedent to be true when the consequent is not true. But if this is possible, the major premiss will not be valid; while if it is impossible, at the moment of positing "Not the consequent" we posit also "Not the antecedent," and the major premiss is redundant once again, the argument propounded being "It is not light, therefore it is not day."

The same reasoning applies also to the third non- 161 demonstrable argument. For either it is pre-evident that it is impossible for the clauses in the coupled premiss mutually to co-exist, or else it is non-evident. And if it is non-evident we shall not grant the negative of the coupled premiss; but if it is pre-evident, at the moment of positing the one clause the other is annulled, and the negative of the coupled premiss is redundant when we propound the argument in the form "It is day, therefore it is not night."

And we deal in like manner with the fourth non- 162 demonstrable argument and the fifth. For either it is pre-evident or it is non-evident that in the disjunctive premiss one clause is true, the other false, in complete contradiction, as the disjunctive proclaims. And if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the disjunctive; but if it is pre-evident, if one of its clauses be affirmed it is apparent that the other is not true, and if one is negated it is pre-evident that the other is true, so

πρόδηλον ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν συνερωτῶν οὕτως “ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν,” “ οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νύξ ἄρα ἔστιν,” καὶ παρέλκει τὸ διεξυγμένον.

- 163 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγειν ἔνεστι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν, οἷς μάλιστα χροῦνται οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. οἷον γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ “ τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν ” ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται καὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἄδηλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δοθησεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου συνερῶτησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ συνάξει ὁ συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ἦ καλόν, τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι τόδε τι καλόν ἐστὶ συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερῶτησιν “ τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν,” καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἔτερον λῆμμα ἐν ᾧ τὸ
- 164 καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐλέγετο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ “ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶν,” εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πρόδηλον αὐτόθεν ὅτι πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν ἦ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ ζῶν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ἢ καθόλου πρότασις, οὐδὲ δώσομεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ
- 165 συνερῶτησει. εἰ δὲ ἔπεται τῷ ἀνθρωπὸν τινα εἶναι τὸ καὶ ζῶν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ὁμολογουμένως ἢ “ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν ” πρότασις, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερῶτησιν “ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶν,” καὶ παρέλκειν

that it is sufficient to frame the argument thus—“ It is day, therefore it is not night,” or “ It is not day, therefore it is night ”; and the disjunctive premiss is redundant.

One may also make similar observations on the so-called “ categorical ” syllogisms, which are chiefly used by the Peripatetics.^a Thus, for example, in the argument—“ The just is fair, but the fair is good, therefore the just is good,”^b either it is agreed and pre-evident that “ the fair is good,” or it is disputed and is non-evident. But if it is non-evident, it will not be granted in the process of deduction, and consequently the syllogism will not be conclusive; while if it is pre-evident that whatsoever is fair is also without exception good, at the moment of stating that this particular thing is fair the fact that it is good is likewise implied, so that it is enough to put the argument in the form “ The just is fair, therefore the just is good,” and the other premiss, in which it was stated that “ the fair is good,” is redundant. So 164 too in an argument such as this—“ Socrates is a man; every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an animal,”—if it is not at once pre-evident that whatsoever is man is always also animal, the universal premiss is not agreed, and neither will we admit it in the process of deduction. But if the fact that he is a 165 man is logically followed by the fact that he is also an animal, and in consequence the premiss “ Every man is an animal ” is by agreement true, at the moment of stating that “ Socrates is a man ” we admit therewith that he is also an animal, so that an argument in the form “ Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an

^a Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well.

^b Cf. Plato, *Alcib. I.* 116.

166 τὴν “ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν ” πρότασιν. παρα-
πλησίαις δὲ μεθόδοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρώτων
κατηγορικῶν λόγων χρῆσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ
νῦν ἐνδιατρίβωμεν.

Πλὴν ἐπεὶ παρέλκουσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐν οἷς τὴν
ὑποβάθραν τῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ τίθεν-
ται, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρορκῇ διατρέπεται πᾶσα ἡ
διαλεκτική, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν διακρίναι τοὺς
παρέλκοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυνάκτους λόγους ἀπὸ
167 τῶν συνακτικῶν καλούμενων συλλογισμῶν. εἰ δὲ
οὐκ ἀρέσκει τισὶ λόγους μονολημμάτων εἶναι, οὐκ
εἰσὶν ἀξιοπιστότεροι Ἀντιπάτρου, ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς
τοιούτους λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζει.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνεπικρίτός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῖς
διαλεκτικοῖς συνακτικὸς καλούμενος λόγος. ἀλλὰ
καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος ἀνεύρετός ἐστι διὰ τε τὰ
προειρημένα καὶ ἐπεὶ πάντως ὀφείλει εἰς ἀληθὲς
λήγειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λεγό-
168 μενον ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ φαινό-
μενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ διὰ τῶν
λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι δι' ἑαυτοῦ προσπίπτον
καὶ οὐχ ἦττον τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ φαινόμενον.
εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνεπικρίτως
διαπεφώνηται, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν,
διόπερ καὶ ἀκατάληπτά ἐστίν, ἀκατάληπτον ἐστὶ
καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἶναι λεγομένον
λόγου. εἰ δὲ [καὶ] τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, οὐ

^a *i.e.* of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of
Barbara and *Darii*, so “the others” would belong to
Celarent and *Ferio*. But Heintz’s suggestion, “τρόπων τῶν
(for πρώτων), “the other figures,” may well be right.

^b *i.e.* Stoics and Peripatetics, *cf.* § 146 *supra*.

animal” is sufficient, and the premiss “Every man is
an animal” is redundant. And (not to dwell on the 166
matter now) in the case of the other primary ^a cate-
gorical arguments also it is possible to employ similar
methods of reasoning.

Since, however, these arguments which the Dialec-
ticians ^b lay down as the foundations of their syllo-
gisms are redundant, by reason of this redundancy
the whole of Dialectic is thus far overthrown, seeing
that we cannot distinguish the redundant, and conse-
quently inconclusive, arguments from what are called
the conclusive syllogisms. But if some persons dis- 167
approve of arguments being of a “one-premiss form,”
they deserve no more credence than does Antipater ^c
who does not reject such arguments.

For these reasons, then, the argument named by
the Dialecticians “conclusive” is not judged accept-
able. But further, the “true” ^d argument is indis-
coverable both for the foregoing reasons ^e and because
it ought in all cases to end in truth. For the con-
clusion which is said to be true is either apparent
or non-evident. And it is certainly not apparent; 168
for it would not need to be disclosed by means of the
premisses if it were perceptible of itself and no less
apparent than its premisses. But if it is non-evident,
then, since there is an unsettled dispute concerning
things non-evident, as we mentioned above,^f and they
are in consequence non-apprehensible, the conclusion
also of the argument said to be true will be non-
apprehensible. And if this is true-non-apprehensible,

^e A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School *circa* 150-30
B.C.; *cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the “curtailed
syllogism.”

^d *Cf.* § 143.

^e See §§ 85-94 *supra*, and § 138.

^f *Cf.* § 116.

γνωσόμεθα πότερον ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ συναγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀγνοήσομεν οὖν πότερον ἀληθής ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἀνεύρετος ἔσται ὁ ἀληθής λόγος.

169 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρῶμεν, ὁ διὰ προδήλων ἀδηλον συνάγων ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔπεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δ' ἐπόμενον καὶ τὸ λήγον πρὸς τί ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, εἰ μὲν ἀδηλόν ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀδηλα ἔσται καὶ τὰ λήμματα, εἰ δὲ πρόδηλά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἅτε συγκαταλαμβανόμενον αὐτοῖς προδήλοις οὖσιν, ὡς μηκέτι ἐκ προδήλων ἀδηλον
170 συνάγεσθαι. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ἢ ἐπιφορά, ἥτοι ἀδηλος οὐσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη, ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν ἢ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγὴν, τουτέστι συνακτικῶς, διὰ τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστω οὔτε συνακτικὸς οὔτε ἀληθής οὔτε διὰ τινων προδήλων ἀδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

171 Καὶ κατ' ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ καὶ ἀνεπινόητον εὐρήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ γὰρ λέγων εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἥτοι γενικὴν τίθησιν ἀπόδειξιν ἢ εἰδικὴν τινα· ἀλλ' οὔτε τὴν γενικὴν οὔτε εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν τιθένα δυνατόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν

^a Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125.

^b Cf. §§ 135, 143 ff.

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 382 ff.

we shall not know whether the deduction is true or false. Thus we shall be in ignorance as to whether the argument is true or false, and the "true" argument will be undiscoverable.

But, to pass over these objections also, the argument which deduces what is non-evident by means of pre-evident premisses is undiscoverable. For if the inference follows from the combination of its premisses, and what follows and forms the consequent is relative and relative to the antecedent, and relatives are apprehended, as we have shown,^a simultaneously,—then, if the conclusion is non-evident, the premisses also will be non-evident, while if the premisses are pre-evident the conclusion also will be pre-evident, as being apprehended along with the pre-evident premisses, so that no longer is there a deduction of what is non-evident from pre-evident premisses. And 170 for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of anything to reveal it. So that if proof is defined ^b as "an argument which by deduction, that is conclusively, reveals a non-evident inference by means of certain premisses agreed to be true," while we have shown that there exists no argument either conclusive or true or which deduces a non-evident conclusion by means of evident premisses or serves to reveal its conclusion,—then it is apparent that proof is without real existence.

That proof is unreal, or even inconceivable, we shall 171 discover also from the following line of attack.^c He who asserts the existence of proof posits either a general or a particular proof; but, as we shall suggest, it is not possible to posit either the general or the

- μεν· παρὰ δὲ ταύτας ἄλλο τι νοεῖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα δύναται τις ὡς ὑπάρχουσιν τιθέναί τὴν
- 172 ἀπόδειξιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνυπόστατος ἐστὶ διὰ τὰδε. ἦτοι ἔχει λήμματά τινα καὶ τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ λήμματά τινα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τινα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὕτω καὶ ἀποδεικνύον ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, εἰδικὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις.
- 173 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εἰδική. ἦτοι γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύστημα ἀπόδειξιν ἐροῦσιν, ἢ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον· οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα
- 174 ἔστιν εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις. τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μέρος τι ἔχουσα ἄδηλον, τουτέστι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ἄδηλος ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἰ γὰρ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, αὐτὴ δεῖσεται τοῦ ἀποδείξοντος αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐτέρων ἔσται ἀποδεικτικὴ.
- 175 Εἴτα καὶ ἐπεὶ πρὸς τί φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἐτέροις νοεῖται, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τῆς ἀποδείξεως· εἰ οὖν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, οὐ νοηθήσεται ἢ ἀπόδειξις σὺν τῷ συμπεράσματι. καὶ γὰρ ἦτοι συμβάλλεται τι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν συμβάλλεται, ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικόν, εἰ δὲ οὐ συμβάλλεται ἀλλὰ παρέλκει, οὐδὲ μέρος τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔσται,

particular proof; and besides these no other can be conceived; no one, therefore, can posit proof as really existing. Now the general proof is unreal for the 172 following reasons. It either has or has not certain premisses and a certain inference. And if it has them not, it is not even proof; while if it has premisses and an inference, then, since everything which proves or is proved in this way belongs to the class of "particulars,"^a proof will be particular; therefore no general proof exists. Nor yet any particular proof. For they 173 will describe as proof either the system made up of the premisses and the inference^b or only the system of the premisses; but neither of these is proof, as I shall show; therefore particular proof does not exist. Now the system composed of the premisses and the 174 inference is not proof because, firstly, it contains a non-evident part—that is to say, the inference—and so will be non-evident, which is absurd; for if the proof is non-evident, instead of serving to prove other things it will itself be in need of something to prove it.

Moreover, since they assert that proof is a relative 175 thing and relative to the inference, and relatives, as they themselves affirm, are conceived in relation to other things, the thing proved must be other than the proof; if, then, the thing proved is the conclusion, the proof will not be conceived along with the conclusion. For the conclusion either contributes something to its own proof or does not do so; but if it contributes, it will serve to reveal itself, while if it does not contribute but is redundant it will not be even a part of the proof, since we shall declare the

^a Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 *supra*; "things of a *partial* character" as opposed to "wholes" or *genera*.

^b Cf. § 135 *supra*.

176 ἐπεὶ κάκεινῃν κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐροῦμεν εἶναι μοχ-
θηράν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων
μόνων ἀποδείξεις ἂν εἴη· τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ οὕτω
λεγόμενον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἢ λόγον εἶναι ἢ διάνοιαν ὅλως
ἀπαρτίζειν; οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημ-
μάτων μόνον ἀποδείξεις ἔστιν. οὐδὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ἄρα
ἀποδείξεις ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἡ εἰδικὴ
ἀποδείξεις ὑφέστηκε μήτε ἡ γενικὴ, παρὰ δὲ ταύτας
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐννοεῖν ἀποδείξιν, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ
ἀποδείξεις.

177 "Ἐπι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως
ἐνεστὶν ὑπομνήσκω. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεις,
ἤτοι φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἢ
ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη
ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων ἐκκαλυπτικὴ δύναται
178 ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινόητος ἄρα ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐστὶν, ἔσται
τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἅμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον,
φαινόμενον μὲν ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον
δὲ ἐπεὶ δέεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
ὑποπίπτει ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὐτὴ
δεήσειται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται
ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας
179 τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προ-
δήλου δύναται εἶναι ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρό-
δηλος ἀδήλου· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται, συγκαταλαμβανό-
μενον τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδεικνυσθαι
λεγόμενον πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὡς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν
λόγον καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον τὴν ἀδήλου ἀπο-

proof to be faulty by reason of redundancy. Nor yet 176
will the system composed of the premisses by itself
be proof; for who would maintain that a statement
in the form "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is
day," either is an argument or completely expresses
a piece of reasoning? So then, neither does the
system of the premisses alone constitute proof. There-
fore the particular proof has no real existence either.
But if neither the particular nor the general proof has
real existence, and besides these one can conceive
no other proof, then proof is without real existence.

And it is possible to show the unreality of proof 177
from these further considerations. If proof exists,
either as apparent it serves to reveal what is apparent,
or as non-evident what is non-evident, or as non-
evident what is apparent, or as apparent what is
non-evident; but it cannot be conceived as serving
to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.
For if it as apparent serves to reveal the apparent, 178
the thing revealed will be at once both apparent and
non-evident—apparent because it was assumed to be
such, and non-evident because it needs a revealer
and is not clearly perceived by us of itself. And if
as non-evident it reveals the non-evident, it will itself
need something to reveal it and will not serve to
reveal other things, which is foreign to the conception
of proof. And for these reasons neither can there 179
be a non-evident proof of the pre-evident; nor yet
a pre-evident proof of the non-evident; for since
they are relatives, and relatives are apprehended
together, that which is said to be proved, being
apprehended together with its pre-evident proof, will
be pre-evident, so that the argument is reversed and
the proof probative of the non-evident is not found

δεικτικήν. εἰ οὖν μήτε φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις μήτε ἀδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἀδηλος προδήλου μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

180 Πρὸς τούτοις κάκεινο λεκτέον. διαπεφώνηται περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲ εἶναι λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὡς οἱ μηδὲν ὅλως εἶναι φάσκοντες, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν δογματικῶν· ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ 181 μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτήν ἢ μὴ εἶναι φαμέν. καὶ ἄλλως ἢ ἀποδείξεις δόγμα πάντως περιέχει, περὶ παντὸς δὲ δόγματος διαπεφώνηκασιν, ὥστε περὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀνάγκη εἶναι διαφωνίαν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν λόγου ἔνεκεν ὁμολογούμενης καὶ τὸ εἶναι κενὸν συνομολογεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες περὶ τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δογμάτων, ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἐν διαφωνίᾳ ἐστίν.

182 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀδηλὸς ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς (τὰ γὰρ διάφωνα, καθὸ διαπεφώνηται, ἀδηλά ἐστιν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς προὔπτος ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει ἡμῖν συνίστασθαι. ἢ οὖν ἀπόδειξις δι' ἧς κατασκευάζεται ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ὁμολογουμένη μὲν καὶ προὔπτος οὐκ ἔσται (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ὅλως), διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ ἀδηλος οὕσα δεήσειται ἀποδείξεως ἄλλης, κάκεινῃ ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπειρου.

* *i.e.* is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xenocrates, Gorgias, *cf.* § 18.

^b For this Sceptic formula *cf.* i. 188.

^c The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: "If motion

to be pre-evident. If, therefore, proof is neither apparent of the apparent, nor non-evident of the non-evident, nor non-evident of the pre-evident, nor pre-evident of the non-evident, and besides these, as they say, there is no other alternative, then we must declare that proof is nothing.

Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Proof 180 is a matter of controversy; for some declare that it does not even exist, as do those who assert that nothing at all exists,^a but others, including the majority of the Dogmatists, that it does exist; and we affirm that it is "no more"^b existent than non-existent. And besides, proof always contains a 181 dogma, and they are in dispute about every dogma, so that there must necessarily be dispute about every proof. For if (for the sake of argument) when the proof for the existence of void is accepted the existence of void is likewise accepted,^c it is plain that those who dispute the existence of void dispute its proof also; and the same argument applies to all the other dogmas with which the proofs are concerned. Therefore every proof is questioned and is in dispute.

Since, then, proof is non-evident, owing to the 182 controversy which exists concerning it (for things controverted, in so far as controverted, are non-evident), its existence is not self-evident but needs to be established for us by proof. The proof, then, by which proof is established will not be evident and agreed (for we are now inquiring whether proof in general exists), and being thus in dispute and non-evident it will need another proof, and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to

exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists." *Cf.* § 245, *Adv. Log.* ii. 329 ff.

ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδείξει· ἀδύνατον ἄρα παρα-
στήσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

- 183 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ σημείου δύναται ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.
ζητουμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ ἀποδείξεως
τοῦ σημείου δεομένου πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπαρξίν, ὃ
δι' ἀλλήλων εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως
σημείου δεομένης, τοῦ δὲ σημείου πάλιν ἀπο-
δείξεως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπι-
κρίναι δυνατόν ἐστι τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως
διαφωνίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήζει μὲν κριτηρίου ἢ ἐπίκρισις,
ζητήσεως δὲ οὔσης περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον, ὡς
παρεστήσαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείξεως τοῦ
κριτηρίου δεομένου τῆς δεικνουσύνης ὅτι ἔστι τι
κριτήριον, ὃ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρί-
184 σκεται πάλιν. εἰ οὖν μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως μήτε
διὰ σημείου μήτε διὰ κριτηρίου ἔστιν ὑπομνήσαι
ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς πρόδηλός
ἐστιν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ
ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος
ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις· νενόηται μὲν γὰρ σὺν τῷ ἀπο-
δεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο μὴ
καταλαμβανομένη. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.
- 185 Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
δειξιν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ τούναν-
τίον κατασκευάζοντες φασιν ὅτι ἦτοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ
εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἠρωτημένοι λόγοι ἢ
οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί,
οὐ δύνανται δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις· εἰ
δὲ ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι τὴν ὑπόστασιν

prove an infinite series ; therefore it is impossible to
show that proof exists.

But neither can it be revealed by means of a sign. 183
For since it is a matter of inquiry whether sign
exists,^a and since the sign needs proof to ensure its
reality, we find ourselves involved in circular reason-
ing—the proof requiring a sign, and the sign in turn
a proof; which is absurd. And for these reasons
neither is it possible to decide the controversy re-
garding proof, seeing that the decision requires a
criterion, but—because it is a matter of inquiry, as
we have shown,^b whether a criterion exists, and con-
sequently the criterion needs a proof showing the
existence of a criterion—we are again involved in
the perplexity of circular reasoning. If, then, neither 184
by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to
show that proof exists, and it is not evident of itself
either, as we have shown,^c then it will be non-appre-
hensible whether proof exists. Consequently, proof
will also be unreal; for it is conceived together with
the act of proving, and were it not apprehended it
would be unable to prove.^d Wherefore proof will not
exist.

Thus much it will be enough to say by way of 185
outline and in criticism of proof. The Dogmatists,
however, maintaining the opposite view assert that
the arguments propounded against proof are either
probative or not probative; and if they are not
probative, they are incapable of showing that proof
does not exist; while if they are probative, they

^a i.e. if "proof" is non-apprehensible it must also be
unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible "proof"
is incapable of "proving" anything, and "proof" apart
from "proving" is inconceivable—the "conception" of the
one necessarily implying the other.

^a Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121.

^b Cf. §§ 48 ff. *supra*.

^c Cf. §§ 144 *supra*.

186 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκ περιτροπῆς εἰσάγουσιν. ὄθεν καὶ τοιοῦτον συνερωτώσει λόγον· “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἦτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις.” ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἐρωτῶσι τὸν λόγον· “τὸ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἐπόμενον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντίκειται δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ‘ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις—οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,’ ὧν ἕκαστέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις.”

187 “Ἐνεστί μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιλέγειν, οἶον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ μὴ νομιζόμεν τινα λόγον εἶναι ἀποδεικτικόν, καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους οὐ πάντως φάμεν ἀποδεικτικούς εἶναι ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν πιθανούς· οἱ δὲ πιθανοὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί· εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν, ὅπερ οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, πάντως καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ἀληθεῖς δὲ εἰσι λόγοι δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντες· οὐκοῦν ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπιφορά· ἦν δέ γε αὕτη “οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις”· ἀληθές ἄρα ἔστι
188 τὸ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” ἐκ περιτροπῆς· δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἐαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἐαυτοὺς συμπεριγράφειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη ἢ “οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀληθές”

themselves involve the reality of proof by self-refutation.^a Hence also they propound an argument 186 in this form ^b: “If proof exists, proof exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists.” With the same intention they propound also this argument: “That which follows logically from contradictories is not only true but necessary; ‘proof exists’ and ‘proof exists not’ are contradictories, and the existence of proof follows from each of them; therefore proof exists.”

Now to this we may reply, for instance, that, because 187 we do not believe that any argument is probative, we do not assert either that the arguments against proof are absolutely probative but that they appear to us plausible; but those that are plausible are not necessarily probative. Yet if they actually are probative (which we do not positively affirm) they certainly are also true. And true arguments are those which deduce what is true by means of true premisses; wherefore their inference is true. Now the inference was this—“therefore proof does not exist”; therefore the statement “proof does not exist” is true by reversing the argument. And just 188 as purgative medicines expel themselves together with the substances already present in the body, so these arguments are capable of cancelling themselves along with the other arguments which are said to be probative.^c Nor is this preposterous, since in fact

^a Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that “proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an “existent” proof.

^c Cf. i. 206, *Adv. Log.* ii. 480.

^{*} Lit. “reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, *Adv. Log.* ii. 463.

οὐ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἐκείνοις συμπεριτρέπει.

“Ὁ τε λόγος οὗτος δύναται δείκνυσθαι ἀσύνακτος “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα,” καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούντως διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐπιχειρή-
 189 ματος. εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔστι τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” δεῖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος, τουτέστι τὸ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” μάχεσθαι τῷ “ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις”. τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τοῦ συνημμένου τὸ ἡγούμενον. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς συνημμένον ὑγιὲς εἶναι ἐκ μαχομένων ἀξιωμαίων συνεστώσ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνημμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λήγον, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα τούναντίον, ὄντος τοῦ ἐτέρου αὐτῶν ὁποιοῦδήποτε ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν ὑπάρχειν. ὄντος ἄρα ὑγιοῦς τοῦδε τοῦ συνημμένου “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” οὐ δύναται ὑγιὲς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον “εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπό-
 190 δεξις.” πάλιν δ’ αὖ συγχωρούντων ἡμῶν καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τότε τὸ συνημμένον “εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” δύναται συνυπάρχειν τὸ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” τῷ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.” εἰ δὲ δύναται αὐτῷ συνυπάρχειν, οὐ μάχεται αὐτῷ. ἐν ἄρα τῷ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” συνημμένῳ οὐ μάχεται τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενῳ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον, ἐκείνου κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὡς ὑγιοῦς
 191 τιθεμένου. μὴ μαχομένου δὲ τοῦ “οὐκ ἔστιν

the saying “nothing is true” not only refutes every other saying but also nullifies itself as well.

And as regards this argument—“If proof exists, proof exists; if proof does not exist, proof exists; but it either exists or exists not; therefore it exists”—there are a number of ways by which it can be shown to be inconclusive, but for the moment the following method may suffice. If the hypothetical 188 premiss “If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the contradictory of its consequent, namely “proof does not exist,” must conflict with “proof exists,” for this is the antecedent of the hypothetical premiss. But, according to them, it is impossible for a hypothetical premiss to be valid when composed of conflicting clauses. For the hypothetical premiss promises that when its antecedent is true its consequent is also true, whereas conflicting clauses contrariwise promise that if either one of them is true the other cannot possibly be true. If therefore the premiss “If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the premiss “If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid. And again, conversely, if we grant by way of 190 assumption that the premiss “If proof exists not, proof exists” is valid, then the clause “If proof exists” can co-exist with “proof exists not.” But if it can co-exist with it, it is not in conflict with it. Therefore, in the premiss “If proof exists, proof exists,” the contrary of its consequent is not in conflict with its antecedent, so that, conversely, this premiss will not be valid, as the former was posited, by agreement, as valid. And as the clause 191 “proof exists not” is not in conflict with “proof

ἀποδείξις" τῷ "ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις" οὐδὲ τὸ διεzeug-
 μένον ὑγιὲς ἔσται τὸ "ἤτοι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις". τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεzeugμένον
 ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγιὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
 λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ψεῦδος ἢ ψευδῆ μετὰ μάχης. ἢ
 εἴπερ ὑγιὲς ἔστι τὸ διεzeugμένον, πάλιν φαῦλον
 εὐρίσκεται τὸ "εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν
 ἀπόδειξις" συνημμένον, ἐκ μαχομένων συνεστῶς.
 οὐκοῦν ἀσύμφωνά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀνααιρετικά
 192 τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ προειρημένῳ λήμματα· διόπερ
 οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὲς ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ
 τι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις δύνανται δεικνύναι, μὴ ἔχοντες
 κριτήριον ἀκολουθίας, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα.

Ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ πιθανοὶ
 μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγοι (ἔστωσαν
 γάρ), πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν λεγό-
 μεναι ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι
 λέγοντας.

ΙΔ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΩΝ

193 Διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν θρυλουμένων συλλογισμῶν ἴσως
 περιττὸν ἔστι διεξιέναι, τοῦτο μὲν συμπεριτρεπο-
 μένων αὐτῶν τῇ ὑπάρξει τῆς ἀποδείξεως (δῆλον
 γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνης μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος
 χώραν ἔχει), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δυνάμει διὰ τῶν ἔμ-
 προσθεν ἡμῶν λελεγμένων ἀντειρηκότων ἡμῶν πρὸς
 αὐτοῦς, ὅτε περὶ τῆς παρολκῆς διαλεγόμενοι μέθ-
 οδὸν τινα ἐλέγομεν δι' ἧς ἐνδέχεται δεικνύναι ὅτι

* See §§ 145 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 159-162 against the Stoics, and 163-166 against the Peripatetics.

exists," the disjunctive "Either proof exists or
 proof exists not" will not be valid; for the valid
 disjunctive promises that one of its clauses is valid,
 but the other or others false and contradictory.
 Or else, if the disjunctive be valid, the hypothetical
 premiss "If proof exists not, proof exists" is, in
 turn, found to be fallacious, as composed of conflicting
 clauses. So then the premisses in the foregoing
 argument are discordant and mutually destructive;
 wherefore the argument is not valid. And further, 192
 they are unable even to show that anything follows
 logically from the contradictories, since, as we have
 argued,^a they possess no criterion of logical con-
 sequence or deduction.

But this discussion is, in fact, superfluous. For if,
 on the one hand, the arguments in defence of proof
 are (let it be granted) plausible, while, on the other
 hand, the criticisms directed against proof are also
 plausible, then we must necessarily suspend judge-
 ment concerning proof also, and declare that proof is
 "no more" existent than non-existent.

CHAPTER XIV.—CONCERNING SYLLOGISMS

So then it is also superfluous, perhaps, to discuss 193
 in detail the much vaunted "syllogisms," since, for
 one thing, they are included in the refutation of the
 existence of "proof" (for it is plain that if this is
 non-existent there is no place either for probative
 argument), and for another, we have implicitly con-
 tradicted them in our previous statements, when
 in discussing redundancy^b we mentioned a certain
 method by which it is possible to show that all the

πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ λόγοι τῶν τε στωικῶν καὶ τῶν περιπατητικῶν ἀσύνακτοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.

194 ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ οὐ χεῖρον ἕως καὶ ἴδια περὶ αὐτῶν διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ μάλιστα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονούσιν. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι λέγειν τὸ ἀνυπόστατον αὐτῶν ὑπομνησκοντας· ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει δὲ ἀρκεῖ τῆδε τῇ μεθόδῳ χρῆσθαι κατὰ αὐτῶν. λέξω δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ τῶν ἀναποδείκτων· τούτων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ σύμπαντες λόγοι διατρέπονται, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ συνάγειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

195 Ἡ πρότασις τοίνυν αὕτη "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον" ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούται· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον ὄντα καὶ ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ Δίωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, δυνατὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶόν ἐστιν, ὡς εἰ κἂν ἐν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντιούμενον φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιῆς ἢ καθόλου πρότασις, οἷον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν πλείστα τῶν ζῶων τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ, μόνος δὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆς ἢ "πᾶν ζῶον τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ"

196 πρότασις. ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, Σωκράτης δ' ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον," ἐκ τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως τῆς "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον" τὴν κατὰ μέρος πρότασιν συνάγειν βουλόμενοι, τὴν "Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον," ἢ δὴ βεβαιωτική τῆς καθολικῆς προτάσεώς ἐστι κατὰ τὸν ἐπαγωγικὸν τρόπον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, εἰς τὸν

* For the phrase ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, "into the bargain," cf. § 47 *supra*.

probative arguments of the Stoics and the Peripatetics are really inconclusive. Yet perhaps it will not 194 be amiss to go further^a and deal with them separately, especially since these thinkers pride themselves upon them. Now there is much that one can say by way of suggesting their unreality, but in an outline sketch it is sufficient to treat of them by the method which follows. And I will deal at present with the axiomatic^b arguments; for if these are destroyed all the rest of the arguments are overthrown as well, since it is from these that they derive the proof of their deductions.

Well then, the premiss "Every man is an animal" 195 is established by induction from the particular instances; for from the fact that Socrates, who is a man, is also an animal, and Plato likewise, and Dion and each one of the particular instances,^c they think it possible to assert that every man is an animal; so that if even a single one of the particulars should apparently conflict with the rest the universal premiss is not valid; thus, for example, when most animals move the lower jaw, and only the crocodile the upper,^d the premiss "Every animal moves the lower jaw" is not true. So whenever they argue "Every man is an 196 animal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal," proposing to deduce from the universal proposition "Every man is an animal" the particular proposition "Socrates therefore is an animal," which in fact goes (as we have mentioned) to establish by way of induction the universal proposition, they fall into the

^b Or "non-demonstrable," including here categorical syllogisms as well as those mentioned in § 157 *supra*.

^c Cf. Aristot. *Anal. pr.* ii. 23 on logical "induction."

^d Cf. Hdt. ii. 68; Aristot. *Hist. An.* iii. 7.

διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι λόγον, τὴν μὲν καθολικὴν πρότασιν δι' ἐκάστης τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούντες, τὴν δὲ κατὰ μέρος¹ ἐκ τῆς καθολικῆς συλλογιστικῶς. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου "Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος τετράπους, Σωκράτης ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι τετράπους" τὴν μὲν "οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους" πρότασιν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βουλόμενοι βεβαιοῦν, ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῆς "οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους" συλλογίζεσθαι θέλοντες, τῇ κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον ἀπορία περιπίπτουσιν.

198 Ὁμοίως δὲ ἐφοδευτέον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς περιπατητικοῖς λεγομένων ἀναποδείκτων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." τό τε γὰρ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνακτικόν ἔστιν, ὡς φασί, τοῦ "φῶς ἔστι," τό τε "φῶς ἔστι" μετὰ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστι" βεβαιωτικόν ἔστι τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιᾶς ἐνομίσθη τὸ προειρημένον συνημμένον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τεθεώρητο συνυπάρχον αἰ
199 τὸ "φῶς ἔστι" τῷ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν." εἰ οὖν δεῖ προκατεληφέναι ὅτι ἡμέρας οὐσης πάντως ἔστι καὶ φῶς εἰς τὸ συνθεῖναι τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνημμένον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ συνημμένου τούτου συνάγεται τὸ [ὅτι] ἡμέρας οὐσης φῶς εἶναι, τὴν μὲν συνυπάρξιν τοῦ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ φῶς εἶναι συνάγοντος τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνημμένον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ προκειμένῳ ἀναποδείκτω, τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τῆς συνυπάρξεως τῶν προειρημένων

¹ <ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούντες, τὴν δὲ κατὰ μέρος> supplēvi: lacunam indic. Bekk.

error of circular reasoning, since they are establishing the universal proposition inductively by means of each of the particulars and deducing the particular proposition from the universal syllogistically. So likewise in 197 the case of such an argument as "Socrates is a man, but no man is four-footed, therefore Socrates is not four-footed," by proposing to establish the premiss "No man is four-footed" by induction from the particular instances while wishing to deduce each several particular from the premiss "No man is four-footed," they become involved in the perplexity of the circular fallacy.

And a similar criticism may be passed upon the 198 rest of the "axiomatic" arguments, as they are called by the Peripatetics; and also upon arguments in the form "If it is day, it is light." For the proposition "If it is day, it is light" is capable, they say, of proving that "it is light," and the clause "it is light" in conjunction with "it is day" serves to establish the proposition "If it is day, it is light." For the hypothetical premiss stated above would not have been considered valid unless the constant co-existence of "it is light" with "it is day" had already been observed. If, then, one has to apprehend 199 beforehand that when there is day there certainly is light also, in order to construct the hypothetical premiss "If it is day, it is light," while by means of this premiss we deduce that when it is day it is light, the co-existence of the being of day and of night being proved (so far as depends on the axiomatic argument before us) by the premiss "If it is day, it is light," and that premiss in turn being established by the co-existence of the facts aforesaid,

βεβαιούσης, κἀνταῦθα ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνατρέπει τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λόγου.

200 Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἄνευ φωτὸς ἡμέραν θεωρεῖσθαι ὑγιὲς ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖται τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι ” συνημμένον, ὡς εἶγε καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν ἡμέρα μὲν φανεῖη ποτὲ φῶς δὲ μὴ, ψεῦδος ἂν λεχθεῖται τὸ συνημμένον εἶναι· ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ ἀναποδείκτω τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμέραν φωτὸς μὴ ὄντος διὰ τοῦ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι ” συνάγεται, ὥστε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βεβαίωσιν χρῆζειν τοῦ τὸ ἕτερον βεβαίως εἰληφθαι, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ πιστὸν γένηται κατὰ

201 τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν τινά, οἷον ἡμέραν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ νύκτα, τό τε ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τὸ “ οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστι,” καὶ τὸ διεzeugμένον, τὸ “ ἢτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν,” ὑγιῆ νομίζοιτο ἂν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν αὐτὰ βεβαιουῖσθαι νομίζουσι διὰ τε τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ τοῦ διεzeugμένου, λέγοντες “ οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” “ ἢτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἢ “ οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν.”

202 ὅθεν ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν βεβαίωσιν τοῦ διεzeugμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ χρῆζομεν τοῦ προκατειληφέναι ὅτι τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀξιιώματά ἐστιν ἀσυνύπαρκτα, τὸ δὲ ἀσυνύπαρκτα ταῦτα εἶναι συν-

—in this case also the fallacy of circular reasoning overthrows the substance of the argument.

So likewise with an argument in the form “ If it is 200 day, it is light ; but it is not light ; therefore it is not day.” For from the fact that we do not observe day without light the hypothetical premiss “ If it is day, it is light ” might be considered to be valid ; just as if, should day, let us suppose, at some time appear, without the appearance of light, the premiss would be said to be false ; but, so far as concerns the axiomatic argument aforesaid, the non-existence of day when light is non-existent is proved by the premiss “ If it is day, it is light,” so that each of these statements needs for its confirmation the secure grasp of the other in order thereby to become credible by means of circular reasoning. Moreover, from the fact that some things are 201 unable to co-exist—take, for instance, if you like, day and night—both the conjunctive “ negation “ Not day exists and night exists ” and the disjunctive “ Either day exists or night exists ” might be considered to be valid. But they consider that their non-co-existence is established both by the negative of the conjunctive and by the disjunctive, arguing “ Not day exists and night exists ; but in fact night exists ; day therefore exists not ” ; and “ Either it is day or it is night ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is not day,” or “ it is not night, therefore it is day.” Whence we argue again 202 that if for establishing the disjunctive proposition and the negative of the conjunctive we require to apprehend beforehand the fact that the judgements they contain are incapable of co-existence, while they believe that they are deducing this incapacity for

* For the “conjunctive” or “coupled” premiss see § 158, note.

ἀγειν δοκοῦσι διὰ τε τοῦ διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ, ὃ δι' ἀλλήλων εἰσάγεται
 τρόπος, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε τοῖς προειρη-
 μένοις τροπικοῖς πιστεύειν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ ἀσυνύπα-
 ρκτον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχομένων ἀξιωματίων
 καταλαβεῖν, μήτε τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον αὐτῶν δια-
 βεβαιοῦσθαι πρὸ τῆς τῶν συλλογισμῶν διὰ τῶν
 203 τροπικῶν συνερωτήσεως. διόπερ οὐκ ἔχοντες πόθεν
 ἀρξόμεθα τῆς πίστεως διὰ τὸ παλίνδρομον, λέξομεν
 μήτε τὸν τρίτον μήτε τὸν τέταρτον μήτε τὸν
 πέμπτον τῶν ἀναποδείκτων ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις
 ὑπόστασις ἔχειν.
 Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ συλλογισμῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ
 παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

ΙΕ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ

204 Εὐπαραίτητον δὲ εἶναι νομίζω καὶ τὸν περὶ
 ἐπαγωγῆς τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 πιστοῦσθαι βούλονται δι' αὐτῆς τὸ καθόλου, ἦτοι
 πάντα ἐπιόντες τὰ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν
 ἢ τινά. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τινά, ἀβέβαιος ἔσται ἡ ἐπα-
 γωγή, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ καθόλου
 τινα τῶν παραλειπομένων κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ ἐπα-
 γωγῇ· εἰ δὲ πάντα, ἀδύνατα μοχθήσουσιν, ἀπείρων
 ὄντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀπεριορίστων. ὥσθ'
 οὕτως ἐκατέρωθεν, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει σαλευέσθαι
 τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν.

co-existence by means of both the disjunctive and
 the negative conjunctive, we involve ourselves in
 circular reasoning, seeing that we are unable either
 to give credence to the aforesaid premisses without
 having apprehended the incapacity for co-existence
 of the judgements they contain, or to affirm
 positively that incapacity before concluding the
 syllogisms based on these premisses. Consequently, 203
 as we possess no principle on which to ground belief
 owing to the circular style of the argument, we shall
 declare that, so far as depends on these statements,
 neither the third nor the fourth nor the fifth of the
 "axiomatic" syllogisms^a possesses valid substance.
 For the present, then, it will suffice to have said
 thus much concerning syllogisms.

CHAPTER XV.—CONCERNING INDUCTION

It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method 204
 of induction. For, when they propose to establish
 the universal from the particulars by means of induc-
 tion, they will effect this by a review either of all
 or of some of the particular instances. But if they
 review some, the induction will be insecure, since
 some of the particulars omitted in the induction may
 contravene the universal; while if they are to review
 all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the
 particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both
 grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction
 is invalidated.

^a For the "five non-demonstrable (or axiomatic) syllogisms" see §§ 157-158 *supra*.

205 Ἄλλα καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ περὶ ὄρων δὴ τεχνολογία μέγα φρονούσιν οἱ δογματικοί, ἦν τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἐγκαταλέγουσιν. φέρε οὖν καὶ περὶ ὄρων ὀλίγα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰπωμεν.

Πρὸς πολλὰ τοῖνυν χρησιμεύειν τοὺς ὄρους τῶν δογματικῶν δοκούντων, δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω κεφάλαια <α>¹ περιληπτικὰ πάσης [ἦς]² λέγουσιν ἀναγκαιότητος αὐτῶν ἴσως εὐρήσεις· ἢ γὰρ ὡς πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ ὡς πρὸς διδασκαλίαν ἐν πᾶσι παραδεικνύουσι τοὺς ὄρους ἀναγκαίους. εἰάν οὖν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων χρησιμεύουσι, περιτρέψομεν, οἴμαι, πᾶσαν τὴν γεγεννημένην περὶ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ματαιοποιίαν.

207 Εὐθέως οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀγνοῶν τὸ ὀριστὸν οὐχ οἶός τε ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον αὐτῷ ὀρίσασθαι, ὁ δὲ γνωσκων, εἴθ' ὀριζόμενος οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρου τὸ ὀριστὸν κατείληφεν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προκατειλημμένῳ τούτῳ τὸν ὄρον ἐπισυντέθεικεν, πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ ὄρος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖος. καὶ γὰρ ἐπεὶ πάντα μὲν ὀρίζεσθαι θέλοντες καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὀρίζομεθα διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τινὰ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ δίχα τῶν ὄρων ὁμολογοῦντες οὐκ ἀναγκαίους πρὸς κατάληψιν τοὺς ὄρους ἀποφαίνομεν, καθ' ὃν τρόπον τὰ μὴ ὀρισθέντα κατελήφθη δυναμένων ἡμῶν πάντα χωρὶς τῶν ὄρων καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὀρισόμεθα [διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν] ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαίους τοὺς ὄρους ἀποφανοῦμεν.

¹ <α> add. T.² [ἦς] om. mss.* Cf. § 4 *supra*.

Further, the Dogmatists take great pride in their 205 systematic treatment of definitions, which they include in the logical division of their Philosophical System, as they call it. So come and let us now make a few observations on definitions.

Now while the Dogmatists hold that definitions have many uses, you will probably find that these fall under two main heads which, as they say, include all their necessary uses; for, as they explain, definitions 206 are necessary in all cases either for apprehension ^a or for instruction. If, then, we shall show that they are of use for neither of these purposes, we shall, I think, bring to naught all the labour so vainly spent on them by the Dogmatists.

So then, without preliminary, if, on the one hand, 207 the man who knows not the object of definition is unable to define the object unknown to him, while, on the other hand, the man who knows and proceeds to define has not apprehended the object from its definition but has put together his definition to fit the object already apprehended, then the definition is not necessary for the apprehension of objects. And since, if we propose to define absolutely all things, we shall define nothing, because of the regress *ad infinitum*; while if we allow that some things are apprehended even without definitions, we are declaring that definitions are not necessary for apprehension, seeing that we are able to apprehend all things apart from definitions in the same way as the undefined objects were apprehended,—then we shall 208 either define absolutely nothing or we shall declare that definitions are not necessary.

Διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πρὸς διδασκαλίαν αὐτοὺς
 εὔροισιν ἂν ἀναγκαίους· ὡς γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος τὸ
 πρᾶγμα γνούς ἔγνω τοῦτο χωρὶς ὄρου, κατὰ τὸ
 παραπλήσιον καὶ ὁ διδασκόμενος αὐτὸ δύναται
 209 χωρὶς ὄρου διδαχθῆναι. ἔτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀριστῶν
 ἐπικρίνουσι τοὺς ὄρους, καὶ φασὶ μοχθηροὺς ὄρους
 εἶναι τοὺς περιέχοντάς τι τῶν μὴ προσόντων τοῖς
 ὀριστοῖς, ἥτοι πᾶσιν ἢ τισίν. διόπερ ὅταν εἴπῃ
 τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον ἢ
 ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν γραμματικόν, ὅπου μὲν μη-
 δενὸς ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἀθανάτου, ὅπου δὲ τινῶν
 μὴ γραμματικῶν ὄντων, φασὶ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν
 210 ὄρον. τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνεπικριτοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ὄροι διὰ
 τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνεσθαι
 ὀφείλουσιν· εἶτα οὐκ ἂν καταληπτικοὶ τε καὶ δι-
 δακτικοὶ τούτων εἶεν ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνονται δηλονότι
 προπεγνωσμένων, εἶγε ἄρα, καὶ προκατειλημμέ-
 νων.

Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τὸ λέγειν ὡς οἱ ὄροι
 χρησιμεύουσι πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ διδασκαλίαν ἢ
 σαφήνειαν ὅλως, ἀσάφειαν ἡμῖν ἐπισκυκλοῦντες
 211 τοσαύτην; οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα τι καὶ παίξωμεν, εἴ τις
 παρά του βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι εἰ ἀπήντηται αὐτῷ
 ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ ἵππου ὀχούμενος καὶ κύνα ἐφέλκώ-
 μενος, τὴν ἐρώτησιν οὕτω ποιήσαιο "ὦ ζῶον
 λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν,
 ἀπήντητό σοι ζῶον γελαστικὸν πλατωνύνηχον,
 ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, ζῶον θνητῷ χρε-
 μειστικῷ τὰ σφαιρίσματα ἐφηδρακός, ἐφ-
 ελκόμενον ζῶον τετράπουνον ὑλακτικόν;" πῶς οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη καταγέλαστος, εἰς ἀφασίαν οὕτω γνωρίμου

* Cf. §§ 26, 28 for this definition of Man.

And for these reasons they are not necessary for instruction either, as we shall discover. For just as the man who first perceived the object perceived it apart from definition, so likewise the man who receives instruction about it can be instructed without definition. Moreover, they judge the definitions by 209 the objects defined and declare those definitions to be faulty which include any attributes not belonging either to all or to some of the objects defined. Hence, whenever one states that man is "a rational immortal animal" or "a rational mortal literary animal," whereas no man is immortal, and some are not literary, such a definition they say is faulty. And it may be 210 also that the definitions do not admit of judgement owing to the infinity of the particulars by which they ought to be judged; and consequently they will not convey apprehension and instruction regarding the objects whereby they are judged, which evidently have been known beforehand, if at all, and apprehended beforehand.

And how could it be other than absurd to assert that definitions are of use for apprehension or instruction or elucidation of any kind, when they involve us in such a fog of uncertainty? Thus, for instance, to take 211 a ridiculous case, suppose that one wished to ask someone whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a dog and put the question in this form—"O rational mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science, have you met with an animal capable of laughter, with broad nails and receptive of political science,* with his (posterior) hemispheres seated on a mortal animal capable of neighing, and leading a four-footed animal capable of barking?"—how would one be otherwise than ridiculous, in thus reducing the

πράγματος ἐμβαλὼν τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοὺς ὄρους;

212 Οὐκοῦν ἄχρηστον εἶναι τὸν ὄρον ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις λεκτέον, εἴτ' οὖν λόγος εἶναι λέγοιτο διὰ βραχείας ὑπομνήσεως εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἄγων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς φωναῖς πραγμάτων, ὡς δῆλόν γε (οὐ γάρ;) ἐκ τῶν μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων, εἴτε λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλῶν, εἴτε ὁ βούλεται τις. καὶ γὰρ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρος βουλούμενοι παριστᾶν εἰς ἀνήνυτον ἐμπίπτουσι διαφωνίαν, ἣν διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς γραφῆς παρήμι νῦν, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ διατρέπειν τοὺς ὄρους.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ ὄρων ἀπόχρη μοι νῦν λελέχθαι.

IZ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ

213 Ἐπεὶ δέ τις τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν διαλεκτικὴν εἶναι φασιν ἐπιστήμην συλλογιστικὴν ἐπαγωγικὴν ὀριστικὴν διαιρετικὴν, διελέχθημεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἤδη μετὰ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους περὶ τε συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ περὶ ὄρων, οὐκ ἄτοπον ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι καὶ περὶ διαιρέσεως βραχεὰ διαλαβεῖν. γίνεσθαι τοίνυν τὴν διαιρέσιν φασὶ τετραχῶς ἢ γὰρ ὄνομα εἰς σημανώμενα διαιρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ γένος εἰς εἶδη ἢ εἶδος εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον.

* The Aristotelian definition of "Definition," the previous definition being probably Stoic.

† The definition of "Dialectic," and also the four kinds of "Division," here mentioned are given by Alcinous, a second-century (A.D.) Eclectic. As used by Plato and Aristotle, "Division" includes only the 3rd and 4th kinds (i.e. "logical" as distinguished from grammatical (§ 214) and

man to speechlessness concerning so familiar an object because of one's definitions?

So then we must declare that, so far as we may judge by this, the definition is useless, whether it be 212 described as "a statement which by a brief reminder brings us to a conception of the objects which underlie the terms,"—as is plain (is it not?) from what we have said just a moment ago,—or as "a statement declaratory of the essence,"^a or what you like. For in fact, in their desire to propound a definition of the definition they plunge into an endless controversy which I now pass over, because of the plan of my present treatise, although it seems to overthrow definitions.

So what I have said about definitions is enough for the present.

CHAPTER XVII.—CONCERNING DIVISION

Inasmuch as some of the Dogmatists^b affirm that 213 "Dialectic" is "a science dealing with syllogism, induction, definition and division," and, after our arguments concerning the criterion and the sign and proof, we have already discussed syllogisms and induction as well as definitions, we deem that it will not be amiss to treat shortly of "division" also. Division then, as they allege, is effected in four ways: either a name, or word, is divided into its significations, or a whole into parts, or a genus into species, or a

arithmetical (§§ 215-218) division). Logical "division" is the process of defining a class-name by splitting it up into its component parts—the "genus" into "species," the "species" into particulars. By it we enumerate the classes of objects denoted by the name or term which is "divided."

ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἔστω ἐπιστήμη διαιρετική,
ῥάδιον ἴσως ἐπελθεῖν.

ΙΗ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ
ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ

214 Εὐθέως οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν φύσει φασὶν
εἶναι, τῶν θέσει δὲ οὐδαμῶς. καὶ εἰκότως· ἡ μὲν
γὰρ ἐπιστήμη βεβαίον τι καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον πρᾶγμα
εἶναι θέλει, τὰ δὲ θέσει ῥάδιον ἔχει καὶ εὐμετάπτω-
τον τὴν μεταβολήν, ταῖς ἐναλλαγαῖς τῶν θέσεων,
αἱ εἶσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἑτεροιούμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ὀνό-
ματα θέσει σημαίνει καὶ οὐ φύσει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν
συνίεσαν πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαίνόμενα,
ὁμοίως Ἑλληνῆς τε καὶ βάρβαροι, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὰ σημαίνόμενα οἷς ἂν βουλώμεθα
ὀνόμασι ἑτέροις αἰεὶ δηλοῦν τε καὶ σημαίνειν),
πῶς ἂν δυνατὸν εἴη διαιρετικὴν ὀνόματος εἰς
σημαίνόμενα ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ἢ πῶς ἐπιστήμη
σημαίνοντων τε καὶ σημαينوμένων, ὡς οἴονται
τινες, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύναιτ' ἂν ὑπάρχειν;

ΙΘ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΟΛΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

215 Περὶ δὲ ὅλου καὶ μέρους διαλεξόμεθα μὲν καὶ
ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς δὴ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος
περὶ τῆς λεγομένης διαιρέσεως τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ
μέρη αὐτοῦ τὰδε λεκτέον. ὅταν λέγη τις διαιρεῖσθαι

^a That "names" exist "by nature" was held by Hera-
clitus, Cratylus, Stoics and Epicureans; Aristotle and the
Sceptics took the other view. θέσει, "by convention" (or
human ordinance), like the more usual νόμος, is opposed to

species into particulars. But it is probably easy to
show that, on the contrary, in respect of none of these
does a divisive science exist.

CHAPTER XVIII.—CONCERNING THE DIVISION OF A
NAME INTO THINGS SIGNIFIED

Now they at once assert that the sciences of natural 214
objects exist whereas those of conventional objects
have no existence, and that with reason. For science
claims to be a thing that is firm and invariable, but
the conventional objects are easily liable to change
and variation, because their character is altered by
the shifting of the conventions which depend upon
ourselves. Since, then, the significance of names is
based on convention and not on nature ^a (for otherwise
all men, barbarians as well as Greeks, would under-
stand all the things signified by the terms, besides
the fact that it is in our power at any time to point
out and signify the objects by any other names we
may choose), how would it be possible for a science
capable of dividing a name into its significations to
exist? Or how could Dialectic really be, as some
imagine, a "science of things which signify and are
signified"?

CHAPTER XIX.—CONCERNING WHOLE AND PART

Whole and part we shall discuss in what we call 215
our physical treatise,^b but at present we have to deal
with the so-called division of the whole into its parts.
When a man says that the decad is being divided into
φύσει, "by nature," much as we contrast the "artificial"
with the "natural."

^b Cf. iii. 82 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* i. 297 ff., 330 ff., ii. 304.

τὴν δεκάδα εἰς μονάδα¹ καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ἢ δεκάς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ἀρθῆναι μέρος, ἵνα κατὰ συγχώρησιν νῦν τοῦτο δώμεν, οἷον τὴν μονάδα, οὐκέτι ὑπόκειται ἢ δεκάς, ἀλλ' ἐννέα καὶ ὅλως
 216 ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν δεκάδα. ἢ οὖν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀφαίρεσίς τε καὶ διαίρεσις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινων ἄλλων, καθ' ἐκάστην ἀφαίρεσιν ἕτεροιομένων.

Τάχα οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὅλον διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι αὐτοῦ μέρη. καὶ γὰρ εἰ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ὀφείλει² τὰ μέρη ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως, οὐ περιέχεται δέ ἴσως. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος στήσωμεν πάλιν τὸν λόγον, τῆς δεκάδος μέρος φασὶ πάντως εἶναι τὰ ἐννέα· διαιρεῖται γοῦν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐννέα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ ὁμοίως· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ὀκτὼ καὶ δύο. καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἕξ καὶ πέντε καὶ τέσσαρα
 217 καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα πάντα ἐν τῇ δεκάδι περιέχεται καὶ συντιθέμενα μετ' αὐτῆς πεντεκαίπεντήκοντα γίνεται, ἐν τοῖς δέκα περιέχεται πεντεκαίπεντήκοντα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε περιέχεται ἐν τῇ δεκάδι τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη, οὔτε ἢ δεκάς εἰς ἐκεῖνα διαιρεῖσθαι δύναται ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ἃ μηδὲ ὅλως ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖται.

218 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπαντήσεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὅταν τὸ δεκάπηχον μέγεθος, εἰ τύχοι, διαιρεῖν ἐθέλοι τις. οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὖν ἴσως διαιρεῖν οὐδὲ ὅλον εἰς μέρη.

¹ μονάδα T, cj. Bekk. : μίαν mss.

² ὀφείλει Heintz : φιλεῖ mss., Bekk.

one and two and three and four, the decad is not being divided into these. For as soon as its first part, say one, is subtracted—granting for the moment that this can be done—there no longer subsists the decad but the number nine, something quite different from the decad. Hence the division and the subtraction 216 of the other parts is not made from the decad but from some other numbers, and these vary with each subtraction.

Probably then it is impracticable to divide the whole into what are called its parts. For, in fact, if the whole is divided into parts, the parts ought to be comprised in the whole before the act of division, but probably they are not so comprised. Thus for example—to base our argument once more on the decad—they say that nine is certainly a part of the decad, since it is divided into one plus nine. But so likewise is the number eight, since it is divided into eight plus two; and so also are the numbers seven, six, five, four, three, two and one. If then all these 217 numbers are included in the decad, and when added together with it make up fifty-five, then fifty-five is included in the number ten, which is absurd. Therefore neither are its so-called parts included in the decad nor can the decad be divided into them, as a whole into parts, since they are not even seen in it at all.

And the same objections will confront us in the case 218 of magnitudes^a also, supposing one should wish, for example, to divide the magnitude of ten cubits. Probably, then, it is not practicable to divide a whole into parts.

^a The subject of geometry, as numbers are of arithmetic.

Κ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΔΩΝ

CHAPTER XX.—OF GENERA AND SPECIES

219 Οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὑπολείπεται λόγος, περὶ οὗ πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεξόμεθα, ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ νῦν ταῦτα λέξομεν. εἰ μὲν ἐννοήματα εἶναι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη λέγουσιν, αἱ κατὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐπιχειρήσεις αὐτοὺς διατρέπουσιν· εἰ δὲ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῖς ἀπολείπουσιν, τί πρὸς τοῦτο
 220 ἐροῦσιν; εἰ ἔστι τὰ γένη, ἦτοι τσαυτὰ ἔστιν ὅσα τὰ εἶδη, ἢ ἔν ἐστι κοινὸν πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ λεγομένων εἶναι γένος. εἰ μὲν οὖν τσαυτὰ ἔστι τὰ γένη ὅσα τὰ εἶδη αὐτῶν, οὐκετ' ἂν εἴη κοινὸν γένος, ὃ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεθῆσεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν εἶναι λέγοιτο ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσιν αὐτοῦ τὸ γένος, ἦτοι ὅλου αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον εἶδος αὐτοῦ μετέχει ἢ μέρους αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅλου μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τι ὑπάρχον ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλω κατὰ ταῦτ' ὀφείδει περιέχεσθαι οὕτως ὡς ὅλον ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεωρεῖσθαι τῶν ἐν οἷς εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ μέρους, πρῶτων μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθήσει τῷ εἶδει τὸ γένος πᾶν, ὡς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ζῶον ἀλλὰ μέρος ζώου, οἶον οὐσία, οὔτε δὲ ἔμφυχος οὔτε
 221 αἰσθητική. εἴτα μέντοι καὶ ἦτοι ταυτοῦ λέγοιτο ἂν μετεσχηκέναι πάντα τὰ εἶδη μέρους τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐτέρου καὶ ἐτέρου. ἀλλὰ ταυτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. εἰ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ

There still remains, then, the subject of genera and 219 species, which we shall discuss more at large elsewhere,^a but here we shall deal with them concisely. If, on the one hand, they^b assert that genera and species are mental concepts, our criticisms of the "regent part" and of "presentation" refute them; whereas if they assign to them a substantiality of their own, how will they reply to this objection? If 220 the genera exist, either they are equal in number to the species or else there is one genus common to all the species which are said to belong to it. If, then, the genera are equal in number to their species, there will no longer be a common genus to be divided into the species; while if it shall be said that the genus exists as one in all its species, then each species partakes of either the whole or a part of it.^c But it certainly does not partake of the whole; for it is impossible that what is one real object should be equally included in separate things in such a way as to appear as a whole in each of those things in which it is said to exist. And if it partakes of a part, then, in the first place, all the genus will not, as they suppose, accompany the species, nor will "man" be "an animal" but a part of an animal—he will be substance, for example, but neither animate nor sensitive.^d Then, 221 in the next place, all the species will be said to partake either of the same part of their genus or of different parts; but to partake of the same part is impossible for the reasons stated above; while if they partake of "participation" by Aristotle and in the *Parmenides* of Plato.

^a *i.e.* a part of the Genus is taken as meaning a part of its definition; cf. § 224 for this definition of the genus "animal."

^a No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.

^b *i.e.* the Stoics; cf. §§ 29 ff., 70 ff., *Adv. Log.* i. 370 ff. for the Sceptic criticisms.

^c This view is Plato's, the former Aristotle's. The following objections are like those brought against the Platonic theory

ἄλλου, οὔτε ὁμοία ἀλλήλοις ἔσται τὰ εἶδη κατὰ γένος, ὅπερ οὐ προσδέξονται, ἀπειρόν τε ἔσται γένος ἕκαστον εἰς ἀπειρα τεμνόμενον οὐ μόνον τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶον ὁ Δίων εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, οὐδὲ κατὰ μέρος μετέσχηκε τὰ εἶδη τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἐνός ὄντος.

222 Εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅλου μετέσχηκεν ἕκαστον εἶδος τοῦ γένους μήτε μέρους αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν εἶναι γένος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἵδεσιν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι; τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις λέγειν μὴ οὐχὶ ἀναπλάσσαν τινὰς εἰδωλοποιήσεις, αἱ ταῖς ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ἀνεπικρίτοις διαφωνίαις κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους περιτραπήσονται.

223 Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. τὰ εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα ἔστιν· τούτων τὰ γένη ἦτοι καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα ἢ τοῖα μὲν τοῖα δὲ οὐ ἢ οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα. οἷον ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν ἔστι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ἔνια μὲν λευκά, εἰ τύχοι, ἔνια δὲ μέλανα, καὶ ἔνια μὲν μέγιστα ἔνια δὲ σμικρότατα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, τό τι λόγου ἔνεκεν, ὃ φασιν εἶναι τινες γενικώτατον,

224 ἢ πάντα ἔσται ἢ τὰ ἕτερα ἢ οὐδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐδέν ἔστιν ὅλως τό τι, οὐδὲ τὸ γένος, πέρασ ἔχει

* The stock name for a specimen of "Man," *cf.* i. 189, and §§ 227 ff.

^b *e.g.* the Platonic Ideas, *cf.* iii. 189.

^c The argument here is that it is impossible to conceive a number of opposite qualities, such as are possessed by the multitude of species and particulars included in the "genus," co-existing in the unity of the genus; while if they do not all co-exist in it, the "genus" ceases to be inclusive of all

of different parts, the species will be generically dissimilar one to another (which they will not admit), and each genus will be infinite because cut up into infinite sections (not into the species only but also into the particulars, since it is actually seen in these along with its species; for Dion^a is said to be an animal as well as a man). But if these consequences are absurd, then not even by way of parts do the species partake of their genus, it being a unity.

If, then, each several species partakes neither of 222 the whole genus nor of a part of it, how can it be said that the one genus exists in all its parts so as to be actually divided into them? No one, probably, could make such a statement unless by concocting some imaginary entities,^b which will be overturned, as the attacks of the Sceptics show, by the unsettled disputes of the Dogmatists themselves.

Furthermore, there is this to be said.^c The species 223 are of this kind or of that kind: the genera of these species either are of both this kind and that kind, or of this kind but not of that kind, or neither of this kind nor of that kind. When, for instance, of the "somethings" (or particulars) some are corporeal others incorporeal, and some true others false, and some (it may be) white others black, and some very large others very small, and so on with the rest, the genus "something" (to take it for the sake of argument), which some regard as the *summum genus*,^d will either be all these or some of them or none. But 224 if the "something," and the genus too, is absolutely

its proper species and particulars; and if it includes *none* of the opposites, it is wholly unrelated to its particulars, and has no claim to be termed a "genus."

^d The Stoic view, *cf.* §§ 86 f. *supra*.

ἢ ζήτησις. εἰ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ῥηθείη, πρὸς τῷ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἕκαστον¹ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ δεήσει πάντα εἶναι. ὡς γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον, ὡς φασίν, οὐσία ἐστὶν ἔμφυχος αἰσθητική, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία εἶναι λέγεται καὶ ἔμφυχος καὶ αἰσθητική, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γένος καὶ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ψευδές καὶ ἀληθές καὶ μέλαν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ λευκόν καὶ μικρότατον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον πάντα ἔσται· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. ψεῦδος οὖν καὶ 225 τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα μόνα ἐστὶ, τούτων τὸ γένος τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ ἔσται γένος, οἷον εἰ σῶμα τό τι, τῶν ἀσωμάτων, καὶ εἰ λογικόν τὸ ζῶον, τῶν ἀλόγων, ὡς μήτε ἀσώματον τί εἶναι μήτε ἀλογον ζῶον,² καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε καὶ τοῖον καὶ τοῖον τὸ γένος, οὔτε τοῖον μὲν τοῖον δὲ οὔ, οὔτε μὴν οὔτε τοῖον οὔτε τοῖον δύναται εἶναι [γένος]· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ γένος.

Εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι δυνάμει πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, λέξομεν ὡς τὸ δυνάμει τι ὄν δεῖ τι καὶ ἐνεργεία εἶναι, οἷον οὐ δύναται τις γραμματικὸς εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ³ ἐνεργεία. καὶ τὸ γένος οὖν εἰ δυνάμει πάντα ἐστίν, ἐρωτῶμεν αὐτοὺς τί ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία, καὶ

¹ ἕκαστον cj. Bekk.: καὶ mss.

² ζῶον post εἶναι mss., edd., transp. Papp.

³ εἰ μὴ καὶ T: μὴ τις mss., ὦν add. Bekk.

* Aristotle regarded the relation of Genus to Species as that of Potentiality to Actuality, i.e. of unrealized possibility

none of them, the inquiry comes to an end. And if we should say that it is all of them, then, besides the impossibility of such a statement, each of the species and of the particulars wherein it exists will have to be all. For just as when the genus "animal" is, as they assert, "an animate sensitive substance," each of its species is said to be substance and animate and sensitive, so likewise if the genus is both corporeal and incorporeal and false and true and black, it may be, and white and very small and very large, and all the rest, each of the species and of the particulars will be all these—which is contrary to observation. So this too is false. But if the genus is some of them 225 only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the rest; if, for instance, the genus "something" is corporeal it will not be that of the incorporeal, and if the genus "animal" is rational it will not be that of the irrational, so that there is neither an incorporeal "something" nor an irrational animal, and so likewise with all other cases; and this is absurd. Therefore the genus cannot be either of both this and that kind, or of this kind but not of that, or of neither this kind nor that; and if this be so, neither does the genus exist at all.

And if one should say that the genus is potentially all things,^a we shall reply that what is potentially something must also be actually something, as, for instance, no one can be potentially literary without being so actually. So too, if the genus is potentially all things, what, we ask them, is it actually? And to what is real and determinate, or of the germinal to the fully evolved. As the "actuality" of the oak is implicit in the "potency" of the acorn, so the plurality of "actual" particulars are implicit in the "potency" of the unitary "genus."

οὕτω μένουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπορίαι. τὰναντία μὲν
 226 γὰρ πάντα ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι οὐ δύναται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐνεργεῖα τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον, οἷον σῶμα
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖα, δυνάμει δὲ ἀσώματον. δυνάμει γὰρ
 ἔστιν ὁ οἶόν τε ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖα ὑποστῆναι, τὸ δὲ
 σῶμα ἐνεργεῖα ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀσώματον γενέσθαι
 κατ' ἐνεργειαν, ὥστε εἰ <τό τι>¹ λόγου χάριν σῶμά
 ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματον δυνάμει, καὶ
 τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ γένος τὰ
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον. εἰ δὲ
 οὐδὲν ὅλως ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐδὲ ὑφέστηκεν.
 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἔστι τὸ γένος, ὃ διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ εἶδη
 λέγουσιν.

227 Ἐπι καὶ τοῦτο θεάσασθαι ἄξιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ
 ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Πάρις, οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὲν "Ἀλέξανδρος περιπατεῖ" ἀληθές
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ "Πάρις περιπατεῖ" ψεῦδος, οὕτως
 εἰ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἀνθρώπων² εἶναι Θέωνος καὶ
 Δίωνος, εἰς σύνταξιν ἀξιώματος ἀγομένη ἢ ἀνθρω-
 πος προσηγορία ἢ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων
 ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα. οὐ θεωρεῖται δὲ τοῦτο· τοῦ
 μὲν γὰρ Δίωνος καθημένου Θέωνος δὲ περιπα-
 τοῦντος τὸ "ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ" ἐφ' οὗ μὲν
 λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐφ' οὗ δὲ ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα
 κοινή ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ἀνθρωπος προσηγορία,
 καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἰδία ἑκατέρου.

¹ <τό τι> add. Heintz.

² τὸ ἀνθρώπων cj. R. Philippson: τὸ ἀνθρώπων T, cj. Papp.:
 τῷ ἀνθρώπων MSS., Bekk.

thus we find that the same difficulties remain. For
 it cannot actually be all the contraries; nor yet can 226
 it be some of them actually and some only potentially
 —corporeal, for instance, actually and incorporeal
 potentially. For it is potentially that which it is
 capable of really being actually, but that which is
 actually corporeal is incapable of becoming incor-
 poreal in actuality, so that if, for example, the genus
 "something" is actually corporeal it is not potenti-
 ally incorporeal, and *vice versa*. It is impossible,
 therefore, for the genus to be some things actually
 and some only potentially. But if it is absolutely
 nothing actually, it has no substantial existence.
 Hence the genus, which they say they divide into
 the species, is nothing.

And further, here is another point worthy of notice. 227
 Just as, because Alexander and Paris^a are identical,
 it is impossible that the statement "Alexander walks"
 should be true when "Paris walks" is false, so also if
 "manhood" is identical for both Theon and Dion,
 the term "man" when introduced as an element in
 a judgement will cause the judgement to be equally
 true or false in the case of both. But this is not what
 we find; for when Dion is sitting and Theon walking,
 the judgement "man walks" is true when used of
 the one, but false of the other. Therefore the term^b
 "man" is not common to them both and the same
 for both but, if applicable at all, it is peculiar to one
 of the two.

^a Two names of the son of Priam who carried off Helen
 to Troy.

^b "Term," i.e. (in Stoic usage) "common noun or
 appellative" (Diog. Laert. vii. 58).

ΚΑ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΤΩΝ

228 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβεβηκότων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συμβέβηκε Δίῳ τε καὶ Θέῳ τὸ ὄραν, εἴαν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν φθαρῆ μὲν Δίῳ, Θέῳ δὲ περὶ καὶ ὄρα, ἦτοι τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ ἐφθαρμένου Δίῳνος ἄφθαρτον μένειν ἐροῦσιν, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ὄρασιν ἐφθάρθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐφθάρθαι λέξουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκ ἄρα ἢ Θέῳνος ὄρασις ἢ αὐτῆ ἐστὶ τῇ Δίῳνος, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἰδίᾳ ἐκατέρου. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταῦτον συμβέβηκε Δίῳ τε καὶ Θέῳ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἐν Θέῳ ἀναπνοὴν εἶναι, τὴν ἐν Δίῳ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦ μὲν φθαρέντος τοῦ δὲ περιόντος· οὐκ ἄρα ἢ αὐτῆ ἐστὶν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον νῦν ἀρκέσει συντόμως λελέχθαι.

ΚΒ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑΤΩΝ

229 Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ σεμνύνοντες αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων, φασίν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστικὴ, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομένην πιθανότησιν. ὅθεν ὡς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὴν ἔνοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις διὰ τῶν

* The Stoics; cf. § 94 *supra* for the definition of Dialectic.

CHAPTER XXI.—CONCERNING COMMON PROPERTIES

Similar arguments apply also to the "common 228 properties." For if vision is one and the same property in Dion and in Theon, then, suppose that Dion should perish and Theon survive and retain his sight, either they will assert that the vision of the perished Dion remains unperished, which is incredible, or they will declare that the same vision has both perished and not perished, which is absurd; therefore the vision of Theon is not identical with Dion's but, if anything, the vision of each is peculiar to himself. And if breathing is an identical property in Dion and Theon, it is impossible that breathing should exist in Theon and not exist in Dion; but this is possible when the one has perished and the other survives; therefore it is not identical.

However, as regards this subject, this concise statement will be sufficient for the present.

CHAPTER XXII.—CONCERNING SOPHISMS

It will not, perhaps, be amiss to give our attention 229 for a moment to the subject of Sophisms, seeing that those who glorify Dialectic^a declare that it is indispensable for exposing sophisms. For, they say, if Dialectic is capable of distinguishing true and false arguments, and sophisms are false arguments, it will also be capable of discerning these, which distort the truth by apparent plausibilities. Hence the dialecticians, by way of assisting life^b when it totters, strive earnestly to teach us the conception of sophisms, their

^b *i.e.* the views and conduct of ordinary people, cf. i. 23, 165.

σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται διδάσκειν, λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανὸν καὶ δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἧτοι ψευδῆ ἢ ὠμοιωμένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἀδηλον ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσδεκτον, οἷον ψευδῆ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ σοφίσματος ἔχει “οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγορήμα πειν· κατηγορήμα δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀψίνθιον πειν· οὐδεὶς ἄρα δίδωσιν ἀψίνθιον πειν,” ἔτι δὲ ὅμοιον ψευδεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου “ὁ μήτε ἐνεδέχεται μήτε ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὼ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεῖται <οὐκ ἄρα ἄτοπὸν ἐστι τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὼ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει>.”¹ ἔτι δὲ ἀδηλον οὕτως “οὐχὶ καὶ ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν· ἠρώτηκα δὲ τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν.” ἔτι δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες λόγοι, οἷον “ὁ βλέπεις, ἔστιν· βλέπεις δὲ φρενιτικόν· ἔστιν ἄρα φρενιτικόν.” “ὁ ὄρας, ἔστιν· ὄρας δὲ φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον· ἔστιν ἄρα φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον.”

232 Εἶτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν [ὄραν ἧτοι] παριστᾶν ἐπιχειροῦσι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος ὅτι ἄλλο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήρεται. συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεσθαι κατηγορήμα, καὶ εἶναι κατηγορήμα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀψίνθιον. διὸ δέον ἐπιφέρειν “οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον

¹ <οὐκ . . . φονεύει> add. cj. Bekk.

^a Or “meaningless.” The Stoics held that every “judgment” or “proposition” (ἀξιωμα) was significant; so the

differences and their solutions. They declare that a sophism is “a plausible argument cunningly framed to induce acceptance of the inference, it being either false or resembling what is false or non-evident or otherwise unacceptable.” It is false, for example, 230 in the case of the sophism “Nobody offers one a predicate to drink; but ‘to drink absinth’ is a predicate; nobody therefore offers one absinth to drink.” Or again, it may resemble the false, as in this case—“What neither was nor is possible is not absurd^a; but it neither was nor is possible for a doctor, *qua* doctor, to murder; therefore it is not absurd that a doctor, *qua* doctor, should murder.” Or again, it 231 may be non-evident, as thus—“It is not true both that I have asked you a question first and that the stars are not even in number; but I have asked you a question first; therefore the stars are even.” Or again, it may be otherwise unacceptable, like the so-called solecistic^b arguments, such as—“That at which you look exists; but you have a frenzied look; therefore ‘frenzied’ exists”; or “What you gaze at exists; but you gaze at an inflamed spot; therefore ‘at an inflamed spot’ exists.”

Moreover, they attempt also to set forth solutions 232 of the sophisms, saying in the case of the first sophism that one thing is established by the premisses and another inferred in the conclusion. For it is established that a predicate is not drunk and that “to drink absinth” is a predicate, but not “absinth” by itself. Hence, whereas one ought to infer “Nobody proposition “this is not possible” is not ἄτοπον, in this sense of the word.

^b *i.e.* ungrammatical, involving the use of an adjective for a noun, the accusative for the nominative case (as here τόπον for τόπος), and the like. Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* cc. 14, 32.

πίνειν," ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται " οὐδεὶς
 233 ἄρα ἀψίνθιον πίνει," ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγόμενον
 ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν
 ὡς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὀκνεῖν αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι, συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ " οὐκ ἄρα
 ἄτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει." οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἄτοπὸν ἐστίν, ἀξίωμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ " ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει".
 234 διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγὴ φασιν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γένους τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστίν.
 μηδενὸς γὰρ προηρωτημένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθές
 γίνεται, ψευδοῦς τῆς συμπλοκῆς οὔσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι
 ψεῦδος τὸ " ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον" ἐν αὐτῇ. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι
 τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς γινόμενης,
 " ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον," διὰ τὸ ἠρωτηθῆσθαι πρὸ
 τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ
 τῆς συμπλοκῆς πρότασις γίνεται ψευδῆς τοῦ ἐν τῷ συμπεπλεγμένῳ
 ψεῦδους γενομένου ἀληθοῦς· ὡς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι
 τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς
 235 συμπλοκῆς τῆς προσλήψεως. τοὺς δὲ τελευταίους, φασὶν ἔνιοι,¹ τοὺς σολοικίζοντας λόγους
 ἀτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι² παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν τινὲς διαλεκτικοὶ φασὶ περὶ σοφισμάτων (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄλλα λέγουσιν)· ταῦτα

¹ ἔνιοι MT: ἐνθα L, Bekk.

² ἐπάγεσθαι T: ἐπάγειν mss., Bekk.

^a i.e. meaningless—a Stoic dictum.

^b i.e. the third Sophism, in § 231.

therefore drinks the 'to drink absinth,' which is true, the inference drawn is "Nobody therefore drinks absinth," which is false, as not deduced from the established premisses. And as regards the 233 second sophism, they explain that while it seems to lead in a false direction, so that it makes the inattentive hesitate in assenting to it, its conclusion is true, namely "It is not therefore absurd that the doctor, *qua* doctor, should murder." For no judgement is absurd,^a and "the doctor, *qua* doctor, murders" is a judgement, so that neither is it absurd. And 234 the method of leading up to the non-evident^b deals, they say, with the class of things that are variable.^c For when, according to the assumption, no previous question has been asked, the negation of the conjunctive premiss is true, the conjunctive or major premiss being false because of its inclusion of the false clause "I have asked you a question first." But after the negation of the major has been asked, as the minor premiss "I have asked you a question first" has become true, owing to the fact that the negation of the major has been asked before the minor premiss, the first clause in the negation of the major becomes false while the false clause in the major has become true; so that it is never possible for the conclusion to be deduced if the negation of the major premiss does not co-exist with the minor premiss. And as 235 to the last class—the solecistic arguments—some declare that they are introduced absurdly, contrary to linguistic usage.

Such are the statements made by some of the Dialecticians concerning sophisms—though others

^c i.e. judgements which change from truth to falsehood; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 76.

δὲ τὰς μὲν τῶν εἰκαιωτέρων ἀκοὰς ἴσως δύναται γαργαλίξειν, περιττὰ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ μάτην αὐτοῖς πεπονημένα. καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠδὴ λελεγμένων ἡμῖν ὄραν· ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος κατὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικούς καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ποικίλως τε ἄλλως καὶ τῷ τὰ μαρτύρια τῆς συλλογιστικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους δια-
236 τρέπεσθαι λόγους. εἰς δὲ τὸν προκείμενον τόπον ἰδίως καὶ ἄλλα μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ὡς δὲ ἐν συντόμῳ νῦν τὸδε λεκτέον.

“Ὅσα μὲν σοφίσματα ἰδίως ἢ διαλεκτικῆ δύνασθαι δοκεῖ διελέγειν, τούτων ἢ διάλυσις ἀχρηστός ἐστίν· ὅσων δὲ ἢ διάλυσις χρησιμεύει, ταῦτα ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικός οὐκ ἂν διαλύσειεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παρακολούθησιν
237 ἐσχηκότες. εὐθέως γοῦν, ἵνα ἐνὸς ἢ δευτέρου μνησθῶμεν παραδείγματος, ἐρωτηθέντος ἱατρῶ τοιοῦτου σοφίσματος “κατὰ τὰς νόσους ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον· ἐπὶ πάσης δὲ τυπώσεως νόσου πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου πάντως γίνεται παρακμὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ὡς τὸ πολὺ παρα-
λαμβάνει” ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικός οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχει πρὸς διάλυσιν τοῦ λόγου, καίτοι χρησίμην οὔσαν,
238 ὁ δὲ ἱατρός διαλύσεται τὸ σόφισμα, εἰδὼς ὅτι παρακμὴ λέγεται διχῶς ἢ τε τοῦ ὄλου νοσήματος καὶ ἢ ἐκάστης ἐπιτάσεως μερικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς

^a Cf. §§ 80 ff. *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 144 ff., 156 ff.

^c The “Methodic” School of medicine held that the progress of a disease was marked by three-day periods of increas-

indeed make other statements; and what they say may be able, perhaps, to tickle the ears of the casual hearer, superfluous though it is and the result of vain labour on their part. Probably this can be seen from what we have said already ^a; for we have shown that truth and falsehood, according to the Dialecticians, cannot be apprehended, and that by a variety of arguments as well as by the refutation of their evidences for the validity of the syllogism, namely proof and axiomatic arguments.^b And there are 236 many other special objections bearing on the topic before us which we might mention, but now, for brevity's sake, we mention only this one.

As regards all the sophisms which dialectic seems peculiarly able to expose, their exposure is useless; whereas in all cases where the exposure is useful, it is not the dialectician who will expose them but the experts in each particular art who grasp the connexion of the facts. Thus, for instance, to mention 237 one or two examples, if a sophism such as this were propounded—“In diseases, at the stages of abatement, a varied diet and wine are to be approved; but in every type of disease an abatement inevitably occurs before the first third day^c; it is necessary, therefore, to take for the most part a varied diet and wine before the first third day,”—in this case the dialectician would be unable to assist in exposing the argument, useful though the exposure would be, but the doctor will expose the sophism, since he 238 knows that the term “abatement” is used in two senses, of the general “abatement” in the disease and of the tendency to betterment after the crisis in

ing (up to the crisis) or decreasing severity; for the former they prescribed a light diet.

ρόπη πρὸς τὸ κρεῖσσον, καὶ πρὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου ὡς τὸ πολὺ γίνεται παρακμὴ ἢ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως τῆς μερικῆς, τὴν δὲ ποικίλην δίαιταν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ δοκιμάζομεν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παρακμῇ τοῦ ὄλου νοσήματος. ὅθεν καὶ διηρηθῆσθαι λέξει τὰ λήμματα τοῦ λόγου, ἐτέρας μὲν παρακμῆς ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λήμματι λαμβανομένης, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ ὄλου πάθους, ἐτέρας δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τῆς μερικῆς.

239 Πάλιν τε ἐπὶ τινος πυρέσσοντος κατὰ πύκνωσιν ἐπιτεταμένην ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγου “ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματά ἐστιν ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ὑποκειμένη πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν· κατάλληλον ἄρα τῇ ὑποκειμένη πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν ” ὁ μὲν
240 διαλεκτικὸς ἡσυχάσει, ὁ δὲ ἰατρὸς εἰδὼς τίνα μὲν ἐστὶν προηγουμένως προσεχῆ πάθη, τίνα δὲ συμπτώματα τούτων, ἐρεῖ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπτωμάτων προκόπτει τὸν λόγον (ἀμέλει γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τοῦ ψυχροῦ πλείονα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνειν τὴν πύρωσιν) ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν προσεχῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν στέγνωσιν εἶναι προσεχῆ, ἥτις οὐ τὴν πύκνωσιν ἀλλὰ τὸν χαλαστικὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπακολουθούσης θερμοσίας οὐ προηγουμένως προσεχές, ὅθεν μηδὲ τὸ κατάλληλον εἶναι δοκοῦν αὐτῇ.

241 Καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφίσμασι τοῖς χρησίμως ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν διάλυσιν οὐδὲν ἕξει λέγειν ὁ διαλεκ-

* Cf. Hippocrates, *De flat.* 2; for morbid “contraction” counteracted by “dilatation” or “relaxation” cf. i. 238.

the strained local conditions, and this improvement in the local strain generally occurs before the first third day, but it is not for this but for the general abatement in the disease that we recommend the varied diet. Consequently he will say that the premisses are discordant, since one kind of “abatement” is adopted in the first premiss, namely that of the general condition, and another—that of the local condition—in the second premiss.

Again, in the case of one who suffers from fever 239 due to aggravated “contraction” or obstruction, if an argument is propounded in the form—“Opposites are cures of opposites^a; cold is the opposite of the present feverish condition; therefore cold is the treatment which corresponds to the present feverish condition,”—here again the dialectician will keep silence, but the doctor, since he knows what morbid 240 states are fundamentally persistent and what are symptoms of such states, will declare that the argument does not apply to the symptoms (not to mention the fact that the result of the application of cold is to aggravate the feverish condition) but to the persistent morbid states, and that the constipation is persistent but requires an expansive method of treatment rather than contraction, whereas the resultant symptom of inflammation is not fundamentally persistent, nor (consequently) is the state of cold which seems to correspond thereto.

Thus, as regards sophisms the exposure of which 241 is useful, the dialectician will not have a word to say,

By “corresponding” is meant the appropriate “counteracting” remedy. The “persistent” or “deep-seated” (προσεχῆ) morbid states are distinguished from the superficial “symptoms” which the Methodic School disregarded as accidentals.

τικός, ἐρωτήσας δὲ ἡμῶν τοιούτους λόγους “ εἰ
 οὐχὶ καὶ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις,
 κέρατα ἔχεις· οὐχὶ δὲ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα
 242 ἔχεις· κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις.” “ εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἥτοι
 ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὔτε
 δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, μένει γάρ, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν·
 πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνεργοίη τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μηδὲ τὴν
 243 ἀρχὴν ἔστιν; οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι.” “ ἥτοι τὸ ὄν
 γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν ὄν ὄν οὐ γίνεται,
 ἔστι γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γινώ-
 μενον πάσχει τι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ πάσχει. οὐδὲν
 244 ἄρα γίνεται.” “ ἡ χιών ὑδωρ ἔστι πεπηγός· μέλαν
 δὲ τὸ ὑδωρ ἔστιν· μέλαινα ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ χιών.”

Καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς ἀθροίσας ὑθλους συνάγει
 τὰς ὀφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, καὶ
 πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῶν δι’
 ἀποδείξεων συλλογιστικῶν ὅτι γίνεται τι καὶ ὅτι
 κινεῖται τι καὶ ὅτι ἡ χιών ἔστι λευκὴ καὶ ὅτι κέρατα
 οὐκ ἔχομεν, καίτοι γε ἀρκούντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν
 ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν
 διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν
 φαινομένων ἰσοσθενούς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως.
 ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος τὸν κατὰ τῆς
 κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ κατὰ
 τὸν βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζὰς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλ-
 λονται πορείας κατασκευάζουσί τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας

* The *ceratinē* or “Horn-fallacy” (invented by the
 Megarics, cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 111, vi. 39) is generally put in
 a simpler form—“If you have not lost anything, you have
 it; you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns” (a
 joke aimed at cuckolds, thinks Fabricius). Sextus’s com-
 plex syllogism seems much more clumsy (if the text is right).

but he will propound for us arguments such as these ^a
 —“If it is not so that you both have fair horns and
 have horns, you have horns; but it is not so that
 you have fair horns and have horns; therefore you
 have horns.” “If a thing moves, it moves either in ²⁴²
 the spot where it is or where it is not; but it moves
 neither in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor
 in that where it is not (for how could a thing be
 active in a spot where it does not so much as exist?);
 therefore nothing moves.” ^b “Either the existent ²⁴³
 becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does
 not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-
 existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-
 existent is not passive); therefore nothing becomes.” ^c
 “Snow is frozen water; but water is black; there- ²⁴⁴
 fore snow is black.” ^d

And when he has made a collection of such trash
 he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds
 Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish
 for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a
 thing moves, snow is white, and we do not have
 horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront
 the trash with the plain fact in order to smash up
 their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent
 contradictory evidence derived from appearances.
 Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher, ^e when the argu-
 ment against motion was put to him, without a word
 started to walk about; and people who follow the usual
 way of life proceed on journeys by land and sea and

^b Cf. § 245, iii. 7, and *Adv. Gramm.* 311, where this argu-
 ment is ascribed to Diodorus the Megaric.

^c In *Adv. Log.* i. 71 this argument is ascribed to Gorgias.

^d Anaxagoras held this notion about snow, cf. i. 33.

^e Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. vi. 39); see iii. 66.
 Cf. Boswell’s story of how Dr. Johnson refuted Berkeley.

καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ
 245 γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες λόγων. φέρεται δὲ καὶ
 Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἱατροῦ χαρίεν ἀπομνημόνευμα·
 συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ὃς ἐναπειροκαλῶν
 τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξῆει σοφιστικούς κατὰ
 τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. ὡς οὖν ἐκ-
 βαλὼν ποτε ὤμον ὁ Διδώωρος ἤκε θεραπευθισόμενος
 ὡς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκείνος πρὸς
 αὐτὸν λέγων “ ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπω ὁ ὤμος ὧν ἐκ-
 πέπτωκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν οὔτε
 ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν,” ὡς τὸν σοφι-
 στήν λιπαρεῖν εἶαν μὲν τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους, τὴν
 δὲ ἐξ ἱατρικῆς ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θερα-
 246 πείαν. ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδο-
 ξάστως κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις
 βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ
 μάλιστα ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς χρείας λεγομένων
 ἐπέχοντας. εἰ οὖν ὅσα μὲν εὐχρήστως ἂν ἐπιλυθεῖη,
 ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν διαλύσαιτο ἢ διαλεκτικῇ, ὅσα δὲ
 ἐπιλύεσθαι δοίη τις ἂν ἴσως ὑπ’ αὐτῆς σοφίσματα,
 τούτων ἢ διάλυσις ἀχρηστός ἐστιν, ἀχρηστός ἐστι
 κατὰ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν τῶν σοφισμάτων ἢ διαλεκτικῇ.
 247 Καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς
 λεγομένων ὀρμώμενός τις οὕτως ἂν συντόμως
 ὑπομνήσειε περιττὰ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων
 παρ’ αὐτοῖς δὴ τεχνολογούμενα. ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην
 τὴν διαλεκτικὴν φασὶν ὠρμηκεῖναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γινῶναι τί ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται,

^a A famous anatomist of Cos, circa 300 B.C. For Diodorus Cronos cf. i. 234.

^b This refers back to the end of § 244, § 245 being parenthetical.

build ships and houses and beget children without pay-
 ing any attention to the arguments against motion
 and becoming. And we are told of an amusing retort 245
 made by the physician Herophilus^a: he was a con-
 temporary of Diodorus who, being given to juggling 245
 with dialectic, used to promulgate sophistical argu-
 ments against motion as well as many other things.
 So when Diodorus had dislocated his shoulder he
 came to Herophilus to get treated, and the latter
 jestingly said to him—“ Your shoulder has been put
 out either in the place where it was or where it was
 not; but it was put out neither where it was nor
 where it was not; therefore it has not been put
 out ”; so that the Sophist begged him to leave such
 arguments alone and apply the treatment prescribed
 by medical art as suitable to his case. For ^b it is, I 246
 think, sufficient to conduct one’s life empirically and
 undogmatically in accordance with the rules and
 beliefs that are commonly accepted, suspending judge-
 ment regarding the statements derived from dogmatic
 subtlety and furthest removed from the usage of
 life.^c If, then, dialectic would fail to expose any of
 the sophisms which might usefully be exposed, while
 the exposure of all the sophisms which we might
 perhaps grant it capable of exposing is useless,
 then in respect of the exposure of sophisms dialectic
 is useless.

Starting even from the actual statements made by 247
 the dialecticians one might show concisely in this wise
 that their technical arguments about sophisms are
 superfluous. The dialecticians assert that they have
 resorted to the art of dialectic not simply for the sake
 of ascertaining what is deduced from what but chiefly

^c The traditional Sceptic attitude, cf. i. 15, 23 ff., etc.

ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι' ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι· λέγουσι γοῦν εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀλη-
 248 θῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αὐτοὶ φασὶν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα, ἅμα τῷ ἐρωτηθῆναι λόγον ψεῦδος ἔχοντα τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰσόμεθα ὅτι ψευδῆς ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἦτοι μὴ εἶναι συνακτικὸν ἢ μηδὲ τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν ἀληθῆ.
 249 καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. ἦτοι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἔσται· λέγουσι γὰρ συνακτικὸν γίνεσθαι λόγον ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκὴν εἶναι ψευδῆ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας· φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ψεύδει μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀληθεῖ δὲ
 250 οὐδαμῶς. ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθῆς λόγος κατὰ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἐστίν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων.

Εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου ἐν ᾧ ψευδὸς ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, αὐτόθεν γινώσκωμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν παρὰ τί τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὡσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴσμεν

for the sake of knowing how to discern the true and the false by means of probative arguments. Thus they declare that dialectic is "the science of what is true and false and neither." Since, then, they assert 248 that a true argument is one which draws a true conclusion by means of true premisses,^a when an argument is propounded which has a false conclusion we shall at once know that it is false and shall not yield it assent. For the argument itself must either be illogical or contain premisses that are not true. The 249 following considerations show this clearly: The false conclusion in the argument either follows from the combination formed by its premisses, or it does not so follow. But if it does not so follow, neither will the argument be logically sound; for an argument, they say, is logically sound when its conclusion follows from the combination formed by its premisses. If, again, it does so follow, then—according to their own technical treatises—the combination formed by its premisses must necessarily be false; for they say that the false follows from the false and no how from the true.^b And from what we have already said^c it is plain that 250 according to them the argument which is not logically sound or not true is not probative either.

If, then, when an argument is propounded with a false conclusion we know at once that the argument is neither true nor logically sound, because of its false conclusion, we shall not assent to it, even if we fail to see wherein the fallacy lies. For just as we refuse our assent to the truth of the tricks performed by jugglers and know that they are deluding us, even

^a Cf. §§ 137 ff.

^b Cf. Aristot. *Anal. pr.* ii. 2; Diog. Laert. vii. 81.

^c Cf. § 139.

ὅτι ἀπατώσιν κἄν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως ἀπατώσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μὲν πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις πειθόμεθα, κἄν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.

251 Ἡ ἐπεὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ ψεύδος ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά φασι¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἀτοπίας, κοινότερον οὕτω συνερωτητέον. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος λόγος ἤτοι ἐπὶ τι ἀπρόσδεκτον ἡμᾶς ἄγει ἢ ἐπὶ τι τοιοῦτον ὡς χρῆναι αὐτὸ προσδέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἀτόπως αὐτῷ συγκαταθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τι ἀπρόσδεκτον, οὐχ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἀτοπία δεήσει συγκατατίθεσθαι προπετῶς διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοῖς ἀτόποις ἀναγκάζοντος συγκατατίθεσθαι, εἶγε μὴ ληρεῖν παιδαριωδῶς ἀλλὰ τάληθῆ ζητεῖν, ὡς
252 ὑπισχνούνται, προήρηται. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ὁδὸς εἴη ἐπὶ τινα κρημνὸν φέρουσα, οὐκ ἄθουμέν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κρημνὸν διὰ τὸ ὁδὸν τινα εἶναι φέρουσαν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεθα τῆς ὁδοῦ διὰ τὸν κρημνόν, οὕτω καὶ εἰ λόγος εἴη ἐπὶ τι ὁμολογούμενως ἀτοπον ἡμᾶς ἀπάγων, οὐχὶ τῷ ἀτόπῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀποστησόμεθα
253 τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν. ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν συνερωτᾶται λόγος, καθ' ἐκάστην πρότασιν ἐφέξομεν, εἶτα τοῦ ὅλου συνερωτηθέντος λόγου τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐπάξομεν.

Καὶ εἶγε οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρυσίππον δογματικοὶ ἐν τῇ συνερωτήσει τοῦ σωρίτου προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου

¹ τὸ σόφισμά φασι T: τοῖς σοφίσμασι mss., Bekk.

^a The fallacy of the "Heap" (*acervalis*), so-called because commonly framed thus: "This is a heap of grain: take away one grain—two grains—three grains, and so on—is it still a

if we do not know how they do it, so likewise we refuse to believe arguments which, though seemingly plausible, are false, even when we do not know how they are fallacious.

Further, since the sophism leads, they say, not only 251 to falsehood but also to other absurdities, we must discuss it more at large. The argument propounded leads us either to an inadmissible conclusion or to one of such a sort that we must needs admit it. In the latter case we shall assent to it without absurdity; but if it leads to what is inadmissible, it is not we that ought to yield hasty assent to the absurdity because of its plausibility, but it is they that ought to abstain from the argument which constrains them to assent to absurdities, if they really choose to seek truth, as they profess, rather than driblet like children. Thus, 252 suppose there were a road leading up to a chasm, we do not push ourselves into the chasm just because there is a road leading to it but we avoid the road because of the chasm; so, in the same way, if there should be an argument which leads us to a confessedly absurd conclusion, we shall not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. So whenever such an 253 argument is propounded to us we shall suspend judgement regarding each premiss, and when finally the whole argument is propounded we shall draw what conclusions we approve.

And if the Dogmatists of the School of Chrysippus declare that when the "Sorites"^a is being propounded heap?" Or "Does one grain make a heap? Or, if not, 2, 3, . . . *x* grains?" The essence of the fallacy is that "aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur" (Cicero, *Lucull.* 16). In modern Logic "Sorites" denotes a chain of syllogisms in which all the conclusions save the last are suppressed.

φασί δεῖν ἴστασθαι καὶ ἐπέχειν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωσιν εἰς ἀτοπίαν, πολὺ δῆπου μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμῖν ἀρμόζον εἴη σκεπτικοῖς οὖσιν, ὑποπεύουσιν ἀτοπίαν, μὴ προπίπτειν κατὰ τὰς συνερωτήσεις τῶν λημμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπέχειν καθ' ἕκαστον ἕως τῆς ὅλης συνερω-
 254 τήσεως τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀδοξάστως ἀπὸ τῆς βιωτικῆς τηρήσεως ὀρμώμενοι τοὺς ἀπατηλοὺς οὕτως ἐκκλίνομεν λόγους, οἱ δογματικοὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἔξουσι διακρίναι τὸ σόφισμα ἀπὸ τοῦ δεόντως δοκοῦντος ἐρωτᾶσθαι λόγου, εἶγε χρὴ δογματικῶς αὐτοὺς ἐπικρίναι καὶ ὅτι συνακτικὸν ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅτι τὰ λήμματά ἐστιν
 255 ἀληθῆ ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς συνακτικούς λόγους δύναται καταλαμβάνειν οὔτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι τι κρίνειν οἰοί τε εἰσι, μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχοντες, ὡς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεμνήσαμεν. παρέλκει οὖν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἢ θρυλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων τεχνολογία.
 256 Παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαστολῆς τῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀμφιβολία λέξις ἔστι δύο καὶ πλείω σημαίνουσα καὶ αἱ λέξεις σημαίνουσι θέσει, ὅσας μὲν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἀμφιβολίας διαλύσθαι, τουτέστι τὰς ἐν τινι τῶν ἐμπειριῶν, ταύτας οἱ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἐγγεγυμνασμένοι διαλύσονται, τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ τῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεποιημένης θετικῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τῶν σημαινομένων, ὁ δὲ διαλεκ-
 257 τικὸς οὐδαμῶς, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφιβολίας

* Cf. § 214.

they ought to halt while the argument is still proceeding and suspend judgement, to avoid falling into absurdity, much more, surely, would it be fitting for us, who are Sceptics, when we suspect absurdity, to give no hasty approval of the premisses propounded but rather to suspend judgement about each until the completion of the whole series which forms the argument. And 254 whereas we, by starting undogmatically from the observation of practical life, thus avoid these fallacious arguments, the Dogmatists will not be in a position to distinguish the Sophism from the argument which seems to be correctly propounded, seeing that they have to pronounce dogmatically that the form of the argument is, or is not, logically sound and also that the premisses are, or are not, true. For we have 255 shown above that they are neither able to apprehend the logically valid arguments nor yet capable of deciding that a thing is true, since—as we have shown from their own statements—they possess neither a Criterion nor a Demonstration that commands general agreement. Thus far, then, the technical treatment of Sophisms so much talked of amongst the Dialecticians is otiose.

And we say much the same regarding the distin- 256 guishing of ambiguities. For if the Ambiguity is a word or phrase having two or more meanings, and it is by convention ^a that words have meaning, then all such ambiguities as can be usefully cleared up—such, that is, as occur in the course of some practical affair—will be cleared up, not certainly by the dialectician, but by the craftsmen trained in each several art, as they have personal experience of the conventional way adopted by themselves of using the terms to denote the objects signified—as, for example, in the 257

“ ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον.” ἤδη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄχρι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὀρώμεν διαστελλομένους ἀμφιβολίας, ὧν ἡ διαστολή χρησιμεύει αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ. εἰ γοῦν τις ὁμωνύμους οἰκέτας ἔχων κελεύει παιδίον κληθῆναι αὐτῷ τὸν Μάνην, εἰ τύχοι, (τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦνομα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἔστω κοινόν) πεύσεται ὁ παῖς ποῖον. καὶ εἰ πλείονας καὶ διαφόρους τις οἶνους ἔχων λέγοι τῷ παιδίῳ “ ἔγχεόν μοι τοῦ οἴνου πιεῖν,” ὁμοίως ὁ παῖς πεύσεται ποῖον.
258 οὕτως ἢ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐμπειρία τοῦ χρησίμου τὴν διαστολήν εισάγει.

“ Ὅσαι μέντοι μὴ ἐν τινι τῶν βιωτικῶν ἐμπειριῶν εἰσὶν ἀμφιβολίαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν δογματικαῖς οἰήσεσι κεῖνται καὶ εἰσὶν ἴσως ἄχρηστοι πρὸς τὸ ἀδοξάστως βιοῦν, περὶ ταύτας ἰδίως ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχων ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους, καθὼς πράγμασιν ἀδήλοισι καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις ἢ καὶ ἀνυποστάτοις ἴσως εἰσὶ
259 συνεξευγμένα. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ εἰσαυθὶς διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τις δογματικὸς πρὸς τι τούτων ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροῖ, κρατυνεῖ τὸν σκεπτικὸν λόγον, ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρωθεν ἐπιχειρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνεπικρίτου διαφανείας τὴν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐποχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς βεβαιῶν.

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ ποῦ περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.

^a Cf. § 237.

^b i.e. his special attitude, as a Dogmatist, towards ambiguities.

case of the ambiguity “ In periods of abatement one should sanction a varied diet and wine.”^a And in the ordinary affairs of life we see already how people—ay, and even the slave-boys—distinguish ambiguities when they think such distinction is of use. Certainly, if a master who had servants named alike were to bid a boy called, say, “ Manes ” (supposing this to be common name for a servant) to be summoned, the slave-boy will ask “ Which one ? ” And if a man who had several different wines were to say to his boy “ Pour me out a draught of wine,” then too the boy will ask “ Which one ? ” Thus it
258 is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.

All such ambiguities, however, as are not involved in the practical experiences of life but in dogmatic opinions, and are no doubt useless for a life void of dogmatism,—concerning these the Dialectician, in his own peculiar position,^b will be similarly forced, in view of the Sceptic attacks, to suspend judgement, in so far as they are probably linked up with matters that are non-evident and non-apprehensible, or even non-substantial. This subject, however, we
259 shall discuss later on^c; and if any Dogmatist should attempt to refute any of our statements he will be strengthening the Sceptic argument by adding support to their suspension of judgement about the matters in question as a result of our mutual antagonism and interminable dissension.

Having said thus much concerning ambiguities we now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.

^c No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.

Γ

1 Περὶ μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει τοσαῦτα ἀρκούντως λέγοιτο ἄν.

Α'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιόντες οὐ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αὐτοῖς κατὰ τόπον ἀντεροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθολικώτερα κινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσομεν, οἷς συμπεριγράφεται καὶ τὰ λοιπά. ἀρξόμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγου.

Β'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΔΡΑΣΤΙΚΩΝ

Καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις συμπεφώνηται τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς εἶναι τὰς δὲ δραστικὰς, ἀπὸ τῶν δραστικῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησόμεθα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ κυριωτέρας τῶν ὑλικῶν φασὶν εἶναι.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΟΥ

2 Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον οἱ πλείους ἀπεφώνησαν, πρότερον περὶ θεοῦ σκοπή-

* For the Stoic division of "Philosophy" into three parts—logic, physics and ethics—see ii. 13.

† Cf. ii. 84.

BOOK III

CONCERNING the logical division of what is called 1 "Philosophy" ^a the foregoing account may suffice by way of outline.

CHAPTER I.—OF THE PHYSICAL DIVISION

Pursuing the same method of exposition in our investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy, we shall not refute each of their statements in order, but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more general character ^b wherein the rest also are included.

Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles. ^c

CHAPTER II.—OF EFFICIENT PRINCIPLES

Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some are material and some efficient, we shall make our argument start with the efficient; for these, as they assert, are superior to the material.

CHAPTER III.—CONCERNING GOD

Since, then, the majority have declared that God ² is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring

^a "Principles," or "origins" (ἀρχαί), which are assumed to explain existence: fundamental realities: here used practically as a synonym for "Causes" (αἰτία).

σκιμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες ὅτι τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμέν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν τῶν δογματικῶν τάδε λέγομεν.

Τῶν ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, οἷον εἰ σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις ἵππου ἐννοῆσαι δύναιτο μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἵππου μαθῶν. τό τε ἐννοούμενον ἐννοεῖσθαι πού ὀφείλει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν σώμα φασιν εἶναι τὸν θεόν οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωποειδῆ οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ μὲν ἐντὸς κόσμου οἱ δὲ ἐκτός, πῶς δυνησόμεθα ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν μῆτε οὐσίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοῦ ὁμολογουμένην μῆτε εἶδος μῆτε τόπον ἐν ᾧ εἶη; πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογησάτωσάν τε καὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν ὅτι τοῖσδε ἐστὶν ὁ θεός· εἶτα ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ὑποτυπώσασμενοι οὕτως ἀξιούτωσαν ἡμᾶς ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν. ἐς ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνοῦσιν, τί νοήσομεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογουμένως παρ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Ἄλλ' ἀφθαρτόν τι, φασί, καὶ μακάριον ἐννοήσας, τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν εὐηθές· ὡς γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὸν Δίωνα οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ ὡς Δίῳ δύναται νοεῖν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 13 ff. It is argued here (1) that God is not "conceived," §§ 2-5; nor (2) "apprehended," §§ 6-11. Cf. § 218 *infra*.

^b Literally "life"; cf. i. 23 f.

^c "Substances" in the logical sense, as opposed to "properties."

^d The Stoics held God to be "corporeal," not "of human

about God,^a first premising that although, following the ordinary view,^b we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as follows.

When we conceive objects we ought to form conceptions of their substances^c as well, as, for instance, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. And also of their forms; for no one could conceive "Horse" unless he had first learnt the horse's form. And of course the object conceived must be conceived <as existing> somewhere. Since, then, some of the³ Dogmatists assert that God is corporeal, others that he is incorporeal, and some that he has human form, others not, and some that he exists in space, others not; and of those who assert that he is in space some put him inside the world, others outside^d; how shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? Let them first agree and consent together that God is of such and such a nature, and then, when they have sketched out for us that nature, let them require that we should form a conception of God. But so long as they disagree interminably, we cannot say what agreed notion we are to derive from them.

But, say they,^e when you have conceived of a Being⁴ imperishable and blessed, regard this as God. But this is foolish; for just as one who does not know Dion is unable also to conceive the properties which belong to him as Dion, so also when we do not know the form, "inside the world"; the Epicureans, "corporeal," "of human form," "outside the world"; Aristotle, "incorporeal" and "not in space." Cf. § 218 *infra*.

^e *i.e.* the Stoics and Epicurus, cf. § 219 *infra*.

οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβη-
 κότα αὐτῷ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐνοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.
 5 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τί ἐστι τὸ
 μακάριον, πότερον τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κατὰ ἀρετὴν καὶ
 προνοούμενον τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ τεταγμένων, ἢ τὸ
 ἀνεέργητον καὶ μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχον μήτε
 ἐτέρω παρέχον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαφωνή-
 σαντες ἀνεπικρίτως ἀνενόητον ἡμῖν πεποιήκασιν τὸ
 μακάριον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν θεόν.

6 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐπινοῆται ὁ θεός, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη
 περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς
 δογματικοῖς. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν πρόδηλον μὲν
 οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσέπιπτεν, συν-
 εφώνησαν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ τίς ἐστι καὶ ποδαπὸς
 καὶ ποῦ· ἢ ἀνεπικρίτος δὲ διαφωνία πεποιήκειν
 αὐτὸν ἀδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀποδείξεως
 7 δεόμενον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀποδεικνύων¹ ὅτι ἐστι θεός,
 ἦτοι διὰ προδήλου τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσεν ἢ δι' ἀδήλου.
 διὰ προδήλου μὲν οὐδ' αὐδ' αὐδ'· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πρόδηλον
 τὸ ἀποδεικνύον ὅτι ἐστι θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύ-
 μενον πρὸς τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι νοεῖται, διὸ καὶ συγ-
 καταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ, καθὼς καὶ παρεστήσαμεν,
 πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ εἶναι θεόν, συγκαταλαμ-
 βανόμενον τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι αὐτὸ προδήλου ὄντι.
 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πρόδηλον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ ἀπο-
 8 δεῖκνυται ἄρα διὰ προδήλου. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου.

¹ ἀποδεικνύων T: λέγων Steph., Bekk.: om. mss.

^a The Epicurean Deity as contrasted with the Platonic and Stoic. Cf. Lucretius ii. 646 ff.:

omnis enim per se divom natura necessest
 immortalī aevo summa cum pace fruatur
 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe.

substance of God we shall also be unable to learn and conceive his properties. And apart from this, let 5 them tell us what a "blessed" thing is—whether it is that which energizes according to virtue and fore-knows what is subject to itself, or that which is void of energy and neither performs any work itself nor provides work for another.^a For indeed about this also they disagree interminably and thus render "the blessed" something we cannot conceive, and therefore God also.

Further, in order to form a conception of God one 6 must necessarily—so far as depends on the Dogmatists—suspend judgement as to his existence or non-existence. For the existence of God is not pre-evident.^b For if God impressed us automatically, the Dogmatists would have agreed together regarding his essence, his character, and his place; whereas their interminable disagreement has made him seem to us non-evident and needing demonstration. Now 7 he that demonstrates the existence of God does so by means of what is either pre-evident or non-evident. Certainly not, then, by means of the pre-evident; for if what demonstrates God's existence were pre-evident, then—since the thing proved is conceived together with that which proves it, and therefore is apprehended along with it as well, as we have established^c—God's existence also will be pre-evident, it being apprehended along with the pre-evident fact which proves it. But, as we have shown, it is not pre-evident; therefore it is not proved, either, by a pre-evident fact. Nor yet by what is non-evident. For 8

^b i.e. plainly manifest, self-evident, cf. i. 178.

^c Cf. ii. 179, 128.

τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι θεόν, ἀποδείξεως χρῆζον, εἰ μὲν διὰ προδήλου λέγοιτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι, οὐκέτι ἄδηλον ἔσται ἀλλὰ πρόδηλον [τὸ εἶναι θεόν].¹ οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν αὐτοῦ ἄδηλον διὰ προδήλου ἀποδείκνυται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἐκπεσεῖται ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, αἰτούντων ἡμῶν αἰεὶ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φερομένου ἀδήλου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προκειμένου. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑτέρου δύναται ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὸ εἶναι θεόν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστι πρόδηλον μήτε ἐξ ἑτέρου ἀποδείκνυται, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστι θεός.

Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο λεκτέον. ὁ λέγων εἶναι θεόν ἥτοι προνοεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ φησὶν ἢ οὐ προνοεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὲν προνοεῖν, ἥτοι πάντων ἢ τινῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντων προνοεῖ, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων προνοεῖν λεχθή-
 10 σται ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ τινῶν προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε μὲν προνοεῖ τῶνδε δὲ οὔ; ἥτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἢ δύναται μὲν οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἠβούλετο καὶ ἠδύνατο, πάντων ἂν προνοεῖ· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἀσθενέστερός ἔστι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν
 11 οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ· ἔστι δὲ παρὰ

¹ [τὸ . . . θεόν] del. Papp.

if the non-evident fact which is capable of proving God's existence, needing proof as it does, shall be said to be proved by means of a pre-evident fact, it will no longer be non-evident but pre-evident. Therefore the non-evident fact which proves his existence is not proved by what is pre-evident. Nor yet by what is non-evident; for he who asserts this will be driven into circular reasoning when we keep demanding proof every time for the non-evident fact which he produces as proof of the one last propounded. Consequently, the existence of God cannot be proved from any other fact. But if God's existence is neither automatically pre-evident nor proved from another fact, it will be inapprehensible.

There is this also to be said. He who affirms that God exists either declares that he has, or that he has not, forethought for the things in the universe, and in the former case that such forethought is for all things or for some things. But if he had forethought for all, there would have been nothing bad and no badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks all things. If, again, he forethinks some, why
 10 does he forethink these things and not those? For either he has both the will and the power to forethink all things, or else he has the will but not the power, or the power but not the will, or neither the will nor the power. But if he had had both the will and the power he would have had forethought for all things; but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink all; therefore he has not both the will and the power to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the power, he is less strong than the cause which renders him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:

τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναι τιὼς αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖη. εἰ δὲ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής, ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβούντων ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός.

Εἰ δὲ οὐδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀποτέλεσμα, οὐχ ἕξει τις εἰπεῖν πόθεν καταλαμβάνει ὅτι ἔστι θεός, εἶγε μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται μήτε δι' ἀποτελεσμάτων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ
12 ἔστι θεός. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς λέγοντες εἶναι θεόν· πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λέγοντες κακῶν αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσιν, τινῶν δὲ ἢ καὶ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἤτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἀσθενῆ λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται, ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ἀσεβούντων προδήλως.

Δ'. — ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΥ

13 Ἴνα δὲ μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς βλασφημεῖν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ πραγματικῶς ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν, κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ αἰτίου διαπορήσομεν, πρότερον ἐπιστῆσαι πειραθέντες τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίᾳ. ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοησαί τις τὸ αἴτιον δύναιτο, εἶγε πρὸς τῷ διαφώνους καὶ ἀλλοκότους ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου <ἀποδιδόναι>,¹ ἔτι καὶ τῇν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν ἀνεύρετον διὰ

¹ <ἀποδιδόναι> add. T, Bekk. cj.

* *i.e.* by charging us with atheism.

but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should 11 be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the power but not the will to have forethought for all, he will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither the will nor the power, he is both malignant and weak—an impious thing to say about God. Therefore God has no forethought for the things in the universe.

But if he exercises no forethought for anything, and there exists no work nor product of his, no one will be able to name the source of the apprehension of God's existence, inasmuch as he neither appears of himself nor is apprehended by means of any of his products. So for these reasons we cannot apprehend whether God exists. And from this we further conclude that 12 those who positively affirm God's existence are probably compelled to be guilty of impiety; for if they say that he forethinks all things they will be declaring that God is the cause of what is evil, while if they say that he forethinks some things or nothing they will be forced to say that God is either malignant or weak, and obviously this is to use impious language.

CHAPTER IV.—CONCERNING CAUSE

To prevent the Dogmatists attempting also to 13 slander us,* because of their inability to refute us in a practical way, we shall discuss the question of the efficient Cause more at large when we have first tried to give attention to the conception of Cause. Now so far as the statements of the Dogmatists are concerned, it would be impossible for anyone even to conceive Cause, since, in addition to offering discrepant and contradictory conceptions of Cause, they have rendered its substance also indiscoverable by

14 τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον τὸ αἴτιον εἶναι φασίν. δόξαι δ' ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ' αὐτοὺς δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασι, οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἷον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ χεῖσθαι. διό, καθάπερ εἶπον, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα.

15 Τούτων δὲ τῶν αἰτίων οἱ μὲν πλείους ἡγοῦνται τὰ μὲν συνεκτικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ συναίτια τὰ δὲ συνεργά, καὶ συνεκτικὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὧν παρόντων πάρεστι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἰρομένων αἴρεται καὶ μισουμένων μειοῦται (οὕτω γὰρ τὴν περίθεσιν τῆς στραγγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τοῦ πνιγμοῦ), συναίτιον δὲ ὃ τὴν ἴσιν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν ἐτέρῳ συναίτιῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα (οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν ἐλκόντων τὸ ἄροτρον βοῶν αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τῆς ὀλκῆς τοῦ ἀρότρου), συνεργὸν δὲ ὃ βραχεῖαν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μετὰ βραστῶν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὅταν δυοῖν βάρος τι βασταζόντων μόλις τρίτος τις προσελθὼν συγκουφίσῃ τοῦτο.

16 Ἔνιοι μέντοι καὶ παρόντα μελλόντων αἴτια ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς τὰ προκαταρκτικά, οἷον τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἡλίωσιν πυρετοῦ. τινὲς δὲ ταῦτα παρητήσαντο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἴτιον πρὸς τι ὑπάρχον καὶ

^a e.g. Plato's "Ideas" and the Pythagorean "Numbers"; cf. § 32, *Adv. Phys.* i. 364.

^b Cf. Plato, *Cratyl.* 413 A, *Phileb.* 26 E; *Adv. Phys.* i. 228.

their disagreement about it. For some affirm Cause ¹⁴ to be corporeal, others incorporeal.^a In the broad sense, a Cause would seem to be, according to them, "That by whose energizing the effect comes about";^b as, for example, the sun or the sun's heat is the cause of the wax being melted or of the melting of the wax. For even on this point they are at variance, some declaring that Cause is causal of nouns, such as "the melting," others of predicates, such as "being melted." Hence, as I said, in the broad sense Cause will be "that by whose energizing the effect comes about."

The majority of them hold that of these Causes ¹⁵ some are immediate,^c some associate, some co-operant; and that causes are "immediate" when their presence involves the presence, and their removal the removal, and their decrease the decrease, of the effect (it is thus, they say, that the fixing on of the halter causes the strangling); and that an "associate" cause is one which contributes a force equal to that of its fellow-cause towards the production of the effect (it is thus, they say, that each of the oxen which draw the plough is a cause of the drawing of the plough); and that a "co-operant" cause is one which contributes a slight force towards the easy production of the effect, as in the case when two men are lifting a heavy load with difficulty the assistance of a third helps to lighten it.

Some of them, however, have asserted further that ¹⁶ things present are causes of things future, being "antecedents"; as when intense exposure to the sun causes fever. But this view is rejected by some, on the ground that, since the Cause is relative to

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 1, 243.

πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὃν οὐ δύναται προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον.

Ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορήσει τοιάδε λέγομεν.

Ε'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ

- 17 Πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐξήσεις γένοιτο, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά, καθόλου κινήσις, τῶν φυσικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἕκαστον, ἢ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου διοικήσις, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχει, λέξομεν ὅτι διὰ τινα αἰτίαν πάντως φαίνεται ἡμῖν
18 τοιαῦτα ὅποια οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἂν ἦν μὴ οὐσης αἰτίας. οἶον ἵπποι μὲν ἐκ μυῶν, εἰ τύχοι, γεννηθήσονται, ἐλέφαντες δὲ ἐκ μυρμηκῶν· καὶ ἐν μὲν ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις Θήβαις ὄμβροι ποτὲ ἐξαίσιοι καὶ χιόνες ἂν ἐγίνοντο, τὰ δὲ νότια ὄμβρων οὐ μετείχεν, εἰ μὴ αἰτία τις ἦν, δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν νότια ἔστι δυσχείμερα,
19 αὐχμηρὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἕω. καὶ περιτρέπεται δὲ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν αἴτιον εἶναι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀνευ τινὸς αἰτίας τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν, βουλόμενος ἀναιρεῖν τὸ αἴτιον τίθησιν, ἀποδίδουσι¹ αἰτίαν δι' ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον.

¹ ἀποδίδουσι Kayser, Papp.: ἀποδίδουσθω mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. § 25 *infra*.

^b To mark the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, I render the former by "Cause," the latter by "cause." The latter seems used mostly of the particular instance, the former of the general notion; or (as in §§ 19, 23, 24) the former of the cause of existence, the latter of the cause of cognition.

something existent and to a real effect, it cannot precede it as its cause.^a

As regards this controversy, our position is as follows :

CHAPTER V.—DOES ANYTHING CAUSE ANYTHING ?

That Cause exists is plausible; for how could 17 there come about increase, decrease, generation, corruption, motion in general, each of the physical and mental effects, the ordering of the whole universe, and everything else, except by reason of some cause^b? For even if none of these things has real existence,^c we shall affirm that it is due to some cause that they appear to us other than they really are. Moreover, if 18 cause were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything and at random. Horses, for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies, and elephants of ants; and there would have been severe rains and snow in Egyptian Thebes, while the southern districts would have had no rain, unless there had been a cause which makes the southern parts stormy, the eastern dry. Also, he who asserts 19 that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that he makes this assertion absolutely and without any cause, he will not win credence; but if he says that he makes it owing to some cause, he is positing Cause while wishing to abolish it, since he offers us a cause to prove the non-existence of Cause.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 201. "These things," being "appearances" (or phenomena), may not really exist in the form in which they "appear" to us: the "real" may differ from the "phenomenal," but even so a "Cause" of that difference must be assumed.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον·
 20 ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τινός τι αἴτιον
 πιθανόν ἐστὶ, φανερόν ἔσται λόγους ἡμῶν ἐκθε-
 μένων ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς
 τὴν τούτου ὑπόμνησιν. οἶον γοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι
 τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοῆσαι πρὶν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τούτου
 καταλαβεῖν ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ· τότε γὰρ γνω-
 ρίζομεν ὅτι αἰτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, ὅταν
 21 ἐκείνο ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα καταλαμβάνωμεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ
 καταλαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, εἰ μὴ καταλάβωμεν τὸ
 αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ· τότε
 γὰρ καὶ ὅτι ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκου-
 δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ
 22 καταλάβωμεν. εἰ οὖν ἵνα μὲν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ
 αἴτιον, δεῖ προεπιγνῶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἵνα δὲ
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα γνῶμεν, ὡς ἔφην, δεῖ προεπίστασθαι
 τὸ αἴτιον, ὃ διάλληλος τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπος ἄμφω
 δείκνυσιν ἀνεπινώτητα, μήτε τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου
 μήτε τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς ἀποτελέσματος ἐπι-
 νοεῖσθαι δυναμένου· ἐκατέρου γὰρ αὐτῶν δεομένου
 τῆς παρὰ θατέρου πίστεως, οὐχ ἔξομεν ἀπὸ τίνος
 αὐτῶν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς ἐννοίας. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπο-
 φαίνεσθαι δυνησόμεθα ὅτι ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον.
 23 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐννοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ αἴτιον συγ-
 χωρήσῃ τις, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖη διὰ
 τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὃς μὲν γὰρ φησὶν εἶναι τί τινος
 αἴτιον, ἥτοι ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὀρμώμενος
 αἰτίας εὐλόγου τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἢ διὰ τινος
 αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ταύτην ἰέναι λέξει.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔσται πιστότερος τοῦ λέγον-

For these reasons, then, the existence of Cause is
 plausible. But that it is also plausible to say that 20
 nothing is the Cause of anything will be evident when
 we have set forth, to suit the occasion, a few of the
 many arguments which go to prove this case. Thus
 it is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause
 before apprehending its effect as *its* effect; for we only
 recognize that it is causative of the effect when we
 apprehend the latter as an effect. But we cannot 21
 either apprehend the effect of the Cause as *its* effect
 unless we apprehend the Cause of the effect as *its*
 Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only
 when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its
 Cause. If, then, in order to conceive the Cause, we 22
 must first know the effect, while in order to know
 the effect we must, as I said, have previous knowledge
 of the Cause, the fallacy of this circular mode of
 reasoning proves both to be inconceivable, the Cause
 being incapable of being conceived as Cause, and the
 effect as effect. For since each of them needs the
 evidence of the other, we shall not be able to say
 which conception is to have the precedence. Hence
 we shall be unable to declare that anything is the
 Cause of anything.

And even were one to grant that Cause can be 23
 conceived, it might be held to be inapprehensible
 because of the divergency of opinion. For he who
 says that there is some Cause of something either
 asserts that he makes this statement absolutely and
 without basing it on any rational cause, or else he will
 declare that he has arrived at his conviction owing
 to certain causes.* If, then, he says that he states it
 "absolutely," he will be no more worthy of credence

* Cf., for the following arguments, i. 164.

τος ἀπλῶς μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ καὶ
 αἰτίας λέξει δι' ἃς εἶναι τί τινος αἴτιον νομίζει,
 τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου παριστᾶν ἐπι-
 χειρήσει· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ ἔστι τί τινος
 αἴτιον, αὐτὸς ὡς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον
 24 αἴτιον εἶναι φησίν. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς
 ὑπάρξεως τοῦ αἰτίου ζητούμεν, δεήσει πάντως
 αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι τι αἴτιον αἰτίαν
 παρασχέειν, κακείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀπείρους αἰτίας παρασχέειν· ἀδύνατον
 ἄρα διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφῆναι ὅτι ἔστι τί τινος
 αἴτιον.
 25 Πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι ὃν καὶ ὑφ' ἑστώσῃ ἤδη αἴτιον τὸ
 αἴτιον ποιεῖ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ μὴ ὃν αἴτιον. καὶ
 μὴ ὃν μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ὃν, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρότερον
 ὑποστῆναι καὶ προγενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἰθ' οὕτως
 ἐπάγειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ὅπερ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀπο-
 τελείσθαι λέγεται ὄντος ἤδη αἰτίου. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πρὸς
 τί ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, σαφές
 ὅτι μὴ δύναται τούτου ὡς αἴτιον προὑποστῆναι·
 οὐδὲ ὃν ἄρα αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖν δύναται τὸ
 26 οὐ ἔστιν αἴτιον. εἰ δὲ μήτε μὴ ὃν αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖ
 τι μήτε ὃν, οὐδὲ ἀποτελεῖ τι. διὸ οὐδὲ αἴτιον ἔσται
 ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποτελεῖν τι τὸ αἴτιον οὐ δύναται ὡς
 αἴτιον νοεῖσθαι.

Ὅθεν κακείνο λέγουσί τινες. τὸ αἴτιον ἦτοι
 συνυφίστασθαι δεῖ τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ἢ προϋφ-
 ίστασθαι τούτου ἢ μετ' αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι. τὸ μὲν
 οὐδὲν λέγω ὅτι τὸ αἴτιον εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἄγεται μετὰ
 340

than the man who asserts " absolutely " that nothing
 is a cause of anything ; whereas if he shall mention
 causes on account of which he holds that something
 causes something, he will be attempting to support
 the matter in question by means of that matter itself ;
 for when we are examining the question whether
 anything is the Cause of anything, he asserts that
 Cause exists since there exists a cause for the existence
 of Cause. Besides, since we are inquiring about the 24
 reality of Cause, it will certainly be necessary for him
 to produce a cause for the cause of the existence of
 Cause, and of that cause yet another, and so on *ad*
infinitum. But it is impossible to produce causes
 infinite in number. It is impossible, therefore, to
 affirm positively that anything is Cause of anything.

Moreover, the Cause, when it produces the effect, 25
 either is and subsists already as causal or is non-causal.
 Certainly it is not non-causal ; while if it is causal, it
 must first have subsisted and become causal, and
 thereafter produces the effect which is said to be
 brought about by it as already existing Cause. But
 since the Cause is relative and relative to the effect,
 it is clear that it cannot be prior in existence to the
 latter ; therefore not even as being causal can the
 Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause. And if it 26
 does not bring about anything either as being or as
 not being causal, then it does not bring anything
 about ; and hence it will not be a Cause ; for apart
 from its effecting something the Cause cannot be
 conceived as Cause.

Hence some people argue thus : The Cause must
 either subsist along with its effect or before it or must
 come into being after it. Now to say that the Cause
 is brought into existence after the appearance of its

τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ προϋφίστασθαι δύναται τοῦ-
 27 του· πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ νοεῖσθαι λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
 τι φασὶν αὐτοί, καθὸ πρὸς τι ἐστίν, συνυπάρχειν
 καὶ συννοεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συνυφίστα-
 σθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεσματικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐστί, τὸ δὲ
 γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι χρή, πρότερον
 δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἴθ' οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ
 ἀποτέλεσμα. εἰ οὖν τὸ αἴτιον μήτε προϋφίσταται
 τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μήτε συνυφίσταται
 τούτῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα>¹ πρὸ αὐτοῦ
 γίνεται, μήποτε οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεως ὅλως μετέχει.
 28 σαφές δὲ ἴσως ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ
 αἰτίου πάλιν περιτρέπεται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον ὡς
 μὲν πρὸς τι οὐ δύναται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ
 προεπινοηθῆναι, ἵνα δε ὡς αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσ-
 ματος αὐτοῦ νοηθῆ, δεῖ αὐτὸ προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ
 ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον δὲ προεπινοηθῆναί
 τι ἐκείνου οὐ προεπινοηθῆναι [τι] οὐ δύναται,
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ αἴτιον.
 29 Ἐκ τούτων οὖν λοιπὸν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἴ
 πιθανοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καθ' οὓς ὑπεμνήσαμεν
 ὡς χρή λέγειν αἴτιον εἶναι, πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ παρ-
 ιστάντες ὅτι μὴ προσήκει αἴτιον εἶναι τι ἀποφαί-
 νεσθαι, καὶ τούτων προκρίνειν τινὰς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 μήτε σημεῖον μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν
 ὁμολογουμένως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν
 παρεστήσαμεν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπο-
 στάσεως τοῦ αἰτίου, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι

¹ <τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα> add. T, Kayser: μετ' αὐτὸ cj. Steph.

² εἰ T: ἐπει Bekk.: om. mss.

effect would seem ridiculous. But neither can it subsist before the effect; for it is said to be conceived in relation thereto, and they affirm that relatives, in so far as 27 they are relative, co-exist with each other and are conceived together. Nor, again, can it subsist along with its effect; for if it is productive of the effect, and what comes into existence must so come by the agency of what exists already, the Cause must have become causal first, and this done, then produces its effect. If, then, the Cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the Cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. And it is clear probably 28 that by these arguments the conception of Cause is overthrown again. For if Cause as a relative notion cannot be conceived before its effect, and yet, if it is to be conceived as causative of its effect, it must be conceived before its effect, while it is impossible for anything to be conceived before that which the conception of it cannot precede,—then it is impossible for the Cause to be conceived.

From all this we conclude finally that—if the 29 arguments by which it was shown ^a that we ought to affirm the existence of Cause are plausible, and if the arguments which go to prove that it is improper to declare that any Cause exists are likewise plausible, and if it is inadmissible to prefer any of these arguments to the others, since, as we have shown above,^b we confessedly possess neither sign nor criterion nor proof,—we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real existence of Cause, declaring that a Cause is “no more” existent than non-existent,

^a Cf. §§ 17 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 18, 104, 134 ff.

τι αἴτιον λέγοντας ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

5'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ

- 30 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δραστηκῆς τοσαῦτα νῦν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι· συντόμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καλουμένων ἀρχῶν λεκτέον. ὅτι τοίνυν αὐταὶ εἰσὶν ἀκατάληπτοι, ῥάδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν γεγενημένης διαφωνίας παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἄκουστής τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἴππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χίος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἴππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγίνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς 31 Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα πρὸς τοῖς στωικοῖς πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν—περὶ γὰρ τῆς τερατολογουμένης ἀποίου παρατισιῶν ὕλης, ἣν οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταλαμβάνειν διαβεβαιούνται, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν περιπατητικὸν πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν, 32 τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένων ὁμοιομερείας, Διδώρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεῖς

* With the following sections *cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 360 ff., ii. 310 ff.; and for the arguments employed, i. 164.

^b Pherecydes, *circa* 650 B.C., was a semi-scientific cosmogonist; Oenopides was an astronomer and mathematician of the fifth century B.C.; Onomacritus was an Athenian religious poet, said to be the author of some of the Orphic hymns. For the other names see *Intro.*

if we are to judge by the statements made by the Dogmatists.

CHAPTER VI.—CONCERNING MATERIAL PRINCIPLES

So far, then, as concerns the efficient Principle this 30 account will suffice for the present. But we must also give a brief account of what are called the Material Principles.^a Now that these are inapprehensible may easily be gathered from the disagreement which exists about them amongst the Dogmatists. For Pherecydes of Syros^b declared earth to be the Principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander (his pupil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, in his *Orphica*, fire and water and earth; the School of 31 Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth—for why should one even mention that mysterious “indeterminate matter” which some of them talk about,^c when not even they themselves are positive that they apprehend it? Aristotle the Peripatetic <takes as his Principles> fire, air, water, earth, and the “revolving body”^d; Democritus 32 and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, and Epicureries^e; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal

^a For this “formless” or “unqualified” primary matter of the Stoics *cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 11, ii. 312.

^b *i.e.* the *quinta essentia*, aether (*alθήρ* fr. *del θεῖν*, “ever-speeding,” Plato, *Cratyl.* 410 B, Aristot. *De Caelo* i. 3).

^c *i.e.* “things with like parts,” or “homogeneous substances,” is Aristotle’s name for Anaxagoras’s “seeds of things,” or material “elements”; *cf. Intro.* p. xi.

Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικός καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάριθμοι ὄγκοι, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας.

- 33 Τοσαύτης τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι πλείονος διαφωνίας γεγεννημένης περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἥτοι πάσαις συγκαταθησόμεθα ταῖς κειμέναις στάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἢ τισίν. ἀλλὰ πάσαις μὲν οὐ δυνατὸν οὐ γὰρ δήπου δυνησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην συγκατατίθεσθαι, θραυστὰ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγουσι καὶ ποιά, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Δημόκριτον, ἄτομα ταῦτα εἶναι φάσκουσι καὶ ἄποια, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιό-
34 τητα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ τινα στάσιν τῶν ἄλλων προκρινοῦμεν, ἥτοι ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως προκρινοῦμεν ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεως οὐ συνθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ἀληθῆ δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ἀληθῆς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δοθεῖη μὴ οὐχὶ κεκριμένη κριτηρίῳ ἀληθεί, ἀληθὲς δὲ κριτήριον εἶναι δεῖ-
35 κνυται δι' ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης. εἰ τοίνυν ἵνα μὲν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἢ προκρινούσα τινα στάσιν ἀληθῆς εἶναι δειχθῆ, δεῖ τὸ κριτήριον αὐτῆς ἀποδείχθαι, ἵνα δὲ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείχθῆ, δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προκεκριθῆαι, ὃ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, ὃς οὐκ ἑάσει προβαίνειν τὸν λόγον, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως αἰεὶ κριτηρίου δεομένης ἀποδεδειγμένου,
36 τοῦ κριτηρίου δὲ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης. εἰ δὲ

and non-composite bodies; Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the Bithynian,^a homogeneous masses; the School of Pythagoras, the numbers; the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; Strato the Physicist, the qualities.

Since, then, there exists amongst them as much ³³ divergence as this, and even more, regarding the Material Principles, we shall give assent either to all the positions stated, and all others as well, or to some of them. But to assent to all is not possible; for we certainly shall not be able to assent both to Asclepiades, who says that the elements can be broken up and possess qualities, and to Democritus, who asserts that they are indivisible and void of quality, and to Anaxagoras, who leaves every sensible quality attached to the homoeomerics. Yet if we shall prefer any one standpoint. or view, ³⁴ to the rest, we shall be preferring it either absolutely and without proof or with proof.^b Now without proof we shall not yield assent; and if it is to be with proof, the proof must be true. But a true proof can only be given when approved by a true criterion, and a criterion is shown to be true by means of an approved proof. If, then, in order ³⁵ to show the truth of the proof which prefers any one view, its criterion must be proved, and to prove the criterion in turn its proof must be pre-established, the argument is found to be the circular one which will not allow the reasoning to go forward, since the proof keeps always requiring a proved criterion, and the criterion an approved proof. And ³⁶

these "molecules" break in pieces, and when re-united become objects of sense.

^b For this form of argument cf. ii. 183.

^a Asclepiades (first century B.C.), a physician at Rome, held a theory of non-sensible, frangible "molecules" (ὄγκοι) of matter always in motion; by collision with one another

ἀεὶ τὸ κριτήριον κριτηρίῳ κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδείξει¹ ἀποδεικνύναι βούλοισι τις, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβληθήσεται.² εἰ τοίνυν μήτε πάσαις ταῖς περὶ στοιχείων στάσεσι δυνάμεθα συγκατατίθεσθαι μήτε τῷ τούτων, ἐπέχειν προσήκει περὶ αὐτῶν.

37 Δυνατὸν μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων ὑπομνήσκειν τὴν τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀκαταληψίαν· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέστερον τοὺς δογματικούς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, ἐνδιατρίβομεν συμμέτρως τῷ τόπῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλαὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειροὶ τινές εἰσι αἱ περὶ στοιχείων δόξαι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἐκάστην λέγειν εἰδικῶς νῦν παρατηρούμεθα διὰ τὸν χαρακτήρα τῆς συγγραφῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πρὸς πάσας ἀντερούμεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἦν ἂν τις εἴπη περὶ στοιχείων στάσει, ἥτοι ἐπὶ σώματα κατενεχθήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἀσώματα, ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα ὑπομνήσαι ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ σώματα ἀκατάληπτα δὲ τὰ ἀσώματα· διὰ γὰρ τούτου σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτα.

Z'.—Εἰ ΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ

38 Σῶμα τοίνυν λέγουσιν εἶναι τινες ὁ οἶόν τε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστὶ τοῦτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον, οὐδὲ εἰ ἔστι τι πάσχον εἰπεῖν δυνάμεθα· τὸ γὰρ πάσχον πάντως ὑπὸ

¹ ἀποδείξει MLT: δι' ἀποδείξεως Bekk.

² ἐκβληθήσεται T, Nauck: ἐμβλ. mss., Bekk.

* A favourite classification of the Stoics, cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 218.

should any one propose to approve the criterion by a criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will be driven to a regress *ad infinitum*. Accordingly, if we are unable to assent either to all the views held about the elements or to any one of them, it is proper to suspend judgement about them.

Now though it is, perhaps, possible to show by 37 these arguments alone the inapprehensibility of the elements and of the Material Principles, yet in order that we may be able to refute the Dogmatists in a more comprehensive manner we shall dwell on this topic at appropriate length. And since the opinions about the elements are, as we have shown, numerous and well-nigh infinite, we will excuse ourselves—because of the character of our present treatise—from discussing each opinion in detail, but will make answer to them all implicitly. For since the elements, whatever view one takes of them, must be finally regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,⁶ we think it enough to show that corporeal things are inapprehensible and incorporeal things inapprehensible; for thus it will be clear that the elements also are inapprehensible.

CHAPTER VII.—ARE BODIES APPREHENSIBLE?

Some say that Body is that which is capable of 38 being active or passive.^b But so far as this conception goes it is inapprehensible. For, as we have shown, Cause is inapprehensible; and if we cannot say whether any Cause exists, neither can we say whether anything passive exists; for what is passive

^b This definition is ascribed to Pythagoras in *Adv. Phys.* i. 366.

αἰτίου πάσχει. ἀκατάληπτου δὲ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ
 αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, διὰ ταῦτα ἀκατάληπτον
 39 ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα. τινὲς δὲ σῶμα εἶναι λέγουσι
 τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. σημεῖον μὲν
 γὰρ φασιν οὐ μέρος οὐθέν, γραμμὴν δὲ μῆκος
 ἀπλατές, ἐπιφάνειαν δὲ μῆκος μετὰ πλάτους· ὅταν
 δὲ αὕτη καὶ βάθος προσλάβῃ καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν,
 σῶμα εἶναι, περὶ οὐ νῦν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, συν-
 εστῶς ἕκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ
 40 ἀντιτυπίας. εὐμαρῆς μέντοι καὶ ὁ πρὸς τούτους
 λόγος. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἥτοι οὐδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι
 λέξουσιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν τῶν
 προειρημένων. καὶ ἕξωθεν μὲν τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ
 τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τοῦ βάθους καὶ τῆς ἀντιτυπίας
 οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη τὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ σῶμα,
 ἕαν δείξῃ τις ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστιν, ἀναιροῖ ἂν
 καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὰ γὰρ ὅλα συναναιρεῖται τοῖς
 ἑαυτῶν πᾶσι μέρεσιν.

Ποικίλως μὲν οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν· τὸ δὲ νῦν
 ἀρκέσει λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὰ πέρατα, ἥτοι γραμμαῖ
 41 εἰσω ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι ἢ σώματα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπι-
 φάνειάν τινα ἢ γραμμὴν εἶναι λέγοι τις, καὶ τῶν
 προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἥτοι κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι
 δύνασθαι λεχθήσεται ἢ μόνον περὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις
 σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ὑπ-
 ἀρχουσαν ἥτοι γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν ὀνειροπολεῖν
 ἴσως εὔηθες. εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι
 λέγοιτο μόνον καὶ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστάναι τούτων

* Cf. ii. 30, *Adv. Phys.* i. 367, ii. 12.

^b In geometry "Limits" (or "boundaries") was used to

is certainly made passive by a Cause. And when both
 the Cause and the passive object are inapprehensible,
 the result will be that Body also is inapprehensible.
 But some define Body as what has three dimensions 39
 combined with resistance or solidity.^a For they de-
 scribe the point as that which has no parts, the line
 as length without breadth, the surface as length with
 breadth; and when this takes on both depth and
 resistance there is formed Body—the object of our
 present discussion—it being composed of length and
 breadth and depth and resistance. The answer, 40
 however, to these people is simple. For they will
 say either that Body is nothing more than these
 qualities, or that it is something else than the com-
 bination of the qualities already mentioned. Now
 apart from length and breadth and depth and solidity
 the Body would be nothing; but if these things are
 the Body, anyone who shall prove that they are un-
 real will likewise abolish the Body; for wholes are
 abolished along with the sum of their parts.

Now it is possible to disprove these dimensions in a
 variety of ways; but for the present it will be enough
 to say that if the Limits^b exist, they are either lines
 or surfaces or bodies. If, then, one should affirm the 41
 existence of a surface or a line, then it will be affirmed
 that each of the afore-mentioned objects either can
 subsist of itself or is cognized solely in connexion
 with so-called Bodies. But to imagine either a line
 or a surface as existing of itself is doubtless silly.
 While if it should be said that each of these objects
 is cognized solely in connexion with the Bodies and
 has no independent existence, it will thereby be

denote the lines or surfaces by which any magnitude is
 "bounded."

ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι τὰ σώματα (ἐχρῆν γάρ, οἶμαι, ταῦτα πρότερον ὑπόστασιν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ οὕτω συνελθόντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ σώματα),
 42 εἶτα οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σώμασιν ὑφέστηκεν.

Καὶ τοῦτο διὰ πλειονῶν μὲν ἔστιν ὑπομνησκειν, ἀρκέσει δὲ νῦν τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀφῆς ἀπορούμενα λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ ἄπτεται ἀλλήλων τὰ παρατιθέμενα σώματα, τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν, ὅλον ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις, ψαύει ἀλλήλων. αἱ οὖν ἐπιφάνειαι ὅλαι μὲν δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν, ἐπεὶ σύγχυσις ἔσται ἢ ἀφή καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ἀπτο-
 43 μένων διασπασμός· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια ἄπτεται τῆς τοῦ παρατιθεμένου αὐτῇ σώματος ἐπιφανείας, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνεται τῷ σώματι οὐ ἔστι πέρασ, * * *¹ οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ περὶ σώματι θεωρῆσαι δύναται τις μῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἀβαθές, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιφάνειαν.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο ἐπιφανειῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτῶν μῆκος εἶναι, τουτέστι κατὰ γραμμάς, αἱ γραμμαὶ αὗται, δι' ὧν ἄπτεσθαι λέγονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται μὲν ἀλλήλαις (συγχυθεῖεν γὰρ αὖν)· εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τοῖς

¹ The lacuna marked here is to denote that there is probably an omission in the mss. (and Bekk.) of something corresponding to the insertion of T—“(terminus) non erit sine profunditate differentibus eius partibus intellectis secundum profunditatem hac quidem cui opponitur tangenti hac autem secundum <quod> coniungitur corpori cuius est terminus.” Mutsch. inserts a Greek version of this in his text, and I give an English version between brackets.

granted, in the first place, that the Bodies are not generated from them (for if so, I suppose, these objects ought to have had independent existence first, and then have combined to form the Bodies); and ⁴² further, they have no real existence even in the so-called Bodies.

This can be shown by several arguments, but for the present it will suffice to mention the difficulties which arise from <the fact of> touch.^a For if juxtaposed Bodies touch one another they are in contact with their Limits—for example, with their surfaces. The surfaces, then, will not be completely unified one with another as a result of touching, since otherwise touch would be fusion and the separation of things touching a rending apart; and this is not what we find. And if the surface touches the surface of the ⁴³ juxtaposed Body with some of its parts, and with other parts is united with the Body of which it is a limit, <it will not be without depth, since its parts are conceived as different in respect of depth, one part touching the juxtaposed Body, the other being that which effects its union with the Body whereof it is a limit>. Hence, even in connexion with Body one cannot imagine length and breadth without depth, nor, consequently, surface.

So likewise when two surfaces are, let us imagine, juxtaposed along the limits where they come to an end, by way of what is called their “length,” that is to say by way of their “lines,” then these lines, by means of which the surfaces are said to touch each other, will not be unified (else they would be fused together); yet if each of them touches the line which

^a For arguments based on “touch,” or contact, cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 258 ff., *Adv. Geom.* 34 ff.

κατὰ πλάτος ἄπτεται τῆς παρατιθεμένης αὐτῇ γραμμῆς, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνεται τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἧς ἐστὶ πέρασ, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπλατῆς, ὅθεν οὐδὲ γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ μήτε γραμμῆ ἔστω ἐν σώματι μήτε ἐπιφάνεια, οὐδὲ μήκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος ἐστὶ ἐν σώματι.

44 Εἰ δέ τις σώματα εἶναι τὰ πέρατα λέγοι, σύντομος ἔσται ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρίσις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μήκος σῶμα ἐστίν, δεήσει τοῦτο εἰς τὰς τρεῖς αὐτοῦ μερίζεσθαι διαστάσεις, ὧν ἐκάστη σῶμα οὔσα πάλιν αὐτῇ διαιρηθήσεται εἰς διαστάσεις ἄλλας τρεῖς, αἱ ἔσονται σώματα, καὶ ἐκεῖναι εἰς ἄλλας ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀπειρομέγεθες γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα μεριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ σώματα ἄρα εἰσὶν αἱ προειρημένα διαστάσεις. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώματ' αἰσὶ μήτε γραμμαὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐδὲ εἶναι νομισθήσονται.

45 Ἀκατάληπτος δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. αὕτη γὰρ εἴπερ καταλαμβάνεται, ἀφή καταλαμβάνοιτο ἂν. εἰάν οὖν δείξωμεν ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφή, σαφές ἐστὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφή, διὰ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. τὰ ἀπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἦτοι μέρεσιν ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται ἢ ὅλα ὅλων. ὅλα μὲν οὖν ὅλων οὐδαμῶς ἐνωθήσεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἄμεται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· τὰ γὰρ μέρη αὐτῶν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέρη 46 ἐαυτῶν ὅλα. ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ὅλα, ἃ ἐστὶν ἐτέρω μέρη, ὅλα μὲν ὅλων οὐχ ἄμεται διὰ τὰ προειρη-

lies next to it breadth-wise with some of its parts and by others is united with the surface of which it is a limit, it will not be without breadth, and, consequently, it will not be a line. But if there exists in Body neither line nor surface, neither length nor breadth nor depth will exist in Body.

And should anyone assert that the Limits are 44 bodies, he can be answered very shortly. For if length is a body, it must needs be divided into its three dimensions, and each of these, in turn, being a body will be divided into three other dimensions, which will be bodies, and these likewise into others, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the Body comes to be of infinite size, being divided into an infinity of parts: this result is absurd, and therefore the dimensions aforesaid are not bodies. But if they are neither bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will be held to have no existence.

Solidity^a also is inapprehensible. For if it is 45 apprehended, it must be apprehended by touch. If, then, we shall prove that touch is inapprehensible, it will be clear that it is impossible for solidity to be apprehended. That touch is inapprehensible we argue as follows. Things which touch one another either touch with their parts or as wholes touching wholes. Now they certainly will not touch as wholes; for then they will be unified instead of being in contact with one another. Nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, though in relation to the wholes they are parts, are wholes in relation to their parts. So these wholes, which are parts of 46 other things, will not touch as wholes touching wholes,

^a Or "resistance," § 39; for this quality, as treated by Epicurus, cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 222.

μένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τούτων μέρη ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη ὅλα ὄντα οὔτε ὅλα ὅλων ἄψεται οὔτε μέρεσι μερῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ὁλότητα μήτε κατὰ μέρη γινομένην ἀφήν καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται ἡ ἀφή. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον τούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτον.

Οὕτω μὲν ὄν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, 47 ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα· λεκτέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν φασι εἶναι αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν νοητῶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἦτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητόν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν· κατὰ γὰρ συναθροισμὸν μήκους καὶ βάρους καὶ πλάτους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ χρώματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, σὺν οἷς θεωρεῖται· αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι λέγονται 48 παρ' αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ νοητόν εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, δὲ τι πάντως ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων νοητῶν ὄντων ἔσται νόησις. οὐδέν δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον αὐτόθεν νοητόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς ὑπ-

* Cf. § 38.

^b This means that each sense is specialized, so that it is capable of receiving only one kind of impression (e.g. the sight is affected by colour, but not by sound or solidity); cf. § 108.

for the reasons aforesaid, nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, too, being wholes relatively to their own parts, will not be in contact either as wholes with wholes or as parts with parts. But if we apprehend the occurrence of touch neither by way of wholeness nor by way of parts, touch will be inapprehensible. And, consequently, solidity also; and, therefore, Body; for if this is nothing more than the three dimensions *plus* Solidity, and we have proved that each of these is inapprehensible, Body also will be inapprehensible.

Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conception ^a of Body, it is inapprehensible whether any body exists; and about this problem there is this also to be said. 47 Of existing things some, they say, are sensible, others intelligible, and the latter are apprehended by the reason, the former by the senses, and the senses are "simply-passive," ^b while the reason proceeds from the apprehension of sensibles to the apprehension of intelligibles. If then any body exists, it is either sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible; for it is supposed to be apprehended as a conglomeration of length and depth and breadth and solidity and colour and various other things, along with which it is experienced; whereas, according to their statements, the senses are "simply-passive." And if Body is said 48 to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent in the nature of things some sensible object from which to derive the notion of bodies, they being intelligible. But nothing exists save Body and the Incorporeal, and of these the Incorporeal is essentially intelligible, ^c and Body, as we have shown, is not ^c *i.e.* in the view of the Stoics, but not of the Sceptics, for the inapprehensibility of the "Incorporeal" is proved in § 50 *ad fin.*

εμνήσαμεν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ἀφ' οὗ ἢ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι μήτε νοητὸν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ 49 σῶμα. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀντιτιθέντες τοὺς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος λόγους τῷ φαίνεσθαι [δοκεῖν]¹ ὑπάρχον τὸ σῶμα, συνάγομεν τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχὴν.

Τῇ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταληψία συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ ἀσώματον. αἱ γὰρ στερήσεις τῶν ἕξεων νοοῦνται στερήσεις, οἷον ὄρασεως τυφλότης καὶ ἀκοῆς κωφότης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως. διόπερ ἴνα στέρησιν καταλάβωμεν, δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν ἡμᾶς προκατειληφέναι ἧς λέγεται στερήσεις εἶναι ἢ στερήσεις· ἀνευνόητος γὰρ τις ὢν τῆς ὄρασεως οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο λέγειν ὅτι ὄρασω ὅδε οὐκ ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι. 50 εἰ οὖν στερήσεις σώματός ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, τῶν δὲ ἕξεων μὴ καταλαμβανόμενων ἀδύνατον τὰς στερήσεις αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἀκατάληπτον ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. καὶ γὰρ ἦτοι αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν ἢ νοητὸν. εἴτε δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔστι διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων· εἴτε νοητὸν, μὴ διδομένης αὐτόθεν τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως, ἀφ' ἧς ὀρμώμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν δοκοῦμεν, οὐδὲ ἢ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτόθεν

¹ [δοκεῖν] om. T.

sensible. Since, then, no sensible object exists in the nature of things from which we can derive the notion of Body, Body will not be intelligible either. And if it is neither sensible nor intelligible, and besides these nothing else exists, we must declare that, so far as this argument goes, Body has no existence. Accordingly 49 we, by thus opposing the arguments against Body to the apparent existence of Body, infer suspension of judgement concerning Body.

The inapprehensibility of Body involves also that of the Incorporeal. For privations are conceived as privations of states or faculties, as, for example, blindness of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly with the rest. Hence, in order to apprehend a privation, we must first have apprehended the state of which the privation is said to be a privation; for if one had no conception of sight one would not be able to assert that this man does not possess sight, which is the meaning of being blind. If then Incorporeality is 50 the privation of Body, and when states are not apprehended it is impossible for the privations of them to be apprehended, and it has been proved that Body is inapprehensible, Incorporeality also will be inapprehensible. Moreover, it is either sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, it is inapprehensible because of the variance amongst animals and men, the senses and the circumstances, and owing to the admixtures and all the other things we have previously described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.^a If, again, it is intelligible, since the apprehension of sensibles, which is supposed to form the starting-point from which we attain to the intelligibles,^b is not immediately given, neither will the apprehension of

^a Cf. i. 36 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 10.

κατάληψις δοθήσεται, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου.

51 "Ὁ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἤτοι αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου. καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ ἐπέρευσιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οἷον ἡ ὄρασις, ἐάν τε κατὰ ἔντασιν¹ γίνηται κώνου, ἐάν τε κατὰ εἰδώλων ἀποκρίσεις τε καὶ ἐπικρίσεις, ἐάν τε <κατ>² ἀκτίνων ἢ χρωμάτων ἀποχύσεις, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή δέ, ἦν τε ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀήρ ἦν τε τὰ μόρια τῆς φωνῆς φέρηται περὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ πλήττη τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα ὥστε τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς φωνῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ὀδομαὶ τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ αὐτῇ γλώττῃ προσπίπτουσιν, καὶ τὰ τὴν ἀφήν 52 κινούντα ὁμοίως τῇ ἀφῆ. τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα ἐπέρευσιν τοιαύτην ὑπομένειν οὐχ οἷά τε ἔστιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ λόγου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ λεκτὸν ἔστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ φασιν, ὁ λέγων διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάξει. ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ δύναται ἀσώματόν τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀσώματόν τι λαβὼν ἀπλῶς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν ἀσωμάτων ποιῆσθαι θέλει. καίτοι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ ἀσώματος ἔστι, τῆς τῶν 53 ζητουμένων ἐστὶ μοίρας. πῶς οὖν ἀποδείξει τις

¹ ἔντασιν Kayser: ἔντασιν mss., Bekk.

² <κατ> add. T, cj. Bekk.

^a The first of these theories of vision is that of Chrysippus (a cone of light connecting eye with object), the second that of Democritus and Epicurus, the third that of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Plato (*Tim.* 45 v) and Aristotle.

the intelligibles be given immediately, nor, consequently, that of Incorporeality.

Also, he who asserts that he apprehends the In- 51 corporeal will maintain that he apprehends it either by sense or by means of reason. Certainly not by sense, since it is supposed that the senses perceive the sensibles by way of "impression" and "indentation,"—take sight, for instance, whether it occur by reason of the tension of a cone, or of the emissions and immissions of images, or by effusions of rays or colours^a; and hearing too, whether it be the smitten air^b or the parts of the sound that are carried round the ears and smite the acoustic breath so as to effect the perception of sound. Smells also impinge on the nose and flavours on the tongue, and likewise objects of touch on the sense of touch. But incorporeals are 52 incapable of submitting to impression of this kind, so that they could not be apprehended by sense.

Nor yet by means of reason. For if the reason is "verbally expressible"^c and incorporeal, as the Stoics assert, he who says that incorporeals are apprehended by means of reason is begging the question. For when our question is—"Can an incorporeal object be apprehended?" he assumes an incorporeal object and then, by means of it alone, claims to effect the apprehension of incorporeals. Yet reason itself, if it is incorporeal, belongs to the class of things which are in question. How, then, is one to 53

^b Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 67 v; Diog. Laert. vii. 158; "acoustic breath" is Stoic for the air within the ear, cf. ii. 70.

^c For the Stoic theory of "expression" (λεκτόν) cf. ii. 81, 104. *Logos* ("reason" or "word") is from the same stem as *Lekton* ("what can be put into words" or "meaning"), which—as contrasted with "uttered words"—was termed by the Stoics "incorporeal."

ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο τὸ ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεται, φημί δὲ τὸν λόγον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἄλλου ἀσωμάτου, κάκεινου ζητήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ διὰ σώματος, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τῆς καταλήψεως τῶν σωμάτων· διὰ τίνος οὖν δείξομεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται τὸ σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀσωμάτου λόγου λαμβανόμενον; εἰ μὲν διὰ σώματος, εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰ δὲ δι' ἀσωμάτου, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον ἐκπίπτομεν. μένοντος οὖν οὕτως ἀκαταλήπτου τοῦ λόγου, εἴπερ ἀσωμάτος ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τις λέγειν δι' αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

54 Εἰ δὲ σώμα ἐστίν ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων διαπεφώνηται πρότερον καταλαμβάνεται ἢ οὐ, διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, ὡς μὴδὲ τὴν τόδε¹ δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μὴδὲ εἶναι νομιζέσθαι (παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων γινόμενα μὲν ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα), ἀπορῶ πῶς ἐπικριθῆσεται ἢ περὶ τοῦ σώματος διαφωνία, μήτε σώματι μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ ταύτην ὁρῶν ἐπικρίνεσθαι δυναμένην διὰ τὰς μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένας ἀτοπίας. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ λόγῳ δυνατόν ἐστι κατα-
55 λαμβάνειν τὰ ἀσώματα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει μήτε διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως καταλαμβάνοιτο.

Εἰ τοίνυν μήτε περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος μήτε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οἶόν τέ ἐστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἐφεκτέον,

¹ τόδε Apelt: τότε MSS., Bekk.

prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason) is previously apprehended? For if it is by means of another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof of its apprehension also, and so on *ad infinitum*; whereas, if it is by means of a body, the apprehension of bodies is also in question; by what means, then, are we to prove that the body which is assumed in order to prove the apprehension of the incorporeal reason is itself apprehended? If by means of a body, we are plunged into infinite regress; while if we do so by means of an incorporeal, we are wrecked on circular reasoning. Reason, then, since it is incorporeal, remaining thus inapprehensible, no one will be able to say that by means of it the incorporeal is apprehended.

But if reason is a body, inasmuch as about bodies 54 also there is much controversy as to whether or not they are apprehended, owing to what is called their "continual flux,"^a which gives rise to the view that they do not admit of the title "this" and are non-existent—just as Plato^b speaks of bodies as "becoming but never being,"—I am perplexed as to how this controversy about Body is to be settled, as I see that it cannot be settled, because of the difficulties stated a moment ago, either by a body or by an incorporeal. Neither, then, is it possible to apprehend the incorporeals by reason. And if they are 55 neither objects of sense nor apprehended by means of reason, they will not be apprehended at all.

If, then, it is impossible to be positive either about the existence of Body or about the Incorporeals, we must also suspend judgement concerning the Elements, and possibly about the things

^b Cf. ii. 28.

* The Heracleitean doctrine, cf. i. 217 ff.; §§ 82, 115 *infra*.

τάχα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἶγε τούτων τὰ μὲν σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἠπόρηται. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν τε δραστηκῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἐφεκτῶν οὐσῶν ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγος.

H'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΡΑΣΕΩΣ

- 56 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπη τις, πῶς ἄρα καὶ γίνεσθαι φασι τὰ συγκρίματα ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, μήτε θίξεως καὶ ἀφῆς ὑπαρχούσης μήτε κράσεως ἢ μίξεως ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφή, καὶ μικρῶ πρόσθεν ὑπέμνησα, ὅτε περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ σώματος διελεγόμην· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κράσεως ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν δυνατός ἐστι, διὰ βραχείων ἐπιστήσω. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς στάσεις· ὅθεν εὐθέως ἅμα τῇ ἀνεπικρίτῳ διαφωνία καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ σκέμματος συνάγοιτ' ἄν. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀντίρρησιν παραιτησάμενοι διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς, τὰδε λέξεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀποχρώντως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
- 57 Τὰ κιννάμενα ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαι φασίν. ἤτοι οὖν τὰς μὲν οὐσίας αὐτῶν μί-

^a For the four (or five) "elements" cf. §§ 30, 31; for "the things behind" them (from the point of view of cognition), i.e. primary bodies or stuff, cf. § 32.

^b i.e. the primary bodies out of which, as "elements," the (four) so-called "elements" (earth, air, fire, water) were said by the Stoics to be compounded.

^c For "touch" cf. i. 50, 96, iii. 45-46. "Mixture" (of solids as well as fluids) is a wider term than "blending."

which lie behind the Elements^a as well, seeing that of these some are bodies, others incorporeals, and both of these are matters of doubt. In fact, when both the active and the material Principles, for these reasons, call for suspense of judgement, the doctrine of Principles is open to doubt.

CHAPTER VIII.—CONCERNING MIXTURE

But, to pass over these problems, how do they⁵⁶ explain the production of the compounds from the primary elements,^b when neither contact and touch nor mixture or blending^c has any existence at all? For that touch is nothing I showed a moment ago, when I was discussing the subsistence of Body; and that the method of Mixture is equally impossible on their own showing, I shall briefly demonstrate. For there is much argument about Mixture, and the rival views held by the Dogmatists^d on the problem propounded are well-nigh endless; and hence we might straightway infer, along with the indeterminable controversy, the inapprehensibility of the problem. And we shall for the moment, owing to the design of our treatise, excuse ourselves from answering all their views in detail, deeming that the following remarks will amply suffice for the present.

They declare that mixed things are composed of⁵⁷ substance and qualities. If so, one must declare

^d Especially Aristotle (*De gen. et corr.* i. 10) and the Stoics. The following argument is against the latter. As Aristotle says, "mixture" effects some change, but not a total change, in the things mixed, which must be such as are capable of mutually affecting one another, and capable also of being easily decomposed into their constituent particles: he defines "mixture" as "the union of mixables which have undergone alteration."

γνυσθαι φήσει τις τὰς δὲ ποιότητος μηδαμῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν ποιότητος ἀναμίγνυσθαι μηκέτι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἢ μηθέτερον ἀναμίγνυσθαι θατέρῳ, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἐνοῦσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε αἱ ποιότητες οὔτε αἱ οὐσῖαι ἀναμίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις, ἀνεπινόητος ἔσται ἡ κρᾶσις· πῶς γὰρ μία αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τῶν κίρναμένων γίνεσθαι συμβήσεται, εἴγε κατὰ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων μίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κίρναμένα; εἰ δὲ αἱ μὲν ποιότητες ἀπλῶς παρακείσθαι λεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλαις αἱ δὲ οὐσῖαι μίγνυσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ κεχωρισμένων τῶν ποιότητων τῶν ἐν ταῖς κρᾶσεσιν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὡς μιᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν κίρναμένων ἀποτελουμένης αἰσθανόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν ποιότητος μίγνυσθαι λέγοι τις τὰς δὲ οὐσίας μηδαμῶς, ἀδύνατα λέξει· ἢ γὰρ τῶν ποιότητων ὑπόστασις ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἔστιν, διόπερ γελοῖον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὡς αἱ μὲν ποιότητες χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν οὐσιῶν [καὶ]¹ ἰδίᾳ μίγνυνται πῶς ἀλλήλαις, ἅποιοι δὲ αἱ οὐσῖαι χωρὶς ὑπολείπονται.

59 Δεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κίρναμένων καὶ αἱ οὐσῖαι χωροῦσι δι' ἀλλήλων καὶ μίγνυνται τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. ὁ τῶν προειρημένων ἔστιν ἀτοπώτερον· ἀδύνατος γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τοιαύτη κρᾶσις. ὅλον γοῦν ἕαν δέκα κοτύλαις ὕδατος κωνείου χυλοῦ κοτύλη μίχθῃ, παντὶ τῷ ὕδατι συνανακίρνασθαι ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ κώνειον· εἰ γοῦν καὶ τι βραχύτατον μέρος τοῦ μίγματος λάβοι

¹ [καὶ] om. T, Creuzer.

* Here "blend" is used merely as a synonym for "mix."
 † Chrysippus held that "mixture" is not effected by superficial "juxtaposition" but by the mutual "permeation"

either that their substances are blended^a but not their qualities, or their qualities blended but not their substances any longer, or neither blended with the other, or both unified with each other. But if neither the qualities nor the substances are blended with one another, Mixture will be inconceivable; for how will a single sensation result from the things mixed if the things mixed are blended with one another in none of the ways stated above? And if it should be said 58 that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the substances blended, even so the statement would be absurd; for we do not perceive the qualities in the mixtures as separate objects but as a single sense-impression produced by the mixed things. And anyone who should assert that the qualities are blended, but the substances not, would be asserting the impossible; for the reality of the qualities resides in the substances, so that it would be ridiculous to assert that the qualities by themselves, in separation from the substances, are somehow blended with one another, while the substances are left apart void of quality.

It only remains to say that both the qualities and 59 the substances of the mixed things permeate one another^b and by their blending produce Mixture. But this is a more absurd view than any of the foregoing; for such a mixture is impossible. Thus, for example, if a cup of hemlock juice were blended with ten cups of water, it will be said that the hemlock is mixed in with all the water; for certainly if one were to take even the least portion of the mixture he would

or "interpenetration" of the constituents of the mixture: "qualities" as well as substances he regarded as corporeal and thus capable of being "penetrated."

τις, εὐρήσει πεπληρωμένον αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου
 60 δυνάμεως. εἰ δὲ ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ
 μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ παρεκτείνεται αὐτῷ ὅλον
 ὅλῳ κατὰ τε τὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιότητων
 αὐτῶν δι' ἀλλήλων δίοδον, ἢ οὕτως ἢ κρᾶσις
 γένηται, τὰ δὲ παρεκτεινόμενα ἀλλήλοις καθ' ἅπαν
 μέρος τὸν ἴσον ἐπέχει τόπον, διὸ καὶ ἴσα ἀλλήλοις
 ἐστίν, ἴση ἔσται ἢ κοτύλη τοῦ κωνείου ταῖς δέκα
 κοτύλαις τοῦ ὕδατος, ὡς εἴκοσι κοτύλας ὀφείλειν
 εἶναι τὸ μίγμα ἢ δύο μόνας, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῆδε τῆ
 ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως· καὶ κοτύλης
 πάλιν ὕδατος ταῖς εἴκοσι κοτύλαις ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ
 λόγῳ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐπεμβληθείσης τεσσαράκοντα
 κοτυλῶν ὀφείλει τὸ μέτρον εἶναι ἢ πάλιν δύο μόνων,
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν κοτύλην εἴκοσι κοτύλας ἐνδέχεται
 νοεῖν, ὅσαις παρεκτείνεται, καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι κοτύλας
 61 μίαν, ἢ συνεξισοῦνται. δυνατόν δὲ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν
 κοτύλην ἐπεμβάλλοντα καὶ ὁμοίως συλλογιζόμενον
 συνάγειν ὅτι αἱ εἴκοσι δρώμενοι τοῦ μίγματος
 κοτύλαι δισμύριαί ποῦ καὶ πρὸς ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τῆ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως, αἱ
 δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ δύο μόνα· ὅπερ ἀπεμφάσεως ὑπερ-
 βολὴν οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπεν. οὐκοῦν ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ
 62 αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις τῆς κράσεως. εἰ δὲ οὔτε τῶν
 οὐσιῶν μόνων μιγνυμένων ἀλλήλαις οὔτε τῶν
 ποιότητων μόνων οὔτε ἀμφοτέρων οὔτε οὐτετέρου
 δύναται γίνεσθαι κρᾶσις, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ὁλον τέ ἐστιν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀνεπινόητος ὁ τρόπος τῆς
 τε κράσεως καὶ ὅλως τῆς μίξεως ἐστίν. διόπερ
 εἰ μήτε κατὰ θίξιν παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις τὰ
 καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μήτε ἀνακινώμενα ἢ μιγνύ-
 μενα ποιητικὰ τῶν συγκριμάτων εἶναι δύναται,

find it full of the potency of the hemlock. Yet if the 60
 hemlock is blended in with every particle of the water
 and is distributed as a whole over the whole volume
 of the water and through the mutual interpenetration
 of both their substances and their qualities, so that
 Mixture may in this way result; and if the things so
 distributed over each other in every particle occupy
 an equal space, so that they are equal to each other,—
 then the cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups
 of water, so that the blend must consist of twenty
 cups or of only two, according to the assumption now
 made as to the mode of Mixture. And if, again, a
 cup of water were poured into the twenty cups,
 then—according to the theory assumed—the quantity
 is bound to be forty cups or, again, only two, since it
 is admissible to conceive either the one cup as all
 the twenty over which it is distributed, or the twenty
 cups as the one with which they are equalized. And 61
 by thus pouring in a cup at a time and pursuing the
 same argument it is possible to infer that the twenty
 cups seen in the blend must be twenty thousand and
 more, according to the theory of Mixture assumed,
 and at the same time only two—a conclusion which
 reaches the very height of incongruity. Wherefore
 this theory of Mixture also is absurd.

But if Mixture cannot come about by the mutual 62
 blending either of the substances alone or of the
 qualities alone or of both or of neither, and it is
 impossible to conceive any other ways than these,
 then the process of Mixture and of blending in
 general is inconceivable. Hence, if the so-called
 Elements are unable to form the compounds either
 by way of contact through juxtaposition or by

ἀνεπινοήτος ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιο-
λογία καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

Θ.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ

63 Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἦν ἐπιστήσαι τῷ
περὶ τῶν κινήσεων λόγῳ, ᾧ καὶ ἀδύνατος ἂν
εἶναι νομισθεῖη ἢ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιο-
λογία. πάντως γὰρ κατὰ τινα κίνησιν τῶν τε
στοιχείων καὶ τῆς δραστικῆς ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει γίνε-
σθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. εἰ δὲ οὖν ὑπομήσωμεν ὅτι
μηδὲν εἶδος κινήσεως ὁμολογεῖται, σαφές ἔσται ὅτι
καὶ διδομένων καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν προειρημένων
ἀπάντων μάρτην ὁ καλούμενος φυσικὸς λόγος τοῖς
δογματικοῖς διεξώδευται.

Ι'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ

64 Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ
κινήσεως διεληφέναι ἐξ εἶδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν,
τοπικὴν μετάβασιν, φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, αὐξήσιν,
μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῶν
προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπι-
στήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως ἀρξά-
μενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς καθ'
ἣν τόπον ἐκ τόπου περιέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ἥτοι
καθ' ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν
περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ
κέντρῳ κινουμένης σφαίρας. ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς
μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τοὺς τόπους
ἀμείβει.

¹ ᾧ καὶ ego : καὶ ὡς mss., Bekk. : καὶ om. Steph.

mixture or blending, then, so far as this argument
goes, the physical theory of the Dogmatists is in-
conceivable.

CHAPTER IX.—CONCERNING MOTION

In addition to the foregoing we might have dwelt 63
on the argument about the kinds of motion, since
this also might be held to render the physical theory
of the Dogmatists impossible. For the formation of
the compounds must certainly be due to some motion
both of the elements and of the efficient Principle.
If, then, we shall show that no one kind of motion is
generally agreed upon, it will be clear that, even if
all the assumptions mentioned above be granted, the
Dogmatists have elaborated their so-called " Physical
Doctrine " in vain.

CHAPTER X.—CONCERNING TRANSIENT MOTION

Now those who are reputed to have given the most 64
complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds
of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase,
decrease, becoming, perishing.* We, then, shall deal
with each of the aforesaid kinds of motion separately
beginning with local transition. According, then, to
the Dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving
object passes on from place to place, either wholly
or partially—wholly as in the case of men walking,
partially as when a globe is moving round a central
axis, for while as a whole it remains in the same place,
its parts change their places.

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 37 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* vii. 2, *Categ.*
15 a 13; *Plato, Laws*, x. 894.

65 Τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος¹ καὶ τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μελίσσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ κίνησιν ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν εὐρίσκωμεν ἰσοσθενῆ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς
66 λεγομένοις. ἀρξόμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων.

Οὗτοι δὲ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φασί, κινήσις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμᾶς ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας ποιεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων ἀναχθεῖσαι καταΐρουσι ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπλου τῶν προτέρων ἀφ-εστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς οἰκίας καὶ αὐθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα δὲ τελῶς ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβᾶδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας παριστὰς ὅτι ὑπαρκτὴ ἔστιν ἡ κινήσις.

¹ βίος T: βίος MSS., Bekk.

^a Lit. "by life," cf. i. 165, ii. 244.

^b Such as Zeno and Diodorus Cronos, cf. ii. 242.

The main views held about motion are, I imagine, 65 three. It is assumed by ordinary people ^a and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus and certain others ^b that it does not exist; while the Sceptics have declared that it is "no more" existent than non-existent; for so far as the evidence of phenomena goes it seems that motion exists, whereas to judge by the philosophic argument it would seem not to exist. So when we have exposed the contradiction which lies between those who believe in the existence of motion and those who maintain that motion is naught, if we shall find the counter-arguments of equal weight, ^c we shall be compelled to declare that, so far as these arguments go, motion is "no more" existent than non-existent. We shall begin with those who affirm its real 66 existence.

These base their view mainly on "evidence." ^d If, say they, motion does not exist, how does the sun move from east to west, and how does it produce the seasons of the year, which are brought about by its approximations to us and its recessions from us? Or how do ships put out from harbours and cast anchor in other harbours very far distant from the first? And in what fashion does the denier of motion proceed from his house and return to it again? These facts are perfectly incontestable. Consequently, when one of the Cynics ^e had an argument against motion put to him, he made no reply but stood up and began to walk, thus demonstrating by his action and by "evidence" that motion is capable of real existence.

^c Cf. i. 26 for "equipollence" as leading to Sceptic "suspension."

^d i.e. what is plainly obvious, cf. § 266.

^e Cf. ii. 244.

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τοὺς
 67 τῆς ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας· οἱ δὲ τὴν
 ὑπαρξίν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιροῦντες λόγοις ἐπι-
 χειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ
 κινεῖται ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρου, [τὸ
 γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι] ἤτοι ἀναιτίως
 κινήθησεται ἢ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν
 οὐδὲν φασὶ γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν κινεῖ-
 ται, ἢ αἰτία, καθ' ἣν κινεῖται, κινητικὴ αὐτοῦ
 68 μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένῃ ἐπιβολῇ. ἄλλως τε καὶ
 εἰ τὸ κινεῖν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται,
 κάκεινο δεήσεται κινεῖν ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
 τρίτου, καὶ μέχρι ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀναρχον γίνεσθαι
 τὴν κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄποπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινου-
 μένον ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ.
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κινεῖν ἤτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ
 ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνωθοῦν ἢ ἐνθλίβον, δεήσει τὸ
 69 ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν κατὰ τινα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων
 ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ,
 ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔμ-
 προσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς, ὑποκάτω, εἰ δὲ ἐν-
 θλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτὸ τι ἑαυτοῦ
 ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω·
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε
 ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ
 κινεῖται τι.

70 Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν κατα-
 φεύγοι, ὑπομνηστέον αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν
 διαφωνίας, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν,

^a An Aristotelian phrase: freedom of choice was denied by fatalists, such as Democritus and the Stoics.

So these men attempt in this way to put to shame those who hold the contrary opinion; but those who 67 deny the existence of motion allege such arguments as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by another, it will be moved either causelessly or owing to some cause. Nothing, they assert, is moved causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause, the cause owing to which it moves will be what makes it move, and thus we are involved in an infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a little while ago. Moreover, if the movent thing 68 is active, and what is active is moved, that movent thing will need another movent thing, and the second a third, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the motion comes to have no beginning; which is absurd. Therefore the thing that moves is not always moved by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid ways. But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be 69 behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below itself; and if by thrusting down, it will be above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above or before or beneath or behind its own self; therefore it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. But if nothing is moved either by itself or by another, then nothing is moved at all.

And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions 70 of "impulse" and "purpose" we must remind him of the controversy about "what is in our power,"^a and

κριτήριον ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νῦν οὐχ εὐρη-
κότων.

71 Ἐτι κάκεινο λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ
ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν
ᾧ ἔστιν μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν·
οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅπου γὰρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ
οὐδὲ δράσαι τι οὐδὲ παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα
κινεῖται τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστι μὲν Διοδώρου
τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων τετύχηκεν,
ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς συγ-
γραφῆς ἐκθησόμεθα μετὰ τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν
ἐπικρίσεως.

72 Φασὶν οὖν τινὲς ὅτι δύναται τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω
κινεῖσθαι· τὰς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδινου-
μένας σφαίρας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσας τόπω κινεῖ-
σθαι. πρὸς οὓς μεταφέρειν χρὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφ'
ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομνη-
σκοντας ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη
κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται

73 τι. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας
ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον δυοῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν
ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πεισόμεθα γὰρ
αὐτῶν πότε φέρεται τὸ κινούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ
ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον, ἄρα ὅτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ. ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν
δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ οὐκ

74 ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. πρὸς
τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ
μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ

^a Cf. ii. 18 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 245.

how it is still unsettled, since hitherto we have failed
to find a criterion of truth.^a

Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing 71
moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in
that where it is not. But it does not move in the
place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it;
nor yet does it move in the place where it is not;
for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect
nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This
argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,^b but it
has been the subject of many attacks, of which we
shall describe, owing to the character of our treatise,
only the more formidable, together with a judgement
of their value, as it seems to us.

Some, then, assert that a thing can move in 72
the place where it is; at any rate the globes which
revolve round their axes move while remaining in the
same place.^c Against these men we should transfer
the argument which applies to each of the parts of the
globe, and, reminding them that, to judge by this
argument, it does not move even in respect of its
parts, draw the conclusion that nothing moves in the
place where it is. And we shall take the same course 73
in replying to those who declare that the moving
thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that
whereto it shifts. For we shall ask them *when* the
moving object shifts from the place wherein it is to
the other place—whether while it is in the first place
or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first
place it does not pass over into the second, for it is
still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not
passing from it. And besides, the question is being 74
begged; for where it is not, there it cannot be active.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 93, 103.

δήπου φέρεσθαι εἰς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκείνο ἀπλῶς ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.

- 75 Τινὲς μέντοι κάκεινο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὃ μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ οἰκία, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν, ὡς λόγου χάριν ὃ περιτετυπωκῶς μου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος. πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν, ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει τόπον, λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου· εἰτα συνάγοντας ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.
- 76 Ἐρωτητέον δὲ κάκεινον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ ἄθροον μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον δύναται τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἄθροον μεριστὸν διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι ἄρα.

* Cf. §§ 119, 131. "Place" in the "exact" or narrow sense means the precise portion of space occupied by an object, as distinguished from "place" in the "broad" or "extended" sense in which it includes surrounding portions of space. The latter sense of "place" was adopted in order to make "motion in place" feasible; but Sextus argues that it fails to do so.

¹ The following sections, 76-80, criticize two kinds of motion, (1) *successive* motion, by which the moving body occupies the first part of the intervening space first with its

For surely no one will allow that any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.

Some, however, make this statement: Place is ⁷⁵ used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example "my house," and the exact sense,^a as for instance "the air which enfolds the surface of my body." So the moving object is said to move in place, "place" being used not in the exact sense but in the broad sense. To these we can reply by dividing up "place" in the broad sense, and saying that in one part of it the body said to be moved properly exists, this being its own "place" in the exact sense, and in the other part it does not exist, this being the remaining portions of "place" in the extended sense; next we shall argue that an object can move neither in the place where it is nor in that where it is not, and so conclude that nothing can move even in what is perversely termed "place" in the broad sense; for this is composed of the place wherein it is in the exact sense and the place wherein it is not, and it has been proved that a thing cannot move in either of these.

We should also propound the following argument.^b ⁷⁶ If a thing moves it moves either by way of orderly, or gradual, progression or by occupying the divisible interval all at once; but in neither of these ways can a thing move, as we shall prove; so that it does not move at all.

own first part, next with its second part, and so on till all its parts have passed through all the parts of the "interval." (Here it is assumed that both the moving body and the spatial distance, or "interval," are divisible; but, argues Sextus, whether they are infinitely divisible or divisible only into a limited number of indivisible parts, in either case motion is found to be impossible.) (2) *Momentaneous* motion (§§ 78-79), by which the moving body passes into the whole of the interval in a single moment of time.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τι κινεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται τὰ σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι λέγεται τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος τοῦ πρώτον τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὔρεθῆναι, ἀφ' οὗ πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ 77 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἄμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ πρῶτον ἄμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ πρώτῳ ἑαυτοῦ ἄμερῆ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἔστιν ἀτοπώτερον. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ κίνησις.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθρον μριστὸν διάστημα. 78 εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὡς φασί, μαρτυρεῖσθαι τὰ ἀδηλα χρή, ἐπεὶ, ἵνα τις ἀνύση σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι προσήκει, ἐπεὶ τοί γε εἰ ἀθρόως διέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἶη μέρος τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τοῦ δι' οὐ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μὲν, εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν τὸ δὲ λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμὸν τε ἅμα καὶ 79 ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἀτοπον. εἴτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον

Now that a thing can not move in orderly progression is plain on the face of it. For if bodies, and also the places and the times in which the bodies are said to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will derive its initial movement. And if the aforesaid 77 objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the moving things passes equally in an atomic period of time with its own first atom into the first atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity—the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise^a; which is a result even more absurd than the former. Therefore motion does not take place by way of orderly progression.

Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval. For if one ought, as they declare, 78 to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent, since, in order to complete the distance of a stade a man must first complete the first portion of the stade, and secondly the second portion, and so on with the rest, so likewise everything that moves ought to move by way of orderly progression; for surely if we should assert that the moving thing passes all at once through all the portions of the place wherein it is said to move, it will be in all the portions thereof at once, and if one portion of the place through which it has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap, one black, another white, so as to be able also to colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is absurd. Next let them tell us how much space the 79

^a Cf. the Eleatic puzzle of "Achilles" (and the tortoise); cf. Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 9.

εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν, προσδέξονται τι κινεῖσθαι διὰ πάσης τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὀρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὀρίζων τὸν τόπον οὐ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως, πρὸς τῷ ἀποκληρωτικῶν καὶ προπετές ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ἔσται ἰσοταχῆ, εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένους τόπους τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται. εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν ὅτι μικρὸν μὲν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν αἰεὶ τῷ ὑποθεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθεῖναι μέγεθος τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ στήσονται που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν συνερῶτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς σωγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως τι δύνασθαι κινηθῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ ἄθρον μριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται 81 τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρον μριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ

^a Cf. § 77. This is further explained in *Adv. Phys.* i. 154: "If all is indivisible (time, bodies, and space), all moving bodies will be of equal velocity (e.g. the sun and the tortoise), since an indivisible interval is completed by all alike in an indivisible moment of time." In this § 79 the difficulties as 382

moving thing passes through all at once. For if they shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting that a thing moves through the whole of the earth all at once; while if they shirk this conclusion, let them define for us the extent of the space. But, on the one hand, the attempt to define precisely the space or interval beyond which the thing moving all at once will be unable to advance so much as a hair's-breadth is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original difficulty ^a; for all things will be of equal velocity, if each of them alike has its transitional movements over definite intervals of space. And if, on the other 80 hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves all at once through a space that is small but not precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt the *sorites* argument ^b and keep constantly adding a hair's-breadth of space to the breadth assumed. And if, then, they shall make a halt anywhere while we are pursuing this argument, they will be reverting to the monstrous theory of precise definition as before; while if they shall assent to the process of addition, we shall force them to grant that a thing can move all at once through the whole of the earth. Consequently, objects said to be in motion do not move by occupying a divisible interval all at once. But if 81 a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.

These, and yet more than these, are the arguments used by those who reject transient motion. But we, regards the *quantity* of space passed through by the moving body on the *momentaneous* theory are exposed; it must be conceived either as (1) unlimited or (2) precisely limited, or (3) small, but not precisely limited; but all these views lead to absurdities. ^b Cf. ii. 253.

μήτε τοὺς λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων, ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΙΑ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΞΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΙΩΣΕΩΣ

- 82 Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ μειώσεως ἐπέχομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν-ἀργεια δοκεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν, ἣν οἱ λόγοι διατρέπειν δοκοῦσιν. ἡ θέασαι γοῦν· τὸ αὐξόμενον ὄν καὶ ὑφεστῶς εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδιδόμην προσήκει, ὡς εἶγε ἐτέρῳ προσθέσεως γενομένης ἕτερον ἠύξηκέναι τις λέγοι, ψεύσεται. ἐπεὶ τοιούτων ἢ οὐσία οὐδέποτε ἔστηκεν ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ρεῖ τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐπεισκρίνεται, τὸ ἠύξηκέναι λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προτέραν οὐσίαν καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἄλλην τὴν προστεθείσαν ἀλλ' ὅλην ἕτεραν.
- 83 ὡσπερ οὖν εἰ, λόγου χάριν, ξύλου τριπήχεος ὄντος δεκάπηχου ἕτερον ἀγαγὼν τις ἠύξηκέναι τὸ τρίπηχου λέγοι, ψεύσεται διὰ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο ἐκείνου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ αὐξομένου λεγομένου, τῆς προτέρας ὕλης ἀπορρεούσης καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπεισιούσης, εἰ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον, οὐκ ἂν αὐξήσιν τις εἶποι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὄλου ἕτεροίωσιν.
- 84 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῆς μειώσεως λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστῶς ὅλως πῶς ἂν μεμειῶσθαι λέγοιτο;

^a Cf. § 66.

^b i.e. material substance, which Heraclitus and Plato said was "in flux," cf. i. 217 ff., ii. 28.

being unable to refute either these arguments or the apparent facts on which the view of the reality of motion is based, suspend our judgement—in view of the contradiction between appearances and arguments—regarding the question as to the existence or non-existence of motion.

CHAPTER XI.—CONCERNING INCREASE AND DECREASE

Employing the same reasoning we suspend judgement also concerning both increase and decrease. For the outward evidence^a seems to support their reality, which the arguments seem to refute. For just consider: That which increases must grow in size as a stable substance, so that it will be false for anyone to say that one thing increases when an addition is made to another. Since then substance^b is never stable but always in flux, one part supplanting another, the thing said to have increased does not retain its former substance together with the added substance but has its substance all different. Just 83 as if, for example, when there is a beam three cubits long a man should bring another of ten cubits and declare that the beam of three cubits had increased, he would be lying because the one is wholly different from the other; so too in the case of every object which is said to increase, as the former matter flows away and fresh matter enters in its place, if what is said to be added is added, one should not call such a condition increase but complete alteration.

The same argument applies also to decrease.^c For 84 how could that which has no stable existence be said

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἢ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ δὲ αὐξήσις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφαιρέσεις οὔτε πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἢ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἢ αὐξήσις ἔστι τι.

IV'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΕΩΣ

85 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀφαιρέσεις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. εἰ ἀφαιρείται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἦτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρείται ἢ τὸ μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ τὸ ἐλάσσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν· ἀδύνατος ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις.

Ὅτι δὲ κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, δηλον ἐντεῦθεν. τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι χρή πρὸ τῆς

86 ἀφαιρέσεως τῷ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείται. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται, οἷον τὰ ἕξ ἐν τοῖς ἕξι· μείζον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ περιέχον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείται τι τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου, ἵνα μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπολείπηται τι· τούτῳ¹ γὰρ διαφέρειν δοκεῖ τῆς παντελοῦς ἄρσεως ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις· οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ, οἷον τὰ ἕξ ἐν τοῖς

87 πέντε· ἀπεμφαίνει γάρ. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάσσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἕξι περιέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλειοσιν ἐλάσσονα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχεθῆσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι τὰ τρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἕν. ἕξει οὖν τὰ ἕξ πέντε τέσσαρα τρία δύο ἕν, ὧν συντεθέντων γίνεται ὁ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀριθμός, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἕξι περιέχεσθαι συνάγεται διδο-

¹ τούτῳ Mutsch.: τοῦτο mss., Bekk.

to have decreased? Besides, if decrease takes place by way of subtraction, and increase by addition, and neither subtraction nor addition is anything, then neither decrease nor increase is anything.

CHAPTER XII.—CONCERNING SUBTRACTION AND ADDITION

That subtraction^a is nothing they argue thus: If 85 anything is subtracted from anything, either equal is subtracted from equal, or greater from less, or less from greater. But in none of these ways does subtraction take place, as we shall show; therefore subtraction is impossible.

That subtraction takes place in none of these ways is plain from what follows: What is subtracted from anything ought, before its subtraction, to be included in that from which it is subtracted. But the 86 equal is not included in the equal—six, for instance, in six; for what includes must be greater than what is included, and that from which the subtraction is made than what is subtracted, in order that there may be some remainder after the subtraction; for it is this which is held to distinguish subtraction from complete removal. Nor is the greater included in the less—six, for instance, in five; for that is irrational. And for this reason, neither is the less 87 included in the greater. For if five is included in six, as less in greater, four will be included in five, three in four, two in three, and one in two. Therefore six will contain five, four, three, two, and one, which when put together form the number fifteen, and this we conclude is included in six, if it be granted

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 297 ff.

μένον τοῦ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ πεντεκαίδεκα τῷ ἐν τῷ ἕξ ἐμπεριεχομένῳ ὁ τριακοντακαιπέντε ἀριθμὸς περιέχεται καὶ κατὰ ὑπόβασιν ἄπειροι. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἀπείρους ἀριθμοὺς ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἕξ ἀριθμῷ· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεται τὸ ἔλασσον. εἰ οὖν χρῆ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μέλλει, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ οὔτε τὸ μικρότερον ἐν τῷ μείζονι, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος.

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου. ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λέγειν ἢτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους ἀπ-εμφαίνει προδήλως, λείπεται δὲ λέγειν τὸ μέρος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφοῦς ἕνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς. αὕτη οὖν ἢ μονάς οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

90 Εἰ γὰρ ἢ μονάς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἢ δεκάς οὔτε ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ' ἢ συνέλευσις

^a The addition of the numbers 1 . . . 5 gives 15; of 1 . . . 4, 10; of 1 . . . 3, 6; of 1 and 2, 3; so we get the total 35 = 15 + 10 + 6 + 3 + 1; cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 304 ff. But perhaps we should read 105 for 35 (ἐκατὸν for τριάκοντα), as 1 . . . 14 = 105.

that the less is included in the greater. So likewise in the fifteen which is included in the six there is included the number thirty-five,^a and so on, step by step, to infinity. But it is absurd to say that infinite numbers are included in the number six; and so it is also absurd to say that less is included in greater. If, then, what is subtracted from a thing must be 88 included in that from which it is to be subtracted, and neither equal is included in equal, nor greater in less, nor less in greater, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

Again, if anything is subtracted from anything, it is either a whole subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from a whole. But to say that a whole is subtracted 89 from either a whole or a part is plainly nonsense. It remains, then, to say that a part is subtracted either from a whole or from a part; which is absurd. Thus for example—basing our argument on numbers for the sake of clearness—let us take ten and suppose that from it one is subtracted. This one, then, cannot be subtracted either from the whole ten or from the remaining part of the ten, as I shall show; therefore it is not subtracted at all.^b

For if the one is subtracted from the whole ten, 90 since the ten is neither something other than the ten ones nor one of the ones, but the aggregate of

^b In what follows it is argued (§§ 90, 91) that 1 cannot be subtracted from a "whole 10," 10 being ten ones, so that the subtracted 1 must be subtracted from each of those ones, including itself, and thus 10 - 1 = 0. Further, as the number 1 (the "monad") is indivisible, it does not admit of subtraction: and the 1 to be subtracted must fall into 10 parts, and thus be itself a 10, if it is subtracted 10 separate times from the units of the 10.

πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἢ μονάς, ἵνα ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρῆται τῆς δεκάδος. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἢ 91 μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη τις ἀπὸ ἐκάστης τῶν μονάδων ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἕξει μέρη ἢ μονάς, δέκα δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκάς¹ ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ δέκα ἕτερα μέρη ἀπολείπεται, ἀφ' ὧν ἀφήρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι. ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν τὸ ἓν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτοὺς διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.

92 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὀλόκληρον, ἢ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὀλόκληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἢ ἐννεὰς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐννεὰς μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννεὰς, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, διαιρετὴν εἶναι φήσουσι 93 τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μονάς. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε ἀπὸ μέρους

¹ δεκάς T: μονὰς MSS., Bekk.

^a *i.e.* the Dogmatists, who assumed the indivisibility of the "one." In the next sections (92-93) it is shown that "a

the ones, the one ought to be subtracted from each of the ones in order to be subtracted from the whole ten. Now from a one, above all, nothing can be subtracted; for the ones are indivisible, and on this account the one will not be subtracted from the ten in this way. And even were we to grant that the 91 one is subtracted from each of the ones, the one will contain ten parts, and as containing ten parts it will be a ten. And further, since ten other parts remain, after the subtraction of the ten parts of the so-called one, the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say that the one is ten and the ten twenty, and to divide what, according to them,^a is indivisible. Wherefore it is absurd to say that the one is subtracted from the whole ten.

Neither is the one subtracted from the remaining 92 nine; for that from which anything is subtracted does not remain entire, but the nine does remain entire after the subtraction of that one. Besides, since the nine is nothing more than the nine ones, if it should be said that the one is subtracted from the whole nine, the sum subtracted will be nine, or if from a part of it, then in case it be eight the same absurd results will follow, while if the subtraction is made from the last one, they will be affirming the divisibility of the one, which is absurd. So then, 93 neither from the nine is the one subtracted. But if it is neither subtracted from the whole ten nor from

part cannot be subtracted from a part," *i.e.*, in the case of the "Decad," you cannot subtract 1 from 9: for 10 - 1 still leaves an "entire" 9; and if 9 = 9 × 1, and 1 is subtracted from each of the 9 ones, the subtracted 1 will be 1 × 9; and the same applies to subtraction of 1 from other "parts" of the "Decad" (8, 7, 6, etc.), of which the last is 1, which, as indivisible, does not admit of subtraction.

αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος.

- 94 Ἄλλα καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπέληπται. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἦτοι ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεστῶτι· τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ προστίθεται τι τινί. οἷον γοῦν ἔστω τι τετρακοτυλιαῖον πλήθος, καὶ προστιθέσθω κοτύλη. ζητῶ τίνι προστίθεται· ἑαυτῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν προστιθέμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ᾧ προστίθεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
- 95 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης· πῶς γὰρ ἂν προστεθείη τι τῷ μηδέπω ὄντι; καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ καὶ τῇ κοτύλῃ μίγνυται ἢ κοτύλη ἢ προστιθεμένη, ἐξακοτυλιαῖον ἐστὶν πλήθος ἀπὸ τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης καὶ τῆς προστιθεμένης κοτύλης.
- 96 εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ προστίθεται ἢ κοτύλη, ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεκτεινόμενον τινι ἴσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ παρεκτείνεται, τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ πλήθει ἢ κοτύλῃ παρεκτεινομένη διπλασιάσει τὸ τετρακοτυλιαῖον ὡς γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν πλήθος ὀκτώ κοτυλῶν· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον μήτε τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ μήτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ προστίθεται οὐδέν.

a part of it, no part can be subtracted from either a whole or a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted either as whole from whole or as part from whole, nor as whole from part or as part from part, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

Moreover, addition is regarded by them ^a as one of ⁹⁴ the impossibles. For, they say, that which is added is added either to itself or to what pre-exists or to the compound of both; but none of these alternatives is sound; therefore nothing is added to anything. Suppose, for instance, a measure of four cups,^b and add to this a cup. To what, I ask, is it added? for it cannot be added to itself, since what is added must be other than that whereto it is added, but nothing is other than itself. Neither is it added to the com- ⁹⁵ pound of the four cups and the one cup; for how could anything be added to what does not yet exist? Besides, if the added cup is blended with the four cups and the one cup, six cups will be the measure resulting from the four cups and the one cup and the added cup. And if the cup is added to the four ⁹⁶ cups alone, since that which is extended over anything is equal to that over which it extends, the cup which extends over the measure of four cups will double the four cups so that the whole measure becomes eight cups—a result contrary to experience. If, then, what is said to be added is neither added to itself nor to what pre-exists nor to the compound of these, and besides these there are no other alternatives, then there is no addition of anything to anything.

^a i.e. the Sceptics.

^b Cf. § 59.

97 Τῇ δὲ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως ὑποστάσει συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ μετάθεσις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀπὸ τινὸς μὲν ἔστιν ἀφαίρεσις τινὶ δὲ πρόσθεσις μεταβατικῶς.

98 Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ' ἀφαιρέσιν δὲ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλου εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ ἔστι τι ὅλον, ἥτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἢ
99 αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν. ἕτερον μὲν οὖν τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται τὸ ὅλον εἶναι· ἀμέλει γοῦν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται, ἵνα ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λογισώμεθα τὸ ὅλον. εἰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, ὄνομα ἔσται μόνον τὸ ὅλον καὶ προσηγορία κενή, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδίαν οὐχ ἔξει, καθάπερ οὐδὲ διάστασις ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὰ διεστῶτα οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ δεδοκωμένα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ὅλον.
100 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μέρη. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέρη, ἥτοι τοῦ ὅλου ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη ἢ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον. οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ μέρη (καὶ ἄλλως τὰ μέρη οὕτως ἔσται μέρη ἑαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου), οὔτε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέρος

^a Lit. "is cancelled," *cf.* i. 13.

^b *Cf.* ii. 215 ff., *Adv. Phys.* i. 330 ff.

Together with the existence of addition and subtraction and local motion transposition also is abolished,^a for this is subtraction from a thing and addition to a thing by way of transition.

So too with both whole and part.^b For the whole is held to come about by the combination and addition of the parts, and to cease from being a whole by the subtraction of one or more parts. Besides, if a whole exists, it is either other than its parts^c or its parts themselves form the whole. Now it is apparent that the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly when the parts are removed there is nothing left, so as to enable us to account the whole as something else besides its parts. But if the parts themselves form the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an empty title,^d and it will have no individual existence, just as separation^e also is nothing apart from the things separated, or laying beams apart from the beams laid. Therefore no whole exists.

Nor yet parts. For if parts exist, either they are parts of the whole, or of one another, or each one of itself. But they are not parts of the whole, since it is nothing else than its parts (and besides, the parts will on this assumption be parts of themselves, since each of the parts is said to be complementary to the whole); nor yet of one another, since the part is said

^a The view of Epicurus; the Stoics said that the whole is neither the same as its parts nor different.

^b *Cf.* ii. 214, 227.

^c *Cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 344 f., ii. 27.

- ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐ ἐστὶ μέρος, καὶ ἀποπὸν ἐστὶ λέγειν τὴν χεῖρα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν τῷ ποδὶ
 101 περιέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἐσται· διὰ γὰρ τὴν περιοχὴν ἐσται τι ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἕλαττον. εἰ οὖν μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε ἀλλήλων μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι μέρη, οὐδενός ἐστὶ μέρος. εἰ δὲ μηδενός ἐστὶ μέρος, οὐδὲ ἐστὶ μέρος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἀλλήλοις συναναίρειται. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς¹ εἰρήσθω κατὰ παρέκβασις, ἐπειδὴ ἀπαξ ὅλου καὶ μέρους ἐπεμνήσθημεν.

IE'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΟΗΣ

- 102 Ἄνυπόστατον δὲ εἶναι λέγουσὶ τινες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦντες τοιούτοις. εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκότερον δὲ τούτων ἠπόρηται· ἄπορος ἄρα ἐσται καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λόγος. εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, κατὰ τινὰς ἐνεργείας αἰτίου καὶ πάσχον μεταβάλλει. <ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς πάσχον μεταβάλλει>.² διατρέπεται γὰρ ἢ τοῦ αἰτίου ὑπόστασις, ᾧ τὸ πάσχον συμπεριτρέπεται
 103 μὴ ἔχον ὑπὸ ὄτου πάθη. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει τι ἄρα. [δ'] εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε πάσχειν τι οὔτε δρᾶν δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ

¹ ἀπλῶς ego: ἄλλως mss., Bekk.² <ἀλλ' . . . μεταβάλλει> addidi: <δ ἀδύνατον> add. Apelt.^a Cf. §§ 86 ff. *supra*. The notion of "part" involves that of a "whole" which "includes" it, and of which it is "part."^b "Part" and "whole" are "co-relative" notions, each implying the other, and relative things are "apprehended

to be included^a in that whereof it is part, and it is absurd to assert that, say, the hand is included in the foot. Neither will each be a part of itself; for, 101 because of the inclusion, it will be both greater and less than itself. If, then, the so-called parts are parts neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one another, they are parts of nothing. But if they are parts of nothing, parts have no existence; for co-relatives are annulled together.^b

Let thus much be said, then, of a general character, by way of digression, seeing that once already we have dealt with the subject of whole and part.

CHAPTER XV.—CONCERNING PHYSICAL CHANGE

Some, too, maintain that what is called "physical 102 change" is non-real, and the arguments they employ are such as these^c: If a thing changes, what changes is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these is matter of dispute; therefore the theory of change will also be disputable. If a thing changes, it changes 103 through certain actions of a Cause^d and by being acted upon. But it does not change by being acted upon, for the reality of Cause is refuted, and therewith is refuted also the object which is acted upon, as it has no agent to act upon it. Therefore nothing 104 changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is changes or what is not.^e Now what is not is unreal and can neither act nor be acted upon at all, so that

together," the presence, or absence, of the one involving that of the other, cf. ii. 125, 175.

^c With this section cf. §§ 38 ff., 49 and 64 where "physical change" is distinguished from "local transition" and other kinds of "motion."

^d Cf. §§ 17 ff.

^e With §§ 104-105 cf. 109 ff.

- μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεται. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ μεταβάλλει ἢ καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστὶν.
- 105 καθὸ μὲν ὄν μὴ ὄν ἐστὶν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ μεταβάλλει, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄν εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐκ ὄν ἐστὶ. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν γίνεσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει.
- 106 Ἔτι καὶ ταῦτά φασι τινες. τὸ μεταβάλλον ἐν τινι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλειν ὀφείλει· οὔτε δὲ ἐν τῷ παρωχηκότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τι. ἐν μὲν ὄν τῷ παρεληλυθότι ἢ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερος ἐνεστήκεν, ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐστὶ δρᾶν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι καὶ ἐνεστηκότι χρόνῳ.
- 107 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι. ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο νῦν ὑπερθώμεθα, ἀμερῆς ἐστὶν· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ νομίζειν τὸν σίδηρον, εἰ τύχοι, ἀπὸ τῆς σκληρότητος εἰς μαλακότητα μεταβάλλειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν ἐκάστην γίνεσθαι· παρατάσεως γὰρ αὗται φαίνονται χρήζειν. εἰ ὄν μήτε ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι μήτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι μήτε ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι, οὐδὲ μεταβάλλειν τι ῥητέον.
- 108 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τις μεταβολή, ἣτοι <αἰσθητή ἐστὶν ἢ νοητή. καὶ αἰσθητή μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν· αἰ μὲν γὰρ>³ αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἰσὶν, ἣ

¹ οὐδὲ Pasquali: οὐ Bekk.

² <αἰσθητή . . . γὰρ> add. cj. Bekk.

it does not admit of change either. And if what is changes, it changes either in so far as it is in being or in so far as it is not in being. Now in so far as it is 105 not in being it does not change, for it is not even existent; while if it changes in so far as it is existent, it will be other than existent, which means that it will be non-existent. But it is absurd to say that the existent becomes non-existent; therefore the existent does not change either. And if neither the existent nor the non-existent changes, and besides these there is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing changes.

Some also argue thus ^a: That which changes must 106 change in a certain time; but nothing changes either in the past or in the future, nor yet in the present, as we shall prove; nothing therefore changes. Nothing changes in the past or in the future, for neither of these times is present, and it is impossible to do or suffer anything in time that is not existent and present. Nor yet in time present. For the present 107 time is probably also unreal,^b and—even if we set aside this point—it is indivisible; and it is impossible to suppose that in an indivisible moment of time iron, say, changes from hard to soft, or any one of all the other changes takes place; for they appear to require extension in time. If, then, nothing changes either in the past or in the future or in the present, we must declare that nothing changes at all.

Further, if change exists at all <it is either sensible 108 or intelligible; but it is not sensible, since the senses> are specialized,^c whereas change is thought to possess

^a Cf. §§ 144 ff.; Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 6.

^b This is shown later, in §§ 144-145.

^c Lit. "simply passive," i.e. each sense perceives only one class of objects, cf. § 47 *supra*.

δὲ μεταβολὴ συμμημόνευσον ἔχειν δοκεῖ τοῦ τε ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· εἰ δὲ νοητὴ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν νοητῶν ἀνεπίκριτος γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς διαφωνία, καθάπερ ἤδη πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν λέγειν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς μεταβολῆς.

15'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

- 109 Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ· χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἂν τι οὔτε φθαρεῖν, ὅσον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ μεταβολὴν. ὥστε ἀναιρουμένων τῶν προειρημένων κινήσεων ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἴσως ἀνάγκη.
- 110 Οὐδὲν δὲ ἡττόν τινας κἀκεῖνα φασίν. εἰ ἐγεν-
νήθη Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε οὐκ ἦν Σωκράτης ἐγένετο
Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἡδὴ Σωκράτης. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
ὅτε ἦν ἡδὴ γεγενῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δις ἂν εἴη γεγενη-
μένος· εἰ δὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἅμα καὶ ἦν Σωκράτης
καὶ οὐκ ἦν. ἦν μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἦν δὲ κατὰ
111 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. καὶ εἰ ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε
ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν. καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἔζη,
οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν καὶ ἔζη καὶ ἔτε-

* A peculiar Stoic expression, cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 353 ff., ii. 64.

† Cf. ii. 57 ff., i. 170.

“ concurrent recollection ”^a both of that from which it changes and that into which it is said to change. And if it is intelligible, then, since (as we have frequently pointed out already^b) there exists among the ancients an unsettled controversy as to the reality of intelligibles, we shall also be unable to make any assertion about the reality of change.

CHAPTER XVI.—CONCERNING BECOMING AND PERISHING

Both becoming and perishing are included in the 109 refutation of addition and subtraction and physical change ; for apart from these nothing would become or perish. Thus, for instance, it is as a result of the perishing of the ten, as they say, that the nine becomes by the subtraction of one, and the ten from the perishing of the nine by the addition of one ; and rust becomes from the perishing of bronze by means of change. Hence, if the aforesaid motions are abolished it is likely that becoming and perishing are also necessarily abolished.

Yet none the less some argue also as follows^c : 110 If Socrates was born, Socrates became either when Socrates existed not or when Socrates already existed ; but if he shall be said to have become when he already existed, he will have become twice ; and if when he did not exist, Socrates was both existent and non-existent at the same time—existent through having become, non-existent by hypothesis. And if Socrates 111 died, he died either when he lived or when he died. Now he did not die when he lived, since he would

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 269, ii. 346 ff.

θνήκει· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ δις ἂν εἴη τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον οἶόν τέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἐκάστου τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι λεγομένων ἰσάντα ἀναυρεῖν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

- 112 Ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτως συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ γίνεται τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκέναι δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὄν, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ γίνεται ἢ καθὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν. καθὸ μὲν ὄν οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν, οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶν γίνεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου φασι γίνεσθαι, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. τὸ
- 113 ἄρα γινόμενον οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται μήτε τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ γίνεται τι.

- Κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐκ ὄν οὐ φθείρεται· πάσχειν γὰρ τι δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἦτοι γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ ὄν εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένον ἐν τῷ ὄν εἶναι, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ὄν
- 114 καὶ οὐκ ὄν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ φθείρεται καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ καθὸ ὄν ἐστίν, καθὸ μὲν ἐφθάρθαι λέγεται, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ὄν, καθὸ δὲ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεσθαι λέγεται,

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 326 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* i. 8.

† i.e. it is ("other" or) different after it has "become" from what it was before it "became": "becoming" involves a change of nature or character in the thing which undergoes the process.

‡ Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 344 f.

have been at once both alive and dead; nor yet when he died, since he would have been dead twice. Therefore Socrates did not die. And by applying this argument in turn to each of the things said to become or perish it is possible to abolish becoming and perishing.

Some also argue thus^a: If a thing becomes,¹¹² either the existent becomes or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not become; for to the non-existent nothing can occur; neither, therefore, can becoming occur. Nor does the existent become. For if the existent becomes, it becomes either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is non-existent. Now in so far as it is non-existent it does not become. But if it becomes in so far as it is existent, then, since they assert that what becomes becomes other from other,^b what becomes will be other than the existent, and that is non-existent. Therefore what becomes will be non-existent, which is nonsense. If, then,¹¹³ neither the non-existent becomes nor the existent, nothing becomes at all.

For the same reasons, neither does anything perish.^c For if anything perishes, it is either the existent that perishes or the non-existent. Now the non-existent does not perish, for what perishes must be a subject of action. Nor yet does the existent perish. For it must perish either while continuing in existence or while not so continuing. And if it be while continuing in existence, it will be at one and the same time both existent and non-existent; for since¹¹⁴ it does not perish in so far as it is non-existent but in so far as it is existent, it will be other than the existent and therefore non-existent in so far as it is said to have perished, whereas in so far as it is said to

ὄν ἔσται. ἄποπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὄν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι περιίσταται πρῶτον, εἴθ' οὕτως φθείρεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὑπεμνήσαμεν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ὄν φθείρεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φθείρεται τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι, οἷς ἔπεται τὸ ἀν-ὑπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπινώθητον τὴν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς φυσιολογίαν.

IZ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΜΟΝΗΣ

- 115 Ἐπομένως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν μονῆς ἠπόρησάν τινες, λέγοντες ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μένει, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα διαρκῶς κινεῖται κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν ὑπολήψεις, ρευστήν εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ αἰεὶ διαφορήσεις τε καὶ προσθέσεις ποιουμένην, ὡς τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα μηδὲ ὄντα λέγειν τὰ σώματα ἀλλὰ γινόμενα μᾶλλον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον ὀξεῖα ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν
- 116 εὐκνησίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὕλης ἀπεικάζειν. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα μένει. τό γε μὴν λεγόμενον μένειν συνέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ συνεχόμενον πάσχει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι πάσχον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ αἴτιον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ μένει τι ἄρα.

^a Cf. § 64.

^b i.e. "rest" as the opposite of motion in general, not of locomotion only (as in the Stoic use of the term); cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 245 ff.

^c Cf. §§ 51, 54 *supra*.

^d i.e. "matter" (in the ordinary sense) of "our" physical

perish while continuing in existence it will be existent. But it is absurd to say that the same thing is both existent and non-existent; therefore the existent does not perish while continuing in existence. And if the existent does not perish while continuing in existence but passes first into non-existence and then in this way perishes, it is no longer the existent that perishes but the non-existent; and this we have shown to be impossible. If, then, neither the existent perishes nor the non-existent, and besides these there is nothing else, nothing perishes at all.

This account of the motions^a will suffice by way of outline, and therefrom it follows that the Physical Science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.

CHAPTER XVII.—CONCERNING REST

In like manner some have doubted about physical rest,^b saying that what is in motion is not at rest, but every body is constantly in motion according to the views of the Dogmatists who assert that Being is in flux^c and always undergoing effluxes and additions—just as Plato does not even speak of bodies as "being" but rather calls them "becoming," and Heraclitus compares the mobility of our matter^d to the swift current of a river. Therefore no body is at rest. What is said to be at rest is, in fact, held to be embraced by the things which surround it, and what is embraced is acted upon; but nothing acted upon exists, since no causal activity exists, as we have shown^e; therefore nothing is at rest.

universe, as distinct from any logical or metaphysical use of the term.

^e Cf. §§ 13 ff., 103 *supra*.

- Ἐρωτῶσι δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα μένειν
 117 λεγόμενον κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, οὐ μένει. ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον ἐνδέχεται μένειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, εἴπερ ἄρα, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐδὲν [δέ]¹ ἀσώματον οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται οὔτε μένειν· οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει.
- 118 Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ μονῆς εἰρήσθω. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἢ χρόνου ἐπινοεῖται, μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν· ἐάν γὰρ ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου.

IH'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΟΥ

- 119 Τόπος τοίνυν λέγεται διχῶς, κυρίως καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, καταχρηστικῶς μὲν [ὡς] ὁ ἐν πλάτει, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ πόλις, κυρίως δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατέχων, ὑφ' οὗ περιεχόμεθα πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. ζητοῦμεν οὖν περὶ τοῦ [τόπου] πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔθεσαν οἱ δὲ ἀνείλον, οἱ δὲ
 120 ἐπέσχον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὧν οἱ μὲν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καταφεύγουσιν. τίς γὰρ ἂν, φασί, λέξει μὴ εἶναι τόπον ὁρῶν τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, οἷον τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ἀριστερά, τὰ ἄνω τὰ

¹ [δέ] secl. Heintz.

* Cf. § 75 *supra* for this distinction between the "broad" and narrow or "strict" senses of "place." In §§ 121-120 we have the popular arguments for space based on (1) observed facts as to "the parts of space," and the movement of bodies

Some, too, propound this argument: What is at rest is acted upon; but what is acted upon is in motion; therefore what is said to be at rest is in motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest. And from this it is evident that neither does the incorporeal admit of being at rest. For if what is at rest is acted upon, and being acted upon is a property, if anything, of bodies and not of incorporeals, no incorporeal can either be acted upon or be at rest; therefore nothing is at rest.

So much for the subject of rest. And since no one of the things we have mentioned is conceived apart from space or time, we must pass on to consider these; for if one should prove these to be unreal, then, because of them, each of the others also will be unreal. Let us begin with space.

CHAPTER XVIII.—CONCERNING SPACE

Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,^a the strict and the loose—loosely of place taken broadly (as "my city"), and strictly of exactly containing place whereby we are exactly enclosed. Our inquiry, then, is concerned with space of the strict kind. This some^b have affirmed, others denied; and others have suspended judgement about it. And of these, those who maintain its existence have recourse to the evidence of experience.^c Who, they argue, could assert that space does not exist when he sees the parts of space, such as right and left, up and down, before

in space; and (2) traditional language, which assumes the existence of space; (3) if body exists, space must also exist.

^b e.g. the Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. §§ 124, 131.^c Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 1.

- κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν ὀπίσω, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχοῦ
 γιγνώμενος, βλέπων τε ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ ὑφηγητῆς ὁ
 ἐμὸς διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι, τόπον
 τε διάφορον καταλαμβάνων τῶν κούφων φύσει καὶ
 121 τῶν φύσει βαρέων, ἔτι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούων
 λεγόντων "ἦτοι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα χάος ἐγένετο";
 εἶναι γάρ φασι χάος τὸν τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρητικὸν
 αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένων. εἶγε μὴν ἔστι
 τι σῶμα, φασίν, ἔσται καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἄνευ γὰρ
 τούτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑφ'
 οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὐ, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὅπερ ἔστιν ὁ
 τόπος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον
 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.
- 122 Οἱ δὲ ἀναιροῦντες τὸν τόπον οὔτε τὰ μέρη τοῦ
 τόπου διδῶσιν εἶναι· μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τόπον
 παρὰ τὰ τούτου μέρη, καὶ τὸν συνάγειν πειρώμενον
 ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τόπος ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ὡς ὄντα
 λαμβάνειν, τὸ ζητούμενον δι' ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευάζειν
 βούλεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τινι τόπῳ
 γίνεσθαι τι ἢ γεγονέναι φάσκοντας, ὅλως μὴ διδο-
 μένου τοῦ τόπου. συναρπάζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν
 τοῦ σώματος ὑπαρξίν μὴ διδομένην αὐτόθεν, καὶ
 τὸ ἐξ οὐ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ δείκνυσθαι ἀνύπαρκτα
 123 παραπλησίως τῷ τόπῳ. τὸν δὲ Ἡσιόδον μὴ ἀξιό-
 χρεων εἶναι κριτὴν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ οὕτω

* Herodotus of Tarsus, *cf.* *Intro.* pp. xl f.

† Hesiod, *Theog.* 118.

‡ "Chaos" is here absurdly derived from *χώρα*, "room" (the Stoics connected it with *χεῖν*, "to pour"). It means, in fact, a "cavity" or abyss (from *χάσκειν*, "to yawn").

§ "By which" is the "efficient," "from which" the "material" cause: the Stoics regarded both these as "bodies," and so involving the existence of space.

and behind; and when he is now here, now there, and sees that where my teacher^a was talking there I am talking now; and when he observes that the place of things naturally light is different from that of things naturally heavy; and when, also, he hears the 121 ancients declaring that "Verily first of all came Chaos into existence"^b? For space, they say, is called Chaos from its capacity for containing^c what becomes within it. Then, too, if any body exists, space also exists; for without it body would not exist. And if "that-by-which" exists, and "that-from-which,"^d there exists; also "that-in-which," and this is space; but the first is in each of the two, therefore the second is in both.^e

But those who deny space do not admit the existence 122 of the parts of space; for space, they say, is nothing else than its parts, and he who tries to deduce the existence of space from the assumption that its parts exist is seeking to establish the matter in question by means of itself. Equally silly is the language of those who assert that a thing becomes or has become in some place, when space in general is not admitted.^f And they also presume the reality of body, which is not self-evident; and, in much the same way as space, both that-from-which and that-by-which are proved to be unreal. Hesiod, too, is no competent 123 judge of philosophical problems. And while thus

* For the Stoic use of "first" and "second" in hypothetical syllogisms *cf.* ii. 104, 142. In the next sections (122-123) the arguments of the previous sections (120-121) are rebutted: (1) the "parts of space" are identical with space and in asserting their existence we are merely "begging the question"; (2) the reality of "body," or solid matter, as well as of the "efficient" and "material" causes, is likewise pure assumption. In §§ 124-130 the special views of the Stoics are expounded and refuted; in §§ 13 ff. those of Aristotle and his School.

† *Of.* §§ 38 ff. *supra.*

διακρουόμενοι τὰ εἰς κατασκευὴν φερόμενα τοῦ εἶναι τόπον, ἤδη καὶ ποικιλώτερον κατασκευάζουσιν ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, ταῖς ἐμβριθεστάταις εἶναι δοκούσαις τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεσι περὶ τοῦ τόπου προσχρώμενοι, τῇ τε τῶν στωικῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν περιπατητικῶν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

- 124 Οἱ στωικοὶ φασὶ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ διάστημα ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, χώραν δὲ διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον, ἐνίων χώραν εἰπόντων εἶναι τὸν τόπον τοῦ μεγάλου σώματος, ὡς ἐν μεγέθει τῇ διαφορᾷ εἶναι τοῦ τε τόπου καὶ τῆς χώρας.
- 125 λέγεται οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διάστημα ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενόν φασιν εἶναι τὸν τόπον, πῶς καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι διάστημα; πότερον τὸ μήκος τοῦ σώματος ἢ τὸ πλάτος ἢ τὸ βάθος μόνον ἢ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν διάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξισιάζεται ὁ τόπος τῷ οὐ τόπος ἐστίν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ μέρος τοῦ περιεχομένου τὸ περιέχον εἶναι, ὃ
- 126 παντάπασιν ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ αἱ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κενὸν ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ τόπῳ οὔτε ἄλλο σῶμα διάστασιν ἔχον, μόνον¹ δὲ τὸ ἐν

¹ μόνον Papp., Apelt: μένον mss., Bekk.

* The argument is: "Interval" cannot mean one "dimension" only (such as "length") since (by definition) "Place" must be "equated" to the "body" which is in it and must therefore have all three dimensions; and further, the "in-

rebutting the arguments that tend to establish the existence of space, they also demonstrate its unreality more elaborately by making use of what are held to be the most weighty views of the Dogmatists about space, namely those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, in the following fashion.

The Stoics declare that Void is that which is capable 124 of being occupied by an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval empty of body, or an interval unoccupied by body; and that Place is an interval occupied by an existent and equated to that which occupies it ("existent" being here the name they give to "body"); and that Room is an interval partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied—though some of them say that Room is the Place of the large body, so that the difference between Place and Room depends on size. Their opponents then argue thus: 125 When the Stoics define Place as an "interval occupied by body," in what sense do they call it an "interval"? Do they mean the length of the body or its width or its depth only, or all three dimensions? For if they mean one dimension, the place is not equated with the object of which it is the place, and besides, that which includes is part of what is included, which is pure nonsense.^a And if by "interval" is meant the 126 three dimensions, then, since in the so-called place there subsists neither a void nor another body which has dimensions, but only the body said to exist in

cluding" place of one "dimension" would be less than the body of three dimensions which it "includes." Nor can it be all three dimensions, since the body which is "in" it is all these three dimensions and therefore identical with its "place"—the thing contained with the thing which contains it. Thus "interval" and "place" are not explicable in terms of "dimensions."

τόπω λεγόμενον εἶναι σῶμα δ¹ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τῶν διαστάσεων (ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος καὶ ἀντιτυπία, ἣ δὴ συμβεβηκέναι λέγεται ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις), αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ τόπος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις
 127 διάστασις τόπου ὑποκειμένου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος.

Ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ διπλαῖ αἱ διαστάσεις οὐ θεωροῦνται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τόπω εἶναι λεγομένων, ἀλλ' ἐν μῆκος καὶ ἐν πλάτος καὶ ἐν βάθος, πότερον μόνου τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις αὐται ἢ μόνου τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μόνου τοῦ τόπου, οὐχ ἔξει τὸ σῶμα ἴδιον μῆκος οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος οὐθέν,
 128 ὥστε οὐδὲ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ τὸ κενὸν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ τὰς διαστάσεις, εἰ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ τοῦ κενοῦ ὑπόκεινται ἐν τῷ σώματι συστατικαὶ οὐσαὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τοῦ κενοῦ συστατικὰ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔσται συστατικά. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐκ ἔστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν μόνων δὲ τῶν διαστάσεων φαινομένων κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον σῶμα, αἴπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τῷ κενῷ, κενὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις, οὐδεμία ἔσται διάστασις τόπου, διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος. εἰ τοίνυν

¹ δ Papp.: οὐ mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. § 39 *supra*.

place, and it is composed of the dimensions (for it is length and breadth and depth and solidity,^a this last being said to be a property of the foregoing dimensions), the body itself will be its own place and at once both container and contained, which is absurd. Therefore no dimension of a subsisting place exists. 127 And, consequently, place is nothing.

This argument also is propounded.^b Since the dimensions are not found to be twofold in the case of each of the objects said to exist in place, but there is one length, one breadth and one depth, do these dimensions belong to the body only, or to the place only, or to both? If they belong only to the place, the body will have no length or breadth or depth of its own, so that the body will not even be body, which is absurd. If they belong to both, then, since the 128 Void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the dimensions of the Void subsist in the body and serve to compose the body itself, the components of the Void will also be components of the body—for about the reality of solidity it is impossible to say anything positive, as we have shown above.^c And since in the case of the so-called body only those dimensions appear which belong to the Void and are identical with the Void, the body will be Void, which is absurd. And if the dimensions belong to the body only, there will be no dimension of place, and therefore no place

^b This argument raises the question—since “body” and “place” coincide (spatially), to which of the two do the “dimensions” belong, as we cannot assume two sets of dimensions in the same place? To ascribe them to the “body” annuls “place” and *vice versa*.

^c Cf. §§ 45 f.; the “components” of “body” are the three “dimensions.”

κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων εὐρίσκεται
τόπου διάστασις, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.

- 129 Πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται ὅτι ὅτε ἔπεισι τῷ κενῷ τὸ
σῶμα καὶ γίνεται τόπος, ἤτοι ὑπομένει τὸ κενὸν
ἢ ὑποχωρεῖ ἢ φθείρεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει,
τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ πλήρες καὶ κενόν, εἰ δὲ ὑποχωρεῖ
κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς ἢ φθείρεται μεταβάλλον,
σῶμα ἔσται τὸ κενόν· σώματος γὰρ ἰδιὰ ἔστι ταῦτα
τὰ πάθη. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν κενὸν καὶ
πλήρες, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν. ἄτοπον ἄρα
τὸ λέγειν οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος κατα-
130 σχεθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ
τὸ κενὸν ἀνυπόστατον εὐρίσκεται, εἴγε μὴ δυνατόν
ἔστω αὐτὸ κατασχεθῆναι ὑπὸ σώματος καὶ γε-
νέσθαι τόπον· ἐλέγετο γὰρ κενὸν εἶναι ὁ οἶόν τε
ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι. συμπεριτρέπεται δὲ
τούτοις καὶ ἡ χώρα· εἴτε γὰρ ὁ μέγας τόπος ἔστι
χώρα, συμπεριγράφεται τῷ τόπῳ, εἴτε ἡ κατὰ μὲν
τι ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχομένη κατὰ δέ τι κενὴ διά-
στασις, ἀμφοτέροις συναναίρεται.

- Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω πρὸς τὴν στάσιν
131 τῶν στωικῶν περὶ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται· οἱ δὲ περι-
πατητικοὶ φασιν εἶναι τόπον τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περι-
έχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει, ὡς ἐμοῦ τόπον εἶναι τὴν
ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν περιτετυπωμένην τῷ
ἐμῷ σώματι. ἀλλ' εἰπερ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, τὸ
αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅτε γὰρ μέλλει
ἐν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καθὸ μὲν οὐδὲν
δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι, δεῖ προ-
ὑπάρχειν τὸν τόπον, ἵνα οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ γένηται τὸ
σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ὁ τόπος πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ

^a Cf. §§ 49 ff.; and for the "affections," §§ 38, 52, 117.

either. If, then, no dimension of place is found in
any of the ways described above, place does not exist.

Further, it is argued that when the body occupies 129
the Void and place comes about, the Void either
remains or withdraws or perishes. But if it remains,
the Plenum and the Void will be identical; and if it
withdraws by a movement of transition, or perishes
by change, the Void will be a body ^a; for these affec-
tions are peculiar to body. But it is absurd to say
either that Void and Plenum are identical or that the
Void is body. Therefore it is absurd to say that the
Void can be occupied by body and become place.
For these reasons also the Void is found to be unreal, 130
since it is impossible for it to be occupied by body and
to become place; for Void was defined ^b as "that
which is capable of being occupied by body." And,
in the refutation of these, Room also is involved; for
it is annulled along with place if "room is the large
place," while if it is "that which is partly occupied
by body and partly empty extension," its refutation
is included in that of these two.

These arguments, and others besides, are directed
against the views about place held by the Stoics.
The Peripatetics ^c assert that place is "the limit of 131
what encloses in so far as it encloses," so that my
place is the surface of the air that forms a mould
round my body. But if this is place, the same thing
will both be and not be. For when the body is about to
become in a certain place, then, inasmuch as nothing
can become in what is non-existent, the place must
be pre-existent in order that the body may in this
way become in it, and consequently the place will

^b Cf. § 124.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 30 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* iv. 4, *De cael.* iv. 3.

γενέσθαι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμα. καθὸ δὲ περιτυπουμένης τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιφανείας τῷ περιεχομένῳ ἀποτελεῖται, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆναι ὁ τόπος πρὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται τότε. ἀποπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ εἶναι τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τόπος τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει.

132 Πρὸς τούτους, εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἦτοι γεννητός ἐστιν ἢ ἀγέννητος. ἀγέννητος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν· περιτυπούμενος γάρ, φασίν, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματι ἀποτελεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γεννητός· εἰ γὰρ ἔστι γεννητός, ἦτοι ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, τότε γίνεται ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἤδη λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ,

133 ἢ ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ. οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν (ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματος ὁ τόπος) οὔτε ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἶγε περιτυποῦται μὲν, ὡς φασίν, τῷ περιεχομένῳ τὸ περιέχον καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τόπος, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν δύναται περιτυπωθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, μήτε ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, γίνεται ὁ τόπος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖν, οὐδὲ γεννητός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε γεννητός ἐστι μήτε ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

134 Κοινότερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δύναται λέγεσθαι. εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἦτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἀπορεῖται, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀπορος. ὁ τόπος πρὸς τῷ σώματι νοεῖται οὐ ἔστι τόπος· ἀπορος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος λόγος· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἄρα. ὁ τόπος ἐκάστου αἰδίου μὲν οὐκ

exist before the-body-in-the-place becomes therein. But inasmuch as it consists in the moulding of the surface of what encloses round the thing enclosed, place cannot be already subsisting before the body becomes within it, and therefore it will not be in existence then. But it is absurd to say that the same thing both is and is not; therefore place is not "the limit of what encloses in so far as it encloses."

Furthermore, if place is anything, it is either created 132 or uncreate. Now it is not uncreate; for it is brought about, they say, by being moulded round the body within it. Nor yet is it created; for if it is created, it is either when the body is in place that the place, in which the body in place is already said to be, comes into existence, or when the body is not in it. But it does not come into existence either when the 133 body is in it (for the place of the body within it exists already), or when it is not in it, since, as they assert, the container is moulded round the contained and in this way place becomes, and nothing can be moulded round that which is not within it. But if place does not become either when the body is in place or when it is not therein, and no other alternatives are conceivable, then place is not created at all. And if it is neither created nor uncreate, it has no existence.

These objections may also be stated more generally.^a 134 If place is anything, it is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these alternatives is, as we have shown, disputed; therefore place is in dispute. Place is conceived in relation to the body whereof it is the place; but the doctrine of the reality of body is disputed, therefore that of place is likewise disputable.

^a The first objection is based on §§ 38-56, the second also on §§ 38 ff., the third on §§ 109 ff.

ἔστιν, γίνεσθαι δὲ λεγόμενος ἀνυπόστατος εὐρίσκειται γενέσεως μὴ ὑπαρχούσης.

- 135 "Ἐνεστί δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τὸν λόγον μηκύνωμεν, ἐκείνῳ ἐπακτέον ὅτι τοὺς σκεπτικούς ἐντρέπουσι μὲν οἱ λόγοι, δυσωπεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια. διόπερ οὐθετέρῳ προστιθέμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ τόπου.

IG.—ΠΕΡΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ

- 136 Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσει· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινόμενοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. χρόνον γὰρ εἶναι φασιν οἱ μὲν διάστημα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κινήσεως (ὅλον δὲ λέγω τὸν κόσμον), οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ κόσμου, Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἢ ὡς τινας Πλάτων, ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου,
- 137 Στράτων δέ, ἢ ὡς τινας Ἀριστοτέλης, μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς, Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων φησί, σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξί καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσει καὶ μοναῖς.

^a Cf. §§ 66, 81. The Sceptics are here said to be "put to shame," or "confusion" (i.e. caused to hesitate in their judgement as to the nature of space) owing to the "equivalence" of the arguments against space and those for it based on the obvious facts of experience.

^b The Stoics, cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 141. This definition is derived from the fact that Time is measured by the motions of the planets and stars which compose the Universe.

^c Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 10 mentions this (Platonic) definition, cf. Plato, *Tim.* 47 n ff. Aristotle says that our notion of time is derived from a sense of difference and of succession in our

The place of each thing is not eternal, but if we say that it becomes it is found to be unreal as becoming does not exist.

It is possible to adduce many other arguments. 135 But in order to avoid prolonging our exposition, we may conclude by saying that while the Sceptics are put to confusion by the arguments, they are also put to shame by the evidence ^a of experience. Consequently we attach ourselves to neither side, so far as concerns the doctrines of the Dogmatists, but suspend judgement regarding place.

CHAPTER XIX.—CONCERNING TIME

Our attitude is the same with respect to the inquiry 136 about time. For if we depend on appearances, time seems to be something, but if we depend on the arguments about it, it appears unreal. Some ^b define time as "the interval of the motion of the Whole" (meaning by "Whole" the Universe), others ^c as "the actual motion of the Universe"; Aristotle (or, as some say, Plato) as "the number of the prior and posterior in motion"; Strato (or, as some say, 137 Aristotle) as "the measure of motion and rest"; Epicurus (according to Demetrius the Laconian ^d) as "a concurrence of concurrences, concomitant with days and nights and seasons and affections and non-affections and motions and rests." And, in point of 138

thoughts and perceptions, which brings with it a distinction between "before" and "after"—between "past," "present," and "future." Thus "time" is a thing "numbered" or "measured" by the conscious mind, and Aristotle defines it as "a numeration of motion in respect of priority and posteriority" (*Phys.* iv. 11).

^d An Epicurean, cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 318.

138 κατ' οὐσίαν τε οἱ μὲν σῶμα αὐτὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον, (μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφέρειν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος), οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον. ἤτοι οὖν πᾶσαι αἱ στάσεις αὐταὶ εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, ἢ πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς, ἢ τινὲς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαι ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν δύνανται (μάχονται γὰρ αἱ πλείστοι) οὔτε πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς εἶναι δοθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

139 καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ δοθείη ψεῦδος μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἀσώματος ἔστιν, αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται ἢ τοῦ χρόνου ἀνυπαρξία· παρὰ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται ἕτερον. οὔτε τινὲς μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς δυνατὸν καταλαβεῖν διὰ τε τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν κατὰ <τὸ>¹ κριτήριόν τε καὶ τὴν

140 ἀποδείξιν. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔξομεν περὶ χρόνου διαβεβαιώσασθαι.

Εἶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως ἢ καὶ μονῆς ὁ χρόνος ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖ, τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρουμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μονῆς, ἀναιρεῖται ὁ χρόνος. οὐδὲν δὲ ἦπτον καὶ τάδε φασὶ τινες κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἤτοι πεπερασταὶ ἢ

141 ἀπειροὶ ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πεπερασταὶ, ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τινα χρόνον λήξει· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἦν χρόνος, πρὸ τοῦ ἄρξασθαι αὐτόν, καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος, μετὰ τὸ λῆξαι αὐτόν, ὅπερ

142 ἀποπον. οὐ τοίνυν πεπερασταὶ ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ ἀπειροὶ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ λέγεται παρωχηκὸς τὸ δὲ ἐνεστῶς τὸ δὲ μέλλον, ὁ μέλλον καὶ ὁ παρωχηκῶς ἤτοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὐκ

¹ <τὸ> add. Mutsch.

substance, some have affirmed that it is corporeal—for instance, Aenesidemus, arguing that it differs in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,^a that it is incorporeal. Either, then, all these theories are true, or all false, or some true and some false; but they cannot all be true (most of them being in conflict), nor will it be granted by the Dogmatists that all are false. And besides, should it 139 be granted that the assertion of the corporeality of time is false, and that of its incorporeality likewise false, then, *ipso facto*, the unreality of time will be granted; for it cannot be anything but one or other of these. Nor yet can we apprehend which theories are true, which false, owing to the equal weight^b of the rival opinions as well as the perplexity regarding the criterion and proof.^c Hence for these 140 reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything positively about time.

Further, since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. None the less the following objections against time are made by some. If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited. But 141 if it is limited, it began at a certain time and will end at a certain time. Consequently, there was once a time when time was not (before it began), and there will once be a time when time will not be (after it has ended); which is absurd.^d So then time is not limited. But if it is unlimited, since part of it is said to be 142 past, part present, and part future, the future and past are either existent or non-existent. But if they

^a i.e. the Stoics.

^b Cf. i. 8.

^c Cf. ii. cc. 3-7, 12, 13.

^d Cf. Aristot. *Met.* xii. 6.

εἰσίν, μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστώτος ὑπολειπομένου, ὃς ἔστιν ἀκαριαῖος, πεπερασμένος ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαι. εἰ δὲ ὁ παρωχηκῶς ἔστι καὶ ὁ μέλλων ἔστιν, ἐνεστώς ἔσται ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀποπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἐνεστώτα τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπειρός ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπειρος μήτε πεπερασμένος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως χρόνος.

143 Πρὸς τούτους, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἦτοι μεριστός ἔστιν ἢ ἀμέριστος. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς τε τὸν ἐνεστώτα καὶ εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μεριστῶν καταμετρεῖται ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους, καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ μετρούμενου γινόμενου τοῦ μετροῦντος, ὡς ὅταν δακτύλῳ πῆχυν μετρώμεν. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δύναται καταμετρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστώς λόγου χάριν καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρωχημένον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρωχηκῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὁμοίως μέλλων. καὶ ὁ μέλλων εἰ καταμετροίῃ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνεστώς ἔσται καὶ παρωχηκῶς, καὶ ὁ παρωχηκῶς παραπλησίως μέλλων ἔσται καὶ ἐνεστώς· ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

144 Ὁ τε χρόνος λέγεται τριμερῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν παρωχηκῶς τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς τὸ δὲ μέλλων. ὧν ὁ μὲν παρωχηκῶς καὶ ὁ μέλλων οὐκ εἰσίν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ νῦν ὁ τε παρωχηκῶς καὶ ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἔσται ἐνεστώς ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἐνεστώς. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀ-

are non-existent, and there remains only the present, which is momentary, time will be limited and the original difficulties^a will follow. And if the past exists and the future exists, each of these will be present. But it is absurd to call past and future time present; neither, then, is time unlimited. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, time does not exist at all.

Further, if time exists it is either divisible or 143 indivisible. Now it is not indivisible; for it is divided, as they themselves declare, into present, past, and future. Yet it is not divisible either. For each divisible thing is measured by some part of itself, the measure coinciding with each part of the measured, as when we measure a cubit by a finger. But time cannot be measured by any part of itself. If, for instance, the present measures the past, it will coincide with the past and will therefore be past, and similarly it will be future in the case of the future. And if the future should measure the rest, it will be present and past, and so likewise the past will be future and present; which is nonsense. Neither, then, is time divisible. But if it is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.

Time, too, is said to be tripartite, partly past, partly 144 present, and partly future. Of these the past and the future are non-existent; for if past and future time exist now, each of them will be present. Neither is the present existent; for if present time exists

^a e.g. that there was once a time when no time was.

μέριστός ἐστιν ἢ μεριστός. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ λέγεται τὰ μεταβάλλοντα μεταβάλλειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει, οἷον ὁ σίδηρος εἰς μαλακότητα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμέριστος
 145 ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός· εἰς ἐνεστώτας μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μερισθείη, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὀξείαν ῥύσιν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἀνεπινοήτως¹ ὁ ἐνεστώτης εἰς παρωχηκότα μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ἀνύπαρκτος, τὸ μὲν τι μηκέτι ὄν ἔχων μέρος ἑαυτοῦ,
 146 τὸ δὲ μηδέπω ὄν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τέλος τοῦ παρωχημένου καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος εἶναι δύναται ὁ ἐνεστώτης, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἔσται μὲν [οὖν] ὡς ἐνεστώτης, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστώτης μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος μηδὲ τοῦ παρωχημένου μηδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνυπαρκτῶν² συνεστώτης ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστιν.
 147 Λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου κάκεινος ὁ λόγος. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἦτοι γενητός ἐστι καὶ φθαρτός ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτος. ἀγένητος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀφθαρτος οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴγε αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν παρωχηκέναί λέγεται καὶ μηκέτι εἶναι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν καὶ μηδέπω
 148 εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γενητός καὶ φθαρτός. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἕκ τινος ὄντος γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰ

¹ ἀνεπινοήτως Kayser: ἀπερινοήτως mss., Bekk.

² ἀνυπαρκτῶν Kayser: ἀνυπαρκτου mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 6.

it is either indivisible or divisible. Now it is not indivisible; for what changes is said to change in the present time, but nothing changes in indivisible time^a—iron, for instance, into softness, and so on. Hence present time is not indivisible. Neither 145 is it divisible; for it could not be divided into a plurality of presents, since time present is said to change into time past imperceptibly owing to the rapid flux of the things in the Universe. Nor yet into past and future; for so it will be unreal, having one part of itself no longer existent and the other part not yet existent. Hence, too, the present cannot be 146 the end of the past and the beginning of the future, since then it will both be and not be existent; for it will exist as present, but will not exist because its parts are non-existent. Therefore it is not divisible either. But if the present is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist. And when neither the present nor the past nor the future exists, time too is non-existent; for what is compounded of things unreal is unreal.

This argument, too, is alleged against time: If 147 time exists it is either generable and perishable or ingenerable and imperishable.^b Now it is not ingenerable and imperishable, since part of it is said to be past and no longer in existence, and part to be future and not yet in existence. Neither is it generable and perishable. For things generated must be 148 generated from something existent, and things which

^b Time "came into existence" (γένεσθαι), said Plato (*Tim.* 38 b): "No," said Aristotle (*Met.* xii. 6). In §§ 147-148 I render γενητός ("capable of coming into existence") by "generable," and γίνεσθαι by "is generated"; but in § 149, and elsewhere, I usually render γίνεσθαι by "becomes," γινόμενα by "becoming," etc.

φθειρόμενα εἰς τι ὄν φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν
δογματικῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις. εἰ οὖν εἰς τὸν
παρωχημένον φθείρεται, εἰς οὐκ ὄν φθείρεται, καὶ
εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεται, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεται·
οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν
τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι.
οὐκ ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ
δὲ μήτε ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτὸς ἔστι μήτε γενητὸς
καὶ φθαρτὸς, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔστιν.

149 Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πάν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ
γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, εἰ γίνεται ὁ χρόνος, ἐν χρόνῳ
γίνεται. ἦτοι οὖν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται ἢ ἕτερος
ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεται
τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένου ὀφείλει προϋπάρχειν, ὁ
γιγνόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ χρόνος, ἢ μὲν γίνεται, οὐδέπω
150 ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἤδη ἔστιν. ὥστε
οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἕτερος.
εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστῶς ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι γίνεται, μέλλον
ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστῶς, καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ παρωχηκότι, παρ-
ωχηκῶς. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
χρόνων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἕτερος χρόνος ἐν ἐτέρῳ γίνεται
χρόνον. εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται μήτε
ἕτερος ἐν ἐτέρῳ, οὐδὲ γενητὸς ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος.
ἐδείκνυτο δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀγένητός ἔστιν. μήτε οὖν
γενητὸς ὢν μήτε ἀγένητος οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστιν· ἕκαστον
γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἦτοι γενητὸν ἢ ἀγένητον εἶναι
προσῆκει.

¹ ἢ μὲν . . . ἢ δὲ Heintz: εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ mss., Bekk.

perish must perish into something existent, according
to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.^a If,
then, time perishes into the past, it perishes into a
non-existent; and if it is generated out of the future,
it is generated out of a non-existent; for neither of
these is in existence. But it is absurd to say that
anything is generated from a non-existent or perishes
into the non-existent. Therefore time is not gener-
able and perishable. But if it is neither ingenerable
and imperishable nor generable and perishable, it does
not exist at all.

Further, since everything which becomes seems to
become in time, time, if it becomes, becomes in time.
Either, then, it becomes itself in itself or as one time
in another. But if it becomes in itself, it will be at
once both existent and non-existent. For since that
within which a thing becomes must exist before the
thing which becomes within it, the time which becomes
in itself does not yet exist in so far as it becomes,
but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.^b
Consequently it does not become in itself. Nor yet
150 in another. For if the present becomes in the future,
the present will be future, and if in the past, it will
be past. And the same may be said of all the other
times; so that one time does not become in another.
But if time neither becomes in itself nor as one time
in another it is not generable. And it has been shown
that it is not ingenerable either. Being, then, neither
generable nor ingenerable, it is wholly non-existent;
for each existing thing is bound to be either generable
or ingenerable.

^a e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus, Poseidonius; cf. Lucr. i. 151.

^b Cf. § 133 *supra*.

151 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ χρόνος δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ θεω-
ρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἄτοπον καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ
βραχεία διεξελθεῖν. ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ
καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τί φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι
τι ἀκούομεν· ἢ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ
152 τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκίνηκε λόγον. αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ
ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς
ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι λέγουσιν. φασὶ γοῦν ὅτι τὰ φαινό-
μενα ἕκ τινος συνέστηκεν, ἀπλᾶ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ
στοιχεῖα· ἀδήλα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τῶν δὲ
ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα, ὡς αἱ ἄτομοι¹ καὶ
οἱ ὄγκοι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ὡς σχήματα καὶ ἰδέαι
καὶ ἀριθμοί. ὧν τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα,
συνεστῶτα ἕκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους
καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους. οὐ μόνον ἄρα
153 ἀδήλα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσώματά ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἕκαστον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔχει
τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ἢ γὰρ ἓν ἐστὶν ἢ δύο ἢ πλείω. δι'
ἧν συνάγεται ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ
ἀήλοιοι καὶ ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι
ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἢ τε μονὰς καὶ ἢ
κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος
δυάς, ἥς κατὰ μετουσίαν αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίνονται

¹ αἱ ἄτομοι Papp.: οἱ ἄτομοι mss., Bekk.

* With this chapter cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 248-309. In §§ 152-156 the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as the primary constituents, or "elements," of the Universe is expounded; in 428

Since time, it seems, is not found apart from 151 number, it will not be out of place to discuss number briefly.^a In the customary way we speak undogmatically^b of numbering a thing and hear number talked of as something which exists; but the extreme methods of the Dogmatists have provoked the attack upon number also. Thus, for example, the School of 152 Pythagoras declare that numbers are also elements of the Universe. They assert, in fact, that phenomena are constructed from something, and that the elements must be simple; therefore the elements are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some are corporeal, like atoms and masses, others incorporeal, like figures^c and forms and numbers. Of these the corporeal are composite, being constructed from length and breadth and depth and solidity, or even weight. The elements, therefore, are not only non-evident but also incorporeal. Moreover, each of the 153 incorporeals involves the perception of number, for it is either one or two or more. Thus it is inferred that the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which are involved in all perception are the elements of existing things. Yet not simply <these numbers>, but both the Monad also and the Indefinite Dyad which is generated by the expansion of the Monad, and by participation in which the particular dyads

§§ 156-157 the Pythagorean proof that numbers are distinct from things numbered ("numerables") is set forth; in §§ 158 ff. the Sceptical arguments against the Pythagorean doctrine of the real existence of numbers (as distinct from "numerables") are developed.

^b Cf. i. 15.

^c *i.e.* "the limits of bodies" of § 32 *supra*, cf. § 153.

154 *δυάδες δυάδες. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς δυάδος (δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξύ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος (ρύσιν γὰρ εἶναι φασὶ τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ' ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ πλαγίου κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπὶ τι*
 155 *σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον. καὶ οὕτω τὰ τε σώματα καὶ ὄλον τὸν κόσμον ἀνειδωλοποιοῦσιν, ὄντινα καὶ διοικεῖσθαι φασὶ κατὰ ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους, τὸν τε διὰ τεσσάρων, ὃς ἐστὶν ἐπίτριτος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸν διὰ πέντε, ὃς ἐστὶν ἡμιόλιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ἑννέα, καὶ τὸν διὰ πασῶν, ὃς ἐστὶ διπλάσιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ δώδεκα.*
 156 *Ταῦτά τε οὖν ὄνειροπολοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ τὸ ζῶον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι, ἔν, τὸ φυτόν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐστὶ ζῶον, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ <τὸ>¹ φυτὸν ἔν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῶον, <καθὸ ζῶον>,² ἔν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἕξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὐ μετέχει*

¹ <τὸ> add. Rüstow.

² , <καθὸ ζῶον>, addidi: καθὸ ζῶον ἐστίν, ἔν cj. Bekk.: <ὡς ζῶον>, Mutsch.

^a The existence of the "elemental" numbers is said to be due to "participation" in either the principle of "Unity" ("the Monad") or the principle of Duality ("the indefinite Dyad")—odd numbers in the first, even in the second. These principles are the "genera" of which odd and even numbers are "particulars."

become dyads.^a For they say that it is from these 154 that the rest of the numbers are generated—those, that is, which are involved in the perception of numerables—and the Universe is arranged. For the point presents the relation, or character, of the Monad,^b and the line that of the Dyad (it being regarded as lying between two points), and the surface that of the Triad (for they describe it as a flowing of the line breadth-wise up to another point placed transversely), and the <solid> body that of the Tetrad; for Body is formed by an ascension of the surface up to a point placed above. It is in this way 155 that they image forth both the bodies and the whole Universe, which also they declare to be arranged according to harmonic ratios^c—namely, that of the "By-Fours," which is "epitrite," as is the ratio of 8 to 6; and that of the "By-Fives," which is one and a half times, as is the ratio of 9 to 6; and that of the "By-Alls," which is double, as is the ratio of 12 to 6.

These are the fictions they imagine; and they 156 also make out that number is something else apart from numerables, arguing that if "animal" according to its proper definition^d is (say) one, the plant, since it is not an animal, will not be one; but the plant is one; therefore the animal is not one <qua animal> but in virtue of some other attribute perceived outside itself, whereof each animal partakes and because

^a i.e. it is an indivisible unit, and begins the line as the One begins the number-series; cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 278.

^b The terms here used are those of the Pythagorean musical ("octave") system, and denote the ratios 4:3, 3:2, 2:1. Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 36 A; *Adv. Arithm.* 6-9, *Adv. Mus.* 46.

^d Or "in its own essence," apart from relation to anything else.

ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ ἓν. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμητοὶ καὶ βόες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἵπποι, ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ βόες καὶ ἵπποι ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ λευκὸς [ἀριθμὸς]¹ καὶ μέλας καὶ γενευήτης, εἰ τύχοιεν
157 τοιοῦτοι τυγχάνοντες οἱ μετρούμενοι. ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ἄτοπα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ ἔστι στοιχείον.

Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἀριθμητὰ, παρεισήληθεν ἢ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία. λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς, ἦτοι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕξωθεν· οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ἀπέδειξαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς.

158 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἕξωθεν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος τὸν λόγον στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἕνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἢ μονάς, ἣς μετέχον ἕκαστον τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἓν, ἦτοι μία ἔσται αὕτη ἢ μονάς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μία ἔστιν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχων αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἰς ἀνθρωπος, οὐκέτι ἔσται μονάς ἣς μετέξει ὁ εἰς ἵππος ἢ ὁ εἰς κύων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
159 ἕκαστον ὁ λέγομεν εἶναι ἓν, ὥσπερ καὶ πολλῶν

¹ [ἀριθμὸς] om. M (? ἀνθρωπος).

of which it becomes one. And if number is the numerables, since the numerables are men (say) and oxen and horses, number will be men and oxen and horses—and number will be white and black and bearded, if the objects counted should happen to be such. But these things are absurd; therefore number 157 is not the numerables, but it has a reality of its own apart from them whereby it is involved in the perception of the numerables and is an element.

So when they had thus concluded that number is not the numerables, there arose in consequence the difficulty about number. For it is argued that if number exists, number is either the actual numerables or something else apart from them; but number is neither the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have proved, nor something else apart from them, as we shall show; number, therefore, is nothing.

That number is nothing apart from the numerables 158 we shall demonstrate by basing our argument on the Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.^a If the Monad, by partaking in which each of its participants becomes one, is in itself a real object, this Monad will be either one or as many as are its participants. But if it is one, does each of the things said to partake thereof partake of all of it or of a part of it? For if the one man (say) takes all the Monad, there will no longer exist a monad for the one horse to partake of, or the one dog or any one of all the other things which we declare to be one—just as, supposing there 159

^a The argument here is that "participation" of things in the Monad involves either (1) the division of the Monad into an infinite number of parts (§§ 158-159), or (2) the multiplication of the Monad into an infinite number of whole Monads (§§ 160-162), both which results violate the conception of the Monad as unique principle of Unity.

ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἐνὸς ἀμφιασαμένου, γυμνοὶ μενοῦσιν¹ οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου. εἰ δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξει τι μέρος ἢ μονάς, καὶ ἄπειρά γε ἕξει μέρη, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἢ δυάς, οὐκ ἔστι δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μεθέξει τι τῆς μονάδος. ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι μία ἢ μονάς ἣς μετέχειν λέγεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος.

160 Εἰ δὲ ἰσαριθμοὶ τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἓν, αἱ μονάδες εἰσὶν ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος λέγεται ἓν, ἄπειροὶ ἔσονται αἱ μετεχόμεναι μονάδες. καὶ αὗται ἦτοι μετέχουσιν ἐπαναβεβηκυίας μονάδος ἢ μονάδων ἰσαριθμῶν αὐταῖς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰσὶ μονάδες, ἢ οὐ μετέχουσιν ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τινος μετοχῆς μονάδες εἰσὶν.

161 εἰ μὲν οὖν² χωρὶς μετοχῆς μονάδες εἶναι δύνανται αὗται, δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς μονάδος μετοχῆς ἓν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτόθεν περιτρέπεται ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι λεγομένη μονάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μετοχῆς κἀκεῖναι μονάδες εἰσὶν, ἦτοι μῖας μετέχουσι πᾶσαι ἢ μία ἐκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ εἰ μὲν πᾶσαι μῖας, ἦτοι κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστη ἢ ὅλης λεχθήσεται μετέχειν, καὶ μένουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν

162 ἄτοπαι· εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μονάδων ἐκάστη μονάδα ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθεωρουμέναις ἐκείναις ἄλλας, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. εἰ οὖν ἵνα καταλάβωμεν ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες

¹ μενοῦσιν Mutsch.: μένουσιν mss., Bekk.

² οὖν cj. Bekk.: γὰρ mss.

are a number of naked men, who possess only one garment amongst them, which one man had put on, all the rest will remain naked and without a garment. And if each thing partakes of a part of it, then, in the first place, the Monad will have a part. and parts, too, infinite in number into which it is divided; which is absurd. And further, just as the part of the Decad, such as the Dyad, is not a Decad, so neither will the part of the Monad be a Monad, and for this reason nothing will partake of the Monad. Hence the Monad whereof the particular objects are said to partake is not one.

But if the monads, by participation in which each 160 of the particular objects is called one, are equal in number to the numerables to which the term "one" is applied, the monads partaken of will be infinite in number. And these either partake of a superior^a monad or of monads equal in number to themselves, or else they do not so partake but are monads apart from any participation. Yet if these 161 can be monads without participation, each of the sensibles also will be able to be one without participation in a monad, and so at once the monad said to be perceived as real in itself is overthrown. Whereas, if those monads are monads by participation, either they all partake of one monad, or each partakes of a monad of its own. And if all partake of one, each will be said to partake either of a part or of the whole, and the original difficulties will still remain; but if each 162 partakes of its own monad, we must posit a new monad for each of those monads, and others again for the former, and so on *ad infinitum*. If then, in order to apprehend that there are certain self-sub-

^a i.e. "Unity" as a *sumum genus*, cf. i. 38.

καθ' ἑαυτὰς μονάδες, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν, δεῖ κατειληφέναι ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους νοητὰς μονάδας, ἀδύνατον δὲ καταλαβεῖν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους μονάδας νοητὰς, ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀποφῆναι ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες νοηταὶ μονάδες καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἰδίας μονάδος γινόμενον ἓν.

163 Ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τοσαῦται εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἔνεστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ, παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἠρωτημένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἶναι ἀριθμὸν.

164 Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαι φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα οἱ ἐξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ; ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρα μονάδι, ἤτοι προστίθεται τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἐξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται δυάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὐσαι αἱ μονάδες εἶχον τὴν δυάδα¹ ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον, οὔτε νῦν τι αὐταῖς ἐξωθεν προσγέγονεν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἀφῆρηται, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

¹ δυάδα Kayser, Papp.: μονάδα mss., Bekk.

sistent monads by participation in which each existing thing is one, it is necessary to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads, and to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads is a thing impossible, then it is impossible to show that there are certain intelligible monads and that each existing thing is one through becoming one by participation in its own monad.

It is absurd, therefore, to say that the monads are 163 as numerous as the things which partake of them. But if the so-called self-subsistent monad is neither one nor as many as its participants, a self-subsistent monad does not exist at all. So likewise none of the other numbers will be self-subsistent; for one may apply to all the numbers the argument which has now been employed in the typical case of the monad. But if number is neither self-subsistent, as we have shown, nor consists in the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have demonstrated, and beyond these there is no other alternative, then we must declare that number does not exist.

In what way, too, is the Dyad said to be generated 164 from the Monad by those who believe that number is something else apart from the numerables? For when we combine a monad with another monad either something external is added to the monads, or something is subtracted from them, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing is either added or subtracted, there will not be a Dyad. For neither did the monads, when existing apart from each other, contain the Dyad as involved in the perception of them, according to their own definition, nor has any addition now been made to them from without, just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.

165 ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς ἢ σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἕξωθεν τινος γινομένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἕξωθεν ἢ δυὰς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυὰς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονὰς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἕξωθεν δυάδος

166 ἢ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λεγομένων.

Εἰ οὖν μήτε κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μήτε κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἄνευ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως γίνονται οἱ σύνθετοι λεγόμενοι εἶναι ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, ἀσύστατός ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ εἶναι λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀγένητοι τυγχάνουσι ὄντες οἱ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμοί, δηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ συντίθεσθαί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ γίνεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, οἷον τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ

167 δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου. οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργίαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν εἰσηνηγεμέναις.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ καλουμένου τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρους ἀρκοῦντα ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λελέχθω.

Hence the combination of the monad with the monad 165 will not be a dyad, as no addition or subtraction from without takes place. But if subtraction does take place, not only will there not be a dyad but the monads will even be diminished. And if the dyad is added to them from without, so that a dyad may be generated from the monads, the things which appear to be two will be four; for there exists already a monad and a second monad, and when an outside dyad is added to these the result will be the number 166 four. And the same argument applies to all the other numbers which are said to be formed as a result of combination.

If, then, the numbers which are said to be compounded from the superior^a numbers are formed neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction and addition, the formation of the number which is said to be independent and apart from the numerables is non-composite. But they themselves make it clear that the numbers formed by combination are not ungenerated by asserting that they are compounded and generated from the superior numbers—from the monad, for example, and the Indefinite Dyad.^b So then number does not subsist of itself. 167 But if number neither is conceived as self-existent, nor subsists in the numerables, then, to judge from the subtleties introduced by the Dogmatists, number is nothing.

Let this, then, suffice as an account in outline of what is called the Physical section of philosophy.

^a Cf. § 160 *supra*.

^b Cf. § 153 *supra*.

KA'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΗΘΙΚΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

168 Λείπεται δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν τε καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων καταγίγνεσθαι. ἵνα οὖν κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν, περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ζητήσομεν, τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐκάστου προεκθέμενοι.

KB'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΩΝ

169 Φασὶν οὖν οἱ στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἢ σπουδαία πράξεις ἐνέργειά τις οὕσα κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, ὃ δὲ σπουδαῖος
170 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας. μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχουσα· τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος χεῖρ, οὔτε ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ μέρη, οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν. διὸπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔφασαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἶναι λέγουσιν.

^a Lit. "fair" (*honestum*); the Stoics used *καλόν* as a synonym for *ἀγαθόν* "good" (*bonum*), and in this section the terms are used as synonymous.

^b Or "regent part," *i.e.* the mind, *cf.* i. 128, ii. 81; *Introductio*, p. xxv. The doctrine that "the good man" is "not other" than goodness (virtue or "utility") strikes one as curious. The Stoics, we must remember, regarded attributes or qualities as corporeal and parts of the "substance" (*οὐσία*)
440

CHAPTER XXI.—CONCERNING THE ETHICAL
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

There remains the Ethical division, which is supposed to deal with the distinguishing of things good,^a bad, and indifferent. In order, then, to treat of this branch also in a summary way, we shall inquire into the reality of things good, bad, and indifferent, explaining first the conception of each.

CHAPTER XXII.—CONCERNING THINGS GOOD, BAD,
AND INDIFFERENT

The Stoics, then, assert that good is "utility or not
169 other than utility," meaning by "utility" virtue and right action, and by "not other than utility" the good man and the friend. For "virtue," as consisting in a certain state of the ruling principle,^b and "right action," being an activity in accordance with virtue, are exactly "utility"; while the good man and the friend are "not other than utility." For
170 utility is a part of the good man, being his ruling principle. But the wholes, they say, are not the same as the parts (for the man is not a hand), nor are they other than the parts (for without the parts they do not subsist). Wherefore they assert that the wholes are not other than the parts. Hence, since the good man stands in the relation of a whole to his ruling principle, which they have identified with utility, they declare that he is not other than utility.

to which they belong—here the mind ("regent part") of "the good man." For the equation of "virtue" (or "goodness") with "utility" (or "benefit") as "the source (or agency) from which benefit results" see *Diogenes Laertius*, vii. 94. For Stoic Ethics *cf.* *Introductio*, pp. xxvi ff.

171 Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν φασι λέγεσθαι. καθ' ἓνα μὲν γὰρ τρόπον φασὶν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀρετῆ, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελείσθαι, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον τὸ οἶόν τε ὠφελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πράξιν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον θεοῦς τε καὶ σπουδαίους δαίμονας, ὡς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον σημαίνονμεν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου σημαίνονμενου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ
172 πρώτου. τινὲς δὲ φασὶν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετόν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον¹ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ τὸ συμπληρωτικόν· εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ φασὶν, εὐροια βίου.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν τινα εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
173 λέγεται. εἴτε δὲ τὸ ὠφελῶν εἴτε τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετόν εἴτε τὸ συνεργῶν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγαθὸν τις εἶναι λέγοι, οὐχὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρίστησιν, ἀλλὰ τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτῷ λέγει. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάταιον. ἦτοι γὰρ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συμβέβηκε τὰ προειρημένα ἢ καὶ ἑτέροις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἑτέροις, οὐκ ἔστι χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινοποιούμενα, εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς
174 ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἀνευνόητος ἵππου οὔτε τὸ χρεμετίζειν τί ἐστὶν οἶδεν, οὔτε διὰ τούτου δύναται εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθεῖν ἵππου, εἰ μὴ

¹ συλλαμβανόμενον cj. Bekk.: συλλαβάνον mss.

^a i. e. "primary, fundamental, good"—the source of other goods. Good in the first sense is the central good, which

Hence also they assert that good has three mean- 171
ings. In one of its meanings, good, they say, is that by which utility may be gained, this being the most principal good^a and virtue; in another meaning, good is that of which utility is an accidental result, like virtue and virtuous actions; and thirdly, it is that which is capable of being useful; and such is virtue and virtuous action and the good man and the friend, and gods and good daemons; so that the second signification of good is inclusive of the first signification, and the third of both the second and the first. But 172
some define good as "what is to be chosen for its own sake"^b; and others as "that which contributes to happiness or is supplementary thereto"; and happiness, as the Stoics declare, is "the smooth current of life."

These, or such as these, are their statements with reference to the notion of the Good. But in describ- 173
ing as good what is useful or what is choiceworthy for its own sake or what is contributory to happiness, one is not exhibiting the essence of the good but stating one of its properties. And this is senseless. For the properties aforesaid belong either to the good only or to other things as well. But if they belong to other things as well, they are not, when thus extended, characteristic marks of the good; while if they belong only to the Good, it is not possible for us to derive from them a notion of the good. For just as the man 174
who has no notion of "horse" has no knowledge of what "neighing" is and cannot arrive thereby at a notion of "horse," unless he should first meet with a

expands into the second and third senses as into concentric circles—the third including the second, the second the first.

^b Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 6; the other definition is Stoic.

πρότερον ἵππῳ χρεμετίζοντι ἐντύχοι, οὕτως ὁ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητῶν τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, οὐ δύναται γινώσκειν τὸ ἰδίως αὐτῷ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆσαι δυνηθῇ. πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἰθ' οὕτω συνείναι ὅτι ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν.

175 ὅτι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανὰ μνηῦσαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δηλοῦσιν ἔργῳ οἱ δογματικοί. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν ἐστι, παρὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶρηται τὸ οἰοῖναι ἀγαστόν, καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, πάντες ἴσως συγχωροῦσιν ἔρωτῶμενοι δὲ τί ἐστὶν ᾧ ταῦτα συμβεβηκεν, εἰς ἄσπειστον ἐμπίπτουσι πόλεμον, οἱ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀλυπίαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. καίτοι εἰ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἐδείκνυτο τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν ἐστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τούτου φύσεως.

176 Οὕτω μὲν οὖν διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οἱ δοκιμώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν δογματικῶν ὁμοίως δὲ διηρέθησαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγοντες κακὸν εἶναι βλάβην ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον βλάβης, οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ φευκτόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ κακοδαιμονίας ποιητικόν. δι' ὧν οὐχὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἴσως αὐτῷ φάσκοντες εἰς τὴν προειρημένην ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀπορίαν.

^a Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. Plato, *Cratyl.* 412 c, 422 a and § 184 *infra*.

^b The Stoics said "virtue," Cyrenaics and Epicureans "pleasure," some Peripatetics "painlessness" (cf. *Aristot. Rhet.* i. 7).

neighing horse, so too one who is seeking the essence of the good, because he has no knowledge of the good, cannot perceive the attribute which is peculiar to it alone in order that he may be enabled thereby to gain a notion of the good itself. For he must first learn the nature of the good itself, and then pass on to apprehend that it is useful, and that it is choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it is productive of happiness. But that the aforesaid attributes are 175 not sufficient to indicate the concept and the real nature of the good is made plain by the practice of the Dogmatists. All, probably, agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (so that the good is said to be, as it were, "the delightful"^a) and that it is productive of happiness; but when asked what the thing is to which these properties belong, they plunge into a truceless war, some saying it is virtue, others pleasure, others painlessness,^b and others something else. And yet, if the essence of the good had been proved from the foregoing definitions, they would not have been at feud as though its nature were unknown.

Such, then, is the discord amongst those who are 176 reputed the most eminent of the Dogmatists regarding the notion of the Good; and they have differed likewise regarding Evil, some defining Evil as "damage or not other than damage,"^c others as "what is to be shunned for its own sake," others as "what is productive of unhappiness." But since they express by these phrases not the essence of evil but some of its possible attributes they are involved in the logical *impasse* mentioned above.

^c "Damage" or "harm" being the opposite of "utility" or "benefit"—the Stoic definition of "good."

177 Τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορον φασι λέγεσθαι μὲν τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὄρμη μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὄρμη μὲν ἢ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυοῖν τετραδράχμων ἀπαραλλάκτων, ὅταν δέη τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἰρεῖσθαι· ὄρμη μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε. κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συμβαλλόμενον, ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον· ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν εὖ ὅτε δὲ κακῶς χρήσασθαι, τοῦτο ἀδιάφορον εἶναι φασὶν. περὶ οὐ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς 178 διαλαμβάνειν λέγουσιν. τίνα μέντοι καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας δεῖ φρονεῖν, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν σαφές ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέστησαν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν προειρημένων ἐκάστου· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς πεπόνθασιν ἐν ἀνυποστάτοις τάχα πράγμασι σφαλλόμενοι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον, ἐντεῦθεν τινας ἐπιλογίζονται.

ΚΓ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΦΤΣΒΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ
ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΝ

179 Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαῖνον πᾶσι φαίνεται ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ χιών φύσει ψύχουσα πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτική, καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει κινούμενα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς φασὶν, ἔχοντας. οὐδὲν δὲ

* Cf. i. 27.

The term "indifferent," they say, is used in three 177 senses—in one sense, of that which is an object of neither inclination nor disinclination, as for instance the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are even in number; in another sense, of that which is an object of inclination or disinclination, but not towards this particular object any more than towards that, as in the case of two indistinguishable tetradrachms, when one has to choose one of them; for there arises an inclination to choose one of them, but not this one more than that one; and a third sense of the term "indifferent" is, they say, "that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness," as health, or wealth; for what a man may use now well, now ill, that, they say, is indifferent, and they claim to discuss it specially in their Ethics. But what view we 178 ought to take regarding this conception is plain from what we have already said about things good and evil.

Thus, then, it is plain that they have not guided us to a clear conception of the several things above-mentioned; yet, in thus failing with regard to matters that, perhaps, have no real existence, their experience is by no means strange. For there are some who argue on the following grounds that nothing is by nature^a either good or evil or indifferent.

CHAPTER XXI.—IS ANYTHING BY NATURE GOOD,
BAD, OR INDIFFERENT?

Fire which heats by nature appears to all as heat- 179 ing, and snow which chills by nature appears to all as chilling, and all things which move by nature move equally all those who are, as they say, in a natural

τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας κινεῖ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας ὁμοίως
 180 κινεῖ, δηλον, φασίν. ἵνα γὰρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας παρωμεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐεξίαν σώματος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λαγνεύειν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀδηφαγεῖν, οἱ δὲ οἰνοφλυγίαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι κύβοις, οἱ δὲ πλεονεξίαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χεῖρω τινὰ τούτων, αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων τινὲς μὲν τρία γένη φασίν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν, ὡς οἱ περιπατητικοί· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ὡς ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ εὐκότα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός ὡς φίλους, πλοῦτον, τὰ
 181 παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ φίλον, τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτός, οἷον τὸν σπουδαῖον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν· τὰ μέντοι περὶ σῶμα [ἢ ἐκτός],¹ ἃ φασιν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὗ φασιν ἀγαθὰ. ἔτι οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡσπασάντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν αὐτὴν ἀντικρυς εἶναι φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τινὰ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγξασθαι “μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν.”

182 Εἰ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν φύσει κινουῦντα πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως κινούμεθα, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάσαις ταῖς προεκκειμέναις στάσεσι πιστεύειν ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὴν μάχην οὔτε τινί. ὁ

¹ [ἢ ἐκτός] del. Apelt.

* Cf. Plato, *Laws* iii. 697; Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 8.

condition. But none of the so-called “goods,” as we shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident fact. For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom 180 some regard right bodily condition as good, others chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness, others gambling, others greed, and others still worse things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of goods^a; of these some concern the soul, like the virtues, others the body, like health and similar things, while others are external, such as friends, wealth and the like. The Stoics themselves, too, 181 assert that there is a trinity^b of goods; of these some have to do with the soul, like the virtues, others are external, like the good man and the friend, while others are neither of the soul nor external, as for instance the good man in relation to himself; but they deny that the bodily states, which the Peripatetics declare to be goods, are goods. And some have accepted pleasure as a good, whereas some affirm that it is a downright evil, so that one professor of philosophy^c actually exclaimed, “I would sooner be mad than merry.”

If, then, things which move by nature move all 182 men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature. In fact it is impossible to believe either all the views now set forth, because of their conflicting character, or any one of them. For he who asserts that one

^b Apparently a unique sense of the rare word *τριγένεια* (from *τριγενής*, “thrice-born”).

^c Antisthenes, the Cynic.

γὰρ λέγων ὅτι τῆδε μὲν πιστευτέον τῇ στάσει τῆδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἐναντιουμένους τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἀντιδοξούντων λόγους αὐτῷ ἔχων, μέρος γίνεται <τῆς>¹ διαφωνίας, καὶ τοῦ κρινούντος αὐτὸς δεῖσεται διὰ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρους κρινεῖ. μήτε οὖν κριτηρίου ὄντος ὁμολογουμένου μήτε ἀποδείξεως, διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαφωνίαν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν καταστήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἔξει διαβεβαιουῦσθαι τί ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

183 Ἔτι κακείνο λέγουσί τινες ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἦτοι τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐκείνο ὃ αἰρούμεθα. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσπύδομεν τυχεῖν ἐκείνου ὃ αἰρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἐτι αὐτὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθόν ἦν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι ποτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπύδομεν ποτοῦ τυχεῖν· ἀπολαύσαντες γὰρ τούτου τῆς ἀντιποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμεθα. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεινῆν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ ὀχληρόν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν σπύδει μετασχεῖν τροφῆς, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ πεινῆν ὀχλήσεως, καὶ ὁ ἐρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ὀψῶν.

184 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦτοι ἐξωθέν ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξωθεν ἡμῶν, ἦτοι ποιεῖ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀστείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστόν πάθος, ἢ οὐδαμῶς ἡμᾶς διατίθωσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἀγαστόν, οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἔσται οὔτε

¹ <τῆς> add. cj. Bekk.

^a Cf. ii. 18 ff., 134 ff.

must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party to the controversy, since he has opposed to him the arguments of those who take the rival view, and therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on others. And as there does not exist any agreed criterion or proof ^a owing to the unsettled controversy about these matters, he will be reduced to suspending judgement, and consequently he will be unable to affirm positively what the good by nature is.

Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either 183 the Choice ^b itself or that which we choose. Now Choice is not good according to its proper meaning; else we would not have been hurrying to obtain that which we choose, for fear of losing the power of continuing to choose it; for example, if the seeking to get drink were good, we would not have hurried to obtain drink; for when we have enjoyed it we are quit of seeking to get it. So, too, with hunger and love and the rest. Choice, then, is not choiceworthy in itself, even if it is not actually disagreeable; for in fact the hungry man hurries to partake of food in order to get quit of the discomfort due to his hunger; and so likewise the man in love and the thirsty man.

But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this 184 is either external to us or in connexion with us. But if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing motion and a welcome condition and a delightful feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not a delight to us it will not be good,^c nor will it attract

^b Literally, "the (act of) choosing" or "trying to get for oneself." "Choice" (as the context shows) involves "desire" and the striving for satisfaction.

^c For the connexion of "good" (ἀγαθόν) with "delightful" (ἀγαστόν) cf. § 175.

ἐπάξεται ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ οὔτε ὄλως αἰρετὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ [ἐγ]γίνεται τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς προσηγές κατάστημα καὶ ἄσμενιστὸν πάθος, οὐχὶ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετὸν ἔσται τὸ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ γινομένην διάθεσιν·

185 ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐκτὸς εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἤτοι γὰρ περὶ σῶμα εἶναι λέγεται μόνον ἢ περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην ἢ περὶ ἀμφοτέρα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν περὶ σῶμα μόνον, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνώσιν ἡμῶν· ψυχῆς γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις εἶναι λέγονται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄλογον εἶναι φασιν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς διατείνειν λέγοιτο, τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλήψει καὶ τῷ ταύτης ἀγαστῷ πάθει δοκοίη ἂν αἰρετὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κρινόμενον ὡς αἰρετὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ κρίνεται κατὰ αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἄλόγῳ σώματι.

186 Λεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ λέγουσιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἐπελογοσάμην ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγῳ. πῶς δ' ἂν θαρροίη τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τι γίνεσθαι λέγειν ὃ μὴ καταλαμβάνει;

187 ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, πῶς ἄρα καὶ λέγουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι; εἰ γοῦν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἡδονῇ τίθεται τὸ τέλος καὶ φησὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντα, ἐξ ἀτόμων συνεστάναι, πῶς ἐν ἀτόμων σωρῷ δυνατὸν ἡδονὴν γίνεσθαι καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἢ κρίσιν τοῦ τὸδε μὲν αἰρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸδε δὲ φευκτὸν καὶ κακόν, ἀμήχανον εἰπεῖν.

* Cf. ii. 31 ff., which also deals with "the Criterion."

us to the choosing of it, nor will it be choiceworthy at all. And if there arises within us, from the external object, a congenial condition and an agreeable feeling, it is not for its own sake that the external object will be choiceworthy but for the sake of the internal condition which follows upon it; so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception; for our perceptions are said to be properties of the soul, and they assert that the body, viewed by itself, is irrational. And if it should be said to extend to the soul also, it would seem to be choiceworthy owing to its affecting the soul and to the agreeable feeling therein; for, according to them, what is judged to be choiceworthy is judged by the intellect and not by the irrational body.

There remains the alternative that the good is in the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is, perhaps, actually non-existent^a; and even if it exists, judging by what they say it is not apprehended, as I have argued in my chapter "On the Criterion." How then could one venture to affirm that something takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend? But, to pass over these objections, in what manner does the good, according to them, come about in the soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and assent or judgement that this object is choiceworthy and good, that object to be avoided and evil.

188 Πάλιν οἱ στωικοὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ φασὶν εἶναι
 τέχναις τινάς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναι φασὶ
 σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς
 δὲ καταλήψεις γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς
 οὖν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, πνεύματι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπ-
 ἄρχοντι, ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται καταλήψεων καὶ ἀ-
 θροισμὸς τοσοῦτων ὡς γενέσθαι τέχνην, οὐχ οἶόν τε
 ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγυωμένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν πρὸ
 αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτὸν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα
 καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται καθ' ἑκάστην τύπω-
 189 σιν. τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν
 ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημί δὲ
 τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ
 τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ ταύτου, ἢ τοὺς ἀριθμούς,
 τέλειον ληρώδες ἐστίν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι
 190 δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ
 αἰρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχὴν,
 ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθόν.
 Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει·
 τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι
 διώκουσιν ὡς ἀγαθὰ, οἷον ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλ-
 ἀργυρίαν ἀκρασίαν, τὰ εὐκότα. ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν

^a It is a mistake (of the mss.) to make a new chapter here, as §§ 188 ff. carry on the argument of 185 ff. about the connexion of "good" with the soul. The "Art of Living" is first dealt with in § 239.

^b Cf. Cic. *Acad.* iv. 7. 22 "ars . . . ex multis animi perceptionibus constat." The virtues, said the Stoics, are "arts" because they are forms of knowledge and consist in the use or "exercise" of a large number of perceptions or "apprehensions" related to one another in a systematic way. These

Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul 188 are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art, they say, is "a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions," ^b and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle. But how there takes place in the ruling principle, which according to them is breath, ^c a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is impossible to conceive, when each succeeding impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at each impression. For it is perfect nonsense to say 189 that Plato's imaginary construction of the soul—I mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible essence and of the nature of the Other and of the Same, ^d or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the soul either. But if the good is not choice itself, and 190 what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued,—then there does not exist at all any natural good.

For the foregoing reasons also there exists no natural evil. For things which seem to some to be evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally

"apprehensions" are "deposited" in the mind which is conceived as an elastic fluid *pneuma* of which the whole moves when any part of it is moved. Cf. §§ 241, 251 *infra*.

^c Cf. i. 128, ii. 70.

^d Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 35 ff. But "the Numbers" may refer to the Pythagorean theory.

φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει κακόν.

- 191 Ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἀδιάφορόν ἐστὶ τι φύσει διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ μὲν στωικοὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἱκανῆν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἱκανῆν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ
- 192 ἔκτεῖναι ἢ συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον. τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὅτε μὲν προηγμένον φαίνεται ὅτε δὲ ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοντο ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύοντο, πᾶς ἂν ἔλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς
- 193 ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ' ἂν ὁμοίως ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι εἴγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν φύσει, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον.

Ὅτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἰρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν ἀνδρίαν διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι δοκεῖν, καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρούνας, λέγομεν ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἰρετῶν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγωοὶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείονα

existent to move all men alike, whereas the things said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is naturally evil.

Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent, 191 because of the divergence of opinion about things indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected, and others neither preferred nor rejected,^a—the preferred being such as have sufficient value, like health and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient value, like poverty and sickness; while extending the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither preferred nor rejected. Some, however, maintain 192 that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, each of the indifferents appears at one time preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would be a thing rejected. Consequently, 193 since of each of the so-called indifferents some say that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would have counted it indifferent had it been naturally indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally indifferent.

So also, should anyone declare that courage is naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be, and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that, cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy, since deer and hares and many other animals

¹ τολμᾶν καὶ T: τολμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ mss.: ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ edd., Bekk.

^a Cf. *Introduct.* p. xxvii, Cic. *De fin.* iii. 15 f., iv. 9, 16.

ζῶα φυσικῶς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὀρμᾶ. καὶ οἱ πλείστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γὰρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον [βλακευσάμενος]¹ ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν τι τυφωθείς ἔδοξέ τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλείστος ὁμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκκλίνει.

- 194 "Ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικουρείοι δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει αἰρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῶα φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὀρμᾶν μὲν
195 ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκκλίνειν δὲ ἀλγηδόνας. καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν. ἢ δέ γε ἡδονὴ κακῶν ἐστὶ ποιητικὴ· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέτῃγεν ἀλγηδῶν, ἢ ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς φύσει κακόν. οἶον γοῦν ἡδεται ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς, καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις ἀμέτροις χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεινά ἐστι κακά, ὡς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή.
196 παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἔστι φύσει κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμας ἀναλαμβάνομεν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ ἐρωμένης οὕτως ἐγκρατῆς γίνεταί τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει ἀγαθόν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος, πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐλέγομεν· ὀρώμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν αἰρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.

¹ [βλακευσάμενος] delevi, post ἀνθρώπων transp. Apelt: <οὗ βλακ. cj. R. Philippson.

are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake of his country,^a or to seem inspired to do any other daring deed, the great majority of mankind being averse to all such actions.

Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to 194 have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains. But to these we may reply that what is pro- 195 ductive of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, yet these things are productive of both poverty and sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good. Similarly, 196 too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we see many of the philosophers choosing toil and hardship and despising pleasure.

^a The word bracketed in the Greek text (βλακευσάμενος) means "being lazy, or spiritless," and is obviously out of place here, though it would fit well enough in the next clause (as Apelt suggests).

- 197 Ὅμοίως δ' ἂν περιτρέποντο καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἰρεῖσθαι βίον, ὡς ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.
- 198 Οὐκ ἀποπον δ' ἂν ἴσως εἶη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστήσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεις ταῖς περὶ αἰσχροῦν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχροῦν ἀθέσμων τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἔθῶν καὶ τῆς εἰς θεοῦς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατοικομένους ὀσιότητος καὶ τῶν εὐκοτόων· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὐρήσομεν ἀνωμαλίαν.
- 199 Οἶον γοῦν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ παράνομον νενομίσται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τι τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίους τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην τὸν Κρητῆτα οὕτω κεκλήσθαι φασι δι' ἔμφασιν τοῦ Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀν-
200 ἀγοῦσι τινές. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον τοῦτο εἶναι φασίν; καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγ-

^a e.g. the Cyrenaics.

^b Cf. the examples in i. 145 ff. "Amongst us" here, and throughout this chapter (as in i. 145 ff.), means "amongst the Greeks" and refers in special to the laws or customs of Athens.

^c Prob. not "Germans," but a Persian tribe, cf. i. 152.

^d i.e. Μηριόνης is derived from μηρός ("thigh"); cf. § 245 *infra*.

^e Cf. Plato, *Symp.* 180 A.

^f Cf. §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in

And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life 197 is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that some of the sages choose the life which includes pleasure,^a so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.

And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to 198 what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. For thus we shall discover a great variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

For example,^b amongst us sodomy is regarded as 199 shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,^c they say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this practice was not held to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of indicating the Cretans' custom,^d and some refer to this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.^e And 200 what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice is indifferent?^f Having intercourse with a woman,

this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (*De Stoic. repugn.*). We may ascribe them to the "Back to Nature" movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum "Live according to Nature" might be taken to mean "Disregard conventional morals," "Cease to repress your natural instincts." But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories.

νυθαι, καίτοι παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν,
 παρά τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται.
 μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ
 201 περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναικάς ἐταιρεῖν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰ-
 σχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν
 Αἰγυπτίων εὐκλεές· φασι γοῦν ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις
 συνιοῦσαι καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα
 τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς σεμνολογήματος. παρ' ἐνίοις
 δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ
 ἐταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται. καὶ τοὺς στωι-
 κούς δὲ ὀρώμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας τὸ
 ἐταίρα συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἐταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.
 202 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν
 καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ
 203 Σαρματῶν στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα. τό τε ἐλλόβια
 ἔχειν τοὺς ἄρρενας παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ,
 παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥσπερ καὶ Σύροις,
 εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ
 σύνθημα τῆς εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥίνας τῶν παιδῶν
 τετρῶσκοντες κρίκους ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ
 χρυσοῦς ἀπαρτῶσιν, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιε
 204 τις, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφή καὶ ποδήρη τις ἄρρηγ
 ἐνταῦθα ἂν ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι παρὰ
 Πέρσαις εὐπρεπεστάτου τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ
 τούτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ δὲ
 τῷ τῆς Συκελίας τυράνῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθῆτος Πλά-
 τῶνι καὶ Ἀριστίπῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχ-
 θείσης ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν

too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful,
 is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians ;
 at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like
 the philosopher Crates, as the story goes. Moreover, 201
 prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful
 thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly
 esteemed ; at least, they say that those women who
 have the greatest number of lovers wear an orna-
 mental ankle-ring as a token of their proud posi-
 tion.^a And with some of them the girls marry after
 collecting a dowry before marriage by means of
 prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that
 it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or
 to live on the profits of prostitution.

Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful 202
 and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and
 Sarmatians tattoo their offspring. Also, it is a 203
 shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but
 amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is
 a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking
 their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of
 their children and suspend from them rings of silver
 or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do, just 204
 as no man here would dress himself in a flowered
 robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which
 with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly
 respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court
 of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this
 description was offered to the philosophers Plato and
 Aristippus,^b Plato sent it away with the words—

^a Cf. Hdt. iv. 176.

^b Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 78, and i. 155 *supra*. The verses
 are from Eurip. *Bacchae* 836 and 317.

οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδύσαι στολήν
ἄρρην πεφυκώς,

ἢ δὲ Ἀριστιππος προσήκατο, φήσας

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν
οὐσ' ἢ γε σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ᾧ μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ᾧ δὲ
205 αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι. ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ'
ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν. Πέρσαι δέ,
καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες,
οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι
τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὡς ὁ
ποιητὴς φησιν,

Ζεὺς Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι
τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρίψαι,
καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς
τῇ χειρὶ τρίψαι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι. καὶ ὁ
Χρυσίππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δογματίζει τὸν τε
πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν
μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς
ἀδελφῆς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ καθολικώτερον κοινὰς
206 εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν ἀπεφήνατο. τό τε αἰ-
σχρουργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὃν παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ
ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὡς ἀγαθῷ τινὶ τούτῳ
χρησθῆναι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.

207 Ἄλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπείων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ'
ἡμῖν μὲν ἄθεσμον, παρ' ὄλοις δὲ βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν
ἀδιάφορον ἐστίν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν,

^a Cf. i. 152.

^b Homer, *Il.* xviii. 356.

^c Cf. § 246, i. 160.

A man am I, and never could I don
A woman's garb;

but Aristippus accepted it, saying—

For e'en midst revel-routs
She that is chaste will keep her purity.

Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of
them deemed this practice shameful, the other did
not. And with us it is sinful to marry one's mother 205
or one's own sister; but the Persians, and especially
those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom—
namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the
Egyptians^a take their sisters in marriage, even as the
poet says^b—

Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his
sister.

Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for
a man to rub his mother's private part with his own
private part, just as no one would say it was bad for
him to rub any other part of her body with his hand.
Chrysippus,^c too, in his book *The State* approves of a
father getting children by his daughter, a mother by
her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,^d in
more general terms, has declared that wives ought
to be held in common. Masturbation, too, which we 206
count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we
are informed that others, too, practise this evil as
though it were a good thing.

Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with 207
us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of barbarians.^e
Yet why should one speak of "barbarians"

^a Cf. *Rep.* v. 457.

^c Cf. § 225 *infra*.

ὅπου καὶ ὁ Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου
 λέγεται φαγεῖν, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς οὐκ ἄτοπον
 εἶναι φασι τὸ σάρκας τινα ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀν-
 208 θρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ; τό τε ἀνθρωπιῶ μαιίνειν
 αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς
 ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς Ὀρ-
 θωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται πικρῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
 πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι
 ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἀνθρωπὸν
 τινες, καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς
 ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερά δοκοῦμεν ἀν-
 209 θρώπου φόνῳ. τοὺς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ'
 ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δὲ τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς
 τῶν ἐτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι· καὶ φιλοσόφων δὲ
 τινές φασι ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ
 μίγνυσθαι.
 210 Τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελείας
 ἀξιουῖσθαι κελεύει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ
 ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γενομένους αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάτ-
 τουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἴγε ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ
 ἄρπῃ τὰ αἰδοῖα ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς
 τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν, ἡ δὲ Ἀθηναῖα μετὰ
 Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπ-
 211 χειρήσεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος
 ἀναρεῖν ἔκρινεν, καὶ ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ
 τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο, καθ' ὃν φονεύειν ἐκάστω
 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν. παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ
 τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι. οἳ
 τε Ῥωμαίων νομοθῆται τοὺς παῖδας ὑποχειρίους

^a Tydeus, father of Diomedes; his "enemy" was Melanippus (*Il.* xiv. 114 ff.).

when even Tydeus^a is said to have devoured the
 brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare
 that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other
 men's flesh or his own? And with most of us it is 208
 sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood,
 but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the
 altar of Artemis Orthosia^b in order that a great
 stream of blood may flow over the altar of the
 goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim
 to Cronos, just as the Scythians^c sacrifice strangers
 to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are
 defiled by the slaying of a man. Adulterers are, of 209
 course, punished by law with us, but amongst some
 peoples^d intercourse with other men's wives is a thing
 indifferent; and some philosophers,^e too, declare that
 intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.

With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers 210
 should receive due care from their children; but the
 Scythians cut their throats when they get to be
 over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that
 Cronos cut off his father's genitals with a sickle, and
 Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena
 with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to
 bind her father with fetters?^f Moreover, Cronos 211
 decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave
 the Athenians the law "concerning things immune,"
 by which he allowed each man to slay his own child;
 but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children.
 The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children

^b Boys were scourged at the altar of Artemis Orthia in Laconia.

^c Cf. i. 149.

^d Cf. *Hdt.* iv. 180; *Aristot. Pol.* ii. 3.

^e e.g. Diogenes the Cynic, cf. *Diog. Laert.* vi. 72.

^f Cf. *Hom. Il.* xiv. 204, i. 399.

καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παίδων μὴ κυριεύειν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες τύχῃσι κατὰ τοὺς ἀργυρωνήτους· παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ
 212 ὡς τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται. νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολ-
 213 λὰκις καὶ ἀναιροῦντες, τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦν-
 214 ται. νόμος τε παρ' ἡμῖν κελεύει μιᾷ συνοικεῖν ἕκαστον, Θρακῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων (Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο) πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συνοικεῖ. τό τε ληστεύειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ ἀδικόν ἐστι, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δὲ ὅτι καὶ εὐκλεῆς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἐν ληστείᾳ τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἶναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς

ἢ μασιδίως ἀλλάγηθε

οἶά τε ληιστῆρες;

καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ ληστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν <ἦν>¹ οὕτως αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν μὴ ἄρα τοιοῦτοί τινες εἴεν.

215 Ἄλλὰ καὶ κλέπτειν [μὲν] παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀδικον καὶ παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἀδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιοῦσιν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός; φασὶ δὲ τινες ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέπτας

¹ <ἦν> addidi: <ὠνειδίσει> post φιλοφρ. cj. Mutsch.

are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power over the children's property belongs to the fathers and not the children, until the children have obtained their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is rejected by others as being despotic. It is the law, too, 212 that homicides should be punished; but gladiators when they kill often receive actual commendation. Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; yet when athletes strike free men, and often even kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and crowns. With us, too, the law bids each man to 213 have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)^a each man has many wives. Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal, 214 but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved. Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So too Nestor—in the poet's account^b—after welcoming Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—

Say, are you roaming

Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?

Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because of his suspicion that they might be people of that kind.

Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; 215 yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal—for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians also punished those who thieved, not be-

^a Cf. Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 21, 82.

^b Homer, *Od.* iii. 73. For early Greek piracy cf. Thucyd. i. 5.

ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ κεκλοφέναι ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφω-
 216 ρᾶσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥίψασπις ἀνήρ
 κολάζεται παρὰ πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπί-
 दा τῷ παιδί ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα
 “σὺ” ἔφη, “τέκνον, ἢ ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν.”
 Ἀρχιλόχος δέ, ὡσπερ σεμνυνόμενος ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ
 τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥίψας φυγεῖν, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι περὶ
 ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν

ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαίων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἦν παρὰ θάμνῳ
 ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων,
 αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.

217 αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλεον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν παρ'
 αὐταῖς γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρείον αὐτὰ
 ποιῆσαι δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί,
 τοῦ ἐναντίου παρ' ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νεομισμένου.
 καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας,
 οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα ἢ θεός, εἶγε φύσει φαῦλον
 218 ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν
 καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει.

Καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν πεπλήρωται
 πολλῆς διαφωσίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ φασι
 εἶναι τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ Διαγόραν
 τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθη-
 ναῖον. καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναιμένων οἱ μὲν
 τοὺς πατέρας νομίζουσι θεοὺς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς

^a A. of Paros, famous for his iambic poems, *circa* 680 B.C.
 Alcæus, a later poet, also flung away his shield in battle;
 and Hor. *Od.* ii. 7 is based on one or other of these incidents.

^b Cf. *Hdt.* iv. 114.

^c Cybele, whose priests were eunuchs, cf. *Catullus* 63.

cause they had thieved, but because they had been
 found out. Moreover, the coward and the man 216
 who throws away his shield are in many places
 punished by law; and this is why the Laconian
 mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set
 out for the war, said, “Either with this, my child, or
 upon it.” Yet Archilochus,^a as though vaunting to
 us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks
 thus of himself in his poems—

Over my shield some Saian warrior gloats,—
 The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—
 A flawless piece of armour; I myself
 Fled and escaped from death which endeth all.

And the Amazons^b used to maim the males amongst 217
 their offspring so as to make them incapable of any
 manly action, while they themselves attended to
 warfare; though with us the opposite practice is
 regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,^c also,
 approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not
 have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a
 bad thing. So it is that, in regard to justice and 218
 injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a
 great variety of opinion.

Around all matters of religion and theology
 also, there rages violent controversy.^d For while
 the majority declare that gods exist, some deny
 their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theo-
 dorus, and Critias the Athenian.^e And of those
 who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in
 the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed

^d Cf. for this subject *Adv. Phys.* i. 13 ff., 50 ff.

^e Diagoras, atomist and poet, *circa* 420 B.C.; Theodorus,
 a Cyrenaic, *circa* 310 B.C.; Critias, orator and poet, one of
 the “Thirty Tyrants” (404 B.C.) of Athens.

δογματικαῖς αἰρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ὡς Ἄριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρασ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, στωικοὶ δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον,
 219 Ξενοφάνης δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ. καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, οἱ δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὃ Ἐπίκουρός φησι μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἓνα φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς μορφαῖς, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις ἐκπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἱερακομόρφους καὶ βόας καὶ κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεοὺς.

220 Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ ἔν τισιν ἱεροῖς ὄσια, ταῦτα ἔν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια. καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. ὅσον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶ θύουσιν. πρόβατον Ἰσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι λεγομένη τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.

221 τῷ Κρόνῳ <οἱ Καρχηδόνοι>¹ θύουσιν ἀνθρωπον, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀσεβές εἶναι νομίζεται. αἰλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ Ὠρω θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις. ἵππον

¹ <οἱ Καρχηδόνοι> addidi: <τινὲς δὲ> ante τῷ cj. Mutsch.

* This definition of God is not in our Aristotle, but cf. *De caelo*, i. 9, 278 b 14: "We are wont to give the name of 'Heaven' especially to the outermost and highest (part of the Universe), in which all the Divinity, we say, is situated."

in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted that God is incorporeal and "the limit of heaven,"^a the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,^b Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere. Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that "what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble itself nor causes it to others." Hence ordinary people differ also, some saying that there is one god, others that there are many gods and of various shapes; in fact, they even come to share the notions of the Egyptians^c who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.

Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy. But this would not have been so if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods and of other deities. To Cronos^d a human victim is sacrificed <at Carthage>, although this is regarded by most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a

It is this outermost circumference—the abode of Fire, the finest and most divine of elements—which is here termed "the limit" (*πέρας*).

^b Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 138 f. (Stoics), x. 139 (Epicureans). For Xenophanes cf. i. 225.

^c Cf. Hdt. ii. 41, Juvenal xv. 2 ff.

^d Cf. § 208 *supra*.

τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιερῶσιν. Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξ-
αιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῶον ἀπεχθές. αἶγας
'Ἀρτέμιδι θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῷ.
222 καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ λέγειν ἔχων
ἔῶ, τῆς συντομίας [παρα]στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι
τι ἦν ὅσιον φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν
ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν
τῇ κατὰ τὴν διαίταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκείᾳ περὶ
223 τοὺς θεούς. Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος
θᾶπτον ἂν ἀποθάνοι ἢ χοίρειον φάγοι, Αἴβυς δὲ
προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων
εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δὲ τιwes περιστερᾶς, ἄλλοι δὲ
ἱερείων. ἰχθῦς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς θέμις ἐσθίειν,
ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων δὲ τῶν σοφῶν
εἶναι νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζώου φαγεῖν
ἀνίερον εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ
224 πόδα, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις
προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων τῷ κατὰ Πηλού-
σιον Κασίῳ Δί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς κατὰ
Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκοροδίου γεύσασθαι ἂν. ἀπ-
έχονται δὲ ἐν οἷς μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἡδυ-
όσμον, ἐν οἷς δὲ σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶπτον ἂν τὰς
κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασὶ τῶν πατέρων ἢ κυάμους.
225 ἄλλα παρ' ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα. κυνεῖον τε
γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερον εἶναι, Θρακῶν
δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν ἰστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ'
Ἑλλῆσι τοῦτο ἦν σύνθηες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ
τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὀρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν

^a i.e. of Didymus, near Miletus.

^b Cf. Hdt. ii. 47.

^c Cf. Hdt. ii. 39.

^d Cf. Juv. xv. 9.

^e East of the Nile Delta.

horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymæan^a Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius. And I might add a host of similar instances, but I 222 forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would have been deemed so by all men alike.

Examples similar to these may also be found in the religious observances with regard to human diet. For a Jew or an Egyptian priest^b would sooner die 223 than eat swine's flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep, by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal's head,^c others the shoulder, others the foot, others some other part. And no one would bring an onion^d 224 as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,^e just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic. And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others from catmint, in others from parsley. And some declare that they would sooner eat their fathers' heads than beans.^f Yet, amongst others, these things 225 are indifferent. Eating dog's flesh, too, is thought by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of the Asclepiadae,^g prescribes that hounds' flesh should

^f Cf. Emped. Frag. 141; probably a Pythagorean (or Orphic) "taboo"; cf. Hdt. ii. 37.

^g The earliest Greek medical guild; Diocles was a famous physician of the fourth century B.C.

πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὡς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ ἀνέρον παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμισται. 226 καίτοι εἶγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς κατοικομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὀλοκλήρως περιστείλαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῆ καλύπτουσιν, ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίῳ δεικνύειν αὐτούς. Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὰ ἔντερα ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν. 227 Αἰθιοπῶν δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τὰς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους. Ὑρκανοὶ δὲ κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βορὰν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Τρωγλοδύτας δὲ φασιν ἐπὶ τινα γεώλοφον ἄγειν τὸν ἀποθανόντα, εἶτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας λίθους βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἶθ' ὅταν χύσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλ- 228 λομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι. τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθανόντας γῆ κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας. ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφροντίστως καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας δὲ φασιν ἀνασκοπιζέειν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας καὶ νίτρω ταριχεύειν, εἶθ' οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνελεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον πένθος ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὀρώμεν.

^a § 207 *supra*.

be given to certain patients. And some, as I have said,^a even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing which with us is accounted sinful. Yet, if the rules 226 of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, they would have been observed by all men alike.

A similar account may be given of reverence towards the departed.^b Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves. The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them 227 into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians^c expose them as a prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes^d take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there. And some 228 of the barbarians^e slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones,^f while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians^g impale their dead and embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap them round in bandages. How much grief others endure for the dead we see ourselves.

^b For this subject *cf.* Diog. Laert. ix. 84; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 45; Sir T. Browne, *Hydriotaphia*, chap. i.

^c South of the Caspian Sea.

^d *i.e.* "cave-dwellers" of west coast of the Red Sea.

^e *Cf.* § 210 *supra*.

^f *Cf.* Tibull. iii. 2. 17 for the practice of *ossilegium*.

^g *Cf.* Hdt. i. 140.

229 Καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ
φευκτὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ
γούνη Εὐριπίδης φησὶν

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι καταθανεῖν,
τὸ καταθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ φησὶν “ ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς
ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθη-
τοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.” φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς εἴπερ
συνεστήκαμεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁ δὲ θάνατος
διάλυσις ἔστι ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς
ἔσμεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος (οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα),
ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔσμεν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ
μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
230 σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν. ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος
φησὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ
ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἔστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ
ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν
ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς
ψυχὰς ἀναβιούν καὶ ζῆν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ βέλτιον
εἶναι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.
ὁ γούνη Εὐριπίδης φησὶν

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους
τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον
χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

231 ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·

^a Eurip. *Frag.* 638 (Nauck).

^b Epic. p. 61. 6; 71. 6 (Usener); cf. Lucret. iii. 830.

Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and 229
horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says ^a:

Who knows if life be but the state of death,
And death be counted life in realms below?

And Epicurus ^b declares: “ Death is nothing to us;
for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless
is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as
we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a
dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death
does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and
when death exists we do not exist, for through the
cessation of the compound of soul and body we too
cease to exist. And Heraclitus ^c states that both life 230
and death exist both in our state of life and in our
state of death; for when we live our souls are dead
and buried within us, and when we die our souls
revive and live. And some even suppose that dying
is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says ^d:

Rather should we assemble to bewail
The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;
Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,
With joy and gladness we should bear from home.

These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment ^e: 231

^a Cf. Heracl. *Frag.* 67, 78 (B 88 Diels). Part of the
“ Upward and Downward Way ” of H. (see *Introd.* p. viii)
is the cycle of generation by which every creature is simul-
taneously both living and dying. The soul, which consists
of “ fire,” is continually passing into the other elements,
and the other elements into it. But the second clause (“ for
when we live ” etc.) looks rather like a contamination of
Heraclitus's doctrine with the *σῶμα—σῆμα* (“ body a tomb ”)
theory of Pythagoreanism.

^b *Frag.* 449; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* i. 48, Lucr. v. 222 ff.

^c Theognis 425 ff.; cf. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1227.

ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,
μηδ' εἰσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἡελίου,
φύντα δ' ὅπως ὠκίστα πύλας Ἄϊδαο περῆσαι
καὶ κείσθαι πολλὴν γαίαν ἐφессάμενον.

- καὶ τὰ περὶ Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἃ φησὶν
ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ.
232 ἰστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρακῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες
τὸν γεννηθέντα θρηγεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν
φύσει δεινῶν εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἂν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν
τῶν φύσει καλῶν. οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τί ἐστι
φύσει τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρὸς τι.
233 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μετα-
φέρειν ἔστι καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ
ἐξεθέμεθα νῦν διὰ τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ
δὲ καὶ περὶ τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνω-
μαλίαν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνωστοίμοις
ἡμῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.
234 ὡς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγινώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ
τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν
ὀρθῶς διεβεβαιοῦμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν
εἶναι τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ
τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκείνων ἐν οἷς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσι
ἡμῖν ἀνωμαλίας διαβεβαιούσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἶναι
διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφη,
τοῦ παρὰ τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν ἡμῖν μὴ γνωσκομένων
τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

* Cf. Hdt. i. 31; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 47. Their mother Cydippe (the "Argive priestess" of Hera) prayed the goddess to grant her sons, C. and B., the best of boons for mortals: the same night both died in their sleep.

Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for
mortals,
Nor to have looked upon fiery rays of the sun:
Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,
And to lie unmoved robed in masses of earth.

We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton which Herodotus^a relates in his story of the Argive priestess. It is reported, also, that some of the 232 Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant dirges.^b So, then, death should not be considered a thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the things mentioned above is naturally of this character or of that, but all are matters of convention and relative.

The same method of treatment may be applied also 233 to each of the other customs, which we have not now described owing to the summary character of our exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them, we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand, we ought to observe that disagreement concerning them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that are unknown to us.^c For just as, if we had been 234 ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying sisters,^d we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought not to marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.

^b Cf. Hdt. v. 4.

^d Cf. § 205 *supra*.

^c Cf. ii. 40.

235 Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τὴν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι, κὰν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετειάς, ἔπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει,

236 ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ· ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικῶς¹ πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ πάσχει κακὸν ἐστὶ φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χειρόν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστώτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου

237 δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν. ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταρασσεται ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἂ νομίζει φύσει κακὰ εἶναι ποινηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατῆς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ τύφου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, καὶ εὐλαβούμενος μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς νομιζομένοις παρ' αὐτῷ γένηται, ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ

238 ταῖς τυχοῦσαις περιπίπτει· τοὺς γὰρ ἀναπόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακὸν ἐστὶ καὶ φευκτόν, ἢ δὲ πεποιθήσις τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθὰ

¹ αἰσθητικῶς Heintz: αἰσθητικὸς mss., Bekk.

• Cf. i. 13, 25 ff.

Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity 235 of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism^a; and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate; for though, as a human being, he 236 suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience. But, in fact, he who 237 assumes that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. For when he experiences what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed of what seems to him good things he falls into no ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and through fear of losing them, and through trying to guard against finding himself again amongst what he regards as natural evils; for those who assert that goods 238 are incapable of being lost^b we shall put to silence by means of the doubts raised by their dissension. Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that these things are good, those evil, by nature produces

^b So said the Cynics, and some Stoics; other Stoics gave up the doctrine; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105, vii. 127.

τάδε δὲ κακὰ ταραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακὸν ἔστι καὶ
φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθῆναι φαῦλον τι
ἢ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι
περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων.

ΚΕ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΠΕΡΙ ΒΙΟΝ

239 Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὅτι οὐδὲ τέχνη
τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν βίον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη
τέχνη, περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν
κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἔχει· διὸ τούτων ἀν-
επιπάρκτων ὄντων ἀνεπιπάρκτος ἔστι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν
βίον τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ μὴ ὁμοφώνως μίαν
ἀπολείπουνσι πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ τέχνην περὶ τὸν
βίον, ἀλλ' ἄλλοι ἄλλην ὑποτίθενται, ὑποπίπτουσι
τῇ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας λόγῳ, ὃν
ἠρώτησα ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λελεγμένοις ἡμῖν.
240 εἰ μὲντοι καὶ μίαν εἶναι πάντες λέγοιεν καθ' ὑπό-
θεσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, οἷον τὴν αἰδιμὸν
φρόνησιν, ἣτις ὄνειροπολεῖται μὲν παρὰ στωικοῖς,
μᾶλλον δὲ πληκτικωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ,
καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀτοπία παρακολουθήσουσιν.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ φρόνησις ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν
μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ
241 οὐχ ἔξουσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. ὅλως τε,
ἐπεὶ μὴ δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστήναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ
περὶ τὸν βίον ἔσται τέχνη τις ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν.
Οἷον γοῦν τέχνην εἶναι φασι σύστημα ἐκ κατα-

^a Cf. *Adv. Eth.* 167 ff.; *Cic. De fin.* i. 13, v. 6 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 180, 238 *supra*.

^c For the sage as "indiscoverable" cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 133,
Introduct. p. xxix. "Prudence" (*φρόνησις*), or "practical

disquiet, then the assumption and persuasion that
anything is, in its real nature, either bad or good is
evil and to be shunned.

For the present, then, this account of things good,
evil, and indifferent is sufficient.

CHAPTER XXIII.—DOES THERE EXIST AN ART
OF LIVING ?

It is plain from what has been said above that there 239
can be no art of living.^a For if such an art exists, it
has to do with the consideration of things good, evil,
and indifferent, so that these being non-existent the
art of living also is non-existent. Further, since the
Dogmatists do not all with one accord lay down one
single art of living, but some propound one art, some
another, they are guilty of discrepancy and open to
the argument from discrepancy which I stated in our
discussion of the Good.^b Yet, even if they were 240
all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one
—such as, for example, the celebrated "prudence"
whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be
more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally
absurd results will follow. For since "prudence" is a
virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue,
the Stoics, not being sages,^c will not be in possession
of the art of living. And in general, since, according 241
to them, no art^d can have real existence, an art of
living cannot exist, so far as their statements go.

Thus, for example, they declare that art is "a com-

wisdom," is distinguished from "wisdom" (*σοφία*). Note
that in this argument "the art of living" is identified with
"prudence."

^d Cf. §§ 188 ff.; ii. 53 ff.

λήψεων, κατάληψιν δὲ καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν. ἀνεύρετος δὲ ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία καταληπτικῆ ἔστιν, οὔτε ποία τις ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία ἐπιγνωσθῆναι δύναται, ἐπεὶ μήτε πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ δυνάμεθα κρίνειν ἀπλῶς τις μὲν ἔστι καταληπτικῆ τις δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη, χρήζοντες τε καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ποία τις ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς λαμβανομένης ὡς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν

242 ἄλλην αἰτούμενοι. ταῦτά τοι καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐννοίας ἀποδόσει οὐχ ὑγιῶς φέρονται· καταληπτικὴν μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γινομένην, ὑπάρχον δὲ εἶναι λέγοντες ὃ οἶόν τε κινεῖν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπον. εἰ τοίνυν, ἵνα μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ τις τέχνη, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι τέχνην, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ τέχνη, κατάληψιν προῦφεστάναι, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ κατάληψις, καταληπτικῆ φαντασία συγκατάθεσιν κατελιθῆναι, ἀνεύρετος δὲ ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

243 Ἐτι κἀκεῖνο λέγεται. πᾶσα τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀποδιδόμενων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἔργον τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔργον εἶναι ταύτης λέγῃ τις, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὐρίσκεται καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οἷον τὸ τιμᾶν γονεῖς, τὸ παραθῆκας ἀποδιδόναι, τᾶλλα πάντα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὔτε γὰρ

posite of apprehensions," and apprehension is "assent to an apprehensive impression."^a But the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable; for every impression is not apprehensive, nor is it possible to decide which one of the impressions is the apprehensive impression, since we cannot simply decide by means of every impression which one is apprehensive and which not, while if we require an apprehensive impression in order to determine which is the apprehensive impression we are wrecked on the *ad infinitum* fallacy, since we are asking for another apprehensive impression so as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive. And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics, 242 in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression, is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which is derived from a real object,^b and, on the other hand, that a real object is that which is capable of giving rise to an apprehensive impression, they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning. If, then, in order that an art of living may exist, there must first exist art, and in order that art may subsist apprehension must pre-exist, and in order that apprehension may subsist assent to an apprehensive impression must be apprehended, but the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable,—then the art of living is indiscoverable.

Another argument is this. Every art appears to 243 be apprehended by means of its own special products, but there is no special product of the art of living; for anything you might mention as its product—such as honouring parents, paying back deposits, and all the rest—is found to be common to ordinary folk as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we

^a Cf. ii. 4, 53 ff., *Intro.* p. xxv.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 88.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ φρονίμης διαθέσεως φαίνεσθαι λεγόμενόν τι ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου ἢ ποιούμενον, ὡς φασί τινες, ἐπιγνωσόμεθα ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως ἔργον 244 ἐστίν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι, μήτε ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς· κοινὰ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. τό τε λέγειν ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγομένων ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ τάληθῆ γεγονόντων·

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

245 Λεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἄπερ ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν ταῖς βίβλοις· ὦν πολλῶν καὶ παραπλησίων ἀλλήλοις ὄντων ὀλίγα ἐκθήσομαι παραδείγματος χάριν. οἷον γοῦν ὁ αἰρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε “ διαμηρίζειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἡσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικά, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ [ἐστὶ] παιδικοῖς ἄλλα ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἀπείπει τε καὶ πρέ- 246 ποῦτα ἐστίν.” περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς ὀσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δευδὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα. “ καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὐφραίνειν, ὀδυνω-

shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent man from a state of prudence that it is a product of prudence. For the state of prudence itself is inappre- 244 hensible, not being directly apparent either of itself or from its products, these being common to ordinary folk as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his actions^a is the assertion of those who over-estimate human nature and are visionaries rather than truth-tellers :

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire immortal,
So are the minds of mortal men.^b

There remains the assertion that the art of living 245 is apprehended by means of those effects which they describe in their books ; and these being numerous and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way of examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements regarding the rearing of children, says this : “ Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male ; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting to all alike.” And as concerns piety 246 towards parents, the same man states,^c in reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother : “ If she had been ailing in one part of her body and he had done her good by rubbing it with his hands, it had not been shameful ; was it, then, shameful for

^a i.e. always consistently good, impeccable.

^b Homer, *Od.* xviii. 136-137.

^c Cf. § 205.

μένην παύσας, καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν;” τούτοις δὲ ὁμογνωμονεῖ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος· ἐν γοῦν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησὶ “δοκεῖ δέ μοι ταῦτα οὕτω διεξάγειν καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας.” καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντάγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐπεισάγει· φησὶ γοῦν “καὶ ἐὰν τῶν ζώντων ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται.” ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησὶν “ἀπονομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος, καθάπερ ὀνύχων ἢ ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρῆσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος, ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ρίψαντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφῆν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.”

249 Τοιαῦτα μὲν πλείστα ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· ἄπερ οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν διαπράττεσθαι, εἶγε μὴ παρὰ Κύκλωψιν ἢ Λαιστρυγόσι πολιτεύοιντο. εἰ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἰσιν, ἃ δὲ πράττουσι, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν

^a Cf. § 199.

^b Cf. § 207.

him to stop her grief and give her joy by rubbing other parts, and to beget noble children by his mother?” And with this opinion Chrysippus also agrees. At least he says in his *State*: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which a mother has children by her son,^a the father by his daughter, the brother by his full sister.” And he proceeds, in the same 247 treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,^b saying: “And if from a living body a part be cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book 248 *On Duty* he says expressly, regarding the burial of parents: “When our parents de cease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it. Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when it is good, for food, just as also when one of their own parts, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that it and the like parts should be so used; but when the flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’ 249 theories; but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under the laws of the Cyclopes or Laestrygones.^c But if they are totally incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action

^c For C. and L., as savages of ancient Sicily, cf. Hom. *Od.* i. 69, x. 81; Thuc. vi. 21.

ἴδιον ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν ἔχειν ὑποπτευομένων τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. εἰ οὖν αἱ μὲν τέχναι πάντως ὀφείλουσι ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴδιον ἔργον ὁράται τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένης τέχνης, οὐ καταλαμβάνεται αὕτη. διόπερ οὐδὲ διαβεβαιουῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς δύναται τις ὅτι ἔστιν ὑπαρκτή.

ΚΣ'.—ΕΙ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

250 Καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἥτοι φύσει ἐγγίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φύσει, ἥτοι καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ ἐγγίνονται ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἢ καθὸ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ, οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ. εἰ δὲ καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρξεν ἂν ἡ φρόνησις, ὡς πάντας εἶναι φρονίμους τε καὶ ἐναρέτους καὶ σοφοὺς. φαύλους
251 δὲ τοὺς πλείστους λέγουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ ὑπῆρξεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὐδὲ φύσει ἄρα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπειδὴ τὴν τέχνην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων εἶναι βούλονται συγγεγυμνασμένων, διὰ πείρας τέ τινος καὶ μαθήσεως ἐμφαίνουσι μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ ταύτην περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος.

ΚΖ'.—ΕΙ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

252 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήσει ἀναλαμβάνεται. ἵνα γὰρ ὑπόστασιν ἔχη ταῦτα, δεῖ τρία
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peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the art of living. So then, if the arts must certainly be apprehended by means of their peculiar effects, and no effect is observed that is peculiar to the so-called art of living, this art is not apprehended. Consequently, no one can positively affirm regarding it that it is really existent.

CHAPTER XXVI.—DOES THE ART OF LIVING ARISE IN MANKIND ?

Moreover, if the art of living comes into existence 250 in men, it so comes either by nature or through learning and teaching. But if it is by nature, then the art of living will arise in them either in so far as they are men, or in so far as they are not men. Certainly not in so far as they are not men ; for it is not a fact that they are not men. But if it is in so far as they are men, then prudence^a would have belonged to all men, so that all would have been prudent and virtuous and wise. But they describe most men as bad. Neither, then, in so far as they are men will the art of 251 living belong to them. Therefore it does not accrue by nature. And again, since they insist that art is "a system of co-exercised apprehensions,"^b they make it evident that the art under discussion, as well as all other arts, is acquired rather by some sort of effort and learning.

CHAPTER XXVII.—IS THE ART OF LIVING CAPABLE OF BEING TAUGHT ?

But neither is it acquired by teaching and learning. 252 For in order that these should subsist, three things

^a For "prudence," or practical "wisdom," cf. § 240.

^b Cf. §§ 188, 241, 261.

προωμολογήσθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ τὸν μαθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὑφέστηκεν· οὐδὲ ἡ διδασκαλία ἄρα.

ΚΗ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΟΜΕΝΟΝ

- 253 Οἶον γοῦν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἦτοι ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδος· καὶ εἰ μὲν ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο· ἀνύπαρκτον γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀνυπάρκτων δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἶη διδασκαλία. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ἀληθές ἐστὶ λέγοιτο· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνυπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ψεῦδος μήτε τὸ ἀληθές διδάσκεται, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα διδακτὸν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἀδιδάκτων ὄντων τοὺς ἀπόρους μόνους διδάσκειν
- 254 ἐρεῖ τις), οὐδὲν διδάσκεται. τὸ τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα ἦτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔσται διδασκαλίας δεόμενον· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν διαφωνίαν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔσται διδακτὸν· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καταλαμβάνει τις, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκειν ἢ μαθάνειν δύναίτο; εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.
- 255 Ἐπι τὸ διδασκόμενον ἦτοι σώμᾶ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀσώματον, ἐκάτερον δὲ αὐτῶν ἦτοι φαινόμενον ἢ

must first be agreed upon—the matter which is being taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method of learning. But none of these subsists; neither, then, does teaching.

CHAPTER XXVIII.—DOES A MATTER OF INSTRUCTION EXIST?

Thus, for instance, the matter of instruction is 253 either true or false; if false it would not be taught; for they assert that falsehood is non-existent, and of non-existents there could be no teaching. Nor yet if it were said to be true; for we have shown in our chapter "On the Criterion"^a that truth is non-existent. If, then, neither the false nor the true is being taught, and besides these there is nothing capable of being taught (for no one, to be sure, will say that, though these are unteachable, he teaches only dubious lessons^b), then nothing is taught. And the matter taught is either apparent or non- 254 evident. But if it is apparent, it will not require teaching; for things apparent appear to all alike. And if it is non-evident, then, since things non-evident are, as we have often shown, inapprehensible owing to the undecided controversy about them, it will be incapable of being taught; for how could anyone teach or learn what he does not apprehend? But if neither the apparent is taught nor the non-evident, nothing is taught.

Again, what is taught is either corporeal or in- 255 corporeal, and each of these being either apparent or

down (*cf. Adv. Math.* i. 29) that "the dubious (*ἀπορον*) cannot be taught": it is intermediate between truth and falsehood

^a *Cf.* ii. 85 ff.

^b "Dubious lessons": if the text is right, we must supply *λόγους* (sayings, "lessons") with *τοὺς ἀπόρους*. It was laid

ἀδηλούμενον οὐ δύναται διδάσκεσθαι κατὰ τὸν μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένον λόγον. οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τι.

256 Πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ διδάσκειται τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι αἱ διδασκαλῖαι, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀληθὲς δὲ ὄν καὶ ὑπάρξει· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἶναι φασιν ὃ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντίκειται τι. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ λέγειν ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν.

257 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ ὄν, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδάσκειται ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδακτόν, τῶν ὄντων ἔσται, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ διδακτόν· τὰς γὰρ διδασκαλίας ἐκ τινῶν ὁμολογουμένων καὶ ἀδιδάκτων γίνεσθαι προσήκει. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδακτόν ἐστίν.

258 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι. τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστίν οὐ διδάσκειται, οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστὶ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστίν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴτε φαινόμενον εἴη τὸ ὄν ὃ λέξουσι διδάσκεσθαι, εἴτε ἀδηλον, ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀπορίαις ὑποπίπτον ἀδίδακτον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν διδάσκειται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.

^a For the Stoic doctrine of "the true" and "truth" cf. ii. 80 ff. What "the true" is "opposed to" is presumably "the false."

^b Cf. Aristot. *Anal. Post.* i. 1.

non-evident is incapable of being taught, according to the argument we have just now stated. Nothing, therefore, is taught.

Further, either the existent is taught or the non-existent. Now the non-existent is not taught; for if the non-existent is taught the non-existent will be true, since teaching is held to be of things true. And if it is true, it will also subsist; for they declare that "a true thing is what subsists and is opposed to something."^a But it is absurd to say that the non-existent subsists; therefore the non-existent is not taught. Yet neither is the existent. For if the existent is taught, it is taught either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is something else. But if it is to be taught in so far as it is existent, it will be one of the existing things, and therefore a thing incapable of being taught; for teaching ought to proceed from certain acknowledged facts which require no teaching.^b Therefore the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not capable of being taught. Nor, in fact, in so far as it is something else. For the existent has not anything else which is non-existent attached to it, so that if the existent in so far as it is existent is not taught, neither will it be taught in so far as it is something else; for whatsoever thing is attached to it is existent. And further, whether the existent thing which, they will say, is taught be apparent or non-evident, as it is subject to the absurdities we have stated, it will be incapable of being taught. But if neither the existent nor the non-existent is taught, there is nothing that is taught.

ΚΘ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ο ΔΙΔΑΣΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ Ο ΜΑΝΘΑΝΩΝ

CHAPTER XXIX.—DO THE TEACHER AND THE
LEARNER EXIST ?

259 Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ὃ τε διδάσκων
καὶ ὁ μανθάνων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἤττον καὶ κατὰ ἰδίαν
ἀποροῦνται. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην
διδάσκει ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν
τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην οὐ διδάσκει· οὐθέτερος γὰρ
αὐτῶν, καθό ἐστι τεχνίτης, δεῖται μαθήσεως. ἀλλ'
οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τυφλὸν
ὀδηγεῖν δύναται τυφλός. οὐδὲ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνί-
260 τήν· γελοῖον γάρ. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης
τὸν ἄτεχνον· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν.
ὅπως γὰρ ὑποστήναι τεχνίτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι
λέγεται, ἐπεὶ μήτε αὐτοφύως τις καὶ ἅμα τῷ
γενέσθαι τεχνίτης ὑφιστάμενος βλέπεται μήτε ἐξ
ἀτέχνου γίνεται τις τεχνίτης. ἤτοι γὰρ ἐν θεώρημα
καὶ μία κατάληψις δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄτεχνον
261 τεχνίτην ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κατάληψις μία
τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἀπεργάζεται, πρῶτον μὲν
ἐνέσται λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ κατα-
λήψεων ἢ τέχνη· ὁ γὰρ μηδὲν ὅπως εἰδώς, εἰ ἐν
θεώρημα διδαχθεὶς τέχνης, τεχνίτης ἂν οὕτω
λέγοιτο εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ ἕαν λέγη τις ὡς ὁ τινα
θεωρήματα τέχνης ἀνεληφώς καὶ προσδεόμενος
ἐνὸς ἔτι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὦν ἄτεχνος, ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
προσλάβῃ, τεχνίτης ἐξ ἀτέχνου ἀποτελεῖται ἐκ

Now with the refutation of this is involved that of 259 both the teacher and the learner ; though they are just as much open to doubt on their own account. For either the expert artist teaches the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert does not teach the expert ; for neither of them, *qua* expert, needs teaching. Nor does the non-expert teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can lead the blind.^a Nor the non-expert the expert, for it would be ridiculous. The only thing left is to say 260 that the expert teaches the non-expert ; and this, too, is a thing impossible. For it is declared to be wholly impossible that an expert artist should exist, since neither do we see anyone existing spontaneously and from birth as an expert, nor does anyone turn into an expert from being a non-expert. For either one lesson and one apprehension can make an expert of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.^b But if one apprehension makes the non-expert an 261 expert, it will be open to us to declare, firstly, that art is not a system of apprehensions^c ; for the man who knows nothing at all would be termed an expert if only he were taught a single lesson of art. And, secondly, should anyone assert that, as soon as a man who has acquired some principles of art and still needs one more, and because of this is non-expert, acquires also that one principle, he at once becomes an expert instead of a non-expert by means of one

^a For this saying *cf.* Matt. xv. 14 ; Hor. *Epist.* i. 17.

^b The argument here is that the non-expert cannot become an expert either (1) by a *single* lesson, §§ 261-262, or (2) by a course of lessons, which must follow each other *singlely*, § 263. "Apprehension" here means the grasp of a truth or principle of the art or craft which is being imparted, the

"art" itself being defined as a "system" of such pieces of knowledge.

^c *Cf.* § 251 *supra*.

- 262 καταλήψεως μιᾶς, ἀποκληρωτικὸν λέξει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο δεῖξαι τινα ἄτεχνον μὲν ἔτι, τεχνίτην δὲ ἐσόμενον εἴαν ἔν τι θεώρημα προσλάβῃ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἐξαριθμῆσιν τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκάστης τέχνης ἐπίσταται τις, ὥστε ἀπαριθμησάμενος τὰ ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα, πόσα λείπεται πρὸς τὸν πλήρη τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν ἐνὸς θεωρήματος γνώσις οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ θεωρήματα τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλαμβάνει τις, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, καθ' ἕν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τις καὶ τοῦτο καθ' ὑπόθεσιν διδῶ, ὁ κατὰ ἕν θεώρημα τῆς τέχνης ἀναλαμβάνει λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν τεχνίτης γένοιτο· ὑπεμνηστικοί γὰρ ὅτι οὐ δύναται θεωρήματος ἐνὸς γνώσις τὸν ἄτεχνον ποιῆσαι τεχνίτην. οὐδὲ ἐξ ἄτεχνου τοίνυν γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀνυπόστατος εἶναι ὁ τεχνίτης. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ διδάσκων.
- 264 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ μανθάνειν λεγόμενος, ἄτεχνος ὢν, δύναται τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, ἧς ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος, μανθάνειν τε καὶ καταλαμβάνειν. ὥς γὰρ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός, εἰς ὅσον ἐστὶ πηρός, οὐκ ἂν λάβοι χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς ὁμοίως φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος καταλάβοι ἂν τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα ἧς ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη τεχνίτης τε καὶ ἄτεχνος τῶν αὐτῶν, ἄτεχνος μὲν ἐπεὶ οὕτως ὑπόκειται, τεχνίτης δὲ ἐπεὶ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν

^a Cf. § 79 *supra*.

^b These comparisons are ascribed to Anacharsis, the

apprehension, he will be making a random assertion.^a 262 For in the case of individual men we could not point to one who, being still a non-expert, will become an expert by acquiring one additional principle; for no one, to be sure, has such a command of the numeration of the principles of each art as to be able to say, by numbering off the known principles, how many are still needed to make up the full number of the principles of the art. So then the learning of one principle does not make the non-expert an expert. But if this is true, seeing that no one acquires all the 263 principles of the arts at once, but each one singly, if at all—this point also being granted by way of assumption—the man who is said to acquire the principles of the art one by one will not be termed an expert; for we recall the conclusion that the learning of one principle cannot make an expert of the non-expert. No one, then, becomes an expert from being a non-expert. Hence, on these grounds too, the expert artist appears to be non-existent. And therefore the teacher also.

Neither can the so-called learner, if he is non- 264 expert, learn and apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For just as the man who is blind from birth, in so far as he is blind, will not acquire perception of colours, nor, similarly, he who is deaf from birth, of sound,^b so too the non-expert will not apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For should he do so the same man would be both expert and non-expert in the same things—non-expert since he is such by hypothesis, and expert since he has apprehension of the prin-

Scythian sage of Solon's time (circa 590 B.C.); cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 55.

τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης
 265 τὸν ἄτεχνον διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν
 τεχνίτην διδάσκει μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον μήτε
 ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν
 ἄτεχνον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ
 διδάσκων ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδασκόμενος.

A'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙΣ ΜΑΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΤΡΟΠΟΣ

Μὴ ὄντος δὲ μήτε τοῦ μαθάνοντος μήτε τοῦ
 διδάσκοντος καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας παρ-
 266 ἔκει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπορείται.
 ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ἦτοι ἐναργεῖα
 γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργεῖα γίνεται οὔτε
 λόγῳ, καθάπερ παραστήσομεν· οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος ἄρα
 τῆς μαθήσεώς ἐστιν εὐπορος.

Ἐναργεῖα μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται διδασκαλία, ἐπεὶ
 τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια. τὸ δὲ δεικνύ-
 μενον πᾶσιν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἢ
 φαίνεται, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ ληπτόν· τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι
 ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ ἄρα τι ἐναργεῖα διδακτόν
 ἐστίν.

267 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ διδάσκεται τι. οὗτος γὰρ
 ἦτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν
 μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδασκαλικός. εἰ
 δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἦτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει.
 καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάν-
 των ἀκούοντας συνιέναι, οἷον Ἑλλήνας βαρβάρων

* Cf. i. 138, 178.

b Cf. ii. 214.

principles of the art. Hence, neither does the expert
 teach the non-expert. But if neither the expert 265
 teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non-
 expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert
 the non-expert, and these are all the alternatives
 possible, then neither the teacher exists nor the
 taught.

CHAPTER XXX.—DOES THERE EXIST ANY METHOD
 OF LEARNING ?

And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists,
 the method of teaching also is abolished. And it is no 266
 less disputed on the following grounds. The method
 of teaching comes to exist either by ocular evidence
 or by speech^a; but it does not come to exist either
 by ocular evidence or by speech, as we shall show;
 therefore the method of learning also is not easy to
 discover.

Now teaching does not come by ocular evidence,
 since ocular evidence consists in things exhibited.
 But what is exhibited is apparent to all; and the
 apparent, *qua* apparent, is perceptible by all; and
 what is perceptible by all in common is incapable of
 being taught; therefore nothing is capable of being
 taught by ocular evidence.

Nor, in fact, is anything taught by speech. For 267
 speech either signifies something or signifies nothing.
 But if it signifies nothing, neither will it be capable
 of teaching anything. And if it signifies some-
 thing, it does so either by nature or by conven-
 tion. But it is not significant by nature^b because
 all men do not understand all when they hear
 them, as is the case with Greeks hearing barbarians

- 268 καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων. θέσει δὲ εἰ σημαίνει, δηλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι ἀντιλήφονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἄπερ ἠγνόουν, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦτα ἄπερ ᾗδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρήζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως, καὶ μὴ εἰδότες καθ' ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ λέξεις τεταγ-
 269 μέναι, οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν ἔξουσιν. διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ὑποστήναι δύναίτο ἄν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκων κατάληψιν τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς διδασκομένης τέχνης ἐμποιεῖν ὀφείλει τῷ μαθητῶντι, ἵνα οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸ σύστημα τούτων καταλαβὼν τεχνίτης γένηται. οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι κατάληψις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ὑφεστάναι δύναται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι μήτε ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μαθητῶν μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὔτε μάθησις ἔστιν οὔτε διδασκαλία.
- 270 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κοινότερον ἐπικεχίρηται περὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας· ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπορεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς λεγομένης περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι τέχνης. οἷον γοῦν τὸ μὲν διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τουτέστι τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀνυπόστατον ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν· ἀνυπόστατος δὲ ἔστι καὶ ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μαθητῶν. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον διδάξει τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα· οὐδεὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδένα διδάσκει· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λεγομένη
 271 τέχνη. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως περιττὸν καὶ λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα διδάσκει

talk or barbarians hearing Greeks. And if it 268 is significant by convention, evidently those who have grasped beforehand the objects to which the several words are assigned will perceive those objects, not through being taught by the words things of which they were ignorant, but by recollecting and recovering things which they knew; whereas those who require to learn what they do not know, and who are ignorant of the objects to which the words are assigned, will have no perception of anything. Consequently, the method of learning also will be 269 incapable of subsisting. For, in fact, the teacher ought to impart to the learner an apprehension of the principles of the art he is teaching, so that the latter by apprehending them as a system may thus become an expert artist. But, as we have shown above,^a apprehension is nothing; therefore also the method of teaching cannot subsist. But if neither the matter taught exists, nor the teacher and the learner, nor the method of learning, then neither learning exists nor teaching.

Such, then, are the objections put forward regard- 270 ing learning and teaching in general. And the same difficulties may also be alleged in the case of the so-called art of living. Thus, for instance, we have shown above^b that the matter taught, namely prudence, is non-existent; and both the teacher and the learner are non-existent. For either the prudent man will teach the prudent the art of living, or the imprudent the imprudent, or the imprudent the prudent, or the prudent the imprudent; but none of these teaches any other; therefore the so-called art of living is not taught. Probably it is superfluous 271 even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent

^a Cf. § 214.

^b Cf. §§ 240 ff.

τὴν φρόνησιν, ἣ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν ἄγνοιαν ἔχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ἄγνοιαν δὲ τούτων ἔχων πάντως διδάσκοντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ γνώσεται δὲ ταῦτα. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστῶς, ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων θεωρητικῆ. οὐχὶ δέ γε τούτων κατὰ αὐτοὺς ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεωρητικῆ καθέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄφρων ἐστὶ φρόνιμος. ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως¹ λόγον. μὴ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ μήτε ἔναργεία μήτε διὰ λόγου δύναται διδάσκεσθαι, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας ἐγίνεται τινι ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένη τέχνη μήτε φύσει, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένη τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.

273 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίη τις ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐγγίνεσθαι τινι τὴν ὄνειροπολουμένην τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, βλαβερὰ καὶ παραχῆς αἰτία φανήσεται μᾶλλον τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν ἢ ὠφέλιμος.

ΛΑ'.—Εἰ ὠφελει ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴν

Αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν εἴπωμεν, ὠφελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τὸν σοφὸν

¹ τῆς φρονήσεως Mutsch.: τῆς μαθήσεως Bekk.: τήσεως mss.: τῆς ζητήσεως T.

man teaches prudence to the imprudent, and prudence is "knowledge^a of things good and evil and neither," the imprudent man, as he does not possess prudence, possesses ignorance of the things that are good and evil and neither; and since he possesses nothing but ignorance thereof, when the prudent man teaches him what things are good and evil and neither, he will merely hear what is said and will not get to know the things. For if he should grasp them while in a state of imprudence, then imprudence too will be capable of perceiving what things are good and evil and neither. But, according to them, im- 272 prudence is certainly not capable of perceiving these things, since, if it were, the imprudent man will be prudent. Therefore, according to the definition of prudence, the imprudent man does not grasp what is said or done by the prudent. And, as he fails to grasp, he will not be taught by him, especially since, as we have said above, he cannot be taught either by ocular evidence or by means of speech. But, in fine, if the so-called art of living is not imparted to anyone either by means of learning and teaching or by nature, then the art of living, so harped on by the philosophers, is indiscoverable.

Yet even were one to grant, as an act of bounty, 273 that this visionary art of living is imparted to someone, it will show itself to be hurtful to its possessors, and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.

CHAPTER XXXI.—DOES THE ART OF LIVING
BENEFIT ITS POSSESSOR?

Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out of many by way of example—the art of living might

* Cf. § 168.

ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρεχο-
 μένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 274 ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς. ὁ οὖν λεγόμενος κατ'
 αὐτοὺς ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται
 ἐγκρατὴς καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γίνεται ὀρμῇ τῇ
 πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 ἢ καθόσον εἶχε μὲν φαύλας ὀρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς,
 275 περιεκράτει δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν
 τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ἐγκρατὴς· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσῃ οὐ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ ὡς
 οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατὴ πρὸς ἀφρο-
 δίσια καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων
 ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἐπιζήτησις αὐτοῖς γίνε-
 ται τῶν τοιούτων, ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστῶσι
 τῆς ἐπιζήτησεως) τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν
 ἐγκρατὴ ρητέον διὰ τὸ μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πάθος
 276 οὐ ἔσται ἐγκρατὴς. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιόσουσιν
 αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατὴ καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν
 φαύλαις κρίσεσιν περιγίνεται δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ,
 πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσιν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἢ
 φρόνησις, ἀκμὴν ἐν ταραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας
 δεόμενον, εἶτα καὶ κακοδαμονέστερος τῶν φαύλων
 λεγομένων εὐρίσκειται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὀρμᾷ ἐπί τι,
 πάντως ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ περικρατεῖ τῷ λόγῳ,
 συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον
 ταράσσεται τοῦ φαύλου ἐκείνου μηκέτι τοῦτο

* For the Stoic definition of this virtue cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 153. It denotes "self-mastery" by which the rational self (or "Logos") overcomes the irrational appetites and passions.

^b Cf. § 177 for the Stoic use of "inclination" and "aversion" as ethical terms. The Stoic ideal being complete

be thought to benefit the wise man by furnishing him with temperance^a in his impulses towards good and repulsions from evil. He, then, who is termed by 274 them a temperate sage is called temperate either in virtue of his never feeling the impulse towards good or repulsion from evil,^b or in virtue of his possessing slight impulses in either direction and overcoming them by reason. But in respect of his freedom from 275 bad resolutions he will not be self-controlled; for he will not control what he does not possess. And just as one would not call a eunuch temperate in sex-indulgence, or a man with a poor stomach temperate in respect of the pleasures of the table (for they feel no attraction at all towards such things, so that they might rise superior to the attraction through temperance),—in the same way we ought not to term the sage temperate, because he possesses no natural feeling over which he may exercise control. And 276 if they shall claim that he is temperate in virtue of his forming bad resolutions but overcoming them by reason, then, firstly, they will be admitting that prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was in a state of perturbation and needed assistance, and, secondly, he is found to be even more unfortunate than those they term bad.^c For if he feels an impulse towards anything, he is certainly perturbed; while if he overcomes it by reason, he retains the evil, and because of this he is more perturbed than the bad man who no longer experiences this feeling;

absence of passion and emotion ("apathy"), the less "temperance" a man exercised the better he was. "The Sage," being a purely rational self, needs no "self-mastery." Cf. *Intro.* p. xxviii.

^c The "not-wise" of the Stoics, cf. § 251.

277 πάσχοντος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὄρμη, ταρασσεται, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, παύεται τῆς ταραχῆς.

Οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἴπερ γίνεται, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κακοδαιμονέστατος, ὥστε οὐκ ὠφέλειαν ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν αὐτῷ μεγίστην ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον παρέσχε τέχνη. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομίζων ἔχειν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπεγνωκέναι τίνα τὴν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τίνα φαῦλα, ταρασσεται σφόδρα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ παρόντων καὶ τῶν κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν.

278 λεκτέον οὖν ὅτι εἰ μήτε ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ὑπόστασις ὁμολογεῖται, ἢ τε περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑφεστάναι δοθείη καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν παρέχει, τούναντίον δὲ ταραχὰς αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ μεγίστας, μάτην ὠφρῶσθαι δοκοῖεν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ κὰν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας.

279 Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου συμμετρῶς ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθόντες, ἐνταῦθα περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ τρίτον σύνταγμα καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων σπουδάσμα, ἐκείνο ἐπιπόντες.

ΛΒ'.—ΔΙΑ ΤΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΕΝΙΟΤΕ ΑΜΤΑΡΟΤΣ
ΤΑΙΣ ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΣΙΝ ΕΒΡΩΤΑΝ ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΤΕΙ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ

280 Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπος εἶναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σω-

^a Cf. §§ 236 f. *supra*, i. 27.

^b Cf. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258.

for the latter, though he is perturbed if he is feeling 277 an impulse, yet ceases from his perturbation if he gains his desires.

So, then, the sage does not become temperate in virtue of his prudence; or if he does become so, he is of all men the most miserable, so that the art of living has brought him no benefit but the uttermost perturbation. And we have shown above ^a that the man who believes that he possesses the art of living, and that by means of it he discerns what things are naturally good and what bad, is extremely perturbed both when good things are his and when evil things. We must, then, declare that, if there is no agreement 278 as to the existence of things good and bad and indifferent, and the art of living is possibly non-existent, or—if its existence is provisionally admitted—brings no benefit to its possessors but, on the contrary, causes them extreme perturbations, then the Dogmatists would seem to be vainly puffed up in respect of the so-called Ethical division of what they term “philosophy.”

Having now treated of the subject of Ethics also 279 at sufficient length for an account in outline, we conclude at this point our third book, and with it the complete treatise on “Pyrrhonian Outlines,” adding only this final section:

CHAPTER XXXII.—WHY THE SCEPTIC SOMETIMES PURPOSELY PROPOUNDS ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE LACKING IN POWER OF PERSUASION

The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind, desires to 280 cure by speech, as best he can, the self-conceit and rashness ^b of the Dogmatists. So, just as the

ματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κούφωτερα, καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους
 281 ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος ἐπὶ τῶν σφόδρα τῇ προπετείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ κούφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κούφοτέρων πιθανότητων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὅτε μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖς πιθανότησιν ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἁμαυροτέρους φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συν-ερωτᾶν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ὀρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.

physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies which differ in strength, and apply the severe ones to those whose ailments are severe and the milder to those mildly affected,—so too the Sceptic propounds arguments which differ in strength, and employs those 281 which are weighty and capable by their stringency of disposing of the Dogmatists' ailment, self-conceit, in cases where the mischief is due to a severe attack of rashness, while he employs the milder arguments in the case of those whose ailment of conceit is superficial and easy to cure, and whom it is possible to restore to health by milder methods of persuasion. Hence the adherent of Sceptic principles does not scruple to propound at one time arguments that are weighty in their persuasiveness, and at another time such as appear less impressive,—and he does so on purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to enable him to effect his object.