

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

III

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS



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PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume contains the two books "Against the Physicists" (commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* iii., iv., or *Adversus Mathematicos* ix., x.) and the single book "Against the Ethicists" (cited as *Adv. Dogm.* v., or *Adv. Math.* xi.). The authorities for the text are the same as those for "Against the Logicians," viz. the manuscripts L, E, and N (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii, and Vol. II. Prefatory Note).

The Glossary is designed to include Greek words, phrases, and usages which are technical or rare or otherwise noteworthy.

In this, as in the previous volumes, the text is based on that of Bekker, the chief deviations being indicated in the footnotes.

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

ΠΡΟΣ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥΣ

A

- 1 Τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν μετὰ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν ἡμῶν ἄγεται τὸ φυσικόν, καίπερ χρόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων προήκειν δοκοῦν, ἀνώτερον ὑπεμνήσαμεν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ζητήσεως πάλιν ἐνταῦθα συστησόμεθα, οὐκ ἐμβραδύνοντες τοῖς κατὰ μέρος, ὅποιόν τι πεποιήκασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλειτόμαχον καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν χορὸς (εἰς ἄλλοτριαν γὰρ ὕλην ἐμβάντες καὶ ἐπὶ συγχωρήσει τῶν ἑτεροίως δογματιζομένων ποιούμενοι τοὺς λόγους ἀμέτρως ἐμήκυναν τὴν ἀντίρρησην), ἀλλὰ τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ συνεκτικώτατα κινουῦντες, ἐν οἷς ἠπορημένα ἔξομεν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.
- 2 καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις οἱ τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους ὑπορύξαντες τούτῳ συγκαταφερομένου ἔχουσι τοὺς πύργους, οὕτως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσόφοις σκέψαι τὰς πρώτας τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποθέσεις χειρωσάμενοι δυνάμει τὴν παντὸς πράγματος κατάληψιν ἠθετήκασιν. οὐκ ἀπιθάνως γοῦν τινὲς ἀπεικάζουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ζητήσεις συγκαταβαίνοντας τοῖς ἐκ ποδὸς τὸ

* See *Adv. Log.* i. 20 ff.

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

BOOK I

WE have explained above^a the reason why the physical division of philosophy is being examined by us after the logical, although in point of time it seems to precede all the other divisions; and with regard to it we shall pursue again the same method of inquiry, and not delay long on particular points as Cleitomachus^b has done and the rest of the Academic troupe (for by plunging into alien subject matter and framing their arguments on the basis of assent to dogmatic assumptions not their own they have unduly prolonged their counter-statement); instead of this, we shall attack the most important and most comprehensive dogmas, as in the doubts cast on these we shall find the rest also included. For just as, in a siege, those who have undermined the foundation of a wall find that the towers tumble down along with it,^c so too in philosophical investigations those who have routed the primary assumptions on which the theories are based have potentially abolished the apprehension of every particular theory. Thus it is not without plausibility that some people compare those who join in plunging into inquiries into par-

^a The disciple of Carneades, *cf.* Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxiii.

^b *Cf. P.H.* ii. 84.

θηρίον διώκουσι κυνηγοῖς ἢ ἀπὸ ὀρμῆς ἀλείουσαι ἢ ἰξῶ καὶ καλάμῳ τοὺς ὄρνιθας θηρεύουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν συνεκτικωτάτων πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους σαλεύοντας τοῖς λῖνα καὶ στάλικας καὶ σαγήνας περιβαλλομένοις. ὄθεν ὡς πολλῶ τεχνικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον θήραμα πονεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ μιᾶς ἐφόδου πολλὰ δύνασθαι ἀγρεύειν, οὕτω πολλῶ χαριέστερον τὸ κοινῇ κατὰ πάντων κομίζεω ἀντίρρησι τοῦ προσελεύεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ μέρος.

- 4 Ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀκριβέστερον κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περὶ τῶν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχῶν διατετάχθαι τὰς μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν δραστηρίους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς δὲ ὑλικὰς (ὧν τῆς δόξης ἀρχηγὸς ἀξιοῦται τυγχάνειν ὁ ποιητὴς Ὀμηρὸς καὶ μετὰ τοῦτόν γε Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς,—
- 5 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ποιητὴς περὶ τούτων ἀποδιδούς φησιν ἐν οἷς περὶ Πρωτέως καὶ Εἰδοθεᾶς ἀλληγορεῖ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχικώτατον αἴτιον Πρωτέα καλῶν, τὴν δὲ εἰς εἶδη τρεπομένην οὐσίαν Εἰδοθεᾶν.
- 6 ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ἦν πάντα ὁμοῦ χρήματα, νοῦς δὲ ἔλθων αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν, τὸν μὲν νοῦν, ὃς ἐστι κατ' αὐτὸν θεός, δραστήριον ὑποτιθέμενος ἀρχὴν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν πολυμυγίαν
- 7 ὑλικήν. ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἐρμότιμόν φησι τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Παρμενίδην τὸν Ἐλεάτην καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὸν Ἡσίοδον ταῦτα φρονεῖν κατασκευάζοντες γὰρ τὴν τῶν ὄλων γένεσιν ἔρωτα

* Cf. P.H. iii. 1.

^b See Homer, *Odys.* iv. 365 ff. The allegorizing (absurdly ascribed to Homer) is based on etymology (Πρωτεύς from πρῶτος, and εἰδοθεᾶ from εἶδη, "particulars").

particulars to hunters who pursue the quarry on foot or men who fish with a line or catch birds with bird-lime on a cane; whereas those who call in question all the particulars by starting with the most comprehensive postulates, they compare to men who surround (their prey) with lines and stakes and drag-nets. Hence, as it shows much more art to be able to catch a great number with a single onset than to hunt after the game laboriously one by one, so too it is much more artistic to bring one's counter-argument against all in common rather than to develop it against the particular tenets.

Seeing, then, that those who, in the department of 4 Physics, seem to have classified most precisely the principles of the Universe declare that some of these are efficient, others material,^a—and it is claimed that the originators of their opinion was the poet Homer, who was followed by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Empedocles of Acragas and a vast number of others. For the poet makes a statement about these prin- 5 ciples where he speaks allegorically about Proteus and Eidothea,^b calling the first and most original cause "Proteus," and the substance which turns into particulars "Eidothea." And Anaxagoras says— 6 "All things were together, and Mind came and set them in order," assuming that Mind, which according to him is God, is the efficient principle, and the mixture of homoeomerics^c the material principle. And Aristotle^d says that Hermotimus of Clazomenae 7 and Parmenides of Elea and, much earlier, Hesiod held this view; for in picturing the birth of all things

^a i.e. "things with like parts"—Aristotle's name for the material "elements" of Anaxagoras. Cf. P.H. iii. 32.

^d See Aristot. *Metaph.* I. 3, 984 b 18 ff. Hermotimus was an early Ionian physicist (date uncertain).

συμπαρέλαβον, τουτέστι τὴν κινήτικὴν καὶ συν-
8 αγωγὸν τῶν ὄντων αἰτίαν, ὃ μὲν Ἡσίοδος λέγων

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ,
ἦδ' ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν,

9 ὃ δὲ Παρμενίδης ῥητῶς ἀποφηνάμενος

πρῶτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μῆγίστατο πάντων.

10 δόξαι δ' ἄν, ὡς προείπον, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τοιοῦτος
εἶναι· σὺν γὰρ τοῖς τέσσαρσι στοιχείοις τὸ νεῖκος
καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καταριθμεῖται, τὴν μὲν φιλίαν ὡς
συναγωγὸν αἰτίαν, τὸ δὲ νεῖκος ὡς διαλυτικὴν·

“ πῦρ ” γάρ φησι “ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος
ἦπιον ὕψος,
νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
καὶ φιλότης μετὰ τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε.

11 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες
ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄπειον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν
ὑπειλήφασιν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι).

12 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοιαύτη τις ἔστι παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν
φυσικῶν διάταξις, φέρε περὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀρ-
χῶν διαπορῶμεν πρῶτον, σκεπτόμενοι ὅτε μὲν οἷον
δογματικῶς περὶ θεοῦ, ὅτε δὲ ἀπορητικώτερον
περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον. ἀλλ'
ἐπεὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ζήτησιν προτάσσεται ἡ τοῦ ζητου-
μένου πράγματος νόησις, ἴδωμεν πῶς εὐθὺς ἔννοιαν
ἐλάβομεν θεοῦ.

they joined in introducing Love (that is to say, the
moving and unifying cause of existents); as when 8
Hesiod says ^a—

Verily first created of all was Chaos, thereafter
Earth broad-bosom'd, unshakable seat of all things for
^{ever,}
Aye and Love, who of all the immortal gods is the
fairest—

and Parmenides, when he expressly declares that 9

Love was the first of the gods whom she in her wisdom
created.

And, as I said before, Empedocles would seem to hold 10
a like view; for he enumerates Strife and Love along
with his four elements (Love as a unifying, Strife as a
disintegrating cause), saying—

Fire and water and earth, and soft air reaching to heaven,
Strife pernicious, divided from these, and evenly balanc'd,^b
Love, together with these, in length and in breadth ever
equal.

Moreover, the Stoics also, when they declare that 11
there are two principles, God and unqualified matter,
suppose that God acts and that matter is passive and
altered:—seeing then that some such classification is 12
made by the best of the Physicists, come and let us
first express our doubts about the efficient principles,
arguing on the one hand dogmatically concerning
God, and on the other hand more sceptically concern-
ing the non-existence of anything active or passive.
But since, in regard to every inquiry, the conception
of the subject of inquiry must come first, let us con-
sider how exactly we acquired the notion of God.

^a See Hesiod, *Theog.* 116 ff.

^b Lit. “equal in weight every way,” “in perfect equi-
poise,” i.e. symmetrical (like “Love” in the next line).

13 Ὁ περὶ θεῶν λόγος πάνυ ἀναγκαιότατος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δογματικῶς φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἐντεῦθεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. ὅθεν ἐὰν παραστήσωμεν ἡμεῖς ἡγορημένην τὴν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ζήτησιν, δυνάμει ἐσόμεθα κατεσκευακότες τὸ μῆτε τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων μῆτε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτήδευσιν σοφίας.

14 Ἔνιοι τοῖνυν ἔφασαν τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προστάνας καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ βίῳ σκεψαμένους, πάνυ συνετοὺς ὄντας, ἀναπλάσαι τὴν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπόνοιαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν
15 ἐν αἶδο μυθεομένων δόξαν. θηριώδους γὰρ καὶ ἀτάκτου γεγονότος τοῦ πάλαι βίου (ἦν γὰρ χρόνος, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ὀρφεύς,

ἦνίκα φῶτες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων βίον εἶχον
σαρκοδακῆ, κρείττων δὲ τὸν ἥττονα φῶτ' ἐδάϊζεν)

ἐπισχεῖν βουλόμενοι τοὺς ἀδικούντας πρῶτον μὲν νόμους ἔθεντο πρὸς τὸ τοὺς φανερώς ἀδικούντας
16 κολάζεσθαι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ θεοὺς ἀνέπλασαν ἐπόπτας πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμαρτημάτων τε καὶ κατορθωμάτων, ἵνα μηδὲ κρύφα τολμῶσί τι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πεπεισμένοι ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ

ἡέρα ἐσόσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶσιν ἐπ' αἶαν,
ἀνθρώπων ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας ἐφορῶντες.

17 Εὐδήμερος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς ἄθεος φησὶν "ὅτ' ἦν

The doctrine concerning Gods certainly seems to 13 the Dogmatic philosophers to be most necessary. Hence they assert that "philosophy is the practice of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human." Accordingly, if we shall establish the doubtfulness of the inquiry concerning Gods, we shall virtually have demonstrated that neither is wisdom the knowledge of divine and human things, nor philosophy the practice of wisdom.

Some, then, have asserted that those who first led 14 mankind and considered what is of profit for life, being men of great intelligence, invented both the fancy about the Gods and the belief in the mythical events in Hades. For, since life in old times was brutish and 15 disorderly (for, as Orpheus says,—

There was a time when ev'ry man liv'd by devouring his fellow

Cannibal-wise, and the stronger man did feast on the weaker),—purposing to check the wrongdoers they laid down laws, in the first place, for the punishing of such as were manifestly doing wrong, and after this they also 16 invented Gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret, believing that the Gods

Cloaked in garments of mist all over the earth go roaming, Watching the violent doings of men and their lawful behaviour.^a

And Euhemerus, nick-named "the Atheist,"^b says— 17

^a Cf. for the 1st verse Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 255; for the 2nd, Homer, *Odys.* xvii. 487.

^b Euhemerus was probably a Sicilian, and lived at the court of Cassander, king of Macedonia (circa 315 B.C.). He was chiefly noted as the rationalizer of myths.

ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος, οἱ περιγεγόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύι τε καὶ συνέσει ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν κελεύόμενα πάντας βιοῦν, σπουδάζοντες μείζονος θαυμασμοῦ καὶ σεμνότητος τυχεῖν, ἀνέπλασαν περὶ αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλλουσάν τινα καὶ θείαν δύναμιν, ἔνθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνομισθησαν θεοί." Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ Κεῖος "ἤλιον," φησί, "καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελούντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον." καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δῆμητραν νομισθηῖναι, τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα, τὸ δὲ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον καὶ ἤδη τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον.

19 Δημόκριτος δὲ εἰδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιὰ (ἔνθεν καὶ εὐχετο¹ εὐλόγῳ² τυχεῖν εἰδῶλων), εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνᾶς ἀφιέντα. ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ ὑπενόησαν εἶναι θεόν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος θεοῦ

20 [τοῦ]³ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἐννοίαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγενῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχῆν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχῆν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς

"When the life of mankind was without order, those who so far excelled the rest in strength and intelligence that all men lived subservient to their commands, being intent to gain for themselves more admiration and veneration, invented for themselves a kind of superhuman and divine authority, and in consequence were by the populace accounted Gods." And Prodicus of Ceos^a says—"The ancients ac- 18 counted as Gods the sun and moon and rivers and springs and in general all the things that are of benefit for our life, because of the benefit derived from them, even as the Egyptians deify the Nile." And he says that it was for this reason that bread was worshipped as Demeter, and wine as Dionysus, and water as Poseidon, and fire as Hephaestus, and so on with each of the things that are good for use. And 19 Democritus says that certain images impinge on men, and of these some are beneficent, others maleficent (whence also he prayed that he might have "propitious images"), and these images are great and gigantic, and are hard to destroy although not indestructible, and they signify the future to men beforehand, as they are visible and utter sounds. Hence the ancients, on receiving a presentation of these images, supposed that God exists, God being none other than these images, and possessed of an indestructible nature. And Aristotle^b said that the 20 conception of Gods arose amongst mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. It arose from events which concern the soul because of the inspired states of the soul which occur in sleep and

¹ εὐχετο NLE: εὐχεται Bekk.

² εὐλόγῳ NLE: εὐλόγων Bekk.

³ [τοῦ] secl. Kayser.

^a Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xv; § 52 *infra*.

^b Aristot. *Prag.* 10 (Rose).

- 21 *μαντείας*. ὅταν γάρ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνοῦν καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωματίων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὅμηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποίηκε γὰρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς Ἑκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' Ἑκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησίν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεῖον,¹ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ εὐκὸς τῇ
- 22 *ψυχῇ* καὶ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολῶντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον.
- 23 Τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ φάσκοντες ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ὄξυς ὢν καὶ εὐκίνητος ἐν τῷ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἦλθε καὶ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὑπενόησέ τινα ὑπερβαλλόντως δύναμιν νοητικὴν, καὶ ἀναλογοῦσαν μὲν
- 24 *αὐτῷ* θεῖαν δὲ τὴν φύσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γινόμενων κατὰ τὸν κόσμον παραδόξων ὑπονοήσαντες εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἐληλυθέναι θεῶν, ἀφ' ἧς φαίνεται εἶναι δόξης καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος· ὁρῶντες γάρ, φησί, τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς κερανοῦς τε καὶ ἀστρων συνόδους ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψει, ἔδειματοῦντο, θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων
- 25 *αἰτίους* εἶναι. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς

because of prophecies. For, says he, when the soul 21 is by itself in sleep, then it takes on its own proper nature and prophesies and predicts the future. And it is in this state also when it is being separated from bodies at death. He certainly agrees that the poet Homer observed this fact; for Homer told of how Patroclus at the time of his death predicted the slaying of Hector, and Hector the end of Achilles.^a Owing, then, to these reasons (he says) men conceived the existence of some divinity, in itself like unto the soul and of all things the most intelligent. Moreover (they derived this conception) from celestial 22 phenomena also; for when they beheld the sun circling round in the day-time, and by night the orderly motion of the other stars, they supposed some God to be the cause of such motion and orderliness.^b

Such, then, was the view of Aristotle; but there 23 are others who assert that the mind, which is keen and mobile, while inspecting its own nature proceeded also to reflection on the Universe and conceived a Power superlatively cognitive, and analogous to itself but of a divine nature. And there are some 24 who have supposed that we have arrived at the conception of Gods from those events in the world which are marvellous; which opinion seems to have been held by Democritus, who says—"For when the men of old time beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as thunderings and lightnings, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and eclipses of sun and moon, they were affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the causes of these things." But Epicurus thinks that 25

^a See Homer, *Il.* xvi. 850 ff., xxii. 358 ff.

^b Cf. Lucret. v. 1183 ff.

¹ θεῖον N: θεόν cet., Bekk.

ὑπνους φαντασιῶν οἶται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔννοιαν ἔσπακέναι θεοῦ· μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνους προσπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινὰς τοιού-
26 τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομόρφους. ἔννοιαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὐτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγινόμενοι φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπινοίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἰδῆς εὔρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιούσαν,

ἰππήσας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν,
πεζοῦς δ' ἐξόπιθεν,

πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ διατάσσων τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκελευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτόν [ἐγ]κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἡρώων, ὃς ἦδει

κοσμηῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας,

27 καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἔμπειρος νεῶς, ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἰστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην, συνήσιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας κατὰγων,¹ οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως δρόμους σταδιεύοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς ταύτης διακοσμήσεως, οὐκ ἐκ αὐτομάτου στοχαζόμενοι

¹ κατὰγων N (cj. Bekk.): καταντῶν cet., Bekk.

men derived the conception of God from the presentations received in sleep; "for," says he, "when great images of human shape impressed them during sleep, they supposed that some such Gods of human shape really existed."^a And some have recourse to the 26 unalterable and orderly motion of the heavenly bodies, and say that the first beginning of conceptions about the Gods arose from this; for just as, if a man seated on Trojan Ida had been gazing at the host of the Greeks marching along the plain in splendid order and array—

Riding first, in the van, were the knights with their chariots and horses

Next came the men on foot; ^b—

such a man would certainly have arrived at the idea that there exists someone who orders this array and gives commands to the soldiers marshalled under him, such as Nestor (or some other hero) who understood how

Rightly to marshal the steeds and the warriors armed with bucklers.^c

And just as the man who is familiar with ships, as 27 soon as he sees in the distance a ship with a favouring wind behind it and with all its sails well set, concludes that there is somebody who directs its course and brings it into its appointed havens,—so too those who first looked up to heaven and beheld the sun running its courses from east to west and the orderly processions of the stars sought for the Artificer of this most beautiful array, conjecturing that it had not come

^a Cf. Lucret. v. 1168 ff.

^b See Homer, *Il.* iv. 297.

^c Homer, *Il.* ii. 554.

συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος καὶ
 28 ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, ἥτις ἦν θεός. τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων
 στωικῶν φασὶ τινες τοὺς πρώτους καὶ γηγενεῖς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν νῦν συνέσει δια-
 φέροντας γεγονέαι, ὡς πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν
 πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαιοτέρους (συμβλήσεως),¹ καὶ ἥρωας
 ἐκείνους ὡσπερ τι περιττὸν αἰσθητήριον σχόντας
 τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβεβληκέναι τῇ θείᾳ
 φύσει καὶ νοησαί τινας δυνάμεις θεῶν.

29 Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς
 φιλοσόφοις περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐνοίας ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα,
 οὐκ οἴομεθα δὲ αὐτὰ χρειαῖν ἔχειν ἀντιρρήσεως·
 τὸ γὰρ πολῦτροπον τῆς ἀποφάσεως τὴν ἀγνωσίαν
 τοῦ [παντός]² ἀληθοῦς ἐπισφραγίζεται, πολλῶν μὲν
 δυναμένων εἶναι τρόπων τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ νοήσεως,
 τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθοῦς μὴ καταλαμβανομένου.
 ὁμως δὲ κἂν ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ὑπομνήσεις
 χωρῶμεν, οὐδὲν εὐρεθήσεται τῶν εἰρημένων βέ-
 30 βαιον. αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν νομοθέτας τινὰς οἴομενοι
 καὶ συνετοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐμπεποιηκέναι τοῖς ἄλλοις
 τὴν περὶ θεῶν δόξαν οὐ πᾶν τι φαίνονται τῷ
 ζητουμένῳ προσβάλλειν. ἐζητεῖτο γὰρ ἀπὸ τίνος
 ἀρχῆς ὀρμηθέντες ἀνθρωποὶ ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ θεοῦς
 31 νομίζειν· οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοῦντές φασιν ὅτι νομοθέται
 τινὲς ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ θεῶν
 δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄπορον³ αὐτοῦς
 περιμένει, ζήτησαντος ἂν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομο-

¹ <συμβλήσεως> add. Hervetus ("sed plura exciderunt," Bekk.).

² [παντός] seclusi: πάντως cj. Rüstow.

³ ἄπορον Helntz: ἄτροπον mss., Bekk.

about spontaneously but by the agency of some superior and imperishable nature, which is God. And some of the later Stoics^a declare that the first 28 men, the sons of Earth, greatly surpassed the men of to-day in intelligence (as one may learn from a comparison of ourselves with the men of the past), and that those ancient heroes possessed, as it were, in the keenness of their intellect, an extra organ of sense and apprehended the divine nature and discerned certain powers of the Gods.

Such, then, are the statements of the Dogmatic 29 philosophers regarding the conception of the Gods; but we do not suppose that they call for refutation; for the variety of the modes of conception which they assume stamps them with ignorance of the truth; for while there can be many modes of conceiving God, that one of them which is true is not apprehended. Yet even were we to deal with the particular suggestions, none of the statements will be found to be well-grounded. Thus, for instance, those 30 who think that certain lawgivers and clever men implanted in the rest the belief in Gods do not appear at all to attack the problem. For the problem was—"from what starting-point did men set out when they arrived at a belief in Gods?"; whereas those 31 men make the irrelevant statement that certain lawgivers implanted in men this opinion about Gods, not seeing that they have the original difficulty still remaining, when someone may inquire "But how did

^a e.g. Seneca, *Epist.* 90 "sed primi mortalium quique ex his geniti naturam incorrupti sequebantur . . . non tamen negaverim fuisse alti spiritus viros et, ut ita dicam, a dis recentes"; cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* xv. 69—

nam genus hoc vivo iam decrescebat Homero,
 terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos.

θέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος αὐτοῖς θεοῦς,
 32 ἦλλον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν θεῶν; εἴτα πάντες μὲν
 ἄνθρωποι τούτων ἔχουσιν ἔννοιαν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως
 δέ, ἀλλὰ Πέρσαι μὲν, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, τὸ πῦρ θεο-
 φοροῦσιν, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο
 τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἀπίθανόν τε ἦν πάντας ἀνθρώ-
 πους ὑπὸ τῶν νομοθετῶν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντας
 ἀκοῦσαι τι περὶ θεῶν· ἀνεπίμικτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων φύλα καὶ ἄγνωστά γε, κατὰ τὴν ναυ-
 τιλίαν δὲ τὴν Ἀργῶ πρωτόπλου τι σκάφος διὰ
 33 τῆς ἱστορίας παρειλήφμεν. ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως τις
 πρὸ τούτων πάντων φήσει ὅτι οἱ παρ' ἐκάστοις
 νομοθεταὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες ἀνέπλασαν τὴν τοιαύτην
 νόησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοι ἄλλους θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν
 ὑπέλαβον. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθές· κοινὴν γὰρ πάντων
 πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεοῦ, καθ'
 ἦν μακάριόν τι ἐστὶ ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον
 ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον,
 τελέως δὲ ἐστὶν ἄλογον τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς
 οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι. οὐ τοίνυν θέσει οὐδὲ κατὰ τινα
 νομοθεσίαν παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν
 εἶναι θεοῦς.

34 Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 ἡγεμονεύσαντας καὶ διοικητὰς τῶν κοινῶν πραγ-
 μάτων γενομένους, πλείονα δύναμιν αὐτοῖς περι-
 θέντας καὶ τιμὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑπακοῦειν τὰ πλήθη,
 τούτους χρόνῳ τελευτήσαντας θεοὺς ὑποληφθῆναι,
 πάλιν οὐ συνιᾶσι τὸ ζητούμενον. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ εἰς
 θεοὺς ἀνάγοντες αὐτοὺς πῶς ἔννοιαν ἔλαβον θεῶν
 εἰς ἣν αὐτοὺς ἐνέταξαν; τοῦτο γὰρ δεόμενον ἀπο-

the lawgivers arrive at the conception of Gods, when nobody before had given them any tradition about Gods?"—Further, all men possess a conception of 32 Gods, but not in the same way; thus the Persians, for example, deify fire, the Egyptians water, and others other things of that sort. It is improbable, too, that all men should have been assembled together by the lawgivers to hear something about the Gods; for the tribes of mankind were not mixed together but unknown to one another, and it has been handed down to us by history that, as regards voyaging, the Argo was the first bark to sail the seas. Yes, but before 33 all this, someone perhaps will say, the lawgivers and leaders of each tribe invented this conception, and on this account different peoples conceived the existence of different Gods. But this is silly; for, on the contrary, all men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil, and it is quite contrary to reason that all men should apprehend the same characteristics by chance instead of gaining these impressions naturally. Hence, the men of old times did not accept the existence of Gods by convention or owing to legislation.

And those who say that the men who first led man- 34 kind and were the controllers of their public affairs, decked themselves with greater power and honour in order to secure the obedience of the multitude, and afterwards, when they died, were regarded as Gods,—they again fail to understand the problem. For how did the men who raised themselves to the position of Gods obtain that conception of the gods under which they ranked themselves? For this point,

35 δείξεως παρείται. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπίθανόν ἐστι τὸ
 ἀξιούμενον. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων γινόμενα,
 καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τὰ ψευδῆ, ζῶσι μόνον συμπαρα-
 μένει τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τελευτησάντων δὲ ἀναιρεῖται,
 καὶ πάρεστι πολλοὺς ἐπελθεῖν τοὺς παρὰ μὲν τὸν
 τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἐκθειαςθέντας, εἰ μὴ τινὰς προση-
 γορίας θεῶν ὑποστέλλοιεν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ὁ
 36 ἐξ Ἀλκμήνης καὶ Διός. ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς
 φασίν, Ἀλκαῖος τοῦνομα, ὑπέδραμε δὲ τὴν Ἡρα-
 κλέους προσηγορίαν νομιζομένου παρὰ τοῖς τότε
 θεοῦ. ὅθεν καὶ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις λόγος ἔχει πάλαι
 ποτὲ ἀνδριάντα ἴδιον Ἡρακλέους εὐρήσθαι ἐπι-
 γραφὴν ἔχοντα "Ἀλκαῖος Ἀμφιτρύωνος Ἡρακλεῖ
 37 χαριστήριον." καὶ τοὺς Τυνδαρίδας δὲ φασὶ τὴν
 τῶν Διοσκούρων δόξαν ὑπελθεῖν πάλιν νομιζομένων
 εἶναι θεῶν· τὰ γὰρ δύο ἡμισφαίρια, τό τε ὑπὲρ γῆν
 καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν, Διοσκόρους οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν τότε
 ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγον. διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο
 αἰνιττόμενός φησιν ἐπ' αὐτῶν

ἄλλοτε μὲν ζώουσι ἑτερήμεροι, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
 τεθνᾶσι, τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασι ἴσα θεοῖσιν.

πίλους τ' ἐπιτιθέασιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτους
 ἀστέρας, αἰνισσόμενοι τὴν τῶν ἡμισφαιρίων κατα-
 38 σκευήν. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ὑποδραμόντες τὴν τῶν
 θεῶν τιμὴν ἐκράτησάν πως τῆς προθέσεως, οἱ δὲ
 αὐτόθεν αὐτοὺς ἀναγορεύσαντες θεοὺς κατεφρο-
 νήθησαν μᾶλλον.

^a i.e. Castor and Pollux, sons of Tyndareus by Leda. Note
 that the Greek words here rendered by "assume" imply
 sheltering oneself or hiding one's identity (under a divine

which needs explanation, is passed over. More- 35
 over, the view thus maintained is improbable. For
 the things done by leaders,—and especially such
 things as are false,—remain unaltered only during
 the life-time of the leaders, and at their death are
 done away, and one may meet with many who
 were counted as Gods during their life-time but
 were despised after their death, unless they had
 assumed some divine appellation, like Heracles the
 son of Zeus and Alcmena. For originally, as they say, 36
 his name was Alcaeus, but he assumed the appella-
 tion of Heracles, who was regarded as a God by the
 men of that age. Hence, too, there is a story that at
 Thebes long ago a private statue of Heracles was
 discovered bearing the inscription "Alcaeus, son of
 Amphitryon, as a thank-offering to Heracles." And 37
 they say that the sons of Tyndareus ^a assumed the
 title of "Dioscuri," who likewise were reputed to be
 Gods; for the wise men of that time called the two
 hemispheres, that above the earth and that below the
 earth, "Dioscuri." Wherefore also the poet, in
 riddling allusion to this, says about them ^b—

Living on one day, dying the next, in alternate succession—
 So they exist, and honour is theirs no less than the Godhead's.

And they set caps of felt ^c upon them, and upon these
 stars, symbolizing the construction of the hemi-
 spheres. Those, then, who thus assumed the rank of 38
 these Gods somehow secured that pre-eminence, but
 those who openly proclaimed themselves Gods in
 their own right were, instead, despised.

title already recognized, as contrasted with claiming divinity
 in one's own name, see § 38).

^b See Homer, *Odys.* xi. 303 f.

^c Cf. Catullus xxxvii. 2, where C. and P. are called "pil-
 leati fratres."

39 Καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι πάντα τὰ τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦντα ὑπενόησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ποταμούς τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, σὺν τῷ ἀπιθάνου προΐστασθαι δόξης ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω εὐήθειαν καταψηφίζονται τῶν ἀρχαίων. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐκείνους ἀφρονάς εἶναι ὥστε τὰ ὀφθαλμοφανῶς φθειρόμενα ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι θεοὺς ἢ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτῶν κατεσθιομένοις καὶ διαλυομένοις θείαν προσμαρτυρεῖν δύναμιν. τινὰ μὲν γὰρ λόγου ἴσως ἔχεται, καθάπερ 40 τὸ τὴν γῆν θεὸν νομίζω, οὐ τὴν ἀλλακοτομουμένην ἢ ἀνασκαπτομένην οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν διήκουσαν ἐν αὐτῇ δύναμιν καὶ καρποφόρον φύσιν καὶ ὄντως δαιμονιωτάτην. τὸ δὲ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλα συνωφελεῖν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν, ἠγείσθαι θεοὺς οὐδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ἐμβροντησίας ἀπο- 41 λέλοιπεν. οὕτω γὰρ ἐχρῆν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἠγείσθαι θεοὺς, συνωφελοῦσι γὰρ ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, τῶν τε ἀλόγων ζώων τὰ πολλά, συνεργοποιεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν, τὰ τε κατ' οἰκίας [ζῶα] σκευὴ τε καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι τούτων ἐστὶ ταπεινότερον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε σφόδρα ἐστὶ γελοία· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκκειμένην δόξαν ῥητέον ἕγι τυγχάνειν.

42 Ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος τὸ ἦττον ἄπορον διὰ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπόρου διδάσκων ἀπιστος ἐστίν. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πῶς νόησιν θεῶν ἔσχον ἀνθρωποὶ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἢ φύσιν δίδωσιν ἀφορμὰς· τὸ δὲ εἰδῶλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπερφυτῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφὰς καὶ καθόλου τοιαῦτα

Again, those who say ^a that the ancients supposed 39 that all the things which benefit life are Gods,—such as the sun and moon, rivers and lakes, and the like,—are not only defending an improbable view but also convicting the ancients of the utmost stupidity. For it is not likely that they were so foolish as to imagine that things they saw perishing before their eyes are Gods, or that they attributed divine power to things which were being devoured by themselves and dissolved. For some things, perhaps, are reasonable, 40 such as believing the Earth to be divine,—not that substance which is plowed into furrows or dug up, but the power which pervades it and its fruitful, and really most divine, nature. But to suppose that lakes and rivers, and whatsoever else is of a nature to be useful to us, are Gods surpasses the height of lunacy. For, on this showing, one ought also to believe that 41 men, and especially philosophers, are Gods (for they help to benefit our life), and most of the irrational animals (for they co-operate with us), and our domestic furniture and whatsoever else there is of a still more humble kind. But all this is extremely ludicrous; so that one must declare that the view set forth is not sound.

Nor is Democritus ^b to be credited in that he 42 explains the less doubtful by the more doubtful. For nature supplies a great number and variety of facts which go to explain how men acquired the conception of Gods; but the notion that “there exist in the circumambient gigantic images of human shape,”

^a *e.g.* Prodicus, see § 18 *supra*.

^b *Cf.* § 19 *supra*; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xii. “The circumambient” is the air around us.

ὅποια βούλεται αὐτῷ ἀναπλάττειν Δημόκριτος, παντελῶς ἐστὶ δυσπαράδεκτον.

43 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἔνεστι λέγειν, οἰόμενον ὅτι κατὰ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους φαντασίας τῶν ἀνθρωπομόρφων εἰδώλων ἐνοήθησαν θεοί· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τούτων νόησις ἐγίγνετο
44 θεῶν ἢ ὑπερφυῶν ἀνθρώπων; καὶ καθόλου καὶ πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐκκειμένας δόξας ἐνέσται λέγειν ὅτι οὐ κατὰ ψιλὸν μέγεθος ἀνθρωποειδοῦς ζῶον νόησι θεοῦ λαμβάνουσι ἀνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ μακάριον εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προφερόμενον. ἄπερ οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς ἢ πῶς ἐπενοήθη παρὰ τοῖς πρῶτον ἔννοιαν σπάσσαι θεοῦ, οἱ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους αἰτιώμενοι φαντασίας καὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων εὐταξίαν.

45 Οἱ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο φασιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς νοήσεως τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν γέγονεν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνου ἰνδαλλομένων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον θεωρουμένων, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ παρήλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν. ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ νόησιν ἔσχομεν Κύκλωπος, ὃς οὐκ ἐψέκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψῳ ὑλήεντι

ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων, ὅτε φαίνεται οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλων,

οὕτως ἀνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον

46 ἐνοήσαμεν θεόν. καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἀνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐπηύξησαν

* Cf. § 25 *supra*.

^b Cf. § 21 *supra*.

^c Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191 f.

and, in general, all such fictions as Democritus is pleased to invent for himself, is wholly inadmissible.

Against Epicurus,^a too, one may make the same 43 objections; as he imagines that Gods were conceived "in accordance with the presentations during sleep of images of human shape"; for why did there spring from these the conception of Gods rather than of gigantic men? And one may object generally, 44 against all the views set forth, that men do not form a notion of God by means of merely magnifying a creature of human shape, but by including also the fact that he is blessed and imperishable and exhibiting very great power in the Universe. But how, or from what starting-point, these qualities came to be conceived by those who first derived the conception of God, is not explained by those who attribute it to presentations during sleep or to the orderly array of the heavenly bodies.

But to this they reply that, while the notion of God 45 originated in the images presented during sleep ^b or in the phenomena of the Universe, the idea that God is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness was introduced by way of transference from mankind. For just as by magnifying in fantasy the ordinary man we have obtained the conception of Cyclops, who was not—

Like to a corn-eating man, but rather a peak well-wooded
High on the mountain-tops, when it loometh apart from its fellows.^c

so when we have formed a notion of a man who is happy and blessed and fulfilled with all things good, then by intensifying these qualities we form a notion of God as he who excels in them all. And again, 46 when the ancients had imagined a long-lived man

- τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, προσσυνάβαντες τῷ ἐνεστώτι καὶ τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν αἰδίου¹ παραγενόμενοι
- 47 ἔφασαν καὶ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν θεόν. οἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες πιθανῆς μὲν προΐστανται δόξης, ἡρέμα δὲ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐπίπτουσι τρόπον, ὃς ἐστὶν ἀπορώτατος. ἵνα γὰρ πρῶτον εὐδαίμονα νοήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ μετάβασιν τὸν θεόν, ὀφείλομεν νοῆσαι τί ποτέ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν νοεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων. ἀλλ' ἦν γε εὐδαιμονία κατ' αὐτοὺς δαιμονία τις καὶ θεία φύσις, καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων. ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν λάβωμεν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμονίαν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν νόησιν θεοῦ καὶ δαίμονος, ἵνα δὲ τὸν θεόν νοήσωμεν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν ἔννοιαν εὐδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου. τοίνυν ἐκότερον περιμένον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου νόησιν ἀνεπινόητον γίνεται ἡμῖν.
- 48 Καὶ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τοὺς ζητοῦντας πῶς οἱ πρότερον νόησιν θεῶν ἔσχον ἄνθρωποι· ἀκολούθως δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί.

ΕΙ ΕΙΣΙ ΘΕΟΙ

- 49 Ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ ἐπινοούμενον καὶ ὑπάρξεως μετέληφεν, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι ἐπινοεῖσθαι μὲν, μὴ ὑπάρχειν δέ, καθάπερ Ἴπποκένταυρος καὶ Σκύλλα, δεήσει μετὰ τὴν περὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας τῶν θεῶν ζήτησιν καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τούτων σκέπτεσθαι. τάχα γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερος παρὰ τοὺς ὡς ἑτέρως φιλο-

¹ αἰδίου Mutsch. (sec. Hervetum): αἰδίων MSS., Bekk.

they extended his life-time to infinity, by linking together with the present both the past and the future; and having thus arrived at the conception of eternity they went on to say that God is eternal. Those that argue thus maintain, indeed, a plausible ⁴⁷ view, but they slide gently into circular reasoning, which is the most hopeless kind. For in order to conceive first the happy man, and from him to pass on to a conception of God, we ought to have conceived what happiness is, through participation in which the happy man is conceived. But, according to them, "happiness is a certain daemonic and divine nature," and "he who has his daemon well disposed" is said to be "happy."^a So that, in order to grasp human happiness we must previously have a notion of "God" and "daemon," and in order that we may conceive God we must have a previous conception of the happy man. So then, as each of these waits for its conception to be derived from the other, it becomes for us inconceivable.

Let this, then, serve as our criticism of those who ⁴⁸ inquire how the men of a past age acquired the notion of Gods; and let us inquire in the next place if there are Gods.

DO GODS EXIST?

Since not everything which is conceived partakes ⁴⁹ also in existence, but it is possible for a thing to be conceived and not exist—like a Hippocentaur and Scylla,—after our inquiry about the conception of Gods we shall have to examine also the question of their existence. For perchance the Sceptic, as compared with philosophers of other views, will be found

^a The point of this is lost in the English, as it lies in the etymology (εὐδαίμων = εὖ δαίμων).

σοφοῦντας εὐρεθήσεται ὁ σκεπτικός, κατὰ μὲν τὰ
πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους λέγων εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ
πᾶν τὸ εἰς τὴν τούτων θρησκείαν καὶ εὐσέβειαν
συντεῖνον ποιῶν, τὸ δ' ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φιλοσόφῳ
ζητήσῃ μηδὲν προπετευόμενος.

50 Τῶν οὖν περὶ ὑπάρξεως θεοῦ σκεψαμένων οἱ μὲν
εἶναι φασὶ θεόν, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον
εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν οἱ πλείους τῶν
51 δογματικῶν καὶ ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ βίου πρόληψις, μὴ
εἶναι δὲ οἱ ἐπικληθέντες ἄθεοι, καθάπερ Εὐήμερος,

γέρων ἀλαζών, ἄδικα βιβλία ψήχων,

καὶ Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ
Θεόδωρος καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθείς· ὧν Εὐήμερος μὲν
ἔλεγε τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς δυνατοὺς τινὰς
γεγονέναι ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
52 θεοποιηθέντας δόξαι θεοὺς, Πρόδικος δὲ τὸ
ἰσχυροῦν τὸν βίον ὑπειλῆφθαι θεόν, ὡς ἥλιον καὶ
σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς (καὶ λίμνας)¹ καὶ λειμῶνας
53 καὶ καρποὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες. Διαγόρας
δὲ ὁ Μήλιος, διθυραμβοποιός, ὡς φασί, τὸ πρῶτον
γενόμενος ὡς εἶ τις καὶ ἄλλος δεισιδαίμων· ὅς γε
καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἑαυτοῦ κατήρξατο τὸν τρόπον
τούτον “κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται”·
ἀδικηθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τινος ἐπιορκήσαντος καὶ μηδὲν
ἔνεκα τούτου παθόντος μετηρημόσατο εἰς τὸ λέγειν
54 μὴ εἶναι θεόν. καὶ Κριτίας δὲ εἰς τῶν ἐν Ἀθήναις

¹ <καὶ λίμνας> add. N, Mutsch.

* Cf. P. H. iii. 2.

in a safer position, since in conformity with his
ancestral customs and the laws, he declares that the
Gods exist,^a and performs everything which con-
tributes to their worship and veneration, but, so
far as regards philosophic investigation, declines to
commit himself rashly.

Of those, then, who have inquired as to the 50
existence of God some say that God exists, some that
he does not exist, some that he has existence “no
more” than non-existence. That he exists is the
view of most of the Dogmatists and the general pre-
conception of ordinary folk; that he does not exist 51
is the view of those who are designated “atheists,”
such as Euhemerus^b—

A hoary braggart, penning wicked books,

and Diagoras of Melos,^c and Prodicus of Ceos, and
Theodorus, and a host of others. Of these, Euhemerus
declared that those counted as Gods were certain
men of power, because of which they were deified by
the rest and reputed to be Gods; but Prodicus said 52
that what benefits life is God, such as the sun and
moon and rivers and lakes and meadows and crops
and everything of that kind. And Diagoras of Melos, 53
the dithyrambic poet, was at first, they say, god-
fearing above all others; for he began his poem in
this fashion—“By Heaven’s will and Fortune all
things are accomplished”; but when he had been
wronged by a man who had sworn falsely and suffered
no punishment for it, he changed round and asserted
that God does not exist. And Critias, one of the 54

^b Cf. § 17 *supra*; the quotation is from Callimachus
(*Frag.* 86).

^c D. was a disciple of Democritus (*circa* 420 B.C.). Theo-
dorus was a Cyrenaic (*circa* 310 B.C.), cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvii.

τυραννησάντων δοκεῖ ἐκ τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ἀθέων
 ὑπάρχειν, φάμενος ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται ἐπι-
 σκοπόν τινα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κατορθωμάτων καὶ
 ἀμαρτημάτων ἐπλασαν τὸν θεὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδένα
 λάθρα τὸν πλησίον ἀδικεῖν, εὐλαβούμενον τὴν ὑπὸ
 τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίαν. ἔχει δὲ παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ῥητὸν
 οὕτως.

ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
 καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρετής,
 ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
 οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγγίγνετο.
 κᾶπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀνθρωποὶ νόμους
 θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ἦ
 (γένους βροτείου)¹ τὴν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχη·
 ἐξημιούτο δ' εἰ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
 ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τὰμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
 ἀπείργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία,
 λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηρικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
 (πρώτον) πυκνὸς τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ
 θεῶν δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν ὅπως
 εἴη τι δαίμα τοῖς κακοῖσι κᾶν λάθρα
 πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονώσι τι.
 ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο,
 ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτω θάλλων βίω,
 νόω τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τε καὶ
 προσέχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει θείαν φορῶν,
 ὃς πᾶν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται,
 τὸ δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνησεται.
 ἐὰν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλευῆς κακόν,
 τοῦτ' οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς θεοὺς· τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν
 (αὐτοῖς)² ἔνεστι. τούσδε τοὺς λόγους λέγων

Tyrants at Athens,^a seems to belong to the company
 of the atheists when he says that the ancient law-
 givers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right
 and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that
 nobody injured his neighbours privily through fear of
 vengeance at the hands of the Gods ; and his state-
 ment runs thus ^b :—

A time there was when anarchy did rule
 The lives of men, which then were like the beasts',
 Enslaved to force ; nor was there then reward
 For good men, nor for wicked punishment.
 Next, as I deem, did men establish laws
 For punishment, that Justice might be lord
 Of all mankind, and Insolence enchain'd ;
 And whosoe'er did sin was penalized.
 Next, as the laws did hold men back from deeds
 Of open violence, but still such deeds
 Were done in secret,—then, as I maintain,
 Some shrewd man first, a man in counsel wise,
 Discovered unto men the fear of Gods,
 Thereby to frighten sinners should they sin
 E'en secretly in deed, or word, or thought.
 Hence was it that he brought in Deity,
 Telling how God enjoys an endless life,
 Hears with his mind and sees, and taketh thought
 And heeds things, and his nature is divine,
 So that he hearkens to men's every word
 And has the power to see men's every act.
 E'en if you plan in silence some ill deed,
 The Gods will surely mark it ; for in them
 Wisdom resides. So, speaking words like these,

^a i.e. one of " the Thirty " Tyrants of 404 B.C.

^b For this poem Sextus is our only authority and in several
 places the text is dubious. I follow for the most part that of
 Diels (*Frag. d. Vorsokr.* p. 571).

¹ <γένους βροτείου> add. Grotius : <ὁμῶς ἀπάντων> Diels.

² <αὐτοῖς> add. Mutsch. : <ἀγαν> Diels.

διδαγμάτων κέρδιστον¹ εισηγήσατο,
 ψευδεὶ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ.
 ναίειν δ' ἔφασκε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνταῦθ' ἵνα
 μάλιστ' ἂν ἐξέπληξεν ἀνθρώπους λέγων,
 ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόβους ὄντας βροτοῖς
 καὶ τὰς δνῆσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,
 ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἢ ἀστραπὰς
 κατείδεν οὐσας, δεινὰ δὲ κτυπήματα
 βροντῆς, τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας,
 χρόνου καλὸν ποικίλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ,
 ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστέρος στείχει μύδρος,
 ὃ θ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμβρος ἐκπορεύεται.
 τοίους περίξ ἔστησεν ἀνθρώποις φόβου
 στοίχους, καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατώκισεν
 τὸν δαίμον' οἰκεῖν ἐν πρέποντι χωρίῳ,
 τὴν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις κατέσβεσεν.

καὶ ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει

οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πείσαι τινα
 θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

55 Συμφέρεται δὲ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ Θεό-
 δωρος ὁ ἄθεος καὶ κατὰ τινος Πρωταγόρας ὁ
 Ἀβδηρίτης, ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ περι θεῶν συντάγματος
 τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούμενα ποικίλως
 56 ἀνασκευάσας, ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας ῥητῶς πῶς
 γράψας “περὶ δὲ θεῶν οὔτε εἰ εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί
 τινές εἰσι δύναμαι λέγειν· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ
 κωλύοντά με.” παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν θάνατον αὐτοῦ
 57 κατὰ θάλατταν πταίσας ἀπέθανεν. μέμνηται δὲ

¹ κέρδιστον Nauck : ἥδιστον mss., Diels.

Most cunning doctrine did he introduce,
 The truth concealing under speech untrue.
 The place he spoke of as the God's abode
 Was that whereby he could affright men most,—
 The place from which, he knew, both terrors came
 And easements unto men of toilsome life—
 To wit the vault above, wherein do dwell
 The lightnings, he beheld, and awesome claps
 Of thunder, and the starry face of heaven,
 Fair-spangled by that cunning craftsman Time,—
 Whence, too, the meteor's glowing mass doth speed
 And liquid rain descends upon the earth.
 Such were the fears wherewith he hedged men round,
 And so to God he gave a fitting home,
 By this his speech, and in a fitting place,
 And thus extinguished lawlessness by laws.

And, after proceeding a little farther, he adds—

Thus first did some man, as I deem, persuade
 Men to suppose a race of Gods exists.

Theodorus “the Atheist,” too, is of the same mind 55
 as these men, and (according to some) Protagoras of
 Abdera ; the former, seeing that he demolished the
 theological beliefs of the Greeks by a variety of
 arguments in his treatise *Concerning Gods* ; and 56
 Protagoras, where in one place he wrote expressly—
 “Concerning Gods I am not able to say either whether
 they exist or of what sort they are ; for the things
 which prevent me are many.” And when, because
 of this, the Athenians had condemned him to death
 he escaped, and died by shipwreck at sea. Mention 57

ταύτης τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἐν τῷ
 δευτέρῳ τῶν σίλλων ταῦτα διεξερχόμενος,

〈πάντων πρωτίστῳ τό〉 τε¹ καὶ μετέπειτα σο-
 φιστῶν

οὔτ' ἀλιγγλώσσω οὔτ' ἀσκόπων οὔτ' ἀκυλίστω
 Πρωταγόρῃ· ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράμματα
 θεῖναι,

ὅττι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὔτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
 ὁποῖοί τινες εἰσι καὶ οἱ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
 πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης. τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ
 χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο, ὄφρα μὴ οὔτως
 Σακρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον αἶδα δύη.

58 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίουσ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς
 πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν
 59 πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς. οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ
 εἶναι θεοὺς διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων ἰσο-
 σθένειαν ἔλεξαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως. καὶ τοῦτο
 εἰσόμεθα ἑκατέρωθεν τὰ ἐπιχειρούμενα συντόμως
 ἐπιδραμόντες.

60 Οἱ τοίνυν θεοὺς ἀξιούντες εἶναι πειρῶνται τὸ
 προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν ἐκ τεσσάρων τρόπων,
 ἐνὸς μὲν τῆς παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις συμφωνίας,
 δευτέρου δὲ τῆς κοσμικῆς διατάξεως, τρίτου δὲ
 τῶν ἀκολουθούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι τὸ
 θεῖον, τετάρτου δὲ καὶ τελευταίου τῆς τῶν ἀντι-
 61 πιπτόντων λόγων ὑπεξαίρεσεως. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν
 τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας λέγοντες ὡς ἅπαντες ἀνθρωποὶ
 σχεδὸν Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι

¹ 〈πάντων . . . τό〉 τε Diels; ὡς Bekk.; ἔσθη Ν; ὡστε cet.

is made of this story by Timon of Phlius, in the second
 book of his *Silli*,—

First of the Sophists existing then or that shall be hereafter,
 Neither in speech unclear nor dull of sight or of action,
 Protagoras; and they wished to reduce his writings to ashes,
 For that he wrote of the Gods that he knew not and could not
 discover

Who, if any, they truly are, and what is their nature,
 Giving all heed to candour. But that did profit him nothing;
 Wherefore he hastened to flee, that he might not descend into
 Hades,

Doomed to drink of that potion cold which Socrates swal-
 lowed.*

And, according to some, Epicurus in his popular 58
 exposition allows the existence of God, but in ex-
 pounding the real nature of things he does not allow
 it. And the Sceptics have declared that, owing to 59
 the equipollence of the opposed arguments, the Gods
 are existent "no more" than non-existent. This
 we shall learn when we have briefly run through the
 arguments urged on either side.

Those, then, who maintain that Gods exist try to 60
 establish their thesis by four modes, arguing, firstly,
 from the universal agreement of mankind; secondly,
 from the orderly arrangement of the Universe;
 thirdly, from the absurd consequences of the denial
 of the existence of deity; fourthly and lastly, by under-
 mining the opposing arguments.^b Arguing from the 61
 universal conception, they say that practically all men,
 both Greeks and barbarians,^c believe in the existence

* P. was condemned to death (by hemlock) at Athens on
 a charge of impiety (§ 56 *supra*). For Timon and his writings
 see Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxxi.

^b S. deals with these four arguments as follows—(1) in
 §§ 61-74; (2) in §§ 75-122; (3) in §§ 123-126; (4) in §§ 127-136.

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 187.

τὸ θεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συμφώνως μὲν θύουσί τε καὶ εὐχονται καὶ τεμένη θεῶν ἀνιστάσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλως ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ὡς ἂν κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν πεπιστευκότες τὸ εἶναι τι θεῖον, μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχοντες περὶ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ πρόληψιν. εἰ δέ γε ψευδῆς ὑπῆρχεν ἡ τοιαύτη πρόληψις, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως πάντες συνεφώνουν. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως αἱ ψευδεῖς δόξαι καὶ πρόσκαιροι φάσεις οὐκ ἐπὶ πλείον παρεκτείνουσιν, ἀλλὰ συντελευτώσιν ἐκείνοις ὧν χάριν ἐφυλάττοντο. οἶον τιμῶσι βασιλεῖς ἀνθρώποι θυσίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις θρησκείαις, αἷς [ὡς]¹ θεοὺς προστρέπονται· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέχρις ἐκείνων αὐτῶν διατηροῦσιν, τελευτησάντων δὲ ὡς ἄθεσμά τινα καὶ ἀσεβῆ καταλείπουσιν. ἡ δέ γε τῶν θεῶν ἔννοια καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἦν καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰκός, τῶν γιγνομένων μαρτυρουμένη. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ τὴν ιδιωτικὴν ὑπόνοιαν δεῖ παραλείπειν, τοῖς δὲ συνετοῖς καὶ μεγαλοφρονοῦσιν τῶν ἀνδρῶν πείθεσθαι, πάρεστι μὲν τὴν ποιητικὴν ὄραν μηδὲν μέγα μηδὲ λαμπρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν ἐν ᾧ μὴ θεὸς ἔστιν ὁ τὴν ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὸ κράτος τῶν γινομένων πραγμάτων ἐνημμένος, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ Ὀμήρῳ κατὰ τὸν ἀναγραφέντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων πόλεμον. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν πληθὺν ἰδεῖν σύμφωνον τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωνίας Σωκράτης τε καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τάχα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, ὡς αἱ ῥηταὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου λέξεις μαρ-

of the Divine, and because of this they agree in sacrificing and in praying and in setting up shrines for the Gods ; and some do this in one way, some in another, as though all of them in common believed in the existence of some Divinity, but did not possess the same preconception regarding its nature. But if this preconception had been false, they would not all have agreed in this way ; therefore Gods exist. And besides, false opinions and temporary appearances do not survive longer but come to an end together with the persons for whose sakes they were retained. For example, men honour kings with sacrifices and with all the other religious rites with which they worship the Gods ; but they observe these practices only so long as the kings themselves are there, and when they are dead they give them up as being illegal and impious. But the conception of the Gods has existed from eternity and persists unto eternity, as it probably derives its evidence from the very facts of existence. —Moreover, even if one ought to pass over the belief of the ordinary man and put one's trust in men who are clever and most highly gifted, one may see how poetry produces no great or brilliant work in which God is not the person invested with authority and power over the events which take place,—even as he was by the poet Homer in the war he described between the Greeks and barbarians. And one may also see the host of the Physicists in accord with poetry ; for Pythagoras and Empedocles and the Ionians and Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, and perhaps “ the Garden philosophers ”^a too (as the express statements of Epicurus testify), allow

^a i.e. the Epicureans, so called from the garden at Athens in which Epicurus established his school of philosophy.

¹ [ὡς] om. Hervetus (καὶ cj. Bekk.).

65 τυροῦσι, θεὸν ἀπολείπουσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ περὶ τινος τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄρασιν πιπτόντων ἐζητοῦμεν, εὐλόγως ἂν τοῖς ὀξυωπεστάτοις ἐπιστεύομεν, καὶ εἰ περὶ τινος τῶν ἀκουστών, τοῖς ὀξυηκουστάτοις, οὕτω σκεπτόμενοι περὶ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρουμένων οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύειν ὀφείλομεν ἢ τοῖς τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον ὀξυωποῦσιν, ὁποῖοί τινες ἦσαν οἱ φιλόσοφοι.

66 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασιν ἀνθυποφέροντες πρὸς τοῦτο λέγειν οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄδου μυθεομένων κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν ἅπαντες ἀνθρώποι καὶ συμφώνους ἔχουσιν τοὺς ποιητάς, καὶ μᾶλλον γε περὶ τούτων ἢ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τὰ καθ' ἄδου μυθεύμενα, μὴ συνιέντες πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐ μόνον τὰ καθ' ἄδου πλαττόμενα ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῶς πάντα μῦθον μάχην περιεσχηκέναι συμβέβηκε καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι. οἶον ἦν

καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν,
κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κείτο πέλεθρα,
γῦπε δέ μιν ἐκάτερθε παρημένω ἦπαρ ἔκειρον,
δέρτρων ἔσω δύνοντες· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἀπαμύνετο χερσίν·
Λητῶ γὰρ ἦσχυνε Διὸς κυδρὴν παράκοιτιν.

68 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄψυχος ἦν ὁ Τιτυός, πῶς οὐδεμίαν συναίσθησιν ἔχων ὑπὸ τιμωρίαν ἐπιπτεν; εἰ δὲ 69 εἶχε ψυχὴν, πῶς τετελευτήκει; καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται

καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσείδον κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα,
ἔσταότ' ἐν λίμνῃ· ἢ δὲ προσέκλυζε γενεῖω.

¹ περὶ N, Mutsch.: ὅτι Bekk.

God's existence. Therefore, just as, if we had been 65 inquiring about something which is perceived by sight, it would have been reasonable for us to have trusted those who have the sharpest sight, and if it had been about something audible, those of the sharpest hearing,—so also, when we are examining one of the things observed by reason we ought to trust none except those who are sharp of sight in mind and reason, such as were the philosophers.

But in reply to this those of the opposite side are 66 accustomed to argue that all men have a common conception about the legendary doings in Hades as well, and have the poets in agreement with them; and even more so about these things than about the Gods; yet we would not assert that the legendary doings in Hades are real facts, through failing to 67 understand, in the first place, that not only the fictions about Hades but, in general, every legend is such as to contain conflicting elements and to be impossible; as, for instance—

Tityus, too, I beheld, the glorious Earth-mother's offspring,
Lying flat on the ground; nine roods did he cover extended;
Vultures twain sat on either side and tore at his liver,
Plunged in his inward parts; with his hands he could not
repel them:
Seeing he shamed the consort of Zeus, illustrious Leto.*

For if Tityus was lifeless, how was he under punish- 68 ment when he possessed no consciousness? And if he possessed life, how was he dead? And again, 69 when it is related b—

Tantalus, too, I beheld with mine eyes in agonies grievous
Standing within a lake; and up to his chin came the water;

* Homer, *Odys.* xi. 576 ff.; cf. Lucret. iii. 996 ff.

^b Homer, *Odys.* xi. 582 ff.

στεῦτό τε διψᾶων, πείειν δ' οὐκ εἶχεν ἐλέσθαι·
 ὄσάκι γὰρ κύψει' ὁ γέρων πείειν μενεαίνων,
 τοσσάχ' ὕδωρ ἀπολέσκειτ' ἀναβροχέν, ἀμφὶ δὲ
 ποσσὶν
 γαῖα μέλαινα φάνεσκε, καταζήνασκε δὲ δαίμων.

70 εἰ γὰρ μήποτε ὑγροῦ καὶ τροφῆς ἐγεύετο, πῶς
 διέμενεν ἀλλ' οὐ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων διεφθείρετο;
 εἰ δὲ ἀθάνατος ἦν, πῶς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν; μάχεται
 γὰρ ἀθάνατος φύσις ἀληθῶσι καὶ βασιάνοις,
 71 ἐπέπερ πᾶν τὸ ἀλγοῦν θηητόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ὁ μὲν μῦθος οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἔλεγχον περιείχεν,
 ἡ δὲ περὶ θεῶν ὑπόληψις οὐ τοιαύτη τις ἐστίν,
 οὐδὲ μάχην ὑπέβαλλεν, ἀλλὰ σύμφωνος τοῖς γιγνο-
 μένοις ἐφαίνετο. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνεστιν
 ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας· λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ
 οὔσαι καὶ οὐχ ἦττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς
 72 τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν. καὶ καθ'
 αὐτὰς δὲ διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπί-
 κουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωματίων καπνοῦ δίκην
 σκίδναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατη-
 τικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς
 73 ἦσαν αἰτιαί, πολὺ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ἑαυταῖς. ἔκ-
 σκηνοὶ γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην
 οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ
 αἴρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον,
 τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκεία τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει
 ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα, τὸ διαλύσόν τε αὐτὰς ἐν
 74 ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσιν. εἰ οὖν δια-
 μένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται· εἰ

Thirsty he stood, nor could he attain to reach it and drink it;
 Nay, for as oft as the old man stoop'd desirous of drinking
 Just so oft did the wave surge back; and close to his foot-
 prints
 Black did the earth appear, so parch'd was it made by the
 Daemon.

For if he never tasted drink or food how did he 70
 survive and not perish through lack of necessary
 sustenance? And if he was immortal, how is he
 in the state described? For an immortal nature
 is inconsistent with pains and torments, since every-
 thing that suffers pain is mortal. But, (retort the 71
 Stoics,) whereas the myth does thus contain within
 itself its own refutation, the conception of Gods
 is not of this kind, nor does it introduce incons-
 istency, but is evidently in accord with facts. Nor,
 indeed, is it possible to suppose that souls move
 downwards; for since they are of fine particles, and
 no less of a fiery than of a vaporous nature, they
 rather soar lightly to the upper regions. Also, they 72
 persist as they are in themselves, and are not (as
 Epicurus said) "dispersed like smoke when released
 from their bodies."^a For before that it was not the
 body that was in control of them, but it was they that
 were the causes of the body's conjoined existence
 and, much more, of their own. For having quitted 73
 the sphere of the sun^b they inhabit the region below
 the moon, and there because of the pureness of the
 air they continue to remain for a long time, and for
 their sustenance they use the steam which rises from
 the earth, as do the rest of the stars,^b and in those
 regions they have nothing to dissolve them. If, 74
 then, souls persist, they are the same as daemons;

^a Cf. Lucret. iii. 437 f., 457 f.

^b This was a Stoic theory, cf. Cicero, *Nat. D.* ii. 15.

δὲ δαίμονες εἰσι, ρήτέον καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲν αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπαρξίν βλαπτούσης τῆς περὶ τῶν ἐν αἶδο μυθευομένων προλήψεως.

75 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ συμφώνου οἰήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος διακοσμήσεως. ἡ τοῖνυν τῶν ὄντων οὐσία, φασίν, ἀκίνητος οὐσα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ὑπὸ τινος αἰτίας ὀφείλει κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ σχηματίζεσθαι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς χαλκούργημα περικαλλῆς θεασάμενοι ποθοῦμεν μαθεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην ἅτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀκινήτου καθεστῶσης, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων ὕλην θεωροῦντες κινουμένην καὶ ἐν μορφῇ τε καὶ διακοσμήσει τυγχάνουσαν εὐλόγως ἂν σκεπτοίμεθα τὸ κινεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ πολυειδῶς μορφοῦν αἴτιον.

76 τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι ἢ δυνάμιν τινα δι' αὐτῆς πεφοίτηκυῖαν, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ψυχῇ πεφοίτηκεν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ δύναμις ἥτοι αὐτοκίνητος ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλης κινεῖται δυνάμεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρας κινεῖται, τὴν ἑτέραν ἀδύνατον ἐσται¹ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλης κινουμένην, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἐστὶ τις ἄρα καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτοκίνητος δύναμις, ἥτις ἂν εἴη θεία καὶ αἰδιος. ἢ γὰρ ἐξ αἰῶνος κινήσεται ἢ ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου μὲν οὐ κινήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν τις αἰτία τοῦ ἀπὸ τινος αὐτὴν χρόνου κινεῖσθαι. αἰδιος τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ἢ κινουσα τὴν ὕλην δύναμις καὶ τεταγμένως αὐτὴν εἰς γενέσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς ἄγουσα. ὥστε θεὸς ἂν

77 εἴη αὕτη. καὶ ἔτι τὸ γεννητικὸν λογικοῦ καὶ φρονίμου πάντως καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστὶ καὶ

¹ ἐσται N, Mutsch.: εἶναι Bekk.

and if daemons exist, one must declare also that Gods exist, their existence being in no wise hindered by the preconception about the legendary doings in Hades.

Such, then, is the argument from the general and unanimous opinion about God; and let us also consider that which is based on the orderly arrangement of the Universe. The substance of existing things being of itself, they say, motionless and shapeless must be put in motion and shape by some cause; and on account of this just as, when we behold some very beautiful piece of bronze-work, we are anxious to know who the craftsman is, since the material is of itself motionless, so also when we behold the matter of the Universe moving and existing in definite shape and orderly arrangement we shall naturally look for the cause which moves it and shapes it into various forms. And it is probable that this is nothing else than some power which pervades it, even as our soul pervades ourselves. This power, then, is either self-moving or moved by some other power. And if it is moved by another power, it will not be possible for that other to be moved unless it is moved by a further power; which is absurd. There exists, therefore, a power which is of itself self-moving, and this will be divine and eternal. For either it will be in motion from eternity or from some definite point of time. But it will not be in motion from a point of time; for there will exist no cause of its motion from a given point of time. So then, the power which moves matter and subjects it to ordered forms of generation and change is eternal. Consequently this power will be God.—Moreover, that which generates what is rational and wise is certainly itself both rational and wise;

φρόνιμον· ἡ δὲ γε προειρημένη δύναμις ἀνθρώπους
πέφυκε κατασκευάζειν· λογικὴ τοίνυν καὶ φρονίμη
γενήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν θείας φύσεως. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.
78 τῶν τε σωματίων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ
ἐκ συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων. ἡνωμένα
μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα
καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα, ἐκ συναπτομένων δὲ τὰ
ἐκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἓν τι κεφάλαιον
νεύοντων συνεστώτα ὡς ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ
νῆες, ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ τὰ ἐκ διεζευγμένων καὶ [ἐκ]
79 κειμένων ὡς στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιμναὶ καὶ χοροί. ἐπεὶ
οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἦτοι ἡνωμένον ἔστι
σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων. οὔτε
δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς
δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν. κατὰ
γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης ἀυξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ
τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε
καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες περὶ
τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. ὡσαύτως δὲ
καὶ κατὰ τινὰς τῶν ἀστέρων ἐπιτολὰς καὶ δύσεις
μεταβολαὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ παμποίκιοι περὶ
τὸν ἀέρα τροπαὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ
κρεῖττον ὅτε δὲ λοιμικῶς. ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς ὅτι
80 ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος. ἐπὶ μὲν
γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμ-
πάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις, εἴγε ἐν στρατιᾷ πάντων,
εἰ τύχοι, διαφθαρέντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν οὐδὲν
κατὰ διάδοσιν πάσχειν φαίνεται ὁ περιωθειῶν· ἐπὶ

but the aforementioned power is of such a nature as to construct men; therefore it will be rational and wise, and this is the mark of a divine nature. Gods, therefore, exist.—Of bodies, too, some are unified, some 78 formed of things conjoined, some of separate things. Unified^a bodies are such as are controlled by a single “attraction,”^b such as plants and animals; those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into one main structure, like cables and turrets and ships; those formed of separate things are such as are compounded of things which are disjoined and isolated and existing by themselves, like armies and flocks and choruses. Seeing, then, that the Universe also is a body, it is 79 either unified or of conjoined or separate parts. But it is neither of conjoined nor of separate parts, as we prove from the “sympathies” it exhibits. For in accordance with the waxings and wanings of the moon many sea and land animals wane and wax, and ebb-tides and flood-tides occur in some parts of the sea. And in the same way, too, in accordance with certain risings and settings of the stars alterations in the surrounding atmosphere and all varieties of change in the air take place, sometimes for the better, but sometimes fraught with pestilence. And from these facts it is obvious that the Universe is a unified body. For in the case of bodies formed from 80 conjoined or separate elements the parts do not “sympathize” with one another, since if all the soldiers, say, in an army have perished (save one) the one who survives is not seen to suffer at all through transmission; but in the case of unified

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 102.

^b For the Stoic use of *ἕξις*, “attraction” (lit. “holding”);

to denote the principle of cohesion and unity in things inorganic see §§ 81 ff. *infra*; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxv.

δὲ τῶν ἠνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν, εἶγε δα-
 κτύλου τεμνομένου τὸ ὄλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα.
 ἠνωμένον τοίνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος.
 81 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἠνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ
 ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ
 ψυχῆς, καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως
 δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῶα, πάντως δὴ
 82 καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ τίνος τούτων διακρατεῖται. καὶ
 ὑπὸ μὲν ψιλῆς ἕξεως οὐκ ἂν συνέχοιτο. τὰ γὰρ
 ὑπὸ ἕξεως κρατούμενα οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόλογον μετα-
 βολὴν τε καὶ τροπὴν ἀναδέχεται, καθάπερ ξύλα
 καὶ λίθοι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξ αὐτῶν πάσχει τὴν κατὰ
 83 ἄνεσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ συμπίεσμον διάθεσιν. ὁ δὲ
 κόσμος ἀξιολόγους ἀναδέχεται μεταβολάς, ὅτε μὲν
 κρυμαλέου τοῦ περιέχοντος γιγνομένου ὅτε δὲ
 ἄλειου, καὶ ὅτε μὲν αὐχμῶδους ὅτε δὲ νοτεροῦ,
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλως πως κατὰ τὰς τῶν οὐρανίων κινήσεις
 ἕτεροιομένου. οὐ τοίνυν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως ὁ
 84 κόσμος συνέχεται. εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης, πάντως
 ὑπὸ φύσεως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς διακρατούμενα
 πολὺ πρότερον ὑπὸ φύσεως συνείχθητο. ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτὸν φύσεως συνέχεσθαι,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεις. ἡ δὲ γε τὰς
 85 πάντων περιέχουσα φύσις καὶ τὰς λογικὰς περι-
 φύσεις πάντως ἐστὶ λογική· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε τὸ ὄλον
 τοῦ μέρους χεῖρον εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀρίστη ἐστὶ
 φύσις ἡ τὸν κόσμον διοικοῦσα, νοερά τε ἔσται
 καὶ σπουδαία καὶ ἀθάνατος. τοιαύτη δὲ τυγ-
 86 χάνουσα θεὸς ἐστίν. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί. εἶπερ
 τε ἐν γῆ καὶ θαλάσῃ πολλῆς οὔσης παχυμερείας
 ποικίλα συνίσταται ζῶα ψυχικῆς τε καὶ αἰσθητικῆς

bodies there exists a certain "sympathy," since,
 when the finger is cut, the whole body shares in
 its condition. So then, the Universe also is a
 unified body.—But since of unified bodies some 81
 are held together by mere "attraction," others by
 organic structure, others by soul,—by attraction,
 like stones and sticks; by organic structure, like
 plants; and animals by soul,—the Universe also is
 certainly controlled by one of these. Now it will not 82
 be held together by mere attraction. For the things
 controlled by attraction (such as sticks and stones) do
 not admit of any considerable alteration or change,
 but merely suffer the conditions produced by expansion
 or compression. But the Universe admits of con- 83
 siderable alterations, as the atmosphere becomes at
 one time frosty, at another torrid, and at one time
 dry, at another damp, and at other times modified in
 other ways according to the motions of the heavenly
 bodies. So then, the Universe is not held together
 by mere attraction. But if not by this, then certainly 84
 by organic structure; for even the bodies which are
 controlled by soul were first of all held together by
 organic structure. Necessarily, then, it must be held
 together by the best structure, since it contains the
 structures of all things. But that which contains the 85
 structures of all things contains also such as are
 rational; and, moreover, that which contains the
 rational organic structures is certainly rational; for
 it is not possible for the whole to be inferior to the
 part. But if that structure which governs the Uni-
 verse is the best, it will be intelligent and virtuous
 and immortal. And being such, it is God. There-
 fore Gods exist.—Also, if there exist on the earth and 86
 in the sea, which have very dense parts, a variety of

μετέχοντα δυνάμεως, πολλῶ πιθανώτερόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, πολὺ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ εἰλικρινές ἔχοντι παρὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἔμφυχά τινα καὶ νοερά συνίστασθαι ζῶα. καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθοὺς τινὰς εἶναι δαίμονας, σωτήρας ἐυσέλμων νεῶν, καὶ τὸ

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ἀθάνατοι Ζητὸς φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.

87 ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πιθανὸν ὑπάρχειν ζῶα, πάντως εὐλογον καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι ζῶων εἶναι φύσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἄνθρωποι νοεράς μετέχουσι δυνάμεως, κάκειθεν αὐτὴν σπάσαντες. ὄντων δὲ αἰθερίων ζῶων, καὶ κατὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐπιγείων ὑπερφέρειν δοκούντων τῷ ἄφθαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀγέννητα, δοθήσεται καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, τούτων μὴ διαφέροντας.

88 Ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης οὕτως συνηρώτα. εἰ φύσις φύσεώς ἐστι κρείττων, εἴη ἂν τις ἀρίστη φύσις· εἰ ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ κρείττων, εἴη ἂν τις ἀρίστη ψυχὴ· καὶ εἰ ζῶον τοῖνον κρείττον ἐστὶ ζῶου, εἴη ἂν τι κράτιστον ζῶον· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτειν πέφυκε τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὡσπεροῦν οὔτε ἡ φύσις ἐδύνατο ἐπ' ἄπειρον αὔξεσθαι κατὰ τὸ κρείττον οὔτ' ἡ ψυχὴ 89 <οὕτως> οὐδὲ τὸ ζῶον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῶον ζῶου κρείττον ἐστίν, ὡς ἵππος χελώνης, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ταῦρος ὄνου καὶ λέων ταύρου. πάντων δὲ σχεδὸν τῶν ἐπιγείων ζῶων καὶ σωματικῇ καὶ ψυχικῇ διαθέσει προέχει τε καὶ κρατιστεῦει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τοῖνον κράτιστον 90 ἂν εἴη ζῶον καὶ ἀριστον. καὶ οὐ πάντι ὁ ἄν-

¹ <οὕτως> οὐδὲ Heintz: οὔτε MSS., Bekk.

^a Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 252 f.

animals which share in the faculties of soul and of sense, it is much more probable that there exist in the air (which, as compared with earth and water, is very clear and pure) some animals endowed with soul and intelligence. And in accord with this is the saying that the Dioscuri are good daemons, "saviours of well-benched ships," and that

Zeus over mortal men, upon Earth the sustainer of many,
Thrice ten thousand guardians has set, <divine and>
immortal.^a

But if it is probable that animals exist in the air, it is 87 certainly reasonable that animal organisms should also exist in the aether, from which men too derive their share of intellectual power, having drawn it from thence. And as ethereal animals exist, and are deemed to be far superior to terrestrial animals through being imperishable and unbegotten, it will be granted that Gods, which are no wise different from these, exist as well.

And Cleanthes argued thus: "If one nature is 88 better than another, there will be some best nature; if one soul is better than another, there will be some best soul: if, then, one animal is better than another, there will be some best animal; for such things are not of a kind to proceed *ad infinitum*. So then, as nature is not capable of increasing to infinity in goodness, nor soul, neither is the animal capable. One animal, however, is better than another, as (say) 89 the horse than the tortoise, and the bull than the ass, and the lion than the bull. And of all the terrestrial animals Man is the highest and best in respect of the disposition of both body and soul; therefore a certain best and most excellent animal will exist. Yet Man cannot be absolutely the best 90

θρωπος κρτίστον είναι δύναται ζών, ολον εϋθέως
 οτι δια κακίας πορεύεται τον πάντα χρόνον, ει δε
 μή γε, τον πλείστον (και γάρ ει ποτε περιγένοιτο
 ἀρετῆς, ὁψέ και πρὸς ταῖς του βίου δυσμαῖς περι-
 γίνεταί), ἐπικηρόν τ' ἐστὶ και ἀσθενές και μυρίων
 δεόμενον βοηθημάτων, καθάπερ τροφῆς και σκεπα-
 σμάτων και τῆς ἄλλης του σώματος ἐπιμελείας,
 μικροῦ τινὸς τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεστῶτος ἡμῖν και
 τον πρὸς ἡμέραν δασμόν ἀπαιτοῦντος, και ει μή
 παρέχομεν ὡστε λούειν αὐτὸ και ἀλείφειν και
 περιβάλλειν και τρέφειν, νόσους και θάνατον
 ἀπειλοῦντος. ὡστε οὐ τέλειον ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
 91 ἀτελές δε και πολὺ κεχωρισμένον του τελείου. τὸ
 δε τέλειον και ἄριστον κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν ὑπάρχοι
 ἀνθρώπου και πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμπληρω-
 μένον και παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον, τουτο δε
 οὐ διοίσει θεοῦ. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.
 92 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Κλεάνθης ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· ἠρώτησε δε
 και Ξενοφῶν ὁ Σωκρατικός λόγον εἰς τὸ εἶναι θεούς,
 Σωκράτει περιθεῖς τὴν ἀποδείξει πρὸς τον Ἀριστό-
 δημον ζητοῦντι, δι' ὧν κατὰ λέξιν φησὶν "εἰπέ
 μοι ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, εἰσὶν οὓς τινας ἐπὶ σοφία
 τεθαύμακας; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. τίνες οὖν εἰσὶν οὗτοι;
 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ποιητικῇ ἔγωγε Ὅμηρον τεθαύμακα,
 ἐπὶ δε ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ζωγραφίας γε
 93 μὴν χάριν Ζεῦξιν. τουτους οὖν ἀποδέχη οὐ δια
 τὸ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν κατεσκευασμένα περισσῶς δε-
 δημιουργῆσθαι; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. εἰ οὖν ὁ Πολυ-
 κλείτου ἀνδριάς και ἐμψυχίαν προσλάβη, οὐ πολὺ
 μάλλον ἀποδέξη τον τεχνίτην; και μάλα. ἄρ'
 οὖν ἀνδριάντα μὲν ὁρῶν ἐφησ ὑπό τινος τεχνίτου
 δεδημιουργῆσθαι, ἀνθρωπον δε ὁρῶν κατὰ τε

animal, because, for instance, he walks in wickedness
 all his life, or, if not, at least for the greater part of
 it (for if ever he attains virtue, he attains it late and
 at the setting of life's sun), and he is the victim of
 fate and feeble and in need of countless aids—such
 as food and coverings, and all the other requirements
 of the body, which stands over us like a rigorous
 tyrant and demands its daily tribute, and threatens
 us with disease and death unless we provide for its
 washing and anointing and clothing and feeding. So
 that Man is not a perfect animal, but imperfect and
 far removed from the perfect. But that which is
 perfect and best will be better than Man and fulfilled
 with all the virtues and not receptive of any evil; and
 this animal will not differ from God. God, therefore,
 exists."

Such, then, is the view of Cleanthes. Xenophon,
 too, the Socratic, propounded an argument for the
 existence of Gods, ascribing the proof to Socrates,
 when in his interrogation of Aristodemus, he expresses
 himself in the following terms: "Tell me, Aristo-
 demus, are there any persons whom you have admired
 for their wisdom? Yes, said he. Who then are
 they? I have admired Homer for his poetry, Poly-
 cleitus for his statuary, Zeuxis of course for his
 painting.^b Then is it not because of the superlative
 93 craftsmanship of their productions that you approve
 of them? Yes, said he. If, then, the statue of
 Polycleitus should also become alive, would you not
 approve of the artist far more? Most certainly.
 Now, if when you saw a statue you said that it had
 been wrought by some artist, when you see a man

^a See Xen. *Mem.* i. 4. 2.

^b P. and Z. were famous Greek artists (circa 440-400 B.C.).

ψυχὴν εὖ κινούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εὖ κεκοσμη-
 μένον οὐκ οἶει ὑπὸ τινος νοῦ περιττοῦ δεδημιουρ-
 94 γῆσθαι; εἶτα δὲ ὁρῶν θέσιν τε καὶ χρῆσιν μερῶν,
 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διανέστησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁμματα
 γὰρ μὴν ἔδωκεν ὥστε ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ἀκοήν δὲ ὥστε
 ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά. ὁσμῆς γὰρ μὴν τί ἂν ἦν
 ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ ῥίνας προσέθηκεν, χυμῶν τε μὴν
 ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ γλῶσσα ἢ τούτων ἐπιγνώμων ἐν-
 ειργάσθη; καὶ ταῦτα" φησὶν "εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε
 μέρος μικρὸν ἔχεις ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσης,
 ὑγροῦ τε μὴν βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος, πυρὸς ἀέρος τε
 ὁμοίως· νοῦν δὲ ἄρα μόνον οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα εὐτυχῶς
 πόθεν δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι;"

95 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ τοῦ Ξενοφώντος ἐστὶ λόγος,
 δυνάμιν γὰρ ἐπαγωγικὴν ἔχων καὶ τοιαύτην. γῆς
 πολλῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ
 ὑγροῦ πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος
 ἔχεις· καὶ νοῦ ἄρα πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
 μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις. νοερὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν,
 96 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεός. παραβάλλουσι δὲ τινες τῷ
 λόγῳ τὰ λήμματα μεταποιοῦντες αὐτοῦ, καὶ φασι
 "γῆς πολλῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος
 ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑγροῦ πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
 μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ ἤδη ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς· καὶ
 πολλῆς ἄρα χολῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν τι
 μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ φλέγματος καὶ αἵματος." ἀκο-

well disposed in soul and well equipped in body,
 do you not think that he has been wrought by
 some superexcellent mind? And when you observe 94
 further the arrangement and function of his parts ;
 and, in the first place, that he has made man upright,
 and has given him eyes that he may see what is
 visible and ears that he may hear what is audible.
 And of what use would smell have been if he had
 not also supplied him with nostrils, or flavours either
 if he had not had a tongue constructed within him
 which discerns them? And when you know also that
 you have in your body a small portion of the earth,
 of which so much exists, and a little of the water of
 which so much exists, and so likewise of fire and of
 air ; from what source do you think that you have by
 good luck derived your mind, if it alone is nowhere
 existent? "

Such, then, is the argument of Xenophon ; and the 95
 inductive value which it has is this :—" Of the great
 quantity of earth which exists in the Universe you
 possess a small portion, and of the great quantity of
 water which exists in the Universe you possess a small
 portion ; therefore, you also possess a small portion
 of the mind which exists in the Universe in large
 quantity. Therefore the Universe is intelligent, and
 consequently is God." But some meet this with a 96
 parallel argument, by altering its premisses, and say
 —" Of the great quantity of earth which exists in the
 Universe you possess a small portion ; but also of the
 great quantity of water existing in the Universe you
 possess a small portion, and also of air and fire ;
 therefore you possess also a small portion of the great
 quantity of gall existing in the Universe, and phlegm
 and blood. It will follow, therefore, that the Universe

λουθήσει καὶ χολοποιὸν καὶ αἵματος γεννητικὸν
 97 εἶναι τὸν κόσμον· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἱ δὲ ἀπο-
 λογούμενοί φασιν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι τὴν παραβολὴν τῷ
 Ξενοφάντος λόγῳ. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν
 καὶ πρώτων σωμάτων ποιεῖται τὴν ζήτησιν, ὡςπερ
 γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ πυρός, οἱ δὲ τῇ παρα-
 βολῇ χρώμενοι μετεπήδησαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ συγκρίματα·
 χολή γὰρ καὶ αἷμα καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι
 ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλοῦν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν
 πρώτων καὶ στοιχειωδῶν σωμάτων συγκείμενον.

98 "Ἐνεστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως τὸν αὐτὸν συνερωτᾶν λόγον.
 εἰ μὴ ἦν τι γεῶδες ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, οὐδὲ ἐν σοὶ τι ἂν
 ἦν γεῶδες, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἦν τι ὑγρὸν ἐν κόσμῳ, οὐδ'
 ἂν ἐν σοὶ ἦν τι ὑγρὸν, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ ἀέρος καὶ
 πυρός. τοίνυν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἦν τις ἐν κόσμῳ νοῦς,
 οὐδ' ἂν ἐν σοὶ τις ἦν νοῦς· ἔστι δὲ γε ἐν σοὶ τις
 νοῦς· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 νοερός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. νοερός δὲ ὢν καὶ θεὸς
 99 καθέστηκεν. τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἐστὶ καὶ
 ὁ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχων λόγος. ἄρα γε ἄγαλμα
 εἰδὲ δημιουργημένον θεασάμενος διστάσειας ἂν εἰ
 τεχνίτης νοῦς τοῦτο ἐποίησεν; ἢ οὐ τοσοῦτον¹ ἂν
 ἀπόσχοις τοῦ ὑπονοεῖν τι τοιοῦτον ὡς καὶ θαυμάζειν
 τὴν περιττότητα τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ τὴν τέχνην;

100 ἀρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων τὸν ἕξωθεν θεωρῶν τύπον
 προσμαρτυρεῖς τῷ κατεσκευακότητι καὶ φῆς εἶναι
 τινα τὸν δημιουργόν· τὸν δὲ ἐν σοὶ ὁρῶν νοῦν,
 τοσαύτη ποικιλία διαφέροντα παντὸς ἀγάλματος
 καὶ πάσης γραφῆς, γεννητὸν ὄντα νομίζεις ἀπὸ
 τύχης γεγονέναι, οὐχὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τινος δημιουργοῦ

¹ οὐ τοσοῦτον] οὐτ' Bekk.: οὕτως N, Mutsch.: τοσοῦτον
 cj. Bekk.

is gall-making and productive of blood; which is absurd." But others allege in defence that this 97 parallel argument is not similar to the argument of Xenophon. For whereas he bases his inquiry on the simple and primary bodies,—such as earth and water and air and fire,—those who employ the parallel argument jump aside to compounds; for neither gall nor blood nor any bodily fluid is primary and simple, but a compound of the primary and elemental bodies.

It is also possible to propound the same argument 98 in this form: "If there had not been something earthy in the Universe, there would not have been anything earthy in you; and if there had not been something fluid in the Universe, there would not have been anything fluid in you; and so likewise with air and fire. Hence, too, if there had not been some mind in the Universe, there would not have been any mind in you; but there is mind in you. And because of this the Universe is rational; and being rational, it is also God."—To the same effect is the argument which is 99 put in this form:—"If you saw a statue which was well wrought would you be in doubt as to whether an artistic intelligence had made it? Or would you not be so far from having any such suspicions that you would actually admire the excellence of its workmanship and its artistic quality? If then, in such cases, 100 when you behold the external form you take it as evidence of a constructor and assert that there exists a craftsman who made it,—when you see the mind within yourself, which is so far superior in its intricacy to any statue or any painting, do you suppose that it came into being as the creation of chance and not by

δύναμιν καὶ σύνεσιν ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἔχοντας; ὅσπερ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοθί που διατρίβοι ἢ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γενῶν τε καὶ αὔξων. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶ θεός· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.

- 101 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὕτως συνερωτᾷ. τὸ προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προίεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ· λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. ᾧ συνεισάγεται καὶ ἡ τούτου
- 102 ὑπαρξίς. καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς συνερωτήσεως πιθανότης προὔπιτος. πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπὸ τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὥστε πᾶσαν δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὔσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαδίδοσθαι. ὅθεν οἶόν ἐστι τὸ μέρος τῇ δυνάμει,
- 103 τοιοῦτον πολὺ πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ ὅλον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰ προίεται λογικοῦ ζώου σπέρμα ὁ κόσμος, οὐχ ὡς τὸν ἀνθρώπον κατὰ ἀποβρασμόν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς περιέχει σπέρματα λογικῶν ζώων· περιέχει (δὲ)¹ [τὸ πᾶν], οὐχ ὡς ἂν εἴπομεν τὴν ἄμπελον γιγάρτων εἶναι περιεκτικὴν, τουτέστι κατὰ περιγραφὴν, ἀλλ' ὅτι λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχονται. ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον "ὁ δὲ γε κόσμος περιέχει σπερματικούς² λόγους λογικῶν ζώων· λογικὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος."

¹ <δὲ> add. cj. Bekk., [τὸ πᾶν] secl. cj. Heintz.

² σπερματικούς cj. Bekk.: σπέρματος mss., Bekk.

³ For this Stoic term see Vol. I. *Introductio*, p. xxv.

some craftsman possessed of power and intelligence to a superlative degree? And he can dwell nowhere else save in the Universe, governing it and generating and increasing the things that are therein. And this person is a God; therefore Gods exist."

And Zeno of Citium, taking Xenophon as his starting-point, argues thus:—"That which projects the seed of the rational is itself rational; but the Universe projects the seed of the rational; therefore the Universe is rational. And thereby the existence thereof is also concluded." The plausibility of this 102 argument is obvious. For the origin of motion in every nature and soul seems to come from "the regent part,"^a and all the powers that are sent forth into the parts of the whole are sent forth from the regent part as from a fount, so that every power which exists in the part exists also in the whole owing to its being distributed from its regent part. Hence, what the part is in point of power, that the whole must certainly be first. Consequently, if the Uni- 103 verse projects the seed of a rational animal, it does not do so, like man, by frothy emission, but as containing the seeds of rational animals; but it does not contain them in the same way as we might speak of the vine "containing" its grapes,—that is, by way of inclusion,—but because the "seminal reasons"^b of rational animals are contained in it. So that the argument is this—"The Universe contains the seminal reasons of rational animals; therefore the Universe is rational."

^b According to Stoic doctrine the Universal Reason (Logos) is present in particular things as their vital formative principle, and these pluralizations of Reason are termed "seminal reasons"; cf. Vol. I. *Introductio*, p. xxiv.

- 104 Καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ζήνων φησίν, "[εἶ] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον ἐστίν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχίας μετέχοντος. τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἔμψυχου κρεῖττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερός ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος."
- 105 Κεῖται δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ τῇ δυνάμει τοιοῦτος λόγος, κατὰ λέξιν αὐτοῦ γράφοντος "λέγωμεν δὴ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος. τούτου δὴ ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅσα μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γίγνεσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ταύτην δὲ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστα ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρὰ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτο ἂν." εἶτ' ὀλίγα διεληθὼν ἐπιφέρει λέγων
- 106 "διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνεται, <ὅπως>¹ ὅ τι κάλλιστον ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστον τε² ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶν ἔμψυχον ἔννοον τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὸ τῇ θεοῦ γενέσθαι προνοία." δυνάμει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Ζήνωνι λόγον ἐξέθετο· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ πᾶν κάλλιστον εἶναι φησι, κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον ζῶν ἔμψυχον νοερόν τε καὶ λογικόν.

¹ <ὅπως> add. e Plat. Mutsch.

² τε sec. Plat., Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk.

* Plato, *Timaeus* 29 D ff.

And Zeno says again: "The rational is better than 104 the non-rational; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is rational. And so likewise with the intelligent and that which partakes of animation; for the intelligent is better than the non-intelligent and the animate than the non-animate; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is intelligent and animate."

A similar argument is stated by Plato, where he 105 writes in these terms^a:—"Let us declare the cause whereof he that constructed constructed Becoming and this All. He was good and in him that is good there is no envy concerning anything. And being devoid of envy, he desired that all things should be, so far as possible, like unto himself. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos." Then, after 106 a few further remarks, he goes on to say—"So because of this reflection he constructed reason within soul and soul within body as he fashioned the All, that so the work he was executing might be of its nature most fair and most good. Thus, then, in accordance with the likely account, we must declare that this Cosmos is verily a living creature endowed with soul and reason because it has come into existence through the providence of God." Thus Plato has set out 107 virtually the same argument as Zeno; for the former also asserts that "the All is most fair, being a work executed according to nature and according to the likely account a living creature endowed with soul, both intelligent and rational."

- 108 Ἄλλ' ὁ γὰρ Ἀλεξίνος τῷ Ζήνωνι παρέβαλε τρόπον
τῷδε. τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ
γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον ἐστί,
καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας θεωρούμενον κρείτ-
τόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τοιοῦτου· οὐδὲ ἐν δὲ κόσμου
κρείττον ἐστίν· ποιητικὸν ἄρα καὶ γραμματικὸν
109 ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. πρὸς ἣν ἀπαντῶντες παραβολῆν
οἱ στωικοὶ φασὶν ὅτι Ζήνων τὸ καθάπαξ κρείττον
εἴληφεν, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ καὶ
τὸ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ μὴ
110 ἐμψύχου, ὃ δὲ Ἀλεξίνος οὐκ ἐτί· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
καθάπαξ τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ
γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον. ὥστε
μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις θεωρεῖσθαι διαφορὰν· ἰδὸν
γὰρ Ἀρχίλοχος ποιητικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐστὶ Σωκράτους
τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ κρείττων, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος
γραμματικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτωνος τοῦ μὴ
γραμματικοῦ κρείττων.
- 111 Πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως
ἐπιχειροῦσι κατασκευάζειν τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπαρξίν
οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ οἱ τούτοις συμπνέοντες.
ὅτι γὰρ κινεῖται ὁ κόσμος πᾶς ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειεν
112 ὑπὸ πολλῶν εἰς τοῦτο ἐναγόμενος. ἦτοι οὖν ὑπὸ
φύσεως κινεῖται ἢ ὑπὸ προαιρέσεως ἢ ὑπὸ δίνης
καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν δίνης καὶ κατ'
ἀνάγκην οὐκ εὐλογον. ἦτοι γὰρ ἄτακτός ἐστιν ἢ
διατεταγμένη ἢ δίνη. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄτακτος, οὐκ ἂν
δυνηθεῖη τεταγμένως τι κινεῖν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ τάξεώς

* A. was a disciple of Eubulides, the Megaric philosopher, and a contemporary of Zeno the Stoic (circa 300 B.C.); cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvi.

But Alexinus^a opposed Zeno with a parallel argu- 108
ment in this form:—"The poetic is better than the
non-poetical and the grammatical than the non-
grammatical, and the artistic product of the other arts
than the inartistic; but nothing is better than the
Universe; therefore the Universe is poetical and
grammatical." But in answer to this counter-argu- 109
ment the Stoics say that, whereas Zeno has chosen
what is absolutely better—that is, the rational than
the non-rational, and the intelligent than the non-
intelligent and the animate than the non-animate,—
Alexinus has not done so; for the poetic is not 110
absolutely better than the non-poetic or the gram-
matical than the non-grammatical. So that we
observe a great difference between the two argu-
ments; for notice how Archilochus who is poetical
is not better than the non-poetical Socrates, and
Aristarchus^b who is grammatical is not better than
the non-grammatical Plato.

Furthermore, the Stoics and their supporters try to 111
demonstrate the existence of the Gods from the
motion of the Universe. For that the Universe is in
motion everyone will admit, being driven thereto by
many things. It is moved, then, either by nature or 112
by will or by vortex^c and of necessity. But that (it is
moved) by vortex and of necessity is not probable.
For the vortex is either disorderly or orderly. And
if it is disorderly, it will not be able to move anything
in an orderly way; but if it moves anything in a way

^a Archilochus of Paros was an iambic poet circa 700 B.C. Aristarchus was a famous grammarian and literary critic at Alexandria, circa 150 B.C. In these §§ 108-110 "grammatical" means "possessed of the grammarian's art."

^c In the doctrine of Democritus "vortex" (δίνη) was the name for the whirling force giving spiral motion to the atoms.

τι κινεῖ καὶ συμφωνίας, θεία τις ἔσται καὶ δαιμόνιος·
 113 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τεταγμένως καὶ σωτηρίως τὸ ὄλον
 ἐκίνοι μὴ νοερά καὶ θεία καθεστῶσα. τοιαύτη δὲ
 οὐσα οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη ἀτακτον γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτῆ
 καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον. ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην μὲν καὶ
 ὑπὸ δίνης, ὡς ἔλεγον οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον, οὐκ
 114 ἂν κινεῖτο ὁ κόσμος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ φύσει ἀφαν-
 τάστω, παρόσον ἢ νοερά φύσις ἀμείνων ἐστὶ ταύτης.
 ὁράνται δὲ τοιαῦται φύσεις ἐν κόσμῳ περιεχόμεναι·
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸν νοεράν ἔχειν φύσιν ὑφ' ἧς
 τεταγμένως κινεῖται, ἥτις εὐθέως ἐστὶ θεός.
 115 Τὰ γε μὴν αὐτομάτως κινούμενα τῶν κατα-
 σκευασμάτων θαυμαστότερα ἐστὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων.
 τὴν γοῦν Ἀρχιμήδειον σφαῖραν σφόδρα θεωροῦντες
 ἐκπληττόμεθα, ἐν ἧ ἡλίος τε καὶ σελήνη κινεῖται
 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀστέρων, οὐ μὰ Δία ἐπὶ τοῖς
 ξύλοις οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τούτων τεθηπότες, ἀλλ'
 ἐπὶ τῷ τεχνίτῃ καὶ ταῖς κινούσαις αἰτίαις. ὅθεν
 ὄσῳ θαυμασιώτερα ἐστὶ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν, τοσοῦτῳ θαυμασιώτεραί εἰσιν αἱ ταῦτα
 116 κινούσαι αἰτίαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἵππος θαυμασιώτερος
 τοῦ φυτοῦ, καὶ ἡ κινητικὴ τοῦ ἵππου αἰτία θαυμα-
 σιωτέρα τῆς τοῦ φυτοῦ αἰτίας· καὶ ἐπεὶ ὁ ἐλέφας
 θαυμασιώτερος ἵππου, καὶ ἡ κινητικὴ τοῦ ἐλέφαντος
 αἰτία, τηλικούτον γε ὄγκον διαβαστάζουσα, θαυμα-
 117 σιωτέρα τῆς τοῦ ἵππου. τούτων δὲ γε πασῶν κατὰ
 τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης
 καὶ ἀστέρων, καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἢ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις,
 ἥτις καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν αἰτία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μέρους

that is orderly and harmonious, it will be divine and
 supernatural; for it would never have moved the 113
 whole in an orderly and conserving way had it not
 been intelligent and divine. And if it is such, it will
 no longer be vortex; for this is disorderly and of short
 duration. So that the Universe will not be moved of
 necessity and by vortex, as Democritus said. Nor yet 114
 by a non-perceptive nature, inasmuch as the intelli-
 gent nature is superior to this; and such natures are
 seen to be contained in the Universe; of necessity,
 therefore, it must itself possess an intelligent nature
 by which it is moved in an orderly way, and this
 indubitably is God.

Moreover, constructions which move of their own 115
 accord are more marvellous than other kinds. Thus
 when we behold an Archimedean sphere ^a in which
 the sun and moon and all the other stars are in motion,
 we are immensely struck by it—not, to be sure,
 because we are amazed at the woodwork or at the
 motion of these bodies, but at the artificer and the
 causes of the motion. Hence in the degree that per-
 ceipients are more marvellous than things perceived,
 in the same degree the causes which move the former
 are the more marvellous. For since the horse is more 116
 marvellous than the plant, the moving cause of the
 horse is more marvellous than that of the plant; and
 since the elephant is more marvellous than the horse,
 the moving cause of the elephant, which transports so
 huge a bulk, is more marvellous than that of the
 horse; and—to rise to the highest kinds—(more 117
 marvellous) than all the foregoing are the moving
 causes of the sun and moon and stars, and still more
 than these that which is their cause, the nature of the
 Universe. For the cause of the part does not extend

^a A kind of orrery, representing the movements of the stars, invented by Archimedes (circa 230 B.C.).

αἰτία οὐ διατείνει ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον, οὐδ' ἔστι τούτου αἰτία, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου διατέτακεν εἰς τὰ μέρη· διὸ καὶ θαυμασιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ μέρους αἰτίας.

118 ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἢ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου διακοσμῆσεως, εἴη ἂν αἰτία καὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κρατίστη ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ κρατίστη ἐστὶ, λογικὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ νοερά, προσέτι δὲ αἰδιος ἂν εἴη. ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη φύσις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ θεῶ. ἔστι τοίνυν τι θεός.

119 Καὶ μὴν ἐν παντὶ πολυμερεῖ σώματι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διοικουμένῳ ἐστὶ τι τὸ κυριεῦον, καθὸ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὲν ἢ ἐν καρδίᾳ τοῦτο τυγχάνειν ἀξιούται ἢ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὧν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ῥίζας ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὴν

120 κόμην ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐγκάρδιον. ὥστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται πολυμερῆς καθεστώς, εἴη ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ τὸ προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κινήσεων. οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἢ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἣτις θεός ἐστίν. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.

121 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τινὲς ἐροῦσιν ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἡγεμονικωτάτην εἶναι συμβέβηκε καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὴν γῆν καὶ <ἔτι>¹ ἡγεμονικώτερον καὶ κυριώτερον τὸν ἀέρα· ἀνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶ συστήναι κόσμον. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γῆν

122 καὶ τὸν ἀέρα φήσομεν εἶναι θεόν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐήθες, καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ λέγειν κυριώτατον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ ἡγεμονικώτατον εἶναι τὸν τοίχον· ἀνευ

¹ <ἔτι> add. cj. Bekk.

to the whole, nor is it the cause thereof, but that of the whole extends to the parts; wherefore also it is more marvellous than the cause of the part. So that 118 since the nature of the Universe is the cause of the ordering of the whole Universe, it will also be the cause of the parts. And if so, it is most excellent. And if it is most excellent, it is both rational and intelligent, and besides it will be eternal. But such a nature is identical with God. Therefore God is something existent.

Further, in every multipartite body which is 119 regulated by nature^a there exists some ruling element, even as in our case this is said to exist either in the heart or in the brain or in some other part of the body^b; and in the case of plants in a different way,— in some cases in the roots, in others in the leaves, in others again in the central core. Consequently, 120 since the Universe also is multipartite and regulated by nature, there will exist in it an element which rules and originates its motions. And this can be nothing else than the nature of existing things, which is God. God therefore exists.

But perhaps some will say that the result of this 121 argument is that the earth is a most dominant and ruling force in the Universe, and even more dominant and ruling is the air; for without these it is not possible for the Universe to subsist; so that we shall assert that both the earth and the air are God. But 122 this is silly, and much like saying that the wall is the most dominant and ruling thing in the house; for

^a i. e. "nature" (φύσις), or "organic structure," as distinct from "attraction" (ἐξίς); cf. § 81 *supra*. The "multipartite body" is an "organism."

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 313.

γὰρ τούτου μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν οἰκίαν συστήναι. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ταῖς μὲν ἀληθείαις ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀνευ τοίχου συστήναι τὴν οἰκίαν, οὐ μὴν ὑπερφέρει καὶ κρείττον ἐστὶ τοῦ οἰκοδεσπότου ὁ τοίχος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀδύνατον μὲν χωρὶς γῆς καὶ ἀέρος τὴν τοῦ παντός σύστασιν γενέσθαι, οὐ μὴν ταῦτα ὑπερφέρει τῆς διοικουσης τὸν κόσμον φύσεως, ἥτις οὐ διενήνοχε θεοῦ. ἐστὶν ἄρα θεός.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· σκοπῶμεν δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῶν ἀκολουθούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιρουσὶ τὸ θεῖον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐκ ἐστὶν εὐσέβεια [μόνον τῶν αἰρετῶν]¹ ὑπάρχουσα. ἐστὶ γὰρ εὐσέβεια ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας, τῶν δ' ἀνυπάρκτων οὐ δύναται τις εἶναι θεραπεία, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τις περὶ ταύτην γενήσεται· καὶ ὡς οὐχ οἶδόν τε περὶ τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων θεραπείαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἀνυπάρκτων ὄντων, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀνυπαρκτοί, ἔσται τις ἐπιστήμη. ὥστε εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀνυπαρκτός ἐστὶν ἢ εὐσέβεια. ὑπάρχει δὲ εὐσέβεια· τοίνυν ρητέον εἶναι θεούς.

124 καὶ πάλιν, εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀνυπαρκτός ἐστὶν ἢ ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσα πρὸς θεούς· ἐστὶ δὲ γε κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας καὶ προλήψεις πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὁσιότης, καθό τι καὶ ὁσιόν ἐστιν· καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄρα ἐστὶν.

125 εἴγε μὴν μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀναιρεῖται σοφία, ἐπιστήμη οὐσα θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ὃν τρόπον οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρωπείων τε καὶ ἵπποκενταυρείων πραγμάτων διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπους μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἵπποκενταύρους δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τις ἔσται θεῶν

without it the house cannot subsist. For just as, in this case, although the house cannot in fact subsist without the wall, yet the wall does not overrule and is not better than the master of the house,—so also in the case of the Universe, although it is impossible for the structure of the Whole to exist without earth and air, yet these do not overrule the nature which regulates the Universe ; and this does not differ from God. God, therefore, exists.

Such, then, is the general character of these arguments. Next let us consider the nature of the absurd 123 consequences of abolishing Divinity. If Gods do not exist, piety is not existent. For piety is “ the science of service to the Gods,” and there cannot be any service of things non-existent, nor, consequently, will any science thereof exist ; and just as there cannot be any science of service to Hippocentaurs, they being non-existent, so there will not be any science of service to the Gods if they are non-existent. So that, if Gods do not exist, piety is non-existent. But piety exists ; so we must declare that Gods exist.—Again, if Gods do not exist, holiness is non-existent, 124 it being “ a kind of God-ward justice ” ; but according to the common notions and preconceptions of all men holiness exists, and because of this a holy thing also exists ; and therefore the Divine exists.—If, 125 however, Gods do not exist, wisdom is abolished, it being “ the science of things both divine and human ” ; and just as there is no science of things both human and Hippocentaurean owing to the fact that men exist but Hippocentaurs do not exist, so too there will

¹ [μόνον τῶν αἰρ.] secl. ego: μία τῶν ἀρετῶν cj. Bekk.: [μόνον . . . ὑπάρχ.] secl. Kayser.

καὶ ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὑπαρχόντων θεῶν δὲ μὴ ὑφεστώτων. ἄτοπον δὲ γε λέγειν μὴ εἶναι σοφίαν· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀξιοῦν ἀνυπάρκτους.

- 126 Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπι-
πλοκὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τε ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς
θεοὺς εἰσῆκται, εἰ μὴ εἰσι θεοί, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη
127 συστήσεται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν
Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν
πλήθος φασι μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ
παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διήκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ
128 ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες
αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς σαρκῖν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενοι ἀδικήσομεν
τε καὶ ἀσεβήσομεν ὡς συγγενεῖς ἀναιροῦντες. ἔθθεν
καὶ παρήνουν οὗτοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν
ἐμφύχων, καὶ ἀσεβεῖν ἔφασκον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

βωμὸν ἐρεύθοντας μακάρων θερμοῖσι φόνοισιν.

- 129 καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πού φησιν

οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσσχεῆος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε
ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδέησι νόοιο;

καὶ

μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν αἰείρας,
σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος· οἱ δ'
ἀπορεύνται¹

λισσόμενοι θύοντος. ὁ δ' αὖ² νήκουστος ὁμο-
κλέων

¹ ἀπορεύνται Diels: ἐπορεύνται Bekk.: οἱ δὲ (οἶδα N) πο-
ρεύνται mss.

² δ' αὖ Diels: δὲ Bekk.

be no science of things divine and human if men exist but Gods subsist not. But it is absurd to assert that wisdom does not exist; therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the Gods are non-existent.

Furthermore, if justice too has been introduced 126 because of the connexion of men with one another and with the Gods, if Gods exist not, neither will justice subsist; which is absurd. Now Pythagoras and Em- 127 pedocles and the rest of the Italian company declare that we have some fellowship not only with one another and with the Gods but also with the irrational animals. For there is one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole Universe, and which also makes us one with them. Wherefore if we slay them and 128 feed on their flesh we shall be doing what is unjust and impious, as destroying our kindred. Hence, too, these philosophers advised abstinence from animal food, and declared that those men were impious who

Redden'd the Blessed Ones' altars with warm blood pouring from victims.

And Empedocles somewhere says—

129

Will ye not cease from the harrowing sound of slaughter?
Nor see ye
How in your reckless frenzy of mind ye devour one another?

And—

Raising his dear one on high—his son with visage how alter'd!—
Witless the sire doth slay him, with prayer: and the rest are
astonied
Begging him e'en as he slays; but he, ever deaf to their outcries,

σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαΐτα.
ὡς δ' αὖτως πατέρ' υἱὸς Ἑλῶν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες
θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

- 130 ταῦτα δὴ παρήνουν οἱ περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν πταί-
οντες. οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἔστι τι διῆκον δι' ἡμῶν τε καὶ
ἐκείνων πνεῦμα, εὐθὺς ἔστι τις ἡμῖν δικαιοσύνη
πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ διὰ τῶν
λίθων καὶ διὰ τῶν φυτῶν πεφοίτηκέ τι πνεῦμα,
ὥστε ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς συνενουσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν
ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ φυτὰ καὶ λίθους, οὐδὲ μὴν
τέμνοντες καὶ πρίζοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματίων
131 ἀδικοῦμεν. τί οὖν φασὶν οἱ στωικοὶ δικαιοσύνην
τινὰ καὶ ἐπιπλοκὴν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πρὸς
ἀλλήλους καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς; οὐ καθόσον ἔστι τὸ
ἐλληλακὸς διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ἐπεὶ ἂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζώων ἐσώζετό τι δίκαιον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ
λόγον ἔχομεν τὸν ἐπ' ἀλλήλους τε καὶ θεοὺς δια-
τείνοντα, οὐ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων μὴ μετέχοντα οὐκ
ἂν ἔχοι τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς δίκαιον. ὥστε εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
κατὰ τινα κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
ἀνθρώπων πρὸς θεοὺς νενόηται, δεήσει μὴ ὄντων
θεῶν μηδὲ δικαιοσύνην ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι. ὑπαρκτὴ
δέ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη· ῥητέον ἄρα καὶ θεοὺς
ὑπάρχειν.
132 Πρὸς τούτοις εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐδὲ μαντικὴ
ὑπάρχει, ἐπιστήμη οὐσα θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ
τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων, οὐδὲ
μὴν θεοληπτικὴ καὶ ἀστρομαντικὴ, οὐ θυτικὴ,¹ οὐχ
ἢ δι' ὀνείρων πρόρρησις. ἄτοπον δέ γε τοσοῦτο

¹ θυτικὴ Fabr.: λογικὴ mss., Bekk.

Still in his halls doth slay and his horrible banquet prepareth.
Likewise the son doth capture the sire, the children the
mother,
Reave them of life, and greedily feed on the flesh of their
kinsfolk.

This, then, was the advice of Pythagoras, but mis- 130
taken; for it does not at once follow that, if there
exists a spirit which pervades both us and them, there
exists some form of justice as between us and the
irrational animals. For, look you, the spirit also
ranges through stones and through plants, so that we
are united with them, but we have no relation of
justice with plants and stones, nor to be sure do we
act unjustly in cutting and sawing bodies of that
kind.—Why then do the Stoics assert that men have a 131
certain just relation and connexion with one another
and with the Gods? Not on account of the existence
of the spirit which runs through all things,—since
then there would also remain for us a duty towards
the irrational animals,—but because we possess that
reason which reaches out to one another and the
Gods, whereas the irrational animals, having no share
in this, will have no relation of justice towards us.
So that, if justice is conceived because of a certain
fellowship between men and men and between
men and Gods, if Gods do not exist, it must follow
that justice also is non-existent. But justice is
existent; we must declare, therefore, that Gods also
exist.

In addition,—if Gods exist not, neither does 132
prophecy exist, it being “the science which observes
and interprets the signs given by Gods to men”; nor
yet inspiration and astrology, nor divination, nor
prediction by means of dreams. But it is absurd

πλήθος πραγμάτων ἀναιρεῖν πεπιστευμένων ἤδη
παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.

- 133 Ζήνων δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἠρώτα λόγον. τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶη· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν
τις εὐλόγως τιμῶη· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί· ᾧ λόγῳ τινὲς
παραβάλλοντές φασι “ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἂν τις εὐλόγως
τιμῶη· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶη·
εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί.” ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
στοᾶς, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος τοῦ κατ’
134 αὐτοὺς σοφοῦ. ἀπαντῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν παραβολὴν
Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος τὸ δευτέρον φησι λῆμμα
τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τοιοῦτον εἶναι τῇ δυνάμει
“ τοὺς δὲ μὴ πεφυκότας εἶναι οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως
τιμῶη.” τοιούτου γὰρ λαμβανομένου δηλὸν ὡς
135 πεφύκασιν εἶναι θεοί. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰσὶν ἤδη.
εἰ γὰρ ἅπαξ ποτὲ ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ εἰ
ἄτομοι ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν· ἄφθαρτα γὰρ καὶ
ἀγένητα τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν
σωμάτων. διὸ καὶ κατὰ ἀκόλουθον ἐπιφορὰν
συνάξει ὁ λόγος. οἱ δὲ γε σοφοὶ οὐκ ἐπεὶ πεφύ-
136 κασιν εἶναι, ἤδη καὶ εἰσὶν. ἄλλοι δὲ φασι τὸ
πρῶτον λῆμμα τοῦ Ζήνωνος, τὸ “ τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶη,” ἀμφίβολον εἶναι· ἐν μὲν
γὰρ σημαίνειν “ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶη,”
ἕτερον δὲ “ τιμητικῶς ἔχει.” λαμβάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅπερ ψεῦδος ἔσται ἐπὶ τῶν σοφῶν.
137 Οἱ μὲν οὖν κομιζόμενοι λόγοι παρά τε τοῖς
στομακοῖς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰρέσεων

to abolish such a multitude of things which are
already believed in by all men. Therefore, Gods
exist.

Zeno propounded this argument also :—“ One may 133
reasonably honour the Gods ; but those who are non-
existent one may not reasonably honour ; therefore
Gods exist.” But some oppose to this argument a
parallel one—“ The wise one may reasonably honour ;
but one may not reasonably honour the non-existent ;
therefore wise men exist.” Which conclusion was
unpleasing to the Stoics, as their “ Wise man ” has
remained undiscoverable up till now. In reply to the 134
counter-argument Diogenes the Babylonian “ asserts
that the second premiss in Zeno’s argument is virtually
this—“ But those who are not of such a nature as to
exist one may not reasonably honour ” ; for when
this premiss is accepted it is evident that the Gods
are of such a nature as to exist. But if so, they do 135
actually exist. For if they had once existed at any
time, they also exist now, just as, if atoms had existed,
they also exist now ; for according to the conception
of such bodies, they are imperishable and uncreate.
Hence the argument will deduce a consequent
conclusion. But it is not true of the wise that they
actually exist because they are of such a nature as to
exist. But others say that Zeno’s first premiss—136
“ One may reasonably honour the Gods ”—is am-
biguous ; for one of its significations is “ one may
reasonably pay honour to the Gods,” the other “ one
may hold them in honour.”^b But the first is taken as
the premiss, and in the case of the wise this will be
false.

Such, then, in their character are the arguments 137
brought forward by the Stoics, and by those of the

* A Stoic philosopher, disciple of Chrysippus (circa 160 B.C.)

^b By “ pay honour to ” is meant “ worship ” (with offer-
ings, etc.), whereas “ hold in honour ” implies merely the
respect paid to any “ honourable man.”

εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχειν θεοὺς τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι κατὰ τὸν
 χαρακτήρα· ὅτι δὲ οὐ λείπονται τούτων ἕνεκα τῆς
 138 περὶ τὸ πείθειν ἰσοσθενείας καὶ οἱ τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς
 διδάσκοντες παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. εἴπερ τοί-
 νυν εἰσι θεοί, ζῶα εἰσίν· καὶ ὧ λόγῳ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 στοᾶς ἐδίδασκον ὅτι ζῶόν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, τῷ αὐτῷ
 χρησάμενος ἂν τις κατασκευάζοι ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεός
 ἐστὶ ζῶον. τὸ γὰρ ζῶον τοῦ μὴ ζώου κρείττον
 ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δὲ κρείττον ἐστὶ θεοῦ· ζῶον ἄρα ἐστὶν
 ὁ θεός, συμπαραλαμβανομένης τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
 τῆς κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐννοίας, εἶγε καὶ ὁ βίος
 καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρίστων φιλοσόφων
 πληθὺς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ ζῶον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. ὥστε
 139 σώζεσθαι τὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας. εἰ γὰρ εἰσι θεοί,
 ζῶα εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ ζῶα εἰσίν, αἰσθάνονται· πᾶν
 γὰρ ζῶον αἰσθήσεως μετοχῇ νοεῖται ζῶον. εἰ δὲ
 αἰσθάνονται, καὶ πικράζονται καὶ γλυκάζονται· οὐ
 γὰρ δι' ἄλλης μὲν τινος αἰσθήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνονται
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς γεύσεως. ὅθεν
 καὶ τὸ περικόπτειν ταύτην ἢ τινα αἰσθησιν ἄλλην
 140 ἀπλῶς τοῦ θεοῦ παντελῶς ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον· περι-
 τοτέρας γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἔχων [ὁ ἄνθρωπος] ἀμείνων
 αὐτοῦ γενήσεται, δέον μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ
 Καρνεάδης, σὺν ταῖς πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσαις πέντε
 ταύταις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἄλλας αὐτῷ περισσοτέρας
 προσμαρτυρεῖν, ἢ ἔχη πλειόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
 πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν πέντε ἀφαιρεῖν. ῥήτέον
 οὐδὲν τινὰ γεῦσιν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ διὰ ταύτης

* Cf. P.H. iii. 2 ff.

other Schools, in favour of the existence of Gods ; and
 in similar fashion we must show that those which
 maintain the non-existence of Gods do not fall short
 of the former in respect of their equipollence as
 regards persuasion.^a If, then, Gods exist, they are 138
 animals^b; and, employing the same argument as that
 by which the Stoics maintained^c that the Universe is
 an animal, one may demonstrate that God, too, is an
 animal. For "the animal is better than the non-
 animal; but nothing is better than God; therefore
 God is an animal"; and in support of this argument
 is adduced also the common conception of mankind,
 since ordinary folk and the poets, too, and the majority
 of the best philosophers testify to the fact that God is
 an animal. So that the steps of the logical sequence
 are secured. For if Gods exist, they are animals. 139
 But if they are animals, they have sensation; for
 every animal is conceived as an animal by its parti-
 cipation in sensation. And if they have sensation,
 they also feel bitterness and sweetness; for they do
 not perceive sense-objects through some other sense,
 and not through taste as well; hence it is wholly
 improbable that God should be entirely deprived of
 this or of any other sense; for the more numerous 140
 the senses he has, the better he will be, since it is
 preferable—as Carneades said—that, in addition to
 the five senses which belong to all men, yet others
 should supply him with evidence, in order that he
 may be able to apprehend a greater number of things,
 rather than that he should be robbed of the five. We
 must assert, then, that God possesses taste, and by it

^b *i.e.* "animals" in the sense of "living creatures" (cf. § 107)—not as opposed to "men."

^c Cf. § 107 *supra*.

141 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν γευστῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ γεύσεως ἀντιλαμβάνεται, γλυκάζεται καὶ πικράζεται. γλυκαζόμενος δὲ καὶ πικραζόμενος εὐαρεστήσει τισὶ καὶ δυσαρεστήσει. δυσαρεστῶν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ὀχλήσεως ἔσται δεκτικὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, φθαρτὸς ἔστω. ὥστε εἶπερ εἰσὶ θεοί, φθαρτοὶ εἰσιν. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσίν.

142 Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι θεός, ζῶον ἐστίν. εἰ ζῶον ἐστὶ, καὶ αἰσθάνεται· τὸ γὰρ ζῶον τοῦ μὴ ζώου οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ διαφέρει ἢ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἀκούει καὶ ὄρα καὶ ὀσφραίνεται καὶ ἄπτεται.

143 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστι τινὰ τὰ καθ' ἐκάστην αἰσθησιν οἰκειοῦντα αὐτὸν καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦντα, οἷον κατὰ μὲν ὄρασιν τὰ συμμετρῶς ἔχοντα καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρως, κατὰ δὲ ἀκοήν αἰ ἐμμελεῖς φωναὶ καὶ οὐχ αἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσαι, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστι τινὰ τῷ θεῷ ὀχληρά· καὶ εἰ ἔστι τινὰ θεῷ ὀχληρά, γίνεται ἐν τῇ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῇ θεός, ὥστε καὶ ἐν φθορᾷ. φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ θεός. τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπῆρχεν αὐτοῦ· τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον.

144 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς αἰσθήσεως ἐπεξεργαστικώτερον τιθέναι τὸν λόγον, οἷον τῆς ὀράσεως. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ζῶον ἐστίν. εἰ ζῶον ἐστίν, ὄρα [ὄλος]¹.

οὐλος γὰρ ὄρα, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

145 εἰ δὲ ὄρα, καὶ λευκὰ ὄρα καὶ μέλανα. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ λευκὸν μὲν ἔστι τὸ διακριτικὸν ὄψεως μέλαν δὲ τὸ

perceives things gustable. But if he perceives by 141 means of taste, he feels sweetness and bitterness; and feeling sweetness and bitterness, he will be pleased by some things and displeased by others; and being displeased by some things, he will be receptive of vexation and of change for the worse. But if so, he is perishable. So that if Gods exist, they are perishable. Therefore Gods do not exist.

If, however, God exists, he is an animal. If he is 142 an animal, he has sensation; for the animal differs from the not-animal by nothing else than by sensation. But if he has sensation, he hears and sees and smells and touches. And if so, there are certain 143 things in connexion with each sense which are congenial or repellent to him,—for instance, in respect of sight, things which are symmetrical and not the reverse; and in respect of hearing, sounds which are musical and not those of a different kind; and similarly with the rest of the senses. But if so, there are certain things which are vexatious to God; and if there are certain things vexatious to God, God is subject to change for the worse, and thus also to decay. Therefore God is perishable. But this is contrary to the general conception of him. Therefore the Divine does not exist.

And it is also possible to base the argument still 144 more effectively on a single sense,—for instance, vision. For if the Divine exists, it is an animal. And if it is an animal, it sees, for—

He with the whole of his being beholdeth and marketh and heareth.^a

And if he sees, he sees both white things and black. But since white is what is divisive of sight, and black 145

¹ [ὄλος] secl. Heintz.

^a Xenophanes, *Frag.* 2.

συγχυτικὸν ὄψεως, διακρίνεται τὴν ὄψιν καὶ συγ-
χέται ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ διακρίσεως καὶ συγχύσεως
ἔστι δεκτικός, καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι δεκτικός. τοῖνυν
εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, φθαρτὸν ἔστω. οὐχὶ δὲ γε φθαρτὸν
ἔστω· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστω.

- 146 Καὶ μὴν ἢ αἰσθησις ἑτεροιώσις τις ἐστίν· ἀμή-
χανον γὰρ τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως τινος ἀντιλαμβανόμενον
μὴ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἀλλὰ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι ὡς πρὸ τῆς
ἀντιλήψεως διέκειτο. εἰ οὖν αἰσθάνεται ὁ θεός,
καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται· εἰ δὲ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἑτεροιώσεως
147 δεκτικός ἔστι καὶ μεταβολῆς· δεκτικὸς δὲ ὢν
μεταβολῆς πάντως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς
ἔσται δεκτικός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φθαρτός ἔστω.
ἄτοπον δὲ γε τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν φθαρτὸν ὑπάρχειν·
ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τοῦτον.
- 148 Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἰ ἔστι τι θεῖον, ἦτοι πεπερα-
σμένον ἔστιν ἢ ἄπειρον. καὶ ἄπειρον μὲν οὐκ ἂν
εἶη, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀκίνητον ἂν εἶη καὶ ἄψυχον. εἰ γὰρ
κινεῖται τὸ ἄπειρον, τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται·
τόπον δὲ ἐκ τόπου μετερχόμενον ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν, ἐν
τόπῳ δὲ ὃν πεπεράσται. εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι ἄπειρον,
ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν· ἢ εἴπερ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἔστω ἄπειρον.
- 149 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἄψυχόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς
συνέχεται, πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα φερόμενον συν-
έχεται. ἐν δὲ ἀπείρῳ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μέσον οὐδὲ πέρας·
ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔμψυχόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
εἰ ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἔμψυχόν

what is compressive of sight,^a God has his sight divided
and compressed. And if he is receptive of division
and compression, he is receptive also of decay. So
then, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is
not perishable; therefore it does not exist.

Again, sensation is a kind of alteration; for it is 146
impossible for that which apprehends by means of a
sense not to be altered, but to remain in the same
condition in which it was before the act of appre-
hension. If God, then, has sensation, he is altered;
and if he is altered, he is receptive of alteration and
change; and being receptive of change, he will cer- 147
tainly be receptive of change for the worse. And if
so, he is also perishable. But it is absurd to say that
God is perishable; therefore it is absurd also to claim
that he exists.

Furthermore, if any Divinity exists, it is either 148
limited or unlimited. And it will not be unlimited,
since then it would be both motionless and inanimate.
For if the unlimited moves, it passes from place to
place; and if it passes from place to place, it is in
space, and being in space it is limited. Therefore, if
any unlimited exists, it is motionless; or if it moves,
it is not unlimited. So likewise it is inanimate; for 149
if it is held together by soul, it is certainly held to-
gether by movement from the centres to the limits
and from the limits to the centres.^b But in the un-
limited there is no centre nor limit; so that the un-
limited is not animate either. And on account of
this, if the Divine is unlimited it neither moves nor is

^a Alluding to the theory of Plato, *Timaeus* 67 E, that the stream of particles which issues from a white object "divides" the visual current which proceeds from the eyes, while that from a black object "compresses" it.

^b Alluding to the Stoic view that sensation is effected by means of breath-currents passing between the central sense-organ (the heart) and the peripheral sense-organs (eye, ear, etc.).

- ἐστίν. κινεῖται δὲ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἐμψυχίας ἀξιούται
 150 μετέχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πεπερα-
 σμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου μέρος ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὅλον τοῦ
 μέρους κρείττον ἐστὶ, δηλον ὡς τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦ
 θεῖου κρείττον ἔσται καὶ κρατήσῃ τῆς θείας
 φύσεως. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν θεοῦ τι κρείττον, καὶ
 κρατεῖν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως· τοίνυν οὐδὲ πεπερα-
 σμένον ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε ἄπειρόν ἐστι
 μήτε πεπερασμένον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι
 τρίτον νοεῖν, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ θεῖον.
- 151 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι τὸ θεῖον, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ
 ἀσώματον· οὔτε δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἀψυχόν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναίσθητον καὶ οὐδὲν δυνάμενον ἐνεργεῖν
 τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε σῶμα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα μετα-
 βλητόν τέ ἐστι καὶ φθαρτόν, ἀφθαρτόν δὲ τὸ θεῖον·
 οὐ τοίνυν ὑπάρχει τὸ θεῖον.
- 152 Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, πάντως καὶ ζῶον ἐστίν.
 εἰ δὲ ζῶον ἐστίν, πάντως καὶ πανάρετόν ἐστι καὶ
 εὐδαιμόν· εὐδαιμονία δὲ χωρὶς ἀρετῆς οὐ δύναται
 ὑποστήναι· εἰ δὲ πανάρετός ἐστι, καὶ πάσας ἔχει
 τὰς ἀρετάς. ἀλλ' οὐ πάσας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς,
 οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐγκράτειαν ἔχει καὶ καρτερίαν. οὐχὶ
 δέ γε ταύτας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, οὐχὶ δέ γε ἔστι
 τινὰ δυσάποσχετα καὶ δυσεγκαρτέρητα τῷ θεῷ.
- 153 ἐγκράτεια γάρ ἐστι διάθεσις ἀνυπέρβατος τῶν κατ'
 ὀρθὸν λόγον γιγνομένων, ἢ ἀρετὴ ὑπεράνω ποιούσα
 ἡμᾶς τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι δυσάποσχετών· ἐγ-
 κρατεύεται γάρ, φασίν, οὐχ ὁ θανατιώσης γραῶς

animate. But the Divine moves and participates, as is claimed, in animation ; therefore the Divine is not unlimited.—Nor yet is it limited. For since the 150 limited is a part of the unlimited, and the whole is superior to the part, it is plain that the unlimited will be superior to the Divine and will master the Divine nature. But it is absurd to say that anything is superior to God and master over the nature of God ; so then, the Divine is not limited either. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, the Divine will be nothing.

Again, if the Divine is anything, it is either a body 151 or incorporeal ; but it is not incorporeal, since the incorporeal is inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action ; nor is it a body, since every body is both subject to change and perishable, whereas the Divine is imperishable ; so then, the Divine does not exist.

If, however, the Divine exists, it is certainly 152 an animal. And if it is an animal, it is certainly both all-virtuous and happy (and without virtue happiness cannot subsist). And if it is all-virtuous, it possesses all the virtues. But it does not possess all the virtues unless it possesses both continence and fortitude. And it does not possess these virtues unless there are certain things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure. For continence is “ a state of mind in- 153 capable of transgressing the rules of right reason, or a virtue which makes us superior to the things which seem hard to abstain from.” For a man, they say, is continent not when he abstains from an old woman with one foot in the grave, but when he

ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ Λαΐδος καὶ Φρύνης ἢ τινος
 τοιαύτης δυνάμενος ἀπολαῦσαι, εἶτα ἀπεχόμενος.
 154 καρτερία δέ ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ὑπομενετέων καὶ οὐχ
 ὑπομενετέων, ἢ ἀρετὴ ὑπεράνω ποιούσα ἡμᾶς τῶν
 δοκούντων εἶναι δυσσομενήτων· χρῆται γὰρ καρ-
 155 τερίᾳ ὁ τεμνόμενος καὶ καιόμενος, εἶτα [δὲ] δια-
 καρτερῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ οἰνόμελι πίνων. ἔσται οὖν
 τινὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσσομένητα καὶ δυσσπόμενα. εἰ
 γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, οὐχὶ ταύτας ἔξει τὰς ἀρετάς, τοῦτ-
 156 ἐστι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν. εἰ δὲ
 ταύτας οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, ἐπεὶ μεταξύ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν ἔστι, τὰς ἀντιθέτους ταῖσδε ταῖς
 ἀρεταῖς ἔξει κακίας ὡσπερ τὴν μαλακίαν καὶ τὴν
 ἀκρασίαν· καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ἔχων τὴν ὑγίαν
 νόσον ἔχει, οὕτως ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐγκράτειαν καὶ
 157 καρτερίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις ἐστὶ κακίας, ὅπερ
 ἀτοπον ἐπὶ θεοῦ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τινὰ δυσσπόμε-
 να καὶ δυσσομένητα τῷ θεῷ, ἔστι τινὰ καὶ τὰ
 ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτοῦ μεταβλητικὰ καὶ ὀχλήσεως
 ποιητικὰ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, δεκτικός ἐστιν ὀχλήσεως
 ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, διὸ καὶ
 φθορᾶς. ὥστε εἶπερ ἔστιν ὁ θεός, φθαρτός ἐστιν·
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον.
 158 Ἔτι δὲ σὺν τοῖς προκειμένοις, εἰ πανάρτερόν ἐστι
 τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἔχει· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρίαν ἔχει, ἐπι-
 159 στήμην ἔχει δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ τῶν μεταξύ,
 καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστι τι θεῷ δεινόν. οὐ γὰρ δή γε ὁ
 ἀνδρείος διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀνδρείος ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔχει

has the power of enjoying Laïs^a or Phryne^a or some
 such charmer and then abstains. And fortitude is
 154 “the science of things endurable and not endurable,
 or a virtue which makes us superior to the things
 which seem hard to endure.” For it is the man who
 holds firm when he is being cut and burned that shows
 fortitude, and not the man who is drinking sweet
 wine. There will, then, exist certain things which
 155 are hard for God to endure and hard to abstain from.
 For if these do not exist, he will not possess these
 virtues,—namely, continence and fortitude. And if
 156 he does not possess these virtues, since there is no
 mean state between virtue and vice, he will possess
 the vices which are contrary to these virtues, such as
 effeminacy and incontinence; for just as he who has
 not health has disease, so he who has not continence
 and fortitude is subject to the opposite vices, which
 is an absurd thing to say about God. And if there are
 157 some things which are hard for God to abstain from
 and hard to endure, there are some things which are
 able to change him for the worse and to cause him
 vexation. But if so, God is receptive of vexation and
 of change for the worse, and hence of decay also. So
 that if God exists, he is perishable; but the second
 is not (true); therefore the first is not (true).

Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments,—
 158 if God is all-virtuous he possesses courage; and if he
 possesses courage he possesses “knowledge of things
 fearful and not fearful and of things intermediate”;
 and if so, there is something which is fearful to God.
 For, to be sure, the courageous man is not courageous
 159 because he possesses knowledge of the sort of things

^a Two Greek courtesans famed for their beauty; P. sat
 as a “model” to Praxiteles and Apelles (circa 330 a.c.).

τοῦ ποιά ἐστὶ τὰ δευὰ τῷ γείτονι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτῷ ἄπερ οὐκ¹ ἀπαράλλακτά ἐστὶ τοῖς τοῦ πλησίον δεινοῖς. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀνδρείος ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ἐστὶ 160
 160 τι αὐτῷ δεινόν. εἰ ἐστὶ τι θεῷ δεινόν, ἐστὶ τι τῷ θεῷ ὀχλήσεως ποιητικόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπι-
 δεκτικός ἐστὶν ὀχλήσεως, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθορᾶς. ὅθεν εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ θείον, φθαρτόν ἐστὶν. οὐχὶ δὲ φθαρτόν ἐστὶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν.

161 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πανάρετόν ἐστὶ τὸ θείον, καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχει, ἐπιστήμην ἔχει ποιούσαν ὑπεραίρειν τῶν συμβαι-
 νόντων. εἰ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ τινα τὰ συμβαίνοντα αὐτῷ ὦν ὑπεράνω γίνεται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ τινα καὶ ὀχληρὰ τὰ συμβαίνοντα αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτω φθαρτὸς ἐστὶν. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· τοῖνον οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

162 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἴπερ πάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁ θεός, καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. εἰ φρόνησιν ἔχει, ἔχει καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων. εἰ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἔχει τούτων, οἶδε ποιά ἐστὶ τὰ 163
 163 ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ ἀδιάφορα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ πόνος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐστίν, οἶδε καὶ τὸν πόνον [καὶ] ποῖός τις ὑπάρχει τὴν φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ περιπέπτωκεν αὐτῷ· μὴ περιπεσῶν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἔσχε νόησιν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὄν τρόπον ὁ μὴ περι-
 πεπτωκὸς λευκῷ χρώματι καὶ μέλανι διὰ τὸ ἐκ γενετῆς εἶναι πηρὸς οὐ δύναται νόησιν ἔχειν χρώ-
 164 μάτος, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεὸς μὴ περιπεπτωκὸς πόνῳ δύναται νόησιν ἔχειν τούτου. ὁπότε γὰρ ἡμεῖς οἱ περιπεσόντες πολλάκις τούτῳ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς

¹ οὐκ NLE: om. cet., Bekk.

which are fearful to his neighbour, but of those which are fearful to himself; and these are not to be identified with those which are fearful to his neighbour. Consequently, since God is courageous, there is something which is fearful to him. If there is some- 160
 thing fearful to God, there is something which causes vexation to God. And if so, he is receptive of vexation, and therefore of decay. Hence, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is not perishable; therefore, it does not exist.

Moreover, if the Divine is all-virtuous, it also 161
 possesses greatness of soul. And if it possesses greatness of soul, it possesses "knowledge which makes it rise superior to circumstances." If so, there exist certain circumstances above which it rises superior. And if so, there exist certain circumstances which are vexatious to it, and thus it will be perishable. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.

Furthermore: if God possesses all the virtues, 162
 he possesses wisdom. If he possesses wisdom, he possesses "knowledge of things good and evil and indifferent." And if he possesses knowledge of these, he knows what the good things are and the evil and the indifferent. Since, then, suffering is one of the 163
 indifferent things, he knows both suffering and what its real nature is. And if so, he has experienced it; for without experience he would not have formed a notion of it, but, just as the man who has not experienced white colour and black, owing to his being blind from birth, cannot possess a notion of colour, so too God cannot have a notion of suffering if he has not experienced it. For when we, who have often 164
 experienced it, are unable to discern distinctly the

περὶ τοὺς ποδαλγικοὺς ἀλγηδόνας οὐ δυνάμεθα
 τρανῶς γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲ διηγουμένων ἡμῖν τινῶν
 συμβαλεῖν, οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν πεπονητότων
 συμφώνως ἀκοῦσαι διὰ τὸ ἄλλους ἄλλως ταύτην
 ἐρμηνεύειν καὶ τοὺς μὲν στροφῆν τοὺς δὲ κλάσει
 τοὺς δὲ νύξει λέγειν ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς παρακολουθεῖν,
 ἢ πού γε θεὸς μῆδ' ὄλως πόνῳ περιπετωκῶς
 165 <οὐ>¹ δύναται πόνου νόησιν ἔχειν. νῆ Δί', ἀλλὰ
 πόνῳ μὲν, φασίν, οὐ περιπέπτωκεν, ἡδονῇ δέ, κακ
 ταύτης ἐκείνον νενόηκεν. ὅπερ ἦν εὐθες. πρῶτον
 μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀμήχανον μὴ πειραθέντα πόνου νόη-
 σιν ἡδονῆς λαβεῖν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παντός τοῦ ἀλγύ-
 166 νοντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν συνίστασθαι πέφυκεν. εἴτα καὶ
 τούτου συγχωρηθέντος πάλιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ φθαρτὸν
 εἶναι τὸν θεόν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης διαχύσεως
 δεκτικός ἐστι, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς
 ἔσται δεκτικός ὁ θεὸς καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν. οὐχὶ δέ
 γε τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
 167 Εἴπερ τε πανάρετόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὴν φρόνη-
 σιν ἔχει, ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐβουλίαν, παρόσον ἢ εὐ-
 βουλία φρόνησις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ βουλευτά. εἰ δὲ τὴν
 168 εὐβουλίαν ἔχει, καὶ βουλεύεται. εἰ δὲ βουλεύεται,
 ἔστι τι ἄδηλον αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ μῆδέν ἐστιν ἄδηλον
 αὐτῷ, οὐ βουλεύεται οὐδὲ τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἔχει τῷ
 τὴν βουλήν ἀδηλοῦ τινὸς ἔχεισθαι, ζήτησιν οὖσαν
 περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τοῖς παρούσιν ὀρθῶς διεξάγομεν.
 ἄτοπον δὲ γέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι μῆδὲ εὐ-
 βουλίαν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν. τοῖνον ἔχει ταύτην, καὶ
 169 ἐστὶ τι ἄδηλον αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τι ἄδηλον θεῷ, οὐκ

¹ <οὐ> N, Mutsch.

special quality of the pain suffered by gouty patients, or to guess it from descriptions, or to get consistent accounts from the actual sufferers, since they explain it in different ways, and some say that they find it to resemble twisting, others bending, others stabbing,—surely, if God has had no experience at all of suffering, he cannot possess a notion of suffering. Truly, they 165 reply, he has not experienced suffering, but pleasure, and from this he has formed a notion of the other. But this is silly. For, in the first place, it is impossible to acquire a notion of pleasure without having experienced suffering; for it is owing to the withdrawal of everything that gives pain that pleasure really subsists. And, in the next place, if this be 166 granted, it follows once more that God is perishable. For if he is receptive of such a collapse, God will be receptive of change for the worse, and is perishable. But this is not (true), nor, in consequence, is the original supposition (true).

Also, if the Divine is all-virtuous and possesses 167 wisdom, it possesses sound-deliberation, inasmuch as sound-deliberation is "wisdom regarding things requiring deliberation." And if it possesses sound-deliberation, it deliberates. And if it deliberates, 168 there is something which is non-evident to it; for if there is nothing non-evident to it, it does not deliberate nor does it possess sound-deliberation, since deliberation is attached to what is non-evident, being "a search for the way of conducting ourselves rightly under present circumstances." But it is absurd that God should not deliberate nor possess sound-deliberation. So then, he does possess this, and there is something which is non-evident to him. And if there is something non-evident to God, it is 169

- ἄλλο μὲν τι ἔστιν ἄδηλον θεῶ, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἶον εἰ ἔστι τινα αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ φθαρτικά. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄδηλον αὐτῷ, πάντως κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν φθαρτικῶν αὐτοῦ τούτων, ἐξ ὧν ἐν συνθροήσῃ τινὶ καὶ κινήματι 170 γενήσεται, κἂν φοβοῖτο. εἰ δὲ ἐν [συγκινήματι τοιοῦτω γίνεται, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἔσται δεκτικός, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθαρτός. ὧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδ' ὅλως αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν.
- 171 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ μηδὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστι θεῶ ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν ἐκ φύσεως πάντων καταληπτικός καθ- ἔστηκεν, οὐκ ἔχει τέχνην, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴπαμεν περὶ τὸν βάτραχον ἢ τὸν δελφίνα, φύσει νηκτικούς ὄντας, τέχνην εἶναι νηκτικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐκ φύσεως πάντα κατα- λαμβανόμενον εἴπαμεν ἂν εἶναι τέχνην τῷ ἀδήλου τινός καὶ [τοῦ]¹ αὐτόθεν μὴ καταλαμβανομένου 172 ἐφάπτεσθαι τὴν τέχνην. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔστι περὶ τὸν θεὸν τέχνη, οὐδ' ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἔσται περὶ αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἢ ἀρετῆ. μὴ ἔχων δὲ θεὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν. καὶ ἄλλως, λογικός ὧν ὁ θεός, εἰ μὴ ἔχει τὴν ἀρετὴν, πάντως τὴν 173 ἀντίθετον ἔχει κακίαν· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὴν ἀντίθετον ἔχει κακίαν· ἔχει ἄρα τέχνην ὁ θεός, καὶ ἔστι τι ἄδηλον τῷ θεῶ. ὧ ἔπεται τὸ φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, καθὼς πρῶτον ἐπελογοσάμεθα. οὐδὲ γε φθαρτός ἐστιν οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν.
- 174 Εἴπερ τε μὴ ἔχει φρόνησιν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνην ἔχει· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐξίς ἐν αἰρέσει καὶ φυγαῖς σώζουσα τὰ τῆς φρονήσεως

¹ [τοῦ] secl. Heintz.

impossible that this—if anything else—should not be non-evident to God, namely, whether there exist in the infinite any things destructive of himself. But if this is non-evident to him, he will certainly be afraid, owing to the expectation of these destructive things which will put him in a state of alarm and commotion. And if he comes to be in a commotion of this sort, 170 he will be receptive also of change for the worse, and therefore he will be perishable. From which it follows that he does not exist at all.

Here, too, is another argument: If nothing is non- 171 evident to God, but he of his own nature is capable of apprehending all things, he does not possess art, but just as we should not say that there exists in the frog or the dolphin, which swim by nature, an art of swimming, in the same way we should not say of God, who of his own nature apprehends all things, that he has art, since art has to do with a thing that is non-evident and not apprehended of itself. But if God 172 has not art, he will not have the art of living; and if so, neither will he have virtue. But if God has not virtue, he is non-existent.—And again: God being rational, if he does not possess virtue, he certainly 173 possesses its opposite, vice; but he does not possess its opposite, vice; therefore God possesses art, and there is something non-evident to God. From which it follows that he is perishable, as we argued before.^a But he is not perishable; therefore, he does not exist.

Also, if (as we have shown ^b) he does not possess 174 wisdom, neither does he possess temperance; for temperance is “a state which preserves, in preferences and aversions, the decisions of wisdom.”

^a Cf. § 169.^b Cf. §§ 162, 167 ff.

- 175 κρίματα. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ μὴδὲν ἔστιν ὁ τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀρέξεις κινήσει, μὴδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἐπισπάσεται τὸν θεόν, πῶς ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι σώφρονα, τῆς σωφροσύνης κατὰ τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἡμῖν νενοημένης; καθὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν κίονα σωφρονεῖν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν δεόντως φήσομεν σώφρονα τυγχάνειν. περιαιρούμενων δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν περιαιρεῖται καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ λοιπαί. ἀλλ' εἰ μηδεμίαν ἀρετὴν ἔχει ὁ θεός, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ἠγούμενον· τὸ ἄρα λήγον.
- 176 Πάλιν εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ἥτοι ἔχει ἀρετὴν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, φαῖλον ἔστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ κακοδαιμονικόν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ἔχει, ἔσται τι τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττον· ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἵππου ἐστὶ κρείττων καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐστὶ κρείττων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ
- 177 ἔσται κρείττων. εἰ δὲ ἔστι κρείττων τοῦ θεοῦ, δῆλον ὡς ἐλλιπῶς ἔχων φαύλως ἔξει καὶ φθαρτὸς γενήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μεταξὺ μὲν τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, εἰς οὐδέτερον δὲ ὁρᾶται τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐμπύπτων ὁ θεός, ῥητέον μὴ εἶναι θεόν.
- 178 Καὶ ἔτι, εἰ ἔστιν, ἥτοι φωνᾶν ἔστιν ἢ ἄφωνον. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἄφωνον τὸν θεὸν τελείως ἄτοπον καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις μαχόμενον. εἰ δὲ φωνᾶν ἔστί, φωνῇ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὄργανα, καθάπερ πνεῦμονα καὶ τραχείαν ἀρτηρίαν γλώσσαν τε καὶ στόμα. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς Ἐπικούρου μυθολογίας. τοίνυν ῥητέον μὴ ὑπάρχειν
- 179 τὸν θεόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ εἰ φωνῇ χρῆται, ὁμιλεῖ. εἰ δὲ ὁμιλεῖ, πάντως κατὰ τινα διάλεκτον ὁμιλεῖ. εἰ
- 90

And besides, if there is nothing which will excite the 175 desires of God, and nothing which will attract God, how shall we say that he is temperate, when temperance is conceived by us in accordance with this kind of definition? For just as we should not say that the pillar is temperate, so also we are bound to deny that God is temperate. And if he is stripped of these virtues, he is stripped of justice also and the rest. But if God possesses no virtue, he is non-existent; and the antecedent (is true), therefore the consequent (is true).

Again, if the Divine exists, it either has or has not 176 virtue. And if it has it not, the Divine is base and unhappy, which is absurd. But if it has it, there will exist something which is better than God; for just as the virtue of the horse is better than the horse itself and the virtue of the man better than he who has it, so also the virtue of God will be better than God himself. But if it is better than God, plainly he, as 177 deficient, will be in a bad state and will be perishable. But if there is nothing intermediate between the opposites, and it is seen that God falls under neither of the opposites, one must declare that God does not exist.

Further, if he exists, he is either gifted with speech 178 or speechless. But to say that God is speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the fairy-tales of Epicurus. So then, one must assert that God does not exist. Moreover, if he 179 employs speech, he converses. And if he converses, he certainly converses in some dialect. But if so,

δὲ τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον τῇ Ἑλληνίδι ἢ τῇ βαρβάρῳ
 χρῆται γλώσση; καὶ εἰ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι, τί μᾶλλον
 τῇ Ἰάδι ἢ τῇ Αἰολίδι ἢ τινι τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ πάσαις οὐδεμιᾷ τοίνυν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῇ Ἑλ-
 ληνίδι χρῆται, πῶς τῇ βαρβάρῳ χρήσεται, εἰ μὴ
 ἐδίδαξέ τις αὐτόν; <πῶς δὲ διδάξει τις αὐτόν>,¹
 εἰ μὴ ἑρμηνεὺς ἔχει παραπλησίους τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν
 δυναμένοις ἑρμηνεύειν; ρητέον τοίνυν μὴ χρήσθαι
 φωνῇ τὸ θεῖον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον
 εἶναι.

180 Πάλιν εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀ-
 σώματον. ἀλλ' ἀσώματον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ
 τὰς ἐμπροσθεν ἡμῶν εἰρημένους αἰτίας. εἰ δὲ σῶμα
 ἐστίν, ἥτοι σύγκριμά ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν στοιχείων
 ἢ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ στοιχειῶδες σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 σύγκριμά ἐστι, φθαρτόν ἐστιν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ
 σύννοδόν τινων ἀποτελεσθὲν ἀνάγκη διαλυόμενον
 181 φθείρεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἥτοι πῦρ
 ἐστίν ἢ ἀήρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ. ὅποῖον δ' ἂν ἦ τούτων,
 ἀψυχόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλογον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ οὖν
 μήτε σύγκριμά ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς μήτε ἀπλοῦν σῶμα,
 παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, ρητέον μηδὲν εἶναι
 τὸν θεόν.

182 Τοιοῦτον μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων εἶδος
 ἐστίν· ἠρώτηνται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ
 σωριτικῶς τινές, οὓς ὁ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Κλειτό-
 μαχος ὡς σπουδαιοτάτους καὶ ἀνυτικωτάτους
 ἀνέγραψεν, ἔχοντας τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. εἰ Ζεὺς
 θεός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεός ἐστιν·

¹ <πῶς . . . αὐτόν> add. cj. Bekk.

why does he employ the Greek tongue rather than
 the barbarian? And if the Greek, why the Ionian
 rather than the Aeolic or any of the others? And, of
 course, he does not employ them all; and so he
 employs none. For if he employs the Greek, how
 will he employ the barbarian, unless someone has
 taught him? <But how will anyone teach him,>
 unless he has interpreters similar to those amongst us
 who are able to interpret? We must say, then, that
 the Divine does not employ speech, and on this
 account it is non-existent.

Again, if the Divine exists, it is either a body or 180
 incorporeal. But it will not be incorporeal for the
 reasons we have already stated.^a And if it is a body,
 it is either a compound of the simple elements or a
 simple and elemental body. And if it is a compound,
 it is perishable; for everything which is constructed
 by the union of things must necessarily dissolve and
 perish. And if it is a simple body, it is either fire 181
 or air or water or earth. But whichever of these it is,
 it is without soul or reason, which is absurd. If, then,
 God is neither a compound nor a simple body, and
 besides these there is no other alternative, one must
 declare that God is nothing.

Such, then, is the character of these arguments. 182
 And some have been propounded, in the form of a
 "sorites,"^b by Carneades, which his friend Cleito-
 machus recorded as being most excellent and con-
 vincing; and this is the form they take:—If Zeus is
 a God, Poseidon also is a God:—

^a Cf. § 151.

^b For the "sorites" or chain-argument cf. *P.H.* ii. 253 n.

τρεις γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου ἦμεν ἀδελφοί, οὓς τέκετο
 Ῥέα,
 Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης ἐνέροιον
 ἀνάσσειν.
 τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε
 τιμῆς.

ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ζεὺς θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀδελφός
 183 ὧν τούτου θεὸς γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεὸς
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ἀχελῶος ἔσται θεός· εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἀχελῶος,
 καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος· εἰ ὁ Νεῖλος, καὶ πᾶς ποταμός· εἰ πᾶς
 ποταμός, καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἂν εἴεν θεοί, καὶ εἰ οἱ
 ῥύακες, καὶ αἱ χαράδραι. οὐχὶ δὲ οἱ ῥύακες· οὐδὲ
 ὁ Ζεὺς ἄρα θεός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ γε ἦσαν θεοί, καὶ ὁ
 184 Ζεὺς ἦν ἂν θεός. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσὶν. καὶ μὴν
 εἰ ὁ ἥλιος θεός ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἂν εἴη θεός· οὐ
 γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἡ ἡμέρα ἢ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς. εἰ δ'
 ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ θεός, καὶ ὁ μῆν ἔσται θεός· σύστημα
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἡμερῶν. εἰ δὲ ὁ μῆν θεός ἐστὶ, καὶ
 ὁ ἐνιαυτός ἂν εἴη θεός· σύστημα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκ
 μηνῶν ὁ ἐνιαυτός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· τοίνυν οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. σὺν τῷ ἀποπον εἶναι, φασί, τὴν
 μὲν ἡμέραν θεὸν εἶναι λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἔω καὶ τὴν
 185 μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν δειλὴν μηκέτι. εἶγε μὴν ἡ
 Ἄρτεμις θεός ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ Ἐνοδία τις ἂν εἴη θεός·
 ἐπ' ἴσης γὰρ ἐκένη καὶ αὕτη δεδόξασται εἶναι θεὰ
 (< εἰ δὲ θεὰ) ἢ Ἐνοδία, καὶ ἡ Προθυριδία καὶ
 Ἐπιμύλιος καὶ Ἐπικλιβάνιος. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο·
 186 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. εἶγε μὴν τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
 θεὰν λέγομεν εἶναι, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Ἔρως υἱὸς ὧν
 187 Ἀφροδίτης θεός. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ Ἔρως θεός ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ

¹ < εἰ δὲ θεὰ > add. Heintz.

Brethren three were we, all children of Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and myself and Hades, the third, with the Shades for his kingdom.

All things were parted in three, and each hath his share of the glory.^a

So that if Zeus is a God, Poseidon also, being his brother, will be a God. And if Poseidon is a God, 183 Achelous,^b too, will be a God; and if Achelous, Neilos; and if Neilos, every river as well; and if every river, the streams also will be Gods; and if the streams, the torrents; but the streams are not Gods; neither, then, is Zeus a God. But if there had been Gods, Zeus would have been a God. Therefore, there are no Gods.—Further, if the sun is a God, day will 184 also be a God; for day is nothing else than sun above the earth. And if day is God, the month too will be God; for it is a composite made up of days. And if the month is God, the year too will be God; for the year is a composite made up of months. But this is not (true); neither then is the original supposition. And besides, they say, it is absurd to declare that the day is God, but not the dawn and midday and the evening.—Again, if Artemis is a Goddess, Enodia^c too will be 185 a Goddess; for the latter has been accounted a Goddess equally with the former; (and if) Enodia (is a Deity), so also is Prothyridia and Epimylius and Epiclibanius.^d But this is not (true); neither is the original supposition.—Again, if we declare that 186 Aphrodite is a Goddess, Eros, being the son of Aphrodite, will be a God; but if Eros is a God, Eleos 187

^a Homer, *Il.* xv. 187 ff. (Poseidon being the speaker).

^b A river of Aetolia, as Neilos (the Nile) of Egypt.

^c i.e. "Our Lady of the Wayside" (Lat. *Trivia*).

^d These epithets (treated as proper names) signify respectively "Our Lady of the Porch,"—"of the Mill," and—"of the Oven."

"Ελεος ἔσται θεός· ἀμφοτέρα γάρ ἐστι ψυχή ἀπάθη, καὶ ὁμοίως ἀφωσιώται τῷ Ἐρωτι καὶ ὁ "Ελεος· παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις γοῦν Ἐλεόν βωμοὶ τινες
188 εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ ὁ "Ελεος θεός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Φόβος·

ἀμορφότατος [γὰρ] τὴν ὄψιν, εἰμὶ γὰρ φόβος, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχων θεός.

εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. οὐχὶ δέ γε ταῦτα· οὐδὲ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἄρα θεός ἐστιν. εἰ δέ γε ἦσαν θεοί, κἂν Ἀφροδίτη θεὸς ὑπῆρχεν· οὐκ
189 ἄρα εἰσὶ θεοί. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἡ Δημήτηρ θεός ἐστι, καὶ ἡ Γῆ θεός ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ Δημήτηρ, φασίν, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ Γῆ μήτηρ. εἰ ἡ Γῆ θεός ἐστι, καὶ τὰ ὄρη καὶ αἱ ἀκρωτηρίαὶ καὶ πᾶς λίθος ἔσται θεός. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
190 καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιοῦτους σωρίτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς· ὧν τὸ γένος ἀπὸ τῶν προεκκευμένων ἀντάρκως γέγονε πρόδηλον.

191 Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντεπιχειρούμενα παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἰς τὸ εἶναι θεούς καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοιαῦτά τινα καθέστηκεν. ἐφ' οἷς ἡ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἐποχὴ συνεισάγεται, καὶ μάλιστα προσγενομένης αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου
192 περὶ θεῶν ἀνωμαλίας. ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλας καὶ ἀσυνμῶνους ἔχουσι περὶ τούτων ὑπολήψεις, ὥστε μῆτε πᾶσας εἶναι πιστὰς διὰ τὴν μάχην μῆτε τινας διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, προσεπισφραγίζομένης τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ ποιηταῖς

^a i.e. "Pity"; and "Phobos," in the next sentence, is "Fear."

too will be a God; for both are psychic affections, and Eleos^a has been worshipped like Eros; at any rate, amongst the Athenians there are some altars to Eleos. And if Eleos is a God, so also is Phobos—

188

Fear am I, most unshapely to behold,
The god who shares in beauty least of all.^b

And if Phobos, then all the rest of the soul's affections. But these are not Gods; neither, then, is Aphrodite a Goddess. But if they had been Gods, Aphrodite too would have been a Goddess. Therefore Gods do not exist.—Again, if Demeter is a Goddess, Gê too is
189 a Goddess; for Demeter, they say, is nothing else than Gê-meter.^c If Gê is a Goddess, the mountains and the cliffs and every stone will be a God. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.—And Carneades propounds other sorites-argu-
190 ments of this kind to show that Gods do not exist, the general character of which is sufficiently plain from the examples already set forth.

Well then, such are the opposing arguments alleged 191 by the Dogmatic philosophers in favour of the existence and of the non-existence of Gods. As a result of these the Sceptics' suspension of judgement is introduced, especially since they are supplemented by the divergency of the views of ordinary folk about the Gods. For different people have different and dis-
192 cordant notions about them, so that neither are all of these notions to be trusted because of their inconsistency, nor some of them because of their equipollence; and this is further confirmed by the mythologizing of the theologians and the poets; for

^b *Frag. Com. adesp.* 154 (Kock).
^c i.e. "Earth-Mother."

μυθοποιήσεως· πάσης γὰρ ἀσεβείας ἐστὶ πλήρης.
193 ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Ξενοφάνης διελέγχων τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον
καὶ Ἡσίοδον φησὶ

πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε
ὄσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισις ὀνειδέα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
κλέπτει μοιχεύει τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

194 Πλὴν ἐκ τούτων παραστήσαντες ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ
τοῖς περὶ τῶν δραστηρίων ἀρχῶν δογματικῶς
εἰρημένους ἢ ἐποχή, μετὰ τούτ' ἤδη καὶ σκεπτικώ-
τερον διδάσκωμεν ὅτι κοινῶς ἀπορός ἐστὶ τῷ¹ περὶ
τοῦ ποιούντος αἰτίου καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς πασχούσης
ἄλλης λόγος.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΧΟΝΤΟΣ

195 Περὶ μὲν τῆς τοῦ αἰτίου νοήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις
ἀκριβέστερον διελέχθημεν· νῦν δὲ ἀρκούμενοι τῇ
ὀλοσχερεῖ τούτου ἐπινοήσει, λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν σκε-
ψαμένων περὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἔφασαν εἶναι τί τινος
αἴτιον, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ
εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν δογματικῶν
ἢ πάντες σχεδόν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ οἱ τὴν μεταβλητικὴν
καὶ μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀνελόντες σοφισταί· οὐ
χωρὶς γὰρ ταύτης ὑφίστατα, τὸ ποιοῦν. μὴ μᾶλ-
λον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αἰτίον φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ
τῆς σκέψεως. καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκόπως, ἐκ τῶν εἰς
196 ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειρουμένων πάρεστι μαθεῖν. ἀρχὴ δὲ
γινέσθω πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀξιούντων εἶναι τί τινος
αἴτιον.

Εἴπερ τοίνυν, φασίν, ἔστι σπέρμα, ἔστι καὶ αἴτιον,

¹ ἀπορός . . . τῷ N, Mutsch.: ἀπορόν . . . τὸ cet., Bekk.

it is full of all kinds of impiety. Hence, too, Xeno- 193
phanes, in his criticism of Homer and Hesiod, says—

Unto the gods are ascrib'd by Hesiod, like as by Homer,
All of the acts which are counted by men disgraceful and
shameful,
Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with
another.

Now, however, that we have established on these 194
grounds that suspension follows from the dogmatic
arguments concerning the efficient principles, let us
next show, by a more sceptical discussion, that the
account given of passive matter is no less open to
doubt than that of the active cause.

CONCERNING CAUSE AND THE PASSIVE

We have elsewhere^a discussed more exactly the 195
notion of Cause; and now, contenting ourselves with
the general conception of it, we affirm that, of those
who have examined it, some have asserted that a
cause of things exists, others that it does not exist,
others that it is "no more" existent than non-
existent. Most, or almost all, of the Dogmatists
assert its existence; the Sophists who deny change
and transient motion assert its non-existence, as
without such motion the agent does not subsist.
And the Sceptics assert that cause is "no more"
existent than non-existent. And that they do not do
this inconsiderately one may learn from the argu-
ments adduced on either side. Let us begin first 196
with those who maintain that a cause of things
exists.

If, say they, seed exists, cause also exists since the

^a Cf. §§ 4-12 *supra*, P.H. iii. 13 ff.; also *Adv. Phys.* ii. 70 ff.

ἐπεὶ τὸ σπέρμα αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυομένων τε καὶ γεννωμένων· ἐστὶ δέ γε σπέρμα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν σπειρομένων καὶ ζωογονουμένων δείκνυται·
 197 ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἔστι τι φύσις, ἔστι τι αἰτιον· τῶν γὰρ φυομένων ἢ ἐκπεφυκότων αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις. ὑπάρχει δὲ αὕτη, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων συμφανές· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, φασίν, εἰς ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐργαστήριον παρελθόντας καὶ θεασαμένους τῶν ἀνδριάντων τοὺς μὲν τελείους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους τοὺς δὲ ἡμιτελεῖς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας τυπώσεως, πιστεύειν ὅτι ἔστι τις τούτων τεχνίτης καὶ δημιουργός, εἰς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον εἰσελθόντας καὶ γῆν μὲν ἐν μέσῳ θεωροῦντας ὕδωρ δὲ μετὰ ταύτην, καὶ τρίτην ἀνάτασιν ἀέρος, οὐρανὸν τε καὶ ἀστέρας λίμνας τε καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ ζῶων παντοδαπῶν γένη καὶ φυτῶν ποικιλίας, μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι τινα καὶ τῆς τούτων δημιουργίας αἰτιον. τοῖνυν εἰ ἔστι φύσις, ἔστι τι αἰτιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· ἄρα τὸ
 198 δεύτερον. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστι τι ψυχὴ, ἔστιν αἰτιον· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ θνήσκειν αἰτία γίνεται, τοῦ μὲν ζῆν παρούσα, τοῦ δὲ θνήσκειν χωριζομένη τῶν σωμάτων. ἔστι δέ γε ψυχὴ, φασίν, εἴγε καὶ ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι ψυχὴν αὐτῇ προσχρόμενος τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεται· ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον.
 199 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι θεός, ἔστιν αἰτιον· οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τὰ ὅλα διοικῶν. ἔστι δέ γε κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεός· ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον. καίτοι κἂν μὴ θεὸς ὑπάρχη, ἔστιν αἰτιον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς διὰ τινα αἰτίαν γίνεται. καὶ

* Cf. §§ 99 f. *supra*.

seed is the cause of the things which grow and are generated; but seed exists, as is proved by the plants sown and the animals generated; cause, therefore, exists.—And again: If nature exists at all, a 197 cause exists; for nature is the cause of the things which grow or have grown up naturally. But nature exists, as is plain from its effects. For it is in fact absurd, they say, that when we have visited a sculptor's workshop and have seen some of his statues complete and finished off, and some half-completed, and others in the first stage of their shaping, we should believe that there exists some craftsman and artificer of these things,^a but when we enter into this Universe and behold the earth in its centre, and next to this water, and thirdly the extent of air above, and the heaven and its stars, and the lakes and rivers, and the tribes of animals of every kind, and the varieties of plants, we should not suppose that there exists someone who is the cause of the construction of these things. So then, if nature exists, a cause exists. But in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further: If a soul exists at all, it is a 198 cause; for it is the cause of both living and dying, —of living when it is present, and of dying when it is being separated from its bodies. But the soul, they assert, exists, seeing that even he who says that the soul does not exist makes this statement by employing it. Therefore cause exists. —Moreover, if God exists, cause exists; for he is 199 the governor of all things. But according to the general notions of mankind God exists; cause, therefore, exists. Yet even if God does not exist, cause exists; for the non-existence of Gods is due to some cause. And thus both from the existence

τῷ οὖν ὑπάρχειν θεὸν καὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐπ'
 200 ἴσῃς ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι τι αἴτιον. πολλῶν γε
 μὴν γεννωμένων καὶ φθειρομένων αὐξομένων τε καὶ
 μειουμένων κινουμένων τε καὶ ἀκινήτων, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ὁμολογεῖν δεῖ τὸ εἶναι τινα τούτων αἴτια,
 τὰ μὲν γενέσεως τὰ δὲ φθορᾶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐξήσεως
 τὰ δὲ μειώσεως καὶ ἤδη κινήσεως ἢ ἀκινήσιας.
 201 σὺν τῷ κἂν μὴ ὑπάρχη ταῦτα τὰ ἀποτελέσματα,
 φαίνεται δὲ μόνον, πάλιν εἰσαγεσθαι τὴν ὑπαρξίν
 τῶν αἰτίων· τοῦ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ὡς
 ὑποκείμενα, μὴ ὑποκείσθαι δέ, αἰτιόν τι καθέστηκεν.
 202 καὶ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον, πάντα
 ἐκ παντὸς δεήσει γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ,
 ἔτι καὶ κατὰ πάντα καιρόν. ὅπερ ἀποπον· εὐθέως
 γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον, οὐδὲν τὸ κωλύον ἐξ ἀν-
 203 θρώπου ἵππον συνίστασθαι. [αἴτιον ἄρα τι ἔσται.]
 μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ κωλύοντος συστήσεται ποτε
 ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἵππος, καὶ οὕτως, εἰ τύχοι, ἐξ ἵππου
 φυτόν. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἔσται χιόνα
 μὲν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πῆγνυσθαι, ἄβροχίαν δὲ ἐν Πόντῳ
 συμβαίνειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ θέρους ἐν χειμῶνι
 γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐν θέρει συνίστα-
 σθαι. ὅθεν εἴπερ ᾧ ἔπεται τι ἀδύνατον,¹ καὶ αὐτὸ
 ἔσται ἀδύνατον,¹ τῷ δὲ μὴ εἶναι αἴτιον ἔπεται πολλὰ
 204 ἀδυνάτων ὑπάρχειν. ὁ τε λέγων μὴ εἶναι
 αἴτιον ἤτοι χωρὶς αἰτίας τοῦτο λέγει ἢ μετὰ τινας
 αἰτίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν χωρὶς τινας αἰτίας, ἀπιστός
 ἔστιν, μετὰ τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον
 τοῦτο ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ, αἰτίας

¹ ἀδύνατον (bis) Arnim: δυνατόν mss., Bekk.

of God and from his non-existence there follows
 equally the existence of a cause.—And further, 200
 since many things become and perish, increase and
 decrease, move and cease from movement, one must
 necessarily allow that there exist some causes of these
 things—some of becoming, others of perishing; some
 of increase, others of decrease; and also of motion
 or want of motion.^a Moreover, even if these effects 201
 do not really exist but merely appear, the existence of
 their causes is introduced once more; for there exists
 some cause of their appearing to us as really existing
 things and not being such.—Again, if there is no 202
 cause all things will have to come from everything
 and in every place, and also at every time. But this
 is absurd; for indisputably, if nothing is a cause,
 there is nothing to prevent a horse being formed from
 a man. And if there is nothing to prevent this, a 203
 horse will some time be formed from a man, and like-
 wise, perchance, a plant from a horse. And for the
 same reason it will not be impossible for snow to
 congeal in Egypt and drought to occur in Pontus, and
 things proper to summer to happen in winter and
 things proper to winter to take place in summer.
 Hence, if what has for its consequence something
 impossible is itself also impossible, and many im-
 possible consequences follow from the non-existence
 of cause, one must declare that the non-existence of
 cause also is a thing impossible.—Also, he who says 204
 that cause does not exist says so either without a
 cause or with some cause. And if he does so without
 any cause, he is untrustworthy, besides the con-
 sequence he incurs of not maintaining this position
 any more than its opposite, as there pre-exists no

^a With §§ 200-204 cf. P.H. iii. 17-19.

εὐλόγου μὴ προϋποκειμένης, δι' ἣν φησιν ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον. εἰ δὲ μετὰ τινος αἰτίας, περιτρέπεται, κὰν τῷ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι αἷτιον
 205 τίθησι τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμειος ἐρωτῶν ἔξεστι καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως διὰ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, ὃς ἔξει τὴν σύνταξιν τοιαύτην. "εἰ ἔστι τι αἷτιον, ἔστιν αἷτιον· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι αἷτιον, ἔστιν αἷτιον· ἦτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα." τῷ τε γὰρ εἶναι αἷτιον ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον, μὴ διαφέροντος παρὰ τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦ λήγοντος,
 206 τῷ τε μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον ἀκολουθεῖ πάλιν τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον ὑπὸ τινος αἰτίας κινηθεὶς λέγει μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ διεξυγγμένον πρὸς τοῖς δυσὶ συνημμένοις ἀληθὲς γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀντικειμένων διεξυγγμένον, καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις λήμμασι συνεισάγεσθαι, καθὼς ἀνώτερον παρεμυθησάμεθα.

Καὶ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς κεφαλαιωδέστερον εἰπεῖν, εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἴωθε λέγεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς
 207 δογματικοῖς· σκοπῶμεν δὲ ἀκολουθῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀπορητικῶν λόγους· φανήσονται γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς ἐκκειμένοις ἰσοσθενεῖς καὶ ἔνεκα πειθοῦς μὴ διαφέροντες αὐτῶν. τὸ αἷτιον τοῖνον, φασί, τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν· τινὸς γὰρ ἔστιν αἷτιον καὶ τινί, οἷον τὸ σμιλλίον τινὸς μὲν ἔστιν αἷτιον καθάπερ τῆς τομῆς,
 208 τινὶ δὲ καθάπερ τῆ σαρκί. τὰ δὲ γε πρὸς τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπάρχει, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως παρεστήσαμεν· καὶ τὸ αἷτιον ἄρα

^a This is an argument "by two hypotheses," consisting of a double hypothetical major premiss ("If A is, B is; and if A is not, B is") and a disjunctive minor ("A either is or is

reasonable cause which makes him say that cause is non-existent. But if he says so with some cause, he is self-refuted, and in the act of saying that no cause exists he is affirming the existence of some cause. Hence also it is possible to propound to the same effect
 205 the argument stated above, relating to the sign and proof, which will take the following shape ^a:—"If a cause exists, cause exists; but also if a cause does not exist, cause exists; but either it does or does not exist; therefore it exists." For the existence of a cause follows from the existence of cause, as the antecedent does not differ from the consequent; and
 206 the existence of a cause follows again from the existence of no cause, since he who says that no cause exists is moved by some cause when he says that no cause exists. So that the disjunctive in addition to the two hypothetical premisses is true, being composed of contradictories, and the conclusion is inferred from these premisses, as we have shown above.^b

Such then, summarily stated, are the arguments customarily adduced on this side by the Dogmatists. Let us consider next the arguments of the Doubters;
 207 for these will give expression to arguments just as forcible as those set forth and nowise different from them in point of persuasiveness. Cause then, they say, is a relative thing; for it is a cause of something and to something, as, for instance, the lancet is a cause of something, namely cutting, and to something, namely flesh. But relatives are only conceived
 208 and do not exist, as we have established in our chapter "Concerning proof"^c; therefore cause, too, will

not"), with the conclusion "therefore B is"; cf. *P.H.* ii. 3 n. and § 199 *supra*.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 281 f., 466 f.

^c See *Adv. Log.* ii. 453-461.

209 ἐπινοηθήσεται μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. εἴπερ τε αἰτιόν ἐστιν, ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ οὐ λέγεται αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ (εἰ μὴ ἔχει)¹ οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον τὸ δεξιὸν μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται δεξιὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἴτιον μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃ νοεῖται οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον οὐδ' ἔστιν αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε φθορὰν μήτε πείσιν μήτε κοινῶς κίνησιν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων γνωσμένοι τόπων διδάξομεν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν αἴτιον.

210 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἦτοι σῶμα σώματος ἔστιν αἴτιον ἢ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου ἢ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος· οὔτε δὲ σῶμα σώματος, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου οὔτε σῶμα ἀσωμάτου οὔτε ἐναλλάξ ἀ-

211 σώματον σώματος· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν αἴτιον. ἀμέλει καὶ αἰ γιγνόμεναι τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεις συμφωνοῦσι τῇ ἐκκεκμηῆναι διαιρέσει, εἶγε στωικοὶ μὲν πᾶν αἴτιον σῶμά φασι σώματι ἀσωμάτου τινὸς αἴτιον γίνεσθαι, οἷον σῶμα μὲν τὸ σμιλίον, σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορήματος, καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ ξύλῳ,

212 ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καίεσθαι κατηγορήματος. οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον ὑποθέμενοι τὸν κοσμοποιόν² καὶ τὸν πάντα διοικοῦντα θεὸν τούναντίον ἀσώματον σώματος λέγουσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἴτιον. ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος καὶ σώματα σωμάτων καὶ ἀσώματα ἀσωμάτων

¹ <εἰ μὴ ἔχει> addo: <μὴ ἔχον> add. cj. Bekk.

² κοσμοποιόν] κόσμον, οἷον MSS., Bekk. (τὸν κόσμον del. cj. Heintz). (? secl. τὸν post καί.)

* See §§ 218-231, 267 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* ii. 45 ff., 310 ff.

^b For "expression" (λεκτόν) as incorporeal cf. *Adv. Log.*

only be conceived and will not exist.—Also, if cause 209 exists, it must have the thing whereof it is said to be the cause, as (without this) it will not be a cause, but just as right is not right in the absence of that to which it is said to be relative, so also cause will not be cause in the absence of that to which it is conceived as relative. But, in fact, cause has not that whereof it is cause, owing to the non-existence of becoming and perishing and affection and motion in general, as we shall show in their proper places when we come to them.^a Therefore cause does not exist.

Further, if cause exists, either body is cause of 210 body, or the incorporeal of the incorporeal, or body of the incorporeal, or the incorporeal of body; but, as we shall establish, body is not cause of body, nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the incorporeal, nor conversely the incorporeal of body; therefore cause does not exist. Moreover, the exist- 211 ing sects of the Dogmatists agree about the distinctions set forth, since the Stoics declare that "every cause is a body which is the cause to a body of something incorporeal"; for example, the lancet is a body, and "the flesh" is a body, and the expression "being cut" is incorporeal^b; and again, fire is a body, and "the wood" is a body, and the expression "being burnt" is incorporeal. But 212 those who assume that the God who is the World-maker and governs all things is incorporeal assert, on the contrary, that the incorporeal is the cause of body. And Epicurus says that both bodies are the causes of bodies and incorporeals of incorporeals,—

ii. 12. Notice that the cases (dat. and gen.) in the Greek are due to the grammatical form of the full sentences—"the lancet is the cause to the flesh of being cut"—"the fire is the cause to the wood of being burnt."

φησὶν αἴτια τυγχάνειν, καὶ σώματα μὲν σωμάτων
 ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν συγκριμάτων, ἀσώματα δὲ
 ἀσωμάτων ὡς τὰ τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι συμβεβη-
 213 κότα ἀσώματα τῶν τοῖς συγκρίμασι συμβεβηκότων
 ἀσωμάτων. ὥστε ἐὰν δείξωμεν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα
 τοῦ σώματος οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματος τοῦ ἀσωμάτου
 οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματος τοῦ σώματος οὔτ' ἐναλλάξ
 δύναται τυγχάνειν αἴτιον, αὐτόθεν ἐσόμεθα κατ-
 214 σεων κατωρθῶσθαι. σῶμα μὲν οὖν σώματος
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ περ ἀμφότερα τὴν
 αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕτερον αἴτιον λέγεται
 παρόσον ἐστὶ σῶμα, πάντως καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
 σῶμα καθεστῶς αἴτιον γενήσεται. κοινῶς δὲ ἀμ-
 φοτέρων αἰτίων ὄντων οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πάσχον, μηδενὸς
 δὲ πάσχοντος οὐδὲ τὸ ποιῶν γενήσεται. εἰ ἄρα
 215 σῶμα σώματος ἐστὶν αἴτιον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν αἴτιον.
 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματος ἀσωμάτου λέγοιτ' ἂν
 εἶναι ποιητικὸν διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφό-
 216 τερα τῆς αὐτῆς μετέσχε φύσεως, τί μᾶλλον τόδε
 τοῦδε ῥητέον αἴτιον ἢ τόδε τοῦδε; λείπεται
 οὖν ἢ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου λέγειν αἴτιον ἢ ἀνάπαλι
 ἀσωμάτου σώματος. ὅπερ πάλιν τῶν ἀδυνάτων·
 τό τε γὰρ ποιῶν θιγεῖν ὀφείλει τῆς πασχούσης
 ὕλης, ἵνα ποιήσῃ, ἢ τε πάσχουσα ὕλη θιχθῆναι
 ὀφείλει, ἵνα πάθῃ, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματος οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε
 217 θιχθῆναι πέφυκεν. τοίνυν οὐδὲ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ
 ἀσώματος σώματος ἐστὶν αἴτιον. ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ
 μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν αἴτιον· εἰ γὰρ μήτε σῶμα σώματος
 ἐστὶν αἴτιον μήτε ἀσώματος ἀσωμάτου μήτε σῶμα

bodies of bodies as the elements are of the com-
 pounds, and incorporeals of incorporeals as the in-
 corporeal attributes of the primary bodies are of the
 incorporeal attributes of the compounds. So that if 213
 we shall show that body cannot be a cause of body,
 nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor the in-
 corporeal of body, nor the converse, we shall thereby
 have established that none of the views mentioned is
 correct.—Now body will never be the cause of body 214
 since both have the same nature; and if the one is
 said to be a cause inasmuch as it is body, the other
 also, as being a body, will certainly be a cause. And
 as both equally are causes, there is no passive effect,
 and when nothing is passive there will be no efficient
 agency. Therefore, if body is the cause of body,
 there is no cause.—Moreover, the incorporeal cannot 215
 be said to be productive of the incorporeal, for the
 same reason; for if both partook of the same
 nature, why should this one be called the cause
 of that one rather than that one of this one?
 It remains for us, then, to say either that body 216
 is the cause of the incorporeal, or conversely that
 the incorporeal is the cause of body. But this
 again is impossible; for that which acts must
 touch the passive matter in order to act, and the
 passive matter must be touched, in order to be
 acted on, but the incorporeal is not of such a
 nature as either to touch or be touched.* So then 217
 neither is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the
 incorporeal of body. From which it follows that no
 cause exists; for if body is not a cause of body, nor
 the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the

* Cf. §§ 223, 281; Lucr. i. 304 "tangere et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res."

ἀσωμάτου μήτε ἐναλλάξ, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον.

- 218 Ἀφελέστερον μὲν οὖν οὕτω τινὲς παραμυθοῦνται τὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου λήμματα· ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος διαφορώτερον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐχρήτο ταῖς περὶ 219 τῆς γενέσεως ἀπορίας. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ περὶ ἢ ἀγέννητόν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καθάπερ ἢ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἄτομος, ἢ γενητὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπος,¹ καὶ ἢ φανερόν ὡς σίδηρος καὶ πῦρ, ἢ ἀφανὲς ὡς ἄτομος. ὅτι δ' ἂν ἢ τούτων, 220 οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν. ἦτοι γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μένον ἕτερόν τι ποιεῖ ἢ ἑτέρῳ συνελθόν. ἀλλὰ μένον μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ πλείον αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τι ποιεῖν· συνελθόν δὲ ἑτέρῳ τρίτον οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἀποτελεῖν, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὑπῆρχεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐν γενέσθαι δύο δυνα- 221 τόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὰ δύο τρίτον ἀποτελεῖ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν δύο γενέσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν, καὶ ἐκάτερον τῶν γενομένων ἐν ὄν δύο ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ἕκαστον ἐν ὄν δύο ποιήσει, καὶ ὁμοίως τῶν ὀκτῶ ἕκαστον, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον. παντελῶς δὲ γε ἀτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀπειρα λέγειν γίνεσθαι· ἀτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς λέγειν τι πλείον 222 γεννάσθαι. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀξιῶ τις ἐκ τῶν ἡσσόνων κατὰ σύνοδον πλείονα ἀποτελεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ συνελθόν τρίτον ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς δυοῖς τέταρτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς τρισὶ πέμπτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν εἰς ἀπειρον. οὐκοῦν σῶμα μὲν σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον.

¹ ἄνθρωπος Hirzel: ἕθος mss., Bekk. (ἔρνος Fabr.: ? ἔρνος).

incorporeal, nor the converse, and besides these there is no other possibility, of necessity nothing is a cause.

It is thus, then, that some state in more simple form 218 the premisses in the arguments now set forth; but Aenesidemus^a has, in his treatment of them, made a more elaborate use of the difficulties concerning becoming. Body will not be the cause of body, since 219 such a body is either ungenerated, like the atom of Epicurus, or generated, as is man, and either visible like iron and fire, or invisible like the atom. And whichever of these it is, it cannot effect anything. For it acts on another thing either while continuing 220 by itself or after uniting with the other. But while it remains by itself it would not be able to effect anything more than itself and its own nature; and when united with another it would not be able to produce a third thing which was not previously in existence. For neither is the one thing able to become two, nor do the two produce a third thing. For if one 221 is able to become two, each of the units which have so become, being one, will produce two, and each of the four, being one, will make two, and similarly each unit of the eight, and so on *ad infinitum*; but it is wholly absurd to say that an infinite number proceeds from one; therefore it is also absurd to say that anything more is generated from the one.—The same (objection holds good) 222 should anyone maintain that more is produced from less by addition; for if the one added to the one makes a third, the third added to the two will produce a fourth, and the fourth added to the three will produce a fifth, and so on, again, *ad infinitum*. Body, then is not the cause of body.—Moreover, for the 223

^a For Aenesidemus, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxvii.

- 223 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ ἑνὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τι πλεῖον. καὶ ἄλλως ἀναφῆς φύσις καθεστῶς τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν
 224 δύναται. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου ποιητικὸν ἔστιν· οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐναλλάξ, τουτέστι σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος. τό τε γὰρ σῶμα οὐκ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν, τό τε ἀσώματον οὐκ ἐμπεριεῖχε τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν. διόπερ οὐδέτερον ἐξ οὐδετέρου συστήναι
 225 δυνατὸν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ πλατάνου οὐ γίνεται ἵππος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῇ πλατάνῳ τὴν τοῦ ἵππου φύσιν, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἵππου συνίσταται ἀνθρώπος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἵππῳ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκ σώματος ἔσται ποτ' ἂν τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ σώματι τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν,
 226 οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὸ σῶμα. καίτοι κἂν ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ, πάλιν οὐ γενήσεται τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου. εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἔστιν ἐκάτερον, ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἔστιν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ἤδη δὲ ὄν ἐν τῷ εἶναι οὐ γίνεται διὰ τὸ τὴν γενέσειν ὁδὸν ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. οὐδὲ σῶμα οὖν ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματός ἔστιν αἴτιον· ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι αἴτιον.
 227 Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον, ἦτοι τὸ μένον τοῦ μένοντος αἴτιόν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τοῦ κινουμένου ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τοῦ μένοντος ἢ τὸ μένον τοῦ κινουμένου· οὔτε δὲ τὸ μένον τῷ μένοντι γένοιτ' ἂν μονῆς αἴτιον, οὔτε τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως, οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ

same reasons, the incorporeal is not the cause of the incorporeal; for nothing more can become either from one or from more than one. And besides, the incorporeal being an intangible nature cannot be either active or passive. So that neither is the incorporeal capable of creating the incorporeal. And thus the converse is not possible either,—that is to say, body creating the incorporeal or the incorporeal, body. For body does not contain within itself the nature of the incorporeal, and the incorporeal does not include the nature of body. Hence neither of them can be produced from the other, but just as a horse does not spring from a plane-tree because the nature of the horse does not exist in the plane-tree, nor is a man produced from a horse because the nature of the man does not exist in the horse, so the incorporeal will never come into existence from body because the nature of the incorporeal does not exist in body; nor, conversely, will body come from the incorporeal. Yet if the one does exist in the other, even so the one will not spring from the other. For if either of them is existent, it does not come into existence from the other, but it is already in existence and being already in existence it does not become, since becoming is the process towards existence. Neither, then, is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the incorporeal of body; from which it follows that nothing is a cause.

And again: If there exists any cause of anything, either the unmoved is the cause of the unmoved, or the moved of the moved, or the moved of the unmoved, or the unmoved of the moved: but the motionless will not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, nor the motionless to the moved of want of

228 *μονῆς, οὔτε ἐναλλάξ, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι αἴτιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι αἴτιον δι' ἀπαρραλλείαν. ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἐπ' ἴσης μερόντων ἢ ἀμφοτέρων κατ' ἴσον κινουμένων οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε τῷδε ἐροῦμεν εἶναι αἴτιον μονῆς καὶ κινήσεως ἢ τόδε τῷδε. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον, ὅτι κινεῖται, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῆς κινήσεως αἴτιον ὑπάρχει, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὡσαύτως κινεῖται, λεχθήσεται τῷ λοιπῷ κινήσεως εἶναι παρεκτικόν. οἷον κινεῖται μὲν ὁ τροχός, κινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ τροχηλάτης· τί οὖν μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν τροχόν [καὶ] ὁ τροχηλάτης κινεῖται ἢ ἀνάπαλιω διὰ τὸν τροχηλάτην ὁ τροχός; εἴ γέ τοι τὸ ἕτερον μὴ κινεῖτο, οὐδὲ τὸ λειπόμενον κινήσεται. ὅθεν εἰ αἰτίον ἔστιν οὐ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἐπεὶ ἀμφοτέρων παρόντων γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ οὔτε τοῦ τροχοῦ ἀπόντος τελειοῦται οὔτε τοῦ τροχηλάτου, ῥητέον μὴ μᾶλλον τὸν τροχηλάτην αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως τῷ τροχῷ ἢ τὸν τροχόν τῷ τροχηλάτῃ. καὶ πάλιν μένει μὲν ὁ στῦλος, μένει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστύλιον. ἀλλ' οὐ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν στῦλον ῥητέον μένει τὸ ἐπιστύλιον ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐπιστύλιον τὸν στῦλον· τοῦ ἑτέρου γοῦν ἀρθέντος καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καταφέρεται. ὥστε τὸ μὲν μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν αἴτιον. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς δι' ἐναντιότητα φύσεως· καθὰ γὰρ τὸ ψυχρὸν οὐκ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ λόγον οὐδέποτε δύναται θερ-*

motion, nor the converse, as we shall establish. Therefore, no cause exists. Now the motionless will 228 not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, because of their being indistinguishable. For when both are equally motionless, or both equally in motion, we shall no more say that this is the cause to that of its want of motion or its motion than that to this. For if the one, because it moves, is the cause of motion to the other, since the other also moves in like manner it will be said to be supplying motion to the first. For example, the hoop moves and the hoop-trundler also moves; why, then, should the hoop-trundler move because of the hoop rather than, conversely, the hoop because of the hoop-trundler? Certainly if the one does not move, neither will the other move. Hence if cause is "that by the presence of which the effect takes place," since the effect takes place with both present, and it is effected when neither the hoop is absent nor the hoop-trundler, one must declare that the hoop-trundler is no more the cause of motion to the hoop than the hoop to the hoop-trundler. And again, the pillar is motionless, 229 and the lintel also is motionless. But one should not say that the lintel is motionless because of the pillar any more than the pillar because of the lintel; for when the one is removed the other tumbles down. So that for this reason we will not say that the motionless is the cause to the motionless of its want of motion or the moving to the moving of its motion.— So likewise the motionless is not the cause of motion 230 to the moving, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, because of their opposite natures; for just as the cold can never heat, since it does not

μαίνειν, καὶ ὡς τὸ θερμὸν μὴ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ λόγον οὐδέποτε δύναται ψύχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον, μὴ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ μένοντος λόγον, οὐδέποτε δύναται μονῆς εἶναι ποιητικόν, ἢ τὸ ἀνά-
 231 παλιν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς ἐστὶν αἴτιον οὔτε τὸ κινουμένον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι οὔτε τὸ κινούμενον τῷ μένοντι τοῦ μένειν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἄλλο τι προσεπινοεῖν, λεκτέον μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν αἴτιον.

232 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον, ἥτοι τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἢ τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὕστερον ἢ τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ πρότερον· οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος αἰτιόν ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὕστερον οὔτε τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ πρότερον, ὡς
 233 παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι αἴτιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν αἴτιον διὰ τὸ συνυπάρχειν ἀμφοτέρα καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον τόδε τοῦδε γεννητικὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τόδε τοῦδε, ἐκατέρου
 234 τὴν ἴσην ὑπαρξίαν ἔχοντος. οὐδὲ τὸ πρότερον δὲ ἔσται τοῦ ὕστερον γενομένου ποιητικόν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτε ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον, οὕτω ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν αἴτιον, οὔτε ἐκείνο ἔτι αἰτιόν ἐστι, μὴ ἔχον τὸ οὐ αἰτιόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τοῦτο ἔτι ἀποτέλεσμα, μὴ συμπαρόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ οὐ ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐκατέρον ἐστὶ τούτων, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν προηγεῖσθαι τὸ
 235 δὲ ὕστερον. λείπεται οὖν τὸ ὕστερον λέγειν τοῦ

possess the quality of the hot, and as the hot can never chill, since it does not possess the quality of the cold, so too the moving can never be productive of want of motion, since it does not possess the quality of the motionless, nor can the converse take place.— But if neither the motionless is the cause to the 231 motionless of its want of motion, nor the moving to the moving of its motion, nor the motionless to the moving of its motion, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, and besides these there is no other possibility conceivable, we must assert that nothing is a cause.

Furthermore, if anything is the cause of anything, 232 either the simultaneous is the cause of the simultaneous, or the prior of the posterior, or the posterior of the prior^a; but the simultaneous is not the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, as we shall establish. Therefore there does not exist any cause. Now the simultaneous 233 cannot be the cause of the simultaneous owing to the co-existence of both and the fact that this one is no more capable of generating that one than is that one of this one, since both are equal in point of existence. Nor will the prior be capable of 234 producing that which comes into being later; for if, when the cause exists, that whereof it is cause is not yet existent, neither is the former any longer a cause, as it has not that whereof it is the cause, nor is the latter any longer an effect, since that whereof it is the effect does not co-exist with it. For each of these is a relative thing, and relatives must necessarily co-exist with each other, instead of one preceding and the other following. It only remains for us, then, to 235

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 25 ff.

προτέρου αἴτιον γίνεσθαι. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀποπώτατον
καὶ ἀνδρῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀναστρεφόντων· δεήσει
γὰρ τὸ ἀποτελεσμα πρᾶσβύτερον λέγειν τοῦ ποιούν-
τος αὐτό, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴδ' ὅλως ἀποτελεσμα
τυγχάνειν ὡς ἂν μὴ ἔχον τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἀποτελεσμα.
ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον ἡλίθιον ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν υἱὸν μὲν
πατρὸς εἶναι πρᾶσβύτερον, ἄμητον δὲ σπόρου προ-
ήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις, οὕτως εὔηθες τὸ ἀξιοῦν [τι]¹
236 αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος τὸ μῆπω ὄν. ἀλλ' εἰ
μῆτε τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος μῆτε τὸ πρότερον τοῦ
ὑστέρου μῆτε τὸ ὑστέρον τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν αἴτιον,
παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι αἴτιον.

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον, ἤτοι αὐτοτελῶς καὶ
237 ἰδία μόνον προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει τινός ἐστιν αἴτιον,
ἢ συνεργού πρὸς τοῦτο δεῖται τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης,
ὥστε τὸ ἀποτελεσμα κατὰ κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων νοεῖ-
σθαι σύνοδον. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτοτελῶς καὶ ἰδία
238 προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν, ὠφείλει
διὰ παντός ἑαυτὸ ἔχον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δυνάμιν πάν-
τοτε ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτελεσμα καὶ μὴ ἐφ' ὧν μὲν
ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἀπρακτεῖν. εἰ δέ, ὡς φασὶ τινες
239 τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ τῶν ἀπολελυμένων καὶ ἀφ-
εστηκότων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ
πρὸς τῷ πάσχοντι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πάσχον πρὸς
αὐτῷ, χεῖρόν τι ἀνακύψει. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς
240 τῷ ἑτέρῳ νοεῖται, ὧν² τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν τὸ δὲ πάσχον,
ἔσται μία μὲν ἔννοια, δυοῖν δ' ὀνομάτων τεύξεται,
τοῦ τε ποιούντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ πάσχειν
ἐγκλείσεται ἢ δραστήριος δυνάμεις. ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸ

¹ [τι] secl. Mutsch.² ὧν Herv., Mutsch.: οὐ ἄσ., Bekk.

say that the posterior is the cause of the prior ; but
this is a most absurd notion, worthy of men who turn
things topsy-turvy ; for we shall have to say that the
effect is older than what produced it, and consequently
is not an effect at all since it is without that whereof
it is the effect. So just as it is foolish to say that the
son is older than his father, or that the harvest is
earlier in date than the sowing, so it is silly to main-
tain that what is as yet non-existent is the cause of
what already exists.—But if the simultaneous is not 236
the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the
posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, and besides
these there is no other possibility, no cause will
exist.

Moreover, if a cause exists it is the cause of some- 237
thing either wholly of itself and using only its own
power, or else it needs for the purpose the assistance
of the passive matter, so that the effect is conceived
as due to the combination of both jointly. And if it 238
is its nature to effect something of itself and by using
its own power, since it is constantly in possession of
itself and its own power it ought always to be pro-
ducing its effect, and not be at one time active and
at another inactive. But if, as some of the Dogmatists 239
say, cause is not an absolute and independent thing
but a relative thing, since it is viewed in relation
to the thing affected and the thing affected also in
relation to it, a worse consequence will emerge. For 240
if the one is conceived as relative to the other, and of
these the one is active, the other passive, they will
be one in conception but will be called by two names,
the active and the passive ; and because of this the
efficient power will not reside in the cause any more
than in that which is said to be passive. For just as

οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν χωρὶς τοῦ λεγομένου πάσχειν,
οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ λεγόμενον πάσχειν δύναται χωρὶς
241 τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας πάσχειν. ὥσθ' ἔπεται τὸ
μὴ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ὑποκεῖσθαι
τὴν δραστήριον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος δύναμιν. οἶον
(ἔσται γὰρ σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος)
εἴπερ τὸ πῦρ καύσεώς ἐστιν αἴτιον, ἤτοι αὐτοτελῶς
καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ μόνον προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει καύσεώς
242 καιομένης ὕλης. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ
φύσει ἀρκούμενον ποιεῖ τὴν καύσιν, ἐχρῆν καὶ
πάντοτε ἔχον αὐτὸ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν διὰ παντὸς
καίειν. οὐχὶ δὲ πάντοτε καίει, ἀλλὰ τινὰ μὲν καίει
τινὰ δὲ οὐ καίει· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ
243 φύσει προσχρῶμενον καίει. εἰ δὲ σὺν τῇ ἐπιτη-
δειότητι τῶν καιομένων ξύλων, πόθεν ἔχομεν
λέγειν ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τῆς καύσεως αἴτιον, ἀλλ' οὐχ
ἢ ἐπιτηδειότητος τῶν ξύλων; ὃν γὰρ τρόπον μὴ
ὄντος αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται καύσις, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἐπι-
τηδειότητος τῶν ξύλων ἀπούσης οὐ γίνεται καύσις.
ταύτη τε, εἰ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν αἴτιον ὅτι παρόντος αὐτοῦ
γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ ἀπόντος οὐ γίνεται,
ἔσται καὶ ἢ ἐπιτηδειότητος δι' ἑκάτερον τούτων
244 αἴτιον. ὥσπερ οὖν τῆς δι συλλαβῆς ἕκ τε τοῦ δ καὶ
ι συνεστώσης ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ
ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην συλλαβὴν τὸ δ, οὐκ αἴτιον
δὲ τὸ ι, οὕτω συλλαβῇ μὲν εὐκότος τοῦ καίεσθαι,
στοιχείῳ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ξύλων, ἀτοπώτατος
ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ μὲν πῦρ αἴτιον λέγων τοῦ καίεσθαι, τὰ
δὲ ξύλα μηδαμῶς. οὔτε γὰρ δίχα τοῦ πυρὸς οὔτε
χωρὶς τῶν ξύλων γίνεται τὸ καίεσθαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ

¹ εἰ αὐτὸ <καί> cj Mutsch.: ? κατὰ.

the cause cannot act without what is called the passive
thing, so also the so-called passive thing cannot be
passive without the presence of the cause. So it 241
follows that the power productive of the effect does
not reside in the cause any more than in the passive
thing. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear
by an example) if fire is the cause of burning, either
it is productive of burning by itself and using only its
own power, or it needs for this purpose the co-ope-
ration of the burning material. And if it produces the 242
burning by itself, being sufficient of its own nature,
then, since it always possesses its own nature, it ought
to have been continually burning. But it does not
burn always, but burns some things and does not
burn others; therefore it does not burn by itself and
by using its own nature. But if it does so in con- 243
junction with the suitability of the burning wood,
how can we assert that it, rather than the suitability
of the wood, is the cause of the burning? For just
as no burning takes place if the fire is non-existent, so
also no burning takes place if the suitability of the
wood is absent. Thus also, if it is the cause because
the effect occurs when it is present and does not occur
when it is absent, the suitability too will be the cause
for both these reasons. So just as, in the case of the 244
syllable "di," which consists of the letters d and i, it
is absurd of a man to say that the cause of the con-
struction of this syllable is the d, and that the i is not
the cause, so if we compare the act of burning to a
syllable and the fire and the wood to letters, it is
most absurd of a man to say that the fire is the cause
of the burning and the wood not the cause. For
the burning neither takes place without the fire nor
without the wood, just as the syllable does not exist

245 ἢ συλλαβὴ χωρὶς τοῦ δ ἢ τοῦ ι. ὅθεν πάλιν εἰ μῆτε αὐτοτελῶς ποιητικόν τινός ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον μῆτε σὺν ἐπιτηδειότητι τοῦ πάσχοντος, οὐδενὸς ποιητικόν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον.

246 Ἐπι εἰ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἤτοι μίαν ἔχει τὴν δραστη-
ριον δύναμιν ἢ πολλὰς· οὔτε δὲ μίαν ἔχειν δύναται,
ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε πολλὰς, ὡς διδάξομεν· οὐκ
247 ἄρα τι ἐστὶν αἴτιον. μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει δύναμιν,
ἐπεὶ περ εἰ μίαν εἶχεν, ὄφειλε πάντα ὁμοίως δια-
τιθέναι καὶ μὴ διαφερόντως. οἶον ὁ ἥλιος καίει
μὲν τὰ περι τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν μέρη, θάλπει δὲ τὰ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, καταναγάζει δὲ μόνον τοὺς Ὑπερβορέους, καὶ
πήττει μὲν τὸν πηλόν, τῆκει δὲ τὸν κηρόν, καὶ
λευκαίνει μὲν τὰ ἐσθήματα, μελαίνει δὲ τὴν ἡμετέ-
ραν ἐπιφάνειαν, ἐρυθαίνει δὲ καρπούς τινάς, καὶ
ἡμῶν μὲν τοῦ ὄραν αἴτιος γίνεται, τοῖς νυκτινόμοις
δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων, οἶον γλαυξὶ καὶ νυκτερίσι, τοῦ μὴ
ὄραν· ὥστε εἰ μίαν εἶχε δύναμιν, ὄφειλε ταῦτόν
ἐπὶ πάντων ποιεῖν· οὐχὶ δὲ ταῦτόν ἐπὶ πάντων
248 ποιεῖ· οὐκ ἄρα μίαν ἔχει δύναμιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
πολλὰς, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῆν πάσας ἐπὶ πάντων ἐνεργεῖν, οἶον
πάντα φλέγειν ἢ πάντα χεῖν ἢ πάντα πηγνύναι. εἰ
δὲ μῆτε μίαν ἔχει δύναμιν μῆτε πολλὰς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τινὸς αἴτιον.

249 Ναί, ἀλλ' εἰώθασι πρὸς τοῦτο ὑποτυγχάνειν οἱ
δογματικοί, λέγοντες ὅτι παρὰ τὰ πάσχοντα καὶ τὰ
διαστήματα πέφυκεν ἐξαλλάσσεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα
ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰτίου ἀποτελέσματα, καθάπερ τοῦ
ἡλίου. συνέγγυς μὲν γὰρ ὦν τοῖς Αἰθίοψιν ἔοικε
καίει, μετρίως δὲ ἡμῶν ἀφεστηκῶς θάλπει, πολὺ
δὲ τῶν Ὑπερβορέων κεχωρισμένος θάλπει μὲν οὐ-
250 δαμῶς, καταναγάζει δὲ μόνον· καὶ πήττει μὲν τὸν
122

without the *d* or without the *i*. Hence, once more, 245
if the cause is not productive of anything either by
itself or in conjunction with the suitability of the
passive subject, the cause is productive of nothing.

Further, if the cause exists, it either has one 246
efficient power or many; but it cannot have one, as
we shall establish, nor yet many, as we shall explain;
therefore no cause exists. It has not one power, 247
since if it had one power it ought to affect all things
alike and not in different ways. The sun, for instance,
burns the regions about Ethiopia, but warms our
regions, and only illumines the Hyperboreans^a; and
it dries mud,^b but melts wax; and it whitens clothes,
but blackens our complexion, and reddens certain
fruits; and it is the cause of seeing to us, but of not
seeing to the birds which feed by night, such as owls
and bats. So that, if it had one power, it ought to
produce the same effect in all cases; but it does not
produce the same effect in all cases; therefore it has
not one power. Nor yet has it many, since then it 248
ought to operate with them all in every case—burn
everything, for example, or fuse everything, or con-
geal everything. But if it neither has one power nor
many, it will not be the cause of anything.

Yes, but the Dogmatists usually reply to this by 249
saying that the effects produced by the same cause
naturally vary owing to the materials affected and
the distances, as in the case of the sun. For being
close to the Ethiopians it naturally burns them, and
being at a moderate distance from us it warms us,
and being far removed from the Hyperboreans it does
not warm them at all but merely illumines them; and 250

^a Dwellers in the extreme North, "Laplanders."

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 194.

πηλὸν τὸ ὕδατῶδες τοῦ γεώδους ἐξατμίζων, τήκει
 δὲ τὸν κηρὸν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ πηλοῦ
 251 ἰδιότητα. οἱ δὲ χρώμενοι τῇ τοιαύτῃ ὑποτεύξει
 σχεδὸν ἀμάχως ἡμῖν συγχωροῦσι τὸ μὴ ἕτερον
 εἶναι τοῦ πάσχοντος τὸ ποιοῦν. εἰ γὰρ οὐ διὰ
 τὸν ἥλιον γίνεται ἡ τήξις τοῦ κηροῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν
 ἰδιότητα τῆς περὶ τὸν κηρὸν φύσεως, φανερὸν ὡς
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῆς τήξεως τῷ κηρῷ, ἢ
 δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συνέλευσις, τοῦ τε ἡλίου καὶ τοῦ
 κηροῦ. τῆς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συνόδου ποιούσης τὸ
 ἀποτέλεσμα, τουτέστι τὴν τήξιν, οὐ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν
 ἥλιον ὁ κηρὸς τήκεται ἢ διὰ τὸν κηρὸν ὁ ἥλιος
 τήκει. οὕτω τε ἀποπον τὸ ἐκ συνόδου δυοῖν γινόμε-
 νον ἀποτέλεσμα μὴ τοῖς δυοῖν ἀναπιθέσθαι, τῷ δὲ
 252 ἐτέρῳ μόνῳ προσμαρτυρεῖν.
 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστὶ τίς τινος αἰτιον, ἦτοι κεχώρισται
 τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης ἢ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ· οὔτε δὲ
 κεχωρισμένον αὐτῆς δύναται τυγχάνειν αἰτιον τοῦ
 πάσχειν αὐτὴν οὔτε συνὸν αὐτῇ, καθὼς παρα-
 253 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τίς τινος αἰτιον. καὶ δὲ
 κεχωρισμένον μὲν αὐτῆς αὐτόθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ αἰτιὸν
 ἐστὶ, μὴ παρούσης τῆς πρὸς ἣν λέγεται αἰτιον, οὔτε
 254 ἐκεῖνη πάσχει, μὴ συμπαρόντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος. εἰ
 δὲ συνδυάζοι τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἦτοι αὐτὸ μόνον
 ποιεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον αἰτιον ὑπάρχειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πάσχει,
 ἢ ποιεῖ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἅμα ποιεῖ καὶ
 πάσχει, ἐκάτερον ἐστὶ ποιοῦν τε καὶ πάσχον· ἢ
 μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ἐστὶ πάσχουσα ἢ ὕλη, ἢ δὲ ἢ
 ὕλη ποιεῖ, ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάσχον. καὶ οὕτως οὐ
 μᾶλλον τὸ ποιοῦν γενήσεται ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, καὶ

it dries mud by making the watery part steam out
 of the earthy part, but melts wax because it has not
 the peculiar quality of mud. Now those who make 251
 this reply grant us, almost without dispute, that what
 acts is not different from what is acted upon. For if
 the melting of the wax occurs not because of the sun
 but because of the property of the substance of the
 wax, it is plain that neither of them is the cause of
 the melting of the wax but the combination of both
 of them, the sun and the wax. And as it is the
 conjunction of both which produces the effect,—
 namely, the melting,—the wax is not melted because
 of the sun any more than the sun melts because of the
 wax. And thus it is absurd not to ascribe the effect
 produced by the conjunction of two things to those
 two, but to attribute it to one of them only.

Moreover, if there exists any cause of anything, 252
 either it is separate from the matter affected or it
 co-exists with it; but neither when separate from it
 nor when co-existing with it can it be the cause of
 its being affected, as we shall establish; therefore no
 cause of anything exists. Now when separated from 253
 its matter, obviously it is not a cause, since the matter
 with respect to which it is termed a cause is not
 present, nor is the matter affected, since that which
 affects it is not present with it. But if the one is 254
 coupled with the other, that one which is said to be
 the cause either acts only and is not acted upon, or
 both acts and is acted upon at once. And if it both
 acts and is acted upon, each of them will be both
 active and passive; for in so far as the cause acts the
 matter will be passive, but in so far as the matter acts
 the cause will be the passive thing. And thus that
 which acts will be no more active than passive, and

τὸ πάσχον οὐ μᾶλλον ἔσται πάσχον ἢ ποιῶν· ὅπερ
 256 ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ ἀντιπάσχει δέ,
 ἤτοι κατὰ ψιλὴν ψαῦδον, τουτέστι τὴν κατ' ἐπι-
 φάνειαν, ποιεῖ, ἢ κατὰ διάδοσιν. καὶ ἔξωθεν μὲν
 προσπίπτον καὶ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρα-
 βαλλόμενον τῇ πασχούσῃ ὕλη οὐ δυνήσεται τι
 ποιεῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιφάνεια ἀσώματος ἔστιν, τὸ δ'
 257 ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν πέφυκεν. οὐκ
 ἄρα κατὰ ψιλὴν παραβαλλόμενον τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὸ
 αἴτιον τῇ ὕλῃ τι ποιεῖν δύνатаι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 κατὰ διάδοσιν οἷον τέ ἔστιν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ἤτοι γὰρ
 διὰ στερεῶν σωμάτων διζέται ἢ διὰ νοητῶν τινῶν
 καὶ ἀναισθητῶν πόρων. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν στερεῶν
 σωμάτων οὐκ ἂν φέροιο· σῶμα γὰρ διὰ σώματος
 257 οὐ δύναται χωρεῖν. εἰ δὲ διὰ πόρων τινῶν, ὀφείλει
 ταῖς περιγραφούσαις τοὺς πόρους ἐπιφανείαις
 προσπίπτον ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' αἶ γε ἐπιφανείαι εἰσιν ἀ-
 σώματοι, καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν
 εὐλόγον ἔστιν. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ κατὰ διάδοσιν ποιεῖ τὸ
 αἴτιον. ὧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδ' ὅλως αἴτιον αὐτὸ τυγα-
 χάνειν.

258 *Ἐνεστι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀφῆς κωϊότερον τῷ τε
 ποιῶντι καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἐπαπορεῖν. ἵνα γὰρ τι
 ποιήσῃ ἢ πάθῃ, ὀφείλει θιγεῖν ἢ θιχθῆναι· οὐδὲν δὲ
 οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε θιχθῆναι δύναται, καθὼς παρα-
 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ποιῶν ἢ τὸ πάσχον.
 259 εἰ γὰρ ἄπτεται τί τινος καὶ θιγγάνει, ἤτοι ὅλον ὅλου
 ἄπτεται ἢ μέρος μέρους ἢ ὅλον μέρους ἢ μέρος

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 39.

that which is acted upon will be no more passive than
 active; which is absurd.—But if it acts and is not 255
 acted upon, it acts either by mere contact—that is
 to say, superficial contact—or by permeation. And
 if it imposes itself externally and is applied to the
 passive matter on the surface only, it will not be able
 to effect anything; for surface is incorporeal,^a and
 the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to
 256 be acted upon. Therefore the cause is not able to
 act at all upon the matter when applied on the surface
 only. Nor yet is it possible for it to act by permea-
 tion. For it will penetrate either through solid
 bodies or through certain intelligible and impercept-
 ible pores.^b But it will not move through solid
 bodies; for body cannot pass through body. And if 257
 it passes through certain pores, it ought to act while
 in contact with the surfaces which enclose the pores.
 But the surfaces are incorporeal, and it is contrary to
 reason that the incorporeal should either act or be
 acted upon. Neither, then, does the cause act by
 permeation. And from this it follows that it is not
 a cause at all.

Regarding that which acts and that which is 258
 acted upon it is also possible to raise difficulties of
 a more general kind, based upon contact. For in
 order that a thing may act or be acted upon, it
 must touch or be touched; but, as we shall establish,
 nothing can either touch or be touched; therefore
 neither that which acts nor that which is acted
 upon exists. For if one thing is in contact with 259
 another and touches it, it is in contact either as
 a whole with the whole, or as a part with a part,
 or as a whole with a part or as a part with the

^b Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 306, 309; P.H. ii. 98, 140.

ὅλον· οὔτε δὲ μέρος μέρους οὔτε ὅλον ὅλου οὔτε
 ὅλον μέρους οὔτε ἐναλλάξ ἄπτεται, καθὼς διδά-
 ξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τί τινος ἄπτεται. καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν
 μὴδενὸς ἄπτεται, οὔτε τὸ πάσχον ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ
 260 ποιοῦν. ὅλον μὲν οὖν ὅλου οὐχ ἄπτεται κατὰ λόγον·
 εἰ γὰρ ὅλον ὅλου ἄπτεται, οὐ θίξις ἔσται ἀλλὰ
 ἐνωσις ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τὰ δύο σώματα ἐν ἔσται
 σῶμα, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ βάθος ὀφείλειν τὸ
 ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου θιγγάνειν διὰ τὸ καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ
 261 ὅλου καθεστάναι μέρος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μέρος
 μέρους θιγγάνειν δυνατόν ἔστω. τὸ γὰρ μέρος κατὰ
 μὲν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σχέσιν νοεῖται μέρος, κατὰ δὲ
 τὴν ἴδιον περιγραφὴν ἔστιν ὅλον, πάλιν τε διὰ
 ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἦτοι τὸ ὅλον μέρος τοῦ ὅλου
 μέρους ἄψεται ἢ μέρος μέρους. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 ὅλον ὅλου, ἐνωθήσεται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα ἐν γενήσεται
 σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μέρει μέρους,¹ ἐκείνο πάλιν τὸ μέρος
 κατ' ἴδιαν περιγραφὴν ὅλον νοούμενον ἦτοι ὅλον
 ὅλου τοῦ μέρους ἄψεται ἢ μέρει τινὶ τιμος μέρους,
 καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέρος
 μέρους ἄπτεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὅλον μέρους.
 262 εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους ἄψεται, ἔσται καὶ τὸ
 ὅλον συνυποστελλόμενον τῷ μέρει μέρος καὶ τὸ
 μέρος ἀντιπαρεκτεινόμενον τῷ ὅλω ὅλον· τὸ γὰρ
 ἴσον τῷ μέρει τὴν τοῦ μέρους εἶχεν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ
 τὸ ἴσον τῷ ὅλω τὴν τοῦ ὅλου. τελέως δὲ ἀπ-
 ερρωγός ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖν μέρος ἢ τὸ μέρος
 ἴσον ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τῷ ὅλω. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ
 263 μέρους ἄπτεται. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ
 μέρους ἄπτεται, ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ μικρότερον καὶ πάλιν

¹ μέρους Heintz : μέρος mss., Bekk.

whole ; but, as we shall show, it is not in contact
 either as part with part, or as whole with whole,
 or as whole with part, or the converse ; therefore
 nothing touches anything.* And if nothing touches
 anything, neither what is acted upon exists nor
 what acts. Now it is according to reason that a 260
 whole does not touch a whole ; for if whole touches
 whole, there will not be contact but the union of both,
 and the two bodies will be one body, because the one
 must touch the other with its depths, since these too
 are parts of the whole.—Nor, again, is it possible for 261
 part to touch part. For the part is conceived as a
 part in respect of its relation to the whole, but in
 respect of its own limited extent it is a whole, and
 for this reason again either the whole part will touch
 the whole part, or a part of it a part. And if the
 whole touches the whole, they will be unified and both
 will become one body ; while if with a part it touches
 a part, that part again, being conceived as a whole in
 respect of its own limited extent, will either touch as
 a whole the whole part, or touch a part of it with a
 part—and so on *ad infinitum*. Neither then does a
 part touch a part.—Nor, again, does a whole touch
 a part. For if the whole shall touch the part, the 262
 whole, being contracted so as to equal the part, will
 be a part, and the part, being extended so as to
 match the whole, will be a whole ; for what is equal
 to the part has the proportion of the part, and what
 is equal to the whole that of the whole. But it is
 perfectly absurd either to make the whole into a part
 or to claim that the part is equal to the whole. Neither
 then does the whole touch the part.—Moreover, if 263
 the whole touches the part it will be smaller than

* With §§ 259-261 cf. *P.H.* iii. 45 f.

ἑαυτοῦ μείζον· ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου χείρον. τό τε γὰρ ὅλον εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιλαμβάνει τόπον τῶ μέρει, ἴσον ἔσται τῶ μέρει, ἴσον δὲ τούτῳ γενόμενον μικρότερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται· καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ μέρος εἰ ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τῶ ὅλῳ, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τούτῳ τόπον, τῶ δὲ ὅλῳ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπ-
 264 εσσηκὸς τόπον ἔσται μείζον ἑαυτοῦ. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναστροφῆς ἐστὶ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναται τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους ἄπτεσθαι διὰ τὰς μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἐπιλογισθείσας αἰτίας, οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος δυνησεται τοῦ ὅλου ἄπτεσθαι. ὅθεν εἰ μήτε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ ὅλου ἄπτεται μήτε τὸ μέρος τοῦ μέρους μήτε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους μήτε ἐναλλάξ, οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἄπτεται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ αἰτιῶν τί τινος ὑπάρξει, οὐδὲ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ τινος.

265 Πρὸς τούτοις τε, εἰ ἄπτεται τί τινος, ἤτοι μεσο-
 λαβούμενον ὑπὸ τινος, οἷον πόρου ἢ γραμμῆς, ἄψεται τινος, ἢ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς μεσολαβούμενον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τινος μεσολαβοῖτο, οὐχ ἄψεται οὐ λέ-
 γεται ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἀπαξᾶπλῶς μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντος τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἄψεται, ἔνωσις ἔσται ἀμφοτέρων
 266 ἀλλ' οὐ θίξις. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τί τινος ἄπτεται. ὅθεν εἴπερ, ἵνα νοηθῇ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, δεῖ προωμολογησθαι τὸ ὅτι <τι>¹ τινος ἄπτεται, δέ-
 δεικται δὲ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀπτόμενον, λεκτέον μήτε τὸ ποιοῦν μήτε τὸ πάσχον ὑπάρχειν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦν αἰτιον οὕτω καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ
 267 κωιῆ μετὰ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἀπορεῖται· ἀπορος δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος λόγος. εἰ

itself, and again larger than itself; which is a worse consequence than the previous one. For if the whole occupies the same space as the part, it will be equal to the part, and being equal thereto it will be smaller than itself; and conversely, if the part is extended so as to match the whole, it will take up the same space as it, and as occupying the same space as the whole it will be larger than itself.—And to the converse 264 case the same argument applies; for if the whole cannot touch the part, for the reasons set forth a little while ago, neither will the part be able to touch the whole. Hence, if the whole does not touch the whole, nor the part the part, nor the whole the part, nor the converse, nothing touches anything. And for this reason nothing will be the cause of anything, nor will anything be affected by anything.

Furthermore, if one thing touches another, it will 265 touch it either when intercepted by something—such as a pore or a line—or when intercepted by nothing. And if it is intercepted by something, it will not be touching what it is said to touch but the thing which lies between them both; but if the one shall touch the other with absolutely nothing intervening between them, there will be a union of the two and not contact. Neither, then, in this way does anything 266 touch anything. Hence, if the conception of activity and passivity requires the previous agreement that one thing touches another, and it has been proved that nothing touches anything, we must declare that neither the active nor the passive exists.

Thus the active cause is a matter of doubt both separately in itself and when taken along with the thing affected by it. And the account given of the 267 thing affected is also doubtful in itself. For if a thing

¹ <τι> add. Heintz.

γὰρ πάσχει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν πάσχει τι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν·
 οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν πάσχει τι, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε τὸ
 268 μὴ ὄν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν ὄν οὐ πάσχει· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ ὄν ἐστι καὶ
 τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχει, οὐ πάσχει· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν τῷ
 μηδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν πάθει. παρὰ δὲ τὸ
 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι.
 269 οἶον ὁ Σωκράτης ἤτοι ὡν θνήσκει ἢ μὴ ὡν. δύο
 γὰρ οὗτοι χρόνοι, εἰς μὲν ὁ καθ' ὄν ἐστι καὶ ζῆ,
 ἕτερος δὲ καθ' ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἐφθάρται· διόπερ
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλει κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τούτων θνή-
 σκειν. ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἐστι καὶ ζῆ, οὐ θνήσκει· ζῆ
 γὰρ δήπουθεν· θανάων δὲ πάλιν οὐ θνήσκει, ἐπεὶ
 270 δὲς ἔσται θνήσκων, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν θνή-
 σκει Σωκράτης. οἶος δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτου λόγος,
 τοιοῦτος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν
 δύναται πάσχειν ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρχῆθεν ὑπόστασιν νοεῖται, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν· ἀρχῆν
 271 γὰρ οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. καὶ ἔτι
 τρανότερον, εἶπερ γε τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστι, πάσχει,
 ἔσται τάναντία ὑφ' ἑν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· οὐχὶ δέ γε
 τάναντία ὑφ' ἑν περὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συνίσταται· οὐκ ἄρα
 πάσχει τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστιν. οἶον ἔστω τὸ ὄν τῆ
 φύσει σκληρὸν εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν μαλακυνόμενον,
 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σιδήρου θεωροῦμεν. οὐκοῦν ὅτε
 μὲν σκληρὸν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, οὐ δύναται μαλακύνεσθαι,
 272 ἐπεὶ εἰ μαλακύνεται ὅτε σκληρὸν ἐστιν, ἔσται τὰ-
 ναντία περὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑφ' ἑν, καὶ ἡ μὲν κατέστηκεν

is affected, either what exists is affected or what
 exists not; but neither what exists is affected, as we
 shall establish, nor what exists not, as we shall show;
 therefore nothing is affected.^a Now the existent is 268
 not affected, for in so far as it is existent and has its
 own nature it is not affected; and the non-existent
 will not be affected owing to the fact that it does not
 subsist at all. But besides existence and non-existence
 nothing exists; therefore nothing is affected.
 For example, Socrates dies either when existing or 269
 when not existing.^b For these are two periods—the
 one that in which he exists and is alive, the other that
 in which he exists not but has perished; wherefore
 he must necessarily die in one or other of these
 periods. Now he does not die when he exists and is
 alive; for, to be sure, he is alive; nor, again, does he
 die when he has died, since then he will be dying
 twice over, which is absurd. So then, Socrates does
 not die. And the argument used in this case may 270
 similarly be applied to the case of the thing affected.
 For the existent cannot be affected in so far as it is
 existent and is conceived according to its original
 substance; nor can the non-existent, for it does not
 subsist at all; nothing, therefore, is affected.—And 271
 still more clearly, if the existent, when it is existent,
 is affected, opposites will exist in the same thing at
 the same time; but opposites do not exist in the same
 thing at the same time; therefore the existent, when
 it is existent, is not affected.^c For example, let it be
 granted that the existent is hard in its nature and is
 affected by softening, as we see in the case of iron.
 While, then, it is hard and existent it cannot become
 soft, since, if it becomes soft when it is hard, opposites 272
 will exist in the same thing at the same time, and in

^a With §§ 267-268 cf. *P.H.* iii. 104 f.

^b With § 269 cf. *P.H.* iii. 111, *Adv. Phys.* ii. 346.

^c With §§ 271 ff. cf. *P.H.* iii. 107.

ὄν, ἔσται σκληρόν, ἢ δὲ πάσχει ὄν ὑπάρχον, ἔσται
μαλακόν. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἐν καὶ σκληρόν
καὶ μαλακὸν νοεῖσθαι· οὐ δύναται ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ὅτε
273 ὄν ἐστί, πάσχειν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ λευκοῦ
καὶ μέλανος χρώματος. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ἢ ὄν ἐστί,
καὶ λευκὸν εἶναι, καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὸ μέλαν γινόμενον.
οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν [ἐστί] καὶ λευκὸν τότε ἀξιοῦται
πάσχειν ὅτε λευκὸν ἐστί μέλαν (γινόμενον)¹ ἔσται
συμβεβηκότα ἔχον τὰ ἐναντία· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ
τοῖνυν τὸ ὄν, ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστί, πάσχειν πέφυκεν.
274 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ λέγοιμεν τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστί,
πάσχειν, ἔσται τι πρὶν γεγονέαι γεγονός· <οὐδὲν δέ
ἐστί πρὶν γεγονέαι γεγονός·>² οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ὅτε
275 ὄν ἐστί, πάσχει. εἰ γὰρ σκληρόν ἐστί τὸ ὄν, ἐφ'
ὅσον ὄν ἐστί, σκληρόν ἐστί καὶ οὐ μαλακόν· εἰ δὲ
μαλακόν, πρὸ τοῦ γεγονέαι μαλακὸν ἔσται μα-
λακόν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐστί, σκληρόν ἐστί καὶ οὐπω
μαλακόν· ἢ δὲ ὅτε ὄν ἐστί τότε ἀξιοῦται πάσχειν,
πρὶν γεγονέαι μαλακὸν γενήσεται μαλακόν. ἄτοπον
δέ γε τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστί,
276 πάσχειν ῥητέον. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν,
ὅτε μὴ ὄν ἐστί. τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν,
ὧ δὲ μηδὲν συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν συμ-
βέβηκεν· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν πάσχει τι. εἰ δὲ
μήτε τὸ ὄν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν πάσχει τι καὶ παρὰ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστί, οὐδὲν ἐστί τὸ πάσχον.
277 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστί τι τὸ πάσχον, ἦτοι κατὰ πρόσ-

¹ <γινόμενον> addo.

² <οὐδὲν . . . γεγονός.> add. N, Mutsch.

so far as it is existent it will be hard, but in so far as
it is affected while existent it will be soft. But the
same thing cannot be conceived as at once both hard
and soft; therefore, the existent, when it is existent,
cannot be affected. And the same argument holds 273
good also in the case of white colour and black. For
let it be granted that the existent, in so far as it is
existent, is white and that it is affected by becoming
black. If then the existent and white is held to be
affected by becoming black at the time when it is white,
it will have opposite properties; which is absurd.
So then the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not
of a nature to be affected.—Further, if we say that 274
the existent, when it is existent, is affected, there will
exist something become before it has become; <but
there is nothing become before it has become;>
therefore the existent, when it is existent, is not
affected. For if the existent is hard, in so far as it is 275
existent, it is hard and not soft; and if it <becomes>
soft, it will be soft before it has become soft; for in
so far as it is existent it is hard and not yet soft; but
in so far as it is held to be affected at the time when
it is existent, it will become soft before it has become
soft. But such a result is absurd; one must, there-
fore, declare that the existent, in so far as it is
existent, is not affected.—And in the same way, the 276
non-existent is not affected when it is non-existent.
For the non-existent has no property, and being
affected is not a property of that which has no
property; neither, then, is the non-existent affected
at all. But if neither the existent nor the non-
existent is affected at all, and besides these there is
no other alternative, there is nothing which is affected.

Moreover, if there is something which is affected, it 277

θεσιν πάσχει ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτεροίωσιν
καὶ μεταβολήν· οὔτε δὲ πρόσθεσις τις ἔστιν οὔτε
ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε μεταβολή καὶ ἑτεροίωσις, ὡς ὑπο-
278 δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
ὀνομάτων κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρεῖς τρόπους γί-
νονταί τινες μεταπτώσεις, καὶ τοῦ μὲν κωβίους
ὀνόματος ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς πρώτης συλλαβῆς γί-
νεται ἕτερον ὄνομα βίος, καὶ τούτῳ προστεθείσης
τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς συνίσταται τὸ πρότερον ὄνομα,
καὶ παρὰ ἐναλλαγὴν στοιχείων, ὡς τὸ ἄρχων ὄνομα
γίνεται Χάρων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ σώματα λεχθεῖη ἂν
πάσχειν τριχῶς, ἥτοι κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ πρόσ-
279 θεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτεροίωσιν, κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μὲν οἶον
τὰ φθίνοντα, κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὲ οἶον τὰ αὐξήσιμα,
κατὰ τροπὴν δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐξ ὑγείας εἰς νόσον μετα-
πίπτοντα. εἰάν οὖν δειχθῆ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς
ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ προστίθεται καὶ
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀπ' οὐδενὸς μετατίθεται, αὐτόθεν ἔσται
κατεσκευασμένον τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ πάσχον.
280 λέγωμεν δὲ ἐν πρώτοις περὶ τοῦ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν
τρόπου.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἥτοι σῶμα ἀπὸ
σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ
σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος·
οὔτε δὲ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται, ὡς δει-
ξομεν, οὔτε ἀσώματον ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου, καθὼς
παραστήσομεν, οὔτε σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀ-
281 σώματον ἀπὸ σώματος, ὡς καταστησόμεθα· οὐκ
ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός. ἀσώματον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ ἀ-
σωμάτου ἀφαιρεθῆναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ
ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθιγές, τὸ δὲ

^a κωβίους, "gudgeon"; βίος, "life."

is affected either through addition or through sub-
traction or through alteration and change. But no
addition nor subtraction nor change and alteration
exists, as we shall demonstrate; nothing therefore is
affected. For just as, in the case of nouns, modifi- 278
cations take place in these three ways, and when
the first syllable is subtracted from the noun *kōbios*^a
there is formed another noun *bios*, and when the same
syllable is added to this the former noun is con-
structed; and by interchange of letters, as when the
noun *archon* becomes *Charon*;—so, too, bodies may
be said to be affected in three ways, either through
addition or through subtraction or through altera-
tion—through subtraction like decreasing things; 279
through addition, like increasing things; through
conversion, like things that pass over from health to
sickness. If, then, it shall be shown that nothing is
subtracted from anything and that nothing is added
to anything and that nothing is transposed from any-
thing, it will thereby be established that there is
nothing which is affected. And let us discuss in the 280
first place the mode of subtraction.^b

If one thing is subtracted from another, either body
is subtracted from body, or the incorporeal from the
incorporeal, or body from the incorporeal, or the
incorporeal from body; but neither body is sub-
tracted from body, as we shall prove, nor the incor-
poreal from the incorporeal, as we shall demonstrate,
nor body from the incorporeal nor the incorporeal from
body, as we shall establish; therefore nothing is sub- 281
tracted from anything. Now, that the incorporeal
should be subtracted from the incorporeal is a thing
impossible; for what is subtracted from a thing is not

^b With this discussion of "subtraction" cf. *P.H.* iii. 85 ff.

ἀσώματον ἀθιγές ὃν οὐ παρέχει αὐτὸ πρὸς ἀφ-
 282 αἶρεσιν καὶ χωρισμόν. ἔνθεν καὶ ματαιάζουσιν
 οἱ μαθηματικοί, ὅταν λέγουσι τὴν δοθείσαν εὐθείαν
 δίχα τεμεῖν. ἢ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος δεικνυμένη
 εὐθεία αἰσθητὸν ἔχει μῆκος καὶ πλάτος, ἢ δὲ ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν νοουμένη εὐθεία γραμμὴ μῆκός ἐστιν ἀ-
 πλατές. καὶ ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος δεικνυμένη οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη γραμμὴ, καὶ οἱ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι ταύτην τέμνουσιν οὐ
 τὴν οὖσαν γραμμὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὴ οὖσαν τέμνουσιν.

283 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ γραμμὴ
 ἐκ στιγμῶν συνεστῶσα νοεῖται, ἔστω τις εὐθεία
 γραμμὴ, ἣν λέγουσιν εἰς ἴσα τέμνειν, ἐκ περισσῶν
 συνεστῶσα στιγμῶν, οἷον ἑνέα. ἀλλὰ ταύτην γε
 τέμνοντες ἢ τὴν πέμπτην διελοῦσι στιγμῆν, φημί
 δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν τεσσάρων καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων
 νοουμένην, ἢ τῶν τμημάτων τὸ μὲν τεττάρων ποιή-
 σουσι στιγμῶν τὸ δὲ πέντε. τὴν μὲν οὖν πέμπτην
 στιγμῆν οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν τέμνειν· ἀμερῆς γὰρ ἐστὶ κατ'
 αὐτοὺς, καὶ τὸ ἀμερῆς ἀδύνατον νοεῖν εἰς μέρη
 διαιρούμενον.λείπεται ἄρα τῶν τῆς γραμμῆς
 τμημάτων τὸ μὲν τεσσάρων ποιεῖν στιγμῶν τὸ δὲ
 πέντε, ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀτοπον καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρό-
 θεσιν αὐτῶν ὑπισχνούνται μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστημονικῶς
 τὴν δοθείσαν εὐθείαν γραμμὴν εἰς ἴσα διαιρεῖν

284 τμήματα, διαιροῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν εἰς ἄνισα. ὃ δὲ
 αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου λόγος νοεῖσθω. φασὶ γὰρ
 κύκλον εἶναι σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον ὑπὸ μιᾶς γραμμῆς
 περιεχόμενον, [ἀφ']¹ οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου
 πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν ἐκβαλλόμεναι εὐθεῖαι ἴσαι
 ἀλλήλαις εἰσίν. εἴτα ἐπὶ τούτοις πρόβλημά ἐστι
 τὸν κύκλον δίχα τεμεῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. τὸ

¹ [ἀφ'] secl. Mutsch.: ἐφ' Bekk.

intangible, but the incorporeal, being intangible, does
 not submit to subtraction and separation. Hence, 282
 too, the mathematicians talk idly when they say that
 they will bisect a given straight line. For the straight
 line shown to us on the board has length and breadth,
 whereas the straight line conceived by them is
 "length without breadth." And the line shown on
 the board will not be a line, and those who attempt
 to cut it are cutting not the real line but the unreal.—
 Or again, since, according to them, the line is con- 283
 ceived as composed of points, let us assume a certain
 straight line, which they say they cut into equal
 parts, composed of an odd number of points, such as
 nine. But in cutting this, either they will divide the
 fifth point (I mean the point conceived as lying
 between the first four and the last four), or else they
 will make one of the sections consist of four points
 and the other of five. Now they will not say that
 they cut the fifth point; for, according to them, the
 point is without parts, and it is impossible to conceive
 what is without parts as divided into parts. It only
 remains, therefore, to make the one section of the
 line consist of four points and the other of five, which
 again is absurd and at variance with their undertak-
 ing; for they promise to divide the given straight line
 scientifically into equal sections, but they divide it
 into unequal ones.—And the same argument may be 284
 applied in the case of the circle. For they say that
 the circle is "a plane form enclosed by one line, of
 which all the straight lines extending from the centre
 to the circumference are equal to one another." Then,
 on these conditions, the problem is to bisect the
 circle; and this is impossible. For the centre, which

γὰρ κέντρον, ὅπερ παντὸς τοῦ κύκλου μεσαίτατόν
 ἔστιν, ἥτοι δίχα τέμνεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κύκλου
 διχοτόμησιν ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ προσμερίζεται τμήματι.
 285 ἀλλὰ δίχα μὲν τμηθῆναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· πῶς γὰρ
 οἶόν τε τὸ ἀμερές ἐπινοεῖν μεριζόμενον; εἰ δὲ τῷ
 ἑτέρῳ προσμερίζεται τμήματι, ἄνισα γίνεται τὰ
 τμήματα καὶ ὁ κύκλος οὐ μέσος διαιρεῖται.
 286 τὸ τε τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν ἢ τὸν κύκλον ἥτοι σώμα
 ἔστιν ἢ ἀσώματον. ἀλλὰ σῶμα μὲν πῶς ἂν ἐπι-
 νοηθῆι; ἀθιγὲς γὰρ καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνυπό-
 πτωτον ἡμῖν τὸ τεμνόμενον, τοῦτέστιν ἢ γραμμὴ καὶ
 ὁ κύκλος. τοιοῦτο δὲ ὄν οὐκ ἂν τμηθῆι ὑπὸ
 σώματος· τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ σώματος τεμνόμενον παθεῖν
 δεῖ καὶ θιχθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε
 θιχθῆναι πέφυκεν. ὥστε οὐκ ἔνεστι [νοῆσαι] ὑπὸ
 σώματος τεμνομένην τὴν γραμμὴν καὶ διαιρούμενον
 287 τὸν κύκλον ἐπινοῆσαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ
 ἀσωμάτου τινός. εἰ γὰρ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ διαιροῦν
 τὴν γραμμὴν ἢ τὸν κύκλον, ἥτοι στιγμὴ στιγμὴν
 τέμνει ἢ γραμμὴ γραμμὴν. οὔτε δὲ στιγμὴ τὴν
 στιγμὴν οὔτε γραμμὴ τὴν γραμμὴν οἷα τέ ἐστι
 288 τέμνειν, ἀλλὰ στιγμὴ μὲν τὴν στιγμὴν οὐκ ἂν τέμνοι,
 ἐπεὶ ἑκάτερα ἔστιν ἀμερέης, καὶ οὔτε ἢ τέμνουσα
 ἔχει οἷς τεμεῖ οὔτε ἢ τεμνομένη τὰ εἰς ἃ τμη-
 289 θήσεται. γραμμὴ δὲ τὴν γραμμὴν πάλιν οὐκ ἂν
 διαιροῖ. εἴαν τε γὰρ πλαγίως ἐπιζευχθῆι εἴαν τε
 ὀρθίως ἢ τέμνουσα τῇ τεμνομένῃ, κατ' ἀνάγκην
 ὀφείλει στιγμὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι τῇ κατὰ τὴν
 διαιρουμένην γραμμὴν στιγμῇ. ἀμεροῦς μὲν οὖν
 οὔσης καὶ τῆς ἐπιζεύγνυμένης, ἀμεροῦς δὲ καὶ τῆς
 ἐν τῇ τεμνομένῃ, οὐ γενήσεται τις διαίρεσις διὰ τὸ
 μῆτι τὴν τέμνουσαν εὐφύως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ τέμνειν,
 140

is in the very middle of the whole circle, either is
 bisected in the bisection of the circle, or is added on
 to one or other of the sections. But it is impossible 285
 for it to be bisected; for how is it possible to conceive
 what is without parts as partitioned? And if it is
 added on to either of the sections, the sections become
 unequal and the circle is not divided in the middle.—
 Also, that which cuts the line or the circle is either a 286
 body or incorporeal. But how can it be conceived as
 a body? For the thing cut—namely, the line or the
 circle—is intangible and incorporeal and impercept-
 ible by us. And being such, it will not be cut by a
 body; for what is cut by a body must be acted upon
 and be touched, but the incorporeal is not of a nature
 either to touch or be touched. So that it is not
 possible to conceive of the line being cut or the circle
 divided by a body.—Nor yet by anything incorporeal. 287
 For if what divides the line or the circle is incorporeal,
 it is either a point that cuts a point or a line a line.
 But neither can a point cut the point nor a line the
 line. For a point will not cut the point since each of 288
 them is without parts, and the one which cuts has no
 parts wherewith to cut, nor has the one which is being
 cut any parts into which it may be cut. Nor, again, 289
 will the line divide the line. For whether the cutting
 line is joined to the line that is being cut at an acute
 or at a right angle, it must necessarily be joined at a
 point in itself to a point in the divided line. As,
 however, the point of the joined line is without parts,
 and the point in the cut line is also without parts, no
 division will take place, since neither the cutting line
 is suited by nature for cutting, being without parts,

οἶσαν ἀμερῆ, μήτε τὴν τεμνομένην πρὸς τὸ τέμνε-
 290 σθαι τῷ παντὸς ἔστερησθαι μέρους. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδ' ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τὸ τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν
 μεταξύ δυοῖν στιγμῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ τεμνομένῃ γραμμῇ
 πίπτον τέμνει τὴν γραμμὴν. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν προ-
 ειρημένων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
 ἐν συνεχείᾳ γραμμῆς ἀδύνατόν ἐστι μέσον πεσεῖν
 πέρασ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη κατὰ στιγμῆς φερόμενον νοεῖν
 291 τὸ τέμνον. εἶτα κἂν συγχωρηθῇ μεταξύ δυοῖν
 στιγμῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ τεμνομένῃ γραμμῇ φερόμενον
 τὸ τέμνον τέμνει τὴν γραμμὴν, χεῖρόν τι ἀνα-
 δύσεται τοῖς γεωμέτραις. αἱ γὰρ συνθετικαὶ τῆς
 γραμμῆς στιγμαὶ ἤτοι οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς ὡς μὴ
 παραδέχεσθαι μεταξύ ἀλλήλων ἕξωθέν τινα στιγ-
 μῆν, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἢ ἕξ αὐτῶν σύνθετος συνεχῆς καὶ
 292 μία γραμμῆ. εἰ δ' οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς ὡς ἀν-
 επινόητον ἔχειν μεταξύ ἀλλήλων τόπον στιγμῆς, ἵνα
 τὸ τέμνον διχάζῃ τὴν γραμμὴν, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τὴν
 στιγμὴν δεῖ τὴν καθ' ἧς φέρεται νοεῖν διχαζομένην,
 ἢ τούτου ἀδυνάτου καθεστῶτος τὰς ὑποκειμένας
 στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς νοεῖν ὑπαναχωρούσας καὶ
 τόπον καὶ διάστασιν παρεχομένας, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ
 τὸδε τὸ μέρος συστελλομένων τοτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸδε, ὧν
 293 ἐκάτερόν ἐστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε γὰρ στιγμῆ, καθὼς
 προπαρεμυθησάμεθα, τέμνεσθαι δύναται τῷ ἀμερῆς
 ὑπάρχειν, οὔτε αἱ ἐν τῇ τεμνομένῃ γραμμῇ στιγμαὶ
 ὑπαναχωρεῖν πεφύκασιν· ἀκίνητοι γὰρ εἰσιν. τοῖνυν
 καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τινος ἀ-
 294 σωμαίου οὔτε ἐπιδέχεται τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν. κἂν ἐπὶ
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν δὲ γραμμῶν καὶ κύκλων, τουτέστι

nor the cut line for being cut, owing to its wholly
 lacking parts.—Moreover, it is not possible to say 290
 that what cuts the line cuts the line by falling between
 two points in the line that is being cut. For this is
 still more absurd than the foregoing. For, in the
 first place, it is impossible that an intermediate limit^a
 should be set within the continuity of a line, and one
 must necessarily conceive the thing which cuts as
 striking at a point. And, secondly, even if it be con- 291
 ceded that the sector cuts the line between two of
 the points in the line which is being cut, a worse result
 for the geometers will emerge. For the points which
 compose the line either are so continuous as not to
 admit of any point from outside coming between them,
 or else the line composed of them will not be a single
 and continuous line. But if they are so continuous 292
 that there is no conceivable space between them for
 a point, so as to enable the sector to bisect the line,
 then one or other of two results must follow—either
 we must conceive the point on which it strikes as
 being divided, or, if this is impossible, we must con-
 ceive the existing points of the line as receding and
 affording it space and an interval, by crowding to-
 gether now towards this side, and now towards that ;
 and each of these suppositions is absurd ; for, as we 293
 have pointed out above, the point cannot be cut,
 owing to its being without parts, nor are the points in
 the line that is being cut of such a nature as to recede,
 for they are immobile. So then, the incorporeal
 neither is subtracted from an incorporeal nor admits
 of subtraction.—And even if the geometers propose 294

^a i.e. a point (of the sector) which acts as a "limit" (or ends the line) in the middle of the line by breaking its continuity.

τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος βλεπομένων, θέλωσι στήσαντες τὸν λόγον οἱ γεωμέτραι διδάσκειν τί τινος ἀφαιρούμενον, οὐ δυνήσονται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης τῆς γραμμῆς ἢ ἀφ' ὅλου τοῦ κύκλου δύναται τις ἀφαιρέσις γενομένη νοεῖσθαι οὔτε ἀπὸ μέρους, ὡς μικρὸν ὑστερον προβάτος τοῦ λόγου διδάξομεν, ὅταν εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τεμνομένων σωμάτων ζήτησιν συγκαταβαίνωμεν.

- 295 Νῦν δὲ συντόμως δειχθέντος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς ἀσωμάτου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται, λείπεται λέγειν ἢ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεσθαι ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος ἢ σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου. ἀλλὰ σῶμα μὲν ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι αὐτό-
- 296 θενέστιν ἀδιανόητον, ἀσώματον δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· θιγεῖν γὰρ δεῖ τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου τὸ ἀφαιροῦν, ἀθιγὲς δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀδύνατον δέδεικται ἢ θίξις· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀσώματον σώματος χωρισθεῖ ποτ' ἂν. καὶ ἄλλως τὸ χωριζόμενόν τινος οἶονεῖ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ χωρίζεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τοῦ σώματος
- 297 οὐκ ἂν εἴη μέρος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σῶμα σώματος δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται, ἦτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνισου· ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται, ὡς διδάξομεν, οὔτε τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνισου, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
- 298 σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται. ἴσον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ ἴσου οὐκ ἂν ἀφαιρεθῆ, καθάπερ ἀπὸ πήχεως πήχους, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφαιρέσις
- 299 ἀλλὰ παντελῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσις. καὶ

* Cf. § 282.

• Cf. §§ 297 ff., 331 ff.

to show how one thing is subtracted from another by basing their argument on sensible lines and circles—that is, on those seen on the board,^a—they will not be able; for no subtraction can be conceived as taking place from the whole line or the whole circle, or from a part of them, as we shall show a little farther on in our exposition,^b when we come to deal with the investigation of bodies which are divided.

And now that it has been shown concisely that no 295 incorporeal can be subtracted from any incorporeal, it remains for us to say either that body is separated from body, or the incorporeal from body, or body from the incorporeal. But the subtraction of body 296 from the incorporeal is of itself inconceivable, and the separation of the incorporeal from body is a thing impossible; for what subtracts must touch what is subtracted, but the incorporeal is intangible and touch has been proved to be impossible^c; so that neither will the incorporeal ever be separated from body. And besides: what is separated from anything is, as it were, a part of that from which it is separated, but the incorporeal will not be a part of the body.—Nor, 297 again, can body be subtracted from body.^d For if body is subtracted from body, either the equal is subtracted from the equal, or the unequal from the unequal; but the equal cannot be subtracted from the equal, as we shall show, nor the unequal from the unequal, as we shall explain; therefore body is not subtracted from body. Now the equal will not be 298 subtracted from the equal,—the cubit, for instance, from the cubit,—since such a thing is not subtraction but the complete removal of the object. And besides 299

• Cf. §§ 258 ff.

^d With §§ 297-307 cf. P. H. iii. 85-88.

ἔτι ἦτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος τοῦ πήχεως ποιησόμεθα τὴν
 ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μένοντος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ
 μένοντος, διπλασιάσομεν τὸν πήχυν ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἐλαττώσομεν· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι πήχυς ὑποκείται ὁ
 πήχυς πήχεως ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος; εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ
 μὴ μένοντος, οὐδὲν ἀπολείπομεν τὸ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν
 ἐπιδεξόμενον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἀμήχανόν τι
 ἀφαιρεθῆναι. ὥστε <τὸ>¹ ἴσον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου οὐκ
 300 ἀφαιρείται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἄνισου. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἦτοι τὸ μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἥττονος ἀφαιρείται, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ παλαιστοῦ πήχυς,
 ἢ ἀπὸ μείζονος τὸ ἥττον, ὡς τὸ παλαιστικόν ἀπὸ
 301 τοῦ πηχναίου. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἥττονος οὐκ ἂν ἀφαιρεθῆι· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀφαιρούμενον περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἢ
 ἀφαιρέσει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἥττονι οὐ περιέχεται τὸ μείζον.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν πέντε
 ἀφαιρεῖν τὰ ἐξ (οὐ γὰρ ἐμπεριέχεται τοῖς πέντε τὰ
 ἐξ), οὕτως οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥττονος δυνατὸν ἔστιν
 ἀφαιρεῖν τὸ μείζον· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ ἥττονι
 τὸ μείζον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἀφαιρείται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥττονος
 302 τὸ μείζον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος
 τὸ ἥττον. ὡς γὰρ ἐλέγομεν, δεῖ τὸ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀφαιρούμενον ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἢ ἀφαιρέσει.
 οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ ἔλαττον ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ πλείονι·
 ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ πλείον ἐμ-
 περιέχεσθαι τῷ ἥττονι, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτο εἰδέναι.
 ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττον ἐμπερισχεθῆσεται τῷ μείζονι,
 303 οὕτως δ' οὐδ' ἀφαιρεθῆσεται. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι
 σώζεται τὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, σκοπῶμεν ἐπὶ τῶν

¹ <τὸ> addo.

we will make the subtraction from the cubit either
 while it remains or while it does not remain. And if
 we do so while it remains, we shall be doubling the
 cubit instead of diminishing it; for how will the cubit
 still be really a cubit after a cubit has been sub-
 tracted from it? And if (the subtraction be made)
 while it does not remain, we are leaving nothing
 behind to submit to the subtraction; for it is impos-
 sible for anything to be subtracted from non-existents.
 So that the equal is not subtracted from the equal.—
 Nor, again, is the unequal subtracted from the un- 300
 equal. For if so, either the greater is subtracted
 from the less, as a cubit from a palm; or the less from
 the greater, as that which is a palm in length from
 that which is a cubit in length. But the greater will 301
 not be subtracted from the less; for that which is
 subtracted from anything must be included in the
 thing from which the subtraction takes place, but the
 greater is not included in the less. And because of
 this, just as it is not possible to subtract six from five
 (for five does not include six), so too it is not possible
 to subtract the greater from the less; for the greater
 is not included in the less. So then, the greater is
 not subtracted from the less.—Nor, again, is the less 302
 subtracted from the greater. For, as we have said,
 that which is subtracted from anything must be
 included in that from which the subtraction takes
 place. But the less is not included in the more; for
 if so, it will follow that both the greater and the
 more are included in the less, and this was shown to
 be impossible. So that the less will not be included
 in the greater, and thus it will not be subtracted
 either. And that the rules of logical consistency are 303
 observed we may see from the examples given by

τιθεμένων τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς ὑποδειγμάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἕξ ἐμπεριέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, ἀνάγκη κὰν τοῖς πέντε περιέχεσθαι τὰ τέσσαρα ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, κὰν τοῖς τέσσαρσι τὰ τρία, κὰν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο, κὰν τοῖς δυσι τὸ ἕν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἕξ ἀριθμῷ περιέχεσθαι τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, 304 ἄπερ ἐστὶ πεντεκαίδεκα. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ἕξ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ λόγον ἐμπεριέχεται τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα κατ' ἀνάγκην τῷ πέντε περισχέθησεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, ἄπερ ἐστὶ δέκα. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχῆται τὰ δέκα, οὕτω κὰν τοῖς τέσσαρσι ἔσται τὰ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, τουτέστι τὰ ἕξ, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλα τρία, κὰν τοῖς 305 λειπομένοις δυσι τὸ ἕν. ταύτη συντιθεμένων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἕξ ἀριθμῶν, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ τοῦ δέκα καὶ τοῦ ἕξ καὶ τοῦ τρία, ἔτι καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἔσται ὁ ἕξ ἀριθμὸς περιεσχῆκώς τὸν τριάκοντα 306 πέντε ἀριθμὸν. τούτου τ' ἔτι συγχωρηθέντος ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἀριθμῶν περιληπτικός ἐσται ὁ ἕξ· πάλιν γὰρ ὁ τριάκοντα πέντε τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων ἀριθμῶν ἔσται περιληπτικός, ὅλον τοῦ τριάκοντα τέσσαρα, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ τριάκοντα τρία, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ τριάκοντα δύο, καὶ οὕτω καθ' ὑπόθεσιν 307 μέχρῃς ἀπείρου. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἵνα τί τινος ἀφαιρεθῆ, δεῖ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον τῷ ἕξ οὐ ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις, δέδεικται δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἡττονι τὸ μείζον περιεχόμενον οὔτε ἐν τῷ μείζονι τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἴσον (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ περιέχον μείζον εἶναι τοῦ περιεχομένου, τὸ δὲ τινι ἴσον οὔτε ἐλαττόν ἐστιν ἐκείνου οὔτε

the Doubters. Thus, if 5 is included in 6 as the less in the more, 4 also must necessarily be included in 5, as the less in the more, and 3 in 4, and 2 in 3, and 1 in 2; and because of this there are included in the number 6, 5 and 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 15. But if in 6, according to its own proper 304 definition, 15 is included, there will necessarily be contained in 5, 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 10. And just as 10 is included in 5, so also 3 and 2 and 1, which make 6, will inhere in 4; and, by analogy, 2 and 1, which make another 3, in 3; and in the 2 that is still left, 1. Thus when the contents of the 305 6 numbers are added together—I mean the 15 and 10 and 6 and 3, and also the 1, the number 6 will be found to include the number 35. And if this also 306 is granted, the 6 will be capable of including numbers that are infinite times infinite; for the 35, again, will be inclusive of the subordinate numbers, such as 34, and this of 33, and this of 32, and so downwards *ad infinitum*.—But if it is required, in order that 307 one thing may be subtracted from another, that the thing subtracted should be included in that from which the subtraction is made, and it has been proved that neither is the greater included in the less nor the less in the greater, nor yet the equal in the equal (for what includes must be greater than what is included, but what is equal to a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing to which it is equal), then

μείζον του ὧ ἴσον ἐστί), ῥητέον μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

- 308 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός, ἦτοι ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους· οὔτε δὲ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται οὔτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους οὔτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τελέως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπὸ πῆχους ἀφαιρεῖ πῆχυν, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ κοτύλης κοτύλην, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔσται τινός ἀφαιρέσεις ἀλλὰ ὀλοσχερῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσις.
- 310 ἀδιανόητον δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὅλον λέγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. τὸ γὰρ μέρος ἡττόν ἐστὶ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πλείον ἐστὶ τοῦ μέρους· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡττονος λέγειν τὸ πλεόν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἐν τῷ μέρει τὸ ὅλον, ἵνα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος. λείπεται οὖν τὸ πιθανώτερον εἶναι δοκοῦν, ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, ἐπὶ ἀριθμοῦ. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ δεκάς, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθω ἀπὸ ταύτης μονάς. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀφαιρουμένη μονάς ἦτοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκειμένης δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος δὲ οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος μονάς, ὧ ἐπεται τὸ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ

one must declare that nothing is subtracted from anything.

Moreover, if one thing is subtracted from another, 308 either it is a whole that is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a part from a whole, or a whole from a part^a; but neither is a whole subtracted from a whole, nor a part from a part, nor a whole from a part, nor a part from a whole, as we shall establish; 309 therefore one thing is not subtracted from another. Now that a whole should be subtracted from the whole is perfectly impossible; for no one subtracts a cubit from a cubit, nor a pint from a pint, since such an action will not be subtraction but the complete removal of the existing object. And it is also an 310 inconceivable assertion that the whole is subtracted from the part; for the part is less than the whole, and the whole is more than the part; and to say that the more is subtracted from the less is extremely incredible. For the whole did not exist in the part, so as to enable it to undergo subtraction therefrom, but rather the part in the whole.—We are left, then, with 311 what seems the more probable alternative, that either the part is subtracted from the whole or the part from the part. But this, too, is a thing not feasible. Let us consider the statement, as is the practice of the Sceptics, in the case of number. Thus, let a decad 312 be assumed, and from it let a monad be subtracted. Then this subtracted monad is subtracted either from the existing decad or from the nine which remains after the subtraction; but it is not subtracted either from the nine or from the decad, as we shall show; therefore the monad is not subtracted from the decad; and from this follows that nothing is subtracted from anything. For if the monad is sub- 313

^a With §§ 308-317 cf. P.H. iii. 88-93.

μονάς, ἤτοι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ δεκάς παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας, ἢ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρους μονάδων ἐστὶν ἢ δεκάς. ἀλλ' ἕτεραν μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν δεκάδα· καὶ γὰρ ἀναιρεθῆσιν αὐτῶν συναναίρεται καὶ ὑποκει-
 314 μένων πάρεστιν. εἰ δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἢ δεκάς, πάντως ἐὰν λέγωμεν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρῆσθαι τὴν μονάδα, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκάς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς μονάδας, ὁμολογήσομεν τὴν μονάδα ἀφ' ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρῆσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς
 315 διὰ τὸ σὺν ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα. ἀπὸ πάσης δὲ μονάδος ἀφαιρουμένης καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς τῆς μῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ ἢ τῆς μῆς μονάδος ἄριστος δεκάδος ἄριστος. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ τὴν τῆς μονάδος ἄρσιν δεκάδος λέγειν ἄρσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἀπὸ δεκάδος ἀξιοῦν ἀφαιρῆσθαι μονάδα. καὶ μὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν ταύτην ἀφαιρῆσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἡ μονάς, οὐκ ὤφειλε μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῆς ὀλόκληρος θεωρεῖσθαι ἢ ἐννεάς· τὸ γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρῆται, οὐ μένει ὀλόκληρον μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ γεγονυῖα τις ἀπ'
 316 αὐτοῦ ἀφαίρεσις. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἡ μονάς, ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος. οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ, μὴ ἑτέρας οὔσης παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας τῆς ἐννεάδος, ἢ μονάδος ἄριστος ἐννεάδος
 317 ἄριστος, ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἄμερης καὶ ἀδιαιρέτος ἐστὶν ἡ μονάς, ἔπειτα πῶς ὀλόκληρος ἀπολείπεται ἢ

tracted from the decad, either the decad is something other than the individual monads, or the decad is the sum total of the individual monads. But it is not likely that the decad is other than the individual monads; for it disappears when they disappear, and when they exist it too is present. And if 314 the decad consists of the monads themselves, if we say that the monad is subtracted from the decad, we shall certainly agree that the monad is subtracted from each monad, since the decad is nothing else than its monads; and also that it is subtracted from itself, because the decad is conceived as including this monad. But if the single monad 315 is subtracted from each monad and from itself, the removal of the single monad is the removal of the decad. But it is absurd to say that the removal of the monad is the removal of the decad. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the monad is subtracted from the decad.—Nor yet shall we say that the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine. For if the monad is subtracted from the nine, after its removal the nine ought not to be found complete; for that from which something is subtracted does not remain complete after the subtraction, since otherwise no subtraction will have been made from it. And 316 besides—if the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine, it is subtracted either from the whole nine or from its last monad. But it is not subtracted from the whole nine, since then—as the nine is nothing else than its individual monads—the removal of the monad is the removal of the nine, which is absurd; nor is it subtracted from the last monad since, firstly, 317 the monad is without parts and indivisible; and, further, how is the nine left complete and not

έννεάς, ἀλλ' οὐ <μειοῦται>¹ παρὰ μονάδα; εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται μονὰς μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης έννεάδος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον ἐπινοεῖσθαι, λεκτέον μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
 318 τῆς δεκάδος μονάδα. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται μονὰς, ἦτοι ἀπὸ μενούσης ἔτι τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται ἢ μονὰς ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης· οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης αἶρεται ποτε μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ μενούσης· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος μονὰς.
 319 ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν μενούσης τῆς δεκάδος αὐτόθεν φαίνεται μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ μονὰς· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ μένει δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπ' αὐτῆς. ἀπὸ δὲ μὴ μενούσης πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἄτοπον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεθῆναι τι δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται
 320 τι τινός. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐπι² τῶν μετρητῶν ἀφαιρέσεως, ὅλον τῆς ἀπὸ χοέως ἀφαιρουμένης κοτύλης ἢ τοῦ ἀπὸ πήχεως ἀφαιρουμένου παλαιστοῦ. ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὄλου τοῦ χοέως ῥητέον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ ἦτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος ἢ μὴ μένοντος· ἀπ' οὐδενός δὲ τούτων, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός.
 321 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ προστίθεται τι τινί, παρακειμένως διδάσκωμεν. ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν πηχυαίου σώματος καὶ προστιθεμένου τούτῳ παλαι-

¹ <μειοῦται> add. Rüstow.

² ἐπί Heintz: ἀπὸ mss., Bekk.

* The κοτύλη ("cup") was a liquid measure, about $\frac{1}{2}$ pint;

(diminished) by one? But if the one is taken neither from the ten nor from the remaining nine, and besides these no third possibility can be conceived, one must declare that the one is not subtracted from the ten.—Furthermore, if the one is taken from the ten, the one 318 is taken away either while the ten is still remaining or while it is not remaining; but the one is never taken away from it either while it remains or while it does not remain; but there is no other alternative besides existence or non-existence; therefore the one is not subtracted from the ten. Now that the one is not 319 subtracted from the ten whilst it remains is at once apparent; for in so far as the ten remains, nothing is subtracted from it. And that it should be subtracted from it whilst it does not remain is also absurd. For nothing can be subtracted from the non-existent. Therefore, one thing is not subtracted from another.—And the same argument applies also 320 to subtraction in the case of things measured,—for example, the subtraction of a cup from a gallon,^a or the subtraction of a palm from a cubit. For we must say that the subtraction is made either from the whole pint or from a part of it, and either whilst it remains or whilst it does not remain; but it is made from none of these, as we have shown; neither, then, in this way is one thing taken from another.

So then, it is quite evident from these arguments 321 that subtraction is nothing; and in the next place let us demonstrate that neither is one thing added to another.^b Let us suppose, then, a body of a cubit's length, and added to this one of a palm's length, so

the χοῦς ("gallon") was 12 κοτύλαι, about $\frac{1}{2}$ gallon. A "cubit" contained 6 "palms" of about 3 inches each.

^b With §§ 321-327 cf. P.H. iii. 94-96.

σταιίου ὥστε ἑπταπάλαιστον γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ
 ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς προσθέσεως ἀποτελεσθέν,
 ζητῶ [ἐν]¹ τίνι ποτὲ γέγονεν ἢ τοῦ παλαιστοῦ
 322 πρόσθεσις; ἥτοι γὰρ αὐτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαι-
 στήσ ἢ τῷ προὑποκειμένῳ πήχει ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφο-
 τέρων ἀποτελεσθέντι ἑπταπαλαιστῷ μεγέθει· οὔτε
 δὲ αὐτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαιστήσ οὔτε τῷ προὑπο-
 κειμένῳ πήχει οὔτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελε-
 σθέντι μεγέθει, φημί δὲ ἕκ τε τοῦ προὑποκειμένου
 πήχεως καὶ τῆς προσθέσεως· οὐκ ἄρα προστίθεται
 323 τι τινί. ἑαυτῷ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν προστεθείη ὁ
 παλαιστήσ· μὴ ἂν γὰρ ἕτερος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μὴ
 διπλασιάζων ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν, οὐκ ἂν
 ἑαυτῷ προστεθείη. εἰ δὲ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πήχει
 προστίθεται, πῶς παντὶ προστιθέμενος οὐ παρ-
 ισάζεται αὐτῷ καὶ δύο ποιεῖ πήχεις, ὥστε τὸ μὲν
 μείζον ἦττον γίνεσθαι τὸ δὲ ἦττον μείζον; εἰ
 γὰρ ἐξισοῦται τῇ προσθέσει ὁ παλαιστήσ τῷ
 πήχει καὶ ὁ πήχυς τῷ παλαιστῇ, ὁ μὲν πήχυς
 ἦττονι ἰσαζόμενος μείζων καθεστῶς ἦττων γενή-
 σεται, ὁ δὲ παλαιστήσ μικρὸς ἂν καὶ τῷ πήχει
 324 ἰσαζόμενος μείζων καταστήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴθ'
 ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαιστήσ μήτε τῷ προ-
 ὑποκειμένῳ πήχει, λείπεται λέγειν αὐτὸν τῷ ἐξ
 ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελουμένῳ ἑπταπαλαιστῷ μεγέθει
 προστίθεσθαι. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον· τὸ γὰρ
 πρόσθεσιν ἐπιδεχόμενον προὑποκεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς
 προσθέσεως, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ γνωόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν προ-
 ὑπόκειται αὐτῶν. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γινομένῳ ἕκ τε τῆς
 προσθέσεως καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προόντος προστίθεται τὸ
 325 προστιθέμενον. διαφέρει γε μὴν ἢ πρόσθεσις τοῦ
 γινομένου ἐξ αὐτῆσ, καὶ διαφωνεῖ τοῖσ χρόνοισ

that the body formed of the original body and the
 addition is of seven palms' length—to what, I ask, is
 the addition of the palm made? For the palm is 322
 added either to itself or to the originally existing
 cubit or to the magnitude of seven palms composed
 of both; but the palm is not added either to itself
 or to the original cubit or to the magnitude composed
 of both,—I mean, of both the pre-existing cubit and
 the addition. Therefore one thing is not added to
 another. Now the palm will not be added to itself; 323
 for as it is not other than itself, and does not double
 itself owing to the addition, it will not be added to
 itself. And if it is added to the original cubit, how
 is it that, when it is added to all of it, it does not equal
 it and make two cubits, so that the greater becomes
 less and the less greater? For if by the addition the
 palm is made equal to the cubit and the cubit to the
 palm, the cubit, which is the greater, by being made
 equal to the less will become less, whereas the palm,
 which is small, by being made equal to the cubit will
 come to be larger. But if the palm is not added to 324
 itself nor to the pre-existing cubit, it is only left to
 us to say that it is added to the magnitude of seven
 palms composed of both. But this, again, is most
 irrational; for that which receives the addition must
 be in existence before the addition, but that which
 comes into existence from them is not in existence
 before them. Therefore, what is added is not added
 to what comes into existence from both the addition
 and what previously existed. Moreover, the addition 325
 differs from that which results from it and does not

¹ [ἐν] secl. Heintz.

ἐκείνω· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ἡ πρόσθεσις, οὐπῶ
τὸ γινόμενον ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτε δὲ ἔστι τὸ
γεγονὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν, οὐκέτι ἔσται πρόσθεσις. ὥστε
οὐδὲ τῷ γινομένῳ ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τοῦ
προϋποκειμένου πῆχews προστίθεται ὁ παλαι-
στής. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ προστιθέμενον πάλιν οὔτε αὐτὸ
ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται οὔτε τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ οὔτε
τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν προστίθεται
τινι.

326 Ἐνεστί δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν
ἀπορίαν. ὑποκειμένης γὰρ τετράδος καὶ προσ-
τιθεμένης ταύτῃ μονάδος σκεπτέον τίη γίνεται
ἡ πρόσθεσις. ἢ γὰρ ἑαυτῇ προστίθεται ἡ μονὰς
ἢ τῇ τετράδι ἢ τῇ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελουμένη
πεντάδι. οὔτε δὲ ἑαυτῇ προστίθεται διὰ τὸ τὸ
μὲν προστιθέμενόν τι ἕτερον εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ
προστίθεται, τὴν δὲ μονάδα μὴ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑαυτῆς,
καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἑαυτὴν διπλασιάζειν, δυνάδα γινο-
327 μένην, οὔτε τῇ τετράδι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἰσάζεσθαι αὐτῇ
μηδὲ διπλασιάζειν αὐτὴν· τὸ γὰρ ὅλην τετράδι
προστιθέμενον, μὴ ἕτερα οὔση τῶν κατὰ μέρος
τεσσάρων μονάδων, τετράς ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς τετράδος ἀποτελουμένη πεν-
τάδι διὰ τὸ μὴ προϋποκείσθαι τῆς προσθέσεως τὴν
πεντάδα καὶ αἰεὶ ποτε ὀφείλει τὸ προστιθέμενον
προϋποκειμένῳ τινι προστίθεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα προσ-
τίθεται τι τινι.

328 Ἄλλ' εἰ μήτε ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός, ὡς ὑποδέδει-
κται, μήτε προστίθεται τι τινι, ὡς παρεμυθησάμεθα,
φανερὸν ὡς οὐδὲ μετατίθεται τι ἀπό τινος· ἦν γὰρ
329 ἡ μετάθεσις τοῦ μὲν ἀρσις τοῦ δὲ πρόσθεσις. μὴ
ὄντων δὲ τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχον ὀφείλει εἶναι
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coincide with it in time; for when the addition is
being made, what results from them is not as yet
existent, and when what has resulted from them
exists, the addition will exist no longer. So that the
palm is not added to what results from the addition
and the pre-existing cubit. But since, once more,
what is added is not added either to itself or to the
pre-existing object or to the sum of them both, it is
not added to anything at all.

With regard to numbers also it is possible to raise 326
the same difficulty. For if four be set down and one
be added to it, to what, we may inquire, is the addition
made? For the one is added either to itself, or to
the four, or to the five which is made up of the sum
of both. But it is not added to itself, because what
is added to anything is other than the thing whereto
it is added, but the one is not other than itself; and
also because it does not double itself by becoming two.
Nor is it added to the four, because of its not equalling 327
it or doubling it; for what is added to the whole four,
which does not differ from its four individual ones, is
a four. Nor, again, is it added to the five which is
made up of itself and the four, because the five is not
in existence before the addition, and what is added
must always be added to something which pre-exists.
Therefore, nothing is added to anything.

But if nothing is subtracted from anything, as has 328
been demonstrated, nor anything added to anything,
as we have shown, it is also evident that nothing is
transposed from anything^a; for transposition con-
sists in the subtraction of one thing and the addition
of another. And if these are non-existent, what is 329
affected must also be non-existent, inasmuch as

^a With §§ 328-329 cf. *P.H.* iii. 97.

εἴπερ ἦν κατὰ τινα τούτων τῶν τρόπων τὸ πάσχειν· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπινοήσῃε δυνάμενόν τι πάσχειν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρόπους.

- 330 Συνήπται δέ πως τῇ περὶ τούτου ἀπορία καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου ἐτι δὲ τοῦ μέρους ζήτησις, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ ἡ ἀφαίρεσις μέρους τινὸς ἀπὸ ὅλου δοκεῖ ἀφαίρεσις εἶναι καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις ὅλου πάλιν ὑπάρχει πρόσθεσις. ὅθεν εἰ δειχθεῖη ὅτι ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦ μέρους λόγος, ἐπιδειχθήσεται μᾶλλον τὰ περὶ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ ἀφαιρέσεως πάσχοντός τε καὶ δρώντος προηπορημένα. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐκ εὐχερές ἐστι λέγειν τί τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ καὶ τί τὸ μέρος, ἀκολούθως διδάσκωμεν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΛΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

- 331 Ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου σκέψις ἀναγκαία ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν φυσικοῖς, ἐπεὶ ἀτοπον καθέστηκε τούτους περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦ παντός ἐπαγγελλομένους τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐρεῖν μὴ εἰδέναι τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ τίνα τὰ μέρη, τοῖς δὲ σκεπτικοῖς πρὸς ἔλεγχον τῆς τῶν
332 δογματικῶν προπετείας. καὶ δὴ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι διαφέρουν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὅλον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον, πᾶν δὲ τὸ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ ἔξωθεν κενόν, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὸ μὲν ὅλον πεπερασμένον εἶναι, πεπερασταὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἀπειρον, τοιούτων γὰρ τὸ
333 ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου κενόν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ φύσιν ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν προσαγορεύειν εἴωθεν· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φησὶν ὅτι ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις σώματά ἐστι

¹ τὸ Mutsch.: τε MSS., Bekk.

affection occurs in some one of these ways.^a For no one could conceive of any affection possibly taking place otherwise than in one of these ways.

Connected with the difficulty concerning this 330 matter is that concerning the Whole, and also the problem of the Part, since subtraction seems to be the subtraction of a part from a whole, and addition, again, is the addition of a whole. Hence, if it should be proved that the account given of the whole and the part is doubtful, the difficulties previously raised regarding addition and subtraction, and the passive and the active, will be brought out still more clearly. And that it is not easy to define the whole and the part it will be our next task to demonstrate.

CONCERNING WHOLE AND PART

The investigation of the Whole is necessary for the 331 Physicists, since it is absurd that they, while professing to tell the truth about the Whole and the All, should not know how to define what the Whole is and what the parts are; and also for the Sceptics, as a means of convicting the Dogmatists of rashness. Now the philosophers of the Stoic school suppose that 332 "the Whole" differs from "the All"; for they say that the Whole is the Cosmos, whereas the All is the external void together with the Cosmos, and on this account the Whole is limited (for the Cosmos is limited) but the All unlimited (for the void outside the Cosmos is so). But Epicurus usually gives the 333 name of both Whole and All indifferently both to the nature of bodies and to that of void; for at one time he says that "the nature of the Whole of things

^a For further discussion of "affection," or "the passive," see §§ 267 ff., P.H. iii. 38.

καὶ κενόν, ὅτε δὲ ὅτι τὸ πᾶν κατ' ἀμφοτέρα
 ἀπειρόν ἐστι, κατὰ τε σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν, τουτ-
 ἐστι κατὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων καὶ κατὰ
 τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κενοῦ, ἀντιπαρηκουσῶν ἀλλήλαις
 334 τῶν καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀπειριῶν. οἱ δὲ φάμενοι μὴδ'
 ὅλως εἶναι κενόν, ὡς οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου, τὸ ὅλον
 καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν σωμάτων μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦ
 335 κενοῦ ἐπικατηγοροῦσιν. γέγονε δὲ τις διά-
 στασις βραχεῖα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέρους. Ἐπίκουρος
 μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἡξίου τυγχάνειν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου,
 καθάπερ τὴν ἄτομον τοῦ συγκρίματος, εἶγε ἐκείνη
 μὲν ἄποιός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σύγκριμα πεποιώται, ἥτοι
 336 λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ κοινῶς κεχρωσμένον καὶ ἥτοι
 θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ἄλλην τιὰ ἔχον ποιότητα. οἱ
 δὲ στωικοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ
 αὐτὸ φασιν ὑπάρχειν· ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ
 ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε
 337 ἕτερα παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, σὺν αὐτῇ γὰρ ὁ ἄν-
 ῥωπος νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος. ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος κατὰ
 Ἡράκλειτον καὶ ἕτερόν φησι τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου
 καὶ ταῦτόν· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ὅλη ἐστὶ καὶ μέρος,
 ὅλη μὲν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, μέρος δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦδε
 τοῦ ζώου φύσιν. τὸ δὲ μόριον καὶ αὐτὸ λέγεται
 διχῶς, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ὡς διαφέρον τοῦ ἰδίως νοου-
 μένου μέρους, καθά φασιν αὐτὸ μέρος μέρους εἶναι,
 καθάπερ δάκτυλον μὲν τῆς χειρὸς οὐς δὲ τῆς κεφα-
 λῆς, ὅτε δ' ὡς μὴ διαφέρον ἀλλὰ μέρος ὄν τοῦ ὅλου,
 καθὼς τινὲς φασὶ κοινῶς μόριον εἶναι τὸ συμπληρω-
 338 τικὸν τοῦ ὅλου. προδιηρθρωμένων δὲ τούτων [καὶ
 τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ τὴν τῶν μερῶν συμπλήρωσιν νοου-
 μένου],¹ χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν.

¹ [καὶ . . . νοουμένου] secl. Heintz.

is bodies and void," and at another time that "the All is unlimited in both respects, in respect of both bodies and void,—that is, both in respect of the number of the bodies and in respect of the extent of the void, the infinity of the one matching that of the other." And those who totally deny the existence 334 of void, such as the Peripatetics, predicate Whole and All only of the bodies and not of the void.—There 335 exists also some small dispute about the Part. For Epicurus maintained that the part is other than the Whole, as the atom is other than the compound, since the former is devoid of quality whereas the compound has qualities, being either white or black or, generally, coloured, and either hot or cold or possessed of some other quality. But the Stoics assert that the part is 336 neither other than the Whole nor the same; for the hand is neither the same as the man (for it is not a man) nor other than the man (for it is included in the conception of the man as man). And Aenesidemus, 337 "according to Heraclitus,"^a says that the part is both other than the whole and the same; for substance is both whole and part, whole in the Universe, but part in the nature of this particular animal. And "particle" itself is used in two senses, at one time as different from the separately conceived part—in which sense they speak of it as a part of a part, as the finger of the hand and the ear of the head—and at another time as not different, but as being a part of the whole, in which sense some say generally that "a particle is that which helps to fill up the whole." And 338 now that these distinctions have been drawn [and the whole conceived as a result of the filling up by the parts], let us next proceed to our investigation.

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 210; *Introd.* Vol. I. pp. xxxviii f.

Εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι τι ὅλον, οἷον ἀνθρώπος ἵππος
φυτὸν ναῦς (ταῦτα γὰρ ὀλων ὀνόματα), ἥτοι ἕτερόν
ἔστι τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν
καὶ οὐσίαν νοεῖται, ἢ τὸ ἀθροισμα τῶν μερῶν
339 λέγεται τυγχάνειν ὀλον. ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν τῶν
μερῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὅλον, οὔτε κατ' ἐνάργειαν
οὔτε κατὰ νόησιν. καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν μὲν, ἐπεὶ
εἴπερ ἕτερον ἦν καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν μερῶν τὸ
ὅλον, ἐχρῆν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν ὑπομένον
θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀπέχει τοῦ
πάντων τῶν μερῶν ἀναιρουμένων, οἷον τοῦ ἀν-
δριάντος, μένειν τὸ ὅλον, ὡς κὰν ἐν μόνον μέρος
ἀναιρεθῆ, μηκέτι θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον ὑποκείμενον
340 ὡς ὅλον. κατὰ δὲ νόησιν, ὅτι ὅλον νοεῖται οὐ
οὐδὲν ἄπεστι μέρος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ ἕτερόν ἔστι
τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον, πάντ' ἔσται ἀπόντα τὰ μέρη
τοῦ ὀλου, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτι ἔσται τὸ ὅλον.
ἄλλως τε τὸ ὅλον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς
τὰ μέρη νοεῖται ὅλον, καὶ ὅν τρόπον τὸ μέρος τινὸς
ἔστι μέρος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἕκ τινων μερῶν
ἔστιν ὅλον. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις
δεῖ καὶ ἀχώριστα τυγχάνειν ἀλλήλων. οὐκ ἄρα
ἕτερόν ἔστι τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον, οὐδὲ κεχώριστα
341 αὐτῶν. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν τὰ μέρη εἶναι τὸ
ὅλον. ἀλλ' εἰ τὰ μέρη ἔστιν ὅλον, ἥτοι πάντα τὰ
μέρη ἔστιν ὅλον ἢ τινὰ τῶν μερῶν ἢ τὶ τούτων.
καὶ τὶ μὲν τῶν μερῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὅλον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε
ἢ κεφαλὴ τάνθρώπου ὅλος ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος, οὐδὲ
342 ὁ τράχηλος ἢ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ
μὴν οὐδὲ τινὰ τῶν μερῶν ἔσται τὸ ὅλον. πρῶτον
μὲν γὰρ εἴ τινα τῶν μερῶν ὅλον ἐστί, τὰ λειπόμενα

* With §§ 338-349 cf. P.H. iii. 98-101.

If, then, there exists any whole,—such as man, horse, plant, ship (for these are names of wholes),—either it is other than its parts and is conceived according to its own separate reality and substance, or the sum of the parts is said to be the whole.^a But 339 the whole will not be other than its parts, either in its sensible appearance or in its conception. Not in appearance, since, if the whole were other than its parts and separate, when the parts are removed the whole ought to be found still remaining; but so far is it from true that when all the parts (say, of a statue) are removed the whole remains that even when but one part only is removed the whole is no longer found to subsist as a whole. Nor yet in its 340 conception, because the whole is conceived as that from which no part is missing. And because of this, if the whole is other than its parts, all the parts will be missing from the whole, and thus the whole will no longer exist.—And again,—the whole is a relative thing, for it is in relation to its parts that it is conceived as a whole, and just as the part is a part of something, so also the whole is a whole made up of certain parts. But relatives must co-exist with each other and be inseparable from each other. The whole, therefore, is not other than its parts nor separate therefrom.—It only remains for us, then, to say that 341 the parts are the whole. But if the parts are the whole, either all the parts are the whole, or a certain number of the parts, or some one of them. Now some one of the parts will not be the whole; for, assuredly, the head of the man is not the whole man, nor yet his neck or his hand or any other such member. Nor, 342 again, will the whole be a certain number of the parts. For, firstly, if certain of the parts are the

οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου μέρος, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα καὶ περιτραπήσεται ἢ νόησις τοῦ ὅλου. εἰ γὰρ τινα τῶν μερῶν ὅλον ἐστί, ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ὅτι ὅλον ἐστὶν οὐ μὴδὲν ἄπεισι τῶν μερῶν· τινα γὰρ ἄπεισι.

343 ὥστε οὔτε τι μέρος ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε τινα μέρος. εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν μερῶν, οὔτε ἔσται ὅλον οὔτε τὰ μέρη γενήσεται μέρος. ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ διάστημα παρὰ τὰ διεστηκότα, οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰς πῶς διακειμένας δοκούς, οὐδὲ πυγμὴ παρὰ τὴν πῶς ἐσχηματισμένην χεῖρα, οὕτως <εἰ>¹ οὐδὲν ἔσται ὅλον παρὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν μερῶν,

344 οὐδὲ τὰ μέρη γενήσεται μέρος. καὶ πάλιν, ὃν τρόπον δεξιῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀριστερὸν ἔστι καὶ τοῦ ἄνω μὴ νοουμένου οὐδὲ τὸ κάτω νοεῖται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὅλον, οὔτε τὰ μέρη νοεῖται

345 μέρη οὔτε μέρη τινα ὑπάρξει. ἔστω δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη ὅλον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ζητητέον τε τίνος ἔσται ταῦτα συμπληρωτικά, ὅλου <ἢ>³ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτῶν; οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου ἐστὶ μέρη οὔτε ἀλλήλων οὔτε ἑαυτῶν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τινός ἐστὶ μέρος. ὅλου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἶη μέρος· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα

346 λέγεται εἶναι ὅλον. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλήλων γενήσεται μέρος. τὰ γὰρ τινος μέρη ἐμπεριέχεται τοῖς ὧν ἐστὶ μέρος, ὅλον ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἢ χεῖρ χειρὶ δὲ ὁ δάκτυλος, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφέστηκε καὶ οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται ἀλλήλοις· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἀριστερὰ χεῖρ τὴν δεξιὰν συμπληροῦ οὔτε ἡ δεξιὰ

¹ <εἰ> add. N, Mutsch.

³ οὐδὲ Mutsch.: οὔτε MSS. (οὔτε . . . μέρος om. Bekk.).
² <ἢ> addo.

whole, the rest will not be parts of the whole, which is absurd. And, secondly, the conception of the whole will be overthrown. For if certain of the parts are the whole, it is false to say that the whole is that from which none of the parts are missing; for some are missing. So that neither some one part nor certain of the parts are the whole. And if all the 343 parts are the whole, and the whole is nothing else than the sum of the parts, neither will it be a whole nor will the parts be parts. For just as separation is nothing apart from the things separated, or rafting apart from the rafters arranged in a certain way, or the fist apart from the hand held in a certain position, so too if the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, the parts will not be parts. And again, 344 just as, when "right" does not exist, "left" also is non-existent, and when "above" is not conceived neither is "below" conceived, in the same way, if the whole does not exist, the parts are not conceived nor will any parts exist.—But let it be granted that 345 all the parts are the whole, still we must inquire what it is that these are to complete—is it the whole, or one another, or themselves? But they are not parts either of the whole or of one another or of themselves, as we shall establish; therefore, they are not parts of anything. Now they will not be parts of the whole; for the whole is nothing more than the parts, and they themselves are said to be the whole. Nor yet will they 346 be parts of one another. For the parts of anything are included in the things whereof they are parts,—as, for instance, the hand in the man and the finger in the hand,—but the parts of the man subsist separately and are not included in one another; for the left hand does not complete the right, nor the right the left, nor

τὴν ἀριστεράν, οὐχ ὁ ἀντίχειρ τὸν λιγανόν, οὐχ αἱ
 χεῖρες τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἀλλ' ἴδιον τόπον ἕκαστον τοῦ-
 347 τῶν ἀπέληφεν. οὐδὲ ἀλλήλων οὖν μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ
 μέρη. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἑαυτῶν· ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ
 τι μέρος ὑπάρχει. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερόν ἐστι τῶν
 μερῶν τὸ ὅλον μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη ἐστὶν ὅλον,
 348 οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον. καὶ πάλιν τὸ μέρος, οἷον
 ἡ κεφαλὴ, λέγεται τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον συμπληροῦν
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέρος εἶναι· θεωρεῖται δέ γε ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος σὺν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἑαυτὴν
 ἄρα συμπληροῖ ἡ κεφαλὴ, καὶ ἑαυτῆς γίνεται
 μέρος. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μείζων ἐστὶν ἑαυτῆς καὶ
 ἐλάσσων· ἢ μὲν γὰρ συμπεπληρωμένη νοεῖται ὑφ'
 ἑαυτῆς, μείζων ἐστὶν αὐτῆς, ἢ δὲ συμπληροῦσα,
 349 ἐλάττων. ἡ δὲ αὐτῆ ἀπορία καὶ ἐπὶ φυτοῦ καὶ
 ἐπὶ πῆχεως καὶ κοινῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὧν
 ἐπικατηγορεῖται τὸ ὅλον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ παλαιστής
 μέρος πῆχεως νοεῖται (σὺν γὰρ τῷ παλαιστῇ καὶ ὁ
 πῆχυς νοεῖται πῆχυς), καὶ ἑαυτοῦ συμπληρωτικός
 ἐστὶν ὁ παλαιστής καὶ μέρος ἑαυτοῦ. ὅπερ ἄτοπον
 καὶ σχεδὸν παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας.
 350 Ἄπεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία καὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν.
 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου στίχου,

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,

ζητητέον τὸ μῆνιν καὶ τὸ ἄειδε καὶ τὸ θεὰ καὶ τὸ
 Πηληϊάδεω καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ Ἀχιλῆος, τίνος
 ἐστὶ μέρος. ἦτοι γὰρ ὅλος ὁ στίχος ἄλλο τί ἐστὶ
 τῶν μερῶν τούτων, ἢ τὸ ἄθροισμα αὐτῶν ὁ στίχος
 ἐστίν. καὶ ἐπακτέον τὰς κειμένας ἀπορίας. τὸ
 μῆνιν εἰ μὲν τοῦ ὅλου στίχου μέρος ἐστί, καὶ

the thumb the forefinger, nor the hands the head, but
 each of these has its own separate place. So then the 347
 parts are not parts of one another. Nor yet of them-
 selves; for it is impossible for anything to be a part
 of itself. If, then, the whole is not other than the
 parts, and the parts themselves are not the whole,
 the whole is nothing.—And again, the part (such as 348
 the head) is said to complete the whole man and be a
 part of the man: and the man is certainly viewed as
 a man with head included; and therefore the head
 completes itself and is a part of itself. And because
 of this it is both greater and less than itself; for in
 so far as it is conceived as completed by itself it is
 greater than itself, but in so far as it completes, less.
 And there is the same difficulty in the case of the 349
 plant and the cubit and, in general, of all the other
 things of which the term "whole" is predicated; for
 since the palm^a is conceived as part of the cubit (for
 it is with the inclusion of the palm that the cubit is
 conceived as a cubit), the palm both serves to com-
 plete itself and is a part of itself. But this is absurd
 and contrary, one may say, to our common notions.

This difficulty applies also to the parts of speech. 350
 For in a line like this—

Sing, O goddess, the wrath of the son of Peleus, Achilles,^b—
 one must inquire about the words "wrath" and
 "sing" and "goddess" and "son of Peleus" and
 also "Achilles," of what are they parts? For either
 the whole line is something other than these parts, or
 the sum of them is the line. But here one must bring
 up the difficulties already stated. If the word
 "wrath" is a part of the whole line, it will also be

^a Cf. § 321.

^b Homer, *Il.* i. 1.

351 *ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται μέρος· σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐνοεῖτο καὶ ὅλος ὁ στίχος· εἰ δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ τοῦ “ᾄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,” πῶς οὐ μείζων ἀνακῦψει ἀπορία; τὸ γὰρ τινος μέρος ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ οὐ ἐστὶ μέρος, τὸ δὲ μῆνιν οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ “ᾄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος”· οὐκ ἄρα μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ μῆνιν τοῦ ὅλου στίχου.*

352 *Τοιούτων δὲ ἠπορημένων κατὰ τὸν τόπον εἰώθασιν οἱ δογματικοί, μικρὰν ἀναπνοὴν πορίζοντες αὐτοῖς, λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ αἰσθητὸν οὔτε ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε μέρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐσμεν οἱ ἐκείνου τό τε ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐπι-*

353 *κατηγοροῦντες. ἦν γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τῶν πρὸς τι· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς τὰ μέρη ἐνοεῖτο τὸ ὅλον. καὶ πάλιν τὰ μέρη τῶν πρὸς τι· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον νοεῖται τὰ μέρη. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι ἐν συμμημονεύσει ἐστὶν ἡμετέρα, ἢ δὲ ἡμετέρα συμμημονεύσεις ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν· τὸ οὖν ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν. τὸ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον αἰσθητὸν οὔτε ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε μέρος, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἡμεῖς ἐπικατηγοροῦμεν*

354 *τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν συμμημόνευσιν. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν τράχηλον ἢ τὴν κεφαλὴν μὴ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπου συμπληρωτικὰ εἶναι μέρη ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας συμμημονεύσεως. εἰ δὲ ἡ κεφαλὴ καὶ ὁ τράχηλος συμπληρωτικὰ ἐστί τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὁ τράχηλος ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν, δεήσει τὸν ἀνθρώπον εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. ὅπερ ἀτοπὸν. οὐ τοῖνυν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ συμμη-*

355 *μονεύσει τό τε ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη κεῖται. ναί, φήσει τις, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὅλος ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν κατὰ συμμημόνευσιν, συμπληροῦται δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς τραχήλου καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς κεφαλῆς, ἀλλὰ*

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a part of itself; for the whole line was conceived as including it; and if it is a part of the rest of the line 351 (“Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”), surely a greater difficulty will emerge. For the part of anything is included in that of which it is a part, but “the wrath” is not included in “Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”; therefore “the wrath” is not a part of the whole line.

Such being the difficulties raised about this topic, 352 the Dogmatists—by way of providing themselves with a little breathing-space—are accustomed to argue that the external real and sensible object is neither whole nor part, but it is we who apply to it the terms “whole” and “part.” For “whole” is a 353 relative term, since a whole is conceived in relation to its parts. And again, “parts” are relative, for the parts are conceived in relation to the whole. And relatives are in our consciousness,^a and our consciousness is in us; so the whole and the part are in us. And the external real and sensible object is neither a whole nor a part but a thing of which we predicate our own consciousness. In reply to them one must 354 say, firstly, that it is absurd to argue that the neck and the head are not complementary parts of the external man but of our consciousness. But if the head and the neck are complements of the man and the neck is in us, the man will have to be in us. Which is absurd. So then, the whole and the parts do not reside in our consciousness.—Yes, someone will say, 355 but the whole man is in us, through consciousness, and has its complement not in the external neck and

^a Literally, “concurrent recollection.”

- πάλην ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη ἐννοῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ ὅλος ἄνθρωπος ἐννόημά ἐστιν ἡμῶν.
 356 ὁ δὲ τοῦτο λέγων οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τὴν ἀπορίαν. πάλην γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, εἴτε ἐννόημά ἐστιν εἴτε καὶ ἡμετέρα συμμηνημόνευσις, ἥτοι ἕτερος νοεῖται παρὰ τὰ μέρη ἢ τὰ μέρη νοεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων δύναται ὑπάρχειν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν. καὶ αὐτὴ οὖν ἡ νόησις
 357 ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν πέπτωκεν ἀπορίαν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι ὅλον. ὧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ μέρος ὑπάρχειν· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐκάτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν πρὸς τι ἀναιρεθέντος συναναίρεται καὶ τὸ λοιπόν.
 358 Ὡδε μὲν περὶ τούτων ἠπορήσθω· συνεζητηκότες δὲ ἀπτόρως ἤδη τοῖς δογματικοῖς περὶ τῶν δραστηρίων τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχῶν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο κοινότερον περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διαπορώμεν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ

- 359 Περὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἀρχικωτάτων στοιχείων δύο μὲν αἱ πρῶται γεγόνασι στάσεις, πλείους δὲ κατ' εἶδος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώματα ἔλεξαν εἶναι τὰ
 360 τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματα. καὶ τῶν σώματα φαμένων Φερεκύδης μὲν ὁ Σύριος γῆν ἔλεξε πάντων εἶναι ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχείον, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστής τούτου τὸ ἀπειρον, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Ἰδαῖος ὁ Ἱμεραῖος καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, Σωκράτους δὲ καθηγητῆς, καὶ κατ' ἐπίου Ἡράκλειτος ἀέρα, Ἴππασος δὲ ὁ

* With §§ 359-364 cf. *P.H.* iii. 30-32.

the external head but, once more, in the conceptions which correspond to these parts. For in fact the whole man is itself a concept of ours. But he who 356 argues thus does not escape from the difficulty. For, once again, either this man who is within us, whether he be a concept or our consciousness, is conceived as other than his parts, or else the man is conceived as his parts. But neither of these can be true, as we have established. Thus, too, the very conception itself is overthrown by the same difficulty. And if so, 357 we must declare that no whole exists. From which it follows that no part, either, exists. For each of these is a relative, and when one of a pair of relatives is abolished, the other also is abolished with it.

Let this, then, stand as the statement of our doubts 358 about these matters; and as we have now disputed sufficiently with the Dogmatists regarding the efficient principles of the Universe, let us now state in more general terms the difficulties regarding both these and the material principles.

CONCERNING BODY

Concerning the primary and most fundamental 359 elements there are two leading views, with several sub-divisions; for some have affirmed that the elements of existing things are bodies, others that they are incorporeal.^a And of those who have de- 360 clared them to be bodies, Pherecydes of Syros said that the principle and element of all things is earth; and Thales of Miletus, water; and his disciple, Anaximander, the unlimited; and Anaximenes and Idaeus of Himeria and Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens (Socrates' teacher) and (according to some) Heraclitus, air; and Hippasus of Meta-

361 *Μεταποντίνος καὶ κατ' ἐνίου Ἡράκλειτος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν*

(πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα),

**Ἴππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγίνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χίος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν*

362 *Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ*

(τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἦδ' Ἄιδωνεὺς Νῆστις θ', ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνομα βρό-
τειον),

363 *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μὴ τι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην θετέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ στωικὸς Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μώχου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἀσκληπιᾶδης δὲ ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους.*

364 *τῶν δὲ ἀσώματα δογματιζόντων οἱ μὲν περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔλεξαν πάντων ἀρχεῖν, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωματίων, οἱ*

365 *δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας. τοιαύτης δὲ οὐσης τῆς κατὰ γένος καὶ κατ' εἶδος τῶν φυσικῶν διαστάσεως, ἐνέσται πρὸς πάντας κοινῶς ἀντερεῖν, ἐν μέρει περὶ τε τῶν σωματίων καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων διαπορήσαντας· ὧδε γὰρ ἕκαστος τῶν κατηγορη-*

* Zeus probably stands for the element "air," Herē for

pointum and (according to some) Heracleitus, fire; 361 and Xenophanes, water and earth—

(Verily all we men are sprung from earth and from water); and Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; and Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; and Onomacritus in his *Orphica*, fire and water and earth; and Empedocles and the 362 Stoics, earth and water and air and fire—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their titles:

Shining Zeus, and Herē the life-bringer, and Aidoneus,* Nestis, too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals;—

and Democritus and Epicurus, atoms, unless one 363 should regard this opinion as more ancient and— as the Stoic Poseidonius asserted—derived from a certain Phoenician called Mochus; and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homoeomeries^b; and Diodorus, sur-named Cronos, minimal and indivisible bodies; and Asclepiades the Bithynian, homogeneous molecules. And of those who have dogmatically asserted that 364 they are incorporeal, the Pythagoreans have said that the numbers are the principles of all things; and the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; and Plato, the ideas.—Such, then, being the divergence of opinion, 365 both in general and in particular, amongst the Physicists, it will be possible to give one general answer to them all when we have discussed in turn the difficulties about bodies and those about incorporeals^c; for in this way each of the persons

"earth," Aidoneus for "fire"; Nestis certainly for "water." "The fountain" (or physical source) is the semen.

^b i.e. "things with like parts"—Aristotle's name for the material "elements" of Anaxagoras.

^c "Bodies" are discussed in §§ 366 ff., "incorporeals" in *Adv. Phys.* ii. With § 365 cf. *P.H.* iii. 37.

μημένων σωματικὰς μὲν ἀπολείπων τὰς πάντων ἀρχὰς ταῖς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κομιζομέναις ἀπορίας ὑποπεσεῖται, ἀσωμάτους δὲ δογματίζων
366 ταῖς κατὰ τῶν ἀσωμάτων. ἡγήσθω δὲ ὁ περὶ τοῦ σώματος λόγος, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς σκέψεως λαμβάνων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας.

Εὐθέως τοίνυν κατὰ μὲν τοὺς σώμα νοούντας τὸ οἶόν τε παθεῖν ἢ διαθεῖναι, ὧν ἀρχηγὸς ἱστορεῖται Πυθαγόρας, ἤδη σχεδὸν ἀνηγήκαμεν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ δεόμεθα πρὸς τοῦτο καινοτέρων λόγων· εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ οἶόν τε παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον δέδεικται ἡμῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη τὸ
367 ἐπινοούμενον σῶμα. κατὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐννοίας νῦν συνακτέον¹ τὸ προκείμενον. φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος βάθος πλάτος, ὧν μῆκος μὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἄνωθεν κάτω, πλάτος δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ, τρίτην δὲ διάστασιν ὑπάρχειν, τουτέστι τὸ βάθος, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰς τοῦπίσω. ὅθεν καὶ παρατάσεις εἶναι ἕξ, δύο καθ' ἐκάστην διάστασιν, ἄνω κάτω,
368 δεξιὰ ἀριστερά, πρόσω ὀπίσω. ταῦτη μὲν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ πολὺ τι πληθὸς ἀποριῶν ἐξακολουθεῖν φαίνεται. ἦτοι γὰρ χωριστὸν ἐστὶ τούτων τῶν τριῶν διαστάσεων τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὴν ἐπινοίαν, ὥστε ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι σῶμα ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τοῦ σώματος, ἢ ἄθροισμα τούτων
369 τῶν διαστάσεων ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ χωριζόμενον μὲν τούτων τῶν διαστάσεων τὸ σῶμα οὐκ

¹ συνακτέον cj. Mutsch.: συντακτέον mss., Bekk.

• Cf. P.H. iii. 38.

enumerated who admits that the principles of all things are corporeal will be brought face to face with the difficulties raised about body, and every one who asserts their incorporeality with those raised about incorporeals. And let our discussion of body come
366 first, commencing with an examination of the conception of "body."

To begin with, then, as against those who conceive body^a as "what is capable of being acted upon or of affecting" (and of these it is recorded that Pythagoras was the leader), we have already pretty well abolished body and do not need for this purpose other fresh arguments; for if body is what is capable of being acted upon or acting, since we have proved^b that there is nothing which acts or is acted upon, the body as so conceived will be nothing. But the subject before us must now be treated
367 systematically with reference to the conceptions of the Mathematicians.^c They say that body is "that which has three dimensions, length, depth, breadth"; and of these, length is extent from above to below, breadth from left to right, and the third dimension (namely, depth) is from front to back. Hence, there are six modes of extension, two for each dimension,—up and down, to right and to left, forward and backward. From this conception a vast number of diffi-
368 culties seem to follow. For either body, in respect of its conception, is separate from these three dimensions, so that the body is one thing and the length and depth and breadth of the body something different, or else the body is the sum of these dimensions. But it is not possible to conceive the body as
369

^a Cf. §§ 195 ff., 266 ff.

^b With §§ 367-370 cf. P.H. iii. 39-40.

ἔνεστω ἐπινοεῖν· ὅπου γὰρ μήτε μήκός ἐστι μήτε
 πλάτος μήτε βάθος, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σῶμα νοεῖν οἷόν τε
 ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων σῶμα καθέστη-
 κεν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀσώματόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐξ
 ἀσωμάτων συγκείμενον πάντως ἐστίν ἀσώματον,
 δεήσει καὶ τὴν κοινήν αὐτῶν σύνοδον μὴ σῶμα
 370 ἀλλ' ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν· ὡς γὰρ ἡ συνέλευσις τῶν
 γραμμῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσῶν καὶ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν
 στιγμῶν οὐδέποτε πέφυκε στερεὸν ποιεῖν σῶμα
 καὶ ἀντίτυπον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τοῦ
 βάθους καὶ τοῦ πλάτους σύνοδος, ἀσωμάτων οὐσα
 σύνοδος, οὐκ ἀποτελεῖ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε τούτων
 χωρὶς ἐστὶ τι σῶμα μήτε ταῦτά ἐστι σῶμα, οὐδέν
 371 ἐστὶ σῶμα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ σύνοδος
 τοῦ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους ποιεῖ σῶμα,
 ἦτοι πρὶν τῆς συνόδου τούτων ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ
 περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα καὶ τοὺς ὡσπερ λόγους
 τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μετὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
 συνέβη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον πρὶν τῆς
 συνόδου περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα, ἔσται ἕκαστον
 372 σῶμα· ἐστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ μήκος μόνον ἐστίν
 οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος καὶ βάθος
 καὶ πλάτος, ἕκαστον τούτων ἔχον τὴν σωμα-
 τότητα τρία γενήσεται, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μήκος οὐ
 μόνον μήκος ἔσται ἀλλὰ καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος,
 καὶ τὸ πλάτος οὐχ ἀπλῶς πλάτος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος
 καὶ βάθος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ λειπομένη διάστασις.
 373 εἰ δὲ συνελθόντων τούτων τότε ἐπισυνέβη τὸ σῶμα,
 ἦτοι συνελθόντων αὐτῶν μένει ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις ἢ
 μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν σωματότητα. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει
 ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις, ἐπεὶ ἀσώματά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματα

separate from these dimensions ; for where there is
 neither length nor breadth nor depth, there it is not
 possible to conceive body. And if the sum of these
 is body, since each of them is incorporeal and what is
 compounded of incorporeals is certainly incorporeal,
 the combination of all these together will have to be,
 not body but, incorporeal. For just as the conjunc- 370
 tion of lines, which are incorporeal, and the sum of
 points are never of a nature to make a solid and
 resistant body, so also the combination of length,
 depth, and breadth, being a combination of incor-
 poreals, will not produce a body. But if there is no
 body apart from these, and these, too, are not body,
 nothing is body.—And again, since the combination 371
 of length and breadth and depth makes body, either
 each of these separately, before combining, con-
 tained corporeality and the rational germs,^a as it were,
 of body, or body supervened after their conjunction.
 And if each of them, before combining, contained 372
 corporeality, each will be a body ; and further, since
 body is not length only, nor breadth, nor depth, but
 length and depth and breadth, each of these as
 possessing corporeality will become three, and thus
 length will not only be length but also breadth and
 depth, and depth not simply breadth but also length
 and breadth, and so likewise with the remaining
 dimension. And if it is after these are conjoined 373
 that body supervenes, either their original nature
 remains after their conjunction or it changes to cor-
 poreality. And if their original nature remains,
 since they are incorporeal and remain incorporeal,

^a Or "seminal reasons," i.e. the creative principles derived
 from the Cosmic Reason ("Logos") according to Stoic
 doctrine; cf. *Introduct.* Vol. I. p. xxiv.

374 μένει, οὐ ποιήσει διάφορον σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ σῶμα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον μεταβολὴν ἔστι σῶμα, ἕκαστον τούτων καὶ πρὶν τῆς συνελύσεως σῶμα ὄν, πρὶν σώματος ἀποτελέσει σῶμα. ὡσπερ τε τὸ μεταβάλλον σῶμα ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης παραδέχεται ποιότητα, μένει δὲ σῶμα, ὅλον τὸ λευκόν, ἵνα γένηται μέλαν, καὶ τὸ γλυκύ, ἵνα γένηται πικρόν, ἣν μὲν ἀποβάλλει ποιότητα ἣν δὲ ἀναδέχεται, μὴ ἐκβαῖνον τοῦ σῶμα εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μεταβάλλει εἰς σῶμα, ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης δέξεται ποιότητα· τοῦτο δὲ πάσχιοντα ἔσται σῶματα. εἰ οὖν οὔτε πρὸ τῆς συνελύσεως τούτων ἔστι τὸ νοούμενον σῶμα οὔτε μετὰ τὴν συνελουσι αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ σῶμα.

Πρὸς τούτοις εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι μήκος μηδὲ πλάτος μηδὲ βάθος, οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν τούτων νοούμενον σῶμα γενήσεται· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι μήκος καὶ 376 πλάτος καὶ βάθος, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σῶμα. μήκος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἦν τοῦτο τοῦ σώματος διάστημα ὅπερ λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς γραμμῆ, ἣ δὲ γραμμὴ ἦν στιγμῆ ἐρρηγκυῖα, καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον. (ὅθεν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον),¹ οὐδὲ γραμμὴ γενήσεται, μὴ οὔσης δὲ γραμμῆς οὐδὲ μήκος ἔσται, μήκος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ σῶμα ὑποστήσεται· σὺν μήκει 377 γὰρ σῶμα νοεῖται. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἐντεῦθεν μάθωμεν. εἰ γάρ

¹ <ὅθεν . . . ἀδιάστατον> add. N, Mutsch. (ὥστε . . . ἀδ. add. c). Bekk.).

^a Or (as compared with "breadth" and "depth") the

they will not produce a different body; but if it 374 changes to body, then, since what admits of change is body, each of the dimensions, even before their conjunction, will be body and will produce body before there is body.—Also, just as the body which changes receives one quality instead of another but remains a body,—the white, for instance, in becoming black, and the sweet in becoming bitter, casts off one quality and receives another, while not ceasing to be a body,—so also these dimensions, if they change into body, will exchange one quality for another; and if they are thus affected they will be 375 bodies. If, then, the body as conceived exists neither before their conjunction nor after their conjunction, it is not possible to conceive body.

Furthermore, if there is no length or breadth or depth, neither will the body which is conceived as partaking of these exist; but there is no length and breadth and depth, as we shall establish; therefore 376 body does not exist. For length does not exist, since this, which is termed "line" by the Mathematicians, is the greatest dimension of body,^a and the line is "a point which has flowed," and the point is "a sign which is without parts and without dimensions." (Hence, if no sign^b without parts or dimensions exists,) neither will a line exist, and if the line does not exist neither will length exist, and if length does not exist neither will body subsist; for body, as conceived, includes length. And that there exists no sign with- 377 out parts or dimensions we may learn from what

primary dimension; cf. Nicomachus, *Instit. Arithm.* ii. 6 πρῶτον δὲ διάστημα γραμμῆ λέγεται· γραμμὴ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐφ' ἐν διαστατόν.

^b "Sign" is used in the sequel in the sense of "point."

ἔστι τοιοῦτόν τι, ἥτοι σώμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον.
καὶ σώμα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ διαστατόν ἂν ὑπῆρχε,
τοῦ σώματος τὰς τρεῖς ἔχοντος διαστάσεις. καὶ
378 μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματον. εἰ γὰρ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν,
οὐδὲν γενήσεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ γενῶν κατὰ
θίξιν γενεᾶ, θίξις δὲ οὐδεμία γενέσθαι δύναται ἐπὶ
ἀσωμάτου φύσεως. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι
τὸ σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώμα μήτε ἀσώματον,
379 ἀνεπινοήτόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι
σημεῖον, οὐδὲ γραμμὴ ἔσται. μὴ οὐσης δὲ τῆς
γραμμῆς οὐδὲ μήκος ἔσται, ᾧ ἔπεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ
σώματος ἀνπαρξία.

380 Ἐπι κὰν δοθῇ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσται μήκος.
ἦν γὰρ τὸ μήκος γραμμῆ, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ ρύσις
σημεῖου. ἥτοι οὖν ἔν ἐστι σημεῖον ἐκτεταμένον ἢ
γραμμῆ, ἢ πολλὰ σημεῖα νοεῖται στοιχηδὸν κεί-
381 μενα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔν ἐκτεταμένον σημεῖόν ἐστιν,
οὐκ ἂν εἴη γραμμῆ. ἥτοι γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχει
τόπον τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον, ἢ τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετα-
τίθεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχει τόπον τοῦτο
τὸ σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔσται γραμμῆ ἀλλὰ στιγμῆ· ῥυέν
382 γὰρ ἐνοεῖτο γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ τόπον ἐκ τόπου μέτ-
εῖσι, ἥτοι ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον τόπον οὐ δὲ ἐπιλαμ-
βανόμενον μέτεισι, ἢ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς
383 ὃν δὲ ἐκτεινόμενον. οὔτε δὲ ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον
τόπον οὐ δὲ ἐπιλαμβανόμενον ποιήσει γραμμῆν·
μενεῖ γὰρ ἢ¹ ἀρχῆθεν στιγμῆ, καὶ ᾧ λόγῳ τὸν
πρῶτον ἐπεσχηκὸς τόπον ἐλέγετο στιγμῆ καὶ οὐ
γραμμῆ, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐπειληφὸς καὶ
τὸν τρίτον καὶ τοὺς ἐξῆς οὐκ ἔσται γραμμῆ ἀλλὰ
384 πάλιν στιγμῆ. εἰ δὲ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς ὃν

¹ ἢ ego: ἢ mss., Bekk.

follows: if there is any such thing it is either a body or incorporeal. Now it is not a body, since then it would have had dimensions, as body has three dimensions. Nor yet is it incorporeal. For if it is incorporeal, nothing will proceed from it; for that which generates generates by contact, but there can be no contact in the case of an incorporeal nature. So then, the sign is not incorporeal either. But if the sign is neither a body nor incorporeal it is inconceivable. And if the sign does not exist, neither will the line exist. And if the line does not exist, neither will length exist; and from this follows also the non-existence of body.

Moreover, even if it be granted that the sign exists, length will not exist. For length is line, and the line the flux of a sign. The line then is either one sign extended, or it is conceived as many signs placed in a row. But if it is one sign extended, it will not be a line, for this sign either occupies the same place or changes from place to place. And if this sign occupies the same place, it will not be a line but a point; for the line is conceived as a thing which has flowed. And if it moves on from place to place it moves either by leaving one place and taking up another, or by occupying one place and extending into another. But it will not make a line by leaving one place and taking up another; for it will remain, as at first, a point, and just as when it occupied its first place it was called a point and not a line, so, by the same reasoning, when it occupies its second place and its third, and all the rest, it will not be a line but, as before, a point. And if it makes the line by

δὲ ἐκτεινόμενον ποιεῖ τὴν γραμμὴν, ἥτοι μεριστῶ
 ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τόπῳ ἢ ἀμερίστῳ. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 ἀμερίστῳ, μένει στιγμὴ καὶ οὐ γίνεται γραμμὴ·
 385 μεριστὸν γὰρ τί ἐστὶν ἢ γραμμὴ· εἰ δὲ μεριστῶ
 ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τόπῳ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μεριστῶ ἀντι-
 παρεκτεινόμενον τόπῳ μεριστὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἔχει μέρη,
 τὸ δὲ ἔχον μέρη σώμᾶ ἐστὶν, ἔσται τὸ σημεῖον
 μεριστὸν τε καὶ σώμα, ὅπερ οὐ βούλονται. τοῖνυν
 386 οὐχ ἓν ἐστὶ σημεῖον ἢ γραμμὴ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 πολλὰ στοιχηδὸν κείμενα. ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σημεῖα
 ἥτοι ψαύει ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἢ οὐχ
 ἀπτεται ἀλλήλων, μεσολαβούμενα δὲ τόποις τισὶ
 διορίζεται. εἰ δὲ τόποις μεσολαβεῖται, οὐκέτι μίαν
 ποιήσει γραμμὴν. εἰ δὲ ἀπτεται ἀλλήλων, ἥτοι ὅλα
 387 ὅλων ἀπτεται ἢ μέρεσι μερῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν μέρεσι
 μερῶν, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ μέσον, εἰ τύχοι,
 σημεῖον δυοῖν ἄλλων σημείων πλείονα ἔξει μέρη,
 ἐν μὲν ᾧ ἀπτεται τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν σημείου, ἕτερον δὲ
 ᾧ θιγγάνει τοῦ ὀπισθεν, τρίτον ᾧ τῆς ἐπιπέδου,
 τέταρτον ᾧ τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου μέρους, ὥστε μηκέτι
 388 αὐτὸ ἀμερὲς ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ πολυμερὲς. εἰ δὲ ὅλα
 ὅλων ἀπτεται, σημεῖα ἐν σημείοις περισχεθῆσεται
 καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τόπον. εἰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει
 τόπον, οὐκέτι ἔσται στοιχὸς αὐτῶν, ἵνα γένηται
 389 γραμμὴ, ἀλλὰ πάντα μία ἔσται στιγμὴ. εἴπερ οὖν
 ἵνα μὲν ἐπινοηθῇ τὸ σώμα, δεῖ ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ
 μῆκος, ἵνα δὲ τὸ μῆκος, τὴν γραμμὴν, καὶ ἵνα αὕτη,
 τὸ σημεῖον, ἐπεὶ δέδεικται ἢ γραμμὴ μῆτε σημείον

* i.e. that of the board (or paper) on which the point is
 marked. "The part which lies above" is that which is

occupying one place and extending into another, it
 extends over a place that is either divisible or indi-
 visible. And if it is indivisible, it remains a point
 and does not become a line; for the line is a divisible
 thing; and if it extends over a divisible place, then, 385
 since what extends over a divisible place is divisible
 and has parts, and what has parts is a body, the sign
 will be both divisible and a body; and this they do
 not want to admit. So then the line is not one single
 sign.—Nor yet is it many signs set in a row. For 386
 these signs, as conceived, either are in contact with
 one another or do not touch one another but are
 separated by intercepting spaces. But if they are
 intercepted by spaces they will no longer make one
 line. And if they touch one another they either
 touch wholes as wholes or parts with parts. And if 387
 they touch parts with parts they will no longer be
 without parts; for, to take an example, the sign
 which stands midway between two other signs will
 have several parts,—one by which it touches the sign
 in front of it, another by which it makes contact with
 that behind it, a third by which it touches the sur-
 face,^a a fourth by which it touches the part which
 lies above; so that it is no longer without parts but
 with many parts. And if they touch wholes as wholes, 388
 signs will be contained in signs and will occupy the
 same place. And if they shall occupy the same place
 there will no longer be a row of them, so as to form a
 line, but they will all be one point. If, then, in order 389
 to form a conception of body, one must first conceive
 length, and conceive line, again, before length, and
 sign before line, then—since the line has been shown

visible to the eye (on a higher level) of the observer, and
 beneath which is "the part which touches the surface."

ὑπάρχουσα μήτε ἐκ σημείων σύνθετος, οὐδέν ἐστι γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι γραμμῆ, οὐδὲ μήκος· ὧ ἀκολοθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ σώμα τι ὑπάρχειν.

390 Καὶ ἄρτι μὲν ἐπεδείξαμεν ἀνεπινώθητον τὴν γραμμὴν ἐχόμενοι τοῦ σημείου· ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως αὐτὴν ἀναρῆναι ἐχομένους τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἐπινοίας. φασι γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι ὅτι γραμμῆ
391 ἐστι μήκος ἀπλατές, ἡμεῖς δὲ σκεπτόμενοι οὔτε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὔτε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν μήκος ἀπλατές· ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβωμεν μήκος αἰσθητόν, τοῦτο σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει λαμβάνομεν. ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐκ ἐστὶ τι ἀπλατές [σῶμα].¹
392 καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἔνεστι <τι>² τοιοῦτο φαντασιωθῆναι μήκος. ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρου στενωτέρου μήκος δυνάμεθα νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ φυλάττοντες μήκος ἐκ τούτου κατ' ὀλίγον σχίζωμεν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις τὸ πλάτος καὶ τοῦτο ἄχρι τινὸς ποιῶμεν, ἔλαττον μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ πλάτος γινόμενον νοοῦμεν, ὅταν δὲ φθάσωμεν ἅπαξ στερεῖσαι τοῦ πλάτους τὸ μήκος, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ μήκος νοοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῇ ἄρσει τοῦ πλάτους αἱρεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους ἐπινοία.
393 Καθόλου τε τὸ ἐπινοούμενον πᾶν ἦτοι κατ' ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν νοεῖται ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ ὁμοιότητα ὅτε δὲ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν ὅτε δὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ταύτην δὲ ἦτοι αὐξητικὴν ἢ
394 μειωτικὴν. κατ' ἐμπέλασιν μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐναργῶν νοεῖται ὡς λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὴ καὶ πικρὸν·

¹ [σῶμα] secl. ego: μήκος cj. Heintz.

² <τι> add. LN, Mutsch.

to be neither a sign nor a compound of signs,—the line is nothing. And if the line does not exist, neither does length; and from this it follows that no body exists either.

We pointed out just now, by examining the sign, 390 that the line is inconceivable; but it is also possible to abolish it directly by examining its own conception. For the Geometers state that "the line is length without breadth"; but we in our inquiry are unable to 391 perceive length without breadth either in sensibles or in intelligibles; for whatever sensible length we perceive we perceive as including a certain breadth. So that there does not exist among sensibles any [body] without breadth. Nor yet is it possible to 392 imagine amongst intelligibles any length of this kind. For although we are able to think of one length as narrower than another, yet when we keep the same length and, in our thoughts, gradually pare off its breadth and keep on doing this up to a certain point, then we conceive the breadth becoming ever less and less, but when we have gone so far as to deprive the length of its breadth altogether, we no longer conceive even the length, but along with the removal of the breadth the conception of the length also is removed.

In general, too, everything which is conceived is 393 conceived either through the presentation of things manifest to the senses or through transition from things manifest,^a and this again in various ways—at one time through resemblance, at another through composition, at another by analogy, and this again by way either of increase or of decrease. Thus it is 394 through the presentation of things manifest that things like white and black and sweet and bitter are

^a With §§ 393-395 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 58-60.

ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ εἰ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον νοεῖται. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν ὁμοιωτικῶς μὲν νοεῖται οἷον ἀπὸ [μὲν] τῆς Σω-
 395 κράτους εἰκόνας ὁ μὴ παρῶν Σωκράτης, συν-
 θετικῶς δὲ οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου
 ὁ μῆτε ἄνθρωπος ὢν μῆτε ἵππος, σύνθετος δὲ ἐξ
 ἀμφοτέρων ἵπποκένταυρος, κατὰ δὲ ἀναλογίαν αὐ-
 ξητικὴν ἢ μειωτικὴν οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄραν τὸν κοινὸν
 κατὰ μέγεθος ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑποπίπτοντα αὐξή-
 σαντες μὲν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἐνόησαμεν τὸν Κύ-
 κλωπα, ὃς οὐκ ἐώκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψῳ ὑλήεντι,

μειώσαντες δὲ ἐσπάσαμεν ἔννοιαν τοῦ πυγμαίου
 396 ἀνθρώπου. τοσοῦτων δὴ τρόπων νοήσεως ὄντων,
 εἰ ἐπινοεῖται τι μῆκος ἀπλατές [ἢ γραμμῆ],¹ κατὰ
 τινα τούτων τῶν τρόπων ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι· κατ'
 οὐδένα δὲ αὐτῶν δύναται νοηθῆναι, ὡς παραστή-
 397 σομεν, ὥστε ἀνεπιώητον ἐστίν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν
 ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο νόησις μή-
 κους τινὸς ἀπλατοῦς· οὐδενὶ γὰρ περιεπέσομεν
 μήκει χωρὶς πλάτους ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις καὶ
 398 ἐναργέσι πράγμασιν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν πάλιν τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστὶ
 φαντασιωθῆναι μῆκος ἀπλατές, οὔτε κατὰ ὁμοιό-
 τητα· οὐδὲν² γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μῆκος
 χωρὶς πλάτους, ἵνα νοήσωμέν τι ὅμοιον τούτῳ
 ἀπλατές μῆκος. τὸ γὰρ τινι ὅμοιον γνωσσομένῳ
 καὶ ἐωραμένῳ ὀφείλει ὅμοιον ὑπάρχειν· ἐπεὶ οὖν
 οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ἐναργές ὑποπίπτον μῆκος χωρὶς

¹ [ἢ γραμμῆ] secl. Heintz.

² οὐδὲν Mutsch.: οὐδὲ mss., Bekk.

conceived; for these things, though they are sensible, are none the less conceived. And things are conceived through transition from things manifest either by way of resemblance (as, for instance, the absent Socrates from a likeness of Socrates); or by way of 395 composition (as, for instance, from man and horse but compounded of both); or by analogy, which may either magnify or diminish the object,—as when from seeing the man of average size, as presented to our senses, by magnifying him in imagination we conceive the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains,*

and by diminishing him we derive a conception of the pygmy. Seeing, then, that there are so 396 many modes of conception, if a length without breadth is conceived, it must be conceived after one of these modes; but it cannot be conceived after any of them, as we shall establish, so that it is inconceivable.—Now the conception of a length without 397 breadth will not be formed through the presentation of things manifest; for we have never met with length without breadth amongst objects that are apparent and manifest to the senses. And it is like- 398 wise impossible for length without breadth to be imagined through transition from things manifest, or through resemblance; for amongst things manifest we have not got any length without breadth, so as to enable us to conceive a length without breadth resembling it. For what resembles anything ought to bear resemblance to what is known and seen; since then we have no length without breadth that is

* Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191.

πλάτους, οὐδ' ὁμοίον τι αὐτοῦ συνεῖναι δινησόμεθα
 399 εἶναι μήκος ἀπλατές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἐπισύν-
 θεσιν ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο· εἰπάτωσαν γὰρ ἡμῖν, τίνα
 τῶν ἐκ περιπτώσεως ἐναργῶν [καί]¹ γιγνομένων
 μετὰ τίνων συντιθέντες ἐνόησαν μήκος ἀπλατές;
 400 ὅπερ εἰπεῖν οὐ δύνησονται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ
 ἀναλογίαν παρήλθεν ἡ τοῦ ἀπλατοῦς μήκους νόησις.
 τὰ γὰρ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν νοούμενα ἔχει τι κοινὸν
 πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ με-
 γέθους τὰνθρώπου κατὰ παραύξησιν ἐνόησαμεν τὸν
 Κύκλωπα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάλιν κατὰ μείωσιν
 401 τὸν πυγμαῖον· ὥστ' εἰ ἐστὶ τι κοινὸν τοῖς κατὰ
 ἀναλογίαν νοουμένοις πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται,
 οὐδὲν δὲ ἔχομεν κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἀπλατοῦς καὶ τοῦ
 σὺν πλάτει μήκους, ἵνα ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὀρμηθέντες
 νοήσωμεν τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν
 402 οὐδὲν νοεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν
 νοουμένων κατὰ τίνα τῶν ἐκκειμένων τρόπων
 ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς κατὰ μηδένα
 τρόπον νοεῖσθαι δυνάμενον τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος,
 λεκτέον ἀνεπιπόνητον εἶναι τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος.
 403 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τις ἐρεῖ ὅτι λαβόντες τι μήκος σὺν
 ποσῷ πλάτει κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοοῦμεν τὸ ἀπλατές
 μήκος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτου κατ' ὀλίγον ἐλασσούται τὸ
 πλάτος, ἐλεύσεται ποτε καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀπλατές, ὥστε
 καταλήγειν τὴν μείωσιν εἰς τὸ χωρὶς πλάτους
 404 μήκος. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι ἡ παντελής
 τοῦ πλάτους ἀρισ καὶ τοῦ μήκους ἐστὶν ἀναίρεσις.

¹ [καί] om. N (ἐναργῶς γιγνοσκομένων Mutsch.).

^a i.e. of "intensifying," or gradually increasing, the narrowness of the line (cf. § 405 *infra*), which is equivalent to decreasing its breadth.

manifestly perceived, we shall not be able to discern the existence of any length without breadth which resembles it. Nor, again, is it perceptible through 399 composition; for let them tell us what objects made manifest by sense they compounded with what in order to form the notion of length without breadth, —and that they will not be able to tell us. Nor yet 400 was the notion of length without breadth suggested by analogy. For things conceived by way of analogy possess something in common with the things from which their conception is derived; for example, from the common feature of man's size, by enlargement, we conceive the Cyclops, and conversely, by diminution of the same object, the pygmy. Consequently, 401 if things conceived by analogy have some feature in common with those from which the conception is derived, but we find nothing that is common both to length without breadth and to length with breadth, to enable us by starting from the latter to arrive at the conception of length without breadth,—then this conception is not formed by analogy either. Hence, 402 if everything which is conceived must be conceived in one of the ways mentioned, and we have shown that length without breadth cannot be conceived in any way, we must declare that length without breadth is inconceivable.

But someone, perhaps, will say that we conceive 403 length without breadth by a process of "intension" ^a when we have taken a certain length with a certain breadth; for if, starting with this, the breadth is gradually diminished, it will come in time to being without breadth, so that the decrease ends in length without breadth. But, firstly, we have shown that 404 the complete removal of breadth is also the abolition

ἔπειτα τὸ κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοούμενον οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι
 τοῦ προνοηθέντος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιτεταμένον.
 405 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποσὸν ἔχοντος πλάτος κατ' ἐπί-
 τασιν στενότητος νοήσαι τι θέλομεν, πάντως τὸ μὲν
 ἀπλατὲς μήκος οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν (ἕτερογενὲς γάρ
 406 ἔστω), ἀεὶ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον στενώτερον ληψόμεθα
 πλάτος, ὥστε τὴν κατάληξιν τῆς νοήσεως ἐν ἐλα-
 χιστοτάτῳ γίνεσθαι πλάτει, μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὴν εἰς
 τὸ ἕτερογενὲς μετάβασιν συμβαίνειν, τουτέστι τοῦ
 407 συναιρουμένου τῷ πλάτει μήκους. καθόλου
 τε, εἰ κατὰ στέρησιν πλάτους νοήσαι δυνάμεθα
 μήκος ἀπλατὲς, ἐπεὶ πάντα τὰ στερητικὰ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπλατὲς μήκος· διὸ οὐδὲ
 γραμμῆ. ἵππος μὲν γάρ τι ἔστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ,
 οὐχ ἵππος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἔστιν,
 οὐκ ἄνθρωπος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. τοῖνυν εἰ ἔχομέν τι
 πλάτος ἢ τι μήκος, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται· ἀπλατὲς
 408 δ' οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ὅνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ λέγοντες
 ὅτι ἕτερον ἕτερου μέγεθος ὑπερτιθέντες νόησιν
 λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἀπείρου μεγέθους ὡς σώματος
 πλανῶνται, καὶ μέγιστον μὲν τι καθ' ὑπέρθεσιν
 πολλῶν μεγεθῶν λαμβάνουσι, οὐκ ἀπειρον δὲ τοῦτο
 ἀλλὰ πεπερασμένον (ὃ γὰρ ἔσχατον νεοήκασι, τῇ
 409 διανοίᾳ περιληπτὸν ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ περιληπτὸν ἔστι
 διανοίᾳ, πεπερασται, ἐπεὶ περ τοι τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτω
 περιληφθὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλέγχει τὸ περιληφθὲν ὡς
 μὴ ὄν ἀπειρον), οὕτω τοῖνυν κἀνθάδε ἢ συναίρεισι
 τοῦ πλάτους, εἰς ἐλάχιστον πλάτος καταλγούσης
 τῆς διανοίας, πλάτος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μήκος ἀπλατὲς.

* "Privation," "privative," are (Aristotelian) terms for "negation," "negative."

of length. And next, what is conceived through
 intension is not other than what was previously con-
 ceived but that very same thing after undergoing
 intension. Since, then, we propose to conceive some- 405
 thing from that which has a certain breadth, through
 intension of narrowness, we certainly shall not con-
 ceive length without breadth (for this is a hetero-
 geneous thing), but we shall apprehend a breadth that 406
 is ever getting more and more narrow, so that our con-
 ception ends in the least possible breadth, and after this
 there follows a transition to what is heterogeneous,
 that is to say, when the length is abolished along
 with the breadth.—Also, in general, if we can conceive 407
 length without breadth through privation of breadth,
 since all privatives^a are non-existent in reality, neither
 does length without breadth exist; nor, in conse-
 quence, the line. Thus, horse is a thing which exists
 in reality, but "not horse" does not exist; and man
 exists, but "not man" does not exist. So then, if
 we perceive a breadth or a length, it will exist in
 reality; but "without breadth" will not exist. As, 408
 then, those men who assert that they form a notion
 of an infinite magnitude as body by superimposing
 one magnitude on another are in error, and while they
 grasp a maximum through the superimposition of many
 magnitudes, yet this is not infinite but limited (for
 what they conceived last is capable of being contained
 by the intellect, and what is capable of being con- 409
 tained by the intellect is limited, since otherwise, of
 course, what remains as yet uncontained by the
 intellect convicts what is contained of not being
 infinite),—so too in this case, the contraction of
 the breadth, when the intellect ends with a mini-
 mal breadth, is a breadth and not a length without

- 410 ἄλλως τε, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι νοήσαντάς τι μῆκος
 σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει στερεῆσαι αὐτὸ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ
 τὸ μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἐπινοεῖν, ἐνέσται καὶ σάρκα
 ἐπινοήσαντας σὺν τρωτῷ ἰδιώματι στερεῆσαι τοῦ
 411 τρωτοῦ ἰδιώματος νοῆσαι ἄτρωτον σάρκα, καὶ ἐν-
 δέξεται μετὰ ἀντιτύπου ἰδιώματος σῶμα νοήσαντας
 στερεῆσαι τοῦ ἀντιτύπου ἰδιώματος λαβεῖν ἀναντί-
 τυπον σῶμα. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἄτρωτον
 νοούμενον οὐκ ἔστι σὰρξ, σὺν τρωτῷ γὰρ ἰδιώματι
 ἐνοεῖτο ἢ σὰρξ, καὶ ἀναντίτυπον οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα,
 σὺν γὰρ τῷ ἀντιτύπῳ ἰδιώματι ἐνοεῖτο τὸ σῶμα.
 τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον χωρὶς πλάτους μῆκος
 οὐκ ἔστι μῆκος· σὺν ποσῷ γὰρ πλάτει νοεῖται τὸ
 μῆκος.
- 412 Ἄλλ' ὃ γε Ἀριστοτέλης οὐκ ἀδιανόητον ἔλεγε
 εἶναι τὸ παρὰ τοῖς γεωμέτραις ἀπλατῆς μῆκος (τὸ
 γέ τοι τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος λαμβάνομεν χωρὶς τοῦ
 ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πλάτει τοῦ τοίχου) πλανώμενος.
 ὅταν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος λαμβάνωμεν χωρὶς
 πλάτους, οὐ χωρὶς παντὸς πλάτους τοῦτο λαμβά-
 νομεν ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦ περὶ τῷ τοίχῳ πλάτους.
 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ συγκαταπλέξαντας τὸ τοῦ τοίχου
 μῆκός τινι πλάτει καὶ οἰωδῆποτε οὖν νόησιν αὐτοῦ
 ποιεῖσθαι, ὥστε μῆκος λαμβάνεσθαι οὐ χωρὶς
 413 πλάτους ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦδὲ τινος πλάτους. πρού-
 κειτο δὲ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παραστῆσαι οὐχ ὅτι τὸ
 τινὸς πλάτους ἄμοιρον μῆκος ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι τὸ παντὸς πλάτους· ὅπερ οὐ παρέστηκεν.
- 414 Πρὸς τούτους, εἶπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι οὐ μόνον ἀπλατῆς

• Aristot. *Frag.* 29 (Rose).

breadth.—And further : if it is possible for those who 410
 have conceived a length with a certain breadth to
 deprive it of its breadth and thus to conceive length
 without breadth, it will also be possible for them,
 when they have conceived flesh which possesses the
 property of vulnerability, by privation of the property
 of vulnerability to conceive invulnerable flesh ; and 411
 after conceiving a body with the property of solidity,
 it will be feasible for them, by privation of the pro-
 perty of solidity, to conceive a non-solid body. But
 this is impossible ; for what is conceived as invulner-
 able is not flesh (for flesh was conceived as including
 the property of vulnerability), and the non-solid is
 not body (for body was conceived as including the
 property of solidity). So too the length conceived as
 without breadth is not length (for length is conceived
 as including a certain breadth).

Aristotle,^a however, declared that the length with- 412
 out breadth of the Geometers is not inconceivable
 (" for in fact we apprehend the length of a wall
 without having a perception of the wall's breadth ") ;
 but he is in error. For when we apprehend the
 length of a wall without its breadth, we do not
 apprehend it as without any breadth but without the
 breadth which belongs to the wall. For it is possible
 by connecting the length of the wall with some
 breadth (whatever it be) to form a notion of it, so
 that its length is not apprehended without breadth
 but without this particular breadth. But the task 413
 before Aristotle was to establish that it is possible to
 conceive, not the length which is devoid of a certain
 breadth, but that which is devoid of any breadth
 at all ; and this he did not establish.

Furthermore, since the Geometers assert that the 414

μηκός φασι τὴν γραμμὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πέρασ ἐπι-
 φανείας, [ὁ μηκός καὶ πλάτος ἐστὶν ἀβαθές,]¹
 ἐνέσται κοινότερον περὶ τε γραμμῆς καὶ ἐπιφανείας
 διαπορεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἐπι-
 φανείας, [ὁ ἐστὶ,] μήκος ἀπλατέσ καθεστηκυῖα,
 πάντως ἐπιφανείας ἐπιφανεία παρατεθείσῃς ἢ
 παράλληλοι δύο γίνονται γραμμαὶ ἢ μία ἐξ ἀμφο-
 415 τέρων. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία αἱ παράλληλοι δύο γραμμαὶ
 γίνονται, ἐπεὶ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας, ἢ
 δὲ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ σώματος, τῶν δυοῖν γραμμῶν
 μιᾶσ γινομένων² καὶ αἱ δύο ἐπιφάνειαι μία γενή-
 σονται. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο σώματα ἐν ἔσται
 αἶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ παράθεσις οὐκέτι γενήσεται
 παράθεσις ἀλλὰ ἔνωσις. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἐπὶ
 τῶν μὲν γὰρ παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλοισ σωμάτων
 ἔνωσις γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν, ἐπὶ
 τῶν δὲ οὐκέτι λίθος γὰρ λίθω καὶ ἀδάμασ ἀδά-
 416 μαντι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν οὐχ ἐνοῦται. ὥστε δύο
 γραμμαὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο μία. καὶ ἄλλωσ, ἐὰν
 δῶμεν μίαν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἔνωσιν διὰ τοῦτο τῶν
 σωμάτων, δεήσει τὸν χωρισμὸν αὐτῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰ
 αὐτὰ πέρατα γίνεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα
 μέρη, βιαίωσ ἀποσπωμένων αὐτῶν. οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦτο·
 τῶν γὰρ περάτων καὶ πρὶν τῆσ παραθέσεωσ καὶ
 μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν αὐτῶν ἢ αὐτῇ σῶζεται φύσις.
 οὐκ ἄρα αἱ δύο παράλληλοι γραμμαὶ μία γίνονται.³
 σὺν τούτοισ, εἴπερ αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ μία γί-
 νονται, τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοισ σώματα ἐνὶ ἄκρω

¹ [ὁ . . . ἀβαθές] secl. ego: ὁ . . . ἀβαθές N, Mutsch.:
 ὁ μ. κ. π. ἐστὶν ἀπλατέσ cet. (secl. Bekk.).

² γινομένων N: γινομένησ cet., Bekk.

³ γίνονται cj. Bekk.: γίνοντο mss.: γένοιντο edd.

line is not only "length without breadth" but also
 "the limit of a surface," [this being length and
 breadth without depth,] it will be possible for us to
 discuss more generally the difficulties involved both
 in line and in surface.^a For if the line is the limit of a
 surface, and is length without breadth, then certainly,
 when surface is set beside surface either there are two
 parallel lines or one compounded of both. And if the 415
 two parallel lines become one, since the line is the limit
 of the surface and the surface the limit of the body,
 when the two lines become one the two surfaces also
 will become one. And thus the two bodies also will be
 one body, and because of this the juxtaposition will
 no longer be juxtaposition but unification. But this
 is impossible; for though in some cases when bodies
 are juxtaposed unification is the natural result (as in
 the case of liquids), yet in other cases it is not so;
 for stone is not made one with stone, nor adamant
 with adamant, by juxtaposition. So that two lines
 will not become one.—And again, if we grant that 416
 they do become one, and that owing to this there is
 unification of the bodies, their separation will have to
 take place not at the same limits but in various other
 parts, as they are forcibly pulled apart. But this is
 not so; for the nature of the limits remains the same
 both before the juxtaposition and after their separa-
 tion. Therefore the two parallel lines do not become
 one.—Moreover, if the two lines become one the
 juxtaposed bodies will be smaller by one extreme

^a For "limits" and "surfaces," in geometry, cf. P.H.
 iii. 39 ff.

ἔσται ἐλάσσονα· γεγόνασι γὰρ αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ μία, καὶ ἡ μία κατ' ἀνάγκην ἔχει ἄκρον ὀφείλει. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις σώματα ἐνὶ ἄκρῳ γίνεται ἐλάσσονα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴεν αἱ δύο
 417 γραμμαὶ μία. εἰ δὲ παράλληλοι δύο μένουσιν αἱ γραμμαί, τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν μείζον ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν γινόμενον μείζον ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς γραμμῆς, ἔξει ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν πλάτος, ὃ μετὰ τῆς ἑτέρας ταττόμενον μείζον ποιεῖ διάστημα. καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλατὲς μήκος ἢ γραμμῆ· ἢ εἴπερ ἔστι, σαλεύεσθαι δεήσει τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν.

418 Προηγουμένως μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ῥητέον πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς περὶ σωμάτων τε καὶ
 419 περάτων διάταξιν· μεταβάντες δὲ ἀκολουθῶς σκοπῶμεν εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑποθέσεις δύναται προκόπτειν ὁ λόγος. ἀρέσκει τοίνυν τοῖς γεωμέτραις τὴν εὐθεῖαν γραμμὴν στρεφομένην πᾶσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς μέρεσι κύκλους γράφειν. τούτῳ δὲ εὐθύς αὐτῶν τῷ θεωρήματι μάχεται τὸ μήκος
 420 ἀπλατὲς εἶναι τὴν γραμμὴν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν μέρος γραμμῆς, ὡς φασί, σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον στρεφόμενον κύκλον γράφει, ὅταν εὐθεῖα γραμμῆ στρεφομένη καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐαυτῆς μέρεσι κυκλογραφοῦσα καταμετρή τὸ διάστημα τῆς ἐπιπέδου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου μέχρι τῆς ἐξωτάτης περιφερείας, τότε ἦτοι συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν οἱ παράλληλοι κύκλοι ἢ
 421 διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ὁπότερον δ' ἂν λέγωσι τούτων οἱ γεωμέτραι, εἰς ἄλυτον σχεδὸν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦνται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων,

edge; for the two lines have become one, and this one must necessarily have one edge. But juxtaposed bodies do not become smaller by one edge, so that the two lines will not be one.—And if the two 417 parallel lines remain two, the sum of the two will be greater than the one. And if the sum of the two shall be greater than the one line, each of them will possess breadth, which when ranged along with the other produces a larger dimension. And thus the line will not be “length without breadth”; or if it is, the result must be that the evidence of sense is rendered shaky, as we have shown.

Let this, then, serve as our direct reply to the 418 Mathematicians' formal account of bodies and limits; and let us pass on next to consider whether, even 419 on their own assumptions, their account is admissible. The Geometers, then, are of opinion that the straight line by revolving describes circles with all its parts.^a But the fact that the line is length without breadth conflicts at once with this theorem of theirs. For since every part of the line, as they 420 assert, contains a sign, and the sign by revolving describes a circle, when the straight line, by revolving and describing a circle with all its parts, has measured out the distance of the surface which extends from the centre to the outermost circumference, then the parallel circles are either continuous or separate from one another. But whichever of 421 these alternatives the Geometers may adopt, they will involve themselves in an almost insuperable difficulty. For if these circles are separate from one

* *i.e.* if the straight line AB is made to revolve round the (fixed) point A, with this as centre it will describe as many concentric circles as it contains points.

ἔσται τι μέρος τῆς ἐπιπέδου τὸ μὴ κυκλογραφοῦ-
 μενον καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς τὸ μὴ κυκλογραφοῦν, ὅπερ
 κατὰ τοῦτο τέτακται τὸ διάστημα τῆς ἐπιπέδου.
 422 τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἄτοπον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει σημεῖον ἢ γραμμὴ
 πάντως κατὰ τόδε τὸ μέρος, καὶ τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ
 τοῦτο στρεφόμενον κυκλογραφεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἢ τῆν
 γραμμὴν μὴ ἔχειν κατὰ τι μέρος αὐτῆς σημεῖον, ἢ
 τὸ σημεῖον στρεφόμενον μὴ γράφειν κύκλον, παρὰ
 423 τὸν γεωμετρικὸν ἐστὶ λόγον. εἰ δὲ συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν
 οἱ κύκλοι, ἤτοι οὕτω συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν ὡς κατὰ τὸν
 αὐτὸν τετάχθαι τόπον, ἢ ὥστε ἄλλον παρ' ἄλλον
 νοεῖσθαι μεταξὺ μὴ δυναμένου τινὸς παρεμπεσεῖν
 σημείου· παρεμπύπτου γὰρ ὀφείλει κύκλον γράφειν.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχουσι τόπον, εἰς γενή-
 σονται πάντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μέγιστος κύκλος οὗ
 424 διόισει τοῦ ἐλαχίστου· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἐνδοτάτω
 κύκλος καὶ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστος, ὁ δὲ
 ἐξωτάτω καὶ πρὸς τῇ περιφερείᾳ μέγιστος καθ-
 ἔστηκεν, πάντες δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν κατέχουσι τόπον,
 ἔσται ἴσος τῷ μεγίστῳ κύκλῳ ὁ ἐλάχιστος κύκλος·
 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον. οὐ τοίνυν οὕτως συνεχεῖς
 εἰσὶν οἱ κύκλοι ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπειληφέναι τόπον.
 425 εἰ δὲ παράκεινται ἀλλήλοις ὡς μὴ παρεμπύπτου
 μεταξύ τι σημεῖον, συμπληροῦσι τὸ τῆς ἐπιπέδου
 πλάτος τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης
 περιφερείας. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν πλάτους
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει πλάτος, οἱ κύκλοι συμπληροῦντες
 τὸ τῆς ἐπιπέδου πλάτος ἔξουσι πλάτος. ἦσαν δὲ
 γραμμαὶ οἱ κύκλοι· τοίνυν αἱ γραμμαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν
 ἀπλατεῖς.
 426 Ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὁμοιότροπον
 συνθεῖναι ἀπόδειξιν. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὴν
 200

another there will be a certain part of the surface
 which is not formed into a circle, and of the line which
 does not form a circle, namely that which is situated
 at this interval of the surface. But this is absurd ; 422
 for the line certainly contains at this part a sign, and
 the sign by revolving at this part describes a circle ;
 for that the line at any part of it should not contain
 a sign, or that the sign should not by revolving de-
 scribe a circle, is contrary to the Geometers' doctrine.
 And if the circles are continuous, either they are 423
 continuous in such a way as to be situated in the same
 place or so that they are conceived as lying side by
 side in such a way that no sign can be inserted between
 them ; for if one is inserted, it is bound to describe a
 circle. And if they occupy the same place they will
 all become one, and because of this the greatest circle
 will not differ from the least ; for if the innermost 424
 circle, which is next the centre, is the least, and the
 outermost circle, next to the circumference, is the
 greatest, and all occupy the same place, the least
 circle will be equal to the greatest circle ; which is
 contrary to sense. So then, the circles are not con-
 tinuous in such a way as to occupy the same place.
 And if they are so juxtaposed that no sign is inserted 425
 between them, they fill up the breadth of the surface
 from the centre up to the outermost circumference.
 Since, then, what fills up a breadth necessarily
 possesses breadth, the circles, as filling up the breadth
 of the surface, will possess breadth. But the circles
 are lines ; and so the lines are not without breadth.

And it is possible to construct a proof of a similar 426
 character to the same effect. The Geometers assert

κυκλογραφουσαν εὐθείαν δι' αὐτῆς στρεφομένην κυκλογραφεῖν. διόπερ συνερωτῶντες αὐτοὺς φήσομεν "εἰ ἡ κυκλογραφουσα εὐθεῖα δι' αὐτῆς τὸν κύκλον γράφει, οὐκ ἔστι μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἢ γραμμῆ· ἡ δὲ κυκλογραφουσα εὐθεῖα κατ' αὐτοὺς δι' αὐτῆς τὸν κύκλον γράφει· οὐκ ἄρα μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἔστιν ἡ γραμμῆ." ὅταν γὰρ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου εὐθεῖα ἀγομένη στρέφεται καὶ δι' αὐτῆς γράφῃ τὸν κύκλον, ἦτοι κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ ἐντὸς τῆς περιφερείας πλάτους φέρεται ἢ εὐθεῖα γραμμῆ, ἢ κατὰ τινῶν μὲν φέρεται κατὰ τινῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τινῶν μὲν φέρεται κατὰ τινῶν δὲ μὴ, πάντως οὐ γράφει κύκλον, καθ' ὧν μὲν φερομένη μερῶν τῆς ἐπιπέδου καθ' ὧν δὲ μὴ φερομένη. εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάντων φέρεται, ὅλον τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς περιφερείας πλάτος καταμετρήσει, πλάτος δὲ καταμετροῦν ἔξει πλάτος· τὸ γὰρ πλάτους καταμετρη-
 428 τικὸν ἔχει πλάτος ᾧ καταμετρεῖ. τοίνυν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο ῥητέον μῆκος ἀπλατῆς εἶναι τὴν γραμμῆν.

Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ σαφέστερον γίνεται καὶ ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ γεωμέτραι τὴν πλάγιον τοῦ τετραγώνου πλευρὰν καταγομένην δι' αὐτῆς τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον ἐπίπεδον καταμετρεῖν. εἰ γὰρ μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἔστιν ἢ γραμμῆ, πάντως καὶ ἡ πλευρὰ τοῦ τετραγώνου ἀπλατῆς οὕσα γραμμῆ οὐ καταμετρήσει τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον ἐπίπεδον πλάτος ἔχον· ἢ καταμετροῦσα τοῦτο ἔξει καὶ αὐτὴ πλάτος ᾧ καταμετρεῖ. ὥστε ἢ τὸ θεώρημα αὐτοῖς γίνεται ψευδές, ἢ ὅτι ἢ γραμμῆ μῆκός ἔστιν ἀπλατῆς.

429 Τὸν τε κύλινδρον κατ' εὐθείαν φασὶ γραμμῆν

that the straight line which describes a circle describes it of itself by revolving; and therefore we will propound to them this syllogism—"If the straight line which describes a circle describes the circle of itself, the line is not a length without breadth; but the straight line which describes a circle does, according to them, describe the circle of itself; therefore the line is not a length without breadth." For when the
 427 straight line drawn from the centre revolves and of itself describes the circle, either the straight line moves through all the parts of the surface within the circumference, or it moves through some parts and not through others. But if it moves through some parts and not through others, it certainly does not describe a circle, as it moves through some parts of the surface but does not move through others. And if it moves through them all, it will measure out the whole of the breadth within the circumference, and as measuring out the breadth it will possess breadth; for what is capable of measuring out breadth possesses breadth whereby it measures. So for this reason also
 428 one must deny that the line is length without breadth.

The same thing becomes more evident when the Geometers state that the line drawn as side of the square measures of itself the surface bounded by parallel lines. For if the line is length without breadth, certainly the side of the square, being a line without breadth, will not measure out the surface bounded by parallel lines which has breadth; or, if it measures this, it will itself also have breadth whereby it measures. So that either their theorem proves false, or else the definition of the line as length without breadth.

Also, they say that the cylinder touches the sur- 429

ἄπτεσθαι τῆς ἐπιπέδου, ἐκκυλιόμενον τε τῇ ἀνά μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖν τὴν ἐπίπεδον. εἰ δὴ καὶ κατ' εὐθείαν ἄπτεται τῆς ἐπιπέδου ὁ κύλινδρος καὶ κυλιόμενος τῇ ἀνά μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖ τὴν ἐπίπεδον, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἐπίπεδος ἐξ εὐθειῶν συνέστηκε γραμμῶν καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ κυλίνδρου πάλιν ἐξ εὐθειῶν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἐπίπεδος πλάτος ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κυλίνδρου ἐπιφάνεια, τὸ δὲ πλάτους συμπληρωτικὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπλατές, αἱ γραμμαὶ πλάτος συμπληροῦσαι οὐ γενήσονται ἀπλατεῖς.

- 430 Ἐτι κἂν δῶμεν τὴν γραμμὴν μῆκος ἀπλατές ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀπορος εὐρεθήσεται τοῖς γεωμέτραις ὁ περὶ τοῦ σώματος λόγος. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυέν ποιεῖ γραμμὴν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ῥυεῖσα ποιεῖ ἐπιφάνειαν, ἣτις ἐστὶ πέρασ σώματος
- 431 δύο ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκός τε καὶ πλάτος. ἐπεὶ περ οὖν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ ἐστὶ σώματος, πάντως τὸ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτε παρατίθεται σῶμα σώματι, τότε ἦτοι τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται, ἢ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, ἢ καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων, οἷον (ἔσται γὰρ σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος) εἰ νοῆσαιμεν πέρασ μὲν τὸ ἐξῶθεν τοῦ ἀμφορέως ὄστρακον, πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἀμφορέῳ οἶνον, δυοῖν ἀμφορέων παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου ἄψεται ἢ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου καὶ ὁ
- 432 οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων,

face along a straight line and when rolling forward, by the placing of straight lines in turn, one after another, it measures out the surface. If, then, the cylinder touches the surface along a straight line and when rolling measures out the surface by placing its straight lines in turn, one after another, the surface certainly consists of straight lines, and the superficies of the cylinder likewise is made of straight lines. Since, then, the surface possesses breadth and the superficies of the cylinder also possesses it, and what fills up breadth is not without breadth, the lines as they fill up breadth will not be without breadth.

Moreover, even if we grant that the line is length 430 without breadth, none the less the Geometers will find that their account of body is hopeless. For just as the sign when it has flowed makes the line, so also the line by flowing makes the surface, which is "a limit of body possessing two dimensions, length and breadth." Since, then, the surface is a limit of body, 431 body is certainly limited. And if so, when body is set beside body, then either the limits touch the limits, or the things limited touch the things limited, or the things limited touch the things limited and the limits also touch the limits. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear by an example) if we were to conceive the external earthenware of the jar as the limit and the wine within the jar as the thing limited, then when two jars are set side by side either the ware will touch the ware, or the wine the wine, or both the ware the ware and the wine the wine. And if the limits touch 432 the limits, the things limited (that is, the bodies) will

τούτέστι τὰ σώματα ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων ἄπτεται, τού-
 433 πέρ᾽ αὖτε ἐκτὸς γίνεσθαι· ὁ δὲ πάλιν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ καὶ
 τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται καὶ τὰ πεπερατω-
 μένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, συνδραμοῦνται αἱ ἀπο-
 ρίαι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πέρατα ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται, τὰ
 πεπερατωμένα ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄπτεται, ἢ δὲ ταῦτα
 434 ἀλλήλων θιγγάνει, ἐκτὸς ἔσται τῶν οἰκείων πε-
 ρατωμένων· καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πέρασ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια,
 πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἧτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ
 ἐπιφάνεια ἢ ἀσώματον. καὶ εἰ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι,
 ψεύδος τὸ ἀβαθὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν· πᾶν γὰρ
 σῶμα βάθους μετεῖχεν. εἶτα οὐδὲ ἄψεται τινος τὸ
 πέρασ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν σῶμα γενήσεται ἀπειρομέγεθες·
 435 εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα
 πέρασ ἔχει, κακείνο τὸ πέρασ πάλιν σῶμα ὃν ἔξει
 πέρασ, κακείνο τρίτον, καὶ τὸ τρίτον τέταρτον, καὶ
 οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ἐπι-
 φάνεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς δύναται θιγγεῖν
 οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τινος θιχθῆναι, τὰ πέρατα οὐχ ἄψεται
 ἀλλήλων, τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπτομένων οὐδὲ τὰ πεπε-
 436 ρατωμένα ἄψεται. ὥστε κἂν τῆς γραμμῆς ἀπο-
 σταῶμεν, ὃ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας λόγος ἀπορος ὢν
 εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καθίστησιν.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν πεποιήμεθα τὰς ζητήσεις ἐχόμενοι
 τῶν ἐνοιῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν περάτων, ἔτι
 437 δὲ καὶ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν θεωρημάτων· ἐνεσσι δὲ
 κακείνων τὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνειν,¹ σθεναρῶς συν-
 ἀγοντα τὸ προκείμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἧτοι

not touch each other ; which is absurd. And if the things limited touch the things limited—that is, bodies touch bodies,—they will have to be outside their own limits ; which again is absurd. And if the 433 limits touch the limits and the things limited also the things limited, the difficulties will be combined ; for in so far as the limits touch one another the things limited will not touch one another ; and in so far as the latter are in contact with one another they will be outside their own limits.—Furthermore, if the 434 surface is a limit and the body a thing limited, the surface is either a body or incorporeal.^a And if it is a body, it is false that the surface is without depth ; for every body partakes of depth. Moreover, the limit will not touch anything, but every body will be of unlimited size ; for if the surface is body, since 435 every body has a limit, that limit again, being a body, will have a limit, and this again a third, and the third a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the surface is incorporeal, since the incorporeal cannot touch anything or be touched by anything, the limits will not be in contact with one another, and if these are not in contact neither will the things limited be in contact. So that even if we disregard the line, the hope- 436 lessness of the account given of surface reduces us to a state of suspension.

So, then, we have now carried out our investigations, while confining ourselves to the notions of body and limits, and also to the Geometers' theorems. But it is possible, also, to repeat our former argu- 437 ment which deduces our thesis in a convincing way^b: If a body exists, it is either sensible or

¹ ἀναλαμβάνειν] παραλαμβάνειν NLE: λαμβάνειν cet., Bekk.

^a With § 434 cf. P.H. iii. 41-44.

^b With §§ 437-439 cf. P.H. iii. 47-48.

αἰσθητόν ἐστὶν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητόν μὲν οὐκ
 ἔστιν. ἀθρόα γὰρ ἦν ποιότης κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν
 σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας λαμβανο-
 μένη· ποιότης δὲ κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν τινῶν λαμβανο-
 μένη οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητή· καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα, ὡς
 438 σῶμα νοούμενον, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ νοητόν. ἵνα γὰρ γένηται νόησις σώματος,
 ὀφείλει ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποκείσθαι τι
 αἰσθητόν, ἀφ' οὗ γενήσεται ἡ τοῦ σώματος νόησις.
 οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ
 τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον
 αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ νοητόν τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς
 439 δέδεικται ἡμῖν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν
 πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινός ἀφ' οὗ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ
 σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε
 αἰσθητόν ἐστὶ μήτε νοητόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ἔστι, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα.

440 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων λόγος
 πέφηνεν ἄπορος, ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς πειρασόμεθα
 διδάσκειν ὅτι καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν λειπομένων ἀσωμάτων
 ὁμοίος ἐστὶ τούτῳ.

intelligible. And it is not sensible; for it is "a
 complex quality perceived through the combination
 of form, size, and solidity"^a; and a quality perceived
 through a combination of things is not sensible;
 therefore the body also, conceived as body, is not
 sensible. Nor yet is it intelligible. For in order that 438
 there may be a conception of body, there must already
 exist in the nature of things some sensible object
 from which the conception of body may be formed.
 But nothing exists in the nature of things besides
 body and the incorporeal, and of these the incor-
 poreal is of itself intelligible, and body, as we have
 proved, is not sensible. Since, then, there does not 439
 exist in the nature of things any sensible object from
 which the notion of body may be formed, body will
 not be intelligible either. But if it is neither sensible
 nor intelligible, and besides these there is no other
 alternative, one must declare that body is nothing.

But now that the account given of bodies has been 440
 shown by these arguments to be hopeless, we shall
 start afresh^b and try to demonstrate that the account
 given of the other things, the incorporeals, is equally
 so.

^a This is an Epicurean definition.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 446.

B

1 Τοῖς περὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν περάτων προ-
 ηπορημένοις ἡμῖ νπρὸς τε τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ τοὺς
 γεωμέτρας ἀκόλουθος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ
 τόπου ζήτησις· ἅπασι γὰρ συμφώνως ἀξιούται τὸ
 σῶμα ἢτοι ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι ἢ κατὰ τόπου
 2 φέρεσθαι. διὸ προληπτέον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν Ἐπι-
 κουρον τῆς ἀναφοῦς καλουμένης φύσεως τὸ μὲν
 τι ὀνομάζεται κενὸν τὸ δὲ τόπος τὸ δὲ χώρα,
 μεταλαμβανομένων κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τῶν
 ὀνομάτων, ἐπεὶπερ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἔρημος μὲν καθ-
 εστηκῦια παντὸς σώματος κενὸν προσαγορεύεται,
 καταλαμβανομένη δὲ ὑπὸ σώματος τόπος καλεῖται,
 χωρούντων δὲ δι' αὐτῆς σωμάτων χώρα γίνεται.
 κοινῶς μὲντοι φύσις ἀναφῆς εἴρηται παρὰ τῶν
 Ἐπικούρω διὰ τὸ ἐστερηθῆαι τῆς κατὰ ἀντίβασιν
 3 ἀφῆς. καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ δὲ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι φασι τὸ
 οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ,
 ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθ-
 εκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ ὄντος
 κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισιζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν,
 νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, καθὼς καὶ ἐκ τῆς
 μεταλήψεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστὶ συμφανές· χώραν
 δὲ φασι εἶναι διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον
 4 ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δὲ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον. ἐνιοὶ δὲ

BOOK II

AFTER the foregoing discussion of body and limits, 1
 criticizing both the Physicists and the Geometers, the
 investigation of "Place" seems to follow next; for
 it is maintained by them all with one accord that
 body either is contained in place or moves in place.
 Hence we must notice first that, according to Epi- 2
 curus, "of the intangible nature one part is named
 'void,' another 'place,' another 'room,'" the names
 being varied according to the different applications,
 since the same nature is termed "void" when desti-
 tute of any body, and is called "place" when occupied
 by a body, and becomes "room" when bodies pass
 through it. But the general designation "intangible
 nature" is given to it by Epicurus owing to its lack
 of resistant touch. And the Stoics assert^a that 3
 "void is that which is capable of being occupied by
 an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval
 empty of body, or an interval unoccupied by body;
 and place is that which is occupied by an existent and
 made equal to that which occupies it" (calling body
 now "an existent," as is plain from the interchange
 of the names); and "room," they say, is "an interval
 partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied."

^a With §§ 3-4 cf. P.H. iii. 124.

χώραν ἔλεξαν ὑπάρχειν τὸν τοῦ μείζονος σώματος τόπον, ὡς ταύτη διαφέρειν τοῦ τόπου τὴν χώραν, τῷ ἐκείνῳ μὲν μὴ ἐμφαίνειν μέγεθος τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου σώματος (κἂν γὰρ ἐλάχιστον περιέχῃ σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἦττον τόπος προσαγορεύεται), τὴν δ' ἀξίολογον ἐμφαίνειν μέγεθος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ σώματος.

6 περὶ μὲν οὖν κενοῦ ποικίλως ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων ἐζητήσαμεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ νῦν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον παλινωδεῖν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῆς συζυγοῦσης τούτῳ χώρας, ἥτις καὶ αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τόπος, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος σκεψόμεθα. προδηλοτέροις γὰρ οὐσι τούτοις καὶ παρὰ πᾶσι σχεδὸν ὁμολογουμένοις συναπορηθήσεται καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ σκέψις, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ ἀδηλοτέρου πράγματος προκόπτει.

A.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΠΟΣ

6 Τῆς τοῦ τόπου νοήσεως δεδηλωμένης καὶ τῶν συζυγούντων αὐτῷ πραγμάτων ὑποδεδειγμένων ἀπολείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερον κινήσαι λόγους καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς

7 συναγομένην ἐποχὴν κρατύνεσθαι. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ καὶ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, ἔστι τις τόπος· μέρη γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ ἕξ αὐταὶ παρατάσεις τοῦ τόπου, καὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστὶ τινος τῶν μερῶν ὑπαρχόντων μὴ οὐχὶ κάκεινο ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη. ἔστι δέ γε ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εἰς δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ καὶ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· ἔστιν ἄρα τόπος.

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 333 ff.

† Thus the arguments for the existence of "place" (or

But some have said that room is "the place of the 4 larger body," so that room differs from place in the fact that the latter does not imply magnitude of the contained body (for even if it contains a minimal body it is none the less termed "place"), whereas the former implies considerable magnitude in the body it contains. Now "void" we have already discussed 5 in various ways in our sections "Concerning Elements,"^a and there is no need now to repeat the same account; on the present occasion we shall examine "place" and the allied subject of "room," which itself also comes under the head of place. For along with these, which are more evident and subjects of almost universal agreement, the inquiry about void also will be shown to involve doubt, in so far as it deals with a less evident matter.

CHAPTER I.—DOES PLACE EXIST?

Now that the conception of place has been ex- 6 plained and the things allied therewith indicated, it remains for us—in accordance with the Sceptics' custom—to expound the arguments on both sides^b and to justify the suspension of judgement deduced therefrom. If, then, there exist upwards and down-7 wards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, some place exists; for these six directions are parts of place, and it is impossible that, if the parts of a thing exist, the thing of which they are parts should not exist. But upwards and downwards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, do exist in the nature of things;

"space") are given in §§ 7-12 (cf. *P.H.* iii. 120-121)—those against in §§ 13-19 (cf. *P.H.* iii. 122-123); and further arguments in criticism of "place" are added in §§ 20-36.

8 οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἰ ὅπου ἦν Σωκράτης, νῦν ἔστιν ἄλλος, ὡς Πλάτων ἀποθανόντος Σωκράτους, ἔστιν ἄρα τόπος. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀμφορέϊ ὕγρου ἐκκενωθέντος καὶ ἄλλου ἐπεχυθέντος λέγομεν ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἀμφορέα τόπον ὄντα καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὕστερου ἐπεμβληθέντος ὕγρου, οὕτως εἰ ὅν τόπον κατεῖχε Σωκράτης ὅτ' ἔζη, τοῦτον ἕτερος νῦν
9 κατέχει, ἔστι τις τόπος. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα, καὶ τόπος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. πρὸς τούτοις εἰ ὅπου τὸ κοῦφον φύσει φέρεται, ἐκεῖ τὸ βαρὺ φύσει οὐ φέρεται, ἔστιν ἴδιος τοῦ κοῦφου καὶ τοῦ βαρέος τόπος· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. τό γέ τοι πῦρ φύσει κοῦφον καθεστῶς ἀνώφορον ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ φύσει βαρὺ τυγχάνον κάτω βρῖθει, καὶ οὔτε τὸ πῦρ κάτω φέρεται οὔτε τὸ ὕδωρ ἄνω ἄττει. ἔστιν ἄρα ἴδιος καὶ τοῦ φύσει κοῦφου καὶ τοῦ φύσει
10 βαρέος τόπος. ὥσπερ τε εἰ τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι γίνεταί ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ τι γίνεταί καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ, οὕτως ὑπάρχοι ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεταί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι γίνεταί, ὡς ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ, ὡς αἶτιον, καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ, καθάπερ τὸ τέλος· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεταί, τούτέστιν ὁ
11 τόπος. οἳ τε παλαιοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅλα διακοσμήσαντες ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ὑπέθεντο τόπον, κἀντεῦθεν ὀρμηθεῖς ὁ Ἡσιόδος ἀνεφώνησεν

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ,

^a Cf. Aristot. *De caelo* iv. 3.

^b Hesiod, *Theog.* 116 f. (cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 8).

therefore place exists.—Moreover, if where Socrates 8 was another man (such as Plato) now is, Socrates being dead, then place exists. For just as, when the liquid in the pitcher has been emptied out and other liquid poured in, we declare that the pitcher, which is the place both of the former liquid and of that poured in later, exists, so likewise, if another man now occupies the place which Socrates occupied when he was alive, some place exists.—Again, if a body 9 exists, place also exists; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further, if where what is light naturally moves there what is heavy naturally does not move, there exists a separate place for the light and for the heavy ^a; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). For certainly fire, which is naturally light, tends to ascend, and water, which is naturally heavy, presses downwards, and neither does fire move downwards nor water shoot upwards. There exists, therefore, a separate place both for the naturally light and for the naturally heavy.—Also, just as if there exists 10 that from which a thing becomes, and that by which a thing becomes, and that on account of which a thing becomes, so too there will exist that in which a thing becomes. But that from which a thing becomes (namely, its matter) exists, and that by which (namely, its cause), and that on account of which (that is, its end); therefore, that in which a thing becomes (that is, its place) exists also.—The 11 ancients also in planning the order of the Universe laid down place as the first principle of all things, and starting out from it Hesiod proclaimed ^b how—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
Earth broad-bosom'd, unshakable seat of all things for ever—

χάος λέγων τὸν χωρητικὸν τῶν ὄλων τόπον· μὴ ὑποκειμένου γὰρ τούτου οὔτε γῆ οὔτε ὕδωρ οὔτε τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν στοιχείων, οὐχ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος 12 ἐδύνατο συστήναι. κὰν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν δὲ ἅπαντα ἀνέλωμεν, ὁ τόπος οὐκ ἀναιρεθήσεται ἐν ᾧ ἦν τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' ὑπομένει, τὰς τρεῖς ἔχων διαστάσεις, μήκος βάθος πλάτος, χωρὶς ἀντιτυπίας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ἦν σώματος.

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ εἰώθασι τοιαῦτα οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων διεξέρχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ καταστήσαι τὴν 13 ὑπαρξίν τοῦ τόπου. πάντα δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτο δύνανται ποιεῖν. τό τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ τόπου θέλει ἐπιλογίζεσθαι τὸ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὑπάρχειν τελῶς ἐστὶ μειρακιῶδες· ὁ γὰρ μὴ διδοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ὄλον, οὗτος οὐδὲ τὰ μέρη συγ-χωρήσει τοῦ ὄλου. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ τὰ τινὸς μέρος αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐ τὰ μέρη καθέστηκεν, δυνάμει ὁ λέγων “εἰ ἔστι τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, ἔστιν ὁ τόπος” τοῦτό φησι “εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.” ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ ζητούμενον 14 εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ πίστιν ὡς ἀζήτητον παρείληπται. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ρητέον καὶ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἦν Σωκράτης νῦν εἶναι Πλάτωνα συνάγωσι τὴν ὑπαρξίν τοῦ τόπου. ἡμῶν γὰρ ζητούντων εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, διαφέρων αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λεγομένου περιέχεσθαι σώματος, ἐκεῖνοι ὡς ὁμόλογον ἡμῖν ἀντιφωνοῦσι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ γεγονέναι Σωκράτην καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ νῦν περιέχεσθαι 15 Πλάτωνα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λέγομεν ἀφελῶς ἐν Ἀλεξ-ανδρείᾳ εἶναι τινα καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ

meaning by “Chaos” the place which serves to contain all things; for if this had not subsisted neither earth nor water nor the rest of the elements, nor the Universe as a whole, could have been constructed. And even if, in imagination, we abolish all things, 12 the place wherein all things were will not be abolished, but remains possessing its three dimensions—length, depth, breadth,—but without solidity; for this is an attribute peculiar to body.^a

There are also other reasons of this kind which the Dogmatic philosophers are wont to enumerate for the purpose of establishing the real existence of place. But they are able to effect anything rather than this. 13 For to try to argue from the parts of place that place itself also exists is perfectly childish; for he who does not grant them that the whole exists will not concede that the parts of the whole exist. And besides, since the parts of a thing are that very thing whereof they are the parts, he who argues—“If the parts of place exist, place exists”—is virtually saying “If place exists, place exists.” But this is absurd; for the thing in question is brought in for the purpose of confirming itself as though it were not in question. And 14 the same may be said when they deduce the existence of place from the fact that Plato now exists in the place where Socrates existed. For while we are inquiring whether the place in which the body exists, as distinct from the body itself which is said to be contained therein, is an existent thing they reply to us—as though it were agreed—that Socrates was in a place and that Plato is now contained in that place. Now it is agreed that, speaking loosely, we say that a 15 man is in Alexandria^b or in the gymnasium or in the

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 39.

^b Cf. § 95, P.H. iii. 221.

σχολῆ, ὁμολογόν· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῶν ἡ σκέψις οὐ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ περιγραφὴν τόπου, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, ποταπὸν τὴν φύσιν, ἀρὰ γε σωματικὸν ἢ ἀσώματον καὶ ἐν τόπῳ περιεχόμενον ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ὧν οὐδὲν ἴσχυσαν παραστήσαι οἱ ταῖς προειρη-
 16 μέναις ὑπομήσεσι χρώμενοι. κοῦφόν τε φύσει οὐ δίδοται εἶναι τὸ σῶμα, ἵνα καὶ εἰς ἴδιον φέρηται τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὑπ' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰτίας καὶ καταναγκασμένως¹ εἰς τινὰ ἀνωθεῖται τόπου. εἴτα κὰν δοθῆ ἢ φύσει τυγχάνεναι κοῦφον καὶ φύσει βαρῦ, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀπορήσεται τὸ εἰς τί φέρεται, ἀρα εἰς γε σῶμά τι ἢ κενὸν ἢ πέρας ἢ ἄλλο τι διαφερούσης μετεσχηκῶς
 17 φύσεως. ναί, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐξ οὐ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ καὶ τὸ δι' οὐ, εἴη ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ. οὐ πάντως φήσομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀπορεῖται τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι γίνεται, τοὔτέστι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ, καθάπερ τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ καθόλου τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι ἢ κοινότερον κινεῖσθαι, ἀνάγκη συνηπορῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ. τὸ δ' ὅτι ταῦτ' ἠπόρηται, καὶ πρότερον ἐδειξάμεν περὶ τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος δι-
 18 σκεπτόμενοι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰπὼν

ἦτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 γαῖ' εὐρύτερον, πάντων ἕδος,

¹ καταναγκασμένως Heintz: καταναγκασμένης mss., Bekk.

* For this distinction see § 95 *infra*, and *P.H.* iii. 75.

^b *Cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 195 ff., 207 ff., 267 ff.

^c *Cf.* §§ 310 ff. *infra*.

school; but our investigation is not concerned with place in the broad sense but with that in the circumscribed sense,^a as to whether this exists or is merely imagined; and if it exists, of what sort it is in its nature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and whether contained in place or not. And none of these points have those who employ the foregoing arguments been able to establish.—Nor is it granted that there is any
 16 body which is naturally light, so that it moves into a separate place of its own, but even that which seems to be such is driven up into certain places by some cause and through compulsion. And further, even if it be granted that a naturally light and a naturally heavy exist, none the less it will again be a matter of doubt into what it moves, whether into some body or into a void or a limit or something else possessed of a distinct nature. “Yes,” (they reply), “but if the
 17 ‘from which’ and the ‘by which’ and the ‘on account of which’ exist, the ‘in which’ will also exist.” Not necessarily, we shall say. For if there is doubt about that “from which” a thing becomes (that is, the passive element), and about the “by which” (namely, the cause), and in general about becoming and perishing, or motion generally, then the “in which” also will necessarily be involved in the same doubt. And that these things are matters of doubt we have shown before in our discussion of agent and patient,^b and we shall point it out again when considering becoming and perishing,^c and also, at an earlier stage, motion.^d
 For he who said e—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
 Earth broad-bosom'd, of all things the seat—

^a *Cf.* §§ 37 ff. *infra*.

^b *Cf.* § 11 *supra*.

ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεται· ἐρομένου γάρ τινος αὐτὸν ἐκ τίνος γέγονε τὸ χάος, οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτό φασιν ἔνιοι αἰτίον γεγενῆαι Ἐπικούρῳ τῆς 19 ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ὀρμῆς. κομιδῇ γὰρ μειρακίσκος ὢν ἤρητο τὸν ἐπαναγωγώσκοντα αὐτῷ γραμματιστῆν "ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ'," ἐκ τίνος τὸ χάος ἐγένετο, εἴπερ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσόφων, τοίνυν, ἔφησεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδιστέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ αὐτοὶ τῆν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν ἴσασι.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἰκνούμενον λέγεται εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχειν τι τὸν τόπον, ἐκ τούτων ἤδη γνώριμον· 20 ἐπισυναπτέον δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τις ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος, ἦτοι σῶμά ἐστιν οὗτος ἢ κενόν. καὶ σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ, κακείνος πάλιν ἐν τρίτῳ, καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. 21 οὐ τοίνυν σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος. εἰ δὲ κενόν ἐστὶν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος, ἦτοι μένει τοῦτο τὸ κενόν ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος ἢ μεθίσταται ἢ φθείρεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος, ἔσται κενόν ἅμα καὶ πλήρες, ἢ μὲν μένει, κενόν, ἢ δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ σῶμα, πλήρες. ἀδιανόητον δὲ γε τὸ αὐτὸ κενὸν τε καὶ πλήρες λέγειν· τοίνυν οὐ μένει τὸ 22 κενόν ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος. εἰ δὲ μεθίσταται τὸ κενόν, ἔσται σῶμα τὸ κενόν· τὸ γὰρ μεθιστάμενον τόπον ἐκ τόπου σῶμά ἐστιν. οὐχί

is refuted by himself; for if someone asks him "from what did Chaos come into being?", he will have no answer. And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing. For when still quite 19 a youth^a he asked his schoolmaster, who was reading out the line "Verily first created of all was Chaos," what Chaos was created from, if it was created first. And when he replied that it was not his business, but that of the men called philosophers, to teach things of that sort, "Well then," said Epicurus, "I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things."

So from this it is already evident that nothing pertinent is said to show that place is a real thing; and to this we must further add the Sceptics' argu- 20 ments:—If there exists any place receptive of body, it is either body or void. But the place receptive of body is not body; for if every body must be in a place, and place is a body, place will be in a place, and this again in a third, and the third in a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. So then the place receptive of body is not a body. And if the place receptive of body is a void, this void either remains when the body comes upon it, or moves away, or perishes.^b And if it remains when the body comes upon it, it will be at once both void and full,—void in so far as it remains, but full in so far as it admits the body. But it is irrational to say that the same thing is both void and full; the void, then, does not remain when the body comes upon it. And if the void moves away, 22 the void will be body, for that which moves away from place to place is a body. But the void is not a

^a At the age of 14, according to Diog. Laert. x. 2.

^b With §§ 21-23 cf. P.H. iii. 129.

δέ γε σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν, ὥστε οὐδὲ μεθίσταται ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ μεθίσταται τοῦ σώματος ἐπιόντος, οὐκέτι δέξεται τὸ
 23 σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀτόπων. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν φθειρεσθαι τὸ κενόν· ὃ πάλιν ἀδύνατον. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται, ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ κινήσει γίνεται [καὶ εἰ φθείρεται, γενητόν ἐστι]· τὸ δ' ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ κινήσει γνωόμενον [γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτόν]· σῶμα καθέστηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲ φθείρεται τὸ κενόν. καὶ οὕτως, εἰ μήτε σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, μήτε κενόν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τόπος.

24 Πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι, εἰ ὁ τόπος περιεκτικὸς νοεῖται τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ περιέχον ἐκτός ἐστι τοῦ περιεχομένου, κατ' ἀνάγκην, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ὀφείλει τι τούτων τυγχάνειν ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ
 25 σώματος περάτων, τὸ δὲ πέρατα ἔσχατα. ὕλη μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ τόπος κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, οἷον ἐπεὶ αὕτη μὲν σεσωμάτῳται, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὐ σεσωμάτῳται, καὶ ἡ μὲν ὕλη μέτεισι ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ὕλης λέγομεν ὅτι πρότερον μὲν ἦν ἀήρ, νῦν δὲ πυκνωθεῖσα γέγονεν ὕδωρ, ἡ ἀνάπαλι πρότερον μὲν ὕδωρ ἦν, νῦν δὲ λεπτυνθεῖσα γέγονεν ἀήρ· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου οὐ λέγομεν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάλαι μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν ἀήρ, νῦν δ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ὕδωρ. οὐ τοίνυν δύναται ὕλη ὁ τόπος
 26 νοεῖσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χαλκοῦ, ὃ δὲ τόπος χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· μεταβαίνει γὰρ

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body, so that it does not move away either when the body comes upon it. And besides, if it moves away when the body comes upon it, it will no longer receive the body; and this too is itself an absurd notion. It
 23 remains, therefore, to declare that the void perishes; which again is impossible. For if it perishes, it becomes in a state of change and motion [and if it perishes it is generable]; but that which becomes in a state of change and motion is a body [both generable and perishable]; so that the void does not perish. And so, if place is neither a body, as we have established, nor void, as we have shown, no place will exist.

And furthermore, if place is conceived as containing
 24 body, and that which contains is outside of that which is contained, necessarily, if place exists, it must be some one of those things of which one is matter, another form, another the interval between the extreme limits of the body, another the extreme limits. Now place will not be matter for many
 25 reasons,—because, for instance, the latter is corporealized but place is not corporealized, and matter passes over from place to place, but place does not pass over from place to place. And as regards matter we say that formerly it was air but now after condensation it has become water, or conversely that formerly it was water but now after rarefaction it has become air; but we do not speak thus in the case of place, but we say that formerly there was air in it but now there is water in it. So then place cannot be conceived as matter.—Nor, in fact, as form. For
 26 form is inseparable from matter,—as in the case of the statue it is inseparable from the underlying bronze,—but place is separate from body; for the

¹ [καὶ . . . ἐστι] et [γενητόν . . . φθαρτόν] secl. ego.

ἐκεῖνο καὶ εἰς ἕτερον μεθίσταται τόπον μὴ συμ-
μεταβαίνοντος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ περιείχετο τόπου.
ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, ὁ
δὲ τόπος χωρίζεται ταύτης, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ εἶδος ὁ
τόπος. καὶ πάλιν τὸ μὲν εἶδος συμμεταβαίνει τῇ
ὕλῃ, ὁ δὲ τόπος, ὡς προείπον, οὐ συμμεταβαίνει
τῷ σώματι· τοίνυν οὐδὲ εἶδος ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος.

27 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν περάτων διάστημα·
τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχεται πρὸς τῶν περάτων, ὁ δὲ
τόπος οὐ βούλεται περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τινος ἀλλ'
ἐτέρων εἶναι περιεκτικός. εἴτα πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ
σώματος ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
διάστημα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πεπερατωμένον
σῶμα. εἰ οὖν φαμέν τὸ μεταξὺ [τῶν πεπερατω-
μένων σωμάτων]¹ τόπον εἶναι, ἔσται σῶμα ὁ τόπος·

28 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαίνον. λείπεται οὖν λέγειν
ὅτι τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ σώματος πέρατά ἐστι τόπος·
ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἔσχατα
τοῦ σώματος συνεχῆ ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ μέρη
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀχώριστα, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὔτε συνεχῆς ἐστὶ
τῷ σώματι οὔτε μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἀχώριστος τοῦ
σώματος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν σωμάτων
29 ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὕλη ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ μήτε
τὸ εἶδος μήτε τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν περάτων μήτ'
αὐτὰ τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ σώματος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
ἔστιν ἄλλο ἐπινοεῖν, ῥητέον μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τόπον.

30 Ναὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλόσοφοι,
ἀλλὰ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περιέχοντος σώ-
ματος. τῆς γὰρ γῆς ὕδατι περιεχομένης καὶ τοῦ
ὑδατος ἀέρι περιεχομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος πυρὶ καὶ

¹ [τῶν . . . σωμάτων] secl. ego: τῶν περάτων τῶν σ. Fabr.
in vers.

latter changes its position and moves on to another
place, while the place wherein it was contained does
not change position along with it. So that if form is
inseparable from matter, whereas place is separate
from it, place will not be form. And again,—the
form changes its position along with the matter, but
place, as I said before, does not change its position
along with body; so then place is not form.—So 27
likewise it is not the interval between the limits; for
this is enclosed by the limits, whereas place refuses
to be enclosed by anything, but itself serves to enclose
other things. Moreover, surface is a limit of body,
and the interval after the surface is nothing else than
the limited body. If, then, we assert that what is
between [the limited bodies]^a is place, place will be
a body; which is contrary to sense.—It remains, 28
then, to declare that the extreme limits of the body
are place; but this itself, too, is a thing impossible,
since the extremities of the body are continuous with
the body and parts thereof and inseparable, whereas
place is neither continuous with the body nor a part
of it nor inseparable from the body. Neither, then,
is place the extremities of the bodies. But if place 29
is neither matter nor form nor the interval between
the limits nor the extremities of the body, and besides
these one can conceive no other possibility, we must
declare that place is nothing.

“Yes,” say the Peripatetic philosophers, “but 30
place is the limit of the containing body.”^b For
since earth is contained in water, and water contained
in air, and air in fire, and fire in Heaven,—just as

^a The words bracketed would imply an interval between
different bodies, whereas it seems clear that the reference is
to the internal space of a single body.

^b With § 30 cf. P.H. iii. 131.

τοῦ πυρός οὐρανῶ, ὃν τρόπον τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου πέρασ
τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀγγεῖῳ σώματος, οὕτω καὶ
τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος πέρασ ἐστὶ τόπος τῆς γῆς, καὶ τὸ
τοῦ ἀέρος πέρασ ἐστὶ τόπος τοῦ ὕδατος, καὶ τὸ τοῦ
πυρός πέρασ τόπος ἔσται τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ τὸ τοῦ
31 οὐρανοῦ πέρασ τόπος ἔσται τοῦ πυρός. αὐτὸς
μέντοι ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη οὐκέτ'
ἐστὶν ἐν τόπῳ ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ
ιδιότητι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ περι-
έχοντος σώματος πέρασ, ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν φιλόσοφον οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ
τὸ τούτου πέρασ γένηται τόπος οὐρανοῦ, ἀνάγκη
καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπὸ μηδεὸς περιεχόμενον ἐν
ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις περιέχεσθαι πέρασιν,
32 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τόπῳ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν οὐδέ που ὃν
ἐστὶν ὁ οὐρανός· τὸ γὰρ που ὃν αὐτὸ τε ἔστιν
ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἕτερον τὸ ὅπου ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς
οὐδὲν ἔχει ἕτερον παρ' αὐτὸν ἕξωθεν, διόπερ αὐτὸς
33 ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὧν οὐδέ που γενήσεται. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ
τοῖς οὕτω λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν περιπατητικῶν,
κινδυνεύει ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς τόπος εἶναι πάντων.
κατὰ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλη ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς ἦν τὸ
πέρασ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ἦτοι οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἕτερόν ἐστι
παρὰ τὸ οὐράνιον πέρασ, ἢ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὁ θεὸς
ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὸ οὐράνιον
πέρασ, ἔσται τι ἕτερον ἐκτὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὸ
τούτου πέρασ τόπος γενήσεται οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ταύτη
δύσσοισιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη ἐν τόπῳ περι-
έχεσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν· ὅπερ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦσιν, ἀνθ-
εστῶτες ἑκατέρῳ τούτων, τῷ τε εἶναι τι ἐκτὸς
οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῷ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι.

the limit of the vessel is the place of the body in the vessel, so also the limit of water is the place of earth, and the limit of air is the place of water, and the limit of fire will be the place of air, and the limit of Heaven will be the place of fire. When we come to 31 the Heaven itself, however, according to Aristotle,^a it is not in place but abides within itself and in its own proper selfhood; for since place is the extreme limit of the containing body, and according to this philosopher nothing exists outside Heaven so that its limit should be the place of Heaven, it is necessary that Heaven, being contained by nothing, should exist in itself and be contained within its own limits, and not exist in place. Hence Heaven is not existent 32 anywhere; for that which exists anywhere both exists itself and its "where" is other than it, but Heaven has no other thing besides and outside of itself; and on this account, as existing itself within itself, it will not be anywhere.—And so far as regards 33 these statements of the Peripatetics, it seems likely that the First God is the place of all things. For according to Aristotle^b the First God is the limit of Heaven. Either, then, God is something other than the Heaven's limit, or God is just that limit. And if He is other than Heaven's limit, something else will exist outside Heaven, and its limit will be the place of Heaven, and thus the Aristotelians will be granting that Heaven is contained in place; but this they will not tolerate, as they are opposed to both these notions,—both that anything exists outside of Heaven and that Heaven is contained in place. And if God

^a Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 5.

^b Cf. Aristot. *De caelo* i. 3 270 b 6, πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θεῷ τόπον ἀποδιδάσκει . . . (b 22) αἰθέρα προσωνομάσαν τὸν ἀνωτάτω τόπον.

εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ οὐρανῷ πέρατι ὁ θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πέρασ τόπος ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ὁ θεός πάντων τόπος, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων.

34 καθόλου τε, εἴπερ τὸ τοῦ ἐμπεριέχοντος σώματος πέρασ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου, τοῦτο τὸ πέρασ ἤτοι σώμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον. καὶ εἰ μὲν σώμά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σώμα ὀφείλει ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι, ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ καὶ οὐκέτι τόπος· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος πέρασ, ἐπεὶ παντός σώματος τὸ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, ἔσται ἐκάστου σώματος τόπος ἐπι-

35 φάνεια, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καθόλου τε πῶς οὐ καταγέλαστόν ἐστι λέγειν τὸν οὐρανὸν αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ τόπον εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τε καὶ δύο, σώμα τε καὶ ἀσώματον. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν, ἐν ἔσται, ἢ δὲ περιέχον καὶ ἐμπεριεχόμενον, δύο γενήσεται, καὶ ἢ μὲν περιεχόμενον, σώμα, ἢ δὲ

36 περιέχον, ἀσώματον· τόπος γὰρ ἦν. οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο καὶ σώμα καὶ ἀσώματον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην νόησιν εὐδρομεῖ ἢ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις.

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον ἀηρήκαμεν, ἴδωμεν ἐξῆς εἰ δύναται τι τῶν ὄντων κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι.

B'.—Εἰ ἔστι κίνησις

37 Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξ εἶδη τῆς κινήσεως ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν, ὡν τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι τοπικὴν μεταβάσιν, τὸ δὲ μεταβολὴν, τὸ δὲ γένεσιν, τὸ δὲ φθοράν, τὸ δὲ αὐξήσιν, τὸ δὲ μείωσιν· οἱ δὲ πλείους,

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is identical with Heaven's limit, since Heaven's limit is the place of all things within Heaven, God—according to Aristotle—will be the place of all things; and this, too, is itself a thing contrary to sense.—Also, in 34 general, if the limit of the enclosing body is the place of the enclosed, this limit is either a body or incorporeal. And if it is a body, since every body must be in a place, place will be in a place and will no longer be place; but if the limit of the containing body is incorporeal, since the limit of every body is a surface, the place of each body will be a surface, which is absurd.—Also, in general, how is it other 35 than ridiculous to say that Heaven is itself its own place? For in this case the same thing will be both the container and the contained, and the same thing both one and two, both body and incorporeal. For in so far as it is the same thing it will be one, but in so far as it is both container and contained it will be two; and in so far as it is contained it will be body, but in so far as it is container, incorporeal; for it is place. But the same thing cannot be conceived as at 36 once both one and two, both body and incorporeal; so then, neither with this conception of it does the apprehension of place have an easy course.

And now that we have abolished this also, let us next consider whether any of the existing things can move in space.

CHAPTER II.—DOES MOTION EXIST?

Aristotle said ^a that there are six kinds of motion, 37 and of these one is local transition, another change, another becoming, another perishing, another increase, another decrease; but the majority—amongst 38

^a Cf. Aristot. *Categ.* 15 a 13. With §§ 37-41 cf. *P.H.* iii. 64.

ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀινησιδῆμον, διττὴν τινα
 κατὰ τὸ ἄνωγάτω κίνησιν ἀπολείπουσι, μίαν μὲν
 39 τὴν μεταβλητικὴν, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν μεταβατικὴν,
 ὧν μεταβλητικὴ μὲν ἐστὶ κίνησις καθ' ἣν τὸ σῶμα
 ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μένον οὐσίᾳ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλην ἀναδέχεται
 ποιότητες καὶ ἣν μὲν ἀπολείπει ἣν δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνει,
 ὁποῖόν τι γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰς ὄξος μεταβάλλοντος
 οἴνου καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ὄμφακος εἰς γλυκὺν χυμὸν
 μεταβαλλούσης σταφυλῆς ἢ τοῦ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως
 40 ποικιλλομένου τὰς χροὰς χαμαιλέοντος ἢ πολύ-
 ποδος. ὅθεν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν καὶ
 τὴν αὔξησιν ἔτι δὲ μείωσιν εἰδικὰς ῥητέον εἶναι
 μεταβολὰς· ὡς φασι καὶ τῇ μεταβλητικῇ κινήσει
 ὑποστέλλειν, εἰ μὴ τι τὴν αὔξησιν φήσει τις
 ἔχεισθαι τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως, ὡς πρόβασι
 41 οὖσαν¹ σωμάτων εἷς τε μήκος καὶ εὖρος. μετα-
 βατικὴ δὲ ἐστὶ κίνησις καθ' ἣν τὸν ὅλον ἢ κατὰ μέρος,
 ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τροχαζόντων καὶ περιπατούν-
 των θεωροῦμεν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκ-
 τεινομένης καὶ συστελλομένης χειρὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν
 τῆς περὶ κέντρω² δινομένης σφαίρας μερῶν. ὅλης
 γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσης τόπῳ τὰ μέρη
 ἀμείβει τοὺς τόπους· τὸ γὰρ κάτω ὄν πρότερον ἄνω
 γίνεται καὶ τὸ ἄνω κάτω καὶ τὸ πρόσω ὀπίσω.
 42 καίτοι τινὲς τῶν φυσικῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ
 ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, τὴν μεταβλητικὴν κίνησιν εἶδος
 ἔλεξαν εἶναι τῆς μεταβατικῆς· τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον
 κατὰ ποιότητες σύγκριμα πάντως κατὰ τὴν τῶν

¹ <ὡς> πρόβασι οὖσαν Heintz: προβαίνουσαν mss., Bekk.
² κέντρω Mutsch.: κέντροις mss., Bekk.

whom Aenesidemus is included—allow that motion,
 in its main kinds, is twofold, one sort being that of
 change, the second that of transition; and of these 39
 the motion of change is that by which the body, while
 remaining identical in substance, receives different
 qualities at different times, putting off one quality
 and putting on another,—the sort of thing which takes
 place in the case of wine changing into vinegar and in
 the case of the grape when it changes from a state of
 acidity to a sweet flavour, or when the chameleon or
 polypod takes on a variety of different colours at
 different times. Hence, too, it must be affirmed that 40
 becoming and perishing and increase, and decrease as
 well, are particular forms of change; and they assert
 that these come under the head of the motion of
 change, unless perhaps someone should assert that
 increase belongs to transitional motion, as it is the
 progress of bodies towards length and breadth. And 41
 transitional motion is that by which the moving object
 passes from place to place, either wholly or partially,
 —wholly as we see in the case of runners and walkers,
 and partially as in the case of a hand which is ex-
 tended and clenched, or in the case of the parts of a
 sphere which is spinning round its centre. For while
 this as a whole remains in the same place, its parts
 change their places; for the part which was formerly
 below becomes above, and the above below, and the
 before behind.—Some of the physicists, however,— 42
 and amongst them Epicurus—have declared that the
 motion of change is a particular form of transitional
 motion; for the composite object which changes in

συγκεκρικότων αὐτὸ λόγω θεωρητῶν σωμάτων
 τοπικὴν τε καὶ μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν μεταβάλλει.
 43 οἷον ἵνα τι ἐκ γλυκέος γένηται πικρὸν ἢ ἐκ λευκοῦ
 μέλαν, δεῖ τοὺς συνιστακότας αὐτὸ ὄγκους μετα-
 κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἄλλην ἀντὶ ἄλλης τάξιν ἀνα-
 δέξασθαι· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως συμβαίῃ, ἐὰν μὴ
 μεταβατικῶς κινήθωσιν οἱ ὄγκοι. καὶ πάλιν ἵνα
 τι ἐκ σκληροῦ μαλακὸν γένηται ἢ ἐκ μαλακοῦ
 σκληρόν, δεῖ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἔστι μόρια κατὰ τὸν τόπον
 44 κινήθῆναι· διατάσει μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν μαλακύνεται,
 συνελεύσει δὲ καὶ πυκνώσει σκληρύνεται. παρ' ὃ
 ἢ μεταβλητικὴ κίνησις οὐχ ἕτερα κατὰ γένος ἔστι
 τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως. διόπερ ἡμεῖς πρὸς
 ταύτην μάλιστα κομιοῦμεν τὰς ἀπορίας, ἐπεὶπερ
 αἰρομένης αὐτῆς οἰχῆσεται καὶ ἢ μεταβλητικὴ
 κίνησις.
 45 Πρὶν δὲ τῶν ἀποριῶν γνωστότεον ὅτι τρεῖς γε-
 γόνασι στάσεις κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως.
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ φασι κίνησιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ
 οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὃ τε
 βίος,¹ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχων, καὶ οἱ πλείους
 τῶν φυσικῶν, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν καὶ
 Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ
 Ἐπίκουρον, οἷς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἐπι δὲ
 καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς συναπεγράψαντο καὶ ἄλλοι
 46 παμπληθεῖς· μὴ εἶναι δὲ οἱ περὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ
 Μέλισσον, οὓς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης στασιώτας τε (τῆς
 φύσεως)² καὶ ἀφυσικούς κέκληκεν, στασιώτας μὲν

¹ βίος NL: Bías cet., Bekk.

² <τῆς φύσεως> add. NLE.

quality changes owing to the local and transitional
 motion of the rationally perceived bodies which com-
 pose it. Thus, in order that a thing may become 43
 bitter from sweet, or black from white, the molecules
 which compose it must be arranged in a new order
 and take up different positions; and this could not
 be brought about otherwise than by the transitional
 motion of the molecules. And again,—in order that
 a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft,
 the parts whereof it is composed must move in place ;
 for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard 44
 by their coalescence and condensation. And owing
 to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing
 else than transitional motion. Consequently, we
 shall bring our criticisms to bear chiefly on this last,
 since if it is abolished the motion of change will also
 disappear.

But before we begin our criticisms we must observe 45
 that there have been three main views regarding
 motion.^a Some say that motion exists, others that
 it does not exist, and others that it is “no more”
 existent than non-existent. That it exists is affirmed
 both by ordinary folk, who pay attention to appear-
 ances, and by the majority of physicists, such as
 Pythagoras and Empedocles and Anaxagoras and
 Democritus and Epicurus, to whose view also the
 Peripatetics have subscribed, and the Stoics as well,
 and a host of others. But its non-existence is affirmed 46
 by Parmenides and Melissus, whom Aristotle has
 described as “Nature’s stationers”^b and “anti-
 naturalists”—“stationers” from “standing still,”

where the Eleatics are called τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται (“partisans
 of the Whole”), with a play on στασ. (as if from στάσις,
 “rest”).

^a With §§ 45-49 cf. P.H. iii. 65.

^b This phrase is derived (by A.) from Plato, *Theaet.* 181 A,

ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως, ἀφυσικούς δὲ ὅτι ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς
 ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, ἣν ἀνείλον φάμενοι μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι.
 47 τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ὀφείλει ἀνένειν τι διάστημα, πᾶν
 δὲ διάστημα διὰ τὸ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον δέχεσθαι
 48 τομὴν ἀνήνυτον ἔστιν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κινούμενον τι
 Διόδωρος ὁ Κρόνος, εἰ μὴ τι ῥητέον κατὰ τοῦτον
 κενεῖσθαι μὲν τι κινεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲ ἔν, ὡς προ-
 βαίνοντος τοῦ λόγου διδάξομεν, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 στάσιν ἀκριβέστερον ἐπισκεπτώμεθα· τὰ νῦν δὲ
 ἀπόρηται τοῦτο γνώσκω, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῆς
 αὐτῆς ἔστι δόξης τοῖς τὴν κίνησιν ἀνηρηκόσιν.
 49 μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι κίνησιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔλεξαν οἱ
 ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινο-
 μένοις εἶναι τι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
 λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

50 Τοιαύτη μὲν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν τόπον στάσις· μεθ'
 ἣν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐπιχειροῦντες πρῶτας
 κομιοῦμεν ἐνστάσεις, ἐχόμενοι τῆς κατὰ τὴν
 κίνησιν ἐννοίας. ἔνιοι τοίνυν ὀριζόμενοι τὴν κίνησιν
 φασὶ "κίνησις ἔστι μετάβασις ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς
 51 τόπον." πρὸς οὓς λέγεται ὅτι τὴν μὲν εὐθικὴν
 κίνησιν ἀπέδοσαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ
 πρόσω ἢ ὀπίσω ἢ εἰς δεξιὰ ἢ εἰς ἀριστερά, τὴν
 δὲ κυκλοφορητικὴν παρέλιπον, οἷον καθ' ἣν ὁ
 κεραμεικὸς τροχὸς στρέφεται καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα τοῖς
 κνώδαξιν περιδινεῖται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄξονες
 καὶ τὰ τύμματα· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν οὕτω κινου-
 μένων σωμάτων οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς
 τόπον ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον τόπῳ κινεῖται.

52 ὅθεν τινὲς τὴν τοιαύτην φεύγοντες ἐνστάσιν δι-

and "anti-naturalists" because Nature is the first
 principle of motion, and it they abolished by declaring
 that nothing moves. For what moves must complete 47
 a certain interval, but every interval is incapable of
 being completed because it admits of division *ad*
infinitum, so that no moving thing will exist. And 48
 with these men Diodorus Cronos^a also is in agree-
 ment, unless it should be said that according to him
 something has moved but not a single thing is moving
 —as we shall explain later in the course of our argu-
 ment, when we come to examine his view more
 closely.^b For the present it is enough to notice this
 point, that he too is of the same opinion as those
 who have abolished motion. And that motion is "no 49
 more" existent than non-existent has been stated
 by the Sceptics; for motion is an existent thing if
 we are to judge by appearances, but judging by
 philosophical argument it is non-existent.

Such, then, is the dissension with regard to this 50
 subject; and after this, in our endeavour to show the
 non-existence of motion, we shall bring forward our
 first objections by concentrating on the conception
 of motion. Some, then, in defining motion assert
 that "Motion is transition from place to place." And 51
 to these it is replied that while they have described
 straight-line motion—that is, up or down, forwards or
 backwards, to right or to left,—they have passed over
 circular motion, such as that by which the potter's
 wheel revolves and the sphere spins round its pivots,
 and likewise axles and drums; for each of the bodies
 which move in this way does not pass on from place
 to place but moves whilst remaining in the same
 place.—Hence, by way of escaping this objection, 52

^a Of the later Megaric School, cf. P.H. ii. 245.

^b See §§ 85 ff., 120.

ορθοῦνται τὸν ἐκκείμενον ὄρον, καὶ φασιν ὅτι κίνησίς ἐστι μετάβασις ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν. ὁ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν κινούμενος κατὰ ὁλόγητα ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον μετέρχεται, ἢ τε τοῖς κνώδαξι περιδινουμένη σφαῖρα ὅλη μὲν οὐ μεταβαίνει τόπον ἐκ τόπου, κατὰ μέρη δὲ ἀμείβει τοὺς τόπους, καὶ στρεφομένης αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνω μέρος ἐπιλαμβάνει τὸν κάτω τόπον, τὸ δὲ κάτω μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ ἐναλλάξ. διόπερ τὴν κίνησιν ῥητέον, φασί, μετάβασις εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶς τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι ὅλου τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος 53 ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν. θελήσαντες δὲ οὗτοι τὴν εἰρημένην φυγεῖν ἀπορίαν εἰς ἑτέραν ἐπέπεσαν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς μέτεισιν ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι κατὰ ὁλοσχέρειαν ἢ κατὰ μέρη, ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ τῶν μεταβατικῶς κινουμένων σωμάτων ἅπερ τισὶ μὲν μέρεσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντα τόπῳ κινεῖται τισὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντα ἀλλ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον ἐπιλαμβάνοντα, 54 ὅποιδόν τι ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυκλογραφοῦντος καρκίνου καὶ τῆς ἀνοιγομένης καὶ κλειομένης θύρας. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καρκίνου φαίνεται ἢ τῷ κέντρῳ ἐνηρησμένη κεραία κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν στρεφομένη τόπον καὶ ἢ ἔξωθεν περιαιομένη τε καὶ κυκλογραφοῦσα ἀπ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον μετιούσα τόπον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κλειομένης ἢ ἀνοιγομένης θύρας ὁ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ ὀλμίσκου βεβηκῶς στροφεὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνστρέφεται τόπῳ, τὸ δ' ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ τῆς θύρας μέρος διαφέροντας ἐπέρχεται τόπους καὶ ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπει ὃν δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνει. 55 αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ κινήσεις ἐκπεπτώκασι τῆς

some rectify the definition put forward and say that "Motion is transition from place to place either of the whole body or of the parts of the whole." For he who moves while walking passes as a whole from place to place, but the sphere which spins round on its pivots does not as a whole pass from place to place but changes its place part by part, and as it turns round the upper part comes to occupy the lower place and the lower part passes into the upper place; and the remaining parts likewise alternate. Hence, they say, we must declare that motion is a transition from place to place either of the whole moving body or of the parts of the whole.—But these men in trying to escape 53 the difficulty mentioned have fallen into another. For not everything which moves by way of transition passes from place to place either in its wholeness or part by part, but there are some of the bodies moving by transition which move with some of their parts while remaining in the same place, but move with others while not remaining in the same place but occupying one place after another, as we can see in the case of compasses when they are describing a circle and of a door that is being opened or shut. For in the case 54 of the compasses the leg that rests on the centre is evidently turning in the same place while that which revolves outside it and describes the circle passes from one place to another; and in the case of the door which is being shut or opened the pivot which is set in the socket turns there in the same place but the part of the door opposite thereto passes on to different places and leaves one and occupies another. —These motions, then, are omitted from their de- 55

ἀποδόσεως, ἣν δέ τις καὶ ἄλλη παραδοξότερα κίνησις μεταβατική, καθ' ἣν τὸ κινούμενον οὔτε καθ' ὅλον οὔτε κατὰ μέρος νοεῖται ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου· ἦτις καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκπέπτωκε τοῦ ὄρου, καθὼς αὐτόθεν συμφανές. καὶ ἔσται τὸ ἰδίωμα ταύτης προηλότερον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος 56 ποιησαμένων ἡμῶν τὴν δεῖξιν.¹ εἰ γὰρ τις οὐριόδρομουσης νηὸς ὑποκείτο ἐκ τῆς πρώρας εἰς πρύμναν ὄρθιον δοκίδα μεταφέρων καὶ ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενος τῇ νηί, ὥστε καθ' ὃν χρόνον αὐτὴ εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν ἀνύει πηχυαῖον διάστημα, κατὰ τὸν ἴσον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ κινούμενον εἰς τοῦπίσω μεταβαίνειν πηχυαῖον διάστημα, πάντως κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν γενήσεται μὲν μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ ὅλον τὸ κινούμενον ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ 57 ἔστι τόπου οὔτε κατὰ μέρος· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ κινούμενος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον τοῦ τε ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος μένει διὰ τό, ὅποσον ἂν δοκῆ εἰς τοῦπίσω προκόπτειν, τοσοῦτον σύρσθαι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν. δύναται οὖν τι κινεῖσθαι μεταβατικῶς ὁ οὔτε καθ' ὁλόγητα οὔτε κατὰ μέρος ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου.² ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν εἶναι 58 τοιαῦτα, πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως ἀπορεῖν τοὺς οὕτω τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως ἀποδιδόντας. εἴαν γὰρ νοήσωμέν τι ἀμερὲς καὶ ἐλάχιστον σῶμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρεφόμενον τόπῳ, τουτέστι κυκλοφορητικῶς, ἔσται μὲν τις μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ κατὰ ὁλόγητα ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου (τὸ)³ κινούμενον οὔτε κατὰ μέρος, καὶ κατὰ

¹ δεῖξιν cj. Bekk., Mutsch.: δόξαν mss., Bekk.

² τοῦ . . . τόπου Mutsch.: τὸν . . . τόπον mss., Bekk.

³ <τὸ> add. Heintz.

scription; but there is also another more surprising kind of transitional motion, in which the moving object is conceived as not going out from the place wherein it is either as a whole or part by part; and this too is omitted from their definition, as is obvious at once. And the peculiar character of this motion will be more evident when we have explained it by an example. For if we should suppose that, when a 56 ship is running before the wind, a man is carrying an upright rod from the prow to the stern and moving at the same speed as the ship, so that in the time in which the latter completes the distance of a cubit in a forward direction, in an equal time the man who is moving in the ship passes over the distance of a cubit in a backward direction, then, in the case thus supposed there will certainly be transitional motion, but the moving object will not go out from the place wherein it is either wholly or in part; for the man who is 57 moving in the ship remains in the same perpendicular both of air and of water owing to the fact that he is borne just as far forward as he seems to proceed backward. It is, then, possible for a thing which does not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part to move transitionally.—Such then, as it seems, are cases of this sort; and there are other difficulties 58 which may be encountered by those who thus define the notion of transitional motion. For if we conceive an indivisible and minimal body revolving in the same place,—that is, with a circular motion,—a transitional motion will exist, but the moving body will not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part—not

δλότητα μὲν ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ κυκλοφορητικῶς στρεφόμενον, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ἐπεὶ 59 ἀμερὲς ἔστιν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν συνθώμεν τινα εὐθείαν γραμμὴν ἐξ ἀμερῶν σωμάτων στοιχηδὸν τεταγμένων, καὶ ταύτην νοήσωμεν στρεφόμενην ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄξονας· πάλιν γὰρ ἔσται μὲν μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ ὄλη ἢ¹ εὐθεία ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου, κυκλοφορητικὴν γὰρ μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κίνησιν, οὔτε κατὰ μέρη, τῶν γὰρ ἀμερῶν σωμάτων οὐκ ἔστι μέρη.

60 Ἄλλὰ ταύτας μὲν τὰς ἐνοστάσεις διακρούσονται οἱ μὴ συναρεσκόμενοι τῷ [μῆ] εἶναι τινα ἀμερῆ, κήσουσι τε μέχρις ἐπινοίας προκόπτειν τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτὴν ἐπὶ ὑποστατῶν ἐξετάζεσθαι 61 σωμάτων. ὥσθ' οὗτοι μὲν οὕτως ὑπαντήσονται· οἱ δ' ἀξιούντες ἀμερῆ εἶναι σώματα καὶ τὴν κατάληξιν τῆς τῶν σωμάτων τομῆς εἰς ἐλάχιστον γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἰσχύσουσι λέγειν πρὸς τὰς τοιοῦτοτρόπους ἀπορίας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν μετασῶμεν τούτων, εὑρεθήσεται ἰσοσθενὴς ὁ τε κατασκευάζων τὸ μῆ εἶναι κίνησιν λόγος καὶ ὁ δεικνύς 62 ταύτην ὑπάρχειν. τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κίνησιν συναγορεύει ἢ ἐνάργεια, περὶ δὲ ταύτης ἔστι ζήτησις, παρόσον οἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεσθαι φασι τὴν κίνησιν, οἱ δὲ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, δι' 63 αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι λέγοντες πρᾶγμα τὴν κίνησιν πιστοῦνται τὸ τοιοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ μῆ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐγγίνεσθαι πάθος τῇ αἰσθήσει, ὅλον τῇ ὄψει, ἀπὸ τε τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος, ὅτε κινεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡρεμοῦντος, ὅτε ἡρεμεῖ, ἀλλὰ διάφορον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκινήτι-

¹ ὄλη ἢ Heintz: ἢ ὄλη mss., Bekk.

wholly, since it is assumed to be revolving with circular motion in the same spot, nor in part, since it is without parts. And the same argument applies, 59 if we should construct a straight line out of indivisible bodies placed in a row, and conceive this as revolving in the same place, as do axles; for here again there will be transitional motion but the straight line will not quit the place wherein it is either as a whole (for the motion it has is circular only) or in part (for in indivisible bodies there are no parts).

But those who do not admit the existence of any 60 indivisibles will evade these objections, and they will say that it is only in conception that this sort of motion proceeds, and it must be examined in the case of existing bodies. Consequently, these men will 61 answer thus; but those who maintain that indivisible bodies exist, and that at the minimal point there is a termination to the division of bodies, will not be able to say anything in reply to criticisms of this kind. Nevertheless, even if we refrain from pursuing these, the argument which establishes the non-existence of motion and that which proves its existence will be found to be equipollent. For the evidence of sense 62 advocates the existence of motion, although about this there is disputation, inasmuch as some assert that motion is perceived by sense, but others that it is not perceived at all by sense but by the intellect through sensation. And those who declare that motion is an 63 object of sense support this view by the fact that the same affection is not produced in the sense—in sight, for example—by a moving object when it moves and by a stationary object when it remains stationary, but the motionless object produces one sort of affec-

ζοντος ἄλλοιον δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου, ὥστε κατὰ
 64 τοῦτο αἰσθήσει ληπτὴν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν. οἱ δὲ
 ἀξιοῦντες μὴ αἰσθήσει ταύτην λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 δι' αἰσθήσεως μὲν διανοία δέ, φασὶν ὅτι πᾶσα
 κίνησις κατὰ συμμημονέουσιν γίνεται· ἀναφέροντες
 γὰρ ὡς τότε τὸ σῶμα πάλαι μὲν ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ
 ἐτύγγανε νῦν δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῷδε, ἔννοιαν λαμβάνομεν
 τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κεκινήσθαι. αὐτὸ δὲ τό γε
 μνημονεύειν οὐκ ἀλόγου τινὸς αἰσθήσεως, λογικῆς
 δὲ δυνάμεώς ἐστιν ἔργον. οὐκ ἄρα τῇ αἰσθήσει,
 διανοία δὲ λαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκε τὴν κίνησιν.
 65 ἄλλως τε πᾶσα κίνησις κατὰ ἀπόλειψιν καὶ ἐπί-
 ληψιν τόπου νοεῖται. ἢ δὲ αἰσθησις οὔτε τόπον
 δύναται λαμβάνειν, οὐθεὶς γὰρ τόπος αἰσθητός
 ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐπίληψιν καὶ ἀπόλειψιν· μνημονικῶς
 γὰρ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἢ δὲ αἰσθησις ἄλογος οὐσα
 ἐστὶν ἀμνήμων. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ
 κίνησις.
 66 Πλὴν εἴαν τε αἰσθήσει προηγουμένως λαμβάνηται
 εἴαν τε διανοία, ἀδιάφορον· ἐκείνο γὰρ συμφανές
 ἐστίν, ὅτι συνάδειν δοκεῖ τῷ εἶναι κίνησιν ἢ
 ἐνάργεια. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ
 φιλόσοφοι οὐκ ἄλλοθεν εἰώθασι δυσωπεῦν τοὺς
 67 ἀπορητικούς ἢ ἀπὸ ταύτης. πῶς γάρ, φασίν,
 εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι κίνησις, ἥλιος ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι
 δύσεως τοὺς ἰδίους σταδιεῖν δρόμους; ἢ πῶς
 ὥρων γίνονται μεταβολαί, ἔαρος καὶ θέρους καὶ
 μετοπώρου καὶ χειμῶνος; παρὰ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ
 ἡλίου κινήσεις συνεγγισμούς τε καὶ ἀποστάσεις
 68 αἰσθάνονται. πῶς δὲ καὶ νῆες ἀναχθεῖσαι
 ἐκ λιμένων εἰς ἑτέρους κατὰγονται λιμένας; τίνα
 δὲ τρόπον ὁ ἀναιρῶν τὴν κίνησιν ἀπορητικός

tion and the moving object a different sort, so that in
 this way motion is perceptible by sense. But those 64
 who maintain that it is not perceived by sense, but
 by the intellect through sensation, assert that every
 motion comes about through concurrent recollection;
 for by recalling that this particular body was formerly
 in that particular place but now is in this we acquire
 the conception of motion and of being moved. But
 recollection itself is the work not of any irrational
 sense but of the reasoning faculty. It results, there-
 fore, that motion is not perceived by sense but by
 intellect. And further, all motion is conceived as 65
 involving departure from and occupation of place;
 but sense cannot perceive either place (for no place
 is sensible), or occupation and departure (for these
 things are observed through memory, but sense being
 irrational is without memory). Therefore motion is
 not a sensible object.

However, it is a matter of indifference whether 66
 motion is apprehended chiefly by sense or by intel-
 lect; for it is plain that the evidence of facts seems
 to bear out the view that motion exists. And for
 this reason the Dogmatic philosophers are in the
 habit of using no other means than this to put the
 Doubtters to shame. For, say they, if motion does 67
 not exist how does the sun run its own special course
 from its rising to its setting? * Or how do the
 changes of the seasons—spring, summer, autumn and
 winter—take place? For it is owing to the sun's
 motions, its advances and recessions, that these occur.
 And how do ships, after putting out to sea from har- 68
 bours, put in to land in other harbours? And how is
 it that the Doubter who abolishes motion goes forth

* With §§ 67-68 cf. P.H. iii. 66.

ἔωθεν προελθὼν τῆς οἰκίας καί τινα τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πραγματευσάμενος πάλιν ὑποστρέφει; πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναντίρρητά ἐστι τῆς κινήσεως τεκμήρια. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τις κυνικῶν τοὺς κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως ἐρωτώμενος λόγους ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδὲ ἔν, ἀναστὰς δὲ περιπάτει, δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας 69 τὴν ἀνοιαν¹ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ὀνειδίζων. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ παμπληθῆ τοιαῦτ' εἰώθασιν οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας λέγειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κίνησιν εἶναι. οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς ὡς ἀποχρώσει συνηγορίᾳ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους ἀρκεσθέντες εἰς τούναντιον ἐπιχειρήσομεν. ἐάν γὰρ ἴσον δειχθῆ κατὰ τε πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν τῷ εἶναι κίνησιν τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν, πάντως ἀκολουθήσει τὸ μηθετέρῳ μὲν συναίνειν, ἐπέχειν δὲ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων.

70 Εἴπερ οὖν κινεῖται τι πρώτως, οἷον στοιχείον, ἥτοι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου· οὔτε δὲ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔθ' ὑπ' ἄλλου, καθὼς παραμυθησόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται. ἀντίκα γὰρ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖται, ἦτοι συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ κινούντος κινεῖται ἢ μὴ συνακολουθοῦντος· οὔτε δὲ συνακολουθοῦντος οὔτε ἀφισταμένου κινεῖται, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα 71 τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ κινούντος κινεῖται, δεήσει τῷ ὀπωιδηποτοῦν κινουμένῳ ἐνὶ πάντα συνακολουθεῖν. εἰ γὰρ λόγου χάριν ἕκαστον τῶν εἴκοσι τεσσάρων στοιχείων ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖται, ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἄλφα κινουμένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ βῆτα

¹ ἀνοιαν N, Mutsch. : διάνοιαν cet., Bekk.

^a Diogenes, cf. P.H. ii. 244.

^b With §§ 70-76 cf. P.H. iii. 67.

from his house in the morning and, after transacting some ordinary business, returns to it again? For all these are irrefutable signs of motion. Hence also one of the ancient Cynics,^a when the arguments against motion were propounded to him, made no reply at all but stood up and walked about, thus flouting the folly of the sophist by the evidence of actual fact. And 69 there are hosts of similar arguments which those of the opposite side are wont to adduce in support of the existence of motion. And as we, too, are content with these as affording sufficient support for the establishment of this view, we shall now turn to argue for the opposite view. For if it be shown that the non-existence of motion is equal to the existence of motion in respect of probability and improbability, there will certainly follow assent to neither but suspension of judgement regarding both.

If, then, anything has a primary motion (an ele- 70 ment, for instance), it is moved either by itself or by another; but (it is moved) neither by itself, as we shall show, nor by another, as we shall explain; therefore it is not moved.^b Thus, for example, if everything which is moved is moved by another it is moved either while that which moves it accompanies it or while it does not accompany it; but, as we shall show, it is not moved either while it accompanies or while it recedes from it; therefore, what is moved is not moved by another. For if what is moved is moved 71 while its mover accompanies it, all things will have to accompany that one thing, whatsoever it be, which is being moved. Thus if, for the sake of argument, each one of the twenty-four letters is moved by another, it is necessary that all the rest should accompany Alpha when it is moved by Beta, since, just as

συνακολουθεῖν τὰ λοιπά, ἐπεὶπερ ὡς ἔπεται τῷ
 ἄλφα τὸ βῆτα, κινοῦν τὸ ἄλφα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ βῆτα
 ἀκολουθήσει τὸ γάμμα, κωητικὸν ὄν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῷ
 72 γάμμα τὸ δέλτα, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ω. τοῖνυν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πραγμάτων, εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν
 κινουμένων ἀκολουθοῦν ἔχειν ὀφείλει τὸ κινοῦν,
 ἐνὶ κινουμένῳ πάντα συνακολουθήσει. ἄτοπον
 δέ γε ἐνὸς κινουμένου πάντα λέγειν κινεῖσθαι.
 οὐκ ἄρα ἔπεται τῷ κινουμένῳ τὸ κινοῦν.
 73 εἰ δὲ χωρίζεται αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἀφ-
 ἰσταται τῆς ἀποπαλλομένης σφαίρας, ἀνάγκη
 παθόν πως καὶ διατεθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουήτος τὸ
 κινούμενον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φορᾶν. ἐπεὶ
 οὖν τὸ πάσχον οὐκ ἄλλως πέφυκε πάσχειν εἰ μὴ
 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ μεταβολὴν, δεήσει
 καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τι τούτων παθόν ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουή-
 74 τος κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἂν μηδὲν αὐτῶν πάθη χωρι-
 σθέντος τοῦ κινουήτος στήσεται. εἰδείξαμεν δέ γε
 ἄπορον τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως
 καὶ μεταβολῆς λόγον, ὥστε οὐδ' ἀφισταμένου τοῦ
 75 κινουήτος κινήσεται τὸ κινούμενον. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἰ παθόν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ κατὰ
 μεταβολὴν κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, αἱ ἄτομοι οὐ
 κινήθησονται διὰ τὸ μήτε πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἀφαίρεσιν
 μήτε μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ
 ἑτέρου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἵνα ὑπὸ
 ἑτέρου κινήθῃ, δεῖ συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ ἐκείνου
 κινεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ συνακολουθοῦντος, δέδεικται δὲ
 76 ἐκάτερον ἀδύνατον, λεκτέον μὴ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι.
 καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου τινός

Beta in moving Alpha follows Alpha, so also Gamma
 will accompany Beta as being its mover, and Delta
 Gamma and so on up to Omega. So, too, with objects 72
 in the Universe, if each moving object must have its
 mover following it, all things will follow after a single
 moving object. But it is absurd to say that if one
 thing moves all things move; therefore the mover
 does not follow the thing moved.—And if it is 73
 separated from it, as the hand is parted from the ball
 when it is being flung away, the movements away
 from it must necessarily cause the thing moved to
 be somehow affected and disposed by that which
 moves it. Since, then, what is affected cannot be
 affected otherwise than by way of addition or of sub-
 traction or of change, what is moved will have to
 undergo one of these modes of affection at the hands
 of its mover when being moved, since, if it is not
 affected in any of these ways, it will stand still when
 its mover is separated from it. But we have shown ^a 74
 that the account given of subtraction and addition
 and change is open to doubt, so that neither when
 the mover is parted from it will what is moved be
 in motion.—And besides, if what is moved moves 75
 through being affected either by way of subtraction
 or of addition or of change, the atoms will not move
 because they do not admit of addition or subtraction
 or change. Neither, then, is what moves moved by
 another. For if, in order that it should be moved
 by another, it must be moved either while that
 other follows with it or while it does not so follow,
 and each of these alternatives has been proved to
 be impossible, we must declare that it is not moved
 by another.—Moreover, if everything which moves 76

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

κινείται, ἤτοι τὸ κινεῖν αὐτὸ κινεῖται ἢ ἀκινήτεϊ.
καὶ ἀκινήτιζεν μὲν ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ κινεῖν ἐν-
εργεῖ τι, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται, τὸ ἄρα κινεῖν
κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον
ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς κινεῖται, δεήσει καὶ αὐτὸ¹ κινου-
μενον ὑπὸ τρίτου τινὸς κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ τρίτον
ὑπὸ τοῦ τετάρτου, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ὑπὸ τοῦ πέμ-
πτου, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστε ἀναρχον γίνε-
σθαι τὴν κίνησιν. τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀποπον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται.

77 Καὶ μὴ οὐδ' αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεται. εἰ
γὰρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι πάντῃ κινήτην ἔχει
τὴν φύσιν ἢ εἰς τινα διάστασιν, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῶν
πρώτων καὶ στοιχειωδῶν σωμάτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς φυσικούς ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντῃ
78 κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, οὐ κινήσεται· οὔτε γὰρ
ἄνω ἐνεχθήσεται διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ κάτω κινήτην
ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, οὔτε κάτω διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄνω,
οὔτε πρὸσω διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω, οὔτ' ὀπίσω
διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεπτο-
79 μένων δυοῖν διαστάσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. εἰ δὲ εἰς
τινα διάστασιν κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, εἰ μὲν εἰς
τὴν ἄνω ὡσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, πάντ' ἄνω
κινήσεται, εἰ δὲ εἰς τὴν κάτω μόνον ὡς γῆ καὶ
ὔδωρ, πάντα εἰς τὸ κάτω. εἰ δὲ τινα μὲν εἰς τὴν
ἄνω διάστασιν κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν τινὰ δὲ εἰς
τὴν κάτω, οὐ γενήσεται ἐκ κινουμένων σωμάτων
80 σύγκριμα. εἴτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου νοοῖτο κινου-
μενα τὰ στοιχειώδη σώματα ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα,

¹ αὐτὸ Heintz; τὸ mss., Bekk. (τὸ κινεῖν cj. Papp.).

is moved by some other thing, that which moves it
either is in motion itself or is motionless. But it is
impossible for it to be motionless; for what causes
motion is active, and what is active is in motion, and
therefore what causes motion is in motion. And if
it is in motion, since everything in motion is moved
by something else, it too, being in motion, will have
to be moved by some third thing, and the third by
a fourth, and the fourth by a fifth, and so on *ad
infinitum*; so that motion comes to have no beginning.
But this is absurd; therefore what is in motion is
not moved by another.

Nor yet will a thing be moved by itself. For if it
is self-moved it is of a nature which is movable
either in all directions or in some one direction, as in
the case of the primary and elemental bodies, since
our argument is against the Physicists. But if it has
a nature which is movable in all directions, it will not
move; for it will not be borne upwards since it is also
78 of a nature which is movable downwards, nor down-
wards as being movable upwards, nor forwards as
movable backwards, nor backwards as movable for-
wards. And the same argument applies to the two
other directions.^a And if it possesses a nature capable
79 of being moved in some one direction, if this be
upwards (like fire and air), all things will move up-
wards, while if it be downwards only (like earth and
water) all things will move downwards. And if it is
of a nature which is partly movable in the upward
direction and partly in the downward, no combina-
tion will take place between the moving bodies; for
80 if the elemental bodies are conceived as moving from
the centre towards the limits, the whole will be dis-

^a *i.e.* to the right and to the left.

λυθήσεται τὸ πᾶν· ἐκάτερον γὰρ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρισθὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ἴδιον δραμεῖται κίνησις, τὸ μὲν ἀνωφερὲς ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κατωφερὲς ἐπὶ τὴν κάτω. εἴτ' ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ὑποκέοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον συνωβούμενα, πάντως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον ἐνεχθήσεται ἢ οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φέροιτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀντιπυσεῖται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ οὕτως ἢ ἰσοκρατοῦντα στησεται μηθετέρου νικῶντος, μήτε τοῦ κάτω βιαζομένου μήτε τοῦ ἄνω (ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν στάσις 81 γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς φύσει κινουμένοις), ἢ τούναντίον ἀνισοκρατοῦντα εἰς ἓνα μόνον ἐνεχθήσεται τόπον, ἥτοι τὸν ἄνω ἐπικρατησάντων τῶν ἀνωφερῶν, ἢ εἰς τὸν κάτω ὑπερτερούντων τῶν κατωφερῶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον φέροιτο, οὐ συμβάλλει ἀλλήλοις, μὴ συμβάλλοντα δὲ οὐδὲ συγκρίματος ἔσται τινὸς ἀποτελεσματικά. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐδὲ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ κινούμενον.

83 πάλιν εἰ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ κινούμενον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἥτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνοχλοῦν καὶ θλίβον, δέησει καὶ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἑαυτοῦ κινήτικόν ὃν ἥτοι προωστικῶς κινεῖν ἢ ἐπι- 84 σπαστικῶς ἢ ἀνοχλητικῶς καὶ θλιπτικῶς. εἴτε δὲ προωστικῶς κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ (τὸ γὰρ προωθοῦν ἐξόπισθὲν ἐστι τοῦ προωθουμένου), εἴτε ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔσται ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ, εἴτε ἀνοχλητικῶς καὶ θλιπτικῶς, ὑποκάτωθεν αὐτοῦ. ἀδύνατον δὲ γε νοεῖν τι¹ αὐτὸ ἥτοι ὀπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ

¹ τ. Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk.

solved; for each being separated from each will run on its own special course, the ascending upwards and the descending downwards. And if they are supposed to be driven together towards the centre from the limits, they will certainly be transported either along the same or not along the same vertical line. And if they are borne along the same line, they will necessarily collide with one another, and thus they will either be of equal force and come to rest, neither side being victorious, and neither the upward nor the downward body yielding to force (though it is absurd to say that rest occurs in things which are by nature in motion), or if, on the contrary, they are of unequal 82 force they will be borne into one place only, either into that above if the ascending bodies have gained the mastery, or into that below if the descending bodies are the more powerful. But if they do not move along the same vertical line, they do not meet with one another, and not meeting they will not be capable of effecting any combination. But this is absurd. So then, that which is in motion is not self-moved.—Again, if what is moved is self-moved,⁶ since 83 everything which causes motion does so either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down, the self-moved too, being the cause of its own motion will have to cause motion either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down. But if it moves by propelling it will 84 be behind itself (for what propels is behind what is propelled), and if by dragging it will be in front of itself, and if by heaving and pressing, beneath itself. But it is impossible to conceive of a thing being either behind or before or beneath itself; therefore

⁶ With §§ 83-84 cf. P.H. iii. 68-69.

κινούμενον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον μήτε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, ῥητέον μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον.

- 85 Κομίζεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐμβριθῆς ὑπόμνησις εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπὸ Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, δι' ἧς παρίστησιν ὅτι κινεῖται μὲν οὐδὲ ἔν, κελί-
νεται δέ. καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν, τοῦτο ἀκόλουθόν
86 ἔστι ταῖς κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀμερῶν ὑποθέσεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἀμερὲς σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ περι-
έχεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι (ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τόπον ἔχειν
μεῖζονα τὸ κινησόμενον) μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὕτω
γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κινήθῃ.
ὥστε οὐδὲ κινεῖται. κελίηται δὲ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ
γὰρ πρότερον ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ θεωρούμενον,
τοῦτο ἐν ἑτέρῳ νῦν θεωρεῖται τόπῳ· ὅπερ οὐκ
ἂν ἐγεγόνει μὴ κινήθέντος αὐτοῦ. οὗτος μὲν οὖν
ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπαρήγειν θελήσας τῷ οἰκείῳ δόγματι
ἄτοπὸν τι προσήκατο· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ
μηδενὸς κινουμένου λέγειν τι κελίησθαι; οἱ δὲ
ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ἐπ' ἴσης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι
καὶ περὶ τοῦ κελίησθαι ἀποροῦντες οὐδὲν ἄτοπον
προσδέξονται, καθάπερ Διδώρος προσήκατο.
87 πλὴν οὗτος γε τὸν περιφορητικὸν συνερωτᾷ λόγον
εἰς τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τι, λέγων "εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἦτοι
ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ
ἐν ᾧ ἔστι, μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν,
88 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι." καὶ
ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ἢ δὲ παραμυθία τῶν λημ-
μάτων αὐτοῦ προφανής. δυοῖν γὰρ ὄντων τόπων,

what is moved is not self-moved. But if what is moved is moved neither by another nor by itself, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must declare that what is moved is not in motion.

And another weighty argument for the non-⁸⁵ existence of motion is adduced by Diodorus Cronos,^a by means of which he establishes that not a single thing *is* in motion, but *has been* in motion. And the fact that nothing is in motion follows from his assumptions of indivisibles. For the indivisible body must⁸⁶ be contained in an indivisible place and therefore must not move either in it (for it fills it up, but a thing which is to move must have a larger place) or in the place in which it is not; for as yet it is not in this place so as to be moved therein; consequently it *is* not in motion. But, according to reason, it *has been* in motion; for that which was formerly observed in this place is now observed in another place, which would not have occurred if it had not been moved. Thus this man, in trying to support his own dogma, has admitted what is an absurdity; for how is it other than absurd to say that while nothing moves something has moved? But the Sceptics, being equally in doubt about being in motion and having been in motion, will not assent to any absurdity, such as Diodorus has admitted.—This man, however, pro-⁸⁷ pounds the familiar argument^b to show that nothing moves, when he says—"If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is (for it remains therein) nor in that where it is not (for it does not exist therein); therefore nothing moves." Such then is his argument, and the method of proving⁸⁸ its premisses is obvious. For as there are two

^a Cf. § 48.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 242, 245; iii. 71.

ἐνός μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τι ἔστιν, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, καὶ τρίτου παρὰ τούτους μηδ' ἐπινοεῖσθαι δυναμένου, δεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, εἰ ὄντως κινεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων κινεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀν-
 89 ἐπινοήτῳ οὐκ ἂν κινώτο. ἐν ᾧ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τόπω οὐ κινεῖται· ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτόν· καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, μένει· μένον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐ κινεῖται. ἐν ᾧ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, πάλιν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι· ὅπου γὰρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὔτε δρᾶσαι τι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ οὐδὲ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν τις λέγοι τὸν ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντα ἐν Ἀθήναις κινεῖσθαι, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῶς πᾶν σῶμα ἐρεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ κινεῖσθαι τῷ τόπῳ ἐνθα
 90 μὴ ἔστιν. ὅθεν εἰ δύο εἰσὶ τόποι, ὃ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι, δέδεικται δ' ἐν μηδετέρῳ τούτων δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κινούμενον.

Τοιαύτη μὲν καὶ ἡ τοῦ λόγου παραμυθία, ποικίλως δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντείρηται, ὧν τὰς
 91 ἐνοστάσεις παρακειμένως ἐκθησόμεθα. καὶ δὴ ἔνιοι μὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασὶ τῶν συντελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ εἶναι τὰ παρατακτικὰ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι, καὶ ψευδῶν ὄντων ἀναλόγως ψευδῆ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τι πέρασ, ἔστι κάκεινο, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι πέρασ. εἰ δὲ πέρασ ὑπήρχε τοῦ παρατακτικοῦ τὸ συντελεστικόν, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοῦ συντελεστικοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δὴ πέρασ ἐστίν, εἶναι καὶ τὸ παρατακτικόν οὐ τοῦτο πέρασ ἐστίν.
 92 καὶ ὡς οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ γεγενῆσθαι συντελεστικόν

* This (as Heintz points out) must be the meaning, though not clearly expressed in the Greek. (The insertion of τούτων ἐκεῖνα after ψ. ὄντων would help.)

places,—one being that wherein a thing is and the second that wherein it is not, and it being impossible to conceive a third place in addition to these two,—the thing in motion, if it really moves, must move in one or other of these places; for it will not move in an inconceivable place. Now it does not move in the place wherein it is, for it fills it up; and, so long as it exists therein, it remains; and remaining therein it does not move. And it is likewise impossible for it 89 to move in the place wherein it is not; for where a thing does not exist, there it cannot either effect anything or be affected, and in the same way it cannot move; and just as no one could say that he who is in Rhodes is moving in Athens, so too in general one will not say of any body that it moves in that place where it does not exist. Hence, if there are two 90 places, that wherein it exists and that wherein it exists not, and it has been proved that the moving object cannot move in either of them, the moving object will not exist.

Such, then, is the method of proving his argument; but it is opposed by many in various ways, and we shall in the next place expound their objections. Thus some assert that if preterites are true it is 91 impossible that their presents should be false, and they must be true; and similarly the preterites must be false when the presents are false.^a For that thing whereof a limit exists, exists also itself, and of a thing non-existent no limit will exist. And if the preterite is a limit of the present, it is therefore necessary that when the preterite, which is a limit, exists the present also, whereof it is the limit, should exist. And just 92 as the preterite "to have become" is nothing if the

μη ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τοῦ γίνεσθαι παρατατικοῦ, καὶ ὄν τὸν τρόπον οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ ἐφθάρθαι συντελεστικόν μη προϋπάρξαντος τοῦ φθείρεσθαι παρατατικοῦ, ὡδε ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, μη ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τοῦ κινεῖσθαι παρατατικοῦ, ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ κενωῆσθαι συντελεστικόν.

93 "Ἄλλοι δὲ φασὶ δύνασθαι τι ἐν ᾧ περιέχεται τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι· αἱ γὰρ περὶ τοῖς κνώδαξιν εἰλούμεναι σφαῖραι καὶ οἱ περιδινούμενοι ἄξονες καὶ ἡδὴ τὰ τύμπανα καὶ οἱ κεραμευτικοὶ τροχοὶ καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ τούτοις εὐκότα σώματα κινεῖται μὲν, ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ὥστε ψεῦδος εἶναι ἐν τι τοῦ λόγου λῆμμα, τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ. ἄλλοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς κινήσεως ἠρωτησθαι φασὶ τὸν λόγον. τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον νοεῖται σὺν τόπῳ τῷ ἀφ' οὗ κινεῖται καὶ τῷ εἰς ὃν κινεῖται· διόπερ ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Διόδωρος "εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν," μοχθηρόν τι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως νόησιν λέγει, παρόσον τὸ κινούμενον οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ κινεῖται καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν. ἦσαν δὲ οἱ καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν διεστέλλοντο. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι δύο σημαίνειν φασίν, ἐν μὲν ἐν τόπῳ τῷ κατὰ πλάτος, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμέν τινα ἐν Ἀλεξανδρεία εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ ἐν τόπῳ τῷ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, καθὸ κάμου λέγουσι' ἂν εἶναι τόπος ὁ περιτετυκῶς τῆν ἐπιφάνειάν μου τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ, καὶ ἀμφοτέρους τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένου προσαγορεύεται τόπος. διχῶς δὲ καλουμένου νῦν τοῦ τόπου, φασὶ

present "to become" is not true, and just as the preterite "to have perished" is nothing if the present "to perish" has not pre-existed, so too it is impossible that the preterite "to have moved" should be true if the present "to move" is not true.

Others assert^a that a thing can move in the place 93 wherein it is contained; for the balls which spin round their pivots, and revolving axles, and drums,^b too, and potters' wheels, and hosts of other bodies similar to these, move but move in the place wherein they are, so that one premiss of the argument—that nothing moves in the place where it is—is false.—And 94 others assert that the argument is propounded contrary to the conception of motion. For the moving object is conceived in conjunction with the place wherefrom it moves and that whereto it moves; consequently, when Diodorus says "If a thing moves, it moves either in the place wherein it is or in that wherein it is not" he says what is unsound and contrary to the conception of motion, inasmuch as the moving object does not move either in the place wherein it, or in that wherein it is not, but through both places—both that wherefrom and that whereto it moves.—And there have been some who have dis- 95 cerned an ambiguity. For "being contained in a place," they say, has two meanings,—in the one "in a place" is used in the broad sense, as when we say of a man that he is "in Alexandria,"^c and in the other it is used of place in the exact sense, as the air which is moulded round the surface of my body might be said to be my place, and the jar is called the place of what is contained in it. So as "place" is now applied in two ways, they assert that the

^a With §§ 93-95 cf. P.H. iii. 72-75.

^b Cf. §§ 51, 103.

^c Cf. § 15.

δύνασθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖσθαι, τῷ κατὰ πλάτος, ἔχοντι διάστημα καθ' ὃ γενήσεται
 96 τὰ τῆς κινήσεως. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀπέραντον εἶναι ᾗθησαν τὸν τοῦ Διοδώρου λόγον, ἐπεὶ περ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ διεzeugμένου, ψευδοποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τῶν ἔξης, ἐκότερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ δεικνύς ψεῦδος, τὸ τε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι τι τόπω κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν.

97 Τοιαῦται μὲν αἱ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐνστάσεις, δοκεῖ δὲ Διόδωρος πρὸς τὴν πρώτην εὐθὺς ὑπηνητηκέναι διδάσκων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τῶν συντελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὰ τούτων παρατατικὰ ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ἔστω γάρ τινα πρὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ γεγάμηκέναι καὶ ἕτερον μετ' ἐνιαυτόν. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν "οὔτοι ἔγμην" ἀξίωμα συντελεστικὸν ὄν ἀληθές ἐστιν, τὸ δ' "οὔτοι γαμοῦσι" παρατατικὸν καθεστῶς ψεῦδος ἐστίν· ὅτε γὰρ οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὐπω οὗτος ἐγάμει, καὶ ὅτε οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὐκέτι οὗτος ἐγάμει. τότε δ' ἂν ἦν ἀληθές ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ οὔτοι¹ γαμοῦσιν, εἰ ὁμοσε ἐγάμουν. δύναται οὖν τοῦ συντελεστικοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 98 ὄντος ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ τούτου παρατατικόν. τοιοῦτο δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ "Ἑλένη τρεῖς ἔσχεν ἄνδρας"· οὕτε γὰρ ὅτε Μενέλαον εἶχεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ ἄνδρα οὐθ' ὅτε Πάριον ἐν Ἰλίῳ, οὐθ' ὅτε θανόντος τούτου Δημόφωβον ἐγαμήθη, ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ παρατατικόν τὸ "τρεῖς ἔχει ἄνδρας," ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ συν-
 99 τελεστικοῦ τοῦ "τρεῖς ἔσχεν ἄνδρας." σοφίζεται δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Διόδωρος, καὶ παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν βούλεται ἡμᾶς πλανᾶν. τὸ γὰρ "οὔτοι ἔγμην"

¹ οὔτοι NLE: οἱ cet., Bekk.

^a i.e. the object in "broad" place does not occupy all that place but has a margin of room wherein to move.

moving object can move in the place wherein it is—place in the broad sense,—as this possesses extension through which the processes of motion may take place.^a—And some have thought that the argument 96 of Diodorus is inconclusive, since it begins with a disjunctive premiss, and falsifies this by means of the succeeding statements, in that it proves that both its clauses are false,—both that a thing moves in the place where it is not and (that it does so) where it is.

Such are the objections against the argument; but 97 Diodorus seems to have answered the first one^b at once by explaining that when preterites are true their presents admit of being false. For suppose that a certain man married a year before and another a year after. Then, in the case of these men, the proposition "these men married," which is a preterite, is true, but "these men are marrying," which is a present, is false; for when this man was marrying that man was not yet marrying, and when that man was marrying this man was no longer marrying. And in their case the proposition "these men are marrying" would have been true of them only if they had been marrying simultaneously. It is possible, then, for the present to be false when the preterite is true. Of the same 98 sort, too, is the proposition "Helen had three husbands," for neither when she had Menelaus as her husband in Sparta, nor when she had Paris in Ilium, nor when, after his death, she married Deiphobus,^c is the present—"she has three husbands"—true, though the preterite—"she had three husbands"—is true. But here Diodorus is using sophistry and 99 wishes to deceive us by ambiguity. For the proposi-

^b See §§ 91 ff.

^c A brother of Paris (son of Priam, king of Troy).

δύο σημαίνει, ἐν μὲν πληθυντικὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ
 "οὗτοι συνέγημαν," ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, ἕτερον δὲ
 τὸ κατὰ περίληψιν ἐνικοῦ πράγματος ἐγκεκλιμένον
 ἀπὸ τοῦ "οὗτος ἔγημεν" καὶ ἑτέρου ἐνικοῦ τοῦ
 "οὗτος ἔγημεν," ὧν πάλιν ἐνικῶν τὰ παρατατικά
 ἐστὼν ἀληθῆ, τὸ "οὗτος γαμει" καὶ τὸ "οὗτος
 γαμει"· ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἀληθῆ γέγονε ταῦτα.
 100 ἀμήχανον οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν παρατατικῶν ψευδῶν
 ὄντων ἀληθῆ εὐρίσκεισθαι τὰ τούτων συντελεστικά,
 ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη συναναρῆσθαι ἢ συνυπάρχειν τὰ ἕτερα
 τοῖς ἑτέροις.

Νῆ Δι', ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἑτέραν
 ὁ Διόδωρος κομίζεται παραμυθίαν, σαφεστέρω
 101 χρώμενος ὑποδείγματι. βαλλέσθω γάρ, φησί,
 σφαῖρα εἰς τὸν ὑπερκείμενον ὄροφον. οὐκοῦν ἐν
 τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς βολῆς χρόνῳ τὸ μὲν παρατατικὸν
 ἀξίωμα "ἄπτεται ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς" ψεῦδος
 ἐστίν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐπιφέρεται. ὅταν δὲ ἄψηται τῆς
 ὀροφῆς, γίνεται ἀληθὲς τὸ συντελεστικόν, τὸ
 "ἤψατο ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς." ἐνδέχεται ἄρα
 ψεῦδους ὄντος τοῦ παρατατικοῦ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν
 τὸ συντελεστικόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν
 τι παρατατικῶς κεινησθαι δὲ συντελεστικῶς.

102 μήποτε δὲ κἀνταῦθα πλανᾶται. τὸ γὰρ παρα-
 τατικὸν τὸ "ἄπτεται ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς"
 γίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅτε φέρεται ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἀέρι
 ἡ σφαῖρα, ἀλλ' ὅτε ἄρχεται ἄπτεσθαι τῆς ὀροφῆς.
 ὅταν δὲ τερματίσασα τὴν ψαῦσιν ὑπονοστήσῃ, τότε
 καὶ τὸ συντελεστικὸν γίνεται ἀληθές, τὸ "ἤψατο
 ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς." ἄποπος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ
 Διόδωρος τοῦ μὲν κεινησθαι περιεχόμενος ὡς
 ἀληθοῦς, τοῦ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἀφιστάμενος ὡς ψεῦδους,
 260

tion "these men married" has two senses, of which
 the one is plural and equivalent to "these men
 married together," which is false, but the other is
 formed by the combination of one singular proposition
 "this man married," and another singular proposition
 "that man married," and of these singulars, again,
 the presents are true, namely, "this man is marrying"
 and "that man is marrying"; for these statements
 are true in both cases. It is, then, impossible, if the 100
 presents are false, that their preterites should be
 found to be true; and of necessity both of them
 must either be abolished together or co-exist along
 with each other.

Nevertheless, Diodorus brings forward another
 argument against the same assumption, in which
 he employs a clearer example. Let a ball, he 101
 says, be thrown on to an overhanging roof. Then,
 at the point of time that is midway in the throw, the
 proposition "the ball touches the roof" is false; for
 it is still on its way. But when it has touched the
 roof, the preterite "the ball has touched the roof"
 becomes true; therefore it is possible for the preterite
 to be true when the present is false, and therefore
 possible for a thing not "to be moving" in the present
 but "to have moved" in the preterite. But I suspect 102
 that here too he goes astray. For the present—"the
 ball touches the roof"—is true not when the ball is
 travelling in mid air but when it begins to touch the
 roof. But when it comes down again, after ending its
 contact, then the preterite becomes true—"the ball
 touched the roof." Therefore it is absurd of Diodorus
 to accept "to have moved" as true and to reject "to

δέον ἢ ἀμφοτέροις συγκατατίθεσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτέρων ἀφίστασθαι.

- 103 Οἱ δὲ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι τι κινεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπων, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὰς σφαίρας τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ἄξονας καὶ τὰ τύμπανα παρατιθέμενοι, οὐ λύουσι τὴν ἀπορίαν ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐγκυλίωνται αὐτῇ. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων, καθὼς καὶ ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, καθ' ὁλότητα μὲν μένει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, κατὰ μέρη δὲ ἀλλάττει τοὺς τόπους, τοῦ μὲν ἄνω ἀντιλαμβάνοντος τὸν τοῦ κάτω τόπον, 104 τοῦ δὲ κάτω τὸν τοῦ ἄνω. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μένει τὰ τῆς ἀπορίας. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων μέρος ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται.
- 105 Ἄλλ' ἀκολουθῶς¹ ἔφασκόν τινες παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ κινουμένου κεκομίσθαι τὸν λόγον· νοεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ὡς δυοῖν ἐχόμενον τόπων, τοῦ τ' ἐξ οὗ κινεῖται τοῦ τ' εἰς ὃν μετέρχεται. ῥᾶδιον δὲ ἔστι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὑπαντῶντας λέγειν ὅτι κἂν τοιαύτην εἶναι συμβεβήκη τὴν τοῦ κινουμένου νόησιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ τῆς νοήσεως τοῦ κινεῖσθαι νῦν εἶναι τὴν ζήτησιν τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς προηγουμένως, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως, ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν οἱ τῇ τοιαύτῃ 106 χρησάμενοι ἐνοστάσει. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν τὸν λόγον ἀνατρέψωμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξουσιν εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ὅταν γὰρ φάσκωσι τὸ κινούμενον δυοῖν ἔχεσθαι τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται, πευσόμεθ'

¹ ἀκολουθῶς most mss.: ἀνακολουθῶς al., Bekk.

move" as false, when he ought either to assent to both or to reject both.

And those who declare that a thing can move in the 103 place where it is,^a by alleging the examples now of balls and now of axles and drums, fail to solve the difficulty and are equally entangled in it. For, as we have shown previously,^b each of these bodies remains in the same place as a whole but in respect of its parts it changes places, the part above occupying instead the place below and the part below the place above. And if so, the difficulty remains. For each 104 part of these bodies moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is, as we have established, nor in that where it is not, as we have proved; therefore it does not move.

But, in the next place, some have asserted^c that 105 the argument thus brought forward is contrary to the conception of a moving object; for a moving object is conceived as occupying two places, both that wherefrom it moves and that into which it passes. But in answer to these, too, it is easy to say that, even if it is the fact that the notion of the moving object is of this kind, it has no bearing on our problem because the question now before the Doubters is chiefly concerned not with the conception of motion but with its real existence, and about this those who make that sort of objection have said nothing. And, moreover, 106 even if we overthrow the argument they will have nothing to say against us. For when they assert that the moving object occupies two places, both that wherein it is and that whereinto it moves, we shall ask

^a With §§ 103-110 cf. *P.H.* iii. 72-75; and see § 93 *supra*.

^b See § 52 *supra*.

^c See § 94 *supra*.

αὐτῶν πότε μέτεισι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου τὸ
 κινούμενον εἰς τὸν ἕτερον; ἀρὰ γε ὅτε ἐν τῷ
 πρώτῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ; ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς ἕτερον.
 107 ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν. ὅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
 τούτῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, πάλιν οὐ μετέρχεται
 ἀλλὰ μετελήλυθεν ἤδη· τῶν γὰρ ἀμηχάνων ἔστι καὶ
 τῶν ἀνεπινοήτων τὸ μετελθεῖν τι ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῦ
 τόπου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. ὥστε κἂν τοιαύτην
 ἔχωμεν τοῦ κινουμένου νόησιν, μένει οὐδὲν ἡττον ἢ
 ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορία.
 108 Καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες διχῶς καλεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον,
 ἐν πλάτει τε καὶ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
 τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος νοουμένῳ τόπῳ
 δύνασθαι συμβαίνειν, οὐ πρὸς νοῦν ὑπαντῶσιν.
 προηγείται γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος νοουμένου τόπου
 ὁ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, καὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ
 πλάτος τόπῳ κινήσθαι τι μὴ προκινήθην ἐν τῷ
 109 κατ' ἀκρίβειαν· ὡς γὰρ οὗτος περιεκτικός ἐστι τοῦ
 κινουμένου σώματος, οὕτως ὁ κατὰ πλάτος τόπος
 σὺν τῷ κινουμένῳ σώματι καὶ τὸν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν
 τόπον περιέσχηκεν. καθάπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς δύναται
 ἐν σταδιαίῳ κινεῖσθαι διαστήματι μὴ προκινήθεις
 ἐν τῷ πηχυαίῳ διαστήματι, ὡδε τῶν ἀδυνάτων
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινού-
 110 μενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν. ἠρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διό-
 δωρος τὸν ἐκκείμενον λόγον κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ
 κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἐχόμενος τόπου· τοίνυν ἀναιρου-
 μένης ἐπὶ τοῦτο τῆς κινήσεως οὐθεὶς ἀπολείπεται
 λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον φάσκειν διὰ

them—"When does the moving object pass over from the place wherein it is to the other place? Is it when it is in the first place or when it is in the second?" But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the other; for it is still in the first. And when 107 it is not in this but in the second, once again it is not passing over but has already passed over; for it is a thing impossible and inconceivable that anything should pass over from that place wherein it does not exist. So that, even if we have this sort of conception of the moving object, the original difficulty remains none the less.

Further, those who say that the term "place" has 108 two senses, the "broad" sense and the "exact," and that therefore motion can occur in place when conceived as "broad," are giving an answer that is not to the purpose. For place conceived as exact precedes place conceived as broad, and it is impossible for anything to move in broad place if it has not moved before in exact place; for as the latter serves 109 to contain the moving body, so the broad place contains, along with the moving body, the exact place as well. As, then, no one can move over a distance of a stade^b without first having moved over a distance of a cubit, so it is impossible to move over broad place without moving over exact place. And when Dio- 110 dorus propounded the argument against motion which has been set forth he was keeping to the exact sense of place; so if in its case motion is abolished, there is no argument left in the case of place in the broad sense.

Now it is perfectly foolish to say that the argument

^a See § 95 *supra*.

^b About 200 yards, or nearly a furlong. A cubit = $\frac{1}{3}$ yard.

- τὸ ἀπὸ διεzeugμένου ἀρχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο ψευδοποιεῖν
 111 τὸ διεzeugμένον τελῶς ἐστὶ ληρώδες. κατ' ἀκο-
 λουθίαν γὰρ γέγονε τὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως, καὶ δύναμιν
 ἔχει τοιαύτην " εἰ κινεῖται τι, κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν
 προειρημένων τρόπων ὀφείλει κινεῖσθαι· οὐχὶ δέ γε
 τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον." εἰ γὰρ ὄντος
 τοῦ πρῶτου ἐστὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τοῦ δευτέρου μὴ
 ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσται. ὅπερ καὶ κατὰ τὰς
 αὐτῶν τῶν διαλεκτικῶν ὑποθέσεις ὑγιές ἐστίν.
- 112 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰ ἀντιλεγόμενα τῷ ὑπὸ
 Διοδώρου κομισθέντι λόγῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἰπεῖν.
 κομίζει δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς λόγους οὐχ οὕτως
 ἐμβριθεῖς ἀλλὰ σοφιστικωτέρους, ὧν τὴν ἐκθεσιν
 ποιησόμεθα εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι κατὰ τὰς ζητήσεις
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐκκλίνειν. εὐθέως γὰρ φησι τὸ
 κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τόπῳ ὄν οὐ
 113 κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα κινούμενον οὐ κινεῖται. διττῆς δὲ
 οὔσης κινήσεως, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς κατ' ἐπικράτειαν
 δευτέρας δὲ τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν, καὶ κατ' ἐπι-
 κράτειαν μὲν ὑπαρχούσης ἐφ' ἧς τῶν πλειόνων
 κινουμένων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀλίγα ἡρεμεῖ, κατ'
 εἰλικρίνειαν δὲ ἐφ' ἧς πάντα κινεῖται τὰ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος μέρη, δοκεῖ τούτων τῶν δυοῖν κινήσεων ἢ
 κατ' ἐπικράτειαν προηγέσθαι τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν.
- 114 ἵνα γὰρ τι εἰλικρινῶς κινήθῃ, τουτέστιν ὅλον δι'
 ὅλον, πρότερον ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι κατ' ἐπικράτειαν
 κινούμενον, ὃν τρόπον ἵνα τις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν γέ-
 νηται πολίος, ὀφείλει κατ' ἐπικράτειαν προπεπο-
 λιῶσθαι, καὶ ἵνα τις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν ληφθῇ σωρός,
 ὀφείλει κατ' ἐπικράτειαν γεγονέναι σωρός· κατὰ

is unsound ^a because of its beginning with a disjunctive premiss and asserting the falsity of this premiss. For the steps in the argument are in logical sequence 111 and the force they have is this,—“ If a thing moves, it must move in one or other of the ways stated above ; but the second (clause) is not (true) ; therefore the first is not (true).” For if the second is true when the first is true, when the second is not true the first will not be true either. And this is sound according to the assumptions of the Dialecticians themselves.

These observations, then, it was necessary to make 112 in answer to the objections made against the argument brought forward by Diodorus. And he also brings forward other arguments which are not so weighty but more sophistical, and of these we shall give an exposition so as to be able to avoid each of them in our investigations. For instance, he says, the moving object is in a place, and that which is in a place does not move ; therefore the moving object does not move. And motion being twofold,—the 113 one sort that of the major portion, the second sort absolute,—and that of the major portion being the sort in which while most parts of the body are in motion a few are at rest, and the absolute sort that in which all the parts of the body are in motion,—it seems that of these two motions that of the major portion precedes the absolute kind. For in order 114 that a thing should move absolutely,—that is, as a whole wholly,—it must first be conceived as moving in respect of its major portion ; just as, in order that a man may become completely grey-headed he must first become grey as to the major part, and in order that a complete heap may be obtained, the major part of a heap must first be formed ; in much the

^a See § 96 *supra*, and § 87 *supra*.

- τὸν ὁμοιον τρόπον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν κινήσεως τὴν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἐπίτασις γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν.
- 115 οὐχὶ δέ γε ἔστι τις κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κίνησις, ὡς παραστήσομεν· τοίνυν οὐδ' ἢ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν γενήσεται. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ἀμερῶν συνεστῶς σῶμα, δυοῖν μὲν κινουμένων ἐνὸς δὲ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἀπ-
- 116 αἰτεῖ κίνησις. οὐκοῦν εἰ προσθήημεν τέταρτον ἀμερὲς ἀκινήτου τούτῳ τῷ σώματι, πάλιν γενήσεται κίνησις. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τριῶν ἀμερῶν συγκείμενον σῶμα, δυοῖν μὲν κινουμένων ἐνὸς δὲ ἀκινήτου, κινεῖται, καὶ τετάρτου προστεθέντος ἀμεροῦς κινήσεται· ἰσχυρότερα γὰρ τὰ τριῖ ἀμερῶν μεθ' ὧν πρότερον ἐκινεῖτο, τοῦ προστεθέντος ἐνὸς ἀμεροῦς. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τὸ ἐκ τεσσάρων ἀμερῶν συγκείμενον σῶμα κινεῖται, κινήσεται καὶ τὸ ἐκ πέντε· ἰσχυρότερα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ τέσσαρ' ἀμερῶν μεθ' ὧν πρότερον ἐκινεῖτο, τοῦ προστεθέντος ἀμεροῦς.
- 117 καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πέντε συγκείμενον κινεῖται, πάντως καὶ ἕκτου προσελθόντος ἀμεροῦς κινήσεται, ἰσχυροτέρων ὄντων τῶν πέντε παρὰ τὸ ἓν. καὶ οὕτω μέχρι μυρίων ἀμερῶν προέρχεται ὁ Διόδωρος, δεικνύς ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κίνησις· ἄτοπον γὰρ, φησί, τὸ λέγειν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινεῖσθαι σῶμα ἐφ' οὗ ἑνακισχίλια ἐνακόσια ἐνεθήκοντα ὀκτῶ ἀκινήτου κινεῖται καὶ δύο μόνον κινεῖται. ὥστε οὐδὲν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν, ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι.
- 118 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ἐπιχείρησις τοιαύτη πῶς ἐστίν,
¹ τριῖ ἀμερῶν NE: τρία μέρη cet., Bekk.

same way motion as to the major part must precede absolute motion ; for absolute motion is an intensification of that of the major part. But there does not 115 exist any motion of the major part, as we shall establish ; neither, then, will absolute motion exist.—For let us assume the existence of a body composed of three indivisible parts, two being in motion and one motionless ; for this is what motion of the major part demands. If, then, we were to add to this body a 116 fourth indivisible which is motionless, there will again be motion. For if the body composed of three indivisibles, two in motion and one motionless, moves, it will also move when a fourth indivisible is added ; for the three indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the one indivisible which is added. But if the body composed of four indivisibles moves, that composed of five will also move ; for the four indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the added indivisible. And if that 117 which is composed of five moves, it will certainly move also when a sixth indivisible is added, the five being stronger than the one. And in this way Diodorus proceeds up to ten thousand indivisibles, by way of proving that motion of the major part is non-existent ; for it is absurd, he says, to assert that a body moves as to its major part when it has 9998 of its indivisibles motionless and two only in motion. So that nothing moves as to its major part. And if so, neither does anything move absolutely ; from which it follows that nothing moves.

Well then, such is the argumentation, but it seems 118

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ σοφιστικῆ καὶ παρακείμενον ἔχουσα τὸν ἔλεγχον· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τοῦ πρώτου ἀμεροῦς προσθέσει οἶχεται ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινήσεις, δυοῖν κινουμένων ἀμερῶν δυοῖν δὲ ἀκινήτιζόντων. ὅθεν τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας ἐπιχειρήσεις παραιτητέον, ἐκείνοις δὲ μάλιστα χρηστέον τοῖς
 119 λόγοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, νῦν κινεῖται· εἰ νῦν κινεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται, ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ ἄρα κινεῖται. εἰ γὰρ μερίζεται ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος, πάντως εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα μερισθῆσεται,
 120 καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἔσται ἐνεστώτης. εἰ δ' ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ τι κινεῖται, ἀμερίστους τόπους διέρχεται. εἰ δὲ ἀμερίστους τόπους διέρχεται, οὐ κινεῖται. ὅτε γὰρ ἔστω ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ, οὐ κινεῖται· ἔτι γὰρ ἔστω ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ. ὅτε δὲ ἔστω ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ, πάλιν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ κεκίνηται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι.

121 Πρὸς τοῦτοις πᾶσα κίνησις τριῶν τινῶν ἔχεται, καθάπερ σωμάτων τε καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων, σωμάτων μὲν τῶν κινουμένων, τόπων δὲ τῶν ἐν οἷς ἢ κινήσις γίνεται, χρόνων δὲ τῶν καθ' οὓς ἢ
 122 κινήσις γίνεται. ἦτοι οὖν πάντων τούτων εἰς ἀπείρους τεμνομένων τόπους καὶ χρόνους καὶ εἰς ἄπειρα σώματα γίνεται ἢ κινήσις, ἢ πάντων εἰς ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον καταληγόντων, ἢ τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον καταληγόντων. ἐάν τε δὲ πάντα εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνηται ἐάν τε πάντα εἰς ἀμερές καταλήγη,¹ ἄπορος ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως εὐρεθῆσεται λόγος.

¹ καταλήγη, <ἐάν τε τινὰ μὲν εἰς ἀπείρον τέμνηται, τινὰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καταλήγη.> cj. Bekk.

sophistical and its refutation lies ready to hand ; for motion as to the major part disappears simultaneously with the addition of the first indivisible, when there are two indivisibles in motion and two motionless. Hence, one must set aside arguments of that sort, and use chiefly arguments such as these :—“ If a thing
 119 moves, it moves now ; if it moves now, it moves in the present time ; and if it moves in the present time, it moves, therefore, in an indivisible time. For if the present time is divided, it will certainly be divided into the past and future, and thus it will no longer be present. And if a thing moves in an indivisible time,
 120 it passes through indivisible places. And if it passes through indivisible places, it does not move. For when it is in the first indivisible place it does not move ; for it is still in the first indivisible place. And when it is in the second indivisible place, again it does not move but it has moved.^a Therefore nothing moves.

Furthermore, every motion involves three things,^b
 121 namely bodies and places and times,—bodies which are in motion, places wherein the motion occurs, times during which the motion occurs. Either then
 122 the motion occurs while all these are being divided into an infinite number of places and times and into an infinite number of bodies, or while all come to end in what is indivisible and minimal, or while some of them are being divided *ad infinitum* and some coming to end in what is indivisible and minimal. But whether all are divided *ad infinitum* or all end in what is indivisible, the account given of motion will be found doubtful.

^a Cf. §§ 48, 85, 143.

^b Cf. §§ 139, 142, 154, 169.

- 123 Τάξει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης στάσεως ποιούμεθα τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, καθ' ἣν πάντα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεται. καὶ δὴ οἱ προσεστῶτες αὐτῆς φασὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα ὑφ' ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄθρουν μεριστὸν ἀνύειν διάστημα, καὶ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ διαστήματος (μέρος)¹ πρῶτον ἐπιλαμβάνει τῷ πρῶτῳ αὐτοῦ μέρει καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἑν τὸ ὅλον μεριστὸν διάστημα καὶ ἁθρόως διέρχεται. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον καὶ
- 124 ποικίλως τοῖς φαινόμενοις μαχόμενον. εἰ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τούτων σωμάτων νοήσωμέν τινα κατὰ σταδίου τροχάζοντα διαστήματος, πάντως ὑποπέσειται ὅτι ὀφείλει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιστάδιον ἀνύειν πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον· τὸ γὰρ ὑφ' ἑν ἀξιοῦν τὸ ὅλον ἀνύειν τοῦ
- 125 σταδίου διάστημα τελείως ἄτοπον. καὶ εἰ τέμοιμεν τὸ ἕτερον ἡμιστάδιον εἰς δύο τεταρτημόρια, πάντως πρῶτον διελύσεται τὸ πρῶτον τεταρτημόριον· καὶ εἰ εἰς πλείονα τέμοιμεν, ὡσαύτως. κἂν κατὰ πεφωτισμένου δὲ τροχάζου τοῦ σταδίου, φαίνεται ὡς οὐχ ὑφ' ἑν σκιάσει τὸ στάδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τι
- 126 πρῶτον μέρος τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δὲ τρίτον. καὶ εἰ παραθείοι δὲ τῷ τοίχῳ μεμιλτωμένη τῇ χειρὶ τούτου ἐφαπτόμενος, οὐχ ὑφ' ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τὸν ὅλον τοῦ σταδίου τοῖχον μιλιτῶσει ἀλλὰ κατὰ τάξιν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον. ὅπερ οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔδειξε πραγμάτων, τουτὶ καὶ
- 127 ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν προσδεκτέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἐνεστί ταύτην ἀνελεῖν τὴν δόξαν, πολλαῖς καὶ ποικίλαις εἰς τοῦτο χρωμένους ὑποθέσεσιν. ὑπο-

¹ <μέρος> add. NLE.

Taking them in order, let us commence our argument with the first view, according to which all are divided *ad infinitum*. Now the champions of this view^a assert that the moving body at one and the same time completes the whole of a divisible interval, and does not occupy first the first part of the interval with the first part of itself, and secondly in order the second part, but passes through the whole divisible interval all at once and completely. But this is absurd and conflicts with apparent facts in a variety of ways. Thus, if, in the case of our sensible bodies, we conceive of a man running over a distance of a stade, it will certainly be obvious that such a man must first complete the first half-stade and secondly in order the second; for to claim that he completes all at once the whole distance of a stade is perfectly absurd. And if we were to divide one of the half-stades into two quarters, he will certainly pass over the first quarter first, and so likewise if we divide it into further parts. And if he runs over the stade when it is lighted up, it is evident that he will not cast a shadow over the stade all at once, but now over the first part, now over the second and now over the third. And if he should run alongside the wall and keep touching it with his hand painted red, he will not mark the whole of the wall of the race-course with red paint at one and the same time, but the successive parts of it successively. What, then, the argument has proved in the case of things sensible, this we must also accept in the case of things intelligible.—And besides, it is possible to overthrow this opinion by employing for the purpose a great number of diverse hypothetical cases. For let us suppose a

^a i.e. the Stoics. With §§ 123-126 cf. P.H. iii. 76-78.

κείσθω γὰρ πηχναῖον διάστημα, καὶ διωρίσθω κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα εἰς δύο ἡμιπήχεα. διωρίσθω δὲ καὶ τὰ παλαισσιαῖα διαστήματα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστω τὰ διορίζοντα στερεὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικόπτειν καὶ ἰστᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ κινούμενον. (εἰ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον) ὑφ'¹ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄθρον ἀνέει μεριστὸν διάστημα, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον ἢ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ προειρημένου διαστήματος κινούμενον σώμα ὑφ' ἓνα χρόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ² τὰ δύο ἡμιπηχναῖα διορίζοντος ἀντικοπήσεται

128 σώματος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ παλαισσιαῖα. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀντικοπήσεται, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ κεκινημένον καὶ μὴ κεκινημένον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀντέκοψεν αὐτῷ τὸ διοριστικὸν τῶν ἡμιπηχναίων διαστημάτων, κεκίνηται τὸ ἡμιπηχναῖον διάστημα, ἢ δὲ καὶ τὸ διοριστικὸν τοῦ παλαισσιαίου ἀντέκοψεν, πάλιν οὐ κεκίνηται τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἅμα κεκινήσθαι καὶ μὴ κεκινήσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἀξιῶν τὸ κινούμενον ἄθρον ὑφ' ἓν μεριστὸν ἀνέειν διάστημα καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι.

129 πάλιν ὑποκείσθω πηχναῖον διάστημα, καὶ φερέσθω τινὰ σώματα ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἰσοταχῶς ὡς αἱ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἄτομοι. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται ταῦτα τὰ σώματα ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενα, πάντως κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα τοῦ πηχναίου διαστήματος προσκρούσαντα ἀλλήλοισ ἢ στήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν

130 ὄθεν ἦλθε τόπον³ ἀντικρουσθήσεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἰσταται, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐν

¹ <εἰ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον> ὑφ' N, cj. Bekk. : ἐφ' cet., Bekk.

² ὑπὸ τοῦ N : ὑφ' οὐ cet., Bekk. (ὑπὸ τε τοῦ cj. Bekk.).

³ ἐπὶ τὸν . . . τόπον Mutsch. : ἐκ τοῦ . . . τόπου mss., Bekk.

distance of a cubit, and let it be divided at the middle into two half-cubits. And let its distances of a palm's breadth be also divided, and let the divisors be solid so as to be able to resist and bring to rest the moving object. If, then, the moving object completes the whole of a divisible distance in one and the same time, and the motion is not one of orderly succession, the body which moves over the distance mentioned above will be resisted simultaneously both by the body which divides the two half-cubits and by that dividing the palm's breadths. But if it shall be 128 resisted by these at the same time, the same thing will be at once both having moved and not having moved; for in so far as the divisor of the half-cubit distances has resisted it, it has moved over the half-cubit distance, but in so far as the divisor of the palm's breadth distance has resisted it, it has not, on the contrary, moved over the same distance. But it is absurd to say that the same thing has at once both moved and not moved. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the moving object completes a divisible distance at once and as a whole and does not move by gradations.—Again, let us suppose a distance of a 129 cubit, and let certain bodies move at equal speeds, like the atoms of Epicurus, from each of its extremities. Then, since these bodies are assumed to be moving with equal speeds, they will certainly collide with one another in the middle of the distance of the cubit, and will either come to rest or be driven back towards the place from which they came. And if 130 they come to rest, it is quite evident that each of

ἄλλω μὲν χρόνῳ ἐκινεῖτο τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου διάστημα ἄχρι τῆς μεσότητος, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐμειλιένειν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μεσότητος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. εἰ δὲ ἀνταναβάλλεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου διαστήματος ἄκρα, πάλιν προὔπτον ὡς ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν χρόνῳ διῆλθε τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων διαστήματα¹ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἀντικρουσθέντα ὑπέστρεψεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα. καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.

- 131 "Ἐτι καὶ οὕτως ἐλεγκτέον ἐστὶ τοὺς πάντα μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι λέγοντας, κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα προειληφότας. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοταχῶς κινουμένων σωμάτων ὅσον πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ἀκολουθήσει λέγειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἐκάτερον ἀνύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλείον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.
- 132 ὅπερ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν. διωρίσθω γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον διάστημα τοῦ ἑτέρου σώματος κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα, καὶ τὸ διορίζον ἀντικοπτέτω παντὶ προσπίπτουσι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐκάτερον κινεῖσθαι κὰν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνύειν τὸ τε πηχυαῖον διάστημα καὶ τὰ μέρη τούτου καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν τὰ μέρη ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ὅλον, πάντως ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ ἕτερον τούτων τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὅλον πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον σῶμα κινήσεται τὸ ἡμίπηχυ διάστημα καὶ
- 133 ἀντικοπὲν στήσεται. ἀλλ' ὑπέκειτό γε ἰσοταχῶς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν κινούμενον. τὰ ἄρα ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἄνισον κινεῖται διά-

¹ διῆλθε τὰ ἀπὸ τ. ἄκρων διαστήματα Rüstow: διῆλθεν ἄ. τ. ἄλλων διαστημάτων MSS., Bekk. (ἄκρων cj. Bekk.).

them was moving over the distance from the extremity to the centre at one time, and at another time was about to complete the distance from the centre towards the other extremity. But if they are repelled back towards the extremities of the whole distance, it is obvious again that they passed over the distances from the extremities to the centre at one time, and at another were driven back and retreated towards the extremities. And thus there is nothing which moves all at once and as a whole over a divisible distance.

Moreover, in this way one can also refute those who 131 assert that all things are divided *ad infinitum*, and yet assume that a moving object moves at once and as a whole over a divisible distance. If two bodies are moving with equal speeds over the distance of a cubit, it will follow that they must say that they do not both complete the same distance in the same time, but the one a greater the other a less; which is contrary to evidence. For let the cubit's distance 132 of one of the bodies be divided at the centre, and let the divisor repel everything which collides with it. Since, then, they maintain that both bodies move during an equal time, and during the same time complete both the cubit's distance and the parts thereof, and not the parts in one time and the whole in another, then certainly during the time in which the one of these bodies is moving over the whole distance of the cubit, the remaining body during an equal time will move over the distance of the half-cubit and being repelled will come to rest. But each of them was 133 assumed to be moving at an equal speed. Therefore things which move at equal speeds move over an unequal distance in the same time; which is contrary

στημα· ὅπερ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειάν ἐστιν. τοίνυν οὐ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον ἢ κίνησις ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι.

- 134 *Ἐτι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ κινούμενον πλέον διάστημα τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλαττον διάστημα κινουμένου ταχύτερόν ἐστιν· οἷον ἔαν ἐν ὠριαίῳ διαστήματι καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν κινουμένων τὸ μὲν εἴκοσι σταδίου ἀνύη τὸ δὲ δέκα μόνον, λεχθήσεται συμφώνως κατὰ πάντας¹ ταχύτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸ τοὺς εἴκοσι σταδίου ἀνύον, 135 βραδύτερον δὲ τὸ τοὺς δέκα. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ἐναργές εἶναι δοκοῦν ἀναφύεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκκειμένῃ ὑποθέσει καὶ γίνεται ψεῦδος. ἔσται γὰρ <τὸ>² ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ κινούμενον καὶ ταχύτερον καὶ βραδύτερον· ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαίνον. εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ ὅλον κινεῖται πηχυαῖον διάστημα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὰ τοῦ πηχυαίου διαστήματος μέρη, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ τε ὅλον διάστημα διέρχεται καὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου μέρη, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν 136 τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ ταχύτερον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ πηχυαῖον ἐν τούτῳ διάστημα ἀνύει, ἔσται ταχύτερον, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμιπηχυαῖον, ἔσται βραδύτερον. τελέως δέ ἐστιν ἄτοπον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ λέγειν τι καὶ ταχύτερον εἶναι καὶ βραδύτερον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον.

- 137 Ἰκανῶς δ' ἂν ἐλέγχοντο οἱ ταύτης προεσιώτες τῆς δόξης καὶ διὰ τῆς λεχθησομένης ὑποθέσεως. ἔστω γὰρ τι δακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, διηρήσθω δὲ

¹ πάντας cj. Bekk. : πάντα mss., Bekk.

² <τὸ> add. NE.

to evidence. So then the moving object does not move over a divisible distance at once and as a whole, but motion must take place by gradations.

Moreover, in addition to what has been said, the 134 object which moves over a greater distance in an equal time is speedier than that which moves over a less distance in the same time. For example, if of two bodies assumed to be in motion the one completes twenty stades in the space of an hour, the other only ten, it will be asserted unanimously and on all hands that the one which completes the twenty stades is the speedier, and that of the ten stades the slower. But 135 this fact which seems to be apparent and evident is destroyed—if we are to go by the hypothesis put forward—and becomes false. For that which moves in the same time will be both speedier and slower; which is nonsensical. For if it is not the case that the whole moves over a cubit's distance in one time and over the parts of the cubit's distance in another, but passes through both the whole distance and the parts of that whole in one and the same time, then the same thing will be both slower and speedier in the same time; for in so far as it completes in this 136 time the cubit's distance it will be speedier, but in so far as it completes that of half-a-cubit in the same time it will be slower. But it is perfectly absurd to say that a thing is, in the same time, both speedier and slower. So, then, the moving object does not move over a divisible interval all at once but by gradations.

But the champions of this opinion^a may be 137 sufficiently confuted by the hypothetical case now to be stated. Let us suppose the distance of a finger-

^a Cf. § 123.

τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα εἰς δύο ἡμιδακτυλιαῖα διαστήματα, καὶ ἔστω τὸ διορίζον φύσιν ἔχον ἀντικοπτικὴν καὶ ἀποβάλλειν δυναμένην τὸ προσπίπτον, κινείσθω τε σῶμά τι κατὰ τοῦ τοιούτου διάστηματος· φημὶ δὴ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τό τε ὅλον ἀνύει διάστημα καὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου μέρη, δεήσει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλθειν τε καὶ ἀπελθεῖν·
 138 ὃ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἀνύει τό τε ὅλον δακτυλιαῖον διάστημα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, δακτυλιαῖον δ' ἔστι διάστημα τό τε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου μέχρι τῆς μεσότητος καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ταύτης μέχρι τοῦ ἄκρου, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀνελεύσεται¹ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ προσκρούσαν τῷ διορίζοντι κατελεύσεται. παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν δέ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλθειν τε καὶ ἀπελθεῖν· παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἄρα καὶ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ λέγειν καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι τὴν χεῖρα καὶ συστέλλεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι.
 139 Ὡστε τὸ μὲν κατ' ἄθρον διάστημα γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν οὕτως ἔστιν ἄπορον τοῖς προειρημένοις ἀνδράσιν· πολλῶν δὲ τούτου ἀπορώτερον τὸ μὴ κατ' ἄθρον γίνεσθαι μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον καὶ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον. εἰ γὰρ οὕτω γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, πάντων εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τῶν τε σωμάτων καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων,
 140 οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἵνα γὰρ τι κινηθῆῃ πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ὀφείλει τὸ πρῶτον ἡμίπηχον

¹ ἀνελεύσεται ego: ἀπελεύσεται mss., Bekk. (ἐλεύσεται cf. Bekk.).

length, and let this be divided at the centre into two distances of half a finger, and let the divisor be of a nature capable of repelling and able to hurl back the colliding object, and let there be a body moving over this distance; now I assert that, in the case thus assumed, since the moving object completes in the same time both the whole distance and the parts of that whole, the same thing must both approach and retreat in the same time; which is a thing impossible. For if it completes in one and the same time both the whole distance of a finger and the parts thereof, and the distance of the finger is both that from the extremity to the centre and that from this to the extremity, then the moving object will in the same time both go forward and, after colliding with the divisor, return backwards. But it is contrary to evidence that it should both approach and retreat in the same time; therefore it is also contrary to evidence that motion should take place in this way, just as it is to say that the hand is in the same time both extended and clenched, and not extended in one time and clenched in another.

Consequently, the men mentioned above^a are in 139 a hopeless position in making motion complete a distance all at once; and much more hopeless is it to suppose that it completes a divisible distance not all at once but gradually—the first stage first, and secondly the second. For if motion takes place in this way, when all the bodies and places and times^b are divided to infinity, there will be no beginning of motion. For in order that a thing may have moved 140 over a cubit's distance, it must first pass through the

^a Viz. the Stoics. With §§ 139-141 cf. *P.H.* iii. 76.

^b The three requisites for motion, cf. § 121.

διέρχεσθαι πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δευ-
 τερον. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνύση ἡμίτηχυ
 διάστημα, ὀφείλει τὸ πρῶτον τεταρτημόριον τοῦ
 πηχυαίου διαστήματος διελθεῖν, εἶτα τότε τὸ δεύ-
 τερον. ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰς πέντε διαιρεθῇ (τὸ πρῶτον
 πεμπτημόριον),¹ κἂν εἰς ἕξ, τὸ πρῶτον ἑκτημόριον.
 141 παντὸς οὖν τοῦ πρώτου μέρους ἄλλο πρῶτον ἔχοντος
 μέρος διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομῆν, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε
 ἀρχὴν γίνεσθαι κινήσεως διὰ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτα εἶναι τὰ
 μέρη τοῦ διαστήματος καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ πᾶν
 τὸ ἐκ τούτων λαμβανόμενον ἔχει ἄλλα μέρη.
 142 Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι λέ-
 γοντας τὰ τε σώματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τοὺς
 χρόνους (οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς) ταυθ'
 ἤρμοξε λέγειν· οἱ δὲ πάντα εἰς ἀμερῆ καταλήγειν
 ὑπειληφότες, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, νεανικω-
 τέραις μᾶλλον ἐνέχονται ταῖς ἀπορίαις, καὶ πρῶτον
 143 ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις, ὡς ὁ Διόδωρος ἐδίδασκε τῶν
 ἀμερῶν ἐχόμενος τόπων καὶ σωμάτων. τὸ γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ περιεχόμενον ἀμερὲς σῶμα
 οὐ κινεῖται· περιείχεται γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ καὶ
 ἐκπεπληρώκει τούτον. καὶ πάλιν, τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ
 ὑποκείμενον οὐ κινεῖται· κεκίνηται γὰρ ἤδη. εἰ δὲ
 μήτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἐφ' ὅσον
 ἔστω ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, μήτ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, παρὰ δὲ
 144 ταῦτα τρίτος οὐκ ἐπινοεῖται τόπος, οὐ κινεῖται τὸ
 λεγόμενον κινεῖσθαι. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ χωρὶς
 τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπορίας ἐξ ὑποθέσεως διαβάλλειν τὴν
 στάσιν τῶν κατ' Ἐπίκουρον. ἔστω γὰρ διάστημα
 ἐξ ἑννέα [τε] συγκείμενον ἀμερῶν τόπων στοιχηδόν

¹ <τὸ πρῶτον πεμπτημόριον> add. cj. Bekk.

first half-cubit and secondly the second in order. But
 in order that it may have completed the distance of
 the first half-cubit, it must first have passed through
 the first quarter of the cubit's distance, and in the
 next place the second quarter; so also (the first fifth
 part), if it be divided into five, and if into six the first
 sixth part. Since, then, every first part has another 141
 first part, because of the division to infinity, of neces-
 sity there can never be any beginning of motion,
 owing to the fact that the parts of the distance and
 those of the body are endless, and every one of them
 which is taken contains other parts.

Such, then, are the arguments which it was proper 142
 to bring against those who say that bodies and places
 and times are divided to infinity (and these men
 are the Stoics); but those who, like Epicurus, have
 assumed that all things are reducible to indivisibles
 involve themselves in more formidable difficulties,—
 such as, firstly, the fact that motion will not exist, as 143
 Diodorus^a showed when treating of indivisible places
 and bodies. For the indivisible body contained in the
 first indivisible place does not move; for it is con-
 tained in the indivisible place and fills it up. And
 again: the body situated in the second place does
 not move, for it has moved already. But if the
 moving object neither moves in the first place—
 inasmuch as it exists in the first—nor yet in the
 second, and besides these no third place is conceived,
 then that which is said to move does not move.—And 144
 even apart from this sort of difficulty, it is possible to
 attack the position of the Epicureans by means of a
 hypothetical case. For suppose a distance made up
 of nine indivisible places arranged in a row, and let

^a Cf. § 86 *supra*.

τεταγμένων, καὶ κινείσθω κατὰ τούτου¹ δὴ τοῦ
 διαστήματος δύο ἀμερῆ σώματα ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν
 145 ἄκρων, κινείσθω δὲ ἰσοταχῶς. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἡ
 κίνησις ἐστὶν ἰσοταχής, δεήσει ἑκάτερον τῶν
 τοιούτων σωμάτων ἀνὰ τέσσαρας ἀμερεῖς διέρχε-
 σθαι τόπους. φθάσαντα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν πέμπτον τόπον,
 ὃς ἐστὶ μέσος τῶν τεσσάρων καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων, ἢ
 στήσεται ἢ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν προκαταταχίσει, ὥστε
 τοῦτο μὲν πέντε διελθεῖν ἀμερεῖς τόπους τὸ δὲ
 λειπόμενον τέσσαρας μόνον, ἢ οὔτε στήσεται οὔτε
 τὸ ἕτερον προκαταταχίσει, συνδραμόντα δὲ ὑφ'
 ἐν ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ ἡμισείας διακαθέξει τὸν πέμπτον
 146 ἀμερῆ τόπον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρα στήναι πάνυ
 ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον· τόπου γὰρ [οὐχ]² ὑποκειμένου καὶ
 μηδενὸς πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ἀντικείμενος οὐ στή-
 σεται. τὸ δὲ προκαταταχεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον
 παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑπέκειτο γὰρ ἰσοταχῶς ἐκά-
 147 τερον αὐτῶν κινούμενον. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ὅτι
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνδραμόντα ἀμφοτέρα ἐφέξει τὰς
 ἡμισείας τοῦ λειπομένου τόπου. εἰ δὲ ἐπέχει
 τοῦτο μὲν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸ ἡμίσειαν ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὴν
 καθ' αὐτό, οὐκ ἔσται ἀμερῆς ὁ τόπος ἀλλ' εἰς δύο
 ἡμισείας μεριστός. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα·
 μέρει γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ τοῦ τόπου μέρος ἐπιλαμβά-
 148 νοντα οὐκ ἔσται ἀμερῆ. εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι
 μεριστοὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα οὐκ ἀμερῆ, ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὸν χρόνον μὴ εἶναι ἀμερῆ καὶ ἐλάχιστον. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ διέρχεται τὸν ἀμερῆ τόπον τὸ ἀμερὲς
 σῶμα καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀμεροῦς τόπου μέρος, ἀλλ' ἐν
 ἄλλῳ μὲν τὸν ὅλον ἀμερῆ τόπον, ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ δὲ τὸ

¹ κατὰ τούτου Heintz: κατ' αὐτοῦ mss., Bekk.

² [οὐχ] om. N, Heintz.

two indivisible bodies be moving over this distance
 from each of its extremities, and let them move at
 equal speeds. Then, since their motions are equal in 145
 speed, each of these bodies will necessarily pass over
 four indivisible places. And on arriving at the fifth
 place, which is midway between the one set of four
 and the other, they will either come to a halt or one
 of them will get there first,—so that this one has
 passed through five indivisible places, the other only
 four,—or they will not come to a halt nor will one of
 them get there first but they will both meet together
 in their course and each occupy a half of the fifth
 indivisible place. Now that both should come to a 146
 halt is extremely improbable; for when there is a
 place existing and nothing repelling their motion
 they will not halt. And that the one should get there
 before the other is contrary to the assumption; for
 it was assumed that both move at equal speeds. It 147
 remains, then, to declare that both will meet together
 in their course and occupy the two halves of the
 vacant place. But if this one occupies the half on its
 side, and that one the half on its side, the place will
 not be indivisible but divisible into two halves. And
 so too the bodies; for as occupying a part of the place
 with a part of themselves they will not be indivisible.
 —But if the places are divisible and the bodies also 148
 not indivisible, time too, of necessity, is not indivisible
 and minimal. For the indivisible body does not pass
 through an indivisible place and a part of that in-
 divisible place in an equal time, but the whole indivis-
 ible place in one time and the part of it in a minimal

149 τούτου μέρος. πάλιν ἔστω τι κανόνιον κέν-
 τρους κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος διειλημμένον, καὶ τοῦτο
 περιαγέσθω ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἄκρων κατὰ τινος
 ἐπιπέδου ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. καὶ δὴ
 τοῦ ἄκρου περιαγομένου κύκλοι καταγραφῆσονται
 μεγέθει διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔξωτάτω
 καὶ πάντων περιληπτικὸς μέγιστος, ὁ δ' ἐνδοτάτω
 βραχύτατος, καὶ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀνάλογοι, ἥτοι
 μείζους καὶ μείζους ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου ἐπιόντων
 ἡμῶν ἢ ἐλάσσους καὶ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς
 150 περιφερείας ὑποβαιώντων. ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ
 τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρόνος (ἔστω δὲ ἡμερῆς οὗτος),
 ζητῶ πῶς ἐνός καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου καθεστῶτος
 καθ' ὃν γέγονε τὰ τῆς καταγραφῆς, μιᾶς δὲ οὕσης
 καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, διαφέροντες γεγόνασιν ἀλλήλων
 οἱ κύκλοι, καὶ οἱ μὲν μεγάλοι οἱ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχοντες
 151 τὴν περίμετρον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τῶν
 ἡμερῶν χρόνων διαφορά τις ἐστι παρὰ τὸ μέγεθος
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκλων οἱ μὲν ἐν μείζουσι ἡ-
 μερέσι καταγραφέντες χρόνοι εἰσὶ μείζους, οἱ δὲ ἐν
 ἐλάσσοσι μικρότεροι. εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου μείζων
 ἐστὶν ἡμερῆς χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμερῆς ὁ χρόνος
 οὐδὲ ἐλάχιστος, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον οὐ πάντως ἐν
 152 ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ κινεῖται. πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲ ἐκείνο
 ἔστι φάναι, ὅτι εἰς μὲν ἐστὶν ἡμερῆς χρόνος καθ'
 ὃν ἅπαντες καταγράφονται οἱ κύκλοι, τὰ δὲ μέρη
 τοῦ περιαγομένου κανόνος οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ ἀλλὰ
 τὰ μὲν ταχύτερον περιάγεται τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον, καὶ
 ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ταχύτερον περιαγομένων οἱ μείζους
 συνίστανται κύκλοι ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν βραδύτερον οἱ
 153 μικρότεροι. εἰ δὲ τῷ ὄντι τὰ μὲν θάπτον κινεῖται
 μέρη τὰ δὲ βράδιον, ἐχρήν ἢ διασπᾶσθαι τὸ κα-
 286

time.—Again, suppose there is a certain small ruler 149
 which on one side is provided at intervals with points,
 and let this be made to revolve, starting from one of
 its extremities, over a certain plane surface in one
 and the same time. Now as the extremity revolves,
 circles will be described which differ from one another
 in magnitude, the outermost which surrounds them
 all being the greatest and the innermost the smallest,
 and the intermediate ones in proportion, becoming
 either greater and greater as we advance from the
 centre or less and less as we recede from the outer
 150 circumference. Since, then, the time of the revolu-
 tion is one (and let this be indivisible), I ask how it is
 that, when the time in which the process of describing
 took place is one and the same and the motion also
 is one, the circles have come to be different from one
 another, some being great and some having a small
 circumference. For it is not possible to say that there is
 151 a difference in the indivisible times in respect of magni-
 tude, and because of this those of the circles which were
 described in greater indivisible times are greater, and
 those in less smaller. For if one indivisible time is
 greater than another, the time is not indivisible nor
 minimal, and the moving object does not move wholly
 in an indivisible time. And furthermore, it is not 152
 possible either to assert that, while it is one indivisible
 time in which all the circles are described, the parts
 of the revolving ruler are not of equal speeds but some
 revolve more quickly, others more slowly, and by
 those which revolve more quickly the greater circles
 are constructed, but by those revolving more slowly
 the smaller. But if in reality some parts move more 153
 quickly, others more slowly, the ruler ought to have

νόμιον ἐν τῇ περιαγωγῇ ἢ κάμπτεσθαι γε πάντως, τινῶν μὲν αὐτοῦ μερῶν προκαταταχούντων τινῶν δὲ ὑστερούντων. οὔτε δὲ διασπᾶται οὔτε κάμπτεται· τοῖνυν ἄπορος ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις τοῖς πάντα λέγουσιν
 154 εἰς ἄμερῃ καταλήγειν. καθόλου τε, εἰ πάντα ἄμερῃ ἔστιν, ὃ τε χρόνος ἐν ᾧ γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπερ κινεῖται, ὃ τε τόπος ἐν ᾧ τὰ τῆς κινήσεως συντελεῖται, πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην τὰ κινούμενα ἰσοταχῶς κινήσεται, ὥστε τὸν ἥλιον τῇ χελώνῃ γίνεσθαι ἰσοταχῆ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτῇ ἐν ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ ἄμερές ἀντίε διάστημα. ἄτοπον δέ γε πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἰσοταχῶς λέγειν κινεῖσθαι ἢ τὴν χελώνην τῷ ἥλιῳ τυγχάνειν ἰσοταχῆ· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ πάντων εἰς ἄμερές καταληγόντων ἀξιοῦν γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.

155 Λεῖπεται τοῖνυν σκοπεῖν εἰ δύναται κινεῖσθαι τι τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἄμερές καταληγόντων. καὶ δὴ οὕτως ἠνέχθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Στράτωνα τὸν φυσικόν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρόνους εἰς ἄμερές ὑπέλαβον καταλήγειν, τὰ δὲ σώματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι τε τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ ὅλον ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον
 156 πρότερον. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν τούτων στάσιν (εἶναι) ἀδύνατον¹ ἔσται διδάσκειν πάντως² προδηλοτέρων ἐχομένους ὑποδειγμάτων. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τετραδακτυλῆιον διάστημα, καὶ ἀντέτω τοῦτο τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα ἐν δυσὶν ἄμερέσι χρόνοις, ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον διδακτυλῆιον ἐν ἐνὶ ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ διέρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον πάλιν ἐν ἐνί. τοιαύτης δὲ

been pulled to pieces during its revolution or certainly bent, as some of its parts rush ahead while others lag behind. But it is neither pulled to pieces nor bent; so then motion is inexplicable for those who assert that all things are reducible to indivisibles.—Also, 154 in general, if they are all indivisible^a—not only the time in which the motion occurs, but also the body which moves and the place in which the effects of the motion are completed,—then all the moving bodies will of necessity move at equal speeds, so that the sun is equal in speed to the tortoise; for both the former and the latter complete an indivisible distance in an indivisible time. But it is absurd to say that all moving objects move at equal speeds or that the tortoise is equal in speed to the sun; therefore it is absurd to maintain that, if all things are reducible to indivisibles, motion exists.

It remains, then, to consider whether anything can 155 move if some things are divided *ad infinitum* and others are reducible to indivisibles. And Strato the physicist,^b in fact, took this view; for he supposed that times are reducible to indivisibles, but bodies and places are divided *ad infinitum*, and that the moving object moves over the whole of a divisible distance in an indivisible time all at once and not by gradations. That this view also is impossible one can 156 certainly show by employing quite plain examples. For let us assume a distance of four fingers, and let the moving body complete this in two indivisible times, so that it passes over the one two-fingers' distance in one indivisible time and the other likewise in one. And such being our assumption, from the

^a With § 154 *cf.* P.H. iii. 77.

^b Head of the Peripatetic School, 287-269 B.C.

¹ <εἶναι> ἀδύνατον] ἀδύνατον N, cj. Bekk.: δυνατόν cet., Bekk.

² πάντως Fabr.: πάντων mss., Bekk.

οὔσης ὑποθέσεως ἀφαιρείσθω τοῦ τοσοῦτου διαστή-
 ματος δακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, ὥστε τὸ περιλειπό-
 157 μενον διάστημα τριδακτυλιαῖον γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ
 ὅλον τετραδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα ἐν δυοῖν ἀμερέσι
 χρόνοις τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα διήρχετο, πάντως
 τὸ τριδακτυλιαῖον ἀνύσει ἐν ἐνὶ ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ καὶ
 ἡμίσει, ἐν ἐνὶ μὲν τὸ διδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, ἐν
 ἡμίσει δὲ τὸ λειπόμενον δακτυλιαῖον. καὶ οὕτως
 εἰ ἔστι τοῦ ἀμεροῦς χρόνου ἡμίσει λειπόμενος ἀμε-
 ρῆς χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστι τις ἀμερῆς χρόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 158 οὗτος εἰς μέρη τέτμηται. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος εἰ
 πέμπτον δάκτυλον προσθῶμεν τῷ τετραδακτυλιαῖῳ
 διαστήματι. πῶς γὰρ τοῦτο κινήσεται τὸ κινού-
 μενον; ἄρα γε ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ; ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
 διπλοῦν ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ διήνυεν, ἔσται τὸ ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ χρόνῳ κινούμενον ταχύ τε ἅμα καὶ βραδύ,
 ἢ μὲν διδακτυλιαῖον ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ ἀνύει, ταχύ,
 ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ δακτυλιαῖον διέρχεται, βραδύ. εἰ
 δὲ ἐν ἐλάττονι ἀμεροῦς χρόνου ἀνύει τὸν πέμπτον
 δάκτυλον, μεριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἀμερῆς χρόνος· ὅπερ οὐ
 θέλουσιν.

159 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ'
 ἐν ἄθρονι μεριστὸν ἀνύει διάστημα, στήσεται τι
 ἀναιτίως, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐχὶ δέ γε ἴσταται τι
 ἀναιτίως· οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον γίνεται

160 ἡ κίνησις. ἔστω γὰρ ὀρθιὸν τι διάστημα, οἷον
 δεκάπηχυ, καὶ βαρὺ τι σῶμα, οἷον εἰς μολιβῆ σφαῖρα,
 ἐν ἐνὶ ἐλαχίστῳ χρόνῳ ἀνέτω ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ
 διάστημα ἀνωθεν κάτω. ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθέσθω
 τούτῳ τῷ διαστήματι ἄλλο πηχυαῖον διάστημα,
 ὥστε ὅλον γίνεσθαι ἐνδεκάπηχυ, ἀφίεσθω τε πάλιν

161 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου ἢ σφαῖρα. οὐκοῦν φθάσασα ἐπὶ τὸ

distance stated let the distance of a finger be sub-
 tracted, so that the distance still left is one of three
 fingers. But if the moving body passes over the 157
 whole distance of four fingers in two indivisible times
 it certainly will complete that of three fingers in one
 indivisible time and a half,—the distance of two
 fingers in one, and the remaining distance of a finger
 in a half. And thus, if an indivisible time is less by
 half than an indivisible time, no indivisible time exists
 but this too is divided into parts. And the same 158
 argument applies if we add on a fifth finger to the
 distance of four fingers. For how will the moving
 object move over this? Will it be in an indivisible
 time? But if so, since it also completed double that
 distance in an indivisible time, the object which
 moves over it in the same time will be both fast and
 slow simultaneously,—fast inasmuch as it completes
 the distance of two fingers in an indivisible time, but
 slow inasmuch as it completes but one finger's distance
 in an equal time. But if it completes the fifth finger
 in less than an indivisible time, the indivisible time is
 divisible; which they refuse to admit.

Moreover, if the moving object completes all at 159
 once a divisible distance in an indivisible time, some-
 thing will be coming to a halt causelessly, as we shall
 establish; but nothing comes to a halt causelessly;
 therefore motion does not take place in this way. For 160
 suppose a certain vertical distance, say of ten cubits,
 and let a certain heavy body, such as a leaden ball,
 complete the whole of this distance from the top to
 the bottom in one minimal time. But to this distance
 let there be also added another distance of a cubit, so
 that the total becomes eleven cubits, and let the ball
 be started again from the top. Then, when it has 161

πέρας μὲν τοῦ δεκάτου πήχεως ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ
 ἐνδεκάτου ἢ στήσεται ἢ καὶ τοῦτον διελύσεται,
 φημί δὲ τὸν ἐνδέκατον πήχυν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν στήναι
 ἄτοπον· βαρὺ γὰρ οὕτω σῶμα καὶ δι' ἀέρος φερό-
 μενον καὶ μηδενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος, εἰ στήσεται,
 162 πάντως ἀναίτιως στήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ
 κινήσεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὅλον δεκάπηχυν διάστημα ἐν ἐνὶ
 ἡμέρῃ διέρχεται χρόνῳ, τὸ λειπόμενον πηχυαῖον
 διάστημα τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης κινήσεως ἐν δεκάτῳ
 μέρει τοῦ ἡμεροῦς χρόνου διελύσεται, ὥστε τὸν
 ἡμερῆ χρόνον πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἡμερῆ ἔτι καὶ εἰς
 δέκα μέρη τετμηθῆναι.

163 Καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ ἡμέρῃ χρόνῳ
 ὅλον ἀνύει μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἐνὶ
 καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν πᾶσι γενήσεται τοῖς τοῦ
 διαστήματος μέρεσιν. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ
 χρόνῳ ἐν πᾶσι γενήσεται τοῖς τοῦ διαστήματος
 μέρεσιν, οὐκ ἔσται κεκινημένον τὸ διάστημα ἀλλὰ
 164 ἐπεσχηκός· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ
 ἡμέρῃ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον μεριστὸν διά-
 στημα, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ
 θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν πεφωτισμένον τε καὶ ἀφώ-
 τιστον. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ διπηχυαῖον διάστημα, καὶ
 τούτου ὁ μὲν ἕτερος πήχυσ πεपुरακτώσθω ὁ δ'
 165 ἕτερος ἐψύχθω. εἰ δὴ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ
 αὐτῷ ἡμέρῃ χρόνῳ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἐπιλαμβάνει
 διάστημα, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ τοῦ πεपुरακτωμένου πή-
 χεῶς ἔστω, ἔσται πεपुरακτωμένον, ὅτε δὲ κατὰ
 τοῦ ἐψυγμένου, ἐψυγμένον. γίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὸν
 αὐτὸν χρόνον ἔν τε τῷ πεपुरακτωμένῳ καὶ τῷ
 ἐψυγμένῳ· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον
 ἔσται ἅμα θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν· ὁ τῶν ἀδυνάτων
 292

reached the end of the tenth cubit and the beginning
 of the eleventh, it will either come to a halt or it will
 pass over the latter as well—I mean the eleventh
 cubit. But that it should come to a halt is absurd ;
 for if a body which is so heavy and moving through
 the air and having nothing to resist it shall come to a
 halt, it will certainly be halting causelessly, which is
 absurd. And if it shall keep moving, then, since it 162
 passes over the whole distance of ten cubits in one
 indivisible time, as the motion is the same it will pass
 over the remaining distance of a cubit in the tenth
 part of the indivisible time, so that the indivisible
 time, in addition to being no longer indivisible, is also
 divided into ten parts.

Moreover, if the moving object completes the whole 163
 of a divisible distance in one indivisible time, it will
 necessarily come to be in all the parts of the distance in
 one and the same time. But if it shall be in all the parts
 of the distance in one and the same time, it will not
 have moved over the distance but will have occupied
 it ; which is absurd. So then, the moving object does 164
 not move over a divisible distance in one indivisible
 time, since (if it does so) the same object at the same
 time will be both hot and cold, both illuminated and
 not illuminated. For let us suppose a distance of two
 cubits, and of this let the one cubit be heated by fire
 and the other be chilled. Now if the moving body 165
 occupies the whole of this distance in one and the
 same indivisible time, when it is in the heated cubit
 it will be heated, and when in the chilled one it will
 be chilled. But it is both in the heated one and in
 the chilled one at the same time ; therefore the same
 thing will be at once both hot and cold at the same
 time ; and this is a thing impossible. And not only 166

166 ὑπῆρχεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔφοδον ἔσται διδάσκειν ὅτι ὑφ' ἐν ταυτὸ ἔσται καὶ πεφωτισμένον καὶ ἀφώτιστον· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν.

Πρὸς τούτοις δεήσει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὅπηλικον ἂν τις ὑποθῆται διάστημα, κεινησθαι λέγειν 167 τὸ κινούμενον. ὅσον ἔστω τετραδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, καὶ διηγήσθω εἰς ὀκτώ μέρη, εὐσήμου τε χάριν διδασκαλίας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ μέρος καλεῖσθω Α, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον Β, τὸ δὲ τρίτον Γ, καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐξῆς ὁμοίως. εἰ δὴ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ μεριστὸν ἀνύει διάστημα, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ ΑΒ διάστημα, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δυνήσεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ ΒΓ διάστημα. ἀλλ' εἰ <τοῦτο, >¹ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινήσεται καὶ τὸ ΓΔ, καὶ οὕτω μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὥστε ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ κινήσεται τὸ ὅλον τῆς γῆς διάστημα.

168 Εἰ οὖν μήτε εἰς ἀπειρον οὔσης τῆς τομῆς μήτε εἰς ἀμερές τῆς καταλήξεως, μήτε τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἀπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καταληγόντων, σώζεται ἢ κίνησις, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν. οἷς ἔπεται ἢ ἐποχὴ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων αὐτῇ λόγων ἰσοσθένειαν.

Γ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ

169 Τῆς κινήσεως τριῶν οὐσιῶν, ὡς προείπον, ἔχομένης, σώματός τε τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ τόπου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται καὶ χρόνου καθ' ὃν ἡ κίνησις συν-

¹ <τοῦτο, > add. cj. Bekk.

^a The first view is that of the Stoics (§§ 123 ff.), the second that of Epicurus (§§ 142 ff.), the third Strato's (§§ 155 ff.)

so, but by the same method it will be possible to show also that the same thing will be at once both illuminated and not illuminated; and this too is contrary to the evidence of sense.

Furthermore, one will have to say that the moving object has moved over the distance, whatever the length one assumes this to have, in the same time. For example, suppose a distance of four fingers, and let it be divided into eight parts, and, for the sake of explaining the matter clearly, let the first part of it be called Α, the second Β, the third C, and so on with the rest. Now if the moving object completes a divisible distance in one and the same time, it will be able to move over the distance BC in the same time in which it moves over the distance AB. But if so, it will also move over CD in the same time, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that in a single and indivisible time it will move over the whole distance of the earth.

If, then, motion is secured neither when there is a division to infinity, nor when there is a reduction to indivisibles, nor when some things are divided to infinity but others reduced to indivisibles,^a then one must declare that motion is nothing. And from this there follows suspension of judgement because of the equipollence of the sense-evidence and of the arguments which contradict it.^b

CHAPTER III.—DOES TIME EXIST?

As motion involves, as I said before,^c three things— the moving body and the place wherein it moves and the time in which the movement is completed,—now

^b For "the evidence" of the senses in favour of motion see §§ 66 ff., the counter-arguments being those in §§ 70-168.

^c See §§ 121, 140, 142, 154.

τελείται, ἐπεὶ τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὸν τόπον ἠπορή-
 σαμεν, πειρασόμεθα καὶ περὶ χρόνου ζητεῖν· τάχα
 γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος ἄπορος φανεῖται τοῖς
 τε αἰώνιον ὑποτιθεμένοις εἶναι τὸν κόσμον φυσικοῖς
 καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου λέγουσιν αὐτὸν συνεστά-
 σθαι. καὶ δὴ τινές φασι χρόνον εἶναι “διάστημα
 τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως,” οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ
 κόσμου κίνησιν. οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους οὔτε
 κατὰ τοὺς δευτέρους γίνεται τις χρόνος. εἴπερ γὰρ
 τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως καὶ ἡ κίνησις οὐδὲν
 ἔστι παρὰ τὸ κινούμενον, ὁ χρόνος τῆς κοσμικῆς
 κινήσεως διάστημα καθεστῶς ἢ ιδιαίτερον κοσμικῆς
 κινήσεως οὐδὲν ἔσται παρὰ τὸν κινούμενον κόσμον,
 ἀλλὰ κόσμος πως ἔχων γενήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ὅπερ
 171 ἔστιν ἄτοπον. καὶ ἄλλως, τὴν μὲν κίνησιν τοῦ
 κόσμου ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν κατὰ τινα χρόνον μὴ οὔσαν,
 ὡστ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις <ὁ>¹ χρόνος.
 172 καὶ ἄλλως, πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται,
 διὸ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γενήσεται.
 ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ οὐ γίνεται· ἤτοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ
 γενήσεται ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς ἄλλος,² οὔτε δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ
 γένοιτ’ ἂν (ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς καὶ δύο) οὔτε
 ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ διὰ τὸ μήτε τινα τῶν ἐνεστώτων
 γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ἐνεστώτι μήτε τινα τῶν μὴ
 ἐνεστώτων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι. τοίνυν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο
 173 ῥητέον κόσμου κίνησιν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον. πάλιν
 ὡσπερ ἡ κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται, οὔτω καὶ ἡ
 μονή· ἀλλ’ ὃν τρόπον οὐδεὶς λέγει τὴν μονὴν εἶναι

¹ <ὁ> add. Rüstow.

² ὡς ἄλλος] ἢ ἄλλοις mss., Bekk. (del. Kayser).

that we have discussed the difficulties regarding body
 and place,^a we shall try also to investigate time ; for
 regarding it also the accounts given both by the
 Physicists who suppose that the Universe is eternal,
 and by those who assert that it was constructed at a
 given time, will, perhaps, appear to be hopeless. Now 170
 some declare that time is “the interval of the motion
 of the Universe,” and others that it is “the motion
 itself of the Universe.”^b But neither according to
 the view of the first nor according to that of the second
 does any time exist. For if interval of motion and
 motion are nothing apart from the moving object,
 time, since it is interval of cosmic motion or, more
 precisely, cosmic motion, will be nothing else than the
 moving Universe, and time will be the Universe in
 a certain state ; which is absurd.—And again : it is 171
 possible to conceive the motion of the Universe as
 non-existent at a certain time, so that time will not
 be the motion of the Universe.—And again : all 172
 motion takes place in time, therefore the motion of
 the Universe also will take place in time. But time
 does not take place in time ; for, if so, it will exist either
 in itself or as one <time> in another. But it will not
 exist in itself (for then the same time will be both
 one and two), nor as one time in another, because none
 of the things present exists in what is not present and
 none of those not present in what is present. So,
 then, on this account also one must not assert that
 time is the motion of the Universe.—Once more : just 173
 as motion takes place in time, so also does rest ; but
 just as no one says that rest is time, so neither is one

^a For “body” see *Adv. Phys.* i. 366 ff. ; for “place,” §§ 37 ff. *supra*.

^b The first of these definitions is Stoic, the second Platonic ; cf. *P.H.* iii. 136 f.

χρόνον, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κίνησιν δεόντως
 χρόνον ἀποφαίνεται. ἢ τε τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις
 διὰ παντός ἐστιν ἢ αὐτῆ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ διὰ παντός
 ἐστιν ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὁ αὐτός λέγεται ὅτε δὲ
 ἄλλος, καὶ ὅτε ἄλλος, ὅτε μὲν πλείων ὅτε δὲ
 ἐλάττων. ἕτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις
 174 καὶ ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος. οἷ γε μὴν τὴν τοῦ κόσμου
 κίνησιν ἀνελόντες τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι δοξάσαντες,
 ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀρίσταρχον τὸν μαθηματικόν, οὐ
 κωλύονται νοεῖν χρόνον. τοῖνον ἕτερον εἶναι λε-
 κτέον τὸν χρόνον καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν τῆ τοῦ κόσμου
 175 κινήσει. οἷ τε ἐν καταγείοις τισὶ καὶ ἀλαμπέσι
 σπηλαίοις βιοτεύοντες καὶ οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς πηροὶ τῆς
 μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἔχουσι,
 καθίσαντες δὲ καὶ ἀναστάντες καὶ περιπατήσαντες,
 ἔννοιαν χρόνου λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ τρία ταῦτα
 ἐνήργησαν, καὶ πλείονος μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ τρία,
 ἐλάσσονος δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ δύο, ἐλαχίστου δὲ τοῦ ἐν
 ᾧ τὸ ἐν. εἰ δὲ δυνατόν νοῆσαι χρόνον μὴ νοοῦντας
 τὴν οὐράνιον περιφορὰν, ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ
 ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος.
 176 Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ χρόνον ἔφασκεν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν
 τοῦ ἐν κινήσει πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό
 ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, συμμημόνευσις τις τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου, τὸ ἡρεμοῦν καὶ ἀκινήτιζον οὐκ
 ἔσται ἐν χρόνῳ. ἢ εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ ἀκινή-
 τίζον, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου, ἔσται τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἡρεμοῦν
 177 καὶ κινούμενον ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. διόπερ Στράτων ὁ

right in asserting that the motion of the Universe is
 time.—Also, the motion of the Universe is perpetually
 the same but time is not perpetually the same, but is
 now called the same and again unequal; and when
 unequal, now more and now less. Therefore the
 motion of the Universe is one thing and time another.
 And in fact those who, like Aristarchus the mathe- 174
 matician, have rejected the motion of the Universe,^a
 but have held that the earth moves, are not precluded
 from conceiving time. So, then, we must say that
 time is another thing and not the same as the motion
 of the Universe.—Also, those who live in subter- 175
 ranean and unlighted caverns and those who are
 blind from birth have no conception of the motion of
 the Universe, but after sitting and standing up and
 walking they get a conception of the time in which
 they performed these three actions, and of the time
 of the three as greater, that of two as less, and that
 of one as least. But if it is possible for them to
 conceive time without conceiving the revolution of
 the heavens, this latter is one thing and time another.

Aristotle declared that time is "the number of the 176
 prior and posterior in motion."^b But if time is this—
 a "joint recollection" of the prior and posterior in
 motion,—what is at rest and motionless will not exist
 in time. Or else, if what is motionless is in time, and
 time is the number of the prior and posterior in
 motion, then that which is in time will be both at rest
 and in motion; which is impossible. On this account 177

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 136; *Aristot. Phys.* iv. 11. When the mind distinguishes between past, present, and future, it is using time as the measure (or "number") of the course of events. For the Stoic term "joint recollection" cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 353 ff.

^a Here "the Universe" (*κόσμος*) means "the Heavens" (excluding the earth). Aristarchus of Samos was a famous astronomer at Alexandria (circa 270 B.C.).

φυσικὸς ἀποστὰς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον
 ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς· παρ-
 ἦκει γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς κινουμένοις, ὅτε κινεῖται, καὶ
 πᾶσι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ὅτε ἀκινήτιζοι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 178 πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται. μήποτε δὲ
 πάμπολλά ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοῦτῳ μαχόμενα· αὐτάρκες
 δὲ νῦν ἐκεῖνο λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μετροῦν τὴν κίνησιν ἢ
 τὴν μονὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται [καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ χρόνος].¹
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μετροῦν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ
 τὴν μονὴν <ὁ>² χρόνος· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ οὐ γίνεται
 179 χρόνος. ἄλλως τε, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο μέτρον τῆς
 κινήσεως καὶ τῆς μονῆς ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐπεὶ ἀντι-
 παρῆκει τῇ τε κινήσει ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ κίνησις καὶ
 τῇ μονῇ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ μονή, ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις
 καὶ ἡ μονὴ ἀντιπαρῆκει τῷ χρόνῳ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ
 χρόνος μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς μονῆς ἢ ἡ
 180 κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονὴ μέτρον τοῦ χρόνου. καὶ τοῦτο
 τάχα βέλτιον ἢν εἰπεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος δυσθεώ-
 ρητόν τι ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονὴ εὐσύνοπτον,
 ληφθεῖη δ' ἂν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δυσθεωρήτου τὸ εὐθεώ-
 ρητον ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν.
 181 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ
 Δημόκριτον φυσικοὺς τοιαύτη τις ἀναφέρεσθαι
 τοῦ χρόνου νόησις· “χρόνος ἐστὶν ἡμεροειδὲς καὶ
 νυκτοειδὲς φάντασμα,” καθ' ἣν πάλιν ἀπορός ἐστὶν
 ἡ [περὶ] τοῦ χρόνου φύσις. εἰ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατος
 δείκνυται ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ νύξ, ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τὸ
 ἡμεροειδὲς φάντασμα [μὴ εἶναι χρόνον ἢ]³ ἀνυπό-
 182 στατον ὑπάρχειν. ἡμέρα γὰρ ἡ καὶ ἰδιαίτερον
 νοουμένη καὶ δωδεκάωρος, τουτέστιν ἡ ἀπὸ ἀνα-

Strato the Physicist ^a rejected this notion and said
 that time is “the measure of all motion and rest”;
 for it is co-extensive with all moving objects when they
 are moving and with all immobile objects when they are
 motionless, and for this reason all things which exist
 exist in time. But, very possibly, there is a vast
 178 number of things which conflict with his view; though
 it is enough now to mention the fact that what
 measures the motion or the rest exists in time [and
 is not time]; and if so, time will not be that which
 measures motion and rest; for time does not exist in
 time.—And again: if time is the measure of motion
 179 and rest for the reason that it is co-extensive both
 with motion in so far as it is motion and with rest in so
 far as it is rest, then since, conversely, motion and
 rest are co-extensive with time, time will not be the
 measure of motion and rest any more than motion and
 rest the measure of time. Perhaps, indeed, it would
 180 have been better to have said the latter; for whereas
 time is hard to observe, motion and rest are easy to
 discern, and what is easy to observe is not to be
 perceived through what is hard, but rather the
 reverse.

It seems, too, that there is ascribed to the Physi-
 181 cists Epicurus and Democritus ^b a conception of time
 such as this—“Time is a day-like and night-like
 phantasm” ^c; and according to this, again, the
 nature of time is dubious. For if day and night are
 shown to be unreal, it follows that the day-like
 phantasm also [is not time or] is unreal. For day, in
 182 its narrower conception as consisting of twelve hours

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 137; § 228 *infra*.

^b Cf. § 219 *infra*; P.H. iii. 137.

^c *i.e.* image, or mental picture.

¹ [καὶ . . . χρόνος] secl. Heintz.

² <ὁ> add. N.

³ [μὴ . . . ἢ] secl. Heintz.

183 πολῆς μέχρι δύσεως, σκεψαμένους ἡμῖν ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. ὅτε γὰρ ἡ πρώτη ὑφέστηκεν ὥρα, οὐπω αἱ ἑνδεκα ὑφεστᾶσιν· τῶν δέ γε πλειόνων ὥρῶν μὴ οὐσῶν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἡμέρα. καὶ πάλιν ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα ἐνέστηκεν ὥρα, ἡ μὲν πρώτη οὐκέτ' ἔστιν, αἱ δὲ λειπόμεναι δέκα οὐπω εἰσίν, διὸ τῶν πλειόνων μὴ οὐσῶν ὥρῶν οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται ἡ ἡμέρα. πάντοτε οὖν μιᾶς ὥρας ὑφεστῶσης, τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας μιᾶς ὥρας μὴ οὐσης, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τις ἡμέρα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡ μία ὥρα ὑφέστηκεν· κατὰ πλάτος γὰρ νοεῖται, ἐκ πλειόνων τε καὶ αὐτῆ συνέστηκε μοιρῶν, ὧν αἱ μὲν οὐδέπω εἰσὶν αἱ δὲ οὐκέτι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνυπόστατον γίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὥρα τις ἐστὶ μήτε ἡμέρα μήτε κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον νύξ, οὐδὲ χρόνος ἔσται ἡμεροειδὲς ἢ νυκτερο-
 185 εἰδὲς φάντασμα. καὶ μὴν ἡμέρα λέγεται διχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα ὥρῶν συνεστῶσα, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ὁ πεφωτισμένος ἐξ ἡλίου ἀήρ. ἤτοι οὖν τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὥρῶν συνεστῶσης ἡμέρας φάντασμα εἶναι λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τὸν χρόνον, ἢ τῆς ὡς πεφωτισ-
 186 μένου ἀέρος ἐξ ἡλίου. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὥρῶν συνεστῶσης ἡμέρας οὐκ ἂν εἴπαιεν φάντασμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον· αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆ ἡ ἡμέρα χρόνος ἐστὶ, φημί δὲ τὴν δωδεκάωρον, διόπερ εἰ τὸ φάντασμα ταύτης χρόνος εἶναι νοεῖται, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος τοῦ χρόνου φάντασμα· ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαῖνον. τοῖνυν οὐ λεκτέον τὸ τῆς δωδεκάωρου ἡμέρας φάντασμα χρόνον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς ὡς πεφωτισμένου ἀέρος ἡμέρας φάντασμα· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμέτερον φάντασμα, ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαν-
 302

—that is to say, from sunrise to sunset,—appears when we examine it to be unreal. For when the first hour exists, the eleven do not as yet exist; and when most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. And again: when the second hour is present, the first no longer exists and the remaining ten are not yet in existence, so that in this case too, as most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. Always, then, if one hour exists but day is not one hour, no day will exist. Nor, in fact, does one hour exist; for it is conceived by way of extension and is itself also composed of a number of parts of which some are not as yet and others no longer existent, so that what is compounded of them is unreal. But if there exists neither an hour nor a day nor, by analogy, a night, then time will not be a day-like or night-like phantasm.—Moreover, the word “day” has two senses, being in the one sense that which is composed of the twelve hours, and in the other the air which is illuminated by the sun. Epicurus, then, asserts that time is a phantasm either of the day composed of the hours or of that which is air illuminated by the sun. But he would not say that time is a phantasm of the day composed of the hours; for this day itself—I mean the twelve-hour day—is time, and therefore, if the phantasm of this is conceived to be time, time will be the phantasm of time; which is nonsensical. So then one must not say that the phantasm of the twelve-hour day is time. Nor yet the phantasm of the day which is illuminated air; for this exists in time, and therefore, if time is our phantasm of this

τάσματι γενήσεται ἢ τοιαύτη ἡμέρα. ὁ πολλῶ τοῦ
 188 πρώτου χεῖρον ἐστίν. φθαρέντος τε τοῦ κόσμου
 κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον οὔτε ἡμέρα ἐστίν οὔτε νύξ, διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο οὔτε ἡμερήσιον οὔτε νυκτερήσιον φάντασμα.
 ἄτοπον δ' ἦν φθαρέντος τοῦ κόσμου λέγειν μὴ εἶναι
 χρόνον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποτέ¹ [καὶ τὸ] ἐφθάρθαι καὶ τὸ
 φθεῖρ θῆναι χρόνων ἐστίν ἐμφατικά. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο,
 ἕτερον μὲν ἐστίν ὁ χρόνος, διάφορον δὲ τὸ ἡμερήσιον
 ἢ νυκτερήσιον φάντασμα.

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὕτως ἢ τοῦ χρόνου
 189 ὑπαρξίς ἠπορήσθω· πάρεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένῳ
 λόγῳ τὸ προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν. εἴπερ γὰρ
 ἐστὶ χρόνος, ἦτοι πεπέρασται ἢ ἀπειρός ἐστίν· οὔτε
 δὲ πεπέρασται, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀπειρός
 ἐστίν, ὡς διδάξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι χρόνος. εἰ
 γὰρ πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος, ἦν ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε ὁ
 χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται
 χρόνος. ἄτοπον δέ γε ἢ τὸ γεγονέναι ποτὲ χρόνον
 ὅτε ὁ χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, ἢ τὸ ἔσεσθαι ποτὲ χρόνον ὅτε
 χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποτὲ γεγονέναι καὶ
 τὸ ἔσεσθαι, καθὼς προείπον, διαφερόντων χρόνων
 ἐστίν ἐμφατικά. οὐ τοίνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος.

190 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπειρός ἐστίν. ἐστὶ γὰρ [τι]
 αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι παρωχημένον τὸ δὲ μέλλον. ἦτοι
 οὖν ἐκάτερος τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἐστίν ἢ οὐκ ἔσται.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται, αὐτόθεν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος,
 καὶ εἰ πεπέρασται, μένει τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄπορον, τὸ
 γεγονέναι ποτὲ χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἦν καὶ τὸ

¹ τὸ ποτέ (om. καὶ τὸ) Mutsch.: ὁπότε mss., Bekk. (τὸ ποτέ
 <φθαρῆναι> cf. Bekk.).

day, this day will exist in our phantasm. And this is
 a result far worse than the first.—Also, when the 188
 Universe is destroyed, according to Epicurus,^a there
 exists neither day nor night, and consequently neither
 a diurnal nor a nocturnal phantasm. But it is absurd
 to say that when the Universe is destroyed time does
 not exist; for the statements that it was destroyed
 once and that it is being destroyed are indicative of
 times. And if so, time is one thing and the diurnal
 or nocturnal phantasm a different thing.

Let this, then, serve as our account of the diffi-
 culties regarding the real existence of time which
 arise from the conception of it; but we can also 189
 establish our case by means of direct argument. For
 if time exists it is either limited or unlimited; but
 neither is it limited, as we shall establish, nor is
 it unlimited, as we shall show; therefore time is
 nothing.^b For if time is limited, there was once a
 time when time did not exist, and there will one day
 be a time when time will not exist. But it is absurd
 to say either that there was once a time when time
 did not exist, or that there will one day be a time
 when time will not exist, for the statements that
 "there once was" and that "there will be" are (as I
 said before ^c) indicative of different times. So, then,
 time is not limited.—Nor, in fact, is it unlimited. For 190
 one part of it is past, the other future. Each of these
 times, then, either exists or does not exist. And if
 it does not exist, time is at once limited, and if it
 is limited the original difficulty remains—that there
 was once a time when time did not exist and there

^a Cf. Lucret. v. 91 ff., 235 ff. for the "exitium caeli terrae-
 que futurum."

^b With §§ 189-193 cf. P.H. iii. 141-142.

^c In § 188.

191 ἔσεσθαι ποτε χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται. εἰ δὲ
 ἔστω ἐκάτερος, φησὶ δὲ ὁ τε παρωχημένος καὶ
 ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔσται. ἐν τῷ
 παρόντι δὲ ὑπάρχων, ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι γενήσεται
 χρόνῳ ὃ τε παρωχημένος καὶ ὁ μέλλων. ἀποπον
 δὲ τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα λέγειν κατὰ
 τὸν ἐνεστώτα χρόνον νοεῖσθαι. τοῖνυν οὐδ' ἀπειρός
 ἔστω ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε πεπερασμένος νοεῖται
 192 μήτ' ἀπειρος, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται. τὸ τε μὴν ἐξ
 ἀνυπάρκτων συνεστῶς ἀνυπαρκτον ἔσται, ὃ δὲ γε
 χρόνος ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων ἀξιοῦται συνεστάναι τοῦ
 παρωχημένου μηκέτ' ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος
 μήπω ὄντος· ἀνυπαρκτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος.
 193 Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἰ ἔστι τι χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀμεριστός
 ἔστω ἢ μεριστός· οὔτε δὲ ἀμεριστός εἶναι δύναται,
 καθὼς ὑπομνήσομεν, οὔτε μεριστός, ὡς καταστη-
 σόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις χρόνος. ἀμερῆς μὲν οὖν
 οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν ὁ χρόνος, ἐπεὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς τε
 τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλ-
 194 λοντα. μεριστός δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ
 μεριστὸν ὑπὸ τινος αὐτοῦ μέρους καταμετρεῖσθαι·
 οἶον ὁ μὲν πήχυς ὑπὸ παλαιστοῦ καταμετρεῖται,
 καὶ ἔστι τοῦ πήχεως μέρος ὁ παλαιστής, ὑπὸ
 δὲ τοῦ δακτύλου ὁ παλαιστής, καὶ ἔστι μέρος τοῦ
 παλαιστοῦ ὁ δάκτυλος. τοῖνυν εἰ καὶ ὁ χρόνος
 μεριστός ἔστω, ὀφείλει πρὸς τινος αὐτοῦ μέρους
 195 καταμετρεῖσθαι. οὔτε δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος ἐν-
 δέχεται τοὺς ἄλλους χρόνους καταμετρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ
 ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρωχημένον,
 ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον,
 γνωόμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον οὐκέτι ἔσται
 ἐνεστώτης ἀλλὰ παρωχημένος. καὶ εἰ τὸν μέλλοντα

will one day be a time when time will not exist. But 191
 if each exists—I mean both past and future time,—
 each will be in the present. And as existing in the
 present, both past and future time will be in present
 time. But it is absurd to say that past and future
 are conceived as in present time. So, then, time is
 not unlimited either. But if it is neither conceived
 as limited nor as unlimited, it will not exist at all.—
 Also, what is composed of non-existents will be non- 192
 existent, and time is held to be composed of non-
 existents—of the past which exists no longer and of
 the future which does not as yet exist; time, there-
 fore, is non-existent.

Furthermore: if time is anything, it is either 193
 indivisible or divisible; but it cannot be either in-
 divisible, as we shall show, or divisible, as we shall
 establish; no time, therefore, exists.^a Now time
 cannot be indivisible, since it is divided into past,
 present, and future. And it will not be divisible 194
 because everything divisible is measured by a part of
 itself; the cubit, for instance, is measured by the
 palm, and the palm is a part of the cubit, and the palm
 is measured by the finger, and the finger is a part of
 the palm.^b So, then, if time too is divisible, it ought
 to be measured by some part of itself. But it is not 195
 possible for the other times to be measured by the
 present. For if the present time measures the past,
 the present time will be in the past, and being in the
 past it will no longer be present but past. And if

^a With §§ 193-196 cf. *P.H.* iii. 143.

^b 4 fingers = 1 palm; 6 palms = 1 cubit (= 18 inches).

καταμετρεῖ ὁ ἐνεστώς, κατ' αὐτὸν γινόμενος μέλλων ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐνεστώς. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρόνοις ἐνδέχεται καταμετρεῖν τὸν ἐνεστώτα· ἐκάτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν κατὰ τοῦτον γινόμενος ἐνεστώς ἔσται καὶ οὕτε παρωχημένος οὔτε μέλλων.

196 ἀλλ' εἰ πάντως μεριστὸν ἢ ἀμέριστον δεῖ νοεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὔτε μεριστός ἐστίν οὔτε ἀμέριστος, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον.

197 Σὺν τούτοις ὁ χρόνος τριμερής ἐστίν· τὸ μὲν γάρ τι ἦν αὐτοῦ παρωχημένον, τὸ δ' ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλον. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν παρωχημένον οὐκέτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὐπω ἔστιν. λείπεται δὲ ἐν εἶναι μέρος ἐνεστηκός. ἦτοι οὖν ὁ ἐνεστηκὸς χρόνος ἀμερής ἐστίν ἢ μεριστός. οὔτε δὲ ἀμερής εἶναι δύναται· ἐν ἀμερεῖ γὰρ χρόνῳ οὐδὲν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι μεριστόν, ὡς φησὶ Τίμων, οἷον τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὃ τούτοις ἔοικεν.

198 εἰ δ' ἀμερής ἐστίν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔξει, ἢ συνάπτει τῷ παρωχημένῳ, οὔτε πέρασ, ᾧ συνάπτει τῷ μέλλοντι· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἔχον καὶ πέρασ οὐκ ἀμεριστόν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχει μήτε πέρασ, οὐδὲ μέσον ἔχει· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὡς <πρός>¹ ταῦτα σύμβλησιν νοεῖται τὸ μέσον. μήτε δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχων² μήτε

199 πέρασ μήτε μέσον οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μεριστός ἐστίν ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος, ἦτοι εἰς τοὺς ὄντας χρόνους μερίζεται ἢ εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας. καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας χρόνους μερίζοιτο, οὐκέτ' ἔσται χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας χρόνους μεριζόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρόνος. εἰ δὲ εἰς τοὺς ὄντας χρόνους μερί-

¹ <πρός> add. Heintz.

² ἔχων NLE: ἔχον cet., Bekk.

the present measures the future, being within this it will be future and not present. Hence, too, it is not possible to measure the present by the other times; for, as being within it, each of them will be present and not either past or future. But if one must 196 certainly conceive time as either divisible or indivisible, and we have shown that it is neither divisible nor indivisible, it must be declared that time is nothing.

Furthermore: time is tripartite; for one part of 197 it is past, one present, and one future.^a And of these the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. It remains to say that one part exists, the present. The present time, then, is either indivisible or divisible. But it cannot be indivisible, for "nothing divisible is of a nature to exist in indivisible time," as Timon says,—becoming, for example, and perishing, and everything of a similar kind. And if it is in- 198 divisible, it will neither have a beginning whereby it is joined on to the past, nor an end whereby it is joined on to the future; for that which has a beginning and an end is not indivisible. But if it has neither a beginning nor an end, it will not have a middle either; for the middle is conceived by way of comparison in its relation to the other two. And as having neither beginning nor middle nor end, it will not exist at all. And if present time is divisible, it is 199 divided either into existent times or into non-existent. And if it should be divided into non-existent times, it will no longer be time; for that which is divided into non-existent times will not be time. And if it is divided into existent times, it will no longer, as a

^a With §§ 197-199 cf. P.H. iii. 144-145.

ζεται, οὐκέτι ἔσται ὅλος ἐνεστῶς, ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν αὐτοῦ παρωχημένοι τὶ δὲ μέλλον. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι ἔσται ὅλος [ἐνεστῶς καί]¹ ὑπάρχων, τοῦ μὲν 200 μηκέτι ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ δὲ μήπω ὄντος. ἀλλ' εἰ τριῶν ὄντων, παρωχημένου καὶ μέλλοντος καὶ ἐνεστῶτος, δέδεικται τούτων μηδεὶς ὑπάρχων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις χρόνος.

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἐνεστῶτα χρόνον πέρασ μὲν εἶναι τοῦ παρωχημένου ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἐκ δυοῖν ἀνυπάρκτων χρόνων ἕνα ποιοῦντες, οὐχ ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα χρόνον ἀνυπαρκτον ποιοῦσιν.

201 ἄλλως τε, εἰ πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρωχημένου ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, τὸ δὲ πέρασ τοῦ παρωχημένου συμπαρώχηκε τῷ οὐδ' ἐστὶ πέρασ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, εἴπερ πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρωχη- 202 μένου. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, ἢ δὲ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὕτω ἔστιν, ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος οὕτω ὑποστήσεται, καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἐναντιώτατα τούτῳ συμβήσεται· καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεστῶς ἐστὶν, ὑπάρξει, καθὸ δὲ συμπαρώχηκε τῷ παρωχημένῳ, οὐκέτι ἔσται, καθὸ δὲ τῷ μέλλοντι σύνεστιν, οὕτω ἔσται. ἀποπον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον νοεῖν καὶ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα καὶ μηκέτ' ὄντα καὶ μήπω ὄντα. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ῥήτεον εἶναι τῶα χρόνον.

203 Ἐπακτέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος ἢ φθαρτός καὶ γεννητός· οὔτε δὲ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, ὡς δειχθήσεται, οὔτε φθαρτός καὶ γεννητός, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι χρόνος. ἀφθαρτος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀγέννητος οὐκ ἔστιν εἴ γε τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ παρώχηκε τὸ δὲ ἐνέστηκε τὸ δὲ 810

whole, be present but one part of it will be past, another future. And for this reason it will no longer, as a whole, be [present and] existent, as part of it no longer exists and part is not as yet existing. But if 200 of the three times—past, future, and present—it has been proved that not one exists, no time will exist.

And those who assert that present time is the limit of the past and the beginning of the future,^a—thus making one out of two non-existent times,—make not only one but every time non-existent.—And further : 201 if present time is the limit of past, and the limit of the past has passed away together with that whereof it is the limit, present time will no longer exist, if it really is the limit of the past.—And again : if present 202 time is the beginning of the future, and the beginning of the future does not yet exist, present time will not yet exist, and thus it will have most opposite properties ; for inasmuch as it is present it will exist, but inasmuch as it has passed away together with the past it will exist no longer, and inasmuch as it accompanies the future it will not as yet exist. But it is absurd to conceive the same time as both existing and not existing, and no longer existing and not yet existing. So, then, in this way too one must deny that any time exists.

One may also argue thus : if time is anything, it is 203 either imperishable and ingenerable or perishable and generable ; but it is neither imperishable and ingenerable, as shall be proved, nor perishable and generable, as this also shall be established ; time, therefore, is not anything. Now it is not imperishable and ingenerable, seeing that part of it is past, part present,

^a With §§ 200-205 cf. P.H. iii. 146-148.

¹ [ἐνεστῶς καί] secl. Heintz.

204 μέλλει. καὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἢ μὲν χθὲς οὐκέτι ἔστιν, ἢ
 δὲ σήμερον ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ αὔριον οὐπω γέγονεν. ὅθεν
 καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἔστιν,¹ ὥσπερ τὸ
 παρωχημένον, τὸ δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς τὸ ἐνεστηκός, τὸ δὲ
 οὐπω ἔστιν, καθάπερ τὸ μέλλον. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὔτε
 ἀγένητος οὔτε ἀφθαρτος γενήσεται ὁ χρόνος.

205 εἰ δὲ φθαρτός ἐστι καὶ γενητός, ἀπορον τὸ εἰς τί
 φθαρῆσεται καὶ ἐκ τίνος ἔσται. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μέλλων
 ἔστιν ἤδη, οὔτε ὁ παρωχημένος ἔτι ἔστιν. ἐκ δὲ
 τῶν μὴ ὄντων πῶς δύναται τι γίνεσθαι, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὴ
 ὄντα πῶς δύναται τι² φθείρεσθαι; οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστὶ
 χρόνος.

206 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ ἔστι τι χρόνος,
 ἤτοι γενητός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγένητος ἢ τις μὲν γενητός τις
 δὲ ἀγένητος· οὔτε δὲ γενητός δύναται εἶναι ὁ
 χρόνος οὔτε ἀγένητος οὔτε τις μὲν γενητός τις δὲ

207 ἀγένητος· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι³ χρόνος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 γενητός εἴη, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γί-
 νεται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος γεννώμενος ἐν χρόνῳ ἔσται
 γεννώμενος. ἤτοι οὖν [ὁ]⁴ αὐτός ἐσται ἐν αὐτῷ γεν-
 νώμενος ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. καὶ εἰ μὲν [ὁ]⁴ αὐτός
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ γεννᾶται, ἔσται τι γεγονὸς πρὶν γεγονέναι·

208 ὅπερ ἀτοπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεται ὀφείλει
 προϋπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γεννωμένου, δεήσει καὶ
 τὸν χρόνον ἐν ἑαυτῷ γεννώμενον ἑαυτοῦ προ-
 γεγενῆσθαι· οἷον ἐν ἐργαστηρίῳ δημιουργεῖται
 ἀνδριάς, ἀλλὰ προϋπόκειται τοῦ ἀνδριάντος τὸ

¹ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν Heintz: οὐκ ἔσται mss., Bekk. (οὐκέτ' cj. Bekk.).

² γίνεσθαι . . . τι add. Mutsch. (<γίν. . . . πῶς> add. cj. Bekk.).

³ τι NLE: τις cet., Bekk.

⁴ [ὁ] secl. Kayser.

and part future. For the day of yesterday exists no 204
 longer, that of to-day exists, and that of to-morrow
 has not yet come into existence. Hence one part
 of time (namely, the past) no longer exists, another
 (namely, the present) exists, and another (namely,
 the future) does not yet exist. And for this reason
 time will be neither ingenerable nor imperishable.—
 But if it is perishable and generable, it is hard to say 205
 what it will perish into and from what it will come
 to exist. For neither does the future exist already,
 nor the past exist any longer. But how can a thing
 <come into existence> from non-existents, (or how can
 a thing) perish <into non-existents>? Time, then, is
 nothing.

One may attack it also in this way^a: if time is 206
 anything, it is either generable or ingenerable, or
 partly generable and partly ingenerable. But time
 cannot be either generable or ingenerable or partly
 generable and partly ingenerable; therefore time is
 not anything. For if it were generable, since every- 207
 thing which is generated becomes in time, time too
 being generated will be generated in time. Either,
 then, it will be generated as itself in itself or as one
 time in another. And if it is generated as itself in
 itself, it will be a thing which has come to exist before
 it has come to exist; which is absurd. For since that 208
 in which a thing becomes must exist before that
 which is generated in it, time also, as generated in
 itself, must have come into existence before itself;
 just as a statue is wrought in a workshop, but the
 workshop existed before the statue, and a ship is con-

^a With §§ 206-211 cf. *P.H.* iii. 149-150.

ἐργαστήριον, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ συνίσταται ναῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ προῦφέστηκε τῆς νεῦς ὁ τόπος. τοίνυν εἰ καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, προῦπάρξει ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ οὕτως ἢ¹ μὲν γίνεται, οὐπω ἔσται, ἐπεὶ πάν τὸ γινόμενον, ὅτε γίνεται, οὐπω ἔστιν, ἢ¹ δὲ ἐν 209 ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ὀφείλει προῦπάρχειν. ἔσται οὖν ἅμα χρόνος καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἢ μὲν γίνεται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιβολὴν εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὸν 210 χρόνον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνος, οἷον ὁ μέλλων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐνεστώς ἐν τῷ παρωχημένῳ. εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕκαστος τῶν χρόνων ἀπολείπων τὴν ἰδίαν θέσιν τὴν ἑτέρου ἐπιλήψεται τάξιν. οἷον εἰ² ὁ μέλλων χρόνος γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ χρόνῳ, ὁ μέλλων κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστώτα γινόμενος ἔσται ἐνεστώς ἀλλ' οὐ μέλλων· καὶ εἰ ὁ ἐνεστώς ἐν τῷ παρωχημένῳ γίνεται, πάντως κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον γινόμενος οὐκ ἔσται ἐνεστώς 211 ἀλλὰ παρωχημένος. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν ἀναστρέψωμεν, τὸν μὲν παρωχημένον ποιούντες ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ γινόμενον, τὸν δὲ ἐνεστώτα ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι· αἱ γὰρ αὐταὶ πάλιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀπορίαι. εἰ οὖν οὔτε ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται χρόνος οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐκ ἔστι γεννητὸς ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγέννητός ἐστι μήτε γεννητός, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον ἐπινοεῖν ἀμήχανον, λεκτέον μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν 212 τὸν χρόνον. ὅτι γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητος οὐ δύναται εἶναι, σφόδρα εὐπαραμύθητον. εἰ γὰρ ἀγέννητός

¹ ἢ Heintz: ἢ N: εἰ cet., Bekk.

² εἰ Heintz: ἐπεὶ mss., Bekk.

constructed in a certain place, but the place was existing before the ship. So, then, if time too becomes in itself, it will exist before itself; and thus, inasmuch as it becomes, it will not yet exist, since everything which becomes, while it is becoming, does not exist as yet; but inasmuch as it becomes in itself, it must exist beforehand. Time, then, will be at once both 209 existent and non-existent. Inasmuch as it becomes it will not exist, but inasmuch as it becomes in itself it will exist. But it is absurd that the same thing at the same instant should both exist and not exist; therefore it is also absurd to say that time becomes in itself.—Nor yet does it become as one time in 210 another,—the future, for instance, in the present, and the present in the past. For if one time becomes in another, each of the times will necessarily quit its own position and occupy the post of the other. If, for example, the future time becomes in the present time, the future as becoming during the present will be present and not future; and if the present becomes in the past, as becoming during the past it will certainly not be present but past. And the same 211 argument applies if we reverse their order, making the past becoming in the present and the present in the future; for here again the same difficulties follow.—If, then, time does not become either in itself or as one time in another, time is not generable. But if it is neither ingenerable nor generable, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, one must declare that time is nothing.—Now the fact 212 that it cannot be ingenerable is extremely easy to demonstrate. For if it is ingenerable and neither has

- ἔστι καὶ οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε γενήσεται, εἰς ἔσται
μόνος ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, καὶ οὔτε ὁ μέλλων ἔτι
μέλλων, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πράγματα, οὔτε ὁ παρ-
ωχηκῶς ἔτι παρωχηκῶς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πρατ-
τώμενα. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοῖσιν οὐδὲ ἀγένητός
213 ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τις μὲν γενητός
τις δὲ ἀγένητος, ἐπεὶ ἐπισυντεθήσονται αἱ ἀπορίαι.
ὁ τε γὰρ γενητός ἢ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεσθαι ὀφείλει ἢ ἐν
ἐτέρῳ· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ γένηται, προϋπάρξει
ἑαυτοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ ἐν ἐτέρῳ, οὐκέτι ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος
ἔσται, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃν γίνεται ἀπολείπων τὴν ἰδίαν
214 τάξιν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου·
εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητός ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ μέλλων ποτὲ ἔσται
χρόνος οὔτε ὁ παρωχηκῶς, ἀλλ' εἰς μόνος ὁ ἐν-
εστηκῶς. ἄποπα δὲ ταῦτα. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν,
μήτε γενητοῦ ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου μήτε ἀγενήτου μήτε
τινὸς μὲν γενητοῦ τινὸς δὲ ἀγενήτου, μὴ εἶναι
χρόνον.
- 215 Ἐνέσται δὲ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας,
ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνοίας προσηπόρηται. αὐτίκα γὰρ
τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων φασὶν οἱ μὲν σῶμα
εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τῶν ἀσώματων
φαμένων οἱ μὲν ὡς καθ' αὐτό τι νοούμενον πρᾶγμα
216 οἱ δ' ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἐτέρῳ. σῶμα μὲν οὖν ἔλεξεν
εἶναι τὸν χρόνον Αἰνησίδημος κατὰ τὸν Ἡρά-
κλειτον· μὴ διαφέρειν γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ
πρώτου σώματος. ὅθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς πρώτης εἰσ-
αγωγῆς κατὰ ἕξ πραγμάτων τετάχθαι λέγων τὰς
ἀπλᾶς λέξεις, αἵτινες μέρη τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνουσι,
τὴν μὲν χρόνος προσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν μονὰς ἐπὶ τῆς

become nor will become, one time alone, the present, will exist, and neither will the future, and the things therein, be any longer future, nor will the past, and the things done therein, be any longer past. But this is not so; nor, consequently, is time ingenerable.— Nor yet is it partly generable and partly ingenerable, 213 since, if so, the difficulties will be combined. For the generable must become either in itself or in another; but if it becomes in itself it will exist before itself, and if in another it will no longer be that time but, quitting its own post, it will be the time during which it becomes. And the same argument applies also to 214 the ingenerable; for if it is ingenerable, neither will the future time ever exist nor the past, but one time only, the present. But these results are absurd. It only remains, then, to say that as time is neither generable nor ingenerable, nor partly generable and partly ingenerable, time does not exist.

And it will be possible to doubt about this matter 215 in respect of its substance, just as we have previously shown its doubtfulness in regard to its conception. Thus, for instance, some of the Dogmatic philosophers assert that time is a body, others that it is incorporeal; and of those who assert it to be incorporeal some regard it as a thing conceived as self-existent, others as a property of something else. Thus Aenesidemus 216 "according to Heracleitus" * stated that time is a body; for it does not differ from the existent and the first body. Hence, too, when he mentions in his *First Introduction* that the simple appellations, which are the parts of speech, apply to six things, he asserts that the names "time" and "unit" are

* Cf. P.H. iii. 138; *Adv. Phys.* i. 337. By "the existent and the first body" is meant "air"; see §§ 232 f. *infra*.

- 217 οὐσίας τετάχθαι φησίν, ἥτις ἐστὶ σωματική, τὰ δὲ
 μεγέθη τῶν χρόνων καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 ἐπὶ πολλαπλασιασμοῦ μάλιστα ἐκφέρεσθαι. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ νῦν, ὃ δὴ χρόνου μῆνυμά ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν
 μονάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ
 ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν πολλαπλα-
 σιασμὸν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ νῦν, φημί δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ
 δὲ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν πολυπλα-
 σιασμὸν εἶναι τῆς μονάδος. ὥσθ' οὗτοι μὲν σῶμα
 218 ποιοῦσι τὸν χρόνον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι
 ἀσώματον αὐτὸν ᾤθησαν ὑπάρχειν τῶν γὰρ τινῶν
 φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, τῶν δὲ
 ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἶδη καταριθμοῦνται ὡς λεκτὸν
 καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον. ἐξ οὗ δῆλον
 γίνεται ὅτι πρὸς τῷ ἀσώματον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν
 χρόνον, ἔτι καὶ καθ' αὐτό τι νοούμενον πρᾶγμα
 δοξάζουσι τοῦτον.
- 219 Ἐπίκουρος δέ, ὡς αὐτὸν Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων
 ἐξηγεῖται, τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων
 εἶναι λέγει, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ
 ὥραις καὶ πάθεισι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ
 μοναῖς. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμπτώματά ἐστι
 τισὶ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ ὁ χρόνος πᾶσι τούτοις
 συμπαρεπόμενος εἰκότως ἂν λεχθεῖν σύμπτωμα
 220 συμπτωμάτων. καθόλου γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἀνωθεν
 προλάβωμεν εἰς τὴν τοῦ λεγομένου παρακολου-
 θησιν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν τινα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν,
 τὰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφεστῶσι θεωρεῖται.
 καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκε πράγματα οἷον αἱ
 οὐσίαι, ὡς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κενόν, περὶ δὲ τοῖς καθ'

applied to the substance, which is corporeal, whereas 217
 the extents of the times and the sums of the numbers
 are chiefly expressed by multiples of these. For
 "now," which is an indication of time, and also
 "unit" are nothing else than the substance; while
 "day" and "month" and "year" are multiples of
 "now" (I mean, of time), and "two" and "three"
 and "ten" and "a hundred" are multiples of
 "unit." So that these people make time a body;
 but the Stoic philosophers supposed it to be incor- 218
 poreal; for they assert that of the "Somethings"^a
 some are bodies, others incorporeal, and they enume-
 rate four kinds of the incorporeals, namely, "expres-
 sion" and void and place and time. And from this
 it is evident that, in addition to supposing time to be
 incorporeal, they also regard it as a thing conceived
 as self-existent.

Epicurus, as Demetrius the Laconian interprets 219
 him, declares that time is "a symptom of symptoms,^b
 accompanying days and nights and hours and affec-
 tions and non-affections and motions and rests." For
 all these are symptoms attached to things, and as
 accompanying all these time may naturally be called
 "a symptom of symptoms." For in general—to go 220
 back a little, for the reader following of our exposi-
 tion—some existent things are self-existent, while
 others are viewed as attached to such as are self-
 existent. And such things as substances (like body
 and void) are self-existent; and such as are viewed

^a In the Stoic logic "Something" (τό τι) was the highest
 universal (*summmum genus*); see *Intro.* Vol. I. p. xxvi. For
 "expression" (*i.e.* "meaning" of a term, or the subjective
 idea which it excites) *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 81, *Adv. Log.* ii. 12.

^b *Cf.* § 81 *supra*; *P.H.* iii. 137. "Symptom" (or "con-
 currence") nearly = "attribute" or "property", *cf.* § 221.

221 *ἑαυτὰ ὑφ' ἑστώσι θεωρεῖται τὰ καλούμενα παρ' αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότα. τούτων δὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀχώριστα τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκεν, τὰ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι τούτων πέφυκεν. ἀχώριστα μὲν οὖν ἔστι τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκεν ὥσπερ ἡ ἀντιτυπία*
 222 *μὲν τοῦ σώματος, εἷξις δὲ τοῦ κενοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ σῶμα δυνατὸν ἔστι ποτε νοῆσαι χωρὶς τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὔτε τὸ κενὸν χωρὶς εἷξεως, ἀλλ' αἰδιον ἑκατέρου συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ μὲν τὸ ἀντιτυπεῖν τοῦ δὲ τὸ εἶκειν. οὐκ ἀχώριστα δὲ ἔστι τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκε*
 223 *καθάπερ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονή. τὰ γὰρ συγκριτικὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὔτε κινεῖται διὰ παντὸς ἀνηρημέτως οὔτ' ἀκινήτιζι διὰ παντός, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν συμβεβηκυῖαν ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν ποτὲ δὲ τὴν μονήν, καίπερ τῆς ἀτόμου, ὅτε καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἔστιν, ἀεικινήτου καθεστῶσης. ἡ γὰρ κενῶ πελάζειν ὀφείλει ἡ σῶματι· εἴτε δὲ κενῶ πελάζοι, διὰ τὴν εἷξιν φέρεται δι' αὐτοῦ, εἴτε σῶματι, διὰ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν ἀποπαλτικῶς ποιεῖται τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν.*
 224 *συμπτώματα οὖν ταῦτ' ἔστιν οἷς χρόνος παρέπεται, φημι δὲ τὴν τε ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα καὶ ὥραν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀπαθείας κινήσεις τε καὶ μονάς. ἡ τε γὰρ ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος εἰσὶ συμπτώματα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἡλίου φωτισμὸν συμβαίνει, ἡ δὲ νύξ κατὰ φωτισμοῦ*
 225 *στέρησιν τοῦ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐπιγίνεται. ἡ δὲ ὥρα ἥτοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἢ τῆς νυκτὸς μέρος καθεστηκυῖα πάλιν σύμπτωμα γίνεται τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ νύξ. ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται δὲ πάση ἡμέρᾳ καὶ πάσῃ νυκτὶ καὶ ὥρᾳ ὁ χρόνος· παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν μακρὰ τις ἢ βραχεῖα λέγεται ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ, φερομένων*

as attached to the self-existents are what they call "properties." And of these properties some are 221 inseparable from the objects whereto they belong, while others are naturally separated from them.^a Inseparable, for instance, from the things whereto they belong are the resistance ^b of body and the non-resistance of void; for body can never be conceived 222 as without resistance, or void without non-resistance; but each has a property that is eternal, the one resistance, the other non-resistance. But not inseparable from the things whereto they belong are such properties as motion and rest. For such bodies 223 as are composite are neither in restless motion continually nor continually motionless, but have at one time the property of motion, at another that of rest, although the atom, when it is by itself, is in perpetual motion. For it must collide either with a void or with a body; and if it collides with a void, it passes through this because of its non-resistance; but if with a body, it moves back from this by way of rebound, because of its resistance.—Thus these things 224 are "symptoms" which time accompanies—I mean day and night and hour and affections and non-affections and motions and rests. For day and night are symptoms of the surrounding air, of which day is a property due to the illumination from the sun, while night results from the privation of the illumination from the sun. And hour again, being a part either 225 of day or of night, is a symptom of the air, like day and night. And time extends parallel to every day and every night and hour; and for this reason a day or a night is called long or short, as we pass over the

^a Such "properties" are (in logical phrase) "accidents."

^b Or "solidity," *cf.* § 239; *P.H.* iii. 39.

ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ταύτη συμβεβηκότα χρόνον. τὰ τε
 πάθη καὶ αἱ ἀπάθειαι ἦτοι ἀλγηδόνες ἢ ἡδοναὶ
 ἐτύγγαλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ οὐσίαι τινὲς καθειστή-
 κεισαν ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα τῶν πασχόντων ἦτοι
 ἡστικῶς ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, καὶ συμπτώματα οὐκ ἄχρονα.
 226 πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἔτι δὲ ἡ μονή, ὡς ἤδη
 παρεστήσαμεν, τῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ συμπτώματα
 καὶ οὐ χωρὶς χρόνου· τὴν γοῦν ὀξύτητα καὶ βρα-
 δυτήτα τῆς κινήσεως, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πλείονα καὶ
 227 ἐλάττονα μονὴν χρόνω καταμετροῦμεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι ὅτι Ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἀσώματον
 οἶεται τὸν χρόνον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ
 τοῖς στωικοῖς· ἐκείνοι μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέλεκται,
 ἀσώματόν τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοοῦμενον ὑπεστήσαντο
 τὸν χρόνον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συμβεβηκός τισιν.
 228 Ὡδε μὲν οὗτοι, Πλάτων δὲ ἔλεγεν, ὡς δὲ τινες
 Ἀριστοτέλης, χρόνον εἶναι ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικός, ὡς
 δ' ἄλλοι Ἀριστοτέλης, μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.
 229 Ὅθεν τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν
 χρόνον οὐσίας διαστάσεως, πάρεστι μὲν ἤδη συμ-
 βαλεῖν ἐκ τῶν προσηπορημένων ὅτι οὐδ' ἐκ ταύτης
 οἶον τέ ἐστι βεβαίως τι μαθεῖν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν
 λεκτέον πρὸς μὲν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ
 Στράτωνα τὸν φυσικὸν τὰ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἀντειρημένα,
 ὅτε ἐκ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ χρόνου συνήγομεν τὸ μηδὲν
 230 εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς σωματικὴν ἀξιοῦντας
 εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ χρόνου, φημί δὲ τοὺς Ἡρα-
 κλειτεῖους, ἐκείνο τὸ¹ προχειρότατον ὅτι εἰ χρόνος
 σῶμά ἐστι, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ἢ μένον ἢ κινούμενον

¹ ἐκείνο τὸ cj. Bekk.: κινούτο MSS., Bekk.

time which is a property thereof. The affections, too, and non-affections are either pains or pleasures, and on this account are not substances but symptoms of those who are affected either pleasurably or painfully, and not timeless symptoms. And besides these, 226 motion and also rest are, as we have already established,^a symptoms of bodies and not without time; for certainly we measure by time the quickness and slowness of motion, and the greater or less amount of rest. Well then, from this it is plain that Epicurus 227 thinks that time is incorporeal, but not in the same sort of way as do the Stoics; for whereas they, as has been said, supposed that time is an incorporeal thing conceived as self-existent, Epicurus supposed it to be a property of certain things.

Such were the views of these men; but Plato— 228 and, as some say, Aristotle ^b—declared that “time is the number of the prior and posterior in motion”; and Strato the physicist—and, as others say, Aristotle—that it is “the measure of motion and rest.”

Hence, as there also exists such a divergence of 229 opinion regarding the substance of time, one can already infer from the difficulties stated above that from it too it is impossible to learn anything for certain; but still we ought now to bring against Plato and Aristotle and Strato the physicist the objections we made at the beginning ^c when we deduced from the conception of time that time is nothing, and against 230 those who maintain that the substance of time is corporeal—I mean the Heracliteans ^d—we should bring the argument most ready to hand that if time is a body, and every body is conceived as either at rest

^a Cf. §§ 176-177.

^b Cf. § 176; P.H. iii. 137.

^c See §§ 170 ff.

^d Cf. § 216.

- νοεῖται, τὸ δὲ μένον ἢ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοεῖται, <ἐν σώματι τὸ σῶμα μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοεῖται.>¹ οὐχὶ δέ γε ἐν σώματι τὸ σῶμα μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοεῖται, οὐκ ἄρα σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ
- 231 χρόνος. τὸ τε ὄν κατὰ τοὺς Ἡρακλειτεῖους, ὁ δὴ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δέ γε ὁ χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ σῶμα χρόνος ἐστίν. τὸ τε ζῶον ἐν χρόνῳ ζῆ, ὡς καὶ τὸ τεθνηκὸς ἐν χρόνῳ τέθνηκεν· διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ ζῶον ἢ σῶμα ὁ
- 232 χρόνος. καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρῶτον σῶμα κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον οὐ κωλύονται χρόνον νοεῖν· εἰ δέ γε χρόνος ἦν τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον σῶμα, κἂν ἐκωλύοντο τὸν χρόνον νοεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον ἐστὶ
- 233 χρόνος. τὸ τε ὄν κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον ἀήρ ἐστίν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Αἰνησιδημος, μακρῷ δὲ ἀέρος διέφερεν ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὧ λόγῳ οὐθεὶς τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τὴν γῆν χρόνον λέγει εἶναι, τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ τὸν ἀέρα φήσει· οὐ τοῖνυν τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ χρόνος.
- 234 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν συντόμοις πρὸς ταύτην εἰρήσθω τὴν στάσιν, βραχυῶς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοαῆς λόγος, φάσκοντας τῶν τιῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων εἶδος τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοούμενον οἰομένους τὸν χρόνον. τὸ γὰρ τί γενικώτατον τῷ μήτε σῶμά τι δύνασθαι εἶναι μήτε ἀσώματον μήτε σῶμα ἅμα καὶ ἀσώματον
- 235 οὐκ ἂν εἶη. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστι, δεήσει πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶδη σώματα τυγχάνειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσώματον· καὶ ὄν τρόπον πάντα τὰ τοῦ ζῶου εἶδη ζῶά ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἀψυχον καὶ τὰ τοῦ φυτοῦ φυτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν
- ¹ <ἐν . . . νοεῖται> add. Heintz (lac. in N).

^a Cf. § 218. With §§ 234-236 cf. P.H. ii. 223-225.

or in motion. and what is at rest or in motion is conceived as at rest or in motion in time, <then the body is conceived as being at rest or in motion in a body>; but the body is not conceived as at rest or in motion in a body; therefore time is not a body.—Also, 231 according to the Heracliteans, “the existent,” which is body, is in time; but time is not in time; therefore the existent and body is not time. Also, the living creature lives in time, as also the dead is dead in time; wherefore time is not a living creature or a body.—Moreover, those who assert that “the first 232 body” of Heraclitus does not exist are not precluded from conceiving time; but if time had been the first body of Heraclitus, they would have been precluded; therefore “the existent” of Heraclitus is not time. Also, the existent of Heraclitus, as Aenesidemus says, 233 is air; but time is vastly different from air, and just as nobody says that fire or water or earth is time, so for the same reason nobody will say that air is time; so, then, the existent is not time.

Let this, then, serve as a concise statement of the 234 objections to this view; and brief, too, is our argument against the Stoics, who declare that of the “Somethings” some are bodies, others incorporeals,^a and suppose that time is a particular species of the incorporeals which is conceived as self-existent. For the “Something,” the highest genus, will not exist owing to its being unable to be either a body or an incorporeal or at once both body and incorporeal. For 235 if it is a body, all its particulars will have to be bodies and none incorporeal; and just as all the particulars of Animal are animals and none inanimate, and those

ἐμφυχον, οὕτως ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ τοῦ τινὸς εἶδη σώματος ὄντος σώματα τυγχάνειν καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἔσται πάντα 236 αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶδη ἀσώματα καὶ οὐδὲν σῶμα. ὡσαύτως δὲ κἂν σῶμα ἅμα καὶ ἀσώματον ὑπάρχη, πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἔσται σώματα ἅμα καὶ ἀσώματα, καὶ οὐδὲν κατ' ἰδίαν ἢ σῶμα μόνον ἢ ἀσώματον. ὥστε εἰ μὴ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ τί μηδὲ ἀσώματον ἢ σῶμα ἅμα καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐδὲν ἐστί τὸ τί. τούτου δ' ἀναιρουμένου συναναίρεται καὶ τὰ ἐπ' εἶδους πάντα. 237 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀποπον. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν συναποδοθέντων τῷ χρόνῳ ἀσωμάτων ἠπόρηται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, οἷον τὸ λεκτὸν καὶ τὸ κενόν καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων ἠπορημένου καὶ ὁ χρόνος οὐ συγχωρηθήσεται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἶναι τούτοις.

238 Πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων ἀξιοῦντα τυγχάνειν τὸν χρόνον, πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων λέγεσθαι δυναμένων, ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀπαρκέσει λέγειν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν πως ἔχουσαι οὐσίαι τάχα θεωροῦνται καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα συμβεβηκέναι ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν· 239 οὔτε γὰρ ἀντιτυπία τις ἔστι παρὰ τὸ ἀντίτυπον σῶμα οὔτε εἰζὶς ὑπόκειται παρὰ τὸ εἶκον καὶ κενόν, οὐ κίνησις παρὰ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα, οὐ μονὴ παρὰ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστί στρατηγία παρὰ τὸν στρατηγούμενον οὐδὲ γυμνασιαρχία παρὰ τὸν γυμνασιαρχούμενον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν 240 συμβεβηκότων ἐστί παρὰ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. ὅθεν

^a Cf. § 218.

^b Cf. §§ 219, 227.

^c Or "solidity," a property of "body," cf. § 12.

of Vegetable vegetables and none animate, so too it will follow that, as "Something" is a body, its particulars are bodies and none of them incorporeal. But if it is incorporeal, its particulars will all be incorporeal and none will be a body. And in the 236 same way, if it is at once both body and incorporeal all its particulars will be at once both bodies and incorporeals and none will be by itself either a body only or an incorporeal. So that if the "Something" is not a body nor incorporeal, nor at once both body and incorporeal, the "Something" is nothing. And if this is destroyed, there are also destroyed along with it all its particulars; which is absurd.—Further- 237 more, each of the incorporeals assumed together with time^a—such as "expression" and void and place—have been doubted by the Sceptics; and as each of these has been doubted, it will not be granted that time is of the same genus as they.

And as against Epicurus, who maintains that time 238 is a "symptom of symptoms,"^b although many other arguments can be brought, it will suffice for the present to state this one—that whereas substances in a certain condition are perhaps observed and belong to the class of things really existent, what are called the properties of substances, being not other than the substances, are non-existent; for there exists no 239 "resistance"^c apart from the resistant body, nor does any non-resistance subsist apart from the non-resistant and void, nor motion apart from the moving body, nor rest apart from the stationary; but just as generalship is nothing apart from the acting general, nor headship of a training-school apart from the acting head, so too each of these properties is non-existent apart from that whereof it is a property.

καὶ ἐπειδὴν λέγει ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὸ σῶμα νοεῖν κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων [σωμάτων]¹ βιάζεται τὸ ὄν σῶμα νοεῖν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε μέγεθός τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ τὸ μεμεγεθωμένον μήτε σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον μήτε ἀντιτυπία παρὰ τὸ ἀντιτυποῦν, πῶς ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὑποκειμένων οἶόν τε τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 241 νοεῖν σῶμα; ὥσθ' ἵνα ἡ χρόνος, συμπτώματα εἶναι δεῖ, ἵνα δὲ τὰ συμπτώματα ὑπάρχη, συμβεβηκός τι ὑποκείμενον· οὐδὲν δέ ἐστι συμβεβηκός ὑποκείμενον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ χρόνος δύναται ὑπάρχειν.
 242 ἐῷ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ τὰ οἷς λέγεται συμβεβηκέναι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ τὰ ὧν λέγεται σύμπτωμα τρυγᾶναι, ἀνεύρετά ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἡμέρα ἢ νύξ, ὥρα, κίνησις μονή, πάθος ἀπάθεια. ἡ γοῦν ἡμέρα δωδεκάωρος λεγομένη εἶναι, καθὼς πρότερον ὑπέδειξαμεν, οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατὰ τὰς δώδεκα ὥρας ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν μόνην τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν, ἣτις οὐκ
 243 ἔστιν ἡμέρα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς νυκτός. ἡ τε ὥρα ἐν πλάτει νοουμένη καὶ οἷον τριμερῆς πάλω σκεψαμένοις ἡμῖν ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔστιν ὑφέστηκεν, οὔπω γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔστιν, οὔτε ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον· τότε γὰρ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐκέτι ἔστιν τὸ δὲ
 244 τρίτον οὔπω ἔστιν. τῶν δὲ πλειόνων αὐτῆς μερῶν κατά τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον μὴ ὑπαρχόντων οὐδ' αὐτὴ δύναται ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' ἔστω γε ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ νύκτα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὥρας. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ταῦτά ἐστι χρόνος, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος σύμπτωμά φησιν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὁ

¹ [σωμάτων] secl. Heintz.

Hence when Epicurus asserts that we conceive body 240 by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents; for if no size exists apart from that which is endowed with size, nor shape apart from what is shaped, nor resistance apart from what resists, how is it possible from things non-existent to form a conception of an existent body? So that, in order that time may 241 exist, symptoms must exist, and in order that symptoms may exist there must be a really existent property; but there is no really existent property; so then, time cannot exist.—I pass over the argument 242 that the things of which time is said to be a property and also the things of which it is said to be a symptom are undiscoverable,—such as day, night, hour, motion, rest, affection, non-affection. Thus “day,” which is said to be of twelve hours—as we pointed out above ^a—does not exist during the twelve hours but during only one, the present, which is not a day. And the same 243 account holds good of “night.” And “hour” again, being conceived as extended and, as it were, tripartite,^a appears to us when we examine it to be non-existent. For neither does it exist when the first part of it exists (for the other parts do not as yet exist), nor when the second; for then the first part exists no longer and the third does not as yet exist. But since, 244 in this way, most of its parts are non-existent, it cannot exist itself. But let it be granted that day exists and that night and hours exist; then, since these are time, and Epicurus asserts that time is a symptom of them, time itself, according to Epicurus, will be a

^a See § 182 *supra*. “Hour” may be regarded as “tripartite” as being divisible into past, present, and future.

245 χρόνος αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ σύμπτωμα. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως λόγος ποικίλως ἀπορος δέ-
δεικται διὰ τὸ μήτε ἐν ᾧ τι ἔστι τόπω δύνασθαι
κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι. συναλήρηται δὲ καὶ
τὸ περὶ τῆς μονῆς· κινήσεως γὰρ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ
μονῆ γένοιτ' ἂν. κατὰ γὰρ ἀντιπαραβολὴν τοῦ
κινουμένου νοεῖται τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ τοῦ ἀκινήτι-
ζοντος τὸ κινούμενον· ὅθεν ὡς δεξιῶ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ
ἀριστερόν ἔστιν, οὕτως τοῦ ἐτέρου τούτων μὴ ὑπ-
246 ἀρχοντος οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν δύναται νοεῖσθαι. καὶ
ἄλλως, φασὶν οἱ ἀπορητικοί, τὸ μένον ὑπὸ τινος
αἰτίας ἀναγκάζεται μένεω, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαζόμενον
πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα μένον κινεῖται.
ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τὰ συμπτώματά φησιν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον
ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, δέδεικται δὲ ἠπορημένα, δεήσει ὁμο-
λογεῖν καὶ τὸν συμβεβηκότα τούτοις χρόνον ἠπορη-
247 σθαι. πρὸς τούτοις ἀσώματόν τι ἔστιν ἡ
κίνησις καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορη-
μένων, ἀσώματον δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ
πιθανὸν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ἀσώματα συμβεβηκέναι,
λέγωμεν μηδὲ τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα εἶναι τῶν
ἐκκειμένων συμπτωμάτων.
Ἄλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν χρόνον ἀπορή-
σαντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ζητῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ.

Δ'. ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥ

248 Ἐπεὶ ἔτι τῶν συζυγούντων τῷ χρόνῳ πραγ-
μάτων ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς ἐξαρ-
θμήσεως τῆν τοῦ χρόνου γίνεσθαι καταμέτρησης,
καθάπερ ὥρων καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ μηνῶν ἔτι δὲ

¹ ἀσώματόν τι NLE: ἀσώματός cet., Bekk.

symptom of itself.—Furthermore, the account given 245
of motion ^a has been shown to be in many respects
dubious owing to the impossibility of a thing moving
either in the place where it is or in that where it is
not. And along with this the doctrine of rest is also
destroyed; for if motion does not exist, neither will
rest exist. For it is by contrast with the moving
object that the motionless is conceived, and by con-
trast with the motionless the moving; hence as left
does not exist if right is non-existent, so if either of
these does not exist, the other cannot be conceived.
And besides, say the Doubters, that which is at rest 246
is compelled to be at rest by some cause ^b; but that
which is compelled is affected, and what is affected
moves; therefore that which is at rest moves. But
if Epicurus asserts that time is related to the symp-
toms, and they have been shown to be doubtful, he
will have to confess that their property, time, is also
doubtful.—And further: motion is an incorporeal, 247
and also affection, and each of the things mentioned,^c
and time too is an incorporeal. Since, then, it is not
probable that incorporeals are properties of incor-
poreals, let us declare that time is not a symptom of
the symptoms mentioned.

So now that we have shown the difficulties about
time in respect of its substance, let us inquire next
about number.

CHAPTER IV.—CONCERNING NUMBER

Since number also is one of the things linked closely 248
with time—seeing that the measurement of time (as,
for instance, of hours and days and months, and years

^a See §§ 87 ff.

^b With § 246 cf. *P.H.* iii. 116.

^c Cf. § 242.

ἐναντιῶν, καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμεθα μετὰ τὴν προ-
 ανυθεύσαν ἡμῖν περὶ ἐκείνου ζήτησιν καὶ τὸν περὶ
 τούτου διαθέσθαι λόγον, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτι οἱ ἐπιστη-
 μονέστατοι τῶν φυσικῶν οὕτω μεγάλην δύναμιν
 τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἀπένευμαν ὥστε ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα
 τῶν ὄλων τούτους νομίζω. οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ περὶ
 249 τὸν Σάμιον Πυθαγόραν. εἰκέναι γὰρ λέγουσι τοὺς
 φιλοσοφοῦντας γνησίως τοῖς περὶ λόγον πονου-
 μένοις. ὡς γὰρ οὗτοι πρῶτον τὰς λέξεις ἐξετά-
 ζουσιν (ἐκ λέξεων γὰρ ὁ λόγος), καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ
 συλλαβῶν αἱ λέξεις, πρῶτον σκέπτονται τὰς συλ-
 λαβάς· τῶν δὲ συλλαβῶν (εἰς)¹ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς
 ἐγγραμμάτου φωνῆς ἀναλυομένων, περὶ ἐκείνων
 250 πρῶτον ἐρευνῶσιν· οὕτω δεῖν φασὶν οἱ περὶ Πυθα-
 γόραν τοὺς ὄντως φυσικοὺς, τὰ περὶ τοῦ παντός
 ἐρευνῶντας, ἐν πρώτοις ἐξετάζω εἰς τίνα τὸ πᾶν
 λαμβάνει τὴν ἀνάλυσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν φαινομένην
 εἶναι λέγειν τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴν ἀφύσικόν πως
 ἐστίν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐξ ἀφανῶν ὀφείλει
 συνίστασθαι, τὸ δ' ἐκ τινων συνεστὼς οὐκ ἔστιν
 251 ἀρχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ συστατικόν. ὅθεν καὶ
 τὰ φαινόμενα οὐ ῥητέον ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων, ἀλλὰ
 τὰ συστατικὰ τῶν φαινομένων, ἅπερ οὐκέτι ἦν
 φαινόμενα. τοίνυν ἀδήλους καὶ ἀφανεῖς ὑπ-
 252 ἔθεντο τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς, καὶ οὐ κοινῶς. οἱ γὰρ
 ἀτόμους εἰπόντες ἢ ὁμοιομερείας ἢ ὄγκους ἢ κοινῶς
 νοητὰ σώματα πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀρχεῖν πῆ μὲν

¹ τῶν δὲ σ. <εἰς>] καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ σ. N Mutsch.: ἐκ γὰρ σ. cet.,
 Bekk. ("cumque syllabae resolvantur ex litteris" Herv.).

as well) does not take place without numeration,—
 after the investigation of the latter which we have
 now completed we consider that it is well for us to give
 an orderly discussion of the former; and that the
 more so because the most learned of the Physicists ^a
 have attributed so great a potency to numbers as to
 deem them the principles and elements of all things.
 These men are Pythagoras of Samos and his school.
 For they say that those who are genuinely philo-
 249 sophizing are like those who work at language. Now
 the latter first examine the words (for language is
 composed of words); and since words are formed
 from the syllables, they scrutinize the syllables first;
 and as syllables are resolved into the elements of
 written speech, they investigate these first; so like-
 250 wise the true physicists, as the Pythagoreans say,
 when investigating the Universe, ought in the first
 place to inquire what are the elements into which
 the Universe can be resolved.—Now to assert that
 the principle of all things is apparent is contrary to
 physical science; for every apparent thing must be
 composed of non-apparents, and what is composed of
 things is not a principle, but rather the component
 of that compound (is a principle). Hence one ought
 251 not to say that the apparent things are principles
 of all things, but the components of the apparent
 things, and these are no longer apparent.—Thus they
 assumed the principles of existing things to be non-
 evident and non-apparent, yet they did not do so
 with one consent. For those who declared that
 252 atoms or homoeomerics or molecules ^b or, in general,
 intelligible bodies are the principles of all existing

^a i.e. the Pythagoreans; cf. P.H. iii. 152.

^b Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 363.

κατώρθωσαν πῆ δὲ διέπεσον. ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἀδήλους νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, δεόντως ἀναστρέφονται, ἥ δὲ σωματικὰς ὑποτίθενται ταύτας, διαπίπτουσιν.
 253 ὡς γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων προηγείται τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἀδηλα σώματα, οὕτω καὶ τῶν νοητῶν σωμάτων ἄρχειν δεῖ τὰ ἀσώματα. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὡς γὰρ τὰ τῆς λέξεως στοιχεῖα οὐκ εἰσὶ λέξεις, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα οὐκ ἔστι σώματα· ἦτοι δὲ σώματα ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν ἢ
 254 ἀσώματα· διὸ πάντως ἔστιν ἀσώματα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι φάναι ὅτι αἰώνιους συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὰς ἀτόμους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δύνασθαι σωματικὰς οὐσας τῶν ὄλων ἄρχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ τὰς ὁμοιομερείας καὶ οἱ τοὺς ὄγκους καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα αἰώνιον ἀπολείπουσι τούτων τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ὥστε μὴ μάλ-
 255 λον τὰς ἀτόμους ἢ ταῦτ' εἶναι στοιχεῖα. εἴτα καὶ δεδόσθω ταῖς ἀληθείαις αἰώνιους εἶναι τὰς ἀτόμους· ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον οἱ ἀγένητον καὶ αἰώνιον ἀπολείποντες τὸν κόσμον οὐδὲν ἤττον πρὸς ἐπίνοιαν ζητοῦσι τὰς πρῶτον συστημαμένας αὐτὸν ἀρχάς, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς, φασὶν οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων, κατ' ἐπίνοιαν σκεπτόμεθα τὸ ἐκ τίνων τὰ αἰώνια ταῦτα καὶ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ συνέστηκε
 256 σώματα. ἦτοι οὖν σώματά ἐστι τὰ συστατικὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀσώματα. καὶ σώματα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴπαμεν, ἐπεὶ δεήσει κακείνων σώματα λέγειν εἶναι συστατικὰ καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον προβαίνουσης τῆς
 257 ἐπινοίας ἀναρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν.λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἐξ ἀσωμάτων εἶναι τὴν σύστασιν τῶν νοητῶν σωμάτων· ὅπερ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὡμολόγησε, φήσας

* Cf. § 240.

things proved partly right, but partly went wrong. For in so far as they consider the principles to be non-evident, their procedure is correct, but in so far as they assume them to be corporeal they go wrong. For just as the intelligible and non-evident bodies 253 precede the sensible bodies, so the incorporeals ought to be the principles of the intelligible bodies. And logically so: for just as the elements of a word are not words, so also the elements of bodies are not bodies; but they must be either bodies or incorporeals; certainly, then, they are incorporeals.— Moreover, it is not admissible to say that it is a 254 property of atoms to be eternal, and that on this account they can be the principles of all things although they are corporeal. For, in the first place, those who assert that homoeomerics or molecules or minimal and indivisibles are elements assign to them an eternal existence, so that the atoms are no more elements than they. Next, let it be granted 255 that the atoms are in very truth eternal; yet, just as those who allow that the Universe is ingenerable and eternal seek none the less, in theory, for the principles which first composed it, so also we—as those Physical philosophers, the Pythagoreans, say—examine theoretically the problem as to what are the components of these eternal bodies perceptible by the reason. Their components, then, are either 256 bodies or incorporeals. And we will not say that they are bodies, since then we should have to say that the components of these also are bodies, and, as the conception thus proceeds *ad infinitum*, that the Whole is without beginning. It only remains, therefore, to 257 declare that the intelligible bodies are composed of incorporeals; and this, too, Epicurus^a acknowledged,

κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν σχήματός τε καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους τὸ σῶμα νενοῆσθαι.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι ἀσώματους εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν σωμάτων, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 258 συμφανές. ἤδη δὲ οὐκ εἴ τινα προῦφέστηκε τῶν σωμάτων ἀσώματα, ταῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης στοιχεῖά ἐστι τῶν ὄντων καὶ πρῶταί τις ἀρχαί. ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι ἀσώματοι οὖσαι κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα προῦφεστώσιν τῶν σωμάτων, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γινομένων πρὸς αὐτὰς γίνεται· ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαί, ἐπεὶπερ ἕκάστη ἰδέα κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν λαμβανομένη ἐν εἶναι λέγεται, κατὰ σύλληψιν δὲ ἐτέρας ἢ ἄλλων δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέσσαρες, ὥστε εἶναι τι ἐπαναβεβηκὸς αὐτῶν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, τὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ δύο ἢ τὰ τρία ἢ τὰ
 259 τούτων ἔτι πλείονα ἐπικατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν. καὶ τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα προεπινοεῖται τῶν σωμάτων, ἀσώματον ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν· ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλι οὐκ ἀρχει τῶν πάντων· προάγει γὰρ καὶ τούτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τὰ ἐπίπεδα σχήματα διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων
 260 τὰ στερεὰ συνίστασθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπίπεδα σχήματα θείη τις ἂν τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάλιν ἐκ προαγόντων συντίθεται, τῶν γραμμῶν, καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ προεπινοούμενους ἔχουσι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἐκ τριῶν γραμμῶν τρίγωνον καλεῖται καὶ τὸ ἐκ τεσσάρων τετράγωνον. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπλή γραμμὴ οὐ χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ νενοῆται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημείου ἀγομένη ἔχεται τῶν δυοῖν, οἳ τε ἀριθμοὶ πάντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἐν πεπτῶκασιν (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δυὰς μία τις ἐστὶ δυάς, καὶ

when he said that "body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight."

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that the principles of the bodies perceptible by reason must be incorporeal. But if certain incorporeals 258 exist before the bodies, these are not already of necessity elements of existing things and primary principles. For see how the Ideas, which are incorporeal,^a exist before the bodies, according to Plato, and everything which becomes becomes because of its relation to them; yet they are not principles of existing things since each Idea taken separately is said to be a unit, but two or three or four when taken in conjunction with one or more others, so that there is something which transcends their substance, namely number, by participation in which the terms one or two or three or a still higher number than these is predicated of them. The solid 259 forms also, which are of an incorporeal nature, are conceived before bodies; but they, again, are not principles of all things, for the plane forms precede them in conception, since out of these the solid are composed. Yet, indeed, one should not 260 posit the plane forms either as elements of existing things, for each of these likewise is composed of prior things—namely lines—and lines have numbers already pre-conceived, inasmuch as the compound of three lines is called a triangle and that of four a quadrangle. And since the simple line is not conceived apart from number but, as drawn from a point to a point, involves the number two, and all the numbers themselves fall under the One (for the two is a single two, and the three is one particular thing,

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 364.

ἡ τριάς ἐν τι ἐστί, τριάς, καὶ ἡ δεκάς ἐν ἀριθμοῦ
 261 κεφάλαιον), ἔνθεν κινηθεὶς ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν
 ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα, ἧς κατὰ
 μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν λέγεται· καὶ ταύ-
 την κατ' αὐτότητα μὲν ἑαυτῆς νοουμένην μονάδα
 νοεῖσθαι, ἐπισυντεθείσαν δ' ἑαυτῇ καθ' ἑτερότητα
 ἀποτελεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀόριστον δυνάδα διὰ τὸ
 μηδεμίαν τῶν ἀριθμητῶν καὶ ὠρισμένων δυνάδων
 εἶναι [τὴν]¹ αὐτὴν, πάσας δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν αὐτῆς
 262 δυνάδας νοεῖσθαι, καθὼς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος
 ἐλέγχουσιν. δύο οὖν τῶν ὄντων αἱ ἀρχαί, ἡ τε
 πρώτη μονάς, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀριθμηταὶ
 μονάδες νοοῦνται μονάδες, καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυνάς, ἧς
 κατὰ μετοχὴν αἱ ὠρισμέναι δυνάδες εἰσὶ δυνάδες.

Καὶ ὅτι ταῖς ἀληθείαις αὐταὶ εἰσι τῶν ὅλων
 263 ἀρχαί, ποικίλως οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ διδάσκουσιν. τῶν
 γὰρ ὄντων, φασί, τὰ μὲν κατὰ διαφορὰν νοεῖται,
 τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι. κατὰ δια-
 φορὰν μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν
 περιγραφὴν ὑποκείμενα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἵππος
 φυτὸν γῆ ὕδωρ ἀῆρ πῦρ· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον
 ἀπολύτως θεωρεῖται καὶ οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς
 264 ἕτερον σχέσιν κατ' ἐναντίωσιν δὲ ὑπάρχειν ὅσα
 ἐξ ἐναντιώσεως ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον θεωρεῖται, οἷον
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, δίκαιον ἄδικον, συμφέρον
 ἀσύμφορον, ὅσιον ἀνόσιον, εὐσεβὲς ἀσεβές, κινού-
 μενον ἡρεμοῦν, τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἐμφερῆ.
 265 πρὸς τι δὲ τυγχάνειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον

¹ [τὴν] secl. Heintz.

* The Pythagoreans regarded "the ten" (Decad) as the "perfect" number as being the sum of the first four numbers

a three, and the ten is one sum of number ^a), Pyth- 261
 agoras, moved by these considerations, declared that
 the One is the principle of existing things, by partici-
 pation in which each of the existing things is termed
 one; and this when conceived in its self-identity is
 conceived as One, but when, in its otherness, it is
 added to itself it creates the "Indefinite Dyad,"^b
 so-called because it is not itself any one of the
 numbered and definite dyads but they all are con-
 ceived as dyads through their participation in it, even
 as they try to prove in the case of the monad. There 262
 are, then, two principles of existing things, the First
 One, by participation in which all the numbered ones
 are conceived as ones, and also the Indefinite Dyad,
 by participation in which the definite dyads are dyads.

And that these are in very truth the principles of
 all things the Pythagoreans teach in a variety of
 ways.^c Of existing things some, they say, are con- 263
 ceived absolutely, some by way of contrariety, some
 relatively. Absolute, then, are those which subsist
 of themselves and in complete independence, such
 as man, horse, plant, earth, water, air, fire; for each
 of these is regarded absolutely and not in respect of
 its relation to something else. And contraries are all 264
 those which are regarded in respect of their contra-
 riety one to another, such as good and evil, just and
 unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, holy and
 unholy, pious and impious, in motion and at rest,
 and all other things similar to these. And relatives 265
 are the things conceived as standing in a relation to

(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10); cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 5, 986^a 8 τέλειον ἡ δεκάς εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν περιεληφέναι τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 155. The "Indefinite Dyad" is the generic Two, or principle of Duality.

* With §§ 263-265 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 161-162; *P.H.* i. 137.

σχέσι νοούμενα, ὅσον δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄνω κάτω, διπλάσιον ἡμισυ· τό τε γὰρ δεξιὸν νοεῖται κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν σχέσιν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ δεξιόν, τό τε κάτω κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ ἄνω κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κάτω· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον.

266 διαφέρειν δέ φασι τὰ κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν νοούμενα τῶν πρὸς τι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου φθορὰ γένεσις ἔστι τοῦ ἑτέρου, ὅσον ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου κινήσεώς τε καὶ ἡρεμίας· νόσου τε γὰρ γένεσις ἀρσῆς ἔστι ὑγείας, ὑγείας τε γένεσις ἀρσῆς ἔστι νόσου, καὶ κινήσεως μὲν ὑπόστασις φθορὰ στάσεως, γένεσις δὲ στάσεως ἀρσῆς κινήσεως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ λύπης καὶ ἀλυπίας ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ καὶ κοινῶς τῶν

267 ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἐχόντων. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συνύπαρξιν τε καὶ συναναίρεσιν ἀλλήλων περιεῖχεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεξιὸν ἔστιν, εἴαν μὴ καὶ ἀριστερόν ὑπάρχη, οὐδὲ διπλάσιον, εἴαν μὴ καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ προϋποκέηται οὗ

268 διπλάσιον ἔστιν. πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς ἐπίπαν οὐδὲν θεωρεῖται μέσον, καθάπερ εὐθέως ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου ζωῆς τε καὶ θανάτου κινήσεώς τε καὶ μονῆς· μεταξύ γὰρ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ νοσεῖν οὐδὲν ἔστι, καὶ μεταξύ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι καὶ ἔτι τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ μένειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τί πως ἐχόντων ἔστι τι μέσον· τοῦ γὰρ μείζονος, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τοῦ μικροτέρου τῶν πρὸς τί πως καθεστῶτων μεταξύ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ ἴσον, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἥττονος τὸ ἰκανόν, ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος τὸ

269 σύμφωνον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν, τῶν τε καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφεστῶτων καὶ τῶν κατ'

something else, such as right and left, above and below, double and half; for right is conceived as standing in relation to left, and left also as standing in relation to right, and below as related to above, and above as related to below; and similarly in the other cases.—And they say that things conceived as 266 contraries differ from relatives. For in the case of contraries the destruction of the one is the generation of the other, as in the case of health and disease, of motion and rest; for the generation of disease is the removal of health and the generation of health is the removal of disease, and the existence of motion is the destruction of rest and the generation of rest the removal of motion. And the same account holds good also in the case of pain and painlessness, of good and evil, and in general of all things that are of opposite natures. But relatives have the property 267 both of co-existence and of co-destruction one with the other; for there is no right unless a left also exists, nor a double unless the half also, whereof it is the double, pre-exists.—Furthermore, in the case of 268 opposites, as a universal rule, no intermediate state is conceived, as for instance in the cases of health and disease, life and death, motion and rest; for there is nothing between healthiness and illness, and between living and being dead, or again between moving and resting. But in the case of relatives there is a middle state; for the equal (let us say) will be between the greater and the smaller, these being relatives; and so likewise the adequate between the more and the less, and the harmonious between the high and the deep.—So then, as there are these three classes—the 269 self-existent things, those conceived as in opposition,

ἐναντιότητα καὶ ἔτι τῶν πρὸς τι νοουμένων, ὀφείλει κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐπάνω τι γένος τετάχθαι, καὶ πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ καὶ πᾶν γένος προϋπάρχειν τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ τεταγμένων εἰδῶν. ἀναιρουμένου γοῦν αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ εἶδη συνααιρεῖται, τοῦ δὲ εἶδους ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκέτ' ἀνασκευάζεται τὸ γένος· ἤρτηται γὰρ ἐξ 270 ἐκείνου τούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν. καὶ δὴ τῶν μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ νοουμένων γένος ὑπεστήσαντο Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, ὡς ἐπαναβεβηκός, τὸ ἔν· καθὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καθ' αὐτὸ ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν ἔν τε ἔστι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ 271 θεωρεῖται. τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν ἔλεξαν ἄρχειν, γένους τάξω ἐπέχον, τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἀνισόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐναντιουμένων θεωρεῖται φύσις, οἷον μονῆς μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, οὐ γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον, κινήσεως δὲ ἐν ἀνισότητι, 272 ἐπιδέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον. ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἰσότητι, ἀκρότης γὰρ ἦν ἀνεπίτατος, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἐπεδέχετο γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥσσον. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου εὐθύτητός τε καὶ 273 στρεβλότητος. τὰ μέντοι γε πρὸς τι ὑφέστηκε γένει τῇ τε ὑπεροχῇ καὶ τῇ ἠλείψει· μέγα μὲν γὰρ καὶ μείζον πολὺ τε καὶ πλεῖον ὑψηλόν τε καὶ ὑψηλότερον καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νοεῖται, μικρόν δὲ καὶ μικρότερον ὀλίγον τε καὶ ὀλιγώτερον ταπεινόν τε 274 καὶ ταπεινότερον κατ' ἠλείψιν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι, γένη ὄντα, εὐρηται ἄλλοις γένεσιν ὑποταττόμενα, καθάπερ τῷ τε ἐνὶ καὶ τῇ ἰσότητι καὶ ἀνισότητι ὑπεροχῇ τε καὶ ἠλείψει, σκοπῶμεν εἰ καὶ ταῦτα

and also those conceived as relatives,—above all these there must stand of necessity a certain genus, and it must exist first for the reason that every genus must exist before the particulars classed under it. When it, then, is abolished all the particulars are abolished along with it, but when the particular is abolished the genus is not also done away with; for the former depends on the latter, and not conversely.—Thus the 270 disciples of the Pythagoreans postulated the One as the supreme genus of the things conceived as self-existent. For even as this is self-existent, so also each of the absolute things is one and is conceived by itself. But of the opposites the equal and the un- 271 equal are, they said, the principles and hold the rank of genus; for in them is seen the nature of all the opposites,—that of rest, for instance, in equality (for it does not admit of the more and the less), and that of motion in inequality (for it does admit of the more and the less). So too the natural in equality (for it 272 is an inextensible extreme),^a but the unnatural in inequality (for it admits of the more and less). The same account holds good also in the case of health and disease, and of straightness and crookedness. The relatives, however, are classed under the genus of 273 excess and defect; thus great and greater, much and more, high and higher are conceived by way of excess; but small and smaller, few and fewer, low and lower by way of defect.—But since self-existents and oppo- 274 sites and relatives, which are genera, are found to be subordinate to other genera—namely, the One, and equality and inequality, and excess and defect,—let

^a i. e. a fixed (and best) state which is "extreme" and "inextensible" as incapable of alteration for the better.

τὰ γένη δύναται ἐπ' ἄλλα λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀναπομπήν.
 275 οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἰσότης τῷ ἐνὶ ὑπάγεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐν
 πρώτως αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ δὲ ἀνισότης
 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ τε καὶ ἑλλείψει βλέπεται· ἀνισα γὰρ
 ἔστιν ὧν τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχει τὸ δὲ ὑπερέχεται. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορί-
 στου δυάδος λόγον τέτακται, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ πρώτη
 ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις ἐν δυσὶν ἔστι, τῷ τε
 276 ὑπερέχοντι καὶ τῷ ὑπερεχομένῳ. ἀνέκυψαν ἄρα
 ἀρχαὶ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω ἢ τε πρώτη μονάς
 καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς· ἐξ ὧν γίνεσθαι φασι τό τ'
 ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις πάλιν
 δυάδα, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης μονάδος τὸ ἕν, ἀπὸ
 δὲ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος τὰ δύο.
 δις γὰρ τὸ ἐν δύο, καὶ μήπω ὑποκειμένου ἐν
 τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦ δύο οὐδὲ τὸ δις ἦν ἐν τούτοις,
 ἀλλ' ἐλήφθη ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, καὶ οὕτως
 ἐκ ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς μονάδος ἐγένετο ἡ ἐν τοῖς
 277 ἀριθμοῖς δυάς. κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ
 ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀπετελέσθησαν, τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς
 αἰεὶ περατοῦντος,¹ τῆς δὲ ἀορίστου δυάδος δύο
 γεννώσης καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον πλήθος τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς
 ἐκτεινούσης. ὅθεν φασὶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταύταις
 τὸν μὲν τοῦ δρώντος αἰτίου λόγον ἐπέχειν τὴν
 μονάδα, τὸν δὲ τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης τὴν δυάδα.
 καὶ ὃν τρόπον τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑποστάντας ἀριθμοὺς
 ἀπετέλεσαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ
 278 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ συνεστήσαντο. εὐθέως γὰρ τὸ
 σημεῖον κατὰ τὸν τῆς μονάδος λόγον τετάχθαι·
 ὡς γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετόν τι ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ
 σημεῖον, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἡ μονὰς ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐν
 ἀριθμοῖς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστιν

us consider whether these genera also can be referred
 back to others. Equality, then, is brought under the 275
 One (for the One first of all is equal to itself), but
 inequality is seen in excess and defect; for things
 of which the one exceeds and the other is exceeded
 are unequal. But both excess and defect are ranked
 under the head of the Indefinite Dyad, since in fact
 the primary excess and defect is in two things, that
 which exceeds and that which is exceeded. Thus as 276
 the highest principles of all things there have emerged
 the primary One and the Indefinite Dyad; and from
 these, they say, spring both the numerical one and
 the numerical two,—the one from the primary One,
 and the two from the One and the Indefinite Dyad.
 For the two is twice the one, and when the two did
 not as yet exist among the numbers neither did the
 twice exist amongst them, but it was taken from the
 Indefinite Dyad, and in this way the numerical two
 sprang from it and the One. And in the same way 277
 the rest of the numbers were constructed from these,
 the One always limiting and the Indefinite Dyad
 generating two and extending the numbers to an
 infinite amount.—Hence they say that, of these
 principles, the One holds the position of the efficient
 cause and the Dyad that of the passive matter; and
 just as they have constructed the numbers composed
 of these, so also they have built up the Universe and
 all things in the Universe. Thus the point, for ex- 278
 ample, is ranked under the head of the One; for as
 the One is an indivisible thing, so also is the point;
 and just as the One is a principle in numbers, so too

¹ περατοῦντος NLE: περιπατοῦντος cet., Bekk.

ἐν γραμμαῖς. ὥστε τὸ μὲν σημεῖον τὸν τῆς
 μονάδος εἶχε λόγον, ἢ δὲ γραμμὴ κατὰ τὴν τῆς
 279 δυάδος ἰδέαν ἐθεωρεῖτο· κατὰ μετάβασιν γὰρ καὶ
 ἡ δυὰς καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ νοεῖται. καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ
 μεταξύ δυοῖν σημείων νοούμενον ἀπλατὲς μῆκος
 ἔστι γραμμὴ. τοίνυν ἔσται κατὰ τὴν δυνάδα ἡ
 γραμμὴ, τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον κατὰ τὴν τριάδα, ὃ μὴ
 μόνον μῆκος αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καθὼς ἦν ἡ δυὰς, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τρίτην προσεῖληφε διάστασιν τὸ πλάτος.
 280 τιθεμένων δὲ τριῶν σημείων, δυοῖν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίου
 διαστήματος, τρίτου δὲ κατὰ μέσον τῆς ἐκ τῶν
 δυοῖν ἀποτελεσθείσης γραμμῆς, πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου
 διαστήματος, ἐπίπεδον ἀποτελεῖται. τὸ δὲ στερεὸν
 σχῆμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ τὸ πυραμοειδές, κατὰ
 τὴν τετράδα τάττεται. τοῖς γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις,
 ὡς προείπον, κειμένοις ἐπιτεθέντος ἄλλου τινὸς
 ἀνωθεν σημείου πυραμοειδὲς ἀποτελεῖται σχῆμα
 στερεοῦ σώματος· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη τὰς τρεῖς δια-
 281 στάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος βάθος. τινὲς δ' ἀπὸ
 ἐνὸς σημείου τὸ σῶμά φασι συνίστασθαι· τουτὶ
 γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυέν γραμμὴν ἀποτελεῖν, τὴν δὲ
 γραμμὴν ῥυείσαν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰς
 βάθος κινήθην τὸ σῶμα γενῶν τριχῆ διαστατόν.
 282 διαφέρει δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν στάσις
 τῆς τῶν προτέρων. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν,
 τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ἐποίησαν
 τοὺς ἀριθμούς, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὰ σημεία
 καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς τὰ τε ἐπίπεδα σχήματα καὶ τὰ
 στερεά· οὗτοι δὲ ἀπὸ ἐνὸς σημείου τὰ πάντα τεκταί-

the point is a principle in lines. So that the point
 comes under the head of the One, but the line is
 regarded as belonging to the class of the Dyad; for
 both the Dyad and the line are conceived by way of
 transition.—And again: the length without breadth 279
 conceived as lying between two points is a line. So
 then, the line will belong to the Dyad class, but the
 plane to the Triad since it is not merely regarded as
 length, as was the Dyad, but has also taken to itself
 a third dimension, breadth. Also when three points 280
 are set down, two at an interval opposite to each
 other, and a third midway in the line formed from the
 two, but at a different interval,^a a plane is constructed.
 And the solid form and the body, as also the pyramid,
 are classed under the Tetrad. For when the three
 points are placed, as I said before, and another point
 is placed upon them from above,^b there is constructed
 the pyramidal form of the solid body; for it now
 possesses the three dimensions length, breadth, and
 depth.—But some assert that the body is constructed 281
 from one point; for this point when it has flowed
 produces the line, and the line when it has flowed
 makes the plane, and this when it has moved towards
 depth generates the body which has three dimen-
 sions. But this view of the (later) Pythagoreans 282
 differs from that of the earlier ones. For these latter
 formed the numbers from two principles, the One and
 the Indefinite Dyad, and then, from the numbers, the
 points and the lines and both the plane and the solid
 forms; but the former build up all of them from a

^a Any triangle ABC will illustrate this.

^b Here the plane triangle ABC is assumed to be horizontal, and relatively to it the 4th point is in a vertical line ("from above"), thus forming a "pyramid," having "depth."

ουσω. ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν (γὰρ)¹ γραμμὴ γίνεται, ἀπὸ
γραμμῆς δὲ ἐπιφάνεια, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης σῶμα.

283 Πλήν οὕτω μὲν ἀποτελεῖται τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα²
ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ἀφ' ὧν λοιπὸν καὶ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ³ συνίσταται, γῆ τε καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ
πῦρ, καὶ καθόλου ὁ κόσμος, ὃν φασὶ καθ' ἁρμονίαν
διοικεῖσθαι πάλιν ἐχόμενοι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ἐν οἷς οἱ
λόγοι εἰσὶ τῶν συστατικῶν τῆς τελείου ἁρμονίας
συμφωνιῶν, τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε
καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ ἔκειτο
284 λόγῳ, ἡ δὲ ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ ἐν διπλασίονι. εἴρηται
δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον κἀν τῇ περὶ κριτηρίου
σκέψει κἀν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς.

Νῦν δὲ ὑποδειχθέντος ὅτι μεγάλην δύναμιν
ἀπονέμουσι τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας
φυσικοὶ μετελθόντες καὶ τὰς ἀκολουθοῦσας τῷ τόπῳ
285 κομίζωμεν ἀπορίας. ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι τῶν ἀρι-
θμητῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὑποπιπτόντων,
μηδὲν εἶναι ἓν, μετοχῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦ ὡσανεὶ
πρώτου καὶ στοιχείου ἐν τι καλεῖσθαι, εἰ οὖν τὸ
δεικνύμενον [καὶ τὸ μένον]⁴ ζῶον ἐν εἴῃ, τὸ μὴ
δεικνύμενον φυτὸν οὐκ ἔσται ἓν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
πολλὰ (ἐν)⁵ εἶναι, μετοχῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕκαστον
286 νοεῖσθαι ἓν, οἷον ζῶον ξύλον φυτὸν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ

¹ <γὰρ> add. E, cj. Bekk.

² σχήματα] σώματα MSS., Bekk. (νοητὰ σώμ. Heintz).

³ αἰσθητὰ NE: στερεὰ cet., Bekk.

⁴ [καὶ τὸ μένον] secl. Kayser.

⁵ <ἐν> add. ego.

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155; Adv. Log. i. 96. The terms are those of the Pythagorean musical theory and denote the "intervals" ("fourth" "fifth," and "octave") between the notes. With διὰ τεσσάρων—πέντε—πασῶν sc. χορδῶν.

single point. For from this the line is produced, and from the line the plane, and from this the body.

This, however, is the way in which the solid forms 283 are constructed, with the numbers leading; and, finally, from these (solids) the sensibles are composed, earth and water and air and fire, and the Universe at large; and it, they declare (holding fast once more to the numbers), is ordered according to harmony,^a since it is in numbers that the ratios reside of those symphonies which make up the perfect harmony,—namely, the "By-Fours" and the "By-Fives" and the "By-alls," of which the first lies in the ratio 4 : 3, the second in the ratio 3 : 2, the third in that of 2 : 1. But this subject has been discussed more exactly in 284 our inquiry regarding the criterion^b and in our treatise *On the Soul*.

And now that it has been shown that the Italian Physicists ascribe a great potency to numbers, let us pass on and bring forward the difficulties consequent on this position.^c Thus when they assert^d that none 285 of the numerables—such as things sensible and perceived—is one, but is called one through its participation in the One which is, as it were, primary and elemental, then if the animal pointed out is one, the plant which is not pointed out will not be one. For many things must not really be one, but each of them—such as an animal, a stick, a plant—must be conceived as one through participation in the One. For 286

^b i.e. Adv. Log. i. 96 ff. The treatise *On the Soul* is not extant.

^c With §§ 285-287 cf. P.H. iii. 156. The text here (from μετοχῇ . . . ἔσται ἐν §§ 285-286) is probably corrupt (a conflation of two versions).

^d From here to the end of § 287 we are given the Pythagorean doctrine; the criticism follows in §§ 288 ff.

δεικνύμενον ζῶων ἔν ἐστι, τὸ μὴ ὄν ζῶων, οἶον τὸ
 φυτόν, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν· καὶ εἰ τὸ φυτόν ἔν ἐστι, τὸ
 μὴ ὄν φυτόν, οἶον τὸ ζῶων, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν. ἀλλὰ
 λέγεται γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ζῶων ἔν, καθάπερ τὸ φυτόν,
 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν φυτόν πάλιν ἔν, ὡς τὸ ζῶων. οὐκ
 ἄρα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἔν ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ οὐ
 ἕκαστον μετοχῇ νενοήται ἔν, ἐκεῖνο ἔν τέ ἐστι καὶ
 287 πολλά, ἔν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτό, πολλά δὲ κατὰ περι-
 ληψιν. ὅπερ πλήθος πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς
 ἀριθμητοῖς δεικνύμενον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ζῶων
 πλήθος (πλήθος)¹ ἐστιν, τὸ τῶν φυτῶν οὐκ ἔσται
 πλήθος, καὶ εἰ τὸ τούτων, ἀνάπαλιν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
 τῶν ζῶων. λέγεται δέ γε καὶ ἐπὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
 ζῶων καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων ἱκανῶν πλήθος· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
 ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς δεικνύμενον πλήθος τῶ ὄντι
 πλήθος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνο τὸ οὐ μετοχῇ νενοήται
 288 τοῦτο πλήθος. ὅταν δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγωσιν
 οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὁμοίον τι λέγουσι
 τῷ μηδένα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπον
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν οὐ μετοχῇ ἕκαστος εἰς τε ἀνθρωπος
 νενοήται καὶ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ καλοῦνται. νοεῖται
 γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῶων λογικὸν θνητόν, καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο οὔτε Σωκράτης ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὔτε
 289 Πλάτων, οὐκ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους. εἰ γὰρ
 Σωκράτης, καθὼ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀνθρωπος καθ-
 ἔστηκεν, ὁ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲ Δίων
 ἢ Θέων· καὶ εἰ Πλάτων ἐστίν ἀνθρωπος, ὁ Σω-
 κράτης οὐκ ἔσται. λέγεται δέ γε καὶ Σωκράτης
 ἀνθρωπος καὶ Πλάτων καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων·

¹ <πλήθος> add. Heintz.

* The otiose repetitions in this passage make the text doubtful.

if the animal pointed out is one, that which is not an animal,—a plant, for instance,—will not be one^a; and if the plant is one, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—will not be one. But, in fact, that which is not an animal—for instance, a plant—is termed one; and, again, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—is termed one. It is not true, therefore, that each of the numerables is one. But that by participation in which each thing is conceived as one is both one and many, one in respect of itself but many in respect of its comprehension. And this plurality, again, is not exhibited 287 in the case of the numerables. For if the plurality of animals is a plurality, that of plants will not be a plurality; and if that of the latter is a plurality, that of animals, conversely, will not be a plurality. But in fact plurality is predicated both of plants and of animals, and of many other things; therefore it is not the plurality exhibited in the case of numerables which is really plurality, but rather that plurality by participation in which this plurality was conceived. —Now when the Pythagorean philosophers make 288 such statements, what they say resembles the assertion that no particular man is Man, but only He^b by participation in whom each single person is conceived as a man and many are termed men. For Man is conceived as “a rational mortal animal,” and because of this neither Socrates is Man nor Plato nor any other particular man. And if Socrates, as Socrates, 289 is Man, Plato will not be Man, nor will Dion or Theon; and if Plato is Man, Socrates will not be Man. But in fact Socrates is termed man and Plato too and each of

^b i.e. the “generic Man,” or “Man” as a universal concept.

οὐκ ἄρα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστός ἐστιν
 ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ μετοχήν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν νενόηται,
 290 ἄνθρωπος, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἐξ αὐτῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς
 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ φυτοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν λουπῶν.
 ἄτοπον δέ γέ ἐστι μηδένα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων
 λέγειν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, μηδὲ τῶν φυτῶν φυτόν.
 ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν κατὰ
 291 τὸν ἴδιον λόγον μὴ λέγειν ἓν. ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ἡ κομιζομένη κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἀπορία φθάνειν
 εἶκοι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν
 δόξαν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ γενικός ἄνθρωπος οὔτε μετὰ τῶν
 ἐπ' εἰδους ἀνθρώπων θεωρεῖται, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἔσται εἰδικός, οὔτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ οὐ
 γενήσονται οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι μετοχήν αὐτοῦ
 ἄνθρωποι, οὔτ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις περιέχεται
 292 (ἀδιανόητον γὰρ τούτου μετοχήν ἀπείροις¹ εἶναι
 καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τεθνηκόσι τοῦτο δὲ ζῶσι περι-
 ἔχεσθαι),—ὡς οὖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἄπορος, οὔτω
 καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀπορώ-
 τερος τῷ μῆτε σὺν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητοῖς²
 αὐτὸ θεωρεῖσθαι, μῆτε κατὰ παντὸς αὐτὸ δύνασθαι
 τετάχθαι, μῆτε μετοχήν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἀπείροις ὑπ-
 293 ἄρχειν. ἢ γε μὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἥς κατὰ
 μετοχήν ἕκαστον νοεῖται ἓν, ἥτοι μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ πλείους ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία,
 ἥτοι ὅλης μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ
 μέρους τινὸς αὐτῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὅλης μετέσχηκεν,
 οὐκ ἔστι μία· εἰ γὰρ ὅλην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέαν
 λόγου χάριν τὸ Α, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Β, μὴ ἔχον οὐ

¹ μετοχήν ἀπείροις Heintz: μετοχήν ἀπείρους mss., Bekk.

² ἀριθμητοῖς Heintz: ἀριθμοῖς mss., Bekk.

the others; therefore it is not each of the particular
 men which is Man, but he by participation in whom
 each of them is conceived as a man, and he is not one
 of themselves. And the same argument applies also 290
 in the case of plants and all the rest. But it is absurd
 to say that none of the particular men is a man, nor of
 the plants a plant; therefore it is also absurd to deny
 that each of the numerables, in respect of its own
 definition, is one.—And again, the difficulty brought 291
 against genus^a seems to tell beforehand against this
 theory of the Pythagoreans. For as generic Man
 neither is perceived along with particular men (since
 then it will itself also be particular), nor subsists
 separately (since then the particular men will not
 become men by participation in it), nor is included
 amongst these men themselves (for it is inconceiv- 292
 able that an infinite number of them should have par-
 ticipation in it and that it should be included partly
 amongst the dead and partly amongst the living);—
 as then this account is doubtful, so also the account
 given of this One is still more doubtful, owing to the
 fact that it is neither perceived along with the par-
 ticular numerables, nor is capable of being ranked as
 a universal, and that the infinite (particulars) do not
 participate in it.—Moreover, the Idea of the One, by 293
 participation in which each thing is conceived as one,
 is either one Idea of the One or several Ideas of the
 One.^b And if it is one, each of the numerables par-
 takes either of the whole of it or of a part of it. And
 if it partakes of the whole, the Idea is not one; for if
 A (so to call it) has the whole of the Idea of the One,
 B, as it has nothing whereof to partake, will of neces-

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 219 ff.

^b With §§ 293-298 cf. P.H. iii. 158-162.

294 μετάσχη, οὐκ ἔσται ἓν ὅπερ ἄποπον. εἰ δὲ
πολυμερὴς ἔστω ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
ἀριθμητῶν [ἐκάστου] μέρους αὐτῆς μετείληφεν,
πρῶτον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὐ τῆς τοῦ ἐνός
ἰδέας ἔσται μετείληφός ἀλλὰ μέρους αὐτῆς, καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο οὐκέτι γενήσεται ἓν ὡς γὰρ τὸ μέρος
ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς
λέξεως οὐκ ἔστι λέξις, οὕτω τὸ μέρος τῆς τοῦ ἐνός
ἰδέας οὐκ ἔσται ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα, ἵνα καὶ τὸ μετ-
295 εσχῆκός αὐτῆς γένηται ἓν. εἴτα ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα
οὐκέτι γίνεται ἐνός ἰδέα, οὐδὲ μία ἀλλὰ πλείους.
τὸ γὰρ ἓν, ἢ ἓν ἔστω, ἀδιαίρετον καθέστηκεν, καὶ
ἢ μονάς, ἢ μονάς ἔστω, οὐ διχάζεται ἢ εἴπερ εἰς
πολλὰ διαιρεῖται, ἀθροισμὸς πλειόνων μονάδων
296 γενήσεται καὶ οὐκέτι μονάς. εἰ δὲ πλείους εἶεν
ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἰδίας
τινὸς μετέχειν ἰδέας καθ' ἣν ἓν νοεῖται, ἦτοι ἡ τοῦ
A ἰδέα καὶ ἡ τοῦ B μετέχουσαν ἐνός τινος ἰδέας,
καθ' ἣν ἐκότερον αὐτῶν προσαγορεύεται ἓν, ἢ οὐ
297 μετέχουσαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχουσαν, ὃν τρόπον
αὐταὶ δύνανται τῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἐπικατηγορίας
ἀξιόσθαι μὴ μετέχουσαι τινος ἐπαναβεβηκυίας
τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέας, οὕτω δύνανται καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὅπωσόν
λεγόμενον ἓν μὴ κατὰ μετοχὴν τῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέας
298 προσαγορεύεσθαι ἓν. εἰ δὲ μετέχουσαν, ἢ ἀρχῆθεν
μένει ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ αἱ δύο ἰδέαι τῆς μιᾶς
μετέχουσαν ἰδέας; ὅλης ἐκάτερα, ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς;
ὁπότερον γὰρ ἂν λέγωσιν, ἐπαχθήσονται αἱ μικρῶ
πρόσθεν ἀποδοθεῖσαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ἀπορίαί.
299 Σὺν τούτοις ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ λαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπῳ

sity not be one ; which is absurd. But if the Idea of 294
One is multipartite and each of the numerables
participates in some one part of it, then, in the first
place, each of the existents will be participating not
in the Idea of the One but in a part of it, and for this
reason will no longer become one ; for just as the part
of a man is not a man and the part of a word is not a
word, so the part of the Idea of the One will not be
the Idea of the One so that what partakes thereof may
also become one. And secondly, the Idea of the One 295
becomes no longer an Idea of one, nor itself one but
several. For the One, in so far as it is one, is indivisible,
and the monad, in so far as it is a monad, is not dissected ;
or if it is divided into many parts, it will become an
aggregation of several monads and no longer a monad.
And if there are several Ideas of the One, then, since 296
each of the numerables partakes of a separate Idea
owing to which it is conceived as one, either the
Idea of A and the Idea of B participate in some one
Idea, owing to which each of them is termed one,
or they do not participate. And if they do not partic- 297
ipate, then, just as these can have the title " one "
assigned to them although they do not participate
in any supreme Idea of the One, so also everything
which is in any way called one can be designated
" one " without participation in the Idea of the One.
But if they do participate, the original difficulty 298
remains ; for how can the two Ideas partake of the
one Idea ? Will each partake of the whole or of a
part of it ? For whichever answer they give, those
difficulties which we mentioned a short while ago *
will be brought up against them.

And besides ; since everything perceived by man 299

¹ [ἐκάστου] secl. ego : ἑτέρου cj. Heintz (? ἐνός του).

* See § 293.

ἤτοι αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται καὶ κατὰ ψιλλὴν ἐγκύρησιν ἢ διανοίᾳ, πάντως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς,¹ εἴπερ ἀνθρώπων ληπτὸς ἔστιν, ἤτοι αἰσθήσει ἢ διανοίᾳ κατα-
 300 ληφθήσεται. ἀλλὰ αἰσθήσει μὲν καὶ ἀπλῆ ἐμφάσει οὐκ ἂν ληφθείη· πλανᾷ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἢ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ὑπόστασις, ἐπεὶ βλέποντες ταῦτα λευκὰ ἢ μέλανα ἢ κωῶς αἰσθητὰ ὑπονοοῦσιν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αἰσθητὸν τί ἐστι καὶ φαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, μὴ ἐχούσης οὕτω τῆς ἀληθείας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καί, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ὁ λίθος καὶ τὸ ξύλον καὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ αἰσθήσει ληπτὸν ἔστιν, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὡς ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν αἰσθητὸς οὐδὲ φαίνεται.
 301 σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὡς αἰσθητὰ ἀδιδάκτως ἡμῖν λαμβάνεται· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν ὄραν διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ τραχέος ἢ λείου ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὡς ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἀδιδάκτως ἡμῖν λαμβάνεται· ὅτι γὰρ τὰ δις δύο τέσσαρά ἐστι καὶ τὰ τρις δύο ἕξ ἐστι καὶ τὰ δεκάκις δέκα ἑκατόν, ἐκ μαθήσεως ἔγνωμεν. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς.
 302 εἰ δὲ μνήμη κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν τινων ἔγνωσται, ἀπορήσει τις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀποστάς, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς πῶς τὰ δύο κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν ὄντα οὐ νοεῖται δύο, συνελθόντα δὲ
 303 εἰς ταῦτ' ἔγινετο δύο. εἰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά ἐστι μετὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ὅποια ἦν πρὶν τῆς συνόδου, ἦν δ' ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἓν, ἔσται καὶ

¹ ἀριθμὸς Heintz: ἀθροισμὸς mss., Bekk.

* i.e. as a sense-impression, cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 85.

^b See Plato, *Phaedo* 96 E ff.; § 306 *infra*; *Adv. Log.*

is perceived either by sense and through mere occurrence^a or by intellect, number also, if it is perceptible by man, will certainly be apprehended either by sense or by intellect. But it will not be 300 perceived by sense and simple impression; for the nature of the numerables leads some people astray, since, when they see these to be white or black, or, in general, objects of sense, they suppose that number too is an object of sense and an apparent thing, whereas the truth is otherwise. For the white thing and the black, and (shall we say?) the plant and the stone and the stick and each of the numerables is apparent and is perceptible by sense, but number, as number, is not an object of sense for us nor is it apparent.—But 301 let us consider it in this way:—The sensibles, as sensibles, are perceived by us without teaching; for no one is taught to see the white or the black, or to perceive the rough or the smooth. But number, as number, is not perceived by us without teaching; for it is by learning that we get to know that twice two is four, and that three times two is six, and ten times ten a hundred. Therefore number is not an object of sense.—And if number becomes known by 302 memory through the combination of certain things, when one has left the sensibles one will be perplexed, even as Plato was perplexed in his book *On the Soul*,^b as to how the two when existing separately are not conceived as two but become two when they are combined together. For if they are of the same 303 sort after the combination as they were before the combination, and before the combination each of them was one, then each of them will also be one

μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον ἑκάτερον ἔν, ἐπεὶ ἂν δῶμεν προσγίνεσθαι τι αὐτοῖς περισσότερον μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον παρ' ὃ ἦν, ὡς τὴν δυάδα, ἔσται ἡ τῶν
 304 δυοῖν συνέλευσις τετράς. εἰ γὰρ τῷ συνελθόντι ἐνὶ καὶ ἐνὶ πλείον τι προσγίνεται ἡ δυάς, ἐπεὶ ἐν ταύτῃ μονὰς καὶ μονὰς νοεῖται, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἐνὸς συνέλευσιν τετράς γενήσεται, δυοῖν μὲν νοουμένων τῶν συνιόντων, διττῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς προσγινόμενης αὐτοῖς δυάδος.
 καὶ πάλιν εἰ τοῖς κατὰ σύνοδον ποιούσι τὴν δεκάδα πλείον τι προσγίνεται ἡ δεκάς, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ δεκάδι νοεῖται τὰ ἐννέα καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ καὶ κατ' ὑπόθεσιν οἱ λοιποὶ ἀριθμοί, ἀπειράκις ἀπειρῶν ἔσται πλῆθος τὰ δέκα, ὡς ἀνώτερον δεδείχαμεν.

305 Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ ἄλλως ἐπιχειρεῖν βούλεται. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ ἔν, φησὶν, ὅτε διαιρεῖται καὶ χωρίζεται, δύο νοεῖται, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἀνά ἐν εἰς ταῦτὸ σύνοδος οὐ νοηθήσεται δύο· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἔστι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰτίῳ τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωριζόμενα δύο ἔστί, τὰ εἰς ταῦτὸ συναγόμενα καὶ ἀλλήλοις παραθεμιμένα οὐκ ἂν εἶη δύο. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ῥητὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τὸν
 306 τρόπον τοῦτον· “θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἦν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, ἐν ἦν ἑκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, πλησιάσαντα δ' ἀλλήλοις, αὐτῇ ἄρα αὐτῶν αἰτία ἐγένετο δυοῖν γενέσθαι, σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἕαν τις ἐν διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πεισθῆναι ὅτι ὡσαύτως αἰτία γέγονεν ἡ σχίσις τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι. ἐναντία γὰρ γέγονεν ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι· τότε

¹ ἢ Mutsch. (sec. Platonis text.): ἡ MSS., Bekk.

^a See *Adv. Phys.* i. 303 ff. ^b See Plato, *Phaedo* 97 A.

after the combination ; since if we admit that after the combination some further new attribute was bestowed on them, such as duality, the combination of the two will make four. For if to the one and one which
 304 were combined the Dyad is attached as something further, then, since a monad and a monad are conceived as existing therein, a four will be formed by the combination of the one and the one,—the things combined being conceived as two, and the Dyad attached to them being of its own nature twofold.— And again, if to the numbers which by combination make up the Decad the Decad is attached in addition, since the nine is conceived as included in the Decad, and the eight and the seven and the rest of the numbers in descending order, the ten will be infinity times infinity in number, as we have previously pointed out.^a

And Plato attempts also to argue in another way.
 305 If the one, he says, when it is divided and separated is conceived as two, the combination of each of these single ones taken together will certainly not be conceived as two ; for the second cause is opposed to the first, and if the separated parts of the same thing are two, those which are brought together and set side by side will not be two. His statement ^b is put in this form : “ For I am surprised that, whereas
 306 when each of them was apart from the other each of them was one and they were not then two, yet when they came close to each other this coming together in mutual juxtaposition actually proved the cause of their becoming two. Nor can I yet come to believe that if a man bisects a one the act of bisection likewise is the cause of its having become two ; for this cause of its becoming two is the opposite of the former

μὲν ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο
 ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται
 307 ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου." ῥητῶς γὰρ διὰ τούτων φησὶν
 ὡς εἴπερ ἢ ψιλλὴ σύνοδος τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ ἢ
 αὐτὸ μόνον παράθεσις αἰτιῶν ἐστὶ τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι
 τὰ πρότερον μὴ ὄντα δύο, πῶς ἔτι πεισθῆναι
 δύναμαι ὅτι τὸ ἓν, ὅτε χωρίζεται καὶ διασπᾶται,
 δύο γίνεται; ἐναντία γὰρ τῇ συνόδῳ ἢ σχίσιν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ χωρισμός.
 308 Τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων· ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ ὠδε
 συνερωτᾶν. εἰ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός, ὅτε παρατίθεται
 τι ἑτέρῳ, ὅλον τῇ μονάδι ἢ μονάδι, τότε ἢ προσ-
 γίνεταί τι ταῖς συνελθούσαις μονάσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεται
 τῶν συνελθουσῶν ἢ οὔτε προσγίνεται τι αὐταῖς
 οὔτε ἀπογίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε προσγίνεται τι
 αὐταῖς μήτε ἀπογίνεται αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς
 κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἑτέρας τῇ ἑτέρῳ, ὡς οὐδὲ
 309 πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἐτύγγανεν. εἰ δὲ ἀπογίνεται τι
 κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐλάσσωσις ἔσται τῆς
 μιᾶς μονάδος καὶ οὐκέτι δυὰς γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ
 προσγίνεται τι αὐταῖς, ὅλον ἢ δυὰς, τὰ ὀφείλοντα
 δύο εἶναι τέσσαρα γενήσονται. δυὰς γὰρ ἢ ἐπι-
 γενομένη μονὰς ἦν καὶ μονὰς· προσελθούσα οὖν
 μονάδι καὶ μονάδι, ταῖς συνερχομέναις, τὸν
 τέσσαρα ποιήσει ἀριθμόν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.
 τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός.

Ε'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

310 Ἡ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ζήτησις συνίσταται
 τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς σχεδὸν τι περὶ
 360

cause ; for then it was because the ones were brought
 close to each other and added to each other, but
 now it is because they are taken apart and separated
 the one from the other." In these words he says 307
 expressly that if the mere combination of one and
 one and their simple juxtaposition is the cause of
 those which formerly were not two becoming two,
 how can I still believe that the one when it is separated
 and pulled apart becomes two ? For bisection and
 separation is the opposite of combination.

Such, then, is Plato's view. But it is also possible 308
 to argue thus ^a: "If number is anything, when
 something is set beside another, say the monad beside
 the monad, then either something is added to the
 combined monads or subtracted from them, or nothing
 is either added to them or subtracted. But if
 nothing is either added to them or subtracted from
 them, there will not be a dyad because of the setting
 of the one beside the other, just as none existed before
 the combination. And if something is subtracted 309
 because of their being set side by side, there will be a
 decrease of one monad and no longer will a dyad come
 into existence. And if something is added to them,
 say the dyad, those which ought to be two will become
 four ^b; for the added dyad was a monad *plus* a monad ;
 when, then, this is added to the monad and monad
 which are being combined, it will make the number
 four ; which is absurd. So then, number is nothing.

CHAPTER V.—CONCERNING BECOMING AND PERISHING

The inquiry concerning becoming and perishing, 310
 as undertaken by the Sceptics against the Physicists,

^a With §§ 308-309 *cf.* *P.H.* iii. 164-165.

^b *Cf.* §§ 303, 304.

τῶν ὄλων, εἶγε τῶν σκεψαμένων περὶ τῆς τοῦ
 παντός συστάσεως οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγέννησαν τὰ
 πάντα οἱ δ' ἐκ πλείονων, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἑνὸς οἱ μὲν
 311 ἐξ ἀποίου οἱ δὲ ἐκ ποιοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐκ ποιοῦ οἱ μὲν
 ἐξ ἀέρος οἱ δ' ἐξ ὕδατος οἱ δ' ἐκ πυρός, ἄλλοι ἐκ
 γῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐκ πλείονων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀριθμητῶν οἱ
 δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀριθμητῶν οἱ μὲν ἐκ δύο
 οἱ δ' ἐκ τεσσάρων οἱ δ' ἐκ πέντε οἱ δ' ἐξ ἕξ, καὶ
 τῶν ἐξ ἀπείρων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις
 οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομοίων, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀπαθῶν
 312 οἱ δ' ἐκ παθητῶν. ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς
 σώματος τὴν τῶν ὄλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ
 στωικοί· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν
 ἡ ἀποιος ὕλη καὶ δι' ὄλων τρεπτῆ, μεταβαλλούσης
 τε ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ
 313 ἀήρ, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ. ἐξ ἑνὸς δὲ καὶ ποιοῦ γεγενῆσθαι
 τὰ πάντα θέλουσιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ἴππασον καὶ
 Ἀναξίμενη καὶ Θαλῆ, ὧν Ἴππασος μὲν καὶ κατὰ
 τινὰς Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκ πυρός ἀπέλιπον
 τὴν γένεσιν, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος, Θαλῆς δὲ
 ἐξ ὕδατος, Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατ' ἐνίου ἐκ γῆς·

ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα, καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ.

314 ἐκ πλείονων δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητῶν, δυοῖν μὲν, γῆς τε
 καὶ ὕδατος, ὁ ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος, ὅτε μὲν λέγων

is practically concerned with the Whole of things, seeing that of those who have investigated the structure of the Universe some have generated all things from one, others from several things^a; and of those who have generated them from one, some have done so from an unqualified and others from a qualified thing; and of those who have done so from 311 a qualified thing, some make this air, others water, others fire, others earth; and of those who have generated all from several things, some have done so from numerable things, others from things infinite in number; and of those who adopt numerables, some make them two, others four, others five, others six; and of those who adopt things infinite in number, some make these like to the things generated, others unlike; and some of these last make them impassive, others passive things. Thus the Stoics supposed 312 the becoming of all things to be derived from one unqualified body; for the principle of existing things, according to them, is the unqualified and wholly convertible matter, and by its changes the four elements come into being,—fire and air, water and earth. But Hippasus and Anaximenes and 313 Thales hold that all things have become from one thing which is qualified; and of these Hippasus—and, according to some, Heraclitus of Ephesus—derived the becoming from fire, but Anaximenes from air, and Thales from water, and Xenophanes (according to some) from earth,—

All things spring from the earth, and all in the earth have their ending.

And of those who derive all from things several and 314 numerable, the poet Homer makes them two, earth and water, as he says in one place^b—

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 30; *Adv. Phys.* i. 379 ff.
^b Homer, *Il.* xiv. 201.

᾽Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,
 ὅτε δὲ
 ἄλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε.
 συμφέρεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖ κατ' ἐνίους καὶ ὁ
 Κολοφώνιος Ξενοφάνης· φησὶ γὰρ
 πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα.
 315 ἐκ γῆς δὲ καὶ αἰθέρος Εὐριπίδης, ὡς πάρεστιν
 ἐκδέξασθαι ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὸν
 αἰθέρα καὶ γαίαν πάντων γενέτειραν αἰίδω.
 ἐκ τεσσάρων δὲ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς·

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·
 Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Ἄιδωνεύς
 Νῆστίς θ', ἧ δακρυῖος τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

316 ἐκ πέντε δὲ Ὀκελλος ὁ Λευκανὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης·
 συμπαρέλαβον γὰρ τοῖς τέσσαρσι στοιχείοις τὸ
 πέμπτον καὶ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, ἐξ οὗ λέγουσιν
 317 εἶναι τὰ οὐράνια. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἑξ τῆν πάντων ὑπ-
 ἔθεντο γένεσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα. ἐν οἷς
 μὲν γὰρ λέγει τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ριζώματα, ἐκ
 τεσσάρων ποιεῖ τὴν γένεσιν· ὅταν δὲ προσθῆ

νεῖκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
 καὶ φιλή μετὰ τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε,
 ἕξ παραδίδωσι τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς, τέσσαρας μὲν
 τὰς ὑλικάς, γῆν ὕδωρ ἀέρα πῦρ, δύο δὲ τὰς δραστη-

^a Homer, *Il.* vii. 99.

^b Eurip. *Frag.* 1023 (Nauck).

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 362, with note *ad loc.*

^d i.e. the aether, cf. *P.H.* iii. 31.

Ocean, sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare
 them;

and again,^a

Nay, but I would that ye all might be turnèd to earth and
 to water.

And with him Xenophanes of Colophon is thought by
 some to agree; for he says—

All we men from earth and from water have our beginning.

And Euripides (derives all things) from earth and 315
 aether, as one may gather from his saying ^b—

Aether I hymn and Earth, the goddess-mother of all things.

And Empedocles from four things ^c—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their
 titles:—

Shining Zeus, and Herè the life-bringer, and Aídoneus,
 Nestis too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals.

And from five things Ocellus the Lucanian and Aris- 316
 totle; for along with the four elements they also
 adopted the fifth body which revolves in a circle,^d and
 from which they say that the celestial objects are
 derived. And Empedocles assumed that the genera- 317
 tion of all things is from the six. For in the verses
 where he speaks of "the four roots" of all things he
 makes their generation to be from four; but when
 he adds ^e—

Strife pernicious, divided from these and evenly balanc'd,
 Love, together with these, in length and breadth perfectly
 equal,—

he is handing down six as the principles of existing
 things, four material (earth, water, air, fire), and

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 10; and with § 318 cf. *P.H.* iii. 32;
Adv. Phys. i. 363.

318 *ρίους, φιλίαν καὶ νείκος. ἐξ ἀπειρῶν δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τούτεστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ποντικὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν παθητῶν δέ, καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.*

319 *Προεληφότες οὖν ὅτι πᾶσι τούτοις ἄπορος δεικνυταὶ ὁ τῆς φυσιολογίας τρόπος ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς, προθυμότερον ἀπτώμεθα τῶν λόγων. καίτοι γε ἐὰν ἐξετάζωμεν, διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτάρκως ἤδη συμβεβίβασται*
 320 *τὸ κεφάλαιον. τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται, χρόνος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἀνώτερον παρεστήσαμεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ*
 321 *γινόμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἔσται. πᾶσά τε γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ μεταβλητικαὶ τινές εἰσι κινήσεις, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶ κίνησις, ὡς προκατεστησάμεθα·*
 322 *τοῖνυν οὐδὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γενήσεται. καὶ πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ δρώντος καὶ πάσχοντος γεννᾶται ἢ φθίρεται, οὔτε δὲ δρᾶτι οὔτε πάσχει, ὥστ' οὐδὲ γεννᾶται τι οὐδὲ*
 323 *φθίρεται. καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται τι καὶ φθίρεται, ὀφείλει τίτιν προστίθεσθαι καὶ τί τινος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ τί ἐκ τινος μεταβάλλειν· γένεσις γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν τούτων τρόπων ὀφείλει συνίστασθαι, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος κατ' ἀφαιρέσειν*

two efficient (Love and Strife). But Anaxagoras of 318 Clazomenae and Democritus and Epicurus and a host of others held that the generation of things is from innumerables; yet whereas Anaxagoras said that these are like to the things generated, Democritus and Epicurus said that they are unlike and impassive (namely, the atoms), while Heraclides of Pontus and Asclepiades said that they are unlike but passive (namely, the irregular molecules).

Having, then, first grasped the fact that the physical 319 theory of all these men is shown to be hopeless if becoming and perishing are abolished, let us deal with their arguments all the more confidently. Yet, if we examine them, the main point has been sufficiently established already by our previous arguments. For what becomes and perishes becomes and 320 perishes in time; but, as we showed above,^a time does not exist, so that what becomes and perishes will not exist either.—Also, becoming and perishing 321 are always change-causing motions; but, as we have previously shown,^b motion is nothing; neither, then, will becoming and perishing exist. Nothing, too, 322 which is generated or perishes is generated or perishes without an agent and a patient,^c but nothing is agent or patient, so that nothing is generated or perishes.—Moreover, if anything becomes and perishes, some- 323 thing must be added to something and something be subtracted from something or something changed from something. For becoming and perishing must come about in some one of these three ways,^d—as, for instance, in the case of the ten, the nine becomes

^a See §§ 170 ff.

^b See §§ 37 ff.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 195 ff.

^d Cf. *P.H.* iii. 109; *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

τῆς μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ ἐννεὰς φθίρεται δὲ ἡ δεκάς, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐννεάδος κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ δεκάς φθίρεται δὲ ἡ ἐννεὰς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τροπὴν φθειρομένων ἢ γεννωμένων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· οὕτω γὰρ φθίρεται μὲν ὁ
 324 οἶνος γίνεται δὲ ὄξος. εἰ δὴ τοῖνυν πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἦτοι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ κατ' ἀφαιρέσιν ἢ κατὰ μεταβολὴν γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται, ἐπεὶ παρεστήσαμεν μήτε πρόσθεσιν οὖσαν μήτε ἀφαιρέσιν μήτε μεταβολὴν, δυνάμει προκατεστησάμεθα τὸ μηδὲ γένεσιν ἢ φθορὰν
 325 ὑπάρχειν. πρὸς τούτοις τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον ψαύειν ὀφείλει ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐξ οὗ φθίρεται καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει, οὐδὲν δὲ ψαύσις ἔστιν, ὡς παρέσταται· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ γένεσις ἢ φθορὰ συστήναι δύναται.
 326 Πάρεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως ἀποροῦντας λέγειν ὡς εἶπερ τι γίνεται, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν, ὧ δὲ μηδὲν συμβέβηκεν,
 327 οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ γινόμενον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲν δύναται πάσχειν· ὄντος γὰρ τὸ πάσχειν οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τὸ ὄν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν γενέσεως· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν γεννᾶται. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τὸ ὄν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται, παρὰ ταῦτα δ' οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον ἐπινοεῖν,
 328 οὐδὲν γεννᾶται. ἄλλως τε, ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 85, 102; *Adv. Log.* i. 378 ff.

through the subtraction of the one but the ten perishes; and again, in the case of the nine, through the addition of the one the ten becomes but the nine perishes. And the same account holds of the things which perish or are generated through conversion; for in this way wine perishes and vinegar becomes. If, then, everything which is becoming and perishing
 324 becomes and perishes either through addition or through subtraction or through change, then, since we have established^a that neither addition exists nor subtraction nor change, we have already virtually established that neither does becoming or perishing exist.—And further, that which is being generated or
 325 is perishing must be touching that wherefrom it perishes and that whereinto it changes; but, as has been shown,^b touch is nothing; so then, becoming or perishing cannot subsist either.

It is also possible for us, as doubters, to argue
 326 directly that if a thing becomes, either the existent becomes or the non-existent.^c But the non-existent does not become; for the non-existent has no property, and of that which has no property neither is becoming a property. And again: what becomes
 327 is affected, but the non-existent cannot be affected at all; for affection belongs to the existent; therefore the non-existent does not become. Nor yet does the existent; for the existent exists already and has no need of becoming; neither, therefore, is the existent generated. But if neither the existent becomes nor the non-existent, and besides these no third thing can be conceived, nothing is generated.—And again,
 328

^b Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 258 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 45 ff.
^c With §§ 326-327 cf. *P.H.* iii. 112.

θεωρεῖται τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννώμενα κατὰ μετα-
 329 βολήν, τὰ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κατὰ σύνθεσιν· καὶ ἐξ
 ἑνὸς μὲν κατὰ μεταβολήν ὅποσα τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας
 μενούσης ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας μεταλαμβάνει ποιότητα,
 οἷον ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑγροῦ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 πλήθει τὸ μὲν γλευκος ἀφανισθῆ ὄλνος δὲ γένηται,
 ἢ ὁ ὄλνος μὲν ἀφανισθῆ ὄξος δὲ ὑποστῆ, ἢ τοῦ
 κηροῦ μένοντος ἢ μὲν σκληρότης ἀφανίζεται ἢ δὲ
 330 μαλακότης γένηται, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐκ πλειόνων δὲ
 κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν ὡς ἄλλυσις μὲν κατ' ἐπισύνδεσιν
 κρίκων, οἰκία δὲ κατὰ σύνοδον λίθων, ἐσθῆς δὲ
 331 κατὰ κρόκης καὶ στημόνων συμπλοκήν. εἰ δὲ
 κὰν τοῖς νοητοῖς γίνεταί τι, ἤτοι ἐξ ὄντος γίνεται
 τι ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν
 δύναται γίνεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ γεννητικόν τινος
 οὐσίαν ἔχειν καὶ ποῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι κίνησιν, ὥστ'
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γεννώμενον. καὶ
 332 μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος
 γίνεταί τι, ἤτοι ἐξ ἑνὸς γίνεται ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων.
 καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη γεννώμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ
 ἑνὸς γίνεται, ἤτοι αὐξανόμενου ἢ μειουμένου ἢ
 333 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος γίνεται. ἀλλ' αὐξάνεσθαι
 μὲν καὶ μειοῦσθαι οὐχ οἷον τε ταυτό, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 δυναθεῖν ἑαυτοῦ τι μείζον ἢ ἑαυτοῦ τι ἕλαττον
 ἀποτελεῖσθαι ταυτόν. ἐάν τε γὰρ αὐτοῦ πλεῖον
 γένοιτο, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔχει πλεῖον παρ' ἑαυτό, ἐξ οὐκ
 ὄντος ἕξει τὴν πρόσθεσιν· ἐάν τε ἕλαττον ἑαυτοῦ,
 πάλιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτό, τὸ¹ ἀπολλύμενον
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολείται. οὐδὲν ἄρα δύναται

¹ < τὸ > add. Rüstow.

amongst things apparent some are observed to be gener-
 ated from one thing through change, others from several
 things by combination; and from one thing through 329
 change come all those which take on one quality in
 place of another while the same substance remains,
 —as for example when, while the same fluid remains
 in the same quantity, the must disappears and wine
 becomes, or the wine disappears and vinegar is formed;
 or, while the wax remains, its hardness disappears and
 softness becomes, or the converse. But (others are 330
 formed) from several things by combination, such as
 the chain formed by the joining together of the links
 and the house by the combination of stones, and the
 robe by the weaving together of woof and warp.—And 331
 if amongst the intelligibles also something becomes,
 something becomes either from an existent thing
 or from a non-existent. But from the non-existent
 nothing can become; for that which is generative of
 anything must possess existence and admit of qualified
 motion, so that nothing will be generated from the
 non-existent. Nor yet from the existent. For if 332
 anything becomes from the existent, it becomes either
 from one thing or from several. And it will not be
 generated from one. For if it becomes from one, it
 becomes through this being increased or decreased or
 remaining in the same state. But it is not possible 333
 for the same thing to increase and decrease, and the
 same thing will not be able to be made into something
 greater than itself or less than itself. For if it should
 become more than itself, it will get the addition from
 a non-existent, since it has nothing more beyond
 itself; and again, if it becomes less than itself, what
 vanishes from it will vanish into the non-existent,
 since it has nothing except itself. Nothing, there-

334 ἐκ τοῦ αὐξομένου ἢ μειουμένου γίνεσθαι. καὶ μὴν
οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος ἔσται τὸ γεννώ-
μενον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἦτοι ἀτρέπτου καὶ ἀμετα-
βλήτου μένοντος αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐκ
τρεπομένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀτρέπτου
335 τι ἑτεροίωσις γὰρ τίς ἐστὼν ἢ γένεσις. εἰ δὲ ἐκ
τρεπομένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος, ἦτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ
μεταβάλλοντος γίνεται τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ εἰς ἕτερον.
καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸ μεταβάλῃ τὸ γεννητικόν τινος,
πάλιν μένει τὸ αὐτό, καὶ μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδενὸς
ἔσται περισσοτέρου γεννητικόν. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἕτερον
τρέποιτο, ἦτοι ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως ὅτε
τρέπεται καὶ γεννᾶται, ἢ μένει μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ
ὑποστάσει, ἄλλο δὲ εἶδος ἀντ' ἄλλου εἶδους μετα-
λαμβάνον γεννᾶται, ὡς ὁ μετασχηματιζόμενος
κηρὸς καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλην μορφήν ἀναδεχόμενος.
336 ἀλλ' ἐκβαίνον μὲν τῆς ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως εἰς τὸ μὴ
ὄν φθαρήσεται, καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθειρόμενον
γενήσεται οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ μένον ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει
καὶ ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης ποιότητα ἀναδεχόμενον
337 γεννᾶται, κρατεῖται τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπορίᾳ. ἦτοι γὰρ
μένοντος τοῦ πρώτου εἶδους καὶ τῆς προτέρας
ποιότητος περὶ αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἶδος
καὶ ἢ δευτέρα ποιότης, ἢ μὴ μένοντος. οὔτε δὲ
μένοντος τοῦ πρώτου εἶδους γίνεται τὸ δεύτερον
οὔτε μὴ μένοντος, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν παρεστήσαμεν,
ὅτε περὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐσκεπτόμεθα. τοῖνυν οὐδ'

• Cf. *P.H.* iii. 112 ff.

• Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 266 ff. "The patient" means "what

fore, can become from what increases or decreases. Nor yet will that which is generated be from that 334 which remains in the same state. For if so, something is generated from it either while it remains unconverted and unchanged or while it is being converted and changed.^a But while it is unconverted and remaining constantly as it was nothing will be generated from it; for becoming is a form of alteration. And 335 if it is being converted and changed, that which is being generated from it becomes while it is changing either into itself or into another. And if that which is generative of something changes into itself, it remains again the same, and remaining the same it will not be generative of anything further. And if it is converted into another thing, either it passes out from its own substance when it is converted and generated, or it remains in its proper substance and is generated by assuming one form instead of another, just like the wax which changes its shape and receives various forms at various times. But if it passes out from 336 its own substance it will perish into the non-existent, and perishing into the non-existent it will generate nothing. And if it is generated while remaining in its own substance and assuming one quality in place of another, it is defeated by the same difficulty. For the 337 second form and the second quality become either while the first form and the first quality remain in it or while they do not remain. But, as we showed before^b when we were investigating "the patient," the second form does not become either while the first form remains or while it does not remain. So then, what is generated does not become from one

is affected," or "acted upon," as opposed to "the agent" (or "efficient cause").

- 338 ἐξ ἐνὸς γίνεται τὸ γεννώμενον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ'
ἐκ πλειόνων. δυοῖν γὰρ συνελθόντων τρίτον οὐκ
ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν δυοῖν, καὶ πάλιν τριῶν
όντων τέταρτον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν
τριῶν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον, ὅτε
περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑποστάσεως ἐζητοῦμεν,
παριστάντες ὅτι οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος οὔτε
339 ψυχὴ οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον. διόπερ εἰ μήτε ἐξ ἐνὸς
ἐστὶ τὸ γεννώμενον μήτε ἐκ πλειόνων, παρὰ δὲ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
γεννάται.
- 340 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ ἀπορητικοὶ περὶ γενέσεως διεξ-
ίασιν· οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ μὴ πρὸς νοῦν ἀπαντῶντες
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐναργείας ὑποδείγματα συμφε-
ρουσιν. τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ θερμὸν ὄν, μὴ ὄν δὲ ψυχρόν,
γίνεται ψυχρόν· καὶ ὁ ὑπάρχων χαλκός, μὴ ὄν
ἀνδριάς, γίνεται ἀνδριάς· καὶ τὸ ὄν κατὰ δύναμιν
μὲν ἐστὶ νεοσσός, κατ' ἐντελέχειαν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
[ἀλλὰ λέγεται κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι νεοσσός εἰς τὸ
κατ' ἐντελέχειαν ὑπάρχειν].¹ καὶ τὸ ὄν τοίνυν
δύναται γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἴτα καὶ ὀρώμεν
βρέφος μὲν γεννώμενον ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, χυλὸν δ' ἐκ
πόας. ὥστε πάντα τὸν τῶν ἀπορητικῶν² λόγον
341 παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν χωρεῖν. πλανῶνται δ' οἱ
ταῦτα λέγοντες, καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ προκειμένον
ἀπαντῶσιν. τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν (ὄν)³ ὕδωρ καὶ οὐκ ὄν
ψυχρόν οὔτε θερμὸν γίνεται τῷ εἶναι οὔτε ψυχρόν
τῷ μὴ εἶναι· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν
ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔστι τις γένεσις.

¹ [ἀλλὰ . . . ὑπάρχειν] secl. ego (? ἀλλ' ἀγεται <ἐκ τοῦ> κ. δ.).

² ἀπορητικῶν Heintz; δογματικῶν mss., Bekk.

³ <ὄν> addo.

thing.—Nor yet does it become from several things. 338
For when two things are combined a third will not
become while the two remain; and again, if there are
three, a fourth will not become while the three re-
main. But we made a more precise statement about
these matters when we were investigating the sub-
stance of Man^a and showed that Man is neither body
nor soul nor the compound of both. Wherefore, if the 339
thing generated is neither from one thing nor from
several, and besides these there is no further possi-
bility, then of necessity no existent thing is generated.

Such are the arguments concerning Becoming 340
which the Doubters rehearse in detail; but the
Dogmatists, without resorting to reason, take refuge
once more in examples drawn from the evidence
of sense. Thus water being warm, and not being
cold, becomes cold; and the bronze, which is not a
statue, becomes a statue; and the egg is potentially
a chick but is not so actually [but is said to be a chick
potentially until it is one actually].^b Both the
existent, then, and the non-existent can become.
Moreover, we also see a baby generated from a
human being, and juice from grass. So that all the
argumentation of the Sceptics runs contrary to the
evidence of sense.—But those who say this are in 341
error, and are not facing the problem before them.
For the water which is hot and is not cold neither
becomes hot by being so nor cold by not being so;
but besides being and not being nothing exists; not
even, therefore, in the case of water is there any

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 263 ff., 288 ff.

^b As this clause seems futile, one may suspect (with
Heintz) that the text is incomplete, the original being to the
effect that "it is said <to become a chick in that it changes
from being> a chick potentially to being one actually."

καὶ πάλιν, οὔτε ὁ χαλκὸς γίνεται τῷ εἶναι χαλκὸς
 342 οὔτε [ὁ]¹ ἀνδρίας τῷ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ λόγος.

ἄλλως τε ἤτοι πλείον τί ἐστὼν ἐν τῷ κατ'
 ἐντελέχειαν παρὰ τὸ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ
 εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν πλείον ἐστὼν, αὐτόθεν οὐδὲν γίνεται
 τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ ἔστι τι πλεόν, ἐκ τοῦ
 343 μὴ ὄντος τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ναί, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ βρέφος ἐκ τῆς ἐγκύμονος γεννᾶται καὶ χυλὸς
 ἐκ τῆς πόας συνίσταται. καὶ τοῦτο τί πρὸς τὸ
 ζητούμενον; ἐροῦμεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βρέφος γίνεται
 τικτόμενον, εἰς τοῦμφανές δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς
 ἄγεται, οὔτε ὁ χυλὸς· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πόα προϋπ-
 ἤρχεν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς πόας γινόμενος τόπον μόνον
 ἤλλαξεν. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ζόφου εἰς τὸ φῶς
 προελθόντα οὐ λέγομεν γίνεσθαι, τόπον δ' ἐκ τόπου
 μεταβεβηκέναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ τὸ
 βρέφος ἐροῦμεν γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τινὸς
 τόπου εἰς ἕτερον μεταβαίνειν τόπον. οὐδὲν οὖν
 γεννᾶται.

344 Κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται
 τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ
 μὴ ὄν φθείρεται· τὸ γὰρ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ
 εἶναι χωρεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν [τι] ἤδη ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι
 ὄν οὐ δεῖται τῆς εἰς τοῦτο μεταβάσεως. τοῖνυν
 345 οὐ φθείρεται τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἤτοι
 γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ
 εἰ μὲν μένον, ἔσται ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφθαρμένον

¹ [ὁ] secl. Heintz.

* With §§ 344-345 cf. *P.H.* iii. 113-114.

becoming. And again: neither does the bronze be-
 come bronze by being so nor a statue by not being so.
 And the same may be said of the cases of potentiality 342
 and actuality.—And further, there either is or is not
 something more in the actual than in the potential;
 and if there is nothing more, it follows that nothing
 becomes by existing potentially; but if there is some-
 thing more, this becomes from the non-existent,
 which is absurd. Yes, (they reply,) but the babe is 343
 generated from the mother, and juice is formed from
 the grass. And how, we shall ask, does this affect
 the question? For neither does the babe become by
 being born (being merely brought from obscurity into
 sight), nor does the juice become (for it was pre-
 existing in the grass, and in becoming outside the
 grass it has merely changed its place). As, then, we
 do not say that the man who has advanced out of the
 darkness into the light is becoming, but that he has
 passed on from place to place, so in the same way we
 shall not say that the babe becomes, but that it
 passes on from one place to another place. Nothing,
 then, is generated.

Nor, for the same reasons, does anything perish.* 344
 For if anything perishes, either the existent perishes
 or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not
 perish; for what perishes passes into a state of non-
 existence, but the non-existent, as it is already in
 the state of non-existence, does not require trans-
 ference into this state. So then, the non-existent
 does not perish. Nor yet does the existent. For 345
 it perishes either while remaining in existence or
 while not remaining. And if it does so while re-
 maining, it will be at once existent and non-existent,
 perished and not perished; but if it does so while not

καὶ μὴ ἐφθαρμένον· εἰ δὲ μὴ μένον, ἀπόλλυται,
καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται. ὥστε
346 εἰ μήτε τὸ ὄν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται, παρὰ δὲ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστω, οὐδὲν φθείρεται.

Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν χρόνων ἐχόμενοι τῆς τε
γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς οὕτω συνερωτώσιν. εἰ
ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε
ἔτελεύτα. καὶ ζῶν μὲν οὐκ ἀπέθανεν· ἔζη γὰρ
347 δῆπουθεν καὶ ζῶν οὐκ ἐτεθνήκει. οὔτε δ' ὅτε
ἀπέθανεν· δις γὰρ ἔσται τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα
ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνά-
μεως, ἐπὶ διαφέροντος δὲ ὑποδείγματος, λόγον
συνηρώτηκε καὶ ὁ Κρόνος τοιοῦτον. εἰ φθείρεται
τὸ τειχίον, ἦτοι ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων οἱ λίθοι
καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, ἢ
ὅτε διεστᾶσιν· οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων
348 καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, οὔτε
ὅτε διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· οὐκ ἄρα φθείρεται τὸ
τειχίον. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ἡ δὲ δύναμις
αὐτοῦ προφανής. δύο γὰρ εἰσι χρόνοι κατ' ἐπί-
νοιαν, ἐν ᾧ ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων οἱ λίθοι καὶ εἰσὶν
ἡρμοσμένοι, καὶ ἐν ᾧ διεστᾶσιν· παρὰ δὲ τούτους
349 οὐδ' ἐπινοηθῆναι τρίτος τις δύναται χρόνος. εἰ
οὖν φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων
ὀφείλει φθειρεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ᾧ ἄπτονται ἀλ-
λήλων οἱ λίθοι καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι, οὐ δύναται
φθειρεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ ἔτι τειχίον, καὶ εἰ ἔστω, οὐ
φθείρεται. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων·
οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστω τειχίον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ δύναται
350 φθειρεσθαι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων
οἱ λίθοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, μήτε ὅτε διεστᾶσιν

remaining, it is destroyed, and it is no longer the
existent but the non-existent which perishes. So that
if neither the existent nor the non-existent perishes,
and besides these there is nothing, nothing perishes.

Some also, fastening on the times of becoming and 346
perishing, argue thus: If Socrates died, he died
either when he was living or when he was dead.^a But
he did not die while living; for assuredly he was
living, and as living he had not died. Nor when he
died; for then he would be twice dead. Therefore
Socrates did not die.—And to the same effect, 347
although using a different example, Cronos^b pro-
pounded an argument of this kind: If the wall
perishes, the wall perishes either while the stones are
touching one another and are fitted together or when
they are disparted. But neither when they touch
one another and are fitted together nor when they are
disparted does the wall perish; therefore the wall
does not perish. Such is the argument, and the force 348
of it is quite plain. There are two times conceived,
that in which the stones touch one another and are
fitted together and that in which they are disparted;
and besides these no third time can be conceived. If,
then, the wall perishes, it must perish in one or other
of these times. But it cannot perish in the time when 349
the stones are touching one another and are fitted
together; for it still exists as a wall, and if it exists it
does not perish. Nor in the time when they are dis-
parted from one another; for then it no longer exists
as a wall, and the non-existent cannot perish. If,
then, the wall does not perish either when the stones
are touching one another or when they are disparted

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 269; *P.H.* iii. 111.

^b i.e. Diodorus Cronos (*cf.* § 85).

350 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον. καὶ
 οὕτω δὲ δυνατὸν συνερωτᾶν. εἰ γίνεται τι καὶ
 φθείρεται, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι χρόνῳ γίνεται καὶ
 φθείρεται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστιν,
 οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ ἔστι
 τοῦτο, οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι πάθοι ἂν τι τούτων· ἐν ᾧ γάρ τι μὴ
 ἔστιν, οὔτε παθεῖν τι οὔτε ποιεῖν δύναται. εἰ δὲ
 τοῦτο, οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται.

351 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς τῶν φιλο-
 σόφων εἰρήσθω· καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη μετελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τοὺς τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀσπασα-
 μένους.

from one another, the wall does not perish.—And 350
 it is also possible to argue thus: If a thing both
 becomes and perishes, it becomes and perishes either
 in the time in which it exists or in that in which it does
 not exist. But in that in which it exists it neither be-
 comes nor perishes; for inasmuch as it exists as this
 thing it neither becomes nor perishes. Nor yet will
 it undergo any of these affections in the time in which
 it does not exist; for in the time in which a thing does
 not exist it can neither affect nor be affected at all.
 And if so, nothing either becomes or perishes.

Let these, then, be our answers to those of the 351
 philosophers who are Physicists; but now it will be
 time for us to pass on to those who have embraced
 the Ethical division of philosophy.

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

VOL. III

N 2

ΠΡΟΣ ΗΘΙΚΟΥΣ

1 Τὰς μὲν κομιζομένας ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀπορίας εἰς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος πρότερον ἐπεληλύθμεν, ὑπόλοιπον δέ ἐστι καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ ἠθικὸν φέρεσθαι δυναμένας προσυποτάττειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὴν τελείαν καὶ σκεπτικὴν ἀπολαβὴν διάθεσιν κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα βιώσεται

ῥῆστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταῦτά,
μὴ προσέχων αἰνοῖς¹ ἠδυλόγου σοφίης.

2 ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν θεωρίαν συμφώνως σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὑπελήφασιν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν διάκρισιν γίνεσθαι, καθὸ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεκωηκέναι Σωκράτης παρήγγειλεν ὡς ἀναγκαϊότατον ζητεῖν

ὄττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται,

δεήσει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εὐθύς περὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις διαφορᾶς σκοπεῖν.

¹ αἰνοῖς: δειλοῖς mss., Bekk.: δίνους Nauck (λήροις cj. Bekk.).

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

WE have already discussed the difficulties brought forward by the Sceptics with regard to the Logical and Physical divisions of philosophy, and now it remains for us to subjoin further those which can be brought against the Ethical division; for in this way, by acquiring the perfect and sceptical frame of mind, each of us will (in the words of Timon^a) pass his life—

In great comfort and calm,
Ever devoid of care, uniformly free from distraction,
Quite regardless of all Sweet-voiced Science's tales.

But since almost all have with one accord supposed that the study of Ethics is concerned with the distinction between things good and evil,^b—even as Socrates, who is thought to be the first who introduced it, proclaimed as the most necessary subject of inquiry—

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted,^c

we too shall have to begin at once by considering the difference which exists between them.

^a Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxi.

^b With §§ 2, 3 cf. *P.H.* iii. 168.

^c Homer, *Odys.* iv. 392; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 21.

A'.—ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ
ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ

- 3 Πάντες μὲν οἱ κατὰ [τὸν] τρόπον στοιχειοῦν
δοκοῦντες τῶν φιλοσόφων, καὶ ἐπιφανέστατα παρὰ
πάντας οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ
ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ τῆς στοᾶς, εἰώθασι
διαιρούμενοι λέγειν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθὰ
τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξύ τούτων, ἅπερ καὶ ἀδιά-
4 φορα λέγουσιν· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ
Ξενοκράτης καὶ ταῖς ἐνικαῖς πτώσεσι χρώμενος
ἔφασκε “ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἔστιν
5 ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν.” καὶ τῶν
λοιπῶν φιλοσόφων χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως τὴν τοιαύτην
διαίρεσιν προσιεμένων αὐτὸς ἐδόκει καὶ ἀποδείξειν
συμπαραλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι κεχωρισμένον
πρᾶγμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τῶν μῆτε
ἀγαθῶν μῆτε κακῶν, ἐκεῖνο ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν
τριῶν γενήσεται· εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἦτοι κακὸν
ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν· εἴτε
δὲ κακὸν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν τριῶν ὑπάρξει, εἴτε οὔτε
ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστι, πάλιν ἐν τῶν τριῶν
καταστήσεται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ
κακὸν ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν.
6 δυνάμει δὲ καὶ οὗτος χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως προσήκατο
τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὁ εἰς κατασκευὴν αὐτῆς
παραληφθεὶς λόγος οὐχ ἕτερός ἐστιν αὐτῆς· ὅθεν εἰ
ἐν αὐτῇ περιέσχηκε τὴν πίστιν ἢ ἀποδείξεις, ἔσται
καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐξ αὐτῆς πιστὴ μὴ διαφέρουσα τῆς
ἀποδείξεως.
7 Ἄλλ’ ὁμως, καίπερ συμφώνου δοκοῦντος ὑπάρ-
χειν κατὰ πάντας τοῦ ὅτι τρισσὴ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν ὄντων
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CHAPTER I.—WHAT IS THE MAIN DIFFERENCE IN
THE THINGS WHICH CONCERN LIFE?

All the philosophers who seem to teach systematic- 3
ally the principles (of Ethics), and, most notably of
all, those of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics,
and the Stoics also, are accustomed to make a dis-
tinction by saying that “ of existing things some are
good, some evil, some between these two,” and these
last they term “ indifferent ”; but Xenocrates,⁶ in 4
phrases peculiar to himself and using the singular
case, declared that “ Everything which exists either
is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” And 5
whereas the rest of the philosophers adopted this
division without a proof, he thought it right to
introduce a proof as well. “ If,” he argued, “ any-
thing exists which is apart from things good and evil
and things neither good nor evil, that thing either is
good or is not good. And if it is good, it will be one
of the three; but if it is not good, it is either evil or
neither evil nor good; and if it is evil, it will be one
of the three, and if it is neither evil nor good, again
it will be one of the three. Therefore everything
which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good
nor is evil.” But he, too, virtually accepted the 6
division without proof, since the argument adopted to
establish it is nothing else than the division itself;
hence, if the proof contains in itself the confirmation,
the division, too, will be its own confirmation as it
does not differ from the proof.

But yet, although it seems to be agreed by all that 7
the distinction between existing things is threefold,

⁶ Head of the Platonic “ Academy,” 339-314 B.C.

διαφορά, τινές οὐδὲν ἤττον εὐρεσιλογούσων, ὁμο-
λογοῦντες μὲν τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι διαφορὰν ὅτι τοιαύτη
τίς ἐστι, σοφιστικῶς δὲ προσειλούμενοι τῇ ἔκτε-
θείσῃ διαιρέσει. καὶ τοῦτο εἰσόμεθα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν
προλαβόντες.

- 8 Τὸν γὰρ ὄρον φασὶν οἱ τεχνογράφοι ψιλῇ τῇ
συντάξει διαφέρειν τοῦ καθολικοῦ, δυνάμει τὸν
αὐτὸν ὄντα. καὶ εἰκότως· ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν “ ἄνθρωπός
ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῷ εἰπόντι “ εἴ τί ἐστὼν
ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνο ζῶον ἐστὶ λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῇ
μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον.
- 9 καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο, συμφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὸ καθ-
ολικὸν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἶναι περιληπτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸν ὄρον ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ εἶδη τοῦ ἀποδιδόμενου
πράγματος διήκειν, ὅσον τὸν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ
πάντας τοὺς κατ’ εἶδος ἀνθρώπους, τὸν δὲ τοῦ
ἵππου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ἵππους. ἐνός τε ὑποταχ-
θέντος ψεύδους ἐκάτερον γίνεται μοχθηρόν, τό τε
- 10 καθολικὸν καὶ ὁ ὄρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὡς ταῦτα φωναῖς
ἐξηλλαγμένα κατὰ δυνάμιν ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, ὥδε καὶ
ἡ τέλειός φασι διαίρεσις, δύνάμιν ἔχουσα καθολικὴν,
συντάξει τοῦ καθολικοῦ διενήνοχεν. ὁ γὰρ τρόπῳ
τῷδε διαιρούμενος “ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶν
Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ” ἴσον τι λέγει τῷ “ εἴ
τινές εἰσὼν ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἢ Ἕλληνές εἰσὼν ἢ
βάρβαροι.” εἴαν γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος εὐρίσκῃται μήτε
Ἕλληνα μήτε βάρβαρον, ἀνάγκη μοχθηρὰν μὲν εἶναι
τὴν διαίρεσιν, ψεύδος δὲ γίνεσθαι τὸ καθολικόν.
- 11 διόπερ καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον “ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν

none the less some people invent captious objections,
and while allowing that the distinction between things
is of this kind, yet attack the division as set forth in
sophistical fashion. And this we shall learn when we
have first gone back a little.

The professional Logicians assert that the definition ⁸
differs merely in its verbal construction from the uni-
versal, being identical in meaning. And rightly; for
he who says “ Man is a rational, mortal animal ” says
what is identical in meaning, though different in word-
ing from him who says “ Whatever thing is man, that
thing is a rational, mortal animal.” And that this is ⁹
so is plain from the fact that not only is the universal
inclusive of the particulars but the definition also
extends to all the particular instances of the thing in
question,—that of Man, for example, to all the partic-
ular men, and that of Horse to all the horses. Also,
if one false instance is classed under it each of them is
vitiating, both the universal and the definition. Well ¹⁰
then, just as these, which vary in wording, are identi-
cal in meaning, so also, they declare, the perfect
division, which has a universal meaning, differs from
the universal in verbal construction.⁴ For he who
divides in this fashion—“ Of men some are Greeks,
others barbarians ”—says what is equivalent to
“ Whosoever are men, they are either Greeks or
barbarians.” For if any man is found who is neither
a Greek nor a barbarian, the division must necessarily
be vicious and the universal false. Hence, too, a ¹¹
statement in the form “ Of existing things some are

Greeks); as thus inclusive of all possible instances (*i.e.*
“ exhaustive ”) it is “ universal in meaning ” and differs only
in form from a regular “ universal proposition ” (*e.g.* “ All
men are either Greeks or non-Greeks ”).

⁴ In a “ perfect division ” the two *species* into which the
genus is divided are contradictories (*e.g.* Men = Greeks + non-

- ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ τούτων μεταξύ”
 δυνάμει κατὰ τὸν Χρύσιππον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καθολικόν “εἴ τινα ἔστιν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα ἤτοι ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἢ κακὰ ἔστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορα.” τὸ μέντοι γε τοιοῦτον καθολικὸν ψεύδος ἔστιν ὑποτασσομένου τινὸς αὐτῶ
 12 ψεύδους. δυοῖν γάρ φασιν ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ ἀδιαφόρου, ἢ κακοῦ καὶ ἀδιαφόρου, τὸ μὲν “τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθόν” ἀληθές ἔστι, τὸ δὲ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ” ψεύδος· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν τὸ δὲ κακόν.
 13 καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστι κακὰ” πάλιν ψεύδος· οὐ γάρ ἔστι κακὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων· ψεύδος γάρ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀδιάφορα,” ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ.” ἢ μὲν οὖν ἔνστασις τοιαύτη πως καθέστη-
 14 κεν, φαίνεται δὲ μὴ καθάπτεσθαι τοῦ Ξενοκράτους διὰ τὸ μὴ ταῖς πληθυντικαῖς πτώσεσι κεχρησθαι, ὥστ’ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν δείξεως ψευδοποιηθῆναι τὴν διαίρεσιν.
 15 Ἄλλοι δὲ κάκεινως ἐνέστησαν. πᾶσα γάρ, φασίν, ὑγιῆς διαίρεσις γένους ἐστὶ τομὴ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἶδη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μοχθηρὰ καθέστηκεν ἢ τοιαύτη διαίρεσις “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.” τῷ γὰρ ἑτέρῳ τῶν προσεχῶν εἰδῶν οὐ τὸ συζυγοῦν καὶ προσεχές εἶδος ἀντιδιέζευκται, ἀλλὰ τὰ τούτου εἶδη, δέον οὕτως εἰπεῖν “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι,” καὶ καθ’ ὑποδιαίρεσιν λοιπὸν “τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.” ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διαίρέσεως, ἐπεὶ ὅσα μὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ

good, others evil, others between these two,” is virtually, according to Chrysippus, a universal such as this—“Whatsoever things are existent, they either are good or are evil or indifferent.” Such a universal, however, is false if a false instance is classed under it. For, they say, when two things subsist, the one good¹² and the other evil, or the one good and the other indifferent, or an evil and an indifferent, the statement “This one of existing things is good” is true, but “These things are good” false; for they are not (both) good, but the one is good and the other evil. And again the statement “These things are evil” is¹³ false; for they are not (both) evil but only the one of them. And so likewise in the case of the things indifferent; for “These things are indifferent” is false, just as is “These things are good, or evil.” Something like this, then, is the objection, but it¹⁴ appears not to affect Xenocrates because he does not employ plural cases, which would result in the falsification of his division when things of different kinds are to be indicated.

And others have raised the following objection:¹⁵ Every sound division, they say, is the cutting up of a genus into its proximate species, and for this reason a division such as this is unsound—“Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” For the first proximate species has matched against it not its correlative proximate species but the sub-species of this, the correct statement being, “Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians,” and next, by subdivision, “And of barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” And this applies also to the¹⁶ division of existing things, since all such as are good

καὶ κακά, διαφέροντά ἐστιν ἡμῖν, ὅσα δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀδιάφορα. ἐχρῆν οὖν μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς ἔχει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκείνως " τῶν ὄντων ἃ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα ἃ δὲ διαφέροντα, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἃ
 17 μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἃ δὲ κακά." ἐώκει γὰρ ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη διαίρεσις τῇ λεγούσῃ " τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἴνδοί." ἡ δὲ ἐκκειμένη ὁμοίωτο τῇ τοιουτοτρόπῃ " τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἴνδοί."

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐνοστάσεων οὐκ
 18 ἀνάγκη νῦν μηκύνειν, ἐκείνο δ' ἴσως ἀρμόσει προδιαρθρῶσαι ὅτι τὸ ἐστὶ δύο σημαίνει, καὶ ἐν μὲν τὸ οἶον ὑπάρχει, καθὸ φαμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμέρα ὑπάρχει, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ οἶον φαίνεται, καθὸ τινες τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰώθασιν λέγειν πολλάκις ὅτι τὸ μεταξὺ δυοῖν τινῶν ἀστέρων διάστημα πηχυαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐν ἴσῳ λέγοντες τῷ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ πάντως ὑπάρχει· τάχα γὰρ ὑπάρχει μὲν σταδίων ἑκατόν, φαίνεται δὲ πηχυαῖον παρὰ τὸ ὕψος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς ὀψεως ἀπόστασιν.
 19 διττοῦ δὲ τυγχάνοντος τοῦ ἐστὶ μορίου, ὅταν λέγωμεν σκεπτικῶς " τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακά τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων," τὸ ἐστὶν ἐντάττομεν οὐχ ὡς ὑπάρξεως ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ φαίνεσθαι δηλωτικόν. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποστάσεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων ἱκανοὶ πῶς εἰσιν ἡμῖν ἀγῶνες πρὸς τοὺς

and evil are "different"^a to us, but all that lie between the good things and the evil are "indifferent" to us. The division, then, ought not to have been stated in its present form but rather in this form—"Of existing things some are indifferent, others different; and of the different some are good, others evil." For this form of division resembles that which 17 runs—"Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians; and of the barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians"; but the division put forward resembled one of this type—"Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians."

However, there is no necessity now to speak at length about these objections; but it will, perhaps, 18 be fitting to explain first that the word "is" has two meanings, one of these being "really exists" (as, at the present moment, we say "it is day" for "day really exists"); and the other "appears"^b (as some of the mathematicians are frequently in the habit of saying that the distance between two stars "is" a cubit's length, this being equivalent to "appears to be but is not really"; for perhaps it is really "one hundred stades" but appears to be a cubit owing to its height and owing to the distance from the eye). When, then, as Sceptics, we say that 19 "Of existing things some are good, others evil, others between these two," as the element "are" is twofold in meaning, we insert the "are" as indicative not of real existence but of appearance. For concerning the real and substantial existence of things good and evil and neither we have contests enough with the

^a i. e. such as to "make a difference" to us, important.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 135, 198.

20 δογματικούς· κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκα-
στον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον
προσαγορεύειν, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς
ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν, ὅταν φῆ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
ὡς ζῆ¹ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ,
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότητος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

Κεμένης οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὑποδεδειγμένον τρόπον
τῆς προειρημένης διαιρέσεως, ἴδωμεν ἂν χρῆ φρονεῖν
περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ τῆς
ἐννοίας ποιησάμενοι.

Β'.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΝ

21 Τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον χειριζομένης ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς
δογματικούς ἀντιρρήσεως τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος
ἐχούσης ἐν τῇ διαγνώσει τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,
πρὸ παντὸς ἀρμόσει τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τούτων στήσαι·
κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὔτε ζητεῖν ἔστιν
22 οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἀνευ προλήψεως. οἱ μὲν οὖν στωικοὶ
τῶν κοινῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐννοιῶν ἐχόμενοι ὀρίζονται
τἀγαθὸν τῷ τρόπῳ τῷδε “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ὠφέλεια ἢ οὐχ
ἕτερον ὠφελείας,” ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν
ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ
ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον.
23 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα,
καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πράξις ἐνέργειά τις οὔσα κατ'
ἀρετὴν, ἀντικρὺς ἔστιν ὠφέλεια· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος, πάλιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντες καὶ

¹ ζῆ: ἡ mss., Bekk.

Dogmatists; but as regards the appearance of each 20
of these things we are in the habit of designating it
good or evil or indifferent, even as Timon seems to
make plain in his “Images,” when he says—

Verily I will relate each fact as to me it appeareth,
Standard exact of truth having in this my speech,
How that the nature of God and of Goodness abideth for
ever,
Whence proceedeth for man Life that is equal and just.

So then, the division mentioned above having been
laid down in the form described, let us see what view
we should take of the terms contained in it, beginning
our discussion with the conception (implied by those
terms).

CHAPTER II.—THE ESSENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL AND INDIFFERENT

Since the controversy which we wage on this 21
subject with the Dogmatists has for its most important
point the differentiation of things good and evil, it
will be fitting first of all to formulate a conception of
these; for, according to the sapient Epicurus, “It
is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a
preconception.” Now the Stoics, holding fast to the 22
common notions (so to call them), define the good in
this way^a—“Good is utility or not other than
utility,” meaning by “utility” virtue and right
action, and by “not other than utility” the good
man and the friend. For virtue, being a certain state 23
of the regent part, and right action, being an activity
in accordance with virtue, are exactly utility; and
the good man, again, and the friend, belonging also
themselves to the class of “good things,” cannot be

^a With §§ 22-27 cf. *P.H.* iii. 169-171.

αὐτοί, οὔτε ὠφέλεια λεχθῆεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν οὔθ' 24 ἕτεροι ὠφελείας δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην. τὰ γὰρ μέρη, στωικῶν φασὶ παῖδες, οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἕτεροῖα τῶν ὅλων, ὡς ἡ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ὅλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ γὰρ ὅλος ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἡ χεὶρ, οὔτε ἕτερα τοῦ ὅλου, σὺν γὰρ τῇ [ὄλῃ]¹ χεὶρὶ ὅλος ὁ ἀνθρώπος νοεῖται ἀνθρώπος. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ φίλου μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, τὰ δὲ μέρη οὔτε ταῦτα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἕτερα τῶν ὅλων, εἴρηται ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας. ὥστε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄρω ἐμπεριεληφθαι, εἴαν τε ἐξ εὐθείας ὠφέλεια τυγχάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ ἢ ἕτερον ὠφε- 25 λείας. ἔνθεν καὶ κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν τριχῶς εἰπόντες ἀγαθὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἕκαστον τῶν σηματο- μένων κατ' ἰδίαν πάλιν ἐπιβολὴν ὑπογράφουσιν. λέγεται γὰρ ἀγαθόν, φασί, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἐστὶν ὠφελείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχι- κώτατον ὑπῆρχε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης ὡς περ 26 τινὸς πηγῆς πᾶσα πέφυκεν ἀνίσχειν ὠφέλεια. καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελείσθαι· οὕτως οὐ μόνον αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεχθήσονται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεις, εἴπερ καὶ κατὰ ταύτας συμ- 27 βαίνει ὠφελείσθαι. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ τελευ- ταῖον τρόπον λέγεται ἀγαθὸν τὸ οἶόν τε ὠφελεῖν, ἐμπεριλαμβανούσης τῆς ἀποδόσεως ταύτης τὰς τε ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐναρέτους πράξεις καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους ἀνθρώπους, θεοὺς τε καὶ 28 σπουδαίους δαίμονας. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐν ἴσῳ λέγεται παρὰ τε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοκράτη πολλὰ ὀνομάζεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ὅταν φῶσιν

said either to be utility or to be other than utility, for the following reason: The parts, say the sons of the 24 Stoics, are neither the same as their wholes nor of a different kind from their wholes, even as the hand (for instance) is neither the same as the whole man (for the hand is not the whole man), nor other than the whole (for the whole man is conceived as man when including the hand). Since, then, virtue is a part both of the good man and of the friend, and the parts are neither the same as their wholes nor other than their wholes, the good man and the friend are called "not other than utility." So that every good thing is comprehended in the definition, whether it be directly "utility" or whether it be "not other than utility." Next, and by way of corollary, they 25 state that "good" has three senses, and in each of its significations, again, they portray it by a separate description. In one sense "good," they say, means that by which or from which "utility" may be gained, this being the most principal good and virtue; for from virtue, as from a fountain, all utility naturally springs. And in another sense, good is that of which 26 utility is an accidental result; thus not only will the virtues be called "good," but also the actions in accordance therewith, inasmuch as utility results also from them. And in the third and last sense, "that 27 which is capable of being useful" is termed "good," this description comprehending the virtues and the virtuous actions and the friends and the good men, and both gods and good daemons.—And because of 28 this Plato and Xenocrates do not mean the same as the Stoics when they say that "good" has several senses. For when the former declare that the Idea

¹ [ὄλῃ] secl. Arnim.

29 *ἐτέρως λέγεσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ ἐτέρως τὸ μετέχον τῆς ἰδέας, σημαίνοντα ἐκτίθενται καὶ κατὰ πολὺ ἀλλήλων διεστῶτα καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα κοινωσίαν, οἷον τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύων φωνῆς θεω-*
ροῦμεν. ὡς γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης σημαίνεται μὲν πῶσις ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ὑλακτικὸν πέπτωκε ζῶον, καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ἔνυγρον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὑφ' ἣν ὁ φιλόσοφος, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ἄστρον, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἔχουσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πτώσεις, οὐδ' ἐμπεριέχεται τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἢ πρώτῃ καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἢ δευτέρᾳ, οὕτω κὰν τῶ φάναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ἰδέας ἔκθεσις μὲν ἐστὶ σημανομένων, κεχωρισμένων δὲ καὶ οὐδεμίαν περίληψιν ἐμφαυόντων.
 30 *ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι, ὡς προείπον, τοιοῦτοί τινας ἦσαν· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς θέλουσι ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προσηγορίας τὸ δεύτερον σημαίνοντα ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ τρίτον περιληπτικὸν τῶν δυοῖν. ἦσαν δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν. οἱ δ' οὕτως "ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν," τινὲς δὲ "τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εὐδαιμονίας." εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθηρ καὶ Χρυσίππον ἀπέδοσαν, εὐροία βίου.*

31 *Πλὴν τὸ μὲν γένος τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποδόσεως ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· εἰώθασι δ' ἔννοι, τριχῶς λεγομένου τὰγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πρώτου σημανομένου ὄρον εὐθὺς ἐπιζητεῖν, [καθὸ λέγει "τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἐστὶν ὠφελείσθαι,"]¹ ὡς εἰ ταῖς*

¹ [καθὸ . . . ὠφελείσθαι] secl. Heintz (? λέγεται pro λέγει).

is termed "good" in one sense and that which partakes of the Idea in another sense, they propose significations which differ greatly from one another and have no connexion, as we see in the case of the word "dog." For just as by this is signified a meaning^a under which falls the barking animal, and also the marine animal, and besides them the philosopher, and moreover the star as well; but these meanings have nothing in common, and the first is not included in the second nor the second in the third,—so also in the statement that the Idea is good, and also that which partakes of the Idea, we have a declaration of significations, but of such as are separate and display no mutual connexion. Such then, as I 30 said before, were the views of the earlier thinkers; but the Stoics hold that, in the case of the term "good," the second signification should be inclusive of the first and the third inclusive of the other two. And there have been some who have asserted that "good" is "that which is desirable for its own sake."^b And others put it thus: "Good is that which contributes to happiness"; and some—"that which helps to fulfil happiness." And happiness, as Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus have defined it, is "an equable flow of life."^c

Such, in fine, is the general form of the definition of "the good." But as "the good" is used in three^d senses, with regard to the definition of the first signification [which says "The good is that by which or from which utility can result"] some are wont to

^a Literally, "case" (falling), as a grammatical term "Dog" is variously applied to "dogs," "dog-fish," "Dog-men" (Cynics), "Dog-star."

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 172; Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 1.

^c Cf. § 110 *infra*.

^d See § 25 *supra*.

ἀληθείαις ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελείσθαι, μόνην ῥητέον τὴν γενικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν (ἀπὸ μόνης γὰρ ταύτης συμβαίνει τὸ ὠφελείσθαι), ἐκπίπτει δὲ τοῦ ὄρου ἐκάστην τῶν εἰδικῶν, ὅσον τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς.
 32 ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ αὐτῶν συμβαίνει [τὸ]¹ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὠφελείν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐ κοινότερον τὸ ὠφελείν (εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνοι, τὸ ὠφελείν, οὐκ ἔσται ὠρισμένως φρόνησις, γενικὴ δ' ἀρετὴ), καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν κατηγορήμα, σωφρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ κοινόν,
 33 ὠφελείν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ ἀνάλογον. οἱ δ' ἀντικαθιστάμενοι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ ἔγκλημα τοῦτό φασι· ὅταν λέγωμεν "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τὸ ὠφελείσθαι," ἐν ἴσῳ τοῦτο λέγομεν τῷ "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι." οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους ἀρετῶν ἀγαθὸν γενήσεται, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ ὠφελείν μὴ ἐπιφέρουσα, τὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι παρεχομένη, ὅσον ἢ μὲν φρονεῖν, καθάπερ ἢ φρόνησις, ἢ δὲ [τὸ] σωφρονεῖν, ὡς ἢ σωφροσύνη.
 34 θελήσαντες δὲ οὗτοι ὡς ἀπολογούμενοι τὸ πρότερον ἔγκλημα φυγεῖν, εἰς ἕτερον ἀπεκυλίσθησαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτο "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι," ἢ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν οὕσα οὐχ ὑποπέσειται τῷ ὄρω· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι, ἐπεὶ μία τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους γενήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ὠφελείσθαι.
 35 Καὶ ἕτερα δὲ εἴωθε λέγεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ὄρους, δογματικῆς ἐχόμενα περιεργίας. ἡμῖν δὲ

¹ [τὸ] secl. Mutsch.

argue further that if in very truth good is "that from which utility can result," we must declare that generic virtue alone is good (for it is from this alone that utility results), and that each of the particulars—such as wisdom, temperance, and the rest—fall outside the definition. For the precise fact of being useful does ³² not result from any of these, but from wisdom "being wise" results and not "being useful" more generally, (for if just this—namely, being useful—were its result it would not be wisdom in particular but generic virtue), and from temperance results what is named after it (namely, "being temperate") and not the general result (namely, "being useful"), and similarly with the rest.—But those who resist this ³³ indictment say this: When we state that "good is that from which utility results," this is equivalent to saying "good is that from which results one of the things useful in life." For thus each of the particular virtues also will be a good, not as procuring utility in general but as providing some one of the things useful in life—one of them (namely, wisdom) providing the state of being wise, and another (namely, temperance) the temperate state. But these men, in attempting ³⁴ by this defence to escape the previous charge, have involved themselves in another one. For if the statement is this—"Good is that from which results one of the things useful in life," then generic virtue, which is a good, will not fall under the definition; for none of the things useful in life results from it (since otherwise it will become one of the particulars), but simply utility.

* And other objections, which partake of Dogmatic ³⁵ over-subtlety, are customarily made against these

* With §§ 35-39 cf. P.H. iii. 173-174.

ἀπόκρι ἀποδείξει ὅτι ὁ λέγων ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὠφελοῦν ἢ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἢ τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, οὐχ ὁ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν διδάσκει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ παρίστησιν. ὁ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τάγαθῷ παριστάς οὐκ αὐτὸ δεικνυσι τάγαθόν. εὐθέως γοῦν τὸ μὲν ὅτι ὠφελεί τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ὅτι αἰρετὸν ἔστι, παρὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶρηται τὸ οἶον ἀγαστόν, ὅτι τε εὐδαιμονίας ἔστι ποιητικόν, πάντες συγχωροῦσιν· ἀλλ' εἴαν προσεξετάζηται τί ποτε ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ὠφελοῦν καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν, οὐκέτι ὁμοφρονήσουσι, καίπερ συμφώνως πρότερον αὐτὸ λέγοντες τὸ ὠφελοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀσπειστον ἐξενεχθήσονται πόλεμον, τοῦ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντος τοῦ δ' ἡδονὴν τοῦ δ' ἀλυπίαν τοῦ δ' ἄλλο 37
 37 τι τῶν διαφερόντων. εἰ δέ γε ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἐδείκνυτο ὁ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπεστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τάγαθοῦ φύσεως. τοῖνυν οὐχ ὁ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι ὄροι διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τάγαθῷ. διόπερ οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον εἰσι μοχθηροί, ἀλλὰ καὶ 38
 38 καθόσον ἀδυνάτου τινὸς ἐφίενται πράγματος· ὁ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτος οὐδὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνῳ γινώσκει δύνатаι. οἶον ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τί ἔστιν ἵππος λέγων "ἵππος ἔστι ζῶον χρεμετιστικόν" οὐ διδάσκει ὁ ἔστιν ἵππος· τῷ γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντι τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὸ χρεμετίζειν ἀγνοεῖται, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ ἵππου συμβεβηκός. καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὸν μὴ κατειληφῶτα τί ἔστι βοῦς προφερό-

* Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. § 85 *infra*; P.H. iii. 175; Plato, *Cratyl.* 412 c.

definitions. But for us it is sufficient to show that he who asserts that the good is "the useful," or "what is choiceworthy for its own sake," or "that which contributes to happiness," or gives some such description of it, does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property. But he who states the property of the good does not show us the good itself. For certainly all agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (and for this reason it is called "good" as being "delightful" *), and that it is productive of happiness; but 36
 36 if one inquires further what this thing is which is useful and choiceworthy for its own sake and productive of happiness, they will no longer be of one mind, although they previously agreed in calling it the useful and the choiceworthy, but will be swept away into a truceless war, one man calling it virtue, another pleasure, another painlessness, another something else quite different. But if it had in fact been 37
 37 shown by the definitions mentioned above what the good is, they would not have been at strife as though the real nature of the good were unknown. So then, the definitions set forth do not teach us what the good is but the accidental property of the good. Consequently, they are unsound not only in this respect but also inasmuch as they aim at something which is impossible; for he who is ignorant of an existing object 38
 38 cannot get to know the property of that object either. For example, the man who says to one who is ignorant of what a horse is, "A horse is an animal capable of neighing," does not teach him what a horse is; for "neighing," too, is unknown to the person who does not know the horse, as it is a property of the horse. And he who to the man who has not grasped

μενος "βοῦς ἐστὶ ζῶον μυκητικόν" οὐ παρίστησι
 τὸν βόυν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντι τοῦτον συνακα-
 ταληπτέεται καὶ τὸ μυκάσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον
 39 τοῦ βοός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνενόητον ὄντα
 τὰγαθοῦ μάτην καὶ ἀνωφελῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἀγαθὸν
 ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετόν ἢ τὸ ὠφελοῦν. πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖ
 μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἶτα τότε
 συνιέναι ὅτι ὠφελεί καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν ἐστὶ καὶ εὐδαι-
 μονίας ποιητικόν. ἐπ' ἀγνοουμένη δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι τῶν ὄρων οὐ διδάσκουσι τὸ ζητούμενον.
 40 Δείγματος μὲν οὖν χάριν ἀπαρκέσει ταῦτ' εἰρη-
 σθαι περὶ τῆς τὰγαθοῦ νοήσεως. ἐξ ὧν, ὡς οἶμαι,
 σαφῆ τυγχάνει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ τεχνολογού-
 μενα παρὰ τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις. κακὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὅπερ βλάβη ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον
 βλάβης, καὶ βλάβη μὲν ὡςπερ κακία καὶ ἡ φαῦλη
 πράξις, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ βλάβης καθάπερ ὁ φαῦλος
 41 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐχθρὸς. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων, φημι
 δὲ τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, ὅπερ καὶ ἀδιάφορον
 ὠνομάζετο, ἐστὶ τὸ οὐδετέρως ἔχον. τίς δ' ἦν ἢ
 τῶν ὄρων τούτων δύναμις καὶ τίνα ῥητέον πρὸς τοὺς
 ὄρους, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λεγομένων πάρεστι
 μαθεῖν. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ προκατασταθεῖσι τούτοις μετ-
 ελθόντες σκεψώμεθα εἰ ὡςπερ ἐπινοεῖται τι ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπαρκτὸν
 ἐστίν.

Γ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ

42 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ κεκρατημένως ὑπέγραψαν οἱ
 δογματικοὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ,

* With § 40 cf. P.H. iii. 176.

^b Cf. §§ 21-39 *supra*.

what an ox is propounds the definition, "An ox is an
 animal capable of bellowing," does not explain the
 ox, for "bellowing" too is equally uncomprehended
 by the man who does not know the ox, it being a
 property of the ox. Therefore also it is vain and 39
 useless to say to the man who is devoid of a con-
 ception of the good that the good is the choice-
 worthy or the useful. For one ought first to learn
 the real nature of the good itself, and then, in the
 next place, perceive that it is useful and that it is
 choiceworthy and productive of happiness. But if
 this is unknown such definitions as these do not
 inform us of what we seek.

It will be enough, then, to have said thus much, by 40
 way of illustration, regarding the conception of the
 Good. And from this the logical subtleties which
 the Dogmatists devise regarding Evil will also be
 plain.^a For the evil is the contrary of the good; and
 it is harm or not other than harm; and it is "harm"
 as in the case of badness and wicked action, but "not
 other than 'harm'" as in the case of the wicked man
 and the enemy. And between these (I mean, between 41
 the good and the evil, and termed the "indifferent")
 is that which is in neither state. And what the signi-
 ficance of these definitions is, and what is to be said
 against the definitions, one may learn from our dis-
 cussion of the good.^b But now, on the assumption
 that these are already established, let us pass on and
 consider whether good and evil are really existent in
 the way in which they are conceived.

CHAPTER III.—DO GOOD AND EVIL REALLY EXIST?

Now that the Dogmatists have not described the 42
 conception of Good and Evil convincingly we have

πρότερον ἐπελογισάμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ εὐχρέστερον
 συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ
 λόγους αὐταρκές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἄρα πάντες ἀν-
 θρωποι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Αἰνησίδημος, ἀγαθὸν
 ἡγούμενοι τὸ αἰροῦν αὐτούς, ὅποιον ἂν ποτ' ᾖ,
 43 καὶ ὄν τρόπον συμφωνοῦντες, εἰ τύχοι, περὶ τοῦ
 εἶναι τινα σωματικὴν εὐμορφίαν περὶ τῆς εὐμόρφου
 καὶ καλῆς γυναικὸς στασιάζουσιν, τοῦ μὲν Αἰθίο-
 πος τὴν σιμοτάτην καὶ μελαντάτην προκρίνοντας,
 τοῦ δὲ Πέρσου τὴν γρυποτάτην καὶ λευκοτάτην
 ἀποδεχομένου, ἄλλου δὲ τὴν μέσην κατὰ τὴν
 χαρακτῆρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν χροῖαν πασῶν καλλίονα
 44 λέγοντος, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ κατὰ κοινὴν πρό-
 ληψιν δοξάζοντες εἶναι τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οἱ τε
 ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ αἰροῦν
 αὐτούς καὶ ὠφελοῦν, κακὸν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον,
 κατ' εἶδος πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦσιν·

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις,
 καὶ κατ' Ἀρχίλοχον

ἄλλος ἄλλω ἐπ' ἔργω καρδίην ἰαίνεται,

εἶγε ὁ μὲν δόξαν ἀσπάζεται, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτον, ἄλλος
 εὐεξίαν, τίς δὲ ἡδονήν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ
 45 αὐτὸς λόγος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ
 τοῦ περιπάτου τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
 καὶ ἃ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν ἃ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ἃ δὲ
 ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχὴν
 τὰς ἀρετὰς, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν

* With §§ 42-44 cf. *P.H.* iii. 175.

† Homer, *Odys.* xiv. 228 ; cf. *P.H.* i. 86.

already argued^a; but in order to become more easily
 familiar with the arguments about its existence it is
 quite sufficient to say that, after all (as Aenesidemus
 used to assert), whereas all men consider that the good
 is what attracts them, whatever that may be, the
 particular views they hold about it are conflicting.
 And just as, although men agree (shall we say?)⁴³
 that comeliness of body exists yet they are at variance
 about the comely and beautiful woman,—the Ethio-
 pian preferring the blackest and most snub-nosed,
 and the Persian approving the whitest and most
 hook-nosed, and someone else declaring that she
 who is intermediate both in feature and in colouring
 is the most beautiful of all,—so in the same way both⁴⁴
 laymen and philosophers share the same pre-concep-
 tion and believe that good and evil exist,—good being
 that which attracts them and is useful, and evil that
 which is of the opposite nature,—but as to particular
 instances they are at war with one another:—

One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another.^b
 and, in the words of Archilochus,^c—

Men differ as to what things cheer their hearts,
 seeing that this man welcomes glory, that man wealth,
 another well-being, and another pleasure. And the
 same account applies to the philosophers. ^d For the⁴⁵
 Academics and the Peripatetics^e assert that there are
 three classes of goods, and that some belong to the
 soul, some to the body, and others are external to
 both soul and body,—the virtues belonging to the
 soul, and to the body health and well-being and keen-

^a *Frag.* 36 (Bergk).

^b With §§ 45-47 cf. *P.H.* iii. 180-181.

^c Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* i. 8.

- καὶ εὐαισθησίαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας
 ἐστὶν ἰδέας, ἐκτὸς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος πλοῦτον
 46 πατρίδα γονεῖς τέκνα φίλους, τὰ παραπλήσια. οἱ
 δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τρία μὲν γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 αὐτοὶ τυγχάνειν ἔλεξαν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ· τούτων
 γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχῆν τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ
 ψυχῆν οὔτε ἐκτὸς, ἔξαιροῦντες τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα ἀγαθῶν ὡς μὴ ἀγαθῶν. καὶ δὴ περὶ μὲν
 ψυχῆν εἶναί φασι τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας
 πράξεις, ἐκτὸς δὲ εἶναι τὸν τε φίλον καὶ τὸν σπου-
 δαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς
 καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, οὔτε δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν οὔτε ἐκτὸς αὐτὸν
 τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. οὔτε γὰρ
 ἐκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν οὔτε περὶ ψυχῆν.
 47 ἐκ γὰρ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνέστηκεν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ
 τοσοῦτον ἀπέχοντες τοῦ ἐξαιρεῖν τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ
 σώματι ἀγαθῶν ὡς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχικώτατον
 ἀπολιπεῖν ἀγαθόν· ὅποιοι εἰσω οἱ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα
 ἡδονὴν ἀσπαζόμενοι. καὶ ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν νῦν ἐπὶ
 πλείον ἐκτείνειν τὸν λόγον, παριστάντες ὅτι ἀσύμ-
 φωνός ἐστι καὶ μαχομένη ἡ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ
 κακοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κρίσις, ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ὑποδείγματος¹
 ποιησόμεθα τὴν ὑφήγησιν, καθάπερ τῆς ὑγείας,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ συνηθέστερός ἐστιν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς
 λόγος.
- 48 Οὐκοῦν τὴν ὑγείαν οἱ μὲν νομίζουσιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
 οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπολαμβάνόντων
 οἱ μὲν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ταύτην ἔλεξαν οἱ δ' οὐ
 μέγιστον, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν εἰπόντων οἱ μὲν
 ἀδιάφορον προηγούμενον, οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφορον μὲν, οὐ

ness of sense and beauty and everything which is of a similar character, and external to soul and body being wealth, country, parents, children, friends, and the like. But the Stoics, though they too declared that 46 there are three classes of good things, yet classed them differently, saying that some of them belong to the soul, that some are external, and that some are neither psychical nor external, and eliminating the class of bodily goods as not being goods. Thus those belonging to the soul are, they say, the virtues and the right actions; and external are the friend and the good man and good children and parents and the like; and neither psychical nor external is the good man in his relation to himself, for it is impossible for him to be either external to himself or psychical; for he is composed of soul and body. And there are some who 47 are so far from eliminating the class of bodily goods that they even assign to them the most principal good; and of this sort are they who approve of carnal pleasure. But lest we may seem now to be unduly prolonging our argument in showing that the judgement of men regarding Good and Evil is discordant and conflicting, we shall base our exposition on one example only—namely health, since the discussion of this is specially familiar to us.^a

Health, then, is by some considered to be a good, by 48 others not a good; and of those who suppose it to be a good some have declared it to be the greatest good, others not the greatest; and of those who have said that it is not a good, some have counted it "a preferred indifferent," others an indifferent but not

¹ ὑποδείγματος Heintz: ὑποδειγματικῶς mss., Bekk.

^a Since Sextus himself was a physician.

49 προηγούμενον δέ. ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο
 πρῶτον, εἰρήκασι τὴν ὑγίαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν τε
 ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν συγγραφέων καὶ καθόλου πάντες
 οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου. Σιμωνίδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ μελοποιὸς
 φησι μηδὲ καλᾶς σοφίας εἶναι χάρις, εἰ μὴ τις ἔχει
 σεμνὴν ὑγίαν· Λικύμνιος δὲ προειπὼν ταῦτα

λιπαρόμματε, μάτερ ὑψίστα,¹ θρόνων
 σεμνῶν Ἀπόλλωνος βασιλεία ποθεινά,
 πραῦγελως ὑγεία,

ποῖον ὑψηλὸν ἐπιφέρει·

τίς γὰρ πλοῦτου χάρις ἢ τοκῆων
 ἢ τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου βασιλιῆδος ἀρχᾶς;
 σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὐ τις εὐδαίμων ἔφθ.

50 Ἡρόφιλος δὲ ἐν τῷ διαιτητικῷ καὶ σοφίαν φησὶν
 ἀνεπίδεικτον καὶ τέχνην ἄδηλον καὶ ἰσχὺν ἀν-
 αγώνιστον καὶ πλοῦτον ἀχρεῖον καὶ λόγον ἀδύνατον

51 ὑγείας ἀπούσης. ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν οὕτως ἀγαθὸν
 δ' εἶπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἳ τε
 ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου.
 δεῖν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν οἰκείαν
 τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ
 εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν

52 πάντῃ χαρίεντι συνεχρήσατο παραδείγματι. εἰ γὰρ
 νοήσοιμεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέα-
 τρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρίον καὶ
 τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιοῦμενον ἦκειν, εὐθὺς καὶ εἰς
 ἔννοιαν ἀναχθησόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δια-

¹ ὑψίστα Wilamowitz: ὑψίστων MSS., Bekk.

* For the two subdivisions of the "indifferent"—"pre-
 ferred" and "rejected"—cf. §§ 59 ff. *infra*; P.H. iii. 191 f.;
 Vol. I. *Introductio*. p. xxvii.

"preferred." ^a Now that health is a good, and the 49
 prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the
 poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk.
 Thus Simonides the lyric poet declares ^b that "Even
 fair Wisdom lacks grace unless a man possesses
 august Health." And Licymnius, after first uttering
 this prelude ^c—

Mother sublime, with eyes bright-shining,
 Lov'd queen of the holy throne of Apollo,
 Gently-smiling Lady of Health—

adds this lofty strain—

Where is the joy of wealth or of kindred,
 Or of kingly dominion that maketh man god-like?
 Nay, parted from thee can no one be blessed.

And Herophilus ^d in his *Dietetics* affirms that wisdom 50
 cannot display itself and art is non-evident and
 strength unexerted and wealth useless and speech
 powerless in the absence of health.—Such then are 51
 the views of these men. But the Academics and
 Peripatetics ^e said that health is indeed a good, but
 not the prime good. For they held that one ought
 to assign to each of the goods its own proper rank
 and value. Hence Crantor,^f wishing to bring us to
 have a clear image of the object under discussion,
 made use of a very delightful illustration. If we were 52
 to imagine, he says, a general theatre, common to all
 the Greeks, and that each of the goods were to come
 and present itself in this and challenge for the first
 prize, we should be brought at once to a realization of
 the difference between the goods. For in the first 53

^b *Frag.* 70 (Bergk).

^c *Frag.* 4 (Bergk).

^d A physician of Cos, *circa* 300 B.C.; cf. P.H. ii. 245.

^e Cf. § 77 *infra*.

^f An Academic, disciple of Xenocrates, *circa* 300 B.C.

53 φορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος παραπηδήσας ἔρει " ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθήτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν χρεώδης εἰμι νοσοῦσι καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνά,
54 ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεύρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι." τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκούσαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες ὁμοθυμαδὸν κεύθουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ πλούτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτου ἤδη ἀνακηρυττομένου ἐπιστάσα ἢ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃ, ἐνὶ δ' ἱμερῳ, ἐν δ' ὀαριστύς,
πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον τύκα περ φρονούντων,

55 λέγῃ δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα ὅτι αὐτὴν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν

(ὁ γὰρ ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
ἐξίπτατ' οἴκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον,

διώκεται τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγινομένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὕτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράζονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν
56 στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλούσης, ἐπὶν εἰσβάλλῃ ἢ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν συν- ἔδρων αὐτῇ θεῶν, καὶ διδάσκῃ ὡς οὔτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε πλοῦτου ὄφελός τί ἐστιν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

(τί γὰρ με πλοῦτος ὠφελεῖ νοσοῦντά γε;¹
μικρ' ἂν θέλωμι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἄλυπον οἰκεῖν βίον ἢ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν),

57 ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ καταλαβόντες

¹ νοσοῦντά γε Fabr., Bekk.: νόσον MSS. (? μεστόν ὠφελεῖ νόσον).

place Wealth, springing to the front, will say—" I, O all ye Greeks, by providing adornment to all men and garments and shoes and all other comforts am indispensable both to the sick and to the whole, and while I furnish delights in peace, in war I become the sinews of action." Then all the Greeks, on hearing 54 these words, will with one consent give orders that the first prize be bestowed on Wealth. But if, whilst he is already being proclaimed the victor, Pleasure should present herself—

In whom love doth abide and longing and amorous converse, Speech seductive which stealeth the wits, yea e'en of the wisest,^a—

and taking her stand in the middle should declare 55 that it is right to proclaim her victor—

For unsure is Wealth: it lasteth but a day,
Then, after briefest flow'ring, takes to flight,^b

also it is pursued by men not for its own sake but for the enjoyment and pleasure which accrue because of it,—then certainly all the Greeks, conceiving that this is in fact the case, will cry aloud that they must crown Pleasure. But when she, too, is about to carry 56 off the palm, as soon as Health makes her entry in company with her fellow-deities,^c and explains that in her absence there is no profit either in pleasure or in wealth—

What doth wealth profit me when I am sick?
Better a little portion day by day
With painless life than riches with disease^d—

then, once again, when they have heard her and have 57

^a Homer, *Il.* xiv. 216.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Phoen.* 558, *Electra* 944.

^c Such as Asclepius, Panacea, Athenê (an altar to Athenê Hygieia was set up in Athens by Pericles).

^d From Eurip. *Telephus* (*Frag.* 714 Nauck).

ὡς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῆ καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγίαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἤδη νικώσης, ἐπὶ εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρία πολὺ στίφος ἀριστέων καὶ ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ 58 ἑαυτήν, καταστᾶσά τε λέγῃ "ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἢ κτήσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὐξαινό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὡς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν," καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεία τῆ ἀρετῆ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεία τῆ ὑγείας, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῆ ἡδονῆς, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

59 Καὶ δὴ ὁ μὲν Κράντωρ τὴν ὑγίαν ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ ἐτίθετο, στοιχῶν τοῖς προειρημένοις φιλοσόφοις· οὐκ ἀγαθὸν δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔλεξαν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορον. τὸ ἀδιάφορον δ' οἴονται λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὄρμη μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷον ἐστὶ τὸ περιττοῦς ἢ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆ κεφαλῇ 60 τρίχας, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὄρμη μὲν καὶ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυοῖν δραχμῶν ἀπαραλλάκτων τῷ τε χαρακτήρι καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι, ὅταν δέη τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἰρεῖσθαι· ὄρμη μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν 61 [αἰρεῖσθαι], οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε. κατὰ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον, καθ' ὃ σημανόμενόν φασὶ τὴν τε ὑγίαν καὶ νόσον καὶ πάντα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀδιάφορα τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ μήτε

come to realize that happiness cannot exist when bed-ridden and diseased, all the Greeks will declare that Health is the victor. But even while Health is already claiming the victory, as soon as Courage enters, surrounded by a great press of nobles and heroes, and taking her stand speaks thus—"If I am 58 not present, O ye Greeks, the ownership of your goods falls into other hands, and your enemies would pray that you might abound in all things good since they intend to conquer you"; then, on hearing this, the Greeks will assign the first prize to valour, and the second to health, and the third to pleasure, and they will rank wealth last.

Thus Crantor put health in the second place, 59 adopting the order of the philosophers previously mentioned; but the Stoics affirmed that it is not a "good" but an "indifferent."^a They suppose that the term "indifferent" has three senses: in one sense it is applied to that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination,—such as the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are odd in number or even; in another sense it applies to that 60 for which there exists inclination and disinclination but not more for this thing than for that—as in the case of two drachmae indistinguishable both in markings and in brightness, when one is required to choose one of them, for there exists an inclination for one of them but no more for this one than for that. And in the third and last sense the indifferent, they 61 say, is that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness; and indifferent in this signification, they say, are health and disease and all things of the body and most external things because they

* With §§ 59-61 cf. *P.H.* iii. 177.

πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συν-
 τείνειν. ὧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ'²
 ἂν εἶη ἀδιάφορον διὰ παντός δ' ἀρετῇ μὲν καλῶς,
 κακία δὲ κακῶς, ὑγεία δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι
 62 ἂν εἶη ἀδιάφορα. ἤδη δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ
 τὰ μὲν εἶναι προηγμένα τὰ δ' ἀποπροηγμένα τὰ
 δὲ μήτε προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα, καὶ προ-
 ηγμένα μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἱκανῆν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα, ἀπο-
 προηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἱκανῆν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα, μήτε δὲ
 προῆχθαι μήτε ἀποπροῆχθαι οἷον τὸ ἐκτείνειν ἢ
 63 συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τούτῳ παρα-
 μένοις τήν τε ὑγείαν καὶ τήν ἰσχύν καὶ τὸ κάλλος
 πλοῦτόν τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὰ εὐκότα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
 ἀποπροηγμένοις νόσον καὶ πεινίαν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα καὶ
 τὰ ἀνάλογα. ὦδε μὲν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς·
 64 μὴ εἶναι δὲ προηγμένον ἀδιάφορον τὴν ὑγείαν καὶ
 πᾶν τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν παραπλήσιον ἔφησεν Ἀρίστων ὁ
 Χίος. ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν
 ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι
 65 μόνον διαφέρειν. καθόλου γὰρ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα μὴ ἔχειν μηδεμίαν παρ-
 αλλαγὴν, μηδὲ τιμὰ μὲν εἶναι φύσει προηγμένα τιμὰ
 δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφορούς τῶν
 καιρῶν περιστάσεις, (ὡς)¹ μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα προ-
 ῆχθαι πάντως γίνεσθαι προηγμένα μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα
 66 ἀποπροῆχθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὑπάρχειν ἀποπροηγ-
 τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ

¹ <ὡς> add. cj. Heintz.

tend neither towards happiness nor towards un-
 happiness. For that which it is possible to use either
 well or ill will be indifferent; and whereas one
 always uses virtue well and vice ill, one can use
 health and the things of the body at one time well
 and at another ill, and consequently they will be
 indifferent.—And they say too that of things 62
 indifferent some are “preferred,” others “re-
 jected,” others neither preferred nor rejected,^a and
 that the preferred are those which have consider-
 able “worth,” and the rejected those which have
 considerable “unworthiness,” and that extending the
 finger, for example, or contracting it, and everything
 like that, is neither preferred nor rejected. And 63
 amongst the things preferred are ranked health and
 strength and beauty, wealth and glory and the like;
 but amongst the things rejected, sickness and poverty
 and pain and suchlike.—So say the Stoics; but 64
 Ariston of Chios^b affirmed that health, and everything
 of a similar kind, is not a “preferred indifferent”;
 for to call it a “preferred indifferent” is equivalent
 to claiming it to be a “good,” and practically differs
 only in name. For, without exception, amongst the 65
 indifferent things which lie between virtue and vice
 there is no distinction; nor are some of them pre-
 ferred, others rejected naturally, but owing to the
 different circumstances of the various occasions; (so
 that) neither are those said to be preferred inevitably
 preferred, nor those said to be rejected necessarily
 rejected. Were it, for instance, obligatory that men 66
 in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on
 this account be destroyed, but that the sick should

^a Cf. § 48 *supra*. With §§ 62-66 cf. *P.H.* iii. 191-192.

^b A Stoic, with Cynic tendencies, *circa* 260 B.C.

νοσοῦντας ἀπολυομένους τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπο-
 λύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ
 σοφὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ [ὄτι]¹ τὸ
 ὑγιαίνειν. καὶ ταύτη οὔτε ἡ ὑγεία προηγμένον ἐστὶ
 67 πάντως οὔτε ἡ νόσος ἀποπροηγμένον. ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἐν ταῖς ὀνοματογραφίαις ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα προτάττομεν
 στοιχεῖα, πρὸς τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀρτιζό-
 μενοι, καὶ τὸ μὲν δέλτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Δίωνος ὄνομα
 γράφομεν, τὸ δὲ ἰῶτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ἰωνος, τὸ δὲ ὦ
 ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ὠρίωνος, οὐ τῇ φύσει ἐτέρων παρὰ τὰ
 ἕτερα γράμματα προκρινόμενων, τῶν δὲ καιρῶν
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ
 ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πράγμασι οὐ φυσικῆ τις γίνεται
 ἐτέρων παρ' ἕτερα πρόκρισις, κατὰ περίστασι δὲ
 μᾶλλον.

68 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἀσυμφώνου δειχθείσης καὶ
 ὑποδειγματικώτερον τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ
 κακῶν ἔτι δὲ ἀδιαφόρων προλήψεως, δεήσει λοιπὸν
 καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ προκείμενον
 69 λεγομένων ἐφάπτεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τι φύσει
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐστὶ τι φύσει κακόν, τοῦτο ὀφείλει
 κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων καὶ πᾶσι ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 κακόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαντικὸν καθ-
 εστῶς πάντας ἀλεαίνει καὶ οὐχ οὓς μὲν ἀλεαίνει
 οὓς δὲ ψύχει, καὶ ὁν τρόπον ἢ χιών (φύσει)² ψύ-
 χουσα οὐχὶ τοὺς μὲν ψύχει τοὺς δὲ ἀλεαίνει, πάντας
 δ' ὁμοίως ψύχει, οὕτω τὸ φύσει ἀγαθὸν πᾶσι
 70 τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν. παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων συνιστᾷς
 ὅτι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων
 ἐπικεχειρήκεν. ὥς γὰρ θερμοῦ, φησὶν, ἰδίον ἐστὶ

¹ [ὄτι] secl. Arnim (? οὕτως). ² <φύσει> add. cj. Mutsch.

be set free from that service and freed likewise from
 destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would
 choose sickness rather than health. And thus neither
 is health inevitably preferred nor sickness rejected.
 As, then, in the writing of names we place different 67
 letters first at different times, adapting them to the
 varying circumstances,—Delta when we are writing
 the name of Dion, Iota when it is Ion, Omega when
 it is Orion,—no one letter being preferable to the
 others by nature, but the occasions compelling us to
 act thus,—so also in the things which lie between
 virtue and vice there exists no natural precedence of
 some before others, but rather a precedence due to
 circumstance.

But now that we have thus shown, mainly by means 68
 of examples, that there is no agreement about the
 preconception regarding things good and evil, and
 the indifferent as well, it will be our next task to deal
 with the arguments of the Sceptics about the problem
 before us. If, then, there exists anything good by 69
 nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to
 be common to all men and be good or evil for all.^a
 For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature
 warms all men, and does not warm some but chill
 others,—and like as snow which chills (by nature)
 does not chill some and warm others, but chills all
 alike,—so what is good by nature ought to be good
 for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
 Wherefore also Plato,^b in establishing that God is 70
 good by nature, argued on similar lines. For, he
 says, as it is the special property of heat to make hot

^a With § 69 cf. P.H. iii. 179.

^b Cf. Plato. *Rep.* ii. 379 A ff., and 335 D.

τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ ψυχροῦ ἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν· τὰ-
 γαθὸν δέ γε ὁ θεός· ἰδιὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθο-
 71 ποιεῖν. ὥστε εἰ ἐστὶ τι φύσει ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο πρὸς
 ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ τι φύσει κακόν,
 τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστὶ κακόν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν
 πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν, ὡς παραστήσομεν·
 72 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν. ἦτοι γὰρ
 πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τινος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ῥητέον ταῖς
 ἀληθείαις ἀγαθόν, ἢ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥη-
 τέον· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τινος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν
 λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ταῦτόν ὑπὸ ἑτέρου δοξάζεται
 [δοξάζεται] ἀδιάφορον, δώσομεν τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ
 73 κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον ὑπάρχειν. οἶον
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπικούρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησιν,
 ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν “μανεῖην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην” κακόν, οἱ
 δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον,
 ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι
 μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν [αὐτὴν] ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ
 κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος
 κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας,
 οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν, Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν
 74 κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ
 τοῖνυν πᾶν τό τινι φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο πάντως
 ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τῷ μὲν Ἐπικούρῳ
 φαίνεται ἀγαθόν τινὶ δὲ τῶν κυνικῶν κακόν τῷ δ’
 ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον, ἔσται ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν

and the property of cold to chill, so also it is the special property of good to do good ; but the Good is God ; therefore it is the property of God to do good. So 71 that if there exists anything good by nature, this is good in relation to all men, and if there exists anything evil by nature, that is evil in relation to all. But there is nothing good or evil which is common to all, as we shall establish ; therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by nature. For we must 72 declare either that everything which is supposed by anyone to be good is in very truth good, or not everything. But we must not declare that everything is so ; for if we should call good everything which is supposed by anyone to be good, then, since the same thing is supposed by one man to be evil, and by another good, and by yet another [is held to be] indifferent, we shall be granting that the same thing is at once both evil and good and indifferent. Epicurus, for example, asserts that pleasure is a good, 73 but he who said “ I would rather be mad than enjoy pleasure ”^a counted it an evil, while the Stoics say it is indifferent and not preferred ; but Cleanthes says that neither is it natural nor does it possess value for life, but, like a cosmetic, has no natural existence, whereas Archedemus^b says that it has a natural existence, like the hairs in the armpit, but possesses no value, and Panaetius that it exists partly by nature and partly contrary to nature.—If, then, everything 74 that seems good to anyone is altogether good, then, since pleasure seems good to Epicurus, and evil to one of the Cynics, and indifferent to the Stoic,

^a Antisthenes, the Cynic : with this § 73 cf. *P.H.* iii. 180-181.

^b A Stoic, like Cleanthes and Panaetius.

ἄμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον. οὐχὶ δὲ γε δύναται τῇ φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ ἐναντία τυγχάνειν, ἀγαθὸν ἄμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τό τι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, τοῦτο ῥητέον εἶναι
 75 ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. εἰ δὲ <οὐ πᾶν>¹ τό τι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντῃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ὀφείλομεν καταληπτικοὶ εἶναι καὶ διακρίνειν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐν τοῖς δοξαζομένοις ἀγαθοῖς διαφορὰν, ὥστε λέγειν τὸ μὲν τῷδε δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ταῖς ἀληθείαις εἶναι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷδε δοξαζόμενον μὲν
 76 ἀγαθόν, οὐκέτι δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν. ἤτοι οὖν δι' ἐναργείας ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἢ διὰ λόγου τινός. ἀλλὰ δι' ἐναργείας ἀμήχανον. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δι' ἐναργείας προσπίπτον κοινῶς τε καὶ συμφώνως λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχόντων τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, ὡς παρὸν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν φαινομένων. οὐχὶ δὲ γε συμφώνως τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, τοῖς δὲ ἡδονή, τοῖς δὲ ἀλυπία, τισὶ δ' ἄλλο τι. οὐκ ἄρα ἐναργῶς προσπίπτει πᾶσι τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθόν.
 77 εἰ δὲ λόγῳ λαμβάνεται, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστος πάντων τῶν κατὰ διαφοροὺς αἰρέσεις κοσμουμένων ἴδιον ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, δι' οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δεδόξακεν, ἄλλον δ' Ἐπίκουρος, δι' οὗ τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης, δι' οὗ τὴν ὑγείαν, ἴδιον πάλιν ἕκαστος εἰσηγήσεται ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ κοινὸν
 78 πάντων. τοῖσιν οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἕκαστου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν πάντων οὐδὲ

¹ <οὐ πᾶν> add. Heintz.

^a Cf. § 36 *supra*.

pleasure will be at once good and evil and indifferent ; but it is impossible for the same thing to be by nature opposite things,—at once good and evil and indifferent therefore we must not declare that everything which seems good or evil to anyone is good or evil.—But 75 if what seems good to anyone is not in all cases altogether good, we ought to be gifted with discernment and able to distinguish the difference between the supposed goods so as to declare that this thing which is supposed by this man to be good is in very truth good, whereas that thing which is supposed by that man to be good is not also good by nature. This difference, 76 then, comes to be perceived either through sensible evidence or through a process of reasoning.—But it cannot be through sensible evidence. For everything which causes an impression through sensible experience is of such a nature as to be perceived with one accord by all in common who have their perceptions undistorted, as one may see in the case of nearly all appearances. But the same thing is not accounted good by all with one accord, but by some virtue and what partakes of virtue, by others pleasure, by others painlessness,^a by others something else. Therefore the really good does not impress all men through sense-evidence.—And if it is perceived by reasoning, 77 then, since each of those persons who are held in honour in the different sects has his own peculiar reason—Zeno one by which he opined that virtue is the good, Epicurus another by which he chose pleasure, Aristotle a different one by which he chose health,—each of them likewise will introduce his own peculiar good, which is not a good by nature nor common to all. So then nothing is good by nature. 78 For if the private good of each is not the good of all

φύσει, παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστι
συμφώνως ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθόν.

79 Καὶ μὴν εἴ ἔστι τι ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον αἰρετὸν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ πᾶς ἀνθρώπος
αἰρεῖται τούτου τυγχάνειν ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κακὸν
φυγεῖν. οὐδὲν δὲ γε αἰρετόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον [ὡς αἰρετόν],¹ καθάπερ δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
80 τι ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον αἰρετόν, ἦτοι αὐτὸ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αἰρετόν
ἔστιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, οἷον ἦτοι τὸ αἰρεῖ-
σθαι τὸν πλοῦτον αἰρετόν ἔστιν ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ πλοῦτος
81 αἰρετός ἐστιν. καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἂν
εἴη αἰρετόν. εἰ γὰρ αἰρετόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν σπουδάζειν
τυχεῖν οὐπερ αἰρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ
ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ <φευκτέον>² τὸ πίνειν
ἢ ἐσθίειν, ἵνα μὴ πίνοντες ἢ φαγόντες ἐκπέσωμεν
τοῦ ἔτι θέλειν τὸ πίνειν ἢ ἐσθίειν, οὕτως εἰ τὸ
αἰρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ἢ ὑγίαν αἰρετόν ἔστιν, οὐκ
ἐχρήν ἡμᾶς διώκειν τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ τὴν ὑγίαν, ἵνα
μὴ τυχόντες αὐτῶν ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι.
82 διώκομεν δὲ γε τὴν τευξίν αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα αἰρετόν
ἔστι τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, φευκτὸν δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὅν
τρόπον ὁ ἐρών σπεύδει τυχεῖν τῆς ἐρωμένης, ἵνα
φύγῃ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἐρᾶν ὄχλησιν, καὶ ὡς ὁ διψῶν
ἐπείγεται πιεῖν, ἵνα φύγῃ τὴν ἐν τῷ διψῆν βάσανον,
ὧδε καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ αἰρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ὀχλούμενος
[κατὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι]³ ἐπείγεται τυχεῖν πλούτου, ἵνα
83 ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι. εἰ δ' ἕτερόν τι

nor by nature, and besides the private good of each
there exists no good upon which all are agreed, no
good exists.

Moreover, if good exists, it ought to be desirable 79
on its own account, since every man desires to obtain
it even as he desires to escape evil.^a But, as we shall
show, nothing is desirable on its own account; there-
fore there does not exist any good. For if there is 80
anything desirable on its own account, either the
desire itself is desirable or something other than
this,—for example, either the desire for wealth is
desirable or wealth itself is desirable. But the desire 81
itself will not be desirable. For if the desire is desir-
able on its own account, we ought not to be eager to
obtain that which we desire lest we should cease from
desiring any longer. For just as <we ought to avoid> ^b
drinking or eating lest by having eaten or drunk we
should cease to wish any longer to drink or eat, so, if
the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought
not to pursue after wealth or health, lest by acquiring
them we cease to desire them any longer. But we 82
do desire the acquisition of them; therefore the
desire is not desirable but rather to be avoided. And
just as the lover is eager to obtain his beloved that
he may escape from the distress which love entails,
and as the thirsty man hurries to drink that he may
escape the torment of thirst, so also he who is dis-
tressed through his desire for wealth hurries to obtain
wealth that he may be relieved from further desire.—

^a With §§ 79-84 cf. *P.H.* iii. 183-184.

^b Probably more words have been lost from the Greek, as
we should rather expect "we ought to have avoided drinking
or eating if the desire for them is desirable," or the like.

¹ [ὡς αἰρετόν] secl. Heintz.

² <φευκτέον> addo: <ἐμβραδύνομεν τῷ> cj. Bekk.

³ [κατὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι] secl. Heintz.

ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, ἥτοι τῶν
 κεχωρισμένων ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ἢ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς. καὶ
 εἰ μὲν κεχώρισται ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκτὸς ἐστίν, ἥτοι
 συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει·
 οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου ἢ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου ἢ
 τέκνου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἐκτὸς εἶναι λεγομένων
 ἀγαθῶν ἢ συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀστέιον
 κίνημα καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν
 πάθος, ἢ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τοιοῦτον οὐδέ ἐσμεν ἐν
 84 διαφόρῳ κινήματι, ὅτε αἰρετὸν ἡγοῦμεθα τὸν φίλον
 ἢ τὸ τέκνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπαξιαπλῶς γίνεται
 τι τοιοῦτον περὶ ἡμᾶς, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται τὸ ἐκτὸς
 αἰρετὸν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἀκινήτως διακειμέθα,
 85 τοῦτου οἷον τε αἰρεσιν ποιεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς; καὶ γὰρ
 ἄλλως, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν χαρτὸν νενόηται ἐκ τοῦ
 χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ἐκ τοῦ
 λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγασθαι, ἀκολου-
 θήσει, ἐξ οὗ μήτε χαρὰ τις ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται μήτε
 ἀγαστὴ διάθεσις μήτε ἀσμενιστὸν τι κίνημα, ἐκ
 86 τοῦτου μηδὲ αἰρεσὶν τινα ἐμφύεσθαι. εἰ δὲ γίνε-
 ται τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς, οἷον τοῦ φίλου ἢ
 τοῦ τέκνου, προσηγὸς κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν
 πάθος, ἔσται οὐ δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸς ὁ φίλος ἢ τὸ
 τέκνον, διὰ δὲ τὸ προσηγὸς τοῦτο κατάστημα καὶ
 ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος. ἀλλ' ἦν γε τὸ τοιοῦτο κατά-
 στημα οὐκ ἐκτὸς ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν
 87 ἐκτὸς δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐστίν ἢ ἀγαθόν. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ
 ἀγαθόν. ἥτοι γὰρ σωματικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο μόνον
 ἢ ψυχικόν. ἀλλὰ σωματικὸν μὲν μόνον οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη· εἰ γὰρ σωματικὸν μόνον ὑποκέοιτο, οὐκέτι

But if the desirable is something other than the desire 83
 itself, it is either a thing separate from ourselves or a
 thing belonging to ourselves. And if it is separate
 from us and external, either some effect is produced
 in us by means of it, or no effect; as, for instance, by
 the friend or the good man or the child, or any other
 of the so-called external goods, either there is pro-
 duced in us a pleasing motion and a welcome state
 and a delightful affection, or no such result occurs
 and we do not experience any different motion when
 we regard the friend or the child as desirable. And 84
 if absolutely no such effect is produced in us, no
 external thing at all will be desirable in our eyes.
 For how can we possibly have a desire for a thing in
 regard to which we feel no emotion? And besides, 85
 if the enjoyable is so conceived because we get joy
 from it, and the painful because we get pain, and
 the good because we get delight,^a it will follow that
 no desire is implanted by that which produces in us
 no joy nor delightful feeling nor agreeable emotion.
 But if there is produced in us by an external object, 86
 such as the friend or the child, a welcome state and an
 agreeable affection, the friend or the child will not be
 desirable for his own sake but for the sake of this
 welcome state and agreeable affection. But such a
 state is not an external thing but is personal to our-
 selves. Therefore none of the external things is
 desirable for its own sake or good.—Nor yet is the 87
 desirable and good one of the things personal to our-
 selves.^b For it is either solely corporeal or psychical.
 But it will not be solely corporeal; for if it really were
 solely corporeal, and no longer a psychical affection,

^a For the derivation of ἀγαθόν from ἀγασθαι cf. § 35 supra.

^b With §§ 87-89 cf. P. II. iii. 185-186.

δὲ καὶ ψυχικὸν πάθος, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνώσιν
 ἡμῶν (ψυχῆς γὰρ ἔστι πᾶσα γνώσις) καὶ ἴσον ἔσται
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς
 88 ἡμᾶς συμπάθειαν. εἰ δὲ διατείνουσιν ἔχει τὴν
 εὐαρέστησιν εἰς ψυχὴν, ἔσται κατ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὸν
 καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὼς ψιλῶς σωματικόν ἔστι
 κίνημα. πᾶν γὰρ αἰρετὸν κατὰ αἴσθησιν ἢ νόησιν
 κρίνεται, οὐ κατ' ἄλογον σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἦγε τὸ
 αἰρετὸν λαμβάνουσα αἴσθησις ἢ διάνοια ψυχῆς
 ἔστι [κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον]¹· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν περὶ
 σῶμα συμβαινόντων δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἔστι καὶ
 89 ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν, ὃ πάλιν εἰς
 τὴν ἀρχῆθην κυλλίεται ἀπορίαν. τῆς γὰρ ἐκάστου
 διανοίας ἀσυμφώνους ἔχουσης τὰς κρίσεις πρὸς τὴν
 τοῦ πέλας, ἀνάγκη ἑκάστον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθὸν ἡγεῖσθαι. οὐκ ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ φαινόμενον
 ἀγαθὸν φύσει ἀγαθόν. οὐδὲ ταύτη τοῖνυν τί ἔστιν
 ἀγαθόν.
 90 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κακοῦ. δυνάμει γὰρ
 συναποδέδοται² τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζητήσῃ,
 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι [ἐπεὶ]³ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀναιρουμένου
 συναναίρεται καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατὰ
 τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον σχέσιν νενόηται· εἴτα
 ἐπεὶ καὶ προηγουμένως ἔνεστι τὸ τοιοῦτον <ἡμῖν
 παριστᾶν, πειρασόμεθα>⁴ πάλιν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ὑπο-
 δεύματος καταστήσασθαι τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ τῆς
 ἀφροσύνης, ἣν μόνην φασὶν εἶναι κακὸν οἱ ἀπὸ
 91 τῆς στοᾶς. εἰ γὰρ φύσει κακὸν ἔστιν ἡ ἀφρο-
 σύνη, δεήσει, ὃν τρόπον τὸ θερμὸν γνωρίζεται ὅτι

¹ [κατὰ . . . λόγον] secl. Heintz.

² συναποδέδοται Mutsch. : ἀποδέδοται mss., Bekk.

it would elude our perception (for all perception is a property of the soul) and it would be on a par with the things which exist externally and have no fellow-feeling with us. But if the pleasure it contains 88 extends to the soul, it will be desirable and good on account of this but not on account of its being a merely corporeal motion. For every desirable thing is judged to be so by means of a sensation or perception and not by means of an irrational body. But the sense or intelligence which apprehends the desirable is of the soul; therefore none of the things which happen to the body is desirable for its own sake and good, but, if any, those which happen to the soul; 89 and this involves us once again in the original difficulty.^a For since the intelligence of each man disagrees with that of his neighbour in respect of its judgements, each must necessarily regard as good that which appears so to himself. But what appears good to each man is not good by nature. So in this way, too, nothing is good.

And the same argument applies also to evil. For 90 it virtually results from our investigation of the good that, in the first place, when one of these is abolished the other also is abolished along with it (for each of them is conceived in its relation to the other); and next, since it is possible <for us to establish> this directly, <we shall attempt> once more to base our argument upon a single example, namely folly, which alone, say the Stoics, is evil. For if folly is evil by nature, then, 91 just as the hot is known to be hot by nature from

^a See § 77 *supra*.

³ [ἐπεὶ] secl. Mutsch.

⁴ <ἡμῖν . . . πειρασόμεθα> addo (sec. Mutsch.).

θερμόν ἐστι φύσει ἐκ τοῦ τοὺς προσπελάσαντας αὐτῷ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ ψύχεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην φύσει κακὸν ὑπάρχουσαν γνωρίζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦσθαι. ἤτοι οὖν οἱ λεγόμενοι ἄφρονες κακοῦνται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φρόνιμοι οὐ κακοῦνται· ἐκτὸς γάρ εἰσι τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος αὐτοῖς κακοῦ ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμένου οὐκ ἂν κακωθεῖεν. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἄφρονας κακοῖ ἢ ἀφροσύνη, ἤτοι πρόδηλος αὐτοῖς οὐσα κακοῖ αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀδηλος. καὶ ἀδηλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἀδηλὸς ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδὲ φευκτὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν μὴ φαινομένην λύπην καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον ἀλγηδόνα οὔτε φεύγει τις οὔτε ταρασσεται, ὥδε καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόπτωτον ἀφροσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀδηλουμένην οὐδεὶς ὡς κακὸν περιστήσεται. εἰ δὲ πρόδηλως αὐτοῖς γινώσκεται καὶ ἔστι φύσει κακόν, ὧφειλον οἱ ἄφρονες φεύγειν αὐτὴν ὡς φύσει κακόν. οὐχὶ δὲ γε οἱ ἄφρονες τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀφραίνων ὡς πρόδηλον κακὸν φεύγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν κρίσιν ἀποδέχεται τὴν δὲ τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον δοξάζοντος κακίζει. ὥστ' οὐδὲ πρόδηλός ἐστι τοῖς ἀφροσιν ὡς φύσει κακὸν ἢ ἀφροσύνη. ὅθεν εἶπερ οὔτε οἱ φρόνιμοι κακοῦνται τι πρὸς τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔτε τοῖς ἄφροσι φευκτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφροσύνη, ῥητέον μὴ εἶναι φύσει κακὸν τὴν ἀφροσύνην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν.

96 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως, πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπορίας ὑπαντώντες, λέγειν ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῶον φεύγει

the fact that those who approach it are made hot,^a and the cold from their being made cold, so also it will be necessary for folly to be known as being evil by nature from the fact that people are made evil. Either, then, it is those who are called fools that are made evil by folly, or the wise. But the wise are not made evil; for they are outside of folly, and they will not be made evil by an evil which is not present with them but separated. And if folly makes evil the fools, it makes them evil either when evident to them or when non-evident. But certainly not when non-evident; for if it is non-evident to them it is neither evil for them nor to be avoided, but just as a man neither avoids nor is perturbed by a non-apparent pain and a non-perceptible pang, so also no one will account as evil the folly which is unsuspected and non-evident. But if it is quite plainly perceived by them and is evil by nature, the fools ought to have avoided it as evil by nature. But the fools do not avoid as an evident evil that which is called by outsiders "foolishness," but each one accepts his own judgement and reckons that of the man who holds an opposite opinion to be evil. So that it is not evident to the fools that folly is evil by nature. Hence, if neither are the wise made evil at all by folly nor is folly a thing avoided by the fools, we must declare that folly is not a thing evil by nature. And if it is not, neither is any other of the so-called evils.

But some of those who belong to the sect of Epicurus, in answer to these objections, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally

^a Cf. § 69 *supra*.

μὲν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν· γεννηθὲν
 γοῦν καὶ μηδέπω τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν δουλεύον ἅμα
 τῷ ῥαπισθῆναι ἀσυνήθει ἀέρος ψύξει ἔκλασέ τε
 καὶ ἐκώκυσεν. εἰ δὲ φυσικῶς ὄρμῃ μὲν πρὸς
 ἡδονὴν ἐκκλίνει δὲ τὸν πόνον, φύσει φευκτόν τε
 97 ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁ πόνος καὶ αἰρετόν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ
 συνείδον δὲ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὅτι
 καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις ζώοις μεταδιδόασιν τὰγαθοῦ,
 πολλή γὰρ μετουσία κἀκεινοῖς ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς, εἰθ'
 ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ καθάπαξ φευκτόν ἐστιν ὁ πόνος· καὶ
 γὰρ πόνῳ πραῦνεται πόνος, καὶ ὑγεία, ἔτι δὲ
 ῥώσις καὶ θρέψις, γίνεται σωματίων διὰ πόνων,
 τέχνας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμας τὰς ἀκριβεστάτας
 ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἄνδρες οὐ χωρὶς πόνου, ὥστ' οὐ
 98 πάντως φύσει φευκτόν ὁ πόνος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ
 δοκοῦν ἡδὺ φύσει πάντως αἰρετόν· πολλάκις γοῦν
 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐμπέλασιν ἡστικῶς ἡμᾶς
 διατιθέντα, ταῦτα ἐκ δευτέρου, καίπερ ὄντα τὰ
 αὐτά, ἀηδῆ νομίζεται ὡς ἂν τοῦ ἡδέος οὐ φύσει
 ὄντος τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-
 στάσεις ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὅτε δ' ἐκείνως κινουῦντος
 ἡμᾶς.
 99 Naί, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν δοξάζον-
 τες δείκνυσθαι νομίζουσιν ὅτι φύσει τοῦτο αἰρετόν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων. ὀρώμεν γάρ,
 φασίν, ὡς τινα γενναῖα ζῶα, καθάπερ ταῦροι καὶ
 ἀλεκτρυόνες, καίπερ¹ μηδεμίᾳς αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένης
 τέρψεως καὶ ἡδονῆς διαγωνίζεται μέχρι θανάτου.
 100 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ οἱ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἢ γονέων
 ἢ τέκνων εἰς ἀναίρεσιν ἑαυτοῦς ἐπιδιδόντες οὐκ
 ἂν ποτε τοῦτ' ἐποίουν, μηδεμίᾳς αὐτοῖς ἐπι-
¹ καίπερ Apelt: ἀπερ mss., Bekk.

and without teaching; thus when it is born, and is
 not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as
 soon as it is smitten by the air's unwonted chill. But
 if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a
 disinclination for toil, toil is a thing naturally avoided
 by it and pleasure a thing desirable. But they who 97
 argue thus have failed to notice, in the first place,
 that they are giving a share in the good even to the
 basest animals (for they too have a large share in
 pleasure); and, next, that toil is not a thing to be
 absolutely avoided; for, in fact, pain is alleviated
 by toil, and health of body, as well as strength and
 growth, comes by means of toils, and men do not
 acquire the most exact arts and sciences without
 toil, so that toil is not a thing naturally to be avoided
 altogether. Moreover, what seems to be pleasant 98
 is not in all cases naturally desirable; thus it often
 happens that things which on their first occurrence
 affect us pleasantly, on the second occasion, although
 they are the same, are deemed unpleasant, just as
 though the pleasant were not so by nature, but affected
 us now this way and now that according to the differ-
 ing circumstances.

Yes, but even those who hold that only the fair is 99
 good think that it is proved by the irrational animals
 that this is desirable by nature.^a For we see, they
 say, how certain noble animals, such as bulls and
 cocks, contend unto the death even when they have
 no feeling of delight and pleasure. And those men 100
 who have given themselves over to destruction for the
 sake of country or parents or children would never
 have done so, when they had no hope of pleasure after

^a With §§ 99-100 cf. *P.H.* iii. 193.

ζομένης μετὰ θάνατον ἡδονῆς, εἰ μὴ φυσικῶς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τούτους τε καὶ πᾶν τὸ γενναῖον αἰεὶ ζῶν ἐπεσπάτο πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ αἵρεσιν.

101 λέληθε δὲ καὶ τούτους ὅτι τελέως ἐστὶν εὐήθες τὸ νομίζειν τὰ προειρημένα τῶν ζῶων ἐννοία τὰγαθοῦ μέχρι τῆς ὑστάτης ἀναπνοῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι. αὐτῶν γὰρ πάρεστιν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ὅτι ἡ φρονιμὴ διάθεσις μόνη βλέπει τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη τυφλῶται περὶ τὴν τούτου διάγνωσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἀλεκτρυὼν καὶ ὁ ταῦρος μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονιμῆς διαθέσεως οὐκ ἂν βλέποι

102 τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἔστι τι περὶ οὗ διαγωνίζεται ταῦτα τὰ ζῶα μέχρι θανάτου, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγείσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ τὸ νικᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑποτάσσεσθαι κάλλιον ἐστὶν, ὅπου γε ἐκότερον ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορον. οὐ τοίνυν φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορον τὸ

103 νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγείσθαι. ἄλλως τε¹ εἰ φαίεν καὶ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα ἢ ταῦρον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀλκίμων ζῶων τοῦ καλοῦ ἐφίεσθαι, πόθεν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχάζεται; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκεῖνα δείξει τούτου προνοούμενα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ὢν

104 δέδεικται, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ ὅτι τινὰ τῶν ζῶων ἀλκιμὰ ἐστὶ καὶ καταφρονητικὰ μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος κατεξ-
 105 ἀναστατικὰ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος προνοεῖσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ, ἐπεὶ τὰ πολλὰ λίχνα ἐστὶ καὶ γαστροὶς ἤττονα, τοῦμπαλιν ἐροῦμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἡδέος μᾶλλον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι.

106 εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν εἶναι μὲν τινὰ ζῶα φιλήδονα, τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον μὴ πάντως τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀναστρέψαντες καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν, οὐκ εἴ τινα τῶν

¹ ἄλλως τε Apelt: ὥστε mss., Bekk.

death, unless the fair and good had naturally drawn them, and every noble animal, to desire it. But these 101 people, too, fail to notice that it is perfectly silly to suppose that the animals just mentioned contend to their last breath owing to a conception of the good. For one may hear them declaring themselves that it is only the wise state of mind which beholds the fair and good, while folly blinds men for discerning it; and hence the cock and the bull, as they have no share in the wise state of mind, will not behold the fair and good. And besides, if there is anything 102 about which these animals contend unto the death, it is nothing else than victory and leadership. But sometimes it is a fairer thing to be vanquished and subdued, at least where either result is indifferent.^a Therefore victory and leadership is not good by nature but indifferent. And besides, if they should assert 103 that the cock or the bull or any other of the valiant animals strives after the fair, whence comes it that man also aims at the same thing? For in proving that those animals have a preconception of this, it is not proved that man is of a like kind, since, to be sure, 104 if man too is said to have a preconception of the fair because some animals are valiant and contemptuous of pleasure and capable of resisting pains, then, since most of them are greedy and the slaves of their bellies, we shall declare also, conversely, that man is still more eager for pleasure. And if they should argue that, 105 though some animals are pleasure-loving, man is not wholly so, we too shall turn round and say that it does

^a i. e. when neither victory nor defeat is (strictly speaking) either "good" or "evil" the latter may be "fairer" (i. e. more "good") than the former.

ζώων κατὰ φυσικὸν λόγον μεταδιώκει τὸ καλόν,
 εὐθέως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχαζέται
 106 τέλους. ἄλλος δέ τις φήσκει περιμάχτηον εἶναι
 τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῖς ζώοις [δι' αὐτό,
 ἀνθρώπων δ']¹ οὐ δι' αὐτό, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔπακολου-
 θούσαν αὐτῷ κατὰ ψυχὴν τέρψιν καὶ γῆθος, προσ-
 ηγές τι τυγχάνον κατὰστασμα. καὶ μᾶλλον γε
 τοῦτο ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ
 τιμὴ καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ δωρεαὶ καὶ δόξαι ἰκανά ἐστιν
 ἡδεῖν καὶ διαχεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 κατεξαναστατικὴν αὐτῆν τῶν ὀχληρῶν παρέχειν.
 107 ὅθεν καὶ οἱ μέχρι τελευτῆς ἀριστεύοντες καὶ ὑπὲρ
 πατρίδος εἰς ἀναίρεσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιιδόντες διὰ
 ταύτην ἴσως τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγωνίζονται
 καὶ θνήσκουσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τελευτῶσι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν
 μεθίστανται, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ὅτε ζῶσιν ἡδονταὶ καὶ
 108 γήθονται πρὸς τοὺς ἔπαινους. εἰκὸς δ' ἔστιν
 ἐνίοις αὐτῶν καὶ προσδοξάζοντας ὅτι μετὰ
 τελευτῆν ὅμοιος αὐτοὺς ἔπαινος περιμένει, προὔπ-
 τον αἰρεῖσθαι θάνατον. οὐκ ἀπίθανον δ' ἄλλους
 τοῦτο πάσχειν βλέποντας ὅτι δυσυπομένητα μᾶλλον
 αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν, θεασαμένοις

υἱάς τ' ὀλλυμένους ἐλκυσθείσας τε θύγατρας
 καὶ θαλάμους κεραϊζομένους καὶ νήπια τέκνα
 βαλλόμενα ποτὶ γαίῃ ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτήτι.

109 διὰ πολλοὺς οὖν τρόπους τὸν μετ' εὐκλείας τινῶν
 αἰροῦνται θάνατον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ περισπούδαστον
 ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ παρά τισι τῶν δογματικῶν θρυλού-
 μενον καλόν. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον ἠπορήσθω.

¹ [δ' . . . δ'] secl. Heintz.

not at once follow that, if some animals for a natural
 reason pursue after the fair, man also aims at the
 same goal.—But some other man will assert that 106
 victory and leadership is a thing highly prized by the
 animals not for its own sake but for the sake of the
 delight and joy of soul which follow upon it, this being
 an agreeable state. And one may suppose that this
 is even more true of men, with whom reputation and
 praise and gifts and honours are sufficient to please
 and thrill the mind and because of this to render
 it capable of resisting hardships. Whence, too, it is 107
 probably owing to this cause that those who prove
 valiant to the end and devote themselves to destruction
 for their country's sake struggle manfully and die.
 For even if they die and depart from life, yet to be
 sure while they are alive they take pleasure and joy
 in the praise. And it is likely also that some of them 108
 believe further that similar praise awaits them after
 death, and thus they desire a conspicuous death. And
 it is not improbable that others endure death through
 seeing that the woes of life will be still harder for
 them to endure, when they behold—

Death overtaking their sons and ravishers seizing their
 daughters,
 Plunderers wrecking their chambers, and even their infant
 children
 Brutally dashed to the ground in the fearful fury of
 fighting.^a

It is for many reasons, then, that some desire death 109
 with glory, and not because they regard "the fair"
 (so harped upon by certain of the Dogmatists) as a
 thing to be greatly sought after. But let this serve
 to conclude our discussion of these problems.

^a Homer, *Il.* xxii. 62 ff.

Δ'.—ΕΙ ΤΗΠΟΤΕΘΕΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ
ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΣ ΒΙΩΤΩΝ

- 110 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ κακὸν ἀντάρκως ἐσκεψάμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ εἰ συγχωρηθέντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν ἐστιν εὐρώως ἅμα καὶ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν. οἱ μὲν οὖν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδ' ἄλλως φασὶν ἢ οὕτως ἔχειν· ὁ γὰρ τυχὼν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκκλίνων τὸ κακόν, οὗτός ἐστιν εὐδαιμόν· παρὸ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τιὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν φρόνησιν, διακριτικὴν μὲν οὖσαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν 111 καὶ κακῶν, περιποιητικὴν δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως μηδὲν εἰκῆ τιθέντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες, ἅπανθ' ὑπὸ τὴν σκέψιν εἰσάγοντες, διδάσκουσιν ὡς τοῖς μὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενοις ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ κακοδαιμόνως βιοῦν, τοῖς δ' ἀοριστοῦσι καὶ ἐπέχουσι

ρήϊστη βιοτῆ πέλει ἀνθρώποισι.

- 112 καὶ τοῦτο μάθοιμεν ἂν μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλαβόντες.
Πᾶσα τοίνυν κακοδαιμονία γίνεται διὰ τινα ταραχὴν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ταραχὴ παρέπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἤτοι διὰ τὸ συντόνως τιὰ διώκειν 113 ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ συντόνως τιὰ φεύγειν. διώκουσι δὲ γε συντόνως πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸ δοξαζόμενον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ὑποσταθὲν κακόν. πᾶσα ἄρα κακοδαιμονία γίνεται παρὰ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν διώκειν ὡς ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ φεύγειν ὡς κακά. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ δογματικὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι

* Alluding to the Stoic definition of happiness as the "equable flow of life"; cf. § 31 *supra*.

CHAPTER IV.—ASSUMING THAT THINGS GOOD AND EVIL EXIST BY NATURE, IS IT POSSIBLE TO LIVE HAPPILY?

We have, then, sufficiently considered the question 110 of the non-existence of any thing good or evil by nature; and now let us inquire whether, if (the existence of) these be conceded, it is possible to live at once equably ^a and happily. Now the dogmatic philosophers assert that this, and nothing else, is actually the case; for according to them the man who acquires the good and avoids the evil is happy. Wherefore also they allege that wisdom is a science of life, it being capable of distinguishing things good and evil ^b and of securing happiness. But the Sceptics, 111 neither affirming nor denying anything rashly but subjecting all things to criticism, maintain that those who assume the existence of good and evil by nature have in consequence an unhappy life, whereas for those who refuse to define and suspend judgement—

Freest from care is the life they lead.*

And this we may learn if we first go back a little. 112

Now every unhappy state occurs because of some perturbation. But every perturbation in men is a consequence due either to an eager pursuit of certain things or to an eager avoidance of certain things. And all men eagerly pursue what is believed by them 113 to be good and avoid what is supposed to be evil. Therefore every case of unhappiness occurs owing to the pursuit of the good things as good, and the avoidance of the evil things as evil. Since, then, the Dog-

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 240.

* Homer, *Odys.* iv. 565.

τὸδε ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸδε ἐστὶ φύσει κακόν,
 αἰεὶ τὸ μὲν διώκων τὸ δὲ φεύγων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 114 ταραττόμενος, οὐδέποτε εὐδαιμονήσει. ἦτοι γὰρ
 πᾶν ὃ διώκει τις, τοῦτ' εὐθὺς καὶ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ φεύγει τις ὡς φευκτόν, τοῦτο τῷ
 ὄντι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ἢ τί τῶν διωκομένων ἐστὶν
 αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ πᾶν, καὶ τί τῶν φευγομένων
 φευκτόν· ἢ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχει ἐστὶ ταῦτα,
 καὶ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε τὸδ' ἐστὶν αἰρετόν ἢ φευκτόν,
 ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε
 αἰρετόν ἐστὶν οὔτε φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ νυνὶ μὲν αἰρετόν
 115 νυνὶ δὲ φευκτόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν πᾶν τὸ ὅπως οὖν
 ὑπὸ τινος διωκόμενον ὑπόβοιτό τις φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ τὸ φευγόμενον φύσει φευκτόν, ἀβίωτον ἔξει
 τὸν βίον, ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ αὐτὸ διώκειν ἅμα καὶ
 φεύγειν, καὶ διώκειν μὲν ἢ πρὸς τιῶν αἰρετόν
 ὑπέληπται, φεύγειν δὲ παρόσον ἐτέροις φευκτόν
 116 δεδόξασται. εἰ δὲ πᾶν μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ἢ
 φευγόμενον μὴ λέγοι αἰρετόν καὶ φευκτόν, τί δὲ
 αὐτῶν αἰρετόν καὶ τί φευκτόν, βιώσεται μὲν, οὐ
 χωρὶς δὲ ταραχῆς βιώσεται· διὰ παντός γὰρ τὸ
 δοξασθὲν αὐτῷ φύσει τυγχάνειν ἀγαθὸν διώκων
 καὶ τὸ ὑποληφθὲν κακὸν περισταμένος οὐδέποτε
 ἀπαλλαγῆσεται ταραχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μήπω δραξά-
 μενος τ' ἀγαθοῦ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν
 σφοδρῶς ταραχθήσεται, καὶ τυχῶν διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-

matist firmly believes that this thing is good by nature
 and that thing is evil by nature, as he is always
 pursuing the one and avoiding the other and being,
 consequently, perturbed, he will never be happy.
 For either everything which anyone pursues is at 114
 once and by nature good and everything which any-
 one avoids as a thing to be avoided is such in reality ;
 or else some one of the things pursued is desirable,
 but not every one, and some one of the things avoided
 is to be avoided ; or else these things belong to the
 relative class, and in relation to this man this thing is
 desirable or to be avoided, whereas in relation to the
 real nature of the things it is neither desirable nor
 to be avoided, but at one time desirable, at another
 to be avoided.—If, then, a man should assume that 115
 everything which is in any way pursued by anyone is
 good by nature and that everything which is avoided
 is by nature to be avoided, he will have a life that is
 unlivable, through being compelled both to pursue
 and to avoid at the same time the same thing,—to
 pursue it, inasmuch as it is conceived by some to be
 desirable, but to avoid it, in so far as it is deemed by
 others a thing to be avoided.—But if he were to say 116
 not that everything which is pursued or avoided is
 desirable and to be avoided, but that some one of
 them is desirable and some one to be avoided, he
 will have a life indeed, but not a life free from per-
 turbation ; for through continually pursuing what
 he believes to be good by nature and shunning what
 he supposes to be evil he will never be clear of
 perturbation, but both when he has failed as yet
 to grasp the good he will be extremely perturbed
 because of his desire to gain it, and when he has
 gained it he will never be at rest owing to the excess

βολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς ἢ διὰ τὴν φρουρὰν τοῦ κτηθέντος
 117 οὐδέποτε ἠρεμήσει. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ
 κακοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐκτὸς ὧν αὐτοῦ ἀμέριμνός ἐστιν,
 ἱκανῶς ποιηλατούσης αὐτὸν τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ
 φεύγειν καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ προφυλάττεσθαι ταραχῆς,
 οὔτε ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστῶς παύσαν ἔχει τῶν βασάνων,
 σκεπτόμενος " πῶς ἂν φύγοι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον."

118 Εἰ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον τις λέγοι τι φύσει αἰρετὸν ἢ
 φευκτὸν μηδὲ μᾶλλον φευκτὸν ἢ αἰρετὸν, ἐκάστου
 τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντος καὶ κατὰ
 διαφέροντας καιροὺς καὶ περιστάσεις νυνὶ μὲν
 αἰρετοῦ καθεστῶτος νυνὶ δὲ φευκτοῦ, βιώσεται μὲν
 εὐδαιμόνως καὶ ἀταράχως, μήτε ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ὡς
 ἀγαθῷ ἐπαιρόμενος μήτε ἐπὶ κακῷ ταπεινούμενος,
 τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβαῖνον γεννικῶς δεχόμενος,
 τοῦ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν ὀχληροῦ, καθ' ἣν κακὸν τι παρ-
 εῖναι ἢ ἀγαθὸν δοξάζεται, ἐλευθερούμενος. τοῦτο
 μὴν αὐτῷ παρέσται ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 ἢ κακὸν δοξάζειν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν εὐδαιμόνως
 βιοῦν φύσει ἀγαθὰ τινα ἢ κακὰ ὑποστησάμενον.

119 Καὶ μὴν τό τινος κακοῦ ποιητικόν, τοῦτο πάντως
 ἐστὶ φευκτὸν ὡς καὶ (τὸ)¹ κακόν. οἷον εἰ ἢ
 ἀλγηδὼν ἐστὶ κακόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς
 ἀλγηδόνος ἐπισυστήσεται τῇ ἀλγηδόνι φευκτὸν ὄν·
 καὶ εἰ ὁ θάνατος τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ἔσται καὶ τὸ
 θανατοῦν τῶν κακῶν ἅμα καὶ φευκτῶν. τοῖνυν καὶ
 κωῶς, εἰ τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ κακοῦ φευκτὸν ἔσται καὶ κακόν.

120 τὰ δὲ λεγόμενά τισι φύσει ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακῶν
 ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ὡς διδάξομεν. δυνάμει ἄρα κακὰ

¹ <τὸ> add. cj. Bekk.

of his joy or on account of keeping watch over his
 acquisition. And the same argument applies also to 117
 evil; for neither he who is without it is care-free, as
 he is no little tormented by the perturbation caused
 both by avoiding it and by taking precautions; nor
 does he who is in an evil state have any cessation
 of his torments, through taking thought—

How to escape from the steep of destruction.*

But if a man should declare that nothing is by 118
 nature an object of desire any more than of avoid-
 ance, nor of avoidance more than of desire, each thing
 which occurs being relative, and, owing to differences
 of times and circumstances, being at one time desir-
 able, at another to be avoided, he will live happily
 and unperturbed, being neither exalted at good, as
 good, nor depressed at evil, manfully accepting what
 befalls him of necessity, and being liberated from the
 distress due to the belief that something evil or good
 is present. This, in fact, will accrue to him from his
 belief that nothing is good by nature or evil. There-
 fore it is not possible to live happily if one posits any
 things good or evil by nature.

Moreover, that which is productive of any evil is 119
 certainly to be avoided, just as is the evil. For
 instance, if pain is an evil, certainly also what is pro-
 ductive of the pain will take rank with the pain as a
 thing to be avoided; and if death is one of the evils,
 what causes death will also be at once both evil and a
 thing to be avoided. So then in general, if evil is to
 be avoided, what is productive of evil will of necessity
 be a thing to be avoided and an evil. But, as we shall 120
 show, things which are said by some to be good are
 also productive of evils. Therefore the things which

* Homer, *Il.* xiv. 507.

ἔστι τὰ ὑπὸ τινων λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
κακοδαμονίας τυγχάνει αἷτια. διὰ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἔστι τὰ κακά, φιλαργυρία τε
καὶ φιλοδοξία καὶ φιλονεκία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ
121 τᾶλλα ὅποσα τούτοις ἐμφερῆ ἔστιν. ἕκαστος γὰρ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ δοξασθῆν ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν
τε καὶ αἰρετὸν συντόνως διώκων καὶ μετὰ σφοδροῦ
πέισματος ληληθότως εἰς τὴν ἀγχίθυρον κακίαν
ἐμπίπτει. οἶον (ἔσται γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον σαφές
122 τῶν οἰκείων ἡμῖν τεθέντων ὑποδειγμάτων) ὁ μὲν
τὸν πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προειληφώς ὀφείλει
πάντα ἐσπευσμένως ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ
πλούτου, καὶ ἑκάστοτε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὸ κωμικὸν
ἀναμελετᾶν παράγγελμα,

κέρδαι' ἔταίρε καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος,
καὶ τὸ τραγικὸν ἀποδέχεσθαι,

ὦ χρυσέ, δεξίωμα κάλλιστον βροτοῖς.

τὸ δέ γε πάντα ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ πλούτου τυχεῖν οὐκ
ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ φιλαργυρεῖν. ὁ ἄρα τὸν πλοῦτον
μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἰνδαλλόμενος ἐν τῷ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ
123 τοῦτον γίνεταί φιλάργυρος. πάλιν ὁ τὴν δόξαν
αἰρετὴν ὑποτιθέμενος συντόνως ἐφίεται τῆς δόξης,
τὸ δὲ συντόνως ἐφίεσθαι τῆς δόξης ἔστι φιλοδοξεῖν.
τὸ ἄρα τὴν δόξαν αἰρετὸν καὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ὑπο-
τίθεσθαι μεγάλου κακοῦ τινὸς γεννητικὸν ἔστι,
124 τῆς φιλοδοξίας. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ ταῦτον
εὐρήσομεν τοῖς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν τεύξιν αὐτῆς σπεύ-
δουσιν ἀνάγκη <ἔξιν>¹ τινὰ μοχθηρὰν² συνεξακο-
λουθεῖν, τὴν φιληδονίαν. ὥστε εἰ τὸ ποιητικὸν

¹ <ἔξιν> addo: <ταραχήν> cj. Bekk.

² μοχθηρὰν cj. Bekk.: μοχθηρὰ mss.

are said by some to be good are potentially evil, and
on account of this are causes of unhappiness. For,
in fact, it is owing to such goods that all these evils
exist,—love of money and love of fame and love of
strife and love of pleasure and all the other things
which resemble these. For it is by pursuing earnestly 121
and with extreme persistence what he himself believes
to be good and desirable that each man unwittingly
falls into the evil lying next-door.^a Thus for instance
(for our meaning will be clear if we take examples
familiar to us), the man who has already assumed that 122
wealth is a good must make every effort for the obtain-
ing of wealth, and keep always rehearsing to himself
the injunction of the Comedy^b—

Winter and summer get thee gain, good sir ;
and he must accept what the Tragedy says^c—

Thou fairest of all boons to mortals, Gold !

But to make every effort for the gaining of wealth
is nothing else than to be a money-lover. Therefore
he who imagines wealth to be the greatest good, in
his zeal for this, becomes a money-lover. Again, the 123
man who supposes fame to be desirable earnestly
strives for fame, and the earnest striving for fame is
love of fame ; therefore the supposition that fame is
desirable and good by nature serves to generate a
great evil, love of fame. And in the case of pleasure 124
we shall find the same thing ; for to those who are
eager for its acquisition there results necessarily a
certain depraved condition, love of pleasure. So
that, if what is productive of evils is evil, and it has

^a Cf. Genesis iv. 7 " Sin lieth at the door."

^b Frag. Com. adesp. 1255 (Kock).

^c Eurip. Frag. 324 (Nauck).

τῶν κακῶν κακόν ἐστι, δέδεικται δὲ τὰ δοξασθέντα τισὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαθὰ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ποιητικά, ῥητέον τὰ τισι δοξασθέντα ἀγαθὰ τῇ δυνάμει τυγχάνειν κακά.

- 125 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν τοῖς ἐξ ἐναντίας ὡς κατὰ μὲν τὴν δίωξιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτὰ ὄρμην πάρεστί τι τοῖς ὀρμῶσι καὶ διώκουσι κακόν, ὅλον τῷ μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον μεινόντι ἢ φιλαργυρία, τῷ δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἢ φιλοδοξία, τῷ δ' ἄλλο τι ἄλλοία τις ταραχὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τεύξιν αὐτῶν ἀπαλλαγὴ γίνεται τῶν ταραχῶν καὶ ἀνάπαυλα τῆς πρότερον
- 126 ὀχλήσεως· ὁ γὰρ τυχῶν τοῦ πλοῦτου οὐκέτι συντόνως ἐπιζητεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ ὁ λαβόμενος τῆς ἡδονῆς λύσει τὸ σύντονον τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδῆς. καθάπερ οὖν τὰ κρημνοβατοῦντα τῶν ζώων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πιεῖν δι' ἀλγηδόνοιο ἵεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ἅμα τῷ κορεσθῆναι παύεται τῶν πρὶν μόχθων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπιείγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀχλεῖται, τυχῶν δὲ οὐ
- 127 ἐπόθει καὶ τῆς ὀχλήσεως ἀπαλλάττεται. οὐ δὴ δυνατόν ἐναί φημεν ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα. κἂν γὰρ τύχῃσι τῶν νομιζομένων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, συνεχόνται καὶ ἐπιλυποῦνται μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐ μόνοι ταῦτα ἔχουσιν· σὺν τούτῳ γὰρ τὰγαθὰ τίμια καὶ περιμάχητα νομίζουσι, σὺν τῷ μόνοι ταῦτα κεκτηῖσθαι, διὸ καὶ ζῆλος αὐτοῖς ἐμφύεται πρὸς τοὺς πέλας καὶ βασκανία καὶ φθόνος. ὥστε καὶ τὴν δίωξιν τῶν λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀταλαίπωρον

been shown that the things which are believed by some philosophers to be good are productive of all the evils, one must declare that the things believed by some to be good are potentially evil.

Moreover, it is not possible for our opponents to 125 argue that although, through their pursuit of them and their impulse towards them, there accrues some evil to the subjects of the impulse and the pursuit (love of money, for example, to the man who goes after wealth, and love of fame to him who goes after fame, and some other kind of perturbation to him who is after something else), yet as a result of their acquisition there comes about a relief from the perturbations and a cessation of the previous distress ; for he who has acquired the wealth no longer seeks 126 earnestly after wealth, and he who has got the pleasure will relax the intensity of his zeal for it. For just as the animals which haunt the crags are driven for the sake of drinking through pain to pleasure and as soon as they are satisfied cease from their previous distress, so also man is necessarily distressed during his efforts after the good, but when he has gained what he yearned for he is also relieved from his distress.—But we assert that it is not possible to 127 argue thus, nor is this the truth of the matter. For even if men obtain what they regard as goods, they are still more oppressed and vexed that they are not alone in possessing them ; for it is when accompanied with this—with their being alone in possessing them—that they regard the goods as precious and highly to be prized, and hence they are infected with jealousy towards their neighbours and ill-will and envy. So that while the pursuit of the things said to be goods is not devoid of misery, the

εἶναι, καὶ τὴν περίκτισιν πλειόνων κακῶν ὑπάρχειν
 128 ἐπισύστασιν. πάλιν τε καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν
 κακῶν ὁ αὐτός ἐστι λόγος. προειληφώς γάρ τις
 εἶναι τινα φύσει κακά, καθάπερ ἀδοξίαν πενίαν
 πῆρωσιν ἀλγηδὸνα νόσον, κουνῶς ἀφροσύνην, οὐ
 μόνοις ὀχλεῖται τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ παμπληθέσιν
 129 ἄλλοις τοῖς δι' αὐτὰ κακοῖς. παρόντων μὲν γὰρ
 αὐτῶν χειμάζεται οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν δόξης, καθ' ἣν πεπίστευκεν ὅτι
 κακὸν αὐτῷ πάρεστιν, καὶ ὡς ὑπὸ μείζονος κακοῦ
 πορθεῖται τῆς τοιαύτης προλήψεως. μὴ παρόντων
 δὲ ὁμοίως οὐκ ἀναπαύεται, ἀλλ' ἥτοι προφυλατ-
 τόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἢ δεδιώς σύνοικον ἔχει τὴν
 130 μέρμυναν. λόγου δὲ παραστήσαντος ὅτι οὐδὲν
 τούτων φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φύσει κακὸν, λύσις
 ἔσται τῆς παραχῆς καὶ εἰρηναῖος ἡμᾶς ἐκδέξεται
 βίος.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν διὰ τὰ δοξαζόμενά τισιν
 ἀγαθὰ πλήθος ἐπισυμβαίνει κακῶν καὶ διὰ τὰ κακὰ
 ἕτερα γίνεται κακά, ὡς χάριν αὐτῶν ἀνέφικτον
 γίνεσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 131 συμφανές· ἀκολουθῶς δὲ ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδὲ
 βοηθείας ἐνδέχεται τυχεῖν διὰ τῆς δογματικῆς
 πορευομένου φιλοσοφίας. ὑποκειμένου γάρ τινος
 φύσει ἀγαθοῦ ἢ φύσει κακοῦ, ὁ παραμυθούμενος
 τὸν παρασσόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ συντόνως διώκειν
 τὰγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἢ σφοδρῶς φεύγειν τὸ κακὸν
 ὡς κακὸν καταστέλλει τὴν παραχῆν ἥτοι τοῦτο
 λέγων, ὅτι καθήκον ἐστὶ μῆτε τὰγαθὸν διώκειν
 132 μῆτε τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν, ἢ τοῦτο παριστὰς ὅτι τὸδε
 μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐλαχίστην ἔχει
 ἀξίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκτεῖον αὐτὸ διώκειν, τὸδε δὲ

acquisition of them is the heaping up of more
 numerous evils.—And again, the same account holds 128
 good also of the evils themselves. For when a man
 has a preconception that certain things are by nature
 evil (such as ill-repute, poverty, lameness, pain, dis-
 ease, folly in general), he is not distressed by these
 alone but also by hosts of other evils due to them.
 For when they are present he is tempest-tost not only 129
 by them but also by his belief about them, through
 which he is convinced that evil is present with him ;
 and by such a preconception he is devastated as by
 a greater evil. And he is equally devoid of rest when
 they are not present, and, either through taking pre-
 cautions against the future or through fear, he has
 anxiety as his house-mate. But when reasoning has 130
 established that none of these things is good by
 nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from
 perturbation and there will await us a peaceful life.

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that
 a multitude of evils occur as the result of the things
 believed by some to be goods, and as a result of the
 evils other evils come about, so that owing to these
 happiness becomes unattainable. And, in the next 131
 place, we must show that we cannot gain assistance
 either by taking the road of the dogmatic philosophy.
 For if anything good by nature or evil by nature is
 assumed to exist, he who is consoling the man who is
 perturbed owing to his strenuous pursuit of the good
 as good, or his excessive avoidance of the evil as evil,
 checks the perturbation either by declaring that it is
 a duty neither to pursue the good nor to avoid the
 evil, or by showing that the object which the man 132
 pursues possesses very little value and that it is not
 proper to pursue it, whereas this other object has

μείζονα, καὶ ἀρμόζει αὐτὸ μετέρχεσθαι, ὅσον ἐλάτ-
 τονα μὲν ἔχει ἀξίαν ὁ πλοῦτος μείζονα δὲ ἡ ἀρετῆ,
 καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ ταύτην διωκτέον, ἢ ὅτι
 τοῦτο μὲν ὀλιγωφελὲς ὄν πολλὰς ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις,
 τοῦτο δὲ πολυωφελὲς καθεστῶς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς
 133 ὀχλήσεις. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
 οἰκεῖόν ἐστι συντόμως διώκειν οὔτε τὸ κακὸν
 φεύγειν, παρὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσιν ἐστίν,
 αἰεὶ ποτε τὴν ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογὴν τούτων τὰς
 134 τε αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς θρυλούντων. τὸ δὲ φάναι
 τὸδε μὲν μὴ δεῖν διώκειν ὡς ταπεινόν, ἐπὶ τὸδε δ'
 ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς λαμπρότερον, ἀνδρῶν ἦν οὐκ ἀπο-
 λούντων τὴν ταραχὴν ἀλλὰ μεταγωγὴν ταύτης
 ποιουμένων· ὡς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον διώκων τις
 ὀχλείτο, οὔτω καὶ τὸ δεύτερον διώκων τις ὀχλη-
 135 θήσεται, ὥστε νόσον ἀντὶ νόσου ποιεῖν τὸν τοῦ
 φιλοσόφου λόγον, ἐπεὶ περ τὸν ἐπὶ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν
 ἢ ὑγίαν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὀρμῶντα ἀποστρέφων εἰς τὸ
 μὴ ταῦτα διώκειν ἀλλὰ τὸ καλόν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, οὐκ ἐλευθεροῖ τῆς διώξεως ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑτέραν
 136 μετατίθησι διώξιν. ὡς οὖν ὁ ἰατρός ἀναιρῶν
 μὲν πλευρίτιν ποιῶν δὲ περιπνευμονίαν, ἢ ἀνα-
 σκευάζων μὲν φρενίτιν ἀντεισάγων δὲ λήθαργον,
 οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τὸν κίνδυνον ἀλλ' ἐναλλάττει,
 οὔτω καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἑτέραν ταραχὴν ἀνθ' ἑτέρας
 137 ἐισηγούμενος οὐ βοηθεῖ τῷ παραττομένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀντεισαγομένη ταραχὴ
 μέτριός ἐστιν ἢ δὲ ἀναιρουμένη σφοδροτέρα. οἷαν
 γὰρ εἶχε δόξαν ὁ παραττόμενος περὶ τοῦ πρότερον
 450

greater value and to follow after it is a fitting thing
 (wealth, for example, possesses less and virtue more
 value, and one ought not to pursue the former but
 the latter); or (by showing) that this object is of
 little use and entails many annoyances, whereas that
 object is of great use and entails few annoyances.
 But to declare that it is not proper either to pursue 133
 the good or to avoid the evil strenuously is contrary
 to the view of the Dogmatists, who are always harp-
 ing on the selection or rejection of these things and
 on desires and avoidances. And to say that one 134
 ought not to pursue this object as being base, but to
 strive after that object as being more noble, is the
 action of men who are not getting rid of the per-
 turbation but effecting a change in its position; for
 just as the man who pursued the first object was
 distressed, so also he who pursues the second will be
 distressed, so that the philosopher's discourse creates 135
 a new disease in place of the old, since, by turning
 away the man who strives after wealth or fame or
 health, as being a good, towards the pursuit not of
 these things but of "the fair" (shall we say) and of
 virtue, he does not set him free from the pursuit
 but makes him change over to another pursuit.—As, 136
 then, the physician, if he does away with a pleurisy
 but creates inflammation of the lungs, or removes
 brain-fever but in its place introduces lethargy, does
 not get rid of the danger but shifts it over, so also
 the philosopher, who introduces one perturbation
 in place of another, gives no succour to the person
 perturbed. For it is not possible to argue that the 137
 perturbation introduced is a moderate one, whereas
 the one removed was more violent. For the per-
 turbed person has the same sort of belief about the

διωκομένου, τοιαύτην ἔχει καὶ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου·
 ἐδόξαζε δὲ τό γε πρῶτον ὡς ἀγαθόν, καὶ διὰ
 138 τοῦτο ἔσπευδεν ἐπ' αὐτό· τοίνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοξάζων καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐπ' αὐτὸ σπεύ-
 δων τὴν ἴσην ἔξει παραχῆν, τάχα δὲ καὶ σφοδρο-
 τέραν, ὅσω μεταπέπεισται εἰς τὸ μείζονος ἀξίας
 εἶναι τὸ νῦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διωκόμενον. οὐκοῦν εἰ
 ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ὁ φιλόσοφος παρασκευάζει τὸν
 ὀχλούμενον διώκειν, οὐκ ἀπολύσει τῆς ὀχλήσεως.
 139 εἰ δ' ἀπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τουτὶ μὲν ὀλιγωφελές
 ἔστι, πλείονας δ' ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, <τουτὶ δὲ
 πολυωφελές καθεστῶς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις,>¹
 σύγκρισιν ἔσται ποιῶν αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς
 ἑτέραν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγῆν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς
 παραχῆς. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· ὁ γὰρ ὀχλούμενος οὐ
 βούλεται μαθεῖν τί μᾶλλον ὀχλεῖ καὶ τί ἦττον,
 140 ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ὀχλήσεως πεπόθηκεν. μόνως
 οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην, εἰ ὑποδείξαιμεν τῷ
 ταρρατομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγῆν ἢ κατὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δίωξιν ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθόν τι ἔστι
 φύσει οὔτε κακόν,

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται

κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα. τὸ δὲ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον
 ἴδιον τῆς σκέψεως. ταύτης ἄρα ἦν τὸ εὐδαίμονα
 βίον περιποιεῖν.

¹ <τουτὶ . . . ὀχλήσεις> add. cj. Bekk.

second object of pursuit as he had about the previous
 one ; but he believed that the first object was good
 and because of this he went after it eagerly ; so, as 138
 he also believes that the second is good and goes after
 it with equal eagerness, he will be equally perturbed,
 or perhaps even more violently in so far as he has
 been converted to the belief that his present object of
 pursuit is of greater value. If, then, the philosopher
 should cause the distressed person to pursue one
 object in place of another, he will not rid him of his
 distress. And if he simply teaches that this object is 139
 of little use but entails many annoyances, <while that
 object is of great use and entails few annoyances,> he
 will be making a comparison between one desire and
 avoidance and another desire and avoidance, and
 will not be removing the perturbation. But this is
 absurd ; for the person in distress does not wish to
 learn which thing is more distressing and which less,
 but yearns to be rid of his distress. It will only be 140
 possible, then, to avoid this by making it evident to
 the person who is in distress, owing to his avoidance
 of evil or his pursuit of good, that there does not exist
 anything which is either good or evil by nature,—

But by the judgement of men Sentence upon them is
 pass'd,

as Timon says. And to teach this is, in fact, the
 peculiar task of Scepticism ; therefore it belongs to
 it to secure a happy life.

Ε'.—ΕΙ Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ
ΕΠΕΧΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ

141 Εὐδαιμῶν μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἀταράχως διεξάγων καὶ
ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Τίμων, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ γαληνότητι
καθεστώς·

πάντη γὰρ ἐπέειχε γαλήνην

καὶ

τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἐνόησ' ἐν νηνεμίῃσι γαλήνης.

τῶν δὲ λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν
τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν εἰσῆκται τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀνάγκην.

142 ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν [λογικὴν]¹ δόξαν εἰσῆκται ὅσα κατὰ
κρίσιν διώκουσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ φεύγουσιν, ὅσον ἐν
μὲν τοῖς ἐκτὸς αἰρετὰ λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ πλοῦτος
καὶ δόξα καὶ εὐγένεια καὶ φιλία καὶ πᾶν τὸ εὐικός,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ σῶμα κάλλος ἰσχύς εὐεξία, ἐν
δὲ τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀνδρία δικαιοσύνη φρόνησις,
κοινῶς ἀρετή, καὶ φευκτὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.

143 κατ' ἀνάγκην δὲ παρήλθεν ὅποσα κατ' ἄλογον
αἰσθήσεως πάθος συνίσταται περὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅσα
φυσικὴ τις ἀνάγκη παρέχει, “ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἂν τις
144 ἔλοιτο” ἢ φύγοι, ὡς ἀληθῶν καὶ ἡδονῆ. διόπερ
τοιαύτης οὐσης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς, περὶ
μὲν τοῦ μόνον ἀταράχως διεξάγειν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
δόξαν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς τὸν περὶ πάντων ἐπ-
έχοντα ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν καὶ πρότερον, ὅτε περὶ
τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους διελεγόμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
παρόντος, ὅτε ἐδείκνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν

¹ [λογικὴν] secl. Heintz.

^a From Homer, *Il.* iii. 66.

^b Cf. *P.H.* i. 25 ff.

^c Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

CHAPTER V.—IS HE WHO SUSPENDS JUDGEMENT RE-
GARDING THE NATURE OF THINGS GOOD AND EVIL
IN ALL RESPECTS HAPPY?

He, then, is happy who lives to the end without 141
perturbation and, as Timon said, existing in a state
of quietness and calm—

For on all sides calm was prevailing,

and—

Him when thus I descried in a calm with no winds to disquiet.

And of the goods and evils which are said to exist
some are introduced by belief, others by necessity.
Thus by [rational] belief are introduced all those 142
which men pursue or avoid of their own judgement,—
as, for example, amongst things external, wealth and
fame and noble birth and friendship, and everything
of the kind, are called desirable and good; and,
amongst qualities of the body, beauty and strength
and sound condition; and, amongst qualities of the
soul, courage and justice and wisdom and virtue in
general; and the opposites of these are regarded as
things to be avoided. But by necessity are brought 143
about all such things as befall us because of an
irrational affection of sense, and all that some natural
necessity brings about, “but no one would willingly
choose them,”^a or avoid them,—such as pain and
pleasure. Hence, since there exists such a difference 144
as this in these things, the fact that it is only the man
who suspends judgement about all things who lives
to the end an unperturbed life in respect of the goods
and evils due to belief we have already established,
both in our previous discussion of the Sceptic “end,”^b
and also on the present occasion^c when we showed
that it is not possible to be happy if one assumes the

145 φύσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ποιῶν ἀνηνύτοις συμπεριεφέρετο ταραχαῖς, τὰ μὲν φεύγων τὰ δὲ διώκων, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῷ ἐπισπώμενος κακὰ διὰ τὰγαθὰ, ἐν πολλαπλασίῳσι δὲ τριβόμενος κακοῖς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν
 146 κακῶν δόξαν. ὅλον ὁ λέγων, εἰ τύχοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον κακὸν δὲ τὴν πενίαν, μὴ ἔχων μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον διχῶς ταραττεται, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται τὴν περίκτῃσιν αὐτοῦ, κτησάμενος δ' αὐτὸν κατὰ τρεῖς τιμωρεῖται τρόπους, καὶ ὅτι πέραν τοῦ μετρίου γέγηθε, καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται εἰς τὸ παραμένειν αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ ὅτι ἀγωνιᾷ καὶ δέδιεν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 147 ἀποβολήν. ὁ δὲ μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἀγαθοῖς τάττων τὸν πλοῦτον μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς, τὴν δὲ "οὐ μᾶλλον" προφερόμενος φωνήν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τούτου ταραττεται οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ γέγηθεν, μένει δὲ καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀτάραχος. ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς τούτων αἰρέσεσι καὶ
 148 φυγαῖς τελέως ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' αἰσθησιν καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασιν μετριάξει.¹ τὰ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὴν συμβαίνοντα καὶ τὴν φαύλην δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀκούσιον τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ
 149 κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. τῷ γὰρ διὰ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ὀχλουμένῳ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν πείσμα διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ὀχλεῖται, καὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς τούτων παρηγορίας

¹ μετριάξει cj. Bekk. : εἰκάζει mss. (? ἀναχάζει).

existence of anything good and evil by nature. For 145 he who does this is tossed about with endless perturbations, through avoiding these things and pursuing those, and drawing upon himself many evils because of the goods, and being afflicted by many times more evils because of his belief about evils.— Thus the man who declares that wealth (shall we say?) 146 is a good and poverty an evil is perturbed in two ways if he has not wealth,—both because he has not the good and because he is toiling for the acquisition of it,—and when he has acquired it he is punished in three ways,—because he is immoderately overjoyed, and because he toils to ensure that his wealth stays with him, and because he is painfully anxious and dreads the loss of it. But he who ranks wealth neither amongst 147 the natural goods nor amongst the natural evils, but utters the formula "Not more,"^a is neither perturbed at its absence nor overjoyed at its presence, but in either case remains unperturbed. So that in respect of the things held, as a matter of belief, to be good and bad, and in respect of the desires and avoidances thereof, he is perfectly happy, while in respect of the 148 sensible and irrational affections he preserves a due mean. For the things which occur, not because of a distortion of the reason and foolish belief but, owing to an involuntary affection of the sense it is impossible to get rid of by means of the Sceptical argument^b; for in a man who is distressed because 149 of hunger or thirst, it is not feasible to implant, by means of the Sceptical argument, the conviction that he is not in distress, and in the man who is overjoyed

^a For this Sceptic formula (denoting suspense of judgement) see *P.H.* i. 187 ff.

^b *Cf. P.H.* i. 30, iii. 237.

διαχειομένῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πειθῶ ἐμποιεῖν περὶ
 150 τοῦ ὅτι οὐ διαχέεται. τί οὖν, φασίν, ὄφελος
 ὑμῖν, οἱ δογματικοί, πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς
 ἐποχῆς, εἰ ταραττεσθαι πάντως δεῖ καὶ ταραττο-
 μένους κακοδαιμονεῖν; μέγα, φήσομεν, ὄφελος.
 καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταραττεται ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κατὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ἀλγύνοντος παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' εὐφορώτερον
 παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων φέρει τὴν ὄχλησιν,
 151 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσον ἀπειρα τῷ πλήθει
 τάγαθὰ διώκοντα καὶ περισταμέμονα τὰ κακὰ ὡς
 ὑπὸ Ἑρινύων ἐλαύνεσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὰς διώξεις
 καὶ φυγὰς ταραχῶν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ πάσχειν, ἐν
 δὲ μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀποτεμνόμενον κακὸν τούτου
 152 τὴν ἔκκλισιν καὶ φυλακὴν πραγματεύεσθαι. δεύ-
 τερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπερ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐφεκτικοὶ ὡς
 κακόν, οὐκ ἄγαν ἐστὶ ταρακτικόν. ἢ γὰρ μικρὸς
 τις ὁ πόνος ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ὁ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν
 ἐγγνώμενος ἡμῖν λιμὸς ἢ δίψος ἢ ψῦχος ἢ θάλπος
 153 ἢ τι τῶν παραπλησίων, ἢ τοῦναντίον σφοδρότατος
 καὶ ἀκρότατος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνηκέστοις συνεχο-
 μένων βασάνοις, δι' ὧν πολλάκις οἱ ἰατροὶ ἀν-
 ωδύνους πορίζουσι δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸ βραχεῖαν τινα
 λαβεῖν ἀναστροφὴν εἰς βοήθειαν, ἢ μέσος καὶ
 154 παρατείνων, καθάπερ ὁ ἐν τισὶ νόσοις. τούτων
 δὲ ὁ μὲν καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν συναντῶν ἐπορί-
 στούς ἔχων τὰς παρηγορίας, τροφὴν καὶ πόμα καὶ
 σκέπη, πρὸς ἐλάχιστον ταραττεῖ. ὁ δὲ ἀκρότατος
 καὶ εἰς τὰ μάλιστα ταρακτικώτατος, ἀλλά τοι
 γε πρὸς ἀκαρὲς ἀστραπῆς τρόπον δειματώσας ἢ
 155 ἀναιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖται. ὁ δὲ μέσος καὶ παρατείνων
 οὔτε παρ' ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸν βίον οὔτε συνεχῆς τὴν

at getting relief from these sufferings it is not in its
 power to implant the belief that he is not overjoyed.
 —What help, then, towards happiness (ask the Dogma- 150
 tists) do we get from suspension of judgement if one
 has to be perturbed in any case and unhappy because
 perturbed? Great help, we shall reply. For even
 though he who suspends judgement about all things is
 perturbed owing to the presence of what causes pain,
 yet as compared with the Dogmatist he bears the
 distress more lightly, because, firstly, to pursue goods 151
 and to shun evils which are endless in number and thus
 to be harassed by the perturbations due to these pur-
 suits and avoidances as by Furies is much worse than
 not to suffer thus but merely to be engaged in avoiding
 and guarding against only one isolated form of evil.
 And, secondly, even the thing which the Ephectics^a 152
 avoid as evil, is not excessively perturbing. For the
 suffering is either small, such as that which befalls us
 every day,—hunger or thirst or cold or heat or some-
 thing similar;—or, on the contrary, it is very violent 153
 and intense, as in the case of those afflicted with
 incurable torments, during which the doctors often
 provide powerful anodynes to assist the patient in
 obtaining some relief; or else it is moderate and
 protracted, as in some diseases. And of these, that 154
 which faces us every day perturbs us least as the
 remedies for it (food and drink and shelter) are easy
 to provide; and that which is most intense and in the
 highest degree perturbing terrifies us, after all, but
 for a moment, like a lightning-flash, and then either
 destroys us or is destroyed. And the moderate and 155
 protracted kind neither remains all through life nor

^a *i.e.* the Sceptics (as “suspenders” of judgement), *cf.*
P.H. i. 7, 196.

φύσιν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς διαναπαύσεις ἔχων καὶ βραστά-
νας· διηλεκτῆς γὰρ ὢν οὐκ ἂν παρέτεινεν.

μέτριος οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ οὕτω φοβερά ἢ περὶ τὸν
156 σκεπτικὸν συμβαίνουσα ταραχή. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ
μεγίστη τις ἦ, οὐχ ἡμᾶς αἰτιᾶσθαι δεῖ τοὺς
ἀκουσίως καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φύσιν,

ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει,

καὶ τὸν δοξαστικῶς καὶ κατὰ κρίσιν ἐπισπώμενον
ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν πυρέττοντα οὐκ
αἰτιατέον ὅτι πυρέττει, ἀκουσίως γὰρ πυρέττει,
τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν ἀσυμφόρων αἰτιατέον,
ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔκειτο τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀσυμφόρων,
οὕτω τὸν μὲν ταραττόμενον ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς
157 ἀλγενοῖς οὐκ αἰτιατέον· οὐ γὰρ παρ' αὐτὸν γίνεται
ἢ διὰ τὸν πόνον ταραχή ἀλλ', ἔάν τε θέλη ἔάν τε
καὶ μὴ, γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλει· τὸν δὲ παρὰ
τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἀναπλάττοντα αὐτῷ αἰρετῶν
τε καὶ φευκτῶν πραγμάτων πλήθος αἰτιατέον·
ἑαυτῷ γὰρ ἐγείρει κακῶν πλήμμυραν. καὶ
ταῦτ' ἴσως ἀρεστὴν ἰδεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λεγομένων
158 κακῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν προσδοξάζων περὶ τοῦ
κακοῦ εἶναι τὸν πόνον ἔχειται τῷ καθηναγκασμένῳ
τοῦ πόνου κινήματι· ὁ δὲ γε προσαναπλάσσων ὅτι
μόνον ἀνοϊκειῶν ἐστὶν ὁ πόνος, ὅτι μόνον κακόν,
διπλασιάζει τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ τὸ κατὰ παρουσίαν
159 αὐτοῦ συμβαῖνον ὄχλημα. ἢ γὰρ οὐ θεωροῦμεν
ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεμνομένων πολλάκις αὐτὸς μὲν
ὁ πάσχων καὶ τεμνόμενος ἀνδρικῶς ὑπομένει τὴν
ἐκ τῆς τομῆς βίασανον, μήτε

¹ ταῦτ' Heintz: τοῦτο mss., Bekk.

is continuous in its nature but has many intervals of
rest and periods of relief; for were it unceasing it
would not have been protracted.—The perturbation,
then, which befalls the Sceptic is moderate and not
so very alarming. Notwithstanding, even if it be 156
very great, we ought not to blame those who suffer
involuntarily and of necessity but Nature,

Who recks not aught of custom,^a

and the man who through his beliefs and owing to his
own judgement draws upon himself the evil. For just
as the man with a fever is not to be blamed because
he has a fever (for he has the fever involuntarily), but
the man who does not abstain from things inexpedient
is to be blamed (for it lay in his own power to abstain
from things inexpedient),—so the man who is per-
turbed at the presence of painful things is not to be
blamed; for the perturbation caused by the pain is 157
not due to himself but is bound to occur of necessity
whether he wishes it or not; but he who through his
own imaginations invents for himself a host of things
desirable and to be avoided is deserving of blame; for
he stirs up for himself a flood of evils.^b—And one may
see the same thing in the case of the so-called “ evils ”
themselves. For he who has no additional belief 158
about pain being an evil is merely affected by the
necessitated motion of the pain; but he who imagines
in addition that the pain is objectionable only, that
it is evil only, doubles by this belief the distress which
results from its presence. For do we not observe 159
frequently how, in the case of those who are being
cut, the patient who is being cut manfully endures
the torture of the cutting—

^a Eurip. *Frag.* 920 (Nauck).

^b Cf. Hamlet's “ Take arms against a sea of troubles.”

ὠχρήσας χροῖα κάλλιμον μήτε παρειῶν
δάκρυ' ὁμορξάμενος,

διὰ τὸ μόνω τῷ κατὰ τὴν τομὴν ὑποπίπτει
κινήματι· ὁ δὲ παρεστῶς αὐτῷ, σῖναμα τῷ βρα-
χειᾷν ἰδεῖν αἵματος ῥύσιν, ὠχριά τρέμει περιδροῖ
ἐκλύεται, τὸ τελευταῖον ἄφωνος καταπίπτει, οὐ
διὰ τὸν πόνον, οὐδὲ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, διὰ δὲ
160 τὴν περὶ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον δόξαν; οὕτω
μείζων ἐστὶν ἐνίστε ἢ διὰ τὴν περὶ τιος κακοῦ ὡς
κακοῦ δόξαν ταραχὴ τῆς δι' αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον
εἶναι κακὸν συμβαινούσης. οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ
πάντων [μέν] ἐπέχων τῶν κατὰ δόξαν τελειοτάτην
161 καρποῦται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις
καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασι ταραττεται μὲν

(οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐστι παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ
πέτρης,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν γένος ἦεν),

162 μετριοπαθῶς δὲ διατίθεται. ὅθεν καὶ καταφρονεῖν
ἀναγκαῖον τῶν εἰς ἀνεργησίαν αὐτὸν περι-
163 κλειέσθαι νομιζόντων ἢ εἰς ἀπέμφασιν, καὶ εἰς
ἀνεργησίαν μὲν ὅτι τοῦ βίου παντὸς ἐν αἰρέσει
καὶ φυγαῖς ὄντος ὁ μήτε αἰρούμενός τι μήτε
φεύγων δυνάμει τὸν βίον ἀρνέεται καὶ τιος φντοῦ
164 τρόπον ἐπέειχεν, εἰς ἀπέμφασιν δὲ ὅτι ὑπὸ τυράννω
ποτέ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῖν ἀναγκα-
ζόμενος ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ τὸ προσαττόμενον ἀλλ'
ἐκούσιον ἐλείπει θάνατον, ἢ φεύγων τὰς βασάνους
ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι "ἀφυγῆς
καὶ ἀναίρετος ἔσται" κατὰ τὸν Τίμωννα, ἀλλὰ τὸ
μὲν ἐλείπει τοῦ δ' ἀποστῆσεται, ὅπερ ἦν τῶν μετὰ
462

His fair hue paling not, nor from his cheeks
Wiping the tears away,^a

because he is affected only by the motion due to the cutting; whereas the man who stands beside him, as soon as he sees a small flow of blood, at once grows pale, trembles, gets in a great sweat, feels faint, and finally falls down speechless, not because of the pain (for it is not present with him), but because of the belief he has about pain being an evil? Thus the 160 perturbation due to the belief about an evil as evil is sometimes greater than that which results from the so-called evil itself.—He, then, who suspends judgment about all things which depend on belief wins happiness most fully, and during involuntary and 161 irrational affections although he is perturbed—

Yea, for he is not sprung from a rock or an oak primeval
But of the race of men was he,^b

yet his state of feeling is moderate. Hence, too, one 162 must scorn those who fancy that he is confined to a state of inactivity or of inconsistency,—to inactivity, 163 because, as all life consists in desires and avoidances, he that neither desires nor avoids anything is virtually rejecting life and remaining like a vegetable; and to 164 inconsistency because, should he ever be subject to a tyrant and compelled to do something unspeakable, either he will not submit to the order given him but will choose a voluntary death, or else to avoid torture he will do what is commanded, and thus he will no longer be (in Timon's phrase) "unmov'd by choice and avoidance," but will choose the one and refuse the other, which is the action of those who confidently

^a Homer, *Odys.* xi. 529 f.

^b The first line is from Homer, *Odys.* xix. 163; the half-line is S.'s addition.

πέισματος κατειληφόντων τὸ φευκτόν τι εἶναι καὶ
 165 αἰρετόν. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες οὐ συνιᾶσιν ὅτι
 κατὰ μὲν τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον οὐ βιοῖ ὁ σκεπτικός
 (ἀνεπέργητος γὰρ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ), κατὰ δὲ
 τὴν ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν δύναται τὰ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι
 166 τὰ δὲ φεύγειν. ἀναγκαζόμενός τε ὑπὸ τυράννου
 τι τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων πράττειν, τῇ κατὰ τοὺς
 πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὰ ἔθνη προλήψει τυχὸν τὸ
 μὲν ἐλείπεται τὸ δὲ φεύζεται· καὶ ῥᾶόν γε οἶσει τὸ
 σκληρὸν παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων, ὅτι οὐδὲν
 ἔξωθεν τούτῳ προσδοξάζει καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος.
 167 εἰρητὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους σχολασθεῖσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καῖον

αὐθις ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεῖν.

“Ὅθεν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀποδόντες, ἀφ’ ὧν
 αἱ ἀπορίαι ἐπὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὸν ἠθικὸν διατείνουσι
 τόπον, φέρε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἔστι τις
 περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

5'.—Εἰ ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

168 “Ὅτι μὲν ἔστι δυνατόν κατὰ τρόπον βιοῦν αἰρου-
 μένους τὴν περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν, ἀποχρώντως ἡμῖν
 δέδεικται· οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει ἐκ παραλλήλου δοκιμά-
 ζειν καὶ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν στάσιν, καίπερ ἀπὸ
 μέρους ἤδη δοκιμασθεῖσαν. ἐπαγγέλλονται γὰρ
 169 τέχνην τινα περὶ τὸν βίον παραδώσειν, καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο Ἐπίκουρος μὲν ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέρ-

* Cf. P.H. i. 23.

ᵇ See P.H. i. 25-30.

ᵇ Homer, *Odys.* xii. 453.

hold that something to be avoided and desirable
 exists.—Now in arguing thus they do not comprehend 165
 that the Sceptic does not conduct his life according to
 philosophical theory (for so far as regards this he is
 inactive), but as regards the non-philosophic regula-
 tion of life ^a he is capable of desiring some things and
 avoiding others. And when compelled by a tyrant to 166
 commit any forbidden act he will perchance choose
 the one course and avoid the other owing to the pre-
 conception due to his ancestral laws and customs ;
 and as compared with the Dogmatist he will certainly
 endure hardship more easily because he has not, like
 the other, any additional beliefs beyond the actual
 suffering.—But we have discussed these matters more 167
 exactly in our discourse “On the Sceptic End,”^b
 and there is no necessity

Once again to repeat an account most plainly deliver'd.^c

Hence, as we have completed our account of things
 good and evil, the difficulties raised by which extend
 over almost the whole sphere of Ethics, come and let
 us consider next whether there exists any art of
 life.^d

CHAPTER VI.—DOES THERE EXIST ANY ART OF LIFE?

We have proved sufficiently that it is possible to 168
 live a satisfactory life by adopting suspension of
 judgement about all things ; but nothing hinders us
 from examining also in a similar fashion the view
 of the Dogmatists, although it has been partially
 examined already. For they promise to present us
 with an “art of life,” and because of this Epicurus 169
 declared that “philosophy is an activity which

^d For the “art of living” cf. P.H. iii. 239 ff.

γειαυ εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 170 βίον περιποιούσαν, οἱ δὲ στωικοὶ καὶ ἄντικρύς φασὶ
 τὴν φρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
 καὶ οὐδετέρων, τέχνην ὑπάρχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἣν
 οἱ προσλαβόντες μόνοι γίνονται καλοί, μόνοι πλού-
 σιοι, σοφοὶ μόνοι. ὁ γὰρ πολλοῦ ἀξία κεκτημένος
 πλούσιός ἐστιν, ἣ δὲ ἀρετὴ πολλοῦ ἐστὶν ἀξία, καὶ
 μόνος ταύτην ὁ σοφὸς κέκτηται· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφὸς
 ἐστὶ πλούσιος. καὶ ὁ ἀξίεραστός ἐστι καλός, μόνος
 δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἀξίεραστός· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφὸς ἐστὶ
 171 καλός. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται ὑποσχέσεις θηρεύουσι μὲν
 τοὺς νέους ἐλπίσι ψυχραῖς, οὐκέτι δὲ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς.
 παρὸ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένους
 τὴν παράδοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπισκώπτει, λέγων

πολλῶν λακεδόνων λυμάντορες αἰπυδολωταί,¹

172 ὅτε δὲ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς μεταμελομένους ἐφ'
 οἷς μάτην ἐμόχθησαν παρειαγάγει διὰ τούτων·

φῆ δέ τις αἰάζων, οἷα βροτοὶ αἰάζουσιν,
 οἷμοι ἐγὼ τί πάθω; τί νυ μοι σοφὸν ἔνθα
 γένηται;

πτωχὸς μὲν φρένας εἰμί, νόου δέ μοι οὐκ ἔνι
 κόκκος.

ἦ με μάτην φεύξασθαι οἶομαι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον.
 τρις μάκαρες μέντοι καὶ τετράκις οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες

¹ αἰπυδολωταί Fabr., Bekk.: ἐπιδολωταί (or -οταί) mss.:
 ἐπιδοδῶται Usener (? ἀρχιδολωταί).

* For the Stoic "Wise Man," or "Sage," see Vol. I.
 Introd. p. xxviii. "Fair" (καλός), here, means "noble" or
 466

secures the happy life by arguments and discussions";
 while the Stoics assert outright that "wisdom, which 170
 is the science of things good and evil and neither, is
 an art of life, and only those who attain this become
 fair, only they rich, as only they are wise. For he
 who possesses things of great value is rich, and virtue
 is of great value, and it only the Wise man^a possesses;
 therefore the wise man only is rich. And the lover
 of the valuable is fair, but the wise man only is a lover
 of the valuable; therefore the wise man only is fair."
 Now promises such as these capture the young with 171
 fruitless expectations, but they are not also true.
 Wherefore also Timon in one place scoffs at those
 who promise us to provide us with these things, calling
 them—

Spoilers of many a doctrine and masters of knavish im-
 posture^b;

and in another place he brings in the people who have 172
 paid attention to them, repenting of the vain labours
 they have undergone, in these words—

One, then, lamenting did cry, as men are wont when lament-
 ing,

"Oh, what is to befall me! Where now shall I gain any
 wisdom?"

Beggar'd in soul I am, and of sense not a grain is within me.
 Vainly methinks shall I try to escape from sheerest destruc-
 tion.

Thrice, yea four times, blessed are those devoid of possessions,

"honourable" (*honestus*),—gifted with "the beauty of
 holiness."

^b For λακεδόνων ("doctrines"), which can scarcely be
 right, I suggest βλακεδόνων ("wastrels"), which accords
 better with the next quotation (Hervetus has *juvenum*); then
 λυμάντορες βλ. will mean "those who bring wastrels (or
 idlers) to ruin."

μήτε κατατρώξαντες ἐνὶ σχολῇ ὄσ' ἐπέπαντο.
 νῦν δέ με λευγαλέαις ἔρισιν εἵμαρτο δαμῆναι
 καὶ πενίη καὶ ὄσ' ἄλλα βροτοὺς κηφῆνας ἔλαστρεῖ.

- 173 διότι δὲ ταύθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάθοιμεν ἂν ἐντεύθεν ἐπι-
 στήσαντες. ἡ γὰρ ἀξιουμένη περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι
 τέχνη, καὶ καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐ μία
 τις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ καὶ διάφωνοι, οἷον ἡ μὲν
 κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, τὶς
 δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. ἤτοι οὖν πάσαις ὁμοίως
 174 ἀκολουθητέον ἢ μιᾷ μόνῃ ἢ οὐδεμιᾷ. καὶ πάσαις
 μὲν ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν ἀμηχάνων διὰ τὴν μάχην· ὁ γὰρ
 ἦδε προσάσσει ὡς αἰρετόν, τοῦτο ἦδε ἀπαγορεύει
 ὡς φευκτόν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ
 175 διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν. εἰ δὲ μιᾷ κατακολουθητέον
 ἐστίν, ἤτοι τῇ ὁποιαδήποτε οὖν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
 (τὸ μία) ἀκολουθεῖν¹ γὰρ ἴσον τῷ² πάσαις θέλειν
 ἔπεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ τῆδε προσεκτέον, τί μᾶλλον τῆδε ἢ
 τῆδε; καὶ ἀναστρόφως. λείπεται ἄρα τῇ προκρι-
 176 θείσῃ λέγειν δεῖν ἔπεσθαι. ἤτοι οὖν τῇ ὑπ' ἄλλης
 προκριθείσῃ κατακολουθήσομεν ἢ τῇ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν τῇ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀπιστος ἐστὶν, ἢ δεήσει
 πάσας ἠγείσθαι πιστάς· εἰ γὰρ ἦδε καθόσον ὑφ'
 ἑαυτῆς κέκριται ἐστὶ πιστή, καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ γενή-
 σονται πισταί· ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς
 177 κέκριται. εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλης, δεήσει πάλιν καὶ οὕτως
 αὐτὴν ἀπιστεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ αὐτὴ παρόσον διαφωνεῖ
 ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐδεῖτο κρίσεως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ κρίνουσα
 αὐτὴν, ἢ διαφωνεῖ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀγωγαῖς, δεήσειται

¹ <τὸ μία> ἀκολουθεῖν] ἀκολουθεῖ mss., Bekk.: <τὸ ταύτη>
 ἀκολουθεῖν Heintz.

² τῷ N, Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk. (ἴσως cj. Bekk.).

* With §§ 173-177 cf. P.H. iii. 239.

Those who never have wasted their goods in idle existence.
 But my fate it is now to be stricken by grievous contentions,
 Penury, too, and what else doth harry the drones amongst
 mortals."

And the reason why this is so we may learn if we 173
 attend to the following point.^a The art of life which,
 it is claimed, exists and owing to which they suppose
 that men are happy, is not one art but many and
 dissimilar—that, for instance, of Epicurus, and that
 of the Stoics, and another of the Peripatetics. Either,
 then, one must follow all alike or one only or none.
 But to follow them all is impracticable because of 174
 their conflicting character; for what this one enjoins
 as desirable that one forbids as a thing to be avoided,
 and it is not feasible both to pursue and avoid simultane-
 ously the same object. And if one ought closely 175
 to follow one art, either this is anyone whatsoever,
 which is impossible; for then, to follow one is equi-
 valent to being willing to follow them all; for if we
 should give heed to this one, why to this one rather
 than that other? and conversely. It only remains,
 then, to say that we ought to follow that one art
 which has been judged best. Either, then, we shall 176
 follow that which is judged best by another art or
 that which is judged best by itself. And if it is that
 judged best by itself, it will be distrusted or else we
 shall have to count them all trustworthy; for if this
 one is trustworthy inasmuch as it is judged by itself,
 the rest also will be trustworthy; for each of them
 is judged by itself. But if it is judged by another art, 177
 even in this case, again, it will have to be distrusted;
 for just as it, in so far as it differs from the rest,
 needed judgement, so also the art which judges it,
 in that it differs from the other doctrines, will need

τῆς κρινούσης καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸν ἐκείνης κριτήριον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάσαις ἐνδέχεται ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχναις ἀκολουθεῖν
 178 μήτε μιᾷ, λείπεται μηδεμιᾷ ἔπεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, ὡς προείπον, πολλῶν οὐσῶν περὶ τὸν βίον τεχνῶν κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ τὸν μιᾷ τούτων προσαναπαυσάμενον κακοδαιμονεῖν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου προϊόντος λεχθησομένην. ἕκαστος γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχεται πάθει τινί· ἢ γὰρ φιλόπλουτος ἐστὶν ἢ φιλήδονος ἢ φιλόδοξος. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν ὑπ' οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν δογματικῶν ἀγωγῶν δύναται κατα-
 179 στέλλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν φιλόπλουτος ἢ φιλόδοξος ἐκπυρσεύεται μᾶλλον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπὸ τῆς περιπατητικῆς φιλοσοφίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος προσεκκαίεται ὑπὸ τῆς κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἀγωγῆς (τέλος γὰρ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ ἡδονῆ ἀποδείκνυται κατ' αὐτόν), ὁ δὲ φιλόδοξος προσεκτραχηλίζεται εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος πρὸς τῶν στωικῶν λόγων, καθ' οὓς ἡ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενον.
 180 πᾶσα οὖν ἡ λεγομένη περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐπιτείχιμα ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν ἀλλ' οὐ βοήθεια.

Καὶν μίαν δὲ δῶμεν εἶναι τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, καὶ ταύτην σύμφωνον, ὅλον τὴν στωικὴν, οὐδ' οὕτως προσησόμεθα διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας
 181 αὐτῇ συνεισάγεσθαι κήρας. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη φρόνησις οὐσα ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ οὐχ ἔξουσι φρόνησιν οὐδὲ τέχνην τιὰ περὶ

one to judge it, and owing to this fact it will not be a trustworthy criterion of the other. If, then, it is not feasible to follow either all the arts of life or one, it only remains to follow none.—And again: since, as I 178 said above,^a there are many arts of life, he who abides by one of them must necessarily be unhappy, not only for the reasons previously stated^b but also for that which shall be stated as our argument proceeds. For each individual man is subject to a certain affection; for either he is a lover of wealth^c or a lover of pleasure or a lover of fame; and being such, he cannot be calmed down by any of the dogmatic doctrines; nay, the lover of wealth or the lover of 179 fame is further enkindled in his desire by the Peripatetic philosophy, according to which wealth and fame are among the goods^d; and the lover of pleasure is further inflamed by the doctrine of Epicurus (for on his showing pleasure is proved to be the perfection of happiness); and the lover of fame is also plunged headlong into this very affection by the Stoic arguments, according to which virtue alone is good and that which results from virtue. In every case, 180 then, what is called by the Dogmatic philosophers "the science of life" is a bulwark in defence of the evils of mankind rather than an aid against them.

And even if we grant that there is one art of life,^e and this an agreed one,—for instance, the Stoic,—not even so shall we accept it, since along with itself it brings many and diverse calamities. For if the art of 181 life, as consisting in wisdom, is a virtue, and only the Sage possesses virtue, the Stoics not being sages will not possess wisdom nor any art of life, and not possessing

^a Cf. § 120 *supra*.

^d Cf. §§ 51, 77 *supra*.

^e With §§ 180-183 *cf. P.H.* iii. 240-242.

^a See § 173 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

- τὸν βίον, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ ταύτην οὐδὲ ἄλλους διδά-
 ξουσιν. εἴπερ τε κατ' αὐτοὺς οὐδεμία δύναται
 182 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. τέχνη γάρ
 ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, καὶ καταλήψις ἔστι
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις. οὐδεμία δ'
 ἦν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία διὰ τὸ μῆτε πᾶσαν ὑπ-
 ἄρχειν φαντασίαν καταληπτικὴν, μάχονται γάρ,
 μῆτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἀνεπικρισίαν. μὴ οὔσης δὲ
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσις τις
 αὐτῆς γενήσεται, οὕτωςι δὲ οὐδὲ κατάληψις. μὴ
 οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως οὐδὲ σύστημα ἐκ κατα-
 λήψεων γενήσεται, τουτέστι τέχνη. φ' ἀκολουθεῖ
 183 τὸ μηδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι τινα τέχνην. πρὸς
 τούτοις ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κρίνεται κατὰ
 τοὺς στωικοὺς, ὅτι καταληπτικὴ ἔστι, τῷ ἀπὸ
 ὑπάρχοντος γενέσθαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον
 ἐναπομεμαγμένως καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένως· τὸ θ'
 ὑπάρχον δοκιμάζεται, ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἐστίν, ἐκ τοῦ
 καταληπτικῆν κινεῖν φαντασίαν. εἰ δὲ ἴνα μὲν ἡ
 καταληπτικὴ κρίνηται φαντασία, τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ
 ἐπεγνώσθαι, ἴνα δὲ τοῦτο καταληφθῆ, τὴν κατα-
 ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν βέβαιον εἶναι, ἐκάτερον δὲ διὰ
 θάτερόν ἐστιν ἄπιστον, ἀγνωρίστου οὔσης τῆς
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ τέχνη,
 σύστημα οὐσα ἐκ καταλήψεων.
 184 Εἴπερ τε ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη, τουτέστιν ἡ
 φρόνησις, θεωρητικὴ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
 οὐδετέρων ἐστίν, ἥτοι ἕτερα καθέστηκε τῶν ἀγαθῶν

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 388 ff.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 248, 402, ii. 86.

this neither will they teach it to others.—Also, if, on their showing, no art can be constructed, neither will the art of life be constructed; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). For an art is 182 “a system constructed of apprehensions,” and apprehension is “assent to an apprehensive presentation.” But no apprehensive presentation exists^a because neither is every presentation apprehensive (owing to their conflicting character), nor yet any one of them (owing to their being unjudged). And if an apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither will there be any assent to it, and thus there will not be any apprehension either. And if there is no apprehension, neither will there be a system of apprehensions, that is to say, an art. Wherefrom it follows that there is no art of life either.—Further- 183 more, according to the Stoics the apprehensive presentation is judged to be apprehensive by the fact that it proceeds from an existing object and in such a way as to bear the impress and stamp of that existing object^b; and the existing object is approved as existent because of its exciting an apprehensive presentation. But if the existent must be ascertained in order that the apprehensive presentation may be judged, and if the apprehensive presentation must be established in order that the existent may be apprehended, and each of these is untrustworthy because of the other,—then, as the apprehensive presentation is unknowable, art also is abolished, it being a system of apprehensions.

Also, if the science of life,—that is, wisdom,—is 184 cognisant of things good and evil and neither,^c either it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the

^c Cf. § 170 *supra*.

- ὦν λέγεται ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνειν, ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καθὸ καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τιwes ἐξ αὐτῶν φασὶν
 185 "ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς." καὶ εἰ μὲν ἑτέρα ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰγαθὰ ὧν λέγεται ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ὑπαρκτῶν τινῶν ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν ἀνύπαρκτα, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
 186 εἰ δ' αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν καὶ ἀξιούται τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμη, ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη. ὁ πάλιν ἀποπον. τὰ γὰρ ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ταῦτα προ-επινοεῖται τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἷον ἰατρικὴ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· ἀλλὰ προὔφεστηκε τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ προηγείται τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσερά. πάλιν τε ἡ μουσικὴ ἐμμελῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκμελῶν ἐνρhythμων τε καὶ ἐκρhythμων ἐπι-
 187 στήμη· ἀλλ' οὐ πρὶν τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ μουσικὴ. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἔφασαν ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· οὐκοῦν προ-ὔφεστηκε τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ οὐθέτερα. εἰ δὲ ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ φρόνησις, ὀφείλει προὔφεσταναι ἑαυτῆς· οὐδὲν δὲ δύναται ἑαυτοῦ προὔφεσθηκέναι· οὐδὲ ταύτη τοίνυν ρητέον εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμην.
 188 Πᾶσά τε ὑπαρκτὴ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐκ τῶν ἀποδιδόμενων ὑπὸ αὐτῆς τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστη-μονικῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἰατρικῶς γινομένων, κιθαριστικὴ δὲ ἐκ τῶν κιθαριστικῶς καὶ ἤδη ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλα-στικὴ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐμφερεῖς. ἢ δέ γε περὶ τὸν βίον

science, or it is itself the good, even as some of them assert in their definition—"Good is virtue or what partakes of virtue."^a And if it is other than the 185 goods whereof it is said to be the science, it will not be a science at all; for every science is the knowledge of certain existing things, but we have previously shown^b that goods and evils are non-existent, so that neither will there exist any science of goods and evils. But if it is itself the good and claims to be the 186 science of the goods, it will be the science of itself; and this again is absurd. For the things which form the object of a science are conceived before the science. Thus medicine is said to be the science of things healthy and morbid and neither; but the healthy and morbid things are in existence before medicine and precede it. And again: Music is the science of things in tune and out of tune, rhythmical and unrhythmical; but previous to these Music does not exist. The Stoics, too, have said that Dialectic^c 187 is "the science of things true and false and neither"; so, then, before Dialectic the true and false and neither pre-existed. If, then, wisdom is the science of itself, it must have existed before itself; but nothing can have existed before itself; so that neither in this way can it be asserted that any art of life exists.

Also, every existing art and science is apprehended 188 by means of the artistic and scientific effects which it produces,^d—medicine, for instance, by its medical results, and harp-playing by those of the harper, and painting and sculpture as well, and all arts of a like kind. But the art which is supposed to be conversant

^a Cf. § 22 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 42-10

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 94, 247.

^d With §§ 188-189 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243.

ἀξιουμένη στρέφεται τέχνη οὐδὲν ἔχει συμβεβηκὸς ἐνέργημα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ
 189 τὸν βίον τέχνη. οἶον πολλῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς
 στωικοῖς περὶ τε τῆς τῶν παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς καὶ περὶ
 τῆς πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς καὶ ἔτι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς
 κατοικομένους ὁσιότητος, ὀλίγα ἐξ ἑκάστου εἰδούς
 ἐπιλεξάμενοι δείγματος χάριν προοισόμεθα εἰς τὴν
 τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως κατασκευήν.

190 Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς ἐν ταῖς δια-
 τριβαῖς ὁ αἰρεσιάρχης Ζήνων τοιαῦτά τινα διέξεισιν.
 “ διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦσσαν παιδικὰ
 ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα
 παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρόποντα ἐστίν.” καὶ
 πάλιν “ διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε.
 πότερον οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ
 μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπιθυμήσας¹ παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν [ἦ]²
 ἐφοβήθης κελεύσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ
 μάλα. εἶθ’ οὐχ ὑπέρτησέ σοι; οὐ γάρ.”

191 περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς παράθιτο ἂν τις
 τὰ τῆς μητρομξίας ὑπ’ αὐτῶν θρυλούμενα. καὶ γε
 ὁ μὲν Ζήνων τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἰοκάστης καὶ Οἰδίποδος
 θεῖς ἱστορούμενα φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τριψαί τὴν
 μητέρα. “ καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν τὸ σῶμα ταῖς
 χερσὶ τρίψας ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δ’ ἐτέρῳ
 μέρει τρίψας, εὐφραίνει* ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ
 παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ποιήσας, τί ἦν
 192 αἰσχρόν;” ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατὰ

¹ ἐπιθυμήσας cj. Bekk.: ἐπεθύμησας mss., Bekk.

² [ἦ] secl. Arnim (εἶτ’ cj. Bekk.).

* εὐφραίνει Arnim: ἐφ’ ᾧ εὐρέν mss., Bekk.

with life has no resultant effect, as we shall establish ; therefore, no art of life exists. Thus, since much is said 189 by the Stoics both about the education of children and about the honouring of parents, and also about piety towards the departed, we shall select a few points under each of these heads by way of illustration and bring them forward in support of our criticism.

Well then, as regards the education of children, 190 Zeno, the founder of the School, gives the following exposition in his discourses^a: “ Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male ; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting in respect of all alike.” And again,—“ Have you had intercourse with your beloved one ? I have not. Did you not desire to have intercourse with him ? Certainly. But, though desiring to win him for yourself, were you afraid of inviting him ? Not at all. But you invited him ? Certainly. Then he did not yield to you ? He did not.”—And with regard 191 to honouring one’s parents one might adduce the cases of incest which they harp upon. Thus Zeno, after stating the facts about Jocasta and Oedipus, asserts that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother. “ If she had been ailing and he had done her good by rubbing her body with his hands, it had not been shameful ; what shame was it, then, if he stopped her grief and gave her joy by rubbing her with another member, and begat noble children by his mother ? ” And Chrysippus, in his *State* says 192

^a With §§ 190-196 cf. *P.H.* iii. 245-249. The Stoics seem to have derived these ugly tenets from the Cynics; cf. *P.H.* 200 n.

λέξιν φησὶν οὕτως· “δοκεῖ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως διεξάγειν¹ καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἶθισται, ὥστε καὶ <τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ>² τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας.” δεῖγμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς κατοικομένους αὐτῶν ὁσιότητος γένου³ ἂν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωποφαγίας παραγγελλόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀξιούσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐσθίειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν σάρκας, εἴ ποτε
 193 τύχοι τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἀποκοπέν. λέγεται δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου ταυτί· “καὶ ἂν τῶν μελῶν ἀποκοπῆ τι μέρος πρὸς τὴν τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως <ἐκ>³ τῶν ἡμετέρων
 194 ἕτερον μέρος γένηται.” ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς διεξερχόμενος ῥητικῶς φησὶν “ἀπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐδ’ ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῆν χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίους· ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων αὐτῶν ἢ κατορύξαντες τὸ μνήμα ἐποίησουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ῥίψαντες οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφήν αὐτῶν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.”
 195 Ὡδε μὲν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, ἐπακτέον δ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ

¹ διεξάγειν Fabr.: ἐξαγαγεῖν mss., Bekk.

² <τὴν . . . καὶ> add. Fabr.

³ <ἐκ> add. Mutsch.

expressly: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which <the mother has children by her son, and> the father by his daughter, and the brother by his full sister.”—And their recommendations concerning cannibalism may serve as an example of their piety towards the departed; for they deem it right to eat not only the dead but even their own flesh, if ever any part of their body should happen to be cut off. This is what is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise *On Justice*:—“And if any part of the limbs be cut off that is good 193 for food, we should neither bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book *On Duty*, when 194 discoursing about the burial of parents, he says expressly: “When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like nails or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow on it no care or attention of that kind. Hence, also, when their flesh is good for food, men shall make use of it, just as also of their own parts,—when, for instance, a foot is cut off it is proper for them to use it, and things like it; but when the flesh is not good, either they shall bury it and lay the mound upon it, or burn it up and scatter the ashes, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

Such is the Stoics’ doctrine; but against them we 195

ἀκόλουθον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως. ἤτοι γὰρ οὕτω παραγγέλλουσι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὡς μελλόντων αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων ἢ ὡς μὴ χρησιμοποιμένων. καὶ ὡς χρησιμοποιμένων μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οἱ γὰρ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, εἰ μὴ τι παρὰ Λαιστρυγῶσι καὶ Κύκλωψι δεήσει βιοῦν, παρ' οἷς θεμιτόν ἐστιν

ἀνδρόμεα κρέ' ἔδευ καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρητον γάλα πίνειν.

- 196 εἰ δ' ὡς μὴ χρησιμοποιμένων, παρέλκουσα γίνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἧς ἡ χρῆσις ἐστὶν ἀδύνατος· ὡς γὰρ ἐν τυφλῶν δῆμῳ ἄχρηστός ἐστι ζωγραφία, βλεπόντων γὰρ ἡ τέχνη, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν πόλει κωφῶν ἀνόνητός ἐστι κιθαριστική, ἀκούοντας γὰρ τέρπει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη πρὸς μηδέν ἐστι τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις αὐτῇ χρῆσθαι.
- 197 Καὶ μὴν πᾶσα τέχνη, εἴαν τε θεωρητικὴ καθεστῆκη ὡς γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ, εἴαν τε πρακτικὴ ὡς ὄπλομαχητικὴ, εἴαν τε ἀποτελεσματικὴ ὡς ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλαστική, ἴδιον ἔχει ἔργον ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, (τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως οὐκ ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἔργον),¹ ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις.
- 198 ὡς γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν μουσικοῦ καὶ ἀμούσου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ μουσικόν, καὶ τὸ κοινὸν γραμματικοῦ καὶ ἀγραμμάτου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ γραμματικόν, οὕτω καὶ συλλήβδην τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ ἀτέχνου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ τεχνικόν. διόπερ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ἀφρονος κοινὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς φρονήσεως
- 199 ἴδιον ἔργον. πᾶν δέ γε τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου γίνε-

¹ <τῆς . . . ἔργον> add. N.

must bring the next point in our criticism. Either they enjoin these actions with the idea that young people will perform them or with the idea that they will not perform them. But certainly not with the idea that they will perform them; for the laws forbid them, unless it shall be their lot to live amongst the Laestrygones and Cyclopes, where it is permissible—Human flesh to devour, and pure milk swallow thereafter.^a

And if they enjoin them with the idea that they will not perform them, the art of life becomes redundant, as the practice of it is impossible. For just as painting is useless in a country of the blind (for this art is for men who have sight), and just as harp-playing is valueless in a city of the deaf (for it is those who have hearing that it delights), so also the art of life is of no benefit to those who are unable to make use of it.

Moreover, every art,^b whether it be theoretical, like geometry and astronomy, or practical, like the military art, or creative, like painting and sculpture, possesses a special work of its own whereby it differs from the other states of mind, (whereas there is no special work which belongs to wisdom,) as I shall establish; therefore wisdom is not an art of life. For just as the work common to the musical man and the unmusical is not music, and the work common to the literary and the non-literary is not literature, so too, in general, the work common to the artistic and the non-artistic is not artistry. Hence also the work common to the wise man and the unwise will not be the special work of wisdom. But in fact every work which seems to be done by

^a Homer, *Odys.* ix. 297.

^b With §§ 197-199 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

σθαι δοκοῦν ἔργον, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὐρίσκεται καὶ τοῦ μὴ φρονίμου ἔργον· οἷον ἐάν τε τιμᾶν γονεῖς θώμεθα τοῦ φρονίμου ἔργον, ἐάν τε τὸ παρακαταθήκη ἀποδιδόναί τοῖς πιστεύσασιν, ἐάν τ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους εὐρήσομεν τούτων τι ποιούντας. ὥστε μηδὲν ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον, ᾧ διοίσει τῶν μὴ σοφῶν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φρόνησις ἔσται τέχνη τις περὶ τὸν βίον, ἧς ἴδιον οὐδὲν τεχνικὸν ἔστιν ἔργον.

- 200 Ἄλλὰ πρὸς τοῦθ' ὑπαντώντες φασι πάντα μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ πάντων τὰ ἔργα, διορίζεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἢ ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γονέων καὶ ἄλλως τιμᾶν γονεῖς τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔστιν ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαίου
- 201 τὸ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ποιεῖν· καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἔστι τοῦ τε ἱατροῦ καὶ ἰδιώτου, τὸ δὲ ἱατρικῶς ὑγιάζειν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἴδιον, ὧδε καὶ τὸ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς κοινὸν τοῦ τε σπουδαίου καὶ μὴ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς ἴδιον τοῦ σοφοῦ, ὥστε καὶ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἔχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἧς ἴδιόν ἔστιν ἔργον τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἀπὸ ἀρίστης διαθέσεως πράττειν.
- 202 εἰκόμασι δ' οἱ ταύτη χρώμενοι τῇ ὑπαντήσει ἐθελοκωφεῖν καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιζητούμενόν τι λέγειν. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἀντικρυς δεικνύντων ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴδιόν ἔστι τοῦ φρονούντος ἔργον, ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν μὴ φρονίμων, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ σπουδαίων γίνεσθαι, αὐτοὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἴσχυσαν ἀνελεῖν, ἔξωθεν δὲ φασιν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης

the wise man is found to be a work common also to the unwise ; if, for example, we count honouring parents as a work of the wise man, or rendering back a deposit to those who have entrusted it, or any other thing of the kind, we shall also find men who are not virtuous doing any one of these things. So that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise. And if this is so, neither will wisdom be an art of life, as it has no artistic work peculiar to itself.

But in reply to this they say that although all the 200 works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding either from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition. For the work of the virtuous man is not that of caring for his parents and generally honouring his parents, but doing this because of wisdom is the act of the virtuous ; and just 201 as procuring health is common both to the medical man and to the layman, but to procure health medically is peculiar to the man of art, so also honouring one's parents is common both to the virtuous man and the non-virtuous, but the honouring of his parents because of wisdom is peculiar to the wise man, so that he possesses also an art of life, of which the special work is the performance of each of his actions from the best disposition.—But those who make this 202 reply would seem to be wilfully deaf, and doing anything rather than answer the question before them. For when we were definitely proving that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he differs from the not wise, but everything which is done by him is done also by those who are not virtuous, the Stoics were unable to disprove this ; but they assert irrelevantly that the work common to both proceeds in

203 γίνεται διαθέσεως ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ φαύλης. ὅπερ ἀπό-
 δειξις μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κοινὸν ἔργον τῶν τε φρο-
 νίμων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, δείχεται δὲ
 (αὐτὸ)¹ ἀποδείξεως, ζητήσαντος ἂν τινος πόθεν γε
 διαγνωσόμεθα πότε γίνεται ταῦτα ἀπὸ φρονίμης
 διαθέσεως καὶ πότε οὐ γίνεται· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ
 ἔργα τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐμφαίνει, παρόσον ἐστὶ κοινά.
 204 ἐνθεν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς κομισθὲν ὑπόδειγμα
 κατ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον εὐρίσκεται. ὅταν γὰρ φῶσι
 τὸ ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἰατροῦ τε καὶ οὐκ ἰατροῦ καθ-
 εστηκὸς ἐξαίρετον γίνεσθαι τοῦ τεχνίτου, ἐπειδὴν
 ἰατρικῶς ἀποτελεσθῆ, τότε ἦτοι ἴσασι τι διαφόρως
 γινόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ παρὰ τὸν ἰδιώτην, οἶον
 τὸ συντόμως καὶ ἀπόνως καὶ μετὰ τάξεως καὶ
 ποιότητος, ἢ οὐκ ἴσασι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα
 205 κοινὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὑπειλήφασιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσασι,
 αὐτόθεν ἰδίον τι τοῦ ἰατροῦ φαινόμενον ἔργον
 ὠμολογήκασιν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἀκόλουθον ἦν αὐτοῖς
 ἀπὸ τούτου μετελθοῦσι διδάσκειν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ τι
 ἴδιον ἔργον, ᾧ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ σοφοῦ. εἰ δὲ οὐκ
 ἴσασι ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ γινόμενον, τοῦτ'
 ἐροῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδιώτου γίνεσθαι, ἀφελοῦνται
 τοῦ ἰατροῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον καὶ ἀπαραλλαξίας οὔσης
 κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς γινόμενοις ἔργοις οὐ
 διαγνώσκονται τὸν τε τεχνίτην καὶ τὸν ἀτεχνον, οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἐνεργούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ
 ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὴν καθ' ἕκαστον [ἀφανῆ]²
 διάθεσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς δύνασθαι γνωρίζεσθαι οὐσαν

¹ <αὐτὸ> addo.

² [ἀφανῆ] secl. Heintz.

[•] Cf. § 201 *supra*.

the one case from a wise disposition and in the other
 from a foolish. But this is not a proof that there is no 203
 work common both to those who are wise and those
 who are not so, but itself needs proof, since one might
 inquire how we are to discern when these works pro-
 ceed, and when they do not proceed, from a wise
 disposition; for the common works themselves do
 not make this clear, inasmuch as they are common.—
 Hence, too, the example brought forward from the 204
 art of medicine ^a is found to tell rather against them.
 For when they assert that procuring health, which is
 a thing common both to the medical and the non-
 medical man, belongs specially to the man of art when
 it is effected medically, then either they know that
 there is some difference in what is done by the doctor
 as compared with the layman,—the work being, for
 instance, rapid and painless and done systematically
 and on a definite plan,—or else they do not know this,
 but conceive that all these things are also common
 to laymen. And if they know it, they are directly 205
 confessing that there is an apparent work which is
 peculiar to the doctor, and their next task is to pass
 on from this and to show that there is also a work
 peculiar to the wise man, wherein he will differ
 from the not wise. But if they do not know it, but
 shall declare that everything which is done by the
 doctor is also done by the layman, they will be
 robbing the doctor of his own peculiar work, and,
 —since there exists, apparently, exact similarity
 in the works executed,—they will not distinguish
 between the expert and the non-expert, nor between
 what is performed by an artistic disposition and by a
 non-artistic, because the disposition of the individual
 cannot be discerned of itself, as it is non-apparent.

208 ἀφανῆ. τοῖνυν οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὁμολογεῖν
 μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι τὰ ὑπὸ τε τοῦ σοφοῦ γινόμενα
 ἔργα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ, διαφέρειν δ' αὐτὰ
 <φάναι>¹ τῷ νυνὶ μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης γίνεσθαι δια-
 θέσεως νυνὶ δὲ ἀπὸ ἄφρονος.

"Ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ τῷ διομαλισμῷ καὶ τάξει ταῦτα
 207 διορίζεσθαι νομίζοντες. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων
 τεχνῶν ἰδίον ἔστι τοῦ τεχνίτου τό τε τεταγμένως
 τι ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι διομαλίζειν
 (ποιήσαι γὰρ ἂν ποτε καὶ ἰδιώτης τὸ τεχνικὸν
 ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπανίως καὶ οὐ πάντοτε, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ
 αὐτὸ καὶ ὠσαύτως), ὥδε καὶ τοῦ μὲν φρονίμου
 φασὶν ἔργον εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι διομαλί-
 208 ζειν, τοῦ δὲ ἄφρονος τοῦναντίον. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ
 οἱ οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν περὶ τῆς
 ἐν χερσὶ ζητήσεως διαταπτόμενοι. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τινα
 βίου τάξιν κατὰ τεχνικὸν λόγον ὠρισμένως εἰρη-
 μένην εὐχῆ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν. πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς
 τὰς τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων πραγμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ
 ποικιλίας ἀρτιζόμενος οὐδέποτε δύναται τὴν αὐτὴν
 τάξιν φυλάττειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔμφρων τό τε
 ἄστατον τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ ἀβεβαιοῦν τῶν πραγμάτων
 209 ἐννοούμενος. ἄλλως τε, εἴπερ μίαν καὶ ὠρισμένην
 εἶχε βίου τάξιν ὁ φρόνιμος, κἂν ἐκ ταύτης ἐναργῶς
 κατεῖληπτο τοῖς μὴ φρονίμοις· οὐχὶ δὲ γε κατα-
 λαμβάνεται τούτοις· τοῖνυν οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν
 ἔργων ληπτὸς ἔστιν ὁ φρόνιμος. ὅθεν εἰ πᾶσα μὲν
 τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων φαίνεται, τῆς δὲ φρονή-

¹ <φάναι> add. cj. Heintz.

So then, it does not profit them at all to agree that the 206
 works performed by the wise man and by the not
 wise are common to both, while alleging that they
 differ by being done in the one case from a wise
 disposition, in the other from an unwise.

But there are others who think that these works
 are distinguished by (the presence or absence of)
 unvarying quality and order. For just as in the 207
 case of the intermediate arts^a it is the peculiarity
 of the artist to produce a thing in an orderly way
 and to be unvarying in his products (for the layman,
 too, may at times produce an artistic work, but
 rarely and not at all times, nor consistently and in
 the same way),—so also they say that the work of
 the wise man is to be unvarying in his right actions,
 and that of the unwise the opposite. But these men, 208
 too, are evidently not dealing with the question in
 hand according to the real state of the facts. For
 that there exists some order of life definitely formu-
 lated by the artistic reason seems rather like an
 illusory hope. For no man, in preparing himself to
 meet the different and varied occurrences, is ever able
 to preserve the same order,^b and, least of all, the wise
 man who is aware both of the instability of fortune
 and the insecurity of events. And besides, if the 209
 wise man had a single definite order of life, he would
 also have been plainly recognized through this by the
 not wise; but in fact he is not recognized by them;
 so then, the wise man cannot be discerned through
 the order of his works. Hence, if every art is
 apparent through its own special works, whereas

^a With §§ 207-209 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243-244. By "intermediate" is meant "common" or "vulgar" arts (cf. ἐς μέσον, "in public").

^b i.e. rule of life, programme of conduct.

σεως οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον ἔργον ἐξ οὗ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις.

210 Καὶ μὴν εἰ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις, οὐκ ἄλλον ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ὠφέλησεν ἢ τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὴν σοφόν, ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρασχομένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ κακὸν¹ ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ¹ ἀφορμαῖς. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸν σοφὸν ὠφελεί ἢ φρόνησις, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα

211 τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον. ὁ γὰρ λεγόμενος ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατὴς, καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ γίνεται ὁρμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ καθόσον ἔχει μὲν φαύλας ὁρμὰς περικρατεῖ δὲ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν λεχθεῖ ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσῃ οὐδὲ οὐκ

212 ἔχει. καὶ ᾧ τρόπῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατῆ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων μίξιν καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπιζήτησις τις γίνεται τούτων, ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξανααστῶσι τῆς ἐπιζήτησεως), τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῆ ῥητέον διὰ τὸ

213 μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οὐ ἔσται ἐγκρατὴς. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιόσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῆ, καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσι περιγίνεται δ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσι τὸ ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἢ φρόνησιν ἀκμὴν ἐν παραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἴτα καὶ κακοδαι-

214 μονέστερον τῶν φαύλων εὐρίσκεσθαι. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾶ ἐπὶ τι, πάντως ταράσσεται, ἢ δὲ περικρατεῖ

¹ κακὸν . . . ἀγαθοῦ Heintz: ἀγαθὸν . . . κακοῦ mss., Bekk.

of wisdom there is no special work through which it is apparent, then wisdom will not be an art of life.

Moreover, if wisdom is an art of life,^a it would have 210 benefited no one more than the wise man who possesses it, by furnishing him with self-control in his inclinations towards evil and in his disinclinations towards good. But wisdom does not in fact benefit the wise man, as we shall establish; therefore it is not an art of life. For the wise man who is termed 211 "self-controlled" is termed self-controlled either in respect of the fact that he has no inclination towards evil or disinclination towards good, or in respect of the fact that he has foolish inclinations but keeps them in control by his reason. But in respect of his not forming foolish judgements he will not be called self-controlled; for he will not control what he has not got. And just as one would not call the eunuch self- 212 controlled as regards sexual intercourse, nor the man with a bad stomach as regards the enjoyment of food (for they do not possess any appetite at all for these things, so that through self-control they might rise superior to the appetite),—in the same way one ought not to call the wise man self-controlled because the thing which he is to keep in control does not arise in him. And if they shall maintain that he is self- 213 controlled in respect of the fact that he forms foolish judgements but keeps them in control by his reason, they will be granting, firstly, that his wisdom has not benefited him at all, as he is still beset by perturbations and needing succour, and, secondly, that he is found to be even more unhappy than the foolish. For in that he has an inclination for something he 214 is certainly perturbed, and in that he controls it by

^a With §§ 210-215 cf. *P.H.* iii. 273-277.

τῷ λόγῳ, συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 μᾶλλον ταραττεται τοῦ φαύλου μηκέτι τοῦτο πά-
 σχοντος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὄρμῃ, ταραττεται, ἢ δὲ τυγ-
 χάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, ὑπεκλυομένην ἴσχει τὴν
 215 ταραχήν. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατῆς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ
 τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἶπερ γίνεται, πάντων
 ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονέστερος γίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ
 ἐκάστη τέχνη τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὴν ὠφελεῖ μᾶλλον,
 δέδεικται δὲ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀξιουμένη τυγχάνειν
 τέχνη μηδὲ τὸν κεκτημένον ὠφελούσα, ῥητέον μὴ
 εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην.

Ζ'.—ΕΙ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

- 216 Δυνάμει μὲν οὖν συναποδεδείκται τῷ μὴ εἶναι
 τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην τὸ μηδὲ διδακτὴν αὐτὴν
 καθεστάναι· τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων οὐ γίνεται μάθησις·
 ὁμῶς δ' ἐκ περιπτοῦ συγχωρήσαντες αὐτῆς τὴν
 217 ὑπαρξὴν διδάσκωμεν ὡς ἔστιν ἀδίδακτος. πολὺς
 μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλος ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ
 περὶ τῆς μαθήσεως λόγος· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε τὰ κυριώ-
 τατα ἐπιλεξάμενοι θήσομεν, ὧν τὰ μὲν κοινότερον
 ἐπιχειρεῖται παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ μηδὲν
 εἶναι μάθησιν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιαίτερον λέγεται περὶ
 αὐτῆς τῆς φρονήσεως. τάξει δὲ πρώτας σκοπῶμεν
 τὰς κοινότερας ἐπιχειρήσεις.
- 218 Ἐπὶ πάσης τοίνυν μαθήσεως ὁμολογεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ
 τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ
 τὸν μανθάνοντα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως.
 οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὁμολογον, ὡς δεῖξομεν· οὐκ
 ἄρα ἔστι τις μάθησις. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἐμνήσθημεν
 τοῦ διδασκομένου πράγματος, περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον
 219 ἀπορητέον. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τι πρᾶγμα, ἦτοι τὸ
 490

his reason he retains the evil within himself and is, on this account, more perturbed than the fool who is no longer affected in this way; for the latter is perturbed in that he feels inclination, but in that he obtains the things desired he has his perturbation gradually diminished. So then the wise man is not 215 self-controlled in virtue of his wisdom; or if he is so, he is of all men the most unhappy. But if every art especially benefits him who possesses it, and it has been shown that that which is, as they maintain, the art of life does not even benefit its possessor, one must declare that there does not exist any art of life.

CHAPTER VII.—CAN THE ART OF LIFE BE TAUGHT?

Now in the proof that no art of life exists there is 216 virtually involved the proof that it is incapable of being taught; for there is no learning of non-existent things. However, let us concede, gratuitously, that it exists, and let us teach that it cannot be taught. Now amongst the philosophers the arguments about 217 learning are many and varied; but we, for our part, shall select and state the most important points, of which some are the more general criticisms of the Sceptics which go to show that learning is nothing, and others the more special discussions of wisdom itself. And first in order let us consider the more general criticisms.

In every instance, then, of learning there ought to 218 be agreement regarding the subject taught and the teacher and the learner and the mode of learning; but, as we shall show, none of these things is agreed; therefore no learning exists. And since we have mentioned first the subject taught, we must raise questions about it first. Now if any subject is taught, 219

ὄν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθησόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταιί τι πρᾶγμα. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐ διδάσκεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν, ὥστ'
 220 οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν· τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν ἔστιν ἡ μάθησις. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐθύς καὶ ὑπαρκτὸν γενήσεται· ἀληθὲς γοῦν φασὶν οἱ στωικοὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειταιί τινι. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν διδά-
 σκεται. τό γε μὴν διδασκόμενον κινοῦν φαν-
 τασίαν διδάσκεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ δύναται κινεῖν
 221 φαντασίαν· οὐκ ἄρα διδακτὸν ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων ἔστι τὰληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι ψεῦδος. ἄτοπον δέ γε πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον εἶναι ψεῦδος· οὐ τοίωον τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται. ἐπεὶ τοι εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἦτοι καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καθὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ὄν διδα-
 χθήσεται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστω, ὥστ'
 222 οὐκ ἂν διδαχθῆι τὸ μὴ ὄν. λείπεται οὖν λέγειν τὸ ὄν διδάσκεσθαι· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων δείξομεν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν

either the existent is taught or the non-existent.^a But neither is the existent taught, as we shall show, nor the non-existent, as we shall argue; therefore no subject is taught. Now the non-existent is not taught; for it has no property, so that it has not that of being taught. And besides, if the non-existent is 220 taught, the non-existent will be true; for learning is of things true. And if the non-existent shall be true, it will straightway be real as well: for certainly the Stoics say that "the true is that which is real and is opposed to something."^b But it is absurd that the non-existent should be real. Therefore the non-existent is not taught. And, certainly, what is taught excites an impression when being taught, but the non-existent cannot excite an impression; therefore the non-existent is not capable of being taught. Furthermore, if the non-existent is taught, nothing 221 true is taught; for the true belongs to the class of things existent and real. And if nothing true is taught, everything which is taught is false. But it is, in fact, absurd that everything which is taught should be false; so then the non-existent is not taught. For, of course, if the non-existent is taught, it is taught either in virtue of its non-existence or in virtue of something else. Now it is not taught in virtue of its non-existence; for if the non-existent is taught in virtue of its non-existence, nothing existent will be taught; which is absurd. Nor yet in virtue of something else; for that "something else" exists, but the non-existent does not exist. So that the non-existent will not be taught.—It remains then to say that the existent is 222 taught; and this too we shall prove to be a thing impossible. For if the existent is taught, it is either

^a With §§ 219-223 cf. *P.H.* iii. 256-258.

^b *Cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 10.

ἐστιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καὶ εἰ μὲν καθὸ ὄν ἐστι
 διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδίδακτον· εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων
 οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἀδίδακτον, οὐδὲ γε ἔσται τὸ διδασκό-
 μενον· δεῖ γὰρ ἀδίδακτόν τι εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου
 μάθησις γένηται. ὥστε καθὸ μὲν ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν
 223 διδαχθεῖν τὸ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ
 γὰρ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι)¹ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὅπερ
 μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὄν
 ἐστιν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὐ διδάσκεται,
 οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὅτιποτέ
 ἐστιν ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν μήτε
 τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα
 οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων διδάσκεται.

224 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ τῶν τιῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστί σώματα
 τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, εἰ διδάσκεταιί τι, ἤτοι τὸ σῶμα
 διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ ἀσώματον· οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα
 διδάσκεται οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματον· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταιί
 τι. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα οὐ διδάσκεται, καὶ μάλιστα
 κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λεκτὰ γὰρ ἐστί τὰ
 225 διδασκόμενα, σῶμα δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὰ λεκτὰ. καὶ
 ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ σῶμα μήτε αἰσθητόν ἐστι μήτε νοητόν
 ἐστιν, οὐ διδάσκεται τὸ σῶμα. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ διδασκό-
 μενον ἢ αἰσθητόν εἶναι ἢ νοητόν, μητέτερον δὲ ὄν
 οὐ διδάσκεται. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὔτε αἰσθητόν ἐστὶν οὔτε
 νοητόν ἐστί τὸ σῶμα, παρεστάκαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς
 226 τοὺς φυσικοὺς. εἴαν τε γὰρ ἄθροισμός τις ἦ τὸ
 σῶμα, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, μεγέθους καὶ σχή-

¹ < τὸ . . . τῷ add. Heintz.

• With §§ 224-231 cf. *P.H.* iii. 255. "Something" was the highest category of the Stoics, cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxvi.

in virtue of its existence or in virtue of something else. But if it is taught in virtue of its existence, nothing will be untaught; and if of existing things none is untaught, neither will there exist anything taught; for something untaught must exist in order that from it learning may come about. So that the existent will not be taught in virtue of its existence. Nor yet in virtue of something else; <for the existent 223 has no other> property belonging to it which is non-existent, but every property which belongs to it is existent. So that if the existent is not taught in virtue of its existence, neither will it be taught in virtue of something else; for that other property, whatsoever it be, which belongs to it is existent. If, then, neither the existent is taught nor the non-existent, and besides these there is no other alternative, no existing thing is taught.

And again^a: since of the "Somethings" some are 224 bodies, others incorporeal, if something is taught either it is a body that is taught or an incorporeal; but neither is the body taught nor the incorporeal; therefore nothing is taught. Now the body is not taught, according to the Stoics especially; for the things taught are "expressions," and expressions are not bodies.^b And besides, if the body is neither 225 sensible nor intelligible, the body is not taught. For what is taught must be either sensible or intelligible, and if it is neither it is not taught. And the fact that body is neither sensible nor intelligible we have established in our treatise *Against the Physicists*.^c For whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combina- 226

^b For the incorporeality of "expressions" (*λεκτὰ*) cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 12; *P.H.* ii. 81.

^c See *Adv. Phys.* i. 437-439, 361 ff.; cf. *P.H.* ii. 47 ff.

ματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας, ἐάν τε τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον
 διαστάσεις μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ
 σύνοδον πλειόνων λαμβανόμενον οὐκ ἔστι τῆς
 227 ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ λογικῆς τιὸς δυνά-
 μως, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ
 αἰσθητὸν δὲ ὑπάρχοι, πάλιν ἀδίδακτον γενήσεται·
 τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν οὐδὲν διδάσκεται, οἷον οὐδεὶς
 λευκὸν δρᾶν μανθάνει, οὐδὲ γλυκέος γεύεσθαι, οὐχ
 ὑπὸ τιος εὐωδίζεσθαι ψύχεσθαι ἀλεινεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἀδιδάκτος ἔστιν ἢ πάντων τούτων ἀντίληψις. οὔτε
 τοῖνυν αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, οὔτ' εἰ αἰσθητὸν
 228 ὑπάρχει, κατὰ τοῦτ' ἔσται διδακτόν. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδ' ὡς νοητὸν δύναται διδάσκεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε
 τὸ μήκος κατ' ἰδίαν ἔσθι σῶμα μήτε τὸ πλάτος
 μήτε τὸ βάθος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων σύνθετον,
 δεήσει πάντων ἀσωμάτων ὄντων καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν
 229 αἴθροισμα ἐνοεῖν ἀσώματον καὶ οὐ σῶμα· διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἀδίδακτον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα. τῶν τε σω-
 μάτων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά. διόπερ
 εἰ διδάσκεται τὸ σῶμα, ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται
 ἢ τὸ νοητὸν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται διὰ
 τὸ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πᾶσι πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν,
 οὔτε τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλόγητα καὶ τὴν ἀνεπι-
 κριτον μέχρι τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνίαν, τῶν μὲν
 ἀτομον αὐτὸ λεγόντων τῶν δὲ τμητόν, καὶ τῶν μὲν
 ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν δὲ μεριστὸν καὶ εἰς
 230 ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι δυνάμενον. οὐκ ἄρα διδακτόν
 ἔστι τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον.
 ἢ γὰρ ἰδέα τίς ἔστι Πλατωνικὴ ἢ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς

^a With §§ 227-228 cf. P.H. iii. 254.

^b This last is the Stoic view, whereas the Epicureans be-
 lieved in indivisibles ("atoms").

tion of size and form and solidity, or whether it is that
 which has the three dimensions plus solidity, since it is
 not the part of the irrational sense but of some rational
 faculty to perceive everything which is perceived
 owing to the concurrence of several elements, body will
 not be an object of sense. And even if it should be 227
 sensible, it will, once again, be incapable of being
 taught.^a For no sensible thing is taught,—as, for
 instance, no one learns to see the white, or to taste
 the sweet, to derive a sweet smell from something,
 to feel cold or heat, but the perception of all these
 things is untaught. So, then, neither is body sensible
 nor, should it be sensible, will it on that account be
 capable of being taught.—Moreover, even supposing 228
 it to be intelligible it cannot be taught. For if
 neither length by itself is body, nor breadth nor
 depth, but the compound of them all, as they are all
 incorporeal we shall have to conceive of the combina-
 tion of them as being incorporeal and not body; and
 because of this body is also incapable of being taught.
 Also, some bodies are sensible, others intelligible. 229
 Hence, if body is taught, either the sensible is taught
 or the intelligible. But neither is the sensible
 taught (because it appears and is of itself quite
 evident to all), nor the intelligible (because of its
 obscurity and the hitherto undecided controversy
 about it, some saying that it is indivisible, others
 divisible, and some that it is without parts and
 minimal, others that it has parts and can be divided
ad infinitum^b). Body, therefore, is not capable of
 being taught.—Nor, indeed, is the incorporeal. For 230
 it is either a Platonic Idea, or the "expression" of

- στωικοῖς λεκτὸν ἢ κενὸν ἢ τόπος ἢ χρόνος ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. ὅ τι δ' ἂν ἦ τούτων, ἔτι ζητουμένην καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνουμένην ἔχει τὴν 231 ὑπόστασιν· τὸ δὲ τὰ ἔτι ἀμφισβητούμενα ὡς ἀνἀμφίλεκτα λέγειν διδάσκεισθαι τελέως ἐστὶν ἄπορον. ἀλλ' εἰ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, δέδεικται δὲ μηθὲν τούτων διδασκόμενον, οὐθὲν ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.
- 232 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ ψεῦδος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς αὐτόθεν φαίνεται· ἀληθές δ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν, ἄπορον ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου ἐδείξαμεν, καὶ περὶ ἀπόρων οὐκ ἐστὶ μαθήσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.
- 233 πρὸς τούτοις τὸ διδασκόμενον ἢ τεχνικὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἄτεχνον. ἀλλ' ἄτεχνον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ δεῖσεται μαθήσεως. εἰ δὲ τεχνικὸν ἐστὶν, ἤτοι αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἢ ἀδηλόν ἐστὶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν φαίνεται, καὶ ἄτεχνόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδιδασκόν· εἰ δὲ ἀδηλόν ἐστὶν, οὐ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀδηλεῖσθαι διδασκόν.
- 234 Ἐκ τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄπορον παρίσταται τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα· συναναιρείται δ' αὐτῷ ὁ τε διδάσκων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ διδάξει, ὁ τε μαθάνων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ μάθη. οὐθὲν δ' ἦττον ἔσται καὶ 235 ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ὁμοίας κινεῖν ἀπορίας. εἰ γάρ ἐστι τις ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ἔστι τις ὁ μαθάνων, ἤτοι τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάξει ἢ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ἐναλλάξ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην. οὐτε δὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 258 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 12.

^b With §§ 232-233 cf. *P.H.* iii. 253.

the Stoics, or void or place or time or something else of the kind.^a But whichever of these it be, its real existence is still a matter of doubt and of unsettled controversy. But to say that things still in dispute 231 are taught as though they were uncontroverted is perfectly absurd. But if of things existent some are bodies, others incorporeal, and it has been shown that none of these is taught, then what is taught is nothing.

Yet again : if anything is taught, it is either true 232 or false.^b But it is not false, as is apparent at once ; and if it is true it is doubtful, as we have shown in our chapter "On the Criterion," and concerning things doubtful no learning exists. Therefore what is taught does not exist.—Furthermore, what is 233 taught is either technical or non-technical. But it is not non-technical, since then it would not require learning. And if it is technical, either it is apparent of itself or it is non-evident. But if it is apparent of itself, it is both non-technical and incapable of being taught ; while if it is non-evident, because of the very fact of its being non-evident it is not capable of being taught.

By these arguments it is established that the thing 234 taught is open to doubt ^c ; and along with it both the teacher is abolished, because he will have nothing to teach, and the learner, because he will have nothing to learn. None the less, in their case also it will be possible to raise similar difficulties. For if a teacher 235 exists and a learner exists, either the expert will teach the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or conversely the expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert. But neither can the non-expert

* With §§ 234-238 cf. *P.H.* iii. 259-260.

διδάσκει δύναται, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς τὸν τυφλὸν
 ὀδηγεῖν, οὐθ' ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔχει πάντως ὁ διδάξει. οὔτε μὴν ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
 τεχνίτην, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς ὀδηγεῖν ποτὲ δύναται
 τὸν βλέποντα· πεπήρωται γὰρ ὁ ἰδιώτης εἰς τὰ τῆς
 236 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνεπιτήδειος πρὸς
 τὸ διδάσκειν. ἀπολείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὅτι ὁ
 τεχνίτης τὸν ἰδιώτην διδάσκει, ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀμη-
 χάνων· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης συνηπόρηται ἡμῖν τοῖς
 237 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήμασι, καὶ ὁ ἄτεχνος εἰ διδάσκεται
 καὶ γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἥτοι ὅτε ἄτεχνός ἐστι γίνεται
 τεχνίτης ἢ ὅτε τεχνίτης ἐστίν, οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄτεχνός
 ἐστὶ δύναται γίνεσθαι τεχνίτης, οὔτε ὅτε τεχνίτης
 238 ἐστὶν ἔτι γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἀλλ' ἐστίν. καὶ κατὰ
 λόγον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄτεχνος ἔοικε τῷ ἐκ γενετῆς
 τυφλῷ ἢ κωφῷ, καὶ ὃν τρόπον οὔτε ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς
 τυφλὸς εἰς ἐννοιαν ἔρχεται χρωμάτων οὔτε ὁ ἐκ
 γενετῆς κωφὸς εἰς ἐννοιαν ἔρχεται φωνῶν, οὕτω καὶ
 ὁ ἄτεχνος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος, πεπηρωμένος
 πρὸς τὴν τῶν τεχνικῶν θεωρημάτων ἀντίληψιν οὐ
 δύναται τούτων αὐτῶν ἔχειν τὴν γνῶσιν. ὁ δὲ
 τεχνίτης οὐκέτι διδάσκεται ἀλλὰ δεδιδάκται.
 239 Καὶ μὴν ὡς ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄπορα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεώς ἐστὶν ἄπορος. ἢ γὰρ ἐναρ-
 γεία γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργεία οὔτε λόγῳ
 γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς
 240 μαθήσεώς ἐστὶν εὐπορος. ἐναργεία μὲν οὖν οὐ
 γίνεται μάθησις, ἐπεὶ τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἢ
 ἐνάργεια, τὸ δὲ δεικτόν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 55.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 264.

• With §§ 239-242 cf. *P.H.* iii. 266-268.

teach the non-expert (just as the blind cannot lead
 the blind ^a) nor the expert the expert, for certainly
 he has nothing to teach him. Nor yet the non-expert
 the expert, just as the blind man can never lead the
 man who sees; for the layman is incapacitated for
 grasping the theorems of the art, and on this account is
 unfitted for teaching.—It remains, then, to say that the 236
 expert teaches the layman, which again is a thing im-
 practicable; for together with the theorems of the
 art the expert was doubted by us; and the non-expert 237
 too, if he is taught and becomes an expert, becomes
 an expert either when he is non-expert or when he is
 expert; but he cannot become an expert when he
 is non-expert, and when he is expert he no longer
 becomes an expert but is one. And reasonably so; 238
 for the non-expert resembles the man who is blind or
 deaf from birth, and just as he who is blind from birth ^b
 does not attain to a conception of colours, nor does
 he who is deaf from birth attain to a conception of
 sounds, so also the non-expert, in so far as he is non-
 expert, seeing that he is incapacitated for grasping
 the technical theorems cannot possess knowledge of
 them. And the expert is no longer being taught but
 has been taught.

Moreover, just as these things are doubtful, so also 239
 is the method of learning doubtful.^c For learning
 takes place either by the evidence of the senses or by
 speech. But, as we shall establish, it takes place
 neither by evidence nor by speech, so that the method
 of learning is not free from doubt either. Now 240
 learning is not by means of evidence, since evidence
 is of things pointed out. But what can be pointed
 out is apparent; and the apparent, in so far as it is

φαινόμενον, ἢ φαίνεται, κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
 241 ἐναργεῖα δευκτὸν διδακτὸν ἔστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ τι διδάσκεται. ἢ γὰρ σημαίνει τι ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐδὲ ἐν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μὴδὲ ἐν σημαίνων οὐδ' ἔστιαι τινὸς διδάσκαλος. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἦτοι φύσει σημαίνει ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν, <οἶον>¹ Ἕλληνας
 242 βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων, θέσει δ' εἶπερ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι ἀντιλήψονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἄπερ ἡγνόουν, ἀλλ' ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανοούμενοι ταυθ' ἄπερ ἤδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρῆζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως, καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες καθ' ὧν εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι
 243 αἱ λέξεις, οὐδενὸς ἀντιλήψιν ἔξουσιν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι πρᾶγμα μήτε ὁ διδάσκων μήτε ὁ μαθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν ἔστι μάθησις.

Κουώτερον μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖται τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι μάθησιν· ἐνέσται δὲ μεταφέρεω τὰς ἀπορίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν λεγομένην περὶ
 244 τὸν βίον τέχνην. ἦτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον ταύτην διδάξει ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα. οὔτε δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον λέγοιτ' ἂν ταύτην διδάσκειν, ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ τέλειοι κατ' ἀρετὴν εἰσι καὶ οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν δέεται μαθήσεως, οὔτε ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα, ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ χρεῖαν ἔχουσι μαθήσεως

¹ <οἶον> add. cj. Heintz.

* Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

apparent, is perceptible by all alike, and what is perceptible by all alike is incapable of being taught. Therefore what is pointed out by evidence is not capable of being taught. Nor yet is anything taught by speech. For either the speech signifies something 241 or it signifies nothing. But if it signifies nothing it will not be a teacher of anything. And if it signifies something, it signifies either by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature,^a because all men do not hear all men,—Greeks, for instance, barbarians and barbarians Greeks. And if it signifies by convention, evidently those who have apprehended 242 beforehand the objects to which the terms are assigned will comprehend those terms, not because they are taught by them things of which they were ignorant but by recalling and being reminded of the things which they knew; while those who need to learn the unknown things, and are in ignorance of the things to which the terms are assigned, will have no comprehension of anything. Wherefore, if neither the thing taught exists nor the teacher nor the learner 243 nor the method of learning, learning is nothing.

These, then, are the objections of a more general character brought forward by the Sceptics to show the non-existence of learning^b; and it will be possible also to apply these difficulties in turn to the so-called art of life. For either the wise man will teach this to the wise, or the unwise to the unwise, or the unwise 244 to the wise, or the wise to the unwise. But neither would the wise man be said to teach it to the wise (for both are perfect in virtue and neither of them needs to learn), nor the unwise to the unwise (for both of them have need of learning and neither of

^b With §§ 243-246 cf. P.H. iii. 270-272.

καὶ οὐθέτερος αὐτῶν φρόνιμος (ἔστιν),¹ ἵνα τὸν
 245 ἕτερον διδάξῃ. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἄφρων διδάξει τὸν
 φρόνιμον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ τυφλὸς μνηστικός γίνεται τῷ
 βλέποντι χρωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα τὸν φρόνιμον
 246 διδακτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἄφρονος· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν
 ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἀγα-
 θῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων
 τινὰ φρόνησιν, ἄγνοιαν δὲ ἔχων τούτων πάντων,
 διδάσκοντος τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ
 οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ
 γνώσεται δ' αὐτά. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν
 ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε
 ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων γνωριστική. οὐχὶ
 δὲ γε τούτων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεω-
 ρητική· ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλήψεται τῶν ὑπὸ
 τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν
 247 τῆς φρονήσεως λόγον. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς
 πηρὸς, μέχρις οὗ πηρὸς ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν
 χρωμάτων, καὶ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφός, μέχρις οὗ
 κωφός ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται φωνῶν, οὕτω καὶ
 ὁ ἄφρων, ἐφ' ὅσον ἄφρων ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται
 τῶν φρονίμως λεγομένων καὶ πραττομένων. οὐδ'
 ὁ φρόνιμος ἄρα δύναται τοῦ ἄφρονος ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν
 248 βίον τέχνῃ καθηγεῖσθαι. καὶ μὴν εἰ ὁ φρόνιμος
 διδάσκει τὸν ἄφρονα, θεωρητικὴ ὀφείλει εἶναι ἡ
 φρόνησις τῆς ἀφροσύνης ὡπερ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τῆς
 ἀτεχνίας· οὐχὶ δὲ γε ἡ φρόνησις δύναται εἶναι
 θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἀφροσύνης· οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ
 ἄφρονος ἐστὶ διδακτικός. ὁ γὰρ γενόμενος φρό-
 νιμος ἐκ τινος συνασκήσεως καὶ τριβῆς (φύσει γὰρ

¹ <ἔστιν> addo (post αὐτῶν add. Mutsch.).

them is wise so as to teach the other). Nor yet will 245
 the unwise teach the wise; for neither is the blind
 man capable of instructing the man who sees about
 colours. It only remains, therefore, that the wise
 man is capable of teaching the unwise; and this too
 is a matter of doubt. For if wisdom is "the science 246
 of things good and evil and neither,"^a the unwise
 man, when the wise man is teaching him the things
 good and evil and neither, will merely hear the things
 spoken and will not know the things themselves,^b
 since he does not possess any wisdom but is in ignor-
 ance of all these things. For if he should comprehend
 them while he is in a state of unwisdom, unwisdom
 will be capable of knowing things good and evil and
 neither. But, according to them, unwisdom is not
 capable of perceiving these things; therefore the
 unwise man will not comprehend the things said or
 done by the wise man in pursuance of the rule of his
 wisdom. And just as he who is blind from birth,^c so 247
 long as he is blind, has no conception of colours, and
 he who is deaf from birth, so long as he is deaf, does
 not apprehend sounds, so also the unwise man, in so
 far as he is unwise, does not comprehend things
 wisely said and done. Neither, therefore, can the
 wise man guide the unwise in the art of life.—
 Moreover, if the wise man teaches the unwise, wisdom 248
 must be cognisant of unwisdom, even as art is of lack
 of art; but wisdom cannot be cognisant of unwisdom;
 therefore the wise man is not capable of teaching the
 unwise. For he who has become wise owing to some
 joint exercise^d and practice (for no one is such by

^a Cf. § 170 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 238, 242 *supra*.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 175. With § 247 *cf.* P.H. iii. 264.

^d i.e. simultaneous training of several parts or faculties:
cf. Adv. Log. i. 146.

οὐδείς ἐστι τοιοῦτος) ἤτοι ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ
 τῆς ἀφροσύνης προσεκτῆσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἢ κατὰ
 τὴν ἐκείνης ἀποβολὴν καὶ τὴν ταύτης κτῆσιν γέγονε
 249 φρόνιμος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς
 ἀφροσύνης προσεκτῆσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἔσται ὁ
 αὐτὸς φρόνιμος ἅμα καὶ ἀφρων· ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.
 εἰ δ' ἀποβολῇ ἐκείνης ἐκτῆσατο ταύτην, οὐ δυνή-
 σεται διὰ τῆς ὑστερογενοῦς διαθέσεως τὴν προ-
 οῦσαν διάθεσιν, νῦν δὲ μὴ παρούσαν γνωρίζειν.
 250 καὶ εἰκότως. παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ
 ἢ νοητοῦ γίνεταί κατάληψις ἤτοι κατὰ ἐνάργειαν
 περιπτωτικῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιπτωτικῶς
 πεφηνότων ἀναλογιστικὴν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην
 251 ἤτοι ὁμοιωτικὴν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους
 εἰκόνος γνωρίζηται ὁ μὴ παρὼν Σωκράτης, ἢ
 συνθετικὴν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου κατ'
 ἐπισύνθεσιν νοῶμεν τὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἵπποκένταυρον,
 ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που παραυξητικῶς μὲν λαμβάνηται ὁ Κύκλωψ, ὃς
 οὐκ ἐψέκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψι ὑλήεντι,

252 μειωτικῶς δὲ ὁ πυγμαῖος ἄνθρωπος. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ
 τῇ φρονήσει λαμβάνεται ἢ ἀφροσύνη καὶ τῷ φρο-
 νίμῳ ὁ ἀφρων, ἤτοι κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται ἢ
 κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν. οὔτε
 δὲ κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται (οὐδείς γὰρ ὡς
 λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν κατὰ
 περίπτωσιν ἔγνω, οὔτω καὶ ἀφροσύνην) οὔτε κατὰ

nature) either has acquired wisdom in addition while
 his unwisdom still subsists within him, or else has
 become wise through getting rid of the latter and
 acquiring the former. But if he has acquired wisdom 249
 in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within
 him, the same man will be at once both wise and un-
 wise, which is impossible. And if he has acquired the
 former by getting rid of the latter, he will not be able
 to know his pre-existing condition, which is not now
 present, by means of a condition of later origin. And 250
 naturally so^a; for certainly the apprehension of
 every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes
 about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or
 by way of analogical inference from things which
 have appeared empirically, this latter being either
 through resemblance (as when Socrates, not being
 present, is recognized from the likeness of Socrates), 251
 or through composition (as when from a man and a
 horse we form by compounding them the conception
 of the non-existent hippocentaur), or by way of
 analogy (as when from the ordinary man there is
 conceived by magnification the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of
 the mountains,^b

and by diminution the pygmy). Hence, if unwisdom 252
 is perceived by wisdom and also the unwise man by
 the wise, the perception takes place either by experi-
 ence or by inference from experience. But the per-
 ception does not take place by experience (for no one
 gets to know wisdom in the same way as white and
 black and sweet and bitter), nor by inference from

^a With §§ 250-251 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 58-60; *Adv. Phys.*
 i. 393-395.

^b Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191; cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 45.

τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν εἰκὸς ἀφροσύνη· [εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τούτου ποιεῖται τὴν μετάβασιν ὁ φρόνιμος, ἥτοι ὁμοιωτικὴν ἢ συνθετικὴν ἢ ἀναλογιστικὴν,]¹ ὥστε οὐ
 253 λήψεται ποτε τὴν ἀφροσύνην ἢ φρόνησιν. ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως τις ἔρει ὅτι ὁ φρόνιμος τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ φρονήσει τὴν περὶ ἄλλον ἀφροσύνην δύναται κατανοεῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθες. ἡ γὰρ ἀφροσύνη διάθεσίς
 254 ἐστὶν ἔργων τῶν ἀποδοτικῆ. εἰ οὖν αὐτὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρεῖ καὶ καταλαμβάνεται ὁ φρόνιμος, ἥτοι αὐτὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καταλήψεται τὴν διάθεσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ἐπιβάλλων ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ αὐτὴν
 255 γνωρεῖ, καθάπερ τὴν μὲν ἰατρικὴν διάθεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰατρικῶς γινομένων ἔργων, τὴν δὲ ζωγραφικὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ζωγραφικῶς γινομένων. οὔτε δὲ αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς δύναται τὴν διάθεσιν λαβεῖν· ἀφανὴς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀθεώρητος, καὶ οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος μορφῆς περιαιρηθῆσαι· οὔτε ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτῆς ἀποδιδόμενων ἔργων· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἔργα, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν, κοινὰ
 256 φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἐστίν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα διδάξῃ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, δεῖ θεωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς ἀφροσύνης καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τεχνίτην τῆς ἀτεχνίας, δέδεικται δ' ἀληπτος αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφροσύνη, οὐκ ἂν δύνατο ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην διδάσκειν.
 257 Καὶ δὴ τὰ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἠθικὸν τόπον ζητουμένων ἠπορηκότες, ἐν τοσοῦτοις τὴν σύμπασαν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διέξοδον ἀπαρτίζομεν.

¹ [εἰ δ' . . . ἀναλογιστικὴν] secl. ego (ἀλλ' L, ἢν' E, οὐδ' R, εἰ δ' cet., Bekk.: ? ἢν' . . . ποιῆται κτλ.).

experience (for no existing thing resembles un wisdom) [But if the wise man makes the inference from this, it is either through resemblance or through composition or through analogy]; so that wisdom will never perceive un wisdom.—Yes, but possibly someone will
 253 say that the wise man can discern the un wisdom of another by the wisdom within himself; but this is puerile. For un wisdom is a condition productive of certain works. If, then, the wise man sees and
 254 apprehends this in another, either he will apprehend the condition directly by means of itself, or by attention to its works he will also get to know the condition itself, just as one knows the condition of the medical
 255 man from works in accordance with the art of medicine, and that of the painter from works in accordance with the art of painting. But he cannot perceive the condition by means of itself; for it is obscure and invisible, and it is not possible to view it closely through the shape of the body; nor by means of the works which result from it; for all the apparent works are, as we showed above,^a common to wisdom and un wisdom alike. But if it is necessary
 256 that the wise man, in order that he may teach the art of life to the un wise, should himself be capable of perceiving un wisdom—even as the artist lack of art,—and it has been shown that un wisdom is to him imperceptible, then the wise man will not be able to teach the un wise the art of life.

So now that we have critically discussed the most
 257 essential of the problems which belong to the department of Ethics, we herewith bring to a close the whole of our exposition of the Sceptic Way.^b

^a See §§ 197-209 *supra*.

^b For this expression cf. *P.H.* i. 4 n.

GLOSSARY

[In the Glossary and Indexes the following abbreviations are used:

- I. = Introduction (in Vol. I.);
- P. = "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I.);
- L. = "Against the Logicians" (in Vol. II.);
- Ph. = "Against the Physicists" (in Vol. III.);
- E. = "Against the Ethicists" (in Vol. III.).]

- ἀγωγή*, (doctrinal) procedure, method: *ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγ.*, "the Sceptic Way," P. i. 4, 7, etc.
- ἀδιάκριτος*, indistinguishable, P. ii. 152, 155 f.
- ἀδιάπτωτος* (*φαντασία*), unerring, infallible, L. i. 110, etc.
- ἀδιάστροφος*, unperverted, acting instinctively, P. iii. 194.
- ἀδιάφορα*, "indifferents," *i.e.* (in Stoic ethics) things which lie midway between "good" and "evil"; see P. iii. 177, Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii.
- ἀδοξάστως* (oppd. to *δογματικῶς*), undogmatically, P. i. 15.
- ἀθετεῖν*, set aside, reject, L. i. 260; so *ἀθέτησις*, L. ii. 142;
- ἄθετος πρὸς* (*τι*), unfitted for, L. i. 183.
- ἀθιγής*, intangible, Ph. i. 281, etc.
- αἰρεσιάρχης*, leader or Head of a School or sect, P. iii. 245.
- αἶρεσις*, choice, approval, preference, P. i. 230; "doctrinal rule," P. i. 16; sect, School, L. i. 27, etc.
- αἶρετά*, preferred, choiceworthy (oppd. to *φευκτά*), P. i. 55, etc.
- ἀκαθεκτούμενον* (oppd. to *κατεχόμενον*), unoccupied (space), P. iii. 124, Ph. ii. 3.
- ἀκαρές*: *πρὸς ἀκ.*, for a moment, suddenly, E. 154.
- ἀκαριαῖος*, minute, momentary, P. i. 132, iii. 142: *κατὰ τὸ ἀκ.*, to the smallest extent, a hair's breadth, P. iii. 79.
- ἀκαταληπτεῖν*, be non-apprehensive, fail to grasp, P. i. 201; so *ἀκατάληπτος*, P. ii. 22: *ἀκαταληψία*, P. i. 1.
- ἀκμήν* (*adv. accus.*), still, just (while), P. ii. 11, iii. 276, L. ii. 257, E. 213.
- ἀκολουθία*, (logical) sequence, coherence, P. i. 16, ii. 114: pursued method, practice, P. i. 237.
- ἀκύλιστος* (Timon), lacking in versatility or energy, Ph. i. 57.

GLOSSARY

- ἀμνήριος** (c. genit., Timon), untroubled by, heedless of, P. i. 224.
- ἀμφιβολία**, verbal ambiguity, P. ii. 256 (cf. Diog. L. vii. 62).
- ἀναιρεῖν**, abolish (logically), deny (oppd. to *τιθέναι*, posit, affirm), P. i. 19, iii. 119, etc.
- ἀναλογία**, proportion, L. i. 106.
- ἀναλογισμὸς**, (reasoning from) analogy, P. i. 147; so *ἀναλογιστικός*, E. 250.
- ἀνάλυσις** (*συλλογισμῶν*), analysis, resolution, L. ii. 231.
- ἀναμφίλεκτος** (oppd. to *ἀμφισβητούμενος*), undisputed, E. 231.
- ἀναντίτυπος** (oppd. to *ἀντίτυπος*), non-resistant, yielding, Ph. i. 411.
- ἀναπόδεικτοι** (*λόγοι*), indemonstrable (of syllogisms or principles assumed, as not requiring demonstration), P. i. 69 n., ii. 156 ff.; so *ἀναποδείκτως*, without demonstration, P. i. 60, etc.
- ἀνασκευαστικός**, (logically) destructive, contradictory (oppd. to *κατασκευαστικός*), L. ii. 196.
- ἀναστροφή**: *κατὰ ἄν.*, reversely, *vice versa*, L. i. 430; so *ἀναστροφῶς*, L. i. 302, etc.
- ἀνεπίκριτος** (*διαφάνεια*), incapable of decision, unsettled, P. i. 98, 112, etc.; so *ἀνεπικρισία*, E. 182.
- ἀνεπίνοητος**, inconceivable, P. ii. 22, etc.; so *-ήτως*, imperceptibly, P. iii. 145.
- ἀνεπίτατος**, inextensible, Ph. ii. 272 (cf. *ἐπίτασις*).
- ἀνετεροίωτος**, immutable, unaltered, L. ii. 455.
- ἀνέφικτος**, unattainable, E. 130.
- ἀνηρεμήτως**, unrestingly, Ph. ii. 223.
- ἀνθυποφέρειν**, object, retort, L. i. 440.
- ἀνοχητικῶς**, by heaving up, Ph. ii. 83 f.
- ἀντακολουθεῖν**, mutually follow, involve, be interdependent, P. i. 68 (cf. Diog. L. vii. 125).
- ἀντίληψις**, perception, apprehension, P. i. 44, etc.; so *ἀντιληπτικός*, P. i. 70.
- ἀντιπαρατείνεσθαι**, be stretched out side by side with, be extended so as to equal, Ph. i. 262, etc.
- ἀντιπαραεξαγωγή**: *κατὰ ἀντ.*, by way of attacking, as a counterblast, L. i. 150.
- ἀντιπαρήκειν**, stretch parallel to, be co-extensive with, L. i. 361, etc.
- ἀντιπεριέλκειν**, draw round to the other side, convert to an opposite belief, L. i. 189.

GLOSSARY

- ἀντιπίπτειν**, conflict, tell against, refute, P. i. 179, etc.: (c. dat.) L. i. 333.
- ἀντιποίησης**, seeking possession of, pursuit of, P. iii. 183.
- ἀντιστηρίζειν** (Democr.), press against, resist, L. i. 136.
- ἀντιστροφος**, corresponding, equivalent, L. i. 6.
- ἀντιτυπία**, resistance, solidity, P. iii. 39, etc.
- ἀνυπαρξία** (oppd. to *ὑπαρξίς*), unreality, non-existence, P. i. 21, etc.; so *ἀνυπαρκτος*, P. i. 104, etc.
- ἀνυπόστατος**, non-substantial, unreal, P. ii. 80.
- ἀντικώτατος** (*λόγος*), most effective, Ph. i. 182.
- ἀνωτάτω** (as adj.), most generic (or inclusive), main types of, P. i. 4, iii. 65; so *κατὰ τὸ ἄν.*, Ph. ii. 38, 45.
- ἀξίωμα**, (logical) judgement, proposition, assertion, P. i. 189, ii. 81, etc.
- ἀοριστία**, (Sceptic) indeterminateness, refusal to define, P. i. 198; so *ἀοριστέω*, P. i. 28.
- ἀόριστος** (*δύαδ*, Pythagorean), indefinite (Dyad, *i.e.* the "two" as principle of plurality), P. iii. 154.
- ἀόχλησία** (Epicur. and Sceptic), unperturbedness, serenity, P. i. 10; so *ἀόχλητος*, P. i. 29.
- ἀπαξία** (oppd. to *ἀξία*, Stoic ethics), worthlessness, E. 62.
- ἀπαράλλακτος**, indistinguishable, P. iii. 177, etc.; so *ἀπαράλλαξία*, L. i. 108, 403, etc.
- ἀπαρροπίστος**, unimpeded, clear, L. ii. 187, E. 76.
- ἀπαρέμφατον**, infinitive (mood), P. i. 204.
- ἀπαρτίζειν**, complete, express fully, P. ii. 176, E. 257.
- ἀπειρομεγέθης**, infinitely large, P. iii. 44.
- ἀπειρον**: *εἰς ἄπ.*, (regress) *ad infinitum*, P. ii. 78, etc.; so *μέχρις ἀπείρου*, P. i. 122, etc.
- ἀπεκλογή** (oppd. to *ἐκλογή*, Stoic), rejection, E. 133.
- ἀπεμφάνειν**, be incongruous, absurd, P. i. 112, ii. 188, etc.; so *ἀπέμφασις*, P. iii. 61 (= "improbable presentation," Carneades), L. i. 169.
- ἀπερίαντος** (*λόγος*), indefinite, inconclusive, L. ii. 429.
- ἀπεριέργως**, simply, not positively or dogmatically, P. 240.
- ἀπερίσπαστος** (*φαντασία*), irreversible, indubitable, P. i. 227, L. i. 166.
- ἀπλανής**, unerring, infallible, L. i. 138, 146, etc.; so *ἀπλανησία*, L. i. 394.
- ἀπλάτεις** (*μήκος*), (length) without breadth (def. of *γραμμῆς*), P. iii. 39, Ph. ii. 279, etc.

GLOSSARY

ἀποπαθεῖς (*αἰσθήσεις*), simply-passive, *i.e.* receptive of only one kind of impression, P. iii. 47, 108.
ἀπό: οἱ ἀπὸ (τῆς Στωῆς), members of (the Stoic School), P. iii. 181 etc.
ἀποβρασμός, frothy emission (of a fluid), Ph. i. 103.
ἀπόδοσις, account rendered, description, E. 30.
ἀποδοτικός (c. genit.), productive of, E. 253.
ἄποιος (*ἄλη*), devoid of quality, P. iii. 33, Ph. ii. 310, etc.
ἀποκληρωτικός, acting at random, capricious, P. iii. 79.
ἀπολείπειν (oppd. to *ἀναίρειν*), admit, allow (the existence or truth of a thing), P. ii. 43, 219, etc.
ἀπόλυτα (oppd. to *πρὸς τι*), absolute, existing in their own right, L. ii. 273; so *ἀπολύτως*, P. i. 135, etc., and *ἀπολελυμένος*, L. ii. 162.
ἀποπάλλειν, hurl away, Ph. ii. 73: *ἀποπαλικῶς*, by way of rebound, Ph. ii. 223.
ἀποπροηγμένα (oppd. to *προηγμένα*), unpreferred, rejected, P. iii. 191, E. 62.
ἀπορητικός, doubting, sceptical: οἱ ἀπ., Sceptics; ἡ ἀπ., Scepticism; P. i. 7, 221, etc.; so *ἀπορητικῶς*, L. i. 30, etc.
ἀποροπόρητον (*σῶμα*), made without pores, impermeable, L. ii. 309.
ἀποσυμβεβηκότα (oppd. to *συμβεβηκότα*), non-attributes, not properties, L. i. 281.
ἀποσυεργεῖν, thwart, counteract, P. i. 212.
ἀποτελεσμα, completed result, product, P. iii. 11, 14, etc.; so *ἀποτελεσματική*, E. 197, *ἀποτελεστικόν*, P. iii. 27.
ἀποτομή: κατ' ἀπ., separately, independently, L. i. 446.
ἀπόφασις, declaration, formula, P. i. 5; affirmation (*καταληπτική ἀπ.*), P. ii. 123; so *ἀποφαντόν*, declaratory, P. ii. 104, *ἀποφαντικόν*, L. ii. 71.
ἀπόφασις, negation, P. i. 192; *ἀποφατικόν*, negating, negative, P. i. 192, ii. 161, etc.
ἀποφορά, effluvia, scent, P. i. 101; so *ἀποφόρησις*, P. i. 126.
ἀπτερέως (Xenophanes), without wavering, firmly, L. i. 111.
ἀπτότως, firmly, securely, L. ii. 187.
ἀραιώματα (*νοητά*), interstices, pores, L. ii. 220.
ἀρρηψία (Sceptic), state of even balance, equipoise, mental neutrality, P. i. 190, L. ii. 159, etc.
ἄρσις (oppd. to *θέσις*), removal, abolition, denial, P. i. 70, 192, iii. 86, etc.

GLOSSARY

ἀρχικώτατον (*αἴτιον*), most principal, original, supreme, Ph. i. 5, etc.
ἄσημοι (*φωναί*), non-significant, without distinct meaning, P. ii. 130.
ἀστεία (*κίνησις*), soothing, kindly, P. iii. 184, L. i. 42, 45.
ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν, withhold assent (= *ἐπέχεω*), L. i. 157.
ἀσύνακτος (*λόγος*), inconclusive (oppd. to *συνακτικός*), P. ii. 137, etc.
ἀσυνάρτητα (*λήμματα*), inconsistent, without logical coherence, P. ii. 153 (*cf.* *διάρρησις*).
ἀσυνύπαρκτος, incapable of co-existence, P. ii. 202.
ἀσύστατος (*ἐπίνοια*), without cohesion, impossible to construct, P. ii. 27.
ἀταραξία (Sceptic), unperturbedness, quietude (of mind), P. i. 8, 25, etc.; so *ἀταρακτεῖν*, P. i. 12, etc., and *ἀταραχῶς*, E. 118, etc.
αὐτόθεν, of itself, at once, *ipso facto*, P. ii. 164, *passim*.
αὐτοτελής, self-complete, P. ii. 104; so *αὐτοτελῶς*, wholly of itself, independently, Ph. i. 237, etc.
αὐτότης: κατ' αὐτότητα *ἑάντης*, in its self-identity, Ph. ii. 261.
ἀφαίρεσις (oppd. to *πρόσθεσις*), subtraction, P. iii. 84, (distingd. fr. *ἄρσις*) P. iii. 86, (fr. *ἀναίρεσις*) Ph. i. 298.
ἄφάνταστος (*φύσις*), devoid of apprehension, non-perceptive (oppd. to *νοερά*), Ph. i. 114.
ἄφασία (oppd. to *φάσις*), non-assertion, (Sceptic) refusal to say "Yes" or "No" about anything, P. i. 192, ii. 211.
ἀφορμή (oppd. to *ὀρμή*), disinclination, aversion (Stoic), P. iii. 177, 273-274, E. 210-211.

βίος, life, ordinary belief or conduct, P. i. 237; hence *ὁ βίος* and *οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ β.*, ordinary folk (oppd. to philosophers), P. i. 165, etc., E. 49; so *βιωτικός*, P. i. 23; *βιωτικά* (*κριτήρια*), ordinary, taken from common life, P. ii. 15.

γενικώταται (*αἰρέσεις*), most comprehensive, leading (Schools), L. i. 27.
γῆθος, joy, delight, E. 106.
γλυκαντικῶς (*κινεῖσθαι*), (be affected by, or taste) sweetness, L. i. 344.
γνησίη (oppd. to *σκοτίη*), genuine, true (*γνώσις* Democr.), L. i. 138-139.

GLOSSARY

γυμναστικοὶ (λόγοι), exercitatory, providing mental exercise (of the Socratic dialogues of Plato), P. i. 221.

- δεδολευμένος (λόγος), cunningly framed (sophism), P. ii. 229.
 δείγμα, indication, example, proof, P. i. 85; so δείγματος χάρην, by way of example, as specimens, E. 40.
 δείξis, pointing out, indicating, P. ii. 25, etc.; so δευκτικῶς, L. i. 267.
 διαγνωστική, capable of distinguishing, P. ii. 229; so διάγνωσις, ascertaining distinctly, discerning, L. i. 24.
 διάθεσις, condition, disposition, state (of mind or body), P. iii. 243, etc.
 διαθήκη (Democr.) = διάθεσις, L. i. 136.
 διαίρεσις, division (4 kinds of), P. ii. 213 ff.; τέλειος δ., E. 10; so διααιρετική, P. ii. 213.
 διάκενος (έλκυσμός), vacuous (attraction), of a purely subjective impression, L. i. 241, ii. 67.
 διαλεκτική, dialectic, logic (Stoic def., "Science of things false and true and neither"), P. ii. 94, 213, etc.; so of διαλεκτικοί, the Logicians, P. ii. 146, etc.
 διάλληλος (τρόπος), circular mode (of reasoning), arguing in a circle, P. i. 117, 164, etc.; so δ' δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος, P. ii. 202, L. i. 426, etc.
 διά πασῶν (συμφωνία), the octave-scale (ratio of 2 : 1), P. iii. 155, L. i. 95; so διὰ τεσσάρων (= 4 : 3), and διὰ πέντε (= 3 : 2), *loc. cit.* (all terms of Pythagorean musical theory).
 διαπίπτειν, collapse, fail, go wrong, P. i. 185, (oppd. to κατορθοῦν) Ph. ii. 252.
 διάρρησις, inconsistency, lack of congruity (in the premisses of an argument), P. ii. 146, 152, L. ii. 429.
 διάστασις, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 11, 118, 177; (Spatial) dimension, P. iii. 44, 125, etc.; so (τριχῆ) διαστατόν, P. ii. 30, etc.
 διαφορά: τὰ κατὰ δ. (oppd. to τὰ πρὸς τ), things which have a distinct existence of their own, self-existent (= ἀπόλυτα, absolutes), P. i. 137, L. ii. 37, 161, Ph. ii. 263.
 διαφορούμενον (ἀξίωμα), duplicated, P. ii. 112, L. ii. 108, etc. (*cf.* Diog. L. vii. 69 : ? διαφορ., as Prantl).
 διεξωδευμένη (φαντασία), thoroughly scrutinized, tested, P. i. 227, L. i. 181, 438 (*cf.* περιωδευμένη).
 διήκεν (Methodic School), pervade, P. i. 240 n.; Ph. i. 40.
 διολκή, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 322.

GLOSSARY

- διομαλιωμός, evenness, uniform quality, P. iii. 244, E. 206; so διομαλίζειν, not vary, E. 207.
 διοριστικός, capable of distinguishing, L. i. 64; serving to divide, marking off, Ph. ii. 128.
 διπλασίων (λόγος), duplicate (ratio), double, L. i. 97.
 διχάζειν, cut in two, divide, Ph. i. 292; so διχοτόμησης, bisection, Ph. i. 284.
 δογματολογία, expositions of dogmas, L. ii. 367.
 δοκιμαστικός, capable of scrutinizing, testing, L. i. 27, etc.
 δόκος (= δόξα, Xenophanes), opinion, P. ii. 18.
 δόκωσις, laying beams, rafting, P. iii. 99, Ph. i. 343.
 δοξαστής, one who opines, conjecturer, L. i. 157; so δοξαστικῶς, E. 156.
 δόξις (= δόξα, Democr.), opinion, L. i. 137.
 δραστήριος (ἀρχή), active, efficient, L. i. 115, etc.; so δραστική, P. iii. 1, δραστικώτατον (αἴτιον), P. iii. 2.
 δύναμις, ability, potency, P. i. 8, etc.; δυνάμει (oppd. to ἐνεργεία), potentially, virtually, implicitly, P. i. 11, ii. 225-226; ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις = medicines, P. i. 133, E. 153.
 ἐγγράμματος (φωνή), written (speech), Ph. ii. 249.
 ἐγκεκαλυμμένος (λόγος), "the Veiled" (classed, with the "Sorites," among the "insoluble" (ἀποροὶ) arguments by the Stoics, see Diog. L. vii. 82), L. i. 410.
 ἐβλοκωφείν, affect deafness, be wilfully obtuse, E. 202.
 εἰδησις, cognition, awareness, L. i. 163.
 εἶδος (oppd. to ὄλη), form, Ph. ii. 26; (distingd. fr. γένος) species, particular, L. ii. 41; so οἱ (τὰ) ἐπ' εἶδους (or κατ' εἶδος), particulars, individual cases, L. i. 20, E. 9, etc.
 εἰδωλοποιήσεις, image-formations, imaginary objects, P. ii. 222.
 εἰλικρίνεια, purity, Ph. i. 73; ἡ κατ' εἰλ. κίνησις, absolute (or complete) motion, Ph. ii. 113; so εἰλικρινῆς κριτής, impartial (perfect) judge, P. i. 113; εἰλικρινῶς, clearly, absolutely, P. i. 207, ii. 25, etc.
 εἰζίς (oppd. to ἀπιτυπία), yielding, non-resistance, Ph. ii. 221 ff.
 εἰσοχή (oppd. to ἐξοχή), concavity, depression, P. i. 92, ii. 70, etc.
 ἐκβάλλειν, throw over, reject, P. i. 177, etc.; ἐκβ. εἰς ἄπειρον, make regress *ad infinitum*, P. i. 164.
 ἐκκαλυπτικός, serving to reveal, disclosing, P. ii. 101, 116, etc.; so ἐκκαλυπτικῶς, by way of disclosure, P. ii. 141.

ἐκπεριθεύειν, (go right round,) inspect closely, scrutinize, L. i. 188 (*cf.* διεξοθεύειν).
 ἐκπίπτειν (c. genit.), be ousted from, lose, L. i. 268, etc.;
 ἐκπ. εἰς (ἀπειρον), be forced off into, be lost (wrecked) in, P. i. 186, ii. 253, etc.; so ἐκπτώσις, P. ii. 207, etc.
 ἐλαστρεῖν (= ἐλαύνειν, Timon), drive, worry, E. 172.
 ἐλκυσμός (διάκενος), (vacuous) attraction, or compulsion (of wholly subjective impressions), L. i. 241.
 ἐμμέθοδος (λόγος), orderly, systematic, P. ii. 21, 48.
 ἐμπειρία, practice, experience, P. ii. 256; (medical) empiricism, P. i. 236, L. ii. 191; so ἐμπειρικῶς (ιατρούειν), L. ii. 204.
 ἐμπέλαισις, approach, impact, Ph. i. 393; so ἐμπελάζειν (Democr.), Ph. i. 19.
 ἐμφασίς (reflection), probable subjective appearance (Carneades), L. i. 169; implication, P. ii. 112; indication, allusion, P. iii. 199.
 ἐναλλαγή (στοιχείων), interchange (of letters), Ph. i. 278.
 ἐναλλάξ, alternately, in turn, *alternando*, P. i. 9, 186, etc.
 ἐναπειροκαλεῖν, (deal tastelessly), fool with, P. ii. 245.
 ἐναπεισφραγισμένη (φαντασία), stamped (or imprinted) on (the mind), P. ii. 4; so ἐναπεισφραγισμένος, E. 183.
 ἐναπόθεσις (καταλήψεων), storing within, deposit, P. iii. 188.
 ἐναπομεμαγμένη (φαντασία), impressed upon (the mind), P. ii. 4 (*cf.* E. 183).
 ἐνάργεια (oppd. to λόγος), sensible evidence, P. iii. 266; sense-impression (= φαντασία, Epicur.), L. i. 203.
 ἐναρθροί (φωναί), articulate, L. ii. 275.
 ἐνδεικτικόν (σημείον), indicative (sign), P. ii. 99 ff., L. i. 161.
 ἐνδειξις, indication (techn. term of the Methodic School of Medicine), P. i. 240.
 ἐνδιάθετος (oppd. to προφορικὸς) λόγος, internal reason, mental discourse, P. i. 65, L. ii. 275.
 ἐνδιήκουσαι (κοινότητες), pervading (of a class qualifying all its particulars), L. ii. 41.
 ἔννοια (Peripatetic), comprehension, concept, L. i. 223 f.; κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, common conceptions, general opinion, Ph. i. 178, 199.
 ἐνομολόγησις (Timon), prating about (discussing) laws or customs, moralizer, L. i. 8.
 ἔνστασις, objection, (logical) hindrance, L. i. 256; lodgement (of bodies, so as to block a passage,—medical term), L. ii. 220.

ἐνσσημα, objection, contradictory fact, L. i. 256.
 ἔντασις (κόνου), tension (of coniform light, or visual stream), P. iii. 51.
 ἐντελέχεια (oppd. to δύναμις), actuality, Ph. ii. 340.
 ἐξάλλαγή, variety, differing nature, P. i. 36.
 ἐξάπλου, unfold, explain, P. i. 217; so κατὰ ἐξάπλου, when stated simply, L. i. 51.
 ἔξις, state, condition, faculty (oppd. to στέρησις), P. iii. 49, 50; cohesion (distingd. from φύσις and ψυχή, as ground of inorganic unity), Ph. i. 81 (*cf.* Vol. I. Intro. p. xxv).
 ἐξοχή (oppd. to εἰσοχή), convexity, prominence, P. i. 92, 120; κατ' ἔξ., P. ii. 70, L. i. 372.
 ἐπαγωγή, induction (arguing from parts to whole), P. ii. 204; so ἐπαγωγικὸς (τρόπος), P. ii. 196; ἐπαγωγικῶς, P. ii. 195, 197.
 ἐπακολουθήμα: κατ' ἐπ. (oppd. to προηγουμένως), as a sequel, secondarily, L. i. 34.
 ἐπαραβεβηκῶς, super-ordinate, (logically) higher or more comprehensive, P. i. 38, 174, iii. 160, etc.
 ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι, enter in separately, P. iii. 82.
 ἐπεικυκλεῖν, roll in on, surround with, P. ii. 210.
 ἐπέχειν, come to a halt, withhold judgement, P. i. 26, 29, etc. (*cf.* ἐποχή).
 ἐπιβάλλειν (c. dat.), approach, perceive, attend to, deal with, P. i. 69, ii. 72, etc.; (c. infin.) undertake, proceed to, P. ii. 16, (mid.) L. i. 37.
 ἐπιβολή, objection, criticism, P. iii. 67, L. i. 65; aspect, occurrence, instant, L. i. 222, Ph. ii. 209, E. 25.
 ἐπιθεωρεῖν, theorize about, imagine, assume in addition, L. i. 22, P. iii. 162, 164.
 ἐπικράτεια, predominance, P. i. 80; so ἡ κατ' ἐπ. κίνησις (oppd. to κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν), majority-motion (when most parts move, but a few are at rest), Ph. ii. 113 f.
 ἐπικρίνειν, judge, distinguish, P. i. 26, etc.; decide, settle (a controversy), P. ii. 19, 113, etc.
 ἐπίκρισις, judging, deciding, P. i. 12; ἐπ. εἰδώλων (oppd. to ἀποκρίσεις), immissions, P. iii. 51.
 ἐπιλογισμός, reckoning, reasoning, P. ii. 123, L. i. 352.
 ἐπιμαρτύρησις, confirmatory evidence, P. i. 181, L. i. 212.
 ἐπιμέτρον: ἐξ ἐπιμέτρον, by way of excess, into the bargain, P. ii. 47, 194, L. ii. 2.
 ἐπιμίξια, admixture, intermixture, P. i. 36, 126, 128; so ἐπιμύγη, P. i. 124; ἐπιμικτος, P. i. 185.

GLOSSARY

- ἐπίνοια (oppd. to ὑπαρξίς), concept, notion, L. ii. 381; κατ' ἐπ., conceptually, Ph. ii. 348.
- ἐπιπέδος (ἡ), plane surface, plane, Ph. i. 387, 420, 428.
- ἐπιρρυμίη (δόξίς, Democr.), in-flowing, adventitious, L. i. 137.
- ἐπισπαστικῶς (oppd. to προωστικῶς), by pulling (after, oppd. to pushing), P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83.
- ἐπίστασις, attention, close observation, L. i. 23, 114; so ἐπιστατικῶς, attentively, L. i. 182.
- ἐπιστατεῖν, have charge of, control, L. i. 43, 124.
- ἐπιστημονικός (oppd. to δοξαστός λόγος), cognitive, scientific, L. i. 111, 114; (κατάληψις), L. i. 110; (αἴσθησις), L. i. 145; so ἐπιστημονικῶς, scientifically, Ph. i. 283.
- ἐπιστροφή, attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
- ἐπισυνθεσις, composition, enlargement by addition, P. iii. 153, L. ii. 58, 60, Ph. ii. 302.
- ἐπίτασις (oppd. to ἀνεσις), intensification, increase, P. ii. 40; κατ' ἐπ., Ph. i. 403.
- ἐπιφορά, conclusion, Ph. i. 135, 206.
- ἐπιχειρεῖν, handle, attempt, argue against, object, P. iii. 13, 270, Ph. ii. 69, 305.
- ἐπιχείρημα, (hostile) argument, critique, P. ii. 188; so ἐπιχειρήσις, P. ii. 192, 219, E. 217.
- ἐποχή, checking, stopping, P. i. 238; (Sceptic) suspension of judgement, withholding assent, P. i. 5, 8, 11, etc.
- ἐρωτᾶν (λόγον), propound (an argument, regarded as in the form of question and answer, or "dialectic"), P. i. 20, 33, ii. 134, etc.
- ἔστω (c. accus. and infin.), let it be granted (that), P. ii. 51, L. i. 423, etc.
- ἐτεῖη (Democr.), verily, in sooth, P. i. 214, L. i. 135, 137, ii. 62.
- ἐτερογενῶς (διαφέρειν), by generic distinction, L. i. 361.
- ἐτεροδόξος (c. genit.), differing in opinion (from), P. ii. 6, 118, etc.
- ἐτεροίωσις, alteration, modification, P. ii. 70, L. i. 230, 372 (as def. of φαντασία, Chrysippus); so ἐτεροωτικός, P. ii. 70.
- εὐαπόδοτος (λόγος), easy to explain, or state, L. i. 343, ii. 85.
- εὐαρεστέν, be well-pleased, Ph. i. 141; so εὐαρέστησις, E. 88.
- εὐδόκησις (Cyrenaic), approval, satisfaction, L. i. 200.
- εὐδρομεῖν, run easily, prove satisfactory, Ph. ii. 36 (cf. εὐοδεῖν, L. ii. 67).
- εὐπηβολώτερος, more sharp-witted, more shrewd, L. i. 322.

GLOSSARY

- εὐπελόγιος, easily inferred, L. i. 75.
- εὐθέως, at once, for instance, P. ii. 214, (with οἶον) L. i. 298, Ph. i. 114, E. 35.
- εὐθική (κίνησις), in a straight line, rectilinear, Ph. ii. 51.
- εὐλογία (εἰδωλα, Democr.), lucky, propitious, Ph. i. 19.
- εὐρευλογία, word-play, sophistry, P. ii. 9, 84; so εὐρευλογεῖν, P. i. 63, E. 7.
- εὐροια (βλου), smooth current, fair course (= εὐδαιμονία, Stoic), P. iii. 172, E. 30; so εὐρώως (βιοῦν), E. 110.
- εὐσμος (διδασκαλία), easily intelligible, plain, P. iii. 158, Ph. ii. 167.
- εὐχρηστῆν, be useful, Ph. i. 18.
- ἐφεκτική (ἀγωγή), suspensive (= Sceptic), P. i. 7, 209, ii. 9; (masc.) P. ii. 10, E. 152; so ἐφεκτός, P. i. 219, iii. 55; ἐφεκτέον, P. ii. 94, iii. 55, L. ii. 160.
- ἐφιστάναι (c. accus.), check, make pause, P. i. 180; (c. dat.) dwell on, attend to, P. ii. 229, iii. 13, 198, L. i. 410; (c. ὅτι) argue, make out, P. iii. 56.
- ἐφοδεύειν, inspect, examine, P. i. 200, 209, etc.
- ἐφοδευτικῶς (oppd. to ἐκκαλυπτικῶς), by (logical) advance, or progression, P. ii. 141-142, L. ii. 307-308.
- ἐφοδος, mode of approach or attack, counter-argument, method, P. i. 183, ii. 222, 258; L. ii. 140, 142.
- ζητητική (ἀγωγή), (way) of investigation (i.e. Scepticism), P. i. 7.
- ζωγραφικῶς, in accordance with the art of painting, artistically, E. 255.
- ζωῦφα, animalcules, P. i. 41.
- ἡγεμονικόν (Stoic), ruling principle, regent part, P. i. 128, ii. 70; L. i. 233 f., etc. (cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv).
- ἡγούμενον (oppd. to λήγον), antecedent (clause), P. ii. 111 f., 148, etc.
- ἡμίλιος (λόγος), ratio of 3 : 2, one and a half times, P. iii. 155.
- ἡστικῶς (oppd. to ἀλγεῖν), pleasantly, agreeably, Ph. ii. 225, E. 98.
- θεματίζω, propose, assume, L. ii. 202; so θέματα, assumptions (distingd. fr. λήματα), L. ii. 302.
- θεοφορεῖν, deify, Ph. i. 32; (pass.) be god-possessed, in a state of ecstasy, P. i. 101.

GLOSSARY

- θέσις*, (local) position, P. i. 36, 118; (oppd. to *φύσις*) assumption, convention, P. ii. 214, 256.
- θετικός*: *θ. χρήσις*, conventional, agreed use, P. ii. 256; so *θετικῶς*, as laid down, on trust, P. i. 38.
- θεωρεῖσθαι*, be seen, observed, found as a fact (hence almost = *εἶναι*), P. ii. 198, 224; L. i. 183, 362, etc.
- θεώρημα*, argument, principle, lesson, P. ii. 3, 70, iii. 261; L. ii. 291.
- θίξις*, touching, contact, P. iii. 56, Ph. i. 260, 265 (*cf. ἀφή*).
- θλιπτικῶς*, by pressure, Ph. ii. 83.
- ιδιάζειν* (Heracleit.), be peculiar, act (or think) on one's own, L. i. 133.
- ιδιαιόντως*, privately, in a peculiar way, P. i. 182.
- ἴδιος*: *κατ' ἴδιαν*, privately, by (one)self, solely, P. iii. 259, L. i. 277 f., 296, etc.; *ἰδιαιτερον*, more particularly, specifically, L. ii. 272, 396; Ph. ii. 182.
- ιδιουσγκρισία*, peculiar constitution (or temperament), idiosyncrasy, P. i. 79, 89.
- ιδιότης*, peculiar nature, individuality, L. ii. 41 f.
- ιδίωμα*, peculiar property, characteristic, L. i. 55, ii. 425, Ph. i. 410 f.
- ιδιωτική* (*ἀπόφασις*), crude, common-place, L. i. 265, Ph. i. 63 (*cf. ιδιώτης*) (*τεχνίτης*, L. i. 55).
- ἰκτερικολί*, jaundiced, P. i. 101, 126, etc.; so *ἰκτεριῶν(τες)*, P. i. 44, L. i. 192, etc.
- ἰσοκρατεῖν*, be of equal force, Ph. ii. 81.
- ἰσοσθένεια*, equality of (logical) force, equipollence, P. i. 8, 190, 196, etc.; so *ἰσοσθενής*, P. i. 26, etc.
- ἰσotάναι* (*λόγον ἐπί τινος*), base (an argument on), P. i. 66, 72, 77, etc.; *ἰστασθαι*, halt, pause, P. i. 186, ii. 253; *ἔστηκε* (*ἔστως*), stands still, remains constant, L. ii. 427.
- ἰστορία*, inquiry, account, L. i. 140, ii. 1, 14; so *ἰστορικῶς*, as a chronicler, in detail, P. i. 4.
- καθάπαξ*, once for all, wholly, absolutely, P. i. 104, ii. 97, 208, etc.
- καθίστασθαι* (= *γίγνεσθαι*), become, L. i. 130; so *καθεστάναι* (= *εἶναι*), be, L. i. 29, 50, etc.; *καθεστῶς* (= *ὢν, ὄν*), being, L. i. 69, 73, etc.
- καθολικός*, general, universal, P. ii. 196, E. 8; so *καθολικώτερος*, P. ii. 84, iii. 205.

GLOSSARY

- κανονίζειν*, measure (by a rule or standard), judge, L. i. 158, 175, etc. (so *κανών*, carpenter's rule, P. ii. 15, L. i. 27).
- κανονικά* (Epicur.), rules (of thought), logic, L. i. 22.
- Καταβάλλοντες* (*οἱ*), *The Down-Throwers* (wrestling term, title of a book of Protagoras, also called *Ἀλήθεια*), L. i. 60.
- κατάκλειστος*, shut up, treasured, P. i. 143.
- καταλαμβάνειν*, grasp, apprehend, perceive, P. i. 26, 99, 182, etc.; *καταλαμβάνεσθαι* (pass.), P. i. 178, ii. 8, etc.; (mid.) L. i. 300, 305, 310, ii. 209, etc.
- καταλήγειν* (*εἰς*), fall back on, terminate in, P. i. 12, 163, 165, etc.; so *κατάληξις*, end, Ph. ii. 61.
- καταληπτικός*, apprehensive, capable of perceiving, E. 75; *κ. φαντασία* (Stoic), P. i. 68, 235, iii. 241 f., etc. (*cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv*); so *καταληπτός*, apprehensible, P. i. 235, etc.
- κατάληψις*, apprehension, perception, P. i. 179, L. i. 151 f., etc.
- κατασκευάζειν*, make out, argue, demonstrate, establish, P. i. 32, 61, 168, etc.; so *κατασκευαστικός*, L. ii. 343.
- κατασκευή*, (physical) construction, constitution, P. i. 48, 54, 217, etc.; (logical) demonstration, P. i. 169, 173.
- κατάστημα*, (physical) condition, P. iii. 184.
- κατάχρησις* (oppd. to *ἀκρίβεια*), misuse (of words), loose language, L. ii. 129; so *καταχρηστικά* (*δνόματα*), L. ii. 129; *καταχρηστικῶς*, P. i. 191, 207; *καταχρηστικώτερον* (oppd. to *κυρίως*), L. ii. 400.
- κατεξαναστατικός* (c. genit.), fit to resist, impervious to, E. 104, 106 (*cf. κατεξαναστήναι*, P. iii. 275, etc.).
- κατηγόρημα*, predicate, asserted fact, P. ii. 230, 232, Ph. i. 211, E. 32.
- κατηγορικός* (*λόγος*), affirmative, categorical (oppd. to hypothetical), P. ii. 163, 166.
- κατηνγκασμένος*, necessitated, unavoidable, P. i. 13, 29, iii. 235, etc.
- κατόρθωμα* (Stoic), right action, L. i. 158, Ph. i. 16 (*cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii*).
- κεκρατημένως*, convincingly, E. 42.
- κενοπαθεῖν* (Stoic), have empty affections (of illusory sensation), P. ii. 49, L. ii. 213; so *κενοπάθεια* (Democr.), L. ii. 184; *κενοπάθημα*, L. ii. 354.
- κεφαλαιωδέστερον*, rather summarily, Ph. i. 206.
- κινεῖν*, move, excite, affect, P. i. 193, etc.; remove, overthrow, dispute, P. ii. 84, iii. 1, L. i. 137, etc.; arouse, set agoing, L. i. 6.

GLOSSARY

- κοινότης (medical term), general (morbid) state, type, P. i. 240.
- κοσκινωόμενα (σπέρματα, Democr.), sifted, winnowed, L. i. 117.
- κουφοροεῖν, rise lightly, soar, Ph. i. 71.
- κρατύνειν, confirm, establish, P. i. 147, ii. 96.
- Κρατυνήρια, *Confirmations* (title of a work by Democr.), L. i. 136.
- κρητήριον, standard (of belief or conduct), criterion, P. i. 21 f., P. ii. 13 ff., L. i. 26 ff. (*cf.* Vol. I. *Intro.* pp. xxv, xxxiii ff.).
- κυκλογραφεῖν, describe a circle, Ph. i. 420 ff., 426.
- κυκλοφορητικός, moving in a circle, revolving, P. iii. 31, Ph. ii. 51, 316 : -κώς, Ph. ii. 58.
- κυλλεσθαι, be bandied about, be current talk, L. i. 116 ; (εἰς), be brought up against, involved in, L. ii. 169, E. 89.
- κύων, dog, P. i. 63, etc. ; Cynic, L. i. 48, ii. 5 ; (various senses of) E. 28 f.
- κωβίος, kind of fish, gudgeon, Ph. i. 278.
- λακεδών (Timon), cry, utterance, E. 171 (dubious word).
- λαμβάνειν, take, accept, admit, P. i. 186, etc. ; grasp, discern, diagnose, P. ii. 39, L. i. 179.
- λαμπηδών, sparkle, lustre, P. i. 45.
- λειποθυγεῖν, lose consciousness, faint, P. iii. 236.
- λεκτόν (Stoic), expressible, expression (= meaning of a name, or mental image evoked by it), P. ii. 81, 104, 107 ff., L. ii. 12, 70, Ph. ii. 218, E. 224 (*cf.* note on P. ii. 81).
- λέξις, word, part of speech, Ph. ii. 216 ; κατὰ λ., word for word, expressly, Ph. i. 92.
- λεπτός : τὰ κατὰ λεπτόν, refinements, subtle points, minutiae, L. ii. 295.
- λευκαίνεσθαι, have a sensation of whiteness, sense white colour, L. i. 191, 197, 293.
- λευκανθίζοντες (ὄφθαλμοί), flecked with white, albino, P. i. 44.
- λευκαντικώς (διατεθῆναι, etc.), have a feeling, or sense, of whiteness, L. i. 192, 198, 344, ii. 397.
- λήγον (oppd. to ἡγούμενον), (logical) consequent, P. ii. 111 ff., etc.
- λήμματα, (logical) premisses, P. ii. 135, etc.
- ληπτός, within reach, attainable, L. i. 124.
- ματαιάζειν, speak foolishly, talk nonsense, Ph. i. 282.

GLOSSARY

- ματαιοποιία, useless labour, P. ii. 206.
- μάχεσθαι (c. dat.), conflict with, contradict, P. i. 184, etc. : so μάχμιον, disputed, L. ii. 45.
- μεγεθοποιεῖν, make great, enlarge, L. i. 108.
- μεγεθοῦν : μεμεγεθωμένον, magnified, enlarged, Ph. ii. 240.
- μέθοδος, "Method" (*i.e.* the doctrinal system of the Methodist School of Medicine), P. i. 236 ; so μεθοδικός (ιατρός), P. i. 239 ff. : μεθοδικώτερον, more systematically, in due order, L. ii. 141.
- μειωτικώς (oppd. to παραξητικώς), by diminution, E. 251.
- μέρος, part, parties to, P. i. 59, 90, etc. : ἀνὰ μ., in turn, Ph. i. 429 ; ἀπὸ μέρους, in part, L. i. 283 ; ἐν μέρει, in turn, L. i. 28, ii. 183 ; (c. genit.) by way of, L. ii. 118 ; τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, (logical) particulars (oppd. to "genus," or "universal"), P. ii. 87, L. i. 399, etc. ; so (τὰ) κατὰ μέρος, P. ii. 84, 86, 195 f., etc. ; παρὰ μέρος, by turns, alternately, L. i. 286, 376, etc.
- μεσολαβεῖν, intercept, Ph. i. 265, 386.
- μεταβατική (φαντασία), transitive (impression, *i.e.* passing on so as to combine with others and form knowledge), L. ii. 276, 288 ; μ. κίνησις, (distingd. from μεταβλητική κ.) Ph. i. 195, ii. 38, 41. So μεταβατικώς, by transition, P. iii. 97, 129, Ph. ii. 43, 53.
- μεταβλητική (δύναμις), capable of changing, P. i. 103 ; μ. κίνησις, Ph. i. 195, ii. 42, 321.
- μετάθεσις, transposition, substitution, Ph. i. 328.
- μετακοσμίεσθαι, be rearranged, transformed, P. i. 217.
- μετουσία, sharing, participation, P. iii. 153, Ph. i. 375.
- μετριώπθεια (Sceptic), moderate feeling, P. i. 25, 30 ; so μετριώπθειν, P. iii. 235 f. ; -παθῶς, E. 161.
- μέγχις ἐκείων, so long as they live, during their lifetime, Ph. i. 62.
- μηρυτικός, capable of informing, indicative of, P. i. 187, L. i. 85, ii. 165, E. 245.
- μημονικός, capable of remembering, retentive, L. ii. 274 ; -ικώς, by way of memory, L. i. 347.
- μονολήμματος (λόγος), with one premiss only, P. ii. 167, L. ii. 443.
- μονομάχης, fighter in single combat, gladiator, P. i. 156, iii. 212.
- μονόποιος, of one quality only, P. i. 94 f.
- μουσουργός, music-maker, musician, P. i. 54.

GLOSSARY

μοχθῆρὸς (oppd. to ὑγιής, ἀληθής), unsound, invalid, P. ii. 105, 111, 146, 175, etc.

μυθοποιήσις, myth-making, invention of fables, Ph. i. 192.

μυζωτήρες, nostrils, P. i. 127.

μύουρος (στούα, oppd. to σύμμετρος), running to a point, curtailed, P. i. 118.

ναστόν (σῶμα), solid, impermeable, P. ii. 142, L. ii. 309; (plur.) i. 213.

νηκτικός, able to swim, Ph. i. 171.

νοητοὶ (πόροι), intelligible (i.e. not perceptible by sense), P. ii. 98, 140, L. ii. 146, 220, 306, Ph. i. 256.

νόστιμος: τὸ ν. τῶν καρπῶν, produce, yield, richness, L. i. 17.

νυκτερήσιον (φάντασμα), nocturnal, Ph. ii. 188; so νυκτεροειδὲς φ., Ph. ii. 184: νυκτοειδὲς φ. (Democr., Epicur.), Ph. ii. 181.

νυκτινόμος (ὄρνις), (feeding, or) flying by night, Ph. i. 247.

ξέσματα, filings, slivers, P. i. 129.

ξυνός (= κοινός, Heraclit.), common, universal, L. i. 133.

ὄγκος, mass, material body, molecule, L. i. 287, 290 f., P. iii. 152; (ἀναρμοί) P. iii. 32, Ph. i. 363, (νοητοί) L. ii. 220.

ὀδμάσθαι (Democr.), smell, L. i. 139.

ὀδός, way, avenue (to), P. i. 210 ff.; ὀδῶ (ζητεῖν), methodically, L. i. 2: ὀδοῦ πάρεργον, as a bye-work on the road, in passing, L. ii. 378.

οἴησις, conceit, (idle) fancy, P. ii. 258, iii. 280 f.; (c. genit.) belief in, opinion about, L. i. 5, Ph. i. 74.

ὀλμίσκος, socket of door-hinge, Ph. ii. 54.

ὀλοσχερής, whole, entire, P. i. 130; so ὀλοσχερέστερον (εἰπεῖν, adv.), in general terms, broadly, P. i. 31: κατὰ ὀλοσχερείαν (oppd. to κατὰ μέρη), as a whole, totally, Ph. ii. 53.

ὀλόγησις: κατὰ ὀλόγητα (oppd. to κατὰ μέρη), as a whole, completely, P. iii. 46, 64, Ph. ii. 52, 57, 103.

ὀμοιομέρειαι (Anaxagoras), homoeomerics, substances composed of homogeneous parts, P. iii. 32 f., Ph. i. 6, ii. 252, 254.

ὀμοιοπαθεῖν (c. dat.), be similarly affected, share the sensation of, L. i. 301, 363.

ὀμοιωτικός: κατὰ ὀμοιωτικὴν μετάβασιν, by inference based on similarity, E. 250; so ὀμοιωτικῶς (νοεῖσθαι), Ph. i. 394.

ὀμολόγος, agreed, granted, L. i. 75, ii. 183, 194.

GLOSSARY

ὄνειροπολεῖν, dream of, imagine (vainly), P. ii. 157, iii. 41, 156; (mid.) L. ii. 57; (pass.) P. i. 91, etc.

ὄνοματογραφία, writing down names, E. 67.

ὄξη ακούσματος, with most acute hearing, Ph. i. 65.

ὄξυαπεῖν, have keen sight, be sharp, L. i. 55, Ph. i. 65; so ὄξυαπέστατος, Ph. i. 65.

ὄρατικῶς (κινεῖσθαι), (affected) by the sensation of sight, L. i. 355; so ὄρατικὸν πάθος, L. i. 355.

ὀρίζεσθαι (mid. = ὀρίζω), define, P. ii. 101, 207, etc.; so ὀριστόν, object of definition, P. ii. 207.

ὀρικῶς, by defining, through a definition, L. i. 426.

ὄρμη, impulse, instinct, P. iii. 70; (oppd. to ἀφορμή), inclination, desire, P. iii. 177, 273 f., E. 59 f.

ὄρος, (logical) definition, P. ii. 27, 205 ff., (distingd. fr. τὸ καθολικόν) E. 8.

οὐροδρομεῖν, run before the wind, Ph. ii. 56.

οὐσία, being, what exists, P. ii. 5; (material) substance (δεῖ βεῖ, βευστή), P. iii. 82, 115; τρεῖς οὐσῆαι (Xenocr.), L. i. 147, Ph. ii. 169.

ὀφθαλμοφανῶς, plainly before their eyes, Ph. i. 39.

ὀχυρωτικός (c. genit.), serving to fortify, L. i. 23.

πάγιος, firm, certain, (oppd. to εἰκός) L. i. 110, ii. 187; so παγίως, L. ii. 186.

παθηματικῶς (ὑποπίπτοντα), (things experienced) by way of passive affection, P. ii. 10.

παθητός (oppd. to ἀπαθής), subject to affection or change, passible, Ph. ii. 311.

πάθος, suffering, P. i. 70; affection, impression, feeling, P. i. 192, etc.: τὰ πρῶτα π. (Epicur.), L. i. 203.

παλαισιταῖος, of a palm's breadth (about 3 inches), Ph. i. 300, 321.

παραβάλλω (c. dat.), compare, set against, object to, Ph. i. 96, 108, 133; so παραβολή, analogous contradictory argument, objection, Ph. i. 97, 109, 134.

παραγγελματικῶς, by way of command, imperatively, P. i. 204.

παραγράψιμος (φαντασία), exceptionable, rejected, L. i. 170.

παραθλίβειν (ὀφθαλμῶν), press at the side, P. i. 47.

παρακειμένως, similarly, in the next place, L. i. 77, 182, 227, Ph. i. 321, etc.

παρακμή (medical), post-crisis stage, abatement (of disease), P. ii. 237 f., 257.

GLOSSARY

- παρακολούθησις*, connexion, comprehension, P. ii. 236, Ph. ii. 220.
πράλειψις (logical, = ἔλλειψις), omission, deficiency, P. ii. 150.
παραλογίζεσθαι, be fallacious, reason falsely, P. ii. 250.
παραμυθεῖσθαι (= διδάσκειν), show, argue, establish, L. i. 66, 344, ii. 17, etc.
παραμυθητικός, capable of relieving, P. i. 70, 72.
παραμυθία, proof, confirmatory evidence, L. i. 116, ii. 240, 469, etc.
παραπέμπειν (oppd. to *παραλαμβάνειν*), dismiss, reject, P. i. 183, L. i. 11, 81.
παραπέζω, press on the side, L. i. 192.
παραπλοκή (χυμῶν), blending, intermixture, P. i. 102.
παρασπορά, extra sprinkling, P. i. 46.
παραστάς (βαλανείου), vestibule, P. i. 110, ii. 56.
παραστάσις, establishing, proof, L. i. 119.
παραστατικός (= μηνυτικός), able to establish, probative, L. i. 85, ii. 202, 214, etc.
παρατάσις, extension (in time), P. iii. 107; (in space) Ph. i. 367, ii. 7.
παρατακόν (oppd. to *συντελεστικόν*), imperfect (or present) time, Ph. ii. 91 f., 97, 101; so *-κῶς*, Ph. ii. 101.
παρατυπωτικός: π. (*φαντασίαι*), incorrectly impressed, fallacious, L. ii. 67.
παραύξεισις, additional increase, enlargement, P. iii. 80, L. ii. 58 f.; so *παραυξητικῶς*, E. 251.
παραυχειρεῖν, hand on to, transfer to, P. i. 234.
παρέκβασις: κατὰ παρέκβασιν, by way of digression, P. iii. 101.
παρέλκειν, be superfluous, redundant, P. ii. 77, 147, 156, 163, 175, L. i. 334.
παρέμπτωσις, occurrence, L. i. 175.
παρενθήκη, parenthesis, supplement, L. ii. 378.
παρηγορία, relief, assuagement, E. 149, 154.
παραστᾶν (-ιστάναι), set forth, make good, establish, prove, P. ii. 21 f., 108, etc.; (pass.) defend, P. ii. 42.
παραλοκή, (logical) redundancy, P. ii. 146, 156, 159, 166, 175, L. ii. 292, 429, etc.
παρόσον (= παρ' ὅσον), in so far as, inasmuch as, L. i. 405, 407, 419, etc.
παρνήσιασθαι (c. dat.), be dependent on, result from, P. i. 205, L. ii. 12.

GLOSSARY

- παχυμείρεια*, thickness, density of parts, Ph. i. 86; so *παχυμερής* (ἄηρ), P. i. 125.
πείσις, feeling, passive affection, P. i. 22, L. i. 237, 239, 384, Ph. i. 209.
πέισμα, conviction, assurance, E. 149; μετὰ πείσματος, P. i. 18, L. ii. 159, E. 121, 164.
πεισθήσις, confidence, assurance, P. i. 60, 197, iii. 238.
περατοῦν: πεπερατωμένον, limited, (spatially) bounded, Ph. i. 431 ff., ii. 27.
περιαντολογεῖν, to laud oneself, brag, P. i. 62.
περιγράφεω, conclude, P. ii. 259, iii. 279; cancel, annul, P. i. 15, L. i. 268; encircle, enclose, Ph. i. 257.
περιγραφή: κατὰ π. (= κατ' ἴδιαν), separately, by itself, solely, L. i. 277, ii. 161 f., 394, Ph. i. 103, 261, ii. 263.
περιεργία, needless labour, over-elaboration, subtlety, P. ii. 246, iii. 151, (plur.) 167.
περιέργος: οὐ κατὰ τὸ π. (= ἀπεριέργος), not in a special, or technical, sense, P. i. 9.
περιέχειν: τὸ περιέχον (Heracleit.), that which encompasses, the environing (atmosphere), L. i. 127, 129, ii. 286, Ph. i. 75, 79.
περίκτησις, acquisition, L. i. 166, E. 127, 146.
περιληπτικός, inclusive, comprehensive, L. i. 143; so *περιληπτός*, comprehensible, L. i. 141 f.
περιουσίτατος, most keen-witted, cleverest, L. i. 326.
περίπτωσις, occurrence, P. i. 144; actual impression, experience, (κατὰ π.) L. ii. 56 f., E. 252; so *περιπτωτικῶς*, actually, experientially, P. ii. 8, E. 250.
περισπᾶν, draw away, cause to doubt, L. i. 179 (cf. ἀπερ-σπαστος).
περίστασις, circumstance, condition, P. i. 30, 100, L. i. 185.
περιτρέπειν, overthrow, confute, P. i. 122, ii. 64, 78, etc.; (εἰς) change over, convert (to), P. i. 81, ii. 76, L. ii. 295 f.; so *περιτροπή* (λόγου), reversal, refutation, P. i. 200, ii. 123, 185, 187.
περιτυποῦν, mould round, enfold, P. iii. 75, 131 ff.
περιφορητικός (λόγος), banded about, familiar, Ph. ii. 87.
περιωδευμένοι (*φαντασίαι*), scrutinized, fully tested, P. i. 227 ff., L. i. 182, 187, 437 (cf. διεξωδευμένοι).
περιών: ἐκ (τοῦ) περιόντος (lit. from our reserves, or extra resources), over and above, into the bargain, P. i. 63, 78, ii. 96, iii. 273; so ἐκ περιουσίας, P. i. 62, 76, ii. 192, L. ii. 183, 262, 296.

GLOSSARY

- πιθανότης*, credibility, probability, plausibility, P. ii. 79, 229, iii. 281.
- πικραντικῶς* (*διατίθεται*), am affected by (have a sensation of) bitterness, L. i. 367.
- πλασματικός*, fictitious, fanciful, P. i. 103; so *πλασματώδης*, L. ii. 367.
- πλατύτερον* (oppd. to *ἐν ὑποτιπώσει*, *λέγειν*), more fully, at length, P. i. 222.
- πληκτικός*, pungent, overpowering, P. i. 125; striking, convincing, P. iii. 71, 240; (*φαντασία*) L. i. 173, 257 f.
- ποιότης*, quality, P. i. 94 ff., iii. 32, 57.
- πολυμυγία*, multi-mixture, amalgam, Ph. i. 6.
- πολυπλασιασμός*, multiplication, Ph. ii. 217.
- πολυσχιδεῖς* (*γνώμαι*), much divided, various, L. i. 349.
- πολυωρία* (Zenon), attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
- ποριστικός*: π. (*τέχνη*), capable of providing, P. i. 66, 72.
- πόροι* (*νοητοί*, *q. v.*), (bodily) passages, pores, P. ii. 140, etc.; (sing.) P. i. 50.
- ποροποιεῖν*: *πεποροποιημένον* (*σῶμα*, oppd. to *ναστόν*), provided with pores, permeable, L. ii. 309.
- πραγματικῶς* (*ἀντιλέγειν*), in a practical way, effectively, P. iii. 13.
- πρακτικός* (*λόγος*), systematic, direct, P. i. 62.
- πρὶν* (c. genit.), before, L. i. 162, ii. 445, etc.
- προάγειν* (c. genit.), precede, Ph. ii. 259: *προηγμένα* (Stoic), preferred, P. iii. 191 f., E. 62 ff.
- προανσθέν*, accomplished before, already completed, L. ii. 1, Ph. ii. 248.
- πρόδηλον*, pre-evident, quite obvious, P. i. 91, 210, etc.; (oppd. to *ἄδηλον*) P. i. 138, ii. 97 ff.; so *προδηλοτάτη*, P. i. 214: *προδήλιος*, P. i. 226, L. i. 141.
- προδιάθεσις*, predisposition, antecedent condition, P. i. 100, 110.
- προδιακρίνεσθαι*, be distinguished first, P. ii. 68 (*-διευκρινεῖσθαι* c. Bekk.).
- προδιαρθροῦν*, enucleate (make clear) beforehand, Ph. i. 338, E. 18.
- προδιεξοδεύειν*, go through (make sure by scrutiny) beforehand, L. i. 188.
- προηγούμενῳ λόγῳ*, by direct argument, Ph. ii. 189; so *προηγούμενως*, firstly, principally, directly, P. ii. 16, 247. Ph. i. 390, etc.

GLOSSARY

- προθεσμία*, appointed day: *ὑπὸ μίαν προθεσμίαν*, at one and the same moment, L. ii. 165.
- προκαθηγούμενον* (oppd. to *λῆγον*, logical), antecedent (proposition), P. ii. 101, 106, 115.
- προκαταρτικὰ*, antecedents, immediate causes, P. iii. 16.
- προκαταταχεῖν*, get the start of, outspeed, Ph. ii. 145 f., 153.
- προκενήματα*, preliminaries, first outgoings, L. i. 107.
- προκόπτειν*, advance, proceed (of arguments, etc.), P. ii. 240, L. ii. 369, etc.; (spatially) Ph. ii. 57, 60, etc.
- προκρίνειν*, prefer, P. i. 60 f., 78, 90, etc.; so *πρόκρισις*, preferring, P. ii. 45.
- πρόληψις* (*κοινή*), preconception, instinctive judgment, P. i. 211, L. i. 443, ii. 157, 337 ff., etc.
- προνοητικῶς*, providentially, by design, L. ii. 286.
- προπάθεια* (*ἀγγείων*), prominence, swollen state, L. ii. 219.
- προπετεια*, precipitancy, rashness, P. i. 20, 177, etc.; so *προπετής*, P. iii. 79, etc.: *προπετῶς*, P. i. 212, ii. 17, 37: *προπετεύεσθαι*, P. i. 20, 205, 237, etc.
- πρὸς*: τὰ πρὸς τι, things related to something else, (logical) relatives, P. ii. 125, 175, 179, L. ii. 38, etc.
- προσαλλοτριβοῦσθαι* (c. dat.), be averse from, L. i. 140.
- προσαναπλάσσειν*, invent besides, fancy in addition, E. 158.
- προσβολή* (*φαντασίας*), impact, application, occurrence, P. ii. 16, L. i. 36 f.; (*μύωπος*) stroke, L. ii. 271.
- προδιασαφείν*, explain further, L. i. 114.
- προδοξάζειν*, suppose besides, hold the additional opinion, P. i. 30, iii. 236, etc.
- προσειλέσθαι* (c. dat.), press against, oppose, Ph. i. 3, E. 7.
- προσεχῆ* (*πάθη*), persistent, chronic, P. ii. 240; (*εἶδη*) related, appropriate, E. 15.
- προσηνές* (*κατάστημα*), congenial, agreeable, P. iii. 184, E. 86, 106.
- πρόσκεισις* (c. dat.), adherence to, dependence on, P. i. 16; inclination, assent, P. i. 230.
- πρόληψις* (logical), minor premiss, P. ii. 149, 234, L. ii. 333, etc.
- προσοικειοῦσθαι* (c. dat.), be naturally attached to, find congenial, L. i. 140.
- προσπάθεια*, tendency towards, inclination, consent, P. i. 230.
- προστακτικὰ* (*λεκτά*, Stoic), imperative, L. ii. 71, P. i. 204.
- προσφέρεσθαι* (mid.), give oneself, consume, P. i. 81, 83, 108, 110; (pass.) P. i. 52, 130.

GLOSSARY

- πρότασις* (logical), premiss (esp. major premiss of a syllogism), P. ii. 164 f., 195 ff.
- προφέρεσθαι* (*φωνάς*, etc.), utter, emit, P. i. 14, 73, etc.; (pass.) L. ii. 132, 290; so *προφορά* (*φωνών*), utterance, P. i. 15, 203.
- προφορικός* (*λόγος*, oppd. to *ἐνδιάθετος*, Stoic), uttered (reason, i.e. speech), L. ii. 275, 287.
- προωστικῶς* (oppd. to *ἐπισπαστικῶς*), by pushing forward, propulsively, P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83 f.
- πτῶσις* (grammatical), inflexion, case, verbal usage (sense), E. 4, 29; so *τὸ πτωτικόν*, declinable form, noun, L. ii. 84.
- πυρακτοῦσθαι*, be heated, Ph. ii. 164 f.
- πύρωσις* (medical), feverish heat, inflammation, P. ii. 239.
- πύσμα*, interrogation, question, P. i. 189.
- ρεῖν*: *ρύνεσα* (*στιγμῆ*, etc.), flowing, moving continuously, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376, 381, 430.
- ρευστή* (*ῥη*), in (constant) flux, P. i. 217, iii. 115.
- ῥητός*: *τὸ ῥητόν*, precise statement, Ph. i. 54, (*ῥ. λέξεις*) Ph. i. 64; so *ῥητῶς*, literally, expressly (in quoting), P. iii. 248, etc.; *ῥητότατα* (oppd. to *δυνάμει*), most explicitly, distinctly, L. i. 16, 134.
- ῥῖσις* (medical), flux, issue (e.g. sweat), P. i. 238; (*ῥησις*) P. iii. 54, 115; (*γραμμαῖς*) P. iii. 154, Ph. i. 380.
- ῥῶσις* (*σωμάτων*), strengthening, E. 97.
- σαλεύειν* (*ἐν*), be engaged in, deal with, P. i. 65; be storm-tossed, in distress, P. ii. 229; shake, upset, L. ii. 56, 337, 339, Ph. i. 3; (pass.) P. ii. 204, L. ii. 385, Ph. i. 417.
- σαρκοδακῆς* (*βίος*, Orpheus), flesh-eating, Ph. i. 15.
- σαρκοτοκεῖσθαι*, be flesh-born (i.e. as fleshy lumps), P. i. 42.
- σαρκοφανής*, fleshy-looking, coated with flesh, P. i. 50.
- σεμολόγημα*, proud position, dignity, P. iii. 201.
- σημείον* (*ὑπομηθηστικόν*) (*ἐνδεικτικόν*): sign, P. ii. 96 ff., 99 ff., L. ii. 140 ff.; (geometr.=*στιγμῆ*), point, P. iii. 39, 154, Ph. ii. 278 ff.
- σημειώσις*, reading signs, interpreting, L. ii. 269; so *σημειωτικῶς*, by means of signs, by interpretation, L. ii. 158; *σημειωτόν*, thing signified, P. ii. 100 f., 116 ff., etc.
- σῆλλοι* (title of book by Timon), Satires, lampoons (fr. *σῆλλος*, squint-eyed), P. i. 224.
- σκεπτοσύνη* (Timon), speculation, scepticism, P. i. 224.

GLOSSARY

- σκέψις*, the Sceptic way of thought, scepticism, P. i. 185, 209, 213 ff., etc.
- σκηνογραφία*, scene-painting, illusion, L. i. 88.
- σκυδαλός*, (a meaningless word) "what d'ye call it," L. ii. 133.
- σκολιόπορα* (*ᾠτα*), with winding passages, P. i. 126.
- σκολιή* (oppd. to *γενεή*, *γνώσις*, Democr.), bastard, inferior, L. i. 138 f.
- σολοικίζοντες* (*λόγοι*), solecistic, ungrammatical, P. ii. 231, 235; so *σολοικισμός*, L. i. 44.
- σπᾶν*, draw in, derive (*λόγον*, *φαντασίαν*, etc.), L. i. 129, 176, 180, 186, etc.
- σπουδαῖος* (oppd. to *φαῦλος*), good, virtuous, P. ii. 83, L. i. 410, 418, etc.
- σταθμητικός* (*ζυγός*), able to weigh, or measure, L. i. 442.
- στάλιξ*, stake for nets, Ph. i. 3.
- στάσις*, rest, immobility, Ph. ii. 46, 81; (doctrinal) position, opinion, school of thought, L. i. 53, 89, 190, ii. 13, Ph. ii. 45, etc.; (= *διάστασις*) dissension, L. i. 214.
- στασιώτης* (partisan), stationer, arrester, Ph. ii. 46.
- στερέμιος*, substantial, solid, L. i. 207, ii. 63, 65.
- στερήσις* (logical), privation, negation, Ph. i. 407; so *στερητικά*, negatives, Ph. i. 407.
- στιγμῆ* (geometr.), point, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376.
- στοά* (porch), the Stoic School, Stoicism, P. i. 235, ii. 5; *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς*, Stoics, P. iii. 181, etc.
- στοιχεῖν* (c. dat.), range oneself with, side with, E. 59.
- στοιχείον*, (physical) element, P. ii. 111, iii. 37.
- στοιχειοῦν*, teach principles (elements), E. 3.
- στοιχηδόν* (*κέλιμενα*), in a row, side by side, Ph. i. 380, 386, ii. 59, 144.
- συγγεγυμνασμένοι* (*καταλήψεις*, Stoic), co-exercised, used in conjunction, P. iii. 188, 251.
- συγκατάθεσις* (oppd. to *ἄρησις*), assent, P. i. 7, 13, 16, 19, 233, etc.
- συγκαταλαμβάνειν*, apprehend together with, P. ii. 116 f., 119, etc.
- συγκουφίζειν*, help to make light, P. iii. 15.
- σύνκρμα* (Democr.), composite substance, compound, P. ii. 24, iii. 56, Ph. i. 97, etc.
- συζυγεῖν* (Stoic), be ranked together, be correlative, L. i. 151, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 5 f., etc.; so *συζυγία*, correlative pair, L. ii. 172, 175.

συλλογιστικός (λόγος, Stoic), conclusive, demonstrative, P. ii. 149.
 συμβεβηκός (logical), attribute, property, P. ii. 27, 228, L. i. 269 ff., Ph. ii. 220 ff., E. 37 f.
 συμβιβάζειν, conclude, demonstrate, (συμβεβίβασται) L. i. 283, Ph. ii. 319.
 σύμβλησις, comparison, reference, relation; κατά σ., L. i. 375, 395, ii. 34, 459, Ph. ii. 198.
 συμνημόνευσις (Stoic), simultaneous recollection, P. iii. 108, L. i. 279, Ph. i. 353 ff., ii. 64, 176.
 συμπάθεια, feeling for, emotional assent, inclination, P. i. 230; sympathy, sharing of affections, Ph. i. 79 f.
 συμπαράτηρέισθαι (c. dat.), be observed together with, P. ii. 100 f., L. ii. 143, 152; so συμπαράτηρησις, simultaneous observation, L. ii. 154.
 συμπερασμα (logical), conclusion (cf. ἐπιφορά), P. ii. 113 f., 134, 139 ff., L. ii. 140.
 συμπεργράφειν, cancel (annul) together with, P. i. 14, 206, ii. 47, etc.
 συμπλέκειν, intertwine, combine, (λήμματα) L. ii. 416 f.; συμπεπλεγμένον, (logical) combination, complex, P. ii. 137 f., L. ii. 125, 419, 421.
 συμπληρωτικός (Epicur.), serving to fill up, complementary, P. iii. 100, 172, L. i. 98, Ph. i. 337, etc.; so συμπλήρωσις, filling up, completion, Ph. i. 338.
 συμπλοκή, (carnal) conjunction, P. i. 41; (logical, cf. συμπλέκειν) combination, P. ii. 113, 137 ff., etc.; connexion (of meaning) L. ii. 430.
 σύμψοια (καὶ συμπλοκή), accordance, consistency, L. ii. 430; so συμψνεῖν, be in accord with, side with, Ph. i. 111.
 σύμπτωμα (medical), symptom; (Epicur.) σ. συμπτωμάτων (as def. of Time), concurrence, P. iii. 137, Ph. ii. 219.
 συμφυής, of one substance with, P. i. 225; so συμφύτια, L. i. 129, σύμφυσις, L. i. 130, substantial union, essential connexion.
 συνάγειν (logical), infer, conclude, P. i. 32, 35, etc.; so συναγωγή, inference, deduction, P. ii. 143, 170.
 συναγωγός (αἰτία), combining, unifying, Ph. i. 7, 10.
 συναδηλείσθαι, be non-evident therewith, be likewise obscure, L. ii. 2.
 συνακαταληπτεῖσθαι, be also uncomprehended, E. 38.
 συνακτικός (λόγος), drawing a conclusion, conclusive, P. ii. 137 ff., 151, L. ii. 120, etc.

σύναμα (= σὺν ἄμα), together with, E. 159.
 συνανασκευή, joint refutation, L. i. 214; so συνανασκευάζεσθαι, L. i. 214.
 συναρπάζειν, (τὸ ζητούμενον) beg the question, P. i. 90, ii. 35, etc.; σ. (ὑπαρξῶν), assume, P. iii. 121; συναρπασθεῖς (ὑπὸ φαντασίας), being carried away, influenced, L. i. 186.
 συνάρτησις (oppd. to διάρτησις, logical), connexion, coherence, P. ii. 111, L. ii. 265, 430.
 συνεκτικός, conclusive: σ. αἰτία, direct, primary causes, P. iii. 15; συνεκτικώτατον, most comprehensive, conclusive, L. i. 333, Ph. i. 1, E. 257.
 συνεμφάνειν (Stoic), indicate therewith, imply also, L. i. 233; so συνέμφασις, added implication, L. i. 239.
 συνεξέρχεσθαι (= συνεκβάλλεσθαι), pass out with, be rejected along with, L. i. 421.
 συνεργανίζειν, contribute: τὸ συνεργανισμένον (ἐκ τούτων), the total made up of, L. i. 295.
 συνεργὰ (αἰτία), co-operant, accessory, P. iii. 15.
 συνεργοπονεῖν (c. dat.), be fellow-workers with, help in the toil of, Ph. i. 41.
 συνεργωτᾶν, join in asking; σ. λόγον, propound an argument (by means of question and answer), P. ii. 131, 160, etc.; συνεργωτητέον, P. ii. 251; so συνεργώτης, P. ii. 162, etc.
 συνέχειν, hold together, retain, L. i. 375; σ. πρὸς (τὰ ἠθικά), relate to, be concerned with, P. i. 145.
 συνημένον (λήμμα, logical), combination (of clauses or propositions), hypothetical major premiss or syllogism, P. ii. 101, 104, 111 f., 157 n., L. ii. 109, 112 f., 247, etc.
 συνηρότης, (mental) commotion, perturbation, Ph. i. 169.
 σύτταγμα, treatise, book, P. i. 241, iii. 247, 279.
 συντελεστικός (oppd. to παρατακτικός), perfect (tense), past (time), Ph. ii. 91 f.; so -κώς, Ph. ii. 101.
 συνύπαρξις, co-existence, P. ii. 199; so συνυπάρχειν, P. ii. 109, 144, etc.
 συνυπόπτωσις, joint occurrence, being sensed together, L. ii. 174; so συνυπόπτειν, L. ii. 165, 174.
 συστατικά (μέρια), component, P. iii. 128, L. ii. 84.
 συστηματικός, forming an organized whole, composite, L. i. 40 f. σχέσις, attitude, (active) relation, application, L. i. 35 ff., 168, 243, ii. 162.
 σχήμα (μοχθηρόν) (ὑγιές, logical), form (of statement of a syllogism), P. ii. 146, L. ii. 413, etc.

GLOSSARY

σχηματισμός, formation, configuration, L. i. 229; so σχηματίζεσθαι, Ph. i. 75.
 σχολάζειν (c. dat.), devote oneself to, L. i. 8: τὰ σχολασθέντα (περὶ), lectures on, discussion of, E. 167.
 σχολικῶς (πλάττεσθαι), after the style of the Schools (i.e. with perverse subtlety), L. ii. 13.
 σωματικός, corporeal, E. 61: σωματικώτερον, more solidly, thoroughly, P. i. 7.
 σωματότης, corporeality, Ph. i. 371 ff.; so σωματοῦν (σεσωματώται, is corporealized), Ph. ii. 25.
 σωρίτης (logical), the Sorites, (the fallacy known as "the Heap"), P. ii. 253, L. i. 416, Ph. i. 190.
 σωριτική (ἀπορία), of the Sorites-argument, P. iii. 80; so σωρικῶς, Ph. i. 182.

ταυτολογεῖν, repeat oneself, L. i. 262.
 τελαμιών, linen wrapper, swathing-band (for a mummy), P. iii. 228.
 τέλος (ethical), final purpose, objective, end, P. i. 25, L. i. 199 f.
 τεράστιος (φύσις), monstrous, incredible, L. ii. 104.
 τερατολογουμένη (τύπωσις), marvellous, mythical, P. ii. 70, (ἕλη) iii. 31, (δόξα) L. ii. 66.
 τερματίζειν, bring to an end, terminate, Ph. ii. 102.
 τετρακτύς (Pythag.), the Tetractys (i.e. Ten, as sum of first 4 numbers), L. i. 94.
 τεχνογράφος, writer on the art (of logic), E. 8.
 τεχνολογία, systematic treatment, logical theory (or rules), P. ii. 205, 249, 255, L. ii. 87, 257, 406; so τεχνολογούμενα, P. ii. 247, E. 40.
 τήρησις, observance, rule of conduct. (βιωτική) P. i. 23, ii. 254; (κοινά) ii. 246; (ἀφιλόσοφος) E. 165.
 τηρητική (ἀκολουθία), observant (sense of consequence or power of inference), L. ii. 288.
 τίς: τὸ τι (Stoic), "something" (the highest logical genus), P. ii. 86, 223 f.; (plur.) Ph. ii. 234, E. 224.
 τιμητικῶς ἔχειν, hold in honour, regard as honourable, Ph. i. 136.
 τοιούτουσχημον, of such a shape, L. i. 209.
 τοιοῦτώδης, suchlike, of like kind, L. ii. 206, Ph. i. 52.
 τρανὴ (φαντασία), clear, vivid, L. i. 258; so τρανῶς, L. i. 172,

GLOSSARY

Ph. i. 164; τρανότερον, L. ii. 144, Ph. i. 271; τρανότατα, L. i. 404.
 τρεπόμενος (οἶνος), turning sour, P. i. 41.
 τρεπτή (οὐσία), to be changed, alterable, L. i. 434.
 τριγένεια (ἀγαθῶν), a trinity, threefold class, P. iii. 181.
 τροπικόν (Stoic, = συνημμένον), hypothetical premiss, P. ii. 202, L. ii. 438, 440, 442.
 τρόπος (= λόγος), "trope," mode (of argument), P. i. 35 ff., 164; (λόγων) L. ii. 227, 235, 237, 292.
 τυγχάνειν (= εἶναι), to be, P. i. 105, L. i. 38, 40, etc.: εἰ τύχοι, *verbi gratia*, P. i. 106, ii. 201, 218, etc.
 ὑποδιαίρειν, subdivide, P. iii. 75; -ρεῖσθαι, L. i. 35; so ὑποδιαίρεισι, E. 15.
 ὑπόθεσις, supposition, assumption: καθ' ὑπ., P. i. 73, 79, etc.; ἐξ ὑπ., P. i. 168, ii. 20, etc.; so ὁ ὑποθετικὸς τρόπος, P. i. 164, 173.
 ὑποκείμενον (oppd. to φαινόμενον), substantial (or real object, which underlies the sensible appearance), P. i. 19, 22, 46, 59, etc.: ὑποκείται= ἐστὶ, L. i. 183, 278, etc.
 ὑπομνησκειν, suggest, show, teach, P. ii. 76, 80, 177, etc.; so ὑπόμνησις, P. ii. 130, L. ii. 327.
 ὑπομνηστικόν (oppd. to ἐνδεικτικόν σημεῖον), suggestive, commemorative, P. ii. 99 f., L. ii. 151; so -ικῶς, L. ii. 289.
 ὑποπίπτειν, occur, be noticed or perceived (*sub sensus cadere*), P. i. 35, 40, 94, etc.: ὑποπείθεται ἀπορίας, fall under, be faced by, Ph. i. 365.
 ὑπόπτωσις, occurrence, sense-experience, L. i. 85, 161, 215.
 ὑπόστασις, substantiality, real existence, P. ii. 94, 176, 199, etc.; so ὑπόστατος, Ph. ii. 60.
 ὑποστέλλειν (c. dat.), yield, be subordinate to, L. ii. 32, Ph. ii. 40: (c. accus.) cloak oneself in, adopt (as a disguise), Ph. i. 35 (= ὑποδραμεῖν, Ph. i. 36).
 ὑπότευξις, rejoinder, reply, L. i. 359, Ph. i. 251; so ὑποτυγχάνειν, L. ii. 375, 440, Ph. i. 249.
 ὑποτύπωσις, outline, sketch; (ὡς ἐν ὑ.) P. i. 206, 222, ii. 79, etc.; so ὑποτυπούσθαι, P. iii. 3; ὑποτυπωτικὸς (τρόπος) P. i. 239; -ικῶς, P. i. 4, ii. 1.
 ὑφ' ἐν, in one moment, together, simultaneously, L. i. 229, 231, 303, etc.
 ὑφήγησις, sketch, exposition, description, P. i. 6; guidance, P. i. 23 f., 237.

GLOSSARY

ὑφίστασθαι, lay down, suppose, L. i. 14, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 270, (derive) 312: *ὑποσταθέν=δοξαζόμενον*, E. 113.

φαλάγγιον, venomous spider, P. i. 82, 89.

φαντάζεσθαι, appear, P. i. 47; have a presentation, P. i. 104.

φαντασία, presentation, sense-impression (as *appearing* to the sentient subject), P. i. 22, 52, etc.; (Stoic def. of *φ.*) P. ii. 70, L. i. 228 ff.; *ἀπλή φ.*, L. ii. 276; *καταληπτική φ.*, P. ii. 4, iii. 241, etc.; *λογική φ.*, L. ii. 70; *αἰσθητική φ.*, L. i. 424.

φαντασοῦν, cause a presentation, produce a mental image in, L. ii. 406 f.; (pass.) receive an image, be impressed, P. ii. 72, L. i. 99, ii. 397, 402, etc.

φάντασμα, image, imaginary concept, L. i. 222, 224, Ph. ii. 181, 184 ff.; illusory appearance, phantasm, L. i. 256.

φανταστικῶς (*πάσχουσα*), (affected) as by a presentation, L. i. 373, ii. 410.

φανταστον, object presented to sense (the cause of sense-impressions), L. i. 203, 344, 357, etc.

φάσις, affirmation, assertion, P. i. 192, ii. 107, 121, 153, etc.

φάυλος, (oppd. to *σοφός*, Stoic), foolish, L. i. 153, 432; (*συνημμένον*) invalid, P. ii. 191.

φιλαύτως, self-conceitedly, L. i. 314.

φιλοποιία, making friends, affection, L. i. 239.

φμοῦσθαι, be muzzled, silenced, without reply, L. ii. 275.

φουικτικῶς (*πάσχειν*), (have a sensation) of redness, L. i. 198.

φρενήρης (*τὸ περιέχον*, Heraclit.), intelligent, L. i. 127, ii. 286.

φρεντίξω, be delirious, rave, P. i. 101, ii. 52, L. i. 247; so *φρεντικὸν βλέπει*, look crazy, P. ii. 231.

φυλοκρινεῖν, select with care, scrutinize, L. i. 183.

φυσιογνωμονική (*σοφία*), physiognomy, art of judging character by features, P. i. 85.

φυσιολογία, study of nature, physical science, P. i. 18, iii. 62, etc.; so *φυσιολογεῖν*, P. i. 18.

φωνή, vocal utterance, speech, sound, L. i. 119, ii. 180 ff.;

φωναί (*σκεπτικαί*), formulae, P. i. 14, 187 ff.

φωνομαχεῖν, fight about words or phrases, P. i. 195, 207.

φωρατός, discoverable, detected, explicable, P. i. 183; so *φωρασθαι*, P. iii. 215, L. ii. 167.

φωτειδής (*δύσις*), light-like, resembling light, L. i. 93, 119.

χαλαστικός (*τρόπος*, oppd. to *πύκνωσις*), loosening, laxative, P. ii. 240.

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χαρακτήρ, distinctive nature, form, characteristic, P. i. 191, 209, iii. 37, etc.; (oppd. to *χρῶσα*) shape, features, E. 43; so *χαρακτηριστικά* (*τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*), distinguishing marks, peculiarities, P. iii. 173.

χαριέντως, aptly, wittily, L. ii. 325: *χαριεντίξεσθαι*, say wittily, jest, P. ii. 245.

χαροπός, blue-eyed, L. i. 198.

χαρόν (oppd. to *λυπηρόν*), joyful, delightful, E. 85.

χεῖν (= *τήκειν*), melt, Ph. i. 248; (pass.) P. iii. 14.

χειρίζω (*λόγους*, *ἀπορίας*, etc.), handle, apply, use (as instruments), L. i. 443, ii. 14, E. 21.

χηνώδης (oppd. to *φρόνιμος*), goose-like, silly, L. i. 329.

χιτών (*ὀφθαλμοῦ*), skin, membrane, P. i. 126.

χρωάδης (oppd. to *κρυμνώδης*), in a fine state, powdery, P. i. 130.

χολερικά (*πάθη*), like cholera, P. i. 131.

χολοποιός, bile-producing, Ph. i. 96.

χρειῖν (*πρὸς τι*), be helpful, suffice, L. i. 436.

χρῆμα (= *πράγμα*, Protag.), thing, object or event, P. i. 216; amount, sum of money, L. i. 107.

χρησιμεῖν (*πρὸς τι*), be of use, be needed, P. ii. 94, 150, 205 f., 236, L. ii. 143, etc.

χρώζειν: *κεχρωσμένον*, tinged, coloured, Ph. i. 335.

χυλοειδής, like juice, flavour-like, L. i. 119.

χύσις, melting, liquefying, P. iii. 14; so *χυτὸν* (*τὸ πνεῦμα*), fluid, mobile, P. iii. 188.

χωλεύειν, make lame, maim, P. iii. 217.

χώρα, place, space, (Stoic def.) P. iii. 124, 130, Ph. ii. 2 f.

ψαῦσις (Democr.), (sense of) touch, L. i. 139; contact, Ph. ii. 102. *ψευδοποιεῖν*, give the lie to, falsify, L. ii. 24, Ph. ii. 96, 110, E. 14.

ψηλαφᾶσθαι, be handled, examined, L. ii. 108.

ψηφοπαίκτης, player with pebbles, juggler, P. ii. 250.

ψιλός (*φάσις*, *ἐνοια*, etc.), bare, bald, mere (unconfirmed), P. ii. 121, L. i. 182, ii. 179, 459, etc.; so *ψιλῶς*, separately, taken by itself, P. i. 144, (= *κατ' ἴδιαν*) L. i. 277, ii. 15, E. 88.

ψυκτικός (*χρών*), making cold, chilling, P. iii. 179; so *ψυχοῦσθαι*, be made cold, Ph. ii. 164 f.

ὤμον ἐκβαλεῖν, put out (dislocate) the shoulder, P. ii. 245 (so *ὤμος ἐκπέπτωκεν* P. ii. 245).

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ὀμοπλάτη, shoulder-blade, shoulder, P. iii. 223.
ψοτοκείσθαι, be born as eggs (like birds), P. i. 42.
ώρα (ἡ πρώτη, δευτέρα), hour (of the day), Ph. ii. 182 ff.; so
ὄριαιον διάστημα, interval of an hour, Ph. ii. 134.
ὀρισμένως, definitely, L. i. 336, ii. 297; in the limited sense,
 E. 32, 208.
ὥς . . . ὥδε, as . . . so, E. 10: οὐδὲ ὥς, not even so, P. ii. 42.
ὥσπερ (= *τουτέστι*), that is to say, namely, L. i. 94: *ὥσπεροῦν*,
 even as, as in fact, P. i. 57, ii. 101, Ph. i. 88.
ἄχρα (oppd. to *μέλαν*), pale, light-coloured (of wine), L. i.
 91; so *ἄχρόν*, L. i. 193.
ὠχραίνεσθαι, be made (have a sense of) yellow, or pale colour,
 L. i. 193; so *ὠχραντικῶς κνεῖσθαι*, be affected by yellow,
 see (things) as yellow, L. i. 192, 198.

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