

To William M. Thornton

In memory of the good old times
of Mass and paper
and of the better new times
of drink and fruit.

Baltimore Nov. 21. 1907


B. L. G.

PROBLEMS
IN
GREEK SYNTAX

BY
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I.—PROBLEMS IN GREEK SYNTAX.¹

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Some nine years ago I conceived the plan of collecting my own studies in Greek syntax, together with those that had been set on foot at my suggestion, and of publishing the whole under the title of 'Problems in Greek Syntax.' While I found little to retract, there was not a little to add by way of further illustration and

¹In an address delivered in December, 1899, on the 'Place of Philology,' President Wheeler of the University of California made public lamentation over 'the exaggerated attention paid to syntax in American class-rooms of Greek and Latin' as constituting 'the severest menace to the usefulness and therefore to the continuance of classical study'. This warning was duly echoed by the editor of the *Classical Review*, himself a grammarian; but as no names were mentioned and as, of late years, other American scholars have flooded the philological world, and, for aught I know, their class-rooms, with a fertilizing Nile of syntactical studies, I might have failed to take the lesson to myself. True, I have worked at syntax and if I have not 'turned up the field of Aphrodite or the Charites' with my grammatical ploughshare, as Pindar would say, I have, at least, like Tennyson's Northern Farmer (Old Style) 'stubb'd' or helped to stub 'Thurnaby waäste.' But in order that I might not comfort myself with the thought that I had done some decent work and that at any rate I was not the greatest sinner in the land, the editor of an English educational journal proceeded to point President Wheeler's moral and to reinforce Professor Postgate's comment by holding up Professor Gildersleeve as one who had exercised a deleterious influence on cis-Atlantic classical studies. What a sad return for the patience with which I have kept my arrows within my quiver for all these years! *μή τις ἔτι πρόφρων ἀγανός και*

explanation, and the volume would have bulked large enough to arrest the attention of the scholarly world. For no *obiter dicta*, no pregnant aphorisms, will avail nowadays. If the chips are not sent in with the fable, the table cannot be accepted as a specimen of joiner's work. To this collection I intended to prefix an introductory essay which should set forth my point of view and indicate some lines of research that could, in my judgment, be profitably pursued. In the preparation of this essay I made use of no works of reference, in the hope that I should thereby gain in readableness, a hope which proclaims me to be still in the bonds of literary iniquity.¹ No true grammarian has any right to be readable. Being called on unexpectedly to say something at the Chicago meeting of the American Philological Association, in 1893, I availed myself of the opportunity to air some of the notions embodied in the essay, so that a few of the phrases here used may be familiar to some of my readers and in the time that has elapsed some of the points made have been more fully developed, now in the Journal, now in special treatises by my students, and happily by others. On reviewing this performance I cannot help thinking that while it was well to abandon the projected volume of syntactical studies, the introductory matter

ἤπιος ἔστω. . . But the publication of this series of papers will show how little I am disturbed by these criticisms, which I mention by way of encouragement to my fellow-syntacticians and I resume my lucubrations in cheerful mood. *ὅσα ὀρῶν εὐφραίνε θυμὸν*, says Bakchylides. And should I ever need heartening, I will read and re-read what Weil, who is no syntactician à *outrance*, has written on the subject of Greek Syntax in the *Journal des Savants* for May, 1901. ' <Le> don < de sentir et de faire sentir les nuances les plus délicates >, nécessaire à tout grammairien, l'est particulièrement à celui qui entreprend d' écrire une syntaxe grecque. Rien ne ressemble moins à un code : elle obéit, il est vrai, à des lois que l'on peut dégager, mais dès qu'on essaye de formuler ces lois, elle résiste, elle réclame sa liberté : cette liberté n'est cependant pas la licence ; si elle semble enfreindre la lettre de la loi, c'est pour mieux se conformer à son esprit. C'est que la langue grecque, produit naturel d'un peuple admirablement doué, n' a pas connu pendant des siècles le joug étroit des grammairiens de profession ; instrument d'une merveilleuse souplesse, elle s' accommoda au caractère des genres littéraires, au génie des poètes, des orateurs, des écrivains qui savaient en jouer, capable de rendre les plus fines nuances du sentiment et de la pensée. Mobile et variée à l'infini, tout en restant la même, cette langue fait, par son apparente indiscipline, le désespoir des grammairiens rigides et les délices des esprits qui savent la goûter.'

¹ The notes are all afterthoughts.

may not have lost all its interest. As editor of the American Journal of Philology I have imposed on myself a self-denying ordinance, and when after the first ten years, the supply of copy for the department of original communications became ample, I withdrew into the narrow confines of 'Brief Mention.' But in the volumes that are yet to be issued under my management I expect to try the patience of my subscribers more seriously than I have done heretofore, and with this number I make the beginning.

It is a droll fate that a man whose ambition for all his early years was to be a poet, or, failing that, to be a man of letters, should have his name, so far as he has a name at all, associated with that branch of linguistic study which is abhorrent to so many finely constituted souls. But when I renounced literature as a profession and betook myself to teaching, I found that there was no escape from grammar, if I was to be honest in my calling. Every teacher must spend much time in the study of grammar, if he is to do his duty, for no teacher finds any grammar satisfactory at all points. Each author has a grammar of his own, written or unwritten. Each student has a grammar of his own, has his ways of adjusting the phenomena to his range of vision or *vice versa*, less frequently *vice versa*. As soon as one begins to handle the language practically, to set exercises, to correct exercises, even in the elementary form of retroversion, problems are sure to arise. The rules will not work; the facts will not fit into the scheme; analysis will not yield synthesis; the prepositions and the cases are rebellious; and the moods and tenses will not reproduce themselves, when the test of retranslation is applied. It is in the very beginnings that the troubles show themselves. In Greek verse composition, in Latin verse composition, the problems are not so obtrusive. They are veiled in phraseology, and hence in the mosaic of Greek and Latin verses there are much fewer errors in grammar than might be expected from the very slender knowledge that the artists display when they come to write on grammatical subjects. One is reminded of the way in which Aristophanes mimics epic syntax. True, in almost all modern productions of this kind the eye of the student of historical syntax will detect absurd lapses, absurd anachronisms, absurd violations of sphere;¹ but if we are

¹ So in running my eye over a volume of Greek verses to which I owe some pleasant half-hours, I notice *εἰσω* in Attic verse as a present; 2nd pers. pres.

to lay righteousness to the line and judgment to the plummet, there will be no enjoyment of any artificial poetry, there will be no pleasure in the study of the Alexandrians or in the contemplation of the Greek Anthology. There is such a thing as being too sensitive. One scholar tells us that Victor Hugo lost somewhat of his French touch by his residence in Jersey. Another that Lysias had lived too long in the West to be considered a safe guide in the matter of Atticism.¹ Let us not be too hard to please; let us not break the bruised 'Reeds of Cam' nor pluck to pieces the paper 'Garland of the Severn,' nor stop our ears to the 'Whispers of the Hesperides.' The advantage that comes to the individual from the close study of diction and versification is undeniable, and the cheap fun that has been made of Latin and Greek verse-wrights ought not to lead scholars who have not been brought up under English influences to sneer at exercises that have a positive value. What English scholar would be guilty of such quantities as German 'Gelehrte' inflict on a long-suffering public?² What sterner demand for practice in verse-making could be made than has been made of late by Wilamowitz—one of the most brilliant scholars of our day? No translator 'is he that cannot translate both ways.'³ But the advantage is an individual

subj. with neg. as an imperative, which, by the way, may be found in Hug's Symposium 179, B 5 (*μὴ λέγῃς*); the articular infinitive used with the same freedom as in prose; *πρὶν* with pres. inf. as a normal thing and as many *δεῖ σ' ὀπώρας*' as are to be found in the whole range of Greek literature.

¹ A. J. P. IV 88.

² 'Quanta tum sorem felicitate beatus' is an hexameter pilloried in the C.I.R. 1892, p. 452, and the following note copied from the Nation of March 17, 1892, may be of interest. 'I had just re-read,' says "An Old Contributor," 'Ritschl's merciless review of Madvig's "Adversaria" in which the Danish scholar's false quantities are not spared (Opusc. iii. 164), when I opened a volume of "Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft Wilhelm von Christ zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht" and began with the "Carmen Salutatorium" by J. Menrad, who is known as the author of a creditable piece of work on contraction and synizesis in Homer. Where his master, Christ, studied I do not know; but many a sexagenarian scholar of Ritschl would rather have died at fifty-nine than have lived on to be congratulated in a poem that begins with the portentous blunder *Iam lux ter vicies*. To be sure, *vicies* is no worse than Madvig's *nāssē* and *pāletur*, and Latin verses are an anachronism; but the anachronist should possess and use a *Gradus ad Parnassum* under penalty of having his verses considered *perparvi valoris*, as a German Latinist wrote the other day.'

³ A. J. P. XIII 517.

advantage and belongs to a range of studies that the world rightly or wrongly has agreed to discard. *Versus et cetera Et ludicra pono.* The teacher's main business is to account for the phenomena of the authors read in class; and composition is tolerated chiefly for the exactness it gives in the command of the facts.¹ It is just here, just in the daily explanation of the texts, just in the correction of exercises that almost every thoughtful teacher finds difficulties more or less abundant, according to his vision, according to his temperament. And my first studies in Greek syntax were of this practical kind. Many of the formulae reached during twenty years of teaching were deposited in the notes of my edition of Justin Martyr, which I have elsewhere compared to a hunter's *cache*, and much that I have written since is little more than a justification of rules and principles established or verified in the course of my class-work. Established or verified, I say. To the eye of the specialist the novelties are few indeed; and what I have fancied was my own may have been nothing but reminiscence. Questions of originality and priority concern me little. He would be a poor teacher who should not hit upon a happy phrase, an apt formula now and then. What I am desirous of setting forth is the point of view, which, apart from the moral obligations of the teacher, has given grammatical research so large a place in my professional life. But of this point of view, this creed, this ideal, I have written at some length in my essay on 'Grammar and Aesthetics'; and I will not repeat what I have set down there. Suffice it to say, the study of Greek syntax would always have imposed itself on me as a duty, but take away its spiritual, its artistic content, and it would cease to be for me the meadow of asphodel it has been for years. It would lack the purple glow that lights up the arid plain of grammar until it becomes the Elysian fields of art. It is the moral, the aesthetic side of the study that has interested me from the beginning, and it is the glimpses of the moral and the aesthetic side that have made me less forlorn. The man in Bunyan was so busy with his muck rake that he did not see the crown of glory that was over his head. The muck rake is sometimes the only instrument by which the crown of glory can be reached.

Fortunately for the student of the historical syntax of Greek that wishes to redeem his department from the charge of that

¹See an article entitled: Quelques mots sur l'histoire du thème grec, *Revue Universitaire*, 15 mars, 1893, p. 281.

statistical dulness into which we have been drifting of late, aesthetic syntax is an organic part of his work, an inevitable part of his work. For history we must have chronology and the various departments of Greek literature develop themselves chronologically, so that one important factor in the account is secure. But in the history of literature, chronology is not everything. The sphere must be considered, and the more one studies, the more one becomes convinced of the importance of the literary range. Each department of literature has a history of its own; each author has a stylistic syntax of his own; and these are the problems that have always interested me most, that have made of a passionate lover of literature a dispassionate dissector of language. But the anatomist and the physiologist have their loves despite scalpel and microscope, and I trust that the grammarian has not wholly killed the literary man in me. Indeed so far from that, it is the literary man in me that seeks the aid of the grammarian at every turn. Grammatical figure cannot be divorced from rhetorical figure. Music is older than rhetoric, rhetoric is older than grammar. What were the men who used the language doing in the long ages before writing checked growth? All through those aeons artistic work was going forward, and not all unconsciously. From the grammatical side euphony is movement in the line of least resistance. From the artistic side it is delight in the play of sound; and the artistic definition has imposed itself on grammar. What is analogy from the linguistic side, is love of symmetry from the artistic side. Language as art, is the art of arts, and outdoes in its perfection painting and sculpture, but art works under law and it is largely the function of grammar to determine the law. We cannot escape grammar when we study style; and he did good service who entitled his book a 'Grammar of Ornament.' We cannot escape grammar when we study style. We cannot escape style when we study grammar. Bald truism, perhaps. But unless I am mistaken few appreciate how close the connexion is, how often the interpretation of a point of grammar turns upon the knowledge of an author's style. Perhaps I may be pardoned for giving one or two familiar illustrations from elementary grammar.

THE SENTENCE.

Syntax begins with the sentence—*si dis placet*. Of course, in genetic syntax one does not deal with such old-fashioned things

as 'sentence,' 'subject' and 'predicate.' Genetic syntax has to do with 'current' and 'poles,' but for the outer world it may be safe to say that syntax begins with the sentence. To be sure, the most simple form of the sentence, the finite verb with its implied subject, does not admit of syntax. As soon, however, as the subject is expressed, the problem begins. *εἶπον*. Well and good. But are we to say *ἐγὼ εἶπον* or *εἶπον ἐγὼ*? And lo! we encounter at once the question of hiatus, we encounter the question of position, we encounter the question of expressing the subject at all, every one a stylistic problem.¹

Our grammars tell us that the subject need not be expressed, nay, is not expressed unless it is emphatic; but it is expressed, needlessly expressed, expressed where we can feel no special emphasis. The verbs of these subjects have a certain range; they are very often verbs of saying, thinking, knowing, and with these verbs the first person is very often expressed where we do not feel the need. This assertion of personality in *ἐγὼ* is, in *ἐγὼ*μαι, is a clue to the tone. The same phenomenon is set down as vulgar in Latin. It is to a certain extent vulgar in Greek, and we are not surprised that the vulgarian Aischines is given to an undue use of the personal pronoun outside of the consecrated range. Is it not 'better form' in our own world to suppress 'I' in favor of the colorless 'one,' in favor of the impersonal passive?

One of the first sections in syntax is the use of the copula. Of course, we are promptly told that the copula is often dispensed with, as in *μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν, ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ* and all the other wise saws that we quote, but do not practise. Strictly speaking, we might turn the statement round. The verb which serves as a flux—*εἰμί*—was originally something more than a flux, shows itself, if half a chance be given it, much more than a flux. Two words put side by side will work out the problem of predicate and subject. The old will be the subject, the new will be the predicate, or they will be subject and predicate in turn. We cannot help asking the stylistic meaning of this so-called omission of the copula. Being primal, it belongs to elevated language. Pindar scarcely ever uses the copula, the flux. Being primitive, it is found in proverbial language and proverbial language belongs to the speech of the people. Extremes meet in syntax as in vocabu-

¹ See Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato*, p. 90. Cf. A. J. P. VI 489 and X 439 (Hussey).

lary. Our poetical words are often vulgar. Our vulgar words are often poetical. One would like to know more about the omission of the copula than is taught in school grammars.¹ Go a step farther in the same direction. When two substantives are put side by side, one may serve as predicate to the other. Which is which, is extra-linguistic. In Latin juxtaposition must be made to yield the result. ~~There are certain conventionalities, as they are called, in position, *nomina substantiva, adjectiva* nouns.~~ In Greek the development of the article serves to distinguish subject from predicate. All this comes naturally from the demonstrative force of the article. The article gives the old notion (*schon da gewesen*), the anarthrous the new. But see how stylistic considerations come into the naïveté of language. At a late period the prefixing of the article here and the omission of it there, were looked upon as a contrivance for avoiding ambiguity, just as in still later times the prefixing of the article was looked upon as a means of indicating gender, τὸ ἄρθρον being practically τὰ ἄρθρα.² Outside of such combinations as οὗτος, ὅδε, ἐκεῖνος, with the article, in which we have the old appositive use, the predicative position of the article, as it is called, involves a certain amount of analysis and it is not impossible that in οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ a later time may have felt οὗτος as the predicate. Another such gnomon of style was recognized by the Greeks themselves in the different attributive positions of the article, adjective and substantive. ὁ ἐμὸς υἱός was to them an illustration of συντρομία, ὁ υἱὸς ὁ ἐμὸς of ὄγκος, and the swell of the latter form was sought after by some of the orators. The third position υἱὸς ὁ ἐμὸς depends for its interpretation on the grammatical stage of the language. When the article is still largely implicit, when υἱός is ὁ υἱός then υἱὸς ὁ ἐμὸς = ὁ υἱὸς ὁ ἐμὸς. When it is explicit, then υἱὸς ὁ ἐμὸς has a decidedly naïve effect, the after-thought ὁ ἐμὸς is a *grata neglegentia*, a slipshodness of the Greeks, and we are not surprised to find it so often

¹ See now Bishop on the omission of the copula with -τέον, A. J. P. XX 248. and Delbrück, *Vergl. S.* III 121. Worse than useless is such a note as Campbell's on Plato, *Theaet.* 143 E: 'The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb.' It is an explanation that fails to explain.

² Theon *προλογ.* II 83 Sp.: προσθέσει ἄρθρων οὐκ ἐτι ἀμφίβολος γίνεται ἢ λέξις. In old-fashioned grammars of Latin *hic, haec, hoc* served as substitutes for ὁ, ἡ, τό. Every one will remember the Latin lesson in the *Merry Wives of Windsor*: 'Articles are borrowed of the propoun and be thus declined, *singulariter, nominativo, hic, haec, hoc.*'

in Herodotos.¹ But this is only one of the manifestations of the article that cannot be studied grammatically without being studied stylistically. Beginning as a demonstrative pronoun, the article never loses its demonstrative force, but its sphere and its range are different at different times and in different authors. The Homeric use is an adumbration of what it is to be, but the epic use is not the lyric use, the lyric use is not the dramatic use. Compare the chorus of the drama with the dialogue. Compare comic poetry with tragic. The article with proper names has in it a history of styles from the universal omission in the epic to the universal employment in the late Homeric paraphrast.² The orators are bound as the historians are not, and among themselves the orators, vary according to their regard for the conventionalities. But I must not let my illustrations outgrow my thesis, which after all no one will think it worth while to controvert. Every Greek syntax is more or less a *syntaxis ornata*, and if I shall be able to extend the domain of this *syntaxis ornata*, I shall be more than satisfied.

The facts are doubtless more or less familiar and my only hope is that the grouping of the facts and the presentation of the facts may be of service to those who have not made a special study of the relations of grammar and style. Nor need there be any dread lest the necessary analysis destroy the feeling for language. Feeling for language is not destroyed by multiplied observations of this sort. Nay, it is but heightened. The reasoned observation passés over into the unreasoned perception. The mere literary student of style may be able to pronounce with Cicero's man that this verse is by Plautus, this not³, but the scientific student of literature has other and more certain tests. After a while the application of these tests becomes so instinctive that the process is not felt, and when the rhetorician tells the grammarian that this piece of Lysias and that piece of Demosthenes are indistinguishable,⁴ the grammarian feels an array of differences as immediately as if he had not learned those differences by analysis.

¹ See Aristotle's Rhetoric III c. 2, and my comments on his example τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός A. J. P. XX 459, which must not be taken too seriously. To the examples of *pluralis maiestatis* there given, add Eur. El. 34: ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ διδωσιν Ἡλέκτραν ἔχειν | δάμαρτα. On the slipshod position see Justin Martyr Apol. I, 6, 7; A. J. P. VI 262 where I correct my statement as to Lucian, and XVII, 126, 518; and Mildner's dissertation on the Limits of the Predicative Position in Greek, p. 10.

² A. J. P. XI 483.

³ Cic. Fam. IX 16, 4.

⁴ Dion. Hal., Dem. 992 R.

PARTS OF SPEECH.

There is a queer little book by Spangenberg (A. J. P. VIII 255), if indeed it be by Spangenberg,¹ in which the Nouns under their king *Poeta* make war on the Verbs under their King *Amo*. Spangenberg's—or rather Guarna's—jest becomes earnest with us and we also have to recognize a certain rivalry between the two in the matter of aesthetic syntax. Hermogenes, a famous rhetorician, gives us to understand that the use of the noun gives a certain dignity to style² and a practical illustration of this even in English is furnished by a comparison of the style of Johnson, and the style of Addison as was pointed out long ago. See my *Essays and Studies* p. 155. Whence this dignity? The meaning of the noun is more implicit than that of the verb. The noun wraps itself up, as it were, in its mantle with an air of reserve and whereas the finite verb reveals its voice, its mood, its tense, its person, the abstract noun lets you divine all this. Noun and verb are twins, but not more unlike were Esau and Jacob, Esau, the outspoken and Jacob, the supplanter. Each of these twins has its advantages, the noun in compactness, the verb in directness. But the lively Greek is not content with one advantage at a time—*ἀ ὄς τὰν βάλανον τὰν μὲν ἔχει τὰν δ' ἔραται λαβεῖν*—and impatient of reserve introduces the articular infinitive to do the office of both noun and verb. Introduces it, for the articular infinitive seems to have belonged originally to the realm of vulgar speech, to the realm of eating and drinking—*τὸ φαγεῖν, τὸ πειν*. It is not allowed to figure in the aristocratic epic, for in nothing does Parmenides show more plainly his indifference to style than in the use of the articular infinitive in the hexameter. It appears, though rarely, in the lyric, which will not be bound by conventionalities. Fiery Alkaios will cry out:

τὸ γὰρ
"Ἄρειν κατθάνην κάλον

and lofty Pindar will deign to say:

τὸ δὲ παθεῖν εὖ πρῶτον ἀέθλων.

¹ See Fleckeisen's *Jahrb.* Bd. 154 (1896), p. 443, and a long article by L. Fränkl in *Z. f. vergl. Littg.* XIII, 242, which goes to show that the author is Andreas Guarna Salernitanus. The book was published at Strassburg 1512.

² Classen, *Einleitung zu Thuk.* LXVI, A. J. P. VIII 333, XVI 525, XX, 111 and now my *Greek Syntax* §§ 61, 141.

But for all that, the articular infinitive is a tribune of the people, a representative of the wants and wishes of the mobile verb. To be sure, it may be said that the infinitive was an abstract noun, to begin with, but it had become the drudge in the family of the verbs and it had served as a substitute for every mood. The patrician Claudius had become the plebeian Clodius and at first τὸ θανεῖν could hardly have been more dignified than τὸ θρέττε. But the promotion of the infinitive and its free association with abstract nouns on a footing of equality gave it something of the σεμνότης of its companions and yet the σεμνότης is a false σεμνότης and there is an ἀπειροκαλία about it at times that reminds one of the market-place. The free use of the articular infinitive in narrative, the free use of the articular infinitive, where the regularly developed verbal noun will serve, are notes of a vulgar style, such as that of Polybios,¹ just as in English 'nonce-nouns' made of infinitives are all vulgar. 'It is my *shoot*', 'it is my *try*' are forcible enough and 'shoot' and 'try' have the same advantage over 'shot' and 'trial' that the articular infinitive has over the verbal noun, but I should think long before using in a serious composition Browning's 'He thinks many a long think'.

To the ancient grammarians the infinitive was not a distinct part of speech. τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον was only a manifestation of the verb, though they might have made it a part of speech with the same right as they made the participle, the μετοχή, a part of speech. Nor did the ancient rhetoricians have much to say about the stylistic effect of the infinitive. But in the participle they did recognize a potent element of style, as I have already set forth at length (A. J. P. IX 137), and well they might. The participle adds color and sweep to description. The color sometimes becomes confusing, the sweep sometimes becomes a tangle, but an ametoichic discourse would lack fluency, would lack light and shade. In Greek the participle is idiomatically used where few languages dare follow. So of two imperatives, one is subordinated and our English resents. There is a variant in Matt. 9, 6, that tells the story. ἔγειρε ἄρον σου τὴν κλίνην is the Semitic of ἐγερθεὶς ἄρον. It is ἔγειρε ἄρον in Mark 2, 11. In Luke 5, 24, however, it is ἔγειρε καὶ ἄρας τὸ κλινιδίον σου πορεύου. Nay, the subordination of the participle with the imperative is common enough in the N. T. The great command is: πορευθέντες οὖν μαθητεύσατε ἰσραὴλ

¹ See Hewlett, A. J. P. XI 287.

πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. But in the narrative even the Greek of the N. T. does not neglect the participle. It could not be Greek at all if it did, and so the Evangelist goes on to say ἐγερθεὶς ἀπῆλθεν where in English we say, 'He arose and departed.'

But the Greek participle did not achieve all its triumphs at once. It has a history. The logical elements which we dissect out of the participle when we call it causal, adversative, conditional, final, all these lay undifferentiated in its original plastic use. This original plastic use is felt throughout the language. This is the use that manifests itself after verbs of perception, for after verbs of actual perception, the participle must be used and no periphrasis will take its place (A. J. P. XIV 374). This is the use that manifests itself in those combinations in which we say that the participle is used *instead* of a substantive, such as ἀμ' ἡλίφ ἀνιόντι, where the translation by an abstract noun destroys the concreteness of the expression.¹ The participle, to begin with, is an adjective but it has more movement than an adjective. The temporal significance is a part of its being. If it loses that temporal significance it is degraded to an adjective, to a noun. If the adjective gains temporal significance it is elevated to the rank of a participle and may take the construction of a participle.² Now it is out of that temporal significance that the familiar categories of cause and condition arose; it is in this way that the participle came to be regarded as an abridged sentence, if one may use the somewhat dangerous phraseology of our grammars. But was there to the Greek himself any consciousness of the participial sentence as an abridged sentence? The Greek rhetoricians give us samples of shifting expression which show consciousness, but their evidence has to be taken with considerable caution and our best guide is the usage of the classic authors. When an author uses a conditional sentence in one member of an antithesis and a participle in the other we can hardly deny the full consciousness of a conditional participle.³ But the conditional participle as such could

¹ For English examples, see Kellner, Historical Outlines of English Syntax, p. 263, and cf. A. J. P. XIX 463, XX 353.

² Cf. Pind. O. 9, 2: φωνᾶεν Ὀλυμπία where one of Pindar's unfortunate commentators wishes to 'emend.' Comp. Ion fr. 1, 7 (Bgk.), where the same word is construed as a participle, παῖδες φωνήεντες, ὅταν πῆσθ' ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλω, | πρὶν δὲ σιωπᾶσιν.

³ E. g. Hdt. 1, 187: ἦν σπανίση—μὴ σπανίσας.

not have come at once, because a conditional participle requires the negative *μή* and the negative *μή* with the participle is a comparatively late achievement.¹ As we can watch the timid introduction of *ἄν* with inf. to match *ἄν* with opt. in *oratio recta*,² so we can watch *μή* stealing into the participial sentence. Once established there, *μή* extends its empire as by divine right, and this 'generic' use of *μή* of which so much is made in the grammars is nothing but a transfer from the conditional sentence as abridged in the participle. The conditional sentence itself goes back to the imperative, goes back to the optative meaning of *μή*, and it is no longer necessary to divide the body of *μή* and to recognize in it two distinct uses, as is practically done by some, openly by others.³

When *μή* is first used with the participle it is used only in consequence of the general requirements of the sentence. There is, strictly speaking, no *μή* with the participle in Homer.⁴ When we find it again *μή* with the participle distinctly echoes the *μή* of an equivalent finite construction. And the articular participle with *μή* is a condensed form of the conditional relative. The naïveté of the language is over in Pindar's *ὁ μή στυγείης* (N. 4, 31) as it is over in Pindar's *ἀγνωμον δὲ τὸ μή προμαθεῖν* (O. 8, 61). The participle, then, expresses concretely relations that would be expressed logically by the finite verb; and the use of the finite verb for the participle or the participle for the finite verb produces a stylistic effect which the ancient rhetoricians recognized distinctly.⁵ But participle in Homer and participle in Isaios are not the same thing. In Homer involution precedes evolution; in Isaios evolution precedes involution. It is evening primrose against umbrella. In the one

¹ All these points have been worked out since the date of these remarks in two Johns Hopkins dissertations, Gallaway, On the use of *μή* with the Participle, and Bolling, On the Participle in Hesiod.

² Il. 9, 684—Comp. v. 417.

³ Cook-Wilson says, 'whatever the common ultimate ancestry of the two meanings of *μή*, they are as distinct uses as if they were represented by different words.' See A. J. P. XII 520.

⁴ A. J. P. XVIII 244, 369. Remarkable is the steadiness of epic syntax even among imitators. See C. J. Goodwin on Apollonius Rhodius. As to the special instance Ap. Rh. 2, ~~οὐδὲ~~ οὐδέ τις ἔτλη | *μή* καὶ λυκκανίη ^ε δὲ φορέμενος ἄλλ' ἀπὸ τηλοῦ | ἔστηώς, that is not a true example of *μή* with the participle. It is an elliptical figure like *μή* *ὄτι*, but that also is alien from epic poetry. But see now G. M. Bolling, The Participle in Apollonius Rhodius (Studies in Honor of B. L. G., p. 462).

⁵ Dion. Hal., Iud. de Isaeo, 598 R.; Pindar I. E. cix; A. J. P. IX 142.

case the bud has not opened. In the other the umbrella has been folded. As a verb, the participle encroaches on the verb; as an adjective, it encroaches on the adverb. Here again we have concreteness instead of analysis. Conspicuous is the well-known coincidental use of the participle in that construction in which finite verb and participle are reversible, such as the early use of *φθάνω* and *λανθάνω*, as the later use of *τυγχάνω*.¹ For *λανθάνω* the Greek can use *λάθρα*, for *τυγχάνω* he can use *τύχη*, for *φθάνω* he can use the prefix *προ-*, but what a difference in feeling and color; what a difference in feeling and color in the like use of the adjective, *λαθραῖος* for *λάθρα*, *σκοταῖος* or *σκότιος* for *ἐν σκότῳ*, 'darkling' for 'in the dark,' and the rest of the *-ιος* forms. The manner of the action becomes the characteristic of the agent and in some of the combinations we are not far from the concrete Hebrew. (See Pindar xci note.)² *πεμπταῖος* is 'the son of the fifth day' or as the Hebrew has it, the son of five days, just as *κλεινῖος* is the son of *κλεινίας*. Like the English 'son' in proper names, the feeling may be dulled somewhat but it can always be sharpened. The Jewish Mendelssohn thrusts itself on us by sheer bulk, but 'son' and 'sen' are not dead nor is *-ιος* dead. In some of the dialects it is the regular patronymic instead of the genitive. In Attic it is used with the feeling that reminds one of Fitz or Ap before names that are wont to take the Anglo-Saxon 'son.' *κλεινῖος* used of Alkibiades is like 'Fitz-Smith' or 'Ap-Smith' for 'Smithson.' But not to enlarge on this point which brings us into perilous proximity to the genitive, there is evidently a greater naïveté, a greater inliness in this use of the adjective for the adverb, *λαθραῖος* for *λάθρα*, *νύχιος* for *ἐν νυκτί*, and a grammatical category becomes a norm of style.

Indeed, every metastasis of the parts of speech is full of stylistic meaning. So the shift from preposition to adverb, from adverb to preposition. Preposition and adverb belong ultimately to the same category. But in Greek the preposition is sharply differentiated from the ordinary adverb by the facility with which it forms those loose compounds, which to the Greek are *παράθετα* rather than *σύνθετα*. Only in a few instances do preposition and verb grow together and form a corporeal unity. The augment and the reduplication come between verb and preposition. There is

¹ A. J. P. XII 76.


² Plat. Rpb. 614 B: *δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρρῇ κείμενος ἀνεβίω*.

no marriage, only a 'hand-fasting,' as the Scotch say. The Greek will not submit to more, and submits to this only with the preposition. The pseudo-prepositions may disport themselves with the cases, *ἀμα* may take the dative and *ἐνεκα* the genitive but a false Smerdis, if not the only one,¹ on the list of prepositions proper is *σύν*. Now the growth of this relation between the verb and the preposition we can divine from what the written language reveals. We can see how habit brings about love (*consuetudo concinnat amorem*)—how the independence of the prepositional adverb gives way to the seduction of the verb. The preposition as an independent adverb still exists in prose—but only in a few specimens. Even in poetry we feel more than we do in the case of the non-prepositional adverbs that where the preposition is, the mate cannot be far off. Hence the phenomenon is called tmesis, for union having become a second nature, non-union is construed as a divorce, and it is not necessary to speak of tmesis as the 'so-called' tmesis. Everyone can watch the growth of these alliances in certain verbs; everyone feels the difference between the adverbial state and the prefix state. 'Stretched out' and 'outstretched' are not the same even to us, nor 'fill up' and 'upfill'.² But it might be forcing the matter to attach too much importance to the stray prepositions that are still used as adverbs in Greek prose. It is a phraseological survival, an old tradition; and this maintenance of tradition lends raciness to style, makes it idiomatic. A style that abounds in idioms abounds also in traditions, abounds in those unreasoned survivals so precious to the student of language as language, not less precious to the student of language as art.

To the same sphere belongs the shifting use of the prepositions now in composition, now with their cases, now with both. The repetition of the preposition or the use of its synonyms with the case shows a desire to bring out the plastic character of the preposition which is apt to become effaced in the compound, and a large use of such repetitions is stylistically significant. In the earlier language it might be set down to the native desire for reduplication. But in the later language it would seem to show a

¹ Brugmann puts *διά* in the same category, Gr. Gr.³, p. 453, as Professor Miller kindly reminds me.

² Shakespeare, R. & J., I 3: 'I must upfill this osier cage of ours | With baleful weeds'; not to cite examples in which the sense is wholly different, as 'run out' and 'outrun.'



conscious desire to be plastic, a would-be naïveté of style. But it would be premature to formulate in this direction, for in spite of recent labors, there remains much to be done in the whole field of prepositions and prepositional combinations, and those who come after us will have to blush for Greek scholarship as we have to blush when we think that the sphere of *σύν* was not delimited until less than thirty years ago, though, it would seem, any novice might have been struck by the range of citation in the ordinary lexicons.¹ And now that one knows what one knows about *σύν*—which is by no means everything—one is apt to speak as if *σύν* had dropped out of the language, and yet the practical death of *σύν* as a preposition did not affect its life as a prefix, so that it can arise and shine as a preposition in later Greek. Xenophon, it is true, may have something to do with this rehabilitation, as Xenophon is accountable for a variety of revivals in later Greek, but Xenophon alone would not have sufficed.

In estimating, therefore, the frequency of prepositions as a norm of style it is necessary to consider both elements of the preposition, the preposition which takes a case, the preposition which serves as a prefix. A simple enumeration of the prepositions will not serve and *ὀλιγοπροθεσία, πολυπροθεσία* cannot be based, as Mommsen has based them, on what we may call for brevity's sake the ptotic preposition. Still the variation in the number of these ptotic prepositions is not without its interest, not without its significance. The writer who has to do with the practical realm of things in the outer world must perforce use a large number and great variety of prepositions, as we can see in the narratives of the orators. In the earlier language we should expect the local signification of the cases to be more sharply felt and the use of the ptotic prepositions to be less imperative. But no matter how far back we go, the preposition is needed for the plastic, the concrete in style. The early poet does, it is true, make free use of the dative as a where case, not so free use of the genitive as a whence case, but the accusative as a whither case is reduced to narrow limits and we must not exaggerate this locative use. And even if the figures show *ὀλιγοπροθεσία* as they do in Pindar, the prepositions must be weighed, not counted merely. Pindar's use of the prepositions

¹ In my Pape of 1849, my constant companion for many years, one reads, 'Homer u. Folgende überall,' and yet outside of Xenophon he cites only two passages, both from Plato, one from the Laws. And this is the kind of work that was accepted in my youth as respectable.

is extremely effective and may be set down as a *gnomon* of his style (Pindar I. E. xli, xcvi foll.). But it is not Pindar, it is the tragic poets that outdo early Greek in their locative use of the cases; and this is one of the marks of conscious antiquarianism in the drama that must not be lost sight of in making up the verdict on this manifestation of antique art. No one can study vocabulary or syntax historically without a serious reduction of the *naïf* in his estimates. Much is conscious effort that is set down to native impulse. But if our enjoyment is not to be marred by all this reflexion and all this analysis we must remember that the technique soon ceases to be conscious, that the burin becomes part of the engraver's hand. Not to cite the long vindication of analysis in art given by Dionysios (Dem. 1113 R. foll.), we may simply say with Euenos:

φημί πολυχροσίην μελέτην ἔμεναι φίλε καὶ δὴ
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

THE CASES.

From the consideration of the stylistic effect of a shift in the parts of speech we next approach the stylistic effect of a shift in the cases and here we encounter a number of delicate problems that need the application of those precise methods which so many despise. There is a sad if not a dreary lack of statistical and other material. We have dissertations without number on the use of such and such a case in such and such an author but, so far as I am aware, there has been no research into the average frequency of the occurrence of the several cases and no study of the conditions of the varying proportions. And yet vowels and consonants have been counted and that not merely for purposes of phonetic analysis. In our English type-cases the *e*-box is the largest of all. But even in advance of exhaustive investigation it would be safe to say that there must be a different normal use of the nominative in different languages, that there must be a different individual use of the nominative in different authors. Two authors, for instance, might be differentiated by their respective use of the nominative of abstract nouns. The nominative implies person or personification (A. J. P. XX 111). That is the reason why the neuter has no nominative and the free personification of abstract nouns would be foreign to a simple, practical prose style, would be native to

poetry, to philosophy.¹ Much can be learned from a dry Index verborum. To be sure, one cannot take the nominative alone as, indeed, few phenomena of language can be considered alone. So, for instance, the range of the nominative and the range of the passive cannot be wholly dissociated. Some languages have an aversion to the passive. So the whole Germanic group. But in English the repugnance has been overcome by early translation from languages that use the passive freely and by close contact with Romance syntax, and we use the passive with the utmost readiness, nay, the English language is notoriously passive-loving.² It is a φιλυππιωτάτη διάλεκτος, as one might say, and goes beyond its models. And this freedom in the use of the passive is furthered by the degradation of the cases, which enables us to turn the active into the passive as readily as does the Greek, nay, more readily. But when we compare Greek with Latin we see the difference. In Latin the dative is not turned into a nominative with the passive as in Greek, but recourse is had to an impersonal passive and *φθονοῦμαι* becomes *mihi invidetur*. This use of the impersonal, of the dative, carries with it a certain legal particularity of tone, which is in perfect accordance with the character of the Latin language. When the Latin language violates its rule we feel that it is off on a frolic with the Greek. At the same time it will be noticed that the Greek is much more shy of turning its so-called intransitives into impersonal passives. *φθονεῖναι μοι* would be worse than *invideor*. The shyness of Greek is not as the shyness of Latin. Greek will not give up the life of its person, Latin will not give up the exactness of its case. But the characteristics of different languages as based on the relative frequency of their use of the nominative must await more detailed investigation; and it may suffice for the present to note that the effect of the free use of the nominative in Greek has not escaped the observation of the Greek rhetoricians. Ὁρθότης, or the use of the nominative and the finite verb, was to them a note of simplicity. (See A. J. P. IX 141.) This is the

¹ See A. J. P. X 37.

² 'The use of the passive is much more extensive in English than in French, as, in fact, in any language ancient or modern.' See Mätzner *Engl. Gr.*³, I 344. Super-Weil, *On the Order of Words*, p. 50. 'In Old English only transitive verbs could be used in the passive. 'We still hesitate over and try to evade such passive constructions as "she was given a watch," "he was granted an audience," because we still feel that *she* and *he* are in the dative, not the accusative relation.' Sweet, *N. E. Gr.* § 2312.

way in which stories have been told from time immemorial. This is the way in which fables begin. This is the way in which Lysias regularly opens his *narratio*. (A. J. P. IX 142 n.) But simplicity may be overdone. When we rise to a higher sphere like that of tragedy the fabulistic style is felt to be inappropriate and as early a critic as Aristophanes assailed Euripides for the mechanical uniformity of his prologues, which allowed the comic muse to 'hang a calfskin on the recreant limbs' of tragedy, to substitute a dish-clout for the sable pall of Melpomene and to make *ληκύθιον ἀπόλεσεν* an immortal gibe.¹ The grand manner of Demosthenes avoids rather than seeks a nominative opening and what is called technically *πλαγιασμός* takes its place. That master of forensic chess disdains the ordinary gambit.

Nominative and accusative are the two poles of the explicit sentence, they are the two poles of the implicit sentence, the finite verb. *φονεύω* involves *ὁ φονεύς*, it involves also *τὸν φόνον*. No *λόγος* without the two. But there is a difference which pole is presented, whether we say *ἡ δημοκρατία κατελύθη* (Lys. 13, 4), or *κατέλυσαν τὴν δημοκρατίαν* (cf. § 12), or *τὴν δημοκρατίαν κατέλυσαν*. In translation, it is true, we are perfectly right to sacrifice active to passive or passive to active as the case may be, in order to bring out the emphasis of position, but translation is a poor approximation and should not be allowed to efface, in our minds at least, the native distinctions. The accusative has far more primitive force, has far more passion in it than the nominative, and in all moments of excitement rushes to the head of the sentence, so that this reversal of the poles of the sentence is a mechanical device that cannot be considered a perfect success, and yet if we retain the original order and say 'Him ye have taken', 'This Jesus hath God raised up,' everyone feels that the stress is overdone. This is a problem of perpetual recurrence and has not escaped our grammars, but involving as it does the order of words, it is either passed over lightly or answered by a mechanical formula that satisfies no one. It is, then, by no means a matter of indifference whether we express a thought actively or passively, whether the subject takes the place of the object or not—nay, the rhetoricians tell us that in some circumstances it makes a difference whether we use the nominative with the finite verb or the accusative and the infinitive,² but the distinction which they

¹ Ar. Ran. 1212.

² Theon II 74 Sp.

make is hardly a grammatical one. It simply amounts to saying that with the accusative and infinitive one shirks the responsibility and is therefore more modest.

OBLIQUE CASES.

The rivalry of nominative and accusative, though fairly recognized, is commonly relegated to the unsatisfactory category of emphasis, and so dismissed, but the real point, the rivalry between the oblique cases will not down and makes it hard to sit in the seat of those who are scornful of petty grammatical distinctions.

No grammar can escape the registry of these rival uses and a certain differentiation is demanded. When two cases have the same form, as dative and locative in Greek or as many datives and ablatives in Latin, how are we to tell which case is meant? Ordinarily in Latin the problem is simple enough, but sometimes it cannot be solved by grammatical tests. Sometimes the only test is the author's way of looking at things, just the same test that we apply to vocabulary in case of ~~verbs~~ words, just as we say that in Pindar P. 2, 62: ἀναβάσομαι στόλον, it is more poetical¹ and consequently more Pindaric to take στόλον in the sense of 'prow' than in the sense of 'voyage' as a cognate accusative to ἀναβάσομαι, just as Mr. Pater translates *carrière ouverte* 'an open quarry' whereas ninety-nine hundredths of ordinary mortals would translate it 'open lists' or mayhap 'open career.'²

To take a Latin instance, if both dative and ablative are permissible, the choice will be determined by the way in which the author is wont to personify. But the problem of choice between ablative and dative is complicated by the fact that the ablative itself is a mixed case. To discover this was not reserved for our day. It was pointed out by Quintilian, who says that there is a certain natural amphiboly in the ablative and gives a concrete instance which he quotes from memory and misquotes, *caelo decurrit aperto*.³ Is *caelo aperto* local, is it circumstantial? So,

¹ See Jebb on Soph. Philoct. 343.

² Plato and Platonism, p. 96: 'We . . . will bring you like some perfectly accomplished implement to this *carrière ouverte*, this open quarry, for the furtherance of your personal interests in the world.' Needless to say, this is a little joke of Mr. Pater's like Plato's use of ἄλοχος (Theaet. 149 B). ἄλοχος, by the way, reminds me of Buchholz's κουρίδιος ἄλοχος (II 2, 7) and the painful necessity of learning some elementary things before one ventures on 'Homerische Realien.'

³ Cf. Quint. I. O. 1. 4, 26; 7, 9, 10.

modern commentators have asked if in *assiduo ruptae lectore columnae* the ablative *assiduo lectore* is instrumental or circumstantial. To me it is as instrumental as the famous *lassata viris* is instrumental but I recognize the right of private judgment and there are many instances in which the decision may fairly be in suspense. The dative is a mixed case; in Greek clearly so. Now the choice between the different elements of this mixed case in a given instance must be determined in large measure by the aesthetic character of the author and the department. Shall we have the cold local dative or the warm personal dative?¹ These are problems with which the personal equation of the investigator must interfere to a considerable extent. It is easier to reduce *dare* to a mere verb of motion in Latin than it is to perform the same office for *δοῦναι* in Greek,² but at the same time it is harder to depersonalize the dative in Latin than to depersonalize the dative in Greek. These are undoubtedly perplexing problems. Evidently we have to be guided by extra-grammatical considerations, so that while we are trying to frame a code of aesthetics out of grammar, we have to construct a grammatical code out of aesthetics. As Quintilian puts the problem, we should have to consider the extent to which the author and the period use the ablative of manner, the ablative of time, which has become the ablative absolute, and the locative ablative before we can decide a simple point of grammar. The mixed cases once thoroughly mixed must have lain to a certain extent undifferentiated in the consciousness of the users of the language, and to decide when this or that element is dormant, when it is awake and at work, is no easy matter and this universal difficulty is further complicated by the character of period, department, individual.

More tangible seems to be the problem when different cases are permissible and when there can be no question as to the form, as when we find the genitive of the owner and the dative of the possessor side by side, as when certain adjectives oscillate between dative and genitive. Yet even these differences are not to be measured by any mechanical rule. What an interval,

¹ See Pind. O. 2, 90; I. E. xciii; Thompson on Phaedr. 254 E.; A. J. P. VIII 253, 254; Conington on Verg. Aen. 10, 681.

² To the examples of *δοῦναι* with dat. before cited I beg to add Sim. Amorg. 7, 54: τὸν δ' ἄνδρα τὸν παρόντα νανοσίη διδοί. Eur. Bacch. 621: χεῖλεσιν διδοῦς ὀδόντας 'letting his lips have his teeth'. Eur. Tro. 96: ἐρημία δούς (cf. 'leaves the world to darkness and to me'). Plat. Rpb. 566 C: θανάτῳ δίδοται.

for instance, separates the fine ethical use of the pronoun from the coarse σχῆμα Κολοφώνιον with its ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶ ἀνθρώπῳ. Indeed, so crude is this ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶ ἀνθρώπῳ that we can hardly believe the traditional example, for Greek normally uses the genitive with parts of the body. So crude is it that we are tempted to call it negro-Greek as *maitre à moi* is negro-French. It may be hard to follow the finer lines of differentiation, and I myself have said (I. E. xciv), "There is a certain caprice in these matters that it is not profitable to pursue," but psychologists have made a special study of the knee-jerk¹ and the nimble capers of language must be followed up. There is clearly something more *naïf*, more dramatic about the dative than there is about the genitive. *θυγάτηρ οἱ* (Pind. O. 9, 16) is 'daughter to her' not 'her daughter'² and it would not be exaggeration to say that the encroachment of the dative on the genitive with adverbs and adjectives which we notice in certain authors shows a tendency to emphasize the personal relation; and assuredly this is a characteristic of style. It is the story of the genie. The dative releases the verbal element of the adjective which was shut up in the casket of the genitive. φίλος as a substantive takes the genitive, as an adjective it takes the dative.³

¹ See W. P. Lombard, Variations of the normal knee-jerk, Am. Journal of Psychology I, p. 5, 1888.

² To be sure, *οἱ* is now considered by some a virtual genitive and not a dative and Brugmann, Gr. Gr.³ p. 393, says that it is false to make the dative sense basic (vom dativischen Sinn auszugehen), as Dyroff and Kühner-Gerth have done. But that is not the last word on the subject, unless I am very much mistaken. That *οἱ* was a dative to the Greek feeling seems to be as plain as anything can be. See my note on the chiasmic use of genitive and dative, Pind. O. 6, 5. And it is with the Greek feeling that I have mainly to do in my researches. How far comparative grammar helps to that end is a subject not to be discussed in a footnote. 'Das drama,' says Wilamowitz (H. F. 626), 'drückt in der anrede das possessive verhältnis bei verwandtschaftswörtern durch den dativ aus, *θυγάτηρ μοι, τέκνον μοι, γύναι μοι.*' Does this mean the effacement of the difference between the dative of the possessor and the genitive of the owner (cf. Plato, Theaet. 197 B), or is it simply one of the many devices that remind us how far the language of the stage was from *naïveté*?

³ Of course, here also Delbrück and Brugmann have turned themselves and with themselves the grammatical world upside down, and I venture to heave again the sigh of which I delivered myself in my Chicago address of 1901: 'I must confess that I am in mourning because of the genitive and expect to go mourning all my days because of the genitive. In fact, I am tempted in dark hours to curse the genitive and die, or at any rate to say with Dame

πλησίον which normally takes the genitive, occasionally rebels against normality and the late ἐγγύς with the dative is a revolt of the living person against the dead place. The story of *par* in Latin is also instructive and the struggle of *plenus* to get rid of the genitive is not without significance. Verbs of touching in Pindar may take the dative. Is not this a part of his aloofness like the discarding of ἵνα and the espousal of ὄφρα? In fact all the shifts of the cases have meaning. So, for instance, in the κατά- compounds, so many of which take the genitive, while καταρᾶσθαι takes the dative, as does καταγεῶν in Herodotos to Cobet's intense disgust,¹ and κατακρίνειν follows κρίνειν. The anaconda, analogy, swallows and assimilates so much that what has escaped the analogic process may well arrest attention and, in fact, grammarians essay to answer some of these questions. But the answers are often unsatisfactory to the oracles themselves, and the full significance, the sharp characteristics cannot be formulated without a study of the cases that will have regard to the whole range of the language as well as to departments and individuals.

Not an uninteresting chapter in the rivalries of the cases is the story of the absolute uses. All the Greek cases are used absolutely. The vocative, of course. The nominative when used alone is a sentence in itself and cannot get rid of its implied verbal function. It is a manifestation of character, if nothing else. And yet at times it tries to be irresponsible, and then we call it a nominative absolute, but it is at best a *nominativus pendens*, it is a functionary that is awaiting its function. We find the phenomenon at one end in the οἰδῶρων πέτρα that we call Aischylos, we find it at the other in the shallow feuilletonist Philostratos, but how different the tone, how different the

Quickly: "Vengeance of Jenny's case! Fie on her! Never name her!" The fact is, the genitive, the Greek genitive, seems to have gone wrong and I find it hard to accommodate myself to the reversal of the old views on the subject of that beautifully blended case. Theoretically I know how much a landscape gains by being viewed head down, and the regimen of the genitive is doubtless much more beautiful when you set the old theory on end, but when one is not only stiff in one's intellectual joints but has worn the academic and epicene attire of a professor for a few scores of years, the operation is not so easy as when one was more limber in his structure and had the freedom of bifurcated garments.'

¹N. L. 97.

sphere. Three other cases enter the race—accusative, dative, genitive. The accusative gains a footing though comparatively late, the dative never wholly succeeds, never wholly fails, but the genitive becomes the absolute case by eminence. It might be not an altogether idle speculation to inquire why different languages have chosen this or that case for their absolute case, but for us it is of immediate importance to consider what is peculiar to Greek in the evolution of the genitive absolute and the significance of the evolution. Of course, everyone knows that the genitive absolute is not strictly absolute, but at the same time everyone feels the exceptional position and that is enough. I have been taken to task more than once for the use of figurative language in the domain of grammar, and one of my critics has been offended at my comparison of the genitive absolute with Milton's 'tawny lion pawing to get freed his hinder parts' (Pind. O. 6, 3). He says that nothing is gained by it. Perhaps not. But few scholars like any figures except their own, and for that matter critics have found fault with Milton's pawing lion as well as with my poor comparison. The paws, I need not say, are the participles and the hinder parts are the genitive, and the whole attitude represents the transition from the low relief of the earlier construction to the high relief of the later construction. But the lion is a terror to slothful intellects and possibly an impertinence here. Let us proceed soberly.

The genitive absolute was a gradual evolution. The dependent genitive released itself more and more from definite control until first familiar phrases gained their freedom and then long complexes. We can see the process going forward. The Homeric usage is an old story; the Pindaric usage marks a considerable advance on Homer and yet Pindar is much less free than Attic prose. A genitive that is dependent in Homer and Pindar may be independent in Plato and Demosthenes. The presumption is in favor of dependence in the earlier, of independence in the later writers. And this is a study that leads to another view of the cases, a stylistic view as well as a grammatical view. The cases have different tensile strength, different carrying power. Accusative and nominative can wait long for their regimen. Not so the genitive. If its regimen is to be felt it must be within easy reach and a genitive at the head of a sentence has a tendency to dissociate itself from the rest. Some uses of the genitive are, it is true, more tolerant than others. So

the partitive genitive can wait some time for its parts, but to Homer the distributive apposition is easier—that distributive apposition which is one of the features of Homeric syntax. No statistics are known to me in regard to this carrying power of the cases and evidently there must be a considerable difference in periods, department, individuals; and just as we find that the article has an enormous carrying power in the dactylo-epitrites of Pindar, which it lacks in the logaoedics, so in stately and deliberate language the genitive may carry much farther than in rapid conversation. We can see this by our use of the English equivalent of the genitive. ‘Of man’s first disobedience’ is far enough from ‘Sing, Heavenly Muse,’ to set up an establishment of its own. But our minds are attuned to a more equable movement and we are not impatient. Elsewhere we should treat ‘Of man’s first disobedience’ as if it were the title to a book like Milton’s ‘Of Prelatical Episcopacy’ and we should not think of any regimen. This is what we find true of a number of genitives for which the grammars were good enough to supply *περί* or rather *περι*. But there is nothing to supply. The genitive at the head of the sentence without a regimen simply becomes an object of thought. If we must have a prop, let it be the neuter accusative article, let *τοῦ τῆς τοῦ* be *τὸ τοῦ*, *τὸ τῆς*, *τὸ τοῦ*, but no prop is needed.

The personal dative seems to have been almost ready to develop an absolute use and nearly approaches an absolute use in a number of phrases taken from everyday life, *εἰσιόντι, ἀψαμένῳ* and the like, but so sensitive is the dative that it sets up a relation anywhere and so ready is its attachment to any part of the sentence that grammarians are apt to consider it as dependent on the whole sentence rather than on any special word.

PREPOSITIONS.

If we pass from the cases to the prepositions we enter upon a field which has been worked in spots until the ground is pulverized with the statistical harrow, while in parts it lies absolutely fallow. Of polyprothesy and oligoprothesy something has been said already. Of the sphere of the different prepositions it is hardly possible to do more than give some illustrations. Each period, each dialect, each department, has a special register. Every author has his necessities, has his habits, has his

super

fads. A number of prepositions that parade themselves in our grammars by the side of the working members of prose society are really unpractical creatures, that are found chiefly in poetry, such as ἀμφί and ἀνά. In a recent edition of Pindar there is a long and rather fanciful excursus on ἀνά.¹ ἀνά is a fine old preposition, but it may be said of ἀνά as of Rose Aylmer, 'Ah! what avails the princely race.' ἀνά is dead to the prose of everyday life and κατὰ reigns in its stead. The large use of ἀνά gives at once an antique hue and we may expect to find it in conscious poetry. ἀμφί, which abounds in Pindar, has given way to περί. Thanks to legal phrases, and to its use by certain popular authors σύν holds on, and in later Greek there is a restoration of σύν, but such a model of deportment as Isokrates is careful to avoid a mixture of styles and no σύν is to be found in his orations. This scrupulous behavior of Isokrates was observed many years ago by Haupt, but it was not until 1874 that Mommsen set the character of σύν in its true light. This separation of prepositions into poetical and universal may, if you choose, be ranked under vocabulary and so escape syntax proper, but the poetical, the dialectic uses of the universal prepositions are assuredly syntactical and as assuredly stylistic. The gradual deadening of ἐπὶ into an equivalent of περί shows only one side of the process of change. In the course of time a preposition may be specialized and take on an atmosphere. So παρά narrows itself in prose to a personal use with genitive and dative. What is largely chez (casa) in prose is simply 'alongside' in poetry and if we transfer the personal connotation to poetry, we shall evidently give too much color, we shall evidently overdo. (Pindar, I. E., c and O. 1, 20.) The distinction, sharp and clear, which runs through prose remorselessly, despite the commentators, between διά with genitive and διά with accusative in a metaphorical sense, is naught in Homer because in Homer there is no διά with genitive, in the sense of a person through whom, and the distinction which is made in Homer, not with perfect assurance, between διά with genitive and διά with accusative in a local sense, falls away in prose which will have nothing to do with διά and the accusative in a local sense, and transfers that duty to the prefix διά so that we must say διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμόν or διαβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ and there is no διὰ πόντον to compare with διὰ πόντον. ἔξ to an Ionian

¹ J. B. Bury, Isthmian Odes, Appendix H.

cannot have had so much color as it has to the writers of standard prose who differentiate it with more or less care from ἐπί. Those who change the Thukydeian ἐπί into the normal ἐπί, those who substitute ἐπί for ἐπί with dative (A. J. P. XI 373) are sinning against individual rights which must be scrupulously guarded even if the assertion of those rights amounts, as it does in the case of Thukydidēs, to perverseness. As to the chapter on the favorite preposition, for which in the range of the Attic orators the industry of Lutz has provided us with ample statistics, we must be on our guard against rapid inference. That nothing is aesthetic that withdraws itself from perception is the baldest of truisms, and yet one must not lose one's footing on it; for perception is relative and figures are not to be despised. Figures serve to confirm impression, figures serve to train powers of observation, but microscopic differences in this direction and that, are of little avail. We must have large masses of phenomena, we must have startling contrasts. ^ If one is told, ~~for instance~~, that ἐπί is a favorite preposition with Isaios, one remarks languidly that Isaios had largely to do with inheritance cases and was obliged to use ἐπί. One would hardly recognize a stylistic element in the recurrence of 'cubits' in the account of the building of the tabernacle or in the history of the temple. One would not be impressed by 'out of' in a stud book. Somewhat different is the case when we come to Isokrates and his use of ἐπί, but with the shifting exigencies of the world about us, with the large variety of prepositions that we encounter, it is hardly possible to hear any dominant note, and if one begins to hear one note more than another, it is often at the expense of the whole symphony. Hyperaestheticism is even more fatal to enjoyment than the dull content which considers all constructions alike.

and yet

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

I.—PROBLEMS IN GREEK SYNTAX.

II.

THE ARTICLE.

In its day Middleton's book, 'The Doctrine of the Greek Article', was a wonder for its ample treatment of a minute subject and was playfully cited in somewhat the same tone as the mythical three volumes on *-di -do -dum*. But nowadays grammatical treatises of similar bulk weigh down the domain of language everywhere like the mortgage pillars, of which Solon tells us, and a whole volume would be needed for a mere digest of the 'literature' on the subject of the Greek article. And yet, as we have seen under the head of the articular proper noun,¹ the subject has not been exhausted, and even pressing practical problems have hardly been touched with the tips of the fingers. To be sure, every school grammar teaches the gradual evolution of the article from the demonstrative. Every beginner is warned to expect a different article in Homer from the article as it is found in Attic. Every novice knows the difference between the particular article and the generic. And yet the story is not always taught in the organic way, and the relation of the articular noun to the anarthrous noun is not always brought home to the feeling. With the genesis of the terminations of the noun this essay has nothing to do. To call *-s* in *ἴππο-ς* pronominal may or may not be a rank heresy. This, however, is true: the article is the explicit expression of what lies implicit in the

¹A. J. P. XXIII 9.

noun; ἵππος is not 'a horse' but 'the horse', and the particular article reinforces whatever it is in the termination that fixes the floating action or quality in an individual.¹ The particular article is felt to be more and more a necessity, and not, as Julius Caesar Scaliger called it, a *flabellum loquacissimae gentis*. But the generic article, the article that picks out an individual and holds it up as a model, a type, a standard, never becomes a necessity, and the differences which the grammars make between abstracts with and without the article not only lack practical warrant in the every-day language, but fail to work in the field in which they are most needed; and he who tries to distinguish between σοφία and ἡ σοφία, ἀρετή and ἡ ἀρετή everywhere in Plato is not wise. The differences that Plato himself makes, Plato himself unmakes. How can we distinguish between οὐσία and ἡ οὐσία when the introduction of an articular infinitive and an oblique case destroys the possibility of distinction? You may say οὐσίας or τῆς οὐσίας, you must say τοῦ εἶναι, you must say τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. Flat and unscientific as it may seem, the addition and the omission of the article are often due to rhythm. Flat and unscientific as it may seem, the addition and the omission of the article are often suggested by nothing more serious than the practical necessity of distinguishing between predicate and subject,² or the artistic need of amplitude on the one hand, of condensation on the other.

The oldest use of the article anticipates the youngest, the youngest use is rooted in the oldest, so that the article is alive throughout the whole history of the language. It is the degree

¹In 1893 I had rashly written 'the swift one', but I have learned to be more cautious. In his recently published work, 'Lectures on the Study of Language' (N. Y., 1902), Professor Oertel says (p. 306): 'To me it would seem much more likely that a sound complex first attached itself to the compound percept of an object, and that only later it came to signify also a prominent element of this compound; so that the Indo-European word for "horse" did not originally mean "swift" and was then used for the "horse", but that it originally meant "horse", and the meaning "swift" was a later development, the quality being expressed by the word for the object which possessed the quality in a marked degree.' And in support of this view he cites a number of authorities. The trouble is that 'horse' in compounds is used in so many ways that the notion 'swift' does not come out inevitably. In popular parlance it is said that a fence ought to be 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight'. Here reference is had to the horse's jumping power, and in most of the compounds with 'horse' far other qualities are prominent than swiftness. No more fascinating field than semantics, none more dangerous.

²Plato, Theaet. 188 B: ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης.

of life, the manifestation of life, that interests the student of style; and nothing can bring this life more directly to the consciousness than the comparison of Latin, which has only what we have called the implicit article. It is this absence of the article that gives Latin its lapidary style. This lapidary style the Greek can take on, but it does not continue long in that stay. It is only a temporary pose. Homer is too rich and varied to dispense with the article which abounds in him as a demonstrative and prefigures largely its later use. It is in the higher lyric that the scarceness of the article makes itself felt; for we see that the resources of the later article are at hand and yet remain unused. Here and there the article has an un-Homeric extension, so that we note the conscious abstinence of art and pass almost with a feeling of relief from the rare atmosphere of higher lyric to the lower levels of dramatic dialogue and to the broad campaign of prose; and in certain moods we are ready to welcome the hearty multiplication of the article which is said to have characterized the Doric dialect.¹ We come down from Pindar's Olympian heights, from the lonely crag which the Theban eagle 'clasps with hookéd hands' to the meadows in which Aristophanes disports himself, and where the Laconian guests of Lysistrata (1247-1261) foot it so featly. There is no hyperaesthesia here. A little training, and the feeling is soon disciplined, and, once disciplined, becomes an unailing source of pleasure—in the classic regions. Of course one must pay for it as soon as one comes into the vulgarities of the perpetually articular proper noun. But one accepts vulgarities in certain strata of language as in certain strata of society, with mild resignation.

Among the fellow demonstratives of the article, *οὗτος*, a manner of reduplicated article, is nearest of kin, and stands to the article as the article does to the termination, if, indeed, the termination is a demonstrative. *ὁ, οὗτος* and *ὁς* form a group most closely associated from the beginning of our record, and the familiar shift from one to the other gives an antique coloring to style. 'Them that', 'those that', 'those who', and the provincial 'them as' may serve as illustrations of similar feeling in English. Of this primitive state of things there are traces enough in the standard language; but while the grammars expand on *ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ*, on *τὸ δ, τὰ δ, πρὸ τοῦ* and the like, one of the most important

¹ Müller, Dor. II, 504, Blaydes on Ar. Lys., 1247. Read Alkman's Partheneion, and comp. A. J. P. XXI 352.

syntactical survivals of the whole group is not emphasized or not emphasized in the right place, and that is the use of *οὗτος* without a conjunction at the head of a sentence. This is not asyndeton. *οὗτος* at the head of a sentence without a conjunction is no more asyndetic than is the relative. *οὗτος* is the universal demonstrative; the others are all particular; it is the regular antecedent of the relative, and with it the relative is 'that'. With the others, *ὅδε* and *ἐκεῖνος*, it is rather 'who' or 'which'. In practical use, *ὅδε* sets up an opposition to *οὗτος*, gets to itself the connotation of the important first person, but it is only in dramatic style that *ὅδε* can make head against *οὗτος*; and it is the large use of *ὅδε* that gives so much of the conversational tone to the discourse of Herodotos. To be sure, *ἐκεῖνος* gives bulk, gives weight, but it lacks precision. It is a 'yon', which is as vague as the next world, to which it is always assigned, and great hulking demonstrative as it is, it needs the guidance of *ὅδε* and *οὗτος*. *οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ*. All these are the commonplaces of grammar. But, of late, scholars have thought it worth while to watch the usage of so familiar a pronoun as *οὗτος* in the Attic orators, and have formulated delicate regularities unformulated before;¹ and a theory as to the composition of the work of Thukydidēs has been based on the shifting position of *ὅδε*, on *ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε* and *ὅδε ὁ πόλεμος*.² 'This' and 'that' in English are not so simple as might be supposed. Foreigners do not always master them perfectly; a German friend of mine always said 'one of those days', and the use of *este* and *ese* is said to be the Spanish shibboleth. No one, however blunt his senses, is indifferent to the final *ι* in *ὀδί* and *οὔροσι*, and it is not unprofitable to train the perceptions to catch finer differences.

THE VERB.

The domain of the voices is variously distributed in various languages, as we have incidentally seen. Active, passive, reflexive are used in differing proportions. In

Voices.

French and German the reflexive is much more freely used than in English, which, in its turn, uses the passive with an un-Germanic freedom suggestive of Biblical Latinity, as Biblical Latinity is suggestive of Greek influences. Doubtless

¹ See Blass, *Rh. Mus.*, Vol. XLIV, A. J. P. XI 107.

² See Herbst as summarized in A. J. P. I 241.

the predominance of one of these forms of expression over another would be a matter of stylistic interest, but so far, only a few sporadic observations have been made. A digest of the actual usage is still lacking and impressions are not to be trusted. How the elements of active, passive and middle may lie undifferentiated in the same form we can see by the verbal noun, we can see by the so-called active infinitive, we can see by the so-called passive participle in *-τος*.¹ *ἄξιος θαυμάσαι* is the more primitive form, and yields grudgingly to *ἄξιος θαυμασθήναι*. The passive *-τος* sets up active and middle meanings. The finite verb is clearer but not overclear. Our record begins before the voices had clarified themselves, and in fact middle and passive continue throughout the language undifferentiated in the tenses of continuance and completion. It is only in the tense of attainment, where clearness seems to be absolutely necessary, that middle and passive go apart. Even there we find an occasional aorist middle that serves as a passive; and the so-called deponent passives, while ultimately explained as intransitive actives, remind one of the passives which the modern Greek uses as middles, nay, even as direct reflexives.² The *-θησομαι* future is late. It is an evolution that may be due to the desire of marking the ingressive, the complexive character of the future more distinctly,³ and the emergence of the form is an interesting sign of grammatical consciousness such as we see in the persistent spread of such locutions as 'is being built' in English. All such new formations are in a large sense stylistic. We are no longer in an Homeric world, a Pindaric world; we are among the sophists, the sophists on the stage as well as the sophists in the forum. But for most of the phenomena of the voices mentioned in the grammars there is no history given, although there must be a history; there is no stylistic meaning given, though there must be a stylistic meaning. Instead of that we have much discourse about the distinction between transitive and intransitive, a distinction which, from a higher point of view, is futile. Call a verb that has a

¹ C. E. Bishop, Verbals in *-τος* in Sophokles, A. J. P. XIII 171-99; 329-42; 449-62.

² For example, *ἔφονέθη*, 'he killed himself'. Vincent and Dixon (p. 315) cite *ἑσκέθη*, 'he considered', *ἑστοχάθη*, 'he perceived', *ἐπλύθη*, 'he washed', *ἐνίθη*, 'he washed his hands', *ἐκρεμάθη*, 'he hanged himself,' not only 'he was hanged'.

³ See my Syntax, § 168.

passive a transitive verb, a verb that does not form a passive an intransitive verb. That is well enough. But this passing over to an object business is elusive. Any verb may be transitive to the extent of taking an inner object. Any verb may be intransitive when the object is involved, i. e., when it merely expresses an action. 'Thou shalt not kill' is intransitive. It means 'thou shalt do no murder'. So far theory. But practice is another matter, and habits need watching in English and in Greek. "Only in America, I believe", says Mr. Fitzedward Hall in the Academy, March 25, 1893, "is the verb *empty*, except as meaning 'become empty', any longer intransitive: the humblest rustic in my parish would say, 'the Ore *empties itself* into the Alde.'" I must confess that as an American I am not ashamed of an obsolescence that I share with Sir Thomas Browne, and when Mr. Eugene Field tells us that the intransitive use of 'weary' is wrong,—well, most students of English would prefer the taste of Tennyson to the taste of the Chicago poet. For all that, we should like to know which of the Greeks does these things, which of them uses the language to its legitimate or illegitimate stretch, whether those genial sinners, the poets, or the self-willed Thukydides with his *αὐτόγνωτος ὀργά*, or the *condottiere* Xenophon, *πολυπλάνητος κάρτα* (Hdt. I, 56), like the Dorians whom he admired so much. *βάλλ' ἐς κόρακας* has a common sound, but *εἰσβάλλει* is perfectly acceptable, as acceptable as 'empty' would have been to an American until Mr. Fitzedward Hall uttered his dreadful note of warning.

The moods are the keys of the music of language, and the Latin *modus*, however meant, is a happier name than the Greek

Moods. *ἐγκλισις*. Indeed, the moods of the Greek verb have a certain analogy with the moods in Greek

music. The direct and manly Dorian reminds one of the indicative, the martial Aeolian of the imperative, the longing Lydian yearns with the optative. It is said of the Fourth Olympian of Pindar that the lively Aeolian mood is tempered by the plaintive Lydian. If so, *θεὸς εὐφρων εἴη λοιπαῖς εὐχαῖς* would correspond to the plaintive Lydian strain, *Ὀὐλυμπιονίκαν δέκευ Χαρίτων ἑκατι τόνδε κῶμον* to the Aeolian element. But if this especial illustration be fancy, as it is, the general analogy holds good; and like the moods in music, the moods of the verb represent the states of the soul, *τὰς διαθέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς*; and so the English 'mood' gains an additional fitness and is not to be discarded for 'mode', as the

ψυχῆς

manner of some is. Here, if anywhere else, sympathy is necessary to understanding, and yet we are not to leave everything to sympathy; we are not to renounce definition, to renounce analysis. The transfer of moods from one language to another may be impossible, the transfer of feeling may be made, and analysis may aid in the transfer. It will not do to say that this or that turn makes no difference to us, that to us *ὅπως* and *ὅπως ἄν* are all one.¹ Inasmuch as it must have made a difference to *them*, we must learn to feel after the difference, if haply we may find it. Orderly research has brought many apparent vagaries of language under the dominion of law; and where analysis fails, atmosphere helps. The construction is known by its fellows, by the company it keeps, whether it haunts the courts or wrangles in the mart or hides in the study. It is well to emphasize these principles at this point, for the range of the moods differs so much in different languages, there is so much overlapping, so much crossing that, apart from certain rough and ready criteria, the beginner is tempted to give up the whole domain to the sway of chaos; but Chaos and Old Night are not our rulers and we need not surrender everything to *ἄλογος ἀσθησις*. *Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo investigari possiet.*

In studying the elements of the problems of the moods, we have to consider time as well as feeling. Moods are temporal, tenses are modal. The attitude of mind is largely concerned with that which is not yet, that which is no longer, with the future, with the past. In fact, so much has mood to do with time, that future relations are expressed modally. The Greek future is a mood, the Latin future is a mood, the English future so far as it is differentiated from the present is distinctly modal, is imperative, is optative, that is if 'shall' and 'will' are imperative and optative. The sphere of present and past is occupied by the indicative. The other moods divide out the future. Imperative, subjunctive, optative are all future. *δός, δίδου, δῶ, δίδῶ, δοίην, διδοίην, δῶσω* are all modal and all future. But present indicative and imperfect indicative may also reach forward, each into its future; the one into the future of the present, the other into the future of the past. There is an expression of will in the conative present, a sigh of failure in the conative imperfect. The imperfect is a suspended future. It

¹ Madvig, § 122, Bei *ὅς* und *ὅπως* bewirkt *ἄν* keine bemerkbare Veränderung der Bedeutung. So Goodwin, M. and T. § 44, I, N. 2 (O. E.). But see A. J. P. IV (1883), 422, and Goodwin, M. and T. (1889) R. E., § 312, p. 110.

can be interpreted into terms of *ἔμελλον* with the infinitive. It needs no *ἄν* to mark its unreality. Now over this range of the future, the future of the past and the future of the present, the Greek moods undulate with their 'fluid footsteps', but they are no more lawless than the tides. *δώσει, δότω, δοίη, δοίη ἄν* may be used in the same general way, but what a difference of tone, what a difference of sphere. The familiar future, the direct imperative, the implication of order in wish, the courteous or ironical suggestion, how these play up and down over the domain of will.¹ Every novice feels or ought to feel the shifting tone, but the enjoyment is enhanced if one watches the sphere, if one notices that Hesiod who has so much to do with the imperative tempers its austerity with the optative more frequently at least in proportion than any other author, that Pindar shares in this respect what may be called the Delphic sphere of Hesiod, that the Attics abound in the imperative optative with *ἄν*, which shows all its resources of bitterness in the tragic poets, all its resources of fun in Aristophanes, all its resources of urbanity in Plato.² How strange it seems when we pass from the optative and *ἄν* of Attic society to the legal optative with *κα* in the dialect of Elis, and find a hint turned into a law.³ A syntactical journey is a journey like any other from pine to palm, from snow to Sahara.

But it is only in the more elaborate and complex forms of the sentence that the moods display all the subtlety of their usage as it is only in the more elaborate and complex forms of social life that the emotions require alembic and crucible. Outside the compound sentence, subjunctive and optative have a short story. But from the beginning of recorded Greek, we have to do with complex sentences just as in the beginning of Greek history we have to do with a complex society. Neither syntax nor society is primitive in Homer. Even there we are under the dominion of conventions. And so there are conventions in the use of the moods that control the whole range of the language from the beginning of our record. Not that these conventions are in-

¹ Mme. de Beaumont chez de Vogüé, Heures d'Histoire, p. 91: Le style de M. de Chateaubriand me fait éprouver une espèce de frémissement d'amour; il joue du clavecin sur toutes mes fibres.

² On the imperative optative with *ἄν* see now my S. C. G. § 394. A fine example of bitterness is So. El. 1491 where Orestes says to Aigisthos *χωροῖς ἄν εἰσω*.

³ See Bergk, Gr. LG. I 110; Cauer³ No. 259.

organic. They go back to primitive needs, no doubt, just as the two buttons on the back of the modern coat go back to the needs of the ancient swordbelt. They have their inner propriety, no doubt, and being subject to the shifting taste of the time, to the shifting taste of the individual, they serve to show us the form and pressure of the time and the character of the individual. But for all that they tend to mechanical uniformity of practice; they are fashions and like fashions exact a minimum of consciousness from ovine humanity.

To this sphere belong the sequences and it is here that we encounter the problem of the use of subjunctive and optative. From the beginning of our record the subjunctive and the optative have divided the dependent sentences between them. The subjunctive after principal tenses, the optative after historical tenses. That is a convention which may lose its hold but never loses its rights. Nothing could be more unhistorical than the statement that after historical tenses the optative is permissible only, not necessary (A. J. P. V 400). It is the unconventionality of the subjunctive after the historical tenses that gives it the charm of dramatic directness, of what is called *repraesentatio* (A. J. P. VIII 231). If we ask the question how it came about that the subjunctive has associated itself with the principal tenses and the optative with the historical tenses, we ask a question that is not easy of answer. Those who contend that the subjunctive is a mood of will, the optative the mood of wish, see in the will the stronger, more vivid form, that fits it for the practical prospective of the future of the present, whereas the wish seems to them weaker, less vivid than the will and hence better fitted for the future of the past, which is no longer a matter of practical consideration. But there are those who deny that the subjunctive is a mood of the will and the optative a mood of the wish. They are both futures, one more vivid, the other less vivid. But how do they come to be futures? Is not the Greek future indicative that we have modal? Are not 'shall' and 'will' modal? All that we know, all that it is safe to say is this, that a form which elsewhere conveys command associates itself with the principal tenses, that a form which elsewhere conveys a wish associates itself with the historical tenses and that this association, which is suggested by the similarity of the respective terminations, is found from the beginning to be a convention, a rule, a regular sequence. It is a sequence that is seldom violated in Homer,

never violated in Pindar, and unless we appreciate it as a sequence we cannot appreciate the freedom that breaks up the sequence; we cannot appreciate what the French call the inconsequences of the coquette, Language. The audacious substitution at pleasure of the subjunctive for the optative is a revolution like that of the sophists, like that of the *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*, like that of the *droits de l'homme*. If we search the record we can see premonitions of the deliverance just as we can see premonitions of the French revolution; but epic conservatism like political conservatism dies hard. Herodotos, the dramatic, Thukydidēs, the sophistic lead the way in prose, but Xenophon is not carried wholly away by the mob which he loathes. *Stare super antiquas vias* is a motto which he would have understood. Plato keeps nearer to the older tradition. The prose poet, the idealist, the regenerator of the state, has his point of rest amid the tide of motion, while the orators oscillate to and fro, balancing between *νόμος τύραννος* and *δῆμος τύραννος*. But be it noted that the shift is from optative sequence to subjunctive sequence, that it is all in one direction. It is a revolution that does not go backward. Subjunctive for optative almost, as it would seem, at the sweet will of the speaker, but a shift the other way causes the grammarian to cry out. Aristophanes makes it once or twice and it is resented as a piece of *gaminerie* too outrageous even for that *gamin*.¹ It will not work both ways. It is the subjunctive that encroaches on the optative, not the optative on the subjunctive, just as it is *μή* that encroaches on *οὐ*, not *οὐ* on *μή*. Now this encroachment runs through all the forms of the strictly dependent sentence, relative, temporal, conditional, and belongs therefore to the universal aesthetics of the language. In later Greek the vulgarization, if I may say so, is complete. The optative becomes more and more an artificial form, and its function is restricted to the primal wish. The communism of the New Testament knows scarcely anything of the optative. Form and thought are alike doomed. All the optatives we find in later Greek are artificial and the frantic effort of the Greek Renaissance to keep the old language alive shows how great the dissidence is between the spoken and the written word. The optative is considered elegant—and they wear it in the wrong place. It is a fine thing after a past tense. Why should it not be a fine thing after a principal tense? And so they proceed to use it, and Lucian's

¹ See the commentators on Vesp. 110.

optative for subjunctive has been set down to vividness (see A. J. P. IV 428), whereas it is simply a bit of misapplied finery and reminds one of those who revive the English subjunctive and think that they are elegant when they use 'if I were' where 'if I was' is the only grammatical possibility.

The infinitive is not a mood, though it has been so accounted by ancient grammarians. A verbal noun, it has learned to represent all the moods, and, as the universal representative, has acquired modal rights. When we first become acquainted with it in Homer, it has learned to represent the indicative, and has taken on, though reluctantly, the negative *οὐ*. In obedience to the necessities of the indicative, it has developed a future, quite needless in its first estate. In fact, it has all the apparatus for *oratio obliqua* which the Greek handles so lightly, the Roman so heavily. But, as the dative of a verbal noun, its natural affinities are with the imperative, and this imperative infinitive has a vigorous life at the beginning of our record (see A. J. P. XIV 124). As prose advances, the imperative infinitive recedes until it finds one last refuge, the conservative pale of legal language. The infinitive of law and decree, of prescription, direction, recipe, the infinitive of Attic decrees and of Xenophon's Hunter's Own Book, is an independent infinitive. No leading verb is necessary. It is simply old-fashioned, like the long imperative in Latin, and suits old-fashioned things like laws, old-fashioned spheres like the sphere of ventry. But as often happens, the dependent sentence retains the original life. The modal future survives in *εἰ* with the future indicative, in the relative with the future indicative; and the imperative infinitive, if banished from the society¹ of the leading clause, is fully alive in dependent discourse. In its dependency on verbs of will and endeavor the supplementary infinitive is still an imperative. It is the imperative of *oratio obliqua*, a fact not sufficiently emphasized in the ordinary grammars, and carries that imperative force even into the relative dependencies. Nay, when the nominal nature of the infinitive resumes its rights and the infinitive is forced back into the ranks of the noun by the article, it does not forget its imperative functions. *περὶ τοῦ μὴ πιστεύειν* = *περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν πιστεύειν*.²

¹ On fashions in imperative expressions see Kurrelmeyer's interesting treatise, 'The Historical Development of the Types of the First Person Plural Imperative in German.' (J. H. U. Diss.) Strassburg, Trübner, 1900.

² Cf. Plato, Legg. 862 E: *παράδειγμα τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν* = *τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἀδικεῖν*.

Still the infinitive was doomed. The final sentence encroached more and more on its province, first pure finality, 'in order that', then complementary finality, 'to'. We see *ἵνα, ὡς, ὅπως* encroaching on the territory that was all the infinitive's own. Even in Homer, even in conservative Pindar, we notice the beginnings of an invasion that was to sweep the infinitive away. *ὄτι* in Homer was a prophecy of what was to come—of the vast inroads on the territory of the *oratio obliqua* infinitive. The seeds of death are the same as the seeds of life. The marvellously mobile noun-verb perished from the face of the language. The Centaur was no more, and well might the modern Greek say: *Ἦθειλον Χειρώνά κε Φιλυρίδαν ζῶειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον, φῆρ' ἀγρότερον, νοῦν ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον.* It is an enormous, an incalculable loss to any language and changes its whole aspect. It differentiates modern from ancient Greek as much as anything else. This is one of those mutilations to which one may resign oneself; but one cannot kiss a wooden hand though Goetz von Berlichingen may fight valiantly with an iron one.

In my previous paper I had something to say about the participle, which the ancients counted as a distinct part of speech, and was betrayed into some discussion of the negative *μή* with the participle. After *μή* had found its way into the logical conditional sentence and the scheme of the conditional was thus completed,¹ *μή* became something more than the negative of the will. We may put *ὁ μή συνιείς* (Pind. N. 4, 31) back into *μή συνιέτω τις*, but for all that *ὁ μή συνιείς* is a substantivizing of *ὁς μή συνιῆ* of the old generic relative. But while the participle may do this, the adjective is not ready for it, certainly not the anarthrous adjective, and those who would write *μή φίλον* Pind. P. 1, 51 are sinning against the history of the language. Once admitted to the sphere of the participle, then to the sphere of the adjective, the negative *μή* went forth conquering and to conquer. It became the dominant negative of the articular participle, of the articular adjective, and finally usurped a wide domain in the later language. But it is distinctly to be remembered that whenever in the Greek of the good period difficulty arises with the negative, the true appeal is not to the artificial generic but to the natural imperative. Scratch the generic and you will find an imperative, as I have shown. But the shifting use of the negative with the participle

¹Vierke ap. Monro, Homeric Grammar, § 359.

is only one illustration of the importance of the negative particles. For the Greek negatives are eminently things of moods, if not of fancies, if I may adapt Conington's translation of 'varium et mutabile semper'. The modality of *οὐ* and *μή* helps us to understand other modalities as well. If we can bridge the gap between the imperative *μή* and the ideal *μή*, we can bridge the gap between the imperative subjunctive and the futural subjunctive; and the use of *οὐ* with the optative and *ἄν* helps us to understand the optative as a dream that has found an issue, be it gate of ivory or gate of horn, into the realm of reality.

Of the proethnic history of the Greek negatives I have little or nothing to say, for in these papers I do not deal with origins. Not that I underrate the importance of origins. Given the origin, and the multiform manifestations of the one principle are much simplified. But language is an organic growth under conditions, under conventions. We ourselves are the children of conventions and a return to the primitive may shock us. So we feel a decided shock when *οὐ* is combined with an abstract noun, we feel no shock when it is used with an infinitive; and yet there must have been a time when *οὐ διαλύσαι* would have been as repellent as *οὐ διάλυσις*.¹ A conventional remnant of this repugnance we have in the rule that tells us how the Greek of all periods prefers *οὐ φημι* to *φημι οὐ*, *οὐκ οἶμαι* to *οἶμαι οὐ*, just as the Roman prefers *nego* to *aio non*. But as *οὐ* is very common in *oratio obliqua*, the statement of the grammars has no organic meaning. Let a man, however, read attentively and he will see how seldom the hateful misalliance is suffered in Homer. To *μή* with the infinitive there is not the same repugnance, because the infinitive was used as an imperative before it was used as a representative of the indicative.

*oratio
obliqua*

The study of origins, the study of comparative grammar, helps us somewhat, as I have said. It is well to know, for instance, that in all likelihood *οὐ* = *haud*, for this identification helps forward the theory of adhaerescence. But the main service of it lies in the check that it gives to the hasty parallelism of *οὐ* with *non* and of *μή* with *ne*, which like most parallelisms between Greek and Latin runs a very little way; and practically the two negatives in Latin are of not much more use to the student of Greek syntax than the two negatives in Hebrew,

¹ See now H. A. Hamilton, *The Negative Compounds in Greek*, p. 31.

an entirely alien tongue. In fact, it is better to dissociate these Greek negative moods, as they may be called, from the Latin phenomena, lest we get into the tangle that has immeshed the treatment of the positive moods.¹ It is better simply to face the fact that the Greek negatives present peculiar problems, problems that demand psychological sympathy as well as historical knowledge for their solution, and even then seem to baffle the most sympathetic and the most learned, so that eminent scholars are not ashamed to enter their *non liquet* against puzzle after puzzle. Of course, certain formulae are on everybody's tongue. *οὐ* is the negative of statement; *μη* is the negative of will or wish. And there is another formula not so tangible. *οὐ* belongs to the world of actuality, *μη* to the world of ideality. But these two sets are not to be dissociated, as has been done, openly by some,² covertly by others. If we are to have any unity in the treatment, we must recognize the fact that the ideal comes not through vision but through will. 'Bring me up Samuel' is a command that precedes vision. The vision has to be conjured up, and it is a cardinal error to look for the genesis of the *μη* constructions elsewhere than in creative, or rather destructive, force. But the vision itself, as a vision, is actual, and all its negatives are *οὐ*.³ How important this distinction is we can see by the negative of the future. Originally modal, the future leads us to expect the negative *μη*. And yet in the simple sentence it refuses to take the negative *μη* except in the question, where any indicative can take it. The future has become a real indicative, and it is only in the dependent sentence that it retains its modal meaning. There is practically no *μη* with the future indicative in an imperative sense.⁴ We must use the aorist subjunctive. In the simple sentence, *μη* with the future indicative in an imperative

¹On *neque* and *neve* see A. J. P. XVIII 123; Giles, Latin Negatives and their Use in Prohibitions, Proc. Cambridge Philol. Soc., 1901, pp. 12-3; W. K. Clement, A. J. P. XXII (1901), p. 90; Lattmann, cited by Golling, Z. 8. G 49, 275.

²See A. J. P. XII 520 (cited above, XXIII 13).

³The adhaerent character of *οὐ* as contradistinguished from *μη*, stoutly denied by Aken, T. u. M. § 234 foll., seems destined to come to honor again. See Hamilton, l. c. As I hinted in the last number, I did not become acquainted with Aken's work until after the war between the States. If I had known his views earlier, I should have had to acknowledge as many obligations as there are coincidences in the results of our studies.

⁴See now S. C. G. § 270, or A. J. P. XV 117 foll.

sense has died without a sign. *οὐ* with the subjunctive, despite its obvious advantages, despite the possibility of fine distinctions between durative and complexive,¹ has given way to *οὐ* with the future, to *οὐκ ἄν* with the optative. It is only in the dependent sentence that the modal meaning reasserts itself. *ἦν μή* with subjunctive cannot keep out *εἰ μή* with future indicative, as *στάν* with subjunctive has kept out *στρε* with the future indicative; and the final relative takes the old modal future indicative, which has a variant in the optative with *ἄν*, and which may be represented by the articular future participle, but not by the subjunctive, natural as it seems to those who have been accustomed to make a mechanical parallelism between Latin and Greek subjunctive.² All this has become a habit, and when we go back to the earlier world we take our latter-day phrasings with us. When Homer's use differs from standard prose, we feel the shock, but unless we are taught to observe we do not notice the pudencies of Homer, we do not notice the absence of certain familiar prose uses. We have to learn that there was a time when *μή* with the participle was a novelty, as we have to learn that at a late day *μή* with the participle is to be the rule. To us *μή* is the natural negative of the subjunctive and the Homeric *οὐ* with the subjunctive is a sport, so that we read with not a little surprise in an Homeric scholiast that the natural negative of the subjunctive is *οὐ*,³ and we ask ourselves how such a notion could have entered his foolish brain. Shall we revise our conception of the subjunctive as an imperative? For imperative it is throughout, except when the contrast between *μή* and *οὐ* is brought out by the necessity of a double negative, as in *μή οὐ*. *μή* is the regular negative of the optative of wish, but the potential optative gives us pause; and see how in time the language reconciles itself to *οὐ* with the optative as a representative of the

¹ See now S. C. G. § 386.

² How natural it is may be seen from Bäumlein's discussion in his *Untersuchungen*, p. 195. That the Latin relative in so-called final relations is at all events originally potential is one of the points that emerge from the *tohu-bohu* that is preceding the new creation of Latin syntax. This potential (optative with *ἄν*) conception of the final relative in Latin is put forward in my L. G. of 1872 (§ 632 Rem.), with due caution.

³ λέγεται ὡς τῶν πέντε ἐγκλίσεων αἱ μὲν δύο ἦγον ἢ ὀριστικῆ καὶ ὑποτακτικῆ ἔχουσι φυσικὸν τὸ οὐ, αἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἦγον ἢ προστακτικῆ καὶ εὐκτικῆ καὶ ἀπαρέμφατος τὸ μή. Schol. L on O 41.

indicative. But that is essentially a post-Homeric construction and follows in the wake of *oratio obliqua*. *οὐ* with the infinitive was at one time, as we have seen, an abomination. The Greeks of a later period, the book Greeks, were puzzled by this. The only living optative to them, and a poor life it had, was the optative in wishes, *μή γένοιτο* and the like, and into their imitation of the standard language they slipped an occasional *μή* with *oratio obliqua* optative.¹ The negative of the imperative is *μή*. The mood is kingly and as a king it has long arms and rules large territories of dependencies, yet even there we find variations, even there a stubborn adversative participle refuses obedience, even there we have 'exceptions' that show how the primitive feeling breaks the bonds of conventionality. Nowhere do we feel a sharper thrill than when *οὐ* encroaches on the sphere of the imperative *μή*. In post-Homeric Greek *μή* with the indicative in the dependent sentence is perfectly familiar to us; and we are ready enough with our *μή* in a generic sentence, *μή* in a conditional sense and the like, but to Homer, *μή* with the indicative was a liberty, a liberty due to passion, to hope and fear, to wish and will. The bounds of convention once broken, and Homer goes beyond the limits of classic syntax, and we find in him constructions that remind us of the period of decline, constructions that the scholiasts call by the hard name Alabandic (A. J. P. I 46). At any rate, when these constructions occur in the best period, we are all on hand with our little emendations, we hustle the offending *μή* out of Antiphon with Jebb, we hustle it out of Theognis. We prefer an unnatural stress in the one case, a false sphere in the other. We forget the possible intrusion of passion, a possibility that makes all impossibilities possible.

In all this matter of the negative, the sphere is of especial importance. How small a part does the *μή* of apprehension play in pre-Platonic literature, that *μή* of apprehension, which, like the Latin *vide ne*, amounts to a cautious assertion. It is not foreign to Homer and yet Homer uses it in a way in which the fear, the apprehension is still felt. In Plato it is little better than a formula, an Homeric construction rising like a lost river in Attic speech,² and in later Greek it is used mechanically. But the Platonic use, the later Greek use must not en-

¹ Justin Martyr, Apol. I 26, 21.

² See now S. C. G. § 385 or Weber, *Entwicklungsgesch. der Absichtssätze*, p. 192.

courage us to accept an explanation based on the practically positive character of the formula. *οὐ μή* cannot be treated as *οὐ* + positive.¹ The *οὐ* would necessarily rouse the negative element of *μή* into active life and, besides, the history of the independent *μή* itself should teach us caution.

If, however, the tentative *μή* with the subjunctive is old, as we have seen, *οὐ μή* may be as old. The age of the articular infinitive is not to be judged by its emergence in literature, nor the age of *οὐ μή* by its first appearance. Parmenides uses it, but he damns himself thereby as an epic poet as he damns himself by his *μή* with the participle and by the articular infinitive. Professor Lawton, who has no very good opinion of grammarians, says that Parmenides sags in his flight. The grammarian says that he has not the epic wing for the flight. As students of style we need not go into the origin of these things, we need not enter upon analyses at all. To us they are aesthetic elements and we say that *οὐ μή* is a stranger to the earlier literature, to the more aristocratic literature. It is absent from the epos and it is a sin to do what some critics have done and foist it on Pindar's sublimities. We can almost hear the poet saying with his wonted aloofness: *ἀφίσταμαι*. In an excited Paionian strain (O. 2, 6), he was guilty of a *-τέον* form, but only once, and in his hot youth he was guilty of a genial Doric articular proper noun (P. 10, 57), but only once. Guilty of *οὐ μή διώξω* (O. 3, 45), never. *οὐ μή* belongs to the dialogue of the wrangling mart; it belongs to the drama, by which, it would seem, so many vulgarities have found their way into classic society. Parmenides was so much in earnest that he forgot himself. That is all. History has no need of it and the orators use it sparingly. The elevation of the *bema* carried with it certain conventionalities which even common creatures like Aischines, if indeed Aischines was a common creature, had to respect. 'Keep your hand snugly within your *himation*,' said to himself the ex-actor of dignitaries.² 'Don't point. Don't fling about your articular proper nouns.'³ Don't make free with *οὐ μή*.' Why, even Demosthenes, who dared everything,

¹ See A. J. P. XVII 516.

² τὸ τὴν χεῖρα ἐνδον ἔχοντα λέγειν (cf. I, 25) was a part of Aischines' stage *σεμνότης*. See his statue at Naples.

³ A. J. P. XI 486. Franke's statistic seems to be shamefully inexact. Professor W. K. Clement wrote me at the time that he found 63 cases where Timarchos' name is mentioned, two of them with the article.

is shy of it, and his master Isaios uses it once only, and then in one of those dramatic bits that help to make us understand how he was the fountain of the power of Demosthenes. Turn to the LXX, turn to the New Testament, and in half an hour you will gather up more *οὐ μή*'s than are to be found in all classic literature. It has become the cheap emphasis of a showy race and a degenerate time (A. J. P. XVIII 460, 461). In the same line of degeneracy is the frequent use of *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά* in such writers as Polybios, in the same line the incessant *νῆ Δία* of later essayists, who swear where swearing is out of the question;¹ and it is only by contrast with their exaggerated uses that we learn to appreciate the exquisite reserve of the best period.

As to the other combination *μὴ οὐ*, that is perfectly legitimate after verbs of fear and apprehension, but it has little scope in Homer. It is not overcommon anywhere. It belongs so entirely to momentary needs, to dramatic pressure, that it does not readily pass over into the formulae of the *oratio obliqua*. *μὴ οὐ* with optative expressing *μὴ οὐ* with subjunctive is suspicious. Out of this *μὴ οὐ* with the subjunctive grow the other combinations *μὴ οὐ* with infinitive and participle, Attic constructions which seem to be possible only to the portentous mobility of both the thought and speech of that marvellous strain. It is the Ionic blood that does it. It is the Ionic spirit that does it. And we are not surprised to find it in Herodotos. Modern commentators get their brains muddled and their tongues twisted with *μὴ οὐ*. It was a formula like *quin*, of which perhaps no Roman could have given a rational account; and it may be that the Attics were tangled in their own negatives, though one sooner distrusts one's own skill in unwinding the skein than that of the Attics in winding it. Of course, *μὴ οὐ* became a formula, and was used in later Greek just as any other formula, but in the better times there is always something more than a formula. It is never used except when a problem of practical interest arises, except when there is an *οὐ* of fact or statement to be met by a *μὴ* of will.²

The modal particles *ἄν* and *κε(ν)* figure largely in the study of the Greek moods, and as *ἄν* and *κε(ν)* were undoubtedly of different origin, it might be possible to note stylistic differences in the varying use of these AN and KE(N) particles when they occur side by side as in Homer. The inquiry

¹ Lucian, De conscribenda hist. II 19 R.: *ὅτι γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔστι κὰν ἐπωμοσάμην, εἰ ἀστεῖον ἦν ὄρκον ἐντιθέναί σὺν γράμματι.*

² See A. J. P. VII 170.

is a legitimate inquiry, but so far no one has succeeded in differentiating the two throughout to the satisfaction of the world.¹ $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, whatever its virtues, is obsolete, is dialectic. In the literature of the Attic time, it is as dead as $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$. It belongs to the unreturning past of the epos. It fades out before $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ even there, so that in looking over the whole range of Greek we can disregard $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ as dialectic and concentrate our attention on $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$. Now if we follow the history of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ we find a gradual growth of formulae that remind us of the behavior of 'ever' and 'soever' in English, translations of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ which are something more than translations. In the simple sentence there are particles to which $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ nestles close, there are sequences in which $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ has its favorite position. $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ with optative runs trippingly from the tongue. $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}$, optative with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, is a harder saying. It is hard to separate $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ from the love of the negative, not because the negative is negative but because it is modal. No wonder that it prefers the negative to the infinitive, when one remembers how shy $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ was of the infinitive, what a stretch it seemed to carry into *oratio obliqua* the finer shades of *oratio recta*.² But it is in the compound sentence that $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ shows most clearly this gradual adhaerescence. First in the temporal particles. $\delta\tau'$ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ becomes $\delta\tau\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ becomes $\epsilon\pi\eta\gamma\eta\nu$, $\epsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$. $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is born all at once. The original $\delta\tau\epsilon$ with the subjunctive is after a while allowed no standing room. The temporal particles of limit, 'while', 'until', resist the process longest. $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ and $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ are found here and there without $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$. Like $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$, they have rights of finality. 'Until' may carry with it purpose and pure purpose will not have $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$. But they too succumb to formula and $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ and $\epsilon\omega\varsigma \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ alone are orthodox. The relative yields, as the conditional yields, to the encroachment, and distinctions that are still discernible in Homer are swept away in the democratization of the language. We lift our eyebrows and sigh when we find $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ with the indicative in later Greek. What else could one expect of a generation of levellers? And then again the old usages reappear in spheres from which they had almost formally been excluded and shock the uniformitarian sense that we all possess to a greater or less degree. So the omission of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ where $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ is expected always gives rise to feats of commentatorial agility, and the problem is met in different ways. Sometimes it is set down to the scribe and haplography lends its ready aid to restore

¹A. J. P. III 446.²See A. J. P. XXIII 13.

the missing particle, though the restoration rends our ears by the reduplication of an unaesthetic sound—rends our ears and perhaps unnecessarily, *ἀναγκαίως*, as we might say, as the Greeks would hardly have dared to say. Sometimes when the metre is recalcitrant or there is no reason to suspect the tradition, we see survival, we see a certain self-willed individuality. *εἰ* with subjunctive in tragedy, *ῥε* with subjunctive in tragedy—these are not alien to the epic note which we hear in tragedy, now in vocabulary, now in form. Surely *ῥε* with the subjunctive in tragedy is no worse than the occasional omission of an augment, and *ῥε* with subjunctive in Thukydides is more readily comprehensible than it would be in Isokrates, though hardly acceptable even in Thukydides.¹ Nor are all spheres of *ἄν* to be judged alike, as we have seen in the case of *ἔως* and *πρίν*, where the omission of *ἄν* may have offended the Attic ear as little as an occasional subjunctive would offend our own generation, which seems to be bent on the destruction of a mood that to most people is too vague to serve any useful purpose. And yet so subtle a thing is language that the revival of an old formula may be attended with a new meaning. When *εἰ* with subjunctive revisits the glimpses of the moon, it is not necessarily generic, as we find it in Homer and in Pindar, but it reminds us of the other use of *εἰ* with the subjunctive, the interrogative use, in which *εἰ* with subjunctive is = *εἰ δεῖ* + infinitive, so that *εἰ* with subjunctive is in tone very much like *εἰ* with future indicative.² Hardest of all to admit is the potential optative without *ἄν*. It has its rights in the older language, but when we leave Homer every example is suspicious. The imperative formula provides for most of the few instances, for in the imperative sense optative and optative with *ἄν* meet. Then, again, we say that the key of *ἄν* may dominate a long complex and if *ἄν* is found in the preceding sentence the situation is relieved. Euphony, as has already been hinted, may be at work. The repetition of syllables was an abomination to the Greek ear, and we, who take such liberties with the double sibilant in the possessive case, ought for justice' sake to be charitable to omission of *ἄν* in poetry or in carefully articulated prose. In Pindar's famous *οὐ ξείναν ἰκοίμαν γαῖαν*

¹ See the commentators on 4, 17, 2: *οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι*, which sounds like a proverb in ischiorrhogic metre.

² Transactions of Am. Phil. Ass., 1876, p. 8.

ἄλλων (P. 4, 118), there are *-ων*'s enough and to spare. And yet there are unannealed optatives still left to torture the grammatical soul with 'remote deliberatives' and the like. By the student of aesthetics all these adherences to an obsolete type, all these departures from established formulae are to be regarded as so many notes of style; and our critical conclusions must be swayed in a large measure by the character of the author, the character of the department.

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

I.—PROBLEMS IN GREEK SYNTAX.

III.

From moods and modal particles we pass over to the tenses and consider first those temporal relations that are common to all the moods, the so-called *status actionis* or kind of time, that which makes *δίδου* to differ from *δός*, *ἦν δίδω* from *ἦν δῶ*, *διδούης* from *δοίης*, *διδόναι* from *δοῦναι*, *διδούς* from *δούς*, as well as *εἰδόμεν* from *ἔδομεν*. For these are the universal relations and, which is especially important, these were the relations to which the Greeks were sensitive from the beginning to the end, so sensitive that experienced Grecians have acknowledged their inferiority in this regard to the poorest *Graculi*.¹ What the original scheme of the tenses was need not trouble us here. The categories of past, present and future to which we cling despite our own language, which has no future, these categories are not vital. Out of durative or

¹ Blass, G. N. T. G., § 57, 'This distinction is observed in the N. T. with the same accuracy as in classical Greek.' Cf. A. J. P. XI 107. On the other hand, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Lesebuch*, Erl., p. 215, says: Der Unterschied zwischen den Imperativen des Praesens und des Aorists wird in der vulgären Rede vernachlässigt. On the domination of the aor. imper. in certain spheres see my remarks on Justin Martyr, *Apol.* I 16, 6. Doubtless the problem is often a very delicate one, as in Eur. Hipp. 473: ἀλλ' ὦ φίλη παῖ, λῆγε μὲν κακῶν φρενῶν, | λῆξον δ' ὑβρίζουσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο πλὴν ὑβρις | τὰδ' ἐστί. Is this change a mere matter of *metri causa*? Or, to use the consecrated formula, does *λῆγε* give a general and *λῆξον* a specific command, the specification being made by *ὑβρις τὰδ' ἐστί*, or does *λῆγε* connote impatience (S. C. G. § 405) as the aorist connotes urgency?

progressive, out of aoristic, ingressive, complexive, completed action, one can get by combination temporal relations enough to satisfy life.¹ And yet respectable scholars, more than respectable scholars, have slighted or sneered at the *status actionis* of the extra-indicative moods, and, whilst they accept and expand the traditional differences between *ἔφευγον* and *ἔφυγον*, pass over lightly or ignore the difference between *φεύγειν* and *φυγεῖν*. Of course, this is a sad inconsistency, because *ἔφευγον* differs from *ἔφυγον* only as *φεύγειν* differs from *φυγεῖν*. But, of late years, a disposition has been shown to efface this inconsistency also, and the differences between imperfect and aorist have been wiped out by various scholars, notably by one from whose native familiarity with two distinct preterites one would have expected a different attitude.² But the French *prétérit défini* is a book tense, and the French imperfect, while it helps us to understand the Greek imperfect, helps us also to misunderstand it. In fact, there are few domains in which national variations are so puzzling as in that of the tenses. With all the practice of long residence and all the advantages of hard study the foreigner bewrays himself by the tenses. This is true of the German in America, of the American in Germany. This was true of the Roman writer of Greek, and the use of the tenses is one of the marks by which the Latinizing writer of Greek is detected. Too many pluperfects, too few imperfects.³ But just now we are dealing not so much with the past-imperfect and the past-aorist as with the imperfect in general and the aorist in general, the progressive tenses and the aoristic tenses.⁴ True, the differences are often hard to translate, sometimes impossible of translation. But what concerns us here is the direct perception of the differences between such temporal relations, not the difficulty of rendering these differences into an alien tongue. We may resort to special periphrases, we may use auxiliary verbs to bring out the distinctions, we may even go as far as Curtius has done and make use of different verbs for different tenses, just as in Greek itself *ἦλθον* is the practical aorist of *εἶμι* and *ἐπάταξα* the practical aorist of *τύπτω*.

¹ See A. J. P. XXIII 106.

² Riemann in the *Mélanges Graux*, 585-598. See now Riemann and Goelzer, p. 250 and p. 832.

³ A. J. P. XIV 104; XVI 259.

⁴ For which I have recently proposed the terms 'paratatic' and 'apobatic', A. J. P. XXIII 106.

All that interests us here is the establishment of the fact of the feeling. Once the feeling was almost universally admitted, but objections have not been wanting. There is the *metri causa* argument, to show that the distinction, if any, is overborne by the march of the verse. There is the parallel passage argument, the argument that has been used triumphantly to show that there is no difference between this future and that future. If one admits that *metri causa* may suffice to efface slight differences, the inch of concession becomes an ell whereby to measure all Greek. If one attempts to show that two passages may have the same general meaning and yet a very different coloring, one cannot expect a patient hearing from those who think that it is very much the same thing whether you use two finite verbs or one finite verb and one participle.¹ But in spite of all cavil there are passages in which the Greek author himself makes a point that turns on the shift of the tenses, and to these we can look with confidence as proofs that the distinction is not dead. It is at most dormant. It can be roused to life whenever needed. And if this is so, the style of an author will be very different according as these modal tenses are always used sharply and clearly, or as he slurs distinctions which must have been national.

Not least interesting nor least convincing in this range of studies are the fixed formulae; for in these formulae we have the record of distinctions that must have been sharply marked to the early speakers of the language. What may seem subtle to us could not have been subtle, to begin with. Such a formula is the coincidence of the kind of time in *φθάνω* and its participle. It is a regular paradigm, *φθάνω ποιῶν, φθάνω* (hist. pres.) *ποιήσας, φθήσομαι ποιήσας, ἔφθασα ποιήσας, παύ—ἔφθακα πεποιηκώς. φθάνω* and the participle are, if not absolutely faithful to each other, at least reasonably so through all generations of Greek. It is an example of conjugal fidelity worthy of all admiration.² The participle of *λανθάνω* is not so constant and the participle of *τυγχάνω* is as inconstant as *τύχη* herself.

In studying the tenses of a foreign language it is especially desirable to get rid of one's native ply; and yet, as it is impossible to get rid of it, the next best thing is to make allowances for it. So in studying the Greek present we must

¹For Homeric examples see T. D. Seymour, Transactions of American Philological Association, XII 81.

²See A. J. P. XII 78-9.

remember that we have two familiar periphrases for the present for which the Greek has no exact parallels, the so-called progressive 'I am walking', which is not adequately rendered by *βαδίζων εἰμι*, and 'I do walk', which produces an impression akin to *βαδίζω δὴ*. We are prone, therefore, to analyze the Greek present as we are usually forced to analyze the Greek future, as we are forced to decide between the periphrastic 'shall' and 'will'. To the Greek the present was an indefinite tense. In familiar language it answered for present, it answered for past, it answered for future. It is universal: 'The sun rises in the East and sets in the West'. It is particular: 'The sun sets behind a cloud'. And this suffices. But we cannot help asking: Is it originally progressive or, if you choose, durative? Is it originally aoristic? Or, have we one set of forms that are progressive, one that are aoristic? Was there, for instance, the same difference between a long present form and a short present form that we feel between *ἀγνίω* and *ἄγω*? All that can be said with approximate confidence is that a typical difference having set itself up between imperfect and aorist in certain forms, the present associated itself with the imperfect and became by preference durative, by preference progressive. When, therefore, an aoristic present was needed, the aorist itself was employed. We who have learned to feel the augment as the sign of the past time may have our sensibilities shocked, but we have to unlearn that feeling; and in any case the fact is there, and it is impossible to explain all the uses of the aorist side by side with the present by a resort to the paradigmatic aorist or to the empiric aorist. It is an interesting phenomenon that the so-called gnomic aorist holds to its augment in Homer with a tenacity that is very strange in view of the fact that gnomic aorist and present are so often paralleled.¹ True, the paradigmatic aorist has its legitimate use in proverbs, which are largely abridged parables, abridged stories. A typical action is good for all time. The empiric aorist appeals to experience as the Preacher appeals to experience. 'The thing that hath been it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun'. But the

¹ Platt, E. J. of Phil. XIX (1891): 'The general rule is that the gnomic aorist in old Epic poetry takes the augment. Exceptions are so few as to be practically non-existent'.

paradigmatic and the empiric explanations do not satisfy the feeling in passages in which the shift from present to aorist is clearly a shift from durative to complexive, from progress to finality, and it is just these passages that show how alive the Greek is to the kind of time.¹ If the Greek had used throughout his literature the historical present for the past, the aoristic feeling of the present might have been more pronounced, but the historical present, belonging as it does to the household stock, seems to have been tabooed as vulgar by the epic and the higher lyric.² There is not an example in Homer, and I have challenged all that have been cited in Pindar (I. E., cii). It was the drama, which is chiefly representative and not narrative, that ventured to bring it back. Once rehabilitated by the drama, it became common in prose and was used freely by historians and orators, not, however, without individual differences, which it might be worth while to scan more narrowly, but it was never, perhaps, employed so recklessly as among the Romans, who are sadly given to overdoing. In English the historical present is in like manner apt to be overdone by flashy writers, and is not unfrequently sought by those who wish to be lively at all hazards. The historical present is a well-known weakness of Dickens. As Augustine Birrell says, 'What can be drearier than when a plain, matter-of-fact writer attempts to be animated and tries to make his characters live by the futile but easy expedient of writing about them in the present tense?' As a future the present is used only in those verbs in which the will is the deed. There are very few. Nor does the present for the future show itself much in the Greek dependent sentence, whereas it reigns in idiomatic English. The Greek absolutely riots in futures of every shade and seldom calls on the *praesens propheticum*, which is reserved for solemn occasions. We are in the region of 'Burdens' and 'Warnings'. 'Behold, the Lord maketh the earth empty and maketh it waste and turneth it upside down'.

¹ The passages in my S. C. G. § 260 might have been multiplied, perhaps ought to have been multiplied. The aorist produces an effect of finality akin to the perfect, of which the aorist is often the shorthand. In S. C. G. § 257, which has been freely criticised, read, 'the gnomic perfect < is based > on experience < real or imaginary (vision) > .

² See now S. C. G., § 200, and cf. Kellner, *Historical Outlines of English Syntax*, p. 229: 'The Historical Present is scarcely to be met with in Old English; but there are numerous instances of it from the thirteenth century down to our times. Frequent in Chaucer and Elizabethan writers'.

The Greek future is, for us, as has been intimated, an untranslatable tense. In every simple sentence we are obliged to differentiate and as the use of 'will' and 'shall' has varied greatly from the time of Shakespeare to our own days and still varies in different localities, the difficulty of rendering is greatly enhanced. But the translation should not be allowed to get between us and the Greek future. We encounter a like puzzle in every direction, we encounter it in the Latin future, in the Romance future, which no native analyzes into 'will' and 'shall'. In the leading clause the negative is *οὐ*, but in the dependent clause with the exception of the descriptive relative the negative is *μή*. In the one it is indicative, in the other it is, for want of a better word, imperative. Now according to Dr. Rutherford, who is a Scotchman, the future indicative in an *ei*-clause is to be translated by an emphatic 'will',¹ but I am not certain that I always understand a Scotchman's 'will'; and the American 'will' is not uniform. 'We will' for 'we shall' is exceedingly common over the whole country and is not a specifically Southern error, as has been charged: and even those who make the book difference between 'shall' and 'will' are apt to lean too much to 'shall' and others who manage to keep 'shall' and 'will' apart in statement are prone to fuse them in the question and in indirect discourse and, then again, those who are decent enough in the matter of 'shall' and 'will' are reckless in the matter of 'should' and 'would', to which the same principles apply. I should therefore prefer not to accept Dr. Rutherford's uniform translation of an emphatic 'will' for *ei* with future indicative and yet it is but fair to say that the 'shall' by which we are prone to render *ei* with future indicative in contradistinction to *εἰάν* with the subjunctive seems to be more formal, minatory, legal in its tone now than it was centuries ago. Let us, therefore, put translations aside for a while and say: It is enough if we associate the imperative idea with the *μή* future of the dependent clause. In the independent sentence there is no *μή* future. There the negative is *οὐ* and the so-called imperative future with *οὐ* is not an imperative but a familiar prediction, which involves either absolute control or foreknowledge absolute. It is the address to a slave, to a familiar, and all the mildness of its imperative use is the merest fancy. 'Thou shalt not steal' is not the rendering of the Greek *οὐ κλέψεις*. The Hebrew has the negative of prediction. The command is addressed to the servant of the Most High.

¹ First Greek Syntax § 285.

The Greek future does not escape the question of its modality nor does it escape the question as to the kind of its time. Is it undifferentiated or does it lean toward progressive action on the one hand or toward complexive action on the other? The close resemblance in form—I waive all questions of origin here as elsewhere—the close resemblance in form to the first aorist subjunctive may have given it a ply in the aoristic direction and a remarkable indication of that is the steadiness of *φθάσω* (*φθήσομαι*) with the aorist participle, but whatever its natural affinities, the Greek prefers other expressions than the future indicative for more exact relations of future time. The future indicative has, it is true, established itself in the independent sentence but in the dependent sentence it is confined to a limited sphere from which it has not succeeded in ousting the more exact expressions of temporal relations such as *ὄταν* and *ἐπειδάν* with present and aorist subjunctive. It has not forced its way into temporal sentences of limit such as *ἕως ἄν* and *πρὶν ἄν*. *ἦν* with present and aorist subjunctive outnumbers *εἰ* with future indicative and the generic relative prefers *ὅς ἄν* with present and aorist subjunctive. Nay, even in the leading clause, the optative with *ἄν* disputes the territory with the future, and the positive future is balanced by the negative optative with *ἄν*. This desire for an exact future is characteristic of the language and gives rise to complicated periphrases, but nowhere is it shown more strikingly than in the exactness with which the comparatively late first future passive is used whenever there are two competing forms. In the *De Compositione* Dionysios bids us consider whether we shall use *ἀφαιρήσομαι* or *ἀφαιρεθήσομαι*,¹ but Dionysios is thinking of the rhythmical effect merely. The modern grammarian is thinking of the kind of time. *ἀφαιρήσομαι* is durative and may be compared with the verbs of depriving, *ἀφαιρεθήσομαι* is aoristic; and the conviction of the justice of this distinction caused Blass to revise his scheme of the tenses in the new edition of Kühner, as is well known.² We see then that the survival of the original modal sense of the future, the range of its employment as an imperative, the replacement of it by other moods, all these belong to aesthetic syntax as well as to every-day syntax: and so does the use of the future as a gnomic

¹ De comp. verb. 43 (R): *καὶ ἀφαιρήσομαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεθήσομαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . μετασκευάζει τὰς λέξεις ἵν' αὐτῷ γένοιτο ἄρμωσθεῖσαι καλλίους καὶ ἐπιτηδείτεροι.*

² Cf. Teil I., Bd. II., S. 585 with Bd. I., §190.

tense, so does the traveller's future of Herodotos, by which the story-teller enters into confidential relations with his listener.

The future perfect has little range in Greek. It is a rare form. Grammarians tell us that it is not formed from pure verbs that begin with a vowel. If one chooses to consider *ᾠφελήσομαι* a future perfect what is there to prevent it? And the context might demand it. In its narrow range the future perfect has its full rights. There is no abatement of its force in *δεδήσομαι* or *πεπράσομαι* any more than there is an abatement in the force of the perfect imperative. *εἰρήσεται* has the same sphere as *εἰρήσθω*.¹ That the future perfect occurs chiefly in the dramatic poets is due not to the iambic metre at the close of the verse, as has been maintained. That is a mere coincidence of position with sense. Where else shall we look for finality if we are not to look for it in the future perfect and at the end of the verse? When Aias says: τὰ . . . τεύχη κοῖν' ἐμοὶ τεθάψεται, who would dare to write *ταφήσεται*, no matter how the metrical Moloch might smile with its iron jaws?

To the sphere of the present belongs the perfect. Everybody recognizes now that in the perfect form, as elsewhere, reduplication, has only to do with the character of the action, that we have to make a variety of classes, that we have to sunder f. i. the onomatopoetic perfect and the emotional perfect from the perfect of completion. And yet it is not so very many years since 'I have set up a yell and therefore am yelling' was gravely put forward as an explanation of the tense of *κέκραγα*. Few would venture nowadays to explain *τέτριγα* and *δέδια* as perfects of completed action. Verbs of perception, verbs of gesture have passed into the intensive category, not always with so clear a right. Of course the large use of such perfects is to be sought in the poetical sphere—which is the sphere of fancy and emotion and need not detain us—but a word as to the sphere of the ordinary perfect may not be amiss.

In practical life the perfect was much more frequently used than we might gather from a general survey of the literature; and in fact, the nearness of any department of literature to practical life may readily be measured by the perfect. The perfect belongs to the drama, to the orators, to the dialogues of Plato. The drama, to be sure, is under the thrall of verse and the perfect is a heavy form and suffers a replacement by the aorist; and yet it is of not infrequent occurrence. In history the perfect has no place outside

¹ See A. J. P. XVII 518 and S. C. G. § 279 foll.

of the speeches and the reflective passages in which the author has his say. One would hardly expect a dearth of perfects in an author like Polybios, head of the pragmatistical school of historians. Statistics are a bugbear to many, and perhaps the statistics of the perfect would not be profitable. In the absence of statistics, turn over the leaves of Veitch's Irregular Verbs and see in what authors perfects most do congregate. I have just alluded to the replacement of the perfect by the aorist, which, as I have said elsewhere, may be used as the shorthand of the perfect (A. J. P. XIV 105). The aorist has a strong affinity for the negative and we often find the tenses so associated that the negative thought is expressed by the aorist, the positive by the perfect. Then whole ranges of verbs form no perfect that we know of, and many of the perfects that figure in our grammars are due to the mechanical manufacture of an artificial period, to the desire of completing a paradigm such as gave birth to the various unrealities that were wont to figure under ΤΥΠΤΩ, though in view of the fact that even in the best period there are so many isolated perfects, we ought not to be too hasty in damning the *Graeculi*, whom it is so easy to damn.

In consideration, then, of all these cross-calculations it will be admitted that the stylistic study of the use of the perfect is a complicated problem and perhaps all that can be formulated with certainty is that the very large use of the perfect in any sphere shows too much analysis and is a mark of decline, and in later Greek suggests Roman influence—the same influence that manifests itself in an undue use of the pluperfect.

The three historical tenses were used with full consciousness by the Greeks of the best period, by the Greek of the period in which imagination and reflection held perfect balance; and the distinction between imperfect and aorist and the distinction between aorist and pluperfect play a large part in syntax and yet not too large a part. The formulae are too vague, the observations too superficial; too little attention has been paid to the sphere of usage, so that assaults on the traditional distinctions are not surprising. These assaults have had for their object mainly the levelling of imperfect and aorist; for the difference between aorist and pluperfect is too evident to be ignored. Indeed, if we study the passages in which the Greek makes a point on the shifting use of the three historical tenses, it does not readily appear how any student of the Greek language who has to deal with practical phenomena could allow a theory of origin

to interfere with the facts of usage. There might be room for carping when the three historical tenses as used in the same sentence come from different verbs, but what is to be done with the classic passage in Herodotos, in which the same verb is used, the tense shifting as if the historian were giving a lesson in grammar?¹ The difference thus made is the typical difference, which may be obscured here and there, which can never be effaced. Much has been made of a small and ancient group of verbs in which we have indifferent preterites—*ἦν, ἦα, ἔφην*—though even these are not indifferent throughout, and let us frankly say that for aught we know the group may have been much larger. Nay, it may be conceded that the whole difference between aorist and imperfect is in all likelihood the result of a gradual differentiation. *ἔτραπον* the aorist of one dialect is the imperfect of another. But the differentiation is there. Just as in another sphere we say that whatever *ἑστεφανώσατο* may have been in the beginning, it becomes rigidly middle, so it may safely be said that an imperfect in the classic language is never interchangeable with the aorist, though the shift from one to the other is often so subtle as to escape our analysis, and we have to resort to the imponderable category of 'feeling'. The best contrasted definitions do not avail throughout. We call the aorist the tense of statement, the imperfect the tense of description; we call the aorist the complexive tense, the imperfect the tense of evolution. We say that the aorist gives the sum, the imperfect the items. We say that the imperfect is the tense of actual vision, the tense of sympathy. The aorist appeals more to the intellect, the imperfect more to the eye. The aorist descends like lightning, the imperfect comes down like a pall. There is an aorist of eagerness, an imperfect of reluctance; and so on through a long array of metaphors. And yet a simple *ἔλεγε* where one might use *εἶπε* drives Cobet to set up a peculiarity of the Ionic dialect, and his fine remark on the propriety of the imperfect for the *oculati testes* (N. L. 409) is wasted on himself. *ἔπεμπον, ἐκέλευον, ἔλειπον* have evoked a variety of explanations.² The artistic imperfect *ἔπολε* seems to have puzzled

¹ See now S. C. G., § 264.

² The aorist of eagerness is the so-called dramatic aorist which figures in all the grammars (S. C. G., § 262), but I did not have the heart to add another category to my exhibit of the imperfect in spite of my own note on Pindar, O. 6, 45: *ἔλειπε*, 'She had to leave'. Cf. Il. 19, 288, and Eur. H. F. 554, with the note of Wilamowitz.

the ancients themselves, and the almost sentimental explanation that we find in Pliny has been accepted with rapture and cited over and over again as an illustration of the modesty of the Greek artist, who lingered lovingly over his work and never counted himself to have attained, until some pitiless statistician found out that the early artists had no such sentimentality, and now the prosaic explanation which parallels *ἐποίει* with *ἔτικτε*, 'was the maker' with 'was the mother', has thrust out the other.¹ And yet the other may have been superinduced. The artists of modern times who have accepted Pliny's explanation, and have inscribed on their work *faciebat* in good faith, must have had partners in their error among the antique artists, for Pliny's contribution to the theory of the tenses was doubtless a tradition of the studio. Nay, even Pindar lends color to the tradition when he sings: *αἰλῶν τεύχε* (sc. *παρθένος*) *πάμφωνον μέλος*, where we see the Virgin Goddess fashioning the melody. But the aorist follows, *εὔρεν θεός*. (P. 12, 19.)

In the list of traditional differences between aorist and imperfect given above, the reader may miss the formulae of 'prolonged' and 'momentary' action. Few formulae have done more harm than these. Tense of duration, tense of momentum, would not be so objectionable, but, unfortunately, duration has to be explained and the seat of the duration put where it belongs, in the eye of the beholder, in the heart of the sympathizer, and not in the action itself. Describe a rapid action and you have the imperfect. Sum up a long action and you have the aorist. Definite numbers take the aorist with a fateful regularity, if there is no interruption to the series.² The negative takes the aorist as a rule, the imperfect only when there is something countervailing, something that has to be opposed, so that the negative with the imperfect often gets a modal translation, just as we say in English 'The door would not shut'. So in Latin the historical tenses of verbs of hindering are limited to the imperfect sequence. Hindering involves opposition to will, involves resistance to pressure.

¹ See S. C. G., § 213, footnote. Ulrichs's remark occurs in his *Chrestomathia Pliniana*, *Einleitung*, XIV. Add Meisterhans³, p. 241.

² So in any kind of Greek that is Greek, Hebrews 3, 17: *τίσιν δὲ προσέχθισεν τεσσαράκοντα ἔτη*; The catena can easily be effected and in my *Syntax* § 244 I did not care to multiply examples, which any index that has numerals in it will increase indefinitely. Examples with the non-indicative moods, however, are not so common, and I am sorry that I did not cite Dem. 50, 39: *τὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ χρόνον τριηράρχησον τοὺς ἐξ ἡμέρας*.

Much can be done in the way of observing the spheres in which the imperfect moves, the verbs that it prefers, and analysis has not exhausted its resources, though, of course, much will always be left to immediate feeling and Queen Grammar will lose her rights. In shifting from one language to another, one has to acquire a different set of tentacles. As a tense *ἔλεγε*, 'dicebat', 'disait', 'said', 'sagte' may be called by the same name and may have the same function and yet demand a different treatment. Our English imperfect has collapsed into an aorist, so much so that the progressive is used when we need certain phases of the imperfect, and yet the aoristic use of our imperfect is in need of reinforcement, and when we use the negative, which has affinities with the aorist, we use the reduplicated aorist 'did'. Nay, we Americans shocked the late Mr. Fitzedward Hall by going so far as to say 'did not have', which, I am ready to believe, is abominable. In South Germany the imperfect is less used; and in French the imperfect is used in a way that seems to be nearer to Greek than it is to Latin. There are no statistics to show what is the proportion of imperfect to aorist in Greek compared with the proportion of imperfect to historical perfect in Latin. It has been maintained of late on the basis of a very imperfect induction that the Roman did not use his imperfect so freely as did the Greek, and it is *a priori* very likely, but the conditions are so complicated that mere counting will not suffice. To plunge into Caesar's Gallic War and Xenophon's Anabasis and emerge with a bushel-basket of statistics will not serve. The spheres are not exactly the same, and oh! the difference of authors, apart from the nationality.¹ The large use of the imperfect in Greek may, however, well be considered a note of *naïveté*, but that note of *naïveté* is lost in the transfer to English, to German. The English progressive would be intolerable for any length of time and is excluded from a certain range of verbs. 'I was loving' of our paradigms is an impossibility. The German imperfect does not produce the same impression as the Greek imperfect, and as the South German is more *naïf* than the North German, one might have to substitute the perfect and save the tone at the expense of the tense. Here, then, on what some would consider the very threshold of the language, we meet a problem that is to be solved by sympathy and sympathy alone. The open sense of the student is the only open sesame.

¹A. J. P. XIV 105.

The pluperfect, which figures so largely in Latin, has a much more modest rôle in Greek. It is made up in very much the same way, but it is a relatively heavier form, and the notion of antecedence in the past which gives the Latin pluperfect so wide a scope is jauntily borne in Greek by the aorist. The aorist is not so exact as it might be; but the Greeks were satisfied with a hint. The Greek pluperfect is to the imperfect what the perfect is to the present. It hunts in couples with the imperfect and aorist, and should be studied in connexion with its comrades. But it is a lumbering tense and requires more analysis of the situation than the Greeks were disposed to wait for. Hence there is no more suspicious circumstance in later Greek than the abounding use of the pluperfect; and the multiplication of the pluperfect in Babrius gives the effect of a translation from the Latin, though even that does not avail to destroy the charm.

THE COMPOUND SENTENCE.

We now pass from the domain of the simple sentence to that of the compound sentence, from the combination of words to the combination of sentences, now in parataxis, now in hypotaxis. In the older grammars parataxis received scant notice. A few remarks on the copulative, adversative, causal and illative conjunctions, and then the attention was concentrated chiefly on hypotaxis with its more complicated phenomena. Nowadays parataxis is looked upon as the key to hypotaxis. All subordination is traced to co-ordination and the first question in regard to every hypotactic phenomenon is: How did it originate in parataxis? The value of the method is undoubted, and it is true that many of the most difficult problems in the syntax of the sentence find their ultimate explanation in the original parataxis. But no sooner was the key found than it was forced into locks which it could by no means be made to fit, and warning voices were not long in making themselves heard, Brugmann's most emphatically (A. J. P. IV 418, 419). The processes of the lover of language ought not to be brutal.

*τὸν δὲ Κένταυρος ζαμενῆς, ἀγανᾶ χλαρὸν γελάσσαις ὄφρῦι, μῆτιν ἔαν
εὐθὺς ἀμίβετο· Κρυπταὶ κλαῖδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων.*

Pyth. 9, 38.

Analysis must imitate the coaxing process of synthesis. Valuable as it is in enabling us to understand origins, the paratactic formula

rudely applied has wrought positive mischief. We must not insist on forcing it to the front, we must not insist on feeling it under formulae that were established as formulae, that had established other formulae long before our record. 'Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world?' (I Cor. 6, 1), may be analyzed thus: 'The saints shall judge the world'—'do you not know that?' but analysis fails to reproduce the effect of the synthesis—fails to explain the synthesis. The change of order alone is fatal to such a genesis. The matter is not so simple as it seems. And so in Greek, as Brugmann has pointed out, while certain sentences may be explained paratactically they are not felt paratactically. True, we never lose the negative feeling of μή, the conflict of negatives in μή οὐ, and *ut* after a Latin verb of fear has a way of its own with it¹ and is not felt as an equivalent of *ne non*. There is therefore a manner of survival of parataxis in sentences of fear, though only a manner of survival; but the final sentence which ultimately belongs to the same group had passed into the stage of formula before our record. Emotion may revive the original parataxis with verbs of fear. Purpose is too closely welded to permit the revival of parataxis. The final sentence is ultimately an imperative sentence and we should expect the tenses to run on the same lines as the imperative tenses, but with all the work Weber has done on the final sentence, this is a point that he has not wrought out and it is worth working out. But however that may be, the shifting conjunctions color the finality somewhat. The Homeric ὡς is 'how', and so is ὅπως, and we feel *κεν* when it attaches itself to these, we feel *ἄν*. In

ἀλλ' ἴθι, μή μ' ἐρέθιζε, σαώτερος ὡς κε νήηαι

the little *κε* is heard amid the outburst of rage; the subtle touch is lost in *oratio obliqua*. In Plato's prose rendering we have simply the optative: ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε καὶ μή ἐρεθίζειν ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε ἔλθοι.² ὅφρα 'until' is dying as 'until'. In the *Odyssey* it is largely 'in order that'. In Pindar it is only 'in order that', in fact, is nothing more than a bit of poetical obsolescence, and the 'in order that' of ἵνα is as early as the time of Homer dissociated from the 'where' of ἵνα, which survives only in out-of-the-way corners of speech until the artificial writers of late centuries fished it up as Attic and made it do duty as 'where' at the same time that they

¹ A. J. P. VI 84.

² Rpb. 393 E.

rehabilitated $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$. How far the final sentence had become formula, how far it was going on the way already traversed by the other final, the infinitive, we can see by the occasional use of a final sentence as a complementary sentence of design¹ such as are familiar in Latin, *impero ut* and the like. But by one of those pudencies to which language is subject, the process did not go forward along the whole line and, while we find such constructions with the semi-final conjunctions $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ and $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ even in the best period, the shamelessness of $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ and the subjunctive does not become rampant until a late period, until in fact the Orontes had disembogued into the Tiber as the Tiber had absorbed the Ilissus. In the modern language the infinitive has disappeared and $\nu\acute{\alpha}$ with the subjunctive reigns in its stead.

It is clear, then, that if we find the reign of formula in the dependent sentence so well established from the beginning of our record as to anticipate the corruption of later times, it is idle to lay too much stress on primitive conditions. And yet the primitive conditions are not to be neglected especially when they survive in languages to which we can apply the test of direct appreciation, and for the evolution of the subordinate clause our own language gives us unusual opportunities. In the whole matter of the genesis of dependent sentences, the relative plays an important part and for the state of things that preceded the relative we have valuable survivals in English. For like the English stock, the English language has retained much that is primitive and few cultured languages show more clearly the process of growth. The Cyclopean structure of the sentence is found more familiarly in English than elsewhere and we go back to a period that antedates the relative. 'The man I saw', 'I fear he knows', 'I hope he sees', which run trippingly off our tongues, would be strange in other languages. In Shakespeare's time the freedom was much greater. Now we limit the usage to the objective relatives proper but, as it is, the bounds are wide enough to make a foreigner stare. 'The man that I saw', 'the man which I saw' 'the man whom I saw' represent different states and stages. 'The man I saw' is primal.²

Now the relative owes its main binding force to its position at the head of a sentence. To use Greek terminology, it would not have become an $\acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\rho\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\tau\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$, if it had not been so

¹ See Monro, H. G. § 286.

² See Kellner l. c. § 109.

decidedly an ἄρθρον προτακτικόν. The demonstrative οὗτος at the head of a sentence has exactly the same office, and we cannot speak of asyndeton when οὗτος is employed with reference to what precedes. It is the antecedent as we call it, the correlative of the relative, οὗτος—ὅς, ὅς—οὗτος.

From sentences thus connected by ἀναφορά arises what is called hypotaxis, what is called subordination. It is younger, we say, less primitive than co-ordination and absence of it gives simplicity, gives *ναῖνελé* to style. And yet so old is it that some familiar forms of parataxis might be classed as hypotaxis. Whatever may be thought of *καί, τε—καί* and *τε—τε* are as hypotactic as *τοσοῦτον—δσον*.

Position and correlation are, as we have seen, the great factors in the building up of the hypotactic sentence. Correlation grows by position and never can dispense with position, whereas position can dispense with correlation. You can use *ὅς* alone, but as soon as you have the so-called antecedent you must put it where it will be felt. The shifting of the position is technically called hyperbaton and this hyperbaton or overleaping is possible only by a return to the primitive life of the language. The hyperbaton of the relative is a return to the demonstrative in Greek, to the interrogative in Latin. Separate the article, when it has become an article, from its substantive and the demonstrative nature comes back.

Position enables us to dispense with correlation it is true, but the expression of correlation is not a matter of indifference. The correlative style is more deliberate, better balanced, and the Greek loves balance, so that correlatives hold their own whereas the single element dies out. *τε—τε*, nay, for that matter, *οὐτε—τε, μήτε—τε* are more common than *τε solitarium*. We can gauge an author's style by his use of *πρότερον—πρίν*; and the expression of the correlative of *ὥστε* gives a certain grave deliberateness which the flippant afterthought *ὥστε* has not.¹ The absence of a regular correlative to the final sentence, to the conditional sentence, must also be taken into consideration when the effect as well as the genesis of these combinations is to be studied. The temporal sentence indulges freely in correlation but some forms avoid it. *τέως—ἕως* is as formal as a lawsuit, and the two are

¹ A. J. P. XIV 241. The correlative use of *ὥστε* and consequent stylistic effect has recently been elaborated in a special J. H. U. dissertation by W. A. Eckels: *ὥστε as an Index of Style in the <Attic> Orators*.

seldom seen together. Hence a certain masquerading *τέως* is sometimes used as *ἔως*, and *τέως* not unfrequently has an indefinite use. If *ἄν* had been blessed with a correlative, we should have less trouble with a particle which behaves as *τέως* behaves—now definite, now indefinite.

So important is the relative in the organization of the dependent sentence that all hypotactic sentences have been considered in some sort relative sentences, as each class of sentences is introduced by relative or, which is the same thing, demonstrative particles. The conditional *εἰ* is, according to some scholars, a manner of relative, and in explaining the anomalous intruder, *πρίν*, recourse has been had to *ἤ*, which has also been considered a relative. But the relative sentence has a life of its own, and the parallels so frequent between the relative sentence and the other forms often do harm. *ὅς ἄν* does not go the whole way with *εἰάν*. The final relative sentence is put in the future indicative, not in the subjunctive. Each class of sentences gets habits of its own, and the deviation from these habits gives variety, gives undulation to style, variety and undulation which cannot be appreciated unless there be a norm. Long familiarity with the trim garden of Attic syntax is a necessary preliminary to the enjoyment of the luxuriance of Homeric syntax. Only one must be careful to do justice to the luxuriance and not deny law because the phyllotaxy is not at once apparent.

The subdivision of hypotactic sentences into the various familiar categories has undeniable practical advantages and is not lightly to be given up, though all logical categories are open to suspicion. But so far as I am aware, no one has made a careful study of the proportion of these classes in different authors. Inside the different classes something has been done, but one would like to know which author leans to the final, which to the conditional, which prefers the participle, which the object sentence. In this whole line of research only beginnings have been made. So we know that in Aischylos the conditional sentence is rare in comparison with Euripides. It is an epitome of the difference between the two great poets, between the gravity of the Areiopagos and the mobility of the Heliaia. The relative sentence is less analytic than the final, than the temporal, the participle than all these. And under the different classes of sentences what variety of usage, what interesting coincidences of usage. Pindar and Aischylos, so alike and yet so different, make

kindred use of the logical conditional. It is a severe note that is not to be disregarded. It is a sharp line of Kalamis. Under the head of the temporal sentence it has been noted that $\xi\omega\varsigma$ encroaches on $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ and actually steals some of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$'s peculiar territory, until familiar $\omicron\upsilon$ $\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ — $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ is replaced by $\omicron\upsilon$ $\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ — $\xi\omega\varsigma$. What is that but the encroachment of the reflective on the naïve, just as the growing use of *naïf* for naïve is a token of the encroachment of the reflective on the *naïf* naïve? $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ is equivalent to $\xi\omega\varsigma$ only by inference. $\xi\omega\varsigma$ itself is more accurate, more prosaic. One can almost hear the voice of some ancient pedant saying as Whitelaw has said, ' $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ can never be $\xi\omega\varsigma$ '. No! but it connotes $\xi\omega\varsigma$ and if it were not for connotation where would many scholars be? The tendency to simplification, which we notice in the healthy language, is accelerated in the decline. As the pure subjunctive of the conditional sentence gives way to the $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ form and all Homeric differences are swept away, so in later Greek $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is found in place of $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ before the indicative, and even intrudes into the sphere of the simple $\acute{\alpha}\nu$. $\delta\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is used for $\delta\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$; $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ with subjunctive usurps the place of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ with infinitive; $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ η runs riot. We say to ourselves, 'Chaos and Old Night. There are no problems of Greek syntax possible. We are in the realm of Solecism'. But that is not true. Language remains organic. The laws of the death are the laws of the life. Deorganization is unravelling and the unweaving teaches us the weaving.

Here I made a provisional end nine years ago; and I have little desire to continue the plea for the kind of studies to which I have for so many years been addicted. That I am not altogether a stranger to the problems of genetic syntax, that I too have occupied myself somewhat with the histology of speech, that my formulae are the results of a study of the living forces of language and not mere convenient summaries of phenomena, I do not care to show in detail. My reward has been the contemplation of the beautiful workings of the beautiful language to which so much of my life has been given up, and so far as human approval is concerned let it be said at the last: *Vaghiagli il lungo studio e il grande amore.*

ADDENDUM.¹

The participle is not a mood but it is susceptible of modal relations, and the future tense of it is almost wholly modal, is almost wholly final. But when we first meet the participle, it has only the capabilities of the modal life which it afterwards developed. When we first find it, it is an adjective *plus* tense and clings to its substantive like a skin. True, it is not the tight skin of man or woman, but rather the loose skin of lion or tiger. Still, it will not come off and in fact never comes off; and this is our difficulty in dealing with the Greek participle. We too have a participle, and, under Latin influences, under French influences, our participle has acquired much of the mobility of the classic tongues.² And yet we feel distinctly when the line is overstepped, as it is overstepped by Milton, whose syntax is unnaturally close to his antique models, and who uses the participle, especially in its absolute form, with the utmost freedom. When he says,

Doth God exact day-labour, light denied?

we understand perfectly, we understand immediately, we do not stop to ask whether he means 'when light is denied', 'if light be denied', 'though light be denied', but, after all, analysis would be more natural to us, and we are not satisfied to state relations so concretely as they appear in participial compression, to say nothing of the lumbering form of our perfect participle active, which can not vie with the Greek aorist in lightness and which is too stiff for conversational purposes. When, therefore, we attack the Greek participle in translation, actual or mental, we are apt to bring to bear a number of logical categories, causal, adversative, concessive, conditional, what not. Now the early Greek did not analyze as we analyze, and the Homeric grammarian is right

¹ To be inserted p. 132, l. 16 from bottom after '*μή* with the participle'. By some mischance the section on the participle which was to have followed the treatment of the infinitive in this little series went astray. But the demands of the press are remorseless and I consoled myself by thinking that the subject had been fairly covered by my elaborate article in Vol. IX of the Journal and by my remarks in the Introduction to Pindar. So the printing went on without the section. However, on my return to Baltimore the missing MS turned up and it may possibly be worth the space which is given to it here.

² Nothing could be more exotic than Caxton's participialities. His *Eneydos* (1490) begins thus: After dyverse werkes made, translated and achieved, having no werke in hande, I sitting in my studye whereas lay many dyvers paunflettis and bookes, happened that to my hande cam a lytyl booke in Frenshe. (Kellner.)

when he implies that it is a mistake grammatically to sort Homeric participles into categories.¹ There is but one category, the temporal. All else is inference. And the same thing is generally true of Pindar (see I. E. cx), though it is in Pindar that we find a portentous advance. But the beginnings of analysis are there. The causal may still be merged in the temporal, but *καί—περ* in Homer, *καίπερ* in Pindar, is made to bring out the adversative element, though even that is mainly left to circumstance. There is nothing, however, to force the conditional. There is no *μή* with the participle in Homer, after the fashion so familiar to us in post-Homeric Greek, and, with the assumption of *μή*, the participle enters upon a new and more conscious life. The addition of *μή* to the participle marks a new era in the history of the language. It affects participle and negative alike. The participle is more conscious of its resources, and *μή* extends its empire. The negative of will becomes the negative of idea. *τὸ μή* with the infinitive had the imperative note to begin with, but in *ὁ μή* with the participle the imperative note is fainter. It merely echoes the *μή* of the conditional sentence, and the *μή* of the logical condition seems to be an intruder.²

B. L. G.

¹ Vogrinz says briefly but emphatically (S. 278): Die 'Auflösungen' der Partizipien sind *rein logische Operationen*. See also Bolling, l. c., p. 426.

² In the first part of this series a few typographical errors and other slips have been noted. Most of them correct themselves, such as p. 23 l. 3 from bottom 'phenomena' for 'phenomenon', p. 25 l. 6 from bottom 'department for 'departments.' 'Calf-skin' for 'calf's skin', p. 17 l. 8 from top, is a slip of the pen about which a page might be written. More serious is p. 20 l. 17 from top where for 'case of verbs' read 'case of doubt.' The Latin example p. 8 l. 8 from top is not apposite and should be omitted. P. 17 l. 3 from bottom cite: R. S. Radford, Personification and the Use of Abstract Subjects in the Attic Orators and Thucydides, J. H. U. 1888 just published though referred to in A. J. P. XX III.

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