

# Trends in Linguistics

Studies and Monographs 70

*Editor*

Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter  
Berlin · New York


# The Byzantine Grammarians

Their Place in History

*by*

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Mouton de Gruyter  
Berlin · New York 1993



## Preface

In general, Byzantium has not had a "good press". The inclusion of the whole of Byzantine history in the decline and fall of the Roman Empire by Gibbon (1776) was followed by the savage contempt expressed by nineteenth century historians such as Lecky. Only in this century have works by Robert Byron (1929), Sir Steven Runciman (1933, 1951–1954, 1970 a, 1970 b), and others redressed the balance with a fairer picture of the Byzantine achievement in the history of civilization.

Early nineteenth century philhellenism and the romantic support of Greek independence from Byron and other European sympathizers were directed at the revival of classical Greece, not of the Byzantine Greek Empire.

Through much of the nineteenth century liberal and philhellenic people were concerned for the Greece of our educational experience. Political enthusiasm was more motivated by dislike of the Turks and of their rule over the Balkan peninsula as a whole, tempered always by a wariness towards Russia as the self-styled protector of the Orthodox Church in eastern Europe and Asia Minor. Around the turn of the eighteenth century *Greek* and *Turk* were equally terms of abuse by popular consent. The apprentice boy in *Sally in our alley* sings "Let him (his master) bang like any Turk; I'll bear it all for Sally", and around the same time *Greeking* was a slang term for cheating at cards.

British support for Turkey in the Crimean War and later on the part of Disraeli was a matter of *Realpolitik* and the determination not to let the Russians have Constantinople, a stubborn refusal deplored by Krumbacher at the end of the nineteenth century (1897: 1067): "Englands Widerstand streitet gegen Natur und Geschichte" (less than a score of years before Germany found herself the enemy of Russia and the ally of Turkey in 1914).

William Gladstone was a Greek scholar and a philhellene, but his political energies were on behalf of the Balkan Christians as a whole, and it was the Bulgarian atrocities that aroused his almost manic fury at the Turks: "Let them depart bag and baggage from the province they have desolated and profaned". The *Megálē Idéa* [the Great Concept] of Greek rule over all the Greek-speaking areas of Asia Minor never won consistent European favour, and it surely perished with the defeat of another Constantine in the disastrous Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922.

It has been not only in politics that the Byzantine world was underrated and for long neglected. During this century, however, the tide has turned at least in respect of Byzantine architecture and painting, including the once controversial icons of their worship. But as late as 1890 Krumbacher in the preface to the first edition of his massive *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur* (1897: v) felt constrained to apologize for his interest in a period of Greek literary history in which the preposition *apó* 'from' might be constructed with an accusative case, as it is in Modern Greek.

A similar prejudgment seems to have affected historical opinion in other fields. The Christological controversies of the Eastern Church are regarded as pedantically irrelevant, but the debates about transubstantiation and the Real Presence among westerners, no less incomprehensible to most Christians and almost repellent to non-believers, are accorded a respectable place in western ecclesiastical history.

We read regularly in the Press today of "Byzantine" complexity as a term of reproach for administrative excesses and incompetence. All bureaucracies tend to self-aggrandizement and proliferation of their members, with the concomitant dangers of corruption. Is there any reason to rate the competence of the Byzantine civil service much lower than that of civil services elsewhere in the mediaeval and modern world? Runciman at least has declared (1933: 61): "That the Byzantine Empire should have endured for eleven hundred years was almost entirely due to the virtues of its constitution and administration".

These general historical questions form no part of this book. What I have attempted to do is to assemble and present sufficient extracts of grammatical writings through successive periods of the Byzantine Age, so that the general reader may be enabled to form his or her own appraisal of these grammarians' thoughts and expositions. The texts are taken for the most part from printed sources, but these are hard of access to many linguistics students and teachers other than those with the advantages of exceptionally well endowed academic libraries. Readers will, I hope, be able to form their own judgments from seeing actual texts, instead of taking the unexemplified verdicts of such as Pauly-Wissowa, Krumbacher, and Sandys.

Much original research remains to be done. Byzantine grammatical manuscripts remain to be catalogued, edited, and published, on the lines already undertaken on the western grammarians by Bursill-Hall (1981) and Law (1982). My arguments and conclusions may well be unacceptable to some scholars, but at least part of the currently available literature

will have been published in a readily accessible form. It is hoped that the English translations of all passages and quotations in Greek and in Latin will make it possible for those who are interested but do not readily read these two languages to find their way through this part of the history of linguistics. If this book encourages further source work and reevaluation of the sort so well initiated by Donnet (e. g. 1967 b and 1982), it will have achieved its author's hopes and will lead to an enrichment of our scholarly literature in a hitherto neglected field.

One of the pleasures of academic research and writing is the advice and assistance so readily given by one's colleagues. Several persons have helped me in various ways in writing this book, but I wish to thank in particular Jean Lallot for reading and commenting on a draft of chapter 11, Vivien Law for advising me on chapters 5 and 6 and on an earlier version of chapter 7, Keith Percival for his suggestions for improving chapter 12, and Ruth Webb for drawing my attention to the importance of Philostratos in Byzantine education. These are all experts in their field, and I have benefited from their assistance in pointing out errors, omissions, and misjudgments. I am most grateful for their help, but the further failings that remain are my own responsibility and no-one else's.

I must thank Professor Werner Winter for the original invitation to write this book when we were at Ochrid in Yugoslavia for the meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea in 1986, after which other commitments delayed the start of this work. In preparing the book I have derived much profit from the editorial advice and suggestions from Dr. Marie-Louise Liebe-Harkort, Editor-in-Chief, Mouton de Gruyter.

Finally I must express my gratitude to the Leverhulme Trust for awarding me an Emeritus Fellowship over two years, which has not only given me great encouragement in my research but has also assisted me financially with photocopying and other services, which would otherwise not have been available to me after my retirement.

London, July 1991

R. H. Robins

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## Chapter 1

### Outline of Byzantine history: the political context

This chapter goes no further than an attempt at a sketch of the history of the Byzantine (Eastern) Empire, sufficient to locate the grammarians considered in later chapters within their historical and social context. For more detailed accounts the reader should turn to such books as the following: Runciman (1933, 1951–1954, 1970); Baynes (1948); Obolensky (1971); Nicol (1972; 1992); and of course the Byzantine chapters of Gibbon's *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire* (1776).

There has been some discussion about a starting point for the Byzantine Empire. In one sense, of course, any chosen date must be arbitrary. One can locate individual events to particular years, and often to months and days, but events are not themselves starting or finishing points of major historical developments. Some would postpone the term *Byzantine*, as opposed to *Roman, Empire* until the reign of Justinian (527–565); others make the rededication of Byzantium as the New Rome, Constantine's city, in 330 the inauguration of the Byzantine Empire. It is convenient for the purposes of this book to take the earlier date, as it will embrace the date of the final "edition" of the *Téchnē grammatikē* [the science of grammar], as argued by many scholars today, and the great Latin grammar of Priscian, written some time near 500 in the city.

However, the Byzantine Empire was in fact and in its founder's intent just the continuation of the old Roman Empire in changing times and in a changed location. The *Imperium Romanum*, or Principate, as is generally known, was established by Octavian (Augustus) in the years immediately preceding the Christian era, involving a skillful and balanced sharing of civic power between the Princeps (Augustus) and the old republican Roman Senate. This imperial constitution remained in effective control of the whole Empire for the next two centuries, the second of which, the age of the Antonines, was famously declared by Edward Gibbon to be "The period in which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous"; he was, of course, referring to the European and Middle Eastern countries under Roman control. In fact, most Europeans enjoyed as much personal liberty, though not political liberty, in matters of travel, commerce, residence, thought, and speech, as was only achieved over western Europe as a whole in our own time.

For reasons not yet fully analysed, during the third century the decline began; events and stresses, internal and external, could not be effectively mastered by those intended to be in charge at the centre of Roman politics. Between 180 and 284 no fewer than thirty-four different Emperors came and went, usually by military intervention, often fatal. One of them, Valerian, suffered the humiliation of being taken captive by the Persians in one of the many wars that beset the Empire during the third century.

In 284 Diocletian took power and by strenuous efforts he stabilized and rearranged the Empire. But such stabilization as was achieved was at the expense of personal freedoms almost taken for granted in the preceding centuries. Diocletian took the first step towards the Byzantine Empire, by dividing the imperial territory into two parts, with two Emperors, one for each part. Diocletian's reordering hardly survived his decision to abdicate in 305, and civil wars between the two Emperors and other aspirants continued until Constantine, after marching on Rome from York in England (311) became sole Emperor and decided to move his capital city to the city of Byzantium, refounded in his name (330). Thereafter the dyarchy of eastern and western Emperors continued fretfully until the shaming deposition of Emperor Augustulus by the then ruling Goths in 476.

Constantine did not use the name *New Rome* lightly to refer to Constantinople. The Augustan system of governmental titles, such as *senator*, *consul*, *praefectus*, and *quaestor* went on through part or all of the age, though with progressively diminishing powers and with the addition of several specifically Byzantine bureaucratic offices. In the Preface to his grammar book Priscian dedicates it to a consul Julianus with elaborate praises.

The succession of Byzantine "dynasties" effected through family relationships interrupted by military and political impositions, though not "legitimate" in the sense applied to modern monarchies, was not out of character with the history of the earlier imperial families, the Julio-Claudians, the Flavians, and the Antonines in the first and second centuries. But the power officially accorded to Byzantine Emperors, whether successful or unsuccessful, steadily increased. Augustus's imperial state was a careful blend of important political and religious authorities derived from republican days. In Constantinople, partly no doubt through its predominantly Greek-speaking populace, *Princeps* [First Citizen] gave way to *Autocrator* [Absolute Ruler] and later to *Basileus* [King], whereas in Rome, in deference to the early abolition of

kingship and an intense and enduring dislike of the office of *Rex* [King], Augustus and his successors never adopted or permitted such a title. Byzantine Emperors also took advantage of the regular gift of divine honours to rulers in the eastern provinces, which some Roman Emperors had accepted locally, but often with contempt.

Under Constantine Christianity was first tolerated and then made the official religion of the Empire. The brief attempt at the restoration of a revised version of the traditional pagan religion of Rome under Julian (the Apostate) served only to reinforce the hold of Christianity on the Empire. The Byzantine Emperor was the head of the Church, a representative of God on earth alongside the Pope, and it was the Emperor who appointed the High Priest, the Patriarch of Constantinople. This combination of political and ecclesiastical primacy in one person is sometimes referred to as Caesaropapism, and it contrasts with the later western separation of the secular power of the (Holy Roman) Empire and the spiritual power of the Pope, fought out over the Investiture Question in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

With the weakening and ultimately the collapse of the late Western Empire, Constantinople saw itself as bearing three responsibilities, the continuation of the old Empire and all that it had stood for, the defence and propagation of Christianity in the face of its pagan neighbours, and the preservation of Greek civilization in its arts and its intellect, of which they were now the trustees.

The first of these tasks is seen in the name used of themselves by the Byzantine population, *Rōmaïoi* 'Romans'. Long after Latin had ceased to be spoken or written in the city, the name *Rōmaïoi* survived, and its survival is attested by the use into modern times of *Romaic* to refer to spoken Greek in daily use. In the language of the Byzantines *Hellene* and *Hellenic* meant something else, referring to ancient Greek life and letters and to students of Hellenic Antiquity. Though still associated with paganism such studies were always maintained with affection, admiration, and nostalgia (cf. Runciman 1933: 16–23).

Constantine was determined to ensure the continuance of the Greek environment in Constantinople. Statues and other works of art were gathered from Greece itself for the adornment of the city, notably the partially surviving Delphic monument to the battle of Plataea.

As a bulwark of the Christian religion Constantinople sent forth missionaries among the newly arrived Slavic peoples in the Balkans. Among them the brothers Sts. Cyril and Methodius were responsible in the ninth century for the introduction of the alphabetic writing to the

Slavs, first in the Glagolitic alphabet and subsequently in the Cyrillic, which is still in use in Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, making possible the translation of the Scriptures into Slavic languages and the ultimate diffusion of the Eastern Orthodox version of Christianity through much of the Eastern Empire and beyond. Despite several waves of invading pagan Slavic tribes the Byzantine liturgy established itself in the Balkans and in Russia; at the end of the Byzantine age, in 1472, the Czar Ivan III of Russia married a Byzantine princess Sophia, niece of the last Emperor, Constantine XI. In subsequent centuries Moscow sometimes thought of itself as the "Third Rome", and Russian interest in, and patronage of, the Orthodox Church in the Balkans and in the Turkish Empire were a strong element in Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

Championship of the Church also involved the suppression of heresies within the Christian community, and led to increasing friction between the Papacy as head of the western Church and the Patriarchate as head of the Eastern Church and of the Orthodox faith. As early as 325 at the Council of Nicaea Constantine had to confront the "Arian heresy", originating in Alexandria. More damaging was the break with Rome over Church rites, the Latin and the Greek, and the Great Schism of 1054.

Much effort and thought was spent on these religious controversies; in general the Byzantines were a pious people and the only route to salvation lay for them in meticulous observance of the correct version of the faith and the correct rituals of the Church. We need not go into details here. The principal theological questions were concerned with the nature of the Trinity and the type of ritual to be used with reference to the Three Persons in Church observances. The theological issue revolved around the Second Person (Christ on earth) and his spiritual relationship with the First Person (God the Father) and the Third Person (God the Holy Spirit); proponents of diverse opinions claimed the support of selected Biblical text passages. The main source of disunity is often designated the *Filioque* [and the Son] question, whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son together, as in the western Creed "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son ...", or from the Father alone. The same question was put in different words, whether the Father and the Son were the same in substance ("being of one substance with the Father") or being of like substance. The Greek words *homooúision* 'of one substance' and *homoioúision* 'of like substance' differ graphically by the letter *iota*,

the smallest letter of the Greek alphabet, and this has added to the unthinking contempt often expressed at Byzantine theology.

This obscure but central controversy deepened the already deep cleavage between the Latin and the Greek churches and encouraged political rivalry of Rome and Constantinople as the recognized authorities in the Christian community. It finally gave occasion for the Great Schism, when Pope and Patriarch excommunicated each other. Despite conferences and delegations designed to heal the rift it ultimately proved fatal in the terminal years of the Eastern Empire.

Internal religious strife was not the only persistent danger to the Byzantine state. Population pressure from mainly Germanic tribes outside its European frontiers had been a continuing source of anxiety to the unitary Empire from the earliest days of the Principate. But in the main these tribes wanted to settle inside the Empire and enjoy the wealth and stability of it themselves. Germans were allowed to come within the bounds of the later Empire and they gave their services as territorial troops to guard what they had been given. But later incursions were more serious, with looting, disruption, and the forcible taking over of invaded territory. The sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 and their subsequent deposition of the last western Emperor were cases in point. Similar predatory pressures and invasions were faced by the Byzantines from different peoples. Calling themselves Romans they did not forget that they should be the guardians of the imperial lands as well as of its culture and civilization. This took its strongest form in Justinian's vain attempt to recreate the old unitary Empire by force of arms in his war of 534–537. Justinian was a Latin speaker and still Latin-oriented, insisting on the codification of Roman law as the basis of Byzantine law. At their most successful, Justinian's very well led armies regained control of Italy from the Goths, the North African littoral from the Vandals, and Spain from the Visigoths, while holding the Persian frontier in the east. This was a grand conception, the last effort to hold on to something like the Roman Empire at its height, though now under Christian auspices. His forces and his finances were not adequate for the task, and his heroic, if impracticable, efforts were dismissed in Fisher's orotund sentence (Fisher 1936: 136): "As for a moment we tread beside him through the corridors of the past we seem to see the shades of night battling with the blood-red sunset of Imperial Rome".

Italy and the west were gradually abandoned to others; the more immediate problems were around Greece itself and Greek Asia Minor. From the north of the Greek peninsula Slavic and other tribes invaded

hitherto imperial territory, setting up the Kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria. These were converted to Christianity by missionaries of the Eastern Church such as Cyril and Methodius, but their relations with Byzantium remained fickle and unstable.

In the east, where the earlier Empire has always had, or feared having, trouble, the renewed strength of the Persians was a threat to be met militarily or diplomatically. But more important, and not only to Byzantine territory, was the swift conquest of so much of the Near East and of North Africa by the Arabs and by the Arabic Islamic religion. In the course of the seventh century the Arabic Empire was established over Persia and the rest of Asia Minor, with the capture of the holy city of Jerusalem in 638 and a blockade of Constantinople itself in the years 673–677. Religious controversies played some part in the easy conquest of Egypt and the Near East, as many of the Christian population preferred the Islamic faith to the particular version of Christianity forced on them from Constantinople (Runciman 1933: 41).

As is so often the case, political jealousy and opportunism accompanied and partly motivated these controversies. The Bishops of Alexandria and Antioch were jealous of the Patriarch in Constantinople; Rome and Constantinople vied for primacy in the Christian world; and the period of iconoclasm in the Empire (726–843), inspired to an extent by political hostility to the power of the icon-worshipping monks soured relations with the Roman Church at a time when their aid was sorely needed. But it was the Turks, first the Seljuks and later the more terrible Osmanlis (Ottomans), who posed the greatest threat and ultimately caused the downfall of the city. Successively overrunning Persia and the Arabs they inflicted defeats on the Byzantine forces, capturing the Emperor Romanus after the battle of Manzikert (1071), rather as the Persians had captured Valerian some eight centuries earlier, and effectively gaining control over all Asia Minor. This was not the end of Turkish ambitions; the final capture of Constantinople in 1453 was the end of the Eastern Empire, but only the beginning of Turkish conquest in eastern Europe, only finally brought to a halt by the defeat of the Turkish army outside Vienna in 1683.

The capture of Jerusalem by the Arabs and then by the Turks was the ostensible cause of the wars known as the Crusades. These wars have been romantically invested with the lights of knightly Christian chivalry and valour, but their motives were, to say the least, mixed ones, and their effects on the Byzantine Empire were ultimately catastrophic (for a full account of these wars, see Runciman 1951–1954).

The First Crusade (1095–1098) allowed Alexius I (the historian, Anna Comnena's father) to recover some territory from the Turks and made possible the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. But this was at the expense of Byzantine power in the longer term; trade routes opened to the East away from Constantinople, and concessions made to participating Italian cities, such as Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, along with the military costs of the war, all resulted in the weakening of the Empire's financial and political strength. The Second and Third Crusades did little or nothing to help the Byzantine cause, and movements in the city against foreigners living and trading there made relationships between the two halves of Christianity worse, not better.

The Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) was a disaster for the Empire. Notionally aimed at the recovery of territory for the Christians, it failed, but led to the capture and the sacking of Constantinople itself by the Crusaders, led and directed by the Venetian forces, to avenge some attacks on the Venetian residents, and installing Venice in effective control of Middle Eastern trade. For more than half a century (1204–1261) Latin Emperors ruled in the city and to the anger of the priests and people the Latin rite was enforced in the churches. The Byzantine court had to flee, settling in the Bithynian town of Nicaea. Latin-ruled States were also present in parts of Greece thereafter.

Growing Greek recovery of strength and progressive weakness of the Latins allowed the retaking of the city by the Greeks in 1261, under the final Palaeologan dynasty, which endured until the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

It is true that the territory under control by the Eastern Empire had been reduced just before the fall in 1453 to a small area round the city. But this is not to say that Byzantine history is one of continuous decline. In wealth it remained one of the leading countries in the European world, and its general level of culture and education was well above other cities in the early Middle Ages, notwithstanding the fact that these later produced individual thinkers of greater originality and distinction than had appeared in Byzantium.

Politically Justinian's dream of a reunited Roman Empire was doomed from the start, but his long reign saw the architectural embellishment of the city and the massive codification of the laws. After considerable losses of land in the seventh and eighth centuries, in the ninth and tenth, having recovered from the iconoclastic years, the Empire "reached the zenith of its mediaeval glory" (Runciman 1933: 46). For a brief period after 1261 the Byzantine Emperors sought diplomatic agreements with the Turks





and military and political help from the Latin church. At the Council of Florence in 1439 a union of the Eastern and Western churches was agreed, but only to be firmly rejected by the Byzantine populace itself. Such western military aid as the West could provide ended in defeat at the Battle of Varna at the hands of the Turks.

The Empire ended in 1453, the last Emperor, Constantine XI, meeting his death and an unknown resting place fighting on the walls of the beleaguered city that his namesake had refounded and renamed more than a thousand years before. The last hours of the imperial capital have been eloquently and tragically recorded by Edward Gibbon. The semi-independent imperial state of Trebizond held out until 1461. After the fall of Constantinople and the absolute end of the old Roman Empire, the New World was discovered less than half a century later in 1492, and by general consent today Modern Europe and Modern history began. The Roman state lasted for seven and a half centuries according to the conventional chronology, since its foundation by Romulus; the Roman Principate founded by Augustus lasted five hundred years up to the deposition of Romulus Augustulus; the Byzantine Empire endured for more than a millennium between the first and the eleventh Constantine.

Despite the political and military decline in the last two centuries of its existence, these last two centuries of the Empire saw a flourishing of science and literature, and have been described as the "Last Byzantine Renaissance" (Runciman 1970a). It may be noted here that Maximus Planudes, probably the most original writer on grammatical subjects (chapter 11) was a person of this age, also prominent in politics, diplomacy, and Church affairs. But he is not the only linguistic scholar who also played a part in public life: in the tenth century Photius, who as Patriarch of Constantinople (857–886) came into damaging controversy with Pope Nicholas I, was a major Greek lexicographer and literary critic and did much to preserve and copy classical manuscripts. Photius was philosophically an Aristotelian; in the next century Psellus was a Platonist, and he too served the state in civil capacity and has been criticized for excessive political ambition. Among other topics he wrote on grammar, alternating monastic seclusion with high academic responsibilities. In the final century of the Empire Byzantine grammarians were those principally responsible for carrying in person and in writing Greek grammatical and literary studies to early Renaissance Italy, and among them Chrysoloras (cf. 236) was involved in strenuous negotiations over the never achieved union of the two Churches.

In the context of a book such as this it is the third self-imposed task of the Byzantines, the preservation of classical Hellenic culture, that most concerns us; grammatical study and teaching were a vital part of that culture. The *Rōmaïoi* did not regard themselves politically as Hellenes, but all the time as guardians and cultivators of the Hellenic language and its literature. From their writings we may reconstruct their attitude towards their Roman and Hellenic past. Chrysoloras the fourteenth century grammarian, compared the splendours of the Old and the New Rome, each enhancing the others, and both worthy of mutual support (cf. 237). But old mainland Greece was a cause for lament. It is not a reproach but a statement of cultural fact that Byzantium embodied a past-classical vision of itself. The best had been; Greece and especially Athens had cradled the unique civilization which they, the inheritors, did their best to preserve and interpret. Plato, Thucydides, Aristotle, and above all Homer were the masters whose original standards could neither be equalled nor surpassed; commentary, explication, summaries, and resources for teaching, grammars and dictionaries, were their responsibility now. At different periods Byzantines who had visited and dwelt in Attica reported on the fallen state of their once supreme city of light and learning.

In his Funeral Oration, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, in the words put into his mouth by Thucydides, Pericles declared that Athens was the educational centre of Greece (*tên pásan pólin tês Helládos paideusin*, Thucydides 2.41) and worthy of its citizens' passionate love (*erastás gignomévous autês*, 2.43). A very different and a sadder picture presented itself to Byzantine visitors. Synesius (c. 400) wrote to his brother (Hercher 1873: 722): *oudèn échousin hai nÿn Athênai all'è tà kleinà tôn chōriōn onómata ... hai dè Athênai pálai mèn ên hē pólis hestia sophōn, tò dè nÿn échon semnÿnousin autà hoi melittourgoi* [Athens today has nothing holy about it except the famous names of its places ... the city of Athens was once the home of learned men, as things are now only the beekeepers hallow its land]. In the eleventh century Psellus wrote (Sathas 1876: 5.472): *kakeïse gár en skiaïis hē Akadēmia kai hē poikilē tou Chrysippou Stóa kai tò Lukeïon méchris onómatos, hoútō gár kamoï, tà mèn onómata tôn epistēmōn emmeménēke, kai tò tês philosophías exaireton, tà dè eph'hoïs taúta hai peristáseis apheílonto* [There too in the shadows lie the Academy, the decorated colonnade of Chrysippus, and the Lyceum, known by name only, and in this way for me also the names of the sciences have remained along with the special place of philosophy, but the necessary conditions, the support on which these rest, have been

taken away]. After that we have a long letter from Michael Acominatus, Archbishop of the city, comparing his lot with that of people living in Constantinople (Lampros 1880: 2.44):

τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, βεβαρβάρωμαι χρόνιος ὢν ἐν Ἀθήναις, καὶ, τὸ σχετλιώτερον, ἐπελήσθην ὡσεὶ νεκρὸς καὶ ἐπιέλησμαι. Κατέβην γὰρ εἰς τὴν κατωτάτην ταύτην ἐσχατιάν, ἧς οἱ μογλοὶ κάτοχοι αἰώνιοι.

...  
τί χρεῶν πάσχειν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀπάσης σοφίας ὑπερορίους καὶ παρ' οἷς βάρβαρος μόνον ὄχλος καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπωσάμενος καὶ οἱ πάλαι ἀττικισταὶ νῦν βαρβαρισταὶ, ὡς μόλις τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐνιαυτῶν τῆς διαλέκτου σύνεσιν μελετῆσαι ἄνευ τῶν ἐπιπερισωζομένων ἀδιαφθόρων ὀνομάτων, τοῦ Πειραιέως, τοῦ Ὑμηττοῦ, τοῦ Ἀρείου Πάγου.

[Truth to tell, I have become barbarized dwelling so long in Athens, and what is worse, I am forgotten as if I were dead, and I am forgetful myself. I went down to the deepest extremity, whose imprisoning bars are eternal. ... Why should we suffer those who are beyond the scope of all learning and among whom there is but a barbaric mob, alienated from all philosophy, and where former speakers of Attic Greek are now barbarized in their speech? In the past three years one has scarcely understood their dialect, except for names which survive uncorrupted, like *Peiraeus*, *Hymettus*, the *Areopagus* ...].

One notices how these writers almost cling in despair to the old names of the old city, alone surviving its ruination. More generally, we have of the fourteenth century Theodore Metochites (Müller–Kiessling 1821: 13–18) making his prefatory declaration that everything worthwhile has been said already.

These lamentations were not in vain. Greek literature and the Greek culture of which it formed so great a part were preserved, albeit in reduced volume (partly through the depredations of the men of the Fourth Crusade). Greek could revive in the Renaissance because its study and teaching had never ceased. The grammarians whose work we shall examine in this book surely had their limitations, partly self-imposed, their inaccuracies (who has not?), and their occasional pedantries. But they achieved their ultimate purpose, in and after the epoch through which they lived and taught.

## Chapter 2

### The Byzantine oeuvre: the literary context

No body of specialist literature can be written or appreciated without reference to the general context of political, social, and intellectual conditions and circumstances in which the individual works were composed. This is true of grammatical writings as it is of any others, and the close connection sometimes drawn in the present century between theories of grammatical structure and theories of political morality are a case in point (cf. Chomsky 1976: 124–134).

Byzantine grammar books and their authors are no exception. Grammar in the traditional sense of morphology and syntax must be a part of more general linguistic and literary studies of its time and place. This chapter is intended to locate the works of the writers to be described and discussed in the general and overall setting of Byzantine literature. For a more comprehensive survey of the literary output of the Byzantines the reader is referred to such works as Runciman (1933: chapter 10), Marshall (1948), and above all the classic work of Krumbacher (1897). In its totality the amount of Byzantine literature is immense; by no means all of it survives, and of what does survive much remains unedited, unpublished, and therefore little known.

Four main periods in the literature of Byzantium have been identified (Marshall 1948: 220–225), though, naturally, without mutual exclusiveness or sharp divisions: the first is said to comprise the fourth to the seventh centuries, embodying the close of post-classical and traditional pagan writing and the rise of Patristic theological and ecclesiastical works, which was to play so large a part in Byzantine literature as a whole. The second period is made to coincide with the two centuries between 650 and 850, when the Empire faced the external threats of Arabs in the south and of Slavic tribes in the north and the internal strife between the iconoclasts and the icon worshippers, and when few notable literary innovations are observed. The third period began when in the later ninth century more favourable circumstances encouraged the revival of the classical heritage. Classical Greek, officially supported by the Church, the Court, the Emperors, and the University of Constantinople, was more intensively studied, learned, and used, although by this time it was becoming more and more a second language taught in school. After the

calamitous break between 1204 and 1261 the reestablished Byzantine Empire back in its own capital city saw the fourth and final phase, part of the "Last Byzantine Renaissance", which included a continued study of classical literature such as was later to make such a great contribution to western Renaissance Greek studies (cf. Wilson 1983).

The literature of Byzantium was, naturally, divided between prose and poetry of various kinds, but it was also increasingly divided between the language of classical Greek and its derivative *koiné* (*diálektos*) [common or standard dialect], well represented in the Greek *New Testament*, and the more colloquial Greek *Umgangssprache*, the first language of most Greek speakers and the only language of the less educated. This was characterized by many loanwords from neighbouring languages and by deviations from the recognized grammatical rectitude of the language of school and university use and of the higher literature. In particular, the case government of some prepositions and verbs was different, for example *eis* '[classical] into' used of place-at, and *apó* 'from' constructed with the accusative, as it is in Modern Greek. This was something to which the grammarians paid much attention.

The most noticeable contrast, however, was in phonology, the gradual supersession of the classical pitch accentuation of words, graphically shown by the accent marks, in favour of a stress accentuation, such as also prevails in Modern Greek, where the different written accents mark the stressed syllable without further phonetic differentiation. This accent change was roughly contemporary with the loss of phonologically distinctive length in spoken vowels, *omikrón* (ο) and *óméga* (ω), etc., the two letters being just graphically distinct in spelling, as in Modern Greek (cf. Allen 1974: 89).

Compositions along the lines of classical Greek prosody, based on quantitative distinctions continued during the Byzantine age; this is seen in a short poem by Cometas, a Homeric scholar and minor poet, probably about 900 (*Anthologia Palatina* 9.586):

- α. Εἰπέ νομεῦ, τίνος εἰσὶ φυτῶν στίχες; β. Αἱ μὲν  
ἐλαῖαι,  
Παλλάδος· αἱ δὲ περὶξ ἡμερίδες, Βρομίου.  
α. Καὶ τίνος οἱ στάχτες; β. Δημήτερος. α. Ἄνθεα  
ποιῶν  
εἰσὶ θεῶν; β. Ἥρης καὶ ῥοδέης Παφίης.  
α. Πάν φίλε, πηκτίδα μίμνε τσοῖς ἐπὶ χεῖλεσι σύρων·  
Ἦχῶ γὰρ δῆεις τοῖσδ' ἐνὶ θειλοπέδοις.

[Say, shepherd, whose are the rows of trees? These are olives, and belong to Pallas (Athene); those growing around are vines and belong to Bromius (Dionysus). And whose are the ears of corn? Demeter's. To which gods belong the flowers? To Hera and to Aphrodite of Paphos, fair as a rose. Dear Pan, stay with us playing on your pipe; in these sunny places you will find Echo.]

There is an elegant verse translation in the final poem of the *Oxford book of Greek verse in translation* (706). This little poem is written in classical elegiacs in a faultless literary dialect. Its content accords well with the feelings of sad nostalgia for the classical past age, referred to in the preceding chapter. But such compositions may by this time have begun to represent graceful exercises in a learned literary language, not unlike the elegant "verses" of later European scholars and literati.

Much of the poetry written in Byzantine times was affected by the contemporary stress accentuation, even when traditional quantitative metres were used. This has been recognized as early as the fifth century in the forms of the hexameters of Nonnus's *Dionysiaca*, one of the last Greek pagan epic poems, on the life and adventures of Dionysus (Allen 1974: 119–120).

From the earliest years of Christianity hymns had been a prominent feature of church worship. At first these were formed in the classical quantitative metres, but later the accentual changes gave rise to different metrical structures, more close to everyday spoken usages and based on the alternation of stressed and unstressed syllables. Ultimately a line of fifteen syllables became standard, under the title of *stíchoi politikoi* [popular verse line]. This metrical system was regularly used for hymns and other religious verse writing, and is seen in the work of Romanus (sixth century), regarded as a master of hymnography. An example of a hymn by Romanus is seen in Krumbacher (1897: 694); opening with two lines of fifteen syllables, it follows with three similar lines of differing lengths:

Ἡ παρθένος σήμερον τὸν ὑπερούσιον τίκτει  
Καὶ ἡ γῆ τὸ σπήλαιον τῷ ἀπροσίτῳ προσάγει  
Ἄγγελοι μετὰ ποιμένων δοξολογοῦσιν  
Μάγοι δὲ μετὰ ἀστέρος ὁδοιποροῦσιν  
Δι' ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἐγεννήθη παιδίον νέον ὁ πρὸ αἰῶνων θεός.

[Today the Virgin gives birth to the supersubstantial Child;  
and the earth provides the cave for the inaccessible place;  
angels sing praises with the shepherds;

the Magi make their way with the guidance of a star;  
for the God of Ages has been born as a young child for our sake.]

*Stichoi politikoí* were also used as teaching aids for ready memorizing, and some examples of this device used by grammarians are seen in certain *schédē* [lessons] (see pp. 145–146). Such use of versification in teaching is matched in the West by the verse Latin grammar of Alexander Villadei (c. 1200).

While the prosodic basis of these lines was quite different from that of classical quantitative verses, some Byzantine scholars attributed their origin to the trochaic and iambic lines of the classical dramatic poets, as does Maximus Planudes (Bachmann 1828: 99–100); but Planudes complains that the classical authors kept to the quantitative metres, whereas current writers of fifteen-syllable verses attended to the (stress) accents alone (from the *Dialogue on grammar*):

τοῖς εἰς τὸ πολιτικὸν ἄρτι μετανιστάσιν ὄνομα στίχοις καὶ Τραγικοί πάντες καὶ ὁ Κωμικός ἔστιν οὐδ' χρησάμενοι φαίνονται οὐκ ἀμέτρως μέντοι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τροχαίοις ποιήσαντες ὁ δὲ Κωμικός καὶ ἰάμβοις· ἑκάτεροι μέντοι τετράμετρον καταληκτικόν. αὐτοῖς ὄρον ἐστήσαντο ... ἡρέμα δὲ καὶ κατολίγον, ὕστερον — πρὸς γὰρ τὰ χεῖρω καὶ εὐχερῆ πάντες εὐολισθότεροι — καὶ τὸ μέτρον ὡς πορρωτάτω ἐξετόξευσαν, ὡς μὴδ' ἴχνος αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῖς στίχοις ἐμφαίνεσθαι, μόνου δὲ τοῦ εἰρμοῦ τῶν τόνων ἀντεποιήσαντο καὶ νῦν οὐδὲν ἀποδεῖν δοκοῦσι σώματος ἐρήμου ψυχῆς — ψυχὴ γὰρ στίχου τὸ μέτρον.

[Verse forms that have lately changed their name to “popular” are also seen to have been used by the Tragedians and by the Comedian (Aristophanes), but not without regard to metre, the tragedians using trochaics and the Comedian also using iambs; but each of them set for themselves a catalectic tetrameter (i. e. four double feet with the final syllable omitted) ... But later, since everyone more readily slips into what is inferior and easy to manage, poets quietly shot meter away little by little as far as they could, so that not a trace of it even appears in their lines, and cared only about the sequence of the (stress) accents. Now their poems seem just like body bereft of soul, for metre is the soul of a verse line.]<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Examples of such verses by the classical authors referred to are: (trochaic) *ὁ βαθυζώνων ἀνασσα Περσίδων ὑπερτάτη* (Aeschylus, *Persae* 155). ‘O most high Empress of the deep-girded Persian women’, and (iambic) *mimouámenos kai toin podoin hōdi parensaleiōn* (Aristophanes, *Plutus* 291) ‘Imitating him and swinging to and fro on my two feet like this’.

As would be expected, prose literature of different types serving different purposes was published throughout the Byzantine Age. It was soon entirely Greek literature, at different stylistic levels of the language. But in the first period Byzantine works of the highest social and historical importance were written in Latin. In its early days and by the wish of the Latin-speaking Constantine Constantinople was the New Rome, with Roman governmental institutions, and Latin was the language of the highest ranks in Church and state. Priscian’s Latin grammar (chapter 5), written about 500, set out all that was accepted for the grammatical description and teaching of Latin as the result of Greco-Latin work extending over nearly one thousand years from its beginning. Priscian was writing for teachers and students of classical Latin who were largely native speakers of Greek, but needed to know and use Latin for social and professional advancement. It was a doomed cause; by the eighth century Latin was all but extinct as a living language in Byzantium.

Priscian is an interesting example of a writer whose intended purpose was soon no longer relevant to the society for whom he wrote, but who became of enormous significance and value in places and in ways quite unforeseen by him. For those Byzantine Greek scholars who could still read Latin, his grammar, along with the many Greek books of the Alexandrian grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus and the brief phonetic and morphological booklet known as the *Téchnē grammatiké* ‘the Science of grammar’ (chapter 4), remained a major teaching resource, being based so largely on the Greek model of Apollonius. But when it became widely known in the West during the Carolingian age (Law 1982: 21), its reputation was immense as the one full-scale authoritative Latin grammar, on which all later grammars were based. Moreover in the later Middle Ages (c. 1100–1400), especially in France, it embodied the data base on which was erected the whole edifice of philosophical (“speculative”, “modistic”) grammar, giving birth to the theory of universal grammar, which has excited the minds of linguists ever since (cf. Bursill-Hall 1971: 35). But Priscian just opens his book with a reference to the “philosophical” (or perhaps “scientific”) theory of articulate speech (Keil 1855: 5.1) and thereafter ignores all philosophical speculation. Such are the ironies of history.

Priscian’s Latin grammar was not the only major Byzantine work written in Latin. In 534 one of the last Latin-speaking Eastern Emperors, Justinian, thoroughly Roman in outlook, has his famous *Corpus iuris*, [Totality of Roman law] formally approved and published in Latin, but later additions, the *Novellae*, were issued in Greek, and soon a Greek

translation of the entire work was necessary. It remained the basis of the law throughout the Byzantine Age.

Church, state, and literature were more closely connected in Byzantium than they were in the western world after the disappearance of the western Roman Empire. For example, Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople 858–867 and 878–886, served as an envoy to the Caliph of Bagdad, engaged in political and theological controversy with the Pope, completed *inter alia* his *Bibliotheca*, comprising reviews and critical comments on the vast array of classical authors discussed in his classes, and a lexicon of classical Greek vocabulary, and became famous for the lectures he gave on Aristotelian philosophy. He was by no means unique as a writer, a churchman, and a servant of the state. Religious disputes such as that between the Iconoclasts and the Icon-worshippers were of political importance, as was the containment of heresies, and people in what today's jargon would call "the Establishment" usually moved easily between the teacher's chair, central and local administration, Church office, and the seclusion of the monastery. Monastic communities of "solitaries", *monachoi* [monks], had greatly increased in numbers, forming an important part of Church life.

Several grammatical authors who will be mentioned in later chapters themselves engaged in political affairs and in ecclesiastic debate, notably Maximus Planudes (chapter 11). As might be expected in a state in which the Church played so prominent a role and for many people piety was their most important consideration, the greatest body of writing was concerned with religion. There were many Biblical commentaries, and among religious writings those on the problems of Christology, the nature of Christ, and the status of the Trinity were of great significance, becoming separated from and ultimately hostile to the works of the Latin Fathers of the Church. Along with such doctrinal works went books on the lives of the Saints, written in a more popular style of Greek and very much read by the general public.

Classical philosophical work continued mostly in the form of commentaries on the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. Despite the closure of the pagan schools of philosophy in Athens by Justinian in 529, philosophy was studied and taught in Constantinople during the following centuries. Among the better known philosophical writers are the Aristotelian commentator Simplicius (sixth century), Ammonius (also sixth century) and his pupils, and Stephanus (seventh century). Platonism and its mystical derivative Neoplatonism had a ready appeal to the Byzantine Church. Proclus expounded Neoplatonism in the fifth century, and in the

eleventh century Psellus formed part of the revival of Platonism itself. At the end of the Age George Gemistus Pletho (c. 1356–1450), rejecting Aristotle and renouncing Christianity, though still championing the Greek cause at the Council of Florence in 1439, expounded Platonism and Neoplatonism to delighted audiences in Italy, and dreamed of establishing, on the lines of his hero Plato, an ideal commonwealth in the Peloponnese.

Byzantine prose literature includes histories of the Empire, written during and about different periods all through the Age (for a full account see Krumbacher 1897: chapter 2). In the first years of the Eastern Empire historians, of whom Zosimus (fifth century) is typical, continued writing the history of the Roman Empire as a whole. Later and especially after Justinian's reign historians focussed their attention on the Byzantine Empire, writing from a specifically Christian viewpoint. In the sixth century Procopius recounted Justinian's western wars; and others, like Malalas (sixth century), wrote histories from the Creation until their own time, in the manner of certain western Christian historians. Typical historians of the subsequent centuries were Theophanes, writing in a more popular style in the eighth century on events in the sixth, and Leo Diaconus (born c. 950), writing on the tenth century. The eleventh century polymath Psellus, serving as Professor of Philosophy, Law, and Philology in Constantinople, a political leader and then a monk, included among his extensive writings a history of his own lifetime, as well as work on the Greek language. At the end of the Age Laonicus Chalcondyles, brother of the grammarian Demetrius (see pp. 236–237) wrote an account of the later period of Byzantine history with particular reference to the rise of Turkish power. Like some other historians he recounted the final defeat of the Eastern Empire as a momentous event in world history.

History and biography have no sharp dividing line, and Anna Comnena's *Alexiad*, her encomium on her father Alexius I's reign (1081–1118), which includes an account of the First Crusade, written in nearly faultless Attic Greek (but see Dawkins 1948: 257), is a welcome example of a lady historian's work, and her personal and feminine thoughts and feelings make an agreeable contrast to the austere masculinity of the classical Thucydides.

Apart from historical and ecclesiastical works, the two not being wholly differentiated, Byzantine scholars have left us books in several specialist fields or *Fachwissenschaften*, and we know of geographers, writers on law, on medicine, on the natural sciences, military affairs, and mathematics. In geography a merchant and traveller of the sixth century,



Cosmas Indicopleustes wrote an extensive account of Eastern lands on the authority of what he had read about or personally visited. In this *Christian topography* he also discussed theological questions and sought to prove that the earth was flat. It has been translated into English (McCrindle 1897), and as Marshall (1948: 240) nicely puts it, "if one has learned the art of "skipping", it is well worth reading".

In matters of law Justinian's codification, first set down in Latin, was followed, and later writings were largely amendments and commentaries of the *Corpus iuris*, written in Greek.

In the same and typical Byzantine manner the teaching of medicine and writings thereon followed the lines of the earlier Hippocrates (c. 400 B.C.) and Galen (second century A.D.). Several medical works are known, among them *Perì energeiôn kai pathôn tou psychikou pneûmatos* [On the actions and diseases of the living spirit], by John Actuarius, in fact a treatise on the functions and the disorders of the human body in general, with their remedies (Hercher 1841: 312–386). Among his other writings Maximus Planudes was also responsible for a brief medical treatise (Hercher 1842: 318–322).

We know of a number of writings on science in general, within which mineralogy and chemistry sailed close to alchemy. No less a man than Psellus wrote a letter *Perì chrysopoïias* [On the making of gold], and the geographer Cosmas wrote a tract *Hermêneia tês epistêmês tês chrysopoïias* [Explanation of the science of making gold].

Several books on military and strategic matters are known or known of, but Krumbacher's judgment (1897: 635) is fair that, considering the successes of Byzantine arms during much of its troubled history, it is remarkable that no service textbooks are found of comparable excellence.

Mathematical work blossomed late in Byzantine scientific literature, apart from some commentaries on Euclid and the mathematical aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Much of the later Byzantine mathematical learning was the consequence of intellectual contacts with the Arabs and Persians and through them the Indians, from whom we know that the "Arabic" numerals, incorporating the number 0 for arithmetical calculation were derived. Among Greek mathematical works was an account by Maximus Planudes on this numerical system, *Psêphophoria kat'Indoûs hê legomênê megâlê* 'The so-called great method of counting according to the Indians' (Gerhardt 1865). It begins:

οἱ τῶν ἀστρονόμων φιλοσοφώτεροι, ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου γνῶσις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφευρον σχήματά τινα

καὶ μέθοδον δι' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἂν τὰ τῶν ἐν χρήσει ἀριθμῶν εὐσυννοπτότερον τε κατανοῆται καὶ ἀκριβέστερον. εἰσὶ δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἑννέα μόνα ..., τιθέασι δὲ καὶ ἕτερον τι σχῆμα ὃ καλοῦσι Τζίφραν, κατ' Ἰνδοῦς σημαῖνον οὐδέν.

[Because number can increase without limit but there is no way of knowing infinity, the more scientific of the astronomers have devised some symbols and a means of using them, so that, as it were, what is involved in the way we use numbers may be understood more easily and with greater accuracy. There are just nine figures ..., but they add another one, which they call zero; according to the Indians it means "nothing".]

There follow examples of the use of these figures and of the arithmetical operations, addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division performed with them.

One of Maximus Planudes's pupils, the fourteenth century grammarian Moschopoulos (p. 143) wrote a treatise on the "magic squares" (Tannéry 1886: 88–118). This gives an illustration of how the new number figures could be arithmetically manipulated in ways inconceivable with the traditional Greek and Latin numeral symbols. Moschopoulos explains the arrangement of the nine "Arabic" numerals into "magic squares", *áarithmoi tetrágōnoi* [squared numbers], whereby all the lines and the diagonals add up to the same total. The simplest example uses each figure once, with the sum of fifteen from each line:

4	9	2
3	5	7
8	1	6

Contact of this sort between Byzantium and the eastern peoples were not confined to the sciences. A famous and much read "novel", *Barlaam and Iosaphat*, of Buddhist origin, was made to describe the conversion of a very wealthy young prince to Christianity and the performance of good works. The story is written in a popular Greek style and has been traditionally assigned to John of Damascus (eighth century), a champion of the place of icon worship during the iconoclastic strife. It has been much appreciated in general literature and is available in Greek and English in the *Loeb Classical Library* (Woodward–Mattingley 1914).

In their major and laudable preoccupation with the preservation of their classical Greek inheritance the Byzantines produced ancillary literature of all kinds for this purpose, and it may be noted that, although

classical literature was pagan literature and therefore to some eyes less desirable than Christian writing, there was not the rather sharp conflict between the two genres such as distressed Augustine in the West so much between the claims of Christianity and Cicero. As well as poems in the classical style such as we have seen above (p. 12) we have also from Cometas a poem on the raising of Lazarus (*Anthologia Palatina* 15.40). There is also the long poem of uncertain date and authorship, the *Christus patiens*, telling the story of the Passion in iambic verse on the model of Euripides, as the author says (Brambs 1885: 25), and composed mainly by lines taken from Euripides's tragedies with a few from Aeschylus and the Bible; the Biblical lines are altered for metrification, and liberties are taken with some of the tragedians' lines to suit the purpose of the story.

The Byzantine grammars were a part of the service that Byzantine scholars felt bound to give for the preservation of the classical Greek language. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the contrast they saw between the Greece of the classical age and its contemporary sad state moved them greatly; they felt themselves to be the guardians, and the only guardians of what had been. In his book on the grammarians of later antiquity (Kaster 1988) the author entitles his work *Guardians of language*; though he is mainly concerned with western grammars of Latin, much of what he says in chapters 1 to 6 would be equally applicable to the Byzantine context.

In this context we may finally survey Byzantine literary scholarship in general, within which their grammar books played a vital role. We are concerned with books about books and books in the service of reading and appreciating books. This is philology in its widest sense, and Krumbacher (1897: 449) observes that, theology apart, about half the total Byzantine *oeuvre*, some of it still unedited and unpublished, was directed towards one or the other aspect of philology. Much of it was intended to throw light on past authors and their texts, and much of this is of the greatest value today; several Byzantine literary scholars, for example the lexicographers Hesychius of Alexandria (probably fifth century), Hesychius of Miletus (sixth century), and Suidas (tenth century), are familiar names to classical scholars of our own time.

Apart from the grammarians the most prominent and important writers among the Byzantine philologists are the lexicographers. Lexicography had had a long history in the Greek world. In its beginnings it was concerned with glossing archaic, dialectal, and purely literary words, or with words being used in senses other than their everyday meanings. Such work lay within the compass of the broad coverage of *grammatikḗ*

'grammar', as it is set out in the first section of the *Téchnē*, a section certainly part of the genuine work of Dionysius Thrax (chapter 4; cf. pp. 42–44). One part of the grammarian's subject, according to the extended definition given, was *glōssōn te kai historiōn prócheiros apódosis* 'the provision of notes on particular words and on the subject matter'. This was the beginning of unilingual explicatory dictionaries, of more interest and importance for scholarship than the later very practical Greek-Latin and Latin-Greek lexicons of the years of the unitary Roman Empire. Among purely Greek lexicographic works the distinction between the dictionary entry and the encyclopaedic entry was not drawn as sharply as we like to think it is drawn today. Dionysius's original prescription is not restrictive in this regard. The two Hesychii and Suidas certainly contain short encyclopaedic forms of explanation.

A dictionary more closely resembling a modern lexicographic book is seen in the *Etymologikōn méga* [Great etymological dictionary], compiled between 1100 and 1250, one among several similar compilations. These dictionaries are truly etymological, but etymological in the sense in which etymology was understood in Antiquity and presumably in the sense that Dionysius had in mind, the attempted explication of word meanings by reference to a synchronic examination of their component parts (not unlike morphemes in today's parlance). Words were "unfolded" and their forms and meanings derived from simpler and presumably prior words compressed into a single word (cf. the definition given by a commentator on the *Téchnē* (Hilgard 1903: 14.23–24): "etymology is the unfolding of words, by which their true meaning may be made clear"; cf. p. 47, where the Greek text is given). It is as if all etymology was concerned with the sort of new formations in English today like *breathalyze*, 'analyze the breath (for the detection of alcohol)', or *permafrost*, where frost is a permanent climatic condition.

Plato (*Cratylus* 399 C) had written:

σημαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὄρα οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἐώρακεν – τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὄπωπε – καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται τοῦτο ὁ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὄρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε.

[This word *ánthrōpos* 'man' means that all other living creatures neither examine, nor consider, nor closely observe (*anathreí*) anything of what they see, but man at one and the same time sees – that is *ópōpe* 'looks' – and closely observes and thinks about what

he has seen. Therefore alone among living creatures man is rightly called 'man', *anathrōn hā ópōpe* 'closely observing what he has seen'.]

This was one example of classical etymology; it is duly repeated among other possible etymologies in the *Etymologikōn mégā* (Krumbacher 1897: 574):

Ἄνθρωπος. Παρὰ τὸ ἄνω θρεῖν ἤγουν ἄνω βλέπειν ὁ μόνος γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνω βλέπει. Ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀναθρεῖν ἢ ὀπωπεν, ἤγουν ἀναλογίζεσθαι ἢ εἶδε καὶ ἤκουσε.

[*Ánthrōpos*. From gazing aloft, i. e. looking up at (*ánō blépein*), for alone among other creatures man looks up at things (*ánō blépei*); or from closely observing what he has seen, that is considering what he sees and hears (*anathreîn hā ópōpen*).]

Some such etymologies are incorporated into *schédē* 'lessons' (cf. p. 194).

In their explication and interpretation of the classical texts very many commentaries were made, rather in the form of notes, some quite lengthy, on successive passages of authors selected for comments of various kinds. These comments were called *scholia* 'little lectures', and their writers were called scholiasts. In grammar the *Téchnē* was subject to a great array of such scholia at different periods and by different hands, enormously exceeding the size of the size of the little book itself. One may also take note of the size of Choeroboscus's commentary on Theodosius's *Kanónes* [Rules for the formation of nouns and verbs]. Against Theodosius's 97 pages in modern print, he takes up 269 pages (Hilgard 1889–1894).

Outside the field of grammar itself scholia were written on such authors as Pindar, the Tragedians, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, and above all on the Homeric poems, the correction of whose texts, begun in Antiquity, was still a source of lively concern. Eustathius was a leading Homeric commentator in the twelfth century. Tzetzes, also of the twelfth century, wrote a long didactic commentary in fifteen-syllable *stichoi politikoí* on a number of authors from Homer to Quintus Smyrnaeus (probably fourth century A. D.), as well as scholia on Hesiod, Aristophanes, and others. Ammonius's (sixth century) and Stephanus's (seventh century) commentaries on Aristotle are well known.

Several Byzantine scholars, including some of the grammarians, were, as we have seen, polymaths, writing on various subjects. They were aware not just of the importance of classical Greek literature but of the amount

of it that they possessed. The corpus available to them was much in excess of what we have today, mainly through the depredations and destruction wrought first by the Fourth Crusaders and then by the Turks after their capture of Constantinople.

For the aid and encouragement of students and to satisfy the needs of the general reading public, chrestomathies and anthologies, collections of selected passages from prose writers and poets, a genre not unknown in classical times also, were produced in considerable numbers. Chrestomathies ("readers") in the Byzantine Age were compiled by Proclus, whose identification is controversial, and by Sopater of Apamea (Sandys 1958: I, 379–380), but the only chrestomathy surviving today is a fifth-century work by Stobaeus.

Closely allied to such works were the anthologies, which were a particularly welcome Byzantine literary production. Typically they comprised collections of short passages of verse, something like modern books of collected poetry, of which in English perhaps Palsgrave's *Golden treasury* is the most famous example. Greek anthologies contain verses on all subjects, personal, memorial, political, humorous, and tragic. Their origin lies in classical Greece; Meleager of Gadara (c. 30 B.C.), himself a poet, is known to have compiled one, entitled *Stéphanos* [A garland]. It was the basis of the collection made by Constantinus Cephalas (tenth century), the so-called 'Palatine Anthology' (*Anthologia Palatina*). The grammarian Maximus Planudes abridged this but added further poems, his collection being known as the *Anthologia Planudea* (cf. Wilson 1983: 240); it is possibly the best known piece of work by him in general classical circles. With some more additions Planudes's work is the basis of the 'Greek anthology' (*Anthologia Graeca*). The famous epitaph on the Spartan dead at Theromopylae: *ô xeîn' angéllein Lakedaimoniois hóti tēide | Keímetha toís keinōn rhēmasi peithómēnoi* [Tell them in Lacedaemon, passer by, that here obedient to their word we lie], and the poem quoted above from Cometas come from these anthologies, as do the more bitter, satirical epigrams of Palladas (c. 400). One of these makes fun of grammarians, playing on the double meaning of *génos* 'gender, sex': *grammatikou̇ thygátēr éteken philótēiti migeísa | paidíon arsenikón, thēlykón, oudéteron*, delicately translated by Marris (*Oxford book of Greek verse in translation*) 'The dominie's daughter eloped with a suitor, and the baby was masculine, feminine, neuter'.

It would certainly not be argued that Byzantine literature was the equal of the literature of classical Greece. It was derivative in form and content; only the Christian controversial exchanges introduced an element



of novelty. Ammonius was not Aristotle, nor was Pletho another Plato. But this does not invalidate the claim that Byzantine literature does deserve recognition and study. It was the literature of an enduring though backward-looking civilization, which played an incomparable part in the preservation and transmission of the culture of Antiquity. Byzantine scholars copied, annotated, and kept in being, so far as their western and eastern antagonists allowed, the texts which form the greatest part of our classical Greek literature and the Greek part of classical syllabuses in modern universities (on Byzantine scholarship as a whole see Wilson 1983, though he makes little direct reference to grammar itself). This work did not take place in a political or cultural vacuum, and these two first chapters are intended to supply a background and a context for the appreciation of the Byzantine grammarians, which is offered in the chapters that follow.

## Chapter 3

### Byzantine Grammar: the linguistic context

The Byzantines took over responsibility for grammatical studies from the Ancient World, and this cannot be overemphasized. How far they developed original ideas and original methods and ideas in the description and teaching of grammar is a matter of controversy. Some would deny originality in their grammatical thinking and say that it is futile to look for any instances of it (cf. Pauly – Wissowa 1916: 1749; and chapter 11, p. 225), but others see some distinct and important developments in grammatical theory among some of them, as in the theory of verbal tense and of nominal case in the writings of Maximus Planudes (chapter 11). Essentially they did not consider their task primarily as pioneer research work. This was in marked contrast to the classical civilization of Greece, where the whole of intellectual life had followed the preaching of Socrates that one must follow wherever the argument leads, however surprising or embarrassing, privately or publicly, the answer might turn out to be. Bloomfield puts this well (1935: 13): “The Ancient Greeks had the gift of wondering at things that other people take for granted”.

The Byzantines were the inheritors, and after 476 the defenders and champions of this inheritance of the once unitary Roman imperial system. This has been in their general literary culture in the preceding chapter, commenting on and attempting to clarify what had been written by the classical authors, and preparing study and research aids in the form of dictionaries, epitomies, textual studies, and the like. This was a main feature of Byzantine writing; only perhaps in ecclesiastic debate were any marked divergences expressed from their classical forebears.

In their grammatical work the grammarians continued the task originally taken up after the Macedonian conquests, the Hellenization of the eastern world in so far as it fell under their control and influence. Confident in the great value of Greek civilization, the Greek language, and the classical literature of Greece, especially of Homer, they produced large numbers of grammatical textbooks of different kinds to serve the needs of different pupils. The Byzantine grammarians were first and foremost teachers; their researches and enquiries were always oriented towards teaching and the requirements of teachers, but it does not necessarily follow (as in Krumbacher 1897: 501) that their contribution to grammatical theory was negligible.

In earlier Hellenistic times the main objective was the Hellenization of the non-Greek-speaking populations of the eastern provinces of the unitary Empire together with the north African littoral. Schools and universities had been founded, most notably in Alexandria, and scholars invited and encouraged by the governments of the Macedonian successor states. Their very success modified the purposes of the Byzantines somewhat. We hear from the twelfth-century historian Anna Comnena (cf. chapter 7 pp. 128–129) of the diversity of the pupils being taught classical Greek in her imperial father's school, but it must be the case that still the greatest need was felt for the maintenance of Greek literary standards in a widely spread community that spoke Greek, but, except for the formal usage of the most educated persons, varieties of Greek less and less like the Greek of old Athens and of the New Testament.

Linguistics in Ancient Greece had, broadly, two sources and inspirations. In the first place came the speculations on the origin, nature, and structure of language on the part of rhetoricians and philosophers from the sixth century B.C. As far as we can see, this activity was not concerned with language teaching or with anything like the applied linguistics of modern times, but simply formed part of the restless spirit of enquiry that characterized and directed the public and private life of Greek cities and, most notably, of Athens. The history of linguistics in Ancient Greece has been recounted in several books, and it need only be briefly summarized here.

Socrates is recorded as having devoted one of his *Dialogues*, the *Cratylus*, as reported by Plato, to general questions about language, and the beginnings of the syntactic analysis of sentences are found in other works of Plato and in Aristotle's writings; it was Aristotle who first used the word *ptōsis* 'fall' as a technical grammatical term to refer, as far as he was concerned, to all morphological variations in grammatical word forms. But grammatical studies reached their systematization from the Stoics. Their express view was that, if philosophy is in part the study of the human mind then language is an obvious window through which the working of the mind can be seen: *tēs dē dialektikēs theorias symphōnōs dokei tois pleistois apō tou peri phōnēs enárchesthai topou* [to most of the Stoics it seems appropriate to begin the study of dialectic by the part of it concerned with speech] (Diogenes Laertius 7.55). In morphology the Stoics put nominal case, to which they confined the term *ptōsis*, into something like the position it has occupied ever since. They further revealed an understanding of the aspectual, as well as the purely temporal, sense of the Greek verbal tense forms, which seems generally to have

escaped the insights of grammarians of other schools, except in so far as they took over some Stoic terminology (cf. the thoughts of Maximus Planudes, chapter 11). But syntax was the key subject of their investigations, and at least one book specifically on syntax is known to have existed, though it is not now extant (Diogenes Laertius 7.190–192).

It is unfortunate that most of the early Stoic work on grammar, from the third century B.C. onward, does not survive in its primary sources. We have to rely in the main on reports and summaries of what they were discussing and writing from general compilations somewhat in encyclopaedic form by others, most notably Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the philosophers*. Stoic doctrine and terminology is mentioned in some later grammarians, but not as part of the central tradition of grammar teaching in Greek and in Latin, and not always with proper understanding of Stoic theory.

Stoic syntactic theory arose from their more general propositional logic. Aristotelian logic was mainly a logic of class inclusion and class membership, strong on definitions and taxonomies, and enshrined in the hallowed tradition of the syllogism, the most famous one being: "All men are mortal: Socrates is a man: therefore Socrates is mortal". The Stoics were concerned with the sort of valid inferences that sentences of different kinds would convey. A favourite example of this type of logic was "If it is daytime it is light; but it is daytime, therefore it is light". (For its use in some well known fallacies see Diogenes Laertius 7.187). The Stoics' propositional logic led them on to examine the forms and implications of active and passive constructions, and the different roles of the nominative case and the oblique cases in such sentences and in intransitive sentences and those that had an oblique case in a quasi-subjectival place instead of a nominative, as in *metamélei Sokrátēi* 'Socrates (dative) regrets'. For more detailed discussion and statement of Stoic grammatical theory one may consult such books as Mates (1953: chapter 2); Long (1971: chapters 4 and 5); Frede (1978); Dinneen (1985); and Brekle (1985: 44–67).

The main Greek grammatical tradition sprang from quite another source, a practical and a didactic one, Hellenization, already referred to, the effort to bring Greek as a foreign language and Greek literature as a new and higher form of literature to the peoples of the former Persian Empire, brought under the control and government of the Macedonians following Alexander's conquests in the latter half of the fourth century B.C., ostensibly in the interest of spreading Greek civilization to others than Greeks.

Among the schools and libraries set up for this purpose the most famous were Pergamum and Alexandria. Philosophically Pergamum leaned towards Stoicism and Alexandria towards Aristotelianism; but Alexandria was the main centre of grammatical and literary study and teaching. In so far as it drew from Aristotelian philosophy it put its emphasis on taxonomy and the systematic division and definition of its subject matter. But its orientation was towards classical literature, and it is no coincidence that some of the best known Alexandrian grammarians were also Homeric scholars of high standing.

Greek was being widely diffused as the language of culture, education, and social advancement, and a version of Athenian (Attic) Greek became the basis of the *koinē* (*diálektos*), the standard language of the Hellenized world. The universal curriculum was Greek literature, beginning with Homer. Greek teachers faced linguistically a twofold task, to spread the knowledge and the use of Greek in the non-Greek world, and at the same time to preserve Greek as far as possible in the accepted standards of grammar and correct pronunciation. For the first time the need arose to provide orthographic marks in Greek writing for the Greek pitch accents, which ultimately changed into the modern Greek stress accent, and Aristophanes of Byzantium, Librarian of Alexandria (c. 257–180), is credited with the invention of the three accent marks, grave (´), acute (´), and circumflex (¨), to indicate the tonal structure of each word.

All these “applied” requirements rested on the availability of teachers and teachers’ resources. The first grammar book of Greek of which we know was the *Téchnē grammatiké* [The science of grammar], assigned to Dionysius Thrax, a pupil of Aristarchus of Alexandria and, like him, a Homeric scholar as well as a grammarian (c. 100 B.C.). There are problems about the genuineness of the text of this short book (fifteen pages in print), which are discussed later (chapter 4). But certainly a book under this title setting out the orthography, phonetics, and morphology of classical Greek was published and much used as a model for teachers and for later textbooks, notably some grammatical papyri found in Egypt (Wouters 1979). By the fourth century A.D. at the latest this book was recognized as the standard grammar of Greek, and its system of word classes (parts of speech) and their grammatical categories, case, tense, etc., was accepted and retained throughout the Byzantine period. Dionysius was hailed as the authority on word taxonomy (chapter 4).

Syntax, considered as the arrangement of words (*léxeis*) in a sentence (*lógos*), is mentioned in the *Téchnē* (§ 11), but not further explored. Later

(§ 18) *sýntaxis* [syntax], the arrangement of words with each other, is contrasted with *sýnthesis* [composition], the morphological structure of individual words; in the manner of ancient and mediaeval grammarians the *Téchnē* identifies as *prothéseis* [prepositions] both independent words, as in *peri tòn oûkon* ‘around the house’ and first elements of morphologically compounded words like *perioikos* ‘neighbour’.

An explicit treatment of syntax in the Alexandrian style had to wait until the masterly researches of Apollonius Dyscolus, also of Alexandria (second century A.D.). He wrote at great length, discussing the arguments for his statements and providing a large number of examples, mostly drawn from classical literature, especially Homer. Some of his books survive, four on syntax in general (Uhlig 1910; English translation Householder 1981), and one each on pronouns, adverbs, and conjunctions (Schneider 1878). Apollonius’s work shows some Stoic influence, but he uses the same word classes and the same grammatical categories as are found in the *Téchnē*, though in places with somewhat different definitions; and he appears to have accepted the framework of the *Téchnē* as standard and universally understood. Syntax is presented at the outset of the first book on *Syntax* as the arrangement of words in sentences and something comparable to the arrangement of *grámmata* [letters and articulate speech sounds] in syllables and words. There are constraints and orderliness in the one as in the other.

The massive tomes of Apollonius’s complete works are certainly not a textbook. Their length and their style are much more reminiscent of research papers and detailed descriptions of sentence structures. Some specifically syntactic concepts are brought into Greek grammar, notably concord of number and gender and something like immediate constituency (Uhlig 1910: 47.6–48.13), and where he shows how a sentence with examples of all the word classes, except the conjunction, can be progressively reduced to just the noun and the verb, to which all the rest of the syntax of Greek can be referred (Uhlig 1910: 17.1–15; 33.9–10: *tà hypóloipa tōn merōn tou lōgou anágetai prōs tēn tou rhēmatos kai tou onōmatos sýntaxin* [the remaining word classes are referable to the syntax of the noun and the verb]). The relationship of government (rection), when certain words, e.g. verbs and prepositions, require their conjoined nouns to be in a particular case, is expressed in a number of quite different words drawn from everyday language, an indication, perhaps, of the still tentative state of syntactic analysis in the Alexandrian mainline tradition. The following examples of technical adaptation are found: *paralambánetai* ‘is taken along with’ (Uhlig 1910: 332.3), *ei ... epi rhēma*

*phéroito* [if it is taken ... to a verb] (114.3), *tò ginóskei aitiatikèn apaitei ginóskei* [(reads) requires an accusative] (121.4), *hóste ... charizesthai ... tèn piósin tōi rhēmati* [so suits its case to the verb] (121.2–3), *tò eikein ... kai tò hypochōreîn ... eis dotikén katéntēsen* [both *eikein* (yield) and *hypochōreîn* (give up) came down to a dative] (427.8–9).

It seems that Apollonius introduced the specifically syntactic concept of transitivity (and its counterpart intransitivity). Transitivity involved a construction having two non-coreferential persons or things, represented overtly by a noun or a pronoun, or “understood” in the personal inflection of the verb (cf. Uhlig 1910: 40.19; 280.6). The words used for transitivity were *diábasis* [passing across] and *metábasis* [transference]. The source of these terms is clear (395.14): *hē enérgeia hōs prōs hypokeimenón ti diabi-bázetai, hōs tò témnei* [the activity passes over to some entity, as in *témnei* ‘he cuts (something)’]. But we see that this syntactic relation is not referred to a syntactic element like subject and object (*hypokeimenon* [entity] is not a technical term in Apollonius), but to case forms (413.3–4): *prophanēs hē ginoménē enérgeia ek tōn eutheíōn epí tēn aitiatikén* [It is clear that the activity proceeds from the nominative to the accusative] (see further Luhtala 1991). The descriptive priority of morphology over syntax is plain to see; it was to characterize Byzantine grammar throughout its course (cf. Priscian in Keil 1859: 213.10 and chapter 5).

Such was the legacy of Antiquity to the Byzantine grammarians and teachers of Greek grammar. While Constantinople was still the nominal head of the Roman Empire (“New Rome”), Latin was still the official language at the highest level of government. Justinian (Emperor 527–565), who made the inspired but vain attempt to reconquer the western half of the Empire, was himself a speaker of Latin, one of the last Emperors in this position. But while it remained an official language, Latin and Latin literature had to be learned and taught. Historically this was a doomed cause as the separation of the two halves of Christian Europe widened and hardened, and after the eighth century little Latin was taught or understood in the East. But while the systematic teaching of Latin persisted, Priscian’s magisterial works provided the Latin teacher with his resources and his authority. Priscian, a generation before the Emperor Justinian, is best known for his monumental Latin grammar, the *Institutiones grammaticae*, which became the single greatest teacher’s authority in East and West; in today’s print it runs to more than one thousand pages (Keil 1855, 1859). It is organized into eighteen volumes, and the last two volumes are devoted to Latin syntax. Priscian often explicitly proclaimed his dependence on the Greek syntax of Apollonius,

whom he describes as *maximus auctor artis grammaticae* [the greatest authority on the science of grammar] (Keil 1855: 548.6–7). In addition to the *Institutiones* Priscian wrote more immediately didactic books of shorter compass, *Praeexercitamina* [First stages] (Keil 1859: 430–440), *Institutio de nomine et verbo* [Rules for the noun and the verb] 443–456), and the *Partitiones* [Analyses] (459–515).

The full corpus of Apollonius’s works will have been available to him; and other Greek grammarians, of whom we know little but their names, also formed part of the legacy of Antiquity. But we are justified in assuming that the three major authoritative texts for the Byzantine grammarians were the *Téchnē* in its final form, the complete works of Apollonius, and Priscian’s *Institutiones* and *Institutio*. As Byzantine knowledge of Latin declined except among the most highly educated until closer western contacts just prior to the Italian Renaissance, Priscian became less directly accessible; but among a few others Maximus Planudes (c. 1260–1310) appears to have derived his book *On Syntax* more directly from Priscian than from Apollonius (see further chapter 11).

In fact, for rather different reasons Priscian had a wider influence in the West, once his work was fully known. Some hundreds of manuscripts of the *Institutiones* were copied, and with the much briefer grammar of Donatus (fourth century), these two grammarians became in Helen Waddell’s words (Waddell 1926: xxix) “the schoolmasters of Europe”. In a subsequent and separate development that lies outside the purview of this book, Priscian provided the formal grammatical basis for the philosophical speculative grammarians, the *Modistae*, of the later scholastic period of the Middle Ages in western Europe.

Apart from the very brief *Téchnē*, the Byzantines did not have to hand a teacher’s manual for Greek grammar as a whole comparable to the *Ars grammatica* of Donatus and the *Institutiones* of Priscian. Such books had to be designed and written by the Byzantines themselves. A considerable number of such works are known, and several grammar books survive and have been subsequently edited and printed (Krumbacher 1897: 579–593). Conformably with the Byzantine culture the linguistic scholars whose work we are considering, like other scholars in that culture, often held offices in both political and ecclesiastical circles, and some wrote treatises on ecclesiastical and doctrinal questions.

Within their constraints and their perceived objectives several different forms and styles of grammar writing are apparent. Some were elementary and wholly didactic, with little attempt at explanation and theoretical justification of the information given. Such were the *Kanónes* [Rules] of

Theodosius (chapter 6) and, of course, the *Téchnē* itself, one of the foundations of Byzantine grammar teaching (chapter 4). This style of grammar concentrated its attention on the correct morphological forms of inflected words, and their correct accentuation. They might be in part set in catechistic question and answer format and grouped into summary pieces, as seen in the *Schédē* [Lessons] (chapter 7), all for ease of memorization by pupils and ease of presentation by teachers. Rather more theorizing and attempted explanation of rules is seen in the extensive and multiple commentaries on the *Téchnē* and on the *Kanónes*.

In their style of writing some grammar books could be austere and rather arid, while others display a heartening personal dedication to a favourite pupil, looked on as a son (cf. John Glykys, chapter 10), or a certain light, almost colloquial, style (cf. Gregory, chapter 9).

It is the case that specific manuals of syntax, published under that title, were a Byzantine creation as far as the mainline tradition is concerned; the coverage of the terms "syntax" and "grammar", however, varied as book titles. Grammar might mean no more than morphology and phonology, with the *Téchnē* and the grammar of Chrysoloras (chapters 4, 12); and syntax often included at least a minimal account of the morphology on which all syntax, *sensu stricto*, was based and ordered.

Some writers set out to follow Priscian in a comprehensive grammar, though none is known to have written at such length as he did. Those who sought to theorize and discover general principles underlying their data tried to explain specific semantic features of the grammatical categories, in particular nominal case and verbal tense, instead of just listing typical individual meanings and uses. Case and tense, being the original criteria for the primary division between nouns and verbs, received most attention. All grammarians at least displayed the various uses of case forms in relation to prepositions and verbs, especially those constructing with more than one case differentially. Some confusion of the case syntax established in the classical authors was a characteristic feature of Byzantine usage, leading ultimately to the reduced case system of Modern Greek, and therefore the compilation of the case meanings in classical literature was accorded particular attention.

Maximus Planudes (chapter 11) and Theodore of Gaza (chapter 12), among some others, made efforts to abstract a basic theory of case and tense semantics underlying the multifarious actual usages of the case and tense forms themselves; and at least one grammarian, John Glykys (chapter 10), looked for a general theory of the origin and purpose of human language, within, of course, the accepted context of Biblical

authority. The excerpts from some of these grammarians are intended to give a fair picture of the styles of grammar writing.

A typical "table of contents" of an intended full-scale grammar would set out the following range of subjects, after some preliminary treatment of orthography, accentuation, syllable structure, and the like:

- The eight word classes and their subclassifications (*eidē*).
- The sentence and the word as the upper and lower limits of grammatical structure.
- The five cases and their meanings.
- The tenses, voices, and moods of verbs.
- Noun and verb as the minimal sentence structure, but with mention of the nominative pronoun "understood" in the personal inflections of verbs.
- The special syntactic and inflectional position of the participle.
- The preposed (definite) article and the postposed article (relative pronoun).
- Pronouns.
- Prepositions and the cases that each governed.
- Adverbs.
- Conjunctions.

All this was illustrated and exemplified with numerous quotations, and it is agreeable to see their contrast with later western grammarians in their drawing on illustrative material from classical (pagan) texts and Christian literature side by side, and often in the same paragraph. Jerome's lament that he would be accused of being a Ciceronian, not a Christian (Sandys 1958: I.232), does not seem to have found a Byzantine echo, at least not among linguistic circles.

Compilations of this sort, whether comprehensive or partial, and whether long or short, provided the means whereby pupils who already spoke and knew some sort of Greek *Umgangssprache* could understand classical and Biblical authors and themselves compose sentences in correct grammatical form. The two sorts of faults inherent in the spoken and in some of the written Greek of the time were solecisms, mistakes of sentence form, wrong concords, incomplete constructions, *anacoloutha*, and the like, and barbarisms, morphological and phonetic mistakes in the written and spoken forms of individual words, including incorrect graphic and pronounced accentuation. The use of these two terms for the two types of grammatical fault had been known for long and persisted through the Byzantine age (cf. Hilgard 1901: 446.35–449.28); the putative derivation

of *soloikismós* 'solecism' from the type of mistakes made by Greek speakers in the remote and isolated town of Soloi in Cilicia, is briefly mentioned by one commentator (Uhlig 1910: 273.10–274.1). The grammarians sometimes pushed further into grammatical theory, as Maximus Planudes did in particular, but the correction and prevention of errors were their prime concern, and this concern shaped the content and the form of their grammar books.

One must note that historically Greek syntax in the Alexandrian and therefore in the following Byzantine tradition had sprung from an already agreed and established phonology and morphology. This was more than a historical order (cf. Donnet 1967 a). Methodologically, syntax was stated and worked out in terms of words, already identified and classified, and in terms of grammatical categories, in today's usage both inflectional and (synchronically) derivational, that arose from the morphology and the lexical meanings of words as isolable units. Ancient Greek grammar was word-based; the word, not an element comparable to the morpheme, was the universal minimal foundation of grammatical description. Syntax was therefore based on words and depended on the classes of words and their categories that had been in place in the *Téchnē* (section 11), wherein syntax rates no more than a bare mention. For this reason syntax was not, and could not be, an autonomous level within grammar, still less a level hierarchically superior to morphology in the way that today's generative grammarians envisage it.

This unilateral dependence of syntax on a prior set of morphological classes and categories persisted through the Byzantine period, with the consequence that the Greek grammarians did not envisage syntactic components like subject and object, dependence, determination, and others, such as were developed by western grammarians, more especially by the speculative grammarians, the Modistae, of the late Middle Ages. This is summed up by Donnet's statement (1980 a: 38) that the Byzantines cultivated "la syntaxe du mot au détriment de la grammaire de fonction" (on western notions of dependency cf. Percival 1990).

Certainly Plato's *lógon mérē* ['parts of speech' or 'parts of a sentence'] could refer to syntactic constituents of indefinite length, but, despite the Latin translation *partes orationis* and hence the traditional title in modern grammatical terminology, as the system developed they came to be regarded as classes of words, defined on morphological and semantic grounds; only the conjunction was identified by its specifically syntactic role of conjoining words, phrases, or clauses (c. g. *Téchnē* section 20).

The later concern expressed by Apollonius and others for the minimal requirement of a noun (or a pronoun) together with a third person verb form to complete a sentence was a pragmatic not a syntactic requirement. In a "pro-drop" language like Greek a single third person verb form is as grammatically acceptable as a first or second person form. The question "Who is walking, writing, etc.?" is a pragmatic one, and where this is known from the context a single word such as *badízei*, *grápheí* is entirely acceptable in a way that a corresponding English one word sentence \*walks, \*writes, etc. cannot be. Apollonius makes this quite clear (Uhlig 1910: 169.1–10):

Ἀνάγκη μέντοι πᾶσα τοῖς τρίτοις προσώποις προσεῖναι ἢ αὐτὰς τὰς ἀντωνυμίας ἢ τὰ ἀνθ' ὧν παραλαμβάνεται, λέγω τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐχ ἔνεκεν πτώσεως, ἐπεὶ πάλιν παρυφίσταται ἢ εὐθεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἔνεκα προσώπου (νοεῖται γὰρ ὅτι τρίτον), ἀλλ' ἔνεκά γε τοῦ μὴ ἀορισθοῦσθαι, ἀπειρά γε ὄντα τὰ τρίτα πρόσωπα μᾶ ἐπαρκεῖται συντάξει τοῦ ῥήματος· καὶ σαφές ὅτι μία λέξις κατ' ἀπειρῶν κειμένη ἀόριστον πρόσωπον ὑπαγορεύει, εἰς πολλὰ τῆς διανοίας τρεπομένης. οὔσαι δὴ ὄρισμένων προσώπων παραστατικαὶ ἀναγκαίως παρατίθενται τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν παρὰθέσεως περιγράφηται ἡ ἀόριστος ἔννοια τῶν ῥημάτων. γράφει γὰρ ὄδε ἢ οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, αὐτός.

[With third person verb forms it is necessary to have either the pronouns themselves present or what they replace, i. e. one of the nouns; this is not in order to mark the case, since the nominative is already implicit, and not for marking the person (for we know it is a third person form), but for the sake of avoiding opacity. An unlimited number of third person words can be constructed with a single verb, and it is clear that a single lexical word to which an infinite set can be applied does not suggest a definite third person reference, so that the mind has to turn in many directions. So pronouns that can refer to specific personal entities are necessarily supplied with the verbs, in order that in this way the indefinite reference of the verbs themselves may be circumscribed. Thus *this man here, this man, that man, he himself, is writing.*]

This aspect of sentence structure is taken up and discussed by the Byzantines, as we see in the work of Syncellus (chapter 8) and Gregory of Corinth (chapter 9).

Elsewhere it may be noticed in the works of Apollonius, Syncellus, and Gregory that a single syntactic construction should be stated and

restated with reference to different inflectional paradigms, though these may be irrelevant to the specific relation being discussed. Apollonius, for example, finds it necessary to point out (Uhlig 1910: 432.7–13) that the case governed by a verb remains the same for each mood, tense, and person (Donnet 1967 a: 40–41). This same sort of redundant information is given by Gregory (Donnet 1967 b: 193), who adds that the gender of a noun in no way affects its case syntax. When Syncellus deals with the concord of gender and case (Donnet 1982: 171–223), he does so not as part of the syntax of noun-adjectives (in the Greek sense) with their head nouns, but within the syntactically irrelevant subclassification of nouns and pronouns on the lines of the *Téchnē*, in which, of course, syntax was not treated to more than a mention.

This whole topic is discussed fully in Donnet (1967 a; 1980 a), where he regrets the “fragmentation” of grammar (1967 a: 41), and the fact that Greek Antiquity and the Byzantine Age never achieved a properly independent theory of syntax, though Theodore of Gaza, at the end of the Age, has been credited with progress in that direction (Donnet 1980 a: 41–42). This is fair criticism, but equally one must not deny the value of the syntactic work done by Apollonius and the Byzantines even within their morphological constraints. The germ of immediate constituency and therefore of formal tree analysis set forth by Apollonius have already been noticed, as well as the distinction of transitive and intransitive verbs, in which Householder (1981: 4–17) discerns the beginnings of the much later concept of deep structure in a generative grammar. Though an explicit theory of government was only emerging under a variety of new technical terms, the fact remains that this aspect of syntactic relationship was quite surely emerging. But what the later Latin scholastic grammarians achieved was a syntax independent of both morphological priority and dependence on subject-predicate logic. Aristotle’s *hypokeímenon* [(logical) subject] was a technical term in his logic. But this same word is used quite frequently by Apollonius, sometimes contingently referring to what is in fact both a logical and a syntactic subject, but it is also specifically assigned to the syntactic object noun in reference to transitivity (Uhlig 1910: 395.14): *hē enérgeia hōs pròs hypokeímenón ti diabibázetai* [the activity passes over to some entity] (cf. further references to this term in Schneider 1910: 276–277, s. v. *hypokeímenon*). The Byzantines continue this vague and only partially technical term (Hilgard 1894: 105.29–30): *hypokeímena kaloúsin hoi grammatikoi tà ónta kai hypárchonta* [grammarians use *hypokeímena* to refer to entities and existents], and from the

example immediately following, ‘stone’, ‘wood’, ‘man’, it is plain that what is meant is simply what nouns can designate.

Apollonius’s use of *diábasis* and *metábasis* and the two verbs *diabibázesthai* and *metabibázesthai* to signify the relationship between transitive verbs and the accusative case of their objects has an interesting consequence. The literal meaning of these verbs, ‘being carried across’ is conformable with the sense of “motion to” in the semantic field of this case. It is in this way further compatible with the later Byzantine term *ekpompé* [sending out] for the transitive construction in general, involving a process or activity proceeding out of the agent (nominative) to something or somebody outside (cf. chapter 8). It may, therefore, be seen as preparing the way for the more fully localist case theory of Maximus Planudes, in which motion from, place at, and motion to are made the basis of the meanings of the three oblique cases (chapter 11).

A feature of Greek case syntax is that verbs of sensation other than sight regularly construct with the genitive, such as *háptomai* ‘touch’, *osphraínomai* ‘smell’, *akoúō* ‘hear’, *geúomai* ‘taste’, but that verbs like *horō* and *blépō* ‘see, look at’ take the accusative case only. Apollonius explained this difference in terms of active and passive syntax, in the same way that the verb *philō* ‘to love someone’ rationally takes the accusative, while the verb *erō* ‘to be overcome with passionate love’ takes the genitive, since the lover in this situation is no longer in rational control of his own feelings, and is more in a passive condition. In sensation generally the perceiver is being affected by external events, but sight is more far-reaching and so “the most active of the senses” (*hē ge mēn ek toū horān diáthesis energestátē estin kai epì plēon diabibazomēnē* (Uhlig 1910: 418.2–3; cf. Donnet 1980 b).

Byzantine grammarians, however, explain the same data rather differently in terms of *ekpompé* [sending out] in verbs of seeing, which construct with the accusative only, and *eispompé* [introduction from outside] in other verbs of perception, which may take the genitive as well as the accusative. Syncellus, for example, writes (Donnet 1982: 255; cf. 1980 b):

Τὰ πρὸς αἰσθησιν λαμβανόμενα, πρὸς ἀκοήν, γεῦσιν, ὄσφρησιν, καὶ πρὸς γενικὴν συντάσσεται καὶ πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν ἀκούω σου καὶ ἀκούω σε, ὄσφραίνομαί σου καὶ ὄσφραίνομαί σε, γεύομαί σου καὶ γεύομαί σε· καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνομαι ὁμοίαν οὐνταξιν ἔχει. Τὰ μέντοι τῆς ὀράσεως πρὸς μόνην αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσεται, οἷον· βλέπω σε, ὀρῶ σε, ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις κατ’ εἰσπομπὴν γίνονται, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς εἰς ταύτας πέμπουσι, καὶ οὕτως ἐνεργοῦν-

ται, τὰ δὲ τῆς ὄρασεως κατ' ἐκπομπὴν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς δηλοῖ· οὐδέ τοι ὀξύτατον κεφαλῆς ἐκδέρκεται ὄσσε.

[Verbs of perception, that is, hearing, tasting, and smelling, construct with the genitive as well as with the accusative: 'I hear you' (genitive and accusative), 'I smell you' (genitive and accusative), 'I taste you' (genitive and accusative); and the verb 'perceive' follows the same type of syntax. But verbs of seeing construct with the accusative only, as in 'I look at you' (accusative), or 'I see you' (accusative). This is because the other senses involve an introduction of something from outside, i.e. they operate by sending their sensations from external circumstances. But sight involves sending something out from oneself, as the poet says (Homer, *Iliad* 23.477): "Your two eyes do not shine forth brightly from your head".]

Much later, Constantine Lascaris sets out the same explanation (1608: 8):

τὰ δὲ τῆς ὄρασεως μόνον αἰτιατικῇ, ὁρῶ, βλέπω, σκοπῶ, εἶδον. κατὰ μὲν τὸν δεινὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις κατ' εἰσπομπὴν γινόμεναι, τουτέστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτὸς εἰς ἑαυταῖς λαμβάνουσαι, ἐνεργοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ ὄρασις κατ' ἐκπομπὴν, τουτέστιν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς εἰς τὰ ὀρώμενα τὴν ἐνέργειαν πέμπει.

[Only the verbs of seeing, 'see', 'look', 'behold', 'saw' (a past tense form) take the accusative. According to the insightful Apollonius the other senses operate by reception from outside, taking their experiences from without; but sight operates by sending out, that is to say by sending its force into what is seen.]

Not all grammarians took this line. Glykys (chapter 10) determined to find partially the basic meaning of the genitive case contrasts *akoúō* 'hear' with the genitive for casual hearing and the accusative for whole-hearted attention. This is less satisfactory, and it is scarcely borne out by the usages of classical Greek.

Priscian had to take a different track. In Latin all verbs of sensation and perception construct with the accusative case. Recognizing the fundamental passivity of sensation, he nevertheless declared that grammatically considering these verbs engaged formally in the same constructions as other transitive verbs and must be so treated (Keil 1855: 373.15–25).

Apollonius was not a localist theoretician, but in his account of the Greek verbs of sensation he can be recognized as the precursor of the

later partial localism of *ekpompē* and *eispompē* and the more fully fledged localist case theory of Maximus Planudes (cf. chapter 11). Unlike the Greeks, the scholastic grammarians used the separate terms *suppositum* and *appositum* to signify syntactic subject and object, distinct from the collateral logical terms *subjectum* and *praedicatum*.

One must, however, remember that the scholastic grammarians were speculative philosophers of language. They very properly looked for a self-consistent theory of grammar and of syntax within grammar. They were teachers of linguistics, not of a language. Students came to their lectures and read their texts already trained and drilled in Latin, work left to schoolmasters and rather downgraded by some speculative grammarians. Thomas of Erfurt's *Grammatica speculativa* (Bursill-Hall 1972) would have been of no great help to a student of the Latin language any more than, for example, Chomsky's *Aspects of the theory of syntax* to a student learning English. The Byzantine grammarians never forgot that they were firstly teachers, writing for teachers and their pupils. In so doing, some of them at least contributed to grammatical theory, as the following chapters are intended to show. They kept alive the systematic teaching and learning of Greek in their own generations, and in the end provided the teachers and the resources for the teaching of Greek in Renaissance Italy. This was the main part of their scholarly achievement and likewise a major part of our European cultural heritage.



## Chapter 4

### The *Téchnē Grammatikē*: the foundations

The first text presented in this book does not originally come from the Byzantine period, but its claim for inclusion rests on its place as a prime source for all the main tradition of grammatical studies in both the Greek and Latin worlds of later antiquity and the Middle Ages.

The *Téchnē* in the form in which we have it is a short and very concise compilation, in essence a descriptive taxonomy of classical Greek phonology and morphology. Its very conciseness argues for the general acceptance of what it sets out, and the phonology, word classification, and grammatical categories, and the contextualization given in the booklet are those that in all major respects constitute the standard grammar of classical Greek.

The definitions and the terminology as well as the grammatical descriptions themselves, except for a few differences in wording, formed the basis of Apollonius Dyscolus's works on syntax (c. 200 A.D.), and thus of Priscian's magisterial *Institutiones grammaticae* (c. 500 A.D.), since he deliberately and explicitly modelled his Latin grammar on the works of Apollonius, his "*maximus auctor*" (e.g. Keil 1855: 548.6). The continuation of this tradition in western Europe through such shorter grammars as Donatus's *Ars grammatica* (fourth century A.D.) and later of Priscian himself lies outside this survey. But its acceptance as a basic teaching textbook in the Greek East is manifested by the amount of annotation and explanation accorded to it by the various scholiasts or commentators.

We can get some idea of the weight laid on this work by comparing the fourteen and a half printed pages that it takes up in Bekker's edition (1816: 629–643) with the writings of the scholiasts on the *Téchnē*, occupying no less than 326 pages, though admittedly with some almost word-for-word repetitions (647–972); there is a later edition of the text and the comments in Uhlig (1883) and Hilgard (1901), a French translation in Lallot's edition of the text (1985 b), and an English translation is available of the *Téchnē* in Taylor (1987: 169–189). Some excerpts from the scholiasts' commentaries are given in this book, to provide a picture of this body of Byzantine scholarship, which played an important role in school and in higher education and was mainly centred on the University of Constantinople, up to the end of the Empire.

The history of the text of the *Téchnē* itself is controversial. It has traditionally been ascribed to an Alexandrian teacher, Dionysius Thrax, a pupil of Aristarchus, the Homeric and grammatical scholar, who may well have been responsible for much of the description of Greek grammar expounded in the *Téchnē*. Dionysius was born about 166 B.C., and he taught in Alexandria and in Rhodes; we have independent evidence for his life, and the first section of the *Téchnē* as we have it, wherein the contextualization and the content of grammatical studies are set out, may be definitely regarded as genuine, as passages from it are taken by Varro, a younger contemporary in Rome, and by Sextus Empiricus (second century A.D.), who mentioned him by name (*Adversus mathematicos* 1.57; cf. Dionysius's definition of grammar: "Grammar is empirical knowledge of the general usage of poets and prose writers", and Varro's definition (Funaioli 1907: 265): *Ars grammatica scientia est eorum quae a poetis historicis oratoribusque dicuntur ex parte maiore* [Grammar is knowledge of what in general is said by poets, historians, and orators]).

However, the rest of the *Téchnē* presents some difficulties as regards the present text. While a majority of scholars have, broadly, accepted it as the work of Dionysius, serious doubts have also been expressed both in Antiquity and in modern times. In the first place the bulk of the text, though not inconsistent with the first section, does not deal or even mention again all of the topics listed as the six "parts" of grammar. Besides this, a main problem is that in some places where Apollonius refers by name to Dionysius he does not appear to be using the same text that we now have. This was noticed by some of the scholiasts, and among the points they raised was the separation of proper nouns (*onómata*) and common nouns (*prosēgóriai*) as different classes and the uniting of the article and the pronoun under one class, both of which were and remained Stoic doctrine; and it was said that the grammarian Tryphon, who lived in the Augustan period, was the first to bring the two classes of noun together (Hilgard 1901: 124.7–14; 356.16–23), and that Apollonius quoted a different definition of the verb from that which appears in the *Téchnē* (Hilgard 1901: 161.2–8). Aristotle had ascribed two major features to the verb, that it signified time and that it was the formal exposition of a predicate (*De interpretatione* 3: *rhēma dé esti tò prossēmainon chrónon ... kai éstin aei tôn kath' hetérou legomenôn sēmeíon*). In the *Téchnē* it is the former feature that is given as part of the definition of the verb and its predicational function is not mentioned. But Apollonius is said to have quoted Dionysius's definition in a work no longer extant as *léxis katēgórēma sēmainousa* [a word designating a predicate],

i. e. the second part of Aristotle's definition, which was also Stoic doctrine (161.6–8; Diogenes Laertius 7.38). Also, according to Priscian (Keil 1855: 548.4–7) it was Tryphon (late first century B.C.) who separated the participle from the verb, as is done in the *Téchnē*. It was therefore argued by some that another Dionysius was the author of the present text of the *Téchnē* (Hilgard 1901: 124.7–14; 160.31–161.2).

Against these objections we may observe that they were raised by only some commentators (124.7–8: *thélousin oûn tines mē eînai gnésion tō Thraikòs tò paròn sýngramma* [some wish to say that the compilation that we have is not genuinely the work of Thrax], and that Dionysius Thrax has been firmly designated as the one who prescribed the eight word classes ("parts of speech"; 128.27–28: *ho Thraîx Dionýsios, ho peri tôn oktò merôn tou lôgou didáxas hēmâs*), and that in general the *Téchnē* was ascribed to Dionysius Thrax, implying that the counterevidence was based on mistakes or carelessness at some point.

There the matter rested until the nineteenth century. In this period and subsequently most scholars have accepted the genuineness of the bulk of the text (Lersch 1840; Schmidt 1852–1853; Steinthal 1890–1891; Pauly–Wissowa 1893–1972; Traglia 1956; Pecorella 1962). But another factor came into consideration in the second half of the present century, the study of a number of grammatical papyri in Egypt, written in Greek. On the evidence of these Di Benedetto (1958–1959; 1973) reasserted the "spurious" state of the bulk of the *Téchnē*, arguing that it was a later compilation, perhaps of the third or fourth century A.D., to which Dionysius's name had been attached. In particular more Stoic features were assigned to what Dionysius may have written and taught on grammar than those that formed the mainline tradition of Apollonius, Priscian, and the Byzantine Greek grammarians, and than the western tradition of Latin grammar. Di Benedetto's arguments were largely accepted by Pinborg (1973) and more recently by Taylor (1987), though Wouters, having examined all the grammatical papyri in Hellenized Egypt available in 1979, makes the important judgment that at least by the first century A.D. there was widespread teaching of Greek grammar based on manuals very much on the lines of the *Téchnē*, sometimes apparently copying parts of it word by word, though also making small individual variations. He suggests that, whoever may have been the author of our text, something very much like it was available and widely used by the end of the first century B.C. The evidence of the data cannot yet be decisive. Discrepancies between quotations and references can always be explained away as errors or inaccuracies, but the more numerous and

serious they are, the less plausible such "explanations" become. Perhaps we may look at the version that we have of the *Téchnē* as the final and canonical "edition" of an original textbook written by Dionysius which had passed through various alterations in the light of theoretical and technical revisions, while retaining the name of the original author as a mark of its prestigious origin. For a suggestion that this final "edition" only became known and used in the Latin world around 300 A.D. see Law (1990).

What is more important for present purposes is that, whatever its editorial history may have been, the *Téchnē* in its present form, with its extensive commentaries, was the foundation and a major authority for teaching and researching the Greek language and its grammar in the Byzantine Empire. Raising our sights further ahead and more widely we may take note of the tribute paid by Forbes (1933: 112): "There is scarcely a textbook on English grammar that does not display evidence of its debt to Dionysius Thrax".

In the texts that follow the section numbers are those used in Uhlig (1883: 3–101).

## 2. ἐπὶ γραμματικῆς

Γραμματικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῶ-  
σιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων. Μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς εἰσὶν ἕξ: πρῶτον  
ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβῆς κατὰ προσῳδίαν, δεῦτερον ἐξήγησις, μετὰ  
τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικούς τρόπους, τρίτον γλωσσῶν τε καὶ  
ἱστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις, τέταρτον ἐτυμολογίας εὑρεσις,  
πέμπτον ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμὸς, ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ  
κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ.

### [1. On grammar.

Grammar is empirical knowledge of the general usage of poets and prose writers. It has six divisions: first, expert reading with due regard to prosodic features; second, explanation of the literary expressions found in the texts; third, the provision of notes on particular words and on the subject matter; fourth, the discovery of etymologies; fifth, the working out of grammatical regularities; sixth, the critical appreciation of literature, which is the finest part of all that the science embraces.]

### Commentary

This section is historically perhaps the most important section in the *Téchnē*. As has been argued above, it is almost certainly the work of Dionysius, whatever the status of the rest of the text.

It sets out definitively the general setting of linguistic studies in the Hellenistic world, namely as a propaedeutic to the critical appreciation of classical Greek literature, and the teaching and learning of Greek for those speaking other languages or non-standard Greek dialects. Homer stood to Greek literature rather as Shakespeare does to English literature today, and he is freely quoted and cited in the text. Though the grammar of the Homeric poems differs from fifth-century Attic (Athenian) Greek at least as much as Shakespeare's English does from modern standard English, no specific Homeric forms are given in the *Téchnē*, except in the quotations.

The 'six divisions' of grammar cover much more than even the widest interpretation of *grammar* today. The whole section reads like a general syllabus for the elementary study of Greek literature. One scholiast rightly draws attention to this (Hilgard: 1901: 452.33–453.4): what is involved is not so much the content of grammar but the requirements laid upon the teacher.

It was an authoritative statement. Subsequent grammars both of Greek and of Latin either incorporated a similar definition of their subject into their work or left Dionysius's definition unmentioned and unchallenged. This persisted in the West until the scholastic grammarians insisted on a reorientation and so a redefinition of grammar as a philosophical theoretical subject, not primarily concerned with language teaching or with classical literature. In the East the Dionysian conception of grammar generally endured, and it was well suited to the renewed study of Greek as a language of literature and education in the Renaissance in western Europe.

The definition of grammar as "empirical knowledge" reflects an earlier controversy to which the scholiasts draw attention, most fully in the following quotation (Hilgard 1901: 166.25–30):

Ἐμπειρίαν εἰπὼν ἐξεφαύλισε τὴν τέχνην· ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστιν ἢ ἄλογος τριβή, ὡς καὶ ἐμπειρικούς λέγομεν ἰατροὺς τοὺς ἄνευ λόγου τὰς θεραπείας τοῖς πάσχουσι προσάγοντας· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ θεραπεύειν οἶόν τε ἐστὶ τὸ φάρμακον πρὸς τὸ ἔλκος, ἐπίστανται· εἰ δὲ τις ἔροιτο τίνας ἔνεκα πρὸς τόδε τὸ πάθος ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει, ἀποροῦσιν. Ἡ δὲ γραμματικὴ πάντα μετὰ λόγου καὶ τῆς δεούσης ἀναλογίας κανονίζει.

[By calling it "empirical knowledge" he downgraded the science; empirical knowledge is routine practice without underlying principle, just as we use the term "empiricals" to refer to those doctors

who give treatments to their patients without a principle. They know that a particular drug may treat a particular lesion; but if someone asks why it is expedient for this condition, they are non-plussed. But grammar frames all its rules in a principled manner and in accordance with the necessary regularity of patterning.]

All this was one aspect of the difference in attitude most notably taken by the Stoics and the Alexandrian literary grammarians. The Stoics saw grammar and linguistics in general as part of philosophy or dialectic and as a key to understanding something of the working of the human brain or mind (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.55). In Antiquity, as in later times, linguistics was envisaged either as part of philosophical (or psychological) studies or as a practical discipline for language teaching and for the study of literature. Clearly, textual studies are more directly based on the empirical observation of literary, or of conversational, practice. Alexandria was predominantly literary and therefore empiricist in this respect. Those who felt that grammar was being downgraded in this definition could recall Plato's distinction between *téchnē* as principled (*lógon échousa*) and *empeiria* as *álogos* [unprincipled] (*Gorgias* 465 a). In Hilgard (1901: 112.34–113.7) a scholiast lists four grades of intellectual achievement in ascending order: *peira* [skill], *empeiria* [empirical knowledge], *téchnē* [science], and *epistēmē* [infallible understanding], geometry and in the context of the time astronomy being given as examples of *epistēmē*. Despite this controversy, the requirements of Hellenistic, Roman, and subsequently Byzantine education ensured that literary empiricism became and remained the standard “paradigm” of linguistics (cf. Kuhn 1962: 10).

Skill in reading aloud, in recitation, particularly of poetry, is emphasized. It is a moot point whether silent reading was an extensive accomplishment in antiquity, but obviously there was much more reading aloud than in our own day. Prosodic features included pitch and length, these two being given separate sections. The Greek accent was primarily one of pitch, though probably some differences of stress were involved (cf. Allen 1974: chapter 6). While the *Téchnē* goes no further, some comments by the scholiasts indicate that *prosōidia* as a technical term could be extended to cover some features that are included under the heading of prosody in modern prosodic phonology: aspiration (“breathings”), punctuation, and word juncture. Differential pitch was marked by the accents, a device invented by the Alexandrian grammarian Aristophanes (c. 200 B.C.).

The two “breathings” (*pneumata*) were *dasý* [rough] and *psilón* [smooth], aspirated and unaspirated respectively. Words beginning with a vowel could be minimally distinguished by this feature, for example *hóra* ‘time’ and *óra* ‘care’. Both such words were phonologically vowel-initial words in Greek, as far as concerned the facultative elision of preceding vowels and the addition of *-n* to some vowel-final words (e.g. *estí(n)* ‘[it] is’). Punctuation was a written indication of pauses in utterance, but the scholiasts treated word junctures under the same head (*páthē* [modifications]). These latter features were such as to distinguish *estí Nákios* ‘he is a Naxian’ from *estín áxios* ‘he is worthy’. We can only speculate what was the phonetic nature of the distinction, whether it was similar to the differences between English *a notion* and *an ocean*; it can hardly have involved an actual pause in normal speech. Some of the scholiasts refer to these junctural prosodies as not properly (*kyriōs*) so designated but misapplied (*katachrēstikōs*), on the ground that they did not form part of the sound sequence of the word itself, but what happened to it (hence *páthē*) in discourse (cf. Hilgard 1901: 135.22–136.11; 292.26–28).

The *glōssai* [literary expressions], requiring explanation, are regarded as non-Attic dialect forms found in Homer and other authors (*glōssá esti léxis xēnē metaphrazoménē eis tēn hēmetéran diálekton* [a literary expression is an unfamiliar word translated into our dialect] (Hilgard 1901: 469.10–11)).

*Etymológiai* [etymologies] must be understood in the ancient sense of the word rather than in its modern, essentially historical, meaning. Etymology was an attempt to discover the true meaning of a word by “unfolding” it. This amounted to drawing it from a sequence of other supposedly more primitive words: *etymologia estín hē anáptyxis tōn léxeōn dí hēs tò alēthēs saphēnizetai* [etymology is the unfolding of words, by which means their true meaning may be made clear] (Hilgard 1901: 14.23–24). The explanation of *rhapsōidia* in section 5 is an example.

*Analogias eklogismōs* [the working out of grammatical regularities] is very much like our current “capturing generalizations”. It also reflects an earlier controversy between analogists, who insisted on the basic regularity of languages, and the anomalists, who challenged such a view on the grounds of paradigmatic irregularities, in which Greek abounded, and of semantic and formal discrepancies such as plural nouns for single entities (*Athēnai* (plural) ‘Athens’) and incongruous genders like *paidion* (neuter) ‘child’. Varro (first century B.C.) discusses this whole controversy at length in relation to both Greek and Latin (*De lingua Latina*, books

8 and 9). One by-product of the search for regularities was the set of *kanónes*, lists of total verbal inflexions, whether or not some of them were attested in actual texts, which became a part of later Alexandrian and Byzantine teaching (chapter 6, pp. 111–112).

Interestingly one scholiast distinguished *analogia*, the province of grammar, and lexical suitability, the province of what today we would call semantics and pragmatics:

Ἐναλογία λέγεται ἡ τῶν ὁμοίων παράθεσις ... δι' ἧς συνίστανται οἱ κανόνες τῶν γραμματικῶν, ὡσπερ ὅτε ζητοῦμεν, τίνος ἕνεκεν ὁ Ὅμηρος τοῦ Ὀμήρου καὶ ὁ φίλος τοῦ φίλου, τὸ βέλος δὲ τοῦ βέλους· ἀκριβῶς οὖν ζητήσας εὖρον εἶναι τὸν κανόνα τοιοῦτον, ὅτι πάντα τὰ εἰς ὄσ ἀρσενικά καὶ θηλυκά εἰς οὐ ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν, οἷον Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀλεξάνδρου, καλὸς καλοῦ, παρθένος παρθένου, ἄμπελος ἀμπέλου, Σάμος Σάμου, τὰ δὲ οὐδέτερα εἰς ὄσ λήγοντα εἰς οὐς ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν, οἷον μέρος μέρους, ὄξος ὄξους, ὄρος, ὄρους· οὕτως οὖν καὶ βέλος βέλους. Ἐπὶ πάντων οὖν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μέρων τοῦ λόγου ἀκριβῶς ζητοῦντες καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρατιθέμενοι τοὺς κανόνας ἀσφαλῶς ἀποφανόμεθα.

[Analogy means the setting of like forms by like forms, ... and by its means the paradigms of the grammarians are put together, as when we seek to know why we have *ho Hómēros, to Homērou* 'Homer' and 'of Homer', and *ho philos, tou philou* 'the friend' and 'of the friend', but *to bélos, tou béλους* 'the arrow' and 'of the arrow'. Looking at this carefully I found that the paradigm was like this: all masculine and feminine nouns ending in *-os* form their genitive in *-ou*, like *Aléxandros, Alexándrou, kalós, kalou* 'beautiful' and 'of (someone) beautiful', *parthénos, parthénou* 'virgin' and 'of a virgin', *ámpelos, ámpéλου* 'vine' and 'of a vine', *Sámos, Sáμου* 'Samos' and 'of Samos'; but neuter nouns ending in *-os* form their genitive in *-ous*, like *méros, mérους* 'part' and 'of a part', *óxos, óxους* 'vinegar' and 'of vinegar', *óros, óρους* 'mountain' and 'of a mountain', and thus *bélos, bélous*. So with all nouns and verbs and the other word classes, if we make careful search and set like beside like we reveal for ourselves the paradigms with accuracy.] (Hilgard 1901: 15.11–23)

ἡ χρῆσις, ἡνίκ' ἂν περὶ τοῦ σημαινομένου ζητοῦμεν, οἷον εἰ τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε τιθέμενον κύριον ἢ ἀκυρον, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐθέντης ἔαν

ζητῶμεν, εἰ καλῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ δεσπόζοντός τινος τάσσεται· ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀναλογία οὐχ οἷα τε κρίνειν, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις ἐξετασθεῖσα πέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἀκύρως μὲν παραλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ χυδαίων, ταχθὲν δ' ἂν δεόντως ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτόχειρος καὶ φονέως.

[Usage is concerned with the meaning of words, as when we ask whether this word is properly or improperly used of this thing meant, for example if we ask about the word *authéntēs* whether it is properly used of one holding absolute power. This is not something that grammatical regularity can decide, but usage has shown us that the word is improperly used in this way by vulgar speakers, but that it would properly be used of a murderer or assassin.] (Hilgard 1901: 446.25–30)

In fact dictionaries now cite both meanings, *Analogia* and *chrēsis* jointly comprised *Hellēnismós* [correct Greek].

## 2. Περὶ ἀναγνώσεως.

Ἐνάγνωσις ἐστὶ ποιημάτων ἢ συγγραμμάτων ἀδιάπτωτος προφορά. Ἐνάγνωστέον δὲ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν, κατὰ προσῳδίαν, κατὰ διαστολήν· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς προσῳδίας τὴν τέχνην, ἐκ δὲ τῆς διαστολῆς τὸν περιεχόμενον νοῦν ὁρῶμεν· ἵνα τὴν μὲν τραγωδίαν ἠρωϊκῶς ἀναγνώμεν, τὴν δὲ κωμωδίαν βιωτικῶς, τὰ δὲ ἐλεγεία λιγυρῶς, τὸ δὲ ἔπος ἐντόνως, τὴν δὲ λυρικὴν ποίησιν ἐμμελῶς, τοὺς δὲ οἴκτους ὑφειμένως καὶ γοερῶς. Τὰ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν τούτων γινόμενα παρατήρησιν καὶ τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν ἀρετάς καταρρίπτει καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τῶν ἀναγιγνωσκόντων καταγελάστους παρίστησι.

## [2. On reading.

Reading is the speaking of verse or prose works without any faults. One should read with due regard to dramatic presentation, prosodic features, and punctuation; from these we see, respectively, the merits of the poet, the skill of the reader, and the sense of the text. So one should read tragedy in a heroic style, comedy in a lively style, elegy sweetly, epic poetry earnestly, lyric poetry melodiously, and lamentations gently and mournfully. If these rules are not followed, the qualities of the works read will be destroyed and the conduct of the readers will appear ridiculous.]

## Commentary

It will be seen from the author's elaboration of what is subsumed under reading that the successful recitation, often in public, of literary and mainly poetical texts was one of the principal objectives of higher education in the Greek-speaking world. That *areté* 'merits' refers to the excellence of the text is confirmed by a scholiast, who writes (Hilgard 1901: 16.19–20): *Tinos dè tèn aretèn horômen? tôn anagignôskoménôn* [*Whose merits do we see? Those of the text that is being read*].

## 3. Περί τόνου.

Τόνος ἐστὶ φωνῆς ἀπήχησις ἑναρμονίου, ἢ κατὰ ἀνάτασιν ἐν τῇ ὀξειᾷ, ἢ κατὰ ὀμαλισμὸν ἐν τῇ βαρείᾳ, ἢ κατὰ περίκλασιν ἐν τῇ περισπωμένῃ.

## [3. On accentuation.

Pitch accent is the sound of a harmoniously modulated voice, raised with the acute accent, level with the grave accent, and up and down with the circumflex.]

## Commentary

The scholiasts analyse the circumflex accent as a sequence of acute and grave, linking the pitch levels of the spoken accent with the actual shape of the circumflex sign (e.g. Hilgard 1901: 23.14–18). It was probably a falling glide, according to Allen (1973: 234). In pointing out that the circumflex accent can only appear on long vowels, a commentator arrives at something very akin to the mora concept of modern phonologists (Hilgard 1901: 138.26–31):

Ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ περισπωμένη σύνθετος λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ δύο τόνων σύγκειται, ἐξ ὀξειᾶς καὶ βαρείας, ἢ διότι αἰεὶ ἐπάνω φύσει μακρᾶς τίθεται, ἥτις σύνθετος χρόνος λέγεται· πᾶσα γὰρ φύσει μακρὰ ἀντὶ δύο χρόνων παραλαμβάνεται· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέων τρίχρονον λέγομεν, τὴν βραχειᾶν ἀντὶ ἑνὸς χρόνου παραλαμβάνοντες, καὶ τὴν μακρὰν ἀντὶ δύο.

[We may say that this is the reason for calling the circumflex a complex accent, because it consists of two accents, raised and grave, or because it is only ever put above a syllable long by nature, which is called a complex time unit. Every syllable long by nature is the equivalent of two time units; that is why we call the word *léōn* 'lion'

three-timed, taking the short syllable for one time unit and the long syllable for two.

With this we may compare Allen 1973: 92–93 and 122–123.

The author of the *Téchnē* and the commentators were concerned with explicating the three written accents, which indicated pitch levels and movements. No mention was made of a possibly coexistent stress accent, which by Byzantine times was becoming stronger, leading ultimately to the stress accentuation of modern Greek (cf. Allen 1973: chapter 16).

## 4. Περί στιγμῆς.

Στιγμαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τελεία, μέση, ὑποστιγμῆ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν τελεία στιγμὴ ἐστὶ διανοίας ἀπηρτισμένης σημεῖον, μέση δὲ σημεῖον πνεύματος ἕνεκεν παραλαμβάνομενον, ὑποστιγμῆ δὲ διανοίας μηδέπω ἀπηρτισμένης ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνδεούσης σημεῖον.

## [4. On punctuation.

There are three punctuation marks, full stop, medium length stop, and comma. The full stop is the sign of a completed thought, the medium length stop is for taking breath, and the comma indicates that the expressed thought has not been completed but there is more to come.]

Τίτι διαφέρει στιγμὴ ὑποστιγμῆς; Χρόνος· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ στιγμῇ πολὺ τὸ διάστημα, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑποστιγμῇ παντελῶς ὀλίγον.

[How does the full stop differ from the comma? By relative length of time. With the full stop there is a considerable interval, but with the comma there is a very short interval.]

## Commentary

Punctuation was the written representation of pausal and junctural features and was so interpreted by the scholiasts. As well as written accentuation Aristophanes the grammarian is said to have systematized the punctuation marks in Greek writing, which became standard usage. Herodian, the son of Apollonius Dyscolus (second century A.D.) wrote a treatise or handbook devoted to this subject.

The marks were the full stop, (.), the colon, (:), and the comma (,), to which was added the hyphen (*hyphén* [unification]), which was not normally marked but which could be indicated by a subscript distinguishing, for example, *cheiri sóphos* and *cheirísophos* (Hilgard 1901: 136.6–7), both meaning 'clever with the hands'. More than one scholiast includes *ek-*

*thlipsis* [elision] among the features marked by an apostrophe, as part of punctuation, e. g. *hézet' épeit' aráneuthe neôn* 'he sat down after that far from the ships' (Hilgard 1901: 146.7–8).

The comma is defined as the mark for a very brief pause in reading, as in modern languages today. It is also made the mark of word division in otherwise ambiguous strings of unspaced letters, e. g. *ésti Náxios* 'he is a Naxian' and *éstin áxios* (Hilgard 1901: 7–8), as already referred to under section 1. It is difficult to believe that there was regularly any pause in such sequences unless for some other reason; the writer may have been referring to junctural features such as a greater length of final *-n* and a different syllabification, as in the case of an actor who mispronounced *galén'*, *horô* 'I see a calm sea' as *galén horô* 'I see a weasel'. Perhaps the scholiast misinterpreted such distinctions as a very slight pause between the words, which could, no doubt, have been introduced for explicit disambiguation (cf. Allen 1973: 105, 227).

#### 5. Περὶ ῥαψωδίας.

Ῥαψωδία ἐστὶ μέρος ποιήματος ἐμπεριειληφός τινα ὑπόθεσιν. εἴρηται δὲ ῥαψωδία, οἷον εἰ ῥαβδωδία τις οὔσα, ἀπὸ τοῦ δαφνινῆ ῥάβδῳ περιερχομένου ἄδειν τὰ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ποιήματα.

#### [5. On rhapsody.

A rhapsody is a part of a poetic composition covering an entire theme. It is called a rhapsody as if it were a recital with a staff, because men used to go around reciting Homeric poems carrying a laurel staff.]

#### Commentary

The scholiasts give examples of such rhapsodic themes from Homer's *Iliad*: The anger of Achilles (book 1), Agamemnon's dream (book 2), and the fight between Paris and Menelaus (book 3) (Hilgard 1901: 28.11–23).

The etymology of this word is doubtful; at least one scholiast gives an alternative to the definition by the author of the *Téchnē*, from *rháptein* [to stitch together], the view generally taken today (Hilgard: 1901: 179.7–10; cf. Pindar, *Nemean ode* 2.1–2: *Homēridai rhapsōn epéōn ... aidoí*, 'children of Homer, singers of words strung together').

Once again we see the literary emphasis in Hellenistic and Byzantine grammatical studies.

#### 6. Περὶ στοιχείου.

Γράμματά ἐστιν εἴκοσι τέσσαρα ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾱ μέχρι τοῦ ω̄. γράμματα δὲ λέγεται διὰ τὸ γραμμαῖς καὶ ξυσμοῖς τυποῦσθαι γράψαι γὰρ τὸ ξύσαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, ὡς καὶ παρὰ Ὀμήρῳ,

νῦν δὲ μ' ἐπιγράψας ταρσὸν ποδὸς  
εὔχει αὐτως.

Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ στοιχεῖα καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἔχειν στοιχόν τινα καὶ τάξιν.

Τούτων φωνήεντα μὲν εἰσιν ἑπτὰ, ᾱ, ε̄, ἦ, ἰ, ὀ, ὑ καὶ ὦ. φωνήεντα δὲ λέγεται, διότι φωνὴν ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἀποτελεῖ, οἷον ᾱ ἦ. Τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μὲν εἰσι δύο, ἦ καὶ ὦ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, ε̄ καὶ ὀ, δίχρονα δὲ τρία, ᾱ, ἰ καὶ ὑ. δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται. Προτακτικὰ φωνήεντα πέντε, ᾱ, ε̄, ἦ, ὀ, ὦ. προτακτικὰ δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι προτασσόμενα τοῦ ἰ καὶ τοῦ ὑ συλλαβὴν ἀποτελεῖ, αἰ, αῦ. ὑποτακτικὰ δὲ δύο, ἰ καὶ ὑ, τὸ ὑ δὲ ἐνίοτι προτακτικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἰ, ὡς ἐν τῷ μυῖα καὶ ἄρπυια, υἰός, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις. Δίφθογγοι δὲ εἰσιν ἔξ, αἰ, αῦ, εἰ, εῦ, οἰ, οῦ. Σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἑπτακαίδεκα, β̄, γ̄, δ̄, ζ̄, θ̄, κ̄, λ̄, μ̄, ν̄, ξ̄, π̄, ρ̄, σ̄, τ̄, φ̄, χ̄, ψ̄. σύμφωνα δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνηέντων φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ. Τούτων ἡμίφωνα μὲν ὀκτώ, ζ̄, ξ̄, ψ̄, λ̄, μ̄, ν̄, ρ̄, ζ̄. ἡμίφωνα δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι παρόσον ἦττον τῶν φωνηέντων εὔφωνα καθέστηκεν ἐν τε τοῖς μυγμοῖς καὶ σιγμοῖς. ἄφωνα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐννέα, β̄, γ̄, δ̄, θ̄, κ̄, π̄, τ̄, φ̄, χ̄. ἄφωνα δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ κακόφωνα, ὡσπερ ἄφωνον λέγομεν τραγῳδὸν τὸν κακόφωνον. Τούτων ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, κ̄, π̄, τ̄, δασέα δὲ τρία, θ̄, φ̄, χ̄, μέσα δὲ εἴρηται, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστὶ δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα. καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν β̄ μέσον τοῦ κ̄ καὶ τοῦ γ̄, τὸ δὲ δ̄ μέσον τοῦ τ̄ καὶ τοῦ θ̄.

#### [6. On the minimal element.

Letters of the alphabet are twenty-four in number, from alpha to omega. They are called (scratched) letters because they are formed by scratching and scraping; for writing was the same as scraping among the ancients as it is also with Homer: "Now that you have scratched the sole of my foot you are boasting like this" (*Iliad* 11, 388). They are also called (ordered) elements because they have an ordered place and position in the language.

Of the letters seven are vowels, *a*, *e*, *ē*, *i*, *o*, *y*, and *ō*. They are called vowels because they complete a vocal sound by themselves, as *á* and *ē*. Two are long, *ē* and *ō*, and two are short, *e* and *o*. Three are of common length, *a*, *i*, and *y*. They are called common because they may be uttered as long or as short vowels. Five vowels are prepositive, *a*, *e*, *ē*, *o*, and *ō*. They are called prepositive because put before *i* and *y* (*u*) they produce a complete syllable, e. g. *ai*, *au*.

Two are postpositive, *i* and *y* (*u*). But *y* (*u*) can sometimes be put before *i*, as in *myiá*, ‘fly’, and *hárpυiá* ‘whirlwind’, and *hyiós* ‘son’, and similar words. There are six diphthongs, *ai*, *au*, *ei*, *eu*, *oi*, and *ou*.

The other seventeen letters are consonants, *b*, *g*, *d*, *z*, *th*, *k*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *x*, *p*, *r*, *s*, *t*, *ph*, *ch*, *ps*. They are called consonants because by themselves they do not produce a speech sound, but they do with the vowels. Of these eight are semivowels, *z*, *x*, *ps*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, *s*. They are called semivowels because, being less sonorous than vowels, they consist of murmurings and hissing sounds. Nine are without sound, *b*, *g*, *d*, *th*, *k*, *p*, *t*, *ph*, *ch*. They are called soundless because they are poorer in sound than the others, just as we call an actor with a poor voice soundless. Of these three are smooth, *k*, *p*, *t*; three are rough, *th*, *ph*, *ch*; and three are medial, *b*, *g*, *d*. They are called medial because they are rougher than the smooth consonants, but smoother than the rough. *b* lies between *p* and *ph*; *g* lies between *k* and *ch*; and *d* lies between *t* and *th*.]

There follows a paragraph exemplifying the contrasts between rough and smooth consonants, describing the so-called double consonants, *z*, *x*, *ps*, and the liquids, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, and giving some morphophonemic details about particular consonants.

#### Commentary

It is commonly said that Greek linguists confused letters with sounds or phonemes. This is not really a valid criticism. *Stoicheiá*, the elements or minimal constituents of articulate speech, were the *grámmata* [letters], comprising written shapes and phonetic values. This is easier to understand in Greek than in English, because the Greek alphabet was much more phonemic than the English alphabet, and it normally gave an unambiguous indication of the pronunciation of a word.

This appears to have been first stated by the Stoics (Diogenes Laertius 7.56):

Τριχῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ γράμμα, τὸ τε στοιχεῖον ὃ τε χαρακτήρ τοῦ στοιχείου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα, οἷον ἄλφα.

[The term *grámma* is used with three meanings, the element of speech, the written shape, and the name, e. g. *álpha*.]

The Latin grammarians translated these three as *potestas*, *figura*, and *nomen*. A scholiast added a fourth property, ordered place (*táxis*), refer-

ring to the statement of phonotactics in the second paragraph of this section (Hilgard 1901: 31.27–29).

We notice the quite different use of the term *hēmiphōna* [semivowel] as compared with present-day terminology. The phonemes so designated are all those consonants which are either continuants, like /m/, /s/ etc. or include a continuant component, like /ks/ and /ps/. ζ was included because its pronunciation in classical Greek, which was being described, was /zd/ (Allen 1974: 53–56), though during the Byzantine period the change to /z/, as in modern Greek, was already under way.

The distinction between the aspirated and unaspirated pairs of plosive consonants was linked by the scholiasts to the distinction between rough and smooth breathings in vowel-initial words, the same terms, *dasy* ‘rough’ and *psilón* ‘smooth’, being in standard use:

οἱ παλαιοὶ ... ἄλλως τε τὰ δασέα ἐξερφονοῦν καὶ ἄλλως τὰ ψιλὰ, πῆ μὲν μετὰ πολλοῦ πνεύματος, πῆ δὲ μετὰ ἐλαχίστου.

[The ancients pronounced the rough and the smooth (vowels) differently, the former with a lot of breath, the latter with very little.] (Hilgard 1901: 33.14, 20–21)

ψιλὰ δὲ λέγεται τὰ ὀλίγῳ πνεύματι ἐκφονοούμενα, δασέα δὲ τὰ πολλῶ.

[Smooth (consonants) are pronounced with little breath, rough consonants with a lot of breath.] (Hilgard 1901: 43.5)

The words *hoi palaiói* [the ancients] are important. The commentators were expounding classical Greek, but by Byzantine times vowel aspiration had ceased, as in modern Greek, and the aspirated plosives had taken their modern forms as fricatives, /θ/, /φ/, and /χ/. The rough breathing mark on initial (r(h)) indicates its pronunciation as a trilled aspirated alveolar sound, also found in the second /r(h)/ of geminate /rr(h)/ within words (cf. Allen 1974: 16–24, 39–43, 50–53). A scholiast notes that in the Aeolic dialect deaspiration had already begun in classical times (Hilgard 1901: 143.13–20).

The term *mésa* (*grámmata*) has been much discussed. In the classical period they were voiced plosives, like Latin /b/, /d/, /g/. The Latin grammarians translated the term as *mediae* (*litterae*), and this usage is still found in some modern English books. The *Téchnē* clearly puts them in a single dimension of ‘roughness’, and the commentators all follow this line. The homorganic articulation of the three triads was well rec-



ognized, and an approximation to their places of articulation was achieved (e. g. Hilgard 1901: 43.10–44.14); but, as we know, the proper diagnosis of voice was not made by western linguists until they had learned the lessons of the Sanskritic Indian phoneticians (cf. Allen 1953: 33–37). The scholiasts all discuss the *méssa* without adding significantly to their elucidation.

We also see that no reference is made either in the *Téchnē* or by the scholiasts to the phonetic value of written  $\gamma$ , /g/, before another velar or before /m/, as [ŋ]. Priscian discusses this (Keil 2: 7–30) and reports a special name for it in Greek, *agma* (αγμα).

7. Περὶ συλλαβῆς.

Συλλαβὴ δὲ ἐστὶ κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνου μετὰ φωνήεντος ἢ φωνηέντων, οἷον Κάρ, βοῦς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐνὸς φωνήεντος, οἷον ᾠ, ἦ.

[7. On the syllable.

Properly a syllable is a combination of a consonant with one or with two vowels, as in *Kár* ‘Carian’ and *boús* ‘ox’, but it is less properly also used with reference to a single vowel, like *a* and *(h)ē*.]

There follow three sections on syllable length; syllables may be long “by nature”, containing a long vowel or diphthong, or “by position”, when the vowel is followed by a double consonant or by more than one single consonant.

*Commentary*

The insistence on the term “syllable” being only properly applied to a minimal structure *CV*, while seeming rather pettifogging to a modern phonologist, is entirely understandable. The word as a technical term, like all other linguistic terminology, had been taken over by the Greeks from general usage, where its meaning ‘taking together’ was obvious and its etymology was more prominent to a Greek writer than that of the word *syllable* is today.

A scholiast points out the phonological importance of the syllable as the unit bearing a single accent and a single breath force, with no possibility of an internal pause (Hilgard 1901: 48.11–15):

Ἔστιν οὖν τὸ ἐλλείπον τοῦτο, “ὄφ’ ἐν πνεῦμα καὶ ἓνα τόνον ἀδιαστάτως λεγομένη”, ὥστε τὸν ὄλον ὄρον συλλαβῆς εἶναι τοιοῦ-

τον “συλλαβὴ ἐστὶ κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνων μετὰ φωνήεντος ἢ φωνηέντων ὄφ’ ἓνα τόνον καὶ ἐν πνεῦμα ἀδιαστάτως λεγομένη”.

[(The definition given in the *Téchnē*) is deficient, as it omits this: “uttered with a single breath force and a single accent”, so that the full definition is like this: “The syllable is properly the combination of consonants with one or with two vowels uttered with a single breath force and a single accent”.]

At the upper limit of syllable structure several scholiasts cite the word *stránx* ‘drop (of liquid)’, phonetically [stránks], remarkably coincidental with the English maximal syllabic structure exemplified in *strengths* [streŋθs] (e. g. Hilgard 1901: 345.22).

11. Περὶ λέξεως.

Λέξις ἐστὶ μέρος τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου ἐλάχιστον.

[On the word.

A word is the minimal part of a syntactic construction.]

Περὶ λόγου.

Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ πεζῆς τε καὶ ἐμμέτρου λέξεως σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αὐτοτελῆ δηλοῦσα. Τοῦ δὲ λόγου μέρη ὀκτώ, ὄνομα, ῥήμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντωνυμία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα καὶ σύνδεσμος, ἡ γὰρ προσηγορία ὡς εἶδος τῶ ὀνόματι ὑποβέβληται.

[On the sentence.

A sentence is a combination of words in prose or verse expressing a complete thought. There are eight parts of the sentence (parts of speech, word classes): noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, and conjunction. The common noun has been put under the noun as one of its subclasses.]

*Commentary*

This section defines the lower and the upper limits of grammar (morphology and syntax) of the Hellenistic and Byzantine grammarians. Only in the nineteenth century was the concept, and later the name, of morpheme evolved, largely under the influence of the Indian grammarians; and it has not been until the present century that grammar, as opposed to rhetoric and stylistics, should be extended beyond sentences to take in whole paragraphs and texts, in text grammar. Bloomfield was able to write in 1933 (1935: 170): “Each sentence is an independent linguistic

form, not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form". This is the same in essence as the statement in the *Téchnē*, though expressed in more formal terms. The only moves in the direction of a formalized grammar of suprasentential texts were made by the *Téchnē* and the commentators in their listing of some conjunctions (today's particles), in section 20.

The theory and the terminology of the *Téchnē* and of the Byzantine commentators remained firmly in what Hockett has referred to as the W(ord and) P(aradigm) model (1954: 210). Inflection and derivation are treated as alterations, mostly in the "endings" of words, following the Stoic term *klísis* [bending, inflection], drawn from the language of material objects (cf. *Téchnē*, section 19: *Epírrhēmá esti méros lógou ákliton* [the adverb is an uninflected part of speech]; Hilgard 1901: 262.3: *klísis ákolouthos* [concordant inflection]). Another metaphorical usage is seen in *kineísthai* [to be moved, disturbed]: *kinoúntai dé hai antónymiai kai katà prósopon kai katà ptôsin* [pronouns are altered both in accordance with person and with case] (Hilgard 1901: 262.7). *Légein* [to end] is a frequently used term, though its actual form is often omitted (*Téchnē*, section 12, on the different types of superlatives): *ho eis -tatos, hoíon oxýtatos, bradýtatos, kai ho eis -stos, hoíon mégistos, áristos* [the one (ending) in *-tatos*, like *oxýtatos* 'sharpest' and *bradýtatos* 'slowest' and the one (ending) in *-stos*, like *mégistos* 'biggest' and *áristos* 'best'], *hôte eis -os légei hē geniké* [when the genitive ends in *-os*] (Hilgard 1901: 367.13), *tês eis ou légousēs* [of the (case) ending in *-ou*] (369: 10), *pása metochē thēlykē eis a légei ē eis ē, hoíon légousa legoménē* [every feminine participle ends in *-a* or in *-ē*, as in *légousa* 'saying' and *legoménē* 'said'] (416: 24–25). Compound words that included one or more bound forms were referred to as made up from 'incomplete' (*apoleíponτες*) words (cf. *Téchnē* section 12, paragraph 5). The unlimited grammatical extensibility of sentences was recognized in the possibility of the continued use of certain conjunctive particles (section 20).

The *Téchnē* defines *léxis* [word] as the minimal part of a syntactic construction. This is a formal definition, more pellucid than its usual translation *part of speech*, which appears to have arisen from the different meanings of Latin *oratio* ['speech' and 'sentence']; Priscian used *pars orationis* as the Latin equivalent of the Greek *méros lógou* (Keil 1855: 53.8), echoing the text of the *Téchnē*, though (*more suo*) with much greater prolixity.

The set of eight word classes (parts of speech) became standard in Alexandrian and Byzantine grammar books. It had evolved through

several generations of grammarians from the first division of the sentence, given by Plato, distinguishing the nominal and verbal components, like the generative grammarians'  $S \rightarrow NP VP$ , through the Stoics to the Alexandrian Aristarchus, the teacher of Dionysius Thrax. The note on common nouns being subclassified as nouns in one overall class refers to the Stoic system which distinguished them as a separate class, that continued among some writers of grammars (Hilgard 1901: 14.18–19; 356.7–9; Wouters 1979: 52). The eight word-class system was set out by the *Téchnē* and assumed in the syntactic work of Apollonius. It was taken over by the Latin grammarians but with the interjection recognized as a separate class; the Greek system treated it as a subclass of adverbs (section 19), except for *ô*, which was assigned to the article class as its vocative case form. The Latins retained the number eight because the language does not have an article, and the relative pronoun (*qui, quae, quod*) was included either among the nouns, as in Priscian's grammar, or among the pronouns. Traditional language teaching, particularly of the classical languages, has included the participle among the inflections of the verb and separated the nouns substantive from the nouns adjective, but otherwise it has preserved the system more or less unchanged.

The stability of the system was recognized by the scholiasts and Dionysius Thrax was named as its first expositor: (Hilgard 1901: 128.27–28) *Thraîx Dionýsios, ho perì tôn oktô merôn tou lógou didáxas hēmās* [Dionysius Thrax, who taught us about the eight word classes], though one added that to the *Téchnē*'s definition of the *léxis* [word] should be added that it was a minimal meaningful unit (*méros eláchiston dianoías*) (Hilgard 1901: 212.2–4). The Homeric line (*Iliad* 22.59) was cited as a sentence comprising one each of the eight classes:

*pròs dé me tòn dýstēnon éti phronéont'*  
preposition conjunction pronoun article noun adverb participle  
*elēson*  
verb

'Have pity on me, the unhappy one, while yet living'.

(Hilgard 1901: 58.16)

The primary division of the sentence into NP and VP was retained in the scholiasts' statement that words of these two classes, noun and verb, were the minimal independent sentence components, dividing the semantic content of a sentence, and the prototypical minimal sentence was exemplified in *Sôkrátēs anagignôskei* 'Socrates is reading'. The indispensability of the noun and the verb, their order in the minimal sentence, other than

elliptical or stylistically marked sentences, and their order of presentation in the *Téchnē* were justified on both syntactic and semantic grounds. The following scholiast's comments are typical:

Τῶν ἄλλων προύχουσι ταῦτα τὰ δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, κύρια γὰρ καὶ γνησιώτερα μέρη λόγου τὰ δύο ταῦτα, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν τελείαν σύνταξιν ἐπινενόηται.  
... μετοχὴ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ιδιότητος καὶ μεταξὺ εἶναι ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· καὶ ἄρθρον διὰ τὸ συναρτᾶσθαι πτωτικοῖς, τουτέστι συνδεδεσμέναι· ἀντωνυμία δὲ ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνεσθαι· πρόθεσις δὲ διὰ τὸ προτιθεσθαι τῶν προειρημένων δύο μερῶν τοῦ λόγου, ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ἐπίρρημα δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ ῥήματα φέρεσθαι· σύνδεσμος δέ, ἐπειδὴ συνδεδεμένοι.

[These two parts of speech, the noun and the verb take precedence over the others, because these two are dominant and more genuine parts of a sentence, and the others have been invented for a full construction ... The participle is so called because it participates in the property of verbs and nouns and lies between them, the article ('joint') because it is joined with case-inflected words, that is to say, it is bound together with them, the pronoun because it is taken into use in place of a noun, the preposition because it is preposed to the two aforementioned parts of speech, the adverb because it is brought in connection with the verb, and the conjunction because it joins (parts of a sentence).] (Hilgard 1901: 357.37–358.9)

Ἐλλόγως τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ῥήματος προτακτέον, εἰ καὶ προτέτακται τῇ φύσει τὸ ῥῆμα, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα κατὰ οὐσιῶν τίθεται, τὰ δὲ ῥήματα κατὰ πραγμάτων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομα οὐσίας ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα πράγματος· κυριώτερα δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων· ἀσύστατον γὰρ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν δίχα τοῦ μετίοντος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, εἰ μὴ εἴη ὁ μετίων τὴν ἀναγίγνωσιν Σωκράτης· προτερνεύτω τοίνυν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅσον καὶ ἡ οὐσία προτερνεύει τοῦ πράγματος.

[There are good reasons for placing the noun before the verb, even if it has been natural to put the verb first, because nouns relate to substances, but verbs relate to actions; the noun designates a substance, the verb an action. Substances are superior to actions. It is nonsensical to speak of philosophizing without the person doing it, and likewise about reading if there were not Socrates doing some

reading; so let the noun take precedence over the verb, in as much as substance takes precedence over action.] (Hilgard 1901: 358.14–21)

The independent statement in this section insisting on the common and the proper nouns belonging to the same class may be a deliberate correction of an earlier Stoic-influenced separation referred to in the Introduction (p. 42).

## 12. Περὶ ὀνόματος.

Ὄνομα ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαῖνον, σῶμα μὲν οἷον λίθος, πρᾶγμα δὲ οἷον παιδεία, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως λεγόμενον, κοινῶς μὲν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, ἰδίως δὲ οἷον Σωκράτης, Πλάτων. Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ὀνόματι πέντε γένη, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πτώσεις.

Γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τρία, ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν καὶ οὐδέτερον, ἔνιοι δὲ προστιθέασιν τούτοις καὶ ἕτερα δύο, κοινόν τε καὶ ἐπίκοινον, κοινόν μὲν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, ἐπίκοινον δὲ οἷον γελιδόν, ἀετός.

Εἶδη δὲ δύο, πρωτότυπον καὶ παράγωγον. πρωτότυπον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην θέσιν λεχθέν, οἷον γῆ, παράγωγον δὲ τὸ ἀφ' ἑτέρου τὴν γένεσιν ἐσχηκός, οἷον γαιήϊος. Εἶδη δὲ παράγωγον εἰσὶ ἑπτὰ, πατρωνυμικόν, κτητικόν, συγκριτικόν, ὑποκοριστικόν, παρόνυμον, ὑπερθετικόν καὶ ῥηματικόν. πατρωνυμικόν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ κυρίως τὸ ἀπὸ πατρὸς ἐσχηματισμένον, καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ προγόνων, οἷον Πηλεΐδης ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς καὶ Αἰακίδης.

Κτητικόν δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κτήσιν πεπτωκός, ἐμπεριειλημμένου τοῦ κτήτορος, οἷον Νηληΐαι ἵπποι, Ἐκτόρεος χιτών, Πλατωνικόν βιβλίον. Συγκριτικόν δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν ἔχον ἑνὸς πρὸς ἓνα ὁμοιογενῆ, οἷον Ἀχιλλεύς ἀνδρείότερος τῶν Τρώων. τῶν δὲ συγκριτικῶν τύποι εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ὁ εἰς τερος, οἷον ὀξύτερος, βραδύτερος, καὶ ὁ εἰς ων καθαρόν, οἷον βελτίων, καλλίων, καὶ ὁ εἰς ων, οἷον κρείσσω, ἥσσω. Ὑπερθετικόν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἐπίτασιν ἑνὸς πρὸς πολλοὺς παραλαμβανόμενον ἐν συγκρίσει. Τύποι δὲ αὐτοῦ εἰσὶ δύο, ὁ εἰς τατος, οἷον ὀξύτατος, βραδύτατος, καὶ ὁ εἰς στος, οἷον μέγιστος, ἀριστος. Ὑπερκοριστικόν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μείωσιν τοῦ πρωτοτύπου δηλοῦν ἀσυγκρίτως, οἷον ἀνθρωπίσκος, λίθαξ, μαιρακύλλιον. Παρόνυμον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ παρ' ὄνομα ἢ ὡς ἐξ ὀνόματος ποιηθέν, οἷον θεῶν, Τρύφων. Ῥηματικόν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ῥήματος παρηγμένον, οἷον Φιλήμων, Νοήμων.

Σχήματα δὲ ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ τρία, ἀπλοῦν, σύνθετον, παρασύνθετον, ἀπλοῦν μὲν οἶον Μένων, σύνθετον οἶον Ἀγαμέμνων, παρασύνθετον δὲ οἶον Ἀγαμεμνονίδης, Φιλίππιδης. Τῶν δὲ συνθέτων διαφοραὶ εἰσὶ τέσσαρες, ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν ἐκ δύο τελείων, ὡς χειρίσοφος, ἃ δὲ ἐκ δύο ἀπολείποντων, ὡς Σοφοκλῆς, ἃ δὲ ἐξ ἀπολείποντος καὶ τελείου, ὡς Φιλόδημος, ἃ δὲ ἐκ τελείου καὶ ἀπολείποντος, ὡς Παρικλῆς.

Ἀριθμοὶ δὲ τρεῖς, ἐνικός, δυικός καὶ πληθυντικός, ἐνικός μὲν οἶον Ὅμηρος, δυικός δὲ οἶον τῷ Ὀμήρῳ, πληθυντικός δὲ οἶον Ὅμηροι. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες ἐνικοὶ χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, οἶον δῆμος, χορός, καὶ πληθυντικοὶ κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυικῶν, ἐνικῶν μὲν ὡς Ἀθῆναι, Θῆβαι, δυικῶν δὲ ὡς ἀμφοτέροι.

Πτώσεις δὲ εἰσὶν ὀνομάτων πέντε, ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική καὶ κλητική. Λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ὀρθή ὀνομαστική καὶ εὐθεΐα, ἡ δὲ γενική κτητική καὶ πατρική, ἡ δὲ δοτική ἐπισταλτική, ἡ δὲ αἰτιατική κατ' αἰτίαν, ἡ δὲ κλητική προσαγορευτική.

#### [12. On the noun.

A noun is a part of speech inflected for case, designating a physical object or an abstract entity, an object such as “stone”, an abstract entity such as “education”. It may be used in both a common sense and in an individual sense, common as in “man” or “horse”, individual (proper) as “Socrates” or “Plato”. Five categories apply to nouns: gender, subclass, form, number, and case.

There are three genders, masculine, feminine, and neuter. Some add two more to these, common and epicene, common as with *ánthrōpos* ‘human being’ (which may be used as a feminine noun, meaning ‘woman’) or *hippos* ‘horse’ (stallion or mare), epicene as with *chelidón* ‘swallow’ (always feminine) and *aetós* ‘eagle’ (always masculine).

There are two (major) subclasses, primary and derived. Primary nouns are those used as they were first imposed on things, such as *gḗ* ‘earth’; derived nouns are those having their origin in another word, like *gaiḗios* ‘earthly’. There are seven subclassifications of derived nouns: patronymics, possessives, comparatives, diminutives, denominals, superlatives, and deverbals. A patronymic is strictly a noun formed from the father’s name, less properly from one of the ancestors, as with Achilles ‘son of Peleus’ and ‘(grand)son of Aecus’.]

There follow details of various formations of patronymics.

[A possessive is a noun relating to possession, including the possessor’s name, like *Neleus’s horses*, *Hector’s coat*, a *Platonic book*. A comparative is one that compares one with another of a similar class, e. g. *Achilles is braver than Ajax*, or with many of different classes, *Achilles is braver than the Trojans*. There are three types of comparatives: those ending in *-teros*, like *oxýteros* ‘sharper’, and *bradýteros* ‘slower’, those ending in *-ōn*, like *belliōn* ‘better’, and *kalliōn* ‘more beautiful’, and those ending in *-sōn*, like *kreíssōn* ‘better’, and *hḗssōn* ‘worse’. A superlative is a noun that brings the intensiveness of one individual into comparison with many others. There are two types: those ending in *-tatos*, like *oxýtatos* ‘sharpest’, and *bradýtatos* ‘slowest’, and those ending in *-istos*, like *mégistos* ‘biggest’, and *áristos* ‘best’. A diminutive is a noun that indicates a smaller version of its original without any comparison, like *ánthrōpiskos* ‘manikin’, *líthax* ‘pebble’ (*líthos* ‘stone’), *meirakýllion* ‘a mere boy’ (*meirákion* ‘boy’). A denominal noun is one formed alongside another noun or from it, like *Théōn* (*theós* ‘god’) or *Trýphōn* (*tryphḗ* ‘softness’, ‘luxury’). A deverbal noun is one derived from a verb, like *Philémōn* (*phileîn* ‘to love’), or *Noémōn* (*noeîn* ‘to understand’).

There are three forms of nouns, simple, compound, and decompound, simple like *Mémnōn*, compound like *Agamémnōn*, and decompound like *Agamemnonidēs* ‘descendant of Agamemnon’, or *Philippidēs* ‘descendant of Philip’ (*phileîn*, ‘to love’, *hippos* ‘horse’). There are four different forms of compounding, some compounds being formed from two complete words, as *cheirísophos* ‘skilled with the hands’ (*cheirí* ‘by hand’, *sóphos* ‘clever’), some from two incomplete words, as *Sophoklḗs* (*sópho-* ‘clever’, ‘wise’, *kléos* ‘fame’), some from an incomplete word and a complete one, as *Philódēmos* (*phílo-* ‘friend’, *dēmos* ‘people’), and some from a complete and an incomplete word, as *Periklḗs* (‘famous all round’, *perí* ‘around’, *kléos*).

There are three numbers, singular, dual, and plural, singular like *Hómēros* ‘Homer’, dual like *tò Homērō* ‘the two Homers’, and plural like *Hómēroi* ‘(more than two) Homers’. Some nouns that are singular in form refer to many individuals, like ‘people’, ‘chorus’, and some that are plural in form refer to single items, like *Athens*, *Thebes* (the Greek nouns *Athēnai* and *Thēbai* were morphologically plural), and to two items, like *amphóteroi* ‘both’.

There are five cases, nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, and vocative. The nominative is also called the naming case and the

upright case, the genitive is also called the possessive case and the paternal case, the dative is also called the epistolary case, the accusative the causative case, and the vocative the case of address ...]

There follows a separate subclassification of nouns on the same lines as the preceding: proper, common, adjectival, relative, quasi-relative, homonym, synonym, double naming, given name, ethnic name, interrogative, indefinite, anaphoric, collective, distributive, inclusive, onomatopoeic, generic, specific, ordinal, (cardinal) numeral, participatory, independent (understood in isolation), and two classes of deverbal nouns, active and passive.

#### Commentary

The sections on the noun and the verb (13) well illustrate the style and the context of the *Téchnē*. The conciseness of the definitions and subclassifications, with the relevant categories, imply an established descriptive procedure, requiring no extensive justification, whatever may be the date of much of the text as we have it. In this it is very unlike the syntactic books of Apollonius, a teacher like Dionysius, but one who feels the need to question, discuss, and defend with examples much of what he is saying about Greek syntax. But he assumes the Dionysian classifications and morphological categories, only differing in one or two definitions.

In the definition of the noun given in the *Téchnē* the word *prâgma* requires some comment. It is clearly to be understood in a different sense from that incorporated in the definition of the verb by the commentators (which is to be seen in the comments quoted on the preceding two sections). The commentators make the distinction in the *Téchnē*'s definition between *sôma* and *prâgma* explicitly one of a three-dimensional existent as against an abstract one (Hilgard 1901: 524.13–15):

Σωμά ἐστι τὸ τριζῆ διάστατον, μήκει, πλάτει, βάθει, ἀφῆ τὲ καὶ θέα ὑποπίπτον· πρᾶγμα ὃ μηδὲν τούτων ἔπεται, νῶ δὲ μόνον νοεῖται.

[A body is something that extends in length, width, and depth, and is accessible to touch and sight; an abstraction is something to which none of these apply, but is entertained only in the mind.]

Another commentator unites the two concepts under the single head of *ousia* 'existent, substance' (Hilgard 1901: 214.26).

Word-form variation is treated under the term *parepόμενα* (literally) [what follows], translated by the Latins as *accidentia* (hence English *accidence* for this part of grammar). It is indeed likened to the Aristotelian *symbebēkóta* [accidents, properties] by a scholiast (Hilgard 1901: 217.23) *parepόμενον δὲ ἐστὶ symbebēkós* (cf. Aristotle *Topics* 131 a 27, *Sophistical refutations* 168 b 28–31). When we look at the formal differences in the lists of *parepόμενα*, we see that in the main line of Greek (and Latin) grammar no distinction was made between inflectional and derivational categories. Such a distinction was made by Varro, between *declinatio naturalis* and *declinatio voluntaria*, respectively (*De lingua Latina* 8: 21–22), and more formally set out on different criteria as *modi respectivi* and *modi absoluti* by the scholastic grammarians in the western later Middle Ages.

Case inflection entered into the definition of the noun just as caselessness was part of the definition of the verb. This made inevitable the separate recognition of the participle, since this was both case-inflected and subject to most of the specifically verbal categories (section 15).

Of the nominal categories case is the most interesting. It had been established by the Stoics in its continuing position as the primary distinguishing feature of nominally inflected words. Though the *Téchnē* says little about it, a syntactic theory of case, already established in Stoic theory and the subject of a separate book by Apollonius, was further developed by the Byzantine grammarians; and it has persisted through the centuries to the present day in versions of case grammar, and case assignment is now a basic component of generative grammar (Horrocks 1987: 102–108).

In Antiquity and still among most modern linguists case is a category of morphological differences in nominal words with various syntactic and semantic functions. Since the Stoics the Greek cases were divided into the nominative and the oblique cases. The commentators had to explain both the use of the term *ptōsis*, in object language 'fall', and the justification for the nominative being called the 'upright' case in Greek (*orthē* or *eutheia*). They regarded the noun as such, before its "fall" or case assignment, as a more abstract lexical entity not yet fully grammaticalized (Hilgard 1901: 231.16–27):

Ἀπαριθμησάμενος τὰς πτώσεις διδάσκει ἡμᾶς πῶς ἐκάστη λέγεται. Λέγει τὴν εὐθεῖαν καὶ ὀνομαστικὴν, καθὼς ὀνομάζειν τινὰ βουλόμενοι ταύτη κεχρήμεθα ... Πῶς δὲ οἷόν τ' ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν καὶ πῶσιν λέγεσθαι; Καὶ φαμεν ὅτι δυνατόν τὴν πῶσιν

λέγεσθαι καὶ εὐθείαν κατὰ τινὰ λόγον· καθὼ μὲν γὰρ πέπτωκεν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ εἰς ἰδιότητα, ὀνομάζεται πτώσις· καθὼ δὲ πεσοῦσα ἔμεινεν ὀρθή καὶ ἔστιν ὡσπερ ἦν ἐν τῷ γενικῷ, καλοῖτο ἂν ὀρθή, ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν καὶ περὶ γραφείου, ὡσπερ ἂν τις λάβῃ γραφεῖον καὶ ἀφῆ εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ ὀρθὸν στή, καθὼ μὲν πέπτωκεν ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς, δοκεῖ πεπτωκέναι, καθὼ δὲ πεσὼν ὀρθὸν ἔσται, λέγεται ὀρθόν.

[Having made an inventory of the cases (Dionysius) teaches us how each one gets its name. He calls the ‘upright’ case also the nominative, in as much as we use it when we want to name someone ... But how is it possible that this same upright case can also be called a ‘fall’? We say that there is some sense in allowing the ‘fall’ to be also upright. For in so far as it has fallen from generality into a particular case, it is called a fall; but in so far as having fallen it remained upright and is in the same position as it was in its generic form, we would call it upright, as we would say of a stylus, if someone dropped it to the ground and it stood upright, that in so far as it has fallen from his hand it does seem to have fallen, but in so far as having fallen it stood upright it is said to be upright.]

The nominative case is used with nouns in the subject position in basic sentence structure, as compared with the “sideways” oblique cases used in object positions, that is, designating entities acted upon; mostly these were accusative case forms but some verbs constructed with objects required genitive or dative cases. A commentator continues a Stoic metaphorical explanation of this distinction in cases from wrestling, and justifies the practice of listing the genitive immediately after the nominative by the fact that in passive sentences the agent is put into the genitive case, corresponding to the subject of active constructions (Hilgard 1901: 546.13–14):

Ὅρθως σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ συντάσσεται τοῖς ὀρθοῖς ῥήμασι, τούτεστι τοῖς ἐνεργητικοῖς.

[(The upright) case designates the substance involved in the action as upright, and it constructs with “upright” verbs, that is, active (transitive) verbs.] (Hilgard 1901: 546.13–14)

Ἡ δὲ γενικὴ προτάσσεται τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· τὰ ἐνεργητικὰ ῥήματα καλοῦνται δραστικά, καλοῦνται καὶ ὀρθά, προσερχόμενα δὲ εἰς πάθη καλοῦνται καὶ παθητικά καὶ ὑπτία, ἀπὸ

μεταφορᾶς τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ὀρθῶν ἢ ὑπτίων καλουμένων· τὰ δὲ προερχόμενα ἐνεργητικὰ γενικῇ συντάσσονται μετὰ τῆς ὑπὸ προθέσεως, τύπτω, τύπτομαι ὑπὸ σοῦ.

[The genitive is put before the other (oblique cases) for these reasons: active (transitive) verbs are called effective and also upright, but those that are getting involved with being acted upon are called both passive and laid back, from the metaphor drawn from athletes who are either named as upright or laid back. The forementioned active verbs are constructed with the genitive case with the preposition *hypō* ‘by’ (when they are passivized): *týptō* ‘I beat’, *týptomai* ‘I am beaten’ *hypō sou* ‘by you’.] (Hilgard 1901: 548.34–549.2)

This commentator also gives an alternative derivation for *ptōsis* as a technical term, from the falling of dice (Hilgard 1901: 546.12), a derivation proposed by Sittig (1931) and supported by Hjelmslev (1935).

Choeroboscus (Hilgard 1894. I: 109.30–34) offers both alternative explanations of *ptōsis*, distinguishing the nominative (“upright fall”) from the oblique (“sideways fall”), as a metaphor from a dropped stylus, which may fall upright or in a sideways position. However, he prefers the dice metaphor without giving a proper explanation (*hōper béltion éstin* [which is preferable]), and one must admit that the falling stylus metaphor does distinguish the nominative from the oblique cases more readily.

The accusative case was defined simply in the *Téchnē* as the case involved in a caused action, the effected or the affected case. The standard term *accusative* is usually attributed to Varro (*De lingua Latina* 8.66–67, *casus accusandi*); a scholiast gives it a double function, based on the double sense of the Greek verb *aitiāsthai* [‘to allege as a cause’ and ‘to accuse’] (Hilgard 1901: 232.3–4: *kat’ aitian phēsin étoi kat’ aítiasin* [he uses the term in relation to causation or accusation]).

In later years a definite localist theory of case was evolved and has continued in importance. It is principally associated with the syntactic work of Maximus Planudes (pp. 215–227); its origin lies in the sets of three denominal adverbs (section 19), like *oikoi* ‘at home’, *oikade* ‘homeward’, and *oikothēn* ‘from home’, though this is not further commented on either by the author of the *Téchnē* or by the scholiasts.

The concluding paragraphs of the section, as given in the *Téchnē*, return to the subclassification of nouns under the category of *eidē* [subclasses]. These paragraphs coexist rather strangely with the earlier listing of nominal *eidē* and it was suspected as a later insertion by Steinthal (1891: 249–251), who otherwise accepts the *Téchnē* as the work of

Dionysius in its present form, but the scholiasts include them in their commentaries. If the text is regarded as having passed through several “editions” over the years such occasional inconsistent interpolations are not improbable.

Partially repeating what has already been said about the *eidē*, this further listing includes the subclass of *ónoma epítheton*, translated by Priscian as *nomen adiectivum* and destined for separate recognition as *adjective* in modern times. Two comments are in order:

(1) Both the *Téchnē* and the commentators write themselves out of the modern criteria for the recognition of adjectives, namely the three grades of positive, comparative, and superlative, through their separate listing the latter two as themselves different subclasses, *synkritikón* and *hyperthetikón*.

(2) In view of the other subclasses of nouns given in this listing and in the earlier list, the class membership of *ónoma epítheton* is more constrained semantically than is the class of adjectives in modern European grammars. The relevant passage reads:

Ἐπιθετὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν ὁμωνύμως τιθέμενον καὶ δηλοῦν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον. λαμβάνεται δὲ τριχῶς, ἀπὸ ψυχῆς, ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός, ἀπὸ μὲν ψυχῆς ὡς τὸ σῶφρων, ἀκόλαστος, ἀπὸ δὲ σώματος ὡς τὸ ταχύς, βραδύς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐκτός ὡς τὸ πλούσιος, πένης.

[A (noun) adjective is one that is put with proper noun and common nouns and with various meanings, indicating praise or reproach. Adjectives have three sources: from mental states, like ‘prudent’ and ‘intemperate’, from bodily states, like ‘quick’ and ‘slow’, and from external conditions, like ‘rich’ and ‘poor’.]

The commentators add little to this. But syntactically they observe the parallelism between *epítheta* and *epirrhémata*, being subordinated to other nouns and to verbs respectively (Hilgard 1901: 233.25–27; 552.26–27), and this is why adjectival nouns have forms for each of the three genders (553.3). “Double naming” (p. 64) refers to the two names given to a single individual, with the example *Paris* and *Alexander*.

### 13. Περὶ ῥήματος.

Ῥῆμά ἐστὶ λέξις ἄπτωτος, ἐπιδεκτικὴ χρόνων τε καὶ προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν, ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παριστώσα. Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ῥήματι ὀκτώ, ἐγκλίσεις, διαθέσεις, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί,

χρόνοι, πρόσωπα, συζυγία. καὶ ἐγκλίσεις μὲν εἰσι πέντε, ὀριστική, προστακτική, εὐκτική, ὑποτακτική καὶ ἀπαρέμφατος. διαθέσεις δὲ εἰσι τρεῖς, ἐνέργεια, πάθος, μεσότης· ἐνέργεια μὲν οἶον τύπτω, πάθος δὲ οἶον τύπτομαι, μεσότης δὲ ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτὲ δὲ πάθος παριστώσα, οἶον πέποιθα, διέφθορα, ἐκποιησάμην, ἐγραψάμην. εἶδη δὲ δύο, πρωτότυπον καὶ παράγωγον, πρωτότυπον μὲν οἶον ἄρδω, παράγωγον δὲ οἶον ἀρδεύω. σχήματα δὲ τρία, ἀπλοῦν, σύνθετον, παρασύνθετον. ἀπλοῦν μὲν οἶον φρονῶ, σύνθετον δὲ οἶον καταφρονῶ, παρασύνθετον δὲ οἶον ἀντιγονίζω, φιλιππίζω. ἀριθμοὶ δὲ τρεῖς, ἐνικός, δυικός καὶ πληθυντικός· ἐνικός μὲν οἶον τύπτω, δυικός δὲ οἶον τύπτeton, πληθυντικός δὲ οἶον τύπτομεν. πρόσωπα δὲ τρεῖς, πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον πρῶτον οἶον τύπτω, δεύτερον οἶον τύπτεις, τρίτον οἶον τύπτει· πρῶτον μὲν ἀφ’ οὗ ὁ λόγος, δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, τρίτον δὲ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος. χρόνοι δὲ τρεῖς, ἐνεστώς, παρεληλυθώς, μέλλον. τούτων δὲ ὁ παρεληλυθώς ἔχει διαφορὰς τέσσαρας, παρατατικόν, παρακειμένον, ὑπερσυντελικόν, ἄριστον, ὧν συγγένειαι εἰσι τρεῖς, ἐνεστώτος πρὸς παρατατικόν, παρακειμένου πρὸς ὑπερσυντελικόν, ἄριστου πρὸς μέλλοντα.

[13. On the verb.

A verb is a word not inflected for case, but admitting tense, person, and number and indicating an activity or being acted on. Eight categories are applicable to a verb: mood, voice, subclass, form, number, tense, person, and conjugation. There are five moods: indicative, imperative, optative, subjunctive, and infinitive. There are three voices: active, passive, and middle: active like *týptō* ‘I hit’, passive like *týptomai* ‘I am hit’, and middle, which sometimes designates an action and sometimes an experience, like *pépoitha* ‘I obey’ (‘I have been persuaded’), *diéphthora* ‘I have been destroyed’, *epoiēsámēn* ‘I did it for myself’, and *egrapsámēn* ‘I wrote for myself’. There are two subclasses, primary and derived, primary like *árdō* ‘I water’, and derived like *ardeiúō* ‘I water’. There are three forms: simple, compound, and decompound: simple like *phronō* ‘I think’, compound like *kataphronō* ‘I despise’, and decompound like *antigonizō* ‘I support Antigonus’ and *philippizō* ‘I support Philip’. There are three numbers, singular, dual, and plural, e.g. *týptō* ‘I hit’, *týpteton* ‘you two hit’, and *týptomen* ‘we (more than two) hit’. There are three persons first, second, and third: *týptō* ‘I hit’, *týpteis* ‘you (singular) hit’, *týptei* ‘he, she, it hits’; the first person denotes the

speaker, the second person denotes the one addressed, and the third person denotes who or what the sentence is about. There are three tenses, present, past, and future; of these the past has four distinctions: imperfect, perfect, pluperfect, and aorist; and there are three linkages: the present with the imperfect, the perfect with the pluperfect, and the aorist with the future.]

There follows one section on the conjugations, the contracted verbs (*phileîn* 'to love', etc.), and the verbs in *-mî*.

#### Commentary

The verb receives the same kind of treatment as the noun in its definition, subclassification, and relevant categories.

The five moods (Priscian's *modi*) are glossed by the scholiasts as indicating "attitudes of the mind" towards what is being expressed (*dêloûsi diathêseis psychês*), and three of them are defined in semantic or pragmatic terms: stating, commanding, wishing. The subjunctive (*hypotaktikê*) is named after its subordinated role in syntax, after such conjunctions as *hîna* 'in order that ...' and *eân* 'if', and the infinitive (*aparêmphatos*) is so called from its exemption from two of the constraining or modifying categories, person and number (Hilgard 1901: 245.1–9). Lacking these *paremphatiká* [modifications] it could be regarded as belonging to a higher level of abstraction, rather like the noun when considered apart from its cases (pp. 65–66). A scholiast writes (Hilgard 1901: 72.29–30):

Τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον ὀνομά τοῦ πράγματος καὶ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ μήπω ἐμπεσόν εἰς ψυχὴν.

[The infinitive is the name of the action and signifies the action itself before it has entered the mind.]

Despite their elaborations the scholiasts' treatment of verbal mood remains incomplete; indicatives can be subordinated, optatives are the required subordinated mood in some constructions, and subjunctives can be used as the main or the sole verb in some independent sentences.


The Greek verb had three voices that could all be formally differentiated in some tenses: *égrapsa* 'I wrote', *egráphê* 'it was written', and *égrapsámên* 'I wrote for myself'. *Energêtikôn* [active] was used of active transitive verbs; intransitive verbs, though they may be active in form, are designated *oudétera* [neutral] (Hilgard 1901: 246.11). While active and passive present no special problems, the semantics of the Greek middle

voice is notoriously difficult to analyse. The forms classed as middle in the *Téchne*, as variously expressing an active or a passive role, are set up without regard to their actual forms; *pépoitha* and *diéphthora* are morphologically active forms in the perfect tense, while *epoiêsámên* and *égrapsámên* are distinctively middle voice forms (in fact, in classical Greek *diéphthora* is regularly active in meaning). The scholiasts concentrate almost exclusively on the ambiguous nature of middle verbs, standing between active and passive signification. Only a brief reference is made by one scholiast to the self-involvement of middle verbs (Hilgard 1901: 246.5–6): *tò epoiêsámên dêloí hótî emautôi epoiêsá ti 'epoiêsámên* means 'I did something for myself'.

Just as case was incorporated into the definition of the noun, *chrónos* [time] was given first place in the formal definition of the verb. Aristotle had pointed out that a verb form necessarily had temporal reference (*De interpretatione* 3: *rhêma dé esti tò prossēmaînon chrónon* [the verb is what additionally indicates time]), and this was developed by all later grammarians. But the morphosemantics of the Greek verb, as with verbs and verbal groups in most languages, is not as simple as that. The Stoics distinguished two inherent and interlocking meanings, time reference and aspect, continuous or incomplete and completed, and this was followed most perceptively and neatly by Varro in his account of the Latin verb (*De lingua Latina* 9.96–97 and 10.48). The account in the *Téchne* which became the account in the main-line tradition, tried to subsume all tense meanings under the single heading of time reference, even though some of its terminology is manifestly drawn from Stoic aspectual usage.

The formal tense distinctions are first divided into present, past, and future, and then the past is further divided into four varieties:

*enestós* 'present'

*parelēlythós* 'past' 

*mêllôn* 'future'

There are then listed three "close relationships" (*syngéneiai*), on morphological grounds: present with imperfect (e.g. *poiô* 'I do', *epoioûn* 'I was doing', perfect with pluperfect (e.g. *pepoiêka* 'I have done', *epepoiêkein* 'I had done'), and aorist with future (*epoiêsa* 'I did', *poiêsō* 'I shall do'). This last relationship is not accepted in derivational terms today, the two



sigmatic tenses having separate historical sources (Buck 1933: 279, 282; Chantraine 1961: 245–248).

The commentators discuss the philosophical analysis of time, with particular reference to the problem known later as the “specious present”. They also mention the specifically Attic use of the future perfect (*pepoiēsomai* [only used regularly in the middle and passive voices] ‘I shall have done [something] for myself’), and they seek to justify the three *syngéneiai* semantically as well as formally. The following passages are typical:

Ἄναγκη ἐστὶ τὸ ῥῆμα χρόνους ἔχειν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα πρᾶγμα ἐστὶ, τὸ τε πρᾶγμα ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος ἐπαγγέλλεται, ἀνάγκη τὸ γινόμενον ἢ κατὰ πάθος ἢ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ χρόνους ἔχειν. Εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον δύο, ὃ τε παρεληλυθὸς καὶ ὁ μέλλον· τὸ γὰρ πρᾶττόμενον ἢ ἐπέπρακται ἢ μέλλει, οὐδέποτε δὲ ἐνίσταται· καὶ γὰρ οἱ φιλόσοφοι δύο ὀρίζονται· φασὶ γὰρ, εἰ ὁ πόλος κινούμενος τὸν χρόνον ἀπεργάζεται, ἐν κινήσει δὲ οὗτος αἰεὶ καὶ ἐνίσταται οὐδέποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἐνεστώς. Ἡ δὲ ἐκ τῆς γραμματικῆς ἀκριβεστάτη κρίσις ὀρίζεται τινα ἀκαριαῖον χρόνον καὶ ὀνομάζει ἐνεστώτα, ἵνα τὰς κλίσεις τὰς ῥηματικὰς ἀκολουθῶς δυνηθῆ μετὰ τῆς ἐχούσης ἀκριβείας παραδιδόναι· ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κλίσεως παραδίδωσι καὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς λεγομένης πτώσεως, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥήματος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος, φημὶ τοῦ ἐπινηνομένου, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως ποιῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ, ὡς τρεῖς γίνεσθαι χρόνους.

[It is essential that the verb should have tenses; for if the verb represents action, and action professes to be either performance or experience, it is necessary for what happens either as an experience or as a performance to have temporal relations as well. There are three tenses, but strictly speaking there are only two times, the past and the future; for what is done is either done or about to be done, but it does not stand still. The philosophers just distinguish two time relations; they say that if the movement of the firmament gives rise to time, and the firmament is always in motion and never stands still, there cannot be a present. But by a very precise grammatical analysis a momentary point of time has been determined and called the present, so that the verbal inflections can be set out consistently and with continued accuracy. In the same way that with nouns the starting point of their inflection is the nominative singular, so with verbs the starting point of their variation in form is made to be the

present (I mean this invention of the grammarians), and so we have the three tenses.] (Hilgard 1901: 248.13–27).

(Hilgard 1901: 250.1–25):

Πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ συγγενείας αὐτοῖς περιτίθησι, λέγων τὸν ἐνεστώτα συγγενῆ εἶναι τῷ παρατατικῷ καὶ τὸν παρακείμενον τῷ ὑπερσυντελικῷ καὶ τὸν ἀόριστον τῷ μέλλοντι. Τούτων κατὰ δύο τρόπους ἔστι καταλαβεῖν ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον· καὶ κατὰ φωνὴν ἔστιν ὁ ἐνεστώς τῷ παρατατικῷ συγγενῆς, ὅτι μικρὸν τῆς φωνῆς παρατρέψας τοῦ ἐνεστώτος καὶ προσθεῖς ἢ καὶ μὴ προσθεῖς ἀπεργάσῃ τὸν παρατατικὸν· οἶον τύπτω· τὴν γὰρ τελευταίαν τρέψας εἰς ὄν καὶ προσθεῖς ἔξωθεν τὸ ἔαποτελεῖς τὸν παρατατικόν· “ἢ μὴ προσθεῖς” εἶπον διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἦχῶ, καὶ μόνον τὸ τέλος εἰς ὄν μετατρέψας εὐρήσεις τὸν παρατατικόν. Τῷ δὲ σημαίνοντι πάλιν εἰσὶ συγγενεῖς οὕτως· ὁ ἐνεστώς τὸ προσφάτως πρᾶττόμενον ὑποφαίνει, ὁ δὲ παρατατικός τοῦ πράγματος τὸ μὲν ἔχει ἤδη γεγονός, τὸ δὲ ἔτι γινόμενον, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔτι γίνεσθαι τῷ ἐνεστώτι κοινωνεῖ. Συγγενῆς δὲ ὁ παρακείμενος τῷ ὑπερσυντελικῷ· μικρὸν γὰρ παρατρέψας τοῦ τέλους καὶ προσθεῖς ἢ καὶ μὴ προσθεῖς εὐρίσκεις τὸν ὑπερσυντελικόν. Ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἀόριστος τῷ μέλλοντι, κατὰ μὲν φωνὴν, ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμφώνου τὴν χορηγίαν ἔχουσι· ἔαν γὰρ ἔχη ὁ μέλλον τὸ ψ, καὶ ὁ ἀόριστος, εἰ δὲ ξ, κάκεινος ὁμοίως· πάλιν κατὰ φυσικὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἀμφοτέροι ἀόριστοὶ εἰσι καὶ γὰρ εἰ εἴποις “ἔτυπα”, οὐχ ὀρίσω τὸν καιρὸν πλὴν ὅτι ἐπέπραχας, καὶ πάλιν ἔαν εἴπῃς “τύψω”, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐσήμανας τὸν καιρὸν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὅτι τύψεις· τὸ δὲ πότε οὐ δηλοῖς. Ὁ δὲ παρακείμενος καὶ ὁ ὑπερσυντελικὸς συγγενεῖς εἰσι διὰ τοῦ ὀρίζειν· ὀρίζουσι γὰρ ἀμφοτέροι τὸ πότε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ἄρτι, ὁ παρακείμενος, ὁ δὲ τὸ πάλαι, ὁ ὑπερσυντελικός.

[(The author) attributes linkages to these tenses, saying that the present is akin to the imperfect, the perfect to the pluperfect, and the aorist to the future. We can see the truth of these linkages in two ways, by form and by meaning, the present is related to the imperfect because by making a small change in the form of the word and adding, or not adding, the augment, you will produce the imperfect, as with *τύπτω* ‘I strike’, changing the ending to *ον* and adding the augment *ε* from outside you complete the imperfect form. I said “or not adding” for this sort of reason: you will also find imperfect forms with just the change of ending, as with *ἔχῃ* ‘I sound’. But on the side of meaning

there are linkages like this, too: the present tense indicates some event just past, and the imperfect has part of the action already having taken place and part to come, and in this latter it joins forces with the present. The perfect is akin to the pluperfect; with a slight change in the ending and with or without the augment you will come to the pluperfect. And the same is true of the aorist and the future: in terms of form they have the same provision of consonants; if the future has *ps* so does the aorist, and the same is the case with *x*. Again by natural logic the same kinship arises, because both tenses are indefinite. If you say *étypsa* 'I struck' you have given no set time other than that you have done it, and if you say *týpsō* 'I shall strike' you have not indicated any time beyond saying that you will strike. You do not make clear when you will strike. The perfect and the pluperfect are akin by their time specification; both indicate when the action took place, the one recently, the other a long time ago.] (Hilgard 1901: 250.1–25)

It will have been seen that their semantic analysis of the tenses relies on the single dimension of time, the perfect and pluperfect being distinguished by the adverbs *árti* 'recently' and *pálai* 'long ago'. But in Greek, as in English, the reference of the perfect is to present-day completion and the reference of the pluperfect is to completion prior to some other event reported in the past, irrespective of time depth. One may instance, for example, Thucydides's use of the perfect to refer to the Homeric poems, when he was writing in fifth-century Athens: *pepoiēke gár chiliōn kài diakosiōn neōn, tās mèn Boiōtōn eíkosi kài hekatōn andrōn, tās δὲ Philoktētou pentēkonta* [he (has) represented the fleet as consisting of 1200 ships, the Boeotian ships carrying 120 men, Philoctetes's ships carrying fifty] (1.10); and Herodotus uses the pluperfect in a sentence whose context must pragmatically be recent: *tón te adelpheón hoí Mēkistéa apektónēe kai tòn gambròn Tydéa* [he had killed both his brother Mekisteus and his kinsman by marriage Tydeus] (5.67). This unidimensional semantic analysis of the Greek tense system dogged Byzantine scholarship throughout, though Maximus Planudes (see pp. 227–233) came near to the aspectual component that had been identified by the Stoics but lost in the main tradition.

#### 15. Περὶ μετοχῆς.

Μετοχή ἐστὶ λέξις μετέχουσα τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδιότητος. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῇ ταῦτ' ἅ καὶ τῷ ῥήματι καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι, δίχα προσώπων τε καὶ ἐγκλίσεων.

[15. The participle is a word sharing the properties of verbs and nouns. The same categories are applicable to it as to the verb and the noun, except for person and mood.]

#### Commentary

A scholiast points out the subordinating function of the participle (Hilgard 1901: 416.18–21): *dýo dé rhēmata prò tou onómatos è metà tò ónoma dýo rhēmata heureîn adýnaton, ei mè tò hèn rhēma eis metochēn trapēi oudè gár légomen* "Achilleüs epolémēsen enikēse", *mállon dé* "Achilleüs polemēsas enikēsen" [One cannot have two verbs in front of or after the noun, unless one of them is transformed into a participle. We do not say "Achilles made war won", but rather "Achilles, having made war, won"].

The definition of the participle displays its "sharing" (*metéchousa*) of nominal and verbal categories. Having declared that case was the *fundamentum divisionis* between noun and verb, and tense as the main defining category of the verb, Greek grammarians has forced themselves to recognize the participle as a separate class of words, countering the inclusion of them within either the nominal or the verbal classes (Hilgard 1901: 518.17–32). Greek participles, of course, had more separate forms for the active, passive, and middle voices, and for different tenses, than were available in Latin or are available in English.

#### 16. Περὶ ἄρθρου.

Ἄρθρον ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, προτασσόμενον καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῆς κλίσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων. καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον μὲν τὸ ὄς, προτασσόμενον δὲ τὸ ὄ. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῷ τρία, γένη, ἀριθμοί, πτώσεις. γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τρία, ὁ ποιητής, ἡ ποίησις, τὸ ποίημα. ἀριθμοὶ δὲ τρεῖς, ἐνικός, δυικός καὶ πληθυντικός· ἐνικός μὲν οἶον τὸ ὄ – ἦ – τό, δυικός δὲ τὴ – τά, πληθυντικός δὲ οἶ – αἶ – τὰ, πτώσεις δὲ ὄ – τοῦ – τῷ – τόν – ὦ, ἦ – τῆς – τῇ – τήν – ὦ, τό – τοῦ – τῷ – τό – ὦ.

#### [16. On the article.

The article is a part of speech inflected for case, put before and after the inflected forms of nouns; *hós* 'who, which', is postposed, and *ho* 'the', is preposed. Three categories are applicable: gender, number, case. There are three genders: *ho poiētēs* 'the poet', *hē poiēsis* 'poetry', and *tò poiēma* 'the poem'. There are three numbers: singular, dual, and plural. Singular *ho, hē, tó*, dual *tó, tá*, and plural

*hoi, hai, tá.* The cases are *ho* (nominative, *toiû* (genitive), *tôi* (dative), *tón* (accusative), and *ô* (vocative) masculine; *hē tēs, tēi, tēn, ô*, feminine; *tó, tou, tói, tó, ô*, neuter.]

#### Commentary

The article is the first closed class of words treated in the *Téchnē*. Only two lexemes come into its membership: *ho, hē, tó* 'the' and *hós, hē, hó* 'who, which (relative)'. Etymologically the Greek definite article and the relative pronoun, as we use the terms today, are distinct, but their close morphological similarities justified the *Téchnē* in treating them under one head, the article, the definite being preposed to a noun or noun phrase, the relative postposed (Hilgard 1901: 420.14–15): *ho Hómēros, hós ēn pás béltistos tōn poiētōn* 'the (poet) Homer, who was the very best of the poets' (580.7–8); *makários ho anēr ekeínos, hós ouk eporeúthē en boulēi asebhōn* 'blessed is that man who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly'. The scholiasts further point out the anaphoric reference carried by the definite article to what has already been mentioned or alluded to (256.21–27):

Ἔστι δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἄρθρον ἐπινοήσεται πρὸς τὸ ἀναφορὰν σημαίνειν· ἀναφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀναπόλησις προεγνωσμένου καὶ ἀπόντος προσώπου· ἄλλο γὰρ τι ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν "ἄνθρωπος ἦλθε", καὶ ἄλλο μετὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου· τὸ γὰρ ἄρθρον δευτέραν γινώσιν ἐπαγγέλλεται· ἐὰν γὰρ τίς σοι εἴπῃ "ναῦς ἦλθε", δοκεῖς ἀγνοεῖν ποία· ἐὰν δὲ σὺν τῷ ἄρθρῳ, τρόπον τινὰ ὑπομνήσκει τοῦτο τὴν προεγνωσμένην ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λέγοντος.

[One may say that the article was invented to indicate anaphora. anaphora is a repeated reference to a person already known and in his absence; it is one thing to say *Ánthrōpos ἔλθε* 'A man has come' and another thing to say it with the definite article. The article has the implicature of a second recognition; if someone says to you *Naús ἔλθε* 'A ship has arrived', you will probably not know what sort of ship, but if the statement is made with the article in some way it reminds you of a ship already known to you and to the actual speaker.]

The *Téchnē* treated the exclamation *ô* 'oh' as the vocative of the article. The interjection was not recognized as a separate class by Greek grammarians, though it was by the Latins, and Priscian assigns this form to the interjection class, though with some reservations (Keil 1859: 91.5–7).

The scholiasts preferred to put into a subclass of adverbs, *klētikòn epírrhēma* [vocative adverb] (Hilgard 1901: 75.3–4; 418.20).

#### 17. Περὶ ἀντωνυμίας.

Ἄντωνυμία ἐστὶ λέξις ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παραλαμβανομένη, προσώπων ὀρισμένων δηλωτικῆ. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῇ ἕξ, πρόσωπα, γένη, ἀριθμοί, πτώσεις, σχήματα καὶ εἶδη.

#### Περὶ πρωτοτύπων.

Πρόσωπα πρωτοτύπων μὲν ἐγώ — σύ — ἵ, παραγῶγων δὲ ἐμός — σός — ὄς. Γένη πρωτοτύπων διὰ μὲν τῆς φωνῆς οὐ διακρίνεται, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν δεξιῶς, οἷον ἐγώ· τῶν δὲ παραγῶγων ὁ ἐμός — ἡ ἐμή — τὸ ἐμόν. Ἀριθμοὶ δὲ πρωτοτύπων ἐνικός μὲν ἐγώ — σύ — ἵ, δυικός δὲ νῶι — σφῶι, πληθυντικός δὲ ἡμεῖς — ὑμεῖς — σφεῖς· παραγῶγων δὲ ἐνικός ἐμός — σός — ὄς, δυικός ἐμῶ — σῶ — ὦ, πληθυντικός ἐμοί — σοί — οἶ. Πτώσεις δὲ πρωτοτύπων μὲν ὀρθῆς ἐγώ — σύ — ἵ, γενικῆς δὲ ἐμοῦ — σοῦ — οὔ, δοτικῆς δὲ ἐμοί — σοί — οἶ, αἰτιατικῆς δὲ ἐμέ — σέ — ἔ, κλητικῆς δὲ σύ· παραγῶγων δὲ ἐμός — σός — ὄς, ἐμοῦ — σοῦ — οὔ, ἐμῶ — σῶ — ῶ, ἐμόν — σόν — ὄν. Σχήματα δὲ δύο, ἀπλοῦν, σύνθετον· ἀπλοῦν μὲν ἐμοῦ — σοῦ — οὔ, σύνθετον δὲ ἐμαυτοῦ — σαυτοῦ — εαυτοῦ. Εἶδη δὲ δύο, ὅτι αἱ μὲν εἰσι πρωτότυποι, ὡς ἐγώ — σύ — ἵ, αἱ δὲ παράγωγοι, ὡς πᾶσαι αἱ κτητικαί, αἱ καὶ διπρόσωποι καλοῦνται. παράγοναι δὲ οὕτως, ἀπὸ μὲν ἐνικῶν αἱ ἕνα κτήτορα δηλοῦσαι, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὁ ἐμός· ἀπὸ δὲ δυικῶν αἱ δύο, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῶι νοίτερος· ἀπὸ δὲ πληθυντικῶν αἱ πολλούς, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμεῖς ἡμέτερος. Τῶν δὲ ἀντωνυμίων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀσύναρθοι, αἱ δὲ σύναρθοι· ἀσύναρθοι μὲν οἷον ἐγώ, σύναρθοι δὲ οἷον ἐμός.

#### 17. On the pronoun.

A pronoun is a word that is substituted for a noun, designating particular persons. Six categories are applicable to it: person, gender, number, case, form, and subclass.

#### On primary pronouns.

The persons of primary pronouns are *egō* 'I', *sy* 'you' [singular], *hi* 'he, she, it', and the secondary forms are *emós* 'my', *sós* 'your', and *hós* 'his, her, its'. The genders of primary pronouns are not formally indicated, but by what they designate, like *egō*. But they are formally indicated in the derived pronouns: *ho emós, hē emē, tò emón*. The numbers of the primary are: singular, *egō, sy, hi*; dual, *nōi* 'we two', *sphōi* 'you two'; plural *hēmeis* 'we', *hymeis* 'you [plural]', *sphēis*

'they'. In the derived forms we have: singular, *emós, sós, hós*; dual, *emó, só, hó*; plural *emoi, soi, hoí*. The case forms of the primary pronouns are: nominative, *egó, sy, hí*; genitive, *emoú, sou, hoú*; dative, *emoí, soi, hoí*; accusative, *emé, sé, hé*, and vocative [second person only], *sy*; of the derived pronouns they are: nominative, *emós, sós, hós*; genitive, *emoú, sou, hoú*; dative, *emói, sói, hói* accusative *emón, són, hón*. There are two forms, simple and compound: simple, *emoú, sou, hoú*, compound, *emautoú* 'of myself', *sautoú* 'of yourself', and *heautoú* 'of himself, herself, itself'. There are two subclasses, as some are primary like *egó, sy*, and *hí*, and some are derived, like all the possessive pronouns, which are also called bipersonal. Their derivation is like this: from singular pronouns come those referring to a single possessor, as *ho emós*, from *emoú*; from dual pronouns come those referring to two possessors, as *nóitēros*, from *nói*; from plural pronouns those referring to many possessors, as *hēméteros*, from *hēmeis*. The primary pronouns do not construct with the article, like *egó*, but the derived pronouns do, like *ho emós*.]


#### Commentary

Pronouns form another closed class. The *Téchnē* makes its major distinction between the personal (primary) pronouns and the possessive (derived) pronouns. To this list the commentators add *hoútos, autós, ekeínos*, and *hóde* 'this, he and himself, that, this', along with *ho deína* 'a certain one, such a one', they point out that in classical Attic Greek *autós* had largely replaced *hí* for the third person (Hilgard 1901: 80.8–9; 82.3–4; 561.11).

These are the only words classified under this heading. Their principal semantic functions were deixis and anaphora (Hilgard 1901: 520.34–35). Scholiasts say that only proper nouns are replaced by pronouns, which is not in accord with Greek usage, though it comes nearer to it in a "prodrop" language like Greek than, for example in English where a preverbal pronoun is required before all non-imperative verbs (Hilgard 1901: 77.26–7; 260.21).

It is interesting to notice that, unlike most sentences used for exemplification, drawn from classical literature or made up, several illustrative sentences involving pronominal anaphora are taken from the *New Testament*: (581.1) *ho opísō mou erchómenos* 'he that comes after me (Christ)'; (581.3) *autós hymās baptísei* 'he will baptize you' (Matthew 3.11).

Attention is drawn to the peculiar property of derived (possessive) pronouns in that they have two personal anaphors (*diprósōpoi*), and mark one person by their lexical form and the other by their nominal inflection:



*háma gár tōi ktēma sēmainein kai tōn ktētōra perilambánousin ... en mēn tēi archēi tò prósōpon tou ktētōros, en dē tōi télei tò ktēma* [as well as referring to the thing possessed they also include the possessor ... at the beginning (of the word) comes the person of the possessor, at the end the thing possessed] (Hilgard 1901: 264.30–265.5).

#### 18. Περὶ προθέσεων.

Πρόθεσις ἐστὶ λέξις προτιθεμένη πάντων τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ἐν τε συνθέσει καὶ συντάξει, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι προθέσεις ὀκτὼ καὶ δέκα, ὧν μονοσύλλαβοι μὲν ἕξ, ἔν, εἷς, ἕξ, πρό, πρὸς, σύν, αἰτινες οὐκ ἀναστρέφονται, δισύλλαβοι δὲ δύο καὶ δέκα, ἀνά, κατά, διά, μετά, παρά, ἀντί, ἐπί, περὶ, ἀμφί, ἀπό, ὑπό, ὑπέρ.

#### [18. On prepositions.

A preposition is a word put before all parts of speech in composition and in syntax. They number eighteen in total; six are monosyllabic: *én* 'in', *eís* 'into', *éx* 'out of', *pró* 'before', *prós* 'towards', and *sún* 'with', which do not reverse the accent; twelve are disyllabic: *aná* 'up', *katá* 'down', *diá* 'through', *metá* 'with', *pará* 'beside', *anti* 'against', *epi* 'on', *peri* 'around', *amphí* 'around', *apó* 'from', *hypó* 'under', and *hypér* 'beyond'.]

#### Commentary

We now pass to the invariant, uninflected word classes. It is strange that an adequate definition of the preposition or an explicitation of the preposition-noun construction was not achieved before the western Middle Ages in Europe. Though he gives many examples of prepositions in construction with nouns and nominal phrases, Apollonius Dyscolus does not make evident their necessary connection with verbs, nor does his self-styled pupil Priscian, who even identifies the Latin negative prefix *in-* with the preposition *in* 'in', despite the homonymous but contrastive pair *invisus* 'unseen' and 'looked at askance' (cf. p. 97). The teaching manual of Alexander de Villadei (c. 1200) notices the cases governed by different Latin prepositions, using the terms *regere* and *gubernare*, but the expli-

cation of their specific function of syntactically linking nouns with verbs was the work of the scholastic grammarians of the later Middle Ages (cf. Reichling 1893: 1333–2338, 1395; Thomas of Erfurt, section 81).

The scholiasts add little to what is said in the *Téchnē*, beyond pointing out that as independent words (*en syntáxei*) prepositions construct with one of the oblique cases, whereas in nominal compounds they form nouns that carry the full paradigm of cases (cf. Hilgard 1901: 92.12–23). Prepositions are another closed class, and the *Téchnē* lists all those words that its author recognizes as falling into this class. The inadequate definition of the class was presumably responsible for the neglect that they show for the prepositional function of such words as *dícha* ‘apart from’, *chōris* ‘without’, and *hēneka* ‘for the sake of’ (cf. under section 20).

The reference to accent reversal (*anastrophē*) is from the paroxytone accentuation of disyllabic pronouns when they are put after their nouns: *tēs gēs*, *ápo* ‘from the land’, etc.

#### 19. Περί ἐπιρρήματος.

Ἐπιρρήμα ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου ἄκλιτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι. Τῶν δὲ ἐπιρρημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα: ἀπλᾶ μὲν οἷον πάλαι, σύνθετον δὲ οἷον πρόπαλαι. τὰ δὲ χρόνου δηλωτικά, οἷον νῦν, τότε, αὖθις· τούτοις δὲ ὡς εἶδη ὑποτακτέον τὰ καιροῦ παραστατικά, οἷον σήμερον, αὔριον, τόφρα, τέως, πηνίκα. τὰ δὲ μεσότητος, οἷον καλῶς, σοφῶς, δυνατῶς. τα δὲ ποιότητος, οἷον πύξ, λάξ, βοτρυδόν, ἀχελυδόν. τὰ δὲ ποσότητος, οἷον πολλάκις, ὀλιγάκις, μυριάκις, τὰ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ δηλωτικά, οἷον δὶς, τρίς, τετράκις. τὰ δὲ τοπικά, οἷον ἄνω, κάτω, ὧν σχέσεις εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ἢ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ εἰς τόπον, ἢ δὲ ἐκ τόπου, οἷον οἴκοι, οἴκαδε, οἴκοθεν. τὰ δὲ εὐχῆς σημαντικά, οἷον εἴθε, αἴθε, ἄβαλε. τὰ δὲ σχετλιαστικά, οἷον παπαῖ, ἰοῦ, φεῦ. τὰ δὲ ἀρνήσεως ἢ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον οὐ, οὐχί, οὐδῆτα, οὐδαμῶς. τὰ δὲ συγκαταθέσεως. οἷον ναί, ναίχι. τὰ δὲ ἀπαγορεύσεως, οἷον μή, μηδῆτα, μηδαμῶς. τὰ δὲ παραβολῆς ἢ ὁμοιώσεως, οἷον ὡς, ὥσπερ, ἤυτε, καθά, καθάπερ. τὰ δὲ θαυμαστικά, οἷον βαβαί. τὰ δὲ εἰκασμοῦ, οἷον ἴσως, τάχα, τυχόν. τὰ δὲ τάξεως, οἷον ἐξῆς, ἐφεξῆς, χωρίς. τὰ δὲ ἄθροίσεως, οἷον ἄρδην, ἅμα, ἥλιθα. τὰ δὲ παρακελεύσεως, οἷον εἶα, ἄγε, φέρε. τὰ δὲ συγκρίσεως, οἷον μᾶλλον, ἥττον. τὰ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, οἷον πόθεν, ποῦ, πηνίκα, πῶς. τὰ δὲ ἐπιτάσεως, οἷον λῖαν, σφόδρα, ἄγαν, πάνυ, μάλιστα. τὰ δὲ συλλήψεως, οἷον ἅμα, ὁμοῦ, ἄμυδις. τὰ δὲ ἀπωμοτικά, οἷον, μά. τὰ δὲ κατωμοτικά, οἷον νῆ. τὰ δὲ θετικά, οἷον ἀναγνωστέον, γραπτέον, πλευστέον. τὰ δὲ βεβαιώσεως, οἷον δηλαδῆ. τὰ δὲ θειασμοῦ, οἷον εὐοῖ, εὐάν.

#### [19. On the adverb.

An adverb is an uninflected part of speech, said about a verb or added to a verb. Some are simple and others are compounded: simple like *pálai* ‘long ago’, compounded like *própalai* ‘a very long time ago’. Some are temporal, like *nῦn* ‘now’, *tóte* ‘then’, *aúthis* ‘again’; one should add to these those adverbs designating a definite point in time, like *sémeron* ‘today’, *aúrión* ‘tomorrow’, *tóphra* ‘during that time’, *téōs* ‘meanwhile’, and *pēnika* ‘at what time?’. Some are adverbs of manner, like *kalōs* ‘beautifully’, *sophōs* ‘wisely’, *dynatōs* ‘ably’. Some are qualitative, like *pýx* ‘with the fist’, *lax* ‘with the foot’, *botrydón* ‘in clusters’, *agelédón* ‘in masses’. Some are quantitative, like *pollákis* ‘often’, *oligákis* ‘seldom’, and *myriákis* ‘ten thousand or numberless times’. Some are numerative, like *dis* ‘twice’, *tris* ‘thrice’, *tetrákis* ‘four times’. Some are locative, like *ánō* and *kátō* ‘up’ and ‘down’, and of these there are three relationships, in a place (in)to a place, and out of a place, e.g. *oíkoι* ‘at home’, *oíkade* ‘homeward’, and *oíkothen* ‘from home’. Some adverbs are a mark of prayer, such as *eithe*, *aíthe*, *ábale* ‘would that ...’. Some are pejorative, like *papai*, *ioú*, *pheú* ‘alas’. Some are negative, such as *oú*, *ouchi* ‘not’, *oudēta* ‘certainly not’, *oudamōs* ‘not at all’. Some are affirmative, like *naí*, *naichí* ‘yes’. Some are prohibitive, like *mē*, *mēdēta* ‘do not’, *mēdamōs* ‘certainly do not’. Some are used for comparison or likening, such as *hōs*, *hōsper*, *ēyte* ‘like, as’, *kathá*, *katháper* ‘just as’. Some express astonishment, like *babai* ‘good heavens!’. Some are conjectural, such as *isōs*, *tácha*, *tychón* ‘perhaps’. Some are used for ordering, like *hexēs*, *ephexēs* ‘in line’, ‘in a row’, *chōris* ‘separately’. Some are collective, like *árdēn*, *háma* ‘together’, *élitha* ‘in quantity’. Some are used for encouragement, like *eíā*, *áge*, *phére* ‘come on!’. Some are comparative, such as *mállon* ‘more’, *hēsson* ‘less’. Some are interrogative, such as *póthen* ‘whence?’, *poú* ‘where?’, *pēnika* ‘at what time?’, *pōs* ‘how?’. Some are intensive, like *lian* ‘too much’, *sphódra* ‘very much’, *ágan* ‘too much’, *pány* ‘wholly’, *málista* ‘very much’. Some are conjunctive, like *háma*, *homoiú*, *ámydis* ‘together’. Some are used for denying on oath, such as *má* ‘no, by ...’, or for affirming on oath, like *nē* ‘yes, by ...’. Some are obligative, like *anagnōstéon* ‘one should read’, *graptéon* ‘one should write’, *pleustéon* ‘one should sail’. Some are confirmatory, like *dēladé* ‘clearly, obviously’. Some are ritualistic, like *euoi*, *euán* (used in Bacchanal chants).

## Commentary

The adverbs form an extensive class, fully subclassified, mainly on semantic criteria. Like Apollonius, Priscian, and the commentators, the *Téchnē* only recognizes, or anyway only treats, the adverb–verb construction, although several common adverbs may be freely constructed with adjectives (*lian méga* ‘too big’, for example). Some words which grammarians today would class under others of the eight classes are listed as adverbial subclasses, as are interjections, which were separated from adverbs by the Latins.

The term *mesótēs* [(literally) middle] marks the largest and most productive subclass of adverbs, being formed from adjectives and broadly translatable into English “adverbs of manner”. The scholiasts give a morphological explanation of the term: as deadjectival adverbs (like English *bravely* etc.) they do not distinguish the genders but lie between them being linked most directly with the genitive plural forms, which are homonymous in gender (*kalōn* ‘beautiful’, *kalōs* ‘beautifully’). They do additionally point out that all these adverbs are, in their meanings, adverbs of quality or manner, in addition to the small subclass so designated in the *Téchnē*. Priscian simply uses the term *adverbium qualitatis* (Keil 1859: 86.22; 86.6). The following passage exhibits the position of the scholiasts (Hilgard 1901: 97.31–98.5).

Μεσότητος ἐπιρρήματά ἐστιν ὅσα ἀπὸ γενικῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς ὧν γεγόνασι· καὶ εἴρηται μεσότητος, παρόσον εἰσὶ μεσὰ ἄρσενικῶν καὶ θηλυκῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς τὸ καλοὶ καλά καλῶν καλῶς, φίλοι φίλαι φίλων φίλως, σοφοὶ σοφαί σοφῶν σοφῶς. Καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως μεσότητος, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς σημασίας ποιότητος ἐπιρρήματα καλοῦνται, οἷον ἐὰν εἴπω “καλῶς γράφω” τὴν ποιότητα τῆς καλῆς γραφῆς ἐδήλωσα, ἢ ἐὰν εἴπω “σοφῶς λέγω”, τὴν ποιότητα τῆς σοφωτάτης λέξεως ἐδήλωσα· ὥστε τοῖνον εἴ τι μεσότητος, τοῦτο καὶ ποιότητος· οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν.

[Middle adverbs are those that are formed from genitive plurals changed to *-ōs*, and they are called middle because they lie in the middle of the masculine and feminine forms of the nouns adjective: cf. *kaloi* (masculine) *kalai* (feminine) *kalōn* (all genders) *kalōs* (adverb) ‘beautiful(ly)’, *philoī philai philōn philōs* ‘dear(ly)’, *sophoi sophai sophōn sophōs* ‘wise(ly)’. From their formation they are middle, but from their meaning they are qualitative: for example, if I said *kalōs graphō* ‘I write beautifully’ I referred to the quality of beautiful

writing, or if I said *sophōs légō* ‘I speak wisely’ I referred to the quality of very wise utterance. So then if an adverb lies in the middle it is also an adverb of quality, but not *vice versa*.]

As the Stoics had uses *mesótēs* for all adverbs (Diogenes Laertius 7.57), many modern writers have preferred Steinthal’s syntactic explanation (1891: 212–213) that adverbs are formed primarily from nouns adjective but enter into the syntax of the verb phrase, thus lying “between” the two major classes.

What is surprising to a modern linguist is the allocation to the class of adverbs of the quasi-gerundival forms like *anagnōstéon* ‘one should read’, corresponding to forms such as Latin *legendum est*. As well as being deverbally derived these forms share all the syntactic possibilities of their underlying verbs, such as transitivity, construction with particular cases, and so on. One scholiast writes (Hilgard 1901: 282.18–19): *thetiká eirētai pará tò theînai, theînai dè tò poiēsai* [they are called *thetiká* by reference to *theînai* ‘to make’, and making is doing something (*poiēsai*)]. He goes on to explain their use pragmatically by reference to a synonymous verbal phrase (282.20): *hôte anachōreîn thélomen, légomen “anachōrētéon”* [when we want to go back, we say “one-should-go-back”]. Another writes (101.33–4): *eân gàr eípō “gamētéon”, horizō hōti deî gameîn* [if I say “one-should-marry” I am affirming that one ought to marry]. Though these forms are fully verbal in their syntax, one could perhaps interpret them as adverbial forms with underlying but deleted *estí* ‘it is the case (that such-and-such should be done)’.

## 20. Περὶ συνδέσμων.

Σύνδεσμός ἐστι λέξις συνδέουσα διάνοιαν μετὰ τάξεως καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας κεχηνὸς πληροῦσα. Τῶν δὲ συνδέσμων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συμπλεκτικοί, οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοί, οἱ δὲ συναπτικοί, οἱ δὲ παρασυναπτικοί, οἱ δὲ αἰτιολογικοί, οἱ δὲ ἀπορηματικοί, οἱ δὲ συλλογιστικοί, οἱ δὲ παραπληρωματικοί. Καὶ συμπλεκτικοὶ μὲν εἰσιν ὅσοι τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἐκφερομένην συνδέουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, μὲν, δέ, τέ, καί, ἀλλά, ἡμὲν, ἡδέ, ἀτάρ, αὐτάρ, ἦτοι, διαζευκτικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι τὴν μὲν φράσιν ἐπισυνδέουσι, ἀπὸ δὲ πράγματος εἰς πρᾶγμα διστώσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, ἦ, ἦτοι, ἡέ. συναπτικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι ὑπαρξίν μὲν οὐ δηλοῦσι, σημαίνουσι δὲ ἀκολουθίαν· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, εἴ, εἴπερ, εἰδή, εἰδήπερ. παρασυναπτικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι μεθ’ ὑπάρξεως καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, ἐπεὶ, ἐπείπερ, ἐπειδή, ἐπειδήπερ. αἰτιολογικοὶ δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι ἐπ’ ἀποδόσει αἰτίας παραλαμβάνονται· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, ἵνα, ὅφρα, ὅπως, ἔνεκα, οὕνεκα,

δι, διό, διότι, καθό, καθότι, καθόσον. ἀπορηματικοὶ δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσοις ἐπαποροῦντες εἰώθαμεν χρῆσθαι· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, ἄρα, κᾶτα, μῶν. Συλλογιστικοὶ δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσοι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιφορὰς τε καὶ συλλήψεις τῶν ἀποδείξεων εὖ διάκεινται· εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, ἄρα, ἀλλά, ἀλλάμην, τοίνυν, τοιγάρτοι, τοιγαροῦν. παραπληρωματικοὶ δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσοι μέτρου ἢ κόσμου ἕνεκεν παραλαμβάνονται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἶδε, δή, ῥά, νύ, ποῦ, τοί, θήν, ἄρ, δήτα, πέρ, πώ, μήν, ἄν, αὖ, οὖν, κέν, γέ. τινὲς δὲ προστιθέασι καὶ ἐναντιοματικούς, οἶον, ἔμπης, ὅμως.

#### [20. On conjunctions.

A conjunction is a word binding together an expressed thought in an orderly manner and filling a gap in its interpretation. Some conjunctions are copulative, some disjunctive, some conditional, some connective, some causal, some are dubitative (interrogative), some are syllogistic, and some are expletive. Copulative conjunctions bind together the interpretation of sentences that may be prolonged indefinitely: *mén*, 'on the one hand', *dé* 'but', *te kai* 'and', *allá* 'but', *ēmén*, *ēdé* 'and', *atár*, *autár* 'but', *étoi* 'surely'. Disjunctives bind together the construction but separate one thing from another; *é*, *étoi*, *ēé* 'or'. Conditionals do not designate a state of affairs but a consequence: *eí*, *eíper*, *eidé*, *eidēper* 'if'. Connectives designate both a state of affairs and an order within it: *epeí*, *epeíper*, *epeidé*, *epeidēper* 'when, since'. Causal conjunctions are introduced to explain reasons or causes *hína*, *óphra*, *hópōs* 'in order that', *héneka hoúneka* 'because (of)', *hóti*, *dió*, *dióti* 'because', *kathó*, *kathóti*, *kathóson* 'in so far as'. Dubitatives are those that we tend to use when we are in some doubt: *ára* 'is it so?', *káta* 'and so?', *mōn* 'surely not?'. Syllogistic conjunctions are appropriate for marking conclusions and connections in proofs: *ára* 'consequently', *allá*, *allamén* 'but', *toínyn*, *toigártoi*, *toigaroún* 'therefore'. Expletives are introduced for metrical or stylistic purposes: *dé* 'indeed', *rhá* 'consequently', *ný* 'then', *poú* 'perhaps', *toí* 'so', *thén* 'surely', *ár* 'consequently', *déta* 'to be sure', *pér* 'though', *pó* 'yet', *mén* 'truly', *án* 'then, if so', *ai* 'then, on the other hand', *oún* 'therefore', *kén* 'then, if so', *gé* 'at least'. Some grammarians add the set of oppositives, e. g. *émpēs*, *hómōs* 'notwithstanding'.]

#### Commentary

The class of conjunctions is extensively subdivided. It is defined syntactically as "binding together" an expressed sentence, and then as filling in gaps in its interpretation. This latter function is mainly fulfilled by the

much used set of what today are generally called particles *mén*, *dé*, *gár*, etc. 'on the one hand, on the other hand, for', whose presence is not required for grammatical acceptability, but which link up different parts of a sentence and different sentences into paragraphs and texts. It is well known that Greek was a language making more use of such words than, for example, English, and that relatively weak degrees of contrast or causation would be explicitly marked by particles such as *dé* and *gár*, but left unmarked lexically in some other languages, to be grasped from the context. Whether this also correlated with a more restricted range of contrasting intonations in classical Greek cannot be determined.

The brief distinction made in the *Téchnē* between the syntactic unification and the semantic disjunction effected by the disjunctive subclass is elaborated by the scholiasts (Hilgard 1901: 287.29–33):

Κατὰ τι λέγονται οὗτοι σύνδεσμοι, καὶ κατὰ τι διαζευκτικοί· καὶ σύνδεσμοι μὲν, καθὸ τὴν φράσιν ἐναρμονίως κοσμοῦσιν· διαζευκτικοὶ δὲ, καθὸ τὰ δι' αὐτῶν φραζόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχει, οἷον νύξ, ἡμέρα "ἢ νύξ ἔστιν ἢ ἡμέρα".

[From one side they are called conjunctions, from another disjunctives, conjunctions to the extent that they bring an agreeable order to one's diction, but disjunctive to the extent that what are designated are the opposites of each other, as with *nýx* 'night' and *hēméra* 'day': *Ἐ νύξ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡμέρα* 'Either it is night or it is day'.]

In the commentaries on some of the conjunctions this is the one place where we find the indefinitely extensible potentiality of sentences, so much emphasized today, explicitly recognized and discussed (Hilgard 1901: 285.9–10):

Πολλῶν δὲ πραγμάτων συνδετικοὶ εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ σύνδεσμοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπειρων, "καὶ θεὸς ἔστι καὶ δίκη καὶ νόμοι καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ πολιτεία".

[These (copulative) conjunctions join up many things, or, rather, an unlimited number of things: 'There is a god, and there is rectitude, and laws, and a king, and prudence, and citizenship ...'.]

*Héneka* 'for the sake of, because of' would today be regarded as a postposition governing the genitive case, and not included among the conjunctions. But the Greek grammarians might claim that their definition of the preposition (section 18) scarcely applied to *héneka*, since it rarely occurred before its noun and did not enter into any compound

formations. In fact, both Apollonius and the scholiasts comment on the possibility of a conjunctive use (*syndesmikē syntaxis*) of some prepositions; classing *hēneka* as a conjunction they have to admit to its near equivalence to *ek* and *diá* (Uhlig 1910: 457.12; Hilgard 1901: 93.7–9: *ésti dē hóte kai anti syndesmōn paralambánontai, hōs phámen “ek rhaithymías péponthas” anti toū “hēneken rhaithymías péponthas”* [Sometimes prepositions are used in place of conjunctions, as when we say “You have suffered from your idleness” instead of “You have suffered because of your idleness”]).

Three interrogative particles are listed: *ára* asks a question neutrally (Latin *-ne*), *ár'ou* expects an affirmative answer (Latin *nonne*), *ára mé* expects a negative answer (Latin *num*), like *mōn*, and *káta* (from *kai eíta*) implies doubt as to what has been asserted. It has been asked why these words are classed as conjunctions, as they neither join words together nor phrases or sentences. Lallot (1985 b: 100) suggests that this may be due to the demand by questions for another sentence in response, or to a deleted phrase, ‘Is it the case (or not)?’

All the subdivisions are semantic. The syntactic distinction between coordinating conjunctions (*kai* ‘and’, etc.) and subordinating ones (*epei* ‘when, since’ and *ei* ‘if’, etc.) is nowhere made explicit.

## Chapter 5

### Priscian: the Latin grammarian of Constantinople

#### Introduction

Priscian must have been one of the relatively few Latin grammarians teaching and writing in Constantinople in Byzantine times. He had, however, a Greek pupil Eutyches, who subsequently was the author of some Latin grammatical books (Keil 1868: 447–89).

When Priscian was working in the city, around 500 A.D., it was still very much a continuation of Rome, the “New Rome” as its founder Constantine had called it; and its government retained many of the traditional Roman appointments, however much their actual functions may have changed. Priscian’s grammatical writings clearly point to the need for educated persons and senior administrators who were native speakers of Greek to learn Latin and to use Latin at least in their official duties. That he was writing primarily for Greek-speaking pupils is shown by his constant comparison of the two languages and his regular use of Greek examples where he thought these would aid comprehension.

In fact, the task he had set himself was one whose purpose was steadily declining in the city wherein he had settled. Runciman (1933: 232) estimates that Latin as a language of conversation and routine administration had virtually died by the eighth century, and only existed thereafter as a specialist learned and written language. However, Priscian’s historical importance can scarcely be overestimated. He is numbered among the “late Latin grammarians” and he was quite the most prolific of any of them (Keil 1855, 1859). Though his principal work was not immediately appreciated in western Latinate Europe, by the time of the Carolingian Renaissance (ninth century) his was the main teacher’s resource book and it was to become the descriptive foundation upon which was built the impressive edifice of scholastic theoretical grammar by the so-called Modistae (their treatises were often entitled *de modis significandi* [on the modes of meaning] from the name they gave to the grammatical categories and the grammatical features of Priscian’s Latin grammar). The impact of Priscian in the West, both in teaching and in theoretical research can be estimated by the several hundreds (once thought to be a thousand) separate manuscripts of his grammar that are known to have existed.



The contribution of the philosophical grammars to the linguistic tradition in the West, including an explicit formulation of the theory of universal grammar, lies outside the scope of this book, and the reader is referred to such publications as Robins (1990: chapter 4), Bursill-Hall (1971), Rosier (1983), Covington (1984).

Little is known of Priscian's life. He was a native of Mauretania (Morocco), but he had settled in Constantinople by the time when his known grammatical writings were done. His principal and best known book is his majestic grammar of Latin, *Institutiones grammaticae*, which in modern print takes up nearly one thousand pages (Keil 1855, 1859). Besides this he wrote shorter pieces, on the Roman numerals, on the metres of the Latin playwright Terence, a textbook, *Praeexercitamina*, on different rhetorical styles, the *Institutio de nomine pronomine et verbo*, briefly summarizing the derivational and inflectional forms, and a set of twelve *Partitiones* [parsings] of the first lines of the twelve books of the *Aeneid*. These last two works were more directly formed for use as classroom texts. All these works are printed in Keil 1859: 407–515. *Partitiones* used well-known literary texts to provide formal drill in the teaching of grammar. It was a widely used device known as *schedographia* in the Greek-speaking world, and it merits a chapter of its own, where it will be exemplified and discussed (chapter 7). Parts of one of Priscian's *Partitiones* are given here (pp. 105–108).

Priscian's major work, the *Institutiones*, is the first fully comprehensive grammar of a classical European language that we have. It comprises a preface and eighteen books, their contents being listed at the end of the preface. No definition of grammar is given, but it is clear that he understood grammar in the organization and context set out in the first section of the *Tēchnē* (pp. 44–45).

Different opinions are expressed by historians according to their prime interests on the century in which the Middle Ages take over from classical Antiquity; but as far as linguistics is concerned, Priscian's *Institutiones* (beginning of the sixth century) can be seen both as the boundary and the link between the two. His grammar represents an exhaustive compilation of all that had been achieved along the mainline tradition of Greco-Roman linguistic scholarship; but at the same time it formed the data base and the resource book for grammar teaching and for linguistic research (see further Law 1982). Among the figures of the Seven Liberal Arts on the west front of the Cathedral at Chartres, Grammar has with her a carving of her greatest expositor, Priscian (Sandys 1958, I: 672).

After a brief account of articulate speech and the Latin alphabet Priscian treats at length the derivational and inflectional morphology of the inflected parts of speech: nouns (including, of course, adjectives), books 1–7, with much attention to the case forms of the different declensions; verbs, books 8–10; participles, book 11; and pronouns, books 12 and 13. Then follow the uninflected word classes: prepositions, book 14; adverbs and interjections, book 15; and conjunctions, book 16. The last two books, 17 and 18, set out the syntactic uses of the word classes already described morphologically.

In these last two chapters Priscian expressly models his description as far as possible on Apollonius, whom he regards as the greatest authority on grammar as a whole (e. g. Keil 1855: 548.6; 1859: 107.2). Some passages in Priscian's text look very much like almost literal translations of the corresponding parts of Apollonius's syntactic books (cf. the excerpts given below [pp. 100–102]). This dependence on Greek models was encouraged by the typological similarity between the Greek and Latin languages and by the whole attitude of deference in matters of scholarship and the arts in general taken by the Romans toward classical Greece. It was reinforced by the explicit statement of a Greek grammarian, Didymus (first century B.C.; cf. Keil 1855: 445.15): *ostendens omnia, quae habent in arte Graeci, habere etiam Latinos* [(Didymus) showing that everything that the Greeks had in their grammar the Latins had likewise].

This was not completely true in all detail. Varro had drawn attention to the Latin six-case system in contrast to the five-case system of Greek, with the consequent reallocation of syntactic and semantic functions between them; and Latin grammarians noted the absence of a definite article such as is found in Greek, assigning the relative pronoun, the "postposed article" of the *Tēchnē* to the noun or the pronoun class, but keeping the number of eight word classes intact by separate recognition of the interjection, a subclass of adverbs in Greek grammar, as a word class of its own.

It is typical of the state of grammatical exposition in Antiquity that Priscian's morphological books are far more systematically set out than his last two books, on syntax. The *Tēchnē* looks both concise and authoritative, but it is concerned only with orthographic phonology and morphology. Some non-extant Stoic treatises on syntax are known to have existed, but Stoic doctrine in linguistics, though sporadically mentioned by other grammarians, as it was by Priscian, was never expressly incorporated into the tradition of Greco-Roman grammar teaching.

Two centuries after the *Téchnē* Apollonius had written his books on Greek syntax, which comprised four general books on syntax and a number of others covering the particular syntactic usage of different classes of words, of which only those on adverbs, pronouns, and conjunctions survive today. Priscian of course knew Greek well and had the whole Apollonian corpus at his disposal, but Apollonius's syntax, though forming a "paradigm" for subsequent work in this field in both Greek and Latin, appears much less well developed than its contemporary word classification and morphology. It has been said that his was a tentative and "observational" account of syntax rather than a systematically descriptive, let alone an "explanatory" one, in Chomskyan terms (cf. Sandys 1958.1: 319–320). Priscian went little further. His "perspective on syntax" has recently been characterized "as lacking in theoretical clarity. So often he appears to us moderns to have been on the brink of discovering an important syntactic concept. The fault, of course, lay not in him — he was a mere compiler, but in his Alexandrian sources" (Percival 1987: 72; cf. Gaquin 1983: 137, 307–309). It would be perhaps fair to describe him not as a brilliant pioneer in linguistic scholarship, but as a careful and immensely painstaking expositor of existing knowledge at the stage in which he found it; and he may be credited with setting out the state of didactic grammar in the early years of the Byzantine Empire (Robins 1988 b).

We may take note of the practice of several mediaeval grammarians of referring to the first sixteen books of the *Institutiones* as *Priscianus maior* and the last two, on syntax, as *Priscianus minor*. Others distinguished syntax and morphology as *grammatica nova* and *grammatica vetus*, reworking a different distinction seen in the commentaries on the *Téchnē* (cf. Robins 1986: 16). This attitude continued in the west until the speculative grammarians, the Modistae, made syntax the central concern of theoretical grammatical studies (*studium grammaticorum praecipue circa constructionem versatur* [the study of grammarians is especially concerned with syntactic construction]) (Robins 1980: 232), setting themselves and accomplishing (in their own terms) the task of expounding a concise and disciplined theory of sentence structure.

#### PRISCIANUS CAESARIENSIS GRAMMATICUS

Iuliano Consuli ac Patricio

Huius tamen operis te hortatorem sortitus iudicem quoque facio, Iuliane consul ac patricie, cui summos dignitatis gradus summa adquisivit in omni studio ingenii claritudo, non tantum accipiens

ab excelsis gradibus honorum pretii, quantum illis decoris addens tui, cuius mentem tam Homeri credo quam Virgillii anima constare, quorum uterque arcem possederat musicae, te tertium ex utroque compositum esse confirmans, quippe non minus Graecorum quam Latinorum in omni doctrinae genere praefulgentem. tibi ergo hoc opus devoveo, omnis eloquentiae praesul, ut quantamcumque mihi deus annuerit suscepti laboris gloriam, te comite quasi sole quodam dilucidius crescat.

[Having had the good fortune of your encouragement in this work, I make you also its judge, Julian, consul and patrician. In you have been combined the highest ranks of public service and intellectual distinction in every branch of study. You have both received acclaim from your senior governmental appointments and yourself added to their honour. Your mind, I believe, is as much matched with the soul of Homer as with that of Virgil, each of whom occupied the very summit of poetry. I am sure that you are the third occupant, combining the merits of each of the two, since you shine forth in every sort of learning, no less of the Greeks than of the Latins. I therefore dedicate this book to you, our leader in all eloquence, in the hope that, whatever fame God may have granted me for the work that I have undertaken, it may shine the brighter with you as my companion and almost a sun.] (Keil 1855: 2.24–3.2)

This is the concluding part of Priscian's rather fulsome dedication to Julian, a Roman consul in Byzantium. It is written in a somewhat overblown Ciceronian Latin, noticeably different from the much barer style of the grammar itself. It is followed by a table of contents, with a brief summary of the subject of each of the eighteen books.

Clearly the city still retained much of the Roman governmental system as the "Second Rome", and at this time the rulers and the ruling class were Latin speakers, or if they were not they had to learn the Latin language and Latin literature as a prerequisite for social advancement.

On the word and the sentence:

Dictio est pars minima orationis constructae, id est in ordine compositae: pars autem, quantum ad totum intellegendum, id est ad totius sensus intellectum; hoc autem ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur 'vires' in duas partes dividere, hoc est in 'vi' et 'res', vel quaedam huiusmodi. non enim ad totum intellegendum haec fit divisio.

[The word is the minimal part of a constructed sentence, that is, one put together in proper order. It is a part in so far as it contributes to the full understanding of the sentence, a full understanding of what is meant. We say this lest someone tries to divide *vires* 'strengths' into two parts *vi-* and *-res*, or something similar. For this division does not contribute to the full understanding of the sentence.] (Keil 1855: 53.8–12)

Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans. est autem haec definitio orationis eius, quae est generalis, id est quae in species sive partes dividitur. nam oratio dicitur etiam liber rhetoricus nec non unaquaqueque dictio hoc saepe nomine nuncupatur, cum plenam ostendit sententiam, ut verba imperativa et responsiva, quae saepe una dictione complentur, ut si dicam 'quid est summum bonum in vita?' et respondeat quis 'honestas', dico 'bona oratione respondit'.

[A sentence is a well-formed sequence of words setting forth a complete thought. But this is a definition of the sentence for general purposes, for within the class of sentences we can distinguish different forms and parts. We speak of *oratio* to refer to a whole book of rhetoric, and also a single word is often called a sentence when it reveals a complete thought, as with imperatives and with responsive forms, which are often completed with one word: if I say *Quid est summum bonum in vita?* 'What is the highest good in life?' and someone says *Honestas* 'Integrity', I reply *Bona oratione respondit* 'He has answered in an excellent sentence'.] (Keil 1855: 53.28–54.2)

These two passages may be compared to the corresponding section of the *Téchnē* section 11, from which they are obviously derived. The same doctrine as regards fundamental units of grammar is expounded, though at greater length. Priscian plays on the double meaning of the Latin word *oratio*, signifying both an oration and a sentence in his reference to a complete rhetorical treatise and a single-word sentence.

On the distinctive properties of the parts of speech (Keil 1855: 55.4–56.27):

Igitur non aliter possunt discerni a se partes orationis, nisi uniuscuiusque proprietates significationum attendamus.

Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare. hoc habet etiam appellatio et vocabulum: ergo tria una pars est orationis.

Proprium est verbi actionem sive passionem sive utrumque cum modis et formis et temporibus sine casu significare. hoc habent etiam infinita, quare non sunt separanda a verbo. participium autem iure separatur a verbo, quod et casus habet, quibus caret verbum, et genera ad similitudinem nominum, nec modos habet, quos continet verbum.

Proprium est pronominis pro aliquo nomine proprio poni et certas significare personas. ergo 'quis' et 'qui' et 'qualis' et 'talis' et 'quantus' et 'tantus' et similia, quae sunt 'infinita' sive 'interrogativa' vel 'elativa' vel 'redditiva', magis nomina sunt appellanda quam pronomina: neque enim loco priorum nominum ponuntur neque certas significant personas, sed etiam substantiam, quamvis infinitam, et qualitatem, quamvis generalem, quod est suum nominis, habent: nomina sunt igitur dicenda, quamvis declinationem pronominum habeant quaedam ex eis. non enim declinatio, sed vis et significatio uniuscuiusque partis est contemplanda: indifferenter enim multa et nomina modo pronominum et pronomina modo nominum invenimus declinata. quid enim stultius quam omnia, quae numeros significant, nomina dicere, unum autem, 'unus unius', propter declinationem pronomen appellare? quod si declinatio facit indicium, qualis sit dictio, debent omnia possessiva pronomina, quia nominum declinationem sequuntur, et participia in his computari, quod omnino caret ratione. ergo non declinatio, sed proprietates est excutienda significationis.

Et quoniam de proprietate nominis et verbi et participii et pronominis breviter dictum est, non incongruum esse arbitror, summam de ceterarum quoque proprietate partium orationis percurrere.

Proprium est adverbii cum verbo poni nec sine eo perfectam significationem posse habere, ut 'bene facio', 'docte lego'. hoc ergo inter adverbium et praepositionem est, quod adverbium et sine casualibus potest praeponi et postponi verbis et cum casualibus, ut 'pone currit' et 'currit pone', 'venit tempore longo post' et 'post longo tempore venit'. Terentius in adelphis:

post faceret tamen.

si igitur invenias cum nomine adverbium sine verbo, scias hoc per ellipsin fieri, ut si dicam 'non bonus homo' pro 'malus', subaudio 'est'.

Praepositionis autem proprium est separatim quidem per appositionem casualibus praeponi, ut 'de rege', 'apud amicum', coniunctim vero per compositionem tam cum habentibus casus quam cum non habentibus, ut 'indoctus', 'interritus', 'intercurro', 'proconsul', 'induco', 'inspiciens'.

Proprium est coniunctionis diversa nomina vel quascumque dictiones casuales vel diversa verba vel adverbia coniungere, ut 'et Terentius et Cicero', 'vel Terentius vel Cicero', 'et formosus et sapiens', 'vel formosus vel sapiens'; 'et legens et scribens', 'vel legens vel scribens'; 'et ego et tu', 'vel ego vel tu'; 'et facio et dico', 'vel facio vel dico'; 'et bene et celeriter', 'vel bene vel celeriter'; quod praepositio non facit. interest autem etiam hoc, quod praepositiones componi possunt cum verbis, coniunctio vero numquam, ut 'subtrahō', 'addico', 'praepono', 'produco', 'dehortor', coniunctio autem, licet sit praepositiva, in compositione tamen non invenitur cum verbis, ut 'at', 'ast', 'sed', et quod praepositio casualibus separata praepositur semper, coniunctio vero omnibus potest dictionibus modo praeposita modo postposita coniungi.

[There is no other way of distinguishing the different parts of speech (word classes) than by paying attention to the semantic properties of each one.

The distinctive property of the noun as a name is to signify a substance and a quality. Common animate and inanimate nouns have this property, and so all three are one part of speech.

The distinctive property of the verb is to signify activity or being acted upon, or both. Verbs have moods, morphologically different forms, and tenses, but they do not have cases. These properties are also taken by the infinitives, so they should not be separated from verbs. The participle, however, is rightly separated from the verb, because it has case as well, which the verb does not have, and also gender, like nouns; nor does it have moods as verbs do.

The distinctive property of the pronoun is to be substituted for a proper noun and to refer to specific persons. For this reason *quis* 'who?' and *qui* 'who', *qualis* 'what sort of?', of which sort' and *talis* 'of that sort', *quantus* 'how much? as much' and *tantus* 'so much', and the like, which are indefinite or interrogative, or relative or demonstrative, should be called nouns rather than pronouns, since they are not used in place of proper nouns nor do they signify

particular persons; but they carry with them substance, however indefinite, and quality, however general, which is the property of nouns. They should therefore be called nouns even though some of them have pronominal inflections. For we must consider not the inflections but rather the force and meaning of each part of speech. We find many examples of nouns inflected like pronouns and of pronouns inflected like nouns. What could be more absurd than to call all the words designating numbers nouns, except for just one, *unus*, genitive *unius*, 'one', to be called a pronoun because of its inflection? If inflection is made the criterion of the class to which a word belongs, all possessive pronouns, which follow a nominal inflection, along with the participles, would have to be numbered with the nouns, which lacks all rationality. Therefore it is not the inflection but the semantic property that must be examined.

Because we have briefly touched on the properties of the noun, the verb, the participle, and the pronoun, I think that it is not inappropriate to run through the properties of the other parts of speech.

It is the distinctive property of the adverb to be constructed with the verb and it cannot have a full meaning without this: e. g. 'I do well', 'I read learnedly'. What distinguishes adverbs and prepositions is that adverbs can precede or follow verbs with or without case-inflected words, as in 'behind he runs' and 'he runs behind', and 'he came a long time afterwards' and 'after a long time he came'. Terence in *The brothers* (1.2.30) writes *post faceret tamen* 'later on he might do it none the less'. So if you find an adverb with a noun but without a verb you will know that this results from ellipsis: if I say *non bonus homo* 'not a good man' for *malus (homo)* 'a bad man', you will understand *est* 'is' (*non est bonus homo*).

It is the distinctive property of the preposition to precede case-inflected words in apposition, like 'about the king', 'with a friend', but in composition with both case-inflected and non-case-inflected words such as *indoctus* 'untaught', *interritus* 'undaunted', *intercurro* 'run between', *proconsul* 'in place of a consul', *induco* 'lead in', and *inspiciens* 'looking in'.

It is the distinctive property of the conjunction to join different nouns or any other case-inflected words, or different verbs and adverbs, as in (Terence and Cicero), 'either Terence or Cicero', 'both beautiful and wise', 'either beautiful or wise', 'reading and writing', 'either reading or writing', 'I and you', 'either I or you', 'I both do

and speak', 'either I do or I speak', 'well and quickly', 'either well or quickly'. A preposition cannot do this. But it is also relevant that prepositions can be compounded with verbs, which a conjunction cannot be, as in *subtrahō* 'take away', *addico* 'award', *praepōno* 'prepose', *produco* 'produce', *dehortor* 'discourage'. A conjunction, though it may precede a verb, is not in composition with verbs; examples are *at*, *ast*, *sed*, all meaning 'but'. But a conjunction can be constructed with all classes of words, whether preposed or postposed.]

The list of specific properties of each class of words shows a greater emphasis on semantic factors in word classification than is found in the *Téchnē*. We see its detailed application in the allocation of a set of words between the noun and the pronoun classes in this passage. It accords with the doctrine of his self-imposed master Apollonius (*On the pronoun* 85 a): *ou phōnais meméristai tà tou lōgou mērē, sēmainoménois dé* [words are distributed into word classes, not by their inflected forms, but by their meanings]. When each class is subsequently treated at length definitions are given in rather more formal terms, often almost a translation of the corresponding definitions in the *Téchnē* (cf. Keil 1855: 369.2–3; *verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus et modis, sine casu, agendi vel patiendi significativum* [the verb is a part of speech with tenses and moods but without case, signifying action or being acted upon]).

The continuing importance of case inflection as a *fundamentum divisionis* between word classes required Priscian, as it had required the author of the *Téchnē*, to recognize the participle as a separate word class (section 15).

There is some admitted disagreement among the grammarians about the difference between *appellatio* and *vocabulum*, though all recognize the two as common nouns, distinct from proper nouns (names). Some make the distinction between abstract (*appellatio*) and concrete (*vocabulum*), while others distinguish between *appellatio* as animate and *vocabulum* as inanimate (cf. Keil 1857: 320.14–24; 533.22–27; 1864: 373.5).

In his discussion on the noun-class membership, as elsewhere in his works Priscian assigns the relative and interrogative pronouns (in modern terminology) to the noun class, though he admits that some Latin grammarians have taken a different view, putting them among the pronouns (cf. Keil 1855: 61.9–20), for example the fourth-century grammarian Probus (Keil 1864: 133.14–136.18). He therefore goes into the question fairly closely. He was faced with a clear morphological difference between

the Greek relative pronoun, inflected like the definite article and treated as a "postposed article" (*Téchnē* section 16) and the Latin relative pronoun inflected like the interrogative pronouns; and, of course, as he points out more than once, Latin had no definite article (e.g. Keil 1859: 11.25: *articulum Romani non habent* [the article is what the Romans do not have]). Apollonius set out a fairly full account of relative constructions in reference to the "postposed article", *hós, hē, hó*, etc. (Uhlig 1910: 116–128; Householder 1981: 79–87); Priscian writes less on this topic, his main statement being in the syntactic chapters (Keil 1859: 127.12–128.15).

The subclasses of nouns under discussion follow generally their Latin uses: *quis* and *qui* are indefinite in such constructions as *si quis ...* 'if anyone ...', followed by a verb; *qui*, as in *qui color* 'what colour?', is used as an interrogative adjective (in modern terms; the Greek and Latin grammarians included the adjective within the noun class).

Priscian uses the term *relativum* rather widely. In some passages it clearly translates into an English relative: (Keil 1859: 128.1) *Virgilius, cui gloria contigit* 'Virgil, to whom glory was given'; *Virgilius, quem laudant* 'Virgil, whom they praise'; (129.6) *quis scripsit bucolica? qui etiam georgica* 'who wrote the Eclogues? He who also wrote the Georgics'. But in some other passages *relativum* is used almost interchangeably with *redditivum*: (Keil 1859: 125.1) *autós* 'he, himself' (Greek), *quod est pronomem relativum* [which is a relative pronoun]; (142.28–29) *relativa quidem sunt 'ipse' vel 'is' vel 'sui'* [also relative are *ipse* 'himself', *is* 'he, that one', or *sui* 'of himself'] (cf. Keil 1855: 578.12, 23). In his discussion on specifically pronominal inflection he had a particular Latin feature before him (e.g. *ille* 'he, that one', genitive *illius*, dative *illi*, as compared with *servus* 'slave', genitive *servi*, dative *servo*).

On adverbs Priscian follows the statement made in the *Téchnē* that they are only used in syntactic constituency with verbs, although constructions with other word classes are as regular in Latin as they are in Greek. The exact syntax of the example of ellipsis is rather obscure, though its signification is clear enough: presumably *non bonus homo* is to be understood as *non est bonus homo*.

On prepositions the same rather misleading treatment as was given in the *Téchnē* is repeated by Priscian, who even regards the negative prefix *in-* as a compounded preposition (cf. Keil 1859: 164.10–11), despite the existence in Latin of the homophonous pair *invisus* 'unseen' and *invisus* 'looked at askance, hated'. No doubt the fairly lengthy account of the

differences between prepositions and conjunctions is due to the Stoics' assignment of them to one single class.

On the interjection:

Interiectionem Graeci inter adverbia ponunt, quoniam haec quoque vel adiungitur verbis vel verba ei subaudiuntur, ut si dicam 'papae, quid video?', vel per se 'papae', etiamsi non addatur 'miror', habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. quae res maxime fecit, Romanarum artium scriptores separatim hanc partem ab adverbii accipere, quia videtur affectum habere in se verbi et plenam motus animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur verbum, demonstrare. interiectio tamen non solum quem dicunt Graeci *σχετλιασμόν* significat, sed etiam voces, quae cuiuscumque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem intericiuntur. habent igitur diversas significationes: gaudii, ut 'euax'; doloris, ut 'ei'.

[The Greeks class the interjection with the adverb, since it also constructs with verbs or verbs are understood in ellipsis with it. If I say *papae quid video* 'Good gracious! What do I see?' or *papae* 'Good gracious!' by itself, though no such verb as *miror* 'I wonder' is added, it has this meaning. This was why the writers of Latin grammars took this sort of word as separate from the adverbs, because they are seen to have in themselves the force of verbs and to signify a mental affection even without an added verb. But the interjection is not only what the Greeks call *schetliasmós* 'indignant complaint', but it also includes expressions which can be exclamatorily interjected by the impulse of any mental experience. Interjections therefore have diverse meanings, of joy *euax* 'hurray' and of grief *ei* 'alas'.] (Keil 1859: 90.6–15)

So far as we know, the first Latin grammarian to have treated the interjection as a separate word class was Cominianus, following Remmius Palaemon (Keil 1857: 238.19–25: *nihil docibile habent, significant tamen affectum animi* [they have no definite meaning but they indicate a state of mind]). Thereby the Greek number of eight word classes was preserved in the absence of a Latin definite article and the reallocation of the relative pronoun. Priscian's observation that the Greeks considered only pejorative forms is misleading. Forms which would be classed as interjections by the Latin grammarians are distributed among the many subclasses of adverbs in section 19 of the *Téchnē*.

On syntax:

In supra dictis igitur de singulis vocibus dictionum, ut poscebat earum ratio, tractavimus; nunc autem dicemus de ordinatione earum, quae solet fieri ad constructionem orationis perfectae, quam admodum necessariam ad auctorum expositionem omnium diligentissime debemus inquirere, quod, quemadmodum literae apte coeuntes faciunt syllabas et syllabae dictiones, sic et dictiones orationem. hoc enim etiam de literis tradita ratio demonstravit, quae bene dicuntur ab Apollonio prima materies vocis esse humanae individua. ea enim non quocumque modo iuncturas ostendit fieri literarum, sed per aptissimam ordinationem, unde et 'literas' verisimiliter dicunt appellari, quasi 'legiteras', quod legendi iter praebeant ordine congruo positae. nec non etiam auctiores literis syllabae idem recipiunt, cum ex eis coeuntes iuncturae pro debito dictionem perficiunt. igitur manifestum, quod consequens est, ut etiam dictiones, cum partes sint per constructionem perfectae orationis, id est τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν αὐτοτελοῦς λόγου, aptam structuram [id est ordinationem] recipiant: quod enim ex singulis dictionibus paratur sensibile [id est intellegibile], quodammodo elementum est orationis perfectae, et quomodo elementa iuncturis syllabas efficiunt suis, sic etiam ordinatio intellegibilium imaginem quandam syllabae perficit adiunctione dictionum. est enim oratio comprehensio dictionum aptissime ordinarum, quomodo syllaba comprehensio literarum aptissime coniunctarum; et quomodo ex syllabarum coniunctione dictio, sic etiam ex dictionum coniunctione perfecta oratio constat.

Possumus autem ex accidentium quoque similitudine hoc contemplari.

Bis idem elementum accipitur, ut 'reliquias, reddo', sed etiam syllaba, 'Leleges, tutudi, peperit', similiter et dictio, ut:

Me, me — adsum qui feci

[In earlier pages we have dealt with the individual forms of words, as was required; now we shall speak of their ordering in strings, which is done in order to construct a complete sentence. This is something we must examine very carefully as it is vitally necessary for the explanation of literary authors. Just as letters properly joined make syllables, and syllables make up words, so do words make up sentences. This has been shown in the case of letters by the accounts which have been handed down to us; Apollonius does well to tell

us that letters are the primal individual matter of human speech. It shows us that we do not have letters joined together just in any order but through the most properly formed sequences. This is why *literae* 'letters' are rightly so called, as if they were *legiterae* 'reading paths', because they show us the way in which they should be read by being put in ordered sequences.

Moreover syllables, of greater size than letters, are treated in like manner, since combinations of them properly complete a word. Therefore it is obvious that in consequence words too, being the components of complete sentences, should be put in a well formed structure (or ordering). What is seen as perceptible (i. e. intelligible) in individual words is in some manner the component of a complete sentence, and just as the component letters produce syllables by their combination, so too does the ordering of meanings produce the impression of some sort of (semantic) syllable through the string of words. A sentence is the unification of properly ordered words, just as the syllable is the unification of joined letters, and as the word consists of joined syllables, so too does the full sentence consist of joined words.

We can look at this also in the light of the similar treatment of these forms. A constituent letter may be repeated as in *relliquias* 'remains', *reddo* 'give back', and so may a syllable, *Leleges* 'a Pelasgian tribe', *tutudi* 'I struck', and *peperi* 'I gave birth'; and likewise a word may be repeated: *Me, me — adsum qui feci* 'On me, on me, I who did the deed am present'.] (Keil 1859: 108.5–109.7)

The analogy of the ordering of letters and syllables with the syntactic ordering of words in a sentence is Greek. It was set out at the beginning of the first book on syntax by Apollonius (cf. *Syntax* 1.1–3; Householder 1981: 19). In fact, if these two passages are compared it will be evident that Priscian is translating almost word for word the Greek text of Apollonius with the substitution of Latin examples.

*Litera* 'letter' is used simultaneously as the minimal unit or element of both spoken and written Latin, as was *gramma* in Greek (cf. *Téchnē* section 6). The explanatory "etymology" is typical of the way in which etymology was understood in antiquity, whereby the meaning of a more complex word was to be discovered by "unfolding" it into its alleged constitutive underlying words (cf. Commentary on *Téchnē* section 1). Both Apollonius and Priscian treat the relationship between letter, syllable,

word, and sentence as one of size rather than as separate levels of phonology on the one hand and of morphology and syntax on the other. The former, single level, analysis seems to be implicit, if not definitely stated, in the earlier writings of the Prague School and of Bloomfield (cf. 1926). Hockett (1961) discusses this matter very thoroughly, distinguishing, as in most current practice, the C(onsisting of) relations between units at a single level and the R(epresentation) relation between units at different levels.

The example of word repetition is taken from Virgil, *Aeneid* 9.47, the full text being; *Me me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum, O Rutuli ...* 'On me, on me, who did the deed, turn your swords, Rutulians'.

On syntax:

sicut igitur apta ordinatione perfecta redditur oratio, sic ordinatione apta traditae sunt a doctissimis artium scriptoribus partes orationis, cum primo loco nomen, secundo verbum posuerunt, quippe cum nulla oratio sine iis completur, quod licet ostendere a constructione, quae continet paene omnes partes orationis. a qua si tollas nomen aut verbum, imperfecta fit oratio; sin autem cetera subtrahas omnia, non necesse est orationem deficere, ut si dicas: 'idem homo lapsus heu hodie concidit', en omnes insunt partes orationis absque conjunctione, quae si addatur, aliam orationem exigit. ergo si tollas nomen aut verbum, deficient oratio, desiderans vel nomen vel verbum, ut si dicam 'idem lapsus heu hodie concidit' vel 'idem homo lapsus heu hodie'; sin subtrahas adverbium, non omnino deficient oratio, ut 'idem homo lapsus heu concidit'. nec non etiam participium si adimas, neque sic deficient, ut: 'idem homo heu hodie concidit', nec si praepositionem et interiectionem: 'idem homo cecidit', nec si etiam pronomen: 'homo cecidit'.

[Just as the complete sentence results from the proper arrangement of words, so we have been handed down by our most learned writers of grammars the parts of speech in their proper order. They placed the noun first and the verb second, for without these two no complete sentence can be formed. This can be shown with a sentence construction containing nearly all the different parts of speech. If you take away the noun or the verb the sentence is not well formed, but if you take away all the others the sentence is not necessarily defective. If you say 'The same man who slipped, alas, today has collapsed', look, all the parts of speech are there, except the conjunction, which would need another sentence if it were added. So,

if you take away the noun or the verb, the sentence is defective by its absence, as, if I say 'The same who slipped, alas, today has collapsed', or 'The same man who slipped, alas today'. But if you delete the adverb the sentence is in no way defective, as in 'The same man who slipped, alas, has collapsed'; nor is it defective if you delete the participle, as in 'The same man, alas, has collapsed'; and the same thing applies with the preposition and the interjection, as in 'The same man has fallen'; nor is the sentence defective if you delete the pronoun: 'The man has fallen'.] (Keil 1859: 116.5–19)

This passage, too, follows closely the corresponding passage in Apollonius (Uhlig 1910: 17.4–18.4; Householder 1981: 23–24), and is consistent with his assertion that all the other parts of speech are syntactically referable to the noun or the verb (33.9–10; Householder 1981: 30; cf. pp. 59–60) and it follows the original Platonic division of the *lógos* 'sentence' into NP (*ónoma* 'name' or 'subject') and VP (*rhēma* 'what is said about it' or 'predicate').

*Ordinatio* 'ordering or arrangement' here refers not simply to the linear order of the words, which in Latin could vary considerably for stylistic reasons without affecting the syntactic structure of the sentence, but also to their hierarchical ordering in terms of their potential constituency. This point is tolated more fully in reference to Greek by Gregory of Corinth (pp. 169–170) *Idem* 'the same' is counted as a pronoun (cf. Keil 1855: 589.14), and the prefix *con-* in *concidit* is taken as the conjoint form of the free preposition *cum* 'with'. The somewhat wooden English translations are intended to make the positions of permissible and impermissible deletions clearer by sticking to a word-for-word translation in the same word sequence as Priscian's Latin. A little further on (Keil 1859: 116.27–117.4) sentences comprising a single verb, which are quite common in a "pro-drop" language like Latin, are explained by the "understanding" of a nominative subject NP, in the case of impersonal verbs like *fulminat* 'lightning flashes' and *tonat* 'it thunders' the "understood" subject being Jupiter.

On transitive verbs:

Verba quoque transitiva similiter variis solent casibus coniungi, ut 'miles eget imperatoris; Aeneas praemia donat Euryalo; Plato erudit Aristotelen; Cicero potitur laude'. quomodo autem nominativus obliquis apte possit construi, quantum ratione potui comprehendere docebo, quos tamen etiam flexus sibi defendit, ut 'Aeneas rex Troia-

norum; Aeneae regis Troianorum; Aeneae regi Troianorum'; sic per reliquos casus quoque.

Nominativus igitur [casus nominum] genetivo adiungitur, quando possessio aliqua et possessor significatur. et nominativo quidem possessionem, genetivo autem possessorem proferimus, ut 'Hector filius Priami; Davus servus Simonis; Aeneas rex Troianorum; Patroclus amicus Achilles; patronus Verris Hortensius'. quae sic interpretatur, ut, adiuncto verbo possessionem significante, possessio quidem mutet nominativum in accusativum, possessor vero genitivum in nominativum, verbi huius natura hoc exigente, ut intransitive quidem nominativum, transitive vero accusativum exigat; 'quid est enim Hector filius Priami?' interpretantes dicimus: 'hoc est "Hectorem filium Priamus possidet"' vel 'habet'.

[Transitive verbs can in like manner be constructed with different cases, as in 'A soldier needs a commander' (genitive), 'Aeneas gives rewards to Euryalus' (dative), 'Plato teaches Aristotle' (accusative), 'Cicero wins praise' (ablative). I will set out the rules for properly constructing nominal case forms with the oblique cases, which are formally maintained by their inflection, as far as I have been able to grasp them systematically. Examples are: 'Aeneas, king of the Trojans', 'of Aeneas, king of the Trojans', 'to Aeneas, king of the Trojans', and so for the rest of the oblique cases.

The nominative is constructed with the genitive when a possession and a possessor are signified; and we make known the possession by the nominative, but the possessor by the genitive, as in 'Hector, son of Priam'; 'Davus, slave of Simon'; 'Aeneas, king of the Trojans'; 'Patroclus, friend of Achilles'; 'Hortensius, patron of Verres'. These phrases are interpreted in the sense that with the addition of a verb signifying possession, the possession transforms the nominative into the accusative, and the possessor transforms the genitive into the nominative, since the inherent features of the verb require that it takes the nominative intransitively but the accusative transitively. 'What is "Hector, son of Priam?"'. Interpreting this phrase we say 'It is "Priam possesses, or has, a son, Hector"'.] (Keil 1859: 212.27–213.12)

This passage illustrates Priscian's use of the transitive and intransitive syntax of verbs. It is similar but not identical in its relation to modern usage; transitivity relates to separate component NPs in the sentence, and there is an intransitive relation between the subject and a transitive



verb as much as between the subject and an intransitive verb (Priscian, of course, never encountered the problems associated with ergative constructions, to which so much attention is being paid today, in which the subjects of intransitive and transitive verbs are in different cases differently constructed). It derived from Apollonius's use of *metábasis* and *diábasis* [moving across], analysing the meaning of transitive verbs as involving some action "passing over" from the subject as agent to the object as recipient, crudely illustrated by verbs such as 'cut' and 'beat', and then extended to all verbs taking an object in an oblique case (cf. Uhlig 1910: 46.17–19; Householder 1981: 35; 243.3–4; Householder 208: *hē enérgeia hōs prōs hypokeímenōn ti diabibázetai* [the activity is, as it were, carried across to some object]). With intransitive verbs no such transition takes place, the activity being confined to the nominative subject, as in an English verb like *thrive* or *soar*. It follows that transitive verbs can be passivized.

Speaking of *subject* and *object* in relation to transitive verbs in the work of Apollonius, Priscian, and, indeed, the grammar books of the Byzantine age, as we have just done, is strictly speaking anachronistic. As we saw with Apollonius (p. 30), transitive and intransitive verbs are related directly to the oblique cases and the nominative case, not to independently named syntactic elements like subjects and objects as such (the specifically syntactic terms *suppositum* and *appositum*, distinct from the logical *subiectum* and *praedicatum*, were the creation of the later western scholastic grammarians; cf. p. 162). It will be noticed that in the quotation from Apollonius given above the term *hypokeímenon* 'subject' in the metalanguage of logic, is used simply to indicate the referent of the oblique ('object') noun form (cf. pp. 36–37).

In his detailed exposition of the relations between possessor and possession phrases and their corresponding full sentences Priscian resorts to a metalanguage reminiscent of earlier transformational usage, though in this case the sentence would be taken as basic and the nominal phrase its transform.

This is not just a matter of the syntactic classification of verbs. In *Priam has a son, Hector* the relation between *Priam* and *has* is intransitive, and that between *has* and *a son, Hector* is transitive (cf. Keil 1859: 213.10). Formally the distinction is between verbs constructing with one NP only and those accepting or requiring two NPs. In Latin the object NP was usually in the accusative case, but as the examples show the genitive and ablative were used with some verbs.

We see in Priscian's exposition the germ of the notion of government or rection, which, along with the transitive and intransitive distinction, was very influential among the Latin grammarians of the later western Middle Ages.

#### Partitio II:

##### CONTICVERE OMNES INTENTIQUE ORA TENEBANT.

Scande versum. Conticu ere om nes in tenti que ora te nebant. Dic caesuras. Semiquinaria, conticuere omnes. Quot habet figuras? Decem. Quare? Quia habet duos dactylos et tres spondeos. Tracta pedes. Conticuere omnes et cetera. Quot partes orationis habet? Sex. Quot nomina? Duo. Quae? Omnes ora. Quot verba? Duo, conticuere tenebant. Quid aliud habet? Participium, intenti, et coniunctionem, que. Tracta singulas partes.

Conticuere quae pars orationis est? Verbum. Quale? Perfectum. Quo modo dictum? Indicativo, coniugationis secundae. Cur secundae? Quia in praesenti tempore secunda persona in es productam desinit, conticeo contices, quamvis a prima quoque persona hoc manifestum est in hac coniugatione. omnia enim verba in eo desinentia secundae sunt coniugationis exceptis paucis primae coniugationis, quae fere sunt haec, beo beas, creo creas, screeo screas, meo meas, nauseo nauseas, laqueo laqueas, calceo calceas, quod alii calcio, enucleo enucleas; et quartae, eo is, queo quis, et quae ex his componuntur. Cuius est significationis? Activae. Dic passivum. Conticeor. Cuius est numeri? Pluralis. Cuius figurae? Compositae. Ex quibus? Ex integro et corrupto. nam con praepositio est integra, quamvis separata in appositione non potest inveniri, sed semper in compositione; ticuere autem corruptum est, quia a, quod habuit integrum, mutavit in i, ticuere pro tacuere. Cuius est personae? Tertiae pluralis, quae tam in re quam in runt in hoc tempore finitur. Cuius est temporis? Praeteriti perfecti. Dic primas eius personas in omni tempore per singulos modos. Indicativo conticeo conticebam conticui conticueram conticebo.

[‘They all fell silent and in their eagerness kept their mouths closed.’] Scan the line. *Conticu ero om nes in tentique ora te nebant*. Give the caesuras. One caesura after two and a half feet: *conticuere omnes*. How many different forms can such a line have? Ten. Why? Because it has two dactyls and three spondees. Set out the feet. *Conticu ere om nes* and so on. How many component words does it have? Six.

How many nouns? Two. Which are the nouns? *Ommes* 'all' and *ora* 'mouths'. How many verbs? Two, *conticuere* 'they fell silent' and *tenebant* 'kept closed'. What else does the line contain? A participle *intenti* 'eager' and a conjunction *-que* 'and'. Explain each single word.

What part of speech is *conticuere*? A verb. Of what sort? Perfect (in tense). What mood? Indicative, second conjugation. Why second conjugation. Because in the present tense the second person (singular) ends in *-es* [with a long vowel]: *conticeo*, *conticēs*. But in this conjugation it is also made clear from the first person (singular); all verbs ending in *-eo* are of the second conjugation except for a few that belong to the first: for all practical purposes these are: *beo*, *beas* 'bless', *creo*, *creas* 'create', *screo*, *screas* 'hawk and hem', *meo*, *meas* 'go', *nauseo*, *nauseas* 'be sick', *laqueo*, *laqueas* 'entangle', *calceo* *calceas* (for some *calcio*) 'furnish with shoes', *enucleo*, *enucleas* 'lay open', and to the fourth conjugation: *eo*, *is* 'go', *queo*, *quis* 'be able' and verbs compounded from them.

What is its structural meaning? Active. Give the passive. *Conticeor* 'silence is kept about me'. What is its number? Plural. Of what structure is it? Compounded. Compounded from what? From a whole word and an incomplete word. For the preposition *con-* 'together, with' is complete, though it cannot appear by itself in a construction, but always in a compound word. But *-ticuere* is incomplete, because the *a* which the independent form had has been changed to an *i*, giving *-ticuere* from *tacuere*. What is its person? Third person plural, which in this tense ends in *-re* as well as in *-runt*. What is its tense? Past perfect. Give the first person singular forms in each mood. In the indicative: *conticeo* 'I fall silent', *conticebam* 'I was falling silent', *conticui* 'I fell silent', *conticueram* 'I had fallen silent', *conticebo* 'I shall fall silent'.] (Keil 1860: 469.14–470.3)

The *partitio* continues on the same lines to complete the forms associated with *conticuere* and then deals in like manner with each successive word. Two further short passages may be considered:

Omnes quae pars orationis est? Nomen. Quale? Appellativum. Cuius est speciei? Numeralis. Omnia autem numerorum significativa appellativa sunt, quamvis sint quaedam cognomina propria, quae vocem quidem habent numeralium, non tamen etiam significationem, ut Quintus Catulus, Decimus Brutus. Potest habere

comparationem hoc nomen? Non. Quare? Quia nullum nomen numerum significans comparisonem potest habere, cum unus quisque numerus in se constat nec augeri aut minui in sua qualitate potest, excepto prior, quod de duobus ordinem significat.

[What part of speech is *omnes*? A noun. What sort of noun? A common noun. Of what class? Numeral. All nouns signifying numbers are common, even though some are also proper nouns or names, having the forms but not the meaning of numerals, such as *Quintus Catulus* (*quintus* 'fifth') or *Decimus Brutus* (*decimus* 'tenth'). Can these nouns have a comparative form? No. Why? Because no noun signifying a number can have comparison; each single number is constant in its meaning and in its own nature can be neither increased or decreased. An exception is *prior*, which signifies prior order in two entities.] (Keil 1860: 472.11–18)

Ora quae pars orationis est? Nomen appellativum neutrum plurale simplex, casus in hoc loco accusativi. idem tamen est semper in neutris nominibus et nominativus et accusativus et vocativus. Dic singulare. Os oris. nam si correpte os dicas, aliud significat, et ossis dicis genetivum. Fac diminutivum. Oscillum, osculum et ex hoc osculor oscularis. ostium quoque inde derivatur, ex quo ostiarius et ostiatim. oro quoque verbum ab ore est et oraculum.

[What part of speech is *ōra*? A noun. A common noun, neuter plural and un-compounded; its case in this context is accusative. The nominative, accusative, and vocative cases are always in the same form in neuter nouns. Give the singular. *Ōs* 'mouth', *ōris* (genitive). If you shorten the *o* the word has a different meaning, *ōs* 'bone', and you give its genitive as *ossis*. Make the diminutive forms of *ōs*. *Oscillum* 'small cavity', *osculum* 'kiss', and from this *osculor*, *oscularis* 'kiss (verb)'. *Ostium* 'door' is also derived from it, out of which we get *ostiarius* 'door keeper' and *ostiatim* 'from door to door'. From *os* comes the verb *oro* 'pray' and the noun *oraculum* 'oracle'.] (Keil 1860: 474.3–9)

These passages are taken from the second of Priscian's twelve *Partitiones*. Each one comprises an analysis of the first lines of each of the twelve books of Vergil's Aeneid. *Partitiones*, in Greek *merismoi* or *epimerismoi*, played a vital role in education in language and literature. They enjoyed particular favour in Byzantine times, and more is said of them later (chapter 7; for a full account see Glück 1967).

Essentially they were extensive treatments of lines from selected literary and later of Biblical texts, sometimes, as here, set partly in question and answer form, and clearly designed for rote teaching and rote learning. While they are not unlike the notes provided in modern school texts of classical authors, they go considerably further, being taken, as is evident from the passages quoted here, for an opportunity to rehearse general grammatical information, expressed in “gobbet” form. The great contemporary value of such teaching resources lay in the rarity of books for school and for other purposes. Though ultimately Priscian’s *Institutiones* ran into several hundred manuscripts (a testimony to its reputation), we must remember that every copy of every book before the age of printing was a one-off product of individual copyists. The amount of reading aloud by the teacher, to be taken down by students must have been enormous (our word *lesson* is, of course, a derivate of Latin *lectio* ‘reading’), and every device for ready memorization, “learning by heart”, such as versification (as in Alexander Villa-Dei’s *Doctrinale*) and the division of knowledge into memorable bits summarily expressed was naturally employed. Though a few public and private libraries contained many thousands of books, we must assume that most libraries could at best be likened to a reference collection in a good university library today; and the number of books possessed individually by most students must have been minimal by modern standards.

In the metrical section *figurae* ‘forms’ (Greek *schēmata*) stood for the possible permutations that such a line could have. With a spondee or its trochaic equivalent obligatory as the final foot in Latin hexameters the possibility of either a spondee or a dactyl existed in the other five feet, though a spondee in the fifth foot was decidedly “marked” and rare. Within this system a combination of three spondees and two dactyls, or of two spondees and three dactyls could be metrically arranged in ten different ways (*figurae*). In a verse with one dactyl and four spondees in the first five feet five different arrangements could be made (as in the metrical composition of the line in *Partitio* VIII, Keil 1859: 496.1–6). Where all five feet were dactyls only one sequence was possible (as in *Partitio* X, Keil 1859: 504.1–6).

*Conticeo* is a present tense form collateral with the much commoner *conticesco*, both meaning ‘fall silent’ and both having their perfect tense form *conticui*. The possibility of the passive *conticeor* is supported by the transitive use of *conticuit* ‘kept silent about’, as in *tantumque nefas mens conscia vatum conticuit* ‘his mind, aware of the soothsayers, kept silent about so great a wrong’ (Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica* 3.302).

It is to be noticed that Priscian, like Apollonius (Uhlig 1910: 395.12–396.2; Householder 1981: 208) effectively distinguishes three classes of verbs: active, passive, and neutral (intransitive). Only verbs capable of forming a passive paradigm and engaging in regular passive syntactic constructions (i. e. transitive verbs) are counted as active. Other verbs in *-o*, though the same in their morphology as active transitive verbs, are categorized as neutral (Keil 1855: 373.26–28; 375.9–12).

In its general didactic function the *Partitio* goes beyond the simple analysis of the component words themselves, as we see in the treatment of *conticere*. The same extension of summary information is seen also in the short passages quoted from the sections dealing with *omnes* ‘all’ and *ora* ‘mouths’.

Priscian’s shorter grammar book, the *Institutio de nomine, pronomine et verbo* (Keil 1859: 443–456), though of less intrinsic interest than his *Institutiones*, is worth a mention in view of its didactic importance and its wide-spread use in the West, some years before the *Institutiones* became so well known. It amounts to a concise morphological presentation of these three inflected word classes, with the forms of participles appended to the verbal section. Nouns and verbs are set out in the five declensions and the four conjugations found in the *Institutiones*, the same as those used since then in all traditional grammars of Latin in modern times. Conjugations as a subclassification of verbs go back to the Greek grammar of the *Téchnē*; but among grammars of Greek we do not find nominal declensions of the sort used by Priscian, which, in fact, were foreshadowed by Varro (*De lingua Latina* 10.62; cf. Taylor 1990), before the final centuries of the Byzantine Empire, when contacts between East and West were intensifying (chapter 12, pp. 242–244).

One passage from the *Institutio*, in fact its first paragraph, will be enough to illustrate the style of this brief textbook (Keil 1859: 443.3–9):

Omnia nomina, quibus Latina utitur eloquentia, quinque declinationibus flectuntur, quae ordinem acceperunt ab ordine vocalium formantium genitivos. Prima igitur declinatio est, cuius genitivus in ae diphthongon desinit, ut hic poeta huius poetae; secunda, cuius in i productam supra dictus finitur casus, ut hic doctus huius docti. Tertia in is brevem, ut hic pater huius patris; quarta in us productam, ut hic senatus huius senatus; quinta in ei divisas syllabas, ut hic meridies huius meridiei.

[All nouns used in the Latin language are inflected in (one of) five declensions, which are ordered by reference to the order of the

vowels forming their genitive (singulars). The first declension, then, is the one that forms its genitive with the diphthong *-ae*, as in *hic poeta* 'this poet', *huius poetae* 'of this poet'; the second is the one forming this case with (long) *-ī*, as in *hic doctus* 'this learned man' *huius doctī* 'of this learned man'; the third inflects with short *-is*, as in *hic pater* 'this father', *huius patris* 'of this father'; the fourth inflects with (long) *-ūs*, as in *hic senatus* 'this senate', and *huius senatūs* 'of this senate'; and the fifth inflects with disyllabic *-ei*, as in *hic merities* 'this noontide', and *huius meridiei* 'of this noontide'.]

## Chapter 6

### The *Kanónes* and their commentators: the morphological data-base

In addition to the *Téchnē* and Apollonius Dyscolus, another scholar of Alexandria was destined to have a didactic influence among teachers of Greek throughout the Byzantine period. This was Theodosius, who probably lived in the second half of the fourth century A.D. His best known work was his exposition of the "rules of grammar", specifically of morphology, the famous *kanónes*, for the different inflectional and derivational forms of the Greek noun and the Greek verb, a straightforward listing of all the grammatically possible forms (Hilgard 1894: I.1–99). In the verbal section two verbs are taken as exemplificatory, *týptō* 'beat, hit' and *tithēmi* 'put' representing the *-ō* verbs and the *-mi* verbs respectively.

*Týptō* had been taken as a typical verb by the author of the *Téchnē*, though he confined himself to the Attic forms in regular use by the classical authors of his day. Theodosius lists all the possible verbal tense forms of his two verbs, including duals, first and second aorists and futures, in all voices and moods, including now the participial forms, and exhibiting some forms certainly not in classical usage and probably not in regular general use. He admits to the non-use of *thēkō* as an aorist subjunctive of *tithēmi*, though pointing it out as theoretically possible: *édei mèn eàn thēkō* [there ought to be (eàn) *thēkō* '(if) I put'] (Hilgard 1894: I.96.6; cf. Sandys 1958 I: 361–362). Some later writers followed the same expository method. Theodosius also lists the second aorist forms like *éthēn* 'I put' and *édōn* 'I gave' as well formed (Hilgard 1894: I.85.21–23), but Choeroboscus comments (II.345.31–32) that such forms 'have not been found in actual use' (*ouch héurēntai en chrēsei*).

It may be asked what purpose these *kanónes* fulfilled. Certainly in all ages elementary Latin grammars have followed the same lines in listing individual word forms that would be hard to contextualize, though they are morphologically well formed, like *anne* 'oh year!' and *amamini* 'be ye loved!' (Kennedy 1930: 18, 73); and the scholastic grammarians, freed from direct connections with literature, produced such non-starters as *Socrates pulsat Platonem* 'Socrates hits Plato' and *Socrates albus currit bene* 'white Socrates runs well'. A similar disregard for contextual plau-

sibility or even formal acceptability will have had the same didactic purpose of setting out the grammar of the language without at this stage burdening the teacher and the learner with a heavy lexical load. Theodosius and his successors were telling their readers "If all the morphologically possible forms and all their variants were to be formed on a single verb root, this is what it would all look like". Pupils could then derive and correctly analyse those forms that were in actual use with lexically different verb roots. All this is, naturally, very remote from the teaching of a language like English, with so reduced a morphology. But we must remember the morphological complexity of Greek and also bear in mind the wide spread in centuries and in dialects contained within the accepted corpus of Greek literature by this time.

The Byzantine grammarian Choeroboscus (c. 750–825; Bühler–Theodoridis 1976) who lectured in Constantinople and may have been the university librarian (Kaster 1988: 394–396), wrote very expansive commentaries on Theodosius's *Kanónes* (Hilgard 1894 II.1–371). He was a prolific writer and his commentaries were much in use by some of the grammarians in Italy during the revival of Greek teaching in the early Renaissance (Sandys 1958 I: 390). They amount to a diligent and exhaustive search for formation rules governing the paradigm lists set out by Theodosius. Choeroboscus was concerned both to prevent and correct "barbarisms" and "solecisms", which he defined separately (Hilgard 1894: II.1.15–2.3), the former being spelling and accentuation errors in individual works, like *Dēmsthénou* instead of *Dēmsthénous* as the genitive of *Dēmsthénēs* or \**anthrōpós* in stead of *ánthrōpos*, the latter being syntactic errors such as the *nominativus pendens* like \**egō peripatōn to toichos ēpesen* 'I walking about, the wall fell down' (a sentence like this is actually found in an *ad sensum* construction in Plato, *Apologia Socratis* 21 c: *dialegómēnos autōi édoxé moi* 'talking with him it seemed to me ...'). Clearly the primary objective of these lengthy commentaries was to assist in the "Hellenization" of the inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire into familiarity with literary Greek and the formal *koiné* for Biblical studies, either as second languages or as a different form of Greek from the contemporary *Umgangssprache*.

Another similar set of commentaries on Theodosius's *Kanónes* has come to us in the form of excerpts from the sixth-century grammarian Charax made by Sophronius, a ninth-century Patriarch of Alexandria (Hilgard 1894: II.372–434).

The term *kanón* (Latin *regula*, English *rule*) was used to refer both to the formation rules of nouns and verbs and to the ordered paradigms

generated by the rules. In conformity with ancient practice a specific word form, nominative singular in nouns, first person present active in verbs, served as the basis for the rules, with the other word forms being taken as the result of "bending" (*klisis*). Where necessary the forms themselves are identified by their "endings", from the verb *légō* (-*eis*) [end, finish (in)]. This use of *légō* goes back at least as far as Apollonius (Schneider 1878: 31.6–7).

The following passages may be taken as typical examples of Theodosius's *Kanónes* and the commentaries of the later grammarians:

εἰσαγωγικοὶ κανόνες  
περὶ κλίσεως ὀνομάτων

Κανὼν α'

Ἐνικά. Αἴας Αἴαντος· τὰ εἰς ᾗς καθαρὸν ὀνόματα δισσύλλαβα βαρύτερα μακροκατάληκτα διὰ τοῦ ντ κλίνεται, Θόας Θόαντος, Ὑας Ὑαντος, Αἴας Αἴαντος τῷ Αἴαντι· πᾶσα γενικὴ εἰς ὅς λήγουσα μεταβάλλουσα τὴν ὅς εἰς ἰ τὴν δοτικὴν ποιεῖ ὁμότονον καὶ ὁμόχρονον, ἔρωτος ἔρωτι, Μίνως Μίνωϊ, Αἴαντος Αἴαντι. τὸν Αἴαντα – πᾶσα δοτικὴ εἰς ἰ ἐκφωνούμενον λήγουσα ὅτε ἔχει ἰσοσύλλαβον τὴν αἰτιατικὴν τροπῇ τοῦ ἰ εἰς ᾗ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, λέβητι λέβητα. ὦ Αἴαν· πᾶσα γενικὴ διὰ τοῦ ντ κλινομένη ἀποβαλὴ τοῦ τῶς ποιεῖ τὴν κλητικὴν, εἰ μὴ διφθόγγῳ παραλήγοιτο, Αἴαντος Αἴαν Ξενοφῶντος Ξενοφῶν· πλακοῦντος δὲ πλακοῦ καὶ Σιμοῦντος Σιμοῦ.

#### [Introductory rules for the inflection of nouns

##### Rule 1

Singulars. *Aias* 'Ajax': disyllabic nouns ending in *-as* and with the vowel long and unchanged and with grave accentuation inflect with *nt*, *Thóas Thóantos*, *Hýas Hýantos*, *Aías Aíantos*. *Tōi Aíanti* 'to Ajax': every genitive ending in *-os* forms its dative by changing *-os* to *i*, accentuation and vowel length remaining unaltered, *érōtos érōti* 'of love, to love', *Mínōs Minōi* 'of, to Minos', *Aíantos Aíanti*. *Tōn Aíanta* (accusative): every dative ending in *-i* pronounced separately and having an accusative parasyllabic to the dative changes the *-i* to *-a* to form its accusative, *lébēti lébēta* 'kettle'. *Ó Aían* 'O Ajax': every genitive formed with *nt* forms its vocative by deleting *-tos*, provided that it does not have a diphthong in its penultimate syllable, *Aíantos Aían*, *Xenophōntos Xenophōn*, but *plakoúntos* 'flat cake' *plakoú* and *Simoúntos Simoú*.] (Hilgard 1894: 1.3.1–13)

εἰσαγωγικοί κανόνες περὶ  
κλίσεως ῥημάτων

Ἐνικά. Τύπτω τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀριστικοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐνεστώτων ἐνεργη-  
τικῶν δύο εἰσὶ καταλήξεις, ἢ τε εἰς ᾧ καὶ παράγωγος ἢ εἰς μὴ  
εἰπόντες οὖν πρῶτον περὶ τῶν εἰς ᾧ ῥημάτων ὕστερον καὶ περὶ  
τῶν εἰς μὴ διαληψόμεθα. πᾶν τοίνυν ῥῆμα εἰς ᾧ λήγον βαρύνεται,  
λέγω, φέρω ὅσα δὲ περισπάσθη, ταῦτα ἀπὸ βαρυτόνων συνηρέθη,  
ποιῶ ποιῶ, βοᾶω βοῶ, χρυσῶ χρυσῶ. τύπτεις πᾶν πρῶτον  
πρόσωπον εἰς ᾧ λήγον ἀμοιβῆ τοῦ ᾧ εἰς εἰς τὸ δεύτερον πρόσωπον  
ποιεῖ, λέγω λέγεις, κόπτω κόπτεις τὰ περισπώμενα πρὸς τὴν  
συναίρεσιν ποιεῖται τὴν γραφήν, ποιέεις ποιεῖς, βοάεις βοᾶς τὸ  
γὰρ αἶ εἰς ᾧ κινᾶται, οἶον τὰ ἐμά τὰμά χρυσόεις χρυσοῖς· καὶ  
ἔδει μὲν χρυσοῦς· τὸ γὰρ οἶ εἰς τὴν οὔ δίφθογγον κινᾶται, ὡς τὸ  
ἐμόν τοῦμόν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ εἰς ᾧ ῥήματι πάντως ἐν δευτέρῳ  
προσώπῳ δίφθογγον ἔχει τὴν μετὰ τοῦ ἰ, ἐπεκράτησεν ἢ οἶ δί-  
φθογγος ἐκθλιβέντος τοῦ ὕ. τύπτει πᾶν δεύτερον πρόσωπον εἰς ζ  
λήγον ἀποβολῆ τοῦ ζ τὸ τρίτον ποιεῖ, ποιεῖς ποιεῖ, ἔλεγες ἔλεγε·  
περὶ γὰρ τοῦ παρακειμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

[Introductory rules for the inflection of verbs

Singular. *Týptō* 'beat': in indicative verbs there are two endings in the present tense active, those in *-ō* and the derived ending *-mī*. So we will speak first about verbs in *-ō* and later take in those with *-mī* as well. Every verb, then, ending in *-ō* has a final grave accent, *légō* 'I say', *phérō* 'I bear'; those having a circumflex accent are contracted from a grave accent, *poiéō poiō* 'I make', *boáō boō* 'shout', *chrysoō chrysoō* 'I gild'. *Týpteis* 'you beat': every first person ending in *-ō* forms its second person by changing *-ō* to *-eis*, *légō* 'I say' *légeis* 'you say', *kóptō* 'I cut' *kópteis* 'you cut'; circumflex verbs are written in the contracted form, *poiéεις ποιεῖς* 'I, you make', *boáεις βοᾶς* 'I, you shout', because *ae* suffers crasis to give *a*, as in *tā emá tamá* 'mine (plural)', *Chrysoῖς* 'you gild': it ought to be *chrysoῦς* because *oe* gives *ou* as in *tō emón toumón* 'mine (singular)', but because verbs in *-ō* all have a diphthong with *i* in the second person the *oi* diphthong won through with the *u* squeezed out. *Týptei* 'he, she beats': every second person ending in *-s* forms its third person by deleting the *s*, *poiεῖς ποιεῖ* 'you, he makes', *éleges élege* 'you, he was saying'. We will speak later about the perfect and the aorist.] (Hilgard 1894: I.43.1–18)

At this stage *klisis* is used in the same sense for nominal and verbal inflection; there are no separate declensions listed as such, nor is *syzygia*

'conjugation' used in Theodosius's account of verbal morphology, though it does appear as a technical term in Choeroboscus (Hilgard 1894: II.13.18). In the main the rules are set out in relation to graphic forms, but attention is drawn to the separate pronunciation of *i*, marked *ī*, in word forms like *Minōi*, and the now "silent" *i* written with the "iota subscript" in the letters *α*, *η*, and *ω* (for details see Allen 1974: 80–83). It may be noted how after the nominative of nouns and the first person of verbs each successive inflected form is used wherever possible as the descriptive basis for the form next listed.

The terms *klisis* and *syzygia* are worth some attention. *Klisis* had been used by the Stoics to stand for any relevant morphological differences within the nominal and verbal forms in Greek. Its Latin translation, first made by Varro, was *declinatio*, used in the same sense. But the *Téchnē* lists thirteen *syzygiai* as subsets of verbs having similar inflectional paradigms, rather strangely counting *syzygia* as one of the *parepόμενα* [grammatical categories] of the verb (section 13) and assigning a separate section (14) to them alone. There are six conjugations of verbs in *-ō* (*barýtona* [grave accented]), depending on their root-final consonant, on which other forms depended (e.g. *gráphō* 'write', future *grápsō*, *némō* 'distribute', future *nemō*, etc.), three of "contracted verbs" (*perispόμενα* [with final circumflex accent]), *tim(a)ō* 'honour', *phil(e)ō* 'love', and *dēl(o)ō* 'show', and four of the verbs ending in *-mī*, *títhēmi* 'place', *hístēmi* 'set', *didōmi* 'give', and *deiknymi* 'show'.

This persisted through the later Greek and until the later Byzantine age, though *klisis* continued to be used in the general sense of inflection, as in *klisis rhēmatōn* [verbal inflection]; a scholiast on the *Téchnē* (Hilgard 1901: 549.33–34) notes that nouns have inflection and case, but verbs have only inflection (*en tois onómasi légomen klisin kai ptōsin, en de tois rhēmasi klisin monēn* (cf. chapter 12, pp. 243–244)).

The Latin translation of *syzygia*, *coniugatio* (English *conjugation*) appeared in technical relation to verbal morphology as early as Sacerdos, a third century author of an *Ars grammatica*, and such a morphological subclassification of Latin verbs is to be seen in Varro (9.109), where three subclasses were distinguished by their second person singular forms: *meo*, *meas* 'go', *neo nes* 'sew', and *ruo, ruis* 'fall'. In Priscian's *Institutio* the four conjugations are set forth in the same way and with the same memberships as in subsequent and modern Latin grammars (Keil 1859: 450.12–25).

Though in general Latin grammarians followed rather than led their Greek colleagues, it does seem that in nominal morphology they were more innovative.

Varro used *declinatio* in its wider sense of all morphological variation, but he also recognized specific nominal *declinationes* [declensions] as subclasses of nouns by reference to their ablative singular forms (10: 62), *terra* 'earth', *lance* 'platter', *clavi* 'key', *caelo* 'sky', *versu* 'verse'. By the late fourth century Charisius had distinguished the five declensions by reference to their genitive singular forms, essentially the practice of modern European grammars of Latin (Keil 1857: 18–31; 31.8–22).

Donatus does not directly refer to this, but his commentator Servius (c. 400) explicitly repairs this omission, also making the genitive case criterial for each declension (Keil 1864: 408.36–409.3):

Omnia nomina, quae in rerum natura sunt, quinque regulis continentur, quae regulae apud Donatum quidem non sunt propter compendium, tamen tenendae sunt. colliguntur autem istae regulae de genetivo singulari: nam is casus quinque finibus terminatur, aut ac diphthongo, ut *Musa Musae*, aut *i*, ut *doctus docti*, aut *is*, ut *pater patris*, aut *us*, ut *hic fluctus huius fluctus*, aut *ei*, ut *hic vel haec dies huius diei*.

[All nouns, as they stand, are brought within five declensional paradigms. These rules are not found in Donatus, for the sake of brevity, but they should be observed. They are formulated by reference to the genitive singular, because this case has five endings: in *-ae*, like *Musa* 'Muse' *Musae*, in *-i*, like *doctus* 'learned' *docti*, in *-is*, like *pater* 'father' *patris*, in *-us*, like *fluctus* 'wave' *huius fluctus* 'of this wave', or in *-ei*, like *dies* (masculine or feminine) 'day', *huius diei* 'of this day'.]

This system, accepted in all modern grammars of Latin, was clearly set out by Priscian at the beginning of his didactic *Institutio* (1859: 443.1–9 (cf. chapter 5, pp. 109–110)). But he continues to use *declinatio* in its generalized sense of inflection with reference to verbs: *de generali verbi declinatione* [on the general inflection of verbs] (Keil 1855: 452.1).

In the exhaustive nominal paradigms of Theodosius's *kanónes* there are fifty-six separate rules and sets of forms generated by the rules, sorted into masculine, feminine, and neuter nouns, and subclassified by their nominative and genitive endings, but without any further sorting into declensions. Probably under Latin influence the very late Byzantine grammarians who carried the Greek language back to Italy in the fourteenth century adopted a system of five declensions, still using the generalized term *klisis*, though with some differences between them on the membership of these five declensions (see pp. 243–244).

We may now look at some of the comments made by Choeroboscus and Sophronius. On the five-case system of Greek nominals Choeroboscus writes (Hilgard 1894: 1.110.26–111.23):

ἄξιον δὲ ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, εἰ οὖν οἱ ὄροι τῶν εὐθειῶν εἰσι, — τί γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὀριζόμεθα, καὶ οὐχὶ τί ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου — ἢ δὲ εὐθεῖα, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐκ ἐστὶ κυρίως πτώσις, διὰ τί ὀριζόμενοι τὸ ὄνομα λέγομεν ὅτι “ὄνομά ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν”. Ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὡσπερ γελαστικόν λέγομεν τὸ πεφυκὸς γελᾶν καὶ χρεμετιστικόν τὸ πεφυκὸς χρεμετίζειν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πτωτικόν ἐνταῦθα λέγομεν τὸ πεφυκὸς ἐπιδέχεσθαι πτώσεις· καὶ γὰρ ἢ εὐθεῖα πτώσις μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ, κλίνεται δὲ εἰς πτώσεις, τουτέστιν εἰς γενικὴν δοτικὴν αἰτιατικὴν καὶ κλητικὴν. Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τούτοις. Εἰ δὲ τις τὴν ἀκριβείαν σκοπήσει, εὐρήσει ὅτι οὐδὲ ἢ κλητικὴ ἐστὶ κυρίως πτώσις· καὶ δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· αἱ γὰρ πτώσεις οὐ σημαίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος ἄλλ' ἐκ πλαγίου· ἢ γὰρ ἔνεκεν κτήματος παραλαμβάνονται ἢ ἔνεκεν πράγματος· ἔνεκεν μὲν κτήματος, οἷον Ἀριστάρχου ἀγρός, Ἀριστάρχου οἶκος, ἔνεκεν δὲ πράγματος, οἷον Ἀριστάρχου ἡκουσα, Ἀριστάρχω δέδωκα· ὅθεν καὶ πτώσεις καλοῦνται, ὡς ἐκπεσοῦσαι τῆς ὀρθῆς σημασίας, καὶ πλάγιοι, ὡς μὴ σημαίνουσαι ὀρθῶς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος ἄλλ', ἐκ πλαγίου· ἢ δὲ κλητικὴ ὀρθῶς σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος· ἄρ οὖν οὔτε ἢ κλητικὴ ἐστὶ κυρίως πτώσις.

[If our definitions are of nominative forms (for we define *ánthrōpos* 'man' but not *ánthrōpou* 'of a man') and the nominative is, as has been said, not properly a case, it is legitimate to ask why we define the nouns as a case-inflected part of speech. One can say that just as we call “laughing” that which is naturally inclined to laugh and “neighing” that which is naturally inclined to neigh, so we call “case-inflected” that which naturally admits case inflection. The nominative is not a case, but it is inflected into cases, genitive, dative, accusative, and vocative. So much for that. But if one looks into the precise state of affairs, he will find that the vocative is not properly a case either. This is plain to be seen; the (oblique) cases do not designate the essence of what they stand for directly, but obliquely, either in relation to a possession or in relation to the thing itself: in relation to possession as in ‘Aristarchus’s field’ or ‘Aristarchus’s house’, in relation to the thing itself as in ‘I heard Aristarchus’ or ‘I gave something to Aristarchus’. These forms are called cases (‘fallings’) because they fall outside the straightforward



meaning of what they stand for and oblique because they do not indicate its essence directly, but from a particular angle. But the vocative does designate directly the essence of what it stands for, and this is why the vocative is not strictly speaking a case either.]

Sophronius's comment on this same question is as follows (Hilgard 1894 II: 378.26–38):

Ἰστέον ὅτι πτώσεις καλοῦνται οὐ καθὸ κατὰ φωνὴν ἐκ τῆς εὐθείας πεπτώκασι — κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ὀφείλει πτώσεις ἔχειν — ἀλλ' ὅτι ἢ μὲν εὐθεῖα ὀρθῶς τὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνει· ὅθεν οἱ ὄροι ὡς τῆς οὐσίας σημαντικοὶ ἀπ' εὐθείας ἄρχονται· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι οὐκ αὐτὴν προηγουμένως ἀλλὰ τι τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν· ὅθεν καὶ πλαγιοὶ καλοῦνται, ὡς κυρίως μὲν τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐκ πλαγίου δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν σημαίνουσαι· ἢ δὲ ὀρθῆ κατὰ συνεκδρομὴν πτώσις καλεῖται, ὡσπερ ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος ἔγκλισις, καὶ τὸ ὄ τῆς κλητικῆς ἄρθρον καταχρηστικῶς. Κέκληται δέ, ὡς φαμεν, ὀρθῆ διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς ὀρθοῖς ῥήμασι, τουτέστιν ἐνεργητικοῖς συντάσσεσθαι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπίτοις, τουτέστι τοῖς παθητικοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ τιμιωτέρου τὴν ὀνομασίαν εἴληφεν· εὐθεῖα δὲ συνωνύμως λέγεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν εὐθύ.

[It is to be noted that cases are so named not by reason of the form in which they have fallen from the nominative (“vertical”) case (if this were so, the verb ought to have cases too), but because the nominative straightforwardly signifies the essence of the noun; this is why definitions of the essence of anything are based on the nominative case forms. The other cases do not define an essence directly but some relation which it bears; so they are called oblique cases, because they properly signify circumstances attendant on the essence, and signify the essence itself from a sideways (oblique) position. The nominative is called a case by analogy, just as the infinitive is included in the verbal moods, and the ὄ ‘oh’ of the vocative is called an article, but improperly. As we say, the nominative has been called the upright or straightforward case because it directly signifies the essence of the noun, but also because it constructs with “upright”, that is to say, transitive active verbs; if the “laid back”, that is, the passive verb forms, are also involved, then the name “upright” has been taken, as the title of the more prestigious one. *Orthós* ‘upright’ and *euthís* ‘vertical’ are synonymous terms, because what is upright is vertical.]

The contrast between the three oblique cases and the nominative is primarily a syntactic one, between subject and object. But these specifically syntactic terms were not available to the Byzantines, and following Apollonius they treated the transitive relations between nouns and verbs as holding between a nominative and an oblique case (cf. chapter 3, pp. 37–39, where we have an explicit and authoritative statement of this case to case relationship [Uhlig 1910: 413.3–4]).

The problem of the vocative is an old one, going back to the Stoics, who were the first grammarians to distinguish clearly between the nominative and the oblique cases. Syntactically and presumably phonologically it was more independent within the sentence than the other cases, and could easily constitute a sentence by itself, or aided only by ὄ ‘oh’. But morphologically it belongs within the case paradigm and vocatives are often homophonous with nominatives, in all nouns so in the dual and plural numbers. The inclusion of the vocative within the category of case by the author of the *Téchnē*, followed reluctantly but pragmatically by later grammarians, as we see here, marks the triumph of morphology over syntax, which fits in well with the general grammatical priority assigned to it throughout the Greek and Byzantine centuries. This excerpt may be compared with the observations of the commentators on the *Téchnē*, who expound the same thinking but in somewhat different words (see chapter 4, pp. 65–67).

On the morphology of the Greek cases Choeroboscus writes (I.175.5–18):

Ἀποροῦσι δὲ τινες λέγοντες, καὶ πῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ χάλκεα χαλκᾶ καὶ χρύσεια χρυσᾶ καὶ ὀστῆα ὀστᾶ καὶ κᾶνεα κανᾶ συμφώνου προηγουμένου τοῦ εἰς ᾧ ἐγένετο ἢ κρᾶσις, Ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐγένετο τὸ χαλκᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκέα κατὰ κρᾶσιν οὔτε τὸ χρυσᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χρύσεια οὔτε τὸ ὀστᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀστῆα οὔτε τὸ κανᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κᾶνεα, ἀλλὰ λέγομεν ὅτι αἱ εὐθεῖαι τούτων αἱ ἐνικαὶ δίχως λέγονται, καὶ ἐντελῶς καὶ κατὰ κρᾶσιν· καὶ αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐντελεῖς εὐθεῖαι πληθυντικαὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐντελοῦς ἐνικῆς εὐθείας ἐκλίθησαν, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ χάλκεον χάλκεα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χρύσειον χρύσεια καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀστῆον ὀστῆα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κᾶνεον κᾶνεα, αἱ δὲ κατὰ κρᾶσιν εὐθεῖαι πληθυντικαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ κρᾶσιν εὐθείας τῶν ἐνικῶν εἰσιν, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦν χαλκᾶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χρυσοῦν χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ οστοῦν ὀστᾶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κανοῦν κανᾶ, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ εὐθείᾳ τῶν ἐνικῶν ἐγένετο ἢ κρᾶσις καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἢ κλίσις τοῖς πληθυντικοῖς.



[Some have raised the question, how do we get a crasis (vowel combination) of *e* into *a* in words like *chálkea* ‘copper’ and *chalká*, *chrýsea* ‘golden’ and *chrysá*, *ostéa* ‘bones’ and *ostá*, and *kánean* ‘baskets’ and *kaná*, when a consonant precedes. The answer is that none of the above words were derived in this way; we say rather that the nominative singulars of these words are found in two forms, without crasis and with crasis and that the nominative plurals without crasis are formed from similar nominative singulars, as *chálkea* from *chálkeon*, *chrýsea* from *chrýseon*, *ostéa* from *ostéon*, and *kánean* from *káneon*, but the nominative plurals with crasis are formed from nominative singulars with crasis, as in *chalkoûn* and *chalká*, *chrysoûn* and *chrysá*, *ostoûn* and *ostá*, and *kanoûn* and *kaná*. That is to say, the crasis occurs in the nominative singular and the nominative plural forms are derived from this.]

Choeroboscus (II.11.23–12.7) takes up the semantics of the verbal tense forms very much on the lines of the scholiasts commenting on section 13 of the *Téchnē* (see chapter 4, pp. 71–74):

Χρόνοι δὲ καθόλου εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ἐνεστώς παρεληλυθώς μέλλον. Ἐκ τούτων ὁ ἐνεστώς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διαίρεσιν, ἐπειδὴ κινδυνεύει μὴ εἶναι χρόνος· λέγουσι γὰρ τινες, ὅτι εἰ ἄρα αἰεὶ ὁ χρόνος κινεῖται, οὐκ ἄρα δύναται ἴστασθαι, εἰ μὴ ἴσταται δέ, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος. Ἀλλὰ λέγομεν, ὅτι οἱ χρόνοι εἰ μὴ ἐνέστησαν οὐδὲ παρήρχοντο· πῶς γὰρ δύναται παρελθεῖν τὸ μὴ σταθῆν, καὶ γὰρ ἢ χθесινῆ ἡμέρα εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐνέστη οὐδὲ παρήρχετο· καὶ πάλιν ἂν τις βρέξῃ τὸν δάκτυλον αὐτοῦ εἰς κρουνὸν αἰεὶ ῥέοντα ἢ εἰς πόταμον αἰεὶ ῥέοντα τὸν πόδα αὐτοῦ, δηλονότι οὔτε ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι δύναται βρέξαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ· καὶ ἡ διαχάραξις δὲ ἢ γινομένη ἐκ τοῦ τροχοῦ δηλονότι δι’ ἐνεστώτος χρόνου γίνεται καὶ οὔτε διὰ τοῦ παρελθόντος οὔτε διὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος· καὶ πάντα δὲ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ λέγονται καὶ γίνονται. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἐνεστώς ἀκαριαῖος, τουτέστιν ἅμα τῷ λέγεσθαι ἔχει καὶ τὸ εἶναι· εἰκότως οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τίνα διαίρεσιν. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι παρὰ μὲν τοῖς γραμματικοῖς πλατικός ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεστώς· οἴονεϊ γὰρ πλάτος ὑπεμφαίνει ὡς πρὸς τὸν παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκαριαῖον λεγόμενον χρόνον, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν “ὁ ἐνεστώς ἐνιαυτός τοιόσδε ἐστὶ”, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκαριαῖός ἐστι, τουτέστιν ἅμα τῷ λέγεσθαι ἔχει καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τύπτω γράφω ταῦτα γὰρ ἅμα τῷ λέγεσθαι ἔχουσι καὶ τὸ εἶναι.

[There are three different times altogether, present, past, and future. Of these the present cannot be subdivided, because it may very well not be a real period of time at all; for some say that if time is always moving forward it cannot stand still, and if it does not stand still there is no such thing as time present. But we reply that if times did not present themselves they have not passed. How can what has not stood at all pass? If yesterday was not once present it has not passed either. Again, if one dips one’s finger into a flowing fountain or one’s foot into a flowing river, it is clear that one cannot be dipping it in what has passed or is yet to come, but in what is here now. The divisions of time marked by a turning wheel are plainly in present time, neither past nor future. Everything that happens and everything that is said happens and is said in the present. But the present is without duration; that is to say, it has its existence at the moment it is spoken of. It cannot, therefore, admit of any subdivision.]

But we must note that for grammarians the present tense has some breadth; for example, it seems to suggest an extension to the instantaneous time envisaged by the philosophers, as when we say “The present year is such and such”. For the philosophers the present is instantaneous, that is, it has its existence at the moment it is spoken of, as with *týptō* ‘I am hitting’; *gráphō* ‘I am writing’. These words are said and the events take place at precisely the same time.]

The Greek verb translated by ‘stand’ in the passage above has the same root as *enestós* (*chrónos*), originally the intransitive aorist participle of *enhistēmi* [stand in one’s presence]. Sophronius’s discussion (Hilgard 1894: II.413.31–32) on the problems of tense and time may be compared:

Τριχῆ διαίρεται ὁ χρόνος, εἰς ἐνεστώτα παρωχημένον καὶ μέλλοντα· πᾶν γὰρ πρᾶγμα ἢ πάρεστιν ἢ παρήλθεν ἢ μέλλει.

[Time is divided in three ways, present, past, and future. For every action is either taking place here and now, or has been taking place, or is going to take place.]

There follows some discussion on the descriptive priority of the tense forms (Hilgard 1894: II.414.7–14):

προτέτακται ὁ ἐνεστώς ὡς ὄρατός καὶ φανερός· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὄρωτο ἢ φαίνοιτο μήπω ἐληλυθώς; ἔτι δὲ καὶ καθὸ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων

φωνὰς ἐνεστῶτι ἐκφωνοῦμεν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι σαφέστερός ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τις τὸν τοῦ λείψω ἐνεστῶτα ἐρωτηθεῖη, ἀμφίβολον εὐρήσει τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ λείβω καὶ τοῦ λείπω τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν μέλλοντα· ἔαν δὲ ὑπὸ ἐνεστῶτος ἀρχώμεθα, οὐδὲν ἀμφίβολον γίνεται· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λείβω καὶ τοῦ λείπω ὁ αὐτὸς μέλλον λείψω.

[The present tense has been given priority as being visible and apparent in its reference; for how could what has not yet come about be visible or apparent? And it is also the case that we pronounce the other tense forms by reference to the present tense, and this makes for greater clarity. If one were to be asked for the present tense of *leipsō* ('I shall leave' or 'I shall pour'), one would get an ambiguous answer, because the two verbs *leibō* 'pour' and *leipō* 'leave' have identical future-tense forms. But if we start from the present tense no ambiguity results. We just say that *leibō* and *leipō* have the same future tense form *leipsō*.]

Throughout Antiquity and the Byzantine period discussion continued over the semantic relations between formal tense and actual time, especially with reference to the status of "present time", and the distinctions between the meanings of the "four past tenses". The aspectual insights of the Stoics seem to have left little except some terminology to the mainline tradition of grammatical writing. The difference between the philosophers' time and the grammarians' tense was made rather less easy to handle by the fact that in Greek a single word *chrónos* represents both concepts. We have to wait until later, in the work of Maximus Planudes (chapter 11, pp. 227–232), for significant advances in Byzantine tense theory.

As the *Kanónes* and the comments on them made by later grammarians were primarily done for didactic purposes, it would be vain to expect systematic theoretical expositions, and we notice how a general philosophical discussion on time is put "off limits" as far as the grammarian is concerned, as it is by the commentators on the *Téchnē* (see pp. 72–74). In the grammatical description the dominant model is the one designated by Hockett (1954) as word-and-paradigm, and the relations between members of a paradigm are predominantly of the process type, whereby the forms of inflected words are derived by rules relating them to a basic form or to one already given.

Once again we see the priority given to the morphological component of grammar. Sophronius justified the present tense as the best starting point for a description of verbal morphology by reference to its economy

of rules and the avoidance of ambiguity. We may compare this with Bloomfield's observation (Bloomfield 1935: 217) that several French adjectives which vary formally in their genders may be more economically described if we start from the feminine forms, deriving the masculine forms by deletions (c. g. *lente* (feminine) /lãt/ 'slow', and *laide* /lãd/ 'ugly', giving the masculine forms *lent* /lã/ and *laid* /lã/ 'ugly', respectively.

## Chapter 7

### *Epimerismoí* and *Schedographía*: teaching methods

The Greek words *merismós* and *epimerismós* refer to an educational device of long standing. The corresponding Latin word was *partitio*, and we have seen a specimen example of Priscian's twelve *Partitiones* (chapter 5), for a full account of which see Glück (1967). It would appear that it played an important part in Greek and Byzantine education (Glück 1967: 162), enjoying an especial educational favour during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the Byzantine Empire, under the title *schedographía*. We are looking not just at an aspect of the development of grammatical and general linguistic theory, but at a major teaching technique and school drill.

Like all technical terms in ancient linguistics the pioneers had no choice but to employ existing ordinary-language lexical items in special senses, as with *ónoma*, *rhêma*, etc. which then became institutionalized in the accepted terminology. *Merismós* and *epimerismós* had a regular non-technical meaning of division, distribution, and allocation (e.g. Plato, *Laws* 903 B), like their associated verbs *merizein* and *epimerizein* and the already established *méré lógou*, which had been used by Plato to designate the two major syntactic components of sentences, later to take on the meaning of word classes. *Merismós* and *epimerismós* were employed by Apollonius to refer to the parsing of phrases and sentences and the allocation of the component words to specific classes (e.g. Schneider 1878: 144.11; Uhlig 1910: 34.17, 65.6, 150.8, 264.14, 491.14). He also wrote four books devoted to this analytic process, of which, however, only fragments remain (Schneider 1910: 30–37).

Later in the second century A.D. Sextus Empiricus used the verb *merizein* in this technical sense, and in a section of his *Adversus mathematicos* he included the scansion of a line of verse within this analytic process (1: 158–168).

Thereafter the content of *epimerismós* was enriched as it passed through the hands of Herodian, Apollonius's son (Glück 1967: 31–46), and others, reaching the level already seen in Priscian's *Partitiones* (chapter 5).

Scholars have pointed out how much emphasis was laid by teachers and by the public on education in the Byzantine Empire, and that, while no writers or teachers at the level of Abelard and Thomas Aquinas are

found there, the general level of education was very much higher than in the west (Buckler 1929; Marrou 1948: 340; Runciman 1933: chapter 9; Reynolds – Wilson 1978: 45–69).

Hellenism, the teaching of the Greek language and its literature and Greek culture in general was originally a product of the Macedonian conquests, and the educational tradition inaugurated in the Hellenistic age persisted, unaltered in its essentials through the period of Roman imperial control and the different conditions of the Eastern Empire. Naturally Greek grammar was a central and vital part of this education, and as with specifications set out in the *Téchnē* (p. 44, above) the term *grammatikḗ* was used in both its wider and its narrower sense.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the basically theocratic nature of Byzantine statecraft, the conflict between pagan (classical) learning and Christian scholarship was not nearly as strong as it was in parts of the west; no great distinction between *artes* and *auctores* appears to have arisen, with classical and Christian scholarship flourishing side by side in the schools and the university system. We may notice Anna Comnena's wide education, of which she was so proud (Buckler 1929: 165, 1948). The Byzantine tradition would have been wholly on the side of the *auctores* in the *Battle of the Seven Arts*, as is shown by the part it later played in the revival of humanism in the Italian Renaissance.

All this formed the context in which meristic studies took up their central place in educational techniques, with both pagan and religious texts being used as sources for *epimerismoí*. Devised as an analytic and descriptive method of grammatical explication and based on the grammatical model set out in the *Techné*, they had been extended beyond the scope of the text lines themselves and were no longer confined to grammatical theorizing, but formed a didactic instrument for facilitating learning and textual interpretation. On them could be hung, as we have seen with Priscian's *Partitiones*, grammatical and lexical information ranging far outside the immediate explanation of the words selected from the text lines, though their first task was in line with the earlier sense of (*epi*)*merismós*, the grammatical identification of the individual words and their assignment to word classes, and their further information always retained a link, however tenuous, with the word cited for the *epimerismós*.

Their didactic purpose should be plainly seen in the excerpts given in this chapter. Again it must be emphasized that in a society in which every book was a one-off copy made by hand the number of books in the possession of most school pupils and even university students would be scanty and so memory was at a premium to an extent difficult to

comprehend today (Runciman 1933: 223–224). Byzantine students are reported to have known by heart long texts from Homer and other classical authors, and the more extended of the *epimerismoí* would have served as material for committing to memory a good deal of the requisite grammatical information in the course of education.

The question-and-answer format of parts of many *epimerismoí* provided one means then available for ready information retrieval, and it may be observed that one of the first grammars of Greek for use in the Italian Renaissance, by Chrysoloras, was cast in this mode and entitled *Erôtēmata* [Questions]. Some collections of *epimerismoí* were set in verse form, as were some Latin grammars in the West; such memorizing devices survive fragmentarily today in the traditional Anglican Catechism and in the so-called gender rhymes of older Latin primers (cf. Kennedy 1930: 221–225). Boissonade (1830: 340–393) provides an example of a short grammar of Greek written in verse form.

The word *schédos* [lesson] was used to refer to passages of *epimerismoí* containing grammatical and other linguistic information for instructional purposes; they might range from a single short sentence to quite a long text. *Schedographía* [the writing of *schédē*] signified the composition of such pieces. They were held in high esteem in Byzantine schooling, particularly in the eleventh century, perhaps under the influence of Psellus, a philosopher and historian in Constantinople, where he held a number of senior government appointments. He also wrote on grammar and claims that he was one of those who revived this educational technique (Sathas 1876: 492). The etymology of the word *schédos* is unclear; it has been explained as a tablet on which the information was written for school and private use (Sophokles 1887, s. v.).

The historian Anna Comnena vigorously attacked the whole educational policy expressed in the *schédē*, which she saw as a recent craze. It is not only against *schedographía* as a didactic device that she directed her attack, for she clearly disapproved of its exalted place in education as a whole. She was voicing the perennial complaint made by some about what they see as the excessive formalism and desiccation of many types of parsing grammar. Her dislike must have been intense; she brought in her personal recollections of the hated drill almost adventitiously into the final book of her laudatory biography of her father, the Emperor Alexius (*Alexiad* 15.7, Reifferscheid 1884: 293–294; Dawes 1967: 411). Book 15 begins with her father's last campaign against the Turks, in which he was victorious, and continues with his humanitarian care for the victims of the war, the veterans, the wounded, the widows, and the

war orphans, who were housed and educated in the celebrated Orphanage (*orphantrophéion*). After describing the care that the inmates received she turns her enraged attention on to *schedographia*, which she claimed in her times was supplanting literature, history, and general liberal education. Thereafter she returns to her narrative, recounting her father's struggles with sundry heretics and his death. The passage is worth quoting in full, with its personal emphasis and its near total irrelevance to the story she is writing in this book, as an example of contemporary criticism from a highly educated writer (Reifferscheid 1884, 2: 293–294).

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ τεμένη καὶ ἱερά φρονιστήρια εἰσιόντι σοὶ κατὰ λαιὰν ἀπαντήσεις· κατὰ δὲ τὴν δεξιὰν τοῦ μεγάλου τεμένου παιδευτήριον ἔστηκε τῶν γραμματικῶν παισὶν ὀρφανοῖς ἐκ παντοδαποῦ γένους συνειλεγμένοι, ἐν ᾧ παιδευτὴς τις προκάθεται καὶ παῖδες περὶ αὐτὸν ἑστᾶσιν, οἱ μὲν περὶ ἐρωτήσεις ἐπτοημένοι γραμματικᾶς, οἱ δὲ ξυγγραφεῖς τῶν λεγομένων σχεδῶν. καὶ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν καὶ Λατῖνον ἐνταῦθα παιδοτριβοῦμενον καὶ Σκύθην ἑλληνίζοντα καὶ Ῥωμαῖον τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συγγράμματα μεταχειριζόμενον καὶ τὸν ἀγράμματον Ἑλληνα ὀρθῶς ἑλληνίζοντα. τοιαῦτα καὶ περὶ τὴν λογικὴν παιδευσιν τὰ τοῦ Ἀλεξίου σπουδάσματα. τοῦ δὲ σχεδίου ἢ τέχνης εὖρημα τῶν νεωτέρων ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐφ' ἡμῶν γενεᾶς.

ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐδ' ἐν δευτέρῳ λόγῳ τὰ περὶ τούτων τῶν μετεώρων καὶ ποιητῶν καὶ αὐτῶν συγγραφέων καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμπειρίας· πεττεῖα δὲ τὸ σκούδασμα καὶ ἄλλα τὰ ἔργα ἀθέμιτα. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω ἀχθομένη διὰ τὴν παντελῆ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδεύσεως ἀμέλειαν. τοῦτο γάρ μου τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναφλέγει, ὅτι πολὺ περὶ ταῦτα ἐνδιατέτριφα, κἂν, ἐπειδὴν ἀπήλλαγμαί τῆς παιδαριώδους τούτων σχολῆς καὶ εἰς ῥητορικὴν παρήγγειλα καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠψάμην καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν πρὸς ποιητὰς τε καὶ ξυγγραφέας ἤξα καὶ τῆς γλώττης τοὺς ὄχθους ἐκεῖθεν ἐξομαλίσάμην, εἶτα ῥητορικῆς ἐπαρηγούσης ἔμοι κατέγνων τῆς τοῦ πολυπλόκου τῆς σχεδογραφίας πλοκῆς.

[On your left as you come in you would see the sanctuaries and the schools. On the right of the large sanctuary a grammar school has been established for orphans brought in from every race, and in it a schoolmaster sits with his pupils standing around him, some puzzling over questions of grammar, others writing the so-called parsing grammars. There you can also see Latin speakers being

educated, a Scythian learning Greek, a citizen of the Empire studying classical Greek literature, and an illiterate Greek speaking the language correctly. Alexius's passion for education in logic was no less. The technique of parsing grammar is a discovery of the younger people and of our generation.

...  
But now not even a second place is allotted to more exalted studies, studies of our poets and prose writers and of the knowledge that comes from them. This passion for parsing and other improper subjects is like a game of draughts. I say this because I am distressed by the complete neglect of general elementary education. This enrages my mind because I have spent much time on these same parsings, and when I escaped from these puerile studies and took up rhetoric and applied myself to philosophy, as part of these studies I turned eagerly to the writers of poetry and prose, and from them I smoothed away for myself the roughness of my speech; and then with the help of rhetoric I recognized the worthlessness of the complexities of this already excessively complicated writing of parsing grammars.]

Clearly Anna expresses her distaste both for the theory and practice of schedography. One problem of translation and interpretation remains. The translation given here follows Krumbacher in referring to *spoudasma* in the second paragraph to schedography itself and listing it with other useless pursuits as the grammatical subject to the verbless predicate *petteia* 'a game of draughts'. Others, for example Buckler (1929: 167–188) and Dawes (1967: 411) treat *petteia* as the subject linked with *tà érga athémata* as a complex predicate and taking to *spoudasma* as the subject [the present craze of the students is for draughts and other improper pursuits]. Against this interpretation lie the previous use of *tà spoudásmata* to refer to areas of scholarship and the appearance of this short section in the middle of her attack on schedography in the schools. On this view *alla tà érga athémata* would be taken as an expletive reference to *schedographia* [this craze for parsing grammar and all that rubbish].

In one sense Anna's diatribe is timeless, in facing the question how far should elementary education rely on rote learning and predigested gobbets of systematic knowledge. Her assertion of the dead and deadening nature of *schedographia* as compared with the liberating effects of rhetoric and literature is comparable to debates today on the purposes of education and on educational standards and practices, and the extent to

which pupils' creativity can be combined with a rigorous control of a learned body of basic knowledge. Krumbacher's comment is relevant here (1897: 592) that the didactic principles involved in the *schédē* were not far removed from the school practices of the Prussia of his own time (late nineteenth century), a time in which German educational achievements were greatly admired in Europe as a whole.

The *schédē* or *epimerismoí* and the *kanónes* on which they were based are scarcely exciting in theoretical terms, but our debt to the scholars of the Byzantine Empire in their continuation of classical Greek scholarship while Greek linguistic and literary studies dwindled in the early Middle Ages in western Europe must be incalculable. Ferdinand Lot (1951: 189) and others have drawn our attention to the great part played by the Latin grammarians in the defense of the classical heritage in the West (Lot 1951: 189; cf. Law 1982). A recognition of the no lesser debt to the Byzantine Greek grammarians is overdue. *Schédē* could be fairly lengthy or very short; they were normally keyed to a particular text, but there are some examples of alphabetically arranged *schédē* (e.g. Cramer 1835: 331–426).

Examples are given below exemplifying epimeristic and schedographic techniques devoted to sacred and profane texts, and the sort of information that was thought fit to include within their range.

*Epimerismós* on *anēr* 'man' from Psalm 1, verse 1, "Blessed in the man ..." (Georgi Choerobosci, *Epimerismi in Psalmos*, ed. Thomas Gaisford, 1842: 6–8):

ἌΝ'ΗΡ ὀνόματος ἐστὶ γένους ἀρσενικοῦ, εἶδους παραγώγου, εἶδους τῶν παραγῶγων, ῥηματικοῦ. Πόθεν γίνεται; Παρὰ τὸ ἀνώ, τὸ τελειῶ καὶ πράττω, ἀνὴρ, ὅσπερ παρὰ τὸ αἶθω, τὸ καίω αἰθὴρ, καὶ ἄω, τὸ πνέω, ἀήρ, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀνώ ἀνυήρ, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ ἀνὴρ· ἀνυστικώτερος γὰρ καὶ πρακτικώτερος ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γυναικός. Τί πνεῦμα ψιλόν; Τὸ Α πρὸ τοῦ Ν ψιλοῦται· ἄνια ἄνεμος. Τὸ ἀνώ Ἄττικοὶ δασύνουσι. ἌΝ'ΗΡ Η διατί· πᾶν ἀρσενικὸν καὶ θηλυκὸν ...

Καὶ ἄλλως· τὰ εἰς ΗΡ ἐπὶ παντὸς γένους διὰ τοῦ Η γράφεται. Ἄνὴρ διατί δξύ; Τὰ εἰς ΗΡ λήγοντα ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν ἀπλᾶ, μὴ ὄντα κύρια, μὴδὲ ἔθνηκα, δξύονται, οἷον αἰθὴρ, δαῆρ, ἀήρ, ἀνὴρ· μάχεται τὸ ἐρήρη· ἴσως δὲ τοῦ ἐρήρηρος ἐστὶν ἀποκοπή. Πόσα σημαίνει ἌΝ'ΗΡ; Τέσσαρα· τὸν φύσει, ὡς τὸ ἄνδρα μοι ἔνεπε μοῦσα πολύτροπον· τὸν γήμαντα, ὡς τὸ

ἄνδρα μὲν, ᾧ ἔδοσαν με πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ· τὸν ἀνδρείον, ὡς τὸ ὃ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἐστέ, καὶ τὸν ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίαν ἔχοντα, ὡς τὸ ὅς που νῦν γε μετ' ἀνδρῶν ἴζει.

ἌΝ'ΗΡ ποίου εἶδους τῶν ὑποπεπτωκότων τῷ ὀνόματι; Ὅτε σημαίνει τὴν φύσιν, προσηγορικοῦ. Διόρισον. Προσηγορικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν κοινὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, ἀνὴρ. Εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τὸν ἀνδρείον, ποίου εἶδους τῶν ὑποπεπτωκότων τῷ ὀνόματι; Ἐπιθετικοῦ. Διόρισον. Ἐπιθετον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν ὁμωνύμως τιθέμενον. Καὶ τὸ ἀνὴρ τοῦτο πόθεν λαμβάνεται; Ἀπὸ σώματος. Διόρισον. Ἀπὸ δὲ σώματος, ὡς ταχὺς, βραχὺς. Εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τὸν γήμαντα, ποίου εἶδους τῶν ὑποπεπτωκότων τῷ ὀνόματι; Τῶν πρὸς τι. Διόρισον. Πρὸς τι ἔχον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχον σχέσιν, ὡς πατὴρ, υἱός, φίλος, δεξιός. Καὶ πρὸς τίνα ἔχει; Πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα. Καὶ ποσαχῶς τὰ πρὸς τι; Τετραχῶς. Κατὰ τι καὶ τί; Φύσει μὲν, ὡς πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν· τύχη, ὡς δοῦλοι πρὸς δεσπότην· τέχνη, ὡς μαθητὴς πρὸς διδάσκαλον· προαιρέσει, ὡς φίλος πρὸς φίλον. Εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τὸν ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίαν ἔχοντα, ποίου εἶδους τῶν ὑποπεπτωκότων τῷ ὀνόματι; Τῶν ὡς πρὸς τι. Διόρισον. Τῶν ὡς πρὸς τι ἔχον δὲ ἐστὶ, τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον μὲν λεγόμενον, κατ' ἐναντιότητα δὲ, φθαρτικόν, ὡς νύξ ἡμέρα, θάνατος ζωὴ. Καὶ ποσαχῶς λαμβάνονται τὰ ὡς πρὸς τι; Τετραχῶς· κατὰ ποιόν, ὡς τὸ γλυκὺ πρὸς πικρόν· κατὰ ποσόν, ὡς τὸ μικρὸς πρὸς μέγας, καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς μεράκιον· κατὰ ἔμμεσον, ὡς τὸ ἁμαρτωλὸς πρὸς δίκαιον· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἁμαρτωλὸν μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ τὸν δίκαιον ἁμαρτίας· κατὰ ἄμμεσον ὡς τὸ νύξ ἡμέρα, θάνατος ζωὴ. Καὶ τί διαφέρει τὰ πρὸς τι τῶν ὡς πρὸς τι; Διαφέρει ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι σωματικά εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ εἴρηται πατὴρ χωρὶς υἱοῦ, οὐδὲ υἱὸς χωρὶς πατρός· τὰ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τι ἀναιρετικά εἰσιν ἀλλήλων· ἀναιρουμένης γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἔρχεται ἡ νύξ, καὶ ἀναιρουμένης τῆς ζωῆς ἔρχεται ὁ θάνατος. Πῶς κλίνεται; Τοῦ ἀνέρος. Ὁ κανὼν· τῶν εἰς ΗΡ δξύτων ὅσα μὲν ἔχει τὸ Τ ἐπ' εὐθείας διὰ τοῦ Η κλίνεται, καμπτήρος εἰς ατήρος (ἐλατήρος,) σεσημειωμένου τοῦ πατέρος ἀστέρος· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει τὸ Ρ ἐπ' εὐθείας διὰ τοῦ Ε κλίνεται, ἀέρος, δαέρος, ἀνέρος, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ ἀνδρός. Ὁ κανὼν· αἱ συγκοπτόμεναι γενικαὶ καὶ μιμείσθαι θέλουσι τὰς δξύτῶνας εὐθείας. Καὶ πῶς; Γίνεται δ' ἀνδρὸς κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ Δ. Καὶ διατί ἐπλεόνασε τὸ Δ; Διότι τὸ Ν οὐ δύναται εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ Ρ, οὔτε κατὰ σύλληψιν, οὔτε κατὰ διάστασιν· κατὰ σύλληψιν, πλὴν τοῦ Μ τοῦ Ν ὡς ἐν τῷ μνεῖα καὶ

ἀμνός· κατὰ διάστασιν, ὅτι πᾶσα συλλαβὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ρ ἀρχομένη θέλει ἔχειν τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς εἰς Ρ λήγουσαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, οἶον ἄρρεν, μυρρίνη, ἄρρωστος· διὰ τοῦτο πλεονάζει τὸ Δ, καὶ γίνεται ἀνδρός.

Καὶ διατί οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν ἄλλο σύμφωνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ Δ; Ἐπειδὴ αἱ συγκοπτόμεναι γενικαὶ μιμεῖσθαι θέλουσι τὰς ὀξυτόνους εὐθείας· ἢ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀμυδρός, ἢ πατρός καὶ θυγατρὸς, τὴν ἱατρὸς.

Καὶ κατὰ πόσους τρόπους πλεονάζει τὸ Δ; Κατὰ τέσσαρας. Κατὰ τί καὶ τί; Κατὰ κλίσιν, ὡς τὸ ἀνήρ, ἀνέρος, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ ἀνδρός· κατὰ γραφὴν, ὡς τὸ ὕω τὸ βρέχω, ὕωρ, καὶ πλεονασμῶ, τοῦ Δ ὕδωρ· κατὰ ποιητικὴν ἄδειαν, ὡς τὸ

ἔδδεισε δ' γέρον καὶ ἐπείθετο μῦθω.

κατὰ ἀναγκαίαν σύνταξιν, ὡς τὸ χεῖρ, χειρός, ἄχερος, καὶ πλεονασμῶ τοῦ Δ ἄχερδος· ἔστι δὲ βοτάνη ἀκανθώδης, μὴ δυναμένης χειρὸς ψαῦσαι ταύτης. Καὶ αἰτιατικὴ, τὸν ἄνδρα. Ὁ τόνος; Αἱ μέντοι εἰς Α αἰτιατικαὶ δισύλλαβοι μόνως βαρύνονται, χῆνα, παῖδα, ἄνδρα. Ἡ κλητικὴ, ὦ ἄνερ. Ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ἀμετάβολα λήγοντα μακροκατάληκτα, ἀποβάλλοντα τῆς γενικῆς τὴν ἐσχάτην τὸ ΟΣ, ποιεῖ τὴν κλητικὴν. Ὅτι ἡμάρτηται καὶ κατὰ τὸν τόνον καὶ κατὰ τὴν κλίσιν. Καὶ ἄλλως· σεσημείωται τὸ ἄνερ, πάτερ, σῶτερ, δᾶερ, ἀναβιβάζοντα τὸν τόνον ἐπὶ τῆς κλητικῆς. Καὶ διατί σεσημείωται; Διότι κανὼν ἔστιν ὁ λέγων, ὅτι τὰ εἰς Ρ βραχυκατάληκτα ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν ἀναστρέφονται τὴν ὀξεῖαν τάσιν, πλὴν τῆς ὑπὲρ προθέσεως καὶ τοῦ αὐτὰρ συνδέσμου.

[*Anēr* is a masculine noun belonging to the subclass of derived nouns, and derived from a verb. What is its derivation? From *anyō* 'achieve' (cf. *teleiō* 'complete' and *práttō* 'do'), like *aithēr* 'upper air' from *aithō* 'burn' (cf. *kaiō* 'burn') and *aēr* 'air' from *áo* 'breathe' (cf. *pnéō* 'breathe'). Or it may be from a word form *anyēr* 'achiever' (cf. *anyō*) with elision of the *y* vowel, man being more active and practical than woman. Why does it have a smooth (unaspirated) vowel onset? Because words beginning with *an* are all smooth (cf. *ánia* 'troubles' and *ánemos* 'wind'). But speakers of Attic Greek do aspirate *anyō*. Why is *anēr* written with a long vowel *ē*? All masculine and feminine nouns ... or nouns ending in *-ēr* of all genders have the long vowel.

Why is it oxyton? Words of more than one syllable ending in *-ēr* are oxyton, except for proper nouns and ethnic nouns, e. g. *aithēr*

'upper air', *daēr* 'brother-in-law', *aēr* 'air', *anēr* 'man'. *Eriēr* 'faithful' is exceptional; perhaps it comes from *eriēros* with the loss of *os*.

How many meanings does *anēr* have? Four.

1. Its natural meaning, as in 'Sing, muse, of the man of many wanderings'.

2. 'Husband', as in 'My husband, to whom my father and lady mother gave me'.

3. 'Courageous', as in 'My friends, be men!'.

4. 'A male of adult age', as in 'One who now sits among the full-grown men'.

To what subclass of nouns does *anēr* belong? When it bears its natural meaning it is a common noun. Give a definition. A common noun is one that signifies a common essence, like *ánthrōpos* 'man', *hippos* 'horse', *anēr*. But if it means 'courageous' to what subclass does it belong? It is an adjective. Give a definition. An adjective is a subclass of nouns which may be put in conjunction with proper or common nouns. And from what is this use of *anēr* taken? From physical features, as with *tachýs* 'quick' and *brachýs* 'short'. And when it means 'husband' of what subclass is it? It is a relational noun. Give a definition. A relational noun is one semantically related to another, like 'father', 'son', 'friend', 'right (hand)'. To what is 'man' related? To 'woman'. How many such relationships are there? Four. According to what and to what else? Natural, as father to son; contingent, as slaves to a master; in scientific knowledge, as pupil to teacher; by choice, as friend to friend.

If it means 'someone of adult age' to what subclass does it belong? It is a quasi-relational noun. Give a definition. A quasi-relation is said to be in a relationship to another noun, as in antonymy or negation, like *nýx* 'night': *hēméra* 'day', *thánatos* 'death': *zōē* 'life'. How many such quasi-relationships are there? Four: in quality, like *glykýs* 'sweet': *pikrós* 'bitter'; in quantity, as in *mikrós* 'small': *mégas* 'great', *anēr* 'man' and *meiráktion* 'boy'; intermediately, like *hamartólōs* 'sinner': *díkaios* 'righteous', because the sinner may partake of some righteousness and the righteous man may partake of some sinfulness; and directly, as in *nýx* 'night': *hēméra* 'day', *thánatos* 'death': *zōē* 'life'.

How are relational and quasi-relational nouns distinguished? In this way: relational nouns are physically related to each other; you cannot speak of a father unless there is also a son, nor of a son

without a father. Quasi-relational nouns are destructive of one another; if day is ended night comes, if life is ended death comes.

How is *anēr* declined? The genitive is *anēros* 'of a man'. The rule is that oxytonic nouns ending in *-ēr* with *t* in their nominative are declined with long *ē*: *kamptēros* '(of a) turning point' and words in *-atēros* (e.g. *elatēros* (of a) charioteer'); exceptional are *patēros*, genitive of *patēr* 'father' and *astēros*, genitive of *astēr* 'star'. But those without *t* in their nominative case forms are declined with short *e*, as with *aēros*, *daēros*, *anēros*, and with vowel elision *andrós*. The rule for this: vowel-elided genitives tend to follow the oxytonic nominatives. How are they formed? *Andrós* is formed by the addition of *d*. Why is this? Because *n* cannot precede *r* either within the syllable or between syllables. Within the syllable only *mn* is found, as in *mneia* 'memory' and *amnós* 'lamb'; between syllables, syllables beginning with *r* generally have their preceding syllable ending in *r* for the most part, as in *árrhen* 'male', *myrrhinē* 'myrtle', *árrhōstos* 'weak'. That is why we add *d* and get *andrós*.

Why are not other consonants added apart from *d*? Because vowel-elided genitives seek to follow oxytonic nominatives: *andrós* like *amydrós* 'indistinct', *patrós* 'of a father' and *thygatrós* 'of a daughter' like *iatrós* 'doctor'.

In how many ways is *d* added? In four ways. What are they?

1. In inflection, as with *anēr*, *andrós*, after vowel elision.
2. Graphically, as with *hýō* 'rain' (cf. *bréchō* 'wet') *hýōr* becomes *hýdōr* with the addition of *d*.
3. By poetic licence, as in *éddeise d'ho gērōn kai epeitheto mýthōi* 'The old man shuddered and did as he was bidden'.
4. By grammatical exigency, as with *cheír*, *cheirós* 'hand', *ácheros* 'without hands', and with the addition of *d* *ácherdos* 'a prickly shrub'; this is a plant rather like an acanthus and it cannot be touched by hand.

The accusative *ándra*: what about its accent? Disyllabic *-a* final accusatives make this case paroxytonic only: *chéna* 'goose', *paída* 'boy', *ándra* 'man'. And the vocative *ō áner*: The rule is that nouns ending in a liquid consonant and a long vowel form their vocatives by deleting *-os* from their genitives. This breaks the rule as far as accentuation and inflexion are concerned. Alternatively, vocatives like *áner*, *páter*, *sōter* 'saviour', and *dāer*, which move their accent back are marked as irregular. And why are they so marked? Because there is another rule which says that words with final *r* and a short

vowel and which are disyllabic do move back the accent, except for the preposition *hypér* 'beyond' and the conjunction *autár* 'but'.]

This is one of the longest *schédē*, with three pages of printed text in reference to a single word. It comes from the *schédē* written for the *Book of Psalms*, and *anēr* 'man' is chosen with others from the first and following verses. The first verse reads: 'Blessed is the man who walks not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stands in the way of sinners, nor sits in the seat of the scornful'.

Schedographic texts vary greatly in length even in reference to the same passage, some being no more than one line long. This one clearly passes beyond the mere explication of the word referred to and attaches to it a general review of spelling, accentuation, and morphology. There is a gap in the text at the end of the first paragraph; and presumably the rather otiose information that nouns ending in *-ēr* are spelled like that is included because the letter H had not been always or universally used to indicate "long *e*", *e* like *alpha* being left graphically indeterminate as regards length.

Some points in this *schédos* are of interest. We see how well integrated were secular and religious education. The word being glossed comes from sacred literature, but it freely quotes from classical (pagan) texts. It is set partly in question and answer form, and devotes much attention to the sort of word-for-word etymologies with which the ancient and mediaeval worlds found themselves familiar, and which persisted until Renaissance times and in some cases beyond, before being ultimately replaced by increasingly rigorous comparative-historical etymologies.

The basis of the grammatical information is in the form laid down in the *Technē* as the Byzantine world had it, whatever may have been its prior Alexandrian history (see in particular section 12, with reference to the forms and categories of nouns). More immediately the *schédē* in this text are based on the information given summarily in Theodosius's *Kanónes* and discussed at length in Choeroboscus's comments on them. In the final section of the *schédos*, for example, Choeroboscus's observations on the vocatives in *-er* in *anēr* and other identically inflected nouns, referring to two possible explanations of the forms may be read in conjunction with the rules given by Theodosius (Hilgard 1894: I.17.12–18.3 and 38.12–15) and the commentaries thereon (262.3–262.5, 390.4–12) by Choeroboscus and by Charax (II.394.21–24).

It will be seen that in essence the choice lies between a strictly class-based noun-morphology rule, and a more inclusive rule of general word



structure stating that in words ending in a short vowel and *r* the accentuation is paroxyton. Each rule as formulated involves some individual lexical exceptions, which could, of course, in modern generative terms be suitably marked as such. Each rule is a typical example of the purely synchronic derivational rules, written in the prevailing word-and-paradigm model of grammar (Hockett 1954: 210), accounting for one or more inflective forms as derivatives of some other form chosen as descriptively basic (cf. p. 58 above).

In contrast to a lengthy *schédos* on a single word, that we have just seen, the entire set of *epimerismoi* on Psalm 23 runs to no more than a single page in print. (The tendency to progressive brevity in *epimerismoi* as one advances through the text is also seen in Priscian's *Partitiones* as he passes from one Virgilian line to the next.) In the interest of overall conciseness the same information is not repeated again and again.

In the *schedē* on this psalm, though the text is religious, the notes for the student's attention are simply linguistic ones. The Greek text of the psalm is given below and the translation follows the Greek as closely as possible.

Κύριος ποιμαίνει με, καὶ οὐδέν με ὑστερήσει. εἰς τόπον χλοῆς ἐκεῖ με κατεσκῆνωσεν· ἐπὶ ὕδατος ἀναπαύσεως ἐξέθρεψέ με· τὴν ψυχὴν μου ἐξέστρεψεν ὁδήγησέ με ἐπὶ τρίβους δικαιοσύνης ἔνεκεν τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ. Ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πορευθῶ ἐν μέσῳ σκίας θανάτου, οὐ φοβηθήσομαι κακά, ὅτι σὺ μετ' ἐμοῦ εἶ· ἡ ῥάβδος σου καὶ ἡ βακτηρία σου, αὐταὶ με παρεκάλεσαν. Ἡτοίμασας ἐνώπιόν μου τράπεζαν ἐξεναντίας τῶν θλιβόντων με· ἐλίπανας ἐν ἐλαίῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν μου, καὶ τὸ ποτήριόν μου μεθύσκον ὡς κρᾶτιστον. Καὶ τὸ ἐλεός σου καταδιώξεταί με πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ζωῆς μου, καὶ τὸ κατοικεῖν με ἐν οἴκῳ Κυρίου εἰς μακρότητα ἡμέρων.

[The Lord is my shepherd and nothing shall be lacking to me. In the place of green grass there he settled me, and by the water of repose he nurtured me. He corrected my soul from error, and he led me into the ways of righteousness for his name's sake. Even if I walk in the midst of the shade of death, I will not be afraid of evil things, because you are with me. Your rod and your staff were my comfort. You prepared before me a table against those who trouble me, and you anointed my head with oil. My cup runs right over with wine. Your compassion will follow me all the days of my

life, and my settlement will be in the house of the Lord for the length of days.] (Gaisford 1842: 134–135).

ὙΣΤΕΡῚΩ, ἐκ τοῦ ὕστερος, τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ προθέσεως, τὸ συγκριτικόν, ὑπότερος, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ τοῦ Σ ὕστερος· πλεονάζει δὲ τὸ Σ, ἐπεὶ κανὼν ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, ὅτι τὸ ο συγκοπτόμενον πέφυκε πλεονάζειν τὸ Σ, οἷον θεόφραστος, θεός, (θεόφατον θέσφατον) θεοεἰκερος(λος) θέσκελος, ὑπότερος, ὕστερος. Ὑστερίζω δὲ καὶ ὕστερῳ διαφέρει· ὑστερίζω μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ βραδύνω, ὕστερῳ δὲ τὸ παντελῶς στερίσκω.

ΧΛΟῚ Η παρὰ τὸ φλέω, τὸ ἀναδίδωμι.

ΣΚΙῚ Α, παρὰ τὴν σὺν πρόθεσιν καὶ τὸ κίω τὸ πορεύομαι, ἡ συμπορευομένη τῷ σώματι.

ΒΑΚΤΗΡῚ ΙΑ παρὰ τὸ τὴν βάσιν τηρεῖν. Ῥάβδος καὶ βακτηρία διαφέρει. Ῥάβδος μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ποιμαντικὴ, βακτηρία δὲ ἡ τοῦ γήρως ἀνάπαυσις.

ΤΡῚ ΑΠΕΖΑ, παρὰ τὸ τέσσαρας πέζας ἔχειν, ἡ πόδας.

ΜΕΘῚ ὙΣΚΩ ἐκ τοῦ μεθύω μεθύσω, καὶ πλεονασμῷ τοῦ Κ μεθύσκω. Τὸ μεθύω παρὰ τὸ μὴ θέειν ἢ μὴ τρέχειν· οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες ἀκίνητοί εἰσι μέχρις οὗ ἀπομεθύουσιν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ μεθύω τὸ ἀμελῶ.

[*Hysterō̄*. From *hýsteros* 'late'. This is formed from the preposition *hypó* 'below' and the comparative form *hypóteros*, with elision and the addition of *s* to give *hýsteros*, because the rule says that the elision of *o* is naturally followed by the addition of *s*, like *theóphrastos* 'manifested by God' and *théos* 'God' (*théophaton*, *thésphaton* 'what is ordained by God'), *theoeikeros(-los)*, *théskelos* 'godlike', and *hypóteros*, *hýsteros*. *Hysterizō* and *hysterō̄* differ from each other: *hysterizō* means 'slow down', but *hysterō̄* means 'totally deprive'.

*Chloē* 'green grass'. Compare *phlèō* 'abound' and *anadidōmi* 'send forth'.

*Skiá* 'shade', 'shadow'. Compare the preposition *syn* 'with' and *kiō* 'go' like *poreúomai* 'go'. The shadow 'accompanies the body'.

*Baktēria*. Compare *básin tēreîn* 'guard one's step'. *Rhâbdos* and *baktēria* are different; *rhâbdos* is what shepherds use, *baktēria* is for the relief of old age.

*Trápeza* 'table'. Compare what has *tésseras pézas* or *pódas* 'four feet'.

*Methýskō* 'run over, inebriate'. From *methýō* (*methýsō*, future tense) 'be drunk', with the addition of *k*; compare *mē théein* or *mē tréchein* 'not to run', since those who are drunk are motionless until they become sober again. *Methýō* may be compared with *amelō* 'take no care'.] (Gaisford 1842: 134–135)

*Hysterō* in classical usage constructs with the dative case, this later use with an accusative may be compared with its use in Mark 10.21: *hén se hysterei* 'one thing is lacking to you'. The alleged "derivation" of the word is also given in Choeroboscus's commentary on the *Kanónes* (Hilgard 1894: I.291.8, 391.10).

These *schédē* are almost wholly confined to the sort of etymologies so beloved in antiquity and the Middle Ages, in which complex or supposedly complex words were "derived" from one or more simpler words with various rather arbitrary additions and subtractions. These continued to be sought by Christians as by earlier pagans as long as man's age upon earth since creation or descent from gods or goddesses was considered so short, and some means had to be found to account for the richness of known languages in relation to the assumed sparseness of the earliest forms of human speech with their few *prōtai phōnai* or *prōta onómata* 'first sounds', 'first names'. The verb *kíō* is, in fact, used by Plato in his dialogue devoted to language (*Cratylus* 426 C) as a source word; otherwise it is confined to Homeric and some later poetic usage.

A set of *epimerismoi* based on the *Iliad* is very similar to Priscian's *Partitiones* on the *Aeneid*. Their date is uncertain but it may be around 1,000. The comment on the first word of the first line of the first book is a good example of a *schédos* drawn from a classical text (Cramer 1841: 294–296). This text has been edited more recently by Dyck, and the passage that follows is to be found in Dyck (1983: 55–60).

μήνις. Ὄνομα προσηγορητικὸν ῥηματικόν, παρὰ τὸ μένω, μένις καὶ μήνις, ἢ ἐπίμονος ὀργή. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μένω γέγονε. μένος ἢ ψυχή, αἰδῖος γάρ.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς κλίσεως τῶν εἰς ἰς, οὕτως ἐνὶ διαλαβεῖν. τὰ εἰς ἰς λήγοντα ὀξύτονα ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν πάντα διὰ τοῦ δος κλίνονται, εἴτε ἐκτείνουσι τὸ ἰ, εἴτε συστέλλουσι. τὰ μὲν ἐκτείνοντα, οἷον κνημῖς, σφραγίς· τὰ δὲ συστέλλοντα οἷον ἀσπίς, ῥανίς. πλὴν τοῦ ἀγλίς, ἀγλίθος, σημαίνει δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῶν σκοροδῶν. πρόσκειται ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν, διὰ τὸ κίς καὶ λίς, τὸ ἀκτίς διὰ τοῦ νος κλινόμενον δικατάληκτόν ἐστι. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἰς ὀξύτονα, μόνως

εἰς ἄ ἔχει τὴν αἰτιατικὴν, πλὴν εἰ μὴ Αἰολικῶς μετὰ βαρείας τάσεως, κάμνιν γὰρ λέγουσι καὶ σράγιν καὶ ἄψιν.

τρισπίθασμον δ' ἄψιν.

ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἰς ἰς ὀξύτονα οὐ γίνονται παρὰ τοῖς Ἴωσι κατὰ ἀποβαλὴν τοῦ δ' ἐν τῇ γενικῇ, κνημῖος ἀσπίος, ὡς Πάριος Θέτιος, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἰς περισπώμενα θηλυκὰ διὰ τοῦ δος κλίνονται, καὶ εἰς ἄ μόνως ἔχουσι τὴν αἰτιατικὴν, οἷον Βενδῖς, Ἀταργαστίς, Μοσχίς, Πίτις, δαίμονες τιμώμενοι παρὰ Θραξί. τὰ δὲ εἰς νῖς μακρᾶ παραληγόμενα, διὰ τοῦ δος κλίνονται, ὄνωνις, ὄνωνιδος, εἶδος ἀκάνθης, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὸ δὲ κόνις καὶ ὕνις καὶ σπάνις βραχυπαραληκτοῦντα διὰ τοῦ ὄς ἐκλίθη. ἡμάρτηται τὸ ὄρνις, ἢ ὅτι τὰ εἰς ἰς λήγοντα ἔχοντα πρὸ τοῦ ἰ δύο ἀμετάβολα διὰ τοῦ θος κλίνονται, δέλλις, δέλλιθος· ἐστὶ δὲ ζῶων ὁμοιον μελίσση· μέρμης, μέρμιθος, τὸ λεπτόν σχοινίον· ὁμοίως καὶ ὄρνις, ὄρνιθος, πλὴν τοῦ Τράλλις, Τράλλιδος ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ εἰς ρῖς διὰ τοῦ δος, ἔρις, θοῦρις, χάρις, χάριδος, τὸ δὲ χάριτος Δωρικόν, πλὴν τοῦ ὕβρις καὶ ἄγυρις, καὶ ὄσα παρὰ τὸ γῦρις, τὸ δὲ κίσηρις καὶ κάππαρις διαφορεῖται. πλὴν τοῦ ἄκρις, ἄκριος, ἐστὶ δὲ ἢ τοῦ ὄρους ἐξοχή. τοῦτο δὲ ἰστέον ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἰς βαρυτόνων τῶν διὰ τοῦ δος κλινόμενων εἰς ἄ μόνως ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι ἢ αἰτιατικῇ· εἰ μὴ κατὰ ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν ἢ διάλεκτον,

Ζεὺς δ' ἔριδα προΐαλλεν

Τὸ δὲ νις ἰ. τὰ εἰς ἰς εἴτε ἀρσενικὰ εἴτε θηλυκὰ εἴτε δικατάληκτα. Καὶ ἄλλως ... Εἴτε βαρυτόνα εἴτε μὴ κοινολεκτούμενα, ἀποστρέφονται τὴν εἰ δίφθογγον, εἰ μὴ ἔχοι τὸ ε ἐν τῇ γενικῇ, ὡς χαρίεις χαρίεντος, καὶ εἰς ἑνός, πλὴν τοῦ κλείς καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ, κατακλείς καὶ ἀντήρις, ὃ λέγεται πᾶν εἰς δ' ἐπερείδεται τις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν εὐθεῖαν τηρεῖ τὴν δίφθογγον. τὴν δὲ κλίσιν ὡς ἀπὸ ὀξύτονου εὐθείας συνεσταλμένου τοῦ ἰ ἐποίησεν, ἀντηρίδος γάρ.

Βαρύνεται τὸ μήνις, ὅτι τὰ εἰς νῖς δυσύλλαβα, ἔχοντα πρὸ τέλους ἐν φωνῇ μακρὸν ἢ ἐκτεινόμενον, βαρύνεσθαι θέλει, εἰ μὴ ὑποκοριστικῶς τετυπωμένα, ἢ ἔθνικα, οἷον Θῶνις, Τάνις, εἰσὶ δὲ πόλεις Αἰγύπτου· ἦνις, νῆνις ἢ νεᾶνις. πρόσκειται εἰ μὴ ὑποκοριστικῶς εἶη, διὰ τὸ φωνίς ἀντὶ τοῦ φωνῆ· ἔθνικόν δὲ διὰ τὸ Θυνίς, παρὰ γάρ τὸ Θῦνος ἐγένετο, ὡς παρὰ τὸ Λοκρὸς Λοκρίς.

Διαφέρει μήνις κότου. κότος ἐστὶν ὀργὴ μόνιμος πρὸς τὸ ἀντιλυπῆσαι ὀρθῶσα, μήνις δὲ ἢ ἀπλῶς μνησικακία.

[*Mēnis* 'wrath'. A common noun of verbal origin. Compare *ménō* 'remain', *mēnis* and *mēnis* 'lasting anger'. Alongside *ménō* we have *mēnos* 'human life', the soul, for it is everlasting.

On the inflection of *mēnis* we may make the following distinctions: all nouns of more than one syllable ending in *-is* and oxytonically accented are declined with *-dos* (genitive), whether the *i* is long or short. Examples of long *i* are *knēmīs* 'greave' and *sphragīs* 'seal ring', and of short *i* *aspīs* 'shield' and *rhanīs* 'raindrop', an exception being *aglīs*, *aglithos*, meaning 'head of garlic'. "More than one syllable" is added because of *kīs* and *līs* 'weevil' and 'lion'. *Aktīs* 'sunray', which is declined with *-nos*, has another nominative form, *aktin*. These oxytonic nouns ending in *-is* form their accusative with *-a* only, except when they are pronounced in the Aeolic manner with a low pitch on the syllable; for the Aeolians say *kámmnīn*, *srágin*, and *ápsin* 'felloe':

*trispíthamon d'ápsin* 'a felloe of three spans'.

These oxytonic nouns ending in *-is* do not form their genitives in the Ionic dialect by deleting the *d* (*\*knemios*, *\*aspíos*), as do the barytone nouns, such as *Páris*, *Pários*, and *Thétis*, *Thétios*. Feminine nouns ending in *-is* and bearing a circumflex accent decline with *-dos*, ending in *-n* in the accusative only, as *Bendīs*, *Atargastīs*, *Moschīs*, and *Titīs*, all gods revered among the Thracians. Feminine nouns ending in *-nis* with a long penultimate syllable decline with *-dos*: *ónōnis*, *onōnidos* 'rest-harrow', a species of acanthus, and the others. *Kónis* 'dust', *hýnis* 'ass's dung', and *spánis* 'dearth', with a short penultimate syllable, are declined with *-os*. *Órnīs* 'bird' is the result of a mistake, or it may be because nouns ending in *-is* with two liquids before the *-is* inflect with *-thos*, like *déllis*, *déllithos* 'a kind of wasp', a creature like a bee, *mérmis*, *mérmithos* 'thin rope', and so likewise *órnīs*, *órnithos*, an exception being *Trállis*, *Trállēōs*. In the same way nouns ending in *-ris* decline with *-dos*: *éris* 'strife', *thouáris* 'furious (feminine)', *cháris* 'grace', *cháridos* but *cháritos* in Doric, exceptions being *hýbris* 'overweening pride', *ágyris* 'gathering', and words like *gýris* 'flour'. *Kisēris* 'pumice' and *kápparis* 'caper' are declined in two ways. An exception is *ákris*, *ákrios* 'mountain top'. Note that with barytone nouns ending in *-is* and declined with *-dos* the accusative must only appear in *-n*, except for metrical reasons or in dialectal variations: *Zeús d'érida proíallen* 'Zeus sent forth bitter strife'.

*Nis* and *i*. Nouns in *-is*, masculine or feminine, or nouns with two endings: additionally, whether barytone or not in Attic or *koiné* form, they reject the diphthong *ei* if they do not have *e* in the

genitive, as with *charieis*, *charientos* 'graceful' and *heís*, *henós* 'one', except for *kleís* 'key' and its derivatives such as *katakleís* 'doorlock' and *antēreís* 'prop', said of anything that one presses on, which keep the diphthong in the nominative, though it is declined as if its nominative were in a short *i* vowel, for its genitive is *antēridos*.

*Mēnis* is barytone, because disyllabic nouns in *-nis* preceded by a long or lengthened vowel should be barytone, unless they are formed as diminutives or are ethnic words; examples are *Thōnis* and *Tānis*, two Egyptian cities, and *ēnis* 'yearling', *nēnis* or *neānis* 'girl'. We add "unless they are formed as diminutives" because of *phōnis* 'small sound' instead of *phōné* 'sound', and "ethnic words" because of *Thynís* coming from *Thynós* and *Lokrós*, *Lokris* 'Locran'.

*Mēnis* differs from *kótos* 'rancour'. Rancour is persistent anger looking for revenge; *mēnis* 'wrath' refers simply to the memory of injury received.]

The *epimerismós* just given deals with the first word of the Iliad, *mēnin*, accusative of *mēnis*. It is followed by a similar note on the second word *áeide* ('Sing of the wrath ...'). We see how little such grammatical gobbets differ, whether from texts in sacred or secular literature. Beyond some detailed lexical information distinguishing *mēnis* from other words in the semantic field of anger, in which *orgē* is taken as the most generic term, the word is used simply as an item to which to attach the same sort of grammatical review and etymological speculation as that which we saw in the *epimerismós* on *anér*. Some such etymologizing is here omitted from the text as it stands.

It is to be observed how closely the writer follows the precepts of Dionysius Thrax in his list of topics involved with *grammatikē* (section 1), accentuation, dialect differences, particularly literary dialectal forms, and the glossing of rare and literary words are all brought in, in addition to grammatical rules and explanations. The graphic representation of pitch accentuation received particular care; it had been an Alexandrian invention to assist with the correct pronunciation among those learning Greek as a second language and to help maintain correct classical usage while the *koiné* gradually moved away from these standards and "barbarism" and "solecisms" became more widespread (see p. 33). The correct location of the accent marks was especially important in Byzantine times, not only because it was part of the spelling of words, but because by around 400 A.D. the classical Greek pitch accent was already being

replaced by the Byzantine and modern Greek stress accent (Allen 1974: 119–120).

The entire passage of this *epimerismós* was written by someone with Theodosius's *Kanónes* and Choeroboscus's commentary of them to hand. Almost all the words cited appear in the *Index vocabulorum* of Hilgard's edition (1894), and the sentences often correspond with those given in this volume, though in this latter they are much longer, more explicit, and carry more examples. One instance will illustrate this: Where the *epimerismós* refers to *cháritos*, genitive of *cháris* 'grace' as Doric, Choeroboscus has the further necessary information (Hilgard 1894: I.154.37–155.1): *toúto dè kai par' hēmīn hoútōs epekrátēse légēsthai* [this pronunciation of the word became the form used by us (speakers of Attic Greek) too] (cf. Hilgard 1894: I.197.22–23). The whole passage (I.196.33–198.36) presents a much fuller version of the information summarized in this *epimerismós*, with many more exemplificatory nouns.

Some individual notes may be helpful. *Mēnis* as a variant of *mēnis* assisting the etymology is not attested. As with so many etymologies of antiquity, which in a sense served a different purpose from our contemporary understanding of etymology, modern historical linguists derive the word from *\*men-* 'think, be mentally aroused' (Pokorny 1959: 726–727).

In dealing with oblique case inflection, the writer refers to the genitive as covering the others because in the Greek tradition this case normally appeared in lists immediately after the nominative. In a few cases variant spellings and accentual patterns appear. The writer of the *epimerismós* gives *ónōnis* 'rest harrow' as does Theodosius (Hilgard 1894: I.31.2), but Choeroboscus writes *onōnis* (328.18), and 'caper' appears as *káparis* and *kápparis*; the two forms of the declension of *kisēris* 'pumice' and *káparis* are *kisēridos* and *kapáridos*, *kisēreos* and *kapáreos* (Attic *-eōs*) (Hilgard 1894: I.329.7–11).

The use of *ametábola* [(literally) unchanging] to cover nasal consonants as well as the modern "liquids" *l* and *r* goes back to the *Tēchnē* (section 6).

*dikatálēkta* [with two endings] is explained by Choeroboscus (Hilgard 1894: I.267.22) by reference to words like *delphís* 'dolphin', which had a later nominative form *delphín*. *Antēreis* [prop], which is singled out for special mention, is listed in the Liddell and Scott *Lexicon* in the form *anteris*. *Koinolektoúmena* [in Attic or *koinē*] distinguishes standard Attic Greek forms, from which the *koinē* sprang, from non-standard dialect forms, in this instance Boeotian (Hilgard 1894: I.204.8, 208.22).

Two sets of *schédē*, very similar to each other, are found on a religious text. One is anonymous and of uncertain date (Boissonade 1831: 330–338), though presumably it is later than the merger of *iōta* and *ēta* in pronunciation (Allen 1974: 71), in view of the careful reference to the spelling of *edēmiourgēse*, below. The other is part of Moschopoulos's *Peri schedōn* [On parsing grammar notes] (1655: 102–107). Moschopoulos was one of the pupils and friends of Maximus Planudes (see pp. 201–202), and one of the leading grammarians and classical scholars of the early fourteenth century.

It is clearly a commentary on the miraculous healing of the man blind from birth (*John* 9.1–7). The text itself reads as follows, with the *schédē* coming immediately after. The first *schédos* comes from the anonymous text (Boissonade 1831: 330–331):

Δεικνὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ὅτι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐδημιούργησε καὶ ἀπὸ χοῦς διήρτισε, πηλῶ χρησάμενος ὀμματοῖ τὸν πεπηρωμένον τῶν ὀπῶν, ἦτοι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ φῶς αὐτῷ χαρίζεται.

[Christ, showing that he created man and moulded him from earth, uses some clay and gives sight to the man whose eyes were blind and blesses him with the light of his eyes.]

The following extracts illustrate this type of *schedographia*:

Δεικνὸς. Συζυγίας τετάρτης τῶν εἰς μῖ· τὸ θέμα δεικνύω, καὶ ὁ παρατατικὸς ἐδείκνυν, ἢ μετοχή ὁ δεικνύς.

— — — — —

Τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Εὐθεΐα ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Πόθεν ἐτυμολογεῖται; Παρὰ τὸ ἄνω ἄθρεῖν, ἤγουν βλέπειν· μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ἄνω βλέπει· ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἄνω θεωρεῖν, ἤγουν διαλογίζεσθαι ἃ ὄπωπεν ἦτοι εἶδε. Τὸ θρω μέγα διὰ τί; Τὰ παρὰ τὸν ὄπα ἐν συνθέσει γινόμενα ὀνόματα διὰ τοῦ ω μεγάλου γράφεται, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, πρόσωπον, μέτωπον, ἐνώπιον, βλοσυρωπός, ἀγριοπός, αἰμωπός, σκυθρωπός, δυσωπῶ, ἀντωπῶ, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

Ἐδημιούργησε. Συζυγίας πρώτης τῶν περισπωμένων. Τὸ θέμα δημιουργέω δημιουργῶ, ὁ μέλλων δημιουργήσω, ἀόριστος ἐδημιούργησα ἐδημιούργησας ἐδημιούργησε. Τὸ δὴ πῆ· διὰ τί; καὶ τὸ μῖ ἰ; διὰ τί; Δημιουργός πῆ καὶ ἰ· δημηγόρος δὲ καὶ δημηγορῶ ῥῆμα, ἦτα τὰ δύο. Τὸ γῆ, ἦ, διὰ τί; Ἐκ τοῦ δημιουργῶ, δημιουργήσω μέλλοντος.

Καὶ ἀπὸ χοός. Πόσα μέρη λογου εἰσί; γ'. Καὶ, σύνδεσμος: ἀπὸ, πρόθεσις: χοός, ὄνομα ἀρσενικόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ εἰθεῖα ὁ χοός, τοῦ χοός: τὸ βοῦς, βοός.

[*Deiknḗs* 'showing'. From the fourth conjugation of verbs ending in *-mi*. The basic verb is *deiknḗō* 'show'; its imperfect is *edeiknyn* 'I was showing', and the [present] participle derived from the verb in *deiknḗs*.

...  
*Tōn anthrōpon*. Nominative *ho anthrōpos*. What is its etymology? Compare *anō athreîn* 'look upwards' *blēpeîn* 'see'. For man alone of living creatures looks up at what he sees. Or compare *anō theōreîn* 'observe at a high level' or rather *dialogizesthai hā ópōpen étōi eíde* 'contemplate what one has seen and knows'. *Thrō* is long; why? Nouns comparable to *ōpa* 'eye (accusative)' in compounds are written with long *ō*, like *ánthrōpos*, *prósōpon* 'face', *métōpon* 'brow', *enōpion* 'face to face', *blosyrōpós* 'grim looking', *agriōpós* 'wild looking', *haimōpós* 'looking like blood', *skythrōpós* 'looking angry', and the verbs *dysōpō* 'put to shame', *antōpō* 'look in the face', and so on [cf. chapter 2, pp. 21–22].

*Edēmiourgēse*. First conjugation circumflex (contracted) verb. Basic verb *dēmiourgēō* or *dēmiourgō* 'create'; future *dēmiourgēsō* 'I will create'; aorist *edēmiourgēsa*, *edēmiourgēsas*, *edēmiourgēse* 'I, you, he created'. Why do we have *dē* with *ē* and *mi* with *i*? *Dēmiourgós* 'maker' has *ē* and *i*, and *dēmēgorós* 'orator' and the verb *dēmēgorō* 'speak in public' both have *ēta* 'long ē'. Why do we have *gē* with *ē*? From *dēmiourgō*, future *dēmiourgēsō* 'I will create'.

*Kai apō choós*. How many parts of speech are there here? Three: *kai* 'and', conjunction, *apō* 'from', preposition, and *choós* 'earth', masculine noun. Its nominative is *choús*, genitive *choós* (cf. *boús* 'ox', genitive *boós*.) (Boissonade 1831: 330–331)

Moschopoulos's *schédē* on the same words are more didactically set out (1655: 102):

Δεικνύς. Κανόνισον. Δείκνυμι, συζυγίας τετάρτης τῶν εἰς μί. καὶ ὁ παρατατικός, ἐδείκνυν, ἡ μετοχή δεικνύς.

Ἐδημιούργησε. Κανόνισον.

Δημιουργέω, δημιουργῶ, ὁ μέλλων δημιουργήσω, ὁ ἀόριστος, ἐδημιούργησα, τὸ δεύτερον, ἐδημιούργησας, τὸ τρίτον, ἐδημιούργησε.

Τὸ δῆ, ἦ, καὶ τὸ μί, ἰ, δημηγόρος καὶ δημηγορῶ ῥῆμα. ἦ τὰ δύο, δημιουργός ἦ καὶ ἰ.

Καὶ ἀπὸ χοός. Πόσα μέρη λόγου εἰσί; Τρία. Καὶ, σύνδεσμος, ἀπὸ, πρόθεσις, χοός ὄνομα, οὐ ἡ εἰθεῖα ὁ χοός.

Πόσα σημαίνει χοός; Δύο. Τὴν εἰς κόνιν λελεπτυσμένην γῆν, καὶ μέτρον ἀττικόν, ὅπερ ἐχώρει κοτύλας ὀκτώ.

[*Deiknḗs*. Give the rule. *Dēiknymi* 'show'; fourth conjugation of verbs ending in *-mi*; imperfect *edeiknyn*, (present) participle derived from this verb *deiknḗs*.]

Moschopoulos has no *schédos* on *tōn anthrōpon*.

[*Edēmiourgēse*. Give the rule. *Dēmiourgēō*, *dēmiourgō*, future *dēmiourgēsō*, aorist *edēmiourgēsa*, second person *edēmiourgēsas*, third person *edēmiourgēse*. *Dē* with *ē* and *mi* with *i*. *Dēmēgorós* and the verb *dēmēgorō* both have *ēta*; *dēmiourgós* has *ē* and *i*.

*Kai apō choós*. How many parts of speech are there here? Three: *kai*, conjunction, *apō* preposition, and *choós* noun, and its nominative is *ho choús*. What does *choús* mean? It has two meanings: 'earth pulverized into dust' (as here), and an Athenian measure of quantity which held eight cupfuls.]

*Charizetai* 'blesses' is given this grammatical explication by Moschopoulos (1655: 107), but it is not included in the anonymous text:

Χαρίζεται. Κανόνισον. Χαρίζω ἄχρηστον, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐνεργητικὰ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τὸ παθητικόν, χαρίζομαι, τὸ δεύτερον χαρίζη, τὸ τρίτον χαρίζεται. σημαίνει δὲ δύο: τὸ δωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ χάριν ποιεῖν. καὶ συντάσσεται δοτικῇ καὶ ἀμφότερα.

[*Charizetai*. Give the rule. \**Charizō* is not found, nor are any of the active forms themselves. The passive forms *charízomai* 'I bless', second person *charízēi* 'you bless', third person *charízetai* 'he blesses'. It has two meanings: 'bestow a gift' and 'grant a favour', in both meanings constructed with a dative case.]

Reference has already been made to alphabetically ordered *schédē* and to their expression in verse form as part of their memorizability (p. 130). In the examples given below the verse lines are in the demotic metre (*politikoi stíchoi*), which became commonly used from the eleventh century and followed the spoken Greek of the time in being syllabically

based without regard to the quantitative distinctions of classical Greek. The lines here are of fifteen syllables each (Baynes – Moss 1948: 211; Krumbacher 1897: 650). They were often little more than one or two line lexical glosses; those given here are from Boissonade (1832: 374–375), an anonymous *Schedographic lexicon*.

Δαῖδες δὲ πάλιν λέγονται, φίλε μου, αἱ λαμπάδες.

Ἐλεος, ἐλεήμων τε. καὶ ἐλεγείον, μέτρος στίχων καλῶν  
οῤηνητικῶν καὶ πλήρης κωκυμάτων.

Ἐλλόβια, κόσμος γυναικός. Ἐλω καὶ τὸ προκρίνω.

Ἐτυμος δὲ ὁ ἀληθής· ψιλὰ τε καὶ τὰ δύο.

Ἐπω, τὸ λέγω, νοεῖ μοι ἔπω δ' ἀκολουθῶ σοι.

Τὸ πρῶτον μετὰ τῆς ψιλῆς, τὸ δεύτερον, δασείας.

Αἰκνον τὸ δεῖκνον ἀληθῶς, αἰγλή καὶ ἡ λαμπρότης.

Αἰγλήεις πάλιν, ὁ λαμπρὸς καὶ στερεὸς τὰς πράξεις.

Καὶ κλίνεται αἰγλήεντος. Αἰχμὴ δὲ τὸ κοντάριν.

Εὐχέτης, ὁ εὐχόμενος περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας.

[*Dáides* 'torches', my friend, are also spoken of as *lámpades* 'lamps'.

*Éleos* 'mercy' is merciful. *Elegeíon* 'elegiac' is a verse metre with sad lines of great beauty and full of lamentations.

*Ellóbia* 'earrings', an adornment of women. *Hélō* also means the same as *prokrinō* 'choose'.<sup>1</sup>

*Étymos* 'genuine' is the same as *aléthēs* 'true'; both words are unaspirated.

*Épō* 'speak' means the same as *légō* 'say', please note. *hépō* 'follow' means that I accompany you. The first word is unaspirated, the second is aspirated.

*Aíknōn* means the same really as *deípnōn* 'dinner'. *Aíglē* means 'brilliance'. And a man who is brilliant and strong in his deeds is *aíglēis* 'splendid'. It declines with the genitive *aíglēentos*. The word *Aíchmē* 'spear' has the same denotation as *kōntárin* 'pike'.

He who prays for his safety is *euchētes* 'a suppliant'.]

Many more examples of *epimerismoi* and *schédē* could be quoted, but this would be tedious and unrewarding. Enough has probably been given to show the various forms in which they could be composed and ordered. Clearly these differences relate to the levels of instruction for which they were intended. There is little if any difference between those based on

<sup>1</sup> This is the assumed basic present indicative underlying forms such as *heílon* 'I took', etc. in the suppletive paradigm of *hairō* 'take, choose'.

classical texts and those based on religious and Biblical texts. What was important was that they were attached to writings with which educated people of the Byzantine Empire should be expected to be familiar in the course of Hellenization and a Christian upbringing.

Though some are allocated considerable length, their mnemonic compression makes one suppose that they were to be used as a means of private learning and revision along with more discursive instruction from such works as Choeroboscus's commentary on the *Kanónes* and the personal teaching of the schoolmasters and lectures. We have already taken note of the close correspondences between schedographies and Choeroboscus's lengthy work. It would, of course, be ridiculous to compare the merits of the *schédē* with Pāṇini's marvellous grammar of Sanskrit, but their relationship to the whole system of teaching of their times may not be without some similarities.

The *schédē* were essentially didactic, but their teaching was securely founded on the descriptive and analytical method handed down from the *Téchnē* and from Apollonius Dyscolus. Those who, like Anna, sharply objected to the whole process of *schedographia* did so on both these counts. They found the current parsing grammar dry and needlessly complex as compared to the pleasures of rhetoric and the comprehensively educational value of literature, a view, it must be admitted, that is shared by many students of language today.

The debt of the *schédē* to the Greek tradition is seen in the range of information loosely hung on the words most selected for comment. It covered the subjects listed by Dionysius in the first section of the *Téchnē*, accentuation, the "prosodies", attention to dialectal and literary locutions, the lexical explanation of specific words, and etymologies in the ancient sense of this procedure, all set alongside the rules and regularities of *grammar* in the narrower sense (*analogiai*) and keyed to the critical study of established and revered literature.

Grammar in western Antiquity was, as we have seen, W(ord and) P(aradigm) in its model. Given words and given forms of words (the nominative singular of nouns and the first person singular indicative active of verbs) were taken descriptively as basic (*théma*), and other words and word forms were referred formally and semantically to them; other morphological forms were the result of *kllisis* [inflexion], bending or modifying the basic forms, the model originally set up by Aristotle with his concept of *ptōsis*, grammatical modification in general (cf. chapter 11, p. 215, below).

Etymology underwent a sea-change after the Renaissance with its enhanced perspective of history, though the earlier conception of it lingers still in some popular etymologizing. But through all the changes that have taken place and are taking place in theoretical grammar and linguistic analysis the classical and Byzantine model and methods of didactic grammar have remained in the European tradition of foreign language teaching up to the present day.

## Chapter 8

### Michael Syncellus: a typical Byzantine syntax book

Living and working in the first half of the ninth century, Syncellus may be taken as a representative of the early mediaeval Byzantine age. He was Patriarch of Jerusalem, still within the religious orbit of the Eastern Empire. Along with rhetorical and ecclesiastical works he was the author of a simple and popular textbook on syntax, *Méthodos peri tês tou lôgou syntaxeôs* [The syntax of the sentence]. The text has recently been edited with a French translation and a full account of the textual transmission, together with a commentary (Donnet 1982).

This work is of interest in the history of linguistics as an example of a grammatical textbook specifically devoted to syntax. In many ways it exemplifies the conception of syntax taken from Apollonius and the final two books of Priscian's *Institutiones*, and incorporated into a single and much more concise book. The grammatical frame of the *Téchnē* was its basis, with the word, *léxis*, and the sentence, *lógos*, being the minimal and maximal units of syntactic structure and defined on the same lines as in the *Téchnē*. A nominal and a verbal element represent the indispensable components of a complete and autonomous sentence (Donnet 1982: 237), but Syncellus recognizes the well-formedness of a one-word, single verb, sentences, since the inflection indicates the nominative pronoun to be understood (as in many "pro-drop" languages). He justifies this on the ground of parallelism with phonology: syllables are by form and definition joint products of consonantal and vocalic elements, *grámmata*, but that does not preclude the limiting case of the single vocalic syllable.

Each word class is presented in order, with its subclasses, and with the syntactic functions of each. The embedding or subordinating role of the participle is given prominence as a means of achieving syntactic economy in a complex sentence. All this leads to a close attention to the meanings of the cases and the prepositions. The identification of the prefixal morphemes as prepositions, on the basis of their derivations or assumed derivations, continued to be the standard practice of Byzantine grammarians inherited from the *Téchnē* through Apollonius and Priscian.

Although on lines laid down in the *Téchnē*, this is clearly a book on syntax, in the narrower sense of that term. There is little said about morphology as such, and there are no paradigms of forms such as those

presented in Theodosius's *kanōnes* and the commentators on them. The book is obviously aimed at readers and students who already knew some Greek, mostly non-classical, and we see in the concluding sentences of the book that its main purpose is to enable its readers to avoid unacceptable constructions, solecisms. It is, in fact, dedicated to a favourite pupil, named Lazarus, who is in several places addressed in words of warm friendship (e.g. Donnet 1982: 159; 415: ὁ *philōtēs* [beloved], ὁ *phile paī* [dear young man]).

Grammatical definitions are taken for the most part from class or general meanings; on case meanings he writes (Donnet 1982: 159): *eirētai dē orthē hē orthē ptōsis epeidē orthōs sēmainei tēn ousian tou prāgmatos; légetai dē kai eutheia kai onomastikē; eutheia mēn epeidē synōnymōn esti tō euthy tōi orthōi, onomastikē dē hōti onomasai tā prāgmata boulōmenoi, tēi orthēi chrōmetha* [the nominative case is called “upright” because it directly indicates the essence of the thing; it is also called the “straight” and the nominative case, because “straight” and “upright” mean the same here, and nominative because we use the “upright” case when we want to name things]. But the oblique, *plāgiai*, cases represent the maning of a noun circumstantially: *ek plagiou dē tā perī tēn ousian ōnta ē ginōmena* [(they refer) obliquely to what state or happening there is that affects the nature of the thing] (Donnet 1982: 229). The vocative case is included among the oblique cases with due notice of its semantic and syntactic independence within its sentence (Donnet 1982: 235).

Syncellus focuses attention on the syntactic connections between words, in particular to the case government rules of nouns (including, of course, adjectives), verbs, and prepositions. The following excerpts are representative of his exposition:

Noun – noun:

ὄσα ἐστὶν ὀνόματα ῥηματικά σημαίνοντα ἐνέργειαν γενικὴν ἀπαιτοῦσιν, οἷον “ποιητῆς ὄδε τοῦδε, κτιστῆς ὄδε τοῦδε, κριτῆς ὄδε τοῦδε”· καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁμοίως γενικὴν ἀπαιτοῦσιν, οἷον “ποιητικός ὄδε τοῦδε, συνεκτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, περιεκτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, μεταληπτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, μεθεκτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, μηνυτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, ἐφεκτικός ὄδε τοῦδε, ἐρωτικός ὄδε τοῦδε”. Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κυρίων τε καὶ προσηγορικῶν ὁμοιογενῶς καὶ ὁμοιοσπῶτως κατηγορούμενα πρὸς γενικὴν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων συντάσσονται· πρὸς δὲ δοτικὴν καὶ αἰτιατικὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα: “ἄριστος ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, ταχὺς ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, κάλλιστος ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, τίμιος ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, ἐνδοξος ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, ὕγιης

ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε, σῶος ὄδε τῷδε καὶ τόδε”. Πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν δὲ μόνην τάδε “λευκὸς τὴν τρίχα, μέλας τὴν σάρκα, δαφεινὸς τὰ νῶτα, πυρρὸς τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς”.

[Deverbal nouns with active-transitive meanings require the genitive case, as in ‘this man is the creator of this’; ‘this man is the founder of this’; ‘this man is the judge of this’. Nouns (adjectives) of the same sort also require the genitive: ‘this is the man who created this’; ‘this is the man who holds this together; ‘this is what contains this’; ‘this is the man who takes a share in this, who shares this, who gives information about this, who checks this, who loves this’. These and similar nouns, among both proper and common nouns, that are categorized as of the same sort and of the same case linking construct with the genitive case forms of other nouns.

Nouns like the following construct with the dative and the accusative: ‘this man is best for this and in respect of this’, and so ‘swift’, ‘fairest’, ‘honoured’, ‘famous’, ‘healthy’, and ‘safe’. But these take only the accusative: ‘white(-haired)’, ‘black(-fleshed)’, ‘dark(-backed)’, ‘red(-eyed)’.] (Donnet 1982: 221 – 223)

Verb – noun:

“Ὅσα ἐστὶν ἐνεργητικά ῥήματα καθαρὰ, καὶ εἰς παθητικὴν μεταβαίνει διάθεσιν, πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσεται, οἷον “τύπτω σε”, ὅτι “τύπτομαι”, “τέρπω σε”, ὅτι “τέρπομαι”, “σφίζω σε”, ὅτι “σφίζομαι”, “λέγω σε”, ὅτι “λέγομαι”, δαίρω, λακτίζω, ὑβρίζω, φονεύω· εἰ δὲ εἵπομεν “λέγω σοι, σφίζω σοι, κομίζω σοι”, περιποίησιν δηλοῦμεν, νοουμένης ἐξωθεν τῆς αἰτιατικῆς, οἷον “λέγω σοι λόγον, σφίζω σοι φίλον, κομίζω σοι ἵππον”.

Τὸ μάχομαι, δέχομαι, ἔρχομαι, πέτομαι, ἐνεργητικά εἰσιν ἦτοι αὐτοενεργητικά, παθητικά δὲ τῇ φωνῇ ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅθεν οὐκ ἔχουσι ἐνεργητικά θέματα, ὡσπερ τὸ θνήσκω, πίπτω, ὀφθαλμῶ, πυρέσσω, ῥυπῶ, ῥιγῶ, φρίσσω, τρέμω, χαίρω, ἐρυθριῶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνεργητικά ὄντα, παθητικά οὐκ ἔχουσιν· αὐτοπαθῆ γὰρ εἰσιν.

Ἐνεκα δὲ τίνος πρόσκειται “καθαρὰ”; Ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ μὴ καθαρὰ ἐνεργητικά ἅτινα, εἰ καὶ εἰς παθητικὴν διάθεσιν μεταβαίνει, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσονται, οἷον· πρὸς μὲν γενικὴν “ἀκούω σου”, καὶ “ἀκούομαι ὑπὸ σοῦ”; πρὸς δὲ δοτικὴν, οἷον “πολεμῶ σοι” καὶ “πολεμοῦμαι ὑπὸ σοῦ”. Ὡστε τῶν ἐνεργητικῶν ῥημάτων



τῶν εἰς παθητικὴν διάθεσιν μεταβαίνοντων, τὰ μὲν πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν, ἄπερ ἔστι γνήσιά τε καὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς γενικὴν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς δοτικὴν συντάσσονται.

Διὰ τί δὲ εἴρηται “καὶ εἰς παθητικὴν μεταβαίνει διάθεσιν”; Ἐπειδὴ τὰ οὐδέτερα ῥήματα καὶ κατὰ φωνὴν μὲν ἐνεργητικά, σημαιομένω δὲ παθητικά, εἰς φωνὴν παθητικὴν οὐ μεταβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν “ζῶμαι”, οὔτε “πλουτοῦμαι”, οὔτε “ὄφθαλμιῶμαι”, οὔτε “πάσχομαι”, ἀλλὰ μόνον “ζῶ” καὶ “πλουτῶ”, καὶ “ὄφθαλμιῶ” καὶ “πάσχω”.

Τὰ δὲ παθητικά ῥήματα, ἥνικα μὲν δηλοῦν ἐθέλει τὸν πάσχοντα τόπον, πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσεται οἷον “ὀδυνῶμαι τὴν κεφαλὴν, τέρωμαι τὴν φρένα, τέρωμαι τὴν χεῖρα, πάσχω τὸν πόδα”· ἥνικα δὲ τὸ ὄργανον φῆτι τὸ πάθος ἐνήργηται, πρὸς δοτικὴν, οἷον “ἐτύφθη τῇ μαστίγι, ἐπλήγη τῷ ξίφει”· τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνεργητικῶν φυλάττεται, οἷον “Διομήδης ἔτρωσε τῷ δόρατι τὸν Πάνδαρον”.

[Verbs that are purely active-transitive and can be transformed into the passive voice construct with the accusative case; such verbs are ‘I beat you’, because we have ‘I am beaten’, ‘I please you’, ‘I am pleased’, ‘I save you’, ‘I am saved’, ‘I tell you’, ‘I am told’, and likewise ‘skin’, ‘kick’, ‘insult’, and ‘murder’. If we were to say ‘I tell to you’, ‘I save for you’, or ‘I provide for you’, we would indicate some sort of gift or service, with the accusative understood from the context, like ‘I tell a tale to you’, ‘I save a friend for you’, ‘I provide a horse for you’.

‘Fight’, ‘receive’, ‘come’, and ‘fly’ are active or rather inherently active, but they are passive in their morphology and so they do not have underlying specifically active forms. In the same way ‘die’, ‘fall’, ‘have eye trouble’, ‘have a fever’, ‘be filthy’, ‘shudder’, ‘shiver’, ‘tremble’, ‘rejoice’, and ‘blush’ are active in form but do not have passive forms, as they are inherently passive.

But why do we add “purely” (to “active-transitive”)? Because there are some verbs which are not purely active-transitive; such verbs are able to be transformed into passives, but even so they do not construct with an accusative, but with a genitive, like ‘I hear you’ and ‘I am heard by you’, or with a dative like ‘I make war on you’ and ‘I am made war on by you’. So of the active-transitive verbs that can be transformed into the passive voice some construct with the accusative; these are genuine active-transitive verbs, and

they are in the great majority, but there are some that construct with the genitive, and some with the dative.

Why do we say “and can be transformed into the passive voice”? Because intransitive verbs are active in form but passive in meaning and they do not change into passive forms. We do not say ‘I am lived’, ‘I am riched’, ‘I am eye-troubled’, or ‘I am undergone’, but only ‘I live’, ‘I am rich’, ‘I have eye trouble’, and ‘I undergo’.

Passive verbs construct with the accusative when it is desired to indicate the location of the experience, as in ‘I have a head-ache’, ‘I am glad at heart’, ‘I have been hurt in the hand’, or ‘I have trouble with my foot’. But when it is necessary to indicate the instrument with which the experience was effected, such verbs construct with the dative, as in ‘I was beaten with a whip’, or ‘I was struck with a dagger’. This construction is also used with active-transitive verbs, as in ‘Diomedes wounded Pandarus with a sword’.] (Donnet 1982: 249–253)

#### Preposition – noun:

Πρόθεσις δὲ ἐν παραθέσει μετὰ τῆς εὐθείας ἢ μετὰ τῆς κλητικῆς οὐδέποτε τάσσεται· συντάσσεται μόντοι ταῖς τρισὶ πλαγίαις, τῇ γενικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ καὶ αἰτιατικῇ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον.

Ἡ ἐν πρόθεσις μετὰ δοτικῆς συντάσσεται, οἷον “ἐν οἴκῳ, ἐν ἀγρῷ”· σημαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐν τινι σχέσιν. Καὶ γενικῇ δὲ συντάσσεται ἄττικῶς διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν τῆς δοτικῆς· συμπαθεῖ γὰρ ἡ δοτικὴ πρὸς τὴν γενικὴν, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον “κὲν ἀγροῦ, ἐν Ἄιδου”· σπανίως δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις εὐρίσκεται καὶ οὐ χρὴ τὸ σπάνιον εἰς κοινότητα παραλαμβάνεσθαι· ἡ σύνταξις αὕτη ἔλλειπτικῶς γίνεται ὥστε νοεῖσθαι “ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Ἄιδου, ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγροῦ”· ἔτι “ἐν γειτόνων, ἐν ποδῶν, ἐν διδασκάλων”.

Ἡ εἰς πρόθεσις πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσεται, οἷον “εἰς ἐκκλήσιαν, εἰς ἀγοράν”, ἄττικῶς δὲ καὶ πρὸς γενικὴν, ὡς φαμεν “εἰς διδασκάλου, εἰς Ἄιδου”. Σημαίνει δὲ τὴν εἰς τόπον σχέσιν· ὁμοίως καὶ αὕτη κατ’ ἔλλειψιν νοεῖται, ὥστε εἶναι “εἰς τὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου” καὶ “εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἄιδου”.

Σημειωτέον δὲ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν ἀψύχων, τῇ εἰς προθέσει χρώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐμψύχων τῇ πρὸς, οἷον “ἀπέρχομαι εἰς τὴν ἀλλήν, πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον”· ὁ μόντοι ποιητῆς χρῆται ἑκατέρω ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων· τῇ μὲν εἰς ἀντὶ τῆς πρὸς, ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ ῥαψωδίᾳ, ἐνθα φησὶν·

Αἴαντ’ αὖθ’ ἐτέρωθεν εὐκνήμιδες Ἄχαιοι  
Εἰς Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον ἄγον κεχαρηότα νίκη.

τῆ δὲ πρὸς ἀντὶ τῆς εἰς, ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ῥαψωδίᾳ, ὅπου φησὶ περὶ τοῦ φανέντος δράκοντος

βομοῦ ὑπαίξας πρὸς ῥα πλατάνιστον ὄρουσεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν· εἰς τὴν πλατάνον· ἀλλ' οὐ χρηστὸν τῇ ποιητικῇ συνηθείᾳ.

Ἡ ἐξ πρόθεσις εὐσύντακτος οὔσα πρὸς γενικὴν συντάσσεται μόνην ἢτε μητέρα ὑπάρχουσιν πασῶν τῶν πλαγίων, οἷον “ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ἐκ θαλάσσης”· ἐπαγομένου μὲν συμφώνου εἰς κ̄ τὸ ξ̄ μεταβάλλουσα, ἐπιφερομένου δὲ φωνηέντος, ἀτρέπτως τὸ ξ̄ φυλάττουσα σημαίνει δὲ ἐν ταῖς συνθέσεσι τὴν ἔξω σχέσιν καὶ ἐκριψιν, οἷον “ἔκβολος, ἔξοικος, ὁ ἔξω βεβλημένος, καὶ ὁ ἔξω οἴκου διάγων”.

Ἡ σύν πρόθεσις πρὸς δοτικὴν μόνην συντάσσεται, οἷον “σὺν ἀνθρώπῳ, σὺν παιδίῳ”· σημαίνει δὲ ἐν ταῖς συνθέσεσι τὴν μετὰ τινος συνάφειαν, οἷον “συνέμπορος, συνέκδημος, σύντροφος, σύμπονος, συνόμιλος”· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ξυνός, ὁ δηλοῖ τὸ κοινός, ἀπὸ τῆς σὺν φαμεν γεγενῆσθαι, τοῦ σ̄ τραπέντος εἰς ξ̄· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄττικοι αὐτὴν τὴν σὺν ξύν φασιν.

Ἡ πρὸς πρὸς γενικὴν καὶ δοτικὴν καὶ αἰτιατικὴν συντάσσεται πρὸς γενικὴν μὲν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐξ παραλαμβανομένη, οἷον “πρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ” ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ”, ἢ “παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ”· πρὸς δοτικὴν δὲ ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀντὶ τῆς παρὰ μόνης, οἷον πρὸς τοῖς ποσὶ· ἀντὶ τοῦ “παρὰ τοῖς ποσὶ”· πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν δὲ καθ' ὃν ἐφθήμεν εἰπόντες λόγον, οἷον “πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα”. Λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς μετὰ, ὡς καὶ ἀλλαγῶς κεῖται· οὐχὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αἱ ἀδελφαὶ αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰσιν, ἀντὶ τοῦ “μεθ' ἡμῶν εἰσιν”, καὶ “μεθ' ἡμῶν ἀναστρέφονται”, καὶ ὡς ὁ κυριακὸς λόγος· καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν· ἀντὶ τοῦ “μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ” ἢ “σὺν τῷ Θεῷ”. Σημαίνει δὲ ἐν ταῖς συνθέσεσι μάλιστα τὴν πρὸς τι πρᾶγμα ἐγγύτητα, οἷον “προσέδραμον, προσδρομή, προσβολή”.

Ἡ πρό πρὸς γενικὴν συντάσσεται δύο σημαίνουσα, τόπον ἢ χρόνον· τόπον μὲν οἷον “πρὸ τῆς θύρας”, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν “ἔμπροσθεν τῆς θύρας”· χρόνον δὲ οἷον “πρὸ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολέμου ὁ Τρωϊκός”. Σημαίνει δὲ ἐν ταῖς συνθέσεσι τὴν πρό τινος ὁρμὴν ἢ στάσιν ἢ τὴν εἰς τοῖς φανερὰς πρόδον, οἷον πρόδρομος, ὁ πρό τινος δραμών, πρόβολος ὁ πρό τινος ἰστάμενος, προφανής δὲ ὁ προκειμένος εἰς φανέρωσιν, καὶ πρόδηλος ὁμοίως. Σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τι πρὸ ἄλλων κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ τὸ προεῖναι κατὰ χρόνον, οἷον πρόεδρος καὶ πρόγονος, προγενέστερος· ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ παρήχθη καὶ τὸ πρότερος.

[The preposition *en* ‘in’ is not used before a nominative or vocative case, but constructs with the three oblique cases, the genitive, dative, and accusative<sup>1</sup>.

It constructs with the dative, as in ‘in a house’, ‘in a field’, and it designates place within something. In Attic Greek it is also used with the genitive, by attraction. The dative is attracted to the genitive, but not the other way round, as in *en agroū* ‘in the field’, *en Haidou* ‘in Hades’. But this usage is rare among the older authors and one ought not to make common use of what is rare. The actual construction comes about through an ellipsis: we understand ‘in those belonging to Hades’ and ‘in those belonging to the field’; likewise ‘in the neighbours’ (houses), ‘in the (bones of) the feet’, ‘in the teachers’ (house).

The preposition *eis* ‘into’ constructs with the accusative, as in ‘into church’, ‘into a market place’, but in Attic also with the genitive, as when we say ‘into the teacher’s (houses)’, or ‘into (the domain of) Hades’. *Eis* signifies the relationship of going into a place; it can also be used elliptically in this way, as in ‘into the teacher’s’, or ‘into Hades’.

It is important to note that we use *eis* with inanimate entities but *prós* with animates, as in ‘I am going away into the hall’, but ‘I am going into the presence of the teacher’. But the poet [Homer] uses either preposition for both meanings: he uses *eis* for *prós* in the eighth book of the *Iliad*<sup>2</sup>, where he says “The well-greaved Achaeans took Ajax on both sides back to Agamemnon rejoicing in his victory”, but he uses *prós* instead of *eis* in the second book [2.310], where he says, of the apparition of a serpent, “Slipping from under the altar it darted to the platree”, instead of ‘into the plantree’. But one should avoid this poetic usage.

The preposition *ex* ‘out of’ is well-formedly used in construction with the genitive only, which is the source of the oblique cases<sup>3</sup>, as in ‘out of heaven’, ‘out of the sea’. With a following consonant *x* changes to *k*, but with a vowel it remains unchanged. In composition it designates an outward relationship or an expulsion, as in ‘outcast’, (i. e., one who has been cast out), ‘sojourner’ (i. e., one who lives away from his home).

<sup>1</sup> *eis* being treated here as a variant of *en*.

<sup>2</sup> Actually Book 7.311–312.

<sup>3</sup> See below p. 195.

The preposition *syn* 'with' constructs with the dative only, as in 'with a man', 'with a boy'. Within compounds it signifies a connection with someone or something, as in 'fellow-traveller', 'fellow-expatriate', 'brought up together', 'fellow-worker', 'associate'. Hence also *xynós*, which means *koinós* 'common'; we say that it is derived from *syn* with *s* changed to *x*, for speakers of Attic Greek pronounce *syn* itself as *xyn*.

*Prós* is constructed with the genitive, dative, and accusative, being a replacement for *ex* when used with the genitive, as in 'from God' instead of 'out of God'. It goes with the dative when used instead of *pará* 'beside', as in 'at one's feet' instead of 'beside one's feet'. It is used with the accusative according to the rule already given [155], as in 'to Agamemnon's presence'. *Prós* is also used in place of *metá* 'with', as it appears in 'neither his brothers nor his sisters are with (*prós*) us', instead of 'they are with (*metá*) us' or 'are dwelling with us', and of the word of God, 'the word was with God' instead of 'with God' (*metá*) or 'with God' (*syn*). In compound words its principal meaning is proximity to something, as in 'I ran up to', 'running up to', 'application'.

*Pró* 'before' takes the genitive and has two meanings, local and temporal: local for example in 'before the door', instead of *émpros-then tēs thýras* 'in front of the door', temporal in *prò tou Persikou polémou ho Trōikós* 'the Trojan war was before the Persian war'. In composition it signifies an advance or a position in the front or going on into greater clarity, as in *pródromos* 'forerunner' (i. e., he who has run ahead of someone), *próbolos* 'guardian' (i. e., he who stands in front of someone), and *prophanés*, 'plainly visible' (i. e., he who has become manifest); *pródēlos* 'already in sight' means the same). It also signifies being ahead of others in authority and precedence in time, as in *próhedros* 'president' and *prógonos* 'forefather' [or] *progenēsteros* 'greater in age'. *Próteros* 'the one before' [in place or time] is derived from *prós*, as well]. (Donnet 1982: 303–311)

The conception of the genitive case as the "mother" of the other oblique cases is a commonplace among Byzantine grammarians. It was supported both by the name *geniké* [pertaining to the family] and by its use as the indicator of the type of declension to which a noun belonged (cf. Hilgard 1901: 384.5: *genesis estī taīs állais ptōsesi kai tōn plagiōn mētēr hē geniké* [the genitive case is the source of the other cases and the mother of the oblique cases] (see p. 195)).

The basic meanings of the cases are given in the traditional way, dative, for example, referring to giving, favouring, and sending. But in the passage quoted above Syncellus further identified a locative meaning for the dative, accusative, and genitive cases in conjunction with *en*, *eis*, and *ex*, giving the examples *en oikōi* 'in a house', *eis ekklēsian* 'into church', and *ex ouranou* 'out of heaven'. The tricasual prepositions *prós* and *pará* are semantically matched with *en*, *eis*, and *ex*, respectively. This may be seen as a step toward the development of the localist theory of case set out more fully and explicitly by the later grammarian Maximus Planudes (see pp. 215–227). Noticeably the locative, and the temporal, meanings are discussed by Syncellus with reference to the individual prepositions, not with the cases themselves alone; these continue to be defined and interpreted in the tradition of the *Tēchnē*.

Syncellus does, however, make use of a kind of localist description, or rather a localist metaphor, in dealing with transitive verbs, by linking the accusative and genitive cases, respectively, to *ekpompē* [sending out, emission] and *eispompē* [sending in, introducing from outside] (Donnet 1982: 255) *hai állai aisthēseis kat' eispompēn ginontai, toutēstin ek tōn ektōs eis taútas pēmpousi, kai hoútōs energoúntai, tà dē tēs horáseōs kat' ekpompēn*. [The other perceptions come about by introduction from outside, that is to say they send something in from without and operate in this way, but visual perceptions come about by emission (of sight rays)]. This is best illustrated from the active and passive forms of transitive verbs designating a definite action, like *týptō* 'beat': *týptō se* 'I beat you' and *týptomai hypó sou* 'I am beaten by you'. Priscian deals with this (Keil 1855: 373.15–25) pointing out that, if one considers the matter more deeply (*si quis altius consideret*), verbs of perception like *audio* 'hear' represent a passive experience more than an activity; but as a practical grammarian he considers that it is not unreasonable (*non irrationabiliter*) for them to be treated as active verbs (*audio te* 'I hear you', etc.).

The Greek situation was rather different, since many such verbs constructed equally and sometimes preferentially or exclusively with genitive nouns (cf. Donnet 1982: 251–253), but could be formally and semantically used as passives (*akoúō sou* 'I hear you' and *akoúomai hypó sou* 'I am heard by you'), like formally middle verbs such as *déomai géuomai, aisthánomai (sou)* 'require, taste, perceive (you)'. Used with the preposition *hypó* 'by' as the agent of a passive verb construction, the genitive was seen to have passivity as one of its own meanings, alongside that of 'outside, from' in its construction with *ex* 'out of' and *apó* 'from'.

The reference to *ekpompē* and *eispompē* in Donnet's text confirm the use of these terms at this earlier period (cf. pp. 37–38, 258). They are given more detailed treatment in a passage which for various reasons Donnet does not regard as genuine (1982: 146–154). This passage is printed in the 1525 edition by the Aldine Press (214r), where the whole work is falsely attributed to Lekapenos (Krumbacher 1897: 586), and it appears among the *Textes annexes* in Donnet 1982: 437–440. The relevant passages are:

Καὶ γενικὴν μὲν ζητοῦσι ὅσα ἐξῶθεν λαμβάνει, ἃ καλεῖται κατ' εἰσπομπήν, οἷον ὀρέγομαι σου, ἐρῶ σου, δέομαι σου· ἰδοὺ γὰρ τὸ ὀρέγομαι σου ἐξῶθεν ὄρεξιν σημαίνει, οἷον ἀπὸ σοῦ ἔχω ὄρεξιν· ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ἐρῶ σοῦ, τουτέστιν ἐρωτα ἔχω ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου καὶ τὸ δέομαι σοῦ ὁμοίως· οὐ γὰρ "παρέχω σοι" σημαίνει τὸ δέομαι ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σοῦ ζητῶ· καὶ λείπομαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

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Αἰτιατικὴν δὲ ζητεῖ ὅσα οἴκοθεν εἰς τὰ ἐξω προβάλλει ἃ καλεῖται κατ' ἐκπομπήν, οἷον ἀγαπῶ σε, φιλῶ σε, ὀρῶ σε· τὸ γὰρ ὀρᾶν κατ' ἐκπομπήν γίνεται· ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος διὰ μέσου ὑέλλου ἢ ὕδατος τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἐκπέμπει τὸ φῶς, διὸ καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς ἦτοι ὀπτικῆς ἐξεως ἀλμὸς ἦγουν πῆδημα· τὰ γοῦν οὕτως ἔχοντα αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσεται.

[The genitive is required by verbs that bring in something from outside, and which are designated as introductive, such as 'I want you', 'I am in love with you', and 'I require you'. Note that *orégomai sou* 'I want you' indicates a source of desire from outside, like 'I have a source of desire from you'. So also with *erō sou* 'I am in love with you', that is, I have love from what is in my heart; and *deōmai sou* 'I require you' likewise does not mean that I provide you with anything but that I want something from you. *Leípomai* 'I am left without, I lack', etc., are similar verbs.

...

The accusative is required with verbs that send out from within to the outside, and which are designated as emissive, as with *agapō se* 'I like you', *philō se* 'I love you', *horō se* 'I see you'. Seeing involves emission, like the sun emits light in sunbeams through glass or through water; that is why the word *ophthalmos* 'eye' is the optical faculty's *halmos* 'spring' (i. e. leap). Verbs like this are constructed with the accusative.] (Donnet 1982: 438)

The contrast between *erō* 'love passionately', whereby the lover is enthralled by his beloved, and the rational love expressed by *agapō* and *philō* was a long-standing theme, going back to Apollonius (Uhlir 1910: 418.9–419.2):

Φαίνεται δ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοῦ ἐρᾶν διοίσει, καθότι ἢ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐγγινομένη διάθεσις ἐνεργείας ὄνομα σημαίνει, οἱ γοῦν φιλοῦντες παιδεύουσιν, πάλιν τῆς διαθέσεως κοινῆς τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπ' αἰτιατικὴν συντεινούσης. οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν καὶ τὸ πείθειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴν ἐρᾶν ὁμολογεῖ τὸ προσδιατίθεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου.

[It is clear that the verb *philein* 'love' will be different from *eran* 'to be in love with', in as much as the disposition involved in *philein* signifies the name of an activity: those who love are influencing someone and they share with the verbs already discussed a commitment to the accusative case. *didáskein* 'teach' and *peithein* 'persuade' are like this. *eran* acknowledges being also under the influence of one's beloved.]

The alleged derivation of *ophthalmos* 'eye' to suit this emissive interpretation of seeing is typical of derivation as understood in the ancient and mediaeval world (cf. p. 47). *Halmós* (*hállomai*) [leap, spring], whose form suits this proposed derivation, is not listed in the classical dictionaries, and it is therefore glossed by the regular noun *pédēma* [leap, jump].

The use of *ekpompē* and *eispompē* in reference to the accusative and genitive cases is also seen in Theodorus Gaza (1525). As Theodore was later than Maximus Planudes, Hjelmslev (1935: 12–13) suggests that he may have been influenced in this by Planudes's explicit localist interpretation (see p. 219), but in fact this goes back to an earlier analysis, one that is far less clearly localist. The passage reads (Theodore 1525: 116):

εἶδη δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα μεταβάσεως τῶν προσωπικῶν ὑποκείμεσθωσαν καθόλου τε καὶ ἀπλᾶ· πρῶτον μὲν εἰς αἰτιατικὴν τῶν κατ' ἐκπομπήν θεωρουμένων, οἷον διδάσκω σε καὶ διδάσκω γράμματα δεύτερον δὲ εἰς γενικὴν τῶν κατ' εἰσπομπήν, οἷον δέομαι σου, τρίτον δὲ εἰς δοτικὴν τῶν κατὰ περιποίησιν, οἷον δίδωμί σοι.

[Let it be agreed that there are in general three simple types of personal transitivity: first, those verbs that are considered as emissive take the accusative, like *didaskō se* 'I teach you' and *didaskō grámmata* 'I teach reading and writing', second those that are

considered introductive take the genitive, like *déomai sou* 'I require [something from] you', and third those verbs concerned with provision take the dative, like *didōmi soi* 'I give [to] you'.]

Syncellus entitled his book *Peri tēs tou lōgou syntaxeōs* [On the syntax of the sentence], and he felt it necessary to discuss the word *lōgos* with some care. As the upper limit to grammatical structure its technical use had been familiar and accepted since the first appearance of the *Tēchnē*; in fact its first syntactic division into *ónoma* and *rhēma* ['(logical) subject' and 'predicate'] goes back to Plato (e.g. *Sophistes* 262 A–263 D). But *lōgos* had several other meanings, and, as we all know, it is technical linguistic terms with multiple meanings outside the metalanguage of the subject that cause the most trouble (compare, for example, the repeated attempts in modern times to reach a satisfactory definition of *word* or of *sentence*). Syncellus devotes a page to its various meanings:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ λόγου εἶπειν προεθέμεθα, δεόν εἶδέναι πρότερον ποσαχῶς ὁ λόγος εἴρηται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ κατὰ πολλῶν σημανομένων φερομένη. Λέγεται γὰρ λόγος ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λογισμὸς καθ' ὃν λογικοὶ καὶ διανοητικοὶ ἔσμεν· λέγεται λόγος καὶ ἡ φροντίς, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν "οὐκ ἔστι λόγου ἄξιός· οὐ ποιοῦμαι αὐτοῦ λόγον"· λέγεται λόγος καὶ ὁ ἀπολογιαρισμὸς, ὡς λέγομεν "ὁ ἡγεμὼν πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτρόπους λόγον ἔχει"· λέγεται λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία ὃν τρόπον λέγομεν "ἔδωκε περὶ τούτου λόγον"· λέγεται λόγος καὶ ὁ καθόλου ὁ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ πᾶσαν λέξιν καθ' ὃ σημαίνονμενον πᾶν μέρος λόγου, ἦτοι ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον καὶ τᾶλλα μέρη, λόγος λέγεται· πάλιν λόγος λέγεται ὁ ὅρος ὡς λέγομεν "ἀπόδος τὸν τοῦ ζώου λόγον", οἷον οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική· λέγεται λόγος καὶ ἡ αὐτοτελὴ διάνοιαν δηλοῦσα τῶν λέξεων παράθεσις, τουτέστιν ὁ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγος, ὃς καὶ μερικὸς γίνεται εἴτουν μονομερῆς καὶ διμερῆς καὶ τριμερῆς καὶ τετραμερῆς, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτῶ μερῶν συνιστάμενος·

[Since we have set ourselves to discuss the sentence (*lōgos*), we must first know in how many ways the word *lōgos* is used. This single word form is used with several different meanings. It is used to mean the innate mental power of reasoning whereby we men are rational and intelligent. *Lōgos* also means consideration, as when we say *ouk esti lōgou axios* 'He is not worth our notice' or *ou poioūmai autoū lōgon* 'I shall take no account of him'. It is also used to mean a discussion, as when we say *ho hēgemōn prōs toūs*

*heautoū epitropous lōgon échei* 'the ruler is having words with his administrators'. *Lōgos* also means an account, in the way that we say *édōke peri toutou lōgon* 'he gave an account of this'. It is also used comprehensively, comprising within itself all words, in which sense it refers to all the word classes or parts of speech: noun, verb, participle, article, and the rest. Again, *lōgos* means definition, as when we say *apódos tòn tou zōou lōgon* 'Give a definition of "living creature"', such as a being that is animate and sentient. *Lōgos* also means a string of words expressing a complete thought; this is *lōgos* 'sentence' as a syntactic term. A sentence can specifically be of just one, or of two, three, or four members of different word classes; on occasion a sentence consists of one word each from all the eight (parts of speech).] (Donnet 1982: 221–223)

Syncellus's definition of *lōgos* as a technical linguistic term closely follows the definition given in the *Tēchnē* (section 11; see p. 57). The sort of eight-word sentence with one word from each word class was a favourite reference from the *Tēchnē* onward. A commentator quotes the Homeric line (*Iliad* 22.59; Hilgard 1901: 58.16; cf. p. 59) as an example: *prōs dé me tòn dýstēnon éti phronéont' eléeson* 'have pity on me, the unhappy one, while yet living'. Priscian follows with a sentence of his own taken from Apollonius's Greek composition: *idem homo lapsus heu hodie concidit* 'the same man who slipped alas has fallen down today'; *ho autōs ánthrōpos alisthēsas sēmeron katēpesen* 'the same man who slipped fell down today' (Keil 1859 III: 116.11–12; Uhlig 1910: 17.4–5). Unlike the commentator on the *Tēchnē* both grammarians list the prepositional prefixes, *con-* and *kat(a)-* as representatives of the class of prepositions, and both explicitly omit an instance of the conjunction, because it requires more than a single sentence. Presumably they would regard the anaphoric conjunction *dé* 'but' in the commentator's quoted line as dependent on a preceding sentence. In Latin, as was the usual practice since Remmius Palaemon, the interjection was recognized as a separate word class, and Latin, of course, had no word corresponding to the Greek definite article.

Syncellus ends his book with an affectionate dedication to his pupil Lazarus, expressing the hope that in it he has given a fuller account of the syntax of classical Greek than some of his predecessors (*entelestéran didaskallian*), and he asks no more for it than recognition as an elementary textbook (*progymmasian*; Donnet 1982: 415).

It would not be claimed that Syncellus wrote a brilliant theoretical book. He is, however, easily read, concise, clear, and authoritative. The

book is, in other words, a typical and credible textbook for immediate use by students and their teachers, which, for all their different merits, cannot be said of Apollonius's various books and the massive tomes of Priscian. It is certainly a didactic work, a *Greek syntax*, something we do not find, or find references to, in the mainline tradition of grammar in antiquity (i. e. apart from the Stoic grammarians cf. p. 97). In consonance with the general Byzantine attitude to the subject we see that examples drawn from Biblical texts are used side by side with references to classical (pagan) literature.

His syntax is the syntax of words, in this respect following the conception of syntax set forth but not followed up in the *Téchnē*. The words had already been identified and defined by morphological and semantic criteria, these latter being often taken from the language of logic. Donnet (1982: 13) sums up well: "Le point de départ est le mot plutôt que la relation". This was the legacy of Antiquity and Syncellus was neither better nor worse than his Byzantine predecessors and successors in capturing syntactic generalizations. There was not available to them, nor did they devise, a set of syntactic terminology or concepts such as a specifically grammatical subject and predicate distinct from logical connotations. Though relatively modern grammarians have not always done any better, it was much to the credit of the western speculative grammarians that starting from the data base given by Priscian they were able to identify such purely syntactic relations as determination and dependency (with its counterpart, the satisfaction of a dependency [*dependentiam terminans*]), which involved words of several different classes without being tied to any one of them. Most important of all were *suppositum* and *appositum*, distinct both from the word classes with which they were embodied and from the logical categories of *subiectum* and *praedicatum* (cf. further Robins 1980).

The speculative grammarians relegated the teaching of Latin to a lower rank in scholarship as against the exposition of grammatical theory. The Byzantine scholars never separated these two aspects of linguistic writing, producing grammar books at various levels, on which, in due course, the western Renaissance was to rely for the initial revival of Greek language teaching. As an example of a Byzantine grammar book directed at Greek syntax Syncellus's *Peri syntaxeōs* deserves recognition and attention.

## Chapter 9

### Gregory of Corinth: the avoidance of errors

Gregory of Corinth lived in the latter half of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth. Also known under the name of Pardos he was Metropolitan of Corinth, and like several other grammarians he was the author of ecclesiastical books. On the linguistic side he compiled a treatise, which enjoyed considerable popularity for a time, on the dialects of classical Greece (cf. Wilson 1983: 184–190). His grammar book was entitled *Peri syntaxeōs tou logou etoi peri tou mē soloikízein* [On the syntax of the sentence, or rather on the avoidance of syntactic errors]. Like its predecessor, the grammar of Syncellus, this work has been edited with a French translation by Donnet (1967 b). As its title implies, it concentrates on syntax rather than on the details of morphology, though later sections are devoted to word formation (derivational morphology) and the inflections of nouns and verbs.

Again, following its full title, it is unashamedly didactic in content and style. There is a sequence of mementos to the reader or the teacher who may be using the book, for example, *mē nóμize dē hóti ...* [don't think that ...] (Donnet 1967 b: 169), *hóra kai touto ...* [notice this also ...], *próseche oūn en taís syntáxesin aponémeín tōi prosōpōi tò hármozon rhēma* [be careful in constructions to assign to the pronoun the verb form that is in agreement with it] (Donnet 1967 b: 171), *phére kai peri syntaxeōs rhēmátōn eípōmen* [come on, let's talk about the syntax of verbs] (Donnet 1967 b: 207). Syntactic analysis is explained, but always with reference to the pupil's own constructing sentences correctly; description and explanation are made to subserve instruction in writing. This was standard Byzantine practice, and it is borne out by a passage from another grammarian quoted by Donnet (1967 b: 234) where, following the precepts of the *Téchnē* (section 1), grammatical correctness and accurate pronunciation (reading aloud) are stressed:

οὕτως δφείλετε, παῖδες, μανθάνειν· πρῶτον μὲν γράφειν τὰ ἐκδιδόμενα ὑμῖν ἀσφαλί· εἶτα μανθάνειν αὐτὰ ἀκριβῶς πρὸς δέ, καὶ ἐρμηνεύειν αὐτὰ συνετῶς καὶ συντάσσειν αὐτὰ κατὰ κανόνα καὶ μέθοδον λογικὴν, ἐξαιρετικῶς δὲ καὶ πρόνοιαν μεγίστην τῶν ἀντιστοίχων τίθεσθαι καὶ στρέφειν ἐπὶ τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν χειλέων προφέρειν ἀεὶ.

[Children, this is how you must learn: first you must write out without any mistake what you have been given, and learn it by heart. After that you must explain it intelligibly and set it out by rule and in a logical manner; in particular you must pay the greatest attention always to the pronunciation of the contrastive consonants sounds, to turn over in your mind what you are going to say, and to give it utterance through your lips.]

The basis of the grammar is traditional, the eight word classes with the essential representation of a noun and a verb in a fully independent sentence, the almost obligatory specimen sentence containing one example from each class (Donnet 1967b: 167). He gives prominence to the use of the different cases in relation to the verbal voices and to the meanings of unicasual and multicasual prepositions, also pointing out the syntactic use of cases in constructions involving the postposed article (our relative pronoun) *hós* with the verb of its own clause (Donnet 1967b: 196–197; more extensively set out by Planudes [see pp. 211–212]). The following excerpt exemplifies the style of his writing (Donnet 1967b: 199–201):

Ἡ διά μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς καὶ γενικῆς συντάσσεται καὶ μετ' αἰτιατικῆς μὲν ὅταν αἰτίαν δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ “διὰ τὸν φίλον μου μαστίζομαι, διὰ τὸν Θεόν μου κολάζομαι”· μετὰ γενικῆς δὲ ὅταν ἀντίληψιν δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ “διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μου ἐσώθην”, “διὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐρρύσθην ἐκ τῶν ἐχθρῶν”.

Ἡ μετὰ μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς καὶ γενικῆς· καὶ μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς μὲν ὅταν ὑστεροχρονίαν δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ “μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ὁ οἶνος” καὶ “μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἀδελφὸν ἐγεννήθη ὁ δεῦτερος”, μετὰ γενικῆς δὲ ὅταν ἐνωσιν δηλοῖ ὡς τὸ “σήμερον μετ' ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ” καὶ “μετὰ τῶν γονέων οἱ παῖδες αὐλίζονται”.

Ἡ παρά, ὅταν κεῖται ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπό, μετὰ γενικῆς συντάσσεται, ὡς τὸ “ἡ βοήθειά μου παρὰ Κυρίου”, τούτέστιν “ἀπὸ Κυρίου”, ὅταν δὲ νοεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔξω, μετ' αἰτιατικῆς συντάσσεται, ὡς τὸ “παρὰ τὸν νόμον ποιεῖς”, ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἔξω τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖς”, καὶ ὅτε ἀντὶ τῆς εἰς κεῖται, ὡσαύτως μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς, ὡς τὸ “παρὰ σὲ ἦλθον”, ἀντὶ τοῦ “εἰς σέ”, καὶ ὅτε ἀντὶ τῆς διά λαμβάνεται, μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς, ὡς τὸ “παρὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι μνήματα ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐξήγαγες ἡμᾶς θανατῶσαι εἰς τὴν ἔρημον” ἀντὶ τοῦ “διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι μνήματα ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ”. Συντάσσεται δὲ καὶ μετὰ δοτικῆς ὅτε κεῖται ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν προθέσεως, ὡς τὸ “παρὰ σοὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἐλπίς μου” ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἐν σοί”, καὶ ὅτε πλησιότητα δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ “παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ ὁ δεῖνα κάθεται”, τούτέστι “πλησίον τοῦ βασιλέως”.

[*Diá* is constructed with the accusative and with the genitive, with the accusative when it signifies a cause, as in ‘because of my friend I am whipped’, or ‘I am punished by the agency of my God’. With the genitive it indicates intervention: ‘I was saved through Christ’ or ‘By the King’s favour I was rescued from the midst of my enemies’.

*Metá* constructs with the accusative and with the genitive, with the accusative when it refers to posteriority in time, as in ‘After the flood (came) the wine’ or ‘After the first brother the second was begotten’. It is used with the genitive when it refers to a union, as in ‘This day you will be with me in Paradise’ or ‘The children live with their parents’.

*Pará* when used instead of *apó* ‘from’ goes with the genitive, as in ‘My help comes from the side of the Lord’, that is, *apò Kyriou* ‘from the Lord’, but when used in the same sense as *éxō* ‘outside’ it takes the accusative, as in ‘You are acting against the law’ in place of ‘You are acting outside the law’. When used instead of *eis* ‘(in)to’ it goes likewise with the accusative, as in *parà sè êlthon* ‘I came into your presence’ instead of *eis sé* ‘I came to you’. It is also used with the accusative when it replaces *diá* ‘through’, as in ‘By reason of the lack of memorable deeds in Egypt you took us into the desert to die’ instead of ‘through the lack of memorable deeds in Egypt’. *Pará* also constructs with the dative, when used in place of *en* ‘in’, as in *Pará soi pása hē elpís mou* ‘All my hope rests with you’ instead of *en soi* ‘in you’, and also when signifying propinquity, as in ‘Somebody sat down in the king’s presence’, that is to say, *plēsion toũ basiléōs* ‘near the King’.]

This passage from Gregory may be compared with a similar account of prepositional meaning in Syncellus (see pp. 153–156). It will be seen how at the hands of both grammarians the three unicasual prepositions *en* ‘in’, *eis* ‘into’, and *ex* ‘out of’ are made the basis for the distinction of meanings of the bicasual or tricasual prepositions, used “instead of” one of them. This is not localism in the sense that it is taken by Planudes later on (see pp. 219–227). Syncellus and Gregory are concerned with the meanings of the prepositions, and it is nowhere assumed that locative relations are the original and fundamental meanings of the cases themselves, sometimes without any preposition being present. With *diá*, strangely, the locative meaning ‘through’ is ignored by Gregory.

Barbarisms and solecisms are the errors to be avoided through due attention to grammatical correctness. It is clear that he was writing

primarily for Greek speakers whose everyday speech and writing fell well below classical and Hellenistic standards of precision and correctness. He readily admits that Greek morphology in the noun and verb forms is extensive and complicated, and for this reason the *kanónes*, with their paradigms and question-and-answer format were devised (Donnet 1967 b: 219) to keep educated people from uttering barbarisms like \**tymménos* for *tetymménos* 'beaten' and \**tetýmmeñ* for *etetýmmeñ* 'I had been beaten'.

In a comment less radical than that of Anna Comnena (see pp. 127–129) he contrasts the relative simplicity of verbal syntax, even where more than one case may be governed by a single verb, with the inevitable complications found in the work of the schedographers (Donnet 1967 b: 207):

Φέρε καὶ περὶ συντάξεως ῥημάτων εἴπωμεν· χρήσιμα γὰρ καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὸ μὴ σολοικίζειν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολυσχιδὲς τὸ τῶν ῥημάτων πλῆθος, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἀμετρίαν τὸν λόγον ἐξελευσώμεν, τὰ μὲν ἀπλῆν τὴν σύνταξιν ἔχοντα ῥήματα παραδράμωμεν, ὡς οὐ πάνυ δύσγνωστα, τὰ δὲ διπλῆν ἔχοντα τὴν σύνταξιν ἢ καὶ ποικιλωτέραν, ταῦτα νῦν μόνον παραλάβωμεν, ὡς χρήσιμα καὶ εἰς τὴν διπλοῦν τῆς σχεδικῆς πλεκτάνης.

Ἀγαπῶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ποθῶ, αἰτιατικῆ, ὡς τὸ “ἀγαπῶ τὸν φίλον μου”· ἀγαπῶ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρκοῦμαι, δοτικῆ, ὡς τὸ “ἀγαπῶ τοῖς προσοῦσί μοι χρήμασιν”.

Ἄνέχομαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ καταφρονῶ, γενικῆ, ὡς τὸ “ἀνέχομαι τοῦ θράσους σου, εὐστράτιε γεννάδα”· ἀνέχομαι δὲ τὸ ὑπομένω, αἰτιατικῆ, ὡς τὸ “οὐκ ἀνέχομαι τὴν θερμὴν γυμνῆ κεφαλῆ”· ἀνέχομαι δὲ τὸ βαστάζω, δοτικῆ, ὡς τὸ “ἀνέχομαι τῇ ῥάβδῳ κεκμηκῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ γήρωος” καὶ “ἀνέχεται ὁ δόμος τοῖς κίονσιν”.

[Come on, let's talk about the syntax of verbs, which is useful for the avoidance of solecisms. Though the total number of verbs involves many subdivisions, to avoid dragging out our account indefinitely let's leave aside verbs whose [case] syntax is simple, as these are readily understood, but let's just take notice of verbs with two or more constructions, as this will also be useful in clarifying the ambiguities woven into the *schédē*.

*Agapō*, when it means the same as *pothō* 'want, yearn for' goes with an accusative, as in *agapō tōn philon mou* 'I love my friend', but when it means the same as *arkoūmai* 'be satisfied' it takes the dative, as in *agapō toīs prosoūsi moi chrēmasin* 'I am happy with the money that I have'.

*Anéchomai* 'make light of' goes with the genitive, as in *anéchomai toū thrāsous sou, eustrátie gennáda* 'I make light of your boldness, my fine warrior', but when it means as *hyponémō* 'endure' it takes the accusative, as in *oúk anéchomai tēn thétmēn gymnēi kephalēi* 'I cannot stand the heat bare-headed'; and when *anéchō* means the same as *bastazō* 'support' it takes the dative, as in *anéchomai iēi rhábdōi kekmeκōs hypō toū qērās* 'I support myself on a stick, being wearied by old age' and *anéchetai ho domos toīs kíosin* 'The house is held up by its pillars'.]

Interestingly, Gregory is a informative on permissive variation in word order as he is about overall correctness. Nouns and verbs are the primary parts of speech, and they are listed in that order and before the remainder, but this does not mean that any specific order of words in a sentence is syntactically required (Donnet 1967 b: 167–171):

Ὀκτώ εἰσι πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντωνυμία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα, σύνδεσμος. Ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου σύνταξιν καὶ ἀπάρτισιν δύο εἰσὶ, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τούτων μόνων συμπληροῦνται λόγος καὶ ἔννοια, οἷον “Αἴας μονομαχεῖ, Ἀχιλλεὺς ὀργίζεται”. Παρέπονται δὲ πολλακίς καὶ τὰ μὴ τοσοῦτον ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς τοῖς ἀναγκαιότατοις τοῦ σώματος μέρεσιν ὄνυχες ἢ καὶ τρίχες, οἷον μετοχή, ἐπίρρημα ἢ τι τῶν λοιπῶν, καὶ γράφομεν οὕτως “Αἴας μονομαχεῖ πολεμῶν εὐτόλμος”.

Πολλακίς δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ὀκτῶ μερῶν συμπλέκομεν τὸν λόγον, οἷον “Αἴας μονομαχεῖ πολεμῶν εὐτόλμος καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σάκουσ αὐτοῦ”. Ὁρᾷς, ἰδοὺ τὰ ὀκτῶ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν δύο ἀναγκαιότατα, τὸ ὄνομα φημι καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐξ οὗ τοσοῦτον.

Πρόσεχε οὖν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσι καὶ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ζῆται τὰ ῥηθέντα δύο ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου καὶ μὴ λήγης εἰ μὴ πρότερον εὐρης αὐτά, μηδὲ ἀρκοῦ τοῖς παρεπομένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἀπάρτισεις τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτοῖς, κἂν μυρία ἐπιστοιβάζωνται, οἷον “ὁ Αἴας πολεμῶν εὐτόλμος καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σάκουσ αὐτοῦ καὶ μαχόμενος θαρσαλέως καὶ συμπλεκόμενος τῷ Ἐκτορι μετὰ γενναιότητος”. Ἰδοῦ, προσετέθησαν πλείστα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπρητίσθη ὁ λόγος διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον ῥῆμα, τὸ “μονομαχεῖ”, τυχόν, ἢ “πολεμεῖ”.

Ἐάν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὄνομα ἐπιλείψῃ, ἀτελὲς πάλιν ὁ λόγος, κἂν εἰ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα κεῖται καὶ ἕτερα μέρη, οἷον



“μονομαχεῖ, πολεμῶν εὐτόλμως καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σάκουσ αὐτοῦ”. Ἴδου γὰρ ἐπέλειψε τὸ “τίς ὁ μονομαχῶν;”, ἤγουν ὁ Αἴας, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἔμεινε ἀτελής.

Ζῆται οὖν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσι καὶ εὗρισκε πρώτως τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὄνομα, οἶον “ὁ Αἴας”, εἶτα τὸ “τί ποιεῖ;”, τὸ “μονομαχεῖ”, ὃ ἐστὶ ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐξῆς: τί ποιῶν; πολεμῶν; πῶς; εὐτόλμως; καὶ μετὰ τίνος; μετὰ τοῦ σάκουσ; τίνος; αὐτοῦ ἤγουν ἑαυτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτω συντάξεις ὀρθῶς. Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον σύγκειται τοῖς λοιποῖς, οἶον “ὁ Αἴας ἀνελεῖν διὰ ξίφος ἑαυτὸν βούλεται”, σὺ πάλιν τὸ ὄνομα προηγουμένως ζῆται, τὸ “Αἴας”, εἶτα τὸ “βούλεται”, ῥῆμα, καὶ μετ’ αὐτὰ τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον, τὸ “ἀνελεῖν”. Καὶ οὕτω συντάξεις ὀρθῶς.

Μὴ νόμιζε δὲ ὅτι, ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τοῦ λόγου, πρῶτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, δεύτερον τὸ ῥῆμα, εἶτα τότε ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ὡς τύχη συντίθεται παρὰ τοῦ λογογραφουῦντος ἢ σχεδουροῦντος, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα πρῶτον, ποτὲ δὲ ἢ μετοχή, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα, καὶ δεύτερον ἢ τρίτον ἄλλοτε ἄλλο, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀτάκτως τίθενται. Καίτοι ἐχρῆν φυσικῶς προτάττεσθαι μὲν τὸ ὄνομα ὡς οὐσίαν, μετέπεσθαι δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα ὡς συμβεβηκός, ὑποτάττεσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ, ἀλλ’ ὁμως ἀδιαφορίαν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις παρετηρήσαμεν: καὶ σὺ γοῦν, ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσι, μὴ ζῆται προαναταταγμένον εὐθὺς εὗρίσκειν τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἐλέχθησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐνθὰ ἂν εὗρης τεθειμένον τὸ ὄνομα, λαβὼν ὡς προηγούμενον, ἐκφώνει, καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ οὕτως ἀπροσκόπτως ἐκπεράνης τὴν σύνταξιν.

[The parts of speech, the word classes, are eight in number: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, conjunction. Of these the noun and the verb are the two words most essential for the construction and completion of a sentence. With these two alone the sentence or the thought behind it is fully expressed, such as *Aias monomachei* ‘Ajax engages in single combat’, *Achilleus orgizetai* ‘Achilles is angry’. But often words of other classes are added less essentially, like, for example, nails and hair in relation to the essential bodily components. Examples are the participle, the adverb, and the rest, and so we write *Aias monomachei polemōn eutómōs* ‘Ajax engages in single combat fighting courageously’.

Often we compose a sentence from all the eight word classes, e. g. *Aias monomachei polemōn eutómōs kai metá tou sákous autoū* ‘Ajax engages in single combat fighting bravely and with his shield.

You see, you must look at the eight word classes, but two of them are absolutely essential, the noun and the verb, the others being less important.

So take care in your construing and first look for what have just been called the essential parts of a sentence, and go on until you have found them; do not be satisfied with the other words, because you will not be able to complete the sentence with them alone, however many such words you pile up, e. g. *ho Aias polemōn eutómōs kai metá tou sákous autoū kai machómenos tharsaléōs kai symplekómenos tōi Héktori metá gennaiótētos* ‘Ajax fighting courageously with his shield and battling boldly, pitted against Hector with noble bravery’. Note how many words have been added, but there is no complete sentence, because it lacks the most essential verb such as *monomachei* ‘engages in single combat’ perhaps, or *polemei* ‘fights’.

If the first and essential noun is missing, again the sentence is incomplete, even if there is a verb and words of other classes, such as *monomachei, polemōn eutómōs kai metá tou sákous autoū* ‘engages in single combat fighting bravely and with his shield’. Note that we do not know who is engaging in single combat (in fact, Ajax), and the sentence remains unfinished.

So in your construing look for and find first the essential noun, such as *ho Aias* ‘Ajax’, then what he is doing that is *monomachei* ‘is engaging in single combat’, which is the verb, and then in order find: doing what? — *polemōn* ‘fighting’; how? — *eutómōs* ‘bravely’, with what? — *metá tou sákous* ‘with the shield’; whose? — *autoū* ‘his’ or *heautoū* ‘his own’. In this way you will construe a sentence properly. If there is an infinitive along with the other words, as in *ho Aias anheleîn diá xiphous heautòn bouletai* ‘Ajax wants to kill himself by his sword’, once more seek first the noun *Aias* ‘Ajax’ and then the verb *bouletai* ‘wants’ and after that the infinitive *anheleîn* ‘to kill’. In this way also you will correctly construe a sentence.

Do not think that in the construction of a sentence the noun necessarily comes first, the verb second, and after that such and such a word. Speech writers and grammarians use words in any order, and sometimes the noun is first, sometimes the participle, and sometimes the verb, and the second and third words are of all sorts and quite simply unordered. By their nature the noun ought to come first as signifying a substance, followed by the verb signi-

lying an occurrence, with the rest coming afterwards; but none the less we find no differentiation among such words. Anyway, in your construing do not expect to find immediately the noun and the other words already ordered in the way they are listed, but wherever you find the noun take it as if it were the head, pronounce it clearly and then take the verb and the rest successively; and in this way you will put the sentence together in a wholly acceptable form.]

The question of the minimal two-word sentence was one that had long troubled the Greek grammarians. In any “pro-drop” language a sentence is syntactically complete with a single verb form. When a third person verb form is involved such a sentence can only be acceptable if an anaphoric reference to a noun in a previous sentence is contextually understood, as Gregory’s example of a fragmentary sentence shows, *tis ho monomachôn?* ‘Who is engaging in single combat?’. But with first and second person verb forms, discussed since Apollonius’s syntactic works (Schneider 1878: 23.6–30; Uhlig 1910: 161.9–162.10; cf. p. 35), except where it is required for contrast or emphasis, a first or second person pronoun, as equivalent to a noun, is understood. This was expressly allowed for by Syncellus (see p. 149).

Gregory, like others, was not writing just about syntactic analysis but about correct composition and interpretation (cf. p. 163). As every student of Greek knows, its word order is flexible, perhaps even more flexible than the preferred order in Latin, and it appears that the free word order of classical Greek was maintained as the teacher’s standard. In the West the speculative grammarians began to operate within a more fixed word order, distinguishing *pars ante* [the part before (the verb)] and *pars post* [the part after (the verb)], for subject and object.

On possible “ungrammatical” forms among classical authors Syncellus had reluctantly to admit that the prepositions *en* ‘in’ and *eis* ‘into’ could be elliptically constructed with a genitive case: *en Haidou (dómōi)* ‘in (the house of) Hades’ (cf. p. 155). Gregory draws attention to what is now generally called a *constructio ad sensum*, when a formally singular collective noun is colligated with a formally plural verb. This is common in most languages (cf. in English *The Cabinet have decided*); Gregory’s example is (Donnet 1967 b: 187) *hē plēthys thoryboûsin* ‘the crowd are raising a shout’. In Greek all this is a pragmatic (contextual) matter rather than a syntactic requirement, as is the case in English.

The passages quoted above should give an idea of the style and the content of this grammar book. It shares many features with other gram-

mars of the Byzantine age, notably with the work of Syncellus. In fact, though there are some important differences and some grammar writers are more theoretical and not simply didactic, as, for example Planudes, most of them expound the same tradition of grammar that they inherited from classical and Hellenistic Greece. Gregory’s syntax is word-based and word-oriented, words being distinguished and defined on morphological and semantic criteria. Syntactic relations such as concord and government were expressed in morphological terms by reference to the word endings involved. As expounded by such writers as Syncellus, Gregory, and Planudes, syntax was a reasonably distinct component of grammar, the other component being morphology combined with orthographic phonetics. This latter had been the province of Dionysius Thrax and through later versions of the *Tēchnē*, it became the province of the writers of *kanónes* and their commentators. Greek syntax was developed through the lengthy researches of Apollonius, which were the basis of Priscian’s two syntactic books in the *Institutiones*; but it was left to Byzantine grammarians to write separate expositions of syntax for the use of teachers and their students.

In relation to some current uses of the word “syntax” we might say that the Byzantines looked at grammar from the way up, beginning with, or assuming, the morphological forms and their categories and on this basis proceeding to syntax. Under the comprehensive use of “syntax”, covering the whole of grammatical structure as traditionally understood, generative grammarians begin with the larger units, S(entence) and P(hrase), working down through sequentially ordered rules in which word shapes are generated by lower level rules and ultimately the P(honological) rules.

Gregory’s discussion of word order is important and interesting in relation to a language with relatively free word ordering. Pragmatically it is clear that in the whole utterance as produced and understood word order is vital, and it is much discussed today in such terms as topicalization, foregrounding, and so on. At the level of grammatical acceptability and of truth-value semantics such a multiplicity of word sequences is more or less equivalent. This appears still to be the case in modern Greek, where, of course, more of the classical case morphology survives than do the Latin case distinctions in the Romance languages (cf. Philip-paki-Warburton 1985, and pp. 100–102 above).

The reference to the prominent pronunciation of the subject noun raises tantalizing questions about formal intonation tunes in the classical Greek expounded by the teachers, who had in Byzantine times to take

account of the shift from a lexical pitch accent to a simple stress accent, as in modern Greek, a shift that had already had its effect on some contemporary literature and which must have dominated the spoken Greek of Byzantine citizens in their daily usage (cf. Allen 1974: chapter 6). References to pronunciation among the grammarians follow the wider definition of grammar given in the *Téchnē* (sections 1, 2). From what Gregory has written it seems clear that understanding a syntactic construction, being able to compose one, and expressing it acceptably were all included in the purview of the teacher of grammar.

## Chapter 10

### John Glykys: the maintenance of standards

John Glykys, sometimes erroneously called Glykas, lived in the fourteenth century and was for a time Patriarch of Constantinople. He wrote a treatise on 'Correct syntax' (*perì orthótētos syntáxeōs*), dedicated to his favourite pupil Nicephorus Gregoras, himself a scholar of some renown in several fields. In modern print the work runs to fifty-nine pages. It was edited by Jahn (1839), who expressed his approbation of his scholarship and style; he wrote (1839: ii): "Loquendi dulcedine conspicuus, Atticismi ac purioris sermonis cultor, degeneram et paene barbaram sui aevi loquelam castigare et polire sollicitus", and (1839: iv) "Ut verbo dicam: grammaticum de syntaxi philosophantem per totum opus audire tibi videaris". Krumbacher (1897: 589) is less enthusiastic: "Die mehr durch Klarheit der Sprache als durch Gelehrsamkeit ausgezeichnete Schrift", duly repeated by Sandys (1958.1: 432) "more remarkable for its lucidity than for its learning". An earlier generation was kinder to him. Egger (1854: 265) wrote "la netteté des idées contraste avec l'élégance un peu raffiné du style", and of the book as "vraiment supérieur au siècle qui l'a produit".

It is attractively written not least for its picturesque, if not always convincing, analogies drawn from outside language itself and developed in some detail. In the excerpts that follow we see the neglect of earlier standards of correctness compared to a river that has burst its banks and run into channels never intended; the distinction between *kratō* 'hold, hold power over' when used with the accusative and with the genitive justified by reference to the insecurity of military victory when confronted by reviving morale on the part of the other side; and the syntactically unifying function of the oblique case forms, especially the genitive, likened to the cross pieces and slanted supports to uprights in the construction of a secure building.

He is not, however, despite Krumbacher's remark, always clear to the reader. This is mainly due to his use of constructions of a considerable length and a rather Latinate prolixity. In so far as can be done without an unacceptable style of English, an attempt has been made to preserve his syntactic complexity in the translations. He is also very repetitious, constantly referring back to earlier statements (e.g. *hōsper eipomen* [as we said before]), not all of which back references need translating.

What is attractive about his writing is his obvious modesty, as we see in the last sentence of the book (see pp. 199–200 below), his affectionate relations with his pupil, and the earnestness with which he confronts his task. Like others in the Byzantine world his purpose is strictly didactic: to explain as fully as he can the rules for correct syntactic constructions and the logical justification for these rules. Also like other Byzantine writers he looks back nostalgically to vanished glories (cf. pp. 9–10 above) and deplures the decline, as he and others saw it, in the beauty, purity, and clarity of the great writers of prose and poetry in the classical age of Greece, which the Byzantines, under increasingly difficult external circumstances, were striving to preserve, to teach, and to hand on to their pupils. Though Glykys would not yet have recognized this, their pupils were the Italian Renaissance Hellenists, and thereafter the Hellenists of all Europe, continuing through the centuries to those in the modern world who revere and study the language and the literature of the Greek classics.

Glykys's grammar is rounded. It begins with a general consideration of the origin and the uses of language. In his examination of the cases of nouns he follows the general view that inflectional forms were produced in stages so that the original rather jejune sort of language first spoken could be refined and varied (*poikillontai*) and intended meanings could be expressed with proper clarity, a lesson, he said, which was being forgotten through contemporary ignorance, carelessness, or attempts at striking innovation leading to solecisms, to the detriment of lucidity. He returns to this theme in his *envoi* to his pupil (and to other readers), restating his desire to maintain standards of correct Greek in his own day.

Glykys writes as a sincere Christian believer, but he is fully versed in classical (pagan) writings, notably those of Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes. But his work is in no sense complete, although it is typical of Byzantine doctrine. His main technical concern is with the correct use of the different cases in the basic NP – VP syntax of the sentence. There is no attempt at an overall theory of case meaning, such as is found in Syncellus and Theodore of Gaza on the one hand and in Maximus Planudes on the other. The cases are explained semantically by reference to their traditional and presumed basic meanings. No detailed attention is paid to prepositions in their government of cases, here in marked contrast to his near contemporary Maximus Planudes; it is the relations of cases with verbs that are made the central focus of his teaching, especially the use of two different cases in relation to a single verb, whose meaning and use also differ according to which case is selected. This

must have been very dear to his heart, since a prominent feature of Byzantine *Umgangssprache* Greek was the progressive deviation from the former grammar of the cases, ultimately leading to the disappearance of the classical dative in the morphological paradigms of nouns and pronouns.

Like Gregory, Glykys is vitally concerned with the avoidance of errors in inflection and in syntax, barbarisms and solecisms, such as he and others saw in current Greek writing. But his emphasis is rather different. Gregory's target had been specific morphological and syntactic mistakes and especially the wrong use of cases with prepositions. Glykys directs his attention more generally to the recovery and maintenance of the elegance and clarity that he found in the former classical age of Greek literature.

Ἡ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσις εὐρηται μὲν ἢ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δέδοται παρὰ θεοῦ τῆς ἀναγκαίας κοινωνίας ἕνεκα· φιλόκοινων γὰρ ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀγελαστικὸν κατὰ Πλάτωνα. Ἐδέησε τοίνυν αὐτοῖς λόγου, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ μετ' ἀλλήλων ποιῶνται κοινωνήματα, οἴονεϊ τινὶ τῶν βουλευμάτων ἐρμηνεῖ, τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενοι.

Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὖν οἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μάλιστα σχολάσαντες καὶ τὴν περὶ λόγους ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιζητήσαντες ἄλλα τε πλείστα ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις ὁμοῦ τοῖς σοφωτέροις ἑαυτῶν ἐσφάλησαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων χαμερπῆ τινὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ γῆϊνα φρονήσαντες, ἐκ γῆς τε αὐτοὺς ἀναδιδόασι, καὶ ὥσπερ τινὰ φυτὰ τῇ κινήσει μόνη διαφέροντα, ἀφώνους αὐτοὺς ἀναφυσῆσαι, εἰ δ' οὖν, ἀλλ' ἀσήμοις παντάπασι χρωμένους ταῖς φωναῖς ἀνέγραψαν, ᾧ τετίμηται μάλιστα λόγῳ παρὰ θεοῦ, τῷ πλείστῳ τούτου μέρει τῷ τῆς προφορᾶς ζημιῶν νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς αὐτίκα τὸν δημιουργόν. Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ὄψε ποτε πρὸς ζήτησιν αὐτοὺς τοῦ λόγου καὶ συνθήκην συνελθεῖν οἴονται, τῆς χρήσεως μόλις πρὸς τὸν κατὰ προφορὰν τοῦτον λόγον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης δῆθεν κινήσεως αὐτοὺς. Καὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ εὐρεσιν, ὡς ἔφημεν, ἀνατρέχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ βουλόμενοι καὶ δηλοῦν, ὅθεν τε καὶ ὅπως συντεθείς ὁ λόγος ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τὴν χρῆσιν εὐρηται, ἐξ ἀσημάντων τινῶν φωνῶν τὰς πρώτας σημασίας παρειλῆφθαι λέγουσι, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν τῶν κατ' ἐπιτήδευσιν καὶ τέχνην πρῶτα δοκαιοῦντες εἶναι, οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο γε τιθέμενοι, καὶ ῥοίζους τινὰς καὶ φλοίσβους καὶ ἄλλα ὁμοιότροπα τὸ πρῶτον ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ σημαίνειν τὶ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου

σύνθεσιν λαμβάνειν λέγουσι, καὶ στοιχεῖα τάττουσιν ἐπὶ ταῖς φωναῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν τραχυνόμενά τε καὶ λειομένα. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἅπασαν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν κατὰ συνθήκην μὲν, ἀπτομένην δὲ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως προβῆναι τε καὶ συντεθῆναι παρὰ τῶν πρώτων εὐρετῶν τοῦ λόγου φάσκουσι, καθὰ δὴ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ ὀρθότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων βούλεται. Οἶδὲ συνθήκη μόνη τὰ ὀνόματα προῆχθαι λέγουσιν, οὐδαμῶς τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιλαμβανόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχόν μέρος τῆς φωνῆς ἐπὶ τῷ τυχόντι πράγματι προσάγοντα καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνοις ἔδοξεν, ἀρμόττοντα, ὥσπερ μάλιστα δοκοῦν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει φαίνεται.

[The use of language was discovered, or rather given to mankind by God, for the sake of their necessary community life. Man is a communal animal, and according to Plato a member of a herd. Humans therefore needed language in order that they might carry on their dealings with one another by its use, as it were through an interpreter of their purposes.

Of the Greeks those who gave most thought to such matters and investigated the origin and the exact nature of words were in error, even among the wisest of their number, on essential matters. Indeed, thinking of men as truly earthbound creatures and worldlings they saw them as coming from the ground like plants, differing from them only by their mobility, without speech and so they wrote of them as using meaningless sounds; in reasoning, in which they had been most highly honoured by God, their Creator had immediately punished them by depriving them of the greatest part of rationality, namely speech. So they think that mankind came together at some later time to devise and agree on a language, their need moving them laboriously towards spoken language.

Wishing to approach the original exact nature of language and its discovery, and to show whence and in what ways it was constructed and began to be of service, they say that the first meaningful elements were derived from meaningless sounds, thinking, not unreasonably, that the first words referred to practicalities and skills. They say that those who first undertook the construction of language took whistlings, roars, and similar noises as the initial steps towards bearing a meaning. They assign rough and smooth sound units to the spoken forms according to the nature of what was referred to. Thus they maintain that the entire use of language came

about and was organized by its original inventors through convention but also with proper attention to the nature of things, as Plato too would have it in what he says about the correctness of naming. But others say that names were produced by convention alone, with no sort of connection with the nature of things, but simply a particular bit of speech sound to a particular thing, as seemed best to them at the time. This appears to have been Aristotle's opinion as well.] (Jahn 1839: 1–2)

Like others before and after him, Glykys speculates on the origin of human language. As is plain throughout the text, he knows the classical literature well and is familiar with the discussions on the nature of language given therein. But he is, of course, writing as a Christian in a Christian country. *Hellēnes*, as elsewhere in Byzantine writings, refers to the classical pagan authors, who must be observed and copied as far as the maintenance of a good Greek style is concerned, but whose doctrine on any matter touching man's relationship with God must be corrected and, if wholly at variance with received religious opinion, rejected.

The emergence of articulate language from inarticulate noises is a familiar and traditional theme, maintained by Condillac among others and given detailed support in some contributions to a recent anthropological conference on the subject (Harnad 1976).

In the ancient dispute between adherents of the "natural" origin of language against the "conventional" origin, Socrates is portrayed by Plato in the *Cratylus* dialogue as giving a hearing to both sides; Aristotle is firmly in the conventional camp (cf. Robins 1990: 21–23).

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, ποταμοῦ τινός εἵτινες ὄχετοὶ ἐξυβρίσουσι, ῥῆον ἂν τις τὰ τε ἴχνη τῆς πάλαι ὀρῶν ὁδοῦ καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐκεῖ τοῦ ρείθρου φερόμενον, ἐκεῖθεν εἶναι καὶ τοὺς πλανηθέντας ὄχετοὺς συννοήσῃε καὶ τῷ πλήθει ἐπὶ μέρος ἐπεσθαι δικαιώσει, εἴτις περὶ τούτων ἔσται διαφορὰ· οὕτως ἄρα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις τύπων καὶ κανόνων πᾶς τις, οἶμαι, γίνεσθαι δικαιώσει, τοῖς πλείοσι καὶ πλείονι τῷ λόγῳ χρωμένοις τὰ σὺν ἐλάττονι τῷ λόγῳ ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀδήλω ἐπεσθαι μάλιστα καὶ ὀρθοῦσθαι. Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτων ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἤδη, εἴη δὲ καὶ τι πρὸς τὴν σὴν ζήτησιν ἡμῖν ἀνυσθῆναι.

Οἶμαι τοίνυν, δοκοῦν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πᾶσιν οἶμαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζέσθαι βουλομένοις, ὡς οἱ κατὰ φύσιν λόγοι καὶ ταύτη μᾶλλον ἐπόμενοι, οὗτοι καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος εἰς ὅσον ἔξεστιν ἐπιτυχάνουσι, καὶ εἴτις τὸν ἐν γράμμασι τοῦτον

λόγον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν ὀρθότητα ἐπὶ τῇ συντάξει φυσικῇ τινὶ προῆχθαι ἀκολουθία καὶ τάξει δύναται ἐπιδειξάσθαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀρθότητα ἐπὶ τούτοις. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν σύνταξις ἐν λόγῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων ἐστὶν εἰς ταῦτ' οὐδὲν ἀδρομὴ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐπὶ δηλώσει πράγματος συνέχεια καὶ κοινωνία, ὃ δὴ λόγος ἐστὶν εὐπρεπῶς καὶ ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τέχνην συντεθειμένος, εἰ δεῖξομεν τὴν τοῦ λόγου ταύτην σύνταξιν καὶ συναφὴν ἐπομένην τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων κοινωνίᾳ, τῇ πρώτῃ δηλονότι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ὀρθῶς ἂν οἶμαι ἔχειν πάντη, καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς συντάξεως εἶναι τοῦτον, ᾧ χρησάμενοι καὶ οἱ πάλαι περὶ αὐτῆς ἐγένοντο.

[If some of the channels of a river overflow, by seeing the path of the old river and the bulk of the water carried along it one will more easily recognize how the streams have gone astray and make sure they follow the main body of the river, if there is a difference between the two flows. In the same way, I think, everyone will, by reference to the majority patterns and and a more logical ordering, correct what is wrong in regard to grammatical models and rules, and set right what is not fully logical and even wholly unclear, making it follow the usage of the majority and a logical sequence. This is how we are undertaking our work; may it be accomplished in accordance with your wishes.

I think, then, that everyone who wishes to think correctly will agree that sentences constructed naturally and conformably to the nature of the language will make true and appropriate statements, as far as this is possible, and if anyone is able to demonstrate the principles behind this and correctness in natural syntax in an orderly and proper arrangement, this will be what is truly the right course in these matters.

Syntax is nothing other than the collocation of verbs and nouns and their successive and combinative relations with other such words in order to express some fact. This constitutes a sentence put together in due order, using nature and skill, as far as this can be done. If we can show you this sentence syntax and composition as it accompanies the communication of man about things, as it was naturally at the beginning, I think this will be wholly right and be the principles of syntax which the ancient writers came to follow.] (Jahn 1839: 4)

Ἔστι μέντοι καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ῥήμασι καὶ ὀνόμασιν, ὡς εἴρηται, συντεθειμένος· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ κοινωνίαν καὶ συνέχειαν θεωροῦνται, παραπληρώμασι τισὶ προσχρόμενα. Ποικίλλονται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ταῖς καλουμέναις πτώσεσι καὶ τοῖς προσώποις ἐπ' εὐρείᾳ τῇ χρήσει καὶ καθαρῶ τῇ δηλώσει τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

[As we have said the sentence itself is made up of verbs and nouns; words are examined in connection with the sentence and with its communication and coherence, and they use in addition other words to fill it in. Nouns and verbs vary in form by what are called cases and persons in order to widen their application and to make their meaning clear.] (Jahn 1839: 5)

Ἔσχε μέντοι τῶν πτώσεων ἐκάστη ἰδίαν τὴν δήλωσιν καὶ σημασίαν καὶ τόπον ἐπὶ τῇ συντάξει τε καὶ συνεχείᾳ τοῦ καθόλου λόγου· ὡς γὰρ ἴδιόν τι σημαίνουσα καὶ ἰδίαν ἔσχεν ἐκάστη σύνταξιν, κατὰ φύσιν γε μὴν καὶ οἰκείως ἔχουσιν καὶ κατὰ λόγον τὸν προσήκοντα, οἷον ἡ γενικὴ, ὡς ἔφημεν, ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους τέτακται καὶ μέρος τι συνῆψε πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ὅσα καθ' ὁμοιότητα συνάπτονται καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς τὸ γένος πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὸ, εἰ καὶ μὴ γένη ἀκριβῶς εἰσὶν ἄλλ', ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, ὅλον τε καὶ μέρος ἢ ἀπλῶς ὡς τὰ λεγόμενα κτητικὰ, καὶ αὐτὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ γένους γενικῇ συνάπτονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν· ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ δεῖνος ἐστὶν υἱός, οὕτω λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τοῦ σώματος ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς χειρὸς ὁ δάκτυλος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κτητικῶν δὴ τούτων ὡσαύτως· ὁ ἀγρός τοῦ δεῖνος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ οἰκία τοῦ δεῖνος. Ταῦτα μέντοι πάντα ὥσπερ γενικῇ συνάπτονται, καὶ διὰ γενικῆς ἀπομερίζονται καὶ τέμνονται καὶ παρ' ἄλλων μερικῶς μετέχονται, ὥστε ὅτε τις βούλεται εἰπεῖν, ὡς τοῦ ὅλου μερικῶς μετέχει καὶ μέρος ἐξ αὐτοῦ λαμβάνει, φυσικῶς καὶ κατὰ λόγον γενικῇ συντάξει· ᾧ γὰρ τρόπῳ πᾶν συνάπτεται, φύσιν ἔχει πάντως τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ λύεσθαι. Διὰ τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὅτι μέτεστι μοι τοῦ ἀγροῦ ἢ τοῦ οἴκου, μέρος δηλονότι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦ ὅλου κέκτημαι, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ γενικὴ μερικὴν ἀπὸ ὅλου τινὸς μετουσίαν καὶ μετάληψιν δηλοῦσα. Καὶ οὕτω διὰ πάντων εὐρήσεις αὐτῆς τὴν σημασίαν καὶ τὴν σύνταξιν τοῦ ὅλου μὲν γενικῶς καὶ περιληπτικῶς ἐφαπτομένην, μέρος δὲ τι ἐξ αὐτῆς δηλοῦσαν ἀποτέμεσθαι· τὰ παραδείγματα δὲ κατωτέρω ἐκτεθέντα σαφέστερον ὁ λέγομεν ποιήσει· εἴ τι γὰρ καὶ δοκεῖ προσίστασθαι, τούτου σοὶ τὴν λύσιν παρεξόμεθα. — Τὸ δὲ νῦν λέγομεν ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τῆς δοτικῆς, ὅτιπερ

καὶ αὐτὴ ἰδίαν ἔχει σημασίαν, καὶ ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι δηλώσεως καὶ σημασίας, ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκότως σύνταξιν ἐκφέρονται· σημαίνει γὰρ ἢ δοτικῆ, περὶ τὴν ἐξωτερικὴν, ὡς ἔφημεν, οὐσα κοινωνίαν, δόσιν τινὰ ἢ χάριν, ἢ ὅλως τι ἐνεκά τινος γινόμενον, ἢ ἀπλῶς σύμπραξιν τινα καὶ κοινωνίαν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ δοτικῆ ὠνόμασται, ὡς περὶ δόσιν τε καὶ λῆψιν τὸ πλεῖστον οὐσης τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς ταύτης κοινωνίας, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι οἶον εἰς δόσιν αὐ καὶ κοινωνίαν ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὠνόμασται δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς δόσεως καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς λήψεως, ἐπειδὴ προηγείται πανταχοῦ τῆς λήψεως ἢ δόσις· τοῦ διδομένου γὰρ πράγματος ἢ λήψις, καὶ διότι πρὸς τοῦ κρείττονός ἐστι τὸ διδόναι ἢ περὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν. Σημαίνει δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ πρὸς χάριν τινὰ ἢ καὶ καθ' ἡδονὴν γινόμενα ἢ δοτικῆ, ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ χαρίζομαι καὶ τὸ δωροῦμαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς δόσις τις ἀβούλητος εἰς δοτικὴν ἀνάγονται, οἶον τὸ ὀργίζομαι, τὸ ἀπειλᾶ, τὸ χαλεπαίνω, τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια δοτικῆ συντάττονται. — Ἐχει τοίνυν καὶ τὴν τῆς δοτικῆς σημασίαν ἰδίαν, καὶ τὸν τύπον ἐπὶ πάντα ἰκανῶς τὰ εἰρημένα ἐξικνούμενον. Λείπεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς ἢ τινὰ ἰδίως ἔχει σημασίαν εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅπως τὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ὄντα σημασίας καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν σύνταξιν ἐδέξαντο. Ἴδιον τοίνυν τῆς αἰτιατικῆς ἐστὶν ὀλόκληρόν τι πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀκέραιον δηλοῦν· ἢ γὰρ πρόσωπον εἰς τὴν αἰτίαν ἄγεται, ἢ πρᾶγμα τι καὶ πρόσωπον ἢ φίλον ἢ ἐχθρὸν· αἰτιώμεθα γὰρ ἢ φίλον καὶ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ἢ ἐχθρὸν κακοῦ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥηθέντος παραδείγματος λέγομεν, ὅτι διὰ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ δεινότητα ὁ συγγενῆς ἀφεῖται τῆς δίκης, μέλλων ἀποθνήσκειν διὰ τοὺς συκοφάντας· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τοῦ μὲν σωθῆναι τὸν Δημοσθένην αἰτιώμεθα, τοῦ δὲ ἀποθνήσκειν, εἰ συνέβαινε, τοὺς συκοφάντας. Εἰσὶ γοῦν τὰ εἰς αἰτίαν ἀγόμενα πρᾶγματα ὀλόκληρα· πρόσωπα γὰρ οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρᾶγμα τι ἢ πρᾶξιν εἴτις ἄγει εἰς αἰτίαν, ὀλοκλήρως αὐτὴν ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ὅλη τῆ αἰτία καὶ τῷ πράγματι σπεύδει τὸν ὑπαίτιον περιβαλεῖν·

[Each case acquired its generic meaning and its place in syntax and in the construction of the whole sentence. Having its own meaning, each case had its own syntactic function by its own nature and by what was properly required by the sentence. As we have said, the genitive case was designed for genetic relations and it linked the part to the whole; consequently entities that are associated by similarity also have a sort of generic relationship like the class in

relation to its members, even if they are not strictly genetically related, like part and whole and what are called possessives. We say, for example, *ho deīna tou deīnos estin hyiōs* 'so-and-so is so-and-so's son', and likewise *hē cheir tou sōmatos estin* 'the hand is part of the body' or *tēs cheirōs ho daktulos* 'the finger is part of the hand', and with possessives in the same way; *ho agrōs tou deīnos estī* 'the field belongs to somebody' and *hē oikia tou deīnos* 'the house is (the property) of so-and-so'.

These are all linked together by the genitive, and by means of the genitive selection, division, and other forms of participation are expressed, so that when someone wants to say that he shares in a whole and takes a part of it he uses a genitive construction naturally and rationally. The way everything is put together is naturally the way in which it is separated; so we say *métesti moi tou agroū* or *tou oikou* 'part of the field (or of the house) is mine'; that is clearly a part and I myself have got all of that part. The genitive refers to the part-ownership and part-receipt of some whole. You will always find that the meaning and the syntax of the genitive is attached generically and comprehensively to a whole, but referring to the cutting off of a part of it. The examples given below will make what we are saying clearer; if anything appears to trouble you we will provide a solution to it.

Now we will deal with the dative case in the same way, because whatever is involved in its reference and meaning is expressed in its appropriate syntax. The dative refers to a sharing from an external source, a gift or a favour, or generally something that comes about for someone else's sake, or simply a collaboration or common purpose. That is why it is called the dative case, because sharing from an outside source is mostly giving and taking or the sort of thing that can be referred to as giving or sharing. It takes its title from giving and not from taking, because giving always precedes taking what has been given and because giving is an act of a better man than is receiving. The dative refers not only to things that give favour or pleasure, as with *charizomai* 'gratify', *doroūmai* 'present', and the like, but also to their opposites. Such things are assigned to the dative as an unwanted gift, like *orgizomai* 'be angry', *apeilō* 'threaten', *chalepainō* 'be annoyed', etc. For this reason these and similar verbs construct with the dative. You now have the specific meaning of the dative and an outline that adequately covers what has been said.

It remains for us to describe the specific meaning of the accusative case and how all that is involved in it received the same syntax. The specific meaning of the accusative is an entity whole and entire, a person or a thing and a person alleged as a responsible cause, whether as a friend or an enemy. We hold a friend or a comrade responsible for something good, or an enemy for something bad. To take an earlier example<sup>1</sup> we say that through Demosthenes (accusative) and his cleverness (accusative) his kinsman was acquitted of the charge, when he risked death through informers (accusative); we say that Demosthenes was responsible for his being saved, and that the informers would have been responsible for his death, and that happened.

Entities in their entirety are said to be causes; they are persons. Not but what, if anyone alleges that a thing or an action was responsible, he brings the case against it as a whole and hastens to the charge the person involved in it.] (Jahn 1839: 8–10)

Glykys's general, and traditional, treatment of case semantics has been referred to above. He deals in turn with the genitive, the dative, and the accusative.

The genitive, with its wide range of meanings and uses, was always a problem. It could be directly linked to another noun, as well as, like the others, to verbs and prepositions. Its underlying noun form *génos* stood for both genetic relations and partitive or class membership relations. The single word *génos* in this technical context is not easily translated to preserve its supposed unity, despite the availability in English of the two similarly derived words, *genetic* and *generic*.

The dative ("giving") is similarly and more readily treated in this way, with due mention of unwelcome "gifts", with reference to which there was a Greek proverb (Sophocles, *Ajax* 664–665): *hē brotōn paroimía, echthrōn údōra dôra kouk onésima* [the proverbial saying of mankind: the gifts of enemies are no gifts; they are not beneficial]. The superiority of giving over receiving in the naming of this case probably echoes the wording of the Biblical sentence (*Acts* 10.35): *makárión esti mállon didónai è lambánein* [it is more blessed to give than to receive].

It is well known that the accusative case took its Latin name from one of the meanings of the Greek verb *aitiáomai* ['allege as a cause, hold responsible' and 'accuse, charge']. Glykys adds to this the refer-

ence to a whole entity or activity and not a partial one; this is his interpretation of the contrast between the two cases, and to this he returns later.

The point of the final paragraph (in the translation) would appear to be that responsibility and causation are primarily matters relating to persons, although things and events may be analogously represented and in some way personalized.

Γίνονται οὖν συμπλοκαὶ καὶ συζυγίαι τῆς συντάξεως τρεῖς: τὰ μὲν γὰρ γενικῇ συντάσσεται καὶ αἰτιατικῇ, τὰ δὲ δοτικῇ καὶ αἰτιατικῇ, τὰ δὲ, εἴπερ ἐνεχῶρει, γενικῇ ὄφειλε καὶ δοτικῇ.

Ἴδωμεν οὖν πρῶτον περὶ τῶν γενικῇ συνταττομένων καὶ αἰτιατικῇ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων θεωρήσωμεν τὸν ὑποτεθέντα περὶ τῶν πτώσεων κανόνα τῆς συντάξεως. Εὕρηται τοίνυν τὸ κρατῶ, τὸ ἀκούω, τὸ αἰσθάνομαι γενικῇ καὶ αἰτιατικῇ πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς συνταττόμενα, καὶ πλεῖστα μὲν ἄλλα, ἀρκεῖτω δ' οὖν καὶ ταῦτα. Λέγομεν οὖν ὅτι κρατεῖ τις τὸ δόρυ τῇ χειρὶ ἢ τὸ βιβλίον ἕτερος ἢ ἄλλος ἄλλο. Λεγέσθω γὰρ ὡς τὸ κρατεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ παραδείγματος, οὐ πλειστάκις ἐν τῇ χρήσει εὕρισκόμενον. Ὡσαύτως λέγομεν, ὅτι ἐκράτησεν ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἢ ὁ πύκτης τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἢ ὁ παλαιστής τῶν ἀντιπάλων. Ὅτε μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ δόρυ ὡς ὄλον τι λέγομεν κρατεῖν ἢ τὸ βιβλίον, αἰτιατικῇ κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἰτιατικῆς τύπον, τῆς τὸ ὄλον σημαίνουσας, τὸ κρατεῖν συντάττομεν: ὅτε δὲ οὐ τὸ ὄλον, ἀλλὰ τὴν μερικὴν εἶκε δηλοῦν τὸ ῥῆμα σημασίαν, συντάττομεν αὐτὴς γενικῇ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον περὶ ταύτης τύπον. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ πλήθους εἶκε κρατεῖν ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ περιεκτικῶς καὶ ὀλικῶς τῶν πολεμίων περιγίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξωτερικῆ ἐστὶν ἡ λήψις καὶ ἡ κατοχὴ, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὑποπεσεῖν μόνον τὰ φρονήματα τῶν πολεμίων: πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ μόνον αὐτῶν πόρρωθεν ὀφθέντων καὶ μηδ' εἰς χεῖρας συνελθόντων ἔτι τῶν εἰς τὴν παράταξιν, οἱ ἕτεροι ἢ τὴν δεινότητα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ τὴν τόλμαν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων ἢ πλῆθος ἢ ἄλλο τι πτοηθέντες ὑπετάγησαν ἰσοπαλεῖς ἢ ἐγγὺς που ἴσως ὄντες, εἰ ἐς αὐτὴν τὴν μάχην ὄρμησαν, ὥστε πολλοὺς ἂν ἴδοις πρὸς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ὄρμην τῆς μάχης ὑποκύψαντας καὶ κρατηθῆναι δόξαντας, εἶτα μετ' ὀλίγον ἀναλαβόντας φρόνημα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καταφρονήσαντας καὶ, ὃ φησιν ὁ Θουκυδίδης, οὐ φρονήματι μόνον ἐς αὐτοὺς ἐλθόντας ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ μεθ' ἑαυτῶν τὴν νικην σχόντας. Οὕτω πως κρατῆσαι ἢ τῶν πολεμίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἐπὶ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπ' ἑλαττον κρατῆσαι,

<sup>1</sup> Jahn 1839: 7.



οὐ τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ξίφος ἔχοντος καὶ πραγματικῶς κρατοῦντος ἢ τοῦ πέδαις τὸν ληστήν κρατήσαντος.

[There are three collocations and couplings of case syntax: some verbs take a genitive and an accusative, some a dative and accusative, and some ought to take the genitive and dative, if that were possible. Let us look first at verbs taking the genitive and the accusative and examine the underlying syntactic rule of the cases. We have found *kratō* 'hold (power)', *akoúō* 'hear', and *aisthánomai* 'perceive' taking the genitive and the accusative in many places and in many contexts; there are many others too, but these will suffice. We say: *krateĩ tis tò dóry tēi cheiri* 'someone holds a spear in his hand', another *tò bíblion* 'the book', and so on<sup>2</sup>. But it must be said that this use of 'hold' in the examples just given is not the most frequent. Thus we say: *ekrátēsēn ho stratēgōs tōn polemíōn* 'the general held power over the enemy', *ho pýktiēs tōn antagōnistōn* 'the boxer over his opponents', or *ho palaistēs tōn antipálōn* 'the wrestler over his fellow-wrestlers'<sup>3</sup>. When we speak of all of the spear or of the book, we construct *kratō* with the accusative on the pattern of this case, designating a whole. But when it is necessary to refer the meaning of the verb, not to a whole, but to a part, we use the genitive according to the pattern set by this case. For if the general appears to hold power over a multitude and to be the master of his foes completely and wholly, his capture and control are from outside, through the collapse of the morale of the enemy forces. Often when forces are only seen from far off and have not yet come to hand-to-hand fighting, those on the other side, frightened by the skill of the general, the bravery of their opponents, their numbers, or something else, have given in when they were equal or nearly equal in strength, had they rushed into battle; so you see many men cowering down at the first charge of the battle and seeming to be beaten, but a little while afterwards, recovering their morale and despising the enemy and, in Thucydides's words, advancing against them not just in high spirits but in a spirit of superiority as well, sometimes winning the victory by themselves. Holding power in this way over enemies or other antagonists is partial

<sup>2</sup> With the accusative.

<sup>3</sup> With the genitive.

and is power at a lower level, not like having a spear in one's hand and effectively holding it, or holding a burglar in fetters.] (Jahn 1839: 11–12)

In this and the following excerpts Glykys is dealing with his central interest, the distinctive use of cases with certain verbs, where a verb can take two cases differentially. It is verbal case syntax that exercises him, and he is clearly worried and depressed about the laxer and therefore less clear uses of the case forms in contemporary Byzantine speech and writing. It is to be noted that *syzygia* [coupling] here has nothing to do with its meaning of 'conjugation' with reference to the inflectional subclasses of verbs as used by the *Téchnē* and by other grammarians. It specifically relates to the syntactic and semantic relations between a verb and the cases with which it may be directly linked.

We have one of Glykys's typical pictorial analogies, on the holistic meaning of the accusative and the partial or partitive meaning of the genitive. The two case relations correspond to the distinction in English of holding in the sense of grasping and holding power over someone or something. This latter partitive use of the genitive with verbs like *kratō* can be literally but less picturesquely explained than it is by Glykys. It is not so much partial control (which may be lost in battle) as control over a part of a human being or a community (their minds, thoughts, wills, etc.), as distinct from the physical grasp of and control over the whole of a person, treated as a physical object, like a burglar being in fetters.

Ἄλλ' ἐπέπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ τῆς γενικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ μέρος ἐδηλώθη, ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον καὶ ὅλως τὸ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν ἐρχόμενον γενικῆ ὁμοίως συνετάχθη, καὶ τοῦτο αὐθις ἀναγκαιῶς· οὔτε γὰρ πτώσεις ἦν εὐρεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων πλείονας, ὡς ἄνωθεν ἐδειξάμεν, τοῦ παντὸς δι' αὐτῶν περατουμένου λόγου, οὔτε τὰς ὑφέσεις αὐ καταμετρεῖν καὶ πτώσειν ἰδίαις τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δηλοῦν· ἀλλ' ἤρκεσεν ἡ γενικῆ ἀναλογώτερον ἔχουσα παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πρὸς τὴν στέρησιν, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐπὶ μέρος τε καὶ τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ὡς εἴρηται, δηλοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν διὰ τῆς ὑφέσεως προβαίνουσα καθ' ὁδὸν καὶ μέχρι τῆς στερησεως αὐτῆς προβῆναι, ἅτε δὴ καὶ πρῶην διὰ τῆς ὑφέσεως, ὡς εἶπομεν, λεληθότως ἅμα καὶ στέρησιν δηλοῦσα.

[Since partiality was signified by the genitive from the start, then having a smaller part and then the smallest and finally what

amounted to total deprivation were little by little brought within the genitival construction, and this was necessarily so. It was not possible to work out more cases, as we have shown, the whole of language being encompassed by the existing cases; nor was it possible to measure the successive reductions and indicate them by separate cases. The genitive was sufficient, being more akin to a deprivational meaning than the others, not only because it signified partiality and ever decreasing amounts, but because it progressed towards deprivation, through this reduction finally reaching deprivation itself along the way without this being noticed at the time.] (Jahn 1839: 13–14)

The genitival meaning of deprivation is explained here by reference to the limiting point of an ever diminishing part or share. It could equally well be considered an extension of an earlier and underlying sense of removal from something, as with such prepositions as *apó* 'from' and *ex* 'out of'. But whatever may be thought of the actual semantic connections proposed by Glykys, his basic assumption that a language cannot be structurally enriched without limit to cope with every conceivable semantic difference without reference to any context is remarkably like Humboldt's later fundamental insight that a language must always make infinite use of finite resources (Humboldt 1836: 103).

Ἔστι τοίνυν, ὡσπερ ἔφημεν, καὶ τὸ ἀκούω γενικῆ καὶ αἰτιατικῆ συνταττόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο μέντοι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν τὴν τῶν πτώσεων· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπεριμερίμωτος καὶ ὡς τῆς ἀκουστικῆς ἕκαστος ἔχει καταλήψεως (οὐδεὶς δὲ πάντως πάντων ἐφικνεῖται, μηδενὸς αὐτὸν ἐκφεύγοντος), τότε, ὡς μὴ πάντων ἀσφαλῶς ἐπιλαμβανομένου τοῦ ἀκούοντος, γενικῆ τὸ ῥῆμα συνετάχθη, μερικὴν πως τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς γενικῆς δηλούσης· ὅτε δὲ ὡς ὀφειλὴν τις ἔχων καὶ ἀνάγκην ἢ καὶ βούλησιν ἰδίαν ἀνελλιπῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς τοῦ λόγου ἀκροῦσθαι καὶ ἀντέχεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἀκούει, τότε, ὡς ὀλικῆς οὔσης τῆς τοῦ λόγου καταλήψεως, εἰς αἰτιατικὴν ἢ σύνταξιν ἐτάχθη.

[*Akoúō* 'hear' takes the genitive and the accusative, and this relates to the meaning of the cases. When one simply hears without special attention but just as one catches the sound (no-one gets everything in its entirety, with nothing escaping him), the verb is constructed with the genitive, indicating a partial grasp, as the hearer has not taken in everything in complete accuracy; but when someone, from

duty, necessity, or personal inclination to listen to what is said without any omissions or mistakes, hears in this way, then, as his grasp is of its entirety, the construction is made with the accusative.] (Jahn 1839: 15)

Glykys places the differential signification of the two cases used with verbs like *akoúō* 'hear' on a partial and almost casual hearing, as opposed to attentive listening. In fact the genitive is more commonly used with the human source of what is heard and the accusative with what actually is heard. He is obviously concerned to press the partitivity of the genitive as far as he can; the two cases are not very clearly distinguished with this verb, as can be seen in texts.

Ἔχεις οὖν, ὡς οἶμαι, τέλεον καὶ διὰ πλείστων ἀποδειγμένον τὸν ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ταύτῃ συζυγίᾳ τρόπον τῆς συντάξεως· εὔρηται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δευτέρας συζυγίας οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν ῥημάτων, δοτικῆ δηλονοτι καὶ αἰτιατικῆ συνταττόμενα· καὶ δηλον καὶ ταῦτα ὡς πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν τὴν τῶν πτώσεων δέχεται τὴν σύνταξιν, οἷον λέγομεν· δωροῦμαι σοι τὰ, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ· δωροῦμαι σε τοῖσδε ἀντὶ τοῦ· εὐ ποιῶ σε ταῖς τοιαῖσδε δωρεαῖς· ὄλον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἠδέως ἢ ὠδέ πως διατιθημί σε τοῖς δωρήμασιν. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς περὶ ὄλου τὴν τῆς αἰτιατικῆς ἐνταῦθα σύνταξιν ἐδέξατο τὸ ῥῆμα. Πάλιν τὸ προσκυνῶ δοτικῆ ὁμοίως καὶ αἰτιατικῆ ὁράται συνταττόμενον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν τὸ προσκυνῶ εἴληπται οὕτω πως, οἷον ὅτι· δεομένως καὶ ὑποπεπτωκότως καὶ οἶνει λατρευτικῶς προσέρχομαι σοι, δοτικῆ συντάττεται, ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ λατρεύω καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν προσκυνούμενον δηλοῖ τις, ὡς τῇ τιμῇ τῆς προσκυνήσεως περιβάλλειν βούλεται καὶ οἶνει προσκυνητὸν τιθέναι, ὡς περὶ ὄλην τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος καὶ πρὸς τόδε τι ὑπάγων καὶ διατιθεὶς εἶδος τῆς τιμῆς, τότε αἰτιατικῆ συντάξει· οὐ γὰρ δώσει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔοικε, ἀλλὰ δράσει μάλιστα τι περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἐνεργεῖα.

Ἐπὶ μέντοι τῆς τρίτης συμπλοκῆς καὶ συζυγίας, ὡς καὶ ἀνωτέρω εἶπομεν, οὐχ εὔρηται ῥήματα γενικῆ ὁμοῦ καὶ δοτικῆ συνταττόμενα διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τρόπον τινὰ τὸ διδόναι τῷ λαμβάνειν. Ὡσαύτως καὶ το κοινωνῶ εὔρηται μὲν γενικῆ δοκοῦν συντάττεσθαι καὶ δοτικῆ, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ οὐ συντάττεται, οἷον λέγομεν· κοινωνῶ τοῦ σκέμματος καὶ κοινωνῶ τῷ φίλῳ, ἐπ' ἄλλῳ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τέτακται καὶ ἄλλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κοινωνῶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμπράττειν μετὰ δοτικῆς λεγόμενον τῷ προσώπῳ ἤρμοσται, τὸ δὲ κοινωνῶ ἀντὶ τοῦ μετέχω τῷ πράγματι· καὶ οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐνθα

ἡ γενική, δύναμαι εἰπεῖν τὴν δοτικὴν, δι' ἧς ἡ τοῦ συμπράττειν σημασία, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου πάλιν δύναμαι εἰπεῖν τὴν γενικήν, δι' ἧς ἡ τοῦ μετέχειν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μετέχειν ἔχει χώραν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐδὲ μεθέξει τις αὐτὸς ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβές, εἰ μὴ πρόσωπον ἕτερον τρόπον ὡς πράγματος· ὅλον γὰρ τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅλου δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ μετασχεῖν ἀλλὰ μέρους, ὥστε τοῦ προσώπου οὐδεὶς μεθέξει ὡς προσώπου, ἀλλ' ἴσως τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ δούλου, καὶ ἐστὶ πάλιν τὸ μετέχειν ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ὡς ἐπ' ἄλλω οὖν καὶ ἄλλω τεταγμένον, οὐ διττῶς λέγομεν συντάττεσθαι ἐνταῦθα ἀλλὰ μοναχῶς τὸ κοινωνῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἀκριβέστερον τὸ ῥῆμα θεωρούμενον μιᾷ καὶ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἔοικε συντάξει ὑποπίπτειν, τῇ τῆς γενικῆς· καὶ ὅτε γὰρ δοτικῇ δοκεῖ συντάττεσθαι, πρὸς γενικὴν νοεῖται ἔχειν τὴν ἀπόδοσιν· ὅτε γὰρ εἰπόμεν, ὅτι· κοινωνῶ τῷ φίλῳ πράγματός τινος, κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ εἰκάμεν δηλοῦν, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν μονοειδῆ τὴν σύνταξιν τοῦ κοινωνῶ.

Ταῦτά σοι καὶ περὶ τῆς τρίτης ἔστω συζυγίας τοῦ μὴ διαφυγεῖν σε χάριν μηδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν ἀκρίβειαν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ, ὡς ἔφημεν, ἡ γενικὴ τῇ δοτικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ῥήματος ἅμα οὐ φιλεῖ ὡς ἐπιπλεῖστον παραγίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἴσθι ὡς ἡ δοτικὴ δύναμιν τινα ἰδίως ἔχει πάντοτε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐφέλκεσθαι τὰ ῥήματα τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὡς ὅταν τὰ τῶν ῥημάτων σημαινόμενα, ἐπ' ἄλλων ἐνεργούμενα, ἐτέρων χάριν λέγεται, οἶον τοῦ ἀκούω πρὸς γενικὴν ἔχοντος τὴν σύνταξιν, ὅταν εἰπόμεν· ἀκούω σοι, αὐτοῦ δηλοῦμεν τοῦ λέγοντος ἀκούειν· ὅταν δὲ εἰπόμεν· ἀκούω σοι, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὸν δύναται τὸν λέγοντα τὸ ἀκούω λέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἐτέρου χάριν δηλοῦμεν εἶναι τὸ ἀκούειν, πρὸς ὃν τῇ δοτικῇ συντάττομεν, ὡς ἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι· σοὶ ἀκούω τάδε, ἦτοι· σοῦγε ἐνεκεν, ὡς ὑστερόν σοι ταῦτα ἀπομνημονεύσων· ὡς δόσις γὰρ τότε ἡ ἀκρόασις καὶ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπομνημονεύσις δύναται λογίζεσθαι.

[You have before you now the collocations of one class of verbs in full and amply exemplified. But we find a number of verbs having the second type of collocation, taking the dative and the accusative. It is clear that their syntax is determined by the meanings of the cases. We say: *dōroūmai soi tā* 'I present something to you' and *dōroūmai se toīside* 'I present you with something', in the sense of *eū poiō se taīs toiaīsde dōreaīs* 'I benefit you with these presents'; for I am treating him, a whole person,

kindly, or whatever, with my gifts. For this the verb takes the accusative case, being concerned with a whole entity. In the same way the verb *proskunō* 'do honour' is found taking the dative and the accusative; when it is understood as if I am coming to you imploringly, submissively, and almost religiously, like the verb *latreúō* 'serve religiously', and other such verbs, it takes the dative. But when it is clear that one wishes to crown the man honoured with the prestige of being honoured, manifesting this in regard to his whole personality, invoking and setting out the nature of the honour, then the accusative case is used. This is not like a gift, but more like a performance and an action in regard to the one so treated.

However, in regard to the third type of collocation and juncture, as I mentioned above, you will not in fact find verbs taking both the genitive and the dative, because in a way giving and taking are opposites. Thus the verb *koinōnō* 'to share' appears to take the genitive along with the dative, but this is not so: we say *koinōnō toū skémματος* 'I share in the enquiry' (genitive) and *koinōnō toī philōi* 'I share things with my friend' (dative), but each refers to something different. *koinōnō* in the sense of collaborating, used with the dative, is attached to the person; but *koinōnō* in the sense of taking a share is attached to the thing shared. I cannot in respect of a thing, where the genitive belongs, use a dative, whose meaning is collaboration; nor in respect of a person can I use the genitive, where the meaning is taking a share; there is no place for taking a share in a person, nor will one, strictly speaking, take a share in him, unless the person is in some way treated as a thing. A person is a whole and it is impossible to have a share in a whole, but only in a part of it; so no-one will have a share in a person, except, perhaps, in the use of him, as with a slave, and that is sharing in a thing again. We say then that *koinōnō* is used with the one or the other singly and not in a double manner; rather, when the verb is looked at more accurately, it is constructed with one case, the genitive, in both constructions. When it seems to take the dative it is understood to have a genitival reference; when we say *koinōnō toī philōi prágmátos tinos* 'I share the thing with a friend', we apparently say that we are taking a share for him, and so the case syntax of *koinōnō* is still unitary.


So much for the third type of syntactic collocation, so you will not lack accurate information about all this. Though, as we have said, the genitive does not occur with the dative in relation to the same verb for the most part, you must take note of the fact that at all times the dative has a power of its own to attract verbs to itself, as when the meaning of the verb, directed to others, is said to be on someone else's behalf. For example, while *akoúō* 'hear' takes the genitive, when we say *akoúō sou* 'I hear you' (genitive) we mean that we hear the person speaking; nevertheless, when we say *akoúō soi* 'I hear for you' (dative) *akoúō* 'hear' cannot refer to hearing the speaker himself but to another. Hearing someone we make it clear that we are hearing him for the sake of someone else, in relation to whom the dative case is used, as if we said to him *soi akoúō táde* 'I hear this for you' (dative), that is to say "for your sake, intending to repeat it to you later on". Then the listening and the repeating of it to him can be thought of as a sort of gift.] (Jahn 1839: 22–27)

Glykys is here dealing with verbs that construct with either the dative or the accusative. The concept of wholeness is again referred to as part of the basic meaning of the accusative case. The distinction is made between the focus on the recipient (accusative) and the focus on the gift or, abstractly, the service (accusative) to the recipient (dative). The concept of giving is easily extended to submission or self-giving.


His discussion of an alleged class of verbs constructing with either the genitive or the dative in the same sort of relationships as the verbs already said to construct with the genitive and the accusative and with the dative and the accusative, is interesting and syntactically as well as semantically important. A verb like *koinōnō* 'share' always has two semantic aspects, taking or having a share and giving a share. In fact, both cases can be used with the same verb in a single sentence, as in *koinōnō soi toú agrōú* 'I share the field with you, I give you a share of the field', the genitive being, in fact, understood when only the dative overtly appears, as he points out. This is very different to the alternative choices of one case or the other with different, though related, meanings. He goes on to point out that verbs like this are not distinctively collocated with the dative, and that this use refers not to the basic meaning of the verb but to the VP as a whole, whether another oblique case is used or not.

His point is that the dative has its own specific (benefactive) relationship not to the basic meaning of the verb, but to any VP, be it a single

verb or a verb already collocated with a noun or pronoun in another oblique case. Schematically the difference between the two constructions can be set out in this way:



Glykys gives an example of the verb *akoúō* 'hear' with an accusative pronoun, and his sentence can be schematized like this:



This construction is distinct from that of specific verbs of giving, saying etc., in which the indirect (dative) object and the direct (accusative) object are on the same level of structure. These two uses of the dative are, in fact, seen in a single sentence in the Homeric lines (*Iliad* 14.501–502):

eipémenai moi, Trôes, agaíou Ilionēos  
 patrì philōi kai mētri goēmenai en megároisin

(lit. Trojans, say for me to the father and mother of noble Idomeneus to weep in their home).

In fact almost any transitive or intransitive verb can be linked in this way to serve as the carrier of a "benefactive dative", which would normally be translated by English *for* instead of *to*, the usual preposition

with verbs of giving, etc. In Glykys's words this is expressed by its "power to attract verbs to itself". The following examples from classical Greek will further illustrate this construction: *pās anēr hautōi ponei* 'every man works for himself' (Sophocles, *Ajax* 1366); *emmeinatē moi hoīs edeēthēn hymōn mē thorybein* 'continue to do for me what I asked of you, not to interrupt' (Plato *Apologia Socratis* 30c). In the latter example the verb *emmēnō* 'stand by, abide by' regularly constructs with a dative, here *hoīs edeēthēn* 'what I asked', and the pronoun *moi* 'for me' is a separate constituent, linked with the higher VP. This use of the dative is akin to the Latin and Greek "ethic dative" (*Quid mihi Celsus agit?* 'tell me, what is Celsus doing?', etc.).

Though he does not deal separately with prepositional case government, in the verb *hypakouō* 'obey', which regularly takes the dative, he attributes such a construction to the semantic force of the prepositional prefix *hyp(ō)* 'under' carrying the meaning of submissiveness or subordination into the verb as a whole (Jahn 1839: 26): *kathōlou katischeuōsēs tēs prothéseōs eis tēn toū hypotássomai kai hypopiptō sēmasian* [the preposition forcing into the verb as a whole the meaning of *hypotássomai* 'be subject to' and *hypopiptō* 'fall down before (someone)'].

Glykys's account of the dative construction appears to be original. It is not found in Priscian, nor in the extant works of Apollonius; and it is important.

Ἄλλα γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων σύνταξιν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν σοι διηρθρώσαμεν, τὴν τούτων κοινωνίαν καὶ συνάφειαν κατὰ τὸν διπλοῦν τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τρόπον ὑποθέμενοι, μεσολαβηθείσης ἐν ταύτῳ καὶ τῆς αἰτίας, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιῶς ἐπὶ πάσαις κοινωνίαις τε καὶ πράξεσι καὶ ταύτην ἐπεσθαι εἰκός ἂν εἴη, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξῆς καὶ τελεωτέραν σύνταξιν τοῦ λόγου μὴ ἀποκαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ταύτης δοῦναί σοι, ὡς δυνατόν, τῆς ὀρθότητος τοῦς τύπους· σῶμά τι γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ἕς τὸ πλήρες εἰρμοῖς καὶ μέλεσιν, ὡς ἐκείνο, καὶ αὐτὸς συγκείμενος. Τὰ γοῦν τῶν εἰρμῶν, ὡς ἔφημεν, ἰκανῶς σοι διαρθρώσαντες, τὸ ἐξῆς ἂν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν μελῶν σοι διαρτίας καὶ ἀρμοστίας τὸν λόγον ποιησόμεθα· οὕτω καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἐντελῆ τοῦ λόγου κίνησιν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα χρῆσιν τελέως ἀποδοῖμεν ἂν σοι· περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν συνάφειαν, ὡς χρῆ, καὶ σύνταξιν καὶ ὁ λεγόμενος σολοικισμὸς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ χωλότης ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, φαίνεται, περὶ οὗ σε φροντίσαι δεῖ οὐδέν τι ἥττον τῶν καλλίστων ἐπὶ τῇ γραφῇ ἰδιωμάτων καὶ ὠραϊσμάτων ἀττικῶν, μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιπλέον·

τούτων γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον ἂν τις καὶ μετέχει, οὐ μεμπτός, πλὴν ὅσον ἔνδειαν τινα τοῦ περὶ ταῦτα κάλλους καὶ χαρίτων ἔχων λογισθήσεται· τὸ δὲ προσπταῖεν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καὶ χωλεύειν πολὺ τὸ αἴσχος καὶ ὁ γέλως.

[Now that we have done our best to set out the syntax of verbs and nouns, suggesting that their association and connection accord to the twofold manner of human communication, taking in the reason for these through the necessity for it to be in line with all spoken intercourse and all activities, it would be sensible not to give up in face of the consequential and fuller syntax of the sentence but to give you, as far as we can, an outline of what is correct.

A sentence is a sort of body, and like a body it consists entirely of joints and limbs. We have already told you enough about the joints, and now we will go on to give you an account of the shaping and arrangement of the limbs; in this way you will have before you an account of the whole operation of language and of its use in all circumstances. It is in these limbs and their connections and syntax that, as one would suspect, what is called solecism, that is lameness in the sentence, makes its appearance. You must pay attention to this, which involves nothing less than the finest styles of written literature and the beauties of the Attic authors. More than this, as long as one shares in this correctness, one meets with no censure, save to the extent to which one is thought lacking beauty and grace in these matters; but stumbling and lame writing in these respects result in great shame and ridicule.] (Jahn 1839: 34–35)

By "joints and limbs" Glykys seems to be referring to today's constituents, which must be properly attached to the body of a well-formed sentence; in later sections he is concerned about the loose parataxis of *nominativi pendentes* and other solecisms in recent and current Byzantine Greek. His emphasis on the excellence of classical literature and the need to maintain its standards is a recurrent theme in his book, as it is in others.

εἰ γὰρ τις εἴποι· ἐγὼ περιπατῶν ὁ τοῖχος ἐπεσεν, ἀσυνδέτος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ σημαίνει ὅπερ καὶ ὁ λέγων βούλεται·

Τό· ἐγὼ περιπατῶν τοῦτο μόνον ἀσυνδέτως ἐλλίπες, ἢ μᾶλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δήλωσιν· ὡσαύτως καὶ τό· ὁ τοῖχος ἐπεσεν οὐ δηλοῖ τι, πρὸς γε δὴν τὸν νοῦν τοῦ λέγοντος· βούλεται γὰρ ὁ λέγων ἐνταῦθα δηλῶσαι, ὡς· ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν ἐμὲ ὁ τοῖχος ἐπεσε· τοῦτο δὲ, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' εὐθείας ἢ τὰ κῶλα ἐκφερόμενα, οὐδαμῶς δηλοῦται,

εἰ μὴ συνδεθῆ ἢ εὐθεΐα, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἶπομεν, πρὸς γενικὴν, ὡς εἶναι· ἐμοῦ περιπατοῦντος ὁ τοῖχος ἔπεσε· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὴν δῆλωσιν ἔχει ἀκεραΐαν, ὡς ἅμα ἐμοῦ περιπατοῦντος καὶ ὁ τοῖχος ἔπεσε·

[If someone says *egō peripatōn ho toichos épesen* 'I walking the wall fell down', the sentence is syntactically ill-formed and does not express what the speaker intends. *egō peripatōn* 'I walking' by itself is ill-formed and defective, or rather it has no signification. Likewise *ho toichos épesen* 'the wall fell down' does not convey a meaning so far as the speaker's intention is concerned. He wants to say that during his walking the wall fell down; but as long as the constituents are put in the nominative, the meaning is not expressed unless the nominative is syntactically linked to a genitive, as with nouns; we want *emoū peripatoũntos* (genitive) *ho toichos épese* 'while I was the wall fell down'. This has a fully expressed meaning that my walking and the falling of the wall were taking place at the same time.] (Jahn 1839: 35–36)

The unacceptable sentence *egō peripatōn ho toichos épesen* 'I walking the wall fell down' was a familiar example of this type of solecism (cf. p. 112 above).

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ πλαγιασμός τὸ τῆς γενικῆς σχῆμα προσηγόρευται, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῶν ἄλλων πτώσεων καὶ τῶν κώλων ἐνστηριζομένων καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ βεβηκὸς συνισχομένων. Ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν ἔχει κατασκευασμάτων· ὀρθὸν γὰρ ἐπ' ὀρθῷ σφαλερὰν τὴν ἔδραν ἔξει καὶ οὐκ ἄνποτε ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐστήξει, εἰ μὴ τάχιστα τῷ τέκτονι τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μεταμέλειν δεῖ, ἐγκαρσίῳ δὲ μάλιστα χρησάμενος σχήματι συμφερόντως καὶ σωφρόνως χρήσεται πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν· οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς γενικῆς νοῆσαι χρὴ· τῆς γὰρ πτώσεως ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εὐθείας ἐγκλιθείσης, ὃ δὴ καὶ πλαγιασμός τοῖς γραμματισταῖς, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐκλήθη, καὶ τινα περιοχῆς καὶ συνοχῆς ἐντεῦθεν τύπον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους, ὡς περ ἔφην, οἰκειότητα λαβοῦσης, ἀσφαλῆς ταῖς πτώσεσι χώρα πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου τμήμασι καὶ κώλοις γέγονεν, ὥστε ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντα, ὡς ἔφημεν, συνέρχεσθαι καὶ συγκολλᾶσθαι μητρὸς τινος καὶ γένους τῆς πτώσεως αὐτοῖς ὡσαυτεὶ γεγεννημένης καὶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κοινωνίαν φυσικῶς τῷ πλαγιασμῷ παρεχομένης, καθὰ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς οἰκοδομαῖς ὀρώμεν ἔχον, τοῖς ὀρθοῖς τὰ πλάγια καὶ τοῖς ἄλλως ἔχουσι τοῦ σχήματος πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἔδραν ὑποκείμενα.

[This is why we speak of the obliqueness of the genitive case forms; the other cases and constituents are constructed and held in their syntactic position by this case. It is like the equipment of a skilled workman: two uprights are insecure and would not stay in position for long if the workman did not have to take immediate care and use a slanting construction sensibly and carefully to make it safe. This is how we must think about the genitive. This case was inflected from the nominative for generic use, and this is what the grammarians called obliqueness (slanting), and it took on the meaning of containing and holding from its generic signification. It became a safe haven for the rest of the cases and for the segments and constituents, so that constituents with other relations could come and join themselves to it; it had become like a maternal and genetic case, naturally supplying security and fellowship by its obliqueness, as we see in buildings. The uprights and the other parts of the framework are held securely in position by the cross-pieces.] (Jahn 1839: 36–37)

The genitive was regarded as the oblique case *par excellence* among the Greek grammarians. Morphologically it was listed first in the oblique case paradigm of nouns and pronouns and used as the source or starting point for the formation of the dative and accusative (cf. Hilgard 1894 I: 3.4–13). Syntactically it was the only case in Greek that could be directly linked to another noun (*Pétrou oikia* 'Peter's house'), as well as to verbs and prepositions (cf. Sophronius in Hilgard 1894 II: 379.1–2: *protéaktai tēs dotikēs, hōti prōs ónoma kai rhēma kyriōs syntásetai* [it is listed before the dative, because it is properly constructed with both the noun and the verb]).

Glykys plays on the "maternal" aspect of the genitive by appealing to the genetic meaning of the underlying noun *génos* 'stock, family'. His simile of uprights in a building needing cross pieces or slanting supports is typical of his style. The genitive absolute *emoū peripatoũntos* 'while I was walking', may be considered to be leaning on the main verb in the full sentence and thereby supporting it in a unified construction.

οὐ μὴν ἀθῶα γε παντάπασι φαινόμενα τῆς λύμης, ἐν χρήσει δὲ ὅμως τοῖς παλαιοῖς παρελημμένα, ἃ καὶ ἐσκεμμένως θεωρούμενα τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ τῆς ὀρθότητος οὐκ ἀποπίπτει, ὅποιον ἐστὶ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ τό· ἄμφω δ' ἔζομένω γεραρότερος ἦεν Ὀδυσσεύς, καὶ τό· σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένω καὶ τ' ἐνόησεν ἕτερος, καὶ ἕτερα· ταῦτα γὰρ εἰκόσιν γενικὴν μάλιστα ἐπιζητεῖν, ὡς εἶναι· ἄμφω δ'

ἐξομένοιν γεραρώτερος ἦεν Ὀδυσσεύς· οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐνταῦθα πλαγιάζειν εἰς τὴν γενικὴν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καθήμενων ἕτερον ἦν πρόσωπον περὶ οὗ ἐλέγτο τό· γεραρώτερος ἦεν, γενικὴ ἐπ' αὐτῶν ὄφειλε ζητεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ οὕτω ἔχειν τὰ διηρημένα καὶ ἀλλότρια συντίθεσθαι καὶ συγκολλᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ συντάττεσθαι λαμβάνειν ὑπὸ γενικῆς· ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ γεραρώτερος ἐν τῷ καθῆσθαι εἰς ἔστι τῶν καθήμενων, καὶ ὁμοιον ἔστιν ὡς εἰ ἔλεγεν· ὁ εἰς καθήμενος γεραρώτερός ἐστι θατέρου· εἰ γὰρ καὶ λέγομεν, ὡς γενικῆς ἔστι τὸ συναρμόττειν μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συντάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ εὐθεία ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσώπου εὐθέα δύναται συνάπτεσθαι· δύνασαι γὰρ εἰπεῖν· ἐγὼ περιπατῶν ἐνέτυχον τῷ δεῖνι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ περιπατῶν ἅμα καὶ ὁ ἐντυχὼν, οὐ δύνασαι δὲ εἰπεῖν· ἐγὼ περιπατῶν ὁ φίλος συνηντῆκει.

[Some constructions that appear to be not entirely faultless and are found in the ancient writers' usage none the less, if they are examined closely, do not fall away in accuracy and correctness. Compare what we find in the poet (Homer): 'Both of them sitting down (nominative) Odysseus was the more distinguished', and 'Two of them coming, the other of them thought', and so on. These would seem to require the genitive, leading to *amphoîn d'hezoménoin gerarōteros êen Odysseús*, but in this type of sentence it is not necessary to make the words oblique and put them in the genitive. If the person about whom was said *gerarōteros êen* 'he was more distinguished' was someone other than the two men seated, the genitive would be required, because in this interpretation we would have two separate and different constituents to be joined and bound together and this syntactic joining takes place by means of the genitive. But in the example given above the more distinguished person is one of those who are sitting, and it is as if he had said 'One of those sitting down was more distinguished than the other'. If we say that syntactic conjoining is the particular function of the genitive, a nominative can still be joined to a nominative with reference to the same person, you may say *egō peripatōn enétychon tōi deîni tōn epitēdeîōn* 'While walking I chanced on one of my friends' because the one walking and the one chancing on his friend are the same person; but you cannot say *egō peripatōn ho philos synēntēkei* 'I walking my friend met (me)'.] (Jahn 1839: 37–38)

In the passage just given Glykys has to recognized the acceptability of one noun in the nominative being subordinated to another nominative,

if the second noun is included in the reference of the first. The point is made clearly: the example *amphō d'hezoméno gerarōteros êen Odysseús* '(of) the two men sitting down Odysseus was the more distinguished' makes it clear that Odysseus was one of those sitting down. With the first two words put in the genitive (*amphoîn hezoménoin*) the Greek sentence would be ambiguous: it could mean the same as the previous sentence, but as the genitive was the case used for the referent of a comparative adjective, it could also be interpreted as 'Odysseus was more distinguished than the two men who were sitting down'. The ambiguity arises from the fact that the genitive had a partitive as well as a comparative meaning; in English there would be no need of disambiguation, as the two words *of* and *than* provide the necessary contrast: *Odysseus was the more distinguished of the two men who were sitting and Odysseus was more distinguished than the two men who were sitting down*.

Φιλόστρατος γε μὴν ὁ λήμνιος, ὄλος ἐπὶ τὴν καινότητα τραπόμενος καὶ ἀπειροκάλως ἐς τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῇ χρησάμενος, τοῖς μὲν ἀρχαιοτέροις ἴσως ἐνιδεῖν οὐκ ἐβουλήθη, ἦπου καὶ ἐκὼν παρεῖδε, τῆς δ' ἐς ὕστερον τοῦ ἔθους παραχρήσεως λαβόμενος, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τὴν ὀρμὴν εἰς τὸ καινὸν ποιοῦμενος, αὐτῇ μὲν τῇ μέχρις αὐτοῦ καινοποιήσει ἀφθόνως καὶ ἀδεῶς καὶ κατακόρως ὡς κοινότητι καὶ συνηθείᾳ κατεχρήσατο, τῶν ἄλλων ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ταύτῃ χρησαμένων, ὡς ἂν δὴ τοῦ ἀτόπου καὶ τῆς τόλμης συναισθανομένων· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης αὐτὸς προσεξευρίσκειν καὶ καινοποιεῖν ἀρξάμενος, ἐπὶ πᾶσαν στροφὴν τε καὶ καμπὴν τοῦς λόγους καὶ τὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς σχηματισμὸν ἐξήγαγε, καὶ τὰς πτώσεις, ὡς ἔτυχε καὶ ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, συνάπτει· τοῖς γὰρ ὕστερον, ἀσυνδέτως καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων τύπον διὰ τῶν παρεμβολῶν συνάπτουσι τὰς πτώσεις, προσφῶς καὶ ἐπακολουθήσας, τὴν μὲν εὐθείαν ἀπόλυτον ἔαν κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ τὸ ἔθος οὐτ' ἔγνω οὔτε ἐβουλήθη, ἀδιαστάτως δὲ συνάπτων τῇ ἐπαγομένῃ, ἀντὶ γενικῆς τῇ εὐθείᾳ καθαρῶς καὶ ἐμφανῶς ἐχρήσατο. Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀτόπων ἠκολούθησεν ἐσμός· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ἔθους τόπῳ μόνον χώραν τῷ ἀτόπῳ δέδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως, ὅποι δὴ καὶ τύχοι, τῇ εὐθείᾳ ἀντὶ τῆς γενικῆς χρῆται καὶ πλαγιασμοῦ· ἐκ τῶν εἰκόνων γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαυτὰ σοὶ ἐξείλεται· φησί που τῶν τῆς γραφικῆς πινάκων ἐξ ὧν τὰ τῶν εἰκόνων τῷ παιδί διέξεισιν· ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν Θηβῶν ἔστιν ἀλώσεως· ὁ Καπανεὺς δὲ τὰ τεῖχη βλέπει περιφρονῶν τὰς ἐπάλξεις ὡς κλίμακι ἀλωτὰς, οὐ μὴν βάλλεται πῶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων, ὀκνοῦντές που οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἄρξαι μάχης· ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ

πάλιν λόγιον γάρ τι ὁ Τειρεσίας λέγει, ταῖνον εἰς Μενοεικέα, τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος, ὡς ἀποθανόν, ἔνθα ἡ χειρὰ τοῦ δράκοντος, ἐλευθέρα ἢ πόλις εἶη.

[Philostratus the Lemnian was wholly in favour of innovations and used them to the maximum without any taste; he did not wish to take note of the older writers – indeed he deliberately overlooked them; he seized on the misuses of the later style, making them the starting point for his rush into novelty, making quite excessive use of the innovations that were in use before his time, exploiting them in abundance, without compunction, and to great excess, as if this was a common and habitual way of writing, while others used it to a very limited extent, realizing its deviance and brashness. He himself began to make even more innovations and changes and drove his sentences and their structure into every twist and turn, linking the cases at random and as he chose. Clinging to and following those modern authors who joined cases together by parataxis and without regard for models of the ancient authors, he had neither the knowledge nor the wish to leave the nominative syntactically independent, as was customary, but constantly joined it to another nominative simply and openly using it instead of a genitive.]

A host of absurdities resulted from this. Not only did he give a place for deviance instead of accepted usage, but without distinction and just as he pleased he used a nominative rather than a genitive or any other oblique case. I have picked out examples like this from his *Pictures*. Somewhere among the tablets from which he is giving the boy details of the pictures he says: ‘This picture is of the taking of Thebes. Capaneus is looking at the walls and thinking that they can be captured by scaling; but nothing is yet being thrown at him from the defences, the Thebans (nominative) shrinking from starting a battle.’ On the same picture he goes on to say ‘Teiresias makes an announcement directed at Menoeikeus, son of Kreon, that, he dying (nominative) where the serpent’s lair is located, the city would be free.’ (Jahn 1839: 53 – 54)

Philostratus’s *Eikónes* [Pictures], that he claimed were descriptions of pictures that he had seen, were taken as part of Byzantine rhetorical instruction, exemplifying one style of composition. Opinions varied: some found him stimulating and welcomed his loose and disjointed syntax as adding liveliness to what he was saying about the pictures. Others, such as Glykys, strongly disapproved, as we see from the excerpt here given.

It comes down to the constant struggle in Byzantium between classical Atticists’ purism and the contemporary, more colloquial, Greek, which had become ever more widespread and acceptable. Naturally Glykys’s main objective led him to reject Philostratus’s style, particularly its reliance on asyndeta in sentence construction. As we see, Glykys’s own style in prose erred, if anything, on the other side, with more complex and lengthier sentences than most classical Attic writers had employed. The quotations in the text are from Philostratus “the Elder” (third century A.D.) in his description of the painting “Menoeceus” (Philostratus *Eikónes*: 14–16).

Though the *Eikónes* were written during the final years of the unified Roman Empire, its influence was such that even in his own day Glykys hoped that his book would do something to stem the tide and, in his own terms, return the streams, which had overflowed, back into their proper channels. Deviances like this concern the paratactic joining of what should be well-formed subordinate clauses within a single matrix sentence. Similar ill-formed embeddings occur in most languages. One may instance English sentences, duly stigmatized, such as

*He has not come*  
 \*on account of / because  
 he is unwell,  
 \*plus / and because  
 I have kept him in bed.

Amusingly, at the very end of the book the author is himself guilty of a solecistic confusion of number in his use of a singular participle with reference to himself (“I”) and an “author’s plural” (“we”) and a plural form of the main verb: *chárten àn eîē, ei sou kēdōmenos* (singular), *toîs alloîs heuretheîēmen tà métria en toútōi charizόμενοι* (cf. p. 200 below) [it will be pleasant if, thinking (singular) of you we were to have made a modest contribution in this field].

ὁ δ’ ἐμοὶ δηλοῦν ἢ βούλησις, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τῶν ὄρων, οὓς οἱ πάλαι ἔθεντο, μακρὰ τις, ὥσπερ ἔφην, ἐν πολλοῖς ἢ λήθη κατακέχυται, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ τοῦ χρόνου μήκει συνεχώσθη, τινὰ δ’ ὁμοῦ καὶ τῷ καινῷ τῆς παραχρήσεως οὐκ ὀλίγον τῆς ὀρθότητος ἀπέστη, αἰεὶ τι τῶν καινοποιεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις βουλομένων τῆς μὲν ὀρθότητος κατὰ μικρὸν ὕφιμένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ πόρρω τῶν ἀρχαίων τύπων λανθανόντως ὑποφερομένων, ὥστ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἦτε λέξις παρ’ ἐνίων οὐκ



δλίγον τι τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκινήθη, καὶ ὁ σχηματισμὸς παράσημος καὶ ἰδιότροπος κεχάρακται. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' αἱ κύρβεις τῆς ὀρθότητος ἐν τῇ φύσει πάλαι τυπωθεῖσαι καὶ μέχρι νῦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς ὀρῶσι καὶ ἐξητασμένως διαφαίνουσι· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἡμῖν εἴτι παρὰ τούτων εὐρηται καὶ ἀμυδροῖς τοῖς τύποις καὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἀνέγνωσται καὶ τῷ βιβλίῳ τῷδε παραδέδοται, σοῖ μὲν χάριν τοῦ φιλάτου ταῦτα πεπραγμάτευται, κρινέσθω δὲ τοῖς βουλομένοις. Κἄν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δόξη τι καίριον ἠγύσθαι, χάριεν ἂν εἴη, εἰ σοῦ κηδόμενος, τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρεθείημεν τὰ μέτρια ἐν τούτῳ χαριζόμενοι, καὶ οὐ μάτην οὐδ' εἰκῆ τὸν νοῦν ἐξώρως ἐπὶ ταῦτα τρέψαντες· εἰ δὲ τῆς βουλήσεως ἀπολειφθῆναι δόξομεν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς γε δὴν υἰέσι παρὰ τῶν πατέρων ἀδελφά καὶ, ὅπη ποτ' ἂν ἔχοι, ποθητὰ δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῖς καὶ εἴη καὶ νομίζοιτο.

[What I want to make clear is that on many there has fallen a protracted forgetfulness of the science of grammar and of the constraints that ancient writers followed, and a great deal has been broken down and in the novelty of the misuse of language there has been a considerable loss of correctness, people always wanting to make innovations and little by little relaxing their standards and being carried along without realizing it far away from the older patterns, so that among some of them their style was shifted in no small degree from what was required and their manner of writing came to be marked by errors and idiosyncracies. But the fixed standards of old framed by nature have been clear up to the present, to those who see rightly and accurately. If something of these standards has been found by us and has been read in this book that we have written, dim though this outline may be, our labours have been for you, my dear boy; so let it be judged by those who will. If something worthwhile appears to others to have been achieved, it would be pleasant if, thinking of you, we were to be found to have made a modest contribution in this field, and not to have set our mind on it in vain, heedlessly, and inopportunistly. If we seem to have fallen short of your wishes, it comes with family love like that of fathers for their sons, and however it may turn out, it would be and be reckoned to be, something that was rightly to be sought.] (Jahn 1839: 58–59)

This graceful *envoi* is typical of Glykys's attitude to his book and its potential readers throughout.

## Chapter 11

### Maximus Planudes: a Byzantine theoretician

Maximus Planudes (1260–c. 1310) was certainly the most distinguished Byzantine scholar in linguistic science, and he was also a prominent figure in the general scholarship of his times. He lived through a period which is sometimes referred to as the “last Byzantine renaissance” (Runciman 1970 a), a period extending from the reconquest of Constantinople from the Normans in 1261 to the final tragedy of 1453.

This renaissance covered some two centuries, marked simultaneously by a progressive military, political, civic, and economic decline, through loss of territory and loss of population from plague, invasion, and civil war. But at the same time there was a final blossoming of scholarship in the fields in which Byzantium was most concerned: theology, classical and Biblical commentaries, philosophy, and some of the natural sciences. Theology, the so-called “inner learning”, was universally regarded as the queen of the sciences, to be studied in so far as it was considered possible for mortals to investigate the will and the purposes of God, by those advanced in general education and spiritual wisdom. This general education, “outer learning”, was built, as in the West, around the Seven Liberal Arts of the Trivium and the Quadrivium: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Such educational achievement was quite widely spread among the public at large. In the emperor Alexius's orphanage his daughter Anna (see pp. 128–129) writes of Latins (non-Greek-speaking citizens of the Empire) and foreigners (Scythians) learning Greek, others studying the Greek texts themselves, and Greek speakers refining their language along classical lines, a process which she admitted she underwent herself.

In all this spiritual and intellectual activity Maximus Planudes played a significant and a typical part. A monk himself, he did not hold a university post, but he taught in a monastic school in Constantinople. Like other prominent Byzantines he combined a religious life, political work, teaching, and publication. Politically he was well connected in Court circles and he served for a time as the Byzantine ambassador in Venice, being one of the few Byzantines of his age with a good command of Latin. His religious attitude towards the major stumbling block preventing a serious union of the Eastern and Western Churches was am-

biguous. At first he was a supporter of a union, but later he became hostile to a main tenet of the Western Church, the inclusion of the Son as a source of the Holy Spirit ("filioque"), against which he wrote. Those who have a taste for ecclesiastic controversies about the interrelations of the Three Persons of the Trinity may look at Planudes's argument against the "filioque" position, along with replies from supporters of the Latin view (Migne 1866, Vol. 161: 309–319).

His known writings are extensive (for a complete bibliography see Pauly–Wissowa 1950 s.v. Planudes; for a brief account of his general scholarship, Wilson 1983: 230–241). Like all Byzantine churchmen he wrote on theology and on the theological controversies so characteristic of Byzantine churchmanship; but he also wrote on grammar, rhetoric, history, and the sciences, including medicine and mathematics, as well as letters and commentaries on Christian and pagan authors. He was, indeed, a typical Renaissance polyhistor, enjoying a considerable contemporary reputation, and he displayed his wide interest in scholarship outside the Greek and the Byzantine world. He urged the adoption of Arabic numerals in place of the mathematically inconvenient Greek system of numeration, and he was a leader in the late Byzantine interest in contemporary western thinking. As his first name implies, he enjoyed Latin connections and among his Greek translations of Latin works were Boethius's *Consolations of philosophy*, Caesar's *Gallic war*, Donatus's *Grammatica minor* (Keil 1864: 355–366), and some of Cicero's prose and Ovid's poetry, as well as the later theological treatise of Augustine, *On the Trinity*.

Though knowledge of Latin and indeed interest in the language had faded in the Greek East as much as Greek studies had in the West, one of the better consequences of the disastrous sack of Constantinople and the installation of a Latin ruler was a renewed concern with events and intellectual movements in the West among the Byzantines. This was reciprocated in the far more important transference of ideas, texts, and scholars themselves from Byzantium to Italy and thence to western Europe as a whole. Among these scholars may here be noticed Manuel Moschopoulos, a pupil of Maximus Planudes, whose catechistic grammar of Greek was of some influence in the Italian Renaissance (Sandys 1958.1: 429; cf. p. 143, above).

Among Planudes's classical Greek writings were an edition of Aesop's *Fables* and the compilation of the *Anthologia Planudea*, a collection of epigrams, and some bibliographical work. But in the history of linguistics his two most important works were the *Peri grammatikēs diálogos* [A

dialogue on grammar] and his treatise *Peri syntaxeōs* [On syntax] (Bachmann 1828: 3–101 and 106–166).

The *Dialogue* is cast in Platonic style between Palaitimus [Old Stager] and Neophrōn [Young Thinker] who is made deferentially to declare (Bachmann 1828: 3.10–11) that he would sooner listen to what Palaitimus has to say than to the songs of the Sirens. The contents of the dialogue clearly interpret grammar in the wide sense of a literary and philological education originally set out by Dionysius Thrax at the beginning of the *Téchmē* (section 1). The topics discussed are not specifically ordered, but appear in the following sequence: the morphology of verbs, syllable structure, prepositions and cases, the syntax of adjectival nouns (p. 68), accentuation, the spellings of some participles and verbs, adverbs, nouns in metaphorical use, pronouns, comparative and superlative constructions, poetical uses of consonant gemination, meaning changes in poetry, conjunctions, and finally the different syntactic possibilities of certain verbs, such as *mélō* 'concern', transitive in Homer, (*Iliad* 20.21) *mélousi moi ollimenoí per* 'those that perish do indeed concern me', and intransitive in Attic, *mélei moi tou anthrópou* 'I am concerned about the man', and *ballō* 'throw', constructing with the accusative both of the thing thrown and of the target, *bállei mén tis tina bélei, è lithōi, kai bállei hýdōr eis ággos* 'someone throws a dart or stone at someone else (literally 'throws someone else with a dart or stone'), and 'he throws water into a pot' (Bachmann 1828: 83.19–28, 90.17–18).

The style of the dialogue may be seen in the discussion between the two on the status of the middle voice in reflexive sentences (Bachmann 1828: 7.33–11.3):

Π. Τὴν τῶν μέσων δὲ κλήσιν ἔχουσιν, ὅτι τῆς προφορᾶς παθητικῆς τυχόντες, ἐνεργητικὴν ἐκληρώσαντο σημασίαν, ὡς ἀκούσομαι καὶ θήσομαι καὶ ἠνεγκάμην καὶ ἔδρεψάμην.

Ν. Εἶεν· τοῦ δὲ γε λούσομαι καὶ ἐλουσάμην, καὶ ἔστιν ὧν τοιούτων οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰρημένων χρόνων ἡ σημασία;

Π. Κατηγορεῖται.

Ν. Ἔδει τοίνυν καὶ ταῦτα μὴ πάθος, ὃ δὴ καὶ δηλοῖ, βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαν.

Π. Νυνὶ δὴ περὶ τῶνδὲ σοὶ διάληψις, μὴ πάντα περιλαμβάνειν ἐφικνουμένη, οὐ μακρὰν ἀποστατεῖν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦδε, οἷον εἴ τις πηλὸν ἢ τι τῶν γλίσχρων καὶ διερῤῥηκῶτων τῇ δρακί λαβῶν, ἔπειτα σφίγγειν ἐπιχειροῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅσον γε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκράτησε

περιέξει· τὸ δὲ πολὺ τούτου τὰς τῶν δακτύλων ἄρμογὰς βιασάμενον ἐκθλιβήσεται. Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖς τί ποτε πάθος ἐστὶν εἶδέναι.

N. Καὶ μὴν οἶδα· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖ τις ἕτερον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς πάσχει, τοῦτο πάθος πέφυκεν εἶναι.

P. Ὡς Νεόφρον, εἰ καὶ τᾶλλα τόνδε τὸν τρόπον εἰδείης, οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν ἡμᾶς παρακαλεῖς ἀγῶνα· μελλήσομεν γάρ σοι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐξόφθαλμον, ὃ δὴ λέγεται, τὴν γνώσιν ἐχόντων ἀποδείξεις ποιεῖσθαι. Ἀλλὰ φέρ' εἰπέ, τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ πάσχειν ταῦτόν λέγεις ἢ ἕτερον;

N. Καὶ πῶς οὐχ ἕτερον;

P. Τὸν τοῖνυν λούοντα ποτέρου τούτων ἔχασθαι φήσομεν;

N. Τοῦ ποιεῖν, ὦ Παλαίτιμε.

P. Τὸν λουόμενον δέ;

N. Τοῦ πάσχειν.

P. Ὁ δὲ ἑαυτὸν λούων δήπου καὶ λούεται;

N. Καὶ μάλα.

P. Ταῦτόν τοιγαροῦν, ὦ Νεόφρον, τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ πάσχειν;

N. Πῶς ταυτόν;

P. Ὅτι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα ἐκάτερα θεωρεῖται.

N. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς τί ποτε λέγεις;

P. Καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, Νεόφρον, παρὰ τὴν τῶν προσώπων ἑτερότητα γίνεται. Ὁ τε γὰρ τύπτων, ἕτερον τύπτων, λεχθήσεται τύπτειν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ὃ τε τυπτόμενος, ὑφ' ἑτέρου τυπτόμενος, τύπτεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο πάσχειν. Ἀμέλει δὴ καὶ ὁ λουόμενος, ἂν μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρου λούηται, φανερώτατον αὐτὸν πάσχειν· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν λούει, θάτερον ὄν περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὕτω λέγω δ' ὁπότερον, δικαίως τις ἀποφάνηται;

N. Ἀλλ' οὐ θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ μήτε παρ' ἄλλου τὸ λούεσθαι πάσχει ὁ λούων ἑαυτὸν, μήτ' αὐτὸς ἕτερον τοῦτο ποιεῖ, πῶς, οὐ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ ἐκεῖνο λεχθήσεται; καὶ διοίσει οὐδέν, εἴτε ποιεῖν αὐτὸν ἀπαγγέλλοιμεν, εἴτε πάσχειν.

P. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλὰ ὄντα νυνὶ λέγειν παρήμι, ἃ κωλύει μὴ δεῖν μηδὲν διαφερόμενον περὶ ταυτοῦ ὅτε μὲν τουτοῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἐκεινοῖ λέγειν τῶν ἐναντίων· ἀνέχου δὲ μικρὸν ἐρομένου· πότῃ λέγεις τι φύσει θερμὸν, ἢ οὐ λέγεις;

N. Λέγω.

P. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ φύσει ψυχρὸν οἶός τ' εἰ λέγεις;

N. Οὐδεμιᾷ μηχανῇ.

P. Περαινοῖς ἂν δὴ τοῦντευθεν αὐτός· αἰθῆς γὰρ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ σε συνηχέθη περιπεσεῖν ἀτοπία, ταῦτό συνάγοντα τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ

πάσχειν, εἴγε μηδὲν φῆς διαφέρειν ὁπότερον ἂν τῶν ἐναντίων περὶ ταυτοῦ λέγῃς.

N. Καὶ ποῦ δὴ, Παλαίτιμε, τάττοιμεν ἂν τὸν ἑαυτὸν λούοντα;

P. Ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, ὦ Νεόφρον.

N. Τί δήποτε;

P. Ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο γε συμβέβηκεν ὑφ' ἑτέρου πάσχειν.

N. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἕτερον τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ὦ Παλαίτιμε, ὥστε εἰκότως ἂν ἔχοι τάττειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν.

P. Οὐχ' οὕτως.

N. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

P. Ὡδέ μοι σκόπει· ὁ λούων ἑαυτὸν ὑφ' ἑτέρου τοῦτο πάσχει;

N. Ἦκιστα πάντων.

P. Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ πάσχει;

N. Φαίνεται.

P. Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος ἑαυτὸν λούων ποιεῖ τι;

N. Ποιεῖ δήπου.

P. Εἰ τοῖνυν πάσχει μηδὲν ὁ λουόμενος ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ποιεῖ δὲ, καὶ τῶν πάντων δικαίον δικαιοτάτος ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τάττεσθαι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔρεῖς, ὡς ὁ λούων ἑαυτὸν κάμνει, κἀντεῦθεν πάσχει. Ἡ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁ σκάπτων ἔπασχεν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐργάζεται· καὶ ὁ ὑφ' ἵππου φερόμενος, ἵνα μὴ κάμνοι βαδίζων, εἰργάζεται ἂν, ἐπεὶ μὴ κάμνει· ἀλλὰ μὴν πάσχει, φέρεται γάρ.

N. Ὅστις, ὦ Παλαίτιμε, τὸν περὶ ταῦτα δεινὸν θαυμάσαι βούλεται, οὐκ οἶδα τίνα ποτὲ ἄλλον σε παραδραμῶν ἐπαινεσεται· ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὸ λούσομαι καὶ ἐλουσάμην ὁδηγῶ σοι χρώμενος τοῖς ἐνεργητικοῖς ἐναρίθμια τίθημι. Ἄ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ, τίνα λέγωμεν;

P. Τὸ λουθήσομαι καὶ ἐλούθην, Νεόφρον, ἃ δὴ σοι καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα τῶν ῥημάτων οἶα τίς ἐστι κανὼν, ὃ πάθος ἂν καὶ ἐνέργειαν κρίνοις. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κάκεινό μοι σκόπει. Εἰ δύο τινὰ εἴη τὸν τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπον οὐ ταῦτόν ἔχοντα, ἄλλο δὲ τι τρίτον ἐξωθεν θατέρῳ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει γέννησιν, ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον — ἀλλὰ γὰρ αἰσχύνη καὶ περὶ τῶν οὕτω δήλων ἐρωτήσεις προτείνειν — ὁμοιον ἐσται, πλήν — ἀλλ' ἐπίσχες, μήπω μηδὲν ἀποκρίνη, πρὶν ὅπως τουτί λέγων δῆλον θῶμαι. Ἐστω μὲν ἵππος, ἔστω δὲ κόραξ· τούτους κατὰ ταυτά σοι δοκεῖ γεννῶν, ἢ καθ' ἕτερα;

N. Καθ' ἕτερα· εἴ γε ὁ μὲν κόραξ ὥστοκεῖν ἔτυχε φύσεως· ἵππῳ δὲ φύσις τὸ ζῶα τίκτειν.

P. Προσέστω τι τούτοις καὶ τρίτον· ἔστω δὴ βοῦς. Ζωοτοκεῖται καὶ οὗτος, καὶ προκείσθω τὰ τῶν τριῶν ὑπ' ὄσιν γεννήματα.

Μόσχον οὖν πῶλω ἢ κόρακι δεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς τυγχάνειν γενέσεως φήσομεν;

N. Εἰ τάληθῆ βούλομαι λέγειν, πῶλω.

[P. Middle verb forms are so called because they have passive shapes but active meanings, like *akoúsomai* 'I shall hear', *thésomai* 'I shall place', *ēnegkámēn* 'I carried off', and *edrepsámēn* 'I culled'.

N. Yes. But is it not the case that *loúsomai* 'I shall wash myself' and *elousámēn* 'I washed myself' and other verbs like them are also called middle like the tense forms just cited?<sup>1</sup>

P. That is the case.

N. Then these verb forms must be intended to signify not passive experiencing, which, in fact, they do also signify, but actively doing something.

P. Now on these matters it seems to me that the distinction you are trying to make, if it cannot manage to take everything into account, is not far from the sort of situation you have if you take in your hands some clay or other slippery or runny substance and then try to squeeze it; you will not be able to grasp as much as you started with, but most of it will be squeezed through the joints of your fingers and force its way out. You do not yet seem to me to know what passive experience is.

N. Yes, I do. What you do not do to someone else, but experience yourself, is bound to be passive experience.

P. Neophron, if this is your understanding of these matters, you are bringing us into no little trouble. We shall have to frame explicit demonstrations of what can be understood at first sight, as they say. Tell me: do you say that doing is the same as experiencing? Or is it something different?

N. How can it be other than different?

P. Then to which of the two would we say that *louōn* 'he who washes' belongs?

N. To doing, Palaitimus.

P. And *louómenos* 'he who is washed'?

N. To experiencing.

P. But someone washing himself is also being washed, is he not?

N. Yes, indeed.

<sup>1</sup> The point is that the future and the aorist were the only tenses formally distinguishing the middle voice.

P. In that case, Neophron, doing and experiencing are the same?

N. In what way are they the same?

P. In that we can observe both processes involved with the same person.

N. Well, what do you say yourself?

P. Both doing and experiencing come about with a separation of the persons concerned. A striker, who strikes someone else, will be said to strike, and this is doing something. The one struck, who is struck by someone else, will be said to be struck, and this is experiencing. Of course someone who is washed, if he is washed by someone else, is most clearly experiencing. But if he is doing the washing, would one be justified in asserting one of the alternatives? – and I am not saying which yet.

N. No. If someone who is washing himself neither experiences being washed at another's hands nor washes anyone else, how can we avoid saying one thing or the other? It will make no difference whether we state that he is doing something or experiencing something.

P. I put on one side the many other considerations that preclude us from saying that it makes no difference if we say one thing now and then its opposite about the same thing. But let me ask you a bit more: Do you say that something is hot by nature, or do you not?

N. I do say it.

P. And are you able to say about the same thing that it is also cold by nature?

N. By no means.

P. But you yourself would do just that. For it has happened that you have fallen into the same quandary, bringing together doing and experiencing as the same, if you say that it makes no difference which one says about the same event.

N. Where then, Palaitimus, would we put someone washing himself?

P. In doing something, Neophron.

N. Why so?

P. Because it is not the case that he is experiencing this from someone else.

N. But he is not either doing this to someone else, Palaitimus, so it would be reasonable to put him in the position of experiencing.

P. Not so.

N. Why?

P. Look at it like this: does someone washing himself experience anything from another's hand?

N. Not at all.

P. Then he does not experience anything?

N. It would seem so.

P. But this man washing himself does something?

N. He certainly does.

P. If then the man washing himself does not experience anything through someone else, but does something himself, it would be wholly justified to put him in the position of actively doing something. You will not say that a man washing himself is tiring himself and therefore passively experiencing. Someone who is digging would be passively experiencing weariness, but he is actively working. And a man riding a horse to avoid getting tired by walking is, you would say, actively at work; he is not tiring himself (i.e. experiencing tiredness); but he is experiencing something, because he is being carried.

N. Palaitimus, if anyone wants to marvel at a clever man in this regard, I do not know who else he will praise, leaving you aside. Under your guidance I now put the middle forms *loúsomai* 'I shall wash myself' and *elousámēn* 'I washed myself' among the active verbs. What, though, shall we say indicates experiencing in these verbs?

P. *Louthésomai* 'I shall be washed' and *eloúthēn* 'I was washed', forms, Neophron, which in other verbs too can make a formal distinction whereby you can decide between experiencing and doing. In addition to what I have just said, look at this for me as well. If there were two creatures with different modes of reproduction, and a third having the same sort of reproduction as one of the two, to which of the two will it be more similar (I am sorry for dragging out my enquiries on matters as clear as this), except – but hold on, do not answer until I have made myself clear like this. Suppose we have a horse and a crow; do you think they reproduce themselves in the same way or differently?

N. Differently; the crow is by nature oviparous and the horse is viviparous.

P. Let us add a third creature to these two, a cow. The cow is also viviparous; let us now look at the offspring of the three. Shall

we say that a calf is born in the same way as the horse or as the crow.

N. Truth to tell, the same way as the horse.]

The conclusion is drawn (Bachmann 1828: 11.16–17) that middle verbs belong with active verbs.

While it cannot be claimed that this discussion comes anywhere near an exhaustive answer to the problems of middle voice semantics in Greek, it does tackle the semantic and pragmatic relations between the three voices, whereas the author of the *Technē* and the commentators more or less confine their attention to the morphological neutralization between active and passive meanings, with only a brief reference to the central feature of self-involvement (cf. pp. 70–71). Apollonius does, however, make some mention of this (cf. Uhlig 1910: 296.1–297.1).

It is to Byzantium that we must look for a systematic exposition of Greek syntax in a single volume, and of such works Planudes's *Peri syntáxeōs* [On syntax] is the most representative and important. Apollonius had written at length on this subject in Alexandria, with four books on syntax in general and some others on the syntax of specific word classes, of which the books on pronouns, adverbs, and conjunctions survive (Schneider 1902: 3–116, 199–200, 213–258).

Apollonius's writings are both discursive and extensive, devoted to a detailed observation of Greek syntactic usages rather than to a summary presentation of Greek syntactic structure. His style has something of the pioneer in it, frequently opening an explanation with such phrases as *isōs gār kai hai anaphorikai antōnymiai ant' onomatōn eisi tōn sūn árthrois legoménōn* [perhaps the anaphoric pronouns are used in place of nouns with the definite article] (Uhlig 1910: 25.9–10), *ou lélēthe dé me ...* [I have not failed to see ...] (Uhlig 1910: 161.9), *ouchi oūn légetai ...?* [can one not therefore say ...?] (Uhlig 1910: 165.5), *distázetai prōs tinōn ...* [some people are doubtful about ...] (Uhlig 1910: 320.1) *toútois oūn toīs lógois tis proséχōn dóxei metá pásēs akribéias pistoústhai ...* *áll'ēsti prōs hékaston tōn eirēménōn hypantēsai houtōs ...* (Uhlig 1910: 427.3–5) 'someone who has attended to what has just been said will feel himself fully convinced ...'. But we can answer each of these arguments like this ...' (Uhlig 1910: 427.3–5).

Priscian, working in Latin and on Latin at Constantinople was much more authoritative in his style (cf. Robins 1988 b). His *Institutiones* covers orthography, phonology, and morphology (in great detail), as well as syntax (books 17 and 18). He based his grammar, especially his treatment

of syntax, on Apollonius, for whose authority in matters of grammar he made repeated acknowledgements (Keil 1855: 1.9, 548.61: *maximus auctor artis grammaticae* [the greatest authority on grammar]; 1859: 24.7–8; 107.2; etc.).

The question of Planudes's sources for his *Syntax* have been examined by Murru (1979 b). While it must have been the case that he knew the syntactic works of Apollonius, he also, unlike most of the later Byzantine scholars, knew and read Latin very well, and one may observe whole passages in his *Syntax* that read almost like word-for-word translations of the corresponding passages in Priscian. One may, for example compare the two texts in Keil (1859: 155.5–15) and Bachmann (1828: 154.1–14):

Quidam tamen putaverunt, perfectiorem esse verborum constructionem, si pronomina assumant: 'ego scripsi tibi, ego loquor tibi' et similia, cuius approbationem dicunt esse eam, quod, cum dicam 'ego quidem affui, tu vero non', si tollas pronomen, incongrua erit locutio. sed hoc facit hic maxime coniunctio 'quidem'. itaque ego non arbitror, quod dicunt, verum esse generaliter; non enim omnimodo egent pronomibus verba, idque affirmatur non ex poetica solum constructione, cui licet et deficere et abundare, sed ex communi elocutione doctorum et maxime a scriptorum constructione, qui sine metris scribentes perspicaci magis ea utuntur et ex vi ipsius orationis solent quod necessarium est apponere.

Ἐπιθήσαν μὲν τινες τελειότεραν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων σύνταξιν, εἰ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας προσλαμβάνοιεν, οἷον, ἐγὼ γράφω σοι· ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι σοι, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οὐπὲρ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦτο φασιν εἶναι· ὅταν γὰρ λέγω, ἐγὼ μὲν παρεγενόμην, σὺ δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ ἐξέλεις τὴν ἀντωνυμίαν, ἀνακόλουθος ἔσται ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν σύνδεσμος. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι μηδὲ καθόλου ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο, μηδὲ γὰρ παντάπασιν ἀντωνυμιῶν δεῖσθαι τὰ ῥήματα. Τοῦτο δ' ἂν ἀποδειχθεῖη, οὐκ ἐκ μόνης τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν συντάξεως, ἥπερ ἔξεστιν καὶ ἐλλείπειν καὶ πλεονάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν καταλογάδην λογογραφησάντων, οἱ δίχα μέτρων γράφοντες, ἀκριβῶς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐντιθέσθαι εἰθῶσιν.

[Some have thought that a verbal construction would be more complete if they added the pronouns, as in *ego scripsi tibi/egō grāphō soi* 'write to you',<sup>2</sup> *ego loquor tibi/egō dialégomai soi* 'I talk to you',

<sup>2</sup> *Scripsi* is the "epistolary past tense" in this example.

etc. They adduce in favour of this the following: when I say *ego quidem affui, tu vero non/egō mēn paregenómēn, sὺ δὲ oudamōs* 'I for my part was there, but you were not', if you leave out the pronoun, the sentence will be unacceptable. But this is mainly due to the conjunction *quidem/mēn* 'on the one hand'. Therefore I do not consider that what they say is true in general, as verbs do not require pronouns in all cases. This is confirmed not only from the syntax of poetical composition, where ellipsis and redundancy are permitted, but from the regular prose writing of (teachers and especially of) authors who, free from metrical constraints, regularly use what is strictly necessary for clarity in what they have to say.]

One may also compare Priscian and Planudes in Keil (1859: 115.20–118.1) and Bachmann (1828: 112.9–114.17), Keil (1859: 121.16–123.12) and Bachmann (1828: 119.11–121.22) (notice in the examples given by Priscian on 123.3 and by Planudes on 121.17 that in the same sentence frame Priscian's *Romanus* is replaced by Planudes's *Byzántinos*), and Keil (1859: 139.29–141.5) and Bachmann (1828: 139.3–140.14).

The *Peri syntáxeōs* may be summarized as follows: Beginning with the analogy between words as the constituents of sentences and *grámmata* [letters] as the constituents of speech, the eight parts of speech, word classes, of the *Téchnē* and of Apollonius are listed and discussed. There follows an explanation of the fact that interrogative words are either nominal or adverbial by reference to the primacy of the noun and the verb as the essential components of the sentence, with the close connection between adverbs and verbs. Planudes's progressive deletion of other classes of words from an original sentence containing them all and still leaving a minimal grammatical structure (Bachmann 1828: 112.20–113.6) may be matched, allowing for the minor difference in the accepted set of word classes between Greek and Latin, with Priscian's example (Keil 1859: 116.11–19; cf. pp. 29; 101–102). In the analysis of locative questions, involving such adverbs as 'whence?', 'where?' and 'whither?', Planudes established links with the three Greek oblique cases and the three temporal distinctions of past, present, and future, pushing local and temporal analysis beyond what had been achieved before. This will be examined separately later in this chapter (pp. 227–233).

There follow statements on the article, in which, like his Greek predecessors, Planudes includes the definite article *ho* 'the' and the relative pronoun *hós* 'who, which', with examples of the use of the relative in

different cases and linked either directly with a verb or by means of a preposition. This is well set out in a series of examples sharing much of the same lexicon, to make more prominent the actual syntactic difference (Bachmann 1828: 128.35–129.2, 129.5–8, and 129.23–33):

Ὅμηρος, ὃς ἔγραψε τὸν ἐν Ἰλίῳ  
πόλεμον Ὅμηρος, οὗ περιφανῆ τὰ συγ-  
γράμματα Ὅμηρος, ᾧ τὰ πρωτεύια νέμεται  
παρὰ πάντων Ὅμηρος, ὃν ἐκθειάζουσιν.

[‘Homer, who wrote about the war in Ilium.’  
‘Homer, whose compositions are famous.’  
‘Homer, to whom is accorded the highest place with everyone.’  
‘Homer, whom everyone worships like a god.’]

— — — — —

ἄριστος κοιητῶν Ὅμηρος, ὃς τὴν Ἰλιάδα  
συνέταξεν ἔρῳ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, ὃς τὴν Ἰλιάδα συνέτα-  
ξεν θαυμάζω τὸν Ὁμηρον, ὃς τὴν Ἰλιάδα συνέταξεν  
ζῆς τῆ μνήμῃ, Ὅμηρε, ὃς τὴν Ἰλιάδα συνέταξας.

[‘The best of poets is Homer, who composed the *Iliad*.’  
‘I love Homer, who composed the *Iliad*.’  
‘I revere Homer, who composed the *Iliad*.’  
‘Live in our memory, Homer, you who composed the *Iliad*!’]

— — — — —

θαυμάζω τὸν Ὁμη-  
ρον, εἰς ὃν ἡ φύσις πᾶσαν τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἔτρεψε δύνα-  
μιν ἄγνοεῖ τις τὸν Ὁμηρον, ἀφ’ οὗ πᾶσα σοφία ὡς-  
περ ἀπὸ ρίζης πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαδίδεται ἀμιλλᾶται τις  
τῷ Ὁμήρῳ, μεθ’ ὃν οὐδεὶς οὕτω ταῖς Μούσαις ἐφιλήθη.

[‘I revere Homer, into whom nature poured all her strength.’  
‘Someone does not know Homer, from whom all wisdom is passed  
on to us as it were from its root.’  
‘Someone challenges Homer (dative), after whom no one was so  
much loved among the Muses.’]

These examples (and there are others) display the syntactic independence of the antecedent noun and that of the relative to which it refers.

Following the article Planudes gives us his summary of pronominal syntax and then participial syntax. The final part of the book covers the

syntax of conjunctions (Bachmann 1828: 157.26–166.5), within which is found the syntax of prepositions (Bachmann 1828: 160.18–161.20). In this section Planudes preserves the same identification of prepositional prefixes with the free prepositions themselves, which characterized, and confused, the descriptive analysis of this class of words. He takes note of the possibility of nominalizing verbal infinitives with the definite article, a construction not available in Latin: (Bachmann 1828: 161.1) *en tōi poreúesthai* ‘while journeying’.

In the pages devoted to the syntax of conjunctions, Planudes discusses a matter of syntactic and therefore semantic ambiguity in some types of embedded sentences, such as have concerned current syntactic theorists. In Greek and Latin, as well as in English, pragmatic or contextual considerations apart, sentences like *he asked him to look after his son* may be interpreted as either *he<sub>i</sub> asked him<sub>i</sub> to look after his<sub>i</sub> son* or *he<sub>i</sub> asked him<sub>i</sub> to look after his<sub>j</sub> son*. Constructions of this type, whether ambiguous or not were designated as retransitive (*antimetábasis, retransitio*). Priscian had taken notice of the systematic ambiguity of sentences like this (Keil 1859: 169.7–11), but Planudes discusses the subject more extensively and shows how a disambiguation may be effected (Bachmann 1828: 165.9–19).

δεῖται Ἀρίστων Σωκράτους, ὡς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ παιδεῦσαι. Ἐνθα καὶ ἀμφίβολος ἡ σύνταξις γίνεται, ὅταν ἀπὸ τρίτου προσώπου εἰς τρίτον ἢ ἀντιμετάβασις γίνηται ἄδηλον γὰρ πότερον τὸν Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸν φησιν, ἢ τὸν Σωκράτους. Εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸν τοῦ Σωκράτους υἱὸν λέγει, ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀντιμετάβασις δὲ ἔστιν, ὅταν τὸ ῥῆμα ἀπὸ προσώπου μεταβαίνει πρὸς ἕτερον, καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου πάλιν πρὸς τὸ πρότερον οἶον, δεῖται μου συγγνώμην αὐτῷ· δεῖται συμβοηθῆσαι αὐτῷ.

[*deĩtai Aristōn Sakrátous, hōs tōn hyiōn autoũ paideũsai* ‘Ariston asks Socrates to teach his son’. The syntax becomes ambiguous when the retransitivity goes from one third person to another, because it is unclear whether Ariston’s son or Socrates’s son is being referred to. If specifically Socrates’s son is the one referred to, then one must say *heautoũ* ‘his own (son)’ and not *autoũ* ‘his’. It is a retransitivity when the verb contracts a transitive relation from one person to another and a reverse relation from that person to the person first mentioned, as in *deĩtai mou syggñōnai autōi* ‘he asks me to forgive him’ or *deĩtai symboēthēsai autōi* ‘he asks me to join in helping him’.]

In the example given above it would normally be more natural to interpret 'his son' as referring to Ariston's son. Where different grammatical person categories are involved, as in the last two examples quoted, no ambiguity arises either in Greek or in English, and in English the syntactic ambiguity must be explicitly and lexically resolved when simple third person are involved: *he<sub>i</sub> asked him<sub>j</sub> to look after him<sub>i</sub>*, but *he<sub>i</sub> asked him<sub>j</sub> to look after himself<sub>j</sub>*.

Taking Apollonius, Priscian, and Maximus Planudes as three representatives of explicit syntactic explanation it might be fair to say that Apollonius was pioneering, Priscian was authoritative, and Planudes was concise. It has already been argued that in addition Planudes exercised original thinking on grammatical topics and did not merely repeat and summarize what his sources and his predecessors had already said. In respect of the central categories of nominal case and verbal tense his grammatical writings deserve some detailed discussion in separate sections of this chapter.

There have been suggestions that the *Peri syntaxeōs*, as we have it, was left unfinished (cf. Pauly–Wissowa 1950: 2209) on the ground that there is no designated section on the syntax of the verb; nor, for that matter, is there one on the noun *per se*, the other principal syntactic component of sentences. References, of course, to the syntactic relations between verbs and nouns are apparent throughout the book, but at one point in relation to the syntax of the oblique cases he does refer to a book on the syntax of verbs (*peri hōn idiai lexomen en tōi peri rhēmātōn syntaxeōs* [on these subjects we will speak separately in *On the syntax of verbs*]). Bachmann (1828: 153–154) refers to a work so entitled; this consists in no more than a summary distinction between the syntax of transitive and that of intransitive verbs, followed by a lexicon of verbs of each subclass beginning with *alpha*, which may form part of Planudes's *Syntax of verbs* (cf. Pauly–Wissowa 1950: 2209–2210; Uhlig 1910: iii). This is probably also the work of Planudes on transitive and intransitive verbs cited by Lascaris (1608: 13; cf. p. 251).

Historically the most interesting passages in the grammatical writings of Planudes are on nominal cases, which are considered both in the *Dialogue* and in *Peri syntaxeōs*, and on verbal tenses, which are examined in the *Dialogue*.

## Nominal case

Case and tense were among the first grammatical categories to be identified and studied by writers on Greek grammar. Aristotle made use of *ptōsis* [fall] as a technical term for virtually any morphological difference in a word form, from an assumed prior basic form, which had a distinctive syntactic or semantic function. He also identified the necessary consignification of time reference in the tense forms of the Greek verb. This could be seen as the very beginning of a theory of case and tense, but it was the Stoics who carried this further, restricting "case" (*ptōsis*) in its subsequent traditional sense to the inflections of nominal words, with *klisis* [bending] replacing *ptōsis* as a reference to inflectional and derivational word form variations as a whole. In their theory of case they distinguished the nominative as the subject or agent case, *eutheia* or *orthē* [upright] and the genitive, dative, and accusative as the oblique cases, *plāgiai* [slanted], bearing a separate relationship to the action or process designated by the verb.

The five cases of Greek were soon identified and named by a prominent or characteristic meaning. The "upright" subject case was also named *onomastikē* [naming, nominative] from its use in nomenclatures and the like. The vocative, always rather an anomalous case category, whose treatment by the Stoics is unclear (cf. Robins 1951: 33), was included in the noun paradigm in the Alexandrian tradition and so named, *klētikē* [calling], from its use as a form of address; its anomalous position as a case is noted by commentators on the *Kanōnes* (above, pp. 117–119). The genitive was seen as the possessive or patrilineal case, *ktētikē*, *patrikē*, the actual term *genikē* being variously explained by commentators (cf. Hilgard 1901: 384.5–7, 548.8). The dative, *dotikē* [giving], was traditionally associated with *didōmi* 'give' and *dōsis* 'gift', though its meanings cover a much wider range (De Mauro 1965), and the accusative, *aitiatikē*, was primarily the object case, referring to what is acted on, affected, or effected by the causal activity designated by the verb (cf. *aitia* 'cause').

Varro could not fail to notice that there was an additional case in Latin, the *casus Latinus* or *sextus* [the Latin or the sixth case]. He too identified a basic meaning to each case, that of the ablative being the agent or instrument by which an action is performed (Varro *de lingua Latina* 8.16, 10.62); the term *ablativus* [taking away from] is first found in Quintilian 1.5.59, 1.7.3, etc.). The term *accusative* is generally thought to be the result of Varro's confusion between the two uses of the Greek *aitia*, meaning 'cause' or 'accusation' (cf. Varro *de lingua Latina* 8.66–67).



The practice of naming each case by one of its functions continued in the Latin tradition through Donatus and the western grammarians. The subsequent treatment of English phrases such as *of the man* as a genitive case lies outside the scope of this book. But it is interesting to see Quintilian proposing a seventh case in Latin (1.4.2–3, 26), to distinguish the instrumental and agentive meaning of the ablative from the removal (ablative proper) meaning, in a sense following the Sanskrit case system, of which, of course, he knew nothing. Priscian expressly rejected this proposition on the reasonable ground that in formal terms such separate functions were at no point distinguished in Latin morphology (Keil 1855: 190.14–16).

Though from Aristotle onwards we can speak of an evolving and then stable or “paradigm” (in a Kuhnian sense) theory of case inflection in Greek and Latin, at no point is an attempt known to reach a general theory of case semantics. It is at least arguable that the essence of such a theory as far as the three oblique cases in Greek are concerned was outlined by Maximus Planudes. The relevant passage from the *Peri syntaxeōs* reads (Bachmann 1828: 121.23–123.11) as follows:

Τὰ γε μὴν ἐπιρρήματα ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὰς ἀγνοουμένας ἐνεργείας ἢ τὰς τούτων ποιότητας. Εἰ γὰρ ἐρωτῶμεν, πῶς ἀναγινώσκει; ἀποδιδόντες αὐτῷ τὸ ἐπιρρήμα, ὅπερ ἐπιθέτου τόπον ἐπέχει ἐπὶ τῷ ῥήματι, ἀποκρινόμεθα, καλῶς· ῥητορικῶς· σοφῶς. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τὴν ποιότητα ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεται, τριχῶς ποιούμεν τὴν ἐρώτησιν, ποῦ ἢ πόθι; καὶ πῆ ἢ πόσε; καὶ πόθεν; ὧν τὸ μὲν ποῦ ἢ πόθι, μονὴν καὶ στάσιν ἐν τόπῳ δηλοῖ· οἷον, ποῦ ἐστὶν ὁ δεῖνα, ἢ ποῦ κεῖται ἢ κάθηται; ἀποκρινόμεθα γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἐπιρρηματικῶς, οἷον, ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ, οἴκοι, Ἴσθμοί, πολλαχού, πολλαχόθι, οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδαμόθι· ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὴν δοτικὴν μόνην, οἷον, Ἀθήνησι, Θήβησιν· ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ κατὰ δοτικὴν σὺν τῇ ἐν προθέσει, οἷον, ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ, ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Τὸ δὲ πῆ, ἢ πόσε καὶ πόθεν, καὶ ἄμφω κίνησιν σημαίνει· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν, τὴν εἰς τόπον, τὸ δὲ, τὴν ἐκ τόπου. Οἷον, ἐρωτῶμενοι, πῆ ἢ πόσε βαδίζει ὁ δεῖνα; ἐστὶ μὲν ὅτε καὶ ἐπιρρηματικῶς ἀποκρινόμεθα, οἷον, δεῦρο, ἐκεῖσε, οἴκαδε, Ἀθήναζε, Θήβαζε, πολλαχῆ, πολλαχόσε, πάντη, παντόσε, πανταχῆ, πανταχόσε, οὐδαμῆ, οὐδαμόσε· ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ κατὰ αἰτιατικὴν σὺν τῇ εἰς προθέσει· οἷον, εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἰς τὸν ἀγρόν. Εἰ δὲ εἰς ἔμψυχον πρόσωπον, σὺν τῇ πρὸς προθέσει· οἷον, πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, πρὸς τὸν ἡγεμόνα. Ἐρωτῶμενοι δὲ, πόθεν ἦκει ὁ ἄνθρωπος; κἀνταῦθα ἐνίοτε μὲν δι

ἐπιρρημάτων ἀποκρινόμεθα, οἷον, ἐνταῦθεν, ἐνθένδε, ἐκεῖθεν, οἴκοθεν, Ἀθήνηθεν, Ἴσθμόθεν, γῆθεν, οὐρανόθεν, πολλαχόθεν, πάντοθεν, πανταχόθεν, οὐδαμόθεν· ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ μετὰ γενικῆς σὺν τῇ ἀπὸ προθέσει· οἷον, ἀπὸ Ῥώμης, ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου· ἐστὶ δὲ ὅτε καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκ προθέσει (οἷον ἐκ Ῥώμης, ἐκ Βυζαντίου, ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν). Καὶ σημειωτέον ἐνταῦθα, ὅπως κατὰ τινὰ φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν αἱ τρεῖς αὐταὶ ἐρωτήσεις, τὸ πόθεν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῆ, τὰς τρεῖς πλαγίας ἐκκληρώσαντο πτώσεις· τὸ μὲν πόθεν τὴν γενικὴν, τὸ δὲ ποῦ τὴν δοτικὴν, τὸ δὲ πῆ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν. Καὶ ὡς περ ἐν ταῖς πλαγαῖς πτώσει προηγείται μὲν ἡ γενικὴ, ἔπεται δὲ ἡ δοτικὴ, καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτιατικὴ· οὕτω κἀνταῦθα προηγείται μὲν τὸ πόθεν, ἔπεται δὲ τὸ ποῦ, καὶ τελευταῖόν ἐστὶ τὸ πῆ, ἀκολουθῶς τοῖς τρισὶ μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόθεν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἐστίν· ἐρωτῶντες γάρ, πόθεν ἦλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ἔρχεται, ἢ ἐλεύσεται; δηλοῦμεν καταλειπέναι αὐτὸν τόπον, ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν, ἢ ἔρχεται, ἢ ἐλεύσεται. Τὸ δὲ ποῦ, τοῦ ἐνεστώτος· ἐρωτῶντες γάρ, ποῦ ἐστὶν ὁ δεῖνα ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται; τὴν ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστώτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ τόπῳ μονὴν αὐτοῦ δηλοῦμεν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἦν, ἢ ἔσται. Τὸ δὲ πῆ καὶ πόδε, τοῦ μέλλοντος· ἐρωτῶντες γάρ, πῆ βαδίζει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ἐβάδισεν, ἢ βαδίσει; τὴν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἄφιξιν τούτου σημαίνομεν. Ἦ καὶ οὕτω δεῖ τινὰ ὅθεν δήποτε πρότερον ἔλθειν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· εἶτα μεῖναι ἐν ἡμῖν· εἶτα ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀλλαχόσε ἀπελθεῖν· εἶπερ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον μέλλει τὰ τρία ταῦτα καθάπαξ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνεργήσειν· ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

[Adverbs refer to activities or their qualities of which we are ignorant. If we ask *pōs anaginōskei?* ‘How does he read (aloud)?’, we answer by giving the appropriate adverb, which serves as an epithet to the verb: *kalōs* ‘well’, *rhētorikōs* ‘rhetorically’, *sophōs* ‘wisely’. But if we want to know, not how something is done, but the place where it happens, we can put our question in three ways, *poū, pōthi* ‘where?’, *pē pōse* ‘whither?’, and *pōthen* ‘whence?’. In answer to the question *where?* it is simply a matter of indicating the location, e. g. *poū estin ho deina?* ‘Where is so-and-so? or *poū keitai ē kathētai?* ‘Where is he lying or sitting?’ We sometimes reply with an adverb such as *entaūtha* ‘here’, *ekei* ‘there’, *oikoi* ‘at home’, *Isthmoi* ‘at the Isthmus’, *pollachou* ‘in many places’, *oudamou* or *oidamothi* ‘nowhere’; but we may sometimes just use a dative case form, like *Athēnēsi* ‘in Athens’ or *Thēbēsin* ‘in Thebes’, but more usually we

have the dative case with the preposition *en* 'in', as *en têi pólei* 'in the city', *en tōi agrōi* 'in the field', *en têi Hellādī* 'in Greece'. But *pē* or *pōse* 'whither?' and *póthen* 'whence?' both refer to movement, one (in)to a place, the other out of or from a place. If we are asked *pē* (or *pōse*) *badizei ho deīna?* 'whither is so-and-so walking?' we sometimes answer with an adverb, such as *deūro* 'hither', *ekeīse* 'thither', *oikade* 'homewards', *Athēnaze* 'to Athens', *Thēbaze* 'to Thebes', *pollachē* or *pollachōse* 'to many places', *pántē*, *pantōse*, *pantachē*, or *pantachōse* 'to all places', *oudamē* or *oudamōse* 'nowhere', but mostly we use an accusative case with *eis* '(in)to', as in *eis tēn polin* 'into the city', *eis tōn agrōn* 'into the field'; but if we are referring to a living person we use the preposition *prōs* 'to', as in *prōs tōn basilēa* 'to the king', *prōs tōn hēgemōna* 'to the leader'. If we are asked *póthen hēkei ho ánthrōpos?* 'Where does this man come from?', sometimes we reply with an adverb, such as *enteūthen* 'thence', *enthēde* 'from here', *ekeūthen* 'from there', *oikothen* 'from home', *Athēnēithen* 'from Athens', *Isthmóthen* 'from the Isthmus', *gēthen* 'from earth', *ouranóthen* 'from heaven', *pollachóthen* 'from many places', *pantóthen* or *pantachóthen* 'from everywhere', *oudamóthen* 'from nowhere', but for the most part we use a genitive case with the preposition *apó* 'from', as in *apó Rhōmes* 'from Rome', *apó Byzantiou* 'from Byzantium', sometimes also with the preposition *ek* 'out of', as in *ek Rhómēs* 'out of Rome', *ek Byzantiou* 'out of Byzantium', *ex Athēnōn* 'out of Athens'.

Here it is also to be noticed how by some sort of natural agreement the three questions 'whence?', 'where?', and 'whither?' have had assigned to them the three oblique cases, 'whence?' having the genitive, 'where?' the dative, and 'whither?' the accusative; and as in the noun paradigm, the genitive comes first, then the dative, and then the accusative, so too *póthen* 'whence?' comes first, then *poū* 'where?', and then *pē* 'whither?', corresponding to the three divisions of time. For 'whence?' refers to past time; if we ask *póthen êlthen ho ánthrōpos* (or *érchetai*, or *eleúsetai*)? 'where has this man come from (or is coming from, or will come from)?', we indicate that he has already left the place from which he has come, is now coming, or will have come. 'Where?' refers to the present; asking *poū estin ho deīna* (or *ēn*, or *éstai*)? 'where is so-and-so (or where was he, or where will he be)?' we are simply referring to the place in which he is, was, or will be, at a given time; 'whither?' refers to the future; if we ask *pē badizei ho ánthrōpos* (or *ebádisen*, or *badísei*)?

'where is the man walking to (or where was he walking to, or will be walking to)?', we are referring to his arrival in the (relative) future. Or we may put it like this: someone must first come to us from somewhere, then be with us, and then go away to somewhere else, provided that one and the same person is going to act in these three ways in relation to us at one time. Otherwise this would not be the case.]

In examining Planudes's presentation of the oblique cases we face a number of interrelated questions: firstly, is his account, as just quoted, a statement of what has come to be known as a localist theory of case; and if it is, was it "original" either in the Byzantine world of scholarship as a whole or in the work of Maximus Planudes as an individual?

Ever since Hjeltmslev first raised these questions in relation to Planudes (1935: 10–12) they have been the subject of some debate. The localist theory itself has been expressed in a magnificent example of the German *Bogenkonstruktion* by Bopp (1833: 136): "Die Kasus-Endungen drücken die wechselseitigen, vorzüglich und ursprünglich einzig räumlichen, von Raume auch auf Zeit und Ursache übertragenen, Verhältnisse der Nomina, d. h. der Personen der Sprachwelt zu einander aus" [case endings express the mutual relations, principally and in origin simply local, then extended to temporal and causal relations, between the nouns, that is to say the persons, in the universe of discourse]. This was taken up by Franz Wüllner, linking the primary meanings of prepositions to cases (cf. Wüllner 1827: 77).

The association of local and temporal relations seen in the passage quoted from Planudes is consistent with Condillac's derivation of the abstract meanings of prepositions from original local meanings (Le Roi 1947: 478–481; cf. 87–88, 103). For a summary of localist case theory as it evolved in post-Renaissance Europe Hjeltmslev (1935: 13–32) may be consulted, and some current developments within generative grammar are presented in Anderson (1973, 1977).

Leaving aside subsequent stages of the localist theory, it must be emphasized that Planudes's analysis of the *Grundbedeutungen* of the three oblique cases is well suited to the syntax and semantics of the Greek prepositions. He says, for example, that the dative case on its own may be used to indicate an actual location, although it is more usual to add a preposition. Examples from Greek literature in which each of the three cases signifies the direction or position of someone or something may be seen in *eíkousi tēs hodoū* 'they get off the road' (Herodotus 2.80), *hēmenon*

... *akrotátēi koruphēi* 'sitting on the highest peak' (*Iliad* 5.754), *naioisi d'oikeis toiside?* 'do you dwell in these shrines?' (Euripides *Ion* 314), and *Aidaio dómous ércheai* 'you will come to the house of Hades' (*Iliad* 22.483). It may be noted that De Mauro (1965), like Wüllner (1827: 77), makes location the primary one of the several meanings that he assigns to the Greek dative case.

For prepositional examples Planudes chooses the single-case prepositions, *apó*, *ek*, *en*, and *eis*, though *prós* is also listed. In fact it is the tricasual prepositions which give the strongest support for the localism of the cases, where each preposition may be analysed as having its own distinctive meaning component, which combines with the meaning of the case form following it (cf. Bennett 1975: 35–38 et al.)

With *prós* the specific meaning is proximity; *prós Elidos* 'from Elis', *prós Aiginēi* (in the sea) 'off Aegina', *prós allélous* 'towards each other'. With *hypó* it is 'below': *hypó chthónos hēke* 'he came from beneath the earth', *heúdein hypó pétrai* 'to sleep beneath a rock', *iénai hypó gaiān* 'to go under the earth' (to die). With *pará* it is 'beside': *par* *Aristárchou* 'from beside Aristarchus', *hēsthai pará pyri* 'to sit by the fireside', *pará rótamon* 'to the riverside'. *epi* is less sharply distinguished by its cases, but we find survivals of a locative sense with the genitive in *hormeîn ep' agkýras* 'to ride at (i. e. depending on) anchor' (Herodotus 7.188), and in a transparent metaphor *epi prospólou miās* 'depending on a single attendant' (Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus* 746). Other cases are more obviously distinguished locatively: *naiein epì bómōi* 'to dwell on an altar' (*Iliad* 8.240), *anabainein epì tà hypselótata* 'to go up to the highest points' (Herodotus 1.131).

In the *Dialogue* (Bachmann 1828: 28.23–230.3) Planudes himself makes use of the tricasual prepositions *pará* and *prós* to highlight the locative meanings of the three oblique cases (and cf. pp. 153–156, 164–165 above):

Εἰ μὲν τὸ κινούμενον ἕτερον τόπον καταλιμπάνον, εἰς ἕτερον ἄπεισι, καὶ δύο τοὺς Πόπους λέγεις, τοῦτο κυρίως γινώσκεις ἂν κίνησιν ὡς εἰ τις ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἑτέραν πορεύεται. Εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὲν τὸ κινούμενον περὶ μέντοι τόπον τὸν αὐτόν, τῷ τῆς στάσεως λόγῳ, τοῦτο συντάξεις. Ὅτι γὰρ κἂν τῆ οἰκίᾳ περιπατεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγοντες, τῇ τῆς στάσεως προθέσει τῇ ἐν τοῦτο συντάττομεν. Ἐν γάρ τι λαμβάνομεν, τὴν οἰκίαν, καθ' ἣν κινεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

N. Τί δὲ δήποτε καὶ τὴν ἐν πρόθεσιν στάσιν ἐροῦμεν σημαίνειν;

Π. Καὶ μάλα.

N. Οὐκ ἄρα καλῶς φήσομεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει βαδίζειν τινά;

Π. Ἀπίη σου τοῦτο, Νεόφρον· μήτις οὕτω σε λέγειν ἀράσαιτο.

N. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

Π. Ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εἰς τήνδε βαδίζειν τὴν πόλιν.

N. Ἀμέλει γοῦν οὐδὲ τοῦτο καλῶς ἔχον εἰρήσεται, καθῆσθαι τινὰ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, εἴπερ ἢ εἰς τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ.

Π. Εὖ ἔγνωσ, καὶ σε τὸ συντεταγμένον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν καὶ παρὰ σαυτοῦ τι συνορᾶν ἤδη ποιεῖ· τὸ γε μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καθῆσθαι, καὶ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνυποστόλως ἔρεις. Ἀλλ' ἐπανίωμεν, εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀδίδς εἰς τὴν παρά.

N. Ἐπανίωμεν, δοκεῖ γάρ.

Π. Τοσοῦτον περὶ ταύτης, ὦ Νεόφρον, φαμέν, ὡς ἐπειδὴν κίνησιν σημαίνει, αἰτιατικῇ ταύτην συντάττομεν· ἀλλ' ἢ αὕτη καὶ στάσιν ἔστιν ὅτε δηλοῖ, καὶ τὴν πτώσιν αὐθις ἀμείβει· δοτικῇ γὰρ τηρικαῦτα συνάπτεται· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ τινὰ λέγομεν ἴστασθαι. Εἰ δὲ που καὶ παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα τις ἔγραψεν, ἔγραψε μὲν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσας. Σκόπει καὶ γὰρ ἢ πρὸς ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς παρά λαμβάνεται, οἷα δὴ καὶ σύν, καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων συντάξεως οὐκ ἀφίσταται. Ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν τὴν παρά σημαίνει, τὴν ἀπὸ προσώπου τὴν κίνησιν ἔχουσιν καὶ τῆς ἐκείνης φιλεῖ γενικῇ· ὡς, εἰ στρατηγὸν πρὸς τοῦ βασιλέως λέγομεν πέμπεσθαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ τὴν παρά μὲν καὶ αὐθις, τήνδε τὴν ἐγγὺς στάσιν σημαίνουσιν, δοτικῇ πάντως μάλιστα χαίρει· ὡς εἰ περὶ τινος λέγομεν πρὸς τοῖς ποσὶν αὐτὸν καθῆσθαι τοῦ δεινός· πρὸς δὲ τοῦς πόδας οὐ λέγομεν. Εἰ τοίνυν ἢ μὲν πρὸς τὴν πτώσιν οὐκ ἀποστέργει τῆς προθέσεως, ἀνθ' ἧς λαμβάνεται, δοτικῇ δὲ αἰεὶ, τὴν ἐγγὺς στάσιν δηλοῦσα, συντάττεται, φανερώτατον, καὶ τὴν παρά, τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῦσαν, καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ συνάπτεσθαι πτώσει· εἰ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν τούτοις ἢ παρά καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικῇν, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ ἢ πρὸς.

[Palaitimus: If what is moved leaves one place and goes to another, and you are speaking of both places, you will rightly recognise a movement, as when someone leaves this city and goes to another one. But if what is moved moves around in the same place, you will report this in terms of location. So when we say that the man is walking around in the house, we put this in a construction with the preposition *en* 'in', which designates place-where. For we pick on one thing in relation to which the man is moving.

Neophron: Are we then going to say that the preposition *en* designates a location?

P. Yes indeed we are.

N. Then we will not be correct in saying that someone walks out of this city in this city?

P. You should avoid this, Neophron, or someone may ask you to put it like this.

N. Like what?

P. Saying that he is walking out of this city and into this city.

N. No doubt then this too will not be well formed, to say that someone sits into the house, if *eis* 'into' refers to movement, but one should say rather that he sits down in the house.

P. You have grasped the point, and a sentence put together to sound like this makes you see this yourself. Without hesitation you will speak of sitting in the house and in relation to the house. But let us go on, if you will, to look at the preposition *pará* 'beside'.

N. Yes. Let us do that. I agree.

P. We can say this much about this preposition, Neophron: when it designates movement we construct it with an accusative. But this same preposition sometimes indicates position, and then it changes its case; it is constructed with a dative, and we say that someone is standing *pará tōi basilei* 'in the king's presence'. But if someone wrote (in such a sentence) *pará tōn basiléa* 'to the king's presence', he would have written it but without properly understanding it. Look, *prós* is also sometimes used instead of *pará* and also instead of *syn* 'with' (which takes the dative), and the syntactic construction is the same for all three. But when *prós* is used in the same sense as *pará* to refer to movement away from a person, it needs the genitive just as *pará* does: for example in the expression *stratēgōn prōs toū basiléōs pémpesthai* 'sending the general from the king'. But again, if we use *pará* to indicate position-near, it is much best to construct it with the dative; for example, we say *prōs tois posin autōn kathēsthai toū deīmos*, that is, we say of someone that he is sitting at so-and-so' feet; we do not say *prōs tous pōdas* (with the accusative). If, therefore, *prós* takes the same case as the preposition for which it is substituted, namely the dative signifying place-near, it is quite clear the *pará*, when it means the same, will take the same case. If in these sentences *pará* took the accusative case, *prós* would do the same.]

The three local relations where, whither, and whence had been linked by Apollonius with certain types of interrogation and with certain adverbs, particularly those formed by suffixation on a noun, such as *oikothi* 'at home', *oikónde* 'homeward', and *oikotheren* 'from home'. This goes back to the *Téchnē* (section 19), and Apollonius goes out of his way to make clear that these words are adverbs and not cases of nouns, despite a few redundant prepositions like *ex halóthen* (*Iliad* 21.335) 'from from the sea', which may be compared with the English *from thence* (Schneider 1878: 180.32–181.23, 186.22–1876, 298.10–209.4).

Planudes's words on the basically local meanings of the oblique cases, quoted above from his *Peri syntaxeōs*, also appear in a text formerly attributed to the Alexandrian Theodosius, author of the Theodosian *kanónes* (as in Steinthal 1891: 267). This, however, is now rejected, and it has been shown that the text in question belongs to a collection of grammatical quotations from Planudes and others (cf. Uhlig 1883: xxxvii.10 "mixtura ex technes scholiis et supplementis composita"), belonging to a date later than Planudes. In his introduction to the second edition of Steinthal's *Geschichte* (1891: vi–vii) Guggenheim felt it necessary to point out her error in the unaltered text, written in 1863, before the statement of Uhlig.

We must, then, face the question, was Maximus Planudes enunciating a theory of case meanings based on localist principles, as Hjelmslev (1935: 12) and others have maintained. This question, along with related questions in the history of ancient Greek and Byzantine linguistics has recently been the subject of some debate. Hjelmslev (1935) and Anderson (1973) did not argue the case in detail but simply presented their opinions. In more recent years Murru (1979 a, 1979 b) defended Planudes as an exponent of the localist theory, and Chanet (1985) and Blank (1987) have maintained the opposite.

In one sense, of course, we must be sure about what the position is that is maintained by those supporting the localism of Planudes, including the present writer. No-one would argue that Planudes's words quoted above can be construed as a fully articulated localist theory such as has been set out in modern times. What can, however, be defended is that his statement is the most explicit attribution of local relations and, following them, temporal relations to the three Greek oblique cases as their primary semantic field; such would seem the most natural interpretation of *tās treis plagias eklērōsanto* [(the three locational relations) have had assigned to them the three oblique cases]. Locative meanings come first and temporal meanings are set beside them. Much may depend on

the interpretation of the phrase *katá tina physikèn akolouthían* [by some sort of natural agreement]. Some would dismiss the phrase *katá tina physikèn akolouthían* as little more than a statement of an ordering principle, like the ordering of the letters of the alphabet. But it may be more plausibly suggested that *physikè akolouthía* should be stressed so as to indicate that locative relations are indeed the basis of the source and *Grundbedeutung* of the three cases, with temporal relations derived from them, leaving it to later generations to articulate the localist theory more fully. It is true (cf. Chanet 1985) that the descriptive order of the three oblique cases is genitive, dative, and accusative, and that is a long-standing tradition among the Greek grammarians, derived in part from morphology and in part from one interpretation of the term *geniké* itself (cf. pp. 66, 156, 181, 195); but even if so, the basis for this tradition is different, and the argument for some natural agreement between the three cases and the three locative relations is not thereby invalidated.

It has also been asked (Chanet 1985: 137) why the three locative relations are associated specifically with past, present, and future, since the same questions whence?, where?, and whither?, can be asked and answered in any single tense. This statement is, of course true, but it can be pointed out that the present tense is the central “timeless” dividing line between the past and the future, where we are when speaking, where we have been before speaking, and where we will be after speaking (cf. pp. 72, 121 above).

In this sort of historical reconstruction of theory certainty is not fully attainable, and a balance of probabilities must be accepted. It may be concluded that at Planudes’s hands the basis of a localist theory of case, which fits the Greek usage of case forms with and without prepositions, was set out in a systematic way in the *Dialogue* and the *Peri syntáxeōs*.

It is not, of course, suggested that Maximus Planudes assumed, as some modern proponents of the localist theory since Bopp have done, that all oblique case meanings can be derived from these three locative relations. He may have thought so, but he does not say so explicitly. What he does say, and this is important in the semantics of case, is that the three locative and then the three temporal relations were assigned to the genitive, dative, and accusative cases to form part at least of their fundamental semantic content.

If an affirmative answer may be given to the question whether Planudes was enunciating a localist theory of case, we should now take up the question how far, if at all, his presentation was original.

In the first place we may set aside the argument of “guilt by association” expressed in the syllogism: No Byzantine was an original thinker; Maximus Planudes was a Byzantine; therefore he was not an original thinker. Such was the verdict of Gudeman (Pauly – Wissowa 1916: 1749), lending authority to subsequent judgments: “Originalität auf dem Gebiet der Syntax wird man bei einem Byzantiner des 13. Jahrhunderts nicht erwarten”, repeated in his own words by Blank (1987: 67): “Byzantine writers often seem merely to feast greedily on the corpse of ancient wisdom, grabbing what facts they can and leaving behind much that they cannot or will not carry off with them. Byzantine grammarians are no exception to this rule”.

Once again, it is easy to misrepresent one’s argument. No-one would suggest that a localist theory sprang unheralded and without prior notice from the head of Planudes or of anyone else. Theories are not in general like this, and we may compare the gradual and cumulative development in the west of modistic grammar from and through the generations of commentators on Priscian.

It is possible to trace a sequential conception of a localist case theory among Greek grammarians. The *Téchnē* lists the three denominal locative adverbs *oikoi* ‘at home’, *oikade* ‘homeward’, and *oikothen* ‘from home’, paraphrased by *en tópoi* ‘in a place’, *eis tópon* ‘to a place’, and *ek tópon* ‘from a place’, but without reference to the three cases involved. We have already noted (p. 223) that Apollonius in dealing with the same set of adverbs expressly denies their interpretation as nominal cases. The commentators on the *Téchnē* in general say no more on this, but one such, Heliodorus (? 7th century) brings the cases into a more direct relationship with the three locative relations (Hilgard 1901: 549.22–25): *hai schéseis hai topikai treis eisin, hē ek tópon, hē en tópoi, hē eis tópon; kai hē mēn ek tópon iēs genikēs idia, hē d’ en tópoi iēs dotikeēs, hē d’ eis tópon iēs aitiaikēs* [the locative states are three in number, out of a place, in a place, and into a place; “out of” is specific to the genitive, “in” is specific to the dative, and “into” is specific to the accusative]. This is substantially the account given by Syncellus (ninth century, see pp. 156–157), but Planudes treats case as the principal marker of location and movement, with or without an accompanying preposition, making the three temporal and the three local relations the basic distinction between the three Greek oblique case forms.

The whole passage from Planudes quoted above (Bachmann 1928: 121.23–123.11) deals with the same question that Priscian discusses in his volume 17 (Keil 1859: 133.3–134.14), the use of adverbs in interro-

gation, but despite the general similarity between the two authors here, Priscian makes no attempt at an explanation of the cases used, not even mentioning the ablative case in reference to motion-from, the nearest linking of case with location in the glossing of the Latin oblique cases and the locative adverbs. The relevant passage may be quoted for comparison with what Planudes says on this topic, despite his general reliance on Priscian's exposition: (Keil 1859: 134.8–14):

“Si interrogem *quo?*, respondes *huc* vel *illuc*, *domum* vel *militiam*, *Romam* vel *in Italiam*, sin vero *ubi?*, respondes *hic* vel *illic*, *domi* vel *militiae*, *Romae* vel *in Italia*. Non solum enim adverbium huiusmodi localibus interrogationibus, sed etiam omnia nomina locos significantia licet subicere, ad locos quidem praecedente *quo*, in locis vero *ubi*, de locis *unde*, per loca *qua*. Eodem modo et temporalia.” [If I ask ‘Whither?’, you will answer ‘Hither’ or ‘Thither’, ‘Homeward’ or ‘Into military service’, ‘To Rome’ or ‘To Italy’. But if I ask ‘Where?’, you will answer ‘Here’ or ‘There’, ‘At home’ or ‘In military service’, ‘At Rome’ or ‘In Italy’. Not only adverbs of this sort may be used to answer questions about location, but any nouns that designate places, ‘place whither’ answering ‘whither?’, ‘place in which’ answering ‘where?’, ‘place from which’ answering ‘whence?’, and ‘Place through which’ answering ‘by-what-way?’. Words signifying temporal relations behave in the same way.]

This glossing is scarcely in advance on what Apollonius had written already.

In sum, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a localist theory of noun cases had been gradually developing, from its first hints in the *Téchnē*, through further observations in the works of Apollonius and Priscian, and receiving more prominence among the Byzantine grammarians, notably Heliodorus, but that it received its first recorded explicit presentation at the hands of Planudes. Murru (1979 a: 122–123) notes that the verb *theōreîn* [to examine theoretically] was first used by Maximus Planudes in connection with locative case meanings. He also recognizes Planudes as the culmination of a long trend toward localism through the Byzantine age (1979 b: 95): “Si potrebbe quindi sostenere che la teoria localistica risale a Massimo Planude nella formulazione più esplicita e chiara, ma anche che essa sia stata suggerita al filologo bizantino sotto forma di suggestione da Prisciano” [One may therefore maintain that the localist theory goes back to Planudes in its clearest and most explicit

formulation, but also that it had been suggested to the Byzantine philologist through what had been put forward by Priscian].

It is not possible to be conclusive, only reasonable and unprejudiced. The reader who wishes to pursue the question further and in detail may be referred to the articles just cited from Murru; Robins (1974, 1984, 1988 a); Chanet (1985); Blank (1987). All of these carry full bibliographies up to their dates of publication.

## Verbal tense

We have seen how the author of the *Téchnē*, following Aristotle, made time reference the basic meaning and the distinctive grammatical category of verbs. This was the dimension along which the morphologically different tense forms were described semantically. The Stoics saw things differently and recognized the interlocking of two dimensions of time and the aspectual distinction between incomplete or continuing and complete (briefly, see Barwick 1957: 52–53). In fact, such an analysis is required for the full semantic analysis of verb forms in several languages. The Stoic terminology is self-explanatory. There were three times, present, past, and future, and the two aspects, incomplete and complete. Of these three time references the future was inherently unmarked (the specifically Attic future perfect being ignored), but the other tenses were displayed in a bidimensional setting:

	present	past
incomplete	<i>enestōs paratatikós</i> [present continuing] <i>poiō</i> ‘I am doing’	<i>parōichēmēnos paratatikós</i> [past continuing] <i>epoíoun</i> ‘I was doing’
complete	<i>enestōs syntelikós</i> [present completed] <i>pepoiēka</i> ‘I have done’	<i>parōichēmēnos syntelikós</i> [past completed] <i>epepoiēkein</i> ‘I had done’

Varro, well acquainted with Stoic work in this field, applied it to the somewhat different Latin formal tense system with remarkable success both in semantic and morphological explanations (cf. Robins 1990: 59–60).

However, Stoic thinking and Stoic terminology, though known to the classical Greek grammarians, were not incorporated into their analyses,

which persisted in the unidimensional Aristotelian frame. The *Téchnē* set these tenses as follows:

*enestós* [present], *poiō*  
*paratatikós* [imperfect], *epoíoun*  
*parakeímenos* [perfect], *pepoiēka*  
*hypersyntelikós* [pluperfect], *epepoiēkein*  
 (and *aóristos* [plain past], *epoiēsa* 'I did').

The Stoics had treated the plain past, like the future as unmarked as regards completion or incompleteness, and the term "aorist" [(simple, unmarked) past] has continued as part of grammatical terminology in that sense. These two tense forms were left out of the aspectual frame. Essentially Apollonius, Priscian, and the commentators on the *Téchnē* follow this line. What had to be accounted for was the quadripartition of reference to past time, as it was set out in the *Téchnē*. The actual loading of the tense system was considered to be justified on the ground that we necessarily know more about the past and can therefore make finer distinctions of time within it. But the attempts at explanation illustrate well the difference between implicit or intuitive knowledge of a language and explicit or descriptive knowledge. The grammarians of the classical and Byzantine ages were native speakers of Greek, and later generations of them were well skilled in the writing of classical Greek. Obviously they used the available semantic distinctions in their writing of Greek; the problem was to set down in linguistic terms just what these distinctions were, constrained as they kept themselves along the single dimension of time reference.

Leaving aside the indeterminate position of the aorist or unmarked past tense, the method shared by Apollonius and all the other grammarians was division along the line of time past by reference to such temporal adverbs as *árti* [recently], *pálai* or *ékpalai* [a long time ago], despite the obvious influence of Stoic thought in such technical terms in general use, such as *paratatikós* [imperfect]. It has already been noticed (p. 71, above) how such a single time track explanation given by commentators on the *Téchnē* fails to "save the phenomena" and is, in fact, contradicted by some sentences from classical Greek authors.

Priscian deals with the tense meanings of the Latin verb in the same way (Keil 1855: 416.15–20), translating *árti* and *pálai* by *nuper* [recently] or *modo* [just now], and *pridem* [long ago], respectively. He also makes clear the Latin syncretism of the perfect and aorist meanings in the single Latin *praeteritum perfectum*, the "perfect with *have*" and the "perfect

without *have*" in the traditional teaching of Latin to speakers of English (Keil 1855: 415.23–416), obviously an important point for Greek-speaking pupils who were learning Latin, the readership at which his Latin grammar was primarily directed.

The two-dimensional approach to tense meanings was never fully faced by Byzantine grammarians. Stephanos, a seventh-century writer (Hilgard 1901: 250.26–251.9; cf. Lallot 1985a and Caujolle–Zaslavsky 1985, with French translation), provides a useful presentation of Byzantine and Stoic terminology, with some account of Stoic theory, but he never loses the reliance on temporal adverbs as the means of paraphrasing and distinguishing the Greek past tenses:

τὸν ἐνεστῶτα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐνεστῶτα παρατατικὸν ὀρίζονται, ὅτι παρατείνεται καὶ εἰς παρεληλυθότα καὶ εἰς μέλλοντα· ὁ γὰρ λέγων "ποιῶ" καὶ ὅτι ἐποίμσέ τι ἐμφαίνει καὶ ὅτι ποιήσει· τὸν δὲ παρατατικὸν παρωχημένον παρατατικὸν· ὁ γὰρ λέγων "ἐποίουν" ὅτι τὸ πλέον ἐποίησεν ἐμφαίνει, οὐπω δὲ πεπλήρωκεν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσει μὲν, ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ χρόνῳ· εἰ γὰρ τὸ παρωχημένον πλέον, τὸ λείπον ὀλίγον· ὃ καὶ προσληφθὲν ποιήσει τέλειον παρωχηκότα, τὸν γέγραφα, ὃς καλεῖται παρακείμενος διὰ τὸ πλησίον ἔχειν τὴν συντέλειαν τῆς ἐνεργείας· ὁ τοίνυν ἐνεστῶς καὶ παρατατικὸς ὡς ἀτελεῖς ἄμφω συγγενεῖς, διὸ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συμφώνοις χρῶνται, οἷον τύπτω ἔτυπτον. ὁ δὲ παρακείμενος καλεῖται ἐνεστῶς συντελικός, τούτου δὲ παρωχημένος ὁ ὑπερσυντέλικος· ἐπεὶ ἐκάτερος τελείως παρόχηται, συγγενεῖς καὶ τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς στοιχείοις χρώμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνονται, οἷον τέτυφα ἐτετύφειν· ὡς περ δὲ ὁ ἐποίουν πλέον ἔχει τὸ παρωχημένον πρὸς τὸν ποιῶ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐπεποιήκειν πρὸς τὸν πεποιήκα.

[The Stoics call the present the present continuing, because it extends both into the past and into the future. Someone saying *poiō* 'I am doing' indicates that he did something and that he will do something. They call the imperfect the past continuing, because someone saying *epoíoun* 'I was doing' indicates that he did something but has not yet finished it, and that he will do it, but in a little time; for if the past takes up most of the time, there is only a little for the future, and if this little is added in we get a completed past, *gégrapha* 'I have written', which is called the perfect because the completion of the activity is recent. So the present and the imperfect are akin to each other in that both are incomplete, which is why they use the same consonants, as with *týptō* 'I beat' and *étupton* 'I was beating'.

But the perfect is called by the Stoics the present completed, and the pluperfect is called the past version of this (past completed). Since both tenses are fully past, they are akin to each other and are shown to use the same written letters, as in *tétypha* 'I have beaten' and *etétyphēin* 'I had beaten'; just as *epoíoun* 'I was doing' has more of past time in it than *poíō* 'I am doing', so has *epēpoíēkein* 'I had done' in relation to *pepoíēka* 'I have done'.]

It cannot be said that Planudes properly separates aspectual and temporal meanings, continuing to associate *árti* [recently] with the perfect, and *met'oligon* [after a little time] with the (middle) future perfect, which he discusses (Bachmann 1828: 7.17–23) without reference to its specifically Attic dialect status. But he does raise important semantic relations between time and context that more readily offer an explication of the different meanings of the past tenses. The first eleven pages of the *Dialogue* deal with verbal tense in general, but the most significant lines come from Bachmann (1828: 6.23–7.14):

Τὸν ἐνεστῶτα τοίνυν ὀριζόμενος οὕτως ἂν εἶποι τις. Ἐνεστῶς ἐστίν, ὅταν καθ' ὃν χρόνον ποιῶ τόδε τι καὶ λέγω ποιεῖν αὐτό· ὡς ὅταν γράφω ἐρωτηθεῖς, τί ποιῶ νῦν, λέγω ὅτι γράφω. Παρατατικός δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν περὶ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τί κατ' ἐκείνον, ὡς ἐνεστῶτα, ἐποίουν λέγω· ὡς ὅταν ἐρωτηθεῖς, τί χθὲς ἀνατέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἐποίουν; λέγω, ὅτι ἔγραφον· τοῦτο γάρ, ὃ νῦν λέγω, ὅτι ἔγραφον, νῦν μὲν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγω, παρελήλυθε· χθὲς δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνατέλλοντος, ἐνεστηκός ἦν· καὶ εἰ μὲ τις ἦρετο τηνικαῦτα, τί ποιῶ, εἶπον ἂν, ὅτι γράφω. Παρακείμενος δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρτι παρεληλυθότος χρόνου λέγω, τί πεποίηκα κατ' αὐτόν· ὡς ὅταν ἄρτι πεπαυμένος τοῦ γράφειν καὶ ἐρωτηθεῖς, τί ἄρτι πεποίηκα, εἶπω, ὅτι γέγραφα. Καλῶς ἄρα καὶ παρακείμενος λέγεται· ὁ γὰρ ἄρτι παρελθὼν χρόνος παράκειται πάντως τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, καὶ ἐγγύς ἐστι τούτου. Ὑπερσυντελικός δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν περὶ χρόνου παρεληλυθότος τί ἄρτι κατ' ἐκείνον ποιῶν ἐπεπαύμην, λέγω· ὡς ὅταν ἐρωτηθεῖς, τί χθὲς ἀνατέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπεποιήκειν, τουτέστι τί ἀνατέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου ποιῶν ἐπεπαύμην, εἶπω, ἐγεγράμην. Ἀόριστος δέ ἐστιν, ὁ πάλαι παυσάμενος καὶ μηδένα ὄρον ἔχων, ἦτοι δήλωσιν, πηνίκα ἐγένετο. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεστῶς ὄρον ἔχει τὸ νῦν· ὁ δὲ παρατατικός τὸ ἀνατέλλοντος τυχὸν τοῦ ἡλίου· ὁ παρακείμενος δὲ τὸ ἄρτι· ὁ δὲ ὑπερσυντελικός καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀνατέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου· ὁ δ' ἀόριστος οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν, οὔτε ἄλλο τι.

[If someone were to define the present tense, he would put it like this: a present tense is used when at a given time I am doing something and say that I am doing it, as when asked, while I am writing, what I am doing now, I say *gráphō* 'I am writing'. An imperfect is when in relation to some time in the past I say what I was doing when that time was present time for me; so when asked what I was doing at sunrise yesterday, I reply *égraphon* 'I was writing'. This activity of which I now say 'I was writing' has passed, but at sunrise yesterday it was present, and if someone had asked me then what I was doing, I would have said 'I am writing'. A perfect tense is when I am speaking about recently elapsed time and what I have done in it; when having just finished writing I am asked what I have just done in it I say *gégrapha* 'I have written'. Very properly the perfect is called the tense that is "near to us", because time recently passed presses close on the present and is near to it. It is a pluperfect tense when in relation to time past I say what I had recently finished doing at that time, as when asked what I had done at sunrise yesterday, that is to say what I had stopped doing at sunrise, I say *egegráphēin* 'I had written'. An aorist tense is about what has ceased without further specification or indication of when it happened. The present tense is restricted to present time, the imperfect to what was happening at sunrise, the perfect to what has recently happened, and the pluperfect also in itself to the time of sunrise. The aorist has none of these constraints, nor any others].

Planudes makes the present tense his starting point. This tense, leaving aside stylistic and oratorical devices like the "historic present", signifies an action going on at the time it is spoken of, so that reference to the time of the action and the speaker's time is one and the same. The imperfect describes an action referred to as still going on at the previous point in time selected by the speaker. With the perfect the important thing is that the event described has already occurred and ended at the time of the speaker's mention of it (we may notice that in English, though not in all languages, a perfect with *have* cannot be well formed if qualified by an adverb or adverbial phrase denoting a discontinuity with the speaker's present: for example \**I have seen him last year* (better *I saw him last year*, as against the fully acceptable *I have seen him this year*). Likewise the pluperfect designates an event already in the past by reference to the speaker's report or assumed report of an event subsequent to



it. Actual distances in time are irrelevant. Planudes did not wholly discard the use of temporal adverbials to give the meanings of different past tenses, but by bringing in two separate time references, speaker's time and the relative time of the event to it, which coincide only in present tenses, he probably came as near to a recognition of the aspectual dimension of the tense system as could be allowed within the "official" Aristotelian unidimensional model.

Adverbs like *árti* and *pálati* may often be contextually appropriate to perfect and pluperfect tenses, but they are in no way implicated by them nor are they part of the meaning of the tenses as grammatical categories. We have noticed this earlier (p. 74), and we may cite additional examples of remote time expressed by the perfect, but always relative to the speaker's present time, and of almost immediate precedence of an event designated by the pluperfect, but again always relative to an event reported as already having occurred in relation to some other past event on the speaker's time scale. The following examples will clarify this: *epimelôs hoi theoi hôn hoi ánthrôpoi déontai kateskeuákasin* 'Carefully the gods have provided those things that men need' (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.3.3), and *tôn d'élipé psychê, katà d'ophthalmôn kéchyth' achlýs* 'his life left him and a mist had come over his eyes' (*Iliad* 5.696).

Stoic tense theory was known to the Greek grammarians, from Dionysius Thrax onwards, and part of their terminology was incorporated into the Greek and Byzantine tradition, but it was not fully understood by non-Stoics, and it is clear that Priscian had a very muddled idea of some parts of their linguistic doctrine (cf. Steinthal 1890: 307). Aristotelian theory was the basis of applied and theoretical linguistics during the classical and post-classical periods of the Greek world, mainly through the immense reputation of the *Téchnē* and the grammar that it summarized and expounded.

Planudes and other Byzantine grammarians were attempting to make explicit their intuitive knowledge and literary usage of the Greek past tenses by elaboration within the single time scale. Their adverbial paraphrases were never adequate or even relevant to this part of grammatical semantics. Planudes comes as far as he could while keeping to the existing system; what matters in his account is the extension (completion and incompleteness) of reported events in relation to a separate time frame, here exemplified by yesterday's sunrise. The temporal adverbs *árti*, *pálati*, and the like could have been omitted, leaving his account no less explicit and valid (the reader may further consult Lallot 1985a and Robins 1988a). Within the Aristotelian-Alexandrian theory and without discard-

ing it, Maximus Planudes went beyond what others had attempted and as far as he could reasonably be expected to have gone.

In view of the importance of Maximus Planudes among the grammarians of the Byzantine Age, it would be most helpful if his two grammatical works, the *Dialogue* and *Syntax*, edited by Bachmann more than a century and a half ago, were critically reedited in the light of subsequent and current research on the lines so well laid by Donnet (1967b, 1982).

## Chapter 12

### The Byzantine contribution to the study of Greek grammar in the Renaissance

Even the severest critics of the level of scholarship and scholarly achievement in Byzantine times all admit to the unique debt that the revival of Greek studies in the West owes to their preservation and editing of classical Greek texts, their unbroken tradition of Greek literary education, and in the latter centuries of the Eastern Empire the personal contacts, mostly in Italy, between Byzantine and western teachers.

"The Renaissance" is a term of multiple meanings and many aspects; it cannot be regarded as a unitary event, but nevertheless the whole concept, along with the rather later Reformation, constitutes the accepted beginnings of modern European history and of the modern world (cf. Ferguson 1948; Burke 1987). Here we are concerned with one part of the linguistic history of the Renaissance, the revival of Greek studies in western Europe, itself a part of the general resurgence of classical Greek and Latin learning that gave rise to the term Renaissance itself. This revival of Greek both encouraged, and was encouraged by, the conviction, first felt in Italy and then through the rest of Europe, that it was most desirable, indeed necessary, for the Greek language and literature to be included in the syllabus of educated people (cf. in general Percival 1975; Knös 1945; Geanakoplos 1962; on the revival of Greek studies in France, see Nolhac 1888 and Stevens 1950). Within this our interest is centred on the contribution made by Byzantine grammarians to the study of Greek grammar in the early Renaissance period (up to c. 1500; cf. Reynolds–Wilson 1978: 130–132). While 1453 was a climacteric year for East and West, the process of rehellenizing Italy and western Europe was a more gradual one, spread over many years (cf. Runciman 1970 b).

Scholarship in any field is spread by the arrival of teachers themselves into territory not hitherto under their influence and by the new availability within it of written texts. The collection, by purchase or pillage, of classical Greek texts in manuscript began as early as the Latin seizure of Constantinople in 1204. Thereafter the weakness of the restored Byzantine Empire after 1261 engendered diplomatic and military contacts as Byzantium sought help against the increasing power of the Turks. Scholars from the Eastern Empire were invited as teachers of Greek to Italy, and

during the fifteenth century teachers were among the Greek refugees seeking asylum in the West from the conquering Turks. Among prominent Byzantine texts Apollonius was known from the fifteenth century, but not the *Téchnē*, which first appeared in the eighteenth century.

The first invited teacher of Greek was Manuel Chrysoloras (1350–1415), who came to Florence in 1397 and was the author of a number of books, most notably in this context the *Erōtēmata* [Questions], drawing on an established method of teaching in Antiquity, catechistic questions and answers embodying elementary instruction. Along with the invitation or acceptance of Greek scholars, translations of Greek works into Latin were officially encouraged by the Papal court. But in this regard, of greater importance than anything hitherto available in east and west was the invention of printing and the consequent much wider distribution of books of all sorts. Printing is not the only means by which texts can be produced and multiplied; the separately composed manuscripts of Priscian's *Institutiones* number several hundreds (Passalacqua 1978). But none the less the printed book transformed the teaching and cultivation of scholarship in all its forms as never before, and it was in itself part of the Renaissance of learning (on actual teaching methods, see Sabbadini 1922).

We may therefore consider the grammatical works of Byzantine grammarians that were in print by the year 1500. These do not include Maximus Planudes, who remained unedited until the nineteenth century, though he was obviously known to his successors and his book on transitive and intransitive verbs is cited by the fifteenth-century Lascaris (1608: 13). One of his friends and pupils, Moschopoulus, was in print with an elementary grammar by 1493 (Percival 1975); other grammarians were Chalkondyles (1424–1511), also in print in 1493, Constantine Lascaris (1434–1501, 1476), Theodore of Gaza (1400–1475, 1495), who were also all printed in Latin translations during the sixteenth century (Krumbacher 1897: 581), and the last two, with Syncellus, in print in 1525, have been recognized as the main sources of an early sixteenth-century Latin grammar of Greek (Donnet 1977).

One of the earliest and probably the most important agent in the revival of systematic and structured teaching of Greek in Italy and thence in all western Europe was Chrysoloras. Like several other Byzantine grammarians he was a significant figure in ecclesiastical and political affairs. A pupil of Gemistus Pletho (see p. 17), he was sent at the end of the fourteenth century by the Byzantine Emperor John VIII to Italy to seek reconciliation between the Latin and the Greek Churches and assis-

tance against the Turks. For much of the rest of his life he remained in Italy, but he also travelled widely in other European countries (cf. further on his life Cammelli 1941).

Apart from the *Erōtēmata* Chrysoloras made Latin translations of Homer and of Plato's *Republic*, and in a letter to the Byzantine Emperor an interesting comparison (*Sýgkrisis*) of the Old Rome and the New Rome (Constantinople) for the Byzantine Emperor. In it he praised the architectural, artistic and other cultural splendours of both cities, likened respectively to mother and daughter mutually strengthening each other's renown, and both glorying in their common heritage. For these reasons he justified his urgent plea for political collaboration (Chrysoloras 1655).

Chrysoloras's *Sýnkrisis* and his *Erōtēmata*, though of no great theoretical depth or insight, may be seen in the same light of history as Priscian's *Institutiones* around nine hundred years before. Just as his predecessor served at once as the summarizer of Graeco-Roman achievement in grammatical research and exposition and also as the basis for the teaching of grammar and thinking about grammar in both East and West, Chrysoloras's grammar of Greek represents an end point in the long tradition of Byzantine scholarship in its self-imposed and not ignoble task of sustaining and preserving the heritage of classical Greek literature and the language of its literature in the changed and changing conditions that had arisen from the separation of the two Empires and the subsequent collapse of the Western Empire as it had been known and accepted. Chrysoloras became the standard-bearer in the return of the Grecian legacy to the western shores.

Though probably written by 1397, the first appearance of the *Erōtēmata* in print was in a bilingual summary by Guarino Veronese (c. 1475) on which he had been working during much of the fifteenth century. The original text was first published about 1496 (Pertusi 1962; Percival 1975: 245–247). Chrysoloras's grammar embodies the accepted tradition handed down from the *Téchnē*, with little or no theoretical discussion or explanation. This is not necessarily a defect in the book, given the requirements of his pupils in whose interests he had originally composed it. From its early summary in Latin and Greek we can assess its suitability for the educational needs so strongly felt in his time by the upper classes in early Renaissance Italy. He is known to have attracted large numbers of eager students to his classes, as did Demetrius Chalcondyles a century later (cf. Sandys 1958.2: 64).

The *Erōtēmata* begins with the letters and their phonetic values, followed by the syllable and its structure after the definition of the word

(*léxis*) as *méros sēmantikōn eláchiston toú katà sýntaxin lógou* [the minimal semantic component of a syntactically constructed sentence]. This is balanced by the subsequent definition of the sentence (Chrysoloras 1512: 6): *Tí esti lógos? Léxeōn sýnthesis diánoian autotelē dēloûsa* [What is a sentence? A combination of words expressing a complete thought]. Both are almost word-for-word equivalents of those given in the *Téchnē* (section 11). In a rather different ordering the prosodies and the *páthē* [modifications, punctuations] come between the word and the sentence definitions, listed as the written accents and their phonetic values in classical Greek, distinctive length and shortness of vowels, the rough (aspirated) and smooth breathings, and the punctuation marks, though nothing is said about the junctural features that they carried. All this wholly follows the listing of the prosodies in the scholia on the *Téchnē* (cf. Hilgard 1901: 124.27–125.33).

The traditional eight word classes are listed in question and answer form; but the article, though listed in its traditional place, is described morphologically immediately after the noun and before the exposition of noun inflections and the sections on the verb. This may reflect the inflectional similarities between noun and article (both preposed *ho* 'the' and postposed *hós* 'who'), as against the traditional ordering in the *Téchnē*, which presumably depended on the sort of hierarchy suggested for the different word classes. This is consistent with some earlier Byzantine practice. The *Kanónes* treated nouns and definite articles together, as they marked the gender of each noun displayed. Planudes lists the word classes in the traditional order of the *Téchnē*, but he puts the syntax of the article in prime place (Bachmann 1828: 117, 126). Naturally Chrysoloras, a grammarian working in a Latinate context, would need to give a prominent place to this class of words, as it was unrepresented in Latin.

The following extract exemplifies the style and content of the *Erōtēmata* (1512: 6–7):

Πόσα μέρη τοῦ λόγου; ὀκτώ, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἄνωγυμία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα, καὶ σύνδεσμος.

Πόσα παρέπεται τῷ ὀνόματι; πέντε, γένη, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, καὶ πτώσεις.

Πόσα γένη; τρία, ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν καὶ οὐδέτερον.

Τί ἐστὶν ἀρσενικόν γένος; οὐ προτάσσεται κατ' εὐθείαν, καὶ ἐνικὴν πῶσιν ἄρθρον τὸ ὄ, οἶον ὁ Αἴας.

Τί ἐστὶ θηλυκόν γένος; οὐ προτάσσεται κατ' εὐθείαν καὶ ἐνικὴν πῶσιν ἄρθρον τὸ ἦ, οἶον ἡ μοῦσα.

Τί ἐστὶν οὐδέτερον γένος; οὐ προτάσσεται κατ' εὐθείαν καὶ ἐνικὴν πῶσιν ἄρθρον τὸ τὸ, οἶον τὸ βῆμα.

Πόσα δὲ εἶδη; δύο, πρωτότυπον καὶ παράγωγον.

Πόσα σχήματα; τρία, ἀπλοῦν, σύνθετον, παρασύνθετον.

Πόσοι ἀριθμοί; τρεῖς, ἐνικός, δυικός, καὶ πληθυντικός.

Πόσαι πτώσεις; πέντε, ὀρθή, ἢ καὶ εὐθεία λέγεται, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, καὶ κλητική.

Τῶν ἄρθρων, τὰ μὲν προτακτικά τὰ δὲ ὑποτακτικά.

Προτακτικά μὲν ἀρσενικά, εἰσὶ ταῦτα: ἐνικά ἢ εὐθεία ὄ, ἡ γενική τοῦ, ἢ δοτική τῷ, ἢ αἰτιατική τόν. δυικά ἢ εὐθεία καὶ αἰτιατική τῶ, ἢ γενική καὶ δοτική τοῖν. Πληθυντικά, ἢ εὐθεία οἱ, ἢ γενική τῶν, ἢ δοτική τοῖς, ἢ αἰτιατική, τούς.

Ἐποτακτικά δὲ ἀρσενικά, ἐνικά: ταῦτα ὄς, οὐ, ῶ, ὄν. Δ. ὦ, οἶν. Π. οἶ, ὄν, οἶς, οὐς.

Ἄρθρα θηλυκά προτακτικά, ἐνικά, ἢ, τῆς, τῇ, τήν. Δ. τά, ταῖν.

Π. αἶ, τῶν, ταῖς, τάς. ὑποτακτικά, ἐνικά, ἦ, ἦς, ἦ, ἦν. Δ. ἄ, αἶν.

Π. αἶ, ὄν, αἶς, ἄς.

Ἄρθρα δὲ οὐδέτερα προτακτικά. ἐνικά, τό, τοῦ, τῷ, τό. Δ. τῶ, τοῖν. Π. τά, τῶν, τοῖς, τά.

Ἐποτακτικά, ἐνικά, ὄ, οὐ, ῶ, ὄ. Δ. ὦ, οἶν. Π. ἄ, ὄν, οἶς, ἄ.

Κλητικόν δὲ ἐπίρρημα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσιν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ὦ.

Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν κλίνοντα ἰσοσυλλάβως, οἶον Αἰνείας, Αἰνείου: τὰ δὲ περιττοσυλλάβως, οἶον Αἴας, Αἴαντος, ὥστε καλεῖσθω ἢ μὲν, κλίσις ἰσοσύλλαβος, ἢ δὲ, περιττοσύλλαβος.

Πόσαι κλίσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων; δέκα: πέντε μὲν ἀπλαῖ καὶ συναίρετοι, ὧν τέσσαρα μὲν ἰσοσύλλαβοι, μία δὲ περιττοσύλλαβος: πέντε δὲ συνηρημένοι ἀπὸ τῆς πέμπτης καὶ περιττοσυλλάβου γινόμενοι.

Πρώτη κλίσις τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἀρσενικοῖς μόνοις ἰσοσύλλαβος δηλονότι τινῶν εἰς ᾗς ἢ εἰς ἧς διὰ τοῦ ἠ ληγόντων ἀρσενικῶν ὀνομάτων, ὧν ἡ γενική εἰς οὔ, καὶ ἡ δοτική εἰς τὸ τῆς εὐθείας τελικόν φωνῆεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτιατική εἰς ῥ μετὰ τοῦ φωνήεντος τῆς εὐθείας λήγει: ὁ κοινόν ἐστὶ πασῶν τῶν ἰσοσυλλάβων κλίσεων. ταύτης δὲ κανόνες.

ὀρθή καὶ εὐθεία τῶν ἐνικῶν, ὁ Αἰνείας, ἡ γενική τοῦ Αἰνείου, ἢ δὲ δοτική τῷ Αἰνείᾳ, ἢ αἰτιατική τὸν Αἰνείαν, ἢ κλητική ὦ Αἰνεία καὶ ὦ Αἰνείας.

ὁ προφήτης, τοῦ προφήτου, τῷ προφήτῃ, τὸν προφήτην, ὦ προφήτα.

[How many parts of speech (word classes) are there? Eight. Noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, and conjunction.

What formal categories are applicable to the noun? Five: gender, subclass, form, number, and case.

How many genders are there? Three: masculine, feminine, and neuter.

What is the masculine gender? It comprises nouns that in the nominative singular case are preceded by *ho* 'the', for example *ho Aias* '(the) Ajax'.

What is the feminine gender? It comprises nouns that in the nominative singular case are preceded by *hē* 'the', for example, *hē moûsa* 'the muse'.

What is the neuter gender? It comprises nouns that in the nominative singular case are preceded by *tó* 'the', for example *tò bêma* 'the step, the threshold'.

How many subclasses? Two: primary and derived.

How many forms? Three: simple, compound, and decompound.

How many numbers? Three: singular, dual, and plural.

How many cases? Five: nominative ("upright"), genitive, dative, accusative, and vocative.

There is a preposed and a postposed article. These are the preposed masculine forms: singular, nominative *ho*, genitive *toû*, dative *tôî*, accusative *tón*; dual nominative and accusative *tô*, genitive and dative *toîn*; plural, nominative *hoi*, genitive *tôn*, dative *toîs*, accusative *toûs*.

Postposed: masculine singular: *hós*, *hoû*, *hôi*, *hón*. Dual: *hó*, *hoîn*. Plural: *hoi*, *hôn*, *hoîs*, *hoús*.

Feminine preposed article: Singular: *hē*, *tēs*, *tēi*, *tén*. Dual: *tá*, *taîn*. Plural: *hai*, *tôn*, *taîs*, *tás*.

Postposed: Singular: *hē*, *hēs*, *hēi*, *hén*. Dual *há*, *haîn*. Plural: *hai*, *hôn*, *haîs*, *hás*.

Neuter preposed article. Singular: *tó*, *toû*, *tôî*, *tó*. Dual: *tó*, *toîn*. Plural: *tá*, *tôn*, *toîs*, *tá*.

Postposed. Singular: *hó*, *hoû*, *hôi*, *hó*. Dual: *hó*, *hoîn*. Plural: *há*, *hôn*, *hoîs*, *há*.

The vocative adverb has the same form in all genders and in all numbers: *ô*.

Some nouns have parisyllabic inflections, such as *Aineias* 'Aeneas', genitive *Aeneiou*, and some have imparisyllabic inflections,

such as *Aias*, genitive *Aiantos* 'Ajax'. So we should call the one set parisyllabic and the other imparisyllabic.

How many declensions of nouns are there? Ten; five are simple and uncontracted, of which four are parisyllabic and one imparisyllabic. Five contracted declensions derive from the fifth (simple) declension and are underlyingly imparisyllabic.

The first declension of nouns is found only in the masculine gender and is parisyllabic; some end in *-as*, or *-ēs* inflecting with *ē*. Their genitive ends in *-ou*, their dative takes the final vowel of the nominative, and the accusative takes *-n* following this vowel. This is common to all the parisyllabic declensions.

Paradigms: nominative singular *ho Aeneias*, genitive *toû Aeneiou*, dative *tôî Aeneiai*, accusative *tón Aeneían*, vocative *ô Aeneía* and *ô Aeneías* ...

*ho prophētēs* 'the prophet', (*toû prophētou*, *tôî prophētēi*, *tón prophētēn*, *ô prophēta*).

In the *Erōtēmata* there is less emphasis on definitions of the word classes, which the *Tēchnē* had treated so importantly; the noun, along with some others is left undefined, but the verb is defined on traditional lines as *méros lógou áptōton enérgeian è páthos sēmaînon* [a part of speech without case inflection signifying an action or a being acted upon]. What we do find, presumably catering for pupils speaking Italian as their first language who have learned Latin at school and are now learning Greek as a classical language, are much fuller paradigms of the inflectional forms, on the lines of the Byzantine *Kanónes*.

The classification of the definite (preposed) article as the criterion for gender discrimination was a standard Byzantine practice and the grammarians were anxious to distinguish grammatical gender from animacy and sex. A scholiast on the *Tēchnē* writes (Hilgard 1901: 218.12–14): *Deî gàr eidénai hōti tēn diákrisin tōn genōn hē grammatikē ou katà tēn alētheian poieî, allà katà tēn syntaxin tōn árthrōn* [It must be understood that grammar does not make the distinction between the genders by reference to the real world but according to their construction with the articles]. In the absence of an article in Latin Priscian had used *hic*, *haec*, *hoc* 'this' in a similar discriminatory manner (Kcil 1855: 150.1–151.14).

The further distinction between the subsets of nominal *eidē* [subclasses] and *schēmata* [forms], ignored here, are seen in the *Tēchnē* and its scholia (section 12; Hilgard 1901: 364.1–399.17).

The careful inclusion of dual forms is another indication of the classical context in which the Byzantines had been working and which determined

the form of grammar that Chrysoloras presented to his western pupils. The dual number, already fairly infrequent in classical Greek, had virtually disappeared after Hellenistic times.

The status of the interjection  $\hat{\omicron}$  had been long debated. The *Téchnē* (section 16; cf. pp. 75–76) had classed it as the vocative case of the article; this met objections as early as Apollonius (cf. Schneider 1878: 6.11–12), but mainly on morphological grounds, and it was classed as an adverb, *klētikōn epirrēmata* [vocative adverb] by several commentators (e.g. Hilgard 1901: 75.3–4, 76.11, 258.13–14), with special reference to its association with the vocative case. Though Priscian, like other Latin grammarians had recognized the interjection as a separate class of words (see p. 98), the Byzantine Greeks, perhaps out of a desire to preserve the time-honoured number of eight classes along with their innate conservatism, never got around to this.

The ordering of inflections by reference to an assumed primary nominative case form is a continuation of the practice in the classical world and in Byzantium which may be traced back to Aristotle's original use of one of the earliest technical terms in linguistics, *ptōsis* [falling], to cover all grammatically relevant variations in word forms as derivations from a single basic form (cf. p. 215). In this form of statement Chrysoloras rather leaves aside the vocalic element *iōta* [i] in the subscript letter forms  $\alpha$ ,  $\eta$ , and  $\phi$ . These were, in fact, so written to indicate that the *iōta* had no phonetic value in classical Greek (see further Allen 1974: 80–83). It is, of course graphically more prominent in the standard roman transcription than in the actual Greek forms.

The most obvious breach with earlier descriptive and didactic usage is seen in Chrysoloras's grouping of the noun inflections into specifically numbered declensions, using *klisis* both in its general sense of 'inflection' and with particular reference to nominal inflections (Latin *declinationes*). This had been the standard practice in Latin grammar writing since the time of Donatus, at least, and the set of five such declensions with their various subclassifications and members seen in Priscian (Keil 1855: 283–368) has continued unaltered into the present-day teaching of Latin. The origin of the identification of Latin declensions can be traced back to Varro (Taylor 1990; cf. pp. 115–116). Greek verbs had been comparably put into conjugations (*syzygiai*) since the *Téchnē*, but Theodosius and his commentators had simply listed the various paradigmatically different sets of nouns in an order numbering as many as fifty-six and divided in the first instance by the three genders. This uneconomical

system had been criticized in the West as early as the thirteenth century by Roger Bacon (Nolan–Hirsh 1902: 146).

The late Byzantine specification of *klisis* beyond inflection in general may have been a consequence of Latin practice as a result of the closer contacts between the Latin West and the Greek East at the time of the beginning of the Renaissance. Chrysoloras's listing was the one fairly generally set forth by others in this period, including Theodore of Gaza, though there are minor differences in the allocation of nouns within the declensions.

The first division is made between *onómata isosýllaba* [parisyllabic nouns], having the same number of syllables in all their case forms, e.g. *lógos* 'sentence' *lógon*, *lógon*, *lógon*, and *onómata perittosýllaba* [imparisyllabic nouns], having one more syllable in their forms other than the nominative singular, e.g. *phýlax* 'guard', *phýlakos*, *phýlaka*, *phýlakas*. This meant that nouns like *Aías* 'Ajax', genitive *Aiantos*, were quite distinct from nouns like *kochlías* 'snail', genitive *kochliou*, though they had been listed one after the other by Theodosius on the ground of their gender and nominative singular forms (Hilgard 1894: 3–5). The declensions are given first and the genders of the nouns in each one are listed for each one. There are ten declensions, and the full set is given in Chrysoloras 1512: 8–31, as follows:

Simple,	parisyllabic:	1. <i>Aeneías</i> , <i>prophētēs</i> 'prophet' m. ( <i>Aeneíou</i> , <i>prophētou</i> )		
		2. <i>maíā</i> '(good) mother' ( <i>maías</i> ) f. <i>moúsa</i> 'muse' ( <i>moúsēs</i> ) f. <i>timé</i> 'honour' ( <i>timēs</i> ) f. <i>hēméra</i> 'day' ( <i>hēméras</i> ) f.		
		3. <i>Meneleōs</i> 'Menelaus' ( <i>Meneleō</i> ) m. <i>hálōs</i> 'threshing floor' ( <i>hálō</i> ) f. <i>eúgeōn</i> 'fertile' (neuter) ( <i>eúgeō</i> ) n.		
		4. <i>lógos</i> 'sentence' ( <i>lógon</i> ) m. <i>hodós</i> 'road' ( <i>hodoū</i> ) f. <i>xýlon</i> 'piece of wood' ( <i>xýlou</i> ) n.		
		imparisyllabic:	5. <i>Aías</i> ( <i>Aiantos</i> ) m. <i>trygón</i> 'turtle-dove' ( <i>trygónos</i> ) f. <i>bēma</i> 'step' ( <i>bēmatos</i> ) n. <i>Páris</i> 'Paris' ( <i>Páridos</i> ) m.	

<i>bótrys</i> 'bunch of grapes' ( <i>bótryos</i> )	f.
<i>érōs</i> 'love' ( <i>érōtos</i> )	m.
<i>Láchēs</i> 'Laches' ( <i>Láchētos</i> )	m.
etc.	

The second set of five declensions are essentially nouns that in other dialects have an imparisyllabic genitive singular, in Attic Greek suffering contraction or crasis, as in *Dēmōsthēnēs*, *Dēmōsthēneos* contracted to *Dēmōsthēnous*. The special place accorded to nouns like this arises from two sources, the great prestige of Attic Greek as the dialect of most Greek literature and the ancestor of the *koinē* used generally by educated Byzantines, and the importance attached to the genitive singular in nominal case paradigms (cf. p. 116). In view of their origin in imparisyllabic nouns they were "derived from the fifth declension".

(1) <i>Dēmōsthēnēs</i> ( <i>Dēmōsthēneos</i> , <i>Dēmōsthēnous</i> )	m.
<i>alēthēs</i> 'true' ( <i>alēthēos</i> , <i>alēthoūs</i> )	m.
<i>teíchos</i> 'wall' ( <i>teícheos</i> , <i>teíchous</i> )	n.
(2) <i>óphis</i> 'snake' ( <i>óphios</i> , <i>ópheōs</i> )	m.
<i>pólis</i> 'city' ( <i>pólios</i> , <i>póleōs</i> )	f.
<i>sinēpī</i> 'mustard' ( <i>sinēpīos</i> , <i>sinēpeōs</i> )	n.
(3) <i>basileús</i> 'king' ( <i>basiléos</i> , <i>basiléōs</i> )	m.
(4) <i>Lētō</i> 'Leto' ( <i>Lētóos</i> , <i>Lētóūs</i> )	f.
<i>aidós</i> 'shame' ( <i>aidóos</i> , <i>aidoūs</i> )	f.
(5) <i>kréas</i> 'flesh' ( <i>kréatos</i> , <i>kréōs</i> )	n.

This systematization of noun inflections into a set number of declensions, though Latinate in conception, does not have much correspondence with numerically comparable Latin declensions. Greek nouns in *-os*, for example, belong to the fourth declension but the Latin nouns in *-us* are mostly in the second declension (genitive *-i*), the declension to which all Greek nouns in *-os* were assigned (*philósophos*, *philosophus* 'philosopher' etc.). In today's teaching the Greek declensions are much more closely aligned with the Latin ones.

A feature of the morphological description of the Greek verb, apparent throughout the Byzantine period, was faithfully passed on to the west by Chrysoloras, in the distinction between the subjunctive and optative mood forms. As we know, these are found regularly in Greek, but such a formal distinction is unknown in Latin. The *Téchnē* does no more than list the two in the five *enklíseis* [moods] as *euktikē* [optative] and *hypotaktikē*

[subjunctive], the translations being the exact equivalents of the Greek names chosen. These names seem to have misled the Greeks into making an inaccurate assessment of their syntactic functions. Throughout the later tradition, optatives are listed and glossed only in their independent verbal use as expressions of wishes and the like, and subjunctive forms are correspondingly listed and glossed in their subordinative uses, usually listed together with a subordinating conjunction such as *eán* 'if' (e.g. in a scholion on the *Téchnē* (Hilgard 1901: 1–19; in the *Kanónes* and in Choeroboscus's commentary on them, Hilgard 1889: 72.9–76.23, 1894: 8.19–9.3). This, of course, flies in the face of frequent uses of the subjunctive as a main verb, as in *iōmen* 'let's go', *mē thaumásēte* 'do not be surprised', and of the optative in a purely subordinating role, as in reported speech after a past tense main verb, as in *élege ... hótí ... hēttēménoi eīen* 'he said that they had been defeated' (Xenophon, *Hellenica* vii.1,35; cf. p. 70). The Greek grammatical data on which this paragraph is based may be conveniently consulted in Goodwin (1912), now a classic textbook on Greek grammar.

Priscian, writing early in the Byzantine tradition treats the Latin data in essentially the same way. Though there is no morphological difference between a subjunctive and an optative paradigm, what he does is to identify the use of subjunctival forms in independent or main verb clauses as optatives, and the same forms used subordinately as subjunctives. His relevant passage is as follows (Keil 1855: 424.8–14):

Tertius (modus) est optativus, qui quamvis et temporibus et personis perfectior videatur esse imperativo, tamen eget adverbio optandi, ut plenum significet sensum, et quod, qui optat, inferior videtur esse imperante: itaque iure post imperativum ponitur.

Quartus est subiunctivus, qui eget non modo adverbio vel conjunctione, verum etiam altero verbo, ut perfectum significat sensum.

[The third mood is the optative, which, although seemingly more complete in tenses and persons than the imperative, needs nevertheless an adverb of wishing in order to convey its full meaning, and the person expressing the wish is seen to be below the rank of one who gives an order. Therefore the optative mood is put after the imperative.]

The fourth mood is the subjunctive, which requires not only an adverb or a conjunction, but in addition another verb, to express a complete meaning.]

Priscian's account is entirely straightforward, but it is uneconomical, and the same charge of "supervacuity" could be made against one of his two moods that he himself made against a seventh, instrumental, case in Latin nouns (Keil 1855: 190.14–16):

Uno enim, non duobus, Latini casibus superant Graecos. Supervacuum faciunt igitur, qui septimum addunt, qui nulla differentia vocis in ullo nomine distet a sexto.

[The Latin language exceeds the Greek language by one, not two, cases. Those therefore who add a seventh case, which is not separated from the sixth (ablative) case by any formal difference in any noun, create something that is wholly redundant (*supervacuum*).]

The reference was a suggestion by Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 1.4.2–3, 26) for recognizing a distinction of cases in Latin between the instrumental and the other meanings of the ablative case (see p. 216).

Grammar as a whole in Antiquity had been driven all through its history by morphological analysis. The *Téchnē*, whose origins at least lie around 100 B.C., had set down an agreed framework of Greek morphology and morphologically based word classes, which with their relevant categories were taken over by Apollonius around three centuries later in his syntactic studies and by the Romans when they turned their attention to the grammatical description of their own language (cf. Donnet 1967 a; cf. chapter 3).

This may have been inevitable, but it was left to the West, particularly to the scholastic grammarians of the later Middle Ages, to develop an autonomous syntax, at which the Stoics had aimed, though without much effect, other than in some terminology, on the mainline course of Graeco-Latin grammatical studies. The emphasis on a prior morphology must be held largely responsible for the continued European popular view that it was inflections that constituted the heart of grammar, in the case of Latin grammar, the learning of the declensional paradigms and the "principal parts" of verbs. It is still possible to hear in an entirely serious conversation that modern English to its credit "has far less" grammar than its forebear Anglo-Saxon. But in the words of a scholastic grammarian (Thurot 1868: 213) *Studium grammaticorum praecipue circa constructionem versatur* [The grammarians' studies are principally concerned with syntax], a view shared by many linguists today as evidenced by the frequent use of the term "syntax" to include traditionally morphologically treated data.

The *Téchnē*, for all its historical importance, which was immense, contained no section on syntax. Chrysoloras's *Erôtémata*, for all its historical importance at the other end of Byzantine grammatical studies, does not contain one either. Theodore of Gaza, however, devoted the fourth book of his *Introduction* to syntax (Theodore 1525: 100–144). The Byzantines did not neglect syntax, but they subordinated it to morphology.

Constantine Lascaris was one of the Greek teachers of Greek in fifteenth century Italy. After a period of imprisonment by the Turks after the capture of Constantinople, he travelled to various Greek and Italian cities, giving lessons in Greek and copying manuscripts, despite the coming of the printing press, apparently to relieve his poverty. Among other linguistic and literary works he compiled a grammar of Greek, *A summary of the eight parts of speech*, first published in 1476, one of the first books actually printed in Greek letters.

His grammar follows the traditional lines now well established in Byzantine grammar books. It includes an account of the uses of the three oblique cases in their constructions with verbs, pointing to differences in meanings correlated with differences in case. Though more discursive than Chrysoloras he is not a theoretician, and puts much of his effort into listing various classes of verbs in construction with each case, and listing their major inflectional paradigms by reference to their first person singular forms, also taking note of some irregular verbs in the subclasses. Like Chrysoloras his style shows that he was primarily considering the needs of non-Greek learners of classical Greek.

The following extract gives a picture of his work (Lascaris 1608: 6, 10–23):

Τῶν ῥημάτων τὰ εἰς σωματικὴν διάθεσιν ἀναφερόμενα αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσεται, οἷον γυμνάζω, τρίβω, χαλῶ, νίπτω

— — — — —

Ῥῆμα ἐνεργητικὸν ἐστὶ κυρίως τὸ λήγον εἰς ᾧ, καὶ σχηματίζον παθητικὸν εἰς μαί, οἷον φιλῶ, φιλοῦμαι. τούτου δ' ἐξαχῶς συντασσομένου, τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος τῶν ἐνεργητικῶν ἀπαιτεῖ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνομαστικὴν προσώπου ἐνεργοῦντος, ἥτις φύσει παντὶ ῥήματι προεπινοεῖται, καὶ μεθ' αὐτὸ αἰτιατικὴν προσώπου πάσχοντος, οἷον ὁ καθηγητὴς φιλεῖ τὸν μαθητήν. Ἀγαπάω, ᾧ, ὁ παρατατικὸς ἡγάπαον, ὦν, ὁ παρακείμενος ἡγάπηκα, ὁ ἀόριστος ἡγάπησα, ὁ μέλλον ἀγαπήσω.



Συντάσσεται δὲ καὶ δοτικῇ, ὅτε ἀρκεῖσθαι σημαίνει, οἷον ἀγαπᾶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἀντὶ ἀρκεῖται. φιλέω, ω, ὁ παρακείμενος, πεφίληκα, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐφίλησα. ὁ μέλλον φιλήσω. Συντάσσεται δὲ καὶ ἀπαρεμφάτω, ὅτε τὸ εἴωθε σημαίνει, οἷον φιλεῖ ἀναγινώσκειν, ἀντὶ εἴωθε. στέργω, ὁ ἀόριστος ἔστεργα, ὁ μέλλον στέρξω, ἀντὶ ἀγαπᾶ, αἰτιατικῇ. στέργω δὲ τὸ ἐμμένω καὶ πρόσκειμαι, δοτικῇ. Ποθέω, ποθῶ, ὁ παρακείμενος πεπόθηκα, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐπόθησα, ὁ μέλλον ποθήσω. τὸ δὲ ἀγαπᾶ πλεον τοῦ φιλεῖν σημαίνει, καὶ φιλῶ μὲν παρόντα, ποθῶ δὲ ἀπόντα. τὸ δὲ ἐρῶ συνώνυμον ὄν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ διαβολῆς λαμβάνεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γενικῇ συντάσσεται φησὶν ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος. ὅτε δὲ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ κεῖται, πλεον τοῦ φιλεῖν σημαίνει. ὅθεν καὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν βασιλέα, φασὶ, μὴ μόνον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων φιλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρᾶσθαι.

Μισέω, μισῶ, ὁ παρακείμενος μεμίσηκα, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐμίσησα, ὁ μέλλον μισήσω. βλάπτω, ὁ ἀόριστος ἔβλαψα, ὁ μέλλον βλάψω. τύπτω ὁ ἀόριστος ἔτυψα, ὁ μέλλον τύψω. καταλύω, ὁ παρακείμενος καταλέλυκα, ὁ ἀόριστος κατέλυσα, ὁ μέλλον καταλύσω, ἀντὶ ἀφανίζω. καταλύω δὲ εἰς τὸ ξενοδοχεῖον, τὸ καταλύω παρὰ τῷ ξένῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ ξενίζομαι, ὅθεν καὶ κατάλυμα ἢ πρόσκαιρος κατοικία.

Ἔχω ἀνόμαλον, οὗ ὁ μέλλον ἔξω, ὁ παρακείμενος ἔσχηκα, ὁ δὲ δευτέρος ἀόριστος ἔσχον. ἀπὸ τοῦ χέω, χῶ, οὗ ὁ μέλλον χήσω. ἔχω δὲ τὸ κέκτημαι, τὸ κρατῶ, τὸ οἰκῶ, τὸ φορῶ, τὸ ἐλαύνω, αἰτιατικῇ. ἔχω τὸ δύναμαι ἀπαρεμφάτω, ἔχω ποιεῖν, ἀντὶ δύναμαι, ἔχω τὸ διακείμαι ἐπιρρήματι καὶ γενικῇ, εὖ ἔχω, καὶ οὕτω γνώμης ἔχω, καὶ καλῶς ἔχω τοῦ σώματος, καὶ καλῶς ἔχω τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καλῶς ἔχει μοι ὁ δεῖνα, ἀντὶ ἐπιτήδειός μοι ἐστίν. ἔχομαι δὲ σου, ἀντὶ ἄπτομαι, κοινὸν μετὰ γενικῆς.

Θαυμάζω, ὁ παρακείμενος τεθαύμακα, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐθαύμασα, ὁ μέλλον θαυμάσω ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπαινῶ, θαυμάζω δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπὶ κατηγορίας, καὶ ἔτι θαυμάζω τὸν ἄνδρα σπανίως. ὕμνῶ ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ὁ ἀόριστος ὕμνησα, ὁ μέλλον ὕμνήσω. Ἐπαινῶ λόγους, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐπήνεσα, ὁ μέλλον ἐπαινέσω. Ἐγκωμιάζω γραφῇ, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐνεκωμίασα, ὁ μέλλον ἐγκωμιάσω. Ζηλώω, ζηλῶ, τὸ ἐπαινῶ, καὶ μμοῦμαι, καὶ φθονῶ, ὁ ἀόριστος ἐζήλωσα, ὁ μέλλον ζηλώσω. Πνώσκω ἀνόμαλον, ὁ παρατατικὸς ἐγίνωσκον καὶ πλεον οὗ, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γνώω, ῶ, καὶ γνῶμι, ὁ παρακείμενος ἐγνώκα, ὁ δευτέρος ἀόριστος ἔγνων, ὁ μέλλον γνώσομαι, καὶ ἔτι ἀναγινώσκω τὸ βιβλίον, καὶ διαγινώσκω, συγγινώσκω σοι τὰς ἀμαρτίας, καὶ καταγινώσκω σου ἀμαθίαν καὶ μεταγινώσκω ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις.

τὸ δὲ ἀπογινώσκω ποτὲ μὲν γενικῇ ποτὲ δὲ αἰτιατικῇ. Ὅράω, ῶ, ὁ παρατατικὸς ἐώραον, ὠν, ὁ παρακείμενος ἐώρακα. Ἔτι δὲ τὸ βλέπω καὶ εἶδον ἀόριστος δευτέρος. Ἀπατάω, ῶ, ὁ ἀόριστος ἠπάτησα, ὁ μέλλον ἀπατήσω. Ἀτιμάζω, ὁ ἀόριστος ἠτίμασα, ὁ μέλλον ἀτιμάσω. Βάλλω, ὁ παρατατικὸς ἔβαλλον, ὁ μέλλον βαλῶ, ἀόριστος δευτέρος ἔβαλον, παρακείμενος βέβληκα ἀπὸ τοῦ βλῶ, οὗ ὁ μέλλον βλήσω.

Ἦσαύτως καταβάλλω καὶ διαβάλλω, συμβάλλω δὲ καὶ προσβάλλω δοτικῇ, ὑποβάλλω δὲ σοι τόδε. ὁμοίως καὶ βάπτω, βαπτίζω. Κρίνω καὶ διακρίνω καὶ ἐκκρίνω καὶ ἀνακρίνω καὶ ἐπικρίνω. Βαστάζω, βασανίζω, ἀγείρω, ἄγχω, ἀκοντίζω, λυπῶ, ἀνιῶ, ἀλιεύω, ἀλειφω, ἄπτω, ἀνάπτω πῦρ, νίπτω τὰς χεῖρας πρὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἀπονίπτω δὲ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον, γλύπτω, δάκνω, δαμάζω, δελεάζω, δικάζω, δικαῖω, ἀδικῶ, δοκιμάζω, καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζει, καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα, περὶ ὧν εἰπεῖν οὐ τοῦ παρόντος σκοποῦ ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἄλλοις εἴρηται κατὰ στοιχεῖον καὶ Μαξίμῳ τῷ Πλανύδῃ ἐν τῷ περὶ μεταβατικῶν καὶ ἀμεταβάτων. Ἰστέον ὅτι τοιοῦτοις ῥήμασι τίθεται δοτικῇ πρὸ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς χάριν ἢ περιποίησιν δηλοῦσα, οἷον φιλῶ σοι τὸν υἱόν, τύπτω σοι τὸν παῖδα, ἦτοι σοι χαριζόμενος. Καὶ μετὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν τίθεται δοτικῇ ὀργανικῶς. φιλῶ σε ὅλη ψυχῇ, βάλλω σε μήλοις. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ γενικῇ κατ' ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἔνεκα. φιλῶ σε τῆς ἀρετῆς, μισῶ σε τῆς κακίας, θαυμάζω σε τοῦ νοῦ.

[Verbs that refer to physical dispositions are constructed with the accusative case, such as *gymnázō* 'train', *tribō* 'rub', *chalō* 'loosen', *níptō* 'cleanse' ...

A transitive active verb is properly one that ends in *-ō* and forms its passive with *-mai*, such as *philō* 'love', *philoumai* 'be loved'. There are six syntactic relations involved: Firstly an active verb takes the nominative case of agent which is put before it, and this is assumed to come naturally before every verb. Following the verb comes the accusative case of the person or thing affected, as in *ho kathēgētēs philēi tōn mathētēn* 'the master loves his pupil'. *Agarāō* (contracted form *agarō*) 'love, hold in affection', imperfect *ēgáraon* (*ēgáron*), perfect *ēgápēka*, aorist *ēgápēsa*, future *agarēsō*. It constructs with the dative when it means 'to be satisfied with', as in *agarai tois pepragménōis* 'he is satisfied with what has been done', in place of *arkeūtai* 'he is content'.

*Philēō* (*philō*), perfect *pephilēka*, aorist *ephilēsa*, future *philēsō*, also constructs with the infinitive when it means 'usually do some-

thing' as in *philei anaginōskein* 'he usually reads', in place of *eīōthe* 'he is accustomed'. *Stérgō* 'love', aorist *ésterxa*, future *sterxō* takes the accusative when it is used in the sense of *agapō*; when it is used for *emménō* 'abide by' and *próskeimai* 'be devoted to', it takes the dative. *Pothēō* (*pothō*) 'love, pine for', perfect *pepóthēka*, aorist *epóthēsa*, future *pothēsō*, has more of the sense of *agapō* than of *philō*, and I love (*philō*) what is present to me, but I pine for (*pothō*) what is absent. *Erō* 'adore' is often taken in a pejorative sense, and this is why Apollonius says it constructs with the genitive (Uhlig 1910: 418.9–419.2), but when it is used in a favourable sense it means more than *philō*, and so it is said that the good king is not only loved by men, but is adored.

*Miséō* (*misō*) 'hate', perfect *memísēka*, aorist *emisēsa*, future *misēsō*. *Bláptō* 'injure', aorist *éblapsa*, future *blápsō*, *týptō* 'deat', aorist *étypsa*, future *týpsō*, *katalýō* 'dismiss', perfect *katalélyka*, aorist *katélysa*, future *katalýsō*, means the same as *aphanízō* 'make away with'. But in *katalýō eis tò xenodocheiōn* 'I put up in a lodging place' *katalýō* is used in the sense of being with a stranger rather than being a guest; hence the word *katályma* 'lodging house' or temporary residence (the 'Inn' of the Nativity (Luke 2.7)).

*Échō* 'have' is irregular, future *héxō*, perfect *éschēka* second ("strong") aorist *éschon*, from *chéō* (*chō*), whence the future tense form *chēsō*. But *échō* meaning 'possess', 'have in one's control', 'dwell in', 'carry', 'drive' (i.e. draft animals) takes the accusative; in the sense of 'being able' it takes an infinitive, I am able (*échō*) to do it, instead of I can (*dýnamai*); meaning 'to be disposed' it takes an adverb or a genitive: *eu échō* 'I am well disposed', *hoítō gnōmēs échō* 'I am of this opinion', *kalōs échō tou sōmatos* or *kalōs échō tò sōma* 'I am well in my body, I am physically healthy', and also *kalōs échēi moi ho deīna* 'so-and-so is well disposed towards me', meaning he is my friend, and in *échomai sou* 'I hold on to you' in the sense of 'I cling to you', *échō* is commonly used with the genitive.

*Thaumázō* 'marvel at', perfect *tethaúmaka*, aorist *etháumasa*, future *thaumásō*, is used in the sense of *epainō* 'praise': *thaumázō tou andrōs epì katēgorías* 'I marvel at the man for what is said of him'; *thaumázō tòn andra* is used infrequently. *Hymnō* 'sing hymns in the presence of God', aorist *hýmnēsa*, future *hymnēsō*. *epainō* 'praise' in words, aorist *epéinesa*, future *epainēsō*; *enkōmiázō* 'to

praise' in writing, aorist *enekōmíasa*, future *enkōmiásō*. *Zēlōō* (*zēlōō*) 'praise, imitate, envy', aorist *ezēlōsa*, future *zēlōsō*.

*Ginōskō* 'know' is irregular, imperfect *eginōskon*, but no other tenses from this form, but from *gnōō* (*gnō*) and *gnōmi* we have perfect *égnōka*, (second "strong") aorist *égnōn*, future *gnōsomai*; and there are the verbs *anaginōskō* 'read (the book)', *diaginōskō* 'distinguish', *synginōskō* 'forgive (you your mistakes)', *kataginōskō* 'despise (your lack of learning)', *metaginōskō* 'regret (what has been done)'. *Anaginōskō* sometimes takes the genitive, sometimes the accusative.

*Horáō* (*horō*) 'see', imperfect *heōraon* (*heōrōn*), perfect *heōraka*; there are also *blépō* 'see, look', and *eīdon* ('saw'), (a second) aorist. *Apatáō* (*apatō*) 'cheat', aorist *ēpátēsa*, future *apatēsō*; *atimázō* 'hold in dishonour', aorist *ētímasa*, future *atimásō*. *Bállō* 'throw', imperfect *éballon*, future *balō*, (second) aorist *ébalon*, perfect *béblēka* from *blō*, whence the future form *blēsō* (not attested in classical use).

Likewise *katabállō* 'throw down' and *diabállō* 'throw across, slander', but we have *symbállō* 'compare' and *prosbállō* 'assign to' and *hypobállō soi tóde* 'I submit this to you', all with the dative as well. The following verbs take the accusative: *báptō* 'dip in water', *baptízō* 'baptize', *krínō* 'judge', *diakrinō* 'decide', *ekkrinō* 'choose', *anakrinō* 'examine', *epikrinō* 'determine', *bastázō* 'carry', *basanízō* 'question', *ageirō* 'rouse', *ágchō* 'strangle', *akontízō* 'hurl a dart at', *lypō* 'distress', *aniō* 'annoy', *halieúō* 'fish', *aleíphō* 'anoint', *háptō* 'touch', *anhaptō pyr* 'kindle fire', *niptō tās cheiras* 'wash the hands (before a meal)', but *aponiptō* 'after a meal', *glýptō* 'carve', *dáknō* 'bite', *damázō* 'tame', *deleázō* 'catch', *dikázō* 'judge', *dikaiō* 'put right', *adikō* 'do wrong to', *dokimázō* 'approve', *apodokimázō* 'reject', and many others, which need not be mentioned in this book. Lists like this have been adequately given by others in alphabetical ordering, and by Maximus Planudes in his book on transitive and intransitive verbs.

It is to be noted that the dative is put before the accusative with verbs like these, to indicate a service or an acquisition: 'I love your son (accusative) for your sake (dative)'; 'I beat the boy for you', or 'doing you a favour'. The dative comes after the accusative when used instrumentally: *philō se hólēi psýchēi* 'I love you (accusative) with my whole heart (dative)'; *bállō se mélois* 'I pelt you with apples'. Quite often verbs are also constructed with the genitive, *hēneka* 'because of for' being omitted: *philō se tēs aretēs* 'I love you

for (because of) your virtue (genitive); *misō se tēs kakias* 'I hate you for your wickedness'; *thaumázō se tou nou* 'I marvel at you for your intellect'.]

In this passage one notices the continuing Byzantine practice of deriving grammatical categories from morphology; active and passive are formally defined, and then the syntactic uses of the different paradigms are given. The syntactic relations are stated as being between nominative case, verb, and oblique case, not between a specifically syntactic subject, verb, and object. The word order Subject–Verb–Object (SVO), while standard and unmarked in classical Greek, was not obligatory, and the case inflections of the nouns and the person and number inflections of the verb would disambiguate almost any sentential string, however ordered. Specific statements of order, as given here, are, however, comparatively late in Byzantine work; they fitted in well with the now conventional SVO order of mediaeval Latin, and they are likely to be the result of recent Graeco-Roman contacts. In this context the reader may be referred to the influential *Regulae grammaticales* of Guarino Veronese (1374–1460; Guarino 1512). The six forms of construction to which Lascaris refers are firstly that of the nominative case (as subject) with the verb, the “intransitive construction” of the western scholastic grammarians (cf. Robins 1980), and then the five postverbal constructions with the oblique cases: accusative, dative, genitive, accusative and dative, and accusative and genitive. Ordering is distinctively used later in this excerpt in connection with the syntax of the dative case.

Guarino was one of those Italians who themselves visited Constantinople to study Greek in a Greek-speaking city, forming part of a two-way transmission of scholarship between the Latin and the Byzantine worlds. Guarino's grammar was widely used, and there are a considerable number of variations in the manuscripts and printed texts that we have, including some small differences in the spelling of his name (on this see further Percival 1978).

It will have been seen how various bits of linguistic information are presented at the same time in this grammar: some basic inflections, irregularities, case government (to use a western term), different shades and nuances of meaning and their contextual “felicities” in particular verbs within one semantic field. Such a technique of didactic presentation is similar to what has already been seen in schedographic paragraphs for school use (see pp. 143–145).

In the fairly comprehensive account of *échō*, basic meaning ‘have’, the technical term “second aorist”, which is as early as Theodosius, is still in

use today in Greek grammatical writing, though in much modern grammar it has been replaced by “strong”, after this term had been popularized by Grimm through his almost aesthetic preference for grammatical differences being expressed within the root itself rather than in “weaker” morphological agglutination (Grimm 1919: 876). The traditional desire to derive words, synchronically by rules and diachronically by etymologies, from other words in the language of similar shape must be responsible for the dragging in of the unrelated *chēō* (which in its own right actually means ‘pour’) as the source of *schēsō*, an alternative future, and of *éschon*, the second aorist of *échō*. Likewise the tense forms *égnōn* and *gnōsomai* are referred to the otherwise non-occurrent verb *gnōō* or *gnōmi* as being collateral with *ginōskō* ‘know’, as the format of the morphology of inflections was of a basic word shape and its inflections, established as early as Aristotle's use of *ptōsis* in this sense (see p. 26).

The forms *ginomai* ‘become’ and *ginōskō* appeared in later classical times for the earlier forms *gignomai* and *gignōskō* and they were now the standard orthographic spellings, presumably reflecting the pronunciations [gɪ̄nomai] and [gɪ̄nōskō] (cf. Allen 1974: 33).

The list of transitive verbs is but a small extract from the much larger lists then available in the *schédē katà stoicheïon* (see p. 130). The mention of Maximus Planudes must refer to the work of his referred to earlier (see pp. 214, 251). The instrumental use of the dative case is given by Syncellus (p. 153): *tò órganon hōtini tò páthos enērgētai* [the instrument with which the experience is effected].

Like other Byzantine grammarians Theodore (of) Gaza was a polymathic scholar. Among his writings are an astronomical treatise *Peri mēnōn* [On the monthly phases of the moon], various philosophical works and translations of Latin texts, comments on Homer, and a historical account of the early history of the Turks. He came as a refugee to Italy in 1430. He taught Greek in various cities in Italy, and on his death he left a considerable private library. As a churchman he supported the Latins at the Council of Florence (1439) in a final vain attempt to achieve ecclesiastical unity in the face of the advancing Turkish forces. Philosophically he was strongly Aristotelian.

Of his linguistic works the *Grammatikēs eisagōgē* [‘Introduction to grammar’] is the most important. It is by far the most comprehensive of the early Renaissance Greek grammars and the first one to devote a whole book to syntax (book 4, the last). The first three books deal together with orthography, phonology, and morphology, listing the tra-

ditional eight word classes, their subclasses, and their grammatical categories. Like Chrysoloras he assigned the nouns to declensions (1525: 4–7); there are some minor differences in the allocation of the nouns to each of them. Also like Chrysoloras, Theodore devoted considerable space to the morphological paradigms of inflected words, seeking to convey in a single book both grammatical description and classification, and the sort of information earlier carried out in such detail in the separate *Kanónes* (see chapter 6). He was, of course, like the others teaching and writing for young Italians who had already mastered Latin and were embarking on Greek as a separate language. His grammar book continued to be published, with a Latin translation, until 1803.

Most of his pupils will have had to learn their Greek partly through Greek. Apart from the Greek grammar of Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century, which appears to have been derived from conversations with contemporary Greeks and a visit to Constantinople for this purpose, Latin grammars of Greek only appeared at the very end of the fifteenth century and after (Percival 1975: 245–246; for an example of an early bilingual grammar see Sabbadini 1922: chapter 2). In fact, part of Theodore's grammar was translated by Erasmus. For these reasons Theodore too, had to include extensive paradigms of inflectional forms, but his four books give the impression of a more theoretical and a perhaps more "advanced" work than Chrysoloras's. The information is set out in paragraphs, not questions and answers, and, while not delving as deeply into grammatical theory as Maximus Planudes had done, he does give space for the theoretical explanation of the meanings of the classes and categories that he is describing. His Byzantine sources were primarily Syncellus and Maximus Planudes, but in book 4, specifically devoted to syntax, he relies directly on Apollonius (Donnet 1979 a, 1979 b, 1980 a). As Apollonius had done, he pursued the analogy between the ordering of letters in a word and the ordering of words in a sentence (Theodore 1525: 101–102; cf. Apollonius in Uhlig 1910: 1.1–16.11; Householder 1981: 19–23). He repeated the distinction between morphological barbarisms and syntactic solecisms, which was doubtless necessary both for Greek-speaking and now for Latin-speaking pupils. In the manner established by the *Téchnē* he defines the word (*léxis*) as *méros eláxiston tou katà syntaxin logou* [the minimal unit of syntactic structure] (cf. *Téchnē* section 11), and the sentence (*lógos*) as *syntaxis léxeōn euharmóstiōs syntetheménōn échousa autotelē* [a syntactic sequence of words ordered correctly and having a grammatically independent status] (cf. *Téchnē* section 11). The eight word classes follow each other, each receiving their

traditional definitions and subclassifications: e. g. *ónoma* [noun], *méros lógou ptōtikòn sēmantikòn áneu chrónou* [a part of speech with case inflection and expressing a meaning without time reference] (Theodore 1525: 108); *rhēma* [verb], *lógou méros prosōpōn te diakritikòn kai chrónōn diaphórōn prossēmantikòn katà diaphórous metaschēmatismós* [a part of speech which distinguishes persons and in addition indicates different times by different changes of form] (115), and then the participle (126), the article (and "relative pronoun" (128)), the pronoun (131), the preposition (134), the adverb (137), and the conjunction (141).

Much of this work keeps to the Byzantine tradition. In the analysis of prepositional meanings there is no attempt at establishing any kind of *Grundbedeutung*, such as had been tried by Glykys, not wholly with success (see pp. 179–190); Theodore simply lists the prepositions with their cases and a selection of the meanings covered by each; these are apparently unordered, but they would certainly have been of great use to learners of idiomatic classical Greek, and to subsequent lexicographers.

Two typical accounts of the tricasual prepositions *prós* and *epi* will illustrate his practice. The examples given by Lascaris and Theodore are very much alike in content and in arrangement. Although, naturally, all the grammarians give the same sort of information on prepositional meanings and often use the same examples, the close similarities between these two must be the result of their sharing an immediate common source. It may be worthwhile setting the four paragraphs together for comparison:

ἡ πρὸς γενικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ καὶ αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσεται, γενικῇ ὅταν τὸ ἀπὸ προσώπου σημαίνει κίνησιν, οἷον πρὸς θεοῦ τὰγαθὰ, ἀντὶ παρά, ἢ ὅτε ἐπὶ ὄρκου κεῖται, οἷον ποιήσον πρὸς θεοῦ, ἢ τὸ ἐνώπιον δηλοῖ, οἷον πρὸς τε θεῶν μακάρων, πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τὸ καθήκον, οἷον οὐ πρὸς ἰατροῦ σοφοῦ. Δοτικῇ δὲ ὅτε τὸ πλησίον, οἷον πρὸς τοῖς ποσὶ, πρὸς τῷδε. Αἰτιατικῇ δὲ ὅταν κίνησιν πρὸς τι ἐμψυχον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον σημαίνει, ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἰωάννην, ἢ ἔνωσιν ὡς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀντὶ μετὰ θεοῦ, ἢ λόγον τινά, οἷον ὡς τὰ δύο πρὸς τὰ τέτταρα οὕτω καὶ τὰ τέτταρα πρὸς τὰ ὀκτώ, ἢ παράδειγμα, οἷον πρὸς αὐλὸν ἕδει.

[The preposition *prós* constructs with the genitive, dative, and accusative cases. It takes the genitive when it indicates movement from a person, as in *prós Theōū tagathá* 'the good things are from God' instead of *pará* 'from the presence of', or *epi hōrkou keitai* 'one is on oath', as in *poiēson prós Theōū* 'do it in God's name!'

or is indicating a presence, as in *pròs te theōn makárōn, pròs te thnētōn anthrōpōn* 'before the blessed gods and before mortal men', and when it refers to what is seemly, like *ou pròs iatroū sophou* 'it is not the part of a wise doctor (to do this)'. It takes the dative when it refers to proximity, as in *pròs tois posí* 'at the feet', *pròs tōide* 'in this person's presence'. It takes the accusative for the most part when it indicates movement towards a living being, as in *pròs tòn Iōannēn* 'to John', or union, as in *pròs tòn Theón*, instead of *metà Theou* (both meaning 'with God'). It is also used with the accusative to refer to calculation, such as *hōs tà dyo pròs tà téttara, hoútō kai tà téttara pròs tà oktō* 'as two stands to four, so four stands to eight', or to a pattern, as in *pròs aulōn áidei* 'he is singing to the accompaniment of a flute'.] (Lascaris 1608: 135)

ἡ δὲ πρὸς γενικῆ καὶ δοτικῆ καὶ αἰτιατικῆ, γενικῆ μὲν ὅταν τὴν ἀπὸ προσώπου σημαίνει κίνησιν, πρὸς θεοῦ τάγαθά, ἢ τάσσηται ἐπὶ ὄρκου, ἤκε πρὸς θεοῦ, ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, πρὸς τε θεῶν μακάρων πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τὸ καθῆκον, οὐ πρὸς ἱατροῦ σοφοῦ θροεῖν ἐπωδάς δοτικῆ δὲ ὅταν τὸ ἐγγὺς τε καὶ παρακείμενον, οἷον πρὸς τοῖς ποσί, αἰτιατικῆ ὅταν κίνησιν πρὸς ἔμψυχον μάλιστα τι καὶ ὡς ἄλλως δὴ εἴρηται, καὶ ἔτι ὅταν ἢ σχέσιν τινὰ καὶ λόγον, ὡς τὰ δύο πρὸς τὰ τέσσαρα οὕτω καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα πρὸς τὰ ὀκτώ, ἢ παράδειγμα, ἄδει πρὸς αὐλόν.

[The preposition *pròs* constructs with the genitive, dative, and accusative cases. It takes the genitive when it indicates movement from a person, *pròs Theou tagathá* 'the good things are from God', or when one is placed under oath, *hēke pròs Theou* 'he is here in God's name', or when it shows presence face-to-face, *pròs te theōn makárōn pròs te thnētōn anthrōpōn* 'before the blessed gods and before mortal men', and when it refers to what is seemly, *ou pròs iatroū sophou throein epōidás* 'it is not the part of a skilled doctor to recite charms'. It takes the dative when it refers to what is near at hand and present, as in *pròs tois posí* 'at the feet'. It takes the accusative for the most part when it indicates movement towards a living being, but it has been found in other uses also. Further, it is so used when dealing with a relation or calculation, as in *hōs tà dyo pròs tà téssara hoútō kai tà téssara pròs tà oktō* 'as two is to four, so four is to eight', or referring to a pattern: *áidei pròs aulōn* 'he is singing to the accompaniment of a flute'.] (Theodore 1525: 135)

ἡ ἐπὶ γενικῆ καὶ δοτικῆ καὶ αἰτιατικῆ συντάσσεται, γενικῆ μὲν ὅτε τὸ ἐπάνω δηλοῖ, οἷον τὰ ζῶα, ἐπὶ γῆς, ἢ χρόνον, οἷον ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Πυθοκλέους, ἢ τὸ περί τι καὶ ἐν τινι, οἷον ἐπὶ πολλῶν, ἢ κίνησιν Ἀττικῶς, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας. Δοτικῆ δὲ ὅτε αἰτίαν, οἷον ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἐδημηγόρει, ἢ τὸ ἐπάνω, οἷον ἐπὶ τρόπιδι ἢ ναῦς, ἢ τὸ ὕστερον, οἷον ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἕτερα διηγεῖτο, ἢ αὐτεξουσιότητά τινα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχιερεῖ τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πράγματα, ἢ ἐπιβουλὴν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ δήμου. Αἰτιατικῆ δὲ ὅτε κίνησιν δηλοῖ, οἷον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύετο, ἢ δόλον, οἷον ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὄρησε.

[The preposition *epi* constructs with the genitive, dative, and accusative cases. It takes the genitive when it means 'on' or 'above', as in *tà zōa epì gēs* 'the beasts on earth', or refers to time, as in *epì archontos Pythokleous* 'at the time of Pythocles's archonship (in Athens)', or in reference to a subject and a passage, as in *epì pollōn* 'in many citations', or in Attic Greek to movement, as *epì tēs chōras* 'to the land'. It takes the dative when it signifies a cause, as in *epì agathōi edēmēgorei* 'he was speaking for what was good', or to something above, as in *epì trōpidi hē naūs* 'the ship rests on its keel', or to what is subsequent, as in *epì toutois kai hētera diēgeito* 'after that he related other things as well', or authority, as in *epì tōi archierei tὰ tēs ekklēσίας prágmata* 'the affairs of the Church are in the hands of the Chief Priest', or conspiracy, as in *epì tōi dēmōi* '(conspiracy) among the people' instead of *toú dēmou* 'of the people'. It takes the accusative when it means some movement, for example, *epì iēn Attikēn eporeúeto* 'he was making his way to Attica', or some ambush, like *eph' hēmās hōrmēse* 'he rushed at us'.] (Lascaris 1608: 141–142)

ἡ δ' ἐπὶ γενικῆ καὶ δοτικῆ καὶ αἰτιατικῆ, γενικῆ μὲν χρόνον δηλοῦσα, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Πυθοδώρου, ἢ τὸ περί τι καὶ ἐν τινι, ἐπὶ πολλῶν μάθοι τις ἂν τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ τὸ ἐπάνω, τὰ τετράποδα ἐπὶ γῆς, δοτικῆ δὲ αἰτιολογοῦσα τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ πάντα ἐποίει, ἢ δύναμιν καὶ αὐτεξουσιόν τι δηλοῦσα, ἐπὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν ὑπηκόων, ἢ τὸ ὕστερόν τε καὶ δευτερόχωτον, ἐπὶ τούτοις πολλὰ ἕτερα διεξίει, ἢ τὸ ἐπάνω, ἐπὶ κρηπίδι ὁ τοίχος ἐστηκεν ἰσχυρῶ, αἰτιατικῆ δὲ κίνησιν τινα λέγουσα, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύετο, καὶ γενικῆ δὲ ταῦτά τοῦτο ἐσθ' ὅτε δηλοῖ, ἐπὶ οἴκου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας, ὀρθῶς μὲν καὶ Ἀττικῶς οὐ κατὰ πολλὴν δὲ τινα χρῆσιν.

[The preposition *epi* constructs with the genitive, dative, and accusative cases. It takes the genitive when it refers to time, *epi archontos Athēnēisi Pythodōrou* 'at the time of Pythodorus's archonship in Athens' or to a subject and a passage *epi pollōn máthoi tis an ta legόμενα* 'in many citations one would learn what was being said', or to what is above or on, *ta tetrápoda epi gēs* 'the fourfooted beasts on the earth'. It takes the dative when giving a reason for what has been done, as in *epi agathōi pánta epoiei* 'he did everything for what was good', or when it signifies power and authority, *epi tōi basilei ta tōn hypēkōōn* 'the affairs of his subjects are in the King's hands', or what follows or is added, *epi toútois polla hētera diexiei* 'on top of these he told of many other things', or with reference to something above, *epi krēpidi ho toichos héstēken ischyrāi* 'the wall stands on a strong foundation'. It takes the accusative when it means some movement, *epi tēn Attikēn eporeúeto* 'he was making his way to Attica'; this same meaning is also sometimes expressed with the genitive, as in *epi oikou* 'homeward', and *epi tēs chóras* 'to the land'; this construction is correct and it is found in Attic Greek, but it is not extensively used.] (Theodore 1525: 136)

It will be seen that the two grammarians aim at providing the same information, though they differ somewhat in what they say and in the order that they follow in saying it. In the translation an attempt has been made to match the samenesses and the differences in the English wording. These aggregations of different meanings associated with prepositions and with some other words in relation to the cases with which they construct follow the same lines as comparable entries in modern dictionaries of classical Greek. These are, of course, much fuller and more systematically arranged, but in their form and in their content they make manifest their debt to their Byzantine predecessors.

Theodore lists the cases themselves in their traditional order and with their traditional single meanings associated with their traditional names (Theodore 1525: 114–115), but later in a passage on the syntax of transitive verbs with the oblique cases he reverts to the sort of early localism already seen in Syncellus (p. 158), with the accusative referring, literally or metaphorically, to a generic outward movement (*ekpompē*), and the genitive referring to an inward movement (*eispompē*), and the dative to acquisition (*peripoiēsis*) (Theodore 1525: 117):

ἐκδέχονται μὲν οὖν αἱ πλάγαι τὰ ῥήματα μεταβατικῶς, οἷς ἀμεταβάτως ἢ εὐθεῖα συντάσσεται.

εἶδη δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστα μεταβάσεως τῶν προσωπικῶν ὑποκείμεσθωσαν καθόλου τε καὶ ἀπλᾶ τρία· Πρῶτον μὲν εἰς αἰτιατικὴν τῶν κατ' ἐκπομπὴν θεωρουμένων, οἷον διδάσκω σε καὶ διδάσκω γραμματικά. Δεύτερον δὲ εἰς γενικὴν τῶν κατ' εἰσπομπὴν, οἷον δέομαί σου. Τρίτον δὲ εἰς δοτικὴν τῶν κατὰ περιποίησιν, οἷον δίδωμί σοι.

[The oblique cases take up verbs transitively; the nominative case constructs intransitively.

Let us establish three general and simple types of transitivity with personally inflected verbs. First we have the accusative construction of verbs envisaged as concerned with sending out from within, like *didaskō se* 'I teach you', and *didaskō grammatiká* 'I teach grammar'. Secondly we have the genitive construction of verbs envisaged as concerned with bringing something in from outside, as in *déomai sou* 'I beg (something of) you'. Thirdly there is the dative construction of verbs concerned with acquisition, like *dídōmi soi* 'I give (something to) you'.]

*Ekpompē* and *eispompē* are used here in the same technical sense by Lascaris (Donnet 1980b: 214). Among the constructions involving the accusative case Theodore (1525: 118) takes note of what is now called the "cognate accusative", where the object noun is linked semantically and usually formally as well, to the verb with which it is constructed. This construction was as familiar in Greek and Latin as it is in English. He gives some examples: *máchomai máchēn* 'fight a fight', *zō zōēn* 'live a life', and *douleúō douleían* 'slave (in a life of) slavery'. Such constructions had been identified since Priscian's time; he links them with the formally passive intransitive verbs, such as *curritur* 'running takes place' and *ambulatur* 'walking takes place', instancing *vivo vitam* 'live a life' and *curro cursum* 'run a race' (Keil 1859: 232.1–5). Priscian does not give this construction a name. Theodore refers to it as *epibatikón*, which may be his own invention, since he writes *kalō epibatikón* [I call it *epibatikón*]. The technical etymology of the word is not clear, but it is also used to name the construction of the type *dei phánai* 'one must speak', *chrē labeîn* 'one ought to take it', *endēchetai eînai* 'it is possible to be', *philei genesthai* 'it often happens' (1525: 122). In non-technical usage *epibatikós* means 'taken on board ship' and the like. Possibly it is used here in the sense that the object noun is included in the meaning of the verb, and that the infinitival verb is taken in by the verb of obligation, possibility, or regular

occurrence, to specify its meaning in the sentence. One may perhaps compare the modern rather slangy use of *take on board* to mean 'accept', 'undertake', 'take account of', and the like.

As we have seen above, Theodore's partially localist theory of case goes back to Syncellus and is therefore not derived from the much more detailed and articulated case theory of Maximus Planudes. But he lived and worked more than a century later than Maximus, and, though his principal source was Apollonius (Donnet 1979 a), he must have known of Maximus's work. Certainly his rather summary treatment of verbal tense meanings (1525: 115) does look like a précis of Maximus's lengthier discussion of the subject in his *Dialogue* (see pp. 227–232). Like the earlier commentators (see p. 72), Theodore separates the philosophical notion of time from the grammarian's concern with tense meanings (this is easier for us to do today, with separate terms for the two concepts; the Greeks, having taken over *chrónos* [time] into technical use to designate the category of tense, had more trouble in keeping the two meanings apart). Theodore retains the rather irrelevant but traditional Byzantine insistence on temporal adverbs as part of tense meanings, though he does give an equal place to the aspectual senses of complete and incomplete activities and the involvement of two points in time, which only coincide with the present tense. This is very much the theory of tense put forward by Maximus, and his account (see p. 231) may be compared to the treatment given by Theodore (1525: 115):

Τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα ἔστι μὲν λόγου μέρος προσώπων τε διακριτικοῦ καὶ χρόνων διαφόρων προσσημαντικὸν κατὰ διαφόρους μετασχηματισμούς. Τί δὲ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος πλέον ἢ εἰη κατὰ γραμματικὴν θεωρησαί τε καὶ ὀρίσασθαι. λαβεῖν οὖν καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὡς καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ συγκεχυμένως χρῆναι φάμεν. ἀλλὰ μὴ περιεργάζεσθαι τὸν τῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμὸν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον τε καὶ ὕστερον. πλέον γάρ τοι οὐδὲν εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἢ τοῦ διωρισμένου γνώσις ἡμῖν συμβαλεῖται. Διηρημένου δ' ἄρα τοῦ χρόνου εἰς ἕξ· ὁ μὲν ἐνεστώς τὸ ἐνιστάμενον σημαίνει καὶ ἀτελές, ὁ δὲ παρατατικὸς τὸ παρατεταμένον καὶ ἀτελές τοῦ παρωχημένου. ὁ δὲ μέλλον τὸ μήπω γεγονός. ὁ δὲ ἀόριστος τὸ παρεληλυθός μὲν καὶ τέλειον, οὐχ ὀρισμένον δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ τὸ πάθος. ὁ δὲ παρακειμενός τὸ παρεληλυθός ἄρτι καὶ ἐντελές τοῦ ἐνεστώτος. ὁ δ' ὑπερσυντελικὸς τὸ παρεληλυθός ἄρτι καὶ ἐντελές τοῦ παρακειμένου.

[The verb is a part of speech distinguishing persons and additionally signifying different times by different tense forms. To theorize and

determine the actual nature of time would be outside the scope of the grammarian. We say therefore that *chrónos* 'time, tense' together with many other words must be used indeterminately; we should not waste our energy on numbering motion into prior and later time, because knowledge of this division will not contribute anything more to us on our present topic.

Tense is divided into six sections. The present tense signifies what is here and now and unfinished; the imperfect signifies what has been extended from the past and is still unfinished; the future refers to what has not yet happened; the aorist refers to what is past and finished, whether relating to action or experiencing. The perfect signifies what is recently past and is complete at the present time, and the pluperfect signifies an event that had recently been past and was completed at a previous point in time.]

Grammars such as Theodore's, in print up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, may be set in comparison with the *Institutiones* of Priscian in relation to Byzantine linguistic scholarship. In 476 Romulus Augustulus, the last western Emperor, was dismissed from office by the Goths, who had already sacked the "Eternal City" of Rome in 410, and thus effectively ended the western Roman Empire. A millennium later, in 1453, "New Rome" was captured and held by the Turks. In so far as any particular dates can be regarded as of a special historical significance, politically 476 may be seen as the death of the Old World in the West and 1453 as the death of the Middle Ages in the East; and, less than fifty years later, 1492 has been hailed as the point at which modern history began. Around the year 500 Priscian summarized all that had been worked out and accepted in the grammatical scholarship of the continuing tradition of the Greek and the Roman grammarians, and he also set the pattern and provided the data for both eastern and western mediaeval studies in grammar. In 1475 the *Erōtēmata*, a short book comparable to the *Téchnē* appeared in print (it had been available in manuscript since the last decade of the fourteenth century). In 1495 Theodore's *Introduction* summed up for the Renaissance the grammatical achievements of the Byzantine Middle Ages and provided along with others a textbook for the reviving study of Greek in western Europe.

The Byzantine linguistic scholars and teachers through most of the Middle Ages considered their work as part of the struggle to maintain standards and to continue the task of explaining and preserving the linguistic and literary heritage of classical Greece and of the eastern half

of the formerly united Roman Empire. Through more than a millennium of political, territorial, and religious changes its capital city remained inviolate, at least until the invasion and capture of Constantinople by its alleged Latin allies in 1204; nor did it experience the western division between secular and religious authority with its great effects on political life and the content of education. The Byzantine grammarians were teaching Greek to speakers of Greek and to speakers of languages other than Greek. The final century of Byzantine scholarship faced the task of teaching and providing the material for teaching Greek as a foreign language in the West. Their success had, and continues to have, an effect, profound and irreversible, on the structure and content of education and intellectual life in Europe and in those parts of the wider world that have come under European influence. This is no small achievement.

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