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On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases

Silvia Luraghi

On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases

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On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases: The expression of semantic roles
in Ancient Greek
by Silvia Luraghi

On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases

The expression of semantic roles in Ancient Greek

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Table of contents

Preface ix

List of abbreviations xi

Introduction

1

0.0 Aims of the book 1

0.1 Ancient Greek 2

0.1.1 Accessibility of Ancient Greek data 2

0.1.2 Greek varieties 2

0.1.3 Parts of speech and inflectional categories 3

0.2 Texts used for this book 4

0.2.1 The Homeric poems 4

0.2.2 Herodotus' Histories 5

0.2.3 Thucydides' Peloponnesian Wars 5

0.2.4 Plato's Dialogues 5

0.2.5 Aristotle 6

0.2.6 Other Attic authors 7

0.2.7 Xenophon 7

0.2.8 Later works 8

0.3 Some remarks on the glosses 8

Theoretical foundations

11

1.0 Introduction 11

1.1 The meaning of grammatical forms 11

1.1.1 Lexical meaning 13

1.1.2 'Grammatical' and 'concrete' (uses of) cases 14

1.1.3 'New' and 'old' metaphors 15

1.1.4 Mental maps 16

1.2 Semantic roles 17

1.2.1 Space 20

1.2.2 Time 27

1.2.3 Comitative 28

1.2.4 Causal semantic roles 30

1.2.5 Recipient	39
1.2.6 Beneficiary	40
1.2.7 Experiencer	42
1.2.8 Possessor	43
1.2.9 Purpose	45
1.2.10 Patient	46
1.2.11 Manner	47
1.2.12 Area	47
The semantics of Greek cases	49
2.0 Introduction	49
2.1 Case syncretism	49
2.1.1 Case syncretism as a diachronic process	49
2.1.2 Genitive and ablative	50
2.1.3 Dative, locative, and instrumental	51
2.2 The meaning of cases without prepositions	52
2.2.1 The accusative	52
2.2.2 The genitive	58
2.2.3 The dative	63
2.3 The sub-system of local cases and its substitutes	72
Greek prepositions: Patterns of polysemy and meaning extension	75
3.0 Introduction	75
3.0.1 Categorial status	75
3.0.2 Phrase structure	76
3.0.3 Case variation	79
3.0.4 Position of the particles in Homer	81
3.1 EN	82
3.2 EK/EX	95
3.3 EIS	107
3.4 APO	118
3.5 PARA	131
3.6 SUN/XUN	146
3.7 PRO	155
3.8 ANTI	165
3.9 DIA	168
3.10 ANA	188
3.11 KATA	197
3.12 HUPER	214
3.13 HUPO	225

3.14 META	244	
3.15 AMPHI	256	
3.16 PERI	268	
3.17 PROS	284	
3.18 EPI	298	
Conclusions		315
4.0 Introduction	315	
4.1 Spatial meaning of the prepositions	315	
4.2 Paths of semantic extension and abstract uses of prepositions	320	
4.2.1 Time	320	
4.2.2 Comitative	320	
4.2.3 Agent	320	
4.2.4 Instrument	321	
4.2.5 Intermediary	322	
4.2.6 Cause	323	
4.2.7 Recipient/Addressee	324	
4.2.8 Beneficiary	324	
4.2.9 Possessor	326	
4.2.10 Purpose	326	
4.2.11 Area	327	
4.2.12 Summary of possible semantic extensions	327	
4.3 Distribution of cases within PPs	328	
4.3.1 The prepositional genitive	329	
4.3.2 The prepositional dative	330	
4.3.3 The prepositional accusative	331	
4.4 Further developments	331	
Notes	335	
References	351	
Name index	359	
Subject index	361	

Preface

The meaning of Greek prepositions has been one of my favorite topics of research for over twenty years. I became interested in prepositions when I was a student, and have regarded them as a very stimulating field for linguistic research ever since. This is of course true of prepositions in any language: however, my love for the Ancient Greek authors and their language has made Greek prepositions one of the most fascinating topics I could possibly investigate. I have always had the feeling that Ancient Greek, well studied and well described as it may be, deserved to be better known outside the circle of classicists. With this book, I hope to reach scholars who do not know Ancient Greek, and cannot use the majority of reference works, which generally require a great deal of previous knowledge. I hope that they will find the topic of this book as intriguing as I do.

I would like to thank a number of people and institutions for their help during the preparation of this book. My colleagues at the Department of Linguistics of the University of Pavia have provided me with discussion on some specific points in the theoretical sections. Martin Haspelmath, John Hewson, Silvia Pieroni, and Stavros Skopeteas have read parts of the book, and have given me some insightful suggestions. Part of the research has been supported by a grant of the Italian Ministry of Education (MIUR, prot. 9910428971), in the framework of a national research project on “Typological change in the morphosyntax of the Indo-European languages”. A stay at the Freie Universität Berlin in the summer of 2000 was funded by an Alexander von Humboldt grant. I also wish to thank all the people who have helped me with practical aspects in the preparation of the final manuscript, in particular Franco Bianco, who has formatted the examples, and Lorena Rossi for correcting my English.

List of abbreviations

Grammatical glosses

ABL	ablative
ACC	accusative
ADESS	adessive
AOR	aorist
ART	article
CMPR	comparative
CONN	connective
DAT	dative
DEM	demonstrative
DET	determiner
DU	dual
F	feminine
FUT	future
GEN	genitive
IMPF	imperfect
IMPT	imperative
INDEF	indefinite
INF	infinitive
INSTR	instrumental
INT	interrogative
M	masculine
MID	middle
M/P	medio-passive
N	neuter
N/A	nominative/accusative neuter
NEG	negation
NOM	nominative

OPT	optative
P	passive
PART	participle
PF	perfect
PL	plural
PLPF	pluperfect
POSS	possessive
PRET	preterite
PREV	preverb
PRS	present
PRT	partitive
PTC	particle
REC	reciprocal
REFL	reflexive
REL	relative
SG	singular
SUBJ	subjunctive
SUP	superlative
VOC	vocative

Classical authors

Aesch.	Aeschylus
Arist.	Aristotle
Caes.	Caesar
Dem.	Demosthenes
Hdt.	Herodotus
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lys.	Lysias

Pl.	Plato	<i>Hell.</i>	<i>Hellenica</i>
Plu.	Plutarch	<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
S.	Sophocles	<i>Metaph.</i>	<i>Metaphysics</i>
Th.	Thucydides	<i>Mete.</i>	<i>Metereology</i>
Xen.	Xenophon	<i>Mor.</i>	<i>Moralia</i>
		<i>Mx.</i>	<i>Menexenus</i>
Works		<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
		<i>Pers.</i>	<i>The Persians</i>
<i>An.</i>	<i>Anabasis</i>	<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Ap.</i>	<i>Apology of Socrates</i>	<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Ath.</i>	<i>The Athenian Constitution</i>	<i>Phlb.</i>	<i>Philebo</i>
<i>BG</i>	<i>The Gallic War</i>	<i>Plt.</i>	<i>The Statesman</i>
<i>Cra.</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>	<i>Po.</i>	<i>Poetics</i>
<i>Cri.</i>	<i>Crito</i>	<i>Prt.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Criti.</i>	<i>Critias</i>	<i>Rep.</i>	<i>The Republic</i>
<i>Cyr.</i>	<i>Cyropaedia</i>	<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetorics</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	<i>Tht.</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>HA</i>	<i>History of Animals</i>	<i>Vect.</i>	<i>On Revenues</i>

Introduction

o.o Aims of the book

This book aims at describing the meaning, meaning extensions, and patterns of polysemy displayed by Ancient Greek prepositions. Accordingly, I will try to single out the semantic roles expressed by prepositions, possible affinities between semantic roles, and possible directions of semantic extension. Since prepositions appear with different cases in Ancient Greek, and because plain cases can also encode semantic roles, I will also discuss the meaning of cases, under the assumption that cases and prepositions, and more in general all grammatical forms, are meaningful elements. As these assumptions make clear, in this book I mostly follow the lines of cognitive semantics.

My analysis of the meaning of cases and prepositions is based on examples taken from a corpus of Ancient Greek texts. The discussion of the Greek data is framed in a more general discussion of theoretical issues, with evidence from other languages, both genetically related and not. For this reason the book is also intended to provide significant evidence for language typologists.

Research on language typology has reached a rather high level of specialization in recent years. Today's typologists are trained from the start to work with large samples of languages, and they obviously cannot reach the depth provided by philological study in each specific language. Consequently, philologically well grounded descriptions of relevant phenomena in individual languages, accompanied by typological insight, are in great demand. Such a description is what my book aims at providing.

The theoretical framework and the concepts used in this book are the topic of Chapter 1. In the remaining part of this introduction, I will briefly survey some typical features of Ancient Greek, which may not be known to non-specialists, and may be useful for a better understanding of the numerous examples discussed in later chapters.

0.1 Ancient Greek

0.1.1 Accessibility of Ancient Greek data

Ancient Greek is perhaps second only to English as to the number of studies devoted to it. Available descriptions of Ancient Greek are of course of an extremely high scientific level, and exhaustively cover all aspects of Greek grammar, historical development, dialectal variation, etc. Besides reference grammars and dictionaries, a wealth of studies, indexes and lexicons are devoted to the language of particular writers; recently, the entire corpus of Greek literature and Greek dialectal inscriptions has been made available on CD ROM.

However, ease of access is only apparent. Descriptions of Greek, be it reference works or theoretically oriented ones, are not particularly reader friendly: for one thing, Greek script is almost never transliterated, and examples are not glossed; in fact, they are often not even translated. The reason is simple: with a few notable exceptions, all types of studies on Ancient Greek, (including recent and theoretically updated ones), only address people who already know Ancient Greek. Somewhat surprisingly, Greek linguists do not appear to think it worthwhile to make the Greek data available to linguists working on other languages, general linguists, typologists, etc. So we arrive at the rather paradoxical consequence that data from scarcely described languages with no written tradition are more readily available to non-specialists than data from a thoroughly described language with several millennia of written history, such as Greek.

In this book all examples are transliterated and all forms have glosses with lexical meaning and morphemic analysis; the discussion of the semantic roles expressed by prepositions sometimes requires quite a large context, so many examples contain several lines of continuous text. In this way non-specialists will easily appreciate all the details of meaning under discussion and may become familiar with the grammatical categories typical of Ancient Greek.

0.1.2 Greek varieties

Documented history of Greek starts over three thousands years ago. The first written sources date back to the second millennium BCE, and were found in Pylos (in the Peloponnesus) and on the island of Crete. The language of these early records is usually referred to as Mycenaean Greek.

Although they are several centuries older than the main bulk of Ancient Greek written sources, the Mycenaean tablets do not preserve a sort of ‘Proto-

Greek': in spite of displaying a number of archaic features, including phonemes that later merged with others in all Greek varieties, Mycenaean is already characterized as belonging to a specific dialectal group. The Mycenaean tablets are written in a special syllabic writing, and mostly contain administrative texts.

The first important literary texts, and the earliest texts included in the corpus used for this book, are the two Homeric poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. I will mention some important linguistic features of these texts below, in §0.2.1.

Dialectal variation is a noteworthy peculiarity of Ancient Greek: contrary to most ancient languages, Ancient Greek had various local literary traditions, based on different varieties; furthermore, inscriptions preserve local vernaculars, also different from the standardized literary variety chosen for each dialect. Although variation within the literary language is mostly limited to Pre-Classic time (before the fifth century BCE), specific literary genres remained connected with the dialect in which they had their earliest development, so that classical authors gave a specific dialectal color to certain types of texts.

The two most important literary dialects were Ionic and later Attic. Since these two varieties are closely related to each other, and literary Attic gave up a number of vernacular features under the influence of the more prestigious Ionic, the literary dialect is commonly known as Attic-Ionic. The preservation of dialectal variation was favored by political fragmentation. After the unification of Greece under the Macedonian kings in the fourth century BCE, linguistic unification also started, resulting in the development of a common variety, the Koine, which was spoken during the centuries of the Roman (later Byzantine) Empire, and served as the basis for further developments.

0.1.3 Parts of speech and inflectional categories

Ancient Greek has a large number of inflectional categories, both for nouns and verbs. Its morphology is highly fusional, with a fairly high degree of allomorphy, partly due to simplification of consonantal clusters or monophthongization of diphthongs (vowel contraction).

Nouns, adjectives and pronouns are inflected for case (nominative, accusative, genitive, dative, and vocative) and number (singular, plural, and dual); they belong to three genders (masculine, feminine, and neuter; first and second person pronouns have no gender distinction, as typical of the Indo-European languages). Adjectives agree with their heads in all inflectional categories; they also inflect for degrees of comparison (comparative and superlative). The demonstrative *ho, hē, tó* acquired the function of a definite article after Homer, and it agrees in all inflectional categories with the noun it de-

termines; in the course of time it came to be increasingly used with verbal infinitives, in which case neuter singular forms occur.

Verbs inflect for mood (indicative, optative, imperative, and subjunctive), tense/aspect (present, imperfect, aorist, perfect, future, pluperfect, and future perfect), diathesis (active, middle, and passive), person, and number (singular, plural, and dual). A separate passive is found only in the aorist, perfect, and future; in the other tenses, the middle can have both middle and passive meaning; the imperfect, the perfect and the pluperfect are found in the indicative only, the future and the future perfect only in the indicative and in the subjunctive. Nominal forms of the verb include infinitives and participles for all verbal tenses and two verbal nouns.

0.2 Texts used for this book¹

0.2.1 The Homeric poems

The Homeric poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, were written in the 8th century BCE, but they preserve a more ancient stage of the Greek language, about two centuries earlier. Although we commonly refer to the author of the poems as Homer, they are not the work of a single person: rather, the two poems are examples of oral compositions, and the text that has come down to us is the work of an array of early poets, who repeated the poems in an ongoing process of composition. Discussion about dialectal features of the Homeric poems has been long and complicated and I am not going to summarize it here: suffice it to say that it is now virtually agreed upon that, in spite of some influence from other dialects, Homeric Greek is basically Ionic. In the field of adpositions and cases, Homeric Greek preserves a number of archaic features: in particular, adpositions mostly still had their original spatial meaning; metaphorical meanings known from later Greek were partly in their infancy, and partly as yet undeveloped. Consequently, Homeric Greek is of primary relevance for the purposes of this book, because it allows us to see how meanings of prepositions that seem incompatible with each other developed, starting from the same spatial meaning. For this reason the Homeric evidence constitutes the bulk of the examples discussed here.

0.2.2 Herodotus' Histories

Herodotus is the first important Greek historian; he was born in Asia Minor (present-day Turkey) in 484 BCE, and wrote a long and detailed history of the Persian wars, which had started a few decades before his birth, and ended during his childhood. Herodotus' language is Ionic, and, although it is both chronologically and grammatically closer to the literary Attic of the other authors used here, it also continues a number of features of Homeric Greek, which were unknown to Attic. We will see some cases where Herodotus continues features of Homeric Greek with respect to the use of cases with prepositions and to the meaning of some prepositions.

0.2.3 Thucydides' Peloponnesian Wars

Thucydides was also an important historian; he was about twenty years younger than Herodotus, and described in his book the war between the cities of Athens, his hometown, and Sparta. Thucydides' book refers to political events that took place during the life of the author.

Thucydides wrote in Attic, but, as opposed to writers who pursued other literary genres, he partly adopted some features of Ionic: since Herodotus was recognized by the Greeks as the founder of historical writing, Ionic was considered better suited for this genre. Ionic features in Thucydides rather concern the form than the substance, as one can see in the case of prepositions. For example, Thucydides uses the preposition *sún*, 'with', typical of Ionic, to a larger extent than other Attic authors; however, when prepositions exhibit semantic differences between Ionic and Attic, Thucydides conforms to Attic.

0.2.4 Plato's Dialogues

Early Greek philosophy took some time to find a literary standard of its own: several of the earliest philosophers wrote their works in metrical compositions, often similar to epic literature. Plato's teacher, Socrates, apparently did not think much of writing, and never took the time to put his own thoughts down in writing. However, his method of organizing his teachings in ongoing discussions in which he tried to bring his partners to discover what he thought was right, certainly influenced the writings of his most brilliant pupil: Plato chose the dialogue form for his philosophical writings, with the result that long theoretical discussions are interrupted by more informal verbal exchanges, which set the frame to the dialogue.

Since Plato was creating a new literary genre, he did not have any prestige norms to conform to, and used his own dialect, Attic. In comparison to Ionic, Attic preserves some more archaic features, such as the use of the dual; in the case of prepositions, however, differences between the two dialects point in the direction of a more innovative character of Attic.

Plato, who was born in 427 BCE, lived and taught in Athens in the course of the 4th century; his language constitutes one of the best examples of Classical Attic.

0.2.5 Aristotle

Born in 384 BCE, Aristotle was a pupil of Plato and studied in Athens, but lived and worked in a completely different political situation, which also influenced his language. During Aristotle's life, the Macedonian king Philip conquered and unified Greece; different local vernaculars now had less chance of survival, due to political unification. Aristotle taught and worked in Athens almost all his life, except for an interval of eight years when he was invited by Philip to his homeland, Macedonia, to instruct his son Alexander, later to become Alexander the Great.

In comparison to Plato's works, Aristotle's seem closer to our modern concept of philosophical writing, being organized as treatises, rather than dialogues. However, it must be noted that most of Aristotle's works are not, strictly speaking, his own writings: to a large extent, they have been written down by editors, based on class notes of his students.² So, even if I refer to it as 'Aristotle's language', the language of Aristotle's works is not the unitary language of a single author.

Though the language of Aristotle's works is still very close to Plato's language, it is sometimes described as already inclining toward the Koine. However, it does not contain a mass of Koine features. For these reasons, in linguistic studies and reference works less space is devoted to Aristotle's language than to the 'more classical' language of Plato or the more 'Koine-like' language of later authors. Another reason why Aristotle's language is comparatively little studied is the extension of his works: extant works of Aristotle include a sizeable number of treatises, among which several works devoted to what we now regard as natural science. These latter works in particular contain complicated discussion that is no longer of interest for philosophy, so they are nowadays much less known than Aristotle's philosophical works. I have decided to include Aristotle in my corpus in spite of the problems involved in working with such a large extension of texts, because, as a consequence of the attitudes noted

above, several frequent uses of prepositions, typical of Aristotle, are scarcely ever mentioned even in reference works.

0.2.6 Other Attic authors

Among the other Attic prose writers, the most important are the three speech writers Lysias, Isocrates, and Demosthenes, who lived in the period from the mid-5th to the mid-4th century BCE. I have not included these authors in the corpus used here, but I sometimes give examples from their works that I have taken from secondary sources (reference books or studies devoted to cases and prepositions in specific works).

Apart from the Homeric poems, I have not included other poetic works in the corpus, although admittedly they sometimes constitute good evidence for the knowledge of the spoken language, as in the case of Aristophanes' comedies. Examples from Attic tragedy show that metaphoric uses of prepositions were more widespread in poetry than in prose.

0.2.7 Xenophon

Xenophon was born in Athens in 430 BCE. When still a young man he fought as a mercenary for the Persians, and led the withdrawal of Greek mercenary troops recruited from all over Greece, and from Asia Minor. This experience remained of fundamental importance for the rest of his life, and is also crucial to the understanding of a number of peculiarities of his language. Indeed, Xenophon's language has a number of striking features: in spite of his Attic origins, Xenophon not only exhibits a number of Ionic features that cannot even be found in the Ionic-influenced prose of Thucydides, but he also has a number of uses that evidently derive from different dialectal traditions, although it is sometimes difficult to understand from which.

In the field of prepositions, Xenophon features many peculiarities, both regarding the use of cases within prepositional phrases, and the meaning of prepositions. The dialectal formation of Xenophon's language constitutes a major and widely discussed issue that goes far beyond the scope of this book. As compared to contemporary authors, Xenophon occasionally seems to continue archaic usage, but often also seems to be influenced by dialects that were not part of the main literary tradition. Much of what seems to be idiosyncratic usage can perhaps be traced to the Doric dialect, rather than to Ionic or Attic, and not only does it fail to show up elsewhere in the corpus used for this book, but it does not have reflexes in the Koine either.³ For these reasons, I have

refrained from giving a full account of Xenophon's use of prepositions; I only mention peculiar meaning extensions when they are of general interest in the study of semantic change.

0.2.8 Later works

My study of Ancient Greek ends with the classical period, and the latest author investigated is Aristotle; however, I will briefly point out some subsequent developments, especially with respect to the occurrence of different cases with specific prepositions (see §4.4). When reference to later authors is made, a number of things about the development of the written language must be kept in mind.

After the disappearance of dialectal variation, Greek literary language became increasingly disconnected from the spoken language. Authors of the first few centuries CE tried to stick to classical models, even when these were clearly far from their own language. Only very few texts help us understand the direction of language change in the Koine period. Among these, the most important are non-literary papyri from Egypt, dating back to the first century BCE, and the New Testament, written in the first century CE. My remarks about Koine Greek refer to these two sources.

0.3 Some remarks on the glosses

As I have already mentioned, all examples in this book have a word-by-word translation with full morphemic analysis. Since the glosses are intended to help non-specialists understand Greek texts, I have tried to be as exhaustive as possible. Only few categories are left out, notably:

- a. singular number is not indicated for nominal categories, except for personal and possessive pronouns;
- b. among verbal categories, active diathesis and indicative mood are not indicated;
- c. gender of nouns is indicated as follows: for feminine with a specific gloss in all cases (F); neuter and masculine nominative and accusative have distinct glosses (NOM and ACC for masculine, N/A for neuter); for dative and genitive forms of masculine and neuter nouns gender is indicated only where identifying concord can help to understand phrase structure or, in the case of pronominal forms, to understand cross-reference. In the case of cer-

- tain pronouns, like the indefinite *tis*, which have only one form for masculine and feminine, I have specified the actual gender when it can clarify reference, rather than choose a possible gloss M/F;
- d. several verbal tenses do not have separate passive forms, but middle forms, that can function as either middle or passive. Such verb forms are always glossed M/P. If a form is glossed as passive (P) or as middle (MID), it means that it can only express one of either categories;
 - e. lexical meaning of pronouns or pronominal adjectives is not indicated;
 - f. the article is glossed as such (ART) after Homer; in the Homeric texts it is always glossed as DEM;
 - g. degrees of comparison with adjectives are indicated, except in the case of suppletive forms (e.g. *áristos* is glossed as ‘best’, rather than as superlative of *agathós*, ‘good’);
 - h. personal names and toponyms are abbreviated in the glosses; names of populations are written in full;
 - g. forms of *autós* can function as third person pronoun, or as demonstrative (‘that’), intensifier (‘the same’), or part of the relative pronoun (‘self’); I have glossed them always as DEM, leaving the task of identifying the function to the translation.

Prepositions, which constitute the topic of semantic analysis, could in principle be glossed based on various conventions: one could indicate an abstract meaning (e.g. INTERIOR for *en*, ‘in’, ABLATIVE for *apó*, ‘from’), which, being limited to one feature, would have left out other equally important features. Another possibility would be not to translate the preposition, but to gloss them as PREP, or with their Greek form. I have chosen to always gloss them with their original local meaning, although this sometimes results in a gloss that has little to do with the actual meaning in a specific context.⁴ This choice is as arbitrary as other possible choices would be.

Theoretical foundations

1.0 Introduction

Cases and prepositions¹ encode grammatical relations and semantic roles of nominal constituents. Cases are sometimes thought to be ‘more grammatical’ than prepositions: that this is not the case is demonstrated by the fact that in languages that have no morphological cases, such as English, the function of cases is taken over, by a large extent, by prepositions.² Especially when encoding grammatical relations, cases and prepositions are often considered purely distinctive markers, without an autonomous semantic content. On the other hand, since prepositions in particular typically also encode some S(ematic) R(ole)s, and the existence of a meaning in such cases is hard to deny, grammatical or semantic uses of prepositions are sometimes regarded as involving homophones.

Such an approach has been supported especially by Generative Grammar. Earlier theories, including parts of European Structuralism, relied on a meaning-oriented approach, although the nature of grammatical meaning was sometimes viewed as totally different from lexical meaning. Still earlier, in the 19th century, linguists mostly followed localistic approaches, and thought that the meaning of cases derived by abstraction from an original spatial meaning. Their views, partly similar to current theories on grammatical meaning, were rejected in the early 20th century on account of their basically atheoretical character.³

In this book I follow the approach of Cognitive Grammar, which I briefly discuss in §1.1.

1.1 The meaning of grammatical forms

In Cognitive Grammar grammatical forms are conceived as meaningful. The substance of their meaning is not different from the substance of lexical meaning: the difference lies in the degree of abstractness, rather than in substance.

Furthermore, space is conceived as the basic domain of human experience, which serves as source for understanding other, more abstract domains. Indeed, research on grammaticalization has shown that the abstract meaning of grammatical forms most often derives through metaphoric extension from an original local meaning.

That grammatical forms have a meaning does not imply that one must conceive of them as monosemous. One of the most important differences between the Cognitive Grammar approach and earlier case theories has been highlighted in Nikiforidou (1991): while earlier studies tried to single out a *Grundbedeutung* ('basic meaning') or a *Gesamtbedeutung* ('general meaning') for each case, in Cognitive Grammar cases are considered prototypical categories, which constitute instances of 'structured polysemy', where semantic extension is based on separate features of meaning, so that the members of the resulting category (i.e. different meaning/functions of each form) are related to each other in a radial structure (see Lakoff 1987 on the structures of radial categories).

To say that the abstract meaning of grammatical forms derives from an original spatial meaning does not mean that the spatial meaning is synchronically available as their 'basic' meaning: rather, following the theory of grammaticalization,⁴ one must assume that grammatical forms originated from earlier lexical items with a concrete, spatial meaning. Such a view in turn necessarily implies the integration of a diachronic dimension in the analysis of meaning.⁵

Semantic extension proceeds from abstraction based on two common procedures of human cognition, metaphor and metonymy. Through metaphor a concrete relation is mapped onto a less concrete one, in order "to describe conceptually complex phenomena in terms of less complex ones" (Claudi & Heine 1986:299): for example, in

- (1) *I came in a hurry,*

the extension of the meaning of the preposition *in* is based on the existence of a metaphor, according to which states of affairs are conceived as containers (so-called 'Container metaphor', see Lakoff & Johnson 1980:32 and below, §1.2.1.2 and 3.1.). Through metonymy a certain concept can be used in reference to another, related one, as in

- (2) *Mary is reading Homer.*

In (2), *Homer* is not what is actually being read, but rather the author of the work that Mary is reading.

Crucial to the understanding of how metaphorical extension of meaning can operate is the concept of prototypical categories and *gestalt* properties of categories, as defined in Lakoff (1977). According to Lakoff, *gestalts* are structures in terms of which our perception of the world is organized, and have a number of properties, among which that of being “at once holistic and analyzable” (1977:246); furthermore, “mapping of one *gestalt* onto another may be partial”. So metaphoric extension of meaning from a basic to a more abstract type of relation obtain based on only one of the features of the source.

1.1.1 Lexical meaning

Lexical meaning of the NPs that actually occur with specific cases or adpositions is often crucial to the understanding of the semantic function expressed. In many cases, one can say that a certain lexical feature ‘activates’ a specific meaning of the relevant grammatical form, which is polysemous in isolation. These different meanings are usually related, as in

- (3) *I cut the salami with a knife* (Instrument),⁶
- (4) *I cut the salami with care* (Manner).

Often, however, semantic extension can be shown to have operated diachronically, but synchronically different uses have very little in common (see the example of the Greek instrumental dative, §2.2.3.2).

Examples (3) and (4) illustrate an important and frequent feature of meaning abstraction: the occurrence of an abstract noun triggers a more abstract meaning of the preposition *with*. As we will see in the example of various Greek prepositions in Chapter 3, semantic extension often starts with the occurrence of abstract nouns with otherwise local prepositions. Abstract nouns seem more likely to occur in recently developed metaphorical expressions. At an early stage of semantic extension, abstract nouns provide ‘bridging contexts’ for the development of abstract meaning. Concrete nouns with a certain preposition or case marker are understood as referring to concrete, spatial SRs, while abstract nouns trigger different interpretations. Such process is described as follows in Evans and Wilkins (2000: 549):

...meaning B often comes into existence because a regularly occurring context supports an inference-driven contextual enrichment of A to B. In these contexts, which we term BRIDGING CONTEXTS, speech participants do not detect any problem of different assignments of meaning to the form because both speaker and addressee interpretations of the utterance in context are

functionally equivalent, even if the relative contribution of lexical content and pragmatic enrichment differ. Subsequently this contextual sense may become lexicalized to the point where it need no longer be supported by a given context ...

We will see examples of such processes: for example, in §3.3, the preposition *eis*, ‘to(ward)’ will be shown to extend from Direction to Purpose initially only with action nouns: later, when the new meaning becomes part of the lexical meaning of the preposition, it denotes Purpose with concrete nouns as well.

The importance of lexical meaning is not only visible in semantic change: a frequent polysemy involves Purpose and Beneficiary; typically, the two SRs are kept distinct by the feature of animacy, which triggers the Beneficiary interpretation (see §1.2.6 and 1.2.9).

The importance of lexical meaning is illustrated in Janda (1993:14–15), based on research by various authors on Slavic linguistics: “when the noun’s lexical meaning does not correspond to the concrete meanings of the case, metaphor is often necessarily invoked. ... Conversely it is also possible for the lexical meaning of the noun to determine which submeaning of a case is expressed”. I will come back to the matter of lexical features in §1.2.1.6.

1.1.2 ‘Grammatical’ and ‘concrete’ (uses of) cases

Besides SRs, cases also express factors of a syntactic nature, such as alignment. As a consequence, “their [*sc.* of cases] association with particular roles becomes subsidiary and often inessential” (Langacker 1991:384). In the Indo-European languages, this phenomenon is most apparent for the nominative case, but partly also concerns other cases, mostly associated with a specific grammatical relation, such as the accusative.

Based on the frequency with which a certain case encodes a grammatical relation or an SR, Indo-Europeanists traditionally distinguish between ‘grammatical’ and ‘concrete’ cases. In the classification of Kuryłowicz (1964), grammatical cases are those whose primary function is to encode a grammatical relation, while concrete cases are those that most frequently encode SRs. Grammatical cases can occasionally have concrete uses: for example, the Greek accusative, a grammatical case whose primary function is to encode direct object, can occasionally express Direction, i.e. encode an SR. This traditional terminology is connected to a somewhat rigid distinction between what is meaningful and what is not; I will follow it for convenience only, and refer to cases that

mostly encode SRs as ‘concrete cases’ (in the Indo-European languages, such cases are the locative, the ablative, and the instrumental).

The fact that cases are often associated with pragmatic and syntactic, rather than semantic, functions, has the effect that syncretism can also be based on a syntactic or pragmatic feature, still following *gestalt* properties (i.e. a syntactic feature is focalized as the relevant one for functional extension). This process is what I call syntactic syncretism (see Luraghi 1987, 2000a, 2001a).

1.1.3 ‘New’ and ‘old’ metaphors

The Latin word for ‘head’ was *caput*. In Vulgar Latin, if one wanted to say that somebody was a blockhead, one would use the word *testa*, originally meaning ‘baked clay’, and later ‘(empty) shell’. This was a metaphor, indicating that one is silly, has an ‘empty head’. In some of the Romance languages, e.g. French and Italian, the current word for ‘head’ derives from Latin *testa*: this meaning change shows that the metaphor had become more and more frequent in Late Latin, had lost its implications, and finally became lexicalized. Of course nowadays it is no longer a metaphor, but it did feel as such for quite some time for the speakers who started using it.

Much in the same way, when we say that extension of Comitative *with* to express Instrument relies on a metaphor (so-called ‘Companion metaphor’, see §1.2.4.2), we refer to the origin of the semantic extension, but do not mean that present speakers of English use *with* metaphorically when expressing Instrument: rather, instrumentality is currently part of the meaning of *with*. However, the metaphor can be revived, as shown in

- (5) a. *Buffalo Bill shot dozens of buffalos with his old rifle;*
 b. *Buffalo Bill shot dozens of buffalos together with his old rifle.*

In (5a), *with* has its habitual instrumental meaning, triggered by the occurrence of the noun *rifle*, which refers to a prototypical instrument. In (5b), on the other hand, the occurrence of the adverb *together* only leaves the comitative interpretation. The instrument is personified and conceived as a companion, performing the same action with the agent. The extension of *with* from Comitative to Instrument must have followed the same path.

In Chapter 3 we will see that a number of prepositions whose abstract metaphoric use was at its onset in Homer acquire an extended meaning in later authors.⁷

1.1.4 Mental maps

The meaning of grammatical forms is included in a ‘conceptual space’, in which it can be described as a semantic map, or mental map (see Croft 2001:92–98; Haspelmath, forthcoming). Conceptual space is universally available to human cognition, while a mental map is the portion of conceptual space which constitutes the meaning of a certain form in a certain language. The mental map of a highly polysemous form, such as a case or a preposition, involves a number of neighboring concepts. The use of mental maps for the representation of meaning has the advantage that these concepts are not listed randomly, but according to their closeness and, as far as possible, to the direction of semantic spread.

The use of mental maps requires an in-depth understanding of the (presumably universal) organization of conceptual space, which in turn can be understood only in the light of accurate descriptions of a large amount of different languages. Such a task has not yet been accomplished: consequently, descriptions of conceptual space for the time being remain tentative. To my view, such limitation does not mean that one should give up the use of mental maps, because it is only by trying to understand how different meanings of a certain language-specific form relate to each other that one can reach an understanding of the structure of conceptual space. However, one must be careful in one’s assumptions about this matter.

As an example, let us examine the conceptual space typically covered by the dative case, or by prepositions that correspond to it, according to Haspelmath (forthcoming), as represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. A semantic map of typical dative functions/the boundaries of French *à*

Haspelmath remarks that “the configuration of functions shown by the map is claimed to be universal” and further that “the functions must be arranged in such a way that all multifunctional grams can occupy a contiguous area on the semantic map”.

In the light of the last assumption, the connecting lines are problematic. If we match the uses of the dative in the Indo-European languages with the above

map, the problem arises that Direction is not a typical function of the dative, even in languages such as Latin or Sanskrit, in which the dative expresses Purpose. Indeed, as I will argue in §1.2.5 and 2.1.2, Direction may have been the original function of the Indo-European dative, but the dative case lost it in most Indo-European languages. Consequently, Purpose is unconnected with the other concepts.⁸ One could argue that in this case the link that had provided semantic spread has been lost in diachronic change, and that the result is homophony, rather than polysemy. However, such a view does not consider the frequent polysemy which involves Purpose and Beneficiary: readily available evidence from Romance and Germanic languages shows, for example, that these two SRs (e.g. Engl. *for*, Germ. *für*, It. *per*, French *pour*, etc.), can merge without the mediation of Recipient or Direction.

A further problem with the map in Figure 1 concerns the meaning of French *à*: besides the functions listed, *à* also denotes Location. Haspelmath (forthcoming) acknowledges this fact, but writes that he “arbitrarily limit(s) the discussion to the functions shown” in the above figure. Comparison with other languages, both Indo-European and non-Indo-European, shows that this is not an idiosyncrasy of French *à*: indeed polysemy involving Location and other SRs typically expressed by the dative is widely attested (see below, §1.2.1.6). So Location should be included somewhere in the map, presumably above Direction, and possibly connected with predicative possessor (see §2.1.2).

In sum, more research is needed in the universal structure of conceptual space. In the next sections I will suggest some possible connections among SRs, that may be useful in the description of conceptual space. My use of mental maps in Chapter 3 will mostly have heuristic value and serve the purpose of language specific descriptions of meaning. Note further that mental maps should not be confused with figures in which I simply represent historically attested meaning extensions (as e.g. Figure 31).

1.2 Semantic roles

A certain number of SRs is often assumed without further discussion. When one tries to make an exhaustive list, the problem arises of how to delimit SRs: as soon as one asks oneself how many SRs should be distinguished, it becomes apparent that there are virtually as many roles as there are possible different participants in a state of affairs. Criteria for isolating SRs are discussed in Haspelmath (1997: 10–13), who writes about the methodology followed in his book: “A semantic function has been isolated when there is a significant number of

languages which clearly distinguish this type from related ones in their means of expression... It would be very difficult to base such a list on semantic criteria alone, because there would be no way of constraining the possible proliferation of functions". In this book, I will discuss the most frequently assumed SRs and will consider them separately when they are encoded in a specifically different way from related roles in Ancient Greek.

In this book, I assume that SRs are prototypical categories. This means that beside prototypical exponents of each SR one must allow for the existence of non-prototypical ones. Assuming prototypicality as a constituting feature of SRs has two advantages: in the first place, it allows to capture the essential unity of conceptualization of a given situation in spite of the occurrence of different participants. Furthermore, it avoids multiplying SRs (see §1.2.4.1).

Cognitive Grammar assumes a localistic theory of the meaning of cases and prepositions. In principle, local SRs expressed by a certain morpheme are viewed as having developed earlier than other SRs. The diachrony of meaning extension in the case of prepositions offers extensive evidence for such a development. When one considers non-local SRs, an important question arises about the directionality of semantic extension. Often, semantic extension is considered to be unidirectional, similar to grammaticalization processes: as in grammaticalization, also in semantic extension there is a change from concrete to abstract, often assumed to be irreversible. However, a number of irregularities suggest that the unidirectionality hypothesis does not account for all semantic developments.

Studies devoted to grammaticalization suggest that SRs expressed by cases and prepositions can be arranged on a scale based on their degree of abstractness. Heine et al. (1991: 159) set up the scale given in Figure 2, which is meant to represent the stages of meaning extension for grammatical forms.

According to this scale, the domain of spatial relations is immediately followed by the domain of anthropocentric concepts. Inanimate concepts rank




Figure 2. Paths of semantic extension




Figure 3. The causal chain




Figure 4. The object location metaphor

differently according to whether human activity is necessarily implied (Instrument, Purpose) or not (Cause).

Croft (1991: 185) makes a distinction between antecedent and subsequent roles in the causal chain of events, represented in Figure 3. The mapping of spatial relations onto causal ones obtains according to the scheme in Figure 4, which describes the ‘object-location metaphor’.

Antecedent roles are those that precede the object, while subsequent roles follow it. To the two groups two more SRs must be added, i.e. Location and Possessor, neutral to this distinction. According to Croft, polysemy and semantic spread can only obtain either among antecedent or among subsequent roles, and there is a sharp division between the two groups in terms of possible polysemy (1991: 184).

The predictions of Figures 2 and 3 are not always borne out: for example, syncretism of Comitative and Agent appears to follow naturally from Figure 3, at least as syncretism of Agent and Instrument or Comitative and Instrument. However, while the latter two types of polysemy are frequent across languages, syncretism of Agent and Comitative is almost inexistent.⁹ On the other hand, polysemous forms that can encode both Cause and Purpose, or Cause and Beneficiary should be most infrequent, but this is not the case, as we will see further below and in Chapter 3.

Another problem, connected with unidirectionality as shown in Figure 2, is provided by the extension of the instrumental case from Instrument to Agent in some Indo-European languages. Note that, according to Figure 2, only the extension from Agent to Instrument should occur, but not the extension from Instrument to Agent. I have discussed this type of semantic extension in Luraghi (2001b), where I suggest that the inversion of directionality owes to the fact that it is brought about by metonymy, rather than metaphor. See further below, §1.2.4.1.

1.2.1 Space

1.2.1.1 *Basic local relations*

In the framework of a localistic theory, space is considered the source domain for the conceptualization of reality. Spatial relations are mapped onto other domains through the metaphorical capacities of the human mind, and provide the possibility to understand more complex, abstract relations on the basis of less complex, concrete ones.

The basic local relation is Location: a trajector is located at a certain point, relative to the portion of space delimited by a landmark. If we add a dimension, and directional motion along a trajectory to the relation holding between the trajector and the landmark, we can have either Direction, if the trajector gets closer to the landmark, or Source, in the opposite case. For these two SRs the relation between the trajector and the landmark involves the existence of a trajectory.

Location, Direction, and Source are usually considered the basic local SRs, and their primary cognitive relevance is also reflected in case systems across languages.¹⁰ Often, case systems have three local cases, whose primary function is to express these SRs. The ancient Indo-European languages provide evidence for the reconstruction of one such system of local cases. In Sanskrit, the language thought to be most conservative regarding the case system, Location is expressed by the locative, Direction by the accusative, and Source by the ablative. In Ancient Greek the number of cases was reduced by syncretism (see §2.1); however, the original opposition still partly holds, and involves the dative (Location), the accusative (Direction), and the genitive (Source).

According to the data in Stolz (1992:76ff.), the distinction between locative and allative on the one hand, and ablative on the other appears to be ‘more basic’, in the sense that a separate allative is less frequently attested than a separate ablative; furthermore, in languages that do not have a separate allative, the locative often has both locative and allative functions. The possible syn-

cretism of Location and Direction had been highlighted in the early days of Case Grammar: mostly on the basis of English, Fillmore (1968:26) suggests that the two SRs ('deep cases' in his terminology) were kept distinct by 'the movement or non-movement character of the associated verb'.¹¹ In the Indo-European languages, there is often a fuzzy border between Location and Direction: for examples, there are languages that encode the two SRs in a distinct way only under limited circumstances, while Source is mostly kept distinct. In Latin, a small number of prepositions admits case variation in connection with the Location/Direction distinction: it is the case of *in*, 'in', which denotes Location with the ablative, and Direction with the accusative. However, a much bigger number of prepositions only takes one case and can express both SRs (e.g. *ad*, 'by', *inter*, 'between', 'among', and several others). The distinction is then understood contextually.¹² On the other hand, preposition that denote Source do not normally denote either Location or Direction.

In spite of lesser frequency, syncretism of locative and ablative in presence of a separate allative is attested as well. Lachlan Mackenzie (1978) has suggested the term 'ablative-locative transfer' for a type of semantic change that he describes in several, genetically unrelated languages, as markers of Source extended to Location. Since this phenomenon also occurs in Ancient Greek (see especially §3.13 and 3.17), I will summarize the semantic motivations, as described in Lachlan Mackenzie (1978: 153–154). Lachlan Mackenzie remarks that there are "... sentences where ablative and locative meaning cannot be clearly distinguished". Based on the following example, from Faroese:

- (6) *fáa mjólk undan kúnni*
 get:INF milk from.under cow-ART
 "to milk the cow",

he further remarks that both interpretations 'to get milk under the cow' and 'to get milk from under the cow' are possible, because both "may be used to refer to the same action; they differ only in how the action is conceptualized" (in the terminology of Cognitive Grammar, one can say that the two expressions profile different things, i.e. the starting point of the action, or its location). A possible contact between Source and Location is provided by Origin. Origin can be seen as an abstract type of Source: it does not imply concrete motion, but only an abstract notion of provenience.¹³ Consequently, Source expressions are usually also used in Origin expressions, independent of concrete motion: if we say that somebody *is from* place X, we do not necessarily imply that s/he is no longer located *at* place X. Note further that once a Source expression is re-

interpreted as denoting Location it can also spread to Direction, thus opening a path to a possible Source/Direction polysemy.

A fourth spatial SR is Path: it encodes a state of affairs in which the trajector moves along a trajectory through, or across a landmark. Path is somewhat more complex than the other basic SRs. In a sense, it combines some properties of Location with some of Direction: the trajector moves along a trajectory, as in the case of Direction, but part of the trajectory occupies the area of the landmark, as in the case of Location. The greater complexity of Path is mirrored in the fact that a separate morphological case for Path, so-called perlicative, is less frequently attested in the world's languages than separate cases for the other three SRs.¹⁴

In the case of Proto-Indo-European, the instrumental case is sometimes reconstructed as having had perlicative value. The data of the ancient Indo-European languages which preserve a separate instrumental provide some evidence. In Sanskrit there are occurrences such as

- (7) *ā sahásram pathíbhīr indra rāyā... yāhí*
 PREV thousand path:INSTR.PL I.:VOC king:VOC come:IMPT.2SG
 “kingly Indra, come on a thousand paths” (*Rigveda* vi 18.11).

The Latin ablative, which, in spite of its name, mostly has instrumental value, occurs in expressions such as *portā intrare*, ‘to go inside through a door’. This is indeed a perlicative expression, but of a type quite different from the Sanskrit example. The Slavic languages also have an instrumental of space, still preserved in the modern languages. It occurs, for example, in Russian; its usage covers the type both of the Sanskrit and of the Latin occurrences:

- (8) *pegij pes, beguščij kraem morja*
 skewbald dog:NOM running:PART.PRS.NOM edge:INSTR sea:GEN
 “a skewbald dog, running along the edge of the sea”;
- (9) *krov’ šla nosom i gorlom*
 blood:NOM went nose:INSTR and throat:INSTR
 “the blood went through the nose and the throat”.¹⁵

In Hittite a separate instrumental case is attested, especially in the most ancient texts, with instrumental and sociative function only.¹⁶

In Ancient Greek, the instrumental has merged with the dative/locative; any local uses of the resulting case can be connected with its locative value; Path is expressed through a series of prepositions.

1.2.1.2 Interior/exterior

Once we add more dimensions to the landmark, spatial relations can be understood as involving or not involving its internal space.¹⁷ So a trajector can be located inside or near a landmark, or it can move toward the inside of a landmark or only in its direction; the trajector can move on a trajectory that originates inside a landmark or in its vicinity. In these three cases, we speak of oppositions between inessive/adessive for Location, illative/allative for Direction, and elative/ablative for Source. The opposition interior/exterior is fully grammaticalized in a number of languages, among which Hungarian and Finnish, which also have separate local cases to express the opposition based on contact (§1.2.1.3).

When the trajector is located relative to the landmark's interior, the landmark is typically conceived as a container. The Container metaphor is very important in human cognition, and is based on the dimensionality of the human body, which is in itself a container. In fact, especially for Location, inessive appears to be more basic than adessive, as shown by the fact that morphological markers are simpler for inessive: usually, if there is only one locative case, its most likely meaning is inessive, rather than adessive. Often, in languages in which nouns do not inflect for case, adpositions that express inessive are simpler than those that express adessive. This is also true for the ancient Indo-European languages, in which the locative case basically expresses inessive, and one of the most widely attested and most ancient adpositions, deriving from PIE **en* (Engl. 'in'), is used to strengthen the inessive meaning of local cases.

The Container metaphor implies that the landmark occupies a portion of space limited by boundaries; furthermore, the fact that the trajector is, has been, or is going to be located at the landmark's interior implies coincidence between a portion of the landmark and the trajector.

In Ancient Greek the opposition interior/exterior is grammaticalized to a certain extent through the use of the prepositions *en*, 'in', *ek*, 'out of', and *eis*, 'to', with inessive, elative, and, to a lesser extent, illative value, and the use of *pará* with the dative, genitive, or accusative for adessive, ablative and allative. While the former three prepositions mostly, but not only, denote that the trajector is located or moves relative to the landmark's interior, the occurrence of *pará* explicitly indicates that the local relation holds between the trajector and an area located near the landmark.

While the opposition interior/exterior is considered relevant for Location, Direction, and Source, it is not normally mentioned in connection with Path. This may have something to do with the fact that there are languages with separate morphological cases mirroring this opposition for all local SRs, except

Path. However, if one considers different types of Path expression, one can see that the opposition is relevant for Path as well. Consider:

(10) *I drew a nail through the board.*

Here the trajector (*a nail*) moves along a trajectory that leads it to cross the whole portion of space occupied by the landmark, which is profiled as a bounded entity. But this does not exhaust the possibilities of Path. Consider the following example:

(11) *The dog was running along the river.*

In (11) no assumption is made about the landmark's borders; what is more relevant, the trajectory performed by the trajector in (10) is contained by the landmark, while in (11) it is not.

1.2.1.3 Contact

When a trajector is located relative to a landmark, and outside it, possible contact of the trajector with the landmark's outer surface is also relevant. The opposition based on contact is fully grammaticalized in some of the Finno-Ugric languages. In Hungarian we find a three-fold opposition for the three SRs: Location, Direction, and Source, as shown in Table 1.

In the Indo-European languages this opposition is not grammaticalized through morphological case; however, some adpositions express this contrast: for example, in English we find *on* and *over*, both of which indicate that the trajector's location is vertically oriented with respect to the landmark, with the difference that the first preposition denotes contact, and the second lack of contact (see Brugman 1988). In languages such as Hungarian, which have a special case for location with contact, contact usually holds between the trajector and the upper surface of the landmark.

In Greek, similar to English, there is a pair of prepositions for superiority, *epí*, 'on', and *hupér*, 'over', 'above', and only one, *hupó*, 'under', for inferiority, but, as we will see especially in §3.13, case variation with this last preposition

Table 1. Local cases in Hungarian

	location	direction towards	direction from
interior	inessive <i>-ben/-ban</i>	illative <i>-be/-ba</i>	elative <i>-ból/-ból</i>
proximity	adessive <i>-nél/-nál</i>	allative <i>-hez/-höz/-hoz</i>	ablative <i>-től/-től</i>
contact with			
upper surface	superessive <i>-en/-ön/-on</i>	sublative <i>-re/-ra</i>	delative <i>-ről/-ról</i>

can refer to the opposition between contact and lack of contact.¹⁸ Furthermore, case variation also denotes contact/lack of contact with *perí*, ‘around’, see §3.16.

As in the case of the opposition inside/outside, also for contact there appears to be no special case for Path. However, although this opposition is not frequently grammaticalized, Path, too, can imply contact or absence of contact, as in the case of:

(12) *The airplane flew across the Alps,*

where the landmark is crossed as in (10), but the trajector does not touch its surface in any point.

1.2.1.4 *Plexity*

Landmarks can be conceived as ‘multiplex’, or ‘uniplex’ (cf. Talmy 2000: 177–254), consisting of separate items, or of a non-analyzable whole (e.g. count vs. mass nouns). Some types of relation can only hold if a landmark has certain features, e.g. the relation expressed by English *among* cannot hold if the landmark is denoted by a singular count noun (i.e. the landmark must be ‘multiplex’ in Talmy’s terminology).

Plexity of trajectors is also relevant, but there is a basic difference between trajectors and landmarks, connected with their salience: landmarks are stable, while trajectors can be still or can perform motion. So uniplex trajectors can meet the requirements of multiplex trajectors when they are moving. For example, a preposition such as *around* requires a multiplex trajector if there is no motion, but it can also have a uniplex trajector, if the latter moves along a trajectory:¹⁹

(13) *The boys are standing around the teacher;*

(14) *The girl is running around the table.*

Plexity is normally conceived as a property of landmarks and trajectors; however, it can be relevant for trajectories, too. Especially in the case of Path, it is convenient to distinguish between uniplex and multiplex, or unidirectional and multidirectional paths, as in

(15) *The deer ran (straight) through the wood;*

(16) *We went around in the woods.*

Note that in (16) the trajectory is contained inside the landmark and does not cross its boundaries, whereas it may do so in (15): such a state of affairs can

also be conceptualized as a type of Location, rather than Path, and in fact in some languages it involves locative marking, as in German:²⁰

- (17) *Wir gehen im (dat.) Wald*
 “we walk around in the woods”.

In Ancient Greek, as we will see at length in Chapter 3, multidirectional path is expressed by various prepositions with the accusative. Since the accusative, with the same prepositions, also expresses directional motion, disambiguation between the two types of local relation is usually possible based on plexity of landmarks: multidirectional path usually requires multiplex, continuous landmarks. When an opposition between the accusative and the genitive exists with the same preposition, the genitive is more likely to express unidirectional path inside a landmark (see the discussion on *diá*, ‘through’, in §3.9).

1.2.1.5 *Continuity*

Multiplex entities can be continuous or discontinuous. Continuous entities are often denoted by mass or collective nouns, while discontinuous ones are denoted by plural count nouns. A multiplex continuous landmark has an internal space which is not clearly analyzable, such as the internal structure of a multiplex discontinuous entity would be. Langacker (1987:294) writes that “the grammatical differences between plurals and underived mass nouns reflect the greater individuation of plurals wrought by their compositionality”: in other words, plurals profile the existence of a number of individuated entities (i.e. they are discontinuous), while mass nouns and collectives profile an undifferentiated mass. Besides, as noted in Langacker (1991:69 ff.), mass nouns usually denote ‘unbounded’ entities, i.e. entities that do not have clearly definable boundaries.

In Ancient Greek continuity of landmarks is grammaticalized in the opposition between accusative and (partitive) genitive, the latter typically encoding discontinuity (see Chapters 3 and 4).

1.2.1.6 *Possible landmarks*

Some nouns occur more readily than others as landmarks of local relations, notably toponyms, or other types of noun denoting regions in space or entities typically conceived as a trajector’s ‘place’, e.g. the word for ‘house’. Accordingly, such nouns receive different marking when occurring in local expressions; most often, being highly predictable, they require less morphology than other nouns. In Ancient Greek, where the concrete meaning of local cases has been weakened by case syncretism, nouns with local reference can occur

in Location and Direction expressions without prepositions, as we will see in Chapter 2.²¹

Much in the same way as there are nouns denoting typical locations, there are other nouns that must be handled with special attention when they occur in spatial expressions. Animate nouns in Location expressions for example often require, especially in the singular, special marking in order to indicate that there is no physical coincidence of the trajector and the landmark.

In Greek, where the dative and the locative have merged, a plain dative with an animate noun can only be interpreted as a dative, and not as a locative. In general, as remarked in Aristar (1997: 319), “a low-animacy case such as a locative which appears with a high-animacy nominal such as a personal pronoun may be interpreted as a dative case”. This remark also captures the close relation between dative and locative, attested in the Indo-European languages (see Chapter 2).

1.2.2 Time

Several scholars have observed that Time is most often conceived in terms of space, i.e. that markers of spatial relations very often undergo semantic extension to include some type of Time expression (see Haspelmath 1997 for a survey). Since states of affairs can, according to a common metaphor, be conceived as containers, the Container metaphor mediates between Time and spatial Location: hence the use of the locative case or locative prepositions to denote a certain point in time. Similarly, since time is conceived as moving in a straight line and being unidirectional, markers of Direction and Source can denote origin in time or the future limit of a time span.

Haspelmath (1997: 23–42) singles out as possible SRs for Time expressions Simultaneous Location, Sequential Location, Temporal Distance, and Temporal Extent. Examples of each SR are given below:

- (18) *John came yesterday;*
- (19) *Mary will be in town until tomorrow;*
- (20) *I was here four years ago;*
- (21) *I have been here for four years.*

For the sake of simplicity, and because classification of Time expressions is not among the aims of this book, in the descriptive parts of the meaning of prepositions I will only refer to one temporal SR, Time, under which I group all types of temporal relations.

1.2.3 Comitative

Prototypical Comitative involves an animate agent performing an action together with another animate individuated entity, conceived as performing the same action. A prototypical Comitative is e.g.:

(22) *Mary goes to the movies with John.*

Non-prototypical Comitative, which may be called Accompaniment, is shown in occurrences such as:

(23) *Mary goes to school with her books.*

Note that (22) can be paraphrased as:

(22) a. *Mary and John go to the movies,*

thus showing that, in the state of affairs denoted by (22), the NP *John* denotes a sort of co-agent.²² This is not true of (23), which cannot be paraphrased with:

(23) a. *?Mary and her books go to school.*

Furthermore, Comitative (or Accompaniment) expressions denote Attendant Circumstances (“with such a bad weather I won’t go out”). Attendant Circumstances involve the occurrence of inanimate nouns, and often provide ‘bridging contexts’ for the extension of Comitative to other SRs, notably Manner (see §1.2.11), and possibly Instrument, too.²³

In the Indo-European languages there are no cases traditionally called ‘comitative’;²⁴ however, it is traditionally assumed that the instrumental case had in origin a comitative, or sociative, meaning, and that the instrumental meaning, which gives it its name, represents a later development.²⁵ That Comitative markers extend to Instrument, and that this is apparently the only direction of semantic extension has been shown through typological comparison among genetically unrelated languages in various articles by Stolz, see for example Stolz (1996, 1998 and 2001).

The possible local origin of the Proto-Indo-European instrumental case is not easy to assess. As I have mentioned above, the Sanskrit instrumental had a limited local use in some perlocative expressions. However, it must be kept in mind that the semantic extension of the instrumental case from Comitative to Instrument is very ancient, as shown by agreeing evidence in all the Indo-European languages that continue this case: it must have happened already in Proto-Indo-European. With such time depth, it is very hard to reconstruct a possible local origin of the case ending, considering that Instrument is a fre-

quently grammaticalized SR, and tends to have a specific marker for itself (see below, §1.2.4.2).

The possible local origin of Comitative markers can be seen in languages which present evidence for the semantic extension from space to Comitative of markers of proximity. One of them is Ancient Greek *metá*, that I will discuss at length in §3.14. The original meaning of this preposition was ‘among’; when it came to be connected especially with animate nouns, its meaning shifted to ‘with’. Another example is found in some Romance languages, such as Catalan and French, which do not continue Latin *cum*, ‘with’, for Comitative. In such languages, another preposition has acquired Comitative meaning from its former Location meaning: for example, Catalan *amb*, ‘with’, derives from Latin *apud*, ‘at’. The latter preposition had a locative meaning, denoting proximity of a trajector to a landmark, and it was often found with human nouns. Location with a human landmark provides the link between Location and Comitative: Comitative markers with stative verbs denote Location, as *with* in:

- (24) a. *The children live with their mother,*

a sentence that does not mean

- b. **The children and their mother live,*

as do sentences containing real comitatives.²⁶

Non-prototypical Comitative expressions often build the bridge through which semantic extension leads from Comitative to Instrument, as I will show below. Non-prototypical Comitative may also be a less individuated animate entity, such as the referent of a mass noun or a plural.

In the ancient Indo-European languages, such nouns can occur in Comitative expressions with the same marking of prototypical Comitative, as in (25), or with the marking of Instrument, as in (26):²⁷

- (25) *vereri se ne per insidias ab eo*
 fear:INF.P 3SG.REFL NEG through treachery:ACC.PL by 3SG.ABL.M
circumveniretur; *uterque cum equitatu*
 surround:SUBJ.IMPF.3SG.P both:NOM.SG with cavalry:ABL
veniret
 come:SUBJ.IMPF.3SG

“he feared that Caesar might surround him by treachery, so each party should come with an escort of horsemen” (Caes. *BG* 1.42);

- (26) *illi equitatu atque essedis ad flumen*
 3PL.NOM cavalry:ABL and chariot:ABL.PL to river:N/A
progressi ex loco superiore nostros
 proceed:PART.PF.NOM.PL from place:ABL higher:ABL POSS.1PL.ACC.PL
prohibere et proelium committere coeperunt
 hinder:INF and battle:ACC engage:INF take:PF.3PL
 “they advanced their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground to the river, and started to hinder our troops and engage battle” (Caes. *BG* 5.9).

1.2.4 Causal semantic roles

Causal roles are roles taken by the participant(s) that initiate, or have a part in bringing about a certain state of affairs. Major causal roles are Agent, Instrument, and Cause, to which Reason, Force, Means, and/or Intermediary are usually added. In this section I will deal with the definition of these roles, and their delimitation, as well as the need for keeping all of them separated in any language specific description. Especially in the absence of morphological differences, a scalar notion of agentivity, based on the assumption that SRs are prototypical categories, can avoid multiplying SRs beyond necessity in language specific descriptions, as argued in Delancey (1984).

1.2.4.1 Agent

Typical features of Agent are intentionality and control. Intentionality implies animacy; the same implication, however, is not so clear in the case of control. Indeed, there are inanimate entities that not only cannot normally be controlled by agents (e.g. natural forces), but that are frequently conceived of as exerting control over human beings, notably emotions.

In nominative-accusative languages, such as the Indo-European languages, the role Agent is often assigned to the subject, and expressed by the nominative, a highly grammaticalized case (see §2.0). However, there are other types of clause structure where the Agent is not the subject, and consequently must be coded with specific morphology. This typically happens in passive sentences.

According to current reconstruction, the system of diatheses that we know from some of the ancient Indo-European languages, with an opposition between active and passive, is the result of a comparatively late development. A fully developed category ‘passive’ is very likely not to have existed in Proto-Indo-European: Homeric Greek still preserves evidence for the late development of the passive (for example, passive agents are comparatively rare, and

the function of the passive often simply seems to be to decrease the verbal valency). More evidence is provided by the Anatolian languages, where, in the earliest texts, most verbs can be inflected in one ‘voice’ only (either active or medio-passive).²⁸

It is not my aim here to discuss the origins and chronology of the Indo-European passive; I only wish to point out that, because of its late development, the proto-language did not have a standard way of expressing the agent of passive sentences, that it could pass down to the daughter languages: so the development of Agent expressions must be studied in the individual languages, in which different metaphors can be singled out.²⁹

Keenan (1985:264–265) writes that common means for expressing passive agent are instrumental, locative, and genitive markers. By ‘locative’ Keenan understands both markers of Location and markers of Source. Discussing Keenan’s findings, Croft (1991:248) remarks that Agent expressions can be marked “ablative or locative, depending on the choice of metaphor, object location or event location”. According to Croft’s ‘causal order hypothesis’, passive agent is an antecedent role (Croft 1991:185). This makes clear in particular how Source expressions can come to express Agent.

In the Indo-European languages, the metaphor involving the use of Source expressions for Agent is quite common. In this perspective, states of affairs are conceived as moving entities (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980), and Agent is conceived as the point in space where the state of affairs originates. Source expressions are used for expressing Agent, for example, in some Germanic languages (e.g. German *von*, ‘from’), in Latin (*ab*, ‘from’), and some Romance languages (e.g. in Italian *da*, ‘from’). In Ancient Greek some Source expressions can also express Agent, as we will see in §3.2, 3.4, and 3.17, but they remain marginal, and, as I have shown in Luraghi (2000b), limited to verbs with generic meaning, such as ‘to do’, or verbs with a low degree of transitivity (e.g. verbs that do not denote change of state, such as ‘to say’).

Other spatial metaphors involving different types of Location markers have hardly been the topic of any in-depth semantic analysis. An example is English *by*, which became the marker of passive agent during the Old English period (see Fraser 1987 and Green 1914). Note that English *by* also has an instrumental meaning; however, its use for Agent appears to have originated before the establishment of the instrumental meaning, from the original meaning ‘near’, also attested in the other Germanic languages (see Green 1914 for data and comparison).

Ancient Greek provides a very interesting example of a Location marker that extends to Agent, the preposition *hupó*, ‘under’. As I have shown in Luraghi

(2000b), the spatial meaning of *hupó* is suitable to express physical dominance of a trajector over a landmark, so that the metaphor that links space to agency is based on the feature of control (see §3.13 for further discussion).

Some Indo-European languages, notably Indo-Iranian and Slavic, attest the extension of the instrumental case from Instrument to Agent. An example of an instrumental of agent in Sanskrit is

- (27) *hatá* *índreṇa paṇayaḥ śayadhve*
 smite:PART.NOM.PL I.:INSTR P.:NOM.PL lie.down:PRS.MID.2PL
 “smitten by Indra you, Panis, will sink into death” (*Rigveda* x 108.4).

The extension Instrument > Agent is frequently taken for granted by linguists, possibly because of its widespread occurrence in the Indo-European languages, and in particular in Sanskrit, a language which played a major role in linguistic reconstruction. It is also easy to see common features of Instrument and Agent (both are effectors), and the feature of animacy helps to avoid possible ambiguity. However, as I have remarked in Luraghi (2001b), this extension contradicts the scale of semantic extension (Figure 2). Note that Figure 2 shows the direction of metaphorical extension. I have argued in Luraghi (2001b) that the extension from Instrument to Agent is not based on a metaphor, but rather on metonymy: it is a case of substitution of a concept with a contiguous one, here the agent with the instrument (similar to the author with his/her work, as in example (2) above). To my knowledge, metonymies of this type play a less important role than metaphors in semantic extension of grammatical forms: still this type of change should be investigated further, because, if my explanation is correct, it can apparently bring about variation in the directionality of commonly attested semantic extension, as shown in Figure 2.

Path expressions are also frequently used for Agent. Examples are readily available from many Indo-European languages, such as German *durch*, ‘through’, and French *par*, ‘through’. As in German, Path expressions often denote some kind of less prototypical agent, closer to Instrument (often lacking intentionality). This is the case in Ancient Greek, as we will see in the discussion of the preposition *diá* (§3.9).

Keenan (1985:264) further remarks that many Agent expressions are based on genitival forms. The metaphor involved in this case is not a local one, but it draws on the possessive meaning of the genitive: the agent is conceived as the possessor of an action. The genitive of Agent occurs in some Indo-European languages, most notably Indo-Iranian; in Ancient Greek some nominal compounds attest to an earlier possible use of the genitive with verbal nouns, as in

Diósdotos, ‘given by Zeus’, formed with the genitive *diós* and the verbal noun *dotós* from the verb *didónai*, ‘to give’.³⁰

As I remarked at the beginning of this section, animacy is among the prototypical features of Agent. When a state of affairs is brought about by an inanimate entity, as in

(28) *The ship was wrecked by a storm;*

(29) *He was pushed by ambition;*

we have instances of non-prototypical agents. Often a separate SR is set up for such participants, namely Force. Some other scholars, following Fillmore (1968), view inanimate agents as having the SR Instrument (see for example Radden 1989a). Nishimura (1993) argues at length against this position, pointing out that “[w]ether or not a given inanimate entity is considered to be *intrinsically* capable of acting on its own, it is this conceived possession of force that permits it to be categorized as agent”.

Indeed, there are languages in which inanimate entities exerting control cannot be encoded like animate ones: this is a common phenomenon in some Indo-European languages, in which, as I have shown in Luraghi (1986), animate and inanimate passive agents receive different morphological marking. However, this is not the case in Classical Greek. In Classical Greek, very much in the same way as in Modern English, inanimate entities can occur with passive verbs in the same type of expression as animate ones. Consequently, I will speak of non-prototypical Agent, rather than Force, in order not to multiply SRs, and following Delancey (1984) and Luraghi (1995).

1.2.4.2 *Instrument*

Instruments are (proto)typically inanimate and manipulable. Nouns that occur in Instrument expressions typically refer to ‘natural instruments’, i.e. tools, weapons, means of transportation, and the like. A special class of natural instruments is constituted by body parts, which represent the most readily available instruments for human beings. Nouns denoting natural instruments require the least marking, and, if a language has an instrumental case, they take this case to express Instrument.

The feature of manipulability appears to be more important than animacy for defining Instrument. Among inanimate entities, natural forces and emotions are to a high extent non-manipulable, and in normal situations they cannot take the role Instrument, not even if treated as non-prototypical instances of the SR.³¹

On the other hand, human beings, usually presented as initiators of some state of affairs, can under some circumstances also be acted upon by another agent in order to bring about a certain state of affairs. This situation can imply different relations between the (primary) agent and the other human being, which can be conceived as completely manipulated, or as having an active role in the accomplishment of an action: in the latter case, there appears to be what may be called ‘split agency’, whereby intentionality and control are attributed to either human participant to different extents. The SR taken by such type of secondary agent is Intermediary. Intermediary has a special coding in Classical Greek, as I will show below (see §3.9 and 3.13).

Another important fact about Instrument is that it can only occur in controlled states of affairs, because it requires the co-occurrence of an agent. This is a consequence of the fact that an instrument cannot bring about a state of affairs on its own initiative and can be reconnected with the feature of manipulability: an instrument is not something that might possibly be manipulated, but rather it is conceived as something that must necessarily be manipulated in order to play an effective role in a state of affairs. The feature of manipulation is particularly important in Ancient Greek, as I will show in §3.9.

A separate instrumental case is attested in the case system of numerous languages belonging to various language families. As I have shown in Luraghi (1991), among ‘concrete’ cases the instrumental is in fact one of the most widely attested, along with local cases. An instrumental case is reconstructed for Proto-Indo-European, and is preserved in the majority of the ancient Indo-European languages. In Greek, a separate instrumental is attested only in the earliest written records, the Mycenaean tablets; later, the instrumental merged with the dative-locative (see Chapter 2). However, the plain dative with inanimate nouns fulfilled the function of an instrumental case to a large extent.

Over the last few years a lot of research has been devoted to the relationship between Comitative and Instrument (see above, §1.2.3), which has made it clear that Comitative markers are a possible source for Instrument markers: indeed, in the Indo-European languages, they are the most frequent source. Also the Indo-European instrumental case derived its instrumental meaning from an earlier comitative meaning, as already shown by several scholars in the 19th century (cf. §1.2.3). Semantic extension from Comitative to Instrument is based on the so-called ‘Companion metaphor’, explored in Lakoff and Johnson (1980:135), based on the idea that an instrument can be conceived as acting together with an agent, in order to bring about a state of affairs. The Companion metaphor is common in the modern European languages, including all the Germanic and Romance languages; it also occurs in Modern Greek: in Ancient

Greek, syncretism of the instrumental with the dative/locative points in the direction of a different metaphor for expressing Instrument, as I will argue later on this section and in Chapter 2.

Also attested is the extension of Path expressions to Instrument. According to this pattern of semantic extension, an instrument is conceived as the channel through which the agent's agency is transferred onto the state of affairs. The Channel metaphor is well established in Ancient Greek, in the first place for expressing Intermediary, but later also for Instrument; as an alternative to the highly polysemous plain dative, the preposition *diá*, 'through', can express Instrument also with nouns denoting natural instruments, as we will see in §3.9. The semantic extension is from Path to Intermediary and from Intermediary to Instrument; the latter extension is based on what I will call the Intermediary metaphor, according to which AN INSTRUMENT IS AN INTERMEDIARY. This metaphor is based on the feature of lack of (ultimate) control, common to both Intermediary and Instrument.

A similar extension occurs in English for the preposition *through*. In this connection, another SR, Means, is sometimes identified, as in Croft (1991: 178–179). Radden (1989a: 442–443) also defines Means as relevant for English. Compared to Instrument, Means denotes a somewhat less manipulated and controlled entity. Apparently, the fact that a constituent is indeed assigned the SR Means crucially depends on the occurrence of *through*, or *by means of* in specific examples. In my view, this definition depends too much on formal encoding: it is dubious that the degree of manipulation in *you cannot buy everything by means of money* is indeed lower than in *you cannot buy everything by using money*, although, according to Radden, the former example “tends to be understood” as Means, and the latter as Instrument. I prefer to set up only one SR Instrument: among other reasons, I will show in §2.2.3.3 and §3.9 that non-manipulated entities that may help an agent bring about a state of affairs are consistently encoded as Cause in Greek (see further my concept of ‘enabling cause’, §1.2.4.3).

A third metaphor, especially widespread in non-Indo-European languages, is the Location metaphor. Locative markers are extended to Instrument in the Semitic languages, as well as in a number of Australian languages, and in Finnish.³²

In the case of locative markers that rely on the container metaphor (§1.2.1.2 and §3.1), the extension of Locative to Instrument is made possible by the existence of certain entities, typically conceived as containers, which can be viewed as locations or as instruments. A typical example is constituted by means of transportation, which, in several languages, are constructed as Lo-

cation expressions when in fact they are used as instruments. So for example in Russian, a language in which Instrument is normally expressed through the instrumental case, one commonly uses expressions such as *exat' na poezde/na mašine/na metro*, 'to go by train/by car/by subway', with the preposition *na*, 'in', and the locative case, normally used in Location expressions.

In Ancient Greek, the merging of the ancient instrumental case with the dative/locative is based on the Container metaphor. A class of nouns that has apparently played an important bridging role between the two concepts in Greek is constituted by body part nouns. I will discuss this matter in more detail in Chapter 2.

In §1.2.4.1 I mentioned extension from Instrument to Agent in the case of the Indo-European instrumental. Polysemous markers that can encode the two SRs occur in many non-Indo-European languages, notably in a number of ergative languages, in which one finds an ergative-instrumental case. In Luraghi (2001b) I argued that patterns of polysemy among Agent, Instrument, and Locative in these languages points in the direction of an extension from Agent to Instrument (the direction that one would expect based on Figure 2). Similar to the Companion metaphor that explains the extension of Comitative to Instrument, also in this case we have an extension based on personification, which gives rise to what I will call the 'Agent metaphor', according to which AN INSTRUMENT IS AN AGENT. This metaphor is based on the extension of the feature of primary responsibility from Agent to Instrument: control and intentionality features are left out of account, and only the final segment of the causal chain is profiled, whereby both Agent and Instrument can be conceived as final effectors.

1.2.4.3 Cause

In comparison to the roles mentioned above, Cause is more complicated, among other things, because there is no natural class of causes: causes can be natural forces or emotions, abstract notions, other types of inanimate entity, human beings, and, very often, states of affairs.³³

Indeed languages display a much bigger variety of expressions for Cause than for Agent and Instrument, as one can see in English (see Dirven 1993, and 1995 & Radden 1985), in which virtually all local prepositions can be used metaphorically to express Cause. This variety is somewhat embarrassing, considering that, according to the schema in Figure 3, Cause is an antecedent role and should only merge with other antecedent roles (for example, Source, but not Direction). However, as we will see in the discussion of Purpose (§1.2.9),

there seems to be much less unidirectionality in the paths followed by semantic extension than Figures 2 and 3 apparently imply.

Interestingly, while many languages have an instrumental case, a specific case for Cause is not frequently found. However, the instrumental case itself can express Cause under certain circumstances: specifically, it can express Cause with non-controlled states of affairs, or with controlled states of affairs, with non-manipulated entities. This is a typical function of the instrumental case in the Indo-European languages, as shown by the following example, from Sanskrit:

- (30) *avidyaya- iva tad āhuḥ*
 ignorance:INSTR indeed:DEM.N/A say:AOR.3PL
 “indeed they say this because of their ignorance” (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* i 11.10).

In Ancient Greek, the plain dative, which, with inanimate nouns, fulfills the function of the Indo-European instrumental, can also express Cause, as I will show in §2.2.3.3.

A frequent spatial source for Cause expressions is provided by Source expressions, based on the metaphor CAUSES ARE ORIGINS (of events).³⁴ In fact, the notion of origin mediates between (spatial) source and cause, and often explains the spread of Time expressions to Cause, discussed below.

Area expressions (see §1.2.12) also provide a source for Cause expressions, especially with verbs of emotion, as in the case of English ‘about’ (see Dirven 1995 & Radden 1985). Area expressions are frequently used for denoting Cause in Greek, as we will see especially in Chapter 3 and in §4.2.6 and 4.2.11.

Another frequent source for Cause expressions is constituted by markers of Time. This development is readily exemplified with English ‘since’. The path for semantic extension is provided by common knowledge and beliefs about causation and the structure of events: causes are thought to precede their consequences, so if one event comes before another event in time, it is normal to conceive of the former as having caused the latter (see Hopper & Traugott 1993:74). In fact such an inference is so natural that, on the sentence level, simple coordination of clauses without any overt marker of Cause can be interpreted as denoting causation. Since markers of Time often derive from markers of Source, often Time mediates between space and causation. This is the case of the Greek preposition *ek*, as we will see in §3.2.

An important feature of Cause, which is usually not given enough attention, is the attitude of the agent of a given state of affairs toward the cause that brings it about.³⁵ Some English examples can serve to clarify this point:

- (31) [*John called me and kept me on the phone while I was about to leave home and go to the station; as a result, I left late and missed my train*]: *I missed my train by John's fault.*
- (32) [*John called me and kept me on the phone while I was about to leave home and go to the station: I would have missed my train, if Mary hadn't offered to drive me to the station*]: *I made it to the station by Mary's help.*

The important difference between (31) and (32) is that the *by* phrase in (32) denotes an event that helps the agent achieve his/her intentions. In fact in English it is normally understood as Instrument (or possibly Means), rather than Cause. Note however that there is no implication of direct manipulation from the side of the agent with respect to the other animate entity. If we now consider the following:

- (33) [*John called me while I was about to leave home and go to the station, and would have kept me on the phone for hours, if Mary hadn't called him on the other line. As a result of her call, I was still able to leave in time and didn't miss my train*]: *Thanks to Mary, I made it to the station.*

In (33) the phrase *thanks to Mary* cannot denote Instrument: rather, it can be described as referring to a positively evaluated cause (just as the phrase *by John's fault* in (31) refers to a negatively evaluated cause). It can further be remarked that (33) could also be a paraphrase of (32), which in its turn also admits a paraphrase with *with*: *with Mary's help I made it to the station*. In (31) and (33) we find a state of affairs brought about by an agent, encoded as subject, which is made possible by an action of another agent. Apparently, in English the action of the latter agent can be conceived of in different ways, on a scale that goes from Cause to Instrument. As we will see, in Ancient Greek such types of events, where no manipulation by the primary agent on the 'helping' agent is implied, are always encoded as Cause.

An important type of Cause is Reason, sometimes called 'psychological cause' or 'internal cause'. Reason is the entity or, often, the state of affairs, that motivates an agent to bring about a state of affairs. So the peculiarity of Reason, as opposed to other types of Cause, is that Reason involves the co-occurrence of Agent, and it only occurs in controlled states of affairs, brought about intentionally. Although many languages do not overtly differentiate between Cause and Reason, Reason plays an important role in cognition and in grammar, because it constitutes a field in which two apparently opposite roles, Cause and Purpose, overlap (§1.2.9).

1.2.5 Recipient

Recipient is the role taken by the third argument of some three-place predicates, typically verbs of ‘giving’.³⁶ Verbs of ‘saying’ mostly display constructions of the same type, where the role of the third argument is commonly called Addressee. Recipients and addressees are typically human beings, given the types of state of affairs in which they can occur.

A common source for Recipient/Addressee expressions is constituted by allative markers. An action such as giving involves transfer of an entity from an agent to a recipient, the latter constituting the endpoint of the transfer. In the case of Addressee, communication is conceived as physical motion, following a common metaphor according to which words are objects that move from the speaker to the addressee (so-called ‘Conduit metaphor’, see §3.3).

In the Indo-European languages both SRs are usually encoded by the dative case. The Indo-European dative has as its distinctive property its affinity with animacy: it almost only ever occurs with nouns that denote human beings, and the SRs it most frequently expresses are Recipient, Addressee, and Beneficiary. A possible local origin of the Indo-European dative can be traced back along two lines: one is its morphological affinity with the locative, the other its marginal allative function, attested in Sanskrit and Latin, which is usually considered the source of its metaphoric use in Purpose expressions.³⁷

According to the scale in Heine et al. (1991), quoted above in Figure 2, Beneficiary precedes Recipient/Addressee in semantic extension (the two SRs are called ‘Benefactive’ and ‘Dative’ respectively in Figure 2). In Greek there is limited evidence for the two SRs being encoded in the same way. The only preposition that develops both Recipient and Beneficiary meaning from an earlier purely spatial meaning, i.e. *eis*, does not provide clear evidence for a possible chronology: on the one hand, Addressee and Beneficiary develop at the same time; on the other, use of *eis* for Beneficiary is limited to few occurrences where a plain dative would be the normal type of expression (see §2.2.3 and 3.3). In Byzantine times, *eis* tends to replace the dative in all its uses and ends up becoming the standard marker of Recipient.

A common extension of the dative case and comparable Recipient expressions, at least in the Indo-European languages, is based on syntactic, rather than semantic, properties of Recipient NPs. Consider the following examples:

- (34) a. *Er hat mir das Buch gegeben*
 a.’ *Mi ha dato il libro*
 “he gave me (dat.) the book”

- b. *Er hat mir das Buch weggenommen*
 b.' *Mi ha preso il libro*
 “he took the book away from me (dat.)”

The dative constituent in the (b) examples does not denote Recipient, it rather denotes Source. Indeed, the dative, or corresponding prepositions, cannot express Source in Adverbial NPs, even with human referents, in the languages of example (34): it only expresses Source with three-place predicates which denote states of affairs symmetrical to other states of affairs in which Recipient usually occurs (so *to take away* with respect to *to give*).³⁸ Note that both Source expressions of this type and Recipient expressions are syntactically indirect objects. So the motivation for extension of a certain type of marker, in this case the dative, lies in syntactic similarities, rather than in the meaning of the two types of NP.³⁹

In Ancient Greek both Recipient and Addressee are expressed through the dative case, although some prepositional phrases can also occur, especially in Addressee expressions, which rely on various prepositions with allative meaning, such as *eis*, ‘to’ (§3.3), or *prós*, ‘toward’ (§3.17). Verbs that mean ‘to take away’ can occur in a variety of constructions, the most frequent of which is the double accusative, in which both direct and indirect object appear in the accusative case and are encoded as Patient.⁴⁰

1.2.6 Beneficiary

Beneficiary (also called Benefactive) is the role that is taken by the (human) entity in favor of which an action is performed. An example of Beneficiary is the PP ‘for my mother’ in (35):

- (35) *I bought a present for my mother.*

Beneficiary is sometimes considered as a higher level category which also includes Recipient, as e.g. in De la Villa (1989) and Croft (1991:179). In fact the two SRs have a number of common features: in the first place they are virtually limited to human referents. Furthermore, in some Indo-European languages the dative can encode both Recipient and Beneficiary. The link between the two SRs is provided by the notion of abstract movement: Beneficiary is the SR of an entity affected by a state of affairs, and the state of affairs in question is conceived as being directed toward the beneficiary.

When we take into account prepositions marking Recipient and Beneficiary, we see that polysemy between these two SRs is not as frequent as one

could expect. Even limiting one's observation to the most accessible Indo-European languages, one can remark that the prepositions that encode Recipient do not encode Beneficiary, as shown by Germanic and Romance. Languages with a dative case which can encode Beneficiary, usually also have a preposition used for the same purpose, which cannot encode Recipient: it is the case of Russian *dlja*, 'for', or Latin *pro*, 'for'. Considering Beneficiary prepositions in the Indo-European languages, a frequent pattern or polysemy emerges involving Beneficiary and Purpose, but not Recipient. Indeed Beneficiary and Purpose often appear to be equivalent, and a certain preposition is interpreted as expressing either role only on the basis of animacy, as shown by the following Italian examples:⁴¹

- (36) *Giovanni non ha abbastanza soldi per i figli*
 "John doesn't have enough money for his children";
- (37) *Giovanni non ha abbastanza soldi per i regali*
 "John doesn't have enough money to buy presents (lit.: for presents)".

According to the scale in Figure 2, the direction of semantic extension should be Beneficiary > Purpose. This may be the direction in which semantic extension took place in the case of English *for*, but I am not sure that the same direction was actually followed by semantic extension in the case of Italian *per*, 'for'. Note that this preposition also expresses Cause, and that it does not express Recipient.⁴² In Modern Greek, the preposition *já* can express Cause, Purpose and Beneficiary. It derives from an Ancient Greek preposition, *diá*, 'through', which in origin only expressed Cause (see §3.9). Already in Classical Greek, the meaning of *diá* started to extend to Purpose; only later, in Middle Greek, did it also extend to Beneficiary. Note that, similar to Italian *per*, Modern Greek *já* also encodes Cause, Purpose, and Beneficiary. More research is needed on this matter, but my hypothesis is that if a Beneficiary marker derives from a former Cause marker, as is the case for Greek *já*, this extension can take place through the mediation of Purpose, and the direction of semantic extension may be

Cause > (Reason) > Purpose > Beneficiary

In the event that a Beneficiary marker has another origin, the direction is possibly the opposite one.

Different sub-types of Beneficiary can be distinguished, besides the type of example (35). In particular, one must mention Malefactive, the human entity against which an action is performed, and Behalf. Malefactive can be expressed by prepositions that denote direction, similar to prototypical Beneficiary. Based

on the analysis of the Ancient Greek data, it turns out that when prepositions that have a directional meaning denote both roles, prepositions that denote prototypical Beneficiary profile the direction (their meaning is ‘to’, ‘towards’), while prepositions that denote Malefactive often profile final contact (their meaning is ‘against’).

The Behalf type of Beneficiary can rely on the idea of replacement: if x acts on y 's behalf, x is conceived as acting in y 's place. As we will see, Ancient Greek expressed this SR with various metaphors, partly based on the idea of covering (see §3.12) and on the idea of anteriority in time (see §3.7).

Beneficiary expressions can also indicate possession. This is a frequent extension of the meaning of Beneficiary markers in most Indo-European languages, ancient and modern (English being a notable exception); with respect to the dative case, this use is sometimes called *dativus sympatheticus* (see Havers 1911), and corresponds to external possessor expressions (cf. §1.2.8).

1.2.7 Experiencer

Experiencer is often coded as Agent, and consequently, in the Indo-European languages, it occurs as subject in active sentences. Cognitively, Experiencer is a complicated category because, in spite of its frequent association with Agent, it can sometimes be associated with Patient, i.e. it can be conceptualized in two opposite ways. Croft (1991:213–225) explains this peculiarity of Experiencer showing that mental states are two-way causal relations, which have no a priori causal directionality, and can be represented as in Figure 5.




Figure 5.

In the Indo-European languages, Experiencer is most often encoded as subject, for example with verbs of perception. In the case that the stimulus is chosen as subject, with verbs that mean ‘to think’, ‘to like’, Experiencer is encoded through the dative case: this construction is common to most Indo-European languages and also existed in Old and Middle English, as in

- (38) *mē* *ḍyncǎ* *betre*
 1SG.DAT seem:PRS.3SG better
 “it seems better to me”.⁴³

The occurrence of the dative in Experiencer expressions is a metaphorical extension of the use of the dative for Recipient: physical sensations or mental impressions are conceived as objects transferred from the stimulus to the experiencer.

1.2.8 Possessor

A common way of expressing adnominal possession in many languages, among which the Indo-European languages, is through the genitive case. In this section I will mainly be concerned with other types of Possessor expressions; the semantics of the genitive case will be discussed in §2.2.4.2. It must be remarked that languages with an adnominal genitive, or Possessor encoded by prepositions such as English ‘of’, make use of constructions in which the Possessee is the head noun and the Possessor its modifier. The other strategies discussed below rely on different syntactic constructions.

Possessor expressions often vary according to the type of possessive relation they are involved in. A frequent distinction concerns alienable vs. inalienable possession. The conceptualization of what is alienably or inalienably possessed may vary across languages; in general, inalienably possessed entities are body parts, and other types of entity involved in a whole-part relation, based on the metaphor PARTS ARE POSSESSIONS.⁴⁴ Possessors of inalienably possessed entities may be coded in special ways, for example, they may agree in case with the Possessee, or the case of the Possessee may be copied on the Possessor after the genitive case (see the examples described in Plank 1995; this apparently can only occur in agglutinative languages, see Luraghi 1993).

Case agreement or suffix copying occur in various non-Indo-European languages; among the Indo-European languages, only Classical Armenian and Hittite have consistent patterns of case agreement, as shown in

- (39) *miantolt'eamb* *srtiw*
 simplicity:INSTR heart:INSTR
 “with a simple soul”, Sap. 1.1;⁴⁵
- (40) *nu= kan* GAL-*in arunan* ^o*Ku(ma)rbiyaza* *É-irza* ... *uwater*
 CONN PTC big:ACC sea:ACC K.:ABL house:ABL bring:PRET.3PL
n= an INA *É-* *ŠU arha pehuter*
 CONN 3SG.ACC into house his back bring:PRET.3PL

“they brought the big sea out of Kumarbi’s house, and carried him to his (own) house” (from Luraghi 1993).

Vogt (1932) has argued that the Armenian construction is not of Indo-European origin, but it is the result of contact with Old Georgian, an agglutinative language in which the case of the head noun can be copied after the genitive ending on the modifier, as in (41):

- (41) *perx-n- i kac-isa-n-i*
 foot-PL-NOM man-GEN-PL-NOM
 “(the) feet of the man”.⁴⁶

Following Vogt’s argument, I have shown that the same holds for Hittite, which developed a double case construction under the influence of Hurrian, where suffix copying also occurs, similar to Georgian (see Luraghi 1993, 1994c).

In the other Indo-European languages, double case constructions are sporadic: the only well attested one is the double accusative of part and whole in Homeric Greek.⁴⁷ Examples are:

- (42) *Dēiokhon dē Páris bále ... ômon ópisthe*
 D.:ACC PTC P.:NOM hit:AOR.3SG back:ACC behind
 “Deïochus hit Paris in the back from behind” (*Il.* 15.341);
- (43) *mē me gúnai khalepoîsin oneïdesi thumòn*
 NEG 1SG.ACC woman:VOC.F painful:DAT.PL reproach:DAT.PL spirit:ACC
énipte
 reprove:IMPT.PRS.2SG
 “do not reprove my heart, lady, with hard words of reproach” (*Il.* 3.438).⁴⁸

A third way in which possession is frequently encoded in genetically unrelated languages is the so-called external possessor construction, where the Possessor and the Possessee build two syntactically independent NPs (see the papers in Payne & Barshi 1999). In the Indo-European languages, external possession involves the use of the dative (so-called *dativus sympatheticus*), and it is a very frequent construction in the majority of the Indo-European languages, English being one of the most notable exceptions. It is connected, to a varying extent, with inalienable possession, as shown in Havers (1911), and Haspelmath (1999). Typical occurrences of external possession involve body parts, as in:

- (44) *ich wasche mir die Hände* (Germ.) / *mi lavo le mani* (It.)
 “I wash my hands”.

External possession is also frequent in Ancient Greek. Note that in Greek, as in some other ancient Indo-European languages, the dative can also express possession outside this type of construction, as alternative of the genitive with the copula. This usage, called ‘dative of possession’, is further described in §2.2.3.

From a syntactic point of view, the three types of possessive construction mentioned above (adnominal genitive, double case, and external possessor) are on a scale, along which double case constructions are located between the two extremes from the point of view of constituency. In double case constructions we find two nouns that bear the marking required by their syntactic function, so they can be regarded as independent constituents (either could be left out). The two nouns are in an appositive relation, as in the Ancient Greek examples, in which the noun that denotes the part is an apposition to the noun denoting the whole. In the Armenian and Hittite examples it can be argued that the possessor noun is inflected to agree with the possessee, so that it is treated as an adjective (see Luraghi 1994c). Thus there is a certain degree of dependency between the two nouns. The resulting scale:

adnominal genitive > double case > external possessor

shows that the syntactically most bounded structure (genitive modifier) is the one which can be used for all types of possession. Least predictable (i.e. alienable) possessive relations need the strongest syntactic bounding.

1.2.9 Purpose

Purpose is the SR taken by an entity, often a state of affairs, aimed at by the intentional action of an agent. Common sources for Purpose expressions are allative markers, or markers of Beneficiary, and markers of Cause.

Direction markers can extend to Purpose especially through the bridging effect of abstract nouns: often, when an abstract noun occurs in a Direction expression it triggers an interpretation as Purpose. Some such developments are exemplified by Greek prepositions, such as *eis* (§3.3), and *prós* (§3.17), and will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

I have already discussed the semantic relation between Purpose and Beneficiary in §1.2.6. The relation between Purpose and Cause constitutes an interesting issue, because according to Figure 3, polysemy involving the two SRs should not occur. However, this type of polysemy is widely attested. Croft (1991:293), mostly on the evidence of English *for*, argues that Purpose expressions can extend their meaning to also express Cause.⁴⁹ As I have mentioned

above, evidence for the contrary development, i.e. from Cause to Purpose, is also available (see further Luraghi 2001a and below, §3.9).

In order to explain this apparent irregularity to the unidirectionality hypothesis, I would like to suggest that the notion of Reason, which, as remarked by Croft (1991), mediates between Cause and Purpose, really constitutes a kind of undifferentiated area, in which the reason that motivates an agent to act is cognitively equivalent to the purpose of the action, so that the two notions overlap completely. Purpose denotes a type of mental state, and the two-way model put forth by Croft (1991), cf. §1.2.7, to illustrate the relation between Experiencer and Stimulus can be extended to the relation between Agent and Purpose, as in Figure 6.




Figure 6.

Bidirectionality of semantic extension between Cause and Purpose, as represented in Figure 6, brings about polysemy involving Cause and Beneficiary, as already remarked in §1.2.6.

1.2.10 Patient

In nominative/accusative languages, Patient is the role commonly encoded by the accusative case. Again, many languages allow some variation in case marking, based on typical features of the Patient: degree of affectedness (total/partial), and change of state. Note that in some languages different case marking does not imply a different syntactic behavior (for example, non-accusative direct objects can become subjects of passive sentences). Another common situation is that different case marking is triggered by some lexical features, such as animacy, countability, etc. (see Wierzbicka 1990 on alternations in case marking for the direct object in some Slavic languages).⁵⁰

Since Ancient Greek displays quite a variety of ways of marking the direct object, depending on animacy and internal structure of its referent, I will discuss the features of Patient in Chapter 2.

1.2.11 Manner

Manner is the SR that refers to how a states of affairs is brought about. Languages often rely on one or more derivational affixes to form manner adverbs; the formation of manner adverbs is often so regular that it comes close to inflectional processes (Greek grammarians often described the adverbial ending *-ōs* of manner adverbs as representing a sixth case).

It is not always clear how Manner can be distinguished from Attendant Circumstances and Instrument. Manner Adverbials typically only modify the verb, rather than the verb phrase. Furthermore, the possibility for a PP to be understood as denoting Manner depends on lexical meaning and possible non-referential interpretation of specific nouns. In general, abstract nouns are more likely than concrete nouns to occur in Manner expressions. Besides, certain abstract nouns can only denote Manner: the PP *with care* can virtually only mean *carefully*, independent of any context.

Manner can co-occur with virtually all states of affairs. The latter fact can perhaps explain the wide variety of Manner expressions found in languages: in Greek, in particular, almost all prepositions can express Manner (Martínez Vásquez et al. 1999: 146–153). Crespo (1988a) studies the distribution of different types of Manner expression in Classical Greek, among them manner adverbs and various PPs, and concludes that the choice between them is usually determined by the concrete lexical items that need to be turned into a Manner expression.

1.2.12 Area

Dirven (1995:113) uses the label ‘Area’ in order to refer to non-local uses of ‘about’. He writes: ‘in its nonspatial use the preposition [about] has only two senses, viz. area, or topic, and cause’. According to this definition, Area refers to the topic of verbs of saying and the like. In a sentence like:

- (45) a. *I read a book about gardening,*

the PP *about gardening* denotes an abstract space around which ideally the content of the book is located. In English, the topic of verbs of communication or mental activity can also be expressed through the preposition ‘on’:

- b. *I read a book on gardening.*

This expression is based on a different metaphor: topic is conceptualized as an area that is placed upon the landmark.

Metaphors of both types are available in Ancient Greek, where topic can be expressed by *perí*, ‘around’, or, less frequently, by *hupér*, ‘over’.

Area is defined in a broader sense in Radden (1989a: 448) as “the thematic context or field within which an event is seen”. In this sense, Area is also the SR of NPs that specify the extent to which the state of affairs denoted by the verb applies:

(46) *These two skirts differ in size,*

where the PP *in size* refers to an abstract space in which the situation denoted by the verb holds; furthermore, Area denotes a quality that affects a referent to a certain extent, as in

(47) *John is a lawyer by profession.*

This second type of Area is expressed by the instrumental case in a number of Indo-European languages, and this function is also reconstructed for the Proto-Indo-European instrumental. In Greek some reflexes of this usage are attested in the use of the plain dative (see §2.2.3.3); however, most often Area is expressed through a Greek innovation, i.e. the plain accusative (see §2.2.1.4). Several PPs can also denote the limits of a state of affair. They mostly involve prepositions whose concrete spatial meaning is ‘toward’, and in their abstract meaning can be translated as ‘regarding’. See further §4.2.11.

The semantics of Greek cases

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the meaning of cases. It is not meant to be exhaustive: each single case, if described in all its uses and semantic extensions, could well be the topic of a whole book. The Greek case system consists of five cases: the nominative, the vocative, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative. My aim in this chapter is to highlight those areas in the meaning of each case that are also relevant to the use of cases with prepositions. Consequently, I will mostly be concerned with concrete, as opposed to grammatical, uses of cases. Grammatical uses will briefly be mentioned when relevant to the understanding of case semantics and oppositions between cases. Another consequence is that I will not treat the nominative and the vocative, but will limit the discussion to cases that can appear within prepositional phrases, i.e. the accusative, the genitive, and the dative. I will try to give a synchronic account of the meaning of each case, considering cases as instances of structured polysemy that developed diachronically by means of motivated semantic extensions (although synchronically the various meanings of each case do not necessarily derive from a basic meaning).¹ I will start with a description of pre-literary (partly pre-Greek) developments which resulted in case syncretism, and can explain how various meanings could become compatible and merge with each other.

2.1 Case syncretism

2.1.1 Case syncretism as a diachronic process

Case syncretism, understood as a diachronic process, consists in the merging of two or more cases; it occurred in several Indo-European languages, and followed different patterns. The study of case syncretism has a long tradition in Indo-European linguistics; although phonological factors have often been conceived as playing an important part, the role of semantic affinity among cases

received major emphasis in early studies (see Delbrück 1907).² Recently the use of the word ‘syncretism’ has been extended to include synchronic overlap of semantic roles and polysemy of cases and adpositions. This is the sense in which the problem of syncretism is approached in e.g. Croft (1991) and various works by Stolz (1998, 2001 and others). In this book, I prefer to use the word ‘syncretism’ for the diachronic process of merging among various cases, and ‘polysemy’ for synchronic overlap of semantic roles.

Greek inherited its case system from late Proto-Indo-European. The case system of the latter is usually reconstructed as including three additional cases with respect to Ancient Greek, i.e. the locative, the ablative, and the instrumental.³ These are cases that mostly had adverbial function, as shown by the languages in which they are attested: they often occurred outside the nuclear predication and had strong semantic motivation. In Ancient Greek, two cases are the result of syncretism, i.e. the genitive, which resulted from merging of the genitive and the ablative, and the dative, from the dative, locative, and instrumental.

2.1.2 Genitive and ablative

Syncretism of the genitive with the ablative is usually explained through the partitive value of the genitive. The basic function of ablative markers is to express Source. A common extension goes from the indication of the source of concrete motion to the indication of origin, as shown in English:

- (1) *That girl came here from Nigeria;*
- (2) *That girl is from Nigeria.*

Partitive envisages a trajector as being an individuated, detachable part of a whole (the landmark):

- (3) *One of the Nigerian girls.*

Partitive is connected with part-whole expressions, as in

- (4) *A page of the book.*

Part-whole relations are often metaphorically mapped on the domain of possession: the whole is conceived as the possessor of its parts, following the metaphor PARTS ARE POSSESSIONS (see §1.2.8). Possessor, in its turn, is the SR typically expressed by the genitive in the Indo-European languages. Syncretism of the ablative and the genitive through the partitive can be ex-

plained based on the metaphor WHOLES ARE ORIGINS (see Nikiforidou 1991:173–175).

In several modern Indo-European languages, including Romance and Germanic, the inflectional genitive has been replaced by a former ablatival marker, which has undergone the semantic extension outlined above. In Greek, it is hard to say from the morphology alone if the genitival marker was substituted by the ablative, because the Proto-Indo-European ablative and genitive were distinct only in a minority of paradigms. Syncretism of the genitive and the ablative also occurred in the Baltic and Slavic languages.

2.1.3 Dative, locative, and instrumental

Syncretism of dative, locative and instrumental in Ancient Greek is clearly visible from morphology: the endings of the dative case in the various inflectional classes correspond to different endings of all three cases in the other Indo-European languages (see Chantraine 1961). The three cases did not merge at the same time: the earliest Greek texts, the Mycenaean tablets (about 1150 BCE), provide evidence for a stage at which the dative and the locative had already merged, but the instrumental was still distinct.⁴

The Indo-European dative is closely connected with animacy, being the case of Recipient, Addressee, and Beneficiary. In some of its uses it denotes physical proximity of a trajector to an animate landmark, as in the construction commonly called ‘dative of possession’:

- (5) *ésan dè tōi Kroísōi dúo paides*
 be:IMPF.3PL PTC ART.DAT C.:DAT TWO:NOM child:NOM.PL
 “Croesus had two children” (Hdt. 1.34.2).

The original local meaning of the dative in Proto-Indo-European was possibly allative, rather than locative. The Greek dative has a limited allative function, when it occurs as the second argument of some motion verbs and mostly animate nouns.⁵

The most relevant function of the Indo-European dative with inanimate nouns is to express Purpose. The dative of Purpose, albeit sporadically, also occurs in Greek:

- (6) *lókōi d’ hupethōrḗssonto*
 ambush:DAT PTC arm:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “they armed themselves for an ambush” (*Il.* 18.513).

The fact that the dative expressed Purpose seems to imply that its usage in Direction expressions was once wider: as I have remarked in §1.2.9, Direction markers often develop into Purpose markers. The locative, on the other hand, not only expressed Location, but, to a limited extent, could also express Direction, especially with a set of verbs, such as ‘to put’, ‘to fall down’, ‘to sit down’, with which the locative profiled the endpoint of motion, rather than the trajectory.⁶ Therefore the possible directional value of the two cases provided a semantic link between them.

In fact, the relationship between the dative and the locative in Proto-Indo-European may have been even deeper, as shown by morphological affinities between the endings of the two cases. According to Kuryłowicz (1964: 190), the two endings in the singular were apophonic variants of each other, the dative being “genetically nothing else than an offshoot of the locative used with personal nouns”. Recently, Aristar (1996) has argued in favor of Kuryłowicz’s hypothesis, based on data from genetically unrelated languages. A number of Indo-European languages, beside Greek, display this syncretism, among others Hittite; furthermore, in some of the Romance languages the preposition that substituted the dative can also express Location.⁷

Contrary to the syncretisms examined thus far, syncretism of the dative/locative with the instrumental is a peculiar feature of Greek, and it is not connected with any particular morphological similarity.

The original meaning of the Indo-European instrumental case was most likely sociative, as remarked by Delbrück (1867) in his discussion of Sanskrit, but its most frequent function must have been to express Instrument. The link between Instrument and Location, and thus between the instrumental case and the dative/locative, is provided by a tendency to conceive an instrument as a container. Such tendency is sporadically attested by the use of Location expressions for means of transportation in several languages;⁸ in Greek it became systematic, and not only led to a merger of the instrumental with the dative locative, but, at a later stage and limited to Christian Greek (see §4.4), also favored the extension of the preposition *en*, ‘in’, to Instrument expressions.

2.2 The meaning of cases without prepositions

2.2.1 The accusative

The accusative is, in the first place, the case of the direct object. In this function the need for the accusative to express a grammatical relation often overrides se-

semantic considerations.⁹ However, as we will see in the next paragraphs, Ancient Greek allows for variation in the expression of the direct object; furthermore, the accusative is widely used in adverbial expressions, which makes it possible to speak of an autonomous semantic value of this case more than for some other Indo-European languages.

2.2.1.1 *Affectedness*

As direct object, the accusative most often expresses the semantic role Patient, whose main semantic feature is total affectedness. In Ancient Greek, there are a number of verbs that can take the genitive or dative, and still partake of the syntactic properties of transitive verbs. With these verbs, the Patient expression is still a direct object, and it can become the subject of passive constructions:¹⁰

- (7) *hêke ho Sardiênôs kêrux*
 come:AOR.3SG ART.NOM Sardian:NOM herald:NOM
deômenos Kroísôi boêthéein
 entreat:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM C.:DAT.M help:INF.PRS
poliorkeoménôi
 besiege:PART.PRS.M/P.DAT.M
 “the Sardinian herald came to entreat their help for Croesus now besieged”
 (Hdt. 1.83.1);
- (8) *hoi dipsôntes ... ou boêthoûntai*
 ART.NOM.PL be.thirsty:PART.PRS.NOM.PL NEG help:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “those who are thirsty do not receive help” (Plu. *Mor.* 689c);
- (9) *Dēiokês mén nun tò Mēdikòn éthnos sunéstreψε*
 D.:NOM PTC PTC ART.N/A Median:N/A nation:N/A unit:AOR.3SG
moúnon kai toútou êrxe
 alone:N/A and DEM.GEN.N govern:AOR.3SG
 “Deioces then united the Median nation, and no other, and ruled it”
 (Hdt. 1.101);
- (10) *hupò tou Kúrou Smérdios árkhontai kai hup’*
 under ART.GEN.M C.:GEN.M S.:GEN.M govern:PRS.M/P.3PL and under
oudenôs állo
 INDEF.GEN.M INDEF.GEN.M
 “they are ruled by Smerdis, the son of Cyrus, and by no other”
 (Hdt. 3.74.3).

Example (7) contains the verb *boêthéin*, ‘to help’, with the dative *poliorkeoménôi*, ‘(Croesus) who is besieged’; in (8) we find a personal passive of the same verb. In example (9) the verb *árkhein*, ‘to govern’, takes the gen-

itive *toútou*, ‘this’, ‘the latter’; the same verb occurs in a personal passive construction in (10).

That syntactically accusative and non-accusative NPs can be on the same plane is shown by example (11), where an accusative and a genitive direct object are coordinated:

- (11) *mukēthmoû t’ êkousa boôn*
 lowing:GEN PTC hear:AOR.1SG COW:GEN.PL.F
aulizomenáōn oión te blēkhén
 lodge:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.F sheep:GEN.PL PTC bleating:ACC.F
 “I heard the lowing of the cattle lying (in the courtyard) and the bleating of the sheep” (*Od.* 12.265–266).¹¹

Prototypically, the difference between accusative direct objects and non-accusative ones can be detected in different degrees of affectedness: for example, verbs that take a dative direct object, such as *boētheîn*, ‘to help’, do not denote a change of state on the side of the patient. The use of the genitive for direct objects is even more interesting in this respect, because, besides verbs that only (or almost only) take the genitive, as *árkhein*, ‘to govern’, or *akoúein*, ‘to hear’, there is free variation between accusative and genitive with other verbs, based on the partitive value of the genitive. I will come back to such occurrences below, §2.2.2.

2.2.1.2 Animacy

A feature of many verbs that take non-accusative direct objects is that their direct object is typically animate: this is true for such verbs as ‘help’ or ‘govern’, as in the examples above.¹² The role of animacy is also shown by variation of the accusative and another case with some other verbs, such as *orégein*:

- (13) *orexámenos prumnòn skélos*
 reach:PART.AOR.MID.NOM extreme:N/A leg:N/A
 “hitting (him) upon the base of the leg” (*Il.* 16.314);
- (14) *paidòs oréxato pháidimos Héktōr*
 child:GEN reach:AOR.MID.3SG glorious:NOM H.:NOM
 “glorious Hector reached out to his boy” (*Il.* 6.466);
- (15) *kheíras emoì orégontas*
 hand:ACC.PL.F 1SG.DAT stretch.OUT:PART.PRS.ACC.PL
 “stretching out their hands toward me” (*Od.* 12.257).

Note that between the accusative *prumnòn skélos*, ‘the base of the leg’, in (13) and the genitive *paidòs*, ‘child’, and dative *emoì*, ‘me’, in (14) and (15) there

is a semantic difference: in (13) the direct object is totally affected, while in (14) and (15) it denotes an entity toward which the trajector reaches. In the former case we have a real patient, in the latter, the SR of the direct object is rather Direction. This semantic alternation is independent of diathesis and is apparently triggered by animacy: animate landmarks with *orégein* are only partially affected. Interestingly, partial affectedness can be expressed equally well by the genitive and by the dative. The use of the former case relies on its partitive value (see §2.2.2.2), while the latter can occur in this context due to its directional meaning (see §2.1.3). In fact, even verbs such as *árkhein*, regularly constructed with the genitive, can occasionally take the dative.

Case variation is also diachronic: some verbs that take the accusative in Homer change their government in later authors, while other verbs tend to either lose variation, or change their complement to the accusative in post-Homeric Greek.

2.2.1.3 Local meaning of the accusative

The accusative can denote Direction with motion verbs. This usage, as shown by comparison, can be reconstructed for the Proto-Indo-European accusative; in Ancient Greek, it is mostly limited to the prepositional accusative. Some instances of plain accusative expressing Direction occur in Homer, mostly with nouns that have spatial referents:

- (16) *hē d' ára Kúpron hikane*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC PTC C.:ACC go:AOR.3SG
 “she went to Cyprus” (*Od.* 8.362).

Direction can also refer to nouns denoting ‘social locations’, i.e. nouns that do not necessarily have spatial referents, but denote the setting of social life, as described in the Homeric poems. One such noun is *boulé*, ‘assembly’ (see further §2.2.3.1):

- (17) *toì d' hám' héponto Argeïon basilées*
 PTC PTC together follow:IMPF.3PL Argive:GEN.PL king:NOM.PL
hósoi kekléato boulén
 REL.NOM.PL call:PLPF.M/P.3PL council:ACC.F
 “and there followed with (him) the kings of the Argives, all those that had been called to the council” (*Il.* 10.194–195).

In a number of passages, a local accusative occurs, not with a directional, but rather with a perlocative value:¹³

- (18) *apésusto* *dómatos* *Héktōr* *tèn* *autèn*
 run.away:IMPF.M/P.3SG house:GEN H.:NOM DEM.ACC.F DEM.ACC.F
hodòn
 road:ACC.F

“Hector hurried from the house back over the same way” (*Il.* 6.390–391).

The accusative in (18) is commonly called ‘accusative of extension’; in Homer it mostly occurs with motion verbs. The SR expressed is Path.

In some occurrences, we have non-dynamic states of affairs:

- (19) *leípet’* *agaklêos* *Menelaou* *douròs* *erōèn*
 remain:IMPF.M/P.3SG glorious:GEN M.:GEN spear:GEN cast:ACC.F
 “he was a spear-cast behind glorious Menelaus” (*Il.* 23.529).

In (19) the NP *douròs erōèn*, ‘a spear-cast’, indicates the distance between the trajector and the landmark.

In later prose, both types of occurrence, with or without motion, are frequent; the verb *apékhesthai*, ‘to be far from’ often occurs with the accusative and words denoting measure. With motion verbs and perlocative value, we find expressions such as *thálassan pleîn*, ‘to sail on the sea (acc.)’. Note that this is a different type of perlocative relation, because it denotes motion over a surface, rather than a straight trajectory. In such occurrences, the accusative of extension profiles the limits of the activity of a trajector. Even in Homer, the perlocative value of the accusative does not in itself imply that a trajector moves along a straight trajectory: if we understand that the trajectory must be straight, as in (18), our understanding depends on our knowledge of the actual structure of the landmark.

Apparently, to judge from the Homeric examples, occurrences with motion verbs must precede those in which the accusative simply denotes a distance. This is also in accordance with the semantic explanation outlined below. As we will see in Chapter 3, within prepositional phrases the accusative of extension is very productive in Homer, both with verbs that denote motion within an area, and with verbs that denote state on a certain area.

In (19) the accusative denotes the distance between two referents: the notion of motion along a trajectory is metaphorically shifted to state. This is an instance of ‘fictive motion’, as defined in Talmy (2000, Chapter 2): motion is metaphorically used to refer to static location on an extended area. The metaphor involving fictive motion is widely employed in languages, and covers a number of different instantiations. Talmy (2000) mentions a variety of patterns in which a fictive path can be conceived; the one relevant for the present

discussion is the ‘access path’, which Talmy defines as “a depiction of a stationary object’s location in terms of a path that some other entity might follow to the point of encounter with the object” (2000: 136). An English example is:

- (20) *The bakery is across the street from the bank.*

Langacker (1991: 326–330) also describes static uses of dynamic expressions, such as the one in (20), and considers them the result of subjectification: a location is understood as the result of a motion, starting from the deictic point of a possible observer. Another type of fictive motion, which can similarly be understood as a result of subjectification, is the one described by Talmy as the ‘advent path’: “a depiction of a stationary object’s location in terms of its arrival or manifestation at the site it occupies” (2000: 135). An English example is:

- (21) *Termite mounds are scattered all over the plain.*

This pattern is often found in Greek with the prepositional accusative as we will see in various sections in Chapter 3. In such occurrences, the accusative is referred to as ‘accusative of extension’.

Time expressions in the accusative are based on its spatial meaning: they derive from the accusative of extension, and denote duration:

- (22) *hòs tóte mèn própan êmar es zēlion katadúnta*
 so then PTC whole:N/A day:N/A to sun:ACC set:PART.AOR.ACC
daínunt’
 feast:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “thus the whole day long till the setting of the sun they feasted”
 (Il. 1.601–602).

To sum up, spatial uses of the plain accusative are rather restricted. In particular, in Direction expressions the plain accusative tends to be replaced by the preposition *eis* with the accusative.

2.2.1.4 Adverbial use of the accusative

When shifted to an abstract plane, Area expressions in the accusative denote an abstract domain which limits in some sense a quality or a state of affairs. This function of the plain accusative is so typical of Greek that it has deserved the name of ‘Greek accusative’, or accusative of respect:

- (23) *pódas òkùs Akhilleús*
 foot:ACC.PL quick:NOM A.:NOM
 “Achilles swift-foot” (*passim*);

- (24) *diaphérei* *gunè* *andròs* *tèn* *phúsin*
 differ:PRS.3SG woman:NOM.F man:GEN ART.ACC.F nature:ACC.F
 “there is a difference in nature between men and women” (Pl. *Rep.* 453b).

Example (23) contains an accusative of respect related to an attributive adjective: the accusative clarifies to which area of the landmark the quality applies. Some quasi-adverbial expressions in the accusative are derived from this usage, as the form *mêkos*, ‘in length’, lit.: ‘length:ACC’, used with forms that denote measure or duration. In (24) the accusative of respect relates to the verb *diaphérein*, ‘to differ’, and delimits the area in which two referents are distinct from each other. Interestingly, the accusative of respect can often be substituted by the plain dative in this type of Area expression (*dativus limitationis*):

- (25) *ou* *dià* *tèn* *húlēn* *eidei* *diaphérousin*,
 NEG through ART.ACC.F matter:ACC.F species:DAT differ:PRS.3PL
all’ hótī en tōi lógōi énestin enantíōsis
 but because in ART.DAT reason:DAT be:PRS.3SG contrariety:NOM.F
 “(and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle) differ in species not because of their matter, but because there is contrariety in their formulae”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1058b 14–15).

Here, the form *eidei*, ‘in species’, limits the extent to which the state of affairs denoted by *diaphérousan*, ‘differing’, applies, much in the same way as *phúsin*, ‘in nature’ in (24). Similarly, the form *mékei*, ‘length:DAT’ can occur instead of *mêkos* (see further §2.2.3.3). Furthermore, verbs such as *diaphérein* can also have Area expressions formed with various prepositional phrases (mostly *perí* or *katá*), as shown in §3.11 and 3.16.

2.2.2 The genitive

The Greek genitive is a very versatile case, because of its wide use as partitive, which enables it to substitute for virtually all other cases. A conflict arises between the ablative and the partitive genitive, not only in the sense that the ablative genitive is mostly limited to PPs (see §2.2.2.1), but also, as I will argue at length in Chapter 3, within PPs.

2.2.2.1 The ablative genitive

The genitive functions as an ablative mostly in connection with certain verbs that require a complement with ablative value: in practice, the ablative meaning is part of the meaning of the verb, rather than of the meaning of the genitive

as a plain case. This is true already in Homer, where the plain ablatival genitive occurs with verbs that mean ‘to move away’, ‘to take away’, in much the same way as in later authors:

- (26) *hò mèn pharétrēs exeileto pikròn*
 DEM.NOM PTC quiver:GEN.F take.out:AOR.MID.3SG bitter:ACC
oïstón
 arrow:ACC
 “he had drawn out of the quiver a bitter arrow” (*Il.* 8.323);
- (27) *hoi neóteroi autôn toîsi*
 ART.NOM.PL young:CMPR.NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL.M ART.DAT.PL.M
presbutéroisi suntugkhánontes eíkousi tês
 old:CMPR.DAT.PL.M meet:PART.PRS.NOM.PL turn:PRS.3PL ART.GEN.F
hodoû kai ektràpontai
 way:GEN.F and walk.out:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “younger men, when they meet their elders, turn aside and give place to them in the way” (*Hdt.* 2.80.1);
- (28) *hōs turánnōn eleutheróthēsan Athēnaïoi*
 how despot:GEN.PL.M free:AOR.P.3PL Athenian:NOM.PL
 “how the Athenians were freed from their despots” (*Hdt.* 5.62.1).

In (26) the ablatival genitive occurs with a compound verb, *exaireîn*, ‘to take out’, ‘to take away’, that contains the preverb *ek-*, ‘out of’, ‘from’ (cf. §3.2), a typical situation, as shown also by example (27) from Herodotus, where the ablatival genitive occurs with a motion verb, *ektrápesthai*, ‘to move out’, again a compound with *ek-*. In (28) we find an occurrence with the verb *eleutheroûn*, ‘to free’, which implies the notion of taking away.

Some verbs that denote emotions can take a second argument in the genitive. Although there is no variation with such verbs, one can connect the occurrence of the genitive with its ablatival value: the second argument of verbs of emotion denotes the cause of emotion, and Cause is a SR frequently associated with the ablative in the Indo-European languages that preserve this case.¹⁴

As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, the ablatival value of the genitive is more productive with prepositions, although it tends to be limited to prepositions that do not allow case variation. The most simple substitute for the ablatival genitive is the preposition *ek* with the genitive.

2.2.2.2 *Partitive*

As already remarked, the partitive value of the genitive was particularly developed in Greek; as we will see in further chapters, this also had important consequences on the structure and evolution of the Greek prepositional phrase.

The notion ‘partitive’, which is usually taken for granted as referring to a case or SR, needs to be better understood. As a starting point, let us take the possibility for the partitive to occur in the place of all other cases, irrespective of their syntactic function:¹⁵

- (29) *óphra pioi oínoio*
 for drink:OPT.PRS.3SG wine:GEN
 “in order to drink some wine” (*Od.* 22.11);
- (30) *píne te oínon*
 drink:IMPT.PRS.2SG PTC wine:ACC
 “drink (your) wine” (*Od.* 15.391);
- (31) *eisì gàr autôn kai parà basiléi tói*
 be:PRS.3PL PTC DEM.GEN.PL and by king:DAT.M ART.DAT.M
Perséōn
 Persian:GEN.PL.M
 “there are (some) of these (*sc.* ants) even by the king of the Persians”
 (*Hdt.* 3.102.2);
- (32) *ê ouk Árgeos êen ... ;*
 PTC NEG A.:GEN be:IMPF.3SG
 “was he not in Argos?” (*Od.* 3.251);
- (33) *epeí k' olooío tetarpómestha góoio*
 when PTC dire:GEN.M enjoy:PF.M/P.1PL groan:GEN.M
 “when we have taken our fill of dire lamenting” (*Il.* 23.10);
- (34) *philótēti trapeíomen*
 love:DAT.F enjoy:AOR.MID.1PL
 “we take our joy in love” (*Il.* 3.441).

Examples (29) and (30) contain the frequent alternation between genitive and accusative for direct object, based on partial *vs.* total affectedness. This difference is normally captured by the remark that when the partitive genitive occurs, only part of the entity referred to undergoes the process denoted by the verb. This statement sounds as if one should always have a situation in which a whole referent is present, and a part of it is affected: but it is very important to remark that this is not the case. The genitive *oínoio* in (29) does not mean ‘part of the wine’: it rather functions as an indefinite quantifier, and it is correctly trans-

lated with ‘some wine’. The point is made clearer by the occurrence of a genitive in (31) with the function of a partitive subject: here the referent of *autôn*, ‘of them’, is count (‘ants’). The genitive indicates an unspecified quantity.

In example (32) the genitive occurs as the Location complement of the verb ‘to be’. Locative function is not very frequent for the plain genitive, but it is extremely productive for the prepositional genitive, as I will show extensively in Chapter 3. With this function, the genitive entered an opposition with the accusative of extension, described in §2.2.1.3, which can also denote Location. I will discuss this opposition in Chapter 3 and in §4.3.

Spatial location can be conceptualized as temporal location; accordingly, the genitive also occurs in Time expressions, such as *hespéras* (evening:GEN), *nuktós* (night:GEN), meaning ‘during the evening’, ‘during the night’ (lit.: ‘at an unspecified point in the day/night’). Temporal use of the genitive is common to many Indo-European languages, even to those in which the partitive value of the genitive is not particularly prominent, such as some of the Germanic languages (cf. Goth. *nahts*, ‘by night’, *dagis*, ‘by day’).

Finally, in examples (33) and (34) we find an alternation between the partitive genitive and the instrumental dative. The verb *térpesthai*, ‘to enjoy’, takes a complement which can be variously conceptualized, as the matter of satisfaction (genitive) or as the means by which satisfaction is attained (dative). We have seen in examples (14) and (15) that the genitive can also substitute for a complement in the dative when the latter is a dative ‘proper’, i.e. it expresses Direction with an animate landmark.

2.2.2.3 *The partitive: a real case?*

Given the current definition of the function of morphological case, that is “marking dependent nouns for the type of relationship they bear to their heads” (Blake 1994:1), the partitive does not seem to be homogeneous with the category. Indeed, the partitive conveys information as to the structure of the entity referred to: when we find *eisì autôn*, ‘there are some’, as in (31), the impression is that the function of a partitive comes close to the function of number, rather than to the function of case: partitive denotes a quantity (‘some’), and not a relation of an NP with some other constituent in the sentence.

The use of the genitive as a partitive is typical of some Indo-European languages and virtually not attested in others; those where the genitive most consistently functions as a partitive are the Slavic and the Baltic languages, followed by Ancient Greek. Outside Indo-European, the partitive occurs as a separate case, for example in Finnish, where it is used as alternative to the nominative for partitive subjects and to the accusative for partitive objects:

- (35) *Kirjat ovat pöydällä*
 book:NOM-PL be:PRES-3PL table:ADESS
 “the books are on the table”;
- (36) *Pöydällä on kirjoja*
 table:ADESS be:PRES-3SG book:PRT-PL
 “there are some books on the table”.

Blake (1994:204) defines partitive as “a case that indicates an entity partly affected”. This definition, though commonly accepted, is not devoid of problems. The notion of affectedness in particular seems to imply that partitive is used for direct objects, or subjects which are not agents: but in Finnish, partitive subjects appear with action verbs too, as in

- (37) *Sotilaita tuli illalla*
 soldier:PRT-PL come:IMPF-3SG evening:ADESS
 “some soldiers came in the evening” (from Sulkala & Karjalainen 1992: 211).

That the partitive belongs to case category appears questionable also based on languages in which nouns do not have a morphological case. In the case that partitive is expressed by a preposition, it can be shown that the ‘preposition’ is in fact a different type of lexical item. In some of the Romance languages the Latin preposition *de*, ‘from’, which has substituted for the genitive case, has also acquired a partitive usage. In partitive constructions, the descendants of *de* have undergone re-categorization and currently function as partitive articles, as in Italian and French:

- (38) *C’è un uomo in casa / ci sono degli uomini in casa*
 “there is a man in the house / there are some men in the house”;
- (39) *Prendo i libri / prendo dei libri / prendo il libro / prendo un libro*
 “I take the books / I take some books / I take the book / I take a book”
- (40) *Je suis venu avec les amis / je suis venu avec des amis*
 “I came with my (lit.: the) friends / I came with some friends”.

The distribution of *degli/dei/des* in the above examples is the same as the distribution of indefinite and definite articles, and shows that a partitive construction does not functionally correspond to a morphological case.

To sum up, the partitive value of the genitive makes the latter not completely homogeneous with the other cases. This remark is of particular importance for the use of the genitive within prepositional phrases, a peculiarity of Ancient Greek that will be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.2.3 The dative

As I have remarked, the Greek dative originated from the merger of three distinct cases; not surprisingly, the semantics of the dative is rather complicated. Among the three functions fulfilled by the dative, i.e. dative ‘proper’,¹⁶ locative, and instrumental, **the first basic difference can be detected in the tendency for the locative dative to occur within prepositional phrases only.** On the other hand, the dative proper and the instrumental dative share the fact that they are not prepositional: with the exception of *sún*, ‘with’ (Comitative), the instrumental dative in Greek occurs without prepositions; the same is true for the dative proper, much in the same way as in the other ancient Indo-European languages.¹⁷

The dative ‘proper’ is kept distinct from the instrumental dative through the feature of animacy (see De La Villa 1989 and Luraghi 1987), as shown in the following examples:¹⁸

- (41) *epistaménois* *d’ humîn* *gráphō*
 understand:PART.PRS.M/P.DAT.PL.M PTC 1PL.DAT write:PRS.1SG
hóti ...
 that
 “you to whom I write understand that ...” (Th. 7.14.1);
- (42) *hupográpsantes* *grammàs* *têi* *graphídi*
 write:PART.AOR.NOM.PL letter:ACC.PL.F ART.DAT.F pen:DAT.F
 “having drawn lines with the pen” (Pl. *Prt.* 326d).

Note that the two constituents in the dative in the above examples are different semantically (Recipient in (41) vs. Instrument in (42)), as well as syntactically: *humîn*, ‘to you’, in (41) is an indirect object, and as such it belongs in the verbal valency, while *têi graphídi*, ‘with the pen’, in (42) is an Adverbial.¹⁹

Adverbials in the plain dative can occur with animate nouns as well. In this case, they mostly have the function Beneficiary, as in

- (43) *timèn* *arnúmenoi* *Meneláōi soí* *te* ...
 honor:ACC.F earn:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL M.:DAT 2SG.DAT PTC
pròs *Tróōn*
 toward Trojan:GEN.PL
 “seeking to win recompense for Menelaus and for yourself from the Trojans” (*Il.* 1.159–160).

Here the dative denotes a participant who is (favorably) concerned by a state of affairs, without being the patient: in other words, as stated in traditional

descriptions of the function of the dative, this case denotes partial involvement, as opposed to the accusative. Partial involvement need not imply the notion of benefit. The adverbial dative with animate nouns may simply denote an orientation, a point of view, as in

- (44) *Epídamnós esti pólis en dexiái espléonti*
 E.:NOM be:PRS.3SG city:NOM.F in right:DAT.F sail.into:PART.PRS.DAT
es tòn Iónion kólpon
 to ART.ACC I.:ACC gulf:ACC
 “the city of Epidamnus stands on the right for someone who enters the Ionic gulf” (Th. 1.24.1).

This type of expression, traditionally called *dativus iudicantis* or ‘dative of reference’, is a type of Experiencer: it denotes the human being for whom a certain statement is true. Another example is given in §3.14 as (33). Example (45) demonstrates the connection between this type of dative, Experiencer, and Beneficiary:

- (45) *dokeîn oûn sphîsi kai nûn ámeinson einai tèn*
 seem:INF.PRS PTC 3PL.DAT and now better:N/A be:INF.PRS ART.ACC.F
heautôn pólin teîkhos ékhein, kai idíai
 REFL.GEN.PL city:ACC.F wall:N/A have:INF.PRS and particularly
toîs polítais kai es toûs pántas
 ART.DAT.PL.M citizen:DAT.PL.M and to ART.ACC.PL all:ACC.PL
xummákhous ôphelimôteron ésesthai
 ally:ACC.PL useful:CMPR.N/A be:INF.FUT.MID
 “that they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens and all allies” (Th. 1.91.6).

The dative *toîs polítais*, ‘for the citizens’, expresses Beneficiary; furthermore, *sphîsi*, ‘(to) them’, has the function Experiencer, regularly expressed by the dative with verb such as *dokeîn*, ‘to think’. Another Beneficiary expression also occurs in (45): *es toûs pántas xummákhous*, ‘to all allies’, formed with the preposition *eis*, ‘to’, which is normally used with a spatial meaning to express Direction (see below, §3.3). Besides, two evaluative adjectives occur (*ámeinson*, ‘better’, *ôphelimôteron*, ‘more useful’). Indeed, the two Beneficiary expressions could also be taken as *iudicantis* (or Experiencer); the reason why we take them as Beneficiary is simply that they imply positive evaluation of certain conditions.²⁰

The dative also occurs, occasionally, with passive verbs in Agent expressions. Examples are:

- (46) *Dēmódokon laoisi tetiménon*
D.:ACC people:DAT.PL honor:PART.PF.M/P.ACC
 “Demodocus, held in honor by the people” (*Od.* 8.472);
- (47) *hós moi próteron dedélōtai*
thus 1SG.DAT early:CMPR show:PF.M/P.3SG
 “as I have previously shown” (*Hdt.* 6.123.2).

Agent phrases are most frequent with participles, verbal nouns, or perfect forms, i.e. verb forms that denote states. The occurrence of Agent expressions in the dative with such forms is quite typical of the ancient Indo-European languages, as shown in Schwyzer (1942: 15–16) and Hettrich (1990: 64–77).

The functions expressed by the dative with animate nouns denote either proximity, as in the case of the dative of possession, see above, §2.1.3 and example (5), or a more or less abstract movement toward a landmark, as in the case of Recipient, Addressee, and Beneficiary. Similar to Purpose, these SRs are metaphorically derived from the directional meaning of the dative. At its most abstract degree, this meaning simply denotes the point of view of an observer. The use of the dative for Experiencer also relies on the directional meaning, with the notion of orientation referred to the field of feeling or sensation.²¹

As I stated above, the dative proper does not take prepositions (except, perhaps, *epí*, see §3.18), so its meaning is not relevant for the meaning of the dative within prepositional phrases: however, it is interesting to note which semantic roles it can encode, because they can occasionally be encoded by prepositional phrases as well, see for Example *pró*, *hupér*, *prós*, and *epí* in Beneficiary expressions (§3.7, 3.12, 3.17, 3.18) and *eis* for Addressee (§3.3).²²

2.2.3.1 Locative

The plain dative in Location expressions is mostly limited to Homer, and even at such an early stage it is heavily conditioned by the lexical features of NPs. It occurs with toponyms, as in:²³

- (48) *all' hò mèn autóthi méine, patēr d'*
PTC DEM.NOM PTC there remain:AOR.3SG father:NOM PTC
emòs Árgei násthē
POSS.1SG.NOM A.:DAT abide:AOR.3SG
 “he remained there, while my father lived in Argos” (*Il.* 14.119);

and nouns with local reference, which can be viewed as ‘natural locatives’, such as: *aithéri*, ‘in the sky’, *ouresin*, ‘on the mountains’, *agrôî*, ‘in the field’, *dómōi*, ‘home’, *nomôî*, ‘in the pastures’, *póntōi*, ‘on the sea’, *khérsōi*, ‘on the dry land’, *trapézēi*, ‘at (somebody’s) table’, *agorēi*, ‘at the council’, *mákhēi*, ‘in battle’ (see Chantraine 1953:78).²⁴ The last few nouns do not, strictly speaking, denote locations, because they do not have primary local reference, but they denote events where social life takes place in the Homeric poems. I call these type of referents ‘social location’ (see §2.2.1.2). An example is:

- (49) *geínato* *eío* *khéreia* *mákhēi*
 generate:AOR.MID.3SG DEM.GEN.M inferior:ACC battle:DAT.F
agorēi *dé* *t’* *ameínō*
 assembly:DAT.F PTC PTC better:ACC
 “(the son that) he generated is worse than he in battle, though in the place
 of gathering he is better” (*Il.* 4.400);

(see also (19) in §3.1). Even with these nouns, the dative is often replaced by *en* plus dative in Location expression, already in the Homeric poems.

In Homer, the dative often occurs in Direction expressions, where one could expect a directional accusative. The dative mostly co-occurs with a small set of verbs, such as *pégein*, ‘to fix’, *bállein*, ‘to throw’, *pésein*, ‘to cast’, which denote states of affairs in which a landmark is usually reached by a trajector as the endpoint of a trajectory. The accusative can also occur with the same verbs: in this case, the trajectory is profiled; the dative, on the other hand, profiles the endpoint:

- (50) *kai tóte dè gaíēi* *péxas* *euères* *eretmón*
 and then PTC earth:DAT.F fix:PART.AOR.NOM well.shaped:N/A oar:N/A
 “then when you will have fixed in the earth (your) shapely oar” (*Od.* 11.129);
- (51) *haimatóessa* *dè kheir* *pedíōi* *pése*
 bloody:NOM.F PTC hand:NOM.F ground:DAT fall:AOR3SG
 “so the hand all bloody fell to the ground” (*Il.* 5.82).

As we will see in Chapter 3, the same verbs can also occur in Homer with either the prepositional dative, profiling endpoint of motion, or the prepositional accusative, profiling the trajectory.

2.2.3.2 Between locative and instrumental: body parts

Chantraine (1953:78–79) discusses some occurrences of body part nouns in the dative, and tries to assess the locative or instrumental nature of the dative, in occurrences such as the following:

- (52) *allà patèr hounòs phresì maínetai*
 but father:NOM DEM+POSS.1SG.NOM mind:DAT.PL.F rage:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “my own father rages with (his) mind” (*Il.* 8.360);
- (53) *ho dè khermádion lábe kheirì*
 DEM.NOM PTC stone:N/A take:AOR.3SG hand:DAT.F
 “(Aeneas) grasped a stone in his hand” (*Il.* 20.285);
- (54) *kheirì té min katérexen*
 hand:DAT.F PTC 3SG.ACC stroke:AOR.3SG
 “he stroked her with (his) hand” (*Il.* 6.485);
- (55) *hoí’ ou pó tis anèr ómoisi*
 REL.N/A.PL NEG EVER INDEF.NOM man:NOM shoulder:DAT.PL
phórēsen
 bear:AOR.3SG
 “which never yet a man bore upon his shoulder” (*Il.* 19.11);
- (56) *hèi kephalèi phoréin*
 REFL.DAT.F head:DAT.F wear:INF.PRS
 “to wear upon his own head” (*Il.* 16.800).

As we will see especially in §3.1, body parts are usually conceptualized as containers in Ancient Greek, and occurrences similar to the above also occur with the preposition *en*, ‘in’. This is part of a more general metaphorical principle, by which bounded areas are conceptualized as containers. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:29) write: “each of us is a container, with a bounded surface and an in-out orientation”.

Body parts have an inherent instrumental function for humans: they can be classed as natural instruments. So their occurrence in both locative and instrumental expressions is not surprising. What is peculiar of Greek is the connection between the notion of instrumentality and the notion of container. This connection, which lies behind the merger of the dative/locative with the instrumental, has a cognitive basis, as shown by evidence from other languages (see §1.2.4.2). In Greek, it also holds for some derivational suffixes. For example, Wackernagel (1922:304–305) remarked that the same suffix, *-tro/a-* occurs both in instrument nouns, such as *oistrós*, ‘sting’, and in names with spatial reference, such as *palaístra*, ‘gymnasium’. The link between the two concepts becomes clear when we consider nouns such as *pharétra*, ‘quiver (for arrows)’, which can be viewed as an instrument by means of which arrows are carried, as well as the place where arrows are located.²⁵

2.2.3.3 *Instrumental dative*

Most plain datives occurring in Greek texts express Instrument (De La Villa 1989: 34). An extension of the instrumental dative, that we have seen above, is the so-called *dativus limitationis*, found in Area expressions, in which the dative comes close to the accusative of respect (see example (25) in §2.2.1.4).

Another important extension occurs when the plain dative expresses Cause. The use of the dative in Cause expressions sometimes appears to be considered marginal, as in De La Villa (1989: 36), but in reality it is well established:

- (57) *adúnatoi kataskheîn dià mēkós te ploû*
 unable:NOM.PL keep:INF.AOR through length:N/A PTC navigation:GEN
kai aporiai phulakēs póleōn megálon
 and difficulty:DAT.F watch:GEN.F city:GEN.F.PL large:GEN.F.PL
 “(we should be) unable to keep (you) in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large towns” (Th. 6.86.3);
- (58) *tà dè mésa tón politón hup’*
 DET.N/A.PL PTC middle:N/A.PL ART.GEN.PL.M citizen:GEN.PL.M under
amphotérōn è hótī ou xunēgōnizonto è
 REC.GEN.PL.M PTC because NEG fight:IMPF.M/P.3PL PTC
phthónōi toû perieînai diephtheíronto
 ENVY:DAT ART.GEN.N escape:INF.PRS perish:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy for their neutrality ruined them” (Th. 3.82.8);
- (59) *oudèn gàr hōs étukhe kineítai, allà*
 INDEF.N/A PTC thus happen:AOR.3SG move:PRS.M/P.3SG but
deí ti aei hupárkhein, hósper nún
 need:PRS.3SG INDEF.N/A always derive:INF.PRS as now
phúsei mèn hōdí, bíai è hupò nou è
 nature:DAT.F PTC so force:DAT.F PTC under mind:GEN PTC
állou hōdí
 INDEF.GEN SO
 “for nothing is moved at random, but in every case there must be some reason present; as in point of fact things are moved in one way by nature and in another by force or mind or some other entity”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1071b 34–36).

In (57) and (58), the plain dative is coordinated with other Cause expressions: a PP with *diá* and the accusative and a subordinate clause with *hótī*, ‘because’.

In (59) *phúsei*, ‘by nature’, comes together with *hupò nou*, ‘by mind’. The *hupò* phrase can express Cause or Agent, but what is relevant here, and common to the plain dative, is the feature of non-manipulation, as argued below.

The possibility for the plain dative to express both Instrument and Cause is remarkable, because prepositional phrases that can express either role are usually quite distinct and do not overlap. Note that Cause expressions in Greek also occur for positively evaluated causes (see §1.2.4.3), which, conceptually, can be considered close to instruments, but differ from the latter in that they are viewed as not manipulated. From the texts one gets the impression that the dative could be felt as ambiguous, at least with respect to the feature of manipulation. I will demonstrate this ambiguity by contrasting the use of the plain dative with the use of *diá* with the genitive (Instrument, manipulated) and *diá* with the accusative (Cause, non-manipulated; see further §3.9):

- (60) *éi tis autò toúto mimeîsthai*
 if INDEF.NOM DEM.N/A DEM.N/A imitate:INF.PRS.M/P
dúnaito hekástou, tèn ousían, grámmasí
 can:PRS.OPT.M/P.3SG INDEF.GEN.N ART.ACC.F nature:ACC.F letter:DAT.PL
te kai sullabaís, ár' ouk àn dēloî hékaston
 PTC and syllable:DAT.PL.F PTC NEG PTC show:PRS.3SG INDEF.N/A
hò éstin?
 REL.N/A be:PRS.3SG
 “if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, would he not show what each thing really is?”
 (Pl. *Cra.* 423e);
- (61) *tí dè ho dià tôn sillabôn te*
 INT.N/A PTC ART.NOM through ART.GEN.PL.F syllable:GEN.PL.F PTC
kai grammátôn tèn ousían tôn
 and character:GEN.PL ART.ACC.F substance:ACC.F ART.GEN.PL.N
pragmátôn apomimoumenos?
 thing:GEN.PL.N imitate:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM
 “and how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables?” (Pl. *Cra.* 431d).

Examples (60) and (61) contain two Instrument phrases, involving the same lexemes, one in the plain dative, *grámmasí te kai sullabaís*, and *dià tôn sillabôn te kai grammátôn*, both meaning ‘by means of letters and syllables’, with the verb (*apo*)*mimeîsthai*, ‘to imitate’. They show that the plain dative can have the same meaning as a *diá* plus genitive phrase.

On the other hand, the plain dative can be shown to have the same meaning of a *diá* plus accusative phrase (Cause) as well:

- (62) *all' eán tis moi légēi di' hóti*
 but PTC INDEF.NOM 1SG.DAT say:SUBJ.PRS.3SG through INDEF.N/A
kalón estin hotioûn, ... ou gàr éti toúto
 beautiful:N/A be:PRS.3SG INDEF.N/A NEG PTC PTC DEM.N/A
diiskhurízomai, all' hóti tói kalôi pánta
 affirm:PRS.M/P.1SG but that ART.DAT.N beauty:DAT.N all:N/A.PL
tà kalà kalá
 ART.N/A.PL beautiful:N/A.PL beautiful: N/A.PL

“if anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful . . . about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty.” (Pl. *Phd.* 100c–d).

In (62) the plain dative *tói kalôi*, ‘by beauty’, is the answer to *di' hóti kalón estin hotioûn*, ‘how (by what cause) is a thing beautiful?’: so while Instrument and Cause are always kept distinct by case alternation with *diá*, they cannot be clearly distinct if expressed through the plain dative.

As a result, ambiguity may arise, which can be avoided by explicitly choosing a prepositional phrase, as shown in

- (63) *Sō. Ei oûn tis se hōd' erōtōiē 'Tōi*
 Soc: if PTC INDEF.NOM 2SG.ACC so ask:SUBJ.PRS.3SG DEM.DAT.N
tà leukà kai mēlana horài anthrōpos
 ART.N/A.PL white:N/A.PL and black:N/A.PL see:PRS.3SG man:NOM
kai tói tà oxéa kai baréa akoúei?
 and DEM.DAT.N ART.N/A.PL high:N/A.PL and low:N/A.PL hear:PRS.3SG
eípois àn oîmai "Ómmasí te kai ōsín" ...
 say:OPT.PRS.2SG PTC think:PRS.1SG eye:DAT.PL PTC and ear:DAT.PL
Skōpei gàr apókrisis potéra
 consider:IMPT.PRS.2SG PTC answer:NOM.F INDEF.NOM.F
orthotéra, hōi horōmen toúto einai
 correct:CMPR.NOM.F REL.DAT.N see:PRS.1PL DEM.N/A be:INF.PRS
ophthalmoús, è di' hoú horōmen, kai hōi
 eye:ACC.PL PTC through REL.GEN.N see:PRS.1PL and REL.DAT.N
akoúomen ôta, è di' hoú akoúomen? Th.
 hear:PRS.1PL ear:N/A.PL PTC through REL.GEN.N hear:PRS.1PL. Th.:
Di' hōn hékasta aisthanómetha, émoige
 through REL.GEN.PL INDEF.N/A.PL perceive:PRS.M/P.1PL 1SG.DAT+PTC

dokeî, ô Sókrates, mállon è hoís. Sô.
 seem:PRS.3SG PTC S.:VOC rather PTC REL.DAT.PL.N Soc.:
Deinòn gár pou, ô paí, ei polláí
 strange:N/A PTC PTC PTC boy:VOC if many:NOM.PL.F
tines en hēmín hósper en doureíois
 INDEF.NOM.PL.F in 1PL.DAT as in wooden:DAT.PL.M
híppois aisthéseis egkátēntai, allà mē eis
 horse:DAT.PL.M sense:NOM.PL.F sit:PRS.M/P.3PL PTC NEG to
mían tinà idéan, éite psukhèn éite hóti
 one:ACC.F INDEF.ACC.F image:ACC.F PTC soul:ACC.F PTC INDEF.N/A
deí kaleîn, pánta taúta sunteínei,
 need:PRS.3SG call:INF.PRS all:N/A.PL DEM.N/A.PL strain:PRS.3SG
hêi diá toútōn hoíon orgánōn
 REL.DAT.F through DEM.GEN.PL.N as instrument:GEN.PL.N
aisthanómetha hōsa aisthētá
 perceive:PRS.M/P.1PL REL.N/A.PL perceptible:N/A.PL

“Soc: If, then, anyone should ask you, “By what does a man see white and black colors and by what does he hear high and low tones?” you would, I fancy, say, “By his eyes and ears”. Theat.: Yes, I would. (Soc.: The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect.) Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear? Theat.: I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case. Soc.: Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there were many senses ensconced within us, as if we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not all unite in one power, whether we should call it soul something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.” (Pl. *Tht.* 184b–d).

Here Thaetetus states that we perceive *ómmasí te kai ósín*, ‘by our eyes and ears’, using the plain dative. Then Socrates objects that this expression is not precise, asks him to be more precise, and specify if we perceive ‘through’ them or ‘by them’ (*diá* with the genitive or plain dative), Thaetetus answers *di’hôn*, thus making clear that only this latter expression unambiguously designates Instrument. Socrates then proceeds to say that the organs of sensation have a purely instrumental function, but the reason why we are able to process perception is that there is some other ‘power’ inside of use, ‘by which’ (*hêi*, plain dative) we

perceive: the latter entity is viewed as a positively evaluated cause, and crucially non-manipulated.²⁶

As I have remarked in §2.1.2, the original meaning of the Indo-European instrumental was sociative. Some occurrences of the Greek dative can be explained as derived from this meaning, although the plain dative does not occur in prototypical Comitative expressions (see §1.2.3):

- (64) *pénte dè élabon, kai mían toútōn*
 five PTC take:AOR.3PL and one:ACC.F DEM.GEN.PL.F
autoís andrásin
 DEM.DAT.PL.M man:DAT.PL.M
 “they took five (boats), one with its crew on board” (Th. 4.14.1).

Even in this type of occurrence, the plain dative tends to be substituted by *sún* with the dative or *metá* with the accusative, the usual ways of encoding Comitative.

Finally, the plain dative can express Manner: various prepositional phrases occur in this function, too, as we will see in Chapter 3.

To sum up, the dative is the case most widely employed for different SRs.²⁷ Its great polysemy caused some ambiguity already in Classical Greek. Perhaps for this reason, the dative is also the case that can most frequently be substituted by some alternative expression, involving a preposition.

2.3 The sub-system of local cases and its substitutes

The plain accusative, in its allative function inherited from Proto-Indo-European, the plain genitive, which continued the Indo-European genitive and ablative, and the plain dative, which represented the Indo-European dative, locative and instrumental, built a sub-system of local cases in Early Greek. In the subsystem, each case encoded one of the three basic local relations (see §1.2.1.1). In spite of case syncretism, Ancient Greek was rather conservative in this respect, because the sub-system of local cases of Proto-Indo-European was maintained, although the same cases could also encode different, non-local SRs. High polysemy was the cause that led to increasing use of prepositions. Already in Homer, when expressing the three basic local SRs the three cases tend to be reinforced by three prepositions that do not allow case variation: *en* with the dative to encode Locative, *eis* with the accusative to encode Direction, and *ek* with the genitive to encode Source. In this light, the creation of the preposition *eis* (see §3.3 and Chapter 4) has the effect of keeping the three SRs

fully distinct. Note that PPs formed with these three prepositions are among those with the simplest internal structure, as shown in Chapter 4. Structural simplicity corresponds to cognitive basicness of the three SRs.

Being reinforced by prepositions in their local meaning, the three cases mostly have non-spatial meaning when they occur without prepositions. In the first place, they encode grammatical relations: direct object for the accusative, indirect object for the dative, and nominal modification for the genitive. When occurring in adverbial NPs, the most polysemous case is the dative, which encodes Beneficiary with animate nouns, and Instrument or Cause (and to a limited extent Purpose) with inanimate nouns. The adverbial accusative mostly encodes Area, or some related function (e.g. Time, in particular temporal duration). The genitive has the most restricted use and is not connected with any specific adverbial SR.

Greek prepositions

Patterns of polysemy and meaning extension

3.0 Introduction

In Ancient Greek, several lexical items may occur with an NP and function as prepositions.¹ Among them, eighteen items are usually singled out, and labeled ‘proper prepositions’. Strictly speaking, there are other lexemes that occur in PPs in much the same way as ‘proper’ prepositions, so that this grouping can seem arbitrary, if based on prepositional usage alone. However, these eighteen lexemes share a peculiar morphosyntactic behavior: beside functioning as prepositions, they can also be found in compound verbs, and have a function similar to English or German verbal particles, as *up* in *give up*, or *auf-* in Germ. *aufhören*, ‘to give up’. So in Classical Greek we find for example *katá*, ‘down’, ‘around’, ‘according’, and *katapháinein*, ‘to declare’, compound with *kata-* and *pháinein* ‘to appear’ (as in English and German, the meaning of compound verbs is often non-compositional).

3.0.1 Categorial status

In the Homeric poems, the eighteen ‘proper’ prepositions have the further peculiarity that they can also be used as free adverbs. Far from being an exceptional fact in Homeric Greek, this three-fold nature was the common feature of a class of lexical items known from all ancient Indo-European languages, the so-called ‘preverbs’.²

On account of their syntactic behavior, the categorial status of the Indo-European preverbs is often thought to be problematic, since it is not clear whether they must be regarded as adverbs or adpositions. This allegedly unclear categorial status is also used as an argument to show that prepositional function was a recent innovation.

To my view, categorial status is to a large extent a pseudo-problem, and cannot demonstrate much with respect to the antiquity of prepositions. Vari-

ation in usage is also found in some modern Indo-European languages, as shown in the following English examples:

- (1) *I am in the room* (preposition);
- (2) *I am in* (adverb);
- (3) *I gave in* (verb particle);

but, to my knowledge, nobody has ever used this variation as evidence for the fact that prepositions are a recent development in Modern English.

In this book I consider Greek proper prepositions as items that belong to different lexical classes, in much the same way as Brugman (1988) does for English *over*. They are defined as a separate lexical class exactly by the peculiarity of functioning as prepositions or as preverbs (and as adverbs in Homer). I sometimes refer to them as ‘particles’, when I do not want to specify a lexical class.

3.0.2 Phrase structure

Speaking of prepositions (or adpositions) and prepositional phrases, one implicitly assumes that the particle is the head and the noun its dependent. This view has been challenged by Horrocks (1981) who, on the evidence of Homeric Greek, argues that at the stage represented by Homeric Greek the noun must be considered the head of the phrase, and the particle is a modifying adverb. Later on, in Classical Greek, the dependency relation shifted, nouns became complements of the particles, so that one can properly speak of prepositional phrases. Such a view may account for case variation in occurrences such as the following:

- (4) *mé se, géron, koílēisin egò parà*
 NEG 2SG.ACC old.man:VOC hollow:DAT.PL.F 1SG.NOM by
nēusi kikheō
 ship:DAT.PL.F find:SUBJ.PRS.1SG
 “let me not find you, old man, by the hollow ships” (*Il.* 1.26);
- (5) *iónta par’ Eurútou*
 COME:PART.PRS.ACC by E.:GEN
 “coming from Eurytos” (*Il.* 2.596);
- (6) *eími par’ Hēphaiston*
 go:FUT.1SG by H.:ACC
 “I will go to Hephaestus” (*Il.* 18.143).

In the above examples, we find *pará*, ‘near’, ‘by’, in a Location expression with a dative NP (4), in a Source expression with a genitive NP (5), and in a Direction expression with an accusative NP (6). As we have seen in Chapter 2, the plain cases could express the same SRs (although it is doubtful that they could with the specific lexemes contained in (5) and (6), i.e. with personal names).³

Horrocks writes: “The essential fact about prepositional phrases is that the presence of the preposition is obligatory, since it is the ‘head’ of its phrase; the inflected noun phrase is its dependent. Yet it is a well-known fact that inflected nominal expressions in adverbial function may stand alone *without* particle support in Homeric Greek ... This suggests that the functional burden is carried by the case ending and the presence of the particle is still optional... This optionality is reflected in the fact that the particle may be separated from the phrase containing the noun phrase whose case ending it modifies ... This kind of separation would be impossible if the particle were the head of its phrase, since its removal would leave a prepositional phrase without its (obligatory) head. Thus it is the inflected noun phrase which must be regarded as the head of these phrases, the particle as merely an optional specifier of its case ending” (1981: 18–19).

There are a number of problems with Horrocks’ assumptions. In the first place, while it is true that nominal adverbials can stand alone, the particles too can stand alone in Homer when they function as free adverbs (see the relevant examples in the sections devote to each single particle), so one could argue that the inflected nouns, or possibly the case endings, are specifiers of the particles. As for the possibility of separating the particle from the noun, Horrocks quotes the following example:

- (7) *amphì dè khaítai ómois aíssontai*
 around PTC hair:NOM.PL.F shoulder:DAT.PL move:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “about (his) shoulders (his) mane floats streaming” (*Il.* 15.266–267).

Many more such examples are available, but I am not sure that they demonstrate the optionality of particles: indeed, the noun phrase is not left without the particle, which is not removed, but simply separated by it. Contiguity of sub-constituents does not constitute a diagnostic for individuating the head of a phrase. In Ancient Greek, as in many other free word order languages, genitival and adjectival attributes can be separated from their head nouns, as in:

- (8) *é hína húbrin ídēi Agamémnonos*
 PTC for arrogance:ACC.F see:SUBJ.AOR.M/P.2SG A.:GEN
Atréídaο?
 of.A.:GEN
 “is it so that you might see the arrogance of Agamemnon, son of Atreus?”
 (*Il.* 1.203),

but this does not mean that they must be considered heads of the phrases in which they occur, rather than modifiers.

The most important objection to Horrocks’ argument is that in many occurrences particles are not optional at all, even in Homeric Greek. Consider the following examples:

- (9) a. *pheúgon épeit’ apáneuthe di’ Helládos*
 flee:IMPF.1SG then far through Hellas:GEN.F
 “then I fled far away through Hellas” (*Il.* 9.478);
- (10) *tanussaménos dià mēlōn*
 stretch:PART.AOR.MID.NOM through sheep:GEN.PL
 “stretched among the sheep” (*Od.* 9.298);
- (11) a. *nikēsai kai épeita dià megáthumon Athēnēn*
 conquer:INF.AOR and then through greathearted:ACC.F A.:ACC.F
 “even then (Odysseus) conquered, by the aid of great-hearted Athena”
 (*Od.* 8.520).

It is doubtful that the NPs that occur with *diá* could occur alone with the same meaning. In (6) the genitive alone with the verb *pheúgein* would perhaps be taken as a Source expression:

- (9) b. **pheúgon Helládos*
 ?“fleeing from Greece”.

In (10) perhaps a plain genitive could be taken as a partitive, but since the NP *mēlōn* does not have a local referent it is hard to imagine that it could receive a locative interpretation. In (11) a plain accusative could only be taken as the direct object of the verb *nikēsai*, so not only would the semantic function be different, but the grammatical relation as well:

- (11) b. **nikēsai kai épeita megáthumon Athēnēn*
 “and in the end he conquered the generous Athena”.

Numerous examples could be cited, but I think that the ones indicated here clearly show that not all prepositions could be left out without causing se-

matic and structural changes in Homeric Greek. It appears that the NPs in the above examples function indeed as complements of the preposition *diá*, notwithstanding possible formal variation. Note further that the PPs with *diá* in the above examples are syntactically adverbials, so the choice of case cannot be conditioned by verbal valency, or by some opposition expressed by the verb (as for example rest/motion).

A further problem with Horrocks' assumption that in Homer "the functional burden is carried by the case ending and the presence of the particle is still optional" (quoted above) is constituted by occurrences where the choice of a specific case is determined by the feature of partitivity (see §3.0.3), rather than by a spatial relation, as in

- (12) *hoi mèn ... metà Boiōtōn emákhonto*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC among Boeotian:GEN.PL fight:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 "these were fighting among the Boeotians" (*Il.* 13.699–700);
- (13) *toísi dè thumòn enì stēthessin órine*
 DEM.DAT.PL.M PTC soul:ACC in breast:DAT.PL stir:AOR.3SG
pási metà plēthún
 all:DAT.PL.M among crowd:ACC
 "(he) moved the soul of everyone in the crowd" (*Il.* 2.142–143).

In the above examples, case variation does not express different SRs as it does in examples (4)–(6) (both *metá* phrases in (12) and (13) express Location), but it is determined by the internal structure of the landmark (discrete vs. continuous), as I will show in §3.14.

To sum up, the various types of occurrence described in this section seem not to fit Horrocks' interpretation according to which there are no true PPs in Homer and prepositions simply modify meanings that are already expressed by plain cases.

3.0.3 Case variation

Evidence from the Indo-European languages allows us to reconstruct a situation in which prepositions could occur with concrete cases, i.e. with the locative, the ablative, and the instrumental; the only grammatical case that frequently occurred with prepositions was the accusative, given its allative function.⁴ The genitive did not occur with prepositions belonging to the class studied here. However, it was found with so-called 'improper' prepositions, i.e. adverbs of nominal origin, which could take a genitive as a dependent.⁵ The dative

was also infrequent as a prepositional case, and mostly limited to prepositions of later origin.

In Ancient Greek, where the concrete cases of Proto-Indo-European had merged with grammatical cases, prepositional government was extended to the latter: so we find the dative with prepositions that take the locative or the instrumental elsewhere, and the genitive with prepositions that originally took the ablative, as shown in examples (4) and (5) with *pará*. In other words, one of the reasons for the occurrence of the dative and the genitive with ‘proper’ prepositions is case syncretism.

While case syncretism accounts for the occurrence of the dative with proper prepositions, the prepositional genitive also has another important origin. As we will see in detail in the following sections, in many cases the prepositional genitive had partitive, as in example (12), rather than ablatival value. The use of the partitive genitive with proper prepositions was a Greek innovation, and it had important consequences for the development of Greek prepositional phrases.⁶

Ancient Greek prepositions are often divided into three groups, depending on the number of cases that they can occur with:

- (14) a. prepositions with one case: *antí*, *apó*, *ek*, *pró* (genitive), *eis* (accusative), *en*, *sún* (dative);
 b. prepositions with two cases: *diá*, *katá*, *hupér* (genitive and accusative);
 c. prepositions with three cases: *amphí*, *aná*, *epí*, *metá*, *pará*, *perí*, *prós*, *hupó*.

This subdivision captures to a large extent the increasing internal complexity of PPs: prepositions in (a) mostly reinforce, or disambiguate, a meaning that the plain case could, at least in origin, express by itself. Prepositions in (b) all govern the genitive and the accusative. It is an important feature of Greek prepositions that none can take the dative and another case: either the dative is the only possible case, or the preposition can take all three cases. With prepositions in (b) the genitive may have both partitive and ablatival value, as indeed it does with *katá*, but this ambiguity is not further complicated by overlap of the genitive with the dative. So there is little conflict of meaning internal to PPs. Prepositions in (c) for the most part present a very complex situation regarding the semantic organization of cases. With the exception of *pará*, the partitive genitive with prepositions in (c) has an increasing extension, and often tends to replace the dative. This is most clear with *metá*: in Homer, the genitive was recently introduced, and the dative was very frequent; after Homer, *metá*

only occurs with the genitive and the accusative. A similar development also concerns *perí*, even if loss of the dative took place at a later time.⁷

In the following sections, I have ranked prepositions according to increasing complexity in the use of cases; in the first group I start with prepositions that express basic local SRs.

3.0.4 Position of the particles in Homer

So far, I have always spoken of ‘prepositions’, but it must be mentioned that, in Homeric Greek, particles had a high degree of freedom as to their position, even in adpositional use. To a varying extent, most particles could occur both as prepositions, and as postpositions. Since Classical Greek only had prepositions (postposing of the particles was used as an archaizing poetic device), Greek grammarians and text editors found postposing a somewhat ‘irregular’ feature of Homeric Greek, and called it *anastrophé*, literally ‘back turn’; to indicate postpositional usage they used special accentuation rules (the accent was moved to the first syllable when possible, so *perí* is written *péri* when used as a postposition).

3.1 EN¹

En is one of the most ancient Indo-European prepositions, and has cognates in many other languages, among which English *in*. Contrary to most its cognates, as e.g. Latin *in* and German *in*, *en* can only take the dative, as an outcome of an original construction with the locative, and never takes the accusative. This owes to pre-literary creation of the preposition *eis*, a development found in some Greek dialects, among which Attic-Ionic, but not in all. In Cypriot, for example, only one preposition, *in* (from PIE **en*), is attested;² it can take both the dative and the accusative and, depending on the case, it is found in Location or Direction expressions, much in the same way as its Latin and Germanic cognates.

On the contrary, as remarked above, in Attic-Ionic, as well as in a number of other dialects, *en* only occurs with the dative and expresses Location. (In Homeric Greek it can express Direction in limited circumstances, similar to the plain dative in Homer, treated in §2.2.3.1.) Normally, for Direction expressions a newly created preposition is used, *ens*, later *es* (Ionic) or *eis* (Attic), which always takes the accusative. As I will argue in Chapter 4, this development must be viewed in the framework of the general tendency of Attic-Ionic toward reduction of the prepositional dative.

The original meaning of the Indo-European particle **en* was ‘inside’, ‘in’, ‘into’, and can be observed in the adverbial usage of Greek *en*:

- (1) *en dé hoi askòn éthēke theà mélanos*
 in PTC 3SG.DAT skin:ACC put:AOR.3SG goddess:NOM.F black:GEN.M
óinoio
 wine:GEN.M
 “on the raft the goddess put a skin of dark wine for him” (*Od.* 5.265).

The meaning of *en* as a preposition corresponds to English ‘in’, ‘inside’. In its concrete, spatial function *en* mostly denotes Location: according to Horrocks (1981: 198), the noun governed by *en* (the landmark) denotes an object which “is viewed as a volume or demarcated area (‘with contents’) at which some other object is located”. In the terms of Talmy (2000: 177–254) this means that the landmark is bounded:

- (2) *Argeioi d' en nēusi philēn es patriíd'*
 Argive:NOM.PL PTC in ship:DAT.PL.F their:ACC.F to homeland:ACC.F
ēbēsan
 go:AOR.3PL
 “the Argives had gone back in their ships to their native land” (*Il.* 12.16).

En frequently occurs with toponyms, as in (3) and (5):

- (3) *kaí ken en Árgei eoúsa pròs álles*
 and PTC in A.:DAT be:PART.PRS.NOM.F toward INDEF.GEN.F
històn huphaínois
 cloth:ACC weave:OPT.PRS.2SG
 “then, though being in Argos, you shall ply the loom at another’s bidding” (*Il.* 6.456),

and with the set of other nouns denoting ‘social Location’, that I have described in §2.2.3.1, with which Location can also be expressed by the plain dative in Homer:

- (4) *hízon d' ein agorēi tetiēótes*
 sit:IMPF.3SG PTC in assembly:DAT.F troubled:PART.PF.NOM.PL
 “so they sat in the place of gathering, sore troubled” (*Il.* 9.13).

In spite of the possible occurrence of the plain dative with toponyms and other nouns with spatial referents, the preposition sometimes occurs in formulaic expressions, as *en(i) patriídi gaíēi*, in example (5), found at the end of a verse three times in the *Iliad* and four in the *Odyssey*. This position is important to ensure the antiquity of the PP:³

- (5) *en Lakedáimoni aúthi philēi en patriídi gaíēi*
 in L.:DAT there dear:DAT.F in native:DAT.F earth:DAT.F
 “there in Sparta, in their native land” (*Il.* 3.244).

Similar to the plain dative, PPs introduced by *en* can denote Direction with certain verbs, like *bállein*, ‘to throw’, *pésein*, ‘to cast’, *tithénai*, ‘to put’, or *hézesthai*, ‘to sit down’, whereby the end point of motion is focused:

- (6) *khamai bálon en kontēisi*
 to.the.ground cast:AOR.3PL in dust:DAT.PL.F
 “they cast him to the ground in the dust” (*Il.* 5.588);
- (7) *hoi d' órnuto kai en teúkhessin édunon,*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC arise:IMPF.M/P.3PL and in armor:DAT.PL get.in:IMPF.3PL

àn d' éban en díphroisi paraibátai hēniókhói
 up PTC go:AOR.3PL in chariot:DAT.PL warrior:NOM.PL driver:NOM.PL
 te

PTC

“they arose and put on their armor and mounted their chariots, warriors and charioteers alike” (*Il.* 23.131–132).

Note that the last example contains two occurrences of *en*: the second, *en díphroisi*, governed by the verb *anabaínein*, ‘to get on’, exemplifies the terminative use of *en*, while the first, *en teúkhessin édunon*, lit. ‘they got into their armors’ describes the action of wearing the armors, conceived as containers for the soldiers’ bodies. Note that the verb *dú(n)ein*, too, often takes a Direction expression in the plain accusative, or the PP *eis* with the accusative. Here the use of *en* with the dative, which profiles the end of a movement (the result is (functional) containment of the trajector inside the landmark), seems particularly appropriate for describing the resulting position of the bodies in the armors.

Vandeloise (1994) discusses various models for describing the meaning of the English preposition *in*, French *dans*, and German *in*. He takes into account three possible types of analysis:

- a. geometric, whereby the preposition *in* envisages a three-dimensional relation;
- b. topological, that focus on the inclusion relation expressed by *in*;
- c. functional, which describes the landmark as a container exerting dynamic control over the trajector.

Vandeloise supports (c), showing that it accounts for cases that are not accounted for by (a) and (b). As compared with the geometric analysis, the functional analysis has the advantage that it also accounts for bi-dimensional landmarks, as in *the cow is in the meadow*: in other words, a landmark need not be three-dimensional in order to be conceived as containing a trajector. For Greek, see example (3), (8), and (9):

(8) *Achaioi en pedíōi hístanto*
 A.:NOM.PL in plain:DAT stand:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “the Achaeans stood upon the plain” (*Il.* 2.472–473);

(9) *oúreos en koruphéis*
 mountain:GEN in peak:DAT.PL.F
 “(as a consuming fire makes a boundless forest to blaze) on the peaks of a mountain” (*Il.* 2.456).

As for the inclusion relation, Vandeloise remarks that *in* and similar prepositions are used even in cases in which the topological analysis must be variously adapted, in order to account for landmarks that do not include the whole trajector, as in

- (10) *He has an umbrella in his hand.*

A similar Greek example is

- (11) *Néstōr d' en kheíressi láb' hēnía*
 N.:NOM PTC in hand:DAT.PL.F take:AOR.3SG rein:N/A.PL
sigalóenta
 shining:N/A.PL
 “Nestor took in his hands the shining reins” (*Il.* 8.116).

According to Vandeloise, examples such as (10) and (11) can be explained considering that the hand determines the position of the object which is being held. Another example from Greek that supports Vandeloise’s explanation will be discussed below (see ex. (31)).

Vandeloise notes further that, in cases like (8), where, strictly speaking, the landmark does not exert dynamic control on the trajector, the container analysis can also be shown to apply: in this and other similar occurrences, the area identified as landmark delimits the possible movements of the trajector.

As remarked above, according to the functional analysis a container is conceived as exerting control over the entity it contains. As I have already mentioned (§2.2.3.2), this analysis fits Ancient Greek particularly well, because it mirrors the recurrent tendency to conceive of instruments as containers, thus explaining not only pre-literary syncretism of the dative-locative with the instrumental, but also the use of the dative and of the preposition *en* with body parts in Homeric and Classical Greek, as well as the development of *en* in the New Testament, that I will briefly mention at the end of the present section (see further §4.4).

In some cases, according to Chantraine (1953: 101), *en* appears to convey a less precise meaning. One such example is (9), which cannot be accounted for by a geometric model, but can be explained by the container model, as already noted. But there are some examples that seem to contradict the container model as well, as

- (12) *ho d' ek potamoío liastheis ... eípe ... ei*
 DEM.NOM PTC out.of river:GEN recoil:PART.AOR.P.NOM say:AOR.3SG if

mén k' en potamôi duskēdéa núkta phulássō, ...,
 PTC PTC in river:DAT weary:ACC.F night:ACC.F watch:SUBJ.PRS.1SG
 “but he, going back from the river, spoke ‘If here in the river bed I keep
 watch throughout the weary night, ...’” (*Od.* 5.462–466).

Here the verb *liastheís* seems to suggest that the trajector is outside the landmark, which would make the container interpretation of *en* inconsistent. Horrocks (1981:200) remarks that *en potamôi* can be taken to mean ‘in a river (bed)’. So the person here would be outside the water, but still in what can broadly be described as the area denoted as the river. This analysis is supported by a look at a wider context: “Ah, what will become of me? ... if here in the river bed (*en potamôi*) I keep watch throughout the weary night, I fear that the bitter frost and fresh dew may overcome my spirit ... but if I climb up the slope to the wood ... I fear I may become a prey and a threat to wild beasts” (*Od.* 5.465–470).

Before going on to examine what further types of landmark can occur with *en*, I would like to incorporate the suggestion in Cuyckens (1993:304), that the notion of containment should be taken as implying “coincidence between a target and a container landmark”. The implication of coincidence explains the use of *en* with nouns denoting human entities:

(13) *kai nún en Danaoísi theopropéōn agoreúeís*
 and now in Danaan:DAT.PL propheticize:PART.PRS.NOM speak:PRS.2SG
 “and now among the Danaans you claim in prophecy” (*Il.* 1.109);

(14) *toi' ár' en Alkinóio theôn ésan*
 INDEF.N/A.PL PTC in A.:GEN god:GEN.PL be:IMPF.3PL
aglaà dôra
 glorious:N/A.PL gift:N/A.PL
 “such were the glorious gifts of the gods in the palace of Alcinous”
 (*Od.* 7.132).

In (13) the plural landmark *Danaoísi* is conceived as a group of people that also contains the trajector. With a singular, however, this interpretation would be impossible, the only possible non-metaphorical reading of *en Alkínoi* with the verb ‘to be’ being ‘inside Alcinous’ (i.e. inside his body or mind).⁴ The genitive in (11) is correctly interpreted by Horrocks (1981:199) as involving “the suppression of a noun denoting the place of residence or domain of one person or god”. In other words, such occurrences are the equivalent of English expressions as *at/to the dentist’s*.

A singular human landmark occurs with *en* in (15):

- (15) *en soi mèn léxō, séo d' árxomai*
 in 2SG.DAT PTC cease:FUT.1SG 2SG.GEN PTC start:FUT.MID.1SG
 “with you will I begin and with you make an end” (*Il.* 9.97).

In this example, *en* is used in its terminative function, similar to (6) and (7). Rather than indicate that the (abstract) motion denoted by *légein*, ‘to stay, cease’, is directed towards the interior of the landmark, *en* here profiles final contact.

The container as conditioning factor metaphor is used when *en* occurs with animate nouns, as in

- (16) *nikēs peírat' ékhontai en athánatoisi*
 victory:GEN.F issue:N/A.PL hold:PRS.M/P.3PL in immortal:DAT.PL.M
theoísin
 god:DAT.PL.M
 “the issues of victory are in power of the immortal gods” (*Il.* 7.102).

Here the expression ‘to be, to be held within somebody’ must be understood as based on a metonymy: ‘to be in somebody’s power/will’. The metonymy, in its turn, is based on a metaphorical shift from concrete to abstract Location, whereby an agent’s intentionality or capacity to perform an action are seen as containers.

A common development of Location expressions across languages is produced by the (apparently universal, cf. §1.2.2) tendency to conceive of time in terms of space: so when occurring with nouns with temporal reference, *en* denotes Time:

- (17) *ou mèn gár ti khéreion en hōrēi deípnōn*
 NEG PTC then INDEF.N/A worse:N/A in season:DAT.F dinner:N/A
helésthai
 take:INF.AOR.MID
 “for it is no bad thing to take one’s dinner in season” (*Od.* 17.176).

The shift from the concrete plane of space to an abstract plane is visible in the first place with nouns that denote ‘social Location’, in the sense of §2.2.3.1. Some of these nouns denote events, which are metaphorically conceived of as containers:

- (18) *tòn mèn egò mála pollà mákhēi éni ...*
 DEM.ACC PTC 1SG.NOM very many:N/A.PL battle:DAT.F in
ophthalmoisin ópōpa
 eye:DAT.PL see:PF.1SG
 “I have seen him with my eyes, many times in the battle”, (*Il.* 24.391–392);⁵
- (19) *toíos eòn hoíos ou tis*
 INDEF.NOM be:PART.PRS.NOM INDEF.NOM NEG INDEF.NOM
Akhaiōn khalkokhitōnōn en polémōi: agorēi dé
 Achaean:GEN.PL brazen.coated:GEN.PL in war:DAT council:DAT.F PTC
t’ améionés eisi kai álloi
 PTC better:NOM.PL be:PRS.3SG and INDEF.NOM.PL
 “I that in war am such as is none other of the brazen-coated Achaeans,
 albeit in council there be others better” (*Il.* 18.105–106).

In example (18) we find *mákhēi éni*, ‘in battle’, and in example (19) *en polémōi*, ‘in war’, with the preposition, opposed to *agorēi*, ‘in council’, in the plain dative. Both examples can be compared with example (49) in §2.2.3.1, where battle is also opposed to council, and both nouns occur in the plain dative.

Much in the same way, states can be conceived of as containers:

- (20) *en doiēi dè saōsēmen è apolésthai*
 in doubt:DAT.F PTC save:INF.FUT PTC perish:INF.AOR.MID
 “it is in doubt whether we will save (the ships) or they are lost” (*Il.* 9.230).

In §2.2.3.2 I have discussed at length the frequent metaphor according to which body parts are conceptualized as containers. Some examples with *en* are given below (see also example (11) above):

- (21) *epei ou pō tlēsom’ en ophthalmoisin horásthai*
 since NEG PTC bear:FUT.MID.1SG in eye:DAT.PL see:INF.PRS.M/P
marnámenon phílon huiōn ... Meneláōi
 fight:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC dear:ACC son:ACC M.:DAT
 “since I can in no wise bear to behold with my eyes my dear son doing
 battle with Menelaus” (*Il.* 3.306);
- (22) *hōs pháto, toísi dè thumòn enì*
 thus speak:AOR.MID.3SG DEM.DAT.PL.M PTC heart:ACC in
stéthessin órīne pási
 breast:DAT.PL stir:AOR.3SG all:DAT.PL.M
 “so he spoke, and roused the hearts in the breasts of all” (*Il.* 2.142–143);

- (23) *all' êtoi mèn taûta theôn en goúnasi keítai*
 but PTC PTC DEM.N/A.PL god:GEN.PL in knee:DAT.PL lie:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “yet these things verily lie on the knees of the gods” (*Il.* 17.514);
- (24) *en gàr khersì télos polémou, epéōn d' enì*
 in PTC hand:DAT.PL.F result:N/A war:GEN word:GEN.PL PTC in
boulèi
 council:DAT.F
 “for in our hands is the issue of war; that of words is in the council”
 (*Il.* 16.630).

In example (21) *en ophthalmoisin horâsthai* is an example of container-instrument transfer with body parts, that I have described in §2.2.3.2; it can be compared with the plain dative *ophthalmoisin* in (18). While in English one would say ‘to see with one’s eyes’, it is more common in Greek to say ‘to see in one’s eyes’: the eyes are conceptualized as containing the image which is being seen. This metaphor, involving body parts in general, continues after Homer, as I will show below, examples (31)–(33). When body parts are described as simple instruments, without mediation of the Container metaphor, the preposition *diá* is used instead, as argued in §3.9.

In (23), an abstract entity (the trajector) is located on the body part of an agent (the landmark): such location implies potential control from the side of the agent on the state of affairs. In (24) the expression ‘to be in one’s hands’, with an abstract trajector, denotes control over it: but note that the shift is not complete, the trajector being an event, war, that requires physical involvement of the agent. Accordingly, *télos polémou*, ‘the issue of war’, is here compared with (*telos*) *epéōn*, ‘the issue of words’, an event which is also controlled by human agents, in this case not through their hands, but rather in a typical social location, council.

After Homer, local and temporal uses of *en* remain pretty much the same. Abstract use expands following the lines already described for Homer. For instance, in example (25) we find a parallel to (16), in which a human landmark is conceived as a container that conditions and controls an abstract trajector, which in this case consists of events:

- (25) *en soi nún Kallímakhe estì è katadoulôsai*
 in 2SG.DAT now K.:VOC be:PRS.3SG PTC enslave:INF.AOR
Athénas è eleuthéras poiésanta
 A.:ACC.PL.F PTC free:ACC.PL.F make:PART.AOR.ACC
 “Callimachus, it is now in your hands to enslave Athens or, having made her free, ...” (*Hdt.* 6.109.3)

In (26)–(29) the spatial plane is projected onto discourse. In the second part of example (26), *en lógōi*, ‘in discourse’, is opposed to *en érgōi*, ‘in action’. The two abstract nouns refer to activities, as shown by the English translation, and the Container metaphor applies to states of affairs. In (27) a poetic text is conceived as a container:⁶

- (26) *oúte en tōi lógōi oudamoû méllonti*
 or in ART.DAT speech:DAT nowhere be.about.to:PART.PRS.DAT.M
ti ereîn. kaítoi en állois lógois
 INDEF.N/A.SG say:INF.FUT yet in INDEF.DAT.PL.M OCCASION:DAT.PL.M
pollakhoû dé me epéskhe légonta
 frequently PTC 1SG.ACC stop:AOR.3SG speak:PART.PRS.ACC
metaxú: nún dè oudamoû perì taútēn tēn
 in.the.midst now PTC nowhere about DEM.ACC.F ART.ACC.F
práxin out’ en érgōi out’ oudenì en lógōi
 thing:ACC.F nor in action:DAT nor INDEF.DAT.M in speech:DAT.M
ēnantíōtai moi
 oppose:PF.M/P.3SG 1SG.DAT
 “or at any point of my speech, when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying.” (Pl. Ap. 40b);
- (27) *toú kai Arkhílokhos ho Pários, katà tòn*
 REL.GEN.M and A.:NOM ART.NOM from.P.:NOM down ART.ACC
autòn khronon genómenos, en iámbōi trimétrōi
 same:ACC time:ACC be:PART.AOR.NOM in iambus:DAT verse:DAT
epemnésthē
 remember:AOR.P.3SG
 “Archilochus of Parus, who lived in his same times, also mentioned him in his iambic verses” (Hdt. 1.12.2).

In (28) *en pléoni lógōi*, ‘in a longer discourse’, and similarly *en brakhutérois*, ‘in shorter terms’, in (29) are examples of the metaphor, described in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), by which WORDS (or in our case, expressions) ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANING:⁷

- (28) *hōs dè en pléoni lógōi delōsai*
 thus PTC in lengthier:DAT.M speech:DAT.M show:INF.AOR
 “a lengthier demonstration goes as follows” (Hdt. 2.25.1);

- (29) *hou̓tōs hō̓ste mēdēna sou en brakhutērois eipein*
 so that INDEF.ACC 2SG.GEN in shorter:DAT.PL say:INF.AOR
 “so that nobody can speak in shorter terms than you” (Pl. *Prt.* 335a).

Another interesting occurrence is *en mērei*, ‘separately’, ‘in turn’, in (30), where an abstract location corresponds to the manner in which an action is performed:

- (30) *metà dē en mērei hekástoisi Iōnōn te kai*
 after PTC in part:DAT INDEF.DAT.PL Ionian:GEN.PL PTC and
Aiolōn
 Aeolian:GEN.PL
 “(first Croesus made war on them), afterwards on each of the Ionian and Aeolian cities in turn” (Hdt. 1.26.3).

As remarked above in the discussion of examples (21)–(24), the metaphor by which body parts are conceived as containers was very frequent in Greek. Examples from Herodotus are (31)–(33). Note that Vandeloise’s functional explanation for the Container metaphor appears particularly appropriate in the case of (31):

- (31) *Aigúptioi dē hupò toūs thanátous anieísi*
 Egyptian:NOM.PL PTC under ART.ACC.PL death:ACC.PL let:PRS.3PL
tàs tríkhas aúxesthai tás te en
 ART.ACC.PL.F hair:ACC.PL.F grow:INF.PRS.M/P ART.ACC.PL.F PTC in
tēi kephalēi kai tōi geneíōi
 ART.DAT.F head:DAT.F and ART.DAT chin:DAT
 “after a death Egyptians let their hair and beard grow on their heads and their chins” (Hdt. 2.36.1).

Out of context, the phrase *en tēi kephalēi* could be taken to mean ‘inside one’s head’. Here, however, the fact that the head is mentioned as an appropriate place for hair to grow triggers a different interpretation: the head is conceived as the area on which hair grows, so *en tēi kephalēi* refers to the external area on the head. Note that this interpretation is made possible by the fact that the area on which hair grows is naturally delimited. In other words, the area identified as landmark delimits the possible position of the trajector, thus conforming to the functional analysis, according to which the container constrains the trajector. In other contexts, where it is said that a certain object is located on somebody’s head, the preposition *epí*, ‘on’, is used, in order to avoid the ambiguity that *en* could create, see §3.18.

Example (32) contains the phrase *en ophthalmôisi*, ‘in the eyes’; contrary to (21), however, there is no possible implication of instrumentality in (32): the father’s eyes are presented as an area which contains a specific sight, that of the son who is being killed:

- (32) *tòn dè paída en ophthalmôisi toû Artaiúkteō*
 ART.ACC PTC SON:ACC in eye:DAT.PL ART.GEN A.:GEN
katéleusan
 stone:AOR.3PL
 “as for his son, they stoned him to death in Artauktes’ eyes”
 (Hdt. 9.120.4).

Finally, in example (33) the metaphor is moved to a more abstract plane:

- (33) *all’ ei tò mèn nún taúta préssois tá*
 but if ART.N/A PTC NOW DEM.N/A.PL do:OPT.PRS.2SG REL.N/A.PL
per en khersì ékheis
 PTC in hand:DAT.PL.F have:PRS.2SG
 “for now you should do what you have in hand” (Hdt. 7.5.2).

Here ‘to have in one’s hands’ equals saying ‘to be able to control’: the metaphor is similar to the one found in Homer, example (16).

Apart from occurrences in which *en* is found with landmarks referring to body parts, there are other passages for which some scholars have suggested that *en* could express Instrument in Classical Greek already. Among possible examples, let us examine (34)–(35):

- (34) *hōs oudèn állo manthánōn diatéleas è*
 that INDEF.N/A INDEF.N/A learn:PART.PRS.NOM continue:AOR.2SG PTC
tà stoikheía én te têi ópsei
 ART.N/A.PL letter:N/A.PL in PTC ART.DAT.F sight:DAT.F
diagignóskein peirómenos kai en têi
 recognize:INF.PRS try:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM and in ART.DAT.F
akoêi autò kath’ hautò hékaston, hina mèn
 hearing:DAT.F DEM.N/A down REFL.3SG.N/A INDEF.N/A to NEG
hē thésis se taráttoi
 ART.NOM.F position:NOM.F 2SG.ACC disturb:OPT.PRS.3SG
legoménōn te kai graphoménōn
 speak:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.N PTC and write:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.N
 “in learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from

the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written” (Pl. *Tht.* 206a).

Here, the use of *en* is similar to its use with body parts, that can also be organs of perception: so here sight and hearing are an abstract counterpart of eyes and ears. The Container metaphor is shifted from the concrete plane of the organs of perception to the more abstract plane of perception itself by a metonymy.

In the next example, the Instrument interpretation is supported by the alternation between a plain dative and an *en* phrase:

- (35) *Od: légō s' egō dólōi Philoktētēn*
 Od.: say:PRS.1SG 2SG.DAT 1SG.NOM trick:DAT Ph.:ACC
labeîn. Ne: tí d' en dólōi deî mállon
 take:INF.AOR Neopt.: why PTC in trick:DAT must:PRS.3SG rather
è peísant' ágein?
 than persuade:PART.AOR.ACC manage:INF.PRS
 “Odysseus: I am telling you to take Philoctetes by a trick. Neoptolemus:
 But why must I take by a trick rather than by persuasion?”
 (S. *Ph.* 101–102).

In this passage, *dólōi* appears to have the same meaning of *en dólōi*. The example comes from a tragedy, a type of poetic text with a highly sophisticated language. The conceptual closeness of Location and Instrument is certainly playing an important role here: the fact that the plain dative in certain cases and especially in certain registers can express both roles, makes it possible for the poet to use the two expressions as interchangeable.

Humbert (1930:101) discusses this passage together with a number of other alleged instrumental usage's of *en* in the classical authors. He has the interesting remark that *en dólōi* can be taken as an adverbial expression, and quotes other occurrences where *en* with the dative of an abstract noun is equivalent to an adverb, such as *en tákhei*, lit. ‘in speed’, which has the same meaning as *takhéōs*, ‘fast’, ‘quickly’. Note that this latter type of expression is similar to *en doiēi* in example (20): a state is conceived as a container, and to be inside a certain state is an expression that indicates a certain behavior. Following Humbert (1930:100–115) one can argue that the instrumental meaning of *en* owes to a later evolution, and that one can speak of real Instrument expressions only starting with the New Testament (see below, §4.4).

To sum up, we have seen that the preposition *en* is used in Location expressions in cases where the landmark is conceived as a container, which exerts

dynamic control on the trajector; the area covered by the trajector coincides, at least partly, with the area covered by the landmark.

In Homer we find a further function of *en*, i.e. to express Direction in cases where the landmark is conceived as the endpoint of motion: similar to its use in Location expressions, also with motion verbs *en* implies contact of the trajector with the landmark.

Various extensions of the Container metaphor explain the occurrence of *en* with abstract nouns, in reference to discourse, and with body parts. This last use of *en* is most remarkable, because it exemplifies the widespread employment in Ancient Greek of a metaphor based on physical dimensions of human beings.

3.2 EK/EX¹

The original meaning of *ek* is ‘out of’, ‘from the interior of’. Its infrequent adverbial use preserves the meaning ‘outside’:

- (1) *poiei dè prôtista sákos...*, *perì d’ ántuga*
 make:IMPF.3SG PTC first shield:N/A about PTC rim:ACC.F
bálle phaínèn..., *ek d’ argúreon telamóna*
 put:IMPF.3SG shining:ACC.F out.of PTC of.silver:ACC belt:ACC
 “first he fashioned a shield, and round about it he set a bright rim, and
 outside he made fast a silver baldric” (*Il.* 18.478–480).

In compound verbs the relative value of *ek*, as opposed to the ablative value of *apó* (see §3.4), is clear in couples of verbs such as *ekbaínein/apobaínein* ‘go out, exit’/‘go away, leave’. However, there are cases where the two preverbs have virtually the same meaning, the difference mostly lying in their relative frequency in different authors, as in the case of *ekléipein/apoléipein*, ‘leave’, ‘abandon, desert’, ‘leave out’.

As a preposition *ek* occurs in Source expressions and means ‘out of’, ‘from’; it only takes the genitive, due to the ablatival value of this case. Semantically, *ek* is similar to *en*, because it occurs with landmarks viewed as containers. According to the functional interpretation of the Container metaphor (see §3.1), the landmark is conceived as exerting dynamic control on the trajector. As we will see, this makes *ek* particularly suitable for expressing Origin. Furthermore, I have argued in §3.1 that the notion of contact between the trajector and the landmark is crucial for the understanding of the meaning of *en*: in the present section, I am going to show that something similar also holds for *ek*.

Although *ek* and *apó* are not exactly in complementary distribution, at least in Homer there are strong preferences for the use of either preposition depending on the type of landmark. Horrocks (1981:235) remarks that *ek* “is naturally used to describe movement to the exterior of towns and countries, and of groups of people or things considered to form a coherent mass (i.e. with 2/3-dimensional locations generally) ... It thus contrasts with *apó*, which is used where the ‘source’ is viewed as a point, line or surface (or perhaps where the ‘source’ is not ascribed any particular dimensional properties by the speaker)”. (See §3.4 for further discussion of *apó*.)

In Source expressions *ek* is common with toponyms, especially city names:

- (2) *ek Púlou elthón*
 out.of P.:GEN come:PART.AOR.NOM
 “coming from Pylos” (*Il.* 1.269).

In Source expressions with the word for ‘ship’, *ek* usually occurs, as opposed to *apó*:²

- (3) *ēē pesōn ek nēōs apophthímēn enì*
 PTC fall:PART.AOR.NOM out.of ship:GEN.F perish:OPT.AOR.MID.1SG in
póntōi
 sea:DAT
 “whether I should fling myself from the ship and perish in the sea”
 (*Od.* 10.51).

The preposition *ek* can occur in Location expressions, where no preceding movement of the trajector away from the landmark is implied (as we will see in §3.4, this also hold for *apó*):

- (4) *éntha d’ épeit’ autoì mèn ekhómetha*
 there PTC after DEM.NOM.PL PTC hold:SUBJ.PRS.M/P.1PL
dēiōtētos ek belēōn
 battle:GEN.F out.of missil:GEN.PL
 “thereafter will we hold ourselves aloof from the fight, away from the
 range of missiles” (*Il.* 14.129–130).

Sometimes the choice between the two prepositions appears to be conditioned by the structure of the verse only: so with the word *patris*, ‘native (country)’, one always finds *apó* in the frequent formula *phílēs apò patrídos aīēs*, ‘away from one’s native land’, but *ek* occurs in

- (5) *hoūtō toi kai egōn ek patrídos*
 so PTC and 1SG.NOM+PTC out.of country:GEN.F
 “even so I, too, am away from my country” (*Od.* 15.272),

where *patrídos* alone denotes the landmark.³

Contrary to *apó*, *ek* is comparatively frequent in Time expressions, as in *ex arkhēs*, ‘from the beginning’ (*passim*):

- (6) *gónon Atréōs... Zeús... ékhthēre... ex arkhēs*
 seed:ACC A.:GEN Z.:NOM damage:AOR.3SG out.of beginning:GEN.F
 “Zeus damaged the seed of Atreus from the beginning” (*Od.* 11.436–438);

- (7) *hōs moi dékhetai kakòn ek kakoû aiei*
 so 1SG.DAT succeed:PRS.M/P.3SG evil:N/A out.of evil:GEN always
 “thus for me evil ever follows hard on evil” (*Il.* 19.290).

Extension to the temporal plane is related to the extension of *ek* to Origin, discussed below, through shift from the plane of space to the plane of events. The trajector is an event conceived as a moving entity (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The landmark is the event immediately preceding it, i.e. the starting point of the trajector.

With concrete landmarks, *ek* is used to denote Origin in various senses, while *apó* normally does not have this function in Homer. Often, *ek* occurs with the verb *gígnesthai*, ‘to be born’:

- (8) *Hippólokhos dé m’ étikte, kai ek toû*
*H.:*NOM PTC 1SG.ACC generate:IMPF.3SG and out.of DEM.GEN.M
phēmi genésthai
 declare:PRS.1SG originate:INF.AOR.MID
 “but Hippolochus generated me and of him do I declare that I am sprung”
 (*Il.* 6.206);

but also in occurrences where it does not depend on a verb, as in (9), approaching a partitive value:

- (9) *ek potamoû khróa nízeto díos Odusseùs*
 out.of river:GEN skin:N/A.PL wash:IMPF.M/P.3SG noble:NOM O.:NOM
 “noble Odysseus washed his skin (with water) from the river” (*Od.* 6.224).

The reason why *ek*, rather than *apó*, is used for Origin, is that the relation of containment and especially of contact imply that the landmark is the ultimate point to which the trajector can be traced back. With *apó*, on the other hand, there is no such implication, given the fact that motion does not necessarily start inside or in contact with the landmark: so, before the point where motion starts, there could be another point further back inside the landmark.

With animate landmarks, *ek* also conveys the meaning of a partitive, and often occurs with words like *pántōn*, ‘of all’, or *pollōn*, ‘of many’, as in:

- (10) *pási dé ke Tróessi khárin kai kúdos*
 all:DAT.PL.M PTC PTC Trojans:DAT.PL.M favor:ACC.F and renown:N/A
ároio, ek pántōn de málista Alexándroï
 win:OPT.AOR.MID.2SG out.of all:GEN.PL.M PTC mainly A.:DAT
basilēi
 king:DAT

“you would win favor and renown in the eyes of all the Trojans, and of king Alexander most of all” (*Il.* 4.95–96).

In the relation between the trajector and the landmark *ek* points to the existence of a preceding state of containment and of contact: both these features make *ek* more readily available than *apó* (§3.4) for expressing Origin and various types of partitive relations.⁴

Furthermore, and again contrary to *apó*, *ek* looks like a good candidate for expressing Cause, referring to the ultimate source of causation, and in some occurrences even Agent: *ek* profiles the origin of the trajector inside the landmark, which contained it and was in contact with it at a previous stage, so it can imply that there is no previous cause or controller further back.

Examples of *ek* in Cause expressions are the following:

- (11) *agkhímolon dè êlth' ho gérōn Dolíos, sùn*
 near PTC come:AOR.3SG DEM.NOM old.man:NOM D.:NOM with
d' huieís toío gérontos ex érgōn
 PTC SON:NOM.PL DEM.GEN.M old:GEN.M out.of work:GEN.PL
mogéontes
 toiling:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “when the old man Dolios drew near, and with him the old man’s sons,
 wearied from their work” (*Od.* 24.386–388);
- (12) *ex aréōn mētrōs kekholōménos*
 out.of curse:GEN.PL mother:GEN.F be.angry:PART.PRF.P.NOM
 “angry at his mother’s curses” (*Il.* 9.566).

In both (11) and (12) we find inanimate abstract landmarks; the verb forms are monovalent, and do not allow for the occurrence of an Agent expression: the landmarks represent the ultimate causes of the states of affairs referred to. Especially from example (11), one can see that the causal meaning of *ek* is derived by a metaphor based on its temporal, rather than spatial, meaning. The preposition profiles anteriority of the landmark over the trajector in a temporal sequence, rather than a trajectory in space. This also explains why landmarks with *ek* in Cause expressions are abstract nouns and nouns denoting states of affairs.

In examples (13) and (14), with active verbs, the human NPs with *ek* are viewed as the origin of the states of affair denoted by the predicate:

- (13) *soì d' egò entháde phēmì phónon kai*
 2SG.DAT PTC 1SG.NOM here say:PRS.1SG death:ACC and
kèra mēlainan ex eméthen teúxesthai emòì
 doom:ACC.F black:ACC.F out.of 1SG.GEN come:INF.FUT.MID 1SG.DAT
d' hupò dourì daménta eúkhos emoi
 PTC under spear:DAT conquer:PART.AOR.P.ACC glory:N/A 1SG.DAT
dósein
 give:INF.FUT
 “but for you I deem that here death and black doom have come from me
 and that, conquered beneath my spear, you will yield glory to me”
 (*Il.* 5.652–654);
- (14) *oudé tí min thánaton troméesthai ánōga*
 NEG INDEF.N/A 3SG.ACC death:ACC tremble:INF.PRS.M/P urge:PF.1SG
ék ge mnēstérōn: theóthen d' ouk ést'
 out.of PTC suitor:GEN.PL god:ABL PTC NEG be:PRS.3SG
aléasthai
 avoid:INF.AOR.MID
 “do not fear that death (comes) for him from the suitors: but from the
 gods no one can avoid it!” (*Od.* 16.446–447).⁵

Note that, although both Cause and Agent are the ultimate initiators of the states of affairs referred to in (11)–(12) and (13)–(14), the type of metaphor that allows the two extensions of meaning is not the same. Landmarks in Agent expressions have concrete referents (mostly human beings), rather than events, as do Cause expressions. So in the case of Agent it is not the temporal meaning of the particle that provides the source for the metaphor, but rather its spatial meaning: the extension proceeds from Source to Origin to Agent.

An interesting example is (15), with the verb *tlē-*, aorist of *páskhein*. Although this verb is not a morphological passive, it is often taken as a lexical passive; it can also be accompanied by *hupó* with the genitive. It is important to note that this occurrence is exceptional: usually, lexical passives take Agent expressions with *hupó* and the genitive, rather than Origin expressions. Example (15) contains a future form of *páskhein*:

- (15) *tétlathi, téknon emón, kai*
 stand:IMPT.PF.2SG child:VOC.N POSS.1SG.VOC.N and
anáskheo kēdoménē per.
 bear:IMPT.AOR.MID.2SG suffering:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.F PTC
Polloì gár dè tlēmen ... ex andrōn
 many:NOM.PL PTC PTC endure:AOR.1PL out.of man:GEN.PL

“be patient, my child, and be of good heart, although you are suffering. Much we had to endure from mankind” (*Il.* 5.382–384);

- (16) *ek gàr toû patròs kakà peísomai*
 out.of PTC DEM.GEN.M father:GEN.M evil:N/A.PL suffer:FUT.MID.1SG
 “I will suffer evil from (her) father” (*Od.* 2.134).

The Origin/Source metaphor is rather common in the Indo-European languages for expressing Agent: it is found for example in Latin and in some of the Romance languages, in several Germanic languages, including Modern German, in several Slavic languages, and in Modern Greek (cf. §1.2.4.1). It is based on the metaphor according to which events are moving entities that proceed from a source. The agent, being the initiator of a state of affairs, is viewed as the location from which the state of affairs comes, and which exerts control on its inception. Note that the Container metaphor is crucial in this respect (recall that according to the functional explanation of this metaphor, a container is a landmark which exerts dynamic control on a trajector, see §3.1).

Again in (17) *ek* profiles possible control by the landmark on the possibility that a state of affairs be brought about, although it is not an agent (see also example (24) from Herodotus):

- (17) *Alkinóou d' ek toúð' ékhetai érgon te*
 A.:GEN PTC out.of here depend:PRS.M/P.3SG action:N/A PTC
épos te
 word:N/A PTC
 “here action and word depend on Alkinos” (*Od.* 11.346).

Some examples contain real morphological passives:

- (18) *ephilēthen ek Diós*
 love:AOR.P.3PL out.of Z.:GEN
 “they were loved by Zeus” (*Il.* 2.668–669);
- (19) *tà mèn dé toi tetélestai ek Diós,*
 DEM.N/A.PL PTC PTC 2SG.DAT accomplish:PF.M/P.3SG out.of Z.:GEN
hōs ára dè prín g' eúkheo
 as PTC PTC before PTC pray:IMPF.M/P.2SG
 “those things have been accomplished for you by Zeus, which you had prayed for before” (*Il.* 18.74–75);
- (20) *tèn d' Alkínoos poiésat' ákoitin, kaí*
 DEM.ACC.F PTC A.:NOM make:AOR.MID.3SG wife:ACC.F and
min étis' hōs ou tis epì khthonì
 3SG.ACC.F honor:AOR.3SG as NEG INDEF.NOM.F on earth:DAT.F

tíetai *állē*, *hóssai* *nún ge*
 honor:PRS.M/P.3SG INDEF.NOM.F REL.NOM.PL.F NOW PTC
gunáikes *hup' andrásin* *oíkon* *ékhouisin*.
 woman:NOM.PL.F under husband:DAT.PL house:ACC have:PRS.3PL
Hōs keinē *perì kēri* *tetímētai* *te kai*
 thus DEM.NOM.F about hearth:DAT honor:PF.M/P.3SG PTC and
éstin *ék te philōn* *paidōn* *ék t'*
 be:PRS.3SG out.of PTC dear:GEN.PL.M son:GEN.PL.M out.of PTC
autoû *Alkinóoio kai laôn*
 DEM.GEN A.:GEN and people:GEN.PL

“Alkinos made her his spouse, and honored her as no woman is honored on earth among those who now govern a household submitted to their husbands. So much she was and is honored by her children, Alkinos and the people” (*Od.* 7.66–71).

Although *ek* can denote Agent, profiling the origin of a state of affairs, it must be stressed that only verbs with a low degree of transitivity, or with non-specific meaning, allow this construction.⁶ In Homer, these verbs are ‘love’, ‘honor’, ‘accomplish’, and the verb *páskhein*, normally considered as a lexical passive, but originally meaning ‘to suffer’. Note that the verbs that actually occur in the passive denote states of affairs that do not imply any change of state on the side of the patient.

In Herodotus, *ek* is still preferred to *apó* with all types of toponyms. Furthermore, *ek* is found in Cause expressions, where *apó* does not normally occur. A frequent expression is *ek theopropíou* “by the instruction of an oracle” (*Hdt.* 1.7.11 and *passim*); other examples are given in (21) and (22):

- (21) *ho* *dè Ápis* *hoútōs* *ho* *Épaphos gínetai*
 ART.NOM PTC A.:NOM DEM.NOM ART.NOM E.:NOM be:PRS.M/P.3SG
móskhos ek boós, ... Aigúptioi *dè légousi*
 cow:NOM out.of cow:GEN.F Egyptian:NOM.PL PTC say:PRS.3PL
sélas epì tèn boún ek toû ouranoú
 light:N/A ON ART.ACC.F cow:ACC.F out.of ART.GEN heaven:GEN
katískhein, kai min ek toutou tíktein
 come:INF.PRS and 3SG.ACC.F out.of DEM.GEN.SG.N generate:INF.PRS
tòn Ápin
 ART.ACC A.:ACC

“this Apis, or Epaphus, is a calf born of a cow. By what the Egyptians say, the cow is made pregnant by a light from heaven, and thereafter gives birth to Apis” (*Hdt.* 3.28.2);

- (22) *enthaûta mén nun dià tà psúkhea gínetai*
 there PTC PTC through ART.N/A.PL cold:N/A.PL be:PRS.M/P.3SG
taûta. thômázō dé... hóti en têi Êleîēi
 DEM.N/A.PL marvel:PRS.1SG PTC that in ART.DAT.F E.:DAT.F
pásēi khórēi ou dunéatai gínesthai
 all:DAT.F land:DAT.F NEG can:PRS.M/P.3SG be:INF.PRS.M/P
hēmíonoi, oúte psukhrōú toú khórou eóntos...
 mule:NOM.PL NEG cold:GEN ART.GEN land:GEN be:PART.PRS.GEN
phasi dé autoi Êleioi ek katárēs
 say:PRS.3PL PTC DEM.NOM.PL Elean:NOM.PL out.of curse:GEN.F
teu ou gínesthai sphísi hēmiónous
 INDEF.GEN.SG.F NEG be:INF.PRS.M/P 3PL.DAT mule:ACC.PL

“there (i.e. in Scythia), then, this happens because of the cold. But I think it strange that in the whole of Elis no mules can be conceived although the country is not cold. The Eleans themselves say that it is because of a curse that mules cannot be conceived among them” (Hdt. 4.30.1)

In (21) we find three occurrences of *ek*: in the first, with the verb *gínesthai*, ‘to be born’, a parentage relation is denoted, as in (8). In the second occurrence, *ek toû ouranoû*, ‘out of the sky’ denotes the spatial source of lightning. Finally, the third occurrence *ek toutou tíktein tôn Ápin*, ‘(the cow) generates Apis because of it (i.e. the lightning)’, can also be taken as temporal, as in the *Loeb* translation given above, the causal meaning is then inferred on the basis of common knowledge about the structure of events: causes precede their effects, and a state of affairs which precedes another state of affairs is very often its cause.

In (22) Cause is expressed once with *dià* with the accusative, *dià tà psúkhea*, ‘because of the cold’, and once by *ek*, in *ek katárēs*, ‘because of a curse’. Comparison between the two occurrences clarifies the sequential value of *ek*, already described above for Homer, and for the preceding example. In this passage, Herodotus is discussing why mules are not born in Elis, and the possible causes of such a state of affairs. In the immediately preceding passage, he has explained what he thinks is the relation between climate and peculiarities about cattle:

And in my opinion it is for this reason that the hornless kind of cattle grow no horns in Scythia. A verse of Homer in the *Odyssey* attests to my opinion:
 “Libya, the land where lambs are born with horns on their foreheads,”

Hom. Od. 4.85

in which it is correctly observed that in hot countries the horns grow quickly, whereas in very cold countries beasts hardly grow horns, or not at all. (4.29)

So the expression *dià tà psúkhea* in (22) denotes Cause without any implication of temporal sequencing, it is a general cause that holds all the time in the environment described. On the other hand, *ek katárēs* refers to an event which is conceived as marking the moment at which another state of affairs has begun: it is not for some inherent environmental reasons that no mules can be born in Elis, but this happens as a consequence of (or after) a curse. The difference between the two examples is in profiling: *ek* profiles the temporal relation between the cause and the effect, while *diá* with the accusative does not.

Among classical prose writers, Herodotus is the one who allows the widest variety of Source prepositions in Agent phrases. In the *Histories*, for example, *ex* is found in passages such as

- (23) *trópōi tōi ex emeū hupokeiménōi*
 way:DAT.M ART.DAT.M out.of 1SG.GEN counsel:PART.PRS.M/P.DAT.M
akéo
 mend:IMPT.PRS.M/P.2SG
 “strive to mend the matter as I counseled you” (Hdt. 3.40.4);

and elsewhere, especially with verbs like ‘do’, ‘give’, ‘order’, or ‘say’ (see Schwyzer 1942). A dependency relation is also denoted by the preposition in (24), parallel to (17) from Homer:

- (24) *pás ek Phoinikōn értēto ho*
 all:NOM out.of Phoenician:GEN.PL depend:PF.M/P.3SG ART.NOM
nautikòs stratós
 naval:NOM fleet:NOM
 “the whole fleet depended on the Phoenicians” (Hdt. 3.19.3),

where the verb form *artéesthai* with *ek* represents the standard way of saying ‘depend on’.

The extension of *apó* to Time, Origin, and Agent, and its use, though less frequent than the use of *ek*, with toponyms, show that *apó* and *ek* had started to be semantically closer to each other in Herodotus already (see §3.4).

In Attic prose, the process of convergence between *ek* and *apó* continues.⁷ In some occurrences, the choice appears to be linked to stylistic variation:

- (25) *ex agorás è póthen Menéxenos? ex agorás, ó*
 out.of agora:GEN.F PTC where M.:VOC out.of agora:GEN.F PTC
Sókrates, kai apò toú bouleutēriou
 S.:VOC and from ART.GEN council.chamber:GEN
 “(Socrates) from the agora, Menexenus, or where from? (Menexenus)
 From the agora, Socrates, and the Council Chamber” (Pl. *Mx.* 234a);

In Cause expressions, too, *ek* may come closer to *apó*, as shown in (26), where the landmark is conceived as a kind of instrument, rather than a cause:

- (26) *ek poiōn oūn onomátōn è memathēkōs è*
 out.of INT.GEN.PL.N PTC name:GEN.PL.N PTC learn:PART.PF.NOM PTC
hēurēkōs èn tà prágmata
 discover:PART.PF.NOM be:IMPF.3SG ART.N/A.PL thing:N/A.PL
 “but from what names had he learned or discovered the things”
 (Pl. *Cra.* 438a).

(Compare (26) with example (23) from §3.4.)

Source with animate landmarks is usually expressed by *pará* with the genitive. The occurrence of *ek* profiles active involvement of the landmark, rather than simply spatial origin, as shown in:

- (27) *eporisámetha philosophías génos, hoú*
 procure:AOR.MID.1PL philosophy:GEN.F race:N/A REL.GEN.N
meízon agathòn oút' élthen oúte héxei potè
 greater:N/A good:N/A NEG come:AOR.3SG NEG come:FUT.3SG ever
tôi thnētōi génei dōrēthèn ek
 ART.DAT mortal:DAT race:DAT present:PART.AOR.P.N/A out.of
theôn
 god:GEN.PL
 “than which no greater boon ever has come or will come, by divine be-
 stowal, onto the race of mortals” (Pl. *Tm.* 47b).

In Cause expressions the metaphor based on temporal sequence need no longer be active, as shown by the following occurrence:

- (28) *dià stenótēta dè kai ek megálōn pelagōn,*
 through narrowness:ACC.F PTC and out.of big:GEN.PL see:GEN.PL
toú te Tursēnikoú kai toú Sikelikoú,
 ART.GEN PTC T.:GEN and ART.GEN S.:GEN
espíptousa hē thálassa es autò kai
 pour:PART.PRS.NOM.F ART.NOM.F see:NOM.F to DEM.N/A and
rhoódēs oúsa eikótōs khalepè
 stream:NOM.F be:PART.PRS.NOM.F rightly dangerous:NOM.F
enomísthē
 consider:AOR.P.3SG
 “and the narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that
 pours in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it
 a bad reputation” (Th. 4.24.5),

where a *diá* and an *ek* phrase are coordinated with each other, for no other apparent reason than variation. Note that *ek* here occurs with a concrete landmark, and there is no implication of temporal precedence: the connection between Cause and Time seems to be lost at this stage.

In Agent expressions, *ek* is used in a way similar to *apó* (see example (29) of §3.4), especially in Thucydides:

- (29) *Athēnaïōn goûn tò plêthos Hípparkhon*
 Athenian:GEN.PL PTC ART.N/A mass:N/A H.:ACC
oíontai huph' Harmodíou kai Aristogeítonos túrannon
 think:PRS.M/P.3PL under H.:GEN and A.:GEN tyrant:ACC
ónta apothaneîn, ... hupotopésantes dé
 be:PART.PRS.ACC die:INF.AOR suspect:PART.AOR.NOM.PL PTC
ti ekeinēi tēi hēmērai kai parakhrēma
 INDEF.N/A DEM.DAT.F ART.DAT.F day:DAT.F and momentarily
Harmódios kai Aristogeítōn ek tōn
 H.:NOM and A.:NOM out.of ART.GEN.PL
xuneidótōn sphísin Hippiái memēnústhai...

accomplice:PART.PF.GEN.PL 3PL.DAT H.:DAT inform:INF.PF.M/P
 “the general Athenian public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton; (not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers;) that Harmodius and Aristogiton suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their accomplices, (concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.)” (Th. 1.20.2).

In (29) two Agent phrases occur, one with *ek*, *ek tōn xuneidótōn*, ‘by the accomplices’, which denotes the agent of the verb *memēnústhai*, ‘be given information’, and one with *hupó*, *huph' Harmodíou kai Aristogeítonos*, ‘by Harmodius and Aristogiton’, which denotes the agent of the verb *apothaneîn*, ‘die’, here used as passive of ‘kill’. The preposition *hupó* with the genitive represents the standard way of expressing passive Agent; it can occur with all types of verb, including verbs that denote highly transitive states of affairs, as in the present passage. Other possible Agent expressions, including *ek* with the genitive, are limited to verbs that do not denote change of state, as here (see Luraghi 2000b, and below, §3.4, 3.5, and 3.17).




Figure 7. Mental map of *ek*

In Figure 7, I give a mental map of *ek*; it can be compared with the mental map of *apó* which will be give in Figure 9.

In the present section, I have mentioned several times differences and similarities between the use of *ek* and the use of *apó*. I have already partly shown that the meanings of the two prepositions became closer in the course of time: obviously, in order to complete the comparison it is necessary to analyze the usage of *apó* in detail. The discussion will therefore be completed in §3.4.

3.3 EIS

As we saw in §3.1, *eis*¹ had a comparatively late origin, having derived from *en* in some of the individual Greek dialects, presumably when the class of preverbs/adpositions was already well established as such. In spite of its later origin, *eis* appears to be integrated in this system, although its adverbial usage is somewhat limited.² An example, to be compared with a similar occurrence on *en* (§3.1. ex. (1)), is the following:

- (1) *nèa mēlainan erússomen eis hála dian, ...*
 ship:ACC.F black:ACC.F drag:SUBJ.AOR.1PL to sea:ACC.F divine:ACC.F
es d' hekatóm̄bēn theíomen
 to PTC hecatomb:ACC.F put:SUBJ.AOR.1PL
 “let us now drag a black ship to the shining sea, and place on board a
 hecatomb” (*Il.* 1.141–143).

(Note that the first occurrence of *eis* illustrates its prepositional usage.)

The occurrence of *eis* in formulaic expressions also shows that its use was well established in Homer:

- (2) *phásthe nú pou oikónde philēn es*
 think:PRS.M/P.2PL PTC PTC home:ACC+PTC dear:ACC.F to
patrída gaían
 native:ACC.F land:ACC.F
 “indeed you think that you are going to your native land” (*Od.* 10.562).

The meaning of *eis* as a preposition corresponds to the meaning of English ‘to’. Often in Homer *eis* means ‘into’, thus relying on the Container metaphor, similar to *en* and *ek*. However, the relation of inclusion of the trajector by the landmark is less important in the case of *eis*, and, most relevant, it can be shown that in some occurrences it is not implied that the particle profiles final contact of the trajector with the landmark. In order to demonstrate this, I will list various types of landmark that occur with *eis*.

In the first place, and similar to *en* and *ek*, we find toponyms:

- (3) *prôta mèn es Púlon elthè*
 first PTC to P.:ACC go:IMPT.AOR.2SG
 “first go to Pylos” (*Od.* 1.284).

We also find nouns with spatial reference, which occur in Location expressions either in the plain dative or with *en*:

- (4) *es mésson Tróōn kai Akhaiōn estikhóōnto*
 to midst:N/A Trojan:GEN.PL and Achaean:GEN.PL go:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “they went into the midst of the Trojans and Achaeans” (*Il.* 3.266).

As for referents that can be conceived as containers, *eis* sometimes expresses Direction in passages where it is implied that the trajector finds itself inside the landmark at the end of motion. This happens frequently with the word for ‘chariot’:

- (5) *hè d’ es díphron ébainen*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC to chariot:ACC mount:IMPF.3SG
 “and she mounted upon the car” (*Il.* 5.364);

and with the word for ‘tent’:

- (6) *es klisīēn elthóntes epì klismoīsi káthizon*
 to hut:ACC.F go:PART.AOR.NOM.PL on chair:DAT.PL sit:IMPF.3PL
 “they went into the hut and sat down on chairs” (*Il.* 11.623).

Less frequently, the landmark can be a body part:

- (7) *hē d’ epei oūn émpnuto kai es phréna*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC when PTC revive:AOR.MID.3SG and to breast:ACC.F
thumòs agérthē
 spirit:NOM wake:AOR.P.3SG
 “but when she revived, and her spirit was returned into her breast”
 (*Il.* 22.475).

On the other hand, with the word for ‘ship’, which usually occurs with *en* in Location expressions and with *ek* in Source expressions, *eis* expresses Direction in occurrences in which it is not necessarily implied that the interior of the landmark is reached:³

- (8) *all’ hôte dè tákh’ émelle migésthai*
 but when PTC quickly be.about:IMPF.3SG join:INF.FUT.P
phulákessi pheúgōn es nêas
 sentinel:DAT.PL flee:PART.PRS.NOM to ship:ACC.PL.F
 “but when he was now about to come among the sentinels, as he fled
 towards the ships” (*Il.* 10.365–366).

The subsequent context makes clear that the participant referred to does not reach the ships: so final contact of the trajector with the landmark is explicitly excluded.

It is for this reason that we find a type of landmark with *eis* that cannot occur with *en* and *ek*, namely human landmarks:⁴

- (9) *hoi d' es Panthoídēn agapénora Pouludámanta pántes*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC to P.:ACC kind:ACC P.:ACC all:NOM.PL
epesseúont'
 rush:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “and they rushed all toward the kindly Polydamas, son of Pantoos”
 (*Il.* 13.756–757).

Note that in the above example the landmark is a count noun in the singular: this occurrence, and the other similar ones from both Homeric poems, are quite unparalleled by *en* and *ek* in passages denoting concrete location or motion.

It must also be mentioned that the genitive can occur with *eis*, in elliptical expressions similar to those found with *en* (cf. ex. (14) of §3.1):

- (10) *hixen d' es Priámoio*
 come:AOR.3SG PTC to P.:GEN
 “(she) came to the house of Priam” (*Il.* 24.160).

So *eis* denotes motion toward a landmark, conceptualized as a container when relevant, but the trajectory may or may not end with contact of the trajector with the landmark. The fact that contact may obtain, is shown by the use of *eis* with verbs which profile the endpoint of motion, which can also occur with *en*:

- (11) *es oínon bále phármakon*
 to wine:ACC cast:AOR.3SG drug:N/A
 “(she) cast into the wine a drug” (*Od.* 4.220).

Sometimes *eis* can express the limit of motion, in opposition to *ek*: in this case, too, contact appears to be relevant:

- (12) *ekálupse nékun megáthumos Akhilleüs es pódas*
 cover:AOR.3SG corpse:ACC great.hearted:NOM A.:NOM to foot:ACC.PL
ek kephalēs
 out.of head:GEN.F
 “the divine Achilles covered the corpse from head to feet” (*Il.* 23.168–169).

Besides motion verbs, verbs of ‘seeing’ are often found with *eis*. The trajector is described as performing motion with its sight:

- (13) *hò mèn meídēsen idòn es paída*
 DEM.NOM PTC smile:AOR.3SG look:PART.AOR.NOM to child:ACC
 “then Hector smiled, as he glanced at his boy” (*Il.* 6.404).

Similar to *en* and *ek, eis*, too, can be used in reference to time. In Time expressions, *eis* profiles the limit until which a certain state of affairs is said to obtain:

- (14) *es tí éti kteínesthai eásete laòn*
 to INT.N/A PTC kill:INF.PRS.M/P let:FUT.2PL people:ACC
Akhaióis?
 Achaean:DAT.PL
 “how long will you still allow the Achaeans to slay your host?”
 (*Il.* 5.465);
- (15) *kai nú ken es dekátēn geneèn héterón g’ éti*
 and PTC PTC to tenth:ACC.F generation:ACC.F INDEF.ACC PTC PTC
bóskoi
 feed:OPT.PRS.3SG
 “indeed unto the tenth generation would it also feed someone else”
 (*Od.* 19.294).

With verbs that do not denote motion or perception, and when it is not used in reference to time, *eis* can express Purpose if the landmark is denoted by an action noun. Most frequently, it occurs with the verb *thōrēssesthai*, ‘to arm oneself’:

- (16) *oúte pot’ es pólemon háma laôi thōrēkkhēnai*
 NEG ever to war:ACC with people:DAT arm:INF.AOR.P
 “never have you armed for battle with the host” (*Il.* 1. 226).

The metaphor involved here is based on a commonly found conceptual extension, according to which PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS.⁵

A couple of other verbs also occur:

- (17) *ei gār nún parà nēusi legoímetha pántes*
 if PTC now by ship:DAT.PL.F pick.up:OPT.PRS.M/P.1PL all:NOM.PL
áristoi es lókhon
 best:NOM.PL to ambush:ACC
 “for if now all the best of us were being gathered besides the ships for an ambush” (*Il.* 13.276–277).

The extension of Direction expression from the spatial plane to the abstract domain of Purpose is quite frequent: it can also be observed with the English

preposition ‘to’ (cf. §1.2.9). Note that in the case of *eis* in Homeric Greek, the Purpose interpretation is possible when the landmark is not a concrete object, but an abstract entity: both in (16) and in (17), we find nouns that denote events, while all nouns in the examples in which *eis* denotes Direction have concrete referents. An abstract landmark triggers the interpretation that the trajectory along which the trajector moves is abstract, too. Purpose is conceptualized as an abstract direction toward which the trajector moves.

After Homer, the use of *eis* remains very much the same as far as Direction and Time expressions are concerned. Direction can also be expressed in non-dynamic states of affairs:

- (18) *ekéleuon* *tò* *es Pallēnēn teíkhos katheleîn*
 order:IMPF.3PL ART.N/A to P:ACC wall:N/A destroy:INF.AOR
 “they gave orders to take down the wall looking towards Pallene”
 (Th. 1.56.2).

In (18) the wall stands on the side that faces the landmark, but there is no trajectory.

The most interesting fact about the particle is its use with animate landmarks. We have seen that in Homer *eis* can denote physical motion of a person toward another (cf. example (9)). In later Greek this function is mostly limited to *pará* and *prós*; in its turn, *eis* with human landmarks denotes various types of abstract motion.⁶ The landmark often resembles a Recipient; note however that a plain dative would convey a different meaning:

- (19) *hē* *dè hēgemoniē* *hoútō periélthe,*
 ART.NOM.F PTC supremacy:NOM.F so fall:AOR.3SG
eoúsa *Hērakleidēōn, es tò génos tò*
 be:PART.PRS.NOM.F H:GEN.PL to ART.N/A race:N/A ART.N/A
Kroísou
 C.:GEN
 “now the sovereign power that belonged to the descendants of Heracles fell to the family of Croesus” (Hdt. 1.7.1);
- (20) *aieikéstera* *aporríp̄sai* *épea* *es ándra*
 unseemly:CMPR.N/A.PL cast:INF.AOR word:N/A.PL to man:ACC
presbúteron è khreón
 old:CMPR.ACC PTC necessary:N/A
 “I burst out with an unseemly and wrongful answer to an older man”
 (Hdt. 7.13.2).

In (19) an abstract trajector performs an abstract motion; the verb, *periêlthe*, is a motion verb, which denotes an abstract itinerary in the direction of a concrete, animate landmark.⁷ In (20) the trajector is represented by the words uttered by the subject/agent; the verb *aporriptein* means ‘to throw away’, ‘to cast away’, and its usage is coherent with the Conduit metaphor, described in Reddy (1979), according to which words are objects that are thrown back and forth between the interlocutors during a conversation. In the present occurrence, the speaker recognizes that his words have been too rude in relation to an older man: the words are conceptualized as having been thrown with strength in one direction only. So this example does not represent a case of normal communication, and consequently the plain dative would be inadequate.⁸ The preposition *eis* profiles the one-way direction in which the words are thrown (note that the unidirectionality is reinforced by the preverb *apo-*, prefixed to the verb, which profiles the source).

In (21) *eis* occurs with *légein*, ‘to say’, a more neutral verb of communication, in a context which makes clear that the addressee cannot answer and that the speaker has an hostile attitude:

- (21) *kai álla légōn es autōn*
 and INDEF.N/A.PL tell:PART.PRS.NOM to DEM.ACC
thumalgéa épea
 heart.grieving:N/A.PL word:N/A.PL
 “and telling him other bitter mockery” (Hdt. 1.129.1).

In both (20) and (21) the occurrence of *eis*, which profiles unidirectional motion, highlights the lack of response from the side of the addressee. The Conduit metaphor only partly applies: the words follow only the initial trajectory from the trajector to the landmark, and it is openly indicated that they will not be ‘thrown back’.

Another occurrence where one might expect a plain dative is the following:

- (22) *dexámēnoi dè toūs Minúas*
 receive:PART.AOR.MID.NOM.PL PTC ART.ACC.PL Minya:ACC.PL
gês te metédosan kai es phulàs
 land:GEN.F PTC give:AOR.3PL and to tribe:ACC.PL.F
diedásanto
 distribute:AOR.MID.3PL
 “so they received the Minyae and gave them land and distributed them among their own tribes” (Hdt. 4.145.5).

The verb *diadatéesthai* is not frequent; in Herodotus it occurs only in this passage with a Recipient expression, and it is hard to see from other authors what kind of constructions it could have. The non-compound verb *datéesthai*, ‘divide, distribute’, on the other hand, is relatively frequent and usually takes a Recipient in the dative. The preverb *dia-* profiles the division, thus strengthening a meaning which is already inherent in the verb. Note that the object of *diedásanto*, *gês*, ‘land’, is also the object of *metédosan*, ‘they gave a share’; the recipient is not overtly expressed as such,⁹ but it occurs as object of the preceding verb form, *dexámēnoi*, ‘having received’. So the phrase *es phulás* refers to a further recipient and specifies how the object of the transaction is received by the recipient. The preposition profiles the direction of the action of distribution.

In (23) *eis* occurs with the verb *parékhein*, ‘to offer’, ‘to present’, which usually takes the plain dative, as in (24) and (25):

- (23) *ouk àn aiskhúnoio eis toùs Hállēnas*
 NEG PTC be.ashamed:OPT.PRS.M/P.2SG to ART.ACC.PL Greek:ACC.PL
sautòn sophistèn parékhōn?
 REFL.2SG.ACC sophist:ACC present:PART.PRS.NOM
 “would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a
 sophist?” (Pl. *Prt.* 312a);
- (24) *hóti mēlleis tèn psukhèn tèn sautoù*
 that be.about:PRS.2SG ART.ACC.F soul:ACC.F ART.ACC.F REFL.2SG.GEN
paraskhēin therapeúsai andrī, hōs phēis, sophistēi
 offer:INF.AOR treat:INF.AOR man:DAT.M as say:PRS.2SG sophist:DAT.M
 “that you are about to offer your soul to the treatment of a man who, as
 you say, is a sophist” (Pl. *Prt.* 312c);
- (25) *all’ homoiōs kai plousiōi kai pēnēti parékhō*
 but alike and rich:DAT.M and poor:DAT.M offer:PRS.1SG
emautòn erōtān
 REFL.1SG.ACC ask:INF.PRS
 “but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions” (Pl. *Ap.* 33b).

The occurrence of *eis* in (23) profiles the directionality of the action performed by the agent: the landmark is envisaged as farther away than in (24) and (25), where it is constructed as a recipient. Syntactically, the datives *andrī* in (24) and *plousiōi kai pēnēti* in (25) are indirect objects, thus included in the valency of the verb, which is used as trivalent; in (23) the verb is used as bivalent. Consequently, the PP *eis toùs Hállēnas* is an adverbial, as such not included in the verbal valency: syntactic distance also indicates semantic distance.

In (26) *eis* denotes the relation of a human trajector toward a human landmark:

- (26) *toútois dè es amphotérous philía ên*
 DEM.DAT.PL.M PTC TO INDEF.ACC.PL friendship:NOM.F be:IMPF.3SG
 “they had friendly relations toward both parties” (Th. 2.9.2).

The word *philía*, ‘friendship’, is normally found with directional prepositions, most often with *prós*. Friendship, a type of relation between humans, is metaphorically understood as a trajectory, along which the trajector moves toward the landmark. This type of expression profiles the abstract trajectory.

In general, abstract direction can refer to a human landmark with respect to whom an action is performed: this type of expression comes close to a plain dative in the semantic role Beneficiary. An example (27) is:

- (27) *nún dè autoi turánnōn ápeiroi*
 NOW PTC DEM.NOM.PL tyrant:GEN.PL unused:NOM.PL
eóntes, kai phulássontes toúto deinótata
 be:PART.PRS.NOM.PL and watch:PART.PRS.NOM.PL DEM.N/A carefully
en têi Spártēi mē genésthai, parakhráste es
 in ART.DAT.F S.:DAT.F NEG arise:INF.AOR.MID abuse:PRS.M/P.2PL to
toús summákhous
 ART.ACC.PL ally:ACC.PL
 “as it is, however, you, who have never made trial of tyrants and take the greatest precautions that none will arise at Sparta, abuse of your allies” (Hdt. 5.92a.2).

The verb *parakhráomai*, ‘to misuse, abuse’, usually takes an inanimate Complement in the plain dative; similar to (23) the *eis* phrase in (27) is an Adverbial: the lesser syntactic centrality mirrors the fact that an animate entity cannot be the object of misuse with the same immediacy as an inanimate entity would be. By profiling the direction, the preposition highlights a certain distance which the plain dative would not imply.¹⁰

In (28) the verb *poieîn*, ‘to do’, occurs with a Beneficiary in the plain dative:

- (28) *taúta mèn es Ádrēstón hoi epepoiēto, phulàs*
 DEM.N/A.PL PTC TO A.:ACC 3SG.DAT do:PLPF.M/P.3SG tribe:ACC.PL.F
dè tàs Dōriēōn, hina dē mē hai
 PTC ART.ACC.PL.F Dorian:GEN.PL for PTC NEG ART.NOM.PL.F
autai éōsi toísi Sikuōnōi kai
 DEM.NOM.PL.F be:SUBJ.PRS.3PL ART.DAT.PL Sicyonian:DAT.PL and

toîsi Argeioisi, metébane es álla
 ART.DAT.PL Argive:DAT.PL change:AOR.3SG to INDEF.N/A.PL
ounómata
 name:N/A.PL

“this, then, is what he did regarding Adrastus, but as for the tribes of the Dorians, he changed their names so that these tribes should not be shared by Sicyonians and Argives” (Hdt. 5.68.1).

In this example, *hoi*, ‘to him’, refers back to a participant mentioned in the preceding context. The expression *eis Ádrēstón*, ‘regarding Adrastus’, also has a human referent, but it does not denote the beneficiary: rather, it refers to a person toward which an action is performed to the benefit of another human being.

The meaning ‘regarding’ is also found with inanimate landmarks. In this case, the *eis* phrase expresses Area:

(29) *hoi dè Pérsai ... ēndrapodísanto tēn*
 ART.NOM.PL PTC Persian:NOM.PL enslave:AOR.MID.3PL ART.ACC.F
pólin, hōste sumpesēin tò páthos tōi
 city:ACC.F so that agree:INF.AOR ART.N/A calamity:N/A ART.DAT
khrestēriōi tōi es Mílēton genomēnōi
 oracle:DAT ART.DAT to M.:ACC be:PART.AOR.MID.DAT

“the Persians enslaved the city, and thus the calamity agreed with the oracle concerning Miletus” (Hdt. 6.18);

(30) *epanéroito autòn eis hōti beltīon kath’*
 ask:OPT.AOR.MID.3SG 3SG.ACC to INT.N/A better:NOM down
hēmēran éstai suggignómenos ekeínōi
 day:ACC.F be:FUT.MID.3SG attend:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM DEM.DAT.M

“and then inquired of him in what respect he would be better each day through attending his classes” (Pl. *Prt.* 318c).

As we have seen in Homer, *eis* can denote the limit of motion. Furthermore, as shown in (18), post-Homeric *eis* can also be used to express Direction where no motion occurs. These concrete meanings of *eis* can also be relevant when it metaphorically refers to a relation, as in example (30): the landmark is conceptualized as a limit that defines the extent to which a certain state of affairs has effects, and the preposition denotes a static relation.

The fact that the preposition may denote limit of motion is crucial to the understanding of the extension of *eis* to cases where it co-occurs with verbs denoting change of state, to refer to the end result:

- (31) *hōs dè ára hoi en têi Asiēi Hállēnes*
 as PTC PTC ART.NOM.PL in ART.DAT.F Asia:DAT.F Greek:NOM.PL
katestráphato es phórou apagōgḗn
 subdue:PLPF.M/P.3SG to tribute:GEN payment:ACC.F
 “then, when he had subjugated all the Asiatic Greeks of the mainland and made them tributary (to him)” (Hdt. 1.27.1);
- (32) *éi ti dumatòn es arithmòn eltheîn*
 if INDEF.N/A possible:N/A to number:ACC go:INF.AOR
 “whatever else can be numerically stated” (Th. 2.72.3).

The shift from the spatial plane to the plane of result is based on the similarity of motion, i.e. change of location, with change of state. The metaphor is particularly clear in (32), where the verb form *eltheîn*, ‘to go’, occurs: the trajector, i.e. the objects that must be counted, is conceived as moving from an uncounted state to a state where it, on account of the action of counting, is transformed in a number. Another example of this use of *eis* is the second occurrence of the preposition in example (28), where the action of changing name is described with the verb *metabállein*, ‘to shift’; the object of the verb and trajector is *phulàs tàs Dōriéōn*, ‘the Dorian tribes’, conceived as being moved from a name to another.

As already in Homer, in later authors *eis* is found in Purpose expressions:

- (33) *hósa mèn gàr es aikhmàs kai árdis kai*
 REL.N/A.PL PTC PTC to spear:ACC.PL.F and arrow.head:ACC.PL.F and
sagáris, khalkôi tà pánta khreōntai
 axe:ACC.PL.F bronze:DAT ART.N/A.PL all:N/A.PL use:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “they always use bronze for (making) spear-points and arrow-heads and battle-axes” (Hdt. 1.215.1).

Note that the use of *eis* in Purpose expressions is not limited to a particular type of landmark: in (33) the landmarks are constituted by concrete entities (spear and arrow heads). This shows that the shift from the concrete to the abstract plane is no longer triggered by the occurrence of an abstract landmark as it used to be in Homeric Greek: the Purpose meaning of *eis* is now fully developed.

The preposition *eis* is an example of a Direction marker that acquires further meanings, spreading to Purpose, and, to a limited extent, Recipient

and Addressee. This latter spread continued in post-Classical time and led the preposition to be the marker of Recipient and Addressee in the modern language.

3.4 APO

The meaning of *apó* is ‘off’, ‘from’, ‘away from’. As opposed to other prepositions that have a similar meaning, most notably *ek* and *pará*, *apó* is characterized by its lack of specificity as to the initial position of the trajector relative to the landmark. So while *ek* means ‘from the inside of’, ‘out of’, and *pará* explicitly indicates that there is no contact between trajector and landmark (‘from near’, ‘from the side of’), *apó* has no similar implication. This lesser specificity makes it a particularly versatile preposition, which can also substitute for the more specific ones, as we will see below.

Adverbial use of *apó* is not attested in Homer, but its use as preverb is frequent, in verbal compounds in which it can express motion or location away from a landmark, or other types of separation, as in *apiénai*, ‘to go away, leave’, *apeínai*, ‘to be far away’, *apotámnein*, ‘to cut away’.

As a preposition *apó* only combines with the genitive, on account of the ablative value of this case. In Homer, the difference between *apó* and *ek* is rather consistently preserved, and it is based on the availability of the Container metaphor. Given the original meaning of *ek*, ‘from the inside’, this preposition is mostly found with landmarks that are more readily conceptualized as containers. While, as shown in §3.2, *ek* presents the landmark as a container exerting control on the trajector’s origin, and points toward an original contact of the trajector with the interior of the landmark, *apó* simply refers to the landmark as a point or region from which the trajector moves, but nothing is specified about the landmark’s being the ultimate origin of the trajector.

When used with its local meaning, *apó* expresses Source in the case that it co-occurs with a motion verb, as in:

- (1) *Trôes ... phobéonto melaináōn apò nēōn*
Trojan:NOM.PL fly:IMPF.M/P.3PL black:GEN.PL.F from ship:GEN.PL.F
“the Trojans were driven away from the black ships” (*Il.* 16.303–304).

With a verb of rest, *apó* denotes Location of a trajector away from a landmark:

- (2) *kai gár tis th’ hēna mēna*
and PTC INDEF.NOM PTC one:ACC month:ACC
ménōn apò hēs alókhōio ...
remain:PART.PRS.NOM from POSS.3SG.GEN.F wife:GEN.F
“for he that abides but one single month far from his wife ...” (*Il.* 2.292).

In (1) the trajector is described as moving away from the landmark; note that the landmark, *nēōn*, ‘ships’, is represented by a set of entities that can typically

contain other entities; however, the occurrence of *apó* rather than *ek* here is consistent with the meaning of the two prepositions, i.e. ‘from’ vs. ‘out of’, because the ships referred to are the Greeks’, and the Trojans (here representing the trajector), are being driven away from them after they tried to reach them in an attack, but they were not ‘on’ or ‘inside’ the ships. Movement from inside the ships is usually expressed with *ek* in Homer, as we will see below, examples (6) and (7).

In (2) the verb form *ménōn*, ‘remaining’, ‘staying’, occurs, so there is no motion (for a similar occurrence with *ek*, see example (4) in §3.2). In this specific example, as in example (4) below, one can still see a hint to the Source relation of the landmark with the trajector, profiled with motion verbs. The trajector is described as being far from a landmark which, according to common knowledge, should be its ‘natural’ place, so there is an implication that the trajector’s location is the result of a motion away from the landmark. However, similar to English ‘from’, *apó* need not imply such movement, as shown in (7).¹

With city names usually *ek* occurs in Homer; *apó* is also found, but note the occurrence of the form *-then*, an ablatival suffix:

- (3) *ópsesthai philon huiòn apò Troiēthen iónta*
 see:INF.FUT.MID dear:ACC son:ACC from T.:ABL go:PART.PRS.ACC
 “he will see his son returning from the land of Troy” (*Il.* 24.492).²

As we have seen in §3.1, cities and towns are usually conceptualized as containers in local expressions in Greek. Accordingly, for Source expressions *ek* is preferred to *apó* in Homer. The occurrence of the suffix *-then* may be a way to specify the meaning of *apó*, and indicate that motion originates from the interior of the landmark, or the PP may mean ‘from the region of Troy’, as in the translation given above: this is hard to say, because there is only one analogous occurrence of *apó* with a city name and a motion verb, also with *-then*. In the other passages where *apó* occurs with a city name, the semantic function of the PP is Location, and *apó* means ‘away from’, rather than simply ‘from’:

- (4) *hò d’ ágkh’ autoío pése prēnēs epì*
 DEM.NOM PTC near there fall:AOR.3SG prone:NOM on
nekrōi tēl’ apò Larisēs eribólakos
 corpse:DAT far from L.:GEN.F deep.soiled:GEN.F
 “and thereby he fell headlong upon the corpse, far from deep-soiled Larissa” (*Il.* 17.300–301).

With the word for ‘town’, on the other hand, *apó* also occurs in Source expressions, without further specifications:

- (5) *ou gàr egò plēthùn dízémenos oudè*
 NEG PTC 1SG.NOM crowd:ACC.F seek:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM NEG
khatízōn enthád' aph' humetérōn políōn
 need:PART.PRS.NOM hither from POSS.2PL.GEN.PL.F town:GEN.PL.F
ègeira hékaston
 gather:AOR.1SG INDEF.ACC
 “not because I sought for big numbers or had need thereof, did I gather
 each man of you from your cities” (*Il.* 17.221–222).

As already remarked above, with the word for ‘ship’ *ek* is preferred; an example of *apó* occurs in (6), but note that the preposition governs the noun *prumnēs*, so the landmark is not the ship itself, but one of its parts:

- (6) *nēōs ápo prúmnēs khamádis pése*
 ship:GEN.F from stern:GEN.F to.the.ground fall:AOR.3SG
 “he fell to the ground from off the stern of the ship” (*Il.* 15.435).

(See §3.2 for another example of the same verb, this time with *ek*.)

The fact that *ek* is usually found with *nēōs* can explain the apparent equivalence of *ek* and *apó* in (7):

- (7) *hóson ek nēōn apò púrgou táphros*
 REL.N/A out.of ship:GEN.PL.F from wall:GEN trench:NOM.F
éerge
 enclose:IMPF.3SG
 “(all the space) that the trench enclosed on the side of the ships and the
 wall” (*Il.* 8.213)

Another passage where *ek* and *apó* occur next to each other is the following:

- (8) *hòs Paíōnas ... égagen ex Amudónos ap'*
 DEM.NOM Paenian:ACC.PL lead:AOR.3SG out.of A.:GEN from
Axiou eurū rhéontos
 A.:GEN.M widely flow:PART.PRS.GEN.M
 “that had led the Paenians out of Amydon, from the wide-flowing Axios”
 (*Il.* 16.287–288)

Here again the occurrence of the two prepositions depends on the different nature of the two landmarks: Amydon is the region where the Paenians live, while the Axios is a river. In the first case, the trajector is conceptualized as coming out the landmark, but this would be inappropriate in the second case: the Paenian moved away from the region that surround the river, rather than out of the river itself.

Although a contrast between *apó* and *ek* is discernible in most cases, there are passages where the opposition is neutralized, and the fact that the reference point is inside the landmark or not is irrelevant. For example, we find:

- (9) *dákru d' apò blephárōn khamádis bále*
 tear:N/A PTC from eyelid:GEN.PL to.the.ground cast:AOR.3SG
patròs akoúsas
 father:GEN hear:PART.AOR.NOM
 “tears from his eyelids he let fell upon the ground, when he heard about his father” (*Od.* 4.114),

where one could expect to find *ek*, especially because body parts are usually conceived as containers in Greek.

With human landmarks *apó* is also found in Location expressions, as shown above in (2), and occasionally in Source expressions, as in

- (10) *hoí he mégan per eónta kai*
 DEM.NOM.PL 3SG.ACC great:ACC PTC be:PART.PRS.ACC and
íphthimon kai agauòn ôsan apò speíōn
 mighty:ACC and lordly:ACC drive.back:AOR.3PL from 3PL.GEN
 “and for all that he was great and mighty and lordly, they drove him back from themselves” (*Il.* 4.534–535),

although other prepositions are usually preferred (notably *pará* and *prós*).

Extension of *apó* to the temporal plane is not common in Homer; Chantraine (1953:94) lists the passage given in example (11), but note that *autoû* could also be taken as a local adverb and *ap'autoû* could then be translated as ‘from that place’ (i.e. from the place where they had their meal), as is in fact done in the *Loeb* edition:

- (11) *hoí d' ára deîpnon hélonto... Akhaioi*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC PTC meal:N/A take:AOR.MID.3PL Achaean:NOM.PL
rhímpha... apò d' autoû thōrḗssonto
 hastily from PTC DEM.GEN.N arm:IMP.F.M/P.3PL
 “but the Achaeans took their meal, and as they rose up therefrom arrayed themselves in armor” (*Il.* 8.53–54).

Let us now examine some examples of metaphorical extension:

- (12) *apò thumoù mállon emoì éseai*
 from heart:GEN more 1SG.DAT be:FUT.MID.2SG
 “you shall be even further from my heart” (*Il.* 1.562–563);
- (13) *soì d’ egò oukh hálíos skopòs éssomai*
 2SG.DAT PTC 1SG.NOM NEG vain:NOM scout:NOM be:FUT.MID.1SG
oud’ apò dóxēs
 NEG from expectation:GEN.F
 “and to you shall I prove no vain scout, neither one to deceive your hopes”
 (*Il.* 10.324);
- (14) *eí per apémōn èlthe, lakhōn apò*
 if PTC unharmed:NOM come:AOR.3SG obtain:PART.AOR.NOM from
lēidos aísan
 spoil:GEN.F share:ACC.F
 “if he had returned unharmed with his due share of the spoil” (*Od.* 5.40).

In (12) *apò thumoù* indicates psychological distance: and, since what is distant does not conform to a standard, it comes to denote disagreement. In (13) the landmark *dóxēs* denotes one’s intentions, or convictions: distance again indicates that the trajector does not conform to the landmark, hence the notion of deception.

In (14) we find another type of extension: here the landmark has a concrete referent, but the trajector is not an independent entity that performs motion or is located away from it; rather, it is a part of the landmark. The landmark is then conceived as a multiplex discontinuous entity; a part of it referred to as separate has the landmark as its origin. The metaphor at work here is WHOLES ARE ORIGINS. This passage is important because it documents the antiquity of a partitive value of *apó*, through which the preposition could stand for the plain genitive.³ Extension of *apó* to the plane of causation is sporadic in Homer, but interesting, in the light of the differences with respect to causal meaning of *ek*. Consider the following two occurrences:

- (15) *oudé sé phēmi dērōn emēs apò*
 NEG 2SG.ACC tell:PRS.1SG too.long POSS.1SG.GEN.F from
kheirōs alúxein aipùn ólethron
 hand:GEN.F escape:INF.FUT sheer:ACC destruction:ACC
 “and I deem you will not long escape sheer destruction at my hand”
 (*Il.* 10.370–371);
- (16) *toùs mèn Apóllōn péphnen ap’ arguréioio bioío*
 DEM.ACC.PL PTC A.:NOM slay:AOR.3SG from of.silver:GEN bow:GEN
 “Apollon slew them with shafts from his silver bow” (*Il.* 24.605).


In both examples the *apó* phrase denotes an instrument, rather than the ultimate cause of the event: the event has its origin somewhere else, in an entity, the agent, that precedes it. Note that the landmarks are concrete entities, contrary to what we found with *ek*. Cause expressions with *ek* are formed with abstract nouns, conceived as abstract origins. The opposition between *apó* and *ek* holds on the plane of causation, too: as we saw in §3.2, *ek* can express Cause and Agent in Homer. Here, again, we find an implication of the elative vs. ablative opposition: the agent is the ultimate controller of a state of affairs; it is conceived as its origin, and the fact that it is expressed by *ek*, which denotes motion from inside, indicates that no other effector can be traced further back.

The meanings of the two prepositions can be represented as in Figure 8.

After Homer, the meaning of *apó* undergoes further extensions. In Herodotus, spatial use is similar to what described for Homeric Greek; besides, use of *apó* in Time expressions becomes frequent especially with nouns such as *hēméra*, ‘day’, and in the expression *apò toútou (toû khrónou)*, ‘from then on’:

- (17) *apò toû prôtou basiléos es toû Hēphaístou*
 from ART.GEN first:GEN king:GEN to ART.GEN H.:GEN
tòn hiréa toúton ... mían te kai tesserákonta kai
 ART.ACC priest:ACC DEM.ACC one:ACC.F PTC and forty and
triēkosías geneàs anthrôpôn
 threehundred:ACC.PL.F generation:ACC.PL.F man:GEN.PL
genoménas
 be:PART.AOR.MID.ACC.PL.F
 “from the first king to that priest of Hephaestus three hundred and forty-one generations of men passed” (Hdt. 2.142.1).

ek



apó




Figure 8.

In examples (18) and (19) *apó* still expresses Source, not for a concrete movement, but the source for living:

- (18) *speírousi dè oudén, all' apò ktēnēōn zóousi*
 SOW:PRS.3PL PTC INDEF,N/A but from livestock:GEN.PL live:PRS.3PL
kai ikhthúōn
 and fish:GEN.PL
 “they never plant seed; their fare is livestock and fish” (Hdt. 1.216.3);

- (19) *tò zēn apò polémou kai lēistúos*
 ART.N/A live:INF.PRS from war:GEN and robbery:GEN.F
kálliston
 good:SUP.N/A
 “living by war and robbery (is held) in highest honor” (Hdt. 5.6.2).

In (18) the landmark is concrete, while in (19) there is a further shift: an activity which provides a way to make a living is described as the source for living.

The partitive value, scarcely attested in Homer, becomes more frequent and extends to more contexts. In (20), for example, the landmark is conceived as matter:

- (20) *Indoì dè heímata mèn endedukótes apò*
 Indian:NOM.PL PTC garment:N/A.PL PTC wear:PART.PF.NOM.PL from
xúlōn pepoiēména
 tree:GEN.PL make:PART.PF.M/P.N/A.PL
 “the Indians wore garments of tree-wool” (Hdt. 7.65).

The landmark *xúlōn* is viewed as a whole, a part of which is the matter that constitutes the trajector. The use of Source expressions to denote the matter out of which an object is made is discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980:73–74). It is explained through a metaphor, according to which THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE.

As remarked above in the discussion of example (14), *apó* with the genitive stands for the plain genitive in such occurrences. Note that the development of a partitive value, which was only hinted at in (14), is complete in (20). The occurrence of the word *aísan*, ‘share’, in (14) shows that the prepositional phrase still denotes Source, and that the notion of partitivity is expressed by *aísan*, and not by the preposition; on the contrary, in (20) there is no word denoting the part which is moved away from the landmark.

With human landmarks *apó* can be found in contexts in which it refers to some type of reaction, or answer, coming from a person, as in (21):

- (21) *tò apò Xérxeō deimáinontes*
 DEM.N/A from X.:GEN fear:PART.PRS.NOM
 “fearing Xerxes’ reaction” (Hdt. 8.15.1).

Furthermore, *apó* occurs in contexts in which Homer has *ek* with human landmarks. In the expression of Origin (‘to descend from’) Herodotus still prefers *ek* (more than twice as much as *apó*) but *apó* is also possible:

- (22) *apò gàr toú autoú gegónasi*
 from PTC ART.GEN.M DEM.GEN.M originate:PF.3PL
 “for they have a common ancestor” (Hdt. 6.51).

Herodotus also has *apó* with the verb *gígnesthai*, ‘to become’, ‘to happen’, ‘to be brought about’, not only in examples such as (22), where the landmark is the origin of the trajector, but is not presented as actively involved in bringing about the state of affairs, but also in occurrences such as (23):

- (23) *all’ oudèn gàr méga ap’ autoú állo*
 but INDEF.N/A PTC great:N/A from DEM.GEN.M INDEF.N/A
érgon egéneto
 action:N/A be:AOR.MID.3SG
 “but no other great deeds were accomplished by him” (Hdt. 1.15.1).

In (23) *gígnesthai*, ‘to happen’, can be considered a lexical passive of *poieîn*, ‘to do’, and *ap’autoú* a type of Agent phrase. Examples (22) and (23), then, constitute a real extension of the meaning of *apó* with respect to Homer. On the other hand, example (24) continues the instrumental meaning demonstrated in (15) and (16):

- (24) *têi Helládi penîè mèn aiei kote*
 ART.DAT.F Greece:DAT.F poverty:NOM.F PTC always ever
súntrophos estí, aretè dè épaktos
 foster.brethren:NOM.F be:PRS.3SG courage:NOM.F PTC acquired:NOM.F
estí, apó te sophíēs katergasménē kai
 be:PRS.3SG from PTC wisdom:GEN.F earn:PART.PF.M/P.NOM.F and
nómou iskhuroú
 law:GEN strong:GEN
 “in Greece poverty is always endemic, but courage is acquired as the fruit of wisdom and strong law” (Hdt. 7.102.1).

Here the landmark *sophíēs* is conceived as the (abstract) source from which an understood agent brings about a certain state, here denoted by the clause *areté épaktos estí*, ‘courage is acquired’. The understood agent, the people of Greece,

is easily recoverable from the preceding sentence, where the Beneficiary expression *tēi Helládi* occurs, so the state of affairs is unambiguously controlled; the occurrence of a medio-passive verb form, *katergasménē*, probably with passive value, cannot be taken as a demonstration that the *apó* phrase denotes Agent (or, being inanimate, Force).⁴

In Attic the causal meaning of *apó* extends further. Note that, when compared with other Cause expressions, *apó* usually profiles the source relation between a cause and its effect, in keeping with its concrete meaning. In (25), from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, different types of cause are discussed, and various Cause expressions appear to be equivalent at least in some contexts. Note in particular *phúsei* and *tékhnei* here coordinated with *apò tautomátou*, 'spontaneously'; later on in the same passage we also find *dià tèn phúsin* and *apò phúseōs*:

- (25) *tôn* *dè gignoménōn* *tà* *mèn*
 ART.GEN.PL PTC become:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL DEM.N/A.PL PTC
phúsei *gígnetai,* *tà* *dè tékhnei,*
 nature:DAT.F generate:PRS.M/P.3SG DEM.N/A.PL PTC art:DAT.F
tà *dè apò tautomátou,* *pánta* *dè tà*
 DEM.N/A.PL PTC from spontaneous:GEN all:N/A.PL PTC ART.N/A.PL
gignómēna *hupò té tinos*
 generate:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A.PL under PTC INDEF.GEN.N
gígnetai *kai ek tinos*
 generate:PRS.M/P.3SG and out.of INDEF.GEN.N
 "of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others artificially, and others spontaneously: but everything which is generated is generated by something and from something"
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1032a 12–14);

- (26) *houtō mèn oun gígnetai* *tà*
 SO PTC PTC generate:PRS.M/P.3SG ART.N/A.PL
gignómēna *dià tèn phúsin,*
 be:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A.PL through ART.ACC.F nature:ACC.F
hai *d' állai* *genéseis*
 ART.NOM.PL.F PTC INDEF.NOM.PL.F generation:NOM.PL.F
légontai *poiéseis.* *Pásai* *dè eisín*
 call:PRS.M/P.3PL production:NOM.PL.F all:NOM.PL.F PTC be:PRS.3PL
hai *poiéseis* *è apò tékhnes* *è apò*
 ART.NOM.PL.F production:NOM.PL.F PTC from art:GEN.F PTC from

dunámeōs è apò dianoías toútōn dé
 power:GEN.F PTC from thought:GEN.F DEM.GEN.PL PTC
tines gígnontai kai apò tautomátou kai
 INDEF.NOM.PL.F be:PRS.M/P.3PL and from spontaneous:GEN and
apò túkḗs paraplēsiōs hōsper en tois apò
 from chance:GEN.F same as in ART.DAT.PL.N from
phúseōs gígnoménoi: énia gàr kakéi
 nature:GEN.F be:PART.PRS.M/P.DAT.PL.N INDEF.N/A.PL PTC and+there
tautà kai ek spérmatos gígnetai kai áneu
 DEM.N/A.PL and out.of seed:GEN be:PRS.M/P.3SG and without
spérmatos
 seed:GEN

“such is the generation of things which are naturally generated; the other kinds of generation are called productions. All productions proceed from either art or potency or thought. Some of them are also generated spontaneously and by chance in much the same way as things which are naturally generated; for sometimes even in the sphere of nature the same things are generated both from seed and without it” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1032a25–32).

I have already discussed the use and the semantics of the plain dative in Cause expressions (see §2.2.3.3). As for *diá* with the accusative, we will see in §3.9 that this type of prepositional phrase was the most frequent way to express Cause in Greek. Because *diá* with the accusative, once a Path expression, had lost its concrete meaning immediately after Homer, and could only express Cause in Classical Greek, it profiled a cause only in itself, without adding any hints to some metaphorical relation between the domain of space and the domain of causation, as all other prepositions did: so it is appropriate to use *diá*, as in (26), at the beginning of a paragraph, where no particular aspects of the causal relation had been activated by the context. In the following sentence, *pásai de eisín hai poiéseis è apò tékhnēs è apò dunámeōs è apò diánoias*, the causes of productions are profiled as their sources: hence the use of *apó*. Note that the action noun *hai poiéseis*, ‘productions’, denotes controlled states of affairs. Here, *apó* retains its slightly instrumental meaning, already found in Homer; the landmark is situated somewhere between the agent (the ultimate cause) and the effect. After the source metaphor has been activated, Aristotle continues to use it even when he comes back to natural generation, using *apò phúseōs*. This time, the notion of Source is mapped completely onto the plane of causation, and understood as the direct cause for an event: thus, the last occurrence is semantically different from Homeric (15) and (16), in which *apó* denotes Instrument.

Examples (25) and (26) also contain occurrences of *ek*. In (25) *ék tinos* refers to the ‘material’ cause: anything which is generated must be made of some matter; in (26) *ek spérmatos* ‘from seed’ refers to the most immediate cause of generation. In both cases, the occurrence of *ek* profiles the starting point of the causal relation, in a way typical for *ek* rather than for any other prepositions of similar meaning.

The passage in (27) gives a further example of the connection between Source and Cause. In this passage, we find an enabling cause, with positive evaluation, as described in §1.2.4.3:

- (27) *phílarkhos* *dè kai phílótimos,* *ouk apò tou*
 loving.office:NOM PTC and loving.honor:NOM NEG from ART.GEN.N
légein axiôn árkein oud’ apò
 speak:INF.PRS expect:PART.PRS.NOM govern:INF.PRS NEG from
toioútou oudenós, all’ apò érgōn tōn te
 INDEF.GEN.N INDEF.GEN.N but from action:GEN.PL ART.GEN.PL PTC
polemikōn kai tōn perì tà polemiká
 of.war:GEN.PL and ART.GEN.PL about ART.N/A.PL of.war:N/A.PL
 “a lover of office and of honor, not basing his claim to office on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war” (Pl. *Rep.* 549a).

In Attic, *apó* with the genitive can occasionally express Agent. This use is comparatively frequent in Thucydides, but the distribution of *apó* is limited to some particular contexts, mostly involving verbs with general meaning, or with a low degree of transitivity, or indefinite or not well specified agents:⁵

- (28) *mēnúetai oún apò metoikōn té*
 inform:PRS.M/P.3SG PTC from resident.alien:GEN.PL and
tinōn kai akolouthōn perì mēn tōn
 INDEF.GEN.PL.M and body.servant:GEN.PL about PTC ART.GEN.PL.F
Hermōn oudén, állōn dè agalmátōn
 H.:GEN.PL.F INDEF.N/A INDEF.GEN.PL PTC image:GEN.PL
perikopáí tines próteron hupò
 mutilation:NOM.PL.F INDEF.NOM.PL.F before by
neōtérōn metà paidiás kai oínou
 young:CMPR.GEN.PL among amusement:GEN.F and wine:GEN
gegenēménai
 be:PART.PF.M/P.NOM.PL.F

“information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic” (Th. 6.28.1);

- (29) *eprákhthē dè oudèn ap' autôn érgon*
 do:AOR.P.3SG PTC INDEF.N/A from DEM.GEN action:N/A
axiólogon
 noteworthy:N/A

“nothing worth of being told was accomplished by them” (Th. 1.17);

- (30) *ek dè dēmokratías hairéseōs gignoménēs*
 out.of PTC democracy:GEN.F election:GEN.F be:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.F
rhâion tà apobáinonta hōs ouk apò
 easily:CMPR ART.N/A.PL result:PART.PRS.N/A.PL as NEG from
tôn homoiōn elassoúmenós tis
 ART.GEN.PL equal:GEN.PL beat:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM INDEF.NOM
phérei
 accept:PRS.3SG

“while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his equals” (Th. 8.89.3).

On the difference between *hupó* and *apó* in Agent expressions Schwyzer (1942:41) writes: “*apó* ‘von - her’ wird nicht vom unmittelbaren Agens, sondern vom mittelbaren, vom im Hintergrunde stehenden Drahtzieher gesagt”.⁶ The difference is best demonstrated by the contrast between *apò metoikōn té tinōn kai akoloúthōn* and *hupò neōtérōn* in (28): both agents are indefinite, but in the first occurrence the agent is also unimportant, and what *apó* profiles is the source of information, rather than any features typical of agency. In the second occurrence, the Agent phrase refers to the new and important information, although the specific young people referred to are not known.

Example (29) is typical of the way in which Thucydides uses *apó* to express Agent: *eprákhthē* ‘it was accomplished’, is a morphological passive of the verb ‘to do’, and it has a lexical equivalent in the form *egéneto*, ‘it was brought about’: comparison of (29) with (23) shows that the two verb forms are used much in the same way by Thucydides and Herodotus respectively. The agent is definite in this case, but the object is indefinite and the degree of transitivity is low. In (30) we have a general statement, so again the agent is presented as the source of the state of affairs, rather than as an entity exerting control.⁷

Looking back at the semantic evolution of *apó*, one can see that the original opposition with *ek*, which not only holds on the spatial plane, but extends to

metaphorical meanings as well, though retained throughout the classical period, becomes weaker, starting with Herodotus. Owing to this more generic meaning, *apó* can also be found in contexts where the landmark is in fact the ultimate origin of the trajector, but in cases where this relation must be highlighted, then *ek* is preferred, being more specific.

In Figure 9 I give a mental map of the meaning of *apó*.

Having analyzed the use and the semantic evolution of both *ek* and *apó*, we can now finish the discussion started in §3.2. The two prepositions have quite distinct meanings in Homer, where the more specific meaning of *ek* appears to make it more suitable for various types of extension outside the spatial domain: so *ek* is found in Time and sometimes Cause expressions, it is the standard way to denote Origin, and its occurrence in Agent expressions is also significant. On the spatial plane, too, the two prepositions appear to overlap only partially, since landmarks that can be conceived as containers normally take *ek*.

Starting with Herodotus, we find a process of convergence between *ek* and *apó*. In Herodotus, convergence owes to the extension of the possible uses of *apó*, which acquires temporal value, can be found with city names and in the expression of Origin, and sometimes for Agent. Later on, in Attic prose, some of the peculiarities of *ek* also disappear, as demonstrated by its use in Cause expressions, similar to those in which only *apó* formerly occurred.

Comparison of the two prepositions shows that they ended up with much the same meaning, although semantic extension followed different paths. In particular, it can be shown that the causal meaning of the two particles originated in different ways: for *apó*, Cause was a semantic extension of the spatial meaning, while in the case of *ek* the meaning extended first to Time, and then to Cause. The difference between the two processes is apparent in Homer, who has concrete landmarks in Cause expressions with *apó*, and abstract ones (mostly states of affairs) with *ek*. Extension to Agent, on the other hand, seems to follow the same path, from Source to Origin, to Agent: in fact Agent expressions with *apó* start to occur only when Origin expressions also appear.




Figure 9. Mental map of *apó*

3.5 PARA

The particle *pará* derives from an Indo-European adverbial root, along with numerous other preverbs/adpositions, both in Greek (cf. *pró*, *prós*, *perí*), and in the other Indo-European languages, with the addition of a suffix. Most forms derived from this root indicate some sort of proximity: this is also the basic meaning of *pará* in all its usages in Greek, and remains such in the course of time.

As a free adverb, *pará* means ‘nearby’, and is frequently attested in various types of occurrence, including nominal sentences:

- (1) *parà d’ heísan aidoùs*
 by PTC set:AOR.3PL singer:ACC.PL
 “and nearby they set singers” (*Il.* 24.720).

Similarly, when used as a preverb *pará* adds the idea of proximity to the verbal meaning, as shown in *pareínai*, ‘to be present’, *paratithénai*, ‘to place aside’.

As a preposition, *pará* takes the dative, the genitive, and the accusative without substantial changes throughout its history. Among prepositions with three cases *pará* is remarkable, because it is not sensitive to plexity of the trajector, and only to a very limited extent is it sensitive to plexity of the landmark. For this reason, it may seem to be somehow ‘more adverbial’ than the other prepositions with three cases, because, at least in Homer, it modifies a spatial meaning already expressed by the cases.¹ Since it expresses the basic local relations while explicitly indicating that the trajector and the landmark do not occupy the same physical space, *pará* frequently occurs with nouns denoting human beings.

With the dative, *pará* expresses Location of a trajector near or beside a landmark:

- (2) *kai gár k’ eis eniautòn egò parà soi g’*
 and PTC PTC to year:ACC 1SG.NOM by 2SG.DAT PTC
anekhoímēn hēmenos
 suffer:OPT.PRS.M/P.1SG sit:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM
 “and for a year I would be content to sit in your house (lit.: ‘by you’)”
 (*Od.* 4.595–596);

- (3) *mé se, géron, koílēisi egò parà*
 NEG 2SG.ACC old.man:VOC hollow:DAT.PL.F 1SG.NOM by
nēusi kikheío
 ship:DAT.PL.F find:SUBJ.PRS.1SG
 “let me not find you, old man, by the hollow ships” (*Il.* 1.26).

In (4) proximity of the trajector to the landmark implies that the latter accompanies the former, and the meaning of the preposition comes close to Comitative; note that the *pará* phrase functions as predicate, in the absence of an overtly expressed copula:

- (4) *pár’ émoige kai álloi hoí ké me*
 by 1SG.DAT+PTC and INDEF.NOM.PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC 1SG.ACC
timésousi
 honor:FUT.3PL
 “by me are others who will honor me” (*Il.* 1.174–175).

In the following two examples, *pará* is glossed ‘along’ (*le long de*) in Chantraine (1953: 121):

- (5) *phòkai d’ ex halòs èlthon aollées.*
 seal:NOM.PL.F PTC out.of sea:GEN come:AOR.3PL in.throngs:NOM.PL.F
hai mèn épeita hexès eunázonto parà rhēgmīni
 DEM.NOM.PL.F PTC then in.row lay:IMPF.M/P.3PL by shore:DAT
thalássēs
 sea:GEN.F
 “the seals came forth from the sea in throngs. They then laid down in rows by the sea shore” (*Od.* 4.448–449);
- (6) *kat’ akrotátēs pólios Tróēssi*
 down extreme:SUP.GEN.F town:GEN.F Trojan:DAT.PL
keleúōn, állote pàr Simóenti théōn epì
 exhort:PART.PRS.NOM again by S.:DAT run:PART.PRS.NOM on
Kallikolónēi
 K.:DAT
 “urging on the Trojans from the topmost citadel, and again by the shore of Simoois, running over Callicolone” (*Il.* 20.52–53).

If *pará* is taken to mean ‘along’, then the dative in (5) and (6) would have the same meaning which is usually associated with the accusative. I think that a better translation is simply ‘by’, ‘near’, and that the implication that the trajector is located ‘along’ the landmark derives from our knowledge of the phys-

ical dimensions of the entities involved. This remark especially holds for (5), where the trajector is plural; indeed, the fact that the trajector is located along the landmark is expressed by the adverb *hexês*, ‘in row(s)’, and not by the dative case. In the case of (6), the translation ‘along’ seems even more arbitrary; it depends on how one decides to use punctuation (which is added by modern editors). Chantraine’s interpretation takes the expression *pàr Simóenti* as connected with the verb form *théōn*, ‘running’. The translation, then, would be: “urging the Trojans from the topmost citadel, and again, running along the shore of Simoois, over Callicolone”. In my opinion, *théōn* should better be connected with the expression *epì Kallikolónēi* only: I see no reason to set up a different meaning for *pará* with the dative based on this occurrence only, considering that whenever the verb *theeín*, ‘to run’, occurs with *pará*, and the only possible interpretation is ‘to run along’, the preposition always takes the accusative in Homer.²

Like the plain dative, the dative with *pará* can also occur in Direction expressions, when the landmark is the endpoint of motion:

- (7) *kat’ ár’ hézet’ ep’ eskhárēi en konīēisi pàr purí*
 down PTC sit:IMPF.M/P.3SG on fireplace:DAT.F in ash:DAT.PL.F by
 fire:DAT
 “he sat down on the hearth in the ashes by the fire” (*Od.* 7.153–154).

Final location of the trajector in (7) is expressed with reference to three different landmarks, all denoted by PPs with the dative.

With the genitive, *pará* expresses Source, and indicates that motion starts from beside the landmark. Since the trajector moves along a trajectory which does not, at its starting point, include the same area covered by the landmark, *pará* with the genitive is very frequently used to denote motion away from an individual human being, as in

- (8) *iónta par’ Eurútou*
 come:PART.PRS.ACC by E.:GEN
 “coming from Eurytos” (*Il.* 2.596).

The occurrence of different landmarks (a place in Greece and a human being) explains the use of *ek* and *pará* in the following example:

- (9) *ex Ephúrēs aniónta par’ Ílou Mermerídaο*
 out.of E.:GEN come.back:PART.PRS.ACC by I.:GEN of.M:GEN
 “on his way back from Ephyre, from Ilus, son of Mermerus” (*Od.* 1.259).

As we have seen in §3.2 and 3.4, the word for ‘ship’ in Source expressions often occurs with *ek*, as a consequence of the Container metaphor, and not with *apó*. With *pará* some occurrences can be explained if the source of motion is not inside, but by the landmark, as in (10):

- (10) *hōs eipōn pará nēōs apéion ēdē*
 so speak:PART.AOR.NOM by ship:GEN.F leave:IMPF.1SG PTC
thalássēs
 sea:GEN.F
 “I said so and went away from the ship and the sea” (*Od.* 10.274).

However, occasionally *pará* occurs even when the source of motion is apparently inside the landmark, as in (11):

- (11) *dōra dé toi therápontes emēs pará nēōs*
 gift:N/A.PL PTC PTC servant:NOM.PL POSS.1SG.GEN.F by ship:GEN.F
helóntes
 take:PART.AOR.NOM.PL
 “the servants having taken gifts from my ship” (*Il.* 19.143).

An interesting occurrence is (12), where the *pará* phrase co-occurs with a passive verb and an animate landmark. The *pará* phrase denotes the source of an emotion (*khólos*):

- (12) *éntha k’ éti meízōn te kai argaleóteros*
 then PTC PTC big:CMPR.NOM PTC and terrible:CMPR.NOM
állos pàr Diòs athanátoisi khólos kai
 INDEF.NOM by Z.:GEN immortal:DAT.PL wrath:NOM and
mēnis etúkhthē
 anger:NOM.F arise:AOR.P.3SG
 “then even bigger and more terrible wrath and anger were born from Zeus for the immortals” (*Il.* 15.121–122).

While in states of affairs denoted by verbs of emotion there is no intentional acting, in some other occurrences the preposition hints at a certain intentionality of the human (or divine) referent that instigates the state of affair expressed by the verb, and means ‘on behalf of’, as in:

- (13) *élthe... Íris pàr Diòs... sùn aggelíēi*
 come:AOR.3SG I.:NOM by Z.:GEN with message:DAT.F
 “Iris came on behalf of Zeus with a message” (*Il.* 2.786–787).

The use of *pará* with the accusative is more varied than with the other two cases, partly because of the overlap of directional with non-directional uses of this case, and partly on account of the meanings taken by the preposition in conjunction with different types of landmark. Let us start with Direction expressions. With this function, the accusative mostly occurs with animate landmarks, as in (14):

- (14) *eími par' Hēphaiston*
 go:FUT.1SG by H.:ACC
 “I will go to Hephaestus” (*Il.* 18.143).

Inanimate landmarks in Direction expressions are infrequent, and many of the occurrences which are considered as such in reference works appear doubtful under closer scrutiny. Some examples may clarify the problem. In the first place, *pará* with the accusative of both animate and inanimate landmarks is often connected with a resultative meaning of the verb. This is especially true of animate landmarks, which often occur with verbs that mean ‘to sit down’, ‘to lie down’, as in³

- (15) *hòs ho mèn énth' Oduseùs koimēsato, tòi*
 so DEM.NOM PTC there O.:NOM lie.down:AOR.MID.3SG DEM.NOM.PL
dè par' autòn ándres koimēsanto neēniai
 PTC by DEM.ACC man:NOM.PL lie.down:AOR.MID.3PL young:NOM.PL
 “so there Odysseus slept, and beside him slept the young men”
 (*Od.* 14.523).

Since the verb points toward the achievement of a certain state as a result of previous motion, the function of the *pará* phrase can be understood as Location. As a consequence, we find one occurrence where the *pará* plus accusative phrase is not governed by a verb, and the expressions appear to be equivalent to parallel examples with the dative:

- (16) *néoi dè par' autòn ékhon*
 young:NOM.PL PTC by DEM.ACC have:IMPF.3PL
pempóbola khersín
 five.pronged.fork:N/A.PL hand:DAT.PL.F
 “beside him, the young men held in their hands the five-pronged forks”
 (*Il.* 1.463).

Inanimate landmarks occur in similar contexts, mostly with the verb *hístēmi*, ‘to stand’, as in

- (17) *pàr thrónon hestékei*
 by throne:ACC stand:PLPF.3SG
 “he stood by the throne” (*Od.* 21.434).

In some other occurrences, the *pará* phrase is accompanied by another Direction expression, as in

- (18) *tòn mèn pàr pód’ heòn khamádis*
 DEM.ACC PTC by foot:ACC POSS.3SG.ACC to.the.ground
bále
 throw:AOR.3SG
 “then he cast it upon the ground beside his foot” (*Il.* 7.190).

This example looks similar to other occurrences, where inanimate landmarks are found together with verbs that mean ‘to throw’, ‘to fall’; it can be compared with (7), where the three PPs that denoted the location of the trajector relative to three different landmarks are all in the dative. The difference expressed by the two cases is in profiling: while the dative in (7) profiles the endpoint of motion, accusative with *pará* in (18) the profiles the trajectory.

Example (18) should not be confused with other occurrences, such as the one in (19), which, in my opinion, and as pointed out in Chantraine (1953: 123), should be explained differently:

- (19) *autòs d’ ek díphroio parà trokhòn exekulísthē*
 DEM.NOM PTC out.of chariot:GEN by wheel:ACC roll:AOR.P.3SG
 “but he rolled from out the car beside the wheel” (*Il.* 6.42).

In order to fully understand the meaning of *pará* in (18) and (19), and the different meanings conveyed by the accusative in the two examples, it is necessary to consider non-directional uses of the accusative. When the accusative does not contribute a directional meaning, but rather refers to the stretch of space occupied by the landmark, the preposition means ‘alongside’, and can be found with verbs that denote rest or motion; it expresses Path:

- (20) *kài témenos nemómestha méga Xánthoio par’*
 and estate:N/A possess:PRS.M/P.1PL great:N/A X.:GEN by
ókhthas
 bank:ACC.PL.F
 “and we possess a great estate by the banks of Xanthus” (*Il.* 12.313);
- (21) *tò... bátēn parà thín’ halòs atrugétoio*
 DEM.NOM.DU go:AOR.3DU by shore:ACC sea:GEN unresting:GEN
 “the two of them went along the shore of the unresting sea” (*Il.* 1.327).

Landmarks in examples such as (20), with motion verbs, are multiplex, either plural of count nouns, or singular of nouns that denote an entity which occupies an extended area. Uniplex landmarks (singular count nouns) can also occur, in which case the preposition acquires the meaning of ‘beyond’, as shown in (22):

- (22) *êrkhe* *d’ ára sphin* *Hermeías akákēta* *kat’*
 lead:IMPF.3SG PTC PTC 3PL.DAT *H.:*NOM gracious:NOM down
euróenta *kéleutha.* *pàr d’ ísan* *Ōkeanoû te*
 damp:N/A.PL way:N/A.PL by PTC go:IMPF.3PL *O.:*GEN PTC
rhoàs *kài Leukàda pétren,* *ēdè par’ Ēlíoio*
 stream:ACC.PL.F and *L.:*ACC.F rock:ACC.F and by *E.:*GEN
púlas *kài dēmon oneírōn* *éisan:* *aĩpsa d’*
 gate:ACC.PL.F and land:ACC dream:GEN.PL go:IMPF.3PL quickly PTC
híkonto *kat’ asphodelòn* *leimóna éntha te*
 come:AOR.MID.3PL down asphodel:ACC mead:ACC there PTC
naíousi *psukhaí*
 dwell:PRS.3PL spirit:NOM.PL.F

“Hermes, the Helper, led them down the damp ways. Past the streams of Oceanus they went, past the rock Leucas, past the gates of the sun and the land of dreams, and quickly came to the mead of asphodel, where the spirits dwell” (*Od.* 24.9–14).

More examples of this type are mentioned by Chantraine (1953:122–123); Horrocks (1981:249–250), who is reluctant to set up what he calls “a completely different sense” for *pará*, remarks that “in these examples there is a strong implication that the movement involved continues to some other place ‘beyond’ the object whose ‘side’ is passed”. Consideration of the change in the landmark’s plexity clarifies the semantic extension, and shows that ‘beyond’ or ‘past’ in examples such as (22) is not a completely different meaning with respect to ‘along’ of (20) and (21).⁴ Consider the nature of a movement that covers the path. Such movement necessarily covers a stretch of space, which, in the case of continuous landmarks (a row of objects, or a side of an extended entity), coincides with the extension of the landmark. In the case of a uniplex landmark, the path covered by the movement necessarily leads the trajector beyond the landmark, as shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10.

The semantic extension described above is important, because it serves as a basis for the shift from space to an abstract plane, demonstrated in (23) and (24):

(23) *pàr dúnamin d' ouk ésti kai essúmenon polemízein*
 by strength:ACC.F PTC NEG be:PRS.3SG and eager:ACC fight:INF.PRS
 “but beyond his strength may no man fight, however eager he may be”
 (*Il.* 13.787);

(24) *oudé tí pō parà moíran épos nēkerdès*
 NEG INDEF.N/A PTC by right:ACC.F word:N/A unprofitable:N/A
éei pes
 say:AOR.2SG
 “you have not thus far spoken amiss or unprofitably” (*Od.* 14.509).

In (23) and (24) we find abstract landmarks; the state of affairs in which the trajector is involved (‘fight’ in (23) and ‘speak’ in (24)) is dynamic and consequently can be conceptualized as a type of motion which surpasses the landmark, as in the schema of Figure 10b. The abstract use of *pará* has a major development in later Greek, as we will see below.

In later authors, the preference for the use of *pará* with animate landmarks increases. Herodotus still has a limited number of inanimate landmarks for *pará* with the dative; in Attic, animate dative landmarks are limited to poetry or to authors who use a somewhat Ionicizing style.

Examples of animate dative landmarks in Location expressions are given below:

- (25) *èn dè mégiston prégma Dēmokédēs parà basilēi*
 be:IMPF.3SG PTC big:SUP.N/A influence:N/A D.:NOM by king:DAT
 “Democedes was a man of considerable influence with the King”
 (Hdt. 3.132.2);
- (26) *paratukhóntes dè Athēnaíōn présbeis*
 happen:PART.AOR.NOM.PL PTC A.:GEN.PL ambassador:NOM.PL
Léarkhos Kallimákhou kai Ameiniádēs Philémonos parà tōi
 L.:NOM of.K.:GEN and A.:NOM of.Ph.:GEN by ART.DAT
Sítalkēi
 S.:DAT
 “but there chanced to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors,
 Learchos son of Callimachous and Ameiniades son of Philemon”
 (Th. 2.67.2);
- (27) *homólogoi dè toutois eisi kai hai*
 corresponding:NOM.PL PTC DEM.DAT.PL be:PRS.3PL and ART.NOM.PL.F
timai hai en tais pólesi kai
 honor:NOM.PL.F ART.NOM.PL.F in ART.DAT.PL.F republic:DAT.PL.F and
parà tois monárkhois
 by ART.DAT.PL king:DAT.PL
 “similar to these are the honors (which are bestowed) in republics and
 under monarchies (lit.: ‘by monarchs’)” (Arist. EN. 1115a 31–32).

Note that, especially in (26), but partly also in (25), the proximity relation is similar to Comitative, as already in Homer, in example (4). Example (27) demonstrates the use of different prepositions with different types of landmark for the same function: *en* denotes Location with the word *pólesi*, ‘cities’, a typical landmark which is conceptualized according to the Container metaphor, while *pará* occurs with an animate landmark, thus pointing toward lack of physical coincidence of the trajector with the landmark.

In some other occurrences the preposition apparently strengthens the meaning of the plain dative and *pará* phrases have functions similar to those taken by the plain case:

- (28) *hoūtos par’ emoī tò óunomā toúto ô̄ basileū̄*
 DEM.NOM by 1SG.DAT ART.N/A name:N/A DEM.N/A PTC king:VOC
dikaiōs estī phéresthaī
 right:NOM be:PRS.3SG bear:INF.PRS.M/P
 “this is the one who, in my opinion, King, deserves to bear this name”
 (Hdt. 1.32.9);

- (29) *Zōpúrou dè oudeis agathoergíēn Perséōn*
 Z.:GEN PTC INDEF.NOM good.service:ACC.F Persian:GEN.PL
huperebáleto parà Dareíōi kritēi oúte tōn
 surpass:AOR.MID.3SG by D.:DAT judgment:DAT.F NEG ART.GEN.PL.M
hústeron genoménōn oúte tōn próteron
 after be:PART.AOR.MID.GEN.PL.M NEG ART.GEN.PL.M before
 “there never was in Darius’ judgment any Persian before or after who did
 better service than Zopyrus” (Hdt. 3.160.1);
- (30) *póteron oún ek toútou toú sómatos hólōs*
 PTC then out.of DEM.GEN.N ART.GEN.N body:GEN.N wholly
tò par’ hēmín sōma è ek toú par’ hēmín
 ART.N/A by 1PL.DAT body:N/A PTC out.of ART.GEN.N by 1PL.DAT
toúto tréphetaí te kai hōsa nun dè perì
 DEM.N/A feed:PRS.M/P.3SG PTC and REL.N/A.PL now PTC about
autōn eípomen eílēphén te kai ékhei?
 DEM.GEN.PL.N say:AOR.1PL obtain:PF.3SG PTC and have:PRS.3SG
 “does our body derive, obtain, and possess from that body, or that body
 from ours, nourishment and everything else that we mentioned just now?”
 (Pl. *Phlb.* 29e).

In (28) and (29) the concrete domain of physical location is mapped onto the abstract domain of mental experience. The context and knowledge about the events described make clear that in neither example is the trajector located by the landmark in the physical space: instead, the trajector is located in the mind of the human being who serves as landmark. This type of expression occurs with verbs of thinking and judging and is typical of Herodotus; the function of the *pará* phrase is Experiencer.

In (30) the expression *tò par’ hēmín sōma*, ‘our body’, denotes Possessor. However, the addition of the preposition adds something that would not be expressed through a plain dative of possession or a genitive: from the idea of physical proximity it follows that possession of the body by human beings is presented as something contingent, in keeping with Plato’s philosophy which assumed a strong body *vs.* mind dualism.

The use of *pará* with the genitive after Homer is virtually limited to animate landmarks. Apart from Source expressions, in which the landmark represents the starting point of physical motion, we find a variety of occurrences which involve abstract motion, as in the numerous examples where a *pará* phrase denotes the source of information or knowledge:

- (31) *Mardónios dé hōs hoi aponostésas Aléxandros*
 M.:NOM PTC when 3SG.DAT return:PART.AOR.NOM A.:NOM
tà parà Athēnaíōn esēmēne
 ART.N/A.PL by Athenian:GEN.PL explain:AOR.3SG
 “when Alexander returned and told him what he had heard from the Athenians” (Hdt. 9.1);
- (32) *autòn dé pou tòn dikastèn deí gignóskein*
 DEM.ACC PTC PTC ART.ACC judge:ACC need:PRS.3SG decide:INF.PRS
kai ou manthánein parà tòn amphisbētoúntōn
 and NEG learn:INF.PRS by ART.GEN.PL.M dispute:PART.PRS.GEN.PL.M
 “the dicast must decide by himself, and not get information from the litigants” (Arist. *Rh.* 1354a 30).

In (31) and (32) the events of hearing or learning are described as movement of information from a (possible) speaker to a hearer or experiencer.

Especially with three-place predicates, i.e. verbs of ‘saying’ and related expressions, and occasionally also verbs of ‘giving’, *pará* phrases indicate the source of what is being said or transferred:

- (33) *orthoít’ àn ho lógos ho parà*
 be.true:OPT.PRS.M/P.3SG PTC ART.NOM discourse:NOM ART.NOM by
séo legómenos
 2SG.GEN say:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM
 “(in this way) you would prove that what you say is true” (Hdt. 7.103.2);
- (34) *parà toutōn Hērakleídai epitraphthéntes*
 by DEM.GEN.PL.M H.:NOM.PL entrust:PART.AOR.P.NOM.PL
éskhon tèn arkhèn ek theopropíou
 have:AOR.3PL ART.ACC.F sovereignty:ACC.F out.of oracle:GEN
 “the Heraclidae received sovereignty from these and held it, because of an oracle” (Hdt. 1.7.4);
- (35) *epolémese Milēsíōisi, paradexámenos tòn*
 fight:AOR.3SG Milesian:DAT.PL receive:PART.AOR.MID.NOM ART.ACC
pólemon parà tou patrós
 war:ACC by ART.GEN father:GEN
 “he continued the war against the Milesians which he inherited from his father” (Hdt. 1.17.1).

Occasionally, there is a cause – effect relation between the landmark and the trajector:

- (36) *tês dè parà tôn tukhóntōn kai*
 DEM.GEN.F PTC by ART.GEN.PL.M happen:PART.AOR.GEN.PL.M and
epì mikroís pámpan oligōrései
 on little:DAT.PL.N utterly despise:FUT.3SG
 “(honor) from common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly
 despise” (Arist. *EN* 1124a 10).

In (36) there is no passive verbs, but, being the source of an abstract trajector (honor), the human landmark can be conceived of as originating it.

In some occurrences, *pará* with the genitive occurs with a passive verb, and expresses Agent:

- (37) *hōs parà pántōn homologētai*
 as by all:GEN.PL.M agree:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “as everybody agrees” (Xen. *An.* 1.9.1);
- (38) *ep’ eutukhíai tēi megístēi parà theōn*
 on happiness:DAT.F ART.DAT.F greatest:DAT.F by god:GEN.PL
hē toiaútē manía dídotai
 ART.NOM.F INDEF.NOM.F madness:NOM.F give:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness”
 (Pl. *Phdr.* 245b).

Example (38) is taken from a passage on love; Socrates’ major interest here is to stress its divine origin, so the *pará* phrase appears to stress that the gods are the source of love, rather than to focus on the intentionality of their gift. Note further that in Herodotus *pará* with the genitive and human referents expresses Source in concrete contexts, and there is virtually no overlap with other prepositions, notably with *prós*, in Agent expressions, where the latter is much more productive (see §3.17). Example (37) is from Xenophon, an author who, as we have already seen, uses a variety of constructions from different dialects.

With the accusative, Direction expressions only occur with animate landmarks:

- (39) *autòs dè dē hōs tís genēsómenos*
 DEM.NOM PTC PTC PTC INT.NOM become:PART.FUT.MID.NOM
érkhēi parà tôn Prōtagóran?
 go:PRS.M/P.3SG by ART.ACC P:ACC
 “and what is it that you yourself hope to become when you go to Protagoras?” (Pl. *Prt.* 312a);

- (40) *pálin epanekhóroun es tò téikhos kai hoi*
 back retreat:IMPF.3PL to ART.N/A wall:N/A and ART.NOM.PL
Makedónes parà tous Athēnaious
 Macedonian:NOM.PL by ART.ACC.PL Athenian:ACC.PL
 “they retired back within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians” (Th. 1.63.2).

Inanimate landmarks still occur for Location alongside, but note that this use is mostly typical of Herodotus and Thucydides, and does not appear to belong to Attic authors less influenced by Ionic:

- (41) *aútis dè autēs estì Aigúptou mēkos tò*
 further PTC DEM.GEN.F be:PRS.3SG A.:GEN length:N/A ART.N/A
parà thálassan hexékonta skhoínoi
 by sea:ACC.F sixty schoenos:NOM.PL
 “further, the length of the seacoast of Egypt itself is sixty schoeni”
 (Hdt. 2.6.1);
- (42) *apikómenos dè es Libúēn oikise khōron*
 go:PART.AOR.MID.NOM PTC to L.:ACC colonize:AOR.3SG place:ACC
kálliston tòn Libúōn parà Kínupa potamón
 nice:SUP.ACC ART.GEN.PL L.:GEN.PL by K.:ACC river:ACC
 “when he arrived there, he settled by the Cinyps river in the fairest part of Libya” (Hdt. 5.42.3);
- (43) *tēs dè Paionías parà tòn Axión potamón stenén*
 ART.GEN.F PTC P:GEN.F by ART.ACC A.:ACC river:ACC strip:ACC.F
tina kathékousan ánōthen mékhri Pélles
 INDEF.ACC.F go.DOWN:PART.PRS.ACC.F from.above to P.:GEN.F
kai thalássēs ektésanto
 and sea:GEN.F acquire:AOR.MID.3PL
 “of a narrow strip of land in Paeonia along the river Axius, extending to Pella and the sea” (Th. 2.99.4).

In a small number of occurrences, *pará* with the accusative can express Time; its use is derived from the extensional meaning of the accusative:

- (44) *hétera toutou parà tèn zōēn pepónthamen*
 INDEF.N/A.PL DEM.GEN.N by ART.ACC.F life:ACC.F suffer:PF.1PL
oiktrótera
 pitiable:CMPR.N/A.PL
 “throughout life we have suffered worse things than this” (Hdt. 7.46.2);

- (45) *mènes mèn parà tà hebdomḗkonta étea*
 month:NOM.PL PTC by ART.N/A.PL seventy year:N/A.PL
hoi embólimoi gínontai triékonta pénte,
 ART.NOM.PL intercalary:NOM.PL. be:PRS.M/P.3PL thirty five
hēméraì dè ek tôn mēnōn
 day:NOM.PL.F PTC out.of ART.GEN.PL.M month:GEN.PL.M
toutōn khiliai pentékonta
 DEM.GEN.PL.M thousand:NOM.PL.F fifty
 “then there are thirty-five intercalary months during the seventy years,
 and from these months there are one thousand fifty days” (Hdt. 1.32.3).

In both occurrences, *pará* with the accusative denotes a duration in time: a period of time is conceived as an entity along which a state of affairs holds.

The most productive use of *pará* with the accusative is metaphoric. Similar to the examples from Homer, occurrences in Classical prose writers may involve dynamic states of affairs, where the action or process denoted by the predicate can be metaphorically understood as motion, as in example (46):

- (46) *pollōn parà dóxan agōnísámenoì*
 much by hope:ACC.F fight:PART.AOR.MID.NOM.PL
 “after faring far below their expectations in the fight” (Hdt. 8.11.3).

Static states of affairs also occur frequently:

- (47) *aúthis dè hoi mèn kai parà dúnamin*
 again PTC ART.NOM.PL PTC and by power:ACC.F
tolmḗtai kai parà gnómēn kinduneutai kai
 adventurous:NOM.PL and by judgment:ACC.F daring:NOM.PL and
en tois deinois euélpides
 in ART.DAT.PL danger:DAT.PL hopeful:NOM.PL
 “again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their
 judgment, and in danger they are full of hope” (Th. 1.70.3);
- (48) *diaphorà dé tis phainetai tôn*
 difference:NOM.F PTC INDEF.NOM.F appear:PRS.M/P.3SG ART.GEN.PL
telōn: tà mèn gár eisin enérgeiai,
 end:GEN.PL ART.N/A.PL PTC PTC be:PRS.3PL activity:NOM.PL.F
tà dè par’ autàs érga tiná
 ART.N/A.PL PTC by DEM.ACC.PL.F product:N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL
hōn d’ eisi télē tinà pará
 REL.GEN.PL.F PTC be:PRS.3PL end:N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL by

tàs *práxeis,* *en toútois* *beltiō* *péphuke*
 ART.ACC.PL.F practice:ACC.PL.F in DEM.DAT.PL better:N/A.PL be:PF.3SG
tôn *energeiôn* *tà* *érge*
 ART.GEN.PL.F activity:GEN.PL.F ART.N/A.PL product:N/A.PL

“a certain variety is to be observed among the ends: in some cases the activity of practicing the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities”

(Arist. *EN* 1094a 3–6).

In (47) a number of adjectives function as predicates, while in (48) we find the verb form *eisí*, ‘they are’, which denotes a state. The metaphor that, starting with Homer, enabled the shift from the concrete to the abstract meaning was based on the idea that motion alongside a uniplex landmark would lead the trajector beyond it, and, as we have seen, it involved dynamic states of affairs. Here the shift appears to go one step further, and the preposition acquires the meaning ‘beyond’ without being conditioned by the occurrence of a verb which overtly justifies this meaning shift. Note that in its concrete spatial use *pará* with the accusative in Aristotle no longer expresses Location alongside: apparently, the preposition can only express abstract location beyond a landmark.

As I have stated at the beginning of this section, plexity of landmarks plays a limited role with *pará*, being relevant to its use with the accusative only. In spite of limitation, one can see how a certain meaning that was connected with certain conditions of plexity in Homer (in this case, ‘beyond’, connected with uniplex landmarks) extended to other types of landmarks in later Greek, when plexity became irrelevant for the use of cases with prepositions. This development is also attested in the case of other prepositions (see §3.14 and the discussion in §4.1).

3.6 SUN/XUN

The etymology of *sún* is obscure: a variant *xún* is also attested, mainly in Attic, which, according to some scholars, preserves the most ancient form. According to Chantraine (1968), *xún* could be connected with *metáxu*, ‘in the middle’. Semantically, this particle is comparatively simple, its meaning being mostly confined to Comitative, both prototypical, and not, including various instantiations of the Accompaniment relation. After Homer, Manner can be expressed by *sún*, too, but only to a limited extent; the instrumental value, whose origin is visible in some Homeric occurrences already, never fully developed, partly due to the early disappearance of this particle.

In Homer, where the Comitative use of *metá* with the genitive had not developed yet (cf. §3.14), *sún* is the standard expression for Comitative with animate nouns; furthermore, it can occur with inanimate nouns and express Attendant Circumstances. Apart for its doubtful etymology, there are no hints at a more ancient spatial meaning; even when *sún* is used as an adverb the comitative meaning appears to be well established. Examples of *sún* as a free adverb are numerous:

- (1) *sún te dú’ erkhoméō*
 with PTC two go:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.DU
 “two (men) going together” (*Il.* 10.224).¹

Occurrences of *sún* as a preverb are also frequent, examples are verbs such as *sundéesthai*, ‘to tie together’, *sugkhéin*, ‘to mix (by pouring together)’, etc.

In its prepositional use, *sún* only takes the dative. Its meaning in Homer is similar to the meaning of *metá* with the genitive in later prose writers, as will be described in §3.14.² Examples of the comitative use of *sún* in prototypical Comitative expressions, with nouns denoting human beings, are numerous; one is given in (2); in (3) a personal pronoun occurs:

- (2) *lókhond’ iénai sún aristéessin Akhaiōn*
 ambush:ACC go:INF.PRS with best:DAT.PL Achaeans:GEN.PL
 “go forth to an ambush with the chiefs of the Achaeans” (*Il.* 1.227);

- (3) *sùn soi marnámenon Tróōn pólin*
 with 2SG.DAT fight:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC Trojan:GEN.PL city:ACC.F
exalapáxai
 conquer:INF.AOR
 “(he is said) to have conquered Troy fighting at your side”, (*Od.* 3.85).

That humans are accompanied by divine beings in Homeric Greek amounts to say that they achieve their actions with the help of the gods, as shown in

- (4) *enikēsen sùn Athēnēi*
 conquer:AOR.3SG with A.:DAT
 “he conquered with Athena’s help” (*Il.* 3.439).

The use of *sùn* in this passage is similar to the use of *diá* in examples such as (26) from §3.9. The conceptualization is different: with *diá* the landmark is an enabling cause; in (4) it is the concept of accompaniment that implies help from a superior entity.

With inanimate nouns, too, *sùn* is used to express Accompaniment; this is also true in cases where the landmark is constituted by a noun denoting some sort of typical instrument. With this sort of landmarks, *sùn* indicates that an agent performs an action together with some concrete object, rather than by means of it. Occurrences of this sort are frequent with nouns that denote vehicles (especially the word for ‘ship’) or weapons, as shown in the following examples:

- (5) *sùn teúkhesin álto khamâze*
 with arm:DAT.PL leap:AOR.MID.3SG to.the.ground
 “he leapt on the ground in his armor” (*Il.* 12.81 and *passim*);
- (6) *hoúneka deúr’ hikómestha thoêi sùn nēi*
 wherefore here come:AOR.MID.1PL quick:DAT.F with ship:DAT.F
meláinēi
 black:DAT.F
 “for which we came hither with our swift black ship” (*Od.* 3.61).

Although occurrences like (6) can leave some doubt about a possible instrumental interpretation, the latter is ruled out by the occurrence of a coordinated Comitative NP in other examples, such as (7):

- (7) *all’ íthi nún sùn nēi te sēi kai*
 but go:IMPT.PRS.2SG now with ship:DAT.F and POSS.2SG.DAT.F and
soís hetároisin
 POSS.2SG.DAT.PL.M comrade:DAT.PL.M
 “but now go your way with your ship and your comrades” (*Od.* 3.323).

In one occurrence, the relation expressed by *sùn* is clearly Instrument. In example (8), the preposition has the function of disambiguating the otherwise unclear dative:

- (8) *sún te megálōi apéteisan sùn sphêisin*
 with PTC big:DAT pay:AOR.3PL with POSS.3PL.DAT.PL.F
kephalêisi gunaixí te kai tekéessin
 head:DAT.PL.F wife:DAT.PL.F PTC and child:DAT.PL
 “and with a heavy price do (men) make atonement, with their own heads
 and their wives and their children” (*Il.* 4.161–162)

The verb *apotínein*, ‘to pay back’, is found elsewhere with an animate indirect object in the dative, encoding the role Recipient, as in (9):

- (9) *Tròas ... timèn d’ Argeíois apotinémen hên*
 Trojan:ACC.PL price:ACC.F PTC Argive:DAT.PL pay:INF.PRS REL.ACC.F
tin’ éoiken
 INDEF.ACC.F seem:PF.3SG
 “then let the Trojans pay to the Argives in requital such recompense as
 seems appropriate” (*Il.* 3.285–286).

In (8), the PP *sùn sphêisin kephalêisi gunaixí te kai tekéessin*, ‘with their own heads, their wives, and their children’, denotes the means of atonement. It includes a noun denoting a body part (*kephalêisi*, ‘heads’), which can be regarded as a typical instrument, coordinated with two animate nouns (*gunaixí te kai tekéessin*, ‘wives and children’), which in their turn represent non-prototypical instruments. A plain dative here would make the resulting NP ambiguous between Instrument and Recipient, so the preposition *sún* is used, introducing the metaphor AN INSTRUMENT IS A COMPANION. Note that the accompaniment relation is partly overt in this example: of the coordinated items, the first, being inanimate, can more readily be conceived as an Instrument, whereas the second does not necessarily imply such interpretation. In fact, the PP *sùn gunaixí te kai tekéessin* still leaves open a Comitative interpretation (‘you will atone, together with your wives and children’).

As we will see in §3.14, this metaphor is only exploited to a limited extent in Ancient Greek. In fact, this semantic extension in the case of *sún* was apparently felt as poetical, as I will show below, in the discussion of example (22). Among prose writers, Xenophon displays the extension of *sún* from Comitative to Instrument: we will see an example in (21). In passages similar to (8), where an instrumental dative would be potentially ambiguous and needed to be disambiguated with a preposition, later authors rather employed *diá* with the genitive, as shown in §3.9: but the instrumental use of *diá* with the genitive was unknown to Homer.

With other types of inanimate nouns, *sún* again denotes Accompaniment. In (10) a noun denoting a body part occurs, which would normally be in the plain dative if the relation expressed were Instrument:

- (10) *pleiotéréi sún kheirì philēn es patriá'*
 full:CMPR.DAT.F with hand:DAT.F dear:ACC.F to homeland:ACC.F
hikésthai
 come:INF.AOR.MID
 “to come with a fuller hand to my native land” (*Od.* 11.359).

In (11) and (12) *sún* occurs with abstract nouns. In (11) the trajector is what is said by the agent:

- (11) *all' egò ouk aútōs muthésomai, allà sún hórkōi*
 but 1SG.NOM NEG randomly speak:FUT.MID.1SG but with oath:DAT
 “therefore will I tell you, not at random but with an oath” (*Od.* 14.151).

According to Crespo (1994: 184), *sún hórkōi* here should be understood as expressing Manner, because it is contrasted with a Manner adverb, *aútōs*, ‘at random’. Note, however, that there is a relation of accompaniment between the words spoken by the agent/subject and the landmark (the oath), and the expression should better be taken as denoting Accompanying Circumstances.

In (12) the trajector is the patient, and the landmark denotes an accompanying quality:

- (12) *sún megálēi aretēi ektēsō ákoitin*
 with big:DAT.F excellence:DAT.F acquire:AOR.MID.2SG wife:ACC.F
 “full of excellence was the wife you won” (*Od.* 24.193).

In Herodotus, *sún* is used to express Comitative, much in the same way as in Homer.³ As shown in §3.14, Comitative could also be expressed by *metá* with the genitive in Herodotus. Some passages show that, at least in the case of animate nouns, the two prepositions are used in much the same way:

- (13) *epeíte dè exémathe hōs ou sún keinoisi*
 when PTC know:AOR.3SG that NEG with DEM.DAT.PL.M
eīē taúta pepoiēkōs, élabē autón
 be:OPT.PRS.3SG DEM.N/A.PL do:PART.PF.NOM seize:AOR.3SG DEM.ACC
te tòn Intaphrénea kai toús paídas autoú
 PTC ART.ACC I:ACC and ART.ACC.PL son:ACC.PL DEM.GEN.M
kai toús oikéious pántas, elpídas
 and ART.ACC.PL household:ACC.PL all:ACC.PL hope:ACC.PL.F

pollàs ékhōn metà tōn
 many:ACC.PL.F have:PART.PRS.NOM with ART.GEN.PL
sungenēōn min epibouleúein hoi epanástasin
 kinsman:GEN.PL 3SG.ACC plot:INF.PRS 3SG.DAT rebellion:ACC.F
 “and being assured that they had no part in it, he seized Intaphrenes with his sons and all his household - for he strongly suspected that the man was plotting a rebellion with his kinsmen” (Hdt. 3.119.2).

Mommsen (1895) contains a survey of the use of *metá* and *sún* in various authors. According to his data, *sún* is more frequent than *metá* with the genitive by a ratio of 9/8 in Herodotus; furthermore, *sún* occurs with a bigger variety of landmarks, including inanimate ones, both concrete and abstract, which are rather infrequent with *metá* (see §3.14). With animate landmarks, *sún* also displays a bigger semantic range: for example, it can mean ‘including’, as in:

- (14) *hebdomēkonta sún hippeúsi*
 seven.hundred.thousand with cavalry:DAT.PL
 “seven hundred thousand including the cavalry” (Hdt. 4.87.1).

With abstract nouns, *sún* can express Manner:

- (15) *toúto dè poiésas kárta eupetéōs tà*
 DEM.N/A PTC do:PART.AOR.NOM very easily ART.N/A.PL
loipà kheiroútai, mè poiésas dè toúto
 rest:N/A.PL master:PRS.MID.3SG NEG do:PART.AOR.NOM PTC DEM.N/A
sún pónōi
 with toil:DAT
 “when this is done, the quarry is very easily mastered – if that is not done, (the quarry is mastered) with toil” (Hdt. 2.70.2).

In (15) given the lexical meaning of *pónos*, ‘toil’, the notion of accompaniment is re-interpreted as referring to Manner. This interpretation is favored by the occurrence of a manner adverb, *eupetéōs*, ‘easily’, in the first clause, but the latter condition is not *per se* sufficient: if one compares this passage with (11), one can see that only where a referential reading is impossible the Manner interpretation remains the only possible one.

In (16) we find an extension to an abstract noun similar to the Homeric occurrences with divine referents, shown above in (4):

- (16) *Dareĩos ho Hustáspeos sún te toú híppou*
 D.:NOM ART.NOM of.H.:gen with PTC ART.GEN horse:GEN
tèi aretèi ... ektésato tèn
 ART.DAT.F valor:DAT.F conquer:AOR.MID.3SG ART.ACC.F
Perséon basiléien
 Persian:GEN.PL kingdom:ACC.F
 “Darius, the son of Histaspes, by the valor of his horse conquered the kingdom of Persia” (Hdt. 3.88.3).

In this example the meaning of the *sún* phrase is closer to Cause than Instrument or Attendant Circumstances: the valor of the horse is conceived as the quality that makes possible the states of affairs (the preceding context also makes clear that there is no implication of direct manipulation by the agent), in much the same way as an enabling cause encoded through *diá* and the accusative (see §3.9 for the relevant examples).

In the Attic prose writers, the most notable peculiarity of *sún* is its decreasing frequency. The preposition did not belong to the Attic spoken variety, and the literary language retained it inasmuch as it was influenced by Ionic. The ratiōn *sún/metá* plus genitive in Thucydides is, according to Mommsen (1895:356) 1/11, and becomes much lower when we consider Plato and Aristotle. The meaning of *sún* is equivalent to the meaning of *metá* with the genitive (§3.14).

Some examples of *sún* in Attic prose writers are given below:

- (17) *légō d’ hótī hē mèn houútōs estīn*
 say:PRS.1SG PTC that REL.NOM.F PTC thus be:PRS.3SG
ousía, sùn tēi húlēi
 substance:NOM.F with ART.DAT.F matter:DAT.F
suneilēmémēnos ho lógos, hē d’
 combine:PART.PF.M/P.NOM ART.NOM word:NOM ART.NOM.F PTC
ho lógos hólōs
 ART.NOM word:NOM wholly
 “I mean that one kind of substance is the formula in combination with the matter, and the other is the formula in its full sense”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1039b 20–22);
- (18) *apokteinúntōn kai anabiōskoménōn*
 kill:PART.PRS.GEN.PL.M and bring.back.to.life:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.M
g’ án, ei hoioí t’ êsan, oudenì xùn
 PTC PTC if able:NOM.PL PTC be:IMPF.3PL INDEF.DAT.M with

- nôí, toútōn tōn pollōn*
 sense:DAT.M DEM.GEN.PL.M ART.GEN.PL.M many:GEN.PL.M
 “of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again,
 if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude” (Pl. *Cri* 48c);
- (19) *prōtos dè eíseisin ho tò stádion*
 first:NOM PTC enter:FUT.3SG ART.NOM ART.N/A furlong:N/A
hamillēsómenos sùn toís hóplois
 run:PART.FUT.MID.NOM with ART.DAT.PL arm:DAT.PL
 “first, then, there shall enter the man who, with his arms, is to run the
 furlong” (Pl. *Laws* 833a);
- (20) *hekóntōn gàr hekoûsa oudemía, all’*
 willing:GEN.PL PTC voluntary:NOM.F INDEF.NOM.F but
akóntōn hekoûsa árkhei sùn aeí
 unwilling:GEN.PL voluntary:NOM.F rule:PRS.3SG with always
tini bíai
 INDEF.DAT.F force:DAT.F
 “for none is a form of voluntary rule over willing (subjects), but a volun-
 tary rule over unwilling ones always accompanied by some kind of force”
 (Pl. *Laws* 832c).

In (17) we have a relation of accompaniment (compare with (25) from §3.14, where the preposition *metá* occurs). Accompaniment shift to Manner in (18), again to be compared with analogous examples with *metá* (cf. §3.14 ex. (27)). Note that the Manner interpretation in this passage depends on the meaning of the NP *noús*, ‘mind’, ‘sense’: in principle, if another lexeme occurred, an interpretation as Attendant Circumstances would be possible.

Typical instrument nouns normally do not occur in Instrument expressions with *sún*, as shown in (19), where *sùn toís hóplois* means ‘in arms’, rather than ‘by means of arms’: again, this occurrence can be compared with similar occurrences of *metá* with the genitive, as example (23) from §3.14. Finally, abstract landmarks can occur in Instrument expressions with *sún*, much in the same way (though with much lesser frequency) than with *metá* and the genitive, as shown in example (20) above and in (29) from §3.14. Note that the instrumental interpretation is confirmed by *hekoûsa*, ‘voluntary’, here referring to the subject *oudemía*, ‘none’, which in its turn refers back to *dēmokratían kai oligarkhían kai turannída*, ‘democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny’, in the preceding context.

In the later prose of Xenophon, influenced by Ionic and other dialects, *sún* becomes more frequent again, still displaying the same range of usage

as in Attic prose. An instrumental interpretation is sometimes possible, as shown in (21):

- (21) *epístamai* *dè kai triêreis* *polláki*
 know:PRS.M/P.1SG PTC and trireme:ACC.PL.F often
ekpempoménas *sún polléi* *dapánēi*
 send:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL.F with much:DAT.F cost:DAT.F
 “I know that often ships are sent with much expense” (Xen. *Vect.* 3.8).

In poetry *sún* was more frequently used than in prose, because it was felt as poetic, given its frequency in Homer. In Aeschylus (contemporary of Plato), we find an instance of true Instrument expression with an instrument noun as the landmark, an action verb, and an animate voluntary agent as the trajector:

- (22) *taútá* *toi kakoís* *homilôn* *andrásin*
 DEM.N/A.PL PTC evil:DAT.PL consort:PART.PRS.NOM man:DAT.PL
didásketai *thourios* *Xérxēs. légousi* *d’ hōs*
 learn:PRS.M/P.3SG impetuous:NOM X.:NOM tell:PRS.3PL PTC that
sù *mèn mégan téknois* *plou̓ton* *ektésō*
 2SG.NOM PTC big:ACC child:DAT.PL treasure:ACC win:AOR.MID.2SG
xùn aikhmēi, *tòn d’ anandrias* *húpo éndon*
 with spear:DAT.F DEM.ACC PTC cowardice:GEN.F under at.home
aikhmázein, *patrōion d’ ólbon* *oudèn auxánein*
 fight:INF.PRS of.father:ACC PTC wealth:ACC NEG increase:INF.PRS
 “his lesson impetuous Xerxes learned through conversation with evil men.
 For they kept telling him that, whereas you won plentiful treasure for your
 children by your spear, he, on his part, through lack of manly spirit, played
 the warrior at home and did not increase his father’s wealth”
 (Aesch. *Pers.* 753–756).

This example shows that the Companion metaphor could possibly be activated in Greek, although it did not account for the standard way to express Instrument. In other words, the metaphor is still much closer to a poetic device, than to a grammaticalized shift. The semantic extension had to be interpreted as such each time it was used, and it had not become part of the meaning of the particle.⁴

In this section we have seen that the meaning of *sún* as a preposition is partly parallel to the meaning of *metá* with the genitive in post-Homeric Greek. Its function is to express Comitative and Attendant Circumstances; only from Herodotus on we also find Manner expressions, and limited to abstract nouns.

Note that, much in the same way as for *metá*, the possibility for Comitative to extend to Manner does not seem to imply an instrumental function.

The extension of *sún* to Instrument is sporadic, and mainly confined to abstract landmarks. The occurrence of examples such as (22) in poetry may indicate that meaning of the preposition could have extended in this direction, if *sún* had not been completely obliterated by the increasingly frequent *metá* with the genitive.

3.7 PRO

The particle *pró* means ‘before’, similar to its numerous cognates attested in other Indo-European languages, including English ‘fore-’. In Homer, it occurs as a free adverb, as in (1):

- (1) *prò gâr hêké min Hêrē*
 before PTC send:AOR.3SG 3SG.ACC.F H.:NOM
 “for Hera sent her forth” (*Il.* 18.168),

or as a preposition with the genitive; it also has a frequent usage as a pre-verb, based on its etymological meaning: *probállēin*, ‘to throw forth’, *pronoēin*, ‘to foresee’.

The main function of the preposition *pró* in the Homeric poems is spatial Location:

- (2) *ándra ... eídon prò ptólios dedaïgménon*
 man:ACC see:AOR.1SG before city:GEN.F slay:PART.PF.M/P.ACC
oxēi khalkôî
 sharp.DAT bronze:DAT
 “my husband I saw slain with the sharp bronze before our city”
 (*Il.* 19.291–292);
- (3) *ásbestos dè boè génet’ ēôthi*
 unquenchable:NOM.F PTC cry:NOM.F rise:AOR.MID.3SG dawn:GEN.F
pró
 before
 “and a cry unquenchable rose up before the face of Dawn” (*Il.* 11.50).

The schema denoted by *pró* can be represented as in Figure 11.

An interesting occurrence is (4), with the verb *gígnesthai*, ‘to be’:




Figure 11. Schema of *pró* in (2)–(3)

- (4) *hoi d' epei oûn óikhonto idè pró*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC when then depart:IMPF.M/P.3PL PTC before
hodoú egénonto
 way:GEN.F be:AOR.MID.3PL
 “so when they had departed and were already further on on their way”
 (*Il.* 4.382).

Here *pró* does not indicate that the trajector is located in front of the landmark, but rather that it is advanced in a trajectory that is located inside the landmark. It does not simply profile anterior location, but also a trajectory, and a deictic point, which here is not the landmark’s perspective, but the point of view of an observer. The shift is made possible through a process of subjectification. This meaning is found fairly frequently in Attic prose; it can be represented as in Figure 12.

Occasionally the landmark can be an abstract noun. In this case, the preposition denotes an abstract Location:

- (5) *perì gàr díe mé min Akhaioi ... pró*
 about PTC fear:AOR.3SG NEG 3SG.ACC Achaean:NOM.PL before
phóboio ... lípoien
 fear:GEN leave:OPT.AOR.3PL
 “he was afraid that the Achaeans should leave him for fear”
 (*Il.* 17.666–667).

This occurrence, which is glossed as attesting a causal meaning of *pró* in reference works, displays an occasional metaphor. Indeed, Cause expressions constructed with prepositions that mean ‘in front of’ are frequent in the Indo-European languages, and examples are available both from modern languages (German *vor Angst*, ‘for fear’), and from ancient ones (Hittite *kasti piran*, ‘for hunger’, lit.: ‘in front of (*piran*) hunger:DAT (*kasti*)’). They rely on a metaphor that associates spatial location on the front side of a landmark with direct causation. The diffusion of this metaphor in several Indo-European languages has




Figure 12. Schema of *pró* in (4)

been noted by scholars; Dunkel (1990) has suggested that it should be reconstructed for Proto-Indo-European. However old this metaphor may be, it does not appear to have generated stable polysemy in Greek.

The spatial relation expressed by *pró* envisages the trajector as covering the landmark: with verbs of ‘fighting’, in particular, the location of the trajector before the landmark implies that the trajector can protect the landmark, as shown in

- (6) *allà prò Trōōn kai Trōiádōn*
 but before Trojan:GEN.PL.M and Trojan:GEN.PL.F
bathukólpōn hestaót’ oúte phóbou
 deep.girded:GEN.PL.F stand:PART.PF.ACC NEG flight:GEN
memnēménon oút’ aleōrēs
 remember:PART.PF.M/P.ACC NEG shelter:GEN.F
 “but while standing forth in defense of the men and deep-bosomed women of Troy, with no thought of shelter or of flight” (*Il.* 24. 215–216).

In (6) spatial and abstract meaning may be thought to co-exist: the warrior is depicted as standing forth in front of the enemy on the battlefield on the plain outside the walls of Troy; women and children are inside the city walls, so in fact they are located behind him. In example (7) the shift to abstract meaning is complete and the preposition expresses Beneficiary:

- (7) *mémasan dè kai hōs husmīni mákhesthai*
 be.eager:PLPF.3PL PTC and so battle:DAT.F fight:INF.PRS.M/P
khreioi anankaiēi, pró te paidōn kai prò
 necessity:DAT.F urgent:DAT.F before PTC child:GEN.PL and before
gunaikōn
 wife:GEN.PL.F
 “but even so were they eager to fight for utter need, for their children’s sake and their wives” (*Il.* 8.56–57).

Time expressions also occur in Homer, though infrequently:

- (8) *eí ké sphi prò gámoio teleutései kakòn*
 if PTC 3PL.DAT before marriage:GEN.PL fulfil:FUT.3SG evil:N/A
ēmar
 day:N/A
 “whether or not before marriage he will fulfill for them the evil day” (*Od.* 15.524).

Example (9) is interesting in the light of later developments:

- (9) *es Thēbas, hôte te prò Akhaiôn ággelos*
 to T.:ACC.PL when PTC before Achaean:GEN.PL messenger:NOM
éiei
 go:IMPF.3SG
 “into Thebes, when time he went forth as a messenger of the Achaeans”
 (*Il.* 10.286).

The text continues, explaining that the agent referred to had left his companions where they were camping. So he went on his embassy before the others moved, but note that temporal sequencing as expressed by *pró* does not imply that the state of affairs that could have followed actually took place. This function of the preposition will become relevant in later authors; I will discuss it at length below.

In Attic-Ionic spatial uses of *pró* are still attested, similar to the Homeric ones; the extent of the spatial use of *pró* depends on the individual writers. Herodotus and Thucydides use the preposition fairly frequently in geographic descriptions or to locate events:

- (10) *pròs tòn Isthmòn plósantas naumakhéin*
 toward ART.ACC I.:ACC sail:PART.AOR.ACC.PL fight.by.sea:INF.PRS
prò tēs Peloponnēsou
 before ART.GEN.F P.:GEN.F
 “to sail to the Isthmus and fight at sea in front of the Peloponnese”
 (*Hdt.* 8.49.2);
- (11) *tàs gàr mēkhanàs kai xúla hósa*
 ART.ACC.PL.F PTC engine:ACC.PL.F and timber:N/A.PL REL.N/A.PL
prò toú teíkhous ên katablēména
 before ART.GEN wall:GEN be:IMPF.3SG throw:PART.PF.M/P.N/A.PL
 “the engines and timber thrown down before the wall” (*Th.* 6.102.2).

In Plato one mostly finds idiomatic expressions:

- (12) *prò podôn*
 before foot:GEN.PL
 “nearby” (*Pl. Rep.* 432d).

Aristotle has a more varied local use of *pró*, although the number of occurrences of the preposition is on the whole rather low:

- (17) *kai ei gégonen hósa è péphuke prò*
 and if happen:PF.3SG REL.N/A.PL PTC be:PF.3SG before
ekeinou è héneka ekeinou, hoíon ei éstrapse, kai
 DEM.GEN.N PTC for DEM.GEN.N as if lighten:AOR.3SG and
ebróntēsen, kai ei epeírase, kai épraxen
 thunder:AOR.3SG and if try:AOR.3SG and do:AOR.3SG
 “and if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered, and if one has tried, one has done” (Aris. *Rh.* 1392b 25).

Example (17) is of particular interest, because it equates precedence in time to a necessary preliminary, by coordinating *hósa péphuke prò ekeinou*, ‘things that necessarily precede an event’, with (*hósa*) *héneka ekeinou*, ‘causes of an event’. The same shift occurs in (18):

- (18) *tà gàr prò harmonías anankaía*
 ART.N/A.PL PTC before harmony:GEN.F necessary:N/A.PL
mathémata epístasai all’ ou tà
 knowledge:N/A.PL know:PRS.M/P.2SG but NEG ART.N/A.PL
harmoniká
 harmonic:N/A.PL
 “you know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself” (Pl. *Phdr.* 268e).

The phrase *anankaía mathémata*, ‘necessary knowledge’, refers to notions that must be acquired as preliminary to the study of harmony: they are necessary for the understanding of harmony, so their knowledge must come earlier in a temporal sequence.

The most widespread metaphorical meaning of *pró* is based on its temporal value. Let us first consider the next sentence:

- (19) *hōs basileūs oudeis állos prò seú*
 for king:NOM INDEF.NOM INDEF.NOM before 2SG.GEN
éstai
 be:FUT.MID.3SG
 “for no one else shall be king before you” (Hdt. 3.85.2).

The above sentence, together with similar occurrences, can be taken to have merely a temporal meaning, as in the translation given above; often, the passage is translated “no one shall be king in your place”: with *pró* there is an implication that something which comes before excludes another possibility. On the basis of this implication, *pró* frequently means ‘instead of’, ‘rather than’:

- (20) *hēmîn ge toîs éti eleuthérois pollê*
 1PL.DAT PTC ART.DAT.PL.M still free:DAT.PL.M much:NOM.F
kakótēs kai deilía mē pân pró
 baseness:NOM.F and cowardice:NOM.F NEG all:N/A before
toû douleúsai epexeltheîn
 ART.GEN.N serve:INF.AOR accomplish:INF.AOR
 “it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything possible before submitting to your yoke” (Th. 5.100);
- (21) *oudeîs gàr hoútō anóētos estì hóstis pólemon*
 INDEF.NOM PTC SO foolish:NOM be:PRS.3SG REL.NOM war:ACC
prò eirénēs hairéetai
 before peace:GEN.F choose:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “no one is so foolish as to choose war over peace” (Hdt. 1.87.4).
- (22) *kállion éinai pró toû pheúgein te*
 good:CMPR.N/A be:INF.PRS before ART.GEN.N escape:INF.PRS PTC
kai apodidráskein hupékhein têi pólei díkēn
 and flee:INF.PRS suffer:INF.PRS ART.DAT.F city:DAT.F penalty:ACC.F
 “(if I did not think) it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away” (Pl. *Phd.* 99a).

The path along which the temporal meaning shifts to substitution is still visible in (20), where *pró*, similar to (19), admits both translations (‘before submitting’ or ‘rather than submitting’). In (21) the semantic extension is explained by the implication that, if one’s first choice is war, than one could no longer choose peace; similarly, in (22) the choice of enduring penalty excludes possible escape.

The above examples all contain verbs that denote choice or preference, so that the implication of possible priority is present, although the idea of temporal sequencing can be reconstructed as its origin, but is no longer expressed by the preposition. Still one step farther away from their temporal source are the examples which follow, where the preposition means ‘in exchange for’:

- (23) *mēdē pró spodoû ménontas kinduneúein*
 NEG before dust:GEN stay:PART.PRS.ACC.PL risk:INF.PRS
 “there was no need to risk their lives for the dust (of the desert)”
 (Hdt. 4.11.2);

- (24) *ei hèn humeîs àn prò pollôn khrêmátōn*
 if REL.ACC.F 2PL.NOM PTC before much:GEN.PL good:GEN.PL
kai kháritos etimésasthe dúnamin humîn
 and favor:GEN.F value:AOR.MID.2PL power:ACC.F 2PL.DAT
prosgenésthai
 come:INF.AOR.MID
 “it the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material
 and moral strength, should present itself self-invited” (Th. 1.33. 2).

Note that this meaning, with which *pró* is synonymous with *antí* (see §3.8), is clearly expressed in (24) and several other similar occurrences containing verbs of evaluation. Here and in (23) *pró* denotes Purpose: the landmark is an entity which is received by somebody in exchange for something, so it is the purpose of the exchange. Note that this meaning can also be related to the local metaphor that provides the ground for the extension of *pró* to Beneficiary, discussed below, see example (26).

We have seen in the discussion of examples (6) and (7) that an abstract meaning had developed in Homer out of the spatial meaning of *pró*, by which the preposition could express Beneficiary. This meaning continues particularly in the Attic prose writers, while in Herodotus it is difficult to say if some passages where *pró* means ‘in defense of’ should be better explained as based on the temporal metaphor described above:

- (25) *ou gár ti prokatēménous tosoúto prò*
 NEG PTC INDEF.N/A lie:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL as.much before
tês állēs Helládos mouínous prò huméōn
 ART.GEN.F INDEF.GEN.F Greece:GEN.F alone:ACC.PL before 2PL.GEN
deí apolésthai
 need:PRS.3SG perish:INF.AOR.MID
 “for it is not right that we, being in a foremost position as compared to
 the rest of Greece, should perish alone for your sakes” (Hdt. 7.172.2);
- (26) *kêrugma toiónde poieuménōn, eí*
 proclamation:N/A INDEF.N/A make:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.M if
tis bouiloito Lakedaimoníōn prò tês
 INDEF.NOM want:OPT.PRS.M/P.3SG Spartan:GEN.PL before ART.GEN.F
Spártēs apothnêskein
 S.:GEN.F die:INF.PRS
 “making a proclamation inviting some Spartan to give his life for Sparta”
 (Hdt. 7.134.2).

In (25), in particular, we find two occurrences of *pró*. The first describes an itinerary: a group of Greeks, the Thessalians, whose geographical situation is such that the enemy would encounter them first, would be the only ones to risk their lives. The preposition has spatial reference, but it also denotes an order in time, if we take the point of view of somebody who moves along the itinerary (in this case, the enemies). In the second occurrence, *pró* denotes Beneficiary; *prò huméōn* can be translated as ‘for your sake’ or as ‘in your place’. Example (26) looks similar to (23), and shows the close relation between Beneficiary and Purpose. The extension from Beneficiary to Purpose is connected with the occurrence of an inanimate noun in a type of expression mostly used for animate nouns.

In Attic we find more occurrences of *pró* with the meaning ‘in defense of’, ‘for the sake of’:

- (27) *taúta proubalómēn egō prò tēs Attikēs*
 DEM.N/A.PL put:AOR.MID.1SG 1SG.NOM before ART.GEN.F A.:GEN.F
 “these were the bastions I planted for the protection of Attica”
 (Dem. 18.300);

- (28) *prò érgou gār tò metabáinein eis tò*
 before matter:GEN PTC ART.N/A.SG pass:INF.PRS to ART.N/A
gnōrimóteron
 intelligible:CMPR.N/A
 “it is convenient to advance to the more intelligible”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1029b 3).

In (27) Demosthenes is not referring to concrete entities physically located in front of Attica, but to political speeches, so the preposition can only express its abstract meaning, and denote Beneficiary. In (28) we find the phrase *prò érgou*, a frequent idiom in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, which means ‘favorable’, ‘convenient’.

As a summary we can draw a mental map of *pró* (Figure 13), which shows how its abstract meanings are based partly on spatial, partly on temporal meaning. Since the spatial meaning seems etymologically older, temporal meaning must be derived from it.




Figure 13. Mental map of *pro*

3.8 ANTI

The particle *antí* originally meant ‘in front of’, ‘before’; it has cognates in numerous Indo-European languages (e.g. Latin *ante*, ‘before’), and appears to be formed on a nominal root with the ending of the locative.¹ Another adverb, *ánta*, apparently continues an accusative form. On account of its relatively transparent nominal origin, it is usually thought that the genitive, the only case that occurs with *antí*, originated from an adnominal construction.

Only the form *ánta* is used as a free adverb; however, the form *antí* has both prepositional and preverbal usage. As a preverb, *antí* sometimes continues its etymological meaning, as in *antitássein*, ‘to set opposite to’ (especially referred to armies).

Traces of the etymological meaning of *antí* when it is used as a preposition are scarce and mostly limited to inscriptions in non-literary dialects; however, Xenophon has an occurrence of *antí* in concrete local meaning.² As I have already remarked, this author has an eclectic language, often presenting peculiarities otherwise unknown to the literary language: the local use of *antí* must thus be viewed as deriving from Xenophon’s acquaintance with various dialectal traditions.

In all other writers, starting with Homer, *antí* only occurs with its abstract meaning ‘instead’, ‘in return for’, ‘in exchange for’. Since the semantic development which led *antí* to convey such meaning is unattested, and, on the other hand, the starting point and the endpoint of the development are similar to those I have described for *pró*, one may hypothesize that *antí* followed the same path, but this is of course only a hypothesis.

According to Bortone (2000: 183), “the original distinction between them [*sc. antí* and *pró*] was that *antí* indicated that one object was *facing* the other ... while *pró* allowed the point of view to be that of a third observer”. The two schemas, according to this quote, can be represented as in Figure 14. Unfortunately, this difference cannot be demonstrated based on the literary language.

A few examples from different periods may suffice to illustrate the meaning of *antí*:




Figure 14.

- (1) *soi de theoi tônð' anti khárin*
 2SG.DAT PTC god:NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL.N INSTEAD.OF grace:ACC.F
menoeikéa doien
 satisfying:ACC.F give:OPT.AOR.3PL
 “to you may the gods give in requital hereof grace to satisfy your heart”
 (*Il.* 23.650);
- (2) *dúo te anti henòs nēoüs têi Athēnaíēi*
 two:ACC PTC instead.of one:GEN temple:ACC.PL ART.DAT.F A.:DAT.F
oikodómēse ho Aluáttēs en têi Assēsōi, autós
 build:AOR.3SG ART.NOM A.:NOM in ART.DAT.F A.:DAT.F 3SG.NOM
te ek tēs noúsou anéstē
 PTC out.of ART.GEN.F illness:GEN.F recover:AOR.3SG
 “Alyattes built not one but two temples of Athena at Assesos, and recovered from his illness” (*Hdt.* 1.22.4);
- (3) *Kroíse, tís se anthrópōn anégnōse epì*
 C.:VOC INT.NOM 2SG.ACC man:GEN.PL persuade:AOR.3SG on
gên tèn emèn strateusámenon
 land:ACC.F ART.ACC.F POSS.ACC.F wage.war:PART.AOR.MID.ACC
polémion anti phílou emoì katastēnai?
 enemy:ACC instead.of friend:GEN 1SG.DAT became:INF.AOR
 “Croesus, what man persuaded you to wage war against my land and become my enemy instead of my friend?” (*Hdt.* 1.87.3);
- (4) *ou gàr mónon hina práttōmen allà kai mēthèn*
 NEG PTC only for act:SUBJ.PRS.1PL but and INDEF.N/A
méllontes práttein tò horàn
 be.about:PART.PRS.NOM.PL act:INF.PRS ART.N/A see:INF.PRS

hairoúmetha antì pántōn hōs eipeîn
 prefer:PRS.M/P.1PL instead.of all:GEN.PL.N so speaking:INF.AOR
tôn állōn
 ART.GEN.PL.N INDEF.GEN.PL.N

“not only when we need to act, but even when we are not going to act, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other (senses)”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 980a 24–26);

- (5) *kaī tîn' ân, ô Kritía, mállon antì toutou*
 and INT.ACC PTC PTC K.:VOC rather instead.of DEM.GEN
metaláboimen ... ?
 adopt:OPT.AOR.1PL

“what story should we adopt, Critias, in preference to this?” (Pl. *Tm.* 26e).

The examples can be compared with those analyzed in §3.7, with *pró* denoting substitution or preference. In all examples *antí* means ‘instead of’, ‘rather than’. In §3.7, I have argued that this meaning developed for *pró* out of its temporal meaning; it is hard to demonstrate that the same occurred in the case of *antí*, because temporal meaning is not attested: the idea of substitution evocated by *antí* could also have developed out of its local meaning alone.

3.9 DIA

The preposition *diá* is etymologically related to the root of the numeral for ‘two’, **dis-*; its spatial meaning is ‘through’, or, as we will see, ‘across’. The particle does not occur as a free adverb, but its use as a preverb is frequent in compounds in which it indicates separation, as in *diarpázein*, ‘to carry away’, or it sometimes retains the original meaning, as in *diadérkesthai*, ‘to see through’. Already in Homer, the preverb *diá-* developed a number of other meanings, most notably along two lines. In the first place, it conveys an idea of arranging and ordering, which can be connected with the meaning of separation, as in *diakrínein*, which, from the original meaning attested in Homer ‘to distinguish’, came to mean ‘to decide’. The English word ‘diacritic’ is derived from this verb; it denotes an element which distinguishes between two otherwise identical forms. The second semantic extension, found with verbs that denote distraction, indicates thoroughness, completeness of the action, as in *diaphtheírein*, ‘to destroy completely’. Extension from the spatial meaning ‘through’ to the idea of completeness is based on the assumption that motion through a landmark exhausts its complete extension, i.e. the particle comes to mean ‘throughout’. As we will see in the present section, though, the paths taken by the preposition in its semantic extension are different from those taken by the preverb.

As a preposition, *diá* takes the genitive and the accusative in Homer (there are no traces of a possible use with the dative); its use is mostly spatial with both cases.

Below are some examples of *diá* with the genitive:

- (1) *pheúgon épeit’ apáneuthe di’ Helládos*
flee:IMPF.1SG then far through Greece:GEN.F
“then I fled far away through Greece” (*Il.* 9.478);
- (2) *di’ ómou khálkeon égkhos êlthen*
through shoulder:GEN of.bronze:N/A spear:N/A go:AOR.3SG
“the spear of bronze went through his shoulder” (*Il.* 4. 481–482);
- (4) *dià mèn aspídos êlthe phaínès óbrimon*
through PTC shield:GEN.F go:AOR.3SG shining:GEN.F mighty:N/A
égkhos, kai dià thōrēkos ... ērēreisto
spear:N/A and through corselet:GEN be.fixed:PLPF.M/P.3SG
“the mighty spear went through the bright shield, and through the corselet did it force” (*Il.* 3.357–358);

- (5) *kephalèn d' hapalès apò deirès kópsen*
 head:ACC.F PTC tender:GEN.F from neck:GEN.F cut:AOR.3SG
Oīliádēs ... hēke dé min sphairēdòn
 of.O.:NOM throw:AOR.3SG PTC 3SG.ACC.F like.a.ball
helixámenos di' homílou
 roll:PART.AOR.MID.NOM through crowd:GEN
 “the son of Oileus cut the head from the tender neck, and with a swing he sent it rolling through the throng like a ball” (*Il.* 13.202–204);
- (6) *bàn d' iénai protérō dià dōmatos, hēs*
 walk:AOR.3PL PTC go:INF.PRS forward through hall:GEN until
hikonto Tēlémakhon
 reach:AOR.MID.3PL T.:ACC
 “they walked through the hall, until they reached Telemachus”
 (*Od.* 15.109–110);
- (7) *tò dè dià Skaiôn pedíond' ékhon*
 DEM.NOM.DU PTC through S.:GEN.PL.F plain:N/A+PTC drive:IMPF.3PL
ōkéas híppous
 swift:ACC.PL horse:ACC.PL
 “and the two drove the swift horses through the Scaean gates to the plain”
 (*Il.* 3.263).

In the above examples, *diá* with the genitive occurs with motion verbs: the preposition indicates a straight path through the landmark; sometimes, but not necessarily, a Goal expression follows, which indicates that a further entity is reached through straight motion, as in examples (6) and (7). The landmark is crossed completely by the trajector: often (although not always) the trajectory starts outside the landmark and ends, again outside the landmark, after having crossed it.

In some other passages, *diá* with the genitive occurs in Location expressions, as in

- (8) *hoi gár hoi éisanto diakridòn éinai*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC 3SG.DAT seem:AOR.MID.3PL eminently be:INF.PRS
áristoi tôn állōn metá g' autón:
 best:NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL.M INDEF.GEN.PL.M after PTC DEM.ACC
ho d' éprepe kai dià pántōn
 DEM.NOM PTC appear:IMPF.3SG and through all:GEN.PL.M
 “for these seemed to him to be the bravest beyond all others after himself,
 but he was pre-eminent even amid all” (*Il.* 12.103–104);

- (9) *tanussámenos dià mēlōn*
 stretch:PART.AOR.MID.NOM through sheep:GEN.PL
 “stretched among the sheep” (*Od.* 9.298);
- (10) *polloì dè súes thaléthontes aloiphēi*
 many:NOM.PL PTC swine:NOM.PL bloom:PART.PRS.NOM.PL grease:DAT.F
heuómēnoi tanúonto dià phlogòs
 singe:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL stretch:IMPF.M/P.3PL through flame:GEN.F
Hēphaístoio
*H.:*GEN
 “many swine, rich with fat, were stretched to singe over the flame of
 Hephaestus” (*Il.* 9.467–468).

In (9) and (10) the trajector is stretched through an area occupied by the landmark, so the meaning of the preposition is equivalent to the meaning found with motion verbs. In (8) the occurrence of a genitive, which, through its partitive value, presents the landmark as discontinuous, singles out the trajector among a number of other entities: a uniplex trajector can occur with a genitive landmark in a non-dynamic state of affairs because the structure of the landmark allows to locate it precisely, which would not be the case with accusative landmarks (see below, example (17)).¹

The accusative with *diá*, as with many other prepositions, profiles continuity of the landmark. Though usually glossed ‘through’, much in the same way as with the genitive, *diá* with the accusative is better translated as ‘among’, ‘about’, or even simply ‘in(side)’. In fact, there are cases where it is difficult to see a difference between the two cases, if one analyzes them on the assumption that *diá* must mean ‘through’ with both of them. Compare for example (6) with

- (11) *autàr ho bê dià dôma polútlas*
 but DEM.NOM walk:AOR.3SG through hall:N/A much.enduring:NOM
díos Odusseùs . . . óphr’ híket’ Arétēn te kai
 godly:NOM O.:NOM until reach:AOR.MID.3SG A.:ACC PTC and
Alkínoon basiléa
*A.:*ACC king:ACC
 “but the much-enduring godly Odysseus went through the hall until he
 came to Arete and to Alcinous the king” (*Od.* 7.139–141).

In order to understand what the difference in meaning can be, let us examine some occurrences where the two cases do not appear to be interchangeable. As we have seen above, whenever the contexts gives hints to the type of motion with *diá* and the genitive, one has to do with a straight motion: so in (5),


the head of the champion cut from his neck by a violent stroke rolls straight through the other men, rather than roll around changing direction (see Figure 15, below). Similarly in (2), the spear penetrates straight into the shoulder of the wounded soldier (note that the genitive appears in all occurrences where the poet refers to a wound). On the other hand, *diá* with the accusative occurs in passages such as:

- (12) *helixámenos diá bésas*
 turn:PART.AOR.MID.NOM through glen:ACC.PL.F
 “(a wild boar) turning around through the glens” (*Il.* 17.283);
- (13) *hōs idon Héphaiston diá dómata poipnúonta*
 as see:AOR.3PL H.:ACC through palace:N/A.PL puff:PART.PRS.ACC
 “as they saw Hephaestus puffing through the palace” (*Il.* 1. 600);

where the trajector is described as moving around in the space defined by the landmark, but not on a straight line. In such cases there is motion inside the landmark, but the path followed by the trajector is best described as being multidirectional. Note also that the trajectory appears to be all contained by the landmark, and not to start or end outside it. The difference becomes clear if we compare (5) with (12), where the same verb form, *helixámenos*, cannot denote the same type of motion, on account of the different trajectors: while the head of the champion cut from his neck rolls on itself, the wild boar runs around in different directions, inside a bounded area, as in Figure 15.

Other interesting examples are those where *diá* with the accusative appears to be equivalent of *katá* with the accusative, as (13) and the following (to be compared with (12) and (13) in §3.11).

example (5)



example (12)




Figure 15.

- (14) *árabos dè diá stóma gígnēt' odóntōn*
 noise:NOM PTC through mouth:N/A be:IMPF.M/P.3SG tooth:GEN.PL
 “the teeth clattered in his mouth (lit.: noise made by teeth rose inside his mouth)” (*Il.* 10.375);
- (15) *thésein gār ét' émellen ep' álgeá te*
 give:INF.FUT PTC PTC be.about:IMPF.3SG on pain:N/A.PL PTC
stonakhás te Trōsí te kai Danaoísi diá
 groaning:ACC.PL.F and Trojan:DAT.PL PTC and Danaan:DAT.PL through
krateràs husmínas
 fierce:ACC.PL.F fight:ACC.PL.F
 “for (Zeus) was yet to bring woes and groaning on Trojans alike and Danaans throughout the course of stubborn fights” (*Il.* 2.39–40).

In the light of the above examples, one can say that both *diá* with the genitive and *diá* with the accusative denote Path, but in two different ways: while the former type of expression profiles a straight trajectory, that may surpass the limits of the landmark (unidirectional path), the latter profiles a trajectory that changes direction randomly, and remains inside the landmark.

The trajector can be a count noun in the plural, referring to a multiplex discontinuous entity, scattered in the area of the landmark:

- (16) *autàr ho Kúklōpas megál' épuen, hoí rhá*
 then DEM.NOM *K.*:ACC.PL loudly call:IMPF.3SG DEM.NOM.PL PTC
min amphís óikeon en spēessi di' ákrias
 3SG.ACC around live:IMPF.3PL in cave:DAT.PL through height:ACC.PL.F
ēnemoéssas
 windy:ACC.PL.F
 “then he called aloud to the Cyclopes, who dwelt round about him in caves among the windy heights” (*Od.* 9.399–400).

Example (16) can be contrasted especially with (10), where a plural count noun also occurs, but the entities referred to are profiled by *diá* with the genitive as stretched out through the area defined by the landmark.

In example (17) the accusative is chosen because the continuous trajector (*kapnón*, ‘smoke’) rises as a mass, rather than as a straight line inside a continuous landmark, i.e. an area which is itself constituted by ill-detachable parts:

- (17) *kapnòn d' enì méssēi édrakon ophthalmoísi diá*
 smoke:ACC PTC in midst:DAT.F see:AOR.1SG eye:DAT.PL through
drumà puknà kai húlēn
 brush:N/A.PL thick:N/A.PL and wood:ACC.F

“in the midst (of the island) I saw with (my) eyes smoke through the thick brush and the wood” (*Od.* 10.196–197).

Chantraine (1953:96) mentions as *proprement homérique* a putative temporal usage, where he describes *diá* with the accusative as expressing duration:

- (18) *típhth' hoútō katà nêas anà stratòn oíoi*
 why thus down ship:ACC.PL.F up army:ACC alone:NOM.PL
alâsthe núkta di' ambrosiēn?
 wander:PRS.M/P.2PL night:ACC.F through immortal:ACC.F
 “how is it that you fare thus alone by the ships throughout the camp in the immortal night?” (*Il.* 10.141–142).


Palmer (1962: 142) remarks, in my opinion correctly, that in this occurrence the preposition still retains a spatial meaning. In fact, the expression *dià núkta* always occurs with motion verbs, and often it is juxtaposed as here to other expressions with *aná* and/or *katá*, which also denote a motion along a multidirectional path inside the landmark. The night is conceptualized as a bounded container, and contains the trajectory along which the trajector moves.

The accusative also occurs where the landmark is described as crossed over, left behind in motion, and the preposition does not profile motion through the landmark, but rather the fact that the landmark is left behind. In this case, *diá* can be rendered in English as ‘across’. A clear example is found in

- (19) *aphradéōs diá táphron elaínomen ōkéas híppous*
 senselessly through trench:ACC drive:PRS.1PL fast:ACC.PL horse:ACC.PL
 “it is senseless to seek to drive (our) swift horses across the trench”
 (*Il.* 12. 62);

to be compared with (7). The two types of motion can be represented as in Figure 16.

example (7)



example (19)




Figure 16.

Another couple of occurrences where the genitive and the accusative can be contrasted is found in examples (4) and (20):

- (20) *hèx dè dià ptúkhas èlthe daïzōn*
 six PTC through layer:ACC.PL.F go:AOR.3SG slay:PART.PRS.NOM
khalkòs ateirés, en tèi d' hebdomátēi rhinōi
 bronze:NOM stubborn:NOM in ART.DAT.F PTC seventh:DAT.F hide:DAT.F
skhéto
 stay:AOR.MID.3SG
 “across six folds went the stubborn bronze, but in the seventh hide it stayed” (*Il.* 7.247–248).

In (4) the motion of the spear through the two landmarks (the shield and the corselet) is relevant, i.e. the fact that the spear could penetrate through them. In (20) the six layers are presented as a single unit, and it is not the actual path which is profiled, but rather the fact that the landmark is left behind, similar to (20).

To sum up, the accusative with *diá* has two quite distinct meanings, as is the case with most prepositions: either it denotes an extension, inside which a trajector is located in scattered positions, or is moving following a multidirectional path; or it indicates a goal, which, on account of the meaning of the particle, is not the final goal of motion, but is crossed over in the course of motion.²

A metaphorical use of the accusative is found with abstract landmarks and, less frequently, with human referents. The landmark is understood as being the cause or reason for a certain state of affairs:³

- (21) *mè dí' emèn iótēta Poseidāōn ... pēmaínei*
 NEG through POSS.1SG.ACC.F will:ACC.F P.:NOM damage:PRS.3SG
Trōás te kai Héktora
 Trojan:ACC.PL PTC and H.:ACC
 “not by my will does Poseidon damage the Trojans and Hector”
 (*Il.* 15.41–42);

- (22) *è mála dè gónon Atréos ... Zeùs ekpáglōs ékhthēre*
 PTC very PTC race:ACC A.:GEN Z.:NOM terribly hate:AOR.3SG
gunaikeías dià boulàs
 of.women:ACC.PL.F through counsel:ACC.PL.F
 “Zeus has terribly hated the race of Atreus because of the counsels of women” (*Od.* 11.436–438);

- (23) *gēmen heōn dià kállos*
wed:AOR.3SG POSS.3SG.N/A through beauty:N/A
“(Neleus) wedded (her) because of (her) beauty” (*Od.* 11.282).

In the above examples, the Cause expressions with *dià* co-occur with Agent expressions. The landmarks are envisaged as causing the agents to bring about the states of affairs referred to: so they denote the reasons that move agents to act. Note that the evaluation of the causes in (21) and (22) appears to be negative, since the states of affairs resulting from the agent’s action are described as damaging some other participants, whose vantage point is given relevance.

A different situation is found in the following examples:

- (24) *eis hó k’ Akhaioì Ílion aipù héloien*
to REL.N/A PTC Achaean:NOM.PL I.:N/A steep:N/A take:OPT.AOR.3PL
Athēnaîēs dià boulás
A.:GEN.F through counsel:ACC.PL.F
“until the Achaeans shall take steep Ilios by the counsels of Athena”
(*Il.* 15.70–71);
- (25) *nēss’ hēgēsát’ Akhaiôn Ílion eísō*
ship:DAT.PL.F guide:AOR.MID.3SG Achaean:GEN.PL Ilios:N/A into
hēn dià mantosúnēn
POSS.3SG.ACC.F through profecy:ACC.F
“(who) had guided the ships of the Achaeans to Ilios by gift of prophecy”
(*Il.* 1.71–72);
- (26) *nikēsai kai épeita dià megáthumon Athēnēn*
win:INF.AOR and then through greathearted:ACC.F A.:ACC.F
“(Odysseus) conquered by the aid of greathearted Athene” (*Od.* 8.520).

In (24)–(26), too, the *dià* expressions co-occur with Agent expressions, but the landmarks found with *dià* are not conceived as reasons for the agents to act. Rather, the preposition with the accusative denotes their capability to enable the agents to bring about a desired state of affairs (enabling cause, see §1.2.4.3). In these cases, we find a positive evaluation of the causes: positively evaluated causes are kept distinct from instruments, because they are non-manipulated. While an instrument helps an agent to bring about a state of affairs by being directly used (or manipulated) by the agent, an enabling cause is presented as having an effect which is not directly about by the agent.⁴ Note further that animate referents in Cause expressions with *dià* in Homer are only found in examples such as (26). As we will see below, in later authors animate referents are much more frequent. The *dià* phrase in this type of example could be

taken as denoting Means (see §1.2.4.2). As I have already remarked, I prefer not to set up this SR for Ancient Greek, and regard such occurrences as denoting Cause, because the crucial factor that distinguishes them from occurrences of Instrument is the feature of non-manipulation, which is also the most relevant feature of Cause.

Until now I have not discussed the semantic extension through which *diá* came to express Cause. Recall that the preposition with the accusative can either indicate that a landmark is crossed over in motion, or that a trajector, moving or resting, is located randomly inside a landmark. To my mind, the causal meaning developed from this second spatial meaning, and in particular from the spatial occurrences where preposition expressed multidirectional path. The landmark inside which the trajector moves or acts in a random fashion is conceived as the reason for the trajector's activity. It is important to stress, although it has already been remarked, that the trajector does not move along a straight path, from one end to the other of the landmark: this is the relation denoted by *diá* with the genitive, and, as we will see below, when moved to an abstract plane, it is reinterpreted as an instrumental relation. With the accusative, on the other hand, random motion or uncertain location of the trajector within the landmark is reinterpreted as lack of control of the trajector on the landmark. For this reason, typical referents in Cause expressions with *diá* are either non-manipulated entities, or human beings or gods, that can control their actions (manipulated inanimate entities only appear after Homer). This fact is even more clear in cases where the *diá* phrases do not denote Reason, i.e. where the landmarks are not entities that cause the agents to act, but rather entities which by an independent action help agents to bring about a state of affairs.

After Homer, the use of *diá* changes considerably. The spatial meaning remains limited to the genitive. With motion verbs *diá* expresses Path, as in

- (27) *analabóntes* *dè tà hópla éisan diá*
 take:PART.AOR.NOM.PL PTC ART.N/A.PL ARM:N/A.PL GO:IMPF.3PL through
tês hupōréēs tou Kithairónos
 ART.GEN.F slope:GEN.F ART.GEN C.:GEN
 “they took up their arms and marched along the lower slopes of Cithaeron”
 (Hdt. 9.25.3).

If no motion is expressed by the verb, *diá* plus genitive can denote Location:

- (28) *tò d' apò Phoiníkēs parékei diá têsde tês*
 ART.N/A PTC from Ph.:GEN run:PRS.3SG through DEM.GEN.F ART.GEN.F

thalássēs hē aktē haútē pará te Suriēn
 sea:GEN.F ART.NOM.F peninsula:NOM.F DEM.NOM.F by PTC S.:ACC.F
tēn Palaistínēn kai Aígupton
 ART.ACC.F P.:ACC.F and A.:ACC
 “and from Phoenicia this peninsula runs through our sea along Syrian
 Palestine and Egypt” (Hdt. 4.39.2).

Both Path and Location can be moved to abstract domains, when abstract landmarks occur:

- (29) *è arnēthēnti dià díkēs eltheín*
 PTC deny:PART.AOR.P.DAT.M through trial:GEN.F go:INF.AOR
 “than if he denied and were brought to trial (lit. went through justice)”
 (Th. 6.60.3);
- (30) *ou gār anélpiston autoís, all’ aiei dià phóbou*
 NEG PTC unexpected:N/A DEM.DAT.PL.M but always through fear:GEN
eisí mé pote Athēnaíoi autoís epì tēn
 be:PRS.3PL NEG ever Athenian:NOM.PL DEM.DAT.PL.M ON ART.ACC.F
pólin élthōsin
 city:ACC.F go:SUBJ.AOR.3PL
 “they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant
 fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city” (Th. 6.34.2).

Furthermore, a temporal meaning develops with genitive landmarks, whereby the *diá* phrases express duration, and the spatial meaning ‘through’ mapped onto the domain of time, profiles duration, as a path in time:

- (31) *dià pásēs tēs nuktòs*
 through all:GEN.F ART.GEN.F night:GEN.F
 “all through the night” (Hdt. 8.12.1).

Starting with Herodotus, animate landmarks can appear with *diá*, as in:

- (32) *apikómēnoi dè hoi Naxíoi es*
 arrive:PART.AOR.MID.NOM.PL PTC ART.NOM.PL Naxian:NOM.PL to
tēn Mílēton edéonto toú Aristagóreō, eí kōs
 ART.ACC.F M.:ACC.F ask:IMP.F.M/P.3PL ART.GEN A.:GEN if PTC
autoísi paráskhoi dúnamin tina kai
 DEM.DAT.PL.M furnish:OPT.AOR.3SG power:ACC.F INDEF.ACC.F and
katélthoien es tēn heōutōn. ho dè
 return:OPT.AOR.3PL to ART.ACC.F REFL.GEN.PL.M DEM.NOM PTC

epilexámenos *hōs èn di'* *autoú*
 consider:PART.AOR.MID.NOM that if through DEM.GEN.M
katélthōsi *es tèn pólin,* *árxei* *tês*
 return:SUBJ.AOR.3PL to ART.ACC.F city:ACC.F rule:FUT.3SG ART.GEN.F
Náxou . . .
 N.:GEN.F

“the Naxians then on their coming to Miletus asked of Aristagoras if he could give them some power and so they might return to their own country. Considering that if by his means they were restored to their city he would be ruler of Naxos, . . . ” (Hdt. 5.30.3).

In (32) we find an instance of a human being who is manipulated as an instrument. Since animate nouns denote non-prototypical instruments, their occurrence in Instrument expressions is unexpected, and needs to be marked with more substantial morphological means. Furthermore, as we have seen in §2.2.3, the plain dative with animate nouns is normally taken to express Recipient or Beneficiary: in fact, a dative *autôi* in the place of *di'autoú* in (32) could only be taken as a Beneficiary.

In most occurrences where a noun with a human referent occurs within a *diá* with the genitive phrase, its referent, rather than being overtly manipulated by an agent, is presented as acting on the agent's behalf:

(33) *pémpsas* *dè ho* *Hárpagos tòn* *heōutoú*
 sent:PART.AOR.NOM PTC ART.NOM H.:NOM ART.GEN.PL.M REFL.GEN.M
doruphórōn *toùs* *pistotátous* *eídé* *te*
 bodyguard:GEN.PL ART.ACC.PL trusty:SUP.ACC.PL see:AOR.3SG and
diá *toútōn* *kai éthapse* *toú* *boukólou*
 through DEM.GEN.PL.M and bury:AOR.3SG ART.GEN cowherd:GEN
tò *paidíon*
 ART.N/A SON:N/A

“Harpagus sent the most trusty of his bodyguard and he saw through them and buried the cowherd's child” (Hdt. 1.113.3);

(34) *ouk àn oún dexaímēn* *di'* *emoú*
 NEG PTC then allow:OPT.AOR.MID.1SG through 1SG.GEN
homologoúntos *elégkhesthai* *Prōtagóran*
 agree:PART.PRS.GEN.M refute:INF.PRS.M/P P.:ACC

“I will not allow that Protagoras be refuted through my agreement (lit.: ‘through me agreeing’)” (Pl. *Tht.* 162a).

The occurrences in (33) and (34) can best be described as bearing the semantic role of Intermediary. The states of affairs described are brought about through split agency: the agent, the real initiator of the state of affairs, acts intentionally, but does not exert control on the final result of the action, which is accomplished by the intermediary. The semantic extension of Path to Intermediary is based on a metaphor according to which AN INTERMEDIARY IS A CHANNEL FOR THE AGENT'S INTENTIONALITY. I will call this metaphor the Channel metaphor. Note that in (34) lack of intentionality is explicitly stated: here it is said that the speaker does not want to be used by someone else in order to bring about the state of affairs denoted by the verb.

Intermediaries are typically human, since they act on behalf of agents: exceptionally, in (35) we find an inanimate intermediary, acting on behalf of an inanimate agent:

- (35) *kai nûn hoûtos ho basileûs éstêke en tôi*
 and now DEM.NOM ART.NOM king:NOM stand:PF.3SG in ART.DAT
hirôi tou Hêphaïstou lithinos, êkhôn
 temple:DAT ART.GEN H.:GEN made.of.stone:NOM have:PART.PRS.NOM
epi tês kheirôs mûn, légôn diá
 on ART.GEN.F hand:GEN.F mouse:ACC say:PART.PRS.NOM through
grammátôn táde
 letter:GEN.PL DEM.N/A.PL
 “at this day a stone statue of the Egyptian king stands in Hephaestus’ temple, with a mouse in his hand, saying through an inscription the following: ... ” (Hdt. 2.141.6).

In some passages, *diá* with the genitive and a human landmark occurs with a passive verb, and comes close to an Agent expression. This happens in two types of occurrence. In the first place, consider examples (36) and (37):

- (36) *ei dê di’ heôutoû ge eprêkhthê tà*
 if PTC through REFL.GEN.M PTC make:AOR.P.3SG ART.N/A.PL
pareónta
 be.present:PART.PRS.N/A.PL
 “if the present state of affairs had indeed been brought about by him”
 (Hdt. 1.129.3);
- (37) *kai hê mèn boulésis esti kai perì tà*
 and ART.NOM.F PTC will:NOM.F be:PRS.3SG and about ART.N/A.PL
mēdamôs di’ hautoû prakthénta án, hoion
 NEG through REFL.GEN.M make:PART.AOR.P.N/A PTC like

hupokritén tina nikân è athlétén: proaireítai
 actor:ACC INDEF.ACC win:INF.PRS PTC athlete:ACC choose:PRS.M/P.3SG
dè tà toiaúta oudeís, all' hósa
 PTC ART.N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL INDEF.NOM but REL.N/A.PL
oíetai genésthai àn di' hautoû
 think:PRS.M/P.3SG happen:INF.AOR.MID PTC through REFL.GEN.M
 “also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act” (Arist. *EN* 1111b 23–26).

In (36) and (37) *diá* occurs with forms of the reflexive pronoun. In both cases, the PP *di'heōtoû*, *di'hautoû*, ‘through oneself’, denotes that the landmark is coreferential with the trajector. It is said that an agent brings about a certain state of affairs through himself, in other words, exerting control on himself, or ‘using’ himself. The agent acts as an instigator toward the intermediary and the intermediary brings about the state of affairs on behalf of the agent, much in the same way as in the other examples where Intermediary occurs: but, because agent and intermediary are coreferential, the same participant bears both SRs, and the referent of the *diá* phrase is indeed the agent, although it is not coded as such. So we have a border case between Instrument/Intermediary and Agent; however, we cannot say, strictly speaking, that *diá* with the genitive expresses Agent: this is only a side effect of coreference.

The second group of occurrences is exemplified below:

- (38) *theôn mèn eis anthrōpous dōsis, ... pothèn ek*
 god:GEN.PL PTC to man:ACC.PL gift:NOM.F from.somewhere out.of
theôn erríphē diá tinos Promēthéōs háma
 god:GEN.PL grasp:AOR.P.3SG through INDEF.GEN P::GEN together
phanotátōi tini puri
 bright:SUP.DAT INDEF.DAT fire:DAT
 “it is a gift of the gods for mankind, grasped from some place from the gods through some Prometheus together with a gleam of fire”
 (Pl. *Phlb.* 16c);
- (39) *tèn dè tôn hórkhōn kai spondōn*
 ART.ACC.F PTC ART.GEN.PL oath:GEN.PL and truce:GEN.PL
súgkhusin, hèn ho Pándaros sunékheen, eán
 violation:ACC.F REL.ACC.F ART.NOM P::NOM violate:IMPF.3SG if
tis phēi di' Athēnās te kai Diōs
 INDEF.NOM say:SUBJ.PRS.3SG through A.:GEN.F PTC and Z.:GEN

gegonénai, ouk epainésómetha, oudè theôn
 happen:INF.PF.M/P NEG approve:FUT.MID.1PL NEG god:GEN.PL
érin te kai krísin diá Thémítos te kai
 strife:ACC.F PTC and contention:ACC.F through T.:GEN.F PTC and
Diós.

Z.:GEN

“but as to the violation of the oaths and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention of the gods was the doing of Themis and Zeus” (Pl. *Rep.* 379e).

In (38) there is no expressed agent, however the gods are presented as the source of a certain state of affairs, and *diá tinos Promēthéōs* denotes an indefinite entity, whose volitionality is certainly not an important feature. In the case of (39), again, volitionality is not stressed: in particular, in the first part of the example the responsibility of the state of affairs denoted by *tên dē tōn hórkhōn kai spondōn súgkhusin* is attributed to Pandaros, rather than to Athena and Zeus. So we cannot speak of real Agent phrases.

Another notable semantic extension of *diá* with the genitive is found in the numerous occurrences in which it denotes Instrument:

- (40) *epeán spheas ho theōs hoútos keleúēi diá*
 when 3PL.ACC ART.NOM god:NOM DEM.NOM order:PRS.3SG through
themismátōn
 oracle:GEN.PL
 “whatsoever this god by oracle orders them” (Hdt. 2.29.7).

The instrumental value of *diá* with the genitive is particularly clear in the language of the philosophers, as shown for example in (41), where the particle is used in reference to the word *órganon*, ‘instrument’:

- (41) *allà mèn kai di’ hoú ge deí órganou*
 but PTC and through REL.GEN.N PTC must:PRS.3SG instrument:GEN.N
krínesthai, ... diá lógōn pou éphamen
 judge:INF.PRS.M/P through reason:GEN.PL PTC say:IMPF.1PL
deín krínesthai ... lógoi dē toutou
 need:PRS.INF judge:INF.PRS.M/P reason:NOM.PL PTC DEM.GEN.N
málista órganon
 especially instrument:N/A

“by means of what instrument must we judge? We hold that it is reason by which one has to judge. So reason is the main instrument of judgment” (Pl. *Rep.* 582d).

The passage makes clear that *diá* with the genitive unambiguously denotes Instrument. As we have already seen in §2.2.3.3, *diá* with the genitive is also found in passages where the plain dative needs to be disambiguated. Furthermore, only *diá* with the genitive can occur in Instrument expressions with all types of landmark, i.e. both prototypical and non-prototypical instruments, as examples (42)–(45) demonstrate:

- (42) *hósper gár kai khrómasi kai skhémasi pollà*
 as PTC and color:DAT.PL and shape:DAT.PL many:N/A.PL
mimouantai tines apeikázontes,
 imitate:PRS.M/P.3PL INDEF.NOM.PL represent:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
hoi mèn dià tékhnes hoi de dià
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC through art:GEN.F DEM.NOM.PL PTC through
sunētheías, héteroi de dià tēs phōnēs
 custom:GEN.F INDEF.NOM.PL PTC through ART.GEN.F voice:GEN.F
 “just as people use colors and shapes to render mimetic images of many things, some making use of art, some of experience, while others again use the voice” (Arist. *Po.* 1447a 18–19);
- (43) *ho dià tōn genōn horismōs*
 ART.NOM through ART.GEN.PL gender:GEN.PL definition:NOM
 “the definition by means of genders” (Arist. *Metaph.* 998b13);
- (44) *ésti gár, éphē, haútē hē katástasis*
 be:PRS.3SG PTC say:IMPE.3SG DEM.NOM.F ART.NOM.F constitution:NOM.F
dēmokratías, eánte kai di’ hóplōn génētai
 democracy:GEN.F PTC and through arm:GEN.PL be:SUBJ.AOR.MID.3SG
eánte kai dià phōbon hupexelthōntōn tōn
 PTC and through fear:ACC withdraw:PART.AOR.GEN.PL.M ART.GEN.PL.M
hetērōn
 INDEF.GEN.PL.M
 “that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by means of arms or because one of the parties withdraws in fear” (Pl. *Rep.* 557a);
- (45) *hopóte prospeseísthai pēi mélloi hē*
 whenever fall:INF.FUT.MID wherever be.about:OPT.PRS.3SG ART.NOM.F
mēkhané, aphíesan tēn dokōn khalaraís
 engine:NOM.F leave:IMPE.3PL ART.ACC.F beam:ACC.F slack:DAT.PL.F

taís halúsesi kai ou diá kheiròs
 ART.DAT.PL.F chain:DAT.PL.F and NEG through hand:GEN.F

ékhontes

hold:PART.PRS.NOM.PL

“whenever any point was threatened by the engine, and let the beam go with its chains slack, not being able to hold it with their hands” (Th. 2.76.4).

The above examples show that all types of landmark can be treated as instruments in *diá* phrases. In (42) *diá* with the genitive occurs three times. In the first two occurrences, *diá tékhnēs* and *diá sunētheías*, ‘by art’, and ‘by custom’ are two abstract nouns; the third occurrence, *diá tēs phonēs*, ‘with their voice’, is compared with an Instrument expression in the plain dative, *khrómasi kai skhémasi*, ‘with colors and figures’. Example (43), again with an abstract noun, *genôn*, ‘genders’, demonstrate the adnominal usage of *diá* with the genitive. In (44) the landmark is a prototypical instrument, i.e. the word for ‘weapons’, *hoplôn*; while in (45) we find a body part, *kheirós*, ‘hand’.⁵

The semantic extension from Path to Instrument follows the extension from Path to Intermediary, and is mediated by it.⁶ An inanimate entity is understood as an animate one, based on what we can call the Intermediary metaphor, according to which AN INSTRUMENT IS AN INTERMEDIARY. An instrument is conceived as the intermediary through which the agent brings about a certain state of affairs.

Given the fact that it denotes Instrument, it can appear strange that *diá* with the genitive can occur with an intransitive verb, *gígnesthai*. However, it must be remarked that this verb, besides meaning ‘to be’, ‘to occur’, can also be used as passive of *práttein*, ‘to do’, ‘to accomplish’, ‘to bring about’, and have the meaning ‘to be brought about’. This is the case in (44); another example of instrumental *diá* with the genitive with *gígnesthai*, this time from Thucydides, is given below:

- (46) *hoi gâr Surakósioi nausîn autóthi*
 ART.NOM.PL PTC Syracusan:NOM.PL ship:DAT.PL.F there
ephormoúntes ekólun, kai diá mákhēs édē
 abide:PART.NOM.PL prevent:IMPF.3PL and through fight:GEN.F already
egígnonto hai eskomidaí
 be:IMPF.M/P.3PL ART.NOM.PL.F supply:NOM.PL.F

“for the Syracusan ships were stationed there to prevent it, and nothing could be brought in without fighting” (Th. 7.24.3).

Both in (44) and in (46) the context makes the agent identifiable, although not overtly mentioned. Certain Agent phrases can co-occur with *gígnesthai*, which can be used as a personal passive as well, and mean ‘be brought into existence’ (see for example (23) in §3.4).

In conclusion, we can see that *diá* with the genitive retains its concrete value after Homer while acquiring some other important functions, i.e. in the first place, to express Time, and, secondly, to express Instrument. In this latter function, *diá* with the genitive often has the function of disambiguating the dative. With human referents *diá* with the genitive mostly encodes Intermediary, i.e. a participant which shares some of the features of Agent, but does not act on its own intentions; Agent phrases are marginal and always denote some type of non-prototypical involvement.

After Homer, the accusative with *diá* lost any spatial use, and remained limited to Cause. Again, the causal value of *diá* with the accusative is best exemplified by a passage from Plato:

- (47) *hóra* *gàr éi soi* *dokéi* *anankaíon* *éinai*
 see:IMPT.PRS.2SG PTC if 2SG.DAT seem:PRS.3SG necessary:N/A be:INF.PRS
pánta *tà* *gignómēna* *diá* *tina*
 all:N/A.PL ART.N/A.PL happen:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A.PL through INDEF.ACC.F
aitían *gígnesthai*
 cause:ACC.F be:INF.PRS.M/P
 “see whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being for some cause” (Pl. *Phlb.* 26e).

(Another example is *dià phóbōn*, ‘for fear’, in (44).)

Already in Herodotus, we find a larger variety of landmarks in Cause expressions. In particular, there are some concrete inanimate nouns, besides abstract nouns, which already occurred in this type of expression in Homer:

- (48) *dià* *tèn* *kunéēn* *pheúgein* *es* *tà*
 through ART.ACC.F helmet:ACC.F flee:INF.PRS TO ART.N/A.PL
hélea
 marsh:N/A.PL
 “to be driven away into the marshes by reason of the matter of the helmet”
 (Hdt. 2.152.2);

- (49) *erēmíē esti dià tèn psámmon*
 desert:NOM.F be:PRS.3SG through ART.ACC.F sand:ACC.F
 “(the eastern side) is desert by reason of the sand” (Hdt. 3.98.2);
- (50) *hína dè mè hamártoien tês hodoú dià tòn rhóon*
 for PTC NEG miss:OPT.AOR.3PL ART.GEN.F way:GEN.F through ART.ACC
 course:ACC
 “lest the current should make them miss their course” (Hdt. 2.93.4).

Human referents are also frequent, and not limited to cases where the evaluation of the cause is positive:⁷

- (51) *deísantes ôn hoi Lampsakēnoi Kroíson*
 fear:PART.AOR.NOM.PL PTC ART.NOM.PL from.L.:NOM.PL C.:NOM
lúsantes metékan Miltiádea. Hoútos mèn dè
 free:PART.AOR.NOM.PL release:AOR.3PL M.:ACC DEM.NOM PTC PTC
dià Kroíson ekphéugei
 through C.:ACC escape:PRS.3SG
 “wherefore in fear of Croesus the inhabitants of Lampsacus freed Miltiades and let him go. So Miltiades was saved because of Croesus”
 (Hdt. 6.37.2–38.1);
- (52) *ou méntoi kalôs ge heistíamai, di’ emautòn, all’ ou*
 NEG however well PTC feast:PF.M/P.1SG through REFL.1SG.ACC but NEG
dià sé
 through 2SG.ACC
 “I have not dined well, however – by my own fault, not yours.”
 (Pl. *Rep.* 354a);
- (53) *Thēbaíoi mén nun kai hósoi dià toútous*
 Theban:NOM.PL PTC PTC and REL.NOM.PL through DEM.ACC.PL
oíon apékhontai
 sheep:GEN.PL be.away:INF.PRS.M/P.3PL
 “the Thebans and those who by the Theban example (lit.: ‘because of the Th.’) will not touch sheep” (Hdt. 2.42.3).

In (51) the vantage point taken in the description of the state of affairs is that of Miltiades, so the evaluation is positive. Note that Croesus does not bring about the state of affairs voluntarily, as an agent would, and on the other hand, he is not referred to as being voluntarily manipulated by Miltiades, as an intermediary would be. Thus, one can distinguish between Agent, Intermediary,

Table 2.

	volitionality	manipulation
Agent	+	–
Intermediary	–	+
human Cause	–	–

and (human) Cause based on the features of volitionality and manipulation, as shown in Table 2.

In (52) the effect is described as not desired, so the evaluation is negative. Finally, in (53) the evaluation of the cause is neutral.

In (54) the *diá* phrase denotes the cause of a feeling, *mísei*, ‘hatred’, which is itself presented as the cause of a state of affairs, and referred to by a noun in the plain dative:

- (54) *ideîn mèn gàr psukhèn éphē tén pote Orphéōs*
 see:INF.AOR PTC PTC soul:ACC.F say:IMPF.3SG ART.ACC.F ONCE O.:GEN
genoménēn kúknou bíon hairouménēn,
 be:PART.AOR.MID.ACC.F swan:GEN life:ACC select:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.F
mísei toú gunaikéiou génous diá tòn hup’
 hatred:DAT ART.GEN feminine:GEN race:GEN through ART.ACC under
ekeinōn thánaton ouk ethélousan en gunaikì
 DEM.GEN.PL.F death:ACC NEG want:PART.PRS.ACC.F in woman:DAT.F
gennētheísan genésthai
 conceive:PART.AOR.P.ACC.F be:INF.AOR.MID

“he saw the soul that had been Orpheus, he said, selecting the life of a swan, because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman”
 (Pl. *Rep.* 620a).

There are passages, especially in philosophical discourse, where one has the impression that *diá* with the genitive and *diá* with the accusative are very close to each other, almost interchangeable. As noted in Schwyzer (1950:453), the two types of PP denote similar states of affairs, but the occurrence of an accusative presents the landmark as an independently enabling entity, rather than as a manipulated one:

- (55) *ho d’ Hómēros, hósper kai tà álla*
 ART.NOM PTC H.:NOM as and ART.N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL
diaphérei, kai toút’ éoiken kalōs ideîn, étoi diá
 excel:PRS.3SG and DEM.N/A seem:PF.3SG well see:INF.AOR PTC through

tékhñēn è dià phúsín

art:ACC.F PTC through nature:ACC.F

“but Homer, in keeping with his general superiority, evidently grasped well, whether owing to art or to nature, this point too” (Arist. *Po.* 1451a24).

In (55), *dià tékhñēn è dià phúsín*, ‘owing to art or to nature’, denotes entities that enable the agent to bring about a state of affairs, but has no implication of manipulation from the side of the agent. Compare this example with (42), where *dià tékhñēs* occurs with the genitive, denoting that the landmarks is directly and volutarily manipulated by the agent. The difference is in profiling: the accusative profiles the enabling power of the landmark, rather than active use of the landmark by the trajector.

In the Attic authors we find a further semantic extension of *diá* with the accusative, from Cause to Purpose, in examples such as

- (56) *dià dè tēn toútou saphéneian méga aú kai*
 through PTC ART.ACC.F DEM.GEN clarification:ACC.F big:N/A PTC and
smikròn hē nósis ēnagkásthē ideîn
 small:N/A ART.NOM.F intelligence:NOM.F compel:AOR.P.3SG see:INF.AOR
 “and for the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small” (Pl. *Rep.* 524c);

- (57) *Lakedaimóniōi te hēgoumenoi autôn dià*
 Spartan:NOM.PL PTC lead:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL through
tēn sphetéran dóxan
 ART.ACC.F POSS.3PL.ACC.F glory:ACC.F
 “the Lacedaemonians, using their supremacy over them (i.e. the allies) to promote their own glory” (Th. 2.89.4).

In (56) *dià tēn toútou saphéneian* is the purpose to which the agent must perform a certain action, but it can also be seen as the reason for it: this example demonstrates the closeness of Purpose and Reason, and the role of the latter SR in mediating between Cause and Purpose. In (57) *dià tēn sphetéran dóxan*, ‘for their own glory’, the interpretation as Purpose is the only possible one.

This semantic spread is very interesting in the light of later developments: in Middle Greek, the preposition *diá* (constructed with the accusative only) retains its causal value; its use in Purpose expressions is developed further and another meaning is added, i.e. that of Beneficiary. So the semantic development of *diá* contradicts the directionality hypothesis put forward in §1.2, which predicts that Purpose expressions can develop out of Beneficiary expressions, rather than the other way around (see further §4.4).

3.10 ANA

The particle *aná* means ‘upwards’ and has a counterpart in *katá*, ‘downwards’. It inherently implies motion: as we will see, even in cases in which it expresses Location, it profiles the endpoint of a preceding (physical or mental) motion. In other words, *aná* always implies the existence of a trajectory.

As an adverb, *aná* means ‘up’, also in a dynamic sense, e.g. *ána!*, ‘get up!’, in *Il.* 6.331. This same meaning is found in its preverbal use, especially with motion verbs, as in *anabaínein*, ‘go up’. Further semantic extensions of the preverb are to inchoative meaning, as in *anapháinesthai*, ‘appear’, and repetition: *anametrésthai*, ‘start again’.¹

The use and meaning of cases with *aná* must be seen in close connection to the use and meaning of cases with *katá*: as we will see especially in §3.11, the two prepositions also developed complementary meanings that go beyond the original opposition ‘upwards/downwards’.

As a preposition, *aná* occurs with all three cases in Homer, but the genitive only occurs in the *Odyssey*, always with the word ‘ship’ as a complement and the verb *baineín*, ‘to go’, in:²

- (1) *aná nēds ébēn*
 up ship:GEN.F go:AOR.1SG
 “I went on board of the ship” (*Od.* 9.177);

and two other similar occurrences.

The dative is more frequently attested than the genitive, but it does not seem very productive either, sometimes occurring in fixed formulaic expressions. There are seven different occurrences of *aná* with the dative, plus two repetitions found at the end of the verse (a position that hints toward their formulaic nature). The semantic function of the PPs is either Location, as in (2) and (3), or Direction, in cases where the end of motion is profiled, as in (4) and (5):³

- (2) *heúde... aná Gargároi ákrōi*
 sleep:IMPF.3SG up G.:DAT peak:DAT
 “he was sleeping on topmost Gargarus” (*Il.* 14.352);
- (3) *hoppóte ken dé toi sumblēmenos állos*
 when PTC PTC 2SG.DAT meet:PART.AOR.MID.NOM INDEF.NOM
hodítēs phēēi athērēloigòn ékhein aná
 wayfarer:NOM say:SUBJ.PRS.3SG winnowing.fan:ACC have:INF.PRS up

phaidímōi ómōi

stout:DAT shoulder:DAT

“when another wayfarer, meeting you, will say that you have a winnowing-fan on your stout shoulder” (*Od.* 11.127–128);

(4) *pêxai anà skolópessi*

fix:INF.AOR up stake:DAT.PL

“to fix it on the stakes” (*Il.* 18.177);

(5) *hármata d’ àm bōmoisi títhei*

car:N/A.PL PTC up stand:DAT.PL set:PRS.3SG

“he set the car upon a stand” (*Il.* 8.441).

As usual, the dative has its locative function, whereby plexity of the landmark is not relevant, while contact of the trajector with the landmark is focused. In (2) and (3) two verbs of rest occur, *heúde*, ‘he was sleeping’, and *ekheín*, ‘have’, while in (4) and (5) we find verbs that denote a movement. In the latter contexts, the accusative could occur as well, as shown by

(6) *kaì apò héthen hupsós’ aeíras thêken aná*

and from 3SG.GEN on.high lift:PART.AOR.NOM set:AOR.3SG up

murikēn

tamarisk:ACC.F

“and lifted from him the spoils on high, and set them on a tamarisk bush” (*Il.* 10.465–466).

As usual (see §2.2.3.1, 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and the other prepositions that take three cases), the difference is in profiling: while the dative profiles the endpoint of motion, the accusative profiles the trajectory.

I remarked above that *aná* implies the existence of a trajectory. Indeed, even with the dative and verbs of rest, *aná* often denotes the result of an implied motion. This is also true of *katá*, which, as we will see in §3.11, at least in Homer often combines with verb forms of resultative aspect. In §2.2.1.3 I have described patterns of fictive motion, used in reference to static location through a process of subjectification. Occurrences where *aná* and *katá* (§3.11) profile the result of motion are instances of the ‘advent path’: the trajector’s location is depicted in terms of its arrival or manifestation in a certain region of the landmark.

It must be remarked that when expressing both Location and Direction, *aná* with the dative is equivalent to English *on*, or *upon*, rather than *upwards*: in fact, the original meaning of *aná* used as a preposition is limited to (part of) its occurrences with the accusative. As one can see by comparing the above

examples with examples of *epí* ('on', 'upon') in §3.18, *aná* with the dative was virtually a synonym of this other, much more productive, preposition: this may be the reason why it disappeared immediately after Homer.

The use of *aná* with the accusative is much more widespread (as we will see, the same also holds for its semantic opposite *katá*). Two types of landmark may occur: uniplex, in which case the accusative expresses motion, and multiplex. An occurrence of a uniplex landmark is shown in (6); more examples are given below:

- (7) *aná th' hármata ... ébainon*
 up PTC car:N/A.PL mount:IMPF.3PL
 "they mounted on the car" (*Od.* 3.492);
- (8) *enéplēsthen dé hoi ámphō haímatos ophthalmoi:*
 fill:AOR.P.3PL PTC 3SG.DAT INDEF.NOM.DU blood:GEN eye:NOM.PL
tò d' aná stóma kaí katà rhínas
 DEM.N/A PTC up mouth:N/A and down nostril:ACC.PL.F
prése khanôn
 blow:AOR.3SG yawn:PART.AOR.NOM
 "and both his eyes were filled with blood: up through his mouth and down his nostrils he spurted blood as he opened his mouth" (*Il.* 16.348–350);
- (9) *kíon' an' hupsēlèn erúsai*
 pillar:ACC.F up tall:ACC.F pull:INF.AOR
 "and hoist (him) up the tall pillar" (*Od.* 22.176).

In example (7) *aná* with the accusative occurs with the verb *baínein*, 'to go'; apparently, this PP and the only one with the genitive, in example (1), have similar meanings. Example (8) is particularly interesting because it demonstrates the original semantic opposition between *aná* and *katá*. Finally, in (9) a trajector is described as being lifted on top of a landmark. In all the above examples, the trajector is described as performing a straight motion.

In spatial expressions, *aná* with the accusative and multiplex landmarks indicates that a trajector performs an exhaustive motion, by which it touches all points of the landmark, as in the examples (11) and (12); in the case that there is no motion, the trajector is spread over the whole surface of the landmark, as in (10). In this sense, *aná* is similar to English 'over', which, as remarked in Brugman (1988: 14), denotes a point-for-point correspondence of the trajector with the landmark.⁴ In this type of expression one finds continuous landmarks, mostly denoted by mass nouns, collective nouns, nouns denoting an area, rather than a single spot. Some plural count nouns also occur, in which

case they are typically accompanied by the adjective *pâs*, ‘all’, ‘each’ (cf. example (12)). The semantic role of the PP is Location:

- (10) *pollai gâr anà stratón eisi kéleuthoi*
 many:NOM.PL.F PTC up camp:ACC be:PRS.3PL path:NOM.PL.F
 “for many are the paths throughout the camp” (*Il.* 10.66);
- (11) *kérukes d’ anà ástu Diù philói*
 herald:NOM.PL PTC up city:N/A Z.:DAT dear:NOM.PL
angellóntōn
 proclaim:IMPT.PRS.3PL
 “and let heralds, dear to Zeus, make proclamation throughout the city”
 (*Il.* 8.517);
- (12) *Murmidónas d’ ár’ epoikhómenos thórēxen*
 Myrmidon:ACC.PL PTC PTC walk:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM arm:AOR.3SG
Akhilleüs pántas anà klisías sùn teúkhesin
 A.:NOM all:ACC.PL up hut:ACC.PL.F with armor:DAT.PL
 “but Achilles went to and fro throughout the huts and let harness with
 (their) armor all the Myrmidons” (*Il.* 16.155–156).

Again, the meaning of *aná* in the above examples must be understood in contrast to the meaning of *katá* with the accusative: when motion verbs occur, *katá* denotes multidirectional path, similar to *diá* with the accusative (see §3.9), but it indicates that only some points of the landmark are touched randomly. With verbs of rest, *katá* means that the trajector is scattered over the landmark, without covering its whole surface, see §3.11.

This difference between *aná* and *katá* is best captured by Ebeling, who writes: “a beggar who begs *aná ástu* stops in sequence at each house, begging *katà ástu*, on the other hand, he walks around approaching some doors and skipping others” (1885).⁵ So in

- (13) *Atréidēs d’ an’ hómilon ephoíta pollà*
 of.A.:NOM PTC up throng:ACC walk:IMPF.3SG many:N/A.PL
keleúōn: ó philói anéres éste
 order:PART.PRS.NOM PTC friend:VOC.PL man:NOM.PL be:IMPT.PRS.2PL
 “and the son of Atreus ranged throughout the throng with many words of
 command: ‘My friends, be men!’” (*Il.* 5.528–529).

Agamemnon (here referred to as ‘son of Atreus’) is depicted as moving among his companions and addressing each of them, rather than just talking randomly to a few (cf. example (15) in §3.11).

As they are originally opposed because they denote two opposite directions of motion, *aná* and *katá* developed a further opposition, based on exhaustiveness *vs.* non-exhaustiveness of motion or, with verbs of rest, of spread of a trajector on a landmark. I will discuss this opposition below, but first it is necessary to introduce a further example, where *aná* refers to the rising of a state of affairs.

Example (14) demonstrates the shift from the concrete plane of spatial relations to an abstract plane:

- (14) *ho* *gâr basilēi* *kholōtheis* *noúson* *aná*
 DEM.NOM PTC king:DAT rage:PART.AOR.P.NOM pestilence:ACC.F up
stratòn *ôrse* *kakén*
 host:ACC raise:AOR.3SG evil:ACC.F
 “for he in anger against the king raised throughout the host an evil pestilence” (*Il.* 1.9–10).

In this passage, the trajector is *noúson*, ‘the pestilence’. By the use of *aná* the disease is described as spreading to the whole Greek army, almost as covering it: note that here the meaning of upward motion is also present, because it is said that the god ‘roused’ the illness: the beginning of an event or process is described as ‘rising’, a conceptualization that ultimately goes back to the common metaphor according to which UP IS VISIBLE. As we will see in §3.11 and 3.13, ‘to be down’, in the sense of ‘to be under something’ is occasionally understood in Greek as ‘to be hidden’.

More in general, one can say that things that are up are closer to the speaker’s visual, while things that are down, being farther away, are invisible. So an upward movement comes to be conceived as a movement toward the visible field. This is connected to other common knowledge about the structure of events: for examples, the rising of the sun makes it visible, and its descent makes it invisible. Somebody who stands up becomes visible, while somebody who’s sitting or lying down may be hiding. For this reason, an upward movement can be conceptualized as the sudden popping up of a trajector, coming out of a landmark.

Note that the motion inside the landmark is relevant only in as much as it brings the trajector to the visible field: this explains the sense of exhaustiveness described above. The internal structure of the landmark is described as undifferentiated, thus continuous, rather than as structured in definite sub-units. Downward motion, on the other hand, causes the trajector to leave the visible field and move into an invisible area. In this case, the trajector is conceptualized in Greek as moving randomly to different points within the landmark:

hence the meaning of *katá*. (For a further discussion, and examples with *katá*, see §3.11.)

The fact that *aná* sometimes indicates that a trajector is singled out against the landmark has been pointed out in Skerlo (1892), and can be demonstrated with some other examples:

- (15) *hòs eipòn ho mèn aútis ébē*
 so speak:PART.AOR.NOM DEM.NOM PTC again go:AOR.3SG
theòs àm pónon andròn
 god:NOM up toil:ACC man:GEN.PL
 “so he spoke, and went back again, a god into the toil of men” (*Il.* 13.239);
- (16) *toúneka nún autós t’ anakházomai édè kai*
 therefore now DEM.NOM PTC draw.back:PRS.M/P.1SG PTC and
állous Argeíous ekéleusa alémenai entháde
 INDEF.ACC.PL Argive:ACC.PL order:AOR.1SG collect:INF.AOR.P here
pántas: gignóskō gàr Árēa mákhēn aná
 all:ACC.PL know:PRS.1SG PTC A.:ACC battle:ACC.F up
koiranéonta
 rule:PART.PRS.ACC
 “therefore it is that I now give ground myself and have given command to all the rest of the Argives to be gathered here likewise; for I discern Ares lording it over the battlefield” (*Il.* 5.822–824).

The only occurrence of shift from space to time is found in example (17):

- (17) *ou gár tis némesis phugéein kakón, oud’*
 NEG PTC INDEF.NOM.F shame:NOM.F flee:INF.AOR ruin:N/A NEG
aná núkta
 up night:ACC.F
 “for I count it not shame to flee from ruin, not even by night” (*Il.* 14.80).

The preposition denotes duration: note how time in its duration is a multiplex continuous landmark, much in the same way as *ástu* in (11) or *stratós* in (10).

As we have seen above, the opposition between the accusative and the genitive, which is widely attested with a number of other prepositions, did not develop with *aná*. The dative was dropped, as a consequence of the general process of reduction of the prepositional dative, and only the accusative remained. In Herodotus’ prose, the meaning of *aná* with the accusative is remarkably similar to the Homeric meaning, as shown in the examples:

- (18) *anà tòn potamòn gàr dè ouk hoía té*
 up ART.ACC river:ACC PTC PTC NEG possible:N/A.PL PTC
esti pléein
 be:PRS.3SG sail:INF.PRS
 “for it is not by any means possible to go up stream by water”
 (Hdt. 1.194.5);
- (19) *en téi heōutoú eòn kai próteron*
 in ART.DAT.F REFL.3SG.GEN.M be:PART.PRS.NOM and before
dókimos kai mállón ti kai prothumóteron
 notable:NOM and more INDEF.N/A. and zealously:CMPR
dikaíosúnēn epithémenos éskēe kai
 justice:ACC.F apply:PART.AOR.MID.NOM practice:IMPF.3SG and
taúta méntoi eousēs anomíēs pollēs
 DEM.N/A.PL PTC be:PART.PRS.GEN.F lawlessness:GEN.F much:GEN.F
anà pāsan tèn Mēdikēn epoíee
 up all:ACC.F ART.ACC.F M.:ACC.F do:IMPF.3SG
 “already a notable man in his own (town), he began to profess and practice justice more constantly and zealously than ever, and he did this even though there was much lawlessness throughout the land of Media”
 (Hdt. 1.96.2);
- (20) *anathémata dè apophugòn tèn páthēn*
 offering:N/A.PL PTC escape:PART.AOR.NOM ART.ACC.F illness:ACC.F
tòn ophthalmón álla te anà tà
 ART.GEN.PL eye:GEN.PL INDEF.N/A.PL PTC up ART.N/A.PL
hírà pánta tà lógima anéthēke
 temple:N/A.PL all:N/A.PL ART.N/A.PL famous:N/A.PL dedicate:AOR.3SG
 “most worthy of mention among the many offerings which he dedicated in all the noteworthy temples for his deliverance from blindness are ...”
 (Hdt. 2.111.3);
- (21) *eisí dé sphi phoínikes pephukótes anà*
 be:PRS.3PL PTC 3PL.DAT palm:NOM.PL grow:PART.PF.NOM.PL up
pân tò pedíon, hoi pleúnes autòn
 all:N/A ART.N/A plain:N/A ART.NOM.PL most:NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL
karpophóroi, ek tòn kai sítia kai
 fruit.bearing:NOM.PL out.of REL.GEN.PL and food:N/A.PL and
oínon kai méli poieúntai
 wine:ACC and honey:N/A make:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “they have palm trees growing all over the plain, most of them yielding fruit, from which food is made and wine and honey” (Hdt. 1.193.4).

In (18), *aná* means ‘upwards’ with a motion verb, while in (19), (20) and (21) it conveys the same meaning of exhaustive coverage of a landmark described above, cf. especially example (10). Exhaustiveness in (19)–(21) is further stressed by the occurrence of forms of the adjective *pás*, ‘all’, ‘each’. The possible occurrence of *katá* in such examples would indicate that the units that constitute the landmark are only randomly touched by the trajector: for instance, a possible *katà tà hirá* in (20) would mean that offerings were dedicated in some temples only.

Time expressions also occur. In the first place, we find several occurrences of the PPs *aná pân étos*, ‘each year’, and *aná pásan hēméran*, ‘every day’, that can be compared with example (20): an activity extends on all units of the landmark. Temporal units correspond to physical units with local expressions, hence the use of *pás* to indicate exhaustiveness, as in the examples from Herodotus mentioned earlier and in (12). Furthermore, a Time expression occurs in

- (22) *tôn* *dè duódeka basiléōn* *dikaíosúnēi*
 ART.GEN.PL.M PTC twelve king:GEN.PL.M justice:DAT.F
khreōménōn, *aná khrónon hōs éthusan* *en*
 use:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.M up time:ACC when sacrifice:AOR.3PL in
tōi hirōi toú Hēphaístou
 ART.DAT temple:DAT ART.GEN H.:GEN
 “now the twelve kings were just, and in time came to sacrifice in Hephaestus’ temple” (Hdt. 2.151.1).

This PP is used to denote a certain duration (‘in the course of time’), and can be reconnected to example (17) from Homer. As we will see in §3.11, in Time expressions, too, the opposition between *aná* and *katá* is continued in Herodotus, in spite of the limited use of *aná* (*katá*, on the other hand, is very frequent).

A further use of *aná* in Herodotus does not have parallels in Homer:

- (23) *hē* *dè hodòs* *hē* *ēmerēsē* *aná*
 ART.NOM.F PTC way:NOM.F ART.NOM.F day.long:NOM.F up
diēkósia *stádía* *sumbéblētaí* *moi*
 two.hundred:N/A.PL stade:N/A.PL compute:PF.M/P.3SG 1SG.DAT
 “I reckon a day’s journey at two hundred furlong” (Hdt. 4.101.3).

This last meaning can be reconnected with the basic meaning ‘upward’: the length of the journey ‘reaches up’ to a certain amount of space. Note that, similar to some spatial usage of *aná*, there is no motion here, neither

physical nor abstract, but the preposition profiles the result of a preceding (abstract) motion.

In Attic prose, the use of *aná* is dramatically reduced: the preposition only survives in a couple of fixed expressions, most notably *aná pân étos*, ‘each year’, *aná lógon*, ‘proportionately’ (especially used in mathematic discussions), and *aná méros*, ‘by turns’. The preposition must have survived longer in other dialects, as shown by the fact that Xenophon still knows a wider use:

- (24) *toútous dè éphasan oikeîn anà tà*
 DEM.ACC.PL PTC say:IMPF.3PL inhabit:INF.PRS up ART.N/A.PL
órē

mountain:N/A.PL

“the latter, they said, dwelt on the mountains” (Xen. *An.* 3.5.16);

- (25) *hóti oukh hēgemónas ékhōn anthrōpous*
 because NEG guide:ACC.PL have:PART.PRS.NOM man:ACC.PL
planâi anà tà órē all’ hópēi
 wander:PRS.M/P.2SG up ART.N/A.PL mountain:N/A.PL but wherever
àn tà thēría huphēgētai, taútēi
 PTC ART.N/A.PL animal:N/A.PL lead:SUBJ.PRS.M/P.3SG there

metatheís

run:PRS.2SG

“because you are accustomed to wander up and down the mountains without following human guides but running after the game wherever it leads you” (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.4.27);

- (26) *autòs dè kai hoi Hēllēnes estratopedeuónto*
 DEM.NOM PTC and ART.NOM.PL Greek:NOM.PL encamp:IMPF.M/P.3PL
aná tò Thunôn pedíon
 up ART.N/A Thynian:GEN.PL plain:N/A

“while he himself and the Greeks encamped on the plain of the Thynians” (Xen. *An.* 7.4.2).

However, from these examples it is difficult to understand if the contrast between *aná* and *katá*, as found in Homer and Herodotus, was still known to Xenophon,⁶ or his use of *aná* rather owed to his readiness to accept different dialectal forms (see §3.15, and Gautier 1911:50–51). Note that the sense of exhaustiveness is preserved in the frequent expression used by Xenophon *aná krátos*, ‘vigorously’ (‘up to the full strength’).

3.11 KATA

The local meaning of *katá* is ‘downwards’; it builds a couple with *aná*, ‘upwards’, that also extends to other areas of the meaning of the two particles. An adverb *kátō* is derived from the same root; consequently, occurrences of *katá* as a free adverb are few, and in most cases the particle in adverbial usage displays a closer semantic link with the verb, as in

- (1) *kàd d' ár' epì stóm' éōse*
 down PTC PTC on face:N/A cast:AOR.3SG
 “he cast (him) down upon his face” (*Il.* 16.410).

As a preposition, *katá* takes the genitive and the accusative, both in Homer and later. Similar to *aná*, the original meaning of *katá* always implies the existence, besides the landmark and the trajector, of a trajectory. The difference in meaning conveyed by the opposition between the genitive and the accusative is related to the position of the landmark relative to the trajectory.

The occurrences of *katá* with the genitive can appear at first sight to denote two completely different types of state of affairs. In the first place, the preposition can profile a Source relation between a landmark and a trajector:

- (2) *bê dè kat' Oulúmpoio karénōn aíxasa*
 go:AOR.3SG PTC down O.:GEN peak:GEN.PL dart:PART.AOR.NOM.F
 “down from the peaks of Olympus she went darting” (*Il.* 22.187);
- (3) *baléein megálēs katà pétrēs*
 throw:INF.AOR great:GEN.F down cliff:GEN.F
 “throwing (me) down from a great cliff” (*Od.* 14.399).

In (2) and (3), the landmark denotes the starting point of downward motion. In some other passages, on the other hand, the genitive with *katá* indicates that the landmark is located at the end of a trajectory:

- (4) *aikhmè... katà gaíēs óikhet'*
 spear:NOM.F down ground:GEN.F go:IMP.F.M/P.3SG
 “the spear fell down on the earth” (*Il.* 13.504–505);
- (5) *hupai dè ideske katà khthonòs ómmata*
 over PTC look:AOR.3SG down ground:GEN.F eye:N/A.PL
péxas
 fix:PART.AOR.NOM
 “he would look down with eyes fixed upon the ground” (*Il.* 3.217);

- (6) *psukhè dè katà khthonòs ēúte kapnòs*
 spirit:NOM.F PTC down ground:GEN.F as vapor:NOM
óikheto
 GO:IMPF.M/P.3SG
 “but the spirit like a vapor was gone beneath the earth” (*Il.* 23.100–101).¹

The landmark in (4)–(6) clearly cannot be the starting point of motion. As remarked above, the landmark is not simply located at the end of the trajectory, but it is actually reached, so that the trajector at its final location enters the portion of space occupied by the landmark. As a consequence, as in example (5), there is often a resultative meaning. The lexical meaning of verbs occurring with this type of expression also makes clear that the *katá* does not profile the direction of motion, but rather its endpoint: in particular, in (4) and (6) we find forms of *óikhesthai*, a verb which in its forms derived from the present stem (as here: both examples contain an imperfect) has the meaning of a perfect stem.² Further examples are:

- (7) *Patrólōi d’ aút’ ambrosiēn kai néktar eruthròn*
 P.:DAT PTC PTC ambrosia:ACC.F and nectar:N/A red:N/A
stáxe katà rhinôn
 drop:AOR.3SG down nostril:GEN.PL
 “and on Patroclus she shed ambrosia and ruddy nectar through (his) nostrils” (*Il.* 19.38–39);
- (8) *méssē mén te katà speíous koíloio déduken*
 middle:NOM.F PTC PTC down cave:GEN hollow:GEN hide:PF.3SG
 “up to (her) middle she is hidden in the hollow cave” (*Od.* 12.93).

In (7) *katá* means ‘down into’: the trajectory starts at a higher level, and the liquid (the trajector) follows a downward trajectory until it enters the nostrils, after which it still continues. Example (8) contains a perfect participle; it can be compared with (11), below, with the accusative, in which the landmark does indeed simply represent the direction of downward motion, without the resultative implication of (8). The two meanings of *katá* with the genitive are represented in Figure 17.

It must be noted that in the above examples the landmark, whatever its position on the trajectory, is not an extended area along which the trajector moves: this is one of the meanings of *katá* with the accusative. Similarly, *katá* with the genitive should not be taken to mean ‘around’, indicating a scattered location of the trajector on the area occupied by the landmark: again, this type of state of affairs is denoted by *katá* with the accusative.




Figure 17. Schemas of *katá* with the genitive

Example (9) illustrates my last statement, and, in the meantime, it demonstrates the difference between *katá* and *hupò* (‘under’, see §3.13):

- (9) *kaì tò mèn eù katéthēka katakrúpsas hupò*
 and DEM.N/A PTC carefully lay:AOR.3SG hid:PART.AOR.NOM under
kóprōi, hē rha katà speious kékhuto megál’
 dung:DAT.F DEM.NOM.F PTC down cave:GEN lie:PLPF.M/P.3SG much
ēlitha pollé
 very nuch:NOM.F
 ‘then I laid it carefully away, hiding it beneath the dung, which lay in big quantity on the ground of the cave’ (*Od.* 9.329–330).

In the state of affairs denoted by example (9), the dung may be scattered in heaps around the cave, but what is relevant, and what is referred to by the use of the genitive with *katá*, is its having been thrown down, and being now located on the bottom of the cave: here again the verb form *kékhuto* is a perfect, from the verb *keúein*, ‘to pour’; its meaning is ‘lie as a result of having been poured’. Note further that the dung does not lie beneath the cave, but rather on its bottom, after having moved on a trajectory that crossed the cave. The example also contains the expression *hupò kóprōi*, ‘beneath the dung’, which denotes a different type of relation between the trajector and the landmark, as shown in Figure 18.


The meaning of *katá* in examples (4) through (9) is interesting in the light of the fact that this preposition does not take the dative. As we have repeatedly seen with a number of other prepositions, very often the alternation between dative and accusative is not limited to Location *vs.* Direction: the dative can also



Figure 18.

occur with motion verbs and denote Direction, when the endpoint of motion is profiled. This function appears to be fulfilled by the genitive with *katá*. In order to clarify this point, we may compare the meaning of *katá* with the genitive with that of *aná* with the dative. If we leave out the occurrences where the genitive has an ablatival value, *katá* with the genitive can express both Location, as in (8) and (9), or Direction, as in (4) and (7), similar to the dative with *aná*, respectively in (2) and (3) and in (5) from §3.10. In examples (5) with *katá* and (4) of §3.10 with *aná* we find the same verb, *pégein*, ‘to fix’, both times in the aorist. So one can say that the dative and the genitive have the same functions with either preposition, with the difference that there is no ablatival function of any case with *aná*.

The above remarks also clarify the fact that, as I have remarked in §3.10, the use of the genitive with *aná* never developed. In Homer, we find a twofold opposition, as shown in Figure 19.³

Figure 19. *aná* and *katá* in Homer

Regarding possible SRs expressed by the two prepositions, Source apparently was never a function of *aná*, so the ablatival genitive did not have a chance to occur with the particle.

As with most prepositions, the accusative with *katá* occurs in two types of context. In the first place, we find Direction expressions:

- (10) *potamoùs d' étrepse néesthai kàr rhóon*
 river:ACC.PL PTC turn:AOR.3SG flow:INF.PRS.M/P down stream:ACC
 “the rivers he turned back to flow down the stream” (*Il.* 12.32–33);

- (11) *dúseth' halòs katà kûma*
 plunge:AOR.MID.3SG sea:GEN down wave:N/A
 “he plunged beneath the wave of the sea” (*Il.* 6.136).

In (10) and (11), *katá* profiles a downward trajectory along a landmark: note further that, in examples like (10), *kàr rhóon*, ‘downstream’, downward motion corresponds to motion in the same direction as the landmark.

Where the accusative does not express Direction, *katá* occurs with multiplex landmarks and expresses Location or multidirectional Path on a surface, similar to *diá*:

- (12) *polloì gàr katà ástu méga Priámou epíkouroi*
 many:NOM.PL PTC down city:N/A great:N/A P:GEN ally:NOM.PL
 “for there are many allies in the great city of Priam” (*Il.* 2.803);
- (13) *ou mèn gár pot' áneu dēĩōn ên, allà kat'*
 NEG PTC PTC ever without enemy:GEN.PL be:IMPF.3SG but down
autoùs strōphát'
 DEM.ACC.PL range:IMPF.M/P.3SG
 “for he was never away from the enemies, but ranged among them”
 (*Il.* 13.556–557).

In (12) and (13) we find two different types of trajector. In (12), the trajector, *epíkouroi*, ‘allies’, is a count noun in the plural, modified by the adjective *polloí*, ‘numerous’: according to its internal structure, it is multiplex and discrete. The preposition profiles a locative relation, whereby the various entities that constitute the trajector lie scattered on the surface of the landmark.⁴

In (13) we find a uniplex trajector instead: here the preposition denotes motion of the trajector to different points of the landmark. In the latter case, we have to do with multidirectional motion, to be compared with *diá* and the accusative in examples such as (12) and (13) of §3.9. Actually, in Location expressions such as the one in (12) above, too, the meaning of *katá* with the accusative comes close to the meaning of *diá* with the accusative: see further

- (14) *mnēstères dē dōmon káta daĩta pēnonto*
 wooer:NOM.PL PTC house:ACC down feast:ACC work:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “the wooers were busy with the feast throughout the hall” (*Od.* 2.322);

to be compared with example (13) of §3.9. Here the expression *dōmon káta*, ‘throughout the hall’, ‘around in the hall’, matches the *diá dōmata* (same meaning) found in (13) of §3.9.

Indeed, the different spatial meanings conveyed by *diá* and *katá* have much in common, in that both prepositions can denote a straight trajectory, or a multidirectional motion (or location of a multiplex trajector scattered over a landmark). Note however that, while the two meanings match case alternation with *diá*, they are both expressed by the accusative with *katá*, as shown in Figure 20.⁵




Figure 20. Unidirectional and multidirectional use of *diá* and *katá*

As we have seen in §3.10, *aná* with the accusative and multiplex landmarks can express a relation in which the trajector exhaustively covers the area occupied by the landmark. I have already remarked that exhaustiveness / vs. lack of exhaustiveness explains the choice of either *aná* or *katá*. This point can be illustrated by means of example (15), to be compared with (13) of §3.10:

- (15) *keklómenoí kath' hómilon ... mémasan d'*
 exhort:PART.AOR.MID.NOM.PL down throng:ACC yearn:PLPE.3PL PTC
enì thumôi allélous kath' hómilon enairémen oxēi
 in soul:DAT REC.ACC.PL down throng:ACC slay:INF.PRS sharp:DAT
khalkôi.
 bronze:DAT

“they called one to another through the throng, and they were eager in the throng to slay one another with the sharp bronze” (*Il.* 13.332–338).

(The omitted part of the passage is as follows: “and by the sterns of the ships arose a strife of men clashing together. And as gusts come thick and fast when shrill winds are blowing, on a day when dust lies thickest on the roads, and the winds raise up confusedly a great cloud of dust; even so their battle clashed together”.)

Often, with verbs that mean ‘strike’, *katá* with the accusative can also occur with a uniplex trajector in Location expressions. In such cases, where the trajectory does not move along any type of trajectory, there cannot be a relation of covering of the landmark by the trajector:

- (16) *tòn mèn hupèr mazoío katà stêthos bále*
 DEM.ACC PTC above nipple:GEN down breast:N/A hit:AOR.3SG
dourí
 spear:DAT
 “he struck him on the breast above the nipple with a spear” (*Il.* 11.108).

Here *katá* indicates that the trajector is located somewhere in the area occupied by the landmark. It is remarkable that in this case, too, *katá* is semantically opposite to *aná*, in examples such as (15) and (16) of §3.10, where *aná* with a uniplex trajector profiles a relation of precise individuation of the trajector at a certain spot on the area of the landmark (see the discussion in §3.10).

The meanings of the two prepositions with the accusative of extension are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. *aná* and *katá* with the accusative of extension

	<i>aná</i>	<i>katá</i>
multiple path	systematic	random
location multiplex Tr.	Tr. continuous	Tr. discontinuous
location uniplex Tr.	precise spot	non-precise spot

Metaphorical use of *katá* with the accusative is also attested in Homer:

- (17) *ársantes katà thumón*
 suit:PART.AOR.NOM.PL down mind:ACC
 “suiting it according to (my) mind” (*Il.* 1.136);
- (18) *krîn’ ándras katà phúla*
 divide:IMPT.PRS.2SG man:ACC.PL down tribe:N/A.PL
 “divide the men by tribes” (*Il.* 2. 362).

The two non-local meanings of *katá* are based on the two different local meanings that the preposition can convey, when taking the accusative. In the case in which *katá* means ‘according to’, the semantic extension is based on the meaning ‘along-downwards’. In particular, in examples such as (10), where the preposition means ‘downstream’, there is a sense of conformity to the flowing of the water: a downstream motion is a motion that follows the stream (whereas ‘upstream’ would mean ‘contrary to the flow of water’). This concept, moved to a metaphorical plane, results in the meaning ‘according to’ of (17).

The distributive meaning shown in (18) derives from the locative meaning of examples such as (12). Consider the following passage, which Chantraine (1953:114) mentions under ‘distributive’, but where the meaning of spatial location is also clear:

- (19) *hoi mèn épeita hexeíēs hézonto katà*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC then in.ROW sit:IMPF.M/P.3PL down
klismoús te thrónous te
 chair:ACC.PL PTC seat:ACC.PL PTC
 “they sat down in rows on chairs and high seats” (*Od.* 1.144–145).

Here we have a multiplex trajector and a multiplex landmark, much in the same way as in example (12), the difference lying in the fact that the landmark is a plural count noun. On the other hand, common knowledge about the structure of events makes clear that each person takes a seat on one of the chairs: distributiveness does not, strictly speaking, belong to the meaning of the preposition, but it is inferred from the situation.

In later Greek *katá* remains much more productive than *aná*, as shown, among other things, by the fact that it preserves government of two cases.

In Attic-Ionic, the spatial meaning of *katá* with the genitive continues all the meanings we saw in Homer, but, as in the case of other prepositions, the ablatival value is restricted. Source expressions, albeit infrequent, occur both in Herodotus and in Thucydides:

- (20) *errípton heōutois katà toú teíkheos kátō*
 cast:IMPF.3PL REFL.3PL.ACC.PL down ART.GEN wall:GEN downward
kai diephtheíronto
 and perish:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “(some of them) cast themselves down from the wall and so perished”
 (*Hdt.* 8.53.2);
- (21) *hoi gàr katà tôn krēmnôn*
 ART.NOM.PL PTC down ART.GEN.PL cliff:GEN.PL
biasthéntes hállesthai psiloì
 oblige:PART.AOR.P.NOM.PL leap:INF.PRS.M/P unarmed:NOM.PL
hoi mèn apóllunto, hoi hoi d’
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC perish:IMPF.M/P.3PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC
esóthēsan
 save:AOR.P.3PL
 “some of those who were obliged to leap down from the cliffs unarmed
 escaped, some others perished” (*Th.* 7.45.2).

On the other hand, the directional meaning ‘downward onto’ is more widespread:

- (22) *emanteúonto* *perì tòn* *hirôn*
 consult:IMPF.M/P.3PL about ART.GEN.PL sacred:GEN.PL
khremátōn, *eite sphéa* *katà gês* *katorúxōsi*
 treasure:GEN.PL PTC 3PL.N/A down ground:GEN.F bury:SUBJ.AOR.3PL
eite ekkomísōsi *es állēn* *khōrēn*
 PTC take.away:SUBJ.AOR.3PL to INDEF.ACC.F country:ACC.F
 “they inquired of the oracle about the sacred treasure, whether they should bury it in the ground or take it away to another country” (Hdt. 8.36.1);
- (23) *hōs hai* *epì Lémnōi epikeímenai*
 that ART.NOM.PL on L.:DAT lie:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL.F
nēsoi *aphanizoiáto* *katà tēs* *thalássēs*
 island:NOM.PL.F disappear:OPT.PRS.M/P.3PL down ART.GEN.F sea:GEN.F
 “that the islands off Lemnos would disappear into the sea” (Hdt. 7.6.3);
- (24) *oínon* *epispēsōsi* *katà tōn* *kephalēōn*
 wine:ACC pour:SUBJ.AOR.3PL down ART.GEN.PL.F head:GEN.PL.F
 “they pour wine on the heads” (Hdt. 4.62.3);
- (25) *múron* *katà tēs* *kephalēs* *katakhéantes* *kai*
 myrrh:N/A down ART.GEN.F head:GEN.F pour:PART.AOR.NOM.PL and
eríōi *stépsantes*
 wool:DAT crown:PART.AOR.NOM.PL
 “after pouring myrrh down over (his) head and crowning (him) with fillets of wool” (Pl. *Rep.* 398a).

The above examples demonstrate an extension of the directional meaning of *katá* with the genitive: indeed, it is remarkable that in Attic-Ionic this meaning is no longer connected with resultative aspect, as shown by the fact that the verb forms are not in the perfect. In Homer the achievement of the final location was highlighted; later on, the existence of a downward trajectory along which the trajector moves in the direction of the landmark appears to be more salient in the meaning of *katá*.

Location expressions, whereby a trajector is located below a landmark, are the most restricted, being mostly limited to the phrases *katà khthonós*, *katà gês*, ‘underground’, which occur in poetry and in Xenophon:

- (26) *egò* *mèn toínun* *eúkhomai* *prîn taúta*
 1SG.NOM PTC therefore pray:PRS.M/P.1SG before DEM.N/A.PL
epideín *hup’ humôn* *genómēna*
 see:INF.AOR by 2PL.GEN happen:PART.AOR.MID.N/A.PL

murías emé ge katà tês gês
 thousand:ACC.PL.F 1SG.ACC PTC down ART.GEN.F ground:GEN.F
orguiàs genésthai
 fathom:ACC.PL.F be:INF.AOR.MID

“for my part, therefore, I pray that sooner than live to behold this deed wrought by you, I may be laid ten thousand fathoms underground” (Xen. *An.* 7.1.30).

An interesting extension of the locational meaning is found in the expression *katà nótou*, ‘at the back’, where the meaning of *katá* shifts from ‘below’ to ‘behind’, with a rotation from the vertical to the horizontal axis, that can also occur with other prepositions expressing verticality (see §3.12, §3.18):

- (27) *ex enantías gàr hoútoi katheistékesan, ek*
 out.of opposite.side:GEN.F PTC DEM.NOM.PL stay:PLPF.3PL out.of
plagiou de hoi psiloì kai katà nótou
 flank:GEN PTC ART.NOM.PL unarmed:NOM.PL and down back:GEN
 “these were stationed directly in front of them, while the light-armed troops were on their flank and rear” (Th. 4.33.1).

Possibly the link between the two meanings is provided by the fact that what is behind is invisible, in much the same way as what is below.⁶

Metaphorical meanings, which did not exist for *katá* with the genitive in Homer, have a certain extension afterwards. In the first place, the preposition acquires the meaning of ‘regarding’, and can denote Area, as in:

- (28) *ándres hiroí, tí pheúgontes oíkhesthe,*
 man:VOC.PL holy:VOC.PL why flee:PART.PRS.NOM.PL leave:PRS.M/P.2PL
ouk epitédea katagnóntes kat’ emeû?
 NEG convenient:N/A.PL remark:PART.AOR.NOM.PL down 1SG.GEN
 “holy men, why have you fled away, and so misjudged my intent?” (Hdt. 6.97.2);

- (29) *egð de taútēn t’ alēthē tēn*
 1SG.NOM PTC DEM.ACC.F and true:ACC.F ART.ACC.F
dóxan einai nomízō katà tēs
 reputation:ACC.F be:INF.PRS believe:PRS.1SG down ART.GEN.F
póleōs
 city:GEN.F
 “I for one believe this reputation which prevails concerning the State to be true” (Dem. *Exordia* 16.1).

Of the concrete meanings of *katá*, it is the directional meaning that provides the source for this shift: the shift is triggered by the occurrence of a special type of trajector, as thought, speech, or judgment. These are human activities, which, being voluntary, are conceived as moving along a trajectory with precise direction, determined by intentionality. The same directional value provides the ground for the use of *katá* with the genitive where it denotes the object of an oath:

- (30) *omníntōn* *dè tōn epikhōrion hōrkon*
 swear:IMPT.PRS.3PL PTC ART.ACC of.country:ACC oath:ACC
hékastoi tōn mégiston katà hierōn
 INDEF.NOM.PL ART.ACC big:SUP.ACC down victim:GEN.PL
teleiōn
 full.grown:GEN.PL
 “each shall swear the oath most binding in his country over full-grown victims” (Th. 5.47.8).

Finally, the directional meaning can be understood in a hostile sense, as ‘against’, again with the verbs of ‘saying’, or ‘judging’, and express Malefactive:

- (31) *hína dè mè dokōsin aporein, tà*
 for PTC NEG seem:SUBJ.PRS.3PL be.puzzled:INF.PRS ART.N/A.PL
katà pántōn tōn philosophoúntōn
 down all:GEN.PL.M ART.GEN.PL.M philosophize:PART.PRS.GEN.PL.M
prókheira taúta légousin
 ordinary:N/A.PL DEM.N/A.PL say:PRS.3PL
 “that they may not seem to be at a loss they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers” (Pl. *Ap.* 23d).

The preceding context makes clear that the preposition does not mean ‘regarding’ in a neutral way:

As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth. And when anyone asks them by doing or teaching what? they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, the things in the air and the things beneath the earth and not to believe in the gods and to make the weaker argument the stronger. (Pl. *Ap.* 23d).

Various prepositional phrases occur with verbs of ‘saying’ and denote the topic of discourse, with the SR Area. In particular, in such function *katá* is fre-

quently employed in philosophical discourse, in which it alternates with *perí*. The difference in meaning conveyed in similar contexts by the two prepositions, *katá* with the genitive, and *perí* with the genitive and with the accusative is most interesting, as we will see further in §3.16. We may start by examining example (32):

- (32) *éti dè pásan horôntes taútēn*
 PTC PTC all:ACC.F observe:PART.PRS.NOM.PL DEM.ACC.F
kinouménēn tēn phúsin, katà dè
 move:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.F ART.ACC.F substance:ACC.F down PTC
toú metabállontos outhēn
 ART.GEN.N change:PART.PRS.GEN.N INDEF.N/A
alētheúomenon, perí ge tò pántēi pántōs
 prove.true:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A about PTC ART.N/A completely entirely
metabállon ouk endékhesthai
 change:PART.PRS.N/A NEG be.possible:INF.PRS.M/P
alētheúein
 demonstrate:INF.PRS

“and further, observing that all this substance is in motion, and that no true predication can be made regarding that which changes, (they supposed that) it is impossible to make any true statement regarding that which is in all ways and entirely changeable” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a 7–9).

Here, the *katá* phrase depends on the verb *alētheúein*, ‘to say true things’, similar to the *perí* with accusative phrase in the second part of the example. So one can suppose that the two expressions have about the same meaning. Example (33) contains occurrences of *katá* and *perí* with case alternation:

- (33) *kai gàr tò nóēma hèn ou mónon perí*
 and PTC ART.N/A concept:N/A one:N/A NEG only about
tàs ousías allà kai katà tōn
 ART.ACC.PL.F substance:ACC.PL.F but and down ART.GEN.PL.N
állōn estí, kai epistēmai ou mónon
 INDEF.GEN.PL.N be:PRS.3SG and science:NOM.PL.F NEG only
tēs ousías eisin allà kai hetérōn, kai
 ART.GEN.F substance:GEN.F be:PRS.3PL but and INDEF.GEN.PL.N and
állā dè muría sumbaínei toiaúta: katà
 INDEF.N/A.PL PTC thousand:N/A happen:PRS.3SG INDEF.N/A.PL down
dè tò anankaíon kai tàs dóxas
 PTC ART.N/A necessity:N/A and ART.ACC.PL.F view:ACC.PL.F

tàs perì autôn, ei ésti methektà
 ART.ACC.PL.F about DEM.GEN.PL.N if be:PRS.3SG participated:N/A.PL
tà eídē, tòn ousiôn
 ART.N/A.PL form:N/A.PL ART.GEN.PL.F substance:GEN.PL.F
anankaïon idéas éinai mónon. ou gàr katà
 necessary:N/A idea:ACC.PL.F be:INF.PRS only NEG PTC down
sumbebèkòs metékhontai allà déi taútēi
 accident:PART.PF.N/A participate:PRS.M/P.3PL but need:PRS.3SG there
hekástou metékhein hēi mē kath'
 INDEF.GEN.N participate:INF.PRS where NEG down
hupokeiménou légetai
 subject:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.N predicate:PRS.M/P.3SG

“since the concept is one not only in the case of substances, but also regarding of all other things; and there are sciences not only of substances but of other things as well; and there are a thousand other similar consequences; but according to logical necessity, and from the views generally held about them, it follows that if the Forms are participated in, then there can only be Ideas of substances. For they are not participated in by accidents; each Form can only be participated in so far as it is not predicated of a subject” (Arist. *Metaph.* 990b 25–30).

Here again, the meaning of *katá* with the genitive seems close to the meaning of *perí* with the accusative, since the two phrases are coordinated. Furthermore, there is another *katá* with genitive phrase, *kath' hupokeiménou*, ‘regarding a subject’, governed by the verb *légein*, ‘to speak’. As we will see at length in §3.16, there is a difference between *perí* with the genitive, which means ‘about’ and is used to refer to the topic of discourse, and *perí* with the accusative, ‘regarding’. The difference can sometimes be very subtle, but there are occurrences of either type of prepositional phrase in the same context, in which case alternation determines completely different meanings (see examples (36) and (45) of §3.16).

With the accusative, *katá* used in spatial sense retains the meaning ‘downwards along’ to a limited extent only, especially in expressions such as *katà potamón*, *katà rhoón*, ‘downstream’.⁷ The meaning ‘around’, ‘over’, is frequent. An example from Herodotus also illustrates the opposition with *aná*:

- (34) *hai mén nun ékhidnai katà pásan tēn*
 ART.NOM.PL.F PTC PTC viper:NOM.PL.F down all:ACC.F ART.ACC.F
gēn eisi, hoi dē hupópteroi
 land:ACC.F be:PRS.3PL ART.NOM.PL PTC winged:NOM.PL

óphiēs athróoi eisi en tēi
 serpent:NOM.PL in.mass:NOM.PL be:PRS.3PL in ART.DAT.F
Arabíēi kai oudamēi állēi: katà toúto dokéousi
 Arabia:DAT.F and nowhere else down INDEF.N/A seem:PRS.3PL
polloì eínai
 many:NOM.PL be:INF.PRS

“although there are vipers in every land, the Arabian winged serpents are all in Arabia and are found nowhere else: accordingly they do indeed seem to be many” (Hdt. 3.109.3).

Here *katà pásan tēn gēn* means that there are vipers at different locations throughout the earth, but not that vipers cover all the surface of the earth: compare this passage with examples (19)–(21) of §3.10, where *aná* denotes exhaustiveness. Other examples of *katá* with the accusative in local sense are:

(35) *hēmín d’ estì gē pollē kai en*
 IPL.DAT PTC be:PRS.3SG territory:NOM.F much:NOM.F and in
nésois kai kat’ épeiron
 island:DAT.PL.F and down mainland:ACC.F
 “we have an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland” (Th. 1.143.4);

(36) *tēs gàr emporías ouk oúsēs, oud’*
 ART.GEN.F PTC commerce:GEN.F NEG be:PART.GEN.F NEG
epimeignúntes adeòs allélois oúte katà gēn
 deal:PART.NOM.PL fearlessly REC.DAT.PL.M NEG down land:ACC.F
oúte dià thalássēs
 NEG through sea:GEN.F
 “without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea” (Th. 1.2.2).

A new local meaning found in Attic-Ionic is ‘opposite to’:

(37) *apikómenoì dè antetássonto hōde hupò*
 go:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL PTC array:IMP.F.M/P.3PL so under
Mardoníou. katà mèn Lakedaimoníous éstēse
 M.:GEN down PTC Spartan:ACC.PL position:AOR.3SG
Pérsas
 Persian:ACC.PL

“when they were there, they were arrayed for battle by Mardonius as follows. He posted the Persians facing the Lacedaemonians” (Hdt. 9.31.1);

- (38) *keítai dè he Kephallēnia katà Akarnanían kai*
 lie:PRS.M/P.3SG PTC ART.NOM.F K.:NOM.F down A.:ACC.F and
Leukáda
L.:ACC
 “Cephalenia lies in front of Acarnania and Leucas” (Th. 2.30.2).

This meaning constitutes an innovation with respect to Homer. It is derived through an extension from the meaning of *katá* with the directional accusative: as we have seen, *katá* indicates that a trajector moves downwards along a trajectory. Here the ‘downward’ component of the meaning is lost, and only the notion of trajectory remains; furthermore, since we find non-dynamic states of affairs, motion along a trajectory is fictive (in the sense of Talmy 2000:99–175), because there is no movement, but simply a direction.

Another innovation is constituted by the use of *katá* in Time expressions, in which it denotes duration, such as *katà tòn autòn khrónon*, ‘during that time span’, or *kath’hēméran*, ‘during the day’.

Distributive use of *katá*, already found in Homer, becomes widespread later; an example is:

- (39) *tetrarkhías katéstēsen, hína mē mónon katà*
 tetarchy:ACC.PL.F set.up:AOR.3SG for NEG only down
póleis allà kai kat’ éthnē douleúōsin?
 city:ACC.PL.F but and down tribe:N/A.PL be.subject:SUBJ.PRS.3PL
 “setting up tetrarchies in order to enslave them, not only city by city, but
 tribe by tribe as well?” (Dem. 9.26).

In most other occurrences, *katá* with the accusative means ‘regarding’, ‘as to’, and denotes Area, as in:

- (40) *all’ è tò parápan hétera è katà mégethos*
 but PTC ART.N/A altogether different:N/A.PL PTC down degree:N/A
hétera
 different:N/A.PL
 “and things appear either altogether different, or different in degree”
 (Arist. *Rh.* 1378a 1);
- (41) *prosékein dè oíontai polūōreísthai hupò*
 belong:INF.PRS PTC think:PRS.M/P.3PL esteem:INF.PRS.M/P under
tòn hēttónōn katà génos, katà dúnamin,
 ART.GEN.PL.M inferior:GEN.PL.M down birth:N/A down power:ACC.F
kat’ aretén
 down virtue:ACC.F

“now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue” (Arist. *Rh.* 1378b 36);

- (42) *hē dè haplótēs katà mèn mousikèn en*
 ART.NOM.F PTC simplicity:NOM.F down PTC music:ACC.F in
psukhaís sōphrosúnēn, katà dè gymnastikèn en
 soul:DAT.PL.F sobriety:ACC.F down PTC gymnastic:ACC.F in
sōmasin hugíean?
 body:DAT.PL health:ACC.F
 “while simplicity in music (begets) sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training (begets) health in bodies?” (Pl. *Rep.* 404e).

In (40) *katà mégethos*, ‘in measure’, denotes the limits of the difference between two entities: in similar passages, Area can also be expressed by the plain accusative (§2.2.1.4), the plain dative (§2.2.3.3), or *perí* with the accusative (§3.16). The meaning ‘concerning’ can also refer to human beings:

- (43) *oudeís mēpōth’ heúrēi kat’ ém’ oudèn*
 INDEF.NOM ever find:SUBJ.AOR.3SG down 1SG.ACC INDEF.N/A
elleiphthén
 leave.behind:PART.AOR.P.N/A
 “no man can find any fault (lit.: ‘anything left behind’) on my part”
 (Dem. 18.246).

Here the *katá* phrase denotes the area that delimits the state of affairs denoted by the participle *elleiphthén*, ‘left behind’.

In some occurrences, Area shifts to Cause or Reason, as in

- (44) *Argeiōn mèn nun kai Aiginētēōn hai*
 from.A.:GEN.PL PTC PTC and from.A.:GEN.PL ART.NOM.PL.F
gunaikes ek tósou kat’ érin tèn
 woman:NOM.PL.F out.of INDEF.GEN down feud:ACC.F ART.ACC.F
Athēnaíōn perónas eti kai es emè
 Athenian:GEN.PL brooch.pin:ACC.PL.F PTC and to 1SG.ACC
ephóreon mézonas è prò toú
 wear:IMPF.3PL longer:ACC.PL.F PTC before ART.GEN.N
 “ever since that day even to my time the women of Argos and Aegina wore brooch-pins longer than before, by reason of the feud with the Athenians”
 (Hdt. 5.89.1).

In this example, the limits of the state of affairs are re-interpreted as the reason for the agent to bring it about.

Finally, with abstract nouns *katá* and the accusative can express Manner:

- (45) *kai Astakón, . . . , labóntes katà krátos*
 and A.:ACC take:PART.AOR.NOM.PL down violence:N/A
 “and taking Astakos with violence” (Th. 2.30.1).

The meaning extensions of *katá* with the accusative in Attic-Ionic can be drawn as as in Figure 21.




Figure 21. Meaning extensions of *katá* with the accusative

3.12 HUPER

The particle *hupér* means ‘above’, ‘over’, ‘beyond’, and is an old Indo-European adverb, which has cognates in numerous languages, including English ‘over’ (cf. further Lat. *super*, German *über*). In Greek it is never used as an independent adverb, but it occurs as preverb with a number of verbs: in Homer, the preverb *huper-* is found especially with motion verbs, and indicates that the motion goes over or beyond a certain landmark: *huperbállein*, ‘to throw beyond a mark’, *huperbaínein*, ‘to step over’.

As a preposition, *hupér* takes the genitive and the accusative in Homer. Since its meaning is similar, in many respects, to the meaning of its English cognate *over*, a preposition which has been the topic of in-depth studies, I will briefly discuss some facts about the latter.

Brugman (1988: 13–15) remarks that, among other things, trajectors with *over* may be uniplex or multiplex; that the preposition profiles a verticality relation between trajector and landmark; that there is usually a trajectory existing or implicit between trajector and landmark; that the physical boundaries of the landmark appear to be relevant, at least in some cases; and that there may or may not be physical contact between trajector and landmark. She then examines the prepositions *on*, *above*, and *across*, which all share some, but not all, of the above features. Most relevant for the present discussion, Brugman remarks that vertical orientation is shared by *over* with *on* and *above*, but, while the former implies physical contact, the latter excludes it. Contrary to *over*, *above* does not imply the existence of a trajectory. Shared features of *over* and *across* are the boundedness of the landmark and the existing or implicit trajectory between a trajector and a landmark.

The meaning of *hupér* shares features of *over* and of *above*: in particular, it never denotes contact (contact is denoted by *epí*, ‘on’, §3.18). Some of the meanings conveyed by *over* are conveyed by *hupér*, too, but they are divided between the two cases that can occur with it. In some occurrences, *hupér* denotes that a limit is surpassed, like English *across*.

With the genitive, *hupér* denotes Location. Normally, it implies that the trajector is not in contact with the landmark, but is located on a vertical line above it. These two features are demonstrated in examples (1) through (4), and are shared with English *over* and *above*:

- (1) *stê d’ ár’ hupèr kephalês*
 stay:AOR.3SG PTC then OVER head:GEN.F
 “he took his stand above (his) head” (*Il.* 2.20 and *passim*);

- (2) *bále dourì stérnon hupèr mazoío*
 hit:AOR.3SG spear:DAT breast:N/A over nipple:GEN
 “he hit (him) with a spear in the breast above the nipple” (*Il.* 4.527–528);
- (3) *hupsoû hupèr gaiēs metà gamphêléisin*
 high over ground:GEN.F among jaws:DAT.PL.F
ékhonte
 hold:PART.PRS.NOM.DU
 “holding it in (their) jaws high above the ground” (*Il.* 13.200);
- (4) *trís mèn hupèr táphrou megál’ iakhe díos*
 thrice PTC over trench:GEN.F mightily shout:IMPF.3SG godly:NOM
Akhilleús
*A.:*NOM
 “thrice over the trench shouted mightily the godly Achilles” (*Il.* 18.228).

The trajector’s plexity does not appear to be relevant in the above examples. Furthermore, there appears to be no need to postulate an implicit trajectory: the preposition profiles a static relation between the trajector and the landmark, and in this respect its meaning is closer to the meaning of *above* than to the meaning of *over*. This fact must be kept in mind, when we consider the next two examples, where *hupér* indicates Location of a trajector beyond a landmark. In this case, it corresponds to English *across*, or *over*:

- (5) *hē d’ étheen Boréi anémōi... mésson hupèr*
DEM.NOM.F PTC run:IMPF.3SG B.:DAT wind:DAT middle over
Krētēs
*K.:*GEN.F
 “she ran before the North Wind on a mid-sea course over Crete”
 (*Od.* 14.299–300);
- (6) *punthanómēn Ithákēs ge kai en Krētēi eureiēi, tēlou*
hear:IMPF.M/P.1SG I.:GEN PTC and in K.:DAT.F broad:DAT.F far
hupèr pōntou
over sea:GEN
 “I heard of Ithaca, even in broad Crete, far across the sea”
 (*Od.* 13.256–257).

Note that, with respect to *over*, *hupér* with the genitive only expresses Location, so the component of *across* in examples (5) and (6) corresponds to cases where a trajectory is implicit, as in

- (7) *He lives over the hill.*

Taylor (1993: 166) calls the use of *over* in (7) ‘resultative’, and writes that “the preposition profiles a place relation which has resulted from the attainment of a goal”. According to Taylor, an example such as (7) “locates the tr[ajector] at a place construed as the end-point of an imaginary path that originates with an observer”.¹ We will see how the resultative meaning of *hupér* is relevant to its occurrences with the accusative. In the case of (5) and (6), orientation appears to be more relevant: although not physically lying on a vertical line, the landmark is profiled as being so located with respect to the point of observation. Note further that in example (5) the location *hupér* is associated with the north wind, i.e. with northern orientation (the Greeks named the cardinal points after winds). The relevance of vertical orientation will become clearer when we examine Attic-Ionic occurrences of *hupér* with the genitive.

Closely connected with the meaning demonstrated in examples (1)–(4) is the metaphorical extension found in passages such as

- (8) *teíkhos eteikhíssanto neôn hupér*
 wall:N/A build:AOR.MID.3PL ship:GEN.PL.F OVER
 “they built a wall in defence of the ships” (*Il.* 7.449),

where there is no physical relation of verticality: obviously the wall is not placed vertical above the ships. However, from the notion of verticality an implication is derived that there is a point of view from which the landmark cannot be seen, because the trajector covers it with its extension. Physical covering is then understood as the capability to defend the entity denoted by the landmark.

Often prepositions that denote verticality can metaphorically be extended to denote the topic of discourse, thus expressing the SR Area. This happens in English with *on*; in Greek it can occasionally be found with *hupér*:

- (9) *hóth’ hupèr séthen aískhe’ akouō pròs*
 when over 2SG.GEN shame:N/A.PL hear:PRS.1SG toward
Tróōn
 Trojan:GEN.PL
 “when I hear regarding you words of shame from the Trojans”
 (*Il.* 6.524–525).

Other Area expressions are the frequent ones where *hupér* occurs with verbs of praying, with the meaning ‘for the sake of’:

- (10) *líssom'* *hupèr psukhês kai gounôn*
 implore:PRS.M/P.1SG over life:GEN.F and knee:GEN.PL
sôn *te tokéōn*
 POSS.2SG.GEN.PL PTC parents:GEN.PL
 "I implore you by your life and knees and parents" (*Il.* 22.338).

This use can be explained as deriving from the preceding one, with a further step: the topic of a prayer is understood as the reason which should motivate the recipient of the prayer to satisfy it.

With the directional accusative, *hupér* can occur with motion verbs and uniplex trajectors, and profile motion across the boundaries of a landmark (Direction). In this case, the preposition denotes horizontal, rather than vertical, orientation, with a rotation that can also be observed with *katá* (§3.11) and *epí* (§3.18):

- (11) *karpalímōs hupèr oudòn ebéseto dómatos eísō*
 quickly over threshold:ACC.F go:AOR.MID.3SG house:GEN into
 "he passed quickly over the threshold into the house" (*Od.* 7.135).

Note that in its directional use with the accusative, *hupér* never profiles a relation of verticality: the landmark is placed on a horizontal line with respect to the trajector, and it is conceived as a possible limit that the trajector crosses with its motion. In such usage *hupér* is similar to occurrences of *diá* with the accusative, such as the one in §3.9 example (19).

In a number of other occurrences, *hupér* with the accusative can express Location with multiplex trajectors: its meaning is 'all over', and the trajector is described as 'covering' the landmark.² In this type of occurrence, the orientation remains vertical:

- (12) *hón te méta krokópeplos hupeir hála*
 DEM.ACC PTC after yellow.veil:NOM.F over sea:ACC.F
kídnatai *ēōs*
 spread:PRS.M/P.3SG dawn:NOM.F
 "(the star) after which saffron-robed dawn follows and spreads over the sea" (*Il.* 23.227);
- (13) *tò dè teíkhos húper pân doúpos orórei*
 ART.N/A PTC wall:N/A over all:N/A din:N/A arise:PLPF.3SG
 "and over all the wall the din arose" (*Il.* 12.289).

This last example can be compared with (4), with the genitive: in (4) Achilles is located in a specific position and from there shouting over the trench; in (13),




Figure 22. Schema of *hupér*

on the other hand, the noise rises from different locations and covers the wall completely. The meanings of *hupér* are represented by the schemas in Figure 22.

The metaphorical extension of *hupér* with the accusative is based on its directional value (cf. ex. (11)):

- (14) *Héktor epei me kat' aisan eneikesas oud' hupèr*
*H.:*VOC as 1SG.ACC down lot:ACC.F scold:AOR.2SG NEG over
aisan
 lot:ACC.F
 “Hector, as you scold me duly, and not beyond what is due”
 (*Il.* 3.59).

In (14), *hupér* can be rendered in English as ‘beyond’: the preposition denotes a movement that brings the trajector across the landmark, profiling the result. Landmarks in this type of metaphorical use are abstract nouns that refer to some limiting entity, as *aisan*, ‘share’, ‘lot’; the meaning ‘beyond’ acquires a negative connotation. A frequent expression is *hupèr móron*, ‘beyond one’s fate’; further we find:

- (15) *próteroi hupèr hórkia pēménéian*
 first:NOM.PL over oath:N/A.PL harm:OPT.AOR.3PL
 “first to work harm in defiance of the oaths” (*Il.* 3.299).

Contrary to the concrete directional use they are derived from, the metaphorical occurrences of *hupér* with the accusative shown in examples (14) and (15) present the landmark as an abstract location, surpassed by an implied motion: they are closer to what Taylor describes as ‘resultative’ occurrences of ‘over’ than the occurrences with the genitive in (5) and (6).

In Attic-Ionic the spatial meaning of *hupér* is mostly limited to the genitive, with which it denotes Location. Examples are:

- (16) *hóti hupèr kephalès hoi egíneto ho*
 because over head:GEN.F 3SG.DAT.M be:IMPF.M/P.3SG ART.NOM
nekròs diexelaúnonti
 corpse:NOM pass.through:PART.PRS.DAT.M
 “(the reason he did not use the gate was) that the dead body would be over his head as he passed through” (Hdt. 1.187.4);
- (17) *epì xúlou megáλου anapeítras histái hupèr*
 on pole:GEN tall:GEN fix:PART.AOR.NOM place:PRS.3SG over
tês oikíēs huperékhouan pollón, málista dè
 ART.GEN.F house:GEN.F be.OVER:PART.PRS.ACC.F very especially PTC
hupèr tês kapnodókēs
 over ART.GEN.F vent:GEN.F
 “he places it on a tall pole and stands it high above the dwelling, above the smoke-vent for the most part” (Hdt. 4.103.3);
- (18) *hupépheugon gàr hoi ánthrōpoi kai ekáthēnto epì*
 flee:IMPF.3PL PTC ART.NOM.PL man:NOM.PL and sit:IMPF.M/P.3PL on
tôn lóphōn tōn hupèr tēs
 ART.GEN.PL.M hill:GEN.PL.M ART.GEN.PL.M over ART.GEN.F
póleōs
 town:GEN.F
 “the inhabitants were flying and posting themselves upon the hills above the town” (Th. 3.97.2);
- (19) *ésti dè limén, kai pólis hupèr autoú*
 be:PRS.3SG PTC harbor:NOM and city:NOM.F over DEM.GEN.M
keítai apò thalássēs ... Ephúērē
 lie:PRS.M/P.3SG from sea:GEN.F E.:NOM.F
 “there is a harbor, above which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre” (Th. 1.46.4);
- (20) *Leipsúdrion tò hupèr Paiontēs teikhísantes*
 L.:N/A ART.N/A over P.:GEN fortify:PART.AOR.NOM.PL
 “after fortifying Lipsydrium, north of Paeonia” (Hdt. 5.62.2).

In (16) *hupér* with the genitive profiles verticality and lack of contact between the trajector and the landmark. In (17), too, verticality and lack of contact are combined, and *hupér* contrasts with *epí*, ‘on’, which denotes contact. Note that verticality appears to be less relevant than lack of contact, as demonstrated in (18), again with the opposition between *hupér* and *epí*. Here verticality is

not intended as location of the landmark right underneath the trajector, but rather by its lower edge. I will discuss this twofold possible interpretation of the notion of ‘below’/ ‘under’ in §3.13, when discussing the use of *hupó*. In example (20) *hupér* profiles the end-point of an imaginary upward path. These examples are similar to (5) and (6), except for the fact that the orientation here is clearer: the trajector is located north of the landmark. North is equated with up, following a common convention in the Western tradition of cardinal orientation, which was born in the antiquity.³

The most frequent metaphorical extension is derived from the notion of ‘covering’, by which the preposition already took the meaning ‘in defense of’ in Homer, as shown in example (8), and later came to mean ‘on behalf of’, thus encoding Beneficiary. This semantic development can be traced in occurrences such as the ones in (21); in (22) and (23) the notion of behalf is complete:

- (21) *éti dè toîs mèn sómasin allotriótatois*
 PTC PTC ART.DAT.PL.N PTC body:DAT.PL.N of.another:SUP.DAT.PL.N
hupèr tês póleōs khrôntai, têtì dè
 over ART.GEN.F country:GEN.F use:PRS.M/P.3PL ART.DAT.F PTC
gnómēi oikeiotátēi es tò prássein ti
 intellect:DAT.F personal:SUP.DAT.F to ART.N/A do:INF.PRS INDEF.N/A
hupèr autês
 over DEM.GEN.F
 “their bodies they use generously in their country’s cause; their intellect they save to be employed in her service” (Th. 1.70.6);
- (22) *makhómenos... hupèr humôn*
 fight:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM over 2PL.GEN
 “fighting on your behalf” (Pl. *Laws* 642c);
- (23) *egò án se hupèr toú Hállēnos*
 1SG.NOM PTC 2SG.ACC over ART.GEN Greek:GEN
etisámēn
 punish:AOR.MID.1SG
 “I would have punished you on behalf of the Greek” (Hdt 2.115.4).

Note that the notion of ‘covering’ here is reinterpreted as substitution of the landmark by the trajector. The notion of behalf is made clear especially by example (23). This is the common way to express Behalf Beneficiary, which is sometimes also expressed by *pró* or *antí*, as we have seen in §3.7 and 3.8. In the case of *hupér*, it is the notion of physical covering that explains the shift to this type of Beneficiary: if the trajector is over the landmark, it covers the landmark, which, as a consequence, remains invisible. The trajector, which is visible, if we




Figure 23.

take a vantage point above it, seems to stand in the place of the landmark, and thus replace it, as in the schema of Figure 23. The notion of physical replacement in a dynamic state of affairs is then understood as implying that the trajector acts in the place, or on behalf, of the replaced landmark.

The meaning ‘about’ continues after Homer; *hupér* with the genitive can occasionally encode Area with verbs of ‘saying’, as in (24). Much more frequently, it encodes Area with verbs of ‘fearing’, as in (25) and (26); note however that it does not extend to Cause:

(24) *hupèr toû Diòs agoreúōn*
 over ART.GEN Z.:GEN speak:PART.PRS.NOM
 “in speaking of Zeus” (Pl. *Laws* 776e);

(25) *deimainō hupèr huméōn*
 fear:PRS.1SG over 2PL.GEN
 “I fear what may befall you” (Hdt. 8.140β.3);

(26) *epeidè edéisate hupèr humôn kai oukh hēmôn tò pléon*
 after fear:AOR.2PL over 2PL.GEN and NEG 1PL.GEN ART.N/A
 INDEF.N/A
 “(your coming was prompted) quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us” (Th. 1.74.3).

With verbs of emotion, *hupér* with the genitive often denotes the (mostly human) entity which serves as an indirect cause for the emotion, but not the cause of emotion itself, as shown in (26) (see further §3.15 and 3.16). The landmark denotes what the emotion is about, rather than what brings about the emotion.

After Homer, the accusative with *hupér* is found with spatial meaning only twice in Herodotus, and occasionally in Attic:

- (27) *rhiptéousi hupèr tòn dómon*
 throw:PRS.3PL over ART.ACC house:ACC
 “(they) throw it over the house” (Hdt. 4.188);
- (28) *tôn gàr oréōn... tòn hupèr Mémphin*
 ART.GEN.PL.N PTC mountain:GEN.PL.N ART.GEN.PL.N over M.:ACC.F
pólin keiménōn tò metaxù
 city:ACC.F lie:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.N ART.N/A between
 “the territory between the ranges of mountains beyond the city of Mem-
 phis” (Hdt. 2.10.1);
- (29) *aph’ hoú gegonòs emēnúthē pólemos*
 around REL.GEN.N be:PART.PF.NOM record:AOR.P.3SG war:NOM
toís th’ hupèr Hērakleías stélas éxō
 ART.DAT.PL.M PTC over H.:ACC.PL.F pillar:ACC.PL.F outside
katoikóusin kai toís entòs pásin
 dwell:PART.PRS.DAT.PL.M and ART.DAT.PL.M inside all:DAT.PL.M
 “since the war occurred, as is recorded, between the dwellers beyond the
 pillars of Heracles and all that dwelt within them” (Pl. *Criti.* 108e).

In (27) the preposition profiles a trajectory of the trajector across and beyond a landmark; here the occurrence of *hupér* can be understood as profiling the overcoming of the landmark. The other two occurrences are harder to explain, if we translate *hupér* with ‘above’, as is currently done. In particular, example (28) seems to denote the same relative position of trajector and landmark as in (18) where the genitive occurs; note, however, that the alternation between cases is always meaningful in Classical Greek. On the other hand, if we take *hupér* in (28) to mean ‘beyond’, as in (29), the difference between genitive and accusative becomes clear: in (28) and (29) the preposition with the accusative profiles a horizontal trajectory, while in (18) and other similar occurrences the relation holds on a vertical line. Note further that the idea of limit, which appears to be the most relevant feature of *hupér* with the accusative, as shown by its metaphorical use, applies well to example (29), since the pillars of Hercules were conceived as the limits of the world in Antiquity.

In Attic authors, *hupér* can also refer to Time:

- (30) *neòn gàr makròn spanísantés pote pròs*
 ship:GEN.PL.F PTC long:GEN.PL.F lack:PART.AOR.NOM.PL ever toward
tòn Aiginētòn hupèr tà Mēdikà pólemon
 ART.ACC from.A.:GEN.PL over ART.N/A.PL Pearsian:N/A.PL war:ACC

“when you were in want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion” (Th. 1.41.2);

- (31) *hupèr tèn megístēn phthoràn húdasin*
 over ART.ACC.F great:SUP.ACC.F destruction:ACC.F water:DAT.PL
 “before the greatest destruction by water” (Pl. *Tm.* 23c).

The landmark again is conceived as setting a limit; note that the meaning of *hupér* in Time expressions is hard to understand, if we see time as flowing from past onwards, and take its origin (i.e. the past) as a view point, assuming, as we usually do, that the past lies ‘behind’ us. Indeed, if we do so we have the impression that the limit set by *hupér* is not surpassed, and the meaning of the preposition is ‘before’, rather than ‘beyond’. But if we take the present as viewpoint for both the past and the future, the meaning ‘beyond’ applies again, as shown in Figure 24.

The conception that the Greeks (and the early Indo-European peoples) had of the past has been the matter of extensive discussion. Apparently, a view according to which the past lies before us had been replaced, already before Plato’s times, by the current view, which sets the past behind us. The use of *hupér* in examples such as (30) and (31) may be taken as a remnant of the earlier conception, although much more material should be investigated to draw clear conclusions.⁴

Metaphorical use of *hupér* with the accusative is the most extended in Attic-Ionic; the landmark is understood as a limit and the trajector as being located beyond it. Note that in these examples there is no need to understand the existence of a trajectory. In (32), the landmark is a concrete noun with non-referential reading; in (33) and (34), some kind of possessed substance or quality; often, we find a quantity denoted by a numeral, as in (35):




Figure 24. Types of temporal orientation

- (32) *kai gàr dúnamis hupèr ánthrōpon hē basiléos*
 and PTC might:NOM.F over man:ACC ART.NOM.F king:GEN
estì kai kheir hupermékēs.
 be:PRS.3SG and arm:NOM.F long:NOM.F
 “for the king’s might is greater than human, and his arm is long”
 (Hdt. 8.140β.2);
- (33) *oukh hupèr tèn ousían poioúmenoi*
 NEG over ART.ACC.F means:ACC.F beget:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL
 “not begetting offspring beyond their means” (Pl. *Rep.* 372b);
- (34) *hó te ápeiros éstin hà kai*
 ART.NOM PTC inexperienced:NOM be:PRS.3SG REL.N/A.PL and
pleonázesthai, dià phthónon, éi ti hupèr
 exaggerate:INF.PRS.M/P through envy:ACC if INDEF.N/A over
tèn hautoù phúsin akoúoi
 ART.ACC.F REFL.3SG.GEN.M nature:ACC.F hear:OPT.PRS.3SG
 “the listener who has no direct experience will perceive the exposition
 as exaggerated, because of envy, if he hears anything that surpasses his
 nature” (Th. 2.35.2);
- (35) *apékteinán te hupèr khilíous*
 kill:AOR.3PL PTC over thousand:ACC.PL
 “they killed more than a thousand (of them)” (Th. 4.25.9).

In the course of this section a number of things about the meaning of *hupér* have become apparent, that demonstrate how the genitive and the accusative actually indicated different types of location, also in occurrences in which they are often translated as overlapping. An important point that must be kept in mind is that, already in Homer, *hupér* with the accusative only expressed verticality in its usage with multiplex trajectors, denoting multidirectional Path. In its usage with simplex trajectors in Direction expressions, on the other hand, the preposition indicated that the landmark is a limit setting entity placed on a horizontal trajectory with respect to the initial position of the trajector. Since the function of denoting multidirectional Path was lost after Homer, and given the fact that the metaphorical use of *hupér* was based on its directional meaning, later occurrences of the preposition in space expressions must not be taken as meaning ‘above’, but rather ‘beyond’.

3.13 HUPO

The particle *hupó* means ‘under’, ‘below’, ‘beneath’; as its opposite *hupér* it has cognates in a number of other Indo-European languages (e.g. Latin *sub*, with the same meaning).

An example of *hupó* used as a free adverb is:

- (1) *dúō d’ hupò puthménēs êsan*
 two PTC under support:NOM.PL be:IMPF.3PL
 “underneath (the cup) were two supports” (Il. 11.635).

Usage of *hupó* as a preverb is frequent; the particle adds a local specification to the verbal meaning, as in *hupobállein*, ‘to throw/lay under’, from *bállein*, ‘to throw’.

As a preposition, *hupó* is very productive; it takes all three cases, and presents very interesting semantic developments.

Associated with the dative in Homer, *hupó* expresses Location, and occasionally Direction, whereby the dative profiles the endpoint of motion. As English ‘beneath’, *hupó* can refer to two different areas with respect to the physical space occupied by the landmark, i.e. the area below it, or the area located at its lower edge, as shown in Figure 25.

The above difference is demonstrated in the use of the preposition with the dative, see for example (2) (meaning (a)) vs. (3) (meaning (b)), and with the accusative in both Direction and Location expressions, see (32) vs. (34); and (38) vs. (39). With the ablative genitive we find meaning (b) once, with a compound preposition, *hupék* (ex. (19)), while the genitive expressing Location is limited to meaning (a). This matter will be discussed further below, in the sections devoted to each case.

The dative with *hupó* is most frequently found in Location expressions:




Figure 25. Areas denoted by *hupó*

- (2) *tôi d' hupò possi mégas pelemízet'*
 DEM.DAT.M PTC under foot:DAT.PL great:NOM quake:IMPF.M/P.3SG
Ólumpos
 O.:NOM
 “and beneath his feet great Olympus quaked” (*Il.* 8.443);
- (3) *pollòn gàr rh' apáneuthe neòn márnanto*
 very PTC PTC far ship:GEN.PL.F fight:IMPF.M/P.3PL
thoáōn teíkhei húpo Tróōn
 swift:GEN.PL.F wall:DAT under Trojan:GEN.PL
 “for far from the swift ships were they fighting beneath the wall of the Trojans” (*Il.* 17.403–404);
- (4) *guiōsō mén sphōin hup' hármasin ōkéas*
 cripple:FUT.1SG PTC 3DU.DAT under chariot:DAT.PL swift:ACC.PL
híppous
 horse:ACC.PL
 “I will cripple their swift horses beneath the chariot” (*Il.* 8.402).

The meaning ‘beneath’ = ‘at the lower edge’ could shift occasionally to the meaning ‘behind’ in Homer. The conceptual link is provided by an equation ‘above’ : ‘beneath’ = ‘before’ : ‘behind’. There are many similarities between the position ‘beneath’ and the position ‘behind’ a referent, among others, the fact that both being beneath and being behind imply being away from the visible field.¹ This semantic shift in Homer occurs when the landmark is a shield:

- (5) *stê d' ár' hup' Aíantos sákei Telamōniádao*
 stand:AOR.3SG PTC PTC under A.:GEN shield:DAT of.T.:GEN
 “and took his stand beneath the shield of Aias, son of Telamon”
 (*Il.* 8.267).²

For a location underground, the expressions *hupò gaiēs/gêi/khthoní*, found in later epics,³ do not occur in Homer. A formulaic expression is *hupò keúthesi gaiēs*, ‘beneath the depths of the earth’. The word *keúthos*, only attested in this formula in the Homeric poems, derives from the verb *keúthein*, ‘to hide’; it can be taken to mean ‘hidden area’. The formula thus denotes an area located at a very deep profundity, much deeper than just under the surface of the earth.⁴

As with other prepositions, the dative in Homer may be found in Direction expressions; in this case, the endpoint of motion is profiled:

- (6) *kéleusen démni' hup' aithoúsēi thémenai*
 order:AOR.3SG bed:N/A.PL under porch:DAT.F place:INF.AOR
 “she ordered to place bedsteads beneath the porch” (*Od.* 4.296–297).

On the metaphorical plane, we find an extension based on the conceptual opposition between up and down. The local meaning of *hupó* denotes a relation of inferiority, following a frequently found metaphor based on orientation. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 15) “Having control or force is up; being subject to control or force is down... Physical basis: Physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the victor in a fight is typically on top”. Based on this metaphor, we find a number of occurrences where *hupó* with the dative and human referents denotes Agent:⁵

- (7) *hupò Tróessi damênai*
 under Trojan:DAT.PL conquer:INF.AOR.P
 “to be conquered beneath the Trojans” (*Il.* 13.98);
- (8) *hoiō tó ge léonte dúō óreos*
 INDEF.NOM.DU DEM.NOM.DU PTC lion:NOM.DU two mountain:GEN
koruphêisin etraphétên hupò mētri
 top:DAT.PL.F feed:AOR.P.3DU under mother:DAT.F
 “like two lions upon the mountain tops are reared by their mother”
 (*Il.* 5.554–555);
- (9) *allà kai autoi hup’ Argeioisi phébonto*
 but and DEM.NOM.PL under Argive:DAT.PL flee:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “but themselves were driven in flight before the Argives” (*Il.* 11.121).

The shift from location to agency is made clear by example (10):

- (10) *óletó te stenákhōn hupò gamphêlêisi*
 perish:AOR.MID.3SG PTC groan:PART.PRS.NOM under jaws:DAT.PL.F
léontos, hòs hupò Patróklōi Lukíōn agòs
 lion:GEN so under P.:DAT Lycian:GEN.PL.M chief:NOM
aspistáōn kteinómenos menéaine
 with.shield:GEN.PL.M kill:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM wrestle:IMPF.3SG
 “with a groan he perished beneath the jaws of the lion; even so beneath
 Patroclus did the leader of the Lycian shieldman struggle in death”
 (*Il.* 16. 489–491).

Here *hupò gamphêlêisi léontos*, ‘under the jaws of a lion’, denotes causation, but also refers to an actual location: note further that the verb *óleto*, ‘he perished’, is never used as a lexical passive of the verb ‘to kill’, although the subject is a Patient. In the second part of the simile, we find *hupò Patróklōi*, which can be taken as a real Agent phrase, because it comes with a medio-passive form of the verb *kteinein*, ‘to kill’.

Local meaning is also present in occurrences where the landmark denotes an instrument, or the hand of the agent:

- (11) *emôi d' hupò dourì daménta*
 POSS.1SG.DAT PTC under spear:DAT conquer:PART.AOR.P.ACC
 “conquered beneath my spear” (*Il.* 5.653).

Note that in cases such as (11) with *hupò dourì*, ‘under the spear’, or with *hupò kher sí*, ‘under the hand’, although the landmark is used as an instrument, the Instrument phrases also contains mention of the agent, denoted by a possessive expression (as in (11)), which syntactically is part of the PP.

In a few examples *hupó* with the dative with an animate landmark co-occurs with another Agent expression (the subject), and must be taken as expressing Intermediary, as in

- (12) *tòn tóth' hup' Idomenēi Poseidāōn edámasse*
 DEM.ACC then under I.:DAT P.:NOM conquer:AOR.3SG
 “Poseidon subdued him through Idomeneus” (*Il.* 13.434).

The following context indicates that Idomeneus actually performed the action denoted in the sentence: “but as he stood fixed, even as a pillar or a tree, high and leafy, the warrior Idomeneus smote him with a thrust of his spear full upon the breast” (*Il.* 13.437–439); however, intentionality is attributed to Poseidon, in conformity with the definition of Intermediary (see Chapter 1). As we have seen in §3.9, the semantic role Intermediary is expressed through *diá* with the genitive from Herodotus onward; occasionally, *hupó* with the genitive can also express Intermediary in Herodotus (see below, example (58)).

The paths of semantic extension followed by the two expressions are not the same: *diá* with the genitive, which in the local sense denotes Path, profiles the passing of intentionality originating in the agent through the intermediary; a further extension of *diá* with the genitive is Instrument (see §3.9 for details). On the other hand, *hupó* with the dative profiles the final segment of the event, i.e. the effect of the intermediary’s action. Accordingly, as already remarked, *hupó* with the dative does not develop an instrumental meaning; rather, it occurs in Cause expressions:

- (13) *hōs d' hót' apò platéas ptuóphin ... thróiskōsin*
 as PTC when from broad:GEN shovel:GEN leap:SUBJ.PRS.3PL
kúamoi melanókhroes ... pnoiēi húpo ligurēi kai
 bean:NOM.PL darkskinned:NOM.PL wind:DAT.F under shrill:DAT.F and
likmētēros erōēi
 winnower:GEN strength:DAT.F
 “as from a broad shovel the dark-skinned beans leap because of the shrill
 wind and the might of the winnower” (*Il.* 13.588–590).

Note that, similar to *diá* with the accusative, evaluation of the cause may be neutral, as in (13), negative, as in (14), or positive, as in (15);⁶ furthermore, human referents can appear as causes, as in (14) and (16):

- (14) *hōs ár' hup' Aineíai te kai Héktori kouíroi*
 so PTC under A.:DAT PTC and H.:DAT youth:NOM.PL
Akhaiôn oúlon keklégontes ísan
 Achaean:GEN.PL doom:N/A scream:PART.PF.NOM.PL flee:IMPF.3PL
 “so before Aeneas and Hector fled the youths of the Achaeans, shrieking
 cries of doom” (*Il.* 17.758–759);
- (15) *hós kh' ho xeínos ... pompēi hup' hēmetéréi*
 that PTC DEM.NOM stranger:NOM sending:DAT.F under POSS.1PL.DAT.F
hèn patrída gaían híkētai
 POSS.3SG.ACC.F native:ACC.F land:ACC.F reach:SUBJ.AOR.MID.3SG
 “that the stranger may under our sending come to his native land”
 (*Od.* 7.192–193);
- (16) *hé rh' hupò Tundaréōi krateróphrone*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC under of.T.:DAT stout.heart:ACC.DU
geínato paíde
 generate:AOR.MID.3SG son:ACC.DU
 “she bore to Tyndareus two sons, stout of heart” (*Od.* 11.299).

The genitive with *hupó* can have an ablatival meaning and express Source, as in

- (17) *aípsa d' hupò thrónou órto*
 straightway PTC under throne:GEN rise:AOR.MID.3SG
 “straightway he rose from beneath the throne” (*Od.* 22.364);
- (18) *hoi d' híppous mèn lúsan hupò zugou*
 DEM.NOM PTC horse:ACC.PL PTC loose:AOR.3PL under yoke:GEN
 “they loosed the horses from beneath the yoke” (*Od.* 4.39).

As I have remarked earlier, the ablative genitive seems only to denote motion from beneath the lower edge of a landmark (Figure 25a) and not from a location close to the lower edge (Figure 25b). In the latter case, we find a compound preposition, as shown in example (19), to be compared with (3) with the dative and (34) with the accusative:

- (19) *teíkheos aièn hupèk kat' amaxitòn esseúonto*
 wall:GEN ever from.under down carriage.road:ACC run:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 “they sped, ever away from under the wall along the wagon-track”
 (*Il.* 22.146).

In a number of other occurrences, the genitive with *hupó* denotes Location. It sometimes comes very close to *hupó* with the dative, as shown in comparison with (2) and (20):

- (20) *autàr hupò khthòn smerdaléon konábize podòn*
 PTC under earth:NOM.F wondrously resound:IMPF.3SG foot:GEN.PL
autòn te kai híppōn
 DEM.GEN.PL PTC and horse:GEN.PL
 “the earth echoed wondrously beneath the tread of men and horses”
 (*Il.* 2.465–466).

However, differences between the two cases can be found. In the first place, and similar to the ablative genitive, the genitive in Location expressions only conforms to the schema of Figure 25a, and not to that of Figure 25b. Furthermore, there are differences in the types of landmark that can occur in the genitive: for example, for a location underground *hupò khthonós* occurs twice, while, as I have remarked, there are no corresponding occurrences with the dative (but see, with the accusative, ex. (40)):

- (21) *hèkhi báthiston hupò khthonós esti bérethron*
 where deep:SUP.N/A under earth:GEN.F be:PRS.3SG gulf:N/A
 “where is the deepest gulf beneath the earth” (*Il.* 8.14);
- (22) *ou gár pō etéthapto hupò khthonòs*
 NEG PTC PTC bury:PLPF.M/P.3SG under earth:GEN.F
euruodeiēs
 broad.wayed:GEN.F
 “not yet had he been buried beneath the broad-wayed earth” (*Od.* 11.52).

The above examples are also interesting in the light of the relation between *hupó* and *katá*. As we have already seen in §3.11, *katá* with the genitive could be used in a resultative sense, when it indicated the end of an implied trajec-

tory, sometimes denoting a final location of a trajector below a landmark (cf. examples (6) and (8) in §3.11). Example (21) does not imply any trajectory (a gulf cannot be positioned underground as a result of motion); however, example (22) is similar to the occurrences with *katá*, among other things because it contains a pluperfect verb form, derived from the perfect stem, which often has resultative meaning (see §3.11 Fn. 2).

Finally, I would like to draw attention to occurrences such as the following:

- (23) *krédemnon hupò stérnoio tánussen*
 veil:N/A under breast:GEN stretch:AOR.3SG
 “he stretched the veil beneath his breast” (*Od.* 5.373);
- (24) *húpsi d’ aállē skídnath’ hupò*
 high PTC whirlwind:NOM.F spread:IMPF.M/P.3SG under
nephéōn
 cloud:GEN.PL.F
 “on high a cloud of dust was spinning beneath the clouds”
 (*Il.* 16.374–375).

The above examples require that the landmark is an extended area, as shown especially by the occurrence of the verb *tánussen*, ‘he stretched’, in (23); I will come back to these examples in the discussion of the local meaning of *hupó* with the accusative.

The similarity between *hupó* with the dative and with the genitive goes beyond spatial usage and also concerns Agent and Cause. Agent phrases with passive verbs or with lexical passives occur in the following examples:

- (25) *polloì huph’ Héktores androphónoio thnéiskontes*
 many:NOM.PL under H.:GEN man.slaying:GEN die:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
píptōsi
 fall:SUBJ.PRS.3PL
 “many will fall, killed by man-slaying Hector” (*Il.* 1.242–243);
- (26) *moír’ hupò Patrókloio Menoitiádao damênai*
 fate:NOM.F under P.:GEN of.M.:GEN kill:INF.AOR.P
 “that it is fated that (Sarpedon) be slain by Patroclus, son of Menoetius”
 (*Il.* 16.434).

Cause can also be expressed by *hupó* with the genitive; note that there are no examples similar to (15) with the dative (positive evaluation):

- (27) *tò mèn exetélesse kai ouk ethélous' hup'*
 DEM.N/A PTC finish:AOR.3SG and NEG wish:PART.PRS.NOM.F under
anánkēs
 force:GEN.F
 “she finished it against her will, perforce” (*Od.* 2.110);
- (28) *kai tóte dé m' ekéleusen epotrúnousa*
 and then PTC 1SG.ACC order:AOR.3SG awake:PART.PRS.NOM.F
néesthai Zēnòs hup' angelíēs, è kai nóos
 go:INF.PRS.MID Z.:GEN under message:GEN.F PTC and mind:NOM
etrápet' autēs
 turn:AOR.MID.3SG DEM.GEN.F
 “then she roused me and ordered me to go, either because of some message
 from Zeus, or because her own mind was turned” (*Od.* 7.262–263).

The fact that causes encoded through *hupó* with the genitive can be presented as neutral or negative, but not as positive, means that they are conceptualized as more constraining than causes encoded by means of *hupó* with the dative; it can be one of the reasons why only *hupó* with the genitive survived after Homer in Cause (and Agent) expressions, while *hupó* with the dative lost causal meaning.

With passive verb forms or lexical passives, *hupó* with the genitive mostly occurs with animate nouns; in particular, there are no occurrences with the word for ‘spear’ (cf. example (11) above, with the dative), and only one with a word denoting the hands:

- (29) *hóus héthen héinek' épaskhon hup' Árēos*
 DEM.ACC.PL 3SG.GEN.F for endure:IMPF.3PL under A.:GEN
palamáōn
 hand:GEN.PL.F
 “that for her sake they had endured at the hands of Ares” (*Il.* 3.128).

In general, inanimate nouns in the genitive with *hupó* are abstract: as with other prepositions, the occurrence of an abstract noun triggers the shift to an abstract meaning.⁷ The few inanimate nouns co-occurring with passive verbs, as in (30) and (31), can be taken as expressing Cause, rather than Agent (or Force):

- (30) *Akhaioús dēiōsein ... orinoménous hupò*
 Achaean:ACC.PL slay:INF.FUT stir:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL under
kapnoú
 smoke:GEN
 “to destroy the Achaeans, made insane by the smoke” (*Il.* 9.242–243);

- (31) *teíreto* *d'* *andrôn* *thumòs* *hup'*
 oppress:IMPF.M/P.3SG PTC man:GEN.PL spirit:NOM under
eiresiēs *alegeinês*
 rowing:GEN.F grievous:GEN.F
 “and the spirit of the men was worn by the grievous rowing” (*Od.* 10.78).

As I remarked in Luraghi (2000b), *hupó*, both with the dative and with the genitive, frequently co-occurs with intransitive verbs of active voice, which are normally considered lexical passives, such as *daménai*, ‘to be subdued’, *píptein*, ‘to fall’, *thnēiskein*, ‘to die’, that takes the meaning ‘to be killed’, and *pheúgein*, ‘to flee’, that takes the meaning ‘to put to flight’. Note that what triggers passive interpretation is the occurrence of an expression that can be interpreted as an Agent phrase.⁸

As remarked in De La Villa (1998), the dative is not only more frequent than the genitive in Agent phrases with *hupó*, but its use is more varied: in particular, there are no Intermediary expressions with the genitive. I have shown further that the occurrence of the genitive is semantically more restricted in Cause expressions, too, and that the occurrence of nouns denoting instruments is infrequent with the genitive. According to De La Villa, the wider semantic range of the dative should be taken as the reason why in later Greek only *hupó* with the genitive remained in use as an Agent expression. I will address this question further below.

The Homeric usage of *hupó* with the accusative includes Direction and Location expressions. Direction expressions occur in the following examples:

- (32) *hippous* *zeúxath'* *huph'* *hárvat'*
 horse:ACC.PL yoke:IMPT.AOR.2PL under car:N/A.PL
ágontes
 lead:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “yoke the swift horses leading them beneath the car” (*Od.* 3.475–476);
- (33) *epei oûn*, *Pátrokle*, *seú* *hústeros* *eím'* *hupò*
 since PTC P.:VOC 2SG.GEN second:NOM go:FUT.1SG under
gáian
 earth:ACC.F
 “since I shall after you, Patroclus, pass beneath the earth” (*Il.* 18.333);
- (34) *aískhistos* *dè anèr* *hupò* *Ílion* *élthe*
 evil:SUP.NOM PTC man:NOM under I.:N/A come:AOR.3SG
 “he was the most evil-favored man that came to Ilios” (*Il.* 2.216);

- (35) *hòs Tròes potamoío katà deinoío rhéethra*
 so Trojan:NOM.PL river:GEN down dreadful:GEN stream:N/A.PL
ptòsson hupò krēmnoús
 shrink:IMPF.3PL under bank:ACC.PL
 “even so covered the Trojans in the streams of the dread river beneath the steep banks” (*Il.* 21.25–26);
- (36) *hòs eipóus’ hupò pónton edúseto*
 so say:PART.AOR.NOM.F under sea:ACC plunge:AOR.MID.3SG
kumainonta
 rise:PART.PRS.ACC
 “so saying she plunged beneath the surging sea” (*Od.* 4.425).

Example (32) is parallel to (4) with the locative dative and (18) with the ablative genitive. In example (33) the word *gáian*, ‘earth’, occurs, which is common with the accusative, while, as already remarked, it does not occur in the other cases (see further (40), in a Location expression). Example (34) shows that the accusative of motion can occur in the schema of Figure 25b. In example (35) we find a shift: ‘below’ = ‘behind’ = ‘hiding’, similar to the shift discussed in example (5), that occasionally occurs in later Greek as well (see example (61) from Herodotus). Finally, in example (36) *hupò* occurs with the verb *dúein*, ‘to dive’, similar to *katá* with the accusative in example (11) of §3.11. The difference between the two prepositions is in profiling: while *katá* profiles the downward trajectory, *hupò* profiles on the relation of inferiority between the trajector and the landmark.

Location expressions are shown below:

- (37) *hoúnek’ áristoi híppōn hóssoi éasin hup’*
 because best:NOM.PL horse:GEN.PL REL.NOM.PL be:PRS.3PL under
ēō t’ ēélión te
 dawn:ACC.F PTC sun:ACC PTC
 “because they were the best of all horses that are beneath the dawn and the sun” (*Il.* 5.266–267);
- (38) *é pou éti zóousin hup’ augàs ēelioio*
 PTC PTC PTC live:PRS.3PL under ray:ACC.PL.F sun:GEN
 “if they are still living beneath the rays of the sun” (*Od.* 15.349);
- (39) *hoì d’ ékhon Arkadíēn hupò Kullénēs*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC have:IMPF.3PL A.:ACC under K.:GEN.F
óros aipú
 mountain:N/A steep:N/A

“and those who held Arcadia beneath the steep mountain of Cyllene”
(*Il.* 2.603);

- (40) *Gê te kai Êélios kai Erinúes, hai th'*
 earth:NOM.F PTC and sun:NOM and E.:NOM.PL.F DEM.NOM.PL.F PTC
hupò gaían anthrópous tínuntai
 under earth:ACC.F man:ACC.PL punish:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “Earth and Sun, and the Erinyes, that under earth take vengeance on men”
 (*Il.* 19.259–260).

Examples (37) and (38) denote Location of a trajector under a multiplex landmark. Note, however, that neither plexity nor continuity of either the trajector or the landmark appears to be relevant for the opposition between the accusative and the genitive in Location expression, as shown in comparison with the last few examples with (23) and especially (24). Example (39) shows that the schema of Figure 25b is also possible with the accusative in Location expression. A difference between the accusative and the genitive is perhaps visible in (40), as opposed to (21). Apart from lexical variation, in (40) *hupò gaían* refers to the underworld, similar to (33) with the direction accusative and to all other occurrences of this expression. On the other hand, *hupò khthonós* in (21) has a more concrete meaning, denoting a precise location underground.

More in general, the difference between Location expressions with *hupó* and the dative or genitive, on the one hand, and *hupó* with the accusative on the other are connected to possible contact between the trajector and the landmark. Many languages, including English, have an opposition based on possible contact for prepositions that denote superiority, as in *on vs. above*, while they do not have any such pair of prepositions in the field of inferiority. The same holds for Greek, where we find *epí*, ‘on’ *vs. hupér*, ‘above’, and only *hupó* with the meaning ‘below’/‘under’. However, as the examples show, the accusative with *hupó* in Location expressions implies lack of contact, while contact often holds where we find either the dative or the genitive: this point can be illustrated by remarking that Homer has both *hupò possí* (dative) and *hupò podôn* (genitive), ‘under one’s feet’, but no **hupò pódas* (accusative).

The meaning of *hupó* with the accusative can also be shifted to the plane of time (two occurrences according to Chantraine 1953: 144):

- (41) *pánth' hupò mēnithmón*
 all:ACC under wrath:ACC
 “throughout all the time of (my) wrath” (*Il.* 16.202).

In (41) *hupó* denotes a certain duration: a stretch of time is metaphorically located below a certain event, that functions as landmark, and it lasts until the event holds.

In post-Homeric Greek, the local usage of *hupó* is somewhat reduced for all cases. With the dative, Herodotus has a number of occurrences, reminiscent of the Homeric ones, such as

- (42) *psóphou* *dè ginoménou* *polloù,* *hōs*
 noise:GEN.M PTC become:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.M much:GEN.M as
oikòs *èn phúllōn hupokekhuménōn*
 probable:N/A be:IMPF.3SG leaf:GEN.PL.N scatter:PART.PF.M/P.GEN.PL.N
hupò toísi posí
 under ART.DAT.PL foot:DAT.PL
 “a great noise arose like leaves being crushed underfoot” (Hdt. 7.218.1);

or *hup'hármasin*, ‘under the yoke’ (for the latter expression, see below, in the discussion of example (62)). Plato has very few examples of local meaning:

- (43) *tí pot' ár' ésti tò parà tèn pétan*
 INT.N/A PTC PTC be:PRS.3SG ART.N/A by ART.ACC.F rock:ACC.F
toúth' hestánai phantazómenon hupó tini
 INDEF.N/A stand:INF.PF appear:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A under INDEF.DAT.N
déndrōi?
 tree:DAT.N
 “what is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree?”
 (Pl. *Phlb.* 38d).

However, other authors have a more varied local usage: in particular, Aristotle employs *hupó* with the dative in a spatial sense in passages where the dative appears to denote close contact between the trajector and the landmark; as we will see below, possible differences conveyed by the accusative are not always clear:

- (44) *ho dè dasúpous mónos kai entòs ékhei*
 ART.NOM PTC hare:NOM only:NOM and inside have:PRS.3SG
tòn gnáthōn tríkhas kai hupò toís
 ART.GEN.PL jaw:GEN.PL hair:ACC.PL.F and under ART.DAT.PL
posín
 foot:DAT.PL
 “the hare is the only animal known to have hair inside its mouth and underneath its feet” (Arist. *HA* 519a23);

- (45) *tó te hupò toís óresin ékhein*
 ART.N/A PTC under ART.DAT.PL mountain:DAT.PL have:INF.PRS
tàs pēgàs
 ART.ACC.PL.F SOURCE:ACC.PL.F
 “the fact that (rivers) have their sources beneath mountains”
 (Arist. *Mete.* 350b27).

Example (46) contains a metaphorical use of local *hupó* with the dative, which denotes inclusion:

- (46) *hóti tò hupò taís geōmetriáis te kai*
 that ART.N/A under ART.DAT.PL.F geometry:DAT.PL.F PTC and
taís taútēs adelpháis tékhnaís légeis
 ART.DAT.PL.F DEM.GEN.F sister:DAT.PL.F art:DAT.PL.F speak:PRS.2SG
 “that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts”
 (Pl. *Rep.* 511b).

In (46) the metaphorical shift relies on the assumption that to be under a landmark means to be included in its domain.

Shifted to the metaphorical plane, *hupó* denotes a relation of inferiority, both in Herodotus and in Attic writers. The metaphor is based on the notion of dominance, symmetrical to the meaning of English *over* in expressions such as *to rule over* (see Radden 1989b: 557):

- (47) *tàs állas pólias pásas tàs*
 ART.ACC.PL.F INDEF.ACC.PL.F city:ACC.PL.F all:ACC.PL.F ART.ACC.PL.F
taútēi hup’ heōutoísi epoiēsanto
 there under REFL.3PL.DAT.M make:AOR.MID.3PL
 “they made subject to them all the other cities of that region”
 (Hdt. 5.103.2);
- (48) *ékousan Spartiátas tàs póleis ... hup’*
 learn:AOR.3PL Spartan:ACC.PL ART.ACC.PL.F city:ACC.PL.F under
hautóis pepoiēménous
 REFL.3PL.DAT.M make:PART.PF.M/P.ACC.PL
 “they learned that the Spartans had subjected to their power the cities”
 (Isoc. 12.166).

This usage is based on the same metaphor that lies behind semantic extension in Homer: yet, the meanings that developed in Homeric Greek, most notably Agent and Cause, no longer occur in literary Attic-Ionic. Indeed, the original spatial meaning of the preposition is much stronger in Attic-Ionic, even in metaphorical usage, than it was in Homer. After Homer, the metaphor that

equates spatial superiority to control turns out to apply to agency and causation with *hupó* and the genitive only (see below); while *hupó* with the dative denotes a less active involvement. This point can further be demonstrated through example (49), where, in spite of the co-occurrence of a passive verb form, the *hupó* phrase does not express Agent:

- (49) *toú pheidōlóu ekeinou kai oligarkhikoú*
 ART.GEN.M thrifty:GEN.M DEM.GEN.M and oligarchical:GEN.M
génoit' àn oímai huòs hupò
 be:OPT.AOR.MID.3SG PTC suppose:PRS.M/P.1SG SON:NOM under
tôi patri tethramménos en toís ekeinou
 ART.DAT father:DAT rear:PART.PF.M/P.NOM in ART.DAT.PL DEM.GEN.M
éthesi?
 way:DAT.PL
 “our thrifty oligarchical man would have a son bred under his father’s law, according to his ways?” (Pl. *Rep.* 558d).

In (49), *hupò tôn patri tethramménos* does not mean ‘brought up by his father’, but rather, ‘brought up according to his father’s orders’: there is control and intentionality on the side of the referent of the *hupó* phrase, but not actual performance of the action.

Local usage of the genitive with *hupó* is extremely limited. In Herodotus we find just one Location expression:

- (50) *hoi híppous tàs hupò toú hármatos*
 3SG.DAT horse:ACC.PL.F ART.ACC.PL.F under ART.GEN chariot:GEN
nemoménas
 graze:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL.F
 “his horses, which were grazing yoked to the chariot” (Hdt. 4.8.3).

This passage is only apparently similar to (18) from Homer: in (18), the genitive had an ablative value; in (50), on the other hand, the PP expresses Location. Indeed, *hupó* with the genitive after Homer does not seem to have ablative meaning (at least in prose). The few PPs with spatial reference display a shift from Source to Location, possibly allowed by an ablative-locative transfer of the type described in §1.2.1.1.

Plato has some occurrences of *hupò gês*, ‘underground’, *hupò málēs*, ‘arm in arm’, and few other expressions, where the meaning apparently comes very close to the meaning of *hupó* with the dative:

- (51) *hé te aú pēgē khariestátē hupò tēs*
 ART.NOM.F PTC PTC spring:NOM.F pretty:SUP.NOM.F under ART.GEN.F
platánou rheî
 plane.tree:GEN.F flow:PRS.3SG
 “the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree” (Pl. *Phdr.* 230b).

A somewhat more extended local use of *hupó* with the genitive, that also includes ablatival function, returns in Xenophon, but nowhere else is it attested in Attic-Ionic prose.⁹

By far the majority of occurrences in all Attic-Ionic writers is constituted by Agent and Cause expressions. Both semantic roles occur in (52):

- (52) *hupò dè megátheos tēs pólios, hōs légetai*
 under PTC greatness:GEN ART.GEN.F city:GEN.F as say:PRS.M/P.3SG
hupò tōn taútēi oikēménōn, tōn
 under ART.GEN.PL.M there dwell:PART.PF.M/P.GEN.PL.M ART.GEN.PL.M
perì tà éskhata tēs pólios
 about ART.N/A.PL extreme:N/A.PL ART.GEN.F city:GEN.F
healōkótōn toūs tò méson
 conquer:PART.PF.GEN.PL.M ART.ACC.PL ART.N/A middle:N/A
oikéontas tōn Babulōniōn ou manthánein
 dwell:PART.PRS.ACC.PL ART.GEN.PL B.:GEN.PL NEG know:INF.PRS
healōkótas
 conquer:PART.PF.ACC.PL
 “by reason of the great size of the city – so say those who dwell there – those in the outer parts of it were overcome, yet the dwellers in the middle of Babylon part knew nothing of it” (Hdt. 1.191.6).

Agent expressions with lexical passives also occur, as in Homer:

- (53) *ek Náxou éphugon ándres tōn*
 out.of N.:GEN escape:AOR.3PL man:NOM.PL ART.GEN.PL
pakhéōn hupò tou démou
 wealthy:GEN.PL under ART.GEN people:GEN
 “certain men of substance, being banished from Naxos by the commonalty” (Hdt. 5.30.1).

In Cause expressions with *hupó* we mostly find abstract nouns; Herodotus, in particular, offers no parallels to the occurrences of concrete nouns in Cause expressions with *diá* and the accusative, such as examples (48)–(49) of §3.9:

- (54) *hupò plētheos oudeis àn eípoi arithmón*
 under multitude:GEN INDEF.NOM PTC say:OPT.AOR.3SG number:ACC
 “no one could tell the number, so many they were (lit.: ‘because of the
 multitude’)” (Hdt. 7.187.1);
- (55) *hoi ánthrōpoi hupò tou kaímatos mélanes*
 ART.NOM.PL man:NOM.PL under ART.GEN heat:GEN black:NOM.PL
eóntes
 be:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “the men of the country are black by reason of the heat” (Hdt. 2.22.3).

Inanimate nouns denoting concrete entities appear with passive verbs and denote Force (or non-prototypical Agent), rather than Cause (as they would with *diá* plus accusative):¹⁰

- (56) *ei mèn gàr hupò odóntos toi eípe teleutésein*
 if PTC PTC under teeth:GEN 2SG.DAT say:AOR.3SG die:INF.FUT
me, ... nún dè hupò aikhmês
 2SG.ACC now PTC under spear:GEN.F
 ‘if (the oracle) had told you I should be killed by teeth, but no, it was by a
 spear’ (Hdt. 1.39.2);
- (57) *tò legómenon hupò tôn en Delphoís*
 ART.N/A say:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A under ART.GEN.PL in D.:DAT.PL
grammátōn
 inscription:GEN.PL
 “what is said by the Delphic inscription” (Pl. *Phlb.* 48c).

Occasionally, *hupó* with the genitive occurs in Intermediary expressions, instead of the much more frequent *diá* with the genitive (cf. §3.9):

- (58) *Leutukhídēs hupò kērukos proēgóreue toísi*
 L.:NOM under herald:GEN proclaim:IMPF.3SG ART.DAT.PL
Íōsi légōn
 Ionian:DAT.PL say:PART.PRS.NOM
 “Leutyichidas made a proclamation to the Ionians by (the voice of) a
 herald, saying ...” (Hdt. 9.98.2).

The accusative still occurs in Direction expressions, though infrequently:

- (59) *oud’ hupò tôn autòn órōphon iénai*
 NEG under ART.ACC DEM.ACC roof:ACC go:INF.PRS
 “nor yet to come under the same roof” (Pl. *Rep.* 417a);

- (60) *autoi mèn phámēnoi Pérsas pántas*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC say:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL Persian:ACC.PL all:ACC.PL
sugkaléein hupò tò basiléion teikhos
 call:INF.PRS under ART.N/A royal:N/A wall:N/A
 “saying that they should call an assembly of all the Persians before the palace wall” (Hdt. 3.74.3);
- (61) *kaí min ekeinē ... katakrúptei hupò tèn autèn*
 and 3SG.ACC DEM.NOM.F hide:PRS.3SG under ART.ACC.F DEM.ACC.F
thúrēn
 door.ACC.F
 “she hid him behind the same door” (Hdt. 1.12.1);
- (62) *toùs dè híppous autôn ... zeugnuménous*
 ART.ACC.PL PTC horse:ACC.PL DEM.GEN.PL joke:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL
dè hup’ hármata eínai oxutátous
 PTC under chariot:N/A.PL be:INF.PRS swift:SUP.ACC.PL
 “their horses (are said) to be very swift when yoked to chariots”
 (Hdt. 5.9.2).

Examples (59) and (60) show that both schemes of Figure 25 are still possible after Homer for the direction accusative. In (61) we again find the equation ‘beneath’ = ‘behind’, already found in Homer (cf. ex. (35)). Example (62) resembles example (32) from Homer; however, it is doubtful that this is a real Direction expression, and should not be taken as Location.¹¹

Indeed, Location expressions with the accusative have changed with respect to Homeric Greek. In Herodotus, we find *hup’hármasi/hármatos/hármata* apparently with no major differences. It has already been remarked that local usage of *hupó* with the dative and with the genitive in Location expressions displayed an overlap in Homer (see examples (2) and (20)), the major difference being that the genitive did not allow schema 25b. Further, I have shown that the most important feature of the accusative in Location expressions in Homer is its implication of lack of contact between the trajector and the landmark. Example (62) shows that this feature no longer holds in Attic-Ionic. Further examples where the occurrence of the accusative does not seem to convey a different meaning from the dative are:

- (63) *tò d’ hupò tò kraníon onomázetai prósopon*
 ART.N/A PTC under ART.N/A skull:N/A call:PRS.M/P.3SG face:N/A
 “the part that lies under the skull is called the ‘face’” (Arist. *HA* 491b10);

- (64) *epeì kai hósoi autôn rhéousin ex*
 when and INDEF.NOM.PL DEM.GEN.PL.M flow:PRS.3PL OUT.OF
helôn, tà hélē hupò órē
 marsh:GEN.PL ART.N/A.PL marsh:N/A.PL under mountain:N/A.PL
keísthai sumbaínei
 lie:INF.PRS happen:PRS.3SG
 “even where (rivers) flow from marshes, the marshes in almost every case
 are found to lie below mountains” (Arist. *Mete.* 350b21).

(Compare with examples (44) and (45).)

Note further that Herodotus uses *hupò gēn* in much the same way as Plato uses *hupò gēs*. In sum, the distinctions among the three cases seem to be very labile. For the genitive, this results in almost solely idiomatic usage of local expressions.

Metaphorical use of *hupó* with the accusative is more limited than with the other cases; the meaning is close to the meaning of *hupó* with the dative:

- (65) *hupò tosaútas tò pléthos sumphoràs*
 under INDEF.ACC.PL.F ART.N/A multitude:N/A calamity:ACC.PL.F
hekóntes sphás autoùs hupobállousin
 willing:NOM.PL REFL.3PL.ACC submit:PRS.3PL
 “they submit themselves to such a multitude of calamities” (Isoc. 8.113);
- (66) *hupò sphás poieísthai*
 under 3PL.ACC make:INF.PRS.M/P
 “to bring under their sway” (Th. 4.60.2);
- (67) *hómoion pròs hómoion – hótan ámphō mèn*
 like:N/A toward like:N/A when INDEF.N/A.DU PTC
èi hupò tò autò génos
 be:SUBJ.PRS.3SG under ART.N/A DEM.N/A gender:N/A
 “(the relation of) like to like, when both are under the same gender”
 (Arist. *Rh.* 1357b 28–29).

Examples (65) and (66) are similar to (47) and (48); in (66) too we find a human landmark and the preposition denotes control. Example (67) does not denote control, but simply inclusion in an abstract domain. In all examples there is an implication that what is placed below is included in a domain defined by what is placed above: symmetric expressions that denote the same state of affairs and rely on the same metaphor also occur with *epí*, ‘on’, see §3.18.

To sum up the use of different cases with *hupó*, the most striking development is the fact that the functions of *hupó* with the dative are increasingly

taken over by *hupó* with other cases. Indeed, the frequency of the dative with *hupó* decreases after Homer. In Homer the percentages are as follows: genitive 39.4%, dative 45.6%, accusative 15%. Later we find: Herodotus: 84.2%, 7%, 8.8%; Thucydides 87%, 2.8%, 10.2%; Plato 95%, 2.3%, 2.7%. The enormous growth of the genitive of course is due to its use for passive Agent, and parallels the increasing use of the passive. But even considering this function, not yet fully grammaticalized in Homer, we can see that the dative decreases dramatically also with respect to the accusative, which was the least frequent case in Homer (see Luraghi 1996a: Chapter 3).

The development goes further in the Koine, as shown by the disappearance of the dative with *hupó* in the New Testament and in non-literary papyri.¹²

3.14 META

The original meaning of *metá* is ‘between’, as in nominal compounds: *metōpon*, ‘forehead’, lit.: ‘the region between the eyes’; when the landmark consists of more than two entities *metá* comes to mean ‘among’. However, since the very beginning of written sources, the meaning ‘after’ is equally represented, even in cases where *metá* functions as an adverb. Examples of the adverbial use of *metá* in Homer are the following:

- (1) *metà d’ anéres hoús ékhe gêras*
 among PTC man:NOM.PL REL.ACC.PL have:IMPF.3SG old.age:N/A
 “and among (them) the old men” (*Il.* 18.515);
- (2) *prôtos egō, metá d’ úmmes*
 first:NOM 1SG.NOM after PTC 2PL.NOM
 “I will go first, you will follow” (*Od.* 21.231).

The spatial meaning ‘behind’ from which the temporal value originated is also attested although not frequently when *metá* functions as a free adverb:

- (3) *próste mèn hippées, metá dè néphos*
 in.front PTC horseman:NOM.PL after PTC cloud:N/A
heípeto pezôn muríoi: en dè
 follow:IMPF.M/P.3SG soldier:GEN.PL numberless:NOM.PL in PTC
mésoisi phéron Pátroklon hetairoi
 center:DAT.PL carry:IMPF.3PL P.:ACC comrade:NOM.PL
 “the horsemen (walked) in front, behind the infantry: in the center, the comrades carried Patroclus” (*Il.* 23.133–134).

As a preverb, *metá* frequently indicates a change to a contrary state, as shown by compounds such as *metabállein*, ‘turn, change’, *metabáinein*, ‘pass over, change’.

As a preposition, *metá* takes the dative, the genitive and the accusative in Homer. Both with the genitive and the dative, *metá* refers to the position of a trajector relative to a multiplex landmark. Dative landmarks can consist of two or more entities (‘between’ or ‘among’); genitive landmarks always consist of more. The schema of *metá* with either case is shown in Figure 26.




Figure 26. *Metá* with the dative or the genitive in Homer

The shift from the original meaning ‘between’ to ‘among’ is a common one. ‘Between’ constitutes a border case of ‘among’, where the landmark is bplex, i.e. it consists in the minimum possible number of entities that make it multiplex.

The following passages demonstrate the use of *metá* with the dative (see further example (3) in §3.12):

- (4) *pēdálion metà khersì ... ékhonta*
 rudder:N/A among hand:DAT.PL have:PART.PRS.ACC
 “he held in (his) hands the steering-oar” (*Od.* 3.281);
- (5) *metà prôtoisi mákhesthai*
 among first:DAT.PL fight:INF.PRS.M/P
 “to fight among the foremost” (*Il.* 5.536).

Besides being multiplex, dative landmarks with *metá* are mostly discrete, as in (4) and (5), but some continuous landmarks are found occasionally, mostly inanimate: *metà kúmasi*, ‘among the waves’ (*Od.* 3.91), *meth’haímati kai koníeisi*, ‘among blood and dust’ (*Il.* 14.118); an example of a continuous animate landmark is:

- (6) *all’ei mèn zóousi metà stratôi*
 but if PTC live:PRS.3PL among host:DAT
 “but if they are alive in the host” (*Il.* 22.49).

The spatial SR expressed by *metá* is Location; only occasionally does this type of PP occur with a motion verb, for instance in cases in which *en* (or, in Homer, the dative/locative) can also be found, where Direction is envisaged as the end of motion:

- (7) *hós ken ep’ émati tóide pésēi metà*
 REL.NOM PTC ON day:DAT DEM.DAT fall:SUBJ.AOR.3SG among
possì gunaikòs
 foot:DAT.PL woman:GEN.F
 “who will fall between the feet of a woman (i.e. ‘will be born’) on this day”
 (*Il.* 19.110).

The genitive with *metá* is clearly a recent innovation in Homer; it is found in five passages, always with plural count nouns with human referents (Chantraine 1953: 119): landmarks are necessarily multiplex and discrete. An example is:

- (8) *met’ állōn léxo hetairōn*
 among INDEF.GEN.PL.M lie:IMPT.AOR.MID.2SG comrade:GEN.PL.M
 “lie with the rest of your comrades” (*Od.* 10.320).

In this use, *metá* with the genitive appears to be taking over the function of *metá* with the dative, as in fact happened after Homer.

The use of *metá* with the accusative is more varied and more difficult to describe because it involves both the meaning ‘among’ and the meaning ‘after’. Examples are (cf. De la Villa 1992):

- (9) *es stratòn elthè metà Trôas kai*
 to host:ACC go:IMPT.AOR.2SG among Trojan:ACC.PL and
Akhaioús
 Achaean:ACC.PL
 “go to the host, among the Trojans and the Achaeans” (*Il.* 4.70);
- (10) *toísi dè thumòn enì stēthessin órine*
 DEM.DAT.PL.M PTC soul:ACC in breast:DAT.PL stir:AOR.3SG
pâsi metà plēthún
 all:DAT.PL.M among crowd:ACC
 “he moved the soul of everyone in the crowd” (*Il.* 2.142–143).

In (9) the semantic role of *metá* with the accusative is Direction, the PP denotes motion toward a plural referent: the result of motion is that the trajector will be ‘among’ the landmark. The noun with *metá* is usually a plural count noun; occasionally, collective nouns also occur: the landmark is again multiplex.

In (10) the accusative governed by *metá* is a collective noun and no motion is implied; the SR is Location. Continuity of the landmark appears to be relevant in the choice of case: the accusative denotes an undifferentiated stretch of space. The landmark is multiplex, as with the dative or genitive, but the discontinuity feature is different: in particular, genitive landmarks are discontinuous, while dative landmarks are indifferent to this feature. Especially by comparison of (10) with (6), one can see that the same type of landmark can occur with either case: the difference is simply that the accusative denotes continuity in a clearer fashion.

A transposition to the field of Time of the extension meaning of the accusative is found in (11), where the duration of the action is stressed:

- (11) *hōs egò ou̯ ti hekòn es sòn*
 that 1SG.NOM NEG INDEF.N/A willing:NOM to POSS.2SG.ACC
dómon ... mnēstêrsin aísómenos metà
 home:ACC suitor:DAT.PL sing:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM among
daítas
 banquet:ACC.PL.F

“that I did not come by my own will to your home, to sing for the suitors during the banquets” (*Od.* 22.351–352).

In (12) *metá* has the meaning ‘after’ and the accusative is a count noun in the singular. Note that here too we find a motion verb, similar to (9), where, however, I have translated the preposition with ‘among’:

- (12) *metà tòn dè lákhe kreíōn Eúmēlos*
 after DEM.ACC PTC obtain:AOR.3SG strong:NOM E.:NOM
 “after him it was the turn of strong Eumelos” (*Il.* 23. 354).

The feature that allows to discriminate between the two meanings, ‘among’ and ‘after’, is nominal number: when the accusative is singular and does not have collective reference, the landmark is uniplex, and the meaning of the preposition is ‘after’. In fact, the relation denoted by the English ‘among’ is possible only with multiplex landmarks. Note that the English ‘among’ and ‘between’ cannot occur with uniplex landmarks, with which their meaning would be incompatible. Greek *metá* does not have this restriction: rather, the occurrence of a uniplex landmark denoted by a singular count noun triggers a different interpretation of the relation between trajector and landmark. The accusative still adds a direction component, as with motion verbs and plural count nouns, but the landmark is not such that the trajector can penetrate into it: so it remains behind it, hence the meaning ‘after’. The two meanings can be represented as in Figure 27 and Figure 28.




Figure 27. *Metá* with the direction accusative and multiplex Landmarks in Homer




Figure 28. *Metá* with the direction accusative and uniplex Landmarks in Homer

To sum up, we have the following SRs expressed by *metá*, depending on case variation and on the plexity of landmarks, as shown in Table 4.

Example (13) represents the less frequent case where the meaning ‘after’ can be associated with a plural referent:

- (13) *ek d' autòs metà toùs dómou éluthe*
 out PTC DEM.NOM after DEM.ACC.PL home:GEN go:AOR.3SG
díos Odusseús
 divine:NOM O.:NOM
 “the divine Ulysses himself went out of the house after them” (*Od.* 21.190).

Note however that such examples always occur when the noun in the accusative refers to two human beings (in some occurrences this is also made clear by the occurrence of dual forms, as in *metà nôi*, ‘after the two of us’, in *Od.* 3.168). So the occurrence of *metá* in such passages could be motivated by its original meaning ‘between’, which is nowhere else found with the accusative. The meaning in (13), then, could be ‘he went out to be between them’, i.e. the trajector moved along a trajectory that ended between the two entities that constitute the landmark. The fact that a connection with the etymological meaning can be provided does not exclude the possible inference that the meaning ‘after’ could be extended to multiplex landmarks: indeed, I do not even want to suggest that the meaning ‘between’ was still active in all such occurrences. However, the limitation to bplex landmarks supports my analysis, at least as a starting point for the semantic extension to ‘after’ with all types of landmark.

Further extensions deriving from ‘after’ are found in the following examples:

- (14) *kallístous metá ge klutòn Ōríōna*
 handsome:SUP.ACC.PL after PTC glorious:ACC O.:ACC
 “the most handsome ones after glorious Orion” (*Od.* 11.310);

Table 4. Spatial SRs expressed by *metá*

dative, bplex or multiplex +/- continuous	Location/Direction (with endpoint profiled) ('between', 'among')
genitive, multiplex discontinuous	Location ('among')
accusative, multiplex continuous	Location ('among')
accusative, multiplex +/- continuous	Direction (with trajectory profiled) ('among')
accusative, uniplex	Direction ('after')

- (15) *boulēi metā pántas homēlikas*
 council:DAT.F among all:ACC.PL of.like.age:ACC.PL
épleu áristos
 become:AOR.MID.2SG best:NOM
 “in council you are the best among all those of your own age” (*Il.* 9.54);
- (16) *Kaúkōnes pólemon méta thōrēssonto*
 K.:NOM.PL war:ACC after arm:IMPE.M/P.3PL
 “the Kaukones armed themselves for the battle” (*Il.* 20.329);
- (17) *Héktora ... metā Léiton hormēthénta*
 H.:ACC after L.:ACC assault:PART.AOR.P.ACC
 “Hector, who was assaulting Leitos” (*Il.* 17.605).

Example (14) contains a construction in which the meaning ‘after’ of *metá* is not temporal but rather refers to a qualitative inferiority. No concrete motion is expressed, but the superlative *kallístous* provides the idea of abstract motion: the trajector is moved toward the landmark by a quality. An upward abstract trajectory is metaphorically understood, and *metá* with the accusative indicates that the landmark is the limit of the trajectory. Note that, when co-occurring with superlative forms of adjectives, *metá* with a multiplex landmark does not mean ‘after’, but ‘among’, as it normally does with the directional accusative, as shown in example (15). In (16) *metá* with the accusative expresses Purpose: the action of ‘going after something’ is conceptualized as a mental process. No physical motion needs to be implied in such occurrences in which we usually find inanimate referents, often abstract. In (17) we once again find a human referent. Here, ‘to be after somebody’ appears to have an hostile meaning and *metá* can be translated as ‘against’. This last extension explains some other examples that do not fit the classification given so far, such as

- (18) *sphairan épeit’ érripse met’ amphípolon basíleia*
 ball:ACC.F then throw:AOR.3SG after servant:ACC.F queen:NOM.F
 “so then the princess tossed the ball to one of the maidens (and missed her)” (*Od.* 6.115).

The various extensions of meaning of *metá* with the accusative can be represented as in Figure 29.

After Homer the use and meaning of *metá* undergoes major changes. In the first place the dative case disappears; from Herodotus on we only find *metá* followed by either the genitive or the accusative.

In Herodotus, *metá* with the genitive is not as frequent as in Attic prose writers; except for two occurrences with inanimate nouns, one of which is




Figure 29. Semantic development of *metá* with the accusative in Homer

quoted below, it is limited to animates. The meaning of *metá* has now shifted from Location to Comitative, notwithstanding the fact that *metá* with the genitive still retains a reflex of the requirement for multiplex landmarks, as shown by its higher frequency with plural or collective nouns (about three times as often as with singular count nouns).¹

Meaning shift from Location to Comitative is common, as already mentioned in §1.2.3. In fact, Location markers, when they come to be mostly associated with human referents, are a common source for Comitative markers, based on the inference that if one is located among a group of human beings, one is in the company of the same group of people. Once the shift has been accomplished for plural referents, the marker of Comitative can be extended to singular ones.²

Examples of *metá* with the genitive in Herodotus are (19), with a plural landmark, where the preposition can also be taken to mean ‘among’, (20) with a singular, which shows, in its turn, that the meaning ‘with’ was also well established, and (21) with an inanimate landmark:

- (19) *oíkeon koinêi metà tôn próteron*
 live:IMPF.3PL together among ART.GEN.PL early:CMPR
apikoménōn
 come:PART.AOR.MID.GEN.PL
 “they dwelt there as one body with those who had first come”
 (Hdt. 1.166.1);

- (20) *ho Kleoménēs ... exéballē Kleisthēnea kai met’*
 ART.NOM K.:NOM banish:IMPF.3SG K.:ACC and among
autoû állois polloùs Athēnaiōn
 DEM.GEN.M INDEF.ACC.PL many:ACC.PL Athenian:GEN.PL
 “Cleomenes demanded the banishment of Cleisthenes and of many other Athenians with him” (Hdt. 5.70.2);

- (21) *tóte mèn gàr metà pántōn tōn hudátōn íson*
 then PTC PTC among all:GEN.PL ART.GEN.PL water:GEN.PL equally
hélketai
 draw:PRS.M/P.3SG
 “in this period it is attracted together with the other rivers, in the same way” (Hdt. 2.25.5).

In Attic, *metá* with the genitive is very frequently used; it constitutes the standard way of expressing Comitative with human referents and various relations of accompaniment, often Attendant Circumstances, with inanimate referents. Some examples follow:

- (22) *hoi metà Aristéōs Peloponnésioi . . .*
 DEM.NOM.PL among A.:GEN Peloponnesian:NOM.PL
estratopedéúonto pròs Olúnthou en tōi ísthmōi
 encamp:IMPF.M/P.3PL toward O.:GEN in ART.DAT isthmus:DAT
 “the Peloponnesians who were with Aristeus encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus” (Th. 1.62.1);
- (23) *kai xunéthē tēn díaitan meth’ hóplōn*
 and usual:ACC.F ART.ACC.F live:ACC.F among arm:GEN.PL
epoiésanto hósper hoi bárbaroi
 make:AOR.MID.3PL as ART.NOM.PL barbarian:NOM.PL
 “in their everyday life they regularly went armed just as the barbarians did” (Th. 1.6.1);
- (24) *hai mèn ésontai álogoi hai*
 ART.NOM.PL.F PTC be:FUT.MID.3PL speechless:NOM.PL.F ART.NOM.PL.F
dè metà lógou
 PTC among word:GEN
 “some of them (i.e. the causes) do not speak, others do”
 (Arist. *Metaph.* 1046b 2);
- (25) *hē metà tēs húlēs, hē*
 ART.NOM.F among ART.GEN.F matter:GEN.F ART.NOM.F
khalké orthé
 of.bronze:NOM.F right.angle:NOM.F
 “the material right angle of bronze” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1036a 20–21);

- (26) *allà perì mèn tôn muthikòs*
 but about PTC ART.GEN.PL.M mythically
sophizoménōn ouk áxion metà spoudés
 devise:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL.M NEG worthy.N/A among zeal:GEN.F
skopeín
 consider:INF.PRS
 “however, it is not worthwhile to consider seriously the subtleties of
 mythologists” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1000a 18–19).

In (22) we find an example of Comitative with a human referent. Example (23) contains an inanimate concrete noun, *hóplōn*, ‘weapons’. This noun denotes a prototypical instrument, but note that there is no possible interpretation as Instrument here, the relation being of mere accompaniment.³ A similar relation is denoted by *metà lógou* in (24): some causes (i.e. agents) in the Aristotelian classification are said to be ‘with words’, as opposed to being *álogai*, ‘dumb’. The accompaniment relation denotes a quality of the landmark, as it does even more clearly in (25). Note that in such expressions, *metá* with the genitive comes close to the plain dative, when it expresses Matter. Possible occurrence of the two types of expression is based on different metaphors. The use of the plain dative to express Matter is connected with its instrumental value: the matter of which a certain entity is conceived as the instrument by means of which the entity is made. On the other hand, Matter expressions based on Comitative markers rely on the concept of accompaniment. Finally, in (26) the landmark is an abstract noun, *spoudés*, ‘care’: here the PP comes to express Manner, a frequent extension of Comitative markers, also found in English (see §1.2.11).⁴

I have already discussed the relation between Comitative and Instrument in §1.2.3 and 1.2.4.2, and observed that the metaphor according to which an instrument is conceived as a companion, frequently found in the modern languages of Europe, did not develop in Greek until a late stage. In the case of *metá*, example (23) shows that the occurrence of a noun denoting a highly manipulated entity, typically used as instrument, does not trigger an instrumental interpretation. On the contrary a relation by which the landmark is conceived as being used by an agent, in order to bring about a state of affairs, can be found when the landmark is an abstract noun, i.e. non-manipulated, and with a perception verb. Consider first:

- (27) *kai mèn éoikén ge hēdonè pollákis ou metá*
 and PTC appear:PF.3SG PTC pleasure:NOM.F often NEG among
dóxēs orthēs allà metá pseúdous hēmín
 opinion:GEN.F right:GEN.F but among wrong:GEN.F 1PL.DAT
gígnesthai
 arise:INF.PRS.M/P

“so it appears that often pleasure arises for us not together with a right knowledge, but with a wrong one” (Pl. *Phlb.* 37.e).

Here the verb *gígnesthai*, ‘to come into being’, denotes an uncontrolled state of affairs; in this case there is no agent, *hēmín* rather denoting an Experiencer, and the PP with *metá* can be taken to express Attendant Circumstances, as in the English translation (but see the discussion of *diá* with the genitive on the possible occurrence of Instrument with *gígnesthai*, §3.9). One may even see an implication of causality: but this is not in the meaning of the preposition, it is rather our inference, deriving from our knowledge of the structure of events.

Controlled states of affairs with agents can also occur with *metá*:

- (28) *toútōn dè ouk éstin horismós, allà metá*
 DEM.GEN.PL PTC NEG be:PRS.3SG definition:NOM but among
noéseōs è aisthéseōs gnōrízontai
 intelligence:GEN.F or perception:GEN.F know:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “of these individuals there is no definition, but we appreciate them by intelligence or perception” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1036a 5–6).

Note that in (28) the PP with *metá* does not denote Manner as does the PP in (26), since *metá noéseōs è aisthéseōs* does not mean ‘in an intelligent and perceptible manner’. The notion of accompaniment with abstract referents refers to the means by which a state of affairs comes into being or is brought about intentionally. However, although the verb *gnōrízesthai* denotes an intentional act of mental involvement, it is still far from being a prototypical action verb, and intelligence and perception are manipulated entities to a limited extent.

Cases where *metá* with the genitive comes closer to Instrument involve more prototypical action verbs, while the landmark is still a non-prototypical instrument, albeit manipulated, like ‘poetry’ in:

- (29) *metá poiéseōs epikruptoménōn*
 among poetry:GEN.F conceal:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.PL
 “concealing with poetry” (Pl. *Tht.* 180c).

Although Instrument expressions with concrete nouns denoting prototypical instruments together with prototypical action verbs are found only in the first

centuries BCE,⁵ i.e. later than the period we are considering here, one can see how the metaphor according to which an Instrument is a Companion started developing in Classical Greek, when *metá* was used in examples such as (29). Here, it could in fact alternate with the dative of instrument: non-prototypical instruments ended up coinciding with non-prototypical cases of attendant circumstances, thus paving the way for the extension of *metá* to Instrument, which took place in the change from Ancient to Medieval and Modern Greek. Manner expressions are limited to cases where a certain NP can only have non-referential interpretation, as *metà spoudés*, ‘fast’ (lit.: ‘with speed’).

Generally speaking, *metá* with the accusative tends to lose its local meaning and be used only in the temporal meaning ‘after’, in typical expressions such as *metà taúta*, ‘thereafter’. Note that landmarks need not be uniplex, as in Homer, to trigger the meaning ‘after’. Rather, *metá* appears to have undergone a semantic change which led it to lose the meaning ‘among’, when taking the accusative. The type represented in Figure 27 no longer exists in Attic-Ionic prose. A couple of idioms preserve the meaning of *metá* in Homer with multiplex continuous landmarks, notably the expressions *metà kheíras* ‘in one’s hands’ and *meth’hēméran*, ‘during the day’. Here the extension value of the accusative envisages the landmark as continuous. In particular, *metà kheíras* does not have a concrete spatial meaning and does not mean ‘between the hands’, as *metà khersi* did in Homer (see example (4)), for it is not found with concrete trajectors: it rather indicates some matter currently at issue, as demonstrated in

- (30) *tò ... eíkhomen metá kheíras*
 DEM.N/A have:IMPF.1PL among hand:ACC.PL.F
 “we have had this matter in our hands”, “we have busied ourselves with this” (Hdt. 7.16.β2).

Similar examples also occur in Thucydides:

- (31) *kài hà mèn metá kheíras ékhoi, kai*
 and REL.N/A.PL PTC among hand:ACC.PL.F be:OPT.PRS.3SG and
exēgésasthai hoíos te
 explain:INF.AOR.MID INDEF.NOM PTC
 “he was able to explain with precision any aspects of the matters in which he took part (lit.: ‘which he had in his hands’)” (Th. 1.138.3).

Even if the hands are a natural pair, here they are conceived as an area which includes the matter of interest for a person.⁶

The following are examples of *metá* with the accusative in the meaning ‘behind’, ‘on the other side’, ‘after’, ‘beyond’:

- (32) *metà dè tèn érēmon Androphágoi oikéousi*
 after PTC ART.ACC.F desert:ACC.F A.:NOM.PL live:PRS.3PL
 “the Androphages live across the desert” (Hdt. 4.18.3);
- (33) *tò dè hapántōn thōma mégistón moi estí*
 REL.N/A PTC all:GEN.PL.N marvel:N/A great:SUP.N/A 1SG.DAT be:PRS.3SG
tòn taútēi metá ge autēn tèn pólin
 ART.GEN.PL.N here after PTC DEM.ACC.F ART.ACC.F city:ACC.F
 “I will now show what seems to me to be the most marvelous thing in the
 country after this city” (Hdt. 1.194.1);
- (34) *metá tòn sophistēn anagkaíon .. tòn politikòn*
 after ART.ACC philosopher:ACC necessary:N/A ART.ACC political:ACC
ándra diazēteín nōin
 man:ACC define:INF.PRS 1DU.DAT
 “after the philosopher we must try to define the politician” (Pl. *Plt.* 258b).

Example (32) demonstrates an infrequent extension, from Time to Space. Here *metá* has spatial meaning, but this meaning has nothing to do with the Homeric ‘behind/after’: rather, it is a secondary spatial meaning derived from the temporal ‘after’, and constitutes an instance of subjectification: on an imaginary trajectory, the speaker would reach the landmark first, so it is said of the trajector that it is located ‘after’ it. The point of view of the speaker is assumed, instead than the objective perspective of the entities referred to.

In (33) we find a context similar to that of (14): the meaning ‘after’ is extended from the temporal plane to the plane of quality. Finally, in (34) *metá* again indicates temporal sequence, this time in the development of discourse and argumentation.

To sum up, the changes undergone by *metá* mostly concern the internal structure of the landmark. Originally *metá* with the dative required multiplex and mostly discrete landmarks. The relevance of the state of dividedness of the landmark, together with the general tendency to prefer the prepositional genitive to the prepositional dative, is likely to have brought about the substitution of the dative by the genitive, accomplished after Homer. The landmark’s plexity was also relevant for *metá* with the accusative: in this case Homer has an opposition between multiplex continuous landmarks, which trigger the meaning ‘among’, and uniplex landmarks, with which the preposition means ‘after’ with the accusative. After Homer, meaning polarizes around two centers: ‘with’ (genitive) / ‘after’ (accusative), regardless of the internal structure of the landmark.

3.15 AMPHI

This particle is etymologically related to the Indo-European root of the word for ‘both’. Its original local meaning is ‘on both sides’, and it can be found in words such as *amphēkēs*, ‘cutting on both sides’, as well as in occurrences where *amphí* is used as an adverb:

- (1) *rhēxen dé hoi amphí khitōna khálkeon*
 CUT:AOR.3SG PTC 3SG.DAT around tunic:ACC of.bronze:ACC
 “he cut in two parts his bronze tunic” (*Il.* 13.439–440).

Both as an adverb/preverb and as a preposition, *amphí* very soon acquired the extended meaning of ‘all around’, through a logical extension: if one refers to both sides of an object, one implies that the object only has two sides, so that ‘both sides’ comes to mean ‘all sides’,¹ as shown for example by the verb *amphibaínein*, ‘I come from both/all sides’, which in the perfect (resultative) indicates that a trajector has come to completely occupy the place of a landmark:

- (2) *mála pouí min ákhos phrénas amphibēbēken*
 much PTC 3SG.ACC grief:N/A mind:ACC.PL.F surround:PF.3SG
 “surely grief must have encompassed his heart” (*Od.* 8.541).

Whereas the landmark’s plexity is most relevant with a number of other prepositions, in the case of *amphí* it is the trajector’s plexity which plays a major role. On account of its meaning, *amphí* primarily selects multiplex trajectors; in fact, when used in its etymological meaning, it requires a biplex trajector. Note that in this respect *amphí* has a more restricted use than *perí*, ‘around’, with which uniplex trajectors occurs much more easily (see §3.16).

In prepositional phrases *amphí* can occur with all three cases in Homeric Greek.

The dative with *amphí* occurs in Location expressions, where the extension of the landmark is not envisaged as relevant; frequently it is found with motion verbs, in cases where the achievement of the end point is highlighted, as in

- (3) *amph’ henì doúрати báine*
 around one:DAT plank:DAT go:IMPF.3SG
 “he bestrode a plank” (*Od.* 5.371).

(Compare (3) with (13), where *amphí* occurs with the accusative: in the latter case movement of the two arms is profiled, while in (3) it is rather the result of getting the legs on the two sides of the plank.)

Trajectors are usually multiplex: in the majority of cases we find plural or collective nouns; singular nouns can also occur, in which case they are conceived of as occupying the whole area surrounding the landmark, as in

- (4) *amphì d' ár' autôi bainè léōn hòs*
 around PTC PTC DEM.DAT.M go:IMPF.3SG lion:NOM as
 “over him he strode like a lion” (*Il.* 5.299).

Uniplex trajectors also occur twice with the verb *kteínein*, ‘to kill’; at least in (5) *amphí* appears to indicate only proximity:

- (5) *all' hó g' ár' étrese thēri kakòn*
 but DEM.NOM PTC PTC flee:AOR.3SG beast:DAT.M evil:N/A
rhéxanti eoikós, hós te kúna
 act:PART.AOR.DAT.M appear:PART.PF.NOM DEM.NOM PTC dog:ACC
kteínas è boukólon amphì bóessi
 kill:PART.AOR.NOM PTC herdsman:ACC around COW:DAT.PL
 “but he fled like a wild beast that has done some mischief – one that has slain a dog or a herdsman beside his cows” (*Il.* 15.586–587).

The extension ‘both sides’ > ‘all sides’ is shown in

- (6) *amphì purì stēsai trípoda mégan*
 around fire:DAT set:INF.AOR tripod:ACC great:ACC
 “to set on the fire a great cauldron” (*Il.* 18.344).

The tripod is a cauldron with three legs, and as such it circles the fire in the fireplace, but obviously on three sides.

The meaning of *amphí* with the dative can be moved to an abstract plane, in which case the PP can denote an object or stimulus of mental activity, as shown in (7) and (8):

- (7) ...*Zeús... kat' autoùs... hóra kai phrázeto*
 Z.:NOM down DEM.ACC.PL look:IMPF.3SG and debate:IMPF.M/P.3SG
thumôi, pollà máll' amphì phónōi Patróklou
 heart:DAT many:N/A.PL very around killing:DAT P.:GEN
mermērízōn
 devise:PART.PRS.NOM
 “Zeus looked down upon them, and debated in heart, pondering much about the slaying of Patroclus” (*Il.* 16.644–647);

- (8) *kaī nūn ē toi egō̄ memnēménos amph'*
 and now PTC PTC 1SG.NOM remember:PART.PF.M/P.NOM around
Odusēi
O.:DAT
 “and verily but now, as I recalled Odysseus” (*Od.* 4.151).

The SR expressed in (7) and (8) by the *amphí* phrases is Area. The extension of prepositions meaning ‘about’, ‘around’ to verbs of mental activity or communication (‘speak’, ‘write’, etc.), which one can observe in Greek not only with *amphí* but also with *perí* (see §3.16), can also be found in English as well as several other Indo-European languages; it is based on a metaphor according to which the stimulus with such verbs is conceived as being in a spatial location, and what is thought or said about it is conceived as developing in the area that surrounds it.

Since fighting is an activity which is typically performed by two parties on two opposite sides, the verb *mákhesthai*, ‘to fight’, often occurs with *amphí* and the dative:

- (9) *ē eis hó ken amphì púlēis eū poiētēisi*
 PTC to REL.N/A PTC around gates:DAT.PL.F well made:DAT.PL.F
mákhōntai?
 fight:SUBJ.PRS.M/P.3PL
 “shall it be until such time as they fight about (on the opposite sides of)
 our well-built gates?” (*Il.* 5.466).

With verbs of fighting the location where the fighting takes place often constitutes the matter of the fight: so *amphí* in example (9) is sometimes taken to mean ‘about’ not in a spatial sense, but, as in English, with a causal implication. The extension to a non-local meaning is shown in:

- (10) *ou némesīs Trōas kai... Akhaioūs toiēid'*
 NEG blame:NOM Trojan:ACC.PL and Achaean:ACC.PL INDEF.DAT.F
amphì gunaikì polùn khrónon álgea páskhein
 around woman:DAT.F much:ACC time:ACC woe:N/A.PL suffer:INF.PRS
 “small blame that Trojans and Achaeans should long suffer woes about
 such a woman” (*Il.* 3.156–157).

As in (7) and (8), the SR expressed through *amphí* with the dative here is Area. Causal meaning is secondarily derived: it is only on grounds of common knowledge about events that a causal interpretation can arise in (10) (we know that the entity ‘about’ which people fight is often their reason for fighting).

As for the structure of the trajector, note that the extension to abstract meaning, and in particular to mental activity, makes it possible for *amphí* to occur with uniplex trajectors (examples (7) and (8)). Note further that this extension occurs with the dative and, as I will show briefly, with the genitive, but not with the accusative. As we will see, the accusative case specifically denotes multiplex continuous landmarks. The dative does not have any implication of this type; it rather refers to location in a certain spot, without reference to its physical dimensions.² Consequently, the space on the side of an accusative landmark, even if the latter is a singular count noun, must always be extended, while this requirement does not hold in the case of the dative and the genitive.

The genitive case also occurs with *amphí* in Homer, but only twice, in passages where it seems to be used in the same way as the dative:

- (11) *mákhesthon pídakos amph' olígēs*
 fight:PRS.M/P.3DU spring:GEN.F around little:GEN.F
 “the two of them are fighting near (i.e. ‘on the two sides of’) a small spring” (*Il.* 16.824–825);
- (12) *aeídein amph' Áreos philótētos*
 sing:INF.PRS around A.:GEN love:GEN.F
 “to sing of the love of Ares” (*Od.* 8.266–267).

Compare (11) and (12) with (9) and (8) respectively, where the dative occurs in similar contexts. The occurrence of a uniplex trajector appears to be compatible, and trigger metaphorical interpretation, with the genitive, too, as shown in (12).

As with a number of other prepositions (see especially *metá*, §3.14), the genitive appears to be newly introduced, in competition with the dative. As argued in §3.0, this substitution is due to the partitive value of the genitive, which made it particularly suitable for profiling discontinuity of multiplex landmarks, as opposed to the accusative. However, since continuity in the internal structure of the landmark does not seem to play any relevant role with *amphí*, the replacement of the dative through the genitive appears to be much less successful than in the case of other prepositions, such as *metá*.

The accusative with *amphí* can express Direction or Location in a continuous area. In both cases, the preposition can preserve its etymological meaning, as in:

- (13) *amphì d' heòn philon huiòn ekheúato*
 around PTC POSS.3SG.ACC dear:ACC SON:ACC fling:AOR.MID.3SG
pékhee leukó
 arm:ACC.DU white:ACC.DU
 “about her dear son she flung (her) white arms” (*Il.* 5.314);
- (14) *kai katekoiméthēmen... amphì rhoàs potamoío*
 and sleep:AOR.P.1PL around stream:ACC.PL.F river:GEN
 “and we slept about the streams of the river” (*Il.* 11.731–732).

In (13) a movement of the two arms is described, while in (14) *amphì* indicates that the location is on both shores of the river (but it could also be on one only: cf. ex. (16)).

The meaning shifts to a less specific location: ‘on both sides’ > ‘on the side(s)’, ‘close to (an extended area)’ > ‘along’, as in examples (15) and (16):

- (15) *trìs gàr têi g' elthóntes epeirésanth'*
 thrice PTC here PTC COME:PART.AOR.NOM.PL tempt:AOR.MID.3PL
hoi áristoi amph' Aíante dúō kai
 ART.NOM.PL best:NOM.PL around A.:ACC.DU two:ACC.DU and
agaklutòn Idomenêa ēd' amph' Atreídas kai Tudéos
 glorious:ACC I.:ACC and around of.A.:ACC.PL and T.:GEN
álkimon huiòn
 valiant:ACC SON:ACC
 “for thrice at this point came the most valiant in company with the two Aiantes and glorious Idomeneus and the sons of Atreus and the valiant son of Tydeus” (*Il.* 6.435–436);
- (16) *toùs dè katà prúmnaς te kai amph' hála*
 DEM.ACC.PL PTC down ship:ACC.PL.F PTC and around sea:ACC
élsai Akhaioùs
 push:INF.AOR Achaeans:ACC.PL
 “to push the Achaeans against the ships and along the sea shore”
 (*Il.* 1.409).

In cases such as (15), which has parallels elsewhere in Homer, the expression *hoi amphì tina*, ‘those around somebody’ always refers to an actual relation of accompaniment: the trajector and the landmark are located next to each other at a given time. However, *amphì* does not in itself express Comitative, so that in later authors it allows a shift from actual accompaniment to habitual (‘those usually found in X’s company’ > ‘X’s friends/followers/partisans’, etc.), to simple relatedness (‘X’s family/descendants’); see below, example (25). Such a shift

does not usually occur with the two comitative prepositions *metá* and *sún*, both of which mean ‘with’, implying actual accompaniment or concomitance.

It is important to note that the meaning ‘on all sides’ is achieved by *amphí* as an extension of the original meaning ‘on both sides’: consequently, even if in some cases *amphí* can be taken to mean ‘around’, it never denotes with precision a circular area, a meaning which is expressed by *perí*.³ So with motion verbs, *amphí* denotes the motion of a multiplex trajector towards the two sides (all sides) of a landmark, as in

- (17) *amph’ ára min Tróōn álokhoi théon ēdè*
 around PTC 3SG.ACC Trojan:GEN.PL wife:NOM.PL.F run:IMPF.3PL and
thúgates eirómenai paídas
 daughter:NOM.PL.F ask:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL.F child:ACC.PL
 “round about him came running the wives and daughters of the Trojans
 asking of their sons” (*Il.* 6.238–239),

but it never denotes circular motion of a (possibly uniplex) trajector, as *perí* does.

The different spatial meanings expressed by *amphí* with the accusative and the dative can be schematized as in Figure 30.

Herodotus also uses *amphí* with all three cases, with the genitive only occurring once, but in a rather interesting passage, as I will show below. The original meaning ‘on both sides’ has virtually disappeared with all cases, and, generally speaking, the spatial meaning is weakened.

In Herodotus *amphí* occurs with the dative in the meaning ‘about’, ‘concerning’, in a dozen passages. Although the examples are limited, they are varied; in particular, the occurrence of *amphí* does not depend on specific verbs;




Figure 30. Spatial meanings of *amphí*

as in Homer, the context may suggest a causal interpretation. As in Homer, the SR expressed is Area. Examples are:

- (18) *kai amphì mèn tòi nómoi tóutōi ekhētō hōs*
 and around PTC ART.DAT CUSTOM:DAT DEM.DAT have:IMPT.3SG as
kai arkhèn enomísthē
 PTC first institute:AOR.P.3SG
 “let matters stand concerning this custom as it was first instituted”
 (Hdt. 1.140.3);
- (19) *oudèn phobētheis amphì tēi gunaikí*
 INDEF.N/A fear:PART.AOR.P.NOM around ART.DAT.F woman:DAT.F
 “having no fear for his wife” (Hdt. 6.62.1.);
- (20) *hoi mnēstēres érin eikhon amphí*
 ART.NOM.PL suitor:NOM.PL competition:ACC.F have:IMPF.3PL around
te mousikēi
 PTC music:DAT.F
 “the suitors were competing with each other in music” (Hdt. 6.129.2).

Dative landmarks with *amphí* are to be understood as ‘topics’ of some type of conspicuous activity. In particular, in example (19) the PP *amphì tēi gunaikí* does not mean ‘for his wife’s sake’, as a glance at the whole passage makes clear:

So love for this woman pricked Ariston, and he contrived as follows: He promised to give to his comrade any one thing out of all he owned, whatever Agetus might choose, and he bade his comrade make him the same promise. **Agetus had no fear about his wife**, seeing that Ariston was already married, so he agreed and they took oaths on these terms. (2) Ariston gave Agetus whatever it was that he chose out of all his treasures, and then, seeking equal recompense from him, tried to take the wife of his comrade.
 (Hdt. 6.62.1–2; the sentence corresponding to example (18) is highlighted)

In (20) *amphì te mousikēi* is not the cause or reason of the contest, but rather its topic. In this connection, it is interesting also to look at the only passage where Powell’s *Lexicon* (Powell 1977) glosses over the use of *amphí* with the dative as spatial:

- (21) *éi pér ge émellon hoi oikétores amph’*
 if PTC PTC be.about:IMPF.3PL ART.NOM.PL dweller:NOM.PL around
autēi teleutésein
 DEM.DAT.F perish:INF.FUT
 “if indeed the dwellers were to perish in the matter regarding it”
 (Hdt. 7.143.1).

The PP *amph' autêi* here refers to the island of Salamis: the fact that it has a geographic reference may cause the spatial interpretation, especially if the sentence is considered in isolation. However, since Herodotus is very consistent in never using the dative spatially with *amphí*, it appears to be useful to look at the broader context. Herodotus here is referring to the interpretation of an oracle:

Some of the elder men said that the god's answer signified that the acropolis should be saved, for in old times the acropolis of Athens had been fenced by a thorn hedge, (2) which, by their interpretation, was the wooden wall. But others supposed that the god was referring to their ships, and they were for doing nothing but equipping these. Those who believed their ships to be the wooden wall were disabled by the two last verses of the oracle:

Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women's sons
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.

(3) These verses confounded the opinion of those who said that their ships were the wooden wall, for the readers of oracles took the verses to mean that they should offer battle by sea near Salamis **and be there overthrown**.

(Hdt 7.142)

The last sentence of the above paragraph contains a spatial reference to the island: consistently with Herodotus' use, *amphí* here takes the accusative (*amphí Salamína*, see below, example (26)). The text continues as follows:

Now there was a certain Athenian, by name and title Themistocles son of Neocles, who had lately risen to be among their chief men. He claimed that the readers of oracles had incorrectly interpreted the whole of the oracle and reasoned that if the verse really pertained to the Athenians, it would have been formulated in less mild language, calling Salamis "cruel" rather than "divine" **seeing that its inhabitants were to perish**. (Hdt. 7.143)

Some commentators have suggested that the passage means "seeing that the inhabitants had to die for it", however, a Purpose interpretation is out of the question here, in the first place because this is not the meaning of *amphí* in Herodotus, and secondly because in any case it would make little sense, since the matter at stake was the fate of the (much more important) city of Athens. A much more plausible interpretation, in the light of the other occurrences of *amphí* with the dative, is that the choice of this expression indicates that there should be a relation of some type with the defeat of the inhabitants and the fact that Salamis was mentioned by the oracle, which is what I try to suggest with the translation I give above of (21).

Note further that example (19) demonstrates the occurrence of a uniplex dative trajector with *amphí*, as was already possible in Homer in cases where the preposition had abstract meaning, but contrary to what we have seen for accusative trajectors.

It must be remarked that, observing the occurrences of *amphí* in Herodotus, the impression one has is that it would always be possible to replace it with some other preposition, mostly *perí*, as shown by the alternation between the two:

- (22) *amphí dè tōi thanátōi autēs dixōs hósper*
 around PTC ART.DAT death:DAT DEM.GEN.F twofold:NOM as
perí Smérdios légetai lógos
 about S.:GEN say:PRS.M/P.3SG tale:NOM
 “there are two tales of her death, as there are of the death of Smerdis”
 (Hdt 3.32.1),

while the expression *hoi amphí tina* of example (25) has an equivalent in *hoi perí tina* (both prepositions with the accusative). Sometimes it can apply to other prepositions, like *katá*, as shown by the alternation in example (27). The spatial meaning ‘around’ is also common with *perí*.

The genitive only occurs once with *amphí* in Herodotus, in the only case where the preposition can be translated with ‘around’:⁴

- (23) *epeàn toísi amphiktuósi pási toísi amphí*
 when ART.DAT.PL neighbor:DAT.PL all:DAT.PL ART.DAT.PL around
taútēs oikéousi tēs pólios méllēi
 DEM.GEN.F dwell:PRS.3PL ART.GEN.F city:GEN.F be.about:SUBJ.PRS.3SG
ti entōs khrónou ésesthai khalepón
 INDEF.N/A inside time:GEN be:INF.FUT.MID dangerous:N/A
 “when anything adverse is about to befall those who dwell about their city within a certain time” (Hdt. 8.104).

Although the use of the genitive with this preposition is rather sporadic in Ionic, it must have been more productive in other dialectal traditions, as demonstrated by its two occurrences in Xenophon.

A complete discussion of the use of *amphí* in Xenophon is beyond the scope of this book, since the language of this author, as already remarked in the introduction, is based on various dialectal traditions; in particular, in the case of *amphí* it is difficult to understand to what extent the language of Xenophon reflected real usage, and how this can relate to the language of the other authors considered here. However, a few remarks may be of interest, because the

meaning of *amphí* in Xenophon undergoes further polysemous extension. In particular, the preposition in conjunction with time expressions and numeric expressions means ‘about’, ‘approximately’, as in:

- (24) *esôthēsan méntoi autôn amphí toùs*
 save:AOR.P.3PL PTC DEM.GEN.PL.M around ART.ACC.PL
pentekaideka eis tò Hellēnikón
 fifteen to ART.N/A Greek:N/A
 “about fifteen of them, however, made their escape to the Greek camp”
 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.4).

This semantic extension, again, has a parallel in the English preposition ‘about’; it is based on a shift of the proximity meaning expressed by *amphí* from the spatial to the conceptual plane of time and quantity. Saying that a trajector is located near a landmark amounts to saying that it is almost, but not exactly, at the landmark’s location: the shift moves the idea of ‘almost’ from space to other domains.

With the accusative, *amphí* is mostly found in examples such as:

- (25) *ek tôn autôn gegonótes kai hoi*
 out.of ART.GEN.PL DEM.GEN.PL be:PART.PF.NOM.PL and ART.NOM.PL
amphí Kódrōn te kai Mélanthōn
 around C.:ACC PTC and M.:ACC
 “born of the same ancestors as the families of Codrus and Melanthus”
 (Hdt. 5.65.3),

where there is no implication that the people referred to as being located by the preposition with respect to the landmark have ever occupied the physical space around it. The expression *hoi amphí tina* had originated in Homer, where one finds examples such as (15), in which, as we have seen, it had the concrete meaning of referring to a group of people actually accompanying somebody at the moment described. In Herodotus, and later on in Attic, the same expression has come to indicate some sort of social or kinship relation between the trajector and the landmark, and does no longer imply actual presence of the trajector by the landmark.⁵

In two passages *amphí* occurs with inanimate landmarks. In the first the preposition has spatial meaning and denotes an area generically close to the landmark, without implying that the trajector ‘surrounds’ it, as already in Homer (see ex. (16)):

- (26) *hōs amphì Salamîna deî spheas hessōthênai*
 that around S.:ACC need:PRS.3SG 3PL.ACC defeat:INF.AOR.P
naumakhîên paraskeuasaménous
 sea.battle:ACC.F prepare:PART.AOR.MID.ACC.PL
 “that they should offer battle by sea near Salamis and be there overthrown”
 (Hdt. 7.142.3).

In the second occurrence, *amphí* indicates relatedness much in the same way as is the case with animate landmarks:

- (27) *oúte tà amphì nóúsous oúte tà katá*
 NEG ART.N/A.PL around sickness:ACC.PL.F NEG ART.N/A.PL down
toús thanátous
 ART.ACC.PL death:ACC.PL
 “nor in the matter of sickness and death” (Hdt. 2.142.4).

The SR of the *amphí* phrase in (27) is Area (similar to *katá* with the accusative, as shown by coordination, cf. §3.11). Note that all three examples show that the accusative still requires multiplex trajectors. In example (27) we find an unspecified trajector, *tá*, the plural neuter demonstrative: although (27) is its only occurrence in Herodotus, this construction was not unknown to other authors, and it occurs once in Thucydides:

- (28) *tá te álla dieprássonto kai*
 ART.N/A.PL PTC INDEF.N/A.PL accomplish:IMPF.M/P.3PL and
tà amphì tò áriston
 ART.N/A.PL around ART.N/A dinner:N/A
 “and busied themselves with various other duties as well as with their dinner” (Th. 7.40.2);

furthermore, Xenophon uses it fairly frequently. The same construction is found with *katá* (also occurring in example (27)) and *perí* (see below, §3.16).

Note further that Xenophon, who has *amphí* with the accusative and, sporadically, with the genitive, but never with the dative, appears to have lost the constraint on the trajector’s plexity with accusative landmarks, as shown by a number of passages, such as:

- (29) *kai ho mèn amphì taút’ eikhen*
 and DEM.NOM PTC around DEM.N/A.PL be:IMPF.3SG
 “and he was occupied with these things (i.e. sacrificing)”
 (Xen. An. 7.2.16).

In the Attic dialect, the preposition had presumably already disappeared at the time of Thucydides and Plato, who only used it to the extent that the literary language was influenced by Ionic. So in Plato we only find the expression *hoi amphí tina*, alternating with *hoi perí tina*, ‘X’s followers/ companions/descendants’ (see above, example (25)), while Thucydides also has an example of *tà amphí ti*, ‘the things concerning X’, quoted as example (28).

The semantic extensions found with the preposition *amphí* can be drawn as in Figure 31.




Figure 31. Semantic extensions of *amphí*

In this section we have found an interesting case of a preposition which – especially in connection with certain types of landmark – puts special constraints on the trajector’s structure: the trajector with *amphí* in Homer must be multiplex (or biplex); with respect to the landmark, a uniplex trajector cannot stand in the local relation profiled by *amphí*. This was not a common feature of Greek prepositions, which much more frequently put constraints on the landmark’s structure in Homer. Only marginally uniplex trajectors occur, where the meaning of the preposition bleaches and simply denotes proximity. This is a common process undergone by some other Greek prepositions, as I will show in §4.1.

3.16 PERI

The particle *perí* means ‘around’, ‘about’; in Homer, its adverbial usage is very productive. As an adverb, *perí* retains its local meaning, as in

- (1) *perì dè Trōiaì hális êsan*
 about PTC Trojan:NOM.PL.F in.crowds be:IMPF.3PL
 “round about in throngs were the women of Troy” (*Il.* 3.384);

but it also develops an abstract meaning, as in (2):

- (2) *péiri gár min oizuròn téke mētēr*
 about PTC 3SG.ACC miserable:ACC generate:AOR.3SG mother:NOM.F
 “for beyond all men did his mother generate him to sorrow” (*Od.* 3.95).

The conceptual shift that lies beneath the semantic extension from ‘around’ to ‘above all’, ‘exceedingly’, which is typical of Homeric Greek and of epics, but is not found in later prose, is based on the idea that ‘all around’ means ‘completely’. Another shift leads from ‘completely’ to ‘exceedingly’: if something possesses a quality ‘completely’, it possesses it above all else. This semantic shift is also found in Homer, in the prepositional use of *perí* with the genitive, as we will see below.

As a preposition, *perí* takes all three cases in Homer.¹ With the dative, it usually expresses Location and mostly occurs with uniplex landmarks:

- (3) *perì d’ ênkheì kheira kameítai*
 about PTC spear:DAT hand:ACC.F weary:FUT.MID.3SG
 “(his) hand will grow weary around the spear” (*Il.* 2.389);

with verbs that mean ‘to wear’, *perí* with the dative is very frequent:²

- (4) *knēmídas mèn prôta perì knēmēisin éthēke*
 greave:ACC.PL.F PTC first about leg:DAT.PL.F set:AOR.3SG
 “first he set the greaves around his legs” (*Il.* 11.17).

Example (4) contains a very frequent type of occurrence, in which the landmark is a body part and the trajector a piece of armor (the same expression also occurs with parts of garments or rings). With such types of landmark, the dative, as opposed to the other cases and especially to the accusative, profiles close contact between the trajector and the landmark.

Sometimes *perí* with the dative occurs with verbs that denote a winding movement around a landmark; the trajector is always multiplex:

- (5) *hōs dè drákōn... smerdaléon dè dédorken*
 as PTC snake:NOM terribly PTC look:PF.3SG
helissómenos perí kheîêi
 coil:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM about hole:DAT.F
 “as a snake that glares terribly as it coils around his lair” (*Il.* 22.93–95).

In (6) we find a uniplex trajector and a verb of motion:

- (6) *amphí d’ ár’ autôi bain’ hós tis perí*
 around PTC PTC DEM.DAT.M go:IMPF.3SG as INDEF.NOM about
pórtaki mētēr... hōs perí Patrólkloi báine xanthòs
 calf:DAT.F mother:NOM.F as about P.:DAT go:IMPF.3SG fair:NOM
Menélaos
M.:NOM
 “he bestrode him, as over a calf (stands) its mother, so around Patroclus
 strode fair-haired Menelaus” (*Il.* 17.4–6).

Here, strictly speaking, we can still conceive of the trajector as moving on a trajectory around the landmark. Much more frequently than *amphí*, *perí* can occur with uniplex trajectors and verbs of rest, in which case it comes to mean simply ‘beside’:

- (7) *hestékei hós tis te léōn perí*
 stand:PLPF.3SG as INDEF.NOM PTC lion:NOM about
hoísi tékessin
 POSS.3SG.DAT.PL.N kitten:DAT.PL.N
 “he stood as a lion by his kittens” (*Il.* 17.133).³

Although less frequent, parallels with *amphí* exist for both types of contexts (see examples (4) and (5) in §3.15).

Metaphorical usage of *perí* with the dative is limited. The occurrences, most interesting especially in the light of later developments, involve verbs of ‘fearing’ and verbs of ‘fighting’, with which *perí* expresses Area:

- (8) *perí gàr díe nēusìn Akhaiōn*
 about PTC fear:AOR.3SG ship:DAT.PL.F A:GEN.PL
 “for that greatly did he fear for the ships” (*Il.* 9.433);
- (9) *anèr perí hoísi makheiómenos*
 man:NOM about POSS.3SG.DAT.PL.N fight:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM
kteátessi
 possession:DAT.PL.N
 “a man fighting for his own possessions” (*Od.* 17.471).

In (8), the semantic shift is similar to the shift described for *amphí* with the dative for verbs of mental activity (§3.15): again, the stimulus is conceived as located in space, and the state of affairs as holding around the space of the stimulus. Example (9) shows a pathway for the possible extension from local meaning (‘to fight in the proximity of’) to Reason and Purpose: such a shift is fully accomplished in occurrences where *perí* takes the genitive, as I will show below.

The use of *perí* with the genitive in Homer is very interesting, for two reasons. In the first place, the occurrences clearly show that the genitive was taking over the same meanings of the dative, so they shed light on the process of replacement of the latter case by the former. In the second place, local usage is limited, while abstract meanings develop in different directions, much more than with most other prepositions.

Location expressions with *perí* and the genitive are limited to two occurrences, in which we find multiplex trajectors:

- (10) *esáōsa perí trópios bebaōta*
 save:AOR.1SG about keel:GEN.F stand:PART.PF.ACC
 “I saved (him) when he was bestriding the keel” (*Od.* 5.130);
- (11) *tetánusto perí speíous glaphuroío hēmeris*
 extend:PLPF.M/P.3SG about cave:GEN hollow:GEN vine:NOM.F
hēbōōsa
 flourish:PART.PRS.NOM.F
 “about the hollow cave ran trailing a flourishing garden vine”
 (*Od.* 5.68–69).

At least in (11) one can see that the multiplex structure of the trajector is focused, more than in the examples of *perí* with the dative. Note that the verb denotes a non-dynamic state of affairs, but it implies a trajectory, with a metaphor based on fictive motion (see §2.2.1.3).

Abstract use of *perí* with the genitive is much more widespread. In the first place, we find Area expressions. Similar to *amphí* with the dative, *perí* with the genitive can be the complement of verbs of perception, or of verbs that mean ‘to ask’, ‘to learn’, thus denoting the stimulus of mental activity or the topic of communication. The conceptual shift follows the same path already described for *amphí* (§3.15). In general, the landmark with *perí* is the object of a certain activity: the state of affairs denoted by the verb is conceptualized as holding in the area that surrounds the landmark:

- (12) *épeita dè kai perì pompês mnēsómeth'*
 after PTC also about sending:GEN.F remind:FUT.MID.1PL
 “later we will take thought also of his sending” (*Od.* 7.191–192);
- (13) *Oduśeos egō perì nóstou ákousa*
 O.:GEN 1SG.NOM about return:GEN hear:AOR.1SG
 “I heard of the return of Odysseus” (*Od.* 19.270).

Another type of Area expression, in which the landmark denotes the abstract area that delimits an activity, is demonstrated in:

- (14) *erízeskon perì tóxōn*
 strive:IMPF.3PL about archery:GEN.PL
 “they strove in archery” (*Od.* 8.225);
- (15) *hoppóte kouōroi eríseian perì múthōn*
 when young.man:NOM.PL strive:OPT.AOR.3PL about speech:GEN.PL
 “when the young men were striving in debate” (*Il.* 15.284).

In (14) and (15) the landmark is an abstract location around which the state of affairs develops. In this type of occurrence, the landmark may be a concrete noun, but its meaning is non-referential, and shifted to an abstract plane: so in (14) it is not literally *tóxōn*, ‘bows’, that constitute the matter of striving, but rather the activity performed with them. With a referential interpretation of the NP denoting the landmark, the latter is interpreted as denoting Purpose, as shown in:

- (16) *perì trípodos gàr émellon theúsesthai*
 about tripod:GEN PTC be.about:IMPF.3PL race:INF.FUT.MID
 “for they were about to race for a tripod” (*Il.* 11.700–701).

According to Chantraine (1953: 128), the origin of this expression lies in the habit of organizing races in which the runners ran around the object chosen as the prize of the race: note, however, that the concrete meaning is unattested, not only in Homer, but elsewhere in Greek as well (as we will see later, *perí* with the genitive in the local sense never occurs with verbs that indicate concrete motion).

Since Purpose expressions are comparatively frequent with *perí* with the genitive and verbs denoting various activities, the shift from local (‘around’, not necessarily with motion) to abstract (‘for’) need not necessarily be mediated by the concrete situation described above. The shift can be based on a metaphor which views a landmark as the center around which an intentional activity is performed, and re-interprets this center as the object at which the activity aims.

The difference between Purpose and Area lies in the fact that a purpose is the aim of an intentional action, while an area is simply the abstract space of the action. This difference is borne out by comparison of (14) and (15) with the following examples:

- (17) *perì ptólios te makhēsetai ēdè gunaikôn*
 about city:GEN.F and fight:FUT.MID.3SG PTC woman:GEN.PL.F
 “for (our) city he will fight and for (our) wives” (*Il.* 18.265);
- (18) *epeigómenoí perì níkēs*
 yearn:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL about victory:GEN.F
 “yearning for victory” (*Il.* 23. 437);
- (19) *hoión t’ ándras esérkhetai hoi perì*
 as PTC man:ACC.PL come:PRS.M/P.3SG REL.NOM.PL about
pátrēs... pónon kai dêrin éthento
 homeland:GEN.F toil:ACC and battle:ACC.F set:AOR.MID.3PL
 “(fear) such as comes upon men that toil and strive for their country’s
 sake” (*Il.* 17.157–158).

Note that in the above examples Purpose and Beneficiary expressions always seem conceptually close to Reason.

Finally, *perí* with the genitive occurs in some passages in which it denotes superiority, similar to its adverbial usage seen in example (2):

- (20) *iētrōs dè hékastos epistámenos perì*
 physician:NOM PTC INDEF.NOM know:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM about
pántōn anthrópōn
 all:GEN.PL man:GEN.PL
 “(there) every man is a physician, wise above human kind”
 (*Od.* 4.231–232);
- (21) *perì d’ állōn phasi genésthai*
 about PTC INDEF.GEN.PL.M say:PRS.3PL be:INF.AOR.MID
 “but they say that he was pre-eminent over all” (*Il.* 4.375).

Note that in this type of occurrence the landmark is always the totality of comparable entities: we either find the word for ‘all’, as in (20), or other NPs, such as *állōn* in (21), that imply the notion of ‘all’ (‘the others’ = ‘all other’). This type of expression is limited to Homer.

In Figure 32, I give a mental map of *perí* with the genitive in Homeric Greek.




Figure 32. Mental map of *peri* with the genitive in Homer

The spatial meaning of *peri* with the accusative is always ‘around’ in Homeric Greek. The accusative occurs in two types of context. In the first place, it can occur with verbs of motion and uniplex trajectors:

- (22) *Achilleùs ástu péri Priámoio posìn takhéessi*
 A.:NOM city:N/A about P:GEN foot:DAT.PL swift:DAT.PL
diókei
 pursue:PRS.3SG
 “Achilles is pursuing him with swift feet around the city of Priam”
 (*Il.* 22.172–173);

- (23) *perì nêson alómnoi*
 about island:ACC.F roam:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL
 “roaming around the island” (*Od.* 4.368).

In the above examples, the trajector is moving on a circular trajectory around the landmark. The preposition profiles the trajectory.

With the word *térma*, that denotes a limit in a race, the trajectory referred to by *peri* brings the trajector beyond the landmark, with only a partial turn:

- (24) *hōs d’ hót’ aethlōphóroi perì térmata...*
 as PTC when victorious:NOM.PL about turning.point:N/A.PL
híppoi rhímpha mála trōkhōsi
 horse:NOM.PL swiftly very run:PRS.3PL
 “as when horses that are winners of prizes course swiftly about the turning-points” (*Il.* 22.162–163).

The semantic extension can be compared with a similar extension in the meaning of ‘around’ in English in ‘around the corner’. By its nature the landmark constitutes a turning point; the trajectory goes around it to a certain extent, limited by the landmark’s structure, as shown in Figure 33.



Figure 33.

The expression ‘to go around/about one’s mind’ (*phrénas*) denotes call of attention:

- (25) *tòn d’ aîpsa perì phrénas éluth’*
 DEM.ACC PTC forthwith about mind:ACC.PL.F come:AOR.3SG
iôé
 call:NOM.F
 “and forthwith the call rang all about his mind” (*Il.* 10.139).

When *perì* with the accusative co-occurs with a verb of rest, the trajector is multiplex, and occupies the area surrounding the landmark. Contrary to the situation denoted by *perì* with the dative, *perì* with the accusative implies that there is some space between the trajector and the landmark, or at least that they are not in close contact:

- (26) *hestaótes perì bōmón*
 stay:PART.PF.NOM.PL about altar:ACC
 “they were standing about the altar” (*Od.* 13.187);
- (27) *huîes Akhaiôn marnámenoi perì ástu*
 SON:NOM.PL Achaean:GEN.PL fight:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL about
 city:N/A
 “the sons of the Achaeans fighting around (our) city” (*Il.* 6.255–256).

In (26) we find a verb that denotes fighting. We have seen that in similar occurrences with the dative (example (9)) or with the genitive (example (17)), the meaning tends to shift to the abstract plane of Purpose or Area: with the accusative, on the other hand, local meaning is always retained. (Note further that the only possible accusative landmark is *ástu*, ‘town’.)

A metaphorical usage of *perì* with the accusative can be observed developing from occurrences like (28):

- (28) *ándras sùn kusì kai dóúressi phulássontas*
 man:ACC.PL with dog:DAT.PL and spear:DAT.PL watch:PART.PRS.ACC.PL
perì mēla
 about sheep:N/A.PL
 “men with dogs and spears keeping watch over the sheep”
 (*Il.* 12.302–303);
- (29) *aiei perì keínon oízue*
 ever about DEM.ACC.PL wail:IMPF.PRS.2SG
 “ever be troubled for him” (*Il.* 3.408);
- (30) *perì dórpa... ponéonto*
 about food:N/A.PL be busy:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “they were busying themselves about supper” (*Il.* 24.444).

In the last example *perì* with the accusative comes very close to *perí* with the genitive in Area/Purpose expressions; in (29) *perì keínon* denotes Beneficiary.

Finally, in one occurrence we find the verb ‘to ask’:

- (31) *kai tóte m’ eirésthō pósios péri*
 and then 1SG.ACC ask:IMPT.AOR.MID.3SG husband:GEN about
nóstimon émar
 of.return:N/A day:N/A
 “then let her ask me of her husband regarding the day of his return”
 (*Od.* 17.571).

Again, it is hard to see a difference between the accusative and the genitive. I will come back to the difference between the two cases in similar passages when discussing the use of *perí* with the accusative in Attic-Ionic.

After Homer, occurrences of *perí* with the dative are limited. Location expressions still occur in Herodotus:

- (32) *perì toísi aukhési te kai toísi aristeroísi*
 about ART.DAT.PL neck:DAT.PL PTC and ART.DAT.PL left:DAT.PL
ómoisi perikeímenei
 shoulder:DAT.PL wear:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL
 “wearing them around the neck and over the left shoulder”
 (*Hdt.* 1.171.4);

and seldom also in Attic authors:

- (33) *perì dè tēi kheirì khrusoûn daktúlion*
 about PTC ART.DAT.F hand:DAT.F golden:ACC ring:ACC

ónta

be:PART.PRS.ACC

“wearing a gold ring on (its) hand” (Pl. *Rep.* 359e).

Note that in both cases the landmark is a body part, and the PP profiles close contact with the trajector, as already in Homer.

Abstract meaning of *perí* with the dative, extended to Area, occurs in Herodotus, with verbs that mean ‘to fear’ (*verba timendi*):

- (34) *ouk hoútō perí sphísi autoísi deimainontes hōs perí*
 NEG SO about REFL.3PL.DAT.M fear:PART.PRS.NOM.PL as about
têi Peloponnêsōi
 ART.DAT.F P.:DAT.F
 “fearing less for themselves than for the Peloponnese” (Hdt. 8.74.1).

With such verbs, as with other verbs that denote emotions, the *perí* phrase indicates that the emotion has a certain entity as its object: in connection with verbs of emotion, this entity is understood as a reason for the emotions, and with human landmarks the SR is Beneficiary. When occurring with other types of verb, *perí* with the dative can denote Cause to a limited extent, as in the following example from Thucydides:

- (35) *kàn perí sphísin autoís tà pleiō ptaísōsin*
 PTC about REFL.3PL.DAT.M ART.N/A.PL most:N/A.PL fall:SUBJ.AOR.3PL
 “even though their failure be due chiefly to themselves” (Th. 6.33.5).

With the genitive, *perí* has only abstract meaning in literary Attic-Ionic. It expresses Area, and most often denotes the topic of communication and of mental activity, cause of emotions, similar to *perí* with the dative in Herodotus, and the object of verbs that mean ‘to fight’, ‘to quarrel’. With all these verbs, *perí* expresses Area, mostly of the Topic type, and displays a semantic extension similar to English ‘about’, which, as we have seen, had already begun in Homer. Note that the spatial metaphor, that originated in Homer or earlier, no longer operated in Attic-Ionic for *perí* with the genitive, which had lost local meaning. Some examples of *perí* with the genitive in Attic-Ionic are the following:

- (36) *ê kai dokoúsi soi pántes ékhein didónai*
 PTC and seem:PRS.3PL 2SG.DAT all:NOM.PL have:INF.PRS give:INF.PRS
lógon perí toutōn hōn nundè elégomen
 account:ACC about DEM.GEN.PL.N REL.GEN.PL.N now say:IMPF.3PL
 “do you also think that everybody can give an account of the matter about which we have just been talking?” (Pl. *Phd.* 76b);

- (37) *egò dè oímai humàs... ou perì tòn*
 1SG.NOM PTC think 2PL.ACC NEG about ART.GEN.PL.N
onomátōn diaphéresthai allà tês toútōn
 word:GEN.PL.N quarrel:INF.PRS.M/P but ART.GEN.F DEM.GEN.PL.N
dianoías
 meaning:GEN.F
 “for my part I hold that your concern is not with mere words but with
 their meaning” (Lys. 10.7).

Since *perì* with the accusative occurs with the same verbs, and conveys a different meaning, I will discuss these examples later (see below, examples (45)–(47)).

Cause expressions with *perì* and the genitive also sporadically occur with verbs of emotion, as an extension of Area; in general, however, if there is no intentionally acting agent, *perì* rather takes the dative, as in the examples given above.

An interesting idiomatic use of *perì* with the genitive, derived from its Area function, is shown in (38):

- (38) *ho dè horéōn perì polloú*
 DEM.NOM PTC see:PART.PRS.NOM about much:GEN
poieuménous Spartiétas philon autòn
 consider:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.PL Spartan:ACC.PL friend:ACC DEM.ACC
 “when he saw that the Spartans set great store by his friendship”
 (Hdt. 9.33.4).

In such examples, the landmark is an indefinite quantity, and the PP is always governed by verbs that mean ‘to esteem’, ‘to consider’. Another possible complement of such verbs would be the predicative accusative.

The accusative with *perì* is the only case that productively retains spatial usages. It occurs with motion verbs, to denote circular motion around a landmark:

- (39) *hai mèn prò gámou plókamon*
 DEM.NOM.PL.F PTC before marriage:GEN tress:ACC
apotamnómenai kai perì átrakton
 cut:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL.F and about spindle:ACC
heilíxasai epì tò sēma tithēisi
 roll:PART.AOR.NOM.PL.F ON ART.N/A tomb:N/A lay:PRS.3PL
 “(the girls) before their marriage cut off a tress and lay it on the tomb,
 wound around a spindle” (Hdt. 4.34.1);

- (40) *anábasis dè es autoùs éxōthen kúklōi perì pántas*
 way:NOM.F PTC to DEM.ACC.PL outside spirally about all:ACC.PL
toùs púrgous ékhousa pepoíētai
 ART.ACC.PL tower:ACC.PL have:PART.PRS.NOM.F make:PF.M/P.3SG
 “the way up them mounts spirally outside the height of the towers”
 (Hdt. 1.181.4).

In (39) the trajector (*plókamon*, ‘a tress’) actually moves along a circular trajectory. In (40) we find a static state of affairs metaphorically conceptualized as a dynamic one: the trajector (*anábasis*, ‘the way up’) does not move, but it is described as if it did. This is a common way to describe itineraries, and relies on a metaphor by which motion is used to describe static relations. I have discussed fictive motion, and have shown that it is a result of subjectification, see above, §2.2.1.3.

With verbs of rest, *perì* with the accusative denotes Location, and can be translated ‘around’, ‘by’. With respect to Homer, the meaning is less specific in Attic-Ionic: often the preposition simply denotes location of a trajector near a landmark, and does not imply that the former surrounds the latter:

- (41) *ekálupse pásēi toú kténeos tēi pimelēi*
 cover:AOR.3SG all:DAT.F ART.GEN beast:GEN ART.DAT.F fat:DAT.F
tēi perì tēn nēdūn ginoménēi
 ART.DAT.F about ART.ACC.F belly:ACC.F be:PART.PRS.M/P.DAT.F
 “covers (them) up with all the fat that he finds around the belly of the animal” (Hdt. 2.47.3);
- (42) *dokēei dé moi oudē pân tò húdōr tò*
 seem:PRS.3SG PTC 1SG.DAT NEG all:N/A ART.N/A water:N/A ART.N/A
epéteion hekástote apopémpesthai toú Néilou
 annual:N/A each.time get.rid.of:INF.PRS.M/P ART.GEN N.:GEN
ho hēlios, allà kai hupoleípesthai perì heōtón
 ART.NOM sun:NOM but and retain:INF.PRS.M/P about REFL.3SG.ACC
 “yet I think that the sun never lets go off all of the water that it draws up from the Nile yearly, but keeps some back near itself” (Hdt. 2.25.3);
- (43) *en tēi perì Lésbon naumakhíai*
 in ART.DAT.F about L:ACC sea.fight:DAT.F
 “in the battle off Lesbos” (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.32).

In (41) *perì* still retains the meaning ‘around’: the trajector is located all around the landmark. Note that in this passage the trajector and the landmark are in contact, as was usual in Homer with the dative. In (42) the fact that the tra-

jector does or does not surround the landmark or not is not relevant: it may or may not surround it; the relevant feature about its location is that it is in the landmark's proximity. In (43), instead, not only proximity is the only relevant feature, but it is also clear that the trajector does not surround the landmark: the battle is located at some point by Lesbos, and does not take place all around it. The shift from 'around' to 'nearby' also occurs with *amphí*, see §3.15, examples (16) and (26).

In Time expressions, *perí* with the accusative denotes an approximate location in time, much in the same way as its English equivalent 'about':

- (44) *toû d' autoû thérous, kai perì tôn autòn*
 ART.GEN PTC DEM.GEN summer:GEN and about ART.ACC DEM.ACC
khronon hòn en tèi Mèlōi hoi
 time:ACC REL.ACC in ART.DAT.F M.:DAT.F ART.NOM.PL
Athēnaioi kateikhonto
 Athenian:NOM.PL detain:IMPF.M/P.3PL
 "the same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained
 at Melos" (Th. 3.94.1).

In order to understand abstract usages of *perí* with the accusative, let us examine the following example, where the PP expresses Location, and it is clear that *perí* cannot mean 'around':

- (45) *heúroi d' án tis autàs ouk*
 find:OPT.AOR.3SG PTC PTC INDEF.NOM DEM.ACC.PL.F NEG
eláttous perì toùs barbárous è toùs
 less:ACC.PL.F about ART.ACC.PL barbarian:ACC.PL PTC ART.ACC.PL
Héllēnas
 Greek:ACC.PL

"one could find similar ones (i.e. intermediate constitutions) in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks"
 (Pl. *Rep.* 544d).

In (45) it is said that certain constitutions are found among certain peoples. Note that *perí* with the genitive in such an occurrence would have a different meaning: it would express Area, and would denote what the constitutions are about (so a possible *perì tôn barbárōn* would mean 'about the barbarians', i.e. would denote a topic). Instead, in (45) the landmarks in the *perí* phrase are very close to Possessors. The difference, shown in Figure 34, seems to be related to two possible spatial meanings of *perí*, i.e. 'around', with the genitive, and 'nearby', with the accusative (although it must be stressed that




Figure 34.

concrete spatial meaning never occurs with the genitive in Attic-Ionic and is very limited in Homer: however, the abstract meaning developed out of this original meaning).

The shift to Possessor, based on the fact that possessions are conceptualized as being located by, or near possessors, is even clearer in the next example, which has puzzled scholars because of its difference from similar occurrences involving *perí* with the genitive:

- (46) *dokēi moi ameinōn è katà toús perì*
 seem:PRS.3SG 1SG.DAT better:NOM PTC DOWN ART.ACC.PL about
Lusían einai lógous tà tês phúseōs
 L.:ACC be:INF.PRS speech:ACC.PL ART.N/A.PL ART.GEN.F nature:GEN.F
 “I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias” (Pl. *Phdr.* 279a).

If we compare (46) with (36) we see how the two local meanings, ‘around’ and ‘by’, ‘near’ result in different metaphors: with the genitive, the idea of surrounding, which was inherent in the original meaning of the preposition, determines the Area function of the *perì* phrase in (36), while the proximity meaning results in Possessor in (46).

Note however that the Possessor interpretation with the accusative is always dependent on the context. Indeed, if we consider other examples (e.g. (47) below), we must conclude that the SR expressed by *perì* with the accusative can be Area, too, but of a different type. In some examples, again, the difference connected with case variation is quite clear:

- (47) *amphótera dóxein, kai perì tèn philosophían*
 INDEF.N/A.PL think:INF.FUT and about ART.ACC.F philosophy:ACC.F
diaphérein kai kosmióteron bebiōkénai tôn
 excel:INF.PRS and appropriate:CMPR live:INF.PF ART.GEN.PL
állōn
 INDEF.GEN.PL

“I think I should be acclaimed both for the superiority of my teaching and for the excellence of my conduct” (Isoc. 15.162).

This example can be compared with (37) above: in (47) the verb *diaphérein* is active and means ‘to differ’, in *perì tèn philosophían*, ‘regarding teaching’, the landmark is the area in which the difference (here: superiority) holds, and can be compared with similar expressions involving the plain accusative or the plain dative (see §2.2.1.4 with examples (24) and (25)). The SR expressed here is Area, but note that it is close to Reason: teaching is the reason for which the writer should be acclaimed. In (37) the same verb is inflected in the medio-passive, and means ‘to have an argument’; the landmark is the topic of the argument. The difference between the two types of Area expression, connected with case variation, can be captured by Figure 34 above: Area with the accusative is conceptualized as an area with respect to which the situation holds, located by the landmark; the topic type of Area, expressed by *perí* with the genitive, is located around the landmark.

When *perí* with the accusative comes to mean simply ‘concerning’ the difference connected with case variation becomes subtle:

- (48) *en hôi dè hē aggelē te perì*
 in REL.DAT.N PTC ART.NOM.F message:NOM.F PTC about
tôn Sardíon parà basiléa anéie kai Dareios
 ART.GEN.PL.F S.:GEN.PL.F by king:ACC go:IMPF.3SG and D.:NOM
tà perì tò tóxon poiésas
 ART.N/A.PL about ART.N/A bow:N/A do:PART.AOR.NOM
 “while the message concerning Sardis was making its way to the king, and Darius, having done as I said with his bow ...” (Hdt. 5.108.1);
- (49) *éti dè pāsán horôntes taútēn*
 PTC PTC all:ACC.F see:PART.PRS.NOM.PL DEM.ACC.F
kinouménēn tèn phúsin, katà dè
 move:PART.PRS.M/P.ACC.F ART.ACC.F substance:ACC.F down PTC
toû metabállontos outhèn
 ART.GEN change:PART.PRS.GEN INDEF.N/A
alētheúomenon, perì ge tò pántēi pántōs
 demonstrate:PART.PRS.M/P.N/A about PTC ART.N/A completely entirely
metabállon ouk endékhesthai alētheúein
 move:PART.PRS.N/A NEG be.possible:INF.PRS.MID demonstrate:INF.PRS
 “and further, observing that all this indeterminate substance is in motion, and that no true predication can be made of that which changes, they

supposed that it is impossible to make any true statement about that which is in all ways and entirely changeable” (Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a 8).

In (48) there is a *perí* with the genitive phrase, that indicates the topic of *hē angēlīē*, ‘the message’; in *tà perì tò tóxon*, ‘the actions that concern the bow’, the landmark is connected in a non-specific way with the trajector. When a similar kind of vague connection is used in reference to a verb of saying, as *alētheúein*, ‘to say the truth’, in (49), the genitive and the accusative with *perí* end up conveying similar meanings, as often remarked in the literature.⁴

Finally, depending on the meaning of the verb, the fact that a certain activity is connected with a certain landmark amounts to saying that the latter is the purpose of the activity, as in:

- (50) *Athēnaíōn* *dè néas* *tàs* *árista*
 Athenian:GEN.PL PTC ship:ACC.PL.F ART.ACC.PL.F best
pleoúsas *epilexámenos* *Themistokléēs*
 sail:PART.PRS.ACC.PL.F chose:PART.AOR.MID.NOM T.:NOM
eporeúeto *perì* *tà* *pótima* *húdata*
 go:IMPF.M/P.3SG about ART.N/A.PL drinkable:N/A.PL water:N/A.PL
 “Themistocles, however, picked out the seaworthiest Athenian ships and set out to (look for) drinkable water” (Hdt. 8.22.1).

In (50) *eporeúeto perì tà pótima húdata* literally means ‘set out for (i.e. in order to look for) drinking water’. The Purpose interpretation depends on our beliefs about the structure of events: if one intentionally makes his way to an object, the object must be the purpose of movement. As already remarked in the case of Possessor phrases, the Purpose interpretation, too, is context-dependent.

It has become clear from the above examples that, when used metaphorically, *perí* with the accusative can be interpreted in a variety of ways, all of them determined by the meaning of the co-occurring lexemes. This means that this type of PP was not grammaticalized for all these functions: in other words, Possessor, Reason, and Purpose are not in the meaning of *perí* with the accusative, but can be inferred, on the basis of common knowledge, depending on specific contexts. I suggest that the only abstract SR expressed by *perí* with the accusative is Area, with the exclusion of the Topic and Topic-related type of Area expressed by *perí* with the genitive.

As I have already remarked above, the difference between the two ways of conceiving the SR Area (i.e. as expressed by *perí* with case variation) must be understood in connection with the different spatial metaphor from which they originated. The abstract meaning of *perí* with the accusative derives from its

local meaning ‘by’, ‘near’. On the other hand, the abstract meaning of *perí* with the genitive derives from the meaning ‘around’. This type of expression specializes for the topic kind of Area. Local meaning of *perí* with the accusative was more vague, because it had extended to ‘nearby’, and consequently also the Area meaning is less precise, and can be adapted to various accessory meanings, depending on the context. In Area expressions, *perí* with the accusative is similar to *katá* with the accusative, as in examples (40) and (41) in §3.11.

As for case variation with *perí* one must further notice that the dative decreased to a considerable extent after Homer and was already disappearing in Attic. So this preposition, too, attests an ongoing reduction of the prepositional dative.

3.17 PROS

The particle *prós* means ‘towards’, ‘against’, and denotes directionality. One of its most frequent and earliest abstract meanings is ‘in addition’. I will discuss this semantic extension below (see example (6)); I am mentioning it here because it is frequently found when *prós* functions as a free adverb:

- (1) *pròs d’ ámphō rhêxe ténonte*
 toward PTC INDEF.N/A.DU break:AOR.3SG sinew:N/A.DU
 “and broke furthermore both sinews” (*Il.* 5.307).

As a preverb, *prós* can add its concrete meaning to the verb, as in *prosiénai*, ‘to get closer’; furthermore, it often occurs with verbs of communication, profiling the direction of verbal exchange, as in *prosphánai*, ‘to address’.

As a preposition, *prós* occurs with three cases. Its meaning is partly similar to the meaning of *pará*, because it implies a position or movement of a trajector relative to the exterior (as opposed to the interior) of a landmark; the two prepositions are different in that *prós* often implies contact, while *pará* always refers to the area by the landmark, without contact.

With the dative, *prós* expresses Location, denoting close contact of the trajector with the landmark:

- (2) *pukinaì dè pròs allélēisin ékhontai*
 close:NOM.PL.F PTC toward REC.DAT.PL.F have:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “close they cling one to another” (*Od.* 5.329);
- (3) *hòs toú pròs pétrēisi thraseiáōn apò*
 thus DEM.GEN.M toward rock:DAT.PL.F strong:GEN.PL.F from
kheirôn rhinoì apédrupthen
 hand:GEN.PL.F skin:NOM.PL strip.off:AOR.P.3PL
 “even so from his strong hands were bits of skin stripped off against the rocks” (*Od.* 5.434–435).

The dative and *prós* can also express Direction, profiling the endpoint of a trajectory:

- (4) *potì dè skêptron bále gaiēi*
 toward PTC staff:N/A throw:AOR.3SG earth:DAT.F
 “and down to the earth he dashed the staff” (*Il.* 1.245);¹

- (5) *protì hoì dè lab' éntera kherì*
 toward 3SG.DAT PTC clasp:AOR.3SG bowel:N/A.PL hand:DAT.PL.F
liastheís
 fall:PART.AOR.P.NOM
 “and as he sank he clasped his bowels to him with (his) hands” (*Il.* 20.418).

From the spatial meaning, an abstract meaning is derived, much in the same way as in the case of English *beside*:

- (6) *áasán m' hétaroi te kakoì pròs*
 mislead:AOR.3PL 1SG.ACC comrade:NOM.PL PTC evil:NOM.PL toward
toísi te húpnos skhétlios
 DEM.DAT.PL PTC sleep:NOM cruel:NOM
 “I was misled by my evil comrades, and beside them by merciless sleep”
 (*Od.* 10.68–69).

The preposition acquires an additive meaning. The shift is based on the idea of physical addition: if an entity is located by another entity, the former can be conceived as added to the latter.

The use of the genitive with *pròs* is most interesting. As with some other prepositions, there are occurrences that can be connected with the ablative function of the genitive, and others that cannot; much more than with any other preposition, however, the two values of the genitive create a semantic conflict. Possible semantic ambiguity is resolved by animacy of the landmark, as the examples show.

Animate landmarks in the genitive with *pròs* always occur in ablative expressions; they usually do not denote concrete Source, but rather Origin:

- (7) *xeínos hód'... alómenos híket'*
 stranger:NOM DEM.NOM wander:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM come:AOR.MID.3SG
emòn dó è pròs ēoíōn é
 POSS.1SG.N/A home:N/A PTC toward eastern:GEN.PL PTC
hesperíōn anthrópōn
 western:GEN.PL man:GEN.PL
 “this stranger has come to my house in his wanderings, whether from men
 of the east or of the west” (*Od.* 8.28–29);
- (8) *pròs gàr Diós eisin hápantes xeínoi te*
 toward PTC Z.:GEN be:PRS.3PL all:NOM.PL stranger:NOM.PL PTC
ptōkhoí te
 poor:NOM.PL PTC
 “from Zeus come all strangers and poor” (*Od.* 6.207–208);

- (9) *hóth' hupèr séthen aískhe' akouō pròs*
 when above 2SG.GEN shame:N/A.PL hear:PRS.1SG toward
Tróōn
 Trojan:GEN.PL
 “when I hear regarding you words of shame from the Trojans”
 (*Il.* 6.524–525);
- (10) *timèn pròs Zēnòs ékhontes*
 honor:ACC.F toward Z.:GEN have:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “they have honor from Zeus” (*Od.* 11.302).

As shown by the above examples, *pròs* only marginally occurs in sentences where the verb expresses actual motion of a trajector away from a landmark. Even in passages that contain motion verbs, the landmark is the origin of the trajector rather than a concrete starting point for concrete motion: so in (7) it is not said that the person in question has come, moving away from ‘from men of the east or of the west’, but rather that he belongs to either group, as in English one would say ‘whether he *is from* the east or from the west’. This is even clearer in (8), where the verb ‘be’ occurs, implying that the poor are sent by Zeus: this is a source for the development of the Behalf type of Beneficiary with *pròs*, that I will discuss below (see example (11)). In example (9), the *pròs* phrase indicates the origin of information. As we will see below, in example (20), *pròs* with the accusative has a symmetric meaning, indicating the addressee to whom information is directed. As with other prepositions found in similar contexts, the use of *pròs* follows the Conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979; cf. §3.3). Words are conceived as objects thrown back and forth between the two parties of communication; the occurrence of the same preposition with two different cases profiles symmetric trajectories in the act of communication. Finally, in example (10) we again find a stative verb, *ékhontes*, ‘having’. In this example, the landmark is the origin of the trajector, but no motion is implied, not even an abstract one. Examples like this help explain the ablative-locative transfer that I will illustrate later on in this section for *pròs* with the genitive.

As compared with *pará* with the genitive, which is also frequently used with animate landmarks in the ablative sense, *pròs* denotes Origin, rather than Source. The latter function is mostly expressed by *pará*. What makes *pròs* more suitable to express Origin is the implication of contact carried by *pròs*. We have already seen a similar difference in connection with *ek* and *apó*: *ek*, which profiles a motion away of the trajector from the inside of the landmark, is more suitable than *apó* to express Origin. With both *ek* and *pròs* the trajectory along which the trajector moves starts at a precise point, either inside (*ek*) or in con-

tact with (*prós*) the landmark, while both *apó* and *pará* are more vague in this respect: the trajectory starts at some unspecified point close to the landmark; in the case of *pará*, lack of contact is implied.

In example (11) *prós* expresses Beneficiary; it can be translated as ‘on behalf of’:

- (11) *hoí te thémistas pròs Diòs eirúatai*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC law:ACC.PL.F toward Z.:GEN guard:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “who uphold judgments on behalf of Zeus” (*Il.* 1.238–239).

The shift from the meaning ‘from the side of’ to ‘on behalf of’ is triggered by the occurrence of a verb, *erúesthai*, ‘to protect’, that does not denote motion away or origin. There is another agent (*hoí*, ‘those who’), who performs and controls the state of affairs: the landmark is understood as a removed entity, in which control originates, but which cannot bring about the state of affairs on its own, because of distance.

An interesting example, in the light of later semantic developments, is:

- (12) *pròs állēs històn huphaínois*
 toward INDEF.GEN.F loom:ACC weave:OPT.PRS.3SG
 “you will ply the loom at the orders of somebody else” (*Il.* 6.456).

In (12) again, the landmark is conceived as exerting some control on the trajector, which performs the action. Note that ‘to perform an action on somebody’s behalf’ can be understood as ‘to perform an action to somebody’s benefit’.² Based on this implication, as we will see below, *prós* with the genitive may acquire a wider Beneficiary meaning, not only of the Behalf type, as already seen above, and contrary to the common direction of semantic extension.

With passive verbs, *prós* phrases are found only three times, once with the verb *poieîn*, ‘to do’, once with the verb *didáskein*, ‘to teach’, and once with the verb *timân*, ‘to honor’. The SR expressed is Agent:

- (13) *ê soi árista pepoíētai katà oíkon pròs Tróōn?*
 PTC 2SG.DAT best:N/A.PL do:PF.M/P.3SG down home:ACC toward
 Tróōn?
 Trojan:GEN.PL
 “perhaps because such egregious deeds have been done in your home by the Trojans?” (*Il.* 6.56–57).

A literal translation would be ‘egregious deeds have been done from the side of the Trojans’: the landmark is conceptualized as the origin of agency. Note that

Agent expressions with similar adpositions occur in other languages, as already remarked in §1.2.4.1.

With inanimate landmarks, the genitive does not convey ablative meaning. The semantic role expressed is Direction, when a motion verb occurs, otherwise it can be Location, whereby the landmark specifies a certain orientation:

- (14) *pròs mèn halòs... élakhon*
 toward PTC sea:GEN... receive:AOR.3PL
 “they had their place toward the sea” (*Il.* 10.428–430);
- (15) *hóssoi nésoisi pròs Élidos hippobóio*
 REL.NOM.PL island:DAT.PL.F toward E.:GEN horse.pasturing:GEN
 “all those who (lord it) in the islands towards horse-pasturing Elis”
 (*Od.* 21.347);
- (16) *autòs dè potì ptólios pétet’ aiei*
 DEM.NOM PTC toward city:GEN.F fly:IMPF.M/P.3SG always
 “he always hurried on by the city’s walls” (*Il.* 22.198).

Both Chantraine (1953:133–134) and Schwyzer (1950:515) try to reconnect the above examples to the ablative value of the genitive (Schwyzer only limited to examples (14) and (15)). Horrocks (1981:222) writes that (15) denotes direction toward a part of the landmark, thus understanding the genitive as a partitive. Furthermore, he writes, regarding the passage in (16), that “the mover continually makes for various ‘parts’ of the city, without actually arriving” (1981:245). The fact that the landmark is not reached explains the choice of the genitive instead of the accusative, according to Horrocks (the partitive genitive denotes partial affectedness, cf. §2.2.1.1. and 2.2.1.2). It must be remarked, in any case, that inanimate genitive landmarks with *pròs* are not numerous (less than a third of the total).

Another possible explanation, leaving aside the polysemy of the genitive brought about by its use, both as an ablative and as a partitive, could be that occurrences such as (14) owe to an ablative-locative transfer, of the type described in §1.2.1.1. Indeed, this same type of change is attested for *pròs* with the genitive and human referents in Attic literature, a few centuries later, as I will argue below, so it could also have happened for inanimate referents, at an earlier time. It must be noted that this explanation remains speculative, because there is no trace of Source or Origin expressions with inanimate nouns, and one should assume it without any further evidence. However, as I remarked, ablative-locative transfer did indeed take place with *pròs* and the genitive with human referents at a later time.

Actually, it is not easy to understand why the genitive and not the accusative occurs in (14)–(16). The accusative is found in Direction and Location expressions, which look very similar to the above ones:

- (17) *ein halì keítai pròs zóphon*
 in sea:DAT lie:PRS.M/P.3SG toward darkness:ACC
 “(Ithaca) lies low in the sea toward the dark” (*Od.* 9.25–26);
- (18) *hē mèn dē pròs teíkhos epeigoméne*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC PTC toward wall:N/A hurry:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.F
aphikáneí
 go:PRS.3SG
 “so she is gone in haste to the wall” (*Il.* 6. 388).

Example (17) is most similar to (15). Note that occurrences of the accusative in Location expressions are not numerous (five, according to Fritz 1997: 236). Direction expressions with inanimate landmarks, on the other hand, are frequent, and occur with all types of motion verb. Often, the landmark is *dómata*, ‘house’, ‘palace’, with a possessor in the genitive, but human beings do not seem to be possible landmarks of *prós* phrases in such contexts. Possible occurrence of animate landmarks with motion verbs is apparently what distinguishes *prós* with the accusative from *pará* with the accusative.³

With animate landmarks, *prós* occurs in Beneficiary expressions with verbs of fighting, in the hostile sense (Malefactive):

- (19) *pròs Tròas mákheai*
 toward Trojan:ACC.PL fight:PRS.M/P.2SG
 “you fight against the Trojans” (*Il.* 17.471).

Symmetrical to *prós* with the genitive (see above, ex. (9)), *prós* with the accusative occurs with verbs of speaking, and denotes Addressee. Here again the Conduit metaphor operates (see §3.3):

- (20) *pròs allélous hépea pteróent’ agóreuon*
 toward REC.ACC.PL word:N/A.PL winged:N/A.PL speak:IMPF.3PL
 “they spoke winged words one to another” (*Il.* 3.155).

As shown by the occurrence of *allélous*, the reciprocal pronoun, *prós* in Addressee expressions occurs in passages where communication is reciprocated, and not, as *eis* (§3.3), in order to stress the unidirectionality of communication.

In Attic-Ionic, the usage of *prós* with the dative is similar to the Homeric usage, in passages where it denotes close contact, or, as it very frequently does, addition:

- (21) *epì xeínia autòn kalésanta kai pròs*
 on banquet:N/A.PL DEM.ACC invite:PART.AOR.ACC and toward
autôi toùs paídas
 DEM.DAT.M ART.ACC.PL SON:ACC.PL
 “inviting him to a banquet, and (his) sons with him” (Hdt. 2.107.1);
- (22) *prosbalóntes de pròs tò teíkhos tou*
 attack:PART.AOR.NOM.PL PTC toward ART.N/A wall:N/A ART.GEN.M
mèn pròs thalássēi hesteótos púrgou katà
 PTC toward sea:DAT.F stand:PART.PF.GEN.M tower:GEN.M down
tò proásteion tēs pólios epébēsan
 ART.N/A suburb:N/A ART.GEN.F city:GEN.F go.up:AOR.3PL
 “they advanced to the wall and entered the tower that stands by the seaside
 in the outer part of the city” (Hdt. 3.54.1).

In an abstract context, the dative also denotes close contact, as in (23):

- (23) *tôi ge hōs alēthōs pròs tois oúsi*
 ART.DAT.M PTC as truly toward ART.DAT.PL.N be:PART.PRS.DAT.PL.N
tēn diánoian ékhonti
 ART.ACC.F mind:ACC.F have:PART.PRS.DAT.M
 “to him whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities” (Pl. *Rep.* 500b).

In Attic-Ionic, *prós* with the genitive denotes different functions, based on animacy of the landmark, as in Homer. With inanimate landmarks, *prós* with the genitive expresses Location, and profiles orientation of the trajector toward the landmark:

- (24) *tà de Ábdēra hídrutai pròs tou*
 ART.N/A.PL PTC A.:N/A.PL lie:PRS.M/P.3SG toward ART.GEN
Hellēspóntou mállon è tou Strymónos kai tēs
 H.:GEN more PTC ART.GEN S.:GEN and ART.GEN.F
Ē íónos hóthen dé mín phasi epibēnai epì
 E.:GEN.F whence PTC 3SG.ACC say:PRS.3PL mount:INF.AOR on
tēn néa
 ART.ACC.F ship:ACC.F
 “now Abdera lies nearer to the Hellespont than the Strymon and Eïonos,
 where they say that he took ship” (Hdt. 8.120);
- (25) *hoútoi mèn tôn Indôn hekastērō tôn*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC ART.GEN.PL Indian:GEN.PL far:CMPR ART.GEN.PL
Persēōn oikéousi kai pròs nótou anémou
 Persian:GEN.PL dwell:PRS.3PL and toward south:GEN wind:GEN

“these Indians dwell far away from the Persians southwards”
(Hdt. 3.101.2);

- (26) *hoi metà Aristéōs Peloponnēsiōi... estratopedeuōnto*
ART.NOM.PL among A.:GEN Spartan:NOM.PL encamp:IMPF.M/P.3PL
pròs Olúnthou en tòi isthmōi
toward O.:GEN in ART.DAT isthmus:DAT
“the Spartans under Aristeus encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus” (Th. 1.62.1).

As already in Homer, these expressions are very similar to others, in which *prós* with the accusative occurs (see examples (32)–(34) below).

With animate landmarks the genitive still has ablatival value, as shown in

- (27) *hópōs mē mónon pròs patròs allà kai pròs mētròs*
that NEG only toward father:GEN but and toward mother:GEN.F
apò Diòs ésontai gegonótes
from Z.:GEN be:FUT.MID.3PL be:PART.PF.NOM.PL
“that they should be descendants of Zeus, not only on their father’s side, but also on their mother’s” (Isoc. 10.43);
- (28) *è méte pròs theòn méte pròs anthrṓpōn autōi*
PTC NEG toward god:GEN.PL NEG toward man:GEN.PL DEM.DAT.M
ámeínon ésesthai
better:N/A be:INF.FUT.MID
“otherwise one would not have any favor, either from gods or from men” (Pl. *Rep.* 463d).

Example (28) is similar to example (10) from Homer. In (27) one can compare the meaning of *apó* and *prós*: both prepositions denote Origin, but the scope of each PP is different.

Agent expressions are also attested, but only in Herodotus:

- (29) *hó ti mén nun tà loipà tòn khrēstērion*
INT.N/A PTC PTC ART.N/A.PL rest:N/A.PL ART.GEN.PL oracle:GEN.PL
ethéspise, ou légetai pròs oudamón
prophesy:AOR.3SG NEG say:PRS.M/P.3SG toward INDEF.GEN.PL
“now what answer was given by the rest of the oracles is not related by anyone” (Hdt. 1.47.2);⁴
- (30) *puthómenos dè pròs tòn aggélōn*
learn:PART.AOR.MID.NOM PTC toward ART.GEN.PL messenger:GEN.PL
“being informed by the envoys” (Hdt. 5.73.2).

As we have seen in examples (9) and (20), *prós*, which profiles directionality, appears particularly suitable for referring to the flow of information. This is true also of its use in Agent expressions, in which it most often occurs with verbs of ‘saying’.⁵ After Herodotus, *prós* with the genitive as Agent marker is found only in poetry, but it disappears from the language of prose writers and of comedy, which were closer to the spoken usage.

The metaphor from which Agent and Behalf Beneficiary originate is the same: the landmark is a human entity, which exerts intentionality. In the case of Agent expressions, control over the action and ultimate causation also belong to the same entity, while in the case of Beneficiary there is another acting human who brings about the state of affairs.

With a further shift, *prós* acquires a Beneficiary meaning, which is fully developed in Attic, and no longer limited to Behalf:

- (31) *Kallías mèn dokeî moi mála pròs Prōtagórou*
 K.:NOM PTC seem:PRS.3SG 1SG.DAT very toward P:GEN
eînai
 be:INF.PRS
 “it seems to me that Callias is all for supporting Protagoras”
 (Pl. *Prt.* 336d).

Here *prós* with the genitive means ‘on the side of’: it does not profile the origin, but rather a mental location. The shift to Beneficiary results in an ablative – locative transfer: from the original meaning ‘from one’s side’, we now have the meaning ‘on one’s side’.

Meaning extension of *prós* with the genitive and human referents can be summarized as in Figure 35.

These semantic developments seem to imply that Agent and Beneficiary occupy a neighboring space, contrary to expectations based on the distinction between antecedent and subsequent SRs (see §1.2).

With the accusative, *prós* very frequently denotes orientation, without motion, expressing the SR Location.




Figure 35. Semantic extensions of *prós* with the genitive and human referents

- (32) *hósa álla mérē entòs toú Ístrou*
 REL.N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL horde:N/A.PL inside ART.GEN I.:GEN
potamoú pròs thálassan mállon tèn toú Euxeínou
 river:GEN toward sea:ACC.F more ART.ACC.F ART.GEN E.:GEN
póntou katóikēto
 sea:GEN dwell:PLPF.M/P.3SG
 “the other hordes settled south of the Danube in the neighborhood of the Euxine” (Th. 2.96.1);
- (33) *hoi pròs nóton oikoúntes*
 ART.NOM.PL toward south:ACC dwell:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “the people farther south” (Th. 2.101.2);
- (34) *tà dè katúperthe pròs boréēn légousi ánemon*
 ART.N/A.PL PTC above toward north:ACC say:PRS.3PL wind:ACC
tòn huperoíkōn tēs khórēs ouk
 ART.GEN.PL dweller:GEN.PL ART.GEN.F country:GEN.F NEG
hoià te eínai éti prosōtērō ou̐te horàn ou̐te
 INDEF.N/A.PL PTC be:INF.PRS PTC further NEG see:INF.PRS NEG
diexiénai
 traverse:INF.PRS
 “above and north of the neighbors of their country no one, they say, can see or travel further” (Hdt. 4.7.3).

It is hard to detect a difference between these examples and those in (24)–(26), where Direction is encoded by *prós* with the genitive: especially in the case of cardinal orientation, the *prós* phrases in examples (25) and (33) seem to convey very much the same meaning.

The accusative also occurs in Direction expressions with motion verbs, with both inanimate and animate landmarks. In the latter case (example (36)) its meaning comes close to the meaning of *pará* with the accusative (§3.5, examples (39)–(40)):

- (35) *antipálou dè állēs triérouς*
 equalent:GEN.F PTC INDEF.GEN.F trireme:GEN.F
epigenoménēs ou pròs tò élasson
 be:PART.AOR.MID.GEN.F NEG toward ART.N/A small:CMPR.N/A
nomízōn trépsesthai, all' epì tèn naún
 suppose:PART.PRS.NOM turn:INF.FUT.MID but on ART.ACC.F ship:ACC.F
 “thinking that a ship that could match it, would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large one” (Th. 4.120.2);

- (36) *oúte pròs toùs Lakedaímoníous éti épempon*
 NEG toward ART.ACC.PL Spartan:ACC.PL PTC send:IMPF.3PL
 “they not only gave up all idea of sending (embassies) to the Spartans”
 (Th. 2.65.2).

Note that in (36) *pròs* comes close to Recipient. The verb *pémpein*, ‘to send’, usually takes Direction expressions with *eis*, when denoting a place, and *pròs*, when denoting human beings, as in (36). Recipient expressions with verbs of giving do not occur with *pròs* and the accusative; however, Addressee expressions are fairly frequent.

Most frequently, *pròs* with the accusative and animate landmarks occurs in contexts which do not imply physical motion, but have an abstract meaning. For example, Plato often has a *pròs* phrase with the verb *blépein*, ‘to look’, to indicate an entity toward which sight is directed:

- (37) *eroúmen gàr hóti thaumastòn mèn àn oudèn*
 say:FUT.1PL PTC that surprising:N/A PTC PTC INDEF.N/A
eíē ei kai hoútoi hoútōs eudaimonéstatoí
 be:OPT.PRS.3SG if and DEM.NOM.PL thus happy:SUP.NOM.PL
eísin, ou mèn pròs toúto blépontes
 be:PRS.3PL NEG PTC toward DEM.N/A look:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
tèn pólin oikízomen
 ART.ACC.F city:ACC.F found:PRS.1PL
 “for we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living
 prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in
 the establishment of our state was not this” (Pl. *Rep.* 420b).

In some cases, the *pròs* phrase comes close to a Beneficiary expression; however, one can detect a difference between *pròs* with the accusative and *pròs* with the genitive (example (31)), because only the latter always has the meaning ‘in favor’: *pròs* with the accusative, in turn, has a neutral meaning, and, depending on the context, it can also mean ‘against’:

- (38) *tôi etérōi khrō trópōi*
 ART.DAT.M INDEF.DAT.M employ:IMPT.PRS.M/P.2SG method:DAT.M
pròs me
 toward 1SG.ACC
 “employ the latter method against me” (Pl. *Prt.* 335a).

The directional meaning conveyed by *pròs* with the accusative can be shifted to the temporal plane, similar to the meaning of ‘toward’ in English:

- (39) *toû autoû kheimônos... teleutôntos kai pròs éar*
 ART.GEN DEM.GEN winter:GEN finish:PART.PRS.GEN and toward
 spring:N/A
 “at the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring” (Th. 4.135.1).

With inanimate landmarks, the directional meaning of *pròs* with the accusative can be interpreted as denoting abstract reference to a certain matter: the SR expressed in this case is Area, as in

- (40) *parekhómenoi dè hómōs hà ékhomen díkaia prós te tà Thēbaíōn diáphora kai es humàs kai toùs állois Hállēnas*
 present:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL PTC equally REL.N/A.PL have:PRS.1PL
 right:N/A.PL toward PTC ART.N/A.PL Theban:GEN.PL quarrel:N/A.PL
 and to 2PL.ACC and ART.ACC.PL INDEF.ACC.PL Greek:ACC.PL
 “nevertheless, we will place before you the rights we have regarding the question of the quarrel which the Thebans have against us and also regarding you and the rest of the Greeks” (Th. 3.54.1).

In passages such as the one above, *pròs* is used to denote the abstract area at which an action is aimed. The semantic extension parallels the extension undergone by *eis* in this same passage, and in examples such as (29) and (30) in §3.3. On the other hand, even if the meaning of *pròs* in (40) is similar to the meaning of *perí* with the accusative in (48) of §3.16, but the meaning extension relies on different metaphors: in the case of *perí*, the SR Area is an extension of the spatial meaning ‘by’, ‘near’, while in the case of *eis* and *pròs* it derives from the spatial meaning ‘towards’.

Similar to *eis*, also *pròs* with the accusative may further be shifted from Area to Purpose, especially with abstract nouns (examples with *eis* are (16) and (33) in §3.3; see further (42) below, where PPs with *pròs* and *eis* are coordinated). Purpose better suits the meaning of *pròs*, which, as already remarked, always includes orientation:

- (41) *nún gàr ou dēpou prós ge autò toúto philonikoúmen, hópōs hagò tithēmai, taút’ éstai tà nikōnta, è*
 now PTC NEG absolutely toward PTC DEM.N/A DEM.N/A
 dispute:PRS.1PL for REL.N/A.PL+1SG.NOM assert:PRS.M/P.1SG
 DEM.N/A.PL be:FUT.MID.3SG ART.N/A.PL win:PART.PRS.N/A.PL PTC

taúth' hā sú
 DEM.N/A.PL REL.N/A.PL 2SG.NOM
 “for surely what our present controversy aims at is not to gain the victory
 for my assertions or yours” (Pl. *Phlb.* 14b);

- (42) *hōste ou mónon pròs dóxan allà kai eis*
 so NEG only toward reputation:ACC.F but and to
khremátōn lōgon lusitelei mállon humīn
 money:GEN.PL consideration:ACC be.better:PRS.3SG more 2PL.DAT
apopsēphísasthai
 acquit:INF.AOR.MID
 “so not only with a view to repute, but also in respect of money, it is more
 to your advantage to acquit us” (Lys. 19.61–62).

In the dictionaries, some occurrences of *pròs* with the accusative are glossed as denoting Reason. Closer scrutiny of the relevant passages shows that it is still the directional meaning that underlies such occurrences:

- (43) *hoi de Kurēnaioi pròs tèn*
 ART.NOM.PL PTC Cyrenaean:NOM.PL toward ART.ACC.F
katalabōusan sumphorèn épempon es Delphous
 overtake:PART.AOR.ACC.F affliction:ACC.F send:IMPF.3PL to D.:ACC.PL
 “the Cyrenaeans, in view of the affliction that had overtaken them, sent to
 Delphi” (Hdt. 4.161.1);

- (44) *kai hoi pròs tà tou Babuloníou*
 and 3SG.DAT toward ART.N/A.PL ART.GEN Babylonian:GEN
rhēmata, hōs kat' arkhàs épēse, epeán
 word:N/A.PL REL.NOM down beginning:ACC.PL.F say:AOR.3SG when
per hēmíonoi tékōsi, tóte tò teíkhos
 PTC mule:NOM.PL.F generate:SUBJ.AOR.3PL then ART.N/A wall:N/A
halōsesthai, pròs taútēn tèn phēmēn
 take:INF.FUT.MID toward DEM.ACC.F ART.ACC.F utterance:ACC.F
Zōpúrōi edókee einai halósimos hē
 Z.:DAT seem:IMPF.3SG be:INF.PRS takeable:NOM.F ART.NOM.F
Babulón
 B.:NOM.F
 “(then reflecting he recalled) the words that the Babylonian told him at
 the beginning of the siege – that the city would be taken when mules gave
 birth – and having this utterance in mind Zopyrus conceived that Babylon
 might be taken” (Hdt. 3.153.2).

In (43) and (44) *prós* with the accusative has the same meaning as the English expression ‘in view of’. It concerns mental activity, but rather than denote a reason that motivates an action, it denotes a perspective in which the mental activity is set.

Finally, *prós* with the accusative occurs in various quasi-adverbial Manner expressions, such as *pròs orgḗn*, ‘angrily’, *pròs bían*, ‘by force’, etc.

A mental map of the semantics of *prós* with the accusative can be traced as in Figure 36.

To sum up, case variation with *prós* appears to be semantically rather complicated: already in Homer the genitive encodes both Source and Direction; from the examples available it is hard to find a common root for these two functions. As I have remarked, in Homer the two functions are kept distinct by the feature of animacy: in Classical Greek, however, animate nouns, that only occurred in Origin expressions in Homer, frequently occur in Beneficiary expressions, which can semantically be derived from the Origin meaning, but made the meaning of case variation with *prós* even more opaque.

It must further be noted that, contrary to all other prepositions, the frequency of the genitive with *prós* started decreasing after Herodotus. In Attic prose the genitive was less frequent than the dative, and it does not occur in non-literary papyri of the first century BCE. or in the New Testament. For its part, the dative, too, decreased in post-classical time, and the accusative remained the only productive case.




Figure 36. Mental map of *prós* with the accusative

3.18 EPI

The particle *epí* means ‘on’. It can occur with all three cases, and is extremely frequent. It displays a high degree of semantic overlap with different cases, and, with respect to the other prepositions, a lesser tendency toward simplification in post-Homeric Greek. More specifically, regarding the relation between the dative and the genitive, *epí* is quite exceptional. Although the genitive has no ablatival value, and with *epí* the genitive and the dative seem to cover the same functions in Homer, after Homer the dative remains extremely frequent, even if the functions of the two cases still display some overlap. As a consequence, describing the semantics of *epí* is very complicated.

As an adverb *epí* means ‘over’, ‘besides’:

- (1) *kai epí sképas ên anémoio*
and on shelter:N/A be:IMPF.3SG wind:GEN
“and besides there was shelter from the wind” (*Od.* 5.443).

In Homer, the dative occurs in Location expressions, where close contact is implied:

- (2) *teúkhea mén hoi keítai epí khthonì*
armor:N/A.PL PTC 3SG.DAT.M lie:PRS.M/P.3SG on earth:DAT.F
pouluboteírēi
much.nourishing:DAT.F
“his armor lies upon the nourishing earth” (*Il.* 3.195);
- (3) *emeú zôntos kai epí khthonì derkoménoio*
1SG.GEN live:PART.PRS.GEN.M and on earth:GEN.F see:PART.PRS.M/P.GEN.M
“while I live and have sight on the earth” (*Il.* 1.88).

Often, *epí* with the dative occurs in Direction expressions, and denotes final contact of the trajector with the landmark:

- (4) *teúkhea kál’ apothésthai epí khthonì*
armor:N/A.PL good:N/A.PL lay:INF.AOR.MID on earth:DAT.F
“(he bid) to lay aside their goodly armor upon the earth” (*Il.* 3.89).

Final contact is also implied in (5), where the clang of the weapons is the result of falling down:

- (5) *arábēse de teúkhe’ ep’ autōi*
ring:AOR.3SG PTC armor:N/A.PL on DEM.DAT.M
“his armor clanged upon him” (*Il.* 4.504).

Frequently occurring verbs in passages where *epí* with the dative profiles the endpoint of motion are verbs that mean ‘to put’, ‘to sit down’, ‘to cast’. As with other prepositions, these verbs can also take *epí* with the accusative, whereby the whole trajectory is profiled, and not only its end (see example (30)).¹ However, the use of *epí* with the dative for Direction expressions is much wider than the use of any other prepositions with the dative, and does not only involve the set of verbs mentioned above. Motion verbs of more generic meaning can occur either with *epí* with the dative or with *epí* with the accusative. Various scholars have tried to explain the difference between the two types of expression. In a recent study, Conti (1996) has analyzed all occurrences of a set of motion verbs with the two types of PP. The basic differences lie first of all in the distribution of animate and inanimate nouns: while the former are more frequent with the dative (7/1), the latter are more frequent with the accusative (1/8). In other words, the dative is preferred when the sentence denotes motion toward a (group of) human being(s). Furthermore, while *epí* with the dative mostly means ‘against’, and denotes Malefactive, *epí* with the accusative simply denotes motion. From these findings, and considering that there is no significant difference between the two types of PP depending on whether the goal is reached or not, Conti concludes that the dative with *epí* does not, or not only, continue the ancient locative, but has the value of a real dative, as shown especially by its affinity with animate nouns. This would be the only case in which a preposition takes the dative, not as a result of syncretism with the locative or the instrumental, but on account of the original meaning of the dative itself.

Conti’s explanation, which is partly in accordance with earlier treatments (see especially Delbrück 1901:676–677), may be correct historically;² synchronically, the semantic difference between the dative and the accusative can be explained through different features of the meaning of *epí*, and through meanings that cases also have elsewhere, especially as concerns malefactive expressions with *epí* and the dative, as I am going to show in the next paragraph.

In the first place, it needs to be remarked that motion with final contact can also follow a horizontal trajectory, and this is the case with the verbs studied in Conti (1996). As I have said, in such cases, the preposition is best translated as ‘against’, and, when it denotes the motion of marching soldiers, it comes to acquire a hostile sense:

- (6) *ep’ alléloisin ióntes*
 ON REC.DAT.PL GO:PART.PRS.NOM.PL
 “advancing one (host) against the other” (Il. 3.15).

Here of the two features of *epí* with the dative, (final) contact and vertical orientation, only the first is relevant, with the result that there is a rotation from the vertical to the horizontal axis. The meaning ‘against’ comes from the contact component of the meaning of *epí*: one feature only is highlighted, with a *gestalt* effect, as described in Lakoff (1977) (see §1.1).³ This meaning can also occur outside its original context, without motion, with the verbs *márnasthai* and *mákesthai*, ‘to fight’:

- (7) *ándr’ horóō kraterō epì soi*
 man:ACC.DU see:PRS.1SG valiant:ACC.DU ON 2SG.DAT
memaōte mákhesthai
 yearn:PART.PF.NOM.DU fight:INF.PRS.M/P
 “I behold two valiant warriors eager to fight against you” (*Il.* 5.244).

As for the change in orientation, a similar development also concerns Location expressions: in some occurrences, *epí* with the dative denotes contact without vertical orientation, while in others it can denote vertical orientation, but no contact:

- (8) *háma d’ amphípolos kien autēi paíd’*
 together PTC handmaid:NOM.F come:AOR.3SG DEM.DAT.F child:ACC
epì kólpoi ékhous’
 on bosom:DAT have:PART.PRS.NOM.F
 “with her came a handmaid bearing in her bosom the child”
 (*Il.* 6.399–400);
- (9) *egō mèn áneuthen eph’ haímati phásganon*
 1SG.NOM PTC on.one.side on blood:DAT sword:N/A
ískhōn
 hold:PART.PRS.NOM
 “I on one side holding my sword over the blood” (*Od.* 11.82).

With a conceptual shift, the preposition can denote control of the trajector over the landmark:

- (10) *hós m’ epì bousin heís’ étí tutthōn*
 REL.NOM 2SG.ACC ON cattle:DAT.PL set:AOR.3SG PTC child:ACC
eónta
 be:PART.PRS.ACC
 “(Odysseus), who set me over his cattle when I was still a child”
 (*Od.* 20.209–210).

Here there is no implication of physical location of the trajector on the surface of the landmark; rather, the preposition denotes control, based on the metaphor according to which BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 15, and above, §3.13).

Still among Location expressions, we find occurrences where the preposition does not denote either vertical orientation or contact, but simply proximity:

- (11) *olésēis dè poléas epì nēusin Akhaiôn*
 destroy:AOR.2SG PTC many:ACC.PL on ship:DAT.PL.F Achaeans:GEN.PL
 “that you bring many to death beside the ships of the Achaeans” (*Il.* 1.559).

Since proximity very often indicates location by the side of the landmark, one can again think of a shift from vertical to lateral orientation, partly also displayed by the English preposition *on* in expressions such as *on the right/left* (see example (29)).

Finally, *epí* with the dative can be used in reference to time, in a way similar to the correspondent English preposition *on*:

- (12) *ep' émati tōide*
 on day:DAT DEM.DAT
 “on this day” (*Il.* 13.234);
- (13) *epì pāsi*
 on all:DAT.PL
 “in all circumstances” (*Il.* 4.178).

In the metaphorical sense, *epí* with the dative can express Purpose:

- (14) *moi géras autòs aphairésthai apeileís,*
 1SG.DAT prize:N/A DEM.NOM take:INF.FUT.MID threaten:PRS.2SG
hōi épì pollà mógēsa
 REL.DAT.N on many:N/A.PL toil:AOR.1SG
 “you threaten that you will take my prize away from me, for which I toiled so much” (*Il.* 1.161–162);
- (15) *gastéres haíd' aigôn kéat' en*
 belly:NOM.PL.F DEM.NOM.PL.F goat:GEN.PL lie:IMPF.M/P.3PL on
purí, tàs epì dórpoi kathémetha
 fire:DAT DEM.ACC.PL.F on supper:DAT set:AOR.MID.1PL
 “here at the fire are goats’ paunches lying, which we set there for supper” (*Od.* 18.44–45).

This type of expression often occurs with verbs that mean ‘to stand’, ‘to bear’, ‘to suffer’. The conceptual shift is connected with the orientation meaning of *epí*, and is mostly triggered by the occurrence of abstract nouns.⁴

If the verb does not denote intentionality, the SR can be understood as Cause, rather than Purpose. The landmark can be animate:

- (16) *epì soi mála pollà páthon*
 on 2SG.DAT very many:N/A.PL suffer:AOR.1SG
 “I have suffered much for you” (*Il.* 9.492).

The use of *epí* with the dative in Beneficiary expressions is not limited to Malefactive. Outside contexts such as those in (6) and (7), and with an intentional and controlled state of affairs we find examples such as (17), to be compared with (43) in §2.2.3:

- (17) *ei mèn nún epì állōi aethleúoimen Akhaioí*
 if PTC now on INDEF.DAT.M contend:OPT.PRS.1PL Achaean:NOM.PL
 “if for some other’s honor we Achaeans were now holding contests”
 (*Il.* 23.274).

Beneficiaries can be understood as the reason for an agent to bring about a state of affairs: if the agent acts intentionally to the benefit of another human being, the latter motivates the former’s action. Note that this assumption puts Beneficiary close both to Reason (and hence to Cause), and to Purpose.

The various meanings of *epí* with the dative can be represented as in Figure 37.

With the genitive, *epí* in Homer occurs in Location expressions, some of which are virtually identical to occurrences with the dative:

- (18) *énkhos mèn ... kéitai epì khthonós*
 spear:N/A PTC lie:PRS.M/P.3SG on ground:GEN.F
 “the spear lies on the ground” (*Il.* 20.345).




Figure 37. Mental map of *epí* with the dative

Similar to *epí* with the dative in (4), *epí* with the genitive in (18) denotes vertical orientation and contact between the trajector and the landmark. Further similarities between the two cases can be seen in passages where *epí* with the genitive co-occurs with verbs such as ‘to put’, or ‘to sit down’, which take a Direction expression, whereby the endpoint of motion is often profiled through the use of the dative.

Other occurrences where variation between the two cases is not semantically clear include passages in which *epí* with the genitive denotes proximity, displaying a possible rotation of the vertical axis, similar to *epí* with the dative in (11):

- (19) *nēūs dé moi éd’ héstēken ep’ agrōú nósphi*
 ship:NOM.F PTC 1SG.DAT DEM.NOM.F lie:PF.3SG ON field:GEN away
pólēos
 city:GEN.F
 “my ship lies yonder by the fields away from the city”
 (*Od.* 1.185 = *Od.* 24.308).

Time expressions with the genitive, on the other hand, refer to an extended span of time, rather than to single time units:

- (20) *ep’ eirēnēs*
 on peace:GEN.F
 “in time of peace” (*Il.* 2.797).

Note that in cases where the orientation is not vertical, as in (19), *epí* with the genitive does not normally denote contact: in other words, occurrences such as (8) are typical of *epí* with the dative, but not of *epí* with the genitive.

Especially with the word for ‘ship’, *epí* with the genitive can denote Location, with physical contact of the trajector with the surface of the landmark, or Direction, whereby it implies that the end of motion brings the trajector in contact with the landmark:⁵

- (21) *ée tis ólet’ oléthrōi adeukéi*
 PTC INDEF.NOM perish:AOR.MID.3SG death:DAT cruel:DAT
hēs epì nēòs
 POSS.3SG.GEN.F ON ship:GEN.F
 “or did any perish by a cruel death on board his ship” (*Od.* 4.489);
- (22) *epì nēòs ébaine*
 on ship:GEN.F GO:IMPF.3SG
 “he embarked on his ship” (*Il.* 13.665).

In other passages, *epí* with the genitive denotes vertical Location on an extended surface, in much the same way as *epí* with the accusative:

- (23) *hína mé ti kakorrhíēi alegeinēi è*
 for NEG INDEF.N/A mischievousness:DAT.F grievous:DAT.F PTC
halòs è epì gēs algése te pēma
 sea:GEN PTC on land:GEN.F suffer:SUBJ.AOR.2PL pain:N/A
pathóntes
 suffer:PART.AOR.NOM.PL
 “in order that you may not suffer pain through wretched ill-contriving
 either by sea or on land” (*Od.* 12.26–27);
- (24) *klaggēi taí ge pétontai ep’ Ōkeanoío*
 clamor:DAT.F DEM.NOM.PL.F PTC fly:PRS.M/P.3PL on O.:GEN
rhoáōn
 stream:GEN.PL.F
 “and with clamor they fly on the streams of Ocean” (*Il.* 3.5).

Note that there is a difference between the two above examples, in that in (23) the SP *epì gēs*, ‘on earth’, coordinated with the locative partitive genitive *halòs*, ‘in the sea’, does not denote that the trajector is located on an extended part of the landmark’s surface, but rather that its location is somewhere unspecified on the landmark. In (24), on the other hand, the trajector is described as moving along a trajectory that covers a part of the area occupied by the landmark. In such occurrences, the genitive usually does not denote contact; in similar passages where contact is implied the accusative occurs, as in (33).

Some Direction expressions, including occurrences of abstract motion, are also similar to occurrences with the accusative:

- (25) *papténas eph’ homílou*
 look:PART.AOR.NOM on thron:GEN
 “looking toward the thron” (*Il.* 11.546).

Some Purpose and Beneficiary expressions also occur, similar to those found with the dative, but more limited, and with different verbs:

- (26) *eúkhēsthe ... sigēi eph’ humeíōn*
 pray:IMPT.PRS.M/P.2PL silence:DAT.F on 2PL.GEN
 “pray in silence for yourselves” (*Il.* 7.194–195).

In general, the use of the genitive with *epí* can be explained through its partitive value only (see Ruijgh 1994); no occurrences have ablative meaning. The genitive is well attested (it occurs in more than 150 passages); however, both the

dative and the accusative are much more frequent (there are several hundreds occurrences of *epí* with each of them). The genitive has part of the same uses of the dative and, although more limited, part of the uses of the accusative, but no meaning exclusively of its own; abstract meaning is less attested than with the other two cases. In spite of the frequency of the genitive, these facts seem to attest a relatively recent use of this case with *epí*, remindful of what we have seen with *metá*.⁶ After Homer, the frequency of the genitive increases also with *epí*. Analogies between the two prepositions, however, stop here: the dative with *epí* does not display any notable tendency toward a reduction.

In spite of its non-ablatival origin, the genitive with *epí* does not seem to have any implications regarding the landmark's structure. In this respect, case variation with *epí* is similar to case variation with *hupó* (§3.13): with *hupó* the genitive has very limited ablatival value, soon reinterpreted as locative due to ablativ-locative transfer; most occurrences can be taken as containing a partitive genitive, but one cannot see any tendency of the genitive to denote any feature of the landmark's structure, and there is a significant overlap of the genitive with the dative in Location expressions. In the case of *hupó*, overlap of the two cases is virtually eliminated after Homer through almost total limitation of the genitive to abstract uses; *epí*, as we will see further on, maintained concrete meaning with all cases.

The accusative with *epí*, as with many other prepositions, can express Direction, or refer to an extended landmark and express Location. In Direction expressions, *epí* most often indicates that the landmark is the limit of motion, but does not imply that it is actually reached at the end of a trajectory:

- (27) *all' aútōs epì táphron iôn Tróessi*
 but likewise on trench:ACC.F go:PART.PRS.NOM Trojan:DAT.PL
phánēthi
 show:IMPT.AOR.P.2SG
 “just as you are, go to the trench and show yourself to the men of Troy”
 (*Il.* 18.198);
- (28) *ho gàr êlthe thoàs epì néas*
 DEM.NOM PTC come:AOR.3SG swift:ACC.PL.F on ship:ACC.PL.F
Akhaiôn
 Achaean:GEN.PL
 “for he had come to the swift ships of the Achaeans” (*Il.* 1.12).

In (28) in particular it is not said that the referent of the subject phrase went on board of the ships: on the contrary, this sentence refers to Priam's visit to

the Greek camp, whereby the old man never went into a ship, but remained in the campground, located on the shore, by the ships.

Note that in the above examples orientation of the trajector with respect to the landmark is lateral, rather than vertical, as also shown in

- (29) *oíd'* *epì dexiá,* *oíd'* *ep' aristerà*
 know:PF.1SG on right:N/A.PL know:PF.1SG on left:N/A.PL
nōmēsai *bōn* *azalēēn*
 wield:AOR.INF COW:GEN.PL dry:ACC.F
 "I know well how to wield to right, and well how to wield to left (my shield of) seasoned hide" (*Il.* 7.238–239).

However, there are cases of vertical orientation, where the directional accusative indicates motion to the upper surface of a landmark, with final contact; such passages are similar to those in which *epí* occurs with the genitive or dative:

- (30) *khru̓seion epì thrónon eurúopa Zeùs hēzeto*
 golden:ACC on throne:ACC far.sounding:NOM Z.:NOM sit:IMPF.M/P.3SG
 "and Zeus, whose voice is borne afar, sat upon the golden throne"
 (*Il.* 8.442–443).

Passages in which *epí* occurs with different cases show a contrast between the locative dative and the accusative of motion:

- (31) *kai tò mèn eú katéthēkan ... epì rhumôi pézēi épí*
 and DEM.N/A PTC well set:AOR.3PL on pole:DAT end:DAT.F on
prótēi, epì dè krikon hēstori bállon, ... édēsan ep'
 far:DAT.F on PTC ring:ACC peg:DAT cast:IMPF.3PL bound:AOR.3PL on
omphalón
 knob:ACC
 "(the yoke) they set with care upon the pole at the upturned end thereof,
 and cast the ring upon the pin; and they bound it fast to the knob"
 (*Il.* 24.271–273).

In (31) *epì rhumôi pézēi épí prótēi*, 'upon the pole at the upturned end thereof', and *epí hēstori*, 'upone the pin', contain three occurrences of *epí* with the dative, which profile contact of the trajector with the landmark; the occurrence of *epí* with the accusative, *ep'omphalón*, 'to the knob', rather profiles the trajectory along which the trajector is fastened to the landmark.

The accusative can express Location on the surface of an extended landmark, as in

- (32) *pléōn* *epì oínopa* *pónton*
 sail:PART.PRS.NOM on wine.dark:ACC sea:ACC
 “as he sails over the wine-dark sea” (*Il.* 7.88);
- (33) *phthánei* *dé te pásan ep’ aían*
 precede:PRS.3SG PTC PTC all:ACC.F on earth:ACC.F
 “he goes before (them) over the face of all the earth” (*Il.* 9.506).

In example (34), the accusative can be explained either as denoting abstract Direction, or abstract Location on an extended surface. In the light of example (25) with the genitive, and of example (32), the second explanation seems more convincing:

- (34) *leússōn* *epì oínopa* *pónton*
 look:PART.PRS.NOM on wine.dark:ACC sea:ACC
 “gazing over the wine-dark sea” (*Il.* 5.771).

Shifted to the temporal plane, *epí* with the accusative also displays two possible meanings, one derived from directional expressions, such as (27) and (28), where the landmark constitutes the limit of motion. In this case, the preposition corresponds to the English *until*:

- (35) *heúdon* *pannúkhios* *kai ep’ ēō* *kai méson*
 sleep:IMPF.1SG all.night:NOM and on morning:ACC.F and middle:N/A
ēmar
 day:N/A
 “I slept the whole night through, until the morning and until midday”
 (*Od.* 7.288).

Some other Time expressions are derived from the accusative of extension, and denote limited duration over a stretch of time:

- (36) *he* *d’ éthei* *ou mála pollòn* *epi khrónon*
 DEM.NOM.F PTC run:IMPF.3SG NEG very much:ACC on time:ACC
 “she (the ship) ran on for no long time” (*Od.* 12.407).

As with the other cases, with the accusative, too, *epí* can have a metaphorical meaning and express Purpose, relying on the directional meaning of the accusative, and envisaging an abstract goal as the goal of motion:

- (37) *amphípoloi* *mèn épeita thoós* *epi érga* *trápono*
 handmaid:NOM.PL.F PTC then quickly on task:N/A.PL turn:AOR.MID.3PL
 “the handmaids turned forthwith to their tasks” (*Il.* 3.422);

- (38) *angelîēn epì Tudê steîlan Akhaiói*
 message:ACC.F ON T.:ACC send:AOR.3PL Achaean:NOM.PL
 “the Achaeans sent forth Tydeus on an embassy” (*Il.* 4.384).

In comparison to its abstract use with the dative and with the genitive,⁷ *epí* with the accusative is semantically more specific, because its occurrence is limited to inanimate landmarks, and to controlled states of affairs. As a consequence, there are no occurrences in which the interpretation is uncertain between Purpose and Cause, and there are no Beneficiary expressions.

After Homer, *epí* is well attested with all three cases in all authors; it retains its local meaning and develops some new abstract ones, especially with the genitive.

Both in Ionic and in literary Attic, there are passages where *epí* with the dative and with the genitive appears to convey largely the same meaning. An example from Herodotus is shown in (39) and (40), from the same passage:⁸

- (39) *ággos epì têi kephalêi êkhousan*
 vessel:N/A ON ART.DAT.F head:DAT.F have:PART.PRS.ACC.F
 “bearing a vessel on her head” (Hdt. 5.12.2);
- (40) *phérousa tò húdōr epì tês kephalês*
 bear:PART.PRS.NOM.F ART.N/A water:N/A ON ART.GEN.F head:GEN.F
 “bearing the water on her head” (Hdt. 5.12.4).

The context in which the two examples occur is given below. It makes clear that the position of the trajector relative to the landmark is the same in both cases (the sentences corresponding to the two examples are in bold):

There were two Paeonians, Pigres and Mantyes, who themselves desired to be rulers of their countrymen. When Darius had crossed into Asia, they came to Sardis, bringing with them their sister, a tall and beautiful woman. [2] There, waiting till Darius should be sitting in state in the suburb of the Lydian city, they put on their sister the best adornment they had, and sent her to draw water, **bearing a vessel on her head**, leading a horse by the bridle and spinning flax at the same time. [3] Darius took note of the woman as she passed by him, for what she did was not in the manner of the Persians or Lydians or any of the peoples of Asia. Having taken note of this, he sent some of his guards, bidding them watch what the woman would do with the horse. [4] They, accordingly, followed behind her, and she, coming to the river, watered the horse. When she had done this and had filled her vessel with water, she passed back again by the same way, **bearing the water on her head**, leading the horse on her arm, and plying her distaff.

Ruijgh (1994) discusses some other passages where the two cases alternate, and argues that *epí* with the dative expresses contact with lateral orientation, while *epí* with the genitive occurs where the orientation is vertical. He makes his argument discussing, among other, the passage in (41):

- (41) *ékhei dè ho móskhos hoûtos ho Ápis*
 have:PRS.3SG PTC ART.NOM calf:NOM DEM.NOM ART.NOM A.:NOM
kaleómenos sēméia toiáde eôn
 call:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM mark:N/A.PL INDEF.N/A.PL be:PART.PRS.NOM
mélas, epí mèn tói metōpōi leukón ti
 black:NOM ON PTC ART.DAT forehead:DAT white:N/A INDEF.N/A
trígōnon, epí dè toû nótou aietòn
 triangle:N/A ON PTC ART.GEN back:GEN eagle:ACC
eikasménon
 represent:PART.PF.M/P.ACC
 “this calf called Apis has these marks: he is black, and has on his forehead a three-cornered white spot, and the likeness of an eagle on his back”
 (Hdt. 3.28.3).

In (41) the dative occurs where the landmark is the forehead of the calf (*epí tói metōpōi*), while the genitive occurs where the landmark is its back (*epí toû nótou*), as shown in Figure 38.

Ruijgh’s explanation holds for such a passage, but cannot explain example (39) and (40), where it is hard to imagine that a person holds a vessel against her head, without implying vertical orientation. From the occurrences in various authors, it is clear that Ruijgh’s interpretation is at least partially correct, because the genitive is in fact limited to cases of vertical orientation. The dative




Figure 38.

can mean both ‘on’ (vertical) or ‘against’ (lateral), and always implies contact. In my opinion, the difference between the two cases is that the genitive actually profiles a specific orientation (vertical), while the dative does not profile a specific orientation, but simply contact: the orientation is then understood on the basis of common knowledge about the shape of the concrete entity that occurs as landmark.

Beside denoting contact the dative can express immediate vicinity, as already in Homer:

- (42) *hai epì Lémnōi epikeímenai nêsoi*
 ART.NOM.PL.F ON L.:DAT lie:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL.F island:NOM.PL.F
 “the islands off Lemnos” (Hdt. 7.6.3).

Time expressions with the dative are mostly limited to Herodotus: for stretches of time, the genitive is sometimes found in classical prose, while the most frequent case is the accusative, with which *epí* denotes limit in time or duration, similar to the Homeric examples already seen above.

Abstract usages of *epí* with the dative in Attic-Ionic can be found in the following examples:

- (43) *hóti elákhista kataleípein epì toís krínousi*
 as little:SUP.N/A.PL leave:INF.PRS ON ART.DAT.PL
 judge:PART.PRS.DAT.PL
 “and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges”
 (Arist. *Rh.* 1354a 32–33);
- (44) *hóti ou deí méga phroneín epì toís diá túkhēn allà toís dí’ hautón*
 that NEG must:PRS.3SG big think:INF.PRS ON ART.DAT.PL through
 fortune:ACC.F but ART.DAT.PL through REFL.ACC
 “one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself alone” (Arist. *Rh.* 1368a 3–4);
- (45) *epì toútōi dè hupexístamai tēs arkhēs, ep’ hōi te hup’ oudenòs huméōn árxomai, ou̅te autòs egò ou̅te hoi ap’ emeú aiei ginómēnoi*
 ON DEM.DAT.N PTC give.up:PRS.M/P.1SG ART.GEN.F power:GEN.F ON
 REL.DAT.N PTC under INDEF.GEN.M 2PL.GEN govern:FUT.MID.1SG NEG
 DEM.NOM 1SG.NOM NEG ART.NOM.PL from 1SG.GEN always
 be:PART.PRS.M/P.NOM.PL

“I give up the power under this condition, that neither I nor any of my descendants shall be subject to any one of you” (Hdt. 3.83.2);

- (46) *pseúdetai te kai epì diabolèi tēi emēi*
 lie:PRS.M/P.3SG PTC and on prejudice:DAT.F ART.DAT.F POSS.1SG.DAT.F
légei
 speak.PRS.3SG
 “he is lying and speaking to arouse prejudice about me” (Pl. *Ap.* 20e).

In (43) the local meaning of *epì* with the dative is still clear: a human landmark is conceived as the space where intentionality is located. A similar metaphor occurs in (45), where the *epì* phrase denotes conditions: the landmark is conceived as a location that offers a ground on which the state of affairs may or may not obtain. The SR denoted by the *epì* phrase is Area. In (44) *epì* with the dative expresses Reason. Here, the landmark is conceived as a location on which a mental state of affairs is brought about. Finally, in (46) *epì* with the dative denotes directionality and expresses Beneficiary (of the ‘malefactive’ type).

With the genitive, *epì* may express Location in Attic-Ionic:

- (48) *Xenophôn pémpsas ángelon keleúei autoû*
 X.:NOM send:PART.AOR.NOM messenger:ACC order:PRS.3SG there
meínai epì toû potamoû mē diabántas
 stay:INF.AOR ON ART.GEN river:GEN NEG CROSS:PART.AOR.ACC.PL
 “Xenophon sent a messenger and directed them to stay where they were on the bank of the river, without crossing” (Xen. *An.* 4.3.28).

When used metaphorically, *epì* with the genitive may denote control, a function shared with *epì* with the dative (the latter expression already occurs in Homer: see above, example (10) with the discussion):

- (49) *ho dè ekéleuse toûs epì toutōn*
 DEM.NOM PTC order:AOR.3SG ART.ACC.PL ON DEM.GEN.PL.N
epesteôtas apokteínai pántas toûs Oiobázou
 supervise:PART.PF.ACC.PL kill:INF.AOR all:ACC.PL ART.ACC.PL O.:GEN
paídas
 son:ACC.PL
 “but he told those whose job it was to execute all of Oeobazus’ sons”
 (Hdt. 4.84.2).

Based on the assumption that what is located in an upper position sets a domain for what is located below it, we find examples such as (50), similar to

examples (47) and (48) of §3.13, where the preposition *hupó* has a symmetric function:

- (50) *paraplésion gár estin kai epì tês graphikês*
 similar:N/A PTC be:PRS.3SG and on ART.GEN.F painting:GEN.F
 “it is much the same also in painting” (Arist. *Po.* 1450a 39);
- (51) *kaléetai Gugádas epì tou anathéntos*
 call:PRS.M/P.3SG G.:NOM on ART.GEN dedicate:PART.AOR.GEN
epōnumiēn
 name:ACC.F
 “(the silver) is called ‘Gigian’ after its dedicator” (Hdt. 1.14.3).

The meaning of *epí* with the accusative preserves both the horizontal orientation type and the vertical orientation type, already found in Homer:

- (52) *anabibásas tous paídas epì híppous*
 mount:PART.AOR.NOM ART.ACC.PL child:ACC.PL on horse:ACC.PL
proépempe
 send:IMPF.3SG
 “he had his sons mount and sent them forth” (Hdt. 1.63.2);
- (53) *anekhóresan, hoi mèn es tèn pólin*
 return:AOR.3PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC to ART.ACC.F city:ACC.F
hoi de epì naús
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC on ship:ACC.PL.F
 “they returned, the one party to the city, the other to the ships”
 (Th. 3.91.5).

With vertical orientation in (52) the preposition profiles final contact; example (53) contains a motion verb; *epí* profiles lateral orientation. Note that the landmark is inanimate: with animate landmarks, *epí* with the accusative mostly means ‘against’, as in (54):

- (54) *epirōtân tà khrēstéria ei strateúetai*
 ask:INF.PRS ART.N/A.PL oracle:N/A.PL if make.war:SUBJ.PRS.M/P.3SG
epì Pérsas
 on Persian:ACC.PL
 “he inquired of the oracles whether he was to send an army against the Persians” (Hdt. 1.53.1).

In this example, *epí* with the accusative denotes Malefactive, similar to *epí* with the dative in (46), and in examples (6) and (7) from Homer. Note that the oc-

currence of human landmarks is not *per se* enough to trigger this interpretation for this type of PP, as shown in:

- (55) *Kúron gàr einai tòn pémpsanta parà Ámasin epí*
 C.:ACC PTC be:INF.PRS ART.ACC send:PART.AOR.ACC by A.:ACC on
tèn thugatéra
 ART.ACC.F daughter:ACC.F
 “for it was Cyrus who sent to Amaris for his daughter” (Hdt. 3.2.1);

In (55) *epí* with the accusative expresses Purpose. However, the verb could also take a Malefactive Beneficiary, and *epí* could consequently mean ‘against’, in view of the animacy of the landmark. So the correct interpretation relies on common knowledge and beliefs about the structure of events.

Purpose expressions are common with *epí* with the accusative and other types of landmark:

- (56) *hósper epí deípnon apodedēmēkòs eis Thettalian?*
 as on banquet:N/A leave:PART.PF.NOM to T.:ACC
 “as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet?” (Pl. *Cri.* 53e).

As we have seen in the course of this section, in origin *epí* profiled vertical orientation and contact. Depending on case variation, either features of meaning could be left out already in Homer: in particular, the dative always profiles contact, but orientation could be rotated from the vertical to the lateral axis. Occurrences where *epí* with the dative does not imply contact still denote close vicinity, and can be understood as based on a metaphor, according to which proximity is equated to physical contact. The genitive with *epí* usually occurs in passages where both vertical orientation and contact are relevant: the particle retains most of its original meaning with the genitive. The accusative profiles verticality with final contact, when it denotes Direction, and lack of contact, if it denotes Location on an extended area. In occurrences where it does not profile verticality, *epí* with the accusative still relevantly profiles final contact, and its meaning shifts to ‘against’. The same shift, based on the notions of contact and directionality, also occurs in the meaning of *prós*. Abstract meanings of *epí* are Reason, Purpose, Cause, and Beneficiary with the dative, and Purpose with the accusative.

Conclusions

4.0 Introduction

In this section I briefly summarize the main findings discussed in Chapter 3. In §4.1 I survey major developments in the spatial meaning of the prepositions, hinting only briefly at their abstract meanings. The latter is the topic of §4.2, in which I also discuss the order of semantic extension and possible patterns of polysemy. In §4.3 I discuss changes in the internal structure of PPs and the frequency of each case within PPs. Finally, in §4.4 I briefly illustrate some post-Classical developments.

4.1 Spatial meaning of the prepositions

Two general tendencies in the evolution of the spatial meaning of Greek prepositions can be detected. In the first place, the meanings become less specific: some prepositions lose their concrete meaning altogether; those which retain it, often have a generic meaning in Classical Greek in comparison to Homeric Greek. Second, sensitivity to the landmark's internal structure, which partly determines case variation in Homeric Greek, is lost after Homer (see §4.3).

It can be remarked that prepositions that only take one case display the lesser changes during the explored time stretch. Among these, *en*, *ek*, and *eis* are most stable, although one can notice a weakening of the Container metaphor: this is most visible in the case of *ek*, which, especially in its abstract use (Origin and Agent), tends to merge with *apó*.¹ Abstract meanings of *en* are limited to cases where the Container metaphor is apparent (e.g. states or events conceived as containers). Abstract uses of *eis* mostly rely on the notion of direction and include Purpose and Area; Recipient and Addressee can occasionally be expressed by *eis* if an asymmetry in the exchange needs to be stressed.

The preposition *sún*, which, already in Homer, had no local meaning, shares its semantic development with many other comitative adpositions in

the languages of Europe, in that it starts developing an instrumental meaning; this change cannot be fully appreciated, due to the early disappearance of *sún*.

An almost complete shift from space to time and abstract meanings is attested in the case of *pró*, which develops a meaning of exchange. A similar change was perhaps undergone by *antí*, but it cannot be followed historically, because the preposition has no local meaning in literary sources.

The meaning of *pará* with the dative, genitive, and accusative is equivalent to the meanings of *en/ek/eis* respectively, but denotes spatial relations based on proximity. After Homer, *pará* comes to be used especially in reference to human beings. Semantic extensions also refer to typically human roles, and occasionally include Possessor with the dative, and Agent with the genitive. With the accusative, the local meaning of *pará* displays a change that one also finds with a number of other prepositions. In Homer, *pará* with the accusative has directional and non-directional meanings. The latter include location, with a static trajector, and motion, with a moving trajector, along a multiplex landmark.² When uniplex landmarks occur with a moving trajector the meaning shifts from 'along' to 'beyond'. This latter meaning is conditioned by the occurrence of uniplex landmarks in Homer; later on, when sensitivity to landmarks' and trajectors' internal structure disappears, the meaning 'beyond' applies with all types of landmark and in the case of stative trajectors, too. Abstract meanings mostly develop from the spatial meaning 'beyond'.

A group of prepositions displays a basic opposition between the genitive and the accusative. They denote the existence of a trajectory with a certain orientation; with the non-directional accusative, the orientation disappears and the prepositions denote multiple path. This happens most clearly with *diá* and *katá*. With *diá* the original meaning 'through' remains with the genitive, while with the accusative we find two meanings: 'across' (directional), and 'about' (non-directional). Perhaps because of the overlap with other prepositions (*hupér* as 'across', and *katá* as 'about'), the accusative lost all concrete meanings after Homer and remained limited to Cause. The genitive retained its spatial meaning and developed abstract uses based on the Channel metaphor, extending to Intermediary and Instrument.

With *katá* we have a wider conflict of meanings, because the genitive also retained its ablatival value, albeit to a limited extent after Homer. Consequently, *katá* with the genitive can denote Direction and, marginally, Source. Furthermore, *katá* with the genitive in Location expressions displays a possible rotation of the vertical axis, also found with other prepositions, and acquires some directional meanings that imply a horizontal trajectory, such as 'toward' and 'against'. With the directional accusative, *katá* retains the original mean-

ing ‘downward’, from which a widespread abstract meaning develops, based on the notion of conformity (‘according to’). Non-directional use of the accusative with *katá* leads to a meaning similar to that of *diá*, ‘about’, with the understood notion of non-exhaustivity of motion. This last meaning is one of the bases of the opposition between *katá* and *aná* in Homer: the latter preposition denotes motion along a multiple path all over a landmark. The preposition *aná* is also opposed to *katá* because of its original meaning, ‘upward’, found with the directional accusative. This preposition only occurs twice with the genitive. In Homer, it can take the dative, and denote close contact (see further *hupó* and *perí*); later on, the dative disappeared, and *aná* lost much of its meaning with the accusative as well.

Another preposition which displays rotation of the orientation axis is *hupér*. The pattern of rotation is different: *hupér* with the genitive always retains vertical orientation, and means ‘over’, ‘above’ (no ablative genitive occurs with this preposition). From this concrete meaning, based on a covering metaphor similar to *pró*, develops the abstract meaning ‘on behalf of’. The non-directional accusative also occurs in expressions denoting vertical orientation, and denotes multiple path or location of a multiplex trajector above a landmark. Rotation to the horizontal axis occurs with the directional accusative, with which the preposition takes the meaning ‘beyond’. The meaning is similar to that of *pará* with the accusative, but with a difference in profiling: with *hupér* the landmark is conceived as a limit, so *hupér* profiles surpassing; with *pará* instead the whole trajectory is profiled, and surpassing is only a side effect of the trajectory being extended and the landmark being uniplex.

The extent of the ablative genitive with *hupó*, ‘under’, is limited to a few occurrences in Homer. Non-ablative uses of the genitive, which should derive its meaning from the partitive, display a major overlap with the dative. Apparently, the partitive genitive with *hupó* did not give rise to a productive opposition with the non-directional accusative. Abstract uses of *hupó* in Homer, both with the dative and with the genitive, rely on a control metaphor and also partly overlap. After Homer, the dative retained spatial uses and only a limited number of abstract ones, while the genitive remained mostly limited to abstract uses, and expressed Agent and Cause. It must further be remarked that occurrences of the dative decrease dramatically after Homer. The accusative with *hupó* is the most widely used case in spatial expressions. An opposition between the dative and the accusative based on the feature of contact is partly visible in Homer, but not later on. Reference to a verticality relation is mostly retained, and *hupó* displays no systematic tendency toward rotation to the horizontal axis as do other prepositions, such as *katá*, *hupér*, and *epí*.

With *metá*, ‘among’, ‘after’, the internal structure of the landmark plays a major role in the choice of cases and in their productivity. The original opposition between the dative, denoting Location and contact, and the accusative, denoting direction, was substituted by an opposition between the genitive and the accusative, based on the discontinuity/continuity of the landmarks. Furthermore, similar to *pará*, the accusative had a meaning mostly compatible with multiplex landmarks, denoting motion to a position among sub-units of an entity; when used with uniplex landmarks it acquired another meaning, namely ‘after’. The genitive occurs only with plural count nouns denoting human beings in Homer. After Homer *metá* can no longer take the dative; various restrictions disappear, and the preposition denotes Comitative with the genitive and Time with the accusative. A new spatial meaning, ‘across’, developed for *metá* with the accusative out of the temporal meaning, thus displaying a seldom attested direction of semantic spread.

In Homeric Greek, *amphí* is potentially similar to *metá*: it takes the dative and the accusative, while the genitive occurs only in a couple of passages, apparently as a recent innovation. The subsequent evolution is different, because the use of the genitive does not develop, the dative disappears, and the accusative remains the only case. On the whole, occurrences of this preposition are few, because its original meaning, ‘on both sides’, shifted, already in Homer, to ‘around’, so *amphí* became a synonym of the much more productive *perí*. Already in Homer the two prepositions shared part of the development of their abstract meaning (Area), as well as a tendency toward semantic bleaching. Both prepositions mean ‘around’, consequently, in Location expressions they should in principle only occur with multiplex trajectors. However, uniplex trajectors also occur occasionally, with which the two prepositions acquire the meaning ‘(near)by’.

In many respects, *perí* is similar to *amphí* and *metá* in Homer: the dative and the accusative seem to build the original opposition, based on the feature of contact: the dative occurs when a trajector is located in close contact with the surface of a landmark, which it surrounds completely. The accusative, in turn, can occur with uniplex trajectors moving on a trajectory around the landmark, or with multiplex static trajectors (uniplex stative trajectors can also occur, as remarked above). The genitive, less frequent than the other cases in Homer, was used from the very beginning for abstract meanings only: *perí* extended early on to Area, and Reason. The latter abstract meaning occurs with both the dative and the genitive, but the dative is mostly limited to verbs of emotion. After Homer, the dative strongly reduced local meanings, and became on the whole very infrequent. Spatial meaning remained mostly limited to the accusative.

The accusative also developed an abstract use in Area expressions, thus building a new opposition with the genitive: while *perí* with the latter case specialized for the topic type of Area, *perí* with the accusative denoted Area as the extent to which a state of affairs applies.

Conflict between the ablative and the non-ablative genitive is most apparent with *prós*. In Homer, this conflict is resolved, because human referents can only occur in the genitive when the case has ablative meaning. With inanimate NPs the genitive overlaps to a certain extent with the accusative: with both cases, the preposition denotes direction toward a landmark. The dative especially occurs in Location expressions. Note that the accusative can also denote final contact of the trajector with the landmark in Direction expressions. After Homer, the genitive with *prós* became ambiguous with human referents, on account of an ablative-locative transfer. This transfer mostly holds on the abstract plane, so that *prós* with the genitive comes to denote Agent on the one hand (mostly limited to Herodotus), and Beneficiary, including Behalf, on the other. The dative remains in Location expressions, and denotes addition ('besides'). The accusative denotes Direction, often toward human beings and in a hostile sense (Malefactive), and can also denote Area and Purpose.

The use of cases with *epí* bears some resemblance to the use of cases with its symmetric, *hupó*: the genitive has no ablative value (with *hupó* there are a few occurrences in Homer), but it does not develop an opposition with the accusative, based on the landmark's structure. As a result, all three cases seem to overlap occasionally in Location expressions. Relevant for the meaning of *epí* are the notions of verticality and contact. The biggest difference between the meaning of *epí* with the genitive, on the one hand, and with the accusative and the dative on the other, is that verticality remains relevant for the genitive, while the orientation axis may rotate with the other two cases, as it indeed almost always does with the direction accusative. The feature of (final) contact is common to *epí* and *prós*; accordingly the two prepositions develop similar abstract uses (notably Purpose and Malefactive with the accusative).

Summarizing, one can say that prepositional phrases whose internal structure is simpler are more stable: this is not surprising, because there is no overlap among cases in the same SR and with the same preposition. Furthermore, as remarked at the beginning of this section, the spatial meaning of prepositions tends to bleach in various ways: so for example *perí* can still mean 'around' in post-Homeric Greek, but it often simply means 'near'; with most prepositions that denote verticality there can be a rotation to the horizontal axis, so that they end up simply expressing Location by a landmark or Direction toward it; the Container metaphor is weakened.

4.2 Paths of semantic extension and abstract uses of prepositions

4.2.1 Time

Most prepositions extend to Time, although this shift often only starts after Homer. Like many (perhaps all) languages, Ancient Greek displays a tendency of speakers to conceive of time in terms of space. That time should be considered more ‘abstract’ than space is not clear; what is clear is that generally temporal expressions develop out of local expressions, rather than the other way around (see Haspelmath 1997). In English (cf. Radden 1989b:571), time is conceived as a straight line upon which events are located. Some evidence for a possible difference in the perspective in which the flow of time was conceived by Greek speakers is provided by the occurrence of *hupér* in examples such as (30) and (31) in §3.12, where the present appears to be taken as a possible vantage point for both the future and the past, and represents a turning point for the line of time. This could be taken as evidence for an earlier conception of the past as lying before a possible observer, rather than behind.

As already remarked in §4.1, *metá* provides evidence for the extension from time to space (see example (32) in §3.14), based on a process of subjectification. Note that the temporal meaning was formerly derived from another, earlier spatial meaning.

4.2.2 Comitative

Ancient Greek has two comitative prepositions, *sún*, and *metá* with the genitive. While the former has Comitative meaning from its earliest attestations, the latter developed it during its attested history. The expressions from which Comitative derives originally denoted Location of a human being among other human beings. Comitative developed completely when singular count nouns could occur with the preposition; various notions of accompaniment and Attendant Circumstances are also expressed by *metá* with the genitive, which, after Homer, could also occur with inanimate nouns.

4.2.3 Agent

Homeric Greek attests two competing metaphors for Agent, the Source/Origin metaphor, and the Control metaphor. The former occurs with various prepositions with the genitive: *ek*, *pará*, *prós*; in later Greek the Source metaphor is revived again by extension to *apó*. These prepositions profile different aspect

of the cause-effect relation. One of them, *ek*, denotes initial physical contact of a trajector with a portion of the landmark; together with *prós* it is best suited to express Origin, rather than Source, and profiles the origin of the trajector as a precise point, behind which there is no space for any possible previous portion of a trajectory. When encoding Agent, *ek* and *prós* profile the feature of ultimate control. For this reason, and because it had ablative value with human referents only, *prós* also extended to Behalf Beneficiary (see §4.2.8 for further discussion). The preposition *pará* denotes motion away from the vicinity of a landmark; its extension to Agent is favored by its almost exclusive use with human landmarks, a feature that *pará* shares with *prós* and the ablative genitive. The occurrence of *apó*, which, as I have remarked, is found in Agent expressions only at a later time than the other prepositions, is connected with its increasing productivity: on account of its unspecific meaning, *apó* tended to replace more specific prepositions.

The second metaphor, which gained over and became the standard way of expressing passive Agent in Classical Greek, involves the preposition *hupó*. This metaphor relies on the notion that dominance and control are over: such metaphor also applies in English to certain verbs, such as *rule over*; in Greek it had a wide extension, and it was used not only to encode Agent, but also to encode Cause. As I have shown in Luraghi (2000b, 2003), only the Control metaphor could be used to encode Agent with all possible verbs in Greek: while the ablative prepositions could only occur with verbs denoting a low degree of transitivity and no change of state on the side of the patient, or with verbs like ‘to do’, with a generic meaning, *hupó* could occur with all types of verb already in Homer.

Some Intermediary expressions also marginally occur with passive verbs, as shown in §3.9, examples (36)–(39); they may denote lack of ultimate control or occur with reflexive pronouns.

Non-prototypical agents, i.e. inanimate forces, such as natural forces, emotions or other abstract concepts, are encoded as prototypical agents, consequently an SR Force need not be set up for Ancient Greek, because it is not grammaticalized; note however that the ablative prepositions mostly occur in Agent expressions with prototypical agents (this is partly due to the fact that *pará* and *prós* have ablative value with human nouns only).

4.2.4 Instrument

Instrument is mostly encoded through the plain dative (see §2.2.3.3). The only alternative way of expressing Instrument in Classical Greek is through *diá*,

‘through’, with the genitive. This type of expression had not yet extended to Instrument in Homeric Greek, where *diá* with the genitive had only spatial usage, and encoded Path. Later on, in Herodotus, *diá* with the genitive occurs in Intermediary expressions, relying on the Channel metaphor; still later, in literary Attic, *diá* with the genitive comes to encode Instrument with all types of noun, and becomes an alternative for the dative, used when the latter could be ambiguous. So the extension to Instrument does not, strictly speaking, proceed directly from the spatial meaning of *diá*, but is mediated by a preceding shift to Intermediary. According to the metaphor that explains this extension, AN INSTRUMENT IS AN INTERMEDIARY: it is the actual effector of a state of affairs, but it does not hold control of it. Note that this metaphor is similar to the Companion metaphor, which explains the extension of comitative prepositions to Instrument: the preposition has an original local value, then it extends to a typically human SR, and then to an SR typically assigned to inanimate entities (cf. the scale of semantic extension from Heine et al. 1991, quoted in Figure 2).

The Companion metaphor is only marginally employed in Ancient Greek for encoding Instrument: it occurs with non-prototypical instruments once in Homer and involves the preposition *sún*, in a potentially ambiguous context at a time when *diá* with the genitive was not yet used to disambiguate the instrumental dative (see example (8) in §3.6). In later authors, the Companion metaphor is mostly limited to poetry; *metá* with the genitive occasionally occurs and encodes Instrument with non-manipulated entities (see example (29) in §3.14).

The Container metaphor, which lies behind the extension of the locative dative to Instrument, only holds in the case of body parts used as instruments, usually encoded as Location with *en* and the dative (see example (21) in §3.1).

Occasionally, Source expressions also extend to Instrument, as shown in example (16) in §3.4 with *apó*. This type of semantic extension remains sporadic in Greek.

4.2.5 Intermediary

Intermediary expressions are of two types, and profile different aspects of this SR. In the first place, we find *diá* with the genitive, based on the Channel metaphor. An intermediary acts on behalf of an agent, i.e. according to the agent’s intention. Through the Channel metaphor, the intermediary is conceptualized as a channel for the agent’s intentionality and control.

The Channel metaphor, which accounts for the majority of occurrences of Intermediary expressions in Classical Greek, only develops from Herodotus onwards. Earlier, in Homer, Intermediary could be expressed as Agent (see example (12) in §3.13), with *hupó* and the dative. In later Greek, too, Intermediary could occasionally be encoded as Agent, with *hupó* and the genitive (see example (58) §3.13).³ Extension of Agent to Intermediary focuses on the fact that the intermediary is the actual performer of an action, and leaves out the feature of intentionality.

4.2.6 Cause

Cause is an SR that can be expressed through a variety of metaphors, partly owing to its highly differentiated nature: not only can causes be very different types of entity, they can also occur in a wide variety of states of affairs. As I have already argued in §1.2.4.3, the distinction between Cause and Reason is not grammaticalized in Ancient Greek. Some metaphors are used with certain types of Cause, e.g. cause of emotions, more frequently than others. Furthermore, positive evaluation from the point of view of the agent appears to be limited to *diá* with the accusative and, limited to Homer, *hupó* with the dative. Note that, as I have repeatedly remarked, positively evaluated causes may sometimes be close to what is often defined as a separate SR, i.e. Means.

Among possible Cause expressions, *diá* with the accusative is the one that can co-occur with all possible states of affairs, and with positive, negative or neutral evaluated causes. This type of expression already occurs in Homer. It relies on a metaphor derived from the non-directional use of the accusative with *diá* in multiple-Path expressions. According to this metaphor, A CAUSE IS A MOVING ENTITY THAT CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.

Another frequently employed metaphor relies on the notion of Cause as Source or Origin for an event. According to this metaphor, that, as I have remarked in §4.2.3, can also be used to encode Agent, EVENTS ARE MOVING ENTITIES THAT PROCEED FROM A SOURCE OR ORIGIN. The prepositions involved in this metaphor are *ek* and *apó*, the latter only after Homer.

Cause can be encoded in the same way as Agent, through *hupó* with the dative (in Homer) or the genitive (in later authors). In this case, we may posit a two-step extension, similar to the extension from Path to Intermediary to Instrument, as discussed above, §4.2.4: from the original meaning that denotes a relation of verticality, *hupó* with the dative or genitive was extended to Agent, relying on the Control metaphor, by which physical superiority is reinterpreted as implying control. Further on, Agent expressions are extended

to Cause, based on a metaphor according to which A CAUSE IS AN AGENT: the two SRs share the common feature of control. Note that this development is not attested for *hupó* with the dative: indeed, in Homer Agent expressions are more numerous than Cause expressions, but the latter also exist. However, *hupó* with the genitive only encoded Agent in Homer, and was extended to Cause at a later time: thus, the direction of semantic spread predicted in Heine et al. (1991) also applies in this case.

In Homer and in poetry Cause can also be expressed sporadically by means of *pró*. The preposition in origin meant ‘before’; its extension to Cause relies on a spatial metaphor: a landmark is conceived as an entity which causes a reaction when it is in front of a trajector, i.e. when it is visible. While this metaphor may already have originated in Proto-Indo-European, it never became productive in Greek.

4.2.7 Recipient/Addressee

Recipient and Addressee are mostly encoded through the plain dative. Only in a few cases, and mostly limited to Addressee, can Direction expressions occur, involving *eis* and *prós* with the accusative. As I have argued in §3.3, such an extension relies on the Conduit metaphor, according to which words are objects that are thrown back and forth during communication. I have shown in §3.3 that *eis* occurs in Addressee expressions in order to stress some anomalous form of communication, where the addressee does not have a chance to answer. On the other hand, Addressee expressions with *prós* and the accusative do not seem to convey any additional meaning: on the contrary, they are used with reciprocals, highlighting the symmetrical nature of verbal exchange (compare examples (20)–(21) in §3.3 with (20) in §3.17).

4.2.8 Beneficiary

Beneficiary can be encoded through the plain dative, especially in the case of personal pronouns; most often, however, various prepositional phrases occur, partly in connection with different types of Beneficiary.

The most frequently used prepositions are *pró* and *hupér* with the genitive; they both also extend to the Behalf type of Beneficiary (*hupér* is mostly restricted to Behalf). The preposition *pró* means ‘in front of’ or ‘before’, mostly in time; from the temporal meaning, the Beneficiary meaning is derived through the idea that an entity that comes before in time replaces the entity that comes later. When we have human participants, the substituting participant is con-

ceived as acting to the benefit or on behalf of the substituted one. In the case of *hupér*, the Beneficiary meaning derives from a spatial metaphor involving the notion of covering: from the point of view of a possible observer placed above a landmark, the trajector hides the landmark and indeed seems to replace it.

Beneficiary can also be encoded through *prós* with the genitive. The original spatial meaning of *prós* with the genitive and nouns with human referents is ‘from’. The original ablative value is shifted to locative, through an ablative-locative transfer, so the PP comes to mean ‘on the side of’. That ‘to be on one’s side’ is taken to mean ‘to be in one’s favor’ is not surprising, since this is a common metaphor, at least in the languages of Europe. What is unexpected, from the point of view of possible polysemy of prepositions, is that this meaning is derived from a preceding ablative meaning. Note however that a similar shift occurs in the Romance languages: in French we have *de*, ‘from’, *du côté de*, lit. ‘from the side of’ = ‘on the side of’. In Italian, the analogous expression, *da parte di*, ‘on the side of’ (originally ‘from the side of’) can express both Behalf Beneficiary and, marginally (with action nouns), Agent, similar to *prós* with the genitive.

Note that neither type of expression involves a metaphor based on directionality toward the landmark. In many languages, this metaphor underlies extension of spatial prepositions to Recipient; in Greek, as I have shown in §4.2.7, it explains the use of *eis* and *prós* with the accusative in Addressee expressions. The Direction metaphor is also available for Beneficiary expressions, although to a limited extent. In some cases, *eis* can encode Beneficiary. As remarked in §3.3, occurrences are mostly limited to verbs or adjectives that could also possibly take a Beneficiary expression in the plain dative. Note further that *eis* cannot encode Behalf Beneficiary, but it can encode Malefactive. Indeed, as I remarked in §2.2.3, this type of expression constitutes a possible replacement for the plain dative.

Malefactive Beneficiary relies extensively on the Direction metaphor. Apart from occurrences where it is encoded through *eis*, it is usually expressed by other prepositions that denote directional motion and/or contact, such as *epí* with the dative and accusative, *katá* with the genitive, and *prós* with the accusative. The notions of contact and direction are metaphorically taken to imply a hostile attitude. Among the prepositions mentioned above, *prós* combines both notions, in much the same way as the English ‘against’.

4.2.9 Possessor

Possessor is normally encoded through plain cases in Greek. Among prepositions that denote proximity, *pará* with the dative and *perí* with the accusative can occasionally extend to Possessor, relying on the notion that a possessee is normally close to its possessor (see example (30) in §3.5 and (46) in §3.16). However, this use of *pará* never becomes conventionalized enough to speak of real polysemy of the preposition to include possessive meaning.

4.2.10 Purpose

Purpose expressions have a variety of sources in Ancient Greek. In the first place, a number of prepositions that express Direction can also encode Purpose: *eis*, *epí* with the accusative, and *prós* with the accusative. Direction expressions can be metaphorically re-interpreted as denoting Purpose, on account of a metaphorical equation of human intention with directional motion. Occasionally, and only in Homeric Greek, *metá* with the accusative, ‘after’, also expresses Purpose. In this case, the accusative has allative meaning; motion ‘after’ a landmark implies the intention to reach it, so the landmark is taken as the purpose of an activity. When Direction expressions extend to Purpose, it is frequently the case that abstract nouns precede concrete nouns in Purpose expressions. As I have remarked in §1.1.5 and 1.2.9, abstract nouns often trigger abstract interpretation of otherwise local expressions.

A second and frequent way to express Purpose is through Area expressions. Area is an abstract SR, that denotes the limits of a state of affairs. When the state of affairs implies the participation of a controlling agent, the limits of an action can be viewed as connected with the agent’s intentionality, and thus denote the purpose of the action. Area expressions that extend to Purpose are *amphí* with the accusative, *katá* with the accusative, *perí* with the genitive or accusative, and *prós* with the accusative. Semantic extension in this case already starts from an abstract meaning; I will discuss the shift from space to Area in §4.2.11. Note that Area expressions not only extend to Purpose, but also to Reason, and hence to Cause.

Beneficiary expressions also extend to Purpose. This is the case of *pró*, which extended to Beneficiary in Homer, and only later could occur with inanimate nouns, thus being interpreted as Purpose (see example (26) in §3.7).

Finally, *diá* with the accusative occasionally also occurs in Purpose expressions (see examples (56) and (57) in (§3.9). Although this type of semantic spread is only at its onset in Classical Greek, it is remarkable, because it shows

that semantic extension between Cause and Purpose can be bi-directional (see further §4.4).


4.2.11 Area

Almost all prepositions can denote Area. Area expressions mostly derive from two types of spatial expressions, i.e. Location and Direction. Location expressions involving prepositions that mean ‘around’, ‘about’, or that denote superiority, when understood metaphorically, usually express topic, as *perí* with the genitive, and, to varying extents, *amphí* and *hupér* with the genitive. Other spatial expressions shifted to the Area function mostly delimit the field of a state of affairs. This is the case of *perí* with the accusative, which, in its spatial use, denotes location nearby a landmark, or of *eis*, *katá* with the accusative and *prós* with the accusative, which, shifted on an abstract plane mean ‘regarding’, ‘concerning’. The SR Area is expressed through a metaphor that maps concrete space onto states of affairs. This metaphor provides a basis for further metaphors, leading Area expressions to also express Reason, and hence Purpose and Cause, depending on the verb with which they co-occur.

4.2.12 Summary of possible semantic extensions

The main patterns of semantic extension reviewed above are summarized below. The patterns found do not represent mental maps, but the semantic extensions should be a hint as to which concepts are next to each other in conceptual space.

LOCATION → AGENT → CAUSE	(<i>hupó</i> + dat., gen.)
PATH → INTERMEDIARY → INSTRUMENT	(<i>diá</i> + gen.)
LOCATION → COMITATIVE → INSTRUMENT	(<i>sún, metá</i> + gen.)
SOURCE → [ORIGIN →] AGENT	(<i>ek, apò, pará</i> + gen., <i>prós</i> + gen.)
LOCATION → INSTRUMENT	(<i>en</i>)
SOURCE → [ORIGIN →] CAUSE	(<i>ek, apó</i>)
PATH(multiple) → CAUSE	(<i>diá</i> + acc.)
	CAUSE
	↑
LOCATION → AREA → REASON	(<i>perí</i> + gen., <i>amphí</i>)
	↓
	PURPOSE/BENEFICIARY



(I have not listed some other sporadic semantic extensions, only attested in a limited number of passages in the Homeric poems. Note that *eis* extends to Purpose and occasionally also to Beneficiary, but the two extensions seem to be independent of each other, so I do not consider the SRs Purpose and Beneficiary in this case to be in any sort of chronologic relation with each other.)

4.3 Distribution of cases within PPs

As I have repeatedly noted in Chapter 3, the distribution of cases with prepositions in Homer attest two conflicting systems, one based on the three-fold opposition, ablative/locative/allative = genitive/dative/accusative, inherited from Proto-Indo-European, and the second, discontinuous/continuous = genitive/accusative, of later origin, and which did not involve the dative. The first opposition profiles a position or a trajectory of the trajector with respect to the landmark, while the second profiles a feature of the landmark's internal structure.

The three basic SRs are encoded through different prepositions, each taking only one case, i.e. *en* with the dative for Location, *ek* with the genitive for Source, and *eis* with the accusative for Direction (cf. §2.3). Note that such a situation is reached through the creation of a new preposition, *eis*, which substitutes for pre-literary (and vernacular) alternation of the dative and the accusative with *en*. A consequence of this innovation was the weakening of the opposition between the dative and the accusative with prepositions.

4.3.1 The prepositional genitive

The genitive with prepositions can either have ablative value, or express Location and/or Direction. In the latter case, the genitive does not derive from a pre-Greek ablative, but it is introduced in PPs as a result of its partitive meaning. On account of this meaning, the genitive may denote discontinuity in the internal structure of the landmark. Note however that the opposition between the genitive and the accusative, based on discontinuity/continuity of multiplex landmarks, does not develop with all prepositions that govern these two cases: in particular, it does not develop with *epí* and *hupó*, with which the genitive tends to express the same SRs as the dative in Homeric Greek. With *epí* the two cases are different in profiling: the dative profiles contact, while the genitive profiles verticality. With *hupó* overlap between the dative and the genitive disappears after Homer, the genitive being virtually restricted to Agent and Cause.

Another problem brought about by the prepositional genitive is that with a number of prepositions this case can have both ablative and non-ablative meaning. This is the case especially with *katá*, *hupér* and *prós*. In the case of *katá* and *hupér*, that do not take the dative, the ablative value of the genitive is restricted; in most occurrences the genitive denotes Location (Direction in the case of *katá*) on a vertical axis, while the accusative after Homer no longer denotes verticality. In the case of *prós* the different meanings of the genitive are connected with lexical features: the ablative genitive is limited to human referents.

In general, the ablative meaning of the genitive is connected with prepositions that only take the genitive. The only preposition that allows case variation where the genitive preserves ablative meaning, and does not express Location or Direction is *pará*.

Among the remaining prepositions, *diá*, *katá*, and *metá* allow alternation of the genitive and the accusative in connection with differently structured landmarks; this also holds in part for *hupér*. In the case of *diá* and *katá* the genitive

profiles a straight trajectory inside the landmark, while the accusative may denote multiple path in Homer. After Homer the accusative drops this function (see §4.3.3) with *diá* and remains limited to abstract meaning, while it continues to denote multiple path with *katá*. With *metá* we can see the opposition between the partitive genitive and the non-directional accusative at its onset in Homer; later on the accusative drops its non-directional meaning and the meaning of the preposition remains limited to Comitative with the genitive and Time ('after') or Location ('across') with the accusative.

It is difficult to see a specific spatial value of the genitive with *perí*, because the genitive occurs with this preposition almost only in abstract expressions, already in Homeric Greek. The result is similar to what we find in Classical Greek for *hupó*: the dative becomes marginal (see 4.3.2), the accusative remains for the concrete meanings of the preposition, and the genitive for abstract ones.

Finally, with *aná* and *amphí* the genitive occurs sporadically in Homer and is dropped in later Attic-Ionic.

The frequency of the prepositional genitive relative to the other prepositional cases increases after Homer. Indeed, as I have repeatedly remarked, there is evidence for a recent introduction of the genitive with a number of prepositions among the ones that take three cases. After Homer, the relative frequency of the genitive within PPs increases with all preposition, except *prós*.

4.3.2 The prepositional dative

The prepositional dative undergoes a significant reduction after Homer. In Homer we find a number of prepositions with which the dative builds a special opposition with the accusative, based on contact/lack of contact. This is the case especially with *epí* and *perí*, with which the opposition is at least partially preserved after Homer, and with *aná*, limited to Homer. Furthermore, with numerous prepositions both the dative and the accusative can express Direction, whereby the former case profiles the endpoint, and the latter the trajectory. In literary Ionic the dative is lost with *aná*, *amphí*, and *metá*; later on, in Attic prose it becomes very infrequent with *perí* as well, and relatively less frequent than the other cases with *hupó*. On the whole, the prepositional dative is less productive than the prepositional genitive and accusative, because it is less frequent with prepositions that allow case variation. The latter can take all three cases, and include the dative, or take two cases, which are invariably the accusative and the genitive.

4.3.3 The prepositional accusative

An important fact about the prepositional accusative is its frequency: even if it may not be the most frequent case with each preposition at all language stages, the accusative on the whole has a high frequency throughout the history of the Greek language (and it remained the only case to allow prepositional government from Byzantine Greek onward). In the time stretch analyzed in this book, one can see that, when prepositions that allow case variation drop one case, it is usually the dative, if they drop two cases (as *aná* and *amphí*), they are the dative and the genitive, but the accusative is never dropped.

Similar to the genitive, the accusative can have two values within PPs, i.e. it can either denote Direction, or profile continuity in the internal structure of multiplex landmarks in Homeric Greek. With the directional accusative, prepositions usually indicate a trajectory, shaped in accordance to the meaning of the preposition. With the non-directional accusative, prepositions mostly denote Location, or some kind of motion within a bounded surface, generally along a multiple path. Often, all cases with the same preposition can denote the same spatial SR, most frequently Location, but with different profiling. The opposition between the partitive genitive and the non-directional accusative is lost after Homer, which leads to conventionalization of certain meanings with certain prepositions.

4.4 Further developments

In this final section, I would like to briefly indicate some of the main lines of development in the meaning of Greek prepositions and in case variation, which can be traced back to the Koine time, i.e. between the end of the Classic period and the early Middle Ages.⁴

On the evidence of non-literary papyri and the New Testament, one can see a further reduction of the prepositional dative: *perí* and *hupó* drop it completely, and it also becomes less frequent with *prós*. This last preposition is also the only one that drops the genitive at an early time.⁵

Prepositions also develop new abstract meanings. In a number of cases, the new uses of prepositions serve to substitute the plain dative. The dative case disappeared between the 4th and the 8th century CE, and the first signs of this process date back to the beginning of our era.

One of the most remarkable semantic extensions is visible in the generalized use of *en* for Instrument, typical of the New Testament.⁶ An example, containing an instrument noun, is:

- (1) *ei patáxomen en makhaíreī*
 if strike:FUT.IPL in sword:DAT
 “shall we strike with the sword” (*Luke 22.49*).⁷

In general, the instrumental dative tended to be replaced by PPs in this time: outside the language of the New Testament, the usual replacement was by means of *diá* with the genitive.⁸ This does not represent a new meaning of *diá*, but simply the extension of a meaning that the preposition already had in Classical times. The Companion metaphor, involving *metá* with the genitive (later accusative) only developed in the course of the Middle Ages, when *diá* dropped all meanings connected with the genitive in Classical Greek.

Beneficiary could occasionally be expressed by *diá* with the accusative (Rossberg 1909:39). This semantic extension creates a new meaning for the preposition in comparison with Classical Greek, and demonstrates possible semantic shift from Purpose to Beneficiary, rather than the other way around.⁹

The New Testament also attests a confusion between Location and Direction expressions: not only *en* with the dative and *eis* with the accusative can occur to denote both SRs, but *prós* with the accusative also occurs in Location expressions, as in:

- (2) *ho lógos ên pròs tòn Theón*
 ART.NOM word:NOM be:IMPF.3SG toward ART.ACC God:ACC
 “the word was with God” (*John 1.1*).

Confusion between *eis* and *en* is also widely attested in non-literary papyri from Egypt, as remarked in Rossberg (1909:27–28, 31).

A preposition that becomes very productive is *apó*. In the Koine, for example, it is frequently used with human landmarks, in occurrences where it substitutes for Classical Greek *pará*. Furthermore, *apó* can often express partitivity, thus substituting the plain genitive. This is a function that can also be taken by *ek*; it does not represent a new meaning, but rather an extension of a possible meaning already present in Classical Greek.

Already in the time stretch analyzed in this book, prepositions acquire an increasingly abstract meaning. Concrete meanings expressed by this set of prepositions in Homer are often expressed by newly created adverbs and adverbial prepositions in Classical Greek: the latter are mostly reinforced forms of the prepositions such as *kátō*, ‘below’, and *ánō*, ‘on’, substituting *katá* and

aná, which had lost (most) local reference. In later Greek this process continued, and led to the disappearance of a number of the prepositions reviewed in this book, while others remained limited to the expression of highly abstract meanings or of grammatical relations.

Notes

Introduction

1. Classical authors are cited according to the *Loeb* edition; translations are mostly taken from *Loeb* and adapted.
2. Indeed, the story of Aristotle's works is surprising: they were divided in works prepared for publication, written as dialogues, and so called 'exoteric' works, which were meant to be known only by students in Aristotle's philosophical academy. Nowadays, published works of Aristotle are all lost, with only one exception, the *Athenaiōn Politeía* (*The Athenian Constitution*). All remaining works belong to the exoteric part, which is the reason why the author did not prepare them for publication.
3. See Gautier (1911:48–53), with a discussion of the origin of some peculiarities in Xenophon's use of prepositions.
4. Only for *metá* I have used two different glosses, 'among' and 'after'.

Theoretical foundations

1. I use the word 'preposition' throughout the book. Note however that adpositions in Homer can be pre- or postposed; after Homer preposing becomes obligatory.
2. In languages that have both prepositions and cases the latter express grammatical relations to a greater extent than the former (see Luraghi 1991): more abstract meaning tends to pair with more reduced morphological means. This is also shown by the fact that word order may express grammatical relations, but normally not SRs.
3. A survey on early accounts of case meaning can be found in Hjelmslev (1935).
4. See Hopper & Traugott (1993), & Heine et al. (1991), among others.
5. Claudi & Heine (1986) also highlight the importance of research on language change for the study of grammaticalization processes.
6. Words such as 'Instrument', 'Manner', 'Agent', etc. are capitalized when they refer to SRs; when they refer to concrete instances of each category they are not capitalized.
7. For similar remarks regarding conventional and dead metaphors, see Traugott (1985).
8. Haspelmath (forthcoming) writes that a language that could express Purpose and Recipient with the same form, but not Direction, would be problematic for his theory. In fact, the Latin dative is such a problematic form: it expresses all the typical SRs connected with

animacy, among which Recipient and Beneficiary, and it also productively expresses Purpose, but it is not the normal way of encoding Direction. Direction expressions in the plain dative only occur with a group of verbs that denote approach (those that occur with motion verbs such as ‘come’ and ‘go’ are a handful in the complete *corpus* of Latin literature and only occur in poetry, where the use of the dative can be taken as metaphorical). See Luraghi (forthcoming c), and Van Hoecke (1996:10–12), who discusses what he calls “the *dativus* of approach”.

9. See Stolz (2001) and Luraghi (2001b).

10. On the typology of local case systems see Stolz (1992).

11. Anderson (1971:119) also suggests that a closer link connects allative to locative as opposed to ablative. In this framework, he sets up a binary distinction, whereby locative is opposed to ablative, and static *vs.* dynamic constitutes a sub-distinction of locative.

12. See Luraghi (1989b).

13. Origin also meditates between Source and Possessor, thus explaining syncretism of the genitive and the ablative, see §2.1.1.

14. Beside ablative, locative, allative, and perlative there can be more morphologically distinct local cases in specific languages. See Stolz (1992) for their frequency.

15. The examples are quoted from Janda (1993:166–167).

16. Starting from Middle Hittite, the instrumental merged with the ablative; both cases also developed some uses that are not attested in Old Hittite, such as passive agent; see Melchert (1977) and Strunk (1991).

17. Note that the Container metaphor, which I introduce in this section, does not imply that the landmark is conceived as tri-dimensional: bi-dimensional landmarks can also occur. See further §3.1.

18. Indeed in Greek there is a further pair of prepositions, *aná*, ‘upward’, and *katá*, ‘downward’; in their case, too, the contact feature, connected with case variation, appears to be relevant only for the preposition that denotes superiority (see §3.10 and 3.11).

19. See Brugman (1988:31–34).

20. In German, so-called ‘two-way’ prepositions, i.e. those that can take either the accusative or the dative, take the former case when the trajector moves on a trajectory outside the landmark and in its direction, while they take the dative when the trajector is either located inside the landmark, or moves on a trajectory completely contained inside the landmark, as in (17). See Serra Borneto (1997), and Langacker (1999).

21. The frequency of unmarked nouns with spatial reference in spatial expressions can lead to the renewal of grammatical forms: such nouns can be reinterpreted as markers of SRs, as shown in Aristar (1997).

22. Croft (1991:178) defines Comitative as “an entity that participates in a causal chain at the same point and in the same role as the subject of the main verb”.

23. Bridging contexts for the extension from Comitative to Instrument are certainly provided by non-prototypical instruments in Instrument phrases, as I will argue below. Attendant Circumstances seem to come close to Instrument as well, as shown in §3.14.

24. In grammatical descriptions of languages which have a case that denotes Accompaniment, this case is variously called ‘comitative’ or ‘sociative’, as for example in Tamil grammars.
25. See Delbrück (1867:50; 1888:140–145) for Sanskrit.
26. See Revuelta (2000).
27. In the ancient Indo-European languages, such occurrences of Comitative marked as Instrument are typical of nouns denoting military forces, which are understood as constituted by a plurality of low individuated entities, in much the same way as referents of mass nouns. On Comitative expressions with nouns denoting military forces in Ancient Greek, see Crespo (1994).
28. In fact, evidence for reconstructing a different system of diathesis, possibly based on an opposition between active and stative, is much wider, but it falls outside the scope of the present discussion.
29. See Luraghi (1986) on the impossibility of reconstructing an expression for passive agent in PIE, and further Strunk (1991).
30. On the genitive of agent in Greek and Indo-European, see Schwyzer (1942:14–15) and Hettrich (1990:92–97). Hettrich shows that the origin of this use of the genitive lies in its more usual, possessive use. Partly based on a similar metaphor, and much more widespread in Indo-European, is the dative of Agent (*dativus auctoris*, see Schwyzer 1942:15–16 and below, §2.2.3).
31. Of course in Greek mythological texts lightning can be used by Zeus and winds by Aeolus: however, control over emotions, apparently, is not even a prerogative of gods.
32. See Luraghi (2001a).
33. On the semantics of Cause and causation, see Talmy (2000:479–549).
34. This metaphor is discussed in Nikiforidou (1991:175–176).
35. Talmy (2000:504–509) discusses what he calls ‘enabling cause’, which by and large corresponds to positively evaluated cause in my terminology.
36. The semantics of Recipient and its relations to neighboring SRs is analyzed in depth in Newman (1996).
37. A localistic view of the origin of the dative can be found in Delbrück (1869); note that Delbrück directly connects the notion of directional motion with the typical Recipient/Beneficiary functions of the dative. Apparently, Delbrück conceives of the dative as connected with human referents already at its origin: since Proto-Indo-European already had another allative case, the accusative, and another locative, and since human beings are special landmarks and require special marking in Direction expressions, it may well be that Delbrück’s view is correct.
38. The same extension occurs in part of the Slavic languages, e.g. in Czech, but not in Russian, where the third argument of verbs of ‘taking away’ is encoded as a Source expression, see Janda (1993:58, 114). Janda, who understands the term ‘indirect object’ as an SR rather than as a purely syntactic term, tries to give a semantic explanation of the possible extension.

39. I have suggested a similar explanation in order to account for the extension of the preposition *à* from Recipient to Causee in French, see Luraghi (2001a).
40. On the double accusative construction in Ancient Greek, see the exhaustive study by Jacquinod (1989).
41. De la Villa (1995) contains similar considerations on Beneficiary and Purpose expressions in Latin.
42. English *for* can also express Cause, but the important fact about Italian *per* is that the causal meaning preceded both Purpose and Beneficiary, see Luraghi (2001a).
43. Example from Lass (1994:238).
44. Part-whole relations are typically conceptualized as possessive relations in numerous languages: the whole is viewed as the possessor of its parts. Nikiforidou (1991:169–173) describes at length the metaphor PARTS ARE POSSESSIONS, showing, among other things, that the verb ‘belong’ occurs in several, genetically unrelated languages with reference to the relation of a part to its whole.
45. Note that double case is limited to inalienable possession in Hittite (it occurs for body parts and nouns that denote the ‘natural’ location of a referent), while it appears to be more widespread in Armenian, see Luraghi (1993).
46. The example is taken from Plank (1990).
47. Hahn (1953, 1954) has tried to show that double case was in fact the oldest way to express possession in Proto-Indo-European: her evidence, besides Homeric Greek, comes from Hittite and few Latin examples. Later research on the chronology of Hittite texts has shown that Hahn’s examples come from Middle and New Hittite. As I have shown in Luraghi (1993, 1994c), there are no examples of double case in Old Hittite: at the oldest language stage, another construction, involving the adnominal genitive and possessive clitics, used to express inalienable possession. The Latin examples mostly involve the nominative and are instances of apposition, rather than possessive expressions.
48. A few occurrences of double dative are also attested in Homer, see Chantraine (1953).
49. See Radden (1989b:562) on the abstract meaning of ‘for’. Radden notes that “the objects we aspire for are usually also the cause of our aspiration”.
50. Case marking variation for direct objects has further been studied under the name of ‘differential object marking’, see the definition in Bossong (1998). On phenomena connected with the definiteness scale, and interaction of animacy and definiteness, see Lazard (1984).

The semantics of Greek cases

1. For a similar approach, see in particular the analysis of the genitive case by Nikiforidou (1991).
2. ‘Syncretism’ is a term that is currently understood in different ways, as I have shown in Luraghi (2000a). In the present book, I use it as it was traditionally and originally used in Indo-European linguistics, i.e. to indicate a complete diachronic merger. Other scholars

use it to indicate partial homonymy (e.g. in the case of the Latin dative and ablative, which are identical in the plural, but different in the singular). Note further that in more recent studies of structural orientation, meaning is accorded comparatively lesser importance than in earlier Indo-European linguistics, see e.g. Coleman (1976) and Meiser (1992).

3. This is the traditional reconstruction, found for example in Brugmann (1904). I follow it here without further discussion, which would go beyond the scope of the book. Needless to say, in more than a century of research alternative views have appeared, not only on ancient phases of the protolanguages (Pre-Indo-European), but on late Proto-Indo-European as well. Although I do not intend to examine such theories, it is worth mentioning that evidence from Anatolian points in the direction of a full development of case systems in the individual languages only. In Hittite the system of concrete cases is fully developed in the singular only; furthermore, Old Hittite preserves a separate allative case, so-called ‘directive’, with an ending that also occurs in directional adverbs in some of the other Indo-European languages. For further details, see Luraghi (1997).

4. On the interpretation of the Mycenaean data with regard to the case system, see Hajnal (1995).

5. Note that even in Sanskrit, where the dative has allative value more than in the other Indo-European languages, this value is limited to animate nouns, as remarked in Delbrück (1888: 143–145). As for the Greek dative, in Homer it could actually occur in Direction expressions, but this function was inherited from the Indo-European locative, so it does not help reconstruct an allative meaning for the Indo-European dative, see below, §2.2.3.1.

6. This usage may well be reconstructed for the Proto-Indo-European locative: the opposition between the accusative of motion, profiling the trajectory, and the locative, profiling the end point, is well attested in Sanskrit, as shown in Delbrück (1867) and (1888: 121–122).

7. Cf. the remark on French à, ‘to’, in §1.1.4.

8. See the remarks in §1.2.4.2.

9. I do not mean to say that the use of the accusative for direct object cannot be semantically motivated diachronically: as I will argue below, the accusative denoted total affectedness, and this meaning can be connected with its local meaning (Direction). But such semantic motivation only holds for the accusative with highly transitive action verbs, with which the direct object has the SR Patient. In the Indo-European languages, as in many languages with nominative-accusative alignment, the use of the accusative for direct object is conventionalized and, at least synchronically, not semantically motivated. In this respect, occurrences where one finds case alternation with transitive verbs in Greek are interesting, because they are traces of semantic motivation (see the discussion in the following sections). See further Crespo (1988b).

10. Passivization of verbs that take cases other than the accusative is discussed at length in Conti (1998). The author shows that passivization of non-accusative direct objects is an ongoing phenomenon in Ancient Greek, that increases after Homer. In Homer, only genitive direct objects, but not dative ones, can become subjects of passive sentences.

11. The genitive here has a partitive value, discussed further below, §2.2.2.

12. This is a generalization, and it is not true of all verbs, as seen in the case of *akoúein*, ‘to hear’.

13. On the occurrence of the accusative and of various PPs in perlativ expressions in Greek, see Waanders (1988).
14. See Conti (1999), with a discussion of all verbs belonging to this group and of their use in Homer.
15. This is true of Greek, but, as I will show below, it appears to be a general property of partitive expressions, also found in other languages.
16. As usual in reference books (see Schwyzer 1950:138–139), I do not use the term dative ‘proper’ to indicate a single function or meaning of the Greek dative, but to indicate a group of meanings that derive from the Proto-Indo-European dative, and that can be compared with the typical meanings of the dative in the other Indo-European languages, regardless of possible syncretism or merger with other cases.
17. According to some scholars, the dative with *epi* in Ancient Greek may be an instance of prepositional usage of the original dative, see §3.18.
18. The distinction based on animacy must not be understood as a grammatical rule: rather, it derives from the structure of events. With a verb such as *gráphein*, ‘to write’, it is hard to imagine that an inanimate entity could be the recipient. However, this distinction does not necessarily account for absolutely all occurrences. As we will see below, human beings can be conceived as instruments, so they could at least potentially be the referent of an instrumental dative. This actually happens in a very limited number of cases: most often, non-prototypical instruments receive extra marking (see §3.9). Interestingly, the few cases cited in Schwyzer (1950:165) as only liable for instrumental interpretation are from poetry.
19. Inanimate nouns in the dative could also occur in Purpose expressions, which also function as Adverbials, as in example (6) in §2.1.3.
20. The occurrence of *eis* for Beneficiary is mostly connected with the same conditions in which this SR can also be expressed by the dative: in other words, already at a very early stage *eis* constituted a possible replacement for the plain dative. See §3.3 for further discussion on this occurrence.
21. De La Villa (1989) considers all occurrences of animate nouns in the dative as having the SR Beneficiary, without further defining this SR.
22. As we will see, PPs usually occur in the Malefactive or Behalf types of Beneficiary.
23. The plain dative was still used as a locative by classical prose writers with a limited number of toponyms. On alternation between plain case and PPs in Homer see Luraghi (1996b).
24. Comrie (1986:3) describes case marking for locative in Armenian, and finds a similar distinction between natural locatives, marked with the locative case, and other types of noun, marked with postpositions; he takes this as a demonstration that “the construction type which is least marked formally is also least marked in terms of properties of the real world” (1986:2).
25. See also Schwyzer (1950:531–532). Affixes with the same polysemy occur in other languages; see Thornton (1993) on Italian.
26. Another interesting example of a plain dative in a Cause expression is *húdasin* in (31) in §3.12. It could be argued that the difference between *diá* with the genitive and the plain

dative in fact mirrors the distinction between Means and Instrument. In §1.2.4.2. I argue against the need to distinguish a SR Means in Classical Greek. Indeed, as we will see in §3.9, it appears that *diá* with the genitive was used for prototypical Instrument in Classical Greek, and that the main reason for using the prepositional expression rather than the plain case was to avoid ambiguity engendered by the latter. An argument could also be made that what I call ‘positively evaluated cause’ in example (63) should be considered Means. As we will see in §3.9, however, positively evaluated causes are quite close, in various respects, to other types of Cause.

27. Note that this does not mean that the dative is the most frequently occurring case: from the point of view of token frequency the dative is the least frequent case in Classical Greek, see Luraghi (2000c).

Greek prepositions: Patterns of polysemy and meaning extension

1. As I have already remarked in §1.0 Fn. 1, adpositions could be pre- or postposed in Homeric Greek; later on, pre-nominal position became obligatory, which is the reason why Greek adpositions are referred to as ‘prepositions’ in reference works.
2. On Hittite see Luraghi (2001c).
3. Note that Horrocks does not take case variation *per se* as evidence for the non-complement status of the NPs, otherwise he would deny the existence of real PPs in Classical Greek too, which he does not, as shown by the quote in the next paragraph.
4. I am not going to discuss here the issue raised by the possible existence of adpositions in Proto-Indo-European; such a discussion can be found in Luraghi (2001c).
5. Adverbs with a genitive modifier are not always old noun forms, but often they are built on the root of another adverb with the addition of a nominal suffix, and can be reinterpreted as having nominal syntax, and thus take an adnominal genitive. Such a process is attested in Hittite in the case of so-called ‘static’ adverbs, see Luraghi (2001c).
6. See Wackernagel (1928:212).
7. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in Chapter 4.

EN

1. The preposition *en* can occur in the form *ení*, especially in Homer; the suffix *-i* is thought to be the ending of the ancient locative.
2. See Buck (1955:107).
3. On alternation of the plain dative with *en* and the dative for Location expressions in Homeric Greek, see Luraghi (1994a).
4. Indeed a metaphorical interpretation is possible, as shown in the discussion of example (16).

5. In this example *éni* is postposed to its complement, *mákhēi*, as shown by the position of the accent (normally, all bisyllabic prepositions are accented on the second syllable).
6. Poetic meter can easily be understood as a container for words, since it does in fact put constraints on the form of the text.
7. Note that the transfer of Location to discourse and language is common: in general, we tend to conceive of a text or discourse as having spatial properties. This transfer has important consequences: for example, it enables us to use the same forms for textual deixis as we use for external deixis.

EK/EX

1. The original form is *ex*, as shown by comparison with other Indo-European languages (e.g. Latin), but in Greek the preposition became *ek* in front of words that begin with a consonant. Because the frequency of the form *ek* is higher than the frequency of the form *ex*, *ek* is usually chosen as quotation form in reference works.
2. When motions starts from somewhere close to the landmark, but specifically not from inside or in contact with its surface, *pará* with the genitive is used, cf. §3.5.
3. The word *patrís* is originally an adjective, but it could be used as a substantive already in Homer.
4. On the relation between Origin and partitive, see §2.1.1.
5. For the gloss of the form *theóthen*, see §3.4 Fn.2.
6. See Luraghi (2000b).
7. Valladares Martinez (1970) shows that the opposition elative/ablative had mostly disappeared in Attic.

EIS

1. The phonological shape of the particle was /e:s/. The spelling *es*, used in Ionic, does not distinguish between short and long middle high vowels (what is commonly spelled \bar{e} in the transliteration is a middle low vowel); the spelling *eis* of Attic reproduces the quality of the vowel more carefully. (Note that the spelling *ei* can indicate both a diphthong or, as in this case, a long middle high vowel.) The form derives from *ens* (attested in some dialects), with loss of pre-final *-n-* and compensatory lengthening of the vowel.
2. Chantraine (1953:102) regards as a limitation the fact that *eis* never occurs as predicate of nominal sentences, as some (but not all) of the other particles do (see e.g. example (1) in §3.14). However, the fact that there are no such occurrences may owe to the nature of the semantic role Direction, expressed by *eis*, which is not suitable as predicate for states (*eis* phrases do not occur as complements of the verb ‘be’ either).
3. The infrequency of *eis* with in the meaning ‘into’ with the noun for ‘ship’ owes to the fact that in the case of ships the relation between trajector and landmark in Greek is normally referred to by the preposition *epí*, ‘on’, ‘upon’: rather than say ‘to go into a ship’, then, one would say ‘to go upon a ship’.

4. Human landmarks do occur with *ek*, but only for expressing Origin; with *en* they are mostly found in the plural, see §3.1 and 3.2.
5. Note that the same verb can also occur in Homer with Purpose expressions in the plain dative, see example (6) in §2.1.3.
6. It must further be mentioned that perhaps the most frequent preposition that denotes Direction with human landmarks in Classical Greek is *hōs*, which is not treated in this book because it belongs to the group of secondary prepositions.
7. The word *génos* can have an abstract meaning ('gender'), but here it refers to concrete people.
8. The addressee is presented not as such, but as the endpoint of a communication that allows for no reply.
9. The verb *metadidónai*, 'to give a share', takes a Recipient in the dative; the direct object can be in the accusative or, more frequently, in the (partitive) genitive, as in (22).
10. Another occurrence of *eis* in a Beneficiary expression is *eis anthrōpous*, 'for mankind', in example (38) §3.9.

APO

1. See Taylor (1993:Fn. 14) for a similar remark on English 'from' and Horrocks (1981) with similar remarks on the distribution of *ek* and *apó*.
2. The form *Troiēthen* is formed with the suffix *-then* which has a high productivity in Homer, and can replace the genitive case. With toponyms, this suffix only occurs in the place of the ablative genitive; consequently, I have glossed it as ablative, but it must be noted that even Homeric Greek does not have a real ablative case that belongs, like the other cases, to the nominal paradigms. Pronominal forms with the suffix *-then* are glossed as genitive.
3. On Origin and partitive, see §2.1.1.
4. Schwyzer (1942:40) quotes this passage only partially, leaving out the context, and writes that *apó* is 'clearly' an agent phrase; Powell (1977:37) also apparently supports this interpretation, observing that *apó* occurs with a real passive: interestingly, both scholars content themselves with the fact that passive voice occurs in order to state that *apó* has a meaning nowhere else attested in Herodotus; an analysis of a wider context shows that the meaning of the preposition here is much closer to what is normal for this author.
5. Of all the various types of expression found in Ancient Greek for encoding Agent, only *apó* survives into Modern Greek. But the data from the Koine do not allow us to see the starting point of the process by which *apó* substituted *hupó*, the latter preposition being by far the most frequent also in later authors and in the New Testament, see Luraghi (2003).
6. "*apó*, 'from' is used here in reference not to the immediate agent, but to someone who instigates from the background."
7. As we will see in §3.13, the standard preposition for Agent expressions is *hupó*, 'under', which profiles control, thus contrasting with *apó*, which profiles source.

PARA

1. See Chapter 2 on the local meaning of cases and the discussion about *pará* in §3.0.2.
2. Cf. Fritz (1997:190).
3. Verbs which mean ‘to sit down’ take *pará* with the dative of inanimate nouns and *pará* with the accusative of animate nouns, cf. Fritz (1997:192–193).
4. In general, one should not set up completely different meanings for the Greek prepositions when no English equivalent can be found, that could occur in all the same occurrences.

SUN/XUN

1. Chantraine (1953:135) remarks that the particle must be considered a free adverb rather than a preverb, since the compound verb *sunérkhesthai* means ‘to meet’, rather than ‘to go together’.
2. See Crespo (1994:184) on the value of *sún* with the dative.
3. The use of prepositions for Comitative expressions in Classical Greek is described in Revuelta (2000).
4. On the development of the Companion metaphor to express Instrument in Greek and some other Indo-European languages, see Luraghi (2001b).

ANTI

1. It could be the root of a Proto-Indo-European word for ‘face’, see Bortone (2000:165).
2. For further reference, see Schwyzler (1950:441).

DIA

1. The local meaning of *diá* in Homer is discussed extensively in Luraghi (forthcoming a).
2. See Luraghi (forthcoming a).
3. Example (21) explicitly states lack of intentionality on the side of the human being that functions as Cause. Such examples are also available from later Greek, as we will see later on in this section. On this feature of human nouns in Cause expressions in Homer, see also Conti (1999).
4. De la Villa (1998) notes that the two *diá* phrases co-occur with Agent phrases (the subjects of the two sentences); he suggests that the *diá* phrases mark the role of an entity as something in between Cause and Agent. The co-occurrence with an agent could also point toward the role of Instrument or Intermediary. However it must be kept in mind that *diá* with the accusative is regularly found in Cause expressions, both with animate and inanimate referents, in Homer and in later Greek. In general, it must be remarked that Cause can be conceptualized in different ways, that include its possible evaluation (see §1.2.4.3). The evaluation can be positive, as in the above examples, or it could be negative or neutral.

5. On the instrumental interpretation of *diá* with the genitive referring to organs of sensations, see Luraghi (1989a).
6. Note that the use of *diá* in Intermediary expressions precedes the use in Instrument expressions: the latter occur only sporadically in Herodotus, where the extension to Intermediary is much more frequent.
7. On animate nouns in Cause expressions in Classical Greek, see Luraghi (1994b).

ANA

1. This semantic extension is reminiscent of what we find with English *over*, in expressions as *start over*. As we will see later on, *aná* presents some analogies with ‘over’ in its prepositional use as well.
2. Some scholars think that in this and the other two passages (*Od.* 2.416 and 15.284) where it occurs with the genitive, *aná* should be considered a preverb in tmesis, i.e. disjoined from the verb, which should then be taken as a compound: *anabaínein*. However, there are no clear occurrences of *anabaínein* with a genitive complement, either in Homer, or in later Greek. On the other hand, prepositional phrases with *aná* and the genitive are found in some inscriptions from Southern Italy, cf. Schwyzer (1950:441).
3. I don’t agree with Chantraine (1953:91), who notes ‘sans mouvement’ (‘without movement’), with no further discussion, for all occurrences of *aná* with the dative.
4. Brugman (1988:31–33) remarks, in the case of *over*, that the notion of covering necessarily requires a multiplex trajector, in the case that the trajector is stative, but can also apply to a uniplex trajector, provided that the trajector is moving.
5. “Mendicus *aná ástu* mendicans ordine ad singulas aedes accedit; *katà ástu* autem hic illic vagus alias adit fores, alias preaterit”.
6. In particular, one can compare example (26) with the following passage from Xenophon, where *katá* occurs:

gignôskôn de hóti ei mē hippikôn hikanòn ktésaito, ou dunésoito katà tà pedía strateúesthai, égnō toúto kataskeuastéon éinai, hōs mē drapeteúonta polemeín déoi
 “and perceiving that, unless he obtained an adequate cavalry force, he would not be able to campaign in the plains, he resolved that this must be provided”
 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.15).

KATA

1. According to Benedetti (1983:51) *khthonós* in (6) could be taken as denoting the starting point of motion (as the landmarks of examples (2) and (3)). However, in view of the resultative meaning of the verb form as well as of other similar examples, I prefer to analyze *katà khthonós* as referring to the endpoint of the trajectory.
2. The perfect stem often has resultative value, as in *baínein*, ‘to go’, perf. *bébeka*, ‘I abide (as a result of having gone)’.
3. Figure 19 does not include the extensional value of the accusative, on which see below.

4. This is similar to the Location expressions with *diá* and the accusative, see §3.9 and Luraghi (forthcoming a).
5. Of course, the table does not cover all local meanings of the two prepositions: the genitive with *katá* has functions not comparable to those that it has with *diá*, because it is either ablatival (while no ablatival genitive occurs with *diá*), or it does not profile the trajectory, but rather the endpoint; similarly, the accusative with *diá* also occurs in directional expressions, where the preposition means ‘across’, rather than ‘through’.
6. This extension also sporadically occurs with *hupó*, ‘under’, see the discussion in §3.13.
7. Attic usage of *katá* with the accusative is discussed in Jimenez (1989).

HUPER

1. In other words, this meaning results from subjectification, see §2.2.1.3.
2. See Brugman (1988:31–35) on similar usage of *over*.
3. In fact, the association of ‘north’ with ‘up’, and its parallel, ‘south’ with ‘down’ appears to be very widespread in the orientation systems of different populations, as shown in Brown (1983); see further Heine (1997:35–65).
4. A summary of the discussion on time orientation as expressed in the early Indo-European languages can be found in Anderson (1988).

HUPO

1. The polysemy of grammatical morphemes that denote back region and bottom region is discussed in Svorou (1993:148–150); Svorou shows that transfers between the two axes are quite frequent across languages.
2. Note that the Homeric warriors fought with a high shield that hid the whole body, and not yet with the small round one used in classical times.
3. Such expressions occur in the Homeric Hymns and in Hesiod.
4. A different analysis is put forward in Benedetti (1983:40–41).
5. Agent phrases and other similar expressions in Homer, including those containing *hupó* with the dative and with the genitive are analyzed in De La Villa (1998); see further Luraghi (2000b) and (2003).
6. This holds for *diá* with the accusative especially in Attic-Ionic, see §3.9.
7. This also happens for *diá* with the accusative, cf. §3.9.
8. As I have argued in Luraghi (2000b), although there are other ways to encode Agent with passive verbs in Homer, mostly Source expressions (cf. §3.2), the occurrence of lexical passives with Agent is almost totally restricted to *hupó* phrases.
9. See Benedetti (1983:60).
10. In Luraghi (1994b) I discussed these and other examples and showed that concrete nouns in Cause expressions must be encoded through the preposition *diá* in the event that the verb is passive or may have a passive interpretation.

11. Powell (1977:367) considers this a Direction expression, but apparently only on the evidence that the accusative can denote motion, and not based on the context. Note that the form *zeugnouménous* is a present medio-passive participle, and has stative meaning, rather than resultative, as a perfect participle would have.
12. See Luraghi (1996a).

META

1. See Mommsen (1895) for statistics on the use of *metá* in Comitative function in various authors. Less frequent occurrence of *metá* in Comitative expressions in Herodotus owes to the higher frequency of *sún*, see §3.6.
2. See also Luraghi (2001b).
3. For similar remarks on *sún*, see §3.6.
4. Interestingly the extension of Comitative markers to Manner appears to precede the extension to Instrument, at least based on data from the Indo-European languages.
5. See Wackernagel (1922:218) and Humbert (1930).
6. A comparable use is found with the preposition *per*, ‘through’ in Italian: whereas *avere/tenere fra le mani* has the concrete local sense of ‘have/hold in one’s hands’ (*fra* means ‘between’ or ‘among’), *avere per le mani*, literally ‘have through one’s hands’, means ‘busy oneself with’, similar to the Greek idiom.

AMPHI

1. See Hoffmann (1857:3); the author also shows how, in nominal compounds, the meaning ‘both sides’ could indicate different pairs of sides, such as right/left, above/below, etc.
2. See §3.14 for similar meaning of the accusative and the dative with *metá*.
3. To demonstrate the difference, Hoffmann (1857:8) remarks that while there is a word *perídromos*, ‘encircling’, there is no *amphidromos*. In fact Hoffmann is mistaken, because the latter word does exist; however, it means ‘running both ways’, without implying circular movement.
4. This passage is considered spurious by the editors.
5. This usage is common for *perí*, too; on the distribution of the two prepositions, see Dubuisson (1977).

PERI

1. For a survey of the Homeric usage see Zycha (1886).
2. The dative occurs regularly when the verb denotes a state (‘to be wearing’); when it denotes an action, as in (4), one can find either the dative or (less frequently) the accusative.
3. In examples like (6) the fact that the trajector moves around the landmark, covering all sides with motion, implies protection. This development explains the possible occurrence of

uniplex trajectors without motion (and without implication of a trajectory), and is explicit in the meaning of the verb *peribaínein*, ‘to protect’, compound with *baínein*, ‘to walk’.

4. Several other examples of case alternation are cited in Zycha (1887).

PROS

1. *potí* and *protí* are Homeric forms of *prós*.

2. Actually, the Beneficiary interpretation already seems available for the homeric passage in (12), as understood by many scholars, e.g. Fritz (1997:247). In fact, if a human being acts on behalf of another human being, the former can be said to act to the benefit of the latter.

3. Recall that *pará* with the accusative denotes Direction with animate Landmarks, but it denotes Location with inanimate ones (§3.5). So we have a distinction: *prós* + ACC. = towards an inanimate entity vs. *pará* + ACC. = towards an animate entity.

4. An example where the same verb, *légein*, ‘to say’, occurs in the passive with Agent encoded through *hupó* with the genitive is (52) in §3.13, also from Herodotus. Note that the agent in (29) is indefinite, while in (52) of §3.13 it is denoted by a definite NP.

5. Other verbs that can take an Agent phrase with *prós* are verbs of mental activity; furthermore, *prós* appears to be used by Herodotus to express the agent with nominalizations, see Luraghi (2000b).

EPI

1. Indeed, this group of verbs can also take *epí* with the genitive, see Fritz (1997:122–123).

2. Conti (1996:Fn. 23) is aware of the fact that relevance of animacy for the choice of certain prepositions or prepositional phrases is not limited to *epí*, and mentions the case of *pará* with the genitive (only used for motion away from a human referent after Homer, see §3.5; we may also add *prós*, which selects ablatival value of the genitive with human referents and partitive with inanimate ones). Note however that there appear to be no other instances where the use of the dative with prepositions is connected with animacy.

3. That the meaning ‘against’ is derived through focussing of the contact feature does not imply that *epí* with the dative always denotes final contact: there are occurrences where it is explicitly stated that the trajector does not reach the landmark, as in *Aineías d’epì Mēriónēi dōru ... hēken ... all’ho mēn ánta idōn hēleúato ... égkhos*, ‘Aeneas cast his spear against Meriones, but he, having seen in advance, avoided the spear’ (*Il.* 16.608–10). But this does not invalidate my analysis, since the intended trajectory should have reached its goal, and this does not happen only on account of another unexpected event.

4. Gonda (1957) understands the use of *epí* with the dative in Purpose expressions as a way to reinforce the meaning of the case.

5. Chantraine (1953:108–109) argues that, in spite of some exceptions, the three cases with *epí* and the word for ‘ship’ display the following organization: dative: Location ‘by’, genitive: Location ‘on’ or Direction ‘upon’; accusative: Direction ‘towards’.

6. With reference to the seemingly synonymous expressions *epi khthoni* ‘on the earth (DAT.)’/ *epi khthonós*, same meaning (GEN.), Ruijgh (1994) remarks that the former is more frequent in formulaic expressions, which demonstrate its greater antiquity.
7. The abstract use of *epi* with the genitive in Homer is limited as to the number of occurrences, but semantically more varied than its use with the accusative.
8. Helbing (1904:61) also gives a list of passages with either the dative or the genitive, denoting the same SR.

Conclusions

1. In the case of *eis* the Container metaphor occasionally did not apply in Homeric Greek already, see §3.3.
2. I call non-directional the use of the accusative with *para* with the meaning ‘along’, although this meaning implies a direction in the trajectory: however, the notion of direction crucially depends on the structure of possible landmarks, and not on an independent meaning of the accusative.
3. The difference in case depends on the disappearance of the dative with *hupo* in Agent expressions after Homer (see §3.13.).
4. There are no comprehensive studies regarding the development of prepositions in Byzantine Greek. Jannaris (1897) has some data, but is largely outdated. Some information can be found in Browning (1983) and Horrocks (1997); see further Bortone (2000).
5. In the Middle Ages case variation with prepositions disappeared in Greek. In the *koiné* we already find traces of limitations in the use of the prepositional dative, but not yet for the genitive: as stressed by Rossberg (1909: 10), the genitive is the most frequent case within PPs in Greek non-literary papyri from Egypt.
6. On the use of prepositions in New Testament Greek see Regard (1919).
7. Being post-classical, this development falls beyond the scope of this book. However, I would still like to add that the instrumental meaning of *en* in the New Testament is considered as due to Semitic influence: in the Semitic languages, the same preposition or prefix (in Hebrew *b-*) expresses both Location and Instrument; in fact the Semitic languages offer one of the most interesting examples of syncretism of these two semantic roles, see above, §1.2.4.2. As I have argued at length here and in §2.3 foll., the Instrument-as-Container metaphor was very widespread in Greek: not only did it lie behind syncretism of the dative/locative with the instrumental, it also explains the way in which body parts are conceptualized; affixes with both locative and instrumental value are found in derivational morphology as well as in inflection. So the instrumental use of *en* should be regarded as a ‘secondary Semitism’ (Moulton 1911). As Humbert puts it: “La périphrase au moyen de *en* est parfaitement hellénique ...; mais sa diffusion à un moment de l’histoire – diffusion spontanée et non pas seulement artificielle et livresque ... – ne s’explique que par le rôle que le colonies sémitiques répandues dans tout l’Empire ont pu jouer: la diffusion de *en* en

valeur instrumentale semble avoir été aussi rapide que celle du Christianisme” (Humbert 1930: 48).

8. See Humbert (1930: 116–128). Rossberg (1909: 28) gives a few examples of instrumental *en* from non-literary papyri, mostly involving body parts.

9. Beneficiary expressions with *diá* and the accusative are sporadic in the Koine, and fully develop only in Medieval Greek.

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Name index

A

Anderson, D. W. 336, 346
Anderson, J. M. 336, 346
Aristar, A. R. 27, 52, 336

B

Barshi, I. 44
Benedetti, M. 345, 346
Blake, B. 61, 62
Bortone, P. 165, 344, 349
Bossong, G. 338
Brown, C. H. 346
Browning, R. 349
Brugman, C. 24, 76, 190, 214, 336,
345, 346
Brugmann, K. 339
Buck, C. D. 341

C

Chantraine, P. 51, 66, 85, 121, 132,
133, 136, 137, 146, 173, 203, 235,
245, 271, 288, 338, 342, 344, 345,
348
Claudi, U. 12, 335
Coleman, R. 339
Comrie, B. 340
Conti, L. J. 299, 339, 340, 344, 348
Crespo, E. 47, 149, 337, 339, 344
Croft, W. 16, 19, 31, 35, 40, 42, 45,
46, 50, 336
Cuyckens, H. 86

D

De la Villa, J. 40, 246, 338, 344
Delancey, S. 30, 33
Delbrück, B. 50, 52, 299, 337, 339

Dirven, R. 36, 37, 47
Dubuisson, M. 347
Dunkel, G. 157

E

Ebeling, H. 191
Evans, N. 13

F

Fillmore, C. 21, 33
Fraser, T. 31
Fritz, M. 289, 344, 348

G

Gautier, L. 196, 335
Gonda, J. 348
Green, A. 31

H

Hahn, E. A. 338
Hajnal, I. 339
Haspelmath, M. 9, 16, 17, 27, 44,
320, 335
Havers, W. 42, 44
Heine, B. 12, 18, 39, 322, 324, 335,
346
Helbing, R. 349
Hettrich, H. 65, 337
Hjelmslev, L. 335
Hoffmann, C. A. J. 347
Hopper, P. 37, 335
Horrocks, G. C. 76–79, 82, 86, 95,
137, 288, 341, 343, 349
Humbert, J. 93, 347, 349, 350

J

- Jacquiod, B. 338
Janda, L. 14, 336, 337
Jannaris, A. N. 349
Jimenez, M. D. 346
Johnson, M. 12, 31, 34, 67, 90, 97,
124, 227, 301

K

- Karjalainen, M. 62
Keenan, E. L. 31, 32
Kuryłowicz, J. 14, 52

L

- Lakoff, G. 12, 13, 31, 34, 67, 90, 97,
124, 227, 300, 301
Langacker, R. W. 14, 26, 57, 336
Lass, R. 338
Lazard, G. 338
Luraghi, S. 15, 20, 31–34, 36, 43–46,
63, 105, 233, 243, 321, 335–348

M

- Mackenzie, L. J. 21
Martínez Vásquez, R. 47
Meiser, G. 339
Melchert, C. 336
Mommsen, T. 150, 151, 347
Moulton, J. H. 349

N

- Newman, J. 337
Nikiforidou, K. 12, 51, 337, 338
Nishimura, Y. 33

P

- Palmer, L. 173
Payne, D. 44
Plank, F. 43, 338
Powell, J. E. 262, 343, 347

R

- Radden, G. 33, 35–37, 48, 237, 320,
338
Reddy, M. 112, 286
Regard, P. 349
Revuelta, A. 337, 344
Rossberg, C. 332, 349, 350
Ruijgh, C. J. 304, 309, 349

S

- Schwyzler, E. 65, 103, 129, 186, 288,
337, 340, 343–345
Serra Borneto, C. 336
Skerlo, H. 193
Stolz, T. 20, 28, 50, 336
Strunk, K. 336, 337
Sulkala, H. 62
Svorou, S. 346

T

- Talmy, L. 25, 56, 57, 82, 211, 337
Taylor, J. R. 216, 218, 343
Thornton, A. 340
Traugott, E. 37, 335

V

- Valladares Martinez, M. A. 342
Van Hoecke, W. 336
Vandeloise, C. 84, 85, 91
Vogt, H. 44

W

- Waanders, F. M. J. 340
Wackernagel, J. 67, 341, 347
Wierzbicka, A. 46
Wilkins, D. 13

Z

- Zycha, J. 347, 348

Subject index

A

- ablative 15, 20, 21–23, 31, 50, 51, 59,
72, 79, 80, 238, 286, 288, 292,
305, 319, 325, 328, 329, 336, 339,
342, 343
- Accompaniment 28, 146, 147, 149,
152
- accusative
- allative 23, 72, 79, 328, 336
 - directional 55, 66, 135, 136,
211, 217, 218, 224, 249,
294–296, 306, 307, 316, 317,
331
 - of extension 56, 57, 61, 174,
203, 246, 254, 307
 - of respect 57, 58, 68
- adessive 11, 23, 24
- Agent 19, 20, 30–33, 36, 38, 42, 46,
65, 69, 98–101, 103, 105, 123,
125, 126, 128–130, 142, 175, 181,
227, 228, 231–233, 237–240, 243,
287, 288, 291, 292, 315–317,
319–321, 323–325, 335, 337, 343,
344, 346, 348, 349
- allative 20, 21, 23, 24, 39, 40, 45,
336, 337, 339
- Area 37, 48, 57, 58, 66, 73, 115, 206,
207, 211, 212, 216, 221, 258, 262,
266, 269–272, 274–277, 279–283,
395, 311, 315, 318, 319, 326, 327
- aspect 4, 189, 205
- Attendant Circumstances 28, 47,
146, 151–153, 251, 253
- ## B
- Behalf 41, 42, 220, 286, 287, 292,
319, 321, 324, 325, 340

- Benefactive 39, 40
- Beneficiary 14, 17, 39–42, 45, 46, 51,
64, 65, 73, 114, 126, 157, 162,
163, 178, 187, 220, 272, 275, 276,
286, 287, 289, 292, 294, 297, 302,
304, 308, 311, 313, 319, 321,
324–328, 332, 336–338, 340, 343,
348, 350
- bridging 13, 28, 36, 45, 336

C

- Cause 19, 30, 35–38, 41, 45–47, 59,
68–70, 72, 73, 98, 99, 101–105,
123, 126–128, 130, 151, 156, 175,
176, 184, 186, 187, 212, 221, 228,
231–233, 237, 239, 240, 276, 277,
302, 308, 313, 316, 317, 321, 323,
324, 326, 327, 329, 337, 338, 340,
341, 344–346
- Comitative 15, 19, 28, 29, 34, 36, 63,
72, 132, 139, 146–149, 153, 154,
250–252, 260, 318, 320, 330, 336,
337, 344, 347
- continuity 26, 170, 235, 246, 259,
318, 329, 331

D

- dativae
- allative 39, 51, 339
 - instrumental 13, 61, 63, 68,
246, 248, 322, 323, 340
 - locative, locative 22, 34, 35, 36,
52, 63, 65–67, 85, 189, 234,
238, 245, 306, 322, 349
- delative 24

Direction 14, 17, 20–24, 27, 36, 45,
52, 55, 57, 61, 66, 77, 82–84, 94,
108, 110–116, 133, 135, 136, 142,
188, 189, 199, 200, 224–226, 233,
240, 241, 245–248, 259, 284, 288,
289, 293, 294, 297–299, 303–305,
313, 316, 319, 324, 327, 329, 331,
335–337, 339, 342, 343, 347, 348
discontinuity 26, 246, 259, 318, 329

E

elative 23, 24, 95, 123, 342
Experiencer 42, 43, 46, 64, 65, 140,
253

F

Force 30, 33, 126, 232, 240, 321

G

genitive

ablative, ablative 58, 59, 80, 95,
118, 200, 204, 225, 229, 230,
234, 238, 239, 285, 286, 288,
291, 298, 304, 305, 316, 317,
319, 321, 325, 329, 343, 346,
348
locative, locative 61, 78, 304
partitive 26, 50, 54, 55, 58,
60–62, 78, 80, 170, 259, 288,
304, 305, 317, 329–331, 339,
348

I

illative 23, 24
inessive 23, 24
Instrument 13, 15, 19, 20, 28, 29,
32–36, 38, 47, 52, 63, 68–70, 73,
127, 147–149, 152–154, 176, 178,
180–184, 228, 252–254, 316,
321–323, 332, 335–337, 341, 344,
345, 347, 349
instrumental 15, 20, 22, 28, 31–37,
48, 50–52, 66–67, 72, 79, 80, 85,
299, 316, 336

Intermediary 30, 34, 35, 179, 180,
183–186, 228, 233, 240, 316,
321–323, 344, 345

L

landmark, types of

biplex 245, 248,
continuous 26, 79, 137, 190,
192, 193, 245, 248, 254, 255,
259, 328
discontinuous 26, 122, 170,
246, 248, 328
multiplex 26, 122, 137, 138,
190, 193, 202, 204, 235,
244–250, 254, 255, 259, 316,
318, 329, 331
uniplex 137, 145, 190, 247, 248,
254, 255, 268, 316–318

Location 17, 19–24, 26, 27, 29, 31,
35, 36, 52, 56, 61, 65, 66, 77, 79,
82, 83, 87, 93, 94, 96, 107, 108,
118, 119, 121, 131, 138, 139, 143,
145, 155, 156, 169, 176, 177, 188,
189, 191, 199–202, 205, 214, 215,
217, 219, 225, 230, 233–235, 238,
241, 245, 246, 248, 250, 256, 259,
268, 270, 275, 278, 279, 284,
288–290, 292, 298, 300–307, 311,
313, 316, 318, 319, 322, 327–332,
341, 342, 346, 348, 349
locative 15, 20–23, 27, 31, 36, 39,
50–52, 72, 79, 80, 82, 165, 292,
299, 304, 305, 319, 325, 328, 336,
337, 339–341

M

Malefactive 41, 42, 207, 289, 299,
302, 312, 313, 319, 325, 340
Manner 13, 28, 47, 72, 146, 149,
150, 152–154, 213, 252–254, 297,
335, 347
Means 30, 35, 38, 176, 323, 341
mental map(s) 16, 17, 106, 130, 163,
164, 272, 273, 297, 302, 327

N

- nominative 3, 8, 11, 14, 30, 46, 49, 61, 338
- number 3, 4, 9, 61, 247
- dual 3, 4, 6, 11, 248
 - plural 3, 4, 11, 26, 29, 86, 133, 137, 172, 190, 201, 204, 245–248, 250, 257, 266, 318, 339, 343
 - singular 3, 4, 8, 11, 25, 27, 52, 86, 87, 109, 137, 247, 250, 257, 259, 320, 339
- noun, types of
- collective 26, 190, 246, 247, 250, 257
 - count 25, 26, 61, 109, 137, 172, 190, 201, 204, 245–247, 250, 259, 318, 320
 - mass 25, 26, 29, 190, 337

O

- Origin 21, 95, 97–100, 103, 125, 130, 255, 285, 286, 288, 291, 297, 320, 321, 323, 336, 342, 343

P

- partitive 61, 62, 340, 342, 343
- Path 22–26, 32, 35, 56, 127, 136, 172, 176, 177, 179, 189, 201, 224, 228, 322, 323
- path, types of
- multiplex 25
 - uniplex 25
- Patient 40, 42, 46, 53, 227, 339
- perlative 22, 28, 55, 56, 336, 340
- plexity 25, 26, 131, 137, 145, 189, 215, 235, 248, 255, 256, 266
- Possessor 19, 43, 50, 140, 279, 280, 282, 316, 326, 336
- Purpose 14, 17, 19, 36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 51, 52, 65, 73, 110, 111, 116, 162, 163, 187, 249, 263, 270–272, 274, 275, 282, 295, 301, 302, 304, 307, 308, 313, 315, 319, 326–328, 332, 335, 338, 340, 343, 348

R

- Reason 30, 38, 41, 48, 176, 187, 212, 270, 272, 281, 282, 296, 302, 311, 313, 318, 323, 326, 327
- Recipient 17, 39–41, 43, 51, 63, 65, 111, 113, 116, 117, 148, 178, 217, 294, 315, 324, 325, 328, 336–338, 343

S

- sociative 22, 28, 52, 72, 337
- Source 20–24, 27, 31, 36, 37, 40, 50, 72, 77, 78, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 104, 108, 118, 119, 121, 124, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 140–142, 197, 200, 204, 229, 238, 285, 286, 288, 297, 316, 320–323, 329, 336, 337, 346
- sublative 24
- suppressive 24

T

- Time 27, 37, 57, 61, 73, 87, 96, 103, 105, 106, 110, 111, 123, 130, 143, 157, 159, 184, 195, 211, 222, 223, 246, 255, 279, 303, 307, 310, 318, 320, 330
- Topic 276, 282
- trajector, types of
- biplex 256, 267
 - continuous 172, 203
 - discontinuous 172, 203
 - multiplex 25, 172, 201–204, 214, 217, 224, 256, 257, 261, 266–268, 270, 274, 317, 345
 - stative 316, 318, 345
 - uniplex 25, 170, 201–203, 214, 217, 256, 257, 259, 261, 264, 267, 269, 273, 318, 345, 348

V

- vocative 3, 11, 49

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