

# *The Value of Victory in Pindar's Odes*

GNOMAI, COSMOLOGY  
AND THE ROLE OF THE POET

HANNA BOEKE

## The Value of Victory in Pindar's Odes

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# The Value of Victory in Pindar's Odes

Gnomai, Cosmology and the Role of the Poet

*By*

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*To my father*

*In memory of my mother*



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## PREFACE

When I exchanged a position in the corporate world for a masters programme in the Classics in 1994 I fully expected it to be only a sabbatical from the nine to five life. However, the pull of the ancient world proved irresistible. I added Greek to my course work, discovered Pindar and concluded that the business world could not compete with such grand poetry. Perhaps the most appealing aspect of Pindar's victory odes are the myths they recount, and these narratives have understandably been the focus of much scholarly effort. Interesting as the stories are, what intrigued me even more was the element of reflection found in the many wisdom sayings in the poems, which placed a sportsman and his achievements in the broader context of life. Clearly, athletic success was not just a matter of receiving adulation for physical superiority. The real meaning of victory was sought in relation to profound issues such as the role of the divine in all of life, man's mortality and its consequences, as well as the demands of society.

The project to investigate the world view revealed in the *gnomai* and to determine how it influenced the way in which individual victors were celebrated, turned out to be both fascinating and difficult. Many people, family, friends and fellow classicists, supported me in many ways through the years it took to complete the resulting doctoral dissertation that has become this book. I thank them all, especially for helping me to keep going through the hard times. A particular word of thanks goes to my parents and my husband. In this study project, as in all my other endeavours, I enjoyed the unconditional love, support and encouragement of my father and late mother, a very precious gift. As for Emil, his love and generosity made it all possible.

I have used the eighth edition of Snell-Maehler's *Epinicia* (1987) and H. Maehler's *Fragmenta* (1989) for the texts of Pindar's odes and fragments respectively. Most of the translations in the book are from the relevant volumes in the Loeb Classical Library (see copyright page for details). My own translations are indicated as such.

Consistency is undoubtedly a scholarly virtue, but when it comes to rendering Greek names it proves to be a rather elusive ideal. In recent years the trend has been away from latinised (or English) to Greek forms, although the latter present their own problems. Since I make use of W. H. Race's translations of Pindar published in the Loeb Classical Library I follow his lead in this regard. This means preference is given to the Greek form (e.g. Melissos, Kronos) but in some cases the English form is retained to prevent confusion (e.g. Athens, Corinth, Homer). More details of his considerations when choosing particular forms can be found in the preface to the first of the two Pindar volumes.

The names of ancient authors and works are abbreviated as in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

December 2006

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to investigate the cosmological context of Pindar's victory odes, and its importance for their encomiastic purpose, from two angles. First, the *gnomai* which punctuate the epinikia at regular intervals are used as the basis for an overview of the main ideas about the gods and man's relationship to the divine, the human condition and man in society. Second, three epinikia, *Olympian* 12, *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 are analysed to obtain a closer view of how certain aspects of the cosmology are applied to the sometimes complex circumstances of a specific victor. These analyses are complemented by an investigation into the role of the poet in mediating cosmological premises.

This introductory chapter deals with selected aspects of Pindaric scholarship in order to establish the usefulness of an investigation into the cosmological foundation of Pindar's poetry. In Chapter 2 various ancient texts on *gnomai*, modern scholarship on the proverb and maxim and a number of references in Pindar are analysed in support of the contention that *gnomai* provide a legitimate basis for a cosmological overview. Chapter 3 deals with important definitions and assumptions before the cosmology revealed in Pindar's poetry is discussed. The analyses of *Olympian* 12, *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 are presented in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 looks at the role of the poet as mediator of cosmology in these poems as well as relevant passages from other Pindaric odes.

While many scholars note that Pindar's poetry is underpinned by a distinctive outlook their attitude towards his 'thought' is often dismissive, if not openly disapproving, usually because it is seen as evidence of the poet's inability or unwillingness to embrace the new and, it is implied, superior ideas of the democratic era developing in Athens.<sup>1</sup> A fairly recent example is Race's remarks in his introduction to the Loeb

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. the connection Gentili makes between political convictions and general outlook when he describes Pindar as conservative and Simonides as progressive (1990:63–67, 153–154).

Classical Library edition and translation of Pindar. His praise for the poetry is fulsome: the epinikia “represent the apex of their genre,” and the poet displays “great ingenuity” and “ever new creativity” in varying stock themes. Yet his evaluation of what Pindar expresses has an unmistakably negative ring: the mores are “conservative,” his thought “ethically cautionary” and “(h)is gaze ... primarily backwards toward the models of the past.”<sup>2</sup> Kirkwood also makes a distinction between Pindar’s originality as poet and what he regards as a generally conservative attitude. He sees this as a reflection of strong ties to the Theban aristocracy which represented a social milieu far removed from the innovations in art, religion and society developing in Athens. According to Kirkwood Pindar’s picture of what constitutes greatness is “narrow, but within its range not without nobility as a concept of the meaning of ἀρετή.” This condescending remark tallies with the “sense of estrangement” attributed to modern readers in the face of the political and social implications of the outlook portrayed. For Kirkwood the *gnomai* as they relate to Pindar’s thought have “often proved misleading and ultimately disappointing.”<sup>3</sup> Similar sentiments found in Dihle’s *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* may be attributed to its relatively early date (1967), but they are repeated unchanged in the revised 1991 edition and its 1994 English translation.<sup>4</sup> These value judgments of the cosmology reflected in especially the epinikia take as point of departure the opinions and sensibilities of the modern reader who finds it difficult to reconcile the reprehensible convictions apparently held by Pindar the private citizen with the generally recognised greatness of Pindar the public poet. This confusion of private person and poetic persona can best be explained as a remnant of the by now largely discredited historicism of 19th and early 20th century Pindaric scholarship represented by scholars such as Wilamowitz, Norwood and Bowra, who regarded the odes not as works of art but as documents providing historical and personal information.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Race 1997a:2, 16, 26, 3. For the idea of the backward gaze, see also J. Krause 1976:91 and H. Schmitz 1977:9, 23, and for a critique of this position as well as the Athenocentrism it implies Kurke 1991b:163–165.

<sup>3</sup> Kirkwood 1982:45, 22–23.

<sup>4</sup> See Dihle 1967:95, 97, 98, 100–101 and 1994:69–73.

<sup>5</sup> Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1922, Norwood 1945, Bowra 1964. For brief discussions of these and other representatives of this trend, see Lloyd-Jones 1973:114–116 and Pfeijffer 1999:34.

A decisive break with this tradition came with the publication of Bundy's *Studia Pindarica* in 1962. Since then Pindaric scholarship has to a large extent been positioned with regard to his claim that the victory ode is "an oral, public, epideictic literature dedicated to the single purpose of eulogizing men and communities" and his by now well-known concomitant "master principle," that "there is no passage in Pindar and Bakchulides that is not in its primary intent enkomiastc—that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular patron."<sup>6</sup> Assigning to the epinician ode the single aim of praise presupposes that the individual for whom it is composed and the society in which he finds himself attach the highest importance to victory and the glory it brings.

Such an attitude is supported by the claim of many scholars that the Greek athletic games exemplify a competitive, or *agonal*, attitude, with winning as the aim, which is "one of the characteristic traits and driving forces of Greek culture,"<sup>7</sup> and which distinguishes Greeks from non-Greeks.<sup>8</sup> Even if this is an unfounded generalisation and in some respects even a misrepresentation, as argued by Weiler,<sup>9</sup> the pervasiveness of competition in Greek life cannot be denied. In such a culture winning can indeed be expected to be of prime importance. Many passages in Pindar's victory odes can also be cited to support the claim that superiority in general and victory in the games in particular were among the highest values of the people for whom he composed his songs. Hieron's kingship is gnominally portrayed as the peak of greatness (τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται / βασιλεῦσι, *Ol.* 1.113–114), Theron's victory, comparable to the superlative value of water and gold, and

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<sup>6</sup> Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:35, 3. In his essay on the historic antecedents of contemporary Pindaric scholarship, Heath, with reference to Lloyd-Jones's remark (1973:116) about the resemblance between Bundy's "somewhat formidable technical terminology" and the analysis in terms of ancient rhetorical categories in Erasmus Schmid's *Pindari Carmina* (Wittenberg, 1616), links Bundy's work to Renaissance scholarship, noting that it is "now based on a close internal study of the genre's *topoi*, rather than on the application of an externally derived rhetorical system" (Heath 1986:96). For his discussion of the Renaissance commentators, see pp. 88–90.

<sup>7</sup> Burkert 1985:105. For references to the scholarly literature on this subject, see Burkert 1985:389 n. 70 and for a brief discussion Weiler 1974:14. See also Morgan 2007: 214–218.

<sup>8</sup> So for example Ehrenberg 1935:93: "(D)as Agonale war im Rahmen der antiken Welt *nur* griechisch, es war *sehr* griechisch."

<sup>9</sup> Weiler 1974. He compares Greek representations of competition in myth with those found in other cultures and comes to the conclusion that there are many "Gemeinsamkeiten ..., die es nicht erlauben, dem Griechentum dabei etwas Typisches zuzuschreiben" (313).

reaching the proverbial pillars of Herakles, is the utmost in achievement (εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος, / νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἔσχατιὰν Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν ἰκάνων ἄπτεται / οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος σταλαῖν, *Ol.* 3.42–44), and for Chromios of Aitna the equestrian success flowing from his god-given talents represents πανδοξίας ἄκρον (“the summit of absolute glory,” *Nem.* 1.8–11). The importance of victory in the pursuit of κλέος, fame and glory, is clear from *Isthmian* 5, for Phylakidas of Aigina:

ἐν τ' ἀγωνίοις ἀέθλοισι ποθινόν  
κλέος ἔπραξεν, ὄντιν' ἀθροοὶ στέφανοι  
χερσὶ νικάσαντ' ἀνέδησαν ἔθειραν  
ἢ ταχυτάτι ποδῶν.

and in athletic competitions a man gains  
the glory he desires, when thick crowns  
wreath his hair after winning victory with his hands  
or the swiftness of his feet.

(*Isthm.* 5.7–10)<sup>10</sup>

Pindar also highlights the importance of victory in a negative way, by describing the ignominy of defeat. There is no joyful homecoming for the loser, only derision and isolation (*Ol.* 8.68–69, *Pyth.* 8.81–87), “for in defeat men are bound in silence; (they cannot) come before their friends” (νικώμενοι γὰρ ἄνδρες ἀγρυξία δέδενται / οὐ φίλων ἐναντίον ἔλθειν, fr. 229).

Yet the question has to be asked: Is winning indeed everything for the fifth century competitor at the prestigious Panhellenic games and his social circle? Should it be pursued at all costs according to the poet commissioned to commemorate victory in song? In the conclusion to his study of *Isthmian* 1 Bundy restates the basic principle of his method of interpretation strongly, but adds a significant qualification which points the way, albeit indirectly, to the answer to this question:

... to follow the movement of the ode is ... to pursue the fulfillment of a *single* purpose through a complex orchestration of motives and themes

<sup>10</sup> The passage echoes the words of Laodamas when he invites Odysseus to show his worth by taking part in the Phaeacians' games. In spite of Odysseus' careworn appearance after his long sea journey, Laodamas assumes his having athletic abilities, “for there is no greater glory for a man so long as he lives than that which he achieves by his own hands and feet” (οὐ μὲν γὰρ μείζον κλέος ἀνέρος ὄφρα κ' ἔησιν, / ἢ ὅ τι ποσοῖν τε ῥέξιη καὶ χερσὶν ἔησιν, *Od.* 8.147–148, trans. Murray 1995). Other references to the importance of winning in Pindar are *Ol.* 2.51–52, *Pyth.* 1.99–100, *Pyth.* 10.22–26, *Nem.* 3.70–74, *Isthm.* 1.50–51.

that conduce to *one* end: the glorification, *within the considerations of ethical, religious, social, and literary propriety*, of Herodotos of Thebes.<sup>11</sup>

The qualification suggests that praise for an individual has to stay within certain boundaries which are not determined by rhetorical convention but by the practices and norms of society. I therefore contend that this qualification, which has so far been ignored by both Bundy's followers and his critics, points to an awareness, even if it is not fully expressed, that it is not only the *how* of poetic technique, but also the *what* of the broader context of victory and its celebration that needs to be understood if the poems are to be understood.

This awareness can also be traced in Bundy's analysis of *Isthmian* 1. When he declares in his introduction that epinician poetry is "hostile to personal, religious, political, philosophical and historical references that might interest the poet but do nothing to enhance the glory of a given patron"<sup>12</sup> he denies only that such references are made at the whim of the poet, not that they occur, as his discussion of the poem demonstrates. For example, the political misfortunes of the victor's father are interpreted as a dark foil for the following praise of the victor as well as the means to introduce the 'philosophical' theme of vicissitude into the poem, and the final "inverted gnomic foil" which praises the unselfishness and dedication of successful athletes is recognised for its ethical value and, with its reminder that death is man's common lot, for what it contributes to the value of the poem as a whole.<sup>13</sup> Bundy's analysis shows that rhetorical convention is a powerful tool for determining the significance for the encomiastic programme of references to personal circumstances or reflection on appropriate behaviour and the human condition, but it also implies that it is the specific content of a conventional theme that makes it meaningful as glorification of a specific victor. Knowledge of the conventions of epinician poetry can help explain *how* every passage contributes to the aim of praise, but an understanding of *what* that praise entails is essential if a poem is to make sense as a tribute to one man in particular.

In spite of these hints at a broader view, Bundy's emphasis remains firmly on convention as the preferred exegetical tool, and his final injunction is that "(t)he study of Pindar must become a study of

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<sup>11</sup> Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:91 (my emphases).

<sup>12</sup> Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:35.

<sup>13</sup> See Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:47–53 and 83–91.



genre.”<sup>14</sup> Perhaps predictably the initial effect of his work was a heightened interest in the formal elements of epinician poetry. The subsequent identification of the many conventional rhetorical techniques available to the poet has clarified much that previously seemed irrelevant or incomprehensible,<sup>15</sup> and today it is generally accepted that Bundy and his followers benefited Pindaric scholarship by countering the romanticism and historicism of 19th and early 20th century scholarship.

However, formal analysis can lend itself to excess, and form alone cannot be expected to do justice to the complexity of poetry, something already pointed out by two early critics of Bundy and his followers, Young and Lloyd-Jones. Young sees the study of genre as nothing more than the basis for establishing the value of a poem as “a unique and individual work of art,” while Lloyd-Jones cautions that there is no one key to the understanding of great poetry and that the historical and social context of Pindar’s poems cannot simply be ignored.<sup>16</sup> As a consequence, as Kurke notes, “there has been a trend away from narrowly formalist readings toward a different kind of contextualization,”<sup>17</sup> which focuses on, for example, the performance of the odes or the social spheres evoked in them. Kurke herself interprets the odes on the basis of a “sociological poetics” which aims to reconstruct their social contexts of household, aristocracy and polis. Aspects of performance are treated by Mullen, Heath, Lefkowitz and Carey, while Stoddart investigates the legal framework within which the odes operate and Krummen uses the context of a religious festival specific to a particular poem as an interpretative aid.<sup>18</sup>

What all these studies have in common is an attempt to clarify a given aspect of the historical circumstances of the epinikia and the social practices and norms alluded to by Bundy, with a view to making

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<sup>14</sup> Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:92. Cf. also, for example, his insistence that the use of the theme of wealth “is carefully regulated by convention” (86).

<sup>15</sup> Some studies in this vein are Thummer 1968, Köhnken 1971, Hamilton 1974, Greengard 1980 and Race 1990.

<sup>16</sup> Young 1970:88 and Lloyd-Jones 1973:117. For references to other critical voices, see Goldhill 1991:128 n. 203. See also Stenger 2004:1–6 on the shortcomings of scholarship on *gnomai* in the victory ode which focuses almost exclusively on their formal aspects. He attributes this narrow reading of the *gnomai* to their being perceived as platitudes which make no significant contribution to the meaning of an ode.

<sup>17</sup> Kurke 1991b:10.

<sup>18</sup> Mullen 1982, Heath 1988, Heath and Lefkowitz 1991, Carey 1991, Stoddart 1990, Krummen 1990.

the poems more accessible to an audience not only far removed in time but also in culture and outlook. In their study of Sophokles' *Antigone*, Oudemans and Lardinois attribute the "unfamiliarity" which hampers interpretation, and which these studies attempt to overcome, to a profound difference in cosmology. Approaching it from an anthropological perspective, they define cosmology as

the cluster of preconceptions that a culture possesses regarding man's position between nature and the religious sphere, in various social connections, between birth and death, and in the order of being in general.<sup>19</sup>

Such a cosmology is as much part of the context of Pindar's epinikia as the then current conventions of performance or family law or religious ritual. In fact, it represents the overarching reality—in the sense of how the world is conceived by the people concerned, and how best to deal with the world thus experienced—against which all these elements play out. Furthermore, it is the foundation of the proprieties which, according to Bundy, must be observed when praising a successful man. Familiarity with the cosmological assumptions made in Pindar's odes should therefore facilitate our understanding of the aims of epinician poetry in general and the praise of a given victor in particular. The value of these assumptions lies in the light they throw on the poetry, and the fact that they often do not conform to twenty-first century views should not stand in the way of the pursuit of this understanding.<sup>20</sup>

If Bundy's basic assumption is accepted, namely that the exclusive purpose of every epinikion as a whole and in its parts is the glorification of the victor, but it is also recognised, as intimated in his work, that this purpose unfolds within a particular cosmological context, the question of the value assigned to victory must be re-examined. Does victory or superiority in general have the absolute value that the passages from Pindar quoted above seem to indicate? A brief look at their contexts reveals that in each case achievement is relativised with reference to the divine and the limits of mortal abilities. Hieron's future success is entrusted to god (θεός ἐπίτροπος, *Ol.* 1.106) and Theron's glory is a gift from the Tyndaridai (Θήρωνί τ' ἐλθεῖν κῦδος εὐίππων διδόντων Τυνδαριδᾶν, *Ol.* 3.39). Both are cautioned about the limits for mortals, Hieron as far as his position as king is concerned (μηκέτι πάπταινε πόρσιον, *Ol.*

<sup>19</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:1.

<sup>20</sup> But see Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:6 on the pervasiveness of cosmological presuppositions: "Prejudices of a cosmological nature constitute the conceptual framework of all scholarly effort, and do so tacitly in most cases."

1.114)<sup>21</sup> and Theron with reference to his ἀρεταί (τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον / κἄσσοφοῖς. οὐ νιν διώξω· κεινὸς εἶην, *Ol.* 3.44–45). Chromios of Aitna owes the glory of his success to the abilities he received from the gods (ἀρχαὶ δὲ βέβληνται θεῶν / κείνου σὺν ἀνδρὸς δαίμονιαις ἀρεταῖς, *Nem.* 1.8–9) and Phylakidas of Aigina is reminded that the courage that brings glory such as he has achieved is determined by the divine (κρίνεται δ' ἀλλὰ διὰ δαίμονας ἀνδρῶν, *Isthm.* 5.11). Moreover, important as success and praise are for a good life (12–13), mortal man must be satisfied with whatever share of good things is allotted to him and not strive for what belongs to the gods (14–16).<sup>22</sup>

Bundy's approach of using the encomiastic intention of all components of an epinikion as the point of departure for interpretation has proved to be remarkably fruitful over more than four decades.<sup>23</sup> His contention that epinician poetry has the one aim of praise and glorification of the victor can hardly be gainsaid. Even a sharp critic such as Pfeijffer, who rejects Bundy's claims about the interpretative power of rhetorical convention in favour of explaining an ode from the perspective of the specific occasion of its first performance and the particular people involved, subscribes to the idea that enhancing the glory of the victor is paramount,<sup>24</sup> thus illustrating Goldhill's remark that "(t)he history of modern criticism of Pindar ... turns on the notion of praise."<sup>25</sup> That the purpose of an ode is praise and glorification is not disputed, but what praise and glorification entail seems to admit of various opinions.

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<sup>21</sup> This cryptic statement is elucidated by two *gnomai* in which only slightly varied expressions of the same idea are used in more explicit contexts of man's limits:

for there is among mankind a very foolish kind of person, who scorns what is at hand and peers at things far away (παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω), chasing the impossible with hopes unfulfilled (*Pyth.* 3.21–23),

and

If a man peers at distant things (τὰ μακρὰ δ' εἶ τις / παπταίνει), he is too little to reach the gods' bronze-paved dwelling (*Isthm.* 7.43–44).

Cf. also the gnome about the "unattainable beyond," τὸ πόρσω ... ἄβατον, addressed to Theron in *Olympian* 3.

<sup>22</sup> For the Greek text and a more detailed discussion of these *gnomai*, see Chapter 3, pp. 61–62.

<sup>23</sup> One example is the ongoing discussion of the break-off. See, amongst others, Race 1980, Miller 1983, Miller 1993b, Kyriakou 1996 and Mackie 2003:9–37.

<sup>24</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:4–18.

<sup>25</sup> Goldhill 1991:128.

The examples from Pindar's odes show that glorifying a victor is not a matter of straightforward eulogising, the enumeration of a man's achievements and admirable character traits.<sup>26</sup> Success in general and victory at the games in particular are not presented as desirable goals in themselves, they acquire value in relation to the broader outlook of the community regarding both the divine and the social sphere. This need not mean that the epinikion is not primarily or even exclusively encomiastic, but it does mean that the concept of the glorification of a victor must be explicated. Since the poems make clear that there is more to life than victory and that the victor is not above the ordinary workings of the world, his glorification concerns in addition to his notable achievements his success in life, his overall excellence, of which the victory is but an example. References to the broader context against which the successful life is measured thus become a necessary part of the epinikion.<sup>27</sup> The investigation into the cosmological assumptions that constitute that broader context is therefore intended as a contribution to a better understanding of what the glorification of a victor entails.

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. Gentili 1990:118.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Goldhill's conclusion from his investigation into the tradition of the "declaration and preservation of *kleos*" from Homer to Pindar that "there is no discourse of praise that is not an expression of the changing, normative discourse of what it is to be a(n outstanding) man in society" (1991:166).



## CHAPTER TWO

### GNOMAI AS A SOURCE OF COSMOLOGICAL REFLECTION

Wisdom is a perennial aspect of culture found in various guises throughout the world.<sup>1</sup> Ancient Greece is no exception. Both its mythology and its literature, from Homer onwards, bear ample witness to the importance accorded to both wise individuals and the collective wisdom accumulated through human experience over time.

Prominent among the individual wise men were those specially gifted people who acted as seers and healers and were often closely connected to oracles and the practice of divination, such as Melampus, Kalchas, Teiresias, Amphiaraos and Asklepios. Other traditionally wise figures from myth were Nereus (the Old Man of the Sea), Phoenix, and the fatherly elder statesman Nestor. The centaur Cheiron occupies a special place as educator. In transferring his knowledge of medicine to Asklepios he founded a dynasty of healers that dominated Greek medicine for centuries, while his wisdom about life in general is acknowledged in his status as teacher of the Argonaut Jason and of Achilles, the greatest of all the Greek heroes.

Hesiod's lost work *Χείρωνος Ὑποθήκαι* purports to be Cheiron's precepts addressed to Achilles, but it is his *Works and Days* which is generally regarded as marking the beginning of Greek didactic poetry. Later important works in this tradition include the poetry of Phokylides, and the Theognidea. Also worth noting in this context is the poetry of Solon, one of the group of politicians honoured for their wisdom who became known as the Seven Sages. Acknowledging statesmen in this way is another manifestation of the importance accorded to wisdom in Greek society.<sup>2</sup> The use of wisdom sayings or *gnomai* is a primary characteristic of the didactic poetry mentioned so far.<sup>3</sup> However, *gnomai*

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<sup>1</sup> W.T. Wilson 1991:3, 9.

<sup>2</sup> On sages in general and the Seven in particular as poets, politicians and performers, see Martin 1993. See also Detienne 1996 (French original 1967):53–67 on Nereus. Stenger 2004:22 n. 78 contains more bibliography.

<sup>3</sup> Although very widely used, *gnomai* are of course not the only form in which wisdom can be communicated. Lardinois mentions similes and paradigmatic tales as

are also a conspicuous element in many non-didactic or non-sapiential works, albeit in a secondary role in support of a primary objective that is not the communication of wisdom itself. For example, *gnomai* are used extensively in Homer's epics, Pindar's and Bakchylides' epinicians and the dramas of Aischylos, Sophokles, Euripides and Menander.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter some of the modern scholarship on *gnomai* and the proverb,<sup>5</sup> as well as a few ancient discussions, will be reviewed in order to establish whether it would be legitimate to reconstruct a cosmology from Pindar's use of *gnomai*. Technical and formal analyses are considered only insofar as they touch on issues connected to this aim. Some pointers in Pindar's poetry will also be analysed.

*The nature of gnomai according to modern scholarship*

In both ancient and modern literature the Greek word γνώμη is often used as an umbrella term for various forms of wisdom sayings, indicating the difficulty of formulating watertight definitions.<sup>6</sup> Lardinois defines γνώμη as a “generalizing statement about particular human actions or the gods, often newly coined.” He also discusses παροιμία (“traditional, popular sentence or phrase, sometimes metaphorical”), ὑποθήκη (“instruction, sometimes in the form of a direct command”) and ἀπόφθεγμα (“short generalizing statement or retort, tied to a particular historical figure”), and concludes that γνώμη, as the most generic term, can include the others.<sup>7</sup>

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other possibilities (Lardinois 1997:234). See also on the *chreia*, a later form, Searby 1998:15–16 and W.T. Wilson 1991:15–16.

<sup>4</sup> See Lardinois 1995:278–353 for complete lists of the *gnomai* contained in archaic poetry from Homer to Pindar. He identifies 154 in the *Iliad*, 153 in the *Odyssey*, 124 in *Works and Days* and 298 in Pindar's epinicians (pp. 42, 190, 254 n. 1). On *gnomai* in the dramatists, see Ahrens [1937], Görler 1963, Stickney 1903, Tzifopoulos 1995 and Wolf 1910. See also Stenger 2004:6–20 for brief discussion with more bibliography of *gnomai* in Homer, Hesiod and the dramatists.

<sup>5</sup> Most non-classical scholarship focuses on the proverb rather than the *gnome* (or *maxim*), but as Russo 1997:56 notes, “(t)he difference amounts to very little.” Following Lardinois' definition (see below), I will regard the conclusions of proverb research as equally applicable to *gnomai*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Labarbe 1968:351–353. He hedges his definition, based on the work of ancient rhetoricians from Anaximenes to Jean de Sardes, with several reservations. On the difficulty of defining the proverb, see Russo 1983:129 n. 2 and Russo 1997:52, 145 nn. 11, 12.

<sup>7</sup> Lardinois 1995:19. See pp. 13–19 for his full treatment. Additional related terms

Lardinois' definition, while succinct, gives no indication of the purpose or authority of gnomonic statements. In his treatment of proverb and maxim (gnome) as prose wisdom genres, Russo describes their function as "persuad(ing) the listener and mov(ing) him to correct action by utterance of familiar, unassailable wisdom."<sup>8</sup> This moral-didactic intent or leaning of the use of gnomai in ancient Greece is based on observation of the world and what happens to mankind in the world. According to Spoerri gnomai have human life and experience as theme, more specifically "Stellung des Menschen in der Gemeinschaft; reale Beziehungen der Menschen und Dinge; Welt des Moralischen; transzendente Notwendigkeiten und Abhängigkeiten."<sup>9</sup> These themes echo the themes of the "cluster of preconceptions" which form a cosmology, as defined by Oudemans and Lardinois: man, nature and the gods, man in society, man and his mortality.<sup>10</sup> Wilson, too, regards wisdom as "a means of comprehending and describing human experience" and defines gnomai, as far as their purpose is concerned, as "assertions derived from human experience regarding ethical choice and behavior." It is their link with the realities of life that makes them useful in situations where choices regarding action have to be made.<sup>11</sup> Gnomai derive their authority not only from being grounded in everyday reality, but also, "because of (their) antiquity and accuracy of insight," from being "sanctioned or almost 'sanctified' by the culture as wisdom of the elders that must be taken seriously."<sup>12</sup>

There seems to be consensus among classical scholars that the gnomai of antiquity reflect the views of ancient communities on the nature of their world and how this world works with regard to both human and extra-human realities. Moreover, gnomai generally have enough authority to pronounce on how life should be lived in the world they portray.<sup>13</sup>

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mentioned under 'Gnome' in Cancik and Schneider 1998, 4:1109–1110 are ainos, aphorism, chreia, παραγγέλματα, gnomon (γνώμων) and priamel. I will follow Lardinois for the purpose of determining the material to be analysed in Pindar's victory odes.

<sup>8</sup> Russo 1997:57.

<sup>9</sup> Spoerri 1964:823.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 1, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> W.T. Wilson 1991:3, 11–12. For his comprehensive treatment of "The gnomonic saying in antiquity," see pp. 9–39.

<sup>12</sup> Russo 1983:121 on the proverb. Although not all gnomai can claim the authority of "antiquity," the gnomonic form can give weight to an otherwise non-traditional statement. On the distinguishing formal features of gnomai, see Lardinois 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Stenger 2004:37.



In his studies on *gnomai*, André Lardinois uses the insights of modern proverb research undertaken in the field of ethno- and sociolinguistics to analyse the forms and contexts in which *gnomai* occur in archaic Greek poetry.<sup>14</sup> While most paroemiological studies focus on formal features of the use of proverbs and their impact on interpreting meaning, some do remark, if only in passing, on the nature and significance of the themes often found in wisdom genres. Briggs, Abrahams and Babcock, and Jason base their studies on three different bodies of proverbs, oral performances in New Mexico, a fairly wide variety of literature from the twelfth century AD onwards, and a Yemeni Jewish collection respectively.<sup>15</sup>

According to Abrahams and Babcock, when proverbs are used in social discourse “they carry the force of appearing to embody norms and are therefore voiced by ones who appear to represent society.” If they are detached from an interactional situation, as may happen in some literary contexts, the “normative meaning” is retained, even if some of its persuasive power is lost.<sup>16</sup> The “sententious, hortatory potential” of proverbs,<sup>17</sup> also receives attention in Briggs’ analysis of the features of proverb performances in New Mexican Spanish. The performances often take place in a pedagogical context and aim at instilling the moral values which the proverbs convey in the form of general principles. The use of a proverb constitutes an interpretation of a specific situation and an injunction to act in a certain way, both in accordance with “the talk of the elders of bygone days”—rejection would mean a “violation of a basic value.”<sup>18</sup> Briggs concludes that proverb performances depend on both “the ‘traditional’ shared understandings” of a society and the applicability of the proverbs to “the minute details of everyday life.”<sup>19</sup>

Jason also notes the traditional nature and didactic intent of the proverb, as well as its close connection to life experience, sometimes just

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<sup>14</sup> See notes 3, 4 and 12. For details of what modern paroemiology can contribute to the study of ancient wisdom, see Lardinois 1997:213–217. Russo also acknowledges the importance of these studies (1997:144 nn. 2, 3 and 146 n. 14, and on the importance of context 1983:130 n. 6).

<sup>15</sup> Briggs 1985, Abrahams and Babcock 1977, Jason 1971.

<sup>16</sup> Abrahams and Babcock 1977:415.

<sup>17</sup> Abrahams and Babcock 1977:423.

<sup>18</sup> Briggs 1985:801–802. Cf. Abrahams and Babcock’s characterization of oral proverb usage as “an attempt of the speaker to ‘name’ and suggest an attitude toward a recurrent social situation” (1977:417).

<sup>19</sup> Briggs 1985:807.

summing it up, sometimes using it as the basis for advice.<sup>20</sup> Proverbs have meaning, or a message, within a given social context, insofar as they address the problems a society faces and suggest solutions. Jason identifies three problem areas with which the proverbs in his sample deal: normative behaviour, the relation of man to life and human suffering.<sup>21</sup>

These paroemiological studies, to the extent that they comment on the contents of proverbs, agree that they deal with the realities of human existence. Sometimes these realities are merely stated, but more often a proverb advises an attitude or action as a solution to the problems posed by everyday existence. Their didactic authority derives from their status as traditional wisdom which represents the accumulated life experience of a particular society. In this regard modern proverb research parallels the views of classical scholars on the nature of the use of *gnomai* in ancient Greece.

#### *Ancient thinking on gnomai*

Ancient references to or discussions of the use of *gnomai* are rare, and for the most part date from the fourth century BC and later.<sup>22</sup> Two applications of *gnomai* are of interest to these commentators, moral instruction or education, and rhetoric.

#### *Education through gnomai*

In a dialogue with Antiphon, Xenophon has Sokrates describe the proper way of dealing with the writings of the past so that their practical value may become apparent (*Memorabilia* 1.6.11–14). Instead of demanding a fee for his companionship and teaching, like the sophists, he prefers making friends of those gifted by nature (εὐφυσῶν) and teaching them “all the good I can” (τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν). The study of literature is part of this process:

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<sup>20</sup> Jason 1971:617–619.

<sup>21</sup> Jason 1971:619–622.

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the earliest references, especially Aristophanes’ satiric use of the term, see Sinclair 1995:40–41. For Plato’s use of proverbs, see Kindstrand 1978:73.

καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίπτων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρομαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀρθῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγομεθα.

And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it (*Mem.* 1.6.14; trans. Marchant and Todd 1923, 1968 printing).

The literary treasures he analyses with his friends can reasonably be assumed to include *gnomai*.<sup>23</sup> The value of this wisdom is unlocked only in the interaction between teacher and student, or through the give and take between friends (Sokrates says “we set much store on being useful to one another”). This contrasts with the handsome young Euthydemos’ naive assumption that the possession of a good library would be sufficient to teach him the ἀρετή he needs to fulfil his ambition of becoming a great leader (*Mem.* 4.2). Gaining and honing wisdom is an active and interactive process. If this proviso is kept in mind, literature in general, and *gnomai* in particular, can be a fruitful source of advice on conducting the life of virtue which Sokrates, in this portrayal by Xenophon, champions.

In his treatises *To Demonikos* and *To Nikokles* from the period 374–370,<sup>24</sup> the Athenian orator and educator Isokrates, like Xenophon’s Sokrates, recommends the works of poets and sages as a guide to a virtuous life. The young man Demonikos is advised to collect *akousmata* or sayings into a body of wisdom that will be useful for his education, “for as the body is by nature disposed to be strengthened by suitable exercises, the soul is by nature disposed to be strengthened by serious statements” (τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὐξεσθαι πέφυκε, *Ad Dem.* 12). In the final remarks addressed to Demonikos, he is urged to strive for *καλοκαγαθία* (goodness, nobleness, *Ad Dem.* 51). To this end he should follow the advice given by the writer

<sup>23</sup> In his conversation with Euthydemos Sokrates equates the θησαυροὺς ... σοφίας with the τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας (4.2.9). Cf. Barns 1951:7. Barns discusses the passages in the *Memorabilia* in connection with the origin and use of *gnomologia*. The selection of what is ἀγαθόν, with its moral overtones, certainly points to *gnomai*. However, from 1.2.56–59 it is clear that Sokrates also interpreted non-gnomic material as a guide to action.

<sup>24</sup> Too and Mirhady favour the (often challenged) attribution of *To Demonikos* to Isokrates. See Too 1995:58 n. 53 and Mirhady and Too 2000:19. For the present purposes it is deemed sufficient that the work deals with the same topics and is regarded as from the same period as *To Nikokles* (on the dating, see Mirhady and Too 2000:10, 19).

(the treatise contains a collection of gnomonic or gnome-like statements on various aspects of the virtuous life), but he must also familiarise himself with the works of poets and other wise men (σοφισταί). The purpose of this reading is to select from it useful material, as the following simile makes clear:

ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν μέλιτταν ὀρῶμεν ἐφ’ ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ βλαστήματα καθιζάνουσαν, ἀφ’ ἑκάστου δὲ τὰ βέλτιστα λαμβάνουσαν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τοὺς παιδείας ὀρεγομένους μηδενὸς μὲν ἀπείρως ἔχειν, πανταχόθεν δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα συλλέγειν.

For just as we see the bee settling on all the flowers, and sipping the best from each, so also those who aspire to culture ought not to leave anything untasted, but should gather useful knowledge from every source.

(*Ad Dem.* 52; trans. Norlin 1928)

Just as the bee visits many flowers, but takes away only the nectar to produce honey, a man who wishes to achieve *καλοκαγαθία* should read the poets and other purveyors of wisdom and take from them the *χρήσιμα* that will guide him in his efforts.<sup>25</sup> From the earlier references to *akousmata* and “serious statements,” as well as the nature of the treatise itself, it can be concluded that what the writer has in mind is a selection of wisdom sayings from the poets and sages that can be used as an educational tool.

Literature is also accorded a major role in the education of a king as it is envisaged by Isokrates in *Tō Nikokles*. As in *Tō Demonikos* the object is to promote a life of virtue (ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, *Ad Nic.* 8). Since the aim is practical, usefulness is the criterion for judging poetry, not aesthetics or entertainment value. This applies to the *hypothekai* of the poets of old, one of the private citizen’s many opportunities for education: they are moral instructions that teach how one should live (ὡς χρὴ ζῆν, *Ad Nic.* 3). For a king the counsels of literature are even more important, since social isolation limits him, according to Isokrates, to two sources of instruction. One is contemporary wisdom, in the form of wise, prudent people (φρόνιμοι) with whom the king should surround himself, the other the work of famous poets and sages, which he cannot afford to ignore (μῆτε τῶν ποιητῶν τῶν εὐδοκμοῦντων μῆτε τῶν σοφιστῶν μηδενὸς οἴου δεῖν ἀπείρως ἔχειν, *Ad Nic.* 13).

<sup>25</sup> For detailed discussion, with references to other relevant texts, of this image and its implications for the use of gnomologia in education, see Barns 1950:132–134, and 1951:6–7.

The bulk of the treatise consists of Isokrates' own advice, but in the final section he elaborates on poetry as instruction while contrasting pleasure and usefulness as criteria for judging the worth of things and men (*Ad Nic.* 50). Most people regard both poetry and prose containing advice (τὰ συμβουλευόντα) as the most useful (χρησιμώτατα), yet they find no pleasure in listening to it, just as they would praise those who admonish them, but then associate with people as imperfect as they themselves are (*Ad Nic.* 42). This is illustrated by their reaction to the poetry of Hesiod, Theognis and Phokylides. They are acknowledged as the best counsellors on human life (ἀρίστους ... συμβούλους τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων) but their counsels (ὑποθήκαι) are regularly ignored (*Ad Nic.* 43). The same lot befalls the gnomai of the most outstanding poets:

ἔτι δ' εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας, ἐφ' αἷς ἐκείνοι μάλιστα' ἐσπούδασαν, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς ταύτας διατεθείεν· ἥδιον γὰρ ἂν κωμωδίας τῆς φανλοτάτης ἢ τῶν οὕτω τεχνικῶς πεποιημένων ἀκούσαιεν.

And further, if one were to pick out the so-called gnomai of the most outstanding poets, into which they have put their best efforts (about which they were most serious), they would treat them also in the same way; for they would listen to the commonest (most thoughtless) comedy with more pleasure than to such artistically created things

(*Ad Nic.* 44; my translation).

Against the poor judgment of the ordinary run of people, stands Isokrates' high regard for what is useful. He not only gives his own view that the gnomai represent the refinement of art compared with the common appeal of comedy, but also states confidently that the poets themselves attached the highest value to them.

The contrasting of poetry that fulfils a useful purpose with that which aims at the pleasure of the masses is extended to Homer and the first tragedians (*Ad Nic.* 48–49). Their work is acceptable to those who disregard the advice contained in poetic hypothekai and gnomai because they avoid the useful (τοὺς ὠφελμωτάτους τῶν λόγων) and concentrate on the fictional (τοὺς μυθωδεστάτους) and on action (τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰς ἀμίλλας). While these poets may be admired for their insight into human nature, Isokrates does not regard them as models where admonition and advice are concerned.

It is clear that Isokrates' initial broad recommendation not to neglect any of the famous poets is not an invitation to study literature for its own sake or for any pleasure it may bring. For him the value of poetry

is strictly practical and is to be found in the wisdom artfully expressed by poets in *hypothekai* and *gnomai*.<sup>26</sup>

### *Gnomai in rhetoric*

Two fourth century treatises on rhetoric deal with *gnomai*, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the roughly contemporary handbook known as *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which is generally accepted to be the work of Anaximenes of Lampsakos (c. 380–320).<sup>27</sup> The application of *gnomai* in rhetoric differs fundamentally from the value Isokrates and Xenophon's Sokrates attach to the wisdom of old in the pursuit of virtue. In the latter case the study of wisdom sayings is recommended for their content, the actual advice they contain. Neither Sokrates nor Isokrates concerns himself with the linguistic form of a *gnome* and how this may be exploited to achieve certain effects, while this is the starting point in both Anaximenes' and Aristotle's discussion. Both give a definition followed by an explanation with examples of the ways in which the *gnomic* form can be used in speeches.

According to Anaximenes a *gnome* is “in brief an expression of a personal opinion on matters in general” (Γνώμη δ' ἔστι μὲν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ καθ' ὅλων τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματος ἰδίου δήλωσις, *Rh. Al.* 11, 1430a40–b1). The proofs (πίστεις) that can be used to support a speaker's position are of two types, those derived from actual words, actions and people (direct proof), and those supplementary to what is said and done (*Rh. Al.* 7, 1428a17–19). Surprisingly, given their apparent subjectivity, *gnomai* constitute direct proof. However, comparison with Anaximenes' definition of the speaker's opinion or judgment, one of the supplementary proofs, shows that the effect of a personal standpoint depends on how it is formulated: “The opinion (judgment) of the speaker is the representation of his own understanding of things” (Ἡ μὲν οὖν δόξα τοῦ λεγοντός ἐστι τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανίζειν κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, *Rh. Al.* 14, 1431b9–10). Both definitions concern a personal viewpoint. The difference lies in the qualification by καθ' ὅλων of the things on which an opinion is expressed in a *gnome*. An opinion functions

<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of Isokrates' use of the terms ὑποθήκη and γνώμη, see Biellohlawek 1940:56–57 and Lardinois 1995:18 n. 62.

<sup>27</sup> For bibliography on this attribution, see Stenger 2004:29 n. 98. According to Kennedy 1991:27, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is of slightly later date than the *Rhetoric*, while Sinclair 1995:42, 201 n. 25 follows Grimaldi 1972:75–81 and Sprute 1982:144–145 in placing it earlier.

as supplementary proof (δόξα) and shares the subjectivity of other such proofs (μαρτυρία, βάσανος, ὄρκος—voluntary evidence, evidence under torture, evidence under oath) when it pronounces on particular actions, but it can also be made to appear objective (δόγμα), and thus suitable for use as a logical or direct proof, by casting it in the general terms of a gnome.<sup>28</sup>

However, the gnomic form does not change the personal viewpoint, as Anaximenes' discussion of examples shows. Four of the five examples are formulated as personal opinions by the use of μοι δοκεῖ and μοι δοκοῦσιν. Furthermore, he does not turn to literature (as Aristotle does) for pre-formulated concepts, but lists methods for making gnomai as the occasion arises (πολλὰς δὲ ποιήσομεν αὐτάς), i.e. while the form is conventional, the content is newly invented for every situation. For Anaximenes, then, a gnome is a means to give a personal opinion the appearance of a generally accepted truth.

An important distinction between Aristotle's treatment of gnomai in *Rhetoric* 2.21 and that of Anaximenes, is the ethical foundation the former gives it in his definition:

ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτὰ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν.

A maxim is an assertion—not, however, one about particulars, such as what kind of a person Iphicrates is, but of a general sort, and not about everything (for example, not that the straight is the opposite of the crooked) but about things that involve actions and are to be chosen or avoided in regard to action. (*Rh.* 2.21.2; trans. Kennedy 1991)

In terms of this definition, gnomai concern principles applicable to human conduct and thus extend beyond the personal opinion of the speaker. The ethical position is strengthened by Aristotle's choice of examples from the poets, whose moral authority is undisputed. Sinclair comments as follows on the significance of this approach: "(H)is clear implication (is) that a maxim has reference to an external ethical code with which the speaker wishes to identify himself." It is useful not in the first place as "a personal formulation," but as "a general statement

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Sinclair 1995:42: "The chief contribution of maxims to the forceful execution of an argument, (Anaximenes) says, is in their corroborative force as a summarizing conclusion." Also, according to Briggs 1985:803 "successful proverb performances are akin to logical proofs of the performer's point of view in the conversation."

which is held to be true among people sharing a common ethics.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, when a speaker utters a gnome, he relies on it that his audience will regard it not as a subjective opinion about a particular case, but as a principle, general in nature and generally accepted, that is applicable to the case in hand.

While in Anaximenes’ view the gnomonic form is useful to make an opinion appear of general significance, Aristotle sees gnomai as general principles which happen to express the speaker’s point of view.<sup>30</sup> Although approaching the use of gnomai from opposite ends, both treatments reflect the orator’s need to convince an audience of the general validity of a particular standpoint. From the Anaximeneian point of view gnomai recommend themselves for this task through their ability to “represent ... as authoritative conclusions ... insights that are subjective and contingent.” For the Aristotelian orator gnomai can serve as an objective verification of an argument since they “normally purport to embody the forever and universally valid findings of common human experience.”<sup>31</sup>

#### *The value of gnomai in education and rhetoric*

An example of the way in which gnomai were used in fourth century education and rhetoric, is provided by the Athenian orator Aischines in his speech *Against Ktesiphon*, written c. 330 BC:

[134] And our city, the common refuge of the Greeks, to which in former days used to come the embassies of all Hellas, each city in turn to find safety with us, our city is now no longer contending for the leadership of Hellas, but from this time on for the soil of the fatherland. And this has come upon us from the time when Demosthenes came into political leadership. Well does the poet Hesiod speak concerning such men; for he says somewhere, instructing the people and advising the cities (παιδεύων τὰ πλήθη καὶ συμβουλευόντων ταῖς πόλεις) not to take to themselves corrupt politicians—but I will myself recite the verses (τὰ ἔπη); [135] for this is the reason, I think, that in our childhood we commit to memory the sentiments of the poets (τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας), that when we are men we may make use of them (αὐταῖς χρῶμεθα):

<sup>29</sup> Sinclair 1995:44. See also Stenger 2004:31–32.

<sup>30</sup> Or which he can manipulate to give credibility to a contradictory view. For details on how Aristotle applies his definition to different rhetorical situations, see Sinclair 1995:44–49.

<sup>31</sup> W.T. Wilson 1991:12, 19 (commenting on gnomai in general).



Oftimes whole peoples suffer from one man,  
Whose deeds are sinful, and whose purpose base.

...

[136] If you disregard the poet's meter and examine only his thought (τὰς γνώμας), I think this will seem to you to be, not a poem of Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes. For by his politics army and navy and peoples have been utterly destroyed.

(Trans. Adams 1919, repr. 1948)

It is clear that Aischines attaches didactic value to the *gnomai*<sup>32</sup> of the poets. He sees it as the poet Hesiod's purpose, when using a gnome such as the quoted example (*Works and Days* 240–247), to instruct and give advice. The ability of *gnomai* to do this is not, however, restricted to the original setting and audience. Many generations later they are still useful as an educational tool because they articulate conclusions drawn from general human experience.<sup>33</sup> According to Aischines, the purpose of studying the poets' *gnomai* in one's youth is to prepare one for using them as guidelines when one is a man (ἄνδρες ὄντες), with all the responsibilities that manhood implies, including political decisions. Had the Athenians heeded what they had learnt from the poets in childhood, Aischines suggests, a man such as Demosthenes would not have been allowed to take control of the city, and the city would not have found itself in the current crisis.

When Aischines says (γνώμας) χρώμεθα, he reminds his audience of the power of the poets to help them conduct daily life properly. His own use of *gnomai* stretches further, however. This passage illustrates his awareness of the value of *gnomai* as a rhetorical tool. He does not expect the audience simply to accept his word for it that Demosthenes is the cause of Athens' woes. He presents his portrayal of the situation as a specific instance of a general principle, ancient but still valid,

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<sup>32</sup> Aischines uses γνώμη twice in this passage, with reference to poets in general before quoting Hesiod (135), and referring to Hesiod in particular after the quotation (136). Especially in the second case he is probably not using it as a technical (rhetorical) term like Aristotle in *Rh.* 2.21 or Anaximenes in *Rh. Al.* 11, 1430a40–b1, but rather to indicate “thoughts” or perhaps “opinions.” To the quotation itself he refers as τὰ ἔπη, which could be rendered “words” or “words of advice, counsel” or “(epic) poetry” (LSJ s.v. ἔπος). The remarks about the didactic purpose of the quoted words certainly differentiate them from the rhetorical purposes described by Aristotle and Anaximenes, but in form (a general statement) they are a gnome and are used rhetorically by Aischines, as shown below.

<sup>33</sup> On the change from “coining” *gnomai* to directly quoting from a source, see Lardinois 2001:94 n. 8.

framed in the gnomic statement that “ofttimes whole peoples suffer from one man, whose deeds are sinful, and whose purpose base.” The gnome is expanded by a recital of the ways in which the gods punish such people, punishments with which the beleaguered Athenians can identify, and is quoted as confirmation or proof of Aischines’ arguments about Demosthenes. Finally, by citing such a revered poet as Hesiod, he claims the backing of a figure of ancient authority, thus further strengthening his case.

With the exception of Anaximenes, all the ancient writers who explicitly refer to Greek wisdom as it is expressed in gnomai, acknowledge the role of the poets and wise men of the fifth century and earlier in this tradition, either by mentioning them or using their work as a source of examples. Although there is no discussion about the particular topics treated by the poets, some inferences can be made from the practical application of the gnomai in education and rhetoric.

In both cases gnomai are valued for their relevance to a particular situation. In education their credibility as a means of instruction depends on whether they convey information that is useful for making the right choices and determining how to lead a (morally) successful life. Credibility is equally crucial in rhetoric, since there the general truth a gnome is assumed to convey must be strong enough to support an argument. Whether this is done, following Aristotle’s analysis, by using gnomai as logical proof, or to evoke a specific emotion, or to enhance the speaker’s standing, it is essential to take actual human experience into account.<sup>34</sup>

The fourth century evidence on gnomai places their usefulness and practical applicability centrally and assumes that they deal with the real world in which humans live and have to survive. The poetic gnomai to which educators and rhetoricians refer can therefore be regarded as a reflection of and on life as it is perceived in the society to which

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<sup>34</sup> Aristotle’s example of the use a speaker should make of an audience’s preconceived ideas is a case in point:

... people are pleased if someone in a general observation hits upon opinions that they themselves have about a particular instance ... for example, if some one (*sic*) had met up with bad neighbors or children, he would accept a speaker’s saying that nothing is worse than having neighbors or that nothing is more foolish than begetting children  
(*Rh.* 2.21.15, trans. Kennedy 1991).

For the different types of entechnic proofs (artistic, ‘created by art’), see *Rh.* 1.2.2–6.

these poets, educators and rhetoricians belong, and they are prized for their relevance to matters of real importance to the people concerned.

### *Pindar and gnomai*

The ancient discussions of *gnomai* all date from well over a century after Pindar was active. The question therefore arises whether fourth century views on the nature and use of *gnomai* can in any way be related to Pindar's usage. Slater contends that ancient poets like Pindar used as basis for their work a stockpile of material shared by their audiences. This included "rules for the good life, ... *hypothekai* and proverbial wisdom."<sup>35</sup> Evidence for this view in Pindar's epinikia may be the marking of certain *gnomai* as such by the use of the descriptive nouns λόγος, ἔπος, ῥῆμα and ἐφημοσύνα or the verbs of saying φαμί and λέγω, as well as their attribution to a specific sage or the wise men of old in general.<sup>36</sup> The singling out of one of Homer's ῥῆμα in *Pythian* 4.277–278 (τῶν δ' Ὀμήρου καὶ τόδε συνθήμενος / ῥῆμα πόρρον') also perhaps implies that a corpus of 'Homeric proverbs' was in circulation.<sup>37</sup> In addition there are several instances of the use of *gnomai* in a didactic context which can be traced to the *Iliad* on the one hand and on the other linked to the much later teachings of Isokrates and Xenophon's Sokrates discussed above. According to Bielohlawek the father-son instructions in *Iliad* 6.207–210, 9.252–259 and 11.783–790 are the first evidence in Greek literature of the existence of independently

<sup>35</sup> Slater 1977:194, 199. Cf. on the formal level Bundy's statement that the rhetorical conventions used by Pindar and Bakchylides "protect(...) the artistic integrity of a community of poets working within well-recognized rules of form and order" (Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:3).

<sup>36</sup> λόγος: *Pyth.* 1.35, 3.80, 8.38, 9.94, *Nem.* 3.29, 9.6; ἔπος: *Isthm.* 6.67, fr. 35b; ῥῆμα: *Pyth.* 4.278, *Isthm.* 2.10; ἐφημοσύνα: *Pyth.* 6.20; φαμί: *Pyth.* 4.287, 7.19; λέγω: *Nem.* 6.56; sages: *Pyth.* 4.277 (Homer), 6.22 (Cheiron), 8.39 (Amphiaraos), 9.38 (Cheiron), 9.94 (Nereus), *Isthm.* 2.9 ("the Argive"), 6.67 (Hesiod), *Pyth.* 3.80 (προτέρων), fr. 35b (σοφοί). Cf. also *Pyth.* 2.21–25 (Ixion) and 4.263–269 (Oedipus). Examples from Simonides are fr. 542.11–12 (saying of Pittakos), fr. 579 (ἔστι τις λόγος, followed by his version of Hesiod *Op.* 289–292), fr. 602 (†ὁ δὲ μῦθος) and eleg. 8.1–2 (Homer, quoting *Il.* 6.146), and from Bakchylides Ode 3.78–79 (χαρὴ διδύμους ἀέξειν / γνώμας) and Ode 5.191–194 (Hesiod). On the citation of Hesiod and the Seven Sages as evidence that Pindar and Bakchylides worked consciously in an "ideengeschichtlichen" tradition, see Maehler 1963:94 with n. 4. For a discussion of Pindar's use of similar markers to introduce myth, see Mackie 2003:67–71.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Braswell 1988:378. For a detailed analysis of how Pindar reworked *Iliad* 15.206–207 in this passage, see Mace 1992:177–182.

formulated wisdom teachings.<sup>38</sup> Pindar refers to this practice twice in praise of his patrons: Hieron is a “guide, instructing his son” (ἄγητῆρ ἀνήρ, / υἱῶ τ’ ἐπιτελλόμενος, *Pyth.* 1.69–70) and Lampon urges his sons to follow him in industriousness with reference to an ἔπος of Hesiod (*Isthm.* 6.66–68). This didactic tradition is also reflected in gnomic passages involving Cheiron (*Pyth.* 6.20–26), Nereus (*Pyth.* 9.93–96) and “the Argive” (*Isthm.* 2.9–12).<sup>39</sup>

As far as the use of *gnomai* as a rhetorical tool is concerned, there is no extant evidence that Aristotle’s and Anaximenes’ treatment builds on a tradition that goes back to either literature or rhetoric in the fifth century and earlier.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless it is probable that some account of rhetorical techniques applicable to poetry, including the use of wisdom sayings, existed in Pindar’s time. Slater regards this as a matter of “common sense,” considering the similarity between and complexity of the poems of Simonides, Pindar and Bakchylides.<sup>41</sup> *Nemean* 4.33, where the epinician narrator refers to poetic convention, τεθμός, that would have him cut short his praise of the Aiakidai, supports this contention.<sup>42</sup> Also, a measure of continuity can be deduced from both Aristotle’s use of literary examples<sup>43</sup> and Aristophanes’ satiric use of γνώμη and its derivatives.

It seems reasonable to assume that Pindar’s use of *gnomai* as a didactic or rhetorical tool did not differ substantially from that described by later educators and rhetoricians. The question nevertheless remains whether the pronouncements contained in proverbs and *gnomai* can be used as the basis for describing the cosmology of the society in which Pindar worked. Shimkin and Sanjuan, in their anthropological study “Culture and world view: A method of analysis applied to rural Rus-

<sup>38</sup> Biellohlawek 1940:5–6.

<sup>39</sup> On these and other so-called “expert” passages, see Mace 1992:14–21.

<sup>40</sup> Referring to Cairns 1972, Slater 1979:79 says that

we do not possess the requisite materials for determining the precise debt of poetry to rhetoric or vice versa, because we have neither handbooks of poetry composition nor a comprehensive ancient work on genre theory.

<sup>41</sup> Slater 1979:79. According to Cairns 1972:36 “in antiquity there was no fixed boundary between poetry and rhetoric at any period.”

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:3 n. 11, who interprets τεθμός as a reference to “rules of order.” Carey 1980:147 denies the existence of any formal rule.

<sup>43</sup> Stenger 2004:33 n. 120 goes as far as inferring from these examples that Aristotle intended his remarks on *gnomai* to be applied to poetry as well as rhetoric. See the same note for bibliography on the relationship between poetry and rhetoric.

sia,” argue that it can be done. They analyse the proverbs of three pre-revolutionary Russian communities in order to establish “the major attitudes and psycho-dynamic patterns common to relatively homogeneous communities.”<sup>44</sup> World view (or cosmology), as revealed in the proverbs, is presented regarding three socio-psychological aspects, social relations (e.g. with family and friends, women, different social groups), philosophical orientation (e.g. towards the life cycle, God, other supernatural and natural forces, love, piety and justice) and psycho-dynamic indicators (e.g. control, anxiety and impulse, level of aspiration).

As noted in the discussion of modern paroemiological research above, proverbs are accepted as guidelines for behaviour by the communities concerned. The authors regard them as suitable for the project since they are more likely to express communal viewpoints than any statements made by individuals. Moreover, their flexibility of form means that they can be continually adapted and are thus likely to “reflect local, living attitudes and psychodynamically expressive features.”<sup>45</sup> A further factor is that the proverb collections available to them are large enough, at over 300 examples, to be statistically acceptable. All these factors are mirrored either in the status of *gnomai* in ancient Greek society generally or in the Pindaric corpus.<sup>46</sup> The didactic nature of *gnomai* need not be argued further, and they can only function as such if they represent commonly accepted views.<sup>47</sup> Like the Russian proverbs, standard themes in Greek *gnomai* are varied to suit a particular occasion.<sup>48</sup> Finally, the number of *gnomai* in the *epinikia*, around 300, is large enough to ensure valid conclusions.

The limitations of proverbs as an indication of world view, also in the case of Pindar’s poetry, must nevertheless be kept in mind as well. There is always likely to be a bias towards the views of a dominant group, in this case adult males. Furthermore, some form of self-censorship, determined by the circumstances of the time and the social status of the group, may have occurred. Finally, the historical remove

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<sup>44</sup> Shimkin and Sanjuan 1953:345.

<sup>45</sup> Shimkin and Sanjuan 1953:329.

<sup>46</sup> Since the aim of the study by Shimkin and Sanjuan is cross-cultural comparison, their method of analysis of the proverb material is not relevant to my project. For a summary of the method, see Shimkin and Sanjuan 1953:345.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Slater 1977:199: “All these precepts and proverbs ... are exactly what (Pindar’s) audience already knows and accepts.”

<sup>48</sup> Lardinois 2001, esp. 95–97 and 105–107.

at which the study is done all but eliminates the possibility of taking into account any implicit connotations attached to a proverb in local circumstances, which means that only the explicit meaning is available for analysis.<sup>49</sup>

*The “true point” of gnomai*

The value of gnomai as cosmology is demonstrated in *Pythian* 3 in an encounter between the epinician narrator and his main addressee, Hieron:

εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφάν, Ἰέρων,  
 ὀρθάν ἐπίστα, μανθάνων οἴσθα προτέρων  
 ἐν παρ’ ἐσλὸν πήματα σύνδου δαίονται βροτοῖς  
 ἀθάνατοι. τὰ μὲν ὦν  
 οὐ δύναται νήπιοι κόσμῳ φέρειν,  
 ἀλλ’ ἀγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω.

And since<sup>50</sup> you, Hieron, know how to understand the true point of sayings, you know, learning (continuously) from those of former times:

one good for two misfortunes the immortals distribute to mortals. These now the foolish cannot bear decorously, but the noble can, turning the good things outward.

(*Pyth.* 3.80–83; my translation)

The narrator praises Hieron as one who has learnt to appreciate the wisdom of the ancients and therefore knows what their “true point” is, and, it is implied, how to apply this knowledge to his own life. In the following two gnomai he reminds Hieron, first, of the framework within which sense can be made of the current misfortune of his illness (evil predominates over good and in this man is subject to the will of the gods), and second, of the acceptable way of dealing with this situation (emphasize the good, bear the bad gracefully). Thus the two gnomai exemplify the two broad strands of any world view, description of the world as man finds it, and recommendations on how man should conduct himself in such a world.

<sup>49</sup> Shimkin and Sanjuan 1953:329.

<sup>50</sup> On the conditional εἰ as virtual, see Mace 1992:30 n. 32. Cf. also Smyth 1959:504–505.

In his overview of pre-philosophical popular Greek views of the world and man's place in it Lloyd is at pains to point out the shortcomings of literary works as evidence for such ideas.<sup>51</sup> Not only does the author of a particular work stand between contemporary readers and the people of ancient times whose opinions he is purported to convey. The very fact of the survival of a text and with it certain ideas and not others depended on the values and choices of people as remote from ancient Greek society as late antiquity and the Middle Ages. However, Lloyd's main concern is that the works of, for example, Homer, Hesiod and the tragedians should not be read as in any way representing a "coherent, unified, comprehensive set of ideas" which is derived from an overarching theory of the world.<sup>52</sup>

The proposed overview of the cosmological outlook reflected in the *gnomai* in Pindar's work is not an attempt to reconstruct such a theory, but it does aim to impose a modicum of order on the recurring references in his oeuvre to fundamental questions of human existence, in the hope that this will enhance the reading of individual poems. Although there is no indication that Pindar consciously worked within a systemized cosmology, his use of *gnomai* in the section of *Pythian* 3 analysed above does point to at least an intuitive understanding that the "true point" of wisdom sayings was a way of looking at the world and acting in accordance with that view. The *gnomai* can therefore be considered as adequate, if flawed, evidence for the cosmological assumptions underlying Pindar's poetry.

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<sup>51</sup> Lloyd 2000:20–22.

<sup>52</sup> Lloyd 2000:21.

### CHAPTER THREE

## THE GNOMIC EXPRESSION OF COSMOLOGY IN PINDAR

### *Definitions and assumptions*

Before the cosmology revealed in Pindar's *gnomai* is described, it is necessary to clarify certain terminological and other issues. Cosmology as it is usually understood today is a branch of metaphysics and constitutes "the science of the nature, structure, and origin of the universe as a whole."<sup>1</sup> This definition, which implies an objective approach, or at least one in which the main focus is on the universe, not man and human life in the universe, differs substantially from the one given by Oudemans and Lardinois, which makes man and his place in the world the central issues of a cosmology.<sup>2</sup> In terms of their anthropological approach cosmology concerns "man's relation with nature, his gods, his fellow men, life and death, order and law, and insight."<sup>3</sup> When these cosmological categories are used to interpret and make more accessible societies and their cultural products distant from one's own (in time, place or fundamental nature), cosmology usually presents itself in the form of a popular and unsystemized world view which directs people's lives and behaviour without their necessarily being aware of it,<sup>4</sup> rather than as the systematic scientific or philosophical endeavour of what may be termed metaphysical cosmology.<sup>5</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to describe the main cosmological assumptions underlying Pindar's poetry as they are expressed in *gnomai*, a form of popular wisdom.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., 563.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter 1, p. 7 for their definition.

<sup>3</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:33.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:14.

<sup>5</sup> See Furley 2000 for an overview of Greek scientific cosmology from the earliest philosophers to the Epicureans and Stoics.

<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of the vision of the universe underlying *Hymn* 1, see Hardie 2000. Although he detects both Presocratic and mystic influences in Pindar's "lyric cosmogony," there is no indication that it is based on a systematic scientific study of the subject.



Since the cosmology revealed in this way cannot be more formal than its source, the term will be used in its non-scientific, non-philosophical sense.<sup>7</sup>

If it is accepted that cosmology provides a framework for human life and action, even if subconsciously, a close connection can be expected between cosmology and morality, i.e. the principles, criteria and values which determine moral choices and moral judgments.<sup>8</sup> For example, the epinician speaker bases his refusal to attribute gluttony to a god on the statement that “impoverishment is often the lot of slanderers” (ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους, *Ol.* 1.53). The gnome rests on the moral principle that the gods should not be slandered, which in turn acknowledges the cosmological tenet of divine power over human life. In general most popular moral principles can be assumed to be founded on the cosmological outlook of the given society. Conversely, a popular cosmology can be expected to have moral implications. Since cosmology and morality are often closely interwoven in the gnomai to be investigated in this chapter, no effort will be made to make a sharp distinction. Rather, the concept of cosmology will be broadened to include, besides a description of the world and man in the world, recommendations for living in the world thus described, i.e. cosmology will be considered to have a moral dimension.

I argued in Chapter 2 that gnomai lend themselves to establishing a society’s world view. However, while statements with cosmological significance are concentrated in Pindar’s gnomai, they are by no means the only way in which such issues are addressed. For example, the recounting of a myth may reveal cosmological assumptions,<sup>9</sup> or the epinician narrator may reflect such assumptions in his comments on a winner’s personal characteristics and his way of life. Gnomai are nevertheless convenient for gaining an overview of the cosmology underlying Pindar’s work before analysing complete victory odes to establish the

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<sup>7</sup> It might be argued that ‘cosmology’ should then also be abandoned for a more ‘popular’ term such as ‘world view’ or the German ‘Weltanschauung.’ These have in their favour an emphasis on the human perspective, as appears from two dictionary definitions: “(A) comprehensive view or personal philosophy of human life and the universe” (*Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, s.v.) and “(D)ie Art, wie der Mensch die Welt u(nd) ihren Sinn sowie sein Dasein in ihr betrachtet u(nd) beurteilt” (*Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch*, s.v.). They may occasionally be used as synonyms for ‘cosmology;’ however, their drawback is that derivatives are not possible.

<sup>8</sup> Dover 1974:1.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Stenger 2004:54 on the generalizing tendency of both gnomai and myth.

implications of this view and experience of reality for the victor as well as his family and wider social circle.

A final question regards the categorisation of cosmological themes in the *gnomai*. Any ordering of such material must to a large extent be arbitrary. Since no comprehensive ancient treatments of early Greek cosmology exist as a guide to how contemporary thinkers may have structured the world, classifications tend to be influenced by the background and interests of those analysing the material.<sup>10</sup> Also, the nature of the works on which a classification is based can influence the relative importance attached to different categories. In the case of Pindar's victory odes, for example, there is a strong emphasis on human endeavour and success as well as on the value of poetry in the greater scheme of things, which forces a decision on whether to incorporate these aspects into broader categories or to grant them the status of separate categories. Finally, the interconnected nature of Greek cosmology makes clear distinctions between categories difficult.<sup>11</sup>

The classification that I will use to analyse Pindar's *gnomai* with a view to their cosmological content is based on a combination of the six cosmological categories of Oudemans and Lardinois and the three socio-psychological dimensions of Shimkin and Sanjuan already referred to.<sup>12</sup> The two main categories are philosophical orientation,<sup>13</sup> and man in society. Philosophical orientation includes views on the elemental forces (fate, god, nature) and man's relation to them, as well as on the human condition (life and death, the implications of mortality). Man in society concerns the nature and obligations of different human relationships, such as with family, fellow citizens and enemies, as well as human nature as it reveals itself in a social context. The list of topics

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Dover 1974:xii on his decision to approach the material for his survey from a personal moral angle rather than to follow ancient Greek classifications.

<sup>11</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:48–49. According to Oudemans and Lardinois the distinction between interconnected and separative cosmologies depends on different “modes of differentiation and unification.” A separative cosmology, such as that of modern Europe, is “based on separation of entities and categories and subsequent unification.” In an interconnected cosmology, such as that of ancient Greece, “entities and categories are distinguished as well, but the distinctions are not so absolute: they hide various implicit connections” (1987:32). For their discussion of interconnected cosmologies in general and Greek cosmology as an example of interconnectedness, see pp. 48–81 and 82–106 respectively. On separative cosmologies, see pp. 31–47.

<sup>12</sup> P. 29 above and Chapter 2, p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> The term is anachronistic in relation to the period in question, but makes it possible to group together related topics.

arrived at in this way does not claim to be exhaustive with regard to cosmological concerns revealed in Pindar's poetry. For example, as has already been noted views on man's aspirations and how they should be expressed, and on the role of poetry, could be regarded as separate categories. However, in both cases the positions taken in the poems can be shown to depend on the viewpoints established for the broader main categories, for example the idea that poetry has the power to transcend the limits imposed on man by his mortality is linked to the conviction that the poet possesses a god-given talent which he exercises in accordance with the divine order. These secondary categories will therefore only be noted where they throw light on the primary ideas.

*The elemental forces: Fate, god, nature and man*

Any discussion of the representation of elemental forces in ancient Greek literature is soon faced with the question of whether the many terms used in this field are interchangeable or have different meanings, and if the latter, whether they are subtly or starkly different. For fate or destiny Pindar uses mainly μοῖρα and πότμος, but also αἴσα. In addition the idea of fate is conveyed by adjectives and verbs such as μόρσιμος, μοιρίδιος, πεπρωμένος, κρίνω and λαγγάνω.<sup>14</sup> A related force operating in the human sphere is τύχα, fortune or chance. Apart from the gods as persons, such as Zeus, Apollo and Aphrodite, god or the divine is expressed by θεός/θεοί and derivatives such as θεόσδοτος, δαίμων/δαίμονες/δαίμονιος, μάκαρες, κρέσσονες and ἀθάνατοι. The picture is further complicated by the sometimes ambiguous relationship between fate and god.

*Fate and fortune*

In Pindar's gnomai on fate, it is either represented as an active force that steers human life, or as the result of that action, that which is allotted, the fate, fortune or destiny of man, what may be termed a passive sense of fate. Man's fate is referred to by several terms: πότμος (*Ol.* 2.18), αἴσα (*Pyth.* 3.60, fr. 131a), τὸ μόρσιμον (*Pyth.* 12.30), κρίνω

<sup>14</sup> On the different terms for fate used in Homer, see Dietrich 1965:279–283. For a discussion of the etymology and meaning of various terms, as well as the representation of fate (as a state, object or person), see W. Krause 1936.

(*Nem.* 6.2, *Parth.* 1.7), λαγχάνω (*Nem.* 7.54) and τὸ πεπρωμένον (fr. 232). Its central characteristic is its ineluctability. This is noted starkly in *Pythian* 12.30: “what is fated cannot be avoided” (τὸ δὲ μόρσιμον οὐ παρφυκτόν). In a more metaphoric turn of phrase man’s inability to keep fate in check is compared to his powerlessness in the face of the natural force of fire and the strength of iron: τὸ πεπρωμένον οὐ πῦρ, οὐ σιδάρεον σήσει τεῖχος (fr. 232). The epinician narrator of *Isthmian* 7 is reconciled to his “fated lifetime” (τὸν μόρσιμον / αἰῶνα, *Isthm.* 7.41–42) and the inescapable fact of death (θνήσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες, *Isthm.* 7.42), a key aspect of the human lot which man ignores at his peril, as discovered when Asklepios’ resurrection of a man brought them both instant death (*Pyth.* 3.54–58). This story illustrates the importance of recognising one’s destiny as a mortal and respecting its limits (γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, οἷα εἰμὲν αἴσας, *Pyth.* 3.60).

Fate as an agent in the world appears in the form of personified πότμος,<sup>15</sup> μοῖρα and τύχα. Man’s subjugation to this power is expressed in the image of πότμος acting as a yoke which limits different people in different ways (εἶργει δὲ πότμω ζυγένηθ’ ἕτερον ἕτερα, *Nem.* 7.6). Where these limits fall, what course life will take, is not for man to know, it is determined by πότμος (οὐκ εἰδότες ... / ἄμμιε πότμος / ἄντιν’ ἐγραψε δραμεῖν ποτὶ στάθμαν, *Nem.* 6.6–7). In the context of the games πότμος is also presented as an agent which directs the fortunes of a family: “Inherited Destiny decides the outcome of all deeds” (Πότμος δὲ κρίνει συγγενῆς ἔργων πέρι / πάντων, *Nem.* 5.40–41).<sup>16</sup> In this case the inherited ability of Pytheas, υἱὸς ... εὐρουσθενῆς of Lampon of Aigina (*Nem.* 5.4), has brought victory, but a fragment from the hymns shows that strength does not guarantee success, since τύχα, fortune or chance, is also a force to be reckoned with. According to this fragment, where deeds are concerned τύχα has the upper hand, and is the metaphorical victor (ἐν ἔργμασιν δὲ νικᾷ τύχα, / οὐ σθένος, fr. 38). The experience of the Kleonymidai of Thebes, who lost four men simultaneously in war and so lost their chance of victory in the games, is an example of this power of τύχα over the destiny of a family. They took part in the Panhellenic games with enthusiasm, “but even when men strive, fortune remains hidden before they reach the final goal, for she gives some of this and some of that” (ἔστιν δ’ ἀφάνεια τύχας καὶ μαρναμέ-

<sup>15</sup> According to Gerber 1988:44 “Pindar is the first to personify *potmos* and the first to treat it as an active force.”

<sup>16</sup> See Gerber 1988:43 for further non-gnomic expressions of this idea.

νων, / πρὶν τέλος ἄκρον ἰκέσθαι / τῶν τε γὰρ καὶ τῶν διδοῖ), and they remained unsuccessful (*Isthm.* 4.28–33).

Control over human life is also attributed to μοῖρα, who is said to lead the mortal race as its fortunes fluctuate from generation to generation according to the natural cycle of fields yielding crops and lying fallow, and trees bearing plentiful blossoms one year, fewer the next (ἀρχαῖαι δ' ἀρεταί / ἀμφέρωντ' ἀλλασσόμεναι γενεαῖς ἀνδρῶν σθένος / ἐν σχερῶ δ' οὐτ' ὄν μέλαινα καρπὸν ἔδωκαν ἄρουραι, / δένδρεά τ' οὐκ ἐθέλει πάσαις ἐτέων περόδοις / ἀνθος εὐῶδες φέρειν πλούτῳ ἴσον, / ἀλλ' ἐναμείβοντι. καὶ θνατὸν οὕτως ἔθνος ἄγει / μοῖρα, *Nem.* 11.37–43). This connection between μοῖρα and the vicissitude that characterises human life, a recurring theme in the epinikia, is also revealed in *Nemean* 7 and *Olympian* 2. According to *Nem.* 7.54–58 “complete happiness” (εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπασαν) is a gift Μοῖρα does not bestow. Since different men are allotted (λαχόντες) different things in life and nobody can have everything, there are bound to be ups and downs. In *Ol.* 2.33–37 these are described as streams bringing now pleasure, now pain to man (ῥοαὶ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλαι / εὐθυμῶν τε μέτα καὶ πόνων ἐς ἀνδρας ἔβαν), and Μοῖρα adheres to this principle in alternating happiness and hardship for a family (οὕτω δὲ Μοῖρ', ..., θεόρτω σὺν ὄλβῳ / ἐπί τι καὶ πῆμ' ἄγει, παλιν-τροπέλον ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ).<sup>17</sup>

The benevolent side of fate or destiny is emphasised in a cluster of gnomai earlier in *Olympian* 2, but then also in the context of the alleviation of pain and sorrow:

τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων  
 ἐν δίκῃ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἄν  
 Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατήρ  
 δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος·  
 λάθῃ δὲ πότμῳ σὺν εὐδαιμόνι γένοιτ' ἄν.  
 ἐσλῶν γὰρ ὑπὸ χαρμάτων πῆμα θνήσκει  
 παλίγκοτον δαμασθέν,  
 ὅταν θεοῦ Μοῖρα πέμπῃ  
 ἀνεκὰς ὄλβον ὑψηλόν.

<sup>17</sup> The idea that no mortal can expect perfect happiness is also found in the impersonal use of μοῖρα with the meaning ‘share’ or ‘portion,’ e.g. in *Isthm.* 5.14–16: μὴ μάτερε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι πάντ' ἔχεις, / εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν. / θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει (“Do not seek to become Zeus; you have all there is, if a share of those blessings should come to you. Mortal things befit mortals”) and *Pyth.* 3.84: τίν δὲ μοῖρ' εὐδαιμονίας ἔπεται (“Your share of happiness attends you”). Cf. Dietrich 1965:279–281 on μοῖρα as agent and as share in Homer.

Once deeds are done,  
 whether in justice or contrary to it, not even  
 Time, the father of all,  
 could undo their outcome.  
 But with a fortunate destiny forgetfulness may result,  
 for under the force of noble joys the pain dies  
 and its malignancy is suppressed,  
 whenever divine Fate sends  
 happiness towering upwards. (Ol. 2.15–22)

This passage shows how the destiny allotted to a man is interwoven with fate as an active force. If a man's *πότμος* is *εὐδαίμων* the potential for forgetting life's reversals (indicated by the aorist optative *γένοιτ' ἄν*) is realised whenever *θεοῦ Μοῖρα* intervenes.

The characterisation of *Μοῖρα* as *θεοῦ*, from god, raises the question of the relationship between god and fate, and whether one of these is supreme. A few examples will show that the actions and characteristics of fate described above are not exclusive to it. In *Nem.* 11.42–44 the activity of *μοῖρα* in man's life is all but identified with “that which comes from Zeus” (*τὸ δ' ἐκ Διὸς*, 43) and of which “no clear sign attends men” (*ἄνθρωποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἔπεται / τέκμαρ*, 43–44), just as they do not know what course *πότμος* has plotted for them (*Nem.* 6.6–7).<sup>18</sup> Likewise the results of human endeavour are attributed not only to *πότμος* and *τύχα*, but also to *θεός*, Zeus and *δαίμων*. Fr. 141 describes god as the one “who accomplishes all things for mortals” (*θεὸς ὁ πάντα τεύχων βροτοῖς*). According to the epinician narrator in *Nem.* 10.29–31 the athlete Theaios of Argos “offers courage with a heart not unused to labour” (*οὐδ' ἀμόχθῳ καρδίᾳ προσφέρων*) in his quest for an Olympian victory, but he recognizes that “fulfillment of all deeds lies with (Zeus)” (*Ζεῦ πάτερ, ... πᾶν δὲ τέλος / ἐν τιν ἔργων*). The same principles are expressed gnominically in *Pythian* 12, but now *δαίμων* is the supreme agent: “If there is any happiness among men, it does not appear without toil. A god will bring it to fulfillment ...” (*εἰ δέ τις ὄλβος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν, ἄνευ καμάτου / οὐ φαίνεται ἐκ δὲ τελευτάσει νιν ... / δαίμων, Pyth.* 12.28–30). In addition, this activity of *δαίμων* is closely associated with the ineluctability of fate (see above p. 33), a further example of how intertwined god and fate are.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also *Ol.* 12.7–9 where the uncertainty is with regard to future actions coming from the gods, *θεόθεν*.

In his study of Pindar's piety, Thummer uses several of the examples above to interpret the closeness between god and fate as a relationship in which fate is ultimately dependent on god, so that "der ἀνήρ ἐσλός nicht einer blinden Schicksalsmacht ausgesetzt ist, sondern unter dem Schutze Gottes steht."<sup>19</sup> From his brief discussion of how Pindar "expresses that which is 'given' to man" Greene draws the less absolute conclusion that he makes no real distinction between the personal gods and a less personal power like *Moira*, and that, although they may sometimes be in opposition, "they are far more frequently joined or treated interchangeably."<sup>20</sup> While a phrase such as θεοῦ Μοῖρα may well indicate that fate is subject to god, as Thummer maintains,<sup>21</sup> such an interpretation is more difficult to sustain for, for example, the epinician speaker's assertion that his ancestors came to Thera "not without the gods, but some Fate guided them" (οὐ θεῶν ἄτερο, ἀλλὰ Μοῖρά τις ἄγειν, *Pyth.* 5.76; my translation), especially since the active role is given to Μοῖρα. The ambiguity suggested by Greene's approach would not mean that Pindar and his contemporaries made no distinction between god and fate, but rather that the distinction was more subtle and open to different interpretations than the establishment of a hierarchy such as Thummer's would allow.

What is the consequence of this difference in approach for establishing the cosmological outlook reflected in Pindar's *gnomai*? It seems that a choice must be made between an attempt at making sharp distinctions, and looking at the bigger picture of how man interprets and portrays the world and what happens to him in the world in terms of the nature and role of extra-human forces. The difficulties involved in the former are clear from Gerber's discussion of πότμος in Pindar. His acceptance of the definitions provided by De Heer and Thummer<sup>22</sup> is triply hedged, testifying to the slipperiness of these terms. The definitions

[1] seem adequate [2] for at least some passages in Pindar, [3] provided

<sup>19</sup> Thummer 1957:105. For his discussion of fate, see pp. 90–109. Thummer's views are based on those of Strohm 1944 (see Thummer 1957:90 n. 2).

<sup>20</sup> Greene 1944, 1963 printing: 71–72. Like Thummer he does not interpret Pindar's usage as fatalism.

<sup>21</sup> Thummer 1957:100–101. Cf. Yamagata 1994:115–120, 239 on god and fate in Homer. She concludes that both gods and men act in accordance with fate. Dietrich concludes that "it is not always clear whether in Homer the gods or fate constitute the supreme force which determines the affairs of men" (Dietrich 1965:328).

<sup>22</sup> De Heer 1969:42, Thummer 1957:99.

we keep in mind that Pindar is especially fond of stressing the active rather than the passive aspect of the word.<sup>23</sup>

Although efforts at formulating watertight definitions of terms or describing relationships between forces operating in the world without admitting to ambiguity no doubt have value when interpreting complex texts such as Pindar's epinikia, for the purposes of this inquiry I will follow Greene in accepting fluid definitions and a significant overlap in the activities attributed to different elemental forces.

### *God*

Gods and the divine permeate Pindar's poetry. As far as the epinikia are concerned this fits the occasion since the games were held in honour of a god at one of his shrines or sanctuaries.<sup>24</sup> While particular gods—Apollo, Poseidon, Hera, for example—feature often in prayers and myths, the gods, with the exception of Zeus and Charis, are not mentioned by name in the gnomai, since gnomai make general statements about the divine and its workings in the human sphere. Regarding the various terms used to denote the divine, François comes to the conclusion that Pindar uses δαίμων in the sense of “la Puissance suprême” or “la Puissance surnaturelle” as a synonym for θεός, the most common word. Moreover, although subtle distinctions could be made, the plurals of these terms are also practically synonymous, as well as interchangeable with the singulars.<sup>25</sup> Since μάκαρες, κρῆσσονες and ἀθάνατοι can be regarded as substitutes for θεοί, the gnomai in which they occur will be included in those to be surveyed for cosmological content regarding god. Zeus has a unique role, representing both himself as the supreme god, and, following from that, the gods as a whole and the divine in general.<sup>26</sup>

The well-known opening strophe of *Nemean* 6 provides a convenient basis for discussing the main assumptions about god and man in the Pindaric cosmology:

<sup>23</sup> Gerber 1988:42.

<sup>24</sup> See Krummen 1990 for the representation of religious festivals in the epinikia.

<sup>25</sup> François 1957:75, 80–81, 92–93. Although François notes some reservation about the extent of the synonymy of θεός and δαίμων in his general conclusions, he regards Pindar's usage as a vindication of this interpretation (313–314). For examples of the interchangeability of θεός and θεοί in Pindar, see pp. 75–76.

<sup>26</sup> François 1957:74:

(C)e dieu suprême a atteint un tel degré d'universalité que ses attributions et



Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἔν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν  
 ματρὸς ἀμφοτέρου· διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκρυμμένα  
 δύναμις, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ  
 χάλκεος ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος  
 μένει οὐρανός. ἀλλὰ τι προσφέρομεν ἔμπαν ἢ μέγαν  
 νόον ἧτοι φύσιν ἀθανάτοις,  
 καίπερ ἔφαμερίαν οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲ μετὰ νύκτας  
 ἄμμε πότμος  
 ἄντιν' ἔγραψε δραμεῖν ποτὶ στάθμαν.

There is one race of men, one of gods; and from one mother  
 we both draw breath. Yet a wholly distinct power  
 separates us, for the one is nothing,<sup>27</sup>

whereas the bronze heaven remains a secure abode  
 forever. Nevertheless we do somewhat resemble  
 the immortals, either in greatness of mind or bodily nature,  
 although we do not know by day or in the night  
 what course destiny

has marked for us to run.

(*Nem.* 6.1–7)

The opening statement, Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἔν θεῶν γένος, has been interpreted in two apparently contradictory ways: either there is one race of men and gods, or they belong to different races.<sup>28</sup> While Gerber is probably correct in his conclusion that this statement relates to the common ancestry of gods and men made explicit in ἐκ μιᾶς πνέομεν / ματρὸς ἀμφοτέρου,<sup>29</sup> the strophe as a whole, in its alternation of resemblances and differences, points to an ambiguity which can also be read in the poem's first words: men and gods are both the same and different.

In terms of the world view represented here, men and gods trace their origin to a common mother, Earth (Gaia),<sup>30</sup> which accounts for

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ses pouvoirs sont aussi étendus que ceux de l'ensemble des dieux, sa personnalité familière peut à tout moment se substituer à la Puissance plus imprécise qu'évoquent θεοὶ et surtout θεός.

Cf. Dietrich 1965:324 on Zeus in Homer.

<sup>27</sup> I have amended the first three lines of Race's translation in accordance with Gerber 1999:43–46.

<sup>28</sup> The disagreement appears in both scholarship and translations. For a discussion of different scholarly positions on this question, see Gerber 1999:43–45. Examples of different translations are Race 1997b: "There is one race of men, another of gods," and Dönt 1986: "Ein und dieselbe ist der Menschen und der Götter Abkunft."

<sup>29</sup> Gerber 1999:45–46.

<sup>30</sup> Gerber 1999:43–44 quotes Hesiod *Op.* 108 in support of the common ancestry interpretation: ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἀνθρώποι ("how both gods and men began the same"). According to Clay 2003:99 n. 56 this line is "generally considered spurious." She adds that it

the fact that man can claim some likeness to the gods in mind and body. The references to human attributes—mothers, mind, body—are an illustration of the anthropomorphic nature of the Greeks' envisioning of the gods,<sup>31</sup> which is also reflected in fragment 143:

κεῖνοι γάρ τ' ἄνοσοι καὶ ἀγήραοι  
πόνων τ' ἄπειροι, βαρυβόαν  
πορθμὸν πεφευγότες Ἀχέροντος

for they, without sickness or old age  
and unacquainted with toils, having escaped  
the deep-roaring passage of Acheron.<sup>32</sup>

Here the gods are described with reference to the human failings they do not share, sickness, aging, toil and death. In *Nemean* 6 these failings are concentrated in the crucial difference between men and gods which overshadows the apparent resemblances and places them in different spheres. The δύναμις allotted to the gods is of a totally different order to that of man.<sup>33</sup> Their power or vital force is one of immortality, represented here by the image of heaven as a dwelling-place both secure and everlasting.<sup>34</sup> Against the eternity of the gods' existence man amounts to nothing (οὐδέν), and the vaunted resemblance is puny (τι).

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seems wrong for the *Works and Days*, where men are made by the gods, but they would suit the account in the *Theogony*, where both gods and men spring ultimately from Gaia and Uranus.

For her discussion of the different perspectives on the origins and nature of man in these two works, see pp. 81–99. The portrayal of the gods in *Nem.* 6.1–7 corresponds to several statements in the *Theogony*: θεῶν γένος ..., οὗς Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔτικτεν (44–45; “race of the gods ... whom Earth and wide Heaven begot”), ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἕδοντων (105; “holy race of deathless gods who are forever”), Οὐρανὸν ... μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ (127–128; “Heaven, ..., an abode, secure forever, for all the blessed gods”).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Burkert 1985:119 on the unquestioning anthropomorphism and polytheism of ancient civilizations. The gods are “understood by analogy with man and imagined in human form.”

<sup>32</sup> This passage echoes Hesiod's description of the golden race: ὥστε θεοὶ δ' ἔζων ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες / νόσφιν ἄτρο τε πόνων καὶ οἰζύος· οὐδέ τι δειλὸν / γήρας ἔπην (“And they lived like gods without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief: miserable age rested not on them;” *Op.* 112–114, trans. Evelyn-White 1959). Cf. also Bakchylides fr. 23: οἱ μὲν ἀδμητες ἀεικελιᾶν / ἴνούσων εἰσι† καὶ ἄνατοι, / οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις ἴκελοι (“they are unsubdued by cruel diseases and unharmed, not at all like men,” trans. Campbell 1992).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Keyssner 1932:48–49 on the depiction of the “Uranfänglichkeit und Allumfassendheit” of the divine power in the Greek hymn, and the high respect accorded it by man.

<sup>34</sup> On the eternal nature of the divine expressed by αἰεὶ, see Keyssner 1932:39–45.

The difference between man and the gods is the difference between mortality and immortality. Immortality gives the gods security forever, while mortal man can pierce neither light nor dark (ἐφαμερίαν ... μετὰ νύκτας) to learn the future. He must follow the course mapped out by πότιμος without knowing where it leads. So, in spite of the initial impression of closeness between man and the gods the idea actually conveyed by this passage is the enormity of the difference and distance between them.<sup>35</sup>

The power of the gods is not only inherently different from and superior to that of man, it is also a power that is exercised over man and profoundly influences his life.<sup>36</sup> It is the source of human abilities and achievements, and of the things that befall humans. It can be benevolent, but is also inscrutable, both prosperity and reversals of fortune originate from it. This can first of all be seen in the position and workings of Zeus as the supreme divine power.<sup>37</sup> He is the god “allotted a larger share” (πλέον τι λαχών, fr. 35a), and is “the lord of all” (ὁ πάντων κύριος, *Isthm.* 5.53).<sup>38</sup> As such he can hand out “a variety of things” (τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, *Isthm.* 5.52). For example, he takes charge of the fortune of those he loves, but inspires fear in those he does not. The epinician speaker in *Pythian* 5 attributes to θεός the current success of Arkesilas of Kyrene and prays that the gods, the “blessed children of Kronos,” may promote his success in the future (117–121), but ultimately “the great mind of Zeus steers the fortune of men who are dear to him” (Διός τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ / δαίμον’ ἀνδρῶν φίλων, 122–123). In *Pythian* 1 music is portrayed as an instrument of Zeus. Those for whom “Zeus has no love are terrified when they hear the song of the Pierians” (μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεὺς, ἀτύζονται βοάν / Πιερίδων αἰόντα, 13–14), while the lyre, aided by Apollo and the Muses, calms and delights those forces of

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For hymnic examples of the depiction of “(d)ie Ewigkeit und Unerschütterlichkeit des göttlichen Wohnsitzes,” see p. 40.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Gerber 1999:43: “... it is the difference that receives greater prominence.” Des Places 1964:27 describes the difference as “l’abîme qui sépare les deux races.”

<sup>36</sup> *Pyth.* 5.12–13 presents human δύναμις in a more positive light: σοφοὶ δέ τοι κάλλιον / φέρονται καὶ τᾶν θεόδοτον δύναμιν (“truly, wise men sustain more nobly even their god-given power”). However, this gnome deals not with man in general, but with σοφοί and their superior ability to use their power, which is, significantly, characterised as θεόδοτος.

<sup>37</sup> For an overview of the role of Zeus in Greek religion and life, see Burkert 1985:125–131. On Zeus in Pindar’s *Hymn* 1, see Hardie 2000:23–26.

<sup>38</sup> For the many non-gnomic references to Zeus as lord and father of gods and men, see Slater 1969 s.v. Ζεὺς.

nature, and those among men and gods who, by implication, enjoy the favour of Zeus (1–12). *Pythian* 8 and *Nemean* 11 provide further examples of the ambiguous nature of Zeus' power from the human perspective:

ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὐ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ  
 ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ' ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ,  
 λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μείλιχος αἰών.

Creatures of a day! What is someone? What is no one? A dream of a shadow is man. But whenever Zeus-given brightness comes, a shining light rests upon men, and a gentle life. (*Pyth.* 8.95–97)

τὸ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἀνθρώποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἔπεται  
 τέκμαρ·

As for that which comes from Zeus, no clear sign attends men. (*Nem.* 11.43–44)

On the one hand Zeus provides relief when man is overwhelmed by the transience of his life, on the other hand his plans for man are quite inscrutable.

The divine in general, expressed by a variety of terms (see p. 40), is credited with power similar in nature and range to that exercised by Zeus. The gulf in power between god and man declared in the opening of *Nemean* 6 is illustrated in the myth of Ixion recounted in *Pyth.* 2.21–48. Ixion's arrogant pursuit of Hera puts him in contention with Zeus so that he ends up in “inescapable fetters” (ἀφύκτοισι γυιοπέδαις, 41) while the snare Zeus sets for him, a cloud in the form of Hera, leads to the birth of the Centaurs. Ixion fails in what he sets out to do, Zeus accomplishes his purpose. The epinician narrator comments on these events with the statement that “god achieves his every goal in accordance with his hopes” (θεὸς ἅπαν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται, 49; my translation).<sup>39</sup> The ability of θεός (and Zeus)<sup>40</sup> to turn hope into reality is in stark contrast to the “hopes unfulfilled” (ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν,

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 9.67–68: ὠκεῖα δ' ἐπειγομένων ἤδη θεῶν / πρᾶξις ὁδοί τε βραχεῖαι (“swift is the accomplishment once gods are in haste, and short are the ways”). Theognis 142 expresses the same idea with palpable bitterness: “The gods do everything just as they want” (θεοὶ δὲ κατὰ σφέτερον πάντα τελοῦσι νόον). As for man, “no one gets all he wants; all men stop short, checked by the boundaries of the possible. We think our thoughts in vain, all ignorant” (οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπων παραγίνεται ὅσα θέλησιν / ἴσχει γὰρ χαλεπῆς πείρατ' ἀμηχανίης. / ἀνθρώποι δὲ μάταια νομιζομεν, εἰδότες οὐδέν, 139–141, trans. Wender 1973).

<sup>40</sup> This is an example of the close connection between Zeus and θεός. Cf. p. 37 and n. 26.

*Pyth.* 3.23) and “shameless hope” (ἀναιδεῖ / ἐλπίδι, *Nem.* 11.45–46) from which mankind suffers.<sup>41</sup> The range of divine power is indicated by the rest of the gnome:

θεός, ὃ καὶ πτερόεντ' αἰετὸν κίχῃ, καὶ θαλασ-  
σαῖον παραμείβεται  
δελφίνα, καὶ ὑψιφρόνων τιν' ἔκαμψε βροτῶν,  
ἑτέροισι δὲ κῦδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ'.

the god, who overtakes the winged eagle  
and surpasses the seagoing  
dolphin, and bows down many a haughty mortal,  
while to others he grants ageless glory. (*Pyth.* 2.50–52)

No creature in the sky or in the sea can thwart the divine plan. As for man, if he is arrogant (like Ixion) he will be brought down, but it is also in the divine power to grant the lasting fame men desire. That even forces of nature like darkness and light must also yield to god, appears from fragment 108(b):

θεῷ δὲ δυνατὸν μελαίνας  
ἐκ νυκτὸς ἀμίαντον ὄρσαι φάος,  
κελιανεφεί δὲ σκότει  
καλύψαι σέλας καθαρόν  
ἄμέρας

A god can make unsullied light  
spring from dark night  
and in black-clouded darkness  
hide the pure gleam  
of day.

Again this is in contrast with man’s inability to penetrate either light or darkness to establish his life’s course (*Nem.* 6.6–7).

The absolute difference between human capabilities and the δύναμις of the gods is further illustrated by mythical examples in *Olympian* 13 and *Pythian* 10. *Olympian* 13 recounts how Bellerophon’s impossible dream of riding Pegasus is realised when Athena gives him a golden bridle with which he tames the winged horse (60–90). The gnomic comment on this reversal notes the supreme ease with which the gods accomplish what man can barely imagine:

τελεῖ δὲ θεῶν δύναμις καὶ τὰν παρ' ὄρ-  
κον καὶ παρὰ ἐλπίδα κούφαν κτίσιν.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:106.

The gods' power easily brings into being even  
 what one would swear impossible and beyond hope. (*Ol.* 13.83)

Athena also provides the support that empowers Perseus to the extraordinary feat of slaying the Gorgon and overcoming the captors of his mother Danaë (*Pyth.* 10.44–48).<sup>42</sup> Here the gnomic comment is a declaration of faith in the ability of the gods to achieve what may be unbelievable from a human perspective:

ἔμοι δὲ θαυμάσαι  
 θεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδὲν ποτε φαίνεται  
 ἔμμεν ἄπιστον.

But to me, no marvel,  
 if the gods bring it about, ever seems  
 beyond belief. (*Pyth.* 10.48–50)

The same perception of divine omnipotence is expressed in two odes by Bakchylides, also in connection with superhuman mythic acts. When Apollo saves Croesus and his daughters from the funeral pyre and transports them to the land of the Hyperboreans (3.23–62) the epinician speaker says: “Nothing that the planning of the gods brings about is past belief” (ἄπιστον οὐδέν, ὃ τι θεῶν μέ]ριμνα / τεύχει, 3.57–58).<sup>43</sup> Ode 17 deals with a standoff between Minos and Theseus. Theseus accepts a challenge from Minos to visit his father Poseidon under the sea. To the astonishment of all he reappears on the ship “unwet from the sea” (ἀδιάντος ἔξ ἁλός, 122). Nevertheless, to the narrator such a marvel is entirely believable to the rational man, since it accords with the wish of the gods (ἄπιστον ὃ τι δαίμονες / θέλωσιν οὐδὲν φρενοῶρας βροτοῖς, 117–118). Any divine wish can be realised by divine power.

The *gnomai* discussed so far leave no doubt about the subordinate position of man in relation to the divine, whether expressed personally (Zeus) or generically (θεός, δαίμων). This is in line with the Hesiodic view of the purpose of mankind expressed in *Works and Days*. Clay describes the action of the gods in creating successive races as attempts

to fashion creatures who were both independent of the gods and capable of ensuring their own continuity while also conscious of their inferiority to the gods and hence able to worship them.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> See *Pyth.* 12.6–21 for a more detailed version of the myth.

<sup>43</sup> Translations of Bakchylides are from Campbell 1992.

<sup>44</sup> Clay 2003:98. Cf. also p. 95.

Ixion's sin was that he ignored the distance between man and god and in so doing failed in his duty of honour. *Pyth.* 2.88–89 makes it clear that it is not for man to challenge his position in the cosmos:

χρῆ  
 δὲ πρὸς θεὸν οὐκ ἐρίζειν,  
 ὅς ἀνέχει τοτὲ μὲν τὰ κείνων, τότε αὐθ' ἑτέροις  
 ἔδωκεν μέγα κῦδος.

One must not contend with a god,  
 who at one time raises these men's fortunes, then at other times  
 gives great glory to others.

Just as Zeus gives τὰ τε καὶ τὰ, the gift of κῦδος goes now to one, then to another and no mortal can take it for granted that divine power will be applied to his advantage. Given man's inferiority, it is futile to strive against god.<sup>45</sup> As Tantalos learnt to his cost when he too presumed to cross the boundary between mortals and immortals (*Ol.* 1.54–66), man and his deeds are transparent to the gods (εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἀνὴρ τις ἔλπεται <τι> λαθόμεν ἔρδων, ἀμαρτάνει, 64) and misdeeds will be punished. The better option is to fulfil one's obligations to the gods, who will then also give the appropriate rewards.

These obligations include reverence for Zeus (*Pyth.* 6.23–25) and an attitude of respect and piety under all circumstances to the gods in general. The narrator of *Olympian* 1 rejects the version of the Pelops myth which has the gods resurrecting Pelops with an ivory shoulder after his father had served him as the final course at a banquet for the gods, and attributes it to the eagerness with which people allow themselves to be deceived by lies and exaggerations born of envy (28–29, 36–51). Keeping to the rejected version would entail slandering the gods, with dire results, since “impoverishment is often the lot of slanderers” (ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους, 53). Recasting the story shows the necessary respect and avoids incurring the displeasure of the gods: “It is proper for a man to speak well of the gods, for less is the blame” (ἔστι δ' ἀνδρὶ φάμεν εἰκόσ ἀμφὶ δαϊμόνων καλά: μείων γὰρ αἰτία, 35). The same sentiment is expressed in *Olympian* 9 in connection

<sup>45</sup> Cf., also in the context of myth, *Nem.* 10.72: χαλεπὰ δ' ἔρις ἀνθρώποις ὀμιλεῖν κρεσσόνων (“strife against those who are stronger is difficult for men to face”) and *Ol.* 10.39–40: νεῖκος δὲ κρεσσόνων / ἀποθέσθ' ἄπορον (“strife with those more powerful one cannot put aside”). For similar sentiments in Homer, see *Il.* 5.440–442, *Od.* 4.78, 22.287–289.

with Herakles' exploits against the gods (*Ol.* 9.28–35). The epinician speaker quite forcefully wishes to distance himself from such stories “for reviling the gods / is a hateful skill” (ἐπει τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεούς / ἐχθρὰ σοφία, *Ol.* 9.37–38).<sup>46</sup>

As the stories of Tantalos and Ixion show, respect for the gods also consists in not trespassing on their terrain or trying to usurp their power. When greed prompts Asklepios to overstep the limits of his healing powers by resurrecting a man he is killed by Zeus' thunderbolt (*Pyth.* 3.55–58). The epinician speaker comments as follows on his fate:

χρῆ τὰ εἰκότα πάρ  
 δαϊμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν  
 γνόντα τὸ πάρ ποδός, οἷας εἰμὲν αἴσας.

It is necessary to seek what is proper from the gods  
 with our mortal minds,  
 by knowing what lies at our feet and what kind of destiny is ours.

(*Pyth.* 3.59–60)

Man's mortality limits what he can do, and showing disrespect by striving for more, for “immortal life” (βίον ἀθάνατον, 61) is bound to provoke grievous results.

In contrast, there are desirable rewards for those who give the gods their due. It can be the avoidance of blame and poverty already discussed (*Ol.* 1.35, 52–53), or in a more positive vein success and lasting happiness. In the opening stanzas of both *Olympian* 8 and *Isthmian* 3, Zeus is acknowledged as the one who grants mortals success (*Ol.* 8.1–7, *Isthm.* 3.4–5). In both poems the appropriate attitude of man to god, in the form of piety and reverence, is gnominically described as essential for actually securing that success:

ἀνεται δὲ πρὸς χάριν εὐσεβίας ἀνδρῶν λιταῖς

but men's prayers are fulfilled in return for piety. (*Ol.* 8.8)

ζῶει δὲ μάσσων  
 ὄλβος ὀπιζομένων

and men's happiness has a longer life  
 when they are reverent.

(*Isthm.* 3.5)<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> In *Olympian* 1 the ultimate aim is to deflect a charge of gluttony, or perhaps even cannibalism, from the gods (37–38, 52). In *Olympian* 9 the concern is that they should not be shown as involved in war and fighting (40–41). On the latter passage, see also Chapter 5, p. 183.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 8.17 which links longer-lasting happiness with god (σὺν θεῷ γάρ τοι



Perhaps the most valuable reward for men who fulfil their obligations is that they can rely on the support of the gods. That “the race of the gods is faithful” (θεῶν πιστὸν γένος, *Nem.* 10.54) has been the experience of the family of Theaios of Argos who enjoy their superior athletic ability in return for having provided hospitality to the Dioskouroi (*Nem.* 10.49–54).

The analysis of the power of the divine shows that inasmuch as the statement “Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἔν θεῶν γένος opening *Nemean* 6 refers to the unity of man and god, it has only a very limited application. The gulf between the divine and the human sphere is vast. Man’s attempts to bridge it are doomed to failure and unfailingly elicit retribution. Faced with the reality that the human race is as nothing when confronted with the divine, the best course for man is to acknowledge his inferiority and give god due honour. Although he cannot expect that the divine power will be exercised to his advantage at all times, such an attitude is indispensable for what measure of happiness and success a mortal can hope to experience.

### *Nature*

In a society with an interconnected cosmology such as that of ancient Greece the relationship between man and nature is shrouded in ambiguity. On the one hand nature is feared as a force that threatens civilization, on the other hand it is a power without which civilization and life itself cannot be sustained. Nature represents disorder, but is also in spite of its potential for disrupting the orderly course of life “a divine power which should be worshipped.”<sup>48</sup> Unlike in the case of fate and god, Pindar’s *gnomai* make few explicit pronouncements on nature and its role in man’s life.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless it is possible to draw some con-

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φυτευθεις ὄλβος ἀνθρώποισι παρμονότερος). Although the *gnome* does not refer to the attitude required to enjoy such happiness this is indicated by the respectful way in which the epicinian speaker “as a suppliant ... clasp(s) the hallowed knees of Aiaikos” (ἰκέτας Αἰακοῦ σεμνῶν γονάτων ... ἄπτομαι, 13–14).

<sup>48</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:89. For their discussion of nature as a cosmological category in interconnected societies generally and ancient Greece particularly, see pp. 60–63 and 89–92 respectively.

<sup>49</sup> According to Péron 1974:335, for Pindar “les éléments du monde extérieur sont avant tout des symboles.” For his exhaustive analysis of Pindar’s symbolic use of natural images connected with seafaring (wind, sea, waves, storms) see pp. 167–308, and for a summary of his views on nature in Pindar pp. 334–339.

clusions from especially weather and plant imagery as it is used in the *gnomai*, as well as several *gnomai* dealing with natural ability.

From the human perspective the sea, fire and storms display the disruptive power of nature. The “overpowering sea” (πόντον ... ἀμαιμάκετον, *Pyth.* 1.14) serves as an image of death, “that ultimate intrusion of nature into culture,”<sup>50</sup> in the form of the “wave of Hades” (κύμα Ἄϊδα, *Nem.* 7.31) which overwhelms all. In its ceaseless rising and falling it is also an image of the instability of human life and the vanity of man’s aspirations (*Ol.* 12.5–6).

The gnome stating that “fire that springs from one spark onto a mountain can destroy a great forest” (πολλὰν δ’ {ἐν} ὄρει πῦρ ἐξ ἑνός / σπέροματος ἐνθορόν ἀίστωσεν ὕλαν, *Pyth.* 3.36–37) highlights the destructive nature of this elemental force, while also acting as a metaphor for the havoc that can be wreaked when love, itself a natural power, is abused. Koronis, already pregnant by Apollo, provokes the god’s anger by sleeping with the Arcadian Ischys. Not only does she die by fire, but “many neighbours shared her fate and perished with her” (*Pyth.* 3.8–40). While gods and man share in the power of erotic attraction,<sup>51</sup> for man it can have disastrous consequences because of his tendency to overstep boundaries. Ixion’s attempt on Hera (see p. 41) is another illustration that “aberrant acts of love cast one into the thick of trouble” (εὐναὶ δὲ παράτροποι ἐς κακότατ’ ἀθρόαν / ἔβαλον, *Pyth.* 2.35–36).

Both fire and love also demonstrate the ambiguity of the power of nature. In its ‘civilized’ form fire illuminates and honours. For example, in *Isthmian* 4 the epinician speaker prays that his “beacon-fire of hymns” (πυρσὸν ὕμνων, 43) may light up and honour the victor’s achievement. In the same poem fire in the form of burnt offerings honours Herakles and his sons and provides light through the night (61–66). ‘Tamed’ in marriage, erotic attraction is the foundation of a man’s ability to perpetuate himself in “a son, born from his wife” (παῖς ἐξ ἀλόχου, *Ol.* 10.86) and so overcome his mortality to some degree.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:63.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 9.40–41: καὶ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῦτο κἀνθρώποις ὁμῶς / αἰδέοντ’, ἀμφρανδὸν ἀδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς (“and both gods and humans alike shy from engaging openly for the first time in sweet love”). See also *Hom. Hymn* 5.1–5 on the power Aphrodite wields over gods, men and the rest of nature.

<sup>52</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:91 describe marriage as “a civilized institution which nevertheless sorely needs the elemental power of lust.” On children as a form of immortality, see pp. 66–67 and 69 below.

Divine power over nature as manifested in animals and phenomena such as light and dark has already been discussed (p. 42 on *Pyth.* 2.50–51, fr. 108(b)). Zeus personifies divine control in his role as weather god, “loud-voiced lord of lightning and thunder” (βαρυόπα στεροπᾶν κεραιῶν τε πρύτανιν, *Pyth.* 6.24).<sup>53</sup> One way in which the power this entails unleashes itself is in stormy weather. Man’s defenselessness against the raw forces of nature thus displayed is mirrored in the horrors he experiences in war, which is often represented in storm imagery.<sup>54</sup> In *Isthmian* 5 the sea battle at Salamis is described as “Zeus’ devastating rain, that hailstorm of gore for countless men” (ἐν πολυφθόρῳ ... Διὸς ὄμβρῳ / ἀναρίθμων ἀνδρῶν χαλαζάντι φόνῳ, 49–50). The Kleonymidai of Thebes lost four men in one day in “a cruel blizzard of war” (τραχεῖα νιφὰς πολέμοιο, *Isthm.* 4.17). Gnomai using similar storm imagery deal with efforts to turn the tide of war towards the enemy:

παῦροι δὲ βουλευῆσαι φόνου  
 παρποδίου νεφέλαν  
 τρέψαι ποτὶ δυσμενέων ἀνδρῶν σίχας  
 χερσὶ καὶ ψυχᾷ δυνατοί

Few are able to counsel how,  
 with hands and soul, to turn the storm cloud  
 of imminent slaughter toward  
 the ranks of the enemy.

(*Nem.* 9.37–39)

ἴστω γὰρ σαφὲς ὅστις ἐν ταύτῃ νεφέλῃ χάλα-  
 ζαν αἵματος πρὸ φίλας πάτρας ἀμύνεται,

λοιγὸν ἅντα φέρον<sup>55</sup> ἐναντίῳ στρατῷ,  
 ἀστῶν γενεᾷ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων  
 ζῶων τ’ ἀπὸ καὶ θανόν.

For let him know well, whoever in that cloud of war  
 defends his dear country from the hailstorm of blood

by turning the onslaught against the opposing army,  
 that he fosters the greatest glory for his townsmen’s race,  
 both while he lives and after he is dead.

(*Isthm.* 7.27–30)

<sup>53</sup> For other Pindaric references to Zeus as ruler of the elements, see Slater 1969 s.v. Ζεύς, and for a discussion of his role as weather god Burkert 1985:126.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. fragment 110 which states plainly the anguish induced by war: γλυκὺ δὲ πόλεμος ἀπείροισιν, ἐμπειρῶν δὲ τις / ταρβεῖ προσιόντα νιν καρδίᾳ περισσῶς (“sweet is war to the untried, but anyone who has experienced it dreads its approach exceedingly in his heart”).

<sup>55</sup> Alternative reading of text adopted by Race 1997b:198. Snell-Maehler reads †λοιγὸν ἀμύνων†.

The evocation of winds, snow, rain and hail underlines man's feebleness, which explains both the fact that few are able to change the course of war (*Nem.* 9.37) and the high honour accorded to those who do succeed (*Isthm.* 7.29–30).

Like fire and love weather phenomena also reflect man's ambiguous relationship with nature. Since man's experience of the wind is one of fluctuation and unpredictability, it is a fitting image for his ever changing fortunes: "But in a single portion of time the winds shift rapidly now here, now there," the great Diagoras of Rhodes is reminded at the end of the poem dedicated to his praise (ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μοίρᾳ χρόνον / ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοῖται διαιθύσσοισιν αὖραι, *Ol.* 7.94–95).<sup>56</sup> On the other hand the wind, unpredictable as it is, can, when favourable, be harnessed by man for his own purposes, namely to sail the seas. Therefore, "for seafaring men the first blessing as they set out on a voyage is the coming of a favorable wind" (ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρώτα χάρις / ἐς πλόον ἀρχομένοις πομπαῖον ἐλθεῖν οὖρον, *Pyth.* 1.33–34). Like marriage, sailing is a cultural phenomenon which needs the power of nature. The *gnomai* opening *Olympian* 11 express this dependence of culture on nature with reference to sailing once again, as well as to agriculture: "There is a time when it is for winds that men have greatest need; there is a time when it is for heavenly waters, the drenching children of the cloud" (Ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις ἀνέμων ὅτε πλείστα / χρῆσις· ἔστιν δ' οὐρανίων ὑδάτων, / ὀμβρίων παίδων νεφέλας, 1–3).<sup>57</sup>

The gentler side of nature comes to the fore in plant imagery,<sup>58</sup> which is often used to suggest the abundance associated with success:

δύο δέ τοι ζωᾶς ἄωτον μοῦνα ποιμαί-  
νοντι τὸν ἄλπνιστον, εὐανθεῖ σὺν ὄλβῳ  
εἴ τις εὖ πάσχων λόγον ἐσλὸν ἀκούῃ.

Truly, two things only foster the loveliest  
flower of life with blossoming happiness:  
if a man fares well and hears noble words.

(*Isthm.* 5.12–13; my translation)<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> The same idea involving the wind is expressed in slightly different terms in *Pyth.* 3.104–105 and *Isthm.* 4.5–6.

<sup>57</sup> It should be noted that Lloyd's remarks with reference to Homer and Hesiod about nature and culture as modern, not ancient categories, apply equally to Pindar (Lloyd 2000:22, 25).

<sup>58</sup> For lists of plant imagery in Pindar, see McCracken 1934.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 8.40–42 and *Nem.* 9.48–49 for more gnomical expressions of the conjunction of growth or flowering, success and praise.

This benevolent nature is also linked to the benevolent intervention of the divine in human life. When god is involved in a man's success and the "planting" of fame he has the best chance of achieving the ultimate in happiness (εἰ γὰρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνη τε χαρεῖς / καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτων ἀρετάς / σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐσχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβου / βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἐών, *Isthm.* 6.10–13), since such happiness "lasts longer for men" (σὺν θεῷ γὰρ τοὶ φυτευθεὶς ὄλβος ἀνθρώποισι παρμονώτερος, *Nem.* 8.17).<sup>60</sup>

However, plant imagery also denotes man's integration into the cycle of nature, which means that both ups and downs are inevitable. Periods of growth and success alternate with times in which misfortune or lack of success dominates. This topos is often presented with the emphasis on the positive, for example when the unsuccessful generations of the Bassidai of Aigina are compared to fields lying fallow for a season to "rest to gather strength" so that they can give "abundant sustenance" in the next (τὸ συγγενές ... / ἄγχι καρποφόροις ἀρούραισιν, αἶτ' ἀμειβόμεναι / τόκα μὲν ὦν βίον ἀνδράσιν ἐπητανὸν ἐκ πεδίων ἔδοσαν, / τόκα δ' αἶτ' ἀναπαυσάμεναι σθένος ἔμαρψαν, *Nem.* 6.8–11; cf. p. 34 on *Nem.* 11.37–43 where the same image is used). Although Charis also turns now to one, now to another and her favour therefore fluctuates as far as any one man is concerned, she remains the goddess "who makes life blossom" (ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλον ἐποπτεύει Χάρις ζωθάλμος, *Ol.* 7.11). Megakles of Athens, who alongside his Pythian success has to contend with the envy of his fellow citizens, is encouraged to accept this mingling of good and bad fortune as part of "lasting and flourishing happiness" (φαντί γε μάν / οὔτω κ' ἀνδρὶ παρμονίμῳ / θάλλοισαν εὐδαμονίαν τὰ καὶ τὰ φέρεσθαι, *Pyth.* 7.19–21; my translation).

The less gentle picture of the natural cycle and its effect on man has already been encountered in the use of rapidly shifting winds to depict man's fluctuating fortunes. In *Olympian* 12 pitching waves portray the violent changes in human expectations, and the sudden passing of storms the reversal of fortunes (αἶ γε μὲν ἀνδρῶν / πόλλ' ἄνω, τὰ δ' αὖ κάτω / ψεύδη μεταμόνια τάμνοισα κυλίνδοντ' ἐλπίδες, 5–6a; πολλὰ δ' ἀνθρώποις παρὰ γνώμαν ἔπεσεν, / ἔμπαλιν μὲν τέρψιος, οἱ δ' ἀνιραῖς / ἀντικύρσαντες ζάλαις / ἐσλὸν βαθὺ πήματος ἐν μικρῷ πεδάμειψαν χρόνῳ, 10–12a). In the latter case the image denotes the

<sup>60</sup> Cf. also *Ol.* 11.10. In *Isthm.* 4.18–19 Melissos' success in the games after his family's great misfortunes in war is described as the blossoming forth of red roses from the earth "by the gods' designs" (χθῶν ... φοινκείουσιν ἀνθισεν ῥόδοις / δαμώνων βουλαῖς).

positive experience of the natural cycle, the promise that calm will follow the storm. Although the reverse also holds, there is reassurance in the regularity of nature.

However, when the natural process is distorted man is the one who bears the consequences. Therefore the victor who is rejoicing in his success is warned that “in a short time the delight of mortals burgeons, but so too does it fall to the ground when shaken by a hostile purpose” (ἐν δ’ ὀλίγῳ βροτῶν / τὸ τερπνὸν αὔξεται οὔτω δὲ καὶ πίπτει χαμαί, / ἀποτρόπῳ γνώμα σεσεισμένον, *Pyth.* 8.92–94). Here the usually benign plant imagery (even when it denotes fluctuation) turns uncharacteristically violent. The too quickly ripening fruit cannot withstand being shaken and falls. Instead of the mature fruit of measured action the harvest is the bruised fruit of immoderateness.<sup>61</sup>

An important issue regarding man and nature, especially in the context of the celebration of athletic success, is the role of natural ability in human achievement.<sup>62</sup> What is allotted to each man in life is regarded as φύξις, from nature, and as far as happiness is concerned, what nature gives is incomplete and differs from one person to the next (φυῶν δ’ ἕκαστος διαφέρομεν βιοτὰν λαχόντες / ὁ μὲν τά, τὰ δ’ ἄλλοι τυχεῖν δ’ ἐν’ ἀδύνατον / εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπασαν ἀνελόμενον, *Nem.* 7.54–56). However, there is no doubt about the supremacy of natural ability over learning, and that the victors by their success testify to this supremacy. Furthermore, natural ability is an indication of divine support, since nature is subject to divine power, as has already been shown (pp. 42, 48–52). It may therefore seem contradictory that human effort is also called for if a man is to gain success, but this can be explained by the duality of man’s relationship with nature. The cultural institution of marriage and the activities of sailing and agriculture cannot exist without the natural power of love, wind and rain, but conversely these natural powers can only be beneficial if they are ‘civilized’ by culture. In the same way victory is impossible without natural ability, but natural ability needs the forces of civilization to show results.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. the earlier warning to “enter the contest in due measure” (μέτρον κατάβαν’, *Pyth.* 8.78) and Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:60 on the fear in interconnected societies of anything transgressing the natural order, including “extremely overdeveloped fruit.” Such “(n)atural anomalies may reflect human disorder: when man has exceeded his limits, nature is turned upside-down.”

<sup>62</sup> For a discussion of natural ability as an “aristocratic concept of inherited excellence,” see Rose 1974:150–155.

The following passage from *Olympian* 9 illustrates this complex interconnected way of thinking:

τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν· πολλοὶ δὲ διδασκαίς  
 ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος  
 ὄρουσαν ἀρέσθαι·  
 ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ, σεσιγαμένον  
 οὐ σκαιότερον χρῆμ' ἕκαστον· ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι  
 ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαιότεραι,  
 μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει  
 μελέτα· σοφίαι μὲν  
 αἰπειναί·

What comes by nature is altogether best. Many men  
 strive to win fame  
 with abilities that are taught,  
 but when god takes no part, each deed is no worse  
 for being left in silence; for some paths

are longer than others,  
 and no single training will develop  
 us all. The ways of wisdom  
 are steep

(*Ol.* 9.100–108)

This cluster of *gnomai* follows the impressive list of achievements of the *laudandus*, Epharmostos of Opous. They are presented as proof of his natural ability, the supremacy of which is proclaimed against the effort to achieve through learning.<sup>63</sup> The latter is a fruitless undertaking, since it does not have divine support. Then, in spite of the clear link between god and natural ability, and the implication that those who are naturally talented and enjoy divine support will be successful, a proviso is added in the form of a reminder that wisdom cannot be achieved without effort.

If effort is required in addition to god-given natural ability, the question arises why *διδασκαί* *ἀρεταί* are regarded as *ἄνευ θεοῦ*. The verb *ὀρούω* gives a first indication. It denotes an eagerness to do something, but there is also an element of violent haste and rushing on something.<sup>64</sup> This word portrays taught abilities as an effort to find a shortcut to *κλέος*, as if *μία μελέτα* would suffice. However, the path to success is not that simple, as the *gnome* *ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ*

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Ol.* 2.86–88 and *Nem.* 3.40–42 for other gnostic statements of the superiority of nature over learning.

<sup>64</sup> See LSJ s.v. *ὀρούω*. Cf. Gerber 2002:66 on *ὀρμάω* as a synonym for *ὀρούω* and Miller 1983:209 who calls the action “overly strenuous.”

περαιότερα indicates. In the context περαιότερος, from πέρα, “beyond,” can mean “leading further,” or “longer,” or even “better” (LSJ s.v.), if it is considered against the background of a Hesiodic passage on the roads to κακότης and ἀρετή:

τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι  
 ἠηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει  
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρώτα θεοὶ προπάρουσιν ἔθηκον  
 ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἴμος ἐς αὐτὴν  
 καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὶν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,  
 ἠηιδίῃ δὲ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ εὐῶσα.

Badness can be got easily and in shoals: the road to her is smooth, and she lives very near us. But between us and Goodness the gods have placed the sweat of our brows; long and steep is the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first; but when a man has reached the top, then is she easy to reach, though before that she was hard.

(*Op.* 287–292; trans. Evelyn-White 1959)<sup>65</sup>

The road to ἀρετή is both longer and harder than its alternative, but it is the one with which the gods concern themselves, and unquestionably the better choice. When the epinician narrator transfers this antithesis to athletic endeavour the type of training that can be likened to a smooth and short road is rejected. From the reference to the inadequacy of μία μελέτα (“practice, exercise, drill”), the teaching involved may be presumed to be according to a formula or recipe designed to appeal to πολλοὶ ἀνθρώπων, a shortcut to success for those without the benefit of god-given talent. But there is no single way in which everyone can achieve (athletic) success. It is reserved for those favoured by the gods (and the implication is that they are few).<sup>66</sup> Although there is a strong emphasis on natural ability and divine help, the περαιότερος path shows that this does not mean effortless success. According to Hesiod ἰδρώς, the sweat of hard work, has been placed by the gods on the road to ἀρετή. Likewise, σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί. To reach the pinnacle of success, which is not mere victory, but wisdom, natural talent must be supplemented by work, a cultural activity.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Simonides fr. 579 for his version of this passage.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 3.114–115: “Excellence endures in glorious songs for a long time. But few can win them easily” (ἀ δ' ἀρετὰ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς / χρονία τελέθει· παύροις δὲ πράξασθ' εὐμαρές).

<sup>67</sup> For a similar conclusion, see Hubbard 1985:123, and for a contrary view, Miller 1993a:143, 145.



This interplay between the divine, nature and culture is also reflected in *Nemean* 1. The victor's god-given abilities are acknowledged as a firm foundation, but to achieve the ultimate glory these abilities must be converted into success (ἀρχαὶ δὲ βέβληνται θεῶν / κείνου σὺν ἀνδρὸς δαιμονίαις ἀρεταῖς / ἔστι δ' ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ / πανδοξίας ἄκρον, 8–11). That talent and effort, nature and culture, are both required in this endeavour is unequivocally stated in a gnome which urges the victor to μάρνασθαι φυᾶ, exert himself with the help of his natural talent (25). The point is elaborated in the following gnome. The talents of strength and wisdom only amount to something if they are used, converted into action and counsel. Natural ability, which comes from god,<sup>68</sup> needs man's cultural input to fulfil its potential (πράσσει γὰρ ἔργῳ μὲν σθένος, / βουλαῖσι δὲ φρήν, ἔσόμενον προΐδειν / συγγενὲς οἷς ἔπεται, 26–28).

Like fate and god nature has a powerful presence in man's life. It is something to which he must necessarily subject himself, whether in the form of love or elements like fire and wind, the cycle of the seasons or the allocation of talent. However, this relationship is not one of absolute dependence, since man has the ability through his cultural efforts to harness the forces of nature to his own advantage. Nevertheless the latter's primacy is never in doubt: nature can do without civilization, but civilization cannot do without nature.<sup>69</sup>

### *The human condition*

The analysis of *Nem.* 6.1–7 has shown that death is what primarily distinguishes man from god. Mortality is his central characteristic. It limits his abilities and separates him from the gods who inhabit a place and lead a life to which he would aspire at his peril.<sup>70</sup> The victory odes reflect a society in which death was ever-present, not surprising in view of the low life expectancy, partly as a result of almost constant war.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 1.41–42: ἐκ θεῶν γὰρ μηχαναὶ πᾶσαι βροτέαις ἀρεταῖς, / καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ χειροὶ βιαταὶ περίγλωσσοί τ' ἔφυν (“for from the gods come all the means for human achievements, and men are born wise, or strong of hand and eloquent”).

<sup>69</sup> On nature and culture, cf. Hubbard's remarks on what he terms the φύσις / τέχνη polarity (Hubbard 1985:107–110).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:98–99.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Dover 1974:161–163 on accepting regular warfare, the honour of dying for one's community and the importance of either achieving victory or fighting to the death.

Seven of the victory odes mention dead relatives of the victor (in at least two cases as a result of war), and from the use of the past tense in *Isthm.* 2.35–42 it is generally assumed that Xenokrates of Akragas was already dead when this poem was composed.<sup>72</sup> That death loomed large in the consciousness of the time is further evident from the fact that in almost 70 % of the odes (31 of 45) there is at least one gnome that deals with mortality, if not directly then indirectly, e.g. by referring to man in opposition to or subject to the gods.<sup>73</sup>

The evanescence of mortal life is evoked memorably in *Pythian* 8:

ἐπάμερον τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὐ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ  
ἄνθρωπος.

Creatures of a day! What is someone? What is no one? A dream of a  
shadow  
is man.

(*Pyth.* 8.95–96)

Death is final and bringing back a man's ψυχή is “the vain goal of empty hopes” (κενεᾶν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῦνον τέλος, *Nem.* 8.45).<sup>74</sup> Although there is a note of lament in the epinician speaker's voice in both these passages, elsewhere the unavoidability and universality of death are taken for granted and stated impassively, for example in *Isthmian* 7. The speaker recommends enjoying the pleasures of every day (τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον, 40), i.e. making the most of man's ephemeral existence, and awaiting inevitable old age and death calmly, “for we all alike die” (ὄτι τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον διώκων / ἔκαλος ἔπειμι γῆρας ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον / αἰῶνα. θνήσκειμεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες· 40–42). No one is exempt, neither rich, nor poverty, obscurity or fame can change the fact of death (*Nem.* 7.19–20, 30–31).<sup>75</sup>

There is thus a hint of ambiguity in the attitude to death, which seems to fluctuate between calm acceptance and, if not fullblown fear, at least some anxiety and sorrow about the brevity of life. This may

<sup>72</sup> The other deaths are referred to in *Ol.* 8.77–84 (father and uncle of a boy victor), *Ol.* 14.20–24 (father), *Nem.* 4.13–16, 79–90 (father and uncle of a boy victor), *Nem.* 8.44–45 (father), *Isthm.* 4.16–18 (four family members in war), *Isthm.* 7.23–36 (uncle in war) and *Isthm.* 8.61–65 (cousin).

<sup>73</sup> Segal 1985:201 sees the “insistent consciousness of death” in the odes as an aspect which distinguishes Pindar from Bakchylides, i.e. as something peculiar to Pindar rather than as a reflection of the views of his society.

<sup>74</sup> According to Bremmer 2002:41 resurrection was an “unthinkable idea” for Greeks and Romans. In support he mentions, inter alia, Aischylos *Ag.* 568–569, 1019–1024 and *Eum.* 648. Cf. *Pyth.* 3.54–58 on Zeus' punishment of Asklepios for resurrecting a man.

<sup>75</sup> For Simonides' expression of man's frailty and the universality of death, see fragments 520 and 522.

account for the presence in Pindar's work of both the traditional Homeric vision of the soul and the afterlife, and descriptions of places of eternal bliss and eternal pain, as well as the reincarnation of the soul.<sup>76</sup> Not surprisingly, there has always been great scholarly interest in the latter, especially as expressed in *Ol.* 2.56–80.<sup>77</sup> This has tended to overshadow the fact that, as Lloyd-Jones describes it, “the great body of his work appears to presuppose” the beliefs about life after death “which were generally held among his contemporaries.”<sup>78</sup> These beliefs are also found in *Olympian* 2, in the reworking of the Homeric ideas, now part of popular religion, of a feeble but painless existence in Hades for the majority of men and an eternity of punishment for great sinners (56–67), with the doctrine of the reincarnation of souls which leads ultimately to eternal bliss on the Island of the Blessed (68–77) presented as a third possible state after death.<sup>79</sup>

The emphasis in scholarship on Pindar's references to the afterlife also obscures the fact that most of the reflection on death in his work is concerned with its effect on life, and with man's efforts to deal with his incontrovertible mortality in the here and now. Fragment 143 details the physical consequences of man's mortality in which the gods do not share: sickness, old age and toil (see p. 39 for text).<sup>80</sup> This physical frailty can be seen as an outward manifestation of the mental and spiritual frailty which pervades human life and endeavour. Mortality is the root cause of man's lack of foresight and insight into the plans of the gods (cf. *Nem.* 6.1–7). This makes life unpredictable and limits man's abilities

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Bremmer 2002:5. For his overview of developments in Greek ideas of the soul and the afterlife, see 1–8.

<sup>77</sup> According to Nisetich 1988:1 this is the most analysed poem in Pindar's oeuvre. For a brief discussion of the literature, see Lloyd-Jones 1985:246–248.

<sup>78</sup> Lloyd-Jones 1985:246. Cf. Willcock 1995:139: “(T)he concept of an immortal soul may be said to be inconsistent with the poet's normal view of human life.”

<sup>79</sup> This summary is based on Willcock 1995:137. See also pp. 138–140 for general discussion of the doctrine of reincarnation and pp. 154–161 for commentary on the passage on the afterlife. See Nisetich 1988 and Nisetich 1989:27–72 for an interpretation taking literary rather than religious principles as point of departure. On the Islands of the Blessed, see Gelinne 1988 with p. 224 n. 3 for bibliography.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 10.41–44. The description of the life of the Hyperboreans is virtually identical to that of the gods in fragment 143: “Neither sickness nor accursed old age mingles with that holy race, but without toils or battles they dwell there, having escaped strictly judging Nemesis” (νόσοι δ' οὔτε γῆρας οὐλόμενον κέκραται / ἱερᾶ γενεᾶ: πόνον δὲ καὶ μαχᾶν ἄτερο / οἰκέοισι φυγόντες / ὑπέροδικον Νέμεισιν). On the Hyperboreans, see Romm 1992:60–67, with 60 n. 37 for bibliography, as well as Dillery 1998, Kyriazopoulos 1993.

so that he suffers not only because of his physical shortcomings but also from the reversals of fortune that characterize human life.<sup>81</sup>

These points are illustrated in the gnomic conclusion to *Pythian* 12. The victory of the aulos player “famous Midas” (εὐδοξος Μίδας) is celebrated with the mythical tale of how Perseus’ toils against the Gorgons and Polydektes moved Athena to invent the art of the aulos. In the myth the movement is from hardship to the pleasures of music, but in the *gnomai* the movement is in the opposite direction. Happiness is hard won, and life is uncertain:

εἰ δὲ τις ὄλβος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν, ἄνευ καμάτου  
οὐ φαίνεται· ἐκ δὲ τελευτάσει νιν ἥτοι σήμερον  
δαίμων—τὸ δὲ μόρσιμον οὐ παρφυκτόν—ἀλλ’ ἔσται χρόνος  
οὔτος, ὃ καὶ τιν’ ἀελπίτια βαλὼν  
ἔμπαλιν γνώμας τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ’ οὔπω.

If there is any happiness among men, it does not appear  
without toil. A god will bring it to fulfillment either today—  
what is fated cannot be avoided—but there will come  
that time which, striking a person with surprise,  
will unexpectedly give one thing, but defer another. (*Pyth.* 12.28–32)

The dichotomy between happiness and hardship (ὄλβος and κάματος) in the first gnome parallels the allotment to man of good and bad, pleasure and pain by the gods or fate. Since the divine plan regarding this allotment is inscrutable to mortal man, his life is necessarily unpredictable. Man cannot avoid his fate, which more often than not goes against expectations, as the use of two phrases to express this, ἀελπίτια βαλὼν and ἔμπαλιν γνώμας, demonstrates.

The pervasiveness of hardship is also expressed with reference to Karrhotos, charioteer of Arkesilas of Kyrene. Through μέγαν κάματος he succeeded where many others failed. He is praised fulsomely for his efforts (*Pyth.* 5.26–53), but they also inspire the remark that “no one is without his share of toil, nor will be” (πόνων δ’ οὐ τις ἀπόκλαρός ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔσεται, *Pyth.* 5.54). When Herakles and Telamon contend with the giant Alkyoneus, victory comes at the cost of twelve chariots and 24 lives (*Nem.* 4.24–30), once again demonstrating the idea that success and suffering go hand in hand, even that “it is fitting for one who achieves something to suffer as well” (ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν, *Nem.* 4.32).

Man’s inability to fathom the gods’ plans is linked to his mortality in fragment 61:

<sup>81</sup> Cf. the sophist Aristides’ remark in his oration *In Defense of the Four* on Pindar’s

τί ἔλπει σοφίαν ἔμμεν, ἂν ὀλίγον τοι  
 ἀνήρ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἴσχει,  
 οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως τὰ θεῶν  
 βουλευμάτων ἐρευνάσει βροτέα φρενί·  
 θνατᾶς δ' ἀπὸ μητρὸς ἔφνυ

What do you imagine wisdom to be, which  
 one man possesses in slightly greater degree than another?  
 For it is impossible that he will search out the gods'  
 plans with a mortal mind,  
 since he was born from a mortal mother.<sup>82</sup>

This means human life is dogged by uncertainty. Not only does “many things happen to men counter to their judgment” (πολλὰ δ' ἀνθρώποις παρὰ γνώμαν ἔπεσεν, *Ol.* 12.10), but they cannot know what awaits them, neither in the long term (when they will die) nor in the short term (whether a particular day will end as well as it started) (ἦτοι βροτῶν γε κέκριται / πείρας οὐ τι θανάτου, / οὐδ' ἠσύχιμον ἀμέραν ὅποτε παῖδ' ἀελίου / ἀτειρεῖ σὺν ἀγαθῷ τελευτάσομεν, *Ol.* 2.30–33).

The weather and plant imagery often used to portray uncertainty and vicissitude (see pp. 48–51) underlines the fact that this is a ‘natural’ state of affairs, something inherent to mortal life. The wind as metaphor for the course of life, for example, shows that mortals are not in control of what befalls them. Just as the wind itself is invisible and cannot be pinned down, so the future is unknown and intangible. The wind is visible only in its effect on man and nature. In the same way a mortal knows his fate only from the results he experiences in his life, from what has already happened.

Just as death comes to all, irrespective of their station in life, so all are subject to the vicissitudes of life. In *Pythian* 3 the epinician speaker illustrates this for the benefit of Hieron with reference to the heroes Peleus and Kadmos. In spite of gaining the utmost in happiness among men, they did not enjoy “an untroubled life” (αἰὼν δ' ἀσφαλῆς, *Pyth.* 3.86), but suffered from the misfortunes of their children (*Pyth.* 3.86–103). This unpredictability is generalised in a gnome using the wind metaphor:

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detailed account in the hymns of “the sufferings and reversals befalling men through all time” (γὰν τοῖς ὕμνοις διεξιὼν περὶ τῶν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ συμβαινόντων παθημάτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς, or. 3.620; my translation).

<sup>82</sup> Other expressions of man’s inability to penetrate the gods’ intentions are *Ol.* 12.7–9, *Pyth.* 10.63, *Nem.* 6.6–7, *Nem.* 11.43–44.

ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλοῖαι πνοαί  
 ὑψιπετᾶν ἀνέμων.

Now here, now there blow  
 the gusts of the high-flying winds. (*Pyth.* 3.104–105)

The consequence of the πνοαί ... ἀνέμων characterising mortal life is that happiness is fleeting, a sentiment expressed in the following gnome:

ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται  
 σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσας ἔπηται.

Men's happiness does not come for long  
 unimpaired, when it accompanies them, descending with full weight.  
 (*Pyth.* 3.105–106)

The effect of vicissitude on man can be gauged in a comparison with the gods:

αἰὼν δὲ κυλινδομέναις ἀμέραις ἄλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἐξ  
 ἄλλαξεν. ἄτρωτοὶ γὰρ μὲν παῖδες θεῶν.

As the days roll by, one's life changes now this way  
 now that, but the sons of the gods remain unwounded.  
 (*Isthm.* 3.18–18b)

The impact of the reversals to which men are subjected is intensified by the use of both ἄλλ' ἄλλοτ' and ἐξ ἄλλαξεν (ἐξαλλάσσω = to change utterly). The implied violence of the changes is confirmed in the second part of the gnome. Behind the seemingly innocent remark about the ἄτρωτος life of the sons of the gods lies the contrasting human experience of being wounded by life, of not emerging unscathed from the upheavals that are a man's lot.

Vicissitude is not only an unavoidable part of the human condition and another feature distinguishing man from god, it is also a manifestation of the power of god and fate over man. Especially when a man seems to be totally in control of his life and success comes easily, he must be reminded of this power. In *Pythian* 8 the epinician narrator seems to refer to one of the “few (who) have won without effort that joy which is a light for life above all deeds” (ἄπονον δ' ἔλαβον χάσμα παῦροί τινες, / ἔργων πρὸ πάντων βιότῳ φάος, *Ol.* 10.22–23):

εἰ γὰρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπαται μὴ σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ,  
 πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφρόνων  
 βίον κορουσέμεν ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς·

for if someone has gained success without long labor,  
he seems to many to be a wise man among fools

and to arm his life with effective good planning. (*Pyth.* 8.73–75)

Apparently effortless success gains a man admiration and a reputation for being wiser than his fellow man. However, success is not the result of a man's cleverness, and only fools would think this to be so.<sup>83</sup> The exception to the rule of no pleasure without pain is equally in the power of the divine:

τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κείτει· δαίμων δὲ παρίσχει,  
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὑπερθε βάλλον, ἄλλον δ' ὑπὸ χειρῶν.

But those things do not rest with men; a god grants them,  
exalting now one man, but throwing another beneath the hands.

(*Pyth.* 8.76–77)

The euphoria of victory may be conducive to inappropriate behaviour, hence this reminder that life is unpredictable and that the gods favour now one man, now another. The following exhortation to exercise restraint when competing (μέτρον καταβαίνει, 78) therefore concerns not so much the actual contest as the winner's attitude to his success and his obligation to give due recognition to the gods by staying within the limits set for mortals.<sup>84</sup>

Boundaries are especially important in the context of success, which may lead a man to forget his mortality and reach for the sphere of the divine.<sup>85</sup> In the case of mythical figures this usually means literally trespassing on the terrain of the gods, while the danger for the successful man, be he athlete, general or statesman, lies in expecting more than his allotted, and limited, share. Ixion is an example of a figure from myth who, enjoying the benevolence of the gods, deludes himself that he is equal to them and worthy of being Hera's lover. As punishment for trespassing on Zeus' domain he is tricked into sleeping with a cloud, thus fathering the Centaurs, and then fixed to a wheel on which he

<sup>83</sup> Line 74 can also be rendered "to many among fools he seems clever." The ambiguity is retained in Dönt's German translation "..., scheint er vielen unter Unvernünftigen weise."

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1985:89 with n. 50. For my discussion of vicissitude and the divine in other contexts, see pp. 34 (*Nem.* 11.37–43), 40 (*Isthm.* 5.52–53), 41–42 (*Pyth.* 2.49–52), 44 (*Pyth.* 2.88–89) and 57 (*Pyth.* 12.28–32).

<sup>85</sup> On boundaries in interconnected cosmologies, see Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:48–51.

must spin for all eternity (*Pyth.* 2.21–48).<sup>86</sup> Ixion disregarded the principle that “one should keep in sight due measure in everything in accordance with one’s own position” (χορὴ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὀροῶν μέτρον, *Pyth.* 2.34; my translation), in this case specifically that of being a mortal.<sup>87</sup> Ixion’s story illustrates the negative results of attempting to exceed mortal limits, thereby reinforcing the call to respect boundaries and avoid excess.

The same message is directed at Psaumis of Kamarina in *Olympian* 5 and Phylakidas of Aigina in *Isthmian* 5. In both poems the addressee is reminded that success and the accompanying fame have the potential to tempt a man into forgetting his mortality, and that he should resist this. In the short ode to Psaumis he is presented as lavish in both his sacrifices to the gods (1–8) and his support of the people of Kamarina, leading them “from helplessness to light” (ὑπ’ ἀμαχανίας ἄγων ἐς φάος, *Ol.* 5.14). While a gnome implies that his fellow citizens appreciate his efforts (15–16), the prayer for continued prosperity for the city and a “cheerful old age” for Psaumis (γῆρας εὐθυμον, 17–23) is followed by a gnomic warning that a man should be careful not to overreach himself under such fortunate circumstances:

ὕγιεντα δ’ εἴ τις ὄλβον ἄρδει,  
ἐξαρκέων κτεάτεσσι καὶ εὐλογίαν  
προσιθείς, μὴ ματεύσῃ θεὸς γενέσθαι.

If a man fosters a sound prosperity  
by having sufficient (or: being generous with his) possessions and adding  
praise thereto, let him not seek to become a god. (*Ol.* 5.23–24)

The injunction against striving for divine status in *Isthmian* 5 follows a pattern similar to that in *Olympian* 5, albeit in a more elaborate fashion. It also begins with those things that contribute to ὄλβος, viz. success (indicated by wealth in *Ol.* 5.24) and praise (*Isthm.* 5.12–13, see p. 49 for text). The injunction itself differs from the one in *Olympian* 5 only in the form of the verb ματεύω and the use of Ζεὺς for θεός: μὴ μάτευε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι (*Isthm.* 5.14).<sup>88</sup> Here, however, it is expanded by two motivating statements. According to the first a share of good things

<sup>86</sup> On Ixion see also pp. 41–42 and 44, and for the similar arrogance of Tantalos and Asklepios pp. 44–45.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Yamagata 1994:239.

<sup>88</sup> Lardinois 1995 omits *Isthm.* 5.14–15 from his list of gnomai (p. 352). While the use of direct address may seem to particularize rather than generalize, the position of these lines between three preceding gnomai and one following, and their typically gnomic instructional intent, argue for including them in a set of gnomai spanning lines



(specifically success and the concomitant praise, *Isthm.* 5.13) constitutes everything for a man: πάντ' ἔχεις, / εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν (*Isthm.* 5.14–15). To strive for more would be to aspire to what belongs to Zeus. The implication is that even a share should not be taken for granted, and the use of μοῖρα also hints at the idea of accepting one's fate, which of course for a mortal includes that certain things are out of bounds. The second statement, that “mortal things befit mortals” (θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρόπει, *Isthm.* 5.16) explicitly links man's limits with his mortality.

The importance of the distinction between the mortal and the immortal spheres is emphasized by the use of images which heighten the perception of dealing with a physical reality. The “bronze heaven” is presented as the dwelling place of the gods, which is completely out of bounds for mortals. They cannot even come close to it, and face divine wrath if they should try, as Bellerophon experienced when he tried to enter heaven on the winged horse Pegasus (*Isthm.* 7.44–47). He is an example of a man who “peers at distant things,” only to discover that “he is too little to reach the gods' bronze-paved dwelling” (τὰ μακρὰ δ' εἴ τις / παπταίνει, βραχὺς ἐξικέσθαι χαλκόπεδον θεῶν ἔδραν, *Isthm.* 7.43–44).<sup>89</sup>

The pillars of Herakles, situated as they are at the edge of the known world, represent a much more ambiguous space than heaven, as a point of contact between the human and the divine spheres. On the one hand they are a desirable destination symbolic of the highest achievement, but on the other hand they constitute an absolute boundary beyond which lies transgression.<sup>90</sup> They are an image of both the danger and the reward involved in seeking excellence. In *Olympian* 3, for example, the epinician speaker holds up the magnitude of Theron's achievements by comparing them to reaching the pillars of Herakles (43–44). However, he also warns that “what lies beyond is not to be trodden by either the wise or the unwise” (τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον / κἄσφοις, 44–45; my translation). The implication is that a

7–16. Cf. Bischoff 1938:133. See also W.T. Wilson 1991:24–25 on the distinction between wisdom sentences and wisdom admonitions.

<sup>89</sup> See also *Nem.* 6.3–4 and *Pyth.* 10.27–30. In the latter passage the reference to “the bronze heaven (which) is never his to scale” (ὁ χάλκεος οὐρανὸς οὐ ποτ' ἀμβατὸς αὐτῷ) is followed by one to the equally inaccessible land of the Hyperboreans (see note 80). On the “bronze heaven,” see Gerber 1999:46.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:49.

man may extend himself but he must keep within the limits set for mortals and make sure that he does not trespass on the divine domain.<sup>91</sup>

The drawbacks of the human condition are clear. Because of his mortality man is physically frail, subject to suffering and vicissitude, and finds his life circumscribed. The important question now arises how man should react to these realities of life, both in his attitudes and his actions. In *Pythian* 3, a poem which deals extensively with suffering, an attitude of acceptance of one's lot is advocated. Mortal man "must be happy with what good the blessed gods allot him" (χρηὶ πρὸς μακάρων τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν, 103–104). This also means accepting the changeability of the divine allotment and the brevity of happiness described in the following gnomai (see p. 59 for text). Earlier the epinician speaker has already reminded Hieron of the ancient wisdom that "the immortals apportion to humans a pair of evils for every good" (ἐν παρ' ἑσλὸν πῆματα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς ἀθάνατοι, 81–82).<sup>92</sup> The appropriate response to this undeniable state of affairs is to bear one's troubles with dignity and display only the good things to the world (τὰ μὲν ὧν οὐ δύναται νήπιοι κόσμῳ φέρειν, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω, 82–83). The same appeal to show fortitude in the face of "god-given, unbearable trouble" (θεοσδοτος †ἀτληκηκότας) and hide it, but display publicly one's "share of noble and pleasant things" (καλῶν ... μοῖραν τε τερπνῶν) is made in fragment 42 from the hymns.<sup>93</sup>

The closing lines of *Pythian* 2 argue that railing against the way in which god apportions glory merely increases the misery and that envious men only wound themselves (88–92). The better course is to accept what θεός decides and acknowledge vicissitude and hardship,

<sup>91</sup> For a virtually identical expression of these ideas, see *Isthm.* 4.11–13. The pillars are implied by referring to the furthest possible voyage in *Pyth.* 10.28–29 and *Isthm.* 6.12–13, and the furthest promontory in *Nem.* 9.46–47. In *Nem.* 4.69 the forbidden realm beyond the pillars is indicated as "that which lies to the west of Gadeira" (on this see Péron 1974:82). Cf. also *Nem.* 3.20–26. On the pillars of Herakles in Pindar, see Péron 1974:72–84 and Hubbard 1985:11–16, and in general Romm 1992:17–20.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. fr. 225: ὅπταν θεὸς ἀνδρὶ χάσμα πέμψη, πάρος μέλαιναν καρδίαν ἐστυφέλιξεν ("whenever a god sends joy to a man, he first strikes his heart with gloom"). On the scholarly controversy about the source of the gnome in *Pythian* 3 and the number of urns in the favoured text, *Il.* 24.527–528, see Young 1968:50–51, 51 nn. 1, 2. According to Mace 1992:114 n. 9 it is unlikely that the Homeric text was Pindar's source. She argues for lost verses from the hexameter tradition.

<sup>93</sup> See Maehler 1963:93 n. 2 on how the attitude of restraint differs fundamentally from the personal expression of sorrow, disappointment and indignation in the earlier lyric poetry of Archilochos, Alkaios and Sappho.

but nevertheless not to allow the inevitable reversals of life to become overpowering:

φέρειν δ' ἐλαφρῶς ἐπαυχένιον λαβόντα ζυγόν  
 ἀρήγει· ποτὶ κέντρον δέ τοι  
 λακτιζέμεν τελέθει  
 ὀλισθηρὸς οἴμος·

It helps / is good to bear lightly the yoke taken on one's  
 shoulders; and indeed, the outcome of  
 kicking against the goad is  
 a slippery path.

(*Pyth.* 2.93–96; my translation)

The image is of a draught animal which, when goaded, kicks in stead of submitting to its master, and thereby loses its footing. To rail against and resist the inevitable is not only futile, it is also dangerous. The ὀλισθηρὸς οἴμος points to a loss of control which is bound to end in disaster.<sup>94</sup> For mortals, resistance to their lot makes the load heavier, acceptance lightens the burden. ἀρήγω means both “to help, succour,” and “to be good, fitting” (LSJ s.v.). Thus the gnome recommends an attitude to hardship that is both subjectively beneficial and objectively appropriate, i.e. acceptable to the gods and society.

In contrast to those who are not satisfied with their portion in life, “wise men know well the wind to come on the third day and are not harmed by greed for gain” (σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα τριταῖον ἄνεμον / ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν, *Nem.* 7.17–18). They are aware of the uncertainty that goes with being mortal and take this into account in the way they live their lives. As the weather changes and the wind comes up, so their fortune may change. They do not allow greed to determine their actions, since not only may wealth turn into poverty, it also provides no protection against death.

The inevitability of old age and death can be mitigated by appreciating the pleasures that can be had every day (*Isthm.* 7.40–42, see p. 55 for text). This attitude is also recommended in *Olympian* 1 as an essential complement to the gratification afforded by victory:

ὁ νικῶν δὲ λοιπὸν ἀμφὶ βίον  
 ἔχει μελιπόεσσαν εὐδίαν  
 ἀέθλων γ' ἔνεκεν· τὸ δ' αἰεὶ παράμερον ἐσλόν  
 ὕπατον ἔρχεται παντὶ βροτῶν

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Theognis 441–446. He attributes acceptance and endurance of the fickle gifts of the gods to good men, while the bad are characterized by their lack of control.

And for the rest of his life the victor  
enjoys a honey-sweet calm,

so much as games can provide it. But the good that comes each day  
is greatest for every mortal. (*Ol.* 1.97–100)

Young somewhat disparagingly refers to this attitude as “the philosophy of an easy-going life ... , one that pursues gratifications as they arise, day by day, one by one ... , without much regard for what lies beyond the current concern.”<sup>95</sup> On the contrary such a world view is the result of an acute awareness of the hardness and uncertainty of life and the limited power of a single success such as victory at the games to change that fact.<sup>96</sup> The enjoyment of what pleasures each day brings, can be seen as another way of living according to the dictum expressed in *Pythian* 3 and fragment 42 to emphasize the good in life and downplay the bad.

The appropriate attitude to man’s limitations as a mortal is summarised in *Pyth.* 3.59–60: one should temper one’s expectations from god to what is proper for a mortal, which means concerning oneself with human affairs, with what is “at hand” (τὸ παρκεείμενον, *Nem.* 3.75), and accepting what fate has determined (χρῆ τὰ εἰοκίτα παρ δαμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν / γνόντα τὸ παρ ποδός, οἷας εἰμέν αἴσας).<sup>97</sup> This injunction is followed by one which once again declares the “life of the immortals” out of bounds, and recommends rather to “exhaust the practical means at your disposal” (μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον / σπεῦδε, τὰν δ’ ἔμπρακτον ἀντλεῖ μαχανάν, 61–62). These lines, like the image of the pillars of Herakles, point to the paradox inherent in human life. On the one hand man must always be aware of the limits imposed by his mortality, on the other hand he must make the most of what he has in pursuit of excellence, which in turn creates the risk of overstepping the boundary.

Pelops in *Olympian* 1 accepts this risk, because it is through action that a man can win the fame that provides some immunity against the oblivion of death:

<sup>95</sup> Young 1971:30–31.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. fr. 126. It is unlikely that the advice to a ruler like Hieron not to “diminish delight in life, since by far the best thing for a man is a pleasant lifetime” (μηδ’ ἀμαύρου τέρφιν ἐν βίῳ· πολὺ τοι / φέριστον ἀνδρὶ τερπνὸς αἰών) would have been intended as a recommendation to take life easy and disregard adversity.

<sup>97</sup> For other expressions of the idea that man should limit himself to his own sphere, see *Pyth.* 3.21–23, *Nem.* 3.30, 74–75, *Isthm.* 8.12–14 and *Pae.* 4.32–35.

ὁ μέγας δὲ κίν-  
 δυνος ἀναλκιν οὐ φῶτα λαμβάνει.  
 θανεῖν δ' οἷσιν ἀνάγκη, τὰ κέ τις ἀνόνημον  
 γῆρας ἐν σκότῳ καθήμενος ἔψοι μάταν,  
 ἀπάντων καλῶν ἄμμορος;

Great risk  
 does not take hold of a cowardly man.  
 But since men must die, why would anyone sit  
 in darkness and coddle a nameless old age to no use,  
 deprived of all noble deeds? (Ol. 1.81–84)

The thought of death without fame becomes a spur to action. Man has a choice between waiting resignedly for old age and death, and taking risks in order to perform great deeds. For Pelops the rewards both in life and after death are well worth the effort. He wins the much sought after Hippodameia as wife, fathers six outstanding sons and is buried next to the altar of Zeus in Olympia, where he enjoys enduring honour from the many visitors (Ol. 1.88–93).

Taking part in the games also involves risk, such as the humiliation of losing, but there are enough rewards to make it worthwhile.<sup>98</sup> For example, through his victory at Olympia the boy wrestler Alkimedon of Aigina provides the means to both his still living grandfather and his dead father to deal with death. His “great success” (μεγάλαν / ἀρετάν, Ol. 8.5–6) has given his grandfather the strength to confront one of the consequences of mortality, old age (πατρὶ δὲ πατρὸς ἐνέπνευσεν μένος / γήραος ἀντίπαλον, Ol. 8.70–71), and push the thought of death into the background:

Ἄϊδα τοι λάθεται  
 ἄρμενα πράξαις ἀνήρ.  
 Truly, a man forgets about Hades  
 when he has done fitting things. (Ol. 8.72–73)

Alkimedon’s father, though dead, is nevertheless regarded as partaking in the customs observed at this time of festivity, enjoying his son’s success and sharing it with other departed relatives (Ol. 8.77–84), since “the dust (does not) bury the cherished glory of kinsmen” (κατακρύπτει δ’ οὐ κόνις / συγγόνων κεδνὰν χάριν, Ol. 8.79–80).<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> On the ignominy of losing, see Ol. 8.67–69, Pyth. 8.81–87 and fr. 229.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Pyth. 5.96–103 for a similar relationship between Arkesilas of Kyrene and his ancestors.

The importance of Alkimedon's victory for his living and his dead relatives demonstrates Oudemans and Lardinois' statement that "in interconnected cultures, immortality is not primarily a personal affair."<sup>100</sup> The success of a victor is often described as a source of delight and gratification for his father (see, for example, *Pyth.* 10.22–26 and *Nem.* 6.17–24). The honour that Alkimedon bestows on his dead father shows that such success is not just about the immediate acclaim that achievement brings, but perhaps even more about giving a man a form of immortality through his descendants, an idea set out in *Partheneion* 1:

ἀθάναται δὲ βροτοῖς  
 ἀμέραι, σῶμα δ' ἐστὶ θνατόν.  
 ἀλλ' ὄτινι μὴ λπότε-  
 κνος σφαλῆ πάμπαν οἶκος βιαί-  
 α δαμεις ἀνάγκη,  
 ζῶει κάματον προφυγῶν ἀνια-  
 ρόν·

Humans have immortal  
 days, but their body is mortal.

But he, whose house does not fail  
 of children and is not completely  
 overwhelmed by the force of necessity,  
 lives free from painful  
 toil.

(fr. 94a.14–20)

In addition to a measure of immortality, offspring relieves a man from a life of toil, one of the consequences of mortality, provided that fate does not intervene.<sup>101</sup>

In an interconnected society immortality also consists in being remembered by one's community as a man of worth.<sup>102</sup> The good reputation that ensures this kind of immortality rests not only on success, but also on living peacefully and avoiding arrogance, i.e. in being a responsible member of society:

⟨ἀλλ'⟩ εἴ τις ἄκρον ἐλὼν  
 ἠσυχᾶ τε νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὕβριν<sup>103</sup>  
 ἀπέφυγεν, μέλανος {δ'} ἄν ἐσχατιὰν

<sup>100</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:73.

<sup>101</sup> On ἀνάγκη as fate, see Schreckenberg 1964:72–81.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Dover 1974:267–268 on the importance of leaving a positive image for future generations and being well thought of by them.

<sup>103</sup> On the importance of avoiding ὕβρις for ensuring one's status in the community, see Fisher 1992:219–220 on this passage.

καλλίονα θανάτου (στείχοι) γλυκυτάτα γενεᾶ  
εὐώνυμον κτεάνων κρατίστην χάριν πορών

But if a man has won the peak  
and dwelling there in peace has avoided dire  
insolence, he would go to a more noble bourne  
of black death, having given his sweetest offspring  
the best of possessions, the grace of a good name. (Pyth. 11.55–58)

As in the example of Alkimedon, this gnomic passage reveals the constant exchange between generations. What the one does has significant implications for the other. A man who is honoured in his society knows that death will not erase that honour, while his children are assured of their position because of his status.<sup>104</sup> In contrast the miserly and scornful man will find himself in the realm of the dead without the fame needed to preserve his name or establish that of his family:

εἰ δέ τις ἔνδον νέμει πλοῦτον κρυφαῖον,  
ἄλλοισι δ' ἐπίπτων γελᾷ, ψυχάν Ἄϊδα τελέων  
οὐ φράζεται δόξας ἄνευθεν.

But if a man keeps wealth hidden inside  
and attacks others with laughter, he does not consider  
that he is paying up his soul to Hades devoid of fame. (Isthm. 1.67–68)

The honour of fellow citizens as a way of dealing with mortality is linked in *Nemean* 11 with the power of poetry. Praise for Aristagoras's "admirable build and inborn courage" (τὸ θαητὸν δέμας ἀτρεμίαν τε σύγγονον, 12) is immediately followed by a reminder that wealth, good looks and success cannot avert death (εἰ δέ τις ὄλβον ἔχων μορφαῖα παραμεύσεται ἄλλους, / ἔν τ' ἀέθλοισιν ἀριστεύων ἐπέδειξεν βίαν, / θνατὰ μεμνάσθω περιστέλλων μέλη, / καὶ τελευτὰν ἀπάντων γὰν ἐπιεσσόμενος, 13–16). A man who heeds the implied warning against overreaching oneself deserves the respect of his community (see *Pythian* 11 above), but more than that, in the light of his mortality he needs it:

ἐν λόγοις δ' ἀσπῶν ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπαινέσθαι χρεῶν,  
καὶ μελιγδούποισι δαιδαλθέντα μελίζεν ἀοιδαῖς.

And it is necessary that he be praised by citizens' words of honour,  
and, having been adorned, be celebrated with songs sounding honey  
sweet. (17–18; my translation)

<sup>104</sup> See *Nem.* 8.35–37 for a negative, non-gnomic statement of the idea that the way a man lives has important consequences for his offspring.

He also needs the commemoration provided by poetry. The potency of poetry to breach the barrier of death is a continuous thread in Pindar's work. For example, in *Nemean* 6 the epinician speaker requests the help of the Muse in aiming "a glorious wind of verses" (οὔρου ἐπέων / εὐκλέα, 28b–29) at the Bassidai, "because when men are dead and gone, songs and words preserve for them their noble deeds" (παροιοχομένων γὰρ ἀνέρων / ἀοιδαὶ καὶ λόγοι τὰ καλὰ σφιν ἔργ' ἐκόμισαν, 29–30).<sup>105</sup>

In an extended gnomic simile in *Olympian* 10 the role of poetry in ensuring a man of immortal fame is enhanced by linking it with the conventional view that children are essential for a man's peace of mind when he considers death, and make mortality more bearable. If a man dies without leaving a son, his life's efforts have been in vain, for the wealth he has assembled will go to a stranger (86–89), a situation "most hateful to a dying man" (θνήσκοντι στυγερώτατος, 90). The same is true when a man's deeds go unsung:

καὶ ὅταν καλὰ {μὲν} ἔρξαις ἀοιδᾶς ἄτερο,  
 ..., εἰς Ἄϊδα σταθμόν  
 ἀνήρ ἵκεται, κενεὰ πνεύσαις ἔπορε μόχθῳ  
 βραχὺ τι τερπνόν.

so, when a man who has performed noble deeds,  
 ..., goes without song to Hades'  
 dwelling, in vain has he striven and gained for his toil  
 but brief delight.

(*Ol.* 10.91–93)

Although "noble deeds" are a prerequisite for fame, the deeds of the unsung man, like the wealth of the childless man, will be lost to him and will contribute nothing to his posthumous fame. Poetry, however, like the birth of a child who "warms his (father's) mind with great love" (μάλα δέ οἱ θερμαίνει φιλότατι νόον, *Ol.* 10.87), can remedy the situation, "for the word lives longer than deeds" (ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει, *Nem.* 4.6).

<sup>105</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 1.92–94: ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας / οἶον ἀποιοχομένων ἀνδρῶν διαίταν μανύει / καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς ("only the posthumous acclaim of fame by both chroniclers and singers reveals how departed men have lived;" my translation). On both passages, see Gerber 1999:63–64. See also fragment 121, which emphasizes the unique role poetry has in immortalizing good men's deeds: ... πρέπει δ' ἐσλοῖσιν ὑμνεῖσθαι ... / ... καλλίσταις ἀοιδᾶς. / τοῦτο γὰρ ἀθανάτοις τιμαῖς ποτιψαύει μόνον, / θνήσκει δὲ σιγαθὲν καλὸν ἔργον ("... it is proper for good men to be hymned ... with the most noble songs, for that alone touches upon immortal honors, but a noble deed dies when left in silence ...").



The need for poetry to immortalise deeds arises from another of man's frailties, his forgetfulness. *Isthmian* 7 opens with a catalogue of *καλά* associated with the victor Strepsiadas' city, Thebes, which may reasonably be supposed to be unforgettable (1–15). However, illustrious though these deeds may be, they do not escape the limitations of human memory:

ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ γὰρ  
εὔδει χάρις, ἀμνάμονες δὲ βροτοί,  
ὅ τι μὴ σοφίας ἄωτον ἄκρον  
κλυταῖς ἐπέων ῥοαῖσιν ἐξικηται ζυγέν·

But the ancient  
splendor sleeps; and mortals forget

what does not attain poetic wisdom's choice pinnacle,  
yoked to glorious streams of verses.

(16–19)

These *gnomai* are followed by an injunction to celebrate Strepsiadas in song for his victory (κώμας' ἔπειτεν ἀδυμελεῖ σὺν ὕμνῳ / καὶ Στρεψιάδα· φέρει γὰρ Ἴσθμοῖ / νίκαν παγκρατίου, 20–22). While Strepsiadas' success is clearly intended to be elevated to the level of his city's ancient *καλά*, the gnomic link highlights the importance of commemorative poetry, not only for ancient deeds, but also for the current effort. This is underlined by the use of ἔπειτεν and καὶ in lines 20 and 21. Since even deeds involving gods and heroes tend to fade from memory if they are not fixed in poetry, if a man like Strepsiadas wishes his deeds to leave a lasting impression he too needs it.

To deal satisfactorily with the consequences of mortality a man first of all needs the appropriate attitude: humility towards the immortal gods, acceptance of his limitations and the willingness to emphasize the good rather than the bad that befalls him. However, this does not mean that mortal life is only to be endured passively. The man who wishes to counter the ravages of death needs to establish himself as someone of worth in his community. It is in the social arena that a man's standing is determined, whether his life and actions are such that his fellow men are prepared to accord him the fame and good name that will live on after his death. Also important in the social context is a family's continuity through successive generations. Offspring safeguard the family name and through their own achievements enhance the fame of their ancestors. Yet for all this acknowledgement of the conventional ways in which mortal man seeks to overcome the realities of his essential nature, Pindar's oeuvre suggests that they will not be

enough. Poetry, because it has the support of Mnemosyne, so lacking in humankind, surpasses all these efforts and remains as the only true and lasting reflection of human effort (ἔργοις δὲ καλοῖς ἔσοπτρον ἴσαμεν ἐνὶ σὺν τρόπῳ, / εἰ Μναμοσύνας ἕκατι λιπαράμπυκος / εὐρηται {τις} ἄποινα μόχθων κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς, *Nem.* 7.14–16).<sup>106</sup>

While the above summary reflects the dominant ideas in Pindar's poems on dealing with the human condition, the question of the soul and the afterlife which was raised earlier in connection with views on death (pp. 55–56) also needs to be considered in the context of man's endeavour to find some form of immortality. Several fragments from the threnoi point to a belief at least by some in the immortality of the soul and the possibility of a better life after death for those who lived piously, with corresponding damnation for the wicked.

Fragment 131b posits the concept of a god-given immortal soul which remains after the death of the body:

σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ,  
ζῶν δ' ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἶδω-  
λον· τὸ γὰρ ἔστι μόνον  
ἐκ θεῶν.<sup>107</sup>

The body of all men is subject to overpowering death,  
but a living image of life still remains,  
for it alone is  
from the gods.

(1–3)

The consolation provided by the immortality of the soul rests on the condition that one lives a pious life on earth. According to Plato “among others Pindar says ... that the soul of man is immortal ... that therefore it is indeed necessary to live one's entire life as piously as possible” (λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι ... τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον ... δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὀσιώτατα διαβιώναι τὸν βίον, *Meno* 81B). Fragment 129 from *Threnos* 7 describes the delight and happiness enjoyed by the pious in Hades, while fragment 130 from the same poem holds out “endless darkness” (τὸν ἄπειρον ... σκοτόν) for the unholy. This division between the good and the bad is paralleled in *Olympian* 2 where the ἐσλοὶ are described as “spend(ing) a tearless existence, whereas the others endure pain too terrible to behold” (ἄδακρον νέμονται / αἰῶνα, τοὶ δ' ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον, 66–67). The ref-

<sup>106</sup> For the enduring quality of poetry, see also, amongst others, *Ol.* 4.8–10, *Pyth.* 3.114–115, *Isthm.* 4.40–42.

<sup>107</sup> On Greek ideas of the divine in man, see Pépin 1971:5–11.

erence to the Eleusinian mysteries in fragment 137 also promises happiness for those who die after having seen them,<sup>108</sup> and another version of the reincarnation of the soul described in *Olympian* 2.68–77 is found in fragment 133. While the traditional view accords a man who lives a proper life a good name after his death, i.e. continued social acceptance, and the opposite to those who do not conform to social norms (see pp. 67–68), the mystic religious approach promises immortality, with bliss as reward for piety, horror otherwise.

According to Bremmer these latter ideas are a response to a change in attitude towards mortality during the archaic period, from the traditional concern with social survival to an interest in personal survival.<sup>109</sup> This would correspond to the move from acceptance to fear of death already noted (pp. 55–56). Whether the presence of both views in the Pindaric oeuvre is an indication of developing interests or convictions of the poet himself, or of different positions taken by different patrons and audiences, or a combination of the two, is difficult, if not impossible to establish. However, a leaning towards the individual may also be discerned in the emphasis on the power of poetry to provide immortality. Although this can be interpreted as the best way to keep a man's memory alive in society, or even as a negation of the idea of an active, sentient afterlife,<sup>110</sup> poetic commemoration does single out the individual and his deeds. In this respect the power of poetry as envisioned in the Pindaric oeuvre makes it similar to the inscribed grave monuments mentioned by Bremmer as an example of the reactions to the new interest in the individual's fate after death which also include the ideas of happy abodes and, more radically, reincarnation, both found in Pindar's work.<sup>111</sup>

### *Man in society*

The analysis of those gnomic reflections in Pindar's oeuvre that deal with man's position in the world as he encounters it in nature and the workings of the divine, has shown him to be a fragile creature limited in his pursuit of happiness and success by his inherent weakness, his mor-

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<sup>108</sup> Cf. Bremmer 2002:6 and 137 n. 53.

<sup>109</sup> Bremmer 2002:25.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Willcock 1995:139.

<sup>111</sup> Bremmer 2002:25.

tality. In this situation the importance of a social network comprising both the intimate family circle and the wider community is evident, as has already been noted (pp. 66–68).<sup>112</sup> In an essentially hostile world a man needs the support provided by human relationships for his efforts to shore up his precarious position, and in return assumes certain obligations so that the survival of the network can be assured. In the give and take of relationships human nature reveals itself, admirably in qualities such as respect for ancestors and generous hospitality, less so in, for example, greed and envy.

The political background to the social network in which a man of the first half of the fifth century finds himself, varies between tyranny, democracy and oligarchy, a situation reflected in *Pythian* 2.86–88 when the epinician narrator claims with gnomic authority that “under every regime the straight-talking man excels: in a tyranny, when the boisterous people rule, or when the wise watch over the city” (ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει, / παρὰ τυραννίδι, χῶπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός, / χῶταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι). This raises the question whether political views have a bearing on how the privileges and obligations attached to human relationships are perceived, which would be the case if cosmological convictions were regarded as inextricably and exclusively bound to a particular dispensation. Against the (now largely discredited) historicist approach Lloyd-Jones states unequivocally that it is “certain ... that in his surviving poetry (Pindar) makes no political pronouncements.” He is loyal to his home city of Thebes and reacts sympathetically to the difficulties of his patrons, but “none of these sympathies involve him in a statement of political principle.”<sup>113</sup> These are strong views, but an analysis of the generalisations involving political position found in a handful of gnomai bears out Lloyd-Jones’ position.

Although the gnome cited above mentions the different constitutional forms current in Greece at the time, its theme is not their relative merit, but the desirability and benefit of being an εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ, whatever the political circumstances, rather than a “devious citizen” (δόλιος ἀστὸς, 82).<sup>114</sup> In fact, only five gnomai make statements

<sup>112</sup> This position of the individual in relation to family and community is a feature of interconnected societies. Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:71.

<sup>113</sup> Lloyd-Jones 1973:112. An example of the historicist approach is Bowra 1964. He devotes a long chapter (99–158) to “Echoes of politics” in Pindar and sees in *Pyth.* 2.86–88 the poet’s “preference ... for the aristocratic society of the ‘wise’.”

<sup>114</sup> See Lloyd-Jones 1973:115 with n. 17 for a refutation of the pejorative connotations

about a particular political dispensation, one about oligarchy and four about kingship.<sup>115</sup> Direct praise for the way in which the Aleuadai govern the state of Thessaly (*Pyth.* 10.69–71) is supported by a gnome about the nature of oligarchy and oligarchs: the governing of a city is the preserve of “good men,” it is hereditary, and good men know how to look after and cherish this inheritance (ἐν δ’ ἀγαθοῖσι κεῖται / πατρῷαι κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσεις, *Pyth.* 10.71–72). By implication the Aleuadai are legitimate and competent rulers. However, similar sentiments are expressed of a king, Arkesilas of Kyrene: he enhances the inherited privilege of kingship with his insight (τὸ μὲν, ὅτι βασιλεύς / ἔσσι μεγαλᾶν πολίων / ἐπεὶ συγγενῆς / ὀφθαλμὸς αἰδοιότατον γέρας / τεᾷ τοῦτο μειγνύμενον φρενί, *Pyth.* 5.15–19).<sup>116</sup> Even though the praise of Arkesilas is not given the added weight of a gnomic formulation, the comparison shows that claims are not made for the inherent superiority of one form of government over the other, but rather for the excellence of the particular people occupying the seats of power.

Does the same apply to the *gnomai* on kingship? Three of the four are addressed to Hieron of Syracuse and as in the case of the Aleuadai they are used to magnify the praise of a specific victor by attributing general significance to certain aspects of his political status. Hieron is assured that a king occupies the highest possible position in society, his greatness surpasses that of all others (†ἄλλοισι δ’ ἄλλοι μεγάλοι τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται / βασιλεῦσι, *Ol.* 1.113–114), he is a leader of people and enjoys the attention of destiny (λαγέταν γάρ τοι τύραννον δέρεται, / εἴ τιν’ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ μέγας πότημος, *Pyth.* 3.85–86). Once again these statements are not about the primacy of kingship, but about the advantages enjoyed by those who have this position

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attributed to ὁ λάβρος στρατός. Bell’s misreading of the gnome, according to which “(s)traightness of tongue ... is contrasted with the indiscriminate racket of the contentious,” is based on a pejorative interpretation of the noise of the assembly (Bell 1984:27 with n. 89). Cf. *Ol.* 12.5 where assemblies are characterised positively as “render(ing) counsel” (ἀγοραὶ βουλαφόροι). On the apolitical and non-judgmental nature of the gnome, see also Ostwald 2000:15–16. Hornblower agrees with this position, but nevertheless leans to the view that λάβρος is disparaging (Hornblower 2004:81 with n. 97).

<sup>115</sup> Compare also the generalized first person statement in *Pyth.* 11.50–54 which expresses a preference for the “middle estate” above the lot of the tyrant. For a refutation of the interpretation of this passage as constituting Pindar’s personal political convictions and as a condemnation of tyranny as a political system, see Young 1968:12–15.

<sup>116</sup> On ἐπεὶ in line 17 in stead of ἔχει, as in the manuscripts, see Race 1997a: 303 n. 1.

in society. Also, the acknowledgement due to a king rests not merely on his elevated position, but is a “recompense for (his) excellence” (ἄλλοις δέ τις ἐτέλεσεν ἄλλος ἀνήρ/εὐαχέα βασιλεῦσιν ὕμνον ἄποιν’ ἀρετᾶς, *Pyth.* 2.13–14)—in this he receives no more than any other good man.<sup>117</sup>

Contrary to the *gnomai* discussed so far, there is no link between victor and political dispensation to motivate the choice of subject in *Nem.* 4.83–85, where the enviable position of a king is used to demonstrate the power of poetry: “a hymn of noble deeds makes a man equal in fortune to kings” (ὕμνος δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν/ἐργμάτων βασιλεῦσιν ἰσοδαίμονα τεύχει/φῶτα). In a politically neutral context the fortune of kings is assumed as the best of its kind and something to strive for (note the implied comparison with marble and gold in the preceding lines 81–83). This may reflect the respect for kings or leaders typically found in interconnected societies,<sup>118</sup> but even so the aim is to display the value of song, not to recommend kingship above other forms of government.

What the above analysis does imply, is that the position someone occupies in the hierarchy of his particular city state does not fundamentally influence the expectations and obligations inscribed in the social code regarding aspects such as the insistence on and reward for excellence. In the epinikia social status ranges across that of tyrant or king (Hieron, Theron, Arkesilas) and his family or close associates (e.g. Xenokrates of Akragas, Hagesias of Syracuse, Chromios of Aitna), member of a ruling or otherwise prominent family (e.g. Hippokleas of the Aleuadaï of Thessaly, Megakles of the Alkmaionidai of Athens), an important private citizen (e.g. Psaumis of Kamarina), a member of a family of no apparent distinction (e.g. Hagesidamos of Western Lokroi), and an exile from civil strife in his homeland (Ergoteles of Himera, formerly from Knossos). However, what differentiates these people is less important than what joins them socially, their membership of the upper class or aristocracy, which in turn differentiates them from the rest of society.<sup>119</sup> This state of affairs is mostly taken for granted, but in *Isthmian* 1 the distinction is clearly articulated:

<sup>117</sup> See, for example, *Isthm.* 3.1–3, 7–8.

<sup>118</sup> See Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:71–73, 98.

<sup>119</sup> On the dominance, if not monopoly, of the games by the aristocracy, see Kurke 1991b:3 n. 9 and Golden 1998:141–145. On the same situation regarding politics, even in democratic Athens, see Lacey 1968:20, 65.

μισθὸς γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώποις γλυκύς,  
 μηλοβότα τ' ἀρότα τ' ὄρ-  
 νιχολόχῳ τε καὶ ὄν πόντος τράφει.  
 γαστρὶ δὲ πᾶς τις ἀμύνων λιμὸν αἰανῆ τέταται·  
 ὃς δ' ἀμφ' ἀέθλοις ἢ πολεμίζων ἄρηται κῦδος ἄβρόν,  
 εὐαγορηθεὶς κέρδος ὕψιστον δέκεται, πολια-  
 τᾶν καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον.

For a different payment for different tasks is sweet to men,  
 whether to a shepherd, a plowman, a fowler,  
 or to one whom the sea nourishes,  
 since everyone strives to keep gnawing hunger from his belly.  
 But he who wins luxurious glory in games or as a soldier  
 by being praised gains the highest profit, the finest words  
 from tongues of citizens and foreigners. (*Isthm.* 1.47–51)

Reward in accordance with the task fulfilled is the general principle which allows differentiation. Although the need to keep hunger at bay is acknowledged as a universal concern, the implication is that it is a matter of actual importance only to those depending on subsistence pursuits, not to the man described a few lines earlier as “devoted wholeheartedly to excellence with both expenses and hard work” (ἀρετᾷ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν, / ἀμφότερον δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις, *Isthm.* 1.41–42). The basic reward of food on the table is what the former can expect in return for their efforts, while the ultimate reward of praise from both fellow citizens and strangers goes to the man who can spend his money and effort on the pursuit of ἀρετά in games or war, in Pindar’s time all but certainly a member of the elite.<sup>120</sup>

The views on man in society that will now be investigated (like those on man in the wider world of nature and the divine already discussed) therefore pertain to the dominant social class,<sup>121</sup> irrespective of different positions within that class or different political dispensations in the various cities represented.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Woodbury 1978:296–297 on the shift in meaning of μισθός in this passage. On the link between sport and warfare, and the role of the elite in both, see Golden 1998:23–28.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Poliakoff 1987:129:

Though clearly all social classes were free to enter the contests, it is also clear that throughout its history, sport in the Greek world claimed the attention and participation of the nobility and *was molded by its ideology* (my emphasis).

For his discussion of the social background of athletes from early to late antiquity, see pp. 129–133.

*The household and family relationships*

The household, or οἶκος, is generally regarded as the central social unit in the Greek world of the fifth century.<sup>122</sup> Something of its importance as a positive force in a man's life appears from *Paean* 1:

πρὶν ὀδυνηρὰ γήραος σ[.....μ]ολεῖν,  
 πρὶν τις εὐθυμίᾳ σιαζέτω  
 νόημι' ἄκοτον ἐπὶ μέτρα, ἰδὼν  
 δύναμιν οἰκόθετον.

Before the pains of old age ... arrive,  
 let a man shelter in cheerfulness  
 a mind without rancor in moderation, having seen  
 the resource stored in his house.

(fr. 52a.1–4)

It is the δύναμις contained in a man's household which ensures him peace of mind and good cheer, even if he cannot avoid the infirmity of old age. A house filled with such power no doubt enjoys material wealth (as Race's translation implies),<sup>123</sup> but wealth alone is not enough. For the head of the household its strength also lies in his offspring, in the physical support and care in old age, and ritual care after death they are expected to provide their parents. These are the practical implications of natural affection for one's parents and the honour in which they are held. Both this love and honour are expressed in superlative terms in the epinikia, confirming the importance of family loyalty and obligations in the Pindaric cosmology.<sup>124</sup> *Isthmian* 1 demonstrates that love for one's parents entails putting their interests first. In the opening lines the epinician narrator states his intention to give priority to his obligation towards his mother city even though he is already fully occupied working for another city (Μᾶτερ ἐμά, τὸ τεόν, χρύσσασι Θήβα, / πράγμα καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον / θήσομαι. μή μοι κραναὰ νεμεσάσαι / Δᾶλος, ἐν ᾧ κέχυμαι. *Isthm.* 1.1–4). He explains and justifies this stance with the rhetorical question, "What is dearer to good men than their beloved

<sup>122</sup> See, for example Lacey 1968:9, Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:96, and Kurke 1991b:9, and for a description of the basic composition of the household Lacey 1968:15–16. Further bibliographic references are given in Kurke 1991a:288 n. 6. For a detailed treatment of the role of the οἶκος in Pindar's epinikia, see Kurke 1991b:13–82. She comes to the conclusion that the *kleos* sought at the games "depends on and aims at the preservation and glorification of the *oikos*."

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Rutherford 2001:254 who translates "wealth."

<sup>124</sup> On the responsibility of children for aged parents, see Bolkestein 1939:79–80, 282 and Lacey 1968:116–118.



parents?” (τί φίλτερον κεδνῶν τοκέων ἀγαθοῖς; *Isthm.* 1.5), which implies that parents, including the mother city as metaphorical parent, have the highest claim to love. The narrator can expect his decision to execute the mother city’s commission first to be accepted and respected, because it reflects an outlook on relationships in terms of which love for one’s parents means all other obligations must yield to their claims. As far as τιμὰ is concerned, Thrasyboulos is reminded in the form of Cheiron’s advice to Achilles that parents outrank others as much as Zeus outranks the other gods (μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδα, / ... / θεῶν σέβεσθαι / ταύτας δὲ μὴ ποτε τιμᾶς / ἀμείρειν γονέων, *Pyth.* 6.23–27).<sup>125</sup> The gnome is illustrated by the myth of Antilochos, who died protecting his father against Memnon (28–42), thus demonstrating both the absolute nature of a parent’s claim to honour and that it entails deeds, not just sentiment.

The bond between parents and children, and especially father and son, is not broken at the death of the former. As the epinician narrator reminds Thrasyboulos in *Isthmian* 2, he has an obligation to proclaim the ἀρετά of his dead father against the “envious hopes ... of mortals” (μὴ νυν, ὅτι φθονεραὶ θνατῶν φρένας ἀμφικρέμανται ἐλπίδες, / μὴτ’ ἀρετὰν ποτε σιγάτω πατρῶαν, *Isthm.* 2.43–44). The achievements of a man’s offspring are another way of keeping his name and glory alive, and in the context of the games this appears in the recognition of the participation of dead relatives in the νόμος, the tradition and customs surrounding a victory celebration (ἔστι δὲ καὶ τι θανόντεσσιν μέρος / κὰν νόμον ἔρδομένων, *Ol.* 8.77–78).<sup>126</sup>

While children are indispensable to the continued well-being of older family members and glory of the family name, the protection of the material δύναμις of the οἶκος also depends on them. The importance of preserving the household and its land for the family appears from the explanation given in a gnomic simile in *Olympian* 10 for an old man’s longing for a son: “wealth that falls to the care of a stranger from elsewhere is most hateful to a dying man” (ἐπεὶ πλοῦτος ὁ λαχὼν ποιμένα / ἐπακτὸν ἀλλότριον / θνάσκοντι στυγερώτατος, *Ol.* 10.88–90).<sup>127</sup>

<sup>125</sup> On obligations towards parents, see Blundell 1989:41–42 and Dover 1974:272–273. Dover gives a few parallels for the gods-parents analogy. For a more detailed list, see Kurke 1990:89 n. 20.

<sup>126</sup> For more on offspring as a shield against mortality, see pp. 66–67. On religious duties towards the dead, and their importance, see Lacey 1968:147–149.

<sup>127</sup> Not only the prestige of a particular family was involved. The preservation of

The patriarchal nature of the family is evident in the emphasis on father and son. The pointed desire for a son ἐξ ἀλόχου (“from his wife,” *Ol.* 10.86) highlights the implication of the patriarchy for a woman: her most important role in the οἶκος is to provide it with a legitimate male heir.<sup>128</sup> Since legitimacy was a prerequisite for the inheritance of property, on which the continuance of the οἶκος depended, it is not surprising that adultery is regarded as “most hateful in young wives,” and, since citizens have an interest in preserving the purity and exclusivity of citizenship, something which they would feel entitled to censure (τὸ δὲ νέαις ἀλόχοις / ἔχθιστον ἀμπλάκιον καλύψαι τ’ ἀμάχανον / ἄλλοτρίαισι γλώσσαις / κακολόγοι δὲ πολῖται, *Pyth.* 11.25–28).<sup>129</sup>

Although the parent-child relationship, especially that between father and son, is the focus of household affections and obligations, these also stretch further to include earlier generations and kinsmen in general. The value of a young victor for his grandfather, whose son, the victor’s father, is no longer alive, has already been discussed (see p. 66). According to the narrator of *Paean* 2 an acceptable political situation is one in which “hate-mongering envy has now disappeared for those who died long ago” and where it is acknowledged that “a man must give his forefathers their due portion of ample glory” ([ὁ δ]’ ἐχθρῶ νόησας /

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οἶκοι was also important from a religious and political perspective. On these matters, see Lacey 1968:23, 97–99, and Fisher 1976:6–7, 9–10.

<sup>128</sup> Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:97. Cf. Dover 1974:273, 302–303 on the subordinate position of a man’s dependants in the hierarchy of his relationships.

<sup>129</sup> These gnomai form part of the mythical narrative on the woes of the house of Atreus, and are prompted by a reference to Klytaimestra’s adultery as a motive for the murder of Agamemnon and Cassandra. In the context their purpose is not primarily to expound the common views on adultery (and its implication for women) that they represent, but to demonstrate public reaction to the behaviour of those who enjoy prosperity, namely to speak ill of and envy them (*Pyth.* 11.29). However, although those in high places disregard the clamour of those who “breathe at ground level” (*Pyth.* 11.30), the values expressed in the gnomai can be seen to triumph in the eventual downfall of the adulterers (*Pyth.* 11.36–37). Cf. Maehler 1985:397–399, especially his conclusion that ἄφαντον βρέμει refers to “den lauten, aber ohnmächtigen, von den Herrschenden ignorierten Protest der Bürger gegen Klytaimestras und Aigisths ‘Coup’” (my emphasis). Hubbard comes to substantially the same conclusion (although he does not seem to be aware of Maehler’s article). However, his emphasis is on the invisibility of the ordinary citizen, rather than the disregard of the rulers (Hubbard 1990). For an interpretation of this controversial set of gnomai in terms of what he calls “logical drift,” see Miller 1993b:49–53. On the importance of legitimacy, see Lacey 1968:111–112 and Finley 1981:243, and on attitudes to adultery Lacey 1968:69, 113–116 and Fisher 1976:14–15. For a detailed treatment of the law of adultery in Athens and its effect on women, see Cohen 1991:98–170.

ἤδη φθόνος οἴχεται / τῶν πάλαι προθανόντων / χρεὶ δ' ἄνδρα τοκεῦσι(ν)  
 φέρειν / βαθυδόξον αἴσαν, fr. 52b.54–58).<sup>130</sup> A mythical example of a man's responsibility to his ancestors is found in the confrontation between Jason and his uncle Peleus described in *Pythian* 4. Although Jason is intent on recovering the throne stolen from his parents, he is concerned that the “great honour” of his and his uncle's forefathers will be tarnished if, by coming to blows, they ignore the divinely sanctioned principle that kinsmen owe one another respect:<sup>131</sup>

Μοῖραι δ' ἀφίσταντ', εἴ τις ἔχθρα πέλει  
 ὁμογόνους αἰδῶ καλύψαι.

οὐ πρόπει νῶν χαλκοτόροις ξίφεσιν  
 οὐδ' ἀκόντεσσιν μεγάλην προγόνων τι-  
 μάν δάσασθαι.

The Fates withdraw, if any feuding arises  
 to make kinsmen hide their mutual respect.

It is not proper for the two of us to divide the great honor  
 of our forefathers with bronze-piercing swords  
 or javelins.

(*Pyth.* 4.145–148)

The Pindaric oeuvre gives no indication that the burden of respect and responsibility borne by the young is ever considered onerous. This may be explained by a strong sense of different life stages—childhood, manhood or maturity, and old age—with the promise of different responsibilities and privileges for different generations.<sup>132</sup> In the context of competition this is expressed as the opportunity for someone to “prove superior, as a child among young children, man among men, and thirdly among elders,” these being “each stage that our human race attains” (ὡν τις ἔξοχώτερος γένηται, / ἐν παισὶ νέοισι παῖς, ἐν {δ'} ἀνδράσιν ἀνήρ, τρίτον / ἐν παλαιτέροισι, μέρος ἕκαστον οἷον ἔχομεν / βρότεον ἔθνος, *Nem.* 3.71–74). In *Nemean* 9 the praise for Chromios of Aitna includes a gnome on the rewards a man reaps in old age for the proper execution of his duties as a young man:

<sup>130</sup> Note the resemblance to the injunction to Thrasyboulos to praise his father in the face of envy. On this passage as part of a description of a political situation, see Rutherford 2001:270.

<sup>131</sup> On relations with the extended family, see Blundell 1989:42–43, Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:68–69.

<sup>132</sup> For details on this age differentiation, see Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:68 (interconnected societies), Redfield 1975:110–111 (Homeric society) and Dover 1974:102–106.

ἐκ πόνων δ', οἷ σὺν νεότατι γένωνται  
 σὺν τε δίκῃ, τελέθει πρὸς γῆρας αἰῶν ἡμέρα.

From labors which are borne in youth and with justice  
 life becomes gentle toward old age. (*Nem.* 9.44)

In the context of the poem the *πόνου* refer specifically to military exploits (34–43) and the *αἰῶν ἡμέρα* to the peaceful pleasures of the victory celebrations (48–53), but in a society graded according to age they could equally well be applied to a man's responsibilities and rewards as member of an *οἶκος*. Although the duties of respect and care are strictly enforced, not only the older generation reaps the benefits of compliance—they accrue to both parties, even if not simultaneously. On the one hand a young man receives instruction and advice from his father, and ultimately “the best of possessions, the grace of a good name” (*εὐδώνυμον κτεάνων κρατίστην χάριν πορών*, *Pyth.* 11.58).<sup>133</sup> On the other hand, when a man reaches the next stage in the generational division of life he can reasonably claim the same respect and care he devoted to his elders.

Pindar's poetry presents a wholly traditional picture of the role of the *οἶκος* in the social system and the relationships of its members. It is a patriarchy in which sons and women have clearly defined obligations. While its hierarchical nature places a heavy responsibility on younger members it also ensures that they can depend on the future support of their own children—hence the absolute importance of having offspring and the emphasis on the father-son relationship.

### *Relationships outside the οἶκος*

With his household as the foundation of his standing in the community, a member of the elite would be active in two distinct, but partially overlapping outside social spheres, the city, a political entity, and the aristocracy, a social class in the city but with ties across city borders.<sup>134</sup> Both these spheres are manifested in Pindar's epinikia, although the *gnomai* expressing commonly held views on the conduct of relationships deal predominantly with social contacts in the city. Before the presentation

<sup>133</sup> Cf. also the reminder to Hieron's son Deinomenes that “a father's victory is no alien joy” (*χάρμα δ' οὐκ ἀλλότριον νικαφορία πατέρος*, *Pyth.* 1.59). On father-son instruction in Pindar, see Chapter 2, p. 25.

<sup>134</sup> See Herman 1987 on *ξενία*, ritualised friendship, as an important means of establishing and maintaining these ties.

of outside social relationships in Pindar is discussed, it is necessary to consider the functioning of the principle of reciprocity, or repayment in kind, in all relationships.<sup>135</sup>

The continuous flow of obligations and rewards involved in family relationships is one example of how this principle works in practice. *Pythian* 2 provides evidence of its importance by establishing it as a theme of the poem in an alternation of general statements on and illustrations of the necessity of properly recompensing a benefactor. First, a gnome states the principle of reciprocity operating between kings and their people: the rulers' ἀρετά is rewarded with the "tribute of a resounding hymn" (ἄλλοις δέ τις ἐτέλεσσαν ἄλλος ἀνήρ / εὐαχέα βασιλεῦσιν ὕμνον ἄποιν' ἀρεταῶς, 13–14). The Cyprians celebrating their king Kinyras is an example of such a tribute (15–17). The relationship is further characterised as an exchange of gratitude for deeds of friendship (ἄγει δὲ χάρις φίλων ποί τινος ἀντι ἔργων ὀπιζομένα, 17), turning the hymn into an expression of gratitude for services rendered. Next the general principle is again made concrete with an example, this time involving the victor, Hieron, and the people of Western Lokroi, who owe their safety to his intervention (18–20). In this way the victory hymn addressed to Hieron is expanded to become a tribute not only to his sporting excellence, but also to his prowess in war and his concern for those finding themselves in danger. Finally the negative example of Ixion—he reciprocates with arrogance the divine favour bestowed on him, for which, ironically, he is repaid in kind by being bound to "inescapable fetters" (ἐν ἀφύγκτοισι γυιοπέδαις, 41)—throws into relief Hieron's greatness by implying that anyone who does not repay his achievements with honour and gratitude would be guilty of the same arrogance as Ixion. For his part, Ixion has learnt the lesson, albeit too late, that it is one's duty to repay a benefactor properly, "with deeds of gentle recompense" (τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς ἐποιοχόμενους τίνεσθαι, 24).

In both the mythical and the contemporary relationships described in *Pythian* 2 the beneficiaries find themselves in a subordinate position

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<sup>135</sup> Seaforth 1998:1 defines reciprocity as "the principle and practice of voluntary requital, of benefit for benefit (positive reciprocity) or harm for harm (negative reciprocity)." For a discussion of definitions from an anthropological point of view, see Van Wees 1998:15–20. In addition to these contributions Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford 1998 contains essays on reciprocity covering a wide range of fields. For treatments of this topic as it relates to their specific concerns, see also Hands 1968:26–48, Blundell 1989:26–59 passim and Millett 1991:27–44, 109–126.

to their benefactors (subjects to kings, human to gods). While their duty to reciprocate is in each case linked to the benefits they derived from the relationship, the *χάρις* they express may also, as Most maintains, be based on their respect for their benefactors as “ontologically superior” to them.<sup>136</sup> However, distinctions on the basis of social class are to a large extent secondary to the concept of reciprocity, and superiority alone, without some form of favour to support it, will not be sufficient to secure *χάρις*. For example, although parents and children are not equals, the latter’s obligation of care in old age to the former can be seen as a repayment for parental love and nurture, not just an absolute expression of respect demanded by social differences. Even man’s respect for the gods presumes that they will in some way return the favour.<sup>137</sup>

The treatment of reciprocity in *Pythian* 5 shows that it is in the first place beneficence that demands a return, not superior status. As in *Pythian* 2, gratitude towards a benefactor is a topic of this poem, and once again it involves the relationship both between god and man, and ruler and subject. The appropriate response of beneficiary to benefactor is summed up in the gnome *ἐκόντι τοίνυν πρόπει / νόῳ τὸν εὐεργέταν ὑπαντιάσαι* (“It is fitting, then, to meet one’s benefactor with willing mind,” *Pyth.* 5.43–44; trans. Kurke 1991b:127). Graciousness and recognition are called for. The gnome refers to several relationships posited in the poem. Both the victor, king Arkesilas of Kyrene, and his charioteer, Karrhotos, are indebted to the god Apollo for their success. Karrhotos has already acknowledged his debt to the god by dedicating his equestrian equipment at a shrine at the site of the victory (34–42), and while the epinician narrator urges the king not to forget, in the excitement of the celebrations, that he owes all to the god, he simultaneously represents Arkesilas as invoking Apollo in the song and thus fulfilling his obligation to the god (20–25, 103–104). On the human level the burden of debt lies with Arkesilas, the social superior. In addition to acknowledging the god’s help he must “cherish above all comrades Karrhotos,” who “placed around (his) hair the prize for the first-place chariot” (*φιλεῖν δὲ Κάροττον ἔξοχ’ ἐταίρων*

<sup>136</sup> Most 1985:75–76.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Blundell 1989:41–42, 46–47. On the imbalance that nevertheless characterises these relationships, Blundell remarks (42 n. 80): “Aristotle regards the debt to parents, like that to gods and philosophy teachers, as so great that we cannot hope to repay it in full (*EN* 1164a33–b6).”

... ἀρισθάρματον ... γέρας ἀμφέβαλε τεαῖσιν κόμαις, *Pyth.* 5.26, 30–31). Even though the designation of Karrhotos as Arkesilas' ἑταῖρος indicates a much closer bond than that between kings and subjects portrayed in *Pythian* 2, they cannot be regarded as full social equals. The narrator's emphasis on the charioteer as benefactor and the king as beneficiary thus confirms that reciprocity is a social principle which is primarily concerned with actions rather than status. As in the case of Apollo, the song commissioned by the king is offered as a means of compensation for his charioteer.<sup>138</sup> The narrator asserts that Karrhotos is "blessed with a memorial of finest words of praise" (μακάριος, ὃς ἔχεις / ... / λόγων φερτάτων / μναμῆ', *Pyth.* 5.46–49) and this statement is backed by the most detailed description and praise of a charioteer and his exploits in the epinikia (27–53).

The mutual goodwill of ξεῖνοι epitomises the proper functioning of reciprocity. An important way for the aristocracy to distinguish themselves from the lower classes, is through the institution of ξενία, guest-friendship or ritualised friendship,<sup>139</sup> which Herman defines as "a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units."<sup>140</sup> Only one gnome in Pindar refers to this exclusive arrangement, but it makes an important statement about the nature of the relationship between guest-friends:

ξείνων<sup>141</sup> δ' εὖ προσσόντων  
 ἔσαναν αὐτίκ' ἀγγελίαν ποτὶ γλυκεῖαν ἔσλοί·  
 and when guest-friends are successful,  
 good men are immediately cheered at the sweet news. (Ol. 4.4–5)

The gnome expresses unhesitating goodwill as the norm for ritualised friendship, and also implies that this is part of the mutual obligations

<sup>138</sup> Kurke 1991b:127. Note that finally the victor's expenditure (without which participation in the games would not have been possible) qualifies him as benefactor as well, and that he receives the victory song as recompense (ἔχοντα Πυθωνόθεν / τὸ καλλίνικον λυτήριον δαπανᾶν / μέλος χαρίεν, *Pyth.* 5.105–107).

<sup>139</sup> Herman 1987:162.

<sup>140</sup> Herman 1987:10.

<sup>141</sup> Gerber 1987:12 comments on ξείνων: "here, as in several other passages, simply 'friends.'" However, Herman's investigation of the use of the term shows that it is applied exclusively to "cross-border" relationships, not to friendships in general (Herman 1987:10–12 with nn. 4 and 5). On the differences between guest-friendship and ordinary friendship, see Herman 1987:29–31. The difference between the gnome in *Olympian* 4 and those on relationships in the context of the city, will confirm Herman's analysis.

which entering into such a relationship entails.<sup>142</sup> By attributing pleasure in each other's success to ξένοι, the gnome also demonstrates the resemblance of guest-friendship to kinship: in the epinikia the victory of a son or grandson, or a father, is often presented as a source of joy and satisfaction.<sup>143</sup> For example, in *Olympian* 14 Echo is urged to take the "glorious news" (κλυτὰν ... ἀγγελίαν, 21) of Asopichos' victory to his father in the underworld, and Deinomenes is included in the celebrations for his father Hieron's victory on the grounds that "a father's victory is no alien joy" (χάρμα δ' οὐκ ἀλλότριον νικαφορία πατέρος, *Pyth.* 1.59).<sup>144</sup>

Another example of proper reciprocation is the neighbourliness extolled in *Nemean* 7:

εἰ δὲ γέυεται  
 ἀνδρὸς ἀνὴρ τι, φαῖμέν κε γείτον' ἔμμεναι  
 νόφ φιλήσαντ' ἀτενεί γείτονι χάσμα πάντων  
 ἐπάξιον·

If man has any enjoyment  
 of his fellow man, we would say that a neighbor who loved  
 his neighbor with fixed purpose is a joy to him worth  
 everything. (*Nem.* 7.86–89)

A detailed analysis of diction and context by Mace confirms that this gnome is a paraphrase of Hesiod's declaration that "a bad neighbour is as great a plague as a good one is a great blessing; he who enjoys a good neighbour has a precious possession" (πῆμα κακὸς γείτων, ὅσσον τ' ἀγαθὸς μέγ' ὄνειαρ. / ἔμμορὲ τοι τιμῆς, ὅς τ' ἔμμορὲ γείτονος ἐσθλοῦ, *Op.* 346–347; trans. Evelyn-White 1959).<sup>145</sup> The importance of reciprocity that is implicit in Pindar's version is elaborately stated in the Hesiodic passage:

εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι,  
 αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λώιον, αἶ κε δύνηαι,  
 ὡς ἂν χοηίζων καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἄρκιον εὔρης.

<sup>142</sup> According to Herman 1987:12 the "more formal *xenos* words" (as against, for example, *philos*) were used "when a speaker wished to stress the rights and obligations of ritualised friendship."

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Kurke 1991a on the identification of fathers, sons and grandfathers in Pindar. The importance of the patriline in the confrontation with death and mortality is discussed above pp. 66–67.

<sup>144</sup> See Herman 1987:16–29 for a discussion of the ways in which ritual friendship "mimics" kinship.

<sup>145</sup> Mace 1992:162–173.



Take fair measure from your neighbour and pay him back fairly with the same measure, or better, if you can; so that if you are in need afterwards, you may find him sure. (*Op.* 349–351; trans. Evelyn-White 1959)

A conspicuous difference between the two renderings of the neighbour theme is that Pindar neglects to mention the curse of a bad neighbour. This is part of a strategy to emphasize positive and supportive relationships.<sup>146</sup> The context of Pindar's gnome shows that the χάσμα provided by a good neighbour is on a level with that derived from guest-friendship and close family ties. First, the gnome is preceded by a reference to the relationship between Herakles and Aiakos, his "benevolent guest-friend and brother" (προπράον' ... ξείνον ἀδελφεόν τ', *Nem.* 7.86). Then the oblique request to Herakles to be a good neighbour to the victor is supported by portraying Sogenes as "cherish(ing) a spirit of tenderness for his father" (πατρὶ Σωγένης ἀταλὸν ἀμφέπων / θυμόν, *Nem.* 7.91–92). Thus in setting up Herakles as a neighbour of the victor (89–94), the epinician narrator wishes for the victor the benefits entailed in all these relationships.<sup>147</sup>

Although this passage of *Nemean* 7 highlights the positive in relationships, it would be wrong to read into the omission of the 'bad neighbour' topic a resolutely optimistic outlook on human interaction. In fact the superlative value ascribed to a good neighbour would be meaningless without the tacit acknowledgement of the existence of its opposite.<sup>148</sup> This acknowledgement is implied by the conditional formulation of the saying, which shows that the narrator is well aware that men do not always experience enjoyment of their fellow men. εἰ in the sense of "if ever" or "whenever" limits the positive experience, so that the protasis may be rendered "to the extent that ...," with the apodosis singling out a good neighbour among the instances of pleasure, since this is the relationship the victor enjoys with the hero-god Herakles.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Sullivan 1990:189 on the strong positive feelings expressed by νόφ ... ἀτενεί.

<sup>147</sup> On heroes as neighbours to mortals, see Rusten 1983.

<sup>148</sup> Cf. the characterisation of neighbours as envious in *Ol.* 1.47 but guardians of possessions in *Pyth.* 8.58.

<sup>149</sup> Contra Mace 1992:172 n. 3 who avers that "(d)espite the conditional form ..., the protasis has no real conditional force and its sense is closer to 'of the ways that one man benefits from another ...'." Cf. Smyth 1959:527 (§2335) on general conditions: "The *if* clause has the force of *if ever* (*whenever*), the conclusion expresses a repeated or habitual action or a general truth."

Family, guest-friends and good neighbours take pleasure in a man's good fortune and success, thus repaying him for his efforts. In contrast, fellow citizens are often not as generous and need to be reminded of their duty to recompense excellence with recognition and praise.<sup>150</sup> Their attitude is an example of how the potential for less than cordial relations between citizens implied in the gnome on neighbours becomes a reality.

Reluctance to give a successful man his due, and envy, whether generally of a family or an individual's high standing, or of a specific achievement, such as victory at the games, go hand in hand.<sup>151</sup> The eagerness of πολῖται to defame those in high places has already been noted in another context (see p. 79 with n. 129), and is explained as the result of prosperity attracting envy (ἴσχει τε γὰρ ὄλβος οὐ μείονα φθόνον, *Pyth.* 11.29). An example of the conjunction of a prominent family, the success of a family member, and envy is found in *Olympian* 6.71–76. The Iamidai clan to which the victor Hagesias of Syracuse belongs is “much renowned among Hellenes” (πολύκλειτον καθ’ Ἑλλαννας, 71), they enjoy prosperity, and their virtuous deeds add to their visibility (ὄλβος ἄμ’ ἔσπετο· τιμῶντες δ’ ἀρετάς / ἐς φανεράν ὁδὸν ἔρχονται· τεκμαίρει / χρῆμ’ ἔκαστον, 72–74). A member of such a high-profile family can expect “blame coming from others who are envious” in return for victory, especially since the favour of Charis that accompanies success would make him even more conspicuous (μῶμος ἐξ ἄλλων κρέματα φθονεόντων / τοῖς, οἷς ποτε πρώτοις περὶ δωδέκατον δρόμον / ἔλαννόντεσσιν αἰδοῖα ποτιστάξῃ Χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν, 74–76).<sup>152</sup> In *Pythian* 1 it is the prominence of a ruler which makes him the target of the envy of citizens, who are secretly aggrieved when they hear of others' success (ἀστῶν δ’ ἀκοὰ κρύφιον θυμὸν βαρύνει μάλιστ’ ἐσλοῖσιν ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις, 84).<sup>153</sup> While κρύφιον θυμόν implies that these citizens would not openly display their negative attitude, they should not be dismissed as of no consequence. Just as another ruler, Arkesilas of Kyrene, is urged to act circumspectly “for easily can even weaklings shake a city” (ὀάδιον μὲν γὰρ πόλιν σείσαι καὶ ἀφαιροστέροις, *Pyth.* 4.272), so Hieron must counter

<sup>150</sup> Compare Kurke's discussion of *Hdt.* 7.237.2–3 on the contrast between the goodwill of guest-friends and the envy of fellow citizens when a man experiences success, and its implications for Pindar (1991b:90).

<sup>151</sup> For an analysis of several of the passages mentioned below from the perspective of envy as topic in Pindar, see Bulman 1992:15–36.

<sup>152</sup> On μῶμος as the “voice” of φθόνος, see Bulman 1992:22.

<sup>153</sup> For the link between envy and success, cf. also *Nem.* 8.21–22 and *Parth.* 1.8–9.

those who would diminish his accomplishments with good governance and exemplary behaviour (*Pyth.* 1.86–92).<sup>154</sup>

The complexity of human relationships reflected in the different reactions to another’s success discussed so far, is further demonstrated by the demands made of a man who wishes to be acknowledged for successful exploits. To earn the respect of his fellow men a man must be prepared to face danger and run the risk of failure, otherwise honour is withheld (ἀκίνδυνοι δ’ ἀρεταί / οὔτε παρ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐν ναυσὶ κοίλαις / τίμαι· πολλοὶ δὲ μέμνανται, καλὸν εἶ τι ποναθῆ, *Ol.* 6.9–11). In the particular case of Hagesias his success is in accordance with this principle and he moreover “finds his townsmen ungrudging in the midst of delightful songs” (ἐπικύρσαις ἀφθόνων ἀστῶν ἐν ἱμερταῖς αἰοδαῖς, *Ol.* 6.7). Bulman rightly refers to the “ideal nature of so generous a response to ἀρετά,” given that the usual reaction to another’s success entails blame and envy (see above on *Ol.* 6.71–76).<sup>155</sup> A gnomic passage from *Olympian* 5 confirms the general attitude:

αἰεὶ δ’ ἀμφ’ ἀρεταῖσι πόνος δαπάνα τε μάρονται πρὸς ἔργον  
κινδύνῳ κεκαλυμμένον· εὖ δὲ τυχόν-  
τες σοφοὶ καὶ πολίταις ἔδοξαν ἔμμεν.

Always do toil and expense strive for achievements toward  
an accomplishment hidden in danger, but those who succeed  
are considered wise even by their fellow citizens. (*Ol.* 5.15–16)

Slater interprets καὶ πολίταις, “even by their fellow citizens,” to “(imply) that one’s own colleagues will be the last people to believe one to be *sophos*, and the first to think one stupid.”<sup>156</sup> Even for an achievement based on working hard, making the necessary expenditures and taking risks, i.e. success in accordance with the ideals of honour, recognition can be grudging.

Against the background of the natural tendency to envy another’s success, rather than rejoice in it,<sup>157</sup> injunctions to citizens to honour vic-

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Hands 1968:35 on the increasing importance of the goodwill of the poor as democracy became more dominant socially and politically. For the epinician narrator the right way to respond to the potential censure (μῶμος) of the envious is to observe καὶρός, “appropriateness” or “due measure” in his praise (*Pyth.* 1.81–83).

<sup>155</sup> Bulman 1992:28. See also her p. 23.

<sup>156</sup> Slater 2001:113. His article investigates several instances of the commonplace idea that “success frees one from being called a fool” (112).

<sup>157</sup> The natural tendency to envy is recognised by a scholiast on *Ol.* 6.6–7: τοῦτο δὲ προστίθηνον ἐπειδὴ οἱ πολῖται κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦσιν (text from Bulman 1992:87 n. 51, my emphasis).

tors can be seen as an effort to elicit the ideal generous response which rejects envy. In *Nemean* 9 the obligation to acknowledge achievement is presented with the authority attributed to a λόγος by men:

ἔστι δέ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελεσμένον ἔσλόν  
μὴ χαμαὶ σιγῇ καλύψαι· θεσπεσία δ' ἐπέων  
καύχας ἀοιδὰ πρόσφορος.

Men have a saying: do not hide a noble accomplishment  
on the ground in silence. Rather, a divine song  
with verses of acclaim is called for.

(*Nem.* 9.6–7)

The force of the call to praise is underlined by juxtaposing it with the victor Chromios' appeal for a hymn honouring Leto, Apollo and Artemis (4–5). The opening lines of the poem evoke a picture of Chromios surrounded by celebrating guests in his home (1–3), and in this private context there is no question that they accept the obligation implied by the saying to praise their successful host.<sup>158</sup>

In the civic sphere such generosity can evidently not be taken for granted. Therefore an appeal is made on the basis of the generally accepted principle of reciprocity in relationships, and the portrayal of the victor as a benefactor of his community. Although the formal terms εὐεργεσία and εὐεργέτας are reserved for private contexts, and have particular significance for relations among the aristocracy,<sup>159</sup> the idea that victors and their families benefit their community is promoted repeatedly in the epinikia. In *Isthmian* 6, for example, Lampon, the father of the young victor is described as “bring(ing) to his own city an adornment all share.” Significantly, this is coupled with his “benefactions to his guest-friends” (ξυνὸν ἄσται κόσμον ἔῳ προσάγων / καὶ ξένων εὐεργεσίαις ἀγαπᾶται, 69–70). According to Herman “a benefaction—a favour accepted or imposed—is like a debt: it must be repaid at all costs.”<sup>160</sup> Like the benefactor in the private sphere the man whose achievements bring glory to his city, thus turning him into a public benefactor, deserves recompense from his fellow citizens, a view which is put forward in several gnomai.<sup>161</sup> A notable feature of these gnomai

<sup>158</sup> See also *Nem.* 3.29 and fr. 121 on the justice and propriety of honouring good men in song.

<sup>159</sup> See Kurke 1991b:98.

<sup>160</sup> Herman 1987:48. See also pp. 47–49 and passim on the role of εὐεργεσία in ritualised friendship. For views in the epinikia on repaying personal benefactors, see discussion of *Pythian* 2 and *Pythian* 5 above (pp. 82–84).

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Kurke 1991b:91: “(T)he custom of feasting athletic victors in the prytaneum shows that they were regarded as public benefactors.” For details of prizes and other

is the recurrence of terms such as *χρή*, *ἄποινα*, *ἀντί* and *ξυνός*. They signify a reciprocal arrangement and underline the idea that the relationship between a successful man and his city should be regarded like that between a private benefactor and those who benefit from his generosity.

In *Pythian* 9 both Telesikrates' current victory at Pytho and his numerous successes at local games are characterised as benefiting his city. With his Pythian victory "he made Kyrene light up" (*ἐνθα νικάσας ἀνέφανε Κυρῶναν*, 73; my translation), and at Aigina and Megara he "glorified this city" (*πόλιν τάνδ' εὐκλειΐξαι*, 91). That the glorification of the city makes the victor a benefactor of his fellow citizens and lays a debt of praise on them, is made explicit in a gnome incorporated into the catalogue of local victories:

οὔνεκεν, εἰ φίλος ἀστῶν, εἴ τις ἀντά-  
 εις, τό γ' ἐν ξυνῶ πεποναμένον εὔ  
 μῆ λόγον βλάπτων ἀλίιο γέροντος κρυπτέτω·  
 κείνος αἰνεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐχθρόν  
 παντὶ θυμῶ σὺν τε δίκῃ καλὰ ῥέζοντ' ἔννεπεν.

Therefore, let no citizen, whether friendly or hostile,  
 keep hidden a labor nobly borne on behalf of all,  
 thereby violating the command of the Old Man of the Sea,  
 who said to praise even one's enemy  
 wholeheartedly and justly when he performs noble deeds.

(*Pyth.* 9.93–96)

*οὔνεκεν* establishes a direct link between Telesikrates' success and Nereus' injunction that citizens must praise noble deeds. This is proper reciprocation for efforts undertaken *ἐν ξυνῶ*, a phrase which signals victors as benefactors of their communities.<sup>162</sup>

Reflection in *Isthmians* 3, 1 and 5 on the responsibility of citizens to reciprocate achievement with praise emphasizes the successful man's effort and attitude. The great deed itself is deemed worthy of recognition, even if it does not directly or obviously benefit fellow citizens. Nevertheless, in *Isthmians* 1 and 5 a connection is made between soldiers and athletes, and since war is by definition a communal rather

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honours accorded to victors, see Young 1984:115–133. Cf. also Herman 1987:15 on the "honours and privileges (conferred) upon people who benefited (Greek states) in one way or another."

<sup>162</sup> Cf. Kurke 1991b:208. She translates *ἐν ξυνῶ* as "in the common interest." The implications of this passage for views on friendship and enmity are discussed below.

than private activity, this shows, albeit indirectly, that athletic success is regarded as a benefit to the city which deserves acknowledgement just as fighting for one's city does.

*Isthmian* 3 contains two gnomai on the topic of success and its public requital. The first qualifies the success which is worthy of praise by adding a rider about the successful man's attitude to his achievement:

Εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχήσῃς ἢ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοισι  
ἢ σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φροσὶν αἰανῆ κόρον,  
ἄξιός ἐυλογίαις ἀστῶν μεμίχθαι.

If a man is successful, either in glorious games  
or with mighty wealth, and keeps down nagging excess in his mind,  
he deserves to be included in his townsmen's praises. (*Isthm.* 3.1–3)

Whether κόρος is to be interpreted in terms of social relations generally<sup>163</sup> or more specifically as a pointer to the victor's political aspirations,<sup>164</sup> the importance attached to avoiding it shows that success can alienate a man from his community. However, if he acts appropriately he can claim to be worthy of the approval of his fellow citizens. The basic meaning of ἄξιος, “weighing as much, of like value, worth as much” (LSJ s.v.), underlines the careful balancing of achievement and praise that is called for. In this gnome the main concern is with the successful man and his merit, while the second gnome stresses the necessity of giving him the reward to which he is entitled:

εὐκλέων δ' ἔργων ἄποινα χροῖ μὲν ὑμνῆσαι τὸν ἐσλόν,  
χροῖ δὲ κωμάζοντ' ἀγαναῖς χαρίτεσσιν βαστάσαι.

In recompense for glorious deeds one must hymn the good man  
and must exalt him, as he revels, with gentle poems of praise.  
(*Isthm.* 3.7–8)

The conduct described in the first gnome is picked up by the reference to εὐκλέων ... ἔργων, actions which elicit positive reactions, of which good report is given. Together with ἄποινα the strong χροῖ μὲν ... χροῖ δὲ construction then signifies that such efforts constitute a debt that can only be discharged by appropriate recognition in the form of song and public praise. The gnome does not specify the debtors, but by placing the *laudandus* among revellers, the epinician narrator goes beyond the

<sup>163</sup> Fisher 1992:218–219.

<sup>164</sup> Kurke 1991b:210. See also pp. 209–218 for Kurke's views on the link between the rejection of κόρος and ὕβρις and the fear of tyranny.

notion of private justice implied by ἄποινα to convey the necessity of public recompense.<sup>165</sup>

The elaboration of the principle of reciprocity in *Isthmian* 1.41–51 illuminates several aspects of the relationship between the successful man and his fellow men. The passage begins with a statement of the nature of the effort expected from those who strive for success and the appropriate response when it is gained:

εἰ δ' ἀρετᾶ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν,  
ἀμφοτέρων δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνους,  
χρῆ νιν εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπον  
μὴ φθονεραῖσι φέρειν  
γνώμαις

If someone is devoted wholeheartedly to excellence  
with both expenses and hard work,  
it is necessary to give those who achieve it a lordly vaunt  
with no begrudging  
thoughts

(*Isthm.* 1.41–45)

Success requires total commitment of both resources and effort to the pursuit of a goal. The risk inherent in such an undertaking (and stated directly in *Ol.* 5.15–16 and *Ol.* 6.9–11; see pp. 88) appears from the fact that the endeavour alone is not enough: recognition is reserved for those who actually achieve excellence (νιν εὐρόντεσσιν). The acknowledgement such an achievement demands (χρῆ), praise on a grand scale<sup>166</sup> given with a generous spirit that rejects envy, recalls the working of reciprocity in the close relationships of family, good neighbours and guest-friends, all of whom would naturally, without having to be exhorted to do so, react positively to the successful man in their midst. By implication the injunction to unstinting praise is therefore directed at his fellow citizens who may be more reluctant to give him his due. The skilled or wise man, i.e. the poet, is qualified to undertake this task on behalf of the community:

ἐπεὶ κούφα δόσις ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ  
ἀντὶ μόχθων παντοδαπῶν ἔπος εἰ-  
πόντ' ἀγαθὸν ξυγόν ὀρθῶσαι καλόν.

<sup>165</sup> On the particular use of ἄποινα by Pindar, see Kurke 1991b:108–116, esp. pp. 108–110 on ἄποινα as a form of private justice operating between aristocratic families, and p. 112 on the extension of the obligation to praise success from the private to the public sphere in *Isthm.* 3.7–8.

<sup>166</sup> Compare *Pyth.* 3.55 and *Pyth.* 10.18 where ἀγάνωρος is used in conjunction with gold and wealth.

since it is a light gift for a man who is wise  
to speak a good word in return for labors of all kinds  
and to raise up a noble tribute shared by all. (*Isthm.* 1.45–46)

Praise is again presented as reciprocation for effort (ἀντι μόχθων ... ἔπος ... ἀγαθόν). It is also a ξυνόν ... καλόν, a common or shared good. This phrase can be interpreted from two angles. On the one hand it points to the community's participation in the praise articulated by the poet. By association they share his wisdom, demonstrated in doing the right thing, giving credit to the successful man. On the other hand it indicates that praise for an individual citizen's achievement reflects glory on his community, which shares in the esteem accorded to him. As such he is their benefactor, which in turn obliges them to honour him.

In the final section of the passage the highest value is attached to the acknowledgement given by citizens and foreigners (εὐαγορηθεῖς κέρδος ὕψιστον δέκεται, πολιατᾶν καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον, *Isthm.* 1.51).<sup>167</sup> This is not easily obtained. In the close-knit family and aristocratic social circle honour and respect for success are not negotiable, but in the wider community of the πόλις they cannot be taken for granted. Citizens have to overcome a natural antipathy towards the prosperity of a man with whom they have no close ties and must be convinced that it also benefits them.

An effective way of persuading citizens that the victorious athlete promotes their interests is to equate success in the games with that in war. In a section of *Isthmian* 7 devoted to the uncle of the victor who died in battle it is clear that, in contrast to the athlete, no case needs to be made for rewarding the bravery of a soldier with honour. Such acknowledgement is stated as an evident truth, and is directly connected with the glory his success bestows on his fellow citizens:

τιμὰ δ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἀντίκειται.  
ἴστω γὰρ σαφὲς ὅστις ἐν ταύτῃ νεφέλῃ χάλια-  
ζαν αἵματος πρὸ φίλας πάτρας ἀμύνεται,  
λοιγὸν ἄντα φέρον<sup>168</sup> ἐναντίῳ στρατῷ,  
ἀστῶν γενεᾶ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων  
ζῶων τ' ἀπὸ καὶ θανόν.

<sup>167</sup> For the full text and translation of the last part of the passage (*Isthm.* 1.47–51), see p. 76, where these lines are considered from the perspective of social differentiation.

<sup>168</sup> See n. 55 above.



but honor is laid up as a recompense for brave men.  
 For let him know well, whoever in that cloud of war  
 defends his dear country from the hailstorm of blood

by turning the onslaught against the opposing army,  
 that he fosters the greatest glory for his townsmen's race,  
 both while he lives and after he is dead. (*Isthm.* 7.26–30)

So, by conflating the “luxurious glory” won by the athlete and the soldier (ὄς δ’ ἀμφ’ ἀέθλοις ἢ πολεμίζων ἄρηται κῦδος ἄβροον, *Isthm.* 1.50), the former is presented as benefiting his city no less than the latter.<sup>169</sup> The same strategy is followed in *Isthmian* 5 where the motivation for the call to praise is the honouring of warrior heroes in song:

εἰ δὲ τέτραπται  
 θεοδότων ἔργων κέλευθον ἄν καθαράν,  
 μὴ φθόνει κόμπον τὸν ἔοικότ’ ἀοιδᾶ  
 κινάμεν ἀντι πόνων.  
 καὶ γὰρ ἡρώων ἀγαθοὶ πολεμισταὶ  
 λόγον ἐκέρδαναν· κλέονται δ’ ἔν τε φορμίγ-  
 γεσσιν ἐν αὐλῶν τε παμφώνοις ὁμοκλαῖς

If someone has entered  
 into the clear road of divinely granted deeds,  
 do not grudge to blend into your song a fitting vaunt  
 in return for toils,  
 for among the heroes brave warriors also  
 gained praise and are celebrated on lyres  
 and in the full range of pipes’ harmonies (*Isthm.* 5.22–27)

Although the appeal is made in the singular (μὴ φθόνει) and so suggests that the epinician narrator addresses himself, or his heart, which “tastes no hymns without including the Aiakidai” (τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν / οὐκ ἄτεο Αἰακιδᾶν, κέαρ ὕμνων γεύεται, 19–20), the context and the diction of the gnome point to the victor’s fellow citizens as its intended audience. The victory celebration is specifically situated in Aigina, the home city of the victor (ἔμολον ... τάνδ’ ἐξ εὐνομον πόλιν, 21–22) and, as in *Isthmian* 1, giving praise suited to the effort expended (κόμπον τὸν ἔοικότ’ ... ἀντι πόνων) means avoiding the envy (μὴ φθόνει) with which citizens tend to regard another’s good fortune.

The pressure for recognition of achievement points to a certain level of mistrust among citizens, which makes the support provided

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Kurke 1991b:209 on *Isthm.* 1.50–51.

by friendship all the more valuable.<sup>170</sup> The delight (χάρμα) given by a “neighbour who loves his neighbour” is an example of the worth of such a relationship (see pp. 85–86 on *Nem.* 7.86–89).<sup>171</sup> Millett describes φίλοι as “individuals associated in a *κοινωνία* for the sake of mutual advantage.”<sup>172</sup> This pragmatic approach to friendship is reflected in a gnome in *Nemean* 8:

χρεῖαι δὲ παντοῖαι φίλων ἀν-  
δρῶν· τὰ μὲν ἀμφὶ πόνους  
ὑπερώτατα, μαστεύει δὲ καὶ τέρψις ἐν ὄμμασι θεῶσθαι  
πιστόν.

There are all sorts of needs for friends,  
and while help amid toils  
is greatest, joy too seeks to set in view  
what is trustworthy.

(*Nem.* 8.42–44)

χρεῖαι indicates both the need for and the usefulness of friends, who are expected to stand by one another in both good times and bad. The gnome acknowledges the conventional notion that the need and usefulness are most acute when someone suffers hardship, but its focus is the role of friends in times of success, when they must make sure that a man’s achievement is clear for all to see. The urgency of this task is reflected in the verb μαστεύω, from the root verb \*μάω, “to wish eagerly, strive, yearn, desire” (LSJ s.v.). The previous gnome states that ἀρετά is enhanced when it is praised “among wise and just men” (ἀίσει δ’ ἀρετά, γλωραιῖς ἑέρσασι ὡς ὅτε δένδρον < – >, / < ἐν > σοφοῖς ἀνδρῶν ἀεθρεῖς’ ἐν δικαίῳις τε πρὸς ὑγρόν / αἰθέρα, *Nem.* 8.40–42),<sup>173</sup> and the

<sup>170</sup> The Greek concept of φιλία encompasses a wide range of relationships, from those within the family to those between men and gods, and sharp distinctions in line with modern ideas of friendship are not always possible. The present discussion of the views on friendship propounded in Pindar’s work includes what Blundell terms “personal friends bound by reciprocal favour and often, though not necessarily, by mutual esteem and affection” (Blundell 1989:44). For Blundell’s discussion of the whole range of φιλία and the concept of citizenship as basis of friendship, see pp. 39–49. For a discussion of φιλία based largely on a reading of Aristotle and Xenophon, see Millett 1991:109–126.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. Herman 1987:29. He uses an example of neighbours becoming friends from pseudo-Demosthenes *Against Nicostratus* to illustrate the development of friendship over a long period of close contact. See pp. 29–31 for his discussion of the distinction between civic friendship and ritualised friendship.

<sup>172</sup> Millett 1991:126. Cf. Konstan 1998:282.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. Bakchylides fr. 56 for the same tree comparison and *Nem.* 9.48–49 for a similar but less baroque statement of the power of song to elevate success.

insistence on the duty of friends in this regard is telling in the light of the reluctance of the citizenry to reward success properly.<sup>174</sup>

The obligations of friendship represent one half of the ubiquitous Greek moral imperative to help one's friends and harm one's enemies, another manifestation of the idea of reciprocity or retaliation.<sup>175</sup> The *gnomai* in *Nemean* 8 just discussed are in fact preceded by a first person indefinite (or generalised first person) statement on this theme:<sup>176</sup>

χρυσὸν εὖχον-  
 ται, πεδίον δ' ἔτεροι  
 ἀπέραντον, ἐγὼ δ' ἄστοις ἄδων καὶ χθονὶ γυῖα καλύψαι,  
 αἰνέων αἰνήτᾳ, μομφὰν δ' ἐπισπείρων ἀλιτροῖς.

some pray for gold,  
 others for land  
 without end, but I pray to find favor with my townsmen  
 until I cover my limbs with earth,  
 praising things praiseworthy, but casting blame on evildoers.

(*Nem.* 8.37–39)

With few exceptions friends are regarded as good people who do praiseworthy things and enemies as wicked and deserving of censure.<sup>177</sup> To make the distinction and act accordingly is a mark of sincerity, of keeping to the straight and narrow in life (*κελεύθους / ἀπλόαις ζωᾶς ἐφαπτοίμαν*, 35–36). This ἤθος (35) is in stark contrast to the flattery and deception which favour a man such as Odysseus and refuse recog-

<sup>174</sup> See Carey 1976:35–36 on the particular implications of this passage for an athletic victor.

<sup>175</sup> Simonides fr. 642(b) expresses the thought succinctly: τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς <δ> ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Cf. also Theognis 227–240, 869–872, 1032, 1107–1108. Several more parallels are given in Hubbard 1985:76 n. 9. For a discussion of the topic, see Blundell 1989:26–59 with 26 n. 1 for bibliography of other (brief) treatments. See also Dible 1962:30–40, who treats this rule in the context of the wide application of reciprocity in popular morality.

<sup>176</sup> Although generalised first person statements are not formally gnomic they function in much the same way, in the words of Fränkel 1969: 543 n. 12: “(S)chließlich bedeutet oft ein ‘ich will’, ‘ich werde’ und ähnliches, so viel wie ‘man soll’, weil das Dichterwort ein Ausdruck der öffentlichen Meinung und ein Spiegel maßgeblicher Lebensweisheit ist.” See also p. 587 [2.2–5], as well as Young 1968:12–13, 58. According to Hubbard 1995:49 the “generic ‘I’” used in such statements function gnomically, as “a kind of moral self-exhortation to conform to a certain pattern of behavioral constraint.” He discusses several instances of these statements as part of what he terms the “subject-object relation” at Hubbard 1985:145–148.

<sup>177</sup> Blundell 1989:51–52. Cf. *Nem.* 4.93–96 which states gentleness towards ἐσλοί and rough treatment for παλίγκοτοι as the norm.

nition of a true hero such as Aias (23–34).<sup>178</sup> In antistrophe 4 of *Pythian* 2 sincerity and deceit in dealing with fellow citizens are similarly contrasted. Whereas the devious man tries to be all things to all men (81–82) the “straight-talking man” (εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ, 86) openly behaves as a friend to friends and an enemy to enemies (φίλον εἶη φιλεῖν / ποτὶ δ’ ἐχθρὸν ἅτ’ ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι, / ἄλλ’ ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολαιῖς, 83–85; “Let me befriend a friend but against an enemy, I shall, as his enemy, run him down as a wolf does, stalking now here, now there, on twisting paths”). The moral superiority of the latter stance over the former is clear from the result, acceptance “under every regime” (ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον, 86) rather than a failure of influence “among good men” (ἐν ἀγαθοῖς, 81).

The image of the wolf indicates that any means available can and must be used to achieve the end of undermining an enemy.<sup>179</sup> This uncompromising attitude is stated baldly in a gnome in *Isthmian* 4: “One must do everything to diminish one’s opponent” (χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ’ ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρὸν, 48), including using the wiliness of a fox to outwit him (47). In this poem the injunction is applied to a narrowly personal goal, victory in a pancratium competition, but in *Paeon* 2 its scope is widened to include the interests of one’s homeland. In a section dealing with the defence of a city under attack the following gnome occurs:

εἰ δέ τις ἀρκέων φίλοις  
ἐχθροῖσι τραχὺς ὑπαντιάζει,  
μόχθος ἥσυχίαν φέρει  
καιρῷ καταβαίνων.

If, to aid friends,  
one sternly opposes enemies,  
the effort brings peace  
when it proceeds in due measure.

(*Pae.* 2.31–34)

ἥσυχία cannot be achieved without harsh action against enemies. Since the circumstances require such action it carries the moral approval of being appropriate, being “the properly timed and properly regu-

<sup>178</sup> In the epinician context the distinction is especially important. By subscribing to a general truth which includes blaming where blame is due the narrator proclaims the sincerity of his praise. Since he is someone who adheres to the basic principle of helping friends and harming enemies he can be trusted to “cast a fitting vaunt upon (the victor’s) accomplishment” (πρόσφορον / ἐν ... ἔργῳ κόμπων ἰεῖς, *Nem.* 8.48–49).

<sup>179</sup> Most 1985:115–116. For his detailed treatment of *Pyth.* 2.81–88, see pp. 111–118.

lated application of force.<sup>180</sup> Fierce opposition of enemies is also presented as an essential part of one's obligation to friends. This may be explained by the transitivity of friendship and enmity,<sup>181</sup> but given the political context of the gnome, the meaning of φίλοι is best evaluated against that background. A civic duty is at stake, namely to defend one's city against threats from outside, and in such a situation all fellow citizens should be regarded as friends, regardless of whether personal relationships with them are friendly, hostile or neutral.<sup>182</sup>

In this broad view of friendship obligations towards one's city take precedence over personal animosity. As a result people who would not assume a benevolent attitude towards each other in personal affairs would work together when faced by a threat to their city, e.g. in war.<sup>183</sup> In *Pyth.* 9.93–96 the epinician speaker, basing himself on the wisdom of Nereus, the Old Man of the Sea, goes a step further by demanding positive action towards a personal enemy in the form of recognition through praise if he has benefited the city (see p. 90 for text). It is notable that giving up the enmity is not required, but rather an acknowledgement that the way enemies are treated should take into account the circumstances. Although Blundell is right to maintain that the καί in καὶ τὸν ἐχθρόν (95) “shows that such disinterested magnanimity was not the norm”<sup>184</sup> the seriousness of the injunction cannot be doubted, as the qualification of αἰνεῖν by παντὶ θυμῷ σύν τε δίκα (95–96) shows. As in the case of facing outside enemies a citizen should suspend his personal conflicts for the sake of civic pride and should moreover do so with full engagement, this being regarded as the just thing to do.<sup>185</sup> The passage shows an awareness of the limitations

<sup>180</sup> J.R. Wilson 1980:184. Cf. Fränkel's definition of καρός as “die Norm der treffsicheren Wahl und weisen Beschränkung, der Sinn für das jeweils den Umständen Angemessene, Geschmack, Takt u.ä.” (Fränkel 1969:509). On the similarities between *Pae.* 2.31–34 and the opening of *Pythian* 8, see Fränkel 1969:567–569 with n. 9, J.R. Wilson 1980:184 and Hubbard 1985:87.

<sup>181</sup> See Blundell 1989:47 on this aspect of friendship and enmity.

<sup>182</sup> Blundell 1989:48.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. Blundell 1989:58: “Enmity directed towards outsiders may thus promote a kind of social cohesion whose value may be seen most clearly in military contexts.”

<sup>184</sup> Blundell 1989:51.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Eur. *Herac.* 997–999: εἰδὼς μὲν οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ' ἐτιτύμως / ἄνδρ' ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα· καὶ γὰρ ἐχθρὸς ὢν / ἀκούσεται γοῦν ἐσθλὰ χρηστὸς ὢν ἀνὴρ (“I knew that your son was no cipher but a true man—for though he is my enemy, he shall at all events hear good things spoken of him as befits a noble man,” trans. Kovacs 1995).

of absolute adherence to reciprocity as retaliation in accordance with the dictum that enemies must be harmed. As such it may be regarded as an example of the “(m)annigfache(n) Gedanken zur Überwindung des Vergeltungsgrundsatzes, ... vor und außerhalb der philosophischen Ethik.”<sup>186</sup>

Although most of the *gnomai* which reveal views on relationships outside the family deal with intangibles such as honour and recognition the very real practical implications of friendship or its lack are also dealt with. According to the opening lines of *Pythian* 5, for example, the power of wealth resides in its divine origin, the moral excellence of the man who has received this gift and his use of it as “a companion which brings many friends” (Ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής, / ὅταν τις ἀρετᾶ κεκραμένον καθαρῶ / βροτήσιος ἀνὴρ πότιμος παραδόντος αὐτὸν ἀνάγγη / πολὺφίλον ἐπέταν, *Pyth.* 5.1–4). The *gnome* assumes that the purpose of wealth is to promote friendship.<sup>187</sup> This is in line with a social system which depends heavily on an exchange of services between well-disposed individuals rather than transactions where no personal bond is involved.<sup>188</sup> If wealth is used to build up a network of friends and guest-friends it is εὐρυσθενής, otherwise it has little value and can even be a man’s downfall, as *Isthm.* 1.67–68 shows (see p. 68 for text).<sup>189</sup> The importance of wealth for maintaining friendship and its benefits also appears from the comment on a saying of Aristodemos quoted as “closest to the truth” (ἀλαθείας ... ἄγγιστα) in *Isthmian* 2:

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Measured against what the epinician narrator expects of his audience Eurystheus’ acknowledgement of Herakles’ worth seems at best grudging. This is understandable in the context: although Eurystheus is prepared to give Herakles his due as a worthy man he still has to contend with the “inherited enmity” (ἔχθραν πατρῶαν, 1002) of the latter’s children.

<sup>186</sup> Dihle 1962:45. For his discussion of ideas going beyond retaliation, see pp. 45–48.

<sup>187</sup> Cf. Hands 1968:34 and Millett 1991:117. For a brief treatment of the portrayal of wealth in Pindar, see Woodbury 1968:537–538.

<sup>188</sup> On the difference between these types of transaction and their relative prevalence, see Herman 1987:80.

<sup>189</sup> In his discussion of this passage Hubbard says that “(m)oney, ..., has no intrinsic worth, but exists only as socially recognized medium of exchange,” but he ignores the role of exchange in establishing the value of wealth. He contends that wealth is εὐρυσθενής if it is founded on ἀρετὰ and mediated by the divine (Hubbard 1985:124–125). However, ἀρετὰ and πότιμος only ensure the *potential* of power for wealth. It is when a man invests it in friendship, i.e. in a system of exchange, that this power is activated.

“χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ”<sup>190</sup>

ὄς φᾶ κτεάνων θ’ ἅμα λειφθεῖς καὶ φίλων

“Money, money makes the man,”

said he who lost his possessions and friends as well. (*Isthm.* 2.11)

When a man loses his wealth the loss of his friends is practically inevitable, and this in turn has a negative impact on his standing in the community: “honor disappears when a man loses his friends” (οἴχεται τιμὰ φίλων ταπωμένῳ φωτί, *Nem.* 10.78). The importance of recognition of one’s achievements and worth, and the crucial role of friends in this regard have already been discussed, but the reality is that “few mortals remain faithful in time of toil to share the labor” (παῦροι δ’ ἐν πόνῳ πιστοὶ βροτῶν / καμιάτου μεταλαμβάνειν, *Nem.* 10.78–79).<sup>191</sup>

Like the natural envy citizens tend to display when someone is successful the fickleness of friendship betrays the essential weakness and meanness of human nature.<sup>192</sup> This is of course not the picture presented of the *laudandi*, their families and associates. They are exceptional not only by virtue of their success in sport but also through the qualities of character and personality that set them apart from the normal run of humankind. The somewhat dismal picture of human nature revealed in man’s relationships outside the οἶκος highlights these admirable qualities even more, especially in so far as it refers to obstacles such as envy, slander and deceit that the victor has overcome in his pursuit of greatness.

In summary it can be said that relationships functioning only within the social group, i.e. between family members and ξένοι, are portrayed in a positive light, while those in which the political unit (usually the city) figures prominently are seen as more exposed to negative forces.<sup>193</sup> Friends and neighbours give valuable support, but their goodwill can become compromised in spite of a shared social background. As for

<sup>190</sup> On the saying as pivot for reflection on the use of wealth in the poem, see Kurke 1991b:240–256 *passim*.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. Blundell 1989:57 n. 147 (with references) on the effect of misfortune on friendship. The notion that “even friends betray those who have died” (θανόντων δὲ καὶ φίλοι προδόται, Pindar fr. 160) also demonstrates the precariousness of human relationships.

<sup>192</sup> Many *gnomai* refer to negative aspects of human nature. Some examples are greed and the impulse to excess (*Ol.* 2.95–98, *Pyth.* 3.54, *Pyth.* 4.139–140, *Nem.* 9.33–34, fr. 203), foolish striving (*Pyth.* 3.21–23, *Pae.* 4.32–35), selfcentredness (*Nem.* 1.53–54), forgetfulness (*Ol.* 7.45–47, *Isthm.* 7.16–19), deceitfulness (*Pyth.* 2.81–82, *Nem.* 8.32–34).

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Herman 1987:30 on the potential for conflict between members of the same πόλις.

those with whom a man has no particular bond, they are as likely to display ill will as admiration.

The representation of human relationships is conventional to the extent that it acknowledges as their foundation the principle of reciprocity. When people are well disposed to one another this principle can function unchallenged, but otherwise problems may be encountered which necessitate modifications. In the epinician context these problems are clearly felt and dealt with in a way which furthers the epinician agenda of praise. On occasion the accepted view that enemies must be harmed is pronounced inappropriate and replaced by a call to praise regardless of possible animosity in one's relationship with the successful man. However, the usual strategy is to invoke reciprocity as a positive response by portraying the successful man as a benefactor who is therefore entitled to recompense.





## CHAPTER FOUR

### COSMOLOGY IN ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ODES

In Chapter 3 the cosmology on which Pindar's work is founded is reviewed on the basis of the gnomic statements found throughout the work. In this chapter the focus changes from a broad outline derived from one element of all the poems to a consideration of particular poems as a whole to investigate how Pindar applies cosmological ideas for encomiastic purposes. Analyses of *Olympian* 12, *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 follow on some general remarks on cosmology and praise and a brief discussion of *Pythian* 7 and *Nemean* 2 as examples of the ubiquity of cosmological concerns in Pindar's poetry.

The overview of cosmological ideas presents a world in which man has to recognize both his frailty when confronted with the divine order and the expectations and obligations attached to his position in human society. In such a world the position of the successful man can be a precarious one. While his success is proof of the goodwill of the gods, the danger is that it may lure him into trespassing on their terrain. His pre-eminence makes it all the more important that he should remember his mortality and the limits it imposes on him. In the social sphere success can also be a mixed blessing. Although it provides the satisfaction of being admired and praised by one's fellow men, their goodwill cannot be taken for granted and there is always the danger of attracting envy and slander. Therefore it is important to fit into the accepted patterns of society and conform to the norms it holds dear.

For the poet called in to praise the achievements of successful men these realities can pose tough challenges. The justified desire for recognition of athletic and other achievements must be balanced with the claims of the divine and the sensitivities of society. An awareness of this broader context can be found in even the shortest of the odes. *Pythian* 7 and *Nemean* 2 may serve as examples.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See also Chapter 5, pp. 171–177 passim on the expression of cosmological concerns in these poems.

In *Pythian* 7 the chariot race victory of Megakles of Athens is presented as the latest achievement of a great city (αἱ μεγαλοπόλεις Ἀθῆναι, 1) and a powerful family (Ἀλκμανιδᾶν εὐρουσθενεῖ/γενεᾷ, 2–3). They are the preeminent city and house in Greece (5–8), and the latter is known everywhere for its brilliant restoration of Apollo’s temple at Pytho as well as its athletic successes (9–17a). Nevertheless Megakles is not exempt from social disapprobation and suffers as a result of the envy of his fellow citizens (φθόνον ἀμειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, 19). Instead of being reciprocated with the honour the poet implies he deserves, he celebrates his victory in exile after having been ostracised.<sup>2</sup> A closing gnome interprets this vexing situation in terms of a broader outlook on life: φαντί γε μάν / οὔτω κ’ ἀνδρὶ παρμονίμαν / θάλλουσαν εὐδαιμονίαν τὰ καὶ τὰ φέρεσθαι (“Yet they say that in this way happiness which abides and flourishes brings a man now this, now that,” 19–21). Megakles’ recent experiences are seen as a manifestation of the vicissitudes to which all men are subject, even if they are from a great family such as his. In fact, as Theunissen points out, the gnome indicates that “beständig blühendes Glück,” such as that experienced by the Alkmaionidai, is bound to attract more than its fair share of negative reaction.<sup>3</sup> Enduring happiness is of course only possible through the continuing goodwill of the gods.<sup>4</sup> As restorers of Apollo’s temple the piety of the Alkmaionidai cannot be doubted, nor that the gods support them. In the long run, therefore, their εὐδαιμονία is assured, something of which Megakles’ victory is a sign.

In *Nemean* 2 (the only ode in which no gnomai occur) the cosmological context is provided by framing references to Zeus.<sup>5</sup> The opening strophe not only compares Timodemos’ victory to the prelude to Zeus (Διὸς ἐκ προουμίου, 3) with which Homeric hymns often begin, but also links it emphatically to Zeus’ sanctuary at Nemea (ὄδ’ ἀνήρ / καταβολὰν ἱερῶν ἀγώνων νικαφορίας δέδεκται πρῶτον, Νεμείου / ἐν πολυμνήτῳ Διὸς ἄλσει, 3–5). The penultimate line again refers to Nemea as “Zeus’ contest” (Διὸς ἀγῶνι) and calls on the citizens to celebrate the god with a victory procession for Timodemos (τόν, ὃ πολῖται, κωμάξατε Τιμοδήμου σὺν εὐκλείῃ νόστῳ, 24).<sup>6</sup> By these references the poet establishes a

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.5. See also Burton 1962:32 and Hornblower 2004:250.

<sup>3</sup> Theunissen 2000:262. See also Bulman 1992:20.

<sup>4</sup> Theunissen 2000:263.

<sup>5</sup> On the careful ring composition of this poem, see Krischer 1965:37.

<sup>6</sup> Instone 1989:116 n. 29 reads τόν as referring to Διὸς ἀγῶνι, not just Διὸς. The

divine framework for the young athlete's budding career.<sup>7</sup> Also, in addition to serving as an acknowledgement of Zeus' role in his success, the *κῶμος* places the victor and his victory in their social context. The citizens are encouraged to acknowledge Timodemos' success and, unlike in the case of Megakles and his envious fellow citizens, there seems to be every expectation that they will follow the injunction to "lead off with a sweetly melodious voice" (*ἀδυμελεῖ δ' ἐξάρχετε φωνᾶ*, 25).

The dearth of specific information about the victories being celebrated confirms that, as Carey observes, Pindar "concentrates on the principle involved in victory, not the physical facts."<sup>8</sup> However, this does not mean that every victory is forced into a pre-determined interpretative model. Although the *gnomai* portray a conventional world view the particular circumstances of a victor are not ignored and, if necessary, adjustments are made to accommodate unusual situations, as the analyses of *Olympian* 12 and *Isthmian* 4 will show. On the other hand, in several poems the realities facing a victor or his family are the motivation for an appeal to recognise traditional values, usually so that transgression may be avoided or solace provided under difficult circumstances. Examples of such realities are manifestations of the human condition such as illness or the loss of family members in war (e.g. in *Pythian* 3, *Isthmians* 7 and 8), or social circumstances such as high office and the challenges associated with it (e.g. in *Pythian* 4). The analysis of *Olympian* 13 demonstrates that the poem is unusual in focusing on the victor's family to the virtual exclusion of the victor. Furthermore, exposed as they are as members of the ruling elite, they have to be reminded discreetly of the need to act with restraint in both the divine and the social sphere.

#### *Olympian 12: An immigrant and his adopted city*

The central role of the family in the social outlook of archaic Greece reflected in the *gnomai* in Pindar's poetry is given concrete expression in numerous references to the family of practically every victor. The father of the victor is mentioned in all but a handful of the *epinikia*,

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difference does not seem significant. A celebration of Zeus' contest would ipso facto have been a celebration of Zeus.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. lines 6–14 and Hubbard 1995:55.

<sup>8</sup> Carey 1980:161.

while praise of the larger family often includes the group name (e.g. Emmenidai, Eratidai, Oligaitidai) as well as enumeration of the athletic victories of named relatives or of the family in general.<sup>9</sup>

The liberal mention of personal particulars (names, achievements) in the family sphere reflects the importance of enhancing family prestige as an item on the epinician agenda. Leslie Kurke remarks as follows on the victor in his social context:

Pindar's victors, like the characters in tragedy, are completely enmeshed in a social system which defines them first as members of a household and a family, and then (often) as members of a *polis*. Within such a system, the identification of father and son in the song of praise glorifies the entire family rather than just the individual victor... Pindar's victors base their self-definition on identification with the family and particularly with the patriline.<sup>10</sup>

Kurke's article discusses naming practices and Pindar's use of ambiguity to stress the patriline. Its importance for a man's identity can also be gauged from the ubiquity of the patronymic in the epinikia of both Pindar and Bakchylides.<sup>11</sup> Although the family in general and the patriline in particular are no doubt the most important reference points for the self-definition of many Olympic victors, Pindar's use of this topic, manifested in family and homeland praise and often in choice of myth as well, is by no means formulaic, but displays sensitivity to the circumstances of a particular *laudandus* and insight into the realities of his position. *Olympian* 12 for Ergoteles of Himera illustrates this point.<sup>12</sup>

Gildersleeve says of this poem: "Himera and Ergoteles are paralleled. The city and the victor mirror each other. The fortune of Himera is the fortune of Ergoteles."<sup>13</sup> On the surface the correspondence lies in

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<sup>9</sup> The nature and status of the patronymic groups to which Pindar refers vary. According to Parker 1996:63 n. 26 those referred to as *pátrai* are confined to Aigina. In other states they are usually *oikoi*, e.g. the Emmenidai in Akragas (*Ol.* 3.38, *Pyth.* 6.5) and Timodemidai in Acharnai (*Nem.* 2.18), but some show characteristics of a *genos*, e.g. the Iamidai of Syracuse (*Ol.* 6.71). For the Eratidai of Rhodes (*Ol.* 7.93) and the Oligaitidai of Corinth (*Ol.* 13.97) he regards the evidence as "unclear." See also Dickie 1979:204–209.

<sup>10</sup> Kurke 1991a:289.

<sup>11</sup> It occurs in 34 of Pindar's 45 victory odes, and, despite their often fragmentary state, in 12 of Bakchylides' 15.

<sup>12</sup> For a detailed treatment of the ode, with special emphasis on the role of Τύχα (2), the nature of ἐλπίζ (6a) and the implications of the image evoked in κατεφυλλορόησε(ν) (15), see Nisetich 1977.

<sup>13</sup> Gildersleeve 1908:225.

the parallel histories of city and victor. The ode begins with a hymn of supplication to Tyche (Fortune) on behalf of the city of Himera (Αἰσσομαι, παῖ Ζηνὸς Ἐλευθερίου, / Ἰμέραν εὐροσθενέ' ἀμφιπόλει, σῶτειρα Τύχα, *Ol.* 12.1–2). A reference to the city of the victor is a common occurrence in the opening of epinicians, sometimes taking the form of extensive praise, for example in the comparable short odes *Olympian* 5, *Pythian* 7 and *Pythian* 12.<sup>14</sup> In *Olympian* 12, however, in spite of the perhaps somewhat exaggerated estimation of Himera's power, praise is not the aim of naming the city.<sup>15</sup> Rather, its turbulent history of subjugation and very recent attainment of freedom is evoked by both the earnestness of the entreaty to watch over the city and Tyche's double qualification as "child of Zeus the Deliverer" and "saviour."<sup>16</sup> The positive turn of events also resonates in the following description of Tyche's ordering power in the world (3–5a). The relevance of Himera's history to the occasion of the ode becomes clear in the epode, which is devoted to the victor, whose history has followed a similar course from hardship to felicity. He was forced into exile by civil strife in his home city of Knossos and settled in Himera, a reversal which turned to his advantage since it enabled his participation in the Panhellenic games where he achieved great success (13–19). However, the aim is not just to draw parallels between the fortunes of Himera and Ergoteles, but to interpret the vicissitudes experienced by both city and victor in their "schicksalhaften Bedeutsamkeit."<sup>17</sup> On the one hand the experiences of Himera and Ergoteles demonstrate the (literally) central gnome that "many things happen to men counter to their judgment" (πολλὰ δ' ἀνθρώποις παρὰ γνώμαν ἔπεσεν, 10), that life is uncertain from the limited human perspective. On the other hand their example shows that the

<sup>14</sup> For opening city praise in longer odes, see *Olympian* 13, *Pythian* 2, *Nemean* 10 and *Isthmian* 7.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Barrett 1973:35. He calls the city "undistinguished." Praise could conceivably have been in the form of "Himera with its warm baths," like for example "Kyrene with its fine horses" (*Pyth.* 4. 2), "Akragas on its river" (*Pyth.* 6.6) and "the Aiakidai's high-towered domain" (*Nem.* 4.11–12).

<sup>16</sup> According to Barrett's reconstruction the city was subjected to harsh treatment from the rulers of Akragas after the removal of the tyrant Terillos (before 480). With the fall of the Akragantines to Hieron c. 470 the city came under the power of Syracuse. True freedom was attained only in 466, the most probable date of the poem, through the revolution in Syracuse which drove out the Deinomenidai. See Barrett 1973 for the historical details and the dating of the ode. For a defence of the traditional earlier dating against Barrett, see Cole 1987:562 n. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Strohm 1944:20.

divine, represented by Tyche, is in control and that from that perspective life is not random.<sup>18</sup>

A close association between a victor and his city is found in most odes. However, the relationship between Ergoteles and Himera is unique since he is an immigrant, not a native. As a result the poet cannot exploit the usual tools such as links to local heroes from myth or the established status of the victor's family in the community to recommend him to his fellow citizens. The need to affirm a victor's loyalty can be assumed to be even stronger in such an exceptional case, and Pindar skilfully structures the epode, taking into account that Ergoteles has a birth identity as well as an adopted identity, to strengthen the association between victor and city.

While the patriline is recognized, it is at the same time relegated to the past and even subtly downgraded. The first four lines of the epode are bracketed by references to the birth identity, the patronymic (υἱὲ Φιλάνορος) at the beginning and fatherland (Κνωσίας ... πατρός) at the end, with an account of the past, of life at home, in between:

υἱὲ Φιλάνορος, ἦτοι καὶ τεὰ κεν  
 ἐνδομάχας ἅτ' ἀλέκτωρ συγγόνῳ παρ' ἐστία  
 ἀκλεῆς τιμὰ κατεφυλλορόησε(ν) ποδῶν,  
 εἰ μὴ στάσις ἀντιάνειρα Κνωσίας σ' ἄμερσε πάτρας.

Son of Philanor, truly would the honor of your feet,  
 like a local fighting cock by its native hearth,  
 have dropped its leaves ingloriously,  
 had not hostile faction deprived you of your fatherland,<sup>19</sup> Knossos.

(*Ol.* 12.13–16)

In the city of his birth the victor would have had no recognition of his talent, no fame would have been attached to his name. He would have achieved no more honour than a fighting cock which never ventures from the safety of his own surroundings to test his mettle.<sup>20</sup> The devaluation of the birth identity further appears from the use in connection with the ineffectual cock of σύγγονος, one of the many terms in Pindar's epinicians which otherwise refer to the superiority of what is native or inherited.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the limited opportunities

<sup>18</sup> On Tyche in *Olympian* 12, see Strohm 1944:13–21 and Nisetich 1977:237–242.

<sup>19</sup> Race translates “homeland,” which does not register the emphasis of these lines as “fatherland” does.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. the indictment of the parents of Aristagoras of Tenedos for not allowing him to compete at Panhellenic level (*Nem.* 11.19–26).

<sup>21</sup> For a list of such words, see Rose 1974:152. For the conventional use of σύγγονος,

it offered for attaining distinction the fatherland was also an arena of conflict and violence for the victor. Nevertheless the loss of the fatherland is not portrayed as insignificant, as shown by the use of ἀμερσε, through which it is likened to a robbery or a bereavement.<sup>22</sup> It is only with hindsight, aware now of how the divine has ordered his life, that the victor's fatherland and birth identity can be put in its proper perspective as not promoting achievement and distinction.

In the final lines of the epode the attention turns from the past to the present, the victor's success and his connection with his adopted city:

νῦν δ' Ὀλυμπία στεφανωσάμενος  
καὶ δις ἐκ Πυθῶνος Ἴσθμοῖ τ', Ἐργότελες,  
θερμὰ Νυμφᾶν λουτρὰ βασιτάξεις ὁμι-  
λέων παρ' οἰκειίας ἀρούρας.

But now, having won a crown at Olympia,  
and twice from Pytho and at the Isthmos, Ergoteles,  
you exalt the Nymphs' warm baths, living  
by lands that are your own.

(*Ol.* 12.17–19)

The difference between the past and the present is strongly underlined by the emphatic νῦν δέ which opens this section. Significantly, the victor is now addressed by his own name, Ergoteles (17), the patronymic used earlier (13) belonging to his former identity.<sup>23</sup> In Himera Ergoteles cannot rely on the support of an established family, his standing depends on his own deeds. The enumeration of several Panhellenic victories, in contrast with the image of decline and failure called up by ἀκλεής and κατεφυλλορόησε(ν) in the previous section (15), announces that the mediocrity and obscurity that would have been the victor's lot at home had not in fact materialised. There is no independent evidence for the time of the victor's exile from Knossos,<sup>24</sup> but στεφανωσάμενος ...

see *Pyth.* 8.60 and *Nem.* 11.12. On the force of σύγγονος, see Verdenius 1987:99. He glosses συγγόνω παρ' ἐστία as "home' in the sense of 'one's own country'" (98).

<sup>22</sup> See LSJ s.v. ἀμέρδω. Cf. Verdenius' gloss "to deprive somebody of something naturally belonging to him" (1987:101).

<sup>23</sup> Most victors are of course identified by both their own name and that of their father (see note 11 above). However, nowhere except in *Olympian* 12 is the identity thus established problematic. That the father is named first deliberately to consign that identity to the past is supported by the fact that it is highly unusual to mention an adult victor after his father. In 25 out of 34 cases mentioning the father the victor's name precedes that of his father and of the remaining nine six are boy victors. In *Nemean* 10 Theaios and his father Oulias are mentioned in the same line (24). That leaves Ergoteles and Hagesias of Syracuse (*Olympian* 6).

<sup>24</sup> Barrett 1973:23–24 makes a case for his arrival in Himera around 476 as part of



βαστάξεις makes clear that the whole of his Panhellenic athletic career is dedicated to Himera.

His association with the “Nymphs’ warm baths” (19) has been interpreted variously depending on the meaning attributed to the verb βαστάξεις. On the basis of the meaning “lift up, raise” it is interpreted metaphorically as exalting the city (so LSJ s.v.), or more literally as an indication of taking the water in one’s hands while bathing, which in turn symbolises the victor’s integration into his new community.<sup>25</sup> The latter interpretation emphasises the victor’s adopted identity and fits in with the deliberate consignment of his birth identity to the past. The final phrase of the poem, ὀμλέων παρ’ οἰκείαις ἀρούραις, also concerns Ergoteles’ status as a citizen of Himera. ὀμλέω, although used absolutely, has such a strong sense of social intercourse<sup>26</sup> that, read together with the reference to the warm baths, it conveys more than just the neutral fact of living somewhere and can be taken to emphasize Ergoteles’ acceptance in the society of Himera. As for οἰκείαι ἀρούραι, it literally means the fields attached to Himera that he now owns, but οἰκείος also indicates that he has established for himself that institution central to archaic social life, the οἶκος, and enjoys the recognition that goes with being head of a household.<sup>27</sup> Whether Ergoteles’ position in Himera was in fact as assured as the closing images of the poem suggest must be a matter of speculation. The implication of the first interpretation of βαστάξεις, that he brings glory to Himera with his victories, nev-

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Theron’s resettling of the city. Since his argument is based on events in Sicily, not Crete, the date remains highly speculative (as he also acknowledges, see p. 25).

<sup>25</sup> On the symbolic possibilities of the bath, see Fränkel 1955. For a discussion of the different positions, see Nisetich 1977:264 n. 93. Although he seems to favour the bathing interpretation, he acknowledges the possibility of both meanings being intended. Kirkwood 1982:118 expresses some unease with both interpretations, opting for a somewhat vaguer characterisation of the association as symbolic of “Ergoteles’ new life and success in Himera.”

<sup>26</sup> See LSJ s.v.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1985:57. He concludes that the Herakles myth in *Nemean* 1 “shows that expansion beyond the *oikeion* into the *allotriion* can lead to a superior redefinition of the *oikeion*” and then describes Ergoteles’ career as a movement from *oikeion* to *allotriion* to a new *oikeion*. The use of οἰκείος instead of πάτριος / πατρώιος with ἀρούρα may even hint at Ergoteles’ broken connection with his homeland if it is compared with the references to ancestral land in *Ol.* 2.14 (ἀρούραν ... πατρίαν) and *Isthm.* 1.35 (πατρίαν ἀρούραν) (although the use of the plural in *Olympian* 12 weakens such an interpretation). Cf. also *Pae.* 6.106–107: εἶδεν οὔτε πατροῖαις ἐν ἀρού[ραις] / ἵπλους. The fields of Neoptolemos’ father here stand for his ancestral land which he was destined not to see again.

ertheless shows that Ergoteles' settling in the city must be understood to have benefited not only himself, but the city as well. In that light θεομὰ Νυμφᾶν λουτροῦ βαστάζεις is also a reminder of the principle of reciprocity in terms of which his new fellow citizens would owe him acknowledgement for his contribution to the city's fame.<sup>28</sup>

The nature of that fame appears from Nisetich's analysis of the first part of the epode (13–16). He shows how the litotic use of κεν ... ἀκλεῆς ... κατεφυλλορόησε(v) evokes man's mortality simultaneously with the means to overcome it, the song of praise. Through the song in his honour Ergoteles' athletic triumph has given him the means to escape his mortal limitations.<sup>29</sup> Since the pointed identification of Ergoteles with his adopted city means that what applies to the one applies equally to the other, Himera is also immortalised in the song. Similarly the prayer for the preservation of the city's newly acquired freedom becomes by the end of the poem through this identification a prayer for the continued well-being of Ergoteles as well. The song, even though it assures enduring fame for him and his adopted city, does not eliminate their need for prayer and the protection of the divine since their perspective remains the human one of uncertainty portrayed in the poem's gnomic section.<sup>30</sup> The fusion of prayer and praise song in this ode acknowledges both the precariousness of human happiness and the power of poetry to immortalise the brief moment of balance and harmony shared by victor and city.<sup>31</sup> The prayer for the preservation of Himera and its implied immortalisation by the song can also be seen as Ergoteles' acknowledgement of the city where he was able to forge a new identity for himself when circumstances forced him to relinquish the traditional identification with his family.

*Isthmian 4: Creating χάρις for an ill-favoured victor*

The discussion of how nature as a cosmological category is presented in Pindar's oeuvre has shown that god-given natural ability, φυά, is the

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<sup>28</sup> Reading this obligation into the presentation of Ergoteles as benefactor of Himera is supported by the use of βαστάζω in a gnome in *Isthmian* 3 regarding the duty of praise in recompense for a man's great deeds. See Chapter 3, p. 91–92 for the text and discussion.

<sup>29</sup> Nisetich 1977:260–264.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Verdenius 1987:90 with n. 7 on ἀμφιπόλει as a prayer for continued protection.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Young 1993:127.

indispensable basis of human achievement (see Chapter 3, pp. 55–58). The success of victors at the Panhellenic games is often attributed to the excellence they have inherited from their forebears, be it father, grandfather or the family in general, or even a god. Thus, with his Pythian victory Hippokleas of Thessaly follows in the footsteps of his father, himself an Olympic victor (τὸ δὲ συγγενὲς ἐμβέβακεν ἵχνεσιν πατρὸς / Ὀλυμπιονίκια, *Pyth.* 10.12–13). A few lines further on this example of ability passed on from father to son is generalised in a gnome which declares a winner at Olympia who sees his son winning at Pythia “blessed and a worthy subject for song in wise men’s eyes” (22–26). The Bassidai of Aigina demonstrate τὸ συγγενές, as far as athletic ability goes, in alternate generations (*Nem.* 6.8–26). Thus Alkimidas “places his foot in tracks related by blood, (those) of his grandfather Praxidamas” (ἵχνεσιν ἐν Πραξιδάμαντος ἐὸν πόδα νέμων / πατροπάτορος ὀμαμίαις, 15–16; my translation) who in turn emulated his grandfather Hagesimachos. In *Olympian* 2 Theron, tyrant of Akragas, is praised as the “foremost upholder of his city from a line of famous ancestors,” who enhanced their inborn excellence by acquiring wealth and honour (εὐωνύμων τε πατέρων ἄωτον ὀρθόπολιν / ... / ... πλοῦτόν τε καὶ χάριν ἄγων / γνησίαις ἐπ’ ἀρεταῖς, 7, 10–11). Alkimedon of Aigina and his close relative Timosthenes<sup>32</sup> are examples of athletes owing their success to their family’s connection with a god. Their successes at Olympia and Nemea respectively imply inherited ability, but in addition these victories are attributed to the intervention of Zeus whose relationship with them is described in genetic terms (Τιμόσθενης, ὕμμε δ’ ἐκλάρωσεν πότιμος / Ζηνὶ γενεθλίω· ὃς σὲ μὲν Νεμέα πρόφατον, / Ἀλκιμέδοντα δὲ παρ Κρόνου λόφω / θῆκεν Ὀλυμπιονίκαν, *Ol.* 8.15–18). He can thus be regarded as the founding father of the family and the ultimate source of its inborn excellence.<sup>33</sup>

In *Isthmian* 3 Melissos of Thebes’ chariot race victory at Nemea is credited to the excellence he inherited from both his paternal and maternal family (11–17b). That Melissos’ achievement affirms the natural ability of his forebears, and by implication his own, is stated with litotic emphasis: ἀνδρῶν δ’ ἀρετάν / σύμφυτον οὐ κατελέγγει (“He brings

<sup>32</sup> Carey 1989:1–6 proposes that Timosthenes is the grandfather of Alkimedon, rather than the brother as traditionally accepted following the scholiasts. Kurke 1991a:294 n. 27 makes a convincing case for the traditional position.

<sup>33</sup> Note that all the examples cited are also instances of the self-definition based on family connections referred to above (p. 106).

no disgrace upon the prowess inherited from his kinsmen,” 13–14).<sup>34</sup> The οὐ κατελέγγειν expression is also used of Alkimedon of Aigina, but instead of affirming his outstanding ancestry it confirms the promise of his beauty: ἦν δ’ ἔσορᾶν καλός, ἔργω τ’ οὐ κατὰ εἶδος ἐλέγχων (“he was beautiful to look at, and with his efforts did not dishonour his appearance,” *Ol.* 8.19; my translation). Alkimedon’s deeds match the expectations of excellence raised by his beauty. The preceding lines (15–18, see above) deal with the divine source of Alkimedon’s ability and consequent success, this statement with the manifestation of φῦά first in appearance and then in action. Physical beauty as a marker of excellence and predictor of success also appears in *Nemean* 3 when the pancratiast Aristokleidas is described as “being beautiful and performing (deeds) fitting his form (appearance)” (ἔων καλός ἔρδων τ’ εὐκοτότα μορφᾶ, *Nem.* 3.19; my translation).<sup>35</sup> It comes as a surprise then, given his inherited excellence and the connection between excellence and beauty, that in *Isthmian* 4 Melissos is described in uniquely unflattering terms as not having the “bodily nature” (φύσις) of Orion and being “contemptible to look at” (ὄνοτος ... ἰδέσθαι, 49–50).<sup>36</sup> In spite of his Panhellenic success he seems to have enjoyed less than universal admiration, since he did not conform to the aristocratic notion of a well-built, beautiful victor.<sup>37</sup>

The contradiction of conventional views of excellence represented by Melissos’ victory in the pancratium at Isthmia is not the only challenge the poet has to overcome in the execution of his commission to celebrate this victor and his family. It appears that the fame of Melissos’ family, the Kleonymidai, as warriors and as horse breeders, had suffered in recent times. Four men were lost in battle on one day (*Isthm.* 4.16–17b), and although they had been successful in chariot races at local games, at the Panhellenic games they had to be satisfied with

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Köhnken 1976:63: “... die negative Formulierung οὐ κατελέγγει(ς) ... (entspricht) einer besonders nachdrücklichen positiven Feststellung (‘er bestätigt sehr wohl!’).” At *Pyth.* 8.36 and *Isthm.* 8.65a this expression also refers to continued family excellence. On its use at *Ol.* 8.19 see below.

<sup>35</sup> Note that the οὐ κατελέγγειν topos (in noun form) appears a few lines earlier: Μυρμιδόνες ... / ..., ὧν παλαίφατον ἀγορᾶν / οὐκ ἐλεγγέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας ... / ἐμίανε (“the Myrmidons ..., whose long-famed assembly place Aristokleidas did not stain with dishonor,” *Nem.* 3.13–16). See Chapter 5, p. 186 for a discussion of this passage.

<sup>36</sup> I read *Isthmians* 3 and 4 as two separate odes, following Köhnken 1971:87–93. The following interpretation of *Isthmian* 4 is a slightly revised version of Boeke 2004.

<sup>37</sup> On the connection between καλός and ἀρετή as an aristocratic idea, see Donlan 1980:106–107. Cf. also Pfeiffer 1999:283–285 who includes a list of relevant literature.

the rewards of taking part (25–30). Indeed, their φάμα παλαιά (“ancient fame,” 22) “had fallen asleep” (ἐν ὕπνῳ ... πέσεν, 23). Pindar’s response to the problem posed by the family’s decline has received attention in detailed treatments of the ode by Köhnken and Krummen.<sup>38</sup> The Kleonymidai’s lack of success at the Panhellenic games is linked to their great losses in war: they were on the brink of winning, when fortune robbed them of their chance (31–35). Therefore the poet can portray them as winners even though they had not actually won. This is done by turning the Theban festival in honour of Herakles and his eight sons into a simultaneous funeral celebration for Melissos’ dead relatives where they, who “pleased bronze Ares” (χαλκέῳ τ’ Ἄρει ἄδον, 15), together with the “bronze-clad” (χαλκοόρατος) sons, metaphorically receive winners’ crowns (στεφανώματα, 61–66).

This analysis focuses on why it is such a challenge to praise an ugly victor and how the poet rises to the occasion, not only by metaphorically enhancing Melissos’ appearance, but also by defending his right to be accepted as a worthy winner. Krummen is the only scholar who has tried to account in some detail for the candid depiction of Melissos as an ugly victor.<sup>39</sup> She comes to the extraordinary conclusion that Melissos was a dwarf and that the passage describing him should actually be read directly as praise. Certainly the exaltation of the victor is the ultimate objective of *Isthmian* 4, as of all Pindar’s other epinikia, but it is not done by ignoring the realities of a victor’s circumstances. Here it is achieved in the face of real obstacles which the poet does not shrink from exposing: the precarious position from which the Kleonymidai family has emerged thanks to Melissos’ victory, and the victor’s unprepossessing appearance.

According to Steiner “athletics was an erotically charged ‘spectator sport’ which put beautiful bodies on display.”<sup>40</sup> In the late sixth and

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<sup>38</sup> Köhnken 1971:87–116 has as his main aim the interpretation of the function of the Aias myth, while Krummen 1990:33–97 interprets the ode on the basis of the Theban festival for Herakles described in the last antistrophe. Although neither of these authors approaches *Isthmian* 4 from the perspective of the Kleonymidai’s misfortunes, their interpretations seek to explain how their losses at war and in the Panhellenic games are presented in such a way as to be deemed “praiseworthy.” The following brief account is based on their readings.

<sup>39</sup> Krummen 1990:91, 94–96. T. Schmitz 1994:213 sees humour in the depiction of Melissos, as does Willcock 1995:83, who suggests a “private joke between poet and victor” as an explanation. Race 1990:191 notes the “incongruity between the pankratiast’s appearance and his actual performance” but does not explain it further.

<sup>40</sup> Steiner 1998:126.

early fifth centuries this appears from the portrayal of athletes in both verbal and visual media, i.e. poetry, vase painting and victory monuments.<sup>41</sup> A closer look at Pindar's epinikia shows that competitors in the combat events especially are singled out as worthy of admiration for their appearance, which makes the unflattering remarks on the physique of a pancratiast such as Melissos all the more exceptional.

If the victors Pindar celebrates are categorised according to their events three main groups may be distinguished: winners in the equestrian events, the combat sports events (boxing, wrestling, pancratium) and the running events (including the mixed event pentathlon). As far as general form and content are concerned—aspects such as mention and praise of the victor, his father and his city, and use of myth and gnomai—there is no apparent distinction on the grounds of this categorisation. However, explicit praise of the physical attributes of an athlete is confined to victors in the combat events, and while the praise of someone's appearance implied in certain images and myths covers a broader range of victors, it too centres on the combat sports victors.<sup>42</sup>

Unequivocal statements of the beauty of the victor are found in six of the sixteen odes dedicated to combat athletes. Aristokleidas, pancratiast of Aigina, is simply called beautiful (*καλός*, *Nem.* 3.19). The boy wrestler Alkimedon of Aigina “was beautiful to look upon” (*ἦν δ' ἔσορᾶν καλός*, *Ol.* 8.19), the wrestler Epharmentos of Opous, winning in the men's class as a youth at Marathon, finds himself admired from all sides for his blooming youthfulness and beauty (*ώραῖος ἔων καὶ καλός*, *Ol.* 9.94), and the boy boxer Hagesidamos of Western Lokroi is not only “beautiful of form” (*ιδέα ... καλός*, *Ol.* 10.103), but also *ἑρατός* (“handsome, desirable,” *Ol.* 10.99). In addition to their beautiful bodies, the pancratiasts Aristagoras of Tenedos and Strepsiadidas of Thebes are noted for their strength. Aristagoras, at his installation as councillor, still deserves praise for his wonderful physique (*θαυτὸν δέμας*, *Nem.* 11.12), which is moreover gnomically said to surpass that of others

<sup>41</sup> Steiner 1998:123 n. 2, 124, 142.

<sup>42</sup> See Steiner 1998:136–142 for a discussion of Pindar's presentation of victors as a “source of visual pleasure” (137) comparable to that provided by vase paintings and victory monuments. Although she qualifies the victors singled out for praise of their beauty as mostly adolescents (137), she does not take into account the sporting discipline in which they take part, thus leaving the impression that her analysis applies to victors across the board. In what follows I am indebted to Steiner's insights on the physical radiance with which many victors are endowed by the poet, and the implications of the use of verbs of seeing.

(μορφᾷ παραμεύσεται ἄλλους, *Nem.* 11.13), and the ode expresses regret that he never had a chance to display his strength (βία, *Nem.* 11.22) at the Panhellenic games. Strepsiadidas has a powerful impact on the viewer: his strength is awesome and his body shapely (σθένει τ' ἔκπαγλος ἰδεῖν τε μορφάεις, *Isthm.* 7.22).<sup>43</sup> Two more pancratiasts are praised for their strength (ἀλλὰ ... τλάθυμος, *Nem.* 2.14–15; εὐρουσθενής, *Nem.* 5.4),<sup>44</sup> and the famous boxer Diagoras of Rhodes for his extraordinary size (πελώριος, *Ol.* 7.15).

The explicit praise of the appearance of several of these victors is supplemented by imagery which shows them radiating with the lustre of victory, or by associating them with certain deities or mythical figures.<sup>45</sup> The Muses illuminate the beauty of Strepsiadidas (φλέγεται δὲ ἰοπλόκοισι Μοῖσαις, *Isthm.* 7.23), Alkimedon is a “radiant adornment” for his family (λιπαρὸς κόσμος, *Ol.* 8.82–83), and Timodemos a κόσμος for Athens (*Nem.* 2.8). Aristokleidas, a “suitable adornment” for a praise song, is bathed in light from his victories (ποτίφορος ... κόσμος; τίν ... δέδορκεν φάος, *Nem.* 3.31, 83–84), Aristagoras is imagined adorning his hair with “gleaming garlands” (πορφυρέοις ἔρνεσιν, *Nem.* 11.28–29), and Diagoras, a member of “Herakles’ mighty race,” is portrayed crowned with blossoms (Ἡρακλέος εὐρουσθενεῖ γέννα; ἄνθεσι ... ἔστεφανώσατο, *Ol.* 7.22–23, 80–81). On Hagesidamos the lyre and pipe “sprinkle lustre” (ἀναπάσσει χάριν, *Ol.* 10.94), while Epharmostos’ beauty is foreshadowed by the “indescribably handsome body” of Orous, the eponymous hero of his city (ὑπέρφατος ... μορφᾷ, *Ol.* 9.65).

Similar allusions to the pleasing or imposing appearance of the victor can be found in several of the remaining odes for combat events. Like Diagoras, the boy wrestler Timosarchos of Aigina, “splendidly victorious” son of Timokritos, is described as being crowned with blossoms (καλλίνικος; ἄνθεσι μείγνυον, *Nem.* 4.16, 21). He is also linked to the mythical heroes Herakles and “powerful Telamon,” who, amongst others, overcame the enormous, awe-inspiring warrior, Alkyoneus (κραταιὸς Τελαμών; μέγαν πολεμιστὰν ἔκπαγλον Ἄλκυονῆ, *Nem.* 4.24–27). In *Nemean* 6 a relative of another boy wrestler, Alkimidas of Aigina, found himself “set ablaze by the loud chorus of the Graces,” a description that can be applied to Alkimidas himself, since he has made his “inherited

<sup>43</sup> ἔκπαγλος is used otherwise in the odes only of heroes, Jason (*Pyth.* 4.79), Alkyoneus (*Nem.* 4.27) and Aias (*Isthm.* 6.54).

<sup>44</sup> See also *Isthm.* 5.61 for a reference to this victor’s dexterity and cleverness.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Steiner 1998:138–140.

ability,” which in this family alternates between generations, “plain to see” (Χαρίτων ... ὁμάδῳ φλέγεν; τεκμαίρει ... τὸ συγγενὲς ἰδεῖν,<sup>46</sup> *Nem.* 6.37–38, 8). Finally, in *Isthmian* 5.1–10, the opening invocation of Theia, Mother of the Sun, and the following gnome paint a picture of the crowned victor, Phylakidas of Aigina, bathed in golden sunlight.

Although none of the runners and pentathletes receives direct praise for his beauty most of the odes in their honour contain references to youthfulness, grace and the charms of love. Asopichos of Orchomenos, with his “youthful hair” (νέαν ... χαίταν, *Ol.* 14.22–24), is celebrated in a short ode dedicated to the Charites, the source of wisdom, beauty and splendour for mankind (*Ol.* 14.5–7). Hebe, goddess of youth, and Hora, youthfulness personified, are invoked in the openings of *Nemean* 7 and 8 respectively, with Aphrodite adding an erotic note to the latter. In *Pythian* 9 for Telesikrates of Kyrene the erotic element is to the fore throughout, both in the myth of Apollo’s pursuit of the nymph Kyrene and in the story of the victor’s mythical ancestor Alexidamos’ success in winning the daughter of Antaios in a foot race. The desirability reflected on the victor in this way is expressed by the internal spectators (of whom more below), women who, seeing him victorious, wish him for a husband or a son (*Pyth.* 9.97–100). For the boy runner Hippokleas of Thessaly the circle of admirers includes his peers, older men and unmarried girls (*Pyth.* 10.55–59). In *Pythian* 10 praise of the physical prowess of the victor’s father is transferred to him by stressing the inherited nature of his own abilities (*Pyth.* 10.12, 22–24).

Victors in the equestrian events rarely drove their chariots themselves, so that youth and physical prowess were not significant for success. It is therefore not surprising that few of the odes celebrating them mention either beauty or youthfulness, although on these victors too success is said to shed a beautifying light, as appears from a gnome on the envy aroused by “those who ever drive first around the twelve-lap course and on whom revered Charis sheds a glorious appearance” (τοῖς, οἷς ποτε πρώτοις περὶ δωδέκατον δρόμον / ἔλαυνόντεσσιν αἰδοία ποπιστάξῃ Χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν, *Ol.* 6.75–76).<sup>47</sup> A specific instance of this radiance is Xenokrates of Akragas. His *Isthmian* victory makes

<sup>46</sup> According to Gerber 1999:51 “the infinitive is explanatory and somewhat superfluous.” However, in light of the importance of the internal viewer in many of the odes discussed so far (see below) its deliberate use can be assumed with some confidence.

<sup>47</sup> The envy seems to be not only on account of the victory itself, but also the fact that it enhances the victor in the eyes of others.



him a “light” (φάος) among his fellow citizens, previously at Pythia Apollo gave him “splendour” (ἀγλαΐα) and at Athens the *charites*, graceful favours, of the sons of Erechtheus, attended him (*Isthm.* 2.12–20). In *Pythian* 5 the lustre of victory is not attached to the chariot owner, Arkesilas of Kyrene, but to his charioteer, Karrhotos, whom the “lovely-haired Graces are setting ablaze” (ἠύκομοι φλέγοντι Χάριτες, *Pyth.* 5.45). However, Arkesilas is associated with Aphrodite and Apollo, and is praised for standing strong in competition (*Pyth.* 5.24, 103–104, 113)—he and his charioteer make an impressive pair. That a charioteer could be as imposing as any other athlete, appears from the comparison of the only owner-charioteer, Herodotos of Thebes, with Kastor and Iolaos, the “most powerful charioteers among the heroes” (ἡρώων διφρηλάται ... κρότιστοι, *Isthm.* 1.17).<sup>48</sup>

The options open to the poet regarding praise of a victor’s appearance may now be summarised as follows:

- The victor’s appearance is not mentioned. This applies to most equestrian victors, but the group also includes a few runners and combat athletes.
- Deities and personifications such as Aphrodite, Apollo, Hebe, the Charites and Hora are used to paint a picture of youthfulness, grace and erotic allure. It is mostly runners and combat athletes who are depicted in this way.
- The victor is depicted as bathed in or giving off light. Victors in all disciplines show this “halo effect,” but proportionally more combat athletes are treated in this way.
- Explicit references are made to the beauty, size or strength of the athlete, often in combination with one or both of the two previous options. These statements are confined to combat athletes.<sup>49</sup>

Although appearance features with regard to thirteen of the sixteen combat event victors celebrated by Pindar,<sup>50</sup> it is clear from the above that for those who perhaps do not merit an accolade like καλός, there

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion of the sensual appeal of a charioteer depicted on a victory monument, see Steiner 1998:135–137.

<sup>49</sup> Herodotos’ strength is implied in a comparison (see discussion of equestrian victors above), while chariot race winner Chromios of Aitna’s prowess in battle is alluded to in two *gnomai* (*Nem.* 3.26–28, *Nem.* 9.37–42).

<sup>50</sup> No reference is made to the appearance of Aristomenes of Aigina (*Pyth.* 8), Theaios of Argos (*Nem.* 10) and Kleandros of Aigina (*Isthm.* 8), although the latter’s youth (ἀλιζία) is mentioned in the opening line.

are other more subtle means available to portray them as handsome and desirable, or the subject can be avoided.<sup>51</sup> This raises the question: Why did the poet go so far as making negative comments on the appearance of one athlete? Why not pass over this detail and concentrate on his success in the games, which has provided plenty of material for praise? Why not stop at the techniques of idealisation which, as will be shown, are in fact applied to Melissos?<sup>52</sup> A closer look at how Melissos' appearance is presented in *Isthmian* 4 will provide some clues as to the answer to these questions.

The first statement, "for he was not allotted the bodily nature of Orion" (οὐ γὰρ φύσιν Ὠαρῶνείαν ἔλαχεν, *Isthm.* 4.49) can be read as an explanation of why Melissos needed the special skills and tactics described in the previous lines to overcome his opponents. The negative comparison with the giant Orion points to his shortness, a disadvantage in the combat sports, which were "the domain of the large and strong."<sup>53</sup> However, Orion was famous not only for his size, but also for his handsomeness,<sup>54</sup> a feature Melissos clearly does not share. This statement is thus already an indirect indication that what he has been granted (ἔλαχεν) as far as suitability for a combat event is concerned, is not the prized inherited nature regularly praised in other athletes.<sup>55</sup>

The suggestion that Melissos is ugly is confirmed by the blunt observation that he was ὀνοτός to look at (*Isthm.* 4.50). Although the

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<sup>51</sup> Praise for the form or beauty of boxers was rare on victory monuments, as "boxing was disfiguring" (Poliakoff 1987:10). Poliakoff also notes the absence of the title *atraumatistos* ("unwounded") for boxers (165 n. 9), presumably because an ugly appearance was silently passed over rather than commented on. The portrayal of an ugly boxer on a vase is regarded as an exception to the rule of showing only "lithe and slender" figures (Bonfante 1989:555–556).

<sup>52</sup> On idealisation and "youthening" in the portrayal of victors, see Steiner 1998:132–133.

<sup>53</sup> Poliakoff 1987:8. Contra Krummen 1990:91 who interprets his small physique as ideal for the pancratium.

<sup>54</sup> Orion was a hunter and a giant, the son of Poseidon. In the *Odyssey* Otus and Ephialtes, at nine years already "nine cubits in breadth and in height nine fathoms," are described as the "tallest, and far the most handsome, after famous Orion" (*Od.* 11:305–312; trans. Murray 1995). Odysseus also refers to his huge size when he sees him in the underworld (*Od.* 11:572). There may even be a hint at lack of sexual prowess in the negative comparison with Orion. Cf. Griffiths 1986:66–67 on the hero's "irrepressible randiness." On the various elements of the Orion myth, see Fontenrose 1981, esp. 5–32.

<sup>55</sup> Some examples are *Ol.* 8.15–16, *Ol.* 13.13, *Pyth.* 8.35–45, *Pyth.* 10.12, *Nem.* 6.8–16. As has already been noted (p. 112), in the praise for Melissos' chariot victory he is credited with not disgracing his inherited excellence (ἀνδρῶν δ' ἀρετάν / σύμφοτον οὐ κατέλέγχει, *Isthm.* 3.13–14).

meaning “to be blamed or scorned, contemptible” (LSJ s.v.) seems obvious, considering its derivation from ὄνομαί, “to blame, find fault with, treat scornfully, throw a slur upon” (LSJ s.v.), most commentators and translators appear to find it too strong, preferring renderings such as “paltry” (Race 1997b:169), “unansehnlich” (Dönt 1986:257), “äußere Unscheinbarkeit” (Köhnken 1971:94), “unimpressive” (Willcock 1995:83) and “ill-favoured” (Bury 1892:73).<sup>56</sup> These renderings make of ὄνοτός mainly an indication of someone’s appearance, and underplay the fact that it also, perhaps even primarily, points to a negative attitude towards the person observed on the part of the onlookers.<sup>57</sup> The rarity of the word in the extant literature does make it difficult to assess its impact, but the four instances besides Pindar cited in LSJ all centre on the element of scorn or contempt. One example will suffice. In Apollonios Rhodios’ *Argonautica* Medea says to Jason and the other Argonauts after having fled her home to join them on their return journey: μηδ’ ἔνθεν ἕκαστέρω ὀρηθεῖσαν / χήτει κηδεμόνων ὄνοτην καὶ ἀεικέα θείης (“do not make me, now that I have fled far away from there, scorned and dishonoured for want of protectors,” 4.90–91).<sup>58</sup>

That ὄνοτός is meant to convey the attitude of observers is confirmed by its use in conjunction with ἰδέσθαι, “to see.” Positing an internal viewer through whose eyes the audience of the poem is invited to look at someone in a particular way, is a well-established technique in Greek literature.<sup>59</sup> As far as Pindar is concerned, Steiner suggests

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<sup>56</sup> Bury does give “contemptible” in his line by line commentary, but softens it to “ill-favoured” in the translation of the whole passage preceding the commentary. In his commentary on these lines Thummer 1969:76 ignores this reference to Melissos’ appearance. Pfeijffer 1999:284 recognises “to be scorned” as the intended meaning, but his suggestion that the remark about Melissos’ appearance was necessary to set up the complimentary comparison with Herakles does not explain why the poet followed such an unusual strategy.

<sup>57</sup> Dover 1974:72 describes this distinction with reference to actions as follows:

Clearly we can qualify an act either by an epithet suggesting how one reacts to it or by an epithet denoting the attribute by virtue of which one has that reaction.

I contend that ὄνοτός denotes the former, with the comparison with Orion playing the role of the latter.

<sup>58</sup> The other instances of the word are Hom. *Il.* 9.164 (gifts to Achilles not to be despised), Callim. *Hymn* 4.19–20a (Kyrnos is no mean island) and ps-Lycoph. 1235 (Aeneas not to be despised in battle).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Hom. *Hymn Apollo* 198, Hom. *Hymn Pan* 36, victory statue epigram Ebert 12 = *Anth. Pal.* 16.2 (dated to the first half of the fifth century, also known as Simon. epigram 30), Xen. *Symp.* 1.8–10. On the role of the gaze in vase painting, see Frontisi-Ducroux 1996.

two related functions for this technique. On the one hand it “marks the athlete’s perfect physique as an object of display,” on the other hand it mediates the onlookers’ “erotic longings, and desire to possess (the athlete) in all his loveliness.”<sup>60</sup> Clearly neither of these functions applies to Melissos. While beauty attracts admiration, the implication is that Melissos’ appearance has given rise to scorn. This attitude can be explained with reference to the Homeric epics, in which epithets on the beauty and strength of both Greek and Trojan warriors are common. The notable exception is Thersites:

He was the ugliest man there at Troy:  
bandy-legged, lame in one foot, with shoulders  
hunched over his chest—and above all this,  
a pointed head with some scraggly hair.

(*Il.* 2.216–219; trans. Reck 1994)

He was certainly no hero, and his ugly physique is a mirror of his contemptible nature. He is always trying to ingratiate himself with the other warriors by bad-mouthing the commanders, but this costs him a strong reprimand and a beating from Odysseus and earns him no respect from his more subservient fellows. The positive correlation between beauty and excellence has already been noted. The example of Thersites shows that ugliness in turn is regarded as a marker of inferiority. Melissos’ victory would therefore have seemed incompatible with his appearance. Beauty promises the ability to perform, and great

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<sup>60</sup> Steiner 1998:137, 140. Examples of the former are *Ol.* 8.19, *Isthm.* 7.22, and of the latter *Ol.* 10.99–105, *Ol.* 9.89–98, *Pyth.* 9.97–100, fr. 123.2–6, 10–12. Cf. also *Nem.* 6.8 (inherited ability plain to see) and *Isthm.* 2.18 (Apollo sees the victor and adds to his lustre). With reference to Pindar’s fr. 123, an *enkomion* for Theoxenos, Hubbard 2002:273 criticizes the “one-dimensional view of the lover’s perspective as a simple objectification or reification of the desired beauty, whose value exists only as confirmed and constructed by the lover’s eyes.” Based on an investigation of relevant vase paintings and the insights of modern French philosophy his interpretation of the poem leads him to the conclusion that the “scopic transactions create a dialectic in which subject and object constantly change position and visual ‘penetration’ moves both ways” (290). However, even if such a reciprocity of the erotic gaze can be postulated for the athletic context, Pindar does not make it explicit in the *epinikia* in the way Hubbard sees it in this *enkomion*. Bakchylides comes closest to this concept in Ode 9 with his description of Automedon showing off his beautiful body as he throws the discus and the javelin and performs his wrestling moves (‘Ελλάνων δι’ ἀπ[ε]ίρωνα κύκλον / φαῖνε θαυμ[α]στόν δέμας / δίσκον τροχοειδέα ῥίπτων, καὶ μελαμύλλου κλάδον / ἀκτέας ἐς αἰπινάν προπέμπων αἰθέρ’ ἐκ χειρὸς βόαν ὄτρυνε λαῶν, / ἧ τε[λε]υτάσας ἀμάρυγμα πάλας, 30–36).

deeds fulfil this promise, but ugliness, ὀνοτός implies, can provoke scorn even in the face of achievement.<sup>61</sup>

To return to the question of the purpose of the negative comments about Melissos' appearance: I propose that by conceding, instead of passing over, his physical shortcomings, Pindar indicates that an important object of the poem is to defend Melissos' claim to be acknowledged a worthy winner against those who would have it otherwise.<sup>62</sup> This thesis is supported by the myths he uses, as well as the ways, direct and indirect, in which he portrays Melissos and the strong emphasis he places on both heroes' and humans' deeds.

Central to this interpretation is the poet's treatment of the myth of Aias' suicide, placed at the exact centre of the poem, between praise of the family and praise of Melissos.<sup>63</sup> The myth is introduced as an illustration of the gnomic comment that a weaker man can overcome a stronger through skill (καὶ κρέσσον' ἀνδρῶν χειρῶνων / ἔσφαλε τέχνα καταμάροψαισ', *Isthm.* 4.34–35). Aias committed suicide after the Greeks voted to give Achilles' armour to Odysseus instead of to him: he was undone by the craft of πολύμητις Odysseus ("of many wiles"). However, the poet underplays Odysseus' role in this incident—he is not even mentioned and there is nothing of the strong anti-Odysseus sentiment evident in his portrayal of these events in *Nemean* 7.20–33 and *Nemean* 8.20–34. The focus is elsewhere: the blame is placed on all the Greeks who went to Troy (περὶ ᾧ φασι γὰρ μομφὰν ἔχει / παίδεσσι Ἑλλάνων ὅσοι Τροίανδ' ἔβαν, *Isthm.* 4.36–36b) and who, through their choice, refused to acknowledge Aias as the strongest and handsomest warrior after Achilles (*Il.* 17.279–280). In contrast, Homer did for Aias with his poetry what the Greeks would not. He

τετίμακεν δι' ἀνθρώπων, ὅς αὐτοῦ  
πᾶσαν ὀρθώσας ἀρετὰν κατὰ ῥάβδον ἔφρασεν  
θεσπεσίων ἐπέων λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Carey's remarks on the link between appearance and excellence or its lack (1976:26).

<sup>62</sup> Parallels can be drawn between this undertaking and efforts to ward off the envy that success attracts. Cf. Willcock 1982:9 on envy as a *Hindernismotiv*, i.e. one of the "imaginary difficulties set up by the poet to make his praise more valuable and convincing." In *Isthmian* 4 the difficulties are of course anything but imaginary.

<sup>63</sup> For a detailed analysis of Pindar's treatment of the Aias myth in this ode, see Köhnken 1971:104–114.

has made him honored among mankind, who set straight  
 his entire achievement and declared it with his staff  
 of divine verses for future men to enjoy. (*Isthm.* 4.37–39)

Through Homer the Greeks' bad judgement was reversed, Aias was redeemed and his deeds were made known to posterity. Thus the poet uses the myth to demonstrate the extraordinary power of poetry. It can set the record straight and confer immortality. "If someone says it well" the report of noble deeds will cross land and sea and they will acquire a radiance that can never be dimmed, they will become an inextinguishable light (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀθάνατον φωνᾶεν ἔρπει, / εἴ τις εὖ εἴπη  
 τι καὶ πάγκαρπον ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ διὰ πόντον βέβακεν / ἔργμάτων ἀκτις  
 καλῶν ἄσβεστος αἰεὶ, *Isthm.* 4.40–42).

The part of the poem which precedes the Aias-Homer myth is devoted to praise of the deeds of Melissos' family. Like Aias, the Kleonymidai have suffered reversals of fortune, and the poet makes it clear that his poetry has the power to restore them to their former glory. Poseidon, patron god of the Isthmian games,

τόνδε πορὸν γενεᾷ θαυμαστὸν ὕμνον  
 ἐκ λεχέων ἀνάγει φάμαν παλαιάν  
 εὐκλέων ἔργων

by granting this marvelous hymn to the clan  
 is rousing from its bed their ancient fame  
 for glorious deeds

(*Isthm.* 4.21–23)

The unexpected use of ὕμνος in line 21—νίκα would have been more "logical"—is significant. Without Melissos' victory there would have been no hymn and in that sense the victory is the basis of the restoration of the family's fame. However, by letting the song stand for the victory here, the poet claims the real redemptive power for his poetry, which makes the achievement known. It is through the poetry accompanying Melissos' victory that his family's fame is revived.

As has been shown, this power of poetry, as well as the immortality it bestows, is evoked quite explicitly in the Aias-Homer myth, which can then be read as a reinforcement of the idea that the present poem will re-establish the family's tarnished fame. However, the main force of the myth is found in its application to Melissos. It forms a bridge from praise of the family to the second part of the poem which is devoted to Melissos. This section of the poem starts with an unequivocal statement of what the poet hopes to achieve, namely "to light such a beacon-fire of hymns for Melissos too" (κεῖνον ἄψαι πυρσὸν ὕμνων / καὶ Μελίσσῳ,

*Isthm.* 4.43–44—note the emphatic use of *καί* at the beginning of the verse). Thus a direct line is drawn from Homer and Aias to Pindar and Melissos. Homer’s poetry has set the record straight on the whole of Aias’ achievements, which, it is implied, had been blighted by the events surrounding his suicide. In this way he has safeguarded Aias’ honour among mankind and has ensured the immortality of his deeds. The poet has already implied that his poetry will restore the family’s fame. Now he states his aim as celebrating Melissos’ achievements in such a way that he will receive the honour and immortality he deserves.<sup>64</sup>

Significantly, the poet includes the audience, among them presumably those who found Melissos *ὄνοτος* to look at, in this key passage of the poem. The Aias-Homer myth is introduced by a direct address to the audience: *ἴστε μὲν Αἴαντος ἀλκάν* (“surely you know of Aias’ ... valour,” *Isthm.* 4.35–35b), and when the subject thus raised is rounded off with the application of the myth to Melissos, the request for the Muses’ assistance is made in the first person plural: *προφρόνων Μοισᾶν τύχοιμεν* (“may we find the favour of the Muses,” *Isthm.* 4.43; my translation). By including the audience so pointedly in this passage, it is implied that the blame attached to the Greeks for disrespecting Aias will also adhere to the audience if they do not acknowledge Melissos. However, it also makes them co-responsible for and provides them with an opportunity of praising Melissos properly.

In the course of praising the family the poet has in fact already lighted the *πυρσόν*, the “beacon-fire,” for Melissos through his choice of images to celebrate their return to prominence and fame. Viewed in the light of Melissos’ unimposing appearance, these images are especially instructive. His victory is likened to the arrival of spring after the darkness of a harsh winter.<sup>65</sup> Spring is represented by red roses blossoming forth from the earth (*χθὼν ... φοινικέοισιν ἀνθήσεν ῥόδοις*, *Isthm.* 4.18b).<sup>66</sup> The lushness of the flowers attests to the vigour imparted by success, and the image may be compared to a similar one used of

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 10.55–59. Here the poet also expresses the hope that his songs will enhance the standing of the athlete. However, the circumstances are rather more favourable—he need not establish the victor’s worth, only make him “even more admirable” (*ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον ... θαητόν*).

<sup>65</sup> For a detailed discussion of the winter imagery, see Krummen 1990:80–81.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Pindar’s extensive description of spring in fr. 75.13–19, which includes the *φοινικοέανα* “*Ῥοαί* (red-robed *Horai*) and roses.

Arkesilas' success in *Pythian* 4 to show that the Battidai are still flourishing after eight generations of rule in Kyrene: ὅτε φοινικανθέμου ἤρος ἀκμάᾳ, / παιοὶ τούτοις ὄγδοον θάλλει μέγος Ἀρκεσίλας ("as at the height of red-flowered spring, the eighth generation of those sons flourishes in Arkesilas," *Pyth.* 4.64–65). The vigour of success made visible in the roses also points to the triumph of life over death which Melissos' victory means for a family reeling under the simultaneous loss of four men.<sup>67</sup> The red roses are a striking metaphor for vitality and beauty, qualities thus indirectly attributed to Melissos.<sup>68</sup>

The second image is even more lustrous and explicit. By granting the victory at the Isthmos Poseidon has roused the ancient fame of the Kleonymidai from its sleep, and now "its body shines like the Morning Star, splendid to behold among the other stars" (ἐκ λεχέων ἀνάγει φάμαν παλαιάν / εὐκλέων ἔργων· ἐν ὕπνῳ γὰρ πέσεν· ἀλλ' ἀνεγειρομένα χρώτα λάμπει, / Ἀοσφόρος θαητὸς ὡς ἄστροις ἐν ἄλλοις, *Isthm.* 4.22–24). The family's fame, which is compared to the Morning Star, can again take its prominent place in the community. From being hidden in a bedchamber it has moved to a place where it is clear for everyone to see in all its splendour. It is significant that the family's fame is given a concrete form by the use of χρώς—the simile would have worked equally well without it. And no one but Melissos can be that *body*. In the introduction to the poem Melissos is proclaimed as the source for the current praise of the family, having amply displayed his skills at the games (εὐμαχανίαν γὰρ ἔφρανας Ἰσθμίοις, *Isthm.* 4.2). At this point their fame is literally embodied in him and he is as bright as the Morning Star. Through his victory he has outshone the other competitors, and, as their first Panhellenic victor, has also become the foremost athlete in his family. The luminosity associated with successful athletes,<sup>69</sup> already hinted at in the images of spring, is now fully expressed. The significance of the image of the Morning Star for the perception of Melissos as a worthy winner, becomes clear from Bakchylides *Ode*

<sup>67</sup> In *Threnos* 7.3 (fr. 129) the pious in Hades find themselves "in meadows of red roses" (φοινικορόδοις (δ') ἐνὶ λεμώνεσσι). See Segal 1981:84 n. 13 for more examples of roses symbolising victory over death.

<sup>68</sup> For the use of roses in an erotic context, see Bakchylides 17.109–129. Theseus receives from his mother Amphitrite a purple cloak and the "garland ... dark with roses" (πλόζον ... ὀρόδοις ἐρεμνόν) given to her at her marriage by Aphrodite. Back at his ship his splendid appearance ("the gods' gifts shone on his limbs," λάμπει δ' ἀμφὶ γυίοις θεῶν δῶρ) evokes universal admiration.

<sup>69</sup> See analysis above of the ways in which victors' appearance is presented.



9.27–31, where a similar image is connected explicitly with the victor’s imposing appearance. Automedon is said to be “conspicuous among the pentathletes, as the bright moon outshines the light of the stars in the midmonth night: even so in the immense circle of the Greeks did he display his wonderful form ...,” his θαυμ[α]στόν δέμας (trans. Campbell 1992).<sup>70</sup>

The images of red roses and the Morning Star not only make the splendour of the family’s new fame visible but also metaphorically endow Melissos with striking physical qualities. When, in the second half of the poem, the poet moves to direct praise of the victor he focuses on his actions and the inner qualities they reveal. To achieve this he uses two animal images and the mythical figure of Herakles.

In contest Melissos is likened to the lion and the fox:

τόλμα γὰρ εἰκῶς  
 θυμὸν ἐριβρεμετᾶν θηρῶν λεόντων  
 ἐν πόνῳ, μῆτιν δ’ ἀλώπηξι,  
 αἰετοῦ ἅ τ’ ἀναπιτναμένα ῥόμβον ἴσχει

For in spirit he resembles  
 the courage of loudly roaring wild lions  
 during the struggle, and in craft he is a fox,  
 which falls on its back and checks the eagle’s swoop.

(*Isthm.* 4.45–47; my translation)

With these images the poet ascribes a range of qualities to Melissos. His spirit is daring and courageous (the τόλμα of the lion), but he is also aggressive and ferocious (the loud roar and wildness of the lion). Yet there is more to his effort than brute force. He possesses the wiliness of the fox and knows how to thwart the attacks of his opponents.<sup>71</sup> The gnomic comment which follows, “one must do everything to weaken (obscure) one’s adversary” (χρηὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ’ ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν, *Isthm.* 4.48; my translation), justifies the tactics implied by

<sup>70</sup> Note too how Bakchylides’ description of Automedon illustrates Steiner’s statement that

(b)oth visual and verbal media exhibit youthful bodies at their prime that glisten, gleam, and combine strength with sexuality and erotic allure. Artists and poets both explicitly or implicitly surround their pictures of fleeting loveliness with viewers who gaze admiringly on the scene (Steiner 1998:142).

<sup>71</sup> On the wiliness of the fox, see Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):34–37 and, for an explanation of the technique involved Krummen 1990:90 with nn. 38 and 39, and Willcock 1995:82.

these images.<sup>72</sup> The tactics and the comment are in turn explained by the description of Melissos' unimposing physique.

The myth that flows from this description has Herakles as its theme (*Isthm.* 4.52–66). The poet leaves no room for doubt that he wishes to make a direct connection between Melissos and the hero: Herakles set out from his and Melissos' home town, Thebes, to wrestle with the barbaric giant Antaios. He used not only his strength, but also his cleverness to outwit Antaios, as the poet has implied Melissos did to overcome his opponents—as soon as Herakles realised that Antaios gained strength from being thrown on the earth, his mother, he held him in the air and throttled him. The poet even goes as far as linking them physically, by describing Herakles as *μορφᾶν βραχύς*, short in stature.<sup>73</sup> With this stature, however, goes an unflinching spirit that will not bend or give in, Herakles is *ψυχᾶν ἄκαμπτος* (53b). It is this spirit, to which the lion image has already alluded, which is at the heart of both Herakles' and Melissos' success.

The rest of the myth refers briefly to Herakles' exploits on land and sea (55b–57), and the reward of immortality he received for his achievements (55a, 58–60). Moving back to the human sphere, the poet describes the festival in Herakles' honour held by the citizens of his birthplace (61–66). Thus the myth exemplifies the twin aims of the poem already stated in the Aias-Homer myth, namely achieving for Melissos the honour of his fellow citizens, and immortality. Here, as in the Aias myth, the audience is directly involved in the implied praise for Melissos by the use of the first person plural: *ἄστοι ... αὔξομεν* ("we citizens ... honour," *Isthm.* 4.61–63).<sup>74</sup>

In both myths the hero's reward of honour and eternal fame is grounded in his deeds. They demonstrate that on the strength of Melissos' deeds, i.e. his victories in the local and especially the Panhellenic

<sup>72</sup> On helping friends and harming enemies, see Chapter 3, pp. 96–99.

<sup>73</sup> Most commentators find this description of Herakles a "surprise" (Willcock 1995:84). Thummer 1969:76–77 speculates that it may stem from comedy. An indication that a relatively small Herakles was perhaps not completely unusual is his depiction on a vase by the Niobid Painter from the middle of the fifth century which probably refers to an earlier wall-painting (Osborne 1998:164–167). Osborne describes the figure in the foreground of the vase painting as "a giant compared to the *stocky* Herakles above him" (1998:164; my emphasis). Race 1990:191 n. 6 refers the topos of the small but effective man back to Homer's description of Tydeus as "small in stature, but a warrior" (*Τυδεύς τοι μικρὸς μὲν ἦν δέμας, ἀλλὰ μαχητῆς, Il.* 5.801). By using the negative comparison with Orion the dimension of beauty / ugliness is added to this topos.

<sup>74</sup> On the interpretation of *αὔξομεν*, see Krummen 1990:42–43 and 54.

games, he deserves the praise of his fellow citizens as well as immortality through great poetry, not the scorn implied in the description of his physique. In fact, the pre-eminence of his deeds is precisely what the poet emphasizes even as he admits the deficiencies of Melissos' appearance.

The *ἀλλὰ ... μὲν ... δέ* construction used in the description of Melissos signals that the statement about Melissos' strength in hand-to-hand fighting counters both previous ones about his appearance.<sup>75</sup> οὐ γὰρ φύσιν Ὠαριωνεΐαν ἔλαχεν / ἀλλ' ὀνοτὸς μὲν ιδέσθαι, / συμπεσεῖν δ' ἀκμῆ βαρῦς (*Isthm.* 4.49–51) can be rendered “He was not allotted the bodily nature of Orion, but he is heavy to grapple with in his strength” and “although he is contemptible to look at, he is heavy to grapple with in his strength.” The chiasmic structure of lines 50 and 51 heightens the contrast between συμπεσεῖν and ιδέσθαι, and emphasises the former. This is especially significant considering the usual force of verbs of looking in the context of an athlete's appearance, and underlines that to look at Melissos is one thing, to meet him in the close encounter of the pancratium something quite different. Melissos' power is described with the phrase ἀκμῆ βαρῦς. There is some textual uncertainty about ἀκμῆ,<sup>76</sup> which could mean “in his strength” or, perhaps, “in his prime.” For βαρῦς a choice must be made between the literal meaning “heavy in weight,” in Homer mostly with the collateral notion of “strength and force,” and the metaphorical sense “heavy to bear, grievous” (LSJ s.v.). The former would enhance the notion of Melissos' strength in combat, and might at the same time be an oblique reference to a heavy body. Other occurrences of the word in the epinikia favour the metaphorical sense,<sup>77</sup> in which case the word would apply more to Melissos' effect on opponents in fighting, that it was grievous for them to encounter him. But whether his strength, or even weight, or his effect on others predominates, the point is made that he is superior in combat, regardless of his looks.

Melissos' success challenges the conventional notion of a connection between beauty and deeds. The closeness of this connection is quite evident in the odes in which explicit reference is made to the beauty

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Race 1990:191.

<sup>76</sup> See Thummer 1969:76.

<sup>77</sup> *Ol.* 2.23, *Pyth.* 1.75, *Pyth.* 3.42, *Pyth.* 5.63, *Nem.* 10.20. In *Nem.* 6.50–51, about Achilles' defeat of the Ethiopians, the diction, including the ambiguity of meaning, is remarkably similar to that of the passage on Melissos: βαρὺ δέ σφιν / νεῖκος Ἀχιλλεύς / ἔμπεσε (“upon them fell a heavy opponent, Achilles”).

of the victor. The idea that beauty signifies ability which is confirmed by deeds has already been noted regarding Alkimedon and Aristokleidas (*Ol.* 8.19, *Nem.* 3.19). Admiration for the strength and beauty of Strepsiadas of Thebes is followed by the statement that “he upholds excellence as no worse than beauty of form” (ἄγει τ’ ἀρετὰν οὐκ αἴσχιον φυᾶς, *Isthm.* 7.22; my translation). Epharmostos of Opous, besides being young and beautiful, performs “beautiful” deeds (κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις, *Ol.* 9.94), thereby following in the footsteps of Opous, his city’s hero, who is famous for both his handsome body and his deeds (ὑπέροφατον ἄνδρα μορφαῖ τε καί / ἔργοισι, *Ol.* 9.65–66).<sup>78</sup>

In *Isthmian* 4 Pindar responds to the “beauty equals great deeds” convention by transforming the related idea, that deeds show the real worth of the beautiful man. That deeds are traditionally valued in this way appears from two negative examples in the *Iliad*. Hektor is contemptuous of Paris who is all beauty and no action (*Il.* 3.1–57). When Hektor sees him shrink back from Menelaus he reacts scathingly: while Paris’ extraordinary beauty—the narrator has already used the epithet θεοειδής (“godlike in form”) four times in this scene and Hektor calls him εἶδος ἀριστε—marks him out as a man of the first rank, he has neither strength nor courage to show for it (φάντες ἀριστήα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὐνεκα καλὸν / εἶδος ἔπ’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή, *Il.* 3.44–45). The shamefulness of not matching an admirable appearance with admirable deeds is also clear in the formulaic reproach uttered by Hera (*Il.* 5.787) and Agamemnon (*Il.* 8.228) when the Greeks waver in the face of Trojan attack:

αἰδώς, Ἄργεῖοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, εἶδος ἀρητιοί

Shame, Argives, base things of dishonour, admirable in appearance only!  
(my translation)

The analysis of nature as a cosmological category postulated the dependence of culture on nature (Chapter 3, pp. 46–53). As far as appearance, a gift of nature, is concerned, this means that beauty is the prerequisite for noteworthy achievements. However, the Homeric examples show that a praiseworthy appearance is not enough, and the man of excellence will confirm the promise of his beauty with great deeds. By implication the same holds for Pindar’s epinikia, since every man whose appearance is praised has already proved by winning that he is

<sup>78</sup> For a discussion of the variety of ways in which Pindar expresses the topic of appearance and deeds, see Race 1990:188–192.

capable of the deeds “fitting his form.” However, in the case of Melissos the link between beauty and deeds, nature and culture, is broken and deeds alone are presented as sufficient for earning grace, a form of beauty, and immortality.<sup>79</sup> The praise for Melissos contradicts the traditional world view by attaching the worth of a man to his deeds alone, regardless of his appearance. The poem not only holds out the promise of fame in times to come but also, in the here and now, succeeds in transcending the victor’s physical limitations. In fact, the conventional movement from beauty to deeds is turned around so that deeds become the forerunner of beauty. Melissos’ success makes him worthy of being likened to red roses and the Morning Star, and as a final tribute, just as the “lyre and ... pipe shed grace” on the beautiful Hagesidamos of Western Lokroi (λύρα / ... τ’ αὐλὸς ἀναπάσσει χάριν, *Ol.* 10.93–94) the poet “let(s) fall upon him delightful grace” (τερονᾶν ἐπιστάζων χάριν, *Isthm.* 4.72b; my translation). Through the celebration of his deeds in poetry Melissos is transformed from a man “contemptible to look at” to one covered in grace.

The analysis of relationships outside the intimate social group has shown the extent to which envy or indifference is perceived as a barrier to recognition of a man’s excellence, with the consequent need to convince fellow citizens that a victor is worthy of their support and praise (Chapter 3, pp. 87–94). Often the call for recognition is based on the principle of reciprocity in terms of which the victor’s success is interpreted as an achievement from which his city and fellow citizens derive as much benefit as he does, but praise can also simply be demanded as due reward for a successful man’s efforts. In addition to the natural reluctance to admit the superiority of another, acknowledgement of Melissos’ excellence would require his fellow citizens to overcome their contempt for his ugly appearance, an example of the prejudice inspired by conventional thought. Twice in *Isthmian* 4 the audience is not exhorted, but rather more or less obliged to praise Melissos by being included in the poet’s actions (see pp. 124 and 127). By ending the poem on the image of Melissos covered in grace, Pindar challenges his audience one final time to look past his appearance and give him the honour he deserves as a man of action.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> In his discussion of nature and culture, designated *physis* and *technē*, Hubbard 1985:111 comes to essentially the same conclusion regarding Melissos’ appearance. For his full discussion of the topic, see pp. 107–124.

<sup>80</sup> In the light of the emphasis on the topic of acknowledging a man’s praiseworthi-

*Olympian 13: Praising an ambitious family*

The occasion of *Olympian* 13 is Xenophon of Corinth's victory in both the stadion and the pentathlon at the Olympic games of 464. Considering the importance of victor and victory praise in most odes this unique feat and the man who achieved it receive surprisingly little attention. Although the victory ode is designated as a tribute from Xenophon to Zeus in recompense for his successes (Ζεῦ πάτερ, / ... / δέξαι τέ οἱ στεφάνων ἐγκώμιον τεθμόν, 26, 29), an analysis of the opening of the ode and the victory catalogues preceding and following the myth shows that the emphasis is not on him and his achievements, but on his family, both immediate and extended, and their aspirations.<sup>81</sup> This will form the first part of the following treatment of the ode. In the second part a detailed examination of the ode is made with specific reference to the presentation of the topic of finding the balance between man's ambition and his mortal limitations, and how this applies to the Oligaitidai, the victorious family.

*An Olympic victor in the shadow of his family*

The poem opens with praise for a τρισολυμπιονίκαν / ... οἶκον (1–2). Although it would have been immediately clear to the audience that the reference is to the three Olympic victories of Xenophon and his father Thessalos, the attention is placed firmly on the οἶκος, not its individual members. This is confirmed by the fact that it is the οἶκος, not the victorious athletes, which receives further praise at this stage, for its exemplary conduct to both insiders (ἡμερον ἀστοῖς, 2) and outsiders

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ness in *Isthmian* 3 (see Chapter 3, pp. 91–92 for text and discussion of the two elaborate gnomai involved) it is tempting to doubt the effectiveness of this appeal. According to Lardinois 2001:99 n. 36 Austin's conclusion that "(i)n paradigmatic digressions the length of the anecdote is in direct proportion to the necessity of persuasion at the moment" (Austin 1966:306) is equally applicable to gnomai. If so, *Isthmian* 3 betrays a strong need to win over the audience. Cf. Steiner 1998:137 n. 82 on the "special pleading" demanded by Melissos' ugliness.

<sup>81</sup> In contrast the skolon commissioned by Xenophon following his success (fr. 122) commemorated his personal dedication of prostitutes to Aphrodite. This was not a family undertaking and Xenophon would have figured prominently, even if initially the emphasis would have been more on the public religious ritual and the acknowledgement of the goddess than on his own achievements. At the banquet and symposium following the offering he would presumably have been the centre of attention. For a discussion of the poem as ancient "pornography," see Kurke 1996–1997.

(ξένοισι δὲ θεράποντα, 3).<sup>82</sup> Also, as far as Xenophon is concerned, his victories as an individual achievement are relativized by presenting them together with that of his father and as a glorification of his family, not of himself.

The only direct reference to Xenophon occurs in the second strophe following praise of his city, Corinth. A general prayer for the well-being of the Corinthian people leads to an intervention on behalf of the victor. Zeus, who in *Pyth.* 5.122–123 is acknowledged as the one who κυβερνᾷ / δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων (“steers the fortune of men who are dear to him”) is asked to keep the “fair wind” of Xenophon’s δαίμων on a favourable course, i.e. to sustain the good fortune experienced in his recent success (καὶ τόνδε λαὸν ἀβλαβῆ νέμων / Ξενοφῶντος εὖθυνη δαίμονος οὔρου, 27–28). After the dedication of the celebration to Zeus, Xenophon’s Olympic victories in the pentathlon and stadion are announced with the comment that “he has attained what no mortal man ever did before” (πενταέθλω ἅμα σταδίου νικῶν δρόμον ἀντεβόλησεν / τῶν ἀνὴρ θνατός οὔπω τις πρότερον, 30–31). This remark, while acknowledging the exceptional nature of his achievement, also introduces the idea of his mortality and suggests the limits to which even someone of his ability must adhere. A statement of two victories each at the Isthmian and Nemean games concludes the praise for Xenophon (32–34).<sup>83</sup>

In contrast to the sober treatment of Xenophon’s achievements the victory catalogue of his immediate family is much more expressive. His father Thessalos’ Olympic victory is described as “foot-racing glory” (αἴγλα ποδῶν, 36), his double victory in one day at Pytho has brought him honour (τιμάν, 37), in the same month as his Pythian success he received “three fairest prizes” (τρία ἔργα ... κάλλιστ', 38–39) in one “swift-footed” day (ποδαρκῆς / ἀμέρα, 38–39) in Athens,<sup>84</sup> and at the Hellotian games at Corinth he boasts seven victories (40). It is also worth noting that although praise for Thessalos’ athletic achievements immediately follows that for Xenophon’s no explicit link is made

<sup>82</sup> For other examples of this “common universalizing doublet,” see Young 1968: 45 n. 2. Tellingly, all except *Ol.* 13.2–3 concern praise of an individual. Bundy’s examples concern praise of a victor by both citizens and foreigners (Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:67). Cf. also Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:24 and for examples of other universalizing doublets 24 n. 56.

<sup>83</sup> On the possibility of only one victory at Nemea, see Cole 1987:563–564.

<sup>84</sup> On the Pythic and Panathenaic festivals falling in one month, see Barrett 1978:16 n. 2.

between their talent as, for example, in the case of Hippokleas and his father Phrikias (*Pyth.* 10.12–18) or Deinias and his father Megas (*Nem.* 8.16, 47–48).<sup>85</sup> This would indicate that the catalogue of Thessalos' victories is not a means to the end of exalting his son, but an end in itself and an indication that others beside Xenophon have a major interest in the celebration.

Faced with the many victories at the Isthmos of three more close relatives, Ptoiodoros, Terpsias and Eritimos, the poet protests that it would take too long to go into detail about them (Πτοιοδώρω σὺν πατρὶ μακρότεροι / Τερψία θ' ἔψοντ' Ἐριτίμω τ' αἰοδαί, 41–42).<sup>86</sup> He also professes himself all but overcome by the “multitude of successes” at the Pythian and Nemean games which are hyperbolically compared to the “pebbles of the sea” (ὄσσα τ' ἐν Δελφοῖσιν ἀριστεύσατε / ἠδὲ χόρτοις ἐν λέοντος, δηρίομαι πολέσιν / περὶ πλήθει καλῶν ὡς μὰν σαφές / οὐκ ἂν εἰδείην λέγειν ποντιᾶν ψάφων ἀριθμόν, 43–46). Whether the actual number of victories concerned here exceeds that of Thessalos and Xenophon or not,<sup>87</sup> an impression of abundance is successfully created.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>85</sup> For father and son praised together for their athletic ability, see also *Pyth.* 11.41–50. Cf. *Ol.* 7.15–17 and *Isthm.* 1.34 for other joint praise of father and son. *Nem.* 7.58–60 and *Isthm.* 6.66–73 contain independent praise for the fathers of boy victors. This can be explained by the fact that they would have commissioned the songs.

<sup>86</sup> Opinion is divided on whether Ptoiodoros is the father of Thessalos or of Terpsias and Eritimos. Barrett 1978 makes a case for the former (which is also the position of the scholia), while Koniaris 1981:95 defends the latter against Barrett. Gildersleeve 1908:232 mentions the scholia, but “judg(ing) by Pindar;” reads Ptoiodoros as father of Terpsias and Eritimos. Their relationship to Xenophon and Thessalos probably cannot be definitively settled, but it does not seem unreasonable to regard it as close (so Barrett 1978:1). On the reading of μακρότεροι (41) as “too long” rather than “longer,” see Koniaris 1981:95–96, and cf. *Isthm.* 6.56.

<sup>87</sup> Koniaris 1981:96 argues that a larger number is not necessarily implied. However, his arguments are hardly more convincing than those of Barrett which he sets out to counter (e.g. “If all the victories of Thessalos were to be counted would Pindar have had difficulty in describing the number as ψάφων ἀριθμόν? Probably not.”).

<sup>88</sup> I assume, with Koniaris (1981:96), that the referents of ὄσσα ... ἀριστεύσατε (43) are the three last mentioned family members. Race's translation “your family's victories” (1997a:193) implies the wider family group, while Hubbard ignores the reference to individuals and treats the whole passage (40–46) as praise of the athletic success of the Oligaihidai clan (1986:40–41). Since numbers are given for the Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean victories of the Oligaihidai later in the poem (98–100, 106–107) it seems to me more likely that the earlier catalogue refers only to the immediate family. Although it is unusual to mention Isthmia before Pytho, and this could be used as an argument to attribute only the Isthmian victories to the named athletes, it is not unparalleled: the precedence of the Isthmian victories can be explained by the family's Corinthian citizenship (see Gerber 2002:72–73 on the usual sequence used for Panhellenic victory catalogues and reasons for deviations). Also, the relatively small number of six Pythian



Although Xenophon's unique double Olympic victory heads the first catalogue as unquestionably the most prestigious in the family the focus gradually widens and moves away from him to the rest of the family.<sup>89</sup> The lesser victories of other family members are poetically enhanced to the extent that there is no impression of their inferiority, with the final image of an incalculable number of victories reaching forward to the second catalogue which celebrates the Oligaithidai's numerous achievements ranging across the whole of Greece.

The precedence of the family is confirmed in the final triad of the ode in which instead of the usual return after the myth to the victor and his achievements the focus is firmly on the family. The poet's statement preceding the second elaborate victory catalogue announces that he has "come as a willing helper for the Muses ..., and for the Oligaithidai" (Μοίσαις γὰρ ... ἐκόν / Ὀλιγαϊθιδαισίν τ' ἔβαν ἐπίκουρος, 96–97). As ally of the Muses he has the ability to immortalise the achievements of men, in this case the Oligaithidai, whose ally he becomes in turn by undertaking this task on their behalf.<sup>90</sup> Family praise is of course part of the epinician agenda.<sup>91</sup> As an extension or expansion of victor praise, which Thummer characterises as "wichtigstes Thema und Anlaß des Liedes,"<sup>92</sup> its aim is to increase the prestige of the victor by pointing out that he belongs to a noteworthy family. In *Nemean* 4, for example, the poet introduces the victories of Timasarchos' πάτρα in much the same terms as the Oligaithid catalogue, saying "it is for the Theandridai that I contracted to come as a ready herald ..." (Θεανδριδαισι ... / κάρυξι ἔτοίμος ἔβαν / ... συνθέμενος, 73–75). Although his obligation to the

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victories of the Oligaithidai as a whole provides a further explanation for mentioning them together with those won at Nemea rather than first on their own. Two of these Pythian victories have been won by Thessalos, so that between them Ptoiodoros, Terpsias and Eritimos have at most four, hardly enough to justify the hyperbolic style in which they are presented. By separating Isthmia and Nemea (where the extended family are claimed to have 60 victories) and adding Pytho to the latter, the impression of a large number of victories at all these games is created. Cf. Cole 1987 on Pindar's use of ambiguity as an encomiastic technique to enhance the number of victories.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1986:46.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 7.30–34. Here the poet's support is linked more explicitly to the immortalisation of human deeds by god. A gnomic passage about divine acknowledgement of a man's achievements as the means to gain lasting honour despite the inevitability of death, is followed by the poet's self-presentation as a helper in this endeavour (ἀλλὰ κοινὸν γὰρ ἔρχεται / κῦμ' Ἀίδα, πέσε δ' ἀδόκητον ἐν καὶ δοκέοντα· τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται / ὄν θεὸς ἀβροτὸν αὐῆσι λόγον τεθνακώτων. / βοαθῶν τοι ... / μῶλον).

<sup>91</sup> For an overview of family praise, see Thummer 1968:49–54.

<sup>92</sup> Thummer 1968:54.

family is stated strongly by συνθέμενος, the poet involves the victor by direct address (Τιμάσαρχε, 78) and by referring to “your clan” (πάτραν ... τεάν, 77–78). He is also the addressee of the praise for his maternal uncle (79–90). The success of Timasarchos’ relatives is clearly intended to enhance his own achievement.<sup>93</sup>

In contrast, Xenophon has all but disappeared from the scene by the end of *Olympian* 13. The second catalogue begins with the Oligaitidai’s victories at the Isthmos and Nemea, so many that the poet feels called upon to confirm his truthfulness by appealing to the herald at the games as his “true witness under oath” (ἀλαθῆς τέ μοι / ἔξορκος ἐπέσσειται ... / βοᾷ κάρκυκος, 98–100). The Isthmian and Nemean victories are presumably placed first on account of their large number,<sup>94</sup> but this placement also serves to focus attention on the Oligaitidai rather than on Xenophon and his father who would have been in the prominent position with their Olympic victories if the normal order (Olympia, Pytho, Isthmia, Nemea) had been followed. Instead, these victories are now appropriated by the family, albeit in a curious way: τὰ δ’ Ὀλυμπία αὐτῶν / ἔοικεν ἤδη πάροιθε λελέχθαι (101–102). αὐτῶν refers unequivocally to the family at a point where it would have been conventional to join the victor to his family’s achievements by naming him again. Hamilton’s analysis of the formal aspects of myth odes shows that naming the victor a second time is a “strong norm,” with exceptions pointing to special circumstances. For *Olympian* 13 he concludes that the omission probably means the poem is intended “as much for the whole family as for Xenophon.”<sup>95</sup> The insertion of ἔοικεν in a statement that would have made perfect sense without it strengthens the impression that this reference to the Olympic victories is not an oblique way of praising Xenophon and Thessalos but rather an indication of the family’s concern, which, as the next line makes explicit, is a wish for more of these prestigious victories. Read with the poet’s undertaking to commemorate future Olympic victories (τά τ’ ἐσόμενα τότ’ ἄν φαίην σαφές, 103) ἔοικεν changes what would have been an assertion that the family’s success at Olympia has already been described before into a statement that this only seems so, it is only on the face of things the case, since they confidently expect more victories in the future that

<sup>93</sup> Some other examples of family praise honouring the victor are *Pyth.* 8.32–45, *Nem.* 5.40–46, *Nem.* 10.37–54.

<sup>94</sup> See Gerber 2002:73 with n. 5.

<sup>95</sup> Hamilton 1974:108 n. 5. The only other exceptions are *Pythian* 2 and *Nemean* 8.

will also need celebration. With the addition of  $\xi\omicron\upsilon\zeta\epsilon\nu$  the fixed state of the family's Olympic victories implied by the infinitive in the perfect tense,  $\lambda\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\theta\alpha\iota$ , is effectively denied.

The victory wish is unusual in several respects. First, it is the only such wish which does not conform to the norm for explicit victory wishes, namely that the success aspired to should be higher ranked than any already achieved.<sup>96</sup> Also, the expectation of not just one, but several future victories ( $\tau\acute{\alpha}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ , 103) is out of the ordinary.<sup>97</sup> The only plausible explanation is that this uncommon wish is not for more victories for the victor being celebrated, but for his wider family group, another deviation from the norm.<sup>98</sup> Although the Oligaitheidai can already boast three Olympic successes this is apparently not enough. The wish for multiple future victories and the fact that there is no indication that it concerns Xenophon must mean that there are several other athletes in the family who desire the same prestige for themselves.<sup>99</sup>

The irregular nature of the victory wish confirms that the purpose of the ode is as much the exaltation of the Oligaitheidai as of Xenophon. The extent of the second victory catalogue further underlines the exceptional importance of family praise in this ode. After the Olympic victory wish the catalogue continues with victories at Pytho

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<sup>96</sup> The victory wish for Hieron in *Ol.* 1.106–111 is only apparently an exception. Since the wish is for an Olympic victory in the chariot race, the most prestigious event at the most prestigious games and therefore more highly regarded than the single-horse race celebrated in *Olympian* 1, it does in fact fit the norm. For a list and discussion of explicit victory wishes, see Hubbard 1995:35–37.

<sup>97</sup> In five of the seven other cases the wish is for a single more prestigious victory, while *Isthm.* 1.64–68 hopes for victory for Herodotos of Thebes at both Pytho and Olympia. The statement that Timodemos of Acharnai “is still indebted ... to pluck again and again the fairest prize of the Isthmian festivals” ( $\delta\phi\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota$   $\delta'$   $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota$ , ... / ...  $\theta\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\text{I}\sigma\theta\mu\acute{\alpha}\delta\omega\nu$   $\delta\rho\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$   $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$   $\acute{\alpha}\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ , *Nem.* 2.6–9) comes closest to *Olympian* 13 in wishing for multiple victories. However, there is a strong sense of hyperbole in the use of  $\theta\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}$  which is absent in  $\tau\acute{\alpha}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ . As the record of the Oligaitheidai shows, Isthmian victories are much easier to win than Olympian and thus lend themselves more readily to exaggeration. Contrast also the sober expression of the expectation that Timodemos will win at Pytho:  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\text{P}\upsilon\theta\iota\omicron\iota\sigma\acute{\iota}$   $\tau\epsilon$   $\nu\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu$  (9). For a convincing refutation of the view that *Nem.* 2.10–12 implies a further wish for an Olympian victory for Timodemos, see Hubbard 1995:51–55.

<sup>98</sup> Six of the seven other wishes are for the victor who is being celebrated. In *Isthmian* 6 the prayer for an Olympian victory concerns the victor Phylakidas as well as his older brother Pytheas. This is clear from the preceding reference to both the earlier Nemean success of Pytheas and the current Isthmian victory of Phylakidas (*Isthm.* 6.1–9).

<sup>99</sup> Seen from the perspective of such family members the victory wish is of course “regular” since it is for higher ranked victories than those they have so far achieved.

and twelve other locations, making it the longest list of victory sites in the epinicians.<sup>100</sup> In his analysis of *Olympian* 7 Young argues persuasively for the victory catalogue as a testimony of greatness comparable to the “superlative” compliments most often paid to tyrants towards the end of an ode.<sup>101</sup> The striking similarity of both position in the ode and range of victories enumerated makes Young’s conclusion that the catalogue for Diagoras (*Ol.* 7.80–87) is “about the highest praise Pindar can bestow upon him” equally applicable to the Oligaithid catalogue, with the important difference that the compliment is not for the victor, but for his family. The compliment for the Oligaithidai is underlined by the pointed reference to the Panhellenic significance of their achievements: *καὶ πᾶσαν κάτα / Ἑλλάδ’ εὐρήσεις ἐρευνῶν μάσσον’ ἢ ὡς ἰδέμεν* (“and if you search throughout all Hellas, you will find more than the eye can see,” 112–113).<sup>102</sup> It is the fourth statement in *Olympian* 13 (the others are at 41–42, 43–46, 98–100) aimed at creating an impression of a noteworthy multitude of victories for the family. Although the motif of abundance is a general feature of victory catalogues,<sup>103</sup> and could be treated as mere encomiastic hyperbole, it fulfils an important additional function in *Olympian* 13. Its repeated use in connection with the family ensures that by the end of the poem the attention is on their accomplishments even though Xenophon’s unique achievement at Olympia is qualitatively the most outstanding in the family.<sup>104</sup> The earlier supreme compliment paid to Xenophon, that “he has attained what no mortal

<sup>100</sup> Counting two, Aitna and Syracuse, for the “splendidly rich cities under Aitna’s lofty crest” (*ταῖ θ’ ὑπ’ Αἴτνας ὑψιλόφου καλλιπλουτοὶ / πόλεις*, 111–112). See Gerber 2002:71–72 for a list of catalogues of two or more victories. He lists the Oligaithidai’s Isthmian and Nemean victories separately, ignores the reference to Olympia (101–102) and starts a new list with Pytho. Thummer 1968:23, 27–28 puts all these victories in one list. Either way the Oligaithid catalogue lists more sites than the second longest, that of Diagoras of Rhodes (*Ol.* 7.80–87).

<sup>101</sup> Young 1968:91–93 and 52 with n. 2. In addition to the examples of “superlative” compliments cited by Young (52 n. 2), cf. several gnomic statements which identify *laudandi* with a unique group or emphasize the superiority of their achievement or position: *Ol.* 1.113–114, *Ol.* 3.42–44, *Ol.* 9.100, *Pyth.* 1.99–100, *Pyth.* 10.22–29.

<sup>102</sup> On the importance of a Panhellenic vision for this ode, and the second catalogue as a demonstration of that vision, see Hubbard 1986:44–48.

<sup>103</sup> See Race 1990:20 n. 21.

<sup>104</sup> Contra Koniaris 1981:95–96 who argues that the qualitative superiority of Xenophon’s achievement is such that it cannot be overshadowed by the mere numbers of other family members’ victories. However, in addition to a questionable interpretation of both Thessalos’ and the three other named relatives’ victories, he completely ignores the effect of the final catalogue and consequently does not consider that the ode may be an exception in focusing more on the family than on the victor.

man ever did before” (ἀντεβόλησεν / τῶν ἀνὴρ θνατὸς οὐπω τις πρότερον, 30–31) is finally balanced by the “highest praise” of an elaborate victory catalogue for the Oligaiθidai.

The low-key presentation of the victor and his victory in this ode, coupled with the close attention paid to his family’s achievements and concerns, can be seen as evidence that Xenophon’s victories at Olympia were merely the starting point for the poem’s primary objective, the glorification of the Oligaiθidai. As such *Olympian* 13 is also an expression of the priority of the social group over its individual members in an interconnected society. It shows that in such a society personal achievement, however outstanding it may be, is regarded in the first place as a confirmation of group ability and prestige.<sup>105</sup>

*The poet’s balancing act: Tempering ambition with restraint*

The particular circumstances which led to a praise song in which the victorious family all but overshadows the victor can no longer be recovered. However, the recognition of this emphasis is important for a proper appreciation of the poem’s main concern, in addition to praise, namely balancing human potential and ambition with the demands of society and the gods. The most recent treatments of *Olympian* 13, by Hubbard, Dickson and Jouan, focus on the central myth of Bellerophon’s taming of Pegasus with the help of the bridle provided by Athena.<sup>106</sup> All three refer to the dual nature of the bridle which releases potential by restraining raw power, and Hubbard in particular pays close attention to the “tension between mortal achievement and restraint” thus symbolised which runs through the poem.<sup>107</sup> Since he is more interested in the broader significance of the topic than in the particular relevance it may have had for Xenophon and the Oligaiθidai he tends to underemphasise the cautionary elements in the poem in favour of its encomiastic aims.<sup>108</sup> Two factors suggest them-

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Oudemans and Lardinois 1987:67, 96.

<sup>106</sup> Hubbard 1986, Dickson 1986, Jouan 1995. See also Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):186–212. They too concentrate on the Bellerophon myth. *Olympian* 13 is one of the least discussed poems in Pindar’s oeuvre. For the more than fifty years covered by Gerber’s bibliography, for example, there are only eleven entries (Gerber 1989:216–218).

<sup>107</sup> Hubbard 1986:48.

<sup>108</sup> The tendency to convert every aspect of an epinician into an element of praise, largely the result of Bundy’s influential *Studia Pindarica* (1962, repr. 1986), often seems to blind commentators to both the very real portrayal of human feebleness in the odes

selves as reasons for the poet's concern with the constraints that need to be placed on ambition, the Oligaithidai's political position as part of the ruling elite and the desire of at least some of them for still more success at Olympia. The following analysis focuses on the ways in which the theme of ambition and restraint is developed in the poem. It shows that acknowledgement of the gods is the key to achieving the desired balance and that the poet offers his own achievement of combining inborn excellence with restraint and reverence, as exemplified in the poem, as the example to emulate in this regard.

In *Olympian* 13 an intimate connection between the victorious family and the city of Corinth is postulated at the outset when the poet says that through praising the οἶκος, γνώσομαι / τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον (3–4). He recognises and acknowledges the prosperity of Corinth in the success of the family and thus establishes the latter as representative of the former. The nature of the connection is further specified when the poet gives the reason why he can know Corinth through this family, namely because the city displays the benefits of the presence there of the Horai, Order, Justice and Peace (ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασιγνήτα τε, ..., / Δίκη καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνη, 6–7). This unmistakable reference to the way the city is governed can only mean that the οἶκος in question was part of the oligarchy ruling at the time of Xenophon's Olympic victories.<sup>109</sup> Although the time of the Kypselid tyranny in Corinth was long past and the Corinthian oligarchy was exemplary in its stability, the awareness common to such governments of the danger that one family or one man might aspire to exclusive power will nonetheless not have disappeared.<sup>110</sup> The two extensive victory catalogues preceding and following the myth display the outstanding accomplishments of both the present victor and the Oligaithid clan as a whole. For the poet contracted to praise such high excellence in a family sharing political responsibility in the city with other families the challenge is to give due recognition to greatness while at the same time allaying any possible suspicions of inappropriate ambitions arising from it. Avoiding the envy of fellow citizens is a common topic in the epinikia, but in spite of the Oligaithidai's numerous victories, this is not a primary concern for the

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and the warnings sounded against man's exaggerated opinions of his own importance. See p. 114 for one example of the distortions to which such a position can lead.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1986:28 n. 5. On the oligarchy in Corinth, see Salmon 1984:231–239.

<sup>110</sup> On stability in Corinth, see Salmon 1984:236–237, and on the fear of tyranny Andrewes 1956:15–16 and Berve 1967:9–12.

poet. Rather, he is at pains throughout to point out the necessity of restraint, i.e. he is not defending the victor and his family against the negative perceptions of others, but reminding them what is required of them considering their position in the Corinthian political arena.

Significantly the topic of restraint is introduced first in a political context. Corinth is presented as a city in which good order reigns (Εὐνομία, 6), which is built on the firm foundation of justice (βάθρον πολιῶν ἀσφαλές, / Δίκαια, 6–7) and enjoys the peace necessary for creating and maintaining wealth (Εἰρήνη, τάμ’ ἀνδράσι πλούτου, 7). By implication the victorious family is praised for its share in this admirable state of affairs. However, order, justice and peace are not self-evident. Where there is success such as that achieved by the victor, his family and his city the danger of arrogance and excess has to be taken into account. Therefore the Horai not only positively support prosperity, but also have the negative task of protecting the city and its inhabitants against the risk of overstepping their limits (ἐθέλοντι δ’ ἀλέξιν / ὕβριν, Κόρου ματέρᾳ θρασύμυθον, 9–10). In the oligarchic political arena ὕβρις would mean self-assertion at the expense of others of the ruling group, ending in the κόρος of appropriating more than one’s fair share of power. The implied danger here is the re-establishment of tyranny.<sup>111</sup> The vigour with which the task of safeguarding the city against such destabilising political ambitions is executed at the same time signifies the extent of the danger and praises the rulers for their efforts in warding it off.

As if to counter any momentary suggestion that the *laudandi* may be inclined to exhibit such arrogance and excess, the poet steps forward again with the assurance that he has “fine things to expound” and will do so boldly (ἔχω καλά τε φράσαι, τόλμα τέ μοι / εὐθείᾳ γλῶσσαν ὀρνύει λέγειν, 11–12). The urgency of the task and the fact that it requires τόλμα, daring or courage, point to the ever-present tension between the need to praise καλά and the danger of offending either god or one’s fellow men in so doing. Praise requires boldness if it is to do justice to excellence, but it must also be kept “straight” (εὐθείᾳ, 12), i.e. within

<sup>111</sup> On tyranny as the subject of this passage, see Will 1955:408–409. Cf. also Fisher 1992:221–223 on the political implications of *Ol.* 13.6–10. His suggestion that the danger posed by ὕβρις and Κόρος refers to the efforts of those outside the ruling elite to destabilise the city must be rejected. Apart from the fact that there is no evidence of such a group anywhere in the poem, it does not take into account that the topic of restraint is developed with reference to the victorious family and the activity of the poet. For an analysis of other Pindaric passages where ὕβρις and κόρος are condemned in a political context, see Kurke 1991b:209–218.

proper limits if it is to be acceptable to god and fellow men. The gnome which follows, ἄμαχον δὲ κρύψαι τὸ συγγενὲς ἦθος (“it is impossible to conceal one’s inborn character,” 13; my translation), provides the basis for this daring encomiastic endeavour. On the one hand συγγενὲς ἦθος, in this case of the Oligaithidai and the Corinthians, cannot be hidden and must be praised.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand it is the natural ability of the poet that enables him to accept the challenge of praising success in such a way that the order established by Themis and her daughters is not disturbed.<sup>113</sup> The significance of the control to which the poet promises to subject his celebration of excellence appears in the contrast with the over-confident rashness of speech characteristic of ὕβρις (10).<sup>114</sup> Whereas the inability of those indulging in ὕβρις to stay within acceptable limits impels them to excess, the poet will demonstrate in this poem how the fine line between appropriate and injudicious behaviour should be trodden, thus establishing himself as a positive *exemplum*.

Praise of the Corinthians, now particularly of their natural ability, is resumed with reference to their outstanding talent on both the physical and intellectual level. They are known for their many athletic successes as well as for “inventions of long ago” (ἀρχαῖα σοφίσματα, 14–17); both the Muse and Ares, the arts and military prowess, are prominent in their city (ἐν δὲ Μοῖσ’ ἀδύπνοος, / ἐν δ’ Ἄρης ἀνθεὶ νέων οὐλίαις αἰχμαῖσιν ἀνδρῶν, 22–23).<sup>115</sup> These complementary abilities are reflected in the extensive victory catalogues on the one hand, which stress physical excellence, and the mythical content on the other, which concentrates on the Corinthians’ intellectual achievements, their μῆτις. While the positive aspects of μῆτις are placed in the foreground, as befits a victory ode, its ambiguity as a force which can be used for good or for evil is nonetheless always present.<sup>116</sup> As such the mythical content functions both in praise of the physical success being celebrated and as oblique critique of the excesses to which it may give rise. Just as the presence of the Horai in the city does not mean the absence of the danger of

<sup>112</sup> Note the immediately following genetic reference to them as παῖδες Ἀλάτα (14).

<sup>113</sup> On the ambiguity of the gnome with respect to its referents, see Hubbard 1985: 144.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1986:37. His reading of lines 9–13 (pp. 36–38) highlights their general moral significance without reference to the political context.

<sup>115</sup> Hubbard 1986:34. Note that since they are the gifts of the Horai (ἔμμεν δέ, ... νικαφόρον ἀγλαῖαν ὄπασαν / ... ἐν καρδίαις ἀνδρῶν ἔβαλον / Ὕραι ... ἀρχαῖα σοφίσμαθ’, 14, 16–17), the praise for these physical and intellectual abilities also continues the praise for the good governance of the city.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Jouan 1995:284.



Hybris and Koros, the examples of products of Corinthian intelligence (18–22), while praising their inventiveness, also point to the necessity of restraint and by implication the negative potential of μήτις. As a literary construct the dithyramb exemplifies containment, in this case of what used to be unregulated dance and song.<sup>117</sup> However, that its original wilder connotations lurk just below the surface appears from its characterisation as βολιάτα (“ox-driving,” 19) and its connection with “the delights of Dionysos” (ταὶ Διωνύσου ... / ... χάριτες, 18–19) which are known to include intoxication and riotousness.<sup>118</sup> The second example of Corinthian σοφίσματα is the bridle for restraining horses (ἱππείους ἐν ἔντεσιν μέτρον, 20). While the unusual designation μέτρον in its literal meaning as a curb or check refers to the physical instrument for reining in natural power, it also, by its very singularity, draws attention to the general notion of limits or measure as a theme of the poem.<sup>119</sup> The third example, from the fields of architecture and sculpture, is the decoration of temple pediments with eagles.<sup>120</sup> The capture, metaphorically speaking, of these kingly birds (οἰωνῶν βασιλέα, 21) in art can be read as a further expression of the idea that soaring ambition must be restrained, or, as Hubbard suggests, simply as a reflection of the poem’s parallel themes of the “stimulative” (the soaring eagle) and the “retentive” (the fixed pediment).<sup>121</sup>

The exaltation of Corinth is followed by a prayer to Zeus which acknowledges the possibility already alluded to earlier (9–12) that praise may transgress the norms of propriety. The poet entreats the “most exalted, wide-ruling lord of Olympia” not to “begrudge (his) words for all time to come” (ὑπατ’ εὐρὸν ἀνάσσων / Ὀλυμπίας, ἀφθόνητος ἔπessiv / γένοιο χρόνον ἅπαντα, 24–26). Bulman notes that the references

<sup>117</sup> Will 1955:219–220 with reference to Jeanmaire 1951.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Hubbard 1986:38.

<sup>119</sup> See Dickson 1986:126–127 with 139 n. 22 on μέτρον as the “concrete device or tool by which measure is imposed upon objects.”

<sup>120</sup> See Hubbard 1986:38 n. 37 for the different views on the actual content of the innovation.

<sup>121</sup> Hubbard 1986:38–39. Both possibilities perhaps tend to overinterpretation. The kingly nature of the birds suggests their close connection with Zeus, which would make the notion of constraining them in art somewhat overambitious. However, there may be an allusion to the victor as eagle or a link between the “twin kings of birds” and Xenophon’s double victory, in which case this example could more readily be interpreted as a reflection of the themes of ambition and restraint. Cf. *Pyth.* 5.111–112 where it is said of Arkesilas that “in courage he is a long-winged eagle among birds” (θάρος δὲ πανύπτερος / ἐν ὄρνιξιν αἰετὸς ἐπλετο). On the eagle as image of both poet and victor in *Ol.* 2.86–88, *Nem.* 3.80–82 and Bakchylides 5.16–30, see Pfeijffer 1994.

to divine φθόνος in Pindar all occur in conjunction with myths in which mortals test the limits set for them by the gods.<sup>122</sup> The prayer is thus designed to ensure that neither the poet's nor his patrons' actions attract divine displeasure by transgressing those limits. As for himself, the poet acknowledges that the confidence he has already expressed in his ability to praise appropriately is subject to the endorsement of Zeus. In this respect the qualification χρόνον ἅπαντα is significant. With it he asks for the success of the poetic endeavour, which rests largely on the claim that it provides a means of mitigating the pain of man's mortality. Praying in effect for the acceptance and approval of his words for the rest of time, he is at the same time appealing for acknowledgement that his *laudandi* deserve immortal fame.<sup>123</sup>

The prayer also recognises that the Corinthian people, their stable political situation and physical and intellectual pre-eminence notwithstanding, need the protection of Zeus (καὶ τόνδε λαὸν ἀβλαβῆ νέμων, 27). The intervention on behalf of the victor, Xenophon, has two complementary parts. First Zeus is asked to steer straight the "fair wind" of Xenophon's good fortune (Ξενοφώντος εὐθύνε δαίμονος οὔρον, 28). Like the poet, he needs the guidance of Zeus if he is to keep within his mortal limits. Secondly, the entreaty that the song of praise should not be regarded as a cause for divine envy is now restated positively as a request to accept the victory celebrations as a tribute from the victor (δέξαι τέ οἱ στεφάνων ἐγκώμιον τεθμόν, 29). The potentially dangerous praise of human achievement is positioned as an offering to Zeus, thus giving the assurance that it will keep within the bounds set for humans. The reason for the anxiety about the acceptability of exalting human achievement becomes clear from the victory announcement which flows from the prayer. Xenophon's unprecedented double victory at Olympia makes him an exception among mortal men

<sup>122</sup> Bulman 1992:31. For her discussion of divine φθόνος, see pp. 31–34. The other references are at *Pyth.* 8.71 (mythical *exempla* Porphyriion and Typhos), *Pyth.* 10.20 (Perseus) and *Isthm.* 7.39 (Bellerophon).

<sup>123</sup> For a different approach to divine envy, see Kirkwood 1984:173–177. He concludes that "the possibility of divine envy is for Pindar essentially the highest possible praise" (176). This is another, admittedly ingenious effort to turn every word of a Pindaric ode into praise. While a secondary implication of the evocation of divine envy may be that the victor has come "to the verge of the divine condition" (176), in *Olympian* 13 at least Kirkwood's interpretation neglects both the primary element of warning against the gods' displeasure if man strives beyond his mortal nature and the fact that containment of human overambition is a major topic of the poem.

(ἀντεβόλησεν / τῶν ἀνήρ θνατὸς οὔπω τις πρότερον, 30–31), raising the fear that he may have aspirations beyond his mortality or that the gods may resent the achievement itself.

The victory catalogue introduced by Xenophon's achievements ends with his immediate family's successes at the Isthmian, Pythian and Nemean games (see pp. 132–133). These statements give a strong impression of a vast number of victories, but by their summary nature also demonstrates the poet's commitment to appropriateness in his praise. This principle, the need to temper human striving, alluded to several times already, is now stated unequivocally:

ἔπειτα δ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ  
μέτρον νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος.

For each thing there comes its full measure, and it is best to recognize what fits the circumstances. (47–48; my translation)

Pfeijffer defines μέτρον as a “terminative” concept, evoking connotations of a limit, a border line, the cup being filled to the brim: more is too much,” whereas καιρός “denotes the opportune, the expedient, referring to what is (in the given circumstances) exactly right in relation to one's aims and purposes.”<sup>124</sup> He is undoubtedly right that these concepts here pertain to the common compositional strategy of a break-off passage and thus comment on the poetic endeavour,<sup>125</sup> but more is at stake. Keeping to μέτρον and καιρός is a theme as applicable to the victor and his family as to the poet, since their exceptional achievements must make going too far and not observing the behaviour appropriate to their circumstances, both as part of the ruling elite and in relation to the divine, a tempting possibility. With the gnome the poet gives the reassurance that he intends to observe the proprieties and implies that the *laudandi* should, and will, do the same.

The following myth section of the poem, consisting of brief references to Corinthian heroes and the main narrative concerning Bellerophon and Pegasus, demonstrates how difficult it is to achieve what is “exactly right,” to use one's capabilities to the full without doing “too much.” By placing the accomplishments of the mythological examples in the foreground the poet attributes their intellectual and physical prowess to the Corinthians and the Oligaihidai. However, this praise is

<sup>124</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:659, 649. For his full discussion of καιρός, with bibliography, see pp. 647–653. On μέτρον, see pp. 659–662, as well as Dickson 1986:126, 132–134.

<sup>125</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:650–651.

not absolute. The heroes of Corinth are imperfect, liable to excess, to letting the cup overflow. They are models of outstanding talent, but not always of μέτρον and καιρός in applying that talent. In the final analysis their exploits cannot be recommended unequivocally.<sup>126</sup> Instead, the poet offers his balanced presentation of praise for success coupled with discreet reminders of mortality and its limits as an *exemplum* of the optimal use of talent.

The progression away from Xenophon to the family in the first victory catalogue prepares for the ambiguous introduction of the myth which indicates that it concerns the Oligaiθidai as much as Corinth. The poet states his intention to “proclaim (...) their ancestors’ intelligence and warfare amidst heroic achievements” (μητίν τε γαρούων παλαιγόνων / πόλεμόν τ’ ἐν ἡρωίαις ἀρεταΐσιν, 50–51). Since the passage follows immediately on the praise of Xenophon and his family’s athletic success the first impression is that their ingenuity and martial prowess will now be demonstrated following the same sequence as the earlier praise of Corinth which referred to these three spheres (14–23). Although his subject then turns out to be Corinth (ἀμφὶ Κορίνθῳ, 52) the initial ambiguity serves to mesh the family with the city so that what follows applies equally to the family. Just as the οἶκος stands for the city in the opening of the ode the city’s ancestors from myth now function as ancestors of the Oligaiθidai.

Two first-person statements frame the mythological material in *Olympian* 13. In the first the poet claims that he will not lie about Corinth (ἐγὼ δὲ ... / οὐ ψεύσομ’ ἀμφὶ Κορίνθῳ, 49, 52) by mentioning Sisyphos, Medea and the Corinthians before Troy, among them Glaukos, as examples of the “intelligence and warfare amidst heroic achievements” of the city’s ancient forebears which he now wishes to proclaim (50–51). The poet’s insistence on his truthfulness is a common topic in the epinikia.<sup>127</sup> In this poem he has already described his way of telling of the καλά of the Corinthians as “straight” (εὐθεΐα, 12), and in the victory catalogue of the Oligaiθidai he confidently appeals to the herald’s announcement to support the truth of his statements (ἀλαθῆς τέ μοι / ἔξορκος ἐπέσσειται ... / ... βοὰ κάρυκος, 98–100). However, the conspicuous juxtaposition of οὐ ψεύσομαι and a reference to the arch-

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Bowra 1964:297.

<sup>127</sup> For a brief discussion of Pindar’s attitude to truth, see Pfeijffer 1999:122–123, and 124 for bibliography.

deceiver Sisyphos raises questions about the nature of truth intended here.<sup>128</sup> A closer look at the second statement, at the end of the myth, reveals that not telling lies does not necessarily mean telling everything, and that what is implied can have as much significance as what is made explicit. The short catalogue of Bellerophon's exploits with the bridled Pegasus (87–90) ends resoundingly on the verb ἔπεφνεν, which indicates the lethal effect of this combination. In the next line the poet declares that he will be silent about the hero's own fate (διασωπάσομαι οἱ μῦθον ἐγώ, 91), but it is an eloquent silence. The final word regarding Bellerophon's deathly deeds still resonates. Moreover, Pegasus is shown on Olympos with Zeus (92), his immortality contrasting tellingly with Bellerophon's doom, his punishment for provoking the gods. It is clear that the poet's silence is not a denial of what Bellerophon did and what happened to him as a consequence. On the contrary, it focuses attention on what has been left unsaid.<sup>129</sup> As such the view that such a break-off is aimed at avoiding the introduction of unpleasant matters at the joyous occasion of a victory celebration is at best only a partial explanation.<sup>130</sup> The pointed silence is not just a way of being discreet for the sake of encomiastic propriety, it is an effective means of conveying an important point discreetly. An audience steeped in the myths of their homeland can be expected to fill in the details and make the appropriate conclusions, in this case that the gods must be respected and talent used with circumspection.

The framing statements οὐ ψεύσομαι and διασωπάσομαι can now be seen as two sides of the same coin. The presentation of mythical characters and events will be truthful, but not necessarily complete. The audience is not expected to accept the assertions about not lying and being silent at face value, but rather to interpret them by adding

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<sup>128</sup> Detienne and Vernant call Sisyphos “a hero possessed of the most amazing guile” (Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):189). On the juxtaposition, cf. Jouan 1995:285.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Bulman 1992:33.

<sup>130</sup> This is the position taken by Fuhrer on break-off passages in *Olympian* 9, *Nemean* 5 and the passage in *Olympian* 13 under discussion (Fuhrer 1988:62–67). Cf. also Hubbard 1985:102 and 104–105 on *Nemean* 5. In contrast, Pfeijffer sees the poet's reluctance to tell of the murder of Phokos by his Aiakid half-brothers and the explanatory gnome that silence is sometimes better than telling the exact truth (*Nem.* 5.14–18) for what they are, the means to appeal discreetly to the audience to consider certain pertinent aspects of the political situation in Aigina at the time (Pfeijffer 1999:36–37, 62–68, 86–88).

what is necessary from their own knowledge of the myths and the circumstances that may be relevant to the occasion.<sup>131</sup>

Against this background the mythological references in the introduction to the main myth, while stressing positive aspects as they do, cannot be read as a negation of what is passed over in silence, as a sanitised version of the truth aimed at flattering the Corinthians by smoothing over the unmistakable flaws of their heroes.<sup>132</sup> It is certainly not a lie that Sisyphos was “most shrewd in cleverness like a god” (πυκνότατον παλάμαις ὡς θεόν, 52), but even though it is not said in so many words, it would be difficult not to associate this god-like cunning with his efforts to outwit the gods and cheat death.<sup>133</sup> He is an example of Corinthian μῆτις, but also of presumption with regard to the divine. Like Sisyphos, Medea is prominent in the founding myths of Corinth, but this is only relevant insofar as it qualifies them as παλαίγονοι (50). In fact, the example of Medea’s μῆτις, her role as saviour of the Argonauts (ναῖ σώτειραν Ἄργοι καὶ προπόλοις, 54), is taken from the time before her association with Corinth. Although her intervention in the affairs of the Argonauts involved her magic powers, it is significant that here it is not credited to these powers, but to the fact that she married Jason against the wish of her father (καὶ τὰν πατρὸς ἀντία Μήδειαν θεμέναν γάμον αὐτᾶ, 53). Thus her act of benevolence is linked to an independence which constitutes a serious violation of the customs of the time.<sup>134</sup> For all their excellence on an intellectual level, Sisyphos and Medea also represent the abuse of intelligence, the one in his defiance of divine law and the other in her disregard for social norms. They show that the μῆτις of mortals can threaten both the divine and the social order. As in the case of Bellerophon no mention is made of their ultimate fate,

<sup>131</sup> Cf. Pfeijffer 1999:23–34 on implicitness in Pindar, inter alia as a way of involving the audience and keeping their attention.

<sup>132</sup> See Hubbard 1986:40 with n. 41 for this approach. Cf. Gildersleeve’s unease with Sisyphos and Medea betrayed by his explanation that they “were held in higher esteem in Corinth than in most parts of Greece” (Gildersleeve 1908:233).

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Pfeijffer 1999:614.

<sup>134</sup> Gildersleeve 1908:233 notes that “(t)he middle and the emphatic pronoun show the unnaturalness of the action from the Greek point of view.” On marriage customs, see Lacey 1968:105–110. Contrast this portrayal of Medea’s independent action regarding her marriage with *Pyth.* 4.213–219 where her lack of respect for her parents is attributed to the influence of Aphrodite through Jason. Only later, when they leave Kolchis after Jason, with Medea’s help, has accomplished the tasks set for him, is his abduction of her qualified as being οὐν αὐτᾶ, “with her own help,” or “of her own free will” (*Pyth.* 4.250; see Braswell 1988:344).

but it is not unreasonable to assume that Sisyphos' punishment of having to push a boulder uphill again and again (see *Od.* 11.593–600) and Medea's loss of Jason and flight from Corinth are in the background as a reminder of the wages of sin.<sup>135</sup>

The Trojan war provides the material for the second element of the poet's praise of Corinthian, and by implication Oligaiithid, achievement, prowess in war. Corinthians are represented among both the Greek and the Trojan forces (58–60). The ambivalence inherent in such a position is mitigated by their success on the battlefield: even though conflicting loyalties are implied, they can be praised because they distinguished themselves on both sides by playing a decisive role in the outcome of battles (ἐδόκησαν / ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω μαχᾶν τάμνειν τέλος, 56–57).<sup>136</sup> An example is given from among the Trojan supporters, Glaukos of Lykia, who is said to have made the Greeks tremble (ἐκ Λυκίας δὲ Γλαῦκον ἐλθόντα τρόμεον Δαναοί, 60).<sup>137</sup>

Glaukos' Corinthian roots through Bellerophon effect the transition to the main myth about the latter and Pegasos. He boasts to the trembling Greeks of the pre-eminence of his father<sup>138</sup> in Corinth: he rules there, has a rich estate and a palace (τοῖσι μὲν / ἐξεύχεται ἔν ἄσπεϊ Πειράνας σφετέρου πατρὸς ἀρχάν / καὶ βαθὺν κλᾶρον ἔμμεν καὶ μέγαρον, 60–62). Glaukos' statement makes two important points about Bellerophon. First, it portrays him as firmly connected to Corinth. This is not surprising in an ode for Corinthians, but it is interesting to note that in Homer's version of the Bellerophon myth (*Il.* 6.152–211) a share of the kingship and extended property are part of the reward given to him by the Lykian king after he has killed the Chimaira, the Solymoi and the Amazons as well as the Lykians sent to ambush him. These

<sup>135</sup> Note, however, that there is no allusion to Medea's attempt to penetrate the divine sphere by her efforts to have her children made immortal. Sisyphos is the representative of that form of mortal presumption, she is the example in the human sphere.

<sup>136</sup> Hubbard 1986:45 denies any negative connotations. He reads the passage as praise for "the extent of Corinthian diffusion and influence" in the context of what he terms "Corinth's internationalism."

<sup>137</sup> Compared with the Homeric version, this is a considerable enhancement of Glaukos' prestige. In *Il.* 12.309–331 Sarpedon, the leading Lykian (*Il.* 12.101–104), urges Glaukos to join him at the head of the Lykians. One man, Menestheus, is then described as shuddering at the sight of the two leading the mass of Lykians (τῷ δ' ἰθὺς βήτην Λυκίων μέγα ἔθνος ἄγοντε. / τοὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ἰγίγησ' υἱὸς Πετῶο Μενεσθεύς, 330–331).

<sup>138</sup> *Il.* 6.196–206 makes Bellerophon the grandfather, not father, of Glaukos. Perhaps σφετέρου πατρὸς (61) should be read more loosely as "of his ancestor" (thus Gildersleeve 1908:233).

exploits are the result of his banishment from Ephyre in Argos following false accusations against him by the king's wife, and his success proves his innocence. Clearly this context for Bellerophon's heroic deeds, although it provides ample scope for praise, did not answer the poet's purpose. Hubbard's discussion of Pindar's sources focuses on the Bellerophon/Pegasos myth, and probably because Homer does not mention Pegasos, does not consider his influence on the version presented in *Olympian* 13,<sup>139</sup> although the figure of Glaukos and the transfer of Bellerophon's status and property from Lykia to Corinth make it highly probable that at least the opening scene is an allusion to the Homeric story.<sup>140</sup> The implication is that Pindar deliberately excluded that part of the myth in which Bellerophon was cast as an innocent victim vindicated by his heroic deeds. Hubbard's conclusion that the myth is a reworking of a Corinthian cult-myth in which Athena is prominent so that on the one hand Poseidon and his followers are placated and on the other Bellerophon is given a more active role stops short of the full implication of the latter change.<sup>141</sup> The suppression of the Homeric context for the exploits shows that Pindar was in addition seeking a presentation which would make Bellerophon accountable for his deeds.

The second point made by Glaukos' boast is that Bellerophon enjoyed a position of power in Corinth when he embarked on his quest to tame Pegasos.<sup>142</sup> As the backdrop to his active involvement in the unfolding of events this will prove to be an important reference point for the evaluation of his ultimate fate and the relevance of the myth for the commissioners of the poem, the Oligaihidai.

The contents of the myth as told by Pindar are briefly as follows. Bellerophon wishes to obtain control over the horse Pegasos, but his efforts to yoke him fail. He takes his problem to a local seer who recommends incubation at an altar of Athena. She appears to him in a dream, gives him a golden bridle and commands him to dedicate it to Poseidon with the sacrifice of a bull. On awakening he returns to the seer who tells him to follow Athena's instructions and also to erect an altar for her. Bellerophon bridles and mounts Pegasos and together they slay the Amazons, the Chimaira and the Solymoi. After an allusion

<sup>139</sup> Hubbard 1986:28–33.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Dickson 1986:127.

<sup>141</sup> Hubbard 1986:31–32.

<sup>142</sup> Note that Corinth as the centre of action is confirmed by the fact that his efforts to yoke Pegasos take place "beside the spring" of Peirene in that city (ἀμφὶ κρουνοῖς, 63).



to Bellerophon's doomed effort to reach Olympos the myth ends with Pegasus enjoying the hospitality of Zeus.

The narrative begins with a summary in which two of the main themes that will be worked out in the full account already figure prominently, namely Bellerophon's active pursuit of a dream and the role of the divine in the fulfilment of that dream. In other versions of the myth Bellerophon, rather than acting on his own impulses, reacts to outside impulses. He receives Pegasus already bridled from Athena or Poseidon, which enables him to perform his exploits, or, as in Homer, is driven to action by conflict with his peers. In contrast, in *Olympian* 13 Bellerophon himself initiates the quest to control Pegasus. He has an active role not only in bridling Pegasus, but also in conceiving of the necessity to do so.<sup>143</sup> He is introduced as the one "who once suffered much indeed in his yearning to yoke Pegasus, the snaky Gorgon's son, beside the spring" (ὄς τᾶς ὀφιώδεος υἱὸν ποτε Γοργόνος ἦ πόλλ' ἀμφὶ κρουνοῖς / Πάγασον ζεῦξαι ποθέων ἔπαθεν, 63–64). In spite of his undeniable power and possessions among mankind Bellerophon reaches for more, control over a creature who represents the raw power of nature.<sup>144</sup> His intense suffering (ἦ πόλλ' ... ἔπαθεν) is an indication of both his inability to tame the horse and the intensity of his desire (ποθέων).<sup>145</sup> His frustrated ambitions reveal the limits of his abilities as a mortal, but the rest of the narrative shows that this does not paralyse him, but spurs him on to find other ways of achieving his goal. The opening scene characterizes Bellerophon as a driven man of extreme emotions, thus anticipating the overconfidence that will lead to his doom.

Bellerophon's suffering ends when Athena presents him with a golden bridle and turns his dream into reality (... ἔπαθεν, / πρὶν γέ οἱ χφυσάμπυκα κούρα χαλινόν / Παλλάς ἦνεγκ', ἐξ ὀνειρόου δ' αὐτίκα / ἦν ὕπαρ, 64–67). This confirms the role of the divine in human intellectual pursuits, a topic introduced earlier with the Horai inspired σοφίσματα of the Corinthians (16–17).<sup>146</sup> An enigmatic gnome precedes the list

<sup>143</sup> In this respect Pindar's version may owe something to the story which has Bellerophon capture Pegasus without the intervention of a god. See Hubbard 1986:30.

<sup>144</sup> On the mysterious powers represented by the horse in general and Pegasus as the offspring of Medusa in particular, see Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):190–196.

<sup>145</sup> See Dickson 1986:127–128 for other examples of πόθος and πάθος in Pindar.

<sup>146</sup> See Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):207 n. 4 on the connection between μήτις and σοφισμα.

of Corinthian inventions (18–22): ἅπαν δ' εὐρόντος ἔργον (“All credit belongs to the discoverer,” 17). Who is the εὐρών? Although the Horai are the source of the inventions the credit does seem to be given to the Corinthians who revealed, “discovered,” what had been put in their hearts.<sup>147</sup> However, when Athena presents Bellerophon with the bridle, one of the inventions attributed to the Corinthians, the relationship becomes more complicated. Slater translates the gnome “every work of art has its creator.”<sup>148</sup> Athena clearly is the creator of the bridle, but Bellerophon can be said to have discovered it and he is the one who puts it to use. While the role of the divine is muted in the general overview of Corinthian intelligence, the elaboration of the specific example of the bridle involving Athena and Bellerophon shows that man’s abilities have limits that can only be overcome with the support of the divine. This is confirmed by the gnome which ends the account of how Bellerophon finally obtained the instrument that would put Pegasus in his power: τελεῖ δὲ θεῶν δύναμις καὶ τὰν παρ’ ὄρκον καὶ παρὰ ἐλπίδα κούφαν κτίσιν (“The gods’ power easily brings into being even what one would swear impossible and beyond hope,” 83). Bellerophon’s fruitless yearning and consequent suffering demonstrate the limits of human effort, while Athena’s gift of the bridle is an example of the effortless power of the gods, which, if man submits to it, can make great things possible for him. This is exactly what Bellerophon does. When he realises that his efforts are in vain he turns to the local seer, the representative of the gods, for advice. He takes the initiative to solve his problem, thus showing the active involvement which is also the basis of his accountability for his deeds, and is rewarded with the magic bridle for doing the seer’s bidding to sleep on Athena’s altar (δεῖξέν τε Κοιρανίδα πᾶσαν τελευτὰν πράγματος, ὥς τ’ ἀνὰ βωμῶν θεᾶς / κοιτάξατο νύκτ’ ἀπὸ κείνου χρήσιος, ὥς τέ οἱ αὐτὰ / Ζηνὸς ἐγχεικεραύνου παῖς ἔπορεν / δαμασίφρονα χρυσόν, 75–78).

Bellerophon’s driving ambition, already evident in his anxious striving to gain control of Pegasus, is again displayed in the incubation episode by the intensity of his actions. On awakening he *leaps straight up* to his feet (ἀνὰ δ’ ἔπαλτ’ ὄρθῳ ποδί, 72), *seizes* (συλλαβών, 73) the bridle and *gladly* (ἄσμενος, 74) goes to the seer. He tells the *whole* outcome (πᾶσαν τελευτάν, 75) of his encounter with the daughter of Zeus

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Dickson 1986:124–125. Walsh 1984:148 n. 87 reads invention here as “finding what the gods give.”

<sup>148</sup> Slater 1969:195.

*herself* (αὐτά / Ζηνός ... παῖς, 76–77). The reaction of the seer shows that Bellerophon's urgency has been transferred to him. He bids him to obey the dream *as quickly as possible* (τάχιστα, 79) and follow up the sacrifice to Poseidon *straightaway* (εὐθύς, 82) with the erection of an altar to Athena.<sup>149</sup> Whereas Bellerophon's ambition was continually frustrated before his encounter with Athena, her intervention channels the energy reflected in the fast-paced narrative towards success by making him acknowledge his dependence on divine support. The divinely donated bridle will be the instrument of his triumph, but he will only be able to use it after he has given recognition to the gods of the superiority of their power by the sacrifice and the erection of the altar. This is underlined by the placement of the gnome about divine δύναμις and its ability to transcend human limitations between the seer's commands regarding Bellerophon's religious observances and the final realisation of his goal.<sup>150</sup>

Upon the fulfilment of his duties towards the gods the impossible becomes possible for Bellerophon. Not only is he now for the first time identified by his name, but with the backing of divine δύναμις he has been transformed from a yearning suffering man into ὁ καρερός ... Βελλεροφόντας (84), strong, mighty Bellerophon, who is able to capture Pegasus and worthy of doing so. Although the efficacy of his efforts has undergone a radical change, his basic character still asserts itself in the eagerness with which he acts out his dream. He excitedly exerts himself to seize the horse (ὄρμαινῶν ἔλε ... / ... τείνων, 84–85) and having done so immediately engages in a martial display (εὐθύς ἐνόπλια ... ἔπαιζεν, 86).<sup>151</sup>

In the following battles Bellerophon and Pegasus, both empowered by divine intervention, work together to achieve success against the Amazons, the Chimaira and the Solymoi (87–90). The importance of Bellerophon's relationship with Pegasus is indicated by the emphatic placement of σὺν δὲ κείνῳ at the beginning of the passage. Bellerophon's strength lies in the cooperation of Pegasus who, like his master,

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Dickson 1986:130. He sees Bellerophon's vigorous action as a result of his contact with the magic bridle, not as an expression of his personality. Taken to its logical consequence this would mean that the bridle was the root cause of his downfall, not his own overconfidence.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Jouan 1995:276.

<sup>151</sup> On this war dance, see Detienne and Vernant 1978 (French original 1974):196 and Jouan 1995:283–284. Jouan links it to the state of excitement prior to a battle. A display of nervous tension would be thoroughly in keeping with Bellerophon's excitable nature.

has been transformed by the contact with the divine in the form of the bridle from the offspring of a monster (τᾶς ὀφιδέος υἱόν ... Γοργόνος, 63) to the winged horse (ἵππον πτερόεντ', 86) with the power to operate "from the cold recesses of the empty air" (αἰθέρος ψυχρῶν ἀπὸ κόλπων ἐρήμου, 88).<sup>152</sup> Both Bellerophon and Pegasus are the offspring of a god, Poseidon, and a mortal mother. Up to this point they have followed the same trajectory, moving from the limited earth-bound existence of their mortal ancestry to the intermediate space of the sky from where they are empowered to act through the grace of Athena. However, only Pegasus completes the journey to the divine realm.<sup>153</sup> The poet declines to comment on the hero's ignominious end (91, text p. 146), but shows Pegasus on Olympus enjoying the hospitality of Zeus (φάτναι Ζηνὸς ἀρχαῖαι δέκονται, 92). This draws attention to the contrast between their closeness when they confronted opponents and their ultimate separation, and invites the audience to add the details of why and how the tie was severed. Homer states only the fact that Bellerophon incurred the hatred of all the gods (καῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, *Il.* 6.200), but in *Isthmian* 7 Pindar is more specific. When Bellerophon tries to enter Olympus on Pegasus the winged horse breaks the bond by throwing him (ὃ τοι πτερόεις ἔρριψε Πάγασος / δεσπότην ἐθέλοντ' ἐξ οὐρανοῦ σταθμούς / ἐλθεῖν μεθ' ὀμάγουιν Βελλεροφόνταν / Ζηνός, 44–47). The following gnome explains that a "most bitter end awaits that sweetness which is unjust" (τὸ δὲ πᾶρ δίκαν / γλυκὴ πικροτάτα μένει τελευτά, 47–48). Bellerophon's μῦθος (*Ol.* 13.91) is the result of his appropriation of the good (γλυκὴ) he has been given for unacceptable ends (πᾶρ δίκαν). When he acted within the bounds set for humans Pegasus worked with him, but when he tries to go beyond his powers Pegasus becomes the instrument of his downfall. Homer paints a bleak picture of Bellerophon's τελευτά: he wanders the Aleian plain alone, cut off from all human contact and devoured by grief (ἦ τοι ὁ κάπ πεδῖον τὸ Ἀλήιον οἶος ἀλᾶτο, / ὄν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείων, *Il.* 6.201–202). The myth of *Olympian* 13 ends on the contrast between the ultimate fates of Bellerophon and Pegasus: Pegasus reached Olympus and immortality while Bellerophon did not. The failure of Bellerophon's final effort not only means that he for-

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Dickson 1986:129–130 and 131–132 on the signalling of transformation by the use of different names or epithets.

<sup>153</sup> For Bellerophon's origins, see Hesiod *Cat.* 7.3–16. For Pegasus' origins and his flight from earth to the house of Zeus, see Hesiod *Theog.* 274–287.

feits the company of the gods to which Pegasus has been elevated, but also, looking back at the beginning of the narrative, that he has lost his earthly ties and possessions, the “kingship and rich inheritance and the palace” (61–62) that belonged to him before he set out on his quest. His isolation from god and man is complete.

The myth about Bellerophon and Pegasus shows what a man can achieve with divine help, but it also hints strongly at the danger that someone so gifted may be tempted to stray into forbidden territory. In the transition from the myth to the final praise of the Oligaiithidai the poet shifts the focus from the doomed Bellerophon (91) to Pegasus on Olympos (τὸν δ’ ἐν Οὐλύμπῳ, 92) and then turns to himself and how he fulfils his obligations (ἐμὲ δ’ ..., 93–95) before he begins the enumeration of Oligaiithid victories. The transition from the first victory catalogue to the myth is in the form of gnomic comment on the necessity of observing μέτρον and καιρός (47–48), in the first place with reference to the poet’s task, but also as a general principle with implications for the *laudandi*. After the myth it takes the form of a metaphor, the poet presenting himself as a javelin thrower who, “in casting whirling javelins on their straight path, must not hurl those many shafts from (his) hands beside the mark” (εὐθὺν ἀκόντων / ἴεντα ῥόμβον παρὰ σκοπὸν οὐ χροῖ / τὰ πολλὰ βέλεα καρτύνειν χερσῶν, 93–95). The image is that of a warrior for whom accurate aim is a matter of life and death.<sup>154</sup> Also, he has to be able to hit the target repeatedly, not just once, something which requires great skill. The target of the poetic javelin is in the first place praise, and by admonishing himself not to miss this mark the poet gives an undertaking that praise will indeed follow. Helping the Muses to exalt the Oligaiithidai is after all his primary purpose (Μοῖσαις γὰρ ἀγλαοθρόνοις ἐκὼν / Ὀλιγαίθιδαισίν τ’ ἔβαν ἐπίκουρος, 96–97).<sup>155</sup> Like the skilled warrior who launches πολλὰ βέλεα successfully he

<sup>154</sup> Hubbard 1986:42 n. 45 implies that it is an athletic metaphor. However, war is indicated by the reference to aiming at a mark, and the emphasis on accuracy. In athletic competition achieving distance was the goal, not hitting a mark as in war. See Gardiner 1910:339, 347–348, 354–355 and Harris 1964:92. The context of war is also the more likely considering the immediately preceding account of Bellerophon’s martial exploits and the poet’s positioning of himself with reference to the hero (see below). Moreover, he comes as ἐπίκουρος (97), “militärischer Verbündeter” to praise the Oligaiithidai. See Nünlist 1998:231 and 309–310 on this image.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Most 1985:194–195 on statements in the epinikia that deny or reject the danger that the transition from myth to praise will not be made. Although Hubbard 1986:42 also interprets the metaphor in terms of the transition from myth to praise, he misreads the image by likening the mythological section to the “whirling wind-up” of the javelin

will celebrate the many victories of the Oligaitheidai appropriately, on the one hand giving recognition where it is due, but on the other hand not making himself guilty of the excess that could attract the φθόνος of gods and men.

However, the metaphor conveys more than just encomiastic propriety. With the emphatically placed ἐμὲ δ' (93) at the beginning of the line, strophe and triad and parallel to the τὸν δ' (92) which refers to Pegasos, the poet positions himself, like the winged horse, as the antithesis of Bellerophon regarding the outcome of their endeavours. He will not fail as Bellerophon ultimately did. At the same time this position means that his is the example to follow for making optimal use of one's talent, the συγγενὲς ἦθος of line 13, within the boundaries set for mortals. The πολλά βέλεα can therefore also refer to topics of a more general nature addressed in the poem, such as combining extreme effort with restraint. The "whirling javelin" embodies the emphasis on accuracy, on throwing "straight" (εὐθύον, see n. 155). This reaffirms the broader moral context of the encomiastic activity announced in the opening triad by contrasting the poet's control, his τόλμα ... / εὐθειᾶ (11–12), with the excess that comes from bold-tongued arrogance ("Υβρον, Κόρου ματέρᾳ θρασύμυθον, 10). In the concluding triad of the poem the poet demonstrates both elements of the metaphor, in his commitment to his commission of praise and by his statement of the moral stance required of successful people, particularly as it pertains to their relationship with the divine.

It has already been shown that the second victory catalogue admirably fulfils the poet's duty to praise the Oligaitheidai. His comments on their unusual wish for more Olympic victories tactfully suggest the proper attitude when people who have achieved much have even higher ambitions. In desiring more Olympic victories when they have already achieved three of these highest achievements the Oligaitheidai resemble Bellerophon, who not only desired power over Pegasos when he already enjoyed a rich life but, having achieved that power, reached even further to the realm of the gods. His unhappy fate demonstrates the need for a reminder that human desires are subject to divine sanction. The

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and linking the "final spear cast" with the supposedly "singular and linear (εὐθύον) praise of the victor." In fact the whirling motion does not refer to the way the javelin is prepared for launch but to how it moves after release. Rotation around its axis can be achieved with the help of a thong and improves accuracy. See Gardiner 1910:346 and Harris 1964:93. The spinning javelin therefore strengthens the poet's implied assurance that he will indeed be on target.

poet links the Oligaithidai's possible future success to the opportunity it would give him to exercise his poetic talent (τά τ' ἔσσομένα τότ' ἄν φαίην σαφές, 103). In this way his declaration νῦν δ' ἔλπομαι μέν, ἐν θεῶ γε μάν / τέλος ("at this point I am hopeful, but with the god is the outcome," 104–105) expresses qualified optimism regarding his own ambition to celebrate more Olympic victories as well as the Oligaithidai's goals, thus softening the injunction to bow to divine will. In the light of the family's proven record of success it is certainly reasonable to indulge in hope, but just as Bellerophon needed divine help to realise his dream the final outcome of expectations of victory (and the commissions for poetry that may follow) must be left to god. Whereas the gnome explaining Bellerophon's success (83) highlights the restrictedness of the human perspective considering the δύναμις of the gods, here the danger of exaggerated hopes is pointed out. In the first case what to man may seem impossible and not even worth hoping for can easily be achieved if divine power comes to his aid. In the second what to man may seem an obvious possibility with every chance of realisation may be contrary to the gods' plans, as Bellerophon found out to his cost. The fundamental role of the gods in the unfolding of human life is reiterated with specific reference to the Oligaithidai and their aspirations: εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι, / Δι τοῦτ' Ἐνυαλίῳ τ' ἐκδώσομεν πρῶσσειν (105–106). Future success must be surrendered to the gods. With the pointed inclusion of the *laudandi* through the use of the first person plural ἐκδώσομεν the poet proclaims that they share with him the conviction that their best hope lies in acknowledging the power of the gods and trusting them for the outcome of their future endeavours.<sup>156</sup> In addition to its function as praise the following enumeration of victories (106–113) can then be seen as a recognition that their past victories were a gift from the gods which at the same time strengthens their hopes for the future.<sup>157</sup>

At the end of the victory catalogue the poet urges himself to "escape by swimming out with nimble feet" (ἄγε κούφοισιν ἔκνευσον ποσίν, 114; my translation). The impression of having been all but swamped by the

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Theunissen 2000:394: "Gleichwohl ermutigt er den Wettkämpfer zu einer starken Hoffnung, stark nicht im Selbstvertrauen, aber im Vertrauen auf den Gott, in dessen Händen die Zukunft liegt." For his analysis of *Ol.* 13.104–105 as an expression of the ἐλπὶς "*aus* der (Pindar) spricht" as it distinguishes itself from that "*von* der (er) spricht," see pp. 393–395, and for his full discussion of the topic pp. 307–340 (archaic lyric) and pp. 341–395 (Pindar).

<sup>157</sup> Cf. Theunissen 2000:394–395.

“sea of victories”<sup>158</sup> and the allusion to danger in escaping from it once again imply the ever-present risk of succumbing to ὕβρις and κόρος where great human achievement is involved.<sup>159</sup> However, as κούφοισιν ... ποσίν shows, the poet is confident that he has avoided these pitfalls and structured his praise in a fitting manner. Significantly, with κοῦφος he applies to himself the same word which describes the gods’ ability to bring about what man regards as impossible (κούφαν κτίσιν, 83). This means that with his poem he has succeeded in the task of praising the numerous achievements of a politically prominent and ambitious family within the framework of μέτρον and καιρός as it pertains to man’s social relations as well as his relationship with the divine, something which many may have regarded as impossible. With this image of the accomplished swimmer who negotiates difficulties with ease the poet also reinforces his position as the positive *exemplum* in the poem.

The poem closes with a brief prayer: Ζεῦ τέλει, αἰδῶ δίδοι καὶ τύχαν τερπνῶν γλυκεῖαν (115).<sup>160</sup> The epithet “accomplisher” is a recognition of the power of Zeus, representing the gods, on the one hand to make things happen for mortals (τελεῖ δὲ θεῶν δύναμις, 83), on the other to determine whether their endeavours will have the longed-for result (ἐν θεῶ ... / τέλος, 104–105). The first request, for αἰδῶς, is a reminder that this power should be respected. αἰδῶς is a complex concept. In the closing prayer of *Olympian* 7 Zeus is asked to grant the victor αἰδοίαν χάριν, “respectful favour,” from both his fellow citizens and strangers (89–90). In the opening lines of *Olympian* 13 the victor’s οἶκος is praised for its good treatment of citizens and foreigners (ἡμερον ἄστοις, / ξένοισι δὲ θεράποντα, 2–3) so the closing prayer may well allude to the respect owed them in return. This is Bundy’s reading of the prayer which he sees as consisting of the conventional “‘double crown’ of success and good repute.” He interprets αἰδῶς in a passive sense, rejecting the active sense of “modesty.”<sup>161</sup> It is therefore something received, not exercised. However, according to Hubbard this meaning only applies when αἰδῶς

<sup>158</sup> Gildersleeve 1908:236.

<sup>159</sup> For ἐκνέω as escaping, swimming out of danger or difficulty, cf. Euripides *Cyc.* 1186, *Hipp.* 469 and *Hipp.* 823. Cf. also Nünlist’s conjecture that with κούφοισιν ... ποσίν “das Herauswaten gemeint ist, nachdem der Schwimmer wieder festen Boden unter den Füßen hat” (Nünlist 1998:308).

<sup>160</sup> On “last requests” as a closural technique in Greek lyric, see Rutherford 1997:44–46. Most of the examples in his article are from Pindar. See also Race 1990:119–127 on concluding prayers in epinicians.

<sup>161</sup> Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:72 with n. 93, followed by Race 1990:122.



is used with a dependent genitive (as at *Ol.* 7.44 and *Pyth.* 4.218), and he reads its use in *Ol.* 13.115 as the modesty or restraint which should be exercised equally by victor and poet.<sup>162</sup> Theunissen's interpretation resembles Hubbard's in attaching to αἰδώς an active meaning, but is closer to Bundy's in defining it as "Scheu," awe or reverence, not "Scham," modesty.<sup>163</sup> Unlike Bundy, however, he reads the reverence prayed for at the end of *Olympian* 13 not as a wish for acknowledgement in society, but as an acknowledgement that man does not command the future. The prayer for αἰδώς thus becomes an "Erkenntnis ..., daß die Scheu vor einem Gott, der allein künftiges Glück schenken kann, von eben diesem Gott selbst noch geschenkt werden muß."<sup>164</sup> Such reverence for the power of the divine is the prerequisite for granting the second request, that for the "sweet fortune of pleasant things." The image of the swimmer preceding the closing prayer alludes to the danger of overestimating mortal ability and forgetting that it is subject to divine favour. αἰδώς, reverence for the gods, will counteract any such tendency and make the desired future success possible.

In *Olympian* 13 Pindar evokes the human condition with reference to its implications for the proper conduct of life. Man's responsibilities in society receive attention, but it is the question of the optimal use of his talents, which involves the divine dimension, which forms the main thrust of the poem. In keeping with the fact that this ode celebrates a family, the Oligaitheidai of Corinth, on the occasion of the Olympic victories of one its members, the social focus is their position in the city and how they acquit themselves of their responsibilities.<sup>165</sup> While they are commended for their role in preserving the stability of the ruling oligarchy they are also reminded that this role has limits. If family ambition should turn into ὕβρις, the danger of κόρος, usurping more than their share of power, cannot be excluded. The consequences of such a social transgression are not elaborated, but the desolation which is Bellerophon's ultimate fate for disregarding the gods may be regarded as equally applicable to the overstepping of social limits.

<sup>162</sup> Hubbard 1985:142 with n. 32.

<sup>163</sup> Theunissen 2000:355.

<sup>164</sup> Theunissen 2000:395.

<sup>165</sup> Apart from the matter-of-fact reference to Thessalos and Ptoiodoros as fathers (35, 41) and Glaukos' boast of the prominent position of his "father" in Corinth (61–62) personal relationships do not feature in *Olympian* 13, nor do these references make any comments on the nature or obligations of the father-son relationship.

The major focus of the praise of the Oligaiθidai is their inborn talentedness, demonstrated by their prodigious athletic success and, by association with figures from Corinthian myth, their intellectual abilities. Their quest for more of the prestige attached to victories at Olympia betrays their ambition to reach even higher. The poem tracks two ways of pursuing such a goal, the way of ὕβρις and κόρος, exemplified by Bellerophon, which disregards the limits placed on mortals, and the way of μέτρον and καιρός, exemplified by the poet, which gives due recognition to the power of the gods.

Bellerophon's story makes it clear that it is not wrong to strive to exploit one's talents to the utmost. On the contrary, Athena's support shows that if the help of the gods is sought in this endeavour even the seemingly impossible can be achieved. However, mortals are also held accountable for their use of the divine gift. Like Bellerophon, if they do not recognise their dependence on the gods but use their gifts to further a personal agenda in defiance of mortal limitations, they will inevitably be ruined. In contrast, the poet is the epitome of the proper exploitation of god-given talent. He sees his task as a service to the Muses and recognises the need to keep his praise, now and in the future, within the bounds demanded by Zeus. Yet his circumspection is not a case of cringing submissiveness. His confidence in his gift, apparent throughout the poem, is founded on the certainty that he is exercising it in accordance with divine will and is therefore assured of success. As far as the Oligaiθidai are concerned he knows that he has convincingly held up for them the alternatives open to anyone wishing for greater glory. They are bound to respond in accordance with their συγγενὲς ἦθος, which means that the sweet pleasure of continued good fortune is theirs.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE POET AS MEDIATOR OF COSMOLOGY

The overview given in Chapter 3 of cosmological tenets underlying Pindar's poetry is by its very nature a simplification of a complex web of beliefs, norms, traditions and practices that are seldom explicitly acknowledged as determining the ordinary conduct of life. The simplification results in the first place from the categorisation imposed from outside on the cosmology described. Categories are not an inherent characteristic of cosmology as defined in this study (a popular, unsystematized world view; see Chapter 3, pp. 29–30), and are therefore not only to a large extent arbitrary, but also inevitably portray the views of various aspects of life as more coherent and consistent than they are likely to have been. A second contributing factor is that the overview is based on only a selected element of the poetry, the *gnomai*, which in spite of their suitability for such an undertaking as argued in Chapter 2 may at times lead to a degree of distortion in the picture presented.

The simplification provided by an overview is, however, a useful backdrop against which an evaluation can be made of the presentation of cosmological concerns as they pertain to a specific victor and his unique circumstances, as well as of Pindar's general strategy regarding the positioning of a poem in its cosmological context. The epinikia analysed in Chapter 4, *Olympian* 12, *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13, demonstrate to varying degrees how the complexity of an actual situation compels the poet to emphasise different aspects of the cosmology or even to suggest variations to accepted views. The analyses suggest that Pindar is not an unthinking spokesman for a rigidly enforced world view, but that he consciously exploits this element to further his encomiastic ends.<sup>1</sup>

In both *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 the poet figure plays an important role. His actions indicate that presenting the cosmological context of a particular celebration in an appropriate way is part of the poet's task. In this chapter I take a closer look at the role of the poet in mediating cos-

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<sup>1</sup> See Stenger 2004:317 n. 185, 347 for a similar conclusion regarding Bakchylides.

mological ideas. First *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 are considered again with the focus on the poet's modification of a cosmological principle in the former and demonstration of such principles in the latter. Taking as point of departure the oblique presence of the poet in *Olympian* 12 the section on short odes investigates how the narrator is identified as poet and to what extent this influences his role in the communication of cosmology. In addition to *Olympian* 12, the four short poems *Olympian* 5, *Pythian* 7, *Nemean* 2 and *Isthmian* 3 are treated. In conclusion the perspectives the poet gives on the same cosmological theme in two full-length odes, *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3, are compared.

At this point a clarification of the possible referents of the term 'the poet' is needed. Following the near universal rejection of the autobiographical tradition in Pindaric scholarship a distinction is often made between the man Pindar and the narrator of his poems, most importantly in order to prevent the identification of the feelings and opinions expressed by the latter with those of the former. A recent example is Mackie's statement on this issue: "... , when I refer to 'the poet,' I am speaking of the constructed, fictional narrator of the odes—I do not mean to imply anything about the real live poet Pindar."<sup>2</sup> Divorcing the narrator-poet so absolutely from the biographical poet may be effective for exonerating Pindar from all kinds of presumed failings (such as being "backward-looking") and avoiding unsubstantiated biographical and historical assertions, but it does not account for the fact that the odes are the products of the "real live poet Pindar" and that he created the narrator-poet of each poem.<sup>3</sup> More useful is Rubin's distinction between the epinician speaker, the poet figure who acts in what she terms the Encomium World, and the poet Pindar who acts in the real world, as well as her recognition that, just as the former world resembles the latter, the poetic roles of the epinician poet figure correspond to a large degree to the social functions of the real poet and that "the way Pindar depicts the E-speaker in all his intensional roles has impor-

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<sup>2</sup> Mackie 2003:3 n. 8.

<sup>3</sup> The implied denial of any link between Pindar and 'the poet' can have absurd results. Mackie's definition of 'the poet' is given in a note to another statement: "I interpret the persona constructed and projected by the epinician poet as a convention specific to the genre and its function" (Mackie 2003:3). Substituting her definition for 'the epinician poet' in this statement gives "the persona constructed and projected by the constructed, fictional narrator of the odes," which, if Pindar has nothing to do with it, means that 'the poet' is a self-constructed construct (Mackie uses 'the epinician poet' and 'the poet' interchangeably).

tant implications for his own self-presentation in the real world.”<sup>4</sup> An important consequence of Mackie’s strict separation as against Rubin’s more flexible approach is that Mackie’s ‘poet’ seems to be a convention which, like other rhetorical conventions, may admit of variation in expression, but in essence remains the same throughout the oeuvre, whereas Rubin’s epinician speaker is “objectified” and “shaped” by the real-world poet as his purposes change in accordance with the circumstances of the particular victor he is celebrating.<sup>5</sup> Rubin traces correlations between the mythic and non-mythic sections of *Olympian 1* which “allow Pindar to show a highly efficacious E-speaker attempting to alter reality for the victor . . . , and, in the process, for himself.” Her ultimate aim is to show how the real-world poet Pindar uses the narrator-poet to express his own concerns about the possible outcomes of his poem.<sup>6</sup> With reference to the cosmological context of Pindar’s victory odes Rubin’s distinction between the poet Pindar and the E-speaker can be used first to show how the narrator-poet constitutes the cosmology according to the particular circumstances of the victor and his family and then to make conclusions about the real poet’s approach to the presentation of cosmology in his poetry. However, unlike Rubin’s interpretation of the narrator-poet as the indirect mouthpiece for Pindar’s own views about the effect of his poetry, in the case of the incorporation of cosmological concerns into a poem the issue is not what Pindar believed about the world and man’s place in it, but how he applied such beliefs to his patron’s advantage through his manipulation of the narrator-poet. As far as cosmology is concerned the narrator-poet is not the mouthpiece of the author-poet but a persona used by him to

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<sup>4</sup> Rubin 1984:377–379, 382.

<sup>5</sup> Rubin 1984:391. Cf. Pfeijffer 1999:10 on the bonds between Pindar and his patrons:

We cannot possibly tell whether Pindar’s personal concern was genuine. All we can say is that a hired occasional poet is more likely to express his commissioner’s viewpoint at the cost of his own than *vice versa*.

Pfeijffer makes no formal distinction between Pindar and the epinician speaker, but does regard the depiction of intimacy with the poet’s patrons and audience as probably fictional (p. 9), which amounts to an implied distinction. Stenger 2004:318–344 discusses the particular self-presentation of Pindar and Bakchylides in their victory odes as a necessary foundation for successful gnomic argumentation. He concludes that the epinician poet constructs for himself a poetic identity in accordance with the demands of his public and that this identity does not necessarily coincide with that of the historical individual (p. 343).

<sup>6</sup> Rubin 1984:378, 391–393. Cf. also Rubin 1988:1070.

further his encomiastic aims. In the following discussion ‘the poet’ is the constructed narrator-poet unless clearly indicated by a reference to the author-poet Pindar.

*Isthmian 4: The poet modifies a cosmological premise*

*Isthmian 4* opens with a confident statement by the poet of his mission to praise Melissos and his family and the ease with which it can be accomplished because of Melissos’ achievement at the Isthmos and the family’s excellence in general. This opening establishes a strong presence for the poet in the ode which is maintained until the final line. Initially the poet’s emphasis is on his role as praise singer (1–4), but the introduction of certain conventional cosmological elements subtly changes the focus. Both the poet and the Kleonymidai enjoy the support of the divine, but they are mortal men and thus subject to vicissitude like everyone else (1, 5–6). Praise for the family’s standing in the community and their achievement of the utmost in excellence (7–12) is followed by a reminder of the limits to which mortal men must adhere (13). The family’s loss of four men in war (16–17b) demonstrates the vicissitude which has previously been stated generally in a gnome. Since this setback a “different wind” in the form of Melissos’ Panhellenic victory has however turned the tide for them again and it is the poet’s task with his hymn in honour of the victory to restore the family’s fame (18–24). The victory as compensation for losses in other spheres of life is a topic in several other odes. Ergoteles’ success in the greater Hellenic world is his reward after the loss of his fatherland (*Olympian* 12), Herodotos of Thebes’ chariot race victory provides relief to his father after he experienced political trouble (*Isthm.* 1.32–40) and for Arkesilas of Kyrene a Pythian victory represents the return of calm after the storms of political turmoil (*Pyth.* 5.5–11). The closest parallel to *Isthmian 4* is found in *Isthmian 7* where the grief caused by the death in battle of Strepsiadās’ uncle turns to song and celebration because of his victory (23–39).<sup>7</sup> In contrast to *Isthmian 7*, which celebrates a traditionally well-built and handsome pancratiast whose success mirrors his beauty (22), the situation is complicated in *Isthmian 4* by the fact that the victor does not conform to the norm which links excellence with an imposing appear-

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the topic with reference to all these passages, see Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:48–52.

ance. The task of the poet is therefore not just the straightforward presentation of the glory of victory as an antidote to suffering and loss, but the more difficult one of convincing the audience that the victor is worthy of glory. The prestige of both the victor and his family turns on the poet's ability to cast Melissos and his victory in a new light. The analysis of the poem has shown how he does this by challenging the traditional outlook that beauty promises great deeds (which is accepted without comment in *Isthmian* 7) and replacing it with the idea that deeds alone warrant glory, while at the same time implying through his choice of images that success confers its own grace. The poet's consciousness that he is confronting society's prejudices is clear from his comparison of his song for Melissos with Homer's poetry which rehabilitated Aias in the eyes of the world. Although the references to the Kleonymidai's losses and Melissos' ugliness are made only after both the family and the victor have been comprehensively praised, it can be assumed that the audience of the poem was well aware of these uncomfortable circumstances. The poet's confident opening statement that he has a multitude of options to choose from for the current celebration can therefore also be seen as a direct challenge to a sceptical audience. His intentions are underlined by the Homer comparison which includes the audience in the project of giving Melissos appropriate recognition for his efforts. The important role of the poet in changing reality for the victor, and in consequence for his beleaguered family, is confirmed by the final image which shows him pouring grace on Melissos and thus symbolically fulfilling his assignment to turn an ugly man into a worthy and respected winner.

The poet's treatment of the cosmological issues involved in Melissos' victory and his family's misfortunes is a blend of conforming to traditional views regarding a mortal's position in the world and challenging the norms that regulate a man's position in society. The divine is acknowledged as the foundation of human prosperity. When man suffers the setbacks that are an inevitable consequence of his mortal nature it is in the power of the gods to relieve his suffering, as Poseidon's gift of victory to the Kleonymidai after their losses in war demonstrates. Man's mortality also means that in reaching for excellence he must always be aware of the limits of his powers and refrain from trying to reach what is only accessible to the gods. These ideas, firmly established in the first triad of the poem, can be seen as the shared cosmological platform from which the poet sets about the more delicate task of convincing the audience that they should change their judgment that Melissos is *ὄvo-*



τός, a judgment based on conventional notions of a man's appearance and his worth, by considering his deeds and the lustre they confer on him.<sup>8</sup>

It is fair to say that the notion that beauty is a manifestation of the god-given natural ability which is the foundation of all great deeds is part of the outlook on life reflected in Pindar's poetry (see Chapter 4 for details). However, the fact that the narrator-poet of *Isthmian* 4 challenges this commonplace proves that such ideas are used pragmatically, not to further any personal cosmological agenda, but to enhance the glory of a particular victor. While it is possible and perhaps even likely that Pindar, like his aristocratic contemporaries, subscribed to the idea that beauty and deeds go together, his presentation of the poet in *Isthmian* 4 as the one who modifies this idea to the advantage of the *laudandus* shows that the latter's circumstances rather than any convictions the author is presumed to have determine the emphasis of praise, even where the supposedly rigid aristocratic outlook is concerned.

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<sup>8</sup> The myth of *Olympian* 4 for Psaumis of Kamarina contains the only other example in Pindar's work of a discrepancy between a man's appearance and his achievements. The story of the Argonaut Erginos and the Lemnian women is told to illustrate the truth that a man's deeds prove his worth (διάπειρά τοι βροτῶν ἔλεγχος, 18). Erginos elicits the scorn (ἀτιμία, 20) of the women on account of his prematurely grey hair. Since this makes him look older than his years, he is judged unfit for action. (Although his ability to perform well at Hypsipyle's games seems to be questioned, it is more than likely that the women in fact doubt his virility—having killed their husbands, they planned to seduce the Argonauts in order to repopulate their island.) By winning the race in armour he demonstrates his speed and can therefore confidently assure the women of his strength and courage (οὗτος ἐγὼ ταχυτάτω / χεῖρες δὲ καὶ ἦτορ ἴσον, 24–25), i.e. his manliness. There is still no agreement on whether the myth should be read to imply that Psaumis' abilities were doubted because of his appearance or not. For example, T. Schmitz 1994 argues that the function of the myth, with the gnome which it elucidates, is merely to support the poet's contention that his praise of Psaumis is truthful (οὐ ψεύδει τέγξω / λόγον, 17–18) and that it says nothing about Psaumis' appearance, while Erbse 1999:15–16 (without reference to any other scholars) assumes a physical resemblance between the victor and Erginos (for brief discussions of the different positions, and references, see Gerber 1987:22 and T. Schmitz 1994:210 with nn. 3–5). Even though the gnome underlines the pre-eminence of deeds, the myth demonstrates, as does the case of Melissos of Thebes, that the accepted view was that a man's appearance could be used to appraise his potential for success. On the topic of proving one's worth in deeds, see Gundert 1935:13–14 and Bowra 1964:178–180, and for parallels from other poets Gerber 1987:20.

*Olympian 13: The poet demonstrates cosmological principles*

As in *Isthmian 4* the narrator of *Olympian 13* immediately identifies himself as poet (ἐπαινέων οἶκον ... γνώσομαι ... Κόρινθον, 2–4) and is a prominent character throughout the ode. However, the poet plays completely different roles in the two poems. In *Isthmian 4* he relies on the power of his craft to change reality for the victor and consequently for his family. By poetic means he transforms an ugly winner into someone worthy of the recognition of society. The focus is the relationship between the victor and his fellow citizens with the poet acting as mediator between them. In *Olympian 13* no special claims are made for the powers of poetry to enhance the prestige of the victor and his family. It is clear from the opening praise of the family and the city of which they are co-rulers as well as the two extensive victory catalogues that grounds for glorification are not lacking. Rather, the issue is how to keep the tribute for such a prominent and successful family within acceptable bounds. These bounds are defined primarily in terms of man's mortality and his relationship with god. To be sure, the opening praise of the family for their contribution to political stability in the city of Corinth introduces the topic of restraint, but in the rest of the poem the main concern is with finding the limit of human striving and achievement beyond which lies trespassing on the terrain of the gods. The focus is on man's position in the world rather than in society.

In the search for balance between mortal aspiration and the limits of mortality the narrator-poet of *Olympian 13* plays a vital role. Two intertwined strands of action characterise this role of the poet in the ode. Most conspicuous is his recurring commentary on the way he performs his task of praise, but equally important is his acknowledgement of the ambit of divine power in both the world inhabited by him and his patrons and the world of the heroes of myth.

The poet makes visible the presence and influence of the divine as a general force in human life through the dealings of particular gods with Corinth and the Oligaihidai. The bond between the city and Poseidon is apparent from its designation as the "portal of Isthmian Poseidon" (Ἰσθμίου / πρῶθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος, 4–5), but it is also closely linked to Dionysos, the Muse and Ares (ταῖ Διωνύσου ... χάριτες, 18–19; ἐν δὲ Μοῖσ' ἀδύπνοος, / ἐν δ' Ἄρης ἀνθεῖ, 22–23). Both the political stability in Corinth and the physical and intellectual abilities of its citizens are attributed to the Horai, the daughters of Zeus (6–10, 14–17). Zeus is the highest representative of divine power and the poet

addresses two prayers to him in that capacity. The prayer preceding the first victory catalogue stresses the supremacy of the god and recognises his power over the fortunes of men, both in their social group and as individuals (24–28), while the concluding prayer confirms that the family’s readiness to entrust future victories to Zeus and Ares (105–106) is an acknowledgement that the fulfilment of all human desires rests with god (115). As far as the world of heroes is concerned the Bellerophon myth demonstrates a gnome about the absolute difference between human and divine δύναμις (83). The former is in fact shown to be worth little without the intervention and support of the latter. In the myth divine δύναμις is demonstrated primarily in the actions of Athena, but the respect accorded to Poseidon, the “mighty Earthholder” (εὐρυσθενεῖ / ... Γαιαόχῳ, 80–81), shows that his goodwill is also indispensable for the fulfilment of Bellerophon’s dream of control over Pegasus.

In his presentation of the reach of the divine in the world of heroes and men the poet twice demonstrates the appropriate human response by referring to his own attitude. Excessive praise for human endeavour constitutes a transgression on the divine terrain. By praying that his words may not provoke Zeus’ envy (ἀφθόνητος ἔπεσιν / γένοιο, 25–26) the poet simultaneously acknowledges the limits of his powers and undertakes to stay within those limits. His reaction to the Oligaithidai’s wish for more Olympic victories shows similar restraint. Although such victories could benefit him as much as the victors he takes care to leave control of the future to the gods and to imply that the family should and will follow his example (101–106).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> It has to be said that in this passage the distinction between the author Pindar and the narrator-poet he has constructed is close to breaking down. The problem arises from the anticipated participation of the poet in the commemoration of future victories. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Pindar is referring to himself as author, but if this is the case the expression of hope that he may have this opportunity, combined with deference to the will of the gods, must also be attributed to the historical Pindar, something which the use of a distinction aims to avoid. One solution would be to assume that the same narrator-poet appears in all the poems, but this would negate the flexibility in points of view which the postulation of a narrator distinct from the author recognises. A compromise solution is to posit continuity as regards the narrator for poems for the same victor or family. (Pindar’s poems provide enough material in the form of multiple poems for one victor to test this proposition; however, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this study.) Of course, the fact that an author can construct a different narrator for different poems implies that he himself is capable of conceiving of the differences embodied by these narrators. If scholars would accept archaic poets’ ability to promote agendas other than their own the need for splitting hairs about the identity of the narrator might disappear. A positive contribution in

The poet's acceptance that his work is circumscribed by a divine plan is part of his self-presentation as someone who makes optimum use of his god-given talents. These talents enable him to do justice to the Oligaithidai's many achievements within the limits ordained by the gods. His tribute to them exemplifies *καιρός*, what is "exactly right," since he has mastered the difficult demands of *μέτρον*, exploiting his poetic gifts fully without going "too far," trespassing on the terrain of the gods (47–48). Unlike Bellerophon, who, forgetting that the bridle was a divine gift, ultimately lost everything, the poet faces the future confidently in the knowledge that his relationship with the gods is sound.

In *Olympian* 13 the poet's own actions and attitudes demonstrate the views with respect to god and man's place in the world expected of a family such as the Oligaithidai. The confidence with which he expounds this particular world view shows that he fully expects the family to be in accord with him. Furthermore, any possible misgivings in Corinthian society as to the family's aspirations, be they athletic or political, are countered by the poet's reassuring insistence on the values of moderation and reverence for the gods.

### *Cosmology and the poet in short odes*

The analysis of *Olympian* 12 in Chapter 4 traces the deliberate way in which the victor's association with his family, city of birth and adopted city is presented to take account of his immigrant status. As in the two longer poems discussed so far the narrator's presence is apparent throughout the poem, from the opening first person singular verb *Λίσσομαι* (1) to the direct address of the victor in the last lines (*Ἐργότελες, / ... βασιτάξεις*, 18–19).<sup>10</sup> However, it is not immediately clear as in the longer poems that the narrator has assumed the persona of a poet, nor is there any obvious indication of the narrator's role in modifying the

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this regard is Mann 2000. He shows that the political structure of a victor's home city and his position in that structure, not the views of the poet, determine whether a specific poem will extol a "Herrschaftssystem" or a "Polisideologie" (see pp. 45–46 for his conclusions). Mann's concern that such pragmatism should not prompt a devaluation of the poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides, but rather be recognised as proof of their poetic greatness (p. 46) can only be attributed to the still current prejudice against archaic value systems.

<sup>10</sup> For a list of signs of the narrator in a text, see Louw 1992:31.

usual identification of the victor with the patriline to suit Ergoteles' circumstances comparable to, for example, the poet's openly expressed intention to use his poetry to benefit Melissos of Thebes (*Isthm.* 4.43–44). To establish whether the mediation of cosmological ideas can nevertheless be regarded as part of the poet's task in *Olympian* 12 it is necessary to determine whether the poem contains any references to a poetic programme. According to Nünlist "(p)oetologische Bildersprache ist ein fester Bestandteil des Programms eines Pindarischen Epinikions," but *Olympian* 12 is the one exception which contains no such image.<sup>11</sup> However, as indicated in the analysis (Chapter 4, p. 111), the narrator's assertion ἦτοι καὶ τεὰ κεν / ... / ἀκλεῖς τιμὰ κατεφυλλορόησε(ν) ποδῶν ("truly would the honor of your feet, ... have dropped its leaves ingloriously"; 13–15) is a litotic expression of the power of poetry to overcome man's mortality and thus refers to the poet's task in this regard. The reference to song is admittedly oblique,<sup>12</sup> but in the light of Nünlist's finding about the pervasiveness of poetological imagery it seems reasonable to assume a poetic persona for the narrator in *Olympian* 12 as in the other odes.

As for this narrator-poet's role in establishing the poem's cosmological context, it appears in his prayer to Tucha, daughter of Zeus, on behalf of Himera (and by implication Ergoteles), which acknowledges divine power over human fortunes (1–5). Less direct, but also part of the cosmological ideas the poet presumably wishes to convey, are the following gnomic expressions of the human condition (5–12a). In the epode the presence of the narrator is again strongly felt through his continuous direct address of the victor (13: υἱὲ Φιλάνορος, ... τεὰ; 16: σ'; 18: Ἐργότελες; 19: βασιτάξεις), but, as has already been noted, he gives no overt sign that he is structuring the social references to fit Ergoteles' unique circumstances.<sup>13</sup> Overall, although cosmological themes are prominent throughout the poem their communication is not portrayed

<sup>11</sup> Nünlist 1998:347, 346. He defines "poetological" statements as "diejenigen Aussagen, aus denen ein dichterisches Programm (eine 'immanente Poetik') abgeleitet werden kann" (p. 10).

<sup>12</sup> Nisetich explicates the reference as follows:

Ergoteles' honor has not shed its leaves and so it is not 'in-glorious'—ἀ-κλεῖς, without κλέος. This is equivalent to saying that it has found its way into song, for song dispenses κλέος. Indeed, from an etymological and practical point of view, song and κλέος are the same (Nisetich 1977:261).

<sup>13</sup> Or at least not a sign that present-day readers can still recognise. The way in which the social particulars pertaining to Ergoteles are presented, as set out in my

as a function of the poet and can only be deduced to be such from the assumption that the ode has a poet as narrator.

Nünlist seems to suggest that the absence of poetological images in *Olympian* 12 can be attributed to its brevity.<sup>14</sup> The question then arises whether other short odes show a similar ambiguity as to the identity of the narrator and the issue of the role of the poet in the mediation of cosmological concepts. The odes that will be considered are *Olympian* 5, *Pythian* 7, *Nemean* 2 and *Isthmian* 3. While all these poems contain imagery suggesting a poetic programme,<sup>15</sup> there is considerable variation in the prominence given to the narrator and in how emphatically he is identified as poet. The effect of these variables on the role of the poet as mediator of cosmology will now be investigated.

*Nemean* 2 opens and closes with images of poetic activity. The prelude to Zeus with which the Homeridai begin their songs serves as comparison for Timodemos' first victory at the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea (1–5), but it can also be linked self-referentially to the introduction of the poem itself.<sup>16</sup> This is confirmed in the final lines when the narrator calls on Timodemos' fellow citizens to begin a celebration with song (24–25), thus positioning this short ode as a prelude to the following κῶμος.<sup>17</sup> In spite of the attention thus drawn to the poem's function as poetry the narrator remains in the background and reveals himself as poet only indirectly. His presence is first felt in the deictic ὄδ' ἀνήρ (3), which points to the victor but does not specify him and thus leaves open the possibility that the narrator is also referring to himself as having made a beginning with his poem in the same way that Timodemos has laid a foundation for future success with this first victory (καταβολὰν ... νικαφορίας δέδεκται πρῶτον, 4).<sup>18</sup> An allusion to the narrator as poet can also be detected in a second meaning of καταβολά, "instalment" or "down-payment" (LSJ s.v.), which hints at the poet's remuneration for the poem as well as the possibility that Timodemos' expected

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analysis, may conceivably have been sufficiently different from the norm to alert the original audience to the poet's intentions.

<sup>14</sup> Nünlist 1998:346 with n. 41.

<sup>15</sup> For details, see the Stellenindex in Nünlist 1998.

<sup>16</sup> Nünlist 1998:117.

<sup>17</sup> Hubbard 1995:55.

<sup>18</sup> Nünlist 1998:117. Other signs of the narrator are the apostrophe and second person pronoun in line 14, and the apostrophe and exhortations in lines 24–25. The first person does not occur.

future victories will mean more commissions for him.<sup>19</sup> Although this poet-narrator gives the victory a divine framework and acknowledges its social context (see Chapter 4, pp. 104–105) he draws no attention to these cosmological categories or his representation of them. To the extent that he is visible at all, the poet fulfils the role of *laudator*, not commentator on or representative of a world view.

*Isthmian* 3 is similar to *Nemean* 2 in that the narrator does not act in the first person, but reveals himself indirectly, for example in relation to his addressees, Zeus (Ζεῦ, ... / ἐκ σέθεν, 4–5) and the audience (ἴστε μάν, 15). In contrast to *Nemean* 2, which contains no *gnomai*, this poem consists only of direct praise for the victor and his family (9–17b) and *gnomai* (1–8, 18–18b).<sup>20</sup> Consequently there is a strong emphasis on cosmological topics, including the importance of reciprocity in human relations (1–3, 7–8), the role of the gods in human life and the need to acknowledge their power (4–6), and the vicissitude inherent in the human condition (18–18b). The gnomic assertion of the views on these topics is another way for the narrator to make his presence felt.<sup>21</sup> This presence is especially noticeable in the strong value judgment expressed by the anaphoric modal *χοή* in εὐκλέων δ' ἔργων ἄποινα χοή μὲν ὑμῆσαι τὸν ἑσλόν, / χοή δὲ κωμάζοντ' ἀγαναῖς χαρίτεσσιν βασιάσαι (“In recompense for glorious deeds one must hymn the good man and must exalt him, as he revels, with gentle poems of praise,” 7–8). Significantly, this gnome deals with the topic of reciprocity specifically as it relates to the poet’s task of praise and can therefore be regarded as the narrator’s self-identification as poet.<sup>22</sup> As for the poet’s mediation of cosmological ideas, although he does not take an explicit stand in this regard, the succession of *gnomai* as well as his acknowledgement of Zeus shows that the communication of certain values is essential to the success of his task as *laudator*. On the one hand the *gnomai* imply that the victor Melissos exemplifies the good man who avoids

<sup>19</sup> Contra Instone 1989:113 n. 16. Since he does not make a connection between the prelude of the Homeridai and the opening of the ode, he rejects this meaning for *καταβολά* here on the grounds that it can only apply to Pindar.

<sup>20</sup> Because of the direct address, Ζεῦ, μεγάλοι δ' ἀρεταὶ θνητοῖς ἔπονται / ἐκ σέθεν (4–5) technically does not qualify as a *gnome*, but in the context it can be read as equivalent to “great achievements come to mortals from Zeus.”

<sup>21</sup> See Louw 1992:31 and 45 n. 40.

<sup>22</sup> On this *gnome* as an expression of the poet’s task, see Nünlist 1998:351 n. 53, and for the poetological images it contains pp. 287–288 (song as recompense) and 307 (song as embrace).

excess on the social level and recognises the divine dispensation for his life, on the other hand they exhort his fellow citizens to demonstrate their commitment to these values by rewarding Melissos with praise.

The narrator of *Olympian* 5 addresses three divinities in succession, the nymph Kamarina, daughter of Ocean (Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ, 2), Pallas Athena (ὦ πολιάοχε Παλλάς, 10) and Zeus the Saviour (Σωτήρ ὑψινεφές Ζεῦ, 17). The song begins with a reference to itself as the reward, dedicated to Kamarina, for Psaumis' success at Olympia (1–3). Although the narrator as poet is thus implied he stays in the background while elaborating on the victor's "lofty deeds" (Ἵψηλᾶν ἀρετᾶν, 1; 4–8). In the following city praise, addressed to its guardian Athena, the narrator retreats behind the victor whom he presents as a poet figure coming from Olympia to sing of the city's sacred places (ἱκῶν δ' Οἰνομάου καὶ Πέλοπος παρ' εὐηράτων / σταθμῶν, ..., αἰεῖδει ..., 9–12).<sup>23</sup> Further praise of the victor (13–14) is followed by a gnome, which again establishes the narrator's presence, about the requirements and risks of achievement and the response of fellow citizens (15–16; see Chapter 3, p. 88 for text and discussion). However, only in the final address to Zeus does the narrator both step forward as character in the text and identify himself unequivocally as poet: ... Ζεῦ, ... / ... / ἱκέτας σέθεν ἔρχομαι Λυδίοις ἀπύων ἐν αὐλοῖς (17–19; "Zeus, ... as your suppliant I come, calling to the sound of Lydian pipes"). The poet approaches the supreme god as suppliant on behalf of the city and the victor, praying for fame for manly deeds for the former and that the latter may continue to enjoy prosperity (symbolised by "Poseidon's horses"), and experience good cheer in old age from the support of his sons (20–23). In the prayer for Psaumis the poet explicitly assumes the task of mediating cosmology. By portraying himself as suppliant he demonstrates the appropriate attitude towards the gods, while his prayer alludes to the human condition with its reference to old age and acknowledges the importance of proper social relations, specifically in the family context.

Cosmological concerns are of course already raised in the addresses to the nymph Kamarina and the goddess Athena and more particularly,

<sup>23</sup> On the retreating narrator, cf. Nünlist 1998:351: "... poetologische Bildersprache (zieht sich) wie ein Faden durch Pindars Liedgeflecht, der bald an die Oberfläche tritt, bald wieder hinter anderen Erzählsträngen verschwindet." On the arrival motif, see Bundy 1962, repr. 1986:27–28 and for details of its use as poetological image Nünlist 1998:229–238.



from the point of view of the poet's role, in the gnome about the broader social context of victory preceding the invocation of Zeus. While the narrator is only retrospectively speaking as poet in this gnome the concluding gnome which follows the prayer is clearly part of the poet's presentation of cosmological ideas. In it he positions the successful individual in both the social and the divine sphere by enumerating the conditions for "healthy prosperity": ὑγιέντα δ' εἴ τις ὄλβον ἄρδει, / ἔξαρκέων κτεάτεσσι καὶ εὐλογίαν προστιθείς, μὴ ματεύσῃ θεὸς γενέσθαι (23–24). This man must combine possessions with a good name, i.e. respect from his community. ἔξαρκέων suggests that this is possible with the right attitude to wealth ("sufficient possessions"), namely being generous with it.<sup>24</sup> A man's attitude to his prosperity also has implications for his relationship with the divine. However successful he may be, he must realise his limitations as a mortal and "not seek to become a god."

From the first two triads Psaumis appears as an example of a man who "fosters a sound prosperity." He uses his wealth to honour the gods and benefit his city and fellow citizens, and therefore enjoys their goodwill. In the last triad the poet steps forward boldly to assume the task of reminding the victor and the audience of what is necessary for continued prosperity. Whether the poet's emphatic self-presentation through the image of the suppliant, and the particular cosmological topics he highlights, reflect the victor's unique circumstances or his standing in the community is not revealed in the poem. The poet's mediation of cosmological ideas can therefore only be evaluated in general terms, not as a response to, for example, an affront to a man's dignity (Melissos, *Isthmian* 4) or actions that may lead to overstepping mortal limits (the Oligaitidai, *Olympian* 13).

In contrast, in *Pythian* 7 the narrator explicitly reacts to the circumstances of the victor when he contrasts the joy of victory with the unpleasant consequences of envy (νέα δ' εὐπραγία χαιρῶ τ· τὸ δ' ἄχθυμαι, / φθόνον ἀμειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, 18–19), and gnomically explains such setbacks as part of the inevitable vicissitude that accompanies enduring happiness (19–21; see Chapter 4, p. 104 for text and discussion). He identifies himself as the poet who has come to sing of

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 1.31–32: οὐκ ἔραμαι πολὺν ἐν μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν, / ἀλλ' ἐόντων εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκούσαι φίλοις ἔξαρκέων ("I do not desire to keep great wealth hidden away in a palace, but to succeed with what I have and be praised for helping friends").

Megakles' and his family's victories (ἀγόντι δέ με ... νῖξαι, 13; "... victories ... prompt me").<sup>25</sup> Another part of his duty as poet is to be a ξένοσ for the victor.<sup>26</sup> His reflection on the human condition involves changing his objective stance as *laudator* of the family's successes to subjective involvement in the victor's circumstances, signalled by the intimate tone of the first person statements in line 18, which project the image of a solicitous friend. It is from this position that he provides a cosmological contextualisation for Megakles' ill-treatment at the hands of his fellow citizens. It is the poet as friend, not just a contractually bound associate, who crafts a positive interpretation of vicissitude. In *Olympian* 5 the suppliant-poet intervenes on behalf of the victor and at the same time conveys relevant cosmological views. Similarly, in *Pythian* 7 the poet acting as ξένοσ offers his gnomic interpretation of the world as consolation and explanation for the trying circumstances accompanying Megakles' success.<sup>27</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion that there is no consistent pattern for short odes regarding the identification of the narrator as poet, the weight given to cosmological ideas and the role of the poet in conveying these ideas. The use of the first person is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient means of identifying the narrator as poet. In *Olympian* 5 and *Pythian* 7 a first person verb and pronoun respectively express the narrator's poetic activity, but in *Olympian* 12 the opening first person verb only retrospectively and obliquely, if at all, makes that connection.<sup>28</sup> In *Nemean* 2 and *Isthmian* 3, neither of which contains first person statements, descriptions of the nature or role of poetry nevertheless confirm that the narrator acts in the capacity of poet. With the exception of *Nemean* 2, which refers to cosmological topics almost in passing, the cosmological context of victory is a prominent element of the poems. Some of the major issues addressed are the supremacy of the gods, the limitations and vicissitude of mortal life, identification with the family, including inherited ability, and reciprocity in social relations, with the

<sup>25</sup> Note also the self-conscious reference to song in the poem's opening lines (1–4).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Lefkowitz 1991:35. For details of the ξενία motif as a poetological image, see Nünlist 1998:291–294. See also Kurke 1991b:135–159 for a discussion of ξενία relationships, including that between poet and victor, in Pindar's epinikia.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 8.42–44 on the need for friends (in the more personal sense of φίλοι) in adversity and prosperity (for text and brief discussion, see Chapter 3, pp. 95–96).

<sup>28</sup> Although the opening stance of the narrator of *Olympian* 12 is very similar to that of the suppliant-narrator of *Olympian* 5 he gives no sign, as the latter does, that his intervention on behalf of Himera is that of a poet.

emphasis, to judge from *Olympian* 12 and *Pythian* 7, determined by the circumstances of the victor.<sup>29</sup>

As for the poet as mediator of cosmology in these poems, since the narrator has been shown to be the poet in every case, whatever is conveyed in this regard can in theory be ascribed to the agency of the poet. However, measured against the emphatic self-presentation of the narrator as poet in *Isthmian* 4 and *Olympian* 13 and the noticeable impact this has on the representation of cosmological issues relevant to the victor or his family, the narrators in the odes under discussion are to varying degrees less outspoken about their task as poet and consequently do not emphasize to the same extent the presentation of a particular cosmological outlook as a distinctive function of their fulfilment of this task.

In *Olympian* 12 the power of poetry to immortalise fame is symbolically evoked, but the narrator does not claim any role in this process (as he does emphatically in *Isthmian* 4). The narrator of *Nemean* 2 refers to the working of song and hints at his own activity in constructing the current poem. However, he does not comment on the song's goals as they pertain to his action as poet, but addresses his exhortation to honour Zeus and the victor with song to the citizens, thus making them responsible for demonstrating reverence in the divine sphere and reciprocity in the social sphere. *Isthmian* 3, the third of the poems in which the narrator is indirectly identified as poet, is the only one which combines this identification with reflection on the poet's task, specifically the obligation to reward the good man for his efforts. The gnomic statement of the poet's duty to praise is in fact the transition to the specific praise for Melissos and his family (9–17b). The general statement made concrete in this way shows that this particular poet has accepted the responsibility to act in accordance with the outlook expressed in the gnome. As such his praise also demonstrates to the citizens of Thebes, whom he reminds of the family's fame and that Melissos has now made a further contribution to it (13–17b; note the emphatic ἵστε μάν, 15), how to fulfil their duty, generally expressed in the opening gnome, towards this particular victor. The poet-narrator of this ode thus reveals himself, albeit indirectly, as mediator for a given outlook and its associated conduct.

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<sup>29</sup> Since the focus in the above brief treatments of the odes is on the poet and his role as mediator of cosmology rather than on the cosmological issues themselves not all of these as they appear in every poem have been mentioned.

Even when the narrator's action as poet is expressed in the first person this does not mean that all the cosmological themes found in a poem are necessarily presented specifically as part of the poet's task. For example, in *Pythian* 7, in addition to the closing reflections of the poet as friend on vicissitude and happiness, a particular world view is represented in the identification of the victor Megakles in terms of his family membership. However, although the poet reveals himself as such in praising the family's achievements there is no indication that he regards his presentation of Megakles' identity as part of his poetic endeavour. His duty is to praise, and the reference to family ties is part of the conventional way of doing this.

The poet as suppliant in *Olympian* 5 to some extent resembles the poet as friend in *Pythian* 7, for example when he evokes an intimate picture of Psaumis enjoying a pleasant old age, surrounded by his children. However, whereas in the latter case the narrator metamorphoses from poet as *laudator* to poet as friend in the course of the poem, in the former his stance remains essentially the same throughout. When he makes explicit his identity as poet in the process of interceding with Zeus on behalf of the city and the victor, this is just the culmination of a series of similar actions, first his offer of the song to Kamarina and then his presentation of the singing victor to Athena. On this basis it can be said that the poet has structured the whole poem, not just the final strophe in which he makes explicit his intentions, to convey the cosmological ideas appropriate to a proper celebration of victory, and that he himself leads the way by showing deference to the gods and using his authority as dispenser of wisdom to pronounce on social relations as well as the successful man's attitude to the divine in the form of *gnomai*.<sup>30</sup>

*Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3: *The poet assumes  
different attitudes to a central cosmological tenet*

Family connections are conspicuously emphasised in many of Pindar's victory odes. On a superficial level the naming of kinsmen and clan serves to identify the victorious athlete, but its real function is to support the idea that inherited ability, *φύα*, is a divine gift that runs in

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<sup>30</sup> In her studies of Pindar's first person statements Lefkowitz regularly points out that these statements cast the poet as moral judge and example; see "poet: as moral

families and provides the foundation of achievement. *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3 are two full-length odes for athletes of whom practically nothing is known apart from their success at the games. It is of course not unusual to find references to an athlete only in sources linked to the games, such as epinikia and victory lists, but the almost total lack of information about the social connections of Epharmostos of Opous and Aristokleidas of Aigina is rare. Apart from Midas of Akragas (*Pythian* 12) Epharmostos is the only victor commemorated by Pindar for whom no clan membership or family ties (e.g. father, grandfather, uncle) are specified.<sup>31</sup> Although Aristokleidas' father Aristophanes is named (*Nem.* 3.20) there is no further allusion to a family of any notable ancestry or achievement.<sup>32</sup> Given the importance attached to natural talent inherited from a man's forebears in Pindar's odes one can reasonably assume that part of the challenge of these commissions was how to account for success in the absence of praiseworthy family connections. Both poems display the common strategies of linking the victor's success to the great

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adviser" in the General Index of Lefkowitz 1991. The above discussions of *Isthmian* 3 and *Olympian* 5 show that the expression of this role is not restricted to first person statements.

<sup>31</sup> If the epithet εὔδοξος (5), which constitutes the only direct praise of Midas, is more than mere convention he was probably famous enough for Pindar to dispense with family detail. Also, the same importance was presumably not attached to inherited ability in playing the αὐλός as in sport. For details of the specification of relationships, see Carey 1989:3 with nn. 12–14. See also Miller 1993a:113 n. 10 on odes in which the victor's father is not mentioned. It is also worth noting that of Bakchylides' victory odes only the very fragmentary Ode 12 contains no family references. It is impossible to determine whether the victories enumerated in lines 33–42 are those of Aigina or of the victor's family. Carey includes Lampromachos (*Ol.* 9.84) in a list of named relatives in Pindar whose relationship with the victor is not specified. However, it is by no means certain that Epharmostos and Lampromachos were related. The reference to προξενία (83) could indicate a political role which brought him into contact with Pindar. Although a literal interpretation of the "arrival motif" (see n. 23 above) in passages such as *Ol.* 9.83–85 runs the risk of positing biographical information where there is none, the poet's statement does seem to indicate that he came for Lampromachos' Isthmian achievement and that Epharmostos happened to win on the same day. It is possible that Lampromachos introduced Epharmostos to Pindar as a fellow citizen. The reference in the ode for Epharmostos could then be the athlete's acknowledgement in return for the introduction to a famous poet, and the poet's for the introduction to a very successful athlete. For discussion of these issues and further references, see Gerber 2002:57–59.

<sup>32</sup> The only similar case of a private citizen praised in a full-length ode is Hagesidamos of Western Lokroi. In *Olympian* 10 his father is mentioned twice (2, 99), but Hagesidamos is praised as a Lokrian rather than as member of a particular family (93–100). This link with the city is made even more emphatically in *Olympian* 11.13–15, the short ode in honour of the same victory. The fact that Hagesidamos had a trainer (*Ol.* 10.17–19) may however indicate a family of some status and means.

deeds of his city's heroes as well as to those of Herakles, the hero par excellence, and making strong general claims for the superiority of inherited excellence.<sup>33</sup> However, although in both cases mythical ancestors fulfil the function of a real family, the value ultimately attached to *φύα*, and especially its divine basis, differs considerably. This difference is reflected most conspicuously in the actions and attitudes of the poet as he relates to the victor and in his portrayal of himself as representative of a particular outlook.

Although Epharmostos' athletic achievements could speak for themselves—with the Olympic victory celebrated in *Olympian* 9 he has not only become a *periodonikēs*, but of individual victors celebrated by Pindar only Diagoras of Rhodes (*Olympian* 7) boasts victories at more sites—these successes as such do not constitute his praiseworthiness. It is what they represent, his inborn excellence and with it the favour of the gods, that makes him a man to be reckoned with. In fact his extraordinary athletic prowess, since it cannot be represented as the logical outcome for a member of a distinguished family, needs an explanation.<sup>34</sup> The creation of a genealogy for Epharmostos that posits an exceptionally close relationship with the city of Opous and its mythical ancestors is the centrepiece of the argument. It is supported by the Herakles myth, which emphasises the divine basis of ability, and the special characteristics of the extended victory catalogue.

The intimate association between Epharmostos and the city of Opous is established early in the poem when the poet urges himself to “praise her (i.e. the city) and her son” (*αἰνήσαις ἔ καὶ υἷόν*, 14). The city as metaphorical parent is a common enough image in Pindar's odes, in fact only a few lines later Opous is called “the Lokrians' mother” (*Λοκρῶν ... ματέρ*, 20). In addition to the city as mother the homeland is often evoked as father with the words *πάτρα* and *πατρίς*.<sup>35</sup> However,

<sup>33</sup> Rose 1974:151 notes Pindar's

preference for myths which view the achievement of the victor as the validation of his blood heritage—literally where possible, otherwise what we might call “metaphorically,” that is, as if the heroes of the victor's homeland were direct bloodline ancestors.

He lists 23 odes containing such myths, among which *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3 are the exceptions which do not also refer to actual family excellence (p. 152).

<sup>34</sup> For examples of a victor's success being directly linked to that of his father, see Chapter 4, pp. 132–133 with n. 85.

<sup>35</sup> In the opening of *Isthmian* 1 the poet refers to Thebe, the nymph representing the city of Thebes, as his mother (*Μάτερ ἑμέα*, 1), states the preeminence of parents by

the image of a man as son of his city is unique to *Olympian* 9. While the city as mother implies the citizens in general as children, the specific designation of Epharmostos as son of Opous makes it clear from the start that theirs is a special bond. This is confirmed in the immediately following praise of Opous when Epharmostos' achievements at Olympia and Pythia are merged with those of the city so that he both exemplifies and enhances the latter's prestige (16–20).<sup>36</sup>

The poet interrupts his city praise to elaborate on his own role in spreading the city's glory by sending out the news of Epharmostos' success (21–25). The ultimate purpose of this digression is to draw attention to the divine foundation of all human ability, summarised in the gnome “men become brave and wise as divinity determines” (ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες / ἐγένοντ', 28–29). The poet first presents himself as an example of this principle at work (25–28) and then proceeds to the mythical example of Herakles who successfully fought the gods Poseidon, Apollo and Hades (29–35). Although he goes on to distance himself from this story because of the implied impiety (35–41) he has forcefully made the point that such power can only be from god (“for how else could Herakles have brandished his club in his hands ...?” ἐπεὶ ἀντίον / πῶς ἂν ... Ἡρακλέης σκύταλον τίναξε χερσὶν / ...; 29–30) and must therefore demonstrate divine favour.<sup>37</sup>

Epharmostos' lack of family prestige has already been noted as creating a special need to prove his praiseworthiness. Having established both the athlete's special bond with the city and the divine source of all outstanding ability, the poet now sets out to demonstrate through the main mythical narrative what the implications of the former are for Epharmostos and with the victory catalogue how his athletic career exemplifies the latter.

The crux of the poet's structuring of the foundation myth of the city of Opous is how its early demise as a result of the childlessness of its king Lokros is avoided. The involvement of the gods is crucial. Zeus is

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means of a gnomic rhetorical question (τί φίλτερον κεδνῶν τοκέων ἀγαθοῖς; 5) and calls Thebes the fatherland of Kadmos' people (Κάδμου στρατῶ ... / ... πατρίδι, 11–12). For the city as mother, see also *Ol.* 6.100 and *Nem.* 5.8, and as fatherland *Ol.* 8.20 and 12.16, *Pyth.* 7.5 and 9.74, *Nem.* 7.85 and 8.46, *Isthm.* 2.27 and 5.43.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Miller 1993a:125.

<sup>37</sup> Gerber 2002:39 makes the important point that the myth is not rejected as untrue. For a detailed discussion of lines 21–41, see Miller 1993a:123–130. For a discussion of the various arguments in the controversies about both the relevance of the Herakles myth and the narrator's rejection of the story, see Gerber 2002:34–36, 39.

instrumental in establishing the city (42, 52–53) while the daughters of the Titan Iapetos and the sons of Kronos (55–56) ensure its continuance under “a native line of kings” (ἐγγύοιοι βασιλῆες, 56). When this line is threatened by extinction Zeus again intervenes. He impregnates the daughter of Opous and brings her to Lokros, who adopts the son born from the union, calls him Opous and hands over the rule of the city to him (57–66). Significantly, these events demonstrate that ties of blood are not the only means of transmitting excellence. However, the adopted son has a divine ancestry, and together with the gods’ ongoing involvement with the city, this underlines the point already made by the Herakles myth that all significant human endeavour depends on divine favour. In the last section of the narrative Patroklos, the son of an immigrant, is singled out for his steadfast support of Achilles in the Greeks’ battle against Telephos (67–75). His role as paradigmatic figure parallels that of Opous insofar as he is, in Miller’s words, “heir to a native tradition of excellence that is maintained without continuity of bloodline.” He adds to the paradigm an engagement with the wider world and a demonstration of courage and “mighty spirit” (βιατὸν νόον, 75).<sup>38</sup>

The designation of Epharmostos as son of the city places him in the same genealogical line as the two heroes singled out in the myth and makes him the latest example of Opountian excellence that is not dependent on ordinary mortal heredity. The comparison is a bold one, flying as it does in the face of traditional notions of the roots of a man’s worth. It can only hold if the implication of special divine favour can be shown to be well-founded, which would also validate the use of Herakles as *exemplum*. The poet knows that this is no easy task and therefore prefaces his presentation of the final proof, the victory catalogue, with an elaborate wish for the success of his endeavour, which at the same time pays prospective homage to the greatness of the victor’s achievements (80–83).<sup>39</sup> The catalogue (84–99) gives concrete evidence of much that is implied by the mythic examples. The range of victories across Greece parallels Patroklos’ movement away from the home city, while the description of Epharmostos’ youthful beauty and concomitant “fairest deeds” (ὠραῖος ἔων καὶ καλὸς κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις, 94) links him directly with Opous who has already been described

<sup>38</sup> Miller 1993a:136, 137.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Miller 1993a:139. My remarks on the catalogue owe much to Miller, esp. pp. 128, 137 and 140–142.



as “a man beyond description for his beauty and deeds” (ὑπέροφατον ἄνδρα μορφῆ τε καί / ἔργοισι, 65–66). Beauty is moreover an accepted indication of a man’s inborn ability and contributes to the argument that Epharmostos is divinely favoured. The most prominent feature of the catalogue is the description of the contest at Marathon, unique in the odes for its comprehensiveness and detail.<sup>40</sup> Apart from displaying the victor’s beauty the victory at Marathon supports the notion of natural talent by emphasizing his extraordinary success in youth. He wins in fine style against older and more experienced competitors, “without a fall” (ἄπτωτί, 92). The victory in a class above his own is reminiscent of Patroklos’ exploits against Telephos and especially Herakles’ fights against the gods. The point is that such courage and skill at such a young age can only be inborn, a gift from the gods, and that Epharmostos must thus be regarded, together with the poet and Herakles, as one of those men who are ἀγαθοί and σοφοί in accordance with the divine dispensation (κατὰ δαίμον’, 28). The ecstatic reaction of the spectators, not only in Marathon, but also in Arcadia and Pellana, furthermore signals to the present audience that others before them have recognised Epharmostos’ god-given talent.<sup>41</sup>

After the victory catalogue the natural ability and divine support it implies are first made the explicit subject of general reflection and then directly applied to the victor. Gnomai about the superiority of talent above learning and (litotically) the indispensable role of god in achievement place Epharmostos’ victories in the general context of cosmological convictions (100–107) and in a self-address the poet states unequivocally that “with divine help this man was born with quick hands, nimble legs, determination in his look” (τόνδ’ ἀνέρα δαμμονία γεγάμεν / εὔχειρα, δεξιόγυιον, ὀρῶντ’ ἀλκάν, 110–111).<sup>42</sup> With this final statement the poet announces his conviction that he has succeeded in portraying a victor who does not have the requisite family status as nevertheless belonging to the elect group favoured by god and therefore

<sup>40</sup> See Pfeijffer 1999:579–580 on other passages containing particulars of a contest and for an assessment of Pindar’s use of such information.

<sup>41</sup> Miller 1993a:142 n. 62 compares the audience’s awed reaction with that of three mythical “audiences,” Amphitryon, Artemis and Athena, and Apollo and Cheiron. Significantly, their admiration is directed at young prodigies, the baby Herakles (*Nem.* 1.37–47, 55–58), the child Achilles (*Nem.* 3.43–52) and the young girl Kyrene (*Pyth.* 9.17–35). Cf. Carey 1980:158 with n. 65.

<sup>42</sup> On the verbal link with the earlier gnome on god-given ability, see Miller 1993a:146 with n. 73.

a worthy son of his city. His position in the city is confirmed in the last line of the poem which shows him dedicating his victory crown to the local hero, Aias, son of Peus, at the hero's feast (Αἴαν, τεόν τ' ἐν δαυτί, Ἰλιάδα, νικῶν ἐπεστεφάνωσε βωμόν, 112). According to Kurke such a dedication signifies mutual recognition between the victor and his city, the victor sharing his triumph with the city and the citizens praising him in return.<sup>43</sup> It is thus an apt image to round off a poem in which the relationship between victor and city is of crucial significance.

The narrator of *Olympian* 9 immediately identifies himself as poet with a series of poetological images (5–8, 11–12)<sup>44</sup> and a statement about his praise of the victor and his city (13–14). His presence is manifested throughout the poem, most notably in self-addresses (6, 11, 12, 14, 36, 40, 41, 47, 48, 80, 109) but also in first person statements (21, 25, 27, 83).<sup>45</sup> The poet's most obvious defense of cosmological principles seems to be his rejection of a λόγος that places the gods in a negative light, both by involving them in “war and fighting” (πόλεμον μάχαν τε, 40) and attributing inappropriate powers to a mortal (τὸ κανχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρόν, 38), Herakles (35–42). While this outburst of piety is in accord with the reverence owed to the gods it paradoxically also seems to reject the poet's own example of the divine working in man (28–35), which is unlikely to be his objective. The story of Herakles' exploits having been told, the poet assumes righteous indignation at his own folly in order to make the transition to the main myth about the heroes of Opous. The poet's stance is not in the first place a passionate plea for respect, but the exploitation of traditional views to justify moving on to more pertinent material, i.e. he uses cosmology for a rhetorical purpose. However much he professes to protest, the example of human ability κατὰ δαίμον stands.<sup>46</sup> This is in line with the fact that the actual

<sup>43</sup> Kurke 1991b:205–209.

<sup>44</sup> See Nünlist 1998:145–146 and 279 for details.

<sup>45</sup> Gerber 2002:56 notes that the number of self-addresses is unusually large but doubts that the phenomenon has any particular significance.

<sup>46</sup> The effect is analogous to the poet's supposed omission of certain particulars of a mythical character's life which evokes them all the more surely (see analysis of *Olympian* 13, Chapter 4, pp. 145–147). Miller's interpretation of this passage (1993a:128–130) takes the poet's stance more seriously as “an apologetic acknowledgement, even a kind of exorcism, of whatever ‘boastful’ overstatement may be involved in the unspoken analogy between Herakles' exploit and that of Epharmostos.” However, he does not account for the paradox this “apology” involves. Carey 1980:153 with n. 43 acknowledges the primary rhetorical purpose of the passage, but cautions against assuming that Pindar “saw no impiety in the myth.” See also Pfeijffer 1999:34–37, with references,

subject of cosmological reflection in the poem is the supremacy of natural talent founded on its divine origin. Since the victor cannot claim such talent on the basis of his family history other means have to be used to explain his success and thus incorporate him into the society which espouses these values. This is done by linking him genealogically with the heroes of his city and presenting his history of athletic success as proof that “what comes by nature is altogether best” (τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κρᾶτιστον ἅπαν, 100).

In *Isthmian* 4 the poet unequivocally offers his poetry as the means to set the record straight for the victor. In *Olympian* 9 he is more circumspect, perhaps because Epharmostos was, whatever the deficiencies of his family background may have been, a very successful athlete who had just won his most prestigious victory. He does not portray his praise of the victor explicitly as an effort to enhance the latter’s social status, but he does connect this specific poem, which praises the city of Opous through the announcement of Epharmostos’ success, with the characterisation of his poetic activity as an example of talent received from god and exercised in conjunction with the Graces. He promises that his songs will spread the news everywhere (ἐγὼ δέ τοι φίλαν πόλιν / μαλεραῖς ἐπιφλέφων ἁοιδαῖς, / ... / ἀγγελίαν πέμψω ταύταν, 21–22, 25), because it is “with the help of some skill granted by destiny” that he finds himself tending the “garden of the Graces,” i.e. making poetry (εἰ σὺν τινι μοιριδίῳ παλάμα / ἐξαιρετον Χαρίτων νέμομαι κᾶπον, 26–27).<sup>47</sup> Since the Graces “bestow what is delightful” (κεῖναι γὰρ ὄπασαν τὰ τέργον’, 28) the implication is that as their “gardener” the poet will do the same for the victor. The immediately following gnome indicates that in this case these delights will centre around natural ability and its source. By attributing men’s courage and wisdom to divine will (28–29) the poet simultaneously confirms that he, one of the σοφοί, owes his talent to god and implies that the victor, one of the ἀγαθοί, is also among the elect who enjoy divine favour. By the end of the poem, having developed his argument for the divine foundation of Epharmostos’ success through myth, victory catalogue and gnomai, the poet turns

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on the fictional mimesis of ex tempore speech in Pindar, of which this passage is an example.

<sup>47</sup> Gerber 2002:32 notes the causal force of εἰ, with *Pyth.* 9.50 as parallel. In his explanation of the speaker’s train of thought in lines 21–29 Miller retains the regular conditional (1993a:126). While lines 26–30 specify the conditions for successfully sending the message of victory the poet’s intention is surely also to convey that he meets the criteria.

the implicit gnome of lines 28–29 into an explicit statement that “this man” (τόνδ’ ἀνέρα, 110) has enjoyed divine favour, as demonstrated by his physical skill and mental strength, from birth (110–111).

In *Olympian* 9 the poet does not modify the traditional outlook to suit the victor’s circumstances as he does in *Isthmian* 4. He changes the perspective on the victor’s family circumstances by linking him genealogically to the city, and emphasizes his extraordinary success at Marathon, thus presenting his ability as natural and god-given, not taught, in order to show that he conforms to traditional views. The difference in approach underscores the central importance of family and the divine natural excellence it represents for the cosmology which forms the background to Pindar’s odes. It shows that although beauty is considered as a marker and predictor of excellence, the central principle is heredity. In the opening of *Isthmian* 4 the poet immediately identifies Melissos of Thebes as a member of a family whose many achievements, of which his is the latest, are credited to divine support (Ἔστι μοι θεῶν ἕκατι μυρία παντᾶ κέλευθος, / ὦ Μέλισσ’, εὐμαχανίαν γὰρ ἔφρανας Ἴσθμίοις, / ὑμετέρας ἀρετὰς ὕμνω διώκειν / αἴσι Κλεωνυμίδαι θάλλοντες αἰεὶ / σὺν θεῶ, 1–5). Melissos’ victory is attributed to Poseidon and the positive turn of events it signals for the family after their heavy losses in war is the result of the “gods’ designs” (δαμόνων βουλαῖς, 19; 18–21). Because Melissos has acceptable family credentials the poet can reject the idea that his ugliness deserves scorn and can represent his deeds as sufficient grounds for praise and recognition, indeed as bestowing their own beauty. However, the poet is careful not to question the importance of family for Epharmostos as he does appearance for Melissos, because that would undermine a central proposition of the outlook of the society which must accept Epharmostos as one of their own.

It is all the more interesting that in *Nemean* 3 the poet-narrator acknowledges the role of φῦά and family, but in the end emphasises Aristokleidas’ own hard work and determination as the basis of his success. He uses some of the same strategies found in *Olympian* 9 to establish the victor Aristokleidas’ praiseworthiness in spite of his apparently undistinguished family background.<sup>48</sup> Just as Epharmostos is linked

<sup>48</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:201 remarks on an “absence of ... a strong athletic tradition in his family.” Rose 1974:152 says more generally with reference to *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3 that “presumably the family of the victors was not sufficiently distinguished to permit specific praise.” My brief reading of *Nemean* 3 is indebted mainly to Pfeijffer’s interpretation (199–231) and commentary (241–421). See also Carey 1980:153–160 and Instone 1993.

genetically to his city as her son, Aristokleidas' bond with Aigina is expressed in terms usually reserved for a family relationship: Μυρμιδόνες ... / ..., ὧν παλαιάφατον ἀγοράν / οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας γ' ἐάν<sup>49</sup> / ἐμίανε κατ' αἴσαν (13–16; “the Myrmidons ..., whose assembly place of ancient fame Aristokleidas did not sully with disgrace, according to his own destiny,” trans. Pfeijffer 1999:268). οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν ... ἐμίανε is a slightly elaborated form of the litotic expression οὐ κατελέγχω used in *Pythian* 8, *Isthmian* 3 and *Isthmian* 8 to connect the victor's success with his family's athletic prowess, i.e. to prove his inherited natural ability.<sup>50</sup> For Aristokleidas the ancient Aiginetans fulfil the role of an illustrious family. As a descendant of the Myrmidons it was his destiny to succeed and his victory thus reflects the ability he inherited from them. Like Epharmostos Aristokleidas is also καλός, a sign of natural talent, and his deeds as pancratiast, that merit comparison with Herakles (21–26), are a fulfilment of the promise of his handsome appearance (ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ' εὐοικία μορφῆ, 19). When the poet turns from Herakles to “Aiakos and his race” (Αἰακῶ ... γένει τε, 28) and urges himself to “search at home, for you have been granted a fitting adornment to laud in sweet song” (οἴκοθεν μάτευε. ποτίφορον δὲ κόσμον ἔλαχες / γλυκύ τι γαρύμεν, 31–32) Aristokleidas is implicitly included through the family link already established with the Myrmidons and the talent displayed in his deeds. Similarly the reference to Zeus' blood (Ζεῦ, τεὸν γὰρ αἷμα, 65) after the main myth not only signifies the Aiakidai's descent from the god, but also Aristokleidas'. It confirms that he is to be seen as following in the footsteps of the local heroes celebrated in the main myth, Peleus, Telamon and Achilles (32–63),<sup>51</sup> just as Epharmostos continues in the tradition of Opeus and Patroklos.

The importance of family as the basis of ability is reflected in the myth which deals with the Aiakid brothers Peleus and Telamon and Peleus' son Achilles. A gnome separating the stories of the brothers from that of Achilles focuses the theme of φῦά on the superiority of someone with inborn glory over the “shadowy man” who makes his efforts, based only on learning, “with an ineffectual mind” (συγγενεὶ δέ τις εὐδοξία μέγα βροῖται. / ὅς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει, ψεφρηνὸς ἀνήρ ἄλλοτ'

<sup>49</sup> On substituting γ' ἐάν for τεάν here, see Pfeijffer 1999:626–627.

<sup>50</sup> *Pyth.* 8.35–37 (maternal uncles), *Isthm.* 3.13–17b (both paternal and maternal kin), *Isthm.* 8.65a–66 (cousin). Cf. *Ol.* 8.19.

<sup>51</sup> See Carey 1980:157–160 for details of the stories and their relevance for Aristokleidas. He concludes that “(t)he Aeginetan heroic tradition lives on in the victor” (160).

ἄλλα πνέων οὐ ποτ' ἀτρεκεῖ/κατέβα ποδί, μυριᾶν δ' ἀρετᾶν ἀτελεῖ νόω  
γεύεται, 40–42). Sullivan remarks that

(t)he inadequacy of νόος in this passage lies ... in an inborn moral weakness resulting from birth. Even though it may somehow be the receiver of 'teachings', it cannot bring these into effect.<sup>52</sup>

The gnome thus contrasts inborn greatness with inborn and irremediable inadequacy. The Aiakid heroes, and Aristokleidas as their “descendant,” display inborn greatness, but the general observations of the gnome are most fully explicated in the recounting both of Achilles' exploits and his response to Cheiron's teaching. His μεγάλα ἔργα (44) as a child (43–52) can be explained only in terms of natural talent, and are presented as a precursor of what he will accomplish later in life (ἔξετης τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλον δ' ἔπειτ' ἄν χρόνον, 49). However, he is also an example of the ability to turn διδάκτα into effective action, in contrast therefore to the “shadowy man” of the gnome. To the totally instinctive heroic actions of the child, a specific form of training under “deep-devising” (βαθυμήτα, 53) Cheiron is added for what awaits him as an adult at Troy. The object of this training is to “mak(e) his spirit great in all things fitting” (ἐν ἀριμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων, 58), so that (ῥορα, 59) he will be ready for the challenges he will be set. The result of the interaction between Achilles and Cheiron is that the hero has the mental strength to succeed on his own against formidable opponents (57–63). In contrast to the failure of the naturally inferior man's efforts, Achilles' inborn ability to turn instruction to his advantage enables him to plan and see through his actions.<sup>53</sup>

While the divine foundation of φνᾶ dominates in *Olympian* 9, this aspect is only briefly touched in *Nemean* 3 in the reference to the Aiakidai's descent from Zeus. In fact, the gods are all but absent from this poem. Although it is twice characterised as a hymn in honour of Zeus (10–11, 65) no further mention is made of the power of the gods or their role in the fortunes of mortals.<sup>54</sup> Against this background the emphasis on the superior man's self-reliance in the exercising of his

<sup>52</sup> Sullivan 1990:188.

<sup>53</sup> Sullivan 1989:160 on φρένες in Achilles' encounter with the Ethiopians (ἐν φροσὶ πᾶξαιθ', 62) being “associated with the formation of plans and also with the will to carry them out.”

<sup>54</sup> The Muse as the deity involved in the poetic process is addressed in the opening (1–12), and mentioned again twice (28, 83). Her role is particular and says nothing about the god-man relationship in general. The Thearion of Apollo (70) is assumed to have a religious function, but little firm evidence is available. See Pfeijffer 1999:380–382.

talent is noteworthy. Aristokleidas fulfils “his very own’ destiny”<sup>55</sup> (ἐάν / ... κατ’ αἰσαν, 15–16), Herakles explored the seas on his own (ἰδίᾳ, 24), Peleus alone (μόνος, 34) overcame Iolkos, Achilles’ speed was enough to catch deer, he had no need for either dogs or nets (51–52) and he is portrayed single-handedly battling whole nations at Troy. These achievements in the wider arena of the Trojan war also confirm “in the test” (ἐν ... πείρᾳ, 70) the ability Achilles displayed as a child by killing wild beasts. His story thus illustrates how talent inherited from one’s forebears is converted into triumphant action. That this involves an important principle, namely that talent must be validated in action, is expressed in a gnome about proving one’s superiority in every life stage, as a child, a man and an elder (70–74). The emphasis on proving one’s talent by excelling against others, combined with the treatment of ability as a contrast between the one who is naturally superior and the one naturally inferior, places this topic firmly in the human sphere. In comparison with *Olympian* 9, which not only deals with φυά as a divine gift, but also stresses the gods’ role in the lives of the heroes, *Nemean* 3 is a secular celebration with only passing reference to the gods.

The poet’s portrayal of Aristokleidas confirms that the poem is more concerned with the victor’s own efforts than any divine support he may enjoy. The description of how he achieved his victory emphasises his hard work and endurance, equal to that of Herakles in his quest to reach the ends of the earth (16–26). The poet credits him with the ἀρεταί of proving his worth in every life stage, while at the same time “heed(ing) what is at hand” (φρονεῖν ... τὸ παρκεείμενον, 75), i.e. keeping to mortal limits, (τῶν οὐκ ἄπεσσι, 76). The myth of Achilles shows that “utmost deeds of manhood” (ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις, 20) such as those displayed by Aristokleidas require mental strength in addition to physical excellence. In the penultimate line of the poem Aristokleidas is credited with just this essential character trait. It has given him the victories which in turn have provided the material for spreading his fame through poetry (τίν γε μέν, εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελόισας, ἀεθλοφόρου λήματος ἔνεκεν / Νεμέας Ἐπιδαυρόθεν τ’ ἄπο καὶ Μεγάρων δέδορκεν φάος, 83–84). The preceding image of the highly efficient eagle functioning literally and figuratively on a level high above the screeching jackdaws (80–82) confirms that the focus of the theme of ability is on how it functions in the world, not its divine source as in *Olympian* 9. By nature

<sup>55</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:201. See also n. 49.

the eagle flies the highest, and the way it stalks and snatches its prey shows its purposefulness. In contrast the jackdaws, naturally inferior birds, achieve nothing but discordant sounds. By placing this image between the presentation of the poem to the victor as a carefully mixed drink (76–80) and the final tribute to the latter's "determination for success" the poet claims the natural superiority and strength of mind it praises for himself and for his *laudandus*.<sup>56</sup>

The main similarities between *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3 are that each victor is linked to his city and its heroes as to family and that inborn ability is a central theme of both poems. However, as has been shown, different aspects of natural talent are emphasised in the two poems. A further marked difference between the two poems is the stance of the poet and his relationship with the victor. In the ode for Aristokleidas the poet once again has a prominent presence. The first thirteen lines of the poem deal with him and his song and he steps forward several times more, either directly or by referring to the song (17–18, 27–32, 52–53, 64–68, 76–84). Poetry is the reward for victory, "the fittest companion for crowned achievements" (στεφάνων ἀρετῶν τε δεξιωτάταν ὀπαδόν, 8), and for the hardships of competition (17–18), it ensures that the light of fame shines for the victor (83–84). Compared to Epharmostos, with his long list of victories and spectacular win at Marathon, Aristokleidas is a minor athlete. He has only three victories to his name (84) and seems to have had to work hard for his victory at the least prestigious of the crown games. Yet the poet greets his success with great enthusiasm. His Nemean victory is cause for joyous celebration of his homeland Aigina (12–13, 65–66) and "loud acclaim" for him (67–68). His "utmost deeds of manhood" are likened to Herakles' mastery of the dangers of the sea (19–26) and he is presented as an example of a man who has achieved success throughout life (70–75). The impression of warmth and goodwill in the poet's attitude is confirmed by his direct interaction with the victor in the close of the poem. The poet greets the victor as friend before dedicating his song to him (χαῖρε, φίλος· ἐγὼ τόδε τοι / πέμπω μεμυμένον ... / ... / πῶμ' αἰοίδμῳ, 76–77, 79).<sup>57</sup> The outstanding value

<sup>56</sup> See Pfeijffer 1999:221–223 for a detailed account of this double applicability.

<sup>57</sup> Pfeijffer 1999:396–397 defends the punctuation χαῖρε· φίλος, which makes the poet, rather than the victor, the friend. His contention that the "φιλία motif gains in force" through this change is debatable. That would depend on whether the intention is to highlight the importance of the poet's friendship for the victor, or the victor's for the poet. However, in oral performance the distinction is unlikely to have been noticeable. A reference to mutual friendship therefore seems a preferable interpretation.



of the “draught of song” is reflected in its unique makeup of honey, milk and dew<sup>58</sup> (μέλι λευκῶ / σὺν γάλακτι, κίωναμένα δ’ ἔερος’ ἀμφέπει, 77–78). As such it represents both the poet’s confidence in his own work and his recognition that Aristokleidas and his achievements are worthy of special praise. The close relationship of poet and victor is underlined by the image of the eagle and the jackdaws (80–82) which joins them as the “eagles” in their respective fields, vastly superior to their opponents.

In contrast to the poet’s open friendliness towards Aristokleidas in *Nemean* 3, the poet-narrator of *Olympian* 9 preserves a certain distance between himself and Epharmostos. Apart from presumably including the victor when he addresses the Opountians about the origins of their ancestors (κείνων δ’ ἔσαν / χαλκιάσπιδες ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι / ἀρχᾶθεν, 53–55) the poet does not address him.<sup>59</sup> The victory catalogue contains lavish praise for Epharmostos’ achievements, but it nevertheless gives the impression that the poet regards the athlete as an object for public display, rather than personal commendation, especially in the description of his success at Marathon where “he passed through the ring of spectators to such great shouting” (διήρχετο κύκλον ὄσσα βοᾶ, 93) and in Arcadia and Pellana where “he made a marvellous appearance” (θαυμαστός ἔων φάνη, 96). This impression is strengthened when the poet dedicates the poem to the victor by pointing him out as τόνδ’ ἀνέρα, “this man” who is an example of god-given inborn ability (108–111), a stance in marked contrast to the portrayal of the dedication as an interaction between friends in *Nemean* 3. The poet’s concern in displaying the victor is to show that he does indeed conform to the ideal of φνύα. There is a seriousness to his treatment of this cosmological theme, focusing as it does on the divine dimension of ability, that is lacking in *Nemean* 3, in which the joy of the occasion is paramount.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> On ἔερος as dew, not froth, see Pfeijffer 1999:405 with n. 321.

<sup>59</sup> See Miller 1993a:134 n. 53 on the question of the referents of ὑμέτεροι. He rejects the view that Epharmostos’ family is intended, to which Gerber 2002:48 objects that since he is an Opountian there is no reason to exclude Epharmostos. In fact Miller does include Epharmostos (see p. 138). The point is that the myth provides Epharmostos as individual, not as member of his family, with a genealogy linked to that of the city. Although the absence of direct address of the victor or a family member is not unusual, direct address does occur in two-thirds of the odes.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. also the serious tone in which the poet expresses his wish for “the right words,” “boldness and ample power” so as to proceed in the appropriate way in his praise (εἶην εὐρησιεπῆς ἀναγείσθαι / πρόσφορος ἐν Μοισᾶν δίφρω· / τόλμα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφῆς δύναμις / ἔσποιο, *Ol.* 9.80–83).

In the image of the eagle and the jackdaws at the end of *Nemean* 3 the poet aligns himself, even if indirectly, with the particularly secular view of ability, in which the human perspective is in the foreground, that he has up to that point communicated in the poem. While superiority is acknowledged to be inherited and Aristokleidas is presented as the descendant of the Myrmidons and Aiakidai, in the final analysis his own efforts, his λῆμα and the victories it gave him, are the basis for the poem that makes the light of his fame shine out (83–84). It would be an overstatement to say that the cosmology the poet presents in *Nemean* 3 rejects the divine foundation of human ability, but it certainly comes nowhere near the insistence on this principle and the seriousness with which it is defended in *Olympian* 9.

#### *Summary remarks*

The poet-narrator is the most important vehicle Pindar uses to situate a victory in its cosmological context, although the outlook projected by a poem is not always explicitly linked to a poetic programme. In *Olympian* 12, which deals extensively with cosmological issues, and *Nemean* 2, in which in contrast such issues are not prominent, the presentation of cosmology is not connected to the narrator's poetic programme. The poet can be said to mediate cosmology only to the extent that as the narrator he is the one articulating it. In neither of these odes does the poet demonstrate a particular outlook, and even though the traditional assumptions about family identity are modified in *Olympian* 12 the narrator takes no overt responsibility for the change.

In *Olympian* 13, *Olympian* 5 and *Isthmian* 3, on the other hand, the poet demonstrates certain preferred attitudes which in turn presuppose particular cosmological convictions. The process of demonstration is, however, different in each case. In *Olympian* 13 the poet assumes a vigorous and constructive presence right from the start and finally emerges as the positive *exemplum* for using one's inborn gifts to the full without breaching any social or divine borders. By adhering to these limits in his poetic activities the poet achieves his goal of simultaneously praising an exceptionally successful family appropriately and retaining the favour of the gods so that he can confidently pray for their future success and, by implication, for further opportunities for himself to exercise his talents. His success in praising them demonstrates to the Oligaitheidai the attitudes towards god and man they should follow in

their pursuit of further victories. Although song is a prominent subject in *Olympian* 5 the actions and statements of the poet do not concern the nature of his poetry and poetic endeavour as they do in *Olympian* 13. The poet establishes a cosmological framework for Psaumis' victory not by commenting on how he constructs his poem, but in direct actions: presenting song as a gift to the gods so that it becomes a means to express reverence, interceding with Zeus on behalf of the victor and his city and pronouncing truths in *gnomai*.<sup>61</sup> Through his conduct he also tactfully reminds both the victor and his fellow citizens how to act in accordance with the world view he espouses. In *Isthmian* 3 the poet comments on the duties involved in his poetic function and then proceeds to perform this function as required, thus once again setting an example and exhorting his audience, victor and citizens, to accept the outlook he represents and heed the code of conduct it implies. In spite of the poet's indirect self-presentation, which makes him seem almost anonymous, his address to the audience (15) is a clear challenge to them in this regard and echoes the more elaborate challenge on behalf of the same victor by the poet-narrator of *Isthmian* 4.

The poet's role as mediator of cosmology sometimes involves changing the perspective on the circumstances or attributes of a victor or his family through a modification of cosmological principles, for example in *Pythian* 7 and *Isthmian* 4. References to vicissitude usually act as a warning that this fact of mortal life must not be forgotten in times of success (the most explicit example is *Pyth.* 8.88–94, but cf. also *Ol.* 7.94–95, *Isthm.* 3.18–18b). In *Pythian* 7, however, the poet as friend reinterprets the manifestation of fluctuating fortunes in the victor's life as a characteristic of enduring prosperity.<sup>62</sup> The poet's grief at Megakles'

<sup>61</sup> The same actions also occur in *Olympian* 13. In the poet's first prayer to Zeus, for example, he intercedes for the Corinthians and Xenophon, and offers the song as a tribute from the victor (27–29). However, both the intercession and the song as tribute are consciously marked as poetic activities by the preceding plea to Zeus to look favourably on the poet's efforts (24–26). Cf. Lefkowitz 1991:35. She distinguishes between dedicatory odes such as *Pythian* 12 and *Olympian* 14, in which the poet's primary task is to offer prayer, and *epinikia*, in which the encomiastic aims make his task more complex. In the former he refers to himself only as a traditional *aoidos*, in the latter his "epinician functions" are reflected in his statements about his poetry. The distinction is, however, not always as clear-cut, as *Olympian* 5 shows. While the prayers to deities and the poet's traditional self-reference (ἔρχομαι Λυδίοις ἀπύων ἐν αὐλοῖς, 19; cf. *Ol.* 14.17–18: Λυδῶ γὰρ Ἀσώπιχον ἐν τρόπῳ / ἐν μελέταις τ' αἰείδων ἔμολον) point to the poem's dedicatory nature the extensive praise of Psaumis is characteristic of the *epinician*.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 5.54–55. While the ubiquity of toil is acknowledged, the concomitant ups and downs are not regarded as threatening the long-term prosperity of an ancient

misfortune can reasonably be assumed to reflect the victor's own feelings about it. The reinterpretation then aims in the first place to console him, but it will also signal to his envious fellow citizens the ultimate futility of their conduct. On a much larger scale the poet-narrator of *Isthmian* 4 sets out to change reality for Melissos of Thebes. Melissos is scorned in spite of his success because his ugliness does not fit the conventional idea that a man's handsome or imposing appearance reflects his inherited ἀρετά. The poet seeks to redress this problem with two complementary strategies. Using mainly myth he makes the case for judging a man by his deeds alone, regardless of his appearance, while he applies imagery to suggest that great deeds make a man beautiful, thus further undermining the conviction that beauty equals greatness and ugliness inferiority. The poet also plays the more regular mediating role that sees him demonstrating the preferred outlook. He explicitly assumes the task of making Melissos "honoured among mankind" and "setting straight his entire achievement" as Homer did for Aias (37–45), thereby making his whole poem a demonstration of the way the victor should be acknowledged for his achievement. Significantly he also shows himself at the end of the poem actually celebrating Melissos in a revel song.<sup>63</sup> The poet proves with word and deed that he regards Melissos as a winner worthy of admiration.

*Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3 celebrate victors who seem to have much in common regarding their social background. However, the treatment of the cosmological theme of inherited ability, which has a strong bearing on that social background, is markedly different in the two poems. In the former the divine basis of φηνά is stated as an absolute principle with which the poet completely identifies himself: man is and does nothing of value without god. In the latter the man of superior talent, with whom the poet once again associates himself, wins through because of his own efforts and the role of the divine is all but completely ignored.

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family like the Battid royal house of Kyrene (πόνων δ' οὐ τις ἀπόγλαρός ἐστιν οὐτ' ἔσεται / ὁ Βάπτου δ' ἔπεται παλαιός ὄλβος ἔμπαν τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων). The long-standing prominence of Megakles' family, the Alkmaionidai, is recalled in references to their famous deeds in the sixth century, rebuilding Apollo's temple at Delphi in 548 and an Olympic victory in 592 (*Pyth.* 7.9–12, 14–15; see Burton 1962:32, 34).

<sup>63</sup> The verb κωμάζω is more often used of the victor himself or the citizens celebrating a victory (for the victor, see *Ol.* 9.4, *Pyth.* 4.2, *Nem.* 11.28 and *Isthm.* 3.8; for the citizens *Nem.* 2.24, 10.35 and, represented by the nymph Thebe, *Isthm.* 7.20). The poet celebrates Theban heroes in *Pyth.* 9.87–89 and joins the Muses in an imaginary revel to Chromios' home in *Nem.* 9.1–3.

Whether the difference results from a difference in the victors' convictions about this matter, or in their position in their respective cities, or any other factor, can never be known. However, what it does demonstrate is the author Pindar shaping the narrator-poet to fulfil different roles and represent different viewpoints in order to praise a specific victor in the manner most suitable to his wishes and circumstances.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

A striking feature of Pindar's victory odes is the regularity with which pronouncements on life issues are made in addition to statements aimed more obviously at the glorification of a successful athlete. Mostly in the form of *gnomai* matters such as life and death, man and the gods, and man in his social environment are by implication turned into subjects of concern to men who have achieved the highest honour in the pursuit of physical excellence. This preoccupation with the cosmological context of victory has been the starting point for the preceding inquiry. With the *gnomai* as basis it has sought to establish the topics considered relevant to the victors and audiences and the generally accepted views about those topics. The overview gained in this way presents a fairly uniform traditional outlook on man in his relationship to both extra-human powers and his fellow man. Fate is ineluctible, the power of the gods transcends that of man by far and nature is a force which man may sometimes use to his advantage but can never consider conquered. The human condition is defined by mortality. As a result man's abilities are limited and he is subject to vicissitude. Nevertheless, if he strives for excellence with the right attitude he can hope for fame that may outlive him. The social network is an important part of a man's defense against his inherent frailty. Its foundation is the principle of reciprocity which functions most satisfactorily in the contexts of family and ritual friendship. In the city friends and neighbours are also part of the support system, but a successful man cannot always rely on the goodwill of his fellow citizens and must be prepared for their envy.

The overview of cosmological topics suggests that Pindar's work is founded on an outlook that does not admit of any serious variation and that the same cosmological ideas will therefore be found in poem after poem. This is true to the extent that, for example, the supremacy of the gods is acknowledged in practically every poem and family ties and the abilities they bestow are a recurrent concern. However, the analyses of individual poems show that just as the teachers and orators of antiquity chose *gnomai* to support their educational and rhetorical aims according to their relevance to a particular situation, so Pindar

emphasises different aspects of cosmology for encomiastic purposes as the occasion requires. In *Isthmian* 4, to compensate for the ugliness of the victor the poet focuses on deeds as the basis for praiseworthiness. He turns around the idea that beauty equals ability so that ability proved in deeds gives the victor metaphorical beauty. In *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3, on the other hand, the traditional link between beauty and deeds is used to support the victors' claim to inherited ability in the absence of noteworthy family connections. In *Olympian* 13 a politically prominent family with further athletic aspirations is reminded of their mortal limitations, the supreme power of the gods and the deference they owe them. Divine power also features prominently in *Olympian* 9 but here the focus is on acknowledging it as the source of all human ability. While this poem and *Nemean* 3 both establish close family ties between the victors and the ancestral heroes of their cities the former's emphasis on the divine is completely lacking in the latter which instead praises the victor's own efforts in securing success.

These varying perspectives on cosmological ideas are communicated by the poet persona, an important role player in most of the poems. In some cases the poet allies himself closely with the victor, especially when his circumstances demand encouragement. So he sympathises with Megakles of Athens as with a friend (*Pythian* 7) and offers the redemptive power of his poetry to Melissos of Thebes as counter to the scorn of his fellow citizens (*Isthmian* 4). Often he presents himself as the example to follow regarding certain cosmological principles. In contrast to Bellerophon, who abuses the support of the gods, the poet demonstrates to the Oligaitheidai through the propriety of his praise what it means to use one's native talent without trespassing on the terrain of the gods (*Olympian* 13). In the role of suppliant to Zeus he shows Psaumis of Kamarina how to proceed if he wishes to enjoy his prosperity into the future (*Olympian* 5).

From the poems treated in this study it has become clear that it is part of the poet's task in the victory odes to deal with cosmological issues. This task assumes most prominence when he treats such issues with particular reference to the circumstances of the victor or his family. These cases demonstrate most pointedly that winning, while desirable in the quest for fame, does not have meaning in isolation from the world in which the victor finds himself. For Ergoteles of Himera success means bad fortune turned to good in a generally unpredictable world and the validation of his new identity in his adopted city as well as his acceptance as a member of that community (*Olympian* 12). For Melissos

of Thebes social recognition in spite of his physical shortcomings is a prerequisite for the proper celebration of his victory. The Oligaitidai of Corinth are reminded of the context of human endeavour when they aim for even more victories than those already granted to them. Epharmostos of Opous is provided with mythical ancestors so that, like Melissos, he can be presented not only as a victor but as one who conforms to the ideals of his society (*Olympian* 9). The fact that the poet's task includes situating the victory in its cosmological context thus means that the glorification of a victor entails much more than celebrating merely the moment of victory. It also entails presenting him as praiseworthy in terms of broader life issues, such as the role of the divine in human achievement, a man's attitude to success and his status in society.

As mediator of cosmology the poet persona in Pindar's odes provides a diversity of perspectives on human endeavour in general and victory in particular. In some cases the poet's position on a specific issue, such as the role accorded to the divine in human ability in *Olympian* 9 and *Nemean* 3, and the evaluation of beauty in these poems and *Isthmian* 4, differs markedly from poem to poem. As for the question to what extent the cosmology presented in the odes coincides with the point of view of the historical poet the cases just mentioned prove that it would be difficult to reconstruct Pindar's position on the basis of that of the poet persona. His use of cosmological themes in general speaks of pragmatism rather than conformity to and the consistent defense of a rigid framework of values.





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